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THE
L I F E
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR THOMAS MUNRO, BART.
AND K.C.B.

LATE GOVERNOR OF MADRAS.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE
AND PRIVATE PAPERS.

BY THE REV. G. R. GLEIG,
M.A. M.R.S.L. &c.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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THE
L I F E
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
S I R T H O M A S M U N R O,
BART. & K.C.B. &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

*War with the Mahrattas.—Campaign of General Munro's
Division.—General Correspondence.*

THINGS were in this state, and the Commission, after meeting with endless delays and opposition, was just beginning to act, when events befell, which turned, for a time, the attention of all concerned into a different channel.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that the Pindarries, encouraged by the peculiar distribution of the British army, a large proportion of which was cantoned in the Deccan, as well as secretly supported by Scindiah, Holkar, Ameer Khan, and others, began, towards the close of 1816, to make frequent and destructive inroads into the Madras provinces. These became at last so annoying, that the necessity of resorting to strong measures for their suppression, could no longer be denied, and the approach of war upon a large scale, and against others besides avowed enemies, was very generally anticipated throughout India. It is true that the Native

powers, to whom remonstrances were made, affected to deplore the continuance of the predatory system, and expressed themselves willing to co-operate with the British Government in the extirpation of the freebooters; but the readiness with which they gave to those very freebooters a safe passage through their countries, and the perfect exemption which they experienced from the evils of which the Company complained, led all rational persons to conclude, that in such professions there was no sincerity. The consequence was, that the Governor-General, with the promptitude and sagacity which distinguished him, began early to arrange his plans for a campaign; and orders were issued which placed the troops of each of the Presidencies in a condition for immediate service.

Whilst these preparations were as yet imperfectly begun, Colonel Munro, from whose penetration the true state of affairs could not be concealed, esteemed it proper to solicit from the Supreme Government employment in the line of his own profession. With this view, he addressed a letter to the Marquess of Hastings, in which he gave it as his decided opinion, that the defensive system ought at once to be abandoned. "Against Native armies in general," says he, "defensive measures are always ineffectual, but more especially against Pindarries. The great Mahratta armies, though they move rapidly, must occasionally halt for their bazaars, supplies, and baggage, which affords a chance of coming up with them; but there is no chance of this kind in the case of Pindarries, who move without bazaars, and enter the country merely for plunder, without any view of conquest. They can only be put down by seizing the districts in which they assemble, and either keeping them, or placing them under a Native government, which can keep them under complete subjection." Finally, he requested "that, in the event of a war, he might be entrusted with the command of the subsidiary forces of Hyderabad and Nagpoor, and of such force as might be destined to act between the Godavery and Nerbud-

dah.—I am senior to any of the officers now employed in that quarter," continued he: "I have seen as much service as any officer in the Madras army, having, with the exception of Lord Wellington's short campaign in 1803, been in every service with the army since June 1780, when Hyder Ally invaded the Carnatic."

The preceding letter was written in the month of January, 1817, when as yet the occurrence of a war had not been positively ascertained, or, to speak more correctly, when it was still a matter of doubt with whom the war should be waged. It contained sentiments perfectly in accordance with those of the Governor-General; yet the latter, though not unacquainted with the high character of Colonel Munro, declined to supersede officers already in the field. Whence this determination arose, whether from a feeling of delicacy towards the officers in question, or from a mistaken view of the civil duties in the discharge of which Colonel Munro was engaged, I possess no means of determining; but of the fact itself no doubt exists: indeed, it was distinctly stated, that even in the event of hostilities, his Excellency could hold out little hope that Colonel Munro would be employed actively in the field.

Time passed, and every day rendered more and more palpable the extent of the confederacy which had been formed for the overthrow of the British power. Not Scindiah, and Holkar, and Ameer Khan only, but the Peishwah himself became an object of suspicion; if not to other functionaries, at all events to Mr. Elphinstone, whose situation as resident gave him ample opportunities of observing, which his natural acuteness failed not to improve. It will be recollected, that early in 1817, a new treaty of alliance was set on foot with his Highness, which had for its object a more convenient mode of providing for the discharge of engagements already in force. To this, as it implied a considerable cession of territory, the Peishwah exhibited so much reluctance, that June arrived ere the negotiation produced any result; nor was it till the 13th day of that month that the treaty of Poonah

was concluded, and several important provinces made formally over to the East India Company. These, including a district in the southern Mahratta country, in which were situated the forts of Darwar and Koongul, a tract of land south of the Werdah, and other places, were estimated to produce an annual revenue of thirty-five lacs of rupees, and they were given up as a compensation for the maintenance of a subsidiary force of three thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry.

In the mean while, however, the dispositions which Lord Hastings had resolved to make were gradually arriving at maturity. Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, Commander-in-chief at Madras, received orders to assume the guidance both of his own army and of that of the Deccan, and to associate with himself, as a member of a political commission, Colonel Sir John Malcolm, to whom a Brigadier's warrant was issued. A similar promotion was, at the same time, conferred upon various other officers, including Colonels Doveton, Floyer, and Pritzler, of the Madras Presidency; whilst to each of them was committed either a division or a brigade in the army of which Sir Thomas Hislop was at the head. Now, the whole of these officers, however meritorious in other respects, were junior to Colonel Munro; their experience in Indian warfare was more limited than that which circumstances had enabled him to acquire; yet they were all advanced to the rank of Brigadier, and all invested with commands, while he was left in the grade of Colonel, to attend to civil occupations. Colonel Munro was deeply hurt at this arrangement: if ever he felt ambitious for distinction of any kind, it was for that which the command of troops, in the presence of an enemy, alone affords an opportunity of earning; and it wounded him severely to discover, that now, when other circumstances combined to open a door for its attainment, the pleasure of his superiors should alone stand in the way.

With matters in this vague and unsatisfactory condition, considerable importance was attached to an early occupation

of the new provinces ceded to the Company. Their local position gave to them great value in the existing state of affairs; in the event of a rupture with the Peishwah, that value would be increased fourfold; and hence both the Supreme Government and the Government of Madras were exceedingly desirous that no time should be lost in adjusting the transfer. Colonel Munro was strongly urged to accept the office of Commissioner in this arrangement.* It was not the kind of office which he desired to hold at a moment when hostilities were on the eve of commencing; nor did he conceive that the higher powers behaved to him with the consideration to which he was entitled, when they repeatedly pressed it upon him; but Colonel Munro had never accustomed himself to indulge a private feeling, when the public good seemed to be at issue; and, after a slight struggle between inclination and patriotism, he accepted it. He accordingly repaired to the Toombuddra, upon which a force was already assembled, to the command of which Brigadier-General Pritzler had been appointed, and assuming the temporary direction of it, made ready to occupy Darwar, either by persuasion or force.

No great difficulty was experienced in the accomplishment of this service. Major Newal, being pushed forward at the head of a battalion of sepoy, arrived in front of the place several days before Colonel Munro, who, with the remainder of the brigade, was hindered from passing the river by a violent flood; but that intelligent officer conducted matters with so much address, that he prevailed upon the garrison, though in a state of mutiny, to submit. Colonel Munro came up soon after they had evacuated the place, and took quiet possession. He remained here several weeks, transacting business, or rather striving to transact it, with the agents appointed by the Peishwah to meet him; and he addressed, during

* Among others, his friend Sir John Malcolm wrote to him in the following terms. "If you decline the appointment, I shall address you as Aboo Beker did Omar. The latter said he did not want the Caliphat; I know that, said the expiring sovereign, but the Caliphat wants you."

this interval, the following characteristic and important letter to His Excellency the Governor-General.

Darwar, 12th August, 1817.

WITH regard to what more immediately concerns myself, though I cannot but regret deeply to feel, for the first time, the army in advance shut against me, and that your Lordship's plans do not admit of my being employed with the forces in the Deccan, I am sensible that those plans ought not to give way to the views of individuals.

I have accepted the command offered to me by the Madras Government, of the troops destined for the occupation of the Peishwah's cessions in Darwar and Savanore. Had I been certain that it would have led to nothing else, I would have declined it; but I indulge the hope that, in the event of hostilities, and of any vacancy occurring among the brigadiers in the Deccan, it may possibly lead to my being employed in that quarter. When I consider, however, the weakness of the Native states, and the character of the chiefs under whose sway they now are, I see little chance of war, and none of a protracted resistance. They have not force to turn our armies, and lengthen out the contest by a predatory invasion of our territories. Their great distance from our frontier, and the magnitude of our disposable force, are almost insurmountable obstacles to the success of such an enterprise; whilst nothing but our following them too regularly, could save them from being almost entirely destroyed. They may run ahead for a few days, but, if followed perseveringly by numerous small detachments properly supported, they will have no time to rest or plunder; they will be exhausted and overtaken. I have seen Sir John Malcolm's able observations on this subject; and I should, if any thing, rather rate their military power lower than he does. It is not that they want resources, or that they have not men and horses, but that there is no one amongst them possessed of those superior talents which are necessary to direct them to advantage.

There is so little system or subordination in Native governments, that much more energy is required under them, than under the more regular governments of Europe, to give full effect to their resources. Scindiah was never formidable, even in the height of his power. The great means which he possessed were lost in his feeble hands. The exertions of Holkar against Lord Lake were still weaker than those of Scindiah. The power

of Scindiah's, as well as of Holkar's government, has so much declined since that period, that it is scarcely credible that either Scindiah or Meer Khan would venture to oppose by force, any measure for the suppression of the Pindarries. But it is still possible that they might act otherwise; for there is sometimes a kind of infatuation about Indian chiefs who have lost a part of their dominions, which tempts them to risk the rest in a contest which they know to be hopeless.

The situation of the British Government with regard to the Native powers, is entirely changed within the last twenty years. It formerly brought very small armies into the field, with hardly any cavalry; and the issue of any war in which it engaged was extremely uncertain. It now brings armies into the field superior to those of the enemy, not only in infantry, but also in cavalry, both in quality and in number. The superiority is so great, that the event of any struggle in which it may be engaged is no longer doubtful. It has only to bring forward its armies, and dictate what terms it pleases, either without war, or after a short and fruitless resistance. It may however be doubted whether, after the settlement of the Pindarries, it ought to avail itself of its predominant power, in order to extend the system of subsidiary alliances, by stationing a force in Bhopaul or in any other foreign territory. While the military power of Mysore and of the Mahratta chiefs was yet in its vigour, subsidiary alliances were in some degree necessary for its safety, but that time is now past; and when, therefore, the evils which subsidiary force entails upon every country in which it is established are considered, it appears advisable that future security against the Pindarries should be sought by their reduction, and by compelling Scindiah, for his conduct in supporting them, to cede the districts restored to him in 1805-6, rather than by stationing a subsidiary force in Bhopaul. There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists, weak and oppressive; to extinguish all honourable spirit among the higher classes of society, and to degrade and impoverish the whole people. The usual remedy of a bad government in India is a quiet revolution in the palace, or a violent one by rebellion, or foreign conquests. But the presence of a British force cuts off every chance of remedy, by supporting the prince on the throne against every foreign and domestic enemy. It renders him indolent, by teaching him to trust to strangers for

his security ; and cruel and avaricious, by showing him that he has nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects. Wherever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it in decaying villages and decreasing population. This has long been observed in the dominions of the Peishwah and the Nizam, and is now beginning to be seen in Mysore. The talents of Purneah, while he acted as Dewan, saved that country from the usual effects of the system ; but the Rajah is likely to let them have their full operation. He is indolent and prodigal, and has already, besides the current revenue, dissipated about sixty lacs of pagodas of the treasures laid up by the late dewan. He is mean, artful, revengeful, and cruel. He does not take away life, but he inflicts the most disgraceful and inhuman punishments on men of every rank, at a distance from his capital, where he thinks it will remain unknown to Europeans ; and though young, he is already detested by his subjects.

A subsidiary force would be a most useful establishment, if it could be directed solely to the support of our ascendancy, without nourishing all the vices of a bad government ; but this seems to be almost impossible. The only way in which this object has ever, in any degree, been attained, is by the appointment of a Dewan. This measure is, no doubt, liable to numerous objections ; but still it is the only one by which any amends can be made to the people of the country for the miseries brought upon them by the subsidiary force, in giving stability to a vicious government. The great difficulty is to prevent the prince from counteracting the Dewan, and the resident from meddling too much ; but, when this is avoided, the Dewan may be made a most useful instrument of government.

There is, however, another view under which the subsidiary system should be considered,—I mean that of its inevitable tendency to bring every Native state into which it is introduced, sooner or later, under the exclusive dominion of the British Government. It has already done this completely in the case of the Nabob of the Carnatic. It has made some progress in that of the Peishwah and the Nizam ; and the whole of the territory of these princes will, unquestionably, suffer the same fate as the Carnatic. The observation of Moro Dekshat, in speaking of the late treaty to Major Ford, “ that no Native power could, from its habits, conduct itself with such strict fidelity as we seemed to demand,” is perfectly just. This very Peishwah will probably

again commit a breach of the alliance. The Nizam will do the same; and the same consequences, a farther reduction of their power for our own safety, must again follow. Even if the prince himself were disposed to adhere rigidly to the alliance, there will always be some amongst his principal officers who will urge him to break it. As long as there remains in the country any high-minded independence, which seeks to throw off the control of strangers, such counsellors will be found. I have a better opinion of the natives of India than to think that this spirit will ever be completely extinguished; and I can therefore have no doubt that the subsidiary system must every where run its full course, and destroy every government which it undertakes to protect.

In this progress of things, the evil of a weak and oppressive government, supported by a subsidiary alliance, will at least be removed. But even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to combat, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, and that the Native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and, for want of other employment, to turn it against their European masters. But even if we could be secured against every internal convulsion, and could retain the country quietly in subjection, I doubt much if the condition of the people would be better than under their Native princes. The strength of the British Government enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no Native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression, unknown in those states; but these advantages are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of independence—of national character—and of whatever renders a people respectable. The Natives of the British provinces may, without fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, meerasidars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to any thing beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace—none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil or military government of their country. It is from men who either hold, or are eligible to public office, that Natives take their character: where no such men exist, there can

be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India. No elevation of character can be expected among men who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of subahdar, where they are as much below an ensign as an ensign is below the commander-in-chief, and who, in the civil line, can hope for nothing beyond some petty, judicial, or revenue office, in which they may, by corrupt means, make up for their slender salary.

The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, to debase the whole people. There is perhaps no example of any conquest in which the Natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as in British India.

Among all the disorders of the Native states, the field is open for every man to raise himself; and hence among them there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects. The existence of independent Native states is also useful in drawing off the turbulent and disaffected among our Native troops. Many of these men belonging to the Madras army, formerly sought service in Mysore.

If the British Government is not favourable to the improvement of the Indian character, that of its control through a subsidiary force is still less so.

Its power is now so great, that it has nothing to fear from any combination; and it is perfectly able to take satisfaction for any insult, without any extension of the subsidiary system being necessary. It will generally be found much more convenient to carry on war where it has not been introduced. This was the case in both the wars with Tippoo Sultan. The conquest was complete, because our operations were not perplexed by any subsidiary alliance with him. The simple and direct mode of conquest from without, is more creditable both to our armies and to our national character, than that of dismemberment from within by the aid of a subsidiary force. However just the motives may be from which such a force acts, yet the situation in which it is placed, renders its acting at all too like the movements of the Prætorian bands. It acts, it is true, only by the orders of its own Government, and only for public objects; but still it is always ready in the neighbourhood of the capital, to dictate

terms to, or to depose the prince whom it was stationed there to defend.

I cannot conclude this letter without apologizing both for its length and for the freedom with which I have expressed myself. But it appears to me that our Indian Empire has now reached that point whence it becomes a subject for the most serious consideration, whether it ought in future to be extended by means of subsidiary alliances.

In the mean time the Peishwah, whose designs had all along been hostile, but whose antipathy to the British name received a violent increase in consequence of the late treaty, devised numberless expedients for the purpose of obtaining revenge for his wrongs, real or imaginary. Immediately after the close of the negotiation, he withdrew from the city of Poonah, to which, on a variety of pretexts, he refused to return; but he was not the less busy, through the instrumentality of his ministers, in forwarding the measures which he had in view. There was an old engagement on the part of the Company, to reduce under his subjection certain petty princes, over whom he claimed to hold a feudal superiority. Among these, the chieftain of Soondoor was included; and the Peishwah became extremely urgent that the British Government would employ against him a part of their force now in the field. For some time, Mr. Elphinstone entertained serious doubts whether it would be prudent to comply with this request. As Soondoor lay at a considerable distance from the line of communication, the division detached against it must, in the event of a rupture, be completely isolated; and Mr. Elphinstone could not bring himself to recommend such an arrangement, whilst the disposition of his Highness remained uncertain. But in the month of August, Sir John Malcolm having travelled ninety miles by post, for the purpose of obtaining a personal interview with the suspected potentate, brought back a report so favourable, that Mr. Elphinstone's scruples vanished. Not only was the reduction

of Soondoor recommended as a measure well calculated to please the Peishwah, but General Smith's division, which had hitherto remained in the vicinity of Poonah, was ordered in advance; and the residency was left, in the midst of an armed population, to the protection of an inconsiderable detachment of a few hundred sepoys.

At the suggestion of Mr. Elphinstone, Colonel Munro received instructions to employ the force with which he held Darwar, in the reduction of Soondoor. Leaving a small garrison to secure the former place, he marched on the 13th of October, and arriving in the valley on the 27th, Soondoor was immediately given up. There was something more than commonly striking in the circumstances which accompanied this surrender. The chieftain, Sheo Rao, had enjoyed his principality in uncontrolled possession for upwards of twenty years, holding his little court in a formidable stone fortress which commanded the valley; and he had been repeatedly heard to declare, that sooner than submit to the tyranny of the Peishwah, he would bury himself in its ruins. Against the strength of the British empire, however, he felt that it were madness to contend, and after a severe struggle, made up his mind to submit. "He came out," says an eye-witness, "with his little court and retinue, and met the detachment in the glen which leads into his valley; and on reaching the fort, he delivered up the keys with a dignified resignation, which affected every individual who witnessed the scene. He declared that no alternative was left to him, but to throw himself on the protection of the Company; and called aloud to Colonel Munro, when he took his leave, so as to be heard by all his followers, 'Think of my situation,—have some consideration for us all.'" The appeal was not made in vain. Colonel Munro, touched by the humiliation of the unfortunate man, at once acceded to every request which he advanced; and left him to the full as much overwhelmed with gratitude at the generosity of his conqueror, as sorrowful on account of the overthrow of his own importance. It is

worthy of remark, that when the Peishwah's Government came to be broken up, Colonel Munro recommended that Sheo Rao should be restored to his principality, and that the British Government, well disposed of itself to act with generosity, readily acceded to the proposition.

Having accomplished this service, Colonel Munro, in obedience to his instructions, gave up the command to Lieutenant-Colonel Newall, with directions to move the brigade to the point where Brigadier-General Pritzler was appointed to join. He himself, in the mean while, took the road to Darwar, with the intention of returning as soon as possible to the Presidency; for of military employment he now despaired; and the duties of Commissioner were not of a nature to detain him longer than need be from his family. But on reaching the former place on the 14th of November, intelligence came in, which gave a new turn to the whole of public affairs, and opened out to him new and more brilliant prospects. The attack upon the resident at Poonah left no room to doubt that a Mahratta war was begun; and Colonel Munro instantly repeated his application to be placed in charge of a corps.

This was done on the 26th of November, in a letter descriptive of the state of the southern Mahratta country and of his own views touching the particular field in which his services might be made available. "I hold," he says, "at present the command of the troops in the expected cession in this quarter; but I can bring into the field only three or four companies of the garrison of Darwar, to which I propose to add a few hundred peons, for the purpose of expelling the Mahrattas from the slip of country between Darwar and Soondah. But even this subaltern command I deem more useful at the present moment, than that of any division south of the Toombuddra." On the 28th, however, he wrote again; and his letter contains so many evidences of the singular sagacity and profound calculations of the writer, that I cannot deny to the reader the satisfaction of perusing it at length.

“The hostile conduct of the Peishwah,” says he, addressing himself to the Governor-General, “and my present situation in the middle of the southern Mahrattas, where I have an opportunity of seeing a good deal of their civil and military government, will, I hope, in some degree excuse my addressing your Lordship so soon again. No intelligence has yet been received here respecting the determination of Scindiah; but whether he accede to or reject the arrangement proposed to him, it seems desirable that the whole, or at least the greater part, of the Madras troops now in the field, should be brought as soon as possible to act against the Peishwah. The local situation of the Poonah territories, and the still remaining influence of the Peishwah, as the nominal head of the Mahratta states, make the overthrow of his government the most important, perhaps, of all the measures that can be adopted for the safety of our own dominions.

“The Mahratta Government, from its foundation, has been one of the most destructive that ever existed in India. It never relinquished the predatory spirit of its founder, Sewajee. That spirit grew with its power; and when its empire extended from the Ganges to the Cavery, this nation was little better than a horde of imperial thieves. All other Hindoo states took a pride in the improvement of the country, and in the construction of pagodas, tanks, canals, and other public works. The Mahrattas have done nothing of this kind: their work has been chiefly desolation. They did not seek their revenue in the improvement of the country, but in the exactions of the established chout from their neighbours, and in predatory incursions to levy more. Though they have now fortunately been obliged to relinquish their claims, the wish to revive them will never cease but with the extinction of their power. A government so hostile in its principles to improvement and tranquillity ought, if possible, to be completely overthrown. It may be a matter of some difficulty to decide what ought to be established in its room, and whether the chief of the government should be taken from among the relations of the Peishwah or the descendants of Sewajee. Before the establishment of the new state, however, it might be expedient to require the cession of the southern Jagheers, and of the provinces south of the Kistna, to the British Government.

“The provinces between the Werdah and the Kistna are not properly Mahratta: though there is a considerable mixture of Mahrattas, the Canarese form the great body of the people. The Mahratta jagheerdars and their principal servants are therefore considered, in some measure, as strangers and conquerors. The

best of the horse are in general Mahrattas, and no doubt attached to their chiefs ; but the infantry in the forts and villages are mostly Canarese, and ready to join any power that will pay them. All the trading classes are anxious for the expulsion of the Mahrattas, because they interrupt their trade by arbitrary exactions, and often plunder them of their whole property. The heads of villages, a much more powerful body than the commercial, are likewise very generally desirous of being relieved from the Mahratta dominion. If the Peishwah do not submit unconditionally, or if the greater part of the Madras troops can be soon brought against him, the conquest of his territory will be effected without much difficulty. But in the event of his not submitting, and of its not being practicable to employ speedily such a force against him, the conquest of his southern provinces would be much facilitated by pursuing the course adopted by Hyder Ally in this very country, of garrisoning all the forts and walled villages with peons from Mysore and the Ceded Districts. By this means the regular force is kept entire for field-service, and the civil as well as the military possession of the country is obtained. An army of horse, which is excluded from the principal towns and villages, cannot remain long together ; it can receive no regular supplies ; its chiefs having no place of security, can have no treasure, except in their camp, which is soon exhausted ; the troops are not paid, become dispirited, and gradually disperse ; for even the most irregular and predatory troops cannot be kept long together in the field, unless they have a home to which they can retire in security with their plunder."

The preceding letter is in every respect worthy of the high talents and fervent zeal of its writer ; but the end which he sought to attain, was, by the unsolicited favour of Lord Hastings, already accomplished. So early as the 20th of October, a Brigadier's commission had been made out for Colonel Munro, and forwarded to the Commander-in-chief of the army of the Deccan, with instructions to transmit it whenever the fitting moment should appear to the latter to have arrived. There could be no doubt as to the sentiments either of Sir Thomas Hislop or of any other officer attached to his army on such an occasion. All earnestly desired to see Colonel Munro associated with themselves in the important operations before them ; and the commission was in conse-

quence sent forward on the very day of its arrival at headquarters.*

By this new arrangement, which was not communicated to him till the 29th of November, General Munro found himself invested with a somewhat obscurely-worded superiority over the movements of the reserve division hitherto commanded by General Pritzler. It was announced to him, at the same time, that he should communicate directly with Mr. Elphinstone, the appointed agent for the Governor-General, in controlling the operations of the war with the Peishwah, whilst the latter was recommended to avail himself of General Munro's assistance in the adjustment of all matters political as well as civil. It may with truth be asserted, that never were instructions received with greater satisfaction, or acted upon with better will. There existed between these two distinguished functionaries the most unreserved confidence, which no paltry jealousy was permitted for a moment to interrupt; and hence their letters, official as well as private, are all composed in the spirit which ought alone to actuate men engaged in the common cause of advancing the welfare of their country. But General Munro's situation was not, in other respects, of a very cheering nature, as the following brief account of it will show.

In the first place, his military instructions were so expressed, that though they gave to him the rank of Brigadier, and appointed him to act especially with the reserve, it was doubtful whether they conferred upon him authority to assume the personal command of that corps, or authorized him merely to direct its general movements, leaving the execution in detail to General Pritzler. In the next place, as the reserve was already advanced to the Kistna, between which and Darwar the communication was both remote and hazardous, all power of joining it, had such a measure been clearly defined, was, at least for the present, taken away. 'The

* In the letter which announced to the Commander-in-chief that General Munro was appointed to a command, Mr. Elphinstone observes, "In him you will have all the aid we can give you in one man."

total amount of force, therefore, actually placed at his disposal, amounted only to five companies of Native infantry, with two field-pieces; whilst of a staff to assist him in the organization of such additional means as he already began to count upon, he was entirely destitute. Nor did his difficulties end here.

The Peishwah no sooner came to a determination of acting with hostility towards the British Government, than he issued orders for the re-occupation of the districts which he had ceded by the treaty of Poonah. He directed his jagheerdar chieftains likewise, supported by Cassee Rao Goklah, who was in command of a corps of regular infantry and cavalry, to threaten from the Dooab, between the Kistna and the Toombuddra, an invasion of the British territories: and he filled with troops every fort, castle, and post which appeared capable of embarrassing the movements of an enemy. The consequence was, that General Munro found himself in some measure compelled either to act wholly upon the defensive, for which the numerical weakness of his detachment was peculiarly ill-adapted, or to commence a series of sieges, destitute of all means for conducting them. It must be confessed, that few men would have looked upon such a position as other than desperate; but General Munro's energies on the present, as on other occasions, increased in exact proportion to the increase of his difficulties, and he embarked fearlessly in a course of hardihood and daring, to which the exploits of earlier times in India alone furnish a parallel.

Instead of making any effort to retard the movements of the reserve, or to bring it back to some position where he might be able to join, he communicated both to Mr. Elphinstone, and to General Hislop, his wish, that General Pritzler should push rapidly towards Poonah; and he instructed that officer himself to lose no time in opening a communication with the British resident at the Mahratta capital. This done, he suggested that one or more light brigades ought to be formed out of the entire force, infantry, cavalry, and artillery,

with which General Pritzler might assist in following the Peishwah to any point on which he might retire, whilst the remainder, with a few heavy guns, should be sent back to him, for the purpose of being employed in the siege of the forts with which the southern Mahratta country was studded. In the mean while, however, he determined not to trust to contingencies, upon the certain occurrence of which it was impossible to count, but with his five companies of sepoy's to cross the Toombuddra, and open the campaign in the enemy's country. This was at once a generous and a bold plan—generous as far as the feelings of others were affected, and bold as it referred to his own situation. Yet the reasoning upon which it rested was as sound in theory, as the promptitude with which he carried it into execution was laudable.

General Munro knew perfectly well, that a force so inadequate as his could offer no resistance whatever to a numerous army prepared to pass the frontier of the Madras territory at a variety of points. The division which advanced directly against himself, he might perhaps repulse; but in the mean while other corps would make good their entrance, and the Company's possessions must suffer insult, which it would be impossible for him either to ward off or avenge. On the other hand, he justly calculated, that were he to carry the war into the enemy's country, they would naturally think first of resisting the aggression; and hence, should no other benefit arise out of the movement, it would at all events serve the purpose of securing the British subjects against the evils of a contest at their own doors. But his calculations were too profound and too justly formed, not to extend beyond this. He conceived, that by alarming the feudatory chiefs for the safety of their own possessions, he would shake their fealty to their superior; whilst a few successes in the outset would in all probability deprive them of the power, if not of the inclination, to do serious mischief during the remainder of the struggle. It was well, under such circumstances, that the strong fortress of Soondoor

chanced not to be in possession of the Peishwah's troops. General Munro had, it appeared, seen enough, even at the moment when Sheo Rao was displaced, to make him hesitate as to the propriety of committing that stronghold to a Mahratta governor; and the event proved, that in distrusting the fidelity of the ally in whose favour he then acted, a fresh instance was given of that singular insight into human character which so peculiarly belonged to him.

Having made up his mind to pursue this plan of operations, General Munro lost no time in applying to the Madras Government for such an increase of force as would at once give additional security to the frontier, and aid him in following up his proposed invasion. The application was seconded as well by Mr. Elphinstone as by the Commander of the army of the Deccan, to both of whom he communicated it; but though repeated again and again, on each occasion in terms more urgent than before, it met with no favourable attention. This was exceedingly mortifying, and to a person possessed of less energy of character, might have proved utterly destructive of all hope; but in General Munro it excited only an additional determination to trust all to his own conduct and good fortune. He resolved, at every hazard, to keep the war out of the Company's possessions; and seeing that regular troops were not to be had, he adopted the following singular expedient for recruiting his little army.

The extraordinary talent which General Munro possessed of acquiring the confidence and good-will of the people over whom he presided, has been noticed on more than one occasion during the course of this memoir. Hitherto he had been called upon to make use of that feeling only in preserving order in provinces subject to the British rule; he now prepared to avail himself of it for the subjugation of a district every where overrun by the Peishwah's troops. He determined to arm the inhabitants of the newly ceded provinces, and to employ them, under revenue amildars of

his own selection, against their legitimate sovereign; and he set about this singular operation with so much prudence and judgment, that it was attended with perfect success.

The following letter to the Adjutant-General of the army of the Deccan, which bears date December 24th, will sufficiently explain how the system operated, whilst it will convey to the reader a knowledge of the resources with which Brigadier-General Munro opened his campaign. It is only necessary to premise, that the battering-train, of which the writer speaks, consisted of two iron eighteen-pounders, two iron and two brass twelves, with two mortars, which he was permitted to borrow from the garrison at Bellary.

TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF THE DECCAN.

SIR,

I HAD the honour to address you on the 22nd instant, from Koongul. The force by which I was then accompanied, consisted of two flank and three battalion companies from the garrison of Darwar. The battalion companies proceeded next morning to meet the battering-train from Bellary, and I marched at the same time with the flank companies, with one of the battalion guns, and a five and a half inch mortar, under the command of Major Newall, for Nawelgoond, in order to relieve that place, in which I had a garrison of peons hard pressed by Cassee Rao Goklah. On approaching within two miles of Nawelgoond, some small parties of horse were seen; and advancing about a mile farther, the main body was discovered moving slowly along the side of a rising ground, at the distance of about a thousand yards. Its strength appeared to be about seven hundred; and as it seemed to have an intention of coming round upon our baggage, two shells were thrown, by which two horsemen were killed. The whole body upon this moved off, attended by about two hundred foot, which Cassee Rao had brought with him, and the garrison of Lallghurry, amounting to about one hundred men, and was soon out of sight.

When the Peishwah commenced hostilities, it became evident that the local situation of this province, and Goklah's extensive jagheers in it, would give great facility to the enemy in making

incursions into the Company's territory, The most likely way of preventing it, was to find the enemy employment in the defence of his own possessions; but as there was no disposable regular force present, I determined at once to avail myself of the aid of the inhabitants in accomplishing this object. As much progress in this plan has already been made as was possible with the means within my reach.

I appointed military amildars to most of the districts in the enemy's possessions on this side of the Malpurba, with orders to raise peons, and get possession of as much of their respective districts as was practicable. Among these men, Ram Rao, a native of Mysore, was appointed to Nawelgoond; he got possession of above half the district in a very short time, and on the 19th instant he advanced from a village about two miles from Nawelgoond, with five hundred peons, to attack Govind Rao Goklah, who was at that place with a body of seven hundred horse. About six hundred of this body were picqueted in the streets, and the open space between the pettah and fort. The rest were mounted and watching Ram Rao, who advanced at noon so rapidly that he entered the pettah before the body there could mount and get out of it. The panic was so great that they galloped off in every direction, without attempting to make any resistance. Nineteen horses were taken, above twenty were left dead. A considerable number of the enemy were killed. Govind Rao, who commanded, escaped with difficulty; and of two sirdars under him, one was killed, and the other wounded and taken.

Cassee Rao Goklah, who was then at Badami, on hearing of the defeat of his son, marched to join him with five hundred and fifty horse and two hundred foot; and after collecting the fugitives, he arrived at Nawelgoond on the 22nd, Ram Rao having retired into the old fort: he occupied the pettah before daylight on the 23rd, and was pressing the fort very hard, when the approach of Major Newall's detachment saved the garrison, as its ammunition was nearly expended. The enemy left nine or ten dead in the streets, and they were so much dispirited by their loss in the two attacks, that they abandoned Lallghurry, the ghurry that protects Nawelgoond, and carried off the garrison.

I have given these details, because, without them, I could not have done justice to Ram Rao, whose conduct is entitled to the highest praise.

Having thus succeeded in raising the blockade of Nawel-

goond, General Munro turned his undivided attention to the safe conveyance of the train through the heart of the enemy's country. For this purpose, Major Newall, who, with the Brigadier, fell back upon Darwar as soon as the operations detailed above were completed, was sent out at the head of a detachment of three companies, and meeting the convoy at Colaspoor, on the 3rd of January, brought it in unmolested to head-quarters. There accompanied the guns six fresh companies in addition to Major Newall's escort, namely, two of the 12th Native infantry, and four of pioneers; and there came in soon afterwards, three troops of Native cavalry, under the command of Captain Gorton. The latter were furnished by Major-General Lang, who commanded in the Ceded Districts, at his own responsibility; and they proved of essential service in future operations, by checking the vexatious approaches of Cassee Rao Goklah's clouds of horse.

As soon as these inconsiderable reinforcements reached him, General Munro, conceiving that he was sufficiently strong to act on the offensive, made ready to open the campaign in real earnest. This he did by investing Gudduk on the 5th of January; and on the 6th, after a few shells had been thrown and a battery erected, the place surrendered. He moved next upon Dummul, which, after sustaining a four hours' fire from two batteries, capitulated on the 8th; the garrison, of four hundred and fifty men, engaging not to serve again during the war. From Dummul he marched upon Hooblee, where he arrived on the 13th, having received by the way a very acceptable accession to his force in two hundred Mysore regular infantry. Hooblee opened its gates without resistance, though garrisoned by three hundred men, on condition that private property should be respected; and on the following day, Miseriekotah was admitted to the same terms. All these places General Munro immediately occupied by corps of peons, by which means his little army of regulars was kept entire, and fit for ulterior operations. He then returned to Darwar, threatened at every step, as he had been

during his advance, by Cassee Rao Goklah's cavalry; but as they neither risked a serious attack, nor waited to receive one, he arrived there on the 16th, without the loss of a man.

In the mean while, a variety of lesser operations were conducted with extraordinary success by the irregulars, whom it was not esteemed necessary to attach immediately to headquarters. These, under their amildars, not only drove the enemy from the open country, but succeeded in expelling them from several forts and many walled villages, whilst the inhabitants generally, gained over by the judicious proclamations circulated, espoused with avidity the cause of the British army. It had occurred to General Munro, that were the cultivators once assured of adequate protection against the vengeance of their chiefs, they would gladly hold back as much of the revenue as had not yet been collected; and he caused it to be every where announced, that the British Government would treat as enemies all those who paid any farther tribute either to Goklah or the Peishwah. The people were not slow in paying obedience to an edict in itself so acceptable. They not only refused to satisfy the demands of their old masters, but acted every where in aid of the General's irregulars; and the consequence was, that before the 18th of January he was in possession of the whole of the Mahratta territory south of the Malpurba, with the exception of the two small forts of Hoola and Hangull, of several villages situated to the north of that river, and of a narrow district lying on the north-east of Jallihal.

It has been stated that General Munro, on the fall of Miseriekotah, returned to Darwar. He himself remained here up to the 4th of February, organizing his force, and putting the conquered provinces in order; but his troops were in the interval actively employed, partly in escorting treasure, partly in opposing the Pindarries. It will be recollected that a band of these marauders, passing the flank of the British troops beyond the Nerbuddah, and ascending the Berar Ghauts in the month of December, took their course southward. Amid

the complicated movements which the flight of the Peishwah occasioned, they were little heeded till they entered the Company's territories, separated into lesser bodies, and spread havoc and dismay in all directions. One of these marauding companies, which re-crossed the Toombuddra on the 18th of January, marched north, and arrived on the 20th between Darwar and Hullyhall, whither General Munro instantly dispatched his cavalry to intercept them. It was led by Captain Gorton, who managed matters so well, that he came by surprise upon the enemy's bivouac before sunrise on the 21st, and they were driven with some loss and great confusion beyond the line of the frontier.

But it was not in providing means for the re-organization of his little army alone, that General Munro occupied himself during this period. He renewed his application for additional troops, both to the authorities at Madras, and to the Supreme Government ; and he enjoyed at last the satisfaction to learn, that the latter had issued peremptory orders that the application should be attended to. On the 7th of January an official announcement reached him, that, by the especial command of the Governor-General, His Majesty's 22nd dragoons, with a battalion of Native infantry, then in the Ceded Districts, were placed at his disposal. Unfortunately, however, the alarm of a Pindarry invasion interfered to hinder the accomplishment of this promise, and he was in consequence compelled to trust still longer to his own energies. Nor was this all. Though the Madras Government could not spare the troops which an authority superior to its own had allotted to General Munro's use, it conceived itself authorized to demand from him the party of Native cavalry now in his camp, as if a corps already weak beyond example could be weakened still farther, yet continue effective. General Munro, with great propriety, paid no attention to the requisition, but kept Captain Gorton's squadron till it was relieved, many weeks after, by European dragoons.

On the 5th of February General Munro once more took the field, at the head of twelve companies of infantry, four of them being Mysoreans, three troops of horse, four companies of pioneers, four long guns, as many field-pieces, and one howitzer. He directed his march upon Badaumee, a fortress situated on the Malpurba, by a route so intricate, that the pioneers were continually employed in opening a path for the column, whilst both were exposed to repeated annoyance from the enemy's cavalry, which in great numbers hovered round them. On the 9th he reached Belloor, the garrison, consisting of four hundred horse and three hundred foot, escaping over the hills as he approached, and leaving him to take unmolested possession of a place not devoid of importance. Here he halted till the 12th, preparing his feeble means, as he best could, for the siege; and then pushed forward in high spirits and excellent order towards Badaumee.

After carrying by assault a fortified pagoda, which commanded the line of his march, General Munro arrived in presence of the place to be attacked, and immediately took up the best position which his scanty numbers would permit. This was directly in front of the lower range of works, for Badaumee consists of a number of entrenched heights, having a walled town at the foot of them; and before any attempt could be made upon the former, it was necessary to obtain possession of the latter. No time was lost in throwing up and arming batteries, which played upon the wall without intermission, till a breach being effected on the 17th, which appeared to be practicable, preparations were made to storm. The place was carried with little loss, notwithstanding a gallant defence offered by the garrison in the streets, and the assailants pressed on with so much vigour to escalate the fort, that its commandant hung out a signal of surrender. The garrison, marching out with their arms and private baggage, were permitted to depart with a safe conduct; and by ten o'clock at night of the 18th, Badaumee was in full possession of the British force.

With the single exception of Darwar, there was no fortified town south of the Kistna to be compared in point of importance with Badaumee; and even Darwar was so far inferior to its rival, that its works were both less regular and less extensive. As a necessary consequence, the fall of such a place produced a strong sensation wherever intelligence of the event arrived; and as General Munro had been joined during the siege by the long-expected reinforcements, an opinion speedily obtained throughout the South of the Mahratta country, that to offer resistance to his arms was absolutely useless. Bagreecotah, a fort of some strength upon the Gutpurba, scarcely waited to be summoned ere it opened its gates; whilst Hangul submitted to a single company of sepoys, detached under Lieutenant Stott to straiten its garrison. In a word, the whole of the territory on the south of the Gutpurba was subdued; and nothing remained for him to effect, except the consolidation and political arrangement of his conquests.

Partly with a view to effect this end, partly that he might repair, as far as possible, the injury done to his cannon during the late siege, General Munro halted at Bagreecotah from the 22nd to the 26th. This was not however, at least to him, a period of rest or relaxation. On the contrary, but a faint idea will be entertained of the extent of business with which he was oppressed, if the mere detail of his own military movements be considered; indeed it may with truth be asserted that these, rapid and sometimes hazardous as they were, occupied much less of his attention than the many other arrangements to which he was a party; for, during the entire course of his warlike operations, he was compelled to administer all the civil and revenue details of the different provinces which he overran. He kept up at the same time a constant correspondence with Mr. Elphinstone, Sir Thomas Hislop, Sir John Malcolm, and others, by whom he was regularly consulted as to the general plan of the war; and this was the more embarrassing, because on their parts the corre-

spondence was in cipher, to which, though he repeatedly applied for it, the Madras Government neglected to supply a key. It is impossible, in a work like the present, to insert even a few of the many admirable letters written by him at this period; but I have introduced into the Appendix more than one official communication, which will serve as a specimen of the rest, and suffice to prove the truth of the remark just hazarded, as to the multiplicity of affairs which he was called upon to transact.

On the 26th of February, General Munro again pressed forward, directing his steps up the right bank of the Gutpurba, with a view, first, of completing his conquests south of that river, and then carrying his arms into the districts on the north. The breaking down of some of his guns delayed him, so that he did not reach Gohauk till the 7th of March, but here he crossed the stream, and, re-crossing at Goodagurry, encamped before Paudshapoor, which immediately submitted. One fortress only, that of Belgam, now remained in the occupation of the Peishwah's troops: it was a place of greater strength than any which he had yet attacked, and was held by a garrison of not less than one thousand six hundred men; it is not therefore wonderful that, with his scanty means, he should have experienced some doubt as to the prudence of attempting it. But his hesitation, if such it deserve to be called, exerted no farther influence over him than to produce a powerful appeal for farther means; and when he found that the exigency of the service would permit no attention to be paid to it, he shrank not from the responsibility of employing those already within his reach. He arrived before the place on the 20th; and such were the skill and energy with which the siege was pushed, that on the 10th of April a capitulation was signed. By this the enemy pledged themselves to evacuate the fortress by the evening of the 14th at the latest; and on the 12th, General Munro was in possession of one of the most formidable fortifications in this quarter of India, the *enceinte* of which, covered by a

broad and deep ditch, measures about a mile and five furlongs.

It is scarcely necessary to observe, that General Munro's official dispatch, giving an account of this operation, speaks warmly in praise of the zeal and intelligence of both officers and men who served under him. Perhaps no man in command ever did greater justice to his inferiors, or took less credit to himself; and hence, whilst we find Lieut.-Colonel Newall, Lieuts. Lewis and Dickenson, Walker and Mackay, mentioned in the terms which their gallantry and devotion deserved, not one syllable of self-commendation is to be discovered in the document. This, however, was only one out of many noble traits in the character of Sir Thomas Munro. Whether wealth or fame were the prize to be gained, there never lived a human being more perfectly free from selfishness; indeed, it appeared as if, on all occasions, he was more anxious that others should reap their merited rewards, than that common justice should be done to his own pre-eminent exertions.*

The loss sustained by the British army during this siege amounted to no more than twenty-three men killed and wounded; that of the enemy was admitted by themselves to exceed seventy. The result of the operation placed at the disposal of the conqueror a strong and commanding fortress, thirty-six pieces of ordnance of large calibre, sixty smaller guns and wall-pieces, besides complete stores of every description. No acquisition could have fallen into General Munro's hands of which the value was more likely to be acknowledged; for his eighteen-pounders were so run at the touch-hole, through repeated use, that three fingers might have been easily introduced.

General Munro rested his over-wrought division at Belgam

* General Munro was so deficient in gunners, and indeed in Europeans generally during this siege, that he was obliged to employ the troopers of the 22nd dragoons, both as artillery-men and grenadiers. He speaks of their services in these capacities as being most meritorious.

till the 17th, employing himself all the while in the consolidation of his conquests; after which, being apprised of the march of General Pritzler with the main body of the reserve, for the purpose of joining and acting henceforth under his orders, he put his little column in motion to meet it. He retraced his steps towards the Gutpurba, which for the third time he crossed on the 18th; and on the following day the much-wished-for junction was effected at a place called Nugger Manowlie. Now then at length the subject of this memoir saw himself at the head of a somewhat respectable force; and he who had effected so much with means apparently inadequate to any thing, was not slow in entering, with his enlarged resources, upon operations of still greater importance.

The fall of Belgam having completed the conquest of the Peishwah's dominions south of the Kistna, General Munro determined to grant him no cessation; but to push forward as far as the Beemah, between which and the Gutpurba Cassee Rao's select infantry and guns were known to be encamped. No needless wavering occurred in the execution of this project; for the division, marching on the 26th, compelled the enemy to fall back with precipitation, and arrived on the 9th of May, in front of his position, under the guns of Sholapoor. General Munro, in spite of a heavy fire from the works, closely and accurately reconnoitred it. A native officer was then sent forward with proposals for the surrender of the place; but the Arab governor, regardless of the sanctity of his flag, murdered him at the foot of the rampart. Nothing therefore remained but to commence the siege with as little delay as possible; and to this end, the energies of every man and officer in the British camp were henceforth zealously directed.

“The fort of Sholapoor,” says Colonel Blacker, “is an oblong of considerable area, with a wall and *fausse-braye* of substantial masonry, flanked by substantial round-towers. A broad and deep wet ditch surrounds the place, and the

north and east sides are covered by an extensive pettah, surrounded by a good wall, and divided in the same manner into two parts, of which one is immediately contiguous to the fort. To the southward, communicating with the ditch, is a tank, surrounded on three sides by a mound, which in its extent formed a respectable breastwork to the enemy's position under the walls. Their force, thus strongly posted, amounted to eight hundred and fifty horse, five thousand five hundred and fifty foot,* including one thousand two hundred Arabs, and fourteen guns; independent of the garrison, estimated at one thousand. Major de Pinto, a country-born descendant of Europeans, commanded the regular infantry, and the Native chief, named Gunput Rao Phanse, was the hereditary commandant of the Peishwah's artillery."

From the description which has been given of the ground occupied by the enemy's field-force, it will be seen that nothing effective could be attempted against the fort, while the covering army continued unbroken; and that to hazard an attack upon it, without first of all gaining possession of the works on which it leaned, would have been to waste the lives of his own soldiers for no purpose. General Munro accordingly directed his attention chiefly to the reduction of the pettah; and having ascertained that the walls were not so lofty, nor the ditch so deep as to render an escalade impracticable, he resolved to make trial of that species of assault.

* Colonel Blacker, though for the most part remarkable for his accuracy, has in the present instance greatly underrated the amount of the enemy's force. By official returns obtained after the siege, it proved to be—

Of Arabs	2000
Mohillas	1500
Sindees	1000
Gosaens	700
Major Pinto's infantry	1000
Hindustani and Deccan ditto	4000
	Total
	10,200
	Cavalry
	1,500
	Grand total
	11,700

With this view, he distributed his little corps into three columns, two of which, led on by Lieutenant-Colonel Newall and Major Giles respectively, were told off for the escalade; whilst the third, under General Pritzler, was appointed to act as a reserve, and to watch the movements of Gunput Rao Phanse's army. They mustered, each of the escalating parties, two companies of European flankers, two ditto Native rifles, one weak battalion Native infantry, and one company of pioneers; whilst the reserve was made up of two troops of His Majesty's 22nd dragoons, with their gallopers, two companies of European and four of Native infantry, four six-pounder guns, and two howitzers.

These arrangements being made over-night, at an early hour on the 10th, the attacking columns moved forward, so as to reach the bottom of the wall just as the dawn was breaking. The ladders were immediately planted, and a brisk fire of artillery opening at the same time upon the defences, at a distance of three or four hundred yards, the troops gained the parapet at a rush: they leaped down into the streets, and driving the defenders before them with great impetuosity, soon made themselves masters of the pettah. But the enemy's army, alarmed by the firing, began to make a movement, and in a few moments the reserve found itself exposed to a heavy cannonade from seven guns, pushed forward under cover of a strong body of infantry to enfilade them. The artillery of the reserve was not slow in replying to this salute; and a warm cannonade ensued on both sides, till a shot from one of the six-pounders striking a tumbril in the enemy's line, it exploded, and caused a good deal of confusion. General Munro instantly perceived the accident, and with the greatest promptitude took advantage of it. The reserve, reinforced by such troops from the pettah as could by this time be spared, was ordered to advance, Colonel Dalrymple, of the artillery, leading, whilst the General himself, waving his hat in his hand, nobly set the example. It was an irresistible charge. The enemy, panic-struck, gave way after a feeble

resistance, and abandoning their guns, in the hurry of the flight, took shelter within their lines.

From this moment it was abundantly evident, that the spirit of the Peishwah's followers was broken. A few abortive attempts were indeed made, in the course of the day, to recover the pettah; but these failing, the attention of the Mahratta leaders was directed entirely to secure a retreat. About noon, numerous parties of fifty and a hundred men each were observed stealing from the camp, which halted, one after another, at a couple of miles' distance; and towards four o'clock P.M., the whole army, with the exception of the artillery, which would have encumbered without assisting the movement, was in rapid march to the westward.

General Munro saw at a glance in what predicament affairs stood. The enemy had got the start of him too far to be followed with effect by infantry; but the cavalry, consisting of the 22nd dragoons, two hundred irregular horse, under Captain Munro, of the 7th Native cavalry, and a like number of the Nizam's horse, which had just arrived under Doolah Khan, were placed under General Pritzler's orders, and sent in pursuit. No body of men could do their duty more effectually. General Pritzler overtook the retreating column about seven miles from Sholapoor, charged, broke, and utterly dispersed it, killing upwards of eight hundred upon the spot, and scattering the remainder over the face of the country. The closing in of night, indeed, alone saved any of the fugitives; but the army upon which the Peishwah mainly depended, was so thoroughly disorganized, so completely broken in spirit, and denuded of arms, equipments, and baggage, as to be, in a military point of view, utterly annihilated.

These preliminary operations being happily concluded, General Munro next applied himself to the task of reducing the fort, against which his batteries opened on the 11th, and continued to play till the 14th. A practicable breach was thus effected; but the killedar, disheartened by witnessing

the defeat of the covering army, anticipated the threatened assault, by proposing to capitulate. His offer was not rejected; and the garrison being permitted to march out with arms and private baggage, Shalapoor was taken quiet possession of by the conquerors. There were found in the place, besides wall-pieces, and abundance of military stores and ammunition, thirty-seven guns of different calibres; whilst the total loss sustained during the progress of a service so arduous, amounted to no more than one hundred and two men and officers killed and wounded. But the importance of this capture, and of the victory which preceded it, is not to be estimated by the number of people slain, or the amount of material captured. There cannot be a doubt that intelligence of so heavy a disaster took away from the Peishwah the last glimmering of hope which he might have hitherto encouraged, and tended not a little to bring about the memorable negotiation, which ended soon afterwards in his surrender to Sir John Malcolm.

With the fall of Shalapoor, General Munro's brilliant campaign may be said to have closed, inasmuch as no other place offered the slightest resistance to his arms. Attempts were indeed made by several of the chieftains, more particularly by Appa Dessaye, a jagheerdar of great influence, to overreach in negotiation one whom they ventured not to resist by force; but General Munro's knowledge of the native character was too intimate to lay him open to wiles which he saw through, and defeated with the utmost coolness. The following letter to Mr. Elphinstone will explain how these matters were managed.

2nd June, 1818.

AFTER leaving Sattarah on the morning of the 29th ultimo, I rejoined the reserve the following day about noon. On my arrival, I found that an order from Appa Dessaye to his officers at Manowlie, directing the immediate surrender of that place to the Company, had been received in camp, and dispatched about an hour before. Though the order itself was perfectly clear, I was convinced, both from the character of the Dessaye,

and his recent conduct, that it would not be acted upon, without an attempt being made to gain time to try the effect of negotiation ; I therefore determined to prevent all unnecessary delay by marching to Nepawnee. I informed the two dewans of the Dessaye, who were in camp, of my intention. They endeavoured to dissuade me from advancing, by urging all the usual arguments about their master's sincerity and attachment to the British Government. I told them that their master had been long enough at hand to have carried into effect the order which I had sent to them ten or twelve days ago, for the surrender of Manowlie, if he had been disposed to do it ;—that the season was too far advanced for me to halt, in order to see whether he was sincere or not ;—that I should in consequence march next morning, the 31st May ;—that on the 1st June I should encamp before Nepawnee, and that if the receipt for the delivery of Manowlie to the person whom I had sent to receive possession of that place, did not reach me early on the 2nd, I should, on that day, treat the Dessaye as an enemy, and commence the siege of his fort.

On hearing this, the dewan, Nachur Punt, said, that he would himself instantly proceed to Manowlie and deliver it up, which he did accordingly.

When I marched from Erroor on the 31st ultimo, Appa Dessaye had sent no order for giving up the district of Chickoree. His second dewan, Singoo Punt, who accompanied me, proposed to deliver up the circar, and retain the enaum villages. His plan was at once rejected, because it would in fact have enabled the Dessaye to continue to maintain a number of his servants at the expense of the districts. I told the dewan that the order must be for the surrender of the whole district, without any reservation, and that it must be brought to me before my arrival at Nepawnee. He met me on the march yesterday morning with this order ; but as it reserved the enaum villages, it was returned to him ; and he soon after came back with another order for unconditional surrender. As the time during which he was absent was too short to admit of his having gone to Nepawnee for the second order, it was evident that he had brought *both* with him.

Such is a brief and imperfect outline of the services of Sir Thomas Munro, during the war with the Peishwah and the Mahrattas, in 1817 and 1818. From first to last, they were carried on under disadvantages against which few besides him-

self would have held up; yet their results were such as an ordinary mind, however enthusiastic in its calculations, could not for a moment have anticipated. Of the hindrances thrown in his way, a tolerably correct estimate must have been already formed. He could scarcely be said to be at the head of an army, even when General Pritzler joined him; and till that event occurred, his whole force fell short of the strength of a moderate-sized regiment. The Madras Government, moreover, by what principle actuated I presume not to say, was the reverse of diligent in attending to his requests: nay, there are circumstances connected with their proceedings, which would almost lead the indifferent spectator to conclude that failure on his part would have been more acceptable than the most brilliant success. The extraordinary vacillation likewise displayed by those in power—the shifting of command from General Pritzler to General Munro, and from General Munro to General Pritzler,—might, and in ordinary cases must, have led to the worst consequences. Indeed, it is not going too far to affirm, that nothing but the great temper, and pure and honourable zeal of these officers, hindered such an issue from taking place.

Again, upon General Munro was devolved not merely the conduct of the war, but the civil administration of all the provinces which he obtained by conquest or cession. Every question connected with the settlement of claims, the adjustment of the revenue, and the administration of justice, was referred to him, by which means his tent was not more the head-quarters of an army, than the chief civil court in the Southern Mahratta country. Then his correspondence with other functionaries was voluminous. All unprejudiced men estimated him as he deserved, and were in consequence glad to avail themselves of his advice; whilst he was too sincere a patriot to refuse his counsel, though aware that of the merit of deeds arising out of it he would reap no portion.

But if General Munro's difficulties were of no ordinary nature, and if there were a few quarters where the result of

his exertions was witnessed with regret, these evils were more than counterbalanced by the admiration of all the great and the good both in India and in England. In the gazettes of the day, and in the popular accounts of the war, his name, it is true, will not be found at every page; but the public records at Calcutta—at the India House—and in the British House of Commons, abound with testimonials to his honour. The private letters, likewise, of all the most eminent men employed at the same time, are full of expressions of admiration of his conduct; of which the following, addressed by Sir John Malcolm to Mr. Secretary Adams, may be taken as a specimen.

17th February, 1818.

I SEND you a copy of a public letter from *Tom Munro Saheb*, written for the information of Sir Thomas Hislop. If this letter makes the same impression upon you that it did upon me, we shall all recede, as this extraordinary man comes forward. We use common vulgar means, and go on zealously and actively, and courageously enough; but how different is his part in the drama! Insulated in an enemy's country, with no military means whatever, (five disposable companies of sepoys were nothing,) he forms the plan of subduing the country, expelling the army by which it is occupied, and collecting the revenues that are due to the enemy, through the means of the inhabitants themselves, aided and supported by a few irregular infantry, whom he invites from the neighbouring provinces for that purpose. His plan, which is at once simple and great, is successful in a degree that a mind like his could alone have anticipated. The country comes into his hands by the most legitimate of all modes, the zealous and spirited efforts of the natives, to place themselves under his rule, and to enjoy the benefits of a Government which, when administered by a man like him, is one of the best in the world. Munro, they say, has been aided in this great work by his local reputation,—but *that* adds to his title to praise. His popularity, in the quarter where he is placed, is the result of long experience of his talents and virtues, and rests exactly upon that basis of which an able and good man may be proud.

Confess, after reading the inclosed, that I have a right to exult in the eagerness with which I pressed upon you the necessity of bringing forward this *master-workman*. You had only heard of

him at a distance; I had seen him near. Lord Hastings, however, showed on this, as on every other occasion, that he had only one desire—how best to provide for every possible exigency of the public service.

It is not worth while to incumber the pages of a work like this with transcripts from the numerous official documents which lie within the reach of all men; but the two following panegyrics, the one contained in a private letter from Lord Hastings, the other spoken by Mr. Canning on occasion of a vote of thanks being passed to the army in India, are too eloquent to be omitted.

“In a public acknowledgment of your exploits,” says the former, “I have striven to express my opinion of their tone and importance. With that attempt, however, I cannot be satisfied; it may be liable to be considered as one of those official recognitions, where the phrases are not supposed to be exactly measured; and when he who offers the compliment may be suspected of exaggeration in the terms, for the sake of proving his own liberality in the estimate of his command of language. Allow me, therefore, to indulge myself in a private declaration of my sentiments, that I may assert the formal tribute paid by me to your merits, to have been strictly what your conduct claimed; assuring you of my sincere regret, that your exertions should have contributed in any way to the injury of your health. Let me say, that I do not speak on your own individual account only: I have a deep sense of the loss which the public interest sustains by your relinquishment of active employment. You too have the consciousness, would you avow it, of this latter feeling in your breast; and you will internally grieve that you cannot continue to advance those great objects which you have so conspicuously promoted. It will be some consolation to you to know, that you must convey with you the applause of all who have witnessed your energy and judgment; while this letter will be my testimony to our honourable employers, that they cannot too highly rate the quality of your efforts in their service.”

Mr. Canning's meed of praise, doubly valuable as arising from a man whose eloquence left an impression never to be effaced on the minds of his auditors, was as follows. After

applauding, as they deserved, other armies and other leaders, the speaker went on to say ;—

“ At the southern extremity of this long line of operations, and in a part of the campaign carried on in a district far from public gaze, and without the opportunities of early especial notice, was employed a man whose name I should indeed have been sorry to have passed over in silence. I allude to Colonel Thomas Munro, a gentleman of whose rare qualifications the late House of Commons had opportunities of judging at their bar, on the renewal of the East India Company’s charter, and than whom Europe never produced a more accomplished statesman, nor India, so fertile in heroes, a more skilful soldier. This gentleman, whose occupations for some years must have been rather of a civil and administrative than a military nature, was called early in the war to exercise abilities which, though dormant, had not rusted from disuse. He went into the field with not more than five or six hundred men, of whom a very small proportion were Europeans, and marched into the Mahratta territories, to take possession of the country which had been ceded to us by the treaty of Poonah. The population, which he subjugated by arms, he managed with such address, equity, and wisdom, that he established an empire over their hearts and feelings. Nine forts* were surrendered to him, or taken by assault, on his way ; and at the end of a silent and scarcely observed progress, he emerged from a territory heretofore hostile to the British interest, with an accession instead of a diminution of force, leaving every thing secure and tranquil behind him. This result speaks more than could be told by any minute and extended commentary.”

To the above testimonials in favour of the great merits of General Munro, no language of mine could add any thing. All therefore that I feel called upon to observe is, that there was not a point connected with the well-being of an army, to which he paid not the most scrupulous and unremitting attention. By a discipline strict, yet mildly administered, he at once kept officers and men to their duty ; whilst of maraud-

* Mr. Canning was mistaken as to the number of fortresses reduced. Even those subdued under the immediate eye of General Munro himself exceeded the number of nine ; and if others captured under his auspices be counted, they will amount to more than thrice nine.

ing or wanton plunder, scarcely an instance occurred during the entire course of the service.

“ He possessed,” says an officer now in England, who filled a responsible situation on his staff, “ the happiest talent at conciliating every one under his command, whether European or Native, by his open, manly, just, and honourable way of acting on all occasions ; but he never sacrificed duty. He never allowed any one to assume an authority that belonged to him by right of his situation ; and he was ever most scrupulous not to encroach on the rights and privileges of others, either directly or indirectly. I never met such a considerate man. He never would allow a rude or uncourteous letter to be addressed to any officer, let his rank be what it may, though he never allowed any thing improper to pass unnoticed, and used severity when necessary, but always reluctantly. He never allowed a letter or order to issue under his name, without its being first shown to and approved by him. When displeasure was expressed, and found afterwards not to be deserved, he always acknowledged his error as openly as he had expressed his disapprobation ; but these errors seldom happened with him, for he had too much value for the feelings of all under him.”

The war being now at an end, General Munro, whose health had suffered severely from fatigue, made ready to rejoin his wife and family, whom he had left at Bangalore. For this purpose he applied for leave to resign all his commissions civil as well as military ; and though strongly urged by the Governor-General to assist his friend Mr. Elphinstone in permanently settling the conquered districts, he resolutely refused. No sooner, therefore, was the reluctant consent of the Marquis of Hastings received, than he gave up his command, and took the road to Madras : yet even on this occasion he was not inattentive to the public good. He drew up a paper on the state of the country, whilst prosecuting his journey, which for clearness and energy might serve as a model to all compilers of statistics.

General Munro found his family anxiously waiting his return at Bangalore, with whom he arrived in due time at

Madras. Here, about two months were devoted to the arrangement of necessary affairs, public as well as private; and on the 24th of January, 1819, the party embarked for England, with a firm determination never again to revisit the Eastern hemisphere.

Subjoined are a few out of the many letters written by General Munro to private friends and public functionaries during the progress of this war. They are given, not only because they illustrate the amiable qualities of General Munro's heart, but because, in more than one instance, they throw additional light upon the circumstances in which he was engaged.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Darwar, 10th August, 1817.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

THIS place was given up on the 6th of Newall, and I came here to-day. Your letter of the 21st, from Anantpoor, reached me only yesterday. I read your 95 par. letter at Madras, but was obliged to read against time, which I do not like, and must therefore read it again when I can catch it. In the mean time I am satisfied that your reasonings are just, and that the view you have taken of the resources, &c. of the different Native Chiefs, and their inability to make any effectual opposition, is perfectly correct. There are, however, one or two things which I do not like. One is the preventing the Peishwah and other Princes from having Vakeels resident with each other. This is an old article of our policy, but, I think, a very useless one; it is worse, it is degrading and insulting our weak allies to no purpose. If they wish to intrigue, they can do so without a public minister at a foreign court, as they can employ private agents. The restraint can therefore only have the effect of making them feel their humiliation. Why not let them please themselves with keeping up all the forms of independence? The check may be useful with respect to the reception of European agents; because an European cannot conceal himself and act privately.

The other point of which I do not approve is more subsidiary alliances. We have enough of them. It is now more advantageous, and certainly more honourable, for us to have no more

of them ; but when we are insulted, to make war, and obtain reparation either by cession of territory or money.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO GEORGE BROWN, ESQ., LONDON.

Camp at Guddak, 15th October, 1817.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

WHILE I pursue my present occupation, I see no chance of writing long letters ; I have been constantly in tents since the beginning of last January, and during that time, between travelling in the sun and writing, I have almost destroyed my sight. I have come to camp to enjoy a little ease, and save my eyes ; and I am now on my way with a military force to reduce the petty Mahratta chief of Soondoor, a descendant of Morari Rao, formerly an ally of the Company against Hyder Ally. He will probably surrender his little territory without resistance, on receiving the assurance of some provision being made for him. Whether he does or not, I believe I must conform to the fashion, and write something about manœuvres, and demonstrating and surmounting invincible obstacles of nature and art. If you don't see something of this kind in the papers, you may conclude that my eyes are in a very bad way. We have now in the field about three times the force that was employed under Lord Lake and General Wellesley against the Mahratta confederacy in 1803 ; and I know of no hostile force any where, that is able to meet a single division of any of our armies. With regard to the Pindarries, they are a most contemptible enemy, whose numbers have been greatly exaggerated. No party of them has yet been seen strong enough to oppose a few hundred regulars. All their different parties do not probably exceed ten or twelve thousand, including all kinds of rabble. They never would have ventured to enter our territory, had they not discovered that we were restrained from following them into their own. This conduct of the Indian Government, which I suppose was owing to orders from home, produced the consequence which every body here foresaw. The Pindarries, when they saw that they had nothing to fear if they could only get safe back with their plunder to their own country, were encouraged to repeat their depredations in ours. They are under different chiefs, among whom there is little union, and but very slender resources. Even if they were ever so well united,

they have only a few very small districts, chiefly in the dominions of Scindiah and Holkar. Some of their chiefs were formerly in the service of the Mysore and other Native governments, and are now, from the weakness of their governments, enabled to maintain some kind of independence; and as their possessions are inadequate to the maintenance of their followers, they make up the deficiency by levying contributions both on their Pagan and Christian neighbours. They can make no resistance, and will probably disperse on the advance of our armies, and seek employment under some of the Native states. Scindiah and Holkar's family will, I imagine, accede to any terms we may dictate. Enough of politics,—I am almost tired of them, and often wished, when I read your letter, describing your journey to the Continent, that I had been with you. Few have seen so much in so short a time; and at a time when Buonaparte's operations have rendered most countries on the Continent much more interesting than ever they were before.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Tamberhilli, 1st November, 1817.

SIR,

My letters of the 27th and 31st October will have informed you of the quiet surrender of Sundoor by its chief Sheo Row. I wrote to him on the 18th October, apprising him of the object of my march, and offering him a jagheer of eight thousand rupees in any part of the Company's territory. I did not consider this sum as being an adequate compensation for the loss of his district, but as I was aware that many demands would be brought forward for relations and dependents, I thought it best to begin upon a low scale.

On the 22nd October, I received his answer, which expressed in a general way, that it was his wish to conform to the desires of the British Government, and stated that he would send two Vakeels to treat with me. The Vakeels arrived in camp on the 24th October, bringing with them a paper containing a long list of Sheo Row's demands, among which were a jagheer of twelve thousand rupees for himself, smaller ones for his brother and sister, and provision for his principal servants. I promised that he should have a jagheer of nine thousand rupees; that the Vakeels should each receive an allowance of fifteen star pagodas monthly, and that the other claims should be taken into consideration on my arrival at Sundoor. The Vakeels objected to the smallness

of the jagheer ; they said that their master might submit, but that he would not consent to the arrangement. They were dispatched from camp on the 25th October with my answer, and were directed to inform Sheo Row, that if he intended to submit, I should expect him to meet the detachment on the outside of the pass which leads into his valley.

On the 27th October, the detachment, on approaching near the pass, was met by Sheo Row, attended by a few horsemen and peons. He conducted it through the defile and barrier which defends the entrance into the valley of Sundoor. On reaching the glacis of the fort, he drew up his party, and as he delivered the keys, he said, that he threw himself entirely on the protection of the British Government. He then asked leave to go away, and having obtained it, he called out to me, so as to be heard by all his followers, " Think of my situation, have some consideration for us all."

He went through all the ceremony of surrendering his fort and abdicating the government of his little valley with a great deal of firmness and propriety ; but next day when he came to my tent with his brother and a number of his old servants and dependents, to solicit some provision for them, and to make some arrangements for the removal of his family to the Company's territory, he was so agitated and distressed, that he was obliged to let his brother speak for him. It was finally settled that the two Vakeels should each have an allowance of fifteen pagodas, and that his jagheer, instead of nine thousand, should be ten thousand rupees, from which he should make such allowance as he chose to his relations and followers, and that the pensions and jagheers should be granted in whatever part of the Company's possessions they might be required.

Though I deemed it advisable to limit myself in promising a jagheer to ten thousand rupees, yet, when I consider what Sheo Row has lost, that he was as much a sovereign in his own valley as any prince in India,—that it contained a regular fort, built by Hyder and Tippoo Sultan at a great expense,—that it was besides so strong by nature, that no Mahratta power could have taken it from him,—and that he had ruled over it from his infancy, for the space of twenty-one years without interruption, I cannot think that even the twelve thousand rupees which he has demanded would be more than a very inadequate compensation for the sacrifice which he has been compelled to make.

From the information which I have been able to collect, both

from the inhabitants of Sundoor and those of the neighbouring districts under the British Government, concerning Sheo Row, his claims to Sundoor seem to be in some respects better founded than they are stated to be in your letter to Mr. Strachey of the 10th December, 1816. Sundoor formed a part of the principality of Mora Row, the Mahratta chief of Gootty, who was deprived of his dominions by Hyder Ally. His adopted son, Sheo Row Bapa, fell in battle, leaving a son, Seddajee, only two years old, under the guardianship of his uncle, Vencata Row. In 1790, Vencata Row and his nephew Seddajee, with a party of their own adherents, assisted by the inhabitants of Sundoor, expelled Tippoo Sultan's Killedar, and got possession of the place, which they were allowed to retain after the peace of 1792, as part of the ancient inheritance of their family. Seddajee died without issue in 1796, on which his uncle, Vencata Row, applied to Dowlet Row, the half-brother of Mora Row, for one of his sons to be adopted by the widow, which was refused. He then made the same request of Eshwunt Row, who also refused, but said that he might have one of the sons of his younger brother, Kundy Row. An application being made to Kundy Row, he consented, and gave his son Sheo Row, the present Chief. None of the descendants of Mora Row ventured to reside in Sundoor during the life of Tippoo, because, being completely surrounded by his dominions, they were afraid of being seized by treachery; but on his death, in 1799, Vencata Row and Sheo Row went to Sundoor. The Peishwah about the same time issued a sunnud, granting Sundoor as a jagheer to Eshwunt Row. No use was made of this sunnud until some years after, when Eshwunt Row sent a copy of it with a letter to Vencata Row, saying that he wished that means might be taken to prevent discussions in their families. Vencata Row, therefore, sent for Narsing Row, the second son of Eshwunt, in 1804, and gave him an allowance of one hundred pagodas monthly; but as Narsing Row attempted to form a party, he was dismissed in 1808.

It would appear as if Eshwunt Row had acknowledged the claim of Sheo Row, from his permitting his son to serve under him. Whatever may be the question of right, there can be none of possession,—Sheo Row has held it during the long period of twenty-one years. He was in fact an independent prince, by the same right that so many other Mahratta chiefs have become so. He was independent before the treaty of Bassein, and can hardly, therefore, be included among the refractory vassals whom the

British Government are bound by that treaty to reduce, any more than many other greater vassals, who had before that time shaken off their allegiance to the Peishwah. It is true that the Peishwah has always regarded him as a rebellious vassal, and has never admitted his right to Sundoor.

I trust, however, that on considering the long possession of Sheo Row, his claims as the descendant of Mora Row to a small corner of the dominions of his ancestors, and his patient and moderate conduct, the most Noble the Governor-General will be disposed to grant him a more liberal compensation for the loss of his little principality, than that which I have thought myself at liberty to promise. I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MRS. MUNRO.

Dummul, 19th November, 1817.

I LEFT camp yesterday morning, and the sudden transition from constant noise and bustle, to silence and solitude, appears almost like a dream. This is the only time since my last return to India that I have travelled alone by regular stages, except during my journey from Hurrihur to Darwar. I was glad that you were not in camp, because it would have been both fatiguing and uncomfortable to me as well as to yourself, and would have been a very inconvenient interruption to the free and constant access which every body in a camp should have to the commanding officer; but, now that I am alone, I am sorry that you are away. It is only when I am alone, however, that I wish for you. I should not like to have you at Darwar, because I might be called away suddenly, and be obliged to leave you alone among strangers, and the distance from Madras would be too great for you to undertake the journey alone. I wished much to have had you with me this morning in my walk. The weather is so cool, that I went out after breakfast, between ten and eleven, and strolled along the bank of a rocky nullah for an hour; often standing still for some minutes, looking at the water tumbling over the stones, and the green sod and bushes looking greener from a bright sun. There is nothing I enjoy so much as the sight and the sound of water gushing and murmuring among rocks and stones. I fancy I could look on the stream for ever—it never tires me. I never see a brawling rivulet in any part of the world, without thinking of the one I first saw in my earliest years, and wishing myself beside it again. There seems to be a kind of sym-

pathy among them all. They have all the same sound, and in India and Scotland they resemble each other more than any other part of the landscape. I had written thus far about one o'clock to-day, when I was interrupted by the killedar of this place wanting a pass to visit a pagoda in the Company's territory, with twenty horsemen; then came complaints from the head man of the village about camp-followers; then my own Bramin and Mahratta letters, which, with half an hour for dinner, occupied me till dark. As the same thing will happen to-morrow, and to-morrow, I am now finishing this letter by candlelight, with the help of a handkerchief tied over the shade. This, I believe, is the first time since we were at Shevagunga that I have had such an apparatus. When I was encamped about three weeks ago on the spot where I am now, every thing looked dismal: it had been raining constantly for many weeks, the ground was swampy, the tents were wet outside and inside, and man and beast were jaded. The ground is now dry and covered with grass, as if not a foot had ever trodden upon it; the change is so great, that it seems to me like a transition from war to peace, and as if a long time had passed since I was here. I shall feel the same thing at every halting-place on my way to Darwar, and I shall be harassed with complaints from every village about my own devastations among the grain-fields, when I was marching down this way.

I have contrived to read the whole four volumes you sent me of the *Tales of my Landlord*. The *Black Dwarf* is an absurd thing with little interest, and some very disgusting characters. I like *Old Mortality* much; but certainly not so well as *Guy Mannering*. *Cuddie* has got a little of *Sambo* about him. His testifying mother is just such an auld wife as I have often seen in the West. Colonel *Graham* is drawn with great spirit; and I feel the more interested in him from knowing that he is the celebrated *Lord Dundee*. I admire *Edith*, but I should like her better if she were not so wonderfully wise—she talks too much like an *Edinburgh Reviewer*. Kind remembrance to *Cochrane* and his lady.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE, &C.

Camp at Darwar, 18th December, 1817.

SIR,

I HAD the honour to receive last night from Brigadier-General *Pritzler* a copy of your letter to him of the 3rd instant, and of your letter to me of the 27th Nov. It was probably the

original of this letter that was lost by one of the two peons who brought me your letter of the 1st instant.

I shall treat all the Jagheerdars, except Gocklah, as friends. I have frequent communication with the Dessay of Kittoor, and have little doubt, both from the local situation of his country and other causes, that he is sincere in his propositions. I shall, however, put his sincerity to the proof in a few days, by calling upon him to aid us in expelling a party of the enemy from a small place in this neighbourhood. I have already got possession of a considerable number of places in this district, entirely by the assistance of the inhabitants, of whom nine-tenths at least are in our favour.

In my letter of the 14th instant, I mentioned that Purusghur had set the example, and that all that the inhabitants had requested was, that they should not be transferred to any Jagheerdars. I should have little doubt of gradually getting possession of all the territory south of the Malpurbah, by the help of the armed inhabitants, if the enemy had nothing to oppose to us but their garrisons. But as they are increasing the body of horse near Badaumi, under Cassi Row, who may be expected to act immediately; and as we have no moveable force while the reserve is at a distance, it may become difficult to keep what we have got. The two places mentioned in your letter would be of great use in securing our communications, and might be easily taken were the reserve near.

The Commander-in-Chief's instructions to me of the 19th ultimo, direct me to consider the Company's frontier as the first object, Hyderabad as the second, and the Southern Mahrattas as the third. It is evident that there is nothing to hinder the enemy, while the reserve is in advance, from collecting two or three thousand horse to the eastward of this, who, though they will not face our troops, may attempt to pass the frontier and plunder the country.

This might be prevented by having a force, exclusive of the garrison of Darwar, of not less than a complete battalion of sepoys, to move between the Kistna and the Toombuddra on whatever point it might be necessary; you will be able to judge whether the reserve ought to act with General Smith's force, or to return to the Kistna. If it return immediately, we should soon get possession of what was necessary in the Carnatic, which by covering the Company's frontier, would leave that force more at liberty to act at a distance.

If the Peishwah continues to keep the field with the cavalry, it might be advisable to employ whatever infantry we could spare, after leaving a sufficient body to support our cavalry in the pursuit, and to cover our bazaars and convoys, in the seizure of those places whose reduction would most distress the enemy. The war would be more likely to be brought to a speedy termination by reducing the strong places, as well as following the enemy in the field, than by limiting ourselves entirely to his pursuit.

As the division under General Smith is very strong in infantry, I trust that if the reserve is retained to act in advance, means will be adopted to send at least a battalion of infantry into this province as soon as possible. I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MRS. MUNRO.

Camp at Darwar, 23th December, 1817.

I DO not know when I wrote you last, but I think it must have been about eight or ten days ago, which is the longest time that has ever passed without my writing to you. I believe that one of the causes of my writing to you just now is, that I am too tired to do any thing else. I am constantly occupied all day, and sometimes till very late at night, in a new line of business, in encouraging plots against all the constituted authorities of the ancient government, and hearing the accounts of the success or discomfiture of my friends the conspirators. I see new groups and new faces every day, and many of them not very well-favoured; but well enough for the work in which they are engaged. It is a most fatiguing task to keep them all going, and to be called up at night, and to have my sleep murdered by dire recitals of counter-plots. I hope it will be all over by Candlemas, or, at least, by Whitsuntide, and then I shall go to bed and sleep for a week; and I should not care if it were at sea, for I should like to be rocked by the waves after all this hurly-burly on shore.

TO THE SAME.

Camp at Jallihal, 11th February, 1818.

I SUPPOSE your next letter will inform me of your having got into the paymaster's bungalow. It is a great comfort, in every situation, to have a home of one's own; and, on this account, I sometimes prefer a hot tent to a cool house; but at present, I think, I should have no objections to exchange, for the weather is getting very hot in this part of the country, and we

feel it the more from the coldness of the night. The days are almost as hot now as last year when we were travelling from Madura to Coimbatore. The thermometer is above ninety in the heat of the day, and about fifty at sunrise. On marching-days we rise at three, and either stand or sit, as we please, in the cold, until four, when, our tents being packed up, we march off. It continues very cold till about seven, and by eight o'clock the sun is quite oppressive. From the moment we leave Darwar, our march is over black ground, cracked by the heat of the sun; and almost all the water we meet with is brackish, except some that is as salt as the sea. I sometimes think of the fine water of Malabar, when I am obliged to swallow this stuff with my tea; but I console myself with the expectation of better times, when I shall be able to finish M. Du Deffand, of whose letters I have read at long intervals about half a volume, since we last parted in July. You must think that I am very idle, and it is perhaps the case; for I do not recollect that I have devoted any part of my time to the reading of any other book, not even of a Review. I dare say you are better employed; but I suspect that you have never yet finished Mitford's Greece. I like the book so well, that I am much distressed at his not having continued it to the death of Alexander. Kind remembrance to the Marriotts.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Dammal, 9th January, 1818.

SIR,

I HAD the honour to receive on the 6th instant your letter of the 20th of December, with extracts of instructions from the Governor-General in April last, regarding the Southern Jagheerdars, and copies of your dispatch to Mr. Adam of the 24th, and to me of the 27th November on the same subject.

The line of conduct which you recommend to be pursued with respect to the Jagheerdars, is that which I have followed as far as my intercourse with them extended. I shall probably obtain some trifling secret co-operation from the Kittoor Dessay; from the other Jagheerdars I expect nothing more than that they shall not take any very active part in opposing me.

Both their pride and their fears will deter them from deserting the Peishwah while there is any chance of his continuing to be their master. The Jagheerdar of Hebbuli is zealous in our cause, because being near Darwar, he has nothing to apprehend from the Peishwah's resentment, and probably imagines that a transfer

of territory to the Company from the Peishwah might restore him to some part of his ancient patrimony, the Nurgoond and Ravedroog Jagheers. I shall give him no promises, but keep up the intercourse with him. The Nurgoond Jagheerdar has refused to receive Cassi Row's wounded men, or to let his parties remain in his district; but there is with Cassi Row at this moment a party of one hundred and fifty Nurgoond horse. The Vakeel says that they do not belong to his master, and that the name is kept up merely because the horse were in former times furnished by the Jagheerdar. I suspect, however, that they have Serinjami lands in the Jagheer; but as long as the Jagheerdar is not actively hostile, I shall not look for a very rigid neutrality. This place surrendered yesterday after a few hours battering; Guddok surrendered on the 5th instant. These are the only two places against which I have brought troops. I have now possession of nearly the whole of Goklah's Jagheers, and of a considerable part of the Peishwah's districts south of the Malpurba; but much yet remains to be done in dislodging the enemy from a number of small forts on this side of the river.

The greater part of the country of which I am now in possession, I owe to the exertions of the inhabitants who joined the Amildars. I sent to them and expelled the enemy. They are particularly inveterate against the Goklah's agents, many of whom have committed great cruelties in exacting the revenues; and they have so completely committed themselves in our cause against their own Government, that I trust they will never be given up to it.

The movement of the reserve to the northward, will set some parties of the southern horse more at liberty to act in this quarter. A small body of three or four hundred entered the Ceded Districts a few days ago near Hoollall, in Hirpenhilly; they are said to belong to Mudden Sing, but many of them are probably adventurers from the southern provinces.

