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ROLE OF INDIAN ARMY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Role of Indian Army in the First World War

By

LT. COL. DR. SHYAM NARAIN SAXENA

**BHAVNA PRAKASHAN
DELHI-92**

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INTRODUCTION

A study of the part played by the Indian Army in the First World War is of interest not only to the Army men but also to the serious student of history and to the general reader. War studies are being pursued all over the world and have become an integral part of historical literature. In India not much has so far been done in this direction. The official publications of the Army Department are the only literature that we have on the subject. Though highly authentic, the main drawback of these publications is that they have been written from the professional point of view, are full of technicalities, sometimes abstruse, and do not provide a window through which army affairs can be surveyed by non-professionals.

As an army man, the need for a monograph on the "Role of the Indian Army in the First World War" was felt by the author of the present work and it was lucky for him to have been posted at a station which happens to be the seat of a university where facilities for guidance and material exist. There is much "raw material", but no single authentic work has so far appeared on this subject which has equal fascination for the professional soldier, for the historian and for the general reader. In order to preserve its non-professional character attention has been riveted only on the main theatres of the war and minute details of strategy and tactical devices have purposely been avoided. All these details have been shifted to the various Appendices. In the main narrative the story has been told theatre-wise. The fact is that one Corps did not see service only in one theatre. It frequently shifted from one theatre to the other. Therefore, at the end, the story has been told Corps-wise in Appendix 2. The work is being presented as a doctoral thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Lucknow. The burden of the thesis is what part, however humble, was played by the armed forces for the general benefit of the country.

Once the initial steps had been taken, material began to pour in torrents. The Headquarters Central Command Library, Lucknow, the Ministry of Defence Library, Delhi, and other Army libraries

provide sufficient published material. Besides this, unpublished material of very high value is stocked in the Historical Division of the Ministry of Defence and the National Archives of India, New Delhi. The author left no relevant leaf unturued for bringing under contribution this most valuable material. The details of this material are to be found in the Bibliography at the end of this work. In consonance with the canons of historical criticism an attitude of utmost objectivity has been maintained throughout in the interpretation of documents. How far the author has been succeeded in this regard, it is for others to judge.

The author is extremely thankful to Dr. Brij Kishore for his valuable guidance and directions. But for Dr, Brij Kishore's deep interest in the subject and hard work put in at various stages, in spite of his busy schedule, the present work would never have attained its present forms. His encouragement to go into greater details has enhanced by value of the work.

The author is also thankful to Dr. K.N. Pandey (Director), Dr. D.C. Verma and Dr. K.M.L. Saxena of the Historical Section, Ministry of Defence for ungrudgingly providing him all facilities to use the material in their custody. The author is no less obliged to the other staff of the Libraries of the Historical Section. The National Archives, the Ministry of Defence Library (Delhi) and HQ Central Command Library, Lucknow for their best cooperation in searching the material.

The author cannot forget to record his gratitude to his better half, Rahi, who volunteered to sacrifice her leisure in seeing this work completed and always cheered him with a fresh cup of tea. She also helped in the checking of typed material.

Last of all the author is extremely thankful to Sri Devendra Sharma, who, for the sake of interest and knowledge, volunteered to take upon himself the difficult task of typing the work in almost record time.

FOREWARD

Role of Indian Army in the First World War the book, is an exhaustive authentic account of the gallant deeds of its soldiers who fought in different theatres of war. It is a saga of individual valour and collective endurance of officers and men and of the awards won by them in action. It is a story of how gallantly they fought and how patiently they endured the regours of terrain and climate to which they were not accustomed. Despite the handicaps of training, equipment, inexperience and unfamiliarity, their performance was second to none and their achievements have left an indelible imprint on the pages of war-time history.

As far as I know there are few comprehensive or lucid accounts of the role played by Indian men and material in defending imperial interests. The author has marshalled the facts and figures in a readable style and given a narrative account of the operations in France and Belgium, in Africa and also in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Messopotamia. A connected account of the performance by individual units, of the honours won by them and of the casualties suffered by them has been given in the Appendices. The enormous contribution in men, money and material from Indian sources has been detailed in Chapter 8.

While I was working as Ambassador of India in Brussels, I had opportunity to serve as a member of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. In this capacity I had the privilege of paying my homage to Indian soldiers who had fallen in the battles of Neuve-chapelle, Givenchy, Ypres, Loos etc.

Since the author did not have access to British sources, it has not been possible for him to make an assessment of the Indian contribution to the eventual success of the Allied Arms, but he has succeeded in describing how the Indian troops stemmed the advance of the German Army effectively and helped to turn the course of the war in other theatres in favour of the Allies.

The sacrifices made by the Indian Army, the victories won by its various formations, and the experience gained by combatants and non-combatants alike could not fail to alter the perceptions and

(ii)

perspectives of the leading elements in India and in Great Britain. In a separate chapter devoted to the "Gains of the Army" special reference has been made to the changes in the role description, organisation, training and grant of King's Commissions to Indian Officers. India's participation in the First World War had significant political consequences as well. A brief reference has been made in the concluding chapter to the disappointment of the national leaders with the inadequacy of British response to India's cooperation in the hour of British Need.

The book should prove of value to readers interested in the history of the Indian Army and of British connection with India.



(DR. K.B. LALL)

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CHAPTER 1

CAUSES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The Great War of 1914 was the culmination of those developments¹ that had been taking place for a long time in Europe. The following are the chief ones which ultimately brought about the conflagration.

1. Division of Europe into two Blocks

From 1904 to 1914 Europe was divided into two distinct power blocks; the Tripple Alliance² consisted by Germany, Austria and Hungary; and the Tripple Entente³ included England, France and Russia. These ententes, alliances and counter alliances, though overtly defensive, created an atmosphere of tension.

2. Race for Armaments

The period from 1871 to 1914 is often known as one of armed peace. The powers of Europe, though at peace with one another, were really preparing themselves for War. Conscription, race in armaments and increase in general staff are sufficient to confirm this belief.

3. Imperialism and Nationalism

England, France and Russia had built up big colonial empires, practically dividing among themselves most of the non-European world. Germany had lagged much behind in this race. It was her desire to make up the loss that brought about the conflict. Rising sentiments of nationalism added fuel to the fire of imperialism.

1. Chambers, Harris and Bay Lay, *This Age of Conflict*, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1950, pp. 1-25.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

4. Economic Rivalry between Germany and England

Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century a keen rivalry for markets—for sources of raw materials and for field for investment of surplus capital was clearly visible. Germany was fast forging ahead in industrial and commercial competition, causing moments of worry to Great Britain and some other nations of Europe.

5. German Superiority Complex

Her industrial as well as military potential had given Germany a confidence which bordered on superiority complex. This feeling was amply fed by her litterateur, Barn Hardy, for instance, considered war as a biological necessity.

6. Immediate Cause

The immediate cause for the war was the bitter enmity between Austria and Serbia in the Balkans. Austria had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, provinces akin to Serbia in blood and language. Austria had also deprived Serbia of her legitimate field of expansion. Austria desired to weaken Serbia because a strong Serbia could attract to herself millions of croato-serbs under Austrian rule. It was at the instance of Austria that Serbia was deprived of some of the fruits of her victory in the Balkans war of 1912-13. It was at the instance of Austria again that the artificial state of Albania was set up to prevent Serbia to get an outlet to the sea. The murder⁴ of Archduke Francis, nephew and heir apparent of the Austrian Emperor, and his wife at Serjevo in Bosnia on 28th June 1914, set the match to the train which had already been laid.

This dastardly murder dragged the two rival groups, the Tripple Alliance and the Tripple Entente, into an armed conflict and turned into the First World War. The War began on 1st August 1914,⁵ and came to an end by the German Armistice⁶ on 11th November 1918, and her signing of the Treaty of Versailles⁷ on 28th June 1919.

4. *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 59.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

7. Declaration of War by Britain

Initially England tried to remain aloof. But when Germany crossed into Belgium, whose neutrality had been guaranteed by the leading powers of Europe, including Prussia, Great Britain declared war against Germany on 4th August 1914,⁸ to vindicate the principles of international justice. There was another reason why England joined the war. For centuries past it had been the cardinal principle of English foreign policy to maintain the integrity of the low countries⁹ (Holland and Belgium), so as to prevent coasts opposite her shores from being used as a base for hostile attacks. The German occupation of Belgium would have been a menace to the safety of England. Lastly, since Germany had declared war against the Tripple Entente, Britain had no alternative but to declare war against the Tripple Alliance. Britain's entry into the war was thus reluctant tardy. But once she had entered the war, Britain naturally looked to her colonies and dependencies for sympathy and support.

8. British Empire and its Resources

The British Empire¹⁰ spread over a large part of the world. It included the self governing dominions of Canada, New-Found-Land, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, Irish free state and colonial dependencies such as Southern Rhodesia, Malta, Barbados, Bahamas, Barmuda, British Guinea, Ceylon, Cyprus, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, British Honduras, Gold-coast, Hong Kong, Ashanti, Gibraltar, St. Helena, Somaliland and India.

Covering one quarter of the land surface and comprising one quarter of the total population of the globe, the British Empire presented a variety of climates, race and production. Her imperial resources for war included not only the armies of her dominions, but also their total manpower. They also included the raw materials required directly or indirectly in war.

The British Empire was almost self supporting as far as food was concerned. It needed only petroleum and to some extent cotton.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

10. Lee Fitzgerald, J., "Imperial Military Geography," William Clowes & Sons Ltd., 1923, pp. 22-103,

9. Imperial Defence

(a) *Naval*. The dominions assisted U.K. in the defence of the Empire either by voting sums of money for the upkeep of the British Navy or by providing local navies of their own—India and Canada made money contributions.

(b) *Armies*. The chief military forces of the Empire were as follows :

In U.K.—The Regular Army and Territorial Army.

In India—The British Regular Army and the Indian Army.

In other Self Governing Dominions and colonies—Local Forces.

The forces of Dominions were for local defence and were under the control of their Governments. No attempt was made to maintain forces for overseas expeditions. Their training and equipment was identical to the Imperial Troops and their General Staff was in direct touch with the General Staff in U.K.

CHAPTER 2

ATTITUDE OF INDIA TOWARDS THE FIRST WORLD WAR

British Government received remarkable cooperation from Indian leaders in the prosecution of the war. Britain sought India's help by throwing out certain vague proposals with regard to the transfer of political power. Asquith¹, the British Prime Minister made a pronouncement that in future Indian questions were to be viewed from a "different angle of vision". He held out the promise of Self-Government as a reward for India's loyalty. Soon after, Lloyd George declared that the principle of self-determination was to be applied "in tropical countries" also. Throughout the war India was governed by Defence Ordinances and there was no vigorous anti-British agitation. Indian publicmen² of standing almost unanimously responded to the appeal made by Britain and asked the people to cooperate fully with Britain in a war the main object of which was human freedom.

Reaction of Indian Leaders

The twenty-ninth session of the National Congress was addressed by Babu Bhupendra Nath Basu at Madras in 1914, just when the Great war had broken out. In his Presidential address,³ he outlined the policy that India had to follow:

"India", said he, "has recognised that, at this supreme crisis in the life of the Empire, she should take a part worthy of herself and the Empire in which she has no mean place. She is now unrolling

1. Raghuvanshi, Dr. V.P.S., *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought*, Educational Publishers, Agra, 1959, p. 129.
2. Tilak, Lajpat Rai, Hardayal, Aurobindo, Bipin Chandra Pal, Surendra Nath Banerjee, Annie Besant, M.K. Gandhi, *Ibid.*, pp. 122-128.
3. Nateson & Co, *Presidential Addresses*, Madras, 1934, pp. 150-183.

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her new horoscope written in the blood of her sons, in the presence of the assembled nations of the Empire and claiming the fulfilment of her destiny." "The war", he continued, "has come to us as a trumpet call—it has roused enthusiasm in England for India, it has moved the heart of Anglo-India and has even drawn the British colonies out of their exclusiveness, our Viceroy has been telling us of the formation of a new policy of reciprocity between India and the colonies. No reciprocity except on terms of equality, however, would be acceptable to India Now is our time; we must throw away our lethargy; let us bind our loin cloth and heed forward to our goal and that goal is not unworthy of our highest aspirations; it has satisfied the dignity and the self esteem of the French in Canada and of the Boer in South Africa who today are the staunchest supporter of England; and when it comes to us, as I am sure it soon will, it will strengthen and not weaken the bonds that unite England and India We are beginning to feel the strength and growing solidarity of the people of India; India has realised that she must be a vital and equal part of the Empire and she has worthily seized her great opportunity. In the melting pot of destiny, race, creed and colour are disappearing. If India has realised this, so has England. Through the mouth of the Prime Minister, the English people have told us:

"We welcome with appreciation and affection your profound aid, and in an Empire which knows no distinction of race, colours, where all alike are the subjects of the King-Emperor and are joint and equal custodians of our common interest and futures. We hail with profound and heart felt gratitude your association side by side and shoulder to shoulder with the Home and Dominion troops, under a flag which has a Symbol to all of a unity that a world in arms cannot dis sever or dissolve."

"Brother-delegates," he further continued, "it is no use looking backward; no use in vain regrets. Let us be ready for the future, and I visualise it. I see my country occupying an honourable and proud place in the comity of nations, I see her sons sitting in the Councils of our Great Empire, conscious of their strength and bearing its burden on their shoulders as valued and trusted comrades and friends, and I see India rejuvenated and reincarnated in the glories of future broadened by the halo of the past. What does it matter if a solitary raven croak, from the sand banks of the Jumna and the Ganges?"

Mohandas Karam Chand Gandhi of South African fame was in London at the time the war broke out; after reaching India, he actively pleaded for India's support to the Allies. Gandhi went about recruiting soldiers for the British Army and organising ambulance corps⁴ and doing other jobs. Gandhi's offer to Lord Crewe to organise a Volunteer Ambulance Corps was accepted and six week training under Colonel Baker was organised for strengthening the war effort. He writes in his autobiography, "was it not the duty of the slave seeking to be free, to make the masters need his opportunity? . . . If we would improve our status through the help and cooperation of the British, it was our duty to win their help by standing by them in their hour of need."⁵

Mrs. Annie Besant⁶ a prominent congress leader, then on a visit to England, addressed a crowded meeting in Queen's Hall, London, in the spring of 1914 with Earl Braisey in the chair. She considered it absurd that India's loyalty to the Empire should be "unconditional" and declared that the price of her loyalty was her freedom. Lajpat Rai and Jinnah supported her on her return to India. She organised the Home Rule Movement. See summarised India's hopes in the Congress Session of 1914:

India does not chaffer with the blood of her sons and the proud tears of her daughters in exchange for so much liberty, so much right, as a Nation to justice among the peoples of the Empire India asked for this before the war. India asks for it during the war, but not as a reward but as a right does she ask for it on that there must be no mistake.⁷

Surendra Nath Banerjee toured the province of Bengal extensively, and asked the Bengalis to enrol themselves in the army and fight for the cause of the Empire. A large number of high caste Bengalis responded to his call. Writing in his book about this campaign the veteran leader said that "the key-note of my address

4. Gandhi, M.K., *My Experiments with Truth*, Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1948, pp. 423-424.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 424-425.

6. Raghuvanshi, V.P.S., *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought*, Educational Publishers, Agra, 1959, p. 132.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

was that self-government, which was the goal of our political aspirations connoted self-defence, and that if we sought the privileges of imperial citizenship, we must bear its burdens and responsibilities and the foremost among them was to fight for the defence of the Empire. The appeal went home, and in not one of the numerous meetings that were held was there a single dissentient voice heard.⁸

Tilak⁹ was no less ardent in his support to the Allies as he believed that the Allies were fighting for the principle of democracy. However, he insisted on Great Britain making a clear declaration conceding India the right to determine her own destiny.

Even Bipin Chandra Pal¹⁰, a stormy petrel, appealed to the people to cooperate with the Government in the hour of their trial and prove their loyalty.

Dadabhai Naoroji¹¹ also raised his voice in favour of the British. "We are, above all, British citizens of the Great British Empire... Fighting as the British people are at present in a righteous cause for the good and glory of human dignity and civilisation and more-over, being the beneficent instrument of our own progress and civilisation, our duty is clear; to do our—everyone's—best to support the British fight with our life and property."

The response of the Princes of India was overwhelming. Lord Hardinge's¹² telegram to the Secretary of State on September 7, 1914, gives an idea of the nature of the support offered by India, writes the Viceroy:

"Following is a summary of offers of service, money, etc., made in India to the Viceroy. The Rulers of Native States in India, who number nearly seven hundred in all, have with one accord rallied to the defence of the Empire and offered their personal services and the resources of their states for the war. From among the many Princes and Nobles who have volunteered for active service, the Viceroy has selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur,

8. Banerjee, Surendra Nath, *A Nation in Making*, pp. 300-301.

9. Raghuvanshi, V.P.S., *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought*, Educational Publishers, Agra, 1959, pp. 122-124.

10. *Ibid*, pp. 127-128.

11. Masani, R.P., *Builders of Modern India (Dadabhai Naoroji)*, Publication Division, Government of India, 1960, p. 182.

12. *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 61-64.

Sachin, Patiala, Sir Partab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, the heir-apparent of Bhopal, and a brother of the Maharaja of Cooh Behar, together with other cadets of noble families. The veteran Sir Partab Singh would not be denied his right to serve the King Emperor in spite of his seventy years, and his nephew, the Maharaja of Jodhpur, who is but sixteen years of age, goes with him."

"All these have, with the Commander-in-Chief's approval already joined the Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Gwalior and the Chiefs of Jaora and Dholpur, together with the heir-apparent of Palampur, were, to their great regret prevented from leaving their States. Twenty-seven of the larger states in India maintain Imperial Service Troops, and the services of every corps were immediately placed at the disposal of the Government of India on the outbreak of the war. The Viceroy has accepted from twelve states contingents of cavalry, infantry, sappers and transport, besides a camel corps from Bikaner and most of them have already embarked."

"As particular instances of generosity and eager loyalty of the Chiefs the following may be quoted. Various Durbars have combined together to provide a hospitalship to be called 'The Loyalty' for the use of Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Mysore has placed Rs 50 lakhs at the disposal of Government of India for expenditure in connection with the Expeditionary Forces. The Chief of Gwalior, in addition to sharing in the expenses of the hospitalship, the idea of which originated with himself and Begum of Bhopal, has offered to place large sums of money at the disposal of the Government of India and to provide thousands of horses as remounts. From Loharu in the Punjab and Las Bela and Kelat in Baluchistan come offers of camels with drivers, to be supplied and maintained by the Chiefs and sardars. Several chiefs have offered to raise additional troops for military service should they be required, and donations to the Indian Relief Fund have poured in from all states. The Maharaja of Rewa has offered his troops, his treasury and even his private jewellery for the service of the King-Emperor. In addition to the contributions to the Indian Fund, some chiefs namely, those of Kashmir, Bundi, Orchha, Gwalior and Indore, have also given large sums to the Prince of Wales' Fund. The Maharaja of Kashmir, not content with subscribing himself to the Indian

Fund presided at a meeting of 20,000 people held recently at Srinagar and delivered a stirring speech, in response to which large subscriptions were collected. Maharaja Holkar offers free of charge all horses in his state Army which may be suitable for Government purposes. Horses have also been offered by Nizam's Government by Jamnagar and other Bombay states. Every chief in the Bombay Presidency has placed the resources of his state at the disposal of Government and all have made contributions to the Relief Fund. Loyal messages and offers have also been received from the Mehtar of Chitral and tribes of Khyber Agency as well as the Khyber Rifles. Letters have also been received from the most remote state in India, all marked by deep sincerity of desire to render some assistance, however, humble, to the British Government in its hour of need."

"The same spirit has prevailed throughout British India. Hundreds of telegrams and letters have been received by the Viceroy expressing loyalty and desire to serve Government either in the field or by cooperation in India. Many hundreds have also been received by local administrators. They come from communities and associations, religious, political and social of all classes and creeds, also from individuals offering their resources or asking for opportunity to prove loyalty by personal service."

"The Delhi Medical Association offers the field hospital that was sent to Turkey during the Balkan war, Bengalee students offer enthusiastic service for an ambulance corps, and there were many other offers of medical aid. The Zamindars of Madras have offered 500 horses, and among other practical steps taken to assist Government may be noted. The holding of meetings to allay panic, keep down prices, and maintain public confidence and credit. Generous contributions have poured in from all quarters to the Imperial Relief Fund."

While presenting the above offer of service to Parliament, Lord Crewe¹³ said that similar offers had also reached the Secretary of State from Chiefs who happened to be in Europe. The Gaekwar of Baroda and the Maharaja of Bharatpur had placed the whole resources of their states at the disposal of His Majesty's Government.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

The Aga Khan also offered all his resources and offered to serve in the ranks of any Indian regiment. The Indian Community in England, including the Indian students, had made loyal offers of services. Lord Crewe felt confident that the house and the country would deeply appreciate this magnificent demonstration of loyalty shown by the Princes and the people of India.

The appreciation of this spontaneous offer of help by his Imperial Majesty was read out at the opening of the Legislative Council on the 8th September 1914, by the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge.¹⁴

“Before we pass to the ordinary business of the council, I will ask Hon’ble Members to stand up while I read to the council a gracious message addressed to the Princes and peoples of India by His Majesty the King-Emperor.”

“During the past few weeks the peoples of my whole Empire at home and overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity, civilisation and peace of mankind.”

“The calamitous conflict is not of my seeking. My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which my Empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when, in defiance of pledges to which my kingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed my honour and given to destruction the liberties of my Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with me in this decision.”

“Paramount regard for treaty and pledged word of Rulers and peoples is the common heritage of England and India.”

“Amongst the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of my Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to my Throne expressed both by my Indian subjects and by the Feudatory Princes and Ruling Chiefs of India’s and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in conflict has touched my heart and has inspired to highest issues the love

14. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

and devotion which, as I well know have ever linked my Indian subjects and myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British nation of goodwill and fellowship which greeted my return in February 1912, after the Solemn Ceremony of my Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked."

To this appreciation was added the Viceroy's own gratitude:¹⁵

"I think I am voicing the views of my council and of the whole of India when I say that we are profoundly grateful to His Majesty for his gracious and stirring message and that we can only assure His Majesty of our unflinching loyalty and devotion in this time of crisis and emergency..."

In this great crisis it has been a source of profound satisfaction to me that the attitude of the British Government has been so thoroughly appreciated in India and has met with such warm support. I have no hesitation in saying that the valuable offers of military assistance that I have received from the Ruling Chiefs of India and the countless offers of personal service and of material help made to me by both rich and poor in the Provinces of British India have touched me deeply, and have given me proof, which I never needed, of what I have long known, and never for an instant doubted namely, the deep loyalty and attachment of Indian people to the King-Emperor and the throne and their readiness to make any sacrifice on their part to further strengthen the interests of the Empire. The fact that the Government of India are in a position to help the mother country by the despatch of such a large proportion of our armed forces is a supreme mark of my absolute confidence in the fidelity of our troops and in the loyalty of the Indian people. I trust this may be fully recognised in England and abroad.

"That, owing to the war, sacrifices will have to be made is inevitable, and that suffering will be entailed is unhappily certain, but I am confident that the people of India, standing

15. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

shoulder to shoulder will shrink from no sacrifice and will loyally cooperate with Government in maintaining internal order and in doing all in their power to secure the triumphs of the arms of our King-Emperor. The countless meetings to express loyalty held throughout India and the warm response of the people to my appeal for funds for the relief of distress in India during the war have filled me with satisfaction and have confirmed my first impression that in this war the Government would be supported by the determination, courage and endurance of the whole country.”

“It was moreover with confidence and pride that I was able to offer His Majesty the finest and largest military force of British and Indian troops for service in Europe that has ever left the shores of India. I am confident that the honour of this land and of the British Empire may be safely entrusted to our brave soldiers, and that they will acquit themselves nobly and even maintain their high traditions of military chivalry and courage. To the people of India I would say at this time, ‘Let us display to the world an attitude of unity, of self sacrifice and of unswerving confidence under all circumstances in the justice of our cause and in the assurance that God will defend the right...’”

At the same Council Meeting the Hon’ble Sir Gangadhar Chitnavis moved the following Resolution¹⁶, which was seconded by the Raja of Mahmudabad:

“That in view of the Great war involving most momentous issues now in progress in Europe, into which our August Sovereign has been forced to enter by obligations of honour and duty to preserve the neutrality guaranteed by treaty and the liberties of a friendly state, the Members of this Council, as voicing the feeling that animates the whole of the people of India, desire to give expression to their feeling of unswerving loyalty and enthusiastic devotion to their King-Emperor, and an assurance of their unflinching support to the British Government.”

“They desire at the same time to express the opinion that the people of India, in addition to the military assistance now being afforded by India to the Empire, would wish to share in the

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71,

heavy financial burden now imposed by the war on the United Kingdom, and request the Government of India to take this view with consideration and thus to demonstrate the unity of India with the Empire.”

“They request His Excellency The President to be so good as to convey the substance¹⁷ of this resolution to His Majesty the King-Emperor and His Majesty’s Government.”

This Resolution received the ungrudging and enthusiastic support of the entire Legislative Council, the speeches of non-official members being marked by sentiments expressing the most whole-hearted loyalty and cooperation. Indian support was thus whole-hearted and all-sided.

Fitness of the Indian Army for Participation in the War

The participation of India in the war having been decided upon, the brunt had to be borne by the fighting forces of the country. It would, therefore, be not out of place to review briefly the fitness of the Indian Army for the stupendous task it had to undertake in not very distant future.

The story of the evolution of the Indian Army is a chequered one and need not be related here in all its details. It would suffice to say that it was through the use of this army that the British had obtained for themselves a dominant position in the country, out-rivalling all the country powers. This force was also used for Imperial purpose outside India before the First World War.¹⁸

Indian sepoy even went out of India to the Phillipine Islands (Manila) to join the British forces against Spain in 1762. They went to Sumatra (1779) and Amboyana (1796), and captured Ceylon from the Dutch in 1795. They went to Persia in 1800 and to Egypt (1801).

In 1839 Indian troops invaded Kabul and placed Shah Shuja in the place of Dost Mohammad. In 1840-42 Indian sepoy went to China to fight the ‘OPIUM War’. In 1843 Sind was annexed. In 1852 they participated in the Second Burmese War, and later in the Persian War in 1856. In 1860-61 an expedition was sent to Sikkim, in 1871-72 to Lushai Hills, and to Perak in 1875-76. In 1860 Indian troops participated in the Second China War and the Bhutan War

17. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

18. Mac Munn, Maj. G.F., *The Armies of India*, Adam and Chares Black, London, 1911, pp. 1-173,

(1865), Sepoys were sent to Aden (1865-66) and to Malta (1878) and later to Cyprus. In 1879 troops occupied Kabul. In 1888 an expedition was sent against Sikkim, and China and Lushai (1890-93), besides these, expeditions were sent to Manipur in 1891, to Imphal in 1893, against Abors in 1894, to the Black Mountain in N.W.F. in 1891, to Hunza and Nagar in 1891 and to Chitral in 1895.

Indian troops was service in Africa (1891-95). In 1911 Army Bearer Corps under Gandhi participated in the Boer War.

The Army in India was ill-prepared¹⁹ for the war, wanting in men, material and equipment as it did. The operations across the border in which the Army had so far taken part were of a limited character and were not very far from the Indian base.

Though Lord Kitchner had improved training in the Army by instituting the system of 'Test', the Army had had no opportunities for higher training in warfare. It was in several ways hibernating and rusting and was not ready for a major war in Europe. The Army had ten divisions at the time it participated in the war:²⁰

1. Peshawar Division.
2. Rawalpindi Division.
3. Lahore Division.
4. Quetta Division.
5. Mhow Division.
6. Poona Division.
7. Meerut Division.
8. Lucknow Division.
9. Secundrabad Division.
10. Burma Division.

Prepared or not the Indian Army had to succour British forces which had been cruelly outnumbered and exhausted by constant fighting against superior artillery and machine guns.

Excepting Indians there were no trained regular soldiers in the Empire available at that moment for service in France.

19. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers Private Limited, Printed in India, 1974, p. 151.

20. *The Army in India and its Evolution*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1924, pp. 29-30,

CHAPTER 3

INDIAN CORPS IN FRANCE

Mobilisation commenced on 8th August 1914¹. The Lahore (3 Indian War) Division, Divisional troops and artillery units, embarked at Karachi on 24th August 1914. Between September 9 and 13 the Division reached Suez for the defence of Egypt. In view of the serious situation in France, on His Majesty's Government's direction, the whole of IEF 'A'², except the Bikaner Camel Corps, was directed to proceed direct to Marseilles, and in addition to this force India was directed to provide a complete cavalry division of 4 Brigades, and also 2 additional Field Artillery Brigades for each of the Infantry Divisions of Force 'A'. The IEF 'A' left Alexandria on September 19 to reach Marseilles on September 26,³ leaving behind the Sirhind and the 3rd Mountain Artillery Brigades. Four days later arrived Lieut General Sir James Willcocks⁴ who had been appointed Corps Commander. It was intended to use the Indian Divisions as Corps.⁵ The Lahore Division⁶ remained at Marseilles till September 30, 1914. It entrained for Orleans on September 30, reaching there on October 3, 1914. The Division remained there till 18 October. Meanwhile the Meerut (7th Indian War) Division, comprising the Dehradun, Garhwal and Bareilly Brigades as also the Divisional troops and artillery units had left Karachi on

1. 'IEF 'A' *Indian Expeditionary Force*, War Diary No. 677, dated 8 August 1914, Vol. I, From Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India.
2. IEF 'A', Vol. I, War Diary No. 2417, Appx 116 of 28 August 1914.
3. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers (P) Ltd., Printed in India, 1974, p. 154.
4. IEF 'A', Vol. II, War Diary No. 2939, September 5, 1914, Appx. 44A.
5. IEF 'A', Vol. II, War Diary No. 2883, dated 5 September 1914.
6. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers (P) Ltd., India, 1974, p. 154,

21 September and arrived at Marseilles on 11th October 1914.⁷ In order to prevent confusion between the British and the Indian Divisions, the Indian Divisions for Europe were designated Lahore, Poona and Meerut Divisions.⁸

Indian troops arrived in France just when they were needed most to buttress the weary British line. According to Lord Curzon⁹ they got there in time "to save the cause of the Allies and of civilisation". The Indian Corps was broken up in wings and companies to patch up the British line. This system of shearing which had many inherent disadvantages continued throughout their stay in France. The British were at first doubtful about the adaptability and war worthiness of the Indian Corps in France but these wrong assumptions soon disappeared. The first Indian troops were shelled heavily while entrenching. They courageously faced heavy rifle and machine-gun fire with dash and resolution. The C-in-C¹⁰ of the Indian army asked the Corps Commander to congratulate the Indian troops on their performance.

The Lahore Division left Orleans on 18 October and entered the battle-line trenches on the Flanders¹¹ front on 21 October 1914. The 57th Rifles, closely followed by the 129th Baluchis, were the first Indian battalions¹² to enter the European War trenches. The 57th Rifles, composed of the Sikhs, the Dogras, the Punjabi Musalmans and the Pathans, suffered their first casualties on their very first night in the trenches near Oost Taverne. Sepoy Usman Khan¹³ (55th Rifles attached) was the first Indian Soldier to win the Indian Distinguished Service Medal¹⁴ on the European front. He was hit by rifle fire but refused to leave. Once again he was hit and again he declined to give way. Finally, both his legs were torn by a small splinter and he had to be carried away. The 57th Rifles, together with the Connaught Rangers, participated in the attack on Gappard. In this attack a company of the 129th Baluchis got to within 300

7. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

8. IEF 'A', Vol. II, War Diary No. 3667, Appx 102, dt. 15-9-1914.

9. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers (P) Lt.India 1974, p. 154.

10. IEF 'A', Vol. IV, War Diary No. 6705, Appx 18, dated 3-11-1914.

11. Merewether and Fredrick Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, Al Bemarley Street, W., 1919, pp. 20-21.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

14. Refer to Appx 'L', *Indian Corps in France*, IDSM.

yards of the German trenches and withdrew from there with reluctance and annoyance when ordered to do so.

The trench warfare¹⁵ was entirely new to Indian troops. The interminably long, deep ditches, dark, damp, and muddy, were different from the flat plains, sunny fields and rocky hills where Indian soldiers were at home. The trenches were exposed to the severities of nature, they were inundated when it rained; they became muddy, sticky and slushy when it snowed; and they were open to cold winds and snow drifts. They were equally exposed to shell and splinters, bullets and grenades. There were gaps and openings everywhere and through them enemy snipers crept in stealthily, shooting from the rear. No sooner were the trenches evacuated they were promptly occupied by the Germans. The cold and flat fields of Flanders, wet, windy and muddy, with no sun for days, were harsh and inhospitable. There were ditches and drains in every direction and so also canals and bridges. A haze of thick morning mist blanketed the area till mid-day and then there were clouds. It rained and snowed. There was nothing to break the bleak monotony of the 'flat, dreary expanse'.

While the Lahore Division had its first blood bath, the Meerut Division¹⁶ left Marseilles on 19 October and was three days later concentrated at Orleans. It moved to the front-line on 29 October and was a few days afterwards joined by the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade and the Jodhpur Lancers. The Indian Army Corps¹⁷ in France was now complete except for the Sirhind Brigade which was till then in Egypt. Orders were issued for the corps to take over a segment of the line¹⁸, a stretch of about seven miles from north of Neuve Chapelle to Givenchy, held by the 3rd and 5th British Divisions. Throughout their stay in France, which was nearly fourteen months, the Indian troops, except for "two small breaks in the monotony, remained on this front. At the outset, the Allies had to face a serious handicap. The Germans possessed bombs, trench mortars, rifle grenades, searchlights and "Sausage" observation balloons, and were also preparing poisonous gas and

15. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers (P) Ltd. India, 1974, p. 155.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

17. Merewether and Fredrick Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, p. 67,

18. *Ibid.*, p. 67,

flame throwers. Allied troops had none of these things and for a considerable time were dependent on locally manufactured bombs from empty Jam tins.¹⁹

First Battle of Ypres

The first battle of Ypres was the first serious engagement in which Indian troops were tested. 5.30 a.m. on October 23, orders were received by the 129th Baluchis to move up in support of the 2nd Cavalry Division which was in distress at Hollebeke (Belgium) southeast of Ypres. There was heavy fighting in which the 129th Baluchis were engaged; the battalion suffered many casualties. It had two maxim machine-guns; one was blown to bits by a shell. But Capt. R.F. Dill, with his men, continued to fight with the second gun till he was severely wounded. His men kept up the battle and each one of them except Sepoy (later Subedar) Khudadad Khan²⁰ fell fighting on October 31. Though he was wounded seriously, the valiant Sepoy would not give in and continued to work his gun till his position was rushed upon and overpowered by the Germans in overwhelming numbers. Khudadad Khan was taken by the Germans as dead but he managed to crawl away to safety. For his conspicuous gallantry he was awarded the Victoria Cross. This was the first time ever that the Victoria Cross²¹ was granted to an Indian since its inception in January 1856.

Battle of Neuve Chapelle

The fighting in the village of Neuve Chapelle on 27-28 October deserves mention. In this encounter the 57th Sikhs, supported by the 9th Bhopal Infantry and the 20th and 21st Companies of Indian Sappers and Miner, showed exemplary courage. It was mainly an Indian fight with no British troops participating in it. A bayonet charge was made and the Sikhs, yelling "Shri Wah Guru Ji Ka Khalsa" and "Fateh", tore into the French town which had one central street, a white church, small shops, open air cafes and neat villas. The Germans hurled shot and shell from houses all round but the Indians were not deterred. They fought hand to hand, killing the enemy in the houses and on the streets. "It was a glorious day for the Indian Army," said General Willcocks, "and the story,

19. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

20. *Gazette of India*, dated 7-12-1914.

21. See Serial 1, Appendix 'D'.

although briefly told in despatches, is one of which the Sikhs as a race, and the Sappers and Miners as a Corps, may well be proud.” The Germans put in determined and heavy counter-attacks. As no reinforcements could be sent, the Sikhs had to pull back.

The Viceroy received a report^{21a} from Field Marshal French on the work done by Indian troops at Neuve Chapelle:

“All units of the Indian Corps engaged in recent fighting at Neuve Chapelle did well, and the Indian units which specially distinguished themselves were:

In the 7th (Meerut) Division

39 Garhwal Rifles, 1st and 2nd Battalions and 3rd Queen Alexander’s own Gurkha Rifles, 2nd Bn of Garhwal Brigade, 2nd King Edward’s own Gurkha Rifles, 2 Bn and 9 Gurkha Rifles, 1st Battalion of Dehradun Brigade; No. 3 and 4 companies, Sappers and Miners, 107th Pioneers and Machine-Gun Section and the 4th Cavalry.

In the 3rd (Lahore) Division

47th Sikh and 59th Scinde Rifles of Jullundar Brigade and the 4th Gurkha Rifles, 1st Bn of Sirhind Brigade, 34th Sikh Pioneers and Nos. 20 and 21 Coys Sappers and Miners and Machine-Gun Section of the 5th Lancers.

The GOC Indian Corps especially commends the working of Indian Field Ambulance.

Field Marsal Lord Roberts²² visited the Indian Corps on November 12 and speaking to the officers and men said: “I am greatly moved to find myself again with the troops on whose side I have fought in so many campaigns. Many person feared that the strange surroundings in which it is now your duty to fight would be too hard and severe for the Indian troops. I never shared that fear. I have fought with them too often in every kind of climate, and against every kind of enemy, not to be sure that there are no conditions so hard that they will not do their duties as soldiers.” Nine days later the Indian Corps was visited by the Prince of Wales

21a. IEF ‘A’, Vol. 8, War Diary No. 5887, Appx 167, dated 21-3-1915.

22. Merewether and Fredrick Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, p. 93,

and on 1 December 1941, by his father, King Emperor George V.

Festubert

Another important engagement was fought near Festubert on November 23-24, when two more Victoria Crosses were won. The enemy had, from one point of view, chosen his time well. The relief of Meerut Division by Lahore was fixed for the nights of 22nd-23rd November.²³ The 1st Battalion of the 39th Royal Garhwal Rifles were ordered to reinforce the Ferozepore Brigade which had lost some of its trenches to the Germans. The task of the Garhwali battalion was to recapture those trenches. It was decided to attack from the side and positions were softened with bombing. When the bombs were exhausted, a bayonet charge was made and the Germans were killed, taken prisoner and thrown out of the trenches by the dawn of 24th November 1914. Naik Darwan Singh Negi; although wounded in two places in the head and also in the arm; was one of the first to push round each successive traverse in the face of severe fire from bombs and rifles at closest range." For this most conspicuous gallantry he was awarded the Victoria Cross.²⁴

On the same day, November 24, Lieut Alexander de Pass of the 34th Poona Horse received the Victoria Cross²⁵, posthumously for "conspicuous bravery near Festubert.....in entering a German Sap and destroying a traverse in the face of the enemy's bombs and for subsequently rescuing under heavy fire a wounded man who was lying exposed in the open. Lt de Pass lost his life on this day in a second attempt to capture the aforementioned Sap which had been reoccupied by the enemy."

Givenchy

The Sirhind Brigade joined the Lahore Division on 7 December 1914. Two days later the Indian corps was asked to extend its front and take over the village of Givenchy from the French. The trenches at Givenchy were taken over on December 11, and the area was well defended through various daring actions in December 1914, and January 1915.²⁶ On 19 December 1914, during a night attack near Givenchy Lieut William Arthur Mc Rae Bruce of the 59th

23. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

24. *Gazette of India*, dated 7 December 1914.

25. *Gazette of India*, dated 18 February 1915.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

Scinde Rifles was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously.²⁷

Neuve Chapelle

The battle of Neuve Chapelle was fought from March 10 to 12, 1915. This was the biggest single battle in which Indian troops took part. It was mainly an Indian action and brought great glory to them. A frontage of about 600 yards was attacked. The attack commenced with an artillery barrage at 7-30 a.m. on March 10 and ended at 10 p.m. on March 12.²⁸ The third Victoria Cross to be won by an Indian soldier was bagged in this action. For the second time the honour went to the 39th Royal Garhwal Rifles, but this time the award was secured by its 2nd Battalion. Rifleman Gobar Singh Negi received the Victoria Cross²⁹ posthumously for "most conspicuous" bravery on 10 March 1915.

Second Battle of Ypres

The next important action was the second battle of Ypres³⁰ which commenced with a terrific German bombardment at 5 p.m. on 22 April 1915, and was followed by a fierce attack on the French Colonial Division which was holding the line. In this battle, for the first time, the Germans used asphyxiating gas. Before the assault it was reported that thick yellow smoke was emerging from German trenches. The poisonous fumes, driven by a north-easterly breeze, soon enveloped the French line making hundreds of French soldiers writhe in agony. The French Division vacated its positions and the Germans pressed on the attack. At this stage, the Lahore Division was flung into the battle to stem the German tide. The 47th Sikhs bore the brunt. When the French and the British fell back in confusion, Jemadar (later Subedar) Mir Dast of the 55th Coke's Rifles (attached 57th) remained behind in a trench after his officers had been killed or wounded. He collected all the men he could find, especially those who were recovering after the gas attack, and held on till he was ordered to retire after dusk. While retiring, he collected a number of men from various trenches and took them

27. *Gazette of India*, 4 September 1919.

28. Merewether and Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, pp. 217-244.

29. *Gazette of India*, dated 28 April 1915.

30. Merewether and Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, p. 290.

with him. In addition he assisted in carrying eight British and Indian officers to safety even though he was exposed to very heavy fire which wounded him. This happened on 26 April. For his outstanding valour, Mir Dast was awarded the Victoria Cross.³¹

May 1915 was an active month; fighting was continuous. The battle of Festubert³² raged from the 15th to 25th. In this action Lieut J.G. Smyth of the 15th Sikhs was awarded the Victoria Cross.³³

By the end of May it was obvious that the Indian Corps needed rest and reinforcements. Lord Kitchner visited the Indian Corps on July 9th. At the instance of Lord Kitchner, the Indian Corps Commander sent the 4th Gurkhas for service in Gallipoli. On 3rd September 1915, the command of the Indian Corps was changed.³¹ General Willcocks handed over to General Anderson on 6th September 1915.

Loos

The last action in France in which the Indian Corps took part was the attack near Fanquissart on the opening day of the battle of Loos on September 25th. On that day the British also used poisonous gas³⁵ for the first time. The gas was turned on at 5.50 a.m. but it did not help very much. An adverse wind brought the fumes to the Indian Corps front. Seeing this, the gas detachments, on their own initiative, closed the valves at once.

An act of remarkable gallantry and self-sacrifice was performed by Rifleman Kulbir Thapa of the 2/3 Gurkha Rifles, "when himself wounded on the 25th September 1915, he found a badly wounded soldier of the 2nd Leicestershire Regiment behind the first line German trench, and though urged by the British soldier to save himself, he remained with him all day and night. In the early morning of the 26th September, in misty weather, he brought him out of the German wire, and leaving him in a place of comparative safety, returned and brought in two wounded Gurkhas one after the other.

31. *Gazette of India*, dated 29 April 1915.

32. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, pp. 345-384.

33. *Gazette of India*, dated 29 June 1915.

34. Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, p. 411.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 411.

He then went back in broad day light for the British soldier, and brought him in also, carrying him most of the way, and being at most points under the enemy's fire. For this heroic action Rifleman (later Havildar) Thapa was awarded the Victoria Cross.³⁶

After the Fanquissart action, the Indian Corps could stretch its resources no more. It was weary, depleted and battle-scarred. It was, therefore, decided to withdraw the Indian Corps from France and orders to this effect were received on October 31, 1915. Some cavalry troops and Divisional Artillery were left behind to join the 11th Corps which was to take over the front held by the Lahore and Meerut Divisions. Of the Cavalry Corps which stayed in France, Lance Dafadar Gobind Singh³⁷ of 28th Light Cavalry distinguished himself by winning a Victoria Cross in 1917.

On 4th November 1915, commenced the relief of the two Indian Divisions by the 11th Corps. Three days later most of the Indian troops left for Marseilles. The Corps Headquarters moved back on November 9, and by nightfall on November 10, the Indian Corps had been completely relieved of its onerous duties on the frontline. By an order issued by General Headquarters on December 26, 1915, the last Corps troops left Marseilles.

Appreciation of War Services of Indian Corps in France

Two Indian Divisions, numbering 24,000 men, had to come to France in September and October 1914, when the German onslaught was in full vigour.

The Indians had to face many odds. The climate, the language and the people of the country were different from their own. They, who had never suffered heavy shell fire, who had no experience of explosives, who had never seen warfare in the air, who were totally ignorant of modern trench fighting, were exposed to the latest and most scientific developments that had come into use in the art of destruction. Thus they had to do with the knowledge that they were not fighting for their own country or for their own people. They knew they were engaged in a quarrel which was not of their own making, yet they faced the situation cheerfully and with perfect sense of loyalty.

36. *Gazette of India*, dated 18 November 1915.

37. *Gazette of India*, dated 11 January 1918.

When the Indian contingent reached France, the British Army, cruelly outnumbered and exhausted by constant fighting against superior German artillery and a more numerous equipment of machine guns, was almost crumbling down. Indian and British regiments, working together, however, saved the situation in time.

It was the combined effort of the Expeditionary Force, the Indian Corps, the Territorial Divisions and the overseas and Kitchner's Armies of the Indian Corps that stemmed the tide of German onslaught during the late autumn of 1914, culminating in the bitter fight at Givenchy. Though the Indian troops lost many an action, they played a glorious part in the battle of Neuve Chapelle, the Second battle of Ypres, the struggle for the Aubers ridge, and the desperate assaults at Loos—all claiming a toll of blood from this devoted corps. Their devotion to duty, courage and gallantry is amply borne out by the appreciations that follow. They are given here battlewise.

Battle of Givenchy

The Corps Commander showed his appreciation by the following message to the Division:³⁸

“I congratulate you on the good work done last night, which shows what can be done by enterprise and care. Please send my hearty congratulations to Major General Keary, the Leciesters, and the 2/3rd Gurkhas for their gallant behaviour.”

Battle of Neuve Chapelle

Sir John French in his despatch dated 5th April 1915, remarked:³⁹

“While the success attained was due to the magnificent bearing and indomitable courage displayed by the troops of the 4th and Indian Corps, I consider that the able and skillful dispositions which were made by the General Officer Commanding, First Army contributed largely to the defeat of the enemy and to the capture of his position.”

38. Merewether and Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, p. 160.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

In the same despatch Sir John French continues:

“I can best express my estimate of this battle by quoting an extract from a Special Order of the day which I addressed to Sir Douglas Haig and the First Army at its conclusion: I am anxious to express to you personally my warmest appreciation of the skillful manner in which you have carried out your orders, and my fervent and most heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and devoted tenacious courage displayed by all ranks whom you have ably led to success and victory. My warmest thanks to you all.”

In publishing this order of the day, Sir Douglas Haig added the following appreciatory remarks:⁴⁰

“I desire to express to all ranks of the 1st Army my great appreciation of the task accomplished by them in the past four days severe fighting. The 1st Army has captured the German trenches on a front of two miles, including the whole village of Neuve Chapelle, and some strongly defended works—very serious loss has been inflicted on the enemy, nearly 2,000 prisoners are in our hands, and his casualties in killed and wounded are estimated at about 16,000. I wish also to thank all concerned for the careful preparation made for the assault. Much depended on this thoroughness and secrecy. The attack was such a complete surprise to the enemy that he had neither a corps nor an Army Reserve at hand, and had to draw on the adjoining army for help.”

“The absolute success of the operation of breaking through the German lines on the first day is not only a tribute to the careful forethought and attention to detail on the part of the leaders, but it has proved beyond question that our forces can defeat the Germans where and when they choose, no matter what mechanical or elaborate defences are opposed to their advance.”

In an order of the day on the 14th March 1915, the following telegram received from Field Marshal Sir John French, was published by Sir James Willcock:⁴¹

40. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

“I have cabled following to Viceroy, India, begins: I am glad to be able to inform your Excellency that the Indian troops under Sir James Willcocks, fought with great gallantry and marked success in the capture of Neuve Chapelle and subsequent fighting which took place on the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th of this month. The fighting was very severe and the losses heavy, but nothing daunted them; their tenacious courage and endurance were admirable, and worthy of best traditions of the soldiers of India. Message ends. Please make this known to the corps under your command. Accept yourself and repeat to all troops my warm and hearty appreciation of their services, and my gratitude for the help they have rendered, which has so much conduced to the success of operations.”

Second Battle of Ypres

General Keary's remarks,⁴² in the summing of his report on the operations deserve to be quoted:

“In the conclusion I consider that the troops did all that it was humanly possible to do under circumstances. They had to pass along some miles of road and narrow streets under a hail of shell fire, advance to a position of assembly over open ground, and from thence to a position of development under the same conditions.”

“The Germans had prepared a position which required the most accurate intense gun fire to reduce it. Owing to the hurried nature of the attack, it was impossible to reconnoitre sufficiently to ensure such a fire. Nor were the guns registered. During the first two days the Infantry advanced against a position on an open glacier which was virtually unshaken.”

“After the first two days only one Brigade was in action and its action depended on that of the French, whose right never advanced to the attack.”

“In spite of all these disabilities the carrying of the position by French and British was only prevented by the use of asphyxiating gases.”

Where all had done splendid service, General Keary considered

42. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

that the following units deserved special mention :

.....

 47th Sikhs
 57th Rifles
 40th Pathans.

From the time of its arrival till the morning of the 28th April the Division was under the orders of General Sir Horace Smith—Dorien, Commanding the Second Army. On the 7th May the following letter was received from General Smith Dorien:¹³

“Having read the very complete and excellent report on the work of the Lahore Division in the heavy fighting near Ypres on the 26th and 27th April 1915, the Commander of the Second Army is confirmed in the views he formed at the time that the Division had been handled with great skill and determination by Major General Keary.”

“Sir Horace whilst deploring the heavy casualties wishes to thank the Divisional General Brigadier and Commanding Officers and all ranks of the several arms employed for the great service they performed for the 2nd Army on those eventful two days. In this respect he would especially mention the following regiments:

47th Sikhs
 57th Rifles
 40th Pathans.”

General Sir James Willcocks sent the following message⁴⁴ to General Keary:

“Please convey to all ranks of the Division my own and all their comrades, best congratulations on havings taken part in the battle near Ypres. We are proud of you all. Well done.”

43. *Ibid.*, p. 342.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

Two days after rejoining the Indian Corps, the Lahore Division relieved the Meerut Division in the trenches which speak of the stamina of these men.

The Battle of Festubert

As a tribute to the gallantry of the Bareilly Brigade in the face of tremendous odds, the words of General Southey's report⁴⁵ are worthy of quotation:

"I wish to bring to the notice of the Lieut General commanding the gallant behaviour of all regiments engaged. They saw in front of them the hundreds of men of the Dehradun Brigade lying out on our front wounded and died. They knew the enemy were unshaken, seeing them with their heads over the parapet firing, and thoroughly realising that what had happened to the Dehradun Brigade would in all probability happen to them; but not a man faltered, and as they boldly advanced over the parapet, only to be shot down British and Indian ranks alike did their level best to reach the enemy's line. Even when the attack had failed, the moral of the Brigade remained unshaken and, had, another attack been ordered, they would have undertaken it in the same spirit."

