

## The Battle of Glenshiel

A PLAN of the Battle of Glenshiel, by Lieutenant John Henry Bastide, was published by Mr. A. H. Millar in the *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries*, 1882-3, and has been reproduced in the same author's *Rob Roy* (1883), in Mr. W. K. Dickson's *The Jacobite Attempt of 1719* (1895), and in the present writer's *The Chevalier de St. George* (1901). It is reprinted here for purposes of comparison.

The general accuracy of Bastide's plan, apart from the evidence of contemporary narratives, is confirmed by a plan of the battle by John Ross, of Aberdeen, the original of which is at Brahan Castle, in the possession of Colonel Stewart Mackenzie of Seaforth. It was exhibited by him in the Jacobite Exhibition at Inverness in 1903, and through his kindness is here published for the first time.

Ross's plan bears the inscription

'A Disposition of his Maiesties forces comanded by Maj<sup>r</sup> Gen<sup>l</sup> Waightmain and of y<sup>e</sup> Rebels at y<sup>e</sup> Pass of Glenshiels in Kintail North-Britain where y<sup>e</sup> battle was fought upon y<sup>e</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> of June 1719 drawn by John Ross Aberdeen.'

The plan presents the rough contour of the hills about the Pass of Glenshiel (marked  $\varepsilon$  upon the plan). Towards its leftward margin, a broad streak marks the course of the river Shiel, to the right, that is the north, of which the roadway is shown, converging upon the river where both thread the Pass. Towards the right-hand top corner of the plan (marked o) appears a height described as 'Mount Shururan.' Upon Bastide's plan it is called 'The Mount called Skururan, the highest in Scotland except Benevis.' The mountain indicated is Sgurr Fhuaran, or Scour Ouran, which attains an altitude of 3505 feet.


At the foot of the plan a series of positions (c, b) marks the ground (A) on which Wightman drew up his force before the engagement. The position extends on both sides,

### REFERENCES TO THE PLAN

1. A Sergt. and 12 Grenadiers.
2. An Officer and 24 do.
3. Main Body of Grenadiers, 120 in Num.
4. Col. Montagu's Regmt.
5. Col. Harrison's Detacht Battalion.
6. Huffel's Regmt. and 4 Companies of Amerongen's.
7. Dragoons.
8. Col. Clayton's Regiment.
9. The Monro's Highlanders.
10. The Sutherland's Right.
11. The first march by ye Right.
12. Clayton's march by the Left.
13. The Dragoons march to the Plain.
14. The Dragoons Halt.
15. The Dragoons advance to the middle of the Plain.
16. Clayton's four Plottoons and the Monro's making ye First Attack on ye Rebels Right.
17. Cohorn Mortars throwing Granades at the Rebels where ye First Attack was Ordered.
18. Cohorn Mortars throwing Granades at ye Spaniards in their Entrenchments.
19. Part of Clayton's attacks the Barricade of the Pass.
20. 35 Dragoons on Foot attack the Spaniards Breast Works.
21. The Dragoons mount the Hill.
22. Our March in line of Battle to the Rock where the Attack began under ye command of Col. Clayton.
23. Our Right pursue the Rebels.
24. The Plottoons and the Monro's halt upon the Hill, having putt the Ennemy to the Flight.
25. Our Right halts upon ye Mountain.
26. Part of Clayton's takes possession of ye Hill that commanded the Pass.
27. Guard for the Baggage and place for the Hospitall.
28. The Bagage advanced with the wounded men for their security.
29. Majr.-Genl. Whightman giving his directions during the Action.


### REFERENCES TO THE ENNEMY

- A. A Spanish Regiment posted on the Hill that commanded the Plain and the Pass.
- B. Spaniards march to ye Mount and Halt.
- C. The Spaniards retire to the Top of the mountain.
- D. The Barricade that defended the Pass on the River Side.
- E. The Breastworks on the Side of the Hill.
- F. The Highlanders drawn up before the attack.
- G. A straggling number of Highlanders of Clayton's and the Monro's behind them in the time of the attack.
- H. A Body of Highlanders going to sustain their Right.
- M. The Flight of the Rebels, The Mount called Skururan the highest in Scotland except Benvis.