I am glad to hear that you propose the formation of a corps for carrying on sieges, while the lighter part of the army is pushing the Peishwah in the field. If a speedy termination of the war be not expected, recruiting ought to be continued to keep your army efficient, and to supply garrisons for the conquered places, and a regular system of permanent occupation of the enemy's territory ought to be adopted. I am convinced that four or five battalions of sepoys would be sufficient to occupy a double chain of posts; one extending from the Kistna to Ahmednuggur, and the other

from the Kistna to Poonah. Regular Dawks might be established along both lines; convoys might pass without escort; all the enemy's movements within that tract would be instantly known, and a sufficient revenue might be collected to pay the whole expense of the five corps so employed. I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

On the 13th January, 1818, he had written to Mr. Stratton, his colleague in the Judicial Commission, in the following terms:—

“ I have not a moment to myself; I am doing subaltern's duty as a general-officer, and am obliged to endure more fatigue than ever I did in any camp in my life. When I was at the head of the reserve, the business was easy; I had Staff to look after all the details; but now I am again in a civil as well as a military capacity. I am endeavouring, with a small detachment, to occupy an extensive tract of country, which, I fear, has been so much exhausted, and will be so much overrun by the enemy, that it will not pay the landstrum I have taken upon myself to raise. I have not a moment to myself from morning to night; and unless times change very much, it may be a long while before I can answer the Bengal queries.”

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LANG, &c.

Camp at Hooblee, 14th January, 1818.

SIR,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter of the 11th instant, mentioning the irruption of a body of three hundred Pindarries into the Ceded Districts. No regular force can effectually protect the country from such an enemy while the villages are defenceless. A long course of peace has led to too much security, not only in the Ceded Districts, but in Mysore. The best remedy is to revert to the ancient system, to leave the Kutpuddi Peons in their respective villages; to raise what are called Ahsham or regular Peons for the protection of all the Amildars' Cutcheries, and of all the larger villages; to see that all the Peons are well armed, and that they are supplied with ammunition; for the restrictions on the sale of gunpowder has rendered it so scarce, that very few people who have fire-arms have any ammunition. In this part of the country the Pindarries cannot plunder any village which has a wall or a mud tower, defended

by ten or twenty Peons, and they can therefore do no material injury to the country. It was formerly the same in the Ceded Districts, and will be so again whenever the proper precautions are adopted.

I need not mention that breaches in the walls of villages should be repaired as far as may be practicable. I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Darwar, 25th January, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE this moment received yours of the 15th, and though much of it is in cipher, I can make out the general meaning of it. It will be impossible to discuss the various questions you propose until we meet, or until the war is over; but this is of little consequence, because I think that, during war, harm rather than good would arise from the appointment of civil collectors in districts in which there is any enemy, or which are liable to be overrun.

Military possession is the great object during war, the next is to collect what we can by the help of Native Tishildars. These should collect from the potails, or heads of villages, and the potails from the rayets. There should be no farming; there should be no innovation, at least during the war. The rents should be much lower than usual, or the inhabitants will have no motive to join us. We should rather endeavour to hinder the enemy from getting revenue than to collect such ourselves; our revenue measures at present should all be directed towards the facilitating of our military operations. I find the revenue a heavy task, but it would be much heavier were it not under my immediate charge. If you have any military officer conversant with revenue, it would be convenient to employ him for the present. If you have not, the easiest and simplest way would be to direct the business yourself, through the aid of an experienced revenue servant as secretary.

The person I would recommend for this office is Mr. McDonnell, or should he not be present, Mr. Nisbet.

The police should remain under the Potails of villages and Tishildars of districts; both should have judicial authority in petty matters. The Collector should be judge and magistrate; road and market customs, and all other duties should remain as at present until the conclusion of the war. Districts which may

now be occupied, will not pay the expense of their establishments, as the enemy will already have anticipated the whole nearly of the present year's revenue. Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp near Darwar, 26th January, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

YOUR performance at Mahedpoor had reached me before I got your letter, but I rejoice to see it under your own hand. I rejoice that you have acted so conspicuous a part in that drama, both on your own account, and on that of the honour of the coast army. You have nobly supported each other, and I have nothing to regret but that I was not present. This victory will be decisive of the fate of the war in all other quarters. Surmaul may again once or twice traverse the whole length of his dominions, and probably of a part of the Nizam's, but he must submit. There will be some difficulty in arranging matters so as to keep down the Pindarries after they are dispersed and expelled. The states in which they lived must either be made strong enough for this purpose, or the neighbouring ones must be able to confine them to their own districts, if they are allowed to have any. Your battle, while it lasted, seems to have been as severe as that of Assye; but I do not understand why you did not instantly follow up the victory, instead of halting four days to sing *Te Deum*, and write to your grandmothers and aunts how good and gracious Providence had been. We shall talk it all over, some rainy day, in the Strand or Oxford-street.

Between three and four hundred Pindarries crossed the Toombuddra on the 6th and repassed it on the 18th; about half of them were killed before they reached the Malpurba on their way back. This twelve days' irruption of three hundred horse has thrown the whole country, to the Carnatic, into alarm. Lang has been censured for letting me have two hundred cavalry to guard my camp while I was besieging Gudduk with an army of four hundred Sepoys. But what is much more serious, the 29th, and detachment of the 22nd Light Dragoons, ordered by Lord Hastings to reinforce the reserve, have been detained until farther orders in the Ceded Districts, by Government, and I don't know when I shall get them. This has disconcerted my whole plan of driving the Peishwah's troops from all their possessions south of the Kistna.

Yours most truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Nowlgoond, 28th January, 1818.

SIR,

I WROTE you on the 21st, 22nd, and 25th instant. I received yesterday General Pritzler's letter of the 23rd, inclosing yours and General Smith's to him without date, mentioning that General Smith would be at Huttani on the 23rd instant, and that if the Peishwah escaped, the whole of both forces would be formed into two divisions, one for pursuit, and the other for besieging forts and occupying the country. If such a pursuing force can be formed as may be able to force the Peishwah to fight or to take refuge in a fort, it would be better than a continuance of the present plan. But if such a force cannot be formed, it would perhaps be better to persevere in the present plan, as you will harass the Peishwah more and yourselves less by following him with two divisions, than by following him with one only. If you pursue with only one division, the besieging force must be equal to any thing the Peishwah can bring against it, because he may outrun the pursuing force and attack the besieging one, if it is not sufficiently strong.

Before this letter can be received, your plan will probably have been fixed; should I not be able to join in time to take the command of the main body of the reserve, I shall take that of the besieging force. It may require consideration how far it may be advisable to treat the Jagheerdars as friends for some time longer. If they employ their whole force actively against us, this indulgence cannot be necessary. But you have the best means of knowing what their conduct is.

In besieging forts, it would, perhaps be proper to begin with those contiguous to our own territory, and to proceed so as to obtain a connected command of the country as we advanced. In this view it would be necessary to begin with the Peishwah's forts, between the Malpurba and the Kistna, neglecting such of them as are of little importance in securing our communications. But if it be determined to act hostilely towards the Jagheerdars, it may probably be deemed expedient to begin with the attack of such of their forts as might, from the fear of losing them, be most likely to induce them to quit the Peishwah; if, however, there is no great chance of the fall of their forts producing this effect, we ought to begin with those the possession of which will gain us the firmest hold of the country.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT.

Camp at Moral, 30th January 1818.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to enclose copies of two letters from the Honourable M. Elphinstone to Brigadier-General Pritzler, respecting the movements of the Peishwah's army. As the Peishwah was on the 23rd a few miles to the north-west of General Smith's force, it is probable that he will be able to escape to the northward. His army is much harassed, and, even if not forced to action, must lose a number of horses and camels in its flight. General Pritzler, in his reply to Mr. Elphinstone's letter of the 23rd, states, that he will reach Erroor on the 25th instant, but must halt there to refresh the troops.

In my letters of the 22nd and 23rd, I took the liberty of submitting my opinion as to the effect which the situation in the Ceded Districts of the reinforcements for the reserve would have in putting a stop to all offensive operations in this quarter. I am now obliged, by the smallness of my force, to employ the whole of it in covering a convoy from the Ceded Districts for the reserve.

Major-General Lang has called upon me to send back the three troops of the 5th Regiment Native Cavalry, and has informed me that he means to recommend that the detachment of the 22nd Light Dragoons shall be kept in the Ceded Districts until they shall have returned. As the state of affairs upon the Company's frontier has been entirely changed within the last ten days, by the retreat of the Pindarries and of the Peishwah, I trust that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council will approve of my retaining the three troops of native cavalry until they can be relieved by the dragoons, or until I can receive the orders of Government.

I beg leave to state that, with only a few companies of sepoy, and without cavalry, it will be impossible to carry on supplies to the reserve, and to protect the country of which we have got possession; that I shall not be able to attack the most trifling place, because, while the troops were engaged in the siege, a small body of the enemy's horse might drive off our cattle while grazing, and with them the valuable establishment of draught bullocks belonging to the battering train; and that the vigorous prosecution of offensive operations in the Southern Mahratta States is regarded as the measure which will be most likely to

induce the Jagheerdars, who compose so great a part of the Peishwah's army, to quit his standard. I have, &c,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Badaumi, February 21st, 1818.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive, on the 12th instant, your letters of the 31st of January and the 1st of February, with a copy of your letter to Mr. Adam, of the 17th of January.

I expect every day a copy of the cipher, which will enable me to understand fully the plans proposed in these letters, of which at present I can only form a very imperfect idea. The plan of operations against the Peishwah should be regulated by the amount of the whole force that is likely to be brought against him, not only by General Smith and the reserve, but by the divisions under the immediate command of General Doveton and of the Commander-in-chief. As I have no information regarding any of the divisions excepting General Smith's and the reserve, it is only upon the employment of these two that I can offer any opinion. I suppose that General Smith, when joined by the cavalry of the reserve, will always be able to keep within one or two marches of the Peishwah, and that he will occasionally be able, in favourable situations, to leave his infantry and push him with cavalry alone to a certain distance. If General Smith, instead of being able to follow the Peishwah closely, should be left five or six marches behind, nothing will be gained by the junction of the reserve cavalry to his force, the Peishwah would be less harassed than at present, and might, during the intervals when he had left the pursuing force at a distance, do much injury both to us and our allies in the southern districts. This might in some degree be prevented, if the reserve were so equipped as to be able, after leaving its heavy train in some fort or post, to move expeditiously to the point of danger. Such a movement might, however, prove extremely inconvenient by being required in the middle of a siege. The most effectual, and, I believe, the only mode of securing and extending our acquisitions in this quarter, is to allot for these objects such a force as might meet the Peishwah's cavalry without danger, or maintain itself against his whole army, by taking up a position protected by a fort or gurry. If we leave this country without a force to protect it, an invasion of a few days might produce a very dangerous reaction. The

people would lose their confidence in our power of defending them, and arm against us in order to save themselves from punishment by their former masters. The force which I should think necessary for the Carnatic would be two battalions of Native Infantry, in addition to the battalion and detachment of the 22nd Light Dragoons already ordered by the Governor-General, with a proportion of artillery, and a body of irregular cavalry of from five hundred to a thousand. The force would perhaps be more efficient if four or five hundred Europeans could be substituted for one of the battalions of Native Infantry. Europeans are necessary for the storming of forts, but more particularly where a part of the garrison is composed of Arabs. If it were smaller, it would be unequal to the complete conquest of the Peishwah's and Goklah's possessions in the Carnatic; because, after taking the forts, it would not be able to spare garrisons for their defence. It might occasionally either join the main body of the reserve, or give or receive reinforcements from it. The heavy division, formed, as you propose, partly from the reserve and partly from General Smith's force, for the siege of forts, ought to begin with that of Sattarah, because this place, though of little strength, is of great political importance. After Sattarah, no place could be so useful in every view as Nepauni; its capture would compel Appah Dessay to quit the Peishwah, and his example would undoubtedly be followed by all the Southern Jagheerdars, for they adhere to him only because none of them like to incur the reproach of being the first to desert him. The defection of these chiefs would soon be followed by the dissolution of the Peishwah's army. The fall of Nepauni, even if it did not make its chief abandon the Peishwah, would make us masters of the Carnatic; for though Belgaum, a strong fortress belonging to the Peishwah, would still remain, its situation does not enable it to command the country, excepting to a very small distance. By the possession of the Carnatic, we should have in our hands the best means both of forcing the Jagheerdars to leave the Peishwah, and of carrying on the war against him. If we do not take Nepauni, we shall not be able to subdue the Carnatic; for though we might seize the lands of Appah Dessay, they would be recovered again by troops detached from his capital, and this could not be prevented without employing a greater force for the purpose than we can spare. The siege of Nepauni should, if possible, be commenced by the 10th of next month, which will allow sufficient time to Appah Dessay

to renounce the Peishwah's cause, if he be so disposed. The force now with me is hardly adequate to the reduction of the place with the ordinary garrison; but as the garrison has already been, and may be still further augmented, the capture of the place could not be insured without a greater force. I would therefore recommend that either the whole of the heavy division now acting under General Smith, or the infantry and artillery of the reserve, should be ordered to join the force now with me in order to carry on the siege. With such a force the operations could last only a few days, and the troops brought from the North of the Kistna might be immediately sent back. There is no place whose fall would have so great an influence in hastening the termination of the war as that of Nepauni; for it would give us possession of the Carnatic, from the Toombuddra to the Kistna, and of all the resources of the Southern Jagheerders. The Vakeels of Madho Row Dajee and of Gopaul Row arrived in camp some time ago. They have, in all their discussions with me, repeated nearly the same language as in their meetings with you. Madho Row's Vakeel stated the difficulty of withdrawing his master's son and nephew in safety from the Peishwah's camp, as great obstacles in the way of his complying with the terms proposed by you. Gunput Row's Vakeel asked, how his master, after bringing away his troops, was to be protected, if the Peishwah marched towards his Jagheer? I told him that Gunput Row might either shut himself up in a gurry for a few days, retire into the Company's country, or join one of their armies; but both Vakeels maintained, and I believe with truth, that the main objection to acceding to our terms was the disgrace of abandoning the Peishwah. I observed that Purseram Bhow had not been so scrupulous in remaining in the Peishwah's cause. They answered that he had transferred his allegiance to another Peishwah, and that, if another were now set up, they could do the same. I informed them that I had no authority to say in what manner the final arrangement would be made, but that their masters must in the mean time recall their troops to their respective Jagheers. They left me on the 19th instant, after promising that their masters would comply with the terms proposed in your letter, and they would themselves return as soon as possible with their answers.

I received yesterday a letter from the Nepauni chief, brought by Walli Khan, the same Jemadar of horse who brought me his first letter in November last. The letter stated that the Jemadar

was authorised to treat with me. Walli Khan, however, denied that he had such authority ; he said that he could treat, but that he could settle nothing without the presence of Appaujei Litchmen, his master's Vakeel. He spoke much of the good advice given by his master to the Peishwah, and of his wish to bring about a peace. I answered that no proposition could be received regarding the Peishwah, unless it came openly from himself, and that our discussions must be confined to the point of the Nepaunikurs being willing or not to renounce the cause of Bajee Row. In reply, he said a great deal of his master's obligations to the British Government—of his wish to continue under its protection—of his conduct in not acting hostilely towards our armies, but merely accompanying the Peishwah with his contingent, and of the disgrace to which he would be exposed were he to desert him. As he appeared to think that the disgrace consisted, not so much in the act of desertion itself, as in the reproaches which would be cast upon him, I answered that there could be no disgrace in abandoning a cause in which Goklah and Trimbukjje were principals, and that as the other Jagheerdars would undoubtedly follow his example, it could not be supposed that they would reproach him for what they had themselves done, and that he would have the advantage (as the first to join us) of greater consideration in the final settlement of the Carnatic. He asked what this advantage would be. I answered, in granting some additions to his Jagheer, and making the conditions of his service easier ; but that they could only be settled by his master's returning with his troops to his own Jagheer ; that I would give him fifteen days to go to camp, and return with the Vakeel ; and that if within that period his master did not either actually quit, or agree to quit Bajee Row, the British Government would not deem it necessary to respect his master's possessions any longer.

Camp at Bagri-Cottah, 22nd February, 1818.

THE object of Appah Dessay is evidently to gain time, in the hope that his mediation for the Peishwah may be accepted, or that, by some of the other chiefs leaving him, he may be spared the disgrace of having been the first to do so. There can be no doubt but that his attention to his own interest will induce him to take this step, but no dependence can be placed upon any promise he may make of doing it at a particular time. We ought also to consult our own convenience, and act against him when we are ready. I think that a force ought to be assembled for the

siege of Nepauni by the 10th or 15th of March. If we are not prepared to reduce this place, the partial seizure of his lands might serve only to irritate and bind him closer to the Peishwah. I have had no message or Vakeel from Chintamene Row. His Jagheers are more within our reach than those of Nepauni; but I should wish to delay taking advantage of his circumstances as long as it can be done with safety to ourselves. I shall immediately endeavour to raise a few hundred irregular horse in the Carnatic, both with the view of employing them against the enemy, and of showing that they may find service under our Government. I shall not send you any of the Peons or irregular infantry of the country, because their expense far exceeds any service they can render. They will not cross the Kistna for less than seven rupees a month for each private. They would be more than double the expense of regular sepoy. One thousand sepoy, however imperfectly trained, would go farther than five thousand peons in protecting our conquests: I employ Peons only because I cannot get regulars. There are no troops so cheap as regular sepoy, either in subduing or maintaining possession of a country: they should therefore be recruited with increasing exertion as long as the war lasts.

The infantry force in the field in this province has, until within a few days, varied from two to six companies from the garrison of Darwar, with two companies of the second battalion 12th regiment Native Infantry, which joined with the battering train. The reinforcements ordered by the Governor-General joined during the siege of Badami, which place was taken by storm on the morning of the 18th instant. Bagricottah was abandoned by the garrison on the 20th instant, and we took possession of the place this morning. Cassi Row, Goklah, and Madden Sing, who left this neighbourhood on the 19th, are said to have repassed the Kistna with the remains of their horse.

I trust that I shall as soon as possible receive your answer respecting the proposed operations against Nepauni.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. STRATTON.

Camp near Belgaum, 24th March, 1818.

I CAN be of no use to you while the war lasts. I shall never be able to command six hours' leisure, which you think enough; and even if I had this leisure, I should be thinking of more immediate concerns than laws and regulations. I have

five-and-twenty amildars on my hands, with a list of about seven thousand peons, or, what is called in the newspapers, irregular infantry. I have also the command of regular troops, the political management of the southern jagheerdars, and much more than I can well attend to. I should be delighted to have a few weeks' leisure with you at Madras, to finish whatever is wanting; but you must expect nothing from me while I am on this side the Toombuddra. You can do what is wanting yourself better than any body else.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Camp Badshapoor, 11th March, 1818.

MR. — is wrong, if he thinks I am tired of the Commission (judicial). I am as much interested about every thing regarding it as when I embarked from England; but the long illness I had at Madras, and the overwhelming labour I have had for the last six months, have injured my constitution, and will soon render me unfit for any heavy business. It is therefore better that I should give up my employment, than that I should seek to retain it when I am no longer capable of discharging its duties as formerly.

On the 16th May, he wrote from Shalapoor—

“ I AM half blind; the heat is excessive—108, and not under 100 in the day, for nearly a month. It has knocked up many officers and men, and has almost finished me.”

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Camp, Hooblee, 15th June, 1818.

I MUST get you to draft the letter; a few lines will do. I would not trouble you, were I not still occupied with the details of a camp. This takes up all the forenoon, and always some part of the afternoon. I am engaged in transferring some territory from the most turbulent and ambitious of all the Mahratta jagheerdars, the Dessaye of Nepawnee, to the Kolapoor Rajah. To do this, I must have the command of troops, as it is military authority which facilitates civil arrangements among these chiefs. I shall not quit my command till I have done all the rough work which I think necessary for ensuring the quiet conduct of these men hereafter. The fellows have no idea of recognizances.*

* Alluding to a good deal of discussion which had passed among the judicial Commissioners on this point.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

(Private.)

Camp near Belgaum, 8th March, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE questions proposed in your letter of the 2nd, cannot easily be answered in writing, as they embrace subjects too extensive to be discussed in an occasional correspondence.

I shall, however, endeavour in a few words to state generally my opinion respecting them.

I think that the Jagheerdars ought not to be in a worse situation than under the Peishwah's government, and that therefore those of your first class should not be required to keep up more horse than formerly, though the number which they then maintained might not have been a third or a fifth of their Tynant Zabitahs. This number, whatever it was, they might be obliged to muster, and in the event of any deficiency, a proportional part of the Jagheer might be resumed.

In the case of your second class of Jagheerdars, I would not attempt to exchange for money that part of their Jagheers which is assigned for their personal expenses, unless with their own consent. Without it, the measure would give offence, and the land resumed would, in most cases, probably not yield the sum for which it was taken.

I see no objection to the sequestration of the lands of the third class of Jagheerdars who may be very refractory, and giving some pecuniary allowance in the event of devastation.

I am not sure that I understand your remark on the numerous divisions of revenue, of which Jagheers are usually composed, being oppressive in their collection to the Ryets. In the smaller Jagheers, there will, I imagine, be no difficulty in consolidating the different heads; but in the greater Jagheers, where the internal administration must be left to the Jagheerdars themselves, it will not be so easy. Even among the greater Jagheerdars, however, all such revenues as they may derive from Sirkar villages, under various administrations, may be redeemed, either by paying them the amount in money, or by giving them one or more whole villages, yielding a revenue equal to the aggregate of what they collect from many.

Though the people of India have not what we call gentry, they have what they respect as such themselves; it will not therefore, I think, merely with a view to the establishment of this class of

society, be necessary to restore the Desmooks and Dessays who have been removed to make way for the Mahratta revenue servants. Many of these Desmooks, &c. had usurped lands and revenues during times of confusion, and though they have been deprived of them, they still enjoy, in many instances, all that they had any right to originally. Many of them will still be found holding the office of potail, or curnum, of one or of a number of villages, or even of a whole district; and where this is the case, they should be continued. But it would not be advisable to restore them, where they have long been removed, because their offices and emoluments have been subdivided among another set of men, to whom long possession or purchase has rendered them a private property. Where they have been recently removed, and their rights not granted to any other persons, they might be restored. I do not apprehend the smallest danger from their influence; good treatment will reconcile them all to our government, and lead them to employ whatever influence they have in its favour.

All charities and religious expenses, whatever their amount may be, ought, I think, to be continued for the present; considerable portions of them are probably consecrated by time, and could not be touched without a violation of private rights and of religious prejudices; a large portion of them too, will, no doubt, be found to have arisen from unauthorized grants, and other frauds. The whole should be carefully investigated after peace is restored, and the country settled; and such part of the expenditure as is of modern date, and not duly authorized, should be stopped. This course is followed by the native governments at every new succession, and frequently more than once in the same reign.

We should, I think, let every thing connected with the religious establishments, charities, Jagheerdars, Desmooks, and other public servants, remain as at present, until peace affords leisure to investigate them properly.

I wish to do nothing more in the case of the Jagheerdars you have assigned to me. I shall assure the Putwurdan, that their situation will not be worse, but better than formerly; but I shall tell them, when they call upon me for the particulars, that it would be impossible, without many months of leisure, to make any arrangement that would satisfy them all. Peace must be restored before any thing can be done in it.

This matter must be left to my successor. Your's sincerely,
THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS SISTER.

Camp near Belgaum, 28th March, 1818.

MY DEAR ERSKINE,

WHEN I think of the long time which has passed without my writing to you, it seems so strange, that I can hardly believe it. There are many causes, however, which prevent me from writing either to you or to any one else as formerly. I cannot now write by candlelight; and it was after dark that all my private letters used to be written. If I persist in writing when I feel my eyes uneasy, they water, and get blood-shot. But the great obstacle to my corresponding with you and my brother is, the endless public business writing, which comes upon me whether I will or not. Fortune, during the greatest part of my Indian life, has made a drudge of me; every labour which demands patience and temper, and to which no fame is attached, seems to have fallen to my share, both in civil and military affairs. I have plodded for years among details of which I am sick, merely because I knew that it was necessary, and I now feel the effects of it in an impaired sight: and a kind of lassitude at times, as if I had been long without sleep. But though I have not written to you, I have, I believe, thought of you oftener than at any former period. The changes in my constitution make me naturally think oftener of home, where it would suffer less; and I certainly never think of home without remembering you, and wishing to ramble with you among the banks at Ammondel, or any other banks you like. When I am once again fairly upon your favourite bridge, nothing shall ever tempt me to return to India. I hope, however, that you will not expect me to eat as much as any three of your guests, nor insist upon my being sick, when I devour only as much as two.

I do not recollect whether I have written to Margaret since my return to India, but I fear that I have not. I hear of her frequently, as well as of all my friends at home, from Alexander, who is an excellent correspondent. I hope that Mr. Erskine is again well, and able to enjoy his country-life and long walks, as usual. He ought never to be sick; for were he but in health, he has so much enjoyment in every thing, and he would never have an unhappy hour.

We are still engaged in war with the Peishwah; but it is not likely to last longer than two or three months, and may probably be over sooner. I shall then turn my whole thoughts to

giving up employment, and getting leave to go home; and I hope that I shall be able to leave India by September.

TO HIS BROTHER.

Camp near Belgaumi, 6th April, 1818.

MY DEAR ALEXANDER,

I KEEP a list of letters, or rather I try to keep one, for I forget to insert many that I write, which is probably one cause of my finding none in it to you later than the 16th October. The two last letters from you I sent to Mrs. Munro, and desired her to keep them till we could meet; I forget their dates, but neither of them is, I believe, later than May. The interference of the post-office at home with Indian correspondence, makes the arrival of our letters much more uncertain, and often much slower than formerly. I hope, however, that a few months more will make it of very little consequence to me how long their voyage is. Had the Mahratta war not broken out, I should by this time have taken my leave, and probably been on my way home. As soon as the Peishwah is reduced, and I can get clear of his great feudatories, the Southern Jagheerdars, whose affairs are to be arranged by Mr. Elphinstone and myself, I shall take my leave of Indian wars and politics. Mr. E. fancies that I shall stay to finish all these arrangements, and that I like the business as well as himself. The moment the war is over, I shall make over to him all my share of political duties—nobody can conduct them better than he, and I am sick of them—I am tired of sitting for hours every day with the Vakeels of a set of high-titled Chiefs, who have long since been beaten into submission, and who follow the standard of Bajee Row, without any intention of fighting against us. Even if they were more chivalrous than they are, we have some security against their exercising that spirit, by having already got possession of most of their Jagheers, which will however be continued to them on their good behaviour. Were I a younger man, or had I any wish to prolong my stay in India, I should muster patience, and go through the tedious work of negotiating with these Vakeels; but as the complete arrangement of the claims of the different Chiefs would require at least a whole year of peace and leisure, I shall not stay to finish it.

You have, I suppose, already learned from different publications what were the causes of our present war. The Pindarries had been encouraged by our system of respecting the territory where they resided, to repeat their incursions every year, either

into our own districts or those of our allies ; and it became necessary either to submit to this disgrace, or to invade their possessions. It was thought that offensive operations might ultimately involve us in hostilities with Scindiah, Holkar, and Meer Khan, on account of their connection with the Pindarry leaders, and our preparations were very properly made upon a scale adequate to whatever might occur. A much greater army was brought into the field than ever was done upon any former occasion by our Indian Government. The Pindarries, against whom the war was undertaken, were soon found to be the most trifling of our enemies, and the States of Poonah and Nagpoor, from which co-operation was expected, the most formidable.

In April and May last, the Peishwah had been compelled to agree to cede to us territories yielding thirty-four lacs of rupees, for the maintenance of a body of five thousand horse and three thousand foot, which he was bound by former treaties to maintain for our aid, but which he had never done. The new treaty, to which he was so averse that he did not sign it till June, was intended to secure the funds necessary for the maintenance of this body of troops, and also as a punishment for his supporting Dainglia, who had caused the murder of the Gwykwar Vakeel, and for conniving at, if not encouraging, his raising troops. It would perhaps have been better, as we had determined to reduce the Pindarries, to have reserved the punishment of the Peishwah for a future period, when this service should have been finished. It is not certain that he would even in this case have remained at peace with us. He might have intrigued, but I doubt if he would have taken an open and active part against us as he has done ; and I think it is pretty clear, that if he had continued quiet, neither Holkar nor the Nagpoor Rajah would have commenced hostilities. Both these Chiefs, however, have been so completely humbled, that their joining this confederacy has been fortunate on the whole, as it has enabled us to reduce their power, and to render the revival of the Pindarry system impracticable.

I shall not enter into the details of the war, as you know as much of them at home as we do here. Lord Hastings says in his general order, that its objects have been obtained, and that the Pindarry power has been destroyed. We have now no enemy to contend with except the Peishwah. Some corps are following him in the field, while others are employed in besieging his forts ; and I trust that, by the end of June, if he does not submit sooner, we shall have reduced them all.

If you have seen the exaggerated statements which have appeared, even in most of the official papers, of the numbers of the Pindarries, you will be surprised at never finding them offering any resistance worth noticing. The truth is, that they possessed very little real strength; they were, in fact, nothing more than a number of bands of mounted thieves, under different chiefs, whose business was to plunder, and to avoid fighting. Their whole force was, I believe, estimated at about twenty-five thousand by Captain Sydenham, now at Aurungabad, in a paper drawn up by him a year or two ago. I have seen lists drawn up by officers who have served long on the Nerbuddah in watching the Pindarries, which makes the whole force under their different Chiefs about fourteen or fifteen thousand. Even this is, I imagine, far beyond the truth. I should not estimate the aggregate numbers of all their horse of every kind at more than seven or eight thousand. All the possessions of the Pindarries were confined to a few small districts in Malwa, which would not have maintained half that number. If we suppose that as many more were maintained by plunder, it is making a great allowance; for plundering, though destructive to the inhabitants, is not always profitable to the plunderers, who often lose more than they gain by various accidents, before they reach their homes through a hostile country. The Pindarry Chiefs cannot bring large bodies into the field; but it is a part of their system to magnify their force, in order to strike terror, and prevent resistance. Secrecy and expedition are essential to their success, and it is only in small parties that they can move rapidly and elude pursuit. A body of them which crossed the Toombuddra in January, and returned by Darwar, was estimated in the public dispatches, while on its march, at two thousand; but it was certainly under four hundred. Some prisoners were taken as it returned: none of them called it more than five hundred, others not four hundred. Sydenham is, however, considered in general as very moderate; for many men in office think that the Pindarries can bring at least fifty thousand horse into the field. The Peishwah, and all his feudatories together, have not during the present contest been able to bring into the field more than sixteen thousand horse. The number has at times been carried above twenty thousand, by the accession of fugitives from the armies of Holkar and Nagpoor, but has soon sunk again. Tippoo, in the zenith of his power, had not more than twenty to twenty-five thousand horse; but it is believed that an army of horse which could hardly be kept up by him, can

easily be maintained by a few miserable chiefs of banditti, who have not the fiftieth part of his means. Holkar's horse at the battle of Mahedpoor are estimated by the Adjutant-General Conway, a cavalry officer, at eight thousand, which is at least as many as Holkar was able to maintain; other officers, however, call them twelve and fourteen thousand.

The present war has been extensive, and sometimes very harassing; but we have had a most contemptible enemy every where to deal with. The only men who have made any resistance, are the Golandazes, who have behaved well on some occasions, both in the field and in garrison. As soon as the war is over, I shall prepare to return home; for there is no object to detain me in India. Your affectionate brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Naggurmurly, 23rd April, 1818.

SIR,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter of the 12th instant, inclosing one for the Rajah of Kolapoor, which I have forwarded to him, because his troops cannot be more usefully employed than in repressing the depredations of the Prushetighur banditti. Chintamene Row's Vakeel informed me, that his master had sent a detachment against the banditti, but he denies his having restored any villages, from which he had driven them, to Bajee Row's officers. He says, that his master never occupied those villages; that they were abandoned by the enemy in their flight, and again taken possession of by Bajee Row's officers. It is most probable, however, that the villages were actually restored by the servants of Chintamene Row to those of the Peishwah. It could hardly, indeed, be expected that he would have followed any other course, as there was no officer of the Company on the spot to claim them, and as he could not have retained them without the appearance, at least, of hostile conduct towards Bajee Row,—a charge which all the Jagheerdars are very anxious to avoid.

The Putwadars have often stated, through their Vakeels, the impossibility of their acting against Bajee Row. I have told them that all that was required was, that they should quit his standard, return with their troops to their Jagheers, and remain there. Their doing this is as much as can be looked for at present. Their neutrality is of great importance, as it withdraws

from the service of Bajee Row a very considerable portion of his army: any co-operation which they could give, would render us very little service. I have, therefore, abstained from demanding it, more particularly as the demand cannot be made without agitating the question of the transfer of their allegiance from Bajee Row to the Company, to which, as far at least as regards its being done openly and directly, they have all expressed the strongest repugnance. This repugnance would, no doubt, gradually subside, when they saw the dominion of the Company completely established, but something is wanted in the mean time to tranquillize and to facilitate the settlement of the country. I have mentioned in former letters, that they had proposed that some one of Bajee Row's family should be raised to the office of Peishwah in his room, and that I had informed them that it could not be, and that it was a point on which I had no authority to enter into any discussion with them. Whenever they have more recently revived the question, I have shown them that it was evident, from the proclamation issued by you in February last, announcing the design of the British Government, after making provision for the Rajahship of Sattarah, to occupy the remaining possessions of Bajee Row, that no place was left in the proposed new arrangement for any separate state under a Peishwah.

The Jagheerdars have now, I believe, no expectation of seeing Bajee Row, or any of his relations, at the head of a state; but their zeal for the continuance of the office of Peishwah, even though divested of all real power, is as strong as ever. They retain their own possessions, and feel, therefore, in a much smaller degree the dissolution of the substance of the Mahratta empire, than that of its forms. They derive whatever they possess from those forms; they have for generations been accustomed to respect and serve under them, and they regard it as disgraceful to abandon them for others. The easiest way of subduing these prejudices, and of rendering them useful feudatories, would be for the Company to take upon itself the office of Peishwah, and to issue all public acts as coming from the Pundit Purdhan, as under the late Government. Investiture might be received, according to custom, from the Rajah of Sattarah. The Company, acting as the Pundit Purdhan, would hold an office which, as in the case of that of the Dewanee in Bengal, would take from it none of its sovereign powers; and its governing the country under this ancient title, would, I believe, reconcile the Jagheerdars to the change of masters, and induce them to employ their troops

willingly at the call of the British Government. They testify at present great aversion to being summoned as its immediate servants, and propose that they should rather give up part of their Jagheers, and hold the rest service free. This objection is possibly exaggerated; but if it can be removed merely by the maintenance of a form and the substitution of a name, it ought perhaps to be done, more particularly as the preservation of this ancient name would probably be likewise acceptable to Scindiah and Holkar, as their ancestors obtained their possessions not from the Rajahs of Sattarah, but from the Pundit Purdhan.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Camp, one coss south of Rayhaug,
26th April, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

WE are moving towards the Kistna, looking anxiously for your answer respecting the two iron twelve-pounders, about which General Pritzler wrote you on the 19th. We shall, I hope, soon take Sholapoor, if we can find water to drink within any reasonable distance. The fall of that place will leave the Peishwah no fortress south of Ahmednuggur. The reserve then returns, and if found advisable takes Nepauni. In a few weeks we may expect that Bajee Row will be driven from all his southern and most of his northern possessions. He can have but little treasure, and having no revenue, he cannot long keep any thing like an army together. This war will become a mere Pindarry one. I can have but little share in it, and shall on that ground, as well as for other causes, wish to quit all duties, civil as well as military, in June, when I return to the Dooab.

I returned to this country with great reluctance, and had the Mahratta war not taken place, I would have gone home in January last, but having engaged myself both in the civil and military affairs of the Mahratta provinces, I should gladly, had my health permitted, have continued to act until both had been finally settled. My sight, however, has lately suffered so much, as to render me nearly unfit for business. I first began to feel a visible change in it while I was in Malabar, during the last hot season; but within the last three months the decay has been rapid and alarming. I felt with much concern during the siege of Belgaum, when I was day after day straining my sight to observe the effect

of our artillery, that I could not pronounce positively, as I could have done some months ago, whether the breach was practicable or not. But I am not obliged to look at a breach every day. It is in civil affairs, which require writing every day, that the decline of sight becomes a most serious evil. There are many days when I cannot write at all, in consequence of a painful straining of my eyes. There is no day in which I can write without pain, or for more than a few minutes at a time. In writing a letter I must pause every five or six lines, and shut my eyes to relieve them from the glare. A man who wishes to enter into the details of civil and political arrangements among Jagheerdars and Zemindars, must examine, himself, every person who can give him information, take down in writing what each person says, and compare their different reports. This is the course I have always followed, but I cannot continue it now. I should not get through in a month what was formerly the work of a few days. I must not, therefore, disgrace myself by holding employments, the duties of which the decay of my sight will prevent me from discharging with efficiency.

The Carnatic will be exposed to no inconvenience from my quitting the direction of its affairs. I shall leave in it a great body of revenue servants, some of them of the greatest experience, and a population attached to our Government by good treatment, as much as men can be in so short a period. The Jagheerdars will give no opposition that can affect the tranquillity of the country. They will enter into long discussions, and debate upon every trifling point; but they will submit to what we require, if we only act openly and fairly. The Putwardars should, I think, have the possessions they were entitled to by the terms of Punderpore, with some addition, from a tenth to a fifth, according to circumstances. Their principal Vakeels should also have some provision.

The other Jagheerdars who have not yet come in, ought not to have the Punderpore terms, but should be deprived of a smaller or greater part of their Jagheers, as may be found advisable hereafter.

You will not yourself have time to settle all these matters, and I would therefore recommend your securing a man of ability and temper to arrange them. The fittest person in the Madras civil service is undoubtedly Mr. Chaplin, the Collector of Ballari. He has been talking of going home, but the charge of the Carnatic as principal collector, with a liberal salary, might induce him to

accept the situation. The salary ought, I think, to be a thousand pagodas a month, or twelve thousand pagodas per annum. The first settlement of a country is of the utmost importance, for on it depends not only its future revenue, but its tranquillity. Government cannot purchase too dearly the service of a man who can give a proper form at first to the affairs of a newly-acquired province. I hope, therefore, that you will apply for Mr. Chaplin.

If he cannot be spared, or is unwilling to change, I would ask for Mr. Thackeray, formerly chief secretary, and now acting as Collector of Coimbatore.

I hope, when you have time, you will say that this letter has reached you, as I have no copy.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp near Darwar, 10th June, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I RECEIVED yours of the 19th of May some days ago, and yesterday your letter without date, but probably of the 30th of May. It long since occurred to me that an official document, as stated by your friend Adams, would be necessary, and I therefore addressed the Madras Government in April *in forma pauperis*, and they forwarded my letter to Bengal; but you and Adams seem to have managed the business without waiting for it. I need not say that I feel myself much obliged to you both, not only in a pecuniary view, but on the higher ground of my having the satisfaction of believing that my services are thought to entitle me to the allowances proposed to be granted. You were present at the India Board office when Lord B—— told me that I should have ten thousand pagodas per annum, and all my expenses paid; and you may remember that you proposed that as the allowance differed only a few hundred pagodas from that of a resident, it should be made the same. I never thought of taking a Muchulka from Lord B——, because I certainly never suspected that my expenses would, above two years ago, have been restricted to five hundred pagodas, a sum which hardly pays my servants and camp equipage, or that Mr. E—— would have taken me by the neck and pushed me out of the appointment the very day on which the three years recommended by the Directors expired, though they authorised the term to be prolonged if deemed advisable. I hope that Bajee Row has by

this time shown himself the "man of taste you took him for," and gone to drink the Ganges' river in preference to roaming about like a vagabond. This event will settle the country, at least in all great points. Many petty disputes may remain to be adjusted, but none that can give us any serious trouble. I have been preaching this doctrine, with as much zeal as any new-light man, to Elphinstone for some time past, as I find that he considers the difficulties as much greater than they really are, and that my aid would be useful in clearing the ground; but this is already done. The jungles and the Babool-trees are down, and he has only now to shave or mow the weeds, which are plenty. I observe also that you have been making honourable mention of me to Adams, and have contrived to make him believe that I might be an useful instrument in settling the southern Mahratta states. The thing is very easy. All that is requisite is to do what he himself suggests, to keep them out of the hands of the Madras Government for some time. A provisional administration directed by Mr. Elphinstone, under the Supreme Government, should be established for two or three years, until the mass receive its form. For this task nobody is so well qualified as Elphinstone. He knows all the Jagheerdars and the people better than any body else. He must have deputies and assistants selected by himself, who will act zealously with him; not fellows sent from a presidency, who have been all their lives in a state of lethargy; and a military force ready to move should be kept up in the conquered country. There will, I think, be no cause to employ this force; but the best way to obviate the necessity of doing so, is to show that you are prepared.

With respect to myself, it is impossible that I can undertake the settlement in detail of any part of this country. I am as well with regard to general health as ever I was in my life; but my eyes have suffered so much, that I write with great difficulty at all times, and there are some days when I cannot write at all. Without sight nothing can be done in settling. It is a business that requires a man to write while he speaks, to have the pen constantly in his hand, to take notes of what is said by every person, to compare the information given by different men on the same subject, and to make an abstract from the whole. Since July last I have been obliged to change the number of my spectacles three times; and if you are a spectacle-man, you will understand what a rapid decay of vision this implies. I cannot now do in two days what a few years ago I did in one, and I can

do nothing with ease to myself. I cannot write without a painful sensation in my eyes of straining. The only chance of saving my sight is to quit business entirely for some months, and turn my eyes upon larger objects only, in order to give them relief. At the rate I am now going, in a few months more I shall not be able to tell a Dockan from a Breckan. Before this happens I must go home and paddle in the burn. This is a much nicer way of passing the evening of life, than going about the country here in my military boots and brigadier's enormous hat and feathers, frightening every cow and buffalo, shaking horribly its fearful nature, and making its tail stand on end. I shall willingly, now that all the great operations of war are over, resign this part of it to any one else. I am not like the Archbishop of Granada, for I feel that I am sadly fallen off in my homilies.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp at Hoobli, 19th June, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I HAVE got yours of the 5th, and congratulate you most cordially on your having caught Surmunt by the lugg. But you seem to have followed the practice of Buonaparte, and given him rather a friendly pinch when you offered eight lacs. You are mistaken in thinking that I am *sukht* (harsh) towards Mahara-jahs. You form this opinion probably from my having driven all pretenders to principalities out of the Ceded Districts. But these were a set of fellows whose ancestors had been expelled forty or fifty years before. Some of them were serving as common peons, when they were discovered by some adventurer of a Karkern, who borrowed a hundred rupees in the bazaar, rigged out the new Rajah with a turban and mantle as fine as Timour the Tartar, and started him in the field under the title of Soam Shanker Nacy, or some other warlike name. On these fellows I certainly had little compassion, for I stripped them of their trappings in order to pay their creditors. But for fallen monarchs I have a great respect; and had Surmunt had the good luck to have fallen into my hands, or I to have caught him, I should probably have offered him ten in place of eight lacs. His surrender is a most important event; it will tend more than any thing else to restore tranquillity and facilitate the settlement of the country. It deprives all the turbulent and disaffected of their head and support. I would rather

have taken Bajee Row than the Bombay Government. You will, I hope, be the taker of both. In your situation I would wait a little for Bombay. You are still young enough to do so. I am not, and therefore if I had a chance, which I have not, I would not wait. I have passed too much of my life in obscure drudgery to have any wish to continue the same course any longer. You know that I have been long deaf, and that knowledge at one entrance is quite shut out. I am getting blind fast: I must take care and not get blind altogether, and have knowledge shut out at the only remaining entrance. I should then indeed be fallen on evil days, when I should be able to read neither the lucubrations of the Indian Governments nor of the Directors.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

FROM SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp, 10th July.

MY DEAR MUNRO,

I HAVE received your two last letters; that dated the 19th ultimo came two days ago. You were right in your guess about my reason for thinking you *sacht*; your sentiments upon my settlement with Bajee Row were quite a cordial. I have not been so happy in this case as to anticipate the wishes of the Governor-General: he expected Bajee Row would get no such terms; that his distress would force him to submit on any conditions, and that his enormities deprived him of all right either to princely treatment or princely pension. I think his Lordship will, when he hears all, regret the precipitation with which he formed his judgment. In the first place, he will find, in spite of the report made by every commanding officer who ever touched Bajee Row that he had destroyed him, that the latter was not destroyed, but had about six thousand good horse and four thousand infantry, and the gates of Asseir wide open, all his property sent in there, and half his counsellors praying him to follow it; while Jeswunt Row Lar was positively ambitious of being a martyr in the cause of the Mahratta sovereign. Add to this, the impossibility of besieging Asseir till after the rains, the difficulty of even half blockading it, and the agitated state of the country, and then let his Lordship pronounce the article I purchased was worth the price I paid, and he will find it proved I could not get it cheaper. There are, however, other grounds which I can never abandon, that recommend this course on the score of policy: our own

dignity ; considerations for the feelings of Bajee Row's adherents, and for the prejudices of the natives of India. We exist on impressions ; and on occasions like this, where all are anxious spectators, we must play our part well, or we should be hissed. I have your opinion in my favour ; I have Ochterlony, Elphinstone, and Jenkinson, and many minor men, and I think I will yet force an assent from head-quarters ; but they foolishly enough committed themselves, knowing, as they stated at the time, their instructions would be too late. They did not think any circumstances could entitle him to have more than two lacs, and he was to be watched, restrained, and I know not what. My system is all opposite : I am either for the main guard, or a confidence that gives you a chance at least of the mind, the only other security except the body. You shall have a *short* narrative of my proceedings.

I grieve for your decay of vision, and none of your arguments will persuade me it is not at this moment a public misfortune ; but you should not remain a moment longer than you can help in India, and give up labour ; the warning is too serious. I shall stay till August 1819, till I get answers to letters I now write. If not then appointed, I go home. Yours sincerely,

JOHN MALCOLM.

TO KIRKMAN FINLAY, ESQ.

Bangalore, 11th Sept. 1818.

MY DEAR LORD PROVOST,

A FEW weeks ago, before I left camp at Darwar, I saw a sight gude for sair een—two of your letters, dated the 26th Feb. arrived under cover from Mr. Jas. Ritchie, your partner at Bombay. He wrote to me, mentioning that he intended after the monsoon to visit the Mahratta country. I told him that I should probably have left it by that time, but that I would request my successor, Mr. Chaplin, to facilitate his operations in carrying into effect your threats of showing the Rayets how much better customers free merchants were than a Company of monopolists. Mr. Chaplin is one of the ablest men these monopolists have got in their service. I have given him a copy of the paragraph of your letter, which promises to give his rayets more than any one else for their cotton ; and if this be not done, I trust that he will let your friend Baillie Graham know of it.

A great deal of fine cotton is grown in the provinces which have fallen into our hands. I was too much engaged in war and

politics to have time to enter into inquiries regarding its fitness for the European market. The inhabitants have been so much impoverished by their late weak and rapacious Government, that it will be a long time before they can be good customers to Glasgow or Manchester. In those districts which I traversed myself, I fear that I left them no richer than I found them; for wherever I went I appointed myself collector, and levied as much revenue as could be got, both to pay my own irregular troops, and to rescue it from the grasp of the enemy.

I shall not trouble you with military operations, as you will get the details in the newspapers. It is fortunate for India that the Peishwah commenced hostilities, and forced us to overthrow his power; for the Mahratta Government, from its foundation, has been one of devastation. It never relinquished the predatory habits of its founder, and even when its empire was most extensive, it was little better than a horde of imperial thieves. It was continually destroying all within its reach, and never repairing. The effect of such a system has been the diminution of the wealth and population of a great portion of the peninsula of India. The breaking down of the Mahratta Government, and the protection which the country will now receive, will gradually increase its resources, and I hope in time restore it to so much prosperity, as to render it worthy the attention of our friends in Glasgow.

Baillie Jarvie is a credit to our town, and I could almost swear that I have seen both him and his father, the Deacon, afore him, in the Salt-market; and I trust, that if I am spared, and get back there again, I shall see some of his worthy descendants walking in his steps. Had the Baillie been here, we could have shown him many greater thieves, but none so respectable as Rob Roy. The difference between the Mahratta and the Highland Robs is, that the one does from choice what the other did from necessity; for a Mahratta would rather get ten pounds by plunder, than a hundred by an honest calling, whether in the Salt-market or the Gallowgate.

I am thinking, as the boys in Scotland say, I am thinking, Provost, that I am wasting my time very idly in this country; and that it would be, or at least would look wiser, to be living quietly and doosly at home. Were I now there, instead of running about the country with camps here, I might at this moment be both pleasantly and profitably employed in gathering black Boyds with you among the braes near the Largs. There is no enjoyment in this country equal to it, and I heartily wish

that I were once more fairly among the bushes with you, even at the risk of being stickit by yon drove of wild knowte that looked so sharply after us. Had they found us asleep in the dyke, they would have made us repent breaking the sabbath; although I thought there was no great harm in doing such a thing in your company.

My wife joins in best wishes to Mrs. Finlay and the family.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Bangalore, 13th September, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th August. I do not apprehend any insurrection in the south. None of the Jagheerdars are, I believe, disposed to risk the loss of their possessions, and without leaders scattered horsemen will not act, and if they did, they could do nothing. The materials for Pindarries are no doubt, as you say, doubled by the disbanding of the native soldiery, but then we are to consider that our means of suppressing them are increased in a much greater ratio.

The Pindarries were bold before, because they had a safe retreat in Malwa. Without a place of refuge there can be no formidable insurrection.

The individuals who must compose an insurrectionary force, have families, and houses, and property, and many of them a mare and colt or two. They will not hastily put these things to the hazard for the sake of getting a little plunder, which they cannot be sure of keeping. Had they strongholds or places of refuge into which we could not follow them, they might rise; but they have not, and therefore cannot rise. In all the countries south of Poonah, at least, our authority pervades every part of the country, and no assemblage could take place without our knowledge. If there is any rising, it will not be as an army or a military body, but as banditti, and I doubt if it will ever go to this extent. If any small parties were to enter the Nizam's territory, his own troops would be sufficient to disperse them; and our seizing their small property in our villages, would discourage any future attempts of the kind. I would not, however, neglect the additional security to be derived from our military force being kept moveable: Rastrah's Jagheer, and the districts on the Kistna, are the most likely places for disbanded horse to

assemble. As the weather moderates, the reserve might move towards the Kistna, traversing the districts where there is any suspicion. For two years, at least, I would make the division march over the country during the fair season. I would also keep the assessment very moderate. There are many advantages in this. It enables the country to recover from its depressed state. It occasions a greater demand for hands in agriculture, and gives an opening for the employment of the soldiery as cultivators or servants, and it strengthens the attachment of the body of the people to our Government.

I have much more cause than you to regret the close of our official correspondence, and to wish for the continuance of our private one. Nothing but the state of my eyes would have made me leave the reserve this year, for in every other respect I am in perfect health, and I think that I feel marching in the sun less than I did fifteen or twenty years ago. Some days I can read and write the whole day, others an hour or two makes me half blind, and obliges me to stop. This was the case yesterday, and I was obliged to leave this letter unfinished, like an old woman who had lost her spectacles. I believe the difference is owing to my sometimes beginning in the morning with small print, or a crabbed hand, which makes my eyes smart for the rest of the day. I must get away from writing entirely, for some time at least, except now and then a private letter. I shall always find sight enough to read yours with pleasure, and to answer them, though I shall not have much to say that you care about. I mean to go to Madras in a few days, and from thence to Calcutta, if I can get a passage, though I do not know a soul there. I do not like, however, to leave India, without seeing the capital and the sacred stream. If I can find time I shall endeavour to go a few hundred miles up the Ganges, perhaps as far as Patna.

While writing I have got yours of the 3rd. You wrote me before on the Shalapoor affair, and said more than I had any right to expect. I imagine you have assigned the true cause of Lord Hastings's silence. Sir Thomas could say nothing, as he had given up the army of the Deccan; and if he had said ever so much, it would have drawn nothing from the Madras Government.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. CHAPLIN.

Vellore, 23rd September, 1818.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

BEFORE I received your last letter, I wrote to you about the reports of insurrections; Mr. Elphinstone had written to me on the subject, and I answered that I had no faith in them. The Cutcherry people are all great alarmists; Lachman Rowe in particular is very timid, and a great believer in plots. There are, no doubt, many people out of employment, and many dissatisfied, as must always be the case in every revolution; but where there is a strong government, these discontents gradually subside by the individuals who wish for a change finding that they are too weak, and betaking themselves to some peaceable occupation. Men who are soldiers, and not mere thieves, in order to rise must have a leader, a fixed object, and at least some hope of success. There is no respectable Jagheerdar who would risk his possessions on the chance of overturning our power. Even if he were disposed to make the attempt, he would find very few followers, because almost all the owners of horses are landholders or respectable inhabitants, who will not subject themselves to confiscation of property and banishment for the sake of any leader. They know very well that if the Peishwah, with all the advantages of an unbroken army and military and civil possession of the country, could not oppose us, nothing can be expected from the efforts of a few insurgents but ruin to those concerned. Horsemen who will readily make an incursion into a foreign territory, will not easily be induced to try an insurrection in their own; because, in the one case, they have a safe retreat in their own country, in the other none. Mr. Elphinstone supposes that the insurgents may invade the Nizam's country; but they would still run the same danger of punishment, because your Amildars would know what men had left their villages, or returned to them from such expeditions. Mr. Elphinstone formerly wrote to me about stationing Akbar Nowirs at Minez, Targaom, and other places of the Jagheerdars. I requested him to send his own, and said that the Amildars would do what was necessary in the other districts. For intelligence one Tishildar is worth a dozen of Akbar Nowirs. He has much greater means of procuring information, and is much more interested in getting what is correct. Nana Row, and men like him, who have served with horsemen, are more likely to ascertain what is going on than mere Maamlet men.

The Tishildar of Sholapoor was put in, because there was at the time no choice; but there had been too short a trial to know whether he was or was not as fit as others.

The Cusbah Bijapoor man was selected on account of his connections in the district, by whose means it was thought that he would be more likely to get possession of it than the best revenue man who had not been accustomed to such service. It was a duty on which very few wished at this time, the end of February, to go. I imagine he knows little of accounts and farms; but I believe he will become, if looked after, a very useful agent,

When the weather settles, the reserve ought to move about the country.

There are two men at Misriekottah who ought to be kept in irons at labour. One is the late Killedar. After taking cowle, and being permitted to remain in the country, they engaged in a plot to seize the place. I ordered them to be confined, meaning, on my return, to have tried them by a military committee. Before we returned from the Kistna, they were reported dangerously ill with bowel complaints. I wrote to the Cutchery to have them taken out of irons until they got better, and never afterwards till now thought of them.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

I came here to-day, and start to-morrow for Madras.

TO HIS BROTHER.

Madras, 30th September, 1818.

MY DEAR ALEXANDER,

THERE are two causes for my writing so little to you: one is, that I have more official writing than I can easily get through; and the other, and a much stronger one, is, that my sight has been so much injured by unceasing labour, by the climate, and perhaps by age, that I cannot write long without pain at any time, and some days my eyes smart so much, and become so weak, that I can hardly write at all. I have resigned the command of the reserve division of the army, which I had long anxiously coveted, and also my situation of Political Resident and Collector in the Southern Mahratta States. It was always my intention to have resigned when the war was finished, and to have gone home immediately. There was no chance when I resigned last month of getting home before January, but the state of my eyes made me resolve to give up my appointments, and to go and visit Bengal in the intermediate time. I do not care

about military command, excepting in war. I saw no chance of a Government, and I am determined never to act in any subordinate civil capacity. I wrote from Bangalore, to have a passage taken for me to Calcutta; but on my arrival here, I found the Castlereagh had come in with a detachment of the 48th regiment from Botany Bay, and was to sail for England next month. I have taken my passage in her, and we shall probably sail about the 25th of next month, and, with a tolerable passage, we may expect to see England in March. I am sorry to leave India without seeing Bengal; but as I have nothing to do there, and might lose my passage both there and here, by finding all the ships full before I reached Calcutta, I do not think that the mere sight of Calcutta is worth the risk of longer detention in India.

I do not mean to enter into any details of the Mahratta war, which may be said to have terminated with the surrender of the Peishwah early in June, though some small places held out two months longer. The last place which held for the Peishwah was Paurghur, a hill fort among the Western Ghauts, to the north-west of Darwar. It made a celebrated defence in former days under Sivajee; it offered to surrender in April last, if the arrears of the garrison were paid. This was refused. Being out of the line of operations, no attack was made upon it. It was foreseen that, if left to itself, it would capitulate, when it saw all the surrounding country subdued, and no prospect of relief: it surrendered on the 8th of August.

A great deal more has been said than was necessary about this war. Our enemies, though numerous, were not more so than ourselves. They were from the beginning disorganized and contemptible. The Pindarries were magnified to five times their real number; Holkar's horse and foot made no resistance; his artillerymen stood by their guns while we were forming to attack them, and it was from them alone that any loss was sustained. The Nagpoor troops were still worse than Holkar's. The family of Purseram Bhow, and the other Southern Mahratta chiefs who composed the main strength of the Peishwah's army, followed his standard, to save themselves from the disgrace of having deserted their sovereign. They were more afraid of us than of him, as their Jagheers, lying chiefly to the southward of the Kistna, were in a great measure at our mercy. They kept Vakeels secretly with us during the war, and they never acted with any vigour against us. Some of them left him in February; all of them by the end of April. The long and close pursuit by the force under

Brigadier-General Doveton was the immediate cause of the final breaking-up of his army ; he was not allowed time to rest or to feed his horses. He made his escape to the neighbourhood of Assurghur, with a rabble of a few thousand horse and foot ; some of them his own troops originally, and the rest fugitives from Nagpoor and Holkar. He pushed forward a Vakeel to Malcolm, who agreed, on condition of his disbanding his troops, and residing where the Governor-General might think proper, to secure him in the enjoyment of his personal liberty, and an annual allowance of eight lacs of rupees. The amount of the pension, and I believe also the principle of granting him any terms whatever, have been disapproved of. I certainly think differently ; I think that great allowance should be made for a native Sovereign, reduced to a state of degradation by a foreign power, from which he can have no hope of rescue but by treachery. If we were to grant terms at all, I do not think the allowance of eight lacs was too much. It is idle to say that he may make a dangerous use of such a sum ; because it may easily be expended on his account, without passing through his hands. He would no doubt have been compelled in another month or two to have surrendered at discretion ; but the speedy termination of the war, and settlement of the country, was well worth the sacrifice. He had before made overtures at different times to Mr. Elphinstone, who rejected them, as he had been instructed to receive none but those of unconditional surrender. No instructions regarding him had been sent to Malcolm, as it never had been supposed that he would have left his own country, and taken refuge at Assurghur. It is a general opinion in the Madras army, that the Governor-General might have said a great deal less of the Bengal troops, and somewhat more of those of Madras. I shall, on my return to England, be as unsettled and as undetermined as to the place of my future residence as when I last went home.

Yours affectionately,

THOMAS MUNRO.

The following, which was written to Lord Hastings during his stay at Madras, will not, it is presumed, be read without interest.

Madras, 12th November, 1818.

My temporary detention here, in consequence of the Castlereagh's having been driven out of the Roads by the hurricane of the 24th ultimo, has permitted me, before leaving this

country, to have the honour of receiving and answering your Lordship's letter of the 22nd September.

I believe that there is no stronger incentive to the zealous discharge of public duty, than the hope of gaining the approbation of those whose characters we have been accustomed to respect, because they are respected by the public: it cannot therefore but be a source of the highest gratification to me, to find that my endeavours to execute properly the share of the late campaign assigned to me, have been deemed worthy of a private testimonial, as well as official record, by your Lordship. Had I not been conscious that I ought, on account of my health, to leave India for a time, I would not so soon have given up my situation in the Mahratta country, as I thereby sacrificed every future prospect of again earning praise where I most valued it.

On my return to Madras, Mr. Elliot expressed his desire that I should remain in India till January, in order to finish what he thought was still incomplete in the business of the late Commission; and he mentioned at the same time, that it was his intention to re-establish the Commission until my departure. I was sorry the proposal was made, because my not assenting to it might be construed into disrespect: but I declined it on the ground, that having relinquished a military command merely on account of the state of my eyes, it was impossible that I could accept of a civil situation which, from the very nature of its duties, must prove much more injurious to them. Had they not suffered so much from long residence in this country, as to render an entire relief from business necessary for a time, I should, with pleasure, have resumed the pursuits of the labours of the Commission; for I was anxious to give what assistance I could in carrying into effect the orders of the Court of Directors, for employing the natives more extensively in the internal administration of the country. Their exclusion from offices of trust and emolument has become a part of our system of government, and has been productive of no good. Whenever, from this cause, the public business falls into arrear, it is said to be owing to the want of a sufficient number of Europeans; and more European agency is recommended as a cure for every evil. Such agency is too expensive; and even if it was not, it ought rather to be abridged than enlarged, because it is, in many cases, much less efficient than that of the natives. For the discharge of all subordinate duties, but especially in the judicial line, the natives are infinitely better qualified than Europeans. I have never seen

any European whom I thought competent, from his knowledge of the language and the people, to ascertain the value of the evidence given before him. The proceedings in our Courts of Judicature, which, in our Reports, make a grave and respectable appearance, are, I know, frequently the subject of derision among the natives.

But it is said that the natives are too corrupt to be trusted. This is an old objection, and one which is generally applicable, in similar circumstances, to the natives of every country. Nobody has ever supposed that the subordinate officers of the Excise and Customs in England are remarkable for their purity. But we need not go home for examples. The Company's servants were notoriously known to make their fortunes in partnership with their native agents, until Lord Cornwallis thought it advisable to purchase their integrity by raising their allowances. Let this be done with regard to the natives, and the effect will be similar—though not perhaps in a similar degree, for we cannot expect to find in a nation fallen under a foreign dominion the same pride and high principle as among a free people; but I am persuaded that we shall meet with a greater share of integrity and talent than we are aware of. While we persist in withholding liberal salaries from the natives, we shall have the services of the worst part of them: by making the salaries adequate to the trust, we shall secure the services of the best. Natives should be employed in every situation where they are better calculated than the Europeans to discharge the duty required. In all original suits, they are much fitter to investigate the merits than Europeans. The European judges should be confined almost entirely to the business of appeals. In criminal cases, the fact should be found by a native jury, who are much more competent than either the European judge or his officers to weigh the nature of the evidence.

Our Government will always be respected from the influence of our military power; but it will never be popular while it offers no employment to the natives that can stimulate the ambition of the better classes of them. Foreign conquerors have treated the natives with violence, and often with great cruelty, but none has treated them with so much scorn as we; none have stigmatized the whole people as unworthy of trust, as incapable of honesty, and as fit to be employed only where we cannot do without them. It seems to be not only ungenerous, but impolitic, to debase the character of a people fallen under our

dominion ; and nothing can more certainly produce this effect than our avowing our want of confidence in them, and, on that account, excluding them as much as possible from every office of importance.

It is with great reluctance that I have declined acting again in a Commission, the main object of which was, to give to the natives a greater share in the internal administration of the country ; and the remarks which I have ventured to make have been drawn from me chiefly by my anxiety to satisfy your Lordship that my refusal to engage in a civil occupation has proceeded altogether from the same cause which compelled me to resign my military command.

CHAPTER II.

Return to England.—Appointed Governor of Madras.—Arrival at Fort St. George.—General principles of Government.—General Correspondence.

IT has been stated that General Munro, having resigned his military command, and given over the political management of his conquests to the agents of the new Commission, set out in the month of August 1818, to rejoin his family at Bangalore. Here he spent several weeks much to his own satisfaction—for to Bangalore he had always been partial; and the fatigues which he had of late undergone, rendered a state of comparative repose doubly acceptable; but as it was his intention to proceed to England with as little delay as possible, he removed to the Presidency early in September. From the date of his arrival there, up to the middle of October, he and Mrs. Munro were the guests of his old and attached friends Mr. and Mrs. Cochrane; and time passed over them as lightly as it usually passes in the society of those whom we esteem.

The reader is doubtless aware, that from the middle of October to the middle of December, the prevalence of the monsoons renders Madras roads a very insecure place of anchorage for shipping, and hence that no vessels clear out for England later than the earlier weeks of the former month. When General Munro reached the Presidency, one ship only, the *Castlereagh*, was expected to sail previous to the commencement of the gales, and in her passages were secured; but on the morning of the very day of his intended embarkation, the 14th of October, a storm arose which drove her from her moorings, and injured her so severely, as to render her totally

unfit to undertake the homeward voyage, till after she should have undergone a thorough repair. The consequence was, that General Munro was compelled to lay aside his intention of quitting India that season. He removed to his own house in Madras; and the weather being exceedingly delightful, and no important business pressing, he passed some months there very agreeably.

On the 24th of January, 1819, General and Mrs. Munro took their passage on board the *Warren Hastings*. The voyage was, upon the whole, a pleasant one, for the ship touched both at Ceylon and St. Helena; and some delay taking place at the latter island, General Munro was enabled to gratify a wish which he had long entertained. He traversed the rock from end to end, visiting every spot to which the presence of Napoleon had given an interest; and he left it more than ever impressed with mingled admiration and pity for that great, misguided, and ill-fated man. This, however, was not the only occurrence which rendered his present homeward passage memorable. On the 30th of May, the ship being then in the latitude of the Azores, Mrs. Munro was delivered of a boy, who received the name, and has since, too soon, succeeded to the title of his father.

Towards the end of June, the *Warren Hastings* came to an anchor in the Downs, and General and Mrs. Munro landing at Deal, proceeded without delay to London. Their sojourn here was not, however, protracted; indeed they appear to have made no pause beyond what was absolutely necessary for refreshment; but pushing directly for Scotland, Mrs. Munro took up her abode with her father, whilst the General amused himself for a brief space, in travelling through the Highlands. But General Munro's merits were too justly appreciated to encourage any expectation that he would be permitted long to enjoy the calm of private life. He had scarcely reached the shores of Kent, ere intelligence was communicated that there was a design in agitation of again employing him in a high station in India; and he was recalled from the North,

within a few weeks after his arrival, by a formal announcement of his promotion. As the circumstances under which this appointment took place are highly creditable to all concerned, it may not be amiss to give here a somewhat detailed account of them.

In the month of August 1818, when intimation was received that Sir Evan Nepean desired to relinquish the Government of Bombay, it occurred to Mr. Canning, then President of the Board of Controul, that an excellent opportunity was afforded at once to gratify the Court of Directors, and to mark the sense which his Majesty's Government entertained of the brilliant services performed during the late war, both by the civil and military servants of the Company. With this view, he intimated his own readiness to recommend to the high station about to be vacated, some individual trained in the politics of India, taking care, however, to specify the names of three gentlemen, Sir John Malcolm, Mr. Elphinstone, and Colonel Munro, as men particularly deserving of so marked a preference. "The more general practice of the Court," said he, in the letter explanatory of his views, "is to look for their Governors rather among persons of eminence in this country, than among the servants of the Company: and when I profess myself to be of opinion that this practice is generally wiser, it is, I am confident, unnecessary to assure you, that such opinion is founded upon considerations the very reverse of unfriendly to the Company's real interests: but the extraordinary zeal and ability which have been displayed by so many of the Company's servants, civil and military, in the course of the late brilliant and complicated war, and the peculiar situation in which the results of that war have placed the affairs of your Presidency at Bombay, appears to me to constitute a case, in which a deviation from the general practices, in favour of your own service, might be at once becoming and expedient. It farther appeared to me, that the compliment to your servants would be more distinguished if suggested by a previous declaration

of the readiness of the King's Government to concur in such a choice, should the Court of Directors think proper to propose it. To have coupled such a declaration with the name of any *one* individual, would have been to expose the motives of it to misconception; to have named *none* would have been to retain, altogether undiminished, the power of objecting to any individual nomination. The gentlemen whose names I have mentioned, have been selected by me as conspicuous examples of desert in the various departments of your service, and on that scene of action which has been most immediately under our observation. I mean no disparagement to others, whose eminent qualities may stand fairly in competition with theirs; and I may add, that there is but one of the three with whom I have the honour of a personal acquaintance.

“On whomever your preference shall fall, it will always be a great satisfaction to me to have had this opportunity of recording, not only my admiration of the talents and conduct of those gentlemen whose names I have specified, but the high and just estimation in which I hold the general merit and character of your service.”

The choice, on this occasion, fell upon Mr. Elphinstone; but in the following year it was found necessary to appoint a successor to the Honourable Hugh Elliot in the Government of Madras, and to that high office General Munro was immediately appointed. Almost at the same time, the rank of Major-General was conferred upon him; and he was invested, in reward of his distinguished military services, with the insignia of K.C.B. But though the latter honours were fully estimated and gladly received by the subject of this memoir, it is very doubtful how far the former distinction was welcomed; for Sir Thomas harboured no wish to return to India in any capacity. Not that he disliked either the climate or the country, to both of which, on the contrary, he was extremely partial; but he had already spent so large a portion of his life in a species of honourable exile, that to his kindred and native land he was become, in some

degree, an alien. Besides, there were around him now other and closer ties than had existence in former days; whilst his anxiety to become acquainted with the manners and customs of European nations, continued as strong as ever. On these accounts, and on many others, there is reason to believe, that had his private feelings only been consulted, he would have declined the proffered appointment, doubly gratifying as it was, from the circumstance that it came totally unsolicited. But Sir Thomas Munro was not in the habit of obeying his own inclinations, when a sense of duty stood opposed to them; and finding that his acceptance of office was looked to with anxiety by men of all parties, he did not refuse it.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that previous to the departure from England of an Indian functionary of high rank, the Honourable the Court of Directors are in the habit of testifying their respect to him in person, by inviting him to a magnificent entertainment. The good custom was not, as may be supposed, neglected on the present occasion; and the assemblage of great and able men who attended at the City of London Tavern, was even more strikingly numerous than usually takes place at such meetings. Among these may be enumerated the Duke of Wellington and Lord Powis, both intimate personal friends of Sir Thomas Munro; Mr. Canning, the Earl of Eldon, with the rest of His Majesty's ministers; whilst numbers, whom business or other accidents kept at a distance, failed not to testify by letter their satisfaction at the elevation of the new Governor. Some of these friendly communications are subjoined, as well as an extract from an eloquent speech, in which Mr. Canning congratulated the East India Company on the prospects before them; because they furnish the best possible evidence of the kind of feeling which prevailed in all quarters, as to the wisdom of the selection just made.

“ We bewilder ourselves in this part of the world,” said one of the greatest orators whom England has ever produced, “ with

opinions respecting the sources from which power is derived. Some suppose it to arise with the people themselves, while others entertain a different view; all however are agreed, that it should be exercised *for* the people. If ever an appointment took place to which *this* might be ascribed as the distinguishing motive, it was *that* which we have now come together to celebrate; and I have no doubt that the meritorious officer who has been appointed to the Government of Madras, will, in the execution of his duty, ever keep in view those measures which will best conduce to the happiness of twelve millions of people."

Lord William Bentinck again, to whom the appointment had first been offered, but whom circumstances induced to decline it, no sooner heard of Sir Thomas's elevation, than he addressed him in the following terms:—

"Mr. Canning has communicated to me your appointment to the Government at Madras, and I have answered, that this nomination did *him* great honour, and gives *me* infinite satisfaction; and that whatever feeling of regret, upon public grounds, I may have felt on refusing to return to India, was now completely removed, by my conviction, that a much better substitute had been found. All this is my real true opinion; and I will only add, that it gives me great pleasure, that your great and noble services have at last toiled through to their just distinction."

In like manner, the Right Honourable John Sullivan, who was for many years an efficient member of the Board of Controul, said—

"I am so much alive to the sincere and warm feeling of joy upon your nomination to the Government of Madras, that I cannot mix any thing with my congratulations. I write to offer my humble tribute to Mr. Canning upon a selection that does him so much honour."

Whilst Mr. M'Culloch, not the least qualified of all Sir Thomas's friends to judge of his fitness for office, expressed himself thus strongly on the occasion:—

"I shall take an early opportunity of calling upon you to express my unfeigned joy in the prospect of an event which appears to me more calculated than any that has occurred for years, to

gladden the hearts of those who feel an interest in the welfare of the people of India, and in the reputation of the British Government in that part of the world."

So many congratulatory addresses could not fail to make a deep impression upon a man of Sir Thomas Munro's mental conformation. He was peculiarly gratified by them, and wrote to his friend Mr. Cumming on the subject of the public meeting, in the eloquent and forcible language of nature.

"I am sorry," says he, "that the change in the destination of the ship from Portsmouth to the Downs obliged me to leave town so suddenly, that I was prevented from thanking Mr. Canning for what he said of me at the London Tavern. I do not know that I shall derive so much enjoyment from the whole course of my government, as from what passed that evening. It is worth while to be a Governor, to be spoken of in such a manner, by such a man."

The letter from which the preceding extract has been taken was despatched from Deal, whither Sir Thomas and Lady Munro proceeded early in December. They had committed their boy in charge to Lady Munro's father some months previously, and hence they prepared to set out upon their long voyage, as little encumbered as when first they quitted England together. The following, addressed to his sister from the same place, will however serve to show how varied were Sir Thomas's feelings and anticipations on the occasion.

Deal, 12th December, 1819.

MY DEAR ERSKINE,

WE are here ready to embark the moment the wind becomes a little more favourable. I wish it were so now, for the weather is fine and clear, and it is tiresome waiting at an inn when one is going to leave one's country. I had no wish to leave it again; but as I must return to India, I am impatient to be there. My attachment to both countries is so nearly equal, that a very little turns the scale. I like the Indian climate and country much better than our own; and had we all our friends there, I would hardly think of coming home; but this country is the country of all our relations and of early life, and of all the associations connected with it. It is also the country of all the arts

—of peace, and war, and of all the interesting struggles among statesmen for political power, and among radicals for the same object. It is near France and Italy, and all the countries of the Continent, which I have earnestly wished to visit ever since I first read about them. The only objection I feel to going again to India is my age. I might now, perhaps, find employment in this country, and I have health enough to travel over Europe, and visit whatever is remarkable for having been the scene of great actions in ancient times; but when I return from India, it will be too late to attempt to enter upon a new career in this country; and my eyes will probably be too old, if I am not so, in other respects, to permit me to derive any pleasure from visiting the countries of the Continent. I may deceive myself, and fancy, like many other old Indians, that I am still fit for what may be far beyond my power. There is no help for it now: I must make the experiment of the effects of another visit to India upon my constitution and mind.

I hope you will visit Craigie sometimes, and see that my son is not spoiled, but brought up hardily as we were in Glasgow.

In the beginning of May 1820, Sir Thomas and Lady Munro arrived at Bombay, where they were hospitably received, and magnificently entertained by the Governor, Mr. Elphinstone. After spending about a fortnight here, they again took shipping, and on the 8th of June reached Madras. Sir Thomas was received with all the state due to his high station; and being conducted to the Government House, entered without delay upon the execution of his arduous duties. Into these, as they occurred in detail, it is not my intention to enter much at length, because the best record which could be given of the manner in which they were performed, is to be found both in the archives of the East India Company, and in the sentiments of the people. But of the principles which guided him in all his public proceedings, as well as of the manner in which his time was spent, it is necessary that the reader should be made generally acquainted.

With respect to the grand leading principle of Sir Thomas Munro's public conduct, enough has been said already to

place it distinctly before the eye of an ordinarily attentive observer. A just, but not a prejudiced, judge of the Indian character, he ever felt and taught, that no point was to be gained of benefit either to the ruler or the subject, except by functionaries capable of speaking and understanding the vernacular languages of the country. He considered, too, that it was the indispensable duty of every European, holding a situation of trust, to be thoroughly acquainted with the customs, habits, prejudices, and feelings of the people; and he invariably laid the blame of such petty disturbances as broke out from time to time in the provinces, on the absence of due knowledge, or becoming attention in the resident British authorities. His own career indeed had fully established the soundness of this theory; for to no man were more turbulent districts committed; yet he not only reduced them to order, in the ordinary sense of that term, but rendered the inhabitants at once willing subjects of the Company, and personally attached to himself. His great object therefore was, to impress those in authority with the policy and absolute necessity of studying both the dialects and feelings of the people; and he applied that principle to all classes, to the military not less than to the civil servants.

With this statesman-like and philanthropic notion uppermost in his mind, one of his first public acts was to be present at an examination of the students,* in the College of Fort St. George, to whom he addressed, in a very impressive manner, the following characteristic speech:—

“The junior civil servants of the Company have a noble field before them. No men in the world have more powerful motives for studying with diligence, for there are none who have a prospect of a greater reward, and whose success depends so entirely upon themselves. The object of all your studies here is one of the most important that can be imagined. It is that you may

* The reader is doubtless aware, that at Madras a sort of college or public school exists, through which every candidate for employment in the civil service must pass, ere he be admitted to fill the office of assistant either to a judge and magistrate, or to a collector.

become qualified to execute, with benefit to the state, the part which may hereafter fall to your lot in the administration of the affairs of the country:—language is but the means, the good government of the people is the great end; and in promoting the attainment of this end, every civil servant has a share more or less considerable; for there is no office, however subordinate, in which the conduct of the person holding it has not some influence on the comfort of the people, and the reputation of the Government.

“The advantage of knowing the country languages is not merely that it will enable you to carry on the public business with greater facility, but that by rendering you more intimately acquainted with the people, it will dispose you to think more favourably of them, to relinquish some of those prejudices which we are all at first too apt to entertain against them, to take a deeper interest in their welfare, and thus to render yourselves more respected among them. The more you feel an anxious concern in their prosperity, the more likely you will be to discharge your duty towards them with zeal and efficiency, and the more likely they will be to return the benefit with gratitude and attachment.

“In every situation it is best to think well of the people placed under our authority. There is no danger that this feeling will be carried too far; and even if it should, error on this side is safer than on the other. It is a strong argument in favour of the general good qualities of the natives, that those who have lived longest among them, have usually thought the most highly of them. I trust that you will all hereafter see the justice of this opinion, and the propriety of acting upon it; for in almost every country, but more particularly in this, the good-will of the people is the strongest support of the Government.”

The following fragment of a memorandum found among Sir Thomas's papers, seems too valuable to be omitted.

MEMORANDUM.

THE importance of public officers being free from debt. No excuses for being encumbered with it. The causes of it—dissipation, thoughtlessness, or want of firmness.

2. It is a great drawback on every man in office. Some men may do their duty with it; but never so well as without it.

3. There are few qualities in a public servant more really valu-

able than order and economy in his private affairs. They make him independent, and enable him to devote, without disturbance, his whole time to his public duty.

4. It is very essential, both to your own future advancement, as well as to the good of the service, that you should leave the College fully prepared, by your knowledge of the native languages, to enter upon its duties with advantage to the people, and that they should not have cause to lament that they are placed under the authority of men, who, not being qualified to execute the duties of their situation, are incapable of protecting them.

5. Many have left the College perfectly qualified for commencing their public career. Some have left it with a very imperfect knowledge of the languages, who have afterwards, by persevering study, completely retrieved their lost time. It is much safer, however, to leave the College already provided with the necessary qualifications for public business, than to trust to the chances of acquiring it in the provinces; for though some may acquire it in this manner, others will fail, and never become useful or distinguished members of the service.

Referring, in some degree, to the same subject, is the following admirable Minute, which I insert, because it will explain more perfectly than could be done by any language of mine, as well the view which Sir Thomas Munro took of the character of the people of India, as his notions of the system of political instruction which ought to be pursued, after candidates for office quitted College.

MINUTE.

8th of August, 1820.

THE Court of Directors has, in its letter of the 1st of March 1820, proposed certain rules for our guidance in the selection of persons to fill the offices of provincial and zillah judges, and of secretaries to Government and the Board of Revenue, and of members of that Board, and of register and members of the *Sudder Adawlut*. The Court has desired us to take this subject into our particular consideration, and to furnish it with our sentiments thereupon.

The reasons which render it desirable that the offices in question should, as far as may be practicable, be filled with men pos-

sessing a considerable share of revenue experience acquired in the provinces, are so fully explained in the Honourable Court's Letter to Bengal, of the 8th April 1819, that it is not easy to add any thing to them; and it therefore appears to me that all that remains for us to do is, to endeavour, without delay, to carry into effect the intentions of the Honourable Court to as great an extent as may be found possible, in the present state of the service. It is obvious, however, that from the great want of regularly-trained servants, we must proceed gradually, and that many years must elapse before full operation can be given to the plan. Until within the last twenty or thirty years, we had little territory in our own hands, and, consequently, hardly any means of forming revenue servants. We have been more fortunate than could have been expected under such disadvantages; for most of the principal offices at the Presidency have generally been filled by a succession of able servants, and some of the most distinguished of them have been men who never were employed, or only for a very short time, any where else but at the seat of government; such men, however, would undoubtedly have been much fitter for their station if they had served some years in the revenue line in the provinces. We have now, in our widely-extended territory, an ample field for the training of the junior servants in revenue affairs, and we ought to avail ourselves of it for that purpose. A knowledge of revenue business will be useful in whatever department they may be afterwards employed; but a knowledge of the natives is still more essential, and this knowledge is only to be acquired by an early and free intercourse with them, for which the revenue presents infinitely more facilities than any other line. It ought to be our aim to give to the younger servants the best opinion of the natives, in order that they may be the better qualified to govern them hereafter. We can never be qualified to govern men against whom we are prejudiced. If we entertain a prejudice at all, it ought rather to be in their favour than against them. We ought to know their character, but especially the favourable side of it; for if we know only the unfavourable, it will beget contempt and harshness on the one part, and discontent on the other. The custom of appointing young men, as soon as they leave college, to be registers to zillah courts, is calculated rather to produce than to obviate this evil. The most likely way of preventing it, and of fulfilling the desire of the Court of Directors to improve the efficiency of the Civil Service, would be, to make every civil servant begin his career in the revenue line. The

slightest reflection will satisfy us, that it is much more probable that he will become an useful public servant by beginning in the revenue than in the judicial departments.

There are some men who overcome all difficulties, and become valuable public officers in whatever line they are placed, and whatever may have been that in which they were first employed: but in making rules, we must look to men such as they generally are.