Sir John French, in his despatch⁴⁶, dated the 15th June 1915 sums up the results of the battle in the following words:

"In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a position which was strongly entrenched and fortified and ground was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards. The enemy is known to have suffered very heavy losses, and in the course of battle 785 prisoners and 10 machine-guns were captured. A number of machine-guns were also destroyed by our fire."

The Battle of Loos

Brigadier General Blakader, Commanding the Garhwal Brigade may be quoted:⁴⁷

45. *Ibid.*, p. 364.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 383.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 433.

“I would bring to notice the gallant conduct and fine spirit that animated all ranks of the assaulting battalions. They did all that was possible, and a sufficient testimony is the number of dead and wounded that lay in front of the German wire which barred their further advance.”

Major General Jacob, Commanding the Meerut Division, made the following remarks on the behaviour of the troops on this most trying day:⁴⁸

“The outstanding feature in the operations is the extraordinary keenness, spirit, elan, and dash shown by all units. It was very marked in the period preceding the day fixed for the attack and the way all ranks worked to make the operations a success was most gratifying. The vigour with which the different battalions made the assault left no doubt as to their determination to get through the German lines at all costs. The charge made by 2/8th Gurkhas and 2nd Leicesters in the Garhwal Brigade and by the 2nd Black Watch, 69th Punjabis and 1/4th Black Watch in the Bareilly Brigade could not have been finer. It was the keenness and spirit which caused some units to overlook their first objective and to go too far, with the result that some of them were cut off and wiped out.”

Sir Douglas Haig concluded his report, dated 26th September 1915, with these words:⁴⁹

“The General Officer Commanding 1st Army wishes to express his appreciation of the good work done by all ranks and his gratification at the good progress made by 1st and 4th Corps. Also, though the opposition North of Canal prevented great progress of subsidiary attacks, the GOC is very pleased with the manner in which the 1st, 3rd and Indian Corps carried out the role assigned to them by retaliating the enemy on their front.”

The Corps Leaves France: Health of Indian Troops in France

The strain of this ceaseless warfare and unfamiliar climate was

48. *Ibid.*, p. 456.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 460,

telling heavily upon the Indian Corps in France. It was feared that the rapid transition from the dry, warm climate of India to the cold and damp of Flanders would lead to a great increase of sickness among the troops.

It was expected that pulmonary affections, such as pneumonia, and bronchitis would be common, but these as well as malaria and dysentery, were rare, while gastric diseases due to change of food were almost unknown.

Influenza and trench fever occurred among the Indians in much the same way as amongst British.

After the fighting on the 25th September 1915, following so closely on Neuve Chapelle, Ypres, and the heavy losses in May, it was felt that the breaking point had been reached.

By 10th November 1915, the Indian corps in France was relieved⁵⁰ to reorganise itself and participate in another theatre of war in Mesopotamia.

On the 22nd November 1915, the following Special Order of the day was issued by Field Marshal Sir John French:⁵¹

“On the departure of Indian corps from my command, under which you have fought for more than a year, I wish to send a message of thanks to all officers, non-commissioned officers and men for the work you have done for the Empire. From the time you reached France you were constantly engaged with the enemy. After a few weeks rest you returned to the trenches and since then you have continually held same portion of the front line, taking part in the important and successful engagements of Neuve Chapelle and of Richebourg, and in the heavy fighting at the end of September. The Lahore Division was also engaged in the severe actions near Ypres in April and May. That your work has been hard is proved by the number of your casualties. The British troops of the corps have borne themselves in a manner worthy of the best traditions of the Army.”

“The Indian corps have also shown most praiseworthy courage under and novel trying conditions, both of climate and fighting, and have not only upheld, but added to good name of the army which they represent. This is all the more praiseworthy in view of the

50. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 471.

heavy losses amongst British officers having deprived the Indian ranks of many trusted leaders whom they knew well and of the fact that the drafts necessary to maintain your strength have frequently had to be drawn from regiments quite unconnected with the units they were sent to reinforce. You have done your work here well, and are now being sent to another place where an unscrupulous enemy has stirred up strife against the King Emperor. I send you all my good wishes for success in the part you will now be called on to play in this great. I thank you for the services you have rendered while under my command, and trust that the united efforts of the Allies may soon bring the enemy to his knees and restore peace to the world."

His Majesty's Message⁵²

On the 25th November a parade of representatives of the Indian corps was held at Chateau Mazinghem, at which the following message of his Majesty the King Emperor to the British and Indian troops of the Indian Army Corps in France was read by the Prince of Wales:

"Officers, Non-commissioned officers and men of the Indian Army Corps."

"More than a year ago I summoned you from India to fight for the safety of my Empire and the honour of my pledged word on the battle fields of Belgium and France. The confidence which I then expressed in your sense of duty, your courage and your chivalry you have since then nobly justified."

"I now require your services in another field of action, but before you leave France, I send my dear and gallant son the 'Prince of Wales', who has shared with my Armies the dangers and hardships of the campaign, to thank you in My name for your services and express to you My satisfaction."

"British and Indian comrades-in-arms, your's have been a fellowship in toils and hardships, in courage and endurance often against great odds, in deeds nobly done and days of memorable conflict. In a warfare waged under new conditions and in particularly trying circumstances, you have worthily upheld the honour of the Empire and the great traditions of My Army in India."

52. Ibid, p. 479,

“I have followed your fortunes with the deepest interest and watched your gallant actions with pride and satisfaction. I mourn with you loss of many gallant officers and men. Let it be your consolation, as it was their pride, that they freely gave their lives in a just cause for the honour of their sovereign and the safety of My Empire. They died as gallant soldiers, and I shall ever hold their sacrifice in grateful remembrance. You leave France with a just pride in honourable deeds already achieved and with my assured confidence that your proved valour and experience will contribute to further victories in the new fields of actions to which you go.”

“I pray God to bless and guard you, and to bring you back safely, when the final victory is won each, to his own home—there to be welcomed with honour among his own people.”

CHAPTER 4

ROLE OF INDIAN ARMY IN GALLIPOLI

Turkey Enters the War

At the end of October 1914, Turkey came in on the side of Germany.¹ This altered the complexion of the war. Her great value to Germany as an ally was that England and Russia were obliged to send out new military expeditions to the various theatres of the war. The offensive against the Turks was undertaken by the British² on the request of Russia³. The purpose was to draw off the Turkish forces which would otherwise have thrown all their pressure⁴ against Russia in the Caucasus. Thus a helpful division was created. If Britain had not to fight in the Russian region in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, Palestine and the Caucasus and had concentrated on the Germans, perhaps the war might have ended earlier.

Geographical Importance of Turkey

Turkey was essentially the land-man of Anatolia, with a small

1. Moorehead Alan. *Gallipoli*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1956, pp. 28-32.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

The Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, had asked Sir George Buchanon (The British ambassador in Petrograd), "if it would be possible for Lord Kitchner to arrange for a demonstration of some kind against the Turks elsewhere, either naval or military, and to so spread reports as to cause Turks, who he says are very liable to go off at a tangent, to withdraw some of the forces now acting against the Russians in the Caucasus, and thus ease the position of the Russians."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

At the Admiralty both Churchill and Fisher got down to the question of just what action it should be. Fisher, "I Consider Attack on Turkey Holds the Field". "But Only if it is Immediate."

4. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

At the admiralty Kitchner had said that he could not spare a man for any new expeditions; 'if there was to be any demonstration it has to be a naval affair.'

extension into the Balkans and an Arabian Empire to the south. There were four routes to attack Turkey. The first was by a direct thrust at Constantinople from the sea by the Dardanelles and Gallipoli; the second an approach from Egypt by the coast of Palestine to Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo; the third, from Basra by the Tigris to Baghdad and thence to Aleppo; the fourth, from Russia by the Caucasus. Fronts were opened on each of these routes. They may be looked upon as sectors of the same front interrupted by large intervening masses of mountain and desert. Turkey lying in the centre had the advantage of being able to transfer troops quickly from one sector to the other.

Geographical Importance of Gallipoli

Somewhat more than half way down the Gallipoli Peninsula the hills rise up into a series of jagged peaks, which are known as Sari Bair. The central crest is called Chunuk Bair. The whole of the Mediterranean is visible from these heights.

To the south, in Asia, lie Mount Ida and the Trojan plain, reaching down to Tenedos. To the east, the islands of Imbros and Samothrace come up out of the sea. The Dardanelles, divides Asia from Europe.

From Chunuk Bair the Hellespont—the Dardanelles—does not appear to be a part of the sea at all. It looks more like a stream running through a valley.

The mouth at Cape Helles in the Mediterranean is 4,000 yards wide with banks open on either side by four and a half miles until they close in again at the Narrows. Above Narrows it again opens out to a width of four miles up to the sea of Marmara, just above town of Gallipoli.

There is no tide, but the Black Sea rivers and the melting snows create five knot current⁵ which throughout the year sweeps through Dardanelles to the Mediterranean. In severe winter this current can be blocked with chunks of floating ice.

Gallipoli Operations

The operations in Gallipoli were more dramatic than in Mesopotamia as they aimed at striking at the heart instead of at the extremities of the Turkish Empire. Gallipoli was the Gateway to the Dardanelles.

5, *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52,

The British had their naval mission in Turkey for years. They knew that there was barely a division⁶ of Turkish soldiers on the Gallipoli Peninsula. They were badly equipped.

The War Council⁷ in England decided, "That the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."

The attempt of the British Navy on March 10, 1915, to force the Dardanelles by the fleet alone, unsupported by an attack of the army on land, was a mistake. Mines, land batteries and torpedoes of the enemy rendered the progress of the Navy impossible. The attempt had given alarm to the Turks and when six weeks later combined operations by land and sea were launched, the Turks had prepared themselves. Any kind of surprise was out of question.

The difficulties at Gallipoli were underestimated from the very start. The Turks boasted that no troops in the world could land on the Peninsula and establish themselves there in the face of a deadly hail of bullets and mines that swept the beach.

On March 12, 1915,⁸ General Ian Hamilton was appointed to command a new army meant to support the naval fleet at Dardanelles against Gallipoli.

There were some 75,000⁹ men at the General's disposal; 30,000 Australian and New Zealanders divided into Divisions, the 29th British Division of 16,000 and the Royal Naval Division of 10,000. All these forces together with 1,600 horses, mules and 300 vehicles had to be assembled on board the ships that they might be able to land on the enemy coast under the direct fire of the Turkish guns.

General Ian Hamilton reached Alexandria on 26th March 1915.¹⁰ He wanted to launch the largest amphibious operations by the middle of April 1915.

Hamilton's Plan¹¹

Hamilton's plan amounted to simple assault on Gallipoli Peninsula itself. The main striking force was to be his best division, the British 29th under Huston-Weston. It was to go ashore on five

6. Ibid., p. 37.

7. Ibid., p. 40.

8. Ibid., p. 81.

9. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

10. Ibid., p. 116.

11. Ibid., pp. 120-121,

small beaches at Cape Helles at the extreme tip of the Peninsula, and it was hoped that by the end of the first day, the crest of Achi Baba would be in its hands. Meanwhile, General Birdwood was to land with the Anzac Force about thirteen miles up the coast between Gaba Tape and Fisherman's Hut. Striking across the Peninsula through the Sari Bair Hills, he was to make for Mal Tepe. Thus, the Turks fighting Huston-Weston at Cape Helles would be cut off in the rear and the hills dominating the Narrows would be overcome.

Simultaneously two main diversions were to be carried out. The Royal Naval Division was to make a pretence at landing at Bulair and the French were to go ashore for a large armed raid on Kum Kale on the Asiatic side of the Straits. Later, these forces would be brought back to Cape Helles and put into the main attack. By the second or third day it was hoped that the lower half of the Peninsula would be so over-run that the fleet with its minesweepers could safely pass through the Narrows into the Sea of Marmara.

The Landing

On 26th April¹² 1915, the landing was effected by the British on the south of the Peninsula. The ANZACS (Australian New Zealand Army Corps) landed before dawn. Springing out of their boats they flashed straight on the enemy's rifles. There were many separate landings. At one spot a liner was run ashore, and the men poured out of the bowels of the ship. Nearby Turks attacked in boats. Most of the regiments were killed before they reached the shore. Those who jumped out into the sea found themselves entangled in barbed wire stretched under the water. As they emerged they were shot down. Further west the Lanchashire Fusilliers faced odds almost as terrific. The first line of man who threw themselves on the wire entanglements were swept away. After an almost superhuman struggle the landing was effected under the direction of General Ian Hamilton. The Turks were driven away from the trenches on the beach and on the cliffs. The ANZACS were holding a strip of land to the south of the Peninsula. The Turks fought desperately to win it back, driving in counter-attack after counter-attack. The orders of their German General, Firnan Von Sanders, were to drive the British into the sea at the point of the bayonet.

12. Hamilton, Sir Ian, *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. I, Edward Arnold, London, 1920, pp. 143-148.

On the night of April 27¹³, 1915, the fighting slackened. On the day-after the landing had been made, the village of Sedd-el-Behr fell. Hamilton judged it to be absolutely vital to take Achi Baba before Firnan Von Sanders could bring reinforcements down to the town of the Peninsula. On April 28th¹⁴, with the French on the right and the British on the left, a general forward movement began. It moved about two miles and then came to halt because of opposition. The whole Allied position was under the fire of Turkish guns from across the straits and from the Peninsula. The Turks lost many thousand in their counter attack, but they could not dislodge the British force. On the other hand, the progress of the Allies was slow due to terrible wastage of men in almost every attack. It was trench warfare again. The Turks had to be forced back yard by yard before Allies could dominate the Narrows to enable ships to pass through. The Turks were greatly superior in numbers. A larger force was required for an attack on their position. The Turks had 250,000 to draw upon for their defences.

Thus, at the very outset, the pattern of the Gallipoli campaign was settled—the action, the reaction and the stalemate. The exhausted Army lay stranded below the crest of Achi Baba. On this the 42nd Division together with an Indian Gurkha Brigade and two mountain Indian batteries, No. 1 and 4, landed. The Indian Brigade¹⁵ consisted of the 14th Sikhs and the 4th, 5th and 6th Gurkhas.

The night of 26 April¹⁶ 1915, was marked by heavy fire on both sides. Both the Turks and the Allies had begun regular mining, and counter-mining, blowing up and attacking each others trenches with alternate success and failure. Gallipoli had become a 'Slaughter house' and the men there could be driven away with the greatest possible difficulty.

By 5th May¹⁷ 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton got his reinforcements from Egypt and he kept them at Cape Helles. Each day it was hoped to get Achi Baba. At Cape Helles he had lost 6,500 men. His overall casualties of British, French and Anzac troops on two fronts were 2,000. Achi Baba was still untouched.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-166.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 193 (The Brigade was commanded by Cox).

16. Moorehead Alan, *Gallipoli*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1956, p. 163.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

On 16 May¹⁸ 1915, the fire became intense and on 19th May¹⁹ 1915, the attack was launched by the Turks. It was directed against the 1st Australian Division. General Birdwood was woken up in his dug-out at Anzac²⁰.

Other heavier battles than this were fought at Gallipoli, but none with such a terrible concentration of killing, none so one-sided, and none with so strange an aftermath. Through the long afternoon the wounded lay with dead on the battlefield, and although the trenches on either side were only a yard or two away no one could go out to evacuate their wounded and bury the dead without taking the risk of being instantly shot.

Truce—20 May 1915²¹

The terms of truce for nine hours on 20th May 1915, between the British and the Turkish troops were settled. Three zones were marked out with white flags for the burial of the dead—one Turkish, one British and the third common so both sides.

On 20th May^{21a} 1915, the Turks came out in red crescent colours for recovering their dead and wounded whose bodies were decomposing in the heat. The truce was very much welcomed by the Australian too for the same reasons. The Turkish dead were about 4,000.²² The Allied casualties were nearly 5,000.²³

Helles to Anzac June-July 1915

During June and July neither side made any serious attempt to attack at *Anzac*. The uneasy stalmate²⁴ continued there. Five pitched battles were fought at Cape Helles. They were all frontal attacks, all of short duration, a day or two or even less, and none of them succeeded in altering the front line by more than half a mile.

In the beginning the Allied Commanders had envisaged an advance upon Constantinople itself and cavalry was held in reserve

18. Hamilton, Sir Ian, *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. I., Edward Arnold, London, 1920, pp. 228-229.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 234-236.

20. Moorehead Alan, *Gallipoli*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1956, p. 174.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

21a. Hamilton, Sir Ian, *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. I., Edward Arnold, London, 1920, p. 240.

22. Moorehead Alan, *Gallipoli*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1956, p. 186.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-221.

for that purpose. By June they were concentrating upon Achi Baba. By July they were thinking in still more restricted terms of an advance of 700 or 800 yards for the capture of two or three lines of the enemy trenches.

In the same way the Turks gradually began to give up their notions of pushing the enemy into the sea. After July they tried no more headlong assaults, they were content to contain the Allies and harass them on their narrow foothold on the sea.

The 14th Sikhs of the 29th Indian Brigade on 4th June 1915²⁵, opposed powerful Turkish trenches on the further side of a ravine known as Sagir Dara. They were ordered to advance in two lines. The front line was to advance along the ravine itself to attack the enemy's second line of trenches. The Sikhs moved as one man. Two companies reached the Turkish trenches and held on them manfully for many terrible hours. When at last they were relieved, only sixteen men were found alive. In the ravine four officers and a quarter of the men were killed, and wounded but some groups struggled on and reached their objective, where they hurriedly entrenched themselves. Forty-nine of them stayed there all night. At dawn the enemy drove them back with bombs which the Sikhs lacked. Before the action, the 14th Sikhs numbered fifteen British officers and 574 men; when the roll call was taken after the fight only three British officers and 134 men answered to their names. The names of the fallen live in the Roll of Honour.

The IX Corps, to which the operations at Sulva were assigned, was commanded by General Stopford. It was on 6th August 1915²⁶, that Stopford launched his big attack at Sulva. The attack was launched at Godley with the Australians, New Zealanders, the Indian Brigade and Shew's 13th Division. It began through very difficult country, parallel to the coast, with the intention of sweeping round to the right on to Sari Bair, while an attack was also made on the Nek at the head of Monash Gully.

Despite the care of General Birdwood's preliminary concentration, despite the valuable and important surprise which had thereby been effected, and despite the successful capture of the Turkish northern outposts in the opening moves of the battle,

25. Hamilton, Sir Ian, *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. I, Edward Arnold, London, 1920, p. 274.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-56.

the long prepared scheme for gaining the crest of the main ridge on very easy terms had definitely failed. The enemy's sole defences on the northern flank had been so completely disorganised by the spirited action of NZMR, that the New Zealand Infantry Brigade met with no opposition, while General Cox's troops encountered nothing more than delaying tactics. On the right, the narrow failure to reach Chanuk Bair was due in great part, if not entirely, to the unfortunate chance by which one battalion lost its way and the Brigadier refused to advance without it. At 1 a.m. on the 7th August²⁷ 1915, he had arrived within 1,500 yards of his objective, which at that time was untenanted. At half-past four he was still, 1,200 yards away.

Major Allanson, by a very gallant and skillful leadership, actually reached the coveted crest Chanuk Bair with companies of 5th²⁸ and 6th²⁹ Gurkhas, and these were the only men to look down on the waters of the Dardanelles. Major Allanson's success led to high hopes for a while, but heavy shells fell on his Gurkhas and scattered them. None of the three British Brigadiers who were concerned in this action came forward with the leading troops. They remained two miles in the rear, and so the troops received no further orders. Instead of pursuing the Turks they sat down and waited; when night fell all contact with the enemy had been lost.

Thus at the end of the first twenty-four hours at Sulva there had been very little change. The troops were barely two miles inland and the generals were in exactly the same places—Hammersley on the beach, Stopford on the Jonquil and Hamilton on Imbros. The only new factor was that the Turks, having inflicted some 1,600 casualties on the British, had retired and the Sulva plain was now empty.

The Sulva plan which was a good plan had failed because of wrong commanders and soldiers had been employed, and at Anzac the best officers and men were employed upon a plan that would not work. The chief causes of failure³⁰ at Sulva Bay were:

27. Hamilton, Sir Ian, *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. II, Edward Arnold, London, 1920, pp. 55-56.
28. Jackson Donovan, Major, *India's Army*, Sampson Low Marston & Co. Ltd., pp. 424-425.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 430-431.
30. Moorehead Alan, *Gallipoli*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1956, pp. 268-294.

1. Landing of raw troops at night instead of experienced troops at dawn.
2. Appointment of elderly inefficient commanders.
3. The commanders remained in dark because of excessive secrecy maintained about the operation.
4. The troops suffered on account of thirst and heat.

Both attacks had been devilled at the outset by the difficulties of advancing through a strange country in the night.

By mid-day on August 10th, not a single height of any importance at Sulva or Anzec, was in British hands. At Cape Helles the battle subsided to a fateful end.

In October 1915, Sir Birdwood took over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force from General Ian Hamilton. On 27th November 1915³¹, an unprecedented storm came at Helles, worse at Anzec, and worst of all at Sulva. At Sulva, the piers and lighters were somewhat shattered by cliffs running down in the north-west side to the water's edge, but at Anzec and at Helles, the shores were strewn with the wreckage of small craft.

For the troops in the trenches those three days were days of sheer agony. The Allies were entirely unprepared for such an emergency; no precaution for frost-bite had been taken nor were stocks of warm clothing available. A terrific thunderstorm was followed by twenty-four hours of torrential rain, during which men got soaked to the skin. Then came an icy hurricane; the rain turned into a blinding blizzard; then heavy snow, followed by two nights of bitter frost. At Anzec the caves and underground galleries made by the troops provided shelter for many and the front line trenches had some measure of protection from the surrounding hills. At Helles, too, the trenches on sloping ground suffered little from flooding. The brunt fell upon the unfortunate IXth Corps at Sulva. Exposed to the unbroken fury of the storm, trenches were soon flooded, water courses becoming roaring torrents, and well-like spate of mud and water, several feet high, bore down the corpses of dead Turks and pack ponies into Allied lines. The trenches were quite uninhabitable, and the men had to seek what refuge they could find on the parapets or the drenched ground to the rear.

From a military point of view, the Turks were in the same

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 327-328.

plight, and the benumbed garrisons of both sides stood miserably about in an unofficial truce of several hours duration. Many were drowned in the trenches and more died of exposure, the 86th Brigade, in particular, being virtually thrown out of action. A stream of exhausted men struggled down to the beaches, many collapsing and freezing to death where they fell. Hospitals, supply and ordnance were packed to overflowing. While the storm lasted it was difficult to evacuate the casualties to the hospital-ships. At Sulva alone, during three dreadful days, there were more than 500 cases of frostbite, and over 200 men were either drowned or frozen to death. No such storm had been known.

Some of the Indian troops on the extreme left of Anzac suffered badly, and it was pathetic to see the gallant little Gurkhas being carried away, as they were unable to walk. Some fifty of them lost one or both feet from frostbite.

It was not until 8th December 1915³², that the decision to remain at Salonica was taken, and final orders of withdrawal from Gallipoli were received. The Allies were greater losers. During the 259 days between the first landing and the final withdrawal in January 1916, they sent half a million men to Gallipoli, and slightly more than half a million of them became casualties. Turkish losses officially reported were 251,000 which was just a thousand less than that of the Allies and this indicates how closely the battle was fought. Strategically 20 Turkish Divisions were set free to attack Russia and to threaten Egypt.

Before the Ottoman Empire fell in 1918, nearly three quarters of a million Allied soldiers were sent to Salonica, and another 280,000 fought their way northwards across the desert from Egypt to Jerusalem and Damascus. The Gallipoli Campaign was a miserable failure for the Allies. Its abandonment after eight months was still worst as it set free 20 Turkish Divisions which were engaged elsewhere.

Health Hazards in Gallipoli

Heat. By July the heat reached a steady eighty-four degrees in the shade. From four in the morning until eighty at night the sun glared down and made an oven of every trench and dug-out. It was a fearful heat, so hot that the fat of the bully beef melted in the tins, and

32. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

a metal plate would become too hot to touch. There were no wells in Cape Helles. At Anzac the men were forced to condense salt water from the sea.

Flies. In May June, the nuisance of flies was unbearable. The flies fed on the unburied corpses in no man's land, and on the latrines, the refuse and the food of both Turkish and British armies. Mosquito nets were unknown. The most valuable possession of a soldier was a little piece of muslin cloth, which he could put over his face when he ate or slept.

Dysentery. From June onwards dysenteric diarrhoea spread through the Army and soon every man was infected by it.

Health. The flies were principally to be blamed for the spread of disease. The food was also very poor. Very occasionally the troops got eggs or fish. Mostly they lived on milkless tea, bully beef, plum and apple jam. There was general scarcity of green vegetables.

Medical Services. The medical services came near to a breaking point during June, July 1915. They had been organised on the principle that hospitals would be set up on the Peninsula soon after the original landing. When they failed, hurried arrangements were made to establish a base under canvas on the island of Lemons, while the more serious cases were evacuated to Egypt, Malta and even England.

In June the doctors were faced with the major epidemic of dysentery. On Lemons the patients lay about on the ground in their thick cord breeches and they were pestered by flies. They were no mosquito-nets, and often no beds, not even pyzemas. Trained dentists were unknown in Gallipoli. These things began to cause resentment in Army.

Obviously a man suffering from dysentery, pestered by flies, getting bad food and exposed to unbearable heat, was not likely to give his best attention to his work.

Psychological Attitude Towards the War

After June it was noticed that a psychological change was overtaking the Army. Discipline flagged, and a despondent and irritable atmosphere spread through the trenches. To accept risk in idleness, to wait under constant shelling without plans and hopes—that was an intolerable thing. After the mid-July battles this attitude towards the campaign became more marked than ever. Nearly all

were dysentery cases. Many in fact were so infected that they never returned to the front again.

The men were exhausted and dispirited. Nothing ever seemed to go right, they attacked and it always ended in a stalemate. Many of the soldiers began to feel that the whole expedition was a blunder; the politicians and brass-hats at home had tried to pull a victory on the cheap, and now that it had failed the expedition was to be abandoned. The real core of their grievances was that they were being neglected and forgotten.

CHAPTER 5

INDIAN ARMY IN MESOPOTAMIA (Indian Expeditionary Force 'D')

General Description of the Country¹

The area known as Mesopotamia consists, generally speaking, of the lowland regions of the basin of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The term Upper Mesopotamia is usually applied to the northern portion reaching almost as far as Baghdad. Lower Mesopotamia, or Iraq, stretches thence, roughly southward to the sea. The boundaries of Mesopotamia are: on the north, the Armenian plateau and Kurdistan; on the east Persia; on the west, the Arabian table-land and the Syrian Desert; on the south, the Persian Gulf and the deserts of the North-Eastern Arabia.

The sole access to the sea is through the channel formed by the confluence, at Kurmat Ali, of the Euphrates and the Tigris and known as the Shatt-al-Arab. It is navigable by any vessel.

The Karun river enters it 'about forty-five miles upstream at Mohammerah. It forms the principal means of Communication with Arabistan and the Anglo-Persian Oilfields. The delta below Mohammerah is navigable by only one arm and for six months in the year is generally a swamp caused by the melting of the snows and occasionally by the action of the autumn rains.

The river Kurmat Ali, five and three-quarter miles above Basra the Euphrates enters from the west by its new channel; while its old channel comes in at Qurna, forty miles further up. The Hammer Lake, about thirty-five miles west of Qurna, offers the chief obstacle owing to its shallowness and narrow entrance.

From Qurna to Hammer Lake and beyond it to some seven miles downstream of Nasiriya the channel runs through extensive swamps.

1. Moberley, F.J., Brig-Gen, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918*, Vol. I, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1923, pp. 1-15,

The Tigris, the main line of communication between the sea and Baghdad, begins above Kurmat Ali.

In 1914, Basra was the best port for transshipment from ocean-going steamers to river craft. But it was in no sense a modern civilised port and possessed no resources or facilities which would assist materially towards the development required to meet the sudden increase of traffic.

Above Baghdad, navigation is usually only downstream by rafts, though small steamers can go 50 miles up to Samara.

Connecting the Tigris and Euphrates is the Shatt-al-Hai, a branch of the Tigris which it leaves at Kut-al-Amara; but thirty miles above Nasiriya it diverges into many small channels which waste themselves for the most part in the hammer marshes.

Lower Mesopotamia

Practically the whole of Lower Mesopotamia is beneath the water-level of its Tigris and the Euphrates during the high flood season; and rivers are only kept within their banks by means of slight dams of loose earth heaped up at the edge of the rivers. Owing to the low-lying nature of the country, there are large areas of marsh and shallow lakes, which may extend to twenty miles in width and fifty miles or more in length. The effect of water on soil, which in Lower Mesopotamia is everywhere a sandy loam, is to convert it into a thick, tenacious mud which impedes all military movements until it has dried. When dried, the surface is capable of supporting temporarily all but the heaviest military traffic.

Rainfall

The average annual rainfall of the Mesopotamia plain is only about six and a half inches. The flood season in Mesopotamia occurs at the best time, climatically for military operations. The weather from March to May is better than at any other time; there is little rain, and a reasonable temperature prevails; but the subsidence of floods is followed immediately by the extreme heat of June, July and August.

Roads

The following roads were suitable for wheeled transport. Wheeled transport was, however, not used extensively, Camels,

donkeys, and in the hilly country, mules were used.

Basra to Nasiriya.

Baghdad to Najef via Musaiyib and Karbala.

Baghdad to Hilla.

Baghdad to Falluja (for Damascus and Aleppo).

Baghdad to Samara (for Mosul)

Baghdad to Delhi Abbas via Ba'quba (for Kifri, Kiruk and Mosul)

Baghdad to Khaniqin (for Kermanshah)

Caravan-Routes

There were also well-used caravan routes from Baghdad via Kut-al-Amara, Amara to the Persian border, and from Basra to Kuwait and Nejd via Zubair.

Climate

The climate in Mesopotamia is one of extremes. The hot weather begins in May and ends about the beginning of October, the hottest period being from June to September. In November the weather is generally cool and from December to February it is extremely cold, especially in Upper Mesopotamia, where the temperature falls to below freezing point. March and April are warm and unsettled, with occasional thunder and sand storms. The prevailing winds are from the north and north-west and the shamal comes from the latter direction. It begins normally about the middle of June and blows intermittently for about forty days; its velocity occasionally reaches forty miles an hour and it has the effect of drying the atmosphere and offers some relief from the great heat. The east wind is accompanied usually by high temperature, and the south wind is oppressive and accompanied by dust. Sand storms are most common in the spring months.

Diseases

Mesopotamia is a hot-bed of ravaging diseases. Plague, small pox, cholera, malaria, dysentery and typhus, if not actually endemic, are all prevalent in this region.

Upper Mesopotamia

In upper Mesopotamia the plains are generally more or less

undulating. Here and there they are traversed by low ranges of hills, whose general trend is eastward to westward. The surface of the plains is open and treeless. The soil is generally of a better surface to stand military traffic than in Iraq. In the north, where numerous streams carry water for half the year, large tracts are covered in the spring with rich grass ; but to the south, the plain becomes increasingly arid, being in many places a hard desert. There are also large areas in which water from Wadi's (valleys) collects and on evaporation leaves an incrustation of salt.

The Kurdish mountains rise to heights of 11,000 to 14,000 feet and form a difficult and intricate barrier. To the south-east they merge often into rolling downs and lower hills, where in spring grass is frequently plentiful. Along the Persian frontier the ranges run generally north-west and south-east. The tracks for pack animals which cross them are all more or less difficult. The passes, in winter, are usually blocked by snow.

West of the Euphrates the country is generally an arid desert, though towards the north it becomes gradually less so.

To sum up, the problems in Mesopotamia due to the nature of the country are rarely the same for more than a few weeks. All military problems therein, whether strategical, tactical or administrative, are affected by local conditions to an extent rarely met with in any theatre of the war. The problems arose either due to the scarcity of water; or near the rivers due to the excess of it.

Indian Army In Mesopotamia

As the Lahore and Meerut Divisions were leaving Marseilles in December, 1915, the British got into a mess in another theatre of war, that is, Mesopotamia. The original intention was to refit these two war-weary Indian Divisions, renamed the 3rd and the 7th Divisions, in Egypt before they could be used some where outside France. Indian troops were happy to have left the sodden fields of Flanders, cold and miserable, and the narrow, sepulchral trenches which had hemmed them in for months. They were looking forward to battles in open and sunny fields. But little did they know that they were about to fall from the frying pan into the fire—the burning sands and scorching heat of Mesopotamia. The predicament of the British in Mesopotamia left little choice to those who were in over-all control of the war. The Indian Divisions from France, without any refitting or rest, had to be rushed to Mesopotamia to relieve the beleaguered

British forces at Kut-al-Amara.

The 3rd and the 7th Divisions arrived at Qurna helter-skelter without their horses, vehicles, artillery and field ambulances. They had come to a stark and sterile Arabian desert, with mirages and haze, dust and sand, burning heat and blinding glare. There was either no water or brackish marshes or so much sub-oil water that the earth became a clay loam, sticky and impassable for any manner of transport-vehicular or animal. In any case there was little drinking water. There were sand banks in the rivers which made navigation difficult and caused floods frequently. River transport was inadequate. High velocity winds caused suffocating sand storms. Heat, haze and mirages interfered with observation and artillery fire. In summer the temperature rose from 112 degrees to 130 degrees in shade, while in winter it rained and was miserably cold. Above all this, there were sand-fleas and mosquitoes. The Indian and British troops became victims of diarrhoea, dysentery, cholera, malaria, small-pox, typhus and scurvy. There were few doctors to attend to them; medical aid was extremely inadequate. This was scandalous as was later pointed out by the Mesopotamia inquiry commission. It was not the lack of fighting capacity and efficiency of the Indian troops that could be blamed for failure in this theatre of war. In the words of the Inquiry Commission it was the system of military administration in control of that Army that was to be censured for the failure.

When the Indian troops from France reached Mesopotamia, the British were hard pressed in maintaining their position for the protection of the Anglo-Persian oil company's refineries, pipe-lines and installations in the Middle East. It was to succour this British force that a Middle Eastern Force was sent from India on October 16th² and 18th, 1914, for Abadan. A few days later, on November 5, Turkey also declared war against England. The following day the spearhead of the Middle Eastern Force, known as the Indian Expeditionary Force 'D'³ (16th Infantry Brigade), under Brigadier

2. IEF 'D' War Diary No. 4942, Appx 16, Vol. I, dt. 3-10-1914.

3. IEF 'D' War Diary No. 4910, Appx. 5, Vol. I, dt. 2-10-1914. (The Secretary of State informed the Viceroy that the appellation IEF 'D' is to be used in referring to this force for Mesopotamia and that it should be despatched secretly with IEF 'A' on 10 October 1914. As soon as the leading brigade arrived at Shatt-al-Arab, secrecy may be abandoned).

Delamain,⁴ landed at Fao,⁵ captured⁶ the fort then moved up the
rever, occupying Saniyeh between November 8 and 10. A Turkish
counter-attack on November 11 was beaten back. On November 14,⁷
General Barrett, GOC 6th Poona Division, arrived at Saniyeh and
took over command of the MEF which had by then swelled to the
size of a Division. The 18th⁸ Infantry Brigade came with General
Barrett and the remainder of the 6th Poona Division was to leave
Bombay on November 17. General Barrett, who had received instructions
to get to Beers, was delayed but without much delay, drove
away the Turks from Saniyeh on November 15, 1914. He again
defeated them on November 17 and occupied Beers on
November 22, 1914. Finally, General Barrett was killed on December 9.

4. IEF 'D' War Diary No 6972, Appx 122, Vol II, dt 24 Oct, 1914 (Gen
Barrett's instructions to Force 'D' at Bakerin along with the

5. IEF 'D' War Diary No 6569-A, Appx 85, Vol II, dt 1-11-1914 (The
General was instructed the Viceroy that Force 'D' should proceed to
Saniyeh and attack Fao and then Shamiya and clear Turks out of
Shatt-el-Arab and Shamsuniya

6. IEF 'D', War Diary No 6972, Appx. 122, Vol II, dt 6-11-1914

7. IEF 'D' War Diary No 7877, Appx 33, Vol. III, dt 15-11-1914

8. IEF 'D' War Diary No 6972, Appx 142, Vol II, dt 7/8-11-1914 (The 18
Inf Bde included 2 Norfolks, 110 MLI, 120 Rajput Inf-IEF 'D', Vol I,
p. 1113)

9. IEF 'D' War diary No 7551, Appx 38-A, Vol III, dt 16-11-1914

Saihan Action

In the Saihan action of 12 to 17 November 1914, Subedar Sabal Singh
and Net Singh of 104th Rifles, Jemadar Feroz Ali of 3 Sappers and
Miners and Bugler Sarain Singh were awarded the Indian Order of
Merit,

Subedar Sabal Singh and L/Nk Net Singh showed notable gallantry on
the 17th November, during the flank attack on the edge of a dete grove
near Sahil

Jemadar Feroz Ali commanded with excellent results about 100 men
who did splendid work when both the company commanders and Subedar
had been badly wounded, Bugler Surain Singh of 20th Punjabis, performed
an act of bravery in going forward in the face of a heavy fire and climbing
on and setting fire to a building held by the enemy. He was awarded IOM
IInd class—Gazette of India, 24 December 1914. Also refer to IEF 'D'
War Diary No 10135, Appx. 171, Vol V, dt 27-12-1914

10. IEF 'D', Appx 85, Vol III, dt 23-11-1914

11. IEF 'D', Appx 95, Vol IV, dt 6-12-1914,

About this time the 6th Poona Division landed at Basra. The initial objective had thus been achieved. If the British had stopped at that point many a disaster that they had to face in the future could have been avoided.

The Government of India, and not the War Office in London, were directing the operations in Mesopotamia. For the British the campaign in Mesopotamia was not important in the over-all strategy of the war. The Viceroy of India had, however, his own political motives. He was concerned¹² about the Muslim population in India

Also refer to longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, pp. 140-151.

Qurnah Action

Troops under Lt Col Frazer had a successful action with the enemy opposite Qurnah on the left bank of the Tigris. The enemy was driven away from the bank losing heavily. 70 persons, including 3 Turkish officers, and two guns were captured. The 110th Mahrattas made a bayonet charge on the enemy entrenchments. On their approach the enemy surrendered village Qurnah. One Indian officer and 19 rank and file were killed.

12. IEF 'D' War Diary No. 8577, Appx. 66, Vol. IV, dt. 2-12-1914.

Religious feelings of Muslims

The Officers Commanding Ferozepore troops submitted a report regarding the unwillingness of Sepoys of the 20th Infantry to fight against the Turks.

Tele P No. 675, cr, dt. 2-12-1914, from the Officer Commanding Troops to the Chief of the General Staff :

The following report has been received from the Commandant, 20th Punjabis. Several Afridi reservists detailed for draft sailing this week expressed unwillingness to fight Turks although they are willing to fight Germans.

They agreed grudgingly when they received direct orders.

It seems that wounded men brought back reports that Mahomedan burial is refused by Regimental Mullah to Mahomedan sepoy, killed in the Persian Gulf because they are fighting Turkey. When cross-examined the wounded men deny exact knowledge.

Other Pathan tribes, especially Khattaks, appear quite willing to go.

There would be no further trouble if the burial question could be authoritatively settled.

IEF 'D', Wardiary No. 8727, Appx. 84, Vol. IV, dt. 5-12-1914.

The GOC Force 'D' reported that the Chief cause of dissatisfaction in the 20th infantry was not want of proper burial, but a disinclination to fight in a country which contains sacred places like Baghdad. Their feeling, he said, was shared by some Punjabi Muslamans, but there was no suspicion of friendliness to Turks or want of loyalty to us,

and the Muslim tribes and countries adjacent to India. Turkey was a Muslim country and England was at war with Turkey. Something spectacular had to be achieved to dazzle and overcome the Muslim world so that they may not side with Turkey, their co-religionists. Likewise, the Muslims in India had to be held in awe and the British Imperial might had to be displayed for keeping them under control. There were a large number of Muslim troops in the Army. Therefore, Baghdad,¹³ the city of legendary fame, had to be conquered. There

Telegram—P No. 92-G, dt. 4-12-1914.
from General Barrett, Basrah,
to the Chief of the General Staff :

Your W-8635, I consider, after investigation, that the report that Musalman soldiers had been refused burial rites is unfounded. The Afridi sepoy of 20th Punjabis were buried by a sepoy acting as Mullah and there was no demur, nor on this account has any dissatisfaction been shown. Disinclination to fight in the country which contains the sacred places, among them Baghdad, regarded as second only to Mecca, appears to be the cause of the trouble among the Afridis of the 20th Punjabis. Some of the Mohamedans of the Punjab, there is reason to believe, share this feeling, but I have no reason to suspect friendliness to Turks or any want of loyalty to us. If more extensive operations were undertaken, this might constitute a source of danger.

13. Moberli, F.J., Brig. Gen., 'The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918, Vol. II, 1924, pp. 1-33.

The Decision to advance to Baghdad

Hitherto the policy in Mesopotamia laid down by H. M's Government though consistantly cautious, had met with striking success. Sir John Nixon had been instructed in March 1915, by the Commander-in-Chief in India, as a precautionary measure, to draw out a plan for advance to Baghdad. In June 1915, it had appeared to the General Staff in India that the Russian advance into Armenia, combined with the Turkish preoccupation in the Dardanelles, had brought about a situation that rendered an advance to Baghdad a more feasible proposition. In August 1915, Sir John Nixon had suggested an advance to Baghdad as the best way of counter-acting unrest in Persia; and in September, Lord Hardings had written to Mr Chamberlain pointing out the great effect in the East which the capture of Baghdad would have.

After the victory of Kut, General Townshend pressed on in pursuit up the Tigris. The enemy had got about forty-eight hours start owing to the delays caused by the difficult navigation. General Nixon pressed for more ships and gun-boats to prevent the enemy making a further stand. Nixon believed that a pursuit, though unavoidably slow, would have demoralising effect upon the enemy and a correspondingly favourable effect on the local political situation.

were not enough troops to do the job. The lines of communications were stretched to nearly 500 miles, there was lamentable lack of both land and water transport and of stores, equipment, artillery, medical cover and the like. These considerations were overlooked. The

On the 3rd October, General Nixon wired that there was no longer any chance of surprising the retreating enemy, who would probably stand and fight at Ctesiphon. But he considered that he was strong enough to open the road to Baghdad which, from a military point of view, it was highly desirable to do; so that with this intention he proposed to concentrate at Aziziya.

The receipt at the India office of General Nixon's telegram of the 3rd October, stating that he proposed to concentrate at Aziziya with the intention of opening the road to Baghdad forced the authorities in England to consider immediately the question of an advance to Baghdad.

On the 5th, Mr Chamberlain wired privately to Lord Hardinge informing him that the cabinet had appointed a committee representing the war office, Admiralty, Foreign and India offices to consider in all its aspects the possibility and policy of an advance to Baghdad. "Political reasons were thought to make occupation desirable as isolating Germans in Persia, if forces available are sufficient to take and hold the place..... Kitchner can hold out no hope of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt. Let me know your views."

General Nixon answered Mr Chamberlain: "I am confident that I can beat Nur-ud-Din and occupy Baghdad without any addition to my present force. But if the Turks should turn their serious attention to the recovery of Baghdad and should send to Mesopotamia the large organised forces which would be necessary for such an operation, then I consider that I should require one division (and I should like also one white cavalry regiment) in addition to my present force to watch both the Tigris and Euphrates lines of approach and defeat the enemy as he comes within reach. Further, the Baghdad position would be the best to do this. Kut is 103 miles and Townshend at Aziziya is 48 miles from Baghdad by road."

The main points of the paper prepared for the war committee by the General Staff in consultation with Admiralty are as under:—

1. The success or disaster in Mesopotamia would mainly affect India.
2. The security of Syria, the Suez Canal and the security of Egypt were important as it would affect direct communications with India. Inter-reinforcement between—
 - (a) Constantinople and Dardanelles
 - (b) Caucasus
 - (c) Syria
 - (d) Mesopotamia.

was a lengthy business owing to lack of communications and the great distance involved.

Army moved from Qurna to Amara and then to Nasiriya and Kut-al-Amara. From the Kut the road led straight to Ctesiphon, but then came a sudden and complete collapse. It took the British several months to get back on their feet, and finally, they tumbled into the blue city of the Caliphs.

In February 1915, an additional infantry brigade (the 12th)¹⁴

The paper concluded on the Balkan and Dardanelles situation that if Austro-German forces reached Constantinople, or the Allies abandoned their Dardanelles position, bodies of Turkish troops would be available for operations elsewhere, probably against Egypt and Mesopotamia.

Regarding the Syrian problem the paper laid emphasis on defence of Egypt.

Regarding the Mesopotamian problem they agreed that the occupation of Baghdad within the next few weeks was a perfectly feasible operation.

Nixon's existing force was considered insufficient. Reinforcement of two divisions enabling him to maintain three divisions at the front was recommended.

The combined staffs were definitely against either occupation or a raid, if there was any doubt as to permission being given to military authorities to withdraw from Baghdad at their discretion, on military grounds.

They concluded that the force employed should be purely Indian, and that no troops should be diverted there from the primary theatre of war for the purpose of conducting this subsidiary operation.

The war office in consultation with the Viceroy of India agreed to spare two divisions from France.

On the 25th October 1915, after the receipt of the British Cabinet's decisions to advance on Baghdad, the Commander-in-Chief India issued orders for the mobilisation and concentration of an "Emergency Force" of two infantry brigades, two cavalry regiments and one brigade of artillery pending the arrival of divisions from France, to be put in hand at once to help General Nixon to open the road to Baghdad.

Mr Chamberlain expressed considerable anxiety about the situation in Dardanelles. The possibility of failure at the Dardanelles, however, seemed to make it all the more necessary to push Allied success in Mesopotamia, Mr Chamberlain expressed his confidence that General Nixon would carry out the coming advance with prudence: Lord Hardinge trusted that if evacuation of Dardanelles became necessary the Russians would be able to keep the Turks so busy elsewhere that they would be unable to undertake the difficult task of sending and supplying a large force to Mesopotamia. The difficulties and dangers of the long Turkish line of communications to Baghdad and the promised despatch of two Indian divisions as reinforcements for General Nixon seemed to justify the advance to Baghdad.

14. Moberley, F.J., Brig. Gen., *The Campaign in Mesopotamia*, His Majesty's Stationery, London, 1923, Vol. I, p. 173—

came from India, commandad by Maj Gen. K. Davison, and a month later two cavalry regiments and a horse battery arrived to form the nucleus of the 6th Cavalry Brigade. On April 9,¹⁵ Gen. Nixon landed at Basra and took over command of the IEF 'D'¹⁶, from General Barrett. Instructions¹⁷ given to General Nixon were :

“Firstly, to retain complete control of lower Mesopotamia; Secondly, safeguard the oilfields, pipelines and refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company;

Thirdly to submit plans for—

- (i) the effective occupation of the whole of the Basra Vileyat which included Amera and Nasiriya and
- (ii) for a subsequent advance on Baghdad.”

The 30th¹⁸ and 33rd¹⁹ Indian Infantry Brigades joined the Force of Nixon which was organised into an Army Corps comprising the 6th and 12th Divisions. The 12th Division was actually short of artillery and it was without any medical organisation.

A decisive action, the battle of Shaiba²⁰, known as the “miracle of Shaiba”, took place between April 12 and 14, 1915. The Turks were defeated. Major G.G.M. Wheeler²¹ of the 7th Hariana Lancers

12th Bde consisted of—

2nd Queen's own Royal West kent Regt.

4th Rajputs, 44 Merwara Inf.

90 Punjabis.

15. Ibid, p. 196.

16. IEF 'D', War Diary No. 5925, Appx. 330, Vol. 8, dt. 21-3-1915.

The CGS informed GOC, Force 'D' that it had been decided to reorganise Force 'D' as an Army Corps under Sir J. Nixon. Sir A. Barrett was to retain the VI Division and Gen. Gorringe was to have the 12th Division. General Davison was to be Inspector-General of Communications.

17. IEF 'D', War Diary No. 5925, Appx. 358, Vol. 8, dt. 3-3-1915.

18. IEF 'D' War Diary, No. 5032, Appx. 143, Vol. 8, dt. 10-3-1915.

30th Bde consisted of—

24th and 76th Punjabis and 2/7th Gurkhas. The Bde commanded by Maj. Gen. C.J. Mellis reached Basra on 6 April from Egypt.

19. IEF 'D' War Diary No. 5925, Appx. 330, Vol. 8, dt. 21-3-1915.

From CGS to Gen. Barrett, GOC Force 'D' Basra.

Reorganisation of Force 'D'.

20. Moberley, F.J., Brig. Gen., *The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1923, pp. 203-208.

21. *Gezette of India*, 1-9-1915.

was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously for "most conspicuous bravery at Shaiba, Mesopotamia on the 12th April 1915." A Turkish counter-attack²² failed and Basra seemed safe for the British. The Turks withdrew to Amara. General Townshend²³—the Arabs called him "Malbrouck"—took over as GOC 6th Division on 22 April. Through a series of brilliant amphibious actions, known as "Townshend's Regatta", he took Amara²⁴ on June 3 and occupied Nasiriya²⁵ on July 25. Greed and ambition grew and whitehall was now induced by the Viceroy to agree to an advance on Kut-al-Amara. The battle of Kut-al-Amara took place on 28th September.²⁶ Though the British forces were tired and exhausted, thirsty and distraught with intense heat, they had been marching and fighting without water and rest since the night before when Kut was occupied by the British on September 29, 1915.²⁷

The advance to Baghdad²⁸ was again seriously debated. It was decided that, "on both political and military grounds, the occupation of Baghdad was most desirable if the necessary reinforcements could be assured. Failing this, General Nixon was not to attempt it." Despite all the difficulties the advance was sanctioned. Baghdad was a touchstone; it could capture the imagination of the world, especially of the Asiatic countries. It seemed as if fate was luring the British into a deadly trap.

The advance began, but the redoubtable Turkish soldiers led by Nur-ud-din, gave the British a good drubbing at Ctesiphon. The battle of Ctesiphon continued from 22 to 25 November.²⁹ The Poona Division was buffeted and got knocked about. The British lost heavily. "The sick were nursing the sick, and the dying the dying". The British had no option but to retreat. They retreated to Lajj³⁰ which was reached on 26 November. It was decided to withdraw to Kut, 210 miles by river from Lajj, and the withdrawal

22. Moberley, F.J., Brig Gen, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918*, H.H.'s Stationery Office, London, 1923, p. 207.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 335.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

28. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 31.

29. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 103-105.

30. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 106.

commenced a day later. The retreating troops showed remarkable endurance, courage and discipline. Exhausted, weary and decimated but not broken in spirit, they reached Kut-al-Amara on December 2³¹ after having covered the forty-nine miles since the morning of 1st December. The Turks allowed no respite to the British and their attack on Kut began on December 4 and lasted till Christmas when they laid siege to Kut with a view to starving out its garrison. The entire British Division was encircled and trapped. Meanwhile, frantic efforts were made by the Government of India to augment³² their force in Mesopotamia. The 34th and 35th Indian Infantry Brigades, three field batteries, one Regiment of Indian cavalry and one company of Sappers and Miners were rushed immediately from India. It was at this time that the Indian Divisions in France—the 3rd and 7th Divisions—were diverted to Mesopotamia.

