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MDCCCXLV.

NOTICE.

THE Second Part of the CONQUEST OF SCINDE completes all the Military and Political operations. The author's original intention was to produce a third, or Administrative Part, as a continuation of the other two; but this plan he has given up, because Sir C. Napier's Administration of Scinde is still going on, and being of a mixed nature will form a separate and complete subject and volume of itself.

W. NAPIER,
Major-General.

May, 1845.

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CORRIGENDA.

- Page 208, line 1, for “Roree and Alore,” read “ground near Roree.”*
- ” 218, ” 4, *for “Son,” read “Nephew.”*
- ” 240, ” 23, *for “many times,” read “at times.”*
- ” 241, ” 2, *for “six,” read “four.”*
- ” 249, ” 3, *for “young Prince,” read “Prince.”*
- ” 271, ” 20, *for “villages,” read “Belooch villages.”*
- ” 283, ” 15, *for “to have,” read “to become;” and for “vengeance,” in side note, read “rebellious.”*
- ” 310, ” 10, *for “into,” read “towards.”*
- ” 310, ” 14, } *for “grenadiers,” read “a company.”*
- ” 315, ” 5, }
- ” 313, ” 20, *for “rode over,” read “down through a gap.”*
- ” 319, ” 27, *for “down dead,” read “down.”*
- ” 320, ” 19, *for “one thousand,” read “seventeen hundred.”*
- ” 322, ” 26, *for “rich armour,” read “armour.”*

Note.—At page 321, 35th line, it is said, the sword of Nadir Shah was taken at Meeanee. This is an error; that sword was in possession of Ali Ackbar before the battle.

THE
CONQUEST OF SCINDE,

ETC. ETC.

PART I.

To the British people who still honour a bold stroke in war, this brief record of a glorious exploit is dedicated. The conquest belongs to the nation, so does the conqueror, and to the people's keeping his fame is committed; they will not fail towards a general whose heroic resolution has renewed the wonders of Poitiers and Agincourt.

CHAP.
I.

Sordid factious writers have described Sir Charles Napier, as a ferocious warrior seeking with avidity the destruction of men; and to make the reproach more large, designated him as one of a brood, bearing the name, always ready for blows and blood. That he and others of his family have been ready with the sword in defence of their country is true; that they seek to spill blood for strife's sake is false; and two of them have need to be chary of blows which topple down thrones and change the fate of kingdoms. Dom Miguel of Portugal, a melancholy exile in Rome—the Egyptian Ibrahim, a fugitive from Syria—the fallen tyrants of Scinde, clanking their chains for the ears of sympathising

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Englishmen as base as themselves, attest the vigour of their conquerors in war; but peace and the arts of peace, have ever been the aim and study of the man who fought so sternly at Mecanee and Hyderabad; and he warred there only because peace and his country's cause were incompatible.

The mountains of Cephalonia, furrowed with roads scarcely inferior to that of Mont Cenis in greatness, and equal in skilful contrivance—the harbours of that island improved by fine quays, and ameliorated and adorned with lighthouses of beautiful construction—fisheries created—agriculture advanced—the law courts reformed—the oppression of feudal chiefs rebuked—justice upheld, and the honest affections of the labouring people secured by unwearied exertion for their welfare: these, the undeniable fruits of Sir Charles Napier's government of Cephalonia, are solid vouchers for that benignity of purpose which renders industry in the works of peace glorious. His efforts were indeed painful, for always they were clogged, and finally stopped by the vulgar jealousy of a splenetic man in power, to whom stupid pomp appeared the vital principle of government. Incapable of distinguishing justice from oppression, honesty from treachery, vigour from arrogance,—all seeming alike to his narrow intellect,—he first obstructed the good man's active beneficence, and then drove him from his post with an accusation of tyranny. The home authorities, the distant rulers, listened and believed; but the men on the spot, the labouring people who were designated as the miserable victims of his harshness, passed their comment, and it is a cordial with a pearl more precious than Cleopatra's, to cheer those who strive honestly for the welfare

Vide Napier on the Colonies. A scarce work because of the efforts made to suppress it.

of the poor and lowly. Thus it runs. Sir Charles Napier, when he was iniquitously deprived of his command, held in Cephalonia a piece of land, so small that he took no heed of it at his departure. Not so the grateful Greek peasants; they voluntarily cultivated the ground, and have transmitted the value of it yearly ever since, without his being even cognizant of their names!

But while the Lord High Commissioner, Adam, could only see in the military Resident of Cephalonia a person to be crushed by the leaden weight of power without equity, there was another observer in that island, who appreciated, and manfully proclaimed the great qualities of the future conqueror of Scinde. This man, himself a butt for the rancour of envious dulness, was one whose youthful genius pervaded the world while he lived, and covered it with a pall when he died. To him, mountain and plain, torrent and lake, the seas, the skies, the earth, light and darkness and even the depths of the human heart, gave up their poetic secrets: and he told them again with such harmonious melody, that listening nations marvelled at the sound, and when it ceased they sorrowed. Lord Byron noted, and generously proclaimed the merits which Sir Frederick Adam marked as defects. Writing from Cephalonia in 1823, he thus expressed his opinion.

“Of Colonel Napier’s military character it were superfluous to speak; of his personal character, I can say, from my own knowledge, as well as from all public rumour, or private report, that it is excellent as his military: in short, a better or a braver man is not easily to be found. *He* is our man to lead a regular force, or to organize a

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national one for the Greeks. Ask the army; ask any one."

This eulogy, so warm so earnest and so true, pronounced when Greece, struggling to be free, like her own fabled Encêlâdus shook the world at every throe, had reference to a design for delivering the bright land of ancient days. It was largely conceived, maturely arranged, and many ardent men had been engaged by Sir Charles Napier for the execution; men hardy and habituated to war, who, tired of inactivity and warmed with a love for Greece and her olden times, had full confidence in their intended chief's ability to plan, and in his courage to lead. Ready and eager they were, under his guidance, to throw themselves, with their valour, their military knowledge, their enthusiasm, and their wealth, which was not small, into the Peloponnesus. He was known also to the Greeks of the continent. His beneficent and vigorous government of Cephalonia had not been unobserved by that acute race; and such had been his kindness to the dispossessed Suliotes, that they called him father! The enterprise, therefore, bade fair for success; but Lord Byron's recommendation, and Sir C. Napier's offered services, were alike disregarded by the Greek Committee in London. Why! it is for the Humes, the Ellices, and Bowering to say. For Greece it was a misfortune, for England a happy neglect. The acquisition of Scinde, that rich and promising kingdom in the East, gained by a just war, and one most grateful to humanity, with the concomitant advantage of restoring our shaken military reputation in India, has been, with long space indeed between cause and effect, the final result.

Sir Charles Napier's plan for the deliverance of Greece was not the only project formed by him against the Turkish power, which he abhorred from witnessing the great cruelties exercised on the unhappy people of the Archipelago and Peloponnesus. He had been previously employed on a secret military mission to Ali, Pacha of Yoanina, who consulted him as to operations against the forces of the Porte then menacing the Pachalic. "Give me," said Napier, "the selection of your troops, and one of the millions in your coffers, and in six weeks I will place you in the seraglio, Sultan of Constantinople, if you will declare the Christians free." The Pacha liked the project, and attentively examined the details of arrangement, but he would not give the treasure! One month afterwards he offered two millions! The reply was:—"Too late; the Turks are in the Etolian mountains! you are lost." The miser, Ali, gave up his life and his money together. This and other experience, gave Sir Charles Napier a clear insight of the character and policy of Asiatic barbarians, which he has since profited from.

During his forced retirement from military life, he added several works to his country's literature, under the following titles:—" *The Roads of Cephalonia* ;" " *The Colonies* ;" " *Colonization, with Remarks upon small farms and overpopulation* ;" " *Military Law*," a work eloquent, and copious of anecdote; " *An Essay on the State of Ireland* ;" " *Notes upon De Vigny's Lights and Shadows of Military Life* ;" finally, a historical romance, called " *Harold of England*," not published, but worthy of being so, and shewing the author's versatile powers of mind.

He became a Major-General by the brevet of

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1837 ; and Lord Hill, at the recommendation of Lord FitzRoy Somerset, a man who was not to be swayed by calumny though it was not spared, placed him in the command of the northern district of England. It was a troubled, critical period, and his political opinions were well known ; they had been strongly expressed in public at fitting times and places ; but his ability, his judgment, his unswerving integrity of purpose, his rectitude, and military conduct, gained him the approbation of the Government of the day, and of the magistrates generally, without any ill-will from the people, who did full justice to the honest desire he shewed for their welfare, even while he was forced to controul them by arms. He was treated with injustice by Macaulay, the Whig Secretary at war, but Lord John Russell, the Home Secretary, acknowledged his merits ; and in the autumn of 1841, Lord Hill offered him a command in India.

Proceeding by the overland journey, he, in passing through Egypt, seized with characteristic quickness the vicious weakness of Mehemet Ali's government, which he thus exposed with the indignation of a man abhorring cruelty and selfish oppression.

Letter to
the Author
of his work

“ A person who has been but a short time in a country has no right to suppose he can trace causes with certainty ; he can, however, judge of effects when they are strongly marked. Rich land, a variety of produce, with a ready market for it in Europe, and a noble people, belong to this country. Mehemet Ali has ruled it for forty years, and the result is horrible ! I have not seen, nor can I hear of any deed of his, nor the result of any of his deeds, that has not the stamp of

“ tyranny, of mischief, of villainy. His mind is
 “ capable of projecting clever things for his own
 “ supposed advantage, or pleasure, or renown, but
 “ incapable of great works for the regeneration of a
 “ people, or even for their temporary advantage :
 “ he does not even leave the means of subsistence
 “ in their possession ! His only really great work,
 “ the Canal of Mahmoudie, eighteen feet deep,
 “ ninety feet wide, and sixty miles long, cost, it is
 “ asserted here, the lives of twenty-nine thousand
 “ persons in one year, out of the hundred and fifty
 “ thousand employed : they were starved by him,
 “ and dug the canal with their hands ! Take that
 “ as a sample of his infernal rule. A great man
 “ would have given them tools ; he would not, to
 “ save expence, have slain twenty-nine thousand
 “ poor men within the year. And when his canal
 “ was finished, the commerce on it would have
 “ proved its use, and his greatness ; but no boat
 “ floats thereon which does not contain the Pacha’s
 “ property, for no man but himself is a proprietor.
 “ This high way of two hundred miles through his
 “ dominions, for it is one with the Nile, exhibits
 “ no sign, therefore, that the barbarian’s mind is
 “ either great or good. What encouragement has
 “ he given to his people ? None ! He has hired
 “ foreign men to make all things which he requires
 “ for war ; and his establishments are of a size
 “ which render his government one of devilish op-
 “ pression ; his monopolies no country could sup-
 “ port ; he is living on his capital !

“ To give an illustration of his system. Let A
 “ be one district, B another. The rent is alike for
 “ each. Some accident injures the crop on B, and
 “ it becomes impossible for the people to pay more

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“ than half their rent. The Pacha levies the de-
 “ ficiency on A, and both are ruined ! Again, an
 “ Abyssian, or some other merchant from the inte-
 “ rior of Africa arrives with cattle, or other goods,
 “ he is offered a large sum in cash ; he cannot take
 “ it ! The Pacha seizes his goods, and pays him,
 “ when convenient, with articles from the Pacha’s
 “ own stock of merchandise of various kinds, to the
 “ amount of half the value ; and this robbery is so
 “ frequent as to be the rule, not the exception.
 “ The Pacha then sells the cattle to the original
 “ cash purchaser, and all trade is thus checked,
 “ except that which is in the hands of English-
 “ men.—The result of all this is a ruined misera-
 “ ble people.”

“ The troops are ill equipped, but they are the
 “ best thing one sees, except the ships of war. The
 “ men, both soldiers and peasants, are fine strong
 “ Arabs, with thin faces, and intellectual to the
 “ greatest degree ; good-humoured, honest-looking,
 “ and resolute. The Egyptian I have not been
 “ able, yet, to distinguish from the Arab ; but *all*
 “ appear fine looking. In five days I have seen
 “ many beaten severely by men in authority, with-
 “ out any apparent cause ; they all seemed dis-
 “ posed to resist, but the consequences were too
 “ terrible and smothered rage was very clearly
 “ depicted. Forty years rule should have produced
 “ better fruit, if Mehemet Ali were, as we are told,
 “ a great man, but of that I see no proof, no trace !
 “ Ibrahim beat a man to death last week in this
 “ town (Cairo). The poor fellow did not bring
 “ eggs enough ?—‘ How many turkeys have you
 “ got ?—How much corn do they eat ?—Do they lay
 “ eggs to cover that amount ?’—‘ Yes !’—‘ Then you

“ must bring me so many eggs daily.’ The man
 “ failed for two or three days. Ibrahim sent for
 “ the wretched creature, and with his own hands,
 “ using a club, beat him to death ! I recollect his
 “ doing the like when I was in Cephalonia.”

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“ Ali Pacha’s ‘ vast improvements,’ have been to
 “ strengthen his forces, and he has done that, but
 “ at ten times the cost necessary. My conviction
 “ is, that his reputation for greatness originates in
 “ the opinions and interests of silly English adven-
 “ turers and speculating merchants, incapable of
 “ judging him, but whose fortunes he makes, and
 “ from no other source. The man lives upon his
 “ capital. How far this may be forced upon him, I
 “ cannot tell.”

Mehemet Ali’s faults were not the only objects of animadversion. A professional gentleman living in Egypt, and not unwilling to be quoted as authority for the fact, if its accuracy should be questioned, affirmed that, the comptrollers of the British Museum, had directed the engineer employed to remove objects of ancient art from Egypt, to cut the statue of Sesostris into four pieces, that it might be sent to England more cheaply ! The engineer refused obedience. Let antiquarians look to this matter. One rude British soldier prevented the vandalism, another tells them of it.

Sir Charles Napier, having reached Bombay,
 was appointed to command at Poonah, and soon
 attracted public notice by his professional activity ;
 and he quickly detected, and in his letters forcibly
 depicted the vices, civil and military, which had
 gained such strength under Lord Auckland’s
 government if they did not originate with it, that
 the total destruction of the Indian army, and the

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ruin of the Indian Empire seemed to be hastening on with giant strides. To give his views at length and in his own nervous language, would be of little public service now, and might be injurious; but those views were at the time shewn to competent authority at home, and returned to the author of this history, with this remark: "Too true a picture drawn by a master hand." But it was at this moment that, for the salvation of India, Lord Ellenborough came, to curb the nepotism of the Directors,—to repress the jobbing tribe,—to reduce the editors of newspapers from a governing to a reporting class, and to raise the spirit of the army, sinking under insult, and the domineering influence of grasping civilians who snatched the soldier's share and calumniated him through a hireling press.

Impressed with the danger menacing India from within and from without, Sir Charles Napier, at the request of Lord Ellenborough, wrote his view of military affairs, and a plan of campaign for the second Affghan invasion. The principal points were the relief of Sale,—the restoration of Dost Mohamed,—the evacuation of Affghanistan,—a position on the left bank of the Indus. He recommended an attack on the Kyber passes in front from Peshawar, and the simultaneous turning of them by both flanks, while a force advancing from Candahar to Cabool assailed them from that quarter also. Treating each point in

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detail, he finished thus. "The chief cause of our disasters is, that when a smart lad can speak Hindostance and Persian, he is made a political agent, and supposed to be a statesman and a general." What influence this memoir had upon Lord Ellenborough, or whether it merely coincided

with his own opinions and plans, is known only to himself; the leading points were in unison with the after operations of Nott and Pollock, and with the abatement of the political agency, that wise measure, which gave so much offence in India, and in England also, to those who profited by the nuisance. But this memoir recommended the employment of more troops than the Governor-General had to dispose of, or could find carriage for.

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While thus offering the aid of a long experience to Lord Ellenborough, General Napier did not neglect the proper duties of his own command. To exercise himself in the handling of troops in the field, a practice useful and necessary for the most experienced officer, if he would be a ready captain in battle; and to improve the rather neglected discipline of what he truly called the "*the noble Indian army*," he broke from the monotony of formal parades on carefully levelled ground, and worked his strong division of troops over the neighbouring hills: thus arousing the latent energies of the officers, and making himself and his troops, mindful that they were regular soldiers not trainbands. He disabused them also of a pernicious error, inculcated by the newspapers of India with a pertinacity of falsehood peculiarly characteristic. They said, and belief was given to them though worthy only of unbelief, that the matchlock of the Affghan and other enemies was superior to the British musket in range and precision. Simply to reason against this widely spread and assiduously inculcated fallacy, would be, he knew, fruitless. Promulgated with a bad motive, and accepted as a truth with dogged credulity,

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he resolved to refute it practically, and to draw attention to the refutation, adopted an ingenious device.

Provoking a warm admirer of the matchlock to produce a marhatta equal with that weapon to a musketeer, he, meanwhile, selected some men and officers of the sepoys, practised with them himself until he discovered the best shot, and then daily contended in person with this man. They were nearly equal, the camp became interested, bets were multiplied, and the partisans of each weapon were fairly pitted against each other, not only for the trial but in the thoughts of the soldiers: this was the General's object. Thus he bent the stiffened neck of the prejudice, and at the end of two months the supporter of the matchlock admitted that he could not win; moreover it was proved that while the matchlock could only be fired five or six times in half an hour, the musketeer could fire sixty shots, and send twenty home to the mark at one hundred and fifty yards distance. Then, to use the General's words, the matchlock was laughed at, and the musket got its place again. This dexterous management of the soldier indicated the great captain before the red stamp of battle made him patent. Previous to this trial a feeling was prevalent, that to encounter the matchlock was to fall, before the musket could harm an enemy; and it was in vain to say the Affghans fired from high places upon uncovered troops, whose fire-arms, discharged at almost perpendicular elevation, could scarcely reach, or if they did, could scarcely harm men ensconced in the rocks above; that the advantage was in the position not in the weapon, and to neutralize it depended on the General. The sepoy's

musket is however of an ancient pattern, and unnecessarily clumsy and heavy. For that strange economy prevails in India as elsewhere, which spares a pound in the cost of a soldier's weapon to be repaid by the loss of the soldier himself, although he never goes into battle for less than a hundred pounds.

Sir Charles Napier observed many errors in the organization and discipline of the Indian army, and digested in his own mind several changes with respect to the artillery and baggage, some of which he has effected since attaining the command of a separate army; and always he was sanguine of good in these matters, because of the willingness to learn which he found in the Company's officers. But the follies of the time were great and manifold, and one for its supreme absurdity merits notice. Every soldier was ordered to have a large box, in addition to the usual baggage of an Indian army! The 22nd regiment, acting under this preposterous regulation, marched for Scinde with thirteen hundred boxes! A camel can carry only four, hence three hundred camels, each occupying five yards in theory, in practice ten, on a line of march, were added to the "*impedimenta*" of a single and rather weak battalion! Truly the strong hand of Lord Ellenborough was wanting to lift our Indian Government from such a slough. He came in time, and no man watched his government with more anxiety than the General at Poonah, who, in common with others, looked to the Affghan operations as the test of his ability. Nor was his mind quickly relieved; for previous to the final burst of Nott and Pollock on Cabool, he could discover no military principle of action, nothing positive to guide his judgment of the operations executed or designed;

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and he characterised the war by this one expressive phrase: A tragic harlequinade.

Meanwhile the public opinion of his own capacity for great actions became strong, and a vague prescience of glory under his guidance, that undefinable sentiment which so often foreruns victory, and predisposes men to give all their energies to the accomplishment, was not wanting in the military community. Yet he sought not, nor desired any active command beyond the Indus. He disliked the appearance of affairs, and was disgusted with the shameless system foully pervading all branches of the public service; a system which he, having then no experience of Lord Ellenborough's great qualities, could not hope to see overborne, supported as it was in England by factious persons of influence, and by the Directory; and in India by the most vehemently unscrupulous press that ever pandered for hire to bad men at the expense of the public interests. Little inclination he felt therefore, to become personally mixed with and responsible, according to his degree, for disasters, which he could not but anticipate from the policy of the rulers, but which he knew would inevitably be charged upon the executive officers: for to make bricks without straw and to be calumniated, is the usual task and the fate of British generals.

He had no choice. After some hesitation as to the quarter for employing him, it being at one time intended to have him on the Nerbudda where insurrection was spreading, the Governor-General sent him to Scinde. The 26th of August, he was directed to assume the command there and in Beloochistan, and the entire controul over all the political agents and civil officers. He was

instructed to keep Kurrachee, and peremptorily told, "If the Ameers, or any one of them, should act hostilely, or evince hostile designs against the British forces, it was the Governor-General's fixed resolution never to forgive the breach of faith, and to exact a penalty which should be a warning to every chief in India."

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The fierce tenor of this order, issued at a moment of great difficulty and immediately after great disasters, bespoke in Lord Ellenborough a consciousness of danger and a magnanimous resolution; it told the General a crisis demanding all his energy and ability was at hand; that much was expected, but by a ruler who would neither shrink himself nor fail towards others. Wherefore, though sixty-one years of age, with a frame always slight and meagre, and, though sinewy and of iron hardness, furrowed with many wounds, he hastened to Scinde with the alacrity of a young warrior. Bred from his childhood in camps, he had been nearly fifty years waiting for this crowning trial of his military life; and few are the men who made their first essays as Generals, at so great an age, with such fiery energy and success, combining such consummate sagacity with matchless enterprise and resolution. The Roman Paulus conquered Macedon in a single battle at the same period of life, but he had long before commanded against the Illyrians and Spaniards; Scinde is a richer country than Macedon, infinitely more formidable from heat, and the Beloochees also are a braver race than the soldiers of Perseus. It is rare to see great prudence in war tempering the heroic valour and confidence of a youthful commander, but more marvellous to find the fierce sanguine daring of early years, untamed by age

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 I. the discretion of the veteran.

1842. Sir Charles Napier embarked at Bombay in the
 September. Zenobia steamer on the 3rd of September, thus
 commencing his new career upon Oliver Cromwell's
 fortunate day ; a coincidence which he did not fail
 to note with some satisfaction as a good omen.
 Yet the augury seemed at fault in the beginning.
 Scarcely had the vessel, which was full of troops,
 gained the open sea, when blue cholera broke out
 in the most terrible form, and the hideous misery
 of the voyage, which lasted until the 9th, shall
 be given in his own words.

Letter
 MS.

“ In those six bitter days and nights we cast
 “ fifty-four dead into the sea ; just one-fourth of our
 “ companions ! One passenger, it happened, was
 “ a surgeon, and he was assisted by two native
 “ apprentices belonging to the hospitals : fortu-
 “ nately only two of the sailors died, or we should
 “ have been lost for want of hands. The engineer
 “ perished the third day, but happily there were
 “ amongst the passengers two others going to the
 “ steamers on the Indus. Since landing ten more
 “ soldiers have died, and one captain, making
 “ sixty-four in all ! This pulls down the spirits of
 “ men. It was the worst description of blue
 “ cholera. The agonies, the convulsions, the dread-
 “ ful groans, were heart-rending : and then the
 “ screams of the poor women who lost their hus-
 “ bands and children ! And amidst all this, in
 “ the darkness of the night, the necessity of throw-
 “ ing the dead overboard the instant life was
 “ extinct to make room for the living ! Then also,
 “ added to this scene of human wretchedness, the
 “ violent effects of the disease could not be cleaned,

“and extreme filth increased the misery. Well, God be praised! it has ceased, but more troops are on this voyage and I dread to hear of similar sufferings, for most of it has been caused by neglect. I have made a formal complaint to Sir George Arthur, who, I am sure, will stir about the matter. The Commander of the Zenobia, Mr. Newman, is a noble fellow. I believe all that were saved owe their lives to him; and we, the officers, have given him a gold snuff-box in token of our gratitude.”—“On making the land both mates got drunk, and such a night scene of confusion I never saw. We were nearly as possible on a reef of rocks, we fired guns and rockets, but no help came. Had we struck all must have perished; at least all the sick, eighty in number: at last we cast anchor, and luckily on good holding ground.”

His first care was to provide for the survivors of this dreadful voyage, which he effected by the 10th, but further mishap awaited himself. On the 13th, he was observing the practice of a rocket train, when one of the fiery missiles burst, rocket and shell together, and tore the calf of his right leg open to the bone, but neither the bone itself nor the great artery was injured, and the wound was instantly stitched. Then a life of temperance aided by a patient spirit of endurance was repaid with a surprising cure. The hurt, jagged as it was, healed by the first intention, and in four days he was out of his tent; the fifth saw him free from fever, on horseback, travelling with an escort of wild troopers towards Hyderabad.

Some superstition the human mind, whether strong or weak, seems to lean towards, and several

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of the greatest minds have rested thereon. Those who deal in war seldom reject predestination, and Sir Charles Napier's life, one justifying Lord Byron's remark that truth is more strange than fiction, encourages this sentiment though reason should recoil. In infancy he was snatched when at the last stage of starvation from a vile nurse; while a young boy, attempting a dangerous leap, he tore the flesh from his leg in a frightful manner; a few years later he fractured the other leg. At the battle of Coruna, in a struggle with several enemies, he received five terrible wounds, and but for the aid of a generous French drummer would there have been killed; he was made a prisoner, and his fate being long unknown, he was mourned for as dead by his family. In the battle of Busaco, a bullet struck his face and lodged behind the ear, splintering the articulation of the jawbone; yet with this dreadful hurt he made his way under a fierce sun to Lisbon, more than one hundred miles! Returning from France after the battle of Waterloo, the ship sunk off Flushing, and he only saved himself by swimming to a pile, on which he clung until a boat carried him off, half drowned, for the pile was too large to climb up, he had caught it during the recession of a wave, and was overwhelmed by each recurring surge. Now escaping cholera, and a second shipwreck off the Indus, and marvellously recovering from the stroke of that unlucky rocket at Kurrachee, he was again firm on horseback, hastening to conduct with matchless energy a dangerous war; and he did conduct it to a glorious termination, for neither age, nor accident, nor wounds, had quenched the fiery spirit. But how the spare body, shattered in

battle and worn by nearly fifty years service in every variety of climate, could still suffice to place him amongst the famous captains of the world is a mystery. His star was in the East!

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Scinde was at this period in a very disturbed political state. The great disasters of the British army at Cabool and at Ghusni; the frequent checks given to detached troops by the hill tribes of Beloochistan; the recent repulse and retreat of Colonel England before an Affghan force of only equal strength in men, and having no artillery! even the firm, but long isolated, position of General Nott at Candahar, had abated the barbarian's fear of British power; and the Beloochees of Scinde, were, princes and chiefs and followers, alike hostilely inclined. Colonel England was now returning by the Bolan passes from Quettah, having under his orders the greatest part of the troops destined to form Sir Charles Napier's army; the Ameers were keenly watching his progress, and had a second disaster befallen him they would have declared war, for only four thousand men were then in Scinde, part at Kurrachee, part at Sukkur—that is to say, four hundred miles asunder, and with insecure means of communication.

This critical state of affairs demanded the instant exercise of the General's sagacity and energy—and he was ready. “Danger from their warfare I can see none,” he wrote from Kurrachee. “I can beat all the Princes of Scinde. When Colonel England joins me, I shall have twelve thousand men; no cavalry, however; which I should feel the want of if the Ameers attack me; but I shall have some soon. My difficulty will be to act as chief political agent to the Governor-General. I believe

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“ his intentions to be just and honourable. I know
 “ my own are. But Hell is paved with good in-
 “ tentions, and both of us may have great difficul-
 “ ties to encounter. Yet I feel neither diffidence
 “ nor hesitation. My plan is formed, so is Lord
 “ Ellenborough’s, and I believe they are alike.
 “ The hill tribes threaten to fall on Colonel Eng-
 “ land’s column as it descends the Bolan pass.
 “ There are, however, reasons to doubt this, and
 “ I have sent to advise and authorise the Com-
 “ mander in Upper Scinde to make a forward move-
 “ ment towards the pass, which I hope he will be
 “ able to do and thus favour England’s retreat by
 “ menacing the rear of his enemies. He has the
 “ mass of my troops with him, I have only four
 “ thousand in Upper Scinde. I ought to have been
 “ here two months ago. I have now to travel two
 “ hundred miles up the Indus, with a guard of only
 “ fifty men through a hostile country. This ap-
 “ pears foolish ; but I must do it—I must get to
 “ my troops. I set off to-morrow, and there will
 “ be no small interest in threading the windings of
 “ the noble river Indus.”

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When near Hyderabad, he judged it fitting to wait on the Ameers as a mark of respect, and also to form an opinion of their characters by personal observation. Those Princes, though of barbaric race and feelings, sensual and cruel and treacherous, were nevertheless polite of manners, subtil, and dexterous to sound the depths and shallows of the human mind which are formed by the whirlpools of crime and passion ; they had guides thereto in their own dispositions, but for virtues they had no tests and looked not for them. They knew, for they had made diligent inquiry, that the

General came with all political as well as military power, which had not been before, even when Lord Keane menaced their capital at the head of a great army; wherefore, they hastened to offer suitable respect to the powerful Feringee with whom they had to deal. Their palanquin was sent for his use, and this the highest honour of their court was enhanced by the presence of their sons, who met him a quarter of a mile beyond the city gates. With these young Lords came camels for the General's retinue; and around the Princes clustered the great Sirdars and nobles on horseback with all their thousands of retainers, chiefs and followers having keen heavy swords girt to their sides, and large shields thrown over their shoulders. The General was at the head of his own guard of the wild horsemen of India, and thus they met, the two bodies commingling, while a multitude on foot surrounded them shouting and screaming. For a moment the mass remained stationary, and then with tumultuous haste made for the Palace. A gorgeous disarray! For all were clothed in the brightest colours, and their splendid arms gleamed and glittered in the broad sunbeams; and high above the crowd the giant camels swayed their huge bodies to and fro with an uneasy motion, while the fiery horses, bearing rich housings, neighed and bounded with violence from side to side, their swarthy riders tossing their sinewy hands aloft with almost frantic energy, and writhing their bodies convulsively. And all this time the multitude on foot were no less vehement. Wearing fine embroidered caps, which set off their handsome eager faces, their piercing eyes, their teeth of snowy whiteness, they pressed forwards fighting and crushing each other to see the "General Saib of the

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Feringees." He, reclining on green cushions in the open high arched palanquin of crimson and gold, a small dark-visaged old man, but with a falcon's glance, must have disappointed their expectations, for they knew not then the heroic force of mind which was so soon to invalidate their wild strength and furious courage on the dreadful field of Meeanee. Now, ignorant, proud and fierce, with barbarian pomp they passed tumultuously along, winding in the deep shadows of the ancient massive towers of Hyderabad, their numbers increasing at every step, until they reached the high embattled gate of the fortress, through which the bearers of the palanquin could scarcely struggle to the palace. When that was effected the hubbub ceased, and the Ameers, having, as they said, consideration for the hurt the General had received at Kurrachee, formed their Dhurbar in the Court below to save him the pain of ascending their great staircase.

Those sovereign Princes were richly dressed, and their swords and shields were resplendent with gold and jewels. None were handsome of person or face, but all were youthful, except Nusseer and another, both being however younger than their visitor. Sweetmeats and provisions were presented after the manner of their Court, and compliments were exchanged, while each party watched keenly for indications of character by which to guide their future intercourse. What impression the Englishman made on the Ameers cannot be known, but the studied respect, the oriental politeness, the princely pomp, and the display of wild military power by which they sought to impose on him, failed to affect his judgment. Well knowing that a barbarian's friendship is self interest, his

wisdom deceit, he kept his mind immoveably intent upon the object of his mission. He was in Scinde, not to bandy compliments with Princes, but to maintain the power and influence and interests of England in all their integrity, according to treaty, and at a moment of such danger that a slight concession might prove fatal. With this object diplomatic cajolery had no proper connection. His orders and his resolutions were, to maintain the cause of British India, by a fair and just though stern and unyielding policy if it might be so; by force of arms if policy failed. Hence he put aside all thoughts of their flattering attentions, and frankly and honourably, even in the midst of their grandeur and while the flow of their politeness seemed to invite friendship, gave them an austere but timely and useful warning, that the previous unsteady weak policy of diplomatic agents in Scinde would no longer facilitate deceitful practices against the tenor of international obligations. He had, at Kurrachee, obtained proof that the Ameers were acting a disloyal part, and he was therefore anxious to let them know he was cognizant of their malpractices, their violations of treaties; and he told them if those offences were repeated, he would make the new Governor-General cognizant of them also, with a view to a forcible remedy.

His letter, written on the 25th of September, being delivered, he passed on to Sukkur, where he arrived the 5th of October, and forthwith com-
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 menced a series of political and military operations which reduced the Ameers to the choice of an honest policy or a terrible war. They chose dishonesty and battle; they tried deceit and were

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baffled by a superior intellect; they raised the sword and were themselves cut down by a stronger arm. Why it so happened in despite of the General's earnest wish and indefatigable exertions to preserve peace, shall be shewn in another place; clearly it shall be shewn that the war was of the Amceers' own seeking, that their heavy misfortunes are the just punishment of their folly and wickedness: a misery only to them, to the world a benefit. With abilities and energies placing him amongst the greatest of those famed western Captains who have forced the pride of the East to stoop on the battle field, Sir Charles Napier sought not strife, it was thrust upon him! But a previous knowledge of the peculiar position of Scinde in 1842, and its connection with British Indian policy when he assumed the command at Sukkur, must be obtained and considered by those who would reach the truth, and are honourably and patriotically anxious to be assured that the dreadful sword of England was not drawn in an unjust quarrel. Wherefore, the next chapter shall contain a retrospective examination; for the Scindian war was no isolated event. It was, to use the conqueror's expression, *The tail of the Affghan storm.*

CHAPTER II.

THE origin and progress of British power in the East is well known. Commencing in trade it has been magnified by arms and policy, and the glittering bubble must expand until it burst or it will collapse. Strangers coming from afar, more civilized, more knowing in science and arts, more energetic of spirit, more strong of body, more warlike, more enterprising, than the people among whom they settle, must necessarily extend their power until checked by natural barriers, or by a counter-civilization. The novelty of their opinions, political and religious, the cupidity of their traders, the ambition or avarice of their chiefs, the insolence of superiority, and even the instinct of self-preservation, render collision with the native populations and their rulers inevitable, and conquest as inevitable as collision. It is the struggle of the fertile land with the desert of Egypt, the waters of the Nile directed against the waste, the stream of civilization against barbaric ignorance. The reflux of barbarian power continually menaces British India, producing wars, leading to wars: peace cannot be till all is won. And the necessity for expansion is more urgent, because the subjected people's condition has not been improved in proportion to the extent of the conquest or the greatness of the conquerors. The frame of government, comparatively, not essentially, just and liberal, wants the

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support of benevolent wisdom, and prying enemies must be kept at a distance.

This inherent craving for aggrandizement has carried British India to the roots of the Himalayas on the North, menacing or menaced by the mountaineers of Nepaul; to the Irrawaddy on the East, grating harshly with the Burman empire. It has sent fleets and armies to obtain a corner nest in China for the incubation of commerce; but the eggs will produce the gliding serpent, the ravening kite, and the soaring eagle. China will be overturned, changed in all her institutions, unless her politic people, acquiring as they are like to do, the arts of European warfare, thrust the intruding strangers quickly from the land. The march of aggrandizement has been more rapid towards the West, because there is felt the influence of a counter-civilization, if such a term can be applied to Russia, expanding towards the East. The danger is prospective and probably distant, yet not to be despised, inasmuch as the basis of Russian strength is natural and enormous. A perception of this truth has hurried, not without policy, the British Indian frontier towards the West, where, under the name of sovereignty, protection, or influence, it extended, before the Affghan war, along the left bank of the Sutledge to the lower Indus, and from thence by the Thurr or great Indian desert, to the run of Cutch and the ocean. From that line the bayonets of England protruded, and her voice of command went forth to the nations of Central Asia. Let the state of those nations, then, be considered, before the policy of invading them to forestall Russia be judged.

The country beyond the Sutledge, was in Alex-

ander's days the kingdoms of Porus and Taxiles. It is now the Punjaub, or land of the five rivers, namely, the Sutledge or Garra, formed by the junction of the ancient *Hyphasis* and *Hesudrus*; the Ravee, or *Hydraotes* of the Greeks; the *Accessines* of antiquity, now the Chenaub; the Jelum, formerly the *Hydaspes*, upon the banks of which the Macedonian hero overcame the giant Indian chief; the *Indus*, which still retains its first name. These streams, descending from the ranges of the Himalayas or Indian Caucasus, flow southward until they unite to form that great river called by Europeans the lower Indus. Their union is completed at Mittun, below Moultan. From thence the vast volume of their waters bears downward to the sea, through an immense plain which, commencing far above their junction, ends only at the coast: this plain is overflowed periodically in summer by the Indus, as the Nile overflows the land of Egypt.

Looking at the countries watered by these rivers, as they confronted the British line before the Affghan war, in the order of their descent from the mountains, we find Cashemere at top, lying amongst the branches of the five streams; the Punjaub next; Scinde at bottom. This may be called the first parallel of nations then opposed to British India.

Westward of the Indus, at a mean distance of forty or fifty miles, a majestic shoot from the Indian Caucasus goes southward to the sea, bearing many names, such as the Soolyman, the Bolan, and Hala mountains. It presents in its whole length a natural wall of rugged strength, pierced only in a few places by roads; it approaches at some points close

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to the great river, at others recedes, as in Cutch Gundava, more than a hundred miles.

These mountains, and their kindred ranges of Kojeh and Gilghie, with the elevated table lands belonging to them, form the countries of Affghanistan and Beloochistan; the former lying to the north, bordering the Punjaub and Cashemere; the latter lying to the south, bordering on Scinde.

This vast tract, including Seestan or Segistan of the desert, formed the second parallel of nations opposed to the frontier of British India; it is bounded on the south by the ocean; on the north by that continuation of the Indian Caucasus known as the Hindoo Khosh and Parapomisan range. This range ends near the city of Herat, which is the western door of Affghanistan opening into Persia. But with exception of the Herat corner, Affghanistan is bounded westward by deserts.

From Herat another great spine of mountains runs to the Caspian Sea, dividing Toorkmania from Khorassan proper, and from Persia. The former, lying north of this spine, is separated from Affghanistan by the Hindoo Khosh and Parapomismus. It was in ancient days the Bactriana, Sogdiana, and Chorasnia of the Macedonians; it is now known by the names of Koondooz, Balk, Bokhara, Samarcand, and Khiva, or Orgunjé, which borders on the Caspian and Aral seas. Toorkmania, Khorassan, and Persia, formed therefore, the third parallel of nations between the Indian frontier and the Russian base of operations.

Through Toorkmania flows the Oxus, running from the Hindoo Khosh to the Aral Sea; it is navigable from above Balk to its mouth, a distance of more than 600 miles. And it is up the Oxus,

through the barbarous nations of Toorkmania, over the snow-clad Hindoo Khosh, and across the rugged Affghan country that Russia must win her way, by force or policy, to meet a British army on the Indus. Or on this route, or by Persia and Khorassan to Herat, she must move; for of her military colonies, planted in the countries ceded to her by China north of the Himalayas, little account need be made, if indeed they exist. Her progress by Constantinople is another question, depending upon European diplomacy and European arms.

Such being the geographical relation of the countries of Central Asia with British India, the political relations and powers of those more immediately affected by the recent wars shall be now touched upon.

The population of the Punjaub, said to be nearly four millions, consists of Seiks, Hindoos, and other people, also to be found in Scinde, Affghanistan, and Beloochistan. The first are the ruling race though not the most numerous; they are athletic, warlike, and turbulent, having a peculiar religion, and a holy book called the "*Grinth*." Of recent date is their power. A few years ago the Punjaub was under the shadow of the Dooranee empire, but Runjeet Sing, having combined the many republican communities of the Seiks into one conquering state, wrested Cashemere and the Peshawar district from Affghanistan; and he took the fortress of Attock on the Indus, which has ever been, and probably ever will be, the door of entrance to India for armies coming from the West. He also extended his power over Moulton, including the tributary dominions of the Bawal-Khan, lying between the Sutledge and the Indus. His regular force was fifty thousand, of which five thousand

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Proceeding southward, Scinde would be the next country to treat of; but the affairs of that portion of the first parallel must be more curiously inquired into, and their connection with those of Afghanistan, Beloochistan, and Doodpoutra shewn. Wherefore the state of these nations demands previous notice.

Doodpoutra, governed by the Bawal-Khan, Bawalpore being the capital, lies on the left of the Sutledge, between the British stations on the upper part of that river and Scinde. The Bawal-Khan's dominions extended at one time across the Sutledge and the Accessines to the Upper Indus, but he was a tributary of the Dooranee monarch. Runjeet Sing demanded the same tribute, and on failure of payment seized the territory between the rivers. The Ameers of Scinde also took from the Bawal-Khan a large district on the left bank of the Lower Indus. Thus pressed, he readily accepted the protection of the British, by which his dominions were guaranteed against further encroach-

ments; and he has ever been faithful to his engagements.

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The origin of the Affghan or Dooranee empire is of recent date. Ahmed Shah, the founder, was of the Sudoyzie family, sacred in the Dooranee tribe of Western Affghan. Taking advantage of the temporary ascendancy of the Dooranees over the Giljhies, with whom power had before resided, he constituted in the middle of last century one conquering nation of Affghans, in place of the ill-cemented confederacy of republican tribes, clans, and families, which previously existed. Ahmed was not a mere eastern swordsman. A great commander, a statesman, and politician, he warred successfully against Persia, subdued Khorassan as far as Meschid in the west; reduced Balk and the neighbouring Uzbecks beyond the Hindoo-Khosh, and awed Bokhara; he overran the Punjaub, acquired Cashemere, occupied Surhind, took Delhi and Agra, and overthrew the Marhattas. Moulton, Daadpoutra, and Scinde, were his tributaries, Beeloochistan and Seestan of the desert were parts of his kingdom.

Ahmed Shah died, in 1773, sixty-six years before the British invasion of Affghanistan. He was succeeded by his son Timour Shah, who was succeeded by his son Zeman Shah, still living, old, blind, and an exile.

Zeman Shah repeatedly menaced India, but each time Persian warfare or civil commotion stopped his invasion, and he was finally dethroned and blinded by his brother Mahmood, who was in turn dethroned, but not blinded, by another brother, Shah Sooja-ool-moolk, so well known by the English invasion of Affghanistan.

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Futteh Khan, chief of the great Barrukzie family of the Dooranee tribe, restored Mahmood, but governed under the title of Vizier. Kamran, the son of Mahmood, persuaded his father to put out the Vizier's eyes, whereupon the brothers of the blinded man took up arms; and then the barbarous Princes caused the helpless, but stern and courageous old Vizier, to be deliberately hacked to pieces in the Dhurbar. The ungrateful King and his son, were, however, soon driven in flight to Herat, where Mahmood died and Kamran retained the government of the city and province.

Shah Sooja was now recalled from exile, for it appears that only from the small but sacred family of the Sudoyzies could a king be chosen. But on the journey he displayed so much arrogance towards one of the powerful Barrukzies, who had recalled him, that, taking timely warning, they at once raised his brother Eyoob to the throne. Sooja, whose highest merit seems to have been forbearing to put out his dethroned brother's eyes, being thus again set aside, Azeem Khan, the eldest surviving brother of Futteh Khan, became Vizier and governed in Eyoob's name. But he soon died of grief for the loss of a battle against Runjeet Sing; civil commotions followed, and finally Eyoob and his son became exiles and the great Dooranee empire was broken up.

During these civil wars, the Persians recovered Khorassan and menaced Herat.

The King of Bokhara appropriated Balk, and the neighbouring Uzbecks resumed their independence.

Cashemere, Peshawar, the Punjaub, Moulton, and part of Doodpoutra, became the prey of Runjeet Sing.

The British conquered Tippoo Sultan, overthrew the Marhattas, added Delhi and Sirhind to their Empire, and established themselves on the upper Sutledge, at Loodiana.

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The Bawal-Khan ceased to be a tributary of Cabool. Merab Khan, the Brahooc-Belooch Prince of Khelat and Seestan of the Indus, assumed independent sovereignty, and allied himself with the Ameers of Scinde, who, not only neglected to pay tribute, but seized a part of Affghanistan on the right bank of the Indus. The hill tribes of Beloochistan resumed their democratic independence. The Affghans, always averse to kingly rule from natural feelings customs and original organization, split into four great divisions, holding together as a nation only by their common religion and language.

Prince Kamran kept Herat, where, in 1837-8, he was besieged for a year by the Persians, at the instigation of Russian agents.

The brothers of the two Viziers, Futteh and Azeem Khan, appropriated the rest of Affghanistan. One seized Candahar, city and province; another took Peshawar, paying tribute to Runjeet Sing; a third brother, the celebrated Dost Mohamed, became chief of Cabool, and his rule extended beyond the Hindoo Khosh on the north, to Herat on the west, to Jellallabad on the east, and to Ghusni, including that town, on the south.

The Affghan population, reckoning the Persian Kuzzlebashes and other settlers, has been stated at more than five millions; and the Belooch population at one million. Dost Mahomed maintained nine thousand cavalry, two thousand infantry, and fourteen guns; the Candahar man, nine thou-

Mount
Stuart El-
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Sir A.
Burnes.

sand cavalry and six guns; the Peshawar chief, three thousand men, with six guns; but these numbers did not represent the force of the country, every chief had his own followers, every tribe and clan were armed, and warlike.

The state of the countries bordering on Scinde, when Lord Auckland undertook the miserable Affghan war, being thus shewn, the course of Scindian affairs can be traced without interruption and a better understanding, from the first commercial connection to the final conquest.

Scinde, the Sindomana of the ancients, was formerly peopled by the Mhurs and Dhurs, now called Sindees, a strong handsome race. Pagans at first, they were conquered and converted by the Mahomedans of Damascus in the seventh or eighth century. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Kalloras, military fanatics from Persia, obtained the rule; and though Ahmed Shah quickly subjected them, he suffered the family to retain hereditary power under the title of Meahs.

In 1771, the Belooch tribe of the Talpoorees, which, with others of their race, had come from the hills to settle on the plains of Scinde, possessed great influence; they held all the principal offices of state, and they were the soldiers of the country. The Kallora prince, jealous of this power, put the chief of the Talpoorees to death; the tribe dethroned him and set up his nephew; but the son of the murdered Talpoor, returning from Mecca in 1778, renewed the quarrel and killed the new Meah in battle: his brother replaced him, and peace was restored for a time. Soon, however, the Meah murdered the second Talpoor chief, commotions ensued, and, after many assassinations and crimes on all sides, the Kallora prince was driven

away. He took refuge with the Prince of Khelat, renewed the war, and being aided by the Affghan monarch Timour, who claimed a sovereign's right to settle the matter, he was finally restored on certain conditions. Those he broke, and murdered the Talpoor chief who had replaced his first victim. This time, however, the tribe killed him in battle, and drove his son an exile to the Punjaub, where he still lives.

If the Kalloras were bad princes, the Talpoorees have been worse. The first of them, though confirmed in his sovereignty by the Dooranee monarch, was forced to share the country with his brothers; and when he died in 1800, those brothers, known as the "*Char Yar*," again divided the power, but unequally, calling themselves the Ameers, or Lords of Scinde. From this division sprung the Kyrpoor Ameers, or Lords of Upper Scinde; the Hyderabad Ameers, or Lords of Lower Scinde; and the Meerpoor Ameer. From it also sprung the anomalous order of succession, which gave the Rais Puggree, or turban of superior rule in each family, to the brother instead of the son. Nevertheless, the Hyderabad family were in some degree obeyed by the others.

The Ameers soon called down more of the hill Beloochees, giving them land on military tenure, and with this aid enlarged their dominions. First on the side of Cutch, at the expense of the Rajah of Joudpore, from whom they took Omercote in the desert and Parkur, and thus came into contact with the British-India frontier. Then on the west they took from the Belooch chief of Lus, Kurrachee, the best bunder or port of Scinde. On the north-east they robbed the Bawal-Khan of Subzulcote and

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Bhoong Bharra on the Indus. To the north-west they spread at the expense of the Affghans; taking from them Shikarpoor and the fortress of Bukkur, which, standing on a rock in the middle of the Indus, commands the navigation.

The first Ameers were usurpers. Their sons were tyrants. Their recent fall has been ostentatiously lamented by factious writers, and by pretended philanthropists who think cruelty for the lucre of gain a virtue, and dealing death in defence of country a crime; by such philosophers, and by disappointed peculators in expectancy, and by political dupes, they have been proclaimed as innocent victims. Yet these heavily bemoaned lords were only lords of yesterday. Many are alive, and notably Roostum of Kyrpoor, who aided to dethrone the Kalloras. Rapacious invaders of their neighbours also, they were, and their Scindee subjects they afflicted with every kind of misery. These last call the events which changed their rulers, the massacre of the Meahs. The Beloochees call it the Conquest. They have another conquest now to reckon from!

For the Belooch, it was indeed a conquest, resembling that of the Norman in England when Harold fell; for each chief was lord of the soil, holding it by military tenure, yet in this differing from his Norman prototype, that the Ameers could, and often did, deprive him of his Jagheere or grant from caprice. This precarious tenure stimulated his innate rapacity; and the Belooch is by nature grasping, and habitually an oppressor. He is a fatalist from religion, and therefore without remorse; an overbearing soldier without fear, and a strong-handed robber without shame, because to rob has

ever been the custom of his race. Athletic, and skilled in the use of his weapons, for to the sword only, not the plough, his hand clutches, he is known, says his conqueror, by his slow rolling gait, his fierce aspect, his heavy sword and broad shield, by his dagger and matchlock. Labour he despises, but loves his neighbour's purse. It was, however, only the Scindee and the Hindoo that he could plunder, for his own race of the hills were like himself in disposition, and somewhat more robust. He was, moreover, a turbulent subject, and often, chief and follower, menaced the Ameers, and always strived to sow dissensions, knowing well that in the time of commotion plunder would be rife and pay high.

The system of government was one leading inevitably and rapidly to self-destruction; and it would seem as if the Ameers had the instinct of this truth; for they secured their persons by numerous slaves, being in the traffic of human beings, both exporters and importers, chiefly of Abyssinian blacks, whom they attached to their interests by manifold favours; and these men, called Seedees, served them with equal courage and devotion: to all others they were brutal tyrants, cruel and debauched. Their stupid selfish policy was to injure agriculture, to check commerce, to oppress the working man, and to accumulate riches for their own sensual pleasures. "What are the people to us," was the foul expression of Noor Mohamed to Lieut. Eastwick. "Poor or rich! what do we care if they pay us our revenue;—give us our hunting grounds and our enjoyments, that is all we require." The most fertile districts were made a wilderness to form their "*shikargahs*," or hunting grounds. Their

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Zenanas were filled with young girls torn from their friends, and treated when in the hareem with revolting barbarity. In fine, the life of an Ameer was one of gross pleasures, for which the labour and blood of men were remorselessly exacted, —the honour and happiness of women savagely sacrificed! These things shall be proved to the letter hereafter, but it is fitting now to shew how the British power came to bear on Scindian affairs.

A commercial intercourse with Scinde when under the Kallora prince, was established by the formation of a factory in 1775 at Tattah, then a wealthy town. Fiscal vexations and civil commotions caused it to be abandoned in 1792, but in 1799 Lord Wellesley made an effort to restore it. The influence of Tippoo Sultan and the jealousy of native traders, aided by a cabal at Hyderabad averse to the British connection, overcame the favourable inclination of the Talpoor prince who then reigned, and Mr. Crowe, the superintendant of the factory, was peremptorily ordered to quit the country in 1800. This insult was not resented, and in 1809, a fear of Napoleon's policy having caused British missions to be sent to Cabool, Persia, and Scinde, the brother Ameers, who had now succeeded the first Talpoor prince, displayed great arrogance. They assented to a treaty indeed, but the terms were brief even to contempt. Commencing with the customary falsehood of eternal friendship, it provided for mutual intercourse by vakeels or envoys, and the Ameers promised to exclude the French. No more.

This treaty was renewed in 1820, with additional articles, excluding Americans also, and settling

some border disputes on the side of Cutch; for the British frontier now touched on Scinde. It required, however, an army of demonstration to enforce the execution of the last article, which shews the faithless habits of the Ameers. To exclude French and Americans, of whom they knew nothing, and whose presence they did not desire, was a mere form; but the border disputes affected their interests, and an army was necessary to enforce the treaty.

Up to this period the measures of the Anglo-Indian Government to establish political and commercial relations with Scinde, appear little more than the results of that feeling which urges a civilized people to communicate with neighbouring barbarians; but soon the inevitable concomitant of such an intercourse, a disposition to profit from superior knowledge and power, became perceptible. And it is important to trace its progress and effects, if we would know when it broke the bonds of justice and true policy, which are inseparable, if justice be rightly considered as an all-pervading principle applicable to the human being generally, and not restricted to the usurped rights, or supposed rights, of evil governors.

An enlightened desire to ascertain the commercial capabilities of the Indus, induced Lord Ellenborough, then President of the Indian Board of Control, to employ the late Sir Alexander Burnes to explore that river in 1831, under pretence of conveying presents to Runjeet Sing. He succeeded, but with great difficulty, and the Indus became known. This important step was soon followed by more direct measures; and it is remarkable that the strong natural sense of two poor ignorant men

should have led them separately to predict the ultimate consequences.

“The mischief is done, you have seen our country,” cried a rude Beloochee soldier when Burnes first entered the river.

“Alas! Scinde is now gone, since the English have seen the river which is the high road to conquest,” was the prescient observation of a Syud near Tattah.

Twelve years afterwards these predictions were fulfilled!

In 1832, Lord W. Bentinck sent Colonel Pottinger to Scinde, to improve the intercourse by a new treaty, and to survey the course of the Lower Indus. The last object was effected by Lieutenant Del Hoste, while Colonel Pottinger negotiated a treaty of seven articles. At this time death had altered the government of Scinde. The lower country was governed by the Ameers of Hyderabad, the chief of whom was Ali Moorad, one of those who had forced the first Talpooree prince to share the spoil of the Kalloras. His brethren were dead, but their sons remained, having certain inheritances, and yielding to him only so much superiority as belonged to the Rais or presiding Ameer. This, however, gave him the right of negotiation, and possessions which went with the turban.

In Kyrpoor, the capital of Upper Scinde, Meer Roostum, the nephew of Ali, was *Rais*, with like advantages; and he held that government independently, though the superiority of the Hyderabad family was faintly acknowledged. Hence double treaties were necessary; one with Ali, the other with Roostum. They did not differ in terms.

A free passage for travellers and merchants through Scinde was granted, and the use of the Indus for commercial pursuits; but no vessel of war was to float on that river, nor military stores to be conveyed by it.

No merchant was to settle in Scinde, and travellers and visitors were bound to have passports.

A tariff was to be proclaimed, and no arbitrary dues or tolls exacted.

The old treaties were confirmed, and the friendly intercourse by vakeels enlarged.

The Ameers bound themselves to alter the tariff, if found too high; and also to put down, in concert with the Rajah of Joudpore, the robber borderers of Cutch.

This was the first treaty giving the Anglo-Indian Government positive and specific rights as to Scinde. It was obtained by negotiation free from menaces, and framed with a social and commercial policy tending to benefit the human race.

In 1834, another commercial treaty of five articles was negotiated. By this the tariff was fixed, and the amount of tolls on the Indus arranged. Colonel Pottinger was appointed political agent for Scinde, and he was to have a native commercial agent under him, to reside at the bunder or port of the Indus. For it was stipulated that only tolls should be demanded on the vessels going up or down the river, and that no duties should be taken for goods, unless any article were landed during transit, in which case it was to pay duty. But the main point of this treaty was the division of the money received for tolls. The Anglo-Indian Government at this time touched the Sutledge, and claimed a right in the navigation

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of its waters to the sea, equally with the native government on the banks. Nor can this claim be deemed unjust. All governments are bound to procure by negotiation the utmost scope for the fair commerce of their people. It is an injury and injustice, if a nation, profiting from its geographical position, seals the navigation of a river to those above or below. But to profit from that position by reasonable tolls, is not more than to profit from climate or soil. Hence it was with a just policy this treaty provided, that tolls should be taken only at the mouths of the Indus, and the gross amount divided amongst the different governments having territory on the banks. These fluvial powers were the Ameers; the Bawal-Khan; the Maharajah; and the Anglo-Indian Government.

The high tolls, and the robber habits of the Belooch tribes on the upper Indus, rendered this treaty unavailing for trade; and soon the Ameers, jealous of any prying into their tyrannical government, drove the native agent away from the bunder. The coast, and the delta formed by the lower branches of the river, were however surveyed, and in 1835 the first steam-boat floated on the Indus. It was a private enterprise by a Mogul merchant of Bombay, named Aga Mohamed Rahim, and this was the only fruit of the negotiation.

Lasting and irrevocable friendship had been the heading of every treaty, yet constant jealousy and want of faith marked the conduct of the Ameers, and in 1836 the Anglo-Indian Government commenced a direct and peremptory interference with the affairs of Scinde; an interference not founded on commercial interests. The increasing influence of Russia in Central Asia, where her agents were

assiduously impressing an opinion of Russian greatness and strength, thus preparing the way, or at least seeming to prepare it for an invasion of India, gave alarm to Lord Auckland, who judged that to obtain an influence with and control over the Affghan people, would be the surest counteraction to the masked hostility of the Czar. The ruler of the Punjaub was too wary and too powerful to be coerced in furtherance of this plan; but the comparative weakness of Scinde offered greater facilities, and to increase and consolidate the British influence in that country was a necessary preliminary. This was certainly an approach to the abuse of superior power, but founded on the instinct of self-preservation, not the desire of aggrandizement, and so far legitimate, if the means employed involved no direct oppression. But where interest pressed, when did a powerful nation ever scrupulously regard the rights of a weak one? On this occasion the first proceedings were as externally fair and moderate as the attainment of the object would admit; and it is edifying to mark with what a plausible gentleness an act of relentless power may be urged and enforced by diplomacy.

Runjeet Sing, long intent upon spoiling the Ameers, under pretext of chastising the Mazaarees, a predatory tribe nominally subject to Scinde, commenced hostilities in 1836, by seizing the town of Rohjan, and capturing a fort on the north-west frontier of upper Scinde, close to the Indus. From this point he menaced a regular invasion. Considering the great courage and barbaric skill of the Scindian Beloochees, it is by no means certain that he would have succeeded; and it is certain the Ameers neither desired nor asked for foreign aid

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against him: "We have vanquished the Seikh, and we will do so again," was the confident exclamation of the chief Ameer. But the Seik monarch, by a singular coincidence, demanded at this moment from the Anglo-Indian Government, a large supply of arms to be sent to him up the Indus! that is to say, through the heart of the country he was going to invade!

This opportunity for meddling was eagerly seized by Lord Auckland. The Maharajah was reminded of an article in the Scindian treaty of 1821, by which the transit of military stores on the Indus was interdicted; and he was admonished not to trouble his neighbours the Ameers unjustly. The British political resident at Lahore was directed to employ every resource, short of menace, to deter Runjeet Sing from hostilities; and at the same time, Colonel Pottinger, who had hitherto remained in Cutch, was sent to Hyderabad to offer, what was designated a closer alliance with the Ameers. They were promised the protection of the Anglo-Indian Government against the Seiks, in consideration of which, it was hoped they would receive and themselves pay, a British force to be stationed in their capital! And this force was actually assembled by the Bombay Government!

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However, a doubt that mere professions of amity would induce the Ameers to let their dominions be thus taken possession of, soon caused Lord Auckland to modify this proposal.

Colonel Pottinger was empowered, if any demur occurred, to offer the mediation of the British, instead of the close alliance, provided a political resident was admitted at Hyderabad, through whom all intercourse with Runjeet Sing was to be carried

on ; and a British force deemed requisite to sustain the mediation, being to be temporarily quartered in Scinde, yet at the expense of the Ameers.

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Colonel Pottinger was also charged to negotiate for the surveying of the coast ; the fixing of buoys and land-marks ; the re-establishment of the native agent ; the warehousing of goods, without payment of duties ; the establishment of fairs in Scinde ; the repression of the Mazaaree robbers ; the clearing of jungle, that is to say the invasion of the Ameers shikargahs or hunting grounds, to facilitate tracking up the Indus ; finally, the appointment of a British superintendent-general. These negotiations provoked all the diplomatic subtilty of the Ameers ; and as their mode of dealing in such affairs was always the same, the history of one will serve as a guide to all. But first, the anomalous nature of their sovereignty must be treated of, because it really influenced their policy and actions, while it also served as a cover for their hollowness.

When the first of the Talpoor sovereigns died, his brothers, designated as the "*Char Yar*," divided the country amongst themselves, but unequally ; and they excluded his son Sobdar from power, though not from his private patrimony. Their names were Ghoolam, Moorad, and Kereem, of Hyderabad ; Tharou of Meerpoor ; Sorab of Kyrpoor. All were dead at this period.

Kereem died without issue. Ghoolam left one son, who was treated as Sobdar had been treated.

Moorad left two sons, called Noor Mohamed and Nusseer Khan, who were at this time the ruling Ameers of Hyderabad ; Noor, because he was *Rais* and wore the Puggree or turban of superiority ; Nusseer, because he governed Noor.

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Tharou left a son, Ali Morad, who succeeded to the Ameer of Meerpoor. But he also died, and was succeeded by Shere Mohamed, the Ameer who fought the battle of Hyderabad, or Dubba.

In upper Scinde, Roostum, the eldest son of Sorab, was the *Rais* of the Ameers of Kyrpoor, but he had many brothers.

The superiority of the Hyderabad branch was faintly acknowledged, as I have before observed, by the families of Kyrpoor and Meerpoor; yet by all the law of primogeniture was discarded; the brother, not the son, succeeded to the turban of the Rais; and with it went lands and revenue as well as dignity. This system evidently sprung from the original usurpation of the "*Char Yar*," and occasioned constant jealousies and disputes; for though the three seats of government were distinct, the different territories were in a manner dovetailed, and mixed in a strange and tangled fashion. Each member of the families was absolute in his own hereditary domains, having armed followers, purchased slaves, and the services of the hill tribes according to his means of payment. Discord therefore prevailed, and fear was prevalent amongst high and low, and the labouring people were plundered and oppressed to a degree, says Sir Henry Pottinger, possibly unequalled in the world. Moreover, the chiefs of tribes and their followers, knowing well that in civil commotions pay would be high for military services, and plunder abundant, encouraged, and even at times forced the Princes into domestic wars.

Thus influenced, the policy of the Ameers could not fail to be tortuous and vacillating, even though their natural dispositions had been frank and

honest, which was not the case. Falsehood, cajolery, and delays, were their principal resources, and forgery was common with them. Shrewdly polite of manners, they invariably paid extravagant attentions to the British political agents. Entertainments and presents were proffered with prodigal liberality; flattery still more profusely; and, judging from the official correspondence published, they seem never to have failed in gaining the friendship of the different agents, and not seldom to have blinded them.

The chief Ameers would accept, with all appearance of joy and gratitude, any proposition, and would promise abundantly in return; but rarely did performance follow promise; and when it did, it was but nominal, for constant evasions or direct violations of every article attended the execution of every treaty. If pressed, the chief Ameers would plead the difficulty, real or pretended, of obtaining the assent of the inferior Ameers; and always one of these last seems to have been designedly in opposition, playing the refractory part. Forged letters, false seals, secret forms of instruction, and correspondence differing from the public style, to lead or mislead the recipient of them. False assertions as to promises which never had been made by the opposite party; nefarious assumption of evil intended where all had been fair and honest. Such were the means diligently, systematically, and not unskilfully employed by the Ameers at all times in their intercourse with the British political agents.

Colonel Pottinger reached Hyderabad in September, and in December told Lord Auckland that December. his negotiation was successful. Yet he seems only

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to have pressed the modified scheme of mediation, and to obtain that, exceeded his powers in promising corresponding services. And, notwithstanding his report, no ratified treaty appears in evidence until a year and a half later, and then only in consequence of significant hints, that Runjeet Sing would be let loose, perhaps aided to work his pleasure in Scinde. Now this ambitious Prince had frankly accepted the British mission, seeing that it was for his interest to do so. His friendship for, and connection with the Anglo-Indian Government were notorious, having been recently cemented by a personal interview with the Governor-General; and his troops still occupied Rohjan in force, menacing Shikarpoor. Thus the ratified treaty of April 1838 was obtained. It contained but two articles, providing for the mediation of the Anglo-Indian Government and the permanent residence of a British political agent at Hyderabad, who was to have the right, however, of moving about at his pleasure, and to be attended by such an escort of Anglo-Indian troops as should be deemed by his own Government a suitable one. All this under pretence of a friendly interest in the affairs of Scinde!

This was the first open encroachment on the independence of the Ameers. It is impossible to mistake, or to deny the injustice. Analyse the negotiation. The Seik monarch menaced Scinde with invasion; the danger was imminent, and the Anglo-Indian Government seized that moment of fear and difficulty to offer protection, on condition of permanently occupying the capital with British troops to be paid by the Ameers! Was not this simply an impudent attempt to steal away their country? The

modified proposal to mediate which followed, was more subtil, not less immoral; the intent in both cases was profit, covered with a sickening declamation about friendship, justice, and love of peace. And Lord Auckland, while thus instructing his envoy, declared his conviction, arising from long experience, that Runjeet Sing would not act against the Ameers in opposition to the wishes of the British authorities. Hence, in the view of mediating there was evidently no need to send troops into Scinde, nor any need to ask for their admission: and the threat of letting the Seik monarch loose was a consistent termination to such diplomacy.

This treaty, by which Lord Auckland placed a loaded shell in the palace of the Ameers to explode at his pleasure for their destruction, was abstractedly an unjust oppressive action. Was it also a wanton aggression? Great interests were at stake; even the question of self-preservation was involved according to the views of the Anglo-Indian Government, and men can only act according to their light. It is necessary then to examine whether that light was good,—whether the opinion was sagely formed by statesmen of reach and policy, or was the offspring of weak distempered minds, actuated, at once, by a groundless terror clouding the judgment, and by a vanity and shallow ambition, without sagacity or knowledge. If the intrigues of Russia, real or supposed, appeared to menace the stability of the British-Indian Empire, it was undoubtedly Lord Auckland's duty to counteract them; yet wisely and justly, under pain of this stigma,—that he degraded his country's reputation by his violence or his incapacity; for surely, public men may not with impunity undertake the

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government of millions, to sport with their happiness and misery, to mar or make their fortunes as chance may guide, in profound ignorance of principles, and with a reckless contempt for details.

There were two modes by which Russia could attempt an invasion of India. One direct with a regular army ; the other, by influencing Persia and the other nations of Central Asia to pour their wild hordes upon Hindostan. The first had been done by Alexander the Great, and he was deified for the exploit. No man else has done the same. The irruptions of Ghengis, Tamerlane, and Nadir, were the wars of Asiatic princes ; and though Russia is half Asiatic of dominion, her regular armies are European of organization. To lead a great and conquering force to India from Europe after the manner of Alexander, requires an Alexander, who shall be at the head of troops prepared by previous discipline, and by political as well as military organization, to follow wherever he shall lead. He must be a man of a fierce genius, untameable will, and consummate knowledge of war, enjoying the confidence of his soldiers, and able to choose a proper conjuncture of affairs in Europe for his enterprise, for that also is necessary to success. But such a man, and so situated, would be more likely to march on Moscow than Delhi : the leader must therefore be a Czar, or the son of a Czar, and the adverse chances are thus immeasurably increased.

Russia wants a man. If she find him his views will hardly be turned eastward. Europe will have more to fear than India. But is Russia really to be feared in Europe ? This is a question easier to ask than to answer. The profound falsehood of her

government,—her barbarous corruption,—her artificial pretensions,—the eye-glitter of her regular armies, shining only from the putrescence of national feeling, would lead to the negative. Her surprising progress in acquisition of territory within the last hundred years, would lead to the affirmative. If we believe those writers who have described the ramifications of the one huge falsehood of pretension, which, they say, pervades Russia, her barbarity, using the word in its full signification, would appear more terrible than her strength. Nor can I question their accuracy, having, in 1815, when the reputation of the Russian troops was highest, detected the same falsehood of display without real strength. For, from the Imperial parades on the Boulevards of Paris, where, oiled bandaged and clothed to look like men whom British soldiers would be proud to charge on a field of battle, the Muscovite was admired, I followed him to his billet, where stripped of his disguise he appeared short of stature, squalid and meagre, his face rigid with misery, shocking sight and feeling: a British soldier would have offered him bread rather than the bayonet.

Nevertheless, some innate expanding and dangerous strength must belong to a nation, which, during long contests with the most warlike people of continental Europe, led by Frederick and Napoleon, has steadily advanced by arms and by policy, appropriating whole countries to herself, until her Cossacks may now encamp, on her own territory, within a few marches of Vienna, Berlin, Stockholm, and Constantinople. Her regular armies may be bad, her fleets in the Baltic and the Black Sea may be worse; but they are there; and she can

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send half a million of wild horsemen, who, without pay, would invade Europe for the plunder; sustained by regular armies on the Russian frontier they would make such ravage as half a century could not repair. The chances of revolution have been spoken of as the remedy for the Muscovite power; but who can predict that revolution will not augment, rather than diminish, her warlike strength and ambition. Her policy is national, and it menaces freedom and happiness and civilization. Poland was the first error of Europe in respect to Russia; Circassia may be the second; Constantinople the last and the greatest.

To return to India. Was the man capable of invading the East known to Russia when Lord Auckland fell into such fear? Was the conjuncture of affairs in Europe favourable to the enterprise? Was there a suitable army ready? By what line was it to operate? Was it through Persia to Herat? or, starting from the Caspian, to march up the Oxus to the Hindoo Khosh? Was it to overrun Affghanistan, or win over that country by policy as a new base of operation previous to crossing the Indus? Were the wild Toorkmans of Orgunjie, the more settled people of Bokhara, the fierce Uzbecks about Balk, to be conquered or gained over as friends? Were not these questions of weight in this matter? Could the solution of them leave a doubt, that a regular invasion of Hindostan by a Russian army was a chimera?

But Persia! Through Persia the tide of war might be poured! Yes, when Russia has broken that country down to a province, and that she had not done, and cannot do, while the gallant tribes of Circassia maintain their independence. It was in

the western not the eastern Caucasus, therefore, that the security of India was to be sought. Had Russia even possessed a Macedonian Alexander, the policy of the Grecian Memnon would have been again effectual; for slow would have been that hero's progress if the wise Persian General had lived. There was provocation also for meddling with Circassian affairs, and modern Persia was as open to British as to Russian influence; and by the Persian Gulph she could be reached more easily than by Circassia. But the only effort made by the Whigs to conciliate the Shah, was a miserable abortive mission, stunted in presents with a ridiculous parsimony, which must have made Mr. Ellis, the able, clear-headed gentleman employed, ashamed of his task.

To combine, by an active astute policy, the nations of Central Asia against the British Empire in the East remained for Russia. Lord Auckland asserted that she was very busily engaged therein, though secretly; that her agents were every where; that the Persians were besieging Herat with her assistance, at her instigation, and for her profit. How was this secret hostility to be wisely met? Surely by cultivating the good will of the high-spirited Affghans, the wild Toorkmans, the keen-witted Persians. To speak to their self-interests by commerce and by presents, to their sagacity by missions, and to trust to their instinct of self-preservation for the rest; this would have been an intelligible policy. The reverse appeared wisdom to Lord Auckland and his advisers, and their proceedings bore at once the stamps of incapacity and injustice. A restless vanity urged him to a gigantic enterprise of war without any knowledge of its guiding principles; and as he did not employ those

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who possessed the requisite knowledge, a direful calamity terminated the folly.

Affghanistan had just been broken down from a great and domineering state to a weak confederacy of democratic communities; and this new organization was in unison with the habits and feelings of the proud, warlike, independent, courageous, and strong-bodied people. Dost Mohamed, their principal chief, and the head of the most powerful family of the most powerful tribe, was comparatively an enlightened man, firm, vigorous, and well disposed towards British interests. Yet he, and his nation, whose welfare could have been promoted and its good-will secured, it was resolved to invade, to coerce, and that in the manner of all others the most offensive to an energetic spirited chief and people. That is to say, forcing on them a native prince twice before driven from supreme power for misgovernment: thus combining the two most deadly of national offences and injuries, a foreign yoke and a hateful native monarch. Shah Sooja, the exiled king, chosen as the instrument for this occasion, was without talent, and vigorous only in cruelty; his executions, his vengeance, are well known, his exploits in battle are unknown. This man was thrust forward in the vain, the preposterous hope, that he, who had been unable to keep his throne when placed on it by his own countrymen, would now remain firm when restored by strangers, offensive to the Affghans as invaders and oppressors, still more offensive as infidels: and, monstrous supposition! that he would reconstitute the kingdom in unity and strength, so as to form an efficient barrier for India towards the west!

What kind of policy was that which sought a

war in Central Asia, more than a thousand miles from England's true basis of power, the sea. Central Asia! Where from remotest times the people have been organized for irregular warfare, which the nature of their country and their own hardy wild habits and frugality render peculiarly appropriate. The military strength of England lies in her discipline; in her great resources of money and materials for war; in the strong knit massive organization of her troops; in her power of combining fleets and armies together. She of all nations is least calculated, from her customs and morals, to meet irregular warfare on a great scale. Yet here we find Lord Auckland, provoking a collision with Russia on the steppes of Tartary, anxious it would appear for a trial of strength in Central Asia, with a nation more powerful in irregular troops than all the rest of the world together; and preparing for that trial by an odious aggression, which was sure to render all the barbarous nations inimical to England if not friendly to Russia.

This conception of the Anglo-Indian Government, applauded and urged on by the Whig government at home, this conception so nearly allied to madness, was executed with consistent absurdity. Shah Sooja was proclaimed king, and troops, commanded by British officers and paid from the Calcutta treasury, were called the King's National Army though not an Affghan was in the ranks. And for this king of Lord Auckland's making, all the lost rights of the Dooranee monarchy were claimed, that is to say, tribute and obedience from the nations formerly subject to it. To enforce those claims, and to place the king on the throne, a strong British army was gathered, with great stores, on the

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upper Sutledge. But Cabool was to be reached, and between that city and the Sutledge was the Punjaub; and the Seik monarch was a wily powerful man, and moreover a proclaimed friend and ally.

It would have been consistent with the claims of Shah Sooja, to have demanded from Runjeet Sing, the restoration of the Dooranee provinces which he had recently got possession of by force of arms; for in this he differed from the other powers who had broken from the Affghan monarchy; they merely asserted their independence, if exception be made for the small district in Cutch Gundava seized by the Ameers of Scinde; but Runjeet conquered largely after establishing the Seik kingdom, and he was too fierce, too strong, too useful, to be roughly dealt with. It was safer to give to than to take from him. To evade this difficulty, a tripartite treaty was concocted, as if it were a voluntary compact between equal and independent powers understanding their own interests and able to maintain them; the contracting parties being the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the Anglo-Indian Government, and Shah Sooja! It was a solemn mockery of sense and justice. Pretending to be a renewal of ancient engagements between Runjeet and the King, this treaty, offensive and defensive, of eighteen articles, bound Shah Sooja to relinquish his rights on Cashmere, Peshawar, Attock, and a number of smaller possessions, all ravished by Runjeet from the Dooranee monarchy. It bound him also, when re-established at Cabool, to make presents, and in various ways, practically to acknowledge the supremacy of the Maharajah, though they were styled in the treaty equals.

If the Shah called for the aid of Seik troops,

they were to share in the *plunder* of the great Barukzie family, containing sixty thousand heads of the noblest houses of Affghanistan! This article at once impolitic, and shameful, was discreditable to civilization, and reduced Lord Auckland's negotiation to the level of barbarism.

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The invasion of Affghanistan thus settled, military principles required that the shortest and most direct lines of operations should be adopted, and those were in the Punjaub. The Maharajah had just concluded a treaty most advantageous to himself at the expense of the King, who was under the influence of the Governor-General. It was but reasonable therefore, that he should give in return a free passage through the ceded territory acquired by that treaty: that is to say, though Peshawar and the Kyber passes, which was the best route to Cabool. There was no reason, if he had faith in his British Allies, why even the Punjaub should not be made the base of operations. The invading army should have assembled with all its stores, not on the upper Sutledge but on the Indus, and from thence have penetrated by the Kyber to Cabool, and from Deera Ishmael Khan, by the Gomul pass, not a difficult route, to Ghusni and Candahar.

When a great point, as it is technically called, must be made in war, there are only two modes of effecting it recognized in military art. By the first, an army should march with all its military means, compact and strong, to bear down opposition, trusting to the genius of its leader to draw subsistence from the country where it is to halt. Such was Hannibal's invasion of Italy. Success depends upon sagacious calculation of power and resistance, moral and physical; in fine, upon the proportion

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which the vastness of the enterprise bears to the leader's genius. This is the highest effort of a general. The second mode is to trust the communications with the base of operations to allies, or to nations subjugated on the march, increasing the army by levies from those nations as it advances. Such was the Macedonian Alexander's method of approaching India. Now, there was no Hannibal to lead Lord Auckland's army; nor was there an army organized rightly for such an enterprise.

The more secure method of Alexander remained, and did not require his genius for the execution. Runjeet Sing was the ally to whom the communications of the army should have been entrusted; and to insure his fidelity, an army of reserve should have been assembled on the Sutledge. If he refused consent, his alliance was hollow, and, justice being set aside from the beginning, policy dictated the forcing him to acquiesce, or the subjugation of his kingdom as a preliminary step to the invasion of Affghanistan. Not so did Lord Auckland reason. Disregarding military principles, of which he and his advisers seem to have been as profoundly ignorant as they were disdainful of equity in their policy, he resolved to perpetrate against the helpless Ameers of Scinde, in the form of aggression, that which he dared not even propose in the way of friendship to the powerful Maharajah.

With this view, articles were inserted in the Tripartite Treaty under which Runjeet accepted the British mediation for his dispute with Scinde; and the Shah, who had resigned without an equivalent his richest provinces to Runjeet, also agreed to relinquish his sovereign rights on Scinde, but on

condition of receiving the arrears of tribute. The object of all this machinery was to obtain a pretence for seizing so much of the Ameers' territory as would secure a line of operations against Affghanistan through Scinde. This line was however so defective, that military considerations alone should have stopped the invasion if no better could be found. Now, by the Kyber passes the line would have been one of five hundred miles, reckoning from Loodiana to Cabool; but only of three hundred starting from Attock on the Indus, if the base had been there first established; and the line by Ishmael dera Khan and the Gomul pass, taking the Punjaub as a base, would have been only three hundred miles to Candahar, and two hundred to Ghusni.

But the line by Scinde, run from Loodiana to Roree on the Indus, crossing that great river and passing through Cutch Gundava, a country fatal from heat to European troops in summer, to penetrate by the terrific defiles of Bolan and through hostile warlike predatory tribes, to the sterile rugged highlands of Affghanistan where Sepoys could not live in winter, so intense is the cold. Then passing by Candahar and Ghusni, fortresses of no mean repute, to reach Cabool it was not less than fifteen hundred miles; and exposed moreover to the operations of the incensed Ameers, the hostile Belooch tribes of the hills, the doubtful faith of Runjeet Sing and his discontented nobles. And with what object? To plunder and spoil the most powerful and popular family of the most powerful tribe in a nation of five millions, whose fathers had within man's memory, conquered from Delhi to the Caspian, from the Oxus to the Ocean! To restore an

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unpopular monarch, to force him upon a people, democratic from feeling customs and institutions, poor, hardy, courageous, and despising the religion of the strangers who thus sought to thrust upon them this Prince, hateful for old sins, and bearing this recent stigma, that to recover his crown, he, false to the national honour and independence, had resigned a third of the tribes to their inveterate enemies the Seiks. Sir John Hobhouse, in one of those turgid speeches upon this enterprise which shocked the common sense of England, affirmed that the Bolan pass was chosen because Shah Sooja's adherents were in that quarter. A puerile reason, but a proof that the King was not desired by the nation.

Under the weight of this policy, Afghanistan, that great military point, was to be made by a General of no repute as a commander; with troops for the most part physically unfitted to sustain the climate; with unsafe communications of enormous length; without moral or political resources opened to the leader. He was to march forward in the wild hope that the King, a weak arrogant man, would not only reconstitute a great nation which had already fallen to pieces in his hands, but would form of it a bulwark for India against Persia and the other nations of Central Asia, those nations being egged on and supported by Russia! Surely the genius and military sagacity of the Duke of Wellington were not needed here, to predict "that the troops would force their way through a wild disunited people, only to find the commencement of their difficulties."

The passage through Scinde and the Bolan pass nearly wrecked the army. It is said Lord Keane

lost many hundred soldiers, and thousands of camp followers, and forty thousand camels, in that march; and that want of promptness and combination amongst the tribes alone enabled him to reach Candahar. That at Ghuzni, his progress would have terminated but for the engineer Thomson's ready genius, and the fiery courage of Colonel Dennie, who, breaking through the only weak part of the barbarian's defence, won a peerage for their General. Shah Sooja thus regained his throne, and fools gaped at him while the Affghan men of spirit pondered revenge. For a time success seemed to attend the unjust aggression, the brilliant ill-requited Dennie sustained it by his talents. But when he and the intrepid Sale marched to Jellallabad, error succeeded error, not unaccompanied by crime, with fearful rapidity, until an entire destruction of the invaders closed the tragic Harliquinade. The system of making smart young men, who could speak Persian, political agents, and supposing them Generals and Statemen, failed. England lost an army by the experiment. Lord Auckland gained a new coronet. But clotted and stiff with the blood of British soldiers shed in an unjust war it must be uneasy to wear.

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For the Affghan invasion the summary given in the foregoing chapter must suffice generally. But the peculiar negotiations connected with it, by which Scinde was inextricably entangled with the Anglo-Indian Government, shall now be developed, and the censures passed on Lord Auckland's policy justified by facts, undeniable, as being extracted from the official correspondence laid before Parliament.

July.

His tripartite treaty bears date June, 1838. In July a copy was sent to Colonel Pottinger, preparatory to a new course of negotiation with the Ameers, to be modelled on that which led to the treaty of two Articles, concluded only two months before and in virtue of which he was now Political Agent for Scinde. This time the project was more artfully conducted. Shah Sooja recognised as king, and as a contracting person in the tripartite treaty, placed at the head of an army raised paid and officered by the Anglo-Indian Government, was thrust forward as an independent sovereign instead of the miserable tool he was. By the tripartite treaty he agreed to relinquish all claim to supremacy and tribute from Scinde, on condition of receiving a sum of money. The amount was to be determined under the mediation of the Anglo-Indian Government, which thus constituted itself umpire in an old quarrel, revived by

itself, to suit its own projects, without the knowledge of the party most interested. But war is costly. The king's pretended national army was to be paid, the Ameers had treasure, and this plan, if it failed to reach their gold was calculated to lay the foundation of other demands more important. Colonel Pottinger's instructions, shamelessly explicit, were in substance as follows:—

“ Tell the Ameers, a crisis menacing British
 “ India has arrived. The Western Powers have
 “ combined to work evil. The Governor-General
 “ has projected a counter-combination. He calls
 “ on his friends for aid. The King has ancient
 “ claims on Scinde; but he will accept money in
 “ discharge of them, and makes the Governor-
 “ General arbitrator of the amount. Great is the
 “ benefit thus conferred on the Ameers. They will
 “ gain undisturbed possession of their territory and
 “ immunity from farther claims. Warm is the
 “ Governor-General's friendship for the Ameers,
 “ and in return he demands ostensible proof of
 “ their attachment. The King will arrive at
 “ Shikarpoor in November; he will be supported
 “ by a British army. The Ameers must, therefore,
 “ agree to pay him the money or abide the conse-
 “ quences, one of which will be, to take military
 “ possession of their town and district of Shikar-
 “ poor. Meanwhile, the article of the former
 “ treaty which forbids the transmission of military
 “ stores up the Indus must be suspended.” And
 yet, to maintain this article intact had been the
 very ground of interference with Runjeet Sing's
 quarrel in the former negotiation!

So far all was founded in love and friendship for the Ameers; but the Persians were besieging Herat,

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and though no war had been declared, and England was by treaty bound not to interfere between Persia and the Affghans, the Persians were designated as opponents of the Governor-General's projects, and the Ameers were suspected of having formed engagements with them. If so, it was to be construed as an act of hostility, and a British army from Bombay would immediately enter their capital. Yet, if any inferior Ameer, popular in Scinde, was inclined to side with the British, he was to be separately supported and advanced to power. The amount of the King's money claim was left undetermined, but it was significantly observed, "the Ameers must be wealthy."

Now, the chief Ameer of Hyderabad, Noor Mohamed, had indeed written to the Persian, yet more, as Colonel Pottinger judged, from religious zeal than political views; for the Ameer was a "*Shea*," or believer in Ali, as the Persians are; whereas Sobdar, the person contemplated by the instructions as likely to side with the British, was a "*Soonee*," or believer in Omar. But there was a Persian agent hovering about Hyderabad, and there is little doubt that an intercourse unfriendly to British interests was maintained. Nor can this excite wonder. The previous negotiations of Colonel Pottinger had too plainly pointed out the ultimate object of Lord Auckland to leave the Ameer in doubt of his fate from the friendship of the Governor-General. He had a right to look for support elsewhere.

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Colonel Pottinger, it might be designing a covert rebuke while he obeyed orders, assured Lord Auckland, "he would not fail to tell the Ameers, the day they connected themselves with any other

power than England would be the last of their independence, if not of their rule.”—“Neither the ready power to crush and annihilate them, nor the will to call it into action, were wanting; if it appeared requisite, however remotely, for the safety or integrity of the Anglo-Indian empire or frontier.” The disclosure of his instructions, was, however, to be delayed until the armies destined to support them approached Scinde. Meanwhile, the Ameers of Hyderabad obtained some knowledge of the tripartite treaty. Their indignation was naturally great, and their first thought was to resort to arms; but at this time they heard the Persians had failed in an assault on Herat with great loss; and being themselves embarrassed by a civil war with the Lugharee tribe, they dropped the design of fighting, and resorted to their favourite diplomacy of falsehood, flattery, menaces, and cajolery. And it is not to be supposed they had given no reasonable ground for complaint in respect of the commercial treaties; they had violated them systematically, with as little scruple as Lord Auckland now set aside the article forbidding the transit of military stores by the Indus.

The political resident foresaw, and warned his Government that many obstacles would arise; but doing so, he treated an argument advanced by the Ameers with such unfounded contempt, that it is scarcely possible not to suspect he was launching a sarcasm at the Governor-General.

“Sobdar and his party, will,” said he, “probably even go so far as to declare the demand for money a breach of the late agreement, on the principle, that without our assistance Shah Soojā had no means to exact a reā from them; consequently,

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“ the demand may be considered as our own. I do not, by pointing out this argument, mean for an instant to uphold its correctness, but it is one just suited to the capacity and feelings of the individuals with whom I have to negotiate.”

Aye ! and to the capacity and feelings of every man capable of reasoning at all ! And the Ameers did afterwards urge it with homely but irresistible force.

“ It is a joke,” they exclaimed, “ to call it a demand from the king. You have given him bread for the last five-and-twenty years, and any strength he has now or may have hereafter is from you. The demand is yours !”

Colonel Pottinger thus continued his observations.

August. “ Had our present connection existed some years, and our Resident thereby had time, by constant kindly intercourse with the chiefs and people, to have removed the strong and universal impression that exists throughout Scinde, as to our grasping policy, the case might have been widely different ; but I enter on my new duties without any thing to offer, and with a proposal, that will not only strengthen the above impressions, (for many besides the Scindees will believe at the onset that we are making a mere use of Shah Sooja’s name,) but revive a claim which has long been esteemed obsolete.”

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The letter addressed to the Persian Shah by Noor Mohamed, though treated lightly by Colonel Pottinger, was eagerly caught at by Lord Auckland. Designating it as a tender of allegiance, a very strained construction the hyperbolic compliments of the East considered, made when the

opposition of the British government to the Shah's designs was notorious, it implied hostility he said, and the Ameer had thus forfeited all friendly consideration: energetic measures must be adopted against him. Meer Sobdar appeared still faithful; it might, therefore, be advisable to give him the turban of command, yet securing British supremacy. But at this time a force of five thousand men was in readiness at Bombay to proceed to Scinde; and the Bengal army was coming down the Sutledge, to occupy Shikarpoor, contrary to former treaties, and without even the form of asking the Ameers' leave thus to occupy their territories. The case was therefore already decided, and Colonel Pottinger was empowered to employ the Bombay force to back his negotiations. Such a proceeding requires short comment. Springing from a predetermined plan to seize Scinde without scruple as to means, it would have been less shocking to good taste if profuse expressions of friendship and love of justice had been spared.

The Ameers of lower Scinde were thus pressed, firstly, to extract money for the king's army because the treasury of Hyderabad was the richest; secondly, to plant a subsidiary force in the country with a view to future subjection of the whole. Yet at this moment Lord Auckland was more desirous to fasten on upper Scinde, because there the passage of the Indus was to be made by the Bengal army, and the line of communication for the Affghan invasion established. Wherefore Sir A. Burnes, then on a mission to the Belooch Prince of Khelat, was ordered to turn aside and negotiate a treaty with the Kyrpoor Ameers as he passed. A simple task. He was to demand money, and what was

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called, a loan of the rock and fortress of Bukkur, which, standing in the midst of the Indus, commanded the navigation. Here it was proposed to cast a bridge to enable the Bengal army to pass the river and unite with the King's army at Shikarpoor: and so little reserve was employed, that Sir A. Burnes was, if asked for a remuneration, to give an evasive answer. He had also charge to obtain stores and means of military transport, yet he was to be subject to the controul of Pottinger, and to present himself rather as a confidential friend than a political agent.