LIEUT. BASTID

*A Plan of the Field of Battle that was fought on the 10th of June, 1719 at the Pass of Glenshiels in Kintail, North Britain with the Disposition of his Majesty's Forces under the Command of Major General Wightman and of those of the Rebels.*



UT. BASTIDE'S PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF GLENSHIEL

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the north and south, of the river Shiel, as in Bastide's plan. Written in ink by a contemporary hand the various units of Wightman's force are indicated; and upon the extreme wings the same annotator apparently has added two important details to the plan. Upon the extreme left appear the 'Munro Highl<sup>rs</sup>' and 'Clayton' (c). Upon their right, the river intervening, appear in order, 'Dragoons,' 'Huffell' and 'Amerong,' 'Harrison,' 'Montague,' 'Granad<sup>rs</sup>,' and 'Strath. Highl<sup>rs</sup>' (B). In Bastide's plan these units are described from left to right as, 'The Monro's Highlanders,' 'Col. Clayton's Regiment,' 'Dragoons,' 'Huffel's Regmt. and 4 Companies of Amerongen's,' 'Col. Harrison's Detacht Battalion,' 'Col. Montagu's Regmt.,' 'Main Body of Grenadiers, 120 in Num.,' 'An Officer and 24 do.,' 'A Sergt. and 12 Grenadiers,' and on the extreme right wing, 'The Sutherland's Right.' In Ross's plan the same contemporary hand has indicated a position in advance of Wightman's front, beyond a tributary burn, and has marked it 'six Dragoons to Reconoitre.'

The published official account<sup>1</sup> of the engagement entirely confirms Ross and Bastide as to the disposition of Wightman's force: 'On the Right were posted all the Grenadiers under the Command of Major Milburn,<sup>2</sup> being above 150 in Number, who were sustained by Montague's Regiment,<sup>3</sup> commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence,<sup>3</sup> and a Detachment of 50 Men commanded by Colonel Harrison,<sup>4</sup> the rest of his Regiment being in Garrison at Inverlochy; these were supported by Huffel's Dutch Regiment, and four Companies out of Amerongen's; this [right] Wing had 56 of Lord Strathnaver's Men in the Flank, under the Command of Ensign Mac Cey, and the whole Wing was commanded by Colonel Clayton,<sup>5</sup> who

<sup>1</sup> *The London Gazette*, 20-23rd June, 1719.

<sup>2</sup> Major Richard Milburn. His regiment is the present Devonshire Regiment (11th Foot). He had led it at Sheriffmuir (Dalton, *English Army Lists*, vol. v. p. 237).

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Edward Montague received the command of the 11th Regiment of Foot on 13th July, 1715, and died on 2nd August, 1738, at which time he held the rank of Brigadier-General (Note communicated by Mr. Dalton).

Lt.-Col. Herbert Lawrence received the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 11th Foot on 11th April, 1712 (Dalton, *English Army Lists*, vol. v. p. 176).

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Henry Harrison received the colonelcy of the 15th Foot on 8th February, 1715 (*Ibid.* vol. v. pt. ii. p. 50).