Several determined efforts were made to relieve Kut between January 4 and April 24, 1916, but they were thwarted by the stubborn fighting and valour of the Turks. Two expeditions under General Aylmer, including the actions at Shaikh Saad*, Wadi%, and Hanna@, and the third expedition under General Gorringe were of no avail. Nearly 22,000 Indian and British troops were killed in these attempts to save Kut. After a siege of 143 days the British Surrendered Kut on 29 April 1916. About 9,000 fighting men—6,000 Indian and 3,000 British—laid down their arms in a mass surrender. This was a monumental military disgrace and a colossal disaster which had wide political repercussions. British prestige slumped immensely.

Nevertheless, courage and fortitude were not altogether absent even during this losing fight. The Comradeship between the Indian and British troops remained at its best. Four Victoria Crosses were won, three by Indians and one by a British officer of the Indian Medical Service, Capt. J.A. Sinton.³³ Of the three Indian soldiers, who won the highest award for gallantry, i.e. the Victoria Cross, two,

31. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 133.

32. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 184.

* 6-8 January 1916.

%13-14 January 1916.

@ 21 January 1916.

33. *Gazette of India*, 21-6-1916.

Chattar Singh³⁴ of the 9th Bhopal Infantry and Lance Naik Lalla,³⁵ received it for the most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty in saving and protecting their British officers in the face of heavy enemy fire at considerable personal risk. The third recipient was Naik (later Jemadar) Shamad Khan³⁶ of the 89th Punjabis.

General Lake replaced General Nixon and the War Committee³⁷ in England took over control of the Mesopotamian Campaign on 26 January 1916. The advance on Baghdad began on 13 December 1916, and there was heavy fighting up to 24 February 1917. Kut was relieved, and with Turks now in retreat the British finally forced a passage across the river Diyala and entered Baghdad. Operations were conducted between March 14 and April 30, 1917, to consolidate the British position at Baghdad.

The Russian revolution started two days before the British entry into Baghdad and the British could no longer expect any help from the Tsar. The earlier plan of combining the Mesopotamian operations with those of the Russians in the Caucasus under the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas had, therefore, to be abandoned. In December, Russia arranged an armistice with Turkey, opened peace negotiations and stepped out of the war. The 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions moved out of Mesopotamia for Palestine. Their place was taken by the newly raised 17th and 18th Indian Divisions. Mosul was finally occupied by the British on 3 November 1918.

The Lahore and Meerut Divisions which served as the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions in Mesopotamia, moved to another theatre of war, Palestine, by January 1918, in time to play a notable part in Lord Allenby's final push in that region.

34. *Gazette of India*, 21-6-1916. Also refer to Appx. 'M' and Ser. 7 of Appx. 'D'.

35. *Gazette of India*, 26-9-1916. Also refer to Appx. 'M' and Ser. 8 of Appx. 'D'.

36. *Gazette of India*, 26-9-1916. Also refer to Appx. 'M' and Ser. 9 of Appx. 'D'.

37. Longer, V., '*Red Court to Olive Green*', Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, p. 164.

CHAPTER 6

INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 'B' AND 'C' IN EAST AFRICA

The General Suitability of the Climatic and Other Conditions¹ in East Africa for the Employment of Indian Troops

East Africa may be roughly divided into three areas:

1. The Lake Area, at a level of about 2,000-3,000 feet, gradually rising to the Upland Area. The Lake Area has the reputation of being unhealthy owing to the prevalence of malaria and sleeping sickness.
2. The Upland Area is at a level of 5,000-8,000 feet. It has the best reputation in the territories formerly German. The Upland Area in British East Africa is healthy and is suitable for Indians.
3. The Coast Area is more or less undulating country, gradually ascending as it extends inland. It is in this area that the troops first arrive from overseas.

Generally speaking, the climatic and other conditions of the East African coast area are most trying to Indian troops on active service. Their constitutions suffer to such a serious degree that this area may be regarded as unsuitable for their employment except for short periods, and then only with considerable precautions for the preservation of health.

The most important diseases in this area may be summarised as follows:

- (a) **Fevers.** Malaria, tick fevers, cerebro-spinal fever, black water fever.
1. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 15882, Appx. 200, Vol. 29, dt. 27.2-18; General Scott's report on his mission to East Africa regarding the welfare and condition of the Indian troops.

- (b) **Water borne diseases.** Dysentery, jigger fleas, biting flies, intestinal parasites.

“The fighting in East Africa has been of an extraordinarily difficult and trying nature. The open terrain of India is the converse of the African bush. Whereas an African takes to the bush, for safety, the Indian feels lost and loses confidence. The problems of Jungle Warfare were unknown to Indian troops such as humidity, sudden drop in night temperature, high rainfall, restricted movements because of the jungle terrain, restricted visibility from air and ground, difficulty of water, and large number of casualties due to diseases common to the terrain. The challenge of the terrain had to be faced by the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’ and ‘C’ in British East Africa and German East Africa.

On the outbreak of the war, the colonial office contemplated operations in the Hinterland of German East Africa. The first Indian soldiers who reached East Africa on 1 September 1914,² were the 29 Punjabis. Germans had occupied Taveta on 15 August 1914,³ and the arrival of the 29th Punjabis was just in time to meet the situation. Brigadier-General Stewart⁴ was entrusted the command of all regulars and volunteers in British East Africa and Uganda in September 1914. This force was called the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘C’⁵ and was entrusted the task of protecting the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line in East Africa.

The main Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’⁶, was sent from India

2. IEF ‘C’ War Diary No. 2647-W, Appx. 32, dt. 1-9-1914.
3. Longer, V., *Red Court to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, p. 168.
4. IEF ‘C’ War Diary No. 2748-W, Appx. 33, Vol. I, dt. 3-9-1914. Col. Stewart gazetted to temporary rank of Brig. Gen. from 2nd September 1914.
IEF ‘C’ War Diary No. 2855-W, Appx. 35, Vol. 1, dt. 4-9-1914. Brig. Gen. Stewart assumed the command of all regulars and volunteers in East Africa and Uganda.
5. IEF ‘C’, War Diary No. 750-W, Appx. 1, Vol. I, dt. 8-8-14.
6. IEF ‘B’, War Diary No. 934, Appx. 6, Vol. I, dt. 11-8-14. (The Viceroy of India suggested that with a view to preserve secrecy force for East Africa be called IEF ‘B’. IEF ‘B’ War Diary No. 1905, Appx. 83, Vol. I, dated 22-8-14.

From the Secretary of States to the Chief of General Staff, “I am directed

to invade the German possessions in East Africa, arrived in Mombasa on 1st November 1914. The force was commanded by General Atiken.⁷ The force initially comprised of:

- The Bangalore Brigade⁸
- The 98th Infantry⁸
- The 101st Grenadiers⁸
- The 28th Mt Battery⁸
- The 61st Pioneers⁸
- The 2nd Kadhmir Rifles⁹
- The Faridkot Sappers⁹
- A Composite Battalion of Gwalior and Nabha Infantry⁹
- 2nd Loyal North Lanchashire Regiment⁸

Some change was made in the composition of force 'B' in 1915. For details see Appendix 1.

The Force 'B', if needed could be reinforced¹⁰ by force 'C'. All supplies¹¹ of Force 'B' and Force 'C' were to be sent from India.

In October 1914,¹² Brig. Gen. Stewart of Force 'C' reported hostile concentration at Moshi to Momo on Tanga line. He suggested that Force 'B' should land at Tanga and establish itself on Tanga-Moshi line in cooperation with Force 'C'. It was hoped that this will have favourable effect in British East Africa as well as on German East Africa for conducting combined operations in future against Daras-Salem and Tabora.

Tsavo Action¹³

The British columns from Tsavo under the command of Major

to say that the Government of India sanction the accompanying "orders for the organisation of a force IEF 'B', for operations over-seas."

7. IEF 'B' War Dairy No. 1516, Appx. 52, Vol. 1, dt. 17-8-14 refers.
8. IEF 'B' War Dairy No. 3517, Appx. 24, Vol. 2, dt. 14-9-14.
9. IEF 'B' War Dairy No. 4177, Appx. 53, Vol. 2, dt. 22-9-14.
10. IEF 'B' War Dairy No. 1420, Appx. 37, Vol. I, dt. 16-8-14.
11. IEF 'B' War Dairy No. 3991, Appx. 85, Vol. I, dt. 22-8-14.
From the Secretary of States to the Viceroy of India, 'Please note that all supplies for forces 'B' and 'C', whether European, Indian or animals, must come from India'.
12. IEF 'B' War Dairy No. 5174, Appx. 11, Vol. 3, dt. 7-10-14.
13. IEF 'C' War Dairy No. 5374, Appx. 19, Vol. 3, dt. 10-10-14,

James encountered the enemy at a distance of 15 miles from Tsavo river on the 6 September 1914. The enemy entered after receiving a severe handling. They were pursued by 29 Punjabis, 45 King's African Rifles and occupied a position 5 miles out.

Major A.A. James with 2 Double Companies of 29 Punjabis were deployed at VOI, 65 African Rifles under Lieut Hardingham at Tsavo and 20 Mounted Infantry King's Rifles under Lieut Davis at Makteu. On receiving reports of more German troops down Tsavo, 29 Punjabis and 45 King's African Rifles left Tsavo to support Hardingham on 5th September.

At midnight on 5th and 6th September 1914, message was received from Capt Skinner, commanding the Double Coy 29 Punjabis, that the enemy were on the high hill between him and Tsavo. Major James directed him to drive the enemy eastwards to the position he was taking up on the ridge west of Tsavo station, 5 miles from it.

At 12-50 p.m. Major James heard firing about 1,000 yards in front. He received two messages from Capt Skinner, both despatched at 12-45 p.m. The first said that he had lost touch with the enemy, and the second, that the enemy were reported to be in the bush and that Capt. Pottinger, and I Coy of 29th Punjabis, and Lieut Phillips with 45 King's African Rifles, had been sent to intercept them. Owing to thickness of the bush Major James was unable to see the position either of his troops or of the enemy.

Lieut Foster, with his whole Coy, moved to take up a position on the hill to the north-west and reported firing on low hill south-west of his position.

On Capt Skinner's report that his troops were in possession of the enemy's position, Major James collected all the men he could, and advanced at 6 p.m. and met the rest of the force, retiring. As the man had no food, he withdrew to Tsavo for the night, leaving a picquet on the Signal Hill.

From Capt. Skinner's report it appears, that at 1-15 p.m. the second double Coy of 29th Punjabis located the enemy and advanced against his position. When within 400 yards, the enemy's dispositions were seen and Capt. Pottinger was sent, with 3 sections, to take the highest hill on their right, which was not held, and commanded the rest of the position. Capt. Pottinger himself led the way, but when nearing the enemy's right, he found he had only 10 men with him, the rest having lost touch with him in the thick

bush. He sent back Naik Gul Mahomed to bring up the rest, and proceeding on, himself, took the enemy in the flank, and silenced 2 machine-guns which were firing on the left front of our frontal attack. This was at a range of 200 yards, but as he was in danger of being out flanked, he fell back about 100 yards. Here Naik Gul Mahomed brought Subedar Sher Baz and the rest of his party to join the Captain. Pottinger then advanced and opened fire on the machine-guns 'a second time'. Naik Gul Mahomed fell severely wounded and Subedar Sher Baz was also wounded when gallantly attempting to drag him under cover. Capt. Pottinger attempted to rescue the Subedar, but the latter was killed by a shot on the head. Capt. Pottinger specially brought to notice the bravery and faithfulness of the late Subedar Sher Baz, who died while bravely attempting to save his comrade. Naik Gul Mahomed of the 29th Punjabis, who throughout the action, had shown great resource and pluck was twice severely wounded.

The action was creditable to all engaged in it considering thick thorn-bushes which rendered it impossible to see things even at a distance of only a few yards.

Capt. Pottinger led his double coy of 29th Punjabis with skill and determination. Subedar Sher Baz (killed) was awarded the IOM and Naik Gul Mahomed, twice severely wounded while showing great bravery, was also awarded the IOM.

Action at Gazi¹⁴

It was fought on 7 October 1914. The troops at Gazi, under the command of Major Hawthorne of the Ist King's African Rifles, consisted of half coy British Volunteers (Indian) Machine-Gun Coy, 2 coys of 29 Punjabis, Jhind Infantry (Imperial Service troops), C Coy Ist King's African Rifles, 1 Arab Coy, half Coy, King's African Rifles Reserve. The total was:

11 British officers
 37 British Rank and file
 608 Indian Rank and file
 182 African Rank and file
 6 Maxims

14. IEF 'C' War Diary No. 7013, Appx. 9, dt. 8-11-1914.
 (From GOC East Africa to His Excellency The Governor and C-in-C, East Africa Protectorate),

After the action at Majoreni on the 22nd September 1914, Gazi was reinforced by 'C' Coy, 1st King's African Rifles under Capt. Stonor.

On the 27th September, the enemy about five hundred strong, were reported between Kikoneni and Jombo just below Maji-ya-Chumbi. Two coys, 29 Punjabis, with 2 maxims were sent from VOI Maji-ya-Chumbi. On 28 September, the later proceeded to Mazeras. One coy of 27th Punjabis were moved from Mazeras to Killindini and then towed to Gazi; the other coy, 29th Punjabis at Mazeras, were ordered to send patrols to cover as advocate against Maji-ya-Chumbi.

On 3rd October 1914, the Jhind Imperial Service troops, and the British Maxim Gun Volunteers arrived at Mombasa with the remainder of the Expeditionary Force 'C'. They were immediately placed under the order of Major Hawthorne, who despatched them to Gazi. The Coy of the 29th Punjabis at Mazeras were ordered to march to Gazi via Tiwi.

On the 6th October, the enemy was seen at Nzole, advancing on Gazi in considerable number.

On the 7th October, the enemy's maxims opened fire at intervals from 8-30 a.m. to 10.00 a.m.

Lt Dent, who had been sent along the Mireli track with half coy Jhind Regt. and one section KAR reservists, reported that the enemy had fired at them not far from their trenches.

A half coy of Reservists and 15 men of the Maxim Coy were sent in support of Capt. Stonor. The 1 coy 29th Punjabis was ordered to combine in this movement by attacking the enemy's right flank.

Capt. Stonor's counter-attack was successful. It drove the enemy to his left front. Capt Stonor with 'C' coy, 1st KAR and a weak coy of the Jhind Regiment advanced to make a counter-attack against the enemy's left flank. Soon after starting they came under heavy fire, but the men pressed forward and put the enemy to flight. The enemy retired through Magemoni towards Kilulu.

The action was quite successful. It was fought in a thick rubber forest, which obstructed communications considerably.

The Indian Expeditionary Force 'B' in East Africa

Brig. Gen A.F. Atiken¹⁵ was selected to command IEF 'B'.

15. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 1516, Appx. 52, Vol. 1, dt. 17-8-14.

He along with Force 'B' landed¹⁶ at Mombasa and proceeded to Tanga on 1st November 1914. The Force managed to land on the outskirts of Tanga on 2nd November¹⁷ but could not occupy Tanga¹⁸ because of German opposition in a dense forest country. The enemy was strongly posted on the eastern edge of the town in houses prepared for defence. The IEF 'B' suffered heavily and movement was stopped for some time. The conduct of some units, especially of the 29th Punjabis was not found up to the mark. Supplies and water were not available at Mombasa and hence the force was moved to Zanzibar till further orders. The commander reorganised force 'B', despatched the Faridkot Sappers and Miners and the 28th Mountain Battery to Nairobi and the 2nd Kashmir Infantry to VOI. The remainders of the Force was kept near Mombasa.

Tanga Operations¹⁹ (2 Nov.—5 Nov. 1914)

At dawn on 2 November 1914, the IEF 'B' arrived on HMS 'Fox' on the eastern outskirts of Tanga, a place reported safe for landing. The 13th Rajputs and half of 61st Pioneers under Colonel Tighe got on land on 3rd November. Only slight opposition was offered. The 13th Rajputs, with the 61st Pioneers to support them, moved towards Tanga. Just outside Tanga an engagement took place and the 13th Rajputs were driven back by a superior force of the enemy. The 61st proved useless. The Force retired to its landing place. More troops, the 63rd, 101st and the 98th, disembarked on 3rd November. Col. Tighe took up an entrenched position, covering the landing place, and ordered Tanga to be attacked with 1 and half Kashmir Rifles on the right, and the North Lanchashire and the 63rd on the left. To left rear of the 63rd echeloned the 101st. The 98th was behind the north Lanchashire. The 61st and the 13th having been demoralised, they were put near Col. Tighe. The advance came under heavy fire when the men reached within 800 yards of the town. The 61st, the 63rd and part of the 13th were at once demoralised. The 101st got caught in a heavy cross-fire.

16. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 6547, Appx. 7D, Vol. 3, dt. 31-10-14.

17. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 6669, Appx. 73, Vol. 3, dt. 3-11-14.

18. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 6861, Appx. 2, Vol. 4, dt. 5-11-14. (From Brig. Gen. Atiken to CGS). The attempt to capture Tanga proved unsuccessful.

19. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 7132, Appx. 32, Vol. 4, dt. 10-11-14. (From Brig. Gen. Atiken to CGS). An account of Tanga operations,

The North Lanchashire and Kashmire Rifles advanced slowly under heavy fire. They forced their way into Tanga, but owing to lack of support could hold a line of only 500 yards east of Tanga.

Realising the futility of an attack on Tanga before superior numbers it was decided to withdraw on November 6, 1914, to avoid further disaster. Most of the units had broken and had thrown away their rifles in bushy country against superior numbers. The force took up defensive²⁰ position and prepared itself for future operations.

20. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 7635, Appx. 86, Vol. 4, dt. 18-11-14. Brig. Gen. Aitken was informed by the Secretary of State to adopt a defensive role for the time being.

Tanga operations: In the Tanga operations (2-5 November 1914) the following personnel were recommended for special consideration vide IEF 'B' War Diary—522, Appx. 48, Vol. 6, dt. 20-11-1914, p.27

1. Lieut Bala Saheb Daphle (Staff officer who carried orders under very heavy fire on 4 November 1914, during section.
2. Subedar Bakhtawar Singh 13 Rajputs was wounded on the morning of 3rd November, but in spite of it continued to lead his men with coolness and gallantry throughout the night.
3. No. 807 Acting Havildar—Major Mehar Ali 101st Grenadiers showed conspicuous gallantry throughout and did excellent work.
4. Lt. Col. Raghbir Singh of 3rd Kashmir Rifles and Lt. Col. Durga Singh of 2nd Kashmir Rifles, commanding officers of respective units handled their units with conspicuous gallantry and skill during the action on 4th November 1916.
5. Subedar Major Abdul Razak 63 Palam Cottah Light Infantry and Subedar Niamet Ullah Khan also displayed good conduct and gallantry.

Nominal Roll of Indian officers wounded in action at Tanga on 3rd and 4th November 1914, vide IEF 'B' *Casualty* Appendix. Vol. 5, p. 20.

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Rank and Name</i>	
13 Rajputs	Subedar Bakhtawar Singh	Shot wounds leg and thigh
"	Jemadar Naurang Singh	Shot wound left thigh slight
61 King George	Subedar Gangaya	Shot wound right thigh slight.
Own Pioneers	Subedar Mannikam	—do—
63rd Pallam Cottah Light Infantry	Sub Kadir Sharif	Left shoulder severe
	Sub Kesavulu	—do—
	Jem Abdul Azim	Right knee severe
101st Grenadiers	Sub Ranji Sawant	Bayonet wound
	Sub Yakob Khan	Right Buttock severe
	Jem Daji Sawant	Left Shoulder and neck severe

Brig. Gen. Aitken in consultation with Brig. Gen. Stewart made the following dispositions²¹ for the defence of the Protectorate.

1. British Infantry 28th MB at Nairobi.
2. $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn Kashmir Rifles, Faridkot S & M at VOI.
3. 1 Bn, Kashmir Rifles at Gazi.
4. 13 Rajputs at Uganda.
5. To guard the whole railway line the 25th and 26th Railway Companies.
6. One Railway Section from Nairobi to Lake—Armoured train.
7. The 101st, the 61st, the 63rd and the 98th at Mombasa.
8. Zanzibar, Rampur and Gwalior Contingents at Zanzibar.

Awaiting further orders, Gen. Aitken divided²² the area into parts—

- (i) Up to and including Mackinnon road station, i.e., the Mombasa area was placed under Gen. Wapshere.
- (ii) The remainder was to be under Gen. Stewart (without disturbing the present arrangement).

In December 1914, the command of IEF 'B' passed into the hands of Brig. Gen. Waphere, whose operational assessment was that the enemy was 7,000 strong in Moshi inclusive of native and European troops. They had large number of machine-guns, with them. Their strength on Dar-es-Sallam-Tabore railway line was estimated to be less than what it was in the Moshi area.

On 1st January 1915, the designation IEF 'B' was given to the amalgamated forces 'B' and 'C'.

The reorganised Force 'B' advanced towards Vanga and Jassin and retook them from the Germans. The Germans had occupied them on the outbreak of the war and had firmly established themselves on the Uмба river. During the advance the enemy offered resistance but suffered heavily. The advance was very difficult owing

2nd Kashmir Rifles	Sub Chattar Singh	Left Shoulder
	Sub Ranbir Singh	Right Shoulder and hand
3rd Kashmir Rifles	Lt. Col. Durga Singh	Head (severe)
	Bhadur IOM	
	Jem Talu	Right Thigh

The above casualties reflect that Indian soldiers displayed their soldierly qualities unmindful of their valuable lives.

21. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 7275. Appx. 45, Vo. 4, dt. 12-11-14.

22. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 7397, Appx. 59, Vol. 4, dt. 12-11-14.

to the paucity of transport, want of water and the region being covered with dense bush.

Longido Action²³

The enemy was in occupation of Longido, an isolated hill, some 10 miles inside German borders. Beyond the hill there was no water for 30 to 40 miles. After the arrival of the remainder of the Force 'C' preparation were made to attack Longido, simultaneously with the landing of Force 'B' on 2 November 1914. A gallant attempt was made by Colonel Drew of the 29th Punjab and his men to secure water supply and cut off the enemy's retirement. On 2 November 1914, troops of East African Rifles moved towards the south-east spur of Longido. On 3rd November, as the troops were ascending the hill at a point 5 miles from the base and 3000 feet above it, a dense mist engulfed the force and groping their way they tumbled into the enemy's camp at 4-15 a.m. and ran the enemy picquets. The enemy, thereupon, opened fire and our troops replied with a maxim gun and rifle fire. The troops of the 29th Punjabis, with the help of East African Rifles and the 27th Mt. Battery charged in a frontal attack and occupied the enemy's position. The Mt. Battery shelled the enemy's horses and men while they were retiring. The enemy sent reinforcements and gained the position of on the left flank

23. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 344, Appx. 27, Vol. 6, dt. 6-1-1915. (Despatch of Brig. Gen. Stewart, GOC East Africa and Uganda Protectorate, regarding operations in Longido on 3-11-1914).

Longido Action

The following were recommended for undermentioned awards in the Longido action :—

OBI

1. Sub Maj. Kesar Singh, 29th Punjab.
2. Sub Maj. Nur Alam 28th Mtn Battery.
3. Sub Prabhudan Singh 13 Rajputs.
4. Major Gandharb Singh 13 Rajputs.
5. Lt Col Haider Ali Khan, 2 Kashmir Rifles.
6. Major Ganash Lal Bharatpur Infantry.
7. Maj Gen Nacha Singh Jhind Infantry.

IOM

1. No. 727 Naik Bachan Singh, 27 Mtn Battery:
 2. No. 1087 Gunner Mal Singh, 27th Mtn Battery.
 3. No. 3856 L/Naik Sundar Singh, 30 Punjab attached to 29th Punjab. (IEF 'B' letter No. 221.B.1) Hqrs.1, dt. 20-11-1914)
- IEF 'B' Vol. 6, p. 17.

of a picquet of the Kapurthala Imperial Service troops. One coy of the 29th Punjabis and East Africa Rifles drove them back.

The Officer Commanding the column decided to retire during the night as the water supply for men and animals was short. Ammunition was also running out and there was no possibility of holding the position they had won. The 27th Mt. Battery, the Kapurthala Imperial Service troops and the 29th Punjabis retired to Manga river camp during the night after continuous marching and fighting for 38 hours. The enemy continued to fire on the retiring column after having occupied the position vacated by them.

As a reconnaissance in force the operation was valuable as it had spotted out the enemy disposition.

The enemy's casualties were estimated at 38 Europeans and 84 natives killed and wounded against 1 OR of Kapurthala infantry wounded and killed and 8 ORs of 29 Punjab killed and 17 wounded.

Umba Valley Action²⁴

The fighting in Umba valley began on 12 November 1915, with the attack of the enemy on a post at Jasin. The attack was beaten off. The enemy lost 1 German officer and 3 native soliders killed against 1 Subedar and 3 rank and file of Jind Infantry and one Rifleman of Kashmir Rifles. Later, in another enemy attack on 20 January 1915m the Jasin post was surrendered after a gallant fight. Lt Col Raghubir Singh, Kashmir Rifles, was killed with 40 others wounded.

Action Near Mbuyuni on 14 July 1915²⁵

By the beginning of July 1915, a railhead had been built at Maktau. The enemy's pressure increased on this railhead, using Mbuyuni as a hostile base. Gen. Malleon, GOC Force 'B', Nairobi, marched out of Maktau on 13th July and attacked Mbuyuni next morning. Later, realising that the enemy was in great strength, he decided to retire. The 29th Punjabis and the King's African Rifles retired to Maktau under enemy's heavy fire.

24. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 1035, Appx. 105, Vol. 6. dt. 14-1-1915.

(From Gen. Wapshere, Commanding Force 'B' to CGS).

25. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 18681 and 18682, Appx 67, Vol. 13, dt. 30-7-15.

(Report on Mbuyuni action on 14 July were received by CGS from GOC East Africa and Uganda).

From the outbreak of the war to the end of it on September 1915, touch with the enemy was maintained along a frontier of nearly 1000 miles, stretching from the sea to the Belgian Congo. In such a situation minor engagements with the enemy took place in which individual acts of gallantry were more conspicuous than pitched battles.

The various minor engagements include the following:

- 6 September 1914—Action at Tsavo river.
 - 13 September 1914—Action at Kisu.
 - 23 September 1914—Morjoreni heavily attacked by the enemy.
 - 26 September 1914—Action at Ingito hills.
 - 7 October 1914—Enemy attacked Gazi.
 - 5 November 1914—Action at Longido.
 - 16 December 1914 to 8 February 1915—Umba Valley operations.
 - 8 January—11 January 1915—Mafia operations.
 - 28 March 1915—Salaita hill affair.
 - 22nd June 1915—Action at Mbuyuni.
 - 3 September 1915—Mounted infantry affair near Maktau.
 - 21 September 1915—Affair at Longido west.
 - November 1914 to April 1915—Turkhana expedition.
- Indian troops had played an active part in the above actions.
Casualties up to the end of September 1915, amounted to:

	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>POWs</i>	
IO and African	21	28	13	
I ORs	539	625	395	
Total	560	653	408	
BO	33	46	4	
B ORs	105	118	37	(POW or missing)
Total	138	164	41	

26. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 8685, Appx. 75, Vol. 9, dt. 28-4-1915.

27. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 28459, Appx. 67, Vol. 16, dt. 24-11-15.

Assumption of Command of IEF 'B'

1. General Malleson took over command of IEF 'B' at Mombasa on 28-4-1915.²⁸
2. East Africa command divided into two in November 1915²⁷—
 - (i) Smith—Durien, GOC East Africa Mombasa;
 - (ii) Temp Maj Gen T.A. Bsidges, GOC Nairobi.
3. In October 1916, Lt Gen. Smuts²⁸ became GOC IEF 'B' with Headquarters at Dar-es-Salaam.
4. On 29-1-1917 Lt Gen Hoskins²⁹ assumed command of IEF 'B'.
5. Lt Gen Van Devanter appointed³⁰ GOC East Africa in succession to Gen Hoskins.

It was decided by the war office to close the campaign in East Africa as early as possible in order to effect economy in force. Most of the Indian units went back to India in the opening month of 1918 except for the 22nd Battery and a company of Sappers and Miners.

Causes of the Failure of Indian Troops in East Africa

The operational worthiness of the Indian units was very low because of adverse climate. The rate of sickness was very high. The number of sick in the hospitals was higher than those who were physically fit. Invariably due to lack of hospital facilities, and heavy sick rate the patients were discharged before they were fit. This resulted in relapses and further physical and mental strain and adversely affected the operational worthiness of the troops. Good Indian units could not fare as well as they were expected to do because of hazards of health peculiar to this theatre. As such a Commission under General Scotts was appointed on December 1917, to investigate the condition of Indian troops in East Africa. It worked from December 1917, to February 1918, and ultimately recommended the return of the troops to India. For details refer to the Appendix-1.

28. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 88977, Appx. 24, dt. 31-10-1916.

29. IEF 'B' War Diarp No. 6208, Appx. 22, Vol. 25.

Awards in East Africa: The Secretary of State informed that the proposal to delegate to GOC of the forces in East Africa the power to award the Indian Order of Merit and Indian Distinguished Service Medal to Indian troops for gallantry in the field was agreed to without referring it to the Govt. of India, IEF 'B' War Diary No. 55140, Appx. 13, Vol. 22m dt. 22-5-1916.

30. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 34022, Appx. 76, Vol. 26, dt. 23-5-1917.

The Commission, interalia reported the following causes of abnormal wastage of Indian units in East Africa :

1. Diseases like malaria, jigger, tick fever, black-water fever, dysentery, sun-fever, constipation etc. were the most common ailments which affected the health of the troops.
2. Shortage of sheep or goat milk and fruits was responsible for the poor health of the troops.
3. Absence of cooking facilities due to the scarcity of water caused much hardship. After dark the fire was not allowed to be lighted, with the result that the men either went hungry or worked up less fit for next day's work. Eating of stale food from heversack caused diarrhoea and even dysentery.
4. The Indians required large quantities of water. In East Africa it was to be found at long distances, and very often the source of supply was scanty and contaminated.
5. The military necessity of having to push regardless of transport resulted in considerable exhaustion, especially when marching under the hot tropical sun.
6. Due to transport shortage the troops had no change of clothing and had only a single blanket for weeks.
7. Even youthful soldiers could hardly bear the tropical sun of East Africa and the resulting fatigue. They frequently fell ill and slowly responded to medical treatment. It was very often necessary to discharge the sick from the hospital before they were absolutely fit to give room to others who needed treatment. They often had to be re-admitted to the hospital within a short period after their discharge.
8. Lastly, the issue of Khaki shorts to troops, use of short sleeves and open collars increased the chances of diseases from mosquitoes, thorns, ticks, jiggers and sun to the Indian troops.

To sum up, malaria, insufficient food, fatigue and exposure in strange surroundings under abnormal tropical conditions adversely affected the vitality of the Indian troops employed in East Africa. The shortage of transport affected the supply of food and carriage of field service kit. The infantry soldier acquired more weight. The fighting in East Africa had been extraordinarily difficult because of

health hazards and climate. It needed specialised training in bush-warfare. This area was unsuitable for employment of troops except for short periods.

In concluding the report the Commission recommended that :

1. All the Indian units, before they can be considered again for active service, should be given a period of complete rest in a suitable climate with plenty of good food.
2. On conclusion of the present operations maximum possible Indian units should be released to return to India.
3. Those Indian units which cannot be released immediately be sent for a period of 3 months each to convalesce in India or Nairobi or any other suitable place.

Appreciation of War Services by Commanders

In spite of their partial failure for reasons beyond their control, the Indian troops earned the appreciation of those who were in close touch with their work.

1. Bharatpur Imperial Service Infantry³¹

It gives me great pleasure to convey my appreciation of the excellent services rendered by the Bharatpur Imperial Service Infantry in East Africa. I look in this fine unit as a most reliable regiment and it has maintained a high reputation all through.

2. Gwalior Imperial Service Infantry³²

I desire to place on record at the departure of the Gwalior Imperial Service Infantry, my appreciation of the work done in East Africa by this unit. The employment of this regiment in the lines of the communications during the greater part of the campaign has been necessitated by circumstances, but the utility of its services is in no way diminished by this fact.

31. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 87869, Appx. 95, Vol. 28, dt. 26-12-15.

(From GOC East Africa, Dar-es-Salaam, to C-in-C India).

32. IEF 'B' War Dairy No 87870, Vol. 29, p. 115, dt. 26-12-1917.

(From GOC, East Africa, Dar-es-Salaam, to C-in-C, India)

33. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 87875, Vol. 29, dt. 26-12-17—Telegram P No. G—697, dt. 25-12-1918. (From Gen. Van Devanter to the C-in-C, India).

3. The Jhind Imperial Service Infantry³³

The Jhind Imperial Service landed in this country in September 1914. In action it has always done well, and through over three years campaigning in a very trying climate it has never lost its spirit of keenness. I look on it as a most reliable regiment and desire to place on record by appreciation of the excellent services it performed in East Africa.

4. The Kupurthala Imperial Service Infantry³⁴

The Kupurthala Imperial Service Infantry has kept its spirit and efficiency in a most creditable manner through 3 years active service in a trying climate and I wish to record my appreciation of the valuable services rendered in East Africa by this regiment.

5. The Kashmir Imperial Mountain Battery³⁵

The Kashmir Imperial Service Mountain battery has rendered good service in East Africa and has through out maintained a high standard of efficiency and discipline, and at the departure of this unit I wish to record my appreciation of the good services rendered.

6. The Faridkot Imperial Service S & M³⁶

The Faridkot Imperial Service Sappers and Miners have gained a fine reputation for its solidierly spirit and technical proficiency and its services have been of very great value to the campaign in East Africa. On departure of this unit I desire therefore to place on record my appreciation of the excellent work it had performed since its arrival in this country three years ago.

34. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 87876, Vol. 29, dt. 26-12-17. Telegram P No. G-898 dt. 25-12-1917. (From GOC, East Africa, Dar-es-Salaam to the C-in-C, India).

35. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 12274, Appx. 188, Vol. 29, dt. 14-12-18. Telegram P No. G-168-dt. 14 February 1918. (From GOC, Gen. Vandeventer Dar-es-Salaam to the C-in-C, India).

36. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 12292, Vol. 29, dt. 14-2-18. Telegram P No. C-169, dt. 14 February 1918.

7. The Rampur Imperial Service Infantry³⁷

As the Rampur Imperial Service Infantry are leaving East Africa I wish to record my appreciation of the work done by this unit in East Africa.

By force of circumstances it was generally employed on L of C but this in no way detracted from the value of the services it rendered.

37. IEF 'B' War Diary No. 18111, Appx. 6, Vol. 30, dt. 7-3-1918. Telegram P No. 243, dt. 6 March 1918. From Gen. Vandevanter to the C-in-C India,

CHAPTER 7

INDIAN ARMY IN EGYPT, PALESTINE AND SYRIA

For a clear comprehension of these campaigns a brief description of the geographical features of the region seems necessary. Here, as elsewhere, the results of the campaigns greatly depended upon this factor.

The Topography of Egypt, Palestine and Syria¹

The campaigns in Egypt, Palestine and Syria were fought along the valleys of the Euphrates and of the Nile. From Egypt the course of the Nile keeps close to the sea while passing over the inhospitable desert of Sinai, thence it runs up the fertile plains of Philistia and Sharon, leaving the highly rocky fortress of Judea to the east; crosses the Carmel Range by a low pass to the plain of Esdraelon or Megiddo; ascends past the sea of Galilee to the plateau east of the Jordan; and so on to Damascus and Aleppo.

The chief military theatres were Sinai, Palestine and Syria.

1. Sinai

The triangular-shaped Sinai Peninsula, 240 miles long from north to south, and approximately 120 miles from east to west, may be divided into three zones.

(a) *The northern zone.* It consists of a narrow coastal plain bordered by a belt of sand dunes of a breadth varying from five to fifteen miles. These sand dunes are impassable for wheels, and make it difficult going even for mounted men and infantry.

(b) *The central zone.* It is a barren stony plateau rising to a height of 3,000 feet. There are no made roads for vehicular traffic, but the going is better and firmer than in the northern zone.

1. Wavell, Field Marshal, *The Palestine Campaigns*, Sagar Publications, New Delhi, 1968, pp. 1-12,

(c) *The southern zone.* It is a mass of rocky precipitous mountains, some of which rise to 10,000 feet. The supply of water is precarious at all times, except after the winter rains. Water is scarest in the southern zone.

The construction of Suez canal during the time of Nepelean has contracted the desert by some fifty miles. However, crossing of the Peninsula could be accomplished only after serious preparation and organisation.

2. Palestine

The territory from Dan to Beersheba and from Mediterranean to the Hejaz Railway was known as Palestine. It is a small country. From Dan (Banias) to Beersheba is one hundred and fifty miles, from the Mediterranean at Jaffa to Hejaz Railway at Amman it is seventy-five miles. Its salient physical features are two mountain ranges. The eastern range, the Mountains of Moab (3,000-3,500 feet) sinks down gradually to the desert on the east and abruptly to the Jordan on the west. The other range, the Judaen Hills falls steeply to the Jordan, whereas on the Mediterranean side its descent to the coastal plain is more gradual. Between the two ranges runs the valley of the Jordan, seven feet below sea-level at Lake Huleh, 680 feet below at Lake Tiberias, and 1300 feet below at the Dead Sea. The dissecting of the country is completed by two depressions running east and west. The great depression is the Plain of Esdraelon, continued eastwards by the Yamruk valley; the lesser is between Samaria and Judea which may be defined by a line drawn from the sea to the Jordan following the River Auja (north of Jaffa), the Wadis Deir Ballut, En Nimur, and Es Samaieh, another river called Auja, flows into the Jordan eight miles north of Jericho.

From military considerations the Palestine theatre may then be subdivided into:

- (a) The Maritime Plain and Plain of Esdraelon;
- (b) The Judaen Hills
- (c) The Jordan Valley;
- (d) Transjordania.

(a) *The Plain Country—Philistia and Esdraelon.* These plains form natural and historical routes for great armies. The coastline is fringed by a strip of sand dunes, varying in width from a few hundred yards up to half a mile, and rising in places to a height of 150 feet above sea

level. Inland from the sand hills the plain stretches for some ten to fifteen miles to the foothills of the main Judaeen Range; it is gently undulating and intersected with numerous small wadis. From April to June it is under crops. In the dry season there are no serious obstacles to military movement along this plain from Gaza to Galilee, save one small stream, the Auja, north of Jaffa, and that low spur of the main range which divides Sharon from Esdraclon and ends near Haifa in Mount Carmel.

The Auja and the "brook kishon" in the plain of Esdraclon are the only perennial streams of running water.

Climate

The plain land of Palestine is on the whole healthy, though special precautions against malaria are necessary. The summer is hot, but not unbearable. The khamsin winds are most oppressive and provoke intolerable thirst.

The chief feature of its climate is its division into a dry and a rainy season. The regular rains last from November to March. There is also little rain at the end of October, and late in March and April. During the rainy season large tracts of plain land become a sea of mud, and the roads are often impassable.

(b) *Judaen Hills.* The Judaen Range consists of a narrow tableland at an average height of 2,400 feet with frequent spurs shooting east and west at right angles to the main ridge. The direction of the spurs, between which run deep wadis, make the move of an army a difficult task in the face of any opposition. The climate is healthy. Few means exist for storing water, which runs rapidly off. Consequently, the problem of providing water to a large army in the hills during the summer is a serious one.

In 1914 only two roads for wheels crossed the range: one from north to south by Nazareth, Nablus, Jerusalem, Hebron to Beersheba; another from east to west—by Jericho and Jerusalem. Jaffa operations in the Judaen range were bound to be slow in view of limited means of communications.

(c) *The Jordan Valley.* The Jordan valley and the Dead Sea act as a serious barrier to passage between the Judaen Range and the Mountains of Moab. The river is not a formidable obstacle by itself. The steepness of the descent from and ascent to the mountains on either side, the poor communications, and the sweltering heat of

the deeply-cleft valley have combined to restrict inter-course between the inhabitants of the two hill ranges.

(d) *Trans—Jordan*. The table-land east of the Jordan carries the railway from Damascus to the Hejaz, from which point the Turkish line of communication to Palestine branches off at Deraa Junction. The railway, and the whole of Trans—Jordania lies open to raid from the desert.

3. Syria

The country lying between the Mediterranean and the desert, from Aleppo in the north to Galilee in the south, was called Syria.

The Juadaean hills have as their counterpart in Syria a much loftier series of ranges which stretch along the coast right up to the Tarus Mountains; the most southern of these is the range of the Lebanons. The western slope of these syrian mountains comes down close to the sea. The eastern chain, the continuation northwards of the Mountains of Moab, is formed by Mount Hermon and the Anti-Lebanon. Enclosed between them and the Lebanon is the fertile valley of El Bekaa. The southern slopes of Hermon descend to the Hauran plateau. North of the anti-Lebanon, about Homs, the eastern range sinks to a plateau running north-east to the Euphrates. From Homs to Aleppo the ground is open and level. Syria is more fertile than Palestine. It is irrigated by several large streams, and the difficulties of water supply are less. The climate is similar to that of Palestine.

Communications

(a) *Sea Communications*. Syria has two small harbours in Alexandretta and Beirut, neither of them was satisfactory. Haifa was good for anchorage but had no facility as a port. Jaffa was a harbour only in the name.

(b) *Railways*. The railways existing in Syria and Palestine at the outbreak of the war were:

- I. Muslimie—Aleppo—Homs—Rayak.
- II. Homs—Tripoli.
- III. Beirut—Rayak—Damascus—Mezerib.
- IV. Damascus—Daraa—Amman—Maan—Medina.
- V. Deraa—Mezerib—Yamruk valley—Afule—Haifa.
- VI. Afule—Sileh,

VII. Jaffa—Jerusalem.

(c) *Roads.* Few metalled roads existed either in Syria or in Palestine. During the dry season, many tracks were passable for wheeled transport, including heavy motor transport. The wet season was a handicap for the movement of motor transport.

The commanders had to plan their operations keeping in view the variety of terrain, climate, shortage of water, influence of rainy season on operations and lack of good maps.

**OBJECTIVES OF THE CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT, PALESTINE
AND SYRIA**

Introduction

The entry² of Turkey into the war in November 1914, on Germany's side resulted in the following:

- (a) It closed the Dardanelles and broke the link with the Russian ally.
- (b) It created a danger to the South Persian Oil fields.
- (c) It Posed a danger to the Suez Canal.
- (d) It created peculiar internal situation in Egypt.

ORIGINAL OBJECT³

Protection of Suez Canal

The original objective in maintaining a force in Egypt was to guard the canal throughout its length of 100 miles. This was hard to achieve on account of Turkish raids.

Advance to the Palestine Border

In 1916 Sir Archibald⁴ Murray became the Commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force ("EEF"). He thought that passive defence of the canal was very wasteful of men and material. The

2. Machunn, Lieut. General, Sir George, "History of the Great War", *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 1.15.
3. Wavell, Field Marshal, *The Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 15.
- 4, *Ibid.*, p. 41,

true strategical base for the defence of Egypt lay between El Arish and Kossima. His proposal to occupy Katia was approved by the War Office⁵ but judgement on further advance to El Arish was reserved.

Influence of Other Theatres

Events in other theatres of the war impelled a forward Policy⁶ in Palestine and gradually developed into a desire to administer the coup-de-grace to the Ottoman Empire. The events are traced in a chronological order.

1916 A.D.

(a) *The defensive policy.*⁷ The Russian offensive in the Caucasus diverted large Turkish forces to that front from Palestine. The danger to Palestine was thus reduced and it assumed the position of a defensive theatre only.

(b) *Offensive policy.*⁸ In December 1916, Lylod George succeeded Asquith as Prime Minister. One of his first acts, in accordance with his policy of "always searching for the joints in Germany's armour elsewhere than on the western front", was to send a telegram to the Eastern Command to say that success in the East was much required owing to the failure of the battle of Somme and of the Russian offensive. In compliance General Murray started making progress in Palestine with his available forces. The first move was the action at Raffa.

1917 A.D.

(a) *Large scale operations deferred.*⁹ In January the war cabinet sent a telegram to defer any large scale operations until later in the year, owing to preparations of a spring offensive in France. General Murray, however, set his eyes on improving the communications up to Wadi Ghuzze and even had an eye to capture Gaza. This resulted in the first battle of Gaza (26-27 April 1917).

(b) *Jerusalem as objective.*¹⁰ In March, while engaged in the first

5. Ibid., p. 42.

6. Ibid., p. 15.

7. Ibid., p. 58.

8. Ibid., p. 58.

9. Ibid., p. 67.

10. Ibid., p. 83.

battle of Gaza, General Murray was told by the War Cabinet to make Jerusalem his immediate objective. The second battle of Gaza (17-19 April 1917) ensued.

(c) *General Allenby takes over the command of the EEF.* The failure of the French offensive in Champagne made Lylod George more adamant in his search for elsewhere. The cabinet decided to reinforce¹¹ the EEF from the Salonica theatre and General Allenby was appointed the new commander of this force. The Prime Minister interviewed General Allenby and told him that Jerusalem was wanted as a Christmas¹² gift for the British Nation.

(d) *Sustaining fourth year of war.* The spring of 1917 had been bitterly disappointing for the allies. Russia had collapsed. The French offensive in Champagne had been a failure. U.S.A. had just entered the war. Some striking success was needed in the fourth year of the war, to keep the morale of the civil population high. The collapse of Russia had released large Turkish forces for the recapture of Baghdad. The best counter-stroke seemed a full-scale offensive, in Palestine. The Prime Minister sent another telegram repeating the importance of capturing Jerusalem.

(e) *To force Turkey out of the war.*¹³ Immediately after the fall of Jerusalem, the Cabinet asked General Allenby for his future plans as it was the aim of the Cabinet to force Turkey out of the war.

1918 A.D.

(a) *Offensive policy in Palestine.* The Supreme War Council¹⁴ met at Versailles in February and passed a plan of campaign for the early part of 1918. The gist of it was to stand on the defensive in the west and to knock out Turkey in Palestine. Two Indian Divisions from Mesopotamia were moved for Palestine.

(b) *Defensive policy.* In March, when the EEF was scrambling through the hills of Moab, the German drive began in France as troops were available to them after the collapse of Russia. In view of these developments General Allenby was asked to adopt a defensive¹⁵

11. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 173-174.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

attitude. 24 battalions were withdrawn from the theatre for the west and were replaced by Indian troops.

(c) *After the Somme.* General Allenby was left free to proceed with his own plans.

While making ready for the grand effort, the Commander-in-Chief, by a system of continuous raids by small forces, wore down the enemy's morale. Having thus prepared the ground, he poured down his famous divisions of cavalry and infantry for the attack on Damascus and Aleppo.

THE FIRST PHASE—SINAI THE DEFENCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

The First Turkish Attack

Turkey declared war on 5th November 1914, against Great Britain and her allies. This posed immediate threat to Great Britain in the oil fields of South Persia and to the Suez Canal. No risks were taken with either of these vital responsibilities. On 6th November 1914, the 6th Division¹⁶ from India landed at Shatt-el Arab. As the news came in of Turkish concentration in Palestine and Syria the immediate need for full trained troops was felt. In the middle of September, the 9th Sirhind¹⁷ Brigade and a brigade of mountain artillery were retained temporarily out of the 3rd Indian Division as it passed through to France. The Sirhind Brigade was relieved by the newly arrived troops from India and sailed on 23rd November¹⁸ to rejoin its division in France.

On the 20th November¹⁹ a patrol of 20 men of the Bikaner Camel Corps was attacked at Bir en Nuss, 20 miles east of Qantara, by the Turks. This was the first act of hostility. The party extricated itself with more than half of its numbers becoming casualties. By December the defence²⁰ of the Suez Canal was entrusted to twenty four Indian battalions forming part of the 10th and the 11th Indian Divisions and

16. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

17. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 14.

18. Wavell, F.M., *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968.

19. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 20,

20. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (India), the Bikaner Camel Corps, three batteries of Indian mountain artillery, and a battery of Egyptian artillery—about 30,000 men in all.

Sir John Maxwell entrusted to Major-General Wilson,²¹ commander of the 10th Indian Division, the defence of the Canal which was divided into three sectors.

The following was the disposition²² of troops in the Canal defence on 15th January 1915.

G.O.C. Canal Defence—Major General A. Wilson.

SECTOR—I

(Port Tewfik to Genecfe, both inclusive)

Headquarters—Suez.

Troops

30th Brigade (24th and 76th Punjabis, 126th Baluchis, 2/7th Gurkha Rifles)

1 Squadron Imperial Service Cavalry.

1 Coy Bikaner Camel Corps.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Coy Sappers and Miners.

1 Indian Field Ambulance.

SECTOR—II

(Deversoir to El Ferdan, both inclusive)

Headquarters—Ismailia old Camp.

Troops

22nd Brigade, less 3rd Brahamans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10 Gurkha Rifles).

28th F.F. Brigade (51st and 53rd Sikhs, 56th Punjabis, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Squadron Imperial Service Cavalry.

Bikaner Camel Corps (less $3\frac{1}{2}$ Coys)

M.G. section of Egyptian Camel Corps

1 Brigade R.F.A. (T)

21. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 27.
22. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 31-33.

1 Battery Indian Mountain Artillery
2 Field Ambulances.

SECTOR—III

(El Ferdan, exclusive, to Port Said, inclusive).

Troops

29th Brigade (14th Sikhs, 69th and 89th Punjabis, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Bn. 22nd Brigade.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Coy Sappers and Miners.

1 Squadron Imperial Service Cavalry

2 Coys Bikaner Camel Corps

2 Batteries R.F.A. (T.A.)

26th Battery Indian Mountain Artillery.

Armoured Train with $\frac{1}{2}$ coy, Indian Infantry.

Wireless Section (T)

Indian Field Ambulance

Detachment R.A.M.C. (T)

ADVANCED ORDNANCE DEPOT, ZAGAZIG

Troops

1 Bn. 32nd (I.S.) Brigade

1 Troop Imperial Service Cavalry

$\frac{1}{2}$ Coy Bikaner Camel Corps.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Coy Indian Infantry

GENERAL RESERVE CAMP, MOASCAR

Troops

31st Brigade (less 1 Coy), (2nd Q.V.O. Rajput L.I., 27th Punjabis, 93rd Burma Infantry, 128th Pioneers).

32nd (I.S.) Brigade, less 1 Battalion (33rd Punjabis, Alwar, Gwalior and Patiala Infantry).

Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (less 3 Squadrons and 1 Troop)

1 Egyptian R.E. Section (Camels)

1 Egyptian Mountain Battery

2 Sections Field Artillery with Cavalry Brigade.

3 Indian Field Ambulances.

Immediately on the declaration of war with Turkey, Egypt had evacuated all the frontier posts²³, held by local Arab Police in Sinai. The Turks promptly occupied El Arish and Nekhl.

The Advance of the Turks

The Turkish force in Syria and Palestine was about 60,000. Djemal Pasha²⁴ was the Commander of the Fourth Army. The Headquarters of the VI corps was at Adana and the Headquarters of the VIII was at Damascus. The Turkish force that assembled around Beersheba in mid January 1915, for march to the canal consisted of 20,000 men. The principal units were 25th Division (Arab), one regiment of the 23rd Division, the 10th Division, one cavalry regiment and some camel companies and mounted Bedouin.

The expedition against Egypt was planned with the object that as the Turkish forces will draw nearer, the Egyptians would revolt against the British.

There were three possible lines of advance of the Turks:

- (a) By the coast road from El Arish, through Bir el Abd and Katia to Kantara.
- (b) By the central tracks from Beersheba and Auja by Hassana and the Wadi Muksheib towards Ismailia.
- (c) From El Kossaima by Nekhl to Suez.