When a young man is transferred from college to the office of a zillah register, he finds himself all at once invested with judicial functions. He learns forms before he learns things. He becomes full of the respect due to the Court, but knows nothing of the people. He is placed too high above them to have any general intercourse with them. He has little opportunity of seeing them except in court. He sees only the worst part of them, and under the worst shapes—he sees them as plaintiff and defendant, exasperated against each other, or as criminals; and the unfavourable opinion with which he too often, at first, enters among them, in place of being removed by experience, is every day strengthened and increased. He acquires, it is true, habits of cautious examination, and of precision and regularity; but they are limited to a particular object, and are frequently attended with dilatoriness, too little regard for the value of time, and an inaptitude for general affairs, which require a man to pass readily from one subject to another.

In the revenue line he has an almost boundless field, from whence he may draw at pleasure his knowledge of the people. As he has it in his power, at some time or other, to show kindness to them all, in settling their differences, in occasional indulgence in their rents, in facilitating the performance of their ceremonies, and many other ways; and as he sees them without official form or restraint, they come to him freely, not only on the public, but often on their private concerns. His communications with them are not limited to one subject, but extend to every thing connected with the welfare of the country. He sees them engaged in the pursuits of trade and agriculture, and promoting by their labours the increase of its resources, the object to which his own are directed. He sees that among them there is, as in other nations, a mixture of good and bad; that though many are selfish, many likewise, especially among the agricultural class, are liberal and friendly to their poorer neighbours and tenants; and he gradually learns to take an in-

terest in their welfare, which adheres to him in every future situation.

If a young man be sent at once from college to the revenue line, the usual effect will be to render him attached to the natives. If to the judicial, to increase the dislike towards them with which he too often sets out. The main object, therefore, in beginning with the revenue, is not to teach him to collect the kists, which is a very secondary consideration, but to afford him an opportunity of gaining a knowledge of the inhabitants and their usages, which is indispensable to the due discharge of his duty in the judicial as well as in the revenue line.

An acquaintance with the customs of the inhabitants, but particularly of the rayets, the various tenures under which they hold their lands, the agreements usual among them regarding cultivation, and between them and soucars respecting loans or advances for their rents, and the different modes of assignment is essential to a judge; for questions concerning these points form the chief part of his business. A judge who is ignorant of them, must often be at a loss on the most simple points; but as a knowledge of them can hardly be attained excepting in the revenue line, it may be said that no man can be a good judge who has not served in it. If this kind of knowledge be indispensable in a zillah judge, it is equally so in the judges of the higher courts, and the secretaries to Government. It is on the right administration of the revenue that the prosperity of the country chiefly depends. If it be too heavy or very unequally distributed, the effects are felt in every department. Trade is depressed as well as agriculture; numbers of the lower orders of the people are driven by their necessity to seek a subsistence in theft and robbery: the better sort become dissatisfied, and give no help in checking the disorder. The roads become unsafe, and the prisons crowded; and we impute to the depravity of the people the mischief which has probably been occasioned by injudicious taxation, or the hasty abolition or resumption of long established rights and privileges. It is of importance that the higher officers of Government should always be able to trace the good or bad state of the country to its true cause, and that with this view they should, in the early part of their service, be employed in the revenue line in the provinces, because it is only there that they can completely see and understand its internal structure and administration.

As the business of a judge is much facilitated by his having

been previously trained in the revenue line, so is that of a collector by his having served in the judicial; but not in the same degree, because he may become tolerably well acquainted with judicial proceedings in the practice of his own duties in the settlement of boundary and other disputes respecting the occupation of land. In framing, therefore, the few rules for giving effect to the instructions from the Court of Directors, which I now submit to the Board, I have not thought it necessary to require that a collector should previously have been employed in the judicial line. It might, at first sight, seem to be desirable that a collector should before have served as a register, and that the civil servants, in rising in the judicial and revenue lines indiscriminately, and in passing from one to the other, should proceed regularly through every gradation in each; but this would be extremely embarrassing and injurious to the service, and would, in fact, be discovered on trial to be nearly impracticable. The conveniency of the service does not always enable us to make interchanges when servants are ready to be transferred from one branch to the other; but we can always secure a few years of revenue instruction, by sending all servants to that line at first. We have then the advantage of the early and first impression; and two years are of more value then, than double the number would be at any after period. After serving two years as an assistant collector, he may either be transferred to the judicial or any other line, or remain in the revenue, and the matter might be determined either by his own option or the exigency of the service. In rising afterwards to the highest offices, it will not be necessary that he should pass regularly through every subordinate one, or that he should serve longer in any of them than such a time as may enable him, with tolerable application, to acquire a practical knowledge of its duties. It may be thought that two years are too short a time for any person to learn much of revenue; but as he may remain in that line as much longer as he pleases, though he cannot be less than two years, there can be little doubt but that a large portion of the junior servants will remain in it; that many of those who leave it, on the expiration of the two years, will have imbibed a partiality for it, and seek to return to it, and that we shall thus always have a sufficient number of servants possessing such a knowledge of revenue as to qualify them to fill efficiently any office whatever.

The rule of sending all young men directly from the college to the provinces, will in future prevent them from thinking of

establishing themselves at the Presidency, and will prove beneficial both to them and the public ; but as it might be attended with inconvenience to those who have been fixed here since 1816, were they to be removed, and more particularly as some of them owed their detention to their superior merits having fitted them to fill situations of greater emolument than they could have obtained in the provinces, I would therefore recommend that, in order to prevent their suffering by the operation of a new arrangement, they should be permitted to have the option of remaining at the Presidency, or going into the provinces.*

Another fundamental doctrine, if I may so express myself, in the political code of Sir Thomas Munro, was, that the pay of every public servant, especially in India, ought to be ample, an adequate remuneration furnishing the best preventative against those mean and dishonest dealings of which too many, whether justly or otherwise, have been accused. From the fragment given a few pages ago, it will be seen, that for the practice of incurring debts he made no excuse, because he regarded it as injurious not merely to the personal respectability, but to the national character of Englishmen : yet his abhorrence of the practice was tempered by a benevolence and kindness of heart which never, under any circumstances, seem to have forsaken him. It may be necessary to state, that when a public servant, on this or any other account, suffered suspension, it was the practice to deprive him of all his salaries, and to leave him to make his way home, not unfrequently by means of charitable contributions raised among the inhabitants of the Presidency. Sir Thomas Munro at once interfered to obtain a modification of this somewhat harsh, as well as injudicious regulation. He conceived that greater injury was done by thus degrading the national character in the eyes of the natives, than the

* The reader will find in the APPENDIX a valuable Minute, in which the principle of paying due attention to the native languages is shown to be as essential among military as among civil officers ; and the question as to the adequacy of certain measures to act as inducements to their study is ably discussed.

benefits arising from example were likely to compensate ; and he obtained a regulation to be passed, by which such unfortunate or imprudent individuals were supplied with funds adequate to cover the expenses of their passage, provided they departed within a specified period.*

While he was thus attentive to the comforts and respectability of European servants, it is not to be supposed that he forgot for a moment what was due to the natives. From what has been said in many of his letters, particularly in those written during the existence of the judicial Commission, it will be discovered, that to the necessity of behaving with liberality to the people of India he was peculiarly alive, and the whole tenor of his government shows that he never lost sight of that commendable object. He early directed his attention to the re-establishment of native schools wherever they had fallen into decay, and to the erection of new seminaries in places where none before existed ; and he embodied a Committee of Public Instruction at Fort St. George, for the exclusive purpose of training up Hindoos and Moham-medans to offices of greater or less importance under the Government. For the support of this useful institution and the maintenance of native schoolmasters, he allotted fifty thousand rupees annually, a sum certainly the reverse of inordinate when the benefits to be derived from its expenditure are considered.

But it was not for the instruction of the natives only that Sir Thomas Munro was a strenuous and persevering advocate ; he was anxious to see them rewarded for their services in such a manner as would induce them to give up the energies both of their minds and bodies to the advancement of the public welfare : and, above all, he was desirous that an adequate provision against old age should be made for such as particularly distinguished themselves by their usefulness.

* There is a most judicious Minute to this effect inserted by him 1st December, 1820, among the Judicial Consultations of Fort St. George, which nothing but the want of space hinders me from transcribing.

The following Minute, on this head, is at once so judicious and so brief, that I cannot refuse to insert it.

EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE.

20th January, 1821.

IN providing for distinguished public servants, both for the sake of doing justice to them and of encouraging others to follow their example, we ought to take care that while we are liberal we are not profuse; for extravagant grants not only diminish our means of rewarding when necessary, but render the gifts of Government less honourable, and make them to be received with less gratitude. There are, it is true, some rare instances of extraordinary services, which cannot be regulated by any standard, or be too highly rewarded; but, in general, the reward should be measured by the nature of the service performed, and the pay, the rank, or the situation in life of the person on whom it is to be bestowed.*

Every person acquainted with the political history of India must be aware, that the necessity imposed by our regulations upon the collector to distrain, in the event of a defalcation of revenue, and to sell by public auction the land from which such revenue was due, led, wherever the practice prevailed, to consequences the most mischievous. Among other effects arising out of it, the Native revenue officers, whose eagerness to possess land was, like that of Asiatics in general, excessive, devised every expedient to cause embarrassments among the proprietors with whom they maintained dealings, in order that they might themselves purchase the estates as soon as they came into the market. Nor did the evil rest here. The possession of landed property gives to its owner in India a degree of influence which a similar contin-

* The method originally adopted for supporting superannuated and disabled Native servants was by means of a pension fund, collected from the salaries of persons in office, somewhat after the fashion of the Widows' Fund in our army. The measure was found not to answer, and had been abolished; but the Court of Directors, taking a different view of the subject, ordered it to be renewed. There is, among the records in the India House, a Minute or statement from the pen of Sir Thomas Munro, so able and so just, that its length alone has deterred me from inserting it in the body of the present work.

gency gives in no other quarter of the globe ; and this, the ill-paid, and generally ill-conditioned servants of our public courts were too much in the habit of turning to the worst purposes. Sir Thomas Munro had all along seen the evil of the system, and repeatedly, in his correspondence with the higher powers, argued against it. He now took the matter up with the earnestness which it deserved, and caused a regulation to be passed, positively prohibiting all revenue officers from holding or possessing land in the several districts within which the compass of their duties lay.

But his anxiety to increase the happiness, and add to the respectability of the natives, was far from ending here. It is probably needless to observe, that under the British Government in India a variety of monopolies exist, all of them more or less hurtful to the interests of the people, though some perhaps, under the existing state of affairs, indispensable. To these Sir Thomas Munro was so far hostile, that he adopted every rational expedient, if not to diminish their number, at all events to hinder their growth : indeed, he looked upon an absolute freedom of cultivation to be the natural right of the rayet ; and against every enactment which had the smallest tendency to counteract it, he decidedly set his face. I have inserted in the APPENDIX a long and able Minute on this subject, called forth in consequence of a proposition to secure to the Government a monopoly in the valuable timber which grows in the forests of Malabar.

Again, there was no point which Sir Thomas Munro was more anxious to press upon the attention of the collectors and zillah magistrates, than the impolicy of interfering, unless in very gross cases, with the disputes of the natives originating in questions of caste. It happened that on the 29th of May, 1820, the usual squabble between the right and left-hand castes occurred at Masulipatam. The collector, more zealous perhaps than prudent, interposed to quell the disturbance, employing for this purpose a party of sepoy ; and the consequence was, that not only were several lives lost, but a good

deal of angry feeling was excited. Sir Thomas Munro took advantage of the circumstance to record his opinion of all such proceedings, and to point out, in a sound and sensible manner, their extreme impropriety. He states, that such squabbles have occurred from time immemorial, and will occur again, without leading to any results dangerous to the Government; and that nothing can be more injudicious than for the civil magistrate to mix himself up in differences of a purely religious character. Above all, he deprecates the practice of employing upon such services the native troops of the Company, by far the greater proportion of whom partake in all the prejudices of the disputants; not only because of the hazard incurred of their refusing to act, but because to require them to act was a demand too severe upon their loyalty and sense of military discipline. This is one out of a thousand instances of his sensitive regard to the feelings of the people, and of his great anxiety that these should be outraged as rarely and to as slight an extent as possible.

Intimately connected with his opinions on these heads were the views which he took of the two most important points connected with our Indian administration—I allude to the questions whether or not the press in India ought to be free and unrestricted; and how far it were judicious to apply the influence of Government for the furtherance of the work of conversion. On the first head, Sir Thomas's sentiments are as correct as they are clearly given. He holds that a perfect freedom of the press is not only unnecessary, but absolutely incompatible with the continuance of our authority in India. But as the subject has of late come in a variety of shapes before the public, I consider it right to insert here the entire Minute in which these sentiments are conveyed.

MINUTE IN CONSULTATION.

12th April, 1822.

A GREAT deal has of late been said, both in England and in this country, regarding the liberty of the Indian press; and although nothing has occurred to bring the question regularly

before the Board, yet as I think it one on which, according to the decision which may be given, the preservation of our dominions in India may depend; and as it appears to me desirable that the Honourable the Court of Directors should be in possession of the sentiments of this Government at as early a period as possible, I deem it my duty to call the attention of the Board to the subject.

2. I cannot view the question of a free press in this country, without feeling that the tenure by which we hold our power never has been, and never can be, the liberties of the people; I therefore consider it as essential to the tranquillity of the country, and the maintenance of our government, that all the present restrictions should be continued. Were the people all our countrymen, I would prefer the utmost freedom of the press; but as they are, nothing could be more dangerous than such freedom. In place of spreading useful knowledge among the people, and tending to their better government, it would generate insubordination, insurrection, and anarchy.

3. Those who speak of the press being free in this country, have looked at only one part of the subject; they have looked no farther than to Englishmen, and to the press as a monopoly in their hands for the amusement or benefit of their countrymen; they have not looked to its freedom among the natives, to be by them employed for whatever they also may consider to be for their own benefit, and that of their countrymen.

4. A free press and the dominion of strangers are things which are quite incompatible, and which cannot long exist together; for what is the first duty of a free press? it is to deliver the country from a foreign yoke, and to sacrifice to this one great object every measure and consideration; and if we make the press really free to the natives as well as to Europeans, it must inevitably lead to this result. We might wish that the press might be used to convey moral and religious instruction to the natives, and that its effects should go no farther; they might be satisfied with this for a time, but would soon learn to apply it to political purposes—to compare their own situations and ours, and to overthrow our power.

5. The advocates of a free press seek, they say, the improvement of our system of Indian government, and of the minds and conditions of the people; but these desirable ends are, I am convinced, quite unattainable by the means they propose. There are two important points which should always be kept in view,

in our administration of affairs here. The first is, that our sovereignty should be prolonged to the remotest possible period. The second is, that whenever we are obliged to resign it, we should leave the natives so far improved from their connection with us, as to be capable of maintaining a free, or at least a regular government amongst themselves. If these objects can ever be accomplished, it can only be by a restricted press. A free one, so far from facilitating, would render their attainment utterly impracticable; for, by attempting to *precipitate* improvement, it would frustrate all the benefit which might have been derived from more cautious and temperate proceedings.

6. In the present state of India, the good to be expected from a free press is trifling and uncertain, but the mischief is incalculable; and as to the proprietors of newspapers, as mischief is the more profitable of the two, it will generally have the preference. There is no public in India to be guided and instructed by a free press; the whole of the European society is composed of civil and military officers, belonging to the King's and Honourable Company's services, with a small proportion of merchants and shopkeepers; there are but few among them who have not access to the newspapers and periodical publications of Europe, or who require the aid of political information from an Indian newspaper.

7. The restraint on the press is very limited; it extends only to attacks on the character of Government and its officers, and on the religion of the natives; on all other points it is free. The removal of these restrictions could be of advantage to none but the proprietors of newspapers; it is their business to sell their papers, and they must fill them with such articles as are most likely to answer this purpose; nothing in a newspaper excites so much interest as strictures on the conduct of Government, or its officers; but this is more peculiarly the case in India, where, from the smallness of the European society, almost all the individuals composing it are known to each other, and almost every European may be said to be a public officer. The newspaper which censures most freely public men and measures, and which is most personal in its attacks, will have the greatest sale.

8. The laws, it may be supposed, would be able to correct any violent abuse of the liberty of the press; but this would not be the case. The petty jury are shopkeepers and mechanics, a class not holding in this country the same station as in England,—a

class by themselves, not mixing with the merchants, or the civil and military servants, insignificant in number, and having no weight in the community. They will never, however differently the judge may think, find a libel in a newspaper against a public servant. Even if the jury could act without bias, the agitation arising from such trials in a small society, would far outweigh any advantage they could produce. The editors of newspapers, therefore, if only restricted by the law of libel, might foully calumniate the character of public officers, and misrepresent the conduct of Government. They would be urged by the powerful incentive of self-interest to follow this course, and they would be the only part of the European population which would derive any advantage from a free press.

9. Every military officer who was dissatisfied with his immediate superior, with the Commander-in-chief, or with the decision of a court-martial, would traduce them in a newspaper. Every civil servant who thought his services neglected, or not sufficiently acknowledged by the head of the department in which he was employed, or by Government, would libel them. Every attempt to restrain them by recourse to a jury, would end in defeat, ridicule, and disgrace, and all proper respect for the authority of Government would be gradually destroyed. The evil of the decline of authority would be sufficiently great, even if it went no farther than the European community; but it will not stop there, it will extend to the natives; and whenever this happens, the question will not be, whether or not a few proprietors of newspapers are to be enriched, and the European community to be amused by the liberty of the press, but whether our dominion in India is to stand or fall. We cannot have a monopoly of the freedom of the press; we cannot confine it to Europeans only; there is no device or contrivance by which this is to be done; and if it be made really free, it must in time produce nearly the same consequences here which it does every where else. It must spread among the people the principles of liberty, and stimulate them to expel the strangers who rule over them, and to establish a national Government.

10. Were we sure that the press would act only through the medium of the people, after the great body of them should have imbibed the spirit of freedom, the danger would be seen at a distance, and there would be ample time to guard against it; but from our peculiar situation in this country, this is not what would take place, for the danger would come upon us from our native

army, not from the people. In countries not under a foreign government, the spirit of freedom usually grows up with the gradual progress of early education and knowledge among the body of the people. This is its natural origin; and were it to rise in this way in this country while under our rule, its course would be quiet and uniform, unattended by any sudden commotion, and the change in the character and opinions of the people might be met by suitable changes in the form of government. But we cannot with any reason expect this silent and tranquil renovation; for, owing to the unnatural situation in which India will be placed under a foreign government with a free press and a native army, the spirit of independence will spring up in this army long before it is ever thought of among the people. The army will not wait for the slow operation of the instruction of the people, and the growth of liberty among them, but will hasten to execute their own measures for the overthrow of the Government, and the recovery of their national independence, which they will soon learn from the press it is their duty to accomplish.

11. The high opinion entertained of us by the natives, and the deference and respect for authority, which have hitherto prevailed among ourselves, have been the main cause of our success in this country; but when these principles shall be shaken or swept away by a free press, encouraged by our juries to become a licentious one, the change will soon reach and pervade the whole native army. The native troops are the only body of natives who are always mixed with Europeans, and they will therefore be the first to learn the doctrines circulated among them by the newspapers; for, as these doctrines will become the frequent subjects of discussion among the European officers, it will not be long before they are known to the native officers and troops. Those men will probably not trouble themselves much about distinction, regarding the rights of the people, and form of government; but they will learn from what they hear to consider what immediately concerns themselves, and for which they require but little prompting. They will learn to compare their own low allowances and humble rank, with those of their European officers,—to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests,—to estimate their own strength and resources, and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke, and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields. If the press be free, they must immediately learn all this, and much more. Their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments

will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans; they will have no great difficulty in finding leaders qualified to direct them; their patience, their habits of discipline, and their experience in war, will hold out the fairest prospect of success; they will be stimulated by the love of power and independence, and by ambition and avarice, to carry their designs into execution. The attempt, no doubt, would be dangerous; but when the contest was for so rich a stake, they would not be deterred from the danger. They might fail in their first attempts, but even their failure would not, as under a national government, confirm our power, but shake it to its very foundation. The military insubordination which is occasioned by some partial or temporary cause, may be removed, but that which arises from a change in the character of the troops, urging them to a systematic opposition, cannot be subdued; we should never again recover our present ascendancy; all confidence in them would be destroyed; they would persevere in their designs until they were finally successful; and after a sanguinary civil war, or rather passing through a series of insurrections and massacres, we should be compelled to abandon the country.

12. We might endeavour to secure ourselves by augmenting our European establishment. This might, at a great additional expense, avert the evil for a time, but no increase of Europeans could long protract the existence of our dominion. In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people: the native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men, formerly belonging to the revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed, and by many now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country, and of its revenue: the great mass of the people would remain quiet. The merchants and shopkeepers, from having found facilities given to trade which they never before experienced, might wish us success, but they would do no more. The heads of villages, who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants, would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shown a strong desire to be transferred to our dominion; but this feeling arose from temporary causes,—the immediate pressure of a weak and rapacious government, and the hope of bettering themselves by a change. But they have now tried our Government, and found, that though they are protected in their

persons and their property, they have lost many of the emoluments which they derived from a lax revenue system under their native chiefs, and have also lost much of their former authority and consideration among the inhabitants, by the establishment of our judicial courts and European magistrates and collectors. The hopes of recovering their former rank and influence would therefore render a great part of them well disposed to favour any plan for our overthrow. We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild Government, would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army.

13. I do not apprehend any immediate danger from the press ; it would require many years before it could produce much effect on our native army ; but though the danger be distant, it is not the less certain, and will ultimately overtake us if the press become free. The liberty of the press and a foreign yoke are, as already stated, quite incompatible. We cannot leave it free with any regard to our own safety ; we cannot restrain it by trial by a jury ; because, from the nature of juries in this country, public officers can never be tried by their peers. No jury will ever give a verdict against the publisher of a libel upon them, however gross it may be. The press must be restrained either by a censor or by the power of sending home at once the publisher of any libellous or inflammatory paper, at the responsibility of Government, without the Supreme Court having the authority, on any plea whatever, to detain him for a single day.

14. Such restrictions as those proposed will not hinder the progress of knowledge among the natives, but rather insure it by leaving it to follow its natural course, and protecting it against military violence and anarchy. Its natural course is not the circulation of newspapers and pamphlets among the natives immediately connected with Europeans, but education gradually spreading among the body of the people, and diffusing moral and religious instruction through every part of the community. The desire of independence and of governing themselves, which in every country follows the progress of knowledge, ought to spring up and become general among the people before it reaches the army ; and there can be no doubt that it will become general in India, if we do not prevent it by ill-judged precipitation, in seeking to effect, in a few years, changes which must be the work of generations. By mild and equitable government ; by promoting the dissemination of useful books among the natives, without

attacking their religion ; by protecting their own numerous schools ; by encouraging, by honorary or pecuniary marks of distinction, those where the best system of education prevails ; by occasional allowances from the public revenue to such as stand in need of this aid ; and, above all, by making it worth the while of the natives to cultivate their minds, by giving them a greater share in the civil administration of the country, and holding out the prospect of filling places of rank and emolument, as inducements to the attainment of knowledge, we shall, by degrees, banish superstition, and introduce among the natives of India all the enlightened opinions and doctrines which prevail in our own country.

15. If we take a contrary course ; if we, for the sole benefit of a few European editors of newspapers, permit a licentious press to undermine among the natives all respect for the European character and authority, we shall scatter the seeds of discontent among our native troops, and never be secure from insurrection. It is not necessary for this purpose that they should be more intelligent than they are at present, or should have acquired any knowledge of the rights of men or nations ; all that is necessary is, that they should have lost all their present high respect for their officers and the European character ; and whenever this happens, they will rise against us, not for the sake of asserting the liberty of their country, but of obtaining power and plunder.

16. We are trying an experiment never yet tried in the world ; maintaining a foreign dominion by means of a native army, and teaching that army, through a free press, that they ought to expel us, and deliver their country. As far as Europeans only, whether in or out of the service, are concerned, the freedom or restriction of the press could do little good or harm, and would hardly deserve any serious attention. It is only as regards the natives, that the press can be viewed with apprehension ; and it is only when it comes to agitate our native army, that its terrible effects will be felt. Many people, both in this country and England, will probably go on admiring the efforts of the Indian press, and fondly anticipating the rapid extension of knowledge among the natives, while a tremendous revolution, originating in this very press, is preparing, which will, by the premature and violent overthrow of our power, disappoint all those hopes, and throw India back into a state more hopeless of improvement than when we first found her.

17. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has brought to

the notice of the Board an anonymous letter, in the Hindostanee language, thrown into the lines of the cavalry cantonment at Arcot, on the night of the ———, urging the troops to murder their European officers, and promising them double pay. This letter was brought in the morning by the Soubadar Major of the regiment of native cavalry, to Lieutenant-Colonel Fowlis, the senior officer present in the cantonment. I received a Hindostanee letter by the post some weeks ago, addressed to myself, complaining of the condition of the native army, their depressed situation and low allowances, and exhorting me to do something for their relief. Such letters have been occasionally circulated since our first conquests from Mysore in 1792. I do not notice them now from any belief that they are likely at present to shake the fidelity of our sepoys, but in order to show the motives by which they will probably be instigated to sedition, whenever their characters shall be changed. But though I consider that the danger is still very distant, I think that we cannot be too early in taking measures to avoid it; and I trust that the Honourable the Court of Directors will view the question of the press in India as one of the most important that ever came before them, and the establishment of such an engine, unless under the most absolute control of their Government, as dangerous in the highest degree to the existence of the British power in this country.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

The same motive which guided me to insert in the body of the work the preceding paper, induces me to give, equally at length, the following on the subject of conversion. It will be read by all parties with the deepest interest; and I am greatly mistaken if, to the minds of the moderate, it carry not absolute conviction. It is to be observed, that to the work of conversion, however zealously carried on, Sir Thomas Munro was no enemy; to the interference of official persons he alone objected, for reasons which he has himself stated at too much length to render any observations on my part necessary.

MINUTE.

15th November, 1822.

HAD I been at the Presidency when the correspondence between the collector and sub-collector of Bellary, regarding the conversion of the natives, was received, I should have lost no time

in recording my sentiments upon it. I perused the papers when on my late circuit; and having again carefully examined them since my return, I am sorry to say that I think it will be advisable to employ Mr. — in some other way than his present situation.

Mr. — transmitted a report, dated the 15th of June, upon the settlement of his district, to Mr. Campbell, the collector. Every thing in this report is highly commendable, excepting those passages in which he speaks of the character of the natives, and of his having distributed books among them. He evinces strong prejudice against them, and deploras the ignorance of the rayets, and their uncouth speech, which he observes must for ever prevent direct communication between them and the European authorities. He speaks as if these defects were peculiar to India, and as if all the farmers and labourers of England were well educated, and spoke a pure dialect. He says that the natives received readily the books which he had brought for distribution; from which he infers that they are not insensible to the advantages of knowledge. He observes, that a public schoolmaster is nowhere a corporate village officer, and that this must have arisen from priestcraft, being jealous of the propagation of knowledge among the people. I see no reason to impute the schoolmaster's not being a corporate officer to priestcraft. There is no restriction upon schools; they are left to the fancy of the people, and every village may have as many as it pleases.

Mr. Campbell was directed to acquaint Mr. —, that he was not to interfere with native schools, and to call upon him to state what were the books which he had distributed. Mr. Campbell, in forwarding Mr. —'s reply to this communication, observes, that he has not confined himself to the information required, but has indulged "himself in a formal and most unprovoked attack upon the religion of the people;" and "has placed upon record, within the reach of many of them, sentiments highly offensive to their tenderest prejudices."

Mr. — says, that the books distributed were Canarese versions of parts of the New Testament, and of tracts in the same language, on moral and religious subjects. They were distributed to the reddies (potails), curnums, merchants, and rayets with whom he had intercourse; a few were also distributed among the servants of his own and the district cutcherries; sometimes, he observes, they were sought with a degree of eagerness. "They were never pressed on those who received them." His own

cutcherry certainly promoted rather than discouraged the distribution of them. He then proceeds to state with seriousness his former doubts on certain points of faith, his subsequent conversion, and his exposition of various texts. He ought to know that these are matters which do not belong to a cutcherry, and that they concern only himself, and ought not to enter into the official correspondence of revenue officers. He says, it did not appear to him that the circulation of books, in the mode which he adopted, militated, in the smallest degree, either against the letter or the spirit of the orders of the Government; that he employed no official influence, no coercive, no compulsory measures; that he usually explained, in a few words, the general nature of the contents of the books; that he left the acceptance of them to the people themselves, and that they were sometimes sought with eagerness. He requests to know "how far the Government wish that public servants should contribute their endeavours to the diffusion of general, moral, and religious instruction among the natives." He says, that "in any thing affecting his situation, he would not deliberately do what the collector disapproved; that he thought himself at liberty to use his discretion in distributing books; and that he has not yet seen any thing to lead him to suppose, that so long as obnoxious interference with the religious opinions and practices of the natives is carefully avoided, the Government would wish to restrict him in its exercise;" and he concludes by earnestly desiring that his observations, together with the appendix containing the passages in Scripture to which they refer, may be recorded.

It is sufficiently manifest from Mr. —'s own plain and candid statement, that his zeal disqualifies him from judging calmly either of the nature of his own interference or of its probable consequences. I agree entirely with the collector, "that he cannot, while he holds his appointment, divest himself of strong official influence;" and that to obtrude his opinions on "his public servants, or on the reddyies, curnums, merchants, and rayets assembled around him on official business, was manifestly converting his official character into that of a missionary."

Mr. —, in fact, did all that a missionary could have done: he employed his own and the district cutcherries in the work; and he himself both distributed and explained. If he had been a missionary, what more could he have done? He could not have done so much. He could not have assembled the inhabitants, or employed the cutcherries in distributing moral and religious

tracts. No person could have done this but a civil servant, and in Harpenhilly and Bellary, none could have done it but him; yet he cannot in this discover official interference. He did not, it is true, use any direct compulsion; that would most probably have caused an explosion, which would instantly have roused him from his delusion. But he did, and will continue to use, unknown to himself, something very like compulsion,—open interference, official agency, the hope of favours, the fear of displeasure. The people, he says, “could have no difficulty in distinguishing between a matter of authority and of option.” There can be no real freedom of choice, where official authority is interested deeply and exerted openly. A very few of the people might possibly have distinguished between authority and option; but the great body of them would have been more likely to believe that he acted by authority, and that what he was then doing was only preparatory to some general measure of conversion.

Mr. — promises to be guided by the orders of Government, in his conduct to the natives; but I fear that he is too much under the dominion of his own fancies to be controlled by any legitimate authority. He has already shown, by his declining compliance with the directions of his immediate superior, Mr. Campbell, how little he regards subordination, when opposed to what he believes to be his higher duties. He appeals to Government; and while he professes his readiness to conform to their decision, he desires that his opinions regarding the natives may stand or fall, “according as they are supported or contradicted by the Word of God,” as contained in certain passages of Scripture forming the Appendix to his letter. This is an extraordinary kind of appeal. He employs his official authority for missionary purposes; and when he is told by his superior that he is wrong, he justifies his acts by quotations from Scripture, and by election, a doctrine which has occasioned so much controversy; and he leaves it to be inferred, that Government must either adopt his views, or act contrary to divine authority. A person who can, as a sub-collector and magistrate, bring forward such matters for discussion, and seriously desire that they may be placed on record, and examined by Government, is not in a frame of mind to be restrained within the proper limits of his duty, by any official rules.

It was never intended to employ collectors and magistrates as teachers of morality and religion; and of course no rules have been framed for their guidance in such pursuits. Every man who

has common sense, knows that they are contrary to his duty, and that no safe rule can be laid down but by absolute prohibition. We cannot allow Mr. —, or any other public officer, to act as a missionary, merely because he supposes that he abstains from "obnoxious interference." Every man has a different opinion regarding the obnoxious limits, and each would fix them differently, according to the standard of his own zeal.

It is the declared intention both of the Legislature and of the Honourable the Court of Directors, that the people of India should be permitted to enjoy their ancient laws and institutions, and should be protected against the interference of public officers with their religion. This system is the wisest that could be adopted, whether with regard to the tranquillity of the country, the security of the revenue, or the improvement or conversion of the natives. Mr. —'s is the worst. It is dangerous to the peace of the country and the prosperity of the revenue, and is even, as a measure of conversion, calculated to defeat his own designs. If I were asked, if there would be any danger from leaving him at Bellary, I could not positively affirm that there would—there might or might not; but if any mischief arose, it would be no excuse for us to say, that it was so unlikely, that it could not have been expected; for we had ample warning, and ought to have provided against it.

In every country, but especially in this, where the rulers are so few, and of a different race from the people, it is the most dangerous of all things to tamper with religious feelings: they may be apparently dormant; and when we are in unsuspecting security, they may burst forth in the most tremendous manner, as at Vellore: they may be set in motion by the slightest casual incident, and do more mischief in one year, than all the labours of missionary collectors would repair in a hundred. Should they produce only a partial disturbance, which is quickly put down, even in this case the evil would be lasting; distrust would be raised between the people and the Government, which would never entirely subside, and the district in which it happened would never be so safe as before. The agency of collectors and magistrates, as religious instructors, can effect no possible good. It may for a moment raise the hopes of a few sanguine men; but it will end in disturbance and failure, and, instead of forwarding, will greatly retard, every chance of ultimate success.

But besides these evils, it would also tend to produce an injurious effect on the administration of the revenue. Designing

men of bad characters would soon surround the collector, and would, by encouraging his hopes, and appearing to enter warmly into his views, soon supplant the more able and less pliant servants of his cutcherry. They would gradually contrive to fill up every subordinate office with their adherents, whom they reported to be favourable to the cause of conversion; and the revenue, between the incapacity and dishonesty of such men, would be diminished both by mismanagement and embezzlement.

The employment by the collector of men as his confidential servants, merely on account of their supporting his plans of conversion, would create suspicion and discontent among the inhabitants; and this spirit might easily be excited to acts of outrage, either by men who were alarmed for their religion, or by men who had no fears for it, but were actuated solely by the hope of forcing the revenue servants out of office, and succeeding them.

It is evident enough from Mr. ——'s own statement of the eagerness with which the books were sought by the rayets and other inhabitants, how ready he is to believe what he wishes, and how well prepared to be deceived by designing natives. He considers the acceptance of the books by the natives, who probably took them merely to flatter him, or to avoid giving him offence, as signs of an impression made on their minds. He never seems to have asked himself why he should have been so much more successful than the regular missionaries: had he been a private individual, his eyes would have been opened.

If we authorize one sub-collector to act as a missionary, or in aid of conversion, we must authorize all. If we find it difficult to keep them within the line of their civil duties, how could we possibly in those of a religious nature restrain them by any rule? How could we control them in distant provinces? The remoteness of their situations, and their solitude among the natives, would naturally tend to increase their enthusiasm, and every one would have a different opinion, and act differently from another, according as his imagination was more or less heated.

The best way for a collector to instruct the natives, is to set them an example in his own conduct; to try to settle their disputes with each other, and to prevent their going to law; to bear patiently all their complaints against himself and his servants, and bad seasons, and to afford them all the relief in his power; and if he can do nothing more, to give them at least good words.

Whatever change it may be desirable to produce upon the character of the natives, may be effected by much safer and surer

means than official interference with their religion. Regular missionaries are sent out by the Honourable the Court of Directors, and by different European Governments. These men visit every part of the country, and pursue their labours without the smallest hindrance; and as they have no power, they are well received every where. In order to dispose the natives to receive our instruction and to adopt our opinions, we must first gain their attachment and confidence, and this can only be accomplished by a pure administration of justice, by moderate assessment, respect for their customs, and general good government.

I have said more on this subject than it may at first sight appear to require; but though it has been brought forward by the conduct of a single individual, it is a question of the most important concern to the welfare of the people and security of the state, and deserves the most serious consideration. I am fully convinced that official interference with the religion of the natives will deteriorate the revenue, and excite discontent and disturbance, and that it will eventually defeat the attainment of the very object for which it is designed. I am also satisfied, that to permit the continuance of such interference would be to hazard the safety of our dominions, for the sake of supporting the experiments of a few visionary men. I recommend that it be prohibited.

I regret extremely that it should be necessary to pass any censure upon Mr. ——. I selected him for his present situation from having had an opportunity of seeing, when he was employed here, that his assiduity and knowledge of the native languages, rendered him well qualified for the office of sub-collector. I trust that he may still be usefully employed in the public service, in other quarters; but he has put it out of the power of Government to let him remain at Bellary. He was not satisfied with confining his attack upon the religion of the natives to a private communication to the collector, but he has, by placing it upon record, made it public. To continue him now would be to sanction his conduct, and to proclaim the design of Government to support it. No declaration,—nothing but his removal, can effectually do away this impression among the people.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Whilst thus keenly alive to the prosperity of the civil part of the community, Sir Thomas Munro was not less attentive

to the true interests and permanent welfare of the Indian army. It was his firm opinion, that such a force ought always to be maintained, as should not only suffice for the preservation of order within our own territories, but enable the Government to keep constantly on the frontier an organized, and as it were a disposable corps. Thither, every battalion in the service ought, in its turn, to be sent, by which means all would acquire a knowledge of field-duty; whilst the utmost attention should be shown to the establishment of bazaars, without which an Indian army is at all times inefficient. To the absence of these, indeed, he attributed the extreme length of our early campaigns, and the meagre results to which they led; and he showed that, in exact proportion as the bazaars increased in efficiency, our wars became less tedious and more successful.

Again, an idea had long prevailed, and it was expressed in Council soon after his arrival, that the Native battalions in general, but more especially the artillery and golandauze corps, stood in need of an increased proportion of European officers to render them efficient. Sir Thomas Munro strongly objected to the measure; first, because he was confident that it would not add to the value of the Native troops; and, secondly, because whilst it greatly increased the expense to Government, it must necessarily interfere, in a serious degree, with the promotion of officers themselves. He held that one European officer present with each company, was all that could be required; inasmuch as the interior details are carried on far more accurately by Native officers, than they could be by Englishmen. As to the fact that some regiments were commanded by majors and some by captains, he looked upon it as no real evil, because a captain of fifteen or twenty years' standing must have served to very little purpose, if he be not adequate to a higher charge than that of a company.

It was customary then, and may perhaps be customary now, so far to distrust the fidelity of the sepoy, that there was an indisposition to keep together in cantonments two or

more native battalions, without intermixing with them a corps of Europeans. Sir Thomas Munro utterly condemned the notion: he contended that the plan had totally failed at Vellore, the only point where its effects were ever put to the test, and that it must fail again under similar circumstances. Nay more, he justly argued that the measure had a tendency to lead to the very result which it was the object of such as acted upon it to prevent; because, by exciting in the minds of the natives a suspicion that confidence was not reposed in them, it led them to inquire somewhat too freely into the probable reasons of distrust. His principle therefore was, that no more effectual plan of securing the fidelity of the sepoys could be devised, than by leading them to believe, that it could not for a moment be doubted; and by teaching them that their own interests were intimately connected with the continuance of the Government under which they served. With this view, he advised that the soldiers be well paid and well treated; that no battalion be permitted to remain too long in one place; but that all be periodically brought back to the provinces or districts from which they had been respectively recruited. By this means, time would not be given for the formation of dangerous connexions abroad; and a constant renewal of domestic ties would cause them to shrink from the idea of a convulsion by which they must inevitably be broken.

The same care which extended itself to the wants of the soldiers themselves, was applied to the remedy of evils arising out of the imprudent marriages which that class of men are too apt to contract. There was an old regulation, which granted to the wife of every European, brought by him to India, a certain allowance for her maintenance whilst her husband was employed in the field. It was either found not to be sufficient, or the example of the other Presidency induced the Commander-in-Chief at Madras to apply for an increase of such allowance, and an extension of the benefit to soldiers' children. Though disapproving totally of the principle from which the arrangement proceeded, Sir Thomas Munro was

too just and too sagacious not to perceive, that the troops in the different Presidencies should, as far as practicable, be placed on the same footing ; he therefore gave his sanction to the proposed increase ; but against every attempt to extend the benefit of the practice to native women and half-caste children, he resolutely opposed himself. This he did on the fair and legitimate ground, that such a regulation would entail an incalculable expense upon the Company, whilst it acted as an encouragement to the increase of a race already too numerous. Towards the half-castes themselves he was by no means disposed to behave with harshness ; on the contrary, he considered them entitled to such treatment as their peculiar circumstances called for ; but he esteemed it both an unwise and an extravagant notion, that they ought to be taken in any manner under the protection of the State.*

Such is a summary, if I may so speak, of the grand leading principles of Sir Thomas Munro's government ; by which, whilst he strove zealously to advance the interests of those for whom he acted, he laboured with no less earnestness to promote the happiness and increase the prosperity of all classes of their subjects. With respect to the system of internal administration carried on in the provinces, it corresponded, as nearly as circumstances would permit, with the plan drawn up at the suggestion of the Commission of which he had formerly been at the head. Whatever his own wishes might have been, he did not consider himself authorized to depart, in the slightest degree, from the rules there laid down ; and hence he continued both the revenue and judicial systems of his predecessors, modified as these were by the sanction of the Court of Directors. His conduct, moreover, was on every occasion marked by the very extreme of good feeling and correct judgment. Firm and inflexible in the pursuit of what he felt to be right, he nevertheless contrived, by the suavity of his manner and the conciliatory tone of his language, to gratify even those whose sentiments differed from his own ;

* There is given in the APPENDIX an extract from one of his Minutes on these subjects.

till, strange to say, the jealousy which had attended him in every inferior station, disappeared on his attaining to the highest.

I subjoin here, though somewhat prematurely, a minute on the general state of the country, which he drew up some time after his arrival; because it contains an exposition of the views and sentiments of the writer on subjects of all others the most important to the welfare of the Indian empire.

ON THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE CONDITION
OF THE PEOPLE.

31st December, 1824.

WE are now masters of a very extensive empire, and we should endeavour to secure and improve it by a good internal administration. Our experience is too short to judge what rules are best calculated for this purpose. It is only within the last thirty years that we have here begun to acquire any practical knowledge; a longer period must probably elapse before we can ascertain what is best. Such a period is as nothing in the existence of a people; but we act as if this were as limited as the life of an individual.

We proceed, in a country of which we know little or nothing, as if we knew every thing, and as if every thing must be done now, and nothing could be done hereafter. We feel our ignorance of Indian revenue, and the difficulties arising from it; and instead of seeking to remedy it by acquiring more knowledge, we endeavour to get rid of the difficulty by precipitately making permanent settlements, which relieve us from the troublesome task of minute or accurate investigation, and which are better adapted to perpetuate our ignorance than to protect the people.

We must not be led away by fanciful theories founded on European models, which will inevitably end in disappointment. We must not too hastily declare any rights permanent, lest we give to one class what belongs to another. We must proceed patiently, and as our knowledge of the manners and customs of the people and the nature and resources of the country increases, frame gradually from the existing institutions such a system as may advance the prosperity of the country, and be satisfactory to the people. The knowledge most necessary for this end is that of the landed property and its assessment, for the land is not only the great source of the public revenue, but on its fair and moderate assessment depend, the comfort and happiness of the people.

Opinions respecting the ancient state of landed property in India are various, in consequence of our ignorance of it. The knowledge of it is however only useful in so far as it may serve to throw light on its present state, and to aid us in finding the way for improving it. There is no reason to suppose that private landed property ever, at any one time, existed upon the same footing over the greater part of India. From Pulicat to Ganjam, in the Ceded Districts, the Baramahl and Coimbatore, it seems to have been always, as now, little known, except as enam from the sovereign. Along the Malabar coast, and above the western Ghauts, from Soondah to Wynaud, it seems to have existed from a remote period as now almost universally, and in the Carnatic, Tanjore, and Madura. In all these provinces it is important to recollect, that when they first fell under the British dominion, the land, whether private property or Circar, was held in small portions by a great body of petty owners immediately of the princes, the Poligars of the south. The modern Zemindars of the northern Circars, whom the Company allowed to retain the districts which they had rented or managed under their native sovereign, and the old Hill Rajahs of that country, form no exemption, as they were, in fact, petty princes, in whose districts the land was in the hands of small occupants, as in those of the Circar. Unless we know in what manner the land of a province is occupied, we can form no just opinion as to how its internal administration should be regulated. In the Carnatic and the southern provinces, where the meeras, or private landed property, as described by Mr. Ellis, prevails, the land, as in other provinces, is distributed in small properties of from five to ten acres to one or two thousand acres. It may be proper to inquire a little into the Meerassée system of the Carnatic, in order to ascertain whether it possesses any such inherent advantages as should render it desirable to uphold the common tenure, where it still exists; or whether the change of common into separate tenure, which has been going on from a period beyond our knowledge, is not rather an improvement which ought to be encouraged.

The Board of Revenue seem to have considered the Meerassadars of the village as the persons to whom the lands of the village were granted on its original settlement. They say that on the original establishment of every Tamul village, the hereditary right to all the lands was vested in all the occupants. They speak of this original settlement as a thing that was perfectly certain. But all this is assumed without the least proof,

and is altogether incredible. The account given by Mr. Ellis is not more satisfactory. He supposes that the Carnatic was chiefly a forest until Adawla Chuckraweti, sovereign of Canara, whose capital was Banawassi, settled three hundred thousand colonists, of whom one fifth were Vellallers, in Tondamundalum. This is evidently fabulous. No prince ever planted such a colony: no country could have supplied the drain. The number of deaths from casualties in such an undertaking would have been as great as that of the surviving colonists. New settlers brought from Canara and Banawassi would die very fast in the Carnatic, even now, when it is cleared. We are not told how three hundred thousand colonists were to maintain themselves among jungles to be cleared away; when we know that, even at this day, such a population could not be maintained without the aid of numerous tanks and water-courses for the cultivation of the lands, which would be otherwise very unproductive.

It is much more likely that the Meerassee tenure with all its incidents, as described by Mr. Ellis, was the gradual growth of a country long peopled and cultivated, than that it was created at once by a grant to a particular tribe of Hindoo cultivators, Vellallers, on their first settling in Arcot, and that province was then an uncultivated forest. It probably originated in local circumstances, and perhaps more in the great number of tanks and water-courses constructed at the public expense, than in any other. As the Circar could be reimbursed for the expenditure upon these works only by the regular cultivation of the lands for which he had provided water, he might have thought it advisable to grant the occupants certain privileges, to enable them to keep up the cultivation as high as possible. A moderate rent, and a hereditary right in the soil, were two of the most obvious means of effecting this object. The joint or Somadayem tenure, by which all the Meerassadars hold all the lands of the village in common, interchangeable at stated periods, probably arose out of the same view of keeping up the cultivation; for, as in unfavourable seasons a portion of the lands could not be fully watered, it is evident that the Meerassadars who held this land, unless there were a periodical interchange, would be worse off and less able than the others to pay their rent regularly.

The great distinction between the wet lands of Malabar and Arcot is, that in Malabar the cultivation of them depends entirely on the falling rains; while in Arcot it depends chiefly on tanks, and other artificial sources of irrigation, constructed at

the expense of Government. In Malabar, the cultivator of wet lands is not at all dependent on the aid of Government : in Arcot, he can do nothing without it. In Malabar, therefore, the cultivator trusts to the seasons and to his own industry for success ; and he can with confidence venture to employ all his savings in the improvement of his land. As Government furnishes him with no water, and bears no share of the expense of the improvements, it has no fair claim to any additional rent on account of it ; and has, in fact, not made it to any great extent ; and hence he has been enabled to render his land a valuable private property, saleable at all times, and transferable at will. In Arcot, the nature of Meerassee hereditary landed property is very different, and is much less perfect ; because being dependent on the Government for its supply of water, and being, in fact, held in partnership with the Government, it does not hold out the same inducement to undertake improvement : and hence the land in general is but indifferently cultivated, and though it is nominally saleable, it will seldom fetch any price in the market. In Malabar, where the falling rain during five or six months supplies all the water of cultivation, the proprietor can lay out his money with safety on his land ; for he knows that he cannot be disappointed while the order of the seasons continues as it is. But in Arcot the proprietor has no such certainty : he is not even sure that he can keep his lands in their present condition ; for, unless Government keep the tanks in repair, this cannot be done. It may often happen that he cannot improve without a larger supply of water, and that this cannot be obtained without enlarging the tank or water-course, which Government may think too expensive ; and it may sometimes happen that the bursting of the tank may render his land for ever unfit for cultivation, because the tank may be allowed to go to decay, from its being found that the revenue of all the land watered by it would not defray the expense of repairing it. There are tanks in the country whose lands would not yield five or even four per cent. of the necessary repairs.

The Native Chiefs were fond of building tanks, as good works, or as the means of transmitting their names to posterity ; and as they frequently erected them at an expense far beyond what the land could yield any adequate return for, when they were broken down by floods, their successors did not always think it advisable to repair them ; and hence the land formerly watered by them was necessarily either left waste or cultivated with dry grain, not

yielding more than from one-fifth to one-tenth of the rice crop. In many parts of Arcot the soil is so poor and sandy, that it will not pay the expense of cultivation unless it be watered. It is evident, therefore, that when Government provides the water, which is the principal part of the expense of cultivation, it becomes a partner with the owner, and has a claim upon him for a fair return for this expense, and that he can never have the same share of the produce as the owner of rice land in Malabar, who bears himself the whole expense of cultivation. From these causes it happens, that in Arcot, and still more in districts where the soil is richer, the most substantial Rayets are found engaged, not in the cultivation of the wet land, where Government supplies the water, but in that of the dry, where they can improve without the aid of Government, and derive the exclusive benefit of every improvement.

It has been maintained by some, that in Arcot and other Tamul countries, the Meerassadar of wet land is bound to pay rent only for what he does cultivate: that if he leave it all uncultivated, Government have no demand on him for rent; and that if Government send another person to cultivate this land, the Meerassadar has a right to exact from this person the landlord's share or rent. If such a right existed anywhere, we might have expected to find it in Malabar and Canara, where private landed property is more perfect than in Arcot, and where Government bears no part of the expense of cultivation. But in those provinces there is no such right, and the landlord is liable for the whole fixed rent of his land, whether he cultivate it or not; and if he fail to pay the rent, his property is liable to distraint and his land to be sold. There does not seem to be any proof of the existence of such a right in Arcot. The belief of it appears to have arisen from confounding the tenant of the Meerassadar with that of the Government. The Meerassadar may undoubtedly make such terms as he pleases with his own tenant; but when he can neither cultivate the land himself nor find a tenant, and Government provides one, he has no claim for rent upon this tenant of Government.

It may at first sight appear to be hard that he should not be entitled to rent for his own land: but it is to be recollected that he has failed to pay the public assessment, and that in such cases the land of the proprietor is, in other countries as well as in this, liable to sale, and that the Meerassadar has still the privilege for a long, though not clearly defined, term of years, of recovering

his land from the Government tenant, on consenting to pay the rent.

The right of the Meerassadar to derive a rent from land for which he neither pays the public revenue nor finds a tenant, is certainly not acknowledged now, and probably never was so at any former time. Government, by the construction of tanks and water-courses in Arcot, supply the water, which is the chief article in the expense of wet cultivation, and has a right to see that the lands, on account of which it has incurred so heavy a charge, are not without necessity left uncultivated, or exempted from their share of the public burdens.

In many parts of Arcot, as has already been remarked, the soil is so poor that, previously to its being watered and converted into rice land, it would not have defrayed the expense of cultivation, and must have lain waste.

In general, the produce of wet is to that of dry land as five to one at least; if, therefore, we suppose that certain Meerassadars possessed a piece of land which under dry cultivation yielded two thousand rupees of annual revenue to Government, it would, after being converted into wet or rice land, yield ten thousand rupees: but the tank which would be required in order to supply the water, would probably cost Government a lac of rupees. The additional revenue, therefore, which Government would derive from this work would be eight thousand rupees per annum, which, making allowance for occasional repairs, would not be more than five or six per cent. for its money: and it would be much less, if we suppose that the Meerassadars, when they did not choose to cultivate, were not liable for the revenue. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Government, where it sunk so large a capital, would expect an adequate return; and as this could only be obtained by the regular payment of the revenue, it would not grant to the Meerassadars a privilege which would defeat this object, but would follow the custom which we find at present established, of transferring the land to other tenants when they failed to pay the rent.

If the Meerassadars, without cultivating themselves or finding tenants to cultivate, had been allowed to levy from the Government tenants a *swamy bhogum*, or landlord's share, of ten to fifteen per cent. they would, without any liability for the public revenue, and without any expense, have derived, by means of a tank constructed at the sole charge of Government, an income from the land four or five times greater than before. No private per-

son would make a tank on such terms; and while there is no proof to the contrary, we cannot suppose that any Government would have done so either.

It appears from the reports regarding the Poonah territories, that the Meerassadar of the Deccan, where meeras exists, is answerable for the revenue whether the land be cultivated or fallow. That if he decline to cultivate or pay his rent, he may be compelled to give in a written deed of renunciation. That the right of Government to dispose of the land after a long absence of the Meerassadar is not disputed. That the Meerassadar gets back his land when his absence has not been long, and when it has been given in temporary lease to another person, but not after a long absence, and its having been granted in meeras to another; and that though he is supposed to have a right, even for a century, to reclaim his land, usage does not allow so long a period. These rules differ very little from those of Malabar and Canara, respecting private landed property; and if ever it was the custom to exempt the Meerassadar of Arcot from rent when he left his land uncultivated, it was a custom different both from that of other provinces, and from that which has long prevailed in Arcot itself. There is one case, and a very common one in Arcot, in which no demand can be made upon the Meerassadar when the land is left uncultivated: it is when it cannot be cultivated in consequence of a want of water.

The waste in meeras villages in Arcot is supposed by Mr. Ellis to belong to the Meerassadars jointly; and he supports his opinion by documents, showing that when a Meerassadar sells his cultivated lands, he transfers by the same deed to the purchaser his right in the produce of the waste, the quarries, mines, fisheries, &c. within the limits of the village. But this appears to be a mere technical form, which can give no actual proprietary right in the waste. It is used in villages where there is no waste as well as where there is, and may be used where there is no meeras. It confers a right, but not the right of ownership, to the pasture of the waste lands, and the fishery of the tanks and nullahs in common with the other Meerassadars of the village. The same right exists everywhere. In those parts of the Deccan where meeras is unknown, the Rayets of every village reserve the fishery and pasture to themselves, and drive away the cattle of strangers, and derive just as much benefit from the waste as those of meeras villages. Such a right seems to be a natural one everywhere, and it is accordingly assumed by the Rayets of every

village, without its being supposed that any formal grant is necessary for the purpose. Mr. Ellis does not seem to be very decided as to the nature of the property enjoyed by the Meerasadar in waste. He admits that he cannot break it up without the permission of the Circar. He does not say that he has any specific share of it, or that he can sell it alone without the cultivated lands, or that he can do more than sell with his arable his right of common in the waste. The Circar from ancient times has everywhere, even in Arcot, as well as in other provinces, granted waste in enam, free of every rent or claim, public or private, and appears in all such grants to have considered the waste as being exclusively its own property. It may be objected, that if this were the case it may give away the whole waste lands of a village, and injure the inhabitants by depriving them of their pastures. It certainly might give away the whole; but whether the exercise of this right would be injurious to the inhabitants, would depend on circumstances. If the lands, according to the general custom of the country, were left uninclosed, there would be no injury, as the cattle of the village would graze on them whenever the crops were off the ground. If the lands were enclosed, the inhabitants would be no worse off than those of many other villages, whose lands are entirely cultivated and enclosed, and who are, in consequence, often obliged to send their cattle during the dry season to graze in distant jungles, and to incur a trifling expense for the wages of the herdsman, and the tax on pasturage. This expense, even where greatest, could never have affected the right of the Circar to dispose of the waste, though it might probably have induced it to compensate the Meerassadar inhabitants for their loss, by some reduction in the assessment of their arable lands.

It has been supposed that in meeras villages in Arcot, in the original compact between the Circar and the first settlers, the exclusive use of the waste was secured to those settlers; but it has already been shown that in all villages, whether meeras or not, the inhabitants reserve to themselves the exclusive use of the waste. But this right is good only against strangers, not against the Circar, which possesses, I think, by the usage of the country, the absolute right of disposing of the waste as it pleases, in villages which are meeras as well as in those which are not. In the Deccan, in meeras villages, the corporation has not the right of disposing of unoccupied land, but the Circar has.

All the lands of Arcot were at one time held, according to Mr.

Ellis, under the joint or somadayem tenure. This tenure has been much praised by some revenue authorities, and its breaking up into the separate individual or palabhogum tenure, has been regarded as a calamity to the country. The happy state of the natives in the joint tenure villages is not supported by the fact of most of them having long since adopted the separate tenure.

When this change took place is not exactly known ; but it was probably the gradual work of time, long before the Company's government. It appears in some places to have occurred at a very early period ; for in many villages, but especially in those south of the Coleroon, the Meerassadars, instead of dividing the cultivated lands periodically, according to the shares held by each, appear, after having once divided them in that manner, to have declared the division permanent. Such a change is the natural course of things, and must always precede every material improvement, and is only restrained from becoming general by over assessment, or by difficulties regarding water. If one part of the lands of a village has advantages over the other in these respects, the common tenure will be acceptable to the proprietors, by giving to all, in their turn, the benefit of the favoured land ; but where the advantages of the several lots of land are nearly equal, the occupants will in general wish to keep their own permanently, because no man ever labours with the same spirit to improve what he is to share with another, as what he is to retain exclusively for himself. The common tenure has existed in many nations, but usually in the rude and early stages of agriculture, and has always, I believe, been considered as hostile to improvement. I do not know that there is any cause to suppose that its effect has not been the same in India as in other countries, for the same substantial Rayets are seldom found in villages where this tenure exists, as in those where the individual tenure prevails. The common tenure is well suited to a country whose Meerassadar Rayets are poor, and whose Government look always to its present wants, and little to futurity ; because as the village community is bound to make good all deficiencies of its members, and to cultivate and pay the rent of all the arable land for which there is water, Government by this means draws as much revenue from the country as is possible under its then actual condition.

The system of paying in kind a share of the produce as the Government rent, is also well adapted to the same state of things, because Government is always sure of obtaining half of the pro-

duce, or whatever its share may be, from the Rayet, whether the crop be scanty or abundant, and because the Rayet is also sure of not being called on for rent when the crop has entirely failed, and he is, perhaps, unable to pay. Such a system is better calculated to save the Rayet from being oppressed by demands which he cannot pay, than to enable him to become wealthy.

This protection to the Rayet from the payment of revenue in a season of calamity, is the only advantage which appears to belong to the system; but it is an advantage which could be necessary only under a rigid system, and would not be wanted under a more liberal one of assessment. The very existence of such a system in Arcot and other districts, where it is most prevalent, is a proof that, however light Indian revenue may be in the theories of Indian writers, in practice it has always been heavy. Had the public assessment, as pretended, ever been, as in the books of their sages, only a sixth or a fifth, or even only a fourth of the gross produce, the payment of a fixed share in kind, and all the expensive machinery requisite for its supervision, never could have been wanted. The simple plan of a money assessment might have been at once resorted to, in the full confidence that the revenue would every year, in good or bad seasons, be easily and punctually paid. No person who knows any thing of India revenue can believe that the Rayet, if his fixed assessment were only a fifth or a fourth of the gross produce, would not every year, whether the season were good or bad, pay it without difficulty; and not only do this, but prosper under it beyond what he has ever done at any former period. Had such a moderate assessment ever been established, it would undoubtedly have been paid in money, because there would have been no reason for continuing the expensive process of making collections in kind. It was because the assessment was not moderate, that assessments in kind were introduced or continued; for a money rent equivalent to the amount could not have been realized one year with another. The Hindoo Governments seem to have often wished that land should be both an hereditary and a saleable property; but they could not bring themselves to adopt the only practicable mode of effecting it, a low assessment. It is however supposed by the Board of Revenue, that it was low. The simple fact of its having been paid in kind is sufficient, were there nothing else to disprove this opinion. The Board say that the Mahomedan exactions converted the Hindoo tax into a land rent, reduced the landlord to a land occupant, who ceased to employ

tenants, and restricted himself to such land as he could cultivate with his own servants, and then Government transferred the vacant land to strangers temporarily, and more often permanently. But there is no proof whatever of this former state of light assessment, of the time when it existed, or when the change began, or when it reached its present standard. It is somewhat singular, that the Board of Revenue, though they consider a light assessment, and the payment in kind of a fixed share of the crop, as fundamental parts of the old Indian revenue system, yet in their conjectures as to the origin of the custom of the revenue, of wet land being demandable in kind, they never once think of ascribing it to any cause tending to favour the Rayet, but only to those causes which tend to secure a high revenue. They say, the fluctuation in the produce, in the value of the produce, the desire to obtain the utmost possible revenue in times of high price, a knowledge of the fluctuation in the value of the precious metals, the impossibility of otherwise obtaining so large a proportion of the gross produce as fifty per cent. may all, or in part, have perpetuated the custom of receiving in kind the revenue demandable from rice lands. I never could discover the least foundation for the assumption, that the Hindoo assessment had been raised by the Mahomedan conquest, or for believing that the assessment which we now find did not exist before that period. We find the assessment as high in the territories of Hindoo as of Mahomedan chiefs. This cannot have been owing to the progress of the Mahomedan arms, because over many of the petty states they never established more than a nominal dominion, nor ever assumed the management of their revenues. Among the chieftains of the Northern Circars descended from the ancient sovereigns of Orissa, and who have for ages been in a great measure independent, as well as among many of the Rajahs of the upper and lower Carnatic, descended from the sovereigns of Vijeanuggur or their deputies, and who also since the fall of that empire have in a great degree been independent, we find the same rate of assessment, amounting usually to about one half, and fluctuating according to the soil from two fifths to three fifths of the gross produce, with little variation except that in some places it is paid in kind, and in others in money. It cannot be maintained that the demands of the Mahomedan conquerors may have compelled these chiefs to introduce a new and higher rate of assessment, because the peshcush imposed upon them by the Mahomedans was trifling, was often

withheld, and was generally less than they had paid to their own princes. The few imperfect records which have reached us of the revenues of Vijeanuggur, the last of the great Hindoo powers, do not show that the assessment was lighter under that Government than under its Mahomedan successors. If, then, there ever did in any age prevail throughout India a moderate land-tax, its loss must be attributed to some other cause than that of Mahomedan invasion. After the time of the first fanatical conquerors, many of the Mahomedan princes seem to have been more enlightened, and as much disposed to be moderate as the former Hindoo rulers. Among these were the Emperor Akbar Mullk Aubar, and other princes, by whom great and systematic reforms were introduced. There is, however, no ground, either from tradition or from record, or from the present state of the country, for believing that a moderate land-tax was ever at any time throughout India the general principle of its revenue system. It is much more likely that a variety of systems have always prevailed in different provinces at the same time, some more, some less favourable to the people, some admitting of private landed property, some rejecting it; that in the same province different systems have predominated at different times; and that the system of all land being the property of the Circar has sometimes succeeded that of private landed property, and sometimes given way to it. At Vijeanuggur, the seat of the last great Hindoo government, and in the countries immediately around it, where, according to the theory of private landed property having been the ancient Hindoo system until destroyed by foreign invasion, we might naturally hope to see it in its greatest perfection, we find no trace or record of its having ever existed. In the countries in the Peninsula it is most perfect in Canara, which was long, and in Malabar, which was a considerable time, under a Mahomedan government.

Next to these provinces it is most complete in Travancore, which never was subdued by that power. In Arcot and Tanjore it is less valuable than in Travancore, and in Madura and Tinnevelly still less so than in Arcot. In a narrow stripe of country along the eastern side of the Western Ghauts, from the south of Mysore to Sattarah, it is found nearly in the same state as in the adjoining districts below the Ghauts. With the exception of this narrow slip, it is unknown in Mysore, in the Southern Mahrattah country, in the Ceded Districts, and in the Northern Circars. It is unknown in Bijapoor; it is found farther north at Sholapoor,

on the same footing as at Sattarah ; but again disappears to the eastward, on the Nizam's frontier. In Sattarah the proportion of Meerassadars to other occupants of the land is two to one ; in Poonah, three to one ; and in Ahmednuggur, about equal. In Khandeis there are very few Meerassadars, and it is thought by the collector, Captain Briggs, that meeras has generally ceased in that province since its conquest by the Mahomedans, in 1306.

But Mr. Chaplin thinks that there is no proof that it existed antecedent to the Mahomedan conquest. The Meeras system was established in Ahmednuggur about the year 1600, by Mullik Ambar, the Mahomedan ruler of that province, and in some other provinces where it is found, and which were long under the Mahomedan dominion. It is uncertain whether it is of Hindoo or Mussulman origin. It is, no doubt, possible that private landed property may in some countries have been swept away by the violence of Mahomedan invasion, and the long continuance of oppressive government ; but it is equally possible that the same thing may have been produced, long before the Mahomedan conquest, by the wars among the Hindoos themselves, and by the subversion of one great Hindoo empire by another ; and it is probable that enlightened princes, both Hindoo and Mahomedan, seeking the welfare of their subjects, may have either revived or introduced private landed property into their dominions.

But the question regarding meeras is one rather of curiosity than of real utility ; for in most districts the meeras is worth little, and has no value that might not be easily given to the lands in every province by a moderate reduction in the assessment. It is much more important to ascertain how this moderate assessment is to be gradually introduced, and private landed property reared upon it, than to seek to trace the origin and the fluctuations of meeras. It is only on the Malabar coast that the meeras yields such a landlord's rent as to make it saleable. In Arcot it yields little landlord's rent, and though nominally saleable, can seldom be sold. In the southern provinces it gives hardly any landlord's rent, and in the Deccan the assessment is usually so high as to leave little or none, and the land when thrown up by the Meerassadar can seldom pay the old rent, because the uncertain tenure of the cultivator (Oopari), prevents his bestowing the same labour upon it. It may therefore be assumed, that except in a few districts, meeras land yields no landlord's rent.

But this does not hinder it from being a desirable property ; for as a man cannot always find employment for his labour and

stock, it is of great importance to possess land by which this employment may be secured. In Circar land as well as meeras, Rayets sometimes have a landlord's rent; for it is evident that whenever they so far improve their land as to derive from it more than the ordinary profit of stock, the excess is landlord's rent; but they are never sure of long enjoying this advantage, as they are constantly liable to be deprived of it by injudicious over-assessment. While this state of insecurity exists, no body of substantial landholders can ever arise; nor can the country improve, or the revenue rest on any solid foundation. In order to make the land generally saleable, to encourage the Rayets to improve it, and to regard it as a permanent hereditary property, the assessment must be fixed, and more moderate in general than it now is; and above all, so clearly defined as not to be liable to increase from ignorance or caprice.

This cannot be attained by receiving as revenue a specific share of the produce in kind, because it is exposed to fluctuation from fraud and many other causes, and because the usual share would be too heavy a tax on improvement; or by a money rent, fixed according to the custom of the country, because, though nominally fixed, it is nowhere registered or accurately known, but is merely understood to be so much, or about so much. It can be attained only by a moderate money assessment, fixed specifically on every separate field or piece of land, and accurately registered in the accounts of every village curnum and of every collector. This is, in fact, no new system, but is merely giving a more accurate form to the system of money rents followed by the natives, where such rents prevailed. There can be no doubt that this system is perfectly adequate to the accomplishment of every object of improvement for which it is intended. All doubt that might have existed on this subject ought to be removed by what has happened in the Baramahl. It was supposed that, soon after the introduction of the permanent assessment into that province, the survey rates of assessment, which had been previously established by Colonel Read, were entirely abandoned between the Mootahdars, or newly-constituted proprietors, and the Rayets; but this is so far from being the case, that the survey assessment was always considered by the Rayets as their great land-mark, and it was it alone which, by furnishing them with a clearly defined standard and maximum of rent, enabled them, when withdrawn from the protection of the collector, and left to that of the Mootahdars and the courts of justice, to which they were too

poor to appeal, to undergo the experiment of such a system for nearly twenty years, and to revert from the Mootahdar to Government with much less loss than could have been expected, and, in some instances, in a much better condition than they had ever been before. In a considerable part of the land, the Mootahdars found it advisable to lower the survey assessment, in order to induce the Rayets to extend their cultivation; in some cases they raised it illegally, by the aid of the influence derived from their situation; but in by far the greater part of the land, the survey assessment still continued to be followed in the engagements between the Mootahdar and the Rayets. This long continuance of a known and fixed assessment has begun to introduce saleable private landed property into the Baramahl, where it was never known before. I do not speak of Mootahs or Zemindarries, because they are merely saleable portions of the Government revenue; but of the single field, or aggregate of fields, which usually compose the possession of a Rayet. In many Mootahs, several fields are saleable, and in some every field is so. This effect has been produced by the survey assessment, not from its moderation, for it is hardly lighter than that of the native governments usually is, but from its having been fixed, and so clearly defined as to leave no uncertainty, and thus to encourage one party to improve, and the other to purchase the land.

This effect, too, has been produced under many disadvantages, and it would have been much more extensive had it been assisted by a lighter assessment, and not been impeded by the petty oppression of the Mootahdarry system. The land which has become saleable in the Baramahl has been sold from two or three to ten or twelve years' purchase. This is an advantage which it possesses over the old Meeras land of Arcot, which, though nominally saleable, is rarely so, except in the neighbourhood of Madras, or of towns on the coast, and there more commonly for building than for agricultural purposes. It possesses a great advantage in its simplicity; for it is not a complicated property, made up of various shares and fees, and bound to pay Government a large share of every improvement, like that of the Meeras; but is a fee simple, held immediately of Government, and liable only to the same fixed rent, however great the produce derived from improvement may be. The land of the Baramahl will probably in time all become saleable, even under its present assessment; but private landed property is of slow growth in countries where it has not previously existed, and where the Government revenue is nearly

half the produce; and we must not expect that it can be hastened by regulations or forms of settlement, or by any other way than by adhering steadily to a limited assessment, and lowering it wherever, after full experience, it may still in particular places be found too high. By pursuing this course, or, in other words, by following what is now called the Rayetwar system, we shall see no sudden change or improvement. The progress of landed property will be slow, but we may look with confidence to ultimate and general establishment. We have never yet followed with perseverance any plan calculated to create or extend private landed property, and where we have laid the foundation of such a plan by a survey and fixed assessment of the land, as in the Baramahl, Coimbatore, and Arcot, and some other provinces, we have counteracted its design by injudicious leases and permanent settlements.

These settlements seem to have been adopted in deference to the example of Bengal, without sufficient knowledge of the claims of the Rayets. The rights of the Meerassadar Rayets of Arcot and Tanjore were well known at the time, but those of the Rayets of other districts, which were equally strong, though not called meerassy, seem to have been but little understood. Most of the well-intended but visionary plans for the improvement of India by the creation of Zemindars of whole districts or of single villages, appear to have originated in extreme ignorance of the state of the landed property of the country, and the rights of the persons by whom it was held. It has been supposed by some that the Zemindars were the landlords or proprietors, and the Rayets their undertenants or labourers; and by others that the sovereign was the sole landlord, and the Rayets mere cultivating tenants. But the Rayet is the real proprietor, for whatever land does not belong to the sovereign belongs to him. The demand for public revenue, according as it is high or low in different places, and at different times, affects his share; but whether it leaves him only the bare profit of his stock, or a small surplus beyond it as landlord's rent, he is still the true proprietor, and possesses all that is not claimed by the sovereign as revenue.

The land in most of the provinces under the Madras Government is occupied by a vast mass of small proprietors or Rayets, holding properties of every size, from two or three, to two or three thousand acres, and some few having whole villages.

These properties are in general very small; but they are of that extent which necessarily results from the limited means of

the owners, and the nature of the institutions of the country. The correctness of this description is not altered by the existence of great possessions in the hands of Rajahs and old Zemindars in some of our provinces, because these men are not private landholders, but rather petty princes, and the Rayets in their districts stand nearly in the same relation to them as to the sovereign in the Circar districts. The distribution of landed property differs in every country; it is different in Ireland from what it is in England, and in India from what it is in either of those countries. But we ought to take it as we find it, and not attempt, upon idle notions of improvement, to force a distribution of it into larger properties, when every local circumstance is adverse to its continuance in that state: the experiment has already been tried by the establishing of village Zemindars or Mootahdars, and has already very generally failed. The event could not possibly have been otherwise of a measure whose object was to bring a new class of proprietors into villages where the produce was too little for the old ones. Even in those villages which are still in the hands of the Mootahdars, the object of having larger landed properties will entirely fail, because the properties by sale and division among heirs are fast subdividing, and will soon dwindle into portions smaller than the properties of individual Rayets. There are instances in which this has already happened, and they will soon become so numerous that the system must, at no distant period, die a natural death.

There is no analogy whatever between the landlord of England and his tenants, and the Mootahdar, or new village Zemindar of this country, and his Rayets. In England, the landlord is respected by the farmer as his superior; here the Zemindar has no such respect, for the principal Rayets of most villages regard him as not more than their equal, and often as their inferior. He is often the former Potal or head Rayet of the village, but he is frequently some petty shopkeeper or merchant, or some adventurer or public servant out of employ. Whichever of these he is, he has usually very little property; he has none for the improvement of the village, but, on the contrary, looks to the village as the means of improving his own circumstances. The Rayets, by being placed under him, sink from the rank of tenants of the Government to that of tenants of an individual. They are transferred from a superior, who has no interest but in their protection and welfare, to one whose interest it is to enlarge his own property at the expense of theirs; who seeks by every way, how-

ever unjustifiable, to get into his own hands all the best lands of the village, and whose situation affords him many facilities in depriving the ancient possessors of them. The Rayets are jealous of a man from whose new power and influence they have so much to fear. They frequently combine, in order to keep down the cultivation, and force him, for their own security, to give up the village; and hence it has happened, that on one side the opposition of the Rayets, and on the other the oppression of the new Zemindar, have in many instances caused villages which were flourishing and moderately assessed, to revert to the Circar, from inability to pay their assessment. If we cannot make a permanent settlement with these village Zemindars, neither is it possible to make one, or even a lease for a term of years, with the Rayets, because their properties are in general so small that numbers of them fail, and must fail every year, from the most ordinary accidents.

Some men are apt to suppose, when they find in almost every district two or three hundred Rayets who require remission for a part, for the half, or even the whole of their rent, that the assessment is too high, or that there is something wrong in the system, and they proceed immediately to recommend a change from the Rayetwarry to something else. But assessment, though it is often the cause, is not the chief cause of the failure of such Rayets. Where the landed property of a district is distributed among many thousand Rayets, and where there is no limitation to subdivision, except what is imposed by the produce of the land being inadequate to the subsistence of the Rayet, it is evident that there will be many gradations of Rayets, descending gradually from those holding the largest properties to those holding portions of land too small for their maintenance. It is evident that a lower assessment will not prevent this, nor cause any other change than that of making the smallest portion of land on which the Rayet can subsist somewhat smaller than before, without rendering him in any degree less liable to failure. There are many Rayets who fail from another cause, which no abatement of assessment can remove, and which it is not desirable should be removed; it is occasioned by a spirit of independence among the caste of husbandmen, which urges every labouring servant who can buy a pair of bullocks, to quit his master, and to take land and cultivate for himself. In this undertaking many fail, because the loss of a bullock, or an adverse season, destroys their small means; but by far the greater number finally succeed, and their

success adds to the resources of the country. It is like the spirit of adventure in trade, which, though it frequently ruins individuals, yet promotes at the same time the prosperity of the country. We must, therefore, in a district containing two or three thousand Rayets, always expect to find two or three hundred who are unable to pay their rent. We must, according to usage, grant them a remission for a few years, until they can do without it; and encourage rather than repress the spirit of independence, which we may be sure will excite industry.

It is not necessary that we should have either permanent settlements with Zemindars, or leases with the Rayets; neither of them is the usage of the country, and neither is requisite for the security of the revenue, or the benefit of the Rayet.

But though we cannot obtain a permanent rent from each individual Rayet, we may by a fixed assessment upon the land obtain a revenue from the whole body of the Rayets, sufficiently permanent for every useful purpose. It will rise or fall somewhat with good or bad seasons, but the average for a term of years will be nearly the same. If we wish to make the lands of the Rayets yield them a landlord's rent, we have only to lower and fix the assessment, and we shall then in time have the great body of the Rayets possessing landed properties yielding a landlord's rent, but small in extent. They cannot be otherwise while their present institutions remain, as these all tend to the subdivision of property. If, in place of lowering the assessment, and letting landed property rise in the natural way, we want to have great landlords raised at once, where none exist, and for this purpose create Zemindars, and turn over to each of them some hundreds of Rayets, we should commit a gross injustice, because we should enable the Zemindar, in time, to degrade the Rayets from the rank of tenants in chief, to that of tenants at will, and often, to that of mere cultivators or labourers. We say, that we leave the Rayets free to act and to make their own terms with the Zemindars, or renters; and that, if they are wronged, the Courts will protect them. We put them out of sight, deliver them over to a superior, and then we tell them that they are free to make their own terms, and that there are Courts to secure their rights. But with what pretence of justice can we place them under any set of men, to make terms for their property, and to defend it against them in Courts of Law? They have no superior but Government; they are tenants in chief, and ought not to be obliged to make terms except with Government.

But it is said, that the Zemindar does not infringe their rights, because he has no authority to demand more than the dues of Government, as regulated by the usage of the country, and that, if the parties be left to themselves, things will find their proper level. They will find the level which they have found in Bengal, and in several districts under this Government, and which the weak always find when they are left to contend with the strong. The question is, whether we are to continue the country in its natural state, occupied by a great body of independent Rayets, and to enable them, by a lighter assessment, to rise gradually to the rank of landlords; or whether we are to place the country in an artificial state, by dividing it in villages, or larger districts, among a new class of landholders, who will inevitably, at no distant period, by the subdivision of their new property, fall to the level of Rayets, while the Rayets will, at the same time, have sunk from the rank of independent tenants in chief to that of sub-tenants and cultivators?—It is, whether we are to raise the landholders we have, or to create a new set, and see them fall? This question, it is to be hoped, has been set at rest by the orders of the Court of Directors, to make the settlement with the Rayets in all districts in which the permanent Zemindarry settlement has not been established.

In all those provinces whose revenues are, by ancient usage, paid chiefly in money, surveys appear to have been made at different remote periods, in order to fix the assessment. In some districts they are only known by tradition; in others, they still exist, in a mutilated shape, in the Curnum's accounts; but there is no certainty that these accounts belong to any particular survey, or that they are not made of fragments of several; or, that the village accounts have not been so often altered by the Curnums, without any regular authority, as to contain no trace of any survey whatever. Though the village accounts were supposed to have a specific rate of assessment for every field according to the class to which it belonged, the Collectors were not made to conform very rigidly to this rate, but were usually somewhat above or below it, according to the nature of the season and other circumstances. The farm or estate of a Rayet was generally composed of three parts: the first and principal was his old farm, containing the lands which he always occupied; the second, but much smaller part, containing land of an inferior quality, was called his Kuttgootah, and was held at a low and fixed rent; and the third was his cowlé land, taken from the

waste of the village, which he cultivated one, two, or more years, and then threw up or kept, according to the terms of the cowle, or engagement.

In all cases where the rent of a Rayet was raised, it was done by imposing an additional assessment on his old farm. The Kuttgootah and cowle lands were always exempted, both because to have imposed an additional assessment upon them would have been regarded as a breach of engagement, and would have discouraged the extension of cultivation. In some districts, the addition made in one year to the rate of assessment was taken off the next. In others it was continued, and fresh additions of five, ten, or fifteen per cent. being made at subsequent periods, and rendered permanent, the aggregate of these extra additions frequently came in time to equal or exceed the original assessment. But there is reason to suppose that these additions were in a great measure nominal, and that they did little more than counterbalance the fraudulent reductions made by the Curnums, in the accounts of the original assessment. These extra rates were usually unwillingly paid at first, and instead therefore of imposing them, it was often thought more advisable to give the Rayet a piece of waste land, the rent of which he was required to pay, whether he could cultivate it or not. The ruling power always endeavoured to encourage, or rather to force the extension of cultivation, as a plea for drawing a larger revenue from the country. The result of such a system, pursued for ages, has been what was to be expected, namely, that the extent of land in cultivation and paying revenue is much too great for the agricultural stock of the country; that every Rayet has more land than he can properly cultivate, and that he is only prevented from throwing off a part of it by the well-grounded fear, that the difference of rent would be thrown upon the part which he retained. This is the state of cultivation generally throughout the Deccan, and it was, and still is, in a great degree, that of most of the provinces which have fallen by conquest under the authority of the Madras Government. The excess of land occupied by the Rayets, beyond what they can adequately cultivate, varies in different provinces, and is estimated at from one-tenth to one-third, and may be reckoned on an average at one-fifth. It is obvious, however, that by more land being occupied than could be properly occupied, the rent must in time have adapted itself to this state of things, and become lower than it would otherwise have been, and that a fixed assessment made on such rent would in general be

favourable to the cultivators or Rayets. It is also obvious, from what has been said, that if, after making such a fixed assessment, perfect freedom were given to the Rayets to throw up whatever land they did not want, they would throw up about one-fifth of their land, and thereby diminish the revenue nearly in the same proportion. But this diminution would only be temporary, because, as the Rayets, by concentrating their agricultural stock upon a similar extent of land, would obtain a greater produce from it, their means would gradually increase, and enable them to take and cultivate again the land which they had relinquished. Under annual settlements, and fluctuating assessment, they are not very anxious about throwing up land, because they know that, by the custom of the country, we can raise the assessment upon the remaining land, according to its produce and improvement; but whenever the assessment has been fixed, they soon discover the advantage which it gives them, and endeavour to get rid of all their extra land. The liberty of doing so has already been partially granted, and must be fully granted to them; for though it will cause a temporary loss of revenue, it is a sacrifice which ought to be made, for the sake of securing the great public benefit of a permanent revenue, founded upon the general establishment of private landed property. It is the ever-varying assessment which has prevented, and as long as it continues, will prevent land from becoming a valuable property; for even where the assessment is lowest, the knowledge that it may at any time be raised, hinders the land from acquiring such a value as to render it a saleable article. We cannot communicate to it the value which it ought to possess, or render it a private property, capable of being easily sold or mortgaged, unless the public assessment upon every part of it be previously fixed. When it is fixed, all uncertainty is removed, and all land, which is not absolutely over-assessed, soon acquires a value, which is every day increased by improvements, made in consequence of the certainty of reaping all the profit arising from them.