Meanwhile the Ameers of Hyderabad, whose rule extended up the right bank of the Indus to Shikarpoor, far from assenting to the occupation of that place by the king, who intimated in general terms his design of going there, replied to him, in substance, thus:

“ The Beloochees are not pleased. You must not come to Shikarpoor. The power of Dust Mohamed is well known. The Shah of Persia is before Herat; he is supported by the Russians. You cannot come by Shikarpoor. If Runjeet Sing and the British support you, there is a direct road to Khorassan from Loodiana: go that way and we will assist you.” By Khorassan they meant Affghanistan, and this biting sarcasm on the mixture of fear, folly, and audacity, which had dictated the line of operation through Scinde, was deemed insolent. Pottinger also, now changing his opinion as to the nature of the Ameers' correspondence with the Persian, exclaimed against their duplicity, and advised the immediate employment of the troops at Bombay.

During these negotiations an under current of

complaint run strongly against the Scindian authorities for violations of the commercial treaties, which they were required to respect while the Governor-General unhesitatingly cast them aside. It is however remarkable, that even at this time, Ali Moorad, the younger brother of Roostum of Kyrpoor, he who has been so vilely slandered by the Indian press, remained firm to his engagements and punished the transgression of the commercial treaties.

Shame being now laid aside, and occasion ripe, Lord Auckland, pretending a virtuous indignation at the duplicity of the Ameers—their unwarrantable enmity and jealousy of the British! moved with pity also for the distracted state of their government, a state which his envoy was expressly instructed to foment, declared that five thousand troops should instantly seize Shikarpoor, and such other parts of Scinde as might be deemed eligible to facilitate the invasion of Affghanistan, and to give effect to the tripartite treaty. Not only the Ameers who were inimical to the British, but those who had disclosed any unwillingness to aid the invasion of the Affghans, with whom they had no quarrel, were to be displaced from power; and this violence was offered to independent governments, over which no rights had been established, save by treaties, granted, not sought for by them, and both in letter and spirit opposed to these aggressions! But to make amends, the Ameers were assured, that the seizure of their territories by a British army meant nothing injurious to their interests! “You are to die by my hands,” said the executioner to the son of the Spanish Philip; “You are to die! Struggle not! Your father orders it for your good.”

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Colonel Pottinger, though acknowledging that the correspondence between the chief Ameer, Noor Mohamed, and the Persian, remained to be proved, was nevertheless disposed to bring the troops from Bombay to Scinde to encourage informers against him. But the delicacy of his negotiation demanded caution. The Ameers if driven to war could embarrass and retard the advance to Affghanistan; and meanwhile camels, grain, money, boats, and storehouses for the approaching armies, could be most easily got under the mask of friendship. Hence, delay was most advisable. But Lord Auckland, unwise even in his political dishonesty, drove his agent to immediate action. Thus pressed, the Ameers put in activity all the resources of their diplomacy; and when boasting, flattery, menaces, promises and evasions were exhausted, offered personal violence to the envoy, which failing to intimidate him, was followed by abject apologies. Then indeed, he judged further negotiation, unbacked by an army, useless; yet he recoiled from one demand. The Ameers had produced formal discharges of all claims by the king, written in Korans, duly signed and attested. How then could money be demanded for another relinquishment? His scruples were quickly spared by an order, not to trouble himself with that part of the negotiation, which would be settled by others!

In one of the angry discussions now becoming frequent with the Ameers, the latter declared that the armies marching down to Bukkur, should not cross the Indus there: "That," said the envoy, "depends not on you but on the Governor-General's orders." "They are not the decrees of the Almighty! they can and shall be altered," was the

reply of Noor Mohamed. But his struggles were vain, the iron screw was upon him, and each day a fresh turn taught him resistance and escape were alike impossible. And while the Hyderabad family were thus writhing in Pottinger's grasp, Sir Alexander Burnes' equally strong but more courtly hand, was upon the family of Kyrpoor; and it was now said that all the Ameers had designed to march on Candahar if the Persians had taken Herat.

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Roostum of Kyrpoor, being weaker than Noor Mohamed of Hyderabad, more exposed also to danger from the Seiks, and from the advancing armies of the king, and the Bengal Government; being also fooled with the hopes of complete independence if he quietly yielded Bukkur, was infinitely conciliating and gentle of intercourse with Burnes; yet here also secret discontent was rife, and his brother Moobarick was openly opposed to any concessions. This conduct gained Roostum some applause, and his final independence was darkly hinted in the following exquisite specimen of Lord Auckland's diplomatic jargon:—

Sept.

“The favourable temper of that chief has been already noted; this feeling Captain Burnes has been instructed to cultivate, and, for its maintenance, in connection with the great importance of the temporary cession of Bukkur, I have informed Captain Burnes, that I am not unprepared to receive propositions for admitting the guaranteed independence of Kyrpoor as an additional arrangement, dependent to a certain degree on contingent events at Hyderabad.”

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October.

But neither Roostum's submissive behaviour, nor his supplication, saved him from the humiliating assurance, that the sins of the Hyderabad family would be visited on him also; and the advance

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of the armies to Affghanistan would not free Scinde from British troops until the king was firmly fixed on his throne. It was the speech of Brennus to the Romans. Earnestly then the Kyrpoor men proffered new treaties, and cast themselves generally on the British protection; but this would have saved them from the peculiar protection designed for them, namely, isolation and loss of independence, in fine, entire obedience to the Anglo-Indian Government. Yet so sincere did their desire to be received as friends appear to Sir Alexander Burnes, that, shrinking apparently from this rigour, he observed, "With such an adherence, I am quite at a loss to know how we can either ask money or any favour of this family."

Nov.

Colonel Pottinger, with more penetration, judged the Ameers of Kyrpoor to be equally false and deceitful as their brethren of Hyderabad, and said so. Whereupon Sir Alexander explained that he only meant to say they were guided by interest at Kyrpoor, while fear would best succeed at Hyderabad, and thus Scinde would be laid prostrate at the mercy of the Governor-General. This was indeed stripping Lord Auckland's policy of all disguise, a policy so painful, that both Burnes and Pottinger, at different periods, advised open war instead.

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About this time a new influence was employed. The Meah of the Kallora dynasty lived an exile in the Punjaub, and his claims were put forward by the British negotiators; but in vain; the Ameers still struggled, and Colonel Pottinger, apparently tired of the lengthened contest, advised Lord Auckland to relinquish diplomacy and demand Kurra-
chee, or a tribute, as a step to future supremacy,

enforcing that demand with an army. Sir Alexander Burnes also, speaking of military measures against the Hyderabad princes, declared that "nothing on the records of Indian history was more justifiable:" a dreadful avowal for Anglo-Indian political morality. And now the king's force, and the troops from Bengal were descending the Sutledge; the Bombay army reached the mouths of the Indus; and though the negotiations were continued, the establishing of a subsidiary force in Scinde was resolved upon, and Colonel Pottinger even urged the seizure of all the country between the Hala mountains and the lower Indus, from above Tattah down to the sea! to give, he said, "a compact territory, complete command of the river, and the only sea port; and then, Sukkur and Bukkur being occupied by British troops on the upper Indus, and British agents placed in Kyrpoor and Hyderabad, British supremacy would be as fully established in Scinde, as though it had been entirely subjugated."

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Sir Alexander Burnes urged personal humiliation in addition to the subsidiary force, but strongly objected to the seizure of territory, saying it would tarnish the national honour throughout Asia. The Ameers, though rancorous and hostile in their feeling, had been guilty of no act to justify such a measure. The intention to injure was not injury. But what honour was there to tarnish, if nothing in the records of Anglo-Indian history was more justifiable than the aggression now perpetrating on the Ameers by Lord Auckland? Shrinking, however, from Colonel Pottinger's proposal, the Governor-General, on the score of expediency, not that of morality, declared, he would not incur the jealousy and distrust of States hitherto friendly or neutral. Al-

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cluding doubtless to the powerful Runjeet, and to the Khelat prince, whose hostility would have endangered the march upon Affghanistan. He nevertheless persisted as to the subsidiary force.

Dec.

Sir John Keane had now arrived with the Bombay army at Vikkur on the Indus, no leave asked. The means of coercing the Ameers were therefore at hand. Those of Hyderabad, assembled their warriors, but distracted with fear and anger, and conscious weakness, could take no firm resolution; and meanwhile, the Kyrpoor chief, Roostum, after a sore mental struggle which led him even to contemplate suicide, gave up Bukkur, or, as he phrased it, the heart of his country, at the same time admitting upper Scinde to be a British dependency. His treaty though consisting of ten articles was called the treaty of Nine Articles, and it and the separate minor contracts with the inferior Ameers, bear date December 24th, yet they were not ratified until January 1839.

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January.

Thus far the course of injustice was unchecked. But now some of the Affghan difficulties were beginning to disclose themselves, and Lord Auckland, dreading the embarrassments which the Ameers of lower Scinde could still create, abated for the moment his demands; yet in secret only, and to Colonel Pottinger, who had now joined Sir J. Keane at Vikkur, leaving a sub-political agent at the residency of Hyderabad. Soon, however, Sir Henry Fane reached Roree with the Bengal army, and the king arrived at Shikarpoor, and these three armies made, simultaneously, hostile demonstrations. The king advanced towards Larkaana down the right bank of the Indus; the vanguard of the Bengal troops menaced Kyrpoor

Jan. 27th.

on the left bank of that river; Sir John Keane marched up against Hyderabad; and at the same period, the reserve, held in readiness at Bombay, was ordered to embark for Scinde.

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The Ameers of the lower province, rendered furious by these menacing movements, immediately plundered the stores collected at Hyderabad for the supply of Keane's army, and chased Lieutenant Eastwick the sub-agent, whom they despised, with insults and threats from the residency. To support this act, they put twenty thousand Beloochees in motion against the Bombay army, and roused the whole country into a violent commotion. It was then discovered, that to trample on Scinde involved great political and military questions. The cry of war was every where heard. Kurrachee was forcibly taken possession of by the British; Hyderabad was menaced with utter destruction; and Sir John Keane, contemplating a battle, designated it as a pretty piece of practice for the army.

But awed by the fierce aspect of an advancing army eager to storm their capital, the Ameers, weak debauched men, after having announced the horrid resolution to put their wives and children to death and then fight to the last, quailed at the muttering of the storm, and ere it broke signed a new treaty presented by Colonel Pottinger. And to obtain the indulgence of thus saving themselves, paid two hundred thousand pounds, half on the instant. Dated February the 5th, this treaty bound them to receive a subsidiary force and contribute three lacs yearly for its support, — to answer for the good behaviour of the Beloochee chiefs, — to contract no engagement with foreign States, unknown to the Anglo-Indian Government, — to

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provide storeroom at Kurrachee for military supplies, — to abolish all tolls on the Indus—finally, to furnish an auxiliary force for the Affghan war if called upon to do so.

In return, the Anglo-British Government pledged itself not to meddle with the internal rule of the Ameers, either generally or in respect of their separate possessions, and to disregard complaints from their subjects; but reserved a right to interfere and mediate in quarrels between the different Ameers, and to put down refractory chiefs. It promised to protect Scinde from foreign aggression, and bound itself not to make engagements with external powers, affecting the Ameers' interests, without their concurrence; thus virtually admitting the injustice of the tripartite treaty though it was the basis of all their proceedings.

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This stringent document did not satisfy Lord Auckland. It granted too much. Kurrachee had been conquered during the negotiation, and he retained it, regardless of the treaty, which was immediately altered and ratified without asking the Ameers' consent to the changes! They were commanded to accept it in its new form. The first document had been made in the names of the Hyderabad and Anglo-Indian Governments; but that implied a chief, and Lord Auckland's policy was to weaken by dividing. The altered treaty was therefore made quadruplicate, one for each Ameer, alike in all things save the payment of money, on which point Sobdar was favoured as a recompense for his amity during the negotiations. So also in the treaty with the Kyrpoor man, a distinction was made; but there the exception was to exact from Moobarick, in expiation of his previous

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enmity. Thus a nice discrimination marked every step of the oppression.

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III.

This amended treaty was, after many writhings, fastened round the Ameers' necks; and in conjunction with that imposed on Roostum of Kyrpoor, became the text of the political obligations of the Scindian rulers; for Shere Mohamed, the Meerpoor man, subsequently sought to be admitted to the same terms as Sobdar. The efforts of the Ameers to ameliorate the pressure, continued until July, when they finally yielded; and it is characteristic of the negotiations, that no relaxation of the Kur-rachee conquest was admitted by Lord Auckland, though Colonel Pottinger urged it strongly. He said no act of hostility had been committed by the Ameers' officers at that point; they had fired indeed, but it was a signal-gun, unshot, and that was made a pretext for destroying the fort with the guns of the Wellesley!

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July.

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pers.

The affairs of Scinde being now brought to a remarkable epoch, it is fitting to give exactly the substance of those treaties which guided the intercourse between the Ameers and the British authorities, up to the period when the war which ended in the destruction of the former broke out.

First, in order of time, stands the treaty with the Kyrpoor Ameer Roostum.

Defensive and offensive, it engaged the British Government to protect the territory of Kyrpoor. Roostum, and his heirs and successors were to act in subordinate co-operation with the Anglo-Indian Government,—to acknowledge its supremacy,—to have no connection with any other chiefs or states, nor to negotiate without the sanction of the British,—to commit no aggression on any one; and if by

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accident any dispute arose, to submit it to the arbitration and award of the Indian Government. At the requisition of the Governor-General he was to furnish auxiliary troops according to his means, and to render every aid and assistance during the Affghan war; and he was bound to approve of all the defensive preparations which might be deemed fitting while the peace and security of the countries beyond the Indus should be threatened. In return, the Indian Government declared that it would not covet a drain or a dam of Roostum's territory, nor his fortresses on this bank or that bank of the Indus. He and his successors were to be absolute and independent in their possessions as rulers, and no complaint by their subjects was to be listened to. He was to co-operate in all measures necessary to extend and facilitate the commerce and navigation of the Indus; and finally, to secure amity and peace, resident ministers were to be accredited to and from each of the contracting powers. But the English Minister was to have the right of changing his abode at will, attended by an escort whose strength was to be determined by his own Government. A supplementary article gave the British a right in time of war to occupy the fortress of Bukkur, which was neither on the one bank nor on the other bank of the Indus, but in the middle of the stream commanding the navigation.

The Hyderabad quadruplicate treaty of Fourteen Articles was concluded with the Ameer Noor, his brother Nusseer, and his cousins Sobdar and Mohamed, but with each separately. Bearing date the 11th of March, 1839 it runs, as follows:—

1°. There was to be lasting friendship and unity of interest between the contracting parties.

2°. A British force, its strength determined by the Governor-General, was to be held in Scinde at Tattah or elsewhere.

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3°. Noor, Nusseer, and Mohamed, were each to pay one lac of rupees yearly towards the cost of the subsidiary force. Sobdar was exempted from this tribute as a reward for previous friendship.

4°. The Ameers' territories were placed under British protection.

5°. The Ameers were to be absolute as rulers, each in his own possessions, and no complaint made by their subjects was to be listened to by the British.

6°. Disputes between independent Ameers were to be referred, with the sanction of the Governor-General, to the Resident for mediation.

7°. If the subjects, that is to say the chiefs of tribes of one Ameer were aggressive towards another Ameer, and the latter were unable to check them, the British Government, if it thought fit, might interfere with force.

8°. Negotiations with foreign states, unless with the sanction of the Indian Government, were forbidden to the Ameers.

9°. An auxiliary force was to be furnished when required for purposes of defence.

10°. The Timooree rupee, current in Scinde being of the same value as the Company's rupee, the latter was to pass as lawful money in that country ; but if the British authorities coined Timooree rupees in Scinde, a seignorage was to be paid to the Ameers ; yet, not during the Affghan war.

11°. No tolls to be paid for trading boats passing up or down the Indus.

12°. Merchandise landed from such boats and

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13°. Goods of all kinds brought to the mouth of the Indus were to be kept there at the owner's pleasure, until the best period for sending them up the river arrived; but if any were sold at the mouth or other parts, always excepting British camps or cantonments, they were to pay duty.

14°. The treaty to be binding on all succeeding Governors of India, and upon the Ameers and their successors for ever; and all former treaties, not rescinded by this, were to remain in full force.

Noor Mohamed, convinced of the inexorable injustice of his oppressors, now sought to turn the general injury to his peculiar profit; in that view he secretly advised Colonel Pottinger to retain Kurrachee as a means of impressing the subordinate chiefs with the power of the British. In this he only anticipated Lord Auckland's resolution by a few days; but his real object was to pass himself off with the chiefs as a man favoured by the powerful British Government, and thus keep them submissive under his exactions. His friendly tone was, however, soon imitated by the other Ameers of Hyderabad. The grace with which they now resigned themselves to their wrongs, did not save them from the cruel mockery of being asked by Colonel Pottinger, if they had the slightest cause to question British faith during the last six months. And the farther mortification of being told that henceforth they must consider Scinde to be, as it was in reality, a portion of Hindostan, in which the British were paramount, and entitled to act as they considered best and fittest for the general good of the whole Empire.

“ To this proof of moderation and disinterestedness, the humbled Ameers, bending in submission and fear, replied with helpless irony, That their eyes were opened. They had found it difficult to overcome the prejudice and apprehension of their tribes, who had always been led to think the only object of the British was to extend their dominion. Now they had been taught by experience English strength and good faith.

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III.

Having concluded this long course of negotiations, Colonel Pottinger thought the world would acknowledge that if the English-Indian Government's power was great, its good faith and forbearance was still more to be wondered at! And then “ distinctly recorded his opinion, though anticipating no such event, that if ever the British military strength was to be again exerted in Scinde, it must be carried to subjugating the country.

To accord the character of good faith and forbearance to these negotiations is impossible. Palliation of their immorality on the score of necessity is the utmost that can be asked, and that but faintly, by the most resolute partizans. Can even that be justly conceded? May it not be said, when Colonel Pottinger thought Lord Auckland must be fatigued with the perusal of the barefaced falsehoods and unblushing assertions of firm and devoted friendship which Noor Mohamed persisted in, that it was absolutely necessary to name that Ameer, lest a doubt should arise as to which power the words were applicable. For, was it not with reiterated assurances of warm friendship and deep interest that Lord Auckland gave the Ameers the right thus to address him.

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You besought us to make treaties of amity and

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You asked for our alliance. We did not seek yours. We yielded to your solicitations and you have used our kindness to our ruin.

You declared yourself, without our knowledge or desire, our protector against a man we did not fear; our mediator in a quarrel which did not concern you. In return for this meddling, which you termed a favour, you demanded permanent possession of our capital, military occupation of our country, and even payment for the cost of thus destroying our independence under the masks of friendship! mediation! protection!

You peremptorily demanded our aid to ruin Dost Mohamed, who was not our enemy; and our backwardness thus to damage, against justice and against the interest of our religion, him and his nation with whom we were at peace, you made a cause of deadly quarrel.

To mollify your wrath, we gave your armies a passage through our dominions contrary to the terms of our commercial treaties. In return, you have with those armies reduced us to a state of miserable dependance.

Can these undeniable facts be justified with reference to national honour? Can they be called forbearing, generous, moderate? Can they be justified on the ground of international law, of self-preservation;—that necessity which sets all common rules aside? Can they even be justified by that necessity for aggrandizement which has been supposed inherent to the peculiar nature of the British position in the East? Lord Auckland indeed said, the western powers were combined to

destroy British-India, hence the invasion of Affghanistan. Aggression on Scinde was an unavoidable contingency, and if it was pushed too far, the fault was with the Ameers; their feelings were hostile, their acts perfidious; they were insolent, obstinate, treacherous!

Let it be proved that the invasion of Affghanistan was an act of self-preservation, and the injustice towards Scinde will be palliated as an act of unavoidable policy, though the mode of doing it displayed such an absolute disregard of political decency. But it cannot be so proved. Founded on doubtful anticipations of danger, unjust in itself, ill judged, ill considered, it was commenced on false principles, political and military; it was executed with incredible absurdity, and terminated with a dreadful calamity which went nigh to shake in pieces that Indian empire it was designed to secure. It was not, therefore, an act founded on any real necessity of self-preservation, or the danger it was intended to obviate would have augmented on its failure; but no such danger has appeared. It was not, either, the result of any inherent force of circumstances beyond the ordinary controul of men. No extraordinary genius, no nice judgment, no far-reaching sagacity, were requisite to detect the fallacy of the conception, or the probable termination; yet the warning voice of England's great captain, whose words on such a subject should have had oracular weight, was not wanting, in hope to stay the mischief. The invasion of Affghanistan, examined in any light, appears therefore the monstrous offspring of vanity and ignorance, devoid of expediency and public morality. And if this, the principal action, was neither just nor

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necessary, the accessory action against Scinde was also an oppression ; indefensible even though it had presented less odious phases during its progress.

If the secret engagements of the Ameers with the Persians ; if their confederation with the Affghan chiefs of Candahar ; if their repeated violations of the commercial treaties ; if their violent insulting conduct towards the British Resident ; if their arrogance, their duplicity, their perfidious intentions, deserved chastisement, Lord Auckland should have so proclaimed the matter to the world ; and, acting on the policy which prescribes a firm and jealous maintenance of national dignity, have declared war ; first setting forth the Ameers' offences. He might then have been accused of a stern, unrelenting procedure, but not of a treacherous oppression. It would have been politic also on military considerations, to have first warred against Scinde ; because a subdued enemy would have been less dangerous to the communications than an ally incensed by injustice, and of unbroken strength.

Why, it may be asked, were the Ameers' territories fastened upon with such tenacity to procure a long circuitous unsafe line of operations, when short and direct and safe lines were to be found in Runjeet Sing's dominions ? That Prince had profited largely by the tripartite treaty ; and of the spoil anticipated from the plunder of the Barukzies he was also promised his share. It would therefore have been no injustice, no unreasonable demand, but the contrary, to have asked for a base of operations in his kingdom : and if he refused, the grounds of quarrel with him would have been more legitimate, and the result more profitable than that with the Ameers. Where then was

the instinct of self-preservation when Runjeet Sing's lair was avoided to fall on the Ameers? The British strength was sufficient to overwhelm either or both together; but Runjeet Sing was wily, and powerful enough to give trouble; the Ameers were weak, despised, and supposed to be rich. Fear! and cupidity! these were the springs of action. Sir Alexander Burnes had said their treasury contained twenty millions sterling.—The Ameers may be supposed wealthy, was one of the earliest intimations given by Lord Auckland to his negotiator.

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The armies now passed onwards to Affghanistan, the subsidiary force entered Scinde, and the political obligations of its rulers became totally changed. The original injustice remained in all its deformity, yet, being admitted by treaty without public protest or stroke in battle, became patent as the rule of policy. And new combinations, involving great national interests, were thus imposed on Lord Auckland's successor, demanding a different measure of right from that which should have governed the Anglo-Indian Government's intercourse previous to these treaties. For amongst the many evils attendant on national injustice, not the least is the necessity of sustaining the wrongdoer's policy, thus implicating honest men in transactions the origin of which they cannot approve. Some abstract moralists hold indeed, that Governments stand in the same relation to each other that private persons do in a community; that as leaders and guides of nations, they should be governed by the same rules of morality as the leaders and guides of families. It would be well for the world were this practicable. But when private persons wrong each other they have a tribunal to

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controul them, and to enforce reparation ; or they may voluntarily amend the wrong. Apply this to nations. Their tribunal is war. Every conquest, every treaty, places them on a new basis of intercourse. The first injustice remains a stigma on the government perpetrating it ; but for the nation, for succeeding governments, new combinations are presented, which may, and generally do, make it absolute for self-preservation, and therefore justifiable, not only to uphold but to extend what was at first to be condemned.

Scinde is a striking illustration of this truth. The Affghan war once kindled, that invasion once perpetrated, the safety of the troops engaged in it imperatively required that Scinde should continue to be occupied ; that the treaties concluded with Lord Auckland should be loyally adhered to by the Ameers. Say the Affghan armies ought rather to have been withdrawn, and two scores of injustice wiped off together. Was it possible ? If possible would it not have been imputed to fear, to weakness, to any thing but an abstract sense of justice. Nations, especially those of the East, are neither so pure nor so frank as to greet virtue in a state garb. Wrong they are ever ready to offer to others ; wrong they ever expect ; and when it fails to arrive, opportunity favourable, they despise the forbearance as a folly. To have abandoned Affghanistan ere victory had redeemed the character of British strength, would have been the signal for universal commotion if not of insurrection throughout India. The having abandoned it at all led to the Scindian war, which was an inevitable consequence of the flagitious folly of the first enterprise.

One alleviation for this otherwise unmitigated transgression against Scinde remains, and it is a great one. It was not perpetrated against a nation, but against the Ameers; not against a people, but their rulers; and they were bad, indescribably bad. Oppressors themselves, they were oppressed by stronger power. Tyrants they were, without pity or remorse. Without pity their fall should be recorded. Their people gained as they lost. The honour of England suffered, yet humanity profited; the British camps and stations offered asylums to thousands who would otherwise have led a life of misery. But this palliation, this solace to the mind, amidst so much to condemn, was not foreseen, it was incidental; it cannot be pleaded by Lord Auckland, his treaties expressly resigned the people to the cruelty of their rulers. The invasion of Affghanistan presents no such redeeming accompaniment. It was undertaken to place a proud and stupidly arrogant tyrant on the throne; to force him on a people who detested him. And being conducted without ability terminated in disaster so dire, as to fill the mind with horror; enforcing what cannot be too often repeated, that incapacity and vanity are, in great enterprises of war, tantamount to wickedness.

Colonel Pottinger, created a baronet, continued Resident in Scinde until the beginning of 1840. He was then replaced in the lower country by Major Outram, having been previously relieved in the upper country by Mr. Ross Bell. He obeyed his instructions, but his negotiations offer some points of character worth noting. His natural feelings of justice, breaking out at the sight of Shah Sooja's receipts for a debt which he was again

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demanding at the head of an army; his reprobation of the attack on the fort of Kurrachee by the *Wellesley*; his aversion to profit by that violence, and his frequent, earnest, exhortations to treat the people with gentleness and fair dealing; contrast strongly with the general oppressive march of the negotiation he was charged to conduct. And still more with the hearty bluntness, by which he overwhelmed the unhappy Ameers, and, as it were, smothered them with praises of Lord Auckland's loyalty and forbearance.

His vehement declarations of the good faith and moderation of political acts which the most subtil sophistry cannot palliate, much less justify, are startling. The deference he inculcated for the tyrannical pleasures of the Ameers whose real rights he had by his treaties just taken away, present curious specimens of reasoning. Their hunting preserves they had formed by turning, within a few years, one fourth of the fertile and peopled land into a wilderness; they were still marching onwards in that devastating career, one of them having recently destroyed two large villages to form a future "*Shikargah*" for his child, then only eight years old; and the whole of them declared that their hunting grounds were dearer to them than their wives and children. Colonel Pottinger yet desired, that their grounds might be respected, because the ancient forest laws of the Normans in England were equally pernicious! And while thus recurring to the worst, the most cruel oppression of the worst periods of English history, as a guide for British policy in the nineteenth century, and an excuse for the Ameers of Scinde, with singular inconsistency he recommended a conciliating and protecting policy towards the people!

CHAPTER IV.

THE mutations of the Affghan war, the hostility of the Brahoos Beloochs and other hill tribes under the Prince of Khelat, nourished the discontent of the Ameers with hopes of redress, and encouraged them to form secret plans, and set intrigues on foot against the supremacy of the British. But soon internal dissensions, and the death of the Brahoos Prince, Merab, who was killed at the storming of Khelat by General Wiltshire, on that officer's return from Cabool to reinforce the subsidiary army in Scinde, prevented the adoption of any decided plan in 1839. But in 1840, when the Brahoos rose in arms for the son of Merab and defeated several British detachments; when the Murrees and Booghtees, on the north-western quarter beyond Scinde, were driven by British injustice to insurrection; when Runjeet Sing, his son, and grandson, had all died in quick succession and the Punjaub was in commotion; then the Ameers became unquiet and thus spoke in their secret councils.

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“It is good to combine with other powers because the British Government is surrounded by enemies; because it fears insurrection in India, and is lax in its rule over neighbouring states; but it is difficult, because its rule is rigid in Scinde, and we are divided and quarrelling. If we could all unite it would be well.”

Parliamentary
Papers,
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No. 248.

At the time these councils were held, Dost

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Mohamed was returning to Affghanistan at the head of the Usbeg army; and many reverses had been suffered by detachments in the Belooch and Brahooe hills. The general aspect of affairs was therefore very menacing; but Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor was at enmity with the Ameers of Hyderabad about their boundary line; and he was anxious to have a treaty with the British on the same terms as Sobdar, who was his fast friend. In upper Scinde, Moobarick had died, and disputes arose about his possessions. Union was impossible; and very soon Colonel Dennie won the battle of Bamean; the Dost surrendered; it became known that a Russian expedition against Khiva had totally failed; reinforcements entered Scinde, and a considerable British division was gathered on the upper Sutledge, watching the Punjaub. In this state of affairs the Ameers seeing ten thousand men again at their palace-gate trembled and avoided open offence.

Noor Mohamed died towards the end of the year, his last act being to claim the British protection for his brother Nusseer and his youngest son Hoosein, against the machinations of his eldest son Shadad, a man incredibly brutal and wicked. He protested also in his last moments that his friendship and alliance with the English, since the treaty, had been sincere. This declaration was certainly the first legitimate ratification of the treaty, and the other Ameers confirmed it soon after his death by seeking the arbitration of the Governor-General on the boundary dispute with Shere Mohamed; slight acknowledgment indeed of its value to them, but giving somewhat of a lawful character to the contract. Shere Mohamed's desire to have

a treaty would have added weight to this consideration, if it had been frankly met; but the Anglo-Indian Government, and its agent, Major Outram, true to the spoliating policy of the first negotiations, rendered that which might have borne the grace of a voluntary contract on one side, and a favour on the other, a rapacious injustice.

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Shere Mohamed desired to be treated as Sobdar had been, but it was resolved to make him pay for the alliance; and when he, seeing he could not escape the imposition, sought to lessen the sum by undervaluing his possessions, it was called a crime! Hitherto he had enjoyed a nominal independence. Now Major Outram, while admitting that possession and right were with Mohamed in the boundary dispute, recommended that a fixed tribute should be demanded from him by the British Government, under pain of letting the Hyderabad Ameers loose, with this intimation, that if he proved too strong the British would aid them, and then his losses would not be confined to the disputed territory! And this expressly to lower his opinion of his own importance! This compendious negotiation produced immediate acquiescence, and was called able diplomacy. Shere Mohamed paid fifty thousand rupees yearly for the favour of British protection; the arbitration then went on, and at the same time the chiefs of tribes were secured in their feudal possessions.

Parliamentary
Papers,
Scinde.
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293.

Every governing power having now in turn offered voluntary homage to British supremacy, by accepting favours under the treaties, and demanding protection against a native opponent, the legal force of those treaties increased, and they had lasted two years; hence, as they also furnished

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1841. Auckland, thinking cession of territory more sure and profitable, coveted Shikarpoor. This the largest city of Scinde, though decayed under the tyranny of the Ameers, promised with better government to recover its former importance, and it was advantageously placed on the line of communication with Affghanistan. The Ameers readily assented to this cession in discharge of tribute, and thus gave the British three permanent military stations in upper Scinde; namely, Sukkur, Bukkur, and Shikarpoor. The first, having an entrenched camp, was on the right bank of the Indus; the second was on a rock in the middle of that river; the third was about twenty miles to the north-west of Sukkur, on the high road to the Bolan pass. In lower Scinde, Kurrachee, the only good port, was kept, as Lord Auckland had determined, and thus the Ameers' candle was burning at both ends.

About the middle of 1841, died Mr. Ross Bell. He had been political agent, governing upper Scinde and Beloochistan with unbounded power; but under his sway, many insurrections had occurred amongst the tribes of Booghtees and Murrees; occasioned, it is said, by his grinding oppression, accompanied with acts of particular and of general treachery, followed by military execution, bloody and desolating, involving whole districts in ruin. He was in constant dispute with the military officers, and he has been described as a man of vigorous talent, resolute, unhesitating,

devoid of public morality, unscrupulous and vindictive; of domineering pride, and such luxurious pomp, that seven hundred camels, taken from the public service, were required to carry his personal baggage. That his conduct was neither wise nor just, seems a correct inference from the deplorable results of his administration; but Lord Auckland approved of it, and regretted his loss. The story of the camels is certainly an exaggerated statement, and the general charges have been principally promulgated by the Editor of the *Bombay Times*, whose word, for praise or blame, is generally false and always despicable.

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Mr. Bell's functions were transferred to Major Outram, who thus became political agent for the whole of Scinde and Beloochistan. Tranquillity in the latter country was immediately obtained by the cessation of oppression. Lord Auckland restored the son of Merab to his father's dignity and the Brahoos were content. This also allayed the excitement of the Ameers, who were connected by marriage with Merab's family; not that his misfortunes were deeply felt by them, but the termination of hostilities in Beloochistan released a large British force, which returned to Scinde, or was at least free to act in that country.

This quietude continued until the calamity of Cabool, in the beginning of 1842, shook the reputation of British power throughout the neighbouring nations, disturbed all India, and excited the smouldering fire of revenge in the hearts of the Scindian Ameers. Nusseer Khan was now considered the head of that fraternity. Secret communications between him and Sawan Mull, the Seik chief of Mooltan, were detected by the po-

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litical agents. The suspicions thus awakened, were increased by other communications between the Ameer Roostum of Kyrpoor, and the Maharajah Shere Sing, now on the throne of the Punjaub and falsely supposed to be less friendly to the British alliance than his predecessor Runjeet Sing. The Ameer's officers behaved vexatiously, a sure sign! Roostum also repelled remonstrance haughtily, and assumed an unusual tone of independence relative to the cession of Shikarpoor, for which no treaty had yet been executed, the delay being, however, with the British authorities. Major Outram accused the Ameers of mean shuffling; yet he directed his assistant, Mr. Postans, to give Roostum hopes of keeping Shikarpoor by the use of ambiguous language, such as would leave the Governor-General a right to reject or insist on the agreement according to the profit which it might promise.

Parliamentary
Papers,
Scinde.
Nos. 308-
323.

But a new era was now commencing for Scinde. Lord Auckland quitted India, leaving it in all the confusion, the terror, and the danger, necessarily flowing from the political immorality and astounding incapacity which had marked his mischievous career. And if any man, free from vehement factious feelings and not blinded by party prejudices, shall doubt the correctness of the picture of whig oppression and folly painted in the foregoing pages, let him read and compare attentively, and with a desire to reach the truth, all the Parliamentary papers on the subject, and he will doubt no longer. Out of their own mouths they are condemned.

Lord Ellenborough arrived too late to prevent, but in time to remedy, the most dangerous evils

menacing India from his predecessor's impolicy, which he denounced in a vigorous proclamation designed as a warning to future governors. The beacon burned bright, but the flame spread too wide and scorched many, whose cries have never ceased, though few men, not personally interested, regard them. Previous to his coming, the ship was rocking in the shallows, but when his strong hand was felt she ceased to strike the sands, and, answering to the helm, was steered into deep water. Nevertheless, the very men whose political iniquity had then brought India to the verge of ruin, are now, with incredible effrontery, imputing all their own crimes and absurdities to him, and most especially in what relates to Scinde, wherefore it is fitting to state exactly his share of the subsequent transactions in that country, and leave judgment to the common sense of mankind.

He found the public mind confused with terror by the Cabool catastrophe, the surrender of Ghusni, the blockade of Candahar, and the seeming inability of General Pollock to relieve Jellallabad. Colonel England, was, soon afterwards, defeated by an inferior force at Hykulzie, and fell back to Quettah, leaving General Nott, as it was supposed, to certain destruction.

He found the finances embarrassed, the civil and political services infested with men greedy of gain, gorged with insolence, disdaining work, and intimately connected with the infamous press of India, which they supplied with official secrets, receiving in return shameful and shameless support; for, thus combining, they thought to controul the Governor-General, and turn the resources of the State to their sordid profit.

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He found the military depressed in spirit, and deprived of their just allowances; the hard working soldier oppressed, the idle vapourer encouraged; discipline attainted; and the military correspondents of the newspapers, assuming, falsely it is to be hoped, the title of officers, constantly proclaiming sentiments cowardly and selfish, without an indication of honour or patriotism.

Lord Ellenborough, amidst these difficulties, steered the course becoming a brave man conscious of danger, and of his own resources to meet it. His first effort was to stay the spreading mischief, of fear on one side and rising hopes on the other, by a manifesto of his views, in which a vigorous determination was apparent. This proclamation of silence! as it were, suspended the general confusion, and gave time to combine military operations to redeem the character of the British arms; and to teach the exulting nations on the frontier, that England's strength was not to be safely measured by recent misfortunes. What though Lord Auckland's policy had been unjust, wicked, and foolish towards those nations! Was Lord Ellenborough, in the very crisis of evil and danger, nicely to weigh the oppressions of his predecessor; and setting aside all the combinations flowing from that predecessor's diplomacy, all the mischief springing from his unwise military enterprises, was he who had undertaken to save the Indian empire to bend before victorious barbarians, to deprecate their wrath, to cheer them in their dreadful career by acknowledging their anger to be legitimate? Was he to encourage their revengeful passions, to foment the hopes of neighbouring powers, eager for war, by a show of humility which could only appear

to them weakness? The safety of the Anglo-Indian empire was at stake, the obligation of securing it was a necessity paramount to all other considerations. Was England to be trampled on because Lord Auckland had been silly and unjust?

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Lord Ellenborough saw clearly and acted boldly, amidst difficulties which would have overwhelmed a man of less ability and energy. But how widely different was his mode from that of Lord Auckland; as widely different as their achievements. Look at Scinde! There the one invariably covered rapacity with professions of friendship, a velvet glove on an iron hand. With Lord Ellenborough the tongue spake no deceit, and the hand was bared at once in all its sinewy strength, a warning to keep men from provoking its deadly stroke. Compare Colonel Pottinger's instructions from Lord Auckland with Lord Ellenborough's to Major Outram. Remembering always, that the former had no international right of meddling with the Ameers, whereas the latter stood on treaties acknowledged and acted on for three years — that the first was instigated by rapacity ministering to an insane aggressive policy; the second stimulated by the lofty ambition of saving India from ruin.

“The Governor-General is led to think you may have seen reason to doubt the fidelity of one or more of the Ameers of Scinde. He therefore forwards three similar letters to be addressed according to circumstances, and at your discretion, to those of the Ameers whom you may have ground for suspecting of hostile designs against the British Government. And you will distinctly understand that the threat contained is no idle threat intended only to alarm, but a declaration of the Governor-General's fixed determination to punish, cost what

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“it may, the first chief who shall prove faithless,
 “by the confiscation of his dominions. But there
 “must be clear proof of such faithlessness, and it
 “must not be provoked by the conduct of British
 “agents, producing in the minds of any chief, a
 “belief that the British Government entertains de-
 “signs inconsistent with its interests and honour.”

Nor were his letters to the Ameers less explicit and honourable. Referring them first to his general manifesto addressed to all the Eastern nations, it run thus :—

“While I am resolved to respect treaties myself,
 “and to exercise the power with which I am in-
 “trusted, for the general good of the subjects of the
 “British Government, and of the several States of
 “India, I am equally resolved to make others
 “respect the engagements into which they have
 “entered, and to exercise their power without injury
 “to their neighbours.”—“I should be most reluc-
 “tant to believe that you had deviated from the
 “course which is dictated by your engagements ; I
 “will confide in your fidelity, and in your friend-
 “ship, until I have proof of your faithlessness and
 “of your hostility in my hands : but be assured, if
 “I should obtain such proofs, no consideration shall
 “induce me to permit you to exercise any longer a
 “power you will have abused. On the day on
 “which you shall be faithless to the British Govern-
 “ment sovereignty will have passed from you ;
 “your dominions will be given to others, and in your
 “destitution all India will see that the British
 “Government will not pardon an injury received
 “from one it believed to be its friend.”

This frank resolute declaration, which was the guide and rule of his conduct in permitting the Scindian war, and by which its justice and policy

must be measured, is not to be taken in a political sense alone. Commercial interests affecting the whole civilized world were also at stake. The Indus had by the several treaties with the Ameers and Runjeet Sing, been made the high road of nations. Those trade treaties, preceding the political engagements, had been freely conceded, were just in themselves, and obtained by just means with a beneficent object: they were for the interest of mankind at large, and were not abrogated by the political treaties, save in the one point of not transmitting military stores by the Indus. But Lord Ellenborough's singleness of purpose was evinced in several ways. Major Outram at this period told him that "he had it in his power to expose the hostile intrigues of the Ameers to such an extent as might be deemed sufficient to authorize the dictation of any terms to those chiefs, or any measure necessary to place British power on a secure footing." And he advised the assuming the entire management of the Shikarpoor and Sukkur districts, to render British power over the Indus invulnerable. This was quite in the aggressive spirit of Lord Auckland's policy, which never appears to have been distasteful to Major Outram until Lord Ellenborough deprived him of his situation; then the Ameers seemed suddenly to rise in his estimation. It was not, however, in the spirit of that nobleman's instructions, which, far from aiming to take advantage of past misdeeds, gave warning for the future only, and expressed a desire to believe the Ameers faithful, offering them a new intercourse on well understood grounds.

But the great operations to restore the British military reputation in Affghanistan, previous to

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the total abandonment of that country, were now in full progress. Jellallabad had been succoured, and the armies of Nott and Pollock were directed by a combined movement on Cabool. The Governor-General's hands were thus freed from the military fetters fastened on them by Lord Auckland, and he instantly employed them in choking off the civil and political leeches who were sucking the public. He broke the connection between official men and newspaper editors, and, defying the blatant fury of the latter and the secret enmity of the former, drove the unclean people from the administration. He restored the drooping spirit of the army by a vigorous protection of its honour and interests; and he put to flight the political agents and their assistants, who, numerous as locusts, had settled on the countries beyond the Indus: their number equalled that of the whole of the salaried officers employed for the diplomacy of all Europe! Their vanity and uncontrolled power, their pomp and incapacity had contributed more than all other things to the recent misfortunes.

Wild was the uproar these reforms occasioned. All the rage of faction broke loose. No calumny that sordid falsehood could invent, or cowardly anger dictate, was spared: and when malice was at fault folly stepped in with such charges as, that the Governor-General's state harness was of red leather! he wore gold lace on his pantaloons! But while such matters were dwelt upon, the incessant activity, the assiduity, the energy, the magnanimity of the man were overlooked. The moral courage and fortitude, which could, in the midst of disaster and abasement of public spirit, at once direct the armies to victory and purify the administration, which could raise

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news-
papers.

and confide in the military honour, opposing and defying the vituperation of the Indian press, re-echoed by the scarcely more scrupulous press of England; these great and generous qualities were overlooked or sneered at, as well as the complete success they procured for the country. But newspapers are not history, and Lord Ellenborough's well-earned reputation, as an able and victorious, and honest Governor-General, will outlive faction and its falsehoods, and its malignant press.

Major Outram withheld the Governor-General's warning letter to the Ameers, lest, as he said, fear should drive them and the chiefs of tribes to extremities, all being alike conscious of treasonable designs. This view of the matter was approved of by Lord Ellenborough, and it was a convincing proof that his object was tranquillity, not subjugation; but he seems to have committed an error, inasmuch as he should have been careful to keep his own manly policy clear of the crooked paths of his predecessor's. To declare oblivion for the past, to look only to the future, acting on a necessity which he found existing to bind him, would have been an undeniable course. His error, however, was one adverse to violence and war, and this is confirmed by the tenor of his first dispatches.

“ The recent engagements attendant on the restoration of the young Prince of Khelat, and the uncertain state of the war, imposed he said, the necessity of maintaining a strong position on the Indus in Scinde, and the power of acting on both sides of that river, consequently, the continued occupation of Kurrachee to communicate with Bombay, and the occupation of Bukkur and Sukkur to insure a passage over the Indus, were

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“ requisite for safe intercourse with the British
 “ stations on the Sutledge on one side, and with
 “ the army at Candahar by the Bolan pass on the
 “ other. The supporting of commerce by the Indus
 “ was another great obligation ; and as his desire
 “ was to put an end, at any financial loss, to the sys-
 “ tem of taking tribute for protection, he proposed
 “ to exchange that to which the Ameers were liable
 “ by their treaties, for permanent possession of
 “ Kurrachee, Bukkur, and Sukkur. Protection was
 “ in most cases as much the interest of the British
 “ Government to afford, as it was the interest of the
 “ protected state to receive ; but however equable
 “ in principle the bargain might be in practice, it
 “ could not fail to affect amity, to raise disagreeable
 “ discussions, and to make the British officers em-
 “ ployed appear odious extortioners in the eyes of
 “ the people, who were taxed to pay the tribute,
 “ and oppressed by other exactions made under
 “ pretence of that tribute. Territory ; therefore,
 “ he desired instead, or in place of territory, the
 “ abolition of duties burthensome to commerce.
 “ He was aware that, regard being had for the for-
 “ mer treaties and the reciprocal obligation im-
 “ posed by them, difficulties might arise, and much
 “ time elapse before his object could be attained,
 “ but this was to be the governing principle of his
 “ policy.”

Assuredly there was nothing oppressive or unjust
 in this view of affairs, nothing indicative of a grasp-
 ing project. Roostum had already given his con-
 sent for the cession of Shikarpoor to Lord Auck-
 land, who certainly contemplated as part of his in-
 vasion of Affghanistan the permanent occupation
 of Scinde, and no qualms of conscience then dis-

turbed the East Indian Directors, though they have since so strongly expressed their disapproval of the same thing, when done by Lord Ellenborough, in a crisis which justified the act : it would thus appear that gross oppressive injustice is absolutely essential, in the minds of the statesmen and moralists of Leadenhall Street, to render an acquisition of territory palatable to them ; or, that they are not really statesmen, but only grasping traders, and foolish prating persons, who would make the amount of their dividend, or their personal anger, the measure of their policy in governing a great empire. Lord Ellenborough passed over this consent of Roostum, and his proposed policy was not one-sided or selfish. The removal of points for collision with rulers, the protection of the oppressed people, and the raising of the English character in their eyes ; finally, the general interests of commerce, with respect to the navigation of the Indus, and all to be sought by fair negotiation without menace, these were his ends, and they indicate no grasping ambition.

Meanwhile Major Outram, declaring with the warmth of a partisan, that he " should not be sorry to afford Government grounds for making an example of Nusseer," diligently gathered all proofs, direct and indirect, of the hostile disposition of the Ameers, and grounded on them a proposal for a new treaty ; observing, that they formed a body of evidence which gave Lord Ellenborough the right to dictate his own terms. They were undoubtedly numerous and strong.

1°. Intercepted letters, addressed by the Ameer Nusseer of Hyderabad, to the Mooltan chief ; and by Roostum of Kyrpoor, to the Maharajah Shere Sing. These were designated as treasonable, by

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Major Outram, a term difficult to understand as applied to sovereign princes ; but they were unquestionably in violation of the eighth article of the treaty of 1839, which forbade the Ameers to negotiate with foreign chiefs or states, unless sanctioned by the British Government : moreover the Mooltan man had collected a large force on the frontier of upper Scinde under false pretences.

2°. A secret confederation of the Brahoos and Beloochee tribes, known to, and encouraged by the Ameers with a view to a general revolt against the British supremacy, whenever new reverses in Affghanistan, which were expected, should furnish a favourable opportunity. The names of the chiefs and the plan of revolt were obtained, and the rising was to be a religious one. “ *The sword was to be drawn for Islam.*” It appeared that Colonel England’s defeat at Hykulzie had greatly excited the hopes and confidence of the tribes, and every thing was ready for a general out-burst, when the relief of Jellallabad by General Pollock checked the movement.

3°. Nusseer of Hyderabad, and Roostum of Kyrpoor, formerly enemies, were then become fast friends, both being governed alike by one Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the minister of Roostum, and well known as a man of talent, but intriguing, bigotted, and bitterly hating the British. Nusseer also, at this time, endeavoured by a false accusation to have Sobdar, who had always appeared friendly and loyal, made to pay tribute contrary to the treaty ; this was in the view of forcing him by such injustice to join the general confederacy.

4°. Nusseer had, during the year before, proposed to the Seiks to drive the British from the

land as the Affghans had done, offering to assist them.

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5°. Lieutenant Gordon, employed to survey the lower country and the coast, discovered that several chiefs, owing no homage to the Ameers, had recently gone to Hyderabad with their followers, pretending fear of the Affghans; obstacles were raised to hinder the execution of his survey, and throughout the lower country he found a decided hostile spirit amongst the Beloochees. A native informed him that he was to be either driven from the country, where he overlooked their preparations, or killed. Moreover, the hill tribes and those of the plain were alike ready to attack the camp at Kurrachee, when any news of reverses in Affghanistan should arrive.

6°. Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, had secret intercourse with the Seiks, and was confederate with the Mooltan man. Sobdar of Hyderabad, and Ali Moorad of Kyrpoor, were the only Ameers supposed to be faithful to their engagements.

7°. The plan of the hostile Ameers, was to get possession of Bukkur; all the fighting would be, they said, in upper Scinde, and there the Kyrpoor troops were to attack Ali Moorad's villages if he did not join the confederacy; the British would of course interfere; then the Hyderabad troops would move up, and the whole force of Scinde unite to give battle.

9°. A Persian had come with secret messages from the Shah to Nusseer.

10°. There was backwardness in the payment of tribute, with a view to the intended outbreak; and tolls and duties were levied contrary to the treaties.

Major Outram, grounding his proposed treaty on these hostile demonstrations, recommended

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also the taking permanent possession of Shikar-poor, and the overthrow of Lord Auckland's policy with respect to the equality of the Ameers; arguing, very justly on this point, that each Ameer evaded responsibility, charging it on others; that the negotiations were necessarily complicate, and every petty dispute was referred to the British Government when it ought to be settled among themselves. His treaty, the preamble to which was worded offensively to the Ameers, involved the cession of Bukkur, the site of the ancient Sukkur, and the entrenched cantonment there, in perpetuity; the cession of Kurrachee in perpetuity; free passage and communication for commerce between Kurrachee and the Indus at Tattah; the old articles against tolls, and the right to cut fuel for steam navigation on each side of the river to a certain extent. This was the first direct proposition for interfering with the Ameers "*Shikargahs*," for Pottinger's proposal was merely to cut a way for tracking. It gave them infinite offence; for they loved them better than their wives and children, better than their subjects' lives, better than their country's prosperity, better than the commerce of the world! In return for these exactions, Major Outram proposed to exonerate the Ameers from all arrears of debt, and from all future tribute; a boon amounting altogether to nearly half a million of rupees of annual tribute, and a million of arrears of debt.

It cannot be supposed the political agent and his assistants, English and natives, could all be so wicked, or so deceived, as to urge the hostile and treacherous proceedings constituting these charges against the Ameers, without reason. It followed, therefore,

that positive violations of the treaties, and the preparations for a wide spread conspiracy to destroy the British troops in Scinde, gave Lord Ellenborough, as Major Outram said, the right to dictate new terms, calculated to secure the public interest from future danger of a like nature. Hence, had the grasping unprincipled policy which has been attributed to him, really influenced his proceedings, the opportunity was most favourable. The cause of offence was clear and of major importance; the means of effecting it at hand, for General England was returning from Candahar and a great army of reserve was assembling on the Sutledge.

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And here it is fitting to notice the true objects of assembling that army of reserve, so ridiculed at the time by the Indian press. It is fitting so to do, as throwing a light upon Lord Ellenborough's prudence; but more so, as shewing the infamous and dangerous nature of that Indian press, whose efforts have been for several years constantly directed to the support of peculation, the depression of the military spirit, the calumniating of every man of patriotic feeling and useful talent, and the inciting and teaching the foreign enemies of the Anglo-Indian Government, how and when to assail the armies with the greatest advantage, even urging the Sepoys at times to mutiny. Let the people of England judge the following sample of their wanton iniquity, their mischief-making falsehood.

When Lord Ellenborough arrived in India, there were thirty thousand Seik troops at Peshawar, but only four thousand British troops, of whom eighteen hundred were in hospital! The presence of the Seiks caused great anxiety; and when

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five thousand of them advanced, unasked and unwished, as auxiliaries to Jellallabad, Lord Ellenborough directed General Pollock, and through his agency succeeded, to persuade these half hostile, turbulent men, to pass to the left bank of the Cabool river, to leave all the resources of the right bank to the British, and to clear their rear as far as Peshawar. Now, when the army was returning from Cabool, twenty thousand Seiks followed the troops, and the army of reserve was most prudently and wisely assembled on the Sutledge, to keep them in awe, and to support the authority of Shere Sing, who was friendly, against the power and wishes of most of his sirdars; and more especially against the Sindhawalla family by whom he was afterwards assassinated. Dhian Sing, his minister, actually proposed to attack the British while traversing the Punjaub on their return from Cabool; and he proposed this, because he had been deluded by the infamous Indian press into the belief that the British meant to attack the Seiks! Shere Sing, however, relied on British faith; and supported by the presence of the army of reserve resisted successfully. He afterwards strongly represented to the foreign secretary, who visited him at Lahore after the armies had passed the Sutledge, the extreme embarrassment which the assertions of the Anglo-Indian press, that the English designed to attack him, had created in all his dealings with his own chiefs and army!

Far from shewing any avidity, Lord Ellenborough rejected Major Outram's counsel and treaty, and condemned the offensive tone of the preamble; he rejected also the cession of Shikarpoor; but, repeating his former determination to punish faithlessness,

intimated his desire to take from the delinquent Ameers the districts of Subzulcote and Bhoong Bharra, and restore them to the Bawal-Khan, from whom they had been, with force of arms, wrested only thirty years before by Roostum and the other Ameers of the day. Lord Ellenborough did not, however, pretend that he would interfere thus between the two powers on any principle of abstract justice, which would have been misapplied to overrule the especial justice of the case; nor yet on the principle of humanity, though the people ardently desired to return to their old master, who was humane and moderate while the Ameers were harsh and exacting; but simply in accordance with his avowed resolution to punish infidelity and reward fidelity. Even this he did not positively contemplate; he desired that the Ameers' minds should be left tranquil, and disclaimed any intention of making hasty changes in his political relations with them, hoping, no doubt, that the operations of Nott and Pollock, then in full activity, would, in conjunction with the presence of Colonel England's column, check any further disposition for hostility.

Fresh offences on the part of the Ameers soon dissipated this hope, and shewed the error of withholding the warning letters of the Governor-General to the Ameers. If they had failed to quell the angry spirit of those Princes, they would yet have placed the British cause in a more dignified posture; and could scarcely, as Major Outram supposed, have hastened an outbreak, seeing the resolution of the Ameers was fixed to regain their independence; their preparations to effect that object were steady, changing only as the mutations of the Affghan war gave them hopes or fears.

The Boogtees and other tribes were at this

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period stirred up by one Mohamed Shurreef, a Syud of Scinde, acting in conjunction with an Affghan named Mohamed Sadig. These men were so active, that the tribes were on the point of breaking out in open warfare on the communications of the British, with Candahar, when the seizure of Mohamed Shurreef by stratagem, caused Sadig to fly, and, according to Major Outram, put an end to the project of war. Nevertheless the expectation of a general outbreak had so excited the Ameers both of Hyderabad and Kyrpoor, that their arrogance burst the bonds of prudence. They interrupted the navigation of the Indus, caused boats of traffic to be fired upon, exacted duties contrary to treaty, and even ordered that all merchants and traders of Scinde, who had built themselves houses or established shops in the British cantonment of Kurrachee, should be punished by the destruction of their houses and the confiscation of their goods. This was a hostile and barbarous proceeding. For the British stations were crowded with persons flying from the tyranny of the Ameers, to whom the reviving commerce of the country was odious if protected from their exactions.

“ We do not choose to let our subjects trade with the British and the fifth article of the treaty of 1839 forbids the British Government to interfere between us and our subjects.”

This was their subtle plea, yet fallacious, because their prohibition was not a dispute between the Ameers and their subjects, but an act of hostility against the British, who were thus cut off and isolated as an infected people: indeed, the Ameers designated them as a pestilence in the land.

The capture of Mohamed Shurreef, and the flight of Sadig the Affghan, checked the hopes of the

Scindian Princes for a moment, but they were again excited by Nott's advance from Candahar; they judged it a forced abandonment of that important city; and though he afterwards destroyed Ghuzni, and in conjunction with Pollock ruined Istalif and Cabool, the apparently hurried retreat from Affghanistan which followed, bore for these misjudging people the character of a flight. It was viewed as a proof of weakness, and both Beloochs and Brahooes became more hopeful and more confident than before. The Rulers of upper and lower Scinde consulted together, how best to league against the Feringhees. Seik vakeels were at Kyrpoor, ready to start for Lahore loaded with presents for the Maharajah. And at the same time letters came from the victorious Affghans, reminding the Ameers that they were feudatories of the Dooranee Empire, and exhorting them to act boldly in the common cause. These things kept the flame of anger alive in the hearts of the Ameers, and led to their final destruction; they were the forerunners of the battle by which they fell; but the primary cause, it has been shewn, was deeper seated. The Scindian war was no isolated event. "It was the tail of the Affghan storm."

Mohamed Shurreef's capture was the last act of Major Outram as supreme Political Agent. It was not Lord Ellenborough's policy to divide power between political and military chiefs; nor to place the latter below the former, when war was at hand. Hence the removal of Major Outram was a necessary consequence of Scinde being placed under a General; but there were other causes for dismissing him. The Governor-General did not think highly of his talents, and had been forced to withdraw all confidence in him, on specific grounds of a serious

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and public nature, distinct from the offence he gave by urging his own opinions and views upon his superiors against all reason. Sir Charles Napier, a better man for war or policy, and of a surer judgment in what constitutes greatness, then took the entire charge of Scinde and its troubled affairs.

Vide his
letter to
Major-Gen-
eral W.
Napier.
Sun News-
paper.

Bulst's
Bombay
Times.

The clamour of many tongues has been raised against Lord Ellenborough for this summary dismissal; as if a man of incredible genius and unmatched services, had been foully driven from a sphere of utility where he alone could guide events to a happy ending. Major Outram has, himself, publicly intimated that his political efforts in Scinde were remarkable in themselves, and productive of the most beneficial results; and that his removal was productive of deplorable consequences. But no facts have been made known to bear out this opinion. No indications of great ability are to be found in his official correspondence. Neither Lord Ellenborough nor Sir Charles Napier were able to detect the mark of this superior genius, which seems to have its birth and resting place in the columns of a-despicable Indian newspaper. It is true that the General, influenced by a generous warmth of temper, and admiring the daring courage and activity of an able partisan, such as Major Outram is universally admitted to be, offered a glowing compliment to him at a public dinner. It is true also, that, giving him credit for greater ability than he found him on trial to possess, Sir Charles obtained permission from Lord Ellenborough to recall him to active political service in Scinde. But these were only the measure of the General's liberal feelings, not of Major Outram's talents; and they were impulses which have not been responded to generously.

CHAPTER V.

At Sukkur Sir Charles Napier found the following instructions, reiterating Lord Ellenborough's unchanged resolutions.

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“Should any Ameer, or chief, with whom we
“have a treaty of alliance and friendship, have
“evinced hostile designs against us, during the
“late events, which may have induced them to
“doubt the continuance of our power, it is the
“present intention of the Governor-General to in-
“flict upon the treachery of such ally and friend
“so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter
“others from similar conduct; but the Govern-
“General would not proceed in this course without
“the most complete and convincing evidence of
“guilt in the person accused.”—“The Govern-
“General relies entirely on your sense of justice,
“and is convinced that whatever reports you may
“make upon the subject, after full investigation,
“will be such as he may safely act upon.”

This dispatch, containing the basis of the writer's policy, was written in September, that is to say, four months after the warning letter to the Ameers, and after receiving Major Outram's reports of their hostile proceedings and temper, with that officer's opinion that the Governor-General might dictate any terms. It shews how entirely averse Lord

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Ellenborough was to hasty or violent procedure against the rulers of Scinde; and if necessity forced him to be stern in maintenance of actual engagements, his desire was to forward by peaceful means a mutually beneficial intercourse; his ultimate object being, as he said in another place, the establishment of unrestricted trade between all the countries of the Indus the Sea and the Himalayas.

But he thus threw the moral responsibility of any action to which he might be provoked by his General's report, upon the latter, and not unreasonably. Deep, therefore, is the feeling of truth with which the proofs of that General's unsullied honour and humanity are now recorded; for he went not to work shackled and bound as a mere executive officer; he had a wide discretion, and an awful charge upon his conscience from a confiding superior, to do what was right and just according to the light afforded him. Whether he responded to that charge with a worthy spirit, or betrayed it with sordid and sanguinary feeling, as writers, infamous in their calumnies, have dared to insinuate—let mankind decide here upon the facts. And the Deity he invoked aloud from the midst of the dead after the battle to judge his motives, will decide hereafter!

It has been shewn how, in the height and flow of their splendid flattery at Hyderabad, Sir Charles Napier warned the Ameers, that it would thenceforth be unsafe for them to break their engagements; for he knew of their infractions of the treaty at Kurrachee, and frankly told them such things should not be—they must abate their pride or meet the Governor-General's displeasure. The offences he specified were, the levying of duties at

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the bunder, or port, on goods going to the British cantonment; the taking of tolls on the river; and the hostile measure of driving their subjects from the bazaar of Kurrachee. The first was a violation of the XII and XIII articles of the treaty of 1839. The second an infraction of the XI article. The last was a breach of the I article, and of the preamble, and of the whole spirit of the treaty, which professed amity and free intercourse; and it was of deep interest, for the people fled in crowds from the Ameer's tyranny to take refuge in the English camps.

The Ameers relied for their justification on the article V, which forbade the British Government to listen to complaints from Scindian subjects, or to interfere in their disputes with the rulers. The General met the subterfuge, by declaring, that the complaint came from the British authorities, not from the subjects of the Ameers; he complained of it as an act of enmity, as indeed it was.

To this argument they could not reply; yet with respect to the tolls they drew a nice distinction. It was true, tolls were not to be levied, but that applied only to foreigners—not to their own subjects. And when the words of the article, precise, positive, and making no such distinction, were shewn to them, they answered, we did not understand it so, or we should have opposed an article depriving us of revenue without any explanation. Moreover, they had in practice levied such tolls without hindrance up to 1840, and though Major Outram then opposed the practice, he advocated the Ameers' view of the matter to Lord Auckland, in opposition to Colonel Pottinger, who made the treaty, and who had, through his native

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agent, and through his assistants, Lieutenants Leckie and Eastlake, positively denied this right to them, and insisted on the text of the treaty being the guide. Mr. Ross Bell also had denied the Ameers' interpretation. Nevertheless Major Outram having discovered that the native agent had intercepted Colonel Pottinger's communications and those of his political assistants on this subject, continued pertinaciously to urge the Ameers' claim upon the Governor-General; supporting his arguments with Benjamin Franklin's authority, to the effect "that no objects of trade warranted the spilling of blood,—that commerce is to be extended by the cheapness and goodness of commodities,—that the profit of no trade could equal the expence of compelling it by fleets and armies."

Very sound maxims, and most curiously misapplied. For there was no attempt to force commerce—it was a question of duties under existing treaties. Franklin's meaning is, that nations cannot be forced to trade profitably, nor to abandon trade against their will, and that to attempt it is wicked and foolish. Here it was not the people who were to be coerced, it was four or five ignorant barbarous despots, who sought to prevent their people from trading. The dicta of the great American, therefore, was specifically opposed to Major Outram's application.

But the most notable circumstance attending this dispute, was the glaring inutility of the political agents, and their assistants, generally. These functionaries, so largely paid, so numerous, their diplomatic ability so lauded, their knowledge of the Eastern people so vaunted, their skill in negotiation so sure, as if it were some occult matter, some ma-

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sonic secret, some talisman which the initiated only could use with effect, were here deceived, baffled, laughed at, by their own native agent and by the barbarian Ameers. And that not once, or for a moment, but for a year, and in respect to an important precise article of a treaty, negotiated by one of them, and the execution of which affected the whole commerce of the Indus—the main object of their diplomatic care! At the end of three years this vital point was still a subject of dispute at a most critical period. To write long letters in self-praise, to describe the dress of one prince, the compliments of another, the feasts of a third—to be the hero of a newspaper—to have an establishment of innumerable clerks and servants, to employ hundreds of camels for personal baggage, to let the real business of the state slip from your hands, and then call for an army to pick it up! This is to be a political agent—this is to “know the people!”

Lord Ellenborough was more than justified in his sweeping reform. And it was a conviction, that the loose mode of intercourse hitherto carried on with the Ameers had led to mischief and was derogatory to such a powerful government as the Anglo-Indian, which induced Sir Charles Napier at once to assume a frank, though stern tone, with these Scindian rulers. For well he knew, that however much modes and customs may differ with nations, man is intrinsically the same all over the world, and to be governed by his passions. He held it shameful, and wicked, by any appearance of infirmity of purpose, to tempt the Ameers to display their arrogance when the Governor-General had assured him the sword of vengeance would be inexorably bared for the first fault. They had,

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however, already been tempted, by an unsteady diplomacy acting on proud minds, into a course full of danger for them, and he was to make a true and faithful report of their misdeeds. This he effected twelve days after his arrival at Sükkur, shewing a list of offences more or less grave, but the whole proving a settled design for war when opportunity offered. Supported by evidence, as good as could be obtained where the secret machinations of princes, who had the power and the will to destroy those who informed against them, were to be laid open, this list of offences certainly warranted a resort to arms, or the imposition of a fresh treaty under pain of war.

Against the Ameer Roostum of Kyrpoor they proved, secret intercourse with foreign states contrary to treaty, and with designs hostile to the British;—maltreatment of British servants;—obstructions to the commerce and navigation of the Indus;—illegal imprisonment of British subjects, and, through the agency of his minister Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, aiding the escape of Mohamed Shurreef a public enemy, which happened about this period.

Against the Ameer, Nusseer of Hyderabad, they proved the levying troops to attack Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, upon a boundary dispute which had been referred to the British arbitration;—perfidiously inveigling the assistant political agent to meddle privately in a dispute between the Ameer and his subjects, and then charging this, his own act, against the British Government as a breach of treaty;—repeated wilful violations of the eleventh article of the treaty, with an avowed determination to set it aside;—delaying the transfer of Shikar-

poor, when he knew of the disasters in Affghanistan;—secretly coining base money to defraud the British Government in the payment of tribute;—exact-
 ing illegal tolls, refusing to refund, and obstructing the navigation and commerce of the Indus;—opposing the free supply of the bazaar at Kurra-
 chee, and preventing his subjects from settling and trading in the British cantonment;—employing troops to menace the possession of another Ameer, when the dispute had been referred to the British authorities, thus violating the 3rd article of the treaty, which guaranteed to each Ameer his separate dominions;—neglect of tribute, and finally, exciting by letter, Beebruck, the chief of the Booghtee tribe, to take up arms against the British troops, who were he said, retreating, worsted, from *Khorassan*, the name by which the Scindians generally designated Affghanistan.

These offences, which were all violations of treaty, had been continued from early in 1841, up to September 1842, shewing a settled enmity; and at the very moment of Sir C. Napier's arrival at Sukkur, Nusseer and Roostum, the chief Ameer of upper and lower Scinde, contracted a secret alliance and confederacy, offensive and defensive against the British power. They sought to draw Ali Moorad into their views; they prepared to send away their wives and children; they collected their troops, enlisted many of the Affghans who had followed General England's column from Quettah; issued instructions to all their feudatory chiefs to be in readiness to take the field, and held councils with the chiefs of the Murrees and other Brahooe tribes. The English troops, they said, were, as their spies informed them, so weak miserable and sickly,

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they could not resist; and if they were healthy, “had they not been driven from Affghanistan! “Let the priests proclaim a religious war against “the Feringhee caffirs! When they went against “Khorassan and Cabool, they made us promise “three lacs of rupees yearly for tribute. Now they “have been driven from thence, and we have an “answer ready when the money is demanded”!

Here were ample grounds for a resort to force. Did Lord Ellenborough eagerly seize the opportunity? Did his General advise him to do so? The answer to these questions will place their conduct in a true light, each on its own pedestal, for their distinct position must always be kept in view. Lord Ellenborough knew all the odious process by which the treaties, giving him the right now to resent these hostile measures of the Ameers, were obtained. The General knew nothing of them, the official correspondence explaining them was not then published; he could not suspect its nature; he could not ask for it, nor would it have been given to him if he had. He could only look at the treaties as contracts voluntarily made, and which he was in Scinde to uphold both as a political agent and as a military officer. As contracts he saw friendship, alliance, protection, offered and accepted by the weaker power; the promotion of trade commerce and navigation; and in their effects the improvement of the people’s condition. He saw those people, of all classes, crowding into the British cantonments to avoid the grinding exactions and barbarous tyranny of their rulers. He saw those rulers, debauched and ignorant, trampling for their pleasures with the hoofs of wild beasts one fourth of the fertile land which should

have fed the starving multitudes : and this with so little remorse, that one had recently depopulated two villages to make a Shikargah for his child of eight years old !

It was with these things before his eyes, this suffering and wickedness on one side, this promise of remedy on the other, that Sir Charles Napier made that report to Lord Ellenborough which was to determine the latter's course of action. And Lord Ellenborough's right to act, that also must be considered, or there can be no just judgment ! It was the right of necessity, of self-preservation, a necessity he had not produced, he found it. In that consists its justice. Take away this ground and it was a continuation of Lord Auckland's aggressive policy ; yet always with this palliation, that Lord Ellenborough sought no aggrandisement, put forth no mocking pretensions of friendship to cover injustice. Standing on the right of treaties concluded, he pursued the general interests of humanity, disregarding only the conventional right of besotted tyrants, men who themselves trampled upon all rights, and were ever ready sword in hand to take from the possessions of their neighbours. This is the worst view that can be given of Lord Ellenborough's policy. But the Ameers' conventional right to govern their miserable subjects without the interference of a foreign power, was nullified by their treaties ; and though it were not so, Lord Ellenborough had the plea of self-preservation. Sobdar of Hyderabad, and Ali Moorad of Kyrpoor had also with a good will accepted the treaties from the first ; and Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, voluntarily sought one on the same footing as Sobdar, demurring only to the payment of tribute. The origin of the Scindian

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war being thus placed on a sound basis for fair discussion, the following view taken by Sir Charles Napier will be more readily appreciated :

“ It is not for me to consider how we came to occupy Scinde, but to consider the subject as it now stands. We are here by right of treaties entered into by the Ameers, and therefore stand on the same footing as themselves ; for rights held under treaty are as sacred as the right which sanctions that treaty. There does not appear any public protest registered against the treaties by the Ameers, they are therefore to be considered as free expressions of the will of the contracting parties.”

“ The English occupy Shikarpoor, Bukkur, and Kurrachee, by treaties which, if rigidly adhered to by the Ameers, would render those princes more rich and powerful, and their subjects more happy, than they now are. If sticklers for abstract right maintain—as no doubt they will—that to prevent a man from doing mischief is to enslave him, then it may be called hard to enforce a rigid observance of these treaties. But the evident object of the treaties is to favour our Indian interests, by abolishing barbarism and ameliorating the condition of society, by obliging the Ameers to do, in compliance with those treaties, that which honourable and civilized rulers would do of their own accord. It is necessary to keep this in view, because though the desire to do good would not sanction a breach of treaty, it does sanction the exacting a rigid adherence to the treaties by the Ameers ; and the more so that their infractions of them evinces the barbarism of those princes, their total want of feeling for their subjects, and their own unfitness

“ to govern a country. These things must be kept
 “ in mind, or what I am about to say will appear
 “ unjust, which is not the case.”

“ By treaty, the time for which we may occupy
 “ our present camps is unlimited ; but there is such
 “ hostility to us on the part of the Ameers—such
 “ a hatred of the treaties—such a resolution to
 “ break them in every way ; there is amongst their
 “ people such a growing attachment to British rule,
 “ that the question arises, whether we shall abandon
 “ the interests of humanity and those of the British
 “ Government, which in this case are one, and at
 “ once evacuate Scinde ; or take advantage of
 “ existing treaties and maintain our camps perma-
 “ nently ?”

“ If we evacuate the country, future events will
 “ inevitably bring us back to the banks of the
 “ Indus. If we remain, our camps will soon be
 “ filled with the Ameers’ subjects flying from
 “ oppression. These camps will quickly grow into
 “ towns, and the people within them will carry on
 “ a transit trade along the Indus, to the exclusion
 “ of the subjects of the Ameers without. Among
 “ the latter misery and poverty will sojourn, for
 “ the exactions of the Ameers will in a great
 “ measure destroy both commerce and agriculture
 “ among their people.”

“ This produces another question ; can such a
 “ state of things long continue ? A government
 “ hated by its subjects, despotic, hostile alike to
 “ the interests of the English and of its own
 “ people : a government of low intrigue, and so
 “ constituted that it must in a few years fall to
 “ pieces by the vice of its construction ? Will not
 “ such a government maintain an incessant petty

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“hostility against us? Will it not incessantly
“commit breaches of treaties, those treaties by
“which alone we have any right to remain in this
“country and must therefore rigidly uphold?
“I conceive such a state of political relations can-
“not last, the more powerful government will at
“no distant period swallow up the weaker. Would
“it not be better to come to the results at once?
“I think it would be better, *if it can be done with*
“*honesty*. Let me then consider how we might
“go to work on a matter so critical, and whether
“the facts to which I have called your attention
“will bear me out in what I propose.”

“Several Ameers have broken treaty in the
“various instances stated in the accompanying
“‘Return of Complaints.’ I have maintained that
“we want only a fair pretext to coerce the Ameers,
“and I think these various acts recorded give
“abundant reason to take Kurrachee, Sukkur, Buk-
“kur, Shikarpoor, and Subzulcote for our own, and
“obliging the Ameers to leave a track way along
“both banks of the Indus, stipulating for a supply
“of wood: but at the same time remitting all
“tribute, and arrears of tribute, in favour of those
“Ameers whose conduct has been correct; and
“finally, enter into a fresh treaty with one of
“those princes alone as chief. I cannot think such
“a procedure would be dishonourable or harsh.
“I am sure it would be humane. The refractory
“Ameers break the treaty to gratify their avarice,
“and we punish that breach. I perceive no in-
“justice.”

“If it be determined to keep Sukkur and Buk-
“kur, I think it would not be politic to give up Shi-
“karpoor. The town of Sukkur stands on an elbow

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“ of the Indus, which surrounds the town on two sides ; on the other two, at about four miles distance, it is closed in by a large jungle, through which passes the road to Shikarpoor where the jungle finishes. If we evacuate Shikarpoor, the robber tribes will descend from the hills and establish themselves in the jungle, Sukkur will be blockaded, and no one be able to move beyond the chain of sentries without being murdered. To clear this jungle with infantry will be impossible ; the robbers will retreat, and when the troops retire again occupy the jungle. But if Shikarpoor is occupied, a body of cavalry stationed there could spread along the outskirts of the jungle, while infantry would by concert push from Sukkur through the wood. The robbers, thus cut off from the hills, would receive such a terrible punishment as to deter other tribes from trying the same experiment.”

“ In a commercial point, Shikarpoor is of considerable importance. It offers a depôt for goods from the north and west, with the countries of which it has long possessed channels of communication. Adverse circumstances may for a while interrupt these, but under a firm protecting government they would soon be re-opened : Shikarpoor goods would be sent to Sukkur, there to be shipped on the Indus ; and they would also be passed by land to Larkana, and thence to Kurrachee. These seem to have been formerly the lines of trade ; they are geographically and naturally so, and will, therefore, quickly revive. But if Shikarpoor be left to the mercy of the surrounding freebooters commerce cannot thrive ; nor, without Shikarpoor be strongly guarded, can

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“ it pass through the jungle to Sukkur. These
 “ two towns naturally support each other in
 “ commerce.”

“ In a political view Shikarpoor has the advan-
 “ tage of being chiefly inhabited by a Hindoo
 “ population, tolerated for ages by the Mussulmans,
 “ and, consequently, forming a pacific link of in-
 “ tercourse between us and the nations north and
 “ west; through Shikarpoor these Hindoos will
 “ gradually filter the stream of commerce, and be
 “ the means of social intercourse between the Ma-
 “ homedans and ourselves, in time uniting those
 “ who will not abruptly amalgamate. Shikarpoor
 “ contains many rich banking houses, which is a
 “ sure evidence of its being a central point of
 “ communication between surrounding countries,
 “ and, consequently, one where the British Go-
 “ vernment would learn what was going on in
 “ Asia. The money market is generally the best
 “ political barometer.

“ The robber tribes in the neighbourhood have
 “ kept down this town in despite of its natural
 “ and acquired advantages; in fact, the robber is
 “ every where the master; therefore all around is
 “ barbarous, and barbarous must continue to be,
 “ till civilization gradually encroaches on these
 “ lawless people, and I think Shikarpoor is pre-
 “ cisely one of those grand positions which ought
 “ to be seized in that view. I have, therefore,
 “ directed Major-General England not to evacuate
 “ that town till further instructions are received
 “ from the Governor-General.”

“ I have drawn up this memorandum entirely
 “ on my own consideration of the subject; but
 “ since Major Outram’s arrival, which took place

“ when I had finished the last paragraph, he has
 “ given me every possible assistance. He concurs
 “ in all I have said, but, at the same time, he has
 “ added much to my local knowledge, and in jus-
 “ tice to the Ameers, I must, with this increase of
 “ information, enlarge upon what I have stated.

“ The Ameers say, they did not understand
 “ article XI. of the treaty to prohibit the levying
 “ of tolls on their own subjects. They urge, in
 “ proof of this misconception, that they resisted
 “ the treaty because of other articles less important,
 “ yet never objected to article XI. because they
 “ relied on article V. This may be; and I would
 “ willingly, if possible, suppose that they really
 “ did conceive the treaty gave them tolls on their
 “ own subjects; but they have attempted to levy
 “ tolls on the boats of the Khan of Bhawulpore,
 “ which the treaty assuredly does not give them a
 “ right to do; and they have fired into the boats
 “ of merchants from Bhawulpore. The treaty
 “ could not have been misconstrued on these
 “ points, and therefore I do not believe they mis-
 “ construed article XI., but broke it purposely.
 “ The treaty has also been broken by treasonable
 “ correspondence, and other vexatious acts, as set
 “ forth in the return of complaints.

“ Now, what punishment do I propose for their
 “ misconduct? Injury to their family? No!
 “ Injury to their subjects? No! What then?
 “ The reduction of their territory by four places;
 “ two of which, Sukkur and Bukkur, are barren
 “ spots yielding no revenue; the other two, Kur-
 “ rachee and Shikarpoor, towns nearly ruined by
 “ their tyranny, and for one of which, Shikarpoor,
 “ we have negotiations pending. To obtain these

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“ places in seignorage it is proposed to remit all
 “ tribute in arrear, and for the future withdraw
 “ our resident from Hyderabad, ensure the amelio-
 “ ration of the impoverished state in which their
 “ subjects languish, and, in time, add to the power
 “ and wealth of the Ameers themselves by opening
 “ the commerce of the river. To their selfish feel-
 “ ings, their avarice and love of hunting, ought
 “ such great general interests to be sacrificed? I
 “ think not. The real interests of the Ameers
 “ themselves demand that their puerile pursuits
 “ and blind avaricious proceedings should be sub-
 “ ject to a wholesome controul, which their breaches
 “ of treaties, and our power give us at this moment
 “ a lawful right to exercise, and the means of
 “ peaceably enforcing. If any civilized man were
 “ asked this question. ‘ Were you the ruler of
 “ Scinde, what would you do?’ His answer would
 “ be. ‘ I would abolish the tolls on the rivers,
 “ make Kurrachee a free port, protect Shikarpoor
 “ from robbers, make Sukkur a mart for trade on
 “ the Indus. I would make a track-way along its
 “ banks; I would get steam-boats.’ Yet all this
 “ is what the Ameers dread.”

“ They have broken treaties, they have given a
 “ pretext, and I have a full conviction, perhaps
 “ erroneously, that what I propose is just and
 “ humane. I will go farther, and say, as Nusseer
 “ Khan of Hyderabad has openly broken the treaty,
 “ if the Governor-General chooses to punish him,
 “ he may justly seize the district of Subzulcote, and
 “ give it to the Khan of Bhawulpore, as I have
 “ understood there was some intention of doing.”

“ The second point to which Major Outram has
 “ drawn my attention is a very strong one. He

“ tells me, the tribes on the river, above that part
 “ possessed by the Ameers of Scinde, do levy tolls,
 “ and that there is no treaty or public document
 “ forthcoming in virtue of which we can call upon
 “ the Ameers even of upper Scinde not to levy
 “ tolls upon their own subjects. It is therefore
 “ evident that to call upon the Ameers of Hydera-
 “ bad to desist from levying tolls, and to allow the
 “ tribes above them on the river to do so, would be
 “ unjust; that is to say, it would be unjust to allow
 “ the others to levy tolls, but not unjust to prevent
 “ the Ameers from doing so. The answer to the
 “ argument: ‘ That tolls are levied on the North-
 “ ern Indus’ is just this. Say to those Northern
 “ tribes, ‘ We have, with great trouble secured to
 “ your boats a free passage on the river through
 “ Scinde; we are resolved to open the commerce
 “ of that great high way of nations; and you, who
 “ receive benefit thereby, must join in this measure
 “ leading to the good of all, and to the loss of
 “ none.’ Wherefore to excuse the Ameers upon
 “ the ground that others are not equally coerced,
 “ is answered by coercing the others.”

“ Having thus given the best view I can take of
 “ this intricate subject, I shall accompany this
 “ report by various documents, among which there
 “ is one giving a kind of return, if I may so call
 “ it, of the accusations against the Ameers, upon
 “ which accusations, (relative to which I have read
 “ every paper,) I have founded my opinion of
 “ their conduct; and by referring to this return,
 “ it will be seen whether I have justly estimated
 “ the complaints made against them by the politi-
 “ cal agents. I have also added the documents
 “ verifying each transaction. I have caused Major

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“ Outram to give me a memorandum of the state
 “ in which the treaty with the Ameers for the pur-
 “ chase of Shikarpoor remains, as it has been in
 “ abeyance since last year. From this memoran-
 “ dum it would appear, that in addition to the
 “ great advantages for Sukkur, which would at-
 “ tend the occupation of Shikarpoor, this district
 “ would be a very valuable acquisition, in point of
 “ revenue, in time; and would with the aid of
 “ Kurrachee, cover the expense of guarding our
 “ newly acquired towns on the banks of the Indus.
 “ Should it hereafter be deemed proper to make
 “ the proposed arrangements with the Ameers so,
 “ as to punish those who have broken the treaty,
 “ the details of such arrangements can be easily
 “ made. The transfer of tribute due, would ade-
 “ quately repay whatever portions of the districts
 “ in question belong to the Ameers whose conduct
 “ has been loyal.”

Appended to this memoir was a table of the value of each town to be taken from the Ameers, the amount of tribute to be remitted being balanced against the gross sum, which gave a money gain to those princes of more than thirty thousand rupees yearly; an overplus to be offered as an equivalent for the right of cutting fuel along the banks of the river, the wood to be paid for besides.

This view of the affairs of Scinde, was transmitted to the Governor-General before the recent confederacy and warlike measures of the Ameers, had become known to place them in a worse position; and, to a man seeking occasion to war, they furnished ample, undeniable justification, for drawing the sword. But neither now, nor at any time, did Sir Charles Napier desire ought but peace and justice.

Calmly he had reasoned on the general conduct of the Scindian rulers, and reached his conclusions with a full conviction of their honesty and humanity; hence the confederacy and all its warlike accompaniments disturbed him not, nor changed his views. He knew the Ameers to be debauched men, habitually intoxicated with bhang; he saw their measures, hasty and violent, were adopted more in defence than offence, as thinking their dominions were to be wrested from them, and he thus laconically noticed them. "The Ameers are nervous, and these ebullitions are the result."

But though the confederacy and its menacing accompaniments was an ebullition, it was only one of many springing from a fixed resolution to throw off the yoke imposed by Lord Auckland; and such ebullitions became more frequent and violent as the state of affairs, in Affghanistan and other places, became more or less favourable for the British. Can any man blame the Ameers justly for this resolution, having retrospect to the aggressive unfair policy which imposed the treaties? Assuredly not! Neither can Lord Ellenborough be fairly censured for his fixed resolution to maintain the treaties he found existing; regard being had to his general position, and the great interests, political, military and commercial, involved in the question; regard being had also, to the cries of humanity, to the suffering Scindians' supplications to abate the tyranny of their rulers; to the robber habits of the Beloochees; and to not the least important consideration resulting from the nature of the Ameers' sovereignty, the order of succession to the Turban being in favour of the brother not the eldest son. The splitting of their private possessions at

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every death, each portion carrying with it sovereign power, and that power being always exercised in the worst spirit of cruelty and oppression. The jealousies, the hatred, the civil dissensions, necessarily attendant on such customs, together with the horrible debauchery and sensuality and ignorance of the princes themselves, under the action of which the whole race of Scindees was rapidly being exterminated, and their land becoming a wilderness, should also be considered. The inevitable termination in a very few years of the Talpoor dynasty, was sure to result from this combination of all evil and hateful influences. The final delivering over of the ruined country to the wild robber tribes, would have followed, and their vicinity to the Anglo-Indian frontier necessarily have produced collision, and provoked conquest at a later period. This would be only to recur, after so much misery on one side, to the supremacy now in possession.

All these urgent and touching considerations, rendered Lord Ellenborough's resolution not only just, because necessary, but praiseworthy; nothing was opposed to it save a past wrong offered, not to the real interests but to the pride of sensual tyrants by a former Governor-General! The world's ways are not so virtuous as to make this a fault, much less a crime!

Lord Ellenborough, taking the evidence presented to him by his General as a guide, adhered to his former avowed resolution, to punish and reward according to the fidelity or infidelity of his allies, as the rule of action; yet cautiously, and with a marked anxiety to apply it, uninfluenced by passion error or undue severity. Roostum of Kyrpoor's letter to the Maharajah, and the part

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which his minister, Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, took in the escape of the Syud Mohamed Shurreef, affixed on that Ameer the character of an enemy : so also, Nusseer of Hyderabad's letter to Beebruck Booghtee, placed him in the same category. But, said the Governor-General, these acts must be clearly traced home to the Ameers ere any demand in reparation can be justly made. The other infractions of the treaty in lower Scinde had been however so frequent, and so pertinaciously persisted in, that effectual remedies and penalties to give them full effect were necessary. And those remedies were to be extended to upper Scinde, the right to do so being grounded on the VIII Article of Roostum's treaty of 1839, by which that Ameer was bound to co-operate in all measures for extending and facilitating the commerce and navigation of the Indus.

In this view, repeating his former reasons for obtaining territory rather than tribute, Lord Ellenborough desired to base the new arrangements upon that principle. Referring also to a great scheme he was revolving to establish uniformity of money throughout India, he seized this opportunity for seeking to bring Scinde within its operation. He was yet willing, in deference to the importance which all native princes attached to the right of coinage as the distinctive mark of sovereignty, to unite the device of the Scindian rulers with the device of England, the latter to bear the whole expense.

The right of cutting fuel for the steamers along the banks of the Indus he insisted upon, but desired in the practice to spare the feelings of the Ameers by respecting their hunting preserves.

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He had no wish, he said, to obtain more territory than was absolutely necessary to secure the command of the Indus. And therefore, whatever he might take from the Ameers in the way of penalty for past transgressions or in exchange for tribute, all beyond that security would be given to the Khan of Bhawalpore, as a reward for his unvarying friendship. This was peculiarly fitting, as being only the restoring of territory which had been unjustly wrested from him by the offending Ameers; it would also give an uninterrupted line of communication, through friendly states, from the British station at Ferozepore to that in upper Scinde.

To secure the military command of the Indus, he required Sukkur, Roree, and Bukkur in upper Scinde; Tattah and Kurrachee in lower Scinde; most of them being, as Sir C. Napier observed, sterile places, for which tribute to a greater amount than their worth was to be remitted: this demand also, was quite in the general interests of mankind.

“ My ultimate object, said Lord Ellenborough, “ is the entire freedom of internal trade throughout “ the whole territory between the Hindoo Khosh, the “ Indus, and the sea; and I only await the favourable “ occasion for effecting this purpose, and for intro- “ ducing uniformity of currency within the same “ limits. And to these great benefits, to be enjoyed “ equally by one hundred and forty millions of “ people, I desire ultimately to add the abolition of “ all tributes payable by one state to another, and “ the substitution of cessions of territory made, by “ means of mutual exchanges, as to bring together “ in masses the dominions of the several sovereigns “ and chiefs.”

These changes, if effected without shocking the national feelings and desires of the different people transferred, formed a great and noble scheme to benefit a fifth part of the human race, and alone would warrant a revision of the treaties with the Ameers by the force of negotiation: but the justice of a revision by force of arms, negotiation failing, would still rest on the violations of existing contracts. The demand for territory was a punishment, to be inflicted only on proof of hostility having been evinced by the Ameers in their secret negotiations for a confederacy against British power. To obtain this proof the General was exhorted to use his utmost diligence, and conscientiously to report. Meanwhile he received the draft of a new treaty embodying the Governor-General's views, a distinction being made in favour of the Ameer Sobdar, whose seemingly unvarying faith was repaid, he not being under any tribute which could be remitted, by an accession of territory equal to fifty thousand rupees yearly.

The required proofs were soon obtained, yet by a most rigid process. The General took an acknowledged seal of Nusseer and compared it with that attached to the intercepted letter to Beebruck; they appeared similar; but when with a minute earnestness he measured each letter and their distances in both, with a pair of compasses, a difference was perceptible. He was however assured that to have two seals, thus differing to deceive, was notoriously the custom of the Ameers. Wherefore he desired the persons who had intercepted the letter, to procure for him also the secret seal of the prince; this they tried but could not do, and thus removed from the General's mind all suspicion of their treachery,

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seeing, that a second forgery would have secured the object of the first, and was not more difficult. None of the persons, English or native, cognizant of the Ameer's signet, doubted the authenticity of the intercepted seal; but their confident assertions on this head the General would not accept as proof, and thus delayed his decision. At last he obtained an authentic paper with the secret signet seal of Nusseer attached, and it was precisely the same as that on the intercepted letter; moreover, the writing accompanying the undoubted seal was known to be the writing of the Ameer's favourite moonshee or scribe. The proof was therefore complete that the Ameer had urged Beebruck Booghtee to fall on the British; and had also urged the Mooltan man, though less openly, to the same course, and with effect, for he raised troops and diligently fortified his capital.