Djemal Pasha elected to send his major force along the central route, sending smaller forces along the other two routes to secure the flanks and to deceive the British as to the real line of attack. The main body, moving in two echelons at one day's interval, left Beersheba in the middle of January. The crossing of the desert was accomplished in ten days. On January 26th and 27th posts towards either extremity of the line at Kantara and at Kubri (seven miles north of Suez) were attacked. On the threatened front there were posts (each of two companies of Indian Infantry) on the east bank at Ferdan, Ferry Post (just opposite Ismailia) Tussum, Serapeum, and Deversoir (just north of Great Bitter Lake). The remainder of the defending force was on the west bank.

23. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 28.

24. *Ibid*,

The Turkish attack²⁵ was delivered at 3 a.m. on 3rd February 1915, under cover of darkness. They succeeded in launching pontoons and rafts to the canal bank just south of Tussum. Only three pontoons reached the west bank, and the occupants of these were killed. The attempt was a failure.

Notwithstanding the failure of their night attack, the Turks advanced again by daylight against the line Tussum and Senapeum to force a crossing. They feinted meanwhile at Ferdan and Kantara. The attack made no headway, and soon after mid-day the Turks began to retreat. The garrison of Deversoir Post (two companies of Gurkhas) had previously attempted a counter-attack on the Turkish left flank. Apart from this the withdrawal of the Turks was unmolested. It was not till the next day that the Imperial service cavalry Brigade crossed the canal at Ferry Post with the mission of reconnaissance and not of pursuit. Djemal Pasha, who was present in person, ordered a retreat to Beersheba.

The results of the attack showed the Turks that by mere threat of blocking the canal large number of British troops in Egypt could not be immobilised. Accordingly, while their main force withdrew to Beersheba, Kress was left in the desert with a force of three battalions, two mountain batteries and a squadron of camelry to keep British anxieties alive by minor enterprises and raids against the canal.

The Western Desert Campaign

In 1915, there were no Turkish troops to spare for any renewal of large scale hostilities against the canal. The Turkish troops were busy in a hazardous and ambitious enterprise—the invasion of the Caucasus in mid-winter and landing of British troops at Helles and Anzac in April 1915, and in the subsequent struggle for the Gallipoli Peninsula. The small force²⁶ of Kress von continued to sow mines in the canal and wreck the railway on the western bank. As the threat to the canal had receded, one Indian brigade (the Gurkhas) departed for Gallipoli, another to Basra, and yet another to Aden. The canal front being thus weakened, Turkish troops from the Yemen threatened

25. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 37-52.

26. Wavell, Field Marsnal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 33.

attack. The reduction in the garrison had caused some anxiety to General Maxwell.

In December 1915, the Turks incited the Senussi²⁷ against their British enemies in Egypt and Sudan. The Senussi force 5000 strong, was manned by Turks. General Wallace²⁸ engaged the enemy near Mersa, Matruh, Hazalin on 13th and 25th December 1915, and on 23rd January 1916 respectively. On 20th February 1916, Major General Peyton²⁹ succeeded General Wallace and defeated the Senusites by 14th March at Sollum. Thus the Turkish danger in the western desert was wiped out.

The Second Turkish Attack on the Canal

In the beginning of 1916, the defence of the canal³⁰ became a serious problem for the British. The Turkish troops released from Gallipoli posed a serious threat for a fresh invasion of Egypt. The news of constant departure of formations from Egypt compelled the Turkish Higher Command, on German bidding, to order some activity towards the canal, in the hope of alarming the British and preventing any further withdrawal of troops.

In March 1916,³¹ Sir Archibald Murray was appointed Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, the title of which was also changed at the same time to that of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force³² (EEF).

Sir Archibald Murray reviewed the problem of defence of Egypt. He looked upon the passive defence of the canal as very wasteful of men and material and considered the occupation of El Arish and Kossaima vital for the defence of Egypt as it blocks the northern

27. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

The Senussites were a religious sect of Islam founded by a pious Sheikh of the Sahara Desert. His aim was to unite all Moslems of North Africa into one brotherhood based on principles of Islam.

28. Macmunn, Lt General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 107.

29. Waveil, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 37-38.

30. Macmunn, Lt Gen., *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 154-174.

31. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications Delhi, 1968, p. 41.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

route across the Sinai. His proposal to take Katia was approved by the war office but on the question of further advance to El Arish the judgement was reserved. At the end of February, construction of a standard gauge railway from Kantara towards Katia war started.

Action of Katia³³

Kress von Kressenstein set out in the middle of April 1916, along the northern route. He had with him two battalions and one coy of the 32nd Regiment, a regiment of Irregular Arabs on camels and a battery and a half of mountain artillery.

The 5th Mounted Brigade (Warwickshire, Yeomanry, Gloucestershire Hussars, Worcestershire Yeomanry) was at this time in the Katia district, covering construction of the railway, which was now approaching Romani. On the evening of 22nd April, two squadrons of the Worcesters were at Oghratina, four miles east of Katia. Kress's raiding force after a nights march, fell on the detachment at Oghratina at 4.30 a.m., on the 23rd. The Yeomanry were surprised and overwhelmed. The Turks then pressed on to Katia which they succeeded in taking. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, however, re-occupied Romani and Katia on 25th. The Turks withdrew to Bir el Abd. After his success at Katia, Kress made no further move for nearly three months.

The Battle of Romani³⁴

The standard-gauge railway from Kantara reached Romani in the middle of May, and the 52nd (Lowland Division) was moved forward to occupy a position there. A light railway had been built from Port Said to Mahemdiya; a branch of standard-gauge line from Romani to Mahemdiya was completed in June and thus railway communication was established close behind the whole position.

In early July Kress moved again. His force consisted of the 3rd (Anatolian) Division and Pasha I. The objective of this new venture was to reach and entrench a position within gun range of the canal, so as to interrupt traffic.

33. Macmunn, Lt. General. *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 154-162.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-203

Steps were at once taken to reinforce No. 3 Section of the Canal Defences, in which forward position at Romani was included. On July 22nd this was held by the 52nd Division and one brigade of the 53rd Division and 42nd Division was also placed under command of Major General Lawrence, Commander of No. 3 Section. At El Ferdan (in No. 2 section) a mobile column of four companies of the Imperial Camel Corps and four Squadrons was formed, under Lieut. Colonel C.L. Smith, VC.

On 24th July, the Turks after advancing within ten miles of Romani, made practically no further move for ten days.

The British troops (1st and 2nd A.L.H.) Brigades kept the Turks under close watch. One of these two brigades in turn used to move out before dawn each morning, and reconnoitered the enemy's position, returning to Romani at nightfall. On the evening of August 3rd Kress's troops followed up the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, while it was returning to its camp, with the intention of surprising the British and seizing Wellington Ridge during the night. Anticipating an imminent Turkish attack, General Chauvel had placed the 1st A.L.H. on the line stretching from Katib Ganit to Hod el Enna. The Turkish attack, therefore, met strong resistance and in the process the 1st A.L.H. Brigade was forced back on the Wellington Ridge on 4th August. Having seen that the British were in a strong position, Kress withdrew. On 6th and 7th August he withdrew to El Arish after fighting several rear guard actions. Romani was thus a decided victory for British arms.

In October 1916,³⁵ Sir Archibald Murray moved his headquarters from Ismailia to Cairo. It was through Murray's foresight that the standard-gauge railway and the 12 inch pipe-line had been laid. It made possible the subsequent advance of the Army up to and beyond the gates of Aleppo. The railway and the pipe-line reached Romani in the middle of November.

Advance to El Arish³⁶

The period of three or four months following the battle of Romani, during which the railway was brought within striking dis-

35. Wazell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 59.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-251.

tance of the Turkish position at El Arish, caused much, weariness to the troops in the desert. Early in December, the advanced guard of the Eastern Force, known as desert column, came under the command of Lieut. General Sir Phillip Chetwode. It consisted of Anzac Mounted Division, the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade and 42nd and 52nd Divisions. When the mounted troops surrounded El Arish on the morning of 21st December, they found the place unoccupied.

Capture of Magdhaba³⁷

The enemy had retired partly on Rafa and partly on Magdhaba. Chetwode decided to strike at the latter force at once, and despatched against it General Chauvel with the Anzac Mounted Division, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade. On 23rd December, after a night march of twenty miles up the wadi El Arish Magdhaba was captured by 4.30 p.m. The force returned to El Arish during the night of 23rd/24th December.

As a result of the occupation of El Arish and the destruction of their rear guard at Magdhaba, the Turks withdrew the remainder of their posts from Sinai.

Action at Rafa³⁸

The next move was against the only enemy troops still remaining within Egyptian territory, a detachment of some 2,000 at Rafa, twenty-five miles to the east. The railway reached El Arish on 4th January 1917, and on 8th January General Chatwode, with Anzac Mounted Division, 5th Mounted Brigade the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade surrounded the Turkish position south-west of Rafa on 9th. In view of strong Turkish resistance General Chetwode had given orders for withdrawal. Before the orders could reach them the New Zealand Mounted Brigade had cleared a central position by a fine bayonet charge. The whole Turkish garrison surrendered with heavy casualties. The action at Rafa finally freed Egyptian soil from Turkish occupation.

First Battle of Gaza³⁹

General Murrey's army had now approached the southern frontier of Palestine.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 253-258.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 262-279.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 279-320.

After the loss of his detachments at Magdhaba and Raffia, Kress had occupied and entrenched a strong position at wadi, Sheikh Nuran just west of Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzze. Here he directly covered the Turkish railway to Beersheba and indirectly protected Gaza. On 5th March he withdrew to Gaza-Beersheba line as he expected a British attack.

In view of Turks withdrawal from Shellal and continued avoidance of battle General Dobell planned to attack Gaza.

On the evening of 25th March, a force was assembled to move on Gaza. The Desert column at Deir el Belah, the 54th Division near in Seriat, the 52nd Division at Khan Yunus, and the Camel Corps Brigade at Abasan El Kebir, just south-east of Khan Yunus, were included in it. In outline, the plan was that the mounted troops should form a screen north-east, and south-east of Gazaso as to prevent the retreat of the garrison. They were also to stop reinforcements coming to the Turks. The 53rd Division was to assault Gaza.

The town of Gaza is grouped on and around a small hill. About a mile from the town an irregular ridge runs from north-east to south-west. This is the famous Ali Muntar Ridge, the real key to the defence of the town.

In the early hours of 26th March the troops reached their allotted positions. By 5.30 p.m. Ali Muntar, afterwards known as the Green Hill, was successfully occupied. It was, however, soon lost to the Turks in a strong counter-attack. There was no longer any hope of retaking Gaza. During the evening of the 27th the line was withdrawn to the west bank of wadi Ghuzze.

The Second Battle of Gaza⁴⁰

On the War Cabinet's insistence to dispose of Turkey, General Murray expressed the hope of capturing Gaza and of conducting a successful campaign in Palestine.

The Turkish line round Gaza ran from the sea across three to four thousand yards of Sandhills on to a feature known as Samson Ridge. Ali Manter was the real core of the defence.

The whole of the 3rd Division formed the garrison of Gaza, the 16th Division returned to Tel esh Sheria; while the 53rd Division and 79th Regiment formed a group between them. A detachment of two

40. Ibid, pp. 326-349,

battalions and a battery held Beersheba; the 3rd Cavalry Division was in reserve near Huj.

The first stage of General Dobell's plan of battle began on 17th April. The 54th and 52nd Divisions crossed the Wadi Ghuzze, and reached the allotted positions, with little opposition and few casualties. The 18th was spent in preparation for the final stage fixed for 19th April. At 7. 15. a.m., the 53rd Division advanced to attack along the coast. Simultaneously, 54th and 52nd Divisions launched their assaults. Further to the right Imperial Mounted Division made a dismounted attack on the Atawineh works, while the Anzac Mounted Division protected the flank against the Hareira Redoubt.

Various attacks were pressed in vain. The Turkish defences were impregnable. General Dobell gave up attempt to attack Gaza.

The British casualties were about 6,500 against 2,000 of Turks.

Events from April to July 1917

The Turks were elated at their double success at Gaza. They settled down along the Gaza-Beersheba road as far east as Sheria, with Beersheba held as a detached post. More reinforcements joined Kress's force.

General Chetwode⁴¹ succeeded General Dobell at the Eastern Force headquarters shortly after the second battle of Gaza. The command of the mounted troops passed to General Chauvel, from whom General Chaytor, a New Zealander, took over the Anzac Mounted Division. The British line ran from Sh. Ajlin on the sea by Samson's Ridge and Blazed Hill to Mansura and Sh. Abbas. At Sh. Abbas close contact with the enemy ceased, and the line turned sharp back, to reach the Wadi Ghuzze at Tel el Jemmi, south-west of El Mandur. Hence the wadi was held as far as Gamli by a series of detached posts.

The failure of the French offensive in Champagne made Lloyd George more keen in his search for "a way round" the apparent deadlock on the western front. News of the Turkish concentration for the recapture of Baghdad was beginning to arrive and demanded some counter measure. So the Cabinet decided to reinforce the E.E.F from the unprofitable Salonica theatre.

41. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 89,

The 7th and 8th Mounted Brigades arrived at the beginning of June from Salonica. Reinforcements⁴³ from Salonica, India and Aden were rushed. While these reinforcements were arriving the communications of the force were being improved. A branch of the railway from Rafa to Shellal was begun at the end of April in order to broaden the front.

The War Cabinet with their resolve to invade Palestine appointed Sir Edmund Allenby⁴³ to command the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. He took over command on 28 June.

The Third Battle of Gaza⁴⁴

The decision of the War Cabinet to reinforce E.E.F. and to undertake the conquest of Palestine made this theatre the most important centre of conflict outside Europe for the remainder of the war.

Throughout the war there was an incessant conflict of views between "the Westerners"—those who held that every possible man and weapon should be mustered against the main army of the principal enemy, and that all outside commitments should be reduced to the minimum compatible with mere safety—and "the Easterners"—those who believed that western front was impenetrable to either combatant, and that victory could more easily be won by striking down Germany's weaker allies and thus gradually tighten the iron ring round Germany herself.

Mr Lloyd George, the then Prime Minister, was the most persistent and persuasive advocate of the latter policy. He now had an additional reason for searching success in Palestine. The spring of 1917 had been bitterly disappointing for the Allies. Russia had collapsed, the French offensive in Champagne had been a failure. All hope of ending the war in 1917 was lost. The British Premier believed that some striking military success was needed to sustain the endurance of the civil population in the fourth year of the war. It was this belief that prompted him to say to General Allenby before his departure to Egypt that "he wanted Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation."

42. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

43. Macmunn, Lieut. General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine* His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 368.

44. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 95-97,

There were sound strategical reasons for striking a blow on the Palestine front at this time. The collapse of Russia, had set free numerous Turkish forces, and it was known that these were being assembled round Aleppo under German guidance and leadership, for the recapture of Baghdad. The threat thus offered to the Mesopotamian sector of the battle line could be more quickly and economically countered by an offensive in Palestine than by direct reinforcement of General Maude's army. Thus, General Allenby's main strategical objective was the defeat of the Turkish army in southern Palestine in order to draw down the Turkish reserves from Aleppo, and in this way to remove danger of an expedition against Baghdad.

Early in 1917 Turkey as the religious head of Islam was in a miserable plight. Out of the four sacred cities in charge of Turkey, two—Mecca and Baghdad—were already in the hands of her enemies, while Medina was besieged and Jerusalem threatened. Not only was she losing the war, but forfeiting her religious prestige as well.

The German High Command decided that some spectacular exhibition was required to restore the shrinking faith of their ally and suggested the reconquest of Baghdad. The negotiations that followed between Constantinople and Berlin it was decided to assemble a Turkish army at Aleppo and to support it with a special body of German troops (known as Pasha II or the Asia Corps). The projected operation for secrecy's sake was to be called "Yilderim⁴⁵"—that is to say, "lightning". The nucleus of the Yilderim force was to be the III and XV Army Corps. They were to constitute the Seventh Army, of which Mustapha Kemal was appointed the Commander. The headquarters of staff Yilderim consisted of sixty-five German officers and nine Turks.

Even before the second Battle of Gaza the staff of the Eastern Force had been considering an advance by the right as an alternative to a direct assault on Gaza. The obvious line of advance into Palestine was also by Gaza, keeping close to the sea. This route secured the full advantage of naval cooperation, directly covered the main line of communication, and presented comparatively small difficulties of water supply. But the defences of Gaza were now too solid to be broken except by a slow and costly process of siege.

45. Cyrill Falls, *Military Operations, in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1930, pp. 5-7.

VII. Jaffa—Jerusalem.

(c) *Roads.* Few metalled roads existed either in Syria or in Palestine. During the dry season, many tracks were passable for wheeled transport, including heavy motor transport. The wet season was a handicap for the movement of motor transport.

The commanders had to plan their operations keeping in view the variety of terrain, climate, shortage of water, influence of rainy season on operations and lack of good maps.

**OBJECTIVES OF THE CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT, PALESTINE
AND SYRIA**

Introduction

The entry² of Turkey into the war in November 1914, on Germany's side resulted in the following:

- (a) It closed the Dardanelles and broke the link with the Russian ally.
- (b) It created a danger to the South Persian Oil fields.
- (c) It Posed a danger to the Suez Canal.
- (d) It created peculiar internal situation in Egypt.

ORIGINAL OBJECT³

Protection of Suez Canal

The original objective in maintaining a force in Egypt was to guard the canal throughout its length of 100 miles. This was hard to achieve on account of Turkish raids.

Advance to the Palestine Border

In 1916 Sir Archibald⁴ Murray became the Commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force ("EEF"). He thought that passive defence of the canal was very wasteful of men and material. The

2. Machunn, Lieut. General, Sir George. "History of the Great War", *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 1.15.
3. Wavell, Field Marshal. *The Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 15.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 41,

true strategical base for the defence of Egypt lay between El Arish and Kossima. His proposal to occupy Katia was approved by the War Office⁵ but judgement on further advance to El Arish was reserved.

Influence of Other Theatres

Events in other theatres of the war impelled a forward Policy⁶ in Palestine and gradually developed into a desire to administer the coup-de-grace to the Ottoman Empire. The events are traced in a chronological order.

1916 A.D.

(a) *The defensive policy.*⁷ The Russian offensive in the Caucasus diverted large Turkish forces to that front from Palestine. The danger to Palestine was thus reduced and it assumed the position of a defensive theatre only.

(b) *Offensive policy.*⁸ In December 1916, Lylod George succeeded Asquith as Prime Minister. One of his first acts, in accordance with his policy of "always searching for the joints in Germany's armour elsewhere than on the western front", was to send a telegram to the Eastern Command to say that success in the East was much required owing to the failure of the battle of Somme and of the Russian offensive. In compliance General Murray started making progress in Palestine with his available forces. The first move was the action at Raffa.

1917 A.D.

(a) *Large scale operations deferred.*⁹ In January the war cabinet sent a telegram to defer any large scale operations until later in the year, owing to preparations of a spring offensive in France. General Murray, however, set his eyes on improving the communications up to Wadi Ghuzze and even had an eye to capture Gaza. This resulted in the first battle of Gaza (26-27 April 1917).

(b) *Jerusalem as objective.*¹⁰ In March, while engaged in the first

5. Ibid., p. 42.

6. Ibid., p. 15.

7. Ibid., p. 58.

8. Ibid., p. 58.

9. Ibid., p. 67.

10. Ibid., p. 83.

battle of Gaza, General Murray was told by the War Cabinet to make Jerusalem his immediate objective. The second battle of Gaza (17-19 April 1917) ensued.

(c) *General Allenby takes over the command of the EEF.* The failure of the French offensive in Champagne made Lylod George more adamant in his search for elsewhere. The cabinet decided to reinforce¹¹ the EEF from the Salonica theatre and General Allenby was appointed the new commander of this force. The Prime Minister interviewed General Allenby and told him that Jerusalem was wanted as a Christmas¹² gift for the British Nation.

(d) *Sustaining fourth year of war.* The spring of 1917 had been bitterly disappointing for the allies. Russia had collapsed. The French offensive in Champagne had been a failure. U.S.A. had just entered the war. Some striking success was needed in the fourth year of the war, to keep the morale of the civil population high. The collapse of Russia had released large Turkish forces for the recapture of Baghdad. The best counter-stroke seemed a full-scale offensive, in Palestine. The Prime Minister sent another telegram repeating the importance of capturing Jerusalem.

(e) *To force Turkey out of the war.*¹³ Immediately after the fall of Jerusalem, the Cabinet asked General Allenby for his future plans as it was the aim of the Cabinet to force Turkey out of the war.

1918 A.D.

(a) *Offensive policy in Palestine.* The Supreme War Council¹⁴ met at Versailles in February and passed a plan of campaign for the early part of 1918. The gist of it was to stand on the defensive in the west and to knock out Turkey in Palestine. Two Indian Divisions from Mesopotamia were moved for Palestine.

(b) *Defensive policy.* In March, when the EEF was scrambling through the hills of Moab, the German drive began in France as troops were available to them after the collapse of Russia. In view of these developments General Allenby was asked to adopt a defensive¹⁵

11. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 173-174.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

attitude. 24 battalions were withdrawn from the theatre for the west and were replaced by Indian troops.

(c) *After the Somme.* General Allenby was left free to proceed with his own plans.

While making ready for the grand effort, the Commander-in-Chief, by a system of continuous raids by small forces, wore down the enemy's morale. Having thus prepared the ground, he poured down his famous divisions of cavalry and infantry for the attack on Damascus and Aleppo.

THE FIRST PHASE—SINAI THE DEFENCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

The First Turkish Attack

Turkey declared war on 5th November 1914, against Great Britain and her allies. This posed immediate threat to Great Britain in the oil fields of South Persia and to the Suez Canal. No risks were taken with either of these vital responsibilities. On 6th November 1914, the 6th Division¹⁶ from India landed at Shatt-el Arab. As the news came in of Turkish concentration in Palestine and Syria the immediate need for full trained troops was felt. In the middle of September, the 9th Sirhind¹⁷ Brigade and a brigade of mountain artillery were retained temporarily out of the 3rd Indian Division as it passed through to France. The Sirhind Brigade was relieved by the newly arrived troops from India and sailed on 23rd November¹⁸ to rejoin its division in France.

On the 20th November¹⁹ a patrol of 20 men of the Bikaner Camel Corps was attacked at Bir en Nuss, 20 miles east of Qantara, by the Turks. This was the first act of hostility. The party extricated itself with more than half of its numbers becoming casualties. By December the defence²⁰ of the Suez Canal was entrusted to twenty four Indian battalions forming part of the 10th and the 11th Indian Divisions and

16. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

17. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 14.

18. Wavell, F.M., *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968.

19. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 20.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (India), the Bikaner Camel Corps, three batteries of Indian mountain artillery, and a battery of Egyptian artillery—about 30,000 men in all.

Sir John Maxwell entrusted to Major-General Wilson,²¹ commander of the 10th Indian Division, the defence of the Canal which was divided into three sectors.

The following was the disposition²² of troops in the Canal defence on 15th January 1915.

G.O.C. Canal Defence—Major General A. Wilson.

SECTOR—I

(Port Tewfik to Geneffe, both inclusive)

Headquarters—Suez.

Troops

30th Brigade (24th and 76th Punjabis, 126th Baluchis, 2/7th Gurkha Rifles)

1 Squadron Imperial Service Cavalry.

1 Coy Bikaner Camel Corps.

½ Coy Sappers and Miners.

1 Indian Field Ambulance.

SECTOR—II

(Deversoir to El Ferdan, both inclusive)

Headquarters—Ismailia old Camp.

Troops

22nd Brigade, less 3rd Brahamans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10 Gurkha Rifles).

28th F.F. Brigade (51st and 53rd Sikhs, 56th Punjabis, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Squadron Imperial Service Cavalry.

Bikaner Camel Corps (less 3½ Coys)

M.G. section of Egyptian Camel Corps

1 Brigade R.F.A. (T)

21. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 27.
22. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 31-33.

1 Battery Indian Mountain Artillery
2 Field Ambulances.

SECTOR—III

(El Ferdan, exclusive, to Port Said, inclusive).

Troops

29th Brigade (14th Sikhs, 69th and 89th Punjabis, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Bn. 22nd Brigade.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Coy Sappers and Miners.

1 Squadron Imperial Service Cavalry

2 Coys Bikaner Camel Corps

2 Batteries R.F.A. (T.A.)

26th Battery Indian Mountain Artillery.

Armoured Train with $\frac{1}{2}$ coy, Indian Infantry.

Wireless Section (T)

Indian Field Ambulance

Detachment R.A.M.C. (T)

ADVANCED ORDNANCE DEPOT, ZAGAZIG

Troops

1 Bn. 32nd (I.S.) Brigade

1 Troop Imperial Service Cavalry

$\frac{1}{2}$ Coy Bikaner Camel Corps.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Coy Indian Infantry

GENERAL RESERVE CAMP, MOASCAR

Troops

31st Brigade (less 1 Coy), (2nd Q.V.O. Rajput L.I., 27th Punjabis, 93rd Burma Infantry, 128th Pioneers).

32nd (I.S.) Brigade, less 1 Battalion (33rd Punjabis, Alwar, Gwalior and Patiala Infantry).

Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (less 3 Squadrons and 1 Troop)

1 Egyptian R.E. Section (Camels)

1 Egyptian Mountain Battery

2 Sections Field Artillery with Cavalry Brigade.

3 Indian Field Ambulances.

Immediately on the declaration of war with Turkey, Egypt had evacuated all the frontier posts²³, held by local Arab Police in Sinai. The Turks promptly occupied El Arish and Nekhl.

The Advance of the Turks

The Turkish force in Syria and Palestine was about 60,000. Djemal Pasha²⁴ was the Commander of the Fourth Army. The Headquarters of the VI corps was at Adana and the Headquarters of the VIII was at Damascus. The Turkish force that assembled around Beersheba in mid January 1915, for march to the canal consisted of 20,000 men. The principal units were 25th Division (Arab), one regiment of the 23rd Division, the 10th Division, one cavalry regiment and some camel companies and mounted Bedouin.

The expedition against Egypt was planned with the object that as the Turkish forces will draw nearer, the Egyptians would revolt against the British.

There were three possible lines of advance of the Turks:

- (a) By the coast road from El Arish, through Bir el Abd and Katia to Kantara.
- (b) By the central tracks from Beersheba and Auja by Hassana and the Wadi Muksheib towards Ismailia.
- (c) From El Kossaima by Nekhl to Suez.

Djemal Pasha elected to send his major force along the central route, sending smaller forces along the other two routes to secure the flanks and to deceive the British as to the real line of attack. The main body, moving in two echelons at one day's interval, left Beersheba in the middle of January. The crossing of the desert was accomplished in ten days. On January 26th and 27th posts towards either extremity of the line at Kantara and at Kubri (seven miles north of Suez) were attacked. On the threatened front there were posts (each of two companies of Indian Infantry) on the east bank at Ferdan, Ferry Post (just opposite Ismailia) Tussum, Serapeum, and Deversoir (just north of Great Bitter Lake). The remainder of the defending force was on the west bank.

23. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Dehli, 1968, p. 28.

24. *Ibid*,

The Turkish attack²⁵ was delivered at 3 a.m. on 3rd February 1915, under cover of darkness. They succeeded in launching pontoons and rafts to the canal bank just south of Tussum. Only three pontoons reached the west bank, and the occupants of these were killed. The attempt was a failure.

Notwithstanding the failure of their night attack, the Turks advanced again by daylight against the line Tussum and Senapeum to force a crossing. They feinted meanwhile at Ferdan and Kantara. The attack made no headway, and soon after mid-day the Turks began to retreat. The garrison of Deversoir Post (two companies of Gurkhas) had previously attempted a counter-attack on the Turkish left flank. Apart from this the withdrawal of the Turks was unmolested. It was not till the next day that the Imperial service cavalry Brigade crossed the canal at Ferry Post with the mission of reconnaissance and not of pursuit. Djemal Pasha, who was present in person, ordered a retreat to Beersheba.

The results of the attack showed the Turks that by mere threat of blocking the canal large number of British troops in Egypt could not be immobilised. Accordingly, while their main force withdrew to Beersheba, Kress was left in the desert with a force of three battalions, two mountain batteries and a squadron of camelry to keep British anxieties alive by minor enterprises and raids against the canal.

The Western Desert Campaign

In 1915, there were no Turkish troops to spare for any renewal of large scale hostilities against the canal. The Turkish troops were busy in a hazardous and ambitious enterprise—the invasion of the Caucasus in mid-winter and landing of British troops at Helles and Anzac in April 1915, and in the subsequent struggle for the Gallipoli Peninsula. The small force²⁶ of Kress von continued to sow mines in the canal and wreck the railway on the western bank. As the threat to the canal had receded, one Indian brigade (the Gurkhas) departed for Gallipoli, another to Basra, and yet another to Aden. The canal front being thus weakened, Turkish troops from the Yemen threatened

25. Macmunn, Lieut General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 37-52.

26. Wavell, Field Marsnal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 33.

attack. The reduction in the garrison had caused some anxiety to General Maxwell.

In December 1915, the Turks incited the Senussi²⁷ against their British enemies in Egypt and Sudan. The Senussi force 5000 strong, was manned by Turks. General Wallace²⁸ engaged the enemy near Mersa, Matruh, Hazalin on 13th and 25th December 1915, and on 23rd January 1916 respectively. On 20th February 1916, Major General Peyton²⁹ succeeded General Wallace and defeated the Senussites by 14th March at Sollum. Thus the Turkish danger in the western desert was wiped out.

The Second Turkish Attack on the Canal

In the beginning of 1916, the defence of the canal³⁰ became a serious problem for the British. The Turkish troops released from Gallipoli posed a serious threat for a fresh invasion of Egypt. The news of constant departure of formations from Egypt compelled the Turkish Higher Command, on German bidding, to order some activity towards the canal, in the hope of alarming the British and preventing any further withdrawal of troops.

In March 1916,³¹ Sir Archibald Murray was appointed Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, the title of which was also changed at the same time to that of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force³² (EEF).

Sir Archibald Murray reviewed the problem of defence of Egypt. He looked upon the passive defence of the canal as very wasteful of men and material and considered the occupation of El Arish and Kossaima vital for the defence of Egypt as it blocks the northern

27. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

The Senussites were a religious sect of Islam founded by a pious Sheikh of the Sahara Desert. His aim was to unite all Moslems of North Africa into one brotherhood based on principles of Islam.

28. Macmunn, Lt General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 107.

29. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 37-38.

30. Macmunn, Lt Gen., *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 154-174.

31. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications Delhi, 1968, p. 41.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

route across the Sinai. His proposal to take Katia was approved by the war office but on the question of further advance to El Arish the judgement was reserved. At the end of February, construction of a standard gauge railway from Kantara towards Katia war started.

Action of Katia³³

Kress von Kressenstein set out in the middle of April 1916, along the northern route. He had with him two battalions and one coy of the 32nd Regiment, a regiment of Irregular Arabs on camels and a battery and a half of mountain artillery.

The 5th Mounted Brigade (Warwickshire, Yeomanry, Gloucestershire Hussars, Worcestershire Yeomanry) was at this time in the Katia district, covering construction of the railway, which was now approaching Romani. On the evening of 22nd April, two squadrons of the Worcesters were at Oghratina, four miles east of Katia. Kress's raiding force after a nights march, fell on the detachment at Oghratina at 4.30 a.m., on the 23rd. The Yeomanry were surprised and overwhelmed. The Turks then pressed on to Katia which they succeeded in taking. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, however, re-occupied Romani and Katia on 25th. The Turks withdrew to Bir el Abd. After his success at Katia, Kress made no further move for nearly three months.

The Battle of Romani³⁴

The standard-gauge railway from Kantara reached Romani in the middle of May, and the 52nd (Lowland Division) was moved forward to occupy a position there. A light railway had been built from Port Said to Mahemdiya; a branch of standard-gauge line from Romani to Mahemdiya was completed in June and thus railway communication was established close behind the whole position.

In early July Kress moved again. His force consisted of the 3rd (Anatolian) Division and Pasha I. The objective of this new venture was to reach and entrench a position within gun range of the canal, so as to interrupt traffic.

33. Macmunn, Lt. General. *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1928, pp. 154-162.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-203

Steps were at once taken to reinforce No. 3 Section of the Canal Defences, in which forward position at Romani was included. On July 22nd this was held by the 52nd Division and one brigade of the 53rd Division and 42nd Division was also placed under command of Major General Lawrence, Commander of No. 3 Section. At El Ferdan (in No. 2 section) a mobile column of four companies of the Imperial Camel Corps and four Squadrons was formed, under Lieut. Colonel C.L. Smith, VC.

On 24th July, the Turks after advancing within ten miles of Romani, made practically no further move for ten days.

The British troops (1st and 2nd A.L.H.) Brigades kept the Turks under close watch. One of these two brigades in turn used to move out before dawn each morning, and reconnoitered the enemy's position, returning to Romani at nightfall. On the evening of August 3rd Kress's troops followed up the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, while it was returning to its camp, with the intention of surprising the British and seizing Wellington Ridge during the night. Anticipating an imminent Turkish attack, General Chauvel had placed the 1st A.L.H. on the line stretching from Katib Ganit to Hod el Enna. The Turkish attack, therefore, met strong resistance and in the process the 1st A.L.H. Brigade was forced back on the Wellington Ridge on 4th August. Having seen that the British were in a strong position, Kress withdrew. On 6th and 7th August he withdrew to El Arish after fighting several rear guard actions. Romani was thus a decided victory for British arms.

In October 1916,³⁵ Sir Archibald Murray moved his headquarters from Ismailia to Cairo. It was through Murray's foresight that the standard-gauge railway and the 12 inch pipe-line had been laid. It made possible the subsequent advance of the Army up to and beyond the gates of Aleppo. The railway and the pipe-line reached Romani in the middle of November.

Advance to El Arish³⁶

The period of three or four months following the battle of Romani, during which the railway was brought within striking dis-

35. Wazell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p. 59.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-251.

tance of the Turkish position at El Arish, caused much, weariness to the troops in the desert. Early in December, the advanced guard of the Eastern Force, known as desert column, came under the command of Lieut. General Sir Phillip Chetwode. It consisted of Anzac Mounted Division, the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade and 42nd and 52nd Divisions. When the mounted troops surrounded El Arish on the morning of 21st December, they found the place unoccupied.

Capture of Magdhaba³⁷

The enemy had retired partly on Rafa and partly on Magdhaba. Chetwode decided to strike at the latter force at once, and despatched against it General Chauvel with the Anzac Mounted Division, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade. On 23rd December, after a night march of twenty miles up the wadi El Arish Magdhaba was captured by 4.30 p.m. The force returned to El Arish during the night of 23rd/24th December.

As a result of the occupation of El Arish and the destruction of their rear guard at Magdhaba, the Turks withdrew the remainder of their posts from Sinai.

Action at Rafa³⁸

The next move was against the only enemy troops still remaining within Egyptian territory, a detachment of some 2,000 at Rafa, twenty-five miles to the east. The railway reached El Arish on 4th January 1917, and on 8th January General Chatwode, with Anzac Mounted Division, 5th Mounted Brigade the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade surrounded the Turkish position south-west of Rafa on 9th. In view of strong Turkish resistance General Chetwode had given orders for withdrawal. Before the orders could reach them the New Zealand Mounted Brigade had cleared a central position by a fine bayonet charge. The whole Turkish garrison surrendered with heavy casualties. The action at Rafa finally freed Egyptian soil from Turkish occupation.

First Battle of Gaza³⁹

General Murrey's army had now approached the southern frontier of Palestine.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 253-258.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 262-279.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 279-320,

After the loss of his detachments at Maghaba and Raffia, Kress had occupied and entrenched a strong position at wadi, Sheikh Nuran just west of Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzze. Here he directly covered the Turkish railway to Beersheba and indirectly protected Gaza. On 5th March he withdrew to Gaza-Beersheba line as he expected a British attack.

In view of Turks withdrawal from Shellal and continued avoidance of battle General Dobell planned to attack Gaza.

On the evening of 25th March, a force was assembled to move on Gaza. The Desert column at Deir el Belah, the 54th Division near in Seriat, the 52nd Division at Khan Yunus, and the Camel Corps Brigade at Abasan El Kebir, just south-east of Khan Yunus, were included in it. In outline, the plan was that the mounted troops should form a screen north-east, and south-east of Gazaso as to prevent the retreat of the garrison. They were also to stop reinforcements coming to the Turks. The 53rd Division was to assault Gaza.

The town of Gaza is grouped on and around a small hill. About a mile from the town an irregular ridge runs from north-east to south-west. This is the famous Ali Muntar Ridge, the real key to the defence of the town.

In the early hours of 26th March the troops reached their allotted positions. By 5.30 p.m. Ali Muntar, afterwards known as the Green Hill, was successfully occupied. It was, however, soon lost to the Turks in a strong counter-attack. There was no longer any hope of retaking Gaza. During the evening of the 27th the line was withdrawn to the west bank of wadi Ghuzze.

The Second Battle of Gaza⁴⁰

On the War Cabinet's insistence to dispose of Turkey, General Murray expressed the hope of capturing Gaza and of conducting a successful campaign in Palestine.

The Turkish line round Gaza ran from the sea across three to four thousand yards of Sandhills on to a feature known as Samson Ridge. Ali Manter was the real core of the defence.

The whole of the 3rd Division formed the garrison of Gaza, the 16th Division returned to Tel esh Sheria; while the 53rd Division and 79th Regiment formed a group between them. A detachment of two

40. *Ibid*, pp. 326-349,

battalions and a battery held Beersheba; the 3rd Cavalry Division was in reserve near Huj.

The first stage of General Dobell's plan of battle began on 17th April. The 54th and 52nd Divisions crossed the Wadi Ghuzze, and reached the allotted positions, with little opposition and few casualties. The 18th was spent in preparation for the final stage fixed for 19th April. At 7. 15. a.m., the 53rd Division advanced to attack along the coast. Simultaneously, 54th and 52nd Divisions launched their assaults. Further to the right Imperial Mounted Division made a dismounted attack on the Atawineh works, while the Anzac Mounted Division protected the flank against the Hareira Redoubt.

Various attacks were pressed in vain. The Turkish defences were impregnable. General Dobell gave up attempt to attack Gaza.

The British casualties were about 6,500 against 2,000 of Turks.

Events from April to July 1917

The Turks were elated at their double success at Gaza. They settled down along the Gaza-Beersheba road as far east as Sheria, with Beersheba held as a detached post. More reinforcements joined Kress's force.

General Chetwode⁴¹ succeeded General Dobell at the Eastern Force headquarters shortly after the second battle of Gaza. The command of the mounted troops passed to General Chauvel, from whom General Chaytor, a New Zealander, took over the Anzac Mounted Division. The British line ran from Sh. Ajlin on the sea by Samson's Ridge and Blazed Hill to Mansura and Sh. Abbas. At Sh. Abbas close contact with the enemy ceased, and the line turned sharp back, to reach the Wadi Ghuzze at Tel el Jemmi, south-west of El Mandur. Hence the wadi was held as far as Gamli by a series of detached posts.

The failure of the French offensive in Champagne made Lloyd George more keen in his search for "a way round" the apparent deadlock on the western front. News of the Turkish concentration for the recapture of Baghdad was beginning to arrive and demanded some counter measure. So the Cabinet decided to reinforce the E.E.F from the unprofitable Salonica theatre.

41. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, p, 89,

The 7th and 8th Mounted Brigades arrived at the beginning of June from Salonica. Reinforcements⁴² from Salonica, India and Aden were rushed. While these reinforcements were arriving the communications of the force were being improved. A branch of the railway from Rafa to Shellal was begun at the end of April in order to broaden the front.

The War Cabinet with their resolve to invade Palestine appointed Sir Edmund Allenby⁴³ to command the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. He took over command on 28 June.

The Third Battle of Gaza⁴⁴

The decision of the War Cabinet to reinforce E.E.F. and to undertake the conquest of Palestine made this theatre the most important centre of conflict outside Europe for the remainder of the war.

Throughout the war there was an incessant conflict of views between “the Westerners”—those who held that every possible man and weapon should be mustered against the main army of the principal enemy, and that all outside commitments should be reduced to the minimum compatible with mere safety—and “the Easterners”—those who believed that western front was impenetrable to either combatant, and that victory could more easily be won by striking down Germany’s weaker allies and thus gradually tighten the iron ring round Germany herself.

Mr Lloyd George, the then Prime Minister, was the most persistent and persuasive advocate of the latter policy. He now had an additional reason for searching success in Palestine. The spring of 1917 had been bitterly disappointing for the Allies. Russia had collapsed, the French offensive in Champagne had been a failure. All hope of ending the war in 1917 was lost. The British Premier believed that some striking military success was needed to sustain the endurance of the civil population in the fourth year of the war. It was this belief that prompted him to say to General Allenby before his departure to Egypt that “he wanted Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation.”

42. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

43. Macmunn, Lieut. General, *Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine* His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1928, p. 368.

44. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 95-97,

There were sound strategical reasons for striking a blow on the Palestine front at this time. The collapse of Russia, had set free numerous Turkish forces, and it was known that these were being assembled round Aleppo under German guidance and leadership, for the recapture of Baghdad. The threat thus offered to the Mesopotamian sector of the battle line could be more quickly and economically countered by an offensive in Palestine than by direct reinforcement of General Maude's army. Thus, General Allenby's main strategical objective was the defeat of the Turkish army in southern Palestine in order to draw down the Turkish reserves from Aleppo, and in this way to remove danger of an expedition against Baghdad.

Early in 1917 Turkey as the religious head of Islam was in a miserable plight. Out of the four sacred cities in charge of Turkey, two—Mecca and Baghdad—were already in the hands of herenemies, while Medina was beseiged and Jerusalem threatened. Not only was she losing the war, but forfeiting her religious prestige as well.

The German High Command decided that some spectacular exhibition was required to restore the shrinking faith of their ally and suggested the reconquest of Baghdad. The negotiations that followed between Constantinople and Berlin it was decided to assemble a Turkish army at Aleppo and to support it with a special body of German troops (known as Pasha II or the Asia Corps). The projected operation for secrecy's sake was to be called "Yilderim⁴⁵"—that is to say, "lightning". The nucleus of the Yilderim force was to be the III and XV Army Corps. They were to constitute the Seventh Army, of which Mustapha Kemal was appointed the Commander. The headquarters of staff Yilderim consisted of sixty-five German officers and nine Turks.

Even before the second Battle of Gaza the staff of the Eastern Force had been considering an advance by the right as an alternative to a direct assault on Gaza. The obvious line of advance into Palestine was also by Gaza, keeping close to the sea. This route secured the full advantage of naval cooperation, directly covered the main line of communication, and presented comparatively small difficulties of water supply. But the defences of Gaza were now too solid to be broken except by a slow and costly process of siege.

45. Cyrill Falls, *Military Operations, in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1930, pp. 5-7,

In July, General Allenby approved General Chetwode's⁴⁶ plan to develop during summer such transport and administrative improvements as would enable a force to be thrust out on to the high ground between Beersheba and Hareira. The necessity for capturing Beersheba was felt for further operations.

The Eastern Force was now abolished, and troops were organised into three corps, viz.,

The Desert Mounted Corps, under General Chauvel, consisting of the Anzac, Australian and Yeomanry Mounted Divisions. The XX Army Corps under General Chetwode—10th, 53rd, 60th, 74th Divisions.

The XXI Army Corps, under General Bulfin—52nd, 54th and 75th Divisions.

The troops directly under General Headquarters included the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, the 7th Mounted Brigade, the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade and the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade.

The XX Corps and the Desert Mounted Corps (less one division) were to form the striking wing for the main blow against the Turkish left; the XXI Corps was to make a secondary attack on Gaza; and one mounted division was to cover the twenty mile gap in the centre between the two attacking wings.

The real difficulties⁴⁷ of the plan were three—transport, water and secrecy. There were no metalled roads available south of the Gaza-Beersheba line. The country between the Wadi Ghuzze and Beersheba and the Turkish left was absolutely waterless, every drop of water required for the personnel had to be carried, while animals could not be watered between bases. The striking force could be supplied with food and ammunition up to Beersheba and for one march beyond by using all transport. The water could be supplied only up to Beersheba. Therefore, rapid capture of Beersheba became the corner-stone of the whole plan. The third difficulty was to concentrate a striking force sufficient to overwhelm the garrison of Beersheba rapidly and then to attack the Turkish left, without the Turks becoming aware of the plan. It was hoped to give the enemy the impression that the movement was merely a feint.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-12.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-23.

In outline therefore the plan⁴⁸ was as follows:

to concentrate as secretly as possible a striking force of four divisions and two mounted divisions opposite the Turkish left and Beersheba; to capture Beersheba rapidly and secure the water supplies at that place; thereafter, to assault with all the possible speed the Turkish left flank defences and to roll up the enemy line towards Gaza, holding the cavalry in readiness to push round towards the water supplies on the Wadi Hesi; and to intercept or harass the Turkish retreat from Gaza; during these operations to fix the enemy's attention on Gaza by every available means, including a heavy bombardment and a determined holding attack.

General Allenby moved his Headquarters from Cairo to a camp at Um el Kelab, near Rafa.

The physical conditions of the summer were trying. The temperature rose to 110, the "khamsin" wind blew for several days and made life unbearable. The slightest cut turned septic in this climate. There was also the "sand fly fever" which was very trying on the soldiers.

Administrative Preparation⁴⁹

1. Kantara, on the Suez Canal became a port.
2. The doubling of the railway up to Deir el Belah progressed rapidly.
3. Pipe lines were developed and extended; new wells sunk and storage for water constructed.
4. Signal communications were improved.
5. Maps of the country were drawn.
6. The units of the army were being systematically trained for their task. Throughout the summer continual raids and enterprises were undertaken by the troops in the line against the enemy trenches opposite Gaza. The training behind the line was directed towards preparation for open warfare and great mobility. Special attention was paid to fitting the men for long marches over heavy ground. They were also trained to work on half a gallon of water per man per day.

48. Ibid. pp. 25-48.

49. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 105-107.

7. By the end of autumn men and horses were to be fit and ready.

Deception Plan

It was impossible to conceal the preparations against Beersheba, but it was possible to conceal their size and extent. For the achievement of this, the following measures were taken:

(a) Army

(i) *Troops.* The great bulk of the troops was kept opposite Gaza till the last possible movement and then moved across rapidly and secretly.

(ii) *Railway and pipe-line.* The prolongation of the railway and the pipe-line across the Wadi Ghuzze into a 'no man's land' was postponed to a late stage of the programme.

(iii) *Stores.* The accumulation of stores was to be contracted into as little time and space as possible.

(iv) *Intelligence.* The intelligence branch conveyed the impression to the Turks that activity near Beersheba was a bluff and the British were faced with the difficulty of getting water and transport for a large force round Beersheba.

(v) *Zero day.* Zero day was the day on which Beersheba was to be assaulted. But operations were to begin a week before the Zero day with a systematic bombardment of the Gaza defences which would be supplemented by naval gun fire; with enemy's attention thus directed on Gaza, the striking force would be hurried secretly over to the flank.

(vi) *Assault on Gaza.* The XXI Corps was to make assault on a portion of the Gaza defences during the interval between the capture of Beersheba and attack on the Turkish left.

Navy

British command of the sea, which made the Turks naturally nervous about their right flank, also helped in the deception of the enemy.

(i) *Rumours.* Intelligence service spread rumours that a landing would take place in the rear of Gaza.

(ii) *Naval vessels and small crafts.* Naval vessels were allowed to be seen taking soundings of the coast and small crafts collected at

Deir-al-Belah as if they were to be used for the transport of a landing force.

(c) Airforce

All these devices to mislead the enemy were possible due to the arrival of new aircrafts which maintained air superiority.

(d) Measures taken to Practice a Feint towards Beersheba

The enemy was given the impression that the activity towards Beesheba and his left flank was a bluff to distract his reserves by the following means:

(i) *Reconnaissance.* Once a fortnight reconnaissance was pushed close up to the defences of Beersheba by a cavalry division, firstly, to suggest that the allied efforts on this side would be confined only to demonstration, and secondly, when the real attack goes the Turks would mistake it for another reconnaissance. Thus a complete surprise would be gained.

(ii) *Wireless messages.* Wireless messages meant to be read by the Turks were transmitted to give an impression that activity around Beersheba would be confined only to a demonstration.

(iii) *Study of ground.* Periodical advances towards Beersheba provided screen for commanders and staff to get acquainted with the ground.

Dispositions of the Opposing Forces

British Forces

Desert Mounted Corps
Anzac Mounted Division
Australain Mountain Division
7th Mountain Brigade (attached)

Locations

Asluj
-do-
Khelasa
Bir-el-Esani

XX Corps

10 Division
53 Division
60 Division
74 Division
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade

Shellal
Gozel Geleib
Bir-el-Esani
Khasif
Shellal

XXI Corps

52 Division

54 Division

75 Division

Composite Force (25th Indian Infantry,
Imperial Service Brigade)

Opposite Gaza

-do-

Sheikh Abbas

El Mendur

Turkish Forces

Eighth Army

X, XII Corps, consisting of 3rd &
53rd Divisions.

Gaza

XX Corps, consisting of 16th & 54th
Divisions.

Sheria

Army Reserve

7th and 19th Divisions

In the rear

Seventh Army

III Corps, consisting of 24th Division
27th & 23rd Cavalry Divisions

Kauwukh

Beersheba

Concentration

On the night of 30/31 October 1917, 40,000 troops of all arms (XX Corps and D.M.C.) moved to take up their battle positions for the attack on Beersheba by 0300 hrs on 31 October. Full moon favoured night approach.

Capture of Beersheba⁵⁰

The 60th and 70th Divisions of XX Corps succeeded in overrunning Turkish defences south and south-west of Beersheba and fixing the Turkish garrison (the 27th Division). D.M.C. now launched their cavalry charge on Beersheba from the north and north-east of Beersheba. Bir-el-Sakati fell by 1300 hours. The charge of 4 A.L.H. Brigade captured Beersheba by night fall. Difficulty experienced by mounted troops which overcame resistance at Tel-as-Saba confirmed the need for supplementing the fire power of the cavalry by providing additional artillery with a heavy air shell. The Turks were com-

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-124.

pletely surprised at the unexpected time, strength and direction of the British attack on Beersheba.

Capture of Gaza⁵¹

The bombardment of Gaza defences opened on 27 October, and continued gradually with increasing severity. The assault was undertaken by the 54th Division with the 156th Brigade of the 53rd Division attached on 31st October. The attack was successful and at 6.30 a.m., the farthest objective, Sheikh Hasan, was captured. The capture of this place seriously menaced the Turkish position.

Capture of Kauwukah and Sheria⁵²

By 6th November, the British striking wing (D.M.C. and XX Corps) had completed its dispositions for the decisive attack and stood as follows:

- (a) 53 Division at Tel Khuweilfeh
- (b) Yeomanry Mounted Division left of the 53rd Division.
- (c) 74th, 60th and 10th Divisions on the western side of Kauwukah.
- (d) On the left of the 10th Division the Australian Mounted Division some, fifteen miles between XX and XXI Corps.

The 74th Division began its advance on 6 November. It bore the brunt of the days fighting under the cover of constant artillery and machine-gun fire. It captured its objectives north of Kauwukah. Meanwhile, the 60th and 10th Divisions had worked up to the main Kauwukah defences, on which artillery had carried out methodical bombardment, and soon over-ran the defences. In the night, very hard fighting took place at Khuweilfeh, and the 53rd Division managed to secure a foothold on the main Khuweilfeh ridge.