The introduction of the fixed assessment into the Baramahl, Coimbatore, and other provinces, has not been so successful as it ought to have been in establishing private landed property; but it has been as successful as could reasonably have been expected, when we consider that it had no fair trial, and that it had hardly begun to operate when it was supplanted by a new system of permanent settlements and leases. Had it been left to produce its own effect undisturbed by a change, there can be little doubt

but that private landed property would by this time have been very generally established in those provinces. Its progress would have been faster or slower, according as the rate of assessment was more or less moderate. The rate of assessment, though somewhat lower than that of the Native Princes, was generally high, but not so high as to prevent the gradual growth of landed property. Wherever it might, in particular instances, have been found to produce the effect, the evil would have been easily remedied by a proportionate reduction. The survey assessment, however, notwithstanding all the difficulties by which it was opposed, has laid the foundation of private landed property in districts in which it was never before known, in the Baramahl, Coimbatore, and the Ceded Districts; and this beginning will gradually spread over all the land of these provinces. In the Baramahl, land has become saleable for several years' purchase in many villages of every district, and even in Ahtore, the most highly assessed of all the districts. In the Ceded Districts land has become saleable in two or three districts of the Ballary division, and in several villages of almost every district in the Cud-dapah division. In all these districts, the survey assessment has, besides giving a beginning to private landed property, simplified and facilitated the collection of the revenue. No survey assessment of a great province can ever at once be made so correct as not to require future alteration; when, therefore, it has been completed with as much care as possible, a trial should always be made of it for six or seven years. This period will be sufficient to discover all defects in the assessment. A general revision of it should then be made, and wherever it might be found too high, it should be lowered, and it may then, with safety to the revenue, and benefit to the people, be made permanent. None of the districts, however, in which the survey assessment had been introduced, had the benefit of such a trial, as in all of them a permanent settlement, or lease, was introduced very soon after the completion of the survey. Coimbatore was more fortunate than the rest; it escaped the decennial lease, and is now the best ordered, the most easily managed, and the most thriving district under the Madras Government. A survey assessment, besides its other advantages, prevents thousands of disputes and litigations about rent and boundaries, and it furnishes a standard by which the revenue of the country can at any time be raised or lowered, according as the state of affairs may require an increase of the burdens of the people, or may admit of

their diminution. I trust that we shall never have occasion to go beyond the original assessment, and that we shall in time be able to make considerable reductions in it. The fixed assessment will not for some years have the same effect in encouraging improvements as it had before the introduction of the leases and permanent settlements; because these measures have shaken the confidence of the Rayets in the continuance of the present system, and will render them cautious in undertaking improvements, lest they should be prevented from enjoying the full benefit of them, by being again placed under a renter or Zemindar. Some years, therefore, must yet elapse before this apprehension can subside, and the survey assessment have its full effect in encouraging improvement, and promoting the growth of landed property.

There are, however, several extensive provinces in which we have no control over the assessment, and scarcely any means of bettering the condition of the Rayets; I mean the Northern Circars. When these districts came into our possession, one part of them was in the hands of Zemindars, and the other and most valuable part was in the hands of Government, and has since, by the permanent settlement, been made over to new Zemindars of our own creation. As in these provinces no fixed assessment has been introduced, nor the rights of the Rayets been defined, the Rayets never can become landholders, nor their lands acquire such a value as to make them saleable. It may be said that they have a right to be assessed only according to ancient usage, and that this right will secure them from undue exaction, and give them the same facility as the Rayets of the Government districts, of rendering their land a valuable property; but many causes combine to prevent this. The ancient usage was in every little district or even village. It is not recorded or defined, and is very little known to us. It is, I believe, in the Northern Circars very generally so high as to leave the Rayet no more than the bare recompense of his labour and stock, and thus to preclude his ever obtaining any portion of a landlord's rent. Even supposing that usage did leave to the Rayet some surplus as landlord's rent, the Zemindar might not permit him to enjoy it. He might raise the assessment. If he were an old Zemindar or hill Rajah, the fear of personal violence would deter the Rayet from complaining. If he were a new Zemindar, the Rayet would, nine times in ten, submit quietly to the loss, not from fear of personal injury, but from the well-grounded fear of losing his cause in the court. He knows that the influence of the Zemindar would easily pro-

cure witnesses to swear falsely on the question of usage, and that they would be supported by the fabricated accounts of the Curnum, who is entirely under the authority of the Zemindar ; and that, if he even gained his cause, it would be of no advantage to him, as the Zemindar, without transgressing any law, would be able to harass him in many ways, and make his situation uncomfortable.

There is, therefore, no prospect, or but a very distant one, of our being able to establish landed property among the Rayets of the Northern Circars, or to improve their condition in any material degree. In the old Zemindarries, which are chiefly among the unhealthy hills, our prospect is as good now as ever it was, because we never there exercised any direct authority over the Rayets, and could not expect to see landed property grow up among them, until time should gradually have wrought such a change in the manners and opinions of their leading men, as to make them see the expediency of encouraging it. But in the new Zemindarries we exercised a direct authority over all the inhabitants, and could have raised their condition and landed property at our pleasure ; but we lost the power of doing so by the permanent settlement. It may be said that Government having set a limit upon its demand upon the Zemindar, he will also set a limit to his demand upon the Rayet, and leave him the full produce of every improvement, and thus enable him to render his land a valuable property. But we have no reason to suppose that this will be the case, either from the practice of the new Zemindars during the twenty years they have existed, or from that of the old Zemindars during a succession of generations. In old Zemindarries, whether held by the Rajahs of the Circars, or the Poligars of the more southern provinces, which have from a distant period been held at a low and fixed peshcush, no indulgence has been shown to the Rayets, no bound has been set to the demand upon them. The demand has risen with improvement, according to the custom of the country, and the land of the Rayet has no saleable value ; we ought not, therefore, to be surprised that in the new Zemindarries, whose assessment is so much higher, the result has been equally unfavourable to the Rayets. The new Zemindarries will, by division among heirs and failures in their payments, break up into portions of one or two villages ; but this will not better the condition of the Rayet. It will not fix the rent of the land, nor render it a valuable property ; it will merely convert one large Zemindarry into several small Zemin-

daries or Mootahs, and Mootahs of a kind much more injurious than those of the Baramahl to the Rayets; because, in the Baramahl, the assessment of the Rayets' land had previously been fixed by survey, while in the new Zemindaries of the Circars it had been left undefined. The little will in time share the fate of the great Zemindaries; they will be divided, and fail, and finally revert to Government; and the Rayets, after this long and circuitous course, will again become what they originally were, the immediate tenants of Government; and Government will then have it in its power to survey their lands, to lower and fix the assessment upon them, and to lay the foundation of landed property in the land of the Rayets, where alone, in order to be successful, it must be laid.

The state of the landed property of the country, held almost everywhere by the Rayets directly of Government, clearly points out to us what our revenue system ought to be, and that it cannot, consistently with usage, be other than Rayetwar. This term has been often much misunderstood, and been supposed to mean some mode of settlement entirely new, which overthrows all former rights; but this is altogether a mistake; the term itself is the ancient and common one of the country, and is used merely from the want of an English one exactly corresponding with it. In revenue language, it means a settlement with the individual Rayet who owns or occupies the land, and the receiving the public assessment from him without the intervention of any renter or Zemindar. Whether the assessment be a fixed rent in kind, or a fixed share of the crop in kind, or computed for money, or a fixed or varying money rent, it makes no difference; it is still Rayetwar. All these varieties of assessment prevail more or less in the provinces under this Government; but though they all come under the general denomination of Rayetwar, their effects on the prosperity of the country are very different; and it is therefore an important object that the kind of Rayetwar which is most conducive to improvement, namely, a fixed and moderate money assessment, should be everywhere gradually introduced. But before we endeavour to make such a change in any district, it is absolutely necessary that we should survey its lands, and ascertain as nearly as possible its average revenue for a long series of years. If we attempt, without this previous knowledge, to convert a fluctuating into a fixed rent, we shall certainly fail, even if our knowledge should be so complete as to enable us to distribute fairly upon the land a fair assessment exactly equal to its

former average revenue. This will not be sufficient, for the Rayets will not agree to the change without some abatement: the abatement must not be nominal and existing only in our accounts, but real and absolute, and amount probably to eight or ten per cent. ; and we must satisfy them it is so, if we expect success. If the Rayet is convinced that the reduction offered to him is real, it will not be difficult to get him to accede to a fixed assessment. The chief cause of the difficulty which is usually found in prevailing upon him to agree to such a change is, that he thinks there is either no actual abatement, or that it is so small as not to compensate for the loss and inconvenience to which he might be subjected in unfavourable years by a fixed assessment. In his dealing with any private individual, he would not hesitate to stipulate to pay annually a fixed sum in money rather than a varying amount in grain, if he thought it would be more profitable. He will follow the same course in his engagements with Government, whenever he is satisfied that he will be a gainer by it. To conduct a survey, however, and convert a fluctuating gain into a fixed money assessment, require a union of experience, industry, and temper, which is not always found. This must necessarily render the progress of the work slow, but it ought not to discourage us. Much has been already done, and what remains to be done will be more perfect, from the opportunity which the delay will afford of discovering and rectifying former errors.

It has been objected to the Rayetwar system, that it produces unequal assessment, and destroys ancient rights and privileges ; but these opinions seem to originate in some misapprehension of its nature. In arguing against it, in favour of a Zemindarry system, it has been maintained that a detailed settlement must ever lead to inequality of taxation ; but there seems to be no reason why the detailed should, more than any other settlement, produce inequality. It is to good or bad cultivation, and other circumstances common to all settlements, that unequal taxation is owing, and it must take place with regard to the lands of the Rayets, whether they are held immediately of Government, or of a Zemindar or renter. The use of a detailed settlement is not to prevent what can never be prevented, unequal assessment, but to prevent the assessment from being any where excessive ; to furnish us with the best information respecting the resources of the country, and by giving us a complete register of all its lands, showing the extent and assessment of each field, to enable us to

judge, whenever there is a failure in the revenue, whether it arises from the assessment, or some other cause. As it is one main principle of Indian revenue, that all land when cultivated is liable to the public assessment, and when left uncultivated is exempt from it, it is manifest that, without the detailed settlement, the amount of the revenue for the year could not be correctly ascertained.

It has also been argued, that it is useless to impose a fixed assessment upon each field or lot of land, because the produce will always fluctuate according to the culture. This objection would be a very just one, if it were intended that the rent payable to Government should always correspond with the produce; but this is not the case. All that is necessary in fixing the Government rent is, that it shall not be higher than what the land is able to yield under the most ordinary degree of culture; whatever entire produce is derived from any culture beyond this should go exclusively to the Rayet; Government should have no share in it. Improved cultivation will, of course, regulate the rent between the proprietor or Rayet and his tenant, but not between the Rayet and Government; and if Government is satisfied with the moderate rent arising from common cultivation, the lands, if cultivated at all, will yield this rent, and there is no danger that any fluctuation in the degrees of culture will preclude the realization of the field assessment. By common usage, where there is no fixed field assessment, Government receives in kind a high share of the produce, or in money a high rent; and its rent, whether in kind or money, rises with the produce. By the field assessment, Government will receive a rent somewhat lower than the present one, and as it will be fixed, and not rise with improvement, it will be more likely to be permanently realized. It has been asserted, in speaking of the Meerassy privileges in the Carnatic, that the Rayetwar assessment destroyed by violence all these ancient usages and customs, and so completely, that both Mr. Græme and Mr. Ravenshaw have denied the existence of Meerassy in these provinces. The Rayetwar assessment had not been established more than four or five years when Mr. Ravenshaw took charge of Arcot. These ancient usages and customs had probably fallen into disuse, or the preservation of them been deemed of little value, or they could not in so short a time have been so lost, as to escape the notice both of him and of Mr. Græme. Even if it were true that they had been destroyed by violence, there can be no cause for attributing to the Rayetwar

an effect which might have been equally produced by any other mode of settlement. The Rayetwar settlement, when properly conducted, respects all private rights; to ascertain and secure them are among its principal objects. The carelessness, or the over-zeal of collectors, may invade them under any settlement whatever, if they are not restrained by superior authority.

It has been objected to the Rayetwar system, that it is intricate, difficult of management, and expensive; but experience contradicts these opinions, for wherever Rayetwar has been properly established, it has been found to be more easy, simple, and efficient than any other kind of settlement. The idea of its being more expensive arises from not considering that it includes all the expenses of collection which would be incurred by Zemindars if the country were under them, and which would in that case be necessarily deducted from the amount of the revenue, and not appear as a charge. One great advantage which the Rayetwar settlement has over every other, is the strength and security which it gives to our Government, by bringing us into direct communication with the great body of the Rayets, or landowners. Objections may be urged to every system. It is enough to recommend it to our adoption, to know that it is the common one of the country. It is one of the primary obligations of a Government like ours to suit its rules and forms of local administration to the condition of the people, to provide every establishment which it may require, and not to withhold any thing which may be necessary to its efficiency, for the sake of avoiding either labour or expense.

When we have determined the principles on which the land revenue is to be fixed, the next question is, by what agency it is to be managed? There can be no doubt that it ought, as far as practicable, to be native. Juster views have of late years been taken of this subject, and the Court of Directors have authorized the employment of the natives on higher salaries and in more important offices. There is true economy in this course, for by it they will have better servants, and their affairs will be better conducted. It is strange to observe how many men of very respectable talents have seriously recommended the abolition of native, and the substitution of European agency to the greatest possible extent. I am persuaded that every advance made in such a plan would not only render the character of the people worse and worse, but our Government more and more inefficient. The preservation of our dominion in this country requires that all the

higher offices, civil and military, should be filled with Europeans ; but all offices that can be left in the hands of natives without danger to our power, might with advantage be left to them. We are arrogant enough to suppose that we can with our limited numbers do the work of a nation. Had we ten times more, we should only do it so much worse. We already occupy every office of importance. Were we to descend to those which are more humble, and now filled by natives, we should lower our character, and not perform the duties so well. The natives possess, in as high a degree at least as Europeans, all those qualifications which are requisite for the discharge of the inferior duties in which they are employed. They are in general better accountants, more patient and laborious, more intimately acquainted with the state of the country and the manners and customs of the inhabitants, and are altogether more efficient men of business.

Unless we suppose that they are inferior to us in natural talent, which there is no reason to believe, it is much more likely that they will be duly qualified for their employments than Europeans for theirs, because the field of selection is so much greater in the one than in the other. We have a whole nation from which to make our choice of natives, but in order to make choice of Europeans, we have only the small body of the Company's covenanted servants.

If it be admitted that the natives often act wrong, it is no reason for not employing them ; we shall be oftener wrong ourselves. What we do wrong is not noticed, or but seldom and slightly ; what they do wrong meets with no indulgence. We can dismiss them and take better men in their place ; we must keep the European, because we have no other, or perhaps none better, and because he must be kept at an expense to the public, and be employed some way or other, whatever his capacity may be, unless he has been guilty of some gross offence. But it is said that all these advantages in favour of the employment of the natives are counterbalanced by their corruption, and that the only remedy is more Europeans, with European integrity. The remedy would certainly be a very expensive one, and would as certainly fail of success were we weak enough to try it. We have had instances of corruption among Europeans, notwithstanding their liberal allowances ; but were the numbers of Europeans to be considerably augmented, and their allowances, as a necessary consequence, somewhat reduced, it would be contrary to all

experience to believe that this corruption would not greatly increase, more particularly as Government could not possibly exercise any efficient control over the misconduct of so many European functionaries in different provinces, where there is no public to restrain it. If we are to have corruption, it is better that it should be among the natives than among ourselves, because the natives will throw the blame of the evil upon their countrymen; they will still retain their high opinion of our superior integrity; and our character, which is one of the strongest supports of our power, will be maintained. No nation ever existed in which corruption was not practised to a certain extent by the subordinate officers of Government: we cannot expect that India is in this point to form an exception. But though we cannot eradicate corruption, we may so far restrain it as to prevent it from causing any serious injury to the public interest. We must for this purpose adopt the same means as are usually found most efficacious in other countries; we must treat the natives with courtesy, we must place confidence in them, we must render their official situations respectable, and raise them in some degree beyond temptation, by making their official allowances adequate to the support of their station in society.

With what grace can we talk of our paternal Government, if we exclude them from every important office, and say, as we did till very lately, that in a country containing fifteen millions of inhabitants, no man but a European shall be entrusted with so much authority as to order the punishment of a single stroke of a rattan? Such an interdiction is to pass a sentence of degradation on a whole people, for which no benefit can ever compensate. There is no instance in the world of so humiliating a sentence having ever been passed upon any nation. The weak and mistaken humanity which is the motive of it, can never be viewed by the natives as any just excuse for the disgrace inflicted on them, by being pronounced to be unworthy of trust in deciding on the petty offences of their countrymen. We profess to seek their improvement, but propose means the most adverse to success. The advocates of improvement do not seem to have perceived the great springs on which it depends; they propose to place no confidence in the natives, to give them no authority, and to exclude them from office as much as possible; but they are ardent in their zeal for enlightening them by the general diffusion of knowledge.

No conceit more wild and absurd than this was ever engender-

ed in the darkest ages ; for what is in every age and every country the great stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, but the prospect of fame, or wealth, or power ? or what is even the use of great attainments, if they are not to be devoted to their noblest purpose—the service of the community, by employing those who possess them, according to their respective qualifications, in the various duties of the public administration of the country ? How can we expect that the Hindoos will be eager in the pursuit of science, unless they have the same inducements as in other countries ? If superior acquirements do not open the road to distinction, it is idle to suppose that the Hindoo would lose his time in seeking them ; and even if he did so, his proficiency, under the doctrine of exclusion from office, would serve no other purpose than to show him more clearly the fallen state of himself and his countrymen. He would not study what he knew could be of no ultimate benefit to himself ; he would learn only those things which were in demand, and which were likely to be useful to him, namely, writing and accounts. There might be some exceptions, but they would be few ; some few natives living at the principal settlements, and passing much of their time among Europeans, might either from a real love of literature, from vanity, or some other cause, study their books, and if they made some progress, it would be greatly exaggerated, and would be hailed as the dawn of the great day of light and science about to be spread all over India. But there always has been, and always will be, a few such men among the natives, without making any change in the body of the people. Our books alone will do little or nothing ; dry simple literature will never improve the character of a nation. To produce this effect, it must open the road to wealth and honour, and public employment. Without the prospect of such reward, no attainments in science will ever raise the character of a people.

This is true of every nation as well as of India ; it is true of our own. Let Britain be subjugated by a foreign power tomorrow ; let the people be excluded from all share in the government, from public honours, from every office of high trust or emolument, and let them in every situation be considered as unworthy of trust, and all their knowledge and all their literature, sacred and profane, would not save them from becoming, in another generation or two, a low-minded, deceitful, and dishonest race.

Even if we could suppose that it were practicable, without the aid of a single native, to conduct the whole affairs of the country,

both in the higher and in all the subordinate offices, by means of Europeans, it ought not to be done, because it would be both politically and morally wrong. The great number of public offices in which the natives are employed, is one of the strongest causes of their attachment to our Government. In proportion as we exclude them from these, we lose our hold upon them ; and were the exclusion entire, we should have their hatred in place of their attachment ; their feeling would be communicated to the whole population, and to the Native troops, and would excite a spirit of discontent too powerful for us to subdue or resist. But were it possible that they could submit silently and without opposition, the case would be worse ; they would sink in character, they would lose with the hope of public office and distinction all laudable ambition, and would degenerate into an indolent and abject race, incapable of any higher pursuit than the mere gratification of their appetites. It would certainly be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogethèr, than that the result of our system of government should be such a debasement of a whole people. This is, to be sure, supposing an extreme case, because nobody has ever proposed to exclude the natives from the numerous petty offices, but only from the more important offices now filled by them. But the principle is the same, the difference is only in degree ; for in proportion as we exclude them from the higher offices, and a share in the management of public affairs, we lessen their interest in the concerns of the community, and degrade their character.

It was from a conviction of the policy of extending native agency, that the establishment of the revenue board cutcherry was recommended in 1822. The right of the people to be taxed only by their own consent, has always, in every free country, been esteemed amongst the most important of all privileges ; it is that which had most exercised the minds of men, and which has oftenest been asserted by the defenders of liberty. Even in countries in which there is no freedom, taxation is the most important function of government ; because it is that which most universally affects the comfort and happiness of the people, and that which has oftenest excited them to resistance ; and hence both its utility and its danger have, under the most despotic governments, taught the necessity of employing in its administration the ablest men of the country.

In this point, at least, we ought to be guided by the example of those governments, and employ intelligent and experienced

natives at the head of the revenue to assist the revenue board. If in other departments we give experienced natives to assist the European officers, shall we not give them in this, whose duties are the most difficult and most important? We cannot exclude them from it without injury to ourselves as well as to them; we cannot conduct the department efficiently without them. But even if we could, policy requires that we should let them have a share in the business of taxing their own country. It attaches them to our Government, it raises them in their own estimation, and it encourages them, by the prospect of attaining a situation of so much distinction, to qualify themselves for it by a zealous performance of their duty. Although we can never leave entirely to the natives the power of taxing the country, we ought to entrust them with as much of it as possible under our superintendence. We ought to make them acquainted with our objects in taxation, and with the principles on which we wish it to be founded, in order that, in communicating their opinions to us, they may not be guided by the mere object of raising the revenue, but that of adapting the revenue to the wants of the state and the circumstances of the people. It is desirable that this knowledge should be widely diffused among the natives; but it can only be effected by their having the benefit of free intercourse with us, and of acquiring experience in important official situations. They have the advantage of this intercourse already, in the cutcherries attached to collectors and to the board of revenue; and under many of the collectors this advantage is rendered more general, by their hearing the opinions of the most intelligent heads of villages, and of respectable inhabitants, not in the service of Government, and discussing in their presence questions of revenue. This establishes confidence in us among the natives, and gradually extends among them juster and more enlarged views of the purposes for which taxation is intended.

This kind of intercourse, however, could hardly subsist, or be productive of any advantage, if we adopted the opinions of most of the advocates of Zemindarry settlements, that the collector ought not to enter into the details of revenue, but leave the natives to conduct them and settle with each other in their own way, and that he should confine himself to their general superintendence under the guidance of general principles. This appears to me to be a mistaken doctrine, which ought to be avoided; because, in order to maintain our power in India, we must have able and skilful servants, and such servants could not

possibly be produced by merely learning a few general principles, without making themselves acquainted with the character of the people, and the rules and customs by which their transactions with each other, and with the officers of Government, are usually regulated. The good government of the country must rest very much on the talents of our local officers, as it is from them chiefly that Government must derive its own information; and hence there is no country in the world in which it is more absolutely necessary to have good public servants than in this. When an European is placed in charge of a district permanently settled, and belonging to a few great Zemindars who conduct all the details of the assessment and collection of the revenue, he has very little to do; no exertion is required from him, and he naturally becomes indolent; if the affairs of the district fall into confusion, he cannot put them right, because, as he has not made himself acquainted with the revenue details and local usages, and has no practical experience, he is ignorant of the cause of the disorder, and of the means by which it is to be remedied. His knowledge of general principles, however extensive it may be, will in such an emergency be of little use, because he will not know how to apply them to the local circumstances of the country. The duties of the collector of a province should be such as to make it imperative on him to know the real state of the country, the amount of the assessment paid by the different classes of the inhabitants, its effects upon them, but especially upon the Rayets, in promoting or discouraging industry, and in rendering them satisfied or discontented with their rules, and to know all the details of internal administration by which the revenue is developed and realized; for it is only by possessing such knowledge, that he can understand either what are the actual resources of the country, or the means by which they may be improved, or furnish useful information to Government.

The duties of a public officer entrusted with the charge of a province ought to be such as to require the constant exercise of his faculties. Without this employment they become dull, and he is satisfied with remaining at the head of a province, for the management of which he is totally unqualified, and it is probably not until something goes wrong that this utter unfitness is discovered.

The civil servants of the Company mix but little with the Native community; they have no common interest with it, and it is only such of them as have naturally a spirit of inquiry, or are

forced by the duties of their situation to inquire, that know any thing about it, or can tell Government whether any particular law is popular or the reverse.

Government itself knows nothing of the state of the country, except what it learns from its local officers. In other countries, Government and its officers are a part of the community, and are of course acquainted with the effect of every public measure, and the opinion of the country regarding it; but here Government is deprived of this advantage; it makes laws for a people who have no voice in the matter, and of whom it knows very little, and it is therefore evident that it cannot adapt its laws to the circumstances of the people, unless it receive accurate information upon this subject from active and intelligent local officers, whose duty it is to investigate carefully the condition and opinions of the inhabitants, and to report upon them. But these officers can acquire this information only through an establishment of experienced native servants, who have beyond all other men, from the very nature of their official duties, the best means of obtaining it. Intelligent collectors are necessary at all times, but more especially when it becomes expedient either to raise or lower the revenue. Such an operation requires not judgment alone, but great knowledge of details; and if undertaken without these essential requisites, would be productive of much mischief. We ought, therefore, not to be satisfied with a superficial knowledge of the general state of the country, but make it a part of our system to obtain the most minute and accurate information concerning its internal condition, and preserve and accumulate that information in clear and detailed revenue accounts and statistical statements.

In comparing our internal administration with that of the Native Princes, it may be said that we have perhaps been more successful in our judicial than in our revenue institutions. In the criminal branch, the extent of our power has rendered the apprehension of criminals more sure, and in spite of the difficulties of conviction arising from the Mahomedan law, punishment is as certain, and justice much more so, than before. I doubt if in civil judicature we have the same advantage yet, or ever can have, until we leave to the Natives the decision of almost all original suits. The Natives can hardly be said to have had any regular system. What it was, has been well described by the late Commissioner of the Deccan; but their decisions by various local officers, by *roprus*, *punchayets*, and the prince, or

the court established near him, though irregular, and often corrupt and arbitrary, dispensed as much real justice as our courts, and with less delay and expense; for the native judges, whatever their irregularities were, had the great advantage of understanding their own language and their own code much better than ours are ever likely to do.

Our judges will, however, improve every day from longer experience, and the expense to the suitors, both of time and money, be much reduced. Our judges, even now, are in general more efficient than our collectors.

In this country the judicial require, perhaps, less talent than the revenue duties; they are less complicated, and are not, like them, affected by adverse seasons, or by peace or war, but are governed by fixed rules, and require in general little more than temper and assiduity. The district Moonsiffs, or native judges, are a great improvement on our judicial institutions. They have relieved the Zillah courts from a great mass of small suits; they get through a great deal of work, and there is reason to infer that it is performed in a satisfactory manner, because the inhabitants crowd to their courts, because the proportion of appeals from their decisions is not large, and because it has not been found necessary to dismiss many for misconduct. They will every day become more respectable, when it is found that the corrupt and indolent are punished, and that the diligent and upright are allowed to hold their situations permanently. Their jurisdiction was extended in 1821 to matters amounting in value to five hundred rupees, and it might with great utility be extended much farther. It will in time absorb almost all original suits, with great advantage to the community, and leave to the Zillah judge hardly any thing but appeals.

There was nothing in which our judicial code on its first establishment departed more widely from the usage of the country than in the disuse of the punchayet. When this ancient institution was introduced into our code in 1816, there was so much objection to it, both at home and in this country, lest it should become an instrument of abuse, that it was placed under so many restrictions as to deprive it of much of its utility. It was unknown to some of the Company's servants as any thing more than a mode of private arbitration; it was known by others to have been employed by the natives in the decision of civil suits, and even of criminal cases, but it was imagined to have been so employed, not because they liked it, but because they had nothing

better ; and it was opposed by some very intelligent men, on the ground of its form and proceedings being altogether so irregular as to be quite incompatible with the system of our courts. All doubts as to the popularity of punchayets among the natives must now have been removed by the reports of some of the ablest servants of the Company, which explain their nature, and show that they were in general use over extensive provinces. The defects of the punchayet are better known to the natives than to us ; yet with all its defects they hold it in so much reverence, that they say, where the *punj* sits God is present. In many ordinary cases the punchayet is clear and prompt in its decision, but when complicated accounts are to be examined, it is often extremely dilatory. It adjourns frequently ; when it meets again, some of the members are often absent, and it sometimes happens that a substitute takes the place of an absent member. All this is, no doubt, extremely irregular ; but the native Government itself is despotic and irregular, and every thing under it must partake of its nature. These irregularities, however, are all susceptible of gradual correction ; and, indeed, even now they are not found in practice to produce half the inconvenience that might be expected by men who have been accustomed to the exact forms of English courts of judicature. They ought not to prevent our employing the punchayet more than we have hitherto done, because its duties are of the most essential advantage to the community, and there is no other possible way by which they can be so well discharged. The natives have been so long habituated to the punchayet in all their concerns, that not only in the great towns, but even in the villages, a sufficient number of persons qualified to sit upon it can be found. We ought to avail ourselves of their aid, by extending the range within which the operations of the punchayet are now confined. Its cognizance of all suits within a certain amount, both in the Zillah and district Moonsiff's courts, should be abolished, and neither party should have the option of declining its jurisdiction. The same rule should hold in all cases tried by the Collector.

The use of the punchayet in criminal trials has been recommended by several persons, and among others by a very intelligent judicial officer, who submitted a draft of a regulation for the purpose. I am persuaded that the measure would be very beneficial, and that, until it is adopted, facts will never be so well found as they might be. The employment of the punchayet, independently of the great help it affords us in carrying on the

business of the country, gives weight and consideration among their countrymen to those who are so employed, brings us in our public duties into better acquaintance and closer union with them, and renders our government more acceptable to the people.

None of the changes in the customs of the country introduced with the judicial code were better formed for the vexation of the people than the system by which the police was in some districts erected into an establishment by itself, and separated from all others. This separation was by many regarded as a great improvement, for it is naturally supposed that the business of the police would be conducted with more regularity and efficiency by a class of men whose time should be devoted to this duty only, than by any class who had other duties to attend to. But this system, besides being objectionable in many points, had one main defect, in not being founded in any of the usages of the country : for no system for any part of the municipal administration can ever answer, that is not drawn from its ancient institutions, or assimilated with them. The new police establishment resembles in some degree an irregular military corps ; it was directed by the Zillah magistrate ; it was spread over the country in small guards, at every town and principal village ; it was entirely independent of the district and village local authorities, and subordinate only to its own Darogahs and petty officers ; it had no common interest with the people ; it seldom knew any thing of the neighbourhood in which it was stationed, and had no means of discovering offenders but by the village watchers, who had been withdrawn from their ancient masters, the Tishildars, and placed under its authority for this purpose. It soon learned to make the use which might have been foreseen of the power which it possessed ; it harassed the heads and Curnums of villages, by constantly summoning them before it, under the pretext of inquiring into imaginary offences, and often extorted money from them as the price of exemption from this grievance ; it often obtained money from some of the more respectable inhabitants, by raising reports of irregularities in their families, and threatening to bring them forward by public investigation ; it also got money by releasing persons whom it had threatened to send to appear as witnesses regarding some pretended offence ; and its abuse of authority was the more felt from the low rank of its agents, who were in general no better than common peons. This very circumstance of placing the dregs of the people above the more respectable classes, was of itself a serious evil, and was regarded by them as a most oppressive measure. Such a police had no

interest in the peace of the country, because it knew that in tranquil times its services were less wanted, and that its numbers would probably be reduced. Its gains were derived from disturbance, and its importance increased in such times, and it was therefore its business to exaggerate every disorder, and to keep up alarm. It was altogether a harsh and vexatious system of espionage.

We have now, in most places, reverted to the old police of the country, executed by village watchmen, mostly hereditary, under the direction of heads of villages, Tishildars of districts, and the collector and magistrate of the province. The establishments of the Tishildars are employed without distinction either in police or revenue duties, as the occasion requires; and it is the intimate knowledge of the inhabitants and of the country, which they and the village servants acquire from their occupation in the revenue, which enables them to discover by whom offences are committed, much more readily than could possibly be done by mere police servants. The village and district servants, as well as the Tishildar under whom they act, are deeply interested in the good order of the country, and they have therefore the strongest motives for exerting themselves in preserving its peace.

What is usually called police can seldom prevent crimes; it can seldom do more than secure the greater part of the offenders. Much has been said and written in favour of a preventive police, but I do not know that the attempt to establish it has ever been successful in any country. When a vigilant police renders detection and punishment more certain, it no doubt acts as a preventive, in so far as it deters from the commission of crime. The only efficient preventive is the improvement of manners, in which the punishment of offences can have very little share. A moderate assessment, by enabling all to find employment and to live, is, next to the amelioration of manners, the thing best calculated in this country to diminish crimes. It is generally found that theft and robbery are most frequent in districts over-assessed, and that, in seasons of scarcity, they become common in districts in which they were before of rare occurrence. Our present system of police is very well suited to its object, and is perfectly equal to all the purposes of its institution, though it is not always so well directed as might be wished. This, however, is not to be wondered at; it arises from our inexperience, and is not to be removed by any new rules, but solely by longer experience. The districts in which gang-robbery and plundering are most pre-

valent, are some parts of the Northern Circars, and the crime itself is occasioned by our want of control over the petty hill chiefs, and by the vicinity of their unhealthy hills and jungles facilitating the escape of the offenders. Those in which murder and maiming are most common, are Malabar and Canara. In Malabar this is to be ascribed chiefly to the depraved habits of the lower classes of the Moplahs, and in Canara to those of the Seddees, a race as bad as the worst of the Moplahs, but fortunately very few in number. They are the descendants of Abyssinians, formerly employed in the armies of the Mahomedan kings of Bijapoor, many of whom rose to the highest ranks in the state, and enjoyed extensive jagheers, on which numbers of their countrymen were settled. Those who now remain are chiefly herdsmen or cultivators, and are in general poor. The atrocious crimes of murder and gang-robbery are much less common in districts which have been long under the Company's government, than in those of more recent acquisition, and are everywhere gradually diminishing.

The frequency of crimes in most of the countries which have fallen by conquest under the British dominion within the last thirty years, as well as in many of those received from the Nabob of the Carnatic, does not arise so much from any thing in the nature of the people, as from the encouragement given to every kind of disorder by a long succession of wars, misgovernment, and anarchy. During those times the sovereign power was too weak to restrain the disorders of its tributaries and subordinate chiefs; gangs of robbers were protected by every little chief, and even where they were not protected, they found security, by the number of petty independent jurisdictions enabling them to escape from one to another. Much was done by the Mysore Mussulman Government to eradicate these disorders; but its duration was too short, and it was too much occupied in foreign war to have had leisure to remedy them effectually. The gangs which formerly lived by plunder are now much diminished by death and other causes; but there are still, probably, several thousand men scattered over our territory, whose business from their earliest days has been robbery. These men, and perhaps their immediate descendants, must pass away, before robbery as a profession can be destroyed.

In estimating the state of crime and the efficiency of the police, we are generally guided by the calendars of the magistrates and criminal judges, and the reports of the circuit judges. But these documents, alone, without the consideration of many other cir-

cumstances, will not enable us to form any just conclusion; and even with the greatest attention to every circumstance, it is difficult to arrive at any thing like accuracy. Many incidental causes tend to swell the number of crimes at one time more than another: peace or war, plenty or famine, the disbanding of troops in our own or the neighbouring countries, the passage through the country of a greater or smaller number of Brinjarries, who are generally robbers. Besides these, there are causes of an official nature, which give a very great increase or decrease of crime where there is little real change. In some districts the magistrates and police apprehend great numbers of persons on groundless suspicion, or for trivial matters, of which no public notice ought to have been taken.

These irregularities arise from the ignorance and the over zeal of the native servants, or from their carelessness, and not unfrequently from those of the magistrates. The best way of ascertaining with tolerable accuracy the increase or decrease of crime, would be by a comparison of the number of the higher crimes in periods of ten or fifteen years. If we include petty thefts, or even burglary, we shall be led to an enormous conclusion, for in this country most of the offences called burglary are little more than petty theft. They do not generally involve housebreaking, but are much oftener confined to the carrying away some trifling article from a hut or house, which is either open or entered without violence. Crimes are, no doubt, sometimes concealed from fear, and other causes; but I believe that the number actually committed is usually overrated, and that many of the burglaries and robberies said to have been ascertained, but none of the offenders discovered, never actually took place. If, what is not uncommon in India, eight or ten thieves from a distant province enter a district, and after robbing a few of the inhabitants or their houses, disappear; an alarm is raised, statements are brought forward of losses which never happened, in the expectation of obtaining a remission of rent, and the magistrate himself is sometimes too easily led to give credit to these reports, and to represent the district as being in an alarming state, and to call for an increase of his establishment in order to meet the difficulty; whereas, if he had given himself leisure to investigate the reports, he would have found that his district was just in its ordinary state.

From the first introduction of our judicial regulations, the people of the country have been accused, both by the magistrates and judges, of not sufficiently aiding the police. The complaint

of offenders escaping, because people do not choose to appear as prosecutors or witnesses, from indolence, apathy, or distance, is common to all countries, and is as little chargeable to India as to any other. I believe that if the matter were fairly examined, it would be found that the police derives much more gratuitous aid from the people in this country than in England; but we expect from them more than ought to be required in any country. As the Mahomedan law officers in criminal trials rejected not only the evidence of the police but of all public servants, it was thought advisable to remedy this inconvenience, by making two or more of the most respectable inhabitants of the village, to which any criminal was brought for examination, attest the depositions, in consequence of which they were obliged to make two journeys to the station of the Zillah court, and many of them were obliged to perform this duty twice a year, because, the better their character, the more likely they were to be called upon as witnesses. They often complained of this heavy grievance; but it was not till lately that they were exempted from it, as it was considered by most of the judges as a duty which they owed to the public, and were bound to perform. The performance, no doubt, facilitated the business of the judge with the Mahomedan law officer; but it was certainly most unreasonable to expect that a respectable shopkeeper or merchant should be always ready to leave his house and his own affairs, and to undertake an expensive journey about a trial in which he had no concern, merely for the sake of public justice. Many of the judges have, however, done justice to the character of the people in their support of the law, and stated that they have of late shown great alacrity in the preservation of the peace of the country, and gallant behaviour in attacking robbers.

We should be careful that, in our anxiety to form an efficient police, we do not sacrifice the comfort of the people, and establish a system of general vexation and oppression. There is nothing by which we are so likely to be unintentionally led into systematic vexation as by schemes of police, registering the inhabitants of villages, making them responsible for each other, dividing them into classes to keep alternate watch, making them account for their absence. All these are fond imitations of the Saxon tything; a system well enough calculated, in an ignorant age, among a poor and scanty population, to ensure peace and personal safety, but calculated at the same time to check every improvement, and to perpetuate poverty and ignorance, and utterly unsuitable to a populous and wealthy country. In countries which have attained

any degree of civilization, it is always found best to provide for the police at the public expense, and to leave the people at perfect liberty to pursue their several occupations without any restraint, and without any call upon them for police duties.

The number of persons apprehended, released, and punished, gives, though not an accurate, yet a general idea of the state of crime in the country. The following is the abstract for the last six months of 1823; it is taken in preference to a similar period in 1824, because in that year the number of commitments was swelled by the famine driving many poor people to seek a subsistence by robbery, and plundering hoards of grain.

Abstract of the number of persons apprehended, released, and punished, from the 1st July to 31st December 1823.

Apprehended.	By the Magistrate.		By the Criminal Judge.	By the Court of Circuit.	Foujdarry Adawlut.
	Acquitted and released				
23,188	Acquitted and released	8,356	1,957	374	86
	Convicted and punished	10,526	1,082	170	120
	Sent to the Criminal Judge	4,728	1,205	265	
	Total	23,610	4,244	809	206

A short abstract of the civil suits for the first six months of 1824, taken from the report of the Sudder Adawlut of the 8th of November 1824, shows that the operations of the different civil courts appear to keep pace with the demands of the country.

Abstract statement of suits in all the Zillahs, from the 1st of January to the 1st of July 1824.

In all Zillahs.	Original Suits.			Appeals.		
	Disposed of	Instituted.	Depending.	Disposed of	Instituted.	Depending.
Before the Judge	272		910	295		1073
Register	432	2551	581	259	775	496
Sudder Ameen	1719		1707	322		171
Total	2423	2551	3198	866	775	1740
District Moonsiffs	27333	25678	20594			
District Panchayets	14	10	26			
Village Moonsiffs	1445	1593	696			
Village Panchayets	3	5	9			

It is observed by the Sudder Adawlut, that the whole number of suits depending on the 1st of July last in the Zillah courts is far short of the number which they may fairly be expected to dispose of within a period of six months; and that the number of causes of older date than 1822 pending in all the courts on the 1st of July last, was but thirty original suits and forty-four appeals.

The peculiar character and condition of the Rayets require that some laws should be made specially for their protection. The non-resistance of the Rayets in general to oppression, has been too little attended to in our regulations. We make laws for them as though they were Englishmen, and are surprised that they should have no operation. A law might be a very good one in England, and useless here. This arises from the different characters of the people. In England, the people resist oppression, and it is their spirit which gives efficacy to the law; in India, the people rarely resist oppression, and the law intended to secure them from it, can, therefore, derive no aid from themselves. Though the Rayets frequently complain of illegal exactions, they very seldom resist them; they more commonly submit without complaining, and they often abscond when they have no longer the means of paying them.

It is in vain to caution them against paying, by telling them that the law is on their side, and will support them in refusing to comply with unauthorized demands. All exhortations on this head are thrown away, and after listening to them, they will the very next day submit as quietly to extortion as before. Some of the more bold and intelligent, it is true, withhold payment and complain; but the number is so small as to have no sensible effect, for the great mass submit quietly, and will continue for generations to submit, until a total change shall have been wrought in their character. There is nothing extraordinary in this; it is the natural consequence of their condition. They had always under their native Princes been accustomed to implicit submission to the demands of the government officers. Both they and their Princes have long since been under a foreign yoke; first, of Mahomedans, and afterwards of Europeans; and their exclusion under both from all share in the Government, has rendered the Rayets of less consideration, and made them still less disposed to resist unauthorised exactions, than under their ancient native rulers. As, therefore, they will not protect themselves by resisting injustice, we must endeavour to protect them

by laws, which would be unnecessary in England, or in almost any country not under foreign dominion ; and we must, for this salutary purpose, invest the collector and magistrate, the person most interested in their welfare, with power to secure them from exaction, by authorising him to make summary inquiry into all illegal exactions, to recover the amount, to restore whatever is recovered to the Rayets, and to punish the offenders. We suppose that our laws are founded on just principles, and that they must therefore have the same beneficial operation here as at home ; but we forget that one great first principle, the freedom of the people, from which they derive their influence, does not exist here. Our institutions here, not resting on the same foundation as those of a free country, cannot be made to act in the same way. We cannot make the inanimate corpse perform the functions of the living body ; we must, therefore, in making regulations here, think only of their probable effect in this country, not of what such regulations have or might have in England. We must often entrust powers here which we would not there : we must even sometimes make a man a judge, where he may be said to be in some degree a party ; but in this case, we are to consider whether it is not indispensable to the protection of the people.

For some years past it has been the object of Government to legislate as little as possible, and the few regulations which have been passed, are less to provide for new matters, than to cancel or amend former regulations, found to be unsuitable to the circumstances of the country. Two great evils which resulted from the joint operations of our judicial code and revenue system, were, the frequent distraint of the property, and imprisonment of the persons of the principal Rayets, on account of balances. The confinement usually continued for many years ; the prisoners frequently died in the course of it, and the debt was seldom realized. The default was sometimes occasioned by fraud, but much oftener by inability, arising from unavoidable losses, and it was always difficult to ascertain the real cause. It has been the main end of the provisions of some late regulations to lessen these evils, and if they produce the desired effect, which there is little reason to doubt, they will confer a most important benefit upon the people. The practice of distraint has been already greatly diminished, and the Collector of Salem, in his report of last year, observes, that the whole of the land revenue of that province, amounting to about seventeen lacs of rupees,

had been realised without a single case of distraint. It was my wish to have abolished altogether the punishment of imprisonment for arrears of land rent, because I thought that the loss from fraud would never be very considerable, and that it would be better that the revenues should suffer it, than that a remedy so harsh and unpopular should be continued; but it appeared safer, on the whole, to adopt the opinion of my colleagues, that the power of imprisonment should be retained, but its exercise limited. The good effects of this measure have already been extensively felt; the imprisonment of a Rayet for a balance of rent is now a rare occurrence. On the 30th of September last, the number of persons in gaol under this Presidency, confined by the several collectors for arrears of rent, was forty-five; but of these, only two were Rayets, the rest were adventurers, who generally engage in farming the sale of spirits, intoxicating drugs, and tobacco, and are usually fraudulent defaulters. When we consider that the land rent is collected from nine hundred and fifty-four thousand nine hundred and fifty-two individuals, holding immediately of Government, this result is extremely satisfactory.

Our great error in this country, during a long course of years, has been too much precipitation in attempting to better the condition of the people, with hardly any knowledge of the means by which it was to be accomplished, and indeed without seeming to think that any other than good intentions were necessary. It is a dangerous system of government, in a country of which our knowledge is very imperfect, to be constantly urged by the desire of settling every thing permanently: to do every thing in a hurry, and in consequence wrong, and in our zeal for permanency, to put the remedy out of our reach. The ruling vice of our Government is innovation; and its innovation has been so little guided by a knowledge of the people, that though made after what was thought by us to be mature discussion, it must appear to them as little better than the result of mere caprice. We have, in our anxiety to make every thing as English as possible in a country which resembles England in nothing, attempted to create at once, throughout extensive provinces, a kind of landed property which had never existed in them; and in the pursuit of this object, we have relinquished the rights which the sovereign always possessed in the soil, and we have, in many cases, deprived the real owners, the occupant Rayets, of their proprietary rights, and bestowed them on Zemindars, and other imaginary landlords. Changes like these can never effect a per-

manent settlement in any country; they are rather calculated to unsettle whatever was before deemed permanent. We erroneously think that all that is necessary for the permanent settlement of a country is, that Government should limit its own demand, and that it is of no consequence by whom this demand is collected; and that, provided the amount be not exceeded, the Rayet is not injured, whether he pay it to the officer of Government, or to a newly-created Zemindar landlord. But nothing can be more unfounded than this opinion, or more mischievous in its operation; for it is a matter not of indifference, but of the highest importance, by whom the Government land rent is collected and paid. Every proprietor or Rayet, great and small, ought to pay his own rent and that of his tenants, when he has any, to the Government officer. If, instead of doing this, some hundreds of proprietary Rayets are made to pay their public rents to a Zemindar, they will soon lose their independence, become his tenants, and probably end by sinking into the class of labourers. Such an innovation would be much more fatal to the old rights of property than conquest by a foreign enemy; for such a conquest, though it overthrew the Government, would leave the people in their former condition. But this internal change, this village revolution, changes every thing, and throws both influence and property into new hands; it deranges the order of society; it depresses one class of men for the sake of raising another; it weakens the respect and authority of ancient offices and institutions, and the local administration conducted by their means is rendered much more difficult. It is time that we should learn, that neither the face of a country, its property, nor its society, are things that can be suddenly improved by any contrivance of ours, though they may be greatly injured by what we mean for their good; that we should take every country as we find it, and not rashly attempt to regulate its landed property, either in its accumulation or division. That whether it be held by a great body of Rayets, or by a few Zemindars, or by a mixture of both, our business is not with its distribution, but with its protection; and that if, while we protect, we assess it moderately, and leave it to its natural course, it will in time flourish, and assume that form which is most suitable to the condition of the people.

If we make a summary comparison of the advantages and disadvantages which have occurred to the natives from our Government, the result, I fear, will hardly be so much in its favour as it

ought to have been. They are more secure from the calamities both of foreign war and internal commotions ; their persons and property are more secure from violence ; they cannot be wantonly punished, or their property seized, by persons in power, and their taxation is on the whole lighter. But on the other hand, they have no share in making laws for themselves, little in administering them, except in very subordinate offices ; they can rise to no high station, civil or military ; they are everywhere regarded as an inferior race, and often rather as vassals or servants than as the ancient owners and masters of the country.

It is not enough that we confer on the natives the benefits of just laws and of moderate taxation, unless we endeavour to raise their character ; but under a foreign government there are so many causes which tend to depress it, that it is not easy to prevent it from sinking. It is an old observation, that he who loses his liberty loses half his virtue. This is true of nations as well as of individuals. To have no property scarcely degrades more in one case, than in the other to have property at the disposal of a foreign government in which we have no share. The enslaved nation loses the privileges of a nation, as the slave does those of a freeman ; it loses the privilege of taxing itself, of making its own laws, of having any share in their administration, or in the general government of the country. British India has none of these privileges ; it has not even that of being ruled by a despot of its own ; for to a nation which has lost its liberty, it is still a privilege to have its countryman and not a foreigner as its ruler. Nations always take a part with their Government, whether free or despotic, against foreigners. Against an invasion of foreigners the national character is always engaged, and in such a cause the people often contend as strenuously in the defence of a despotic as of a free Government. It is not the arbitrary power of a national sovereign, but subjugation to a foreign one, that destroys national character and extinguishes national spirit. When a people cease to have a national character to maintain, they lose the mainspring of whatever is laudable both in public and in private life, and the private sinks with the public character.

Though under such obstacles the improvement of character must necessarily be slow and difficult, and can never be carried to that height which might be possible among an independent people, yet we ought not to be discouraged by any difficulty from endeavouring, by every means in our power, to raise it as

far as may be practicable in the existing relative situation of this country to Britain.

One of the greatest disadvantages of our Government in India is its tendency to lower or destroy the higher ranks of society, to bring them all too much to one level, and by depriving them of their former weight and influence, to render them less useful instruments in the internal administration of the country. The native Governments had a class of richer gentry, composed of Jagheerdars and Enamdars, and of all the higher civil and military officers: These, with the principal merchants and Rayets, formed a large body, wealthy, or at least easy in their circumstances. The Jagheers and Enams of one prince were often resumed by another, and the civil and military officers were liable to frequent removal; but they were replaced by others, and as new Jagheers and Enams were granted to new claimants, these changes had the effect of continually throwing into the country a supply of men, whose wealth enabled them to encourage its cultivation and manufactories. These advantages have almost entirely ceased under our Government. All the civil and military offices of any importance are now held by Europeans, whose savings go to their own country; and the Jagheers and Enams which are resumed, or which lapse to Government, are replaced only in a very small degree. We cannot raise the Native civil and military officers to their former standard, and also maintain our European establishment; but we can grant Jagheers to meritorious native servants more frequently than has been our custom; and we can do what is much more important to the country—we can place the whole body of the Rayets on a better footing with regard to assessment than ever they have been before, and we can do this without any permanent sacrifice of revenue, because their labour is productive, and will in time repay the remission of rent by increased cultivation. The custom of all the sons inheriting equal shares of the father's property, was among all Hindoos a great obstacle to the accumulation of wealth; and among the Rayets the high rate of assessment was an additional obstacle. Few Rayets could ever, even in the course of a long life, acquire much property from the produce of their lands; but many of their leading men or heads of villages had, under the Native governments, other ways of acquiring it. They leagued with the revenue servants in underrating the produce and the collections, and, as they were necessary to them in this work, they received a share of the embezzlement.

Wherever the government dues were paid in kind, the facilities of fraud were greatest, and the principal Rayets have therefore, on this account, usually opposed every attempt to convert a rent in kind into money assessment.

This source of wealth still, no doubt, remains, but in a very small degree in comparison with what it was under the Native governments. We are more exact and rigid in enforcing our demands, and it is therefore the more incumbent on us to see that our assessment is so moderate as to be easily collected, and to enable them to thrive under it. We have of late years done something to raise the condition of the natives, by the appointment of the higher judicial and revenue officers, and of the Moonsiffs or district judges, who have an original jurisdiction to the amount of five hundred rupees. We may do much to raise it still more, by gradually admitting the natives into more important offices, both in the revenue and judicial department, and excluding them from none in which they can be employed consistently with the due preservation of European control.

There is one great question to which we should look in all our arrangements; What is to be their final result on the character of the people? Is it to be raised, or is it to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power and protecting the inhabitants, leaving them to sink gradually in character lower than at present; or are we to endeavour to raise their character, and to render them worthy of filling higher situations in the management of their country, and of devising plans for its improvement? It ought undoubtedly to be our aim to raise the minds of the natives, and to take care that whenever our connection with India might cease, it did not appear that the only fruit of our dominion there had been to leave the people more abject and less able to govern themselves than when we found them. Many different plans may be suggested for the improvement of their character, but none of them can be successful, unless it be first laid down as a main principle of our policy, that the improvement must be made. This principle once established, we must trust to time and perseverance for realizing the object of it. We have had too little experience, and are too little acquainted with the natives, to be able to determine without trial what means would be most likely to facilitate their improvement. Various measures might be suggested, which might all probably be more or less useful; but no one appears to me so well calculated to ensure success, as that of endeavouring to give them a higher

opinion of themselves, by placing more confidence in them, by employing them in important situations, and perhaps by rendering them eligible to almost every office under the Government. It is not necessary to define at present the exact limit to which their eligibility should be carried, but there seems to be no reason why they should be excluded from any office for which they were qualified, without danger to the preservation of their own ascendancy.

Liberal treatment has always been found the most effectual way of alleviating the character of every people, and we may be sure that it will produce a similar effect on that of the people of India. The change will, no doubt, be slow, but that is the very reason why no time should be lost in commencing the work. We should not be discouraged by difficulties; nor because little progress may be made in our own time, abandon the enterprise as hopeless, and charge upon the obstinacy and bigotry of the natives the failure which has been occasioned solely by our own fickleness, in not pursuing steadily the only line of conduct on which any hope of success could be reasonably founded. We should make the same allowances for the Hindoos as for other nations, and consider how slow the progress of improvement has been among the nations of Europe, and through what a long course of barbarous ages they had to pass before they attained their present state. When we compare other countries with England, we usually speak of England as she now is; we scarcely ever think of going back beyond the Reformation; and we are apt to regard every foreign country as ignorant and uncivilized, whose state of improvement does not in some degree approximate to our own, even though it should be higher than our own was at no very distant period.

We should look upon India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular Government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn. That the desirable change here contemplated may in some after-age be effected in India, there is no cause to despair. Such a change was at one time in Britain itself, at least as hopeless as it is here. When we reflect how much the character of nations has always been influenced by that of Governments, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk

into barbarism, while others, formerly the rudest, have attained the highest point of civilization, we shall see no reason to doubt, that if we pursue steadily the proper measures, we shall in time so far improve the character of our Indian subjects, as to enable them to govern and protect themselves.

Those who speak of the natives as men utterly unworthy of trust, who are not influenced by ambition or by the law of honourable distinction, and who have no other passion but that of gain, describe a race of men that nowhere exists, and which, if it did exist, would scarcely deserve to be protected. But if we are sincere in our wishes to protect and render them justice, we ought to believe that they deserve it. We cannot easily bring ourselves to take much interest in what we despise and regard as unworthy. The higher the opinion we have of the natives, the more likely we shall be to govern them well, because we shall then think them worthy of our attention ; I therefore consider it as a point of the utmost importance to our national character and the future good government of the country, that all our young servants who are destined to have a share in it, should be early impressed with favourable sentiments of the natives.

I have in the course of this Minute urged again and again the expediency of lowering our land revenue, and of establishing a moderate and fixed assessment, because I am satisfied that this measure alone would be much more effectual than all other measures combined in promoting the improvement both of the country and of the people. But before we can lower the land revenue to the best advantage, we ought to know clearly what it is we are giving up. As the information requisite for this purpose can only be obtained from an accurate survey of each province, these surveys, where still wanting, should be undertaken wherever the collectors are competent to the task. When completed, they will furnish a ground-work on which the land revenue of the country may with safety hereafter be lowered or raised, according to circumstances. We should look forward to a time when it may be lowered. India should, like England, be relieved from a part of her burdens whenever the state of affairs may permit such a change. Whatever surplus might remain after the payment of all civil and military charges, and of all charges connected with the improvement or protection of the country, should be remitted. The remission granted in peace might be again imposed in war, and even something additional. This would probably obviate, in a great measure, the necessity of raising money by loans

on the recurrence of war. The people would bear the addition willingly, when they knew that it was for a temporary object ; and the remission which had been previously granted would dispose them the more readily to place confidence in the assurance of Government, that the increase was not intended to be made permanent.

THOMAS MUNRO.

I subjoin to this long, important, and deeply interesting minute, a few out of the many private letters written by Sir Thomas Munro during this stage of his career. They stand in need of no comment, nor shall any be offered.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

April 30th, 1819.

MY DEAR SIR,

WHEN I left Madras I had very little idea of ever visiting India again, but I had scarcely landed when I found that I should be obliged to go back to Madras. I would have preferred the overland route had I been alone, but as Mrs. M. accompanies me, my intention at present is to go in one of the Company's China ships to Bombay in April. My reason for going by Bombay is, that I may have the benefit of conversing with you on your arrangements in the Mahratta districts, and that I may learn something of the system of administration in the territories under Bombay. I am in hopes that I shall find many things in it which it will be useful for us to imitate at Madras ; I am anxious that we should be able to ascertain the most effectual means of protecting the Rayets from oppression, and that every regulation for this purpose should be as short and plain as possible, and less encumbered with written forms than it was thought necessary to introduce at Madras with the regulations there.

I trust that Lord Hastings has continued the Peishwah's country under your superintendence, notwithstanding your appointment to Bombay ; or that, if any change has been made, he has given the superintendence to Malcolm, whose eminent services so well entitle him to every distinction that can be conferred upon him. I hope that Macdonell is doing well, and that Captain Grant is bringing the Sattarah principality into good order. I found your uncle, William Elphinstone, in good health, but look-

ing old, which was to be expected at seventy-nine ; he is, however, as warm and as zealous as ever in supporting his friends.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 9th August, 1820.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I HAVE many excuses, but no good one, for not answering your letter of the 14th June. The best I have is the oldness and consequent decay of my eyes, which, in place of serving me all day and all night, as in former times, can do duty only for a few hours daily. Since I came here they have been chiefly occupied in reading masses of papers of useless altercation between different departments ; they require all my patience, and a great deal more, for I have very little left. Nothing is so tiresome as to waste time in discussions about matters of no importance in themselves, but which derive some from the absurd heat of the combatants.

Macdonell, who has just been with me, tells me that you want to know what the private secretary here has to do, in order that you may set Captain Terry to work in the same way. If you really wish to keep him busy, you should set all your public officers at variance with each other, and employ him to read their lucubrations to you. This is what Macdonell and I do, and the Company are, no doubt, much obliged to us for occupying ourselves in a way so much to their advantage. If it were not for this, I really do not know what I could make of a private secretary. I find that there has always been an office for this gentleman here, with an establishment sufficient to have kept the records of a province, but I do not know what was done in it. I imagine that in early and better days, the private secretary's principal business was to lay every rich native under contribution for the benefit of his master ; but as this class of natives has now become extinct at this place, my secretary will, I fear, have but little to do. I have therefore been thinking of desiring him to devote his attention to the discovery of a plan for restoring the prosperity of the country, and increasing the breed of rich men ; and this will, I imagine, in the present circumstances of the country, save him from the evil consequences of idleness.

I think as you do of Macdonell, and shall be glad whenever I can find the means of acknowledging his service. Lady M. was much flattered by finding that your opinion of the merits of

Ivanhoe agreed so much with her own; but she still looks for your critique on Anastasius. I shall wait till October for your report coming back from England; if it does not come within that time, I shall conclude that it has been seized by some admirer of Indian institutions, and request you to give me another copy. I wish you would in the mean time let me have a copy of your Minutes, &c. respecting the education of your civil servants.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE CANNING.

Bombay, 15th May, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

EVERY thing is quiet under the Bengal and Madras Government, and under the Bombay Government, with the exception of some slight disturbance, occasioned by an incursion of a few banditti on the Cutch frontier, which has led to some preparation on both sides, but will, I hope, terminate without hostilities.

Mr. Elphinstone retains the general superintendence of the late Peishwah's dominions; but Mr. Chaplin acts as commissioner. This is just as it should be, for it keeps the Mahratta territories together, till they can be brought into some kind of order, and it places them under the immediate management of the man who, of all the Madras civil servants, is the best qualified for the purpose. Sir John Malcolm means to go home in December:— I am sorry for it; for I think his continuance in Malwa is of great importance to the preservation of tranquillity, and I do not see how his place is to be supplied. He ought undoubtedly to be kept in Malwa for some years, to look after the turbulent chiefs and conflicting interests in that province. The future prosperity of all recent conquests depends on the measures adopted during the few first years, in bringing them into form, and consolidating our power. If we are too impatient to get rid of some trifling expense, and to persuade ourselves that all is right, and that matters will go on smoothly, without the necessity of employing persons capable of controlling every hostile movement, we shall have the centre of India in a state of confusion from which it may be difficult to extricate it hereafter.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 14th October, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

I SEE no reason to expect disturbances from any of the Native states now surrounded by our territory. They are all too weak to give us any uneasiness. The death of a chief may occasionally produce some dispute among the claimants to the succession; but our preponderating force, wherever its interposition is required, will always easily decide the contest. The Bheels and other plundering tribes, of whom so much has been said, are a miserable race, poor and few in number: they are plunderers, because they have themselves been plundered and oppressed; and if they are well treated, they will in a few years become as quiet as any of our other Indian subjects living among woods and hills.

In this country we always are, and always ought to be, prepared for war. But this very circumstance gives us the best security for the long enjoyment of peace, and we ought to avail ourselves of this favourable state of things in order to improve our own territories, and to establish, as far as possible, some degree of regularity in those of the Native powers dependent upon us. The first step for this purpose should be to assign limits to the different Presidencies within which they are respectively to exercise immediate authority, leaving to Bengal the general control over the whole. The limits which I would recommend for Madras are the Mahanuddy and the Nerbuddah to the north; to the west, the boundary between the Nizam's and the Peishwah's country, as it stood in 1792; and to the north-west a line drawn from the Kistna to the Ghauts, including within it the southern Mahratta states.

Within all this range I am confident that the immediate jurisdiction of Madras could be exercised with greater advantage to the empire than that of Bengal. The whole of this tract belongs either to the Carnatic or the Deccan, and its inhabitants are different both in language and character from those of Hindostan and Bengal, and can on this account, as well as from their local situation, be more easily managed by the Madras than the Supreme Government. When Hyderabad and Nagpoor were great foreign and independent states, and more likely to act against us than with us, the immediate control of Bengal was right, more especially as it did not affect the authority of the Madras

Government over its army, of which only two battalions were for several years at Hyderabad. But both Hyderabad and Nagpore are now as completely dependent upon us as Mysore; they must, at some period or other, fall entirely into our hands, and the internal administration must in the mean time be chiefly directed by our resident. No skill can make a country prosper under such a system; but still it may be preserved in a much better state under the Madras than the Bengal Government, because it lies more within our reach, its inhabitants are better known to us, and the country is occupied by our troops. At present the discipline of our army is much injured by our having about twenty thousand men beyond our frontiers, and removed in a great measure from our control. They are under the Bengal Government, or rather the residents, by whom all commands, even of the most subordinate kind, are distributed. When complaints are received respecting supplies, or any other matter, we find it difficult to interfere in a satisfactory manner; and from the absence of a complete and direct control in either government, much confusion and abuse arises, and the national character suffers. This might easily be remedied by placing Nagpore and Hyderabad with their residents under Madras. We could then through our own residents exercise direct authority over our troops; and by having both residents and troops under our orders, we should have better means than the Bengal Government have, of seeing that both did their duty. The Supreme Government would of course, in peace and war, and other great political questions, still direct the affairs of Nagpore and Hyderabad; and if we add to this the direction of our relations with all independent states, and with all the tributaries immediately on Bengal, we shall find that, after leaving to Madras the countries south of the Nerbuddah, it will have as much to do as it can well attend to.

I am, with great esteem, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. JOHN SULLIVAN.

Madras, 12th October, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

I HAD the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 31st January from Paris, some time after my arrival in this country.

I should expect more benefit from the circulation of short tracts by the natives, or of translations of short European tracts by

natives, than from translations precipitately made of the Bible, or any great work, by the missionaries. I have no faith in the power of any missionary to acquire in four or five years, such a knowledge of any Indian language as to enable him to make a respectable translation of the Bible. I fear that such translations are not calculated to inspire becoming reverence for the book. In place of translating the Bible into ten or twelve languages in a few years, I would rather see twenty years devoted to its translation into one. If we hope for success, we must proceed gradually, and adopt the means by which we may be likely to attain it. The dissemination of knowledge is, I think, the surest way; and if we can prevail upon the native princes to give it the support you propose, it will be a good beginning. I shall communicate with the Resident of Tanjore on the subject; and if the Rajah, who is now near Conjeveram on his way to Cassi, calls here, I will mention it to him. There is such a mass of mere routine reading here, that I have scarcely been able to give my attention to general questions since my return. I have lately been for many days engaged in reading the papers connected with the single case of —; and unless we contrive some means of reducing the quantity of reading, the members of government will have no time for giving due consideration to matters of general importance.

The points of improvement in our general system, which I wish to carry into effect soonest, are the regulations proposed in 1816 by the Board of Revenue, for the prevention and punishment of extra collections and embezzlements, and the drafts of regulations proposed by the Commissioners in 1817, upon pattahs, distraints, &c. in consequence of the orders of the Directors. I have always thought that Rayets ought never to have been imprisoned for arrears of revenue, and I wish to abolish the practice. I think that it may be done entirely without any risk of loss of revenue. But as the Board of Revenue and some of the collectors think it would be a dangerous experiment, I shall yield to their alarms, so far probably as to confine the exemption to Rayets holding immediately of the sirkar, and even among them to permit imprisonment only in special cases of contumacy. I am satisfied however, from my own experience, that with regard to the Rayets, the exemption might safely be made complete. The power of distraint is quite sufficient to protect the revenue: it harasses the Rayet, without disgracing him; and if he can pay, will be more likely, than throwing him into gaol, to make him

discharge his debt. The same privilege cannot safely be granted to Zemindars and farmers of revenue, because it might tempt them to withhold and secrete large balances from their actual collections: There is another point which I have long established in my own mind, as one requiring correction—I mean the destruction of all the ancient landholders, by introducing among them the Hindoo law of division among all the brothers, instead of that of descent to the eldest. The written law among all private persons is division; but usage, or the common law, among the ancient Rajahs and Poligars, is undivided descent to the eldest son, who makes a suitable provision for the rest of the family. The consequence of introducing the rule of joint or equal inheritance among them is, that many of them have been ruined by lawsuits, and that every one of them must inevitably suffer the same fate.

Law adventurers get into every family, and excite some member of it to bring his claim into a court of justice. It is of little importance to the vakeels how the suit ends, as they get their fees. These suits are generally very expensive, and the ignorance of the Zemindars in all matters of business makes them doubly expensive by the impositions of their own agents; and if the property is divided, as generally happens, among two, three, or more claimants, the whole are reduced to distress, and the Government is rendered unpopular. I am now endeavouring to bring forward a regulation to restore to all ancient Zemindars the law of primogeniture, who formerly enjoyed it. The privilege will be confined to the families in which it prevailed until it was abolished by our levelling code. I meant, after disposing of some more pressing matters, to extend the operations of some of the regulations of 1816, by increasing the jurisdiction of the Native commissioners or Moonsifs. I have heard three hundred rupees proposed as the limit of the District Moonsifs' cognizance; but I imagine that it may, with advantage to the community, be extended to a thousand. The young writers have all been sent up the country, in order to learn a little revenue, and as much as they can of the people; but this is doing nothing, unless we raise the revenue to the level of the judicial line; if we do not, every man who has friends or talents will run into the judicial.

With great esteem, yours faithfully,
(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL NEWALL.

Madras, 23rd December, 1820.

MY DEAR NEWALL,

You ere now have heard of your appointment to be Resident at Travancore. You can either go direct to your station by the Malabar coast, or you may come here first. Do as you please, but let me know your plan as soon as you can. If you go direct to Travancore, you will, I hope, keep every thing just as you find it, and let the public business go on as if no change had taken place. You will, like all new men coming to the head of an office, be assailed by thousands of complaints against the servants of your predecessor. You can hear them calmly and leisurely; and if you are satisfied they have acted wrong, you can remove them. But in all these matters too much caution cannot be used; and I hope that you will write to me on the subject before you attempt any innovation. We have already, I think, made too much in this country.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GEORGE CANNING.

Madras, 16th March, 1821.

DEAR SIR,

I WRITE to you but seldom, because affairs here proceed so uniformly that hardly any thing occurs which it is necessary to bring to your notice. The territories of this Government are perfectly tranquil, and not likely to be disturbed by either foreign or domestic enemies. We have occasionally, and probably will have for generations yet to come, some petty feuds among families or rival chiefs of woody districts, which cause the loss of a few lives, or the burning of a few huts. They are usually much exaggerated by the local authorities, but they are trifling in themselves, and excited rather by private animosity than by opposition to Government, and have little effect on the general quiet of the country.

The country has suffered much during the last four years from the irregularity of the seasons, and the uncommon frequency of storms, and from the waste of life by the cholera; but this epidemic seems to be now on the decline, and though the revenue will in some districts be considerably less than in former years, it will, on the whole, be nearly about its usual standard.

I have not yet made any extension of the regulations of 1816;

but I have never lost sight of the principles on which they are founded, namely, the relief of the people from novel and oppressive modes of judicial process ; the improvement of our internal administration, by employing Europeans and Natives in those duties for which they are respectively best suited, and the strengthening of the attachment of the Natives to our Government, by maintaining their ancient institutions and usages.

I have always thought that the practice of confining Rayets in the common gaol like felons, so disgraceful to our code, might not only without inconvenience, but with advantage, be abolished. I have had much discussion on the subject since my return to India, and have so far yielded to the general opinion, as to agree that Rayets shall still, in some extreme cases of contumacy, be liable to imprisonment, and a regulation on the subject is now preparing. This regulation will also enable the Tisheldars and other native officers under the magistrates to punish trivial thefts when not committed by professional thieves. At present, every petty theft of labourers from their masters' grain, of children in the power of their parents, or of idlers at fairs, which the Natives themselves would either regard as mere mischief, or as an offence to be punished by reprimand or slight chastisement, are considered as crimes, and the offenders and witnesses dragged away from their homes fifty or a hundred miles, to the presence of the magistrate. As the court of the District Munsiff is much more frequented by the Natives than that of the Zillah Judge, it is intended to extend his jurisdiction to five hundred rupees, that of the Sudder Amin to seven hundred and fifty, and of the Register to a thousand.

The only other regulation which I have in view at present, is one for entailing the possessions of ancient Rajahs upon their heirs, and to secure them against sale for debt. Our sweeping code of 1802 has made the domains of tributary Rajahs, which have been in the same families for ages, which all Governments but ours have respected, and which no money-lender could touch, all liable to sale. There will be some difficulty in replacing these Rajahs in the situations in which we found them, but it must be done.

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TO THE RIGHT HON. G. CANNING.

Madras, 30th June, 1821.

MY DEAR SIR,

You judge right in thinking that your resignation of the office of President of the Board of Control is an event in which I must take "some little interest," for no event could have happened in which I could have taken more. I lament it deeply, both on public and private grounds. I should, even if I had not seen your letter to your constituents, have concluded without hesitation, that your motives for resigning were just, but I should not the less have regretted the loss to the nation.

I trust that we shall soon again see you filling some high office; but I confess I would rather see you in your former one than any other, for my own situation becomes doubly valuable when it is held under a man whose name communicates some show of reputation to all his subordinates.

I always dread changes at the head of the India Board, for I fear some downright Englishman may at last get there, who will insist on making Anglo-Saxons of the Hindoos. I believe there are men in England who think that this desirable change has been already effected in some degree; and that it would long since have been completed, had it not been opposed by the Company's servants. I have no faith in the modern doctrine of the rapid improvement of the Hindoos, or of any other people. The character of the Hindoos is probably much the same as when Vasco de Gama first visited India, and it is not likely that it will be much better a century hence. The strength of our government will, no doubt, in that period, by preventing the wars so frequent in former times, increase the wealth and population of the country. We shall also, by the establishment of schools, extend among the Hindoos the knowledge of their own literature, and of the language and literature of England. But all this will not improve their character; we shall make them more pliant and servile, more industrious, and perhaps more skilful in the arts,—and we shall have fewer banditti; but we shall not raise their moral character. Our present system of government, by excluding all natives from power, and trust, and emolument, is much more efficacious in depressing, than all our laws and school-books can do in elevating their character. We are working against our own designs, and we can expect to make no progress while we work with a feeble instrument to improve, and a powerful one to

deteriorate. The improvement of the character of a people, and the keeping them, at the same time, in the lowest state of dependence on foreign rulers, to which they can be reduced by conquest, are matters quite incompatible with each other.

There can be no hope of any great zeal for improvement, when the highest acquirements can lead to nothing beyond some petty office, and can confer neither wealth nor honour. While the prospects of the natives are so bounded, every project for bettering their characters must fail; and no such projects can have the smallest chance of success, unless some of those objects are placed within their reach, for the sake of which men are urged to exertion in other countries. This work of improvement, in whatever way it may be attempted, must be very slow, but it will be in proportion to the degree of confidence which we repose in them, and to the share which we give them in the administration of public affairs. All that we can give them, without endangering our own ascendancy, should be given. All real military power must be kept in our own hands; but they might, with advantage hereafter, be made eligible to every civil office under that of a member of the Government. The change should be gradual, because they are not yet fit to discharge properly the duties of a high civil employment, according to our rules and ideas; but the sphere of their employment should be extended in proportion as we find that they become capable of filling properly higher situations.

We shall never have much accurate knowledge of the resources of the country, or of the causes by which they are raised or depressed; we shall always assess it very unequally, and often too high, until we learn to treat the higher classes of natives as gentlemen, and to make them assist us accordingly in doing what is done by the House of Commons in England, in estimating and apportioning the amount of taxation. I am, with great regard and esteem.

Your faithful servant,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO,

TO THE HON. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 2nd May, 1821.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I HAVE only heard once from you since your unfortunate fall, which is as often as I could expect when it is considered, that you have been twice in that interval engaged in war with Arabia. Macdonell has sent you occasionally such of our regu-

lations as he thought you would wish to see; but, instead of sending you regulations, I would prefer sending you some young men, to learn in the Mahratta provinces what the Natives of India are, and whether they are likely to be the better of all the dull and heavy regulations which our supposed wisdom is so fond of imposing upon them. A great proportion of the Madras provinces, being under what is called the permanent system, affords no proper field for the instruction of young men in a knowledge of the people or of the revenue. This knowledge can no where be so well attained as in the territory under you, and I am therefore anxious to send some of our collegians to complete their education there. They would be of little use to you, but they would be very useful to us hereafter in whatever quarter we might have occasion to employ them. You have not civil servants, I believe, to supply the demands of your enlarged dominions; and if you had, it would still, I think, be advisable to have Madras servants in that part of them which it is likely may, in a future period, be transferred to this Presidency. I hope therefore that you will draw upon us for a few young civil servants.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. C. B. BATHURST.

Bangalore, 28th September, 1821.

SIR,

MR. CANNING has informed me that he has mentioned me to you. The office which you now hold at the head of Indian affairs would have been a sufficient inducement for me to address you, but this circumstance will make me do it with more confidence.

In a time of peace, a subordinate government like Madras can have no very important political or military transactions, and must be chiefly occupied in the improvement of its resources, and the preservation of its internal tranquillity. Of the two, the preservation of tranquillity is the most immediately necessary, because without it no improvement in the revenue can take place. The insurrections of petty chiefs, which so often disturb the peace of our provinces, but more particularly of the Northern Circars, have too often been occasioned by the misconduct of our own civil and military officers, in acting precipitately, and often upon wrong information, and involving Government in hostilities which might entirely have been avoided. I am endeavouring to prevent a

recurrence of such disorders, by prohibiting the local authorities from summoning those chiefs before them, or using force against them, without the previous orders of Government, and by rendering the chiefs themselves more attached to us, by showing more confidence in them, and assisting them to recover their zemindaries when they have been lost in consequence of our measures, or even of their own imprudence.

The task of improving our resources is one of much greater difficulty than that of maintaining the peace of the country ; and this difficulty arises principally from the assessment being in general too high with respect to the condition of the people ; so that in many districts, in order to have a further increase, we must begin by making a present reduction of our revenue, because the extension of cultivation, from which the increase of revenue must result, cannot possibly be expected under the present assessment. The Presidencies of Bengal and Madras acquired their respective territories under very different circumstances, which have ever since continued to influence their revenue systems. Bengal acquired at once the dominion of rich and fertile provinces, yielding a revenue much beyond its wants ; it had therefore no occasion to enter into any minute examination of the assessment ; it was satisfied with what it got from the Zemindars, and left them in possession of the lands on very easy terms. Madras, on the contrary, rose amidst poverty and many struggles for existence. It never was able to pay its establishments : it acquired its territories by slow degrees, partly from the Nizam, but chiefly from Mysore ; and though the assessment had already been raised too high by those Governments, its own pressing necessities did not permit it to lower the demand, but forced it to enter into the most rigid scrutiny of the sources of the revenue, in order to keep it up, and there has, in consequence, always been a pressure upon the Rayets, which nothing but necessity could justify.

The present secure state of India will, I hope, enable us to lower the assessment gradually in all those districts in which it is too high. This may be done without materially affecting the general amount of the revenue, by taking the districts in succession, two or three at a time, and letting them make up by additional cultivation the reduction of their assessment before it is extended to others. We shall, by this means, ultimately increase the land-rent, and in a much greater degree the customs and every other source of revenue ; and we shall render the payment

of them much lighter to the inhabitants, because they will be enabled to augment the stock from which they are paid. I expect, from a reduction in the assessment, that land will, in time, be every where regarded as an hereditary private property by the Rayets; that their circumstances will be so much improved as to enable them to pay the revenue in all seasons, good or bad; and that the country will be able, when war happens, to bear a temporary additional assessment as a war-tax, and save us from a great part of the heavy expense which we have already been obliged to incur on account of loans.

I imagine that the requisite reduction of assessment may be made without the revenue falling below the average of the last ten years; but to make this reduction judiciously, so as to render it a benefit to the country, requires the aid of men conversant in the revenue detail and customs of the country; and of these we have very few. The great exaltation of the judicial above the revenue line, for the last twenty years, has been extremely unfavourable to their production; but we may undoubtedly have them, by raising the revenue line, and making it an object of ambition to men of talents. Its great depression below the judicial, in point of emolument, has been very injurious to the service: it has been very gradually creating a distinction between first and second-rate men; those who have talent or interest being employed in the judicial, and those who have but little of either, in the revenue. The distinction, though not avowed, is notorious, and it must be removed by bringing them to the same level.

However important the duties of a judge may be, they are, in this country, certainly not more important than those of a collector, who, with the exception of the judicial functions, exercises the whole of the internal administration of the province, and has occasion for much more various qualifications.

His designation is an unfortunate one, and ought to be changed, as it leads to the belief that the collection of the revenue is his sole duty, and that he is a mere tax-gatherer. The collection of the revenue is a very subordinate part of his duty: its distribution is a much more important one. His duty extends to every branch of the finance, and its influence is felt in the prosperity of the inhabitants. He watches the operation of the different existing taxes, and points out such as are oppressive, that they may be lowered, or altogether abolished; and also such as may be augmented without inconvenience. In every country, the amount

and distribution of taxation are perhaps the most important concerns of public authority ; there are no others on which, as on them, the universal comfort and prosperity of the people depend. In this country, the management of taxation rests almost entirely with the collector, for he is the only channel through which Government can obtain any tolerably correct information on the subject, and it is chiefly from his opinions that their own must be formed. An officer from whom so much is required, must not be looked for in a class which is not at least equal in rank and emolument to any other in the service. In order to secure a succession of men qualified to discharge properly so important a trust, we must place the revenue on an equal footing with the judicial line.

In countries where the assessment is very light, the ignorance or misconduct of a collector does not seriously injure the revenue ; but in the greater part of the Madras territories, where the revenue presses closely upon the utmost means of the people, the misconduct of a collector is often very prejudicial both to the revenue and to the people ; because the country has not the means of speedily repairing the losses which it may have sustained from his ignorance, in too rigidly exacting the full assessment in a bad season, or from his indolence in permitting the native revenue servants to levy unauthorized sums from the people. On this establishment therefore it is essential to the welfare of the country, as well as to the security of the revenue, that we should have skilful collectors ; and we find from experience, that they are only to be formed in districts where the rayetwar system prevails. Collectors who have been employed only in districts permanently settled, are not qualified for any revenue duties beyond those of the most ordinary routine. When the revenue of a district has fallen into disorder, they are unable to ascertain the cause, and still less to point out the remedy. On such occasions, recourse must always be had to a collector from a rayetwar district ; and when investigations become frequent, the withdrawing of these collectors from their own districts, to conduct inquiries into the state of others at a great distance, is frequently productive of great embarrassment to the public service. One main object therefore in raising the revenue to a level with the judicial department is, that we may always have a supply of men calculated to carry on investigations into the revenue, and into all the details of the local civil administration ; and as it is only in the rayetwar districts that the requisite knowledge can be acquired,

an extra number of revenue servants will be trained in those districts.

I am in great hopes that, before the end of 1822, we shall be able, without any aid from Bengal, to make our income adequate to all our disbursements. But it is not enough that we should be enabled to meet our ordinary expenditure: we should have a surplus to enable us to meet contingencies, and it ought not to be less than from thirty to forty lacs of rupees. We ought not to depend on Bengal for any pecuniary aid. When a Government has nothing to trust to but its own resources, its affairs will always be managed with more order and economy. But the resources of Madras are not in a condition to enable her to meet unexpected demands; and the only way in which they can be made so is, by transferring to her authority a considerable portion of the southern Mahratta provinces. She has not acquired a single acre of territory either by the Mahratta war of 1803 and 1804, or the late one; so that she has been stationary, while Bengal and Bombay have been rapidly increasing in power and extent of dominion. And as the greater part of her army has during both of these wars been employed in the field, her military charges will consequently appear to have increased during that period in a greater proportion to her revenue than those of the other Presidencies. The annexation of the southern Mahratta provinces to Madras is not only desirable for the sake of rendering this Presidency able to provide for all its expenses without assistance from Bengal, but also for the sake of their local administration. Their situation, and the language and character of the inhabitants, seem to adapt them better for being under Madras than Bengal or Bombay.