Roostum of Kyrpoor's intercourse with the Maharajah was likewise proved by his seal, the authenticity of which was never questioned; and by the concurrent testimony of persons conversant with such matters as to the style and verisimilitude of thought. But the writing was that of his minister, and as Roostum was old, and nearly imbecile from debauchery, Major Outram suggested that the minister might have affixed the seal of the Ameer without his knowledge. This fastidious delicacy of doubt, by a man who had so recently assured the Governor-General that the Ameer's conduct would justify the imposition of any terms, was put aside by this question from the General. If a Prince blindly gives his power and his signet to his minister, is such folly to excuse him from the consequences? Subsequently, Roostum's culpable

knowledge was established. The General, who had been charged by Lord Ellenborough to draw up and present the new treaty to the Ameers when the proofs of delinquency were complete, was now empowered to choose his own commissioner to conduct the details of the negotiation. And, such was the confidence reposed in his judgment, to carry through this affair honourably by diplomacy or arms, that the Governor-General left him master of both, merely observing, that he could make no concession before a native power which was collecting troops, nominally for defensive purposes, but which the least wavering would direct to purposes of aggression.

Sir Charles Napier now became arbiter of peace and war. On his head rested the responsibility, moral and political, of enforcing the treaty; in his hands were life and death for thousands; the fate of Scinde depended on his word, the fate of India perhaps on the stroke of his sword. He was an untried general, but now found equal to the crisis. And what his friends had always known him to be he shewed himself to the world, a man of strong heart and subtil genius, sagacious in perception, ready in expedients, of heroic daring, his fiery courage supported by a pure conscience, and tempered by the gentlest feelings, but warmed with a generous spirit which spurned dishonour in whatever garb it came.

“I will,” he wrote to the man who had so confidently placed him in this post of difficulty and danger, “I will present your treaty to the Ameers. I will spare no pains to convince them, that neither injury nor injustice are meditated, and that by accepting the treaty they will become more rich,

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“ and more secure of power than they now are. If
“ they refuse to listen to reason, if they persist in
“ sacrificing every thing to their avarice and their
“ hunting grounds, they must even have their way,
“ and try the force of arms at their peril, if they
“ are so resolved.

With what an insane fury they did rush to arms
shall be shewn hereafter.

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LOOKING forward, like an experienced soldier, to the ultimate chance of war, Sir Charles Napier had early applied himself to the organization and discipline of his troops, for they were generally inexperienced. He drew them out frequently, and accustomed them to move in masses; he taught them by counsel also, and exhorted them to a subordinate and modest conduct towards the people of Scinde. Nor was he deficient in a quaint humour which no danger or suffering has ever abated, for when did Charles Napier's spirit ever quail! Broad at times the stream of that humour flows, but never sinks to buffoonery. Always illustrative, it conveys instruction and even imperious rebuke in a laughing guise, and with a jest he wins the soldiers' hearts; they feel their general regards them as comrades and not as slaves. Thus, when some insolent and silly young men persisted, insubordinately, to ride violently through the camp and the bazaars, causing frequent accidents, he issued the following characteristic order, bringing ridicule and fear at once to bear on the offenders.

“Gentlemen as well as beggars, if they like, may ride to the devil when they get on horseback. But neither gentlemen nor beggars have a right to send other people to the devil, which will be the case if furious riding be allowed in the bazaar. The Major-General has placed a

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“ detachment of horse at the disposal of Captain
 “ Pope, who will arrest offenders and punish them,
 “ as far as the regulations permit. And Captain
 “ Pope is not empowered to let any one escape
 “ punishment, because, when orders have been
 “ repeated and are not obeyed, it is time to enforce
 “ them—without obedience an army becomes a
 “ mob, and a cantonment a bear garden ; the en-
 “ forcement of obedience is like physic, not agree-
 “ able but necessary.”

He had about twelve thousand fighting men, but many were sick, some were at Kurrachee, and he was ordered to send the Bengal troops to Ferozepore ; yet Lord Ellenborough, who never gave a half support, empowered him not only to retain this column, but even promised him reinforcements if he required them, and extended his command to the troops in Cutch, without reference to the Bombay Government. He did not demand any more troops, but he stopped the march of the Bengal people. He was also charged with a new organization of the political establishment in Scinde, having authority to regulate both numbers and salaries. He made a great reduction in both, and Major Outram, after delivering over the papers of his office, returned to Bombay, first telling the General that with the reduced establishment, he would not be able to conduct the public business : yet he did conduct it, and most successfully, when it was tenfold greater than any which had fallen under Major Outram's direction. This reduction of the political functionaries, instantly excited all the brutish violence of the editors of Indian newspapers ; their obstreperous cries deafened the Eastern community, Doc-

tor Buist, of the *Bombay Times*, being the most dissonant and shrill.

During these transactions the agitation of the Ameers and chiefs augmented, and the cessation of Major Outram's political functions alarmed and offended those of lower Scinde; they called it a slight, and seemed to think it preliminary to giving the country up to the Affghans; for the total evacuation of Affghanistan by Generals Nott, Pollock, and England, they could only understand as the result of weakness. They appear also to have exactly measured Major Outram's capacity as a diplomatist; and loved better to negotiate with him than with the General, whose temper they made but this one trial of. They sent him a present of six thousand pounds, and to their surprise he returned it by the bearer: after that, in deceit was their only hope.

Futteh Mohamed Ghoree on the part of Roostum and his sons, Ali Moorad for himself, and a confidential agent for Nusseer of Hyderabad, now separately demanded conferences, and the General, acceding to the demand of the first, appointed the day most agreeable to Roostum and his sons. He even offered, to cross the Indus to do them honour, and meet them in their own garden away from his troops and unattended, but they immediately concluded there was some scheme to entrap them: they could not appreciate his frank confidence in their honour. Thus, failing to keep their own appointment, they, instead of meeting the General, held a council wherein the sons and nephews of Roostum, being jealous of Futteh Ghoree's influence over the old Ameer, reproached the latter for consenting to meet the Feringhee General at all, saying, that Futteh Ghoree's advice would destroy him. Even

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Ali Moorad appeared to act with the others. Being the ablest and the boldest, he assumed an ascendancy, declaring he would send a vakeel to ascertain what the British commander desired, when, if it were money or territory he would refuse both, and place the country in the safe keeping of the Beloochees. In other words declare war. For these Beloochees were the feudatory troops and impatient for commotion to obtain pay and plunder, it being their custom on times of trouble to despoil the labouring and mercantile people of Scinde.

When Roostum had thus broken his appointment, his sons took Affghan horsemen into pay, and wrote to the Boordees and other tribes to be ready; and at the same time the Brahooe Prince, Newaz Khan, who had been deposed in favour of Merab's son and was living on the bounty of the British Government at Shikarpoor, resigned his allowance and returned to his tribe. Futteh Ghoree made a fruitless attempt to recover his influence over Roostum when the Ameers separated, but he was finally fain to go to Roree as the agent of Ali Moorad, whose voice was now to decide on peace or war. Letters also came from Nusseer of Hyderabad, encouraging Roostum and promising the aid of troops under the command of his son and nephew, the two Housseins. At the same time Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor was constituted commander of the forces in lower Scinde, and he promised to add sixteen thousand fighting men of his own to the general levy.

Roostum, thus swayed, not only kept away from the conference, but assigned fear of treachery as a reason, and he wrote to the Hyderabad family reproaching them for backwardness in collecting forces. The fighting men of the villages were now

all warned to be in arms, and the revenue was collected with great rigour and violence. Sadig, the Affghan accomplice of the escaped Syud, Mohamed Shurreef, was invited to Kyrpoor,—the Patans, or Affghan horsemen continued to reinforce the followers of the younger Ameers daily, and vaunting language about the British troops was freely spoken. In fine, the whole country was in commotion, the hill tribes were getting ready, and the Mooltan man continued his warlike preparations on the rear of the British with unabated diligence, and without ostensible reason. In this state of things Roostum and the inferior Ameers of upper Scinde, having now two thousand armed men as a guard, again demanded a conference with the General, to take place four miles down the river from Roree. He however, seeing their condition of mind, and thinking fit to resent their former neglect, refused. Then they proposed to have it held, as before proposed, in their garden of Roree; but he replied, “I will not go. I will not suffer you to treat me with rudeness and as a treacherous person.”

Meanwhile the agitation of the country increased, and the Ameers were heard to say, “We have eat
“and drank well for many years, and we have en-
“joyed our Ameeree; if it is the intention of the
“English to fight with us, without a doubt they
“shall find us ready for them.” And one sanguinary monster advised that the throats of all their wives and children should be cut if the British advanced.

It is not difficult to find the key to these violent movements and convulsive weaknesses of the Ameers. The aggression of Lord Auckland had left a deep feeling of revenge. The disasters of

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the British army in Cabool awakened their hope of gratifying that revenge, and recovering their independence. The evacuation of Affghanistan, after a second and victorious invasion, was to them a weakness, and Lord Ellenborough's policy, so publicly proclaimed, alarmed them, conscious as they were of secret feelings as well as acts of hostility. Major Outram's plan of withholding the warning letters had therefore failed, because the Governor-General's resolution was well known; it had been proclaimed to the world as his fixed policy; meanwhile his secret instructions were guessed at; and all being vague, was magnified as usual by fear and hope. Territory or money they thought must be demanded, and the sudden reinforcement of Sukkur by General England's column, led them to imagine the demand would be very great.

These considerations excited them in an extraordinary manner; and thinking the British soldiers were too weak and sickly to act in the field, which at first was partly founded in truth, they, with that heat and suddenness common to barbarian councils, resolved on war. But nervous and cowardly from their debaucheries, most of them being continually drunk with opium or blang, their fears prevailed at times against their pride and anger. Wherefore, twisting and shrinking from the final trial, they could take no firm resolution, but were nevertheless impelled forward, in despite of their terrors, by the influence of their feudatory chiefs and followers, men of iron hardihood, fatalists, and breathing only war. Against this influence they had no active counter passion to set, save their avarice, for the Beloochee fighting men were very

costly and insatiable. Hence the continual vacillation of the Ameers; hence their frequent violations of the treaties, their arrogance and humbleness by turns; their falsehoods, their complaints, and excuses; their secret alliances; their cry of war one day, of peace the next. And with all this they had frequent quarrels amongst themselves, so that no general plan could well be settled by men so jealous, so cowardly, so grasping, and so selfish.

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Ali Moorad of Kyrpoor, and Sobdar of Hyderabad, being from policy really averse to break with the British Government, soon discovered their secret desires. The former obtained a conference with the General. He was a bold intelligent man, and at once asked, "if the English would secure the "turban of supremacy to him?"

"We will adhere to treaties?" was the reply. Parliamentary Papers relating to Scinde, p. 456, 57.
 "They bind us to protect each Ameer in his rights.
 "The turban of the Talpoors is Roostum's, unless he forfeits it by hostility, and he shall keep it until he dies, when it will become yours if you continue to be a friend, because such is the order of succession, and such is the treaty."

"But will you protect Roostum if he seeks to give the turban during his life to his son?"

"No! that will be against the treaty. We shall not do so."

Feeling satisfied with this, Ali Moorad asked if he and Sobdar, being of one mind, might make a secret treaty to support the British.

"Be faithful to the British! Yes! it is your duty, but openly. Make no secret compact. You have the existing treaties, adhere to them. The English are powerful enough to make all parties conform to them."

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Thus ended the conference, from which the English General drew these advantages. He displayed his resolution to act justly; he detached the most able and formidable of the Ameers from the family league, and thus diminished the chances of bloodshed; and he had made a step towards reversing Lord Auckland's policy, by re-creating one responsible chief with whom to negotiate, and reducing the rest of these numerous petty despots to the rank of rich noblemen. This was a result he ardently desired, and foresaw would happen, when Sukkur, which was daily increasing in size and wealth under the protection of the British, should become a great and powerful town in their neighbourhood.

During these demonstrations on the side of the Ameers, which occupied the month of November, the General studied the character of those princes, and their measures. Perceiving their unsettled state of mind, he judged that a firm course of policy, appearing not to see settled hostility, but invariably checking any violation of the existing treaties, would be the most likely mode to calm down their agitation, and bring them to a quiet consideration of the provisions of the new treaty, which he was peremptorily ordered to present, as soon as the proofs of past misconduct were complete to justify the proposal. This system accorded also with his military precautions; for amidst such disorder he could not calculate upon peace without being well prepared for war. Hence he hurried not, but resolved to give time, and circumstances which were hourly changing, their full effect, ere he bared the sword whose edge he dreaded for the Ameers more than for himself.

“ Nothing,” he wrote to the Governor-General, “ nothing is lost by delay. We cannot be too cautious in securing firm moral ground on which to rest the defence of whatever events may arise. The Ameers also grow weaker, delay exhausts their treasury, and then they cheat their soldiers, who of course leave them. This also is the season of fevers on the banks of the Indus. Were hostilities to commence now, I should lose many men, and have a large hospital.—To move on Hyderabad I must go by the river or by the desert. To supply the sick by the last, would be difficult if not impossible. To go by the river would augment the hospital. The Indus is falling, and when it is at the lowest the fevers will cease. Meanwhile I have a sickly camp, and I should have regretted if the Ameers had called me out before; now they are welcome. But all these considerations have made me hitherto avoid pressing them hard on any point.

“ If I am forced to take the field, I will cross the Indus and march upon Hyderabad by land; for there are objections to dropping down the river. The water is low, boats go with difficulty when lightly laden; I cannot float more than a thousand men with guns and stores, and the vessels would even then be overladen and ground perhaps for days on the mud within reach of matchlocks. Nothing can be gained by rapidity. The enemy has no position to fortify, no works to strengthen, no stronger place to retire upon; three or thirteen days’ movement will therefore be the same; but by land we go compact, to beat or be beaten altogether; whereas crowded in boats straggling for miles along the river, and half of them

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“grounded in the shallows under matchlock-fire, would lead to disaster. ‘Slow and sure,’ is an adage suited to my position, and moving by land I shall take Kyrpoor at once, and thus throw myself between the northern and southern Ameers; for there need be no slowness when once we take the field, if unfortunately the folly of the Ameers goes that length.”

Acting on these views he endeavoured to dissipate two errors which buoyed these princes up to resistance. These were the supposed exhausted and helpless state of his troops; and the expectation that the greatest part of those fit for duty, had been recalled to Ferozepore, to join the army of reserve there. This army of reserve, their imperfect information and judgment led the Ameers to think was gathered in fear and necessity to defend India, instead of being the prompt action of a prudent man to awe the Punjaub, while the army of invasion was in Afghanistan. It is thus that barbarians, however brave and naturally gifted, always shew themselves incapable of great combinations in war. They have neither the patience nor the knowledge to analyze and class the parts of an extensive military plan of operation. They see quickly, feel intensely, and strike from impulse, vehemently and even mightily at times, but it is only the surge of waters scourging the rocks.

Sir Charles Napier, as we have seen, had stopped the march of the Bengal troops, and now exhibited to Ali Moorad a review of more than six thousand fighting men of all arms, moving with that precision and rapidity which barbarian commanders, used only to irregular multitudes, can scarcely understand but feel the force of. Lord Ellenborough

also, desirous of preventing bloodshed by an imposing display of force, offered to reinforce the army with all the Bombay troops under General Nott; these were declined as unnecessary. But now the continued gross and insolent infractions of the treaties, in the matter of tolls in upper Scinde, accompanied with insult and violence to strangers, forced the General to vindicate his own and Lord Ellenborough's avowed policy, and he sent a staff officer with the following letter to the Ameer Roostum :—

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“ A merchant has been made to pay toll by your Kardar, named Kaymah, at Dowlatpore. This is a breach of the VIII Article of your treaty. It has taken place several times, but this is the first complaint that has been laid before me. I would not have suffered the breach of a treaty in a single instance had I been aware of it, and every man who makes a well founded complaint to me shall have redress. The sufferers in the present case accompany the bearer of this letter, who is one of my aides-de-camp, and he has my orders to insist upon your Highness' repaying the toll levied by your Kardar, and also all the expenses to which the sufferers have been exposed, amounting to the sum of two hundred and thirty-eight rupees. I further insist upon the offending Kardar being sent a prisoner to my head-quarters at Sukkur within the space of five days, to be dealt with as I shall determine.

“ Unless your Highness does immediately comply with these demands, I shall consider these various and insulting violations of treaty have been committed with your sanction, and I shall treat you as an enemy. These are the orders of the Governor-General.”

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The money was instantly paid, and promise given to send the Kardar to Sukkur; but the imbecile Ameer, excited by false reports and constantly intoxicated with Bhang, immediately held a great council with his feudatory chiefs, and his words proclaimed the disorder of his mind: "See," he exclaimed, "the English having been turned "out of Affghanistan and eaten dirt, and have been "killed so far on their return to India. Their "force is large, and if they will but leave Scinde I "shall meet all their demands for money, even to "the jewellery of our women; if they do not leave "Sukkur and Scinde, if they advance to Kyrpoor, "we must fight them."

Parliamentary
Papers
relating to
Scinde,
p. 464.

His warlike hearers assented, and placed their hands on the Koran in token of obedience to his orders.

When the council separated, messengers were sent to engage the Boordees, a powerful neighbouring tribe, to take arms. Yet the recent stern communication from the General had evidently shaken the Ameer's resolution. In the former council, neither land nor money was to be yielded; now money was to be freely offered and points of honour were spoken of. But dissension was rife. Roostum openly avowed his intention to give the turban of supremacy to his son Hoossein, in prejudice of Ali Moorad's right. The latter's determination to adhere to the English interest was, as the General expected, immediately fixed; he went off to his fortress of Dejee-ka-kote, behind Kyrpoor, and disbanded the soldiers in his pay. They were instantly enlisted by Hoossein, who, leading the younger princes, despised his imbecile father Roostum, and told him to retire from state affairs. Then

increasing the number of his own armed followers, he gave his Beloochees orders to rob and slay the stragglers of the British camps, uttering many vaunts.

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In this state of affairs, the favourable season for acting having set in, the General, who had finished his military preparations, and completed the proofs of the Ameers' ferocious hostility without reference to their recent conduct, judged it time to present the new treaty, which he had been again peremptorily commanded to enforce, as an act just in itself, well considered, and not to be departed from. It was therefore delivered in form to the Ameers of upper Scinde on the 4th of December, and to the Ameers of lower Scinde on the 6th of that month, together with official notes from Lord Ellenborough, containing declarations of the estimation in which the conduct of each Ameer was separately held by the Governor-General.

To the Hyderabad Princes he expressed his dissatisfaction at their conduct, and required their assent to the treaty generally; yet he called their attention particularly to the remission of tribute, as proof of his desire to establish peace and friendship. To Nusseer he sent a distinct communication, enumerating his offences and interdicting all friendship until atonement was made.

The tone adopted towards Roostum of Kyrpoor was one of sorrow, that he, formerly so well disposed to the alliance, should now have been led by evil counsels to a secret hostile engagement with the Maharajah; and to aid the escape of the Syud Shurreef, whose object he knew was to war upon the British forces. These violations of the old treaty were, he was told, too serious to be entirely

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pardoned, and therefore he could not be considered a friend unless he accepted the new treaty. The particulars have already been given, but it is good to note again, that Sobdar of Hyderabad was always favoured, because he constantly expressed friendly feelings towards the British alliance, and condemned the proceedings of his brother Ameers. This was indeed no virtue in him, but rather an indication of his discontent at being deprived of his father's dignity by the anomalous law of succession in the Talpoor family; and when the crisis came he was found like the rest in deeds, or perhaps more base and perfidious, being true to neither side, and anxious to commit a horrible treason against one or the other. Nevertheless it proves that Lord Ellenborough sought no unjust pretext for hostilities, and that he was prompt to accept and encourage good will by favour: moreover no notice was taken of the Meerpoor man, though his sentiments were known to be hostile, because his acts furnished no ground of complaint.

The Ameers being now acquainted with the extent of the new treaty offered to them, displayed all their crooked diplomacy. Denying, against evidence, that they had ever violated the old treaties, they invited further investigation, well knowing that none could be openly conducted when the death of any person daring to appear against them would be prompt and sure. They then recurred with affecting force, because with truth, to the original wrong inflicted by Lord Auckland, and with feigned humility professed perfect submission to Lord Ellenborough. But at the same time they increased their forces, and ordered the tax-gatherers to extort from the districts which were to be ceded,

not only the revenue of the year but of the next also; their armed Beloochees plundered all the country between Sukkur and Shikarpoor; their spies entered the British camp at the former place; and in their councils they arranged a general plan of campaign which shall be noticed hereafter.

In Nusseer's protest there was a remarkable assertion, characteristic of Scindian diplomacy, which merits particular notice, as shewing how little reliance could be placed on any declaration promise or statement of that Ameer. "I and Noor Mohamed," he said, "saw the advantage of seeking the protection of the wisest and most powerful nation on the earth, and therefore urged Sir Henry Pottinger, during two whole years, to come into the country, after which we finally succeeded in introducing a British force." Had this startling assertion been true, it would have justified Lord Auckland's aggression, and more forcibly Lord Ellenborough's policy. With such a specimen of falsehood before his eyes, the General could not give credence to their professions of submission. He received them indeed with an outward show of satisfaction; and though Roostum's reply was more completely humble and entire than Nusseer's, assenting to the treaty specifically and acknowledging British supremacy, Sir C. Napier, wary and watchful, kept his attention fixed on their movements: for he knew of all their measures, which were so much at variance with their words, and gave no credence to their protestations.

His situation was now painful and difficult in no ordinary degree. On the one hand the Governor-General's orders were reiterated and peremptory; on the other he had to deal with violent passionate men,

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neither masters of their own senses from habitual intoxication, nor masters of their actions from the rough influence of their armed feudatories, whose attendance they had invoked but whose desire for war and plunder they could neither check nor controul. His aversion to shed blood was intense, his sense of duty to his country as intense, and on his head was now cast the moral, the political and military responsibility, at a crisis when the slightest error might lead to a battle, perhaps to a great disaster, and when each hour brought its change, for the vacillation of the Ameers was surprising. A strong head and brave heart brought him with a clear conscience through the trial.

Having sent the Bengal troops across the Indus, he was preparing to pass over another body, when he was told, the Ameers only awaited this separation of his forces to assail his lines at Sukkur by night ; and their constant intoxication rendered the intelligence probable. Wherefore he wrote to Roostum thus :—

“ Your submission to the order of the Governor-
 “ General, and your friendship for our nation,
 “ should be beyond doubt, because you have
 “ solemnly assured me of the same. We are
 “ friends. It is, therefore, right to inform you of
 “ strange rumours that reach me. Your subjects,
 “ it is said, propose to attack my camp in the
 “ night time. This would of course be without
 “ your knowledge, and also be very foolish, because
 “ my soldiers would slay those who attack them ;
 “ and when day dawned I would march to
 “ Kyrpoor, transplant the inhabitants to Sukkur,
 “ and destroy your capital city with the exception
 “ of your Highness’s palace, which I would leave

Parlia-
 mentary
 Papers
 relating to
 Scinde,
 p. 467.

“ standing alone, as a mark of my respect for your
 “ Highness, and of my conviction that you have
 “ no authority over your subjects. I should also
 “ so far entrench on your Highness’s treasury as
 “ to defray the expenses of this operation, because
 “ it is just that all governments should pay for the
 “ mischief which their subjects inflict upon their
 “ neighbours. I therefore advertise your High-
 “ ness of the destruction which such an attempt
 “ on my camp would inevitably draw down on
 “ Kyrpoor, in order that you may warn your
 “ people against committing any such act of hos-
 “ tility.”

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Thus, quick to prevent by timely checks any rash violence which would draw down the terrible counterstroke he sought to withhold, he relied, with a just perception of the nervous timidity attaching to debauchery, on his dexterity to prevent any untoward outbreak ; feeling confident that a steady diplomacy would then effect his objects without bloodshed. His warning was effectual, and meanwhile vakeels from the Ameers of both the upper and lower Scinde reached his camp ; all promising for their masters that the new treaty would be accepted. Those from Sobdar, and Hoossein Ali of Hyderabad were congratulatory, and cordial in their expressions of pleasure and submission ; but Nusseer and Meer Khan spoke only in general terms of their friendly feelings, and the General’s secret intelligence still contradicted the Ameers’ declarations. These princes, Ali Moorad excepted, were daily augmenting their forces ; the women had been sent from Kyrpoor ; councils were continually held, and a communication from Nusseer developed the real views of the Ameers.

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He complained to Roostum that Sobdar and Houssein were, like Ali Moorad, in the British interest; but all the chiefs of tribes and of the armed men were with him, Nusseer, and if Roostum was ready the sword should be drawn. That ancient Ameer also rebuked his sons for precipitation in sending off the women, saying, "the vakeels are at Sukkur to deceive. When the British regain confidence, and weaken their forces, the torch shall be lighted to consume them."

The dawks, or mails, were at the same time robbed, disorders were every where rife, and the Boordees promised to harass the Bengal troops if they marched towards Ferozepore; but these furious proceedings and wild councils did not disturb the General's judgment. Infirmity of purpose and intoxication were to him apparent in them, and he anticipated no military opposition in upper Scinde. Meanwhile the verbal submission of the Ameers authorised him and the Governor-General enjoined him, to take possession of Subzulcote and Bhoong-Bharra; wherefore he passed the Indus with a considerable body of troops, sent the Bengal columns to occupy the ceded districts, and publicly proclaimed the policy of Lord Ellenborough, according to the terms of the treaty. This passage of the river, effected about the middle of December, was an operation of some difficulty; and it was the first military measure in execution of Lord Ellenborough's avowed policy. It was also a decisive one. The sword was now raised, and the negotiation became an armed parley; it remained to be seen who would strike—who succumb. On one side was the strong warrior armed in steel and brandishing a heavy, but sheathed weapon, and in warning

only, for his desire was peace. On the other, a crouching savage, urged by fury and hatred, troubled by fear and doubt, yet constantly creeping forward knife in hand.

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A geographical outline of Scinde has been already given, but a slight topographical description is necessary to render the operations now in progress intelligible. To effect this clearly, the British stations in upper Scinde shall be taken as the point of departure, and the march of an army down the Indus by both banks sketched. Those stations were, when Sir C. Napier had passed the Indus, Shikarpoor and Sukkur on the right bank of the river; Roree and Alore on the left bank; Bukkur in the middle of the stream.

See Plan
No. 2.

Shikarpoor, a large commercial city though much decayed from the tyranny of the Ameers, is situated on a plain about twenty miles from the river, on the high road to the Bolan pass.

Sukkur, also an ancient but decayed town, is on the bank of the river; it was at this time protected by an entrenched cantonment, and between it and Shikarpoor was a thick jungle.

Bukkur is a fortress on a rock in the river, between Sukkur, and Roree which is also on a rock overhanging the river.

A few miles to the left of Roree, looking down the stream, is Alore, the remains of an ancient city of historic fame.

An army occupying Sukkur, Roree, and Alore, as Sir C. Napier's army did at this time, would have the whole of the Amcer's country before it, except Shikarpoor on the right flank, and the districts of Subzulecote and Bhoong-Bharra in rear of the left wing.

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Suppose the troops on the right bank of the river to advance. They would pass over an immense alluvial plain, which, bounded on the right by the Hala mountains on the left by the Indus, is intersected with river canals, and the beds of water-courses called nullahs, some artificial, but the most part formed by the annual inundations. Sixty miles from Sukkur they would come upon Larkaana, a city near a minor river connected with the Indus, called the Aral.

Marching onwards they would reach Sehwan, the site of an ancient fortress, about one hundred miles from Larkaana. Here the Lukhee hills, shooting from the Hala range, close in upon the river and form a pass; which renders Sehwan a post of strategic importance, confirming the notion that it was one of Alexander's stations.

From this pass the plain gradually opens out again, by the continued divergence of the mountains from the course of the river, until it reaches, and gently spreads along the ocean with a low and placid front, assuaging rather than opposing its fury.

Over this second plain the troops would pass to Hyderabad, which lies on the left bank of the Indus some eighty miles below Sehwan; but still advancing they would reach Tattah fifty miles below Hyderabad.

Near Tattah, formerly rich and flourishing and celebrated for its manufactures, but now, like all places under the abominable rule of the Ameers, sunk to ruin, the Indus, separating into many branches, and opening out like a fan towards the sea, forms a delta, most intricate swampy and unwholesome. The march of the troops, avoiding this tangled

country, would be to the right, leading through Garra, a town of some consequence, to Kurrachee, which lies close under the Hala range, and is the only safe and commodious port of Scinde: the distance from Tattah is about eighty miles.

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Now returning to Roree and Alore, an army advancing from those places down the left bank of the Indus, would also pass over an immense plain, spotted with shikargahs, and intersected with nullahs from one to sixty feet deep.

On their right would be the Indus, which makes however a wide sweep from Sukkur to Hyderabad, the convex towards the mountains, and offering the chord for a march upon the latter town. Along this chord the main road runs, but there are several distinct routes, and one of them follows the winding of the river.

On the left would be the great desert, which, flowing as it were from the Punjaub, hems in a narrow strip of fertile land including Subzulcote and Bhoong-Bharra, as far as Hyderabad, where it eases off gradually towards the east, leaving a wide space between it and the delta.

Fifteen miles from Roree the army would come upon Kyrpoor, the capital of upper Scinde. At twenty-five miles it would confront the strong fortress of Dejee, crowning an isolated rock belonging to Ali Moorad, and supposed to be impregnable by the Beloochees.

At seventy or eighty miles from Roree it would enter Nowshera, the last town possessed by that Ameer to the south, bordering on lower Scinde. From thence a march of one hundred and twenty miles would bring it to Hyderabad, the fortified capital of lower Scinde; and on its left would be Meerpoor, the fortified capital of Shere Mo-

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hamed. There are indeed several Meerpoors, but this capital of Shere Mohamed stands at the very edge of the desert, at the distance of forty miles on a right line drawn from Hyderabad eastward. And the same line prolonged for sixty miles more would fall on Omercote of the desert, a strongly fortified town forming a post of connection between Meerpoor and Deesa on the Bombay frontier.

It will now be understood, that by occupying Roree and Alore, his left resting on the desert, Sir Charles Napier barred the Ameers of Kyrpoor from Subzulcote and Bhoong-Bharra, while his Bengal troops seized those narrow districts behind his position; thus he obtained the object of the treaty with Roostum, without quitting the defensive or provoking a war, and exactly fulfilled the Governor-General's orders. The Beloochees dared not attack him in a position which could be reinforced by the Bengal troops; they could not pass his flank save by the desert, and by a short movement on that side he could intercept them. They were indeed strong at Larkaana on the right of the Indus, and might assail Sukkur, which was hemmed in with jungle; but he had strengthened his lines there as a pivot of movements, and now relying on their force, he sought to reduce the Ameers to quietude by reason.

Lord Ellenborough had permitted him to name a commissioner for conducting the details of the new treaties; and with a generous impulse he asked for the former political agent, thus risking the Governor-General's displeasure. Lord Ellenborough acceded reluctantly, but he was unwilling to deprive Sir C. Napier of the supposed advantage of Major Outram's local knowledge, when he desired to have it; thus that officer was

recalled to Scinde. This disinterested act of kindness was seized by the newspapers in Major Outram's interest, as an occasion for extolling his superior genius and capacity, and abasing the reputations of Lord Ellenborough and Sir C. Napier. The first was described as having basely driven a remarkable man from his former political duties in Scinde; the second, as presumptuously and ignorantly undertaking those duties without ability for the task; both, as having plunged headlong into difficulties which they could no way escape from save by recalling their able victim. This absurd insolence, characteristic of Indian newspapers, is answered by the following letter from the General to Lord Ellenborough on the occasion. But as the Major's friends in England, as well as in the East, have forced a comparison between him and his General, their respective merits shall be tested in the course of this work by reference to their exploits.

“I have no intention of waiting for Major Outram's arrival, because till we get into the details of the treaty I do not want assistance; and as your Lordship has been so good as not to give me a colleague, I mean to consult no one. I see my way clearly.”

Parliamentary papers.
Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General,
Nov. 30,
1842.

Soon after this letter was written Major Outram arrived, with the newspaper reputation of having consummate knowledge of men and of affairs in Scinde; knowledge acquired by long experience in the country, and sustained by great natural capacity; yet he committed error upon error. With a dull or a perverted perception of character, his experience did not prevent him from becoming a dupe to the Ameers' gross diplomacy;

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he displayed no capacity for war beyond the hardy daring of a partisan; his pertinacity of opinion led to deplorable results which shall be noticed hereafter; and it would have caused the entire destruction of the army, but for the keener penetration, superior intellect, and firm resolution of his General, to whom he has ever since acted inimically: but that is human nature.

During the operation of crossing the Indus, Sir Charles Napier discovered that the vakeels of Roostum had received money to corrupt the soldiers, had delayed delivering their letters, and gave their master false hopes. He checked this mischief with a prompt hand, writing thus to the Ameer:—"The men you sent to Roree are robbing you. They will tell you that they are bribing my soldiers, and they extract money from your Highness, under that pretext. If they were really bribing my soldiers to desert, I would punish them, but they are doing no such thing; your Highness is robbed by your servants. However, if you are not robbed, and that, as they pretend, they were bribing my soldiers, it was high time to turn them out of Roree, which I have done; and if I find them attempting to disturb the loyalty of my troops, it will be worse for them. Ameer, I have received my orders, and will obey them. I laugh at your preparations for war. I want to prevent blood being shed: listen to my words,—consult with your brother, his Highness Ali Moorad. Your own blood will not deceive you—your servants will. These men were four days in Roree, and did not deliver your letters to me; had I not sent for them, they would still have kept them from me to gain time, that they might rob you. Eight days have

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“passed, and I have not heard that your Highness
 “has nominated a commissioner of rank to arrange
 “the details of the treaty. I expect to have in
 “writing your full acceptance of the draft thereof,
 “by the return of the bearer. Your Highness is
 “collecting troops in all directions, I must there-
 “fore have your acceptance of the treaty imme-
 “diately,—yea or nay. I will not lose the cold
 “weather. You Highness must be prompt, or I
 “shall act without consulting your Highness; my
 “time is measured, and I cannot waste it in long
 “negotiations.

“Your Highness’ letter is full of discussion; but
 “as there are two sides of your river, so are there
 “two sides to your Highness’ arguments. Now the
 “Governor-General has occupied both sides of
 “your Highness’ river, because he has considered
 “both sides of your Highness’ arguments. Many
 “of your Highness’ family have taken the same
 “view of the case that the Governor-General has;
 “and the respect which they have shewn to the
 “British Government is repaid to them by the
 “Governor-General. But I cannot go into the
 “argument,—I am not Governor-General; I am
 “only one of his commanders. I will forward
 “your letter to him, if you wish me to do so; but,
 “in the mean time, I will occupy the territories
 “which he has commanded me to occupy. You
 “think I am your enemy,—why should I be so?
 “I gain nothing for myself; I take no gifts; I re-
 “ceive no Jagheers. What is it to me whether
 “your Highness, or any other person, occupies the
 “land? The Governor-General has given to you
 “his reasons, and to me his orders; they shall be
 “obeyed.”

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This drew from Roostum an unmeaning public reply, covering however a secret message, to the effect, that, being eighty-five years old, he was oppressed by the younger members of his family and desired a refuge in the British camp. It was an embarrassing proposition. Too favourable for a peaceful termination of the disputes to be rejected, it had this serious drawback; that every proceeding of the Ameer would be imputed to coercion. The General prevailed on Ali Moorad, who was then with him, to carry back the following written response:—

“Your Highness is, I believe, personally a friend, but you are helpless amongst your ill-judging family. I send this by your brother. Listen to his advice, trust to his care: you are too old for war, and if battle begin, how can I protect you? If you go with your brother, you may either remain with him, or I will send an escort to bring you to my camp where you will be safe. Follow my advice, it is that of a friend. Why should I be your enemy? If I was, why should I take this trouble to save you? I think you will believe me, but do as you please.”

It is plain the Ameer was left by this letter master of his movements though invited to a step promising peace, and that was the only wish of the General. But the British mails had been intercepted, and there were two parties to deal with in the same house, namely, Roostum and his sons; wherefore, resolute to suffer no secret hostility, while he soothed the old man in private, he publicly menaced through him, as chief, the more insolent members of his turbulent family. “My letters,” he wrote to Roostum, “have been stopped near Kyrpoor. This has been done

“ without your consent, or it has been done by
 “ your orders. If by your orders, you are guilty.
 “ If without your consent you cannot com-
 “ mand your people. In either case I order you
 “ to disband your armed followers instantly ; and
 “ I will go to Kyrpoor to see this order obeyed.”
 Thus with skilful appliance of gentleness and
 sternness, according to the need of the moment, he
 gradually approached the object of his desire ; a
 peace compatible with the interests of his country
 and the Governor-General’s orders.

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Necessary it is that Sir Charles Napier’s inter-
 course with the Ameer Roostum on this occasion
 should be well understood, because the Ameers of
 Hyderabad did afterwards, and so likewise did
 Roostum, contrary to all truth and reason and
 honour, represent it as the hinge upon which
 war turned. And every assertion of the Ameers,
 however foolish and false, has found its echo in
 Bombay and in England. Their complaints, foul
 as their hearts, have been adopted and proclaimed,
 both in Parliament and out of it, as truths when
 truth was the very thing they wanted. By some
 this has been done with base motives, by some in
 ignorance, the ignorance that will not inquire lest
 it should be enlightened against its will ; by others,
 who have bestowed their tediousness on the public,
 merely to let their reading and writing appear
 when there was no occasion for such vanities ;
 being as intent as ever was Dogberry that what
 was not written down should be remembered.

Roostum, adopting the General’s recommenda-
 tion, fled with his wives and attendants to Ali
 Moorad’s strong fort of Dejee, and there resigned
 to that chief the “ *Puggree*” or turban of command,

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with all the rights and lands attached. When Sir Charles Napier heard of this he advised Ali Moorad not to accept the Puggree. "I think your Highness will do well not to assume the Turban, for the following reasons. People will say that the English put it on your head, against the will of Meer Roostum. But do as you please. I only give you my advice as a friend who wishes to see you great and powerful in Scinde. This is the wish of my Government. The Governor-General has approved of all that I have said to you. If to be the chieftain gives you power, I should say, assume the Turban. But it gives you none. You are strong without it. No one in Scinde can oppose you, no one out of Scinde can oppose you. The British Government will secure you against all enemies. It is not true that we want to injure the Ameers. You know, and I know, that the Ameers have tried to form a conspiracy against the English, and for this the Governor-General has punished those who were guilty. His Highness Meer Roostum has been betrayed by Futteh Mohamed Ghoree; but if a ruler gives his power to another, he must bear the consequence. The chief has now given his seal to your Highness, who will not betray him, because his honour must be your honour, for you are both Talpoors, and the family of the Talpoors will grow great and powerful in Scinde, under your auspices. Look at Sattara and others; have we taken their territories, though we surround them on all sides? No. But we do not surround Scinde. It is our frontier; we wish to see it great, and rich, and strong against those on the other bank of the Indus, that they may not attack

“the Ameers, but for this we must have friendly
 “rulers like yourself and Meer Sobdar. Woe
 “attend those who conspire against the powerful
 “arms of the Company. Behold the fate of Tippoo
 “Sultan and the Peishwa, and the Emperor of
 “China. Highness, you will rule upper Scinde
 “with glory and power, if you are true to the
 “Treaty made with the Company. You know, for
 “I had it from your own lips, that the Ameers of
 “upper and lower Scinde were in league against
 “us,—all, except his Highness Meer Sobdar and
 “yourself,—therefore have they suffered.”

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Ali Moorad replied, that the cession had been voluntary, the act solemn, complete in form and recorded by the holy men in the Koran. It stood therefore a perfect document, irrevocable according to the Mahomedan law and the custom of the Talpoors. And this was true. The event however was unexpected; to use the General's expression it burst like a bomb-shell upon Roostum's family and followers; they all fled in a south-casterly direction by the desert, and the chance of war in upper Scinde ceased. But Sir Charles Napier had been ordered by the Governor-General, to disperse the armed bands gathered in upper Scinde and menacing the British stations. He was now marching upon Kyrpoor with that object, and in pursuance of the notice he had given to Roostum when the mails were intercepted. Wherefore being close at hand to Dejee, and feeling how important it was that the aged Ameer's resignation should not only be, but should be known to be, a spontaneous act, he proposed to visit him, and to restore him to his dignity if he had been coerced. Roostum, far from accepting this friendly advance,

See App. to
c. vi. § 2.

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immediately fled into the desert with his treasure, two guns and several thousand followers: thus ungraciously proving his entire freedom of action.

All the Ameers of upper Scinde inimical to the British were now in flight, and no organized force remained in that province save what was under Ali Moorad, who was friendly from disposition and from interest: the difficult question of tranquilizing upper Scinde without an appeal to arms was thus satisfactorily solved. Roostum however, when flying from Dejee, wrote such a letter to excuse his sudden departure, as marks the profound falseness of his character. "The General," he said, "had advised him to be guided by his brother Ali Moorad, and Ali had told him to fly lest he should be made captive by the British: therefore he fled." This was denied by Ali Moorad. And Roostum's duplicity was apparent, seeing that only a few days before he had sought an asylum in the British camp, and the General had advised him to go to Dejee: he could not therefore believe that he was in danger of captivity. He also in this letter disavowed his cession of the turban; yet the act had been public, in presence of the holy men and all the Dhurbar; and the document recording it, being afterwards shewn to the doctors of the Mahomedan law in Calcutta, was by them recognized as authentic and irrevocable. Moreover Roostum had thousands of armed followers with whom he fled to join his sons, then openly in arms, and closely allied in hostility to the British with the Ameers of lower Scinde. Ali Moorad therefore had no power to coerce him without a battle; and it was not for his interest that Roostum should fly, denying the cession of the turban.

Append.
ut supra.

That Sir Charles Napier desired to have but one governing chief in each province to deal with politically, in opposition to Lord Auckland's policy of division, is true: and it is a proof that he and Lord Ellenborough meant no evil towards the Ameers. To divide power and so excite mischief amongst many rulers with a view to conquest, is an easy policy and as old as the records of the world. It is true also, that Ali Moorad, being in the vigour of manhood and strong minded, and next in succession to the turban, and friendly withal to the British connexion, was the man he wished to make chief of upper Scinde. But to desire a reasonable advantage, and to obtain it by foul means, are things widely apart. A true summary of the transactions in upper Scinde would run thus.

The Ameers had repeatedly and grossly violated treaties of several years standing. Lord Ellenborough, placed by the Affghan disasters and the internal state of India in a difficult and dangerous position, thought, and wisely, that he could not with any pretension to vigour and energy, pass over these violations. Hence he proposed new treaties by which the Ameers were to be more strictly bound for the future. And also as a punishment for past transgressions, he demanded cession of territory; but on conditions by no means onerous to the Ameers in a pecuniary point of view, and most beneficial to their oppressed subjects and to the general interests of mankind. The Ameers professed submission. They accepted the treaty and promised to sign it; but while so saying they prepared for war. Then the British General took forcible possession of the districts to be ceded by

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the treaty, yet without bloodshed, and not before the Ameers had gathered forces to fight; not before they had formed hostile combinations; menaced his camp at Sukkur; sought to debauch his soldiers; stirred up the Boordec tribe to cross the Indus and fall upon his Bengal division of troops, when it should march up the Sutledge to rejoin the army at Ferozepore. Nor could he have delayed longer without exposing himself to the hot season in his military operations, if such should be necessary: a dreadful chance when the mercury rises above 130 degrees in the shade.

Moreover, the justice or injustice of Lord Auckland's treaties could not affect the English General's proceedings. He was sent to Scinde by Lord Ellenborough, not as a lecturer to discuss the morality of treaties made by a former Governor-General; but as an executive officer to maintain existing contracts, and to uphold the honour and interests of England at a moment of great difficulty. This duty he was executing faithfully, when in the very heat and crisis of the transactions, Roostum, the Rais or chief Ameer, an old debauched wretch, frightened by the near approach of the war he was hourly provoking at the instigation of his sons and nephews, proposed to seek an asylum in the British camp: thinking thus to secure his own safety while his family carried on hostilities. This was in itself a virtual renunciation of the turban, and a step towards the introduction of one friendly and vigorous minded chieftain, instead of the oligarchy of princes then ruining the country, and with whom nothing could be permanently or satisfactorily adjusted. But far from seizing with an

aggressive spirit, the occasion thus presented by fortune, the General, stedfast in justice and fair dealing, gave the Ameer advice tending to his safety and honour; yet left him free to act, and with promise of protection and safety. “*Remain with your own brother, you are too old for war.*” “*Come to me and I will protect you.*” “*Choose for yourself.*” These frank expressions could not be misunderstood, and cannot be perverted; they are patent in words and meaning. The Ameer Roostum was not misled nor misused by the English General, but by his own falsehood and folly; the transaction was as honourable to Sir Charles Napier as any part of his glorious career in Scinde. The efforts of Lord Howick and other persons in the House of Commons to give it another character, only confirmed this truth: futile even to ridicule, they were laughed at and pitied.

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1842.
Dec.Debate on
the Vote of
Thanks.

From the flight of Roostum may be dated the commencement of the Scindian war. The sword had been taken from the Ameers of upper Scinde, as it were by a sleight, but they fled to the desert and to lower Scinde, there to raise in conjunction with their cousins of Hyderabad the standard of battle. They trusted in their sandy wastes, their strong and numerous fortresses, their deadly sun, in the numbers, courage, strength, and fierceness of their wild Beloochee swordsmen, and braver barbarians never gave themselves to slaughter. In these things they trusted, and not without reason; but they were opposed to what they could not understand, having no previous experience of his like—a man of fiery but vigilant valour, skilled in war and resolute to win; daring as the boldest chief-tain of their hills and stern in fight. They found

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him fierce when their thousands went down before the bayonets of his valiant soldiers, wallowing in blood; but never cruel or ferocious; for he loves peace and justice with a true heart, and strove hard to avoid the clash of arms. The Ameers would not have it so, and when the shock did come they were broken like potsherds. It was not the English General but the Scindian Princes who sought the contest. No Etruscan feical ever cast his spear across a boundary, invoking his gods to attest the justice of a war, with a purer conscience than Charles Napier marched to battle. And now it shall be my task to shew how victoriously he bore the banner of England across the bloody fields of Meeanee and Dubba; how widely he has since spread England's fame for justice and gentleness by his administration: the Beloochs reverence and the Scindians bless him though the Ameers mourn.

Whether he is to live for more glory, or to die an overlaboured man beneath that flaming sun, whose fiery aspect withers the principle of life and casts men dead to the earth by hundreds as quickly as the malignant ray descends, is in the darkness of futurity. If he lives, he will display all the resources of a mind capacious to regenerate and govern as well as to conquer. If he dies in harness he will leave a spotless reputation. Living or dead his place is amongst the greatest of England's Captains.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I.

SECTION I.

*Extracts from Sir Charles Napier's Private Letters,
touching the Affghan operations.*

"I have told Lord Ellenborough the chief cause of our Poonah,
30th Mar.
1842. disasters was, that when a smart lad could speak Hindostanee and Persian he was deemed a *statesman*, and a *general*, and was made a *political agent*. I mean, if I am employed, to refuse to be controlled by such a colleague. Look at the work made by the politicals * * * * * at Cabool."

"In the course of the next week we shall hear whether they attempt the Kyber pass, or what they propose to do. Sale has not fifty rounds of ammunition left per man, and no money, and no magazine, so they must quickly do something. As to holding Affghanistan, there could be but one folly equal to the attempt to conquer it, and that would be to remain there. But they ought to let our flag fly at Cabool once more before we abandon the country, or the men of Napaul and Burmah will be upon us, and then up would rise many *internal* princes who want to throw off the yoke; and that would be a nice kettle of fish; it is very likely to happen though, and the treasury is empty. Lord Auckland has made a pretty mess of it altogether."

"May the luck which has hitherto attended Pollock go Poonah,
July 16th
1842. upon him! I dread the consequences if fortune turns her back upon him. He will thrash any force that can meet him in battle, but the Affghan will never give him that chance. Akbar was warranted in fighting at Jellallabad with six to one in his favour and relief coming to the besieged; but he will not try it again, and his loss there was trifling,

only 3 or 400. If Pollock and Nott once begin to retreat they will find it no joke : yet all these conjectures are idle ; it is a harlequin farce this Affghan war ; one can reckon on nothing, and, as Moore said of the Spaniards, "I hope all that may happen will not happen." I believe the Seiks are faithful ; all accounts hitherto say so. *Yet I think Lord Ellenborough, by assembling the army of reserve on the Sutledge, has taken the best means of securing their friendship.* People wonder *why* he assembles this force, one would think the reason is plain enough. The Seiks hold the Kyber pass in Pollock's rear, and have thirty thousand well drilled, well commanded troops ! A nice way Pollock would be in if they turned upon him, and no force to move to his rescue. In short, look at the picture in what light you will, it is bad, and must give Lord Ellenborough very great anxiety, both as regards the danger and expense. *If Lord Ellenborough steers through all these rocks he will deserve well of India and of England also.* I sometimes fear I am a croaker, but I feel I am not ; I think things *may* get all right, but I see such extraordinary proceedings that I cannot help thinking mischief must happen. I would give a great deal to see the Duke's opinion of what ought to be done. I wish he was here, or, that those who command armies would read his letters, especially that on Monson's retreat."

[*Note.*—When the military part of this work shall be published, it will be seen, with what a heroic understanding of its bearing Sir Charles Napier read that letter on Monson's retreat.]

SECTION 2.

Extracts touching the State of the Indian Army.

Poonah,
30th Mar.
1842.

"The general frame work of this army is bad. I see nothing that I can remedy as a Major-General, but plenty that I would quickly arrange were I Commander-in-Chief. They are full of the superiority of Europeans, which as regards the soldiers is perhaps true, I have not seen the others fight. But the mistake is this,—the former European officer was the enterprising, hard-headed,

daring fellow, who *taught and formed the Sepoy*, the Clives, the Lawrences, the Bussys, &c. &c. The present European officer is a youngster * * * In ten or twelve years, if he has brains and health, he acquires some knowledge, and is put on the staff, so that regiments are constantly commanded by lieutenants. At this moment I have a troop of Horse Artillery, which if the captain were to be taken ill, would be commanded by a cadet only fifteen years old! While this deterioration of the European officer is going on, the native officer seems to acquire a higher grade in general estimation. From the want of European officers, the young and ignorant are left for regimental duty, and the natives, even at this post, are the real officers, and very good ones too. The Soubadars are respectable men of high caste and very daring; many have the order of merit at their breast for daring actions. The other day the bearers of a palanquin with a wounded officer in it, being pressed by the Affghans, set it down and run; the Affghans made a rush to murder the officer, a Sepoy sergeant run up, shot the first Affghan, slew the second with his bayonet, and defended his officer till help came: and mind! at this moment they were retreating and hotly pursued; it therefore was done in the most trying circumstances. Now when knowledge is added to such intrepidity, it appears to me little short of folly to doubt that our European ascendancy can only be maintained by the European officers being kept complete in each regiment; especially those of the higher grades * * *—These Soubadars are steady, thoughtful, stern-looking men, very zealous and very military, the sole instructors of all the soldiers.

SECTION 3.

*Extract of a Private Letter from Sir C. Napier,
16th January, 1843.*

“I found the Ameers and our Government in the position which a treaty made by Lord Auckland placed them. I had no concern with its justice, its propriety,

or any thing but to see it maintained. I found that all the politicals had gone on, from the beginnng, trifling. Sometimes letting the Ameers infringe the treaty without notice; at others pulling them up, and then dropping the matter: in short I saw it was a long chain of infringement, —denial,—apology,—pardon, over and over. I therefore resolved not to let this, which old Indians call "*knowing the people,*" go on; and I wrote to the Ameers, saying, I would not allow it to continue, they of course, continued their game, and I, as I had threatened, reported the infringements to Lord Ellenborough, who agreed with me, that their irritating, childish, and mischievous sort of secret warfare and intrigue should not continue; and as letters from the Ameers were intercepted, proposing to other powers, to league and drive us out of Scinde; Lord Ellenborough thought, and I think justly, that a new treaty should be entered into, which he sent me. I had laid before him the proposal, and I think, my treaty was a more fair treaty, at least, a more liberal treaty than his; but I do not, as far as I have been able to consider it, think his unjust. Mind I always reason upon affairs, as both Lord Ellenborough and myself found them. I cannot enter upon our right to be here at all, that is Lord Auckland's affair. Well! I presented the draft of the new treaty. The Ameers bowed with their usual apparent compliance, but raised troops in all directions. These I was ordered by the Governor-General to disperse. To disperse irregular troops, they having a desert at their back, and four hundred miles of river to cross and run up the mountains, and all this with their chiefs swearing they submitted to everything, to get me into the hot weather when I could not move, and thus cut off all our communications at their ease, was no trifle. In short it was to attack a "*Will o' the wisp.*" Every man is armed to the teeth, and armies of great strength could assemble and disperse like wildfire.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV.

[Note by Mr. Brown who was attached to Mr. Ross Bell's mission, on the number of Camels which that gentleman was accused of employing for his personal baggage, by Doctor Buist of the Bombay Times.]

“The late Mr. Ross Bell, political agent in Scinde, when marching through Cutchee, and above the passes, had to carry with him every article of consumption required by his camp. He had, I believe, as many as six hundred camels with his camp. He was refused aid in the field from the commissariat department by the military authorities. We never quitted therefore a commissariat station with less than ten days provisions. He had with him an escort of two companies of infantry, and from one to two hundred irregular horse. With establishments, officers attached to his agency and their servants, native chiefs and their followers accompanying his camp, the escort above mentioned and camel drivers, there were seldom less than twelve hundred men with the camp; for all of whom, besides camels, horses, and other beasts, it was necessary to carry supplies for ten days.

“The number of camels appears large but was found necessary by Mr. Ross Bell's successor* when similarly marching.”

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI.

SECTION I.

Extracts touching Sir C. Napier's aversion to war.

“In the northern district I, once a-year perhaps, saw ten thousand men under arms; here I have four thousand every day within reach of my voice almost, but at * * * there is good to be done to social order, and, after all, that is the most interesting life. *My life began and ended at Cephalonia, all before or since falls prostrate in comparison.*”

“I am ordered to take a considerable portion of the territory which belongs to the Ameers or princes of

Poonah,
3rd March,
1842.

Sukkur,
16th and
17th Dec.
1842.

* Major Outram.

Scinde, who have been plotting to turn us out by a simultaneous attack in concert with various allies: there are many of these princes, some are with us, some adverse. *My object is to save bloodshed.*"

"The enemies' troops assembled at their two capitals, Kyrpoor and Hyderabad, and a force at Larkaana. Of their numbers I know nothing: some people make them very great, others not, and they daily assemble. All I know is, that they are bad, and I could put them all into the Indus and wash them, then pull them out and squeeze them dry? However I act as if they were all Frenchmen."

"I have cut off the communication between the Ameers and their territory (ceded districts) and their town of Roree. So I shall effect what I am ordered to do, and, *unless they attack me, no blood will be spilled. I can produce a war in two hours if I like it, but I want to prevent it and trust in God I shall.* I am the only man in camp who does not wish for war with the Ameers, and their own peasantry detest them and are longing for us. But still they collect great numbers of Beloochees and other warlike tribes of the mountains: these robbers form their armies, and their deserts are difficult, and there are great jungles in the deserts. So it is necessary to be careful. A very little rashness might invoke disaster for my small army: and as it is, I have near nine hundred sick with fever. I shall move across the river in three days. I am only waiting to arrange the defence of my camp here against the tribes from Larkaana, who it is said mean to attack it the moment I move over to Roree and am engaged with the Ameers. *If they do it will be worse for them!*"—"I feel I am their master in every thing but numbers."—"How our troops got defeated by these tribes is to me inconceivable!"

March,
1842.

"I mourn over the whole thing. *I hate bloodshed.* I did all I could to prevent it as my conduct will prove, and as every officer in this army knows; for they used to say, '*The General is the only man in camp who does not wish for a battle.*' The Ameers are the greatest *ruffians* I ever met with, without any exception; however I have only obeyed my orders."

[*Note.*—The above extracts, and other proofs to be given in the course of this work of Sir C. Napier's aversion to bloodshed, will it is hoped, suffice to expose the puling political argument, and gratuitous assumption to his disparagement, advanced in the debate on the vote of thanks by Lord Howick and his eight associates, who sung their single note so harmoniously together as to gain for them the nickname of the Nine Muses of the House of Commons; while their coadjutors outside, Messrs. Eastwick, Sullivan, and Marriot, in like manner gained that of the Three Graces of the India House.]

SECTION 2.

TOUCHING SIR C. NAPIER'S CONDUCT TOWARDS THE
AMEER ROOSTUM.

Extract of a Letter from Sir C. Napier to Major Outram, 11th February, 1843.

“Roostum's plea of being sent to Ali Moorad by me is a shallow affair, because, in the first place, he sent a secret message (by Moyadeen, I think Brown told me) to say he was to all intents a prisoner in Kyrpoor, and that he had tried to send away his family, and was obliged to bring them back, after they were on the road, and that he would escape and come to my camp. Brown knows all this matter. The messenger said, he, Roostum, would do whatever I advised. My answer was, “Take your brother's advice—go to him, and, either stay with him, or *I will escort you to my camp.*” His flying from his brother's camp proves that he was not a prisoner. His not flying to mine, proves either his *DUPLICITY* or his *IMBECILITY*. I believe the latter, but imbecility is not a legitimate excuse for Rulers! I have only to deal with his acts. He played you the same trick. He even now stands out! He cannot say Ali Moorad still influences him! I believed he did at first, but he does not now; and I am half inclined now to doubt the fact, though I did not do so at first. But as I said, the intrigues of these people are nothing to me; only I will

not let his cunning attempt to cast his conduct on my advice pass. He went contrary to my advice, and now wants to make out that he went by it."

December.
1843.

"Outram told me what a fine fellow Ali Moorad was; how frank and open, and a thorough friend of ours; adhering to his treaty honestly, as indeed he has done up to this moment. Well! I was quite new to them all, and one night, 18th of December, 1842, a secret message came to me from Roostum, to say, he was a prisoner among his family, and they forced him to act against the English; he begged of me to receive him in my camp, for he was helpless. I wrote to him the above letter [the letter given in the text, chapter VI, advising him to go to his brother, &c. &c.] He did go to his brother, and then would not see me! I really know not what I am found fault with for. He did not take my advice, he only took a part. Now if I advised him to take a seidlitz powder, and he drank only the *acid* powder, he could have no right to complain that I gave him a pain in his belly. But this is exactly what Roostum did. He went to Ali Moorad, as I advised; but he neither remained with him as I advised, nor came to me as I advised. He made over everything to Ali Moorad and then fled, and proclaimed that he was forced! The formal way in which he made all over to Ali, has been proved in detail, and is in the hands of Government: it was also submitted to the Mahometan College, by order of the Governor-General, and the College pronounced it perfectly correct, in all particulars.

"Now, why did not the Ameer Roostum meet me? If he was forced, as he pretends, why not tell me? "Oh!" said Outram, "he was afraid. Ali Moorad made him think you were going to put him in prison." My answer was, "Why should he think so? There was not the slightest motive; but if he did fear it at Dejee, that was no excuse for his not meeting me when I overtook him on the march to Emaum Ghur, and when I had force to seize him and all that were with him; and when instead of doing so I sent you, Outram, his friend of four years

acquaintance, to invite him to come to my tent, and you returned with his two sons, and brought me a message, that he was so *tired* he could not come himself. He could have no fear then." To this Outram said, "Oh! Ali has bribed all about him." This was nonsense; he had humbugged Outram.

"Well! after Emaum Ghur Outram again met him on the road to Kyrpoor, and he agreed to meet Outram there the next day to discuss the treaty, but was again *so tired* that he advised Outram to ride on and he would follow early next morning. Off went Outram, duped; and the moment he was out of sight, Roostum ordered his baggage to be packed, and marched that night with all his treasure and seven thousand men, who he had kept out of sight of Outram, and also two pieces of cannon, and he never stopped till he got to Koonhera, a place sixty miles from Hyderabad, where he had land, and a fort, which he held until I captured him! Here you see that the proofs of my conduct are all clear. I wished to have *one* man to deal with instead of a *dozen*, and that dozen in the hands of an old fox Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, who was the sworn enemy of the English, and the man who was working to form a coalition to fall on us with Beloochees, Affghans, and Seiks, united to the number of two hundred thousand men; I having but seven thousand in Scinde, and those divided between Kurrachee and Sukkur, five hundred miles asunder! I wished the younger brother to be the minister of the other, the Mayor of the Palace, the King being an imbecile old fool, full of useless cunning, and in the hands of a clever knave and some six or seven violent young men. When I found Roostum had resigned the turban to his brother I was opposed to it; because, at first, *I thought it would produce war*, and I sent to Ali Moorad to advise him not to take it. His answer was, "he could not give it up; that it had been given to him by his brother in the most solemn manner, with all legal formality, and that he neither *could* nor

would give it back." I had in the meantime reflected upon the matter, and was convinced Ali was right. It made the matter a decided one, whereas the old idiot would constantly, by his cunning tricks, prevent Ali doing what was necessary. I, thinking it was voluntary, offered no opposition, but sought a meeting with old noodle to ascertain from his own lips that it was voluntary. I never advised him to give up the turban, I consented to it, because I thought it would prevent bloodshed: indeed, it mattered little whether I consented or not, for it was done before I knew of it; and Ali Moorad refused to undo it at my request. He proved right; for, as the sequel shewed, Roostum would have bolted, and used his power as "*Rais*" against us with some appearance of justice. I mean, that holding the Chieftaincy, he could have sanctioned acts which might have embarrassed us; for the Mahometans think much of whoever holds the *title*."—"The more this question is discussed about Roostum the better, because my conduct was quite honest. I advised Roostum to be guided by Ali Moorad. I never forced him to do anything. I never advised him to give up the turban, and when I heard he had, I tried to prevent it; and, when I could not prevent it, I sought an interview with him to be certain that the old man had not been forced or ill used by Ali. But he fled of his own free will. This is the whole story.

"I was very much afraid of the old man being killed in the attack of Kyrpoor, if the people defended it, and I knew this would be vexatious, and give a handle for abuse of all sorts from the infamous Indian press, than which the whole world cannot produce one more rascally. Besides, I pitied the old man. I thought he was the victim of his son, who wanted to get the turban against all law and right, and who, for aught I knew, might kill him on purpose in the row! They are capable of this, any one of them."

Extract of a Letter from Ali Moorad to Sir Charles Napier, Oct. 9th, 1843.

“Meer Roostum Khan, a week before he granted me the turban and territory, importuned me to accept them, saying, that none of his sons appeared qualified to possess the turban and rule the country; and that I should therefore take possession of of the turban and territory from him. He deputed to me at Kote Dehjee, his ^{old} son, Meer Mohamed Hoossein, Meer Nusseer Khan, Futteh Ghoree, Peer Ali Gohur, and certain other confidential persons to solicit me earnestly to accept the turban and territory. At last he came in person, bound the turban with his own hands, and of his own accord, around my head, made the entry in the Koran of his having granted me the whole of his country, sealed it and ratified it with his seal and signature, and thus distinctly made over his country to me.

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Parliamentary
Papers,
Scinde.
No. 176.

“How is it possible, then, that I should have used coercive measures to obtain possession of the country, since I had not even preferred a request to obtain it?”

Note by the Secretary to the Government of India.

“August 30, 1843.

“Sir C. Napier adverts to the legal bearing of the deed under which Meer Roostum abdicated in favour of Meer Ali Moorad.

“It had been represented to Sir C. Napier, that every chief is master of his own property, none of which can be entailed; that the will of the possessor decides who is to have the land; that if he gives it to his children, he may, in virtue of his paternal power, revoke that gift; but that if he gives it to a chief who is his equal, and over whom he has no paternal power, the deed is final.

“It is quite correct that every person is master of his own property, and that there can be no entail;—he may give it to whom he chooses. The gift, when possession has been obtained by the donee, is complete. It can, how

ever, be cancelled under certain circumstances ; but one of the barriers to cancelling a gift, is relationship within the prohibited degrees. A gift, therefore, to a son, cannot be cancelled any more than to a brother.* If made to a person not a husband or wife, nor within the prohibited degrees, it may, in certain cases, be cancelled.

“ Sovereign power is not, however, considered property according to the Mahomedan law, nor is it regulated by the laws which govern the transfer of property, whether real or personal, for there is no distinction between the two. The legal title to sovereign power amongst the orthodox Mahomedans of the Soonee sect, rests upon the election of the chiefs or people ; but, as there are few Sovereigns who could bear to have their titles subjected to this test, much ingenuity has been exercised by lawyers, to accommodate their system to modern usage. The accompanying opinions by the doctors of the Mahomedan college of Calcutta, are a fair specimen of the kind of arguments which can be brought forward. There is no reason to suppose the opinions to be otherwise than sound and correct. It is customary to refer to the law officers of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, when a legal opinion is wanted, but there is only one such officer now entertained in the court, and the post happens at the present time to be vacant. By referring to the college, the unanimous opinion of ten doctors has been obtained : some of them are very able men, and all of them are well informed on the subject.

“ It will be seen that the opinions given lead to the same result as was represented to Sir C. Napier, though there is no ground for the possible distinctions which were supposed to exist. The abdication of Meer Roostum is complete and irrevocable ; the assumption of the power by Meer Ali Moorad is also complete, and recognized by law.

“ J. THOMASON.”

* Vide Macnaghten's " Principles of Mahomedan Law," chap. v. par. 13, p. 51 ; Hamilton's " Hedaya," vol. iii. p. 302.

Questions and Answers respecting the legal effect of the transactions between Meer Roostum and Ali Moorad.

“*Ques.* 1.—The ruler of a country died and left his country and forts to his sons. They divided the country and forts amongst them, and each obtained full possession of his own portion. After a time, one of the sons gave, and made over to his brother, his country, forts, and power. In this case, can the donor recall his gift of country, forts, and power?”

“*Ans.*—The donor cannot recall his gift, because, when he has once removed the country, and power, and forts, from his own control, and made them over to his brother, he is necessarily divested of all authority, and becomes one of the subjects of the State. Thus no option of recalling his gift remains. Such is ruled in the books, but God knows what is right.”

“*Ques.* 2.—What proof do you adduce that the ruler of a country cannot legally retract his gift to his brother, of his forts and country, and that he becomes thenceforward one of the subjects of the Government?”

“*Ans.*—There are two foundations of all authority and kingly power,—

“1st. The consent of the nobles and chiefs to the supremacy of any one.

“2nd. Obedience to his orders, in consequence of the establishment of his power and his supremacy. It is thus laid down in the *Buhur-oor-rayik*, in the chapter on Judicial Decrees, and in the *Kazee Khan*, in the chapter on Apostacy: ‘A king obtains his power by two means:—first, by consent to his accession, and this consent must be on the part of the nobles and chiefs of the nation; and, secondly, by the obedience of the people to his orders, from fear of his power and superiority. But, if men consent to his accession, and yet no obedience is paid to his orders, from his inability to enforce them, he does not become a king. If, on the other hand, he become king by common consent, and then turn oppressor,

still, if his power and authority be confirmed, he cannot be deposed, for, if sentence of deposition were passed, he would yet remain king by his power and strength, and the sentence would be ineffectual; but, if he have no power and authority, then he would be deposed.' Now, since, in these troublous times, discord is the common practice, and union is seldom procured, therefore the learned men of later times have agreed upon this, that, in the present day, power and supremacy is the test of kingly authority. It is thus laid down in the *Fatawa-i-Alumgiri* and the *Khuza-nutool-Mooftiem*, in the chapter on Judicial Decrees, 'and, in our time, authority depends on superiority; and we do not inquire whether kings be just or unjust, because all of them seek after temporal power.'

"It is gathered from the drift of the question, that the ruler in question was actually possessed of power and supremacy; and whereas he gave over to his brother his country and power and forts, and divested himself of his supremacy and dignity, with all their attendant circumstances and pomp, and made these over to the donee, it follows that this gift and transfer could not have been made, without the deposition of himself. Thus necessarily the donor becomes completely deposed, and this may be gathered from a remark of Hunavee upon a passage in the *Ushbah*. The passage in the *Ushbah* is to the following effect: 'A king died, and the people consented to the succession of his minor son. It is necessary that the affairs of the administration be made over to a regent, and that this regent consider himself a dependent on the son of the king, on account of the superior rank of the latter. Now, the son is the king ostensibly, but the regent is king in reality.' Upon this passage Hunavee has remarked, 'The object of this arrangement is to meet the necessity for a renewal of the administration after his coming of age, for this cannot (legally) take place, except when the ruler has effected his own deposition, because a king cannot (legally) be deposed, except by his own act.'

"The ruler who makes the transfer, and is thus de-

posed, becomes one of the subjects of the realm: and this is established by a passage in the Hedaya, on the resignation of a judge,—‘On account of the resignation, the power reverts to the people, and therefore he no longer retains the option of recalling his resignation.’

“MOOHUMMED WUJEEB, *First Professor, Mahomedan College.*

“MOHUMMUD BUSHIRUDDIN, *Second Professor, Mahomedan College.*

“NOOROOLLUCK, *Third Professor, Mahomedan College.*

“MAHUMMUD IBRAHIM, *Fourth Professor, Mahomedan College.*

“ABDOORUHREM, *Professor of Indian Law and Regulations.*

“GHOOLAM HOOSSEIN, *First Assistant.*

“MAHUMMUD MUZHEER, *Second Assistant.*

“HUBEEB-OOL-NUBBEE, *Third Assistant.*

“UJEEB AHMUD, *Moulvee of the Law Examination Committee.*

“HUMUD KUBEER, *Secretary to the College Committee.*”

SECTION 3.

Notes and Observations by Sir Charles Napier touching conversations between himself and Major Outram.

Major Outram. “Ali Moorad is by far the best of the Ameers. I wish you knew him. He is good looking, a frank open manner that you cannot help liking. I wish you could see him, you would be pleased with him. At first he was quite opposed to us, and would have made war against us if the other Ameers had joined him, however seeing it was of no use to oppose us, he joined the alliance with us, and is the only one who has never given us cause of complaint. I am sure you will like him.”

Sir C. Napier. “I believed all that Major Outram said as far as a certain point; that is to say, that Ali Moorad was a superior description of barbarian; but

I had had too much experience of barbarian chiefs to have much confidence in the best of them. They may be naturally very superior men, but the best of them is, and must be, under control of the petty chiefs who surround them; and however strong their own minds may be, the physical force which these petty chiefs command is too powerful to be resisted, and consequently, however naturally honest the great chief may be, you can never be sure of any engagement you enter into with him being fulfilled, unless that engagement involves the good wishes of the minor chiefs, or that you have power to force both him and them to a steady line of conduct. I therefore could not altogether confide in Major Outram's admiration of Ali Moorad: but it so far influenced me as to make me believe that he was the best among the Ameers of Kyrpoor to hold the rule in upper Scinde."

Major Outram. "The great agitator and cause of all opposition to the English is a scoundrel named Futteh Mohamed Ghoree. I have tried to catch this old villain, but he is such a cunning fox, that there is no discovering any fact which I can lay hold of. But allow me to put you on your guard against him, for he is the secret mover of all the breaches of treaty and insults that we have received from the northern Ameers: the Syud Mohamed Shurreef whom I caught with so much trouble was merely one of this old villain's emissaries."

Sir C. Napier. "These observations of Major Outram, I considered as the result of long experience in the petty politics of Scinde. I scarcely knew Major Outram then, but his public character and position gave me a right to confide in his opinion. I therefore assumed upon his authority, that Ali Moorad was the man to look to, and Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the man to be watched in any transactions I might have with the Ameers. *It is curious, that within a month or six weeks of this time, Ali Moorad being then Rais, and Futteh Mohamed Ghoree a prisoner, there was no term of abuse too strong in Major Outram's opinion for Ali Moorad! and the Major asked me to let Futteh Mohamed Ghoree loose! having*

himself before told me that this man ruled Meer Roostum; that he was the bitter enemy of the British; the most intriguing and dangerous man to our interests in all Scinde! This dangerous man he would have had me let loose at the most critical juncture of affairs that ever existed between us and the Ameers; namely, at the moment of my return from Emaum Ghur, when I had summoned a general meeting of the Ameers of upper and lower Scinde, personally, or by their vakeels, to discuss the new treaty: the question of peace or war being in the balance! Futteh Mohamed ruled the majority of the Ameers of Kyrpoor, and yet Major Outram wanted me to let him loose! If Major Outram wanted to secure our having war, such a step was likely to accomplish it. I positively refused to agree to it, and was in utter astonishment at Outram being so short-sighted as to propose it, which he did, at the request of Meer Roostum!

Now let us consider how the elevation of Ali Moorad to the turban took place.

First, I will give you two extracts from Major Outram's letter to the Government of India, dated 21st April 1842.

1st Extract. "Even were not right so clearly in Ali Moorad's favour, I should have been loth to advise the attempt to dispossess him in favour of any other party, of what he now holds; for it could only be done at the risk of considerable disturbance, Meer Ali Moorad being by far the most powerful, influential, and able of all the upper Scinde Ameers; on which account, so far from wishing to weaken his power, I would consider it politic to strengthen him, at least by our countenance and guarantee to such a degree as will induce his assuming the chieftainship in upper Scinde without opposition on the demise of Roostum Khan."

2nd Extract. "My opinion is that it would be both just and politic to support Meer Ali Moorad: the public recognition of whom, and investiture with the turban, by the British representative when Meer Roostum dies, most probably would at once put an end to the intrigues

of other parties for that distinction; and at any rate Meer Ali Moorad would not be likely to require further support, than merely the countenance of the British government. Whereas, as he would not under any circumstances relinquish what he deems his right, and is powerful enough to maintain his own cause against the power of the other party, we should have to support the latter with troops did we espouse their cause."

Observations by Sir C. Napier. "Major Outram here speaks of the death of Meer Roostum, but his resignation of the turban, whether to Ali Moorad or to his son Hoossein Ali, was the same thing: it was the cessation of Meer Roostum's wear of the turban.

"My mind being embued with the substance of this letter and Major Outram's conversations, made me accept with pleasure an invitation from his Highness to meet him at Roree. After some time had passed in general conversation in the Dhurbar, his Highness invited me to retire with him and his vakeel into a private apartment of the tent. Lieutenant Brown was with me, and the following conversation took place:

Ali Moorad. "My brother Meer Roostum is about to give the turban to his son Meer Mohamed Hoossein. By the laws of Scinde, if he dies, I inherit the turban. If he abdicates he can only legally do so in my favour—he has no right to pass over me, and place the turban on the head of my nephew. I am willing to obey him, but I will not allow him to give the turban to any one else—what I want to know from you General, is, if we quarrel, do you mean to assist Meer Roostum or not? I am determined to assert my right. I have force enough to do so, if you will be neuter, but, at any rate, I am determined to maintain my right by force of arms, whether you agree to it or not."

Sir C. Napier. "I will certainly give you assistance to take the turban from your *nephew*, but not from your *brother*. By treaty we are obliged to support the Ameers in their respective rights, one against the other. My duty here is to maintain the treaties, and you may be sure of my doing so in your case in all lawful rights."

Ali Moorad. "That is all I want. I wish my brother to keep the turban, and I will obey him; but I will not allow him to give it to any one else."

Another conversation. "*Ali Moorad.* I have great affection for my elder brother. I am ready at all times to obey him, and I always have obeyed him, but he has become so weak and vacillating, that if you go into his room and make any arrangement with him, however important it may be, he will change it all, if the next person that goes in thinks fit to propose another scheme. Now, as Futteh Mohamed Ghoree is always with him, and always making war upon me, I am obliged to defend myself, not against my brother but against Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, who controls him in every thing. I am determined not to let Futteh Mohamed wear the turban, and I will not obey his orders. I am much stronger than my brother's family. I beat them lately in battle. Every body knows I can take the turban if I choose by force, but I don't want it: I wish my brother to remain chief."

"Embued by Major Outram with a good opinion of Ali Moorad, of whom all the English with whom I conversed at Sukkur held the same opinion, I gave credit to what he said, because I knew the mischievous character of Futteh Ghoree, and the imbecility of Roostum was proverbial. Soon after, a message arrived from Roostum, claiming my protection against the intrigues of his own family; this offered an opportunity of having one man to deal with, instead of a faction, with which it was impossible for a civilized government to deal, and into whose intrigues, with due respect to Major Outram, and his predecessors, I considered it undignified for a great government to enter, and from the first, I determined not to enter into them. I was resolved, when there was a breach of treaty, whether great or small, I would hold all the Ameers responsible, and would not be played off like a shuttlecock, and told this was done by one Ameer, that by another, and so have a week's inquiry to find out who was responsible for aggression; for I at once

saw, on arriving at Seinde, that this hide and seek, shifting responsibility, was the game which the Ameers had been playing. The proposal of Meer Roostum to come into my camp, offered me an easy remedy for this evil, and having adopted the high opinion of Ali Moorad entertained by Major Outram, I had no hesitation in recommending his brother to seek his protection and be advised by him: but it must be borne in mind as a matter of first importance, and one upon which the gist of the thing depends, that, while advising Roostum to be guided by his brother, I, having suspicion, despite the high character given by Major Outram of Ali Moorad, that some intrigue *must* be going on, gave Meer Roostum the option of coming, and an invitation to come to my camp, and to put himself under my protection. I use the word *must*, because it is utterly impossible for me to believe that any Eastern divan can act without intrigue.

“By my advice to Roostum, which was not given until asked, I offered to him the honourable and powerful protection of the British government. This he did not choose to accept. He went to his brother, and then he fled from that brother, with his usual vacillating imbecility; an imbecility I believe to have been produced by his long habits of drunkenness, for he is said never to be sober after mid-day. That this flight was caused by Ali Moorad, as Major Outram affirms, I do not now believe. I have neither seen nor heard of any thing to make me believe it. He deceived Major Outram twice in the same manner, if not oftener. Thus, when he promised to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor next morning, but walked off to the south with a large armed force and his treasure, he could not have been influenced by Ali Moorad, who was then far off with me in the desert. He had played me the same trick on my first arrival at Sukkur, long before there was any question of a new treaty, and when Ali Moorad could have no interest to prevent our meeting.

“When I heard he had resigned the turban to Ali

Moorad, I disapproved of it, and Mr. Brown will recollect my sending Ali Moorad's vakeel back to him with this message. I even recommended him to return the turban, and act as his brother's Lieutenant. His answer was the deed had been executed in due form, before all the Moolahs or Priests, and that it was impossible to alter it. I had nothing to reply. I had no business to interfere with the private arrangements of the Ameers. I was authorized to give advice when asked. I was obliged by existing treaties to give protection to any Ameer whose rights were invaded by another; but I was not called upon to originate a complaint when none was made to me, and especially in a case, which, whether originating or not in family intrigue, had a result so favourable to my own Government and useful to that of the Ameers. I therefore did not interfere between Ali Moorad and his brother. The proofs that he was voluntarily elected by Roostum were laid before me. I sought to have an acknowledgment that it was a voluntary act from Roostum's own lips, but he pertinaciously avoided meeting me; nor was Major Outram able to bring about a meeting afterwards. I believe it was his own family prevented the meeting; they were afraid he would confess to having voluntarily given up the turban. Evidence of their complete power over him from beginning to end are not wanting in every transaction that I have had with him since I have been in Scinde.

“As to Ali Moorad's conduct, I do not believe Major Outram can give proof of any thing he alleges against him; all his allegations are general, there is nothing specific. If the not joining his family in their breaches of treaty be betraying his family, it is clear that he has betrayed them; but I know of no other act of treason against them. Ali Moorad may be any thing Major Outram chooses to accuse him of being, but there must be something specific and accompanied by proof. I have heard of neither. We will even suppose, what I do not admit, though I suspected it at the time, that Ali Moorad bullied his brother into ceding the turban and his

estates; he, Ali Moorad, guaranteeing a due and dignified maintenance to Roostum. We will suppose this, and change the position of the individuals. Suppose Roostum an English gentleman of a large fortune, eighty-five years of age, perfectly imbecile, incapable of managing his estates. Ali Moorad is his legal heir; those who are not his heirs try to deprive him of his inheritance. What would the law of England do? I imagine it would give him the guardianship of the estate and of the old idiot, under certain restrictions. Well! what the law of England would have done for him, Ali Moorad did for himself and by his own power!

“However upon these matters Major Outram, or Major any-body, may form their own opinions; they are indifferent to me; but Major Outram had not a right to tell Sir George Arthur, that I had given power and riches to Ali Moorad and that had caused the war, because there is no foundation for such an erroneous assertion; and by giving his notes of a conversation with Meer Roostum and the other Ameers at Hyderabad, in which I am represented, and certainly by implication made to have forced Roostum into his brother’s power, and to the surrender of the turban and all his territory, without accompanying such notes with my denial of the circumstance, I do consider Major Outram to have acted very unjustly towards me, if Major Outram did so; of which however I have no proofs, except hearing of his notes being in the hands of high and influential authorities without any notice being taken of my contradiction. All this I am determined shall be cleared up.”

[*Note.*—Sir Charles Napier did clear up the matter, and the result was that he wrote a final letter to Major Outram, breaking off all friendship and intercourse with him. But at the time the above notes were written, a rumour was rife that Scinde was to be delivered back to the Ameers, and that Ali Moorad was to be deprived of his territory for *his treachery to the Ameers!!* Upon these rumours Sir Charles thus remarked in continuation of his notes, as follows:—]

“ With regard to returning Scinde to the Ameers, I consider it would be a match for the imbecility of old Roostum. With regard to the depriving Ali Moorad of his territory, I think the more we take into our own hands the better for the Scindian people, and for humanity; but, as Aristides said to the proposal of Themistocles, ‘ *It would be advantageous but not just.*’ I do not see how it is possible to deprive a man of his territory, who has not committed a single breach of treaty; or been even suspected of having done so; and who has always been ready to be a mediator between the English and his family. I have now stated facts from which every one who reads them can form his own opinions. My own are formed and immoveable.”

SECTION 4.

Touching Sir C. Napier's Opinion of Lord Ellenborough's Conduct.

Extract from a Private Letter, April, 1843.—“ I see that all sorts of attacks are made upon Lord Ellenborough's policy, in England as well as here. As regards India the cause is this. Lord Ellenborough has put an end to a wasteful expenditure of the public money by certain civil servants of the State, who were rioting in the plunder of the treasury: at least, such is the general opinion. These men are all intimate with the Editors of papers, and many of them engaged with them; they, therefore, fill the columns of the newspapers with every sort of gross abuse of Lord Ellenborough's proceedings. But men begin to see through this, and justly to estimate Lord Ellenborough's excellent government, in despite of these jackals driven by him from their prey. His Lordship destroyed a system calculated to ruin India, or any country; and to which all our misfortunes in Affghanistan are justly attributed.

“ The army was degraded, vilified, run down, till it really began to be infected with a bad opinion of itself. When I arrived at Poonah, I saw and heard such things

that I had no difficulty in accounting for our misfortunes. I felt ashamed of my profession ; the military spirit seemed to have gone !

“ At this time Lord Ellenborough arrived. He gave public expression to his confidence in the army. The troops then felt they had a protector, and the military spirit came back. The military felt they were no longer commanded by ignorant political agents. Then came the medals for the marches and victories at Cabool, and the army regained its self-confidence. All this was effected by Lord Ellenborough in ten months ; and I chiefly attribute my own good fortune to the spirit infused into the military by Lord Ellenborough, and to those admirable general arrangements which enabled me to apply that spirit with effect. Yet this is the man who is abused in every way, though no error can be brought against his government.

“ Let facts speak.

“ This time last year, India was all gloom and despondency—this year every one is cheerful and confident. The armies in Affghanistan were then supposed to be lost ! They became victorious, and are now on the right side of the Indus ! In short, all is safe and flourishing ! But the treasury is no longer pillaged by the civil servants of the public ! In that lies his Lordship’s crime !”

THE
CONQUEST OF SCINDE,

ETC. ETC.

PART II.

IN the first portion of this work it has been partly shewn, that the political matters which the English General had to deal with in Scinde were complicated; and though of a very mean and pitiful character pregnant with great and terrible consequences. This truth must be further developed to explain his second course of diplomacy, which was mixed with military operations, and embarrassed by the intrigues of three distinct Sovereign families, namely, that of Kyrpoor, that of Hyderabad, and that of Meerpoor; and also with the separate members of those families, nearly all of whom claimed, and, from Lord Auckland's unwise treaties, were entitled to claim, independent power.

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Frequently at war with each other, these petty princes could, by the number of their Belooch followers, and with the treasures their rapacity extorted from the miserable Scindian and Hindoo, very easily raise serious, though partial commotions: and often they did so. Hence the Ameers of Hyderabad, and those of Kyrpoor, were neither

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united amongst themselves, nor together ; nor as public bodies, could they be said to be at peace or war with the British Government. All of them, indeed, professed political amity, and even boasted of the warmth of their attachment and of their strict adherence to the treaties concluded with Lord Auckland ; yet they were daily violating those treaties on the most essential points. When rebuked for such infractions they boldly denied them ; and some members of each family always urged their particular good faith and tried friendship, hoping thus to profit in any event ; for it was afterwards proved that they, like the others, secretly abhorred and cursed the subjection they publicly acknowledged. The Ameers most remarkable for this double dealing were, Roostum of upper Scinde, Sobdar and Mohamed Khan of lower Scinde. The young Houssein of Hyderabad also, but he was a boy, and under Sobdar's tutelage.

All were at this time raising troops without ostensible cause ; and though at enmity with each other on points of personal interest, willing to unite, if opportunity offered, against the intruded supremacy of England. Yet the exhibition of their feelings, and even their real policy, was mutable in the extreme, being influenced by fear, anger, hope, and drunkenness, alternately. Their proceedings were, therefore, fantastic ; and there was such a medley of interests, that it was scarcely possible for the General to decide whether he was to negotiate or to fight, how or with whom to treat, where to menace, when to soothe, when to strike, who to support. " Their system," he said, " leaves " no one responsible ; their professions are so mixed, " that if I were to throw a shell into Hyderabad, it

“ would be as likely to fall on the head of a friend
 “ as an enemy.” In fine, the policy of dividing
 power among many—most effectual and sure, when,
 as in the Auckland policy, the design was to en-
 croach and oppress—became vexatious and burden-
 some when justice and tranquillity and security
 only were sought.

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To the embarrassments thus created were added
 that under-current of personal intrigues, of plots
 and quarrels, which in all countries, but in the East
 especially, always disturbs the main stream of
 affairs. Sir Charles Napier, indeed, peremptorily
 refused from the first to meddle with this turbid
 flow of vice and folly; but he was not the less
 obliged privately to sound its depths, though he
 kept his knowledge secret, using it only when it
 served to direct his judgment of public matters
 where there was doubt.

This entanglement of affairs, the result of former
 mischievous diplomacy, has enabled Lord Howick,
 and others of less note, to confuse and darken the
 true story of the General's negotiations with the
 Ameers; their view being to sustain an ungenerous
 but impotent opposition to the vote of thanks in the
 House of Commons. The army they would praise
 —not the General who led it to victory. Yet it
 was confessed no man in that army had fought more
 bravely, none had displayed such skill; and, withal,
 that he had entirely gained the affection and confi-
 dence of his troops, and, in a superlative degree,
 excited that enthusiastic spirit and devotion which
 is the surest guarantee of triumph. But the
 taint is in the blood — the conceit hereditary.
 Lord Grey of old assailed the conduct of the Duke

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of Wellington in the Peninsula. His son, Lord Howick, assails that of Sir Charles Napier in Scinde.

To purge the public mind of credulity in the spurious humanity—the peurile political philosophy, put forward on that occasion with all the peevishness of faction—this work is written. The obscurity produced by calumniators shall be dispelled, and with it Lord Howick’s dream of patriarchal, fallen Princes, bending beneath the blood-stained sword of a fierce soldier, for whom military glory was as God! Justice as nothing! Instead of this illusion, will be found the reality of a brave and generous British officer, who, in nearly fifty years’ service, struggling against climate, wounds, wrongs, and poverty, has never yet been swayed a hair’s breadth in his noble career, by fear or self-interest or false glory. Sir Charles Napier never did a base or sordid action.

When the Ameer Roostum fled from Ali Moorad’s fort of Dejee-Ka-Kote, the affairs of Scinde had reached a crisis requiring great intrepidity enterprise and judgment to determine it in favour of British interests. But the full exercise and play of the two first qualities were restrained and cramped by the General’s anxiety to attain his end, if possible, without spilling blood. If I can prevent blood being shed, and do not do so, I shall be a murderer, was his language at the time. The General is the only man in the army who does not wish for a battle, was the language of the camp. And so intent was he to protect the people of the country from suffering, that when at Roree, exposed to and expecting an attack, he weakened his force by detaching the Bengal troops to occupy

Sir C. Napier’s letters, MS.

the ceded districts behind him, lest the Bhawal Khan, whose property those districts were to be, should first take possession with his wild horsemen, who would have ravaged the villages.

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Nor was Lord Ellenborough's aversion to violence and blood less unequivocally shewn. His instructions are on record. They inculcate the moral obligation of avoiding war, by all means save the sacrifice of British honour, and the supremacy of power absolutely necessary at the time for the safety of the British Empire in India. And here it is fitting again to advert to the real situation of that Empire, when this wise, vigilant, and honest statesman, so potent from his complete knowledge of affairs and his laborious energy, came to restore the reputation and strength of England in the East.