<sup>5</sup> Colonel Jasper Clayton commanded the regiment now known as the 14th Foot. He was killed at Dettingen (Dalton, *English Army Lists*, vol. iv. p. 130).

acted as Brigadier upon this Occasion. The Left Wing consisted of Clayton's Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Reading, and had on the Flank above fourscore Men of the Monroes, under the command of Mr. Monroe of Culcairn. The Dragoons, which were 120 in Number, commanded by Major Robertson,<sup>6</sup> and had made their March from Inverness without the Loss of so much as one Horse or the least Inconvenience to them, were order'd to keep the Road,<sup>7</sup> having four Cohorns plac'd in their Front.<sup>8</sup> The Major-General [Wightman] himself was posted in the Centre.' His total strength was 850 foot, 120 dragoons, 136 Highlanders, in all 1106, and four mortars.<sup>9</sup>

Ross's plan is not equally detailed as to the disposition of the Jacobite force. Upon the high ground immediately to the north of the Pass is shown the entrenched position (A) occupied by the luckless Spanish contingent (B) which was involved in the haphazard adventure. On its front, facing east towards Wightman's line of advance, are shown a double line of entrenchments held by Highlanders (C), covered by three breastworks defended by the Spaniards themselves (D). On the other (the south) side of the river, upon an eminence in advance of the Spaniards' position, is marked (F) a 'Detachment from y<sup>e</sup> Right command<sup>d</sup> by L<sup>d</sup> G. Murray.' Upon the extreme left of the Jacobite position is shown (G) a 'Body of 400 Highland<sup>rs</sup> comand<sup>d</sup> by Ld. Seaforth.' In Seaforth's rear appears (at H) a force described as 'The body of Men to Sustain the first.' To the rear of Lord George Murray are shown (L) a body of 'Highland<sup>rs</sup> going to Sustain L<sup>d</sup> G. Murray,' and close by them (O) another body of 'Highland<sup>rs</sup> Skulking about the Hills.' On the left (north) of the Spanish entrenchments is marked (I) the position of the 'Woods from whence they [the Highlanders] fired hid behind Rocks.'

<sup>6</sup> Major Patrick Robertson. His regiment was the Royal Regiment of North British Dragoons, now the Royal Scots Greys.

<sup>7</sup> Ross's plan shows the dragoons lying across the road.

<sup>8</sup> The position of the four mortars in the attack is marked N on Ross's plan. A similar position is assigned to them on Bastide's plan.

<sup>9</sup> In Mar's *Distinct Abridgement*, quoted in my *Chevalier de St. George*, p. 491, Wightman's strength is given at about 1500. Wightman, says Mar, 'placed their Horse on the low ground, and a Battalion cross the water near them, with most of their Highlanders on their left; all the rest of their foot were at a distance on a rising ground to the right of the horse.'

Bastide's plan agrees generally with Ross's regarding the Jacobite position. The Spanish contingent (A) is thereon described as 'posted on the Hill that commanded the Plain and the Pass.' Lord George Murray's position (F) is identically represented, and also that of the force of Highlanders (H) 'to sustain their [Lord George Murray's] Right.' Bastide, however, shows a detail which is not specifically indicated on Ross's plan. At about the position E on Ross's plan he marks 'The Barricade that defended the Pass on the River Side' (D). Wightman may have had such a barrier in his mind when he wrote in his official despatch: 'Their Dispositions for Defence were extraordinary, with the Advantages of Rocks, Mountains, and Intrenchments.'<sup>10</sup> Possibly the rope-like detail immediately above E on Ross's plan is intended to represent the entrenchments across the Pass.

The disposition of the Jacobite force is detailed by Tullibardine, who was present,<sup>11</sup> in a letter to Mar from Glengarry on 16th June, 1719.<sup>12</sup> He writes: 'We had drawn up to the right [*i.e.* south] of our main body on the other side of the [Shiel] water upon a little Hill [F on Ross's plan] about one hundred and fifty men, including the Companys of my Lord Seaforths, besides above four-score more were allotted for that place, who was to come from the top of the Hill [O on the left of Ross's plan], but altho' they sent twice to tell they were coming, yet they only beheld the action at a Distance. This party was commanded by Lord Geo. Murray, the Laird of McDougal, Major Mcintosh,<sup>13</sup> and John of Auch,<sup>14</sup> ane old officer of my Lord Seaforths people.'<sup>15</sup> On the north of the

<sup>10</sup> *Historical Register*, vol. iv. p. 283. A letter of 22nd June, 1719, speaks of the Jacobite position at the Pass as 'fortified by strong entrenchments from one side to another, being not above two hundred paces broad' (*Portland MSS.*, vol. v. p. 584).