The similarity of character among the people of the different provinces of the Deccan will always render it easier to maintain our authority over that country by means of the Madras than of the Bengal army, which is composed of natives of Hindoostan, differing in language and usages from those of the Deccan. With the exception of the western part of the Deccan, composed of Mahratta districts now under Bombay, all the rest of the Deccan south of the valley of the Nerbuddah is occupied by Madras troops, while Bengal and Hindoostan are left to those of Bengal. This arrangement is the most simple that can be adopted. It will give the most satisfaction both to the troops and the inhabitants, and will therefore be most likely to insure tranquillity.

It will be the most efficient and economical, and ought never to be abandoned for any temporary benefit. I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,
(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR GRAHAM MOORE, K.C.B.

Madras, 5th Nov. 1821.

MY DEAR GRAHAM,

YOUR letter of the 9th September reached me only in September last; it was sent to me from Penang by Sir H. Blackwood. I am glad that you sacrificed your seat at the Admiralty for the command in the Mediterranean, though I shall, perhaps, on returning home some years hence, and not finding my old friend in that comfortable corner-house of the Admiralty, which I liked so much to visit, lament the romantic notions which tempted him in an evil hour to leave it. I must console myself for the loss by going out now and then to Brook Farm, and getting an account from yourself of your voyages and travels in the most delightful regions, and once the abode of the most interesting people of the earth. No wish has ever with me been so strong and constant from my earliest years as that of visiting Italy and Greece; and were I twenty years younger, I should certainly spend seven of them there. But this last boyish expedition to India has, I fear, been fatal to all my rational plans of travelling in Europe; for by the time I get home I shall, I fear, be too old, or too doited, to feel the recollections which ought to be excited by the sight of the Capitol, or the Piræus. I wished myself along with you when you describe the portraits of De L'Isle, Adom, and Valette, in the hall of the Grand Masters at Malta. I feel more interest in Malta than Gibraltar; and I would rather see Rhodes than either, because it is more connected with the ancient Grecians, whom I admire above all nations, not even excepting the Romans. These nations had not the benefit of the art of printing, and from the effects which it has of late years produced in our own country, I am not sure that they were not as well without it. Perfect liberty of the press would be an excellent thing if we could have it without its licentiousness, but this is impossible; and I therefore suspect that it will one day become necessary to increase the restrictions upon it, for it is an instrument by means of which it is much easier among the lower orders of the people to do evil than good. A writer like Tom Paine can

produce mischief almost immediately, which it may require years to remedy. I could hardly have believed that the press could have done what it did in the case of the Queen, or that such a clamour could ever have been raised about such a woman. It appears, however, to have now subsided, and I trust that the nation will feel the comfort of having in some degree recovered its senses, and endeavour to retain them. I send this letter by Sir John Malcolm, who goes home by Egypt, by which means it will reach you much sooner than by the usual channel. I am not sure whether or not you are acquainted with Sir John. His character stands very high in this country, so high that he has left none behind who can at all be compared with him. I regret his loss, both as a public servant, and as an old and esteemed friend. Lady M. met with a very unfortunate accident in February last, by falling from a horse on her head; the concussion was so great that she was for some days insensible, and one of her eyes has not yet recovered its proper place. She joins me in kindest wishes to you and Lady Moore. Tell Lady M. that her brother is well at Darwar. Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. CUMMING.

Madras, 5th January, 1822.

MY DEAR SIR,

I TAKE the opportunity of a vessel for England, whose packet closes this evening, to send you a part of a Calcutta newspaper containing an account of the Native Officers of Justice in India. The picture is correct, but perhaps too highly coloured—if not for Bengal, at least for Madras, except in a few districts. It, however, on the whole, presents a more distinct view of the subject than I have seen anywhere else. What most amuses me in it is, the strange conclusions of the writer in laying all the evils of the system upon the native character instead of our absurd institutions. I agree with him in his facts, but differ from him entirely in all his reasonings concerning them. What he describes is our own absurd and oppressive Daroga system, introduced with our code, with which the natives have nothing to do. The merit of the measure is all our own, as well as all the effects attending it. The perjury, for which he can see no remedy, arises chiefly out of the very nature of the measure. When every little petty dispute is carried away from the spot where it happened, and sent to be decided by a European magistrate, one

hundred miles distant, who is overwhelmed with numberless causes of the same kind, who has not time to examine properly one-tenth of them, and who from this cause, as well as his imperfect knowledge of the language and customs of the people, must decide in most cases by the number of witnesses rather than by their credibility—it is easy to conceive that the demand for false witnesses must increase. The District Munsiffs do not find many false witnesses, because they are not so liable as Europeans to be imposed upon by them.

Yours very sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS SISTER.

Camp near Nellore, 9th Oct. 1822.

MY DEAR MARGARET,

I WROTE to you some months ago about a certificate for the share in the Calcutta Tontine which your brother took in your name; but as the certificate which you send from England may not be according to the form required by the Society, and as they themselves never thought of a form till lately, I send it to you, and will thank you to have it executed and returned to me. Remember not to touch the affidavit below, as it must be left for me; but you know that I cannot swear that you are the lady until you swear that she is alive. I did not suspect when I last saw you, that the only correspondence you and I were to have was to be about certificates and affidavits, just like two lawyers.

Lady Munro was to have left Bangalore yesterday on her way to Madras, with Lady Grey, under charge of a wise doctor, whose name I forget. She had just received your picture, which Jessy calls a speaking likeness. Lady M. says it is very like, but that it wants something. I rather imagine that it wants nothing; but that it has got something which it ought not to have. An English artist is never satisfied with the quiet, sober grace of beauty, he always adds what he thinks will make it more striking, and I suppose that he has given you a pertish, smartish look, like one of his exhibition heads. If old Hicky at Madras were twenty years younger, I would rather have your picture by him than any English painter, for none of them ever give a true likeness of a lady. You may recollect the picture for which Lady M. sat so often at home: she has had one manufactured here by a French artist, which she thinks very like. It is such a striking likeness, that when it was shown to me with great exultation, I could not find out for whom it was intended. Mrs. Erskine has been

equally fortunate at home; she has sent out her picture, her very image — another speaking likeness, I suppose. It looks about five-and-twenty, and is as like any other woman as her, but more like a milliner's girl than any thing else. It is very odd that women never know what is like them; but the case is perhaps the same with the men: but, my goodness! what can be the cause of it? It is, however, lucky for the women, and for the painters too, that they can be easily pleased by a picture which does not in the least resemble the original. What a heap of stuff about pictures! Let us talk of something more rational before I finish my letter. I am afraid that we have little prospect of seeing you in this country, because I hear with regret that though you are said to be looking as well as ever, you are still liable to the return of a little pain in your side, whenever you make any unusual exertions; and while this continues, your medical men will advise you to remain in England. I have not seen Lady M. since the middle of May, but she is in very good health, and likes Bangalore, and if she had you there, she would never wish to leave it, unless to go home and see her son, whom his Craigie friends are spoiling so fast. I have heard nothing of her eye for some months, and I therefore conclude that no great change has taken place in it. When I last saw her, I thought that it would never entirely recover in this country, and perhaps not even at home. But the defect is now so slight as to be of no great consequence. I do not know where this will find you, but if with any of your own family, give my love to them, and believe me, my dear Margaret,

Yours affectionately,

THOMAS MUNRO.

I have been travelling through the rain for the last three days. The country is everywhere under water, and it is still pouring, and I am sitting at the door of my tent in order to get light enough to write. Every thing looks uncomfortable. The servants and followers are huddling together, and the horses and bullocks are hanging their heads, but I enjoy the gloomy scene, because it is cool, and is like home.

T. M.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 26th November, 1822.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I RECEIVED some time ago yours of the 27th October, and I have in consequence desired Mr. M'Donnell to look over, with

my new Secretary, and see whether there be any papers of a general nature worth sending to you.

I have given the Board of Revenue a complete native cutcherry; I wonder that they should ever have been without it, for it is absolutely necessary to enable them to get through their business properly. I have long felt the want of it, and often found that when I wanted information on matters of which I was ignorant, I could not get it from the Revenue Board, and was obliged to consult an Oomedwar. It will keep up the connection of the Revenue Board with the people, and extend their knowledge of local usages and revenue; and it opens a field to able and aspiring Natives, and prepares the way for giving them some share in the Government half a century or a whole century hence.

We give small grants of land to Native servants who have distinguished themselves in the revenue, political, and military lines, but none for mere length of service. The custom has in some instances been abused by Company grants on writing and record keeping.

Punchayets are always slow, and as well as Potails, are averse to interfere in complaints and suits, from the fear of the Courts. They had no such fear of the Collectors, and under them were useful auxiliaries, and would be so again, if we could contrive some way of making them responsible only to their old superiors, the Tishildars and collectors.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 19th April, 1823.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

IT is a long time since I have written to you, but I have been better employed in reading at intervals your and Chaplin's valuable works, which I have no doubt will one day be considered all over India as the best guides for the internal administration of our provinces. My attention, since my return to India, has occasionally been called to what appear to me to be defects in our military system, incompatible with good government, and which seem to have crept in by degrees, as I cannot discover any regular authority for them. I shall mention the principal.

The Commander-in-chief, at his own discretion, without any previous sanction of Government, alters the dress of the Eu-

ropeans, officers and men, of the Company's army. He, in the same manner, removes lieutenant-colonels from one corps to another as often as he pleases; and he, in the same manner, removes the majors and senior captains from the one battalion to the other of the regiment.

These powers, it is obvious, may be so exercised as to produce much discontent. I have known a lieutenant-colonel in six months in three different corps. Before the regulations of 1796, the commandant of every corps was appointed by Government. This seems to be the rule at home, as the Commander-in-chief can only appoint with the sanction of the King, the head of the Government.

I am anxious to learn what is the practice of Bombay. Are general alterations of dress, and appointments to and removals from the command of corps, made with or without the previous sanction of government?

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. G. CANNING.

Madras, 1st May, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR,

I WOULD have written to you sooner, had I not been prevented by the expectation of seeing you in India. That hope is now at an end; and as I can have no claim to intrude upon your time in your new duties, I write merely for the purpose of taking leave of you as Chief Director of Indian affairs. Your not coming to India has been a great disappointment to me; but I do not regret it. I rather, for the sake of the country, rejoice that you have remained at home. Every man, who feels for its honour, must be proud to see that there are public men who prefer fame, founded on the exertion of great and useful talents, to wealth and splendour.

Though no longer Indian Minister, you can still be of great service to India, by supporting measures calculated for its advantage, and by giving India the same freedom of trade as England. Our power in this country is now very great, and, I think, is in no danger of being shaken, if the local governments are enabled to keep the press and the missionaries within proper bounds, and if the legislature will, by limiting with more distinctness and precision the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, effectually prevent it from extending its cognizance, by fictions of law, to matters with which it ought to have no concern.

By not coming to India, you have escaped the irksome task of toiling daily through heaps of heavy, long-drawn papers. I never had a very high opinion of our records; but it was not until my last return that I knew that they contained such a mass of useless trash. Every man writes as much as he can, and quotes Montesquieu, and Hume, and Adam Smith, and speaks as if we were living in a country where people were free and governed themselves. Most of their papers might have been written by men who were never out of England, and their projects are nearly as applicable to that country as to India.

The Bombay Government have had the benefit of the experience of Bengal and Madras, and their arrangements will, in consequence, be better adapted to the state of this country than those of either of these Presidencies. Their settlements will, in general, be Rayetwar, which is no new system, but an old one of the Deccan, and of most other countries, and of England itself. In a rayetwar settlement of England, every landowner, whether his rent were 5*l.* or 50,000*l.* a-year, would be called a rayet, and the agreement would be made with him. But in a Zemindary settlement of England, we should consider the Lord Lieutenants of counties, and other public officers, as Zemindars and landlords, and make our agreement with them, and leave them to settle with the actual proprietors, whom we should regard as mere tenants. These are matters in which I have long taken a deep interest; but for the last twelve months I have felt a much deeper one in the affairs of Greece. Europe is more indebted to that country than has ever yet been acknowledged. I have seen no book which gives to Greece all that is due to her. Even the constitution of our own country would, without her, probably not have been what it is, notwithstanding the boasted wisdom of our ancestors. We have always, I think, been more solicitous about the preservation of the Ottoman Empire than was necessary. If the Turks were driven out of Europe, there would be no cause to apprehend any danger from their territories being occupied by other powers, unless Constantinople fell into the hands of the Russians. England could lose nothing by other states becoming stronger and richer. It is for the advantage of a great and enlightened nation to have powerful rivals. By the emancipation of the Greeks we should, in one year, make more Christians than all our Eastern missionaries will convert in a hundred. If the Greeks, without foreign aid, could emancipate

themselves, it would be better that they should do so, as the toils and exploits by which they accomplished it would give them a national character, and a spirit to defend their liberty.

I cannot conclude without thanking you for all your kindness to me while you held the office of Indian Minister.

I have the honour to be,
 With great regard and esteem,
 Your most obedient and faithful servant,
 (Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO JOHN SULLIVAN, ESQ.

Madras, 25th June, 1823.

MY DEAR SULLIVAN,

THE inclosed letter was sent open to me by your father, that I might suggest any improvement that might occur to me. I know of none; but I doubt if a map can be made to answer his expectations. Eastern cultivation is not in large masses, but scattered about in such small portions as scarcely to admit of being shown by a map. All improvement, too, does not arise from new cultivation, but much of it from improving lands already cultivated. If you cannot show by a map what is wanted, you can do it in another way, by showing the number of acres. I am glad, however, that your father has called on you for a view of the Rayetwar system, because no person is better qualified to give a correct one, and because by giving it you will both gratify him and perform an essential service to the country. Rayetwar is an unfortunate term, because it is supposed both here and in England to be mysterious, and to mean something very intricate, though, in fact, it merely means an individual settlement with the actual proprietors or occupants of land; such a settlement as we found in Malabar and Canara, though not called Rayetwar there, and such a settlement as would be made in England, if we considered all landowners as Rayets, whether their estates were worth 5*l.* or 50,000*l.* per annum. People not acquainted with the subject, suppose that Rayetwar is an innovation,—that it is introduced by breaking down the ancient proprietors and setting up their tenants, and calling them Rayets,—that it is a system complicated and difficult, almost beyond the power of man to manage, and vexatious and harassing to the people. I think it may be shown that it is no new system, but the usual one in the best times under all Indian Governments,—that it may be either for money or grain,—that it does not prevent Rayets, when they

choose it, from settling jointly for the whole village,—that no other system can be permanent,—that all Mooladary and Zemin-dary must in time, under the operation of division among all the sons and other Indian institutions, come at last to Rayetwars; that no other system is so simple and easy in its management, so well calculated to give us an intimate acquaintance with the state of the country, to establish confidence between the Collectors and the people, to attach them to our Government, to enable us to see wherever they are over-assessed, and to afford them relief and to guard them from undue exactions, &c. I think that you can show all this and much more, and that you can support your doctrine by examples drawn from your own district. A good account of Rayetwar, showing distinctly what it is, how it operates, and the advantages which may be derived from it under a moderate assessment, would be of more use both to the Court of Directors and the India Board than any Indian paper that ever was written; and as you are the person best qualified to execute the task, I trust that you will undertake it. As many ignorant people in India, and many well-meaning people in England think a Collector cannot do justice to the office of magistrate, and ought not to hold it, it would be very desirable to enter into some detail on this subject, to show with how much greater facility, both to himself and the people, the Collector can discharge the duty than any other person,—how much more of his time is taken up by the duties of magistrate, than would be were they still attached to the judge.

I wished this year to have got as far as the Neelgerry, but the death of Thackeray and expected arrival of Lord Amherst will oblige me to shorten my journey this season.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 21st July, 1823.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I SEND you a note from Mr. Ward on titles of honour. He seems to wish to maintain our claim, but I think that we have no right to it; for it appears, that though Barlow gave the title of Honourable in private notes, he himself is the first who has given it in official records.

Our thermometer here is seldom under ninety degrees. We have a hot land wind day and night, and I wish myself in one of

your airy bungalows every time I think of them. Your description is enough to make a plain man romantic. You want nothing but sheep to finish your landscape.

The Governor-General talks of sailing on the 20th.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. CHAPLIN.

Muddanpilli, 14th October, 1823.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

I AM much obliged to you for your letter on the survey assessment of this country, as it contains all that can well be said on the subject, and many details which had either never occurred to me, or escaped my memory. I have never seen the Report to which you allude; it had not reached Government when I left Madras, and I had only heard the general scope of it. It is said that a three years' experience of the Rayetwar, with the advantage of the twenty-five per cent. reduction, has proved that it will not answer. You would suppose from this, that the reduction has been enjoyed by the Rayets for the last three years. No such thing; waste has been added nearly equal to the remission. Ever since you left the Ceded Districts, the Tishildars have been in the habit of adding waste to every village, as it fell in from the lease. In February 1230, the Collector was ordered to make the full remission; but when his report of his settlement came in, it appeared that he had, according to his own statement, induced such Rayets as were able, to take waste equal to one-half of the remission. He does not mention the amount, but I believe it was between three and four lacs of rupees, in addition to what had before been imposed; and in place of being only half, was, on the whole, nearly equal, if not fully equal, to the remission. There are many cases in which it was more. Many Rayets, whose remission was twenty pagodas, were obliged to pay twenty-one or twenty-two for waste which they never saw, and have done so for three years. Government, of course, censured the imposition of the waste in Thirty, and expected it to be taken off in Thirty-one; but nothing of the kind was done. The Collector, it seems, had heard of Putkut, and had taken upon himself to give each Rayet a Quami Puttah, as it was called, for his Putkut, including the waste, and no settlement was made in 1231, but the collections were made upon these Quami Puttahs. In this year, about six lacs and a half fell in, and waste was added

to them; and in 1232 still more waste was added. The Collector seems to have thought that these fresh additions were all the waste, for he took it for granted, that all that had been inserted in his Quami Puttahs was long ago cultivated. But it is all waste, as it was in 1229, and had I not come into this District, the Rayets would have had to pay for it in 1233, and many of them will, I have no doubt, do so still. In place, therefore, of a three years' trial of the remission, there has not been one; it has not yet begun, and the Rayets have suffered more than if there had been no remission. They pay the amount under another name, and with much contention and ill-will, from knowing that it is contrary to the orders of Government. All confidence has been destroyed between them and the Collectors, and a system of concealment has been introduced by the operation of adding waste, which has rendered most of the cutcherry accounts undeserving of credit. We are now, in the fourth year after the remission was ordered, only beginning the experiment, and under much more unfavourable circumstances. The Ceded Districts have been very unfortunate in their Collectors; two more unfit men could hardly have been found, and it is difficult to say whether they have suffered most from the listlessness of the one, or the mischievous bustle of the other.

I never supposed it possible to make a scale which should not require revision; but I thought that, after a trial of six or seven years, every material defect would be discovered, and that such a revision might then have been made as would have been permanent. Had there been no leases, and had you and Ross remained, I am convinced that in 1214 you would have had no difficulty in doing it. What I have lately learned on the spot has rather strengthened than weakened this belief; for, in spite of all the changes and accidents during the leases, the greater part of the Rayets continued to pay according to the survey rates, and I am satisfied that, after the remission shall have been fairly carried into effect, the amount of lands, which may be left uncultivated on account of the rent, will not be one, certainly not two per cent. which is too inconsiderable to cause any injury. Even this will probably be cultivated ten or twelve years hence, when the Rayets have recovered; and should a part of it even then be found too high, it may be remedied by another and final reduction. Had there been a good Collector on the spot, it might have been done, by authorising him to make the remission, instead of one quarter everywhere, in some places a fifth, and in others a

third. Coimbatore has had this advantage of one or two revisions, and it is now, in consequence, the district in which the Rayets are the most comfortable, and the collections the most easily made, of any under the Madras Government. The Collector has hardly any trouble in making the settlement; North Arcot has been brought nearly to the same state; and Salem, notwithstanding all that has been written about over-assessment, will require very little revision. The lands in many villages of every Talook have acquired such a value as to be mortgaged and sold. This practice is beginning in the Ceded Districts, and will soon spread when the remission has had effect. In all districts which have been surveyed, the collections are the most regular, and landed property is best understood. As long as the Sirkar assessment is not fixed, and accurately registered, and known to the Rayets, private landed property cannot be established; because, even if the assessment be moderate, the uncertainty of its continuance, and the chance of its being raised, destroys that confidence which is necessary to enable land to become saleable. I am convinced, that if you were now to revisit Tarputti and Yarki, and see the scramble in those districts for land, where the assessment is fixed and moderate, you would not hesitate about a survey of the southern Mahratta country. It would be the greatest benefit you could confer on the people. Let it be carefully made; let it be revised, when finished, before it is acted upon; let it be tried for seven or eight years; and then let it be revised and finally fixed. The revision should be limited to reduction; no increase should be made. Whatever land is at first over-assessed, should be allowed to be thrown up during the seven years trial.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Thomas Munro, dated 19th July, 1824; in reply to a query whether there were any Report or Minute on record reviewing the measures of his Government :

“No report has gone home on the measures of Government since I came out; our proceedings are, as usual, reported from time to time, and, when necessary, are accompanied by minutes explaining the grounds of them. The measure which has given me the most satisfaction is the abolition of the forest and timber monopoly in Malabar and Canara, under the Bombay conserva-

tors. I have introduced no new system either in the revenue or judicial department. I have reduced some judicial appointments, and created some revenue ones, in order to keep up emulation, to keep both more efficient, and to prevent the whole body of revenue servants from being degraded to a second chop-caste. I have never wished to introduce any new system of revenue, but I wish in all cases to have no renters, but to collect directly from the occupants or owners, whether they are small or great. Renters are no necessary part of any revenue system : they are a mere temporary machinery employed or set aside as suits the convenience or caprice of Government. I wish to see the usages of each country or province adopted as the basis of our revenue system ; to protect landed property as we find it, whether in small portions or large masses ; not to vex the people by regulations ; neither to subdivide what is great, nor consolidate what is small ; and to lower the assessment generally wherever it is too high ;—to leave the rest to Providence and their industry. I shall never review my own proceedings, because they can have no sensible effect in my time, or for many years after ; for it is the nature of measures calculated for improvement, to be slow in their operation. When I read, as I sometimes do, of a measure by which a large province has been suddenly improved, or a race of semi-barbarians civilized almost to Quakerism, I throw away the book. But, even if my reviewing my own remedies could be of any use, I could not possibly find time. We have such a mass of reading from all quarters, that we have no time to think, and far less to write. The judicial system has converted one-half of the service into village lawyers, who write without mercy, like so many law stationers, sheet after sheet, without end.”

CHAPTER III.

Mode of spending time.—Private Letters.

WHILE he thus laboured to establish, upon sound principles, a general system of administration, Sir Thomas Munro was indefatigable in watching the results of such measures as were from time to time pursued by the civil and military authorities under him. It was one of his favourite maxims, that the superintending influence of a governor ought to be felt in every corner of his province; and hence he not only gave up the whole of his time to business during the periods of his residence at Fort St. George, but made frequent and toilsome journeys into the interior and more remote districts. In these he was sometimes accompanied by Lady Munro, though more usually he left her behind; but, whether alone or in a crowd, in a tent or at the Government-house, the distribution of his time was uniformly the same.

Sir Thomas Munro rose early, generally at dawn, or a few minutes after, and was in the habit of spending the first two or three hours of the day in the open air. When at the capital, or his country-seat of Gindy, he rode on horseback for a couple of hours four mornings in the week; the remaining three he gave up to the natives, by walking constantly in the same path, and entering freely into conversation with such as threw themselves in his way. On these occasions he was wholly unattended, except by a couple of peons, or a few of his old revenue servants; and the people, aware of this, as well as of the extreme affability of the Governor, met him at a particular point in crowds. To every one he listened with patience, receiving their petitions with his own hands, and promising to examine and reply to them; and in no single instance is he known to have neg-

lected an engagement thus voluntarily contracted. After spending some time thus, he returned home, dressed, and devoted a brief space to reading and writing, when he adjourned to breakfast, which was served up punctually at the hour of eight.

As the interval between sunrise and the ringing of the breakfast-bell was given up to receiving the personal applications of the natives, so was the period of breakfast itself, and about an hour after its conclusion, devoted to a similar intercourse with Europeans. The table was always spread for thirty persons; and such as had business to transact, or personal applications to make to the Governor, were expected to partake in the meal. By adhering to this arrangement, and steadily refusing to waste so much as a minute in useless chit-chat, Sir Thomas Munro was enabled to withdraw to his own room usually about half-past nine, where till four o'clock he remained employed in public business, and inaccessible, except under very particular circumstances, to all intruders.

Four was his hour of dinner, except twice a month, when large parties were invited to the Government-house, at eight o'clock; yet even these were not permitted to interfere in any respect with the earlier arrangements of the day. At half-past five or six, according to the season of the year, he drove out, for a time, with Lady Munro; after which he again withdrew to his own room, and applied to business. At eight, tea was served, when he joined his family; from the conclusion of this repast till he retired for the night, which occurred about ten or half-past ten, he remained among them. But even this short period of relaxation was not frittered away in unmeaning or unprofitable idleness. As soon as the drawing-room was cleared, one of his aides-de-camp, or gentlemen attached to his household, read aloud either the debates in Parliament, in which he took at all times a deep interest, an article in one of the Reviews, one of Sir Walter Scott's novels, or some other late publication. Thus was

every moment of his waking existence spent in endeavours to promote the welfare and happiness of others; and his own happiness, as a necessary consequence, received, though on his part almost unconsciously, a daily, I might have said, with perfect truth, an hourly increase.

Such was the manner in which Sir Thomas Munro spent day after day, as often as he remained stationary in one place: his mode of acting while prosecuting the journeys, of which notice has been taken, was not dissimilar. The morning's march was always so regulated, as that the party might reach their ground in sufficient time to permit breakfast to be served at eight o'clock, when the routine of conversing with such European functionaries as chanced to be near the spot was continued. Four was still the hour of dinner; but the period set aside at Fort St. George for carriage-exercise was now given up to hearing the complaints of the natives. Whilst the family sat at table, multitudes of Hindoos and Mussulmans were seen to collect round the door of the tent, anxiously expecting the moment when the Governor would come forth; and when it arrived, the eagerness to address him was such as to occasion at times considerable inconvenience. It very seldom happened that the charmana, or audience-tent, proved sufficiently capacious to contain the whole of the applicants. Sir Thomas Munro was accordingly in the habit of walking abroad to some open space, where he stood listening to all who desired to address him, till Nature itself appeared sometimes in danger of giving way. He never retired from these audiences otherwise than jaded and fatigued, as well from the excessive heat of the atmosphere, as from the continued exertion which he found it necessary to make.

A life thus exclusively devoted to the discharge of important public duties, whilst it presents few points of which his biographer can make particular use, necessarily left little leisure for the continuance of familiar correspondence on the part of Sir Thomas Munro himself. Not that he ceased at

times to communicate both his feelings and circumstances freely to his family ; but every moment was now too precious to permit the opportunities of doing so to occur frequently ; and hence the number of private letters written by him between the years 1820 and 1824 are less numerous than at any other period of similar extent throughout the course of his active career. The following specimens will however show, that the tone of feeling which casts so bright a charm over his earlier correspondence, was by no means altered ; and that if he wrote more rarely, he used no greater reserve than when his mind, less harassed by the cares and responsibility of office, poured itself forth in descriptive or playful controversy upon paper.

It is necessary to premise, for the right understanding of several allusions in these letters, that a serious accident occurred to Lady Munro on the 11th of February 1821. She was thrown from her horse, and, falling upon her head, received a severe injury in one of her eyes, for the preservation of which doubts were entertained many weeks. Happily, however, these proved to be groundless ; and her recovery, though tedious and distressing, was complete.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Madras, 15th October, 1820.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I WRITE to you merely to say, that I have got your letters of the 8th of September about your plans, and of the 15th about more plans, and the Malwa Encyclopedia. I have weighed the ninth chapter in my hand ; and I could not help thinking, when poising it as Sancho did when poising Mambrino's helmet in his hand, "What a prodigious head the Pagan must have, whose capacious skull could contain thirteen such ponderous chapters as this !" I look at it with reverence when I open the drawer in which it lies deposited ; but I must not open it till I can get a little spare time to consider the recondite matter with which it is filled. Any remark that I can make must be very general, for Malwa is as little known to me as Tartary. I hope, from my

not hearing of Lord H——'s answer to your proposals, that it is to be more favourable than you expected.

Yours most truly,
(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 15th April, 1821.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I HAVE got your letter of the 19th March from Oudipore, and thank you for the interest you so kindly take in Lady M——. She is recovering, though slowly; and I fear, with regard to complete recovery, doubtfully. Your friend Captain Laurie will write to you about his proceedings. He has acted like a school-boy, with fine feelings, where strong ones were wanted. I think the better of him for it, but am vexed at his weakness. I did not think that your Teviotdalers had been such simple swains as to be circumvented by a connicopilly. I am glad to hear that you are well again; and I trust you will have no more relapses. Macdonald sent me your introduction to your history of Malwa; and when I think of it, and of your chapters, or volumes rather, on revenue, police, &c., I wonder how you have found time for such works. I think that all this must end in your writing a general history, and making all other histories unnecessary, by beginning, like the Persians, with Huzzut Adam, or at least with Mehta Noah. I have been much pleased with your first chapter; it contains a great mass of information: much of it is new; and though much of it also is what was known before, it is not the less interesting on that account; but rather the contrary, as it shows us how general and uniform many of the Indian institutions and customs were in provinces very remote from each other. If you persist in your plan of going home at present, and if ever you venture to India again, I hope you will come and relieve me; for I should be delighted to see this Government in the hands of a man who has had more practical experience in India, than any European who ever visited it. If I am permitted to choose my own time for retiring, and if you have any desire to return, I shall give you intimation that you may take your measures.

Yours most truly,
(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Nagangeri, 30th May, 1821.

THIS is the last day in which I am likely for some months to be in a cool climate; and if I do not write to you now, I do not know when I shall. We had a great deal of rain the night we left Bangalore, and we have had showers every day since. Our journey has so far been very pleasant; but it will be very different to-morrow, when we descend into the burning plains of the Carnatic. We are now encamped about two hundred yards above the spot where our tents were when we last passed this way, and very near the large banian tree to which we first walked. It is a beautiful wild scene of mingled rocks and jungle, and aged trees and water. I wish we had something like it at home. It is pleasant to see the different groups of travellers with their cattle coming in one after another; some sitting and some sleeping under the shady trees and bushes so thickly scattered around. There is something delightful in viewing the repose and stillness which every one seems to enjoy. To me it has always the effect of something that is plaintive, by recalling times and beings which have long since passed away. I wish I could indulge in these dreams, and wander about in this romantic country, instead of returning to the dull and endless task of public business in which I have already been so long engaged. When we last landed in England, I never expected to have been again toiling under an Indian sun, or that I should ever have been obliged again to leave you among strangers. I thought that we might have often travelled together, or that if we sometimes parted, from my being a greater wanderer than yourself, you would at least have remained among your friends and relations. But as these expectations cannot now be realized for some time, we must endeavour to make ourselves as contented as we can, while we continue in this country.

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TO GEORGE BROWN, ESQ.

Bangalore, 23th September, 1821.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

I CAME here two days ago, to accompany Lady M—— back to Madras. I found her perfectly recovered in every respect; but her eye, though much better, is not quite right. I should have made an excursion at this time, even if it had not

been necessary, on her account, because I require occasionally to renew my old habits of travelling in tents, as the heat of Madras, and constant application, without bringing any sickness upon me, exhausts and wears me away. The last season at Madras has been one not of extreme, but of continued heat.

* * * * *

I am afraid that I never shall be able to make what is called a respectable appearance in the world. I have been too long in getting money, and I am too old to wish to remain long in this country to save it, even if I had the option of remaining.

* * * * *

TO HIS SISTER.

Trippitore, 13th October, 1821.

MY DEAR ERSKINE,

I DO not write to you to answer letters, but rather to renew the memory of old times, when you and I were regular correspondents, and when I seldom made a journey without your hearing of it. I set out for Bangalore about a month ago, where Lady Munro had been ever since for the recovery of her health; and I am now on my way to Madras with her, where I shall arrive about the 25th of this month. The distance from Bangalore to Madras by the direct route is two hundred and eight miles; but I have come round by the Baramahl, which is about fifty miles farther, both for the purpose of seeing the inhabitants, and making some inquiries into the state of the country, and of revisiting scenes where, above thirty years ago, I spent seven very happy years. They were the first of my public life, and I almost wish it had ended there; for it has ever since, with the exception of the time I was at home, been a series of unceasing hard labour. The place where I now am, is one where Colonel Read lived between 1792 and 1799, where I often came to see him, with many old friends who are now dead or absent. I thought I had taken my leave of it for ever when I went with the army to Seringapatam; but I have since twice returned to it—once in 1815, and now; and I shall probably yet return to it again before I leave India. We get attached to all those places where we have at any former period lived pleasantly among our friends, and the attachment grows with the increasing distance of time; but, independently of this cause, the natural beauty of the place is enough to make any one partial to it. There is nothing to be compared to it in England, nor, what you will

think higher praise, in Scotland. It stands in the midst of an extensive fertile valley, from ten to forty miles wide, and sixty or seventy long, surrounded by an amphitheatre of mountains of every shape, many of them nearly twice as high as the Grampians. The country here among the hills has none of the cold and stinted appearance which such countries have at home. The largest trees, the richest soil, and the most luxuriant vegetation, are usually found among naked masses of granite at the bottom of the hills. We are travelling with tents; our stages are usually from twelve to sixteen miles. You will think this but a short distance, but we find it long enough. It generally takes three or four hours, and the last half of the journey is usually in a burning sun: when this is to be repeated every day for some weeks, it becomes very fatiguing. In cloudy or cool weather it is delightful, and far preferable to any travelling at home; but at present, just before the change of the monsoon, the weather is clear and sultry. When therefore we reach our tents, though we get out of the burning sun, we merely escape from a greater degree of heat to a lesser; for we have no refreshing coolness, as you will readily perceive when I tell you that the thermometer in my tent is generally ninety-two the greater part of the day.

Your affectionate brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Tekli, 9th August, 1822.

I GOT your short note of the 28th July this morning, after a very hot march. We have now made four marches from Itchapoor, and have four more to Chicacole, where we must give our cattle rest for two days, if they get there without stopping, which is very doubtful, for the roads are very bad. In many places no road at all, except through deep paddy fields, the country covered with water, and the nullahs all full with steep muddy banks, which make it difficult either to get into or out of them. We have had only two fair days since we landed. The sun is always very hot during the day, and in the afternoon, or at night, the rain pours down upon us. I am in hopes however, from so much having already fallen, that it will not continue at the same rate, and that we shall now have every second day fair. The country through which we pass is very beautiful. It has the largest topes of old mangoes I have ever seen; jungles of every kind, close and open; rice-fields and wood-covered mountains; but the great

heat of the sun takes away much of the pleasure of travelling amidst such scenery.

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TO THE SAME.

28th August, 1822.

ON the 26th we encamped at Cassimcottah, where I was stationed thirty-five years ago when a subaltern, and when the hours passed much more pleasantly than they do now. It was a rainy day; but I walked alone in the evening to visit the spot on which our quarters were situated. Most of them had disappeared from the lapse of time; but part of them were still standing, surrounded by waving grain, as all the ground about them had been cultivated. There was to me something very solemn and melancholy in the scene. Most of my companions there are now dead; and how changed I am myself! I then thought that I was labouring to rise in my profession, and to retire to enjoy myself in my native land; but the older I grow, I get the more involved in business, and oppressed with labour.

TO THE SAME.

Rajahmundry, 6th September, 1822.

WE have been here since the 4th, without any prospect of getting away, as the Godaveri is not only full, but has overflowed its banks, and made the road impassable for several miles on the opposite side. We might cross to the other side, and be put down in a village half under water, but we could not get away from it, and prefer remaining here in bungalows. An experiment is now making by sending over some tents, to ascertain whether, by placing them on coolies and rafts, and letting the camels and elephants travel without loads, they may not reach a rising ground about five miles beyond the river. If they succeed, we shall follow; but we cannot receive an answer until tomorrow evening, as the boat takes more than a whole day to make a single trip. Even if our advance is successful, it will require five or six days to carry us all over. I have just been interrupted by Captain Watson, who tells me that, by information just received, there is too much water to make any attempt, so we must just remain quiet for a few days.

The bungalow which I now occupy stands on the top of an old bastion, close to the edge of the river. The scene is magnificent. We see the Godaveri coming along from the Polaveram hills

about twenty miles distant, and passing under our walls in a deep and rapid stream, two miles broad. The mass of water is probably greater than that which flows in all the rivers in Britain together. Most of the party, as well as myself, spend two or three hours every day in looking at it. I never get tired of it; but I wish it were a little nearer to Madras, for it is one of those fine sights which will very much derange all my calculations of seeing you.

I inclose Mrs. Erskine's letter, because it mentions our boy.

TO GEORGE BROWN, ESQ.

Madras, 1st February, 1823.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

* * * * *

I HOPE that the King liked his visit to Scotland. The people there seem to have exerted themselves to please him. They have given him all sorts of ancient sights except a tournament; but this was never much in fashion in Scotland in days of yore; probably because their horses were such poor beasts, that very few of them could have charged with a knight in full armour. He must however, I think, have seen more novelty, and been more amused than any where in his other travels. It will do his Scottish lieges some good as well as himself: it will make them look back to their meeting with satisfaction, and will give them something to claver about for the rest of their lives.

I don't know what to think of your Irish distresses; but I suppose that they are very much exaggerated in the newspapers. It will however most likely be of some use eventually, by teaching the people to be more quiet and industrious hereafter. Your agricultural distresses do not appear to me to be very serious: they seem to consist very much in the country gentlemen and farmers not liking to return to their modes of life before the French war. I should like to see a comparative statement of the rental of the land of any one of the distressed countries for 1790 and 1820.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 4th July, 1823.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

* * * * *

THE general fall of interest will not affect me more than other people; and if we must all sink a little in our expenditure,

I shall still keep my relative place. I hope with you, that there will be no war with Spain. It will probably depend on the opinion the French Government may have as to the intention of England engaging in the contest or not. If the French do enter into a war with Spain, I hope it will end in the expulsion of the Bourbons both from France and Spain. Nothing but the most absurd infatuation can make the French Government think of making war to reform the Spanish constitution. Their armies, if once set in motion, will be as likely to reform their own; and Russia and Austria may then take the opportunity of dividing the Turkish dominions. I trust that the independence of Greece will be secured. I am more anxious about that little country than about all the great powers.

I read and write from six to eight hours every day in the year, without more inconvenience than I felt ten years ago. My general health for the last seven years has been as good as at any former time; and for the last three years I do not think that I have had a single headache. This is more than I can say for any similar period of my earlier days. Your plan of employing a person to read to me would not do, as I should never get through my business by it. My reading is all manuscript, official papers, chiefly relating to accounts, estimates, and plans, requiring attention; and I get through more with my own eyes in one hour, than with any other man's in six. I never employ any one to read for me, unless in some matters of common routine; and when I dictate, it is when the case is short and simple. In all important cases, I must write myself. I have enough to tire me every day, but it was the same twenty years ago. Almost the only time that I have any thing read, is in the evening after tea. I then get some one to read the leading article and the debates from a newspaper, or a new book, for about an hour. But as the newspaper takes up most of my spare time, I make very little progress in any other kind of literature.

TO THE SAME.

Raycottah, 29th August, 1823.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

* * * * *

WHETHER the Spanish constitution be good or bad, the French invasion is both unjust and impolitic; and I imagine there can be no doubt that nothing but our national debt could have prevented us from supporting Spain. Notwithstanding that

debt, I should have been rather inclined to have supported her. I see that the Opposition are clamorous for war, and yet say that we cannot maintain our Peace Establishment. It is the old cry—Plenty of war and fighting, without any expense of British blood or treasure.

* * * * *

I have had more inquiries about my declining health since I wrote you last. As far as I can judge myself of my constitution, I shall return to England with as good health as when I left it. There will be one difference—I left England very grey, and I shall return very white. Kind remembrance to Mrs. Brown and family.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Cuddapah, 4th October, 1823.

I RECEIVED this morning yours of the 1st; we have now got to the fourth day of the last month of our absence. I expect to see your young Toto some time between the 25th and 30th.

We shall leave Cuddapah to-morrow; and I shall be glad when I turn my back upon it, for it is hotter than even it used to be. The thermometer is at 94, with a dry parching wind, curling up the paper, thickening the ink, and, I imagine, aiding time in impairing my sight. I was often at this place twenty years ago, but the heat made me always glad to get away. It is surrounded by lofty hills; but the country has no other beauty. It is flat and highly cultivated, but, unless when the harvest is on the ground, naked and without verdure, and this is one main cause of the heat. You know how much warmer a day becomes by having your tent pitched on sand or black ground; and if this difference is produced by a small spot, you may guess how much greater it must be in Cuddapah, where a great part of the surface of the country is either sand or black earth. I still like this country, notwithstanding its heat. It is full of industrious cultivators; and I like to recognize among them a great number of my old acquaintances, who, I hope, are as glad to see me as I to see them.

CHAPTER IV.

*War with the Burmese.—Correspondence with Lord Amherst.—
Letters to the Duke of Wellington, Mr. Canning, &c.*

IT has been stated that, in accepting the office of Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro was not actuated by any selfish motive, either of avarice or ambition. Of extravagant wealth he never appears to have been covetous; and if the honours which he had already acquired were not such as to satisfy the eager aspirant after titles and decorations, they were at least as numerous as a well-regulated mind, conscious of its own merits, and the part which it had acted, need desire. Besides, he had served long in India; his constitution, though still sound and vigorous, was not what it had once been; while the prospect of an increasing family advanced claims upon him, which no thinking man is disposed to treat with contempt. On all these accounts he would have preferred, had his own wishes only been at stake, a quiet residence in England, to a return into the turmoils of public life. But Sir Thomas Munro was singularly alive to feelings of the purest patriotism, and would have accounted the loss of life itself a poor sacrifice, had he been assured that its surrender would in any degree advance his country's welfare. His patriotic views, moreover, extended far beyond the bounds of the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. He regarded the many millions of Hindoos and Mussulmans, whom the fortune of war have placed in subjection to the British crown, as possessing claims of the highest order upon the regard and attention of their European rulers; and having formed a theory of his own, as to the measures which were likely to confer lasting benefits upon them, he could not cast behind

him so favourable an opportunity of carrying it into practice. It was this, and this alone, which induced him to give up a thousand pleasurable schemes which he had formed for himself and his family at home, and to quit England after a sojourn there of little more than four months.

But though he cheerfully consented to make so great a sacrifice, it was by no means his design to linger on under the burning sun of India, till the capability of relishing existence, were it continued so as to permit his revisiting Europe, should be entirely taken away. He desired indeed to set the machine in motion, but he desired also to leave its working to be superintended by younger hands than his own. In other words, he sailed for Madras with the fixed determination of abandoning it for ever, after a residence of three or four years. The consequence was, that in September, 1823, when India appeared to enjoy a state of profound repose, he addressed a memorial to the Court of Directors, requesting to be relieved; and so urgently in earnest was he as to the success of the application, that he dispatched, by different conveyances, no fewer than four copies of the letter in which it was contained.

The appointment of a successor to a man like Sir Thomas Munro was not, however, a point to be settled in a moment; and the authorities at home seem to have been little disposed to settle it at all. Month after month rolled on, without bringing any answer to his application, till the year 1824 was as far advanced as 1823 had been, when the application was first dispatched. In the mean while, however, a great change occurred in the political prospects of British India. A failure in the usual rains caused, as it invariably does, a scarcity amounting almost to famine in the Madras territories; while a war broke out, if not more justly alarming, unquestionably more dreaded, than any in which the Company had of late years been involved. The war to which I allude was that with the Burman empire, of which, though it is now admitted on all hands to have been one of defence and violated

territory, there were not wanting multitudes at the moment, to condemn both the causes and the conduct.

I am not called upon to enter, in a work like the present, into any inquiry, however slight, touching the general grounds of animosity between the rival powers. Let it suffice to state, that for many years previously to 1824, movements had been made plainly indicative of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Burmans, and that during the latter months of 1823, and the earlier of the year following, a series of desultory hostilities was carried on between the troops of that nation and certain British posts on the eastern frontier of Bengal. Still no expectation seems to have been formed, nor any preparations made for a general war, till in the month of February it was deemed essential by the Supreme Government to make a formal appeal to arms. The following letter, written some time posterior to the opening of the campaign, will show how the writer was affected by the measure, and how little it had been anticipated, at least in the Presidency of Madras.

TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Madras, 18th September, 1824.

MY DEAR DUKE,

THE few young men who have brought me letters from your Grace, have, I fear, derived little benefit from my acquaintance. I have however done what I believe you would have done yourself. I have requested the officers under whom they were placed to look after them, and make them learn their duty. In September last, I sent an application to the Court of Directors to be relieved. I had been quite long enough in India; and as every thing was quiet and settling into good order, I thought it a proper time for my leaving it. Had I then suspected, that within a few months we were to have both war and famine, I should of course never have thought of resigning until our difficulties were at an end. But I regret that it is now too late. I was probably more surprised at hearing of the intended war than people at home will be; for I never had the least suspicion that we were to go to war with the King of Ava, till a letter reached

this Presidency, in February last, asking us what number of troops we could furnish for foreign service. I thought that the local officers of Chittagong and Arracan might have carried on their petty aggressions on both frontiers for another year, and that they would probably have got tired and settled matters among themselves. Such fellows do not read Grotius or Vattel ; and we must not expect them to be guided entirely by their piety. Now that we are actually at war, it is some satisfaction to have those great names on our side. Our case is a clear one of self-defence and violated territory ; and I have little doubt but that fortune will on this occasion take the right side. Our force, under Sir A. Campbell, got to Rangoon in May, with the intention of embarking when the river should rise next month, and proceeding by water, before the S. W. monsoon, to Amra-poor, a distance of five hundred miles. This plan failed for a want of boats ; but even if there had been boats, it would have been impracticable. I think that this force can advance only by land, when the river falls, and the country is dry, in November. It has, to be sure, no draught or carriage cattle ; but we can send enough for a few light field-pieces, and it ought to be able to pick up more in the country. Its heavy baggage and stores must go in boats, which, with proper exertion, may be prepared in sufficient number. I am more afraid of sickness than of any thing else : the rains have been constant, and unusually severe, since the end of May. Fever is very general, but not often fatal ; but many Europeans have been carried off by dysentery, and we are not sure that, by continuing two or three months longer in the same confined spot, the sickness may not increase so much as materially to cripple the army. The Europeans have no fresh meat : they are fed on salt beef and salt fish. There are plenty of cattle in the country, and there were numbers at Rangoon when the troops landed ; but they were not permitted to be seized, lest it should offend the prejudices of the natives. This is carrying the matter farther than we do in India. We must not allow our feelings for the cows to starve ourselves.

The Bengal Government do not seem to have yet determined on their plan of operations. They intended at one time to have entered Ava with their main force from Arracan, and with a small one from Cachar. They have learned that Arracan is too unhealthy, and talk of making their principal attack by Cachar and Munnipoor. They seem to think that Sir A. Campbell cannot advance towards the capital, as he has no bullocks nor

elephants, and that it is quite impossible to supply him with them. We could not equip his force like an Indian army; but there would be no impossibility in sending him three or four thousand bullocks. The expense would be great—five or six lacs of rupees; but this is little to the whole expense of a campaign, and nothing when we consider that the success of the campaign may turn on their being sent or not.

The military character of the enemy is far below that of any of the Indian native powers, and they are miserably armed: no matchlocks, a very few bad muskets, and their pikes and swords do not deserve the name. They are not nearly so well armed as the common villagers of the Deccan, who turn out to fight with each other about a village boundary. The war began on the eastern frontier of Bengal, by employing detachments of sepoys to attack stockades in the jungle, in which they met with frequent checks, and were harassed and dispirited. The defeat of six or eight of these companies, encamped under cover of the bank of a tank, by the Burmans, after three days' regular approaches, gave the enemy at once a high military character, and his numbers were estimated at fifteen thousand men. It is probable that they never exceeded four or five thousand. This body, after its victory, stockaded itself at Ramoo in the Chittagong district, where it remained about two months; but retired lately, on finding that troops were collecting at Chittagong. The enemy's numbers and resources have been greatly exaggerated. He has no means of offering any serious opposition; and I should be very sorry to see peace made, until we have marched through every part of his country, and occupied the capital. We have sent from Madras to Rangoon three regiments of Europeans and nine battalions of Native infantry, and another battalion is on its passage. In addition to this force, Sir Archibald Campbell has two European regiments, and a marine battalion which he brought from Bengal. I cannot understand why this force should not be able to penetrate through a fertile country, when it is well supplied with salt provisions and grain. As the villages and population all lie near the Irawaddi, such a country cannot be driven, except very partially. Their cattle and grain could not be removed out of the reach of light detachments of two or three corps, making a sweep of thirty or fifty miles. I do not like to hear people talking of difficulties when an army can be fed, and when the enemy is too weak to oppose it. I think that, in such circumstances, it never can be impracticable to march through

his country. It is however useless for me to talk any longer on a point on which all that I can say must be mere conjecture, as I have never been in Ava.

I say nothing to you of any body here, for I believe there is not one man in this country of whom you know any thing.

Yours most sincerely,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

From the contents of the preceding letter, it will be seen that, till the arrival of an official inquiry as to the number of troops which could, within a limited space of time, be spared by the Madras Presidency for foreign service, Sir Thomas Munro continued in profound ignorance that British India was on the eve of war. The information, however, tended in no degree to deprive him of that presence of mind which formed a marked feature in his intellectual organization. He made no pause for the purpose of inquiring how far the immediate commencement of hostilities was or was not judicious, but gave himself to second, with all the resources within his reach, the efforts of the Supreme Government.

Of the share which he took in the different operations that ensued, the following extracts from a voluminous and confidential correspondence, carried on during the progress of hostilities, between Lord Amherst and himself, are better calculated than any detail from me to convey an accurate idea. It will be seen that, war once begun, Sir Thomas Munro became a strenuous advocate for its prosecution with ardour and perseverance. The whole strength of the nation ought, in his estimation, to be called forth, provided efforts less gigantic should fail; whilst to grant peace on any other terms besides the thorough humiliation of the enemy, he treated as an arrangement not more impolitic than unsafe. Nor is this all. There was not a point connected with the equipment and operations of the army which he failed to consider,—from the movements of columns, to the providing of a competent supply of water-casks and carpenters' nails; whilst his advice, whether solicited or not, was on every

occasion given with the freedom which his high character entitled him to use. It is but justice to the nobleman who then held the reins of government to add, that no course of proceeding could have been more agreeable to him ; and that he was, and continues to be prompt in his acknowledgments of the assistance which the sound judgment and experience of Sir Thomas Munro afforded him.

The following private letter was dispatched on the day after a formal answer had been made to the official communication already referred to.

TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 25th February, 1824.

MY LORD,

THE official letters from the Supreme Government, regarding the number of troops that could be furnished by this Presidency, for the proposed expedition, were received on the 23rd, and answered on the same day. In our answer, the number of troops is stated that can be ready for "embarkation." There can be no difficulty about the troops, or even a greater number, if necessary ; but there will be serious, and, I apprehend, insurmountable difficulty about the shipping required to transport them. The Bengal letter says nothing about shipping ; and it is therefore doubtful whether it is intended that we should provide it. But the general tenor of the letter, and the expression "to be dispatched," led us to suppose that we are to find the shipping, because it is evident that, unless it be ready, and the stores on board early in April, the troops cannot be dispatched at the time. We shall therefore take measures for procuring tonnage ; but as we have none of our own, and can only get it by hiring such vessels as may touch here, it is very doubtful that we shall be able, within the short time prescribed, to secure one-half of the number requisite for the transport of four to five thousand men ; and we shall thus incur a very heavy expense without accomplishing the object intended, unless another letter from Bengal, instructing us not to prepare tonnage, should reach us in a few days, before we have gone too far.

But the mere tonnage, even if it were ready, is not sufficient. There ought to be a number of flat-bottomed boats, sufficient to land at once the whole or the greater part of the force. In all

maritime expeditions, it is essential that we should have the means of embarking or disembarking rapidly,—an object for which the common ships' boats are totally unfit. The last expedition that sailed from Madras had an ample supply of flat-boats, which were built for the purpose. The preparation of such a number as would be necessary for four or five thousand troops, would require some months. The distance between Calcutta and Madras making it nearly a month before an answer can be received to a letter, renders all sudden operations, in which the forces of both Presidencies are to co-operate, extremely liable to accidents, because there is no time for consultation or explanation; and under such circumstances, no operations are so liable to failure as maritime expeditions. A service of this kind requires, more than any other, that every equipment should be ample, because there can seldom be any medium between complete success and failure; partial success is little better than an expensive failure.

The Supreme Government have, no doubt, some information which may render a sudden operation against the enemy advisable, provided it can be effected; but the want of tonnage, if tonnage is expected to be found here, will certainly render it impracticable, unless some unlooked-for supply should arrive soon. I must own, with the little information which I can be supposed to possess, I should think it better to avoid all inferior expeditions, to wait until we are fully prepared for the main one, and to undertake it with such a force as should leave no doubt of success. This would give time for the two Governments to communicate freely, and for the subordinate one to understand exactly what it was to do, and to make its arrangements accordingly; and it would be more likely, in the end, both to ensure success and to save expense. The occasional hostilities on the eastern frontier of Bengal might, perhaps, still be allowed to continue for some months without much serious inconvenience; and even if the Burmans brought a greater force to that quarter, it might divert their attention from the main object of the attack.

Our troops in the Peninsula lie convenient for all such expeditions, and they are eager to be employed. I am no less anxious that they should go wherever there is service; but I wish, at the same time, that they should go with every means to guard against failure. The drought and scarcity make the march of troops difficult; but this is a difficulty we can get over; but the want of

shipping is one for which there is no remedy, unless longer time be allowed for our preparations:

I hope that your Lordship will pardon the freedom with which I have offered these remarks. We shall address the Supreme Government again in two or three days.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

In pursuance of the above promise, Sir Thomas Munro again addressed the Governor-General on the 6th and 20th of March. Of these letters it may suffice to state, that they give an account of the progress of the preparations, and report, with much apparent satisfaction, the alacrity displayed by the sepoys in volunteering. Mention is likewise made of the difficulties attending the construction of flat-boats, whilst care is taken to keep the superior authorities in mind, that the scarcity which still pressed severely upon the inhabitants of the Carnatic, ought not, even on account of the war, to be neglected. In the mean while, however, Lord Amherst had written at length, giving a detailed account of the plan of operations which it was intended to pursue, and enclosing two memoranda, one by Captain Canning, relative to the mode of conducting the war, the other by Mr. Larkin, head of the Marine Board, touching the supply of tonnage. The following is a copy of his Lordship's letter, to which the answer of Sir Thomas Munro is appended.

Calcutta, 10th March, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

WHILE waiting for the communication which you promise us in two or three days, I take upon myself to acknowledge the letter of the 25th ult., which I had the honour to receive from you yesterday; and I will even go so far as to hazard a few observations on matters on which I cannot but speak with considerable diffidence.

With reference to the difficulty which you state respecting tonnage, I send you a copy of a private note from Mr. Larkin, head of our Marine Board, to Mr. Swinton, our Secretary in the Secret and Political Department, by which it would appear, that quite as large a quantity of tonnage as we shall be likely to require, will be available at Madras. I likewise enclose a copy of a me-

morandum addressed to me by Captain Canning, who, I believe, is better acquainted with Rangoon, and with the kingdom of Ava, than any officer in our service.

We contemplate an attack on Rangoon as soon as it can be made ; and have no reason to doubt that four or five thousand men will be sufficient for its capture and occupation. Of these we may be able to furnish from hence nearly three thousand ; namely, his Majesty's 13th and 38th regiments, two hundred artillery, and a battalion of the 20th Native infantry. We should not require, therefore, from Madras, above two thousand Native troops, with European and Native artillery ; and I should hope that these may be ready to sail from Madras by the 15th of April, —say the whole reaches the rendezvous by the 1st of May. During the first week in that month they may be in possession of Rangoon.

Captain Canning, whom we propose to send with the expedition as political agent, will be directed, on our occupying Rangoon, to tender from thence to the Burmese Government the terms on which we shall consent to make peace. Meanwhile, every possible inquiry will be instituted at Rangoon into the practicability of procuring a sufficient number of boats to transport an army of eight or nine thousand men to Ummerapoor. This point, upon which there are those who speak confidently, but on which it is natural to entertain considerable doubts, may be ascertained in a very few days after reaching Rangoon.

If the measure is found practicable, a vessel will be dispatched from Rangoon to Madras with the intelligence, by the middle of May. She will reach Madras before the middle of June, and by the end of that month the whole army may be assembled at Rangoon, ready to proceed to Ummerapoor, at the most favourable season of the year for ascending the river.

If it is found impracticable to procure a sufficient supply of boats for the purpose above-mentioned, notice to that effect will be sent to Madras ; and it may possibly be proposed to you, instead of sending an addition of four or five thousand men to Rangoon, to detach only a sufficient number to occupy the Island of Cheduba, off the coast of Arracan, or for such other service as the commander of the troops at Rangoon may deem advisable.

I should hope that, although the main enterprise may be relinquished, the possession of Rangoon, Cheduba, and perhaps other ports or islands belonging to the Burmese, may induce them to accede to such terms of peace as we shall propose.

I acknowledge a difficulty which is not yet removed. I do not know how we shall transport to Rangoon a sufficient number of gun-boats, to protect the advance of our troops up the river to the capital. I understand that the flat-bottom boats which you naturally point out as essential to a maritime expedition, will not be required to land the troops at Rangoon.

You have stated many reasons, which I acknowledge to be powerful ones, why the expedition should be deferred till farther communication can be held between this place and Madras. I think they are overbalanced, not only by the consideration of the proper period for ascending the Irawaddy River, and the impossibility of moving from Rangoon to Ummerapooora by land, but also by the security which an early blow would afford to our eastern frontier, and by a reference to the unprepared state in which we may expect to find the enemy.

It is really with considerable hesitation that I have entered into this detail with you. Arrangements like these are far beyond the reach of my experience; and I may have overlooked objections which would readily present themselves to persons more conversant with these matters. But I have thought it desirable that you should be made acquainted with circumstances as they stand at present; and you may rely upon frequent communications from this Government, upon all matters connected with the measures in contemplation.

I am, with sincere respect and esteem, &c. &c.

AMHERST.

To this sensible and modest letter Sir Thomas Munro wrote the following reply:—

Madras, 21st March, 1824.

MY LORD,

AFTER writing to your Lordship yesterday, I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 10th instant.

I have read Captain Canning's paper* with great attention.

* I subjoin this document, as essential to a right understanding of the accompanying correspondence. The memorandum of Mr. Larkin is omitted, because it contains nothing whatever of public interest.

MY LORD,

ANXIOUS to obey, with the least possible delay, your Lordship's injunctions, I proceed to offer a few hurried remarks on those points towards which you have been pleased more immediately to direct my attention.

The subjects on which your Lordship has more particularly required in-

He proposes to advance to the capital, and to occupy the country until we can make peace on our own terms; and, in order to effect this, he recommends that a force of ten thousand men move

formation, appear to refer, in the event of an expedition being sent against Rangoon, to the number of troops that would be required for that service; to the period of the year at which it might be attempted with most advantage; and to the situation in which the European settlers might be placed by the vindictive visitation of the Burmese Government.

To the first question I should, with all diffidence, reply, that if it be intended merely to take and occupy the town of Rangoon, with a view to the prevention of a possibility of the Burmese driving the British force out again, one regiment of Europeans and three battalions of Native troops, with a detail of artillery, and a due number of armed vessels, might probably be about the mark—perhaps rather over than under it. But in these matters your Lordship may probably be of opinion that it is safe to err on the right side. Shells would be on this occasion, as in all attacks of stockades, highly useful. A few thrown into a town built entirely of wood, could hardly fail to cause early conflagration and consequent submission. The mode of warfare on which the Burmese mainly rely is, fire rafts, which, if looked for, are easily guarded against. A cruiser with a few gun-boats, stationed at Yonghenchenah, where the Rangoon river branches off from the main stream of the Irawaddy, and a few more where the Sirian falls into the Rangoon river, two miles below the town, would effectually prevent any number from being collected, or approaching Rangoon. The great temple of Shweh Dugourg, two miles from the city, and connected with it by a causeway, offers a ready constructed fortification. Nor would the occupation of it by our troops in any manner give offence to the natives in a religious point of view.

The above observations refer to the possession of Rangoon on our part, merely with a view to the place being retained pending negotiations of a more general nature. Should it be intended that the occupation of this port should be a prelude to the advance of our troops on Ummerapooora, the capital of the Burmese empire, (a measure, in my opinion, perfectly practicable, the success of which would be still farther insured by the co-operation of a force by the way of Munnipoor,) a large body would of course be required,—say, Europeans three thousand, Natives seven thousand; and this number, with a proportional detail of artillery, and particularly gun-boats, would, I entertain not a doubt, place the capital in our possession, when terms might be dictated, (a leading feature of which I should certainly recommend to be the payment of the expenses of the war,) or permanent possession be retained of the country.

Should an advance on Ummerapooora be determined on, a force from Madras might probably be called on to co-operate; in which case, a most safe and convenient place of rendezvous is afforded by Port Cornwallis, a deep land-locked lagoon at the north-east end of the great Andaman.

With respect to the time of the year at which an attack on Rangoon should be made, it may, in general terms, be said that the place is accessible at all seasons.

During the strong prevalence, however, of the south-west monsoon, or from

from Rangoon, and that another force advance by Munnipoor. This plan appears to me to be a good one. We have here no knowledge of the country or of the people, and have therefore

the beginning of July to the end of September, a degree of difficulty, and perhaps risk, exists, particularly if vessels, in bad and foggy weather, overshoot the Rangoon river, and become entangled among the dangerous shoals of the Selang river and Gulf of Martaban. For the advance of a force on the capital, the commencement of the rains, or beginning of June, should be selected, when the rise in the river would remove all obstacles from the sand-banks, &c. &c. &c. and a strong southerly wind convey the troops to their destination in a month or five weeks, the distance from Rangoon being about five hundred miles.

The effect that an attack on Rangoon might have on the property and lives of the Europeans settled there, becomes next an object of consideration. Their number in 1812 may have been ten or twelve; and I do not understand it has increased since. That their lives would be sacrificed, I do not believe. They would, I conceive it likely, be sent up to the capital, where the mild character of the present king would probably screen them from personal violence. Their property would of course be seized. But this question becomes, in some degree, connected with the measure now in contemplation, of an attack on the island of Chedubah. Whenever this takes place, it will naturally become a signal to the Burmese to fortify, to the utmost of their means and resources, every place in their dominions accessible to our forces; and even a weak and contemptible enemy, thus put on his guard, must, in some degree, become formidable. Of these places, Rangoon is indubitably the most prominent and important. The consequence will therefore probably be, that available vessels, of which a sufficient number is always to be found in the port, will be seized and attempted to be sunk on the bar, whereby the entrance of the river would be rendered impracticable. The approach by land is by an impervious jungle of eighteen miles, and endless swamps, morasses, and creeks put it out of the question; and even were that not the case, and supposing our troops to have obtained possession of the town by an overland route, what inconvenience would not be sustained by the absence of all shipping? Should an early and separate attack on Chedubah be deemed preferable to a combined and simultaneous attempt on that place and Rangoon, and possibly Merghi and Tavoy, the two latter places involving weighty considerations as connected with Siam, the danger of the Burmese closing the entrance of their river might effectually be obviated by a cruiser, or I should rather recommend two being stationed within the bar, which, by moving up and down between the town and that spot, would prevent all mischief; and the commander of these vessels might, with a little management, give notice to the European settlers of the situation of affairs, and receive such on board as might choose to avail themselves of their protection.

Of the number of men that the Burmese could bring into the field, it is difficult to form even a distant conjecture. The population of the country has been greatly overrated by Colonel Symes (*vide* account of his mission) at eighteen millions. The uncertain data on which I was enabled, in 1810, to build a rough guess, did not give three millions, which may be probably under the mark. Of a regular army they have no idea. When troops are required, each

hardly any means of forming a judgment as to the best plan for a campaign against the Burman empire. But there are some general rules which are applicable to campaigns in all countries, viz. not to lose time in subordinate objects, if we have the power of attaining great ones; not to divide our force too much; to act on those points which will most facilitate the subjugation of the enemy; and from whatever quarter we advance into his country, to do it with such a force as may be amply sufficient to drive before it any thing that he can oppose to it. We can easily furnish ten thousand men, the force proposed to operate from Rangoon; and the Bengal Government can probably furnish an equal or a greater force to advance by Munnipoor, or any other route that may be deemed more practicable. I should certainly place more dependence on the ultimate success of an attack by Munnipoor than by Rangoon, because, though it may require more time, yet regular troops possess greater advantages against irregulars in acting by land than by water; and the success of their operations is not left to depend on their finding a sufficient number of boats.

It would be desirable that hostilities should be avoided by the enemy acquiescing in the conditions which may be prescribed; but military operations ought not to be relaxed for a single day on account of negotiations, but should be carried on as if there were no chance of peace. Such an enemy will endeavour to gain

district of a province is assessed at a certain number of men, who are levied from the different houses, agreeably to the number of male inhabitants they contain. The men thus raised receive no pay; in lieu of which they are provided with food; powder and ball, each man manufactures from the raw materials supplied him by the Government. The ammunition thus compounded can, of course, be little effective; but at close quarters the dah, a species of broadsword, is in the hands of the Burmese a formidable weapon. Strength and individual courage they possess in a high degree. Independent of which, desertion or cowardice they well know will be punished by the most savage execution of the whole family. Artillery they have none, with the exception perhaps of a few old ship guns of the very worst description.

The above details may probably be already known to your Lordship; at all events, they appear deserving of notice. To look upon the Burmese as a foe altogether contemptible, and treat them as such, might lead to serious evil; while, by adapting the means to the end in view, certain success may be anticipated, and your Lordship be enabled to dictate terms to the Burmese Monarch, or otherwise dispose of his country in his own capital and palace.

I have the honour to remain, &c.

Government House,
March 4th, 1824.

(Signed) J. CANNING,
B. A. B.

time, because it will be more useful to him than to us ; and will not hesitate to break off at any time when he thinks he can do it with advantage.

I do not know in what state the countries of Pegue, Arracan, Cassey, and other provinces subdued by the Burmans, now are ; but they are probably anxious to regain their independence ; and in this case they might, for their own sakes, aid our operations, and might, by judicious treatment, be rendered of great use in providing us with every kind of supply in provisions, boats, &c. They might be promised future protection in proportion as they might exert themselves in expelling the Burmans, and co-operating with us.

As it appears to be necessary that Rangoon should be occupied by a sufficient force as soon as possible, both for the purpose of securing the place and of enabling us to assist the people of Pegue in any attempt to regain their liberty, we shall send the whole force now ready to the rendezvous. The chief part of the expense has already been incurred ; there could be no use, and much inconvenience might be found in detaining them. They will sail about the 8th of April ; and by the end of May we shall have a second division ready for embarkation.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that at the period when the above letter was written, the most profound ignorance touching the resources, population, and even the geography of the Burman empire, prevailed. By some strange oversight, no care seems to have been taken to obtain even a moderate knowledge of the circumstances of a people with whom it was scarcely possible to doubt that, sooner or later, the Company's troops must come into collision. The consequence was, that when war was finally decided upon, no higher authority than that of Captain Canning could be consulted, as to the best mode of conducting it ; and as he spoke with the confidence of a man who had spent some months in Ava, it was natural that his suggestions should receive their full share of attention. But it will be seen from a variety of expressions in the correspondence yet to be brought forward, that of the plan of advancing entirely by water, Sir Thomas Munro never thought highly, and that there were other

points in the paper, given in a note, of which he decidedly disapproved. In the mean while, however, I transcribe a few sentences from two letters, the former bearing date Madras, 26th March, 1824, in which the writer makes allusions to the merits of certain officers whom he desired to employ; the latter, dated April 3, having reference to the means of transport.

“Major-General Doveton, who is well qualified for the command, is prevented from accepting it by the state of his health; and Major-General Sewel has declined it.* Colonel Scot, who is now at Bangalore, has therefore been nominated to the command of the Madras troops ordered on foreign service; but I have not yet got his answer, and am not sure that his health will enable him to go. We have no officer better qualified for such a charge. He was selected by Lord Hastings, on account of his services in the late war, for the command of the field-force at Jaulnah; but was compelled to abandon it, by bad health alone, two years ago.”

Unfortunately for the service, Colonel Scot's health was still in so delicate a state, that he could not avail himself of an opportunity which, under different circumstances, he would have embraced with avidity, and turned to a good account.

April 3, Madras.

MY LORD,

THE information conveyed in the report from your Marine Board, forwarded in your last official letter from Bengal, is very satisfactory, and removes all doubt regarding the facility of landing. We shall therefore not wait for the flat-bottomed boats, but we shall send such as may be ready, perhaps not more than six or eight, as they will most likely be found useful in some way or other. The expedition will sail under convoy of the *Sophie*, on the 12th instant. The force will amount to about six thousand fighting men, of whom one thousand seven hundred and fifty will

* It is but an act of justice towards this officer to state, that his grounds of refusal were admitted by Sir Thomas Munro to be perfectly sound. I make this declaration in order to obviate any erroneous impressions which might, by possibility be produced to his disfavour in his own profession. I may add, that I have perused the letter from Sir Thomas Munro to General Sewel, in which he approves of the conduct of the latter gentleman.

be Europeans, the rest natives, and there will be about two thousand public and private followers. The whole will have water for six weeks, and provisions for three months. After the expiration of that period they must depend wholly on Bengal for all supplies beyond what can be procured in the country, because the dearth on the coast will render it impossible to send any from Madras, except the single article of arrack. Bengal, I imagine, can have no difficulty in supplying whatever is wanted; but it is a matter which will require early attention, and in which nothing should be left to chance. If the second expedition, required to be ready by the end of next month, should proceed to Rangoon, the force in that quarter will be doubled; and even if the inhabitants should be well-disposed, and the country to the southward open, though it may contribute materially to the subsistence of our troops, it will not be safe to trust to it entirely in so essential a point.

* * * *

The selection of Colonel Sir Archibald Campbell, by the Supreme Government, to the chief command of the expedition, necessarily interfered with other arrangements which the Government of Madras had proposed to make; and the coast division, as is well known, departed in charge of Colonel M'Bean, an officer junior to Sir Archibald in point both of rank and standing. No petty jealousy, however, was permitted for a moment to break in upon the good understanding which had hitherto prevailed between the two Governments. On the contrary, Sir Thomas Munro gave his ready approbation to the motives which actuated the Governor-General in the proceeding; and whilst he congratulated Lord Amherst on having at his disposal an officer of Sir Archibald's high character and acknowledged gallantry, he himself persevered in endeavouring to give to the Madras contingent all the efficiency which circumstances would permit. The next question discussed between them involved a consideration of the terms on which peace ought to be offered.

“The Siamese,” says Lord Amherst in a letter dated from Calcutta, 2nd April, 1824, “inveterate enemies of the Burmese, would cause a most powerful diversion in the South. The aid

to be derived from the Siamese, in the event of protracted hostilities, has entered deeply into our calculation. But I am not disposed, if we can possibly avoid it, to engage too largely in the intrigues and politics of the Indo-Chinese nations, or to enter into engagements which we are not prepared at all hazards to fulfill. Our main object will be, not the acquisition of new territory, but the security of that which we already possess. This we shall make the principal condition of the treaty which we hope to dictate from Rangoon. The defrayment of the expenses of the war will be also a prominent article, if we can bring it forward with any prospect of success;—I mean, if we shall be well assured that the country possesses the means of payment. These, with one or two points of minor importance, will form the terms on which I shall hope to make peace. I am not at all sure that the dismemberment of the Burmese empire, even if we had the means of effecting it, is an event to be desired. The balance is now tolerably equal between them and the Siamese, and they help to keep each other in order. The only tribe to which we have yet held out hopes of independence is the Assamese. These were annexed about four years ago to the kingdom of Ava, and it is highly desirable on every account that they should no longer remain subject to the Burmese yoke. In the instructions to Captain Canning and Sir Archibald Campbell, I am happy to have introduced an injunction almost in your own words, that whenever they negotiate a peace, they must go on acting as if they were sure that their proposition would be rejected.”

To this letter, which reached him on the 15th, Sir Thomas Munro made the following reply:—

“The security of the Bengal frontier, rather than any increase of territory, ought undoubtedly to be the first object of the war; and the next, the payment of the expenses. If the Burmese can be made to pay them, it will be a sufficient security against their disturbing our frontier hereafter. If they do not pay the expenses of the war, there will be nothing to deter them from farther violations of our territory, unless they are deprived of a part of their own. Even if we should not penetrate to Ummerapoorah, I hope the war will not end without our having advanced so far, both by Rangoon and Munnipore, as to give us a complete knowledge of the country, of the supplies which it can afford, and of the best means of moving an army in it; so that if, at some future period, it should become necessary to invade Ava, we

should know what we had to expect, and be able to act with confidence. We have no information regarding that country here, excepting what is given by Symes, Cox, &c. ; but even from what is stated by them, I can have little doubt that, if boats sufficient for going up the river in the wet season could not be collected, the troops, after the rains, might advance by land along the banks of the Irawaddi, with their heavy stores in boats." * .*

I add to this two short extracts from letters dated the 22nd and 28th of April, for the purpose of showing that, whilst the general issues of the war occupied a large share of Sir Thomas Munro's thoughts, the most minute point connected with its progress was not forgotten.

" We have not yet received any official instructions regarding the preparation of transports for the second division of troops now under orders for foreign service ; but as it is stated in your Lordship's private letter to me of the 2nd ultimo, that it will be necessary to leave at Rangoon those which accompany the first division, we shall take our measures accordingly, without waiting for any more formal communication. It will, no doubt, interfere with the rice trade, and subject us to a high freight ; but upon occasions like the present, it is always best to sacrifice inferior objects to the attainment of the main one. There is however a difficulty which we cannot get over without help. We have no water-casks, and are deficient in wood, and still more in hoops, for making them. After taking into the calculation all that can be done by means of what we have on hand, and of what is expected from other quarters, we shall still want one thousand three hundred water-casks ; and as we shall not, without a supply to this extent, be able to equip the second expedition, we have this day written to Colonel M'Bean, desiring him, with the concurrence of Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, to send back instantly one of the transports with one thousand three hundred water-casks, all the hammocks, or as many as can be spared, and about one-half of the ship-utensils."

* * * * *

Again,

" Tonnage and water are the only things which will occasion the least difficulty in sending a part of the second division to the rendezvous, so as all to arrive in May. We cannot purchase

water-casks and hoops, and must therefore wait until the commissariat can make them, with very inadequate means. I hope, however, that we shall be able, by the 20th of May, to dispatch two battalions of sepoy and the 89th regiment to Port Cornwallis. Should we not have sufficient water for the whole, we shall at all events send the two battalions, and let the 89th follow a few days after." * * *

LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort William, 22nd April, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

* * * * *

I HAVE taken care to communicate to the proper department the observations which you make upon the subject of provisioning the troops; and I flatter myself that nothing relating to this essential point will be overlooked or neglected.

It affords me very sincere pleasure to hear you express your approbation of the arrangements which we have made respecting the command of the combined force engaged in the expedition. We have thought it becoming to confer on Colonel M'Bean the rank and allowances of a Brigadier-General.

I am sure that I cannot express to you in adequate terms, the sense which this Government entertains of the zealous and effective co-operation afforded us by the Government of Fort St. George. Without your assistance, it would have been impossible for us to have undertaken the vigorous and extended measures with which we have commenced the campaign.

* * * * *

Sir Archibald Campbell and Captain Canning are instructed to tender conditions of peace to the Burmese, as soon as we are in possession of Rangoon. I trust that the terms we shall offer will be deemed moderate, and such as little exceed the demand necessary for the security of our own territory. We have no wish to weaken or dismember the Burmese empire, nor to acquire for ourselves any extension of the territory we already possess. We propose to require that the Burmese should relinquish their newly-acquired possessions in Assam, from whence they have the means of descending the Barrampooter, and overrunning our provinces at a season of the year when our troops cannot keep the field; that they should renounce all right of interference in the independent countries of Cochar; that the boundary between Chittagong and Arracan shall be accurately defined; and

finally, that they shall pay the expenses, or a share of the expenses, of the war in which they have compelled us to engage. These conditions, with the addition possibly of a stipulation respecting the independence of Munnipore, we are, I think, entitled to demand; and as we shall not relax for a single moment in our threats upon the capital from the south, and possibly from the north-west also, I am not without hopes that they may be acceded to before our force has long been in possession of Rangoon.

SIR THOMAS MUNRO IN REPLY.

Madras, 8th May, 1824.

MY LORD,

* * * * *

THE terms proposed to be offered to the Burmese Government are certainly very moderate. Unless it is much poorer than it is represented to be in any of the published accounts, it ought to be able to pay a crore of rupees for the expenses of the war; or if it will not pay in money, it can in territory. Munnipore would perhaps be very useful to us, even if restored to its former chief, by removing the Burmans to a greater distance from our frontier, and facilitating our invasion of their country whenever it might be rendered necessary by any future aggressions. Their power and that of the Siamese may be pretty nearly balanced; but such kingdoms as these are in a perpetual state of fluctuation, and can never, for any long period, remain like the old governments of Europe, within the same limits. Our best policy is not to look so much to the preservation of any balance between them, as to the weakening of that power which is most able to disturb our frontier. If we go seriously to war, the dismemberment of the Burman empire, to a certain extent, must be the consequence, whether we wish it or not; because the Siamese will undoubtedly seize the opportunity of recovering their ancient possessions to the southward of Rangoon, and their example will be followed by any other state which has any chance of success.

* * * * *

LORD ANHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 7th May, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

WE are busied in obtaining every possible information respecting the country lying between Assam and Cachar and the kingdom of Ava Proper. We keep in mind the probability of

its becoming expedient to advance troops in that direction during the next cold season ; and although I am willing to hope that the possession of Rangoon and other maritime places belonging to the Burmese, may induce them to listen to reasonable terms of peace, I do not propose to relax in the preparations for attacking the capital, not from the south only, but also from the countries adjoining our north-eastern frontiers ; and whether it may be necessary or not, ultimately to advance a force in that direction, it is highly important not to lose the opportunity of making ourselves acquainted with the readiest means of waging offensive war against our turbulent neighbours. * * *

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 22nd May, 1824.

MY LORD,

WE have been two days later than I estimated ; but we have got the pioneers, whom I did not expect so soon ; they have been enabled to join only by very extraordinary exertion. A detachment of them from the neighbourhood of Hyderabad, has marched at the rate of twenty-five miles daily for fifteen days, without a halt, in the hottest time of the year. Our sepoy battalions have embarked without a man being absent. Their conduct has been highly meritorious : no Europeans could have evinced more readiness to go on foreign service than they have done. * * *

LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 22nd May, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

You will have been informed yesterday by Mr. Swinton of the wish of this Government, that two battalions, with two six-pounders each, forming part of the last portion of your second detachment, should be sent direct to Chittagong. We have thought it best not to interfere, even if we could, with that portion of the second detachment which was to sail on or about the 20th instant, thinking it probable that Sir Archibald Campbell will have calculated upon its joining him, and wishing to avoid the disappointment which might be occasioned to Sir Archibald Campbell by any diversion of that part of the force. It is possible that he may not require the remaining portion of the second detachment. At all events, we have urgent need of its assistance at Chittagong. The irruption of the Burmese into that district

was not expected by our agents there, until within a very few days of its taking place. I regret it most on account of the necessity which it imposes on our troops of remaining longer in the southern portion of the district, where I am afraid their health will be unavoidably exposed to injury. It is not our intention, however, to prolong a contest in a part of the country where it will be scarcely possible to preserve the health of our troops. Much as I shall lament the loss of property, and the personal inconvenience and danger which the inhabitants will suffer from the presence of the enemy, I think that, in the balance of evils, the occupation of the country by the enemy must for a time be endured, rather than risk the almost certain destruction of our troops by the effects of the climate; and our authorities there will therefore be directed to retreat gradually, unless they shall see strong reasons to the contrary, on Chittagong, between which place and the present scene of hostilities, we are informed that the country is of such a nature as to make it easy for a retiring force to check the advance of one much superior to itself in numbers. Chittagong itself is not considered an unhealthy station; and we shall look to our operations at Rangoon for the recovery of such portion of our territory on the Naaf as may be temporarily in possession of the Burmese. Indeed, although we are taking such measures as seem to be necessary for the protection of Chittagong, in the event of the enemy moving still farther forwards, I think I am not too sanguine in expecting that it is very possible they may make a sudden retreat on hearing of what, I hope, is on the eve of taking place—the occupation of the island of Cheduba. I cannot think that the Rajahs of Arracan, and other neighbouring districts, now forming the force which has advanced into our territory, will remain easy when they shall hear that we are at the very gates of their homes. Besides, we are led to believe that the Burmese now in the field derive their supplies from that island.

The Burmese appear to be making considerable exertions to resume offensive operations in more than one quarter. We are told that reinforcements have advanced into Munnipore, where an effort is about to be made by Gumber Sing, whose family of late ruled that country, to shake off the Burmese yoke. It is also pretty clear, that an addition must have been made to their force in Assam, as it is not easy to account in any other manner for the advance which they have, within these few days, made to the westward, after having hastily abandoned the country as far as Rungpore, the eastern capital.

* * *

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 4th June, 1824.