He found the first tarnished by bad faith and defeat; the second sapped by folly and corruption. The disaster of Cabool was recent and terrible. The subsequent surrender of Ghusni had augmented the general terror, and directed the public fears to the isolated position of General Nott's army at Candahar, where, blockaded by the Affghans, it was without money or medicine, or means of transport for a march. Then came the unsuccessful attempt and consequent retreat from Hykulzie which General England made to succour General Nott with the supplies his army required. Meanwhile the dangerous situation of General Sale, besieged in Jellallabad, and the inability of General Pollock to move to his aid from want of means to transport his stores, long continued. Pollock's own army, dispirited and precariously supplied with provisions, was wholly dependent on the Seiks, who, irritated by the falsehoods of the Anglo-Indian

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press, were stubborn and moody; and being twice his numbers, infested his communications, menacing rather than protecting them. This was the military picture presented to Lord Ellenborough.

In the interior of India universal despondency prevailed; and such a terror of the Affghans pervaded the population, that it was scarcely possible to find resources for succouring the Generals: of three hundred and fifty camels, sent in one convoy to General Pollock, three hundred and twenty were carried off in a single night by their drivers, who deserted, in fear, a day's march from Peshawar. The Governor-General's secret plans were given to the newspapers by men in office; and a mischievous, ignoble spirit, the natural consequence of making editors and money-seekers the directors of Statesmen and Generals, degraded the public mind and shed its baneful influence over the army. In Scinde, deep-laid plans of hostility were on the point of execution. At Madras, several Sepoy regiments, smarting under a sordid œconomy, were discontented if not in absolute mutiny. Actual insurrection existed at Saugur, and was spreading on one side to Bundelcund; on the other, along the Nerbudda, to Boorampoor. The ancient fear of England's power,—that confidence in her strength which upholds her sway, was nearly extinguished; the Indian population, whether subjects of England, or of her allies and feudatories, especially the Mohamedan portion, desired and expected the downfall of her Empire.

Such was the terrible state of affairs, and but an outline of them is here given, when Lord Ellenborough assumed the government of the East. In one year, with incredible activity and labour of

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body and mind, by vigilance and a fine discrimination of character, of time, and circumstances, he checked internal abuses, put down insurrection, restored confidence to the public, and military pride to the army. He succoured the isolated forces in Affghanistan, and enabled the Generals to win many glorious victories, to daunt external enemies, to repair past disasters, and to add the great and rich province of Scinde to the British Empire. Nor, however able and enterprising those Generals were, could they with truth declare, that their success was not prepared by the energy and vigilance of the Governor-General, and insured, according to their genius, by the magnanimity with which he confided in and supported them.

These great results were not obtained under the advice of old Indian politicians and counsellors, but in despite of them and their mischievous habits. Lord Ellenborough's correspondence with the Generals, Nott and Pollock, counting from his letter of the 4th of June up to the re-capture of Cabool, was withheld carefully from the usual official channels of communication, and even from the Council at Calcutta. Had it not been so, the intended operations would soon have become publicly known, according to the customs of the Auckland Government, and so have reached the enemy. Then Ghusni would have been prepared for defence against General Nott; Pollock would have been more strongly encountered; success might still have attended the invasion, yet great loss would have been sustained, and the effect felt throughout India.

This secrecy was the first offence of Lord Ellenborough, and, with few exceptions, the persons hold-

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ing political situations, immediately commenced an intriguing hostility against the man who had thus rolled up their vanity and official consequence in a lump, to throw aside while he marched onward firmly and silently to his object. That he should have completely succeeded was the second offence, it rendered the first inextinguishable. And when, with a just indignation, he suspended a civil servant of the Company for calumniating the army, the Court of Directors also became inimical to him, and made every effort to weaken, to thwart, and to oppose his Government : at last, finding his energy too great for their evil influence in the East, with malignant desperation they re-called the man who had just saved their empire, because he would not sacrifice the great interests of England and the welfare of India to their silly pride and sordid nepotism.

But the public voice now, and the judgment of posterity hereafter will do him justice. History bears an avenging rod. She will tell, and it will be a tale to wonder at and execrate, that what great statesmen, and noble armies, gained, and defended in the East with matchless vigour, the base cupidity and pitiful wilfulness of "merchant princes" endangered—that there was a constant struggle between enlightened policy and groping avarice—between real greatness and conceit. That the Court of Directors powerless, as they should be, when a man of knowledge and energy presides at the Board of Control, sought the semblance of authority and dignity, by ostentatious communications and correspondence with particular officers in India. That heading, as it were, the opposition to the Government carried on in its own name, acting as a poli-

tical agitator, and encouraging intrigues and malversations, where it could not command, it did in all ways augment the difficulties of ruling that distant and immense empire. That the public press of India, so false, so noisy, and so base, was not the organ of the many but of the few; not of the governed people but of the governing Europeans, who sought their own profit apart from the general good. Finally, that a foul complicated system, odious to honourable minds, pervaded the Anglo-Indian policy; and when a Governor-General of great ability, untiring energy and unbending firmness, attempted to check its evil influence, the Directors with peurile vanity and selfish passion recalled him, substituting calumny for reason in excuse.

The Ameers' resolution to thrust the English out of Scinde was not one of a day. It was a deep rooted feeling, and in accord with the sentiments of their Belooch subjects; and all the tribes of that fierce race, in the mountains beyond, were willing to aid in the holy work. Being zealous Mohamedans, a religious sympathy as well as the ties of kindred, made them rejoice in the Affghans' success, and led them to desire a repetition of that triumph in Scinde. The execution was planned by heads of greater ability, and hearts of greater courage than the Ameers possessed. The ablest plotter was Roostum's Vizier, Futeh Mohamed Ghoree, a wily man, who in conjunction with other designing persons, Affghans and Seiks as well as Beloochees, concerted a general combination of those nations to fall on the British stations with two hundred thousand fighting men. Of this number the Ameers could furnish at least seventy thousand.

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To destroy Colonel England's column on its return from Candahar, when Nott moved against Cabool, was a part of this scheme; its success was to be the signal for a gathering of all the nations to fall on the British force, which would then have been weak and isolated at Sukkur and Kurrachee. Some default of concert, and the unexpected strength of England's column, far more numerous than the one he led up to Candahar, prevented the meditated attack on that officer, and by his arrival at Sukkur Scinde was once more strongly occupied. This was a check and discouragement to the Ameers, and the Ghoree's policy was then thwarted by the vigorous and dexterous diplomacy of Sir Charles Napier.

He founded it on the mutual jealousies and disputes of the Ameers, and on their vacillating nervous habits, the result of constant inebriety. He spoke at once to their fears and to their prudence when the intoxication of bhang left them the power of thought. Yet secret negotiation amongst themselves, and with foreign chiefs, confused plans, infractions of the treaties, and the latent hatred manifested from time to time in their speeches and councils, indicated that the general plot was only deferred, not abandoned. It was national with the Affghans and Beloochees; but the Seiks were deluded by the falsehoods of the Anglo-Indian press, and their better informed Prince, Shere Sing, could hardly restrain them from falling on the British troops then passing through the Punjaub. The assembly of the army of reserve was therefore principally imposed upon the Governor-General, by the newspaper editors; and as it was useful they ridiculed it, according to their

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nature, in which folly strives hard with villainy for preeminence. But if the Ameers of upper and lower Scinde had then been united amongst themselves; and had agreed together to commence the war they had so long contemplated, the Seiks could not have been controlled by their Prince. A great commotion, extending probably to Nepaul and Gwalior, to Bundelcund and the districts south of the Nerbudda, would then have shaken India to its centre, and proved the foresight with which Lord Ellenborough assembled the army of reserve on the Sütledge.

It was, therefore, most necessary to the general interest of India, that Sir Charles Napier, by an adroit and firm diplomacy, and an imposing military attitude, should keep the Ameers in a state of irresolution, as to their intended outbreak, during that critical period. The unrestricted support of the Governor-General enabled him to follow the dictates of his own judgment without fear. "I felt," he said, "that under Lord Ellenborough I might go headlong, if I saw my own way clearly." Indeed, every thing he required was given to him and more than he required. The Bengal division of his army, though under orders to march to Ferozepore, had been placed at his disposal to keep or send away; he was offered more cavalry and guns, together with all the Bombay Sepoys of General Nott's army, then traversing the Punjaub. And his command was extended to the troops of the Bombay Presidency in Cutch; so anxious was Lord Ellenborough by a display of force to insure a peaceful termination of the Scinde difficulties.

The first result of this freedom of self-counsel and of action, was the passage of the Indus to occupy

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Roree and Alore, as already related, and it was certainly a fine stroke of generalship. The Ameers had then only the option of suffering him to take possession of the districts ceded by the new treaty, which treaty they had verbally accepted; or, of attacking him in a strong position with a part only of their army. The first would have been a practical acknowledgment of the treaty, which it was never their intention to make; the last, a dangerous experiment, and a premature disclosure of their hostility. This skilful politico-military movement therefore greatly perplexed them, and gave time to the General Government for another respiration under the pressure of its difficulties. Yet, if the Ameer Roostum had not at that moment broke from his turbulent sons and nephews, and resigned the Turban of Rais to his brother, the war would quickly have begun in upper Scinde; for the Ameers of the lower province were certainly then preparing to take the field, and Ali Moorad, doubtful of the result, would probably have been inclined to act with the others. Some time would have been required, indeed, to bring all their forces together, but that was in their policy, which was not to call the British troops into the field until the hot season.

Roostum's sudden desertion of his family, the impulse of an old man's selfishness, was therefore a great event; and it was, by the ready sagacity of the English General, rendered a decisive one. It secured the alliance of Ali Moorad, and forced the other Princes of Roostum's family to a premature display of their hostility: they abandoned upper Scinde and its resources to the British policy without a blow. This prevented a war in that pro-

vince, and irrefragably proved the sinister designs of the Kyrpoor Ameers while they were professing friendship: yet it has been with stupid malignancy denounced as an injustice perpetrated by Sir Charles Napier, and as the real cause of the war.

The old Ameer soon saw his error, and endeavoured to repair it by falsehoods and low cunning, which, however, failed. But had he remained united with his sons and nephews, and with the Ameers of lower Scinde, the General would have had a very dangerous affair on his hands, which may be thus shewn.

While yet at Sukkur, he had been directed to disperse the armed bands which were menacing and insulting the British army at the instigation of the Ameers. He did not attempt it at that time, well knowing, as he expressed himself, it would be to chase a *will o' the wisp*. Moreover, he desired to combine his political and military measures solidly together, and to make no false step in either. "I can put them all into the Indus, he said, they are barbarians, yet I act as if they were all French." But when he had obtained a position and true base of operations at Roree, covering the occupation of the ceded districts, he resolved to execute his orders. Now, if Roostum had been still Rais, he and his family would have secretly caused the bands to disperse with orders to reassemble again later, and then openly with oaths and lamentations and reproaches, would have declared their innocence, and protested against the injustice of suspecting them; thus, time would have been gained for the coming of the deadly sun, when they would have laughed alike at their oaths and at the General; and in concert with the Ameers of

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lower Scinde, would have commenced war with the advantages of number, union, and climate.

Let it not be supposed that the passage of the Indus, the occupation of Roree, the strengthening of the camp at Sukkur, and the consequent disregard of the Belooch forces assembled at Larkaana, related in the first part of this work, were matters of ordinary command. They brought the field force on to the true line of operations, which was the left bank of the river; they put the political and military measures in harmony; they protected the ceded districts at the same time that they gave the army an offensive and menacing position, with a secure base. Nor were they easy of execution. The passage of the river alone was an operation of several days; for though the fighting-men were but a few thousands, the followers of the army were near twenty thousand, and the baggage enormous. "I have not plagued your Lordship with difficulties unavoidable and not insuperable, but the baggage of an Indian army is an awful affair,"—such was the simple note of the General at the time: those who have commanded will feel its force.

War involves so many combinations, so many details, so much preparation, that there is no surer indication of a great commander than the bringing the multifarious parts of an army to work together in a compact form, capable of being directed with rapidity and decision against the enemy in right time and place, the easiness of the motion giving assurance that the stroke will be effectual. Simple the matter seems then, but what energy of genius is applied to bring it to that simplicity! The steam-engine with its small whirling balls at top, govern-

ing the giant's complicated bones below, is the type of a well conducted army.

By detaching the most powerful and vigorous Ameer of upper Scinde, the legal heir also to the turban, from the family policy; by alternate soothing and menacing of the old Rais and his turbulent relations, the English General brought Ali Moorad's strong sense courage and ambition, Roostum's fears and cunning, and the arrogance and violence of his unruly sons and nephews into direct contention; and all at variance with the able Ghoree's policy; for this vizier was the personal foe of Ali Moorad, the secret director of Roostum, and the adviser of the other Ameers, even those of Hyderabad, when their passions and vanity would let them listen to his counsels. This state of affairs prevented the adoption of any decided general measure; and of course retarded that junction of the armies of upper and lower Scinde which was to be the preliminary of war. The danger of hostilities in the upper country at one time imminent was thus conjured and dissipated. And when the wavering imbecile Roostum fled from Ali Moorad's fort of Dejee-Ka-Kote, to join his sons again, the farce of the Kyrpoor troubles was ended: but then new actors of a sterner aspect appeared, giving notice that a dreadful tragedy was preparing.

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From that time every movement of the English General was critical, involving terrible results. And it is essential to a right understanding of his character to shew, step by step, how exactly he ruled his conduct by the principles of honour and the rights of treaties; obeying his orders rigidly, yet making every effort to preserve peace, ere his sharp sword cut away the Talpoor dynasty from

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the land it afflicted. Cautiously and justly he proceeded with respect to the Ameers, and benevolently towards their people; but also with firmness he supported the dignity of his own country, her rightful claims, and the honour of her arms. Meeting low arts with fair dealing, baffling cunning with superior calculation, he steadily approached his object by negotiation, with a sincere and earnest desire to avoid the spilling of blood; and when the waving of the Belooch weapons forbade this, with incredible energy and daring he broke through their innumerable hosts as a ploughshare breaks through the earth. A full harvest of happiness for Scinde has blessed the glorious labour.

Sir Charles Napier, after occupying Roree and the ceded districts, could no longer delay executing the Governor-General's orders to disperse the armed bands. He had repeatedly warned the Ameers that his orders were to that effect, and he must obey them. The constant answer was:—"There are no bands, we are all submission." Nevertheless the bands were there, strong in number and violence, and they were increasing. They exacted the revenue of the Ameers in advance; they robbed the people and the merchants; they drove from the country all the camels to prevent the British troops obtaining any; they stopped the dawks coming to Sukkur, and intercepted the communications of the army. Remonstrance thus failing, there was no remedy but force, and accordingly the General, knowing how useless and how dangerous it would be to send moveable columns in pursuit of separating bands, through so large and intricate a country, resolved to strike at their headquarters. This was Kyrpoor, the capital of the

Ameers, which being then filled with fighting men, he resolved to storm.

He marched in December, at the head of two thousand infantry, nine hundred cavalry, and twelve field pieces, besides a battery of 24lb. howitzers drawn by camels. Nevertheless, Roostum being then at Ali Moorad's fort of Dejee-Ka-Kote, and Ali Moorad himself acknowledged as Rais, and in alliance with the British, the General had strong hopes that the other Ameers, perplexed and dismayed by Roostum's conduct, would not risk an assault. Hence, before he moved, he sent them the following warning letter:—

“Ameers, I have to request your Highnesses will protect our post coming through your country. Two of our mails have been stopped in the territory of Kyrpoor, and I am going to inquire into this matter, and put a stop to such aggressions. Wherever my posts are stopped, there will I march with my troops; and your Highnesses will have to pay the expense if this happens within your territory.”

His right to act thus was undoubted. If the Ameers had called up the bands and directed their operations, as indeed they had, it was war. If the bands acted without orders, they were common enemies; they were also robbers, plunderers, and murderers. They had stopped the British mails, and filled the whole country with terror and wailing. The Ameers had brought them together, had paid them and were quite unable to control them, if they desired to do so. To disperse such a collection of menacing warriors, was therefore not only a social right, but a duty, on the part of the English General, even though he had received no

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orders to that effect from Lord Ellenborough. It was also in strict accordance with the treaty of nine articles, concluded with Roostum by Lord Auckland. The British Government obtained by that treaty the right to repress aggressions by one Ameer against another, and of course more strongly the right, as the supreme power, of restraining aggression on itself.

The 26th of December, the British force reached Mungaree, a fort near Kyrpoor, where it encamped. But previous to this, the sons and nephews of Roostum, being, as the General expected, dismayed by his advance, and perplexed and troubled at the cession of the Turban to Ali Moorad, whose power and resolution they knew by experience and feared, went off from Kyrpoor to the south with all their fighting men, their treasures and their families.

On the 28th, the old Roostum, once more changing sides, followed them from Dejee-Ka-Kote with his troops and treasure. Then the Larkaana division of Beloochs began to cross from the right bank of the Indus, and made also towards the south, knowing that the Ameer either of upper or lower Scinde would be ready to entertain them for battle. Thus no armed bands remained in upper Scinde, save those under the command of Ali Moorad. The Governor-General's orders were executed, and no blood shed. Then the Scindian labourer rose with a shout of exultation, and the trafficking Hindoo clapped his lean hands in joy at the flight of these barbarous oppressors. Relieved from the Patan and Belooch swordsmen, whose sharp and ready blades cut short all remonstrances against their robberies, the husbandmen and traders flocked into the British camp, offering pro-

visions for sale, and cowering with satisfaction under the protection of the just Feringhee General. And with a vigorous hand he guarded their rights of life and property.

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Inflexible to marauders, he was ever on horse-back watching the behaviour of his troops and camp followers, and enforcing obedience to his orders. Nor was this the lightest of his labours. The abolition of flogging in the Sepoy army left him only the choice of death or imprisonment for plunderers; but death could not be often resorted to, and confinement required guards, weakening the force in the field, while the culprit enjoyed the great pleasure, according to Eastern habits, of doing nothing. To remedy this serious defect in the military code, he multiplied his Provost-mars-hals, thus placing the punishment of plunderers in the hands of functionaries, who were not restricted as to corporal chastisements. He directed them to be rigorous, but took care to prevent cruelty and injustice; and he exhorted the officers to be vigilant, warning them, that straggling and robbery were the two great evils of an army in the field; and quoting the Duke of Wellington's authority for the immense importance of having the peasants of a country, for or against the troops. This plan succeeded. It saved the people from violence, the army from destruction. But the editors of the Indian press took it as their text, to exhort the Sepoys to mutiny; calling upon them, at the most critical periods of the war, "to rise and put an end to that fellow's breaches of law." The authors of this excitement to mutiny and murder, remained unpunished, because they are the organs of a faction supported by the Directors. The Indian Government is weak, and

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it will never be strong, until the official persons in India are forced to obey and support the Governor-General of the Crown, in preference to courting the favour of the trading politicians of Leadenhall Street. Despicable as the editors of newspapers in India are personally, it is no wisdom to neglect such matters as this; the evil they produce is enormous; witness how nearly their falsehoods caused the destruction of the armies traversing the Punjaub on the return from Cabool.

For several days the troops were detained at Mungaree by heavy rains, a very unusual occurrence in Scinde. During this forced halt the General went to Kyrpoor, to meet Ali Moorad, and to arrange with him measures necessary to maintain tranquillity in upper Scinde when the army should descend on lower Scinde. For to prevent or to commence a war in the latter country, as the case might be, was in the Governor-General's instructions, because the same difficulties existed with the Ameers of Hyderabad, which had been terminated at Kyrpoor by the flight of Roostum and his sons and nephews. Nor was there any time to be lost. Hyderabad was one hundred and fifty miles distant. It was the beginning of January, and beyond the middle of March military operations could not be carried on, without great risk and loss from the heat. The Ameers knew this, and their intrigues, their falsehoods, and pretended submissions, their promises to accept the new treaty, and the negotiation they had commenced by their Vakeels, were all designed to waste the cool season unprofitably for the British General.

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Correct intelligence of their movements and numbers, it was very difficult to obtain in a country

where lying is the natural order of intercourse, and truth-telling the exception ; yet many emissaries being employed, and much pains bestowed, the obscurity gradually cleared up. The continued gathering of armed men from the hills, the plains, and the desert, was ascertained. And it was certain the Ameers could, if they all joined and freely dispensed their treasures, bring into the field, time being allowed them, from seventy to eighty thousand fighting men of most robust bodies and courageous spirits, well armed, and well exercised in arms—after their fashion : and that fashion was not contemptible. The Beloochs who knew the difficulties the country presented to an enemy, regulated their plans accordingly, and with intelligence. They chose their position of battle well, and, unlike other Asiatics, prided themselves on their infantry in preference to their cavalry.

To oppose, or rather to control this immense force, Sir Charles Napier had not, at this time, more than eight thousand troops, widely distributed, at Sukkur, at Kurrachee, and in the field. The 41st British regiment was on its march to the coast to embark for Bombay. The Bengal division was within a march or two, occupying the ceded districts, but this only till the Bhawal Khan took possession, when it was to march to Ferozepore. Three thousand fighting men were together in the field ; and those only by the exercise of an overbearing will, and incessant pains taking to overcome obstacles of a serious nature. Scinde had been nearly exhausted by Lord Keane's army of carriage, which, in Indian phrase, means camels and other beasts of burden, and it had not yet recovered : moreover, the Ameers secretly menaced the con-

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tractors, and the principal one forfeited his deposit rather than risk their vengeance. They had also, as before said, caused their Beloochs to drive away all the camels, an act of war in itself, and sufficiently indicative of their ultimate object. These secret hostile measures were successful; only six hundred camels, all miserable worn-out animals, the refuse of Lord Keane's commissariat, were available for the field force. Lord Auckland's delirious invasion of Affghanistan, had not only entailed a dangerous war in Scinde upon his successor, but nearly deprived the army of the means of supporting that war with success. It is thus folly begets mischief.

Of the three thousand men brought into the field, many of the Sepoys had been, during the three years of the Affghan contest, placed in difficult situations; and some had suffered severe defeats from the brave barbarians of the hills. The moral effect of this had been dispiriting. They now felt that they had a commander who was able to win, and past disasters were forgotten. Yet Belooch bravery was still sufficiently impressed on their recollections, to produce respect for their enemy, and that is not the worst cast of mind for soldiers who are engaged in dangerous operations.

The emissaries reports now arrived daily, and enabled the General more clearly to scan the military horizon.

Two thousand men, under Mohamed Ali, the son of Roostum, had thrown themselves into Shah Ghur, a desert fort to the east, on the borders of Jessulmere; his design being to gather a larger force, and from thence operate against Roree and the ceded districts. But Shah-Ghur was an appurtenance

Plan 3.

of the Turban ; wherefore this operation of Mohamed was clearly an act of war, and one of aggression against Ali Moorad, as Rais. It gave the English General a right, under the treaty of nine articles, to interfere with his army.

Roostum, who had numerous followers, it appeared afterwards seven thousand with several pieces of cannon, was within the borders of the desert to the south ; he hung on the cultivated district for the sake of water, yet with the desert at hand for a retreat. He was in direct communication with his sons and nephews, most of whom were at Dingee, a large fortress belonging to the family, about forty-five miles south of Dejee-Ka-Kote, that is to say, just on the line of demarcation between upper and lower Scinde. There the Beloochs from Larkaana, and other tribes, were hastening in arms ; and from thence these turbulent Princes kept up a close intercourse with the Hyderabad Ameers, concerting with them the plan of a war against the British.

Mohamed, or Houssein Khan, also a son of Roostum, had thrown himself, with two thousand men and his treasure, into Emaum Ghur, another desert fortress, which he had previously stored with grain and gunpowder. This place, accounted by the Beloochs impregnable, and to Europeans inaccessible as situated in the very heart of the waste, was designed for the base and place of arms for the main army of upper Scinde. Its seizure by Mohamed was another act of war and aggression against Ali Moorad, for it also belonged to the Turban. There were reports besides of several numerous bodies of Belooch cavalry wandering in the waste, but the final destination of all was said

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to be Einaum Ghur, as the base of operations contemplated by the Ameers of upper Scinde.

At Hyderabad, the Ameers of lower Scinde, and the Meerpoor man, Shere Mohamed, were likewise collecting troops, though less ostentatiously; and all had agreed to a plan of campaign in concert with the Princes of upper Scinde, which was arranged with a skill and intelligence far beyond the Ameers' capacity—having nothing barbarous in the conception. Subsequent intelligence made known that it was the work of the purchased Abyssinian and Arab slaves of the Ameers, called "*Seedees*," probably the same as *Sidi* the Arab word for Lord. Amongst these Hoche Seedee, a black of whom I shall have to speak again, was conspicuous for his ability, greatness of mind, and heroic courage.

Expecting that the General, so prompt and resolute as they had found him in all his proceedings, would not fail to attack Kyrpoor, as indeed he designed, the first arrangement of the Ameers was that the Beloochs of upper Scinde should fall back fighting from that capital to Dingee, where they were to be reinforced to the amount of fifteen thousand men: a like number stationed at Larkaana on the right of the Indus, being ready to attack the camp at Sukkur, while this retreat upon Dingee was effected. If this attack from Larkaana succeeded, the British field force would be isolated, they thought, without a base, and it was to be immediately opposed by the great mass of the upper Scinde army, reinforced by the armies of Hyderabad and Meerpoor, which were promptly to unite at Dingee and give battle.

The foresight of the General in strengthening

Sukkur, and forming a new base at Roree, was overlooked by the barbarians; with that error, their plan was well laid. They had, however, trusted to their false negotiations for delaying the opening of the campaign until the hot season should be near. But the General's detection of their real designs, and his prompt action, baffled their schemes in that point also; and then Roostum's wavering conduct completed their confusion. Hence they fled, as we have seen, at once to Dingee, and the Larkaana people then repaired thither also, instead of storming the camp of Sukkur.

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Still the Princes of Kyrpoor halted at Dingee, and prepared to put the second part of the plan of campaign in execution; and though necessarily modified by the recent events, the leading principles were the same. They resolved, and had hopes of being able, to inveigle the British field force, whose numbers they well knew, down the left bank of the Indus, amongst the nullahs, jungles and swamps, which abound there; to keep it stationary by fresh negotiations and intrigues and falsehoods, until the inundation should invade the camp, and the fierce sun should strike the soldiers down. Then the Belooch blades were to finish the war, or, as they expressed it in their Dhurbars, "*To make the Kaffirs, as they fell beneath their swords, cry out, Oh, God! what have we done, that you let these devils loose upon us?*"

"If we fail to keep him by intrigue on the river bank; if he attacks, and that we are defeated," thus they reasoned, "we will retreat in two bodies on different lines. The Kyrpoor Ameers, with the force of upper Scinde, must strike into the desert and rally again at Emaum Ghur, where there are

PART I. provisions and powder and treasure. But the Ameers of lower Scinde must fall back on Hyderabad—and that is a strong fortress. Whichever body the British General pursues, the other must close on his rear.

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“No European has ever seen Emaum Ghur; it is built in the heart of the wilderness, it is only to be approached by vague uncertain tracks, not known to strangers, and in some places without water for several marches. He cannot reach us there.

“If he halts and encamps, after his victory, on the river’s bank late in the season, pestilence will destroy his troops. If he enters the waste in pursuit of the army of upper Scinde, the army of lower Scinde will cut off his communication with the cultivated district and with the river; then his troops will perish from heat and thirst on the burning sands.

Plan 3. “If he marches down upon Hyderabad, he will encounter the armies of lower Scinde based on that strong fortress, and having the sultry swamps of the Delta to retire upon in the south if again defeated; in the east they will make Meerpoor, another strong fortress on the edge, and Omercote, equally strong, in the heart of the desert. Meanwhile the army of upper Scinde, returning from Emaum Ghur, will emerge from the waste upon his rear, and cut his communications with Roree.

“If, neglecting all these operations, he sees his danger and endeavours to fall back on Rorec, we will all unite to pursue him with harassing attacks night and day. He will never be able to reach Sukkur!”

They counted on having nearly seventy thousand

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fighting men, and thirty pieces of cannon for this warfare. And they well knew if they gained any marked advantage, or even sustained the first shock without utter ruin, maintaining the struggle but for a short time, the Affghans and Seiks, the Brahooc Beloochs, and the Mooltan man, and it might be the Bhiawal Khan's people also, would take part in the war. Then internal commotions would shake India, the army of Gwalior would take the field, and the British empire in the East be rocked to its foundations.

Such was the formidable nature of the affair the English General had now to deal with; such were the terrible results to be expected from an error in judgment, or a misfortune; such were the adverse chances of climate, of intrigue, of the sword, to make his spirit quail, and confuse his perception by a sense of responsibility as much as by the sense of danger. How did he meet that danger? Did he tremble at the responsibility? Let his actions reply.

That some such plan of campaign might be suggested by an able man, and adopted, had not escaped his comprehension; he perceived all its force, and had meditated on the means of meeting it. Hence when the Ameers' project became known to him, he was prepared to baffle it. But he did not confine his view to a simple operation of war. His counter-project was not one merely to put the Ameers' plans aside, but so to shake their confidence in their military resources before they tried a battle, that they would become amenable to negotiation; and in the reaction of fear, after such high wrought confidence, he hoped to find them submissive and ready to ratify the new treaty. For ever

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a horror of blood spilling was uppermost in his thoughts, and in his letters constantly expressed, as if his soul had been prescient of the dreadful carnage of Meeanee and Dubba.

At first he had opposed Ali Moorad's assumption of the turban, thinking it would increase the chances of hostilities; he now changed his opinion. Roostum's restless cunning would have baffled Ali Moorad's superintendence of the government, and the old Ameer would have equally fled from Dejee-Ka-Kote; yet with this material difference in the effect of that flight upon public affairs. Bearing with him the dignity of Rais, his influence would have been great. This advantage he lost in ceding the turban; for the Mohamedan Beloochs always obey him who wears the Puggree, no matter how acquired. It is indeed a most ancient Asiatic maxim, that to the throne not the man belongs the dignity and power. Hence the English General now felt pleased at this state of the affair, and turned it instantly to account in his project for solving the Scindian question in a peaceable manner, without contravening his orders, or damaging the interests of his own country.

To retreat, or even to check the advance, never entered his mind, yet he cautiously looked on all sides. To fight at Dingee, and, if victorious, pursue with his heavy mass of followers and baggage, an enemy flying into the desert without encumbrance, and in person proof against the sun, would, he judged, end in disaster. To pursue the beaten force to Hyderabad, would involve a siege which—his communications with Sukkur being cut off by the people from Emaum Ghur—would be uncertain and tedious, and bring the operations into the hot

season. And when he considered the opposing obstacles, he saw the principal one was not the army at Hyderabad; he could defeat that a second as well as a first time. Neither was it the siege of that fortress; British science could reduce it. The sun and the desert remained. The desert was the pivot upon which the Ameers' operations turned. The supposed inaccessibility of the waste was their stay, the sustenance of their warlike confidence. The sun was their hope. The strength of the wilderness was an illusion, and the English General resolved to dispel it at once while the cool season lasted, and thus deprive them, at one blow, of the double source of their confidence.

As early as the 20th of December, he had informed Lord Ellenborough he thought the desert was the place to strike at; and he now conceived, in that view, an enterprise as hardy as any of which military records tell. Similar it was in design, but more dangerous and more daring with respect to the chances of a battle, than that of Marius when he surprised the city of Capsa in the Jugurthine war. Like Capsa, Emaum Ghur was accounted by the enemy impregnable as a fortress, and inaccessible from situation. It was in the very heart of the waste, eight long marches distant—the exact position was not known. The tracks by which the movement was to be made, and the scanty wells which were to refresh the thirsting soldiers, could be but vaguely indicated by native informants. There were not many Scindians who knew them; and those who did might be traitors. It was certain some marches must be made without any water, and, moreover, the springs were capricious, sometimes bubbling up in one place freely, at another

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time disappearing, to rise again at a distance, being never certain in their locality or abundance. This hidden fortress of Emaum Ghur, so distant, so inaccessible placed, the English General resolved to seek out and attack; though it was, he knew, well provided, and garrisoned by two thousand of the best Belooch warriors; for none but the best would encounter the privations of the desert when absolute necessity did not urge them. And many thousands of horsemen were also in the sandy skirts of the wilderness, acquainted with the water-pits, able to fill them up, or to poison the waters, and ready to fall on the fainting soldiers in their distress. To attempt the destruction of Emaum Ghur in the face of such difficulties and dangers, was an enterprise worthy of Alexander and his Agrians.

It was, however, well reasoned. Success would dismay the Ameers, and deprive their Belooch warriors of a resource suitable to their habits and superior power of sustaining the heat. Their position at Dingee, a chosen one, would be turned by this march to Emaum Ghur, and rendered useless by the march back from that place. Their skilful plan of campaign, embracing the double line of operations, would be frustrated, and the armies of both the Scindes thrown upon one line of retreat to the south. Then, crowded and embarrassed, and confused by the superior generalship of their enemy, they would be forced to disperse, or to accept a decisive battle to cover Hyderabad, without time for consideration, and against troops, few in numbers, indeed, and perhaps not braver, but superior in arms and in discipline. This last trial, however, he expected to be spared. Emaum Ghur was by the Ameers thought stronger than Hyderabad, and

the confusion and alarm caused by its capture, and by the consequent disruption of their plan of campaign, would, the General hoped, so intimidate these inebriate, luxurious Princes, as to incline them to peace.

Thus reasoning, he made instant preparations for the enterprise ; but political as well as military considerations were involved. To march against the desert forts of Emaum Ghur and Shah Ghur, would undoubtedly be an act of hostility against the Princes who had seized them ; yet not necessarily one of war against the Ameers, though it was designed to influence their operations. It would not be a war against the Ameers any more than the march to Kyrpoor, to disperse the bands, had been. The Beloochs holding the forts were part of those bands ; they belonged to the same predicament, and the right to attack them was under the same warrant, that is to say, the treaty of nine articles, reinforced now, however, by the authority of the Rais, Ali Moorad, whose property the forts were. Originally they belonged to Roostum, and his sons were now in possession ; yet it was as Rais only that he had any right in them, and that right he ceded with the Turban. Roostum did not dispute this law, but he denied that his cession of the Turban was valid, and declared that previous to that event he had made over the Puggree to his son, Mohamed Houssein, who was, therefore, holding Emaum Ghur rightfully. This cession of the Turban to his son was, however, notoriously contrary to the Talpoor law of succession ; and to complete the confusion, he offered to use his own authority of Rais, while avowing that he no longer

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possessed that dignity, to remove Houssein and Ali from Emaum Ghur and Shah Ghur.

This was, in truth, only one of his many low intrigues to gain time for the preparation of the general plan of campaign; yet it proved the absolute authority of the Rais over the forts, and Ali Moorad was the legal Rais, as was afterwards formally shewn. This was, indeed, virtually admitted by Roostum, when he declared he had made over his power to his son, for that he could not legally do; and when to do it he had divested himself of the Turban, the latter fell at once to Ali Moorad, whether designed for him or not. The declaration of Roostum also confirmed the truth of what Ali Moorad had urged upon the General during the interview at Roree, namely, that Roostum was seeking to deprive him of the succession in favour of Houssein.

Mohamed Houssein, and Ali Mohamed, or Ali Ackbar as he has been called, were now brought under the action of Article V. of the treaty, which gave the British Government the right to settle any dispute between the different Ameers. Ali Moorad seemed, indeed, somewhat averse to the British entering the desert at all, saying he would reduce Emaum Ghur himself. He had before however complained that his cousins were in arms to resist the authority of the Turban; hence by Article III. of the treaty, he, as Roostum's successor to the Turban, was bound to act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government. It follows that Mohamed Khan in arms, not authorized openly by his father Roostum, and in public opposition to Ali Moorad, was an outlaw, not a Prince; and no preliminary declaration of war was therefore needed,

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to render an attack on him lawful, while every consideration of policy and humanity rendered a delay in announcing that terrible warrant for slaughter, advisable. Nevertheless, to give the expedition the appearance as well as the quality of right, it was essential to have Ali Moorad's countenance and support, and it was advantageous to have his knowledge of the desert and the fortress turned to profit. It was advisable, also, to teach him, who had wavered in his alliance at first, and now shewed his dislike to have the British penetrate the waste, that he could no longer choose his part, having to deal with a man his over-match in policy, and his master in arms, and who thus described his views at the time :—

“ I had discovered, long ago, that the Ameers
 “ put implicit faith in their deserts, and feel confi-
 “ dent we can never reach them there ; and there-
 “ fore, when negotiations and delays and lying
 “ and intrigues of all kinds fail, they can at last
 “ declare their entire obedience, their innocence,
 “ their humility, and retire beyond our reach to
 “ their deserts, and from thence launch their wild
 “ bands against us, so as to cut off all our commu-
 “ nications, and render Scinde more hot than
 “ nature has already done.

“ So circumstanced, and after all the considera-
 “ tion I could give the subject, and after drawing
 “ all I could from Ali Moorad, whom I saw last
 “ night at Kyrpoor, I made up my mind, that,
 “ although war was not declared, nor is it neces-
 “ sary to declare it, I would at once march upon
 “ Emaum Ghur, and prove to the whole Talpoor
 “ family, both of Kyrpoor and Hyderabad, that
 “ neither their deserts nor their negotiations can

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“ protect them from the British troops. While
 “ they imagine they can fly with security to the
 “ deserts, they never will be quiet.

“ I told Ali Moorad, I would place his Killedar
 “ in Emaum Ghur ; that your Lordship was deter-
 “ mined to support the family chief, as bound by
 “ treaty ; that those people who fled with armed
 “ men to Emaum Ghur, and refused to obey their
 “ chief, Meer Roostum, were, in fact, rebels, and
 “ I was resolved to follow them. His reply was,
 “ ‘ He would take Emaum Ghur himself.’ I an-
 “ swered, ‘ I knew he could do so, and his readi-
 “ ness to save my troops the trouble was praise-
 “ worthy, and I was much obliged to him.’ How-
 “ ever, I was determined to shew the Ameers of
 “ Hyderabad, their deserts were of no avail ; that
 “ I could and would follow them everywhere,
 “ whether it was to the deserts of Scinde, or to the
 “ mountains of Beloochistan ; that following his
 “ cousins to Emaum Ghur was, perhaps, the most
 “ difficult of any operation of the kind, and there-
 “ fore would have the most effect. I thought it
 “ not amiss to lift up the curtain, and let my
 “ friend Ali Moorad look into futurity ; it is well
 “ for him to feel that he is wholly dependent on
 “ our power ; that everything he can honestly
 “ wish for, is his, as our faithful ally ; but, that
 “ should he be a traitor, he has no refuge. He is
 “ vigorous minded, ambitious, and, I suspect, a
 “ cunning man, but apparently generous and bold ;
 “ in short, as good as barbarians can be, and better
 “ than most. Sheik Ali Nusseer, his minister, is
 “ very clever ; he has lived in Bengal, knows our
 “ power, and has, I believe, convinced his master
 “ that it is not to be resisted ; besides, he sees that

“ while he keeps his master good friends with us,
 “ his own fortune must thrive: he is therefore our
 “ own.”

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While thus preparing for his expedition, the English General recognized and proclaimed Ali Moorad as the lawful Rais of upper Scinde, by the following manifesto.

“ Ameers and people of Scinde. His Highness
 “ the Ameer Roostum Khan sent a secret mes-
 “ senger to me, saying, he was in the hands of his
 “ family, and could not act as his feelings of friend-
 “ ship for the English nation prompted him to do ;
 “ and if I would receive him, he would escape, and
 “ come to my camp. I answered his Highness I
 “ would certainly receive him, but my advice was,
 “ for him to consult with his brother, the Ameer
 “ Ali Moorad Khan. He took my advice. He
 “ went to the fort of Dejee, to his brother. When
 “ I heard of this, I was glad, for I thought that
 “ Scinde would be tranquil; that his Highness
 “ would spend his last days in honour and in
 “ peace. I moved with my troops towards Kyr-
 “ poor, to force his violent family to disperse the
 “ wild bands they had collected. I sent his
 “ Highness word I should visit him; I wanted to
 “ ask his advice as to the arrangements for the new
 “ treaty. I thought he had again become the
 “ friend of the Government I serve. That night,
 “ I heard he had solemnly conferred upon his
 “ brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad, the Turban of
 “ command over the Talpoor family, which brother
 “ is the lawful heir to that honour. I thought
 “ this a very wise proceeding, and it added to my
 “ desire to meet his Highness, that I might hear
 “ from his own lips all about these things, and

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“ report the same to the Governor-General, being
 “ assured that these acts would recover for him the
 “ good opinion and friendship of the Governor-
 “ General of India. My feelings towards his
 “ Highness were those of friendship, honour, and
 “ peace. I even advised his Highness’ brother,
 “ the Ameer Ali Moorad, not to accept the Tur-
 “ ban, but to assist his brother, the Chief, in the
 “ cares of government. I laboured for the honour
 “ of the Talpoor family. What, then, was my
 “ astonishment to find, that when I expected to
 “ meet the Ameer Roostum Khan, his Highness
 “ had departed from the roof of his brother, thus
 “ insulting and defying the Governor-General,
 “ whose commander I am. But my surprise is
 “ greatly increased, by hearing that his Highness
 “ has joined his family and the armed bands who
 “ have cut off our communications and stopped
 “ our mails. These things have surprised me ;
 “ but my course is plain, and I thus publish it to
 “ the country, that all may know it, and conduct
 “ themselves accordingly. I will, according to
 “ the existing treaty, protect the Chief Ameer, Ali
 “ Moorad, in his right as the justly constituted
 “ chief of the Talpoor family. God willing, I
 “ mean to march into the desert. I will disperse
 “ the armed bands that have stopped our mails. I
 “ will place the Killedars of the chief, Ali Moorad,
 “ in command of every fort ; and I will act to-
 “ wards the Ameers of Hyderabad, as I shall find
 “ their conduct deserves.”

Scarcely had this manifesto been published, when
 a letter from the Ameer Roostum arrived, in which
 he denied having voluntarily ceded the Turban, and
 intimated that the English General had betrayed

him into Ali Moorad's hands, and designed to make him a captive. At the same time, a letter of an equally false character came from Nusseer of Hyderabad, professing obedience indeed, but only to obtain time for the assembling of the tribes. The artifices were too gross.

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“Ameer,” said the General, in reply to Nusseer, “I have received your letter. When a man’s actions and his words do not accord, I am greatly distressed to know how to act. The Government of the Ameers is one of many heads. All speak and act after a different and a very strange manner. I cannot judge afar off. I came to Kyrpoor to see how matters stand, and I mean to go to Hyderabad to do the same. I cannot distinguish friends from enemies at two hundred miles distance; and as you say you are the friend of the Company and Governor-General, you will rejoice to see me. I hear of troops collecting in the south, armed men shall not cross the Indus into Scinde; therefore, I take troops.”

To Roostum he wrote in a sterner manner, for he was indignant at his falsehood, and the accusation of treachery.

“Your Highness’s letter obliges me to speak with a language I regret, but the honour of my country, and the interest of yours, leaves me no alternative. The gist of your Highness’s letter is this. That I advised you to be guided by your brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad; and that he advised you to fly from a meeting with me as a conspirator who wished to make you a captive.”

“Ameer, such a subterfuge is unworthy of your Highness’s rank. You know it is not truth. You know that you offered to come to my camp,

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“and that I advised you to go to your brother’s
“fortress instead of coming to my camp; you,
“therefore, well know that I had no desire to
“capture you, nor to interfere with your family
“arrangements. Yet you now pretend that when
“I asked you to meet me, you flew from me, not
“from any desire to avoid a meeting with me, but
“because I advised you to be guided by your
“brother’s advice; and he advised you to fly! I
“will not suffer your Highness to take shelter
“under such misrepresentations. You made sub-
“mission to me as the representative of the Go-
“vernour-General; you have solemnly resigned
“the Turban, and you now avow that you look
“upon this, the most solemn and important act
“of your life, as a farce and a mockery!”

“Ameer, I do not understand such double con-
“duct. I hold you to your words and deeds; I
“no longer consider you to be the chief of the
“Talpoors, nor will I treat with you as such, nor
“with those who consider you to be Rais.”

While thus occupied during his forced stay at Mungaree, the General received notice from Ali Moorad’s Vizier, Sheik Nusseer, that Futtch Mohamed Ghoree, the prime mover of all mischief and the ablest plotter amongst the Talpoors’ counsellors, had gone disguised to Dejee-Ka-Kote, and corrupted two thousand of the Rais’ troops, intending to carry them off to the sons and nephews of Roostum. The Sheik had seized him, therefore, and asked significantly, “what shall I do with him?” “Keep him captive, but do him no hurt,” was the reply. It was a fortunate event, and a good omen.

During the fall of rain the army could not move,

because the camels slip in the wet, and dislocate their hips; the Bengal division, under Colonel Wallace, had thus lost ninety in one day, by moving, contrary to orders, in bad weather. It was now, however, fair again, and the General having arranged the political affairs of upper Scinde, pushed on to Dejee-Ka-Kote, resolute to attempt the march into the desert; but anxious to confer again with Ali Moorad, and to receive the reports of his emissaries, before he plunged into the unknown waste. He reached Dejee on the fourth of January, and was there joined by Major Outram, who had come from Bombay on being appointed Commissioner. Here also the emissaries' reports came in. The Belooch forces assembled at Dingee were said to have gone into the desert. Roostum was there also with his force, but only just within the skirts, where water and forage were still to be found sufficient for his horses and cattle. All these forces were supposed bound for Emaum Ghur, and not less than twenty, or twenty-five thousand fighting men, besides the garrisons of the forts were therefore to be expected in the waste.

No exact intelligence could be obtained at Dejee-Ka-Kote of the roads, or rather tracks to Emaum Ghur, or of the situation or copiousness of the waters; and it was evident that Ali Moorad was still averse to strangers going there. The English General was not to be turned from his resolution, but he had now made four marches from Roree with his whole disposable force, the two last actually within the precincts of the desert; his next move must be into the heart of the wilderness without sure guides, without any well grounded expectation of finding water and forage, and with almost a cer-

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tainty of being met and fought with, or at the least harassed by the Belooch cavalry in great numbers. The enterprise was therefore most dangerous as well as difficult.

In this strait he would willingly have awaited the Governor-General's approval before he made the attempt, but the recent heavy rains, unusual in Scinde, had facilitated the execution of the design so much, that he would not lose the opportunity by any delay. His first notion was to march upon
Plan 3. Emaum Ghur with his whole force, by the road of Laloo, a place considered to be in the desert, though near the edge of the cultivated district. This line would have turned the Belooch's position of Dingee, and cut their communication with the fortresses in the waste. He could then choose whether to turn suddenly to his right, and fall on the Ameers at Dingee; or to his left, and march on Emaum Ghur. For with a nice generalship, and knowing how war changes its face day by day, he designed to steer this middle course, ready for any accidental advantage which might offer, but hoping always to create such alarm amongst the Beloochs at Dingee, as would cause them to disperse or retreat. In either case he could thus gain time to make his point in the desert, without being troubled by them during that perilous march. If, as his spies reported, the Dingee force had already gone to Emaum Ghur, his resolution was to follow them and fight a decisive battle at its gates, before the Hyderabad army could collect to harass his rear. If they retreated in confusion on Hyderabad, and thus furnished a good occasion, his intention was, to relinquish the desert march, and strike at them beneath the walls of the capital of lower Scinde.

New events became known every hour. The Beloochees' march upon Emaum Ghur from Dingee, had been prematurely reported; some of the Ameers had indeed made an attempt to move them, but their bands soon revolted at the difficulties, and returned to the skirts of the fertile land, preferring the dangers of a battle to the privations of the wilderness. Meanwhile, a native agent sent by the General, to explore the route and note the state of the wells, came back with such a tale of arid sands and dried up pits, that he resigned all hope of being able to effect his march with the whole army. With surpassing hardihood he then selected two hundred irregular cavalry, put three hundred and fifty of the 22nd Queen's regiment on camels, loaded ten more of those animals with provisions, eighty with water, and resolved with these five hundred men to essay that enterprise for which only the day before he had allotted three thousand, thinking it even then most hazardous, as in truth it was.

The guide might be false and lead him astray; Ali Moorad might prove a traitor; the wells might be poisoned or filled up, or the water-skins might be cut in the night by a prowling emissary. The skirts of the waste were swarming with thousands of Belooch horsemen, who might surround him on the march, and the Ameers had many more and better camels than he had upon which to mount their infantry. Emaum Ghur, the object to be obtained, was strong, well provided, and the garrison alone four times his number! To look at these dangers with a steady eye, to neglect no precautions, but, discarding fear, to brave them and the privations of the unknown desert, was the work of

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a master spirit in war, or the men of ancient days have been falsely and idly called great.

He forced Ali Moorad and the native guide to go with him, warning them in his quaint mode, that foul play would cost them dear; that such was his anxiety for their subsistence, they should only eat and drink at the wells with the soldiers, for thus only could he be sure they were not suffering. Then having organised a body of camel-riders to maintain his communications with his army, he started. The weight of nearly fifty years service had not bent his head, the drain of many wounds had not chilled the fiery current of his blood. Refusing no labour, enduring every privation equally with the youngest and most robust of his troops, he led his small determined band into the heart of the trackless desert; not in mere pride and disdainful arrogance of daring, but for an object worth the risk. It was to strike at the vital parts of the Ameers' strength, and the basis of their confidence, and to find peace, he hoped, where they had prepared only war.

Knowing the weak natures of these Princes, as his march could not be concealed, he, with infinite sagacity, sent them notice of it, saying—"I am not going to plunder or to slay, if you make no resistance. If you do, abide the consequences!" Thus he considered and provided for every chance in this desperate trial, with a coolness of calculation that gained for him the unrestricted commendation of that great successful General, whose genius is imperial England's pride. Now it will be understood why the man who won Assye, he who commenced the passage of the Douro with a single

boat and twenty-five men, why he, the Duke of Wellington, speaking in the House of Lords with that elevated simplicity, the peculiar characteristic of his mind, thus described the exploit:—"Sir Charles Napier's march upon Emaum Ghur, is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions."

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On the evening of the 5th he began this march. The night was dark, the sand deep, the guide lost the track; yet the troops made nearly twenty-five miles before they halted. The second day's march was somewhat less, but forage failed, water became scanty, and he sent back three-fourths of his cavalry, retaining only fifty of the best, and hoping, rather than expecting, that he should be able to retain even those beyond another day. Yet he was resolute to proceed while he could keep a hundred men together.

Roostum and his armed followers, ten times the number of the British, and having seven guns, were now discovered on the flank; the General treating that Ameer as one who could not but be submissive, sent Major Outram to bring him to reason, still pushing on himself with his fifty wild horsemen, his two howitzers, and his three hundred Irish infantry, whose Guebre blood, bounding in their veins, seemed to recognize the divinity of that Eastern sun which their forefathers had worshipped two thousand years before.

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It was a wild and singular country the wilderness through which they were passing. The sand-hills stretched north and south for hundreds of miles, in parallel ridges rounded at top and most symmetrically plaited like the ripple on the sea-shore after a placid tide. Varying in their heights, their breadth and steepness, they presented one uniform surface, but while some were only a mile broad, others were more than ten miles across; some were of gentle slopes and low, others lofty, and so steep that the howitzers could only be dragged up by men. The sand was mingled with shells, and run in great streams resembling numerous rivers, skirted on each side by parallel streaks of soil, which nourished jungle, yet thin and scattered. The tracks of the hyena and wild boar, and the prints of small deer's footsteps were sometimes seen at first, but they soon disappeared, and then the solitude of the waste was unbroken.

For eight days these intrepid soldiers traversed this gloomy region, living from hand to mouth, uncertain each morning if water could be found in the evening; and many times it was not found. They were not even sure of their right course; yet with fiery valour and untiring strength they continued their dreary, dangerous way. The camels found very little food, and got weak, but the stout infantry helped to drag the heavy howitzers up the sandy steeps; and all the troops, despising the danger of an attack from the Beloochees, worked with a power and will that overcame every obstacle. On the eighth day they reached Emaum Ghur, eager to strike and storm, and then was seen how truly laid down is Napoleon's great maxim, that moral force is in war to physical force, as four to one.

Mohamed Khan, with a strong fortress, well provided, and having a garrison six times as numerous as the band coming to assail him, had fled with his treasure two days before; taking a southerly direction, he regained the Indus by tracks with which his people were well acquainted, leaving all his stores of grain and powder behind!

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Emaum Ghur, which no European had ever before seen, was now found to be a square fortress of considerable size, having in the centre a tower of the same shape, fifty feet high, built of well burned bricks. This was encompassed by walls forty feet high, with eight round towers of defence, constructed of unburned bricks. Beyond this castle, was another strong wall fifteen feet high, recently erected, and also of unburned bricks, which possess peculiar strength against artillery, seeing, that the shot easily penetrates but brings nothing down; the howitzers were found ineffectual to break them, and recourse was had to mines. Ali Moorad at first consented to ruin the fortress, but afterwards became doubtful. The General was, however, bent on its destruction, yet not from any wanton harshness; his well-grounded motives were partly stated to Ali Moorad at the time, and that Amcer's consent was finally obtained. It will be found in the course of this work, with what sagacity, as well as benevolence, the General acted.

Appendix.

Princes, he observed to Lord Ellenborough, are not always faithful, and if Ali Moorad should fall off from our alliance, this stronghold in the desert might prove vexatious, and require another perilous march to retake it. Meanwhile its existence fosters a false confidence in all the other Ameers, and its sudden destruction will tell on them with stunning

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effect. Such were his publicly avowed motives. But he had observed the intolerable oppression of the Ameers towards their subjects, to be perpetrated with impunity from the strength of their numerous castles and forts, and he thought to destroy even one was so much gained for humanity. Emaum Ghur could only serve as a place wherein to raise the standard of resistance to British supremacy; or a hold enabling some tyrant to act unjustly with security; therefore he destroyed it. To Ali Moorad he offered other reasons which were frankly accepted as cogent, and that Prince, with his own hand, fired the first guns for its destruction.

The place being full of gunpowder and grain, the last was distributed among the troops, the price being first paid to Ali Moorad. The gunpowder was employed to load twenty-four mines for the blowing up of the fortress; and this was effected on the 15th, with the following singular display of zeal and firmness on the part of the chief Engineer, Major Waddington. The matches of all the mines having been lighted, the assistant engineer took refuge behind some accidental cover at a short distance, to await the explosions; there turning he perceived his chief still bending over the train of one mine. Eagerly he called upon him to run, crying out, "the other mines are going to burst." "That may be, but this mine must burst also," was the calm reply. And then having deliberately arranged the match to his satisfaction, Major Waddington walked away, holding up his hands as if to guard his head from the huge hurling fragments, which successive bursting mines sent into the air to fall in showers around him! His body seemed as impervious to hurt as his mind was

to fear. It was a grand action! But not well considered. Major Waddington would have done better to appreciate his own worth, and reserved his heroism for an occasion where it might have turned the crisis of a war. Yet! it was a grand action!

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I.

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Emaum Ghur being thus destroyed, the grain distributed, and the water-skins replenished, the General again considered his position and objects. The Beloochs holding the other desert fort of Shah Ghur, had refused to receive Ali Moorad's killedar. Should he march there also? The place was distant, and there were no tracks, no guides; yet he would have gone had not one of his camel riders come in from Dejee-Ka-Kote, with the intelligence that the tribes were still gathering head at Dingee. Then he resolved to move back as rapidly as possible to the Indus, to rejoin the bulk of his army; but he chose a new route, more to the southward, because one of his objects had been to cause the dispersion of the Belooch army at Dingee; he had not yet effected that, and he determined to push his menacing movement still further, and to go back, not as on the return, but pouring upon their flank from the waste with war and terror. Wherefore with unmitigated hardiness, he made a fresh sweep, and again encountered all the privations and difficulties of a march through an unknown wilderness, still guiding his movement by uncertain tracks, and seeking, as chance guided, the springs of water: when he found them not, he had recourse to his water-skins.

Flushed with success and contemning obstacles, his gallant soldiers again traversed the waste with equal vigour and fortune, and the second day gained

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Plan 3.

Tugull, a point from whence two routes led, the one to Hyderabad, the other to Dingee; here he could choose his direction. But now the camel-riders again met him, with intelligence that his movement had been finally successful. Roostum had quitted the waste; the army collected by his sons and nephews had broken up from Dingee; the Ameers of Hyderabad were terrified. Thus, a second time, the lowering storm of war had been conjured and dissipated, without a life lost. Nevertheless, to fulfil his threat, that he would visit the Ameers of lower Scinde with an army, if they delayed to sign the treaty, he ordered supplies for his whole force to be sent down the Indus, and directed the main body of his troops to descend the left bank of that river from Dejee-Ka-Kote, and meet him at Peer-Abu-Bekr, south of that fortress.

The first three days of his return through the desert were very trying, but on the fourth he found water and forage. On the eighth day, that is to say the 23rd of January, he reached Peer-Abu-Bekr, where he reunited his whole army, and halted on account of new political combinations, new diplomacy, and new difficulties of a nature to put his firmness and sagacity to the severest tests. Eighteen days he had been wandering in the waste, opposed by obstacles demanding the utmost bodily exertions from all under him to overcome; suffering privations and risking dangers, requiring the greatest mental energy to face unappalled. Yet he came back triumphant, without a check, without the loss of a man, without even a sick soldier, having attained his object, dispersed the Ameer's army, and baffled their plan of campaign.

CHAPTER II.

HAVING now to describe new combinations of diplomacy with important military operations, furnishing a distinct action though springing directly from the events already narrated, it seems to me fitting to recapitulate here the leading points of the past policy ; and so to class them, that each step in the conquest of Scinde may be constantly kept in recollection, and the foul charges of injustice and violence, wantonly cast upon the General, dispelled by the evidence of facts.

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To the first period belongs Sir C. Napier's assumption of the political duties in Scinde; his immediate perception of the weak vacillating system of his predecessors, in respect to the Ameers' systematic violation of Lord Auckland's treaties ; his frank and vigorous intimation to those Princes that the time was come when that system must cease.

The second period was marked by a precise and rigorous analysis, in pursuance of the Governor-General's orders, of the proofs furnished by Major Outram, some direct, some circumstantial, of the Ameers' hostile designs against British power. For always the General bore in mind the spirit of Lord Ellenborough's just and discriminating instructions.

“Your first political duty will be, to hear all that Major Outram and other political agents may have to allege against the Ameers of Hyderabad and Kyrpoor, tending to prove the intention, on the part of any of them, to act hostilely against the British army. That they may have hostile feelings

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there can be no doubt. It would be impossible to believe that they could entertain friendly feelings ; but we should not be justified in inflicting punishment upon the thoughts."

The third period was marked by negotiations to induce the Ameers to accept quietly the new treaty, which Lord Ellenborough thought fit to impose on them, as a consequence of their frequent infractions of the old treaties, and to punish their secret measures of hostility to the British. This was, doubtless, the point on which the question of justice or injustice rested ; and it has been shewn with what caution, with what care and pains and acuteness, the General examined and verified the proofs of the Ameers' delinquency.

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Chap. V.

Acting upon the policy he had before publicly proclaimed to all India, the Governor-General offered the new treaty. It did but slightly punish infractions of the old, and was, in truth, framed with a view rather to benefit the civilized world generally, than to press on the Ameers. Its unaggressive and disinterested character was marked by restoring the districts taken from the Ameers to the Bhawal Khan ; his territories they rightfully were, and his undeviating fidelity as an ally merited the reward. This was a critical time for India. The armies of Nott and Pollock were dangerously situated, and any misfortune was sure, aided by the treason of the newspaper editors, to produce wide-spreading mischief. Lord Ellenborough could not then recede from his public declaration of policy ; and this third period was terminated by the vakeels of the Hyderabad Ameers accepting the new treaty in the names of their masters, with assurances of profound submission

and friendship: a like acceptance and assurances on the part of Roostum of Kyrpoor, with the addition of his seal in confirmation of his declared assent, completed the negotiation.

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To the fourth period, belongs the passage of the Indus; the occupation of Roree and the ceded districts of Bhoong-barra and Subzulcote; the advance to Kyrpoor to disperse the armed bands. And it is to be recollected, none of these things were attempted, until Roostum by affixing his seal to the declaration of his assent, and the authorized assurances of the vakeels from lower Scinde, gave the General a warrant for the deed. Nor until the gathering of the Belooch warriors in front of his camps and stations; their menacing language; their violent oppressions of the country people; and the contrast between the Ameers' words and acts, confirming the unvarying reports of the emissaries, furnished reasonable conviction, that a design to fall treacherously on the British stations, when time should be ripe, was in progress. The defection of Ali Moorad from the family policy, the cession of the Turban by Roostum and the flight of the other Ameers from Kyrpoor, terminated this fourth period.

The fifth period was marked by the efforts of Roostum and his sons to maintain a footing in upper Scinde, their sudden occupation of Emaum Ghur and Shah Ghur, and the entrenching of a position at Dingee. This military holding of upper Scinde by those Princes while they were in close connection with the Ameers of lower Scinde, indicates plainly their original design of a general war. For by keeping their ground in the upper province, they were more immediately in connection with the Seiks of Mooltan, with the Brahooc Beloochs and Affghans.

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The astonishing march of the English General into the desert, and his rapid return from thence, baffled all their calculations, terminated this fifth period, and ended the troubles of upper Scinde.

During that march happened a series of political events, and a course of diplomacy, unnoticed at the time to preserve the narrative unbroken, but now to be related, that a complete and clear view of the state of affairs may be obtained, and the force, and reason, and true bearing, of each circumstance made known. Then it will be seen, that throughout this terrible though glorious and just war, the English General, true to the honour of his country and his name, vindicated the double legend of his arms. "Ready aye ready"—"Sans Tache."

It will be remembered, that on the second day's march into the desert, the troops came suddenly upon the Ameer Roostum's camp. Exhausted by his flight from Dejee-Ka-Kote, and alarmed at the unexpected approach of the British, he sent a message to Major Outram, to say he was submissive. That officer asked permission to go to him, and obtained it, because the General thought at the time, Ali Moorad might have frightened the old man and caused him to flee into the desert. He wished therefore to re-assure him, yet forbad Outram to give Roostum assurance or hope of any thing more than personal security, and the quiet enjoyment of his private property as one of the Ameers: no concession or submission would serve to reinstate him as Rais.

Appendix
No. 1.
Section 2.

Outram returned with a son of Roostum, to whom the General in person explained his views in full, telling him his father might return to Kyrpoor,

or live where he pleased in safety, as a simple Ameer, with the assured protection of the British Government under the new treaty. The young Prince seemed satisfied, and went back accompanied by Outram, who now, with the General's consent, invited Roostum to come to the British camp. He agreed to do so, yet pleaded present fatigue, and having thereby deceived the Major, decamped in the night and fled, thus re-enacting the same false part he had played at Dejee-Ka-Kote; for he could not now suspect any foul design, seeing, that instead of being invited, he could have been brought by force into the camp.

When Einaum Ghur was taken, the General thinking to profit by its fall, despatched Major Outram as his Commissioner to Kyrpoor, inviting by proclamation the refractory Ameers of both upper and lower Scinde to meet at that town on the 20th, or to send their vakeels there to arrange and complete the new treaty. The Hyderabad princes did not refuse to send their vakeels, yet they did not do it, and those of upper Scinde were contumacious. Meanwhile the Commissioner, having on the journey discovered Roostum in his old camp again on the skirts of the desert, proposed they should proceed together to Kyrpoor, and in concert with the vakeels from the other Ameers arrange the affair of the treaty. Roostum, who had seven thousand armed followers and seven guns with him at this time, and was in close communication with his turbulent sons and nephews, whose troops he was going to reinforce with his own, laughed in his sleeve at the Commissioner. Keeping his men out of sight, he pleaded fatigue as before, begged of the Major to go on, and promised to be at Kyrpoor the

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next day. Having thus, a second time duped the man whose superior genius was to control and guide both the General and the Ameer, the old chief marched to the south.

This deceit, the Commissioner, with an inconceivable logic, ascribed to the evil influence of Ali Moorad who was then many miles distant with Sir Charles Napier in the desert; Roostum being in the midst of his own friends and relations, and guarded by an army of his own Beloochs! But Outram's judgment seems to have been singularly disturbed at this time by some violent passion; and his opinions, though pertinaciously urged, were marvelously wild and inconsistent. He had on quitting Scinde, when deprived of his political employment, recommended to the General repeatedly to put faith and trust in Ali Moorad, as a man of superior ability, confirmed honour, and unvarying friendship for the British; at the same time he denounced Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the Vizier, as an unprincipled man, hostile to the English alliance, and dangerous in every way. With these sentiments in his mouth he went to Bombay, and in six weeks came back as the General's Commissioner to conduct the details of the new treaty. During his absence he had no means of obtaining any sound information to alter his opinion of the two men; and all their acts during that interval had gone to confirm the justice of his first assertion.

See Ap-
pendix to
Chap. VI.
Part I.

Yet now after only two interviews with Roostum, both marked by the old man's falseness, Major Outram, apparently on that Ameer's authority, with astounding mutability became the vehement accuser and vituperator of Ali Moorad; and by desire of Roostum, recommended at this most critical

period, when all the Ameers of both Scindes were wavering between fear and hostility, that Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the enemy of England, that wiley man whose influence over the Beloochs was so well known; whose participation in the escape of Mohamed Shurreef had been proved by Major Outram himself; that this man, so formidable by his ability and his intrigues, and whose imprisonment was for corrupting Ali Moorad's soldiers to the interest of the other Ameers, might be released from his captivity. He added, indeed, that he should be banished from Scinde; but how was his immediate intercourse with the Ameers to be prevented?

It would be difficult to assign the motive of this proceeding. It might be, that, excited by the silly flattery of the newspapers and remembering his former powerful position in Scinde as sole political agent, he desired to give himself, in the eyes of the Ameers, an appearance of power and influence previous to meeting them in negotiation. It might be a trial of the General's susceptibility of being governed; or perhaps the result of forgetfulness; or a desire to please Roostum without reflection on the critical state of public affairs. In any view of the matter he was clearly a very insufficient and rash political agent.

The General's positive refusal to release Mohamed Ghoree, should have taught the Commissioner to be cautious in his future suggestions. The necessity of giving that refusal should have taught Sir C. Napier to doubt the Commissioner's fitness as a diplomatist. The first was however nowise abashed, the last rather amazed than shocked at his agent's inconsistency; for he is of a nature very open to favourable impressions of other men's abilities, and

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very tenacious of them when once received. Hence, while rejecting the ill-timed proposal, he continued to give his confidence, until other and more monstrous propositions, involving the safety of the whole army, brought the painful conviction that he had yielded too much to the counsel of a man of ordinary talents, very extraordinary pertinacity of opinion, and incessant activity in error.

The General was yet at Dejee-Ka-Kote, before the march on Emaum Ghur, when Roostum, knowing that enterprise was in contemplation, advised the Ameers of lower Scinde, who were then in close alliance with the younger Princes of his family at Dingee, to persevere in their preparations for war. He believed the British troops would be unable to penetrate the desert, that they would return suffering and dispirited, and this was the reason why the position of Dingee had been so long maintained contrary to the General's expectation. When Roostum discovered that the troops, after destroying Emaum Ghur, were coming back unbowed by fatigue, and with that haughty resolution which success confers, he advised the Princes not to abide the shock of battle; telling them to retreat on

See Plan 3. Khoonhera, where he had a fort skirting lower Scinde, within the desert, yet well supplied with water. To that place, after having sent Major Outram on his bootless errand to Kyrpoor, he hastened himself with his own division. There, being in closer connection with the Ameers of Hyderabad and Meerpoor, he could more easily influence their resolutions, and remain with his Beloochs in safety, until the assembling of the army of lower Scinde enabled the whole to take the field together.

A military head might have advised a march into

the desert, to meet and overwhelm the small British force returning from Emaum Ghur; but the General, coming back by a different route, had fore-reached them in such a scheme if it was entertained. Roostum, however, had not miscalculated when he judged it necessary thus to relinquish upper Scinde altogether, and bring the influence of his family and armed followers into closer approximation with the Ameers of Hyderabad. Those Princes, dismayed at the fall of Emaum Ghur, and wanting still three weeks to get all their feudatories together for a battle, began to waver, as drunken sensual men might be expected to do in such a crisis. They called the Ameers of upper Scinde madmen, forbade them to enter lower Scinde; and thinking still to deceive, sent vakeels to Kyrpoor to meet the Commissioner, a measure which before they had studiously avoided. The Princes of upper Scinde, who had felt the vigour of their adversary, both in negotiation and military movement; they who had quitted their palaces and luxurious gardens, and suffered the inconvenience of hurried journeys with their Zenanas; they who had already expended so much treasure to hire fighting men, and met with nothing hitherto but disappointment, were inflamed with pride, and fury, and hatred. Backed up and stimulated by the hardy plunder-loving Beloochs who had gathered at their call, they would hear of no peace. They told the Ameers of lower Scinde, they must, willing or unwilling, make common cause; and they swore, and with them swore all the Belooch Chiefs, whether of upper or lower Scinde, who had yet assembled, that they would fight the accursed Feringhees, and would destroy Ali Moorad.

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In this crisis the Ameers of Hyderabad played as usual a double part. Assenting to the wishes of the war party, they hastened the arrival of their feudatories, but they also sent deputies to the British camp, with the credentials of ambassadors, the instructions of spies, and the powers of military commissaries. They carried secret letters to command the chiefs of the northern tribes on the right side of the Indus, allies and feudatories alike, to come with all their fighting men to the general assembly near Hyderabad.

The arrival of these deputies induced Sir Charles Napier to believe his efforts would be as successful in lower Scinde as they had been in upper Scinde; that he should now arrive by negotiation at a quiet termination of the whole matter. He was mistaken. He did not then know the haughty daring character, the fierce courage of the Belooch warriors, nor the influence they exercised over the Ameers, whose feeble minds and timid disposition he calculated upon too much. And the more readily did he fall into this belief, because his wish was strong that it should be so; and because Major Outram, with unbounded confidence in his own views and judgment, continually assured him he could easily and certainly procure the peaceable submission of the Ameers, who had not any desire for war. To test their inclination, however, the General issued a proclamation, calling on them once more to meet his Commissioner and state clearly their objections to the new treaty; to discuss the matter in dispute with a view to a final settlement, or manfully to declare war, take the field, and no longer play the false doubling game they had hitherto done.

This produced no effect. The Ameers, pressed by antagonist fears of the British army and of their own wild chiefs, yielded naturally to the last as most nearly dangerous; their desire was also for war—their design was war; they only shrunk from it when personal danger menaced them. Yet so many of their feudatories were still distant, they dreaded an immediate conflict, and sought, by their feigned submission, to insure the junction of their whole force: as their fighting men came in, their fear vanished and their pride rose.

Such was the political state of affairs when Sir Charles Napier rejoined his army at Peer Abu-Bekr, in the latter end of January. His troops, nearly three thousand strong, were now well in hand. His right was at the Indus, and on its broad waters floated his armed steamers and supplies. His left rested on the desert, where there was no longer any thing save the wild waste for the Ameers to calculate on. They might, indeed, launch their troops into it, and, by a wide movement, turn his flank unperceived, to fall upon Ali Moorad's territories: yet this he cared not for, that Prince had his own force, and was awake to his danger. He was supported by the troops at Sukkur and Roree, and he was already in hostilities with the Killedars of the other Ameers on the right bank of the Indus, many of whom, trusting to the forts which covered the country, resisted his tax-gatherers. He was, therefore, prepared to fight; and if he should be overmatched by the arrival of fresh forces from the south, or the advance of Ali Mohamed from Shah Ghur, the Bengal division could, in a short time, restore his position.

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Nor could the Ameers push forward the tribes on the right bank of the Indus with any advantage against the camp of Sukkur, which was now very strong. The line of operations for the army was therefore simple and direct to the front, with the right flank secure, and even able, by means of the steamers, to turn the enemy's left and menace his rear. The British left was, indeed, uncovered; yet only to the desert, where the Scinde irregular horse, commanded by Captain Jacob, an officer of peculiar talent for the cavalry service, being pushed within the waste, forbade any surprise. Thus the army was well placed according to military principles, and free to move on any side; it could even cross the Indus and operate on the right bank, either in advance or retreat.

No sure intelligence of the Ameers' numbers or designs could now be obtained, yet it soon became evident that those of lower Scinde were merely seeking to gain time, and those of upper Scinde were bent upon war. The General had, as before stated, when at Emaum Ghur, invited all the Ameers, by proclamation, to meet his Commissioner at Kyrpoor in person, or by vakeel; the latter were however to come each with full powers to conclude the treaty, on pain of being excluded from the conference and his master treated as an enemy. The 20th of January was the day fixed for assembling at Kyrpoor. This time was afterwards extended to the 25th; yet from the Ameers of upper Scinde no person came; and though from lower Scinde vakeels arrived when the troops had returned from the desert, Sobdar's vakeel only had full powers. Wherefore, after halting two days at Peer Abu-

Bekr, Sir Charles Napier moved slowly towards the south, hoping rather than expecting peace, and reasoning thus :—

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“ I cannot lose time ; the hot season approaches, and these barbarians must not treat the British power with contempt. Their intentions are doubtful, their conduct suspicious ; armed men are hastening to them from every quarter, it is necessary to approach near to ascertain their real position and views. If, as it is said, the Ameers of lower Scinde have refused to make common cause with those of upper Scinde, or to let them enter their country, the latter will be found on the frontier, where they may be attacked in front, while Jacob turns their right from the desert. The steam-boats will be on their left, Hyderabad closed against them ; they must win the battle or be destroyed, or submit and sign the treaty. If they fly beforehand to the desert, no place of refuge is there, Emaum Ghur is destroyed. They must go northward, where they will meet Ali Moorad, and more British troops to fight ; the Bengal division is, indeed, on its march to Ferozepore, but the Bhawal Khan’s cavalry are in the ceded districts, and available as allies.”

This view was complete and masterly.

Meanwhile the lower Scinde vakeels were sent back with compliments and the acceptance of their own presence as a mark of amity ; and that nothing might be omitted which could conduce to peace, the period for treating was extended to the 1st of February. Major Outram, at his own urgent request, was now also permitted to go to Hyderabad, for he continued to assert, confidently, that he could bring the Ameers to submission. Nevertheless

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the General continued his march, thinking it would give effect to the Commissioner's diplomacy. He continued also to exhort the Ameers to negotiate, evincing in all ways his desire to avoid a recourse to arms.

“I have now,” he wrote to Major Outram, “waited long enough for the authorised vakeels, and I think you may proceed to Hyderabad; if you think so doing likely to prevent bloodshed, and reconcile the Ameers to the draft treaty, so far as being amenable to it, can be called reconciliation. I am most anxious that they should not resist; I am sure they will not resist by force of arms, but I would omit no one step that you, or any one, thinks, can prevent the chance of it. I think you may probably do good, and not the less for my movements in that direction.”—“I wish you would write to Roostum, to say that I will receive him at any time with every attention to his comfort if he comes to my camp.”

This was written on the 28th of January. On the 30th he again extended the time for treating to the 6th of February, and wrote to Major Outram thus.

“I have seen the Hyderabad deputies. I have ordered them to meet you there on the 6th of February, and you are to tell me directly, whether or not, they have brought the deputies of Meer Roostum and the others, with the prescribed powers. If they have, I wait the result of negotiations. If not, I march against them as enemies on the 6th, but I am willing to do all I can to save the mischief that will fall upon these Ameers, if they will not meet you.”

To the Ameers of lower Scinde he wrote at the same time, in conciliatory terms, complimenting

and praising them for the sending of their vakeels and their apparent desire for peace; but to the Ameers of upper Scinde he had, on the 27th, addressed the following proclamation, which very exactly epitomized the past transactions with those Princes.

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“Ameers, I was ordered to make a new treaty
 “with you. Your Highnesses agreed to the draft
 “of that treaty in words, while you raised troops
 “to oppose it by deeds. You were ordered to
 “disperse your troops, you did not disperse them:
 “you hoped to deceive me by a pretended agree-
 “ment to the draft treaty. You thought you could
 “procrastinate until the hot weather should prevent
 “any military operations by the British troops:
 “you imagined you could then assail us on all
 “sides with impunity. If we marched against you
 “before the heat came, you thought our march
 “would be late, and you resolved to resist with
 “arms: if worsted in fight, you looked to the
 “desert as a certain refuge. You were right, had
 “we abided your time, and marched by the road
 “you expected. But we preferred our own time,
 “and our own road; we marched into your desert,
 “we destroyed your magazines of powder and of
 “grain, we destroyed also the fortress in which
 “they were lodged safely, as you vainly supposed;
 “we have returned from the desert, and we have
 “yet three months of weather fit for war. But I
 “want to prevent war. I therefore desired you to
 “meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor on the 25th
 “instant, there to discuss and arrange the details
 “of the draft treaty, to accept or reject them as
 “seemed best to your Highnesses. What is the
 “result? Your Highnesses have neither replied

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“to my letter, nor sent delegates invested with
 “authority to meet my Commissioner. This con-
 “duct is insulting to the government I serve. I
 “told you that if you so acted, I would take pos-
 “session of your territories, but my object is to
 “avoid hostilities while I obey the orders of the
 “Governor-General. I therefore will still give
 “you to the 1st of February, to send your vakeels
 “to my head-quarters, in hope that you may cor-
 “rect the imprudence with which you have hitherto
 “acted, and which I deeply regret. My military
 “operations must, however, go forward, but your
 “persons shall be respected, you shall be con-
 “sidered as friends up to the first day of February:
 “after that day I shall treat all as enemies who do
 “not send vakeels to meet me.

“Ameers, you imagine you can procrastinate
 “till your fierce sun drives the British troops out
 “of the field, and forces them to seek shelter in
 “Sukkur. You trusted to your desert and were
 “deceived. You trust to your deadly sun and may
 “again be deceived. I will not write a second
 “letter to you, nor a second time expose the autho-
 “rity, which I represent, to indignity; but this pro-
 “clamation will, I hope, induce you to adopt a
 “manly, instead of an insidious course.”

The 31st of January the army reached Nowsharra, a town belonging to Ali Moorad, on the southern border of upper Scinde. Here the General was told that the Ameers of Kyrpoor were at last willing to submit. The tale was false; yet so ready was he to save them from the results of their own violence, that he instantly seized the occasion to urge on Lord Ellenborough a mitigation of the draft treaty, where he thought it pressed hardly on their

pecuniary resources; nor does it seem that his request would have been refused, if the terrible events which followed so quickly, had not put an end to all negotiations.

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At Nowsharra he halted five days, partly to bring up supplies for the European troops, principally to give time for the Ameers to arrange their affairs with Major Outram; thus, for the third time, he extended the period for treating. But a new and strange course of diplomacy was now commenced by Major Outram, whose conduct, from the moment he separated from Sir C. Napier at Emaum Ghur and thus obtained a species of independence until he again quitted Scinde after the battle of Meeanee, creates amazement.

His first measure had been to propose the release of the mischievous Ghoree, accompanied with the language of passion against Ali Moorad; as if that Ameer's adherence to the British alliance was in his eyes a heinous crime. His next step was to grant the Ameers a longer day for treating than had been proclaimed; this was approved of indeed, and was proper, but he forgot to fix a day, which gave an opening for indefinite procrastination until the General amended the error. Then he proposed to alter one of the principal articles of the draft treaty which had been deliberately drawn up by Lord Ellenborough; thus stepping beyond the line of his mission, which was to arrange the details, not to reform the treaty.

See Ap-
pendix,
1st Part,
Chap. VI.

Corrected on those points by Sir C. Napier, he now, seeing the Ameers of lower Scinde sent their vakeels and those of upper Scinde did not, proposed to proceed alone to Hyderabad as a negotiator, promising complete success, thinking all would

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be easy, apprehending no danger; and in truth personal danger, however great, he never shrunk from. The General, more thoughtful and prescient, suspected treachery and sent the light company of the 22nd Queen's regiment after him as a guard; and he would have sent a hundred others, who were convalescents, but for some misunderstanding of orders; his foresight saved the Commissioner's life.

Sir Charles Napier's consent to this change of place for negotiation, was given reluctantly, and it proved detrimental to the public interest, as did all the proposals of Major Outram which were assented to; those which were not assented to would have caused the destruction of the army. Five days of grace were thus accorded to the Ameers, but it was a great endurance, a vivid proof of humanity, a magnanimous display of generous intrepidity, thus to delay the march at this critical period; and it proves the gross injustice of seeking to deprive Sir Charles Napier of the thanks of Parliament, on the ground that he sought battle ferociously, regardless of justice. He never sought battle at all, it was forced upon him. Faction has neither eyes nor ears for truth or reason, nor any sense but for malice. The General saw through the false professions, the studied delays, and all the other shifts of the Ameers to prolong the diplomatic intercourse until the sun should become deadly. He had before him but six weeks of weather really safe for field operations; the heat was even then oppressive, and increasing daily; yet he gave to those deceitful people, without being blinded by their arts, but merely in his strong love and hope of peace, five days which he could have used to such advantage

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in war. What was to hinder him from making forced marches, attended by his war steamers which would have picked up his weakly men, and carried his provisions? What was there to hinder him from falling like a thunderbolt in the midst of the Ameers' half-collected army, and shattering them under the walls of Hyderabad? What but his earnest desire for peace, and his contempt of false glory! Strong in his sense of justice and humanity, secure in the consciousness of genius, firm in moral resolution, he delayed his blow to his own risk, rising above the consideration of danger, though it was of a nature to chill the stoutest heart, combining a fearful responsibility to his own Government with the risks of war. Yet this was his first essay as a Commander-in-Chief.

All the Ameers' proceedings were deceitful. They had no thought save to gain time for the assembling of their whole army, which they calculated could not be before the middle of February; and to delay the war until that period, no falsehood or intrigue, no fraud or daring violence was spared. Sir Charles Napier's correspondence with Major Outram was stolen; Roostum and his sons wrote ridiculous letters and excuses to the Commissioner; they made statements as to their intentions and forces, designed to mislead him, and they did mislead him; but the emissaries' statements were clear, distinct, and positive, all in contradiction of the Ameers and of Outram, and all in accord with each other. The warriors of the different tribes, however distant, were in march or preparing to march, to Hyderabad;—all the Princes of lower and of upper Scinde were in close alliance, offensive and defensive;—the people of the country

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universally declared, that if the Ameers stood out against the British General, a great commotion would happen all over Scinde. Such were the reports of the spies.

The hypocrite Sobdar, exceeding all the others in baseness, now secretly sent a vakeel to the General, saying, he had joined the other Ameers in appearance, but meant to betray them; he was a fast friend to the English, and when the battle took place, his warriors, five thousand in number, should fall on their unsuspecting countrymen, and slay them, in concert with the British. "Tell him," said the indignant General, "that my army fears no Belooch force; I want no help; I despise traitors. If I find his men in the field I will fall on them as enemies. I love not traitors."

The 6th of February was the last day of grace accorded, and on the 5th the Hyderabad vakeels sent word that Roostum had promised to meet the Commissioner in that city, the trick was too gross. Sir C. Napier replied that Ameers' promises, and more especially Roostum's, were too well known to him to be regarded. And so he marched from Nowsharra the next day as he had menaced; yet only eight miles, for still he hoped the moral effect of his advance would finally prevail.

The heat was now rapidly coming on, and this day, from one of his emissaries, he learned that Roostum had indeed gone to Hyderabad, while his sons remained at Khoonhera with only fifteen hundred armed men; they had however seven guns, and great numbers of their warriors had only gone on leave to their homes, with the engagement to return at a moment's notice. It was reported also that the Meerpoor man meant to receive their troops, and give them

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Omercote for a base and place of arms. "This will not do," the General then wrote to Major Outram,—“This will not do. The Governor-General's orders to disperse the armed bands belonging to the Ameers of upper Scinde are positive. I have no time to lose; my own troops must soon disperse from the heat; I will not lose the cold weather.”

“Say, then, to the Ameers of Kyrpoor thus:—

“You were told in December 1842, to disperse your armed bands, yet you have kept, and still keep them together. Disperse them instantly or I will fall on them.”

“To the Ameers of Hyderabad say thus:—

“If you permit the bands of upper Scinde to assemble in your territory I will treat you also as enemies. And if you let them go to your fortress of Omercote in the desert, I will first assault Hyderabad, and then Omercote. You may receive your relations of upper Scinde as guests, but not as enemies of the British.”

Owing to some difficulties of navigation, Major Outram did not reach Hyderabad until the 8th of February. He had then only thirty Sepoys, under Captain Wells, as an escort; the light company of the 22nd did not arrive until three days later. His first despatch announced a positive opinion that the Ameers had no hostile designs; yet he admitted that they were storing their desert fortress of Omercote with grain, and were very blustering. On this it was well observed by the General, When men bully and bluster at the head of sixty thousand men, it is no joke for three thousand who are within their reach.

A long conference was now held, during which the Ameers, Roostum being present, made great

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lamentations, and stoutly denied all the obnoxious acts and letters which had been proved against them before the draft treaty was proposed. Still, pretending great amity for the British, they demanded the restoration of Roostum to the Turban, his destitution was, they said, the only obstacle to their signing the treaty. This, as being contrary to their own laws and customs, they knew could not be, and therefore it was a sure subject for discussion and procrastination.

They were earnest also that the General should delay his march, saying it would be impossible otherwise to restrain the Beloochee warriors, who would rob the whole country far and wide, friends and foes alike. This was an admission that, contrary to their former declarations, they had collected large bodies of armed men, which could be for no other purpose than war.

Then they protested against, and once more denied the charges upon which the draft treaty had been founded, for they were never tired of falsehoods; adding however, they would sign it if the Commissioner advised them so to do; thus they sacrificed Roostum's claims almost with the same breath that they had asserted them. The charges on which the treaty was founded had been supported by a mass of evidence which left no reasonable doubt; and though they proposed to address the Governor-General in vindication of themselves as to those charges, Sobdar, more profoundly hypocritical than the others, declared himself ready to sign the treaty at once without further dispute. Thus the first day passed, and the Ameers promised to send vakeels the next morning to the Residency to accept the treaty.

The 9th was occupied with messages to the Com-

missioner, of the same purport as the talk at the conference, and with the same view to delay. Thus the time was wasted until the evening. Then the Hyderabad Ameers, who had meanwhile corrupted Outram's moonshee or native secretary, having arranged their secret plans, sent their vakeels to the Residency, which was about four miles eastward of the town on the bank of the Indus, to sign a promise to accept the draft treaty, and to affix their seals to that promise. This was precisely what Roostum had done in December at Kyrpoor. In both cases the object was to deceive; the Ameers had at this moment a very large force assembled in a camp four miles northward of Hyderabad, and it had been there since the sixth. Major Outram knew nothing of this camp though so close to him; he totally disregarded many indications of hostility which appeared very suspicious to the officers about him, and with a kind of infatuation persisted in his assertions that no warlike designs were entertained. The Ameers had measured his capacity.

They were now sure that all their warriors, even the most distant, those from the hills above Shikarpore in the north, and those from about Kurrachee in the south, were in movement. Confident in their numbers and prowess they thought only of blood, and revenge. The masks of gentleness and submission were no longer necessary, and in their pride and cruelty, they resolved, with a horrid violation of hospitality and the laws of nations, to murder the Commissioner with all his officers, and destroy his escort, which at this period consisted of thirty Sepoys only. Then, throwing down the assassin's knife, they designed to draw their swords and give battle with sixty thousand ferocious

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warriors, skilled in the use of their weapons and to whom fear was unknown. How could they fail of victory? There were less than three thousand to fight with, and only five hundred of those Europeans! The Affghans had with twenty thousand, destroyed a greater number of English, and the Affghans were not to be compared to the Beloochs. How could they fail?

By previous intrigues, half submissions, much falsehood, and feigned dispersions of their followers, they had, as they thought, adroitly drawn the small British army into an isolated position, far from its reserves. It was at their mercy. And what mercy theirs would have been is known. They had ordained, that, after the victory, every man, woman, and child belonging to the British Government in Scinde should be collected and have their throats cut on the field of battle! "*so shall we make it famous.*" The General alone was to be spared, that they might put a ring in his nose, and lead him with a chain in triumph to their Dhurbar; and against the walls of their palace he was to be thus fastened, a spectacle, and a signal example, while life lasted, of their power and vengeance! Nusseer alone opposed this dire ferocity, and when his remonstrances were unheeded, he suggested a ring of gold as less dishonourable. "No!" exclaimed the savage Shahdad, with an oath. "Of iron, and a heavy one!"

It was in this frame of mind the Ameers invited Major Outram and all his officers to attend a Dhurbar in the evening of the 12th, for the purpose, as they said, of affixing their own seals and signatures to the draft treaty, in ratification of the assent already given by their vakeels at the Residency. This Dhurbar was the snare.

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The Ameers had originally made their arrangements to have the whole of their fighting men assembled in camp on the 9th, but the religious feast of the Moharem, which the Beloochs observe rigidly, intervened, and delayed many of the tribes on their march. The plan was something confused thereby, for it was intended to slay the Commissioner, and go forth to battle at once; but the Moharem did not end until the 11th, and the Ameers, impatient for treachery and blood, would not, by waiting for the assembly of the whole army, let this favourable opportunity of killing the Commissioner pass: moreover the light company of the 22nd had now arrived, and more troops might follow. Wherefore they appointed the Dhurbar to be held on the 12th, being all prepared for murder, and having nearly thirty thousand warriors already at their command, eight thousand of which were told off for an attack on the troops at the Residency.

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Blindly went Outram to the intended slaughterhouse, and if he escaped, it was only because the Ameers, thinking the General was as reckless as his Commissioner, hoped for a greater victim. But the total want of perception manifested throughout these negotiations, and especially in this critical matter of the Dhurbar, by Major Outram, will be better understood from the following account of his daily proceedings and correspondence with the General, whose destruction, and that of the army, he laboured to effect with such a frank, implacable simplicity, as would be incredible on less authority than his own.