<sup>11</sup> His commission 'was read that morning [10th June] at the head of the army, as ample as was ever given to any subject's' (*Portland MSS.*, vol. v. p. 584).

<sup>12</sup> The letter is printed in *The Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, p. 269. It may be observed that Mar's *Distinct Abridgement*, printed in Oliphant's *Jacobite Lairds of Gask*, quotes it almost literally.

<sup>13</sup> 'Major James Mackintosh, Borlum's brother' (*Portland MSS.*, vol. v. p. 585).

<sup>14</sup> John Mackenzie of Avoch.

<sup>15</sup> The letter of 22nd June (*Portland MSS.*, vol. v. p. 585) describes the right of the Jacobite position thus: 'That on the right on the opposite southern hill consisted of about one hundred and twenty Belkash and Loch-Errin men with

river, forming the left of the Jacobite position, according to Tullibardine, 'were first on the right'<sup>16</sup> the Spanish Regiment [B on Ross's plan], which consisted of about two hundred men; about fifty more of them were left behind with the Magazine, several of them being Sick.' Next in the line, on the left of the Spaniards, was 'Locheill with about one hundred and fifty.' On the Camerons' left were 'M<sup>r</sup> Lidcoat's and others, being one hundred and fifty, twenty volunteers.'<sup>17</sup> On their left, in order from left to right, were Rob Roy and forty Macgregors, fifty Mackinnons, and two hundred Seaforth Highlanders under Sir John Mackenzie of Coull. On the extreme left of the Jacobite line, 'at a considerable distance on a steep hill,' was Lord Seaforth himself, 'posted with above two hundred of his best men.' The Earl Marischal and Brigadier Campbell of Ormidale were with him. Brigadier Mackintosh of Borlum was with the Spaniards. On the centre, at the Pass itself, 'where we imagin'd the main attack would be, it being by far the easiest Ground, besides the only way thro' the Glen,' Tullibardine and Brigadier Colin Campbell of Glendaruel took position.<sup>18</sup>

Before dealing with the battle itself, it may be well to sketch the circumstances which had brought the two forces into opposition. Jacobite effort for the most part leant upon French assistance. Simon Fraser's plot in 1703, the French descent of 1708, the risings of 1715 and 1745 establish the fact. But the haphazard effort of 1719 drew its inspiration from Spanish and Cardinal Alberoni's restless and disturbing policy. England, pledged to the Treaty of Utrecht, a signatory to the Treaty of Westminster in 1716, and, with France and Holland, a party to the Triple Alliance of 1717, thwarted Alberoni's schemes. Undaunted he seized Sicily in 1718.

about fifty Camerons, and was commanded by Lord George Murray, Fairbores, John of Avoch, and Major James Mackintosh, Borlum's brother.' 'Fairbores' appears elsewhere (*ibid.* p. 587) as 'Fairburne.'

<sup>16</sup> *i.e.* nearest to the stream and Pass.

<sup>17</sup> Mr. Dickson, *Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, p. 1., conjectures that 'Lidcoat' may be a pseudonym for Glengarry. But a letter from one with the Jacobite force states categorically that 'none of Glengarry' was present (*Portland MSS.*, vol. v. p. 587). The same letter seems to refer to 'Lidcoat's' contingent as 'about eighty stragglers.' In Mar's *Distinct Abridgement* this body is referred to as '150 with 20 volunteers, from the neighbouring bounds.'

<sup>18</sup> *The Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, p. 271.