On the left, the XXI Corps advanced on 7th November and over-ran the famous Ali Muntar Knoll, the key to Gaza. The Turks had evacuated Gaza and were in full retreat.

The Pursuit through Philistia⁵³

The cavalry chased the retreating Turks, stopping them from

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-138.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

53. Cyril Fall, *Military Operations, in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1930, Part I, pp. 105-142.

escaping to the north. Chaytor's Anzac Division captured Ameidat station with four hundred prisoners and large quantities of stores. Tel esh Sheria was captured on 7th November. Meanwhile, General Bulfin, on the left, pressed the pursuit of the Turks who had withdrawn from Gaza. The 157th leading Brigade of the 52nd Division crossed Wadi Hessi; the 54th Division occupied the defences of Gaza itself; while the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade pressed past Gaza towards Beit Hanum.

On 8th the 60th Division occupied Huj. By the evening of 8th the first stage of the exploitation of the victory had ended. The mounted troops had failed to intercept any large portion of the Turkish forces mainly because of water difficulties.

General Allenby issued orders to the mounted troops to capture the objectives Et Tineh-Beit Duras by 9th November which would turn the Nahr Sukherier line.

The Desert Mounted Corps was incapable of a further combined effort. Only the Anzac Division had succeeded in watering the horses during the night of 8th and 9th and went forward first to El Mejdal and then to Beid Duras and Esdud. The Australian Mounted Division and Yeomanry Division remained to provide water. The Anzac Division succeeded in capturing large number of Turks in hot pursuit. Had all the three divisions been able to advance together a greater part of the Turkish army would have been over-run. During 10th and 11th the pace of the pursuit slackened on account of hot exhausting wind.

During these days the enemy's resistance stiffened. He was preparing to defend the junction of the Jerusalem line with his main railway.

During the 12th the force got into position for the attack. On the east, the Australian Mounted Division, advancing in the direction of Tel es Safi, was heavily counter-attacked by four Turkish divisions and driven back. On the other hand, the 52nd Division had a hard fight at Burka, north of the Wadi Sukhereir. The capture of this strategic point opened an approach on the enemy's main line for the next day.

General Allenby's orders directed the Australian Division of the Desert Mountain Corps to attack to the south of the main Gaza Junction station road. The XXI Corps (75th and 52nd Divisions) was to attack between the road and Katrah, towards the Junction Station and the railway immediately north of it. The Yeomanry

Division, supported by the Anzac Division, was to attack on the left of the XXI Corps with the Camel Brigade in the belt of Sandhill along the coast. As soon as [the Junction Station and the railway were reached, the mounted troops were to swing north, to occupy Ramley and Ludd and to reconnoitre towards Jaffa.

The attack began at 7 a.m. on 13th November. By 10 a.m. the 75th Division, advancing along the main road, had taken Tel-el-Turmus and Kustineh meeting with little opposition. The 52nd Division had occupied Beshshit and the Yeomanry Division Yebnah. The 75th division had a hard fight for Mesmiyeh, while the 52nd was held up in front of Katrah and El Mughar. But with the help of the 6th Mounted Brigade El Mughar was eventually cleared.

The 52nd Division had taken Katrah. The 75th Division had pressed on Mesmiyah where the Turkish forces were in full retreat.

On 14th a brigade of the 75th Division occupied the Junction station and the Australian Mounted Division entered Et Tineh.

On the 15th the Australian Mounted Division and 75th Division advanced east of the Junction station towards Latron, where the Jaffa-Jerusalem road debouches from the hills. the Anzac Mounted Division meanwhile occupied Ramleh and Ludd.

On the 16th the Australian Mounted Division occupied Latron and the New Zealand Brigade entered Jaffa without opposition.

With the occupation of Jaffa and the withdrawal of the Eighth Turkish Army behind the line of River Auja and of the Seventh Army to the shelter of the Judaen Mountain Range, the pursuit up the Plain of Philistia came to an end.

In the ten days since the breaking of the Gaza-Beersheba line the British forces had advanced approximately fifty miles. Most of the cavalry had covered 170 miles between October 29th, and November 14th. The 52nd Division had marched sixty-nine miles and fought four severe actions in nine days. The Turks had lost 10,000 personnel as prisoners and 100 guns, but had avoided complete annihilation that at one time seemed to threaten them.

The battle casualties of the British forces during the period of the pursuit—November 7th to 16th—amounted a little over six thousand.

The Capture of Jerusalem⁵⁴

Taking advantage of the enemy's disorganisation, General Allenby

54. Wavell, Field Marshal, *Palestine Campaign*, Sagar Publications, 1968, pp. 157-172.

decided to advance on Jerusalem at once. On 18th the operations were resumed after a days halt.

On the 18th, while the Australian Division was manoeuvring the Turks out of Latron, the Yeomanry Division made good progress towards Lower Beth-horon. The 75th Division assembled towards Latron, and the 52nd at Ramleh and Ludd.

On the 19th, the 75th Division, which comprised some battalions of Gurkhas and other Indian units, battled its way within a short distance of Saris. The leading brigade of the 52nd Division reached Beit Likia, and the Yeomanry Beit-ur el-Tahta. All these troops, in their thin Khaki with no greatcoats and few blankets, suffered severely from the cold and wet.

On 20th November, the 75th Division won Saris and after difficult fighting, and also succeeded in controlling the Kuryet el Enab ridge.

On 21st, the 234th Brigade captured Nebi Samwil, a most important point towards Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Turks made three fierce counter-attacks to get back Samwil from where the Jerusalem defences, and even the city itself could be viewed. The first attempt to take Jerusalem had failed.

The date of the second attack on Jerusalem defences was fixed for 8th December. The first attempt to pivot on the right and then swing to the left across the Nablus road, had failed mainly owing to lack of roads in the country north-west of Jerusalem. This want of road had deprived the infantry of adequate artillery support, whereas the Turks had the main Jerusalem-Nablus road behind their positions and could rapidly reinforce any threatened point. General Sir Philip Chetwode, Commanding the XX Corps, changed the line of attack. He determined to pivot on the left and then to swing up his right past the western outskirts of Jerusalem across the Nablus road just north of the city. This task was to be carried out by the 60th and 74th Divisions, while the 53rd Division, which had not reverted to the command of XX Corps was to send two brigades up the Hebron road towards Bethlehem.

Between 4th-7th December the troops took up their positions for the attack. The 10th Division extended its right so as to enable the 74th Division to concentrate and relieve the 60th Division at Nebi Samwil which was the principal pivot of the attack. The 60th Division assembled south of the Enab-Jerusalem road. It was to attack on

this road keeping in touch with the 53rd Division, which was to reach a position close up to the defences of Bethlehem by December 7th. The 10th A.L.H. Regiment and the Corps Cavalry regiment were to keep the 60th and 53rd in touch with each other. The attack was supported by divisional artilleries and mountain batteries.

On December 7th/8th rain fell incessantly. It hindered the march of the 53rd Division. The main attack began at dawn in driving rain and mist. The strength of the Turkish Seventh Army was estimated at 15,000 to 16,000.

The 74th Division secured the ridge above Beit Iksa. The 60th Division, on whom fell the brunt of the fighting, took Deir Yesin and other defences east of the Wadi Surar. The Turks having seen some of their strongest positions falling, gave up the hope of defending them and retreated. The Mayor of Jerusalem surrendered the keys on the mid-day of the 9th to General Shea, Commanding the 60th Division.

The 53rd, 60th and 74th Divisions all advanced to their final objectives. On 11th December, General Allenby entered into Jerusalem.

The capture of Jerusalem was the climax of a most brilliant campaign. The main achievements of it were:

1. It had fully accomplished the objectives for which it was planned.
2. All danger to Baghdad and to the British conquest of Iraq was finally removed.
3. Practically the last Turkish reserves were drawn in.
4. The British nation received the Christmas present which Lloyd George so much desired.
5. It encouraged Arab revolt against Turkish Suzerainty.
6. It humbled Turkey as it lost one more holy place in addition to Mecca and Baghdad. The Ottoman Empire suffered loss of prestige.

The Winter of 1917-18

The XXI Corps had taken over the defence of the coastal plain from the Desert Mounted Corps on 7th December, and had put all three divisions into the line, the 75th on the right, 54th in the centre, and 52nd on the coast. The objective of this advance was to drive the enemy out of the range of Jaffa, which was to be used as a port

for the landing of supplies, and of the Jaffa-Ludd line, along which a light railway was being built. The necessary bridging material was brought by night to selected points where a passage could be found. One such point was between Hadreh and Jerisheh and the other between Jerisheh and the sea. The 155th Brigade was to cross at the former and attack the Turkish positions at Hadrah; the 156th Brigade was to cross at the latter and secure Sh. Muannis.

In spite of rain and the river swelling to flood, all the three brigades were crossed on 21st morning and the Turkish line over-looking the river was taken.

On 21st/22nd the 54th Division drove the Turks from Mulebbis and Rantieh and the 52nd Division advanced as far as Arsuf. British warships assisted in the operation. The enemy's line was pushed back to eight miles from Jaffa, making the harbour and intended railway secure. On 26/27 the Turks launched an abortive attack on Tel-el-Ful, a prominent hill about three miles north of Jerusalem. Next day the XX Corps began a general advance. The 60th Division took El Jib, Er Ram and Rafat. The 74th Division took Beitunia and the 10th Division Ain Arik.

The Spring and Summer of 1918

Immediately after the fall of Jerusalem, General Allenby was asked by the War Cabinet to give a death-blow to Turkey by advancing to Damascus and Aleppo. General Smuts⁵⁵ was sent in February 1918, to discuss strategical problems and to find out the requirements of force needed for this purpose.

General Allenby's plan⁵⁶ was, firstly, to secure his right flank by the occupation of the Jordan valley and then to demolish the Hejaz railway around Amman so as to isolate Turkish forces. This done, The Arabs were to be encouraged in their revolt against the Turks. When the dry season approached he intended to advance to the Plain of Esdraelon and secure a line from Tiberies to Haifa. Thereafter, the main column was to proceed along the coast by Tyre and Sidon to Beirut. The right flank of this force would be protected by the mountains and by a friendly population. The flank of any Turkish force which stood to defend Damascus could be turned by the Tripoli-Homs gap. Subsidiary columns would work up the Yamruk

55. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

valley towards the Hauran and north of Lake Tiberias along the direct road to Damascus.

Operations in the Jordan valley and beyond took place between February and May 1918.⁵⁷ The March from Jerusalem to Jordan was arduous, involving a descent from 2,000 feet, above sea level to a low sunken valley, 1,200 feet below sea level. Jericho was taken between February 19 and 21 and an abortive attack on Amman was made on March 30.

Reorganisation of EEF

During April and May the Egyptian Expeditionary Force⁵⁸ was reorganised to become mainly an Indian Force. The 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions, 24 other Indian Infantry battalions and the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions replaced the older troops. These months were also utilised for improving communications, for broadening roads, laying railway lines, stock piling supplies and establishing superiority in the air. The stage was thus set for the final push.

OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE SECOND TRANS-JORDAN RAIDS

The Battle of Berukin⁵⁹

Sir Edmund Allenby had informed the war office that after capturing Es Salt and destroying the Hejaz Railway at 'Amman', he hoped to resume his advance on Nablus and Tul Karm in April. By the beginning of April his raids had failed to do serious damage to the Railway and he had evacuated Es Salt. However, he decided to go forward with an attack to be carried out by the XXI Corps, which, if successful, would carry him to the Tul Karm rail head and the headquarters of the Turkish Eighth Army.

In the first phase, the 75th Division was to capture "Mog Ridge", and Sheikh Subi, two miles respectively north-west of Berukin village; then the village of Ra-fat and the hill of 'Arara' north-east of it was to be captured.

57. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1974, p. 166.

58. Wavell, Field Marshal, *The Palestine Campaigns*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 189-190.

59. Cyrill, Captain, *Military Operations, in Egypt and Palestine*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1930, pp. 350-357.

The preliminary attack of the 75th Division began at 5.10 a.m. on the 9th April. The first stage of assault was carried out by all the three infantry brigades in line: the 232nd Brigade on the right against Berukin and El Kufr, the 233rd in the centre against Ra-fat, while the 234th Brigade was to capture "Three Bushes Hill" and the ridge between it and Ra-fat, in order to protect the 233rd's left. The objective was swiftly captured all along the front except on that of the 232nd Brigade. On this brigade's left the 2/3rd Gurkhas seized El Kufr; but on the right the 2/4th Somerset came under heavy fire not only from "Tin Hat Hill", its objective but also from Kufr 'Ain Hill' on its right flank. The latter proved to be a thorn in the side of the 232nd Brigade.

The delay had thrown the attack out of gear as neither the left of the 232nd Brigade nor the 233rd could advance to their second objective until Berukin was secured. Meanwhile, the enemy launched two counter attacks. Eventually Major General Palin decided to postpone the advance to Mogg Ridge. Sheikh Subi and Arara—for the next day.

On 10th April at 6 a.m. the advance was resumed. The 2/3rd Gurkhas of the 232nd Brigade reached the western edge of Mogg Ridge but there was confused and fluctuating fighting on this hill all day. After a twenty minutes bombardment in the afternoon the 2/3rd Gurkhas, assisted by companies of the 2/4th Hampshire and 58th Rifles (attached to the 233rd Brigade), secured almost the whole of Mogg Ridge; but a counter-attack, launched under cover of a trench-mortar bombardment and carried out with great determination by German troops, drove them right off it. In this fierce fighting Rifleman Karan Bahadur⁶⁰ 2/3rd Gurkhas, won the Victoria Cross for a succession of deeds of extraordinary gallantry. In the attack his Lewis Gun Section engaged a Turkish machine-gun at close range. The No. 1 of the gun having been shot, Rifleman Karna Bahadur pushed his body off the gun and took his place; then under a shower of bombs, he fired a burst which destroyed the Turkish machine-gun detachment. He next switched his fire on to the bombers and silenced them. When the battalion fell back he covered the withdrawal by fire until the enemy was close upon him.

60, *Gazette of India*, 21-6-1918,

Campaign in Syria

The Turkish forces⁶¹ in Palestine were organised into three armies. The Seventh and the Eighth lay on the west of Jordan; the Fourth on the east; and the Eighth Army held the coastal sector and extended into the hills as far as Furkhah. It comprised of XXII Corps (7th, 20th, 46th Divisions), and Asia Corps (16th and 19th Divisions, 701st 702nd and 703rd German Battalions). Its commander was Djevad Pasha who had succeeded Kress von Kressentein. The Army Headquarters were at Tul Keram.

The Seventh Army continued its line to the Jordan Valley with the main force on the Jerusalem-Nablus road. Mustapha Kemal was the Commander of this force and its Headquarters were at Nablus. The army comprised the III Corps (Ist and 11th Divisions) and XXIII Corps (26th and the 53rd Divisions).

The Fourth Army was in the Jordan valley on the hills of Moab. It consisted of II Corps (24th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division) and VIII Corps (48th and Composite Divisions, including 146th German Regiment). The Commander of the IVth Army was Djemal. The Commander-in-Chief, had his headquarters at Nazareth.

General Allenby's strategy⁶² for the Syrian campaign was based on the control of Deraa, Beisan, Afule and Messudieh—the vital points in the line of communication which could close the lines of retreat of all the three Turkish armies. His plan⁶³ was to defeat and destroy the Seventh and Eighth Armies.

The salient points of his plan were:

1. The great mass of the troops should be launched on their ride northwards at the earliest possible moment.
2. A breach in Turkish lines should be swiftly made by the infantry, supported by the artillery.
3. The enemy must be kept in ignorance about the concentration on the coast and must be led to expect a blow elsewhere.

General Allenby's plan was in fact the Gaza-Beersheba battle reversed. He proposed to break through on the coast while causing the Turk to believe that a blow was coming to them on their left

61. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

63. Massey, W.T., *Allenby's Final Triumph*, Constable & Co, Ltd., London, 1920, pp. 111-118,

flank.

When his concentration was complete, it seemed he had massed on a front of some fifteen miles, 35,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry and 383 guns. On the same front the Turk had only 8,000 infantry with 130 guns not knowing what the actual strength of the enemy was. On the remaining forty-five miles of the front, 22,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 157 guns faced 24,000 Turks with 270 guns.

The Battles at Megiddo⁶⁴

On 16th September Feisal's Arabs and Air Force began preliminary operations designed to disorganise the enemy's communications and to focus his attention on Deraa and on his eastern flank. On the 16th the railway line was effectively cut to the south between Deraa and Amman, and on the 17th to the north, between Deraa and Damascus, and to the west, between Deraa and Afule. The enemy Commander-in-Chief Limon van Sanders reacted to these attacks and sent his reserves from Haifa towards Deraa.

By 18th September, Allenby's concentration was complete and his main forces stood ready for attack. The opening move of the great battle was made by the XX Corps in the Judaen hills. The Corps with its two divisions, the 10th and the 53rd, planned to advance on Nablus.

The front of the XXI Corps (comprising of the 3rd, the 7th Indian, the 54th and 75th divisions) extended from Rafat in the foothills to the sea north of Arsuf. The task allotted to the 3rd (Indian), the 75th, and the 7th (Indian) Divisions was to make an assault on the Tabsor defences of the enemy and on the line from Jiljulieh to Et-Tireh via Kalkilieh. The 60th Division was to make for Tul Keram.

On 19th September at 4.30 a.m. a fifteen minutes sudden and intense bombardment with every available gun utterly surprised the Turks and aghast at the suddenness and pace of the onslaught, they could offer little resistance. The 3rd (Indian) Division carried the defences of Jiljulieh and Kalilieh and the 75th Division that of Et Tireh. The 7th (Indian) Division cleared the plain up to the marshes on the coast and swung north of Et Tireh, into the foothills. The 60th Division succeeded in breaking through all enemy defences and secured a brigade near the mouth of Nahr el Falik. The 5th

64. Wavell, Field Marshal, *The Palestine Campaigns*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 203-207,

Cavalry Division passed through it. The 60th Division captured Tul Keram before it was dark. The airforce made the task of the 60th Division easy by bombarding Tul keram. The Eighth Army was completely broken and ran helter skelter. The line reached by the XXI Corps at nightfall ran along Rafat (French)—Bidieh (54th Division)—Felamieh (3rd Indian Division)—Et Taiyibeh (7th Indian Division)—Tul Keram (60th Division). The infantry thus had satisfactorily completed the task of breaking the Eighth Army. It was now the turn of the cavalry to follow the rout.

Cavalry Pursuit⁶⁵

During darkness of the 18th/19th, the 4th and the 5th Cavalry Divisions were formed behind the 7th (Indian Divisions) and the 60th Division. The mounted troops took immediate advantage of the success secured by the infantry, and pursued the Turks. The leading brigades of both the divisions overtook enemy detachments and made prisoners in hundreds. On the 20th the leading brigade, the 13th of the 5th Cavalry Division reached by 5.30 a.m. the headquarters of the enemy Commander-in-Chief at Nazareth and captured 1,250 prisoners. They could not, however, hold Nazareth for want of adequate number of troops and withdrew to the plain.

The 4th Cavalry Division lost its route and passing by the Musmus defile reached El Lejjun by dawn. The 2nd Lancers (Indian cavalry), the leading regiment of the Division, rounded up small bodies of Turks who were completely taken by surprise. Supported by the fire of the armoured cars, the Indian infantry squadrons were fell upon the enemy before they could even complete their deployment. Forty-six Turks were speared, and the remainder, about 500, surrendered. The whole action lasted only a few minutes.

The 4th Division reached El Afule at 8 a.m. Leaving the 19th Lancers (Indian Cavalry) there, the Division moved to the Plain of Esdraelon. There they were joined by the remaining mounted force. Australian Mounted Division reached Lejjun. The 3rd A.L.H. Brigade occupied Jenin by the afternoon.

Thus by the evening of 20th September, the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies were utterly routed and all their communications were paralysed.

65. Massey, W.T., *Allenby's Final Triumph*, Constable & Co. Ltd., London, 1920, pp. 147-169,

About noon on the 19th, on hearing the success of the XXI Corps, the XX Corps was ordered to clear the country up to Nablus and to block the routes leading eastwards to the Jordan valley. This was the only route through which the enemy could escape.

The 13th Brigade returned to Nazareth on the morning of 21st and reoccupied it. During the midnight of 21st/22nd, the 18th⁶⁶ Lancers were attacked at Acre road by a Turkish battalion from Haifa. The Turks were routed in the light. Next day the whole of the Division moved to Acre and Haifa. At Haifa there was little action. The leading brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, the 15th (composed of Imperial Service Units), had only two regiments—the Mysore and the Jodhpur Lancers. One squadron of the former was sent to climb Mount Carmel by a steep track and silence the enemy's guns. The Jodhpur Lancers, and the remaining two squadrons of the Mysore, (the fourth had been sent on a wide turning movement to the north), made a mounted attack on the Turks holding the defile. It was successful, and the squadrons then galloped on into the town. Almost simultaneously the Mysore squadron, reinforced by a squadron of the Sherwood Rangers, reached the guns of Mount Carmel and took them by a mounted charge. Sixteen guns and 700 prisoners were taken as a result of this action.

Pursuit to Damascus and Aleppo

Chaytor's force in the Jordan valley (Anzac Mounted Division, 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, two battalions of West India Regiments, two battalions of Jews), had been given the following task:

1. To occupy the attention of the Turkish Fourth Army.
2. To prevent any transference of troops to the west of Jordan.
3. To protect the right flank of the XX Corps, when it moves forward.
4. To advance to Jisr ed Damieh, Es Salt and Amman.

On 21st September, the New Zealand Mounted Brigade advanced on the west bank of Jordan, facing little opposition. On 22nd it succeeded in reaching Nablus, and the Jisr ed Damieh road after a brief fight. The New Zealanders occupied Es Salt on the evening of

66. Wavell, Field Marshal, *The Palestine Campaigns*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1968, pp. 214-215.

23rd and Amman⁶⁷ by 4-30 p.m. on the 25th September after a stiff fight.

In an action on the west bank of the river Jordan on 23rd September 1918, Risaldar Badlu Singh⁶⁸ of the 14th Murray's Jat Lancers, attached to the 29th Lancers (Deccan Horse), won the Victoria Cross for most conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice when he charged and captured a strong enemy position. While capturing one of the enemy's machine-guns, Badlu Singh was mortally wounded and died.

The Advance to Damascus

On 26th September Allenby issued orders for advance to Damascus.⁶⁹ Chauvel's orders to the Desert Mounted Corps were issued the same evening. Barrow, with the 4th Cavalry Division, was to move via Irbid on Deraa. The Australian Division followed by Mac Andrew's 5th Cavalry Division, which was concentrating round Nazareth, was to make for Damascus by the direct road round the north end of Lake Tiberias and through Kuneitra. The distance which the 4th Division had to cover for reaching Damascus was 140 miles. For other Divisions it was only 90 miles. Therefore, the 4th Division was directed to move a day before others. These two widely separated columns eventually reached Damascus within the appointed time. The 4th Cavalry Division had taken up the direct road to Damascus. The Australian Mounted Division began its march for Damascus on 27th September. About mid-day the leading troops reached the crossing of the Jordan river at Jisr Benat Yakub. The enemy had destroyed the bridge and had withdrew from there. The bridge was repaired on 28th afternoon. The 5th Cavalry and the Australian Division reached Kuneitra by the night of the 28th and were forty miles from Damascus. The troops reached Damascus on 30th September 1918. After some confused fighting 20,000 Turks were made prisoners. Turkish rule came to an end and was replaced by Arabs.

67. Massey, W.T., *Allenby's Final Triumph*, Constable & Co. Ltd., 1920, pp. 201-219.

68. *Gazette of India*, 27-11-1918.

69. Massey, W.T., *Allenby's Final Triumph*, Constable & Co. Ltd., 1920, pp. 220-264.

The Advance to Aleppo and Conclusion of the Armistice⁷⁰

Immediately after the fall of Damascus, the war cabinet urged General Allenby to advance to Aleppo, which was 200 miles beyond Damascus. As a first step, General Allenby decided to advance to the Rayak-Beirut line. The cavalry were to occupy the Rayak-Beirut line, while an infantry division marched up the coast to Beirut.

The 7th Meerut Division had already marched for Haifa which it reached on 1st October. Leaving Haifa on 3rd October, it reached Beirut on 8th October.

The 4th Cavalry Division, had to come from the Rayak area to Aleppo. The XXI Corps cavalry regiment and some armoured cars, followed by a brigade of the 7th (Indian) Division, had occupied Tripoli on 13th October.

An advance on Aleppo was ordered. It was 120 miles from Homs. The enemy forces around Aleppo numbered nearly 20,000.

In the evening of 25th the Arabs entered Aleppo after minor engagement enroute. General Mac Andrew entered the city on 26th at 10 a.m.

By the time these operations were concluded, the war had practically come to an end in all the theatres. Negotiations had already been set on foot which culminated in the Treaty of Versailles and later the Treaty of Sevres (1920). As described above, Indian troops had played a significant part in all the campaigns and India had also contributed in other ways for the success of the allies. It is now time to have a look on the after-effects of the war, with special reference to our own county.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-316.

CHAPTER 8

A SUMMING UP OF INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION IN MEN, MONEY AND MATERIAL TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

India made tremendous contribution in men, material and money to the war effort. A number of steps were taken to augment the strength of the Army and to train¹ officers and men. The Indian Army reserve was increased. Cadet Colleges² were opened at Quetta, and Wellington; officers were taken from the Special Reserve and Territorial Force; Schools for instruction were established at Ambala, Banglore, Quetta, Wellington, Sialkot and Nasik; and the Indian Medical Service³ was expanded through recruitment from various sources. Altogether 1,069 officers of the Indian Medical Corps, 1,200 Nursing Sisters, 2,142 Assistant and Sub-Assistant Surgeons, 97 followers were sent to the various theatres up to 31 October 1918. The strength of Army Bearer Corps⁴ during the war increased from 3,258 to 22,750. Skilled workers⁵ required for Military Works Services, Inland Water Transport, Irrigation, Ordnance, Labour Corps and other directorates were recruited and trained in special training camps. A total of 77,444⁶ men of Supply and Transport, including Indians and British, 177⁷ men of Veterinary, 4,000⁸ men of Posts and Telegraphs were sent abroad. From May 1916, to 31st October

1. Longer, V, *Red Coat to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, pp. 151-152.
2. '*India's Contribution to the Great War*', Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 81-83.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

1918, a total of nearly 150,000⁹ of all classes were sent abroad.

An important contribution made by India was the provision of labour for the various theatres of war, especially France and Mesopotamia. A total of 104 Labour Corps,¹⁰ 13 Portar Corps, 15 Syce companies whose strength in men was 1150, 576, and 210 each respectively, were employed in different theatres of the war.

The demand for followers¹¹ which included bakers, blacksmiths, butchers, carpenters, cooks, shoe-makers, smiths, sweepers, tailors, washermen etc. was very heavy. 43,737¹² men were supplied to different theatres.

Twenty days after the commencement of the war, the first Indian division—the Lahore Division—forming part of the Indian Corps—sailed from Karachi for France on August 24th.¹³ By the end of 1914, six¹⁴ expeditionary forces had been sent from India to various theatres of the war. These included three infantry divisions, eight infantry brigades and one mixed force with three infantry battalions, two cavalry divisions, one cavalry brigade and the attendant administrative services as well as four field artillery brigades in excess of the normal allotment. Concurrently with the despatch of Indian Expeditionary Force to France, a mixed force was sent to East Africa to defend Zanzibar and protect the Mombasa-Nairobi railway. An infantry brigade was sent to the Persian Gulf¹⁵ while six infantry brigades together with one Imperial Service Cavalry brigade was sent to Egypt.¹⁶ Expeditions to Mesopotamia and Aden too sailed out of Indian ports. By the early spring of 1915, two more infantry brigades and one more cavalry brigade had been sent abroad. As the war progressed and commitments grew bigger, more and more men, animals and stores were sent from India. Up to November 1918, 1,302,394¹⁷ personnels, 172,815 animals¹⁸ which included 85,953 horses, 65,398 ponies and mules, 10,781 camels, 5061 bullocks, 5692 dairy cattle

9. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

and 3,691,836¹⁹ tonnes of supplies and store left the ports of India for various destinations.

There was tremendous expansion in the officer cadre and rank and file of the Army. At the outbreak of the war the total Indian strength of the Army in India was 239,561²⁰ officers and men which included 193,901²¹ Indian combatants and 45,660²² Indian non-combatants. In addition, there were 72,209²³ British other ranks and 4,744²⁴ British officers. But by December 31, 1919, 877,068 Indian combatants and 563,369 Indian non-combatants had been additionally recruited. The grand total of the British and Indian officers, other ranks and non-combatants sent on service overseas from India was 1,381,050,²⁵ including 285,037 British and 1,096,013 Indian personnel. During the same period 184,350²⁶ animals were sent out on active service.

Within the first few weeks of the war, India supplied 70,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 60,000²⁷ rifles and more than 550²⁸ latest-type guns. Considerable quantity of shell cases were manufactured. Army Clothing Department produced 41,920,223 garments²⁹ between 1914-1918. Raw materials like rough tanned hides, wool, manganese, mica, salt-petre, timber, bamboos, raw silk, hemp, coir, tea, rubber, petroleum oils, and food stuffs were supplied. Everything required for troops in Mesopotamia, both British and Indian, was supplied either from Indian or from other places but paid for by India. India also provided all food-stuffs³⁰ demanded for the Indian troops serving in East Africa, Egypt, France and Salonica. The approximate value of supplies sent overseas during the war to various forces depended on India, in France, East Africa, Mesopotamia,

19. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

27. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, p. 152.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

29. *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 119.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

Egypt, Persia and Aden (half) was £ 34,408,000.³¹ A total of 2,737,862 tonnes³² of important items like rice, flour, atta, ghee, sugar, tea, tinned meat, grain for animals, hay, jam, biscuits and firewood were shipped from India up to March 1919.

By the end of September 1918, the value of equipment³³ and stores despatched to the various fronts amounted to about £ 80,000,000 sterling. India also supplied to Mesopotamia the whole of railway transport,³⁴ as well as telegraphic and telephone equipment employed in that country.

A good many welfare committees³⁵ organised by woman collected and distributed tobacco, sweetmeats, clothing, newspapers, books, badges and other hospital requisites. Indian women helped in running canteens and reception centres for troops.

The Princely states³⁶ played a notable part, sending 26,099 combatants overseas and recruiting 115,891 combatants and non-combatants for the regular army. These troops were maintained in the field at the expense of their rulers. Generous contributions by way of horses, mules, camels, motor ambulances, hospitalships and other conveniences were provided by units of states cavalry, camel corps, infantry, sappers and artillery which formed part of Imperial Service Troops. The troops gave excellent account of themselves, winning many a distinction in the far-flung theatres of war. Some of the state contingents were officered³⁷ or commanded by the rulers themselves. Among them were Maharaja Sir Partap Singh Bahadur, Lt His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur, Colonel His Highness Sir Ganga Singh Bhadur of Bikaner, Major His Highness Sir Madan Singh Bhadur of Kishangarh, Captain, the Hon. Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Lt Raj Kumar Hira Singh of Panna, Lt Maharaj Kumar Hitendra Narayan of Cooch-Bihar, Lt Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh of Tikkari, Lt Malik Mumtaj Mahomed Khan and Capt Shah Mirza Beg. The state forces won 572 awards including four Military Crosses. (For details refer to Appendix-7).

31. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

36. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers Madras, 1974, p. 153.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

Indeed, throughout the war Indian soldiers³⁸ displayed courage, valour, devotion to duty and loyalty of the highest order. They fought on various battlefields of Europe, Africa and the Middle East with vigour and gallantry. The rigours of the terrain and the inclemencies of weather did not deflect them from their duty. Whether it were damp and flat fields of Flanders or the burning and swirling sands of Mesopotamia, the rocky cold and windy hills of Gallipoli or unhealthy uplands and stifling jungles of East Africa, Indian soldiers—Sikhs, Gorkhas, Baluchis, Punjabis, Pathans, Rajputs, Jats, Dogras, Marathas, Kumaonis, Garhwalis—left indelible imprints of their heroism, winning world-wide acclaim. For the first time Indian soldiers won the Victoria Cross for which they had become eligible in 1911. Eleven Victoria Crosses³⁹ were won by them in Belgium, France, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Palestine. In addition six British officers of the Indian Army also won the highest award of gallantry in the British Empire.

The English did not think that Indians could stand up to the rigours⁴⁰ of the European climate and much less did they have faith in the military prowess of Indian troops against an European Army. But the exploits of Indian soldiers even when they are matched against the renowned German army of Kaiser surprised everyone. The health of Indian soldiers gave no cause for concern. In fact their robustness and resilience outpaced those of English soldiers.

India made very handsome monetary contribution towards the war. By resolutions passed by both Houses of Parliament in 1914, it was decided that India should continue to pay the normal pre-War cost of maintaining her troops overseas while extra expenditure involved was met by the Imperial Government. According to the Parliamentary Resolution of September, and November 1914, India's initial contribution payable to the end of 1919-20 was £ 47.5 millions.⁴¹

In the beginning of 1917, the Imperial Legislative Council offered

38. Merewether, Lt. Col., J.W.B. and Rr. Hon. Sir Fredrick Smith Bart, *The Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, pp. 474-489.

39. Refers to Appendix 'C' attached.

40. Longer, V. *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras 1974, p. 154.

41. *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1924, p. 155.

a lump sum of £ 100 millions⁴² as a Special Contribution towards the expenses of the war.

In September 1918, a Resolution was passed by the non-official members of the Legislative Council of the Government of India offering to further contribute to His Majesty's Government towards the expenses of war which was accepted by His Majesty's Government. A further contribution of £ 13.1 millions⁴³ was paid from the Indian revenues. Thus direct monetary contribution from the Indian revenues towards the cost of war amounted to £ 146.2 millions⁴⁴ by the end of 1919-20, excluding the additional charge of £ 49.8 millions⁴⁵ borne by India as a result of war condition for the protection of the North-Western Frontier of India. The protection of Sea-coasts cost India about £ 2.1 millions⁴⁶ to the end of 1921-22. The Aden operations borne by India cost her £ 2.3 millions⁴⁷ by the end of 1921-22. On measures of internal defence, India spent £ 2.7 millions to the end of 1921-22.

India's military budget for 1914-15, framed under peace conditions, was to the tune of £ 20.5 millions⁴⁸ only whereas the 1918-19 budget was £ 121.5 millions,⁴⁹ exclusive of cost of special services.

India incurred heavy expenditure, amounting to 2'25 millions⁵⁰ for the acquisition of mechanical contrivances like armoured cars, armoured trains, aircrafts to increase mobility and fighting value of her troops, and £ 800,000⁵¹ by 1918-19 in the development of frontier roads.

By the end of 1920-21, India contributed £ 3.2 millions⁵² for the raising of an irregular Persian Military Force.

Almost all rulling chiefs and the Rulers of independent neighbouring states, including Nepal, liberally contributed by donating large

42. Lajpat Rai, *England's Debt to India*, New York, 1917, p. IX.

43. *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 159.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

sums. In money alone they contributed £ 5 millions.⁵³ These gifts included lump sums towards the general expenses of the war, money for the provisions of aeroplanes, transport, upkeep of war hospitals, maintenance of convalescent homes, both in India and overseas, construction of religious edifices for troops on field service, the purchase of equipment and maintenance of the 'Hospitalship Loyalty' and for the purchase of motor-boats etc. Enormous sums were given to the Imperial Relief Fund. The total amount subscribed to the Imperial Relief Fund by the peoples and Princes of India amounted to Rs. 2,33,18,600.⁵⁴

India as a relatively poor country paid through her nose for maintaining an army bigger than she needed. The army, in fact, was used for Imperial purposes. In the great war India sent no less than 1,338,620⁵⁵ men to the different theatres of war and her direct money contribution has been officially put down at £ 146.2⁵⁶ millions, besides indirect help in money and material, what sacrifice Britain had to make in the interest of India till the end of the war can be adjudged in the light of these figures ?

Britain kept in India one British soldier for every two Indian soldiers. The British⁵⁷ soldier was expensive and added to the drain. This expenditure, if otherwise utilised in India, would have ushered in prosperity. Indian public opinion demanded Indianisation of the Army which was recommended by the Skeens Commission but received little attention.

The economic exploitation clearly affirms the truth that Britain offered hopeful promises only so long as India met her war needs. In March 1917, for the first time two delegates⁵⁸ from India (Sir S.P. Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner) were considered worthy to participate in the Imperial War Conference, various public bodies of Britain conferred upon them honorary degrees of some universities and the freedom of the cities of London, Manchester, Edinburgh and Cardiff. For the first time it was conceded that India may look forward to a day when she may be treated as a partner in the Empire.

The Investors⁵⁹ Review, London, dated 28th April 1917, remar-

53. Ibid., p. 169.

54. Ibid., p. 171.

55. Ibid., p. 160.

56. Lajpa Rai, *Unhappy India*, New York, 1917, pp. 374-376.

57. Ibid., pp. 374-376.

58. Ibid., p. 376.

59. Ibid., p. 376.

ked "sweet words are now raining upon India, and we trust foreshadow generous deeds".

The speech of the Maharaj of Bikaner given at a lunche on arranged by the Empire Parliamentary Association evoked some pertinent comments in the British Press. The Daily Telegraph⁶⁰ dated 25th April 1917, remarked, "Everyone is aware that at the conclusion of the war not only India expects, but the majority of us at home also look forward to a considerable development, along the lines of political reform". On the conclusion of the war, the promises for self-rule and Indianisation of the army were conveniently forgotten.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 376.

CHAPTER 9

THE GAINS OF THE ARMY

Some lessons had to be learnt from the First World War so far as the organisation of the Indian Army is concerned. As a result of these certain improvements were made.

Before the outbreak of the First World War Lord Kitchner had improved the training in the Army by instituting his system of 'Test'¹ which promoted healthy competition among units and cantonments. Still the Army had had no opportunities for higher training in warfare. The Army was hibernating and rusting. It was not ready for a major war, especially a war in Europe. The equipment was lacking. Artillery and guns were not available in sufficient numbers; rifles were obsolete; machine-guns had to be refitted; there were no howitzers; medical supplies and signalling equipment were poor. The Indian system of transport did not suit western conditions and there were many shortages. There was no system of properly trained reserves which could be drawn upon to provide suitable replenishments. The defects² in the organisation and equipment of Indian Army came into greater prominence after the First World War in 1914-18.

1. The first and most serious defect was that the ancillary services were either non-existent or undeveloped. Out of 9 field army divisions only 7 were actually capable of immediate mobilisation.
2. Peace establishments were generally so inadequate that to effect mobilisation of the war divisions internal security units had to be largely depleted.

1. *The Army in India and its Evolution*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1924, pp. 28-29.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

3. Technical and administrative personnel, required on mobilisation, had to be found from the establishments of combatant units.
4. The standard of equipment in the Indian Army before the war was very low. The Indian troops were, therefore, at a grave disadvantage when they had to fight against those who used latest equipment.
5. There were neither mechanical transport services nor any Air Force.
6. The technical equipment in use was largely out of date.
7. The Indian Army was markedly inferior to the European Armies in respect of mechanical equipment (machine-guns, artillery, hospital equipment and medical establishment).
8. The divisional artillery was inadequate for modern requirements and the heavy artillery was obsolete.
9. Sufficient machinery for reinforcements was lacking.
10. The basis of reserve was discovered to be thoroughly unsound.
11. There was no organisation in existence to cope with the recruitment of fresh personnel, or with their training on the scale required to meet heavy war wastage and to permit a large expansion.
12. Lastly, one great cause of weakness was that India's indigenous resources had not been sufficiently developed and she was largely dependent on outside sources of supply for munitions of war.

The lack of initial preparation was partially made up by improvisation³ made by able military advisers. The improvisation, no doubt, delayed achievement and involved heavier expenditure. The military advisers, therefore, decided to reorganise and reform the army in the light of the lessons lately learnt.

In 1919 a Committee⁴ was appointed under the Chairmanship of Lord Esher with the following terms of reference:

1. To enquire into and report with special reference to post bellum conditions upon the administration, the organisation of Army in India, including its relations with the war office, and

3. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

the India office and the relation of these two offices to each other.

2. To consider the position of the Commander-in-Chief in his dual capacity as head of the Army and Member of the Executive Council, and to make recommendations in this regard.
3. To consider and to report any other matters which they may decide as relevant to the enquiry.

The Committee submitted its report on June 22, 1920. There were two Indian members on the Committee, Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan⁵ and Sir Krishna Gupta.⁶

1. The Committee recommended that the Army Department and the Headquarters Staff should be consolidated under one head i.e. the Commander-in-Chief, who was to be a subordinate only to the Governor—General-in-Council. The authority of the C-in-C should be “second only to that of the Viceroy.”
2. Decentralisation was necessary at Army Headquarters to relieve the C-in-C of all work that can be equally well performed by his subordinates.
3. The command system introduced in the Army in 1895 was considered satisfactory.
4. The committee recommended that India be divided into 14 separate areas to be called “Districts.”
5. The Esher committee recommended the abolition of the Silladari system in Indian cavalry as it was found not up to the mark during the war.

The Governor-General-in-Council generally agreed with the recommendations of the Esher Committee Report and conveyed their Comments to the Secretary of State for India on 3rd February 1921, with the reservation that the Government of India should be consulted on all questions of foreign policy involving the employment of Indian Troops outside India.

A Committee⁷ of the Legislative Assembly was appointed to examine the report of the Esher Committee. The committee, headed

5. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, p. 178.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 185,

by Sir Tej Bhadur Sapru, submitted its report in March 1921, and spelled out its recommendations. The main resolutions which were adopted were:

1. "The purpose of the Army in India being the defence of India against external aggression and the maintenance of internal peace and tranquility," the organisation, equipment and administration of the Army should be "thoroughly upto date" and "in accordance with the present day standards of efficiency in the British Army" so that it may repudiate the assumption underlying the whole report of the Esher Committee.
 - (a) that the administration of the Army in India cannot be considered otherwise than as part of the total Armed Forces of the Empire and;
 - (b) that the military resources of India should be developed in a manner suited to Imperial necessities".
2. The Army in India "should not, as a rule, be employed for service outside the external frontiers of India, except for temporary defense purposes, or with the previous consent of the Governor-General-in-Council in grave emergencies".
3. "The C-in-C and the Chief of General Staff should be appointed by the Cabinet on the nomination of the Secretary of State for India, in consultation with the Government of India and the Secretary of State for war."
4. The C-in-C's right of correspondence with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff should be subject to the restriction that it does not commit the Government of India to any pecuniary responsibility or any line of Military policy which has not already been the subject of decision by them."
5. (a) "That the King Emperor's Indian subjects be freely admitted to all arms of His Majesty's Military, Naval, and Air Forces in India and the ancillary services and auxiliary forces", and "every encouragement should be given to Indians including the educated middle classes subject to the prescribed standards of fitness to enter the commissioned ranks of the Army" and "in nominating candidates for the entrance examination, unofficial Indians should be associated with the nominating authority."
 - (b) "That not less than 25% of the King's commissions should be given to His Majesty's Indians subjects to start with,"

6. (a) That adequate facilities should be provided in India for the preliminary training of Indians to fit them to enter the Royal Military College Sandhurst, and
(b) that a college similar to Sandhurst should be established in India.
7. "The pay of all commissioned ranks in all branches of the Army should be fixed on an Indian basis."
8. "...a serious effort should be made to organise the formation of an adequate Territorial Force", "a system of Short Colour Service followed by a few years in the reserves" and carry out gradual reduction of the ratio of the British to the Indian troops."
9. Suggested reduction in the size of the administrative staff at Army Headquarters.
10. A committee adequately representative of non-official Indian opinion "should be appointed to report upon—
 - (a) the best method of giving effect to the natural rights and aspirations of the people of India to take an honourable part in the defence of their country and prepare the country for the attainment of full responsible Government.
 - (b) the financial capacity of India to bear the burden on military expenditure.
 - (c) her claim to equality of status and treatment with the self-governing dominions.
 - (d) the method of recruitment of the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army."

Under C-in-C Rawlinson, a number of changes⁸ were made in the Army:

1. The Temporary Royal Artillery Depot in India was reorganised on a permanent basis and provision was made that the Headquarters "shall include all Indian personnel required in connection with the administrative and disciplinary functions of the Centre. Improvement was made in the existing pattern of pack artillery gun equipment.
2. A self contained Indian Army Veterinary Corps was formed.

8. Lodger, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, pp. 185-187,

3. A reorganisation of the Military Engineering Services was carried out.
4. Regimental System was introduced into the Indian Infantry and Pioneers. (It was proposed to give all battalions of a 'Group' a common regimental title with each battalion being numbered in sequence with the regiment bearing an appropriate subsidiary title where deemed suitable.)
5. An Indian Signal Corps was formed on the line of Corps of Sappers and Miners.
6. Indian Ordnance Corps was established.
7. Mechanical Transport and Signal Services were added.
8. The Staff College at Quetta which was closed during the war, was reopened.
9. Service in the reserve was made compulsory. This ensured availability of trained manpower which could be drawn upon when required.
10. Better equipment and weapons were provided to the Army.

One of the post-war reforms⁹ was to provide a permanent base for the training of recruits during the war and peace so that combatant units could be relieved of this duty. Training battalions were provided for Infantry and Pioneers, Group-Depot for Indian Cavalry, Signal training Centre and Depot for Indian Signal Corps, Headquarters Corps of Sappers and Miners and the Royal Pack Artillery training centres for the Indian Personnel of the Regiment of Artillery.

Improvement in Service Conditions of Indian Army Since the Commencement of the War and After

When the war ended, a number of concessions and rewards were granted to serving and ex-service personnel of the Army. These included Honorary Commissions as Captains and 2nd Lieutenants to selected Indian officers of the Indian Army who had rendered distinguished Service during the war. Up to 1st January 1923, 371¹⁰ commissions were granted.

In addition, 39 Indian gentlemen including certain Indian officers,

9. *Ibid*, p. 187.

10. *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 237.

were granted King's Commissions¹¹ as temporary 2nd Lieut on probation after under-going a course of training at the Training School for Indian Cadets, Indore. Of these, 32 later received permanent Commissions.¹²

King's commissions¹³ as 2nd Lieutenants were granted to 20 Indian officers for specially distinguished services during the war.

Indian gentlemen of good family and education are made eligible for admission to Sandhurst for grant of King's commission. The number of cadets was limited to 10 annually.

Rewards

Two hundred Special Jagirs¹⁴ (hereditary assignments of land as a reward for service to Government) were granted to selected Indian officers in recognition of their distinguished services during the war.

Twenty thousand other rewards¹⁵ consisting of grants of land or special pensions were awarded. The above were in addition to decorations, orders with increased monetary allowances, accelerated promotion and the various rewards that could be earned for special service in the field.

Pensions

The ordinary retiring and special pensions¹⁶ admissible to Indian officers were increased from 40 to 100 per cent and minimum qualifying service reduced from 18 to 15 years.

Similar increases were made in the rates of family pensions¹⁷ up to 135%. The pension could be transferred to another dependent on the death of the original nominee.

Now rules¹⁸ were introduced with effect from 4th August 1914, affecting the grant of gratuities and wound, injury and disability pensions to Indian Officers and other ranks.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 238-239.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

Rations

Free rations¹⁹ and extra-messing allowance of ten annas per men per mensem was sanctioned for the provision of extra articles of diet in each mess.

Free rations were also given to Indian troops and followers returning sick from the front.

All Government military servants were allowed to purchase any articles of supply and transport at favourable rates (whole sale rates).

Interior Economy

Better married accommodation²⁰ was provided to Indian officers and other ranks. Comforts such as shelves, pegs were provided in barracks where troops lived.

Concession by Rail or Sea

Free passages²¹ were granted to Indian solidiers and their families when travelling by train in India.

Pay and Allowances

Monthly rates for field service²² were enhanced and special field allowances were granted to all Indian troops and followers serving in East Africa, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Aden, Persia etc.

With effect from 1st January 1917, the pay of all combatant Indian officers and non-commissioned officers was increased from 10 to 20 per cent.

Bonus

A bonus²³ of Rs 50 was given to combatant recruits and Rs 15 on completion of training. From 1st June 1918, war bonus of Rs 24 and Rs 60 was given to Indian other ranks and Indian officers respectively for every six months.

Medical

The rates of pay were increased from 27 to 71 per cent and field

19. Ibid., p. 241.

20. Ibid., p. 241.

21. Ibid., p. 241.

22. Ibid., pp. 241.-242

23. Ibid., pp. 241-243.

allowances were enhanced from 33 to 100 per cent in respect of Military Sub-assistant Surgeons²⁴. Free family accommodation was given for those in field service. They were given commissioned rank and were considered eligible for Military Cross.

Hospitals and Sanitation

Better accommodation and diet²⁵ for Indian Station Hospitals were introduced.

Miscellaneous

Free supply of clothing and boots was introduced. For the benefit of disabled Indian soldiers, "The Queen Mary's Technical School",²⁶ was established at Bombay. Regimental Schools for children were set up. The Indian Soldiers (Litigation)²⁷ Act was introduced to protect Indian soldiers from civil and revenue litigation while serving under war conditions. Corporal punishment was abolished.

Indian Soldier's Board was established in January 1919. They dealt with the following subjects:

1. Rewarding officers and men of Indian Army for distinguished service during the war;
2. Employment;
3. Education;
4. The after-care of the wounded and incapacitated;
5. Attention to the general interests and welfare of soldiers serving, discharged or deceased;
6. Relief of distress among the dependents or soldiers;
7. Commemoration of the exploits of the Indian Army.

Post cards²⁸ with the addresses of the regiments printed on them were issued by depots free of cost to the relatives in India and were accepted free of charge by the post offices to ensure communication with the families.

Incentives for Recruitment

Material incentives were held out for joining the army. Former soldiers received relatively liberal pensions and those who served the

24. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 245.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

British with distinction, or who were officers were given grants of land, jaggirs, and were further rewarded by having their relatives favourably considered for recruitment. At the end of World War I, 420,000 acres of land were distributed among 5902 VCO's and other ranking Indian officers. Over 14,000 persons received Jangi-inams—special pensions—for two “lives” i.e. the amount (ten rupees per month for a VCO) was passed on to the next generation. Specially selected VCO's received 200 Jagirs. These Jagirs included:

(a) grant of land with full proprietary rights, yielding a net annual income of Rs 400, and assignment of land revenue for three lives;

(b) pensions amounting to Rs 150 up to the third generation, and

(c) 200 VCO's were granted honorary rank of King's commissioned officers. The King's commissioned officer received double the pension of ordinary Viceroy's commissioned officer upon retirement. The economic and social impact of these awards was very great in Punjab, where most of these were granted.²⁹

War Memorial

At Brighton in England a marble umbrella³⁰ (Chattri) was raised to the memory of those Hindu and Sikh soldiers who had come wounded from the battlefields of Flanders and died in the hospitals at Brighton. The Prince of Wales unveiled the memorial recalling that “our Indian comrades came when our need was highest” and said that they “fought so gallantly and bore themselves so patiently and so nobly. . .” Like-wise, the Muslim soldiers of India were buried with full military honours in England and a memorial gate adorned the cemetery pavillion.

An All India War Memorial Commemorating “the immortal story of the endurance and valour of the sons of India in the cold and mud of Flanders, the heat of Mesopotamia, indeed in every land where the soldiers of the Empire fought and bled”...was raised in New Delhi now known as India Gate at Rajpath. The foundation stone of this memorial was laid by his Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught on 10 February 1921³¹.