He arrived to negotiate with Princes who he had, only sixteen days before, thus described: "It is my

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“intention to discuss every matter in future, in the presence of both parties, thereby to check in some measure, the bare-faced lying they have recourse to behind each others backs.”—“I am positively sick, and, doubtless, you are tired of those petty intrigues, brother against brother, and son against father, and sorry that we should be in any way the instruments to be worked upon by such blackguards; for, in whatever way we may act, we must play into the hands of one party or the other, unless we take the whole country to ourselves.”

With these sentiments, so recently expressed, he gave implicit credence to the Ameers' protestations of peaceable intentions; and to their assurance, that they had ordered their bands to disperse, though they were at the moment surrounded by armed men, had commenced storing the desert fortress of Omercote, and gave other signs of hostility, which he called blustering. Roostum's declarations, that the General had ordered him to obey Ali Moorad; that he had not voluntarily resigned the Turban; he in some measure supported, accompanying the statement with his usual abuse of Ali Moorad, and suggesting a change of policy with regard to that Prince. Yet one irrefragable proof of Roostum's falsehood, he entirely passed over, namely, that the General had repeatedly told the old man, if he had been unjustly or harshly used by Ali Moorad, he would right him, and protect him if he would come to the British camp; but the Ameer, knowing the truth would then be discovered, had always avoided an interview.

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In this credulous state of mind, Major Outram

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continued on the 9th, though the Ameers failed in their promise to give him camel-riders and guides for his despatches; failed in their promise to send their vakeels in the morning to accept the treaty; and had, as he knew, corrupted his moonshee, or native secretary, who was secretly corresponding with them. Nor was he shaken by a refusal of the Kyrpoor Ameers to send vakeels, unless it could be done without prejudice to Roostum's claims on the Turban. He even promised the Ameers he would use his influence to delay the advance of the army, which was in truth their sole object, seeing that the feast of the Moharem had delayed the assembling of their army to oppose the British force.

It was a fearful thing to see a man entrusted with such great interests, so entirely beguiled by Princes, whose falsehood and treachery he had himself so recently and so strongly described. At this time the villages throughout the whole country, between Hyderabad and the British troops, were filled with Beloochs awaiting the signal for battle. Tribes were in march from the most distant points; the men of the desert from about Omercote in the east; the Jockeas from near Kurrachee in the south; the Murrees and Bhoogties, and Chandians, from the hills above Shikarpore in the north. These warriors, whose abodes were four hundred miles distant from each other, who had no common bond but the name of Belooch and the pay of the Ameers, were all hastening to one central point, where an army was already collected; and all openly proclaiming their resolution to fight the Feringhees. Yet Major Outram assured the General no hostile designs were entertained by the Ameers; they

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had dismissed their men, and had no armed followers beyond their usual retinue! But those Princes were avaricious and luxurious, and afraid of the fierce hardy Belooch chiefs assembled around them; how then could it be supposed they would expend so much money, endure such inconvenience, submit to such control, unless with the object of driving the British from Scinde, a plan for which, negotiated with foreign powers, Major Outram himself had detected only a few months before!

The General had now reached Sukkerund, a place on the Indus about sixty miles from Hyderabad, and did halt at Major Outram's desire; not because he agreed to his opinions, but because he was to the last moment willing to adopt any suggestion tending to prevent war, consistent with the safety of his army. Here the military exigencies accorded with his desire for peace; the camels, worn out beasts, had fallen behind, a three days' halt was convenient to get them up, and to prepare the army for a fight, if battle could not be avoided. Nevertheless he would not yield to the Commissioner's suggestions in favour of the Ameers, and against Ali Moorad. His reply was—"I have no power to discuss former treaties, yet I will state to Lord Ellenborough all the Ameers say, because it is fair to them; but I am sure we should not tell them so now, because they would build interminable discussions thereon. Tell the Ameers," he continued, "that their plea of not being able to control the Beloochees is sufficient excuse for any Government to overthrow theirs."

At the same time having received a letter from Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, who pretended to be disquieted, he endeavoured to content him by this assurance:—

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“ No hostility has to my knowledge been com-
 mitted by you. There is no mention of your
 name in the treaty, nor is there any intention of
 dispossessing you of any of your land, or doing
 any thing displeasing to you. The British Go-
 vernment makes war on its enemies, not on its
 friends.”

On the 10th Major Outram reported that the Kyrpoor Ameers, after promising to sign the draft treaty, had deferred it on account of the Moharem, until the 11th. He had accepted that excuse, and again requested that the army should halt, saying, he was sure the treaty would be finally executed by Roostum and his family. That Ameer, however, had been for more than two months incessantly promising the same thing without performance. But now, in the extravagance of his credulity, the Commissioner urged the General to quit his army, and come alone to Hyderabad! Urged him to come into the midst of twenty thousand Belooch warriors, eight thousand of whom were in the city, and all turbulent and menacing! and for what purpose? that he might thus be convinced how superior his Commissioner's judgment was to his own.

On the 11th Major Outram reported that the Kyrpoor Ameers were to sign and seal an acceptance of the treaty by vakeels that day; as if it were a step forwards, when Roostum had actually performed that ceremony more than two months before. Then he launched out into suggestions for new arrangements, accompanying them with arguments in favour of Roostum, and with language injurious to Ali Moorad, which was his constant habit.

He added, that the armed Beloochs assembled

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under the Princes of Roostum's family at Khoonhera, were, as that Ameer told him, merely their necessary attendants, about twelve hundred ; that all not absolutely necessary had been dismissed, and those who held together had no hostile designs against any one. Further, that the Hyderabad Ameers assured him, they had again sent orders to all their bands to disperse, but they did not imagine any remained together after their former orders. And this strange letter, containing matter most offensive to Ali Moorad's feelings and interests, he purposed to send by a servant of Roostum, though he had, only a fortnight before, declared that Ameer to be surrounded and controlled by spies and blackguards in Ali Moorad's pay ! thus very directly enabling them to present to Ali, instead of the General, a missive calculated to drive him in fear from the British alliance !

It was a mere accident which prevented this letter being entrusted to Roostum's servant ; and so intent was Major Outram to enforce his own belief in the Ameer's assertions, that he wrote a second letter the same day, repeating, that the Beloochs at Khoonhera were but the necessary attendants of the Princes' families. Nor was Roostum's anxiety to have this believed, ill-founded. Khoonhera was sixty miles from Hyderabad, on the north-east ; Sukkerund was the same distance north. It followed, that the British could, from the latter place, easily make a rush upon Khoonhera, where there were, not twelve hundred attendants as asserted by Roostum, but seven thousand Belooch warriors, with seven guns and a fort, and ulterior designs against the army. Meanwhile the armed men said to be dispersed by the Hyderabad Ameers, were,

on the contrary, assembling in a camp north of that city. Thirty thousand of them were actually collected and occupying a position of battle at Mecanee, which they were entrenching, in the expectation of having at least twenty-five thousand more in eight days. Never was a civilised man, since the days of Crassus, so beguiled and mocked by barbarians as Major Outram.

During this time events at the British camp strangely contradicted the Commissioner's belief of the Ameers' amity. The villages in the vicinity were filled with armed men who menaced and insulted the British officers; and hundreds of Belooch warriors were daily passing round the left flank of the army by the edge of the desert towards Hyderabad. The General, thinking information of the Ameers' real designs might be found on some of these Beloochs, gave Jacob orders to arrest all persons with arms, endeavouring to pass his position. Very soon twenty-five chiefs, armed and mounted, had the insolence to ride through the middle of the camp. Jacob stopped them, but as they refused to give up their weapons, or go to the headquarters, he was unwilling to provoke mischief, and reported the matter to the General, who sent a squadron to bring them in as prisoners. They were all chiefs of the Murree tribe, whose mountain abode was in the hills north-west of Shikarpore, hundreds of miles distant. Hyat Khan, the chief of that tribe, was amongst the prisoners; he pretended he was going to demand wages due by the Ameers for former services; yet he exclaimed when first brought into the General's presence:—"Why do you stop me? There are six hundred armed Be-

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loochs in a village only two coss from you, there are plenty every where !”

On searching him, however, letters were found from Mohamed Khan of Hyderabad, an Ameer who had always professed entire submission and friendship for the British, and who, in conjunction with Nusseer and Sobdar, had only one week before sent letters with their deputies to assure the General, “ they had no part in Roostum’s movement towards “ their territory—that his force at Khoonhera were “ merely necessary attendants—that they depre- “ cated the advance of the British troops as im- “ proper, and claimed the fulfilment of the Gene- “ ral’s promise to remain at Nowsharra till the 9th “ of February.”

No such promise had ever been given ; the 6th was the day publicly announced for marching from that town ; the 9th was the day originally fixed by the Ameers for the assembling of all their forces, and they would have so assembled but for the Moharem festival, which had been forgotten in their plan of campaign. This communication was only a cloke to cover the deputies from suspicion, while they sent forward to the Murree hills the letters now found on Hyat Khan : they were important and explicit.

Written by Mohamed Khan to the Murree Chief, the first gave notice that on the 9th he designed to march northward with a force of Beloochees, but would halt on the plain of Meeance to arrange his plans ; and to that place Hyat must come with every fighting man of his tribe who could carry sword, shield, or matchlock. The second exhorted him to be firm and faithful, and

obedient to the orders of Gholam Shah, the deputy, who thus united, following the General's expression, the characters of spy, plenipotentiary, and recruiting officer. The real designs of the Ameers could no longer be doubted, yet Major Outram continued credulous.

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On the 12th, having to meet the whole of the Ameers, to see the treaty formally executed, he wrote in the morning previous to the holding of the Dhurbar, thus:—

“ These fools are in the utmost alarm in consequence of the continued progress of your troops towards Hyderabad, notwithstanding their acceptance of the treaty, which they hoped would have caused you to stop. If you come beyond Halla, if so far, I fear they will be impelled by their fears to assemble their rabble, with a view to defend themselves and their families, in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, notwithstanding their submission. I do hope, therefore, you may not consider it necessary to bring the troops any further in this direction; for I fear it may drive the Ameers to act contrary to your orders to disperse their troops, or rather not to assemble them, for they were all dispersed yesterday; and thus compel us to quarrel with them.”

That this curious missive was ill-considered, is abundantly evident. How could it be believed that thousands of poor, rapacious, warlike men, who had come from abodes hundreds of miles distant, seeking prey and plunder, fanatics also, could be dispersed and sent back, and recalled again with a wave of the hand; that powerful and arrogant chiefs were thus to be dealt with by

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effeminate princes. And if the latter did not mean to fight, what was the meaning of Sobdar's previous proposal to make his men fall on their comrades in the battle? At the very time Major Outram was writing, the Murree chief Hyat Khan was taken, with the letters above mentioned on his person; the plain of Meeanee was swarming with warriors, preparing that field of battle with mattock and spade; and eight thousand of the Lugharee tribe, from the right bank of the Indus, were only waiting for the murder of the Commissioner himself in the Dhurbar, to fall on the Residency and cut the escort to pieces.

The statement also was full of inaccuracies as to facts as well as opinions. For first, the whole of the Ameers had not accepted the treaty; and those who had accepted, were receiving and maintaining the troops of the recusant Princes. It was well known also to the Ameers, and ought to have been known to the British Commissioner, that the army had not advanced, but was quiescent in the camp where it had halted at his own request.

Outram's letter was despatched at noon on the 12th, and at three o'clock the same day he wrote again, saying, the coming of the 22nd light company had added to the general disquietude—that he desired to be empowered to say the army should not advance any further—he had expressed his hope to the Ameers it would not do so, since they had complied with all the General's demands. He intimated his intention also to pledge himself that no harm was intended; and he complained that he was not left free to pledge himself positively, to what he conceived fitting: in other words, that he had not the sole direction of this great affair,

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when every hour of every day proved his incapacity to conduct any part of it with judgment. He was not content with repeating continually his desire that the army should not advance, he once more urged the strange counsel, that Sir Charles Napier should quit his troops, and come down alone to Hyderabad. "It would remove all doubt." "Unquestionably," exclaimed the General, with his caustic humour: "it would remove all doubts, and my head from my shoulders." And again Major Outram was in error as to facts. The Ameers had not complied with all the terms; they had not dispersed their bands; sixty thousand men were actually in arms on the front, flanks, and rear of the British, who had not moved forward. Neither had the upper Scinde Ameers actually subscribed the treaty, as stated, they had only promised to do so, and that much they had done two months before.

After despatching the last of these letters, the Commissioner, attended by all the military officers, went to the Dhurbar, and the Ameers signed and sealed the new treaty with all formalities, Nusseer of Kyrpoor excepted; he was absent, but his seal was promised. Roostum's griefs against Ali Moorad were, as usual, made the principal topic of conversation and remonstrance, and Major Outram, in his report, again advocated that old Ameer's cause, and with the same pertinacious abuse of Ali Moorad.

On the 13th he thus described the state of affairs. "From what I saw yesterday of the spirit of the people, it appears to me the Ameers are now execrated for their dastardly submission, as they consider it, to what they style robbery. For the first

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“ time since I came to Scinde in an official capacity,
 “ I was received last night by a dense crowd on
 “ emerging from the fort, after leaving the Dhur-
 “ bar. Shouts expressive of detestation of the
 “ British, and a particular cry in which the whole
 “ population joined as in chorus, the meaning of
 “ which I could not make out at the time, but
 “ which I have since ascertained was an appeal to
 “ their Saint against the Feringhees. Although
 “ the Dhurbar and streets of the fort were densely
 “ crowded, the Ameers’ officers kept such a vigi-
 “ lant look out, that no evidence of the popular
 “ feeling was permitted; but in passing through
 “ the city, it could not be restrained; and had we
 “ not been guarded by a numerous body of horse,
 “ headed by some of the most influential Belooch
 “ chiefs, I dare say the mob would have proceeded
 “ to violence; as it was, a stone was thrown, which
 “ struck Captain Wells, but being quite dark in
 “ the shade of the gateway, he could not see by
 “ whom. This I was not aware of until we got
 “ home, and I have taken no notice of it to the
 “ Dhurbar, as it is evident the Government did its
 “ utmost to protect us, as was shewn by the escort
 “ refusing to go back after clearing the city;
 “ whereas, heretofore, I had always dismissed it,
 “ saying they had strict orders to accompany us
 “ the whole way. In fact the Ameers had reason
 “ to fear that their Beloochees might attempt mis-
 “ chief, having been the whole day engaged in
 “ paying off and dismissing those who had flocked
 “ to the city since the night before last, on hearing
 “ of the continued advance of your troops. Before
 “ I went to Dhurbar they had got the city quite
 “ clear, but after dark great numbers had flocked

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“in again. I am anxiously looking out in the
 “hopes you will come down in the steamer and
 “stop the troops!!”

The cry to the Saint might alone have awakened Major Outram's suspicion, seeing that he had himself in the previous year, said the Ameers designed to make a religious war; and this was confirmed by the British spies in September, 1842. Yet neither that coincidence, nor the violence of the Beloochs towards himself and his officers, prevented him from again urging the General to come down and put himself in the power of the Ameers. Nor did he shrink from this advice, even when writing a postscript to say he had discovered the design was to murder himself and his officers; and that Nusseer of Kyrpoor, the Ameer who had not signed the treaty, had gone off with intent to commence a plundering warfare in upper Scinde, which would draw all the Beloochs to that quarter.

Such was the Commissioner's comprehension of this black affair. Captain Wells, a young man of greater penetration, had formed a very different opinion, and one which after information proved to be correct. He, on entering the Dhurbar, became convinced that mischief was in preparation, because the armed Beloochs in attendance instantly clustered around each officer's chair, separating them from each other. The action was so unusual and menacing, that he at once fixed his eyes on Nusseer Khan's youngest son, a fat luxurious looking boy, designing to seize and use him for a shield and hostage. The boy was evidently conscious of the intended treachery, and felt the influence of Captain Wells' gaze so strongly that he slunk away. The menacing gloomy appearance of

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the Dhurbar continued, until Major Outram told the Ameers he had despatched a steamer for the General and expected him at Hyderabad immediately; then the aspects of those Princes changed, and they left the Dhurbar suddenly, an action affronting and indecent according to eastern customs. It was to deliberate, as Captain Wells thought at the time, upon the question of murdering those who were in their power at once, or sparing them for a day to entrap the General; for in their barbarous pride they thought his judgment and penetration no greater than Major Outram's. Deciding on the last, they suffered all to depart unhurt, and countermanded the execution of the attack on the Residency; but having little time to ensure obedience, sent a sure guard with the Commissioner to prevent mistakes, which he accepted as a compliment and a kindness!

Nusseer Khan of Kyrpoor had not gone off as reported; nor had the Beloochees any design of making a partisan warfare. They were proud and fierce and haughty and courageous, and resolute to fight a pitched battle, trusting to their sharp swords and bold hearts for victory. And it is not the least remarkable point of Major Outram's diplomacy, that while he assumed a confident tone of sagacity as to the Ameers' most secret designs and thoughts, he shewed himself entirely unobservant of their open policy and actions, perpetrated as it were under his windows.

Sir Charles Napier's judgment was disturbed neither by the deceit of the Ameers, nor by the credulity of his Commissioner, nor by the inaccuracy of the reports sent to him. On the 13th, while Major Outram was giving full scope to his halluci-

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nations about the Ameers' amity, the General wrote to him an exposition of their falsehood. Their object was now, he said, evident, and he would march the next day; finishing his letter thus:—"The troops have Lord Ellenborough's orders on their side, and I have delayed from first to last, at risk of their lives, and my own character as an officer, till *not the eleventh, but the twelfth hour*. If men die in consequence of my delay, their blood may be justly charged to my account."

Major Outram continued, however, to press his peculiar opinions. On the 13th he wrote a second letter, saying the Ameers had just told him their Beloochees were uncontrollable; they had taken an oath to have "*yageo*" unless Roostum was righted; they would not obey the Ameers—the latter had advised them to depart as soon as possible. Armed men, he said, were flocking into the city; and all the sheep and bullocks had been driven away from the vicinity; yet he was resolved to stay, and again prayed the army might not advance, expressing his confidence that the Ameers were doing all they could to disperse the Beloochees, and send them out of Hyderabad. And this was true—they were sending them to the field of Meeanee.

Supposed
to be ven-
geance.

A sense of fatigue would now induce a termination to this record of Major Outram's monocular diplomacy, were it not for a passage so extravagant as to put conjecture at defiance for a motive.

The army was on the left bank of the Indus, marching on a direct line down that river against Hyderabad. It drew all its supplies from Roree and Sukkur by the Indus, which was, therefore, its line of communication to the rear, as the march on

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Hyderabad was its line of operations to the front. On its left was the desert; and on a line drawn eastward, perpendicular to the Indus, from Hyderabad, were Meerpoor and Omercote. These towns belonged to Shere Mohamed; both were fortified; the first was at the edge of the desert, forty miles from Hyderabad, the second in the heart of the waste, sixty miles from Meerpoor. This was, therefore, the Ameers' principal line of operation and of retreat, because, to fall down the river would have exposed them to an attack from Kurrachee. Major Outram knew that Omercote had been recently supplied with stores; it was evident Sir Charles Napier's army had no connection with Meerpoor, politically or militarily, and that it could have none until the Hyderabad Ameers used it as a line of retreat, either before a battle or afterwards. Shere Mohamed, to whom it belonged, was not then obnoxious to the British arms. Yet Major Outram, having twice in vain counselled the General to quit his army and come alone to Hyderabad, now urged it a third time, with this astounding addition, that he should also send his army to Meerpoor; thus at one blow depriving it of its General, whose death was certain if he had gone to the Ameers, and of its line of communication and supplies, and of the means of retreat!

The Beloochees of lower Scinde, thirty thousand strong, were then assembled on the plain of Meeanee. The Princes of upper Scinde had seven thousand at Khoonhera. The Chandians, more than ten thousand strong, had crossed the Indus in rear of the British camp on that river. Shere Mohamed had ten thousand at Meerpoor. Omercote was

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garrisoned; and thousands of the hill tribes were coming down to the Indus. The British army, only two thousand eight hundred strong, would therefore have been placed, without a general, on the edge of the wilderness, forty miles from its true line of communication, having a fortified town and an army and the waste in front, and fifty thousand fierce Belooch warriors on its rear. Beaten, it would have been pushed into the desert to have perished there. Victorious in the fight, it would equally have perished; because, reduced in numbers, without ammunition, and encumbered with its wounded men and thousands of camp followers, it could never have regained Roree, a distance of two hundred miles, surrounded and harassed by the swarming multitudes who would have renewed the action the moment it retreated. And in this desperate state it was to be placed, in mere wantonness of folly, without any conceivable object, political or military!

This was the advice of a man who afterwards suffered himself to be represented in the newspapers as the guide and controller of an incapable General. This was an illustration of that knowledge of eastern affairs and eastern people—of that wondrous talent which, it was said, distinguished the political agents of Lord Auckland; those smart youths, empowered to direct generals and armies as well as to manage negotiations, and the suppression of whom has drawn upon Lord Ellenborough the foulest calumnies, and never ceasing vituperation. Such is the value of newspaper reputation. The disaster of Cabool was in the ordinary course of things!

The diplomacy at Hyderabad was not yet terminated. At three o'clock on the 13th, two deputies

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from the Ameers waited on the Commissioner, with instructions to tell him, that, after he had quitted the Dhurbar the evening before, all the Belooch Sirdars met; and because he had given no pledge to restore Roostum to the Turban, swore on the Koran to fight the British army, and not to sheathe the sword until they had restored him: they would march that night, and the Ameers could no longer restrain them. On this statement the deputies founded new remonstrances, and reiterated their former griefs and arguments, finishing by a desire that he would pledge himself to obtain redress for their masters. They were answered according to the General's instructions.

Then they asked if the British would let them fall on Ali Moorad? No! "It is hard," they replied, "that you will neither promise restoration of what has been taken by Ali Moorad, nor allow us to right ourselves."

At last they exclaimed: "The Kyrpoor Ameers then must fight for their own bread, which Ali Moorad has taken: and why should the Ameers of Hyderabad be answerable for that?"

You will not be answerable if you do not let them fight in your territory, and do not assist them.

In this conference, Major Outram answered according to his instructions, and the reason of the case. Nothing had been taken from the Kyrpoor Ameers, except by the new treaty, which they had accepted, and the justice of which has been placed beyond question. Nothing had been given to Ali Moorad, save the Turban and its rights, and that was a voluntary gift from his brother Roostum. The British General had no part in it; he had even opposed it; but once done, it was irrevocable by

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their own laws. That it was really a free gift is beyond doubt. It was witnessed by a Syud or Peer, a religious man of great reputation, who not only would not, but dared not lower his own fame for piety by lending his sanction to Ali Moorad's injustice. It was, however, advantageous to Scindian and to British interests, and neither policy nor justice required that it should be disturbed.

But in truth, the claim was only a pretence for negotiations to procrastinate. The Ameers were resolved to war, and upon much better grounds, namely, the recovery of their independence, which had been deceitfully, forcibly, and unjustly taken from them by Lord Auckland, through the political agency of Sir Henry Pottinger. They desired to recover it; but it has been shewn, that Lord Ellenborough could not restore it, without endangering the British Indian Empire which he was sent to preserve and which he did preserve. It was also an independence injurious to humanity. Its abatement had caused new interests to spring up, and a new base of national intercourse was laid, useful to the British, partially relieving the people of Scinde from dire oppression, advancing general civilization, and not really hurtful to the Ameers, whose hellish deeds of tyranny rendered them objects for horror rather than for sympathy. Lord Ellenborough had the written right to uphold, and there were just and sufficient reasons for upholding British supremacy in Scinde.

Major Outram answered the deputies after his instructions, but not after his desire. He wrote to the General warmly in favour of their views, and reiterated as a known matter of fact, the oft repeated tale, which had however no foundation,

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that lands belonging to the other Ameers had been given to Ali Moorad by the British. Nothing had been given to that Ameer by the British General. The Turban and its appurtenances were gifts from his brother Roostum.

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The most serious part of Major Outram's despatch remained for a postscript. At ten o'clock at night he added, that he had just been told, the Beloochs were to march the next morning to fall on the British army, and the Residency was to be attacked in the night. This was, he said, all boast and vanity; he had not even taken the precaution of placing a night sentinel on the house; it would end in smoke: yet he knew a Commander-in-Chief had been appointed, and many other indications of coming hostility were hourly displayed.

How ill-founded this confidence was, may be judged by the event, and by the proceedings of the Ameers as afterwards discovered. They were, at this time, all prepared to take the field; some had gone to the camp; they had issued secret orders to slay every man, woman, and child belonging to the British who could be found in any part of Scinde unprotected; their ferocious Beloochs were actually engaged in this butchery, from Sehwan to the mouth of the Indus; many persons were thus destroyed, and others only escaped by extraordinary exertions and courage, some fighting their way, others flying with suffering to places of refuge. Amongst those killed, was Captain Innes, a Company's officer who was going down the river sick. In fine, the war was actually begun, and the whole country was a scene of murder, plunder, and commotion.

On the 14th the Ameers sent messengers to

Major Outram, commanding him to begone; for they now perceived their hope to get the General into their hands was illusive, and they desired to push the troops at the Residency into confusion of embarkation, that they might attack them to advantage. Moreover, they feared, and with reason, that the Commissioner might entrench himself and await the arrival of reinforcements.

To this command Major Outram paid no attention, he spoke of it as mere bluster; and though he now heard of Hyat Murree's capture, and of the letters found on him, the inference he drew was quite in unison with his own previous misconceptions. "The capture of that chief would make the Beloochs commence plundering; it would implicate the other chiefs, and hostilities would thus occur; he therefore had sent orders to stop the 41st regiment, then on its way to Kurrachee to embark for Bombay; thus taking upon himself to interfere with a positive order of the Governor-General, which directed that regiment to embark immediately.

The important letters found on Hyat Murree, he treated with contempt, as being opposed to his own opinion, which he now for the tenth time advanced. "The Ameers had no hostile intentions, they only sought to gain some benefit for Roostum by an appearance of fermentation amongst their Beloochs; but that fermentation would now become real because of the detention of the Murree chiefs." Now, previous to this event being known at Hyderabad, the Ameers, having bribed Outram's moon-shee, got from him the treaties which they had so recently and so solemnly sealed, and ratified in Dhurbar, and in the same place where they had signed them, tore them to pieces and trampled

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the fragments under foot! The weakness of the Commissioner's judgment, and the extravagance of his reasoning, are equally obvious. All the warriors of Scinde, sixty or seventy thousand in number, had, according to him, been put in motion at an enormous expense, merely on the chance of obtaining some benefit for aged Roostum! Those Ameers, so jealous of each other, so constantly in dispute about trifles, so avaricious, so luxurious, wasted their treasures, and endangered their own existence as Sovereigns, merely to serve an old man, for whom they really cared so little, that in less than a month from this period they refused him a morsel of bread to satisfy his hunger at the door of their pavilion; and even the loan of a cloak to keep his white head from the raging sun: he would have died there but for the humanity of his enemy, the General, who sheltered and fed him when his kindred turned their backs on his distress. It is evident that Major Outram, perceiving how egregiously he had been duped, was now eager to catch at any excuse for his errors.

In this temper he desired the Hyderabad people to send those of Kyrpoor back to their own country, lest destruction should fall on both, pledging himself in that case to bear them harmless through the crisis. Having thus, as he phrased it, made a last attempt to save the Ameers of lower Scinde, he took credit for the act as likely to prevent the Beloochs from going to meet the British army in large numbers. Not that he thought they would venture to fight a battle, but they would annoy the General's line of march, try to cut up his foragers, and harass the camp at night. This he deemed the extent of their warfare. He also thought the Kyrpoor people would

fly to Omercote. It was Major Outram's fate to be always wrong. The Belooch movements were in no manner influenced by his last attempt to save; they did not try to harass the British line of march, to cut up the foragers, or insult the camp at night; the Kyrpoor men did not fly to Omercote; the whole of the Beloochs marched out, as they had always designed, to battle, and most gallantly and terribly they fought.

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But while the Commissioner was thus floundering in the slough of his own misconceptions, the General had looked at the scene before him like a man who was not to be deceived into supineness, nor stimulated to rashness; who was willing to risk much for peace, more for his country's honour. Peace while reasonable hope remained that it could be obtained; strong war when that hope failed. He had been patient while sufferance was wise; when it became folly to bear more, he shook wide the English banner, and drew a sword as sharp as any that ever struck beneath that honoured symbol.

CHAPTER III.

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INFLUENCED at first, by Major Outram's supposed local knowledge and bloated reputation for ability, the General had been at first perplexed with the discrepancy between his confident assertions, and the reports of the emissaries, who were all in accord as to facts. The letters found on the Murree chief put an end to this disquietude and doubt; and when Outram proposed to send the British troops to Meerpoor, and their Chief to Hyderabad, the latter shut the book of correspondence and took to his weapons: the murmur of the Ameers' false and peevish diplomacy was overpowered by the sullen sound of gathering armies. But that sound was heard on every side, and the guides and villagers, hitherto so zealous, knowing what a strength of war was in motion, fled in terror: ignorant of the power derived from genius and discipline, they could not but think the British a doomed and lost army.

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Sir Charles Napier disregarded the signing of the treaty on the 12th. He looked upon it only as a mockery, as indeed the Ameers themselves did, when they bribed the moonshee to give it back and tore it to pieces. War he saw was come, but the universal terror made it difficult for him to ascertain where and what he was to fight. He knew that the seven thousand men and the guns, belonging to Roostum at Khoonhera, thirty miles from his left flank, were in motion to unite in his

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rear with ten thousand Chandians who had recently crossed the Indus. Many thousands of the Rins, a yet more powerful tribe, were said to be following the Chandians; the Murrees and other hill tribes were coming down; and Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, though in no manner menaced or even mentioned in the new treaty, was advancing towards Hyderabad with ten thousand warriors. The Ameers, he knew, counted on having sixty thousand fighting-men on the field of battle, on the morning of the 18th; but where that field of battle was, or by what roads the men were to be brought together he had not yet ascertained: wherefore, bending all his thoughts upon his situation, he weighed the chances and examined all the questions which those chances suggested.

Should he yield to the disproportion of force and retreat, breaking through the Chandians and the Khoonhera people who were on his rear, to regain Roree? He would be followed by the whole of the Belooch army, harassed day and night, and perhaps forced to fight at last on unfavourable ground, and with a retreating dispirited force. Then also, as Indian Princes' faith was not proverbial, he might when retreating, find Ali Moorad's army in array before him, not as friends but enemies. He had read the Duke of Wellington's observations on Colonel Monson's disastrous retreat before the Marhattas, and this conclusion he drew from them, never to give way before barbarians! Let the Beloochs then be sixty or a hundred thousand, was his magnanimous observation, I will fight.

But how fight? Should he move onwards, and attack whatever might be in his front?—or make only a march in advance, to gain Halla, one of

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the steam-boat stations on the Indus, and there entrench himself with his back to the river? He could there await reinforcements, which would come down in safety by water. I can do both, he thought. If I fight and win, all will be smooth. If I lose the battle, I may still fall back to Halla and entrench myself. Meanwhile the troops can come from Sukkur.

In this mood, he resolved to dare every thing ; yet, neglecting no precaution, he wrote to Colonel Roberts, commanding at Sukkur, to send down the river two regiments, and as much of stores and provisions as might be stowed in country boats and two steamers which were now sent to him. Then putting his sick men and treasure on board those steamers remaining with the army, he commenced his march. His enormous train of baggage and followers were a heavy burthen in a country offering no safe place of temporary deposit ; but he organized them for the coming conflict, so as to become a portion of his order of battle instead of a dead weight and a hindrance : the manner shall be shewn in another place. Now hoping to surprise the Ameers before their troops were all assembled, he urged his march to Hyderabad ; and seeing the Commissioner was inclined to bind himself to them beyond his credentials, he wrote in substance thus—“ Do not pledge yourself
“ to any thing whatever.— I am in full march upon
“ Hyderabad—I will make no peace with the Ameers
“ —I will attack them wherever I come up with
“ their troops—They need send no proposals, the
“ time has passed, and I will not receive their mes-
“ sengers. There must be no pledges. Come away,
“ if possible—if you have not boats, entrench your
“ house for defence ; your men have provisions for

“ a month, and I will be with you the day after
 “ to-morrow. — Hold no intercourse with the
 “ Ameers ; send a messenger to the 41st regiment
 “ to hurry it on for embarkation, it should not
 “ have been stopped ; both the Governor-General
 “ and the Government of Bombay have written
 “ letters upon letters to insure that regiment being
 “ at Kurrachee by the 18th, and are so anxious
 “ about it, they have sent up a steamer to hurry
 “ the embarkation.” This was written on the
 15th, but the storm of war so long impending was
 then bursting at Hyderabad.

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In the course of the 11th the Ameer Shahdad, whose savage nature made him prone to deeds of treachery and blood, either designing to lull the British Commissioner's suspicions, which however had not been awakened, or hoping by deceit to obtain some advantage, sent his interpreter to the Residency, with a declaration of friendship for the English, and to say, his people would not mix in the coming disturbances : he would even go in person to the Residency and remain there for Major Outram's protection. His offer was fortunately rejected, more however from recklessness than any belief in an impending commotion, or any suspicion of mischief. Indeed, so entirely secure did the Commissioner feel, that even on the morning of the 15th, when Captain Wells pointed out many indications of preparation for an attack; he would not heed him.

This offer of Shahdad was a curious illustration of the habitual treachery and falsehood of the Ameers ; at the very moment he made it, Nusseer had gone forth of the city to take the command of the Belooch army at Meeanee,

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and had fixed his quarters in a pleasant garden, two or three miles from the position. There he was holding council with his chiefs and the brave slaves of his household, having previously arranged with Shahdad and Sobdar, who remained behind, that they and their cousin Mohamed Khan and some other Ameers, and Ahmed Khan the Lugharee chief, should with that tribe, eight thousand in number, storm the Residency. And now this was to be done.

Sobdar gave the orders, yet remained close in his palace. Shahdad, all armed for war and surrounded by his friends, led the column of attack against the Residency; not however into fire; cowardly as he was cruel, he stopped on horseback beneath a clump of trees out of shot while the brave Lugharee led his warriors to the assault.

Sir Charles Napier anticipating such an event, had on the 14th ordered a steamer, with ammunition and a reinforcement of fifty men, to go down the river to the Residency. From one of those accidents so frequent in war, the steamer proceeded without the men or the supply, and Major Outram was therefore to resist the assault of eight thousand men and six guns, with two armed steamers, a stone house, and a garrison of one hundred men who had but forty rounds of ammunition each. But what disproportion of numbers, what difficulty or danger in war, ever appalled British soldiers, when led by a determined man with presence of mind and sufficient skill for the occasion. Major Outram's natural intrepidity and reckless spirit exactly fitted him to meet the coming conflict. He could not here give way to his imagination; all before him was matter of fact not to be mistaken or

disguised. And surely a feeling of elation must be excited at seeing a brave man thus lifted by the force of circumstances from groping in a pitiful diplomacy, to a position, where as a gallant soldier he became at once a mark for admiration and praise.

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About nine o'clock some bodies of cavalry and infantry were seen to take post on three sides of the compound, or enclosed ground, of the Residency. Major Outram being then convinced that mischief was at hand, put his small force in order of defence. The 22nd men and the Sepoys lined a wall which covered the three sides of the space exposed to the enemy. The fourth side was towards the river, and open, but it was under the guns of the *Planet* and *Satellite* steamers, which were moored in the Indus, about four hundred and fifty yards from the house. Beyond the walls of the compound there were gardens and houses, which the Beloochs occupied; and immediately opened a hot fire of matchlocks upon the British troops; the latter were only covered from its fire by the wall, not more than four or five feet high, but it was enough for those gallant men.

Captain Conway of the 22nd, having under him Lieut. Hardinge and Ensign Pennefather of that regiment, and being aided by Captains Green and Wells of the Company's service, not a name should be forgotten of that brave band, caused his men to reply to the fire cautiously and slowly, and only when good opportunity offered; he was desirous to reserve his ammunition for the rush which he momentarily expected the multitude in his front to make. Meanwhile Captain Brown, of the Bengal

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Engineers, the General's Aide-de-camp, having come down with his last letter, went on board a steamer and directed the guns. Major Outram with cool resolution conducted the whole defence, and for several hours the unequal contest was maintained. Covered by the low wall, the men waited until the Lugharees, meaning to make their Belooch rush, exposed themselves in such masses as to tempt the British fire, which struck them down thickly; then desirous of saving ammunition, the soldier slowly sunk behind his cover, awaiting in stern content, the next provocation to slaughter.

Bravely and constantly did the Lugharees fight, but their efforts were vain against this combination of discipline and courage. Nevertheless, as the Satellite had come without ammunition, Major Outram could not hope to maintain the Residency permanently against the perseverance of the Beloochees; he had sustained the matchlock fire for three hours, but then resolved to withdraw his men to the steamers, while they had still powder and shot to fight the vessels up the river. The enemy at this moment brought up their artillery, which they forced one John Howel, an Englishman in their service, against his will to direct; he pointed them too high, and the troops were thus enabled to hold the wall of the compound, while the baggage and other property in the Residency was being removed to the steamers. The effort to effect this soon failed; the great body of the camp-followers and servants who carried the first loads, having felt the cross fire of the Beloochs on the open space between the house and the river, would not return for the second load. Wherefore the troops after fighting four hours, seeing nothing

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more was to be done, suddenly collected in a mass, and covering their rear with a few skirmishers, retreated to the river. The steamers being well placed by their captains, Miller and Cole, now swept right and left of the open space with their guns; they thus confined the pursuing Beloochs to one line, and prevented them from making their rush on the flanks of the retiring troops.

The *Satellite* immediately went up the river, followed along the bank by large bodies of the enemy, who fired from several guns, one of which was dismounted by a shot from the vessel. The *Planet* remained to carry off a large flat country boat used to transport troops. This was soon effected under a fire of cannon and small arms, and then the whole armament went up the Indus to seek the army; followed, however, and assailed with shot from both banks. Three men only had been killed; ten were wounded; four were missing. One of the dead, two of the wounded, and all the missing were camp followers. The Lugharees were said to have had sixty slain and many wounded; amongst the latter the Ameer Mohamed Khan. The action was well conducted, and well fought on both sides; a gallant feat of arms, and a fine prelude to the astounding exploit which was so soon to follow.

Scarcely had the sound of musketry ceased when Major Outram fell into his former course of errors, which the attack of the Beloochs had momentarily suspended. Even on board the steamer he wrote a despatch, which he commenced with the startling observation, that his letters for several days past, must have led Sir Charles Napier to expect the negotiations would fail! Yet, passing over his re-

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peated and confident assurances that the Ameers had no hostile designs, he had on the 13th reported the formal signing and sealing of the treaties in full Dhurbar, a proceeding which, as the Governor-General and the Council of Calcutta well remarked, might have been supposed a very promising step in a negotiation for peace.

At Muttaree, a place on the Indus one march north of Meeanee, Major Outram found the army, which was advancing to fight. He joined it, not, as might be expected, proud of his military exploit and somewhat ashamed of his political failure, but with the same inflated opinion of his own sagacity and judgment in diplomacy; and more forward than ever to thrust his dangerous counsels upon his chief in matters beyond his capacity. Thus, despite of the attack which drove him from the Residency, he persisted in declaring that the innocent Ameers desired peace; and he actually pressed the General to halt another day, which would have at once added twenty-five thousand men to the enemy's army at Meeanee. Finding Sir Charles Napier inflexible on this point, and fixed in his resolution to march forward and give battle, he changed his object, and immediately meddled with the military dispositions.

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First he suggested the sending a detachment down to Tattah, as if there was not already a sufficient disparity of numbers: then he spoke of his own notions and conclusions as to the Beloochees mode of warfare, and the places where they were likely to be found; as if war depended on conjectures and not on matters of fact. And always supposing, contrary to what really happened, that the enemy would only harass the British line of march, and

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never deliver battle, he proposed to drop down the river again, to burn the Shikargahs on the bank, and so deprive them of cover. This he pressed so strongly that the General yielded, to free himself from importunity rather than any conviction of its use. Major Outram then actually demanded the best of the European troops besides Sepoys to effect this petty enterprise, and would thus have caused the destruction of the army in the next day's fight, if his desire had been granted. He was, however, forced to content himself with two hundred Sepoys.

It was a great fault to give him any men, and the less excusable that his manifold errors, during his three weeks of diplomacy, had proved the unsoundness of his judgment, both in military and political affairs. But the General had early taken a personal liking for him, being swayed thereto by his manners and reputation, and it has ever been his character to hold tenaciously to friendly impressions. Hence he attributed all the errors he saw and endured the effects of, to an ardent, zealous temperament; and now, having expected his death from the treachery of Ameers, and secretly reproaching himself for letting him run into such danger, he in joy at seeing him safe when almost past hope, was too willing to please a friend. Outram came also, not as an escaped victim, but a triumphant soldier; and the General forgetting his many errors, and overlooking his present preposterous demand for European troops, suffered him to carry off for this wild enterprise two hundred brave soldiers, and with them three European officers, Green, Wells, and Brown, men of singular zeal and courage; and unassuming withal, which greatly enhanced their value as executive

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officers : their absence was sorely felt in the next day's battle. It was a great error.

It cannot be too often repeated to military men, that war is a series of facts, and imagination has no place in the art. He who admits conjectures in place of realities will never be a great general. Every thing that an enemy might do, should indeed be considered by a commander ; he should reflect constantly upon such matters, and be prepared to meet every turn of war, but he must only act upon what *is*, not upon what *may be*, if he means to win. Here it was conjectured by Major Outram, that the Beloochs would occupy the Shikargahs near the Indus ; but in the night they moved eight miles to their right, and thus his enterprise turned greatly to the disadvantage of the British.

War is never made without errors. The permitting Major Outram to go to Hyderabad without a sufficient escort was the the first of a series made by Sir Charles Napier ; the delay of five days at Sukkerunda was the second ; this Shikargah enterprise was the third and the greatest up to this period. The two first were made with open eyes, on political grounds, and were justifiable on moral considerations ; they were deliberate sacrifices of a not irrecoverable military advantage for the sake of humanity. The last was a yielding to personal considerations, to friendship and importunity, what reason denied ; this should never be done in war.

It was also a violation of the rule, which forbids detachments when a battle is expected. It was, therefore, both a weakness and a military error, and committed against Sir Charles Napier's own judgment. There is no impunity for such things in war, and this had like to have cost the army dear. Thrice and again, that truth rushed next day

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on the General's mind, when his line bent before the hurricane of Belooch warfare, and there was no reserve to restore the battle. Yet this personal advantage he gained by Major Outram's absence; he had the field of Meeanee to himself. Had the Commissioner been in the action, the whole of the military glory would have been awarded to him by those who have since attempted to invest him with all the wisdom of the diplomacy.

The army, quitting Sukkerunda on the 14th, had reached Muttaree the morning of the 16th, being then sixteen miles from Hyderabad. Towards evening the spies came in with reports which were afterwards found to be generally correct. The Ameers' troops in the front were only ten miles off, in a position near Meeanee, formed by the dry bed of the Fullaillee. This river, large, and flowing strongly in the inundation time, was now dry, with exception of particular places where deep mud and stagnant pools were to be found. Behind this ravine, and in it, fifteen thousand Beloochs were entrenched; but all the spies agreed that twenty-five or thirty thousand more would certainly be found there by the morning of the 18th, and there were at least as many on the flanks and rear of the British. This was a formidable state of affairs. The army was now reduced to two thousand six hundred of all arms, including officers, fit for duty in the field; and from this number the two hundred detached under Major Outram were to be deducted.

Undismayed by this vast disproportion of numbers, and the knowledge, acquired by the attack on the Residency, that the Beloochs were brave and persevering fighters, the General again meditated on his situation; still fixing as the base of his reasoning, the resolution never to retreat before a

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barbarian army, whether it were fifty or a hundred thousand strong. But should he attack, or bear their assault? If the latter, he must immediately entrench his camp on the Indus and await his reinforcements. This did not please him. There would be an appearance of fear; there was the chance of pestilence in the camp; of accidents to the reinforcements; and, finally, the development of the enemy's immense numbers in front of the troops, might abate the courage and confidence of the Sepoys, many of whom had been formerly defeated by this savage enemy, and all of whom felt, in some degree, the influence of past disasters.

On the other hand, he knew of the delay caused in the gathering of the tribes by the Moharem; and he could calculate, with a near approximation, the period when the Beloochs who were yet expected could join the Ameers at Meeanee. He had ascertained their different distances, and their rate of moving, which gave him till the 18th; this coincided with the reports of the spies: wherefore he resolved to attack the Ameers the next morning, hoping to find only fifteen thousand in position. But subsequent to the emissaries quitting their points of observation, twenty thousand Beloochs had suddenly crossed the Indus, and the whole, that is to say, thirty-five thousand men, were in his front. This great body had begun to cross on the 14th, and were passing towards Meeanee, a few miles from the Residency, at the moment when Major Outram was vehemently asserting that the Ameers had actually dismissed their bands; and that the whole was a feigned fermentation to procure some benefit for Roostum.

This formidable news reached the General

late in the evening, and then only vaguely, and with different versions. It made no change in his decision. He faltered not. The following extract from a private letter, written after he received the information, proves the steady calmness of his resolution:—"The Beloochs are robbers, inspired " by a feeling of enthusiasm against us, and our " protection of the poor *Scindian* people. They " have sworn on the Koran to destroy the English " General and his army! I, being ready for the " trial, march at midnight, and I shall be within a " few miles of them by six o'clock; perhaps I may " make a forced march and begin the battle sooner " than they expect. Various matters will decide " this between now and the morning."—"Their " cavalry is ten thousand strong, and in a vast plain " of smooth, hard, clayey sand."—"My cavalry " about eight hundred! These are long odds—" " more than ten to one; however, to-morrow or the " day after, we shall know each other's value."

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In the night of the 16th, the army marched, and at eight o'clock next morning the advanced guard discovered the Ameers' camp. At nine o'clock the British line of battle was formed. The Beloochs were then in position, certainly above thirty thousand in number, some said forty thousand, with fifteen guns; but the spies had doubled the number of cavalry; only five thousand were in the field.

Appendix,
No. 4. Sec-
tion 4.

The infantry were very skilfully and strongly posted. Their front was upon a development of twelve hundred yards, lining the deep nullah or dry bed of the Fullaillee, whose high bank, sloping towards the open plain in front, furnished a strong rampart. In front of this bank their guns were placed in two masses covering the flanks; and they

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See Plan,
No. 4.

were now pouring shot on the British, as the latter formed their line within range.

The wings of the Belooch army rested on large shikargahs, which extended on each side of the plain in front for a considerable way, so as to flank the British line on both sides when it should advance. These woods were very large, and very dense with jungle and trees. That on the Belooch right was intersected by several minor nullahs of different sizes, but all very deep, and running nearly at right angles with the Fullaillee; and that great nullah took a sudden bend to the rear, behind the shikargah, forming a deep loop in which the Ameers camp and the cavalry were placed. The minor nullahs were all carefully scarped, and rendered impassable for guns and cavalry; and several detachments of matchlock men were posted behind them.

See Plan 4.

The shikargah on the enemy's left was very extensive, and though free from nullahs, furnished an equally strong flank. It was enclosed towards the plain with a wall, having one opening, not very wide, about midway between the Belooch position and the British line of battle; there were five or six thousand infantry posted in it, evidently with the design of rushing out, through the opening, on the flank and rear of the troops when they should advance to the attack.

The General judged that to attempt forcing a way through the large shikargah on the Belooch right, and so assail that flank, would be a fruitless effort; to turn it by a wide movement would waste the day; moreover, in consequence of the bend, he could only bring the army on to the Fullaillee again, where it offered as good a defensive position.

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To turn the shikargah protecting the Belooch left, would have cost still more time ; it would have been even more difficult ; and when effected, the Fullaillee was still to be passed in face of the enemy, and having the Beloochs in the shikargah on the flank and rear. But the Fullaillee on that side was not dry, there was water, and a bottom of deep mud ; to cross such an obstacle, and by a flank march, would have been dangerous ; bridges also must have been made, and the day wasted. The time thus lost would have brought twenty-five thousand more Beloochs into position ; moreover, delay in the presence of such overwhelming numbers might break down the confidence of the soldiers, none of whom the General had proved in danger.

To fall on hardily by the front remained. But thirty-five thousand Beloochs were there ! and the British army, including officers, was, by the detachment under Outram, reduced to less than twenty-four hundred ! From this number a strong baggage guard was to be taken, lest an enemy's detachment should, during the battle, strike at that immense mass of camp followers and animals, near which the fighting men appeared, as indeed they were, but a handful. There was no village with walls near in which to place the baggage ; but with a happy adaptation of the ancient German method, the General cast this enormous mass into a circle, close behind his line of battle ; then surrounding it with the camels, who were made to lie down having their heads inwards, he placed the bales between them as ramparts for the armed followers to fire over ; thus forming a species of fortress not easily stormed if bravely defended. Assigning the Poonah horse, under Captain Tait, about two hundred

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and fifty strong, and four companies of infantry, as a guard, he proceeded to form his order of battle with the rest of the troops, now reduced to less than two thousand of all arms, officers included; the sabres and bayonets were only seventeen hundred and eighty!

Twelve guns under Major Lloyd, flanked by fifty Madras sappers and miners under Captain Henderson, were on the right.

On the left of the artillery marched the 22nd Queen's regiment under the intrepid Colonel Pennefather, worthy to lead such men. This battalion, about five hundred in number, was composed entirely of Irishmen, strong of body, high-blooded, fierce, impetuous soldiers, who saw nothing but victory before them, and counted not their enemies.

To the left of the 22nd stood the swarthy Sepoys of Bombay. Small men and generally of low caste, but hardy, brave, and willing; as good in fire, and more docile out of it, than the soldiers of the higher castes, having fewer prejudices and less pride. First of these were the 25th regiment under Major Teasdale; they moved next to the 22nd, but somewhat behind the line, for in the "echelon" order of battle the General had determined to attack. To their left were the 12th regiment under Major Reid. Then came the 1st Grenadiers under Major Clibborne.

Closing the extreme left of the line, yet somewhat to the rear, rode the 9th Bengal cavalry, under Colonel Pattle. These were men of high caste, stern and proud.

In front of the right some infantry skirmishers were thrown out. Covering the left were the Scinde irregular horsemen, fierce eastern swordsmen,

led by Captain Jacob, an artillery officer and a scientific one, but also of singular ability for cavalry service. These Scindian irregulars on the left, and the flank companies of the 22nd on the right, were at first pushed forward on the plain, to make the Beloochs show their position and numbers; for it is the habit of those savage warriors to ensconce themselves in holes and nullahs, waiting the approach of their foe. They remain thus with matchlocks resting on the edge of their cover, and fire until the mark is close; then throwing down the discharged weapon they leap out with sword and shield, and strong and courageous must the man be who stands before them and lives.

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The plain between the two armies was about a thousand yards over. For seven hundred yards it was covered with low jungle bushes, which impeded the march of the line; but the rest had been cleared by the Beloochs up to the bank of the Ful-laillee, to give the better play to their matchlocks. They fired long shots now and then at the skirmishers and cavalry, but still lay close and hidden in the nullahs and in the Shikargah.

When the line was formed the General gave the signal to advance, and rode forward himself with his staff, and his interpreter, Ali Acbar, an Arab gentleman of high race and true Arab courage, who has never left his chief's side in any danger. Constant and heavy was the fire from the Belooch guns; and though few men could be discovered, the rapid play of the matchlocks indicated the presence of numbers, and marked the position.

The Ameer's right was found to be strengthened and covered by the village of Kattree, which was filled with men: that flank offered no weak point.

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But in the Shikargah on their left the General instantly detected a flaw. It has been before said this Shikargah was covered by a wall, having only one opening, not very wide, through which it was evident the Beloochs meant to pour out on the flank and rear of the advancing British line. The General rode near this wall and found it was nine or ten feet high; he rode nearer and marked it had no loop holes for the enemy to shoot through; he rode into the opening under a play of matchlocks, and looking behind the wall saw there was no scaffolding to enable the Beloochs to fire over the top. Then the inspiration of genius came to the aid of heroism. Taking the grenadiers of the 22nd, he thrust them at once into the opening, telling their brave Captain, Tew, that he was to block up that entrance; to die there if it must be, never to give way! And well did the gallant fellow obey his orders; he died there, but the opening was defended. The great disparity of numbers was thus abated, and the action of six thousand men paralyzed by the more skilful action of only eighty! It was, on a smaller scale as to numbers, a stroke of generalship like that which won Bleinheim for the Duke of Marlborough.

Now the advancing troops, formed in columns of regiments, approached the enemy's front. The British right passed securely under the wall of the Shikargah, cheered and elated as they moved by the rattling sound of Tew's musketry; the left was somewhat refused, to avoid the fire from the village of Kattree, which it was designed Clibborne should storm with his Sepoy grenadiers. Meanwhile the dead level of the plain was swept by the Belooch cannon and matchlocks, which were answered from

time to time by Lloyd's battery, yet not frequently, for rapidly and eagerly did the troops press forward to close with their unseen foes. When the 22nd had got within a hundred yards of the high sloping bank of the Fullaillee, the columns opened line to their left; and as the companies formed in succession, they threw their fire at the top of the bank, where the heads of the Beloochs could be just seen, bending with fiery glances over the levelled matchlocks. The formation was still incomplete, when the voice of the General, shrill and clear, was heard along the line commanding the charge.

Then rose the British shout, the English guns were run forward into position, the infantry closed upon the Fullaillee with a run, and rushed up the sloping bank. The Beloochs, having their matchlocks laid ready in rest along the summit, waited until the assailants were within fifteen yards ere their volley was delivered; the rapid pace of the British, and the steepness of the slope on the inside deceived their aim, and the execution was not great; the next moment the 22nd were on the top of the bank, thinking to bear down all before them, but they staggered back in amazement at the forest of swords waving in their front! Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers, stood the Beloochs in their many coloured garments and turbans; they filled the broad deep bed of the Fullaillee, they clustered on both banks, and covered the plain beyond. Guarding their heads with their large dark shields, they shook their sharp swords, beaming in the sun, their shouts rolled like a peal of thunder, as with frantic gestures they rushed forwards, and full

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against the front of the 22nd dashed with demoniac strength and ferocity. But with shouts as loud, and shrieks as wild and fierce as theirs, and hearts as big and arms as strong, the Irish soldiers met them with that queen of weapons the musket and sent their foremost masses rolling back in blood.

During this time the small band of sappers on the right fought gallantly, and protected that flank of the artillery, which from its position swept diagonally along the bed of the Fullaillee, tearing the masses with a horrible carnage. The Sepoys, Clibborne's grenadiers excepted, who were engaged in a skirmish at the village of Kattree, soon came into action by regiments, in succession, and they were met in the same terrible manner by the enemy, but with undaunted courage sustained the shock.

Now the Beloochs closed their dense masses, and again the shouts and the rolling fire of musketry and the dreadful rush of the swordsmen were heard and seen along the whole line, and such a fight ensued as has seldom been known or told of in the records of war. For ever those wild warriors came close up, sword and shield in advance, striving in all the fierceness of their valour to break into the opposing ranks; no fire of small arms, no push of bayonets, no sweeping discharges of grape from the guns, which were planted in one mass on the right, could drive the gallant fellows back; they gave their breasts to the shot, they leaped upon the guns and were blown away by twentics at a time; their dead went down the steep slope by hundreds; but the gaps in their masses were continually filled up from the rear, the survivors of the front rank still pressed forwards with unabated fury, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in full and frequent conflict.

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Thus they fought in this fearful struggle, never more than three yards apart, and often intermixed, and several times the different regiments, aye, even the Europeans! were violently forced backwards and pushed from the line, overborne and staggering under the might and passion of the barbarian swordsmen. But always their General was there to cheer and rally them. At his voice and intrepid demeanour their strength returned, and they recovered their ground, though nearly deprived of regimental leaders; for fast those leaders had gone down, dying as British officers should, and always will do, where they cannot win.

“The noble soldier Pennefather,” I use his General’s words, the noble soldier Pennefather fell on the top of the bank, deeply, it was thought at first mortally, wounded, and his place was taken by Major Poole.

Private
letter,
MS.

Major Teasdale; animating his Sepoys of the 25th regiment, rode violently over the ridge into the midst of the Beloochs, and was instantly killed by shot and sabre, dying with a glorious devotion.

Major Jackson, of the 12th, coming up with his regiment, the next in succession, followed the heroic example as if the succession of death had been also in his orders. Two brave Havildars kept close to him, all three in advance of their regiment, and all fell dead together covered with wounds; but not passively; several of the fiercest Beloochs were seen to sink beneath the strong arm and whirling blade of Jackson, as crowding around him they tore his body with their griding weapons.

Nearly all the European officers were now slain or wounded, and several times the Sepoys, wanting

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leaders, slowly receded ; but the General, a skilful horseman and conspicuous from his peculiar head-gear, half helmet half turban, was always at the point of greatest pressure, and then manfully the swarthy soldiers recovered the lost ground. Once he was assailed by a chief, but on the instant Lieutenant Marston of the 25th native regiment was at his side, and slew the Sirdar, whose tomb has been raised by his tribe since on the spot where he fell. At another period of the fight he was alone for several minutes, in the midst of the enemy ; they stalked around him with raised shields and scowling eyes ; but whether from some appearance affecting their minds, for the Beloochs are very superstitious, or from some other cause, none lifted sword against him, and he returned to his own people unhurt. The 22nd soldiers seeing him thus emerge from a crowd of foes, called to him by name, and gave him a cheer heard distinctly above the general din of the battle ! And there are men who think the murmur of their factious calumnies can stifle that heroic sound !

Three hours and a half this storm of war continued without abatement, and still the Beloochs, undismayed at their losses, pressed onwards with furious force, their number seeming to augment instead of decreasing. Now it was the General felt the want of those brave men and officers detached with Outram, and acknowledged the lesson of war thus taught ; and that the British troops were not trampled under foot is to be attributed principally to their rapid firing. They tumbled down their foremost enemies so thickly, as they ascended the steep bank on the top of which they were always met, that the survivors, however strong

and active, could not get clear of the carcasses before the muskets were ready to deal the fiery death again; the bayonet sufficed for those who passed the shot unharmed.

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During all this time the grenadiers of the 22nd maintained their post at the opening in the wall of the Shikargah; they even advanced until their gallant captain fell, and always manfully secured the right flank and rear of their regiment, then fighting on the Fullaillee. But on the left flank, Major Clibborne, not deficient indeed in courage or talent, though unendowed by nature with military qualities, was unable to seize the points of the battle; and being perhaps a little oppressed by the recollection of his own failures the year before against these same Belooch warriors, misconceived his orders. Instead of storming the village of Kattree as was designed, he kept his Sepoy grenadiers, who could hardly be restrained from closer fight, in a position where they were but slightly engaged.

Such was the state of the field at the end of three hours, when that inevitable crisis, belonging to every battle, which offers victory to the commander who most promptly and strongly seizes the occasion, arrived at Meeanee. Sir Charles Napier was that commander. He saw Clibborne's error on the left, he was hardly pressed on the right himself, and he had no reserve save his cavalry, the action of which was paralyzed by the village of Kattree. Yet the battle must be lost or won within twenty minutes! Already Jacob, with the intelligence of an officer able to see beyond his own immediate work, had endeavoured to make way through the Shikargah on his left, with the Scinde horsemen, hoping thus to turn the village and get

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on the flank of the Beloochs' position ; but the frequent scarped nullahs, the thick jungle, and the appearance of matchlock men, soon convinced him it was not to be done, and he returned. The General could not quit the right, so thick and heavily the Beloochs pressed on, so stern and dreadful was their fighting, so wearied and exhausted were his men ; but his eye covered the whole field, and on the left he saw victory beckoning to him though Clibborne was unconscious of her presence. Wherefore urging his men by his voice and example, firmly to sustain the increasing fury of the Beloochs, he sent orders to Colonel Pattle, the second in command, to charge at all risks with the whole body of the Bengal and Scinde horsemen on the enemy's right.

It was the command of a master spirit, and with fiery speed and courage it was obeyed. Spurring hard, those eastern horsemen disregarded or drove the Belooch matchlock-men from the village of Kattree, and galloped unchecked across the small nullahs and ditches about it, which were, however, so numerous and difficult, that fifty of the Scinde troopers were cast from their saddles at once by the leaps. But dashing through the Belooch guns on that flank, riding over the high bank of the Fullaillee, they crossed the deep bed, gained the plain beyond, and charged with irresistible fury. Major Storey leading the Bengal troopers fell on the enemy's infantry to the left ; the Scindian horse fell on the Ameers' camp and cavalry, putting all who encountered them to the sword, and spreading confusion along the rear of the line of battle on the Fullaillee. Then at last the Belooch swordsmen, whose fury was scarcely to be

resisted before, somewhat abated their fighting and began to waver, looking behind them. The 22nd first saw their masses shake, and leaping forward with the shout of victory, pushed them backwards into the deep ravine, and there closed in combat again. The Madras sappers did the like; the Sepoys followed the glorious example; and at the same time the multitude in the Shikargah abandoned that cover, and joined the left of the line of battle in the dry bed of the Fullaillee, where the conflict was now renewed. And how fiercely the brave barbarians still fought may be gathered from this. A soldier of the 22nd regiment bounding forward drove his bayonet into the breast of a Belooch; instead of falling, the rugged warrior cast away his shield, and seizing the musket with his left hand writhed his body forwards on the bayonet, until he could with one sweep of his sword, for the Belooch needs no second blow, avenge himself: both fell dead together!

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However, the battle was lost for the Ameers, and slowly the Beloochs began to retreat; yet not in dispersion, nor with marks of fear; in heavy masses they moved, keeping together, with their broad shields slung over their backs, their heads half turned and their eyes glaring with fury. The victors followed closely, pouring in volley after volley until tired of slaughtering, yet these stern implacable warriors still preserved their habitual swinging stride, and would not quicken it to a run, though death was at their heels! Two or three thousand who were on the extreme right, having been passed by the cavalry untouched, kept their position, and seemed disposed to make another rush. The whole of the British guns were immediately turned upon them with such heavy discharges of grape and shells, that they

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also lost hope and went off with the others. Yet so heavy were the retreating masses, so doggedly did they move, so disposed did they seem to renew the conflict, which would then have been on a level plain without protection for the British flanks, and without the advantage of the high bank, that the General did not think it fitting to provoke them any further. He halted his army, recalled his cavalry, and formed a large square, placing his baggage and camp followers in the centre.

Such was the battle of Meeanee, fought on the 17th of February 1843, with two thousand men against more than thirty thousand. It was in its general arrangements, in all that depended on the commander, a model of skill and intrepidity combined; and in its details fell nothing short of any recorded deeds of arms. The front of battle was a chain of single combats, where no quarter was given, none called for, none expected; Sepoys and Europeans and Beloochs were alike bloody and remorseless, taking life for life, giving death for death. The ferocity on both sides was unbounded, the carnage horrible. The General, seeing a 22nd soldier going to kill an exhausted Belooch chief, called to him to spare; the man drove his bayonet deep, and then turning, justified the act with a homely expression, terrible in its truthfulness accompanying such a deed: "*This day, General, the shambles have it all to themselves.*"

But in every quarter were performed astonishing feats of personal daring and prowess as well as ferocity.

Lieutenant McMurdo of the General's staff, a young man of an intrepid temper, rode like Teasdale and Jackson down upon the Beloochs in the bed of the Fullaillee; his horse was killed, yet he

rose instantly, and meeting Jehan Mohamed, one of the greatest and most warlike of the chiefs, slew him hand to hand in the midst of his tribe. Then while engaged with several in front, one came behind and struck fiercely, but a sergeant of the 22nd killed this enemy so instantly that his blow fell harmless. McMurdo turned and did the same service for his preserver, cleaving to the brow a Belooch who was aiming at his back; another fell beneath his whirling weapon in quick succession, and thus he extricated himself from the dangerous press. The tomb of Jehan, a great one, has since been raised by his people, who, with a warlike vanity, have placed it, not where he fell in the bottom of the Fullaillee, but sixty yards beyond the British lines where he never penetrated.

Captain Jacob, though slight of person, meeting a horseman at full gallop, passed his sword with such a foin through shield and body, that the hilt struck strongly against the former. But the exploits of Lieut. FitzGerald of the Scinde cavalry, made all who saw him in the fight marvel. Three or four had fallen beneath his tempestuous hand, when a Belooch, crouching, as their custom is, beneath a shield, suddenly stepped up on the bridle hand, and with a single stroke brought the horse down dead. FitzGerald's leg was entangled by the fall, and twice did the elated Belooch champion drive his keen blade at the prostrate warrior; each time the blow was parried, and then, clearing himself from the dead horse, the strong man rose. The barbarian, warned by the herculean form and countenance, instantly cast his broad shield over his head, which was likewise defended with a thickly rolled turban of many folds, but

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FitzGerald's sword in its descent went shear through shield and turban, and skull, down to the teeth ! These are no vaunting tales nor exaggerations, they are true ; and it is a source of pride that those stern fighters, those daring men of iron limbs, with one accord acknowledged their General was worthy to lead them.

Twenty European gentlemen, including four field-officers, went down in this battle—six killed ; and with them two hundred and fifty sergeants and privates, of whom nearly sixty were slain outright ; and it is to be observed, that the Sepoy grenadiers having been but slightly engaged, this loss was nearly a sixth part of the fighting force. The loss of the Beloochs was enormous, almost exceeding belief. A careful computation gave six thousand ; and most of those died, for no quarter was given ; only those whose wounds did not disable them could have escaped : a thousand bodies were heaped in the bed of the Fullaillee ! Thus in four hours two thousand men struck down six thousand ! three to each man ! At Salamanca, one hundred thousand men, with a hundred and thirty pieces of artillery were engaged for seven or eight hours, and the loss of the British scarcely exceeded five thousand ! Such and so terrible was the battle of Mecanee.

That night the English General formed his camp on the plain beyond the Fullaillee ; but ere he went to rest himself, he rode to the scene of carnage, and alone, in the midst of the dead, raised his hands to Heaven, and thus questioned himself aloud :—

“ Am I guilty of this slaughter ? ” His conscience answered No !

Then he returned to rest, and slept so soundly,

that Major Outram, returning from his enterprise against the Shikargahs, finding the camp in confusion from a false alarm, went to report it to the General, and was forced to pull him off his bed to awake him.

At break of day he sent this message to the Ameers, that he would immediately storm Hyderabad if they did not surrender. Their vakeels then came to ask what terms he would give. "Life, and nothing more. And I want your decision before twelve o'clock, as I shall by that time have buried my dead, and given my soldiers their breakfasts." Soon afterwards six sovereign princes, namely, Nusseer, Roostum, and Mohamed of upper Scinde, Nusseer Khan, Shahdad, and the young Houssein of lower Scinde, entered his camp on horseback, and offered themselves as prisoners. They yielded their fortress, and laid their rich swords and other arms at the General's feet. These arms were worth many thousand pounds; they were the lawful spoil of the victor, which none could dispute or share with him; and it would have been no small honour to a private gentleman to place the swords of so many sovereign princes in his armoury. But disdaining such profits, with a compassionate feeling for his captives, he returned their weapons, making this simple report of the fact to the Governor-General—"Their misfortunes are of their own creation, but as they were great I gave them back their swords."

Those arms were, however, only the ornamented things of state. The Ameers had always been curious in the collection of celebrated swords, and three of the most famous of Asia, one of them being Nadir Shah's, had been picked up covered

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with blood from the field, where they had been cast down, not by their owners, for the Ameers were not seen in the fight, but probably by the bravest of the Seedees, who died for them in crowds. No story is extant that any Ameer but Mohamed Khan of Hyderabad, and Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor exposed their persons in fight; neither of those were at Meeanee. Mohamed Khan and Sobdar never left the fortress; the former probably from his wound, the latter from cowardice and cunning, hoping thus to appear as a friend if the British won the fight; if the Beloochs were victorious, his followers had been there and fought as bravely as the rest; the two Ameers were safe, but the corpses of their devoted Seedees and feudatories were lying stark on the plain of Meeanee. Houssein, the youth who, under the tutelage of Sobdar and Mohamed, had professed such amity for the British, and sent his vakeels to Roree, was now, when the crisis came, clothed by his mother in a new and curious coat of mail, and sent to the battle with this Spartan admonition—"Fight for your race and your religion." Thus appareled, he appeared amongst the foremost until the cannonade commenced; then, struck with terror, he fled, casting off his rich armour which is now in the General's possession.

The Ameers were cowardly, but the Belooch chiefs and warriors were incredibly brave; and full honour and praise their conqueror gave them for their intrepidity, both in his public despatches and in his private letters. Every respect and indulgence consistent with the public interests he has shewn to them since, letting them know, that resolution and daring in an enemy was no bar to

his favour, but the contrary, if they would finally become friends when the contest in arms became hopeless. This mode of dealing with them, springing partly from a fine policy, partly from his natural feelings, has touched these rough wild men in a surprising manner; they have strong though rude notions of honour, and can feel gratitude as well as enmity.

Praise also he gave to his own gallant troops, with a profound sense of what he owed to them, and what their country owed to them. And for the first time, in English despatches, the names of private soldiers who had distinguished themselves were made known to their countrymen. This innovation was instantly perceived and hailed by those who never served under him; it has rendered his name dear to thousands who never saw and never will see him, for the British soldier is keenly sensitive to honour. His despatch also proved how little desire for military glory influenced his actions. It commences with an apology for having gained a great victory.

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WHEN the reception of the fallen Ameers was terminated, the General prepared to take possession of Hyderabad. He had previously been intent to march with the main body of his army against Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor. That chief, bringing ten thousand men to the other Ameers, and intending to join them on the morning of the 18th, was only six miles from Meeanee when the battle was fought. To be able to attack him and at the same time gain Hydradad, the General had sent the stern message to the Ameers, related before, calculating with reason upon their fears under such a defeat; in a few hours therefore, after the surrender of the princes, Shere Mohamed would have been surprised, and probably taken or killed, if Major Outram, who, during this campaign was the evil principle, the Arimanes of the army, had not been in the British camp. He had burned the Shikargahs, there was nobody to oppose him; the smoke might have been seen from the field of battle, yet not until the fight was over, for none were then in a mood to look out for distant objects. He assured Sir Charles Napier this expedition, which, from the absence of enemies, presented neither difficulty nor danger, had essentially contributed to the success of the day; and the General gave some slight countenance to the notion in his despatch; but what effect could the burning of a jungle ten miles off, have had on such a fight?

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Major Outram's natural activity, directed to matters which he understood, might have been valuable; but always intent on meddling with questions beyond his grasp of mind, his pertinacity sometimes overbore the superior judgment of his chief. He implored him now not to march against Shere Mohamed. He knew the man, he said, personally, and perfectly. He understood his character, his present views, his temper, his general policy, his disposition. He would never fight. His march was a mere menace, he would be too glad to submit and obtain peace; he would hurry to that conclusion if his present aggression was unnoticed. Write to him and he will be as pliant as can be desired; march against him, and all will be mischief and bloodshed. Such were the arguments with which the General was plied, until in an evil hour he assented, saying, "Write then what you like, and I will sign it."

Unhappy was the moment when that presumptuous counsel was acceded to. Had the army marched as designed, Shere Mohamed would have been surprised, defeated, and his capital taken in three days. Well he knew this, and in his first fear, on learning the result of the battle, wrote to say he had no part in the late fight; he had not crossed his own frontier. This was untrue, yet the excuse was accepted, and the plan of reducing him to submission adopted in all its extent. The Ameer having thus obtained time to reconsider his position, placed himself in safety by a retrograde march, laughed at the confident simplicity of Major Outram, and commenced rallying the Belooch warriors who had escaped from the battle. In a few days he was at the head of twenty-five or thirty

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thousand fighting men. Fierce as ever, and undismayed they were; and soon he recommenced the war with them; having Meerpoor, his large and strongly fortified capital on the edge of the desert as a base of operations; Omercote, his other fortress so well provided in the heart of the desert, as a place of refuge in case of defeat. This was the greatest error committed by Sir Charles Napier. It produced another terrible battle, and went nigh to cause the destruction of the army; it would have done so, if there had been less genius and energy to repair the mistake. There are however two excuses. First, no man ever failed to make errors in war. Next, the motive of his facility, a too earnest desire to avoid more bloodshed, may be pleaded; and standing as he did amidst the carnage of Meeanee, who shall blame him?

On the 19th the army took possession of the city of Hyderabad; on the 20th the fortress was occupied, and then the cowardice of the Ameers became manifest. Apparently built of soft bricks, into which the heaviest shot would sink without fracture or destructive vibration of the wall, and consequently without damaging it for defence, the lofty ramparts possessed a strength which could not be perceived from the outside. The brick wall was only a casing over a solid rock; breaching was impossible. Sir Alexander Burnes in his travels described it as very weak. He did not know its strength. It could not be battered, it was too lofty for escalade; it could only have been taken by mines and storm, for which its want of good flanks gave facility. The Belooch warriors, though fugitives, were fierce as before the battle, and still of overwhelming numbers, for ten thousand fresh men had

joined them during their retreat from Meeanee; all were earnest to defend both the fortress and the city, house by house, the thick walls of the buildings being well adapted for such a warfare. But the Ameers, foreseeing their own persons would be thus exposed, were terrified, and would not fight. The Beloochees then went off in disgust to join Shere Mohamed; and the Talpoor Princes rode to the British camp to surrender their swords. Thus they terminated a long course of hideous cruelty, and brutal enjoyment, by an act of miserable cowardice.

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The hot season was now approaching, the thermometer marked 112° in the shade; yet the General, who knew the butchery of the British, contemplated by the Ameers if they had proved victorious, and the horrible fate destined for himself; he who with this knowledge had returned them their swords because their misfortunes were great, now left them the full enjoyment of their palace and gardens, contenting himself with the simple shelter of a common field tent in that scorching clime, rather than inconvenience them by entering their abode. Yet Lord Howick, and Lord Ashley, with sorrow and respect the last name is written, spoke of him in Parliament as treating the fallen Princes in his power with harshness and outrage. The strong sense of an English House of Commons rejected the charge with contempt.

The battle had been won, yet the situation of the victor became hourly more complicated and dangerous. His force was greatly reduced; the unendurable heat was rapidly approaching; Hyderabad was too distant from the Indus, which was now his only line of supply, to serve as a base or even a

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depot; he had not the means of carriage to carry his provisions and stores the four miles of road from the banks to the fortress, in which he was, nevertheless, forced to place a garrison of five hundred men. Meanwhile Shere Mohamed was increasing his army hourly, and menacing a new war.

In this untoward state of affairs Sir C. Napier acted like a consummate commander. To march with his reduced strength of men, still farther reduced by the garrison of Hyderabad, and in the heat, against Shere Mohamed, who could retire to the desert if beaten, would have been to risk all he had won; the chances would have been twenty to one against him. He knew that Ameer, though reputed the best soldier of the Talpoor race, had not so much treasure as the others, wherefore he judged it best to leave him undisturbed in his plans, and to let him raise a new army, thus at once augmenting his pride, and diminishing his money. Stimulated by these concurring excitements, he would be sure to seek without delay the British camp, and offer battle at its gates, perhaps attempt to storm it. This would save the British soldiers the trouble and loss of seeking him by long marches in the heat, no time would be lost, and the fight would be according to their wish. They could march to battle without fatigue; they would have a refuge close behind in case of misfortune; their wounded could be carried off and taken care of whether beaten or victorious; this last object was a matter of infinite solicitude to the General, though scarcely possible to attain far from cities.

Having taken this view of his situation, he resolved to remain tranquil, and immediately sent orders to Kurrachee, to have every detachment that

could be spared forwarded without delay ; but his principal reliance was upon Sukkur, from whence he expected the troops he had ordered down when at Sukkerunda. These he desired Colonel Roberts to hasten, and to send likewise a column of all arms by land also. He had before refused the aid of troops from the Sutledge, thinking to save the general government the expense ; he now thought it better to apply for them. His application was anticipated. A rumour of the battle of Meeanee reached Lord Ellenborough, through the natives, before the despatch arrived ; and with the energy and sagacity which distinguished all his military policy, he caused three regiments to be instantly warned for service in Scinde. To these he added three hundred and fifty of Chamberlain's irregular horse, and a camel battery, and sent the whole down to Sukkur. Soon afterwards, Captain Leslie's and Captain Blood's batteries of horse artillery, and the 3rd Bombay cavalry under Major Stack, taken from General Nott's force after it passed the Sutledge, were added to the others. Most of these troops arrived in time to assist in the subsequent battle of Hyderabad, and finally enabled the General to put an end to the war.

Having thus looked to the future, Sir Charles Napier proceeded to strengthen his position by forming an entrenched camp on the bank of the Indus, by which he protected the steamer station there ; and he also commenced a fort on the opposite side of the river, to cover the vessels from the tribes of the right bank. In this camp, which was about four miles from Hyderabad, he placed his hospitals and stores. Then, he, who had before been so audacious and enterprising, became sud-

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denly one of the most cautious, and to outward appearance, timid and forbearing of commanders. Changing as circumstances demanded, and neglecting no precautions, he patiently awaited the moment when he might break forth again the fiery General of Mecanee. And for this wariness also he obtained the unstinted praise of the great Captain who could best appreciate such conduct.

Duke of Wellington's speech. Debate on the vote of thanks.

“ He gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not again likely to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hyderabad, and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear ; he brought up a reinforcement, and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations of war.”

Such was the Duke of Wellington's criticism. And yet one stroke of ability, indicating the great commander as clearly as any act of this eventful campaign, was unknown to him. While Sir C. Napier professed, and gave all outward signs that he dreaded Shere Mohamed's power, to encourage that Ameer's forwardness to seek him, he guarded carefully against its affecting the minds of his own soldiers ; hence, though he formed the entrenched camp, and strongly, he would not suffer his soldiers to enter it, but pitched their tents outside on an open plain, leading them by this, and other means, to understand, that he did it in contempt of Shere Mohamed's army.

Meanwhile the treasure of Hyderabad was taken possession of. Fame had magnified it extrava-

gantly, or the losses and expenses of the Ameers had been prodigious, since Sir Alexander Burnes announced to the world, that twenty millions sterling were in their coffers. Gold and jewels together, it did not much exceed four hundred thousand pounds. Yet it is probable that large sums were concealed. Bernier, the French physician to Arungzebe, expressly states that the Scindian rulers of his day had secret vaults, especially at Omercote, most difficult to discover, in which to hide their treasures in times of disaster. The women of the Zenanas also probably carried away many valuable jewels. For no man was permitted by the General to enter their apartments; their ornaments, their dresses, and the jewels claimed as their own property were so scrupulously secured to them, that when some of the slaves handed out of the door of the Zenana, women's ornaments, the prize agents immediately sent them back. Finally, when they quitted the palaces to regain, according to their own desire, the homes of their families from whence they had been torn, the General let them go from their dire prisons without being searched. He was anxious these poor victims of the Ameers' brutality should return to their friends with some marks of splendour taken from the treasure of their former oppressors, even though it should diminish his own and the army's share of the spoil,—if share there is to be for those who won the battle. Lord Ellenborough would have bestowed the prize on those who laboured for it with the sword; but seemingly it is being silently transferred to the pockets of those who labour with the pen. Sir Charles Napier is supposed to have gained an immense fortune by his victories, yet

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neither General nor army have yet received any portion of the treasure taken at Hyderabad ; nor a promise of any.

Scarcely had the fortress been occupied by the British troops, than it was discovered, that Sobdar and Mohamed, the two Ameers who had not gone to the camp to surrender after the battle, had been as guilty, or more so, as being more treacherous, than the others. They had concerted the attack on the Residency. Mohamed had been engaged in that attack personally. The followers of both had fought on the plain of Meeanee, but the Ameers staid away, and now sought to turn this to profit by giving it the name of Amity. The proofs against them were, however, too strong, and they were constituted prisoners with their brethren.

Previous to the battle, and after it, the country south of Hyderabad was in a state of great commotion, in consequence of the orders issued by the Ameers to slay all the people belonging to the British Government, who could be found unprotected. The smaller British stations for commissariat purposes and coal depots, were generally attacked and plundered ; several of the officers and their servants were killed, others were driven away with their wives and children, deprived of all their property, and escaping with great pain and difficulty to Kurrachee. Some of the troops guarding the posts were destroyed, escorts were attacked, and some detachments forced a passage down the river in boats, and so got off ; a few Sepoys, under a sergeant, escaped up the river, fighting their way so manfully as to draw forth the applause of the General, who caused the sergeant to be promoted. The communication above and below Hyderabad was

entirely cut off, save by the armed steamers. The Beloochs at Shah Ghur, under Roostum's nephew, Mohamed Ali, intercepted the dawks on the side of Jessulmere; the gathering army of Shere Mohamed did the same by the dawks from Cutch: thus the army was in a manner isolated.

The greatest difficulty was to deal with the captive Ameers. To reconcile their safe-keeping with a generous treatment; to spare their feelings and save the army from their treachery was impossible. And now shall be made known the true history of those confused affairs, belonging to that time of danger and trouble which intervened between the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad. Advantage has been taken of the intricate and generally unknown nature of the events of that short and terrible period to calumniate the General; but nothing short of his intrepidity, coolness, energy, and prudence could have brought the army through it in safety. "We shall Cabool him," was the confident cry of the Ameers, inside and outside the camp: "Yes, he will be Cabooled," was the joyous echoing cry from the faction at Bombay. And because he did not suffer his army to be destroyed according to the predictions and wishes of that false and sordid faction, his character has been assailed and his actions misrepresented in India and in England; as if he, one of the most generous and benevolent of men, was only a savage conqueror, prone to blood and eager to insult and to menace his miserable captives. He was, however, at this time happily relieved from the burthen of Major Outram's counsels. That officer, his functions as Commissioner being ended, went to Bombay. Sir George Arthur suggested that he should have remained as a military man,

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most erroneously supposing that Sir Charles Napier acted with the advice of a military council. Outram knew he did not, yet offered to go back instantly; but the General, though still regarding him as a friend, was now convinced of his want of judgment, and firmly declined his assistance. Outram then went to England, where his evil influence still for a time prevailed, to the detriment of the General and the brave troops he commanded.

It was perplexing at first to decide how the Ameers were to be treated, and this perplexity impeded the measures necessary for the security of the army. Were they prisoners of war or deposed Princes? The battle had altered the political relations between them, as Sovereign Princes, and the Anglo-Indian Government. It was no longer a question of enforcing a new treaty. They had appealed to the sword and were by defeat placed at the mercy of their conquerors. How would the Governor-General treat them? This question was decided, on the 12th of March, twenty-four days after the action of Meeanee. Lord Ellenborough, by proclamation, annexed Scinde to the British possessions in the East, and the Ameers were to be sent captives to Bombay.

“The battle of Meeanee,” it was thus the Governor-General explained and justified his policy. “The battle of Meeanee entirely changed the position in which the British Government stood with respect to the Ameers of Scinde. To have placed confidence in them thereafter would have been impossible. To have only exacted from them large cessions of territory would have been to give them what remained as the means of levying war for the purpose of regaining what was

“ceded. Foreigners in Scinde, they only held their
 “power by the sword, and by the sword they had
 “lost it. Their position was evidently different
 “from that of a native Prince succeeding a long
 “line of ancestors, the object of the hereditary
 “affection and obedience of his subjects. They
 “had no claim to consideration on the grounds of
 “ancient possession, or of natural prejudice. Cer-
 “tainly they had none arising out of the goodness of
 “their government. To take advantage of the
 “crime they had committed, to overturn their power
 “was a duty to the people they had so long mis-
 “governed. It was essential to the settlement of
 “the country that he should take at once a decided
 “course with respect to the Ameers; and, having
 “no doubt that he was justified in dethroning them,
 “he determined on at once adopting and announc-
 “ing that decision.”

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When this measure was made known to the General he expressed his satisfaction.

“I had no prejudice,” he said, “against the
 “Ameers. I certainly held their conduct as rulers
 “to be insufferable; but as individuals I felt pity
 “for them. I thought them weak Princes whose
 “folly had brought them into difficulties. It was
 “this feeling that made me return to them their
 “swords; for assuredly I was not insensible to the
 “honour it would be for a private gentleman to
 “possess the swords of so many Princes surrendered
 “to him on the field of battle: and I believe by
 “all the rules and customs of war their swords
 “were mine. This was an undoubted proof of my
 “feelings then. Since then I have seen their real
 “character developed; and I do think that such
 “thorough-paced villains I never met with in my
 “life. Meer Sobdar is even worse than the others.

Letters to
 Ellenbo-
 rough,
 Scinde,
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 mentary
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“ He certainly had five thousand men in the action.
 “ I doubted this at first as he was not there in per-
 “ son. Being now assured that your Lordship will
 “ occupy the country, I can act decidedly, and I shall
 “ have cover for my troops very soon. I executed
 “ the murderer of the Parsee, putting a label on his
 “ breast, to say he was not hanged for fighting
 “ with us, but for murdering a man who was a pri-
 “ soner. The villagers are coming back to their
 “ villages. I believe that the country is gradually
 “ growing quiet. The proclamation has already
 “ produced effect.”

This language, apparently so harsh, was but simple justice. To reconcile politeness towards the Ameers, with what was due to the army became impossible. To understand this it is necessary to shew in detail the exact state of affairs and the power which these bad men still had to produce mischief. The six who had surrendered on the field of battle were at once placed in a large and pleasant garden of their own on the bank of the Indus, close to the entrenched camp. Within this enclosure were pavilions containing all the luxuries that they had been used to ; and they were permitted to have an unlimited number of attendants, and free intercourse by means of those attendants, with the city and the country. Sobdar, Mohamed Khan, and the two Housseins, who were at first supposed to be friends, were left in the quiet enjoyment of their own palaces, until their delinquency was discovered ; then they were made prisoners like the others, Mohamed and Sobdar being sent to the garden, the young Ameers remaining in the fortress. But all were allowed the enjoyment of their luxuries and numerous attendants. This inconvenient division of prisoners increased the difficulty of guarding them, it was

one of Major Outram's strokes of policy, his last act being to implore the General so to lodge them.

It was now discovered that the Ameer Shahdad had caused the murder of Captain Innes. This unfortunate officer was descending the Indus in a boat, on sick leave, when some Beloochs grappled the boat and dragged it to the right bank, where they stripped him naked. When the ruffians were tearing off his shirt, he shivered and pleaded hard to save it—"I am ill," he said, "the water is very cold, leave me my shirt." The reply was a sword stroke that sent his head flying into the water. When the Ameer Shahdad was taxed with the crime he denied it strenuously, but the actual murderer was given up by the others, and at once acknowledged and gloried in the deed, saying, he acted from Shahdad's orders. "I did it," he exclaimed, "and I would do it again: hang me." It was the General's design to hang Shahdad on the highest tower of Hyderabad in sight of Shere Mohamed's army for this, but Lord Ellenborough would not suffer him to do so. It was a misplaced lenity.

While the Ameers were thus gently used in confinement, their women remained in the zenanas. These were six strongly built palaces, forming so many separate forts within the great fortress of Hyderabad. They were, as has been already said, scrupulously respected, and no man of the British

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full of arms complete for the eight hundred, sword, shield, pistol, and matchlock. These men were constantly going back and forwards to the garden of the Ameers, to the city, and to the camp of Shere Mohamed. If one of them was stopped or questioned, a cry, that the women would starve if their attendants were molested, was immediately raised. It was impossible with any human feeling to attempt to enter the zenanas to seize the arms, and reduce these fierce fellows to obedience, because they openly threatened if one zenana was entered, to cut all the women's throats on the instant, and fight their way out. They were quite capable of both actions, and no great effort was necessary; for Shere Mohamed's army was within a few miles; the garrison of the fortress was but four hundred strong, and it had to guard the outward ramparts of the fortress, which was of great extent, and to watch the six separate zenanas within. It could therefore have presented no strength at any particular point to the Belooch rush.

In the garden the Ameers had adopted a similar course of policy. Under the name of attendants they had gathered round them five hundred stout Beloochees, all armed with large knives, and many with sword and shield; and they were continually sending some of these men to the British camp to spy out the disposition and number of the troops, and then to Shere Mohamed to give him intelligence of what they discovered. They arranged a plan also for a concerted attack by his army on the fortress and camp from without, while their Beloochs should fall upon the garrison from within. Their intercourse with his army was incessant,

almost every hour, and so confidently did they anticipate success, that they scarcely tried to conceal their treacherous proceedings.

Such being the inner state of affairs, it is necessary to look on the outside. Shere Mohamed, or the Lion, as he was and shall be in future called, Shere meaning Lion, to distinguish him from several other Mohameds, was now at the head of a force, varying in numbers from twenty-five thousand to forty thousand men. Most of the spies gave the latter number, but the Beloochs often quitted his standard to go on plundering expeditions, and thus his real strength varied. The General, however, was forced to consider him as having the larger number. The Lion was by public rumour charged with many horrible crimes, matricide amongst them; these things are doubtful, but it is certain that he did not disgrace his cognomen, being bold, resolute, and enterprising: his life had been of less luxury than that of his cousins, and he now shewed his training.

Having advanced his main body within ten miles of Hyderabad, and being deceived by the General's apparent timidity and real difficulties, he felt confident of success, openly boasting that he would "*Cabool the British.*" Meanwhile the whole country became again disturbed. The hill tribes, always ready for plunder, were in preparation to descend upon the plains. Mir-Allee, the Jam of the Jokeas, the most powerful chief of southern Scinde, who had received British pay for protecting the dawks through his country and had intercepted them instead, was now menacing the troops at Kurrachee in their cantonments. The stations of Jerruck and

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Vikkur, on the branches of the Indus in the Delta were also attacked and plundered. The reinforcement expected from Sukkur by land, was on its march, and though strong and well composed of old soldiers of all arms, there was danger that the Lion would make a sudden march with his whole power to intercept it. This would have forced the General to follow him, leaving Hyderabad and his camp in the utmost danger and confusion.