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PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF GLENSHIEL, 1719, BY JOHN ROSS, ABERDEEN

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In August of that year Admiral Byng engaged and routed the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro. To cripple England, or at least to hold her powerless to check the policy to which she was committed, was naturally Alberoni's aim. The Hanoverian dynasty in England was still unsettled and unpopular. To encourage latent Jacobitism in England and Scotland was an obvious measure. In November, 1718, accordingly, the Duke of Ormonde was invited from Paris to Madrid. Early the next year the Chevalier himself set out from Rome to Madrid. Ormonde's English project, however, met the usual fate of foreign fleets engaged in Jacobite adventure. James arrived in Spain to learn that an appeal to English Jacobitism was perforce abandoned. But ignorant of the fate of Ormonde's attempt, the Earl Marischal had already sailed for Scotland. His brother, James Keith, had been despatched to France to stir up the Jacobite refugees.<sup>19</sup> Early in April, 1719, Jacobite Scotland was invited to join in the isolated adventure. But the Spanish contingent alone indicated that the brunt of the effort would not be purely local. Sheriffmuir was too recent a memory to tempt obvious immolation. The Clans were cautious. The measure of their enthusiasm has already been gauged in the roll of those who were present at Glenshiel.

Wightman, with the troops already enumerated, had marched from Inverness, haply to quell the rising, on 5th June. On the 10th he advanced westward from Strath Clunie, and found the Jacobite force covering the Pass of Glenshiel.<sup>20</sup> Ross's plan gives indications of the course of the battle. On the front of the position where Wightman halted upon coming into view of the Pass is shown (H) the 'rock' where his force 'wheeld to y<sup>e</sup> right at 4 to atack y<sup>e</sup> Enemy at 6,' confronted by Seaforth and the Highland left (G). To the rear (M) of Wightman's force is shown the 'Guard for y<sup>e</sup> bagadge & place for y<sup>e</sup> Hospital." On the left of Wightman's line a force of 'Dragoons

<sup>19</sup> See *Memoir of Field-Marshal James Keith, 1714-1734*. Spalding Club.

<sup>20</sup> *Historical Register*, vol. iv. p. 283. Wightman's letter to Roxburghe states: Yesterday [10th June] I march'd from Strachlony to the Head of Glenshill, a considerable Pass, which, I was told, the Enemy had resolv'd to defend; but upon my Approach they deserted that Post, and retir'd to cover their Camp, which was at another very strong Pass call'd Strachell.' Mr. Dickson remarks that the 'name of Pass of Strachell] still appears in guide-books, though it is not known in the district' (*Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, p. xlix). The advanced party which Wightman describes as retiring before him was commanded by Lord George Murray.

advanced on horseback' is shown at F. To the rear of that body appears the first position of the mortars, firing across the stream upon Murray's position at F. The second position of the guns (N) shows them bombarding the Spaniards entrenched at A. To the south of the stream, at the foot and on the crest of Lord George Murray's hill (both marked D) is shown 'a Platoon high: marching up y<sup>e</sup> hill to attack Lord G. Murray.' Finally, high up the hill upon the right (north) of the plan is marked (L) the position of 'Our [Wightman's] Army drawn up after the Action.' As to the Jacobite force Ross does no more than indicate the direction of its retreat. Naturally, in view of the presence of cavalry with Wightman's force, the routed Highlanders and their allies kept to the high ground. The Spaniards are shown retreating due north up the hill (M) to its summit (N) 'where they fled after y<sup>e</sup> Action.' At P (twice marked) are shown the 'Highland<sup>s</sup> broke and runing away.'