MY LORD,

I HAVE to thank your Lordship for your letter of the 22nd May, which arrived yesterday. Mr. Swinton's official letter was received at the same time, and we have in consequence ordered a force, composed of two battalions of Native infantry, with four six-pounders, and two, five, and one half-inch howitzers, and sixty artillerymen, to be in readiness to embark for Chittagong. The troops are now ready, but the embarkation of the stores and provisions will require five or six days; but I hope that the ships will be able to sail on the 10th instant. The troops will be victualled only for the voyage, and must depend on the Bengal commissariat after landing. They will be paid to the end of July, and from the first of August we must trust to their being paid by the Bengal paymaster. After the departure of this body of troops, there will remain here, of the second expedition, His Majesty's 54th regiment and one Native battalion, to be sent off on the requisition of Sir Archibald Campbell.

From the reports of Captain Norton, and of the jemadar who abandoned the stockade, transmitted by Mr. Swinton to Mr. Wood, I should be inclined to form a very low opinion of the Burmese troops. Had they been good for any thing, they never would have permitted the gun which had been thrown down to have been brought away with so little loss to our small detachment. The worst Indian irregulars of any native chief would have made a better figure, and caused more loss. If we make the usual allowances for exaggeration, I should not estimate the ten thousand Burmese, mentioned by the jemadar, at more than one thousand five hundred or two thousand. It is no doubt very desirable that the troops should not be exposed during the wet season in an unhealthy part of the country; but I hope before retiring that they will have given the enemy a check.

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LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, May 25th, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

OUR accounts from Chittagong reach down to the 20th instant. At that time Colonel Shapland, with the force with which he had advanced, had returned to Chittagong, and nothing

was known with certainty as to the advance of the Burmese from Ramoo.

We are using every possible exertion to reinforce Colonel Shapland, but our utmost endeavours would go but a little way towards assembling a force calculated numerically to resist an army of fifteen thousand men, which the Burmese are supposed to have collected.

I most anxiously hope, that our request to you to appropriate to the service of this Presidency all that remains of the second division, after you shall have sent the 89th and two Native battalions to Port Cornwallis, will not tend to cripple Sir Archibald Campbell's proceedings. Your first division was so much larger than you engaged to furnish, that I am willing to hope that Sir Archibald may possibly not call for the aid of the second division beyond the 1st European and 2nd Native battalion above-mentioned. We have asked you to send two battalions direct to Chittagong.

We calculate that there may possibly remain two battalions more of the second division, which we now request you to send to Calcutta; and we have frankly told you, that if to these you could add two more, making in all four battalions to be sent to Calcutta, you would render us an essential service. * * *

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

MY LORD,

Madras, 7th June, 1824.

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday your Lordship's letter of the 25th May. I expect that the two battalions for Chittagong will sail on the 10th instant; and I trust that the pilot vessel will meet and conduct them, as none of the officers of the transports know any thing of the coast in that part of the Bay.

His Majesty's 54th regiment, and the remaining battalions of the second expedition, will be sent to Calcutta whenever tonnage sufficient can be procured, which will probably be in the course of a few days.

Two other Native battalions, exclusive of those belonging to the second expedition, will soon be got ready for Calcutta; but their time of sailing must depend upon the arrival of tonnage, which we may look for in the course of the month.

I see nothing very serious in the loss of the detachment at Ramoo. There is no carrying on war without reverses; and that which has happened to Captain Norton appears to have arisen

from the troops having been harassed by being employed in small detachments. Colonel Shapland, when reinforced, will, I hope, be able to drive the enemy out of the province. The territory itself may be poor, and not worth a contest; but it is of importance that our military character should be maintained, and that the reputation of the enemy's arms should not be raised at the expense of our own, by their being permitted quietly to occupy our territory. I am sorry that it should have been rendered necessary by circumstances to divert any part of the force intended for Brigadier-General Campbell from its first destination; but he will still have a very respectable force at his disposal. The best way of rendering it adequate to every purpose for which it is intended, would be by encouraging the Peguers to throw off the yoke, and engaging to support them in recovering their independence.

From the character which hostilities have assumed, there can be no hope that the Burmans will listen to any reasonable terms; and our safest course for bringing the war to a successful termination is, to enter into it with all our means.

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FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 14th June, 1824.

MY LORD,

SHOULD the loss of Rangoon and Chedubah induce the Burman Government to make peace on such terms as your Lordship may deem satisfactory, nothing more can be desired; but should it refuse to do so, it will then become necessary to prosecute the war with all the force that can be spared, both on the side of Rangoon and of Bengal, and to be prepared for its lasting more than one campaign. Sir Archibald Campbell will require the aid of all the second division that was originally destined to join him. He ought to have ten Native battalions, besides his European force. Whether he advances towards Ummerapoorah by land or water, or partly both, he will have a long line of communication, and must have some posts to secure it; and after making these detachments, he must have with himself such a body of men as the whole force of the enemy shall be unable to oppose. The co-operation of the inhabitants would be the easiest way of securing his communications and the arrival of supplies. The system of terror employed by the enemy, by enabling him to drive away the inhabitants from their villages, and to hinder

them from supplying our wants, gives them a great advantage over us; and this advantage will operate against us as long as the people continue to believe that their country is again to be delivered up to the Burman Government. The people themselves will never venture to act in opposition to their present tyrannical masters: before they will venture to take so dangerous a step, they must be satisfied that they are not to return under their dominion; and they must have leaders and a prince of their own to look to. As the southern and most fertile provinces of the Burman empire were formerly under Pegu, it would perhaps be advisable to proclaim the restoration of the ancient family, and to guarantee to it the possession of whatever part of its old territory might be recovered from Ava. Were this done, Sir Archibald Campbell would soon have a friendly instead of a hostile country, along a great part of the line of his operations. If we hold out to the people no hope of their not being placed again under their ancient sovereign, but leave them to suppose, that whenever our troops are withdrawn, they are again to fall under the Burman Government, we must expect no co-operation from them, but to be harassed by their withholding supplies and cutting off stragglers.

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LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 10th July, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE read with due attention your suggestions respecting an offer of our protection to the Peguers, in the event of their assertion of their former independence. We are at present quite in the dark as to the existence of a single individual of their former royal race. I think, indeed, that the whole was exterminated at the time of the final conquest and annexation of the kingdom of Pegu to the empire of Ava. Nothing like a disposition to revolt has at any time manifested itself, I believe, during the present generation; and as circumstances are at this moment, I imagine it would be hopeless to expect that we could excite a disposition to throw off a yoke which has long ceased, at least, to be a foreign one. But circumstances may arise, both in Pegu and in Arracan, to make it our policy to offer assistance in separating those two kingdoms from that of Ava. In fact, if the Court of Ummerapoorra obstinately refuses to listen to any terms of peace, there is nothing left for us but to attempt the subversion of that power as it exists at present, and to divide it once

more into separate, independent, and comparatively powerless states; and as far as indications go at present, I should think it more likely that Arracan will set the example than Pegu.

There are certainly many malcontents in the former who would join us in an attempt to subvert the authority of Ava. It appears to me, however, necessary to proceed with great caution in holding out assurances of our future interference and support. Nothing would incline me to such a measure, but the conviction that we had no other way of beating our enemies, or reducing them to reasonable terms of peace.

I do not meet with a single expression from Sir Archibald Campbell indicative of a wish to be joined by more troops. And yet the arrival of the 89th and 2nd Native battalion seems likely to induce him to push farther up the river than he would otherwise have done. He knows very well that he has only to speak the word to be joined by the remainder of your second division, with the exception of the two regiments gone to Chittagong.

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SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 26th July, 1824.

MY LORD,

I WAS not aware that the royal race of Pegu had been so completely destroyed at the last conquest, that it was not known that a single individual of it was now in existence. This circumstance is no doubt unfavourable to any expectation of revolt in the Rangoon districts. I would not however, on that account, despair of such an event yet taking place. We know that in India, when a race of ancient princes has been extirpated, persons claiming descent from them frequently start up, when the Government is weak, to recover their real or pretended rights, and that, without any claim to royal descent, ambitious and enterprising individuals, when they see a favourable opportunity, collect followers, and endeavour to render themselves independent; and there can, I think, be no doubt that under similar circumstances the same thing would happen in Pegu. What we want there is some party hostile to the Government; we should derive from it information regarding the roads and the country, and aid in procuring provisions. We want no military assistance, as our troops, if well supplied, will be quite sufficient for all military operations.

An invasion of Ava by land has many advantages over one by

sea. It is much less exposed to danger from unforeseen accidents. The advance of the army can be calculated with much more certainty. The border districts of the enemy differ little from our own, and, when entered by our army, may either be occupied by tributary chiefs, or by our civil officers. And as we advance, district after district will, for the time, fall under our dominion, and contribute with our territories in furnishing supplies for the army. And as the army will be accompanied by the necessary establishment of draught and carriage-cattle, it will be able to regulate its marches, and to make them in any direction which may be thought most convenient. An invasion by sea of such a country as Pegu, is destitute of all these advantages. The people are separated from us by the ocean: they know that our invasion is a mere temporary enterprise, and that we have no intention of making a permanent conquest. They have therefore no motive for favouring us either openly or secretly. They know that such conduct would be punished after our departure with the utmost severity. The only event that could give us any chance of assistance from them would be, an insurrection against the Ava Government. The army, in such circumstances, being, on its landing, without draught or carriage-cattle, can procure none from the country while the authority of the Government continues to prevail. All its operations must be attended with great labour and difficulty. As it advances the people will abandon their villages, and remove their cattle and property. Its supplies must come chiefly by sea, subject to the accidents of contrary winds, and to the chance of their being intercepted by the enemy in their passage to the interior. * * *

Every thing that has yet occurred seems, I think, to confirm the account given by Captain Canning, that the Burmans are undisciplined and badly armed. Their military character is lower than I expected to have found it. They have never ventured to assail any regular force: they have acted entirely on the defensive, and have shown less resolution in defending their stockades than we meet with among the irregular troops of India in the defence of their barriers and jungles. I wish that Sir Archibald Campbell had made some estimate of the force which he considered as necessary to enable him to execute the measures which he may have in view. He has said nothing on the subject; and it is possible that he may expect the amount of his force to be determined by your Lordship. It should, I think, be completed to ten, and, if possible, to twelve Native battalions. He has already enough of Europeans. * * *

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 27th July, 1824.

MY LORD,

I AM sorry to observe, from Sir Archibald Campbell's report, that he is in great want of boatmen. It would be a very important object if the dandies he wants could be procured, and it might be advisable to encourage them by high pay. I should think that a corps of Malay boatmen might be raised about Prince of Wales's Island and Sumatra. Their services would be invaluable in facilitating our movements; and would amply repay their expense, however high their pay might be.

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FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 13th August, 1824.

MY LORD,

WE have received the dispatches of Sir Archibald Campbell brought by the Alligator, which were forwarded in the Secretary's letter of the 30th of July. But as that letter merely transmits the dispatches, we are anxiously waiting for your Lordship's decision on the plans proposed by Sir A. Campbell, and on the destination of our own troops, now held in readiness. Of the two plans proposed, we have no means of judging which may be the best. In the event of re-embarking and landing on the coast of Arracan, it is not stated at what point the landing is to be, whether north or south of Chedubah. This change in the operations would hardly be advisable, unless it possessed great and evident advantages, such as being much nearer to the capital than Rangoon; the communication, after the force should have passed the Arracan mountains, being open and secure with the coast, and the facility of receiving supplies from Bengal being greater than at Rangoon, and the force from Arracan being brought into a more early co-operation with that from Bengal.

I am glad however to perceive that Sir A. Campbell himself gives the preference to the plan of carrying on his operations from Pegu. There are many reasons for its adoption, even if the approach to the capital should be slower and more difficult than from Arracan.

The abandonment of a country in which we had been fighting for some months, would appear as a failure, not only to the enemy

but to our own troops: it would encourage the Burmans, and it would shake, in some degree, the confidence of our troops in their commanders; it would leave the Burmans in quiet possession of their southern and richest provinces; it would discourage the Siamese and Peguers at the moment perhaps that they were ready to have risen against the enemy; and it would deter the inhabitants of the province to which the war might be transferred from affording us any aid. After all, however, that plan ought to be preferred which clearly offers the greatest certainty of speedily subduing the enemy. To form a correct judgment on this point requires a knowledge of the country and its resources, its obstacles, its roads, and its water communications, which can be best procured by the officer on the spot.

I think it is evident that Sir A. Campbell applies for the 54th regiment and a battalion, because these corps are the remaining part of the second expedition, and because he does not know that any other troops can be spared; but I have no doubt that he would rather have three battalions of sepoy, because they are so much more easily subsisted, and because the proportion of Europeans to native troops in his force is already much too great. One battalion of sepoy will therefore sail in the course of five or six days for Rangoon; but we shall keep the 54th regiment until we hear again from Calcutta, as I have no doubt that that regiment will be wanted for the Bengal force destined for the eastern frontier. Draught and carriage cattle, and a small body of cavalry, seem to be much required by Sir A. Campbell, and it is desirable that he should have them as soon as possible. They can be furnished much easier from Bengal, and much sooner than from hence; but if any are required from this quarter, we shall take steps to furnish what we can on receiving your Lordship's orders.

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LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort William, 3rd August, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

You will receive, in a day or two, copies of the last dispatches which have reached us from Sir Archibald. He seems to think it nearly impracticable to prosecute his voyage up the Irrawaddy, and he consequently asks our instructions upon what he considers the only two remaining plans for him to pursue, either to advance to the capital by the road from Martaban through Old

Pegue, or to come round with his force, after leaving a strong garrison at Rangoon, and try what he can do on the coast of Arracan.

If we approve of his advance by land, he desires we will send him field-train and equipment, without which he cannot move, together with some squadrons of cavalry.

It is utterly out of our power to comply with his request. We have not the articles to send him. I do not know if we have come to a right conclusion, that it would not be possible for you to supply him, without incurring 'an inordinate and unwarrantable expense. Perhaps you have as little the means of supplying him with draught cattle as ourselves. But I will beg the favour of you to let me know what you are able to do, and also to give me your opinion as to the propriety of incurring so very great a charge. I would not hesitate stretching a point for the sake of rendering his fine army effective to all useful purposes; but we are of an opinion here, that the measure is absolutely impracticable, and therefore do not much discuss its expediency.

Sir Archibald told us, in a former dispatch, that one, two, or three hundred boatmen would be of material use to him. We have sent him six hundred; and coupling the use which he may make of this reinforcement with other circumstances, we do not yet relinquish the hope of his being able to ascend the river. If he could get as far as Prome, we conceive it would be of great advantage; for such an advance would almost bring him in co-operation with a force which we propose to send as early as the season will permit into Arracan. It is by this latter route that we now think it advisable to approach the capital, rather than by Munnipoor. Our force will be more concentrated. The expulsion of the Burmese from Ramoo, possibly their capture or destruction, will combine itself with a movement into Arracan.

From Chedubah we step into the Island of Ramree, and from thence upon another part of the coast of Arracan, but all tending towards the same point. If Sir Archibald is unable to advance either by the Irawaddy or the Martaban road, the remaining alternative of bringing him round to Arracan strengthens our force already in that quarter, and leaves more troops disposable for Cachar and Munnipoor, which, although a secondary point, is still one of considerable importance.

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SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 23rd August, 1824.

MY LORD,

I HAVE been delaying my reply to your Lordship's letter of the 3rd instant, until I should have seen Sir A. Campbell's secret dispatch, and the instructions sent to him in consequence. In my last letter, however, I have, in fact, already given my opinion on the main point; namely, that the plan of advancing by the Irawaddy was preferable to that of either marching south, or re-embarking and landing in Arracan. I can see no object in his going to Martaban, because it would not facilitate his advance to the capital, as, according to his own account, even if the Siamese and Peguers were to take a part in the war, he would still require draught and carriage equipments from Bengal. I suspect too, that operations by sea against the enemy's maritime possessions would, at this season of the year, be liable to great delays, and even to danger. If a field-equipment be indispensable, it would still, I think, be advisable to advance by the Irawaddy, for the equipment could not possibly be to such an extent as to move all the stores without water-carriage. The Siamese should be left to make war in their own way; and the Peguers, if they rise at all, will be more likely to do so by Sir A. Campbell's moving up the river, and drawing the enemy out of their country. With regard to the plan of re-embarking the Rangoon force, and landing it at Arracan, nothing could justify such a measure but the certainty of being furnished there with an equipment of draught and carriage cattle. If they could not obtain it, they would be still more helpless than where they are now, and we should have lost reputation, and given confidence to the enemy by abandoning the original plan of operations.

Sir A. Campbell says, that the prospect of advancing by the Irawaddy is at an end, in consequence of the square-rigged vessels having been found not to answer, the want of country-boats the want of provisions, and sickness. The square-rigged vessels are surely not absolutely useless, and the other wants may be supplied. If it be found impracticable to ascend the river when it is full, the difficulty will probably be removed when it falls, and the stream loses its rapidity, and the country becomes dry enough to admit of troops marching near the banks. Should this be the case, the advance to Prome would be of the greatest advantage: it would give Sir A. Campbell the command of a rich

tract of country, and of an important part of the navigation of the river; and it would perhaps, by bringing him so much nearer to the Bengal army, enable him to open a communication, or to co-operate with it.

There is one serious want, however, which, though not stated by Sir A. Campbell as one of the obstacles to his advance, is yet one under which Europeans cannot long keep the field—I mean the want of fresh provisions. I have however no doubt that, whenever he can move, he will be able to supply himself.

The country along the river is populous and cultivated, and must be full of cattle for agriculture and other purposes. They can easily be driven away from a spot like Rangoon, but they cannot be driven away from a whole country: they cannot get out of the reach of an army that is marching. When the ground is dry, a detachment of two or three thousand men, without guns, can easily march directly inland from the river fifteen or twenty miles, and make a sweep of the villages, and drive in what cattle it may find, always paying for them when their owners can be found.

Sir Eyre Coote, for months together, during Hyder's invasion of the Carnatic, never got fresh beef in any other way. He sent out four or five battalions to some place distant twenty or thirty miles, where it was supposed cattle were grazing in the jungles, and they returned in two or three days with a supply, though always followed and harassed by a body of horse. Operations of this kind however, as well as every other, would be greatly facilitated by a small equipment of draft and carriage cattle. It might sometimes be found necessary to traverse the country to the distance of fifty or sixty miles, in search of cattle, and to employ six or eight days on this service: the Native troops would carry their own rice. Europeans are not usually employed on such occasions; but if the enemy were in force on the route, it might be necessary to have a few Europeans, and also a few light guns. I think therefore that means should be adopted for supplying Sir A. Campbell, as soon as practicable, with from one to two thousand draft and carriage cattle, and more if it can be done. It is evident, if even he had the complete command of the river and all its boats, that his force must still be inefficient, unless it can carry on operations at a distance from the river, and march in every direction. If it cannot do this, it cannot answer the purposes of an army.

I think that a small equipment of cattle would enable Sir A. Campbell to increase it, partly by capture and partly by purchase. The expense of the equipment would be great, but it must be submitted to for the sake of avoiding a much heavier charge. If Sir A. Campbell cannot move without it, we incur the whole expense of the expedition to no purpose; and even if he can move without it, but if by having it he could shorten the duration of the war three or four months, all the extra expense of that period would be saved.

I have not yet ascertained the expense of sending draught cattle from hence, because I have not had any report regarding tonnage; but if one, two, or even four thousand could be sent from Bengal and Madras, at one hundred rupees a-head, four or five lacs employed in this way would eventually prove a very great saving in the expenditure of the war; for all other expense is idle waste, while that part is withheld which puts our army in motion. From the scarcity and dearness arising from the drought, the expense of feeding each bullock, including the pay of the driver during the passage from Madras to Rangoon, will be twenty-two rupees: the tonnage may raise it to a hundred rupees. I shall know the whole probable charge in a few days, as I mean to take up a vessel immediately to send two hundred bullocks to Rangoon. It would be advisable to proceed in equipping Sir A. Campbell as if we expected the war to last more than one campaign, and that he was to extend his operations to a distance from the river to every part of the country. The Commissioners infer, from no overture having been received from Omrapoora, and from the inhabitants not having returned to Rangoon, that the Government is determined to prosecute the war to the last extremity, and that the people are hostile. We cannot expect the Government to offer us any terms, until it sees that we have the power of advancing into the country. The people, whether hostile or friendly, could hardly have acted in any other way than they have done.

They could not return to their habitations until our advance should give them the pretence that we were masters of the country.

As to their being deterred from remaining in their villages by the apprehension of their families being punished, it deserves very little credit.

The families of the principal officers may be kept as pledges of their fidelity; but those of the great body of the people must be

at liberty ; and if our force advances, I have no doubt but the greater part of them will return to their villages ; and that, though they may give us no open aid, they will privately sell or connive at our carrying off, by force, whatever we have paid for. The only difficulty in this war seems to be that of moving and subsisting. The enemy is the most contemptible we have ever encountered.

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LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 4th September, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM not quite sure if, in the letter which I had the honour to write to you a few days ago, I adverted to the embarrassment likely to be occasioned to us by the reports which we have received from the quarters most likely to afford information of the pestilential climate of Arracan. The reports are of such a nature as to induce the Commander-in-chief to abandon the plan of operations which, for a variety of reasons, would have been the most eligible, but which are clearly overbalanced by the almost certainty of the army being rendered ineffective by sickness during its passage through the kingdom of Arracan ; and I believe we must revert to the original plan of advancing the main body of our army through Cachar and Munnipoor, leaving in Chittagong a defensive force only sufficient to protect our Southern district from any attempt which the enemy might possibly contemplate in that quarter. One material inconvenience which arises to us from abandoning operations in Arracan is, that we shall no longer have the prospect of uniting ourselves with Sir Archibald Campbell, should he bring his force round to that coast : and, indeed, the same reasons which prevent our risking the health of the troops intended to advance from Bengal, will also make it unadvisable that Sir Archibald should bring any portion of his force into the same pestilential region. It is really difficult to know in what manner to employ beneficially the army now at Rangoon, supposing it impossible for them to accomplish their advance on the capital ; but I am inclined to think, that although unable to ascend the river, or to march by land to Ummerapoor, they may still do a great deal towards distressing the enemy, and bringing him to terms, by remaining in possession of the southern provinces, and intercepting the large supplies which those provinces are supposed to furnish to the royal treasury.

Sir Archibald's last dispatches, dated 7th of August, inform us,

that he was preparing to take possession of Mergui and Tavoy, on the coast of Tenasserim. These are remote acquisitions; but they would be powerful cards to play in any dealings which we may eventually have with the Siamese. Sir Archibald informs us of an affair with the enemy at Syriam, from which it would appear that they are very unwilling to face us, even under every advantage of position; and, what is still better, he seems to anticipate the return of a part of the neighbouring population.

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 2nd September, 1824.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant.

It is unfortunate that the climate of Arracan is so unhealthy as to make it expedient to abandon the plan of advancing through that province. It is certainly better to do so than run the risk of crippling the army by sickness. We have many unhealthy tracts, but none, I believe, except the hills of the northern Circars, through which an army may not pass without any danger from the climate. I hope that the route by Munnipoor will be found practicable. The distance is great; but as the country is not hostile for a considerable part of the way, it will not materially impede the operations of the force. I should imagine that when it enters Ava, the enemy will abandon Arracan and the whole of the sea-coast. The occupation of Mergui and Tavoy may be useful, if they are not allowed to withdraw permanently any part of our force.

The greatest advantage that could be derived, either from these places or from our intercourse with the Siamese, would be a supply of draught and carriage cattle. With a small equipment to begin with, and with a sufficiency of boatmen, Sir Archibald Campbell ought to be able to go any where. He has force enough, and it can be kept up at its present strength, by occasional supplies of recruits and volunteers from Bengal and the coast. I was therefore somewhat disappointed at seeing, by the last instructions to him, that some doubt existed as to his being able to advance to Prome, and ultimately to the capital. There is a danger of lowering the tone of our enterprise by questioning its practicability. He has, I trust, no doubt of it himself, provided he has boats and a small equipment of cattle. There is no reason, from any thing we have yet seen, to suppose that the

enemy can make any serious opposition; and with such a force as he has, Government have surely a right to expect something more than the occupation of the southern provinces, and to look with confidence to the dictation of peace at the capital, as the result of the operations of his force, and of the Bengal army.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 4th December, 1824.

MY LORD,

I DO not know that there is any urgent necessity for an increase to our military force. I think that it is adequate to the protection of our territories, and to the suppression of all disturbances which may arise in those of our allies, where they are employed as subsidiaries. But the case becomes different, when there is a probability of the Nagpore force being obliged to advance, and of the war in Ava being protracted, so as to cause heavier demands upon us to replace the increasing casualties. It does not appear to me, however, as far as I can judge at present, that we shall require any other than that of a few additional men to each company, and perhaps an extra local corps to occupy Seringapatam, and set at liberty a regular battalion.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 15th January, 1825.

MY LORD,

IT gives me great pleasure to learn that Sir A. Campbell was to move up the Irawaddy towards Gengainchain, about this time. I apprehend no difficulty from the enemy, but much from the want of carriage. This will greatly increase the fatigue of the force, and render it more liable to sickness by privations and exposure. It will cripple all its operations by forcing it to move near the river, and preventing it from pursuing the enemy at a distance from it. An army can do little unless it is able to move in every direction. If Sir A. Campbell cannot himself find carriage cattle, they ought, whatever the expense may be, to be sent to him from India: they may be procured here to any extent that tonnage can be found; and it would be of the utmost advantage to the success of the war, that two thousand, or even one thousand, should be sent every month to Rangoon. But I cannot believe that carriage cattle may not be procured on the spot, if proper persons are employed and liberal prices paid.

I see from some correspondence, that a reward of fifteen rupees was paid for every slaughter-bullock or buffalo brought. This is nothing ; it would be better to give fifty and ensure a better supply. Carriage cattle ought to be taken, if they are to be got, for fifty or even a hundred rupees a-head.

There can be no doubt that, in a populous and well cultivated country, there must be abundance of animals, both for the plough and carriage, and that they may be got by paying double, but not by paying half-price. Paying double prices in an enemy's country, is the cheapest way of carrying on war ; and if it is done in Ava, it will produce the same beneficial effects as in India. When the force ascends the Irawaddy, and gets possession of the points where the main branches separate, the Burman troops will probably abandon the Delta. I imagine that they will also evacuate the country between Rangoon and Martaban, and that the inhabitants of all these countries, if well treated, will be ready to sell cattle to our army at cheaper rates, and in greater numbers, than they can possibly be sent from India.

It would greatly facilitate the military operations, if some civil administration were established in the districts from which the enemy might be expelled. I do not mean for the purpose of raising revenue, but protecting the people collecting supplies, and seeing that they are amply paid for in ready money. The officer who may be employed on this business should be one who has had some experience in such matters,—such a man may no doubt be found among the officers present with the force.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 2nd February, 1825.

MY LORD,

It is of great importance that no time should be lost in ascending the river, to the point where the branches first separate from the main stream, in order to prevent the enemy from carrying off the grain and cattle of the Delta, and secure them for ourselves. I am more solicitous about cattle than grain, because grain can be easily sent from India, if necessary ; but the transport of cattle is slow and expensive. If there are officers with the force who understand the business of purchasing cattle in an enemy's country, I am persuaded that enough may be found in the Delta, and the districts occupied by our troops, to supply what is absolutely necessary both for draught and carriage.

But should there be any doubt on this head, the supply ought not to be left to chance, but should be sent from India. The Commissary-General has now ready above six hundred carriage bullocks, and any number may be procured for which tonnage can be got; but as more than double the tonnage we now have is wanted for troops, we must defer sending the bullocks until we get spare tonnage from Bengal, or are authorized to take what may touch here by chance. Sir Archibald Campbell has never distinctly stated what number of carriage bullocks would enable him to act efficiently: it does not appear to me that less than four, five, or perhaps six thousand, would answer the purpose. Whatever the number may be, it should not only be completed, if practicable, but provision should be ready for filling up all casualties. If his cattle were equal to the carriage at once, without the aid of boats, of a month's supply of his army, I should think it sufficient; but he ought to have elephants to carry some tents for his Europeans. He wants bullocks much more than soldiers. Against such an enemy as the Burmans, I should reckon fifteen hundred European firelocks an ample allowance for the force in camp: a larger body would be only an incumbrance, difficult to move, and difficult to feed, and harassing to the Native troops, who must furnish guards and detachments to supply their wants, and save them from fatigue.

I am glad to learn that no offers of peace will be allowed to interfere with the military operations, which, I trust, will be continued until our armies are in a situation to dictate the terms:—we cannot trust even to the signature. It will be necessary for the troops to retain commanding positions, until every article is completely fulfilled; and when they are recalled, to move by such routes as may give us a perfect knowledge of the country.

As it is advisable not only to keep the original Native part of the expedition complete, but to augment it in order to enable Sir Archibald Campbell to spare troops to occupy posts in the country as he advances, we have, anticipating your Lordship's approval, ordered two Native regiments to embark for Rangoon as soon as may be practicable, one from Madras, the other from Masulipatam: the number of each, including followers, will be about twelve hundred. We have also ordered two hundred pioneers to embark from Masulipatam. Exclusive of these corps, we shall, in the course of three months, have ready for embarkation above two thousand volunteers and recruits, so that we shall want tonnage for nearly five thousand men. What we have is

not adequate to one-half of this number. The main body of the sepoy regiment at the Presidency, about six hundred and fifty firelocks, will probably embark on the 12th instant; but the regiment from Masulipatam cannot embark until transports are sent there from Bengal. An official statement of the probable number of men to be ready for embarkation in the next three months is now preparing, and will be sent to Calcutta by the 5th instant, with the view of enabling your Lordship to give necessary orders regarding the tonnage for them.

* * * *

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 3rd March, 1825.

MY LORD,

I WISH that Sir A. Campbell had attempted to move early in January: if he could by short marches, and frequent halts, have in the course of a month only reached Ganganchain Yah, his situation would have been much improved, and he would have been enabled to relieve much of his present wants, by getting supplies from the country. His difficulties, instead of increasing, would, I think, have diminished every day as he advanced. With regard to the policy of insisting upon the fulfilment of that article among the conditions of peace formerly offered, which imposes upon the Court of Ava the payment of a sum of money for the expenses of the war, I am of opinion that it ought not to be relinquished merely on the consideration of their consenting to the re-establishment of the independent states which formerly existed between Ava and Bengal. In forming this opinion, I do not look to the value of the money, for no sum that we can possibly obtain will counterbalance the expense of protracting the war for another campaign. I consider the exaction of the money of importance only as it will tend more than all the other stipulations to deter the Burmans from committing hostilities upon us in future. Nothing will make such a government keep its engagements but fear or weakness. If in making peace we require nothing more from it than the acknowledgment of the independence of the chiefs between the two frontiers, we shall have no security that it will not encroach upon them again, whenever circumstances may call for our forces in a distant quarter. It will not be deterred by the dread of our resentment, for it will have already seen that it will suffer no permanent loss from it, as we leave it in possession of all its extensive dominions; but if it is

forced to pay a sum of money, it will suffer a loss which it cannot recover, and will therefore be more likely to remain at peace.

The great use of exacting a sum of money is, that it will deter the Burmans from venturing to attack us hereafter, and thereby give us some assurance of their sincerity in making peace with the design of maintaining it.

If the Burman empire were dismembered, by the Siamese getting the southern provinces, or by a new state rising up in Pegue, its weakness would prevent its disturbing us, and I should, in such a case, think it unnecessary to prolong the war for any other purpose but to obtain the money.

In the present state of the war, I think that the cession of Arracan, and the payment of a sum of money, would be sufficient ; but if the war be prolonged, I think that the Burman power should be reduced, by requiring farther cessions wherever it might at the time be found most convenient to have them.

Whenever peace may be made, it should be stipulated, in the event of our forces not having previously traversed the countries near the capital, that they should march by such routes as they may think proper in returning home. * * *

The preceding letters constitute but a slender portion of the intimate and confidential correspondence which was carried on, during the progress of the Burmese war, between Lord Amherst and Sir Thomas Munro. They are given rather as specimens of the tone in which the late Governor of Madras was accustomed to express himself, than as containing any full or connected narrative of his eminent exertions on that occasion ; yet even from them, the reader will be at no loss in collecting the sentiments and views of the writer, both as these affected the nature of the war itself, and the proper mode of conducting it. It will be seen that, of the military power of the Burmans, he thought from the first very meanly ; that he treated as mere accidents the petty successes which they obtained, as well on the eastern frontier as at Ramoo, and that the alarm, which prevailed at one time so extensively as to reach even Calcutta itself, was to him a mystery wholly inexplicable. But while he thus spoke and thought of the dangers of the war, he was by no means disposed to encounter

even the Burmans with an inadequate force; on the contrary, his unceasing exertions were applied to place the army of Sir A. Campbell in such a condition as should enable it to move in every direction, with a moral certainty of success; wisely arguing, that, even in point of economy, it were better to act thus than to risk a prolongation of the contest by adopting a narrower policy. Again, though not less desirous of peace than other public men, Sir Thomas Munro uniformly declared himself against the conclusion even of an armistice till after the enemy should have been thoroughly humbled. He contended that nothing short of this—nothing less than the necessity of purchasing a suspension of hostilities by a money-payment, or the surrender of a portion of his territories, would convince the King of Ava of his own inferiority; and as the same sentiments were happily adopted by the Government of Bengal, the judicious measure was enforced. But perhaps there is no feature in his public conduct at this eventful period more remarkable than the absolute confidence which he reposed in the loyalty and good feeling of the people of India. While apprehensions prevailed elsewhere of commotions and conspiracies, and a cry was raised for more troops to supply the place of those employed at Rangoon, Sir Thomas Munro uniformly maintained that there existed no ground of alarm; and even the mutiny at Barrakpore failed to convince him that the force already embodied was not fully adequate to preserve the tranquillity of the country. From several long and able minutes recorded by him during the progress of the war, we gather that, at one period, full twenty out of fifty regiments of Native infantry were withdrawn from the territories of Madras; yet he resolutely opposed every effort to increase the military establishment, except by adding a few extra men to each company. Never was policy more magnanimous, more equitable, or productive of more fortunate results. By acting thus, he gave the surest proof to the natives, that Government neither feared nor distrusted them; and as no disturb-

ance occurred, a heavy additional expense was saved to a treasury already far from being rich.

The following confidential letter to an officer in the Mysore country, will suffice to show how Sir Thomas was accustomed to treat the awful rumours which from time to time came in. It was written in reply to a report made under circumstances of no common agitation and alarm. It is scarcely necessary to add, that of the horrible plot which involved the massacre of all the European officers in the Company's service, not a syllable was afterwards heard.

I HAVE received yours of the ——— and read the awful denunciation sent to us by ———. Bundageer Sahib is, I imagine, a man whom I have frequently seen in the neighbourhood of Vascottah, and who has often complained to me of the resumption of some enaum, partly by Tippoo and partly by Purnea; but in this respect he is in the same predicament with hundreds as good as himself. The native prince gives and takes away such enaums at pleasure, and we have no business to interfere.

Bundageer seems to have got up a new and very extensive holy alliance against us, comprehending all the most discordant powers in India; but I have been so long accustomed to them, that I think nothing of them. I have heard of one every five or six years since 1792, when a very alarming one was brought forward by some adherents of Tippoo, and circulated through the country by tappal. They usually arise from the political speculation of some holy Hindoo or Mussulman.

Bundageer knows too much to deserve any credit: had he been satisfied with telling us that the old Rana of Kittoor was a malcontent, many would have believed him, because nobody doubted that she was dissatisfied at having been robbed of her property. But he gives us a leaf out of an old almanack, in which it is said, —“In that year there will be in the Eastern quarter bloody wars, and great slaughter, and earthquakes,” &c.; and he, or some other almanack man, seems to have been foretelling eclipses in Bengal, “perplexing monarchs with the fear of change;” for they are raising men enough there for a crusade. The shortest and most effectual way to dissipate the present grand confederacy would be, to restore Bundageer's enaum, or to give him a purse of money, as is usual in Persian tales. The General cannot give the enaum, but he may the purse; and pagodas will answer as

well as dinars. The story of the confederacy, if not already sent, should be sent forthwith to —, in order that he may know that his disorder is not fever, as has been supposed, but magic, and that his medical attendant may adapt his remedy to his complaint. I hope in goodness, as the old ladies say, that these fellows will not bewitch —, for we could ill spare him in the present state of affairs. We should not be able to say that we could have better spared a better man, for we have none better; and I therefore sincerely hope that he, and all of us, may get safe through this ominous year.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

On another occasion, at an earlier period of the war, a disturbance of rather a serious aspect actually broke out at Kittoor, in the southern Mahratta country, which created, as usual, excessive alarm, for which there was no solid ground. The following letter to Mr. Chaplin, who was at the time Commissioner at Poonah, will show the view taken by Sir Thomas Munro of that affair.

Madras, 7th November, 1824.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

I HAVE to-day received yours of the 30th ultimo. The attack on Kittoor has been a melancholy affair; but I do not imagine that the insurrection will extend beyond the district. Chintamene Row, though always discontented, has, I think, too much at stake to risk a contest with us. You will see, when the official papers reach you, that large reinforcements have been ordered to Darwar, which would have been sufficient for every purpose without calling upon you; but the more force on such occasions the better; it concludes the business sooner, and deters those who are wavering from stirring. There was great imprudence and presumption in the whole of the operation. — should have had no troops. He ought to have gone alone, if he went at all; nobody would have injured him. He should have explained his intentions. If they refuse to accede to them, he should have parted from them peaceably, and written to the commanding-officer, or to you, that a proper force might have been sent to enforce submission. In all such cases, there ought either to be no force at all, or an overwhelming one. A good tishildar would have been a much better agent at Kittoor than the collector: he would have caused no commotion; and if he failed, there

would have been no loss of character, or exasperation, and a military force might then have been employed with better effect. I never knew an instance in which I should have thought it advisable that the collector should himself be present to direct the employment of force. When he is present, his feelings get engaged, and the dispute becomes in some degree personal. When he remains at a distance, and leaves the military force to proceed in its own way, there is no hostility between him and the insurgents, and they give him credit for acting upon principle and by superior authority.

We are engaged in a foreign war, which has already drawn away no less than four European and twelve Native regiments, and we ought, during its continuance at least, to avoid every measure which may be at all likely to excite disturbance at home. We must however lose no time in putting down the present insurrection. If it does not spread, which I do not imagine it will, there is nothing formidable in it. There have long been parties in Kittoor, and some of them averse to the zemindars. The widows are probably directed by some of the chiefs. A general amnesty, with very few exceptions, might be offered, and liberal provision for the widows and principal followers, &c. I should never have thought the treasure an object of any consequence, and would much rather have let it go to the widow than have endangered the tranquillity of the country for the sake of it. This little disturbance will not only cause great expense, but embarrass almost every military arrangement from Trichinopoly to Nagpoor.

Yours truly,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

Subjoined are a few out of many private letters addressed, during the continuance of the war, to eminent persons at home. They cast some fresh light upon the politics of the times, and fully illustrate the sagacious and statesman-like views of the writer.

TO THE RIGHT HON. C. WYNN.

Madras, 8th July, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th February, and am happy to learn that you think the assessment of the country ought to be lightened when

it can be done with prudence. It is a measure which is absolutely necessary, not only for the ease of the people, but for the ultimate stability and progressive increase of our revenue. It is not a measure which demands hasty or general adoption; but is one which must not be lost sight of, and which must be carried into effect cautiously and gradually, and suiting the extent of reduction to the condition of the several provinces. Our revenue is now tolerably permanent. There is no very great fluctuation in its annual amount, but it takes from the cultivator too large a share of the produce. If we lower the assessment a little, he will be enabled to improve his land, and get other crops, and his gain will be more than the mere abatement in his rent. But neither this, nor any plan calculated for his relief, can be successful, unless we abandon theories, and follow with perseverance the practical system in use among the Native Governments when best administered. The Rayetwar, the ancient and most common system in the peninsula of India, is that by which only we can know the real state of the country, and protect the people. It has by some misconception, arising out of a superficial knowledge of the customs of the country, been supposed to be something new. It is in fact nothing more than Government, through its officers, receiving the land revenue directly from the land-owners of the country, instead of farming it out to adventurers. Had the whole landed property of a district been in the possession of a few great proprietors, nobody, I believe, would have thought of such a plan; but because it is distributed among a great body of small proprietors, or rayets, it seems to be considered as quite reasonable that they should be turned over to any body, who will pay a fixed annual revenue for them, and that Government should thus be relieved from the trouble of looking after them. As long as the native rules of inheritance remain unchanged, landed property must be small and numerous. But whether a district be divided among a hundred, or ten thousand proprietors, it ought to make no difference as to the relation in which the proprietors stand to Government. They are all tenants in chief, and have a right to the same protection. It is no excuse to say that a direct settlement with them causes greater detail and some additional expense. It is the duty of Government to adapt its arrangements to the convenience of the people, rather than to its own ease.

TO SIR GRAHAM MOORE, K.C.B.

Madras, 25th August, 1824.

MY DEAR GRAHAM,

I AM not sure whether I ever answered your letter of the 30th of July from Zante, but I am sure that I have thought often of doing so; and if I have, this will be a second edition, but no matter if it were a third, for it is pleasant to write and think of auld lang syne. I never think of you without looking back half a century, when we were in Glasgow, and went to school in fear and trembling to meet Bald——.†

* * * * * I have had my share of a warm climate. I am now writing with the thermometer at ninety-two, and it is seldom below ninety in the daytime, from April till October. I don't mind the heat much, but my wife feels it, and probably the more from having brought me another son last year. She has a strong dislike to many good Christian names of his ancestors, and has therefore called him Campbell. I thought that one Highland name was quite enough in a family, and that two Highland surnames without a Christian name, such as Peter or Daniel, could not be canny. I hope that I shall one day have the pleasure of introducing him to your son John.

I see with delight that the Greeks are still on the whole successful. The very gaining of time is gaining an advantage. The longer the contest continues, the more confidence they will have in themselves, and the better qualified they will be to enjoy and preserve independence. You have now, I suppose, taken up your final abode in your own country, after all your toils and wanderings, quite satisfied with what you have done and what you have seen. I, however, have no right to rest, and I must go and see a little of the world like other people. It is, to be sure, rather late, but there is no help for it; it is one of the evils that attend our long employment in India. I shall, therefore, I imagine, soon after I get home, leave it again, in order to visit the Continent, and, if not too dangerous, Greece. I suppose that I must take a Domine to direct me, but on this point there will be time enough to consult you.

I was quite rejoiced to hear of the *cruel* disposition that old Carrick had made in keeping a part of his large fortune from David Buchannan, and giving it to your brother. I should not be at all surprised to meet him in Conduit-street on my arrival,

† A tyrannical teacher, whose chief pleasure consisted in punishing his pupils.

for he has, I fear, been too long about town to have any relish for a country life. I am not sure that even with you one of the chief enjoyments of your rural abode is not that of going to town and meeting an old shipmate occasionally. We are not much accustomed to quiet in India, and we have, therefore, gone to war with the King of Ava. His subjects, the Burmans, are much inferior as soldiers to the natives of India, and are a very miserable enemy; but there are many difficulties from natural causes in the invasion of Ava; the rains last nearly half the year, during which time military operations are nearly impracticable. The cattle, &c. for an army cannot be transported by sea, and by land there are no roads, and the distance is great, and through mountainous and desolate passes. These difficulties will all, however, be overcome; they require nothing but arrangement and perseverance. I am sorry that I shall not be here to see the close of the war, for not expecting any rupture, I wrote last year to be relieved, and my successor will probably be here in January.

Yours affectionately,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS BROTHER.

Madras, 26th January, 1825.

MY DEAR ALEXANDER,

I WROTE to you in the beginning of the month of the unfortunate death of poor John Munro.* What a fatality has attended him as well as his father! I told you in my last that he had been killed at Kittoor, by a matchlock ball, in accompanying the storming party, to which he was urged by the ardour of his temper, contrary to the orders of Mr. Chaplin. He was the only person who fell, and the only one who was not ordered there. There was something so unlooked for and so tragical in his death, that it appears to me almost like something that is not real. Had he lived, he would have turned out much better than you or I expected in his earlier days; for there appeared at that time to be something defective, which prevented his having any distinct impression from what he read. The defect was not in memory, but in want of attention or comprehension. This, however, disappeared as he grew up, and he promised to have become a very valuable public servant. Mr. Elphinstone, in writing to me says, "The melancholy intelligence of your nephew's fate must have

* Sir Thomas Munro's nephew.

reached you long ago ; earlier probably than it did us. It was a real misfortune. With his zeal and talents, and the rapid progress he had made in every thing, he must have proved a public servant of the very first order ; and every day makes me more sensible of the difficulty with which such a loss is supplied." How sadly this fair prospect has been darkened, and all the anxious cares and hopes of his friends disappointed by his melancholy death !

I have forgotten to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th April last, and of one after your visit to Craigie, which Lady M. has kept ever since it came. Erskine had enough to distress her before, but John's death will be a terrible shock, which I fear it will be long before she can recover.

I have heard nothing certain of my stay here, or of any successor.

Your affectionate brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.

EXTRACT.

30th May, 1825.

It gives me great pleasure to hear you speak so favourably of the Rayetwar system, which, though the old system of the country, is by some strange misapprehension regarded in England as a new one. It has been unfortunate for the territories under Madras, that almost all the earlier discussions regarding Indian land and its owners or occupants, were carried on in Bengal, where the long previous weakness of the Mahomedan rulers had allowed the officers of the revenue to assume rights which did not belong to them, and which the British Government augmented, by considering them as landlords, under the term of Zemindar. The opinions derived from Bengal regarding Zemindars, were extended to this Presidency, where, in fact, they are unknown, excepting in the northern Circars, where they were suffered to grow up in the same manner as Bengal. The greater part of our territories have been acquired from Native Princes who did not employ Zemindars, and who collected the revenue, as we now do, from the Rayets, by means of Tishildars, receiving a monthly salary, and appointed and dismissed at pleasure. Most of our provinces have in ancient times been surveyed and assessed ; but as the accounts have in general been altered or lost, we make a new survey and assessment, in order that we may know the resources of the country ; and in order that every Rayet may know the exact amount of his assessment, and thus be

protected against any extra demand. The tendency of the Native rules of inheritance to subdivide the land is no doubt an inconvenience ; but the evil is not found in practice to be so great as might at first sight be supposed. We know its utmost extent. It can never go beyond what it is now ; for in all Rayet-war countries the course of time has long since carried the subdivision of land to its utmost natural limit ; and it has been carried beyond it by frequent wars and arbitrary exactions having impoverished the Rayets, and prevented them from cultivating so much land as they would otherwise have done. Peace, and a moderate assessment, will in a few years considerably increase the size of the Rayet's little properties or estates, by increasing their agricultural stock. The subdivision of estates is also counterbalanced in a considerable degree by the custom of the different branches of a family often remaining for one or two generations undivided, under one head. The subdivisions must, however, be great, as long as the present laws of inheritance continue to be followed. But it is our business to let the distribution of property remain as we find it, and not attempt to force it into larger masses upon any theoretical notion of convenience or improvement. There are many Rayets who have not more than four or five acres ; there are some who have four or five thousand. Between these extremes, there are great numbers who have from one to five hundred. I have no doubt that if the law of inheritance is found to be materially inconvenient to the Rayets, it will in time fall into disuse.

It is desirable in every country that the natives should be employed in every branch of the internal administration, and that their situations should be made respectable. The Indian governments begin to be sensible of this, and they have, during the last twenty years, considerably improved the condition of the judicial and revenue officers, and I imagine that they will gradually do all that is necessary in this respect if supported from home.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO MR. SULLIVAN.

Madras, 11th July, 1825.

THE Burmese war still occupies our attention more than any thing else ; but its active operations are for the present nearly suspended by the monsoon. As the official accounts of the progress of the war are sent home regularly up to the latest date, it will be unnecessary for me to enter into any details. The ori-

ginal plan of the invasion of Ava was romantic and visionary, and was, I believe, suggested by Captain Canning. It was, that Sir A. Campbell, after occupying Rangoon and collecting a sufficient number of boats, should, with the help of the south-west wind, proceed against the stream to Ummarapoorra at once. This, even if it had been practicable, was too hazardous, as it would have exposed the whole force to destruction, from the intercepting of its supplies. Had there been boats enough, this scheme might have been partially executed with great advantage, by going up the river as high as Sarawa. This would have given us the command of the Delta, and of the navigation of all the branches of the Irawaddy, and would have saved the troops from much of the privations which they have suffered from being shut up at Rangoon. But even if there had been a sufficient number of boats, Sir A. Campbell would have been justified, by our ignorance of the country and of the enemy, in not making the attempt until he should have received more troops, to leave detachments at different places on the river, to keep open his communication with Rangoon.

When Captain Canning's plan of sailing up to the capital was abandoned, two others were thought of, but both were impracticable: one was to proceed in the dry season by land from Pegue; the other was to re-embark the troops, land somewhere on the coast of Arracan, and march from thence through the hills to the Irawaddy. This Government, from its subordinate situation, has of course nothing to say in the plans of foreign war; but I took advantage of a private correspondence with which I have been honoured by Lord Amherst, to state privately my opinion strongly against both plans. I said that re-embarkation would be attended with the most disgraceful and disastrous consequences; that the measure would be supposed to have proceeded from fear; that it would encourage the enemy, and would deter the people of the country, wherever we might again land, from coming near us, or bringing us provisions for sale; that we knew nothing of the coast of Arracan or the interior; that if the troops landed there, they would be in greater distress than at Rangoon, because they would find less rice, and be as much exposed to the weather; that they could not possibly penetrate into the country without carriage cattle, of which they had none; and that they would be at last compelled to re-embark again, without effecting any thing: I said that the nature of the country, and the difficulty of sending draught and carriage cattle by sea, pointed out

clearly that our main line of operations could only be by the course of the Irawaddy, partly by land and partly by water, and that this would give us the double advantage of passing through the richest part of the enemy's country, and of cutting off his communication with it, whenever we got above the point where the branches separate from the main stream of the Irawaddy. I calculated that if Sir A. Campbell adopted this plan, he would reach Prome before the rains; and that when they were over, he would be able to continue his march to Ummarapooa. When I reckoned on his getting no farther than Prome this season, I had not so low an opinion of the Burman troops as I now have. I was induced to form a very low estimate of their military character, from their cautious and irresolute operations against the detachment at Ramoo, in May 1824; and from all their subsequent conduct they appear to be very inferior in military spirit to any of the nations of India. There were no letters from Prome later than the 6th of June: the monsoon had set in, and every thing in the neighbourhood was quiet. The heads of districts had submitted, and were sending in supplies. It was expected that offers of peace would be sent from Ava as soon as the occupation of Prome should be known. It is difficult to say what such a government will do; it may submit to our terms or reject them; but we ought to be prepared to insure them by advancing to Ummarapooa, and, if necessary, dismembering the empire, and restoring the Pegue nation. If we encouraged them, a leader would probably be found, and we might, without committing ourselves to protect him hereafter, make him strong enough, before we left the country, to maintain himself against the broken power of Ava.

We have sent on foreign service beyond sea, from Madras, five regiments of European infantry, fourteen regiments of Native infantry, two companies of European artillery, a battalion of pioneers, and above one thousand dooly bearers, and we have relieved the Bengal subsidiary force at Nagpoor. The rest of our troops are thinly scattered over a great extent of country, and will have very severe duty until those on foreign service return. We are obliged to be more careful than in ordinary times; but I see no reason to apprehend any serious commotion, or any thing beyond the occasional disturbances of poligars, which we are seldom for any long time ever entirely free from in this country. I confess I cannot understand what the Bengal Government want to do with so many additional troops, or with any addition at all.

Mr. Adam left them quite enough, and more than enough, to carry on the Burman war, and to protect their own territory. They have not sent a single Native regiment beyond sea, except a marine battalion: they have in Arracan and their Eastern frontier twelve or thirteen Native regiments more than formerly; but they have got nine of them by troops at Nagpoor and Mhow having been relieved from Madras and Bombay, while these troops, which have moved to the Eastward, still cover the country from which they were drawn. We had once five battalions in the Baramahl; we have one there now;—the whole have been advanced to the Ceded Districts. The military authorities in Bengal seem to think that when troops are drawn together in large bodies in time of war, new levies must always be made to occupy the stations from which troops have been taken to join the large body. If we follow such a principle, there can be no limit to the increase of our armies. I found much inconvenience from its adoption in Bengal, because the increase of the Bengal army is narrowly observed by the armies of the other Presidencies, and raises expectations which cannot be satisfied.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

C. W. W. WYNN.

Madras, 16th July, 1825.

DEAR SIR,

ONE of our greatest defects in this country is our readiness on every occasion to exaggerate the power and resources of the enemy. This is productive of very serious evils: it discourages enterprise, excites idle apprehension, causes a large force to be employed where a very small detachment would be sufficient, and leads to much delay and heavy expense in making great preparations where there is no enemy. There are many officers who never see five or six hundred of the enemy without estimating them at as many thousands, and who suppose that the Burmans must have an army of Rangoon, an army of Arracan, and an army of every province we can approach. I think it is clear that they have but one army, or but one large body of men, which from its number may be called an army; that they have great difficulty in keeping it together; and that, when it is together, it is much inferior, in every military quality, to the troops of any Indian prince. The long time required by Bandoolah, in December last, to bring a force against Sir Archibald Campbell, shows plainly enough that he had great difficulty in collecting it;

and I think that this difficulty is one proof, among many others, that the population of the country is extremely thin. We have now traversed the country, in different directions, to the extent of three or four hundred miles at least; and when we consider the mountainous tracts with which it is intersected, that wherever we leave the banks of the rivers the villages are very few and small, and that even on the banks of the Irawaddy the country in many places is desolate, I think there can be no doubt that the population is far below what it has ever been estimated at. I should scarcely suppose that it can exceed four or five millions for the whole empire. I am therefore convinced that the Burmese, if they do not submit during the rains, can give no serious opposition to our advance to the capital next campaign. It is not likely that they will persevere, after that event, in refusing to come to terms; but it is possible that they may; and we should therefore be prepared for it, in order that we may not continue involved in this expensive war longer than is necessary. We cannot retain the country as a conquest, but we may set up any new prince in Ava who has ability and influence to maintain himself. We might make Pegue again independent, and set up any chief of that nation who would be agreeable to the people; and as our troops would necessarily be a considerable time in his territory before they could be entirely withdrawn, he would have leisure, under their protection, to confirm his power. Some such arrangements as these may become necessary; but if the Court of Ava submit, peace may be more expeditiously made on other terms. I should think it desirable, on every account, that Pegue should be made independent; but should it still be continued subject to Ava, I should think that the Bengal provinces will have no cause to dread another invasion, and that no additional troops will be necessary to cover their eastern frontier. I regard the whole of the fifteen thousand men now raising as entirely superfluous. I know of nothing that should make it now necessary to have a larger native army in Bengal than in Lord Hastings' time, when it was found strong enough both to carry on war with the Mahratta powers, and to protect our own territories. It ought certainly to be able to do as much, or more now, as it has been augmented since then by Mr. Adam, and has had eight or nine native regiments set free by the relief of Mhow and Nagpoor by the troops of Bombay and Madras. I cannot at all agree with the military authorities in Bengal, that it is necessary to draw together a division of ten or twelve thousand

men to the north-west of Delhi, when half that number might do; or that the stations left by the troops, when drawn together, should be occupied by new levies.

TO MR. RAVENSHAWE.

18th July, 1825.

WE want no additional regiments of Europeans. All that is wanted, is to keep the corps already in the country complete during the war. I am induced to mention this again, by hearing reports of an intention of sending out more regiments. We have already more than we have use for, and have in consequence sent more to Rangoon than can be fed or moved. The Bengal people are alarmed about their frontier. They could take care of it when they had not a single regiment of cavalry, and now that they have two, they talk of want of protection: they seem to think their force must, even in numerical strength, be equal to that of the enemy. One to five, or even to ten, was once thought enough.

TO KIRKMAN FINLAY, ESQ.

Madras, 15th August, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR,

I do not know that I have ever yet acknowledged the receipt of your letter about Dr. Anderson. I have never seen him, but I understand that he is a very good public servant; which, being our townsman, I consider as a matter of course. I hope that you are a friend to free trade for public servants, as well as for other articles; and that you do not think that men ought to have a monopoly of offices, because they come from a particular town; or that we should call them China, when we know that they come from the Delft-house. I find, however, that there is no shaking off early prejudice, and becoming quite impartial, as a friend to free trade ought to be; I find that, notwithstanding my long exposure to other climates, I am still Glasgow ware; for if I had not been so, I should not, when I saw your opinion quoted by Mr. Huskisson, in support of his measures, have felt as much gratification as if I had had some share in the matter myself.

I remember, when I was in Somerville and Gordon's house, about the time of the appearance of "The Wealth of Nations," that the Glasgow merchants were as proud of the work as if they had written it themselves; and that some of them said it was no

wonder that Adam Smith had written such a book, as he had had the advantage of their society, in which the same doctrines were circulated with the punch every day. It is surprising to think that we should only just now be beginning to act upon them; the delay is certainly not very creditable to our policy. Our best apology is, perhaps, the American and the French revolutionary wars, during the long course of which the nation was so harassed, that there was no time for changing the old system. The nation was just beginning to recover from the American war, when the Revolution in France began; and had that event not taken place, I have no doubt that Mr. Pitt would have done what we are now doing. I am not sure that you are not indebted to your old friend, the East India Company, for the measure not having been longer delayed. The attack upon their monopoly by the delegates in 1812-13, excited discussions, not only upon their privileges, but upon all privileges and restrictions, and the true principles of trade, which probably prepared the minds of men for acceding to the new system sooner than they would otherwise have done. Even now there seems to be too much solicitude about protecting duties: they may, for a limited time, be expedient, where capital cannot be easily withdrawn; but in all other cases why not abolish them at once? There is another point on which anxiety is shown, where I think there ought to be none—I mean that of other nations granting similar remissions on our trade. Why should we trouble ourselves about this? We ought surely not to be restrained from doing ourselves good, by taking their goods as cheap as we can get them, merely because they won't follow our example? If they will not make our goods cheaper, and take more of them, they will at least take what they did before; so that we suffer no loss on this, while we gain on the other side. I think it is better that we should have no engagements with foreign nations about reciprocal duties, and that it will be more convenient to leave them to their own discretion in fixing the rate whether high or low.

India is the country that has been worst used in the new arrangement. All her products ought undoubtedly to be imported freely into England upon paying the same duties, and no more, which English products pay in India. When I see what is done in Parliament against India, I think that I am reading about Edward III. and the Flemings.

I hope we shall talk over all this some day, in a ramble in the

country, where the cows are still uncivilized enough to cock up their tails and chase strangers.*

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. CUNNINGHAM.

Madras, 10th July, 1826.

MY DEAR CUNNINGHAM,

I GOT your letter of the 11th of January only a fortnight since: I don't know where it had been so long, but it seems to have been in bad weather, for it was drenched in salt water, had opened, and was hardly legible. I was, however, able to make out a great deal of satisfactory information about our old friends. They all seem to be very well, except Webb and Jourdan, who never were very strong. I observe you never say any thing about —; I suppose you never see him now, and that he may have betaken himself to better company.

I need not write to you about this country, for I believe there is hardly a person in it whom you know, except Generals Hall and Doveton; one of whom commands the southern, and the other the centre division. I wish we had Scott or Nat. Forbes here, for we are much in want of old officers for divisions.

You will have heard that our Burman war is over. General Bowser, if you have seen him, will tell you all about it much better than I can, or any body else. Our loss in officers has been severe, and both they and the men deserve great praise for their behaviour. The troops will all be here in the course of the month, except one regiment of Europeans and five regiments of native infantry, which remain for the present at Rangoon, and on the coast of Tennasserim.

As peace has returned, I have no object in remaining in this country now, and shall be very happy when a successor arrives and sets me at liberty. It is a long time since January 1780, when I arrived here as a Cadet, and borrowed thirty pagodas of Andrew Ross about six months after, to equip me for the field against Hyder Ally. I begin to feel, though my health is good

* This expression refers to a little adventure in which Colonel Munro and Mr. Finlay took part. They had walked into a field in which a number of cattle were grazing, and Colonel Munro was describing to his companion some military movement, when the animals suddenly rushed at them, and they with some difficulty escaped over a wall.

enough, that I am not so active as formerly ; that my hand is not so steady ; and that either the heat, the climate, or the lapse of time, has had the usual effect, and made me older than I was then. It is now too late to think of getting younger by dying my hair, or changing my dress, or going home. I shall quit this country, where I have passed so much of my life, with great regret, but still I shall be delighted to go home. Yours, very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Bangalore, 29th September, 1825.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

By the desire of Macdonald, I enclose you an interesting paper of his on the difficulties of a Russian invasion of India. I have always considered such an undertaking as impracticable, without the previous conquest of Persia, and the quiet submission of the people to their new masters, neither of which events are likely, unless we are very negligent. At all events, the Russian invasion will not come so soon, I hope, as to find us in Ava. Let us get out of that country, and then come Russians and Persians when they will.

The armies, as they are called, of Ava, are, as far as we have yet seen of them, a most miserable half-armed rabble, greatly inferior to the peons of any Indian zemindar. They are the best ditchers and stockaders since the time of the Romans ; but as a military body, they are little better than an assemblage of badly-armed tank-diggers. The army from Ummarapooora, which was approaching Prome the end of last month, and of which about one-half, or twenty thousand, were then entrenched at Meaday, are said to be chiefly, if not entirely, armed with muskets. I should as soon believe that they were all armed with Manton's fowling-pieces. You must of course have long since observed, that ten or fifteen thousand men, more or less, make very little difference in the military arithmetic of Ava.

One of the most extraordinary circumstances attending the Burman war is, the effect which it has in increasing the Bengal army ;—fresh regiments are raised, because others have gone to the frontier, and more are raised to fill up the places of some which it is proposed to draw together in order to strengthen some of their field-forces, already strong enough.

The Bengal army, as it stood before the Burman war, was at least as numerous as it ought to have been. No increase was

necessary for Ava. It never has been customary in India, when ten or fifteen thousand men are sent into the field, to raise an equal number to supply their places in garrison and cantonment. The Bengal Government has got more troops by transferring Nagpoor and Mhow to Madras and Bombay, than it has sent into Ava. It can hardly be said to have sent any into that country; for those in Arracan and Cochar are still on their own frontier. Since the commencement of the war, we have sent beyond sea, viz.—

Fighting men	{ Europeans	.	5237	
	{ Natives	.	15,277	
Bearers	.	.	1088	
Followers	{ public	.	2644	
	{ private	.	2326	
				———— 26,572

The great addition to the Bengal army on account of the war in Ava, in which we have so great a share without any addition, is a subject much felt and much talked of in this establishment. I regard the increase as entirely useless in itself, and as worse than useless as it affects the Madras army. An adjutant-general officer will always find very urgent reasons for increasing, and even for doubling, the army, if Government is disposed to receive them.

Yours most sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. WYNN.

Madras, 5th January, 1826.

DEAR SIR,

WE have private accounts from Rangoon up to the 28th, which mention that Sir A. Campbell had passed Meaday without seeing any thing of the enemy, who had abandoned their stockades at that place after their defeat near Prome. The enemy have evidently retreated in great consternation and disorder; and Sir Archibald will, I imagine, push on as rapidly as he can to Maloon, or even to Sembewgow, in order to prevent the enemy from re-assembling in force at those places. Should he even find both abandoned, he will probably be obliged to halt a short time in order to let his supplies overtake him; for I suspect that his ardour has made him outrun them.

In the beginning of last month he had reason to expect that Colonel Morison's force in Arracan would reach Sembewgow, on the Irawaddy, about the middle of the present month; but this

hope must now be at an end, because the Arracan force has been destroyed as an army by sickness much more fatal than that experienced at Rangoon the preceding year. The loss of a powerful diversion from Arracan will not however, I think, hinder the Rangoon army from reaching Ummapoora in the course of the present campaign, unless the enemy show more resolution and more skill in harassing us than they have ever yet done. There are two ways by which our advance to the capital might be rendered impracticable: one is by the enemy not fighting us in front, but sending numerous detachments from their army to act on our flanks and rear; and the other is by the people of the country becoming hostile and intercepting our supplies. As far as I can judge, from all the past conduct of the enemy, I think that we have nothing to fear from detachments from their army acting in our rear, because these detachments never seem to trust themselves at any great distance from the main army, never to come forward without it, and never to remain long behind when it retreats. A rising of the people is what is most to be apprehended, as it would involve us in very serious danger. Among most nations, the knowledge that they were to be restored to their former conquerors would produce a hostile feeling, which would raise them against their new masters; but among the Peguers, I rather think that this will not be the case, because the mass of the people are too unwarlike, and because they do not seem to have a local militia, so common in India. It must be owned, however, that our avowed intention of giving up Pegue to Ava furnishes that power with the best means of exciting the Peguers against us, and which, though it may have little effect while we are successful, might be very dangerous if we met with any reverse. It is not unlikely that another armistice will be immediately requested by the Burmans; but, as it may be merely with the view of gaining time and wasting the fair season, I scarcely believe that Sir A. Campbell can with prudence accede to it, until he reaches the capital or its neighbourhood. I should then hope, though not very confidently, that we may have peace. We shall then, at any rate, have possession of the most fertile part of the empire, and be able, by collecting the revenue, to reimburse ourselves for a portion of the expenses of the war. The deplorable state of what was the Arracan army compels us to give what farther aid we can possibly spare, with safety to ourselves, to the army in Ava. We are sending to Rangoon one or two additional regiments of sepoys, and we are preparing to relieve all the weak corps of sepoys now in Ava, by fresh and

complete ones from hence. I have left India as naked of troops as it can safely be ; and if I have committed any error, it is rather in having sent away too many than too few. But I have not acted without fully considering the state of the country, and all the chances of disturbance ; and as I find that we must either weaken ourselves a little more than is prudent, or expose the army in Ava to failure from the want of reinforcements, I have not hesitated to support Sir A. Campbell to the utmost extent of our power. Any evil which might arise in this country from the want of troops in one quarter, may be repaired by drawing them from another ; but the want of troops in Ava would be fatal to the success of the campaign.

I am, with great esteem and respect, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Madras, 16th April, 1826.

MY DEAR DUKE,

I DID not think of troubling you with another letter ; but as we have at last made peace with the Burmans, I think I may as well give you a few lines, by way of finishing the war. I mentioned in my last what kind of troops the Burman armies were composed of, so that it is not necessary to say any thing more of them, except that they did not improve in the progress of the war. We are well out of this war. There have been so many projects since it commenced, that I scarcely expected ever to see any one plan pursued consistently. There has been no want of energy or decision at any time in attacking the enemy ; but there has certainly been a great want of many of the arrangements and combinations by which the movements of an army are facilitated, and its success rendered more certain. There were, no doubt, great difficulties ; every thing was new ; the country was difficult, and the climate was destructive ; but still, more enterprise in exploring the routes and passes on some occasions, and more foresight in others in ascertaining in time the means of conveyance and subsistence, and what was practicable, and what was not, would have saved much time. We are chiefly indebted for peace to Lord Amherst's judgment and firmness in persevering in offensive operations, in spite of all arguments in favour of a defensive war, founded upon idle alarms about the power of the Burmans, and the danger of advancing to so great a distance as

the capital. Had he given way, and directed Sir A. Campbell to amuse himself with a defensive system about Prome or Meaday, we should have had no peace for another campaign or two. Every object that could have been expected from the war has been attained. We took what we wanted, and the enemy would have given up whatever we desired, had it been twice as much. They have been so dispirited, and our position in Arracan and Martaban gives us such ready access to the Irawaddy, that I hardly think they will venture to go to war with us again. The Tennasserim coast cannot at present pay the expense of defending it: it may possibly do so in a few years, as its resources will, no doubt, improve in our hands, and there may be commercial advantages that may make up for its deficiency of territorial revenue. I should have liked better to have taken nothing for ourselves in that quarter, but to have made Pegue independent, with Tennasserim attached to it. Within two months after our landing at Rangoon, when it was ascertained that the Court of Ava would not treat, I would have set to work to emancipate Pegue; and had we done so, it would have been in a condition to protect itself; but to make this still more sure, I would have left a corps of about six thousand men in the country until their government and military force were properly organized; five or six years would have been fully sufficient for these objects, and we could then have gradually withdrawn the whole of our force. We should by this plan have had only a temporary establishment in Pegue, the expense of which would have been chiefly, if not wholly, paid by that country; whereas the expense of Tennasserim will, with fortifications, be as great as that of Pegue, and will be permanent, and will not give us the advantage of having a friendly Native power to counterbalance Ava. Pegue is so fertile, and has so many natural advantages, that it would in a few years have been a more powerful state than Ava. One principal reason in favour of separating Pegue was, the great difficulty and slowness with which all our operations must have proceeded, had the country been hostile, and if the Burman commanders knew how to avail themselves properly of this spirit, and the risk of total failure from our inability to protect our supplies upon our long line of communication. The Bengal Government were however always averse to the separation of Pegue: they thought that the Burmans and Peguers were completely amalgamated into one people; that the Peguers had no wish for independence; that if they had, there was no prince remaining of their dynasty, nor

even any chief of commanding influence, to assume the government; that it would retard the attainment of peace; that the project was, in fact, impracticable; and that if even practicable, the execution of it was not desirable, as it would involve us for ever in Indo-Chinese politics, by the necessity of protecting Pegue. Even if we had been obliged to keep troops for an unlimited time in Pegue, it would have saved the necessity of keeping an additional force on the eastern unhealthy frontier of Bengal, as the Burmans would never have disturbed Bengal while we were in Pegue. The Bengal Government were, no doubt, right in being cautious. They acted upon the best, though imperfect, information they possessed.

Those who have the responsibility cannot be expected to be so adventurous as we who have none. But I believe that there is no man who is not now convinced, that the Taliens (Peguers) deserted the Burman Government, sought independence, and in the hope of obtaining it, though without any pledge on our part, aided in supplying all our wants with a zeal which could not have been surpassed by our subjects. Yours very sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

We sent to Rangoon about three thousand five hundred draught and carriage bullocks; and could have sent five times as many, had there been tonnage.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Madras, 15th June, 1826.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I THANK you for your letters of the 20th and 28th February. Your friend Dr. Mack seems to be a favourite, and will, I have no doubt, get forward; and if I can help him properly, I shall do it. I am quite impatient to see your last chapter. Have you seen the *Last Man*? He ought to die reading your last chapter. Your new edition will be by far the most valuable book in our language on our Indian empire, to every person who takes any interest in its stability. It was so before, and it will be much more so now, with its additions and improvements. Much is still wanted about the army: it is a long subject, and I dare say that you have said all that can be said about it.—Look at the Madras army just now. We had no officers fit to be employed in Ava in any high command, who did not want either rank or health. R. Scott was too ill to be employed; and almost all the lieutenant-colonels who were fit for command were junior to the King's

lieutenant-colonels. Boles, R. Scott, and Deacon are going home. M'Dowell will be the only colonel in the country. After him comes Welch, a very brave and respectable officer; and then —— and ——, both at present, for the sins of the Company and a judgment upon the Madras army, in temporary command of divisions. G. Scott and Forbes, or any respectable officers who want divisions, should be sent out.

Nothing can equal the absurdity and wrong-headedness of ——, and his advisers the prize-agents. When I saw Cadell, after the arrival in this country of the first communications between —— and the trustees, I told him —— was mad, and would do nothing but mischief, and advised him to withdraw from the alliance. What could the man want with lawyers? We had got in the Duke of Wellington the best trustee that could have been found in the kingdom; and if lawyers were wanted, he had the aid of those of the Crown. As the Court of Directors will now send my successor to Madras, I hope that you will be appointed without opposition. I do not understand the politics of the matter; but it appears strange to me that there ever should have been any question on the subject of the candidates. I do not know that you will now, after the lapse of so much time, wish to come; but I trust you will, for you are yet younger than I was when I came out last. I hear that you are going into Parliament. This would be very well if you had nothing else to look to; but it is almost too late to begin a new trade and serve a new apprenticeship. You would be much more at home, and could do much more good at Madras than in the House of Commons. I do not know whether your health be an insuperable obstacle; but if it is not, there is no way in which you could, so honourably to yourself, and so usefully to the nation, close your career as in the government of Madras. Nothing will give me greater pleasure, than to leave you in this country preparing materials for a new edition of your Political History.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO DAVID HALIBURTON, ESQ.

Camp near Combaconum, 3rd August, 1826.

MY DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED, some time before leaving Madras, your letter of the 19th February, by your friend Mr. Findlay Anderson. He appears to be a smart lad, and I hope will in time make a

good public servant. I agree with you entirely in thinking that a great deal too much importance is attached to a proficiency in the Indian languages, and I was therefore glad to see the motion at the India House, for making all cadets pass an examination in them, rejected. An officer wants little more of the Native language than what is necessary to make his men understand him in all points of duty. Many of our best officers have merely this knowledge, and some of our best Orientalists are mere linguists, and better calculated for dominions than officers. We have too many restrictions, both civil and military. A young man's prospects should never be permanently destroyed for mischievous pranks, or idleness at college or school. A lad, who is idle at fifteen or sixteen, often becomes studious at twenty, and gives great application to the country languages, after having been a year or two in India, and found their utility.

I am truly sorry to hear that James Anderson* has had so severe an attack; a man such as he ought never to be ill, and I trust that he has long since recovered. I am not at all surprised that you should still be fond of talking over the negotiations with Scindiah in 1782; it was an eventful period, and more critical and interesting than any thing that has occurred since, and I shall be very happy when I can see you at Bushey, to talk over some of the many of those days. They have been brought to my mind by my present journey through the Carnatic, by Carangooly and Tondervaram, where Sir Eyre Coote's army was always followed and harassed by Hyder, and by my halting two days lately at Chellumbrum, where we were repulsed in 1781, a few days before the battle of Porto Nero. It seems strange to me, that these things should have happened forty-five years ago, and that I should be still on the same spot, and that in riding along the bank of the river, I could in fancy see before me Meer Saheb's cavalry, scampering about and following us close on the opposite bank, as distinctly as if it had been yesterday. I am, I believe, the only European now in India who was with that army on that retreat. I thought little of the heat then, but now find it a serious matter to sit in a tent, with the thermometer at ninety-eight degrees. Such heat must soon wear me out. I must, however, get through my journey; it will be a long and hot one to Tanjore, Madura, and Palamicotah, and back by Dindigul, Coimbatore, and Salem, or Mysore. It is needless to speak to you of

* Formerly in the Bengal Service, now of Wilton Lodge, in the county of Roxborough.

any body in this country, for I shall not in my circuit see a single person you know, or any very old acquaintance of my own; but notwithstanding this, there is a great pleasure in passing through countries enjoying profound peace, and full of industrious inhabitants, which I formerly saw desolate and laid waste by a destructive enemy. I am, my dear Sir, with great regard,

Yours, very sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. WYNN.

Venkalaghery, 17th October, 1826.

MY DEAR SIR,

IT would have been desirable to have avoided the extension of our dominion; but it could not easily have been done. We could not have restored our conquests to the Burmans, without making them in a few years as powerful as ever, and ready to enter into a new war with us with improved means, and the benefit of past experience, whenever they saw a favourable occasion. We could not show the Burmans that we would not avail ourselves of success in war to extend our territory. Such a measure would have the effect of encouraging them and the surrounding nations to make war upon us; for if they are sure that, however unsuccessful it may be, they will lose none of their territory, they have little inducement to remain at peace. It is the dread of losing a part or even the whole of their dominions, that is our best security against their aggression. We could not give Martaban and Tennasserim to the Siamese, because they had no claims upon us, because they could not have defended them for a single season against the Burmans, and because the transfer would have rendered us odious to the inhabitants.

Whatever rules we may prescribe to ourselves for the limitation of our territory, they can never be absolute, but must always, in some degree, yield to circumstances. A civilized and warlike nation, surrounded by half-civilized neighbours, must necessarily, in spite of itself, extend its empire over them. It is the natural progress of human affairs, and the march of civilization over barbarism. All that we can do is, not to precipitate, but to retard events as much as possible; and rather to be forced on by them than to cause them, lest we should produce anarchy by advancing faster than we can consolidate our power and establish order and good government in the countries we subdue.

In the question of retaining Tennasserim, we should consider

not only what direct advantages we can derive from it in a commercial or political view, but likewise what purposes it may be turned to in the hands of the European nations. The French have, in former times, sought to establish themselves in Siam and Cochin China. They probably have not relinquished the design of establishing their power in that quarter; and were they to occupy Tennasserim, and some of the principal lands, they would soon extend their territory, and might, at a future period, become very troublesome neighbours.

I remain, with great esteem, my dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR GRAHAM MOORE.

Nagganjiri, 18th October, 1826.

MY DEAR MOORE,

I RECEIVED some time since yours of the 5th October last. My reason for not writing sooner is the same as yours; I expected to have seen you before this time. It is nearly twenty years since I thought that I had taken a final leave of this country; but I am now, after a tour of nearly a thousand miles, sitting in my tent, at the head of one of the passes leading down from Mysore to the Carnatic, at the distance of about a hundred and thirty miles from Madras. I am anxious to leave India, yet I shall leave it with a heavy heart. I have spent so much of my life in it, I am so well acquainted with the people, its climate is so fine, and its mountain scenery so wild and beautiful, that I almost regret that it is not my own country; but it is not my home, and it is time that I should go there, whether it is to be in Scotland or in England. If I am not too old when I get home, which I suspect I am already, I must take a journey to Italy or Greece, that I may have time to settle where my home is to be. Nothing is more difficult to a man who has been long absent from his own country, than to determine in what part of it he ought to fix his abode. But I must get there first, and I shall be very happy to see Sir John Malcolm come out to relieve me,—no man is better qualified, and none would be more popular.

Your opinion of the Greeks is, I fear, too just. They have, however, after making large allowance for their exaggerations, and when we consider their means and their unfortunate dissensions, made a struggle not altogether unworthy of their ancestors. I should be delighted to see them an independent power; it

would be a noble acquisition to Europe ; their character would improve with their independence. My wife is now at home, and I hope she has been so fortunate as to meet you and Lady Moore, and renew her short acquaintance with you both. When I reach England, I shall not be long in finding my way to Brook Farm, to examine your improvements, and talk over *Auld lang syne*. You have never told me how young John Moore is ; I hope he is well, and like his father. I am happy to hear that Lady Moore was much better, and I trust she is now as well as ever.

Yours, very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO KIRKMAN FINLAY, ESQ.

Madras, 10th May, 1827.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAD great pleasure in reading your letter of the 23rd February, 1826, because it reminds me of old times and places, which I always think of with delight, and because I see from it that you are not involved in any of the joint stock companies. I had great confidence in your judgment, but the rage for speculation was so general that I thought it just possible that you might have gone with the spate. I am glad that is not so, and I hope that Ministers will not be alarmed by clamour, but go on steadily, and remove all the absurd restrictions which have been heaped upon the trade and industry of the nation.

What castle is this you have got into? I read it Castle Howard at first, but thinking that could not be right, I have been trying again, and can make nothing of it unless it be Toward or Foward. I believe I must go to the spot in order to ascertain the true name. I hope you have got plenty of knowt, and stane dykes, and black boyds. The dykes are useful for more things than one ; they keep us in the practice of louping, they help to ripen the black boyds, and they enable us to parley with the knowt without danger.

You are perfectly correct, I believe, in your orthography of the black boyds, at least we spelt them your way when I belonged to the grammar-school between fifty and sixty years ago. I must not do so un-Glasgow-like a thing as not to reply to your recommendation of Lieutenant Campbell, of Ormodale. He is a promising young man, but he is out of my hands at present, as he has lately been appointed by the Commander-in-chief to a staff office with our troops at Penang, and I have no doubt that he

will push his way in the service. I am afraid, from what I have read somewhere lately, of there being twenty-five thousand Irish weavers and labourers about Glasgow, that there can be very few of what you call right proper Glasgow-men left. I suspect that you have not now many of the pure old breed of right proper Glasgow weavers whom I remember about the grammar-school wind and the back of the Relief Kirk. They are probably now like a Highland regiment of which I once heard an old sergeant say, that "what with Irish and what with English, they were now no better than other men."

I am happy to learn that my old friend Colonel Noble is a neighbour of yours. He is an excellent officer, and very much liked by all who know him.

We are all quiet in India at present; and I shall be very happy, after so long an absence from Fatherland, to see my successor. Remember me kindly to Mrs. Finlay, and believe me always yours, very sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 27th May, 1827.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I LOSE no time in replying to your letter of the 15th instant, because, if I delayed two days longer, I should probably forget the matter. The enclosed statement will, I hope, answer your purpose. The same charges may not be exactly under the same heads as with you, but all are entered. You will see that I am rather an expensive traveller; but I console myself with the belief that my personal inspections save ten times the amount of the charge.

From what you say, as well as what we see in the Bengal papers, I conclude that Sir John has been appointed your successor, but we have no account of it here. You could not be relieved by a better man. He is very popular here, and his loss will be much lamented. I should like much to go home by Egypt, but I fear that there are some entanglements, not of my own, but of the Court of Directors, which will prevent it.

Yours, most sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH DELIVERED BY SIR THOMAS MUNRO,
AT A PUBLIC MEETING 26TH OF APRIL, 1826.

“WE must all deeply lament the melancholy cause of our being now assembled here. My own acquaintance with our late excellent Bishop was unfortunately but of short duration, yet in that short time I saw in him so much to admire, that I can hardly trust myself to speak of him as I could wish. There was a charm in his conversation by which in private society he found his way to all hearts, as readily as he did to those of his congregation by his eloquence in the pulpit. There was about him such candour and simplicity of manner, such benevolence, such unwearied earnestness in the discharge of his sacred functions, and such mildness in his zeal, as would in any other individual have ensured our esteem; but when these qualities are, as they were in him, united to taste, to genius, to high station, and to still higher intellectual attainments, they form a character, such as his was, eminently calculated to excite our love and veneration.

“These sentiments towards him were everywhere felt. Wherever he passed in the wide range of his visitation, he left behind him the same impression. He left all who approached him convinced that they never had before seen so rarely gifted a person, and that they could never hope to see such a one again. The loss of such a man, so suddenly cut off in the midst of his useful career, is a public calamity, and ought to be followed by an expression of the public feeling.”