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A more critical and dangerous situation can scarcely be conceived than Sir C. Napier's at this time. He had only four hundred men in the fortress; his field force, now reduced by the battle and sickness to less than two thousand, had to guard not only the entrenched camp, with the hospitals and magazines, and the station of the steamers, but the garden in which the Ameers were confined, the inclosing wall of which was more than a mile in circuit. Here then were two thousand men separated, not willingly but of necessity, into three bodies, the fortress being four miles, and the garden half a mile from the entrenched camp which contained the magazine and hospitals. An army of brave men, said to be forty thousand strong, was only ten miles off on the outside, and in communication with more than twelve hundred inside the position, who were all ready to aid. The reinforcements expected from the north were engaged on a march very hazardous, having to fear the enemy and the climate; the stations to the south were attacked, plundered, broken up, or invested; the hill tribes were gathering in arms for a descent on the plains; the communications of the army by Cutch, Joudpoor, Jessulmere, and Kurrachee, were entirely cut off, while those

with the mouths of the Indus and with Sukkur, were entirely dependent on the armed steamers.

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The captive Ameers, being well acquainted with the real state of affairs, and taking advantage of their conqueror's generosity, sought to increase his difficulties by intrigues and conspiracies of a very dangerous nature. They continually despatched emissaries to excite all their feudatory chiefs and allies to assemble in arms again and renew the war; they kept a constant correspondence with Shere Mohamed, informing him of the weak state of the troops, and all other points of importance to his operations; they organized their Beloochs in the garden near the camp, and in the fortress, to fall on the garrison of the one, and the hospitals of the other, when the Lion should be in march to attack according to the plan concerted between them. To cover these schemes, which were however well known to the English Commander, the Ameers were hourly making loud and false complaints of outrage and violence offered to them and their women, by officers and soldiers of the army; seeking thus to distract his attention, and, to use their own phrase, *throw dust in his eyes*. One of the outrages complained of, was the taking away of the knives and other arms from their attendants in the garden, for, as there were no women there to suffer from their brutality, this was now done.

At first the General admonished the Ameers mildly, upon the extreme audacity of prisoners thus making war, and upon the impudent falseness of their complaints. He spoke in vain, and the following curious example of unflinching mendacity will illustrate their characters. Before

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their attendants were disarmed, Sir C. Napier, accompanied by his staff, entered their garden to remonstrate against the number of Beloochs they had gathered about them, his license for having a full attendance being restricted to Hindoos and household slaves. Arrived at their Pavilion, which was immense, being formed by hanging canvass from the surrounding trees, he found the whole space within crowded with Beloochees, whose robust bodies, fierce air, and peculiar features could not be mistaken; outside stood two hundred more; all were armed, and they pressed around him and his officers so rudely, that the latter, expecting violence, closed together for defence. Yet with this menacing proof of the fact, the Ameers expressed the utmost surprise at the remonstrance, and exclaimed with one voice—"What people! What Beloochees! We have nobody here but a few Hindoo servants! No Belooch ever enters this garden!" Then it was he caused these people to be disarmed, and the Ameers complained of it as an outrage! His consideration for the women's lives alone prevented him from doing the same in the fortress.

Long this treachery and insolence was borne with exemplary patience; but when the danger became imminent, it would have been weakness to hesitate between duty to the troops and a desire to treat the captives with respect and politeness. Long I say the General forbore to apply the remedy which this state of things called for, lest he should be supposed to act revengefully on account of the dire cruelty they had designed to inflict on him if they had been victorious. At last, considering only the safety of his army, he wrote thus to the

Ameers, in answer to one of their usual insolent and false complaints :—

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“ I have received your letter this day. You
 “ must recollect that your intrigues with Meer
 “ Shere Mohamed give me a great deal to do. I
 “ am also much surprised by the falsehoods which
 “ you tell. I will no longer bear this conduct ;
 “ and if you give me any more trouble, by stating
 “ gross falsehoods, as you have done in your two
 “ letters ; I will cast you in prison as you deserve.
 “ You are prisoners, and though I will not kill you,
 “ as you advised your people to do to the English,
 “ I will put you in irons on board a ship. You
 “ must learn, Princes, that if prisoners conspire
 “ against those who have conquered them, they
 “ will find themselves in danger. Be quiet, or you
 “ will suffer the consequences of your folly. Your
 “ friend, Meer Shere Mohamed, has prevented the
 “ letter from the Governor-General as to your fate
 “ from reaching me ; his soldiers intercept the
 “ dawks. He is a very weak man, and will soon
 “ cause himself to be destroyed ; and so will you, un-
 “ less you submit more quietly to the fate which your
 “ own rash folly has brought upon you. I will
 “ answer no more of your letters, which are only
 “ repetitions of gross falsehoods that I will not
 “ submit to.”

Finally, seeing their intrigues were continued, when the Lion was come so close that a battle became inevitable, he placed them on board the steamers, but not in irons.

This letter has been condemned in Parliament, by the persons who opposed the vote of thanks to the General, as an unheard of example of ferocity towards captives ; Napoleon and his rock had no

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doubt passed entirely from their memories ; and in a recent publication it has been stigmatized as wanting in chivalry ! The chivalry of a waiting woman's romance it may be, not the chivalry of common sense ; nor yet the chivalry of madness, for even the Knight of La Mancha gives no warrant for such frothy sentiment. The man who fights and fails is at the mercy of his vanquisher, to kill or spare. Civilization leads men to spare, but with the condition, understood, that the man thus taken to mercy, relinquishes further hostility. He is not to practise secretly or openly against the safety and honour of those who have granted him life ; he is not to profit of the victor's generous treatment to point out to the enemy the weakness of the army under whose protection he exists ; he is not to plot its destruction by new attacks, nor to prepare for treacherously aiding its enemies during the conflict. Such acts take away the character of prisoner, substituting that of spy, traitor, and assassin ; death is the proper punishment. Sir Charles Napier's letter therefore, was not harsh and ferocious, not wanting in chivalry, but a generous, considerate, and merciful warning, and forbearance towards men whose lives he might rightfully have taken. To have shot them without hesitation would have been but simple justice.

But they were " Fallen Princes,"—" Illustrious victims,"—" Friends of all the political agents who preceded Sir Charles Napier,"—" Oppressed weeping sufferers,"—" Dignified in misfortune, domestic, and deeply attached to their relations." In such gentle pity-seeking accents was their fate bewailed, by men whose only sympathy springs from discontent at being, by Lord Ellenborough, debarred

plundering the Scinde revenues, under the names of collectors, secretaries, political agents, and other forms of the Directors' nepotism. Such in substance has been the constant cry of the daily press in India, and a portion of that in England; such has been the declamation in the House of Commons, and at the India House, and in the pages of the Directors' nameless scribbling sycophants. But now shall the real characters of the Ameers be made known, that a fair judgment may be passed upon them. Public opinion will then decide whether Sir Charles Napier's treatment of those Princes was a betrayal of English generosity and honour.

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First as to their merits as sovereigns.

The Ameers governed by the sword and by no other law. The Beloochees were their troops; the Scindians and Hindoos their subjects, their victims; up to the battle of Meeanee, any Belooch might kill a Scindian or Hindoo with impunity, for pleasure or profit: this licence was widely exercised, especially where women were concerned.

The Ameers dealt largely in the slave trade, and so did all their feudal chiefs, both as importers and exporters.

They had, to form Shikargahs or hunting grounds, laid waste, in less than sixty years, more than a fourth of the most fertile land of Scinde, a country nearly five hundred miles in length, and from one to three hundred in breadth. And to form one of these hunting wildernesses for a child of eight years old, they would depopulate whole villages with less hesitation and feeling, than an English farmer smokes a hive of bees. They extracted money from Hindoo and other merchants by torture and mutilations. They forced labouring

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men and mechanics to work for them by the same means, at about two pence daily wages, when their services were worth ten times as much, and more often than not they cheated them even of that pittance: this oppression they carried to such an extent, that when Sir Charles Napier took possession of Scinde, scarcely could a mason or carpenter or other handicraft man be found;—all had fled with their skill to distant countries. The Ameers also restricted commerce, and oppressed merchants and traders, because they disliked the presence of strangers who might draw comparisons between their rule and that of other princes. They dreaded lest their subjects should be told the inflictions they endured were unknown, save in Scinde, the most fertile and most miserable country of all Asia. Finally, they stopped one of the great water-courses, derived from the Indus, purposely to destroy the fertility of the neighbouring kingdom of Cutch, which had been irrigated from it.

“The oppressive nature of their government is possibly unequalled in the world,” said Sir Henry Pottinger.

“It is an iron depotism,” wrote Sir Alexander Burnes.

“They have all the vices of barbarians without their redeeming virtues,” was the observation of Mount Stuart Elphinstone, whose dictum carries with it the authority of great sagacity, combined with extensive and accurate knowledge.

Major Outram called it a “Patriarchal Government.”

But God did not form the teeming land of Scinde with all the germs of fecundity, nor spread the waters of the Indus to bring them forth with plen-

teousness, merely to support the brutal Ameers in luxury: they thought so, but his arresting and avenging hand was laid upon them at Meeanee.

Their actions as men were even more hideously wicked than their actions as sovereigns.

They filled their Zenanas with young girls torn from their relations, who were never allowed to see them more; and they permitted all their Sirdars and other chiefs to do the same. How were those girls treated? It would suffice as an answer, to say, that when the Ameers fell, not one woman, old or young, mother, wife, or concubine, would follow them to Bombay, so much were they detested. And reason good there was for that hatred. They and all their Sirdars and followers, alike, perpetrated such horrid iniquities that the women would have been demons had they not shrunk from the contamination of the Ameers' company.

If a suspicion of infidelity crossed the mind of a Belooch, he sought for no proof, but made the father or mother hold the daughter by the hair while he cut her throat, or hacked her to pieces with a sword. The slightest quarrel, or disobedience, or reluctance shewn, was enough provocation for cutting off the miserable girl's nose or ears with a knife.

The Ameers and Sirdars killed all their illegitimate children; that was the rule; and not unfrequently they extended this rule to the female legitimate children.

And how did these monsters destroy their own offspring? First they gave potions, called "*odalisques*," to procure abortion; if those failed, they sometimes chopped the children to pieces with their own hands immediately after birth; but

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more frequently placed them under cushions and sat down, smoking and drinking and jesting with each other about their hellish work, while the children were being suffocated beneath them ! Nor was this even the limit of their abominations. With inhuman cruelty they chastised what they deemed the poor women's offences, such, perhaps, as weeping over their slaughtered children. Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, reputed the most noble and generous minded of the Ameers, the most humane of the pernicious brood, had in his Zenana a whip expressly to correct the women ; the lash is composed of two lengths of twisted brass wires ! It is no fable ! The usage is certain ; the whip itself is in the General's possession, and not the least prized of his trophies ; it tells him how excellent a deed it was to put his foot upon the ruffian's bended neck.

Such were the Ameers as Princes ; such they were as fathers and husbands. Were they better as relations and friends ?

It has been shewn how they advanced as grounds of war, the alleged ill treatment of Roostum, the most aged chief of the numerous families ; how strenuously they protested to Major Outram, that pity and respect for that patriarch of the Talpoors was the cause, and the only cause, of their resistance to the demands of the Indian Government ; and how Outram with admirable simplicity, believed them. It might therefore be expected that they would have some compassion for his age and misery when fortune had deprived him of all he possessed. They went to battle from their palaces at Hyderabad, carrying with them nought but their arms. He came there from afar, after a long flight

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and sojourn in the desert ; he came with all his treasure and household goods carried on camels. In the battle he lost all. The victors seized the Ameer's camp, and when a false alarm that the Beloochs were returning to fight disturbed them in the evening, the General, desirous to clear the plain for a new action, ordered the captured camp to be fired : thus Roostum was left without resource.

He was sent with the other Princes to the garden on the Indus. There he stood, eighty-five years of age, his white beard streaming in the air, his head bared in the sun of Scinde, without food, without attendance, without cover, without a carpet to lie down on, without a change of clothes ;—and he was sick also. There he stood, I say, a suppliant at the door of the other Ameers' gorgeous pavilion, which was filled with every convenience and luxury their near palaces could supply ; yet no man asked him in, none would let him enter. When he prayed for shelter none proffered him help, none gave him clothes, or money, or food ; they would not even lend him utensils to cook with, a carpet to kneel on for his prayers. He was on the point of perishing when the General and his staff furnished him with a tent, and carpets, and clothes, cooking utensils, and food, and money taken from the prize funds. Here then was ample proof that not for Roostum's sake had they gone to war.

But how had that old Ameer borne himself towards his own family ? His brother, Ali Moorad, was a child when their father died. He was left by that father to Roostum's care and protection ; and to prevent dispute, a will was written in the Koran very exactly. It stated and defined what each

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son's share should be, but Roostum, and another adult brother fraudulently dispossessed Ali Moorad of his patrimony. When grown up he discovered the injury, and being a man of energy, immediately assembled a force, at the head of which he demanded his rights. This was in 1838; he was too formidable to be resisted by arms; but Roostum making solemn promises to restore his villages, and having contracts to that effect written in the Koran, induced Ali Moorad, who is of a generous temper for an Ameer, to disband his troops after a victory, and then laughed at him as a dupe. When the Auckland treaty was ratified, this dispute was referred by virtue of that treaty to the Anglo-Indian Government for decision, and the award was in favour of Ali Moorad; it may therefore be reasonably supposed that gratitude for this act of justice kept him true to the English alliance.

It was with a full knowledge of their faithlessness, their horrid government, and still more horrid practices, that Sir Charles Napier designated the Ameers as thorough-paced villains, and expressed his satisfaction that they were to be deposed.

But their subjects, it was said, loved them, and fought for them to death! The Beloochs fought for them indeed. They fought for their pay, and for plunder, and because, being fanatics, they hated the Feringhees as unbelievers. That they fought for love of the Ameers is false, and this is the proof of its falseness.—Roostum's sons and nephews remain to this day at large, to the number of perhaps thirty. They have never ceased to solicit the mountain tribes on the right bank of the Indus to commence a new war, yet they have never been able to rouse a single Belooch to battle in their

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cause. Many of those wild fellows have indeed come down to rob in the plains according to their ancient customs, but none to fight for the fallen Princes. Nor has the Lion himself, the best of these fallen Princes, been able to drag even a hundred men into the field since he lost his treasure, though, while that lasted, he arrayed thirty thousand for battle with great ease.

And if the fighting tribes had taken arms again to restore the Ameer's dynasty, it would not have been pertinent to the matter. The Beloochs were the soldiers of the Ameers; the Scindians were their subjects. As soldiers the Beloochees fought nobly; they hoped for victory, and they are by nature brave and emulous of military reputation; but it was not possible for them to have real attachment for cowardly Princes, who cared for them as little, save in fear, as they did for the meanest miserable Scindian whom they mutilated with cold cruelty. Of this there is proof. Amongst all the men who so bravely fought at Meeanee only three were taken alive, and they were badly wounded. They had been carried along with the British sufferers to the hospital of the entrenched camp on the Indus, which was close to the Ameers' garden. No attendant speaking their language could be found. Sir C. Napier being interested in their fate, went himself to the Ameers to request they would send a Belooch to aid their own wounded soldiers. No! He then ordered them to do so, whereupon they sent a person with a promise of three halfpence a day! The second day he complained that he could not live for that sum. The Ameers were applied to for more. "No! it is too much, we have no money." The man therefore abandoned

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his charge, and the poor wounded fellows were entirely taken care of by English soldiers. Let faction now lament over the patriarchal Princes, and calumniate the man who has enhanced even the glory of England by their fall.

CHAPTER V.

SHERE Mohamed, in the first moment of alarm, when he heard of the battle of Mecance, sent, as we have seen, a deprecatory but a false message to the General. The answer would have been the charging shout of the British cavalry had not Major Outram interfered, and substituted for the stroke of battle the following epistle:—

“ Syud Imambree, your deputy, came to me
 “ with a message from you, saying your Highness
 “ was a friend of the British, and you did not
 “ march with your army beyond your own territory
 “ in the fight ; therefore I approve of your High-
 “ ness’s message. And now it is necessary that
 “ you should disperse your troops you have with
 “ you, and so keep no one with you in the shape
 “ of an army ; and if I find that your Highness has
 “ any collected I shall attack them. If you dis-
 “ perse your troops, and keep no one with you, I
 “ shall reckon you just the same as before—friend
 “ and ally of the British.”

This intimation produced no effect ; Shere Mohamed had gained time to retreat, and was intent on other matters. The captive Ameers had seen the British troops, and told him of their numerical weakness ; wherefore he remained in the field, rallying around him the fugitive Beloochs, and such warriors as had not taken part in the battle

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of Mecanee ; for they knew he had treasure. He was soon at the head of thirty thousand fighting men ; the spies said forty thousand ; but in truth his force varied, because unable, or perhaps unwilling, to keep so many in pay, large bodies went off at times to plunder : it was thus Jerruk and Vikkur, and other places suffered. With those who remained, about twenty-six thousand, he marched towards Hyderabad ; and having constant intercourse with the captive Ameers, as shewn in the preceding chapter, he designed the following plan of attack :—The fortress to be assailed with part of his army, the Beloochs inside acting in concert. When the British troops should move from the entrenched camp in aid of the garrison, the Ameer in person was to meet them with his main body, on the march, while a strong detachment, placed in a convenient position, should, aided by the Beloochs in the Ameers' garden, assail and storm the camp behind.

This was a well-combined plan ; all the separate portions of the Lion's army would have been in close communication, while the British would have been divided ; the detachment destined for the assault of the camp was near Khooserie, within hearing of the attack on the fortress, and therefore could not have failed as to time and concert. A barbarian's plan of war is however seldom executed with due celerity and precision, because discipline and the rules of art are wanting, and both are necessary to produce exactness and concert. But to shew clearly how the Lion failed in this campaign, where the chances were so much in his favour, it is necessary to trace the operations on both sides with care.

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On the third of March Sir Charles Napier, hearing that Shere Mohamed, notwithstanding his professions of amity, maintained a menacing position and was daily augmenting his forces, addressed him thus:—

“Ameer, you wrote to me, and said, you had not joined in battle against the English. I believed you, and told you to disperse your troops, and that you would be safe. Had you done so you would have been in no danger; but instead of this, you are rallying the defeated Beloochees; you have increased the number of your troops; and unless you come to my camp at Hyderabad, and prove your innocence, I will march against you, and inflict a signal punishment upon you.”

He wrote, at the same time, to several of the Sirdars, who he understood to be wavering, and amongst others, on the 11th, to Mir-Allee the great Jam or chief of the Jokeas, who, when he knew of the fight at Meeanee, made a show of submission, by begging protection for some ladies of his family who had fallen into the General's power.

“I have very good reason to approve of your conduct,” was the reply. “I have reported it to the Governor-General. I am very happy to be of use to your family; the young ladies shall go where they please, and four men of their own, with arms, shall, if they please, accompany them. God forbid that any woman should suffer indignity from me, or from any one under my command, whether such woman belonged to a friend or to an enemy. Women are always to be respected in war.”

On the 13th the General first heard of the great numbers said to be with the Lion. He could

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scarcely credit the report. "He has not much money," he said, "he has not much water; he has not much ammunition: How then can he have assembled forty thousand men? I know not." In fine, he now again experienced the danger of listening to Major Outram's counsel.

Perplexed at the sudden springing up of this new army in such force, he took the safest side, and wrote for reinforcements to Ferozepore. His demand had been forestalled, as I have before shewn, by Lord Ellenborough, and the troops thus sent from General Nott's army had now reached Sukkur. Colonel Roberts, an energetic officer, good in every situation, was enabled, therefore, not only to send the detachments, previously called for by Sir Charles Napier, down the Indus in boats, together with supplies of ammunition and provisions, but also to put a strong brigade of the new comers, of all arms, under Major Stack, to move by land; such being the order of the General who was desirous to profit thus from his victory, while the terror of it still affected the Belooch tribes, who might otherwise have molested the march.

Meanwhile Sir C. Napier adhered to his close system; that is he fortified his camp, pretended fear, and tempted the Lion to approach his quarters, that he might spare his own troops long marches in the heat to seek him. But though willing to give the Ameer a long day, with a view to empty his treasury, and anxious to have his own reinforcements down ere he took the field again, he never designed to give him free play beyond the 24th of March; because from that time to the coming of the unendurable heat, would be scarcely sufficient for defeating his army and taking the towns of

Meerpoor and Omercote. Wherefore, with a greatness of mind which distinguished all his acts in this memorable campaign, he resolved, if his reinforcements were delayed, to seek the enemy even with the few troops at his command, and fight him, though more than twenty to one.

Shere Mohamed, judging the English General's caution to be the effect of fear, soon approached closer to Hyderabad, ravaging the country around, and sending his detachments to insult and harass the British, by carrying off the camels of the army from their pastures : thus he excited great hopes amongst the Belooch party, terrified the Scindians, and gave himself the air of a conqueror. When he had completed and concerted his plan of attack with the captive Ameers, he, from some instigation of pride, or it might be latent fear, thought fit, on the 18th of March, to send vakeels to the British camp with an insolent offer of terms, saying,—“ Quit this land and your life shall be spared, provided you restore all you have taken.” The vakeels entered the camp with great confidence, and delivered this haughty message just as the evening gun was fired. “ You hear that sound. It is my answer to your chief. Begone!” And with that stern observation turned his back on the envoys. The next day he received a shocking proposal to assassinate the Lion ; it came from the Ameer's own brother ! The General, indignant and disgusted, instantly sent information to Shere Mohamed, bidding him beware of the treachery ; at the same time he repaid the insolent message of the vakeels with the following warning :—

“ I will make no terms with you, except unconditional surrender, and security for your person,

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“ such as the other Ameers have received. We were
“ at peace with you ; we made no war with you ;
“ you have made unprovoked war upon us, and
“ have cut off our dawks. If you do not surrender
“ yourself a prisoner of war before the 23rd instant
“ I will march against you and give you battle.”

It would seem that these events and communications delayed the execution of the Lion's concerted plan of attack ; and meanwhile the General's combinations, beginning to tell, drew Mohamed's attention another way, at the very moment when he was on the point of putting his plans in execution. He had advanced to Ali-ka-Tanda, a place within a few miles of Hyderabad, and from thence detached eight thousand to Dubba on his right, and five thousand to Khooserie on his left ; both points being advanced beyond the centre at Ali-ka-Tanda, where twelve thousand fighting men remained. The army thus occupied a triangle, the left wing being to assail the camp, to which it approached by its position ; the right to assault the fortress, which it also approached ; the centre to meet and give battle to the troops coming from the camp.

See Plans,
No. 3 & 5.

The Lion judged the attacks on the camp and fortress to be sure ; he had strong hope of victory in the battle between those places ; and though he should lose it, his final success would, he thought, be certain. Because the British army, weakened in the fight, and having lost its stores hospital and camp, and its port for the steamers on the river, would be forced to retreat in the hot weather to Sukkur, harassed and assailed from all quarters, and likely to meet Ali Moorad on its path arrayed as an enemy instead of an ally. In fine Mohamed had merely modified the Ameer's

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original plan of warfare according to the new state of affairs. And so confident, so elated was he by this prospect, that he publicly boasted, as before stated, that he would "*Cabool the British army.*" Doubtless he would have done so if one of Lord Auckland's political agents had been present in authority; but Lord Ellenborough had replaced the youth who spoke Persian with a veteran General, and the Lion was baffled.

Before the 16th, the British army, received by water, six months' provisions, some recruits from Kurrachee, money, and ammunition; the camp was strongly entrenched, the fortress of Hyderabad repaired and strengthened. The 21st regiment of Sepoys arrived soon after that day from Sukkur, by the Indus; and on the 19th, the fine brigade of old soldiers under Major Stack, consisting of eight hundred Sepoy infantry, three hundred eastern cavalry, and Leslie's battery of horse artillery, moving down the left bank of the river, were computed to be within two or three marches. It was then the General answered the Lion's insolent message, and he fixed the 23rd as the day of surrender, because he expected Stack on the 22nd, and was resolved to fight on the 24th.

The march of that officer, however, gave him uneasiness, because the Lion, whose army, really twenty-five thousand strong and reported by the spies to be forty thousand, was between it and the camp, and the Amcer might, as indeed he designed, throw himself unexpectedly upon the brigade. Hence, to gain exact information of the movements of the Lion, and of Major Stack, and to combine his own in aid of the latter, became the object of his keenest attention: the affair was extremely delicate and critical.

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On the 21st Major Stack reached Muttaree, a long march from Hyderabad. There he received orders, carried by a native messenger called a cossid, to force his movement, and advance constantly; the Lion had, however, notice of his approach, and was preparing to intercept and overwhelm him before he could be succoured. The whole of the Belooch forces had been moved in the night of the 21st from Khooserie and Ali-ka-Tanda to Dubba, with the design of falling the next day on Stack during his march. The Belcoch and English Generals were thus pitted for a trial of skill, but the chances were all against the latter. The Lion had the central position; he had merely to mass his troops on the right by a night march of a few miles, and attack the next day with vigour. Sir Charles Napier, with forces immeasurably inferior in number, and scattered also, had many objects to guard; his combinations were, therefore, necessarily more various and complicated, more subject to disturbances from unforeseen causes, and in this latter respect fortune was at first very adverse. For, Major Clibborne, who was charged with the secret intelligence of the army, having obtained information of the Lion's movement to assail Major Stack's column on the march, sent, without informing the General, a cossid to that officer, bearing this written message in a small quill:—

“Halt, for God's sake! You will be attacked by at least forty thousand men to-morrow.”

Stack, who had just before received precise instructions to march steadily onwards, was naturally perplexed at the contradiction; and being amazed withal at the enormous force of Shere Mohamed, sent the cossid back instantly with the

quill and message, demanding positive orders. The man happily passed the Lion's forces, and reached the camp at the moment when the General was entertaining a great body of officers in his tent, and the dinner was just over when he arrived. The affair was momentous and dangerous. The vicinity of Shere Mohamed's army, his great numbers, his confidence, his arrogant boasting and message; his known intercourse with the captive Ameers, and the force of Beloochs which those Princes had in the garden and fortress; the many others at their command, who were lurking in the city and the neighbouring villages, awaiting the hour of battle to shew themselves, were matters known to every follower of the army, and had produced great disquietude: the reinforcements were looked for with anxiety by the troops, and even by the officers. There was, in fine, great uneasiness if not apprehension, for the aspect of affairs was exceedingly gloomy and menacing.

Clibborne's untoward interference very much increased the difficulties. If Stack should halt at Muttaree, the distance was so great from the camp, that the Lion, who was ten miles nearer, might crush him there before succour could arrive. If the army marched in sufficient force at once to aid him, the fortress and camp would be endangered, should, as was likely, the Lion's reported march proved to be only a feint. Nor would it have been wise to give the Belooch army an opportunity of attacking either body separately on the march. It was essential, therefore, that Stack should continue his movement, and come as near as possible to Hyderabad, ere he was assailed, that the General might be enabled to move to his aid without endangering that fortress or the camp.

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All these considerations rushed on Sir Charles Napier's mind when the cossid brought him Clibborne's unauthorised message to Major Stack. He was uneasy himself, and therefore feared the moral effect the affair would have on others. Hence he was desirous to excite the military feelings of the officers present, by an appearance of confidence and hilarity, and he effected that with a happy stroke of genius, which will recall for the scholar, the simple jest by which Hannibal raised the spirit of his people the evening before the battle of Cannæ, after seeing the great numbers of the Romans. He read the note aloud with this reply, which he wrote on the spot, and sent back by the same cossid instantly, "*Clibborne's army is in buckram. March on.*" The humour was caught by the hearers who repeated it, the laugh went round the camp, and confidence was completely restored.

But it was one thing to encourage his own troops, another to save his reinforcement. Intelligence confirming Clibborne's news, that the Lion was in full march to destroy Stack, arrived in the night of the 21st, and it became necessary to baffle him. His attack could only be made with advantage at three places, namely, Muttaree, Meeanee, and between the villages of Loonar and Bagayet, a few miles nearer to Hyderabad. Muttaree was unlikely because of its distance, and because Stack would be in march from thence as soon as he received the last order; Meeanee came next, Loonar third. But those places were distant from each other, and the combinations to succour Stack must be precise; the arrangements which would suit one place would not suit another. In this perplexing state of affairs, one of those scintillations of genius

See Plan,
No. 5.

which indicate the strength of the fire within, determined the line of action. "Muttaree is distant; the plain of Meeanee is covered with the bleaching bones of chiefs and warriors; the Beloochees are superstitious, they will never go there to fight again; Loonar will be the place of action, and there I will march." Such was the General's reasoning, and in conformity with it he acted.

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Still he did not neglect the chance of an attack at Muttaree. The Ameer's army was on the eastern bank of the Fullaillee, and the winding of the nullah would cause it a somewhat circuitous external march to reach Stack at Muttaree; for though dry, the bed of the river was profound, and in a direct march must have been crossed more than once. The line of communication from Hyderabad was, on the contrary, straight and internal. The General therefore sent Captain McMurdo with the Poonah horsemen, two hundred and fifty strong, to feel if the enemy had intercepted this line; and if not to push on to Muttaree, reinforce Stack, and confirm the order to continue his movement. McMurdo marched on the evening of the 21st, found no enemy, and joined Stack the next morning, that is to say the 22nd, on which day the General sent Jacob also with the Scinde horsemen from Hyderabad along the same road. He moved himself soon after with the Bengal cavalry and some guns, which were followed at a later period by the whole of the infantry.

See Plan,
No. 5.

This succession of columns shewed a mastery in the art. The information of the Lion's march had been somewhat vague, and no sure intelligence of his real number could be obtained. The country, though flat, was covered with houses,

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gardens, and Shikargahs, and intersected with nullahs where thousands of men might be concealed in security. No extended view could be got any where, and it would have been imprudent to uncover the hospitals and magazines of the entrenched camp incautiously; the Lion might have marched against Stack with an overwhelming force, and yet have kept enough troops concealed in that close country to storm the camp in the absence of the field army. Indeed, from previous intelligence, it was known that five thousand men had been so concealed, and with that object at Khooserie; and there was no certain knowledge that they had been withdrawn.

The successive movements were all made with these considerations borne in mind. For first, the General judged that McMurdo's force would probably be by the Lion's spies greatly exaggerated; hence if he met the Belooch army on the road, his sudden appearance, his menacing movements, and his supposed strength, would necessarily cause a delay in its march against Stack. Sure intelligence of the Lion's position would thus be gained, and time given for the army to move up to McMurdo's assistance. But if, as happened, the road was clear, a very resolute officer and two hundred and fifty good horsemen would be added to Stack's force, and he then, having positive orders and greater strength, would push on more boldly. Meanwhile the head of the troops from Hyderabad could approach the Fullaillee, and the perilous distance between the separated bodies of the army be rapidly diminished, while the rear of one would still be near Hyderabad, and therefore able to succour the camp if attacked.

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Major Stack marched at eleven o'clock on the 22nd from Muttaree, and, as the General had anticipated, crossed the field of Meeanee without seeing a Belooch. He passed the Fullaillee, and then moved over a plain, having that nullah, which there took a sudden bend towards Hyderabad, close on his left. He was a good officer, but so wholly intent on effecting his junction with the General, the head of whose column was now only four or five miles from him, that he disregarded all other considerations and managed his operations imprudently.

The line of march gave the left flank, as above said, to the Fullaillee, especially near the village of Loonar; and the opposite bank was covered by a thick Shikargah, in which the Belooch army was lying perdue to fall upon his column. It would have been proper, therefore, to have placed the baggage on the reverse flank, and well in advance, keeping the infantry and guns together, and throwing out the cavalry towards the Fullaillee, to cover that flank. All this could have been easily effected, because he was on an open plain without any obstacle to pass, save one small nullah, which, running at right angles to the Fullaillee, crossed his line of march. Instead of this prudent arrangement, he pushed his guns in advance, followed them with his cavalry and infantry in one column, and left his baggage behind with such a lengthened train, that when the guns had passed the small nullah in front, the rear of the baggage had scarcely passed the Fullaillee at Meeanee. Thus straggling, the baggage approached the nullah again at Loonar, whereupon the Belooch matchlock men crossed in considerable numbers from the Shi-

Plan 5.

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kargah, and opened a fire on the rear guard. At the same time heavy masses were seen moving on the other side, some to support the attack on the baggage, others to fall on the flank of the troops; and one large body was evidently in motion to cross the head of the column, and cut it off from Hyderabad.

In this crisis, Captain McMurdo, being in the rear and having six of the Poonah horsemen in hand, charged the matchlock men, and beat back their skirmishers, sending at the same time to Major Stack for the aid of a troop to support the baggage guard. Meanwhile the matchlock men were reinforced, and renewed the attack on McMurdo; but that gallant young officer sustained their fire for three quarters of an hour, always shewing a menacing front, and keeping them in check until the horsemen he had asked for arrived. His intrepidity saved the baggage. When the troop he had asked for came at last, for some demur had occurred, he charged again and drove the Beloochis entirely across the Fullaillee. During these proceedings, Major Stack, apparently not comprehending the critical position of his baggage, had sent an officer forward to communicate with the General, who he knew could not be far off, and continued to march on with his column towards Hyderabad, the towers of which were in sight.

McMurdo observing this, and fearing for the baggage, desired Lieut. Moore, who commanded the troop of horse, to make the best front he could, and then galloped off to overtake Stack and get a reinforcement. The guns were, as before said, already over the small nullah in front, and it was with some difficulty he obtained leave to take two

See Plan 5.

back. These he placed in a flanking position, and

raked the enemy's troops, who were now gathering in great numbers, but after a few shots which did execution they retired across the Fullaillee. Then the action ceased at this point, and the Belooch masses, which were before menacing the head of the column, halted on seeing Stack, who was now sensible of his error, stop his march and take a position in order of battle. Jacob's cavalry soon afterwards came in sight, the baggage was then closed up, and the movement conducted in a more military manner; but the column did not reach the camp until midnight, exhausted with fatigue though it had suffered no loss.

Had the Beloochees been well commanded and resolute in their attack, the baggage must have been taken, and the troops forced to engage at a disadvantage. Major Stack should, on the first alarm, have formed his line of battle at once, and filed his baggage in rear of it to Hyderabad. He had more than five hundred cavalry, a battery of horse artillery, and eight hundred infantry, all good troops accustomed to fire under General Nott. Jacob, who had been sent forward early from Hyderabad, was almost in sight with five hundred of his irregular troops, all tried swordsmen; the General himself, following close with more cavalry and guns, was scarcely three miles behind Jacob; and in his rear the infantry of Meeanee were coming on. The combination was therefore complete and exact. The Lion was out-generalled, and Sir Charles Napier was most desirous to have found the Belooch army closely engaged with Stack's troops; for they were excellent, and all the three arms were combined. There was no fear of their being able to sustain the efforts of the Beloochs for

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the short time necessary to bring the army from Hyderabad into the action. Then the Lion, placed between two fires, would have been dangerously situated, and the chances would have been all in favour of the British.

The Beloochs, skilful enough in forming a plan of campaign and choosing a position to receive an attack, were not so capable of moving in large masses, and making sudden changes and combinations under fire. They would probably, therefore, have been thrown into confusion, and entirely defeated that day on the plain of Loonar. The vicissitudes of war are, however, proverbial, and the decisive combat for the possession of Scinde remained yet to be fought. Shere Mohamed was not to be despised; he had calculated that Stack's column could not reach Loonar before the 23rd, and made his arrangements accordingly; but that officer had received orders to make a forced march which brought him to the point of attack on the 22nd; it was thus the Lion's combinations had been baffled, happily perhaps for him, but his fate was only deferred.

Sir Charles Napier's difficulties were now beginning to disappear; and fortune having once commenced favouring him, poured forth her gifts by double handfuls. Ever since the battle of Meeanee he had played his game of war so cautiously, had so suddenly and entirely dropt from the heroic daring which he displayed in that fight, that to the enemy he appeared sunk in sloth and fear; the Belooch princes, especially Shere Mohamed, despised him, as indeed the General wished them to do. Elated with insolence and pride the Lion looked upon the ruin of the British as

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certain, never perceiving that the General's drift was to waste his treasure, and thus make the battle he designed to fight, when the time should come, a decisive one for the conquest of Scinde. This feeling spread beyond the Ameers: in the garden, and beyond the camp of Shere Mohamed. Numerous bands of armed Beloochs were traversing the country in various directions, making the most of the short time they expected the war to last, plundering and attacking all detachments, and spreading terror far and near. Thus on the same day that Major Stack was assailed at Loonar, a convoy of three hundred camels and military stores, coming up to the army from the coast, under an escort of one hundred Sepoys, was assailed near Tattah, and Lieutenant Gordon who commanded the party was wounded.

In another place, a Persian nobleman in the British interests, called Aga-Khan, wandering about Scinde with two hundred horsemen, it does not clearly appear why or wherefore, got engaged with some of these bands, and having lost the greatest part of his followers, fled with thirty for refuge to the entrenched camp on the Indus. Thither also came some few of Ali Moorad's Beloochs to serve with the British, and probably to observe the turn of the war, and give their master timely notice of events which might affect his future interests. The rest of his forces, that Ameer kept, to establish his authority as Rais, in upper Scinde, where many of the killedars of his cousins, especially those on the right bank of the Indus, expecting final success for Shere Mohamed and their own Ameers, refused obedience, and even gave battle to his officers, in some cases with success.

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These commotions were now drawing to a head, but the English General had succeeded in all his objects. He had secured his hospitals and magazines with entrenchments too strong for any Beloochee force to storm; he had completed the repairs of the fortress at Hyderabad; he had opened his communication with Sukkur; obtained six months' provisions, plenty of ammunition, and brought his principal reinforcements happily into camp. He had misled and baffled his principal enemy, filled him with false hopes and ill-founded confidence, wasted his treasure, rendered him more hateful to the Scindian people, and by enticing him close to the British position, saved his own soldiers long marches, and secured a field of battle close to their resources. That battle he was now ready for, and resolved to seek. The report of his spies, led him to believe that forty thousand men were in his front, yet he felt that he could win, that the fight would be decisive, and he was fiercely eager for the trial. The snake had cast his slough.

Even on the 23rd he would have gone forth to fight, but the extreme fatigue of Major Stack's troops, they had marched more than twenty miles and had been sixteen hours under arms, induced him to wait yet a day. The delay was happy. There were yet many reinforcements coming by water down the Indus from Sukkur, and from Bombay and Kurrachee up that river; the General longed for their arrival, yet was resolved not to wait for them. In this state of mind, being at breakfast on the morning of the 23rd with the principal officers of his army, and revolving in his thoughts the operations he designed for the next day, he suddenly exclaimed, "Now my luck would be great if I could

“get my other reinforcements either down from Sukkur, or up from Kurrachee and the mouth of the Indus; but that cannot be, they will not be here for a week, and I will not let the Lion bully me any longer, I will fight him to-morrow.” Scarcely had he spoken, when an officer looking out of the tent cried out, “there are boats coming up the river.” All persons rushed out, and, lo! the reinforcements from Bombay were entering the port behind the camp.

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“There are more boats—a fleet coming down the river,” cried out another officer, and in the direction he pointed to, a grove of masts were discerned towering above the flat bank of the Indus. These vessels brought the last of the reinforcements from Sukkur, and the simultaneous arrivals added to the army five hundred good recruits, great store of entrenching tools, and two eight inch howitzers, with, a very much needed, detachment of artillery officers and gunners: previous to this fortunate event there were only three artillery officers to command sixteen guns scantily manned.

The General instantly threw the recruits into the fortress of Hyderabad, and added the former garrison of old soldiers to his field force. Then he reformed his order of battle, and organized nineteen instead of sixteen guns for his batteries. These arrangements occupied him the whole day. When he had terminated them, at seven o'clock in the evening, he drew out the whole force in front of his camp, and proceeded to execute some evolutions, with the view of giving the leading officers a practical lesson in their several charges; for his brigades were commanded by Majors, and his regiments by Captains. On his staff there was

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scarcely a man above three and twenty years of age. Full of fire and courage and zeal and devotion they were, but wholly unpractised, until recently, in the duties of their stations: the chief commissary, Captain Blenkyns, was perhaps the only man who combined consummate experience with great ability.

The General would have put all his stores and sick in Hyderabad also, to increase his active force in the field; but though only four miles distant from the camp, he was still without the means of transporting them. He would not, however, lessen his number of fighting men by guarding the Ameers, for whom he had nothing but treachery to look for, and therefore in contempt of chivalry put them on board the steamers in safe custody. Then organizing his convalescents, Ali Moorad's people, and the Persian Aga-Khan's followers, in all about eight hundred men, as a garrison, he confided to them the defence of his camp, and thus set free all his best soldiers for the fight, which no consideration could now make him delay seeking.

He knew that fortune is capricious, that the enemy's numbers were enormously superior to his, and that a battle is of all events in war the most uncertain; but it was necessary to try it, and if he was defeated, he could, with a short retreat, find shelter in the fortress and his entrenched camp. There he could defy all the Beloochs of Scinde and Beloochistan united, until his steamers brought fresh reinforcements to restore the war. In fine, he had rigidly and wisely followed that rule which prescribes not only the union of all the strength that can be got together to fight a decisive action; but also, however promising the chances of success

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may be, such distrust of fortune as to be prepared for disaster and retreat while seeking victory. All that the principles of the art imposed, all that a subtle prudence dictated, he had executed; now the hour of battle being come, he was again the heroic warrior of Meeanee.

The field force had just formed its line on the evening of the 23rd, when the vakeels of Shere Mohamed again entered the camp and approached the General at the head of his troops. They came to spy, but to cover their real mission pretended to bear the Lion's last summons to surrender. The British army was to yield or be destroyed. Silently the General marched these arrogant ambassadors along the front of the haughty intrepid soldiers awaiting his orders; then turning, he told them to report what they saw. At this moment another vakeel entered the camp. He brought no new propositions, yet eagerly sought a conversation, thus disclosing his real object. The parade being over, the whole of the envoy spies followed the General to his tent, and with all the ingenuity they possessed endeavoured to learn his secret intentions. Their efforts continued until late at night, when, overwhelmed with fatigue, he dismissed them with the following letter to the Lion, and a recommendation to make haste, as he would be quickly with their master.

Appendix,
No. 7.

“ If the Ameer, Meer Shere Mohamed, chooses
 “ to meet me to-morrow as I march to attack him
 “ at the head of my army; and if he will surrender
 “ himself a prisoner without any other conditions
 “ than that his life shall be safe; I will receive
 “ him. If the Beloochee chiefs choose to accom-
 “ pany him, I will receive them on condition that

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“ they swear obedience to the Governor-General,
“ and then they may return to their villages with
“ their followers, and all their rights and posses-
“ sions shall be secured to them.”

This message sent, he lay down at two o'clock,
to rise again at four for the battle.

CHAPTER VI.

AT break of day, on the 24th of March, five thousand fighting men were under arms in front of the British camp; of these eleven hundred were cavalry; and there were nineteen guns of different calibre, five being horse-artillery. Two pieces were assigned for the defence of the camp, seventeen remained with the army, and the march commenced. The line of direction at first placed Hyderabad on the left, because in the night of the 22nd the spies had reported, that when Shere Mohamed failed against Stack, he returned to Ali-Ka-Tanda and Khooserie, and had remained in position at those places the whole of the 23rd; the movement was therefore conducted with a view to fall on him at Khooserie if he should be found there in strength. But in the night he had again changed his position, probably in consequence of the General's letter sent by the vakeels, and concentrated the whole army on his right at the village of Dubba, where he had before entrenched a position to receive the battle which he now saw was inevitable.

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Plan, No. 6.

When this became known by the scouts sent towards Khooserie, the line of march changed so as to pass diagonally in front of Hyderabad towards Dubba, which was about eight miles north-west of that city. In a compact mass the infantry and guns now moved, the cavalry carefully scouting ahead

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and on the flank ; for so thickly was the whole country covered with houses, gardens, Shikargahs, and nullahs, that fifty thousand men might be in position without being discovered at half a mile distance. Though the whole was a dead level, there was no view even where trees and gardens did not interfere, because the nullahs had generally high banks, over which a man on horseback could not look.

An hour or two previous to this, despatches had arrived from Lord Ellenborough, by the only post which had reached the army for two months, all the other dawks had been intercepted. With an eager hand the General broke the seals, and read the contents. They were the Governor-General's thanks to the army, expressed in noble terms for its past conduct and victory at Meeanee, accompanied by the assurance that honour and rewards would wait on that great battle. Prompt to seize and apply all moral resources for increasing the fiery courage of his men, the General caused the contents of the despatches to be made known to the troops. Then arose a shout of pride and exultation ; hope swelled the soldier's heart when he heard his honest services thus acknowledged, and found that favour was not to take the place of merit ; and again the shout arose for the leader who had not forgotten, in the exultation of success, to name the private as well as the officer. It was the cry of victory. The General felt it was so ; and marched with that conviction to the fight.

About ten miles had been passed over since the army left the camp, and still the exact situation of the enemy was unknown, when suddenly an emis-

sary came with information that the Lion was in position with his whole force at Dubba, only two miles on the left. The direction of the column was instantly changed. The irregular horsemen were sent forward at a rapid pace; the General put spurs to his horse, and in a quarter of an hour found himself on a plain in front of the whole Belooch army. Far and wide it stretched, the whole plain was swarming with cavalry and infantry, and yet he could not see above half the real numbers, nor get any distinct view of their order of battle. There were, however, more than twenty-five thousand fighting men with sword and shield and matchlock, and they had fifteen guns, eleven of which were in battery. Two lines of infantry were there entrenched, and behind them a heavy mass of cavalry in reserve. CHAP. VI.
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See Plan 6.

Their right rested on the Fullaillee, the bed of which, though generally dry, had at that point a large pond of mud protecting the flank, and beyond the nullah was a thick Shikargah, which prevented the position being turned except by a wide movement. Idem.

The front was covered by a nullah twenty feet wide, and eight feet deep, with the usual high banks, which were scarped so as to form a parapet. Behind this nullah the first line of infantry was posted, extending on a slightly waving trace for a mile, in a direction perpendicular to the Fullaillee. From thence it was prolonged another mile in the same line to a wood which was occupied, and appeared to be the left flank of the Belooch position. It was, however, not so. Another nullah, scarped like the first, went off at the end of the mile in a diagonal direction to the rear, forming See Plan Letter C.

See Plan, b. B.

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an obtuse angle to the front line, and there the left of the enemy's army was really posted; the wood only contained an isolated body thrown forward in an offensive and menacing manner.

Thus the true front of battle extended from the right, for one mile perpendicularly to the Fullaillee, presenting what may be termed the right wing and centre to an attack; but the left wing behind the second nullah was refused and masked from an attack, by that ditch, by the prolongation of the nullah covering the right and centre, and by the wood, which was again covered by several smaller nullahs. All the cavalry were behind the left in one great mass; and behind the right wing, close to the Fullaillee or Phullala, stood the village of Dubba or Naraja, which was filled with men and prepared for resistance by cuts and by loopholing of the houses. But this was not all the defence.

Between the first line of the right and centre and the village of Dubba was a second nullah, forty-two feet wide and seventeen feet deep, with its bank scarped and prepared like the first. Both of them had, however, one or two ramps for the purpose of advancing or retreating, which proved of singular service to the British in the fight.

This second and largest nullah, extended to where the smaller one, covering the left wing, went off diagonally, that is to say a mile, but no further; and it was planted thickly with the second line of the Belooch army. The Lion's guns also were ranged behind it, with exception of one which was placed on a mound to the right, between the two rising lines and raking the bed of the Phullala. The enemy had also scarped two smaller nullahs at

See Plan G.

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a considerable distance behind the left and centre of the position, apparently to protect his rear, or to give himself a new front if he should be turned. He had cleared the low jungle in front of his line of battle, and in this faultless position resolutely awaited the attack under the nominal command of the Lion.

But good a soldier as that Ameer may be called, a better and braver than he ruled the operations of the Belooch army. This was the African slave, Hoche Mohamed Seedee, who, if his first name be correct, was not unlikely the son of some Abyssinian attached to the French army in Egypt; his vigorous exhortations had urged the Ameers to war; his genius had principally directed the operations at Meeanee and since that battle; and now, true and loyal to his captive master Sobdar, who, though wicked and oppressive to others had been generous to him, the dark hero displayed a military skill worthy of a European General. He also stood with his brother Seedees the foremost in the fight, and when he could not conquer, died sword in hand without a backward step.

The march of the British force from Hyderabad, being diagonal to the front of the Belooch army, brought the head of the column, marching left in front, near the right of the enemy. The line was immediately formed on the same slant, the cavalry See Plan G. being drawn up on the wings, and the artillery in the intervals between the regiments: thus the right was somewhat refused, though not in so great a degree as the enemy's left.

. At first the General was very jealous of the wood, menacing his right. It was occupied and he could not tell whether by many or few; but his

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spies had positively assured him the enemy had selected five thousand of the best men, and ensconced them on some parts of the line, with design to rush out on the British whenever the latter should approach to attack. From the wood, therefore, he expected this counter attack, and therefore pushed the cavalry of his right wing in advance, partly to cover his flank, partly to make the enemy shew his order of battle more clearly. His own position was meanwhile delicate and dangerous. The plain into which he had marched was not very large, and the Fullaillee, making a sudden bend, wound round his rear, while on all other points of the circuit, save the gorge by which he entered, was a network of nullahs, amidst which his compact column, opposed to the multitude of Beloochs, seemed at first like a wild beast within the closing circle of an eastern hunt. Yet the bend of the Fullaillee in his rear was no disadvantage; being quite dry there, it furnished a reserved line of defence.

The English General could not see the whole of the Belooch position. He could make out, indeed, that notwithstanding their deep method of drawing up their swordsmen, they outflanked him by more than half a mile on his right, and still had their cavalry in reserve. But the double lines and nullahs containing their centre and right, he could not see; neither could he make out that Dubba was occupied; it appeared empty. He could not examine their line closely without crossing the Fullaillee, and riding through the Shikargah on the other side; but here, as at Meeanee, he feared to give time for reflection and comparison of numbers, lest doubt should follow

comparison, and the fire he had so recently kindled by reading Lord Ellenborough's despatches go out. His were not national troops. The European stood by the docile Sepoy of Bombay, the lean spare Marhatta marched with the large limbed proud high caste men of Bengal; the regular cavalry charged with the wild horsemen; the fanatic Mohametan levelled his musket between the Christian and the Idolator. All were, indeed, bound together by the tie of discipline; but better still for the moment was the military enthusiasm created by their General, and he could not afford to let the spirit, which then animated alike, the strong fierce Irishmen of the 22nd, and the swarthy Sepoys of Hindostan, abate by delay.

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When the line was first formed, the left was so much advanced, that the Belooch artillery sent its bullets into the ranks; several men were killed, and one shot almost grazed the General's face; the range was however long, and the flight of the balls betrayed the great elevation of the guns; whereupon he threw back that wing, and thus placed his men in security, while he took measures to make out the enemy's position more certainly ere he formed his own order of attack. But now the engineer Waddington, assisted by Lieutenants Brown and Hill, with the cool intrepidity of men who laughed at danger in the pursuit of honour, rode close up to the centre of the Beloochees' position, and along the front to the junction of the centre with the left, under a sharp fire of matchlocks. They thus forced the enemy to shew his first line for two-thirds of its extent; yet still the second nullah could not be seen, nor was the wood made to speak plainly. Several of

See Plan G.

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the ramps for passing the nullah were, however, discovered, and their places indicated for the artillery by those intrepid officers.

While this daring exploit was being performed, Sir C. Napier observed a number of Beloochs, troubled as he thought by the sudden extension of the imposing British line in their front, hurrying from their left towards their right, and towards the village of Dubba. Now the difficulty of discovering the Lion's troops ensconced in the double nullahs was so great, that the General thought they had neglected to occupy that ground and the village, for he could not see a man of their right, from the Fullaillee to a particular point in the centre.*

* That
point is
marked A
in Plan G.

Their present hurrying towards those points of the position he judged therefore to be a confused movement to repair this error. Acting at once on this opinion, and desirous to profit from the effect which the opening of the British line of battle must have produced, he put his troops in motion to attack; preserving here, as at Meeanee, the echelon order, and hoping by his promptness to gain not only the nullah at its junction with the Fullaillee, but to pass it and seize the village of Dubba also, before the Beloochs could arrive there in force. This view of the Belooch's operations proved erroneous, but it was an error that could hardly be avoided without a loss of time which would have been a greater error; and the movement, though founded on a mistake, was one which could scarcely have been amended with better knowledge.

But while thus rapid in his blow, he did not fail to combine his order of battle so as to meet all the contingencies, which he foresaw might happen. The wood was still the object of his peculiar

jealousy ; it was evidently occupied, and the close manner in which the troops there concealed their numbers, convinced him they were the select division appointed to break out upon his flank. From the wood as from Pandora's box all evil might come. Wherefore he placed the Scindian horsemen and the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the whole under the command of Major Stack, in advance on that side, with orders to watch the wood, and to oppose whatever came out. This he thought would give him time, if he was so assailed before he could pass the nullah himself in attack, to throw back all the infantry on the right of the 22nd into a new position, which he had marked in his mind between the Fullaillee and the village and Shikargah of Chilgheree. His design was to fight on the defensive there, with the Sepoys and cavalry of the right wing, while with the 22nd, the horse artillery and the cavalry of the left wing, he continued his own attack on the enemy's right.

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See Plan 6.

The troops had come in sight of the Ameer's army before eight o'clock, and at nine o'clock the battle was begun in the following manner.

Leslie's horse-artillery, pushing beyond the infantry, made diagonally for the Belooch's extreme right, where the nullah, covering their front, fell into the Fullaillee. This advance soon partially uncovered their first line of battle, from the junction of the centre with the right wing, to its junction with the left wing ; and it entirely uncovered the left wing, which was raked in its whole length by these guns. The English battery, though halting and firing at intervals, still continued rapidly to gain the extremity of the right flank, that being given as the point of attack ; and the other guns,

See Plan
from A to
b and from
b to B.

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Sir Charles
Napier's
despatch.

following in succession of batteries, likewise obtained raking positions, crossing their fire with the horse artillery, so that the bullets tore the thick masses of the enemy's infantry in a terrible manner. It was at this time that Lieut. Smith, thinking of his duty and not of his life, with desperate valour rode foremost and alone to the bank of the first nullah, and ascended it. He sought for a place where his guns could pass, he found death! the nullah was filled with Beloochees, and "*there the hero fell.*"

Meanwhile the whole body of infantry was in march, the 22nd regiment being on the left led, and a diagonal line was thus presented to the enemy's fire. The cavalry of the left wing, consisting of the Bengal and Poonah horse, moved in columns close to the bed of the Fullaillee, supporting Leslie's guns and ready to meet any rush the Beloochs might make from their position.

Soon it was discovered that the nullah in front and the village beyond, had not been neglected by the Seedee, Hoche; that brave man had filled them with men, and now at the head of his brother Seedees, awaited this attack in the foremost ranks on the right. Their matchlocks and the single gun on the hillock played with incessant activity, and the march of the 22nd was marked by carnage; half the light company went down beneath the fire from the first nullah; and behind was the second and greater ditch, more strongly lined with warriors, while the village beyond seemed suddenly alive with men whose matchlocks could reach the advancing line.

Now Sir C. Napier felt that he had not judged the enemy's skill rightly, and that the rush of men

towards the village and their right wing had been, not to occupy but to strengthen that flank when they saw it menaced by the disposition of the British order of battle. But there was no time, no means to alter the mode of attack, and, as generally happens even with the greatest captains, courage was required to repair the error of arrangements.

With the foremost of the assailants rode the General, meaning himself to lead the charge over the bank, when suddenly from the right came a horseman at full gallop to tell him all the cavalry of that wing was charging. Hearing this he concluded that the wood, as he had anticipated, was suddenly vomiting forth all its ambushed warriors, and that his right was turned. Wherefore, desiring Major Poole of the 22nd to lead the attack on the nullah, he went at full speed himself to the right, to arrange the new line of battle he had before revolved in his mind. The horseman's report was correct. The whole of the cavalry of the right wing was madly charging across the minor nullahs covering the enemy's left, not because the Beloochs from the wood had moved, but that seeing numbers of the enemy still hurrying in apparent confusion towards the centre, Major Stack concluded it to be a panic, and went headlong down with all his gallant horsemen upon their left wing. He thus uncovered the flank of the line of battle, and exposed the whole army to a defeat, if the wood had really been filled with the selected division of Beloochs appointed for the counter stroke designed by the Seedee Hoche Mohamed.

It was a great error, but a grand and stirring one. It could not be remedied. The whole body of cavalry was at full speed, clearing the nullahs without a check, the riders' spurs deep in their

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horses' sides, their different war cries pealing high and clear, their swords whirling above their heads in gleaming circles; there was the fiery Jacob and the terrible FitzGerald careering alike in the same path of error, while the splendid troopers of the 3rd cavalry, and the red turbans of the wild horsemen of Scinde speeding through smoke and dust, streamed like meteors behind them.

For a moment the General looked at the scene, at first with anger, then with admiration, and then casting his eyes towards the wood, and seeing no indications of any rush from there, while the redoubling thunder of his own artillery called him to the left, he turned at once, and trusting all to fortune and to courage, went back with such speed that he reached the 22nd just as Major Poole, who commanded the brigade, was on the point of storming the first nullah. Riding straight into the foremost ranks he made his presence known by the same clear high pitched cry to charge, which had sent those fiery soldiers headlong to the fight at Meeanee; and here, although the first obstacle and danger to be encountered was even more formidable than the storming the bank of the Fullaillee in that memorable battle, where the whole line had staggered before the swarming swordsmen, no check occurred. There was no hesitation to abate the furious charge. The gallant Lieut. Coote first mounted the bank, seized a Belooch standard, and waved it in triumph while he reeled along the narrow edge with a deep wound in his side. Then with a crashing shout the soldiers leaped into the midst of the swordsmen, who were no sluggards to deal with, for there fought the black hero Hoche and his brother Seedees; and there they fell.

The murderous fire of the British guns and musketry was dreadful, and the bayonet clashing with the sword bore back the bravest and strongest or levelled them in the dust, until the struggling warriors were forced into the second and deepest nullah, where with desperate fury the battle was renewed, as if the previous struggle had been as nothing. But still with conquering strength, and wasting fire, and piercing steel, the 22nd forced its bloody way through the dense masses, supported by the Sepoys of the 25th, who striving on its right kept pace and stroke in this terrible conflict. Now the victorious troops passed the second nullah, and poured with undiminished fury on the the rear of the retreating Beloochs, until they reached the village of Dubba, where the Lugharees and Nizamanees, two of the most warlike tribes of Scinde were well entrenched in the houses, and once more contended for the victory. The two regiments, thus opposed, lapped round the nearest point of the houses, and meanwhile the cavalry of the left wing were directed to turn the village. This they effected, partly by the bed of the Fullaillee, partly across the nullahs; then galloping round the left of Dubba they cut it off, and got a view of the plain beyond, where the cavalry of the right wing were now seen driving the Beloochs, horsemen and footmen before them in scattered bands.

Here also came Leslie's horse-artillery, which by the aid of Henderson's sappers, who had worked slopes down the bank in the midst of the fire, passed the nullahs and charged with the cavalry between the village and the Fullaillec. Dubba, thus cut off, was left to the infantry, and soon surrounded; for the other regiments of the line

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seeing the 22nd and the 25th across both nullahs on the left, Stack's cavalry victorious on the right, and the enemy immediately on their own front, cruelly pounded by the guns, which had silenced the Belooch artillery and never ceased to ply their masses of infantry with sweeping discharges; seeing all this, the regiments rushed vehemently forward, crossed the nullahs, and bringing up their right shoulders continued the circle from the position of the 25th, lapping further round the village. In this charge the 21st Sepoys stabbed every Belooch they came up with, whole or wounded, calling out Innes! Innes! at every stroke of death they dealt. Thus hundreds died for the crime of the villain Shahdad.

This rush put the whole line into some confusion at first, and at that moment a Belooch magazine exploded close to the General while he was restoring order; nearly all around him were killed and wounded; he alone, though his clothes were singed and a bullet broke the sword in his hand, remained unhurt. The enemy, fighting very hardly and strongly, were finally driven from the village, and those who survived joined the other beaten and retreating masses; there was, however, no such thing as flight amongst the warriors on foot, though the horsemen did not shew the same courage. Some of the Beloochs went off to the desert with the Lion; the greater part made for the Indus, designing to cross that river and take refuge on the right bank; but the victorious cavalry of the right turned them from the cultivated districts, and drove them in heaps towards the waste.

The Bengal and Poonah horse, led by Major Storey and Captain Tait, under the immediate

command of the General, who had forced his way through Dubba at the head of the infantry, now followed the retreating masses of the right, putting them to the sword for several miles; yet not without loss to themselves; the brave Captain Garrett of the Bengal horse and others fell; the Belooch swordsman is at all times dangerous.

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The Scinde horsemen pursued on a parallel line more to the right; and there Jacob and Delemain actually got sight of Shere Mohamed's elephant and camel, on one of which he was retreating: in a few moments they would have had him, dead or alive, when Colonel Pattle, second in command, a brave and zealous old man, rode up, but thinking perhaps the dispersion of the cavalry too great, stopped the pursuit. It was an error, the third great error of the day. The two first were however happy errors, this was a misfortune: the Lion escaped to renew the war.

When the General returned with the cavalry of the left wing from the pursuit, the whole of the infantry met him with loud cheers, thus proclaiming their admiration of his conduct as a commander in this battle, which lasted three hours and was very bloody. Hoche and three other chieftains, two of them Talpoorees, the other a Murree, fell on the field. The victors lost two hundred and seventy men and officers, of which number one hundred and forty-seven were of the 22nd regiment. The vanquished lost about five thousand, and they would have suffered still more but for the untimely halt of the cavalry on the right. Eight hundred bodies were lying in the nullahs and at Dubba; but all the villages and lanes beyond the latter place were so filled with dead and dying, that to avoid them

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the army was forced to encamp on the ground it occupied before the action commenced. All the fallen Beloochs were of mature age, grim-visaged men of athletic forms: the carcass of a youth was not to be found.

Two thousand archers were on the march to join the Lion, but they were too late for the fight and dispersed when they heard of the defeat, so that no judgment could be made of their value in a battle. The weapon seems however to be in use. Shere Mohamed's own bows of painted horn, were afterwards taken at Meerpoor, and a Belooch archer, of Ali Moorad's force, attended the General as an orderly during the battle, but he gave no specimen of his skill. Seventeen standards, and fifteen guns, eleven taken on the field and four the next day, were the trophies of the fight, and, contrary to all expectation, there were thirteen wounded prisoners; three only had been found alive at Meeanee, and this slight approach to mildness gave the General infinite satisfaction, for the ferocity on both sides had pained him deeply: the Beloochs never asked for quarter, and never gave it; and it was in vain to ask the British troops who received no mercy to shew compassion.

In this battle, as at Meeanee, surprising feats of personal prowess were displayed. Four or five fell beneath the iron hand of young FitzGerald, whose matchless strength renders the wildest tales of chivalry almost credible. And again the hardy vigour of McMurdo was displayed in three successive combats, hand to hand, with resolute Belooch champions, who had the advantage of shields to aid their swordmanship. Two he slew off hand in succession, but the third, with an up-

ward cut, sheered through his flesh, from the belly to the shoulder, and the sharp well-driven sword would have gone through the ribs also to the viscera, if McMurdo's blow had not been the quickest: falling on the Belooch's head, it split the skull to the brows, and so took away half the force of the counter-stroke, which nevertheless gave a terrible wound.

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During the fight at the village of Dubba, Sir C. Napier saw a chief coming towards him in retreat, yet slowly and with that deliberate stride, that rolling gait and fierce look of defiance which all those intrepid fatalists displayed in both battles. Close he came, as if ready to spring forward in attack; the General drew a pistol, and covered him at the distance of a yard or two; but then remembering that at Meeanee, when he was in the midst of the Belooch warriors for several minutes no hand had been raised against him, he would not fire and let the chief pass on: it was a fruitless clemency, a Sepoy of the 21st followed and shot him, with that cry of blood, Innes! Innes!

This memorable battle, fought thirty-five days after Meeanee, and within a few miles of that field, bears three names, Dubba, Naraja, and Hyderabad. The first from the village, the second from the plain, the third from the city near which it was fought. The last is the one by which it must be known, being that which is inscribed on the colours and medals of the gallant soldiers by whom it was won.

Prompt as the English General had been to fight this action, after receiving his reinforcements, he was now still more prompt to render it a decisive one. His first care was to gather the wounded men, and

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make arrangements for transporting them to Hyderabad ; this and the reorganization of his army for forced movements in advance, together with the writing of his despatches, took about eight hours. Then, having ascertained that the retreat of the Belooch army was principally towards Meerpoor, he put his troops in march again, resolute to win all that fortune would offer to his energy and bravery.

The dreadful heat was augmenting each day ; the desert was before him ; the Indus was on the rise behind him ; the Lion had still a force of nearly four to one, if he could collect his dispersed troops ; and he had two fortified towns, Meerpoor and Omercote to receive and cover his beaten army, and enable him to prolong the campaign. The mercury stood at 110° on the day of the battle ; the troops had marched twelve miles to find the enemy ; they had fought for three or four hours afterwards ; they had only rested eight hours, if that could be called rest, when they had to cook, and gather their wounded, and receive fresh ammunition in the time. But all these things were disregarded by the General, when he saw the enthusiasm of his officers and soldiers, who met him with cheers wherever he moved. They were disregarded also because he well knew the importance of the occasion, and called to mind Cæsar's golden rule of war, "That nothing is done while any thing remains to be done." Nor was his confidence in his men betrayed by weakness of body or mind ; notwithstanding their previous fatigues and the withering heat, they made more than twenty miles in advance before they halted. During this march they passed through two strongly entrenched positions which the Lion had prepared to fall back upon ; but he could not gather

men enough in time to occupy them. This was the first reward of the British energy : the next day the Poonah horse were at the gates of Meerpoor, forty miles from the field of battle.

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Thus pressed, the Lion abandoned his capital, and carrying with him his treasure and his family, fled through the desert to Omercote. The gates of Meerpoor were immediately opened by the people who being all Hindoos and Scindians, welcomed the vanquishers of the Beloochees as deliverers. It was strongly fortified and full of stores. Had it been defended, the hot season being then at hand and the Indus on the rise, it would have been scarcely possible to besiege it, and very difficult to find means for an escalade, which would have been moreover a desperate enterprise against superior numbers of Beloochs. The chance of success by blowing in the gates and storming would have been small ; and a failure in such an attempt, or in an escalade, must have been ruinous to so weak an army. The Lion would then have quickly gathered a new force, and all the hill tribes, and those of the plain on the right bank of the Indus, would have taken arms ; and they could still produce sixty thousand fighting men. In the Delta also, which was the peculiar Ameeree of Shere Mohamed, swampy, unhealthy, intricate, and having many forts, a partisan warfare by Belooch robbers was already commenced, interrupting the communication with the mouths of the Indus. It would, if any check had been given to the British army, have gained such a head, that more than one campaign and twice five thousand men would have been required to put it down. But Hoche Mohamed was dead, and happily the Lion, though a stout warrior, was not equal to the crisis. Meer-

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poor therefore was a second gift of fortune to reward the English General's energy.

Abashed by the rapidity and vigour of his opponent, Shere Mohamed fled with diminishing forces in all haste to Omercote; but swift as his flight was, his pursuers were not far behind. The General, even while taking possession of Meerpoor, had laid Jacob with the Scinde horsemen and the camel battery under Captain Whitley on his traces, and he supported them with the 25th Sepoy infantry under Major Woodburn. He remained himself at Meerpoor with the rest of the forces brought forward in these operations; not from fatigue of body, though he had endured much, nor any relaxation of spirit, but from that cautious skill which characterised all his operations. For the desert line of march upon Omercote furnished but little water, and he pushed on his troops at first only by small bodies and in succession, rather that he might not affront fortune, than from any strong hope of gaining the place at once, which he knew to be well fortified and well stored.

Meanwhile he had to fear the inundation of the Indus in his rear, and therefore kept the main body of his army in a central position, under his own immediate command, that he might regain Hyderabad with the artillery if the waters continued to rise; or reinforce his people before Omercote if the Indus kept down. Hourly he received reports that the river was swelling rapidly, and therefore he maintained his central position within easy distances of Hyderabad and Omercote, that he might, according to circumstances, quickly recall his troops from the desert, or move forward and in person attempt the storming of the last town.

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But to understand all the difficulty and nicety of this affair, it must be remembered that nearly the whole of Scinde is a dead flat; all the cultivated districts near the Indus and its branches are a net-work of nullahs, some artificial, the greater part natural. These water-courses are from six inches to sixty feet deep, broad in proportion, and when the Indus overflows they become streams, rivulets, and rivers; most of them impassable for guns and cavalry, and many impassable for infantry without bridges. On the other hand Omercote was well fortified, having eleven guns mounted, and a separate garrison besides the men carried there by the Lion in his flight from Meerpoor. It was however of great importance to take Omercote, and the English General was willing to make every effort to succeed there as he had done at Meerpoor; yet he trusted more to the moral effect of his victory and his subsequent rapidity, than to his physical means; and to increase the former wrote thus to the Lion four days after the fight.

“Ameer, I offer to you the same terms as before the battle; the same terms as those given to the other Ameer; what those terms will be I cannot tell you, because I have not yet received the orders of the Governor-General, but I am sure he will treat them generously; however, I, being his servant, cannot tell what the orders of my master may be. I promise to you your life, and that your family of women shall be respected as those of the other Ameer have been. I advise you to surrender. There is no dishonour in being defeated in battle. To try and defend Omercote is foolishness. I can batter it down in a day, and destroy all within it.”

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This letter was sent by a camel rider ; but though the General expected some benefit from it, he was not so elated as to risk the danger of the inundation in his rear for the uncertain chance of getting the town; wherefore, though he menaced the place with his irregular cavalry and camel battery, the portion of his army most capable of moving in the desert, he supported them very cautiously with his infantry and the rest of his artillery. His army thus placed in succession at different posts, was equally ready to close up and assault Omercote, or to fall back and escape the inundation.

Reports soon arrived from both sides. "The river was rising before its time and with unusual rapidity." "Omercote would not open its gates." Then orders were issued for a retreat. Nevertheless all hope of winning the city of the desert was not resigned. Lord Ellenborough, as we have seen, had two months before extended the General's independent command to the troops of the Bombay Presidency quartered in Cutch. He now exercised that authority, sending instructions to the chief officer at Deesa, to move through the desert from that side against Omercote; and to aid this movement he projected a new combination to be arranged at Hyderabad.

Meanwhile the order to retreat reached Captain Whitlie in the desert, twenty miles from Omercote, and at the same time that officer heard the Ameer had abandoned the town. In this perplexing situation he thought the best course would be to remain where he was until he could get fresh instructions; and there was in his camp a young man, Lieutenant Brown, ready and able to go for those instructions with the necessary speed. He

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had before distinguished himself ; and now, he rode the forty miles to Meerpoor without a stop, and came back in the same manner bringing instructions to take the place ; thus travelling on horseback without any previous preparation or delay eighty miles of desert under a sun whose beams fell like flakes of fire, for the mercury stood above 130°. As he passed the supporting Sepoy troops on his return he gave them orders to advance, and on the 4th of April the inhabitants of Omercote opened the gates, the garrison retiring into a small interior fort. The people here also as at Meerpoor welcomed the British.

Major Woodburn who had brought up the 25th Sepoys by forced marches, under great difficulties, now placed the guns in battery against the fort, and acting with intelligence and vigour soon caused the garrison to surrender, on promise of life being spared, Omercote was thus reduced and garrisoned by a British detachment, just ten days after the battle, though one hundred miles distant and in the heart of the desert ! This was the third advantage taken at fortune's hands by the English General ; and it was a great one. The desert was no longer a place of refuge for the Beloochs ; the Lion who had fled northward, with only a few followers, might wander there for a time ; he might even collect new forces, but he could not base a new warfare on its sands, and must come sooner or later for water and provisions to the cultivated districts, where he would be met by the British troops.

These operations could not have been successfully conducted without astonishing exertions and resolution, which finely illustrated the character of the troops, and displayed the spirit which their

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General had awakened in them. On one of those long marches, which were almost continual, the 25th Sepoys, being nearly maddened by thirst and heat, saw one of their water-carriers approaching with full skins of water; they rushed towards him in crowds, tearing away the skins and struggling together, with loud cries of Water! water! At that moment, some half-dozen straggling soldiers of the 22nd came up, apparently exhausted, and asked for some. At once the generous Indians withheld their hands from the skins, forgot their own sufferings, and gave the fainting Europeans to drink; then they all moved on, the Sepoys carrying the 22nd men's muskets for them, patting them on the shoulders, and encouraging them to hold out. It was in vain, they did so for a short time but soon fell. It was then discovered that these noble fellows were all wounded, some deeply, but thinking there was to be another fight, they had concealed their hurts, and forced nature to sustain the loss of blood, the pain of wounds, the burning sun, the long marches, and the sandy desert, that their last moments might be given to their country on another field of battle! Their names have been recorded by their grateful General; but what will that avail them, when that General himself has been reviled and calumniated for leading them to battle at all; and Lord Ellenborough has been driven from power for honouring and protecting such soldiers!

Appendix
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Section 3.

The officers were worthy of the men and of the commander. It was a grand and touching spectacle to see the poor soldiers displaying such heroism, and the young officers, full of fire and intelligence, gathering about their veteran leader,

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offering to him in service, that hardihood which no fatigue could break down, that resolution which no danger could appal, that nervous strength and courage in battle before which no enemy could stand; yet acknowledging none amongst them endured more labour of body and mind than he their aged chief. For his victories were not gained lightly; nor was his the generalship that required hundreds of camels from the public service to carry his personal baggage; he did not direct the marches from a luxurious palanquin, appearing only when the battle was commenced. Five camels, purchased at his own cost, carried all the baggage and records of his head-quarters; and all day the soldiers saw him on horseback engaged with field objects, while his staff knew that far in the night he was engaged in the administrative duties. Seldom did he sleep more than five hours. But none could know the extent of deep and painful meditation, which amidst all this activity and labour, enabled him to judge clearly of affairs, and organize with so much simplicity, the means of winning those glorious battles and conquering so great a kingdom.

When Woodburn's success was known, orders were immediately sent by camel riders across the desert to stop the march of the troops from Cutch; a small garrison was placed in Omercote, and the army was again concentrated at Meerpoor. The tide of good fortune continued to rise. The General had, upon the information of the natives, originally calculated that the inundation of the Indus would give him until the 15th of April for his operations in the desert; and on that chance he had pushed so boldly against Omercote. A sudden unexpected and most rapid rise in the river, suspended, as we

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have seen, the attack on that fortress, and induced him to order a retreat ; it was even feared that the guns of the army must be left in Meerpoor until means could be prepared to bridge the nullahs, which were filling fast. But when Lieut. Brown arrived, the river had begun to fall as rapidly as it had before swelled, and such false indications of the periodical overflows are not uncommon. Hence there was no difficulty in reaching Hyderabad without loss ; the army marched there complete. On the 8th, the General was in the palace of the Ameers, master of Scinde, having in sixteen days, with five thousand men, defeated more than twenty-five thousand in battle, captured two great fortresses, and marched two hundred miles under a Scindian sun.

CHAPTER VII.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, as prompt and free to honour and reward, as he had been to give his confidence and support to his Generals, now appointed Sir Charles Napier Governor of Scinde, with authority independent of the Presidencies, reporting and responsible only to the Governor-General. He directed him to proclaim the abolition of slavery, but left him a wide discretion as to the mode in which that and other leading instructions were to be effected. Nor was his good-will restricted, as is but too often the case, to the commander alone; he also conferred honours and rewards, personal as well as regimental, upon the troops, thanking them with expressions of deep feeling, and evincing a profound and grateful admiration of their matchless courage and services.

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“The army of Scinde,” he said, “has twice beaten the bravest enemy in Asia, under circumstances which would equally have obtained for it the victory over the best troops in Europe.”

“The Governor-General regards with delight the new proofs which the army has given of its pre-eminent qualities in the field, and of its desire to mitigate the necessary calamities of war by mercy to the vanquished.”

“The ordinary expression of thanks would ill convey the extent of the debt of gratitude which

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the Governor-General feels to be due to his Excellency Major-General Sir C. Napier, on the part of the Government, the army, and the people of Hindostan."

"To have punished the treachery of protected Princes; to have liberated a nation from its oppressors; to have added a province, fertile as Egypt, to the British empire; and to have effected these great objects by actions in war unsurpassed in brilliancy, whereof a grateful army assigns the success to the ability and valour of its general; these are not ordinary achievements, nor can the ordinary language of praise convey their reward."

Thus speaking to, and of, brave men in humble life, Lord Ellenborough shewed that with the head of a statesman he had the heart of a soldier, and knew its beat.

The captive Ameers, eleven in number, including three of their sons, were, by the Governor-General's orders, transferred to Bombay; the murderer Shahdad was separately and more strictly confined, a slight punishment for his wicked actions and the death of Captain Innes. And it was now that the women proved how inhuman and brutal all the Ameers were in their domestic habits. Not one of the females found in the Zenanas would accompany them into captivity, though that captivity was neither rigorous nor devoid of luxury and state: all, abhorring their former masters, desired to rejoin their families. The brass-wire lash of Nusseer's whip, said to be mild in comparison with the brutal punishments of the other Ameers, was not forgotten by the women, and with one accord they demanded and obtained leave to return to the homes of their childhood, from whence they had

been formerly torn. It is impossible to conceive a more entire and destructive condemnation of those "fallen princes" and their "patriarchal rule," for the condition of Scindian women in their own families, is far from being agreeable or even safe; and the soldier was then abroad.

By the departure of these vile and cruel tyrants, for whose fall the Beloochs expressed no sorrow, while all the Scindians and Hindoos openly rejoiced, Sir Charles Napier was left free to act as he thought fitting, in civil as well as military matters, which had not been the case until this final decision of the general government as to the Ameers was made known. With respect to the war, the principal subject of anxiety was the course of the Lion's operations. He had fled from Omercote by the desert northward; but Emaum Ghur having been, with a far reaching policy, previously destroyed by the English General, no rallying point in the waste remained nearer than Shah Ghur, on the frontier of Jessulmere, for the fugitive Ameer. His relation, Ali Mohamed, the son of Roostum, still maintained indeed a small force at Shah Ghur, and from thence menaced hostilities against his uncle, Ali Moorad; but this last-named chief had an army, and the General also placed British troops on the desert side of Roree, with orders to support him against Ali Mohamed, and to intercept the Lion if he fled to that quarter. Meanwhile the people of the country loudly expressed their satisfaction at the change of masters, and several great chiefs professed submission. They were not all treated alike.

Wullah Chandia, whose tribe was the most powerful but one on the right bank of the Indus, offered on the very day Omercote surrendered, to

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make his salaam. This Chief had led ten thousand warriors to the field from their dwellings in the hills beyond Shikarpore, and they were close in rear of the British on the day of Meeanee though too late for the battle. Being a less lawless people than their neighbours, the Bhoogties and Doomkies, and at feud with them, the General was anxious to conciliate the old chieftain, and replied thus :—

“ I honour you for your obedience to the Ameers
“ of Hyderabad, but God has decreed that they are
“ to rule Scinde no more. The British Government
“ is now master, serve it faithfully as you have done
“ the Ameers, and honour and respect will be shewn
“ to you. But mind what I say, keep your own
“ side of the river. Woe to the mountain tribes
“ that cross the Indus.”

Relying on this message, the Chandian leader went to Ali Moorad, but that Ameer, unable from his barbarian habits to comprehend a generous proceeding towards so powerful an enemy, sent the aged chief a prisoner to Hyderabad. Sir Charles Napier, indignant at this breach of faith, rebuked Ali Moorad sharply, set the Chandian free, and restored to him his arms, making him also a present. Touched by this honourable treatment more than he had been angered by the insult, Wullah swore that he would always be true to the British Government, and he has been so without fault or failure.

Meer Mohamed, one of the Talpoor Sirdars, who had plundered Jerruck before the battle of Hyderabad also demanded terms, but the General's reply to him run thus :—

“ If you will give back to Aga Khan the plunder
“ you took from Jerruck, and come in and make

“ your salaam to me, I will pardon you, and be your friend, and your jagheers shall be respected.”

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To the Jam of the Jokeas, whose conduct had been disloyal and insolent, he wrote menacingly. That powerful chief, scarcely acknowledged the supremacy of the Ameers though he was their feudatory. He was now eighty years of age, but of a strong body and vigorous mind, had great reputation as a predatory leader and was, in fine, a superb robber! His country being partly on the plains westward of the Delta, partly in the lower ridges of the Hala mountains, was very strong. During the warfare of the Ameers he had menaced Kurrachee, and indeed blockaded the entrenched camp there, though it was occupied by two thousand fighting men having a fine field battery, and one of the regiments was the British 28th! From this it may be known, that if Sir Charles Napier brought his army triumphantly through all dangers, it was by the exercise of unusual sagacity and vigour, amidst embarrassments and looming obstacles which would have overwhelmed an inferior man. For here, though the Jam had really not more than seven hundred warriors in front of Kurrachee, so critical and menacing did affairs seem to Colonel Boileau who commanded there, that he suffered the arrogant old chief to invest his camp, until the battle of Meeanee taught the barbarian who was the master of Scinde. Then, only half-submissive, he asked protection indeed for some ladies of his family who had fallen into the conqueror's power; but though it was instantly accorded, he still kept his menacing position at Kurrachee until after the battle of Hyderabad.

Incensed at this, and that he should have been

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allowed to insult, by his petty warfare, a British force greater than that which strewed the plains of Meeanee with carcasses, the General ordered Boileau to make a sally, whereupon the Jam fled, and Sir C. Napier sent him the following missive :—

“ You have received the money of the British for
“ taking charge of the dawk ; you have betrayed
“ your trust, and stopped the dawks ; and you have
“ also attacked the troops. All this I forgive you,
“ because the Ameers were here, and they were
“ your old masters. But the Ameers are now
“ gone from Scinde for ever. They defied the Bri-
“ tish power, and have paid the penalty for so doing.
“ I, as the Governor of Scinde, am now your im-
“ mediate master. If you come in and make your
“ salaam, and promise fidelity to the British Go-
“ vernment, I will restore to you your lands and
“ former privileges, and the superintendance of the
“ dawks. If you refuse, I will wait till the hot
“ weather is gone past, and then I will carry fire and
“ sword into your territories, and drive you and all
“ belonging to you into the mountains ; and if I
“ catch you I will hang you as a rebel. You have
“ now your choice. Choose !”

The Jam yielded, but his barbarian pride would not bend ; he entered the camp at the head of his armed followers, and pushed even into Colonel Boileau's room, with six of his grim attendants, displaying the insolent airs of a conqueror, rather than the submissive demeanor of a man who was to appease the just anger of a victorious General. He, however, discovered his error, when a single officer brought the following message and delivered it to him in his stronghold.

“ Come here instantly. Come alone and make

“ your submission, or I will in a week tear you from
 “ the midst of your tribe and hang you.”

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Had he hesitated, the General would have been upon him within the time specified, with a select body of cavalry and guns which he held ready, waiting for the answer. There was however no need for action, the Jam obeyed, and with such dread, as to entreat the British agent at Kurrachee, who he had before oppressed with his insolence, to accompany him as a mediator and intercessor: thus acting he was pardoned and restored to his dignity. The lesson was not lost upon others. Many chieftains, who were fugitives, or in arms under the Lion's standard, sent offers of submission; and they were met with such a frank and open policy, that the fame of the conqueror's liberality and clemency spread widely, and shook the resolution of the sternest Beloochs. Amongst the leaders, the Ameer Mohamed Khan of Kyrpoor, and another Mohamed Khan, a great Sirdar of the Talpoor family, desired to know what terms they were to expect.

To the former, as a dethroned prince, the General, not being authorized to propose any but unconditional surrender, replied thus:—

“ Ameer, I advise you to go to Ali Moorad, and
 “ remain with him till the pleasure of the Governor-
 “ General be known. I recommend to you to join
 “ the other Ameers at Bombay; but till I have the
 “ authority of the Governor-General, I can promise
 “ nothing but personal security.”

To the Talpoor Sirdar, who was a brave man, he wrote as follows:—

“ I never quarrel with a good soldier. Come
 “ and make your salaam, serve the British Govern-
 “ ment, and be faithful; your jagheer shall be safe.”

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The Sirdar still felt some doubt, and only sent his sword in token of fealty, whereupon the General, making allowance for his fears, endeavoured to reassure him.

“Come,” he wrote, “come and make your salaam, and you shall receive from the English Government all you held under the Ameers; and I will place the sword which you have sent me again in your hands, that you may fight as bravely for my nation, as you did against us when you served the Ameers.”

Mohamed Khan, however, though conscious that resistance was vain, and desirous of securing his ultimate safety, would not then desert the Lion from a principle of honour; but when that Prince was irretrievably ruined, the Sirdar submitted, and met, as shall be shown hereafter, with no worse treatment than he had been promised at first.

There was still another great chief to be dealt with. This was Ahmed Khan, the head of the Lugharees, whose dwellings are on the right bank of the Indus. They had fought well and suffered severely in the battles; but it was at their head that Ahmed attacked the Residency. This offence was grave, yet, as he had acted under the orders of his sovereigns and had bravely exposed his own person while those sovereigns stood aloof from danger, the General was inclined to favour him. In fine he was a gallant barbarian who did not fear to fight or to trust his conqueror, and the latter, though he could not promise him pardon, would not hurt him or lead him into danger, but thus stated his true position, leaving the chief himself to determine his own course.

“I honour a brave soldier, but I have not autho-

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“ rity to forgive you. You attacked the Residence
“ of the British Envoy Outram, your Princes
“ themselves accuse you. The Governor-General
“ is in wrath at this insult offered to the British
“ Government, and has ordered me to make the
“ Ameer Shahdad and yourself prisoners. I must
“ therefore appeal to the Governor-General, and I
“ will plead your cause with him. I hope to gain
“ your pardon ; but I will not pledge myself to
“ anything which I may not be able to perform.
“ If you come and reside here, I will receive you
“ until his Lordship’s pleasure be known; and if
“ he refuses pardon, I will give you forty-eight
“ hours to depart unmolested.”

The Lugharee chief’s pardon was obtained, and he became a friend.

Meanwhile the country, especially in the Delta, was troubled with robbers, who acted in bands, calling themselves the soldiers of the Lion. And now also, a new evil, menacing the most serious consequences, commenced at Hyderabad ; the followers of the army, fifteen thousand in number and all armed, began to plunder the Scindian people, and were in fact very formidable ; yet the General checked their excesses with a rough hand, and immediately disarmed them. The robbers were more difficult to deal with ; the time for dealing militarily with those in the Delta was not arrived, but a native police corps, which was organized at once, abated the depredations of the others ; and by great activity, the able distribution of the troops, and incessant vigilance, a tolerably efficient protection was given to the trader and the cultivator. This, joined to the readiness with which the General accepted the feudatory chiefs’

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submission and assured to them their jagheers and other property, produced a surprising quiet in the midst of war. The character of Sir C. Napier's administration was indeed made known by unmistakeable gestures. He was rapid to strike, prompt to pardon, clear and simple in details, and all his measures were directed to insure tranquillity and security for the labouring masses.

“Make no avoidable changes,” was his instruction to the officers entrusted with the subordinate government of the districts into which he divided Scinde; “make no avoidable changes in the ancient customs and laws of the country. The conquest of a country is sufficient convulsion for the people, without adding to their disturbances by abrupt innovations in their habits and the usual routine of their social life. Confine your exertions to the correcting of those numerous evils which the late tyrannical government of the Belooch conquerors inflicted on this unhappy land. It will depend upon the government of Scinde, to make the people hail the coming of the British, as a memorable redemption from slavery and oppression, or look upon it with apathy, as a mere change of cruel masters.”

It was however impossible that so large a territory, governed as Scinde had been by a federation of tyrants, and a dominant race of feudatory chiefs and their followers, all warriors by profession, and used to commotions which it was for their interest to excite; connected also with kindred hill tribes and desert tribes, poor and rapacious, and robbers by national custom, who looked down on the rich cultivated plains with longing eyes, and had sure retreats, as they thought, in their rocky fastnesses

on one side, and their burning arid desert on the other ; it was impossible for such a country, with such a population, to sink at once into quiescence under the rule of a conqueror, whose strength had been tried in only two battles, and then only by a portion of those ferocious warriors. New commotions were naturally expected, and the hope that they would prove fatal to British ascendancy in Scinde, filled the hearts of Lord Ellenborough's enemies at Bombay, and in other parts of India; with a treasonable delight, which they did not conceal. The editors of the Newspapers loudly proclaimed the wishes of this infamous faction. The Beloochs were regularly informed, and all these articles were translated and read by the chiefs, what were the strong and weak points of the occupation of Scinde, of the number of the sick, and of those who could carry arms, of the places along the river where the steamers could be assailed with most effect ; and precise instructions were given how to effect their destruction with least danger and most certainty. One extract from the Bombay Times will suffice.

“ The Indus is but a pitiful protection against
“ an enemy who sweeps over fifty miles at a
“ stretch, who could leave his mountain home in
“ the afternoon, approach the river in the dark,
“ and before morning have a trench and embank-
“ ment constructed sufficient to protect some scores
“ of matchlock men. A single volley from a
“ position which no musketry or ordnance could
“ touch, might clear the deck of a steamer, and
“ leave the vessel aground, and at the mercy of the
“ enemy before danger was suspected. Should
“ the crew be too strong, or not have been suffi-

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“ciently reduced by the first fire to prevent their
“landing to attack their opponents, the fleet-footed
“Beloochs would have mounted their fleeter steeds
“and left pursuers far behind before our shot could
“reach them.”