Bastide's plan confirms Ross's details. Clayton, commanding the right, led the force to 'the Rock where the Attack began' (22. See H on Ross's plan), and pushed his pursuit to the top of the hill (23, 25. See L on Ross's plan). The attack of Clayton's regiment and the Monroes (D on Ross's plan) upon Lord George Murray's position is shown by Bastide at 16 and 24. The first position of the mortars (unlettered on Ross's plan) is shown at 17. Their second position (N on Ross's plan) is shown at 18, and hard by Wightman is represented (29) 'giving his directions during the Action.' The development of the attack upon the centre of the Jacobite position, the Pass itself, is shown by Bastide with some details which make clearer Ross's confusing lettering. At 19 is shown part of Clayton's regiment, after the rout of Murray's force, engaged in attacking 'the Barricade of the Pass,' and on the other (north) side of the stream (at 20) '35 Dragoons on Foot attack the Spaniards Breast Works.' On Ross's plan these positions are indicated on either side of the river at G G. From Bastide's plan it also appears (21) that the dragoons (F on Ross's plan) and part of Clayton's regiment (26) took possession of the eminence on which the Spaniards had been entrenched.

The general features of the engagement are already clear. Wightman, instead of a direct attack upon the centre of the Jacobite position, and probably with the object of sweeping the pursuit along the valley where his cavalry could deal with it, directed his first attack upon the wings. Victorious on both

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quarters, he forced the Spaniards on the centre to evacuate their entrenched position, and to join the flight of the Highlanders to the higher slopes of Scour Ouran.<sup>21</sup> Such a general impression of the engagement is confirmed by the contemporary accounts of it. Tullibardine<sup>22</sup> states clearly that the brunt of Wightman's attack had been expected on the centre, 'it being by far the easiest Ground, besides the only way thro' the Glen.' Wightman, however, merely stationed his horse 'on the low Ground,' and placed his foot partly on the south of the stream, and partly 'on a rising ground' on his right. The first attack was upon Lord George Murray and the Jacobite right. The Monroes and Clayton's regiment delivered it. Their first detachment was reinforced by a second and a third, until 'most of those with Lord Geo. ran to the other side of a steep Burn, where he himself and the rest were afterwards obliged to follow, where they continued till all was over, it being uneasy for the enemy to pass the hollow Banks of that Burn.' If Ross's chronology is correct, the attack and rout of Lord George Murray must have taken place after four o'clock, when Wightman's right moved up the higher ground against Seaforth.<sup>23</sup> 'When they found that party on our Right give way,' Tullibardine continues, 'their Right began to move up the Hill from thence, to fall down on our left, but when they saw my Lord Seaforths people, who were behind the steep Rock (marked 1 on Ross's plan), they were oblig'd to attack them least they should have been flank'd in coming to us.' The inference is clear. The screened position at 'the steep Rock,' held, as one may conjecture, by 'Lidcoat,' Rob Roy, and the Mackinnons, enfiladed the direct advance of an attacking force approaching the Spaniards. Clayton, therefore, commanding Wightman's right, found it necessary to convert a frontal attack upon the centre into a flank attack upon the Jacobite extreme left. The change of direction brought him upon Seaforth and his Mackenzies (G on Ross's plan). Clayton's move produced immediate effect. Sir John Mackenzie of Coull, on Seaforth's right, in spite of the fact, as Tullibardine states, that 'most

<sup>21</sup> Mr Dickson (*Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, p. lii) remarks: 'Far up the hill there is a corrie which to this day the shepherds call Bealach-na-Spainnteach, the Spaniards' Pass.'

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* p. 271.

<sup>23</sup> Wightman states that he delivered his attack 'about Five in the Afternoon' (*Historical Register*, vol. iv. p. 283).