Before concluding the detail of Sir Thomas Munro's meritorious services during this season of war and famine, it is necessary to state, that clouds no sooner began to gather in the political horizon, than he repented of a step which had been taken under widely different circumstances. Eager as he was to return home, a sense of duty prompted him not to abandon his post now that dangers and difficulties beset it; and he at once volunteered, in the event of no successor being nominated, to continue at the head of the Madras Government. As may be imagined, no offer could have come more opportunely, or been more readily embraced, as the following official document will show:—

EXTRACT FROM A PUBLIC LETTER TO FORT ST. GEORGE.

Dated 10th December, 1827.

2. OUR Chairman has acquainted us that he has received from the Governor of Fort St. George two communications, under dates the 3rd March and 19th July last, in both of which Sir Thomas Munro states the reasons which would have induced him to have withheld the intimation of his wish to be relieved from the office of Governor of Madras, made known to us in his address of September 1823, and expresses his intention to remain till the arrival of his successor. The Right Honourable the President of the Board of Commissioners has likewise made known to our Chairman a letter to the same effect which he received from your President under date the 8th July last.

3. We have derived the most sincere satisfaction from the foregoing communications. We consider Sir Thomas Munro to have evinced the same high public spirit and ardent zeal to promote the interests committed to his charge on the present, as on all past occasions, throughout his long and honourable course of public service. As no arrangement has yet been made for the appointment of a successor to the Governor of Madras, we are happy to signify to you our unanimous desire to avail ourselves of an extension of Sir Thomas Munro's services in that high station, at a period when his distinguished talents and peculiar qualifications cannot fail of being eminently beneficial to the country under your government, as well as to our interest; and we have accordingly unanimously resolved to abstain from nominating any successor to Sir Thomas Munro, until we shall have received from you an acknowledgment of this communication, and an intimation of his wishes in consequence.

4. With the view of making known to the service and public in general the sentiments which we entertain regarding Sir Thomas Munro, we direct that this dispatch be published in the Government Gazette.

I cannot better close this chapter than by the insertion of the following official correspondence between the Governments of Bengal and Fort St. George. Many other testimonials to the merits of Sir Thomas Munro's services are contained in the private letters of Lord Amherst; but enough

has been already adduced to prove, that by no individual in public or private life was his character more justly estimated.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR THOMAS MUNRO, K.C.B. GOVERNOR
IN COUNCIL OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

HONOURABLE SIR,

ON the happy termination of the long and arduous contest in which we have been engaged with the Government of Ava, and the ratification of a definite treaty of peace with that state, we should fail to discharge a duty not less indispensable than gratifying in the performance, if we delayed to avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity to offer our congratulations on this important occasion, and to express our heartfelt obligations for the ever-active and cordial co-operation of your Government in the conduct of the war.

2. In the general orders which we have issued under this date, as contained in the accompanying copy of the Government Gazette Extraordinary, we have endeavoured to do justice to the feelings of admiration with which we have regarded the services of the coast army serving in Ava; and we have now to convey to you the grateful sense we shall ever retain of the alacrity with which you placed the military resources of Fort St. George at our disposal, and not only met, but, in many instances, anticipated our requisitions for aid.

3. We sensibly feel, and are happy to avow, that to the extraordinary exertions of your Government we are mainly indebted for the prosecution of the Burmese war, to the successful issue which, under Providence, has now crowned our arms, and which, we trust, will be productive of important benefit to the British interests, by securing us from farther insult and aggression from a haughty neighbour, who had long been bent on trying his strength with the British power. We have, &c.

(Signed)

AMHERST.
J. W. HARINTON.
W. B. BAYLEY.

Fort William,
11th April, 1826.

REPLY OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

*To the Right Honourable William Pitt Lord Amherst,
Governor-General in Council at Fort William.*

MY LORD,

1. We have derived a high degree of gratification from the receipt of the letter from your Lordship in Council, under date the 11th instant; and, in again tendering our cordial congratulations on the successful and honourable termination of the war in Ava, we beg leave to express our acknowledgements for the share which your Lordship in Council is pleased to ascribe to the exertions of this Government in accomplishing that result. The discharge of our duty in co-operating with the Supreme Government to the entire extent of the means at our command, has been rendered grateful to our feelings, and must have proved more efficacious, in consequence of the uniform confidence with which your Lordship in Council has honoured us, by a liberal communication of the views of the Supreme Government, and an ample discretion as to our means of promoting them. Flattered and gratified by this confidence throughout the whole course of hostilities, we have sincere satisfaction in acknowledging how much it has strengthened our hands and increased our resources, as well as stimulated our zeal in calling forth all the energies of this Government.

2. The most remarkable circumstance in the conduct of the late war, as far as the army of Fort St. George is concerned, has been the spirit and cheerfulness with which the Native troops, without a single exception, and to an extent far beyond all precedent, have, disregarding their habits, attachments, and prejudices, embarked on board ships and proceeded to a foreign country, and submitted, without repining, to hardships and privations, at the simple call of professional duty. It has afforded us extreme pleasure to perceive, that this additional claim to the approbation and favour of Government, established by the Madras sepoys, has been so cordially recognised and so honourably promulgated by your Lordship in Council; and we are convinced that the justice done to the Native troops on this occasion, will tend powerfully to confirm them in their devoted attachment to the service. We have the honour to be, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,

(Signed)

T. MUNRO.

G. T. WALKER.

H. S. GRÈME.

Fort St. George,
25th April, 1826.

On the 24th of November, 1826, shortly after the conclusion of the Burmese war, the Court of Directors passed the following resolution, with reference to the part taken in it by Sir Thomas Munro, which was confirmed by the Court of Proprietors on the 13th and 19th of December following :—

Resolved unanimously—That the thanks of this Court be given to Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. K.C.B. for the alacrity, zeal, perseverance, and forecast which he so signally manifested throughout the whole course of the late war, in contributing all the available resources of the Madras Government towards bringing it to a successful termination.

A vote of thanks was also passed, on the same occasion, in favour of Lord Amherst and Sir Archibald Campbell; but neither the vote to that nobleman nor to Sir Thomas Munro were echoed in Parliament, though my Lord Goderich, in the House of Lords, declared “ that it was impossible for any one to form an adequate idea of the efforts made by Sir Thomas Munro, at the head of the Madras Government.”

CHAPTER V.

Private Proceedings.—Illness of his Son.—Departure of Lady Munro for England.—Letters to Lady Munro.

WHILE these great transactions were passing, a variety of events befell, calculated, some of them to gratify, others not a little to harass, the private feelings of Sir Thomas Munro. Among the gratifying occurrences may be enumerated his elevation to the dignity of a Baronet of Great Britain, an honour which, like all the rest, came upon him unsolicited, but which was conferred as a mark of His Majesty's gracious consideration of his distinguished exertions in the conduct of the Burmese war. This event took place in June 1825, and was, as may be supposed, valued as it deserved; but it may be questioned whether, to a man of Sir Thomas's high and honourable sentiments, another project, then in contemplation, caused not at least equally pleasurable sensations. It is now well known, and need not therefore be denied, that when the Burmese war began to assume a serious appearance, great dissatisfaction was experienced and expressed at home, touching the conduct of the Governor-General. By some, his Lordship was accused of entertaining ambitious designs, to the accomplishment of which the interests of the Company were about to be sacrificed; whilst others laid to his charge a total absence of such qualities as are essential in the head of every government. However groundless these accusations might be, affairs certainly came at one period to an extremity, and serious thoughts were said to be entertained of recalling him.

In this emergency, it was suggested that no fitter person could be nominated to succeed to the Supreme Government

than Sir Thomas Munro. How far arrangements were actually entered into with that view, I am not enabled to state; but that there was a considerable disposition to bring the matter about, is rendered indisputable from the tone of the following letters. They were addressed to a friend in the India House, from whom Sir Thomas had received intimation of the designs then in agitation; and they are given, not less as explanatory of the writer's opinions and wishes, than because they contain a full and manly vindication of Lord Amherst's public character.

FROM SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO ———.

18th July, 1825.

As to my going to the City of Palaces, it is now too late; but had I gone, I should have had no fear of envy and jealousy; nobody could have thwarted me; I should have taken care of that. I think, however, that the present Governor-General is as good as any other that you are likely to send, and that great injustice is done to him in the idle clamour which has been raised against him. His situation was a very arduous one. He was new to India; the Burmans were an enemy entirely unknown to us; we were ignorant of their military force—of their mode of warfare—of their resources, and of the face of their country. Lord Amherst, in his first ideas of the plan of operations, was probably guided by Captain Canning, and the men who were best acquainted with Ava. When he found that the project of sailing at once up the Irawaddy to Prome or Ummarapoora could not be effected, and that other measures must be adopted, he no doubt, in his new plans of military operations, consulted the best military authorities in Bengal, and followed their opinions. I do not see that any other Governor-General, in similar circumstances, could have done more; and ever since he has been fairly embarked in the war, he has taken the best means of bringing it to a successful close, by never relaxing in his exertions to keep the forces in Ava efficient. Some of the military arrangements are not exactly what I approve of;—but what of that? No two men ever agree on such points. There is, I think, one error by which the Bengal plans are all too much influenced; namely, a most exaggerated estimate both of the numbers and prowess of the Burmans, and indeed of all other enemies. This has led to the dis-

couragement of enterprise, to slow and cumbersome operations, to much expense and loss of time, by employing several corps where one would have been enough ; and lastly, to what appears to me a great and useless increase of the Bengal army.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

May 17th, 1826.

THE question regarding the Bengal Government will have been settled one way or other by this time, so that it is hardly worth while to say any thing about it now. I think that the policy of a sudden recall, even when things do not go on as you wish, is very questionable, because it tends to shake the authority and the respect which Government ought to maintain. Lord Amherst has now taken Bhurtpore, and dictated peace to the King of Ava ; and has conducted these measures just as well, if not better than most of the Governors-General you could have sent out. The Court are too unreasonable when they expect to find every day for the Supreme Government such men as appear only once or twice in an age. You cannot have a Lord Cornwallis, or Wellesley, or Hastings every day, and must take such men as are to be found.

With respect to the plan of sending me to Bengal, I should have been delighted with it ten or fifteen years ago, or even when Lord Hastings resigned ; but it is now too late. You forget that it is above forty-six years since I arrived in India, and that I have always been in laborious situations. I ought, according to all ordinary rules, to have been dead seven years ago ; and nothing but a very strong constitution and great temperance have saved me. My constitution may be expected to break every day ; for I fancy that I already see some symptoms. My hand shakes in writing, especially in a warm land-wind day like the present, which it did not do till lately ; and I lost from a cold last year more than one-half of my bad hearing. I am like an overworked horse, and require a little rest. Ever since I came to this Government, almost every paper of any importance has been written by myself ; and during the whole course of the Burman war, though little of my writing appears, I have been incessantly engaged in discussions, and inquiries, and correspondence, all connected with the objects of the war, though, from not being official, they cannot appear on record. Indeed, as we had not the direction of the war, we had no right to give opinions

regarding it ; and it was only by laying hold of the opportunities furnished for remark, by sending away so great a part of our army, that I was enabled now and then to say something about the war.

Were I to go to Bengal, I could hardly hold out two years, certainly not more ; and this period is too short to do any good. Among new people, and new modes of conducting business of every kind, it would require the whole time merely to look about and consider what inquiries I should enter upon, to make myself acquainted with the real state of affairs. When this was done, I should next consider what parts of the system might be improved by change, and what ought to be left untouched. All this could not be done in less than four or five years ; and my remaining so long is entirely out of the question. I never wish to remain in office when I feel that I cannot do justice to it ; and I know that I could once have done as much in three or four days, as I can now do in a week.

At the very moment when the tide of his public life ran thus smoothly, the subject of this memoir was afflicted by domestic cares of no ordinary weight and bitterness. Of Lady Munro's accident, which occurred early in 1822, some notice has already been taken ; and it has been stated, that the recovery of the invalid, though ultimately complete, was extremely tedious. The consequence was, that Sir Thomas was deprived of her society during a considerable portion of the year, the medical attendants requiring her to reside at Bangalore, where his official duties rendered it impracticable for the Governor to join her, except at intervals.

The illness of Lady Munro naturally increased Sir Thomas's anxiety to quit India as soon as possible ; and that desire obtained additional strength when, in September 1823, a second son was born to him. But the Burmese war, and the failure of the crops, stood in the way, and, as has been shown, private happiness was freely sacrificed to a sense of political duty. Sir Thomas, accordingly, remained at his arduous post, and for the space of nearly three years bore, with firmness and magnanimity, whatever of pain usually accompanies "hope deferred."

Things were in this state, and the war, though protracted beyond all expectation, appeared as far from its termination as ever, when the child was seized with a dangerous distemper, and reduced to the point of death. After every other expedient had been tried in vain, an immediate removal to Europe was recommended, and the anxious parents lost not a moment in carrying it into execution. But the bitterest pang of all remained to be endured. Neither Sir Thomas nor Lady Munro could admit the idea of entrusting a child so circumstanced to the care of entire strangers; and painful as the prospect was, they saw that a separation was inevitable. They yielded to their fate; and in the month of March 1826, Lady Munro with her infant embarked for England. They never met again.

The following beautiful letters serve to show how deeply this rending asunder of the tenderest ties of nature was felt by Sir Thomas Munro. I give them, not without some apprehension lest the privacy of domestic life should seem to be violated; but it appears to me that it is by such exhibitions only that the real characters of public men are to be ascertained; and I am sure that society is never more benefited than when proofs are brought before it, that a man may be great both in camps and cabinets, yet retain in perfect freshness all the amiable qualities of the heart. It is only necessary to premise, that the names Kamen and Toto were assumed by Sir Thomas's sons: the elder, called after his father, Thomas, bore the latter appellation,—the younger, Campbell, gave to himself the former.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Guindy, 2nd April, 1826.

WE came here last night, for the first time since you went away; Col. Carfrae and I drove out together. We alighted at the old place, near the well. It was nearly dark, and we passed through the garden without finding you. We had nobody in the evening but Captain Watson, which I was glad of. He has got the floors covered with new mats, which smell like hay; but they

are of no use when those for whom they were intended are gone. The cause which occasioned the desertion of this house gives every thing about it a melancholy appearance. I dislike to enter Kamen's room. I never pass it without thinking of that sad night when I saw him lying in Rosa's lap, with leeches on his head, the tears streaming down his face, crying with fear and pain, and his life uncertain. His image, in that situation, is always present to me whenever I think of this house. I walked out this morning at daylight. I followed Captain Watson's new road, which is now made hard with gravel, as far as the place where it divides; but on reaching this point, instead of turning to the left, as we used to do, I continued along the main branch to the little tank, and there halted a few minutes to admire the view of the distant hills. I then turned towards the garden, where I always found you, and Kamen trotting before you, except when he stayed behind to examine some ant-hole. How delightful it was to see him walking, or running, or stopping, to endeavour to explain something with his hands to help his language. How easy, and artless, and beautiful, are all the motions of a child. Every thing that he does is graceful. All his little ways are endearing, and they are the arms which Nature has given him for his protection, because they make every body feel an attachment for him.—I have lost his society just at the time when it was most interesting. It was his tottering walk, his helplessness, and unconsciousness, that I liked. By the time I see him again he will have lost all those qualities,—he will know how to behave himself,—he will have acquired some knowledge of the world, and will not be half so engaging as he now is. I almost wish that he would never change.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 10th April, 1826.

* * * * *

AT nine to-day I had Sir Ralph Palmer, and half an hour after a missionary from Ceylon. The cause of Sir Ralph's visit was a very melancholy one, which I am sure you will be greatly distressed to hear. It was to consult about a monument to the memory of our late excellent Bishop, who died at Trichinopoly on the 3rd of this month. He had been early in the morning at a Native congregation; he returned home about seven, and immediately went into a cold bath, about seven feet deep, at Mr. Bird's house, into which he had gone the two preceding morn-

ings. His servant, after waiting half an hour, became alarmed at his not coming out, opened the door, and saw him lying at the bottom. Medical aid came immediately, but too late, as every means tried to restore animation failed. The medical opinion is, that on entering the bath he was seized with a fit, fell forward, and was suffocated. I never knew the death of any man produce such an universal feeling of regret. There was something so mild, so amiable, and so intelligent about him, that it was impossible not to love him.

The following extracts are given because they demonstrate his extreme anxiety to withdraw from the cares and pomp of office, and to return to England.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 29th April, 1826.

I TOLD you in my last that I had sent home my resignation by the Neptune, and four copies of it by different ships earlier in this month. I hope that some one of them may reach England soon enough to enable my successor to arrive in February or March; but I fear it will be September. If I could get away in March, and make a good passage, our separation would not be more than about sixteen months; but if I am detained till September, it will be nearly two years. The shortest of these periods is a great deal too long. I have not seen Tom since he was five months old. I can never see him as a child, and I part with Kamen just at the time he is most interesting.

Madras, 16th May, 1826.

ON this day last year we were all together at Chittoor, on our way to Bangalore, looking forward to a pleasant journey through Mysore. We little suspected that you and Kamen would now be going round the Cape, and that I should be here. Had it not been for his unfortunate illness, we might have been all now in Mysore; we might have returned in October by Ryacottah, after spending some days again on the banks of the Kisnagerry river, and gone home in the same ship next year. This is the plan on which I had set my heart; but we have been sadly disappointed. After making the voyage between India and Europe together three times, it is very hard upon you to have been obliged to go home alone. The separation is distressing, but there is no help for it; it is one of the evils attending service in India. I hope I shall not be here another hot season; for, as

Lord Amherst has taken Bhurtpoor, and humbled Golden Foot, I do not see what use either you or I can be of any longer in this country. If I am lucky, I may sail sooner than you think, and see you in June or July next year. I wish to make a long tour this year, if nothing extraordinary occurs to detain me here. I want to examine the state of affairs in the Southern Provinces.

* * * * *

TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 11th June, 1826.

* * * * *

I HAVE been reading and writing very hard all day, which always for the last year makes my hand shake so much, that I can hardly write. This is a sign that I have been long enough in a warm climate. The weather at this season has been cooler than ever I knew it at Madras. It has been continually overcast all last week, which induced me to come out here yesterday evening, after the usual Saturday's dinner. I took a walk in the morning of an hour and a half, and ended with the garden, where every thing is growing in great luxuriance. After getting out of the carriage yesterday evening, I looked at the new well, and found it had water enough to hold out till it got a fresh supply from the rains; but I did not find you or Kamen there, or in the drawing-room. I always miss you both here more than at Madras, because we had fewer visitors, and I was more accustomed to see you and him quietly. Your rooms look very desolate; they are empty all day, and in the evening have one solitary lamp. I now go along the passage without seeing a human being, and often think of him running out to pull my coat. I cannot tell you how much I long to see him playing again. I believe that I shall follow your father's example when I go home, in playing with children. When you reach Craigie, give me a full account of Tom, and of all the points in which he is like or unlike his brother. I have no letter from you since the 24th of March; and I begin to fear that I shall not hear from you until your arrival in England.

The troops are returning from Ava. Major Kelso arrived a few days ago in command of the Kimendyne regiment. There is no chance of hostilities, as the Burmese are completely tired of war. I am glad of it, as I can have no pretence for staying longer in the country; and if the weather were not too hot for calling names, I could call them "*barbarous, and ferocious, and*

arrogant," for not letting me go home with you. I am quite at a loss to know what I am to do when I go home. Where are we to live? in town or country? or both? Are we to travel and see the world and sights, or to jaunt about in our own country, or to stay fixed in one place? You must consider of all this, and be ready with a plan when we meet. Love to all at Craigie.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 29th June, 1826.

As I understand that a ship for England has left Calcutta, and is to touch here, I shall begin a letter to you; because by this means I shall be ready at any time to send you one, whether it contains four lines or four pages. The Chinamen, and other ships lately arrived, have brought several letters for you from your friends. I shall send them all back to you, because you will, I think, be sorry to lose some of them, and will like to read them all, if it were only for the sake of comparing the feelings with which you read them at home and would have read them in India. I read them with pleasure; but would much rather have sat down in Mr. Elliot's chair and listened to you reading them, after returning from our evening ride or walk. I shall keep a letter from Tom to you, as it is on the same sheet with one from him to me, both in his own hand-writing. He is the only one of the family whom I now see. I go into the room where his picture is every day for two minutes, on my way to the dining-room, or rather verandah. I think him more like Kamen than I used to do; and sometimes almost fancy that he looks happier since you went away. I am not sure, however, that there is any change. It is likely enough that, even when you were here, he looked as well pleased as now, but that I did not observe it.

7th July.—I went to Guindy on Saturday evening, and shall probably not go there again before November, as I must set out on the 21st on a long journey to the Southern Provinces. I took as usual a long walk on Sunday morning: there had been so much rain, that the garden looked more fresh and beautiful than I ever saw it; but I found nobody there, except a boy guarding the mangoes and figs from the squirrels—not even the old French gardener. It was a great change from the time when I was always sure of finding you and Kamen there. It is melancholy to think that you are never again to be in a place in which you took so much pleasure. This idea comes across me still more strongly when I enter the house and pass from my own

room to the drawing-room along the passage, now so silent and deserted, and formerly so noisy with your son and you, and his followers. It always makes me sad when I visit the place; but I shall be *vae* when I leave it, like you, for the last time. In my visits there I have never had any strangers. I generally go about once a fortnight.

15th July.—I am now writing in my own room at Guindy. I did not expect to have come here again until after my return from our tour; but Captain Watson had arranged that the travelling baggage should come here, and start from hence to-morrow for Madranticum. I leave Madras on Friday (21st), after council, and go in the chaise to Polaveram, and then go into my palankin.

Our journey will be a long one, by Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Madara, to Palamcottah, from thence to Dindigal and Coimbatore to the Nilgheri hills; and when we get there we shall be guided by the time of the year in returning by Mysore or Salem and the Baramahl. We shall have very hot weather a great part of our march, but there is no help for it. We shall have the pleasure of travelling, and probably some cool days, to reward us.

* * * * *

I was in the garden this morning,—every thing is growing in great luxuriance, but particularly the Hinah and Baboal hedges. The new well is half full. I looked, on my way home, at what you call geraniums, but which seem to me to be more like wild potatoes. I stood for a minute admiring them, merely from the habit of doing so with you; for, had I followed my own taste, I should as soon have thought of admiring a brick-kiln as of gazing at a hundred red pots filled with weeds. There is something very melancholy in this house without you and your son. It has the air of some enchanted deserted mansion in romance. I often think of Kamen marching about the hall equipped for a walk, but resisting the ceremony of putting on his hat.

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TO THE SAME.

Cotallum, 5th September, 1826.

I BELIEVE I wrote to you from Tanjore and Trichinopoly; I have since been at Madara, the most southern point of our travels about ten years ago. From Madara we came by the western road to this place—the distance is about a hundred miles.

The road runs along the foot of the lofty chain of mountains which separate Tinavelly from Dindigal and Travancore: they are high and naked, and full of ragged peaks, and are altogether the most dreary hills I have seen in India. For the last eighty miles, after leaving Madara, there was not a blade of grass,—no rain had fallen since April,—the fields were all ploughed up,—rice sown and flying about in dust, which you know always makes heat more oppressive. I was in hopes that, on coming here, we should again have green fields; but the ground here is as parched as any where else. Though the hills are constantly covered with clouds, and though we see light showers falling upon them every day, we get none. The mist sits on the hills, and we have generally a clear sky, with the thermometer in the day from 84° to 89°. This is cool; but it is much above the temperature of this place in more favourable years, though it is far below what we must expect to experience every day on our march to Coimbatore. We came here on the 1st, and set out on our return to-morrow. I am charmed with this place; the scenery is very grand,—the hills are high, and the country below is full of avenues and clumps of trees of an immense size, such as you may remember to have seen about Talmulla. The waterfall, though a small stream, has a fine effect, tumbling from a naked rock, with the mountain behind it, rising two and three thousand feet, and its summit at this time of the year always wrapped in clouds.

Tokumputti, 6th September, 1826.

I WAS interrupted yesterday by being called away to receive a poligar. Besides the principal waterfall, there are two or three others not visible from below,—one about half a mile, and the other a mile and a half above the first. The road is steep, rugged, and romantic; but, notwithstanding the romantic, I was obliged to be satisfied with going as far as the second fall, for I had business waiting at my tent, and could not afford to be idle for a day. If I could, I should have been delighted to have passed the whole day wandering about the hills, resting or moving on whenever I liked. Nothing soothes me so much as being alone among mountain-scenery;—it is like resting in another world. There are many fine old choultries at Cootallum; and at Tenkassi, about two miles from it, there is a very ancient pagoda and choultry, ornamented with figures, of which the sculpture is far superior to any thing of the kind at Madara.

Colonel Newal came over from Quilore on hearing of my ap-

proach, and stayed three days with us at Cootallum, where we left him this morning. He has been so ill that the doctors despaired of him; but his six months' visit to the Nilgheries has almost restored him: he is thin and weak, but in good spirits, and desires to be remembered to you. If he does not recover his strength, he means to go home in January. He will be a great loss to the service, both as a political and a military officer.

We marched sixteen miles this morning, on our way to Dindigal. We do not return to Madara, but leave it about fifteen miles to the eastward, as we mean to take the road which runs near the foot of the great range of hills.

You have not, I hope, forgotten Dr. Jones, whom you saw at Dindigal. I wish you were there now; but you are better at home with your sons, among your friends.

TO THE SAME.

Dindigal, 16th September, 1826.

NOTHING has given me so much pleasure as your letter and journal from St. Helena. I can think of nothing else since I got them; they have removed all my apprehensions about you and Campbell. From the state in which he left this, I was almost afraid to hear of him from St. Helena, and was glad that Captain Watson's note mentioned that you and he were well before I began to read my letter. Now that he has got so near home, and he would only be a few weeks longer in a tropical climate, I am in great hopes that he will have no return of his complaint. Poor child! It is a very hard thing to have such a complaint impending over him, to be obliged to keep him on low diet, and to be afraid to see him looking strong and healthy. I hope, however, that after he has been a short time in Scotland, and had the benefit of its cool climate, he may, without danger, be treated as other children. I like to hear of all his little sayings and doings on board ship,—of his making acquaintance with the passengers and the sailors, and of his attachment to his old friends, Rosa and Abdul Cawder; and I hope you will continue your narrative of all these interesting things in your voyage from St. Helena to England. I never doubted that you would feel for Buonaparte in his wonderful reverse of fortune. I should have been surprised if you had not; for no person, I think, of proper feeling, can approach the black solitary rock of St. Helena, without being moved at his fate.

24th September.—We arrived at the bottom of the Nilgheri hills this morning. Our tents, or rather Sullivan's, are pitched about a mile from the hills; and the tent in which I am now writing is one of the two sitting tents which sheltered you and me, after many a hot march, when you were first in India. The scenery here is very grand; but you can form a much better idea of it than I can give you, by recollecting what you saw at Gujelhatty. We begin to ascend to-morrow, under the guidance of Sullivan, who met us at Darraporam. It will take about five hours to reach Kotaghery, where we are to be accommodated by Colonel Cubbon and Captain Fyfe. We remain with them the following day. On the 27th we proceed to Cotakamund, where Sullivan lives, and stay with him till the morning of the 30th, when, having seen all the waters of these upper regions, rising at one place as high as eight thousand nine hundred feet above the sea, we shall, with the help of horses and palankins, make a run of forty miles to Goondlapet in Mysore, where we shall find our tents, which went off yesterday by Gujelhatty. On the 1st of October we shall march about twenty-four miles to Sham Rajpet, near Ardenhilli, where the tents we left this morning will be waiting for us. You know the rest of the road by Collegal and the Happy Valley, and Sattigal, and the Falls of the Cavery to Bangalore, which I shall be delighted to see again, and which I shall leave with a heavy heart.

29th September, Whotakamund.—Our party reached Captain Fyfe's house, at Kotaghery, on the 25th, after a very tiresome ascent and descent of five hours. The house is that which was occupied by Colonel Newal, and which you, I believe, once thought of taking. We found Mrs. F. and her children much improved in their looks and health. We felt the cold much more than I expected. We took a walk of three hours after breakfast; but several of the party, as well as myself, were more sun-burnt than ever we had before been in India. We have walked a great deal, both in the forenoon and in the evening, ever since we came up to the hills. The country round Kotaghery is about six thousand feet above the sea; it differs from every thing you have seen. It has no level ground, but is composed of an assemblage of hills green to the summit, with narrow winding valleys between. The sides of the hills are at present covered with a purple flower, of the size of your Bangalore geraniums, which makes them look as if they were covered with heath. A few hamlets, inhabited by the Bargars, an agricultural race, are scattered on the face of

the hills; for they never live either at the bottom or on the summit. The cultivated fields, running up the face of some of the hills to the very top, have a beautiful effect; but the cultivation is thinly spread, and probably does not cover one-tenth of the ground.

We set out for this place on the 27th at daylight. The distance is about fifteen miles. The ride was, beyond all comparison, the most romantic I ever made. We were never on a level surface, but constantly ascending or descending, winding round hills, and stopping every now and then for a few minutes to rest our horses, who thought it hard work, and to admire the ever-varying scene. Before reaching Sullivan's house, we came upon the highest ridge of the Nilgheri, rising in general above eight thousand feet, and many of the peaks from eight thousand three hundred to eight thousand eight hundred feet, which is the elevation of Dodubet, the highest of them all. We dismounted on the top of the ridge, and ascended a hill about three hundred feet above it, from whence we had a view so grand and magnificent, that I shall always regret your not having seen it. We saw over all Coimbatore, a great part of Mysore and Wynand, and the hills of Malabar. But the district of Whotakamund, every spot of which lay below us like a map, surprised me most: it at once reminded me of Bullim. It is Bullim, but Bullim on a grand scale. The face of the country is covered with the finest verdure, and is undulated in every form. It is composed of numberless green knolls of every shape and size, from an artificial mound to a hill or mountain. They are as smooth as the lawns in an English park, and there is hardly one of them which has not, on one side or other, a mass of dark wood, terminating suddenly as if it had been planted, just in the same way as you must remember to have seen in Bullim. In comparing the two countries, I should say that this was much the grandest, but that Bullim was perhaps the more beautiful; for it is better wooded, and has fine cultivated fields, of which Whotakamund is destitute, as it is inhabited solely by the Todars, a pastoral tribe. But when I look at the fine rich verdure with which this country is everywhere covered, and at the beautiful form of its hills, I begin to think that even in beauty it is superior to Bullim. You must not suppose, that what are called ridges and peaks are rocks. There is hardly a stone to be seen upon them. They are round and smooth, and clothed with firm grass. You may ride over every one of them, even Dodubet himself: they differ from artificial

mounds only in their magnitude. There was formerly no water in the scenery here, except some rivulets, until Sullivan made a little loch, about two miles long and a quarter of a mile broad, by damming up a rivulet with an immense mound: it looks like a river, and winds very beautifully among the smooth green hills. After riding five or six miles yesterday afternoon, over the hills and valleys, we embarked in a little boat at the head of the lake, and rowed to the lower end, about a mile and a half from the house. It was beginning to get dark, and very cold, and by the time we got home we were very wet with dew. Nothing surprises me more on these hills than the effect of the cold. It is now two o'clock, the thermometer 62. I am writing in a great coat, and my fingers can hardly hold the pen. I am almost afraid to go to bed on account of the cold. The first night I came up the hills I did not sleep at all. The two last nights I have slept tolerably well, but not comfortably. I have over me, in place of a single sheet, or no sheet at all, as in the low country, a sheet and English blanket, and two quilts, the weight of which oppresses me without making me warm. I am therefore glad that this is to be the last night. Were we to remain a week longer, this cold feel would go off. Our party are no doubt more susceptible to it, from being relaxed by a journey of two months in tents, with the thermometer generally from 95 to 101.—The brightness of the sun here is very remarkable. You have, I think, noticed the brightness of both the sun and the moon at Madras, but you can have no idea how much greater it is here. In the morning, when the sun rises without a cloud, the sky is sparkling with light; the hills appear much nearer than they are; the smallest objects upon them are visible, and there is a dazzling lustre poured upon every thing, as if two suns were shining instead of one. I have not seen Mrs. Sullivan, because she is too near her confinement; but I have seen his two children. They are both pretty, particularly the boy, and have as fine complexions as any children in England. I was made very happy last night, by the arrival of your letter of the 25th of May, sent to Penang by the Camden. I had previously got your long letter of the same date; but still it was very satisfactory to get another. It is rather singular that a letter written by you at St. Helena should find me at Whotakamund. I received at the same time a letter, of the 5th of June, from General Walker, telling me of you and Campbell, and expressing regret at your leaving Plantation House so soon. I must now stop, for I have other letters to write before

dinner. I have written you so much lately that this may probably be my last letter for some time. I hope you are, by this time, safe with your two sons.

TO THE SAME.

Bangalore, 11th October, 1826.

ALTHOUGH I have written to you so often lately, I cannot leave Bangalore for the last time without sending you a few lines. I shall not wait till to-morrow, because, as it is the last day of our stay here, I shall probably have little time for writing, and the letter might be too late for the ship. Some good fortune seems to attend your letters, and I hope ever will; for when I returned from my walk in the garden this morning, and was thinking that I should receive no letters, as it was Sunday's post from Madras, I was delighted to find on my table a note from Mr. Dalzell, inclosing your letter of the 4th of June, bringing me accounts that you and Campbell were well, and that your voyage had hitherto been pleasant and favourable. But I am not so sanguine as either you or the Captain; and I shall think you fortunate if you reach England by the 15th or 20th of July. When I go home I shall not forget to thank General and Mrs. Walker for their attention and kindness to you; and I hope the acquaintance you have made with them will be continued in our own country. Your account of the present state of Buonaparte's house at Longwood, and of the manner in which it is occupied, and of your visit to his solitary tomb, has interested me very much, and affected me more than any ordinary tale of woe could have done. I am surprised that there should be any person so thoughtless, or so unfeeling, as to trample on his tomb; and I trust that the bar in the iron railing will be replaced to protect his grave from such vulgar profanation.

After leaving the Nilgheries, we visited the Falls of the Cavery; they are very grand, and rather exceeded than fell short of my expectations. The fall on the southern branch of the river is about a mile below that on the northern, which we visited together. It is something in the form of a horse-shoe, and consists of seven streams falling from the same level, and divided only from each other by fragments of the rock. There is a descent to the bed of the river by steps; and when you stand there, nearly surrounded by cataracts covering you with small rain, and look at the great breadth of the whole fall, and the woody hills rising behind it, the scene appears very wild and magnificent. We

went from this fall to the northern one, which, as the river was more than half-full, appeared to much more advantage than when we visited it ten years ago. Close to the Fakeer's retreat at this fall, our breakfast-tent was pitched. After breakfast we returned to Sattigall, and crossed the Cavery there to our encampment. Our march was very fatiguing; it amounted altogether to about thirty miles. We were obliged to make it so long, lest the Cavery should rise and become too rapid for our basket boats. In passing Colligal, I looked towards the Happy Valley, where the villagers cropped the spreading branches from so many fine trees, lest you should run your head against them. We came to Bangalore by the Rankanhilli road; we encamped about five miles from the cantonment, on the 9th, and came in in the evening. I found Colonel Scot, as usual, looking for us; but neither you nor Campbell standing on the steps to receive us.

We leave this on the 13th: we go to Oscottah, and by regular stages by Pednaig Darsum. I am sorry we are too late to take the Baramahl road. There has been more rain here than for many years, which has made the country green and beautiful. It still rains heavy every night, which makes the garden a little wet in the morning, but makes every thing in it grow rapidly. Though I have no great enjoyment in so short a visit, I count every hour which brings me nearer the time when I must take a final leave of this place, and grieve that they pass so fast.

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TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 17th January, 1827.

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THE arrival of your letters has made me quite unsettled for some days, but they have been a wonderful relief to me, as I began (from the length of the voyage) to fear at times that you had been obliged to go into some place for water, or that some accident had happened to the ship. But all these alarms are now over; and I hope that, by the end of the year, we shall meet again, and never again have the sea between us. I could almost stay here for the pleasure of getting your letters, and reading how you were employed on certain days, and what Campbell was doing and saying. Nothing can be so interesting as all his little ways, and to see him reconciling himself to the ship, and learning new things every day. But it is a strange and melancholy feeling to see India, the land in which he was born, and all past

events, gradually fading from his memory. It is wonderful to see how they are sometimes brought back to his memory by slight incidents; as when, upon your telling him that the day was Friday, he said, "Council-day." I dare say he thought that the Council-house was not far off, and that I might have come to the ship in the evening, as at Guindy.

TO THE SAME.

February, 1827.

IT is above two years now since I had the first attack of increased deafness. During the first year, it was so much better occasionally, that I was in great hopes it would have left me; but for the whole of last year it has been so uniformly the same, that it will probably never be better. I hear nothing that is said in company: it is with difficulty that I can hear the person who sits next to me, and then only by holding up my hand to my ear. It is fatiguing to people to raise their voices high enough to talk to me, and still more to me to listen to them; but still this does not affect my spirits in the least. I have plenty of business on my hands, and much of it consists in reading papers, writing notes, and giving orders, which do not require much hearing. When sitting in company, I amuse myself with thinking of any thing else. The loss of my conversation is not felt, and my silence is perhaps attributed to dignified gravity, or profound thought on state affairs, when the subject of my meditations is very likely Campbell riding on a stick, or one of your lectures on my temperance, which you so often prophesied would ruin my health. It is a great pleasure to think I shall see you before this year is at an end: it will be a year, next month, since you left this.

TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 11th April, 1827.

IT is difficult to part with a country where we have lived long, and become attached to the people, without a heavy heart at thinking that we shall never again see it, or any of its inhabitants. I wish however that the time for my departure was come, for, as I am to go, it is tiresome to be waiting for the day.

I went to Madras on Monday, the 9th. You will wonder what took me there on that day:—it was to see the *Enterprize* steam-vessel manœuvre for the gratification of the public. She got up her anchor, and sailed past the Government-house a little after

four, while we were at dinner. At five I went up to the top of the Council-house on the Fort, and, after staying a few minutes, we determined to join the crowd on the beach. The evening was as favourable as it could possibly be; a clear sky, a smooth sea, and a light breeze directly from the sea. The immense crowd of people reminded me of what you see at a race in England, but only that there was no drinking and quarrelling. I never saw half so great a number on any occasion. The beach was crowded from the saluting battery to the Custom-house, with thousands of natives, in all their various fanciful costumes. The multitude of carriages was far beyond what I thought the whole Carnatic could have furnished. Every thing that could be mounted on wheels, from a hencoop or a dog-house to a barouche, was in requisition. In some of the hencoops, which would not have held two European ladies, seven or eight native women and children were crammed, all grinning with delight. Among the multitude there were, I believe, people from almost every province in India. I saw a great number of respectable-looking Indian women in carriages, who, I imagine, never appeared among Europeans before, and many of whom, I am sure, you would have thought beautiful, and certainly graceful, beyond any thing in Europe. I scarcely looked at the steam-vessel: all that it can do may be seen in five minutes; but I wish that I could have made a panorama of the living scene to send to you. We have still no southerly wind, but the weather is getting very warm.

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CHAPTER VI.

Tour to the Ceded Districts.—Illness, Death, and Character.

REPEATED mention has been made, in the preceding chapters, of the anxiety experienced by Sir T. Munro to return to England; and the letters just given contain ample testimony that this desire gained, as it was natural that it should, increased force every day. It was not, however, till the Burmese war came to a close, that he considered himself justified in again bringing the subject before the notice of the Court of Directors. But intelligence of that event no sooner reached him, than he hastened to take advantage of it. On the 28th of May, 1824, the very day when the signing of the definitive treaty was communicated to the Madras Government, he dispatched not fewer than six copies of a letter, in which his extreme impatience to resign office was stated, and an urgent request made that a successor might be sent out as early in the following year as circumstances would permit. Whence it came about, I pretend not to possess the means of explaining, but not one of these dispatches was laid before the Court earlier than the 6th day of the following September; and though a successor had already been fixed upon, in the person of the Right Honourable S. Lushington, the 4th of April, 1827, arrived, ere he was formally appointed. To sum up all, Mr. Lushington remained in England till the month of July in the same year, thus rendering it barely possible for himself to reach Madras, and quite impossible for Sir Thomas Munro to quit it, previous to the commencement of the Monsoons.

Far be it from me to insinuate any thing harsh as to the intentions of the authorities at home; but no man, I conceive, can be aware of these plain facts, without arriving at

the conclusion, that less attention was paid than might have been paid to the wishes of a more than ordinarily meritorious public servant. Though he never complained, it is very evident, from the tone of his private correspondence, that Sir Thomas Munro felt this; and when the melancholy consequence is taken into consideration, those who admired him most and knew him best may be pardoned if they feel it also.

To give occupation to his own mind whilst in this state of anxious suspense, and in some degree perhaps with a view to avoid the excessive heat of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro unfortunately came to the resolution of paying a farewell visit to his old native friends in the Ceded Districts. For this purpose, he determined to begin his journey early in the summer of 1827, at a period when the cholera was known to have made its appearance in the country into which he proposed to penetrate. His friends, uneasy at the circumstance, would have retarded his journey by their entreaties; but as he had come repeatedly within the influence of that fatal disease before without suffering severely, in consequence he paid, on this occasion, no attention to their admonitions. Besides, he believed himself, in some degree, bound to ascertain how affairs were conducted in the interior, previous to his retirement for ever from the theatre of Indian politics; and neither now, nor at any other period, was a question of personal hazard permitted to interfere with what he had taught himself to regard as a point of public duty.

Having made up his mind to this proceeding, Sir Thomas Munro, attended by a small escort, and a single medical gentleman, Dr. Fleming, set out from Madras towards the end of May. The party reached Anantapoor on the 29th, at which date several cases of cholera had appeared among the country people; but it was not till the 4th of July, when they halted at Gooty, that the infection reached the camp. There, however, several sepoy and followers were attacked, and perished, under the circumstances of awful rapidity which usually attend this malady; and the malady itself,

with the little progress made in the manner of treating it, became, as might be expected, a subject of frequent conversation at the Governor's table. It is worthy of remark, that to this dire disease Sir Thomas Munro had, at different times, devoted much of his attention. It broke out in his camp during the Southern Mahratta war, and being still unsubdued when he resigned his command, he requested a young friend whom he left behind, to keep him regularly acquainted with its progress; and the result of all his observations was to impress him with a conviction, that it was decidedly contagious in its nature.

On the 5th of July the party reached Jolmagerry, in which, as well as in all the villages round, the cholera raged with extreme violence. Here Captain Watson and another gentleman attached to his suite, were attacked; but the former so far recovered, as to be able to present himself in the audience-tent ere the cavalcade quitted their ground on the 6th. Sir Thomas Munro expressed himself exceedingly delighted by the event, and began his march in excellent health, and in his usual good spirits.

Nothing occurred during the early part of the day to denote that he was in the slightest degree indisposed. On the contrary, he conversed freely with such of the villagers as met him by the way, touching the condition of their crops, and the state of their affairs; and his gratification was as sincere as the declaration of it was undisguised, when he found that the district generally was improving. In like manner, when the party halted at Putteecondah, after a march of about ten miles, Sir Thomas dressed, and sat down to the breakfast-table as usual. He made a hearty meal upon "loogie," a dish of which he never partook when at all disordered; and then, walking abroad to the audience-tent, transacted business with the collector. He was in the act of expressing his approbation of that gentleman's conduct, which a careful examination of certain official statements had elicited, when he suddenly called for his hat and quitted the tent,

without assigning any cause for the proceeding. Dr. Fleming was immediately summoned, who found him slightly indisposed; but as the symptoms were not alarming, no fears were entertained as to the result: he accordingly prescribed some medicine to his patient, and left him.

These events took place about nine o'clock in the morning, from which time till half-past ten, Sir Thomas remained alone. At that hour Colonel Carfrae, who had been long in his family, entered the tent, and inquired into the state of his health. The reply was, that "he was not very unwell, but that he had no doubt of having caught the distemper." Sir Thomas then swallowed the medicine ordered, lay down upon his couch, and continued to converse on matters of public business for some time.

As the day advanced, the illustrious patient became gradually worse, yet neither anxiety nor alarm was perceptible in his own countenance or proceedings. He spoke with perfect calmness and collectedness; assured his friends that he had been frequently as ill before; regretted the trouble he occasioned to those about him, and entreated them to quit the tent. "This is not fair," said he, "to keep you in an infected chamber;" and when told that no apprehensions were entertained, because there was no risk of infection, he repeated his usual observation,—"That point has not been determined; you had better be on the safe side, and leave me."

It was now one o'clock in the day, and his pulse being still full and good, sanguine hopes were encouraged that all might yet be well; but from that time he failed rapidly, and the fears of his friends and attendants became seriously excited. About three, however, he rallied, and feeling better, exclaimed, with a tone of peculiar sweetness, "that it was almost worth while to be ill, in order to be so kindly nursed." Between three and four no event of importance occurred, except that he repeatedly alluded to the trouble which he gave, and repeatedly urged the gentlemen around him to withdraw; but soon after four he himself remarked, that his

voice was getting weaker, and his sense of hearing more acute. These were the last articulate sounds which he uttered; for the disease increased rapidly upon him: and though faint hopes were more than once entertained, owing to the appearance of certain favourable symptoms, for the apprehensions that accompanied them there was too much ground. Sir Thomas Munro lingered till half-past nine in the evening, and then fell asleep.

To describe the effect produced by this melancholy event upon all classes of persons in India, is a task for which I confess myself wholly incompetent. Seldom has a man, holding an office of authority and control, contrived to secure, as Sir Thomas Munro did, the affections of those placed under him; and hence, when a rumour of his unlooked-for demise spread abroad, it were difficult to determine whether men lamented it most on public, or on private grounds. Among the many proofs, however, which have been laid before me, of the estimation in which this great man was held, there is one so touching in every particular, that I cannot refuse to insert it here.

Three days after Sir Thomas Munro's death, Captain Macleod, who commanded the escort, fell a sacrifice to cholera. At sunset on the evening previous to his decease, that gentleman sent for his native officers, and assuring them that he could not recover, enjoined them to take great care of the men; he then minutely inquired whether all their accounts were settled; and being answered in the affirmative, he raised his hand with difficulty to his forehead, and made them a *salam*. Shortly afterwards, he alluded to their march on the following morning, and besought Colonel Carfrae, who was present, "that he would allow a small party to remain and see him decently interred." He was informed that, in the event of any such melancholy service becoming necessary, his body would be sent back to Gooty. "No, no," exclaimed the dying man, "I am perfectly satisfied; it is too much honour for me to be buried near Sir Thomas Munro."

About an hour and a half after the Governor's death, his corpse was removed to Gooty, where it was interred with the expedition necessary in tropical climates, and with all the marks of respect which could be paid to it, in so remote a situation. "There was something exceedingly solemn and touching in the funeral," says a gentleman who was present on the occasion. "The situation of the churchyard; the melancholy sound of the minute-guns reverberating among the hills; the grand and frowning appearance of the fortress towering above the Gom, all tended to make the awful ceremony more impressive." And he adds, "Of all the dispensations of Providence I have ever witnessed or experienced, none have been equal to this,—not even the death of my own father."

On the arrival of the sad intelligence at Madras, the following Extraordinary Gazette was published:

GOVERNMENT GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

Madras, Monday, July 9, 1827.

WITH sentiments of the deepest concern, the Government announces the decease of the Honourable Sir Thomas Munro, Baronet, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Governor of the Presidency of Fort St. George. This event occurred at Putteecondah near Gooty, on the evening of Friday the 6th instant.

The eminent person whose life has been thus suddenly snatched away, was on the eve of returning to his native country, honoured with signal marks of esteem and approbation from his Sovereign, from the East India Company, which he had served for more than forty-seven years, from every authority with which he had occasion to co-operate, from the public at large, and from private friends. From the earliest period of his service, he was remarkable among other men. His sound and vigorous understanding, his transcendent talents, his indefatigable application, his varied stores of knowledge, his attainments as an Oriental scholar, his intimate acquaintance with the habits and feelings of the Native soldiers, and inhabitants generally; his patience, temper, facility of access, and kindness of manner, would have

ensured him distinction in any line of employment. These qualities were admirably adapted to the duties which he had to perform in organizing the resources, and establishing the tranquillity of those provinces where his latest breath has been drawn, and where he had long been known by the appellation of *Father* of the People. In the higher stations, civil and military, which he afterwards filled, the energies of his character never failed to rise superior to the exigencies of public duty. He had been for seven years at the head of the Government under which he first served as a Cadet, and afterwards became the ablest of its revenue officers, and acquired the highest distinction as a Military Commander. He had raised its character and fame to a higher pitch than it ever enjoyed before. His own ambition was more than fulfilled; and he appeared to be about to reap, in honourable retirement, the well-earned rewards of his services and his virtues, when these have received the last stamp of value from the hand of death.

Though sensible how feeble and imperfect must be any hasty tribute to Sir Thomas Munro's merits, yet the Government cannot allow the event which they deplore, to be announced to the public without some expression of their sentiments.

The flag of Fort St. George will be immediately hoisted half-staff high, and continue so till sunset.

Minute-guns, sixty-five in number, corresponding with the age of the deceased, will be fired from the ramparts of Fort St. George.

Similar marks of respect will be paid to the memory of Sir Thomas Munro, at all the principal military stations and posts dependent on this Presidency.

By order of Government,

D. HILL, Chief Secretary.

Fort St. George, 9th July, 1827.

The publication of the preceding order was followed by the calling together of a meeting of the inhabitants of Madras, which was held, according to advertisement, on the 21st of July. Of the general proceedings of that day it is unnecessary to give any detailed account; but the following resolution proposed by Sir John Doveton, and unanimously adopted by the large assemblage of persons present, deserves insertion.

Resolved,—That this meeting largely participates in the affliction of all classes of the community, Native as well as European, at the calamity which has occurred in the death of our late revered Governor, Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Baronet, K.C.B., in the province where he had long been known by the appellation of *Father* of the People, and at a time when he was on the eve of returning to his native country, after a public career, extending to upwards of forty-seven years, and growing in success and honour up to its close :

That this meeting, many of whom were members of the same profession, many fellow-labourers in the same field, and all eye-witnesses of his conduct, take pride in the fame which this most honoured servant of the East India Company first acquired in duties and scenes that are familiar to them, and which, during the last seven years, he consummated by the most eminent and approved public services, at the head of the Government of this Presidency :

That his justice, benevolence, frankness, and hospitality, were no less conspicuous than the extraordinary faculties of mind with which he was endowed, and the admirable purposes to which he constantly applied them ; and that he commanded, in a singular degree, the veneration of all persons by whom he was known :

That to perpetuate the remembrance of his public and private virtues, a subscription be immediately opened for the purpose of erecting a statue to his memory :

That a Committee be requested to undertake the management of the business, and to adopt such measures as shall appear to them best calculated to give speedy effect to the foregoing resolution.

As soon as the above resolution became known in the several provinces subject to the Madras rule, subscriptions were eagerly offered by all classes of the inhabitants ; and a sum was raised in an incredibly short space of time, great beyond all precedent. Out of this the Committee appropriated eight thousand pounds for the purpose of procuring an equestrian statue of the lamented Governor ; and seven gentlemen* in England, friends and admirers of the deceased, were solicited to take upon themselves the charge of seeing

* Colonel Blackburne, Colonel Cunningham, Colonel Wilks, Colonel R. Scott, C.B., John G. Ravenshawe, and Alexander Read, Esq.

the work properly executed. It is scarcely necessary to state that they readily undertook the office intrusted to them; and when it is added, that to Mr. F. Chantrey was committed the task of casting the statue (for a statue in bronze was preferred to one in marble), no doubt can be entertained as to the excellence of the performance.

Besides this public testimony of respect to the memory of the late governor of Madras, a separate subscription was entered into among his more intimate personal friends, with the view of obtaining a full-length painting of the illustrious deceased; whilst a third sum was raised in order to defray the costs of an engraving, likewise at full-length, both of Sir Thomas and Lady Munro. Of these works, the former has already been executed by Mr. Shee of Cavendish-square, from a portrait taken by the same gentleman some years ago; whilst the latter is in progress under the skilful superintendence of Mr. Cousins.

I have hitherto taken notice only of the proceedings of the European population of Madras, in consequence of the lamented death of Sir Thomas Munro. Keenly as the sad event was felt by them, it may be questioned whether their sorrow equalled that of the warm-hearted Natives; more especially of the inhabitants of the Ceded Districts, where Sir Thomas had so long resided, and where he was generally spoken of by the appellation of "the Father of the People."

It was justly considered by the gentleman who succeeded to the temporary authority of Governor, that feelings so creditable to both parties ought, by some mode or other, to be indulged; and he accordingly directed Mr. F. W. Robertson, the principal collector of the district, "to communicate fully and freely with the most respectable inhabitants, and to ascertain in what manner the object of Government, to do honour to the memory of the illustrious Sir Thomas Munro, could be effected most conformably to Native feeling." Though the above recommendation was issued so early as

the 10th of July, the 17th of September arrived ere Mr. Robertson was enabled to make his report upon the subject. In doing so, he regrets the delay that had occurred and adds—

“In a matter so interesting to the Native community, I did not like to write till I had heard from all the talooks, but which I could not accomplish sooner, in consequence of the prevalence of that fatal disease, the cholera, having for a time deterred the inhabitants from meeting together.”

He then says—

“The veneration with which the character of Sir Thomas Munro was regarded by the people of the Ceded Districts, being so perfectly known to the Government, it would be idle on my part to describe the affliction they felt at the misfortune of his death; I shall therefore proceed at once to state the propositions *they* have suggested to do honour to his memory.

First—“That a choultry of sufficient dimensions to accommodate Native travellers, and merchants of all castes, be erected at Gooty by a *voluntary* subscription, as a permanent memorial of the unanimous feelings of the Native inhabitants of the district, on the death of their venerated benefactor.

Secondly—“That an extensive tope of mango and other fruit-trees (besides a well with steps) be planted at Putteecondah, at the spot where their venerated benefactor breathed his last.

Thirdly—“That should the funds raised by subscription be more than enough for the above purposes, the surplus shall be appropriated to the erection of Native choultries elsewhere, or of other useful works of public convenience.

Fourthly—“That the Honourable the Governor in Council be respectfully solicited to endow the charity choultry with sufficient funds for its support.

Fifthly—“That the tomb which it is intended by Government to erect over the remains of the illustrious deceased, and the charity choultry at Gooty, be placed in charge of one and the same establishment, for the purpose of ensuring the preservation of both.”

Mr. Robertson then adds, in support of the proposition of the Natives to erect the choultry at Gooty, “that it would prove eminently useful; and that in, Native estimation, a better monument could not be devised to preserve the memory of the great, the good, the just Sir Thomas Munro.”

With respect to the amount of subscription to be calculated upon, he estimates that at thirty thousand rupees; whilst the cost, to be defrayed by Government, of providing food for travellers and their servants, will not, he presumes, exceed the moderate sum of sixteen hundred. After taking these propositions into consideration, the Government resolved—

“That a proper and substantial stone monument be erected at Gooty, over the remains of the late Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. and K.C.B. :

“That ten caconies of land be allotted for planting trees and sinking wells at the public expense, round the spot at Puttecondah, where Sir Thomas Munro died :

“That a choultry and tank be built at Gooty for the accommodation of travellers, to be called ‘The Munro choultry and tank,’ suited in extent to the population of the place, and to the nature of the thoroughfare :

“That an establishment of servants be maintained for the preservation of the tank and choultry, and for providing travellers with water,—all at the public expense.”

The proposition of the collector to convert the choultry into a charitable establishment was however rejected, upon the ground that it would be difficult to restrict the expenses, and that it might otherwise lead to abuses; whilst the offer of the Native inhabitants to erect the choultry by subscription was also declined, for reasons which deserve to be given in the words of the Acting Governor himself.

“The benevolent, the disinterested, the unostentatious, and modest nature of Sir Thomas Munro,” says Mr. Græme, “made him avoid any personal gratification at the expense of others, and it should be the object of this Government to protect his memory from any evil, direct or remote, which the too eager enthusiasm of his admirers might produce. In this view, it appears to me objectionable that the choultry at Gooty should be erected by the subscriptions of Natives. If it were confined to the most opulent among them, it would be of little consequence,—they can afford it, and they can judge for themselves, and they may be supposed to be acting voluntarily when they contribute; but it

is to be apprehended, that contributions may be exacted, by undue influence or control, from many by whom they would be felt as an inconvenience, and thus to the irreparable calamity of the loss of a great benefactor would be added the hardship of an extra assessment.

“The inhabitants of the Ceded Districts should not only be declared relieved of the expense of building it, but the collector should be enjoined not to permit the levy of contributions for this purpose; they should derive every benefit, but be spared every inconvenience from erecting monuments which are to do honour to Sir Thomas Munro. There should be no feeling arising from it but what is unequivocally pleasurable.”

Instead of the distribution of alms, however, Mr. Græme proposed,—“That a building, to be designated the Munro College, should be erected not far from the choultry, in which should be maintained six professors, for the gratuitous instruction of a certain number of youths of the Ceded Districts, in the English, Sanscrit, Mahratta, Persian, Hindostanee, Teloo goo, and Canarese languages. Such an institution,” he observes, “will secure a perpetual association of Sir Thomas Munro’s name and character, with the system of education of the Natives of this Presidency, which was introduced by him; whilst the annual expense of the institution, falling short of three hundred and fifty pounds, could not possibly be felt as a burthen upon the Company’s treasury.”

Judicious as this proposition was, it received the decided opposition of the Commander-in-chief, on the ground that it would occasion an unnecessary drain upon the Company’s finances. “It cannot be supposed,” continued he, “that the Court of Directors, who did not feel it necessary to grant even a tomb to their old and faithful servant, the late Sir Alexander Campbell,* who expired in their service, however favourably they may regard the memory of the late Governor, should approve of an expense so disproportionate to its object,—an expense not even attached to the memory of our sovereigns.”

* Formerly Commander-in-Chief.

In like manner, one of the other two members of Council conceived, that such an establishment was not needed, the inhabitants of the Ceded Districts benefiting, like the inhabitants of other provinces, by the establishment of the Board for Public Instruction; whilst the third member suggested, "that a more correct estimate of the expense be prepared, and the question then referred to the Court of Directors."

The proposition being thus opposed, the acting Governor relinquished it; but in a second minute, "he trusts that the Court of Directors, to whom he proposes to refer the question, will perceive sufficient utility in the proposed institution to warrant *their* connecting with it *their* sense of the eminent merits of Sir Thomas Munro; remarking at the same time, that it would only be a superior branch of the general system founded by that eminent individual; that it would be strongly promotive of its success; that its locality at Gooty would be particularly appropriate, as the place in which the founder of the general system lies interred, and as being situated in the districts where his benevolence, his justice, and his wisdom, acquired for him the enviable appellation of 'Father of the People.'"—"It cannot," adds the Acting Governor, "be money misappropriated to commemorate the virtues of such a man."

The melancholy intelligence of Sir Thomas Munro's death reached England the end of November 1827. On the 28th of that month, the Court of Directors recorded their feelings on the event in terms to the following effect:—

RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS,

28th November, 1827.

Resolved unanimously,—That this Court has learnt with feelings of the deepest concern, the decease of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, K.C.B., late Governor of Fort St. George; and its regret is peculiarly excited by the lamented event having occurred at a moment when that distinguished officer was on the point of returning to his native land in the enjoyment of his

well-earned honours, after a long and valuable life, which had been devoted to the interests of the Company and his country :

That this Court cannot fail to bear in mind the zeal and devotion manifested by Sir Thomas Munro, in retaining charge of the Government of Madras after he had intimated his wish to retire therefrom, at a period when the political state of India rendered the discharge of the duties of that high and honourable station peculiarly arduous and important ; and this Court desires to record this expression of its warmest regard for the memory of its late valuable servant, and to assure his surviving family, that it deeply sympathizes in the grief which so unexpected an event must have occasioned to them.

It must be admitted, that gratifying as the above resolution may be to the feelings of Sir Thomas Munro's surviving relatives, his own lengthened and meritorious services had amply earned it ; while something like regret will be generally experienced when it is known, that, to the plan brought forward by Mr. Græme, the Honourable Court refused its sanction.

The following are the terms in which that refusal was conveyed :—

“ That, participating fully in the sentiments expressed by the inhabitants of Madras at their meeting on the 21st July 1827, and being desirous of promoting the object they have in view, the Court have authorized bills to be drawn on them for the amount of the subscriptions received from the Indian community, for the purpose of erecting a statue to the memory of the late Sir Thomas Munro ; they have also cordially approved of the measures which the local government had resolved on to do honour to his memory in the Ceded Districts ; but, in consideration of the liberal encouragement which has been given to the Board of Public Instruction, and the benefits which have resulted, and may hereafter be expected to result, from their labours, they consider it quite unnecessary to entertain the proposition for erecting a College to be designated the ‘ Munro College.’ ”

I take it for granted, that no person can have perused the extensive and unrestrained correspondence which has been interwoven into the preceding Memoir, without attaining to a tolerably just estimate of the public and private character of Sir Thomas Munro. Few individuals ever possessed in a more remarkable degree those rare qualities of the mind which, united with correct feeling, and a thorough knowledge of human nature, fit a man for high stations; and hence few have ever been better adapted to fill situations, not of authority alone, but of great and trying responsibility. Endowed by nature with talents of the highest order; possessed of a judgment singularly clear and sound; calmly and resolutely brave; full of fortitude; full of energy and decision; patient in inquiry, prompt in action; cool and persevering amid difficulties and hindrances; quick and ready in adapting his means to his ends; yet so sober-minded as never to be taken by surprise, Sir Thomas Munro seemed formed for a life of active enterprise: while the qualifications which are necessary towards using aright the influence which active enterprise can, for the most part, alone obtain, were, in his case, to the full as conspicuous as the spirit of enterprise itself. Extremely temperate in all his habits; equally indisposed to give as to take offence; candid, open, manly in his bearing, over which neither jealousy nor prejudice was permitted to exert the slightest control, Sir Thomas Munro succeeded in securing the love and veneration, not less than he commanded the respect, of all around him. No man was more ready to acknowledge the merits of others—no man was more free to denounce their errors; and whilst he was always prepared to forgive, where signs of repentance were shown, he was equally disposed to admit his own mistakes, should he chance to have committed them.

Such was Sir Thomas Munro: considered as a public man, well qualified to take a leading part on any stage; whereas if we cast our eyes towards that to which peculiar circumstances restricted him, we shall discover, that India never produced a

more able or devoted functionary. He lived but to promote the public good; whilst, in a thorough knowledge of the manners, customs, institutions, wants, and wishes of the Natives—in his endeavours to obtain their confidence—in the success which attended those endeavours—and in just conceptions of the measures best calculated to contribute to their welfare, few men have ever equalled—fewer still have ever surpassed him.

Though possessing, and not unaware that he possessed, all these great and shining qualities, there was about Sir Thomas Munro a degree of modesty such as rarely attaches to men in public life. So far from obtruding his own claims on the notice of his employers, it required something like positive exertion on their part to drag into light not a few of his meritorious actions; whilst more than one instance might be recorded in which praise and honours were bestowed upon individuals who merely carried into effect his suggestions. It has been already stated, that if there was one disposition which, more than another, Sir Thomas Munro held in sovereign contempt, it was that of exaggerating the value of particular services for the sake of obtaining distinctions; and he rarely concealed his disgust as often as he saw the Government of a country prostitute its choicest prerogative by the promotion of persons undeserving of its notice; yet no man could more justly appreciate unsought honours than he. He regarded them as the just recompense of industry and talent; and he conceived that every government was as much bound to seek out and reward its meritorious servants, as the servants of the government were bound conscientiously to discharge their duty.

Of the literary habits of this remarkable man, so much notice has already been taken, that it appears scarcely necessary to advert to them here. There was no subject within the range of philosophy or science, no question connected with poetry or the belles lettres, in which he failed to take an interest, and which he was not prepared to discuss; whilst the

facility with which he could pass from one to another was scarcely less surprising than the degree of correct knowledge which he possessed upon all. For metaphysics alone he appears to have encouraged no taste; inasmuch as he looked upon the different systems to be equally founded in conjecture, and equally ending in doubt; but he was a profound mathematician, an able chemist, a judicious speculator in political economy, and a keen and successful student both of moral and natural philosophy. His acquaintance with the European languages, moreover, ancient as well as modern, was very extensive; whilst of those in use throughout the East, there were, comparatively speaking, few of which he knew not something. Persian he wrote and spoke like a native; he was well versed in Arabic; Hindostanee was perfectly familiar to him; and in Mahratta, Canarese, and others of the vernacular tongues, he could maintain, with great exactness, either a correspondence or a conversation. Of his English style, the reader has by this time judged for himself; and I am mistaken if many professed authors will be found to be more completely masters of it.

Notwithstanding these numerous accomplishments, few governors of an Indian province have ever devoted their energies, as he devoted his, to the public service. There was no department of the state the chief proceedings of which he did not personally superintend and minutely watch: there was no important question brought forward, concerning which he failed to record his written opinion: and the quantity of records and other papers which he perused in consequence, would surpass belief, but for the notes, in his own hand-writing, which remain. From among these minutes and notes, many might be found, the publication of which would do honour to the Court of Directors, whilst the opportunity of studying them would confer a lasting benefit upon both the civil and military servants of the East India Company.

In the private character of Sir Thomas Munro, again, as

a son, a brother, a friend, a husband, and a father, we find nothing which does not demand our unqualified admiration and respect. Generous and warm-hearted, utterly devoid of all selfishness, his career presents but a series of noble actions; which began when he was a subaltern, very scantily provided for, and ended only with the close of life itself. For it was not to his more immediate connections only, that Sir Thomas Munro freely extended his aid. He never heard of a case of real distress without making an effort to relieve it; and so quietly and unostentatiously was the effort made, that, to use the expressive language of Scripture, "his left hand knew not what his right hand did." Of the extreme affection, however, which he bore towards every branch of his family, sufficient evidence has been advanced in the tone of his letters; yet such was the perfect command which he had learned to maintain over himself, that even of his amiable feelings he made no display. On the contrary, it is remarked of him that he seldom noticed either Lady Munro or his children, farther than appeared absolutely necessary, provided there were strangers by to watch the proceeding; though there was an expression in his eye, as often as it rested upon them, which no one acquainted with his real character could misunderstand.

Sir Thomas Munro's natural turn of mind was contemplative and grave: he thought much, and reflected deeply; yet was he cheerful, and in the society of his more intimate friends, humorous and entertaining. Among entire strangers, and in public meetings, more especially after he came to the head of the Madras Government, there was a reserve about him which passed generally current for moroseness or hauteur; yet no man could be more free from either disposition, as those who knew him best bear ready witness. Of his peculiar faculty of seeing into the true characters of men, numerous proofs remain; one of the most generally known of which occurred in the case of Bishop Heber; whom, though

they met but casually, he depicted with the force of truth, which has been felt and acknowledged wherever the lamented Prelate's fame has extended.

Nevertheless, Sir Thomas Munro was exceedingly cautious how he spoke of others, especially if his judgment happened to be unfavourable. In this case, a sense of public duty alone ever urged him to speak out, because his own mind was too well regulated to take the smallest pleasure in wounding the feelings even of an enemy.

Though gifted with a constitution more than ordinarily vigorous, Sir Thomas Munro spent not so many years in India without suffering occasional attacks of illness. These he always bore with the fortitude of which a remarkable specimen is given in his correspondence during the campaign of 1799; and it is characteristic of the man, that he usually bore them in solitude. As soon as he perceived that a fit of indisposition was approaching, he withdrew altogether from society, and sat in silence, with his elbows on his knees, and his head resting on his hands, till it passed away. His great remedy, in cases of fever and other complaints peculiar to the country, was abstinence; and his aversion to medicine was extreme.

Sir Thomas Munro was brought up in the communion of the Scotch Episcopal Church, to which he continued sincerely and steadily attached to the day of his death. Of his early admiration of the poetical portions of the Bible, something has already been said; but it is not to be imagined that these were the only books in the Sacred Volume which he both read and admired. On the contrary, his acquaintance with the Inspired Writings was singularly intimate, arising from a custom which he never omitted, though, like every other custom connected with religion, it was practised with the strictest privacy:—Sir Thomas Munro never permitted a day to pass, without setting aside some portion of it to devotional exercises; and as the reading of the Scriptures formed a part of these, his knowledge of their contents was remarkably ac-

curate. The following rather ludicrous anecdote, illustrative of this fact, has been communicated to me by a gentleman who was present on the occasion.

It will be recollected, that in the year 1823, during the examination of Sir Abraham Bradley King, before the House of Commons, Sir John Newport, Mr. Butterworth, and others, were extremely anxious to peruse the verse in Holy Writ which was supposed to form part of an Orangeman's oath; chiefly because it was asserted that mention was made in it of the Divine command to root out the Amalekites. Sir Abraham Bradley King refusing to satisfy the House in this particular; the anxiety to effect the discovery became more intense. The verse, it was reported, was to be found in the Book of Joshua. Mr. Canning suggested that probably it would not be found there. Mr. Butterworth also declared that he had examined the Book in question, but could not discover it. Sir John Newport then quoted the chapter and verse. Mr. Butterworth retired to examine the verse again; but returned with a report, that the Amalekites were not mentioned in the verse quoted. The debate, after a long discussion, turned off upon some other point, and the important discovery was never made. When these circumstances were communicated to Sir Thomas Munro, who caused all the debates in Parliament to be regularly read to him, he smiled; and, after making some humorous remarks on the conduct of the parties engaged in this fruitless pursuit, observed, that they might have saved themselves and the House much time and trouble, if they had looked into the 3rd verse of the 15th chapter of the 1st Book of Samuel.

But there are other and better proofs on record, that to study the Bible was to Sir Thomas Munro a pleasing task. His whole life, both in public and private, was modelled upon the rules laid down in the Gospel; and he is, after all, the most vitally religious man, whose general behaviour corresponds best with the revealed Will of God.


Of the personal appearance of Sir Thomas Munro, a few

words will suffice to convey a sufficiently accurate idea. In stature he was tall; of a spare but bony make; very upright and soldier-like in his carriage, and possessed of great muscular strength. There was a display of decision in the lines of his face, which a stranger might readily mistake for sternness; but his eye was bright and penetrating; and when he began to relax, good-humour and benevolence were remarkably lighted up in his countenance. When he spoke, the voice appeared to issue rather from one side of his mouth, and the looker-on might easily detect as often as a playful or ludicrous idea struck him, by a peculiar curl in his upper, and a projection in his lower lip. Upon the whole, it may with truth be asserted, that his countenance was decidedly pleasing, whilst there was an indescribable character in his air, manner, and expression, which no one could behold without respect.

Such was Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, to whom the words of the poet may with perfect justice be applied, that—

“ He was a man, take him for all in all,
We shall not look upon his like again.”

APPENDIX.



APPENDIX.

I.

THE FOLLOWING ARE A FEW OF THE MANY NOTICES ON RECORD, OF THE VALUE ATTACHED TO THE SERVICES OF MAJOR MUNRO AS A COLLECTOR.

THE Government of Fort St. George, under date the 9th October 1800, informed the Court of Directors that the Company's authority had been completely established in Canara and Soondah, by the activity and prudence of the Collector, Major Munro, whose "success had enabled him, at an early period, to pursue his inquiries into the resources, administration, and history of these districts;" and that the result of the researches of that able officer had been submitted to them, "in one of the ablest reports (dated 30th May 1800,) which had passed under their observation."* That Major Munro had traced the government of those countries, from the wise and liberal policy of the ancient Gentoo institutions, down to the tyrannical exactions of Hyder and Tippoo. That in the former, the Collector had discovered, from the existence of authentic records, the foundations of that simple form of government which it was then intended to reintroduce, (viz. the proprietary right of land under fixed assessments,) and, in the latter, had exhibited those destructive changes which had undermined the wealth and population of once flourishing districts. That the revenue settled by Major Munro, for the year 1209, amounted to Sr. Pags. 5,99775, being an increase of about 93 per cent. on the schedules produced by Tippoo Sultan in 1792.

* Printed in Appendix, No. 24, to Fifth Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on India affairs, page 803 to 814; and highly spoken of by the Committee.

Extract of a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George,
dated 24th August 1804.

24. WE derived great satisfaction from the perusal of Major Munro's report of the 30th May 1800, on the resources, administration, and history of Canara and Soondah, and from the subsequent report of the 9th November following. When we consider that, from an actual examination of a number of ancient sunnuds and revenue accounts, Major Munro has been able to ascertain the state of the revenues of the province under the Rajah of Bidanore, as well as under Hyder and Tippoo, and the cause of the decline, and that enough of the ancient documents remain to enable him to furnish a complete abstract of the land, during a period of four hundred years; and that he has actually furnished, from the most authentic materials, a statement of the land-rent of Canara and Soondah, from 1600 to 1799; we are greatly surprised that Mr. Place, in his minute of the 9th October 1802, should have spoken of those statements as merely hypothetical, and recorded an opinion, that the public revenue of the whole province of Canara amounts to little more than a tithe of the gross produce.

25. Under a consideration of the destructive changes which are said to have undermined the population of these once flourishing districts, and reflecting, also, on the consequences of a recent increase upon the former assessment of the province of Malabar, without due attention being had in proportioning that increase in an equitable manner, so as to fall equally upon all, you will proceed with caution upon the reference which was made to you in a preceding dispatch on the subject of Mr. Place's remark; and not hazard any material increase in the present jumma of the province of Canara, without being well assured that the actual state of the produce of the country will warrant you in so doing. By Major Munro's letter of the 9th November 1800, we observe, "that the revenue had been paid with a readiness of which he had seen no example; not because the inhabitants are more able than formerly to pay their rents, but because they believe that their readiness in discharging them will not, under the Company's Government, be regarded as a proof of wealth, or as an argument for laying new impositions upon them." We trust that no measure will be adopted by you that may be likely to lessen this confidence; and you will proceed with great caution

in augmenting the present assessment, even should you entertain an opinion that it is disproportioned to the actual resources of the country, since we feel very much inclined to the opinions of the Revenue Board—"That the revenue will improve, not by increasing the assessment, but by inspiring confidence that it will be moderately fixed."

From Major Munro's report of the 9th November 1800, we observe, that the proprietary right in the lands of Canara had been derived from a very remote period, and the existing knowledge and estimation of the value of those rights among the descendants of the original proprietors, indicated the easy means of introducing a permanent system of revenue and judicature. We likewise observe, that previous to Hyder's conquest, the districts were divided into small estates, which were considered the actual property of the holders, and assessed at a fixed moderate rate. When we consider the attachment of the proprietors to the lands of their ancestors, we recommend to your most serious attention the observation contained in Major Munro's report of the 9th November 1800, respecting the impolicy and injustice of placing a number of small estates under the collection of one head-landlord, preparatory to the perpetual settlement. It were best to adhere, as nearly as possible, to the division which at present subsists; to conclude the settlement with the proprietors of small estates, and not to break in upon ancient boundaries or land-marks, lest any attempt at innovation may be productive of disquietude and disgust, especially as almost all the land in Canara is represented as private property, derived from gift, or purchase, or descent, too remote to be traced; where (according to Major Munro) "there are more title-deeds, and where the validity of those deeds have probably stood more trials than all the estates in England." Of such lands, however, as are denominated sirkar lands, you will make such a division as may appear to be most convenient.

Extract from a Report of the Board of Revenue
at Fort St. George, 5th October 1806.

THE annual Jummabundy report, with its accompanying general comparative statements of the revenues of the Ceded Districts, for July 1215, which we had the honour to lay before your Lordship in Council, with our address, under date the 14th August last, will have afforded satisfactory evidence of

the improved resources of the province,—of the growing confidence of the inhabitants,—and of the unrelaxing energy and successful result of the administration of the principal collector.

114. We consider these remarks as applicable to the judicious and considerate regard which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro has uninterruptedly evinced in advancing the revenues of these districts, from the reduced condition in which he found them, to their present state of comparative prosperity, in proportion only to the capability of the people and the capacity of the country. This is one of the most delicate and difficult of the various important duties with which a collector is entrusted; and in the present case it has been performed in a manner highly creditable to the collector, and entirely satisfactory to us. Amidst the care and exertions necessary for conducting and upholding such extensive collections, the assiduity, ability, and success with which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro has prosecuted, and now nearly accomplished, the arduous duty of surveying and classifying the lands of so large a tract of territory, and assessing thereon a moderate and equitable money-rent, are equally entitled to public approbation. In his experience and intelligence we had the best earnest for the correctness of this important undertaking; but the punctual and complete manner in which the collections have for several years been made, is the most convincing proof of its accuracy and moderation.

Extract from a Report of the Board of Revenue
at Fort St. George, 5th October, 1806.

THESE countries, valued at a gross annual jumma of canterroi pagodas 19,18,758, or star pagodas, 16,51,465,* and, by a census made within these last two years, computed to contain 1,917,376 inhabitants, were, in the month of October 1800, confided to the executive management of Lieutenant-Colonel (then Major) Thomas Munro, who, with the aid of four subordinate collectors, acquitted himself of the trust with eminent ability and success, from the date above-mentioned until the month of October 1807.

The judicious policy, we remarked, could not be too highly applauded, by which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, fixing in the first instance on a moderate scale of jumma, and increasing it

* Though the value at which they were ceded was 16,51,465 star pagodas, the first year's jumma amounted only to 10,06,543 star pagodas.

only as the means of the renters and the capacity of the country enabled him safely to do, advanced these provinces from the almost ultimate point of declension to which they had been sunk by a weak and improvident Government, to the degree of comparative prosperity and promise in which they now remain.

The example we believed to be unparalleled in the revenue annals of this Presidency, of so extensive a tract of territory, with a body of inhabitants little accustomed to passive submission and legitimate obedience to the ruling authority, reduced from confusion to order, and a mass of revenue amounting to no less a sum than 119,90,419 star pagodas, being regularly and at length readily collected, with a remission on the whole of only 3415,28,22 pagodas, or 1 f. 22d. per cent.

Extract from a Revenue Letter from Fort St. George,
dated 12th February 1806.

36. THIS considerable augmentation of produce having succeeded to three years of unfavourable seasons, marked in a strong degree the care with which the resources of the Ceded Districts had been guarded and preserved in the previous settlements formed under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro. We trust that the large augmentation of revenue which you have derived, combined with the improved condition of these valuable possessions, will exhibit a proof, not less satisfactory than it is incontrovertible, of the unexampled success of the principal collector in the execution of the arduous duties committed to his charge, and of the essential benefit which has been produced to the public service, by the indefatigable exertion of the zeal and talents of that valuable public officer.

Extract from a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George,
dated 21st October 1806.

19. It affords us much satisfaction to observe, that the able services of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro have received your approbation. You were informed in the dispatch from this Government, dated the 11th February 1806, that the revenue of the Ceded Districts had nearly attained the standard specified in the schedule of the Treaty of Hyderabad, and that the augmentation of revenue had kept pace with the progressive improvement of the internal resources of the country. We are at the same time

aware, that it is natural that your attention should be excited by the extraordinary proofs of comprehensive detail, which are evinced in the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro ; and it cannot be doubted that there are very few public officers who would be equal to the labours involved in so arduous a charge. It could not be reasonably expected that, in the minute mode of assessment pursued by the principal collector, inequality in the rates of assessment should not occasionally occur ; but we have entire confidence, that by the vigilance and industry of the principal and of the sub-collectors, those inequalities will be gradually rectified, and the whole revenue be at length fixed on an equitable and defined basis ; while it must be apparent, that the system which is pursued by Lieutenant-Colonel Munro is that which is best calculated to lead to such an accurate knowledge of the resources of the country, as it would be hopeless to expect without a vigorous personal investigation.

117. This explanation of the state of affairs in the Ceded Districts will be the best encomium that can be conferred on the superior merits of the principal collector, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, by whose persevering exertions a country which, at the period of its transfer to the authority of the British Government, was infested with every species of disorder and irregularity, has been preserved in the enjoyment of almost entire tranquillity, and has been advanced with the utmost rapidity to a state of progressive prosperity and improvement.

Extract from a Revenue Letter from Fort St. George,
the 21st October 1807.

WITH all due submission and deference to the sentiments of your Honourable Court, we think it our duty to say, that we should have great satisfaction if the exertions which have been made by Lieutenant-Colonel Munro in the advancement of the public service, under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and with a degree of success unequalled in the records of this, or probably of any other Government, should receive a corresponding recompense in the approbation of your Honourable Court.

260. Mr. Petrie (the Acting Governor) reviewed the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro in the Ceded Districts, noticed the gradual augmentation which he had produced of the revenue from twelve and a half lacs to eighteen lacs of star pagodas per annum, and the general amelioration and improvement of the

manners and habits of the Ceded Districts, which had kept pace with the increase of revenue. From disunited hordes of lawless plunderers and freebooters, they are now stated to be as far advanced in civilization, submission to the laws, and obedience to the magistrates, as any of the subjects under this Government. The revenues are collected with facility ; every one seems satisfied with his situation ; and the regret of the people is universal on the departure of the principal collector.

Extract from a Revenue Letter from Fort St. George,
12th August 1814.

6. EVERY writing of Colonel Munro's is entitled to attention. His vigorous and comprehensive understanding ; the range which his mind takes through the whole science of political economy ; the simplicity and clearness with which all his ideas are unfolded ; his long and extensive experience, and his uniform success, rank him high as an authority in all matters relating to the revenues of India. Independently of the general interest excited by the character of its author, his paper, dated the 15th of August 1807, claims notice as containing the only project of a rayetwar permanent settlement. To that paper your Honourable Court's dispatch makes a marked reference, and we accordingly feel ourselves at liberty to regard the project which it contains as the permanent settlement which your Honourable Court would wish to introduce. In speaking of the rayetwar system, we therefore beg, for the sake of accuracy, to be understood to mean the system recommended in Colonel Munro's letter of the 15th of August 1807.

Extract from a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George,
dated 6th November 1805,

36. THE reports of Colonel Munro now brought under our observation, afford new proof of his knowledge of the people, and the lands under his administration, and of his ability and skill as a collector. The mode of settling on the part of Government immediately with the individual cultivator of the soil for the land-rent, under the term of kulwar, appears to be more practised in that division of the Peninsula, where he presides, than we understand it to have been in any of the ancient possessions of the Company. We see reason to be surprised at the industry

which has carried the collector into a detail of no less than 206,819 individual settlements of this nature, averaging only pagodas 65,62 each of annual rent.