29. Bisheshwar Prasad, *Honours and Awards*, Adjutant Generals Branch, Historical Section, New Delhi.

30. *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 264-265.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 259-263.

Some Steps taken towards the Indianisation of the Army

On 25 August 1917³², five days after the momentous announcement in the House of Commons by Mr Montagu, a significant step towards Indianisation of the Army was taken. King's commissions in infantry and cavalry were for the first time granted to seven selected Indians³³ already serving in the Army. They were:

1. Kanwar Amar Singh, 2/4th Cavalry.
2. Zorabar Singh, 1/3rd Horse.
3. Aga Cassim Shah, 104/th Rifles.
4. Bala Sahib Daphle, 16th Rajputs.
5. Mohd Akbar Khan, 1st Brahamans.
6. Prithi Singh, 5/8th Cavalry.
7. Rana Jodha Jang, 23rd Pioneers.

King's commissions had earlier been granted to Indian officers of the Medical Services only. Before the war ended two³⁴ more Indians, who previously held temporary commissions, received the King's commissions. They were:

1. K.S. Himmatsinghji, 4th Rajputs.
2. K.S. Madhosinghji, 3/39th Garhwalis.

They received the commission on 23rd and 24th October 1918, respectively.

Edwin Montagu came to India early in November 1917, and undertook an extensive tour of the country. In April 1918, the famous Montagu³⁵ Chelmsford proposals were made on 20 August 1917. Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, made an important announcement in the House of Commons, stating that "the policy of His Majesty's Government, with which Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing association of Indians in every field of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the Empire." Both the Governor-General and the Secretary of State praised the gallant and faithful services of Indian Army³⁶ during the war and stressed the necessity

32. Longer, V., *Red Coat to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers Madras, 1974, p. 171.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

35. Tarachand, Dr., *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Publications Division, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 459-463.

36. Longer, V., *Red Coats to Olive Green*, Allied Publishers, Madras, 1974, p. 171.

of grappling with the problem of Indianising it. So far Indians were excluded from commissioned ranks of the Army. As a gesture of Indianisation, ten vacancies³⁷ at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, were reserved annually for Indians from fighting classes with good family background and education. These gentlemen, after passing out from Sandhurst, were to be granted King's commissions in the Army. Indianisation was, however, looked upon as a reward³⁸ for services rendered and not as a process in the evolution of India, towards self-government.

While in India, Montagu found the then C-in-C, Sir C.C. Munro, interested in the cause of Indianisation but not enthusiastic about it. Montagu wanted to open up an Indian Sandhurst³⁹ and enable all qualified Indians to obtain a commission. Munro, however, was of the view that first priority should go to the sons⁴⁰ of servicemen. According to Montagu, Munro looked upon the demand for commission as political⁴¹. In addition to the quota of ten vacancies per year at Sandhurst some King's commissions were given to specially selected non-commissioned officers and graduates of the Cadet College, Indore. Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza⁴², who later became President of Pakistan, belonged to the first category while the first C-in-C of India, Gen. K.M. Cariappa⁴³, belonged to the second. In December 1919, 39 cadets were given the King's commission.

As the need for Indian assistance declined with the termination of hostilities, element both in the British and Indian Governments delayed in fulfilling the pledges. Nowhere was this postponement more obvious and blatant than the Indianisation⁴⁴ of the officers corps because British did not want to share authority with others. The Esher Committee (1920), which had been appointed to examine the future of the army in India, was composed of high British civilian

37. Cohen, Stephen, *The Indian Army*, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1971, p. 74.
38. Ibid., p. 74.
39. Ibid., p. 75.
40. Ibid., p. 75.
41. Montagu, Edwin S., *An Indian Diary*, Heinemann, London, 1930, pp. 201-352,
42. Cohen, Stephens, *The Indian Army*, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1971 p. 75.
43. Ibid., p. 75.
44. Ibid., p. 73.

and military officials and had only two Indian members⁴⁵, Sir Krishna Gupta and Sir Umar Hayat Khan.

It rejected increased democratic control over the army, proposed strengthening C-in-C's position, rejected a broadly-based recruitment pattern, and only cautiously encouraged an educational build up which would qualify Indians for Sandhurst. While paying lip service to the 1917 declaration on the future status of India, the Committee proposed little which could actually lead to the formation of Indian officer crops. The question of Indianisation was, in fact, evaded except in the minutes of the two Indian members, Sir Krishna Gupta and Sir Umar Hayat Khan. The former advocated a long service army, recruited exclusively from the martial races and officered by Indians drawn from the same martial races; while the latter held the view that maintaining and intensifying the present system was necessary for political safety of the British and for military efficiency⁴⁶.

The Sivaswamy Aiyer Resolutions

Under the constitution⁴⁷ established by the Montagu Chelmsford Reforms, military expenditure was excluded from the control of the Indian Legislature. However, the members could express their views and exercise indirect influence on military administration and the Army budget.

The first Legislative Assembly under the new constitution sat after the Esher Committee's report had been released. Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer introduced fifteen resolutions on the Esher Committee's report at the end of the First assembly. The resolutions present a clear picture of what change Indian moderates and liberals wanted in the defence pattern. Most members were absent at the end of the session, and thus the Government had lost its majority. After attempting to modify the resolutions by amendment, the Government gave way and accepted them almost in full. The British later felt that it was a 'tactical' mistake.

One of Aiyer's resolutions called for restrictions on the uses of the Indian Army; that it be used for Indian defence, internal or external, but not as a British Imperial Police Force. Another resolution called

45. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

46. Report of the committee to inquire into the Administration and organisation of the Army in India Cmd 943 (1920) (The Esher Committee), p. 101.

47. Section 22 of Government of India Act, 1919.

for the substitution of a civilian member in the Viceroy's council for the Commander-in-Chief, following British practice. Other resolutions called for a cut in the defence expenditure and covered other matters which had been or were going to be adopted by the government. Two crucial resolutions led to an extensive debate, and were to have serious political repercussions. The first resolution, No. 7, called for admission of Indians into all branches of the army and suggested that every encouragement should be given to them, including the educated middle classes, subject to prescribed standard of fitness, to enter the commissioned ranks of the Army.

It also suggested that the quota of 25% of new King's commissions be reserved for Indians⁴⁸. The second proposed the establishment of preliminary military training to prepare Indians for Sandhurst, and also for the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst⁴⁹.

The resolution calling for increased commissions for Indians was amended by the government. The granting of King's commissions was restricted only to officers of the Indian Army who were already holding Viceroy's commissions, and to those cadets who had been trained at Sandhurst. The general rule for selecting candidates for training should be that the majority of them should be from the communities which furnished recruits to the Army and, as far as possible, in proportion to the numbers in which they furnish recruits⁵⁰.

When the Government of India and the C-in-C accepted the Sivaswamy Aiyer Resolutions, they committed themselves to their implementation.

Rawlinson, the C-in-C formed a military committee to implement the Indianisation resolutions passed by the Legislative Assembly⁵¹.

An alternative to the Rawlinson proposals was suggested by the Secretary in the Military Department of the India office (Lt. Gen. Alexander Cobbe) and supported by the Secretary of State for India, Viscount Peel.

48. India, Legislative Assembly, Debates, Vol. I, part 2 (1921). The debate was held on 28 March 1921.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. The activities of Rawlinson's Military requirements committee are recorded in Govt. of India, Army Deptt., proceedings December 1923, No. 85-112, Subject: Indianisation of the Indian Army, Ministry of Defence, Historical, Section File No 601/10728/H.

Cobbe argued that Indianisation must proceed with great caution⁵², and that Indians should not be given the King's commission. Instead Indian officers might be limited to a few units only. This plan would permit Indians to serve as officers and would avoid, the embarrassment of Indians serving alongside British officers, or even worse. Indians commanding the British rank found in some units of the Indian Army.

The Cobbe scheme was received with dismay by the Government of India. The Viceroy, Lord Reading, replied by telegraph that the Rawlinson plan had in effect been accepted publicly by the Government of India; Indian opinion would not tolerate any backsliding on the Indianisation issue, which the viceroy called "the crucial test of our sincerity in the policy of fitting India to advance towards the goal of Self-Government".

Eight units were earmarked for the Indianisation "experiment". The government had earlier accepted the resolution on training and had established the Prince⁵³ of Wales Royal Indian Military College in 1922, a pre-Sandhurst institution.

These changes provided only partial satisfaction to Indian public opinion. Preference was still to be given to youths from the martial classes⁵⁴, though non-martial classes were not totally excluded from holding commissions.

Indianisation, though only a drop in the ocean, resulted in the creation of a small but well trained contingent of Indian officers. When the need arose they were able to replace the British officers with little loss of administrative efficiency.

52. Cohen, p. 83.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

CHAPTER 10

INDIA DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Political

While the Indian forces were fighting for the Allies in the various theatres of the war, leaders of all shades in the country were pressing their claim for the speedy grant of some kind of self rule¹, more or less on the pattern enjoyed by other dominions of the British Empire. Under the stress of the war a coalescing process seemed to have been at work in the public life of the country. The two wings² of the Congress, the Moderates and the Extremists, were trying to narrow down their differences. Dissatisfied with the attitude adopted by Britain towards Turkey before, during and after the war the Muslims³ in India, who looked upon the Sultan of Turkey⁴ as their Caliph or religious head, were making moves to secure the help of the congress to strengthen their cause. Thus, a common platform was coming into shape for the demand of a substantial instalment of political reform. The Pact of 1916⁵ was the fruit of this mutual accommodation. Mrs Besant and Tilak had started the Home Rule Movement⁶ for the attainment of their goal of dominion status.

The return⁷ of soldiers from the various fronts of the war had

1. Tarachand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Publications Division, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 458.
2. Majumdar, Ray Chaudhary & Dutta, *An Advanced History of India*, Macmillan & Co., London, 1950, p. 983.
3. Tarachand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Publications Division, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 428.
4. Raghuvanshi, Dr., *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought*, Educational Publishers, Agra, 1959, pp. 110-112.
5. Tarachand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Publications Division, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 449.
6. Raghuvanshi, Dr., *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought*, Educational Publishers, Agra, 1959, pp. 131-133.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

brought about a new political and social consciousness in the country. These soldiers had fought shoulder to shoulder with the British and men of other nationalities and had lived and worked on terms of equality with them. They had moved about and mixed with citizens of free countries. They had observed from close quarters their way of life and had come to know what liberty means to a nation.

On returning home they must have told their kinsmen and admiring neighbours all that they had seen in foreign lands. That must have charged the imagination of their credulous listeners. Thus, as a consequence of the war a new feeling of a social equality and yearning for political freedom had taken hold of the minds of not only the town dwellers but had percolated to the villages to which most of the war-scarred soldiers belonged. These soldiers had become the harbingers⁸ of a social change. There was at least greater awareness with regard to life as lived in other parts of the world. India now could not sit idle towards the policy of apartheid⁹ followed in South Africa and other parts of the Empire. The feeling gained ground that Indians were placed under various disabilities abroad and were even ill-treated because their own country was not free.

In India life had been a bit hard during the days of the war. As has been shown elsewhere, the drain in men and money was quite large. The economic situation was especially acute. Prices had risen abnormally, causing intense suffering to the poorer and lower middle-class people. War in no way had ceased the unemployment problem. The only employment offered was enrolment in the army. The response of the people was not very enthusiastic, for there was no other element in this employment except the mercenary one; besides the hazards of war cooled down to a certain extent the eagerness for employment. Industry failed to get a push out of the war. India supplied raw materials rather than finished goods. The production of Buckingham and Carnatic Mills considerably went down. There were look outs in some of the mills. The production in the fields did not increase; the export of grain continued; and substantial amount was added to the tax burden of the people. There were actual outbreaks, sometimes even lockup incidents, in Bombay, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

The political situation was also getting complicated day by day. One section of the leaders of the people had raised their powerful voice in support of the Allies, and men and money had been rushed for their support with an open hand. Opposed to them was a microscopic section of leadership which had desired to turn this opportunity to the advantage of their country by raising a general revolt, if necessary, with the help of those¹⁰ who were opposed to the British. Men like Lala Har Dayal, Raja Mahendra Pratap, Obaid-Ullah, Barkat-Ullah, Champakaran Pillai and others, in exile in foreign lands, were maturing plans for an armed revolution in India. Raja Mahendra Pratap had come as near as Afghanistan where he had set up a provisional¹¹ government also. Though the efforts of these revolutionaries proved abortive, they at least succeeded in winning over certain people in India to their own way of thinking. The Russian Revolution, which resulted in the collapse of the Imperialists czars, provided some inspiration. There were astray cases of violence here and there. To add to this, Muslims in general had strongly resented the policy¹² followed by the Allies with regard Turkey. This had brought the Hindus and Musalmans nearer. The demand for swaraj or self-rule had received the support of all sections of the people for the time being at least.

There was thus a general feeling of disappointment during the concluding years of the war. The response¹³ of the British Government to the natural aspirations of the people was tardy and at times even preverse. There was no move from their side to fulfil the promises they had held out at the outset. People were getting restive and some even thought that their tears and toils had gone in vain. The mere inclusion of two Indians in the Peace Conference and their signing the Treaty of Versailles, the admission of India to the League of Nations and her representation on the governing body of the International Labour Office, were honours¹⁴ which fell far short of her expectations. They wanted something substantial. At

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

12. Tarachand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Publications Division, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 428.

13. Majumdar, Chaudbary & Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1950, p. 983.

14. Raghuvanshi, Dr., *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought*, Educational Publishers, Agra, 1959, p. 144.

long last came Mr Montagu's¹⁵ declaration of 20th August 1917, that, "the policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire". This announcement for the first time unequivocally stated British intentions towards India, though much of its importance was taken away by the rider that "progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages, and the British Government and the Government of India...must be the judges of the time and measures of each advance." This announcement was followed by a personal visit of Mr. Montagu. He stayed in the country for a long time and met publicmen of all shades. He actually worked himself to fatigue and insomnia. The result of this strenuous activity was the Report on which the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 were based. The consensus within the congress described the reforms as "inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing."

In spite of its many drawbacks all would have gone well with these constitutional reforms had not the Government of India adopted an unusually hard line in respect of political agitations. In fact, Moderates¹⁶ were prepared to work the reforms and they actually did it. The recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee¹⁷ embodied in the Rowlatt Act¹⁸, were a direct onslaught on civil liberties. Even mild resistance was not to be tolerated. The Jalianwala Bagh Tragedy¹⁹ on the 13th April 1919, was a fitting reward for all the sacrifices that India had made during the war. The very man, Gen. O'Dwyer, who had heinously shed innocent blood at Jalianwala, had only a

15. Tarachand *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Publications Division, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 463.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 408.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 472-473. (On December 10, 1917, the Government appointed a Committee "to investigate and report on the nature and extent of Criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movement in India and to advise as to the legislation necessary to deal effectively with them". Rowlatt and two other judges of High Court of India, were made members of the committee. The committee met in camera from January 1918, and submitted its report on 25 April 1918.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 472-473. (The Assembly passed the bill into law which came into operation from 21 March 1919.)
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 478-485.

short-time ago fully acknowledged the valour and loyalty of the Punjab soldier. In a special victory number dated 16th November 1918, of a weekly newspaper, 'Haq'²⁰, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Governor of the Punjab, had sent the following message to the people of the Punjab...

"The great conflict of the last four year has now ended in the complete triumph of the King Emperor and his allies—I desire to acknowledge through the pages of Hakk the unfaltering spirit of loyalty and sacrifice which the Punjab has shown throughout the struggle, even in the days of gloom and anxiety."

From the beginning of the war the Punjab has sent nearly four hundred thousand of her sons to fight the battles of the King Emperor.

In France and in Belgium, in Africa and in Persia, and above all in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Mosopotamia, those men have bravely upheld the proud traditions of their province, successfully protected the frontiers of India and have borne a gallant part in the achievement of final victory.

The Punjab will ever cherish the memory of those brave men who have faught and fallen; it will welcome back with honour those who will now return; and will not forget those at home, who, they could not share the dangers of war, helped to secure the peace of the Province, to maintain the flow of recruits to our forces in the field, and to soccour the wounded and suffering.

I am proud that the Punjab during the term of my office has so nobly fulfilled its duty, and as the head of the Province, I desire to express my deep gratitude to all who have borne a part in upholding the proud position of the Punjab in India and in the Empire."

Only five months after, he was mercilessly killing the kith and kin of those very people of the Punjab whom he had accepted as saviour of the Empire and who had borne the brunt of war so far as army personnel is concerned.

This senseless policy of repression marred the prospects of the Act of 1919. Gandhiji has already started his Non-cooperation

20. O'Dwyer, Sir, Michael, *India as I Knew It*, Constable & Co., Ltd., London, 1925, pp. 228-232.

Movement²¹. The Khilafat Movement²², now at its peak, received Gandhiji's support. In the face of Congress and Muslim League opposition the reforms could not make much headway. Only the Moderates offered themselves for giving a trial to the reforms for whatever they were worth. Later a faction of the congressites known as the Swaraj Party²³, entered the Legislature in order to prove that the constitutional reforms, embodied in the Act of 1919, were worth nothing and fell far short of what they had expected after making so many sacrifices in the war. Thereafter followed a period of grim struggle which lasted till the conclusion of the Second World War. That story is outside the scope of this work.

21. Majumdar, Ray Choudhary & Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London, 1950, p. 985.

22. Tarachand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Publications Division, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 485-490.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 500-501.

(On January 1, 1923, C.R. Das and Moti Lal Nehru formed the Swaraj Party. In the elections of 1923 for Legislative Assembly 48 Swarajists led by Moti Lal Nehru and 24 independents with Jinnah formed the opposition to the Government.)

CONCLUSION

There was some heat in the political firmament of India when the war broke out in 1914. Ever since its inception the congress had been praying most submissively for some substantial change in the administrative set-up of the country so that an opportunity may be offered to the sons of the soil to govern their own country under a pattern of government which existed in other self-governing dominions of the British Empire. The response of the government being niggardly, people thought of other means than constitutional to press their point. The arbitrary partition of Bengal in 1905 convinced even the moderates that the government had no regard for the public opinion. In the Surat session of the Indian National Congress in 1907, there was a rude parting of ways between the members of the organisation. Mounting agitation compelled the government to concede some constitutional reforms in 1909 and the partition of Bengal was also annulled as a gesture of goodwill in the Delhi Durbar of 1911. Before the implications of the Morley-Minto Reforms were properly understood, the shadow of war began to lengthen on the European continent. War actually broke out in 1914 and was joined by Britain. India was not directly concerned with the war; she got interested in it when it was declared that the war was being fought for the preservation of democratic values and freedom of men. Forgetting her past grievances against her rulers for the time being, she lent her weight willingly to the side of the allies. Leaders of all shades of opinion with one voice appealed to their countrymen to contribute in men, money and material. Surendra Nath Banerjee, Lajpat Rai, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, Bhupendra Nath Basu, Annie Besant, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and many others made the cause of Great Britain their own and speaking from their respective platforms built up a strong public opinion in favour of the Allies. The ardour displayed by the Princely order was warmer still. The whole country was thus mobilised to fight for the Allies who were hailed as champion of democracy.

The theatre of the war was extensive and spread over three

continents. Large forces had to be deployed at different places for fighting the enemy. The stress was too great for the Allies to bear all alone. Britain, therefore, tapped its colonial resources. As has been shown in earlier chapters, India contributed most generously in all spheres of the war effort. Her army consisted of both European and Indian elements. Up to the mutiny of 1857 the Indian element had far exceeded the European one. The officers were mostly Europeans while the rank and file was largely Indian. This army had secured to Britain their Empire in India. It was mainly used for putting down rival Indian and European powers. It had served this purpose well. Britain had full faith in the Indian Sepoy, but this faith was somewhat shaken during the mutiny of 1857 and as a consequence of it the proportion between the Indian and European element was adjusted by inducting more foreign soldiers. This army thought primarily meant for the defence of the country from external aggression and for the maintenance of internal peace, was employed outside the frontiers of India on many an occasion before and after 1857 for purposes which has nothing to do with the defence of the country or preservation of peace. Though bearing the huge cost incurred in the maintenance of this army, the Indian tax-payer had no say either in its organisation or its employment. Indian leadership had thought that the burden was too much for a poor country like India and pleaded in vain for the reduction of the army which ate away nearly 80% of its annual budget. Failing reduction, they suggested that the army may be Indianised. That would bring down expenses as the European element was far more expensive than the indigenous one. Lack of faith in the Indian soldier since the days of the Mutiny disinclined the ruling power to accede to this demand. The army, therefore, continued to be European-officered and the proportion of the Europeans in the ranks and file was also large. More lamentable than this was the fact that the training and equipment of the army was far behind when compared with the armies of Europe or other advanced countries of the world. There was no dearth of soldiers who had a long martial tradition behind them and possessed proven ability in warfare. What they lacked was the necessary training and up-to-date equipment. Something was done in this direction when Lord Kitchner was the Commander-in-Chief in India. For keeping the army in good trim he introduced the system of 'tests'; he also improved the supply system; and ancillary services organised on a more determined basis during his time. Notwithstanding all these

improvements, the army lagged much behind so far as war preparedness is concerned. The condition of armies in princely India was still worse. The advance of British imperialism had totally crushed the armies which the Indian rulers had once possessed. The imperial ruling power looked upon with a jealous eye on any addition or improvement made by any Indian prince in his armed forces. There are instances on record when rulers were actually asked to disband their armies which were above the standard prescribed for them and were forbidden to give them any kind of modern equipment. It was in the closing years of the last century that some of the Indian states were permitted to maintain what came to be known as-Imperial Service troops. This troops were certainly superior to the ones they had previously maintained, but on account of their limited resources they compared unfavourably with the Indian army.

Thus, the preparedness of the Indian army was much below the mark, both in respect of training and equipment, when it was asked to take part in regular warfare against opponents whose war worthiness was well-known. In Europe, in the Middle-east and in East Africa, the contingents of Indian army had to fight under the most adverse conditions. The Indian soldiers were not accustomed to the extremes of climate that was to be found in Flanders, Mesopotamia and Africa. Tactically also, they were at a disadvantage. They had never received training in trench or gas warfare. The result was that they had to suffer heavy casualties as shown in the various appendices attached to the rear of this work. The fighting quality of the Indian soldiers was never in question. What he lacked was proper training and equipment. In spite of these handicaps acts of individual bravery were not wanting. As shown in the appendices, the highest awards were won by Indian soldiers in all the theatres of the war fighting under the most adverse conditions against armies which had all the advantage of training, equipment and efficient leadership and most often fought on their own land or in regions nearby. The Indian army was thrust into the war at a time when the armies of Britain and France were giving way before the determined onslaught of the Germans. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Indian troops stemmed the German tide effectively and in a way turned the direction of the war in favour of the Allies. The battles of Givenchy, Neuve-Chapelle, the second battle of Ypres, the battle of Loos and the struggle for Aubiers Bridge not only brought glory to the Indian fighting forces, they certainly turned the tide of

the war in favour of the Allies. In other theatres of the war also Indian troops put up a performance which earned for them unmitigated praise from those who commanded them. Not that they did not fail. The story of their performance is a blend of both success and failure. They suffered heavy casualties and paid in blood because they had to fight under conditions to which they were not accustomed. On the whole their contribution was rated very high by one and all. There was no Commander who did not have a word of praise for them. The Indian soldiers passed as heroes in the streets of London and in the towns of France where the fighting had been the thickest. Even the King Emperor did not spare words to command the splendid job that they had done and some of the valorous men received the decorations from the gracious hands of His Imperial Majesty himself. On another occasion the Prince of Wales did the same as the representative of his father. The martyrs of the army not only earned a memorial in India but also at Brighton in England. The Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief in India were flooded with messages of appreciation from almost all the fronts. The bravery and loyalty of the Indian armed forces received almost universal acclaim.

It is time to see whether India as a country gained something out of the blood that had been shed by its sons. The conclusion of the war was followed by negotiations for peace. India as a dependency of Great Britain had never been represented at any international meet, not even at the Imperial conferences. It was for the first time that two nominees of Indian Government, the Maharaja of Bikaner and S.P. Sinha, were included in the Peace conference that settled the fate of Germany and her allies in the Treaty of Versailles and those two gentlemen were further honoured in England where they spoke for India and received the freedom of several cities in that country. The Indian Nationalist Congress at its 34th session¹ congratulated Great Britain on its success and nominated Tilak, Gandhi and Hasan Imam for representing India at the Peace conference.

They also reminded their rulers to fulfil the promises that had been made on the eve of the war. An English friend of India, Mrs Annie Besant aided by other publicmen, on a ceaseless propoganda during the period of the war for obtaining Home Rule for the country. Mrs Besant and Tilak in particular emphasised the point that self rule

1. Sitaramayya, P., *History of the Indian National Congress*,

should not come to India as a gift, but as a recognition and reward for the loyal services rendered by India to Britain in her hour of need. The response of the British Government to this demand was tardy and evasive. Their idea was that India was not yet fit for working democracy as a system of government. They wanted to introduce political reforms in phases, and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 were regarded as the first step in this direction. These reforms were granted more as a reward for the services India had rendered during the war than as a positive response to the agitation which had been gaining in momentum with the joint support of the Hindus and the Muslims during and just after the termination of war. It would be unjust to deny that the services rendered by the armed forces of India had played an important part in securing these reforms.

The Reforms of 1919 disappointed all sections of public opinion, but the army being a non-political disciplined body continued to be steadfast in its loyalty to the British Government. So much so that the number of Indian soldiers who took part in the Jallianwala Bagh shooting was twice as large as that of British. The country made no substantial political gain out of the sacrifices the people made during the war. Something, no doubt, was done to improve the working condition in the army. In view of the experience that had been gained during the days of the war some drastic changes were made in the organisation of the Indian army. A number of committees were set up to suggest ways and means for improving the fighting potential of the armed forces. The long standing demand of Indianisation of the army was seriously taken up and new openings were made for Indian officers of proved worth. Some seats were reserved for Indian officers at Sandhurst and a similar academy was opened at Dehradun for the proper training of officers. Pay scales were also revised and improved, arms and ammunition were provided to the army. The idea was to bring the Indian army at par with the continental armies in respect of training and equipment. What success was gained in this direction was clearly seen in later years. There was still much difference between the European and the Indian officer and so was the case with the rank and file. Though still loyal and fully disciplined, the Indian soldier did have a sense of grievance against his alien master as he could very well see that he was sometimes made to do things which were against the interest of his country and was at the same time discriminated against. The soldiers of the same generation which had shot at their kinsmen at Jallianwala Bagh

refused to fire on an unarmed mob at Peshawar. It was this very sense which later led to the formation of the I.N.A. and the Naval mutiny in 1943. The alien rulers long last realised that they had exploited the loyalty of the armed forces too much and the time had come when they could not expect to use them as a mercenary herd. This realisation along with other causes went a long way in their withdrawal from India. It will, therefore, not be wrong to hold that the army did play a part in the freedom struggle of the country from the days of the First World War to the down of freedom after the Second.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX—A

Summary of Awards Won by Indians in Different Theatres of the World War

<i>Award</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>Total</i>
VC	6	—	3	2	—	11
CIE	1	4	2	—	1	8
CBE	—	—	—	—	—	—
OBE	1	—	—	—	—	1
MBE	1	—	—	—	—	1
MC Bar	—	—	1	—	—	1
MC	23	1	42	32	2	100
OBI (1)	3	6	16	6	2	33
OBI (2)	84	31	172	53	12	352
IOM (1)	4	3	11	4	—	22
IOM (2)	239	71	455	138	43	946
IDSMB	4	—	15	7	—	26
IDSMB	625	247	1,756	473	104	3205
IMSMB	1	—	3	3	—	7
IMSM	406	300	909	2,829	56	4500
Total	1,398	663	3,385	3,547	220	9,213
France and Belgium	East Africa	Meso- Potamia	Egypt and Palestine			Galtipoli

*Reproduced from, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1924, p, 184.

APPENDIX—B

Casualties: Total Indian Casualties Compiled up to 31 December 1919

Theatre	Dead from All Causes			Wounded			Missing and Prisoners		
	IO	IOR	FOLL	IO	IOR	FOLL	IO	IOR	FOLL
France	176	5,316	2,218	404	15,893	144	15	830	4
East Africa	67	2,405	500	59	1,927	17	—	40	3
Mesopotamia	364	17,567	11,624	828	31,330	450	15	1,510	284
Dunsterforce	—	158	23	—	15	—	—	—	—
Persia	25	1,779	670	11	454	6	—	1	—
Egypt	74	3,713	555	135	6,286	8	2	158	5
Gallipoli	33	1,591	127	72	3,578	1	—	101	—
Aden	7	500	79	16	548	4	1	21	3
Muscat	1	39	2	—	16	—	1	25	—
Grand Total	747	33,068	15,798	1,525	60,047	630	34	2,686	299

Reproduced from *Indian's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 176.

APPENDIX—C

Below is given a brief description of the Meritorious Service Medals and Decorations to which armymen are eligible for gallantry in the field:

1. The Victoria Cross (VC)

It was instituted by Queen Victoria in 1856. It was the highest decoration awarded by the Sovereign for a signal act of valour in the face of the enemy. Indian soldiers were made eligible for this decoration by the King's pronouncement at the Imperial Durbar at Delhi in December 1912.

2. The Military Cross (MC)

It was instituted on 31 December 1914. It was given for distinguished services in the action to Captains, Subalterns and Warrant Officers.

3. The Indian Order of Medal (IOM)

It was instituted in 1837 for personal bravery and was originally the Indian Soldier's Victoria Cross. Divided into three classes, a recipient could be advanced from one class to another. Each class carried with it extra monthly pay.

4. Order of British India (OBI)

The Order of British India was conferred on Indian Commissioned Officers for long, faithful and honourable service. It had two classes which carried with them the titles of "Sardar Bahadur" and "Bhadur" respectively.

5. The Indian Distinguished Service Medal (IDSM)

The Indian Distinguished Service Medal was awarded for individual instances of distinguished service. It was instituted on 28th June 1907.

OTHER MEDALS**1. 1914 Star**

It was awarded to all who served in France and Flanders between 5th August 1914, and midnight of 22nd-23rd November 1914.

2. 1914-15 Star

This was awarded to all those who had served overseas between 5th August 1914, and 31st December 1915, and who had not received the 1914 Star.

3. British War Medal

This was given to all who served in a theatre of war on certain defence duties in India between 5th August 1914, and 11th November 1918.

4. Victory Medal

It was awarded to all ranks who had served in a theatre of war only between 5th August 1914, and 11th November 1918.

5. The General Service Medal 1923

This was given to Indian troops for military operations in Iraq, Persia and Kurdistan, 1924-29, respective clasps.

Rewards

The rewards given were such as would appeal to the oriental mind, such as Indian titles of honour from "Raja" and "Nawab" down to 'Rai Sahib' and 'Khan Sahib', robes of honour, swords of honour, guns, complimentary sanads (parchment rolls) inscribed with the name and service of the recipient, cash reward, grants of Government land, of revenue free land to individuals, and to communities, remission of taxation. By such measures Government succeeded in boosting recruitment.

APPENDIX—D

**Story of Gallant Deeds of the Winners of Victoria Cross in the
First World War, 1914-18**

1. No. 4050 Sepoy Khudadad Khan, 129th Duke of Connaught's own Baluchis

He was the first Indian Soldier to receive this coveted honour for exceptional gallantry. He received this honour for his gallant service at Hollebeke in Belgium on 31st October 1914.

The battle of Ypres started on October 30th. The Germans

pressed their attack with the utmost vigour and in complete disregard to casualties, which were very heavy indeed. They succeeded in breaking through at Gbeluvlet and all seemed lost. But a vigorous counter-attack saved the situation.

On October 31st at Hollebeke the Baluchis faced the full force of the German assault. Sepoy Khudadad Khan was in the machine-gun section of his battalion and was working on one of the two guns. The British Officer in charge of the detachment was wounded and the other gun was put out of action by a shell. Sepoy Khudadad Khan, though himself wounded, remained working his gun after all the other five men of the gun detachment had been killed. He was left by the enemy for dead, but when the enemy had retreated he managed to crawl down to rejoin his unit. The losses of the 129th on this day were seven British Officers killed or wounded, five Indian Officers killed or wounded, 164 other ranks killed or wounded and sixty-four missing, of whom the majority were probably killed. For his bravery Khudadad Khan was awarded the Victoria Cross.

2. No. 1909 Naik Darwan Singh Negi, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles

The second Indian soldier to win the Victoria Cross was Naik Darwan Singh Negi of the 1st Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles. He was awarded this honour for his bravery at Festubert on the night of 23-24 Nov. 1914, in France. Captain Lumb had jumped with a section and a half into the trench ahead of Major Wardell bayoneting most of the enemy and taking some prisoners. Major Wardell's party had been weakened by casualties during this operation and could do no more than hold the portion of the trench already taken. A gap was thus fast widening between him and Captain Lumb.

Foremost among the heroes was Naik Darwan Singh Negi, who from the beginning to the end, was either the first, or among the first, to force his way round each successive traverse, facing a hail of bombs and grenades. Although twice wounded in the head and once in the arm, he refused to give in, and continued fighting without even reporting that he was wounded. When the struggle was over and the company fell in, his Company Commander saw that he was streaming with blood from head to foot. For his most conspicuous valour Naik Darwan Singh Negi was awarded the Victoria Cross.

3. No. 1685 Rifleman Gobar Singh Negi, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles

Rifleman Gobar Singh Negi was the third Indian to receive the

Victoria Cross in the battle of Neuve Chapelle in France on 10 March 1915.

The battle of Neuve Chapelle was the first Major British offensive undertaken on the western front since the continuous line of trenches had brought open warfare to a stop. On 10th March, after a thirty-five minute bombardment of considerable intensity, four divisions (Lahore, Meerut, 8th and 7th) attacked on a two-mile front. Things went quite well at first but gradually the offensive bettered out through lack of sufficient reinforcements. Then the Germans counter attacked and although fighting continued until the night of the 12th Indian gains were small and total casualties amounted to 544 officers and 11,108 other ranks. Ten VC's were won in this battle, two on March 10 and the remaining ones on the 12th.

The first went to Rifleman Gobard Singh Negi of the 2nd Battalion 39th Garhwal Rifles who were in the leading wave of the attack. As soon as the artillery barrage lifted the battalion followed it at the double, taking the fullest possible advantage of the crushing effect of the shelling. The 2/39th pressed on past the first line of German trenches and took the second. During the assault Negi was one of the bayonet men accompanying the bombers, and was the first man to go round every traverse, killing several of the enemy and forcing the remainder to surrender. He himself was killed afterwards and was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously.

4. Jemadar Mir Dast, later Subedar Mir Dast, 55th Coke's Rifles, attached to 57th (F.F.) Coke's Rifles

He was awarded the Victoria Cross at the Second Battle of Ypres in Belgium on 26th April 1915.

When the French and British were thrown back in confusion, Jemadar (later Subedar) Mir Dast, 55th Coke's Rifles, attached to 57th, remained behind in a trench after his officers had been killed or wounded. He rallied all the men he could find, amongst them many who had been only slightly gassed and were beginning to recover, and with them he held on until he was ordered to retire after dusk. During his retirement he collected a number of men from various trenches and brought them in. Subsequently he assisted in bringing in eight wounded British and Indian officers, being himself wounded in doing this service. This splendid Indian officer already possessed the second class Indian Order of Merit for his gallantry in the Mohamand Expedition, and now for his most conspicuous valour

was awarded the Victoria Cross, being the fourth Indian Soldier to receive that honour.

5. No. 2129 Rifleman Kulbir Thapa, 1/3rd Queen Alexander's own Gurkha Rifles

He was awarded Victoria Cross for his gallantry and self sacrifice in the Battle of Loos on 25th September 1915, in France. Having entered the German trench, he escaped alive. Kulbir succeeded, after being wounded, in penetrating the wire in some extraordinary way and charged straight through the German trench. In the rear of it he found a badly injured man of the 2nd Leicesters. The wounded man begged Kulbir Thapa to leave him and save himself, but the Gurkha refused to do so, and remained by his side throughout the day and the following night.

Luckily, there was a heavy mist on the morning of the 26th September, of which Kulbir took advantage to bring the man out through the German wire. He succeeded, after hair-breadth escapes, in doing this unobserved, and put the wounded man in a shell-hole. Not content with this, he returned and rescued, one after the other, two Gurkhas. He then went back again and brought in the British soldier in broad daylight, carrying him most of the way under fire.

For these successive acts of valour Rifleman Kulbir Thapa received the Victoria Cross, and all would agree that seldom, if ever, has this supreme reward been more splendidly won. The deaths of officers and men who won the Victoria Cross have so often been recorded. It is a relief to mention that Kulbir Thapa survived his wound, proceeded to Egypt with his regiment, and eventually returned to India.

6. Lance Dafadar Govind Singh (later promoted Risaldar of 28th Cavalry attached to 2 Lancers)

He was awarded the Victoria Cross in France in 1917 in the Somme action. At Cambrai and in the subsequent counter battle they were the only Indian Regiment to be mentioned by name in Lord Haig's Despatch. Lance Dafadar Govind Singh received the Victoria Cross for the courage and resourcefulness shown in carrying messages mounted in full view of the enemy.

7. Sepoy Chattar Singh, 9th Bhopal Infantry

He was awarded Victoria Cross in Mesopotamia. In the battle of

Wadi the Commanding Officer was struck down. To his aid went Sepoy Chattar Singh over a spot within two hundred yards of the enemy, who kept up constant fire. He shielded the Colonel with his body. Sepoy Chattar Singh with his entrenching tool slowly and for hours, made a bullet proof shelter for both. For his gallantry he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

8. L/Naik Lalla, 41st Dogras

He was awarded Victoria Cross in Mesopotamia. The 1st and 3rd Battalion of 41st fought in different Brigades at Sheik Saad. At Hanna the Senior battalion supported the junior in the desperate attack over the flat, coverless, bullet swept plain against sunken loop-holed trenches in broad daylight. No troops in the world would have made headway and only twenty-five valiant soldiers reached the enemy line.

During the action Lance Naik Lalla of the 3rd battalion showed a fine example of the Dogra character. He rescued Captain Nicholson of the 1st and Lieut Lindop of the 3rd, both of whom had fallen wounded, from ground across which any form of human movement had been considered fatal. He had also dressed the wounds of many men lying in the open in the pouring rain. For exemplary courage and behaviour he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

9. Naik Shahmad Khan, 89th Punjabis

He was awarded Victoria Cross in Mesopotamia near Beit Ayeesa on 12-13 April 1916. He was in charge of a machine-gun section in a very exposed position covering a serious gap in the line. Undaunted, the Naik and his men beat off three counter attacks. He continued to operate the machine-gun single-handed after the whole of his section save two ammunition belt-fillers, were put out of action. For three hours the gap was held, and when the gun, through the enemy fire, ceased to function, Shahmad Khan and his two comrades held the post with their rifles until ordered to withdraw. The damaged gun, the other arms, equipment and ammunition except two shovels were salvaged by the gallant NCO. Shahmad Khan was awarded Victoria Cross for his bravery.

10. Rfn Karna Bhadur, 2/3 Gorkha Rifles

He was awarded Victoria Cross in Palestine on 10 April 1918. for most conspicuous bravery, resource in action under adverse conditions,

and utter contempt for danger. During an attack, Rifleman Karna Bhadur Rana, with a few other man, succeeded under intense enemy fire in creeping forward with a Lewis gun in order to subdue an enemy machine-gun which had caused severe casualties during previous attempts to put it out of action. The leader of Karna Bhadur's party, on opening fire, was at once shot dead, without any hesitation Karna Bhadur pushed the dead man off the gun in spite of the bombs thrown at him and the heavy shooting from the flanks. He opened fire and knocked out the machine-gun crew. Karna Bhadur then silenced the fire of the enemy in front of him. He received the Victoria Cross from the hands of His Majesty's the King Emperor at Buckingham Palace on the conclusion of special peace march through London by representative detachments of Indian Army on the 2nd August 1919.

11. Risaldar Badlu Singh, 14 Lancers attached to 29th Lancers

He was awarded posthumous Victoria Cross in an action on the west-bank of river Jordan in Palestine on September 23rd, 1918.

His Squadron was ordered to charge a strong enemy position. Badlu Singh realised that the Squadron was suffering casualties from the fire directed from a small hill on the left occupied by machine-guns and some 200 infantry. Without the slightest hesitation he collected six men, charged and captured the position, thereby saving the squadron from very heavy casualties. He, however, was mortally wounded, but all the enemy machine-guns and infantry surrendered to him before he died.

APPENDIX—E

Summary of Awards Theatre-wise Indian Expeditionary Force 'A' (France and Belgium)

1. VC	6
2. CIE	1
3. OBI	1
4. MBE	1
5. MC	23
6. OBI (1)	3
7. OBI (2)	84

8. IOM (1)	4
9. IOM (2)	239
10. IDSM (Bar)	4
11. IDSM	635
12. IMSM (Bar)	1
13. IMSM	406
Total	1398

(Reproduced from *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 184-185).

APPENDIX—F

Detailed List of Awards Won by the Indian Corps in France (Victoria Cross)

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Regimental No. Rank, Name and Corps</i>	<i>Theatre</i>	<i>Place and date</i>	<i>Date of Gazette of India</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1.	No. 4050 Sepoy Khudadad Khan, 129th Duke of Connaught's Own Baluchis	Belgium	Hollebeke 3-10-14	7-12-14
2.	No. 1909 Naik Darwan Singh Negi, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles	France	Festubert 23/24-11-14	7-12-14
	*De Pass F.A. Lieut 34th Prince Albert Victor's Own Poona Horse	—do—	Near Festubert 24-11-14	18-12-15
	*Bruce, Lieut 59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force)	—do—	Near Givenchy 19-12-14	4-9-19
3.	No. 1685 Rfn Gobar Singh Negi, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles	—do—	Neuve Chappele 10-3-15	28-4-15

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
4.	No. Jemadar Mir Dast, 55th Cooke's Rifles (FF) attached 57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F) *Smyth, Liet J.G., 15th Ludhiana Sikhs	Belgium	Ypres 26-4-25	29-6-15
5.	No. 2129 Rfn Kulbir Thapa, Queen Alexander's Own Gurkha Rifles	—do—	South of Fauquissart 25-9-15	18-11-15
6.	No. 2008 Lance Dafadar Gobind Singh, 28th Light Cavalry, attached 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse)	—do—	East of Peiziers 1-12-17	11-1-18

*British Officers commanded Indian troops but they are not to be included in the list as it is concerned only with the performance of Indian officers and men.

Others Awards Won by the Indian Corps in France

Military Cross (MC)

<i>Rank, Name and Unit</i>	<i>Theatre</i>	<i>Place and Date</i>
Subedar Arsla Khan.	Belgium	Second battle of Ypres 20-22 April 1915.
Subadar Dhan Singh, 1/39, Garhwal Rifles.	France	Festubert 23/24 November 1914.
Havildar Havinda, 58 Rifles, promoted to Jemadar.	—do—	Festubert 23/24 November 1914.
Jemadar Incha Ram, 6th Jat Light Infantry.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 14/15 November 1914.
Havildar Indar Singh, 58 Rifles, promoted to Jemadar.	—do—	Festubert 24 November 1914.
Subadar Malla Singh, 20th Coy Sappers and Miners.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 28 October 1914.

Subadar Major Nain Singh Chanwarh, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles.	France	Neuve Chapelle, 10-12 March 1915.
Jemadar Panchan Singh Mahar, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 10 March 1915.

Order of British India (OBI)—Class (I)

Subadar Nasir Khan, 59th Rifles.	France	Gazette of India, 4 August 1915.
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Order of British India (OBI)—Class (II)

Risaldar Major Awal Khan, 4th Cav.	France	Gazette of India, 4 August 1915.
Risaldar Saddh Singh, 4th Cav.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Gauri Shankar Dube, 1 Sapper and Miners.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Sundar Singh, 1 Sappers and Miners.	—do—	—do—
Jemadar Sadha Singh, 1 Sapper and Miners.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Ganpat Mahadeo, 3 Sapper and Miners.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Ismail Khan, 3 Sappers and Miners.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Incha Ram, 6 Jats.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Shib Lal, 6 Jats.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Diwan Singh, 30 Punjabis attached Meerut Signal Coy.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Natha Singh II, 34th Pioneers.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Baij Singh Rawat, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Nain Singh Chinwarh, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Makar Singh Kawar, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	—do—

Subadar Mehar Singh, 1/9th Gurkhas.	France	Gazette of India, 4 August 1915
Subadar Sundar Singh, 41st Dogras.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Sudagar Singh, 47th Sikhs.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Imam Ali, 57tk Rifles.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Raj Taleb.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Major Labh Singh, 107th Pioneers.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Hasmat Dad Khan, 107th Pioneers.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Major Umar Din, 125th Rifles.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Mukhmad Azam, 129 Baluchis.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Zaman Khan, 129th Baluchis.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Sarbjit Gurung, 1/2nd Gurkhas.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Karak Bhadur Thapa, 2/3rd Gurkhas.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Major Gambhir Singh Gurung, 2/3rd Gurkhas.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Shamsher Singh Gurung, 2/8th Gurkhas.	—do—	—do—
Rfn Chand Rabir Thapa, 9th Gurkhas.	—do—	—do—
Rfn Sanbir Gurung, 2/4th Gurkhas.	—do—	—do—
Jemadar Sangram Singh, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles	—do—	—do—
Subadar Sant Singh, 34th Pioneers.	—do—	—do—
Subadar Arsla Khan, 57 Rifles.	Battle of Messines	3 October 1914.
Subadar Fateh Singh Newar, 2/2nd Gurkhas Rifles.	France and Flanders	and 2 November 1914.

Subadar Major Gambhir Singh Gurung, 2/3rd Gurkhas Rifles.	France	Neuve Chapelle 10-12 March 1915.
Subadar Gunpat Mahadeo.	Flanders	Gheluvelt 28-31 October 1914.
Subadar Harnam Singh, 47th Sikhs.	France	Neuve Chapelle, 10-13 March 1915.
Subadar Jagat Singh Rawat, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	Festubert 23-24 November 1914.
Subadar Major Nain Singh Chinwarh, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappelle 10-12 March 1915.
Subadar Natha Singh, 34th Pioneers.	—do—	Festubert 23 November 1914.
Indian Order of Merit (IOM)		
Havildar Abdul Wahab, 59th Rifles.	France	Givenchy, 19 December 1914.
Havildar Alam Singh Negi, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	Festubert, 24 November 1914.
Subadar Arsala Khan, 57th Rifles.	—do—	Givenchy, 22 December 1914.
Naik Atma Singh, 57th Rifles.	Belgium	2nd bottle of Ypres, 26 April 1915.
Naik Ayub Khan, 129th Baluchis, promoted to Jemadar.	France	Visited enemy trench and conveyed important news to own troop. Neuve Chapelle, 23 June 1915.
Havildar Bahadur Thapa, 2/3 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 10-15 March 1915.
Sepoy Bakshi Singh, 15th Sikhs.	Belgium	2nd battle of Ypres, May 1915.
Havildar Bhakat Singh Rana, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Second battle of Ypres, 30 April 1915.
Havildar Bhim Singh Thapa, 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles, promoted Subadar.	France	Battle of Loos, 26 September 1915.
Havildar Butha Singh Negi, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 10-12 March 1915.

Havildar Chagatta, Ist Sappers and Miners.	France	Flanders, Trench warfare, 16 November 1914.
Havildar Chanba Singh, 34th Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvvert, November 1914.
Sapper Dalip Singh.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 28 October 1914.
Rifleman Dhan Singh Negi	—do—	Festuvvert, 23 December 1914.
Havildar Dost Mohammed, 59th Rifles.	—do—	Givenchy, 18 December 1914.
Havildar Gagna, 57th Rifles.	Belgium	Ist battle of Ypres, 31 October 1914.
Subadar Major Gambhir Singh Gurung, 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles.	France	Neuve Chapelle, 10-12 March 1915.
Rfn Gane Gurung	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 10-12 March 1915.
Rfn Ganesh Singh Sajwan, 39th Garhwal Rifles.	Flanders	Flanders, 9 November 1914.
Jemadar Ganesh Gurung, 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.	France	Neuve Chapelle, 12 March 1915.
Havildar Ghulam Mahomed, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	First battle of Ypres, 31 October 1914.
Rfn Chantu Rawat, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles	France	Festuvvert, 23 December 1914.
Lance Naik Harak Singh Gharti, 2/3 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 10-12 March 1915.
Havildar Hari Prasad Thapa, 2/8 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Festuvvert, 24 November 1914.
Subadar Harnam Singh, 47th Sikhs.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, December 1914.
Harnam Singh, Sub-Asstt. Surgeon, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvvert, 23 November 1914.
Rfn Hastobir Roka, 2/2 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 11 March 1915.
Rfn Jagtea Pun, 2/2 Gurkha Rifles	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 11 March 1915.

Subadar Jhandad Khan, 40th Pathans.	Belgium	2nd battle of Ypres, 28 April 1915.
Havildar Jai Lal, 6th Jats	Flander	Flanders, 14 November 1914.
Naik Jaman Singh Bist, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles.	France	Feuve Chapelle, 10-12 March 1915.
Lance Naik Jhaman Singh Khattri, 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.	Flanders	Flanders. 13 November 1914.
Subadar Jit Singh Gurung, 1/1 Gurkha Rifles.	France	Festuvvert, 21 May 1915.
Sapper Jiwa Khan.	—do—	Festuvvert, 21 May 1915.
Rfn Kalamu Bist 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	Festuvvert, 24 November 1914.
Havildar Karam Singh, 58th Rifles.	Flanders	Flanders, 31 September 1914.
Jemadar Lachna Singh, 40th Pathans.	Belgium	2nd battle of Ypres, 28 April 1915.
Sowar Madhu, Poona Horse.	Flanders	Flanders, 29-30 October 1914.
Havildar Mangal Singh, 47th Rifles later Jemadar.	Belgium	2nd battle of Ypres, 27 April 1915.
Naik Mangal Singh, 15 Ludhiana Sikhs.	France	Festuvvert, 18 May 1915.
Rfn Manjit Gurung, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chapelle, 11 March 1915.
Subadar Mehar Singh Khattri, 1/9th Gurka Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappelle, 10 March 1915.
Jemadar Mir Badshah, 129th Baluchi.	—do—	Givenchy, 17 December 1914.
Havildar Narayan Singh, 34th Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvvert, 24 November 1914.
Subadar Natha Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvvert, 24 November 1914.
L/Nk Nek Amal, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	Ist battle of Ypres, 26 October 1914.
Havildar Nikka Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	France	Festuvverst, 23 November 1914.