They were encouraged to profit of these suggestions by assurances of the interest felt in their cause, by persons of power and influence at Bombay, and, as before said, when the General by his provost-m Marshals stopped the troops and followers of the army from plundering, the newspaper organs of that faction called upon the Sepoys “to rise and put a stop by force to the fellow’s breaches of law.”

It is true that the information thus conveyed to the enemy was exaggerated, and often false as to the weakness of the British army at the different stations, because it was an object with the faction to disgust the people of England with the conquest; and also because the editors are so habitually intent on falsehood, that truth is rejected even where it might best serve their villainy. The unusual sickness which afflicted the natives as well as the troops in the latter part of this year, was expressly attributed to the General, and the soldiers were excited to look upon him as the cause of their sufferings. Unfortunately, the principal cause is their own intemperance.

Dr. Buist of the Bombay Times, surpassing all others in venal pandering to the sordid views of the faction he serves, endeavoured to account for the refusal of the women to follow the Amcers into captivity, by announcing that the ladies had been carried off, and were living with the British officers as their paramours, an inexpiable offence to all the Mussulmans of India, which he excited them

to avenge; and this at a time when the Indian population of that sect were very discontented and inimical to the British power. It was in the following terms this despicable tool assailed the honour of British officers.

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“ They who three months since were sharers of
 “ a palace and in the enjoyment of the honours of
 “ royalty, are now the degraded lemans of the
 “ Feringhi ! So it is; the harem has been de-
 “ filed; the last drop of bitterness has been ming-
 “ led with the cup of misery we have given the
 “ Ameers to drink: the heaviest of the insults
 “ Mohamedans can endure, has been heaped upon
 “ their grey discrowned heads. Let it not be sup-
 “ posed we speak of this in the language of pru-
 “ dish sentimentalism. The officers who have dis-
 “ honoured the Zenana of Kings have committed
 “ great wrong; but for that, as for the other evil
 “ deeds attending upon so unjust and cruel a con-
 “ quest, the Government which ordained it is re-
 “ sponsible. We know now, to our shame and
 “ sorrow, the evils which flowed from frailties such
 “ as this permitted in Cabool; and at Hyderabad
 “ we may yet discover the heinousness of our sins
 “ in the magnitude of our punishment. If one
 “ thing more than all the other wrongs we have
 “ inflicted on them, could awaken in the bosom of
 “ each Beloochee chief, the unquenchable thirst of
 “ never-dying vengeance, it must be to see the
 “ sanctities of domestic life invaded and violated as
 “ they have been—to see the daughters of nobles,
 “ and wives of kings, living while youth and
 “ beauty lasts as the concubine of the infidel,
 “ thrown aside when those attractions have de-
 “ parted to perish in their degradation and shame.

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“ This is the first of the black fruits of invasion for
 “ which Britons must blush. We have avoided
 “ explicitness on such a subject ; our readers will
 “ be at no loss to discover our meaning :—The
 “ most attractive of the ladies of the Zenana now
 “ share the tents of British officers ! A series
 “ of acts of injustice first introduced to the Scin-
 “ dians the character of the British Government :
 “ what has just been related will afford them an
 “ insight into the virtues and blessings they may
 “ look for from the advance of civilization ; the
 “ benefits and honours destined them by the most
 “ refined people of the world. This contrasts well
 “ with the reception English ladies experienced at
 “ Affghan hands.”

Appendix
V.
Sect. 3.

To this accusation, an instant and indignant denial was published, signed by the General and all the European officers at Hyderabad. There was not a glimpse of truth in the charge ; not a lady of the Zenanas had ever been seen by a British officer. Nusseer's brazen whip still remained the chief motive of the women's refusal to join the Ameers. Dr. Buist, when his calumny was thus publicly exposed, contended that the women should be collected by force and despite of their repugnance shipped off to the Ameers ; they were prisoners, he said, as well as their Lords. They were slaves and should be made to follow their lawful masters, who had the right as they had the will to cut all their throats or poison them !”

Appendix
V.
Sect. 1, 2.

But so far from tolerating any loose conduct towards the women of the Zenanas, Sir C. Napier had treated them with chivalrous delicacy. He had refused even to let them be searched by persons of their own sex on quitting the hareems, and thus gave

them the means of carrying off, at the expense of the prize property, not only their own ornaments, but such jewels of the Ameers as they could secrete on their persons.

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These calumnies were only a part of the warfare directed from Bombay against the General in Scinde. The greatest misfortunes were predicted. Ali Moorad, on whom the grossest abuse was daily lavished, because he had not joined the other Ameers to destroy the British army, was repeatedly denounced as a traitor to both sides, and a villain whose inexpressible atrocity had been rewarded by the English General, with enormous sums of money and grants of territory. But no grant of territory or money had been made to him; and the only honour bestowed, was the transfer of an elephant to his stables. This mark of state is much coveted by Eastern Princes; but the General, while he thus indulged his pride, bound him to pay into the treasury the price of the animal, if the Governor-General should disapprove of the gift. It was prognosticated also that Ali Moorad would betray the British as he had betrayed his own family; this falsehood was reiterated without cessation against him, and it was said his forces would be found arrayed with the Lion on the field of battle. The Lion's power and numbers also were exaggerated and dwelt upon with a malignant anticipation of his final success.

Appendix,
No. 1.
Sect. 4.

“ He was no fugitive; he was undismayed; he laughed at the impotent boasting English General; he was a great commander, a heroic Prince; he was gathering new forces in the desert, the advantages of which he well understood; his kindred were joining him from all quarters with the war-

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riors of the hill tribes ; all the Beloochs were resolved to support him ; he had crossed the Indus ; he was at the head of forty thousand men ; the standard of Islam had been raised ; the war had taken a religious turn, and the feeling would spread throughout Beloochistan and Affghanistan and the Punjaub ; he was advancing with an irresistible army ; he was within a few miles of the British force, which, weak in numbers, sinking from disease, and commanded by an incapable ignorant old man, would inevitably be overwhelmed, and the tragedy of Cabool re-enacted !

Sir Charles Napier in his despatch, after the last battle, had said there was reason to believe another shot would not be fired in Scinde—meaning that the Ameers yet at large, would not again dispute the conquest at the head of an army in the field. This expression was caught at by the faction of Bombay in its literal sense, and contrasted, in ridicule, with the mighty power and menacing position falsely assigned to the Lion. All those conventional sarcasms which suit complacent dulness were levelled at this empty boast, as it was termed ; and that the expectation of the General was not literally fulfilled is true, for several of his officers did some time afterwards shoot some of the sacred peacocks of the Scindians, and were fired at by the angry owners in return. But the anticipation was, nevertheless, the result of a sagacious and profound consideration of the nature of the country, the character of the enemy, and the peculiarities of the struggle.

The General knew the Lion was the only Sovereign Ameer still at large ; the only one with treasure and influence. He knew the most enterpris-

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ing chiefs and the most courageous warriors had fallen in the two battles, and the spirit of the survivors cowed. He anticipated, and not vainly, the immediate fall of Meerpoor and Omercote; he calculated on the moral effect which his own activity, energy and success, would have on barbarians, whose high wrought confidence in their own strength and courage had been so roughly demolished. He had with a long foresight of the resources of the Belooch leaders, destroyed Emaum Ghur in the desert; he was then marching to seize Meerpoor and Omercote, whose fall would leave the Ameer no resting place in the waste, save the fort of Shah Ghur, far off on the north-eastern side of the desert, and moreover watched by Ali Moorad, who was supported by British troops from Sukkur. In this state of affairs it was clear the Lion could not collect any formidable army in the desert; he might indeed reassemble some thousands of the fugitives from the battle of Hyderabad, and become troublesome, but never dangerous in that quarter, because the Scindian people's disposition towards the British was not to be mistaken; they clung to them as children to a protector. Nor would the Beloochs serve the Lion without pay, which he could not long furnish; or plunder, which must be at the expense of the Scindians, who would thus be knit more firmly to the English interests. Hence no army capable of delivering a decisive battle could be raised on the left bank of the Indus, north of Hyderabad; and if Shere Mohamed was debarred from passing to the right bank, the supremacy of the British would be secured: this passage of the river the General relied on his own activity and vigilance to prevent.

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But though no formidable army was to be expected in the field on the left bank of the Indus, partisan disturbances were to be apprehended; especially in the Delta, which is peculiarly unhealthy, intricate, and intersected with nullahs in a surprising manner, tormented also with jungles and marshes, and at that time filled with small bands of Beloochs, who called themselves Shere Mohamed's soldiers, but were robbers taking advantage of the troubled times. It was to be feared therefore the Lion would throw himself, with his followers, into the Delta, part of which was his patrimony, and there rallying round him all the robbers, and thousands of others intent to rob, he might with skill and resolution maintain himself during the hot months, and prolong the war another year; for that terrible season in Scinde could not be braved in the Delta, rife with so many other evil influences from its marshes and jungles.

Reflecting upon all these and many other considerations, and comparing his own character and military skill with the Lion's qualifications as a commander, the General formed his plan, and thought he should be able to anticipate and baffle his adversary's attempts to extricate himself from the desert. Hence the war did not hinder him from pursuing his system of tranquillizing the country with a just and beneficent policy, attaching the Scindian and Hindoo population by wise regulations for their security, and the enjoyment of their earnings in trade and agriculture; taking care, however, that the Beloochs who had submitted should not be disgusted or driven to desperation by any severity directed against them as a conquered race. He disarmed them indeed, but he left them dependent,

as before, on their various chiefs, and conciliated the latter by honourable treatment, flattering words, and the assurance that their jagheers should not be touched, or their dignity reduced.

In the midst of these cares, however, he watched with the utmost vigilance every movement of the Lion, whose desert lair he was surrounding silently and surely, anticipating with surprising accuracy the very spot where he was to be taken in the toils. In the north, Chamberlain's horse, moving from Roree, were directed to support Ali Moorad; and that chief was ordered to intercept Shere Mohamed's movements if he should attempt to gain the Seik country, or join Ali Mohamed, Roostum's son, who from Shah Ghur carried on a partisan warfare against Ali Moorad. And whatever the latter's secret wishes might be, it was his interest to be faithful. He was not in a position to contend singly against even a small portion of the British army; he had gained the Turban, and was secured in possession of the territories belonging to that dignity as well as in his own patrimony. He could not hope to keep the former if the Ameers, Shere Mohamed and Ali Mohamed, were successful; neither could he hope to play a double game undetected, because his instructions were precise, a British detachment was close to him, and the objects to be effected not to be misunderstood or neglected. But there was no reason to doubt his zeal or loyalty; his alliance with the British had been a rock of safety, his house was standing when the houses of the other Ameers were in ruins; he might lose, he could not hope to gain by an ill-timed disloyalty. Thus any attempt of the Lion to break forth on the northern portion of the growing circle was well provided against.

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Shere Mohamed's force had, however, increased, not to forty, but to eight thousand men, with four guns. The robber bands in the Delta also became more numerous and menacing; having several small forts there, they were uniting in larger masses and acquiring consistence. Other tribes from the southward also collected eastward of the Delta, calling themselves the Ameer's army; and they, and all the Beloochs, whether of the hills or the plain, the Delta or the desert, were continually instigated to a vigorous warfare by the faction at Bombay, speaking through their organ the *Bombay Times*. Debarred of an expected harvest of plunder in the civil administration of Scinde by the appointment of Sir C. Napier, this faction thought the destruction of him and his army scarcely an atonement for such an offence, yet one they laboured assiduously and insidiously to procure. When they found his courage and genius left them no hope of such a catastrophe, they spoke of him thus—"Alas! that this man bears the name of Englishman. Alas! that he is born in the glorious age of Wellington, which he disgraces."

The General had, as before stated, directed Chamberlain with his irregular horse to operate on the desert side of Roree in support of Ali Moorad; he now gave him for aid that daring officer Fitzgerald, who knew the lines of march there, having been of the expedition to Emaum Ghur. At the same time he ordered Colonel Roberts to move down the right bank of the Indus from Sukkur to Sehwan, with fifteen hundred men and a battery, which the provident energy of Lord Ellenborough had enabled him to employ without too much weakening the garrison of Sukkur. His orders were to

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seize all the boats on the river as he descended, and thus prevent the Lion crossing to the right bank, or the western tribes going over to join him on the left bank. This movement, and the operations of Ali Moorad's Beloochs, with Chamberlain's irregular horsemen, were to be responded to by similar combinations in lower Scinde when time should be ripe. The scheme was vast and complicated, demanding the firmest courage and comprehensive judgment on the part of the commander, the most arduous exertions on the part of the troops; but it was as profoundly reasoned, and as energetically pursued, as any of the previous extraordinary enterprises of the campaign.

Was not that an intrepid General, and a leader of good troops, who could resolve to brave, and who did brave, the deadly sun of Scinde in its utmost force, making, when the thermometer stood above 130° in artificially-cooled tents, marches, varying for the different columns, from one hundred to two hundred and fifty miles; and this to seek and circumvent a native army wandering without baggage in a country, unknown to the British, covered with jungles and intersected by a net-work of nullahs, filled at this time with water, and very troublesome to pass. Less brilliant in its results, less obvious in its difficulties and dangers, less imposing for public admiration, than the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad, or the march into the desert, it was more complicate in arrangement, and perhaps not less grand and heroic in the conception, nor less decisive in its effect.

It was not, however, a reckless enterprise, undertaken in the pride of command, the lust of glory; it could not be rejected without risking the con-

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quest altogether ; driven by the force of circumstances to adopt it, or to accept a new and more difficult warfare, the General was between two mill-stones. Great loss of men from the heat during the marches, greater loss from sickness afterwards were inevitable. On the other hand, if the Lion was allowed to gather head, and throw himself into the Delta, he could raise an insurrectional warfare, demanding longer operations and more destructive exertions to put it down in the hot season : that, or inactivity until the cold season arrived, would have been unavoidable. In either case the whole country would have been a prey to oppression and misery ; the Scindian labourer would not have dared to cultivate the ground while the Beloochees were in arms ; famine would have followed war, and the whole scheme of Government, designed to benefit the people and attach them to the British rule, would have been delayed and rendered useless. All would have been commotion, misery, and horror ; for the hill tribes, and those of the plains westward of the Indus, and those of the desert eastward of that river, would soon have taken the field in concert with the Lion, ravaging and slaying. It was in fine a choice of evils, and the difficulties of meeting the least of them was such as only a man of overbearing resolution could have overcome.

The Lion, who was now called by the Scindians the Jungle Wallah, or Keeper of the Jungle, had remained in the desert, after his flight from Omercote, until the last days of April ; then he removed to Khoonhera, where the old Ameer, Roostum, had remained so long after quitting Dejee-Ka-Kote.

Plan 3.

This place, situated on the edge of the desert, was about fifty miles north of Meerpoor, and about sixty from Hyderabad ; the Lion was driven there

to seek water, which became each day scarcer in the desert as the hot season advanced ; he was, however, at the head of eight or ten thousand men, with four guns, and he had other objects in view. His family were on the right bank of the Indus, in the Lukkee hills, inciting the tribes there to take arms, and he desired to be near the river when they should be ready to cross over. His brother, Shah Mohamed, also, had come down and encamped not far from the right bank of the river, with two thousand men and some guns ; but it would seem with views for his own aggrandizement rather than the relief of the Ameer, who he had before offered to assassinate.

In the north, Ali Mohamed of Kyrpoor had advanced from Shah Ghur, and some slight actions happened between his troops and those of his uncle, Ali Moorad.

In the south, the robbers of the Delta were still troublesome ; and eastward of them, a tribe, before mentioned, numbering five thousand fighting men, had taken post in the thick jungle on the Poorana river, about forty miles below Meerpoor, and the same distance from Hyderabad, intercepting the communications between those places and Wanga Bazaar, on the road to Cutch.

These simultaneous menacing movements, and the general state of affairs, becoming more critical every day, gave Sir C. Napier great anxiety, but his own plan of counteraction also made progress. Colonel Roberts was in full march to Sehwan ; Chamberlain and Ali Moorad were vigilant in the north ; Jacob was on the edge of the desert at Meerpoor. There, under divers pretexts, and as if he merely designed to complete his posts of com-

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munication with Omercote, and hasten the repairs and additions to the works of that fortress and Meerpoor, the General had reinforced Jacob with small detachments, until that skilful officer found himself at the head of a moveable column, consisting of the Scinde irregular horse, four hundred infantry, and two guns, with secret and precise orders for his future operations. Meanwhile, Ali-Ka-Tanda, a connecting fort between Hyderabad and Meerpoor, was strengthened, and so were the works of the latter place and Omercote. The Lion was thus debarred any passage to the south, and his communications with the Delta and with the tribe on the Poorana river were intercepted. To complete the chain, and to strengthen the circle enclosing the Ameer, Sir Charles Napier now also drew troops from Deesa, across the desert, to increase the garrison of Omercote, and to watch the Ameer eastward.

During the progress of these arrangements, a squadron of cavalry being sent to feel the tribe on the Poorana, found it so numerous, and the country so intricate and unfavourable for horsemen, that the commander thought it prudent to retreat. At the same time intelligence was received that the Lukkee tribe, having collected boats, was preparing to cross the river and join the Lion. Moreover, it was reported that the Ameer himself was about to move from Khoonhera to Sukkurunda, on the left bank of the river, about half way between Hyderabad and Sehwan; and this in the view of favouring the passage of the Lukkees, and of communicating directly with the Rins, the most powerful Belooch Scindian tribe on the right bank of the Indus, who had promised to send him twenty thousand warriors.

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To prevent these reinforcements crossing the Indus, a steamer was sent up towards Schwan, with a command to destroy the boats collected by the Lukkee people, and to run down without mercy every vessel carrying armed men. This fierce order, purposely made public, together with the appearance of the steamers, produced, as it was designed to do, a general fear amongst the Beloochs of the right bank, and their inclination to join the Lion abated. That chief felt the pressure, and thought to relieve himself by negotiations, and, encouraged probably by his well wishers at Bombay, demanded terms; but the General, fixed in his resolution to break the pride of the Beloochs and to preserve the moral ascendancy he had obtained by his victories, for that he thought the surest way to reduce them to permanent submission and tranquillity, returned only this stern intimation :—

“ In ten days I shall attack you with a larger
“ army than I had on the 24th of March. Troops
“ will come upon you in all directions. I do not
“ wish to kill either you or your people, and I
“ advise you to submit in time to the will of the
“ Governor-General. If not, take your fate. Your
“ blood will be on your own head.”

This was written on the 2nd of May. The Ameer attempted excuses, ill founded, and with some arrogance and false pretensions continued to negotiate, until the following missive dated the 6th of May, put an end to his hopes, leaving him only the choice of absolute submission or victory.

“ You never disbanded your army, as I desired
“ you to do.

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“ You sent a most insolent letter to me by
 “ vakeels ; you offered, if I would capitulate, to let
 “ me quit the country ; I gave your vakeels the
 “ only reply such a letter deserved, namely, that
 “ I would answer you with my cannon. Soon after
 “ that your brother sent to me a letter, offering to
 “ assassinate you ; I sent the letter to you. In my
 “ letter, I told you that you were a brave enemy,
 “ and that I sent you the proposition of your
 “ brother, to put you on your guard. I did not
 “ say that you were not an enemy. If your High-
 “ ness cannot read, you should get trusty people to
 “ read for you. Your Highness has broken treaties,
 “ you have made war without the slightest provoca-
 “ tion, and before a fortnight passes, you shall be
 “ punished as you deserve. I will hunt you into
 “ the desert, and into the mountains ; if you wish
 “ to save yourself, you must surrender in five
 “ days.”

This letter was decisive, both Generals resolved on battle, and their respective combinations, which were characteristic on each side, shall now be told.

There was nothing in Sir Charles Napier's conduct of this campaign more indicative of an able commander, than the readiness with which he seized and turned to profit, every adventitious circumstance. He laid his plans with great care and forethought, arranging his combinations on a very wide basis, embracing all the leading points, political or military, which were likely to present themselves ; but always he was awake to accidental occurrences, and knew how to render them conducive to his purposes. It has been shewn with what dexterity he turned the sudden flight of the old Ameer, Roostum, and his resignation of the

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Turban to account, taking that precise time to make his march into the desert, and forcing Ali Moorad to lend his presence and consent ere he could find an excuse for refusing; thus he carried with the army the native authority of the Rais with all its moral effect, and took from the other turbulent Ameers every legal pretext to misrepresent the expedition as an act of hostility.

He displayed the same promptness of judgment and action, when he marched to Meeanee. There, though resolute to fight many times his own numbers, he yet seized the exact moment for the battle, which deprived the Ameers of the still greater numbers they expected to join them on that hard fought field. It will be recollected also how, at the commencement of the battle, he suddenly detected the enemy's design, to throw the men who were in the Shikargah suddenly upon his right flank and rear; and how, as instantly, he rendered that design abortive, by thrusting Captain Tew's company of Europeans into the single opening of the wall; thus paralyzing six thousand men by the action of eighty.

The same wakefulness to draw advantage from every accidental event, led him, when actually moving to attack Shere Mahomed at Dubba, and almost within sight of his army, to make public Lord Ellenborough's despatches, containing the thanks and honours bestowed on the troops for their previous victory; thus exciting their minds to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, when going to fight. The rapidity of his attack, when he saw the enemy hurrying in apparent confusion from the centre to the flank of his position; the forced marches he made, immediately after the battle, to

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Meerpoor and Omercote, by which those two strong fortresses were instantly reduced, the Ameer deprived of the advantage of the desert, and a year of operation saved, were all proofs of his aptitude for war. And to those instances of readiness, he now added another.

When the Lion's reappearance from the desert became known, he made great efforts to obtain a knowledge of the country between Khoonhera and Sukkurunda, between Meerpoor and Khoonhera, and between the latter place and Hyderabad ; for it must always be remembered, that to his other difficulties was added that of operating in a country of great intricacy, full of nullahs jungles and ravines, all well known to the enemy but unknown to him. The information he received gave him hopes, that the precipitated movements of the Ameer might furnish an opportunity of adopting a more concise plan for destroying him, than the great combination already in progress promised ; and without deranging that combination if the more sudden stroke should fail. It was in this view, that he sent the steamers up the river with those stern orders to run down every boat found transporting armed men from the right bank ; he thus terrified the tribes on that side, and delayed their junction with the Lion. The latter might then indeed have remained at Khoonhera with the desert behind him for retreat, in tolerable safety, until the greater combination brought the hostile circle of troops close around him ; but the spies all declared he was going to Sukkurunda on the Indus, half way between Hyderabad and Sehwan. Upon this information the General conceived the plan of putting a strong detachment on board the steamers to land at Sehwan,

before Colonel Roberts could arrive there from Sukkur. Then, having Jacob's column at Meerpoor, to close at once from that place, from Sehwan, and from Hyderabad upon Sukkurunda, and so hem the Ameer in upon the bank of the Indus.

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If he should escape by slipping between the columns, he could only fly to the waste, and in that case it was designed to occupy the fort of Khoonhera, which was the only place on the edge of the desert where he could obtain water for his troops. This would drive him back to the Indus, and he could then always be looked for on some point of the bank between Hyderabad and Sehwan. He might, indeed, fly northward through the waste to Shah Ghur, but could scarcely hope to escape or break through the united forces of Ali Moorad, Chamberlain, and FitzGerald. The Lion, however, delayed his march into the cultivated country, and tried negotiations; with what success has been related. But fresh difficulties, not to be foreseen, long impeded the General's operations. The Indus had been irregular in its overflow; twice it had swelled within the month of April, and twice subsided; it was now rising a third time with all the indications of truth; but this uncertainty had chained the army, for until the inundation was determined, the troops might march and find themselves suddenly cut off from their base by a succession of nullahs filled with water, and be prevented from advancing, by a swamp which no camels could pass. In fine, the army could not move safely until it was known where the waters spread, and this knowledge had been withheld, by the unusual vacillation of the overflow.

While thus fretting on the curb of necessity, Sir C. Napier heard that the Lion was actually in the

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cultivated districts ; that he expected to be soon at the head of thirty thousand men, and had proclaimed his intention to fight and win, or die sword in hand on the field. Now the Lion was a brave man, and on a line of more than one hundred and fifty miles of river, it was impossible to be sure that the steamers could prevent the tribes from passing the Indus in small bodies and joining him. Hence the report was not to be despised. This was a new, but not a perplexing turn in the war. "I doubt," said the General, "the Lion's determination to die on the field ; but if he really collects twenty or thirty thousand men I shall be in no hurry to fight him ; let him bear the expense, I can laugh at his attacks from behind my entrenchments on the Indus ; I can sally upon him when he retreats ; and if the present overflow is the true one, his followers will find it difficult when the waters are out, to disperse when beaten as they have hitherto done, and I shall make them deeply repent their temerity."

The uncertainty continued for ten or twelve days, but on the 22nd of May, spies brought intelligence that the Lion, disappointed in his hopes of raising an army of Scindian Beloochs, had negotiated directly with the hill tribes of Beloochistan ; that they were not averse to join him ; and those of the Lukkee Range, now recovered from their fear of the steamers, had again collected boats where their rocks overhung the river, in the view of passing. It was evident the time for action had arrived ; and to stop the Lukkees, who had profited from the lesson taught them by the faction at Bombay, Lieut. Anderson was put with one hundred Sepoys on board a steamer, having orders to destroy the boats and drive the tribe from the

bank. He started on the 23rd, and on the 27th reached the Lukkee rocks, whence he was assailed with a heavy matchlock fire by three or four hundred Beloochs; the steamer, whose Captain, Miller, was wounded, immediately opened its guns, the Sepoys landed and drove the enemy from the position with a heavy loss, suffering but slightly themselves. The boats were then destroyed and the vessel pursued its course to Sehwan, to join Colonel Roberts, and give him the power of operating on either bank of the Indus. This slight but well conducted skirmish, and the destruction of the boats, again shook the resolution of the tribes, and the Lion remained without their aid.

On the 29th, Colonel Roberts, whose reception by the people on the right bank of the Indus had been friendly, reached Sehwan with fifteen hundred men. Thus the first part of the great combination was happily completed; the communication between the Ameer and his brother was cut off; the tribes were prevented from joining the Lion; and the three points, from whence the second movement to encircle him were to be made, were occupied without alarming the object of the movements. Now let it be considered how many difficulties opposed the execution of this plan: Sukkur was one hundred and sixty miles from Sehwan in a direct line, Hyderabad was eighty from the latter place; Omercote was one hundred miles from Hyderabad; Shah Ghur more than one hundred miles from Omercote; Deesa was above two hundred miles. And all those places were involved in this vast combination, which was nevertheless directed with such exactness and secrecy, that the circle was around the Lion ere he was aware: and these great marches

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were made under a Scindian sun in the hottest season! Nor was the cleverness with which the General contrived to collect his troops in masses on the fitting points, without betraying his designs, less worthy of notice; for he had not only to deceive the Belooch chief and to baffle his spies, but to mislead the meddling inquisitiveness of newspaper correspondents, to balk their mischievous loquacity, and render their silly, impudent pretension to superior judgment and knowledge, subservient to his designs.

Colonel Roberts's orders were to cross to the left bank of the Indus in the night of the 9th of June, and march towards Khoonhera, upon which point also Jacob was to move from Meerpoor, and the General himself from Hyderabad. Meanwhile Ali Moorad came down towards lower Scinde, having Chamberlain's horse in the desert on his left. But on the evening of the 7th it became known to Colonel Roberts that Shah Mohamed, the Lion's brother, after a successful skirmish with one of Ali Moorad's sirdars, in which he took some prisoners, had encamped at Peer-Arres, near the Lukkee hills, fourteen miles from Sehwan. This opportunity of striking at him was immediately seized. Colonel Roberts marched in the night with four guns, a troop of cavalry, and five companies of infantry. Daylight broke, and the troops were still three miles from the Ameer's camp, which could be plainly discerned in a large grove; surrounded by a thick hedge, just at the foot of the hills. He had taken the alarm and was retreating; the cavalry under Captain Walker were instantly sent forward to turn his left, and if possible to drive it towards the infantry and guns, which were formed in line

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and advanced as rapidly as they could. Walker soon got up with the Belooch force, and then, perceiving they were retreating on different lines, without hesitation charged the nearest body, about three hundred in number, and broke it, putting about ninety to the sword, with a loss to himself of only a few troopers wounded.

Meanwhile the infantry reached the enclosure, and entering it, found the Ameer Shah Mohamed in a close part of the grove with seventeen attendants. At first he seemed disposed to resist, but seeing that the Sepoys were ready to kill him he surrendered. All his cannon, and his family collection of matchlocks, swords, and shields, were taken, but no treasure; a fact proving his impotence to raise a serious warfare on that side of the Indus, for the Beloochs do not serve without pay. This well managed enterprise had been undertaken chiefly on the information and advice of a Patan horseman, called Ayliff Khan, one of those wild adventurers of the east who love war, and live by it, serving any side for pay; simple horsemen one day, generals at another time, they will aim at a kingdom if occasion offers as readily as at a gratuity. Ayliff guided the column to its prey, and in the charge, four Beloochs fell beneath his vigorous arm; he is now with his son in the mounted police of Scinde, and both are alike distinguished for courage, fidelity, skill in arms, and the beauty of their persons.

Colonel Roberts returned instantly to Sehwan, and, following his orders, crossed to the left bank of the Indus with all his troops. The circle was then rapidly closed round the Lion. Jacob marched from Meerpoor on the 10th northward, and the General moved the Hyderabad troops to Ali-Ka-

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Tanda, intending to menace Shah-i-Khauta, a point half way between Hyderabad and Hala on the Indus, to which latter place the Lion had now moved from Khoonhera. The General's march was parallel to that of Jacob, and the Lion getting information of it, took the alarm and retreated, not towards Khoonhera, but up the river bank, tending however towards the desert, though apparently in ignorance of the Sehwan column.

On the 13th the General being at Ali-Ka-Tanda, knew that Colonel Roberts was across the Indus; Jacob, following his orders, was to be that day near Khoonhera; but, at the same time, Ali Moorad, who, coming from the northward, was now close upon the Lion, sent word that the Ameer, apparently frightened at the approach of Roberts, had made a sudden march to the south-east again, and was at Shah-i-Khauta, that is to say, only sixteen miles from Ali-Ka-Tanda. The General immediately marched in the night upon Shah-i-Khauta with his cavalry and guns, directing most of the infantry to follow as fast as they could; his design was to keep the Lion in check, and not lose sight of him until Jacob and Roberts had closed upon his flank and rear. But early on the 14th he got intelligence that the Ameer had moved again, and was at Keypoor, a few miles to the east of Shah-i-Khauta; this indicated a design to break through to the south, wherefore the General directed his own march eastward also upon Nusserpoor, where he could intercept his enemy. At the same time he directed the infantry left at Ali-Ka-Tanda, to move up still more to the east on his right, to connect the line with Jacob, of whose position he had got no intelligence; nor did he know where Colonel Roberts was, although it was evident

from the uneasy movement of the Lion that both must be near him.

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The marches were generally made by night, and the soldiers remained during the day in tents, having wet cloths wrapped round their heads; yet so great was the heat, that more Europeans fell dead than would have sufficed to win a battle, and the General's anxiety both for the health of his men and the success of his operations hourly increased. His own fatigue of body and mind was excessive; he had quitted Hyderabad suffering from fever, and in the midst of his cares for the military movements, the dawk, which had been so long intercepted, arrived with the accumulated correspondence of four months from two Governments, namely Calcutta and Bombay; he had therefore to read, to arrange, and reply to hundreds of letters when his march was over and rest most needful.

In this state of affairs, unable to obtain intelligence of either Jacob or Roberts, he decided to halt during the heat on the 14th, but he was very uneasy, as it was evident that the Lion, being so pressed, would endeavour to break through the circle. And he might succeed, seeing that the different columns were not in military communication as they ought to have been; a failure in the combination caused by a field officer commanding a separate column who had neglected his instructions. Suddenly the sound of Jacob's guns came booming from the east, but they were so few and ceased so abruptly, that at first they were supposed to be a salute; yet this notion soon gave way to the painful thoughts, that he had been overwhelmed by the Ameer; that the latter having

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broken the circle would make for the south and throw himself into the Delta ; that the operations to crush him, which thus far had been conducted with so much labour, such pain, and such loss, would prove abortive, and the partisan warfare so much dreaded would be commenced.

Thus oppressed with care, with fatigue, fever, and want of sleep, the General, as he went out of his tent, was suddenly sun-stricken, and at the same time thirty-three European soldiers fell at once near him beneath the malignant rays ; most of them died within a few minutes, and all were dead within three hours ; the General only survived. He was caught up and bled instantly in both arms, but the struggle for existence was hard, and his state of body and mind was thus depicted by himself. " All was anxiety for me, when just as they had bled me, there came a horseman to tell me Jacob was victorious, and the Ameer's force utterly dispersed. I think it saved me. I felt life come back."

It soon became known that the Lion, having dallied too long in the cultivated districts when he knew that the moveable columns were upon him, resolved like a good soldier, to make up by courage what he had lost as a commander ; he ascertained that Jacob was the weakest, and decided to make a dash at him. But that brave and able officer was a dangerous enemy. The Lion found him so. Able to command, ready to obey, a gallant swordsman and a skilful leader, he had conducted his column along the edge of the waste with great intelligence and vigilance. The 13th, he obtained information of the Ameer's march up the bank of the river, and of his sudden return in a south-eastern direction ;

this he rightly concluded was caused by the approach of Colonel Roberts's column from Schwan, and he therefore pushed on to Shahdadpoor, an advantageous post for intercepting the Ameer, who he supposed would be closely pressed by Colonel Roberts and by the General. Hence he did not hesitate with his weak column to oppose himself to the enemy's whole army.

On the night of the 13th, a Bramin servant of the Lion came into the camp, and warned Jacob that Shere Mohamed would be upon him next morning, with ten thousand men and four guns. And accordingly at daybreak the picquet saw the Belooch army advancing, yet slowly and with hesitation. Jacob observing this, left a guard in his camp, and marched out boldly with the rest to meet the advancing enemy. The Lion had under his command nine great chiefs or Sirdars, most of them Talpoors; amongst them a son of the old Ameer Roostum and a brother-in-law of Nusseer of Hyderabad; but it does not appear that he was well obeyed, or bravely supported by any of them, save Mohamed Khan, the Sirdar who had before sent his sword to Sir Charles Napier. The troops also were fearful or disaffected, for the greatest part of the force had staid behind or deserted him, and he brought only four thousand men and three guns to the fight. These he drew up behind a deep nullah, taking the left wing himself, and giving the right which was composed of cavalry to Mohamed Khan. The ground in his front was so rugged and tormented with ravines that the British troops had great difficulty to join battle, and meanwhile a cannonade commenced on both sides, but it lasted only a short time, the Beloochee infantry dispersed at

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once. Their cavalry charged midst a cloud of dust, and when that cleared up there was no enemy to be fought withal. The ruggedness of the country barred all effectual pursuit, yet the rout was complete. Jacob lost no men, and very few of the enemy fell by the cannonade. The Lion fled with only ten followers.

Thus terminated these extended and difficult operations, without the death of a man in action, but more than sixty officers and soldiers died from the sun, and a far greater number afterwards from sickness, caused by their exertions in the heat; it was however a matter of necessity, and peace, the object sought, was attained.

“We have taught the Belooch,” said the General, “that neither his sun, nor his desert, nor his jungles, nor his nullahs can stop us, and he will never face us more.”

The war was in truth ended. Those desperate fatalists, who had braved death so heroically at Meeanee and Hyderabad; the men who in those battles, with sword and shield, dashed like demons against the serried bayonets and rolling fire of their enemies, fighting as if life was to them a burthen, now suffered nature to prevail, and shrinking from danger in a hopeless contest, acknowledged the mastery of the British soldier in fight. Their real feelings, and the particulars of this action on their side, were made known afterwards by the Sirdar Mohamed Khan, who commanded the Lion's right wing. This chief finding all lost made his salaam, and being well received by the General, held the following dialogue on the occasion.

General. “Mohamed, tell me, how came it that you made so bad a fight with Jacob? Twice you

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“ fought with me well, and I honoured you as good stout soldiers ; but I hold you cheap now. You ought to have killed half of Jacob’s men, and he had to fire only five or six cannon-shot at you : he had not a man wounded.

Mohamed, laughing. “ Why General, it is just because you did fight us twice, that we did not like the third time. We were afraid of you. But, to tell the truth, I know as little of the fight with Jacob as you do. I commanded the right wing ; the Ameer commanded the left wing ; he had the guns, and I nearly all the cavalry. It was hardly light when I heard the Lion’s guns. I thought Jacob was upon him, as there was nothing that we could distinguish in my front. I therefore rode full gallop, expecting to charge Jacob’s flank. You know our horrible dust, it was in vain to look for a man, I thought I was followed. I reached the Ameer, he was alone almost. On halting the dust cleared off, and behold ! only twenty-five men were with me : I was lucky, for had Jacob been there, I should have been killed. But all had run under cover of the dust, and so the Lion and I run also, and that is all I know of the battle.”

General. “ Well, the Lion is a fine soldier ; I honour him, and if I could take him, I would do all in my power to get the Governor-General to pardon him and give him back his estates.”

Mohamed Khan. “ The Lion is a fool. After the battle of the 24th we all saw our people would never stand more, and none of us will ever try it again ; you are hawks, and we are but little birds. I stood out as long as I could, but we see our folly now, and are your slaves for ever.”

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General. “But Mohamed,” (he was a very strong, handsome, and portly man,) “how did you get so fat in the jungle?”

Mohamed. “I am not fat, I have been too much worked since you drove me into the jungle; but now I am being safe, and at my ease under you, who treat us all so well, you will see what I shall become!”

With this courtier-like stroke the conversation ended. Yet the Khan spoke knowingly and truly, as well as flattering; for soon afterwards, four hundred minor chiefs came in to make their salaam, and laid their swords at the General's feet, relying on his generosity to preserve to them their jagheers, and offering their weapons as a propitiatory present. Each weapon was richly sheathed or ornamented, and they were estimated to be worth from fifty to two hundred pounds each; a great sum, and a lawful prize of war, belonging solely to the General; but without hesitation he returned them, as he had before returned those of the Ameers, simply saying, “I lose money, but I gain the good will and confidence of these chiefs.” Two years of tranquillity has proved the fidelity of the men and justified the General's observation, though the Lion and Ali Mohamed, and many others, sons and nephews of the dethroned Ameers, are still abroad, and always seeking to stir up commotions.

The former fled, as has been related, with only ten followers, and, escaping across the Indus, recovered his family. He took refuge amongst the Brahooc Beloochs at first, and afterwards with the Affghans, and these last for some time buoyed his hopes up with promises of aid; but it was only a barbarian deceit to obtain his treasure—in which they

succeeded, and then forced him to seek refuge amongst the Bhoogties, Doomkies and other hill tribes north of Shikarpore. Since then his hostility has been that of a mountain robber rather than a valiant though unfortunate prince, and may possibly bring him in the end to a robber's death. For consorting thus with murderers and thieves, and acting with them, their crimes become his. And already his conqueror, though sincerely disposed to treat him well if he falls into the hands of the British, an event far from unlikely, has begun to entertain doubts, if justice towards the miserable villagers whose property is continually plundered and their lives taken by the friends and protectors of Shere Mohamed, does not demand a rigorous punishment of the Ameer himself, who certainly instigates the robber tribes to make incursions and probably shares in their booty.

Ali Mohamed the son of Roostum, when he heard of the defeat of the Lion, gave up all hope, quitted Shah Ghur, and disbanding his followers, crossed the Indus, and finally joined Shere Mohamed in the Bhoogtie country. Thus the war terminated in upper Scinde, and meanwhile the General turning his attention to the Delta, quickly tranquillized it by means of his native police; for the tribe on the Poorana river having dispersed, the roving bands were no longer able to call themselves the Lion's troops, and were treated according to their merits; that is to say, their forts were taken from them, they were disarmed, and those against whom murders could be proved were hanged at the scenes of their crimes, and with labels on their breast, giving notice that they were executed for those crimes, and

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not for fighting against the British. The effect was great, the principle appreciated ; “ the Padishaw is just, he does not kill any one for himself,” became a saying with the people. Thus the conquest was achieved.

CHAPTER VIII.

OBSERVATIONS.

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THE subjugation of Scinde, that large and most fertile kingdom, teeming with natural riches, and its complete settlement as a dependency of England, was effected by Sir C. Napier in six months. He has thus given to our Eastern Empire a shorter and stronger frontier on the west; the command of the great river Indus, with an easy and direct commercial communication into Central Asia, which even Lord Auckland's invasion of Affghanistan will not finally affect. And he has spread the terror of British arms throughout that vast country, a singular proof of which shall be related further on.

These great things he did in one short campaign, with a force varying from two to five thousand men. Though ill supplied with means of transport, and constantly harassed and delayed by intricate and vexatious negotiations, he marched in the first three months above six hundred miles, constructed an entrenched camp, repaired a large fortress, and fought two great battles, in which he encountered and completely defeated sixty thousand enemies. He killed and wounded more than twelve thousand, took twenty-six pieces of artillery in the field and two camps; reduced four considerable fortresses and several minor forts, and made eight Sovereign Princes captives.

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In the second three months, he marched his troops two hundred and eighty miles, attacked and dispersed twelve thousand fighting men in the field ; drove another Sovereign Prince, the one of most reputation, a fugitive and a vagabond on the face of the earth, and captured his brother. He received the submission of four hundred feudatory chiefs, some so powerful as to bring twenty thousand fighting men into the field ; he repaired Meerpoor and Omercote, erected a fort at Ali-Ka-Tanda, and another on the right bank of the Indus to protect the steamers ; he organised a powerful military police of horse and foot, and formed a body of spies upon the Ameers who were yet at large ; these he chose from persons who had suffered in purse or person from their tyranny, and he had a wide choice. He organized the civil and military occupation and government of Scinde, and with such sagacity that his first framework has never been disturbed, though it has been enlarged and improved by experience. He framed it also, not in the pride or spirit of conquest, but with all regard to justice, and the customs and habits of the people where they did not interfere with the immutable principles of right. Mild also it was, save to murderers, for the Beloochees had enjoyed such impunity of wrong under the Ameers, that to slay a Scindian man, or drag a Scindian woman into slavery, was an every day occurrence : for such criminals he had no mercy. But his boast, and a noble one it is, that in all his military operations no man was slain save on the field of battle ; no act of cruelty was perpetrated ; no plunder permitted ; no insult offered to a woman ; no violence, no oppression, marked the marches of the army. The

Scindian people hailed his soldiers as friends, and sought a refuge and protection under their colours, while they abandoned their villages at once on the approach of the ruthless Beloochees.

With what a discretion, with what sagacity and circumspection, and resolution, also he imposed his system of government on the country he had conquered, may perhaps be shewn hereafter in a history of his administration of Scinde; it has now continued for two years, and is not less extraordinary than his military career. During this short period he has changed the condition of the people from one of misery, and oppression, and brutal insult, and the rule of the robbers' sword, to one of security, and peace, and comparative happiness. He has raised up the sinking Scindian labourer, and abated the pride and violence of the fierce Beloochee, by the force of order and wholesome control; he has protected trade and commerce; and handicraftsmen have been fostered and encouraged to return to the country. The great natural resources of Scinde have been explored in part, and measures taken to profit from them. Public works, some of them very extensive and costly, have been commenced or carried on from former designs, some of his own conception, some of Lord Ellenborough's. Amongst them is the reopening of the great branch of the Indus to restore the fertility of Cutch, and a gigantic pier at Kurrachee, which, beside its land construction, runs two miles into the water, forming a secure harbour. Large and healthful stone barracks for the troops have been erected; the police amount to more than two thousand well-organised, zealous and courageous men, and a native battalion of troops has been

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raised and disciplined. Were it not for the turbulent state of the Punjaub, the General would undertake to hold Scinde without a Sepoy or European soldier. A camel corps of the most efficient kind has been organised and placed under Fitzgerald, who has made marches of nearly eighty miles at once, and thus surprised robber bands from the hills. Finally, though the revenue is drawn from territory less, by Ali Moorad's share, than the Ameers possessed, the British revenue, under the rigid and economical system of Sir Charles Napier, carried into effect by young officers selected by him from the army, exceeds the whole amount of that received by the Talpoor rulers. Every part of the civil and political administration is paid from the receipts; the police corps is entirely maintained from it; and ninety thousand pounds of overplus was, in 1844, paid into the Calcutta treasury; which, with the prize money, makes half a million sterling derived from this much decried conquest in one year. Nor does it appear that the Directors object to the profit, but only to the men by whose wisdom and prowess it has been won. Meanwhile the Scindian cultivator labours in security, obtaining something more than a miserable precarious existence; the handicraftsman, no longer dreading mutilation of his nose and ears for demanding remuneration for his work, is returning from the countries to which he had fled with his skill and industry, allured back by good wages and ample employment. Young girls are no longer torn from their families to fill the zenanas of the great, nor sold into distant slavery. The Hindoo trafficker and the Parsee merchant pursue their vocations in all safety and confidence; and even the proud

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Belooch warrior, not incapable of noble sentiments, though harsh and savage, remains content with a Government which has not meddled with his right of subsistence, but only changed his feudal ties into a peaceful instead of a warlike dependence. He has moreover become personally attached to a conqueror whose prowess he has felt in battle, and whose justice and generosity he has experienced in peace.

These great actions have, according to the usual course of human nature, created a desire with small and envious minds to lessen them. And all the ingenuity of petty malice has been exerted to discover errors or to invent them, and to promulgate censures. Some of the latter are puerile and ridiculous in the extreme, others plausible for those who know not the motives, and difficulties, which determined the English General in his choice of measures: the first may be contemned in silence, the second shall be refuted.

The disparity of force at the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad struck men with astonishment, and the public generally admired the courage and fortitude which could obtain victory against such odds. But self-constituted judges, turning away from the glorious spectacle, proceeded to censure Lord Ellenborough for furnishing so few troops; and the General for risking the army in such an unequal conflict. Yet no blame whatever can attach to Lord Ellenborough, and the General's motives were sound and easily set forth. First Lord Ellenborough gave Sir Charles Napier additional troops, offered him more, and extended his command to Cutch. The General refused the reinforcements, and did not even take with him to

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the field the Bengal infantry when placed at his disposal, though he used them to occupy for a time the ceded districts. Lord Ellenborough did nevertheless send strong reinforcements, the moment he could furnish them, to Scinde, as the war proceeded; and they arrived most opportunely as I have shewn in the course of this work. The General therefore is alone responsible for having so few men at Meeanee. The blame is upon him, if blame be deserved: but it is not deserved.

At the commencement of the operations from Roree, Sir Charles Napier had strong reasons for believing that no war would arise; and his own fixed resolution was to prevent a war if it could be prevented without sacrificing his country's interests. Hence he was anxious to save the General Government an expense which it could ill afford at the time. In this view he sent the Bengal infantry to their own Presidency; and if he used them for a short time in the ceded districts, it was partly from humanity, to prevent those districts from being plundered; partly to cover the rear of the army from insult and a partisan warfare menaced by the Ameers. They served also as a corps of observation on the Bhawal Khan, to keep him true to his alliance, an object of importance, not to be left entirely to his sense of gratitude and fidelity when all India was beginning to waver at the disasters of Afghanistan. More than one point of interest was obtained by this disposition of the Bengal division; and it was at the same time advanced several marches towards its ultimate junction with the Bengal army on the Sutledge, where, in consequence of the falsehoods of the editors of the Indian press, war with the Seiks was more to be apprehended than with the

Ameers. Yet when fighting was inevitable in Scinde, the General it may be said, should have put aside all considerations of cost to bring the most powerful force he could collect into the field ; and this was the more imperative seeing the immense numbers the Ameers could oppose him with. No man knew better or felt more strongly the propriety of this than Sir Charles Napier, but choice he had none, he was governed by necessity.

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There are some countries where want of supplies and natural obstacles, render it difficult and at times impossible to operate with a large force. Scinde in its miserable condition under the Ameers was one of those countries ; at certain seasons of the year water could not be found at any distance from the Indus. At other seasons it could only be found in scanty quantities ; and there were large districts where it could not be found at any season sufficiently abounding for the wants of an army. Thus when Sir Charles Napier marched against Emaum Ghur, he could not take more than three hundred men, after the two first marches. The enterprise in prudence demanded three thousand men ; but had he taken only one thousand, he must have failed for want of water : he supplied the want of numbers, by courage hardihood and perseverance, trusting to the moral effect of these qualities, more than to his real force. And so he did all through the campaign, for always the chances were against him ; but the object was worth the risk, and by his great moral qualities he won his way.

He commenced the campaign with only three thousand men, when certainly he had six thousand available for field service. The larger force might have entered Scinde, but then it must have been divided ; it could not have marched in one mass ;

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it could only have advanced slowly, along certain lines, and in constant communication with the Indus for its supplies. It would have been a huge unwieldy mass; for always it must be recollected that it was an Indian army, and the followers would probably have amounted to thirty thousand persons. Such an army would not have been suitable to the circumstances of the moment, which required bold and sudden enterprise, rapid movements, and occasional abandonment of the line of communication and supply. The General therefore endeavoured to supply the want of weight and force, by suppleness and activity, and to balance numbers with skill and discipline.

The time of year was that in which water was scarce. Hardly could the three thousand men taken into Scinde with their followers, supply their wants; a larger force must have halted on the banks of the Indus. Moreover, the country was an unknown one; the General had as it were to grope his way each march, and to feel like a blind man for the springs and wells; if he had been pressed by the enemy, his difficulty of procuring water would have been very great indeed; the marches were determined by its locality. Scinde must be traversed with great caution. Every season has its peculiar difficulties, and they are not trifles. At one period water cannot be found; at another there is too much. Now the heat is too great for human life; anon it shall be comparatively cold, but half the troops will sink under intermittent fevers: man was found the least dangerous opponent to be encountered, and yet the Beloochees were brave, well armed, skilful, fanatical, and twenty to one in numbers!

Nevertheless, circumstances might force a General

to keep the field at all seasons. This was Sir Charles Napier's position; necessity forced him to brave climate, and sickness, and scarcity of water, and superiority of numbers, men difficult to vanquish as they had neither baggage nor commissariat. Every Belooch knew where to find water, and consequently how to direct his march; food they took by force, and when it failed they changed their position, without changing their warfare. They knew also how to conceal the wells when they quitted their vicinity. These things would have presented insuperable obstacles to a large force, and did embarrass the small force with which Sir C. Napier commenced his operations: it was his bold persevering prompt and fiery genius, tempered with great prudence, that enabled him to succeed.

These motives for not employing a larger force might suffice; but there was another and a major one, the want of carriage, that is to say, beasts of burden to carry the baggage and stores. The Bengal division had carriage of this nature, but the same reason which rendered it advisable to send that division northward imposed the necessity of leaving its carriage untouched. And if there had been abundance instead of a scarcity of animals, only one regiment could have been added to the field force, if it was to remain a moveable and active army; neither would it have been advisable to weaken the garrison of Sukkur and Roree before an enemy, who might without much difficulty pass round the flanks of the field force and assail those places unawares.

It has been said that the Governor-General should have increased the garrison of those places at once,

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and sent camels to the field force. The answer is ; he did so as soon as it was practicable ; but it must always be recollected that Lord Ellenborough came out, not to direct a well-ordered government having the command of great resources ; he came amidst disasters and confusion and exhaustion, public poverty both of money and spirit ; he came to create and to save, and time was required. Moreover the quarrel with the Ameers grew so suddenly to a head, it was unexpected. Ferozepore is forty marches from Sukkur, and had Sir Charles Napier waited for reinforcements and camels, he would have been thrown into the hot season, and then the Ameers, with all their forces united, would have defied and insulted the British Government. This probably would have given rise to new combinations with the Brahoes Beloochs, the Affghans, Seiks, and Mahrattas of Gwalior, and the warfare of the latter was not found an easy one to meet even as an isolated event.

It was impossible to continue at peace with the Ameers. It was dangerous to delay military operations, the crisis was a vital one, there was a necessity to strike, and that boldly and promptly. The army was undoubtedly ill provided for the invasion of Scinde, and the risk was great ; but the English General, conscious of ability to lead troops in whose discipline and courage he confided, and who confided in him, put aside all difficulties with this remark :—“ If a man is afraid to undertake that “ which the public good imperiously demands, till “ everything in his army is perfect, he had better try “ any trade rather than war, because the very nature “ of war prevents everything from being perfect.” And when the result justified his daring, he thus

epitomized his campaign:—"I did everything I could to maintain peace with the Ameers; but I resolved to force their bands to disperse, as I was ordered. I considered the troops I took with me able to coerce the Ameers; and they were so."

They would not have been found so under a man of less genius and resolution; nevertheless the English General did not, imprudently, and recklessly, provoke the terrible dangers through which he carried his army so triumphantly. When he marched against the Ameers of Kyrpoor they appeared to be a separate power from the Hyderabad Ameers; and these last separate from the Ameer of Meerpoor. All three had been quarrelling, and had even fought; separate negotiations were carried on with each; and though a secret undertaking for a general war was known to exist, the continual inebriety, the unsettled policy and clashing interests of these broods of Ameers, made it very doubtful if they could act together on one system, at least in good and timely concert. It was natural, therefore, to expect that the Princes of upper Scinde, when Ali Moorad broke from their confederacy, might be coerced before those of lower Scinde could come to their assistance; for that purpose the troops were enough, and so it happened. When they finally retreated to the lower province, and a junction of the whole military power of Scinde was thus effected, the vehement and constant protestations of amity made by Sobdar, by Mohamed Khan, and by the young Houssein Ali of Hyderabad, were so well feigned as to deceive even Ali Moorad as to their intentions. He assured the General, and in good faith also, for his own interests were involved, that they might be depended

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upon. And when this was followed by the treacherous proposal from Sobdar to send five thousand men to the field, with secret orders to fall on their own countrymen during the battle, it was reasonable to suppose the whole of the Ameers forces would not take the field, and that the same result would be obtained in lower Scinde as in upper Scinde.

It was only when this, apparently well-founded, hope failed, that the astounding discrepancy of force became apparent, to call forth the heroic energies of the leader, and his gallant troops. The military preparations of the General were therefore well calculated before hand, his movements well reasoned, and for the execution let the narrative of his deeds speak. The two greatest errors, namely, the detaching men at Major Outram's desire the night before the battle of Meeanee; and, at the same officer's request, refraining from an attack on Shere Mohamed the morning after that battle, have been already noticed. It has been shewn that they sprung, not from want of judgment, but from yielding against his judgment, to the importunities of a man for whom he had at that time a warm friendship; this led him to overlook defects, at a moment when the recent, intrepid, and really able defence of the Residency, had given weight to that friend's confident pretensions.

So difficult an art is war, that it has been, with something of hyperbole, designated as a series of errors, even when exercised by the greatest Captains. No great captain was ever quite satisfied when calmly considering his own exploits; perhaps, because the fiery spirit and energy, so conducive to success in action, being then quiescent, extraordinary daring appears rashness, even to the man by whom it was

displayed. It shocks the cold reasoning faculty, which always seeks perfection by a slow, cautious, circumscribed process; but the sudden inspirations and impulses of genius belong to a higher intelligence, imperious though inexplicable, and vouchsafed to few. Thus, reviewing the battle of Hyderabad, Sir Charles Napier blamed the precipitancy of his own attack. He thought, the day being young, he should have employed an hour or two to examine the enemy's position more exactly, from the flanks as well as on the front. This he might have effected by passing with some cavalry across the bed of the Fullaillee on his left. Penetrating the jungle there, he could from thence have looked down the whole of the Belooch right and centre, and would thus have discovered the double nullah, and the great numbers posted there and in the village of Dubba. With that knowledge he would have altered his order of battle, and have probably made his principal attack at the junction of the left wing with the centre.

See Plan
No. 6.
From the
Fullaillee
to letter *b*.

See Plan
No. 6.
letter *b*.

This self-criticism is just in one point of view, and in accord with the maxim of war, which requires the most careful examination previous to an attack. On the other hand, the enemy's numbers were so great, and the strength of his position so apparent, that any delay might have affected the enthusiasm of the troops. Moreover the best of the spies had assured him the Beloochs certainly meant to break out with a counter attack; and this might have happened while the General was on the other side of the Fullaillee, for the armies were from the first within cannon shot of each other. Here then the impulse of the moment was probably more valuable than the conclusions of an after examination.

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The battles of Meeance and Hyderabad, especially the first, were astonishing exploits; but it will doubtless be observed, that several facts at variance with the despatches, have been set down in this work touching them, and notably in regard of the numbers on both sides. The despatches are in error; the cause shall now be shewn. When they were written, all was confusion and fatigue; General and soldier were alike crushed with labour, heat, dust, false alarms, and difficulties of all kinds; the former also had broken a sinew of his right hand, and great bodily pain was thus added to his labour of endurance. The assistant-adjutant-general, Wyllie, was too badly wounded to be disturbed, and there was no field return ready. Hence Sir C. Napier took the last return of the army from his desk, more than a week old, and hastily gave the force there set down, as the number engaged. Nothing could be more erroneous; Outram's detachment, the sick of the last ten days, and the baggage guard, were thus all reckoned as good fighting men in the field. When the true returns were afterwards made up, the total of sabres and bayonets, including Clibborne's grenadiers who were but slightly engaged, did not exceed seventeen hundred and eighty, and therefore, officers included, the battle was fought with less than two thousand.

With respect to the numbers of the enemy the facts can be proved beyond doubt. The surest of the emissaries said the Beloochs were, before the battle, nearly forty thousand strong, the greatest number of the spies reduced this number to thirty-five thousand, and one or two stated them at twenty-two thousand; this last number the General adopted from modesty, having no certain proof to the contrary. But subsequently he obtained formal accounts

of the tribes present, made out by the chiefs, who certainly reduced the actual numbers from a natural wish to lessen the disgrace of defeat. Now their rolls gave twenty-five thousand eight hundred and sixty-two men, with sword and shield. But there were two chiefs present in the battle with strong tribes whose returns never were obtained, because they came up only on the morning of the action, and their muster was not made up for the Ameers' pay. There is every reason to believe these were about twelve thousand, which brings the whole force close up to what the most exact and trustworthy of the emissaries had reported. Counting the Beloochs then at thirty-five thousand is certainly no exaggeration; and the English General had the glory of fighting with, and overthrowing, eighteen to one. Noteffeminate Easterns, reluctantly appearing in the field, without spirit or discipline, having ten thousand cavalry in secret league with their opponents; not a rabble who run at the first discharge, being from the beginning far more ready for flight than battle, as at Plassey; but strong and valiant warriors, fanatics, and resolute to win; good matchlock men, and wielding sword and shield with terrific power and energy; habituated to war, skilful in their own mode, and so intrepid, that, neither asking for or giving quarter, six thousand went down on the bloody field ere the remainder, amazed rather than dispirited, slowly retired, broken, not subdued. Six thousand is the number assumed, but the Ameers who were allowed to bury the dead, said eight thousand, and that seventeen hundred bodies were lying in the bed of the Ful-laillee alone.

Here it may be interesting to note a coincidence between the English General's counteraction of the

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Ameer's plan of campaign, and that of Alexander's, two thousand years before, in the same country, and in similar circumstances. In Williams' life of the Macedonian hero, a work which, with some errors of conclusion arising from the author's want of military knowledge, is the most instructive history of that wonderful man, the following passages occur:—

“Alexander received information that the Malli and Oxydracæ, two powerful and free states, were preparing to give him a hostile reception, and dispute the passage through their territories.”—
 “The plan agreed upon by the two nations was, for the Malli to send their warriors down the river and make the territories of the Oxydracæ the scene of war, for the former looked upon themselves as sufficiently protected by a considerable desert.”—
 “Alexander marched laterally from the left bank of the Aecessines, and encamped near a small stream which skirted the western edge of the desert.”—
 There, after a short repose, he ordered them to fill their vessels with water, and marching the rest of the day and all night, with the dawn arrived before a Mallian city which had no fear of being attacked thus suddenly from the side of the desert. The Malli fought resolutely, but the passage of the desert had taken them by surprise, and entirely deranged the plans of the chief who had conducted their warriors down the river.”

Substitute the Ameers of upper and lower Scinde for the Malli and Oxydracæ, and the native plan is the same; while the march to Emaum Ghur is a repetition of Alexander's operations, with only this difference, that he was out five days in the desert, and the English General was eighteen.

Turning now from this review of the military proceedings, it is necessary to resume the story of

the political affairs ; for the campaign ended as it begun, in the mazes of the Ameers' deceit and falsehood, aided and abetted by a cabal at Bombay, whose discontent at being debarred by Lord Ellenborough of expected official plunder in the new conquest, was, and continues to be, evinced with all the rancour and vulgar vehemence belonging to sordid minds deprived of anticipated profits. Had Lord Ellenborough annexed Scinde to the Bombay Presidency all would have been well ; relations and dependents would have been provided for ; they would have fastened with the avidity of leeches upon the new conquest, two years would have fattened them, and given Scinde back to the Beloochees with the loss of a British army.

Scarcely had the Ameers reached Bombay, when the newspaper organ of this unprincipled faction commenced the most pathetic lamentations over the "fallen patriarchal princes." Their virtues, their dignity, their generosity were extolled, and the horrible violence and iniquity of overthrowing them vehemently denounced. But the calumnies of the caballers were no longer confined to the warfare which had put an end to the Ameers' detestable rule. The deposed Princes were induced to set their names and seals to petitions concocted by their patrons at Bombay, and bearing unmistakable signs of their origin. The Mohametans, few of whom can either read or write, were made to interlard their statements with appeals to the doctrines of Christianity, which they had learned from histories and books ! to the principles of the English Government which they had acquired a knowledge of in the same manner, and to prate about the Queen of Sheba !

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See Parlia-
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Supple-
ment to
the Scinde
Papers.

Each Ameer signed separate statements of wrongs endured, which were designed for the English Queen, the Governor-General, and the Governor of Bombay; and these were repeated with such alterations and additions as it suited their European prompters to dictate. Ranging over the whole of their past intercourse with the British Government their memoirs may be thus epitomized :—

“The Ameers being always sincere friends of the British Government, had willingly agreed to become its subjects at the demand of Lord Auckland, and as such were loyal and faithful. There was no cause of complaint against any of them, yet they had been treated with a violence and oppression exceeding any thing recorded in history. They had accepted and signed all the Auckland treaties, and had never violated an iota of any one of them. They had also, though feeling deeply the injustice of it, accepted and set their seals to Lord Ellenborough’s new treaty, yet they had been, in disregard of that act of submission, attacked, defeated, and deprived of their dominions. Sir Charles Napier’s arrival in Scinde was the signal for perpetrating every species of iniquity against them, helpless innocent princes, as they were reposing without care or suspicion of evil, with quiet security in the supposed protection of the British Government. Astonishment and grief overwhelmed them at first when they found their gentleness and dutiful behaviour no safeguard from oppression. In their anguish they pleaded for mercy, but it was denied to them; then their Belooch subjects and friends, enraged at the sight of their misery, assembled in arms, and could not be restrained from attack-

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“ ing the British army, though they, the Ameers,
 “ had, with wonderful zeal and perseverance, sought
 “ to restrain their fury; and they would in truth
 “ have succeeded if Sir C. Napier had not, with
 “ unexampled violence, seized Hyat Khan and the
 “ other Murree chiefs while passing through his
 “ camp. Negotiations were then going forward,
 “ but this iniquity rendered fruitless the efforts of
 “ the Ameers to repress the national phrenzy of the
 “ Belooch chiefs and their warriors, which was
 “ excited, not so much by the injustice and harsh-
 “ ness practised against the Ameers of Hyderabad
 “ as by the cruelty exercised towards the aged
 “ Roostum, whose desolate condition neither the
 “ other Ameers nor the Belooch warriors could
 “ bear. He had been misled, deceived, tricked
 “ out of his possessions by the insidious English
 “ General, and by his false brother Ali Moorad,
 “ who drove him forth, at eighty-five years of age,
 “ a wanderer in the desert.

“ The attack on the Residency and the battle of
 “ Meeanee were the results of the Beloochs natural
 “ and generous indignation. The first was com-
 “ menced without orders, conducted without chiefs,
 “ and far from being encouraged by the Ameers
 “ they had strenuously exerted themselves to pre-
 “ vent the accident. At the battle of Meeanee the
 “ Ameers were forced to appear by their Belooch
 “ warriors, but their intention was not to fight;
 “ they were in the camp to prevent others from
 “ fighting; and they thought they would have suc-
 “ ceeded in this humane project even then, if the
 “ English General had not attacked the moment
 “ he came in sight, killing some and forcing others
 “ to run away. But he could claim no triumph,

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 pendix,
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“ because he had attacked and killed, not enemies
“ but Queen Victoria’s subjects, seeing the Ameers
“ had long considered themselves as her people.

“ After the battle the Ameers entered Sir Charles
“ Napier’s camp not as captives but as friends.
“ They delivered their swords to him indeed ; but
“ he returned them, saying to Nusseer in particular,
“ ‘ I give you all praise. In twenty-five days your
“ ‘ affairs shall be settled, and you will be restored
“ ‘ to Hyderabad with all your dignity and rights.’
“ To their astonishment, after this voluntary pro-
“ mise given, the English General entered Hydera-
“ bad a conqueror, and as it were by storm,
“ plundering houses, breaking into Zenanas, robb-
“ ing the women by violence—even of their earrings
“ and other ornaments, causing them to rush out of
“ their secret apartments to save their lives, and
“ thus exposing them to the gaze of strangers, an
“ abomination and an insult not to be endured by
“ Mohametans. Every article in the palaces, even
“ to the peculiar family arms of the Ameers, things
“ of no real value but dear to them as heirlooms,
“ were made spoil of. And even the original trea-
“ ties and certificates of their alliance with England
“ were carried off with the plunder. Servants of
“ the palace, men of high rank and respectability
“ were made prisoners without cause, and their
“ houses plundered, and especially one named
“ Meerza Khoosroo, who former Ameers treated as
“ a child, was in wantonness of cruelty tied up and
“ flogged until he fainted. In fine, unparalleled
“ horrors were perpetrated.”

These accusations repeated and varied, formed the
substance of the memorials ; but Sobdar Mohamed
Khan and Shahdad added circumstances peculiar to

their cases. The first stated, "that he had been
" the known and particular friend of the British
" Government, in contradistinction to others. That
" he took no part in the battle, nor in the attack of
" the Residency. That after Meeanee he remained
" in his palace confident in the good will of the
" General, who could have no fault to find with
" him, and indeed owed him favour, since he had
" strenuously opposed the wishes of those turbulent
" Beloochs, who returning from the battle desired
" to defend Hyderabad and the fortress. Yet all
" his merit had not saved him from captivity or
" from plunder; his women had been insulted, his
" servants maltreated. Never since the English
" had become masters of India had such disgrace
" and oppression and tyranny being experienced
" towards any friend of Government."

And then he, a Mussulman, appealed in the name of Jesus Christ for redress! thus betraying the real authors of his shameless memorial. He, who pretended he had no control of the Beloochs that attacked the Residency, who claimed favour because he was not at Meeanee, thus casting aside the declarations of his brother Ameers as to their innocence of hostilities, he, this Sobdar, had nevertheless offered just before the battle, to place five thousand of his warriors in the Belooch ranks with orders to fall on their own countrymen during the action: he had control over them for that treachery, none to prevent them attacking the British! But ample proof was obtained that he had urged the attack on the Residency, and had sent his warriors to fight at Meeanee, where hundreds of them perished, while he, coward and traitor, remained in his palace to profit from what-

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ever might happen. In truth he expected the victory, like all the other Ameers, and sent his men, because any lukewarmness would have been his ruin if the battle was gained. The other Ameers cared not for his poltroonery, but they had his former fallings off from them to avenge ; and as he was a "*Soonee*," while they were "*Sheas*," religious fury would have conjoined with political revenge.

The Ameer Mohamed Khan, he who had been wounded at the attack of the Residency, complained that though, like Sobdar, he was the peculiar friend of the British, and had sent no men to fight, and was not in any way concerned in the Belooch disturbances ; he had, nevertheless, been plundered, and made a captive of in a more degrading manner than the other Ameers had been. For while residing in the fortress he was suddenly seized, thrown on an elephant without attendants, and so carried off to the garden of captivity. He also had learned from books and histories, that oppression was not allowed by the Christian religion !

Shahdad's case was even more piteous. He was a lonely captive, yet he had always been a friend, and had nothing to do with the attack on the Residency. He had restrained the Beloochs at that time ; he had harangued the other Ameers on the folly and wickedness of such a proceeding, and, after Oustram's retreat, he had prevented the Lugharees from pursuing the boats up the river. Finally, he had no part in the murder of Captain Innes.

Such were the shameless memorials concocted for those miserable degraded Princes by their infamous coadjutors at Bombay ; and hard they prayed not to be sent out of that capital ; feeling truly that at a distance the game of interested calumny could

not be so conveniently played. Three of their memorials, namely, those of Sobdar, Nusseer, and Mohamed were sent by the Bombay Government to Sir Charles Napier. They reached him while engaged in his last operations against the Lion, just two days before he was struck down by the sun; and he thus noticed them to Lord Ellenborough:—

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“ I send your Lordship three complaints against us, with the replies of the accused. I think it my duty to make no answer (except to your Lordship) to accusations which I know to be concocted by a hostile party at Bombay. There are several other complaints, each of several sheets of foolscap, and gross impudent falsehoods all. I have not answered them, but when I have a little leisure I shall send them with the necessary remarks. After your Lordship has seen my defence I will burn it, if your Lordship pleases, or re-word it for the facts are as I state. Your Lordship will, I am sure, make some allowance for a man absolutely wearied out with their incessant unblushing downright falsehoods. As to going minutely into a disproof of all their gross assertions, I could easily do it, but I must give up my command, and request a permanent establishment; for every disproof of their assertions would be immediately followed by another volume of lies.”

See Appendix for replies.

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But notwithstanding his fatigue and anxiety and illness, and the accumulation of business suddenly imposed on him by the arrival at once of four months' communications from two Governments, he did send refutations of the Ameers' calumnies, complete and irrefragable. Those calumnies, as he had foretold, were repeated, and sent to him by the Bombay Government, as if to

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irritate him; but he refused to receive any more, and desired they might be sent to Lord Ellenborough.

The object of these memorials being neither truth nor justice, nor the public interest, nor any thing decent or honourable, they were, notwithstanding the complete exposure of their falsehood, transmitted to England by their concoctors, to influence the Directors, and even to influence Majesty; but the only effect hitherto has been to display the baseness and knavery which originated them.

It has been shewn that Major Outram's expedition to burn a Shikargah, kept him away from Meeance, and he quitted the army before the battle of Hyderabad, leaving Sir Charles Napier with a lowered opinion of his abilities as a diplomatist and an officer; yet bearing with him the name of friend, and the assurance, not coldly expressed, of the General's esteem for his courage and zeal. After a short stay at Bombay he proceeded to England, openly professing his obligation to the man who had risked the Governor-General's displeasure to get him restored to a public situation in Scinde. Obtaining immediate access to the Ministers and the India House, he placed Sir C. Napier's conduct in the most unfavourable light, affirming that the Ameers were to the last moment willing to submit, and there was no necessity for hostilities—that he would himself have attained the peaceable termination of the difficulties, if he had not been restrained by the General, who had moreover misled Lord Ellenborough, by withholding certain notes of conferences held with the Ameers

of Hyderabad, by Outram, copies of which were now furnished to the Secret Committee.

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Astonished at these revelations, from such a source, so seriously affecting the character of Sir Charles Napier, the ministers became apprehensive that his victories, instead of being achievements worthy of honours and rewards, would be found crimes, subversive of England's reputation for justice and good faith. That reputation was not indeed very high for those virtues in the East; but the Government, disturbed by this intelligence, suspended all notice of the General's exploits. No rejoicing guns announced, no public thanks graced the conquest of a great kingdom, and battles almost without parallel in history, were passed over in gloomy silence. A whispered accusation had more weight than those great exploits.

Major Outram, who was in neither of the actions, had been the direct cause of the only two serious military mistakes committed by the General; and his inopportune advice, if it had not been peremptorily rejected on other points, would have caused the entire destruction of the army. He now intercepted, for a time, the Government's acknowledgment of that army's noble services. And at this moment several English newspapers, taking for their guides the foul Indian Press, laboured to extol Major Outram's conduct in Scinde, and to depreciate Sir Charles Napier's. Some friends and admirers of the former, connected with former Indian Governments, asserted that he ought to replace the General as the abler man; and at times it was not very ambiguously hinted that such would be the final arrangement.

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These swelling anticipations were but wind. Major Outram returned to India, and accepted of an inferior political post in an obscure province, which, it is said, he had held twenty years before. Sir Charles Napier has governed Scinde up to the present day, with the same energy and ability he displayed in the conquest. Widely spread is his fame as a general ; widely also as an administrator and Eastern ruler. His name is known, and his warfare dreaded, throughout Central Asia. Distant barbarian Princes seek his friendship and alliance, for they cannot separate the idea of sovereign power from great exploits in battle. Curious proof of this has been recently furnished by two Embassies in the beginning of the present year. The first from Yar Mohamed of Herat, who sent his nephew with presents and credentials to the Bombay Government ; but the Prince thinking Sir Charles Napier the greater power, turned aside to him and offered his presents. His object was to bespeak the good will of the British Government ; the General advised him to continue his journey to Bombay ; he did so and was most ungraciously received. Scarcely had he quitted the head-quarters, when another Prince, sent by the Khan of Khiva, or Orgunjie, whose dominions touch on the Aral Sea, arrived also with presents, sent direct to the Conqueror of Scinde. He had made his way with great difficulty and danger, and after presenting his credentials delivered this message. " The Khan of Khiva hates the Russians ; and the Bokhara Ruler ; and the man of Herat. Why do you English, of whom it is said, you will avenge even the death of a dog, suffer tamely the massacre of your army at Cabool ? If you will attack

the Affghans, the Khan will assist you. If you will attack the man of Herat and the Ameer of Bokhara from the east, the Khan will attack them from the west, and success will be certain." Such is the renown of Sir Charles Napier in Central Asia: With twelve thousand selected troops he could gibbet the murderer of Bokhara over the graves of Connolly and Stoddart. The glory he has gained by arms and policy is too bright to be obscured by the foul breath of insidious maligners. The morning sun which lights up the mountain's brow, raises malignant vapours from the marsh at its base, the midday sun disperses them.

Major Outram's notes were sent by the Secret Committee to the Governor-General. Lord Ellenborough had never seen them before, and required from the General an immediate explanation. He soon got it, and so full, so complete, that all doubts as to where censure should fall were instantly dissipated. Far from furnishing ground for belief that peace might have been preserved, the notes only proved how egregiously Major Outram had been deluded by the Ameers. The withholding of them from the Governor-General, to whom they were not addressed, was accidental; but in a public view the General did not consider them of any importance; the writer's weakness of judgment and want of penetration were apparent to him at the time, and were completely exposed by subsequent events. In justice to himself the General now sent other communications which he had received from Major Outram, and had designedly withheld, from a generous reluctance to lessen him as a public man in the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, who was already indisposed towards him.

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Appendix,
No. 2.

PART
II.Appendix,
No. 2,
Section 2.Appendix,
No. 1,
Sections
3, 4.

In the copies of the notes of conferences, laid before the Secret Committee was the Ameer Roostum's statement of his intercourse with the General, in the matter of ceding the "Puggree" to Ali Moorad; but Major Outram did not give Sir Charles Napier's letter, written to himself at the time, contradicting Roostum's statement and exposing its falsehood. The Government was thus led to believe the General had insidiously and unjustly driven the old Ameer to give up his dignity and patrimony. Though oblivious of this important document in England, Major Outram had in Scinde, erroneously assumed, in one of his public communications, that Sir Charles Napier had pledged himself to give large tracts of land and amount of revenue to Ali Moorad, and he adverted to a treaty having such a provision. Hence along with the demand for explanation, as to the notes of conference, Lord Ellenborough required an account of this pledge and treaty, of which he knew nothing. Neither did Sir Charles Napier! He had made no treaty, given no pledge, knew not to what Major Outram alluded!

Sustained by irrefragable proofs, the General's answers to these various accusations and imaginings satisfied the Government in the East and in England. Lord Ellenborough and the Council at Calcutta placed on record their strong sense of the honour and ability of Sir Charles Napier; and their astonishment at the extent of Major Outram's delusion as to the Ameers. The Ministers in England moved the thanks of both Houses of Parliament to the gallant troops and their leader: they proclaimed their glowing admiration of the great qualities of the man, whose purity and public

honour they had so recently been led to doubt. The Duke of Wellington's encomiums of his military capacity, amply and forcibly expressed, yet with a nice discrimination of circumstances, which shewed that he had critically examined the operations, may be considered as history and fame.

With these guides, the full force of the General's vindicatory letters will be understood, and the merits of Major Outram as an Indian diplomatist, a military counsellor, and a friend may be judged.

The Sovereign, and the two Houses of Parliament, have accepted the policy of Lord Ellenborough and the exploits of Sir Charles Napier, as honourable augmentations to England's glory; yet secret and nameless calumniators still labour, by appealing to faction, to lower the fame of those brave and worthy men; and with a cuckoo cry continually assail them, wilfully misrepresenting their justification, as one founded on expediency in scorn of justice, whereas it is founded on expediency supported by justice.

It was both inexpedient and unjust to invade Affghanistan; but that war being once commenced it became expedient though unjust, to coerce the Ameers of Scinde; and so by the Auckland Government it was done, with the vice of hypocrisy superadded.

It was expedient and just, that Lord Ellenborough, being Governor-General, should seek to save the Anglo-Indian Empire from the danger in which it had been placed, by the folly and injustice of his predecessor.

It was expedient and just, that Lord Ellenborough should, to attain that paramount object, insist

PART
II.

upon the maintenance of existing treaties in all their integrity; and punish those who violated them at a crisis so vital.

The Ameers of Scinde were bound by the Auckland treaties; they had been unjustly imposed upon those rulers, but they had signed them without a public protest, and had for three years made them the guide and guarantee of their alliance with the British Power. They had profited from their provisions, acknowledged they were binding, and after being deposed, claimed merit not only for adhering to them, but for having been earnest to bring them about. This claim was false indeed on both heads, but it admitted the fact that the alliance rested on those treaties.

The Ameers had violated, grossly and frequently, the Auckland treaties; and that in the view of driving the British army from Scinde, and abating the power of England in India.

It was expedient and just, that Lord Ellenborough should punish such transgressions, and insure future faith by imposing new conditions, seeing the first had failed. The Ameers accepted the new conditions, but at the very moment of signing and ratifying them with their seals, attacked the British troops, not in despair, but in the full hope and confidence of destroying them. They were utterly defeated, and it became expedient, and just and wise, and benevolent, to put an end to their horrid rule.

It was just, because they had shewn that they could not be trusted in peace or war. It was expedient, because it was for the interests of England. It was benevolent, because the well-being of the Scindian people and even of the Beloochs, fairly considered, was secured thereby. It was wise, be-

cause it was benevolent, and because it promoted civilization and commerce in barbarous countries.

CHAP.
VIII.

Who has suffered by it? The Ameers only! The very persons who had offended. To remove such brutal treacherous tyrants, having a well grounded right to do so, was an act of beneficence worthy of England's greatness. The conquest of Scinde is therefore no iniquity. The glory of the achievement is a pure flame kindled on the altar of justice.


The first part of the report is devoted to a general
 description of the country and its resources. It
 is followed by a detailed account of the
 various industries and occupations of the
 people. The report concludes with a
 summary of the principal facts and
 a list of the names of the
 persons who were engaged in the
 survey.

| Name | Rank | Service |
|-------------------|---------|-----------|
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| James B. Jones | Captain | 1845-1850 |
| William C. Brown | Major | 1845-1850 |
| Robert D. White | Captain | 1845-1850 |
| Thomas E. Green | Major | 1845-1850 |
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APPENDIX, No. I.

BEING A CONTINUATION OF THE APPENDIX TO CHAP. VI.
 1ST PART, TOUCHING THE CONDUCT OF SIR CHARLES
 NAPIER, IN THE MATTER OF THE AMEER ROOSTUM'S
 CESSION OF THE TURBAN TO ALI MOORAD.

SECTION I.

Sir C. Napier to Ali Moorad, December, 1842.

“ Meer Roostum Khan voluntarily went to your Highness's fortress of Dejee ; he there publicly and formally placed the Turban on your head. He then wrote solemnly in the sacred Khoran, that he had given to you the Turban of the Talpoors.

“ When I heard of these things, I asked permission to wait upon the Ameer, to speak with his Highness as to the new treaty, and to hear from his own lips that he had given up public affairs to your guidance. What was the course pursued by his Highness ? He abandons your roof, he flies from me, he places himself at the head of those Ameers who have been intriguing against the English, and who have, as you inform me, collected bands for the purpose of resistance to the authority of the Turban. This is strange conduct in the Ameer. The only course for me to pursue is to advise your Highness publicly to proclaim to the Scindians, that you are the legitimate chief of the Talpoors ; to call on the other Ameers to obey you as such and to dismiss their armed followers. If they refuse, I will disperse them by force. To those Ameers you will preserve their lands, but no fortress shall be held in upper Scinde but by your Highness's *Killedar*.”

SECTION 2.

Sir C. Napier to Meer Ali Moorad, Jan. 14th, 1843.

I understand from Major Outram, that he thinks your Highness has not clearly understood what has been interpreted to you, which makes me greatly regret not being able to speak with your Highness myself, that I might make myself understood by your Highness personally. The next safe thing is to put my meaning into writing. The Governor-General has ordered me to support your Highness as the lawful possessor of the Turban. As Rais, your Highness has certain privileges and certain lands, which appertain, not to the individual, but to the Turban. These must be given to you with the Turban, but the rights and possessions of the other Ameers must be maintained, as prescribed in the draft of the new treaty; and I endeavoured from the first to have it explained to your Highness, that no portion of their estates can be transferred to you. If they resist the arms of the Company in war, and if a shot be fired by them at the troops under my command, then I have orders to take all their estates, in the name of the Company, and they would not be made over to your Highness; at least such, in my belief, is the intention of the Governor-General. I hope, therefore, that your Highness will explain to your relations, what great loss of power and territory would fall upon the Talpoor family, if any of them commit hostilities upon the troops under my orders.

SECTION 3.

*Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General in Council,
August 16th, 1843.*

By reference to my letters and proclamations, it will be seen that I promised to preserve to all the Ameers their rights. If Roostum had legally bestowed upon his brother Ali Moorad, all his, Roostum's lands, I should have held myself pledged to support that gift in the discussion of the details of the treaty. If Meer Roostum had not done so, then would his Highness in that dis-

cussion have rejected the claims of Ali Moorad, and I should have felt bound to support his Highness Meer Roostum. I more than once repeated to their Highnesses Ali Moorad and Roostum, that all should be supported in their rights and possessions. My letters and proclamations to this effect are before your Lordship in Council; but I never attended to the details of private transactions, the time for which had not arrived.

In one of the letters to Major Outram, I proposed, even after insult had been offered to me by the Ameer Roostum, to receive him with every honour and attention, whenever he pleased to come to my camp. From first to last, I sought a meeting with Meer Roostum. I made every effort to succeed. Once I sent Major Outram into the Ameer's camp; it was close to mine; he persuaded Outram that he was tired, and would not come. This was all a trick, as I well knew at the time. I was always baffled by the Ameer himself, not by the intrigues of Ali Moorad, as the Major believes, but, as I assert, by the Ameer himself, which finally changed the opinion I originally entertained, that Roostum's flight from Dejee was caused by his brother. I became satisfied that his flight was a voluntary act of the old Ameer's concocting. He is full of duplicity. This, subsequent events have proved. He fled in like manner from Outram.

By the above your Lordship and Council will perceive three important things :—

First. That I made every attempt to ascertain from the Ameer himself, whether or not he had voluntarily made over the Turban to his brother, and I was invariably foiled by the Ameer himself.

Secondly. That I considered the lands given over, exclusive of those belonging to the Turban, as a mere private transaction, with which my Government had then no concern; that it was an affair for after consideration in discussing the details of the treaty.

Thirdly. That I was without a choice, obliged by treaty to acknowledge Ali Moorad. It was the Ameer Roostum, not I, that had given him the Turban. But I was very glad that it was so, for it was evident, that the Ameer Roos-

tum's conduct made it almost impossible to negotiate with him. I could not trust him; and Major Outram, who was his personal friend, was duped by him.

It may be worth remarking, that before Meer Roostum made over his Turban and lands to Meer Ali Moorad at Dejee, he had placed all those lands and the forts in the hands of his son and out of his own power, (see his letter, a translation of which I enclose.) This shews that he was casting discord amongst his relations, for it is evident, that he had virtually made his son the Rais, as Ali Moorad averred and said he would not submit to it, all this shews the duplicity of this Prince.

SECTION 4.

*Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General in Council,
Sept. 29, 1843.*

In reply to your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant, I am again obliged to dissect Major Outram's letter. The sentence to which your Lordship refers is contained in the Major's letter of the 24th Jan. I shall take certain sentences and examine them:—

Major Outram.—"Assigning to Ali Moorad what has been pledged to him, viz. one fourth of the remaining territory of upper Scinde as his perquisite as Rais, besides one fourth as co-heir of the former sovereign, Meer Sorab."

What has been pledged to Ali Moorad? By law Meer Ali Moorad became Rais. By law certain revenues are attached to the Turban. The laws of his family and country are pledged to him, and he is pledged to them to perform the duties of the chieftainship. I know of no other pledges.

When his Highness Meer Ali Moorad told me he would never interfere with his brother's chieftainship, he added, that he would not allow him to place the Turban on the head of his, Roostum's, son. "It is," said he, "either my brother's during his life, or mine if he chooses to resign it, but it cannot be placed on the head of my nephew. This shall not be, for I have force sufficient to prevent it ;

what I want to know is, whether you will interfere with me or not?" This is the substance of our conversation. My answer to the Ameer was distinct. It admitted of no equivocation; it entered into no treaty; it gave no pledge. The substance was—"By the existing treaties of 1839, the British Government is bound to support the Ameer in their rights. You have a right to the Turban; the existing treaty obliges me to support you, and I will support you."

Your Lordship will perceive that I merely assured his Highness that I would support the treaty, and this assurance was in a casual conversation. But Major Outram's words imply that some treaty had been entered into by me with Ali Moorad, and, as I know nothing beyond what I have stated above, I must leave it to Major Outram to explain his own meaning.

Major Outram.—"And as you are bound, I understand, to make good to Ali Moorad his share."

I know not what Major Outram understood, or did not understand, but I was bound to nothing, neither to Ali Moorad, nor any other Ameer.

With regard to the claim of Ali Moorad to part of the territory ceded to Bhawalpoor all that passed between me and his Highness here follows:—

Conversing on the march to Emaum Ghur, the Ameer told me that he possessed one or two villages in the midst of the territory ceded to Bhawalpoor, but he added, throwing up his head, "they are trifling things, and the Governor-General is welcome to them." I replied, "if your Highness has any possessions in that territory the Governor-General has not been aware of it, and when the details are arranged any loss of this kind will be made good to you. The new draft treaty does not contemplate depriving your Highness of any part of your possessions." This is all that passed, and as nearly as I can recollect, the interpretation was in the above words. It is not impossible that a similar conversation may have passed more than once between Sheik Ali Houssein (Ali Moorad's vizier) and myself; indeed, I am sure this must have been the case, for I find a pencil memorandum on Outram's letter, saying, that the Moonshee, Ali Ackbar, informed me that the village, or pergunnah, in

question, was in value from 40 to 50,000 rupees; and the Secretary of Government, Mr. Brown, informs me he thinks the value does not amount to more than 30,000 rupees at the utmost.

Major Outram.—"By a late treaty."

What treaty Major Outram alludes to I know not. I have already said that *treaty, pledge, or promise*, entered into by me, *there has been none*. I know that before I arrived in Scinde, Meer Ali Moorad and his family were at war; a battle had been fought, in which he defeated his brother Roostum and the rest of his family. Roostum, I believe, gave himself up to Ali Moorad on the field of battle. The general opinion that I heard at the time I arrived was, that Meer Roostum and his family had behaved ill to Ali Moorad. However, the latter made it up with his brother on the field of battle, and some family compact may then have been entered into, but that such was the case I do not know, nor did I ever hear that any such compact had taken place. I have been driven to the conjecture in my endeavour to account for Major Outram's expression, "*By a late treaty.*"

Finally, my Lord, I never gave, or promised, a farthing of money or an inch of land to his Highness Ali Moorad, although Major Outram seems to think, from his letters, and from what I have since heard of his conversations at Bombay, that I piled riches and power upon the Ameer! I made him one present; it was an elephant; your Lordship confirmed the gift; and to shew your Lordship how very cautious I have ever been in giving what is not my own property, I took a pledge from his Highness that if your Lordship disapproved of my giving the elephant, he was to pay for it, for as I take no presents I am too poor to make them myself. Ali Moorad's conduct appears to have been loyal from first to last, both to his family and to the British Government. It is obvious that this was his interest, but with his motives we have nothing to do. The fact has been as I state, and had the Talpoors been ruled by the advice of his Highness they would now have been in the full enjoyment of their sovereignty.

APPENDIX, No. II.

TOUCHING MAJOR OUTRAM'S NOTES OF CONFERENCES
WITH THE AMEERS.

[The notes are to be found in the Parliamentary Papers on Scinde; the substance has been given in the narrative of Major Outram's diplomacy at Hyderabad.]

SECTION 1.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee,
June 13th, 1843.*

“ These notes I never read until I saw them to-day. I know absolutely nothing of what may have passed between Major Outram and the Ameers, while he was acting as Commissioner under Sir C. Napier for the settlement of the details of the treaty, to which the Ameers had generally given their assent.”

SECTION 2.

*Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General,
Hyderabad, July 11th, 1843.*

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter, dated 14th ultimo, which arrived here yesterday, inclosing some notes of conversations held by Major Outram with the Ameers, and with their vakeels, between the 8th and 13th February last.