of [his] men began to goe off on the seing the enemy mov'd up with his Battalion to sustain the rest of the M'kenzies.' Clayton, in consequence, pushed his attack on Seaforth with the greater vigour, 'on which my Lord Seaforth sent down [the hill] for a Reinforcement.' Campbell of Ormidale came up at the moment from his post with the Spaniards, 'telling it was not certain if there [Wightman's] main body would not just then fall upon our Centre.' The news spread consternation among those with whom it would go hardly if Ormidale's fear should be realised at the moment when Seaforth's position seemed precarious. It caused, says Tullibardine, 'Rob Roy with the M'grigors and M'kinnin the longer of drawing off' to Seaforth's assistance. Observing Seaforth 'give way,' however, Rob Roy 'made all the dispatch he could' to reinforce him. 'But before he could get up, so as to be fairly in hands with the Enemy, Lord Seaforth's people were mostly gone off, and himself left wounded in the Arm, so that with difficulty he could get out of the place.' Rob Roy thereupon drew off his detachment. 'Lidcoat's' men were sent to reinforce the left, but followed Rob Roy. The Camerons were then ordered to 'march up,' but 'likewise drew off as others had done.' Finally the Spaniards were 'called' to check the rout. But 'none standing to Sustain them, they likewise were oblig'd to draw up the hill on our left, where at last all began to run, tho' half had never once an opportunity to fire on the Enemy.' The whole disorganised force, Tullibardine concludes, 'went off over the mountains, and next morning we had hardly anybody together except some of the Spaniards.'

In the *Portland MSS.*<sup>24</sup> two anonymous letters add some details to the story of the battle. The first, dated 22nd June, is clearly written by one who was not present at it. The second, dated 27th June, is the narrative of an eye-witness whose account is both incomplete, inaccurate, and prejudiced by its writer's animus against Tullibardine. Both, however, contain statements which bear the stamp of accuracy, and may be accepted. The first adds a detail to the attack on Lord George Murray and the Jacobite right: 'The last-mentioned wing was attacked by the forces half an hour after four in the afternoon, and though they were vastly inferior in number to those who attacked them in their bodies, yet being equal in

<sup>24</sup> Vol. v. pp. 584-87.

their courage and superior in their situation, they repulsed them thrice with considerable loss, and maintained their ground bravely for two hours, till at last by their small mortars (a new machine of General Cochorn's invention), the forces fired the heath and woods about them, and by that means smothered them out of their strongholds; upon which they retired in good order and with great deliberation to the main body.<sup>25</sup> Of the attack upon the Jacobite left the writer gives the following account: 'My Lord Seaforth was next attacked, and maintained his ground for two hours more with abundance of bravery, till at last his men, weary of so long and close fire, began to give way, upon which he stepped out before his men towards the enemy, brandishing his sword to rally them, at which time he received a shot in the fleshy part of the arm. However, he rallied them at length, and stood it out at one strong ground or other till about a quarter after nine,<sup>26</sup> when being faint by loss of blood, no succours being sent him from the main body (though earnestly and frequently desired), his hardiest men being fatigued by long action, and overpowered by numbers of forces, who by this time had scrambled up the hill, and were advanced breast to breast, he was at last forced to retire, which he did without the least disorder or confusion.' The writer adds: 'I am not to enlarge upon misbehaviour in general or particular, but certainly there was an Achan in the camp. Imprudence, cowardice, and knavery were the principal ingredients in the composition of some there, and that not without the influence of some who were old friends.' No suspicion rested upon Seaforth, who 'discharged his piece six times after he was wounded.' Sir John Mackenzie, also, 'made a notable effort to recover the reputation he had lost at Inverness.' As to Lord George Murray and the Earl Marischal, 'some of the officers . . . swear they have seen each of them fire fifteen shot.'

The letter of 27th June infers that the Jacobites retreated because 'the whole ammunition was spent.' Tullibardine comes in for criticism. 'When we expected all would act as they ought,' says the writer, 'our General refused with his

<sup>25</sup> The statement that Murray retired to the main body does not find confirmation elsewhere. See above.