Havildar Pala Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	France	Festuert, 23 November 1914.
Rfn Partiman Gurung, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappelle, 11 March 1915.
Sepoy Raji Khan, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres, 27 April 1915.
Rfn Ram Kishan Thapa, 1/1st Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	2nd battle of Ypres, 27 April 1915.
Sepoy Rur Singh, 47th Sikhs.	France	Neuve Chappelle, 13th March 1915.
Sepoy Sahib Jan, 129th Baluchies.	—do—	Givenchy, 17 December 1914.
Sepoy Saiday Khan, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	Ist battle of Ypres, 26 October 1914.
L/Naik Sankaru Gusain, 1/39 Garhwal Rifles	France	Festuert, 24 November 1914.
Subadar Sarbjit Gurung, 2/8 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Loos, 25 September 1915.
Daffadar Sardar Singh, 20th Deccan Horse.	—do—	Givenchy, 21 December 1914.
Subadar Major Senbir Gurunug, 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.	—do— Reconnaissance of German position and control of fire before Battle of Loos.	Neuve Chappelle, 3 July 1915.
Sapper Shaikh Abdul, Rahman.	France	Neuve Chappelle, 10-12 March 1915.
Daffadar Shankwo Rao, 20th Deccan Horse.	—do—	Givenchy, 21 December 1914.
Jemadar Shiv Dho Mal, 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappelle, 11 March 1915.
Sepoy Teja Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	—do—	Festuert, 23 November 1914.
L/Naik Tota Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	—do—	Festuert, 23 November 1914.
Rfn Ujir Singh Gurung, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappelle, 10 March 1915.
Rfn Wajir Singh Burathoki, 1/4 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappelle, 12 March 1914.

Sepoy Zarif Khan, 59th Rifles.	France Awarded 1st Class IOM posthumously. (already IOM II class)	Neuve Chappele, 12 March 1914.
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Indian Distinguished Service Medal (IDSM)

Jemadar Abdul Aziz, 1st Sappers and Miners.	Flanders	Flanders, 13 November 1914.
Sowar Abdulla Khan, 34th Poona Horse.	France	Festuvvert, 26 November 1914.
Havildar Amar Singh, 9th Bhopal.	—do—	Neuve Choppele, 28 October 1914.
L/Naik Asbir Rana, 1/4 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappele, 3 July 1915.
Risaldar Badan Singh, Poona Horse.	—do—	Givenchy, 21 December 1914.
Havildar Badlu, 6th Jat Light Infantry.	—do—	Flanders, 13 November 1914.
Sepoy Bail Ram, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles (30th Punjab attached)	—do—	Neuve Chappele, 13 March 1915.
Havildar Bhagat Singh, 107th Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvvert, 24 December 1914.
Sepoy Bhagmal, 6 Jat.	—do—	Festuvvert, 23 November 1914.
Sepoy Bhan Singh, The Guides (attached 57th Rifles).	Belgium	2nd battle of Ypers, 27-29 April 1914.
Subadar Major Bhure Singh, 9th Bhopals.	France	Neuve Chappele, 28 October 1914.
Naik Bir Singh, 34th Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvvert, 23 November 1914.
Havildar Chagatta, 1st Sappers and Miners.	—do—	Neuve Chappele, 10-12 March 1915.
L/Naik Dangwa Romola, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappele, 13 March 1915.
Rfn Deoti Narain Newar, 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.	Belgium	2nd Bottle of Ypres, 30 April 1915.

Havildar Diwan Singh Padujhar, 39th Garwhal Rifles.	Flanders (Rain of German trenches by Garhwalis)	Flanders, 29-30 November 1914.
Subadar Fateh Jang Bhadur, 57th Rifle.	France —do—	Givenchy, 21 December 1914.
Sowar Fateh Khan, 34 Poona Horse.	—do—	Festuvvert, 26 November 1914.
Sepoy Fateh Singh, 47th Sikhs.	—do—	Festuvvert, 26 November 1914.
Sowar Firman Shah, 34th Poona Horse.	—do—	Festuvvert, 26 November 1914.
Rfn Gajbir Bisht 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.	Flanders	Trench-warfare Flanders, 13 November 1914.
Havildar Gambhir Singh Bohra, 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappele, 11 March 1915.
Sepoy Ganda Singh 19th Punjabis.	—do—	Festuvvert, 18 May 1915.
Subadar Ganga Charan Dixit, 21st Sappers and Miners.	—do—	Neuve Chappele, 28 October 1914
Rfn Ganpati Thapa, 2/3 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Neuve Chappele, Assault on German Trenches, 13 November 1914.
Rfn Garba Singh Gurung, 1/4 Gurkha Rifles.	—do—	Near Neuve Chappele—to find German position, 24 July 1915.
Sepoy Ghulam Hussein, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres, 28 April 1915.
Sapper Gujer Singh.	—do—	2nd Battle of Ypres, 27 April—1 May 1915.
Jemadar Guman Singh Negi, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappele, March 1915.
Sepoy Haider Ali, 40th Pathans.	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres, 27 April-1 May 1915.

Sepoy Harnath Singh, 19 Punjabis.	France	Festuvent, 18 May 1915.
Havildar Harpul, 6 Jat Light Infantry.	—do—	Festuvent, 24 November 1914.
Subadar Hashmat Dad Khan, 107th Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvent, 23 December 1914.
Havildar Hawinda, 58 Rifles.	—do—	Festuvent, 23 December 1914.
Sepoy Ishwar Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvent, 23 November 1914.
Subadar Ismail Khan, 21st Sappers and Miners.	—do—	Neuve Chappele, 14 March 1915.
Sapper Jai Singh,	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres, 26 April-3 May 1915.
Rfn Jewarihu Negi, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappele, 13 March 1915.
Sepoy Kassib, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	Ist Battle of Ypres, 31 October 1914.
Subadar Kedar Singh Rawat, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappele, 10-12 March 1915.
Rfn Khambha Singh Gurung, 1/1 Gurkha Rifles.	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres, 26 April-3 May 1915.
Naik Khan Zaman, 32nd Lahore Division Singal Coy	France	Neuve Chappele, 10-12 March 1915.
Subadar Major Labh Singh, 107th Pioneers.	—do—	Festuvent, 24 December 1914.
Sepoy Lafar Khan, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	Ist Battle of Ypres, 31 October 1914,
Jemandar Lakhi Ram, 6 Jat Light Infantry.	France	Festubert, 23 November 1914.
Sepoy Lal Sher 129th Baluchis.	—do—	Festuvent, 30 November 1914.
Sepoy Lal Singh, 15th Ludhiana Sikhs.	—do—	Festuvent, 18 May 1915.
Jemdar Mangal Singh, 52nd Sikhs (attached 59 Rifles)	—do—	Givenchy, ¶ 19 December 1914.
L/Naik Maru, 6 Jat Light Infantry.	—do—	Festuvent, 23 December 1914.

Rfn Pati Ram Kunwar, 1/4 Gurkha Rifles.	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres, 29 April 1915.
Jemadar Puran Singh Thapa, 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappelle, 10-12 March 1915.
Rfn Phalman Gurung, 1/1 Gurkha Rifles.	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres 29 April-1 May 1915.
Naik Ram Pershad Thapa, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappelle, (German attack on trenches of 2/2 GR on 29/30 October 1914).
Rfn Ram Bhadur Sahi, 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappelle. (Attack on Germans by 2/3 GR and 2/39 Garhwalis on 13 November 1914, on their tranches).
Havildar Ranjit Singh Pandir, 2/9th Garhwal Rifles.	France	Neuve Chappelle, (German attack on 2/2 GR, 9 November 1914.
Sepoy Risal, 6th Jat Light Infantry.	—do—	Raid by 2/3 GR and 2/39 Garhwalis on enemy at Neuve Chappelle, 14 November 1914.
Sepoy Said Ahmed, 129th Baluchis.	Belgium	Ist Battle of Ypres, 31 October 1914.
Sepoy Sapuram Singh, 15th Ludhiana Sikhs.	France	Festuert, 18 May 1915.
Havildar Sar Mast, 57th Rifles.	Belgium	2nd Battle of Ypres, April-May 1915.
Sepoy Sarain Singh, 19th Punjabis.	France	Festuert, 18 May 1915.
Subadar Sher Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers.	—do— (Heavy German offensive)	Lille, 26 October 1914.
Havildar Sucha Singh, 1 Sappers and Miners.	—do—	Festuert, Blowing of mined January 1915.
Sepoy Sucha Singh, 15th Ludhiana Sikhs.	—do—	Festuert, 18 May 1915.

Sepoy Sundar Singh, 19th Punjabis.	France	Festuvent, 18 May 1915.
Sepoy Ujagar Singh, 45th Sikhs.	—do—	Festuvent, 18 May 1915.
Sepoy, Usman Khan 55th (attached 57 Rifles)	Belgium	Ist Battle of Ypres, 23 October 1914.

(Compiled from *War Diaries IEF 'A'*; *Gazette of India* 1914-15; Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919.)

APPENDIX—G

Abstract of Casualties of Indian Corps in France up to the 19 November 1915

<i>Casualties</i>	<i>IO</i>	<i>IOR'S</i>	<i>BO</i>	<i>BOR'S</i>
Killed	103	2,345	150	4
Wounded	336	14,221	294	34
Missing	50	3,148	49	—
Other Deaths	6	661	3	3
Total	495	20,375	496	41

Note: IO (Indian Officers); IOR'S (Indian other ranks)
BO (British Officers); BOR'S (British other ranks)

(Reproduced from Merewether and Smith, *Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, p. 469).

APPENDIX—H

Composition of Indian Corps in France


General Officer Commanding Lieut General Sir James Willcocks

(8 August 1914—6 September 1915)

Lieut General Sir Charles Anderson, G.C., M.G., K.C.S.I.,

D.S.O., K.C.B.

(6 September, 1915 onwards)



Lahore Division

Ferozepur Brigade

Ist Bn Connaught Rangers

129th Duke of Connaught's
own Baluchis

57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F.)

9th Bhopal Infantry.

Jullundur Brigade

Ist Bn Manchester Regiment

15th Ludhiana Sikhs

47th Sikhs

59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.)

Sirhind Brigade

Ist Bn Highland Light Infantry

Ist Bn Ist King Georges own
Gurkha Rifles

125th Napier's Rifles

Meerut Division

Dehradun Brigade

Ist Bn Seaforth Highlanders

Ist Bn 9th Gurkha Rifles

2nd Bn 2nd King Edward's
own Gurkha Rifles

6 Jat Light Infantry

Garhwal Brigade

2nd Bn Leceisterhire Regt

2nd Bn 3rd Queen Alexand-
er's Own Gurkha Rifles

1st Bn 39th Garhwal Rifles

2nd Bn 39th Garhwal Rifles

Bareilly Brigade

2nd Bn Blackwatch

41st Dogras

58th Vaughan's Rifles (F.F.)

2nd Bn 8th Gurkha Rifles

Divisional Troops

Lahore Division
 15th Lancer's Cureton's Multanis
 HQ Divisional Engineers
 No 20 Coy Sappers & Miners
 No 21 Boy Sppers & Miners
 Signal Coy
 34th Sikh Pioneers

Artillery Units

HQ Divisional Artillery
 5th Brigade R.F.A. and
 Ammunition Column
 11th Brigade R.F.A. and
 Ammunition Column
 18th Brigade R.F.A. and
 Ammunition Column
 109th Heavy Battery

Meerut Division
 4th Cavalry
 HQ Divisional Engineers
 No 3 Sappers & Miners Coy
 No 4 Sappers and Miners Coy
 Signal Coy
 107th Pioneers

Artillery Units

HQ Divisional Artillery
 4th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition
 Column.
 9th Brigade R.F.A. and Ammunition
 Column.
 13th Brigade R.F.A. and
 Ammunition Column.
 110th Heavy Battery.

1. Merewether and Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*, John Murray, London, 1919, pp. 10-12.

APPENDIX—J

**Awards:
 Indian Expeditionary Force 'G'
 Gallipoli**

<i>Awards</i>		<i>Numbers</i>
1.	CIE	1
2.	MC	2
3.	OBI Class I	2
4.	OBI Class II	12
5.	IOM Class I	—
6.	IOM Class II	43
7.	IDSMS	104
8.	IMSM	56
Total		220

(Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Printing, Calcutta, 1923, p. 184.)

APPENDIX—K

**Casualties:
Indian Expeditionary Force 'G'
Gallipoli¹**

	<i>IO</i>	<i>IOR</i>	<i>FOLL</i>
1. Dead from all Causes	33	1,591	127
2. Wounded	72	3,578	1
3. Missing and Prisoners	—	101	—
Total	105	5,270	128

1. Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Printing, Calcutta, 1923, p. 176.

APPENDIX—L

**Awards:
Indian Expeditionary Force 'D'
Mesopotamia***

<i>Awards</i>	<i>Number</i>
VC	— 3
CIE	— 2
MC (Bar)	— 1
MC	— 42
OBI Class I	— 16
OBI Class II	— 172
IOM Class I	— 11
IOM Class II	— 455
IDSM (Bar)	— 15
IDSM	— 1,756
IMSM (Bar)	— 3
IMSM	— 909
Total	3,385

*Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Printing, 1923, p. 185.

APPENDIX—M

Awards:
Victoria Cross
Indian Expeditionary Force 'D'
Mesopotamia

<i>No. Rank, name & Corps</i>	<i>Date and Place</i>	<i>Date of Gazette</i>
1605 Naik Shamad Khan 89th Punjabis	Near Beit Ayeesa 12/13-4-16	26-9-16
3398 Sepoy Chattar Singh, 9th Bhopal Infantry	Wadi 13-1-16	21-6-16
501, Lance Naik Lala, 41st Dogras	El Orah 21-1-16	13-5-16

APPENDIX—N

Casualties:
Indian Expeditionary Force 'D'
Mesopotamia*

	<i>IO</i>	<i>IOR</i>	<i>FOLL</i>
Dead from all Causes	364	17,567	11,624
Wounded	828	31,330	450
Missing and Prisoners	15	1,510	284
Total	1207	50,407	12,358

*Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Printing, Calcutta, 1923, p. 176.

APPENDIX—O

Composition of Force 'D'

Mesopotamia

on 1st December 1914

General Officer Commanding—Lieut General Sir A.A. Barrett,
K.C.B., K.C., V.O., Indian Army.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

Cavalry

33rd Queen Victoria's Own Light Cavalry.

Artillery

Headquarters Divisional Artillery—

Divisional Artillery Commander—Brigadier General C.T.
Robinson. 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.

76th Battery, R.F.A.

82nd Battery, R.F.A.

63rd Battery, R.F.A.

6th Ammunition Column, R.F.A.

1st Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade.

No. 23 Indian Mountain Battery.

No. 30 Indian Mountain Battery.

Royal Engineers

Headquarters, Divisional Engineers.

No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.

No. 22 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.

No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.

No. 3 Troop Wireless Signal Squadron.

Pioneers

48th Pioneers.

Infantry

16th Indian Infantry Brigade—Brigadier General W.S. Delamain,
C.B., D.S.O., Indian Army.

2nd Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment.

20th Duke of Cambridge's own Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis).

104th Wellesley's Rifles.

117th Mahrattas.

17th Indian Infantry Brigade—Brigadier General W.H. Dobbie,
C.B., Indian Army.

Ist Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.

119th Infantry (The Mooltan) Regiment.

103th Mahratta Light Infantry.

120th Rajputana Infantry.

7th Duke of Connaught's own Rajputs.

(Moberly, F.J., Brig-Gen., *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918*, London, 1923, Vol. I, pp. 348-349.)

APPENDIX—P

Reorganisation of Force 'D' on 1st April 1915

General Officer Commanding Force—General Sir J.E. Nixon, K.C.B.

2nd Indian Army Corps

6th Cavalry Brigade		6th Poona Division		12th Indian Division		Corps Troops	
"S" Battery R.H.A.	16th Infantry Brigade	12th Infantry Brigade	12th Infantry Brigade	Wireless Signal Troop			
7th Lancers	17th Infantry Brigade	30th Infantry Brigade	30th Infantry Brigade	Bridging Train			
16th Cavalry	18th Infantry Brigade	33rd Infantry Brigade	33rd Infantry Brigade	Printed & Litho Sections			
6th Divisional Troops		12th Divisional Troops					
33rd Cavalry (Less 2 Squadrons).		2 Squadrons 33rd Cavalry.					
10th Brigade R.F.A. (18 Guns)		86th Heavy Battery R.G.A.					
Divisional Ammunition Column		1/5th Hants Honitzer Battery R.F.A. (4 Homitzers)					
1st Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade		12th Field Coy		Sappers & Miners			
(12 guns)		Sirumur Imperial Service Coy		Sappers & Miners			
17th Field Coy	Sappers and Miners						
22nd Field Coy	Sappers and Miners						
34th Divisional Signal Coy		12th Signal Coy.					
48th Pioneers.							

The composition of Infantry Brigades was as follows:

- 16th—2nd Dorsetshire Regiment,
20th Punjabis; 104th Rifles; 117th Mahrattas.
17th—1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry,
22nd Punjabis; 103 Mahrattas; 119th Infantry.
18th—2nd Royal Regiment own Royal.
7th Rajputs; 110 Mahrattas; 120 Rajputana Infantry.
12th—2nd Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment,
4th Rajputs; 44th Mewars Infantry; 90th Punjabis.
30th—24th Punjabis; 76th Punjabis; 2/7 Gurkhas; 33rd Hampshire
Regiment; 11th Rajputs; 66th Punjabis; 67th Punjabis.

Moberly, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-18*, London, 1923, Vol. I, pp. 350-351).

APPENDIX—Q

Awards: Indian Expeditionary Force 'E' Egypt and Palestine

<i>Award</i>		<i>Number</i>
VC	—	2
MC	—	32
OBI Class (I)	—	6
OBI Class (2)	—	53
IOM Class (I)	—	4
IOM Class (2)	—	138
IDSM (Bar)	—	7
IDSM	—	473
IMSM (Bar)	—	3
IMSM	—	2,829
Total	—	3,547

(Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Printing, Calcutta, 1923, p. 185).

APPENDIX—R

Awads:
Victoria Cross
Indian Expeditionary Force 'E'
Egypt and Palestine

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank, Name & Corps</i>	<i>Theatre</i>	<i>Place & Date</i>	<i>Date of Gazette</i>
1.	4146	Rfn. Karna Bhadur Rana 2/3rd Queen Alexander's Own Gurkha Rifles.	Egypt	El Kefr 10-4-18	21-6-18
2.	Risaldar	Badlu Singh, 14th Murray's, Jat Lan- cers, attached 29th Lan- cers (Deccan Horse)	Palestine	West bank of River Jordan 23-9-18	27-11-18

(*Gazette of India*, 1918)

APPENDIX—S

Casualties:
Indian Expeditionary Force 'E'
Egypt and Palestine

	<i>IO</i>	<i>IOR</i>	<i>FOLL</i>
Dead from all causes	74	3,713	555
Wounded	135	6,286	8
Missing and P) W'S	2	158	5
Total	211	7,157	568

(Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 176).

APPENDIX—T**Composition of Force: Indian Expeditionary Force 'E'
Egypt and Palestine****1st Indian Cavalry Corps Headquarters.****1st Indian Cavalry Divisional Headquarters.****2nd Indian Cavalry Brigade Headquarters (Sialkot)**

17th Lancers

6th Cavalry

19th Lancers

5th Indian Cavalry Brigade (Mhow) Headquarters

6th (Innis Killing) Dragoons

2nd Lancers

38th K.G's O CIH

8th Indian Brigade (Lucknow) Headquarters

1st King's Dragoon Guards

29th Lancers

36th Jacob's Horse

Divisional Troops

1st Jodhpur Lancers

A) Batteries R.H.A.

U) Cavalry Divisional Ammunition Column

Q)

1 Field Troop (Pack)

1 Field Troop (wheeled)

2nd Cavalry Division Headquarters**3rd Indian Cavalry Brigade (Ambala) Headquarters**

8 Hussars

9 Hudson Horse

30 Lancers

7th Indian Cavalry Brigade (Meerut) Headquarters

7th Dragoon Guards

20th Deccan Horse

34th Poona Horse

Divisional Troops

N) RHA

V) Cavalry Divisional Ammunition Column. Field troops.

X) (replaced by British units); less administrative services.

(IEF 'A', Vol. 23.)

APPENDIX—U

Indian Expeditionary Force 'E'

Employed in the Last Phase of General Allenby's Campaign

4th Cavalry Division (Maj Gen Barrow)

10th Cavalry Brigade (Brig-Gen Howard Vyse)	11th Cavalry Brigade (Brig-Gen Gregory)	12th Cavalry Brigade (Brig-Gen Wigan)
---	--	--

1/1 Dorsetyeo	1/1 Coy of Londonyeo	1/1 Staffordshireyeo
2nd Lancers	29th Lancers	6th Cavalry
38th Can. Ind. Horse	36th Jacob's Horse	19th Lancers.

5th Cavalry Division (Maj Gen Mac Andrew)

14th Cavalry Brigade (Brig-Gen Clarke)	15th (I.S.) Cavalry Brigade. (Brig-Gen Harbord)	13th Cavalry Brigade (Brig-Gen Kelly)
---	---	--

1/1 Sherwood Rngs	Jodhpur I.S. Lancers	1/1 Gloucesteryeo
20th Deccan Horse	Mysore I.S. Lancers	9th Hudson's Horse
34th Poona Horse	Ist Hyderabad I.S. Lancers.	18th Lancers.

Attached to Anzac Mounted Division

20th Indian Infantry (Imperial Service) Brigade.

XXTH CORPS

10th Division (Maj Gen Longley)

29th Infantry Brigade	30th Infantry Brigade	31 Infantry Brigade
1/101st Grenadiers	Ist Kashmir IS Rifles	2/101st Grenadiers
1/54th Sikhs	38th Dogras	74th Punjabis
2/151st Infantry	46th Punjabis	2/42nd Deolis

53rd Division (Maj Gen S.F. Mott)

158th Infantry Brigade	159th Infantry Brigade	160th Infantry Brigade
4/11th Gurkhas	3/152nd IND INF	1/17th IND INF
3/153rd IND INF	1/153rd IND INF	1/21st Punjabis
3/154th IND INF	2/153rd IND INF	

XXIST CORPS**3rd Lahore Division (Maj Gen Hoskins)**

7th Infantry Brigade	8th Infantry Brigade	9th Infantry Brigade
2/7th Gurkha Rifles	47th Sikhs	1/1st Gurkha Rifles
27th Punjabis	59th Scinde Rifles	93rd INF
91st Punjabis	2/124th Baluchistan INF	105th Mahratta Light INF

7th Meerut Division (Maj Gen Fane)

19th Infantry Brigade	21st Infantry Brigade	28th Infantry Brigade
28th Punjabis	1st Guides INF	51st Sikhs
92nd Punjabis	20th Punjabis	53rd Sikhs
125th Wapier's Rifles	1/8th Gurkha Rifles	56th Punjabi Rifles

60th Division (Maj Gen Shea)

179th Brigade	180th Brigade	181st Brigade
2/19th Punjabis	2nd Guides	130th Baluchis
2/137th Baluchis	2/30th Punjabis	2/97th Deccan Infantry
	1/50th Kumaon Rifles	2/152nd INF

75th Division (Maj Gen P.C. Palin)

232 Brigade	233 Brigade	234 Brigade
72nd Punjabis	29th Punjabis	123rd Outram Rifles
2/3rd Gurkhas	3/3rd Gurkhas	58th Vaughan's Rifles
3rd Kashmire IS INF	2/154th INF	1/152nd INF

(Allenby's *Final Triumph*, Constable & Co. Ltd., London, 1920, extracts from Appendix—A, pp. 338-340.)

APPENDIX—V

Awards:
Indian Expeditionary Force 'B' and 'C'

<i>Awards</i>	<i>Numbers</i>
CIE	4
MC	1
OBI Class (1)	6
OBI Class (2)	31
IOM Class (1)	3
IOM Class (2)	71
IDSM	247
IMSM	300
Total	663

(Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 184).

APPENDIX—W

Detailed List of Awards Won by the
Indian Expeditionary Force 'B'
East Africa

Order of British India

<i>Rank, Name and Unit</i>	<i>Reward Received</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)
Subadar Major Nuralam 'Bhadur' 28 Mountain Battery	Promotion to Class I	Gazette of India Notification No. 725 dated 4th August 1915, with the] title "Sardar Bhadur".

(1)	(2)	(3)
Maj Gen Natha Singh "Bhadur" Commandant Jind Infantry	Promotion to Class I	Gazette of India Notification No. 726, dated 4 August 1915, with the title "Sardar Bhadur".
Maj Gen Lal "Bhadur" Bharatpur Infantry	—do—	—do—
Subadar Major Kesar Singh 29th Punjabis	OBI (2)	Gazette of India, Notification No. 725, dated 4 August 1915, with the title "Sardar Bhadur".
Lt Col Haidar Ali, 2nd Kashmir Rifles.	—do—	Gazette of India, Notification No. 726, dated 4 August 1915, with the title "Sardar Bhadur".
Major Gandharb Singh, 3rd Kashmir Rifles	—do—	—do—
Subadar Bakhtawar Singh, 13 Rajputs.	OBI (2)	Gazette of India, 3 June 1915.
4050 Naik Gul Mohammed, 29th Punjabis.	—do—	Gazette of India, 19 December 1915.
Subadar Sher Baz 29th Punjabis	—do—	Chief of General Staff, India's tele- gram No. 9787 dated 2 December 1914 (Deceased pension bestowed upon the widow).
1222 Sepoy Fazil Khan, 101st Grenadiers	—do—	Gazette of India, 3 June, 1915.
Subadar Ghulam Haider 130th Baluchis	—do—	—do—
Subadar Randhir Singh 2nd Kashmir Rifles	—do—	—do—
Subadar Bal Bhadur Thapa, 2nd Kashmir Rifles.	—do—	—do—

(1)	(2)	(3)
Subadar Harnum Singh Jind IS Infantry Lt Col Durg Singh, Bhadur 3rd Kashmir Rifles	OBI(2) Promoted from OBI (I) to IOM (I).	Gazette of India 3 June 1915 Gazette of India, 10 September 1915. Promotion to Class (I) IOM.
Distinguished Service Medal		
727 Naik Bachan Singh, 27 Mountain Battery.	DSM	Gazette of India, 3 June 1915.
1211 Gnr Mehar Khan	—do—	—do—
28 Mountain Battery		
1870 Sepoy Girdhari Singh, 13 Rajputs	—do—	—do—
1566 Sepoy Daulat Singh, 13 Rajputs	—do—	—do—
3587 Havildar Bhagwan Singh, 13 Rajputs	—do—	—do—
3591 Havildar Pala Singh, 13 Rajputs	—do—	—do—
905 Sepoy Sabdal Khan	—do—	—do—
101st Grenadiers		
811 Sepoy Sowaj Khan	—do—	—do—
3380 Havildar Mohammad Ali 130 Baluchis	—do—	—do—
1091 Sepoy Billu	—do—	—do—
2nd Kashmir Rifles		
6 Sepoy Saif Ali	—do—	—do—
2nd Kashmir Rifles		
310 Sepoy Bal Bhadur Cheti 2nd Kashmir Rifles	—do—	—do—
Subadar Mardan Ali	—do—	—do—
2nd Kashmir Rifles		
2746 Sepoy Ganga Ram 3rd Kashmir Rifles	—do—	—do—
1131 Sepoy Devi Singh	—do—	—do—
3rd Kashmir Rifles		

<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>
1367 Havildar Gujar Singh, Jind IS Infantry	DSM	Govt. of India Gazette 3 June 1915
2287 Sepoy Lakha Singh, Jind IS Infantry	—do—	—do—
2276 Sepoy Sadha Singh, Jind IS Infantry	—do—	—do—
4969 Havildar Pala Singh, Jind IS Infantry	—do—	—do—
2 Havildar Madhu Singh, No 26 Railway Coy Sappers and Miners.	—do—	—do—
9 Sepoy Bhagwan Singh 2nd Kashmir Rifles	—do—	—do—

APPENDIX—X

**Casualties:
Indian Expeditionary Force 'B'
East Africa**

Dead from All Causes	67	2,405	500
Wounded	59	1,927	17
Missing	—	40	3
Total	126	4,372	520

(Superintendent, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Government Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 176).

APPENDIX—Y

**Composition of IEF 'B' in 1915
Fighting Units**

27th Infantry Brigade

Headquarters

2nd Battalion Royal North Lanchashire

101st Grenadiers

98th Infantry

63 Pallam Cottah Light Infantry.

Composite Infantry Brigade

Headquarters

13th Rajputs

2nd Kashmir Rifles

3rd Kashmir Rifles 4 Coys | formed into one Composite

3rd Gwalior Infantry 4 Coys | Battalion

Unallotted Infantry

29th Punjabis

61st Pioneers

130 Baluchis

½ Bharatpur Infantry

½ Jind Infantry

½ Kapurthala Infantry

½ Rampur Infantry

1 Squadron 17th Cavalry

Calcutta Volunteer Battery (15 persons volunteer Maxim Detachment).

(Reproduced from IEF 'B' *War Diary* No. 27102 Appendix I, Vol. 16, dated 12-11-15).

APPENDIX—Z**Composition of IEF 'B' Jan. 1916****Fighting Units (Smith Durrien)**

*1 Corps Headquarters (from home)

2 Divisional Headquarters (one from BEA Tighe, and one from home)

27th Infantry Brigade

2nd Bn Loyal North Lanchashire

63rd Palam Cottah Light Infantry

98th Infantry

101st Grenadiers.

Composite Infantry Brigade

Headquarters

17th Infantry

2nd Kashmir Rifles

3rd Kashmir Rifles 4 Coys

3rd Gwalior Infantry 4 Coys

(Formed into one Composite battalion)

Unallotted Infantry

29th Punjabis

40th Pathans

61st Pioneers

129th Baluchis

130 Baluchis

$\frac{1}{2}$ Bharatpur Infantry

$\frac{1}{2}$ Jind Infantry

$\frac{1}{2}$ Rampur Infantry

1 Squadron 17th Cavalry

27th Mountain Battery

28th Mountain Battery

Unallotted Infantry

Calcutta Volunteer Battery—
15 persons.

Volunteer Maxim

Gun Detachment

Faridkot Sappers

North Western

Railway Maxim

Gun detachment for armoured
train

Force ammunition column

APPEDIX—1

CONFIDENTIAL

Serial No. 6

War Diary Army: Headquarters, India

(F.S.R., Part II, Section 140; and Staff Manual, War Section 20)

IEF 'B'

VOLUME 29

(From December 1917 to February 1918)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Summary of events</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Appendix</i>
27-2-18	General Scott's report on his mission to East Africa regarding the welfare and condition of the Indian troops.	15882	200
210			

Appendix 200

No. 120—T.S., dated 31st December 1917 (DY. No. 15882)

From

Major General T.E. Scott, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.

To

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
London.

I have the honour to submit the accompanying statement which embodies my replies to the points mentioned in the enclosure to the letter from Chief of the General Staff, India, of the 1st October 1917, No. 19059-G.S.—II.

Copy forwarded to:—

The Chief of the General Staff, Delhi.
The General Officer Commanding,
East Africa.

- I. The General Suitability of the Climatic and other Conditions in East Africa for the Employment of Indian Troops—

East Africa may be roughly divided into three areas:

- (i) The Lake Area has the reputation of being unhealthy owing to the prevalence of malaria and sleeping sickness.
- (ii) The Upland Area has the best reputation in the territories formerly German. The upland area in British East Africa is healthy and is suitable for Indians, particularly Puujabis.
- (iii) The Coast Area is the one in which troops first arrive from overseas, and therefore it requires special consideration.

The most important diseases in this area may be summarised as follows:

- (a) Fevers: Malaria which appears to be endemic, tick fevers (often mistaken for Malaria) cerebro-spinal fever, black water fever of diverse origin etc.
- (b) Waterborne diseases—
 - (i) Dysentery.
 - (ii) Intestinal parasites—streams and drinking water are almost universally infected with the era of intestinal worms.
- (c) Other diseases—Jigger fleas, biting fleas and a host of other insects add to the discomfort of the individual, and introduce elements which may lead to unfitness.

4. Generally speaking, I consider the climatic and other conditions of the East African Coast Area are most trying to Indian troops and active service. Their constitutions suffer to such a very serious degree that this area may be regarded as unsuitable for their employment, except for short periods, and then only with considerable precautions for the preservation of health.

II. The Manner in Which Indian Troops were Employed, are they, Generally Speaking, in Posts on the Lines of Communications or as Active Fighting Units. If they are on the Lines of Communication, are they much Split up, and does this Render Effective Supervision Difficult ?

Some of the Imperial Service Troops, Regiments have been employed on lines of communication, and in a few cases worn out

units of the regular army have been withdrawn from the fighting line placed on lines of communication with the idea of resting them. The remainder have been employed as active fighting units.

III. Do Units Ever Get Periodical Reliefs in which they can Rest, and When are they sent to Healthy Places to Recuperate?

This has seldom been possible, as owing to abnormal sickness, there has hardly even been a period when a unit could be spared from the front. In a few cases where units became so depleted that it was obviously no use keeping them in the field, they were sent to lines of communication to rest for short durations. Morogoro was considered the best available place for worn out troops as shortage of shipping made it impossible to send any large numbers to British East Africa.

IV. Accommodation of Troops When Located Outside the Sphere Operations.

Accommodation has been in tents or in "bandas." Both these pattern give insufficient protection from the sun during the heat of the day.

The "banda" is a hut built of poles and grass or leaves, and is always cool and preferable to a tent.

V. In What Direction can Assistance be Rendered in India with Regard to the Training of Drafts for East Africa.

I submit the opinion of Brigadier General S.H. Sheppard, C.M.G., D.S.O. on this point—

"The fighting in East Africa has been of an extra-ordinarily difficult and trying nature. The best Indian Regiment is at a very grave disadvantage when opposed to the Veteran German Askari. If it were possible for drafts to be assembled in certain selected localities before coming to East Africa, and given even the rudiments of such teaching, it would double their value. We cannot do it here. Not only are drafts, always urgently needed with their regiments, but a two months course of training even in the best locality we can offer, would result in 30 per cent or more of the draft being invalidated before they can see their unit,"

Brigadier-General Hannington, C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanding Hanforce, expressed the following opinion:

“.....where an African takes to the bush for safety, the Indian feels lost and loses confidence. Nothing but active service conditions in this country can do any good. Special attention should, however, be given to utilisation of national cover, snap shooting standing and crawling from cover to cover both by individuals and squad.”

VI. What are the Causes of Abnormal Wastage Among Indian Units, Especially Among Indian Infantry Battalions? Can any Measures Be Adopted Which Would Reduce This?

The abnormal wastage among Indian troops in East Africa has been brought about by a variety of factors which, for convenience, may be dealt with as follows:

- (i) Malaria
- (ii) The Jigger
- (iii) Tick fever, Cerebru-Spinal fever.

Black Water Fever etc. are all causative factors in the maintenance of the high wastage figures.

- (iv) Dysentery
- (v) Sun Fever
- (vi) Shortage of Food
- (vii) Difficulties of cooking rations on arrival in Camp for following reasons—
 - (a) Fires may not be allowed after dark.
 - (b) Water may not be available;
 - (c) He (Sepoy) may be too tired;
 - (d) He (Sepoy) may be detailed for Sentry, picquet or fatigue duty, etc.

The result being that he either goes to bed hungary and wakes up less fit to stand another day's hardships, and probably eats the remains of some stale food in his haverseck, which causes disorder of his digestion, doarrhoea or even dysentery.

- (viii) *Difficulties regarding water.*

The Indian requires large quantities of drinking water. The drinking water supplies in East Africa are frequently at long distances apart, and in dry season difficult of access, being often only holes in

the bed of a river. The source of a supply being scanty is also liable to contamination and as noted above, this continuation is a frequent cause of disease. The limitation of water for bathing and washing clothes increases the tendency to vermin and disease.

(ix) *Excessive weight carried by the Soldier on the march.*

The military necessity of having to push on, regardless of transport, frequently resulted in a considerable weighing down of the Sepoy with extra loads such as reserve rations, ammunition, and extra water.

This led to fatigue and exhaustion, especially when marching under the hot tropical sun, and without a very liberal food and water ration.

(x) *Difficulties regarding clothing.*

They have often had only a single blanket each for weeks at a time and no change of clothing.

(xi) A high percentage of unusually young men among the reinforcements, who under tropical sun easily bears fatigue and readily falls ill.

(xii) Lack of any tropical expert opinion of medicine to treat cases.

(xiii) It was frequently necessary to discharge men from hospital before they were absolutely fit, in order to make room for others whose condition required hospital treatment. They had to be re-admitted due to relapses.

VII. Investigate Whether the Khaki Shirts Issued to Troops are the Cause in any Degree of Malaria.

The exposure resulting from short sleeves, open collars and shorts increases the chances of disease from mosquitoes, thorns, ticks, jiggers and sun is a danger to the health of all officers and troops except Africans.

APPENDIX—2

During the war a particular Corps of Indian army was employed not only in one theatre of the war but was frequently transferred from one place to the other. In the main narrative the story of their performance is given only theatrewise. This appendix is meant for those who want to read a connected account of the work done by every individual unit.

Fighting Arms

There are three principal fighting arms viz., Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry. As these fighting arms shared glory and rout together in battles, it will be of interest to know their achievements and share of 'Battle Honours.'

CAVALRY

Cavalry, though an important fighting arm, has only a supporting role. Therefore, any action of Cavalry cannot be studied in isolation. It has to be studied in terms of infantry-cavalry cooperation; which gives lightning speed to an infantry action. The Tulughma system of the Mughals is a true example of cavalry speed and action. It will be interesting to give an account of the 'Battle Honours' shared by various Cavalry regiments along with the Infantry.

Cavalry Battle Honours

<i>Sr. No.</i>	<i>Name of Unit</i>	<i>Battle Honours</i>
1.	Skinner's Horse (1st Duke of York's Own Cavalry)	"France & Flanders", 1914-16.
2.	The 2nd Royal Lancers (Gardner's Horse)	"France & Flanders", 1914-18. "Egypt", 1915. "Megido", "Sharon" "Damascus", "Palestine", 1918. "Tigris", 1916. "Mesopotamia", 1916.
3.	The 3rd Cavalry	"Mesopotamia", 1917-18.
4.	Hudson's Horse	"Givenchy", 1914. "Somme", 1916. "Bazentin", "Flers-Courcelette", "Cambrai", 1917. "France & Flanders", 1914-18. "Megido", "Sharon."

<i>Sr. No.</i>	<i>Name of Unit</i>	<i>Battle Honours</i>
		"Damascus", "Palestine", 1918.
		"Khan Baghdadi"
		"Mesopotamia", 1916-18.
5.	Probyn's Horse (5th King Edwards VII's Own Lancers)	"Mesopotamia", 1915-18.
6.	6th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers (Watson's Horse)	"Shaiba", "Kut-al-Amara", 1915-17. "Ctesiphon", "Tigris", 1916. "Baghdad", "Sharquat", "Mesopotamia", 1915-18. "N-W Frontier, India", 1915. "Afghanistan", 1919.
7.	7th Light Cavalry	"Persia", 1915-19. "Afghanistan", 1919.
8.	8th King Georges V's, Own Light Cavalry	"Givenchy", 1914. "France & Flanders", 1914-18. "Aden", "Afghanistan", 1919.
9.	The Royal Deccan Horse (9th Horse)	"Cambrai", 1917. "France & Flanders", 1914-18. "Sharon", "Damascus", "Palestine", 1918.
10.	The Guides Cavalry (10th Queen Victoria's) Own Frontier Force.	"Khan Baghdadi" "Sharquat" "Mesopotamia", 1917-18. "N-W-F", India, 1915.

ARTILLERY

Artillery is another important fighting arm. It gives additional fire support to the infantry. The more the fire support, easier becomes the job of the infantry and greater is the destruction of the enemy. It is again a supporting arm. No battles can be fought by artillery alone but the fate of battles is often decided on better artillery support.

<i>Sr. No.</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Battle Honour</i>
1.	Ist Artillery and 6th Artillery.	“Anzac” “Landing at Anzac” “Defence of Anzac” “Sulva”, “Sari Bair” “Gallipoli”, 1915. “Suez Canal” “Egypt”, 1915-16.
2.	3rd and 10th Artillery	“Basra”, “Shaiba” “Tigris”, 1916. “N-W-F, India”, 1917.
3.	7th Artillery	“Kilimanjaro”, “Nyango”, “Nurungombe”
4.	8th Artillery	“Kilimanjaro”
5.	Ist and 5th Artillery	“Mesopotamia”, 1916-18. “Persia”, 1918.
6.	9th Artillery	“N-W-F, India”, 1914-15-17. “Megiddo”, “Nablus”.

In recognition of the services of Indian Mountain Artillery in the Great war, the title “Royal” was conferred on the Ist by the King Emperor George Vth on the 31st January 1922.

INFANTRY

Infantry is called the Queen of all arms. Infantry is always the first and last in operations beginning from occupation, withdrawal, consolidation or garrison duties. No battle can be fought without infantry though battles can be fought without artillery or cavalry support. Hence it will be of very great interest to give brief account of the infantry regiments which participated in the First World War and earned various Battle honours for their actions.

THE IST KING GEORGE V'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES (The Malaun Regiment)

Battle Honours

“Givenchy, 1914”, “Neuve-Chapelle”, “Ypres, 1915”, “St.

Julien", "Festubert, 1915", "Loos", "France and Flanders", 1914-15, "Megiddo", "Sharon", "Palestine, 1918", "Tigris, 1916", "Kut-al-Amara, 1917", "Baghdad", "Mesopotamia, 1916-18", "N-W-F., India, 1915-17", "Afghanistan, 1919".

In August 1914 the 1st Battalion was sent to France under the Sirhind Brigade. Their brigade being the first to arrive in Egypt, it was detached for a while to defend the Suez Canal. Therefore, they did not reach action in France until December, 1914. And then their story in France, Flanders, Mesopotamia and finally in Palestine is that of the gallant Lahore Division.

The 2nd Battalion fought in the Khyber actions of the Third Afghan War in 1919.

THE 2ND KING EDWARD VII'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES

(The Sirmoor Rifles)

Battle Honours

"La Bassee, 1914", "Festubert, 1914-15" "Givenchy, 1914", "Neuve Chapelle", "Aubers", "Loos", "France and Flanders, 1914-15", "Egypt, 1915", "Tigris, 1916", "Kut-al-Amara, 1917", "Baghdad", "Mesopotamia, 1916-18", "Persia, 1918", "Baluchistan, 1918", "Afghanistan, 1919".

The contribution to the Allied cause in the Great War began with the Second Battalion's departure for France with the Meerut Division in September 1914. It also participated in Suez Canal and Egypt before it returned to India in 1916.

THE 3RD QUEEN ALEXANDER'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES

Battle Honours

"La Bassee, 1914", "Armentieres, 1914", "Festubert, 1914-15", "Givenchy, 1914", "Neuve Chapelle", "Aubers", "France and Flanders, 1914-15", "Egypt, 1915-16", "Gaza", "El Mughar", "Nebi Samwil", "Jerusalem", "Tel-Asur", "Megiddo", "Sharon", "Palestine 1917-18", "Sharqat", "Mesopotamia, 1917-18", "Afghanistan, 1919".

In 1918 a war raised 3rd Battalion proceeded to Palestine. The 1st Battalion did not proceed abroad until the end of 1917 due to limitations of recruitment from Nepal. Nevertheless, they had four adventurous years in Mesopotamia. The 4th Battalion represented the Regiment in the Afghan war of 1919.

THE 4TH PRINCE OF WALES' OWN GURKHA RIFLES

Battle Honours

“Givenchy, 1914”, “Neuve Chappelle”, “Ypres, 1915”, “St. Julien”, “Aubers”, “Festubert, 1915”, “France and Flanders”, 1914-15, “Gallipoli, 1915”, “Egypt, 1916”, “Tigris, 1916”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Baghdad”, “Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “N-W-F, India, 1917”, “Baluchistan, 1918”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The 1st Battalion were the Regimental representatives on the western front during the Great war. In view of the situation in Egypt and on the Suez Canal, they were detached from Lahore Division and were placed under Sirhind Brigade to hold the fort until territorial troops could be despatched from Britain. They reached Givenchy trenches in France in the December of 1914. Most severe hand to hand fighting took place as the enemy had mined Gurkha trenches. The Battalion was forced back to prevent annihilation.

The Battalion showed their battle at Neuve Chapelle. They celebrate its anniversary. They received the honour of Aubers.

The 1st/4th Gurkhas were in the defensive line in the second battle of Ypres when the French troops broke before the use of gas as a weapon of war. They excelled themselves, and many deeds of daring gallantry were performed in that battle.

The 1st/4th Gurkhas were sent to Gallipoli Peninsula on 7th September 1915. They did not take part in any important action in that theatre as evacuation had been decided upon.

After a spell in Egypt the 1st Battalion returned to the North-West Frontier of India in 1917.

The 2nd Battalion went to the Tigris in time for the last but unsuccessful attempt to relieve the besieged Kut-al-Amara which fell on the 29th April 1915. In the summer of 1915 the 2nd/4th drove the Turks from Kut. Their Brigade was the first to enter Baghdad.

Baghdad Day is their anniversary holiday. Later operations were around the Khalis canal, they advanced up the Adhain, for the third action at Jabal Hamrin. This finished their Mesopotamian career. They were despatched to Balkans, from there to Caucasus, then to Transcaspia, and finally ending up in Constantinople.

THE 5TH ROYAL GURKHA RIFLES

(Frontier Force)

Battle Honours

“Helles”, “Krithia”, “Sulva”, “Sari Bay”, Gallipoli, 1915”, “Suez Canal”, “Egypt, 1915-16”, “Khan Baghdadi”, “Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “N-W-F, India, 1917”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The 1st Battalion received the Suez Canal, and the Gallipoli honours. Sent early to Egypt they shared in the attack on the Turks who were approaching the Suez Canal at El Kubri. Later they were sent to Dardanelles on Sir Ian Hamilton's request. There the 1st Battalion of the 5th remained fighting until the evacuation. After close down at Dardanelles the 1st/5th returned to India. Again they were sent to Tigris in 1917 where they joined the brigade with the 2nd Battalion, who had been serving in that theatre since the year before. The 3rd Battalion took part in the Third Afghan war and in the Arab rising in Iraq during 1920.

THE 6TH GURKHA RIFLES

Battle Honours

“Helles”, “Krithia”, “Sulva”, “Sari Bair”, “Gallipoli, 1915”, “Suez Canal”, “Egypt, 1915-16”, “Khan Baghdadi”, “Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “Persia, 1918”, “N-W-F, India, 1915”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The 1st/6th Gurkha Rifles were sent for the defence of the Suez Canal in October 1914. The Battalion fired its first shots on 26 January 1915, when the Turks attempted to seize the Suez Canal.

In April 1915, on the special request of Sir Ian Hamilton, they were made available by Lord Kitchner to support the Australian and New Zealand troops to make the most difficult landing at Gallipoli.

A great plan was devised to drive the Turks back to Constantinople by an overwhelming break-out from Anzac to which are the 6th Gurkhas were transferred. After three nights and two days of fighting the final ridge was reached. The key to Dardanelles was in the Battalion's hand. Below them was the retreating Turkish Army. The 1st and the 6th did not get any support from the supporting battalions as they had lost their way in darkness. By mistake their own fleet bombarded the crest line and panic set in. The Turks saw it, rallied and the position so courageously won passed out of the Gurkha's hands. Trench warfare now set in, with its discomforts added to by a most unusually severe blizzard, until the evacuation.

The 1st Battalion arrived in India and the 2nd departed for lower Euphrates, moving up to the higher waters for the action which resulted in the victory of Khan Baghdadi. Then they moved to Salonika, to the Black Sea, to Betum, to Georgia, to Armenia and finally, to Caucasia.

The 1st Battalion landed in February 1918, in Tigris for guarding the line of communications. Marching through Persia the 600 miles to the Russian front, they kept the Bolsheviks off, settled affairs with Turkey, and then returned to India.

THE 7TH GURKHA RIFLES

Battle Honours

"Suez Canal", "Egypt, 1915", "Megiddo", "Sharon", "Palestine, 1918", "Shaiba", "Kut-al-Amara", 1915-17", "Ctesiphon" "Defence of Kut-al-Amara", "Baghdad", "Sharqat", "Mesopotamia, 1915-18". "Afghanistan, 1919".

When the Turkish Army under Djemal Pasha attempted unsuccessfully to seize the Suez Canal in January and February 1915, it was the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Gurkha Rifles which defended and earned the honour of saving it.

The main threat to this artery having been successfully disposed of, the next thing to be done was to plug all the loopholes that could be used by the Turks to mine the approaches to the sea. The collection of an enemy force at Tor gave an inkling of their intentions. To deal with this menace the 2nd/7th were embarked and sent to dispossess the enemy. With the loss of only one man, they caused considerable loss to the enemy and captured the garrison.

After Tor, the battalion were transported to the Mesopotamian

Delta just in time for the soldier's battle at Shaiba—so called because the victory was obtained solely on account of the splendid fighting qualities of the regimental officers and men. The higher command played no part in it. Their next venture was in Arabistan. After nearly a month's advance over marshes and muddy creeks in overwhelmingly oppressive heat and clouds of malarial mosquitoes, it resulted in the capture of Nasiriyeh. They were then sent up to join Townshend's force in its advance up the Tigris to Ctesiphon and there when the strategic retreat began, 300 of the 2nd/7th Gurkhas with 100 of the present 4th/14th Punjab regiment held up a whole division of the enemy. The Nepali and Punjabi soldiers finally drove back the remnants of the thousands of riflemen of the Turkish 35th Division. Then followed twelve days of march without sufficient food and water, and often deprived of sleep, they faced disaster at Kut-al-Amara at the hands of the Turks.

In March 1918, the 2nd were sent to join Allenby in Palestine.

The 1st Battalion came from India in 1918 and joined in the further advance from Samara, taking part in the capture of Mosul. They remained in the country until 1920. The 3rd Battalion, formed in 1918, saw service in Baluchistan in the Third Afghan War.

THE 8TH GURKHA RIFLES

Battle Honours

“La Bassee, 1914”, “Festubert, 1914-15”, “Givenchy, 1914”, “Neuve-Chapelle”, “Aubers”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Egypt, 1915-16”, “Megiddo”, “Sharon”, “Palestine, 1918”, “Tigris, 1916”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Baghdad”, “Mesopotamia, 1916-17”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

In 1914 the 2nd Battalion's first experience of trench warfare in France nearly ended in disaster. The trenches were made in an emergency to occupy earth-works too deep for Gurkhas to see the shoot, and as a result they had to give way suddenly to an overwhelming enemy on 30th October 1914.

The 1st Battalion went overseas to the war in an endeavour to prevent Kut from falling. They remained in the “Garden of Eden”, until Baghdad fell. Later they were sent to the Palestine front for the rest of the war.

THE 9TH GURKHA RIFLES**Battle Honours**

“La Bassee, 1914”, “Armentieres, 1914”, “Festubert, 1914-15”, “Givenchy, 1914”, “Neuve Chapelle”, “Aubers”, “Loos”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Tigris, 1916”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Baghdad, “Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

As part of the Dehradun Brigade, the 1st Battalion found themselves at Marseilles by October 1914, to face Kaiser's armies. They were short of equipment and clothing for the severe test from which they emerged sadly depleted.

In January 1915, the 1st Battalion was sent to Basra. From now on Mesopotamia was to be the theatre of Regimental exploits in the war. The 1st Battalion participated in a series of battles up to the fall of Kut-al-Amara. When relieved in 1916 by the 2nd Battalion from India, the 1st returned to India.

The first action of the 2nd Battalion was at the Shumran Bend on the Tigris during the pursuit of the Turks to Baghdad. The operation entailed the crossing of a four-mile wide flooded river in small boats in the early dawn. Swept by the fire the whole way, their action led to the ejection of the enemy from a strongly entrenched position. It was a gallant accomplishment of amphibious operations of the war.

In the Third Afghan war the 1st, 2nd and the 3rd Battalions were employed.