The notes of the meeting with the Ameers, on the 12th of February, were probably sent to me, but I did not receive them.

The notes of the meeting on the 8th February, I received on the 11th, these I could not forward to your

Lordship, because, after the 13th, our communications were intercepted; but the inclosed copy of a letter to Major Outram shows that I intended to do so, although I did not think it necessary, as we were on the eve of a battle, which I knew could not take place if the Ameers were honest and spoke the truth. After the action, the Ameers placed my small force in so much danger, by their intrigues with Meer Shere Mohamed, that I never thought more of Outram's "minutes," till I received your Lordship's present letter.

Recurring to that period, and as it seems that Major Outram has sent his statement to the Government, it is incumbent on me to show what weight was due to his judgment on that occasion, and what weight also was due to the assertions of the Ameers, that they wanted to keep the peace with us; for upon their sincerity depends any value which may be supposed to attach to their conversations with Outram.

I shall, for the present, confine my remarks to the period between the 8th and 12th of February.

Major Outram had been deceived by the Ameers. On the 10th and 11th February, he sent two letters to me, following each other, by express; these letters contained three important things:—

1. A request that I should halt the troops.
2. A request that I should go in person to Hyderabad.
3. The information that the Ameers had dispersed all their troops.

Now, my Lord, it so happened, that the moment when Major Outram wrote the above, 25,862 fighting men were, a portion of them strengthening their position at Meeanee, about six miles off, and the others were round Major Outram's house, preparing to attack it.

Ten thousand men of the Chandia tribe had crossed the river, and were coming down the left bank of the Indus, in my rear; 7000 of Meer Roostum's men were within thirty miles, in rear of my left flank at Kohera, and were about to march on Meeanee; 10,000, under Shere Mohamed, were marching from Meerpoor; and in the moun-

tains on the right bank of the Indus, thousands more were preparing to come; so that I had, as my spies correctly stated, 25,000 men in my front, and 25,000 more marching upon me in all directions, and these without reference to the tribes gathering in the hills, and all these, as the Ameers affirmed to Major Outram, perfectly beyond their control. Yet Major Outram sent me two letters in one day, to assure me that the Ameers had dismissed all their troops, and asked me to let him give them a pledge that I would not march. Thus, in a most perilous position, would the Major's advice have completely shackled my movements, and placed my small army beyond the power of being saved, except by a miracle.

In examining the foregoing facts, let me draw your Lordship's attention to two very important points:—


1. That the Ameers did not want to have peace, that they were confident of victory, and had accurately calculated the day I should arrive at Meeanee, namely the 17th February: and they knew that they could not assemble their full force of 50,000 men, till the night of the 17th or the morning of the 18th of February. Therefore all their diplomacy of dissimulation, procrastination, and protestation, was put in force to deceive Major Outram and obtain a pledge that I should halt, if only for a day. I think he would have so pledged himself, had I not positively forbidden him to give any pledge without my consent.

That this was the real motive of the anxiety exhibited by the Ameers, to suspend my march if only for a day, is made more apparent by the fact that there was no advantage to be gained by delaying the signature of the draft Treaty. On the contrary, to sign this draft would enable the Ameers at once to discuss and formally to protest against any and every part of it, while it would relieve them at once from the presence of our troops; but they were confident of victory, and wanted to fight. There were 25,000 men to be obtained by one day's delay in my arrival at Meeanee; and if the Ameers could have gained a week, it would have brought us into the hot season, which they thought would paralyze my movements, and finally destroy the troops—they were in a great measure right.

2. Had I been persuaded to believe in the jesuitical protestations of the Ameers, I should have betrayed the British arms.

Now, my Lord, when I considered these matters, I saw that I could place no faith in the truth of the Ameers. Their "conversations" appeared to me to be so much waste-paper.

But this was not all. Outram had asked me seriously to go to Hyderabad alone, and recommended me to send my troops to Meerpoor. My throat would have been cut, of course; and the troops having lost their General, and having been removed forty miles from their line of communication, viz. the Indus, would have been placed as follows:—



From this position they would very quickly have been pushed into the desert, and there every soul must have perished; even victory could not have saved them, they could never have regained the river, harassed by a repulsed but hourly increasing force for forty miles, a force more than twenty times their own numbers before the battle.

As Major Outram seems to have forwarded his notes, I think he ought also to have forwarded my denial of Meer Roostum's assertions.

This does not appear to have been done, so I take the liberty of sending herewith a copy of my letter; being indeed the same letter in which I acknowledged the receipt of the conversation with the Ameers on the 8th of February.

Though much harassed by the unavoidable labour, which attaches to the command of a young and inexperienced force suddenly assembled, I am not aware that I left anything unreported to your Lordship that I considered of importance; but, in case of accident, I have all my letters to the Ameers copied, as well as my proclamations, together

with any letters to Major Outram, which bear on the subject; indeed, I believe, all I have do so. These will enable your Lordship to shew the English Government, that I did all but sacrifice the honour of our arms to maintain the peace, for which I believe that both your Lordship and myself were as anxious as Major Outram or any other person."

SECTION 3.

*The Governor-General in Council to Sir C. Napier,
Calcutta, August 7th, 1843.*

"We have all read with the greatest interest your Excellency's letter of the 11th ult., communicating certain explanations, with respect to your correspondence with Major Outram immediately before the battle of Meeanee, and with respect to the position of your army at that period.

We cannot but feel that it is to your penetration and decision, your army owes its safety.

Major Outram's confidential letter to you, of the 11th of February, he had intended to send by a servant of Meer Roostum, who was then betraying him by a false statement of his force at Khoonhera; yet that letter contained a suggestion, which, if communicated to Meer Ali Moorad, might have added him to the confederacy against us.

On the 15th of February, Major Outram observed, that his despatches of the last few days would have led you to expect, that his earnest endeavours to effect an amicable arrangement with the Ameers of Scinde would fail; yet, on the previous day, the Ameers had affixed their seals to the treaty, a proceeding usually viewed in the light of an amicable arrangement, or at least, an arrangement intended to preclude hostilities, not immediately as in this case to precede them."

SECTION 4.

*Sir C. Napier, to the Governor-General,
Hyderabad, July 13, 1843.*

I was much vexed at myself for not having sent Major Outram's notes of his interview with the Ameers, because I

received them on the 11th of February, and the post was open to the 13th, as I find, by a long letter written to your Lordship on that day.

We were all hard-worked at the time, and I recollect thinking that, as a battle would take place, or peace be made in a few days, (if Major Outram's assertions were correct), the face of affairs would change. I therefore delayed sending this paper, till I heard of the Ameers having signed the draft Treaty. I had however made preparations for sending the notes of Outram's meeting to your Lordship, for I have just found among my papers, a copy of that paper prepared for transmission to your Lordship, and with it I find my private notes made on reading it. I had by that time discovered, that there was a party resolved to support the Ameers through thick and thin.

I received Outram's notes on the 11th, I must have made these notes that evening. The copy, occupied as every one was, could hardly have been ready before the evening of the 12th. I required much time each of those days to be alone in uninterrupted reflection, upon the conflicting information sent me by Major Outram, and the reports of my spies. It was impossible to "*jump at conclusions.*" Major Outram's character and local experience, gave great weight to his assertions, yet they were diametrically opposed to the statements of the scouts. The fate of the force, perhaps much more, depended on my decision; few men could go through more anxiety than I did during those days, lest disgrace should fall on the British arms through my agency. The papers found on the Murree chiefs, and their arrest, had occupied all the 12th nearly, and decided my opinion. There remained little doubt of the way in which Outram had been duped. I thought it essential, the copies of the letters found on the Murree chief Hyat Khan, should be sent to your Lordship, in case of any misfortune befalling the troops. I still hoped for the promised treaty, and must have intended to send that and the notes on the interview together. On the 14th all communication was at an end, and my whole time occupied by preparations for meeting the enemy, endeavouring to ascertain where he was, what were his intentions, our proper direction of march, for our

guides were either treacherous or frightened to death. The Ameers and their falsehoods passed from my head; their armies alone occupied my attention. The march upon an enemy of such force, was alone so engrossing, that really if I had thought these papers important, which I neither did, nor do now, I could not have attended to them. If they produce annoyance, or throw difficulties in your Lordship's way, very deeply do I regret that I forgot to send them after the battle.

SECTION 5.

*The Governor-General in Council, to the Secret Committee,
August 14th, 1843.*

Sir C. Napier has entered at some length into a justification of his proceedings previous to the battle of Meeanee. In doing this, he has placed upon our records a mass of most curious and interesting matter, which we regret that it was not in our power to lay before you at an earlier period. We strongly feel that it was to Major-General Sir C. Napier's penetration and decision that our army owed its safety; and we are astonished at the extent to which Major Outram suffered himself to be deluded by the Ameers.

We transmit for your consideration, certain memorials which the ex-Ameers have addressed to us from Scinde; but we consider it unnecessary to make any observations upon them. Sir C. Napier's indignant refutation of the calumnious charges brought against himself and the gallant troops whom he commands, will be sufficient to satisfy you that the Ameers are without truth.

SECTION 6.

*Remarks on Letter from the ex-Ameers Roostum Khan
and Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor to the Rt. Hon. Sir
Robert Peel, dated 17th August, 1844.*

THE AMEERS WRITE—

“ In the meantime Mr. Ross Bell was appointed Resi-
dent, and arrived at Sukkur, part of our kingdom, and
“ aided my younger brother, Meer Ali Moorad, in seizing

“four or five inhabited villages of my country, which I had presented to my nephew Meer Nusseer Khan.”

REMARKS.

On the division of upper Scinde by the deceased Meer Sohrab Khan, he, to prevent future disputes, wrote in his Koran, detailing exactly the shares of his three sons, Meers Roostum, Moobarick, and Ali Moorad Khan. By this deed the villages alluded to were granted to Ali Moorad Khan: during the minority of this Meer the villages were by deceit taken possession of by his brothers in 1838. Ali Moorad assembled a force to recover the villages he had been unjustly deprived of. Roostum Khan persuaded him to disband his force, solemnly promising by writing in the Koran to cause the restoration to Ali Moorad of the villages. This promise Roostum Khan broke. On the British troops being located in Scinde the matter in dispute was, according to treaty, submitted to the Political Agent, Mr. Ross Bell, who after due inquiry adjudged the case in favour of Ali Moorad. That decision has been approved of and confirmed by the Rt. Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed)

E. J. BROWN,
Secretary to Scinde Government.

THE MEERS WRITE—

“After about seven days, on the 16th of Zil Kadur, 1257 Hegira, Captain Brown came to Khyrpoor, and said, ‘If you agree to seal the treaty—good; if not, the English army, which is now at Pultun, near Roree, will march on Khyrpoor to-morrow and plunder it.’ Under this threat he compelled me to seal (sign) the new treaty; he also told me I was to be guided in all parts of my conduct by the advice of my younger brother, Ali Moorad, which I would find for my advantage.”

REMARKS.

There is not one word of truth in this. I was deputed on the occasion referred to by Major-General Sir C. Napier

to take a letter to Meer Roostum and Nusseer Khan at Khyrpoor, calling on them to give a direct answer whether they would sign the new treaty, which had previously been offered for their acceptance. They detained me more than two hours, endeavouring to persuade me to enter into a discussion of the details of the treaty. I gave them but one answer throughout, viz. that I had no authority to enter into any such discussion, that I was the bearer of a letter to them, and that I required their reply, yes or no—and that if they would not give it I should leave for Sukkur without it. They eventually gave me a reply stating their willingness to sign the treaty.

I need hardly remark that at this period no British troops had passed the Indus from Sukkur. Ali Moorad's name was not once mentioned in the conversation.

(Signed)

E. J. BROWN,

Secretary to Scinde Government.

APPENDIX, No. III.

SUPPLEMENTARY LETTER TOUCHING MAJOR OUTRAM'S DIPLOMACY.

SECTION I.

Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General.

Hyderabad, July 3rd, 1843.

A private letter from Bombay informs me that a letter received from * * *, says he "considered the destruction of Emaum Ghur, as a more flagitious act than the attack upon the Residency."

The name of this wise person, is not known to the Author of this work, or it should be given.

As nothing would give me more pain than having done anything which might expose your Lordship to attack, it is necessary for me to furnish proofs that I have not done so.

1. Emaum Ghur, with all other fortresses in upper Scinde, belonged to the Turban, or "Rais."

2. His Highness Ali Moorad was Rais by the law of Scinde, and Meer Mohamed was in rebellion against him.

3. His Highness accompanied me to Emaum Ghur.

On our arrival, he proposed to destroy the fortress, but afterwards seemed doubtful whether he would do so or not. I wrote to his Highness to convince him of the necessity of that measure.

4. He consented, and I enclose to your Lordship His Highness's reply, authorising me to destroy Emaum Ghur.

5. His Highness himself fired some of the guns, and once or twice threw shells into the fort, so that I was fully borne out in what I did by the owner of the fortress. I could legally have done the same thing under the like sanction, in the middle of England, and this without adverting to the breaches of treaty, and preparations for war everywhere carrying on by the Ameers against us.

Another charge against me I find to be, that my "continued march upon Hyderabad, in despite of the advice of Major Outram, was that which forced the Ameers to war." I certainly did reject Major Outram's advice, because I soon saw that he was grossly deceived by the Ameers. I had several proofs of this, one or two of which I now feel it right to state to your Lordship.

1. Major Outram, being at Hyderabad, sent me two (or three my journal says, but I can find but two) despatches by express, on the 12th, to assure me that the Ameers had not any armed men except their usual personal attendants, and that these were not more numerous than Indian Princes of their rank, would move with in time of profound peace. At that moment the army of the Ameers was assembled at Meeanee, only six miles from Hyderabad, and were preparing their position! At the moment he was writing these despatches to me, his house was surrounded by 8000 Beloochees (who had eight pieces of cannon,) preparing for their attack on him, the 15th February.

2. Major Outram wrote to ask me to go to Hyderabad alone to meet the Ameers.

3. He proposed my sending my troops to Meerpoor.

Had I allowed myself to be guided by Major Outram, my own throat and his, and the throats of all with us, would probably have been cut, and the army left without a leader at Meerpoor, forty miles from the river, which formed our

line of communication by steamer with Sukkur and Bombay, and with the friendly territory of His Highness Ali Moorad, which extended south as far as Nowsharra: when thus isolated, the army would have been attacked by 60,000 men, pushed back upon the desert, and there have miserably perished.

As Major Outram had lived many years at the Court of Hyderabad, and every one spoke of his "great local knowledge of the Ameers, and of this country," while I was a perfect stranger to both, I might well have been excused (supposing anything can excuse a general officer for losing an army,) had I allowed myself to have been guided by Major Outram; and his advice was pressed upon me with all the zeal inspired by honesty of purpose, added to an ardent disposition. But my spies brought me intelligence that 30,000 men were in my front; some said 40,000. I concluded that these spies exaggerated numbers, but it was clear to my mind that the Beloochees were above 20,000 men, and in sufficient numbers to make them believe that their victory would be certain. Therefore I argued that Major Outram's report was wrong, that he was deceived, and ignorant of what was passing about him. His proposal to march the troops to Meerpoor, made me think that he understood very little of war; I therefore paid no attention to his suggestions. I put all my sick and treasure on board a steamer, and resolved to attack the enemy; if we were beaten we had plenty of provisions, and with our backs to the river, (for retreat would have been disastrous) and the steamers, I would have entrenched myself till reinforcements arrived. I had full confidence in the troops, and little feared an undisciplined multitude; but still the game was not an easy one; and I have shewn that, had I taken Outram's advice, as I was reproached for not having done, a second Cabool massacre would probably have taken place.

One would have imagined that the attack on the Residency would have, at least, opened Outram's eyes to the treachery of the characters he had to deal with. Not a bit; he joined me on the 16th at Muttaree, and still wanted me to delay my attack for a day! yet, six hours delay would

have added 24,000 men to the forces of the Ameers at Meeanee. It is true that I had no positive information of this at the moment; but I was sure of it from the letter I found on the Murree chief, Hyat Khan, whom I had seized. In this letter the Ameers pressed the Murrees to join on the 9th. Now, I knew that these barbarians would not leave their villages, while the feast of the Moharrem lasted, it was to finish on the 11th; therefore I guessed how fast they would gather after that day, and I resolved not to lose an hour. If my conduct be attacked in the House of Commons, I think the foregoing statement will be a sufficient defence. I am not conscious of having erred in rejecting Major Outram's advice.

Outram's answer will be, "there would not have been war." The Ameers answered this on the 15th; but suppose not; was I to place the army at their mercy, to spare or destroy, as they pleased? Their mercy! I have it in proof, that about the time Major Outram kept assuring me of their pacific feelings and disposition towards us, they had sent orders along both banks of the Indus to their people, "to kill every Englishman, woman and child, they could lay their hands upon." We should have received the tender mercies of the Affghans in the Tezeen Pass,—the mercy which Outram would have received himself, but for my forebodings, and sending him the light company of the 22nd regiment.

SECTION 2.

Meer Ali Moorad to Sir Charles Napier.

January 12th, 1843.

I have received your letter pointing out several reasons why you think it would be better to blow up Emaum Ghur. As far as the value of the property goes, I am quite indifferent; and I fully concur with you in the reasons which make it necessary to destroy it. Therefore, considering me joyfully willing, by all means blow up the fort and consider me always your well-wisher.

SECTION 3.

Sir Charles Napier to Major Outram.

Hyderabad, 22nd July, 1843.

MY DEAR OUTRAM,

1. Before I proceed to discuss other things, I shall begin by observing, that in one of your letters, you twice remark, that you had only received a short note from me. Now the only letters which I have received of yours which I have not answered, are those dated the 8th and 29th of March; the first (with a letter from Lady Napier about the same date, and yours, describing your visit to Mahabuleshwar), I only received a few days ago!!! so it is idle to refer to any letters but those actually received.

2. I could not reply to your letter, dated 20th, sooner; that of the 29th, reached me as I was going out against Shere Mohamed; that of the 8th, I have only had a few days. If I had not a sincere regard for you, I should have no anxiety at all! However, I shall state all that has passed, and you must judge how far you consider yourself right or wrong. I am placed in a situation where in my own defence I am obliged to state all that passed between the 3rd and 12th of February. I am attacked both in public papers and private letters, and I am accused of forcing on the war, because I did not allow myself to be advised by you to halt, but am said to have attacked the Ameers after they had signed the treaty; and about four days ago I had a letter from Lord Ellenborough, saying that he had received from the Secret Committee, printed notes of conversations between you as Commissioner, and the Ameers, and asking if I had ever heard of these conversations; and expressing his surprise at now hearing of them for the first time. At the same time private letters have said that I am supposed to have intercepted reports made by you, and which ought to have gone to the Governor-General.

3. How these notes came into the hands of the Secret Committee, I do not know, nor do I the least care; but the results are these:—*First.* That Lord Ellenborough evi-

dently attaches importance to them, and as I never sent them to him, I appear, till he gets my explanation, as if I concealed what passed from his Lordship for the purpose of forcing the Ameers to battle. *Second.* That Sir George Arthur also attaches importance to these papers, in consequence of his conversation with you and their own contents, for he sent them to Lord Fitzgerald. *Thirdly.* That the Secret Committee attach importance to these notes because they have not only sent them to Lord Ellenborough, but caused them to be printed! My position has therefore this appearance, that I intercepted most important papers, which, had they reached Lord Ellenborough, might have prevented the war; or, that even if I had been induced by your advice to halt and to act differently from the way in which I did act, the war would not have broken out; and worse, (if any thing can be worse), that I so betrayed Lord Ellenborough who had placed unbounded confidence in me, and given me the utmost possible support in every way. This was the position in which the letters from Lord Ellenborough and Sir G. Arthur, must have placed me in my own and their opinion, and this the position in which the printing of those notes, if they become public, must place me in the opinion of the world. Now it is quite clear that if such was the state of the case, I might perhaps be allowed to lay claim to courage, and to some degree of military skill, because success will generally give a man so much credit; but assuredly I could never pretend to honour, to humanity, or to be trusted with the slightest diplomatic transaction; in short, I should deservedly be execrated as a resolute scoundrel, who had sacrificed every thing to military glory, and turned a deaf ear to the supplicating cry of injured and betrayed Princes. This would be my position in face of the public, supposing that there be a word of truth in the whole story. That there is not, it was necessary to show to Lord Ellenborough and my friends.

4. I therefore directly answered Lord Ellenborough thus. *Firstly.* That I had only received *two* of the conversations, and I believed that the third had been intercepted. *Secondly.* I sent him the copy of those notes, prepared on

purpose to send to his Lordship with the probable reasons why they were not. *Thirdly*. I forwarded to his Lordship your demi-official letters, between the 8th and 13th of February, (first examining them to see that they contained nothing private). *Fourthly*. I told him that my reasons for not halting, were that I knew the assertions contained in those conversations to be false as respected anything I had done, especially Roostum's assertion, that I had made him give himself up to Ali Moorad; and that I thought when you showed that assertion to Sir G. Arthur, you should also have shown him my contradiction of it, (perhaps you did?) *Fifthly*. That your wanting me to halt, and twice in one day, and once in another, telling me that the Ameers had dispersed their forces, when I knew that they had not, convinced me that you were deceived by the Ameers; that your wanting me to go to Hyderabad without my army added another proof to my conviction that they had deceived you, and finally, that your proposing to me to march to Meerpoor completed the proofs. *Sixthly*. That the important letter I found on the Murree chief Hyat Khan, coupled with my secret intelligence and a comparison with the Ameers' anxiety that I should halt, proved to me past all hesitation or doubt, that they were only trying to gain a day or two, that they might bring 50,000 men to Meeanee, instead of 25,000 which they had, and our subsequent knowledge of events leaves this a matter of history. Therefore, had I halted I should have lost the army, unless saved by a miracle; and if the force had marched to Meerpoor and lost its line of communication with the Indus, it would equally have been destroyed. Now you, a Major, without much experience of war, may well be excused such errors; but I as an experienced General officer could have no excuse; and should be very justly condemned. Therefore, for these reasons, I stand acquitted for not attending to your advice. *Finally*. I have told his Lordship my reason for being silent, and not keeping him informed on these matters with that exactness which I did on all others. That reason was, that I thought it would injure you in his Lordship's opinion; and this I was anxious to avoid. Afterwards I gave that up, because it

was evidently out of the question ; so that when, not long ago, he wrote to tell me he heard you were going to apply for employment again in Scinde, I told his Lordship I was sure you were not going to apply, for that our ideas of the politics in Scinde were so adverse, that our working together was impossible.

Now, my dear Outram, whether it has been you or your friends that have pushed this matter a head, I know not ; but it has been done, and I necessarily have defended and will defend my conduct. "*It has been done,*" as * * * * * very justly says in a letter to me, speaking of the attacks of the press, "*to attack Lord Ellenborough through you.*" All this has passed within a few days, except the attacks upon me in the papers, (especially the Bombay Times.) They have long been at work, but I did not condescend to defend myself against them, nor indeed had I time.

Having now told you all that has passed, I shall refer to your letter dated 20th March. You are angry that Lord Ellenborough did not thank you for your exertions during the short time you were Commissioner, and you say you are sure I reported to him all your exertions ; my answer is that I did no such thing. I studiously avoided mentioning your name to Lord Ellenborough, as I was well aware that my appointing you Commissioner was contrary to his opinion ; from all you had told me I judged this. You were not his selection, and I have heard that he was surprised at hearing that the papers, without contradiction, held you up as having powers in Scinde. If any one had to thank you it was me, and I did so in my despatch. As to your political exertions they failed ; my advance is said to be the cause of that failure ; to thank you for them would have been to condemn myself. Now I entirely differed with you except in your wish to prevent blood being shed. We even there differed in our motive ; I did it from humanity alone, thinking the war policy of Lord Ellenborough perfectly just ; you wished to keep the peace because you thought the policy unjust, and, as you said to me, "every drop of blood shed you thought was murder." Of course, in despite of such feelings, you exerted yourself as

you were bound to do after accepting the office ; but I confess I see nothing in that which particularly calls for public thanks ! Suppose that the Ameers had made peace, and no battle taken place, should I have thanked you, or expected Lord Ellenborough to thank *me* ? Certainly not ; I should have expected no such thing ; my view of thanks is that they are only to be given for great success in battle, or for a long series of brilliant civil service. I confess I can not see how it casts the slightest reflection upon you ; but I think your wishing to moot the question is injudicious ; I did all I could to avoid the question being brought forward ; but it has now been done, and we must both abide the public judgment, for assuredly I never will allow it to be even hinted at without a flat contradiction that I led Lord Ellenborough into error—that I deceived him—that I was unequal to the high position in which her Majesty had placed me as a General officer. Even the affection of a brother should by me be swept away in a question involving my honour and military character ; if you were wrong it was an error of judgment ; if I was wrong it was either a criminal sacrifice to a thirst of military glory, or a total ignorance of my profession.

This brings me to another matter. The violence of a party against Lord Ellenborough at Bombay, I hear, says that I made my promised account of the defence of the Residency, and that Lord Ellenborough “burked it.” This is false, I did mean to make it, and I do mean to make it, but I never said when, nor can I *now* ! I have not time to devote *at least* two days to make a good dissertation on the defence of outposts, and give the Residency as an example in all its details. You know the heat here, and that the operations I have carried on, military and civil, since the capture of Hyderabad, preclude all work which is not absolutely necessary, but I nevertheless do mean to write the essay on the defence of the Residency when I *can*.

I assure you that this business of defending my conduct has given me more pain and annoyance than anything that has happened to me in Scinde.

Believe me to be, my dear Outram,

Yours truly,

(Signed)

C. J. NAPIER.

I beg of you not to mistake me ; I neither do nor have a right to object to your defending both the cause of the Ameers and your own exertions ; nor am I at all worried at any one else defending them. I only mean to say that *I must defend myself* ; and if the public take a different view, if it pronounces that you were deceived, it has not been my doing, but that of those who have placed me on my defence.*

APPENDIX, No. IV.

SECTION 1.

Observations by Sir C. Napier, on the Memorials of the Ameers of Scinde.

“ Hyderabad, June 12, 1843.

“ The complaints of the Ameers form a tissue of falsehoods. I will answer them seriatim, meeting assertion by assertion, for to send documentary proofs would take up a volume.

1. Complaint of Meer Mohamed Khan.

The Ameer may have, and did acquiesce in, and I believe signed all the treaties with the English ; and, in common with the other Ameers, violated their provisions. The Ameers formed one Government, and must be responsible collectively. The proofs of their violations of treaties, are in the hands of the Governor-General, signed by Major Outram.

The Ameer says that he submitted to the draft Treaty. This is exposed by the answers to three plain questions :—

First Question. Who solemnly signed the new Treaty in full Durbar ?

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan.

Second Question. Who attacked the residence of my Commissioner, (sent in the sacred character of diplomatist), with the intention to massacre the said diplomatist and all that were with him ?

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan.

* Major Outram's reply to this letter caused Sir C. Napier to renounce his friendship.

Third Question. Who, in full Durbar, insultingly tore the signed Treaty to atoms, the Treaty to which the traitor had affixed his name and seal, for the purpose of blinding the diplomatist and securing his destruction ?

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan.

“None of the Ameer’s servants went by orders to fight,” but they did fight, and our comrades were slain by those servants. I utterly disbelieve the fact, that he did not order his servants to fight, but he was bound to prevent his troops from fighting against his ally: as he did not do this he must take the consequence.

The falsehoods stated against Lieutenant Brown and Major McPherson, are answered by those officers with the truth and simplicity becoming English gentlemen. Colonel Pattle is away.

Does the Ameer suppose, that, when he and his compeers, had received their just punishment by force of arms, the lost lives of our soldiers and the cost of the war, were to be cast out of sight, as matters of no value, and their traitorous Highnesses be allowed to keep all their forfeited treasures? Assuredly not!

The Ameer proceeds, “I have spent my life in serving the Government.” I deny the assertion: I refer to Major Outram’s letter to Sir John Keane; I refer to Major Outram’s book; I refer to a mass of documents against the Ameers, that I forwarded to Lord Ellenborough, which were delivered to me as authentic by Major Outram, and verified by that officer’s signature.

2. Meer Sobdar’s complaint.

I always thought that Meer Sobdar was a faithful ally. He was greatly favoured by the new draft Treaty, and his position among the Ameers greatly raised by the increased revenue he would have received; but the cloven foot of duplicity and cowardice was soon displayed. His Highness’ vakeel, named Outrai, met me on the march to the south; he assured me of his master’s good wishes; that he would send 5,000 men into battle with the other Ameers, and, on a signal, turn and traitorously fall upon those troops, while I was so to arrange it, that my soldiers were not to attack those of his Highness. The wretched duplicity of such

conduct was disgusting. Had the force that I commanded been worsted in battle, Sobdar's 5,000 men would have been fresh, unattacked and untouched during the combat, and they would mercilessly have cut the British up, to clear themselves from the charge of treason to their friends, if secrets should transpire. If, on the other hand, we were victorious, no doubt the troops of Meer Sobdar would have fulfilled his engagements by the merciless slaughter of his flying countrymen. My answer to this insidious and abominable proposition, was, "Tell your master, that my army has no fear of the Beloochees, and does not need the aid of traitors. I consider his Highness as our good ally, and, as a friend, advise him to keep his soldiers in Hyderabad, for if I should meet his 5,000 men in the field of battle, I would assuredly fall upon them." His Highness sent 4,800 men into the field at Meeanee, where they fought us manfully.

The Ameer Sobdar says, "no Sepoy in my service fought in the recent battle by my orders." This hypocritical quibbling is of a piece with that of the Ameer Mohamed. The answer is, "your chiefs lie dead at Meeanee, by the side of our men whom they slew: and for this your Highness must answer, or the responsibility of Government for the conduct of its subjects must become a farce, and a by-word among men."

Had Meer Sobdar been found in this fortress at the head of his 5,000 soldiers, and that none of them had fought at Meeanee, I should have respected him as an ally. In proof of this, I offer the respect which I paid to Meer Shere Mohamed, whose dislike to us has been inveterate from first to last. I well knew he was our enemy. I knew that he had arrived within six miles of Meeanee, with 10,000 men, when the defeat of the Talpoors made him rapidly retrace his steps; and he wrote to me a letter, assuring me that he had never passed his frontier (which was a falsehood), and requesting me to say how he was to be treated. Major Outram, who was with me at the time this letter arrived, assured me that this Ameer would be quiet if I would only shut my eyes upon his premeditated aggression.

By my desire, Major Outram wrote to the Ameer, and I consented not to notice his misconduct. I thought Major Outram's knowledge of the man, would give a tone to his letter, and insure the best chance in my power of making peace: but my hopes were vain. Major Outram was deceived in the intentions of Meer Shere Mohamed, and the battle of Hyderabad was the result.

On arriving at Hyderabad, I discovered that Sobdar's men had been in the battle of Meeanee, and I saw no good reason, why his hypocrisy should shelter him from the fate which attended the more manly delinquency of Nusseer Khan; that hypocrisy had not sheltered us from his matchlocks at Meeanee.

Meer Sobdar states that he signed the treaty offered by Lord Ellenborough, and that he has it still. Yes; but Meer Sobdar signed a duplicate treaty, which was put in possession of Major Outram, according to the rules of diplomacy. Meer Sobdar, in dark council with the other Ameers, had resolved to massacre Major Outram, and above a hundred British officers and soldiers that were with him. The Ameers made an ostentatious pretence of protecting him in the evening, knowing that he was to be slain the next morning. They had bribed the moonshee of Major Outram to steal and deliver to them the treaty signed in full Durbar, and in full Durbar they tore it in pieces. Was this an action to restrain, or to encourage, their Beloochee chiefs? How absurd then was their assertion to Major Outram the evening before, that they could not protect him. But suppose this assertion to be true, what does it prove? Why, that Princes who cannot protect accredited agents (invited by themselves to their capital) from being massacred by their troops, are mere chiefs of brigand bands, and must be put down by any civilized government that has the power.

The Ameer says, "that from the time the English became masters of India, never was such disgrace, oppression, and tyranny offered to any sincere friend of Government." The answer to this is easy; sincere friends of Government don't send 4,800 men to cut British soldiers' throats. Moreover, no disgrace was put upon him, except that of being defeated in battle, in which it was disgraceful

to him that his troops should have joined ; no oppression and tyranny except being made prisoners, the natural result of such battle ; and as to being plundered, nothing was taken beyond what is the usual prize of the victorious Government ; nothing was pillaged, everything is in the hands of the regular prize agents, and ready to be accounted for to her Majesty.

3. Complaint of Meer Nusseer Khan.

If friendship be taken into consideration, I beg to say, from the beginning up to the day of the battle of Meeanee, everything was wanting on Meer Nusseer Khan's part ; and my first act, on arriving at Hyderabad, in the month of September, hearing from Lieutenants Gordon and Mylne, then political agents, that the petty insults and breaches of treaty were frequent, was to determine to put a stop to them, and I wrote a distinct letter to the Ameers to that effect. Had they guided themselves by my letter, they would have been, unfortunately for humanity and the Scindian people, still on their thrones at Hyderabad ; but they continued to break certain articles of the treaty, and I reported them to the Governor-General, as I told them I would do.

The Ameer says that no attention was paid to his questions relative to shares in the port of Kurrachee. The decision of these minor details was entrusted by me to Major Outram ; but instead of meeting Major Outram to enter into the discussion of them, the Ameer endeavoured to cut that officer's throat. It was therefore very natural that no attention was paid to his questions.

The Ameer says, " Meer Roostum Khan was sent to Hyderabad without asking us or our agents." Meer Roostum Khan had promised to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor. Major Outram mounted his camel, and went to Kyrpoor, and the Ameer mounted his camel and went off the other way to Hyderabad ;—an insult to my Commissioner, and through him to me, that I am convinced was concocted by the other Ameers, in whose power Meer Roostum was from first to last. The Beloochees of the Murree tribe were seized on the road. " These two things," says the Ameer, " exasperated the Beloochees, and the consequence was slaughter

and bloodshed." The last was quite true: twenty-five Murree chiefs were arrested passing near my camp, into which they were brought fully armed; they imagined that I was to be the dupe of a got-up story, that they were going to demand payment of wages due by the Ameers. They were all chiefs of the Murree tribe, and I took the liberty of examining their persons, as well as of taking away their arms. The chief of the Murrees, named Hyat Khan, was one of them. In his pocket I found a letter from the Ameers, summoning the clan to arms; every male that could muster sword, or shield, or spear, or matchlock. They were to meet the Ameers at Meeanee on the 9th of February; it was therefore, very natural that I should seize the Murree chiefs; and I have now given orders to my outposts if such parties present themselves, immediately to cut them down. The Ameers are much mistaken if they fancy English officers are so easily duped; and nothing but my determination not to shed a drop of blood before a declaration of war, prevented my ordering these twenty-five Murrees to be cut to pieces, for they gave sufficient provocation to have been charged by Jacob's horse; but that officer, having my orders, saved them.

The Ameer says he fixed his seal to the new Treaty; yes, he did so in the evening of the 14th, and in the morning of the 15th, tore it with contumely in open Durbar. The Ameer says he sent a guard of favourite nobles to protect Major Outram—it was very evident that there was no occasion to murder Major Outram in the evening, when they intended to destroy him, and all who were with him, next morning. They knew that by murdering him in the evening, his party would immediately retreat to the steamers and get away, and they would have lost the pleasure of murdering upwards of 100 Englishmen by the premature assassination of one.

But the Ameer at last determined to fight, "having become indifferent about life; and he went forth to battle." It seems, however, that when he heard the British guns, his love of life returned, and, instead of rallying his troops, he ran away.

The Ameer proceeds to say, that he had not more than

7,000 horse and foot in the battle ; whom they belonged to I don't know, but I have the sealed and verified returns in my possession of 25,862 fighting men on the field of Meeanee. The words attributed by the Ameer to me, when I returned him his sword on the field of battle, are utterly false. The Ameer proceeds to say, " as long as Major Outram was there, everything went on well ;" as if Major Outram had the power in any way to interfere with his treatment. Major Outram had no power whatever in Scinde, or over the Ameers, and I had given the charge of the Ameers to Lieutenant Brown ; the accusation against whom, together with Lieutenant Colonel Pattle and Major McPherson, which immediately follows this sentence, has already been answered by those gentlemen.

Meerza Khoosroo Beg was not beaten, nor was anybody else ; but, being in a passion, he seized Major McPherson, (who had neither said nor done anything to him) by the throat, and of course, was instantly made a prisoner.

The following falsehoods are again stated by the Ameer : 1st, he says the fortress was plundered. It was not plundered, it was completely protected from plunder. The treasure it contained was regularly taken possession of, for the Government, by the prize agents. The Ameer is right when he says the fort was neither besieged nor taken by storm ; but it would have been both, had not the terrors of the battle frightened its owners into an unconditional surrender. It was not visited under pretence of seeing ; it was taken possession of by right of conquest ; and it was done gradually and carefully, in order to prevent the ladies of the Zenana being alarmed, or seen by the troops ; but for this delicacy I would have entered the fortress at the head of the troops.

The Ameer again says, " after granting quarter, making peace, promising satisfaction, and agreeing to restore the fort," &c. That we granted quarter is true, nobody was either injured, or even insulted after the fight was over ; but the " making peace" is a falsehood ; " promising satisfaction," another ; and " agreeing to restore the fort," a third ; what remains of the complaint is an accumulation of falsehood.

(signed)

" C. J. NAPIER."

SECTION 2.

*Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General in council.
Kurrachee, October 27, 1843.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose to your Lordship some more information relative to the conduct of the ex-Ameers. I hope it may not prove unsatisfactory, because the further the inquiry is pushed the more will the treachery of the Ameers become apparent. I could have sent this information last February or March, had I chosen to spend my time in the employment suited to a chief of police receiving depositions. But, at the period in question, I had not the power of drawing up above 1500 men in order of battle;—no reinforcements had yet been received; 20,000 men under Shere Mohamed were within a march of my camp;—we were in the midst of an insurgent population, warlike and well armed; I had the magazines and hospitals full of wounded men to guard on the banks of the Indus. I had six sovereign princes in my camp, intriguing as hard as they could to arrange an attack upon my camp by overwhelming multitudes. I had a large fortress to guard; this fortress was three miles from my camp;—I had an immense treasure to guard. I was obliged to respect the Zenana in the fortress, to the hazard of the regiment in the fortress (which regiment had suffered greatly in the battle, and could not muster above 400 men); for in these Zenanas were about 800 powerful Beloochees, well armed, and the Zenanas full of arms. I well knew the treachery of the Ameers, or I should not have been so unjust as to use the terms I applied to them in my despatch after the battle of Meeanee.

SECTION 3.

Memorandum of a Conversation between Meer Gholam Shah, Meer Fuzzil Ali, Meer Bijjur, and Lieutenant Rathborne, relative to the part taken by Meer Shahdad in the attack on the Residency, on the 15th February, 1843.

Yesterday evening, about half-past five o'clock, I called on Meer Gholam Shah at Gholam Hoossein Ka Tanda.

He and his brother, Fuzzil Ali, received me. I mentioned to them that I wished to have some conversation in their presence with Meer Bijjur, their cousin, whose house adjoins theirs. The Meers, Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali, are nephews of the ex-Ameer, Meer Mohamed, their mother having been his sister; and Meer Bijjur is brother-in-law of the ex-Ameer, Meer Shahdad, his sister being Meer Shahdad's wife.

When Meer Bijjur arrived, which was within a few minutes, I requested that we might be private, and then a conversation took place nearly word for word as follows; the parties present being the above mentioned Meers, my Moonshee, Meerza Jan, and myself.

Myself.—Meer Bijjur, you joined in the attack on the Residency; by whose order, or at whose instigation, did you do this?

Meer Bijjur.—I joined in that attack by order of Meer Shahdad.

Myself.—Have you any objection to stating how that business commenced, and what part Meer Shahdad acted in it?

Meer Bijjur.—I will tell you willingly. The way of it was this; but, first, I must explain how we three Meers, now conversing with you, stood. I was in the service of Meer Shahdad; Meer Gholam Shah was in the service of Meer Sobdar, and Meer Fuzzil Ali was in the service of Meer Mohamed. Well, as you know, for some days before the attack on the Residency, there had been a great deal of unpleasant discussion between the Ameers and Major Outram; but at last, on the evening before the attack, Meer Nusseer Khan moved out with his forces to Meer Futteh Ali's garden, on the road to Meeanee. He moved in the evening, the other Ameers remaining in the fort. The night he moved out, a large assemblage of Belooch Sirdars took place at his Durbar: but what was done I do not know, as I was not there. The next morning, as I was going, as usual, to make my salaam to Meer Shahdad, I saw great crowds of Beloochees, and heard they were going to attack the Residency. I went on to Meer Shahdad's. On going into the Dhurbar, Mutakum Moon-

shee also came in, and said the Beloochees were ready to start and attack the Residency, when Meer Shahdad who was all prepared for battle, jumped up and said he would go forthwith and head them. He desired me to go with him. I had my sword with me as usual, but no shield or matchlock, and was quite unprepared for fighting, but of course I obeyed. I then learned that Ahmed Khan Lugharee had been detached with seven or eight thousand men to attack the Residency, by orders given him the night before by Meer Nusser Khan.

Myself.—What! By order of Meer Nusser Khan?

Meer Bijjur.—I understood it was by his order given overnight, at the garden; but I cannot speak positively as I was not there. However, there were the men ready to start. Meer Shahdad was proceeding to put himself at their head: he ordered me to accompany him, and I did so. I had very few men with me, and sent a messenger to Meer Gholam Shah, who was with Meer Mohamed Khan, to tell him what was going on, and beg him to persuade Meer Shahdad to desist. Meer Gholam Shah spoke to Meer Mohamed, and he sent a confidential servant, who came to Meer Shahdad, and told him, that the business he was engaged in was a mad one, and prayed him over and over again to desist.

Meer Gholam Shah.—Yes, I was not in Meer Shahdad's service, but living as I did, near the Residency. I had had much intercourse with the gentlemen there: I had seen enough of the English to be pretty sure that they would beat us first or last, if we went to war with them, and I knew, when they did beat us, they would deeply revenge the murder of their envoy; besides I thought it disgraceful to murder defenceless people. I therefore begged Meer Mohamed to send an order to stop Meer Shahdad, whose hot-headed proceedings would bring eventual destruction on us all; a confidential person was then sent to Meer Shahdad; but the latter replied, he had sworn to do the business, and would go on with it. He added the attack was all arranged; and that Ahmed Khan Lugharee was going with his followers; that he had sworn to act through thick

or thin with Ahmed, and would place himself at the head of the force.

Meer Bijjur.—Well after this, there was an end of remonstrance, and Meer Shahdad, with myself and the rest of the party, started for the Residency, and when we arrived there, Ahmed Khan led forward the people to the attack, while Meer Shahdad with myself and other attendants, remained on horseback under a clump of trees, out of reach of the fire, till all was over: we then returned, and joined Meer Nusseer Khan at Meeanee. That is all I know of the matter. The truth is, though I was Meer Shahdad's brother-in-law, I was never consulted by him—his power was lodged in the hands of servants and others.

Meer Gholam Shah.—Meer Bijjur has given a true statement of the transaction.

Meer Fuzzil Ali.—Yes, that is all true.

Meer Gholam Shah.—May I ask why these inquiries are now made? Meer Bijjur has made his salaam, and we hope the past, as then promised, is forgiven.

Myself.—I can have no difficulty in telling you. Meer Bijjur has made his salaam, and has been forgiven, and there is not the slightest intention of molesting him for what is past. The cause of my questioning him is this:—Meer Shahdad now states that he never headed the party that attacked the Residency, that it was the Belooch Sirdars who insisted on attacking it, and that the purpose for which he went was to remonstrate with them, and save the garrison.

Meer Bijjur.—Why this is notoriously untrue; every one who was with the party knows it to be so. What influence the boasting of Beloochees may have had in procuring the order for the attack I know not; I dare say it may have had a good deal, for they talked loudly of what they could do; but Meer Shahdad headed the party, as I have said, voluntarily, against the remonstrances and orders of Meer Mohamed, attended throughout the fight, and after driving out the English, rode with us over to Meeanee; went up to Meer Nusseer Khan, and saluting him said, "Good fortune attend you, I have gained the day."

Myself.—What! said this to Nusseer Khan?

Meer Gholam Shah.—Meer Bijjur speaks truth; Meer Shahdad, on his return from the Residency, rode up, as Meer Bijjur says, to Nusseer Khan's tent, and entering it, said, "*Meer Sahib Moobarich, Meer Futteh Khia.*"

Myself.—I thank you for this explanation.

Meer Gholam Shah.—We have stated all we know and this truly. I have never spoken an ill word of the Ameers to you, because they were our sovereigns and relations, but as you now question us we have spoken the truth.

Myself.—I have also, as you know, avoided a topic which I thought must be painful to you, but it was my duty to make this inquiry, and I thank you for the readiness with which you have answered me.

After some further conversation on general subjects I took my leave.

A. B. RATHBORNE,
Collector and Magistrate, Hyderabad.

Oct. 22nd, 1843.

N.B.—The above conversation took place on the 21st inst., I made the original memorandum of it on the 22nd, but on reading it over to the Moonshee, he differed as to one point; this was, whether it had been said that Meer Mohamed sent a man to Shahdad to call him, and *himself remonstrated with him*; or, whether the *man* merely conveyed the remonstrance, as now stated. I sent the Moonshee to Meer Gholam Shah to ascertain which was the correct version, and in his interview he elicited from him the following important additional admission:—

Meer Gholam Shah, on the morning of the attack, also waited on Meer Sobdar, *who desired him to join in the attack also.* Gholam Shah replied, that he was not going to put himself under the orders of an inexperienced child like Shahdad, especially as he thought the business a bad one, but if Meer Sobdar chose to go himself, he would, as in duty bound, accompany him. *Meer Sobdar then laughed, and said that would never do.*

This morning Meer Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali called upon me, and I took the opportunity of reading over to them the above conversation, taken down on the 22nd inst.

which they said was quite correct : on this occasion the Moonshee was not present, and on both his aid was not required.

A. B. RATHBORNE,
&c. &c.

24th Oct.

SECTION 4.

Evidence given by Peer Budroodeen, Moosahib, or confidential servant of the ex-Ameer Sobdar Khan, of Hyderabad.

Question.—On what day did the army of the Ameers leave Hyderabad, and where did it encamp ?

Answer.—On the 6th of February, 1843, the troop under the command of Gholam Mohamed Komriewalla and Meer Khan Mohamed Talpoor (Khananie) went out and encamped in the Babool jungle near Meer Futteh Ali Kebah. The two chiefs then returned to Hyderabad, and told Nusseer to get all in readiness for battle. Afterwards the force collected there, and chiefs, as they arrived, remained there. On the evening of the 14th of February, 1843, Meer Nusseer Khan moved out and joined this force.

Do you know what strength the force was ?

I did not count them, but it was well known that it amounted to 30,000 strong.

That was on the 14th of February. What did this force do next day ?

In the morning an order was issued to plunder Major Outram's dwelling.

Who gave this order ?

I know not.

What number of men went to the agency for that purpose ?

Nine or ten thousand men.

Who commanded this party, and what chiefs accompanied it ?

Meer Shahdad commanded the party, and by him the order was given to plunder the agency ; Meer Nusseer of Kyrpoor ; Jehan Mohamed ; Meer Khan Mohamed ; Gholam Mohamed Komriewalla ; a Nizamancee chief, whose

name I forget; Ahmed Khan Lugharee; Meerza Bakur, and other inferior chiefs, accompanied him.

When this party reached the agency, who commanded it, and what orders were given by him?

Meer Shahdad Khan commanded, and he gave orders that "if the troops fight, kill them; but if they run away never mind?"

When Major Outram quitted the agency what did the Scinde troops do?

They plundered all the property left and burnt all the buildings. They then joined Meer Nusseer Khan at the garden, and Meer Shahdad and the afore-mentioned chiefs said, "We have gained a victory; Major Outram has fled, and we have plundered his property; our party have behaved most bravely." Meer Shahdad sent a man, whose name I forget, to give the news of his victory to Meer Sobdar Khan in the fort, and to inform him that Major Outram had fled. Meer Sobdar, on hearing this, answered, "You have done ill: if with 8000 men you have been unable to destroy 100 men, what will you be able to do in front of the General's army?"

This was on the 15th of February. What then occurred?

On the evening of the 15th of February, Meer Nusseer Khan moved from his garden and took up a position at Lunar half a coss from it; on the evening of the 16th he reached Meeanee; next morning the battle took place.

In the battle of Meeanee what was the strength of the Ameers' force?

Some say 40,000, and some say 35,000.

How many of Sobdar's men were in the battle?

With Iktyar Lugharee 4000; with Mohamed Khan Tora 300; with other chiefs subject to Meer Sobdar Khan there were 500 men.

How many men of Meer Mohamed Khan's were there in the battle?

I know not, but every soul he could collect was there.

Was Meer Sobdar in the battle? and what other Ameers were there?

Meers Sobdar and Mohamed Khan were not in the battle. Except these two all the Ameers of upper and lower Scinde were there.

Such being the strength of the Ameers' force on the 17th of February, had the battle been delayed for two or three days more, to what extent would they have been reinforced?

It would have increased to 50,000 or 60,000 men.

Did Meer Sobdar send information to the General that troops were collecting at Hyderabad?

On the night of the day on which the General reached Sukurunda,^a Meer Sobdar called me and said, "Take two days' food and drink, and proceed by the jungle to the General's camp; tell him if he comes quickly it is well, but if he delays, the force here will greatly increase." Jemada Couza said, "Budroodeen is a great man; if he goes it will be well known, and you will get a bad name; it will be better if some one else is sent." I afterwards heard that orders were given to Syud Abbis Ali Shah, and a Cazee, to proceed to the General's camp, and to beg of him to come quickly.^b

^aGeneral's
Notes in
Original,
10th Feb.
C. J. N.

^bThese
men never
came to
me.
C. J. N.

At this time, the 10th of February, 1843, Meer Sobdar was a friend of the British, when did he become hostile?

I do not know?

When did the Ameers commence collecting troops?

When Meerza Khoosroo wrote from Nowsharra to the Ameers, "The General is bent on war, so get ready." When the Meerza returned to Hyderabad the order for collecting troops was given.

Had this collection commenced before Major Outram reached Hyderabad?

The collection of troops had commenced before Major Outram reached Hyderabad.

Had the Ameers gained the victory what would have been the fate of the British troops?

Every soul would have been massacred.

Budroodeen having read over his evidence, declares it to be correctly recorded, and applies his seal to it 22nd October, 1843. Mohamed Moyadeen is witness that Budroodeen gave this evidence, and that he declares it to be correct.

Evidence given in my presence this 22nd day of October, 1843.

APPENDIX, No. V.

SECTION 1.

Reply of the Officers employed to take possession of Hyderabad fort and treasure, to the accusations of the Ameers, Sobdar Khan, Nusseer Khan, and Mohamed Khan.

Statement of Major McPherson, Prize Agent.

With respect to the assertion of the three Ameers, that I entered the fort with the view of seeing it, it is erroneous on their part. I accompanied the troops to take possession of it, and to see the British standard hoisted on its tower, which was done on the 21st of March, 1843. No outrage was committed, no zenana approached, and sentries were placed to prevent any one approaching them. Notice was given when the men would mount the tower, that the ladies might retire, and not be overlooked; and people were only admitted on the tower at a certain time, lest the ladies should be annoyed. During that day, as prize agent, I collected treasure to a considerable amount, principally in gold. No zenana was ever entered by me, or any British officer, during the time they were inhabited by the ladies; but I have taken treasure from those vacated. No female of any description was ever suffered to be ill used at any time. As for taking the ladies jewels from them, I positively deny it; in many instances they were sent out for me to take, but I, as well as my colleagues, invariably returned them again, as being their personal property. I have never heard of any of the ladies of the zenana being ill used, or even seen; and I can safely assert, the complaint made is a gross falsehood on the part of the Ameers. That we the prize agents took money, jewels, swords, &c. &c. from the empty houses is certainly the case. To do so was the duty of the prize agents.

(Signed)

P. MCPHERSON.

Statement of Captain Blenkins, Prize Agent.

After the perusal of three letters respectively from Meer Nusseer Khan, Sobdar Khan, and Meer Mohamed, I beg to state that the whole therein contained, as far as I have

any knowledge, or which relates to myself, or any other of the prize agents, is entirely without any foundation. They, the Ameers, never experienced anything but the greatest kindness and consideration from us. They were repeatedly told that we did not wish the ornaments of their women to be given, or any other property which belonged to them; and in several instances when proffered, I have myself sent them back to their owners; so did the other prize agents; we had no idea of intruding on the ladies, nor did we ever intrude on their zenanas; and we had strict orders from the Major-General to keep perfectly aloof from the dwellings of the women.

W. BLENKINS.

Captain Bazett, prize agent, Lieutenant Brown, commissioner, and Major Reid, commanding the troops in the Fort, all made similar and even stronger statements in contradiction of the Ameers. They are to be found in the supplement to the Scinde Parliamentary Papers. There also may be read the Ameers' memorials, but the substance of them has been given in the narrative.

SECTION 2.

*Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General,
May 9th, 1843.*

The whole of the women of the Ameers refused to accompany them, and are here. They say that they have no means of subsistence. This is said to be untrue. I positively forbade their personal ornaments of gold and jewels to be taken from them, by the prize agents; but whether they carried out treasure or not, I cannot say.

SECTION 3.

CONTRADICTION OF THE FALSEHOODS PROMULGATED BY
DOCTOR BUIST, OF THE BOMBAY TIMES.

Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General, May 16th, 1843.

An infamous article appeared in the "Bombay Times" of the 6th instant. The whole is one lie from beginning to

end. The officers of this army are extremely indignant. The article is headed "The Ladies of the Ameers' Zenana."

My reason for troubling your Lordship on the subject is, that you might have thought some outrage had been committed, and the case amplified. My Lord, there has not been a single irregularity; nor is there a woman, much less one of the ladies of the zenana, in any officer's quarters, nor do I believe any one of these ladies has ever been seen by an officer of this army.

AT a general meeting of the Officers of the Scinde Field Force, stationed at and near Hyderabad, held with sanction of His Excellency Sir C. J. Napier, K. C. B. Governor of Scinde, and commanding the forces in Scinde, to take into consideration the measures that should be adopted to refute a certain calumnious article which appeared in the *Bombay Times* newspaper of the 6th May last, headed, "Ladies of the Ameers' Zenana," it was un-animously resolved:—

That an address to His Excellency the Governor of Scinde be drawn up and circulated for the signature of the officers of this force, expressive of their indignation at the unfounded and injurious calumnies contained in the above-mentioned article, soliciting the protection of His Excellency, and requesting his permission to make their sentiments more generally known, by circulating copies of this address to the Indian Press for publication.

The following address was then drawn up and agreed to—

Address of the undersigned Officers of the Scinde Army, stationed at or near Hyderabad, to His Excellency Major General Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., Governor of, and commanding in Scinde.

SIR,—We, the undersigned officers in the army, serving under your Excellency's command, have seen with indignation an article in the *Bombay Times* newspaper of the 6th May last, closely affecting our honour, and tending to degrade us in the eyes of our friends and country. The article in question is

headed "The ladies of the Ameers' Zenana," and concludes in the following terms :—

"Where are they now? They, who three months since, were sharers of a palace and in the enjoyment of the honours of royalty, are the degraded lemans of the Feringhi! So it is, the harem has been defiled; the last drop of bitterness has been mingled with the cup of misery we have given the Ameers to drink, the heaviest of the insults Mohamedans can endure has been heaped upon their grey discrowned heads. Let it not be supposed we speak of this in the language of prudish sentimentalism; the officers who have dishonoured the Zenana of Kings have committed great wrong; but for that, as for the evil deeds attending upon so unjust and cruel a conquest, the Government which ordained it is responsible. We know to our shame and sorrow the evils which flowed from frailties such as this permitted in Cabool; and at Hyderabad we may yet discover the heinousness of our sins in the magnitude of our punishment. If one thing more than all the other wrongs we have inflicted on them could awaken in the bosom of each Beloochê chief, the unquenchsble thirst of never-dying vengeance, it must be to see the sanctities of domestic life invaded and violated as they have been; to see the daughters of nobles, and wives of Kings, living while youth and beauty last as the concubine of the infidel, thrown aside when their attractions have departed, to perish in their degradation and shame. This is the first of the black fruits of invasion for which Britons must blush. We have avoided explicitness on such a subject: our readers will be at no loss to discover our meaning:—the most attractive of the ladies of the Zenana now share the tents of British officers. A series of acts of injustice first introduced to the Scindians the character of the British Government: what has just been related will afford them an insight into the virtues and blessings they may look for from the advance of civilization; the benefits and honours destined them by the most refined people in the world. This contrasts well with the reception English Ladies experienced at Affghan hands."

We beg to assure your Excellency, from our own knowledge and inquiry as to facts, that the grave charges contained in this extract against the Officers under your command are utterly without foundation, and that not a single instance of ill-treatment or disrespect to the inmates of the Ameers' Zenana has ever come to our knowledge. Having expressed to your Excel-

lency our deliberate conviction that the whole of the statements in the extract complained of, are unfounded in truth, we respectfully solicit that you will be good enough to take such steps as you may deem advisable to clear our characters thus aspersed in the eyes of our military superiors and comrades, and of our friends and countrymen in India and in Europe; and that, with the same end in view, you will kindly permit us to circulate copies of this address to the Indian newspapers for publication.

We have, &c.

Hyderabad, 10th May, 1843.

- (Signed).
 C. Waddington, Comdg. Engr. Bombay Engrs.
 P. McPherson, Major, M. S.
 Edward Green, Acting Asst. Adjt. General.
 E. J. Brown, Lieut. Engrs. and Commissioner.
 W. Brown, Fort Major.
 A. Gibbon, Assist. Surgeon, Post Master.
 M. McMurdo, Lieut. Acting Ass^t Qr. Mr. Genl.
 H. J. Pelly, Lieut. Persian Interpreter.
 F. Cristal, Bt. Capt. A. D. Judge Advocate General.
 D. Erskine, Lt. Artillery
 John Lloyd, Major Arty.
 H. Gibberne, Bt. Capt. Arty.
 J. S. Unwin, Bt. Capt. Arty.
 T. F. V. Outlaw, Lt. Madras Sappers and Miners.
 J. P. Nixon, Lieut. 25th Regt. N. I.
 A. Boileau, 2d Lieut. Madras Sappers and Miners.
 T. Studdert, Lt. Fd. Engr.
 J. A. Wood, Lieut. 20th Regt. N. I.
 D. Carstairs, Capt. 6th Regt. N. I.
 C. G. Bazett, Capt. 9th Light Cavalry.
 C. P. Leeson, Lieut. 25th Regt. N. I. Supt. of Police.
 W. Ward, Assist. Surg. 12th Regt. N. I.
 A. B. Rathborne, Lieut. Collector and Magistrate.
 W. Blenkins, Capt. 6th Regt. N. I.
 J. P. Leslie, Bt. Major, 1st Troop H. A.
 G. Hunt, Capt. Artillery.
 J. G. Petrie, 2d Lieut. Arty.
 D. Gaye, 2d Lieut. Arty.
 A. Rowan, Capt. H. A.
 W. S. Hatch, 3d Lieut. Arty.
- W. J. Whitlie, Capt. Arty,
 W. J. Milford, Bt. Capt. 9th Light Cavalry
 H. C. Plowden, Lieut. Adjt. 9th Lt. Cavalry
 C. Turner, 9th Light Cavalry.
 W. B. Wemyss, Capt. 9th Light Cavalry.
 J. R. Snow, Lieut. 9th Cavalry.
 A. T. Wyllie, Lieut. 9th Bengal Lt. Cavalry.
 J. H. Thomson, Cornet, 9th do.
 M. B. Stone, Cornet, do.
 M. Hyle, Assist. Surgeon.
 H. A. Balmoyne, Cornet, 9th Light Cavalry.
 J. H. Firth, Cornet, 9th do.
 P. F. Story, Major, do.
 C. Buckle, 3d Rt. Bombay Lt. Cavalry.
 M. Stack, Major, do.
 R. R. Younghusband, Lieut. 20th Regt.
 W. Collum, Assist. Surg. 3d Light Cavalry.
 P. T. Taylor, Lieut. 3d Light Cavalry.
 F. F. Forbes, Lieut. 3d Lt. Cavalry.
 R. B. Moore, Lieut. do.
 E. F. Moore, Cornet, do.
 T. Eyre, Capt. do.
 C. Delamain, Capt. do.
 F. S. Oldfield, Lieut. do.
 H. Mackenzie, Lieut. do.
 C. T. North, Lieut. Bombay Engrs.
 T. Pownall, Lieut. H. A.
 R. Henderson, Bt. Capt. Madras Engineers.
 A. Woodburn, Major, 25th Regt.
 G. H. Robertson, Lieut. do.
 G. Mayor, Lieut. do.
 T. Pollett, Capt. do.
 J. Jackson, Capt. do.
 A. Wright, Assist. Surg. do.
 H. Grice, Ensign, do.

| | |
|---|--|
| E. Glennie, Lieut.-Adjt. 25th Regt. | A. S. Hawkins, Capt. 8th Regt. |
| E. Lowrie, Ensign, do. | C. Brasnell, Ensign, do. |
| A. J. Thompson, Lieut. Provost Marshal. | S. J. Dalzell, Ensign, do. |
| A. P. Barker, Lieut. 21st Regt. | R. T. Reid, Major, 12th Regt. N. I. |
| H. Farrell, Lieut.-Col. do. | E. J. Russell, Lieut. do. |
| W. C. Wilkinson, Lt.-Adjt. do. | I. Fisher, Capt. do. |
| F. S. Stevens, Capt. do. | W. Lodwick, Lt. do. |
| E. A. Green, Lieut. do. | W. T. Holbrow, Ensign, do. |
| E. S. Leathes, Ensign do. | A. Y. Bense, Ensign, do. |
| M. J. Battye, Lieut. do. | O. Clarkson, Capt. do. |
| W. J. Merewether, Ensign, do. | Jas. D. B. Forest, Ensign, do. |
| J. M. Younghusband, Lieut. 8th Regt. | W. J. Soppitt, Ensign, do. |
| H. Fenning, Lieut. 21st Regt. | J. B. D. Carter, Lieut. do. |
| E. L. Scott, Ensign, do. | C. M. James, Ensign, 6th Regiment, N. I. |
| J. P. Laurie, Ensign, do. | J. Dalrymple, Surg. 9th Light Cav. |
| G. W. West, Ensign, do. | W. Ashburner, Lieut. Adjt. 3d Lt. Cavalry. |
| H. J. Carter, Assist. Surg. do. | E. G. Malet, Capt. do. |
| W. J. Brown, Major, 8th Regt. N. I. | G. Allender, Staff Surgeon. |
| A. Thomas, Capt. do. | James Down, Lieut. 12th Regt. N. I. |
| J. McKenzie, Assist. Surg. do. | |

(True Copy.) P. MCPHERSON, Major,
Military Secretary.

Hyderabad, 25th May, 1843.

Gentlemen,—Your address has given me great satisfaction. I concur in every word, and confirm every statement it contains.

We are accused by Mr. Buist, the Editor of the *Bombay Times*, of disgracing ourselves, our profession, and our country, by the most infamous conduct towards the women of the *Zenana*; and I am, personally, held up to public scorn as the immediate cause of such scandalous conduct.

You have protected your character, collectively and individually, by exposing this unprovoked and unparalleled calumny; and it is right the public should know that, so far from offering these ladies any insult, no officer of this army has even *seen* a lady of the *Zenana*.

But the officers whom I have the honour to command, are of the same class of high minded gentlemen which compose the rest of the officers of the Queen's and Company's service; the calumny, therefore, applies to the character of the whole military Profession—all will feel the insult!

This calumny is intended to make England look down upon her armies with horror and disgust; and when I consider the bad climate in which we are now serving; that dangers and privations surround us; that we have put forth our best energies to serve our sovereign and our country, and to gain the approbation of our friends; that all have served with reputa-

tion, and some of us grown grey in undishonored arms; that many of our comrades have lately fallen in battle, and by disease, and that all are ready to fall; when I consider these things I say I am at a loss to account for the feelings which induced Mr. Buist (if it be true that he is an Englishman) deliberately to make the groundless fabrication which he has put forth to the world.

Gentlemen, your reputation and mine are inseparable, and I assure you that my best exertions shall be united with yours, to defend our private character as gentlemen, and our military character as soldiers.

I have, &c.

(signed) C. J. NAPIER,

Major-General and Governor of Scinde.

(True Copy.)

P. MCPHERSON, Major,

Military Secretary.

APPENDIX, No. VI.

SECTION I.

Names of Officers mentioned in the Despatches as being distinguished in the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad.

Lieut.-Colonels. Pennefather.—Pattle.

Majors. Poole.—Jackson.—Teasdale.—Lloyd.—MacPherson.—Waddington.—Wyllie.—Storey.—Stack.—Leslie.—Reid.—Brown.—Woodburn.

Captains. Garrett.—Meade.—Tew.—Cookson.—Tucker.—Corrway.—Whitlie.—Hutt.—Blenkins.—Henderson.—Tait.—Delamain.—Jacob.—Willoughby.—George.—Jackson.—Stevens.—Fisher.

Lieutenants. Smith.—Coote.—Wood.—Harding.—Phayre.—M'Murdo.—Pelly.—Boileau.—Outlaw.—Thompson.—Younghusband.—Leeson.—Brennan.—Brown.—Rathborne.—Hill.—North.—Battersby.—Leeson.—FitzGerald.

Surgeons. Dalrymple.—Bell.

Moonshee. Ali Ackbar.

SECTION 2.

*Names of Officers killed at Meeanee.**Majors.* Jackson.—Teasdale.*Captains.* Cookson.—Tew.—Meade.*Lieutenant.* Wood.*Wounded.**Lieut.-Colonel.* Pennefather.*Major.* Wyllie.*Captains.* Tucker.—Smith.—Conway.*Lieutenants.* Plowden. — Harding. — Phayre. — Bourdillon.*Ensigns.* Firth.—Pennefather.—Bowden.—Holbrow.*Officers killed at Hyderabad.**Captains.* Garrett.*Lieutenants.* Smith.*Wounded.**Lieutenants.* Pownoll. — Tait. — Chute. — Coote.—Evans.—Brennan.—Bur.—Wilkinson.—M'Murdo.*Ensign.* Pennefather.

SECTION 3.

Names of men of the 22nd Regiment who concealed their wounds, received in the battle of Hyderabad, and marched with their Regiment the next day, thinking another battle was at hand.

John Durr.—John Muldowney.—Robert Young.—Henry Lines.—Patrick Gill.—James Andrews. Wounds not severe.

Sergeant Haney. Wound rather severe.

Thomas Middleton.—James Mulvey. Severely wounded in the legs.

Silvester Day. Ball in the foot l

SECTION 4.

Report sent by Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General, of non-commissioned Officers and men who had particularly distinguished themselves at the Battle of Meeanee.

From Major General Sir C. J. NAPIER, K.C.B., to the Right Honourable LORD ELLENBOROUGH, Governor-General of India, &c. &c.

Hyderabad, 2nd March, 1843.

MY LORD,—I beg leave to send to your Lordship reports made by my order; that while the memory is fresh, distinguished deeds may be put on record. The great results of this battle have made me anxious that those who were so conspicuous in the hour of trial should be known to your Lordship. Their devotion to their duty was very honourable to them.

In the case of the brave drivers of the two batteries I am sure your Lordship will do them justice, and I beg especially to recommend them to your Lordship's protection.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, Major-General.

From Captain G. HURT, *Commanding Field Battery,*
To the Adjutant of Artillery, *in Scinde.*

Camp, near Hyderabad, 23rd February, 1843.

SIR,—With reference to Division After Orders of yesterday, I beg permission to bring to the notice of the Major-General, the general steadiness and good conduct of the drivers of the battery under my command, throughout the action of the 17th, particularly of three men (*Drivers*—Uggar Khan, Bahadoor, Mahadoo), who brought up the howitzer first in action on the right of the line, under a very heavy and destructive fire, with a degree of coolness and steadiness that could not be surpassed, though two of their horses were dangerously wounded.

I would not presume to bring these men to notice were they enlisted, or treated as fighting men, but as they are still considered as mere followers, men whose families receive no pension

in the event of their death, or themselves, if disabled by wounds, I beg to submit the case to the Major General, as a strong argument in favour of those, on whose courage and conduct the very existence of the battery must often depend. I have, &c.

(Signed) GEO. HURT, *Captain,*
Com^d. Field Battery.

From Major P. F. STORY, *Com^d. 9th Light Cavalry,*
To Lieutenant PELLY, *Asst. Adjutant General.*

Camp, Hyderabad, 26th February, 1843.

SIR,—In forwarding the accompanying Roll, for the information of the Major General, I have the honour to request you will inform him, that I have had the greatest difficulty in selecting these men, where all behaved so gallantly, and nearly equally well.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. F. STORY, *Major,*
Com^d. 9th Light Cavalry.

Roll of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of the 9th Bengal light cavalry, who particularly distinguished themselves in action with the enemy, on the 17th February, 1843.

Camp, Hyderabad, February, 1843.

Subadar. Shaik Bekr Ally,—Had his horse severely wounded in the chest, led his men in a most gallant manner, and was very active in re-forming them for a second attack.

Subadar. Shaik Emam Bux,—Engaged with two troopers in taking a Standard planted near some guns, and which was most bravely defended by the enemy.

Jemadar. Khoman Sing,—Carried the Standard of the 1st squadron (Queen's colour), and was very zealous and active during the whole action.

Havildar. Shaik Emam Bux,—Saved the life of his officer, Shaik Emam Bux, (subadar), and his conduct was conspicuous during the day.

Havildar. Shaik Golam Hussain,—Strongly recommended for great gallantry during the charge.

Naich. Bucktawer Sing,—Behaved most gallantly during the whole day.

Troopers. Birma Deen, Golam Russool,—These two men were equally engaged with the subadar in taking the Standard, which was so nobly defended.

Trooper. Sewdial Sing,—Singly rushed into a walled enclosure and killed one of the enemy, who had several times fired from it with effect.

Trooper. Mootee Sing,—Saved the life of his officer, Captain Garrett.

Trooper. Gungah Sing,—Killed after a long and severe personal conflict with one of the enemy, when no assistance was at hand.

Trooper. Beharee Sing,—After being severely wounded in the wrist, and his horse also in two places, cut down his adversary.

Trooper. Fyzoolla Khan,—Behaved gallantly throughout, and cut down his enemy after a severe personal conflict.

Trooper. Hussain Ally,—Strongly recommended for great gallantry during the charge.

Trooper. Nasser Ally,—Behaved with great gallantry during the charge, and was severely wounded.

(Signed) P. F. STORY, Major,
Com^d. 9th Light Cavalry.

From Major J. H. POOLE, *Commanding 22nd Regiment,*
To the Assistant Adjutant General, *Scinde Field Force.*

Camp, Hyderabad, 24th February, 1843.

SIR,—In reference to No. 2, After Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I called upon the captains and officers commanding companies, to furnish me with the names and acts of individuals under my command, who had especially distinguished themselves in the action of the 17th instant. The officers generally assert that they feel difficulty in making selections, where the conduct of every man of the companies was so satisfactory. In so general a field of action and persevering exertion, I equally feel at a loss, where to draw a distinction; but it may be proper to mention the names of private James O'Neill, of the light company, who took a Standard whilst we were actively engaged with the enemy, and Drummer Martin Delaney, who shot, bayoneted and captured the arms of Meer Whulle Mohamed Khan, who was mounted, and directing the enemy in the hottest part of the engagement. When all the regiment behaved with enduring coolness and intrepidity, I hope the particular circumstances of these two cases

will exonerate me from the imputation of doing injustice to all the brave soldiers of the regiment, by particularizing them.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

J. H. POOLE, *Major,*
Com^d. 22nd Regt.

From Major S. CLIBBORNE, *Com^d. 1st Grenadier Regt. N. I.*
To Lieutenant PELLY, *Acting Asst. Adj. Genl., Hyderabad.*

Camp, near Hyderabad, 24th February, 1843.

SIR,—Agreeably to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I beg to bring to the especial notice of Major General Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., the names of the following officers and men of the 1st grenadiers, who distinguished themselves by zeal and gallantry in the action of the 17th February.

Lieutenant Johnstone, who cut down a Beloochee, and saved the life of a sepoy who had bayoneted this Beloochee, but was overpowered in the life struggle.

Subadar Major Kooshall Sing, and Subadar Esseree Pursaud, likewise privates Sunkur Misser and Kadaree Powar, who were conspicuous throughout the day for their zeal and gallantry.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

S. CLIBBORNE, *Major,*
Com^d. 1st Grenadier Regt. N. I.

From Major N. R. REID, *Commanding 12th Regt. N. I.,*
To the Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Scinde and Beloochistan,
Hyderabad Fort, 25th February, 1843.

SIR,—With reference to No. 3 of the Division Orders, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit, for the purpose of being laid before the Major General, a nominal Roll of non-commissioned officers, naicks and privates, in the 12th regiment, N. I., who have been reported to me by the officers in command, and in charge of the companies to which they belong, as having particularly distinguished themselves in the action of the 17th instant.

I take this opportunity of recording the gallant conduct of the late Captain and Brevet Major Jackson, who fell at the head of the Grenadier company, in a personal conflict with several of the enemy. The other officers, Lieutenant and Brevet Captain

Meade and Lieutenant Wood, who were killed, were also most conspicuous when they fell, in cheering on their men at one of the most critical periods of the action. To the other European officers I am also much indebted for their gallant conduct and example throughout the day; but to Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Brown, the only mounted officer with me in the battle, in a particular degree I beg to place on record the deep gratitude I must ever feel for the assistance he afforded me, as well as my admiration at the gallantry he displayed in cheering the men throughout the conflict, at every part of the line where the resistance was most hot and determined. I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. REID, *Major,*
Commanding 12th Regt. N. I.

Nominal Roll of those men in the 12th Regiment, N. I., who distinguished themselves in the action of the 17th Feb. 1843.

Fort Hyderabad, 25th February, 1843.

- 1 Havildar Dutram Tewaree,
- 1 Naick Bhowanee Sing,
- 2 Naick Allum Sing,
- 1 Private Shaik Adjum,

Wounded, in gallantly defending Capt. and Brevet Major Jackson.

(Sd.) B. D. CARTER, *Ens. in charge of Gr. Company.*

- 1 Havildar Oomrow Sing,
- 1 Naick Lall Khan,
- 1 Private Mathadeen 1st
- 2 „ Booree Aheer
- 3 „ Seetul Lohar.

I heard these men cheering on their comrades after a slight check, and saw them most forward in the action.

(Sd.) G. FISHER, *Capt. Com^d. 5th Company.*

- 1 Havildar Bugwan Sing,
- 2 „ Thackoor Ram,

Behaved gallantly, urging the men on, and foremost in the action.

(Sd.) W. F. HOLBROW, *Ens. in charge 8th Company.*

(True copy.) (Sd.) W. BROWN, *Capt. Adj. 12th Regt. N. I.*

(Sd.) N. R. REID, *Major, Com^d. 12th Regt. N. I.*

From Capt. J. JACKSON, *Comdg. 25th Regt. N. I.*
To the Assistant Adjutant General, *in Scinde and Beloochistan.*

Camp, Hyderabad, 25th February, 1843.

SIR,—Agreeably to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I beg to bring to the especial notice of Major General Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., the following officers of the 25th regiment, N. I., who particularly distinguished themselves, by zeal and gallantry, in the action of the 17th of February, 1843.

The whole of the sepoy's behaved so well, that I consider it would be invidious to make any distinction.

Lieutenant Marston, grenadier company, who cut down two of the enemy, single handed, in front of the line.

Subadar Major Nund Ram, who, though wounded, remained with his company throughout the action.

Subadar Russall Sing, grenadier company, who shot three men, and cut down one, and shewed great zeal in encouraging and leading on his men.

Jemedar Bappoo Sawunt, light company, who cut down one man.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN JACKSON, *Captain,*
Comdg. 25th Regt. N. I.

From Captain J. JACOB, *Comdg. Scinde Irregular Horse,*
To the Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Scinde and Beloochistan.

Camp, near Hyderabad, 23rd February, 1843.

SIR,—With reference to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to request that you will bring to the notice of Major General Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., commanding in Scinde and Beloochistan, that throughout the battle fought on the 17th I received the most essential service from my Acting Adjutant, Lieutenant Russell, whose steady, cool, and daring conduct on the occasion mainly contributed to the good behaviour of the corps I have the honour to command, especially while it was exposed alone for nearly two hours to a heavy fire of artillery, in a most trying position for an irregular sepoy corps, which, until a few months before that day, had, since it was raised, been always dispersed in small detachments, and the men of which had, with few exceptions, never been engaged in any but skirmishing fights. I am also greatly indebted to this officer for the promptness with which he assisted me in the very difficult task of re-

forming, after charging through the enemy's camp, when the men were excited to the highest pitch, and when their services were required to repel an unexpected attack on the rear guard.

I also request that you will have the kindness to bring to the notice of the Major General, the excellent conduct of Russuldar Surferaz Khan, Jemedar Alladad Khan Nawab, and Duffadar Mhobut Khan. The good conduct of these three native officers was most conspicuous throughout the day, and particularly on one occasion, when the regiment was moving over ground rendered nearly impassable by water-courses, hedges, and deep cuts filled with thorns and lined by matchlock-men; in advancing at the gallop over these obstacles so many falls took place, that more than fifty of our horses were lying on the ground at once; this occurred under a very heavy fire from the village and nullahs on the right of the enemy's line, and on this occasion, the native officers above mentioned, re-formed their men, and restored order in a style which was deserving of my highest admiration. I do not mention Lieutenant FitzGerald, my second in command, as I have already brought that officer's services to the notice of the General.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

J. JACOB, *Capt. Arty.*

Comdg. Scinde Irregular Horse.

APPENDIX, No. VII.


Extract from a private letter of Sir Charles Napier, touching the operations against Shere Mohamed, in June, 1843.

18th July.

"I am very ill; I had an apoplectic fit, from the sun, when out on the 13th of June last. I had before had the fever, and was very ill recovered, when I went out, and my tent was 132°. The sun struck me down, and I was, I believe, the only man of many who were so stricken that was not dead within three hours, and most of them in a few minutes. The Doctor was with me in a minute and bled me, put my feet in hot water, wet towels round my head, and so I was got right; but I have never been right since. Such terrible weakness that I cannot write a letter without lying down; a sickening feel comes over me that is quite indescribable. The Doctors tell me I must give

myself holidays ! I ask them how ? If I take one day's rest, I must work double tides the next ! How can I take rest ? That is beyond their power to answer ; I *know* I want it as well as they can tell me, but let them tell me who is to answer, perhaps, *one hundred letters* which at times come in *at once*, from Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, or Agra. In short, it is impossible, without I quit this for ever, to have rest ; and I feel unable to go on. Even this letter to you knocks me up ! Yet 20 sheets of letters on stupid nonsense await at my elbow ! There are *two* reasons why I cannot get rest. There is *no one* to do the work. *2nd.* It is impossible to go away, we are *locked up* for five months by heat and the monsoon. This world is one of suffering, and he who believes it to be only a sojourn makes up his mind to its roughs and smooths ; besides, who is to prophesy ? I may in a week be quite well ! The weather is cooling, the peace of Scinde is secure. I yesterday heard from the north, and the only chief left in arms has fled over the Indus, with a dozen of followers ; and his troops dispersed ! I think I feel better already. Tranquillity is now *certain*, the want of that weighed hard upon me, as I felt my last point of personal strength was to surround Shere Mohamed on the 14th, as I did.

There he was, and though he was a bad soldier to let me pin him up ; yet, like a good one, he slapt at Jacob, who was the weakest, and tried to get to the desert, where he would not fear me, indeed the few Jacob



had could hardly find water ; poor Shere Mohamed's men would not look us in the face. The 24th March took the heart out of the whole of these wild tribes ; and they fled, 4,000 and three guns, before 900 and two guns ! Jacob did not fire a shot but with his cannon. I wanted to go north, to rout out Mohamed Ali, but

am too weak, and this fretted me; now he is disposed of and all is quiet, I shall throw as much work as I can upon others, which with the cool weather will, perhaps, set me up.

My position was a terrible one from 17th February to 22nd March. I had hold of river, fortress, and town, three miles off, Ameers prisoners, immense treasure, and 40,000 men as all accounts stated, gathering upon me; a large hospital, and to guard all these 2,500 men at the most, including officers! And besides all this, the anxiety about the brigade which I had at all hazards ordered to push double marches to Hyderabad from Sukhur; and to protect which, had the enemy ventured to march against it, I must have pursued with 2,000 men at most, an awkward number to follow 40,000! as I heard, and then believed. At last my brigade arrived, and at the same time reinforcements from *up* and *down* the river all arrived on the 23rd and joined. At 7 in the evening I manœuvred the whole in divisions, at 2 in the morning I dismissed an ambassador who arrived to demand my *surrender*, and told him to make haste home for I would be at his heels. I then lay down for two hours, half dead with fatigue, marched at four with 5,000 men, and gave my friend Shere Mohamed such a hiding as he little expected. They will never again fight. All their chiefs have come in and laid their swords at my feet. The whole country is quiet, and rejoicing at being rid of the tyrants. You never saw such a magnificent country, but a wilderness. The collectors have made the calculation, every cultivator paid two-thirds nearly of his produce to the Ameers, rigidly exacted. They have held the country fifty eight years, and it is nearly ruined. Do not fancy the Belooch is the Scindian. ——— says, “I wish you had not been opposed to people fighting for their independence.” How they do blunder in England! Oh! no, we have fought for the *liberties of the people!* Even the Belooch himself is glad, now he finds he is not dispossessed of his conquest, but has only got a good master for bad ones.”

APPENDIX, No. VIII.

TOUCHING THE SICKNESS OF THE TROOPS.

*Extract of a private letter from Sir C. Napier,
19th December, 1844.*

The tales of the Bombay Times about quarters is nonsense. I took the 86th Regt. from Hyderabad, to have no European regiment there during the sickly season. I sent troops to Ahmed Khan, and they had no fever; it was an experiment. I brought the 13th down to Kurrachee to be ready to embark for England. I sent the 78th up to relieve the 13th at Sukhur, and hoped by their arrival very late in October that they would escape fever. It suddenly broke out and raged in the beginning of November, and has killed 125, not one man has escaped and it is raging now. No one can account for it. I shall arrive at Sukkur to-morrow and I will send them down the river directly. The cause is their *drinking*. It does not give the fever, but it so inflames the liver and brain that the fever takes too firm a grasp to be got rid of. Why! their ration is two drams a day, and *eight* of these drams make a quart bottle! so the *sober soldier* swallows *one fourth of a bottle* of raw spirits every day! You and I know them too well to doubt that the other three-fourths go down after the first. Dr. Robertson of the 13th, a clever man, supposed to know India better than most others, tells me that at Jellallabad, where no liquor could be had, where they could get only water, he had not a sick man the whole time! The great disease with officers and men is drink, but the soldiers drink worse liquor, namely, arrack, which is made with anything and everything but rice. Rice the wholesomest of all Indian produce is sadly belied. This arrack is made chiefly of *Bhang*, a liquor drawn from the date tree not by distillation but incision in the bark.

APPENDIX, No. IX.

Abstract of the Revenue and Expenditure of the Government of Scinde for the official year 1843-4.

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Receipts in money | . 892,303 Rupees. |
| Expenditure | . 725,839 ditto. |
| Balance creditor | . 166,464 ditto. |
| Grain in hand valued at | 727,796 ditto. |

Total surplus revenue 894,260 rupees, or £89,426. sterling.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. During this official year war raged till about September 1843, when the last of the Ameer party crossed the Indus in the north and retired to the Bhooghtie hills. It could not therefore be expected that the British collectors could obtain anything like the full revenue; nearly all the grain had been previously seized by the Beloochs.

2nd. The whole expense of the civil Government is included in the abstract, and also the whole expense of two thousand police completely armed, of whom eight hundred are cavalry; and all most efficient.

3rd. The Governor had originally allowed ten lacs for the total expense of the civil Government, but a year's experience convinced him that eight lacs would suffice, exclusive of the police force.

4th. The collection in the above official year *appears* to give a revenue of about sixteen lacs, yet it furnishes a surplus of nearly *nine lacs of rupees*. The *true amount* of revenue will be forty lacs, and the cost of the Government will not require a greater increase than *one lac*, taking round numbers.

5th. The future expense of defending Scinde, will be far less than that of defending the former frontier, along the eastern side of the desert. But while the Punjaub is unsettled the defence of Scinde requires a large force.

6th. The general opinion of all persons conversant with the revenue of Scinde, is that it will increase in a great extent. The ablest collector thinks it will reach a million sterling in *five years*; and the cost of the Government need not increase at all.

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Numerous as are the accounts already published of this great conflict, the information which they convey is generally of too vague and indistinct a nature to satisfy either the military man who seeks for professional instruction, or the general reader who desires to comprehend more clearly, in all its details, that gorgeous machinery, if it may so be termed, which was put in motion, regulated, and controlled by

the greatest masters of their art, who, in modern times, have been summoned forth to wield the mighty engines of destruction wherewith nation wars against nation. How just is the observation of Jomini, one of the most talented military writers of the day—"Jamais bataille ne fut plus confusément décrite que celle de Waterloo." On consulting these accounts the public glean little beyond the fact that at Waterloo the allied army stood its ground during the whole day, in defiance of the reiterated attacks by the French, until the Duke of Wellington led it forward to crown its exertions with the most splendid victory. They afford us but a faint idea of those strategical movements and combinations upon which the grand design of the campaign was based by the one party, and with which it was assailed by the other; and we seek in vain for the development of those tactical dispositions by which the skill of the commanders and the valour of the combatants were fairly tested. From the want of due consecutive arrangement in the details, and the tendency too frequently manifested to compensate for this deficiency by mere anecdotic narration, the motives by which, in the great game of war, the illustrious players are actuated, are left out of view, while circumstances which especially call forth the skill of subordinate officers in command, as also the courage, the discipline, and the prowess of particular brigades, regiments, or even minor divisions of the contending masses, are either imperfectly elucidated, or, as is often the case, unhesitatingly set aside to make way for the exploits of a few individuals whose deeds, however heroic they may be deemed, constitute but isolated fractional parts of that great sum of moral energy and physical force combined, requisite to give full effect to the application of the mental powers of the chieftains under whose guidance the armies are respectively placed. These remarks have reference, more or less, not only to the generality of the accounts of the Battle of Waterloo, with which the public have hitherto been furnished, but also to those of Quatre-Bras, Ligny, and Wavre; the first of which, brilliant as was the reflection which it cast upon the glory of the victors, became eclipsed solely by the more dazzling splendour of the greater, because more important, triumph of Waterloo. To endeavour to remedy these deficiencies, through the medium of the evidence of eye-witnesses, most willingly and liberally supplied, as well as carefully collated, examined, and, at the same time, proved, wherever practicable, by corroborative testimony—every component piece of information being made to dovetail, as it were, into its adjacent and corresponding parts—is the chief object of the present publication.

The opportunities which Captain Siborne has enjoyed of collecting the data requisite for this highly important work, have been peculiarly favourable. Having commenced his large Model under the authority of the government, he received permission to address himself to the several officers who might have it in their power to communicate valuable information; and, with a view to render such information as complete as possible, and to substantiate it by corroborative testimony, he forwarded his applications to almost every surviving Waterloo officer—not limiting his inquiries to any one particular period of the action, but extending them over the whole of the Battle of Waterloo, as also of that of Quatre-Bras, and of the entire campaign. In this manner he has succeeded in obtaining from the combined evidence of eye-witnesses a mass of extremely important matter; and when the public are informed that Captain Siborne has also been in unreserved communication with the governments of our allies in that war, concerning the operations of the troops they respectively brought into the field, it is presumed that the extraordinary advantages he possesses for a satisfactory fulfilment of his design will be at once acknowledged and appreciated.

In reverting, however, to the Model, as connected with the present history, it may not be unimportant to add that some objections were raised against the position thereon assigned to a portion of the Prussian troops. These objections induced Captain Siborne to investigate more closely the evidence he had received relative to that part of the field; and the result of such re-consideration has been a perfect conviction that an error of some importance, as regards time and situation, did exist. When the Model is again submitted to the public, which it will be very shortly, that error will no longer appear, and the circumstances under which it arose will be fully accounted for and explained in the forthcoming work.

One remarkable defect which is manifested, without a single exception, in the existing histories of this campaign, consists in the want of good plans upon scales sufficiently comprehensive to admit of the positions and movements being duly illustrated. By the application of the anaglyptograph to accurately executed models, Captain Siborne has succeeded in producing plans of the different fields of battle, which afford so striking a representation of the features of ground—a representation which has all the appearance of the subject being shewn in relief—that not only the military man who is accustomed to examine plans, but the civilian who has never studied any thing of the kind, will be enabled thoroughly to comprehend them even in the minutest details.

To respond to the interest felt in the record of that glorious contest by the relatives and friends of the combatants, correct lists will be appended to the work, of the names of all officers who were present, distinguishing those who were killed or wounded. Marginal notes will also be introduced wherever officers' names are first mentioned in the course of the work, explaining, if surviving, their present rank, and if dead, the date of their decease, and the rank which they then held.

A work brought out under such favourable auspices, and grounded upon materials which, considering the advanced age of the principal contributors, would at no remote period have been placed beyond our reach, cannot fail to excite, in a considerable degree, the attention of the public; for which reason no pains will be spared in rendering the illustrations fully commensurate with the value and importance of the design. It will comprise two handsome octavo volumes, embellished with beautifully executed medallic portraits, and accompanied by a folio volume, containing military maps and exquisitely engraved anaglyptographic plans from models expressly made by Captain Siborne, of the fields of battle of Quatre-Bras, Ligny, Wavre, and Waterloo.

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