<sup>26</sup> Wightman states that 'a warm Dispute was maintain'd till past Eight' (*Historical Register*, vol. iv. p. 283).

body to engage, alleging he had no orders from the king to fight, and only detached Glenderuell and Rob Roy Macgregor with sixty men to a pass, which they quitted without firing one shot upon the enemy's advancing, and retired to the General.' The writer adds, that while Seaforth was engaged on the left, Tullibardine 'ordered Rob Roy to blow up the whole magazine, which he did, and to carry off his baggage, of which he took more than fell to his and the General's share, and the General marched southward with his whole body, without burning powder except firing the magazine.' Seaforth again is complimented: 'In this action, Seaforth and the few that stood by him acquitted themselves like heroes, and had their ammunition would probably have ruined the enemy . . . He himself [Seaforth] led them on in his Highland habit, and fought amongst them at the same time without any distinction; he received a wound along the ribs, on the right side, which being slight, he concealed, and when the whole ammunition was spent, he drew his sword, and raising his hand with it, gave orders for all to fall on sword in hand, he was shot in the arm through the flesh, and his people flocking about him, and seeing much blood upon him coming from both wounds put them in some confusion, which with the enemies pressing hard upon them obliged them to retire, and march to the "Cro" of Kintail.' The writer concludes: 'Lochriel, Borlam, Glenrue, Rob Roy and some others were the counsellors about the General; how they will account for their conduct I know not. Macdougall, Fairburne, Avach, and Belmukie behaved extraordinarily well in their several stations with Seaforth.'

Keith's *Memoir* adds nothing to the details of the engagement. The official narratives are equally general in their character. Wightman's dispatch to the Duke of Roxburghe is dated 'Glenshill, June 11, Eight o'Clock in the Morning.'<sup>27</sup> He writes: 'Yesterday I march'd from Strachlony to the Head of Glenshill, a considerable Pass, which, I was told, the Enemy had resolv'd to defend; but upon my Approach they<sup>28</sup> deserted that Post, and retir'd to cover their Camp, which was at another very strong Pass call'd Strachell. I gave them no Time, but immediately view'd their Situation, and having made my

<sup>27</sup> *Historical Register*, vol. iv. p. 283.

<sup>28</sup> *i.e.* Lord George Murray and his reconnoitring party. See my *Chevalier de St. George*, p. 489.

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Disposition, began my Attack about Five in the Afternoon, and a warm Dispute was maintain'd till past Eight, when it pleas'd God to give us an entire Victory over them.' He announced that the Spanish troops had agreed to surrender that afternoon, and that his casualties would not exceed one hundred and fifty, including Captain Downes of Montague's regiment, who was killed in the attack. A later letter from Wightman gives the roll of the Spanish prisoners at two hundred and seventy-four including officers.<sup>29</sup> *The London Gazette*, for 20-23rd June, 1719, announced: 'About Five, the Left Wing was order'd to begin the Attack, and the Rebels, always as they had fir'd their Muskets, skipping off, and never venturing to come to a close Engagement, were driven from Rock to Rock, our Men chasing them before them for above three Hours, 'till we gain'd the Top of the Hill, where they were immediately dispers'd.' Lord George Murray, who had his revenge in the '45, was reported wounded in the leg.

The narratives of the engagement on both sides convey unanimously the impression of a Jacobite defeat. That divided counsels contributed to that result is apparent from the accounts already quoted. Mar's *Distinct Abridgement* and Keith's *Memoir* amply confirm them.<sup>30</sup> Sir Walter Scott, however, has represented the engagement as a Jacobite victory. Mr. Hill Burton holds the issue drawn and doubtful. On the contrary, the engagement on 10th June, 1719, was decisive, and, as Mr. Dickson remarks, 'a sorry celebration of James's birthday.'<sup>31</sup> Nearly a generation passed before some of the actors in it, under more inspiring leadership, challenged the issue of it. And with Culloden militant Highland Stuartism expired.

C. SANFORD TERRY.

<sup>29</sup> *Historical Register*, vol. iv. p. 285. For an account of their treatment see *Lochhart Papers*, vol. ii. p. 23; *The Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, p. 274.

<sup>30</sup> See my *Chevalier de St. George*, pp. 474 *et seq.*

<sup>31</sup> *The Jacobite Attempt of 1719*, p. lii.