In October 1914, the Regiment departed for Egypt to enter combat with the Turks in an attack on the Suez Canal. The first attempt failed. In the final attempt on the eastern bank of the Canal though there was a large detachment of the 2nd/10th, still they were greatly out-numbered by the attacking force. The Gurkhas held their ground so firmly that the enemy was brought to a stand still.

On Sir Ian Hamilton's urgent request for Gurkha troops the 2nd Battalion landed in Gallipoli. One party of the battalion here penetrated into the Sulva Bay but suffered heavily on account of bad leadership. Sadly diminished, the 2nd Battalion returned via Mesopotamia to Burma during July 1916, being replaced by the 1st Battalion then under orders for Basra.

The First Battalion arrived in the Eastern theatre during the pre-

paratory period for the avengement of Kut and the advance to Baghdad. One of the essentials for this was the building of a railway from Basra to Nasiriyah up the Euphrates. To protect this construction was the task allotted to the battalion and this duty kept them out of fighting until almost the end of the campaign. After ten days strenuous engagement and pursuit the Turks laid down their arms.

THE 10TH GURKHA RIFELS

Battle Honours

“Helles”, “Krithia”, “Sulva”, “Sari Bair”, “Gallipoli, 1915”; “Suez Canal”, “Egypt, 1915”, “Sharqat”, “Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The 2nd Battalion departed for Egypt in October 1914, to enter combat with the Turks in the pontoon attack on the Suez Canal. The first attempt failed. However, due to the sagacity of the valiant Gurkha soldiers the operation had come to a stand-still as the Gurkhas firmly held the ground.

On the request of Sir Ian Hamilton for Gurkhas, the 2nd Battalion landed in Gallipoli. It is true that one party of the battalion penetrated to the Sulva Bay. Finally, they failed because of poor generalship.

In July 1916, the 2nd Battalion returned via Mesopotamia for the relief of the 1st Battalion.

The 1st Battalion arrived during the preparatory period for the avengement of Kut and the advance to Baghdad. The battalion was entrusted with the task of protection of building of a railway from Basra to Nasiriyah till the end of the campaign.

THE 5TH MAHRATTA LIGHT INFANTRY

Battle Honours

“Megiddo”, “Sharon”, “Nablus”, “Palestine, 1918”, “Basra”, “Shaiba”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1915-17”, “Ctesiphon”, “Mesopotamia, 1914-18”, “Persia 1918”, “N-W-F, India, 1914-15-17”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The Mahratta Light Infantry suffered as well as non admiration in the First World War.

The 1st, 3rd and 5th Battalions, move familiar to great war warriors as the 103rd, 110th and 117th Mahrattas, all formed part of the original expeditionary force to the Persian Gulf in 1914—the 5th Battalion had already been up there stopping gun running in 1909-11.

In the first battle for Kut they proved their worthiness as the best troops of the Empire; confirmed it in the desperate battle of Ctesiphon when the brunt of the loss—half the fighting force—was borne by the infantry; and in the honourable retreat in the face of overwhelming Turkish forces to the glorious stand at Kut; the campaign till then having already cost the 1st, 330 men, the 3rd, 1,170, the 5th, 410. For their conspicuous distinctive service from the original landing at Fao until the capitulation at Kut-al-Amara the 5th Battalion, not then “light Infantry”, were in 1921 honoured by the title “Royal”. This distinction however was not extended to the amalgamated Regiment in 1922, although the battle honours of all are carried by each, as is the title “Light”. There are no Royal battalions in the other armies of the Commonwealth, only Royal Regiments. The 5th have since been selected for complete officering by Indians.

The 10th Battalion (114th Mahrattas) went to the unsuccessful relief of their three brothers shut up in Kut in December 1915, but took no part in the brilliant battles that forced the Turks into retreat until the final coup-de-grace at Sharqat. They remained for the Arab rebellion, playing the leading role in the action at Samawah, July 1st, 1920.

The 2nd and 4th Battalions (105th and 116th Mahrattas) remained behind; the former being on railway internal security, the latter on the Frontier. The 2nd proceeded to Mesopotamia in 1916, had their first share of fire at Kut where they carried out a commended magnificent attack; Palestine called them in March 1918, to earn all the infantry honours for the final decisive phase in that historical theatre.

The 4th also took the stage in Mesopotamia in April 1917, but did not get much opportunity.

The 5th Battalion reformed from drafts in India during 1918, proceeded to the Persian operations in September, remaining there until 1920.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, after the Turkish peace, were sent into the force defending the North-West Frontier against misguided Afghan efforts in 1919, The 1st Battalion fought an outstanding action at Paşesina,

THE 6TH RAJPUTANA RIFLES

Battle Honours

“Givenchy 1914”, “Neuve Chapelle”, “Aubers”, “Festubert, 1915”, “Gaza”, “Nebi Samwil”, “Jerusalem”, “Tell Asur”, “Megiddo”, “Sharon”, “Palestine, 1917-18”, “Basra”, “Shaiba”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1915-17”, “Ctesiphon”, “Defence of Kut-al-Amara”, “Tigris, 1916”, “Baghdad”, “Mesopotamia, 1914-18”, “Persia 1918”, “East Africa, 1914”, “Afganistan, 1919”,

The Rajputana Rifles are the senior rifle regiment of India’s Army and the 1st Battalion the oldest rifle unit.

The 6th Rajputana Rifles was the first Indian Regiment ashore at Tanga, German, East Africa, 1914, where they suffered severely owing to the primary “bungling” which put the gallantry of the battalion to no avail.

In 1914 the 1st Battalion were despatched to Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf to watch the Turkish colonial activities and sealed the fate of Basra.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions were resuscitated from details and drafts in 1917, the former to go to Mesopotamia where they remained until 1919.

The 3rd Battalion were sent to Iraq. By 1920 they reached North Persia.

The 4th Battalion was despatched in 1916 from India for the first phase of Allenby’s advance which gave Jerusalem to the Allies. The work of this battalion was outstanding.

The 5th Battalion in 1914 fought in the indecisive battle at Givenchy. The 5th remained on the western front until withdrawn to join the troops on the long road to Baghdad, and the after battles of Istanbul and Tekrit. After transfer to Palestine for the final, they returned home and were sent to disturbed Waziristan.

The 2nd Battalion received the title “Prince of Wales Own” for their services in 1920.

THE 7TH RAJPUT REGIMENT

Battle Honours

“Macedonia, 1918”, “Suez Canal”, “Egypt, 1915”, “Aden”, “Basra”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1915”, “Tigris”, 1916”, “Mesopotam-

mia, 1914-18", "Persia, 1915-18", "N-W-F, India, 1915-17".
"Afghanistan, 1919".

In the Rajput Regiment, besides Rajputs, Musalmans and Brahmins, the inhabitants of Indo-Gangetic plain, were recruited, making it a class composition between 1893-97.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions did spells of active duty in the Persian Gulf, 1911-14. The 1st were latter sent to the Suez Canal, and did not return to the principal theatres for Indian troops until 1916, when they were almost annihilated at Dujailah; the Battalion later joined the Salovika and Black Sea Armies until the end of the Great war.

The 2nd Battalion also went to Mesopotamia in 1915 and remained there until recalled to the N-W-Frontier, India in 1919.

The 3rd Battalion in Mesopotamia joined in all the battles of the first advance up to the Ctesiphon and subsequent retreat to the final stand at Kut. Reformed from drafts, the battalion joined the Red Sea island garrisons and finally assisted in driving the Turks from the Arabian coast. The numerous awards for gallantry, both in the defence of Kut and Turko-Arabian operations manifestly indicate their magnificent spirit.

The 4th Battalion continually patrolled the NWF of India front of the Great war, until they too were ordered against the Turks and to the oil-fields of South Persia. This battalion especially did well in the defence of Hillah.

The 5th as a unit were unlucky in the Great war. They early sent drafts to France, themselves going to Mesopotamia and no chance came their way during their four month's stay in 1915. Later on they were used for column duty in Persia. The 10th Battalion were retained in India until 1917 when they were sent to Persia. They did not achieve any glory there.

The 11th Battalion was stationed at Fyzabad, being raised there in 1921.

All Battalions saw service at one time or the other in the trying operations of the war.

THE 1ST PUNJAB REGIMENT

Battle Honours

"France and Flanders, 1915", "Macedonia, 1918", "Helles",
"Krithia", "Suez Canal", "Egypt, 1915", "Megiddo", "Sharon",

“Gallipoli, 1915”, Palestine, 1918”, Tigris, 1916”, “Baghdad”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Khan Baghdadi”, Mesopotamia, 1915-18”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

THE 2ND PUNJAB REGIMENT

Battle Honours

“Loos”, France and Flanders, 1915”, “Helles”, “Krithia”, “Gallipoli, 1915”, “Suez Canal”, “Egypt, 1915”, “Megiddo”, “Sharon”, “Nablus”, Palestine, 1918”, “Aden”, “Defence of Kut-al-Amara”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Baghdad”, “Mesopotamia, 1915-18”, “N-W-F, India, 1915, 1916-17”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

N.B. : (The 67th, 69th, 72nd, 74th and 87th Punjabis, the five senior battalions fought enemies of India, and the British Empire from 1914-21).

No other single Battalion of the Armies of the British Empire served in so many theatres of war as did the old 89th Punjabis. Landing to destroy the Red Sea Turkish Fort of Turba whilst in transport to Egypt,—a minor fight in which three Indian Distinguished Service Medals were won—they proceeded to defend the Suez Canal—not letting the canal defend them—and ended their first stage by arriving on the Gallipoli Peninsula where the first casualty occurred. Within less than a month they were forwarded on to France into the Loos sector. No heavy fighting fell to their lot, but many casualties did on account of their constant work on patrol or in trenches.

Withdrawn with the Indian Corps to the Sun and Sand of Tigris front, they did not mark time as far as fighting was concerned. In one of their many actions Lance Naik Shamad Khan found himself on April 12, 1917, in charge of a machine-gun section in a very exposed position covering a serious gap in the line. Undaunted, the Lance Naik and his men beat off three counter attacks. He continued to operate the gun single-handed after all his section, save two ammunition belt-fillers were put out of action. For three hours the gap was held and when the gun through enemy fire ceased to function, Shamad Khan and his two comrades held the post with their rifles until ordered to withdraw. Had it not been for his leadership, determination, his bravery, the action would have had a very different ending.

Shamad Khan received the Victoria Cross.

The Battalion, much depleted, was sent to the North West Frontier. They afterwards returned to Mesopotamia, proceeding during the last year of the war only to Salonika, where the great Armistice called a halt to hostilities.

The 2nd Battalion were on the Euphrates from 1915 to 1918, fighting in the disheartening campaign which failed to relieve Kut; and thereafter in the final victories. This Battalion also took part in the Third Afghan war.

The 3rd Battalion also left the land of the Chinthe and the banks of Irrawady for those of the Tigris in 1916 to take part in the recapture of Kut-al-Amara and the advance to the Caliph's city. In the latter battle of Ramadi, they were much commended for their courage and endurance in favour of the enemy under extremely trying climatic conditions.

The 3rd Battalion, together with the 4th, which had proceeded to Egypt at the end of 1914 to reach Mesopotamia in 1917, went over to Palestine to assist in the brilliant operations which caused Turkey to be the first of the enemy powers to see an armistice with the Allies.

The Suez Canal Defences also received the 5th Battalion during the close of the first year of the war. They, however, went to France, reaching the line just in time for Loos; to return again almost at once to Egypt in transit for Mesopotamia where they spent almost two years before they were sent to Asia minor for service under Allenby.

THE 9TH JAT REGIMENT

Battle Honours

“La Bassee, 1914”, “Festubert, 1914-15”, “Neuve Chapelle”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Shaiba”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1915”, “Ctesiphon”, “Defence of Kut-al-Amara”, “Tigris, 1916”, “Khan Baghdadi”, “Mesopotamia, 1914-18”, “N-W-F, India, 1914-15-17”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The 1st Battalion sailed to France and saw practically unceasing fighting in mud, water, snow and ice during the winter of 1914-15. The 1st Battalion from France made spartan efforts to release their besieged brothers of 2nd Battalion which had gone to save Persian oil pipelines over the wet and muddy flats at Hannah. They stormed

the Turkish lines, but fared badly in the absence of reinforcements. Out of the bloody struggle came unwounded one British Officer, a Subadar Major, a Havildar, and the Quartermaster, alone of the whole Battalion. These heroic attempts were again repeated at Sanaiyat, but fate denied the prize and Kut fell.

The 1st now had to lick their wounds until reinforcements arrived and a new 2nd could be reformed from drafts. Eventually, both together fought for the final surrender of Baghdad.

The depleted units in Mesopotamia made heavy demands on the 3rd Battalion. Eventually they completed the trio of the Regiment fighting the Turks in the Middle-East, departing after a year to confront him on the Black Sea where they took an active interest in the actions at Broken Bridge, Isrud, and Kandrah during 1919 and 1920.

After the war the 1st met the troubles of the Mohmand and the Khyber in 1919.

THE 10TH BALUCH REGIMENT

Battle Honours

“Massines, 1914”, “Armentiers, 1914”, “Ypres, 1914-15”, “Gheluvert”, “Festubert, 1914”, “Givenchy”, 1914, “Neuve Chapelle”, “St. Julian”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Egypt, 1915”, “Megiddo”, “Sharon”, “Palestine, 1918”, “Aden”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Baghdad”, “Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “Persia, 1915-18”, N-W-F, India, 1917”, “Kirimanjaro”, “Behobeh”, “East Africa, 1915-18”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The western front honours for 1914 were all earned by the 4th Battalion. In fairness to the 1st it may be stated that though detained in India, they sent three complete double-companies of their four to France, two of which joined the 4th Battalion, which by September 1915, had sustained over 1,500 casualties.

The 4th Battalion were the first Indian Regiment to attack the Germans, the first Indian Army Officer to fall belonged to them and they are the only Indian Corps to bear the honour “Ypres, 1914”.

The night of the 30th/31st October 1914, was perhaps for the British Empire the most critical day of the war. The whole weight of German Divisions including the Prussian Guard—was hurled against a thin line of hurriedly scrapped earthworks in a desperate attempt to win the channel ports of Northern France, with the weak

and exhausted dismounted cavalry force holding Hollebeke were the 129th Baluchis. No ground they gave in desperate fighting—and their machine-gun detachment were annihilated save for one lone soul—Sepoy Khudadad Khan—who fought with his gun until he fell severely wounded; happily surviving to be the First Indian Soldier to earn the King Emperor's most coveted decoration the Victoria Cross.

The 4th Battalion having well established their reputation as a fighting corps were later withdrawn from the European theatre and sent to East Africa where they further enhanced their fame by earning praise of the German Commander, General Von Letton Vorbeck.

The 1st Battalion expanded into three during the war, the regular battalion serving in Persia and Kurdistan. The 2nd/124th raised overseas at Bushire in August 1916, were the first of the new army, Indian units to see active service before Kut and at Tekrit until their departure to the Palestine theatre.

To East Africa also went the 4th Battalion, February 1915 to September 1917. At Salaite hill they were instrumental in saving certain South African units from disaster. The 4th too joined the Palestine campaigners.

THE 11TH SIKH REGIMENT

Battle Honours

“La Bassee, 1914”, “Armentieres, 1914”, “Givenchy, 1914”, “Neuve Chapelle”. “Ypres, 1915”, “St. Julian”, “Aubers”, “Festubert, 1915”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Helles”, “Krithia”, “Suvla”, “Sar-i-Bair”, Gallipoli, 1915”, “Suez Canal”, “Egypt, 1915-16”, “Megiddo”, “Sharon”, “Palestine, 1918”, “Baghdad”, “Tigris, 1916”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Sharqat”, Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “Persia, 1918”, “N-W-F, India, 1914-15-16-17”, “Tsingtao”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The 1st, 2nd and 5th Battallions of the Sikh Regiment left India's shores in 1914 for foreign fields.

The 1st too over the active defence of the Suez Canal. It was their patrol which discovered the attempt to mine the fair way—and thence to six months continuous fighting on Gallipoli from the Second Battle of Krithia until the evacuation.

The 2nd and 5th Brigaded together pioneered the Indian Troops in France. The 2nd were the first Indian Troops to land on the

mainland of Europe for soldier's work. Lieut J.G. Smyth of 2nd received the Victoria Cross for gallantry at Festubert on 18 May 1915 and 5th were praised in House of Commons for their action at Neuve Chapelle.

After withdrawal from France the 2nd were sent against the Sennusis attempting to invade Egypt from the west during winter of 1915-16.

In the Mesopotamian theatre were concentrated the 1st Battalion from the Dardanelles, the 3rd from the Derajat, the 4th from China, —where in 1914 half of the Battalion with Allied troops had successfully laid siege to the German Treaty Port of Tsengtao, and thus earned an honour. The 3rd and 4th arrived in time to make one last effort to relieve Kut. They suffered over two thousand casualties between them, and had to be withdrawn to the lines of communication. In the words of Sir Stanley Maude their magnificent fighting qualities paved the way for success for the second battle of Kut. After recuperation the 3rd took part in the final operations, the 4th proceeding to the North Persian Force.

The 5th Battalion later served in Palestine and for their war services became "The Duke of Connaughts' Own" on H R H's visit to inaugurate the "Montfort" reforms in 1921.

The 10th Battalion did not serve overseas during the Great War, but sent representatives to fill the depleted ranks of many battalions.

The 2nd Battalion, together with 10th were very active during the Third Afghan War, forming part of the 'flying brigade', despatched through the Khyber in 1919. They fought in the battle at Bagh Springs and Sikh Hill near Dakka.

Most of the Battalions showed dogged determination, especially the 3rd displayed bravery in the relief of Rumaitha during the Iraq Arab Rebellion.

THE 12TH FRONTIER FORCE REGIMENT

Battle Honours

"Suez Canal", "Egypt, 1915", "Megiddo", "Sharon", "Nablus", "Palestine, 1918", "Adcn", "Tigris, 1916", "Kut-al-Amara, 1917", "Baghdad", "Sharqat", "Mesopotamia, 1915-18", "N-W-F, India, 1914-15-16-17", "Afghanistan, 1919".

The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Frontier Brigade served on the Suez Canal at Aden, Tigris and Palestine.

The 2nd and 4th, before they went to fight overseas, had been action on the Indian front. The 4th in 1917 operated against Mahsuds in the Shahur and Khaisora valleys of N.W.F., India.

Between 1914-17 the Infantry of the Guides lived in NWF. However, on the eventual call on India's manhood, the 1st Battalion of the Guides Infantry were despatched to Palestine to take part in the two principal battles before the Turkish Armistice.

THE 13TH FRONTIER FORCE RIFLES

Battle Honours

“La Basse, 1914”, “Messines, 1914”, “Armentiers, 1914”, “Festubert, 1914-15”, “St. Julien”, “Aubers”, “Loos”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Suez Canal”, “Egypt, 1915-17”, “Gaza”, “El Mughar”, “Nebi Samwil”, “Jerusalem”, “Megiddo”, “Sharon”, “Palestine, 1917-18”, “Aden”, “Tigris, 1917”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Baghdad”, “Mesopotamia, 1916-18”, “Persia 1918-19”, “N-W-F, India, 1917”, “Baluchistan, 1918”, “East Africa, 1916-18”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

The two Indian Divisions ordered to France in 1914, took with them the 4th, 5th and 6th Battalions. The 2nd Battalion also left, but were detained at the Suez Canal. The fighting was more severe for which they were not equipped. The reserve system too broke down and could not keep the units at fighting strength. The casualties were heavy in holding impractical line of trenches. As a result, the 1st Battalion, detained on the frontier, sent nearly half their men as reinforcements and with them was Jemadar Mir Dast who received the Victoria Cross for not only conspicuous bravery, but great ability when leading his platoon on 26 April 1915, during the Second Battle of Ypres. He afterwards collected various parties of men who were without leaders and kept them under his command until ordered to retire. Later, on the same day he again displayed remarkable courage in helping to carry eight British and Indian Officers into safety while exposed to very heavy fire.

After France the 4th Battalion garrisoned Egypt, then went to East Africa where they did very well in General Smut's offensive and Van Deventer's pursuit of Van Lettow. They returned to India to

occupy the Peiwar Ko-tal during the Afghan war of 1919.

The 5th also sojourned in Egypt. Thereafter, they served in Palestine from the third battle of Gaza until the final victory for Allenby.

The 6th left the western front, and the 2nd the Suez Canal for Mesopotamia to relieve Kut. They both remained for the capture of Baghdad. After Tekrit, they too joined the Palestine force at the Battle of Sharon and the subsequent advance to Damascus.

The 1st, after expedition against the Mehsuds in 1917, went to East Africa and returned in 1918. A 2nd Battalion formed in April 1918, joined the Persian Field Force in the attack on the Kamrij Pass and the advance to Kazerun. The collective services of the 6th Battalion in the Great War were considered exceptional. At Neuve Chapelle the Battalion fought in a splendid fashion; and so the title 'Royal' was given to her by His Majesty in 1921.

THE 14TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

Battle Honours

"Ypres, 1915", "St. Julien", "Aubers", "France and Flanders, 1915", "Macedonia, 1918", "Suez Canal", "Egypt, 1915", "Palestine, 1918", "Megiddo", "Sharon", "Basra", "Shaiba", "Kut-al-Amara", "Baghdad", "Ctesiphon", "Defence of Kut-al-Amara", "Khan Baghdadi", "Mesopotamia, 1914-18", "Merv", "Persia, 1915-19", "N.W.F., India, 1915-17", "Narungombe", "East Africa, 1916-18", "Afghanistan, 1919".

All the Battalions fought outside India during 1914-20. The 1st Battalion after doing its duty in the Persian—Afghan Cordon in Siestan moved on to support the moderate Menshevik army in Russia against the communist Bolsheviki, an action which brought one of the rarest honours for real battle—"Merv".

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were early arrivals in Mesopotamia where they were later joined by the 4th who had been an original selection for France but had been detached for the defence of the Suez Canal. The 2nd Battalion took part in the battle of Kut-al-Amara, the fighting at Sannayat, and later in the advance to Baghdad, Istabulat and Tekrit, where they accompanied the 7th Lahore Division on its transfer to Palestine for the great advance

through the vale of Sharon in September 1918.

The 3rd and 4th Battalions suffered heavily in distinguishing themselves at Ctesiphon; and during the retreat to Kut, where they both played a gallant part in that memorable seige.

A reformed 3rd raised at Basra occupied Bushire, and afterwards stormed Badek Fort in the Afghan operations of 1919.

The 4th Battalion, reformed in India, returned to the Euphrates to hit hard the Khan Baghdadi, where the entire enemy force was serounded and captured, a return compliment for Kut. The Battalion subsequently went further a field to Salonika and South Russia, eventually halting near Ismid where the 10th Battalion were forming part of the garrison. A deteched company occupied a post some 3,000 yards north of the defences which were held, as a politically passive defence against Kamal Pasha's Nationalist forces. When this company was withdrawn, it walked into an ambush and suffered heavily. This litle fight caused over 25% casualties, earned a Military Cross two Orders of Merit, and a Distinguished Service Medal.

The 5th Battalion journeyed from Hong Kong to France early in 1915. They suffered first casualties while marching through Ypres to support a line stricken by the chemical warfare, and into an action which cost them fifty per cent of their strength. After Loos the 'Pathans' were sent to East Africa where they gave very good account of themselves.

The 10th Battalion spent the first four years of the Great War in troubled NWF, India. In 1918, they proceeded to Egypt and Palestine and advanced with Allenby against the enemy forces.

THE 15TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

Battle Honours

"Loos", "France and Flanders, 1915", "Suez Canal", "Egypt, 1915", "Megiddo", "Sharon", "Palestine, 1918", "Baghdad", "Tigris, 1916", "Kut-al-Amara, 1917", "Mesopotamia, 1915-18", "Persia, 1918", "N.W.F., India, 1917", "East Africa, 1914-17", "Kilimanjaro".

The 1st and 2nd Battalions were serving in Hong Kong in August 1914, where they were doing garrison duty. Both these Battalions were

brought to India in 1915 to Tochi in NWFP. Later, the 2nd was sent to Mesopotamia, consequent upon the investment of Kut-al-Amara. The Battalion formed the advance guard in the long and difficult night march to Dujailh on 8th March 1916, hoping to turn the Turks right flank and relieve the starving defenders. As they did not succeed, Kut fell. The Battalion was engaged almost continuous fighting until the fall of Baghdad.

About this time, a 'hush-hush' enterprise under General Dunsterville started for Asia Minor with the object of providing a nucleus to Armenians to organise the defence of their own country. On this duty the 2nd Battalion remained until the end of the war.

The 1st left the Tochi valley in 1917 for the Euphrates and Tigris. They just missed the victory at Sharqat and again left for Salonika but were disappointed by the Armistice. They later served on the Black Sea and in Anatolia against Turkish Nationalists in 1920.

The 3rd Battalion from the NW Frontier went to the Suez Canal and fought there in February 1915. By September they were fighting in Loos offensive in France from which they were withdrawn to the relief of Kut. They did fine work at Beit Aiessa. After Baghdad the Battalion went to Allenby's command for the decisive battle of Sharon. At the end of this they were at Semakh on the sea of Galilee, where four years before the Turks had rehearsed his plan for crossing the Suez Canal. The same battalion had played a prominent part in repulsing them.

The 4th Battalion from Ceylon joined the Kut relief force in November 1915. After being held up for almost a year opposite Sunniyat, the Battalion shared in Maude's victories at Baghdad. Their services ended in Palestine, where, after taking under heavy barrage of fire, eight lines of trenches in sixty-two minutes in the attack on the 19th September 1918, north of Jaffa, the Battalion saw no more fighting except a little chasing of their enemy who was retreating to the Laventine Coast.

The 4th Battalion left Egypt in 1920 for Wajiristan. In some of the Frontier conflicts that followed, Sepoy Ishwar Singh, when the convoy protection troops were attacked near Haidri Kach, won the Victoria Cross. He was No. 1 of a Lewis Gun Section, and early in the action fell, severely wounded in his chest. In the hand to hand fight that followed the officers and all the havildars of his company were killed or wounded. The Lewis Gun was seized by the enemy.

Calling up two other men, Ishwar Singh got up, charged the tribesmen, recovered the gun and although bleeding profusely, he again got into action.

The 2nd Battalion was in Wajiristan from 1921 to 1923.

THE 16TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

Battle Honours

“La Bassee, 1914”, “Givenchy, 1914”, “Ypres, 1915”, “St. Julien”, “Aubers”, “Loos”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Suez Canal”, “Macedonia, 1918”, “Egypt, 1915-16”, “Megiddo”, “Nablus”, “Palestine, 1918”, “Aden”, “Tigris 1916”, “Kut-al-Amara, 1917”, “Baghdad”, “Mesopotomia, 1915-16”, “NWF, India, 1915-16-17”, “Behobeho”, “Narungombe”, “Nyangao”, “East Africa”, 1917-18”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

In the autumn of 1914 the 3rd and the 4th Battalions were sent. The former to Egypt and latter to France. By October 27, 1914, the 4th Battalion reached the scene of critical fighting in Flanders. The Germans were making an all out efforts to drive the remnants of the British Regular Army into the English channel near Nauve Chapelle the line had nearly gone, and to the aid of the remnants of an unconquered British Battalion were sent the 9th Bhopal Infantry. Advancing across slippery fields, interspersed by hedges and ditches, entangled with barbed wire, on went the men in falling darkness of a chilly late October day towards an unknown objective, search lights playing on them, snipers taking their toll. Then followed a three-day battle, without food, in surroundings of wet and mud with friend and foe inextricably mixed-up. They lost 11 officers and 262 men. There was a loss of another 200 in a stupendous bayonet fight at Festubert a few days later. With the ranks terribly depleted, the Battalion took part in the operations to restore the line in the spring of 1915 when the first use of gas was made by the enemy. They remained in France until May, and then went to Egypt to re-make themselves until they were required on the Tigris.

In the battle of Wadi the Commanding Officer was struck down. To his aid went Sepoy Chattar Singh within two hundred yards of the enemy who kept up constant fire. Shielding the Colonel with his body, the Sepoy with his entrenching tool slowly and for hours, made a bullet proof shelter for both. At night they were rescued.

Sepoy Chattar Singh was awarded Victoria Cross for this conspicuous bravery.

The "Bo-Peeps", as the Battalion were more popularly known to the Army, remained to fight in Mesopotamia until the end of the war. When it was over, of the 'originals', that set out in 1914, only fifteen returned with the unit to India.

The 3rd Battalion after spending nearly a year in the Suez Canal defences, were despatched to France. In their first action at Loos they received, in return of many casualties much glory. They were later transferred to Aden. They went to East Africa in May 1916. They were followed by the 1st Battalion from NWF (India). Both had a rough time in this tropical theatre; both suffered heavy losses against nature and the enemy. After Nyango, the battle which finally drove the Germans to flight, the fighting strength of the 3rd was reduced to a bare hundred. The pluck and tenacity shown by Indian troops was beyond praise. They brought the campaign to a successful conclusion in the face of what seemed to be almost a disaster. Of course, they were assisted by the King's African Rifles and the West African Frontier Force.

The 2nd Battalion joined the Euphrates force in December 1915. After nearly three years in Mesopotamia, they went to Salonika, to Turkey and finally to the Black Sea.

The 10th Battalion embarked on 1918 for the concluding Palestine battles and afterwards played a prominent part in quelling internal Egyptian disturbances along the Nile in 1919.

The 3rd Battalion was sent on active service to Khyber because of the Afghan intrusions of 1919. They also did a year's duty in Asia Minor, 1921-22, as well as nine months insurgent pacifications in Iraq the year afterwards.

THE 16TH DOGRA REGIMENT

Battle Honours

"La Bassee, 1914", "Festubert, 1914-15", "Givenchy, 1914", "Neuve Chapelle", "Aubers", "France and Flanders, 1914-15", "Egypt, 1915", "Megiddo", "Nablus", "Palestine, 1918", "Aden", "Tigris, 1916", "Kut-al-Amara, 1917", "Baghdad", "Mesopotamia, 1915-18". "N.W.F., India, 1915-17", "Afghanistan, 1919".

Less one company, the 3rd Battalion of the 17 Dogra was on its way to Europe by 5th September. They reached Festubert on 31st October 1914, and also participated in the action at Neuve Chapelle. They remained in France for eleven months.

The 1st Battalion were sent to Mesopotamia where the reverse at Ctesiphon showed that the Turkish armies would have to be taken more seriously if Baghdad, was to be held. Arriving in the country in December 1915, they were quickly thrown into the battle. Joined a month later by the 3rd Battalion, they were praised for their gallantry in the action at Wadi.

Both Battalions fought in different Brigades at Sheik Saad.

At Hanna the senior Battalion supported the junior in the desperate attack over the flat, cover-less, bullet-swept plain against sunken-loop-holed trenches in broad day light. Only twenty-five untouched valient soldiers reached the enemy line. During the action Lance Naik Lala of the 3rd Battalion showed a fine example of bravery. He rescued Captain Nicholson of the 1st Battalion and Lieut Lindop of the 3rd, both of whom had fallen wounded, from a ground across which any form of human movement was considered fatal. He had also dressed the wounds of many men lying in the open in the pouring rain. He was awarded Victoria Cross for his courage and behaviour.

The heavy casualties incurred by the Battalion could not be replaced. The remnants of the 1st had been brought out of action by a Subadar.

In the reorganisation following on Sir Stanley Maude's appointment to the command in Mesopotamia, the remains of the 3rd Battalion were sent back to India, while the First made up its strength in the field and carried on with distinction until the end of the war. Among the first units to enter Baghdad, it carried the flag which flew over the Turkish citadel. It is now one of the treasured trophies of the Battalion.

The 2nd Battalion was sent to Aden to keep "Jhonny Turk" at a distance. After four months a move was made towards the Arab Peninsula where the Battalion joined up with the Palestine forces.

THE 18TH ROYAL GARHWAL RIFLES

Battle Honours

"La Bassee, 1914", "Armentieres, 1914", "Festubert, 1914-15",

“Neuve-Chapelle”, “Aubers”, “France and Flanders, 1914-15”, “Khan Baghdadi”, “Sharqat”, “Mesopotamia, 1917-18”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

Both Battalions of Garhwal Rifles 49th and 39th were mobilised in August 1914, as part of the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut Division. Both reached the trenches in Northern France at the end of October and immediately had to face heavy down pour and shelling. They were to relieve the 13th British Infantry Brigade.

The first winter in France, after the invader had been stayed, was largely one of defence and consolidation against further attempt to break down the allied trench line. Towards the end of November Festubert was heavily attacked and this involved the Garhwalis. In the defence, Naik Darwan Singh Negi of the 1st Battalion won the Victoria Cross. He showed the greatest gallantry when the Battalion was engaged in retaking and clearing the enemy out of trenches, and although, wounded in head in two places, as well as in the arm, was one of the first to push round each successive attempt in the face of severe fire from bombs and rifles at the closest range. He was the first ever Indian to receive Victoria Cross from the hands of His Majesty the King Emperor on the field of battle.

Again both the Battalions were operating side by side near Givenchy in the Christmas week of 1914. However, unofficial Christmas armistice was arranged, this gave them no rest and the casualties began to grow until the battle for Neuve Chapelle in March 1915. In that engagement the losses reached such a height that both Battalions were amalgamated on 1st April 1915, to become simply “The Garhwal Rifles”.

Another Victoria Cross was won on 10th March 1915, by Rifleman Gobar Singh Negi of the 2nd Battalion during an attack on the German position. He was one of the bayonet party with bombs who entered the enemy’s main trench, and was the first man to go round each trench corner, driving back the enemy until they were eventually forced to surrender. He, however, died later in the battle.

The victory at Neuve Chapelle, the first of Sir John French’s attempts to break through the Germans trench system, was quickly followed by the exploiting attack on the Auber’s ridge. In retaliation for the British success the enemy attacked at Festubert. The Indian regiment was heavily involved in both actions.

Unusual tenacity was displayed later in the year in the attacks

which were made in support of the flank of the troops involved in the battle of Loos. In one operation it was impossible to proceed owing to enemy fire, nevertheless 2nd Lieut Raha Jodh Singh, attached to the Tehri Garhwal Sappers, valiantly led his company right up to the German wire. It was at Loos that some seventeen soldiers the only Garhwalis to become prisoners in the Great war, were taken when they were cut off and had to surrender.

By now the Indian units in France, except the Cavalry, had deteriorated to the breaking point, due to heavy casualties and the failure of the Indian reserve system. So at the end of October 1915 the Regiment was withdrawn. The Garhwal Rifles, who suffered the most in respect of casualties from first to last, did splendid work and, as testified to by Sir James Wilcocks: "They left a name which will be held in high esteem by all who knew them in France, and not least by the Germans". While Lord Kitchner considered their achievements to have placed them in the first rank of the Indian Corps.

In March 1916, the 2nd Battalion was sent to the Euphrates operations, where they again showed dash, and at the capture of Ramadi took 2,000 prisoners as well as the Turkish Commander on the spot. At Khan Baghdadi they spearheaded the pursuit of the Turks.

Withdrawn from Mesopotamia in September 1918, the 2nd Battalion joined the Salonika force. A little later, the Battalion was sent to Asia Minor, where Kemalists troops had attacked allied posts and had cut the line of communications. Peace was eventually signed and the Battalion arrived back in India in November 1919.

The 1st Battalion, returned to the war in December 1917, was also sent to Mesopotamia to take part in the advance on Mosul. On October 28th-29th 1918, their forced march of twenty-four miles to reinforce the Indian Brigade, which had barred the retreat of the desperate undefeated Turkish army at Sharqat mentally relieved General Cassells. After the Armistice the 1st Battalion continued to remain in Iraq, taking part in Kurdish operations and the Arab rising. They returned to India in 1921.

The 3rd Battalion went on service in the Khyber during the 3rd Afghan War.

THE 19TH HYDERABAD REGIMENT**Battle Honours**

“Megiddo”, “Sharon”, Palestine, 1918”, “Tigris, 1916”, “Khan Baghdadi”, “Mesopotamia, 1915-18”, “Persia, 1915-18”, N-W-F, India, 1914-15-16-17’, “East Africa, 1914-16”, “Afghanistan, 1919”.

In October 1914, the 4th Battalion of the 19th Hyderabad Regiment were in constant operation in East Africa for twenty-six months, then guarded the Frontier against the Mahsuds (N.W.F., India). They were sent to Mesopotamia in 1918, where they had much to do with the Arab and Khurdish Rebellions.

The 2nd Battalion, greatly depleted of trained men who had been sent to France as reinforcements, went early to the Persian Gulf and the Tigris line for the whole war.

The original expedition sent in 1914 to protect the Persian Oil Supplies for the Royal Navy, included the 10th Battalion until May 1915. For a short period they were sent to the Mohmand ‘front’ and then to Mesopotamia for a year. There they served on the lower Euphrates and later in the 15th Division at Hillah. Thereafter they had a two year’s spell in Salonika and on the Black Sea coast during 1918-20.

The 3rd Battalion of the Regiment, since disbanded, was first known as the 4th Infantry Hyderabad contingent, and then as the 97th Deccan Infantry. The honours won by the Regiment included the victory at Khan Baghdadi, Palestine, and the Third Afghan war.

APPENDIX—3**The Indian State’s Forces**

By 1914, the Imperial Service Troops of the various States had reached an approximate total of four companies of Engineers, two mountain batteries, nearly fifteen regiments of Cavalry and three Camel corps. When war commenced, the Princes displayed their unswerving loyalty to the King-Emperor, and immediately offered the whole of the resources of their states. Of the 20,000 Imperial Service Troops, then existing, some 18,000 served overseas. Throughout the

odd four years of the war they were maintained in the field at the expense of their Rulers. The majority of the units were absent from India for over four year, some of them longer. Those few units, too small to be employed overseas, rendered useful service in India on internal security duties and in the training of remounts. Many of the corps earned renown, some reputations which can be envied. Many of the individuals received honours for gallantry and devotion to duty.

An Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the Hyderabad, Mysore and Patiala Lancers, with detachments from several other states, together with the famous Camelry of Bikaner commanded by their ruler served in Egypt and the Suez Canal defences from October 1914, onwards.

The Jodhpur Lancers, reinforced by those of Alwar under the command of H.H. Maharaja Sir Partab Singh served in France with the expeditionary force sent to Europe at the beginning of the war. With this force also went detachments of Sappers from Tehri-Garhwal, Faridkot, and Malerkotla, as well as the transport corps of Bharatpur, Gwalior and Indore.

To Egypt went infantry from Alwar, Gwalior and Patiala, the latter sending two companies as reinforcements to Gallipoli, where they sustained heavy casualties in the fighting on the Peninsula. All were later very actively employed in Palestine where they obtained victories which are unique in the history of warfare. The Mysore and Jodhpur Lancers also joined these expeditions, the latter making a brilliant charge which captured Haifa, believed to be the only occasion when a fortified town has ever been captured by cavalry dash.

To East Africa went units from Bharatpur, Gwalior, Jind, Rampur, Kapurthala and Kashmir. All of them served with distinction. The Faridkot Sappers, in the same theatre, were also singled out for distinction.

The campaign in Mesopotamia employed the Sapper corps, who went in detachments to France and were afterwards reformed into complete units. Here, from the beginning, the Sirmoor Sappers did splendid work, earning a record difficult to surpass. As defenders of Kut, they suffered considerable hardship in captivity.

The transport corps of Bhawalpur, Baharatpur, Gwalior, Indore, Jaipur, Khairpur and Mysore, all did yeomen service. Their work was often carried out under trying conditions of rain, cold and exces-

sive heat, and no praise can be too high for them. Seldom has an unarmed transport company so actively assisted in the winning of a battle. A claim for distinguished service can be made by Jaipur corps sent to Mesopotamia. At Shaiba the dust caused by the rapid advance of the company to remove the wounded from the field was mistaken for cavalry charge and caused panic to prevail in a part of the Turkish line.

Thus the Princes of India by their revolutionary military aid contributed excellently to the cause of the Empire by placing all their resources at the disposal of the Emperor. Not content with the material help extended to the Empire, most of the Princes and Nobles volunteered for active service. The Viceroy selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Kishengarh, Rutlam, Sachin, Patiala, Sir Parab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, Heir Apparent of Bhopal, and a brother of the Maharaja of Cooch Behar. Besides some of the rulers were appointed as staff officers to General officers. The rulers were:

- *1. Raja of Baria as Staff officer in the rank of Lieut to the General officer 7th Indian Cavalry Brigade;
- *2. Nawab of Savanur as ADC to GOC 6 Division;
- *3. Jam Sahib of Jamnagar as Staff officer to General Cooks.
4. H.H. Rana Ranjit Singh of Barwani with the rank of Honorary Captain was made incharge of motor ambulance.

Thus the cooperation from the Princes of India was spontaneous and whole hearted. They offered their services to the Empire as loyal subjects of the Crown in the hour of need.

1. *War Diary*, IEF 'A', Vol. VI, No. 1111, Appex. 167, dated 16 January 1915.
2. *War Diary*, IEF 'A', Vol. IV, No. 106705, Appx 18, dated 3 November 1914.
3. *War Diary*, IEF 'A', Vol. IV, No. 7347, dated 13 November 1914,

APPENDIX—4**Contribution of Imperial Service
Troops up to the Armistice**

<i>Indian States</i>	<i>No. of combatants sent overseas</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)
Alwar	1,502	1 Squadron of Cavalry and 1 Battalion of Infantry.
Bahawalpur	326	Detachments from the Camel Corps and Camel Transport.
Baharatpur	1,581	1 Battalion Infantry and 1 Transport Corps.
Bikaner	1,164	1 Camel Corps.
Faridkot	444	1 Sapper Company.
Gwalior	2,597	2 Battalions of Infantry and detachments Transport Corps.
Hyderabad	1,075	1 Regiment of Cavalry.
Indore	681	1 Squadron of Cavalry and 1 Transport Corps.
Idhar	20	1 Despatch Riders.
Jaipur	1,256	1 Transport Corps.
Jhind	1,116	1 Battalion of Infantry.
Jodhpur	1,342	1 Regiment of Cavalry.
Kathiawar	472	Detachments of Cavalry.
Kapurthala	689	1 Battalion of Infantry.
Kashmir	4,983	Detachments of Cavalry, 1 Battery of Mountain Artillery and 3 Battalions of Infantry.
Khairpur	147	Detachments of Infantry and Transport Corps.
Malerkotla	520	1 Company and detachment of Sappers.
Mysore	1,355	1 Regiment of Cavalry and 1 Transport Corps.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Nabha	538	1 Battalion of Infantry.
Patiala	2,695	1 Regiment of Cavalry and 1 Battalion of Infantry.
Rampur	567	1 Battalion of Infantry.
Rutlam	5	Despatch Riders.
Sirmur	561	2 Companies of Sappers, the second Company replacing the first which was captured at Kut-al-Amara.
Tehri	457	Detachment of Infantry and 1 Company of Sappers.
Udaipur	6	
Total	26,099	

(Reproduced from *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 198-199),

APPENDIX—5

Contribution of Indian States for Recruitment in Regular Army up to Armistice

<i>Indian States</i>	<i>Combatants recruits enlisted</i>	<i>Non-combatants recruits enlisted</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hyderabad	7,830	5,058	12,888
Mysore	3,503	3,028	6,531
Baroda	268	751	1,019
Kashmir	20,722	8,806	29,528
Central India	7,198	3,540	10,738
Rajputana	48,611	5,656	54,267
Sikkim	826	94	920
Total	88,958	26,933	1,15,891

(Reproduced from, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 200),

APPENDIX—6

Casualties :
Imperial Service Troops during the Great War

Killed and died from all causes	1,529 ¹	
Wounded	1,010 ²	
Missing	2	
	———	
	Total — 2,541	(includes 29 British officers attached to Imperial Service Troops.

1. Includes 16 British officers attached to Imperial Service Troops.
2. Includes 13 British officers attached to Imperial Service Troops.

APPENDIX—7

Awards :
Received by Imperial Service Troops

Military Cross	—	4
OBI, Class I	—	37
OBI, Class II	—	78
IOM	—	49
IDSM	—	164
IMSM	—	240
	———	
Total	—	572

(Reproduced from *India's Contribution to the Great War*, Superintendent Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1923, p. 202),

APPENDIX—8

RECRUITMENT

From: Adjutant General in India

To : GOC EGYPT

(War Diary No 90653 Appx. 33—EGYPT,

Vol. 42, dated 10 November 1918)

1. I am directed to state, though recruiting for fighting units has not been extended to menial classes, it has been necessary in order to obtain the large numbers now required to draw on many classes which have hitherto had little or no connection with the Indian Army.

2. A list of such classes is attached. Certain of these are of comparatively low status, such as Mahars and Mussalis, and in these cases they have been kept together as far as possible and are not enlisted into other units. In the case of Artillery, however, drivers of all classes with the exception of Chamars and Sweepers are enlisted.

3. You will realise that, as we have had to raise 500,000 men during the present year as against the pre-war rate of enlistment of 15,000 men per annum, it is inevitable that a certain number of recruits of undesirable classes may be inadvertently be sent to units such as Julahs, Dhobis, Telis, Mirasis and Mendicants. All such classes should be got rid of.

4. With reference to the particular case mentioned in your letter the 18th Infantry has a recruiting area in the Cis-Sutlej, Punjab, Delhi, United Provinces and Bihar and is also allowed to recruit in Hoshiarpur and Jullundar districts; certain large classes such as Sheiks of the United Provinces and Bhattias of the Punjab, though they contain plenty of good material, also include a large number of low class men and it is difficult for recruiting officers during the great stress of recruiting to ascertain whether men claiming these classes are menial or are genuine agriculturists; it is to the latter class to which we endeavour to restrict recruiting.

5. It is hoped that the above will explain the method of recruitment in India and I am to request that you will kindly impress upon the Officer Commanding, Indian units in your Force the necessity of making the best use they can of the material available, although it is recognised that the classes may not be what the regiments is accustomed to in pre-war days still they are the best that can be obtained

under the exceptional circumstances that exist now, whereas there is no doubt that some of the less desirable classes are proving themselves to be good fighters.

**List of New Classes Tried Since the Commencement of War,
August 1914**

<i>Province</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>Unit</i>	
		<i>Attached to</i>	<i>Absorbed in</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Madras	Coorg		
	Moplahs		2-88th
	Nayars	—	Infantry
	Tiyyans		various units
	Telegus		
Bombay	Berede	—	2-103rd Mahrattas
	Bhandaris	—	2-117th Mahrattas
	Bombay Telegu	—	1-117th Mahrattas
	Chambars	—	111th Mahars
	Bombay Christian	Depot	—
		116th Mahratta	
	Jamkhaindi	—	2-103rd Mahrattas
	Kathiawer	Depot	2-125th Rifles
	clsses	125th Rifles	
	Khandesh Bhils	Depot	—
		101st Grenadiers	
	Kolis	Depot	—
		104 Mahrattas	
	Lingayats	—	2-103rd Mahrattas
	Mahars	—	111 Mahars
Mahartta Brahamans	2-2nd		
	Gurkhas	—	
Sindis	2-124th		
	Baluchis	—	
Bengal	Bengalis	—	49th Bengalis
			43rd Divisional
			Six Coy

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Punjab & Delhi	Arains	2-55th Rifles	2-129th Pioneers
		1-129th Baluchis	
	Baltis	—	106th Pioneers
	Bauria Sikhs	—	2-35th Sikhs
	Bishnois	—	2-69th Punjabis
	Gaur Brahmin	1-9th and 2-3rd Brahmana (several other units take them)	—
	Dogra Jats	38th Dogras	—
	Heris	—	2-48th Pioneers 2-128th Pioneers
	Hindu Aroras	222nd Punjabis	—
	Jagirdars of Ambala	2-55th Rifles	—
	Kambohs	2-55th Rifles	—
	Kanets	—	Various units
	Kashmiris (discontinued)	—	—
	Mahatam Sikhs	—	2-35th Sikhs
	Mussallis	—	2-81st Pioneers
	Niazi Pathans	—	2-21st Punjabis
	Punjabi Brahmans	—	37th Dogras
	Punjabi Hindus	—	2-26th Punjabi
	Punjabi Christian	—	71st Punjabis
	Pathan of Chhach	—	2-54th Sikhs
	Rors	2-12th Pioneers	—
	Sainis	2-55th Rifles	—
		1-21st Punjabis	—
	SW Punjabi Musalmans	Various units	—
U.P.	Bhuinhar Brahamin	—	7th, 8th, 1-11th and 2-11th Rajputs
	Hill Doms	1st Sappers and Miners	—
	Gaur Brahmans	—	1-9th and 2-3rd Brahmans

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gwalwan Ahirs	—	5th Light Infantry
	Gadarias	—	2-69th Punjabis
	Hill Brahmans	—	Various units
	Jaduban Ahirs	—	2-95th Infantry
	Kumanois	1st and 2-50th Kumaon Rifles	—
	Ladhas	—	4-9th Infantry
	Nondban Ahris	—	2-9th Infantry
	Oudh Rajputs	—	2-6th Punjabis
	Oudh Brahamans	—	2-3rd Brahamans
	Oudh Muslimans	Depot 1-9th Infantry	—
	Pasis (discontinued)	—	—
NWFP	Miranzi Bangashes	—	2-55th Rifles
	Bannuchis and Marwars	—	(1 Coy absorbed in 2-25th Panjabis and 1 Coy absorbed in 2-128th Pioneers)
	Swatis of Hazera Ahirs	— —	Variis units 1st & 2-5th Light Infantry
	Bhuinhar Jharus	Brahamans 3-8 Gurkhas	2-11th Rajputs —
Assam	Manipuris	Depot 2-39th Garhwal Rifles	— —
	Syllahat Mohammedans	Depot 18th Infantry	— —
Central Provinces	Lodhis and Dangris Mahars	4-9th Infantry 2-103rd Maharattas	— —
Burma	Burmans Karens Arkanese	— — —	70th Burma Rifles — —

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UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

War Diaries

The War diaries provide day to day account of the war maintained by Army Headquarters, India, from the beginning of hostilities to their termination. They are full of contemporary authentic information with a reflection on policy matters, they throw light on all aspects of war from the exchange of letters between the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, the Commander-in-Chief of India and other operational commanders of Indian Expeditionary Forces dealing with policy, planning, execution and review of operations and provisioning of drafts for expeditious replenishment. Further, they provide information about composition of forces, weapons, equipment, casualties, awards, promotions, appointments of commanders, control of logistics and appreciation of commanders. They also give valuable information of tactical handling of operations. In fact, they contain all the information that is required for the study of a particular campaign.

These war diaries are now the prized possession of the undivided Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, R.K. Puram, New Delhi.

For each theatre separate war diaries are maintained and they run in volumes. The nature of information in all these volumes is identical. For each theatre the following available volumes with the Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence have

been consulted by the author. These war diaries are confidential. The following is written on the top of each war diary:

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- IEF 'C'
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- IEF 'D' 'Mesopotamia'
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India's Contribution to the Great War

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The book contains valuable information regarding India's contribution in men, money and material. It also contains information with regard to casualties and rewards for different theatres.

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6	Line 4 last para	Comety	Community
19	Line 4	ypers	ypres
20	Line 1 last para	Marsal	Marshal
78	Line 1 para 2	Nepolean	Napolean
79	Line 7	Esdracton	Esdraeron
93	Line 6 para 3	from	form
132	Ser 4	incapitcated	incapicated
148	Line 11	command	commend
150	Line 3	1943	1946
151	Appendices	Galtipoli	Gallipoli
166	Nikka Singh Ser VI (VII last line)	Festruverst doarshoea	Festuert diorrhoez