Extract from a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George,
dated 24th April 1811.

WE have perused the Survey Report of the Ceded Districts, drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Munro, with much interest. This document not only furnishes a new proof of the zeal, judgment, and talent which have been so often displayed by that meritorious officer in our service, but it contains some curious statistical information, which it would not have been easy for a person of less experience than Colonel Munro to have obtained.

205. The measurement and assessment of the land seems to have been conducted with a just and equal attention to the interests of Government and the rayet ; indeed, nothing could be a stronger testimony in its favour than the concurring facts of the large amount of the fixed assessment, and the universal satisfaction of the people who are to pay it.

217. The information contained in the short paper communicated by Colonel Munro to Mr. Petrie, and recorded along with the latter gentleman's minute, referred to in the hundredth paragraph of your subsequent letter of the 24th December 1807, is peculiarly gratifying. It cannot but be highly pleasing to us to learn that the distractions which prevailed under the government of the Nizam no longer exist ; that the country is quiet, and that the inhabitants are well affected ; in fine, that in districts which it is calculated will, *communibus annis*, yield about eighteen lacs of pagodas, it will not be necessary to call out a single sepoy to support the collections.

218. In such a state of things, we heartily approve of the suggestions of Colonel Munro, which we are pleased to find were adopted by Mr. Petrie, at that time our Governor in council. Innovation, which never ought to be rashly resorted to, would, in circumstances like the present, be altogether inexcusable.

Of the respect and veneration in which he was held by the natives, an anecdote is related by Colonel Wilkes, in his Sketches of the South of India. " I will not deny myself the pleasure,"

says Colonel Wilkes, “ of stating an incident related to me by a respectable public servant of the government of Mysore, who was sent in 1807 to assist in the adjustment of a disputed boundary between that territory and the district in charge of the collector. A violent dispute occurred in his presence between some villagers ; and the party aggrieved threatened to go to Anantpore, and complain to their *father*. He perceived that Colonel Munro was meant, and found upon inquiry that he was generally distinguished throughout the district by that appellation.”

In 1808, after his return to England, Colonel Munro received the following letter, with a piece of plate of the value of five hundred pounds, which was presented to him by several civil servants who had been employed under him in Canara and the Ceded Districts. It was a silver-gilt vase of an Etruscan form, decorated with Oriental ornaments ; and the plinth on which it stands is supported at each corner by elephants' heads.

16th February, 1808.

DEAR SIR,

WE have all had the happiness of serving under you, either in the Ceded Districts or Canara. We admire the generosity, the kindness, and the magnanimous equality of temper which, for eight years, we constantly experienced from you, amidst sickness, difficulties, and fatigue. As public servants, we can bear witness to the justice, moderation, and wisdom with which you have managed the important provinces under your authority. We know that the Ceded Districts hold your name in veneration, and feel the keenest regret at your departure. As for ourselves, we attribute our success in life, in a great measure, to you, and think, if we are good public servants, we have chiefly learnt to be so from your instruction and example. We are at a loss how to express our feelings ; but we request your acceptance of a cup, which Mr. Cochrane, your former deputy in the Ceded Districts, will have the honour to present to you.

Inscription on the piece of plate.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Munro, by William Thackeray, G. J. Travers, H. S. Græme, Alexander Read, Peter Bruce, Frederick Gahagan, William Chaplin, and John Bird, as a mark of their respect and affection for his public and private virtues,

witnessed by them in the course of their service under him during his administration of the provinces of Canara and the Districts ceded to the East India Company by his Highness the Nizam.

The subject represented on this vase is copied from a drawing by Thomas Daniel, R.A. of a bas-relief of great antiquity sculptured in the excavated mountains of Ellora.

I subjoin a letter addressed to Colonel Munro just before he quitted India, by Lord William Bentinck. It speaks for itself.

Fort St. George, July 30, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM concerned to say that I have no good excuse to offer for having so long delayed the acknowledgment of both your letters. In truth, the arrival of the Governor-General, and his protracted stay, has deranged the ordinary course of business, and has been the cause of a great mass of private and public papers being put off for future consideration. I trust I need not take any pains to convince you of the sincere concern which I have felt at your intended departure. I say to you now, what I shall recommend may be stated in the most public manner, that the thanks of this Government are, in an especial manner, due to you for the distinguished and important services which you have been performing for the East India Company for so many years. These have been no ordinary revenue duties; on the contrary, the most difficult work that can be assigned to man has been most successfully accomplished by you. You have restored the extensive provinces committed to your charge, long infested by every species of disorder and calamity, private and public, to a state of prosperity, and have made them a most valuable acquisition to your country. It is a consolation to know that the most important part of the revenue arrangement, the survey, which could scarcely have been executed under any other superintendence, has been completed before your departure. This will make the road, in respect to the revenues, easy for your successors. But I fear that, in provinces not long since so very much disturbed, a continuance of the same good policy will be indispensable. It is to your advice that I must refer for determining by what arrangement these districts shall be hereafter managed,—whether by a principal and subordinate collectors, or by two or three separate

zillah collectors. The zillahs are the cheapest and most convenient mode. Are the servants at present there equal to the charge? The present arrangement was always, according to my judgment, the most eligible. A principal collector partaking of the confidence of Government, is more particularly necessary as your successor. It may be expected that the absence of your authority and arrangement must be attended with some injurious effects. These effects may grow into serious consequences, if there is not immediately established an able and efficient superintendence. It had occurred to me that Mr. Thackeray might be inclined, and would be the most proper person, from various considerations, to succeed you, in case the same arrangement as now obtains should be continued. I am desirous, in the first instance, to receive your sentiments upon this subject. My great and anxious object is to preserve to the Ceded Districts, as far as possible, a continuance of the same system, in all its parts and branches, by which such vast public benefits have been obtained.

I remain, my dear Sir, with great respect and esteem,

Your obedient servant,

W. BENTINCK.

II.

MISCELLANEOUS MEMORANDA BY COLONEL MUNRO.

IN the formation of a government for India, we are not left to mere theory; we have not to create a new system; the present one has existed long enough to show us how far it is calculated to answer the purposes for which it was intended, and to enable us to judge with tolerable precision what are its advantages and its defects. The arrangements originally formed for the management of a few factories have gradually, without any preconceived plan, but following the change of circumstances, been enlarged and organized into a system fitted for the administration of an extensive empire. The mixture of commercial and political principles in which it is founded, however contrary to all speculative notions of government, have not been found unfavourable to its practical operations. The commercial spirit which pervades its constitution, by introducing habits of regularity, perseverance, and method into every department, civil and military, has enabled

it during many long and arduous contests, sometimes for existence, sometimes for dominion, to support reverses and overcome difficulties, which, under any other form of government, would perhaps have been impossible. But it must be confessed that this commercial spirit has also frequently interposed delay where vigour and decision were necessary, and embarrassed the execution of the most important enterprises. But the system, on the whole, with whatever defects may adhere to it, calls rather for amendment than fundamental change.

The India Board, as it is now constituted, does not appear to require any material alteration. It would be desirable that the President should hold his office for a fixed period, and as much longer as might be thought expedient, and not be renewable on every change of ministry ; but this would, I fear, be incompatible with the nature of our government. The powers which he possesses of sending orders to the governments of India for the formation of alliances, and for making peace or declaring war, and of altering all dispatches from the Court of Directors, when not purely commercial, invest him with authority amply sufficient for the due control of the important affairs confided to his management. It might be proper to authorize him to originate dispatches on any matter whatever, when the Court of Directors either declined doing so, or delayed it beyond a specific time. The exercise of this authority would occasionally be required, particularly in restraining the local governments from enacting fundamental laws, where the subject merely demanded temporary regulation. No regulation ought to be adopted as a part of the constitutional law of India, until it has received the sanction of the India Board.

Ceylon, and the conquered European settlements to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, with the exception perhaps of the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, are so intimately connected with India, that they ought to be placed under the Governor-General and the Board of Commissioners.

III.

MEMORANDA, DATED 1812-13.

THERE can be no doubt that a surplus revenue (in India) will gradually arise, and that it may in part be remitted to Europe without injury to India. A continual drain will not ruin a country whose continual surplus produce is greater than that drain.

It is our political power, acquired by the Company's arms, that has made the trade to India what it is: without that power, it would have been kept within narrow bounds by the jealousy and exactions of the Native Princes, and by some, such as Tippoo, could have been prohibited altogether.

All corporations are inimical to the natural rights of British subjects. The corn laws favour the landed interest at the expense of the public. The laws against the export of wool, and many others, are of the same nature. But none are perhaps more adverse to the interests of the nation than those by which West India commodities are protected and enhanced in price. It would be better for the community, that the West India planter should be permitted to export his produce to all countries, and that the duties on India sugars should be lowered. The gain to the nation would be more than equivalent to that of the West India planters. Their profits would be reduced, but not so low as to disable them from continuing their trade.

The Company, it is said, have exported woollens to the value of a million annually, at a loss of fifty thousand pounds; and their opponents say, Why carry on a losing trade? But it is not a losing trade to the nation, though it is to the Company, if it increase the gain of the manufacturers.

A rude ignorant people relinquish their superstitions without much difficulty, in exchange for the religion of other nations, whilst a civilized one preserves them with most persevering obstinacy. The Turks of Europe have attained a considerable degree of civilization; but their intercourse with the Christian powers has not abated their faith in all the wild visions of their

prophets. The change, if ever it is effected, will be extremely slow, and will not even begin until, by the improvement of the country, India shall abound in a middling class of wealthy men, secure in the possession of their property, and having leisure to study our best authors translated into the various languages of the country.

It is a mistaken notion, that the growers of cotton make, in their own family, their light clothing: they get it from the weaver and merchant, and they have a desire for the produce and manufactures of Europe, provided they are suitable to the purposes for which they intend them, are equally good and cheaper, and they can afford to pay for them.

Upon the claims in the India Bill of 1813, which provides that, after establishing a guarantee fund of twelve millions sterling, the excess of territorial revenue paid into the Exchequer is to go in the proportion of five-sixths to the public, and one-sixth to the Company, he remarks, "This is converting India into a rack-rent estate for England."

Every great state must have the means of raising extraordinary taxes in time of war. If it has not, it can only meet its expenses by reductions in peace; a resource which must soon fail, as it cannot, without danger, be carried beyond a certain limit.

This principle ought to be kept in view in all revenue measures, and ought to be fully explained to the inhabitants.

Military allowances, both to European and Native officers, ought to be regulated on the principle of holding out increasing advantages at every progressive step, and the means of realizing a competency after a certain period of service; but under no government will the public resources be adequate to this object, if the allowances to the inferior ranks of the army are too high.

A subaltern upon half-batta may live not only without distress, but comfortably, in any part of India. It is not necessary that he should do more. It is even better that he should feel difficulty occasionally; but it is a bad training for an officer, to place him in a situation where he shall always be at his ease, and scarcely ever feel the necessity of practising economy.

The best remedy to all suits respecting boundaries, village accounts, and exactions, is a well-organized revenue system, which

checks in a great degree these disorders in their origin, and, when they do arise, furnishes at once a clear document for settling them. An independent spirit amongst the rayets themselves is, however, the most sure defence against exaction. This spirit can only exist when the rayets are, as in Canara, actual proprietors, not mere cultivators of the soil. Such a body of men will not submit to exaction from any authority less than that of the Government itself. They will resist it, and, by so doing, guard more effectually their own rights than can be done by all our judicial and revenue regulations united. It is evident, therefore, that the more widely landed property is diffused, the more numerous the class of small proprietors holding of no despot zemindars, of no superior but the Crown, the more will this spirit of independence spread among the people, and the greater will be the number whom it will protect from extortion and every kind of oppression. But landed property can never arise under a system which leaves no landlord's rent. If we wish to see landed property and all its good effects, we must reduce the assessment of the greater part of the provinces under the Madras Government.

Under the zillah judge there should be a certain proportion of Native judges, one to each teshildari, or two where the teshildari was large. The Native judge should hold his court in the same town with the amildar's catcherry, for the convenience of receiving the aid of that magistrate in assembling punchayets, &c.

The separation of power has certainly lowered the European character. It has already, perhaps, in some degree created, and will continue to spread gradually among the Natives, a spirit of independence, but springing less from confidence in themselves, than from an abated respect for the British Government. If we wish, in order to remove their prejudices, to communicate to them more of the European character in their habits and opinions; if we are desirous of raising in their minds that proper independence which results from living under a well-regulated Government, and of rendering them fit to take a share in it, and even at some future period to govern themselves, we have not, I fear, taken the steps most likely to conduct us to this object. The independence which our institutions create is more likely to lead to discontent and disturbances, than to a just estimate of the advantages which may be enjoyed under them, or to any anxiety for their preservation or improvement. While we are endeavour-

ing to diffuse European knowledge among the Hindoos, and just notions of the benefits of good government, we must be cautious that we do not, by too great a division of power, weaken their reverence for our authority, and encourage them to resist it. We must keep them so far united, as may enable us to maintain our dominions unshaken to distant ages, or at least until the time shall arrive when the Hindoos have acquired sufficient knowledge and energy of character to govern themselves.

The main evil of our system is the degraded state in which we hold the Natives. We suppose them to be superstitious, ignorant, prone to falsehood, and corrupt. In our well-meaning zeal for their welfare, we shudder at the idea of committing to men so depraved, any share in the administration of their own country. We never consider that their superstition has little or no influence on their public conduct; that individuals, and even whole nations, the most superstitious and credulous in supernatural concerns, may be as wary and sceptical in the affairs of the world, as any philosopher can desire. We exclude them from every situation of trust and emolument; we confine them to the lowest offices, with scarcely a bare subsistence; and even these are left in their hands from necessity, because Europeans are utterly incapable of filling them. We treat them as an inferior race of beings. Men who, under a Native government, might have held the first dignities of the state, who, but for us, might have been governors of provinces, are regarded as little better than menial servants; are often no better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in our presence. We reduce them to this abject state, and then we look down upon them with disdain, as men unworthy of high station. Under most of the Mohammedan princes of India, the Hindoos were eligible to all the civil offices of government; and they frequently possessed a more important share in them than their conquerors.

In the Ceded Districts (Madras,) reckoning only one *toti* and one *talliar* to each village, there are from twelve to fifteen thousand. If these are what are called *Paikes* in Bengal, the number in the three provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, could not have been less than one hundred thousand, who, with their families, were at one sweep, by a regulation professing to establish landed property, bereft of their little patrimonial estates, which their ancestors had held for ages.

The usage of the country, or common law of the Hindoos, is very different from the written law, which is in a great measure obsolete among themselves. Before the introduction of a new code, we ought to have employed men properly qualified to collect all that could be found of usage or Hindoo common law. Many of the rules would have appeared trifling and absurd, and even contradictory; but from the whole a system might have been formed much better adapted to the genius and condition of the people, than our theoretical code.

Is the effect then of our boasted laws to be ultimately merely that of maintaining tranquillity, and keeping the inhabitants in such a state of abasement, that not one of them shall ever be fit to be intrusted with authority? If ever it was the object "of the most anxious solicitude of Government to dispense with their services, except in matters of detail," it is high time that a policy so degrading to our subjects, and so dangerous to ourselves, should be abandoned, and a more liberal one adopted. It is the policy of the British Government to improve the character of its subjects; and this cannot better be done than by raising them in their own estimation, by employing them in situations both of trust and authority.

There are many reasons why the civil government of India should have a greater control over the military power, than in other foreign dependencies of Great Britain. In all of these, the military force is too inconsiderable, and too closely connected with the Mother Country, to attempt any thing against her; and in most of them the civil government is strengthened by the weight and influence of the colonial assemblies. But in India, Government has nothing to support it but its own character, and the authority with which it is invested. It has no great civil societies to come forward to its aid in the time of difficulty. The chief strength of the army is composed of Natives; and even of the European soldiery, the greater part have no desire to leave the country. It is evident that the authority of Government over such an army ought to be maintained by every means not incompatible with the respect due to the Commander-in-chief, and that the supreme military power should be vested in the Governor in Council.

After the Commander-in-chief, there is no officer it is of so much importance to uphold as that of the regimental commanding officer of the Native corps; for on the respect which he can maintain, rests the subordination of the Native army, and the very existence of our dominion in India. The authority he once possessed has, with the view of checking abuses, been so much divided, that there is too little left any where to command respect. Part of his former power should be restored to him; and he should receive such allowances as will enable him to make an appearance suitable to his rank, in the eyes of the Natives and of the European officers.

Whatever plans may be adopted for accelerating promotion among the European officers, it ought to be accompanied by one for improving the condition of the Native officers; and no room should be left for them to feel that, in every arrangement for the improvement of the army, their interests are neglected.

1814-15. The people will often object to paying a tax expressly for the police of their own town, while they will make none to paying a much greater increase on houses, lands, or any established tax, though not intended for their protection. Government should adopt the tax most agreeable to the people, not that which appears most reasonable to us.

No modification can make the Mohammedan criminal law good for any thing: it ought to be abolished, and our own substituted. For whom is this law preserved? There is not one Mohammedan to twenty Hindoos; nor was the law ever administered worse than among that small portion.

The absolute power of dismissal at discretion is the only foundation of an efficient police: without it there can be no energy or zeal, and all regulations will be useless.

In 1812, a judge, or the judges, of a provincial court having, in a Report, said that the Mohammedan law, with all its modifications, was not suitable to the state of India, and that trial by jury might be introduced easily and with great benefit, Sir Thomas, then Colonel Munro, remarks, at the date of this fragment —“ There can be no doubt that a Native jury would find the facts much better than any European judge.”

Corporal punishment should be restrained within the narrowest limits. Public officers are too apt to inflict it; and when, as sometimes happens, it appears that there was no ground for the punishment, no compensation can be made. A fine is preferable, and can be returned.

Upon a proposition to make persons compounding theft guilty of a misdemeanour, he remarks—"This is much too severe. Before we punish for compromising theft, we ought to take measures to secure the speedy recovery of stolen property, and its return to the owner. If we cannot inspire the people with some hope of recovering their property through the operation of *our* measures, we ought not to expect that they are to take none *themselves* for this purpose.

"Magistrates who are chiefly engaged in the investigation of thefts and robberies, are apt to lose their temper—to proceed as if the whole population consisted only of thieves and receivers; and for the correction of a partial and contingent evil, to propose remedies inflicting a lasting inconvenience on the community in general, by making every member liable to penalties; and on some classes in particular, by restrictions in the exercise of their trades. The evil of theft and robbery, after all, is not so great as a magistrate, with his head full of stolen property, is apt to believe. If we consider the facility given to theft, by the unguarded manner in which property is usually kept, and in which goods are carried through the country, and the encouragement given to robbery by the weakness of the Native Governments, we shall not find that these crimes prevail to a greater extent in this country, (India,) than under similar circumstances they would have done in our own. A zealous magistrate thinks nothing of subjecting the whole inhabitants of a village to a kind of police martial law, and of making a considerable portion of them neglect, in some degree, their own occupations, in order to keep constant watch against thieves and banditti, merely because it is possible that a theft might be committed in the course of the year."

Upon a clause in a regulation which subjects proprietors, landholders, &c. to fine, imprisonment, and forfeiture of estate, if guilty of harbouring, feeding, or assisting banditti, he remarks,—"Where aid is given *from fear*, which it often is, no punishment should be inflicted. The *robber* is often much *more able* to punish the person who refuses him aid, than the *Government* to protect him."

The following remark is made on the fact, that an appeal from the Sudder Court lies to the King in Council:—"This was ordered, I believe, when the Governor was at the head of the Sudder Court; and it ought not to *pass him*: if it does, it is no Government. The Government has the power to reverse wrong decisions and wrong rules; or it may be involved in the work of suppressing commotions raised by The execution of orders of which it was ignorant."

In 1815, Mr. Baber, then magistrate of Canara, stated, in one of his reports,—“Unfounded accusations of the most atrocious crimes have been the cause of so many innocent people having been subjected to a long and ignominious confinement.” Upon this Sir Thomas, then Colonel Munro, remarks—"This most intolerable of all evils arises from our system, from bringing every man before an European magistrate, who knows little of the people, or of what he ought to believe or reject, instead of assigning more of the duty of investigation to natives, who are so much better qualified to appreciate evidence. Were we to commit only upon the report of a jury of Natives, much oppression would be obviated, and much time saved."

1820-21.—The Mohammedan law in criminal cases, never having being generally diffused, should be abolished, and the English substituted.

There is nothing we ought to avoid so cautiously as precipitancy in committing the faith of Government in permanent measures, of which we cannot possibly foresee the consequences, and which may often be quite contrary to our expectations. We ought always to keep open the road for correcting our mistakes, and never to bind ourselves in such a way, by hasty regulations, as to render our injustice, once committed, permanent.

The difficulty which the Bengal collectors and judges find in answering Lord Wellesley's queries, proceeds chiefly from the curnums or village accountants being no longer Government officers. They can say nothing of the resources, of the population, or of the cultivation of the country. They cannot ascertain even the number of villages, or their true proprietors. On every subject their answers are vague. They are reduced to guess, and acknowledge that they have no data from whence to form a judgment. One conceives, another is convinced, an-

other is given to understand, and another as far as he is able to learn.

The potails and curnums of every village, as political instruments holding together the internal frame, are of the highest use to Government. They are immortal; but the zemindar can command no respect. His property dividing and passing away, prevents his acquiring permanent influence. Government loses the services of the potail and curnum, and gets none from the zemindar.

1823.—The rise of the character of the natives is to be effected by means of the higher classes in the judicial and revenue department; by collectors and revenue board cutcherries; by consultation on taxation with them, and with the principal rayets and merchants; by a system admitting a regular reduction of taxation in peace, and increase in time of war; by showing the reason of it, and gaining their confidence, so that they may pay willingly in war, from the certainty that reduction will follow in peace.

Let each Presidency pursue the course best calculated to promote improvement in its own territory. Do not suppose that one way will answer for all, and that Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay—places a thousand miles from each other—must be in every thing so much alike, as to require exactly the same rules of internal administration on every point. Let each Presidency act for itself. By this means, a spirit of emulation will be kept alive, and each may borrow from the other every improvement which may be suited to the circumstances of its own provinces. If there is only one system, and if one Presidency is to be the model of the rest, it will have no other standard to compare its own with; and when it falls into vices, it will, instead of correcting it by the example of others, communicate it to them.

Our Adawlut courts in the several provinces act like so many steam-engines, breaking the great estates into small ones, and the small ones into dust.

The introduction of regular troops into all the countries of India lately occupied by the numerous irregular armies of the Native princes, operates, like the first establishment of the steam-engine, in throwing a great body of men out of employment, because it performs with a few what before was the work of many. It occasions very severe and extreme distress, as well as disaffection, by depriving at once a large body of military men of the means of subsistence. The evil to the common sort may be

temporary ; but to all the better, and particularly the Mussulman officers, it is permanent, because they cannot follow any other profession, and cannot find employment in our armies. We ought therefore, in extending our arms over new countries, to consider the state of these men, and either find employment for them as irregulars, or pension them for life. Their children will enter into our service, or seek a livelihood in some other occupation.

1826.—The Court themselves have been the great destroyers of discipline, by authorizing all subalterns of the army to receive full batta and command-allowance. The subaltern is never taught economy ; he starts with extravagant notions, and never afterwards becomes sober. You may, in fact, pay as high as you please : if you pay upon a wrong principle, you will never have content or discipline.

IV.

ON THE STATE OF THE SOUTHERN MAHRATTA COUNTRY.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Bangalore, 28th August, 1818.

SIR,

MY stay has been too short in the Southern Mahratta provinces, and my time too much occupied in military operations, to have permitted me to acquire any very accurate knowledge either of the political state, or of the revenues of the country ; yet, from my having held civil as well as military authority, and had constant communication with every class of the people, I had ample opportunity, as far as my leisure admitted, of learning their disposition towards our Government, and of ascertaining the means most likely to ensure future tranquillity.

2. In every conquered province there are three points which require immediate attention ; namely, the military protection, the political settlement, and the civil administration of the country : but of these, the military protection is by far the most important, since without it no order can be established or maintained, more particularly in a country long accustomed to anarchy, arising from the weakness of the sovereign, and the pretensions of turbulent feudatories.

3. The force now stationed in the Mahratta country between the Kistna and the Toombuddra, usually called the Carnatic, is barely sufficient for its protection ; and if it is expected that it shall cover the districts of Bijapoor and Sholapoor, beyond the Kistna, and Rastiah's late jagheers on the north bank of that river, it ought to be reinforced with two additional battalions of Native infantry : the whole of the force, with the exception of that part which is required for garrisons, should be kept in readiness for field-service. I do not apprehend that, while such a force is in the country, any serious disturbances can happen. The principal jagheerdars have too much at stake to wish to excite them. The condition of the Putwurdhans, and of the Dessye of Kittoor, will be much improved by the change of government. The Putwurdhans will have more territory ; both will be secured in the enjoyment of their possessions, instead of being exposed to constant attempts to diminish them, as when under the dominion of the Peishwah. The family of Goklah may be regarded as extinct. The elevation of that chief was too recent, and his conduct too violent, to have left him, even if he had lived, any chance of support from the inhabitants of his jagheers. Rastiah's administration was in general moderate and just ; but there is, notwithstanding, no desire to see his jagheers restored, except among his immediate dependents. The Dessye of Nepauni is dissatisfied at being deprived of the districts of Chickori and Manowlee, and would readily join in any combination against us, which he thought was likely to be successful. But he is too wary, and has still too many possessions, acquired almost entirely from his connection with the British Government, to run any risk of losing them. He is, besides, not ignorant that he is detested by all the inhabitants of his jagheers for his oppressive and wanton cruelty, and that they would gladly co-operate in his destruction. During the late campaign, I received invitations from most of his villages to take possession of them. They did not even demand assistance ; all that they asked was, that I would authorize their expelling the garrisons, and engage not to restore them to the Dessye after the war. I am therefore persuaded that he will remain quiet. Some of the petty zemindars will be more likely than the great jagheerdars to excite disturbances ; but their acts, if they attempt any thing, will be those of banditti rather than of rebels. The strength of their country along the borders of Soondah and of the Goa territory, has enabled them for many years to resist the authority of the Peishwah's officers, to with-

hold their rents, and to levy contributions on travellers, or plunder them. The principal of these petty chiefs is the Dessye of Koodlague and Misricottah. He came in to me in January, on a promise of indemnity for all past offences. He had about three hundred and fifty armed followers. He retained fifty, and the remaining three hundred, many of whom were Abyssinians, or their descendants, were distributed, in parties of forty or fifty, among the peons whom I was then raising, and sent to different garrisons. The Dessye, who is a youth of about twenty years of age, told me that both his father and himself had been compelled to subsist by plunder, because they could not reside in their village without the danger of being treacherously seized by the Mahratta Government. I believe that the Government had cause to look after the father, but I think that the son is desirous of living peaceably. The garrisons of Bheemghur and Phanghur, two hill-forts, with their dependent districts, situated among the Western Ghauts, have long paid but a nominal submission to the Peishwah's authority. They received their killedars from Poonah, but attended by only a few followers, whom they could turn out at pleasure. The main body of the garrison in both places was composed of the country militia, who had for above a century enjoyed the rents of the neighbouring villages, as service-lands, together with the produce of the customs on goods passing to and from the sea-coast. They also received a small allowance in money from Poonah, both on their own account and on account of the killedars and their followers. Both places offered to capitulate on the fall of Belgaum, provided their arrears were paid. I rejected the terms. Bheemghur did not surrender till June; and it was not till the beginning of the present month that Phanghur, having lost all hope of succour, sent me a deputation composed of the acting killedar, and two of his head men, which arrived in camp on the 7th instant. On the 8th they agreed to give up the fort, on the single condition of being permitted to hold their ancient service-lands and fees. This was of course granted, and a karcoon, with a small party of peons, was sent back with them to take possession of the place. It is said that they will break their engagements, and that the inhabitants of the neighbouring jungles are a savage and faithless race, who will never submit to any regular government. I have certainly myself no apprehensions on this head, and am convinced that, if well treated, they will be found just as tractable as the inhabitants of the plains. As far as my own experience goes, I have never yet

found what were usually called the wild tribes of the hills or jungles, to be any wilder than the people of the open country; but they are often more independent. Their petty chiefs are enabled, by the nature of the country, to resist a weak government, and to obtain favourable rents; and when a government which fancies itself stronger, attempts to impose a higher rent or tribute, they resist, and are termed wild and turbulent. There are frequently unfavourable circumstances attending the situation of such districts, which render rents, apparently low, as high as they can easily bear; an attempt is made to raise them still higher, without ascertaining the true state of things, and rebellion follows, which would have been avoided, had care been previously taken to inspire confidence, and to show the inhabitants that no increase would be demanded, unless it could be easily paid.

4. The horsemen thrown out of employment are, no doubt, dissatisfied with the change, but they will not venture to rise; they have no leader; they fear the loss of their property in the villages, and their number is much smaller than is usually supposed. A great part of the horses employed in the Mahratta armies, are the property of men who do not belong to the military profession. Many of the wealthy inhabitants, most of the despandes, dessyes, and other hereditary civil officers of the potails and curnums of villages, and many even of the most substantial rayets, breed horses for the armies. They send them to the field mounted by their own domestics and labourers, and hire them to the jagheerdars or the Government. They are horse-dealers rather than soldiers; and when they find that there is no longer the same demand for horses as formerly, they will breed fewer, and seek employment for their funds in some other branch of trade. Rayets who send one or two horses to the field, do so merely for the purpose of raising money to pay their rents. They are not likely to join in any insurrection, for the cultivation of their land is their chief object, and the advantage which they will derive under our Government from enjoying in tranquillity the produce of their lands, is much greater than what they could ever obtain under the Mahratta dominion, exposed almost every year to the ravages of war. They wish for peace, because no class of men suffer so much as they do from war, when their fields are laid waste by the contending armies. There can therefore be no doubt that they will not only not act against us, but that they will assist in suppressing every hostile attempt in their respective villages.

5. The number of horsemen who depend for their livelihood solely on military service is very small; it probably does not exceed the proportion of one-tenth of the whole horsemen usually employed under the southern jagheerdars. It is too inconsiderable, and the individuals of which it is composed are too unconnected, to give any opposition to our Government. In calculating the causes which may give rise to disturbances, we should also consider the means we have of preventing them. We have in our favour, with the exception of a few disbanded horsemen, and the immediate servants of the late Government, almost the whole body of the people. We have all the trading, manufacturing, and agricultural classes, and we have the potails and curnums of villages, and under them the setbundi, or local militia. With these advantages, if we keep a body of troops in the Carnatic ready for the field, it is scarcely possible that the peace of the country can meet with any serious interruption. The military force stationed in a newly-conquered country should always be a strong one, because, as it then leaves no hope of successful opposition, it deters the disaffected from attempting any thing; and the confidence which this state of security inspires, increases the resources of the country, and amply repays the additional military expense which may be incurred. It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of such a country, that it be so strongly occupied at first, as to be preserved in peace for some years. When this is done, a system of order gradually springs up, which is afterwards easily maintained.

6. The want of regular troops obliged me to raise, during the campaign, from nine to ten thousand peons, and three hundred horse. I disbanded, in the course of the last two months, three thousand four hundred peons. The remainder, about six thousand, may, after a few months, be placed upon lower pay, and be gradually reduced; at present they are distributed among the numerous forts and gurrries with which the country is covered, and from which they cannot be withdrawn until it becomes more settled.

7. A survey of the forts ought to be made by a committee of officers, in order to determine in which of them it will be necessary to keep garrisons of regular troops or peons, and which of them may be left unoccupied. Such forts as cannot be garrisoned ought not to be hastily destroyed. They afford, in time of war, shelter to the inhabitants, who will themselves defend them against horse; and they will always be more useful to us, who

depend chiefly on our infantry, than to an enemy whose strength is in his irregular cavalry.

8. Upon the breaking up of an empire like the Peishwah's, it becomes a measure of necessity, as well as of humanity, to give employment to a portion of the irregular troops of the country, both with the view of preventing them from exciting disturbances, and of enabling them gradually to find some other means of subsistence. Where a choice is left, regulars only ought to be employed, for the sake both of economy and safety. If we compare the number of regulars and irregulars required for any particular service, and consider their respective efficiency for executing it, we shall find that the regulars are not one-half so expensive as the irregulars. The result will be the same whether we take the ordinary local militia, or the irregular corps, disciplined and commanded by an European officer. The expense of equipping corps so disciplined, increases in a greater degree than their efficiency, and they are at least twice as expensive as any regular troops. But there is another reason against the employment of irregulars as a matter of choice: it withdraws a great number of useful hands from the labour of the country. The place of one thousand regulars can hardly be supplied by less than five or six thousand irregulars. The loss of so many additional hands must proportionally diminish the produce of the country.

9. The events of the war have rendered the political settlement of the Southern States easier than it might otherwise have been. The whole of Goklah's jagheers have been resumed. Rastiah's jagheers have shared the same fate, with the exception of the village of Tullikattah, which has been left to him, as it is the residence of a part of his family. The districts of Manowlee and Chickori have been taken from Appah Dessye, and given up to the Rajah of Kolapore; but the Dessye has of course been allowed to keep Nepauni, and also Sirkopah, which he obtained from Purseram Bhow.

10. In transferring Chickori to the Rajah of Kolapore, the three enaum villages which formerly belonged to his vakeel's brother were restored, and four villages were given as a jagheer to the vakeel Bhow Maharay himself. I meant at one time to have given him only two; but, on farther consideration, I thought it as well to satisfy the Bhow, by giving the whole, as the Rajah was as likely to be displeased with the grant in the one case as the other. It is said that the Rajah dislikes and fears

the Bhow. The report has, I suspect, some foundation; for, when I proposed to the Bhow that I should only recommend, and that the Rajah should make the grant, he objected to it.

11. On the arrival of the reserve before Nepauni, Appah Dessye surrendered without delay the whole of the districts of Chickori and Manowlee, excepting twenty-four villages, which having appropriated to the support of his household troops and principal servants, he gave up with great reluctance, after an interval of six weeks spent in evasion. He has now nothing to give up, but something to receive. He is not entitled, from his conduct, to any compensation for the territory transferred to the Kolapore Rajah; but he is entitled, from the assurances given to him, to retain all the remaining part of his jagheer which he held at the breaking out of the war; to recover the part of his jagheer resumed by Raj Row, unless when a promise, as in the case of Purrusghur, has been made to the inhabitants, that they will not again be placed under his authority; and to obtain from the Government of Hyderabad an equivalent for his rights in the Nizam's territories. I have told his vakeels that he must not expect to recover any of these lost rights, unless he previously execute all that has been required of him. He has, from the very beginning of his career, pursued a system of throwing into prison all the rich inhabitants, not only of his own districts, but of every district wherever he obtained a temporary authority, with the view of extorting money from them, and of seizing and keeping in confinement the women most remarkable for their beauty. Many of these unfortunate people had been in prison ten or twelve years, and many had died from cruel treatment every year. While I was in the neighbourhood of Nepauni, I heard of only a few prisoners, whom I ordered to be released. It was not until after I had marched from the place, that I learned that about three hundred still remained in confinement. I wrote to Appah Dessye to release them. He has set many at liberty, but many are still detained; and until the whole are set at liberty, I have directed some of his jagheer villages on the south bank of the Kistna, which were occupied during the war, not to be restored.

12. The peshcush, or rather the rent of the Dessye of Kittoor, never was regularly paid, and seldom without force. It is now converted into a fixed peshcush, and the zemindary erected into a summastanun. The peshcush is fixed at its former amount of Shahpoore rupees 1,75,000, and the honorary dress (tushruf) to

be given yearly by the sirkar to the Dessye, according to custom, at rupees 3,955.

13. The Dessye has paid no peshcush for the last two years. The peshcush for the first of those years has been remitted, on account of some expenses incurred by him during the war, but more on account of his early defection from the Peishwah. The whole of the peshcush for the last year is to be paid by the end of October.

14. Raj Row had assigned to the Dessye and the Putwurdhans, seranjami lands in each other's districts, with the view apparently of causing dissension between them. But neither party obeyed his orders. Both retained what they had before; for this reason, and still more for that of their being ancient possessions of Kittoor, Bhagwaddi-Suptguon and Olkottah are continued to the Dessye.

15. By his sunnud, the Dessye was bound to maintain four hundred and seventy-three horse and one thousand foot. He is now absolved from the keeping up of any contingent, and the district of Khannapoor, and an annual allowance of 25,000 rupees from the sirkar, are resumed, because these constituted the whole of what he actually received for furnishing his contingent, as the gudwal peshcush, estimated at 25,000 rupees, and the lands of Chintamene Row estimated at 68,473 rupees, though calculated as forming a part of the allowance for his contingent, were never given up to him.

16. The Dessye is perfectly satisfied with the present arrangement, and he has cause to be so; for, although his peshcush is not lowered, he is exempted from many private demands by the Peishwah's officers, with which he found it necessary to comply. His country is now freed from the incursions frequently made into it lately by the neighbouring jagheerdars and the Peishwah's troops, and will yield him a greater revenue; and he is secure in the possession of what he has. I have therefore no doubt that he feels the advantages of being under the protection of the British Government, and will endeavour to preserve them.

17. The Putwurdhans are the only great jagheerdars with whom an arrangement has not yet been made; but as they are to receive, and not to give, no difficulty is likely to be met with beyond what may arise from their discussions among themselves respecting their several shares of the additional allowances in money and land which may be granted by Government. I have not stated to their vakeels the amount proposed to be given; but

they are desirous that, whatever it may be, the division should be left to be made among themselves. The Tagaone, Chinchani, and Karnudwar chiefs, from the disposition they showed at an early period to quit the Peishwah, are entitled to a greater proportion than the others, and it will therefore be necessary that we make the distributions, unless they themselves express a desire that it should be made without our interference. Two lacs of rupees will, I think, be sufficient to satisfy all their expectations. This sum will be made up by a remission of the daishmook fees paid to the sirkar, by a transfer of such sirkar villages as are insulated among the lands of the Putwurdhans, and by making over a part of Rastiah's resumed jagheer, on the north bank of the Kistna. The amount of the daishmook is variously estimated from fifteen to forty-five, or fifty thousand rupees. As soon as a correct account of it can be obtained, the lands required to make up the two lacs of rupees will be granted.

18. All the branches of the Putwurdhan family are popular in this country. They treat the inhabitants with great kindness, and their lands are well cultivated. Their attention to their improvement renders them averse to war. Their peaceful habits, the great value of their possessions, the facility with which we might seize them, and the benefits they have derived from their connection with us, hold out the strongest security that they will discourage every attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the country.

19. The remaining jagheerdars of the greatest importance are those of Nergoond and Ramdroog, and the Gerhurroh families of Gujundughur and Madoolah. These jagheers are all personal, and not held by military tenures. The jagheerdars of Ramdroog and Madoolah were however with Raj Row during the war, but were paid as jemadars of horse. The Ramdroog never left the Peishwah after his defeat at Ashti. The Madoolah never came away with Appah Dessye. The Madoolah horse, though few, are esteemed the best in the Carnatic. The Jagheerdar of Nergoond, though allied by marriage to Goklah, and though Goklah's mother and daughter were in his fort, was friendly from the very commencement of hostilities. The brother of the Gujundughur jagheerdar was for some time actually employed against us under Muddun Sing; but he was recalled by the jagheerdar, on my threatening to treat the jagheer as a hostile district. These jagheerdars had nothing to expect from Raj Row: and as they have no wish for military service, they will think themselves fortunate

if left in the quiet enjoyment of their lands. We have no claim upon them either for rent or service; but the Nergoond jagheer-dar had obtained from Goklah some villages, which I have ordered to be resumed.

20. The petty jagheer-dar of Hibly, whose ancestors possessed both Nergoond and Ramdroog, joined us on the breaking out of the war, and will for his services receive an addition to his jagheer of lands yielding a rent of two or three thousand rupees. Eshwunt Row Garpurrah has been put in possession of all his villages except three, which belonging to Chukun, have been transferred with that district to the Rajah of Kolapore. But as Eshwunt Row will be satisfied with getting other villages in the Carnatic of the same value, they will be given up to him. The vakeels of the principal jagheerdars have brought forward claims to official lands and fees, of which they have been deprived by Raj Row. It will be advisable to grant them some lands, not as a matter of right, but of indulgence. The whole will not exceed five or six thousand rupees.

21. The total amount of grants in the Carnatic to jagheerdars and others, for their conduct during the war, will probably be nearly as follows:

To the Putwurdhans	Rs. 200,000
To Eshwunt Row Garpurrah, the Hibly jagheer-dar, and the vakeels of the jagheerdars	30,000
	<hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/>
	Rs. 230,000

I do not reckon the districts given to the Kolapore Rajah, because they have been taken from Nepauni; nor do I include any compensation to Appah Dessye, because he is entitled to none.

22. The jagheerdars may be made to maintain from one-fifth to one-fourth of their nominal contingents during peace, and one-third during war. The number of horses have greatly diminished since the time when the Mahrattas were accustomed to lay all their neighbours under contribution. They will decrease rapidly now, as the demand for them for the purposes of war will in a great measure cease, and in place of them most of the owners will probably rear cattle for husbandry.

23. There was no opportunity during the campaign of acquiring any knowledge of the revenue. Not only the collectors, but the officers of accounts absconded, so that it will still require some months, and probably the whole of the current year, before any

tolerably accurate estimate can be formed of the state of the revenue during the last eight or ten years. We know, however, that it has declined greatly since the succession of Raj Row, from the system of renting and sub-renting, and the frequent disturbances arising from the weakness of the government. The most flourishing period of the revenue during the last fifty years was when the country was under the Mysore dominion. The sum entered in the partition treaty schedules of 1792 is supposed to have been almost one-fourth more than the real amount. The revenue may undoubtedly be again brought to that standard; but it will be necessary to proceed with great caution, and to keep the assessment very moderate for some years.

24. The soil is in general extremely fertile; but as the cultivators are few and poor, the country cannot possibly be improved, unless their rents are low. The settlements should be annual. Every rayet should be at liberty to cultivate as much or as little as he pleases, and should pay only for what he cultivates. The rents of the rayets should be collected by the heads of villages, and be paid by them to the tishildars of the collectors. An agricultural survey of the country should be made, in order to ascertain the better its resources, and to establish a fixed and moderate assessment. But as such a survey, if precipitately undertaken, would cause an alarm that an increase of rent was intended, and thereby diminish cultivation, it would be proper not to begin it for three or four years, when the inhabitants will have acquired more confidence in our forbearance.

25. The coining of money, and the levying of customs on goods passing through the country, by the jagheerdars, are prejudicial to trade, and ought to be abolished whenever the jagheerdars can be prevailed upon to accept a fair compensation for the sacrifice of these rights.

26. The dessyes, potails, and curnums have, in general, considerable enaums. It is better that it should be so, as it establishes a respectable class of landholders and gradations in society between the cultivators and Government; and, as by giving to the heads of villages more influence, it renders them more useful as instruments of internal administration. Some confusion has arisen from revenue officers of one class having, by purchase or violence, obtained the offices and enaums of those of another. The dessye or despundi of a small district is sometimes both potal and curnum of several villages. His right cannot

now be set aside ; but the evil may be corrected by insisting on his employing fit persons to execute the duties, and making them a sufficient allowance.

27. All enaums have already been guaranteed to the owners by proclamation, but many enaums will be found, on examination, to have been given clandestinely by revenue officers without authority. Every one, from the curnum of a village to the sirsoobah of the Carnatic, grants both lands and pensions. The sirsoobah, or his deputy, when he is about to quit his office, fabricates a number of enaum sunnuds ; he gives away some, and sells the rest ; the new sirsoobah resumes some, but continues a part of them. Where such enaums have not, by long possession, become in some degree the fair property of the possessors, they ought to be resumed. I would consider all grants of this kind, since the cession of the Carnatic by Tippoo Sultan in 1792, as resumable ; but the Mysore conquests did not extend beyond the Gulpurrbah ; and the year 1792 can therefore have no particular applicability to the rest of the Carnatic and the districts south of the Kistna. In those countries, I would therefore substitute the year of Nana Furnavee's removal from power, or of Raj Row's accession, because there has since been no regular control over the disposal of the sirkar's property.

28. It would be advisable that no zillah court should be introduced for some years. The collector ought, in the mean time, to act as judge and magistrate, and the tishildars of districts, and heads of villages under his superintendance, to manage the police, and exercise judicial authority in petty suits within their respective circuits.

29. The collector should have under him two subordinate collectors, one at Bijapoor, or Shulapoor, and the other at Haveri or Ranie Bednoor. The collector should, as usual in such cases, be called the principal collector, as it serves to give him more weight in the eyes of the natives.

30. I am convinced, from long experience, that the system of management by principal and subordinate collectors is the best calculated for an extensive collectorate, particularly where the territory is a recent acquisition, and requires much investigation ; and that it is also the best adapted for producing a succession of efficient collectors. A subordinate collectorship is the best of all schools for acquiring revenue knowledge. The subordinate collector has all the practice of his principal in revenue details ; and

being exempted from all public correspondence and duties of a general nature, he has more time to examine and understand them thoroughly.

31. With the exception of the small tract south of the Wurdah, the other districts fell into my hands during the progress of the war. The enemy in all had collected more or less of the revenue of the year, and in some which were last occupied, the whole, so that in such districts a considerable expense was incurred for an establishment of revenue officers and irregular troops, without any returns. The tishildars and their irregulars were sometimes driven out of a district, after having obtained possession of it, and every district was too much disturbed to admit of any jum-mabundi, or regular settlement of the revenue, being made. The collections, or rather contributions, were carrying on both by the enemy and us at the same time, and in the same districts. I looked to the collections merely as the means of facilitating our military operations, by lessening the resources of the enemy, and increasing our own. Whatever was got in the struggle was so much gained from the enemy, and might be regarded rather as captured property than as revenue. Under all these disadvantages, enough was realized to defray the charges of all the civil establishments of a body of three hundred horse, and of a body of peons amounting at one time to nearly ten thousand, and to leave a balance in the treasury on the 8th instant, of star pagodas 52, 65, 32, 444; so that the campaign in the Carnatic may be said to have been carried on without any expense to Government.

32. The preparation of the English revenue accounts has been hitherto delayed by the death of the English writer brought from Madras; but they are now nearly finished, and will be forwarded to you in a few days by Mr. Chaplin. I have, &c.

V.

MAXIMS, SUGGESTIONS, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES, COLLECTED
FROM THE VARIOUS WRITINGS OF SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

KEEP your temper.

Be slow to take, and never give offence in official correspondence or communications ; and abstain even from the use of expressions which, though not generally calculated to give offence, may yet be taken offensively.

When a question is once decided, whatever difference of opinion may have existed upon it among those whose duty it was to consider it, discussion should at once give way to co-operation.

There is no use, but much unnecessary trouble, in disputing a question where the argument you favour is at all doubtful, and not clear.

Write down a thought when it occurs to you.

A public man should give up his situation when he finds that he is no longer capable of performing the duties of it efficiently.

Government ought to be extremely cautious in passing censure on appeals from its subordinate officers, because, as almost every appeal must be against the decision either of the Commander-in-chief or of Government, it would evidently tend to prevent the complaints of individuals for real or imaginary grievances from reaching the superior authority at home.

Do what is right ; never mind clamour,

Temper and perseverance in a right course must always insure success.

Improvement in civil affairs must always proceed slowly ; more particularly where much is to be undone that ought never to have been done.

Many measures of Government ought only to be adopted as you have servants properly qualified to carry them into effect ; to

attempt them without, is only to create confusion and useless expense.

A public man should have no motive but the good of his Government and his own reputation, which are inseparably connected.

What India wants most is a free export of her produce to England, as is permitted from England to India. Admission to all our silks and coloured goods, &c. on moderate duties.

If you want discipline, you must support the respectability of commandants of corps ; this, more than any thing, is wanting.

All armies, but more particularly mercenary armies, such as we have in India, require something like service to keep up their attention when, for any length of time, we have no war. The best thing is distant marches to and from a foreign territory.

A Governor should always be a man who will maintain the system prescribed by the Court of Directors.

You do great injustice to a Governor if you give him counsellors adverse to the system he is enjoined to follow, as well as great injustice to the Company and their subjects.

In recommending new systems, people are too apt to think that mankind are mere pieces of machinery, on which it is perfectly harmless to make experiments every day.

When we are actually at war, it is not the business of a subordinate government to ask questions about the origin or justice of it ; but to use every exertion to enable the superior government to get out of the war as well as possible.

Of our troops, one to five, or even ten, of the enemy is enough.

Government loses all its dignity when a bankrupt is employed to rule over his creditors.

Nothing is more unphilosophical, and, what is of more consequence, more imprudent, than to show a slight to any person

however humble his capacity. There is hardly any one who ever forgives it. True philosophy consists, not so much in despising the talents or wealth of other men, as in bearing our own fortune, whatever it may be, with an unaltered mind.

It is always dangerous, and often fatal, to have a force barely sufficient to maintain ourselves in a hostile country, more particularly in a country like Ava, the powers and resources of which we are so ignorant of. The best chance of peace, under such circumstances, is never to trust to appearances, but to consider war as likely to last, to make preparations accordingly, and to engage in it with our whole disposable force. Nothing is so expensive as war carried on with inadequate means. It entails all the expense, without the advantages of war.

If we wait till we hear of the wants of an army, and then only prepare to meet them, the aid may come too late; such wants should be anticipated as far as possible.

There is no time when it is more essentially necessary an army should be strong, than at the very moment when its commander is treating for peace.

Troops will always make allowances for any hardships imposed on them by the exigency of the public service, if proper attention is paid to their comfort and feeling.

An extensive country and scanty population are usually great obstacles to invasion, and more so to conquest.

An enemy should always be made to fear the worst.

No theoretical improvement should make us abandon what is supported by experience.

Any alteration in the rates of exchange at which troops are paid, is a thing desirable at all times to be avoided. It should not even be brought into discussion, especially when the rate at which the coin is paid is already above its value, and when the object is to raise it still higher.

Every thing is possible to a sound and persevering Government.

All the writing in the world will not put people right who do not know, or cannot or will not learn, how to go about a thing.

The way to make our administration efficient is to simplify it,—to employ our European and Native servants on those duties for which they are respectively best adapted. Employ all civil servants *at first* in the revenue line, not merely to teach them revenue business, but because they will see the natives under their best form, as industrious and intelligent husbandmen and manufacturers—will become acquainted with their habits, manners, and wants, and lose their prejudices against them—will become attached to, and feel a desire to befriend and protect them ; and this knowledge and feeling will adhere to them ever after, and be most useful to them and the natives during the rest of their lives.

VI.

MINUTE ON THE CONDUCT OF EUROPEAN FUNCTIONARIES TOWARDS THE NATIVES.

THE unfortunate riot at Masulipatam on the 29th of May, in which three persons lost their lives, seems to have arisen from one of those disputes about ceremonies, which are so common between the right and left-hand castes. The great population of Masulipatam renders it peculiarly liable to such disturbances ; and the well-known zeal of the collector has led him to adopt measures for their prevention ; but I fear that they will not have the desired effect, and that, if sanctioned, they would rather augment than mitigate the evil. His proposition is, that all differences respecting processions and other ceremonies should be decided by the courts of law, and that, in the mean time, he should support the party whose claim seems consistent with natural right. He observes, that the beating of tomtoms, riding in a palanquin, and erecting a pandal, are privileges which hurt nobody, and naturally belong to every person who can afford to pay for them. This is very true ; but it is also equally true, that things equally harmless in themselves have, in all ages and in all nations, and in our own as well as in others, frequently excited

the most obstinate and sanguinary contests. The alteration of a mere form or symbol of no importance, has as often produced these effects, as an attack on the fundamental principles of national faith. It would therefore be extremely imprudent to use the authority of Government in supporting the performance of ceremonies which we know are likely to be opposed by a large body of the natives.

On all such occasions, it would be most advisable, that the officers of Government should take no part, but confine themselves entirely to the preservation of the public peace, which will in almost every case be more likely to be secured by discouraging, rather than by promoting, disputed claims to the right of using palanquins, flags, and other marks of distinction, during the celebration of certain ceremonies.

The magistrate seems to think, that because a decision of the zillah court put a stop to the opposition given to a caste of Brahmins in having the Vadookhan rites performed in their houses in the language of the Vedahs, it would have the same efficacy in stopping the opposition to marriage processions; but the cases are certainly different. The Banians have the sanction of the Shasters for the use of the Vadookhan rites in their families; the ceremony is private, and the opposition is only by a few Brahmins. But in the case of the marriage procession, there is no sanction of the Shasters; the ceremony is public, and lasts for days together; and the opposition is by the whole of the right-hand castes against the whole of the left-hand castes, and brings every Hindoo into the conflict.

The result of the magistrate's experiment ought to make us avoid the repetition of it. We find from his own statement, that the mischief was occasioned by his wish to restore the caste of goldsmiths to the right of riding in a palanquin, which he considered to belong to every man who chose to pay for it. He annulled a former order against it, in consequence of the complaint of the writer of the zillah court, that he was hindered by it from performing his son's marriage in a manner suitable to his rank; and as he did not apprehend any disturbances, he left Masulipatam before the ceremony took place. The assistant magistrate however, two days before its commencement, received information that opposition was intended.

He did whatever could be done to preserve the peace of the town, but to no purpose. He issued a proclamation; stationed the police in the streets to prevent riot; reinforced these with

revenue peons, and desired the officer commanding the troops to keep them in readiness within their lines. But, in spite of all these precautions, a serious affray, as might have been expected, occurs, in which property is plundered, and lives are lost; and all this array of civil and military power, and all this tumult, arise solely from its being thought necessary that a writer of the court should have a palanquin at the celebration of a marriage. Had the writer not looked for the support of the magistrate, he would undoubtedly not have ventured to go in procession, and no disturbance would have happened.

The magistrate states, that this writer had gone about for many years in a palanquin without hindrance; but this is not the point in dispute:—it is not his using a palanquin in his ordinary business, but in going in procession:—it is this which constitutes the triumph of one party and the defeat of the other, and which, whilst such opinions are entertained by the natives, will always produce affrays. The magistrate supposes that the opposition was not justified by the custom of the country, because it was notorious that, in many places of the same district, the goldsmith castes went in procession in palanquins. This is very likely, but it does not affect the question, which relates solely to what is the custom of the town of Masulipatam, not to what that of other places is.

It is not uncommon for a caste to have a privilege in one place, which it has not in another. In a small village, where there are but few persons of the opposite caste, it goes in procession in a manner which it could not do in a great town, where the numbers are more equally balanced. The magistrate has not shown that the goldsmiths had in the town of Masulipatam the privilege which they claim: had it existed, he could have had no difficulty in finding the proof of it among the Mohammedan population, or even among the Brahmins, who, in general, have no interest in the disputes of the right and left-hand castes. We may infer, not only from the magistrate having stated no precedent, but also from the unwillingness of the revenue and police servants to take an active part, or even to give information, that the claim of the goldsmiths was unfounded.

The assistant-magistrate remarks, that the police servants concived at the conduct of the rioters; but that the sepoy, though they might be supposed to act under the influence of the same prejudices, showed no improper bias.

We are not however to conclude, from the conduct of the sepoys, that they were less inclined to the cause of the rioters than the police. Sepoys are often led, by the habit of military discipline, to act in opposition to their prejudices; but nothing can be more dangerous than to expose their fidelity to such a trial, and it ought never to be done unless in cases of the utmost necessity.

It would be desirable that the customs of the castes connected with their public ceremonies should be the same every where, and that differences respecting them should be settled by decisions of the courts; but as this is impossible while their prejudices remain, we ought, in the mean time, to follow the course most likely to prevent disorder and outrage.

The conflicts of the castes are usually most serious and most frequent when one party or the other expects the support of the officers of Government. They are usually occasioned by supporting some innovation respecting ceremonies, but rarely by preventing it. The magistrate ought therefore to give no aid whatever to any persons desirous of celebrating marriages, or other festivals or public ceremonies, in any way not usual in the place, but rather to discountenance innovation. He ought, in all disputes between the castes, to take no part beyond what may be necessary in order to preserve the peace; and he ought to punish the rioters on both sides, in cases of affray, for breach of the peace; and, on the whole, to conduct himself in such a manner as to make it evident to the people that he favours the pretensions of neither side, but looks only to the maintenance of the peace.

I recommend that instructions in conformity to these suggestions be sent to the magistrates for their guidance.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

3rd July, 1820.

VII.

MINUTE AND OPINION ON SUPPOSED ERRONEOUS PROCEEDINGS
AND DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT AT MADRAS RELATIVE
TO A JAGHEER.

I INSERT the following admirable remarks on a decision by the Chief Justice of Madras, because they convey the most accurate definition which I have any where met of the peculiar tenures by which lands are held in India. I have taken no notice of this subject in the MEMOIR, because it is in no necessary degree mixed up with the narrative of Sir Thomas Munro's public or private life.

In Consultation, 15th March 1822.

IN 1783, Asim Khan, Dewan of the Nabob Walajah, obtained a jagheer, which was confirmed to him by a perwannah, dated 29th July 1789, by way of "an Altamgha Enaum" of the Kamil Jumma of sixty-four thousand chuchrums, eleven anas. The grant is in the usual form,—“to be enjoyed by him and his descendants for ever, from generation to generation.” He is authorized to divide it among his descendants; and the local officers are required to consider the perwannah “as a most positive peremptory mandate, and not to require a fresh sunnud every year.”

The terms employed in such documents, “for ever,” “from generation to generation,” or in Hindoo grants, “while the sun and moon endure,” are mere forms of expression, and are never supposed, either by the donor or the receiver, to convey the durability which they imply, or any beyond the will of the sovereign. The injunction with which they usually conclude—“Let them not require a fresh sunnud every year,” indicates plainly enough the opinion, that such grants were not secure from revocation.

This very grant to Asim Khan was resumed on the death of Walajah, by his son Amdut ul Omra, but renewed, by a fresh perwannah, dated the 30th of August 1797. On the assumption of the Carnatic by the Company, it was again resumed, with other jagheers and enaums, for investigation, on a change of Government, according to the usage of the country on such occasions. Soon after this event, and while the jagheer was under resumption, Asim Khan died, in October 1801. He left several children, for all of whom he made a liberal provision by his will,

written in the September preceding his death ; but he left the bulk of his fortune to his eldest son, Kullum Oolla Khan, whom he constituted guardian to his younger children. He said nothing of the jagheer in his will, because he was too well acquainted with the usage of India to believe that he had any permanent proprietary right in it ; because he was aware that these grants were revocable. Although, therefore, he knew that he could not claim the jagheer as a right, he wrote a letter to Government, stating that he had held it by the favour of the Nabobs Walajah and Amdut, and trusting that it would be continued by the favour of the Company. Lord Clive answered his letter, and assured him that attention would be paid to his high character ; and in his minute of the 28th of May 1802, recommended that, in conformity with the resolutions of Government in 1790, all the country jagheers then current should be restored ; and as the jagheer of Asim Khan was one of them, it was restored to his eldest son, Kullum Oolla Khan ; but the grant was not for ever ; and the revenues arising from salt, saltpetre, and the customs, were expressly excepted ; and as it was submitted to the Court of Directors, and sanctioned by them, it might have been expected that it would not be shaken by any authority in this country. This expectation, however, has been disappointed by the proceedings in the Supreme Court. The brothers of Kullum Oolla Khan, instigated by certain Europeans, endeavoured to set aside their father's will, on the ground of insanity ; but the will was established in Court, in 1813. They succeeded afterwards in establishing their claim to the personal property, according to the shares prescribed by the Mohammedan law ; but the Court twice gave a decision against their claim to a share of the jagheer. They soon after filed a new bill, in which the Company were made defendants, as well as Kullum Oolla Khan, and in which they prayed that he might be compelled to account for the revenues of the jagheer, and the Company to issue a new grant to all the brothers and sisters jointly. The Company told their law officer that they had no interest in the suit, and that it ought to be prosecuted between the parties interested. But the objection was overruled by the Court, on the ground that the Company had an interest in the matter ; and the cause was tried ; but before judgment was passed, the Advocate-General, conceiving that the case was not well understood, proposed that fresh evidence should be taken on two points : first, as to the nature of the interest conveyed by jagheer grants ; and, second, as to the usage of

Native Governments in the resumption of such grants. This application was refused, and judgment passed against the defendants on the 22nd of May 1820.

The court decreed, that the perwannahs granted by Walajah and Amdut ul Omrah are "good, valid, and subsisting perwannahs; and that the same are, and were, and have been in force since the resumption of the civil and military authority of the Carnatic by the defendants:" That the complainants "are entitled to their several and respective shares of the jagheer lands and villages;" and also to "like shares of the rents, issues, and profits of such jagheer lands and villages." And it is also ordered, "that the said defendant, Kullum Oolla Khan, do account, before the Master of this Court, touching the said jagheer lands and villages, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof," from the death of Asim Khan. And it is farther declared, that the "said Kullum Oolla Khan hath been, during all the time aforesaid, and now is, a trustee of the said jagheer lands and villages, and of the rents, issues, profits, and revenues thereof, for the benefit of the complainants, to the extent of their respective shares and interest in the same, according to the Mohammedan law of succession."

The arrears of rent decreed by the Court amounted to the enormous sum of eleven lacs of pagodas, being the balance found by the Master, according to his report of the 27th March. This balance was found in the absence of Kullum Oolla Khan, who, on finding himself involved in utter ruin, had fled to Pondicherry; and the report of the Master regarding it was confirmed by the Court on the 5th of April last. Previously to the confirmation of that report, an application, on the part of the plaintiffs, was made to the Court, for the appointment of a receiver of this jagheer, which the Advocate-General resisted on two grounds;—1st, "That the jagheer being out of the jurisdiction of the Court, and the defendant having then quitted it, the Court had no authority to make such an order, the charter having restricted the Court's jurisdiction over the Natives to such only as are inhabitants of Madras and its limits;"—and 2ndly, "That even if the Court had, generally speaking, such authority, yet it did not extend to this case, on account of the specific nature and incidents of the property in question involving the sirkar's share of the produce, and consequently, the collection of the revenue, from the intermeddling with which the Supreme Court is, by the charter, specially interdicted." Both these objections were overruled by the Court:—the first, "because the defendant, having been ori-

ginally amenable, and having submitted to the jurisdiction, the Court had a right, by its process, to act upon the property any where within the Company's territories :”—and the second, “because the Government having assigned to the defendant the jagheer, it could no longer be regarded as public revenue, but was subject to the same process as any other property of the defendant :” and an order was made for the receiver. But on the Advocate-General urging the inconvenience which would result from an order so unprecedented, and intimating that there would be an appeal from the decree ; it was agreed by the parties, on the recommendation of the Court, that, in place of the aforesaid receiver, the collector of the district should be substituted, and should, under the orders of Government, collect the profits of the jagheer lands, pay them into “ the public treasury, with the privity of the Accountant-General of this Court, to the credit of this cause, and subject to the farther order of this Court.” This course was acceded to by Government, for no other reason but that of its being the only one by which discussion with the Supreme Court could be obviated ; and the Advocate-General was directed to take immediate measures for appealing the suit to England. Though Government has therefore already done all that it can do, I ought not, I think, to let so extraordinary a decision pass, without stating, individually, my own sentiments upon it.

The case, on the side of the Company, has been so ably argued by the Advocate-General, and the long and able minute of Mr. Thackeray has so fully explained the grounds on which the right of the Company rests in this case, that no room is left for me to add any thing material to what has been already adduced ; and I must therefore content myself with noticing the main arguments on which the Chief Justice founded his decision, and with stating those ancient usages of the country of which long experience has given me some knowledge, and by which I am led to regard his opinion as erroneous.

The Supreme Court are, by their charter, expressly prohibited from taking cognizance of any matters relating to the public revenue ; but, in the present instance, they get over this difficulty by saying, that the revenue of the jagheer having been assigned to Asim Khan, was no longer revenue, but private property, subject to the same laws which regulate private inheritance. If this doctrine were admitted, it would lead to the most dangerous consequences ; for it would enable the Court to entertain suits

against the Company in all cases of jagheer, enaum, or other grants of public revenue, wherever situated, on the plea that, having been granted, it is no longer public revenue. As all the Native religious establishments, and municipal servants throughout the country, are maintained by grants of land, the Supreme Court might gradually extend their jurisdiction over them, destroy their respect for the authority of Government, and throw the affairs of the country into confusion. Were the Court once to begin to receive suits respecting lands assigned for the maintenance of public servants, it would be impossible for Government to realize the revenue, or to maintain good order in the country. It may be said, that the Court is not likely to interfere in such matters, but of this we can have no assurance at present; for, but a few years ago, its interference in the jagheer of Kullum Oolla Khan, above a hundred miles from the limits of its jurisdiction, was regarded as at least equally improbable. There will never be wanting men whose interest it will be to bring into Court, at all hazards, the jagheers and enaums allotted to the civil and religious establishments of the country; and as the Court will judge for itself in determining whether these lands do or do not come under the description of what is meant as revenue by the charter, I own that I see no hope, after what has passed, of their being regarded as any thing else than mere private property. The only effectual way in which the Government would be secured from the mischievous effects of the Court's extending their interference to public revenue, assigned, in the form of services and charity, for the maintenance of various establishments, would be by restraining the Court from taking cognizance of any suit, respecting any land whatever, situated beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.

It is manifest, from the observations made by the Chief Justice in the course of the trial, that the notions of the Court regarding public and private lands in India, are very vague, and that it must therefore be continually liable to exceed the bounds prescribed to its authority in the charter, by mistaking public revenue for private landed property. The Chief Justice says, "That it does not appear that it was not part of the private possessions of the Crown:" he thinks that the grant to Kullum Oolla Khan is not revenue, because Lord Clive "excepts the sayer, salt, and saltpetre, which are revenue." He supposes that a private property in the land is granted, from the expressions used by the Chief Secretary, "deliver over these lands;" and in

Walajah's grant, "put him in possession of the pergunnah." It is well known that the usual meaning of these terms is nothing more than that the deshmooks, deshpendies, and other public officers, shall make over the management of the village, or pergunnah, to the jagheerदार, and pay him the public revenue. The sunnud says nothing of private revenue; it states clearly, that what is granted is public revenue, estimated according to the kamil jumma, or perfect, or standard assessment, at sixty-four thousand six hundred and three chuchrums and eleven annas. Grants of land usually contain a clause saving all private rights; and when it is not inserted, it is always understood that no private, but only public rights are transferred by the grant. It seems strange that the Chief Justice, after reading the sunnud, should have had any doubt as to what was granted being revenue.

He seems to have been uncertain throughout, and sometimes to have thought that it was public revenue, and sometimes that it was not; and to have given his decision, in a cause of the highest importance, both from the magnitude of the property and the political consequences which it involved, without having any very distinct idea of the nature of the property on which he was deciding. But it is not surprising that an English judge should have believed that grants of land by the sovereign must be grants of crown-lands. It is easy however to show that they are not so in India; and it would have been better perhaps if the Advocate-General had more fully explained in what the difference consists. It might have been shown in a very few words; and by defining the nature of the thing granted, the question of right will be more easily understood. If we suppose the gross produce of the lands of any village of a pergunnah to be one hundred—

That of this amount the expense of cultivation is	40
The landlord's rent or share	20
The Government revenue or share	40
	100

If this village, or pergunnah, be granted as a jagheer, it is the forty only, composing the Government revenue or share, which is granted. The twenty, forming the landlord's rent, is not granted, but remains, as before, in the hands of the owner, as also the forty, making the expense of cultivation, as he must defray it. If the jagheer be resumed, the property of the landlord is not affected by the change: it is the forty only, composing

the Government revenue or share, which is affected by the resumption. It is paid to the Government instead of the jagheer-dar, in the same manner as it was before the grant. The jagheer-dar ceases to have any interest in the village or pergunnah, because he never had any property in the land, but merely in the revenue, which is now resumed. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that wherever private proprietary right in land exists, whatever is granted by Government must be public revenue only; and that as the grants to Kullum Oolla are of lands in the Carnatic, where all lands are the hereditary private property of the inhabitants, the thing granted is public revenue only in the share which the proprietors paid to Government; and that there is not the smallest foundation for the supposition of the Chief Justice, that a proprietary right in the land itself, or any private property of the sovereign, was conveyed by the grant.

In stating the landlord's share at 20 per cent. of the gross produce, I have done so merely for the sake of illustration. It is in some provinces higher, and in others much lower, and in some so low as not to be distinguishable from the charges of cultivation.

The jagheer sunnud conveys the rights of Government, whatever they are, and no more. These rights vary in different parts of the country. Wherever the lands are held, as in the Carnatic, by rayets having an hereditary proprietary right in the whole lands of the village, they are limited to the public revenue, or Government share of the produce, and do not give a foot of land. In some provinces of India, where the lands are held by rayets having an hereditary right to the lands in cultivation, but not to the waste, the jagheer sunnud gives the government revenue, or share of the produce only, in the cultivated lands; but in the waste it gives the proprietary right in the land, whatever it may be, by the custom of the country. When such a jagheer is resumed, no private rent is affected by the resumption. The ancient hereditary rayets pay the public revenue of their lands to Government, in place of the jagheer-dar, and the jagheer-dar himself pays the public revenue of the waste-lands which he may have brought into cultivation; and if he agree to this condition, he retains possession of them with the same proprietary right as the other landowners, or rayets of the district. It is obvious, therefore, that though in rare cases of unclaimed, or waste-lands, Government may confer a private proprietary right, it never resumes it, and that there is no foundation for the opinion, that resumption is an unjust violation of private property, since the thing resumed is always public revenue, never the landlord's rent.

This long explanation respecting Indian grants will appear unnecessary to those who are conversant with the subject ; but as the Chief Justice certainly never understood clearly what was the precise nature of the thing granted, and as the main part of his argument rests upon its having been private property, it became indispensably requisite to show at the outset that it was not private property, but exclusively public revenue.

As the thing granted was public revenue, and as the grant itself was a political act of the Company in their sovereign capacity, the cognizance of it was, on both grounds, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court ; but the Court has set the Company's grant aside, and decreed that the perwannah of Walajah to Asim Khan is a "good and subsisting grant." If it is a good and subsisting grant, it ought to be so wholly, and not partially. It ought to be good for the salt and customs, as well as for the land. The decree of the Court has altered the nature of the grant altogether. It ought to have confirmed either the grant of the Company or the Nabob. It has done neither. It has set aside the Company's grant, but has not restored the Nabob's. It has given to the parties the land, but not the salt and customs ; and as the Chief Justice says that this is because these articles are revenue, we may infer that his decree is founded on the belief that private property only, and not revenue, was granted with the land. It may likewise be observed, that the decree has deviated in another point from the Nabob's grant. By that grant it is required that a division of the jagheer shall be made, whenever Asim Khan requires it. To make the division, or not, is left optional with him. But he never made it, and most probably never intended it ; for he makes no mention of any such design in his address to Lord Clive ; and his whole conduct towards Kullum Oolla Khan, as well as his last will, leaves no doubt that he wished, after allowing a moderate provision for the other children, the rest of his property should go undivided to his eldest son, as the only way in which the rank and character of his family would be preserved.

All the circumstances connected with the grant of Walajah, as well as with that of the Company, show that they were of a political nature, and not property cognizable by the Court. The grant of Walajah to Asim Khan was a grant by the Sovereign of the Carnatic to his minister, as a reward for his long and faithful political services. When the Company succeeded to the government of the Carnatic, they granted the jagheer of Asim Khan to his son Kullum Oollah Khan ; but, in so doing, they acted in their political capacity, in concurrence with the Nabob ; and a

little attention to some of the articles of the treaty of 1801 will show, that the regulating not only of Kullum Oolla's jagheer, but of all the other jagheers, was a measure of state independent of the jurisdiction of every municipal court.

By the first article, "The Nabob Asim ul Doulah Behader is formally established in the state and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors."

By the third article, the Company "charges itself with the maintenance and support of the military force necessary for the defence of the Carnatic, and for the protection of the rights, person, and property of the said Nabob; and the said Nabob stipulates that he will not enter upon any negotiation or correspondence with any European or Native power," &c.

By this, the Nabob does not relinquish his sovereignty: he merely renews the article of former treaties, by which he engaged not to correspond with foreign states without the consent of the Company.

By the fifth article, one-fifth part of the net revenue of the Carnatic is allowed for "the maintenance and support of the said Nabob."

The fifth part is his claim as sovereign of the whole Carnatic. It is the revenue which remains, after providing for the civil and military charges, and is probably as large a clear revenue as was received by any of his ancestors.

By the sixth article, the one-fifth is to be calculated after deducting, first, "all charges of collection;" second, "the amount of the jagheer lands stated in the ninth article of the treaty of 1787, at pagodas 2,13,421, and the same sum of pagodas 6,21,105, appropriable to the liquidation of the debts of the late Mahomed Ally."

By the ninth article, the Company engages "to take into consideration the actual situation of the principal officers of his late Highness's Government." It charges itself with the expense of a suitable provision for their maintenance, to be distributed with the knowledge of the said Nabob, in such manner as shall be judged proper.

By this article, it appears that the Company, in conjunction with the Nabob, may regulate the provision for the officers as it thinks proper. And by the second separate article it is stipulated, "that it shall not be incumbent on the Honourable Company to appropriate lands yielding a revenue to the said amount of pagodas 2,13,421; but that the said Company shall be at

liberty to exercise its discretion on the mode, and in the extent, of the provision to be made."

By the tenth article, the rank of the Nabob as a Prince, and as an ally of the British Government, is declared. No change in the political situation of the Nabob has taken place since 1801. He is still Prince of the Carnatic, and he is a party to the treaty by which one-fifth of the net revenue is secured to him. Without a breach of the treaty, we cannot, except with his consent, alter any of the articles. By one of these articles we are bound to provide for the dependents of the Nabob, and among them, for Kullum Oolla Khan. The Nabob concurred in the provision made for him. If we take it away without the Nabob's consent, it is a breach of the treaty, which is cognizable by the Government at home, but not by the Supreme Court here. The question is not one of private right between two brothers, as maintained by the Chief Justice, but one of state policy, whether a public grant, confirmed by treaty, shall or shall not be set aside by a municipal court. If the Court has jurisdiction in any jagheer included in an article of a treaty, it must have it equally with regard to all the other jagheers; and if it can alter any provisions of an article, it may, on the same principle, set aside the whole treaty.

I doubt whether the Supreme Court can legally exercise jurisdiction in the Carnatic, even in cases of private property. Had the Nabob retained the civil administration, it certainly could not have done so, neither could it have done so under a temporary assumption similar to what has occurred at former periods. The present assumption of the country is more permanent; but the relative situations of the Company and the Nabob are the same as in former cases of assumption. The Nabob is still Prince of the Carnatic,—receives in that capacity one-fifth of the net revenue, and has a right to object to any measure which, by the increase of grants or otherwise, may tend to a diminution of his dues. But if the Company, with the concurrence of the Nabob, were to resume a grant of land or money, and if the Court were to consider the grant as private property, and secure against the resumption, it is obvious that the revenue of the Nabob would be injured thereby. There are many other cases in which the decrees of the Court might be at variance with the rights of the Nabob; and whatever therefore may be thought of the expediency of the Supreme Court's having jurisdiction in the Carnatic, in matters of private property, where the claim is against the

Government, or any of its officers, it would be advisable that it should have none in matters of private property, where the Nabob and the Company have a common interest.

The Chief Justice denies the sovereignty of the Company, and considers the words of Lord Thurlow as a clear authority against their being regarded as a sovereign power, except in the case of dispute with a sovereign relative to peace and war with Pagan states. Whether the Company have or have not either an independent or delegated sovereignty, in the technical sense that the Chief Justice or Lord Thurlow may have affixed to the expression, is of little consequence; for, though the sovereignty be reserved to the Crown, all the powers of the State, by the present constitution of things, as far as regards the Natives of the country, are exercised by the Company. They make peace and war—raise and maintain armies—have articles of war for enforcing their discipline—acquire and cede territories—impose and collect taxes, and make laws, founded on ancient usage, for the administration of the affairs of the country. The Chief Justice, after arguing that the Company can act as sovereign only in the two points of making war and peace, admits that the Nabobs exercised absolute and uncontrolled authority, and that the Company “have the same rights as the Nabobs of the Carnatic.” He says, “If the Advocate-General can make out that the Amdut’s son would have had a right to resume the grant made by his father and grandfather, I admit the Company has the same right; and this, after all, seems the great point in the case.” It is unquestionably the main point at issue between the parties; but the Chief Justice has decided that the Amdut’s son could not resume the jagheer of Asim Khan, and of course that the Company could not resume it, either from the reason of the thing, or by the customs and usages of the country, or by the Mohammedan law.

What the Chief Justice says of the Kings of England not having the power of resuming grants, has no analogy to the present case. The Kings of England durst not, could not resume these grants. They would have been opposed by their barons and churchmen, who chiefly enjoyed them. The Kings of England gave up private landed property; but this did not affect the public revenue. These Crown grants were not, like Indian grants, exempted from contribution to the public revenue. Though lost to the king as private property, they contributed, like other lands, to the national revenue. The land revenue in

India is what the excise and customs are in England,—the main source of revenue, and cannot be permanently alienated with safety to the state. The Kings of England never could alienate the public revenue in perpetuity, nor could any government do so. No government can debar its successors from the use of the public revenue. The existing government must always have the power of calling it forth, for the preservation and defence of the state. In India there is no assembly or public body between the prince and the people, to regulate the rate or the amount of the taxation or revenue. The sovereign himself is the only authority by which revenue is levied and disbursed, and by which it is granted or resumed. The power to resume as well as to grant must be lodged somewhere; and in India, where there is no other authority, it is obvious that it must be vested in the Prince. But this is denied, because opinions are drawn from European institutions, and strained analogies are found, where none exist, between the usages of India and Europe. And hence the Chief Justice observes, that “ he cannot see how any argument can be derived from the particular situation of the Nabob of the Carnatic, which shall, on general reasoning, deprive him of the same right to alienate the revenues of the state, as was actually enjoyed by the Kings and Queens of England.” This is not a correct view of the case. The Kings of England could not alienate the great sources of public revenue in perpetuity. They could alienate their crown-lands, but not the public revenue upon them. But the alienation by the Nabob is that of the whole of the public revenue of extensive districts. The alienation in England was merely a transfer of the crown-lands to private individuals, to be liable to all the public taxes. The alienation by the Indian Prince was a transfer from the state, of all public taxes on land, to individuals as private property. The Chief Justice does not appear to have perceived the distinction in the nature of English and Indian grants; for, in speaking of the grant to Asim Khan, he says, “ It ought to appear that it was properly belonging to the public, or, at least, that it was not part of the private possessions of the Crown.” It has already been shown, that all grants of jagheers in India, are grants of public revenue. They cannot indeed be otherwise, because there are no crown-lands. The Chief Justice is evidently acting all along under the influence of English analogies, and endeavouring to find a resemblance in things which have not the remotest connection. He thinks, that because the sovereigns of Europe, under the feudal system, pos-

sessed extensive crown-lands, the sovereigns of India must, from their being more despotic, have had still more extensive private dominions; but nothing can be more unfounded than such an opinion. Crown-lands, according to the English acceptation of the term, are unknown in India. The most powerful monarchs had none; neither Akhbar nor Aurungzebe had any; and the despotism of the sovereign was itself the very cause of their being none, because, by giving him unlimited control over all land throughout the empire, it rendered the aid of any private domain altogether unnecessary. A small part of the public revenue arose from customs; the rest, about nine-tenths of the whole, from the land revenue or tax. All land was assessed to the public revenue; a part of the land was allotted to religious and charitable purposes, and to municipal institutions, and the public revenue of such lands was enjoyed by the incumbents. But the public revenue of all other land came to the royal treasury, unless when assignments of particular villages or districts were made to civil and military officers for their personal allowances, and the pay of their respective establishments; all which assignments, however varied, ceased at the will of the sovereign. As there was no public body, no class of nobles or clergy, which had any right to interfere in the settlement of the land-tax; as this power was vested in the Sovereign alone, and as he could raise or lower the tax as he saw proper; and as the whole produce was at his disposal, it is manifest that he could derive no advantage, and therefore have no motive for holding, as "private possessions of the Crown," any lands apart from the general mass of the sirkar or Government lands of the empire; and it is also obvious, that whenever he granted land rent-free, he granted the public revenue.

The Chief Justice says, that if we are to argue from the reason of the thing, we may have recourse to the history of our own country, where he shows, that it was declared by the twelve judges, as late as the time of King William, that "it was the ancient and undoubted right of the Crown to alienate its hereditary estates;" and he hence infers, that the Nabob of the Carnatic must have the same right. This argument would be very just if the estates alienated in England and the Carnatic were of the same nature; but as they are totally different, it is not at all applicable. The King of England might, without injury to the nation, alienate his hereditary estates. The owners were changed, but the estates themselves were still liable, like the other lands of

the kingdom, to all the public burdens of the time ; to military service, aids, &c. By the transfer, the Crown became poorer, but the nation richer. But an Indian grant is the reverse of all this: it gives away the public revenue of the lands, it exempts them from military service, from every kind of tax or public burden, and renders them entirely useless as a resource to the state. In England, the alienation of the crown-lands does not lessen the resources of the state ; in India, it annihilates them. In England, the effect of such alienation could only have been partial, as the crown-lands bore but a small proportion to the lands of the kingdom. In India, it might have extinguished all revenue, as the Sovereign, though he has no crown-lands, has the power of granting all lands.

The Chief Justice observes; that it was not in the contemplation of the great men who investigated the subject of the crown-grants, when Queen Anne first succeeded to the throne, to remedy the evil of the resumption. He thinks that their moderation furnishes a contrast with the conduct of the Company's Government. But this Government has never claimed a right to make a resumption at all similar to what a resumption of the crown-lands in England would be. It does not claim to resume any private property conveyed by the grants ; it claims the public revenue only, and leaves the rent of the landlord with the proprietor.

If all Indian Princes could grant *altamgha jagheers*, and if none could resume them, a great portion of the country might, in time, be released from affording any aid to the state, either in revenue, or in military service. Some idea may be formed of the probable effect of such a system, by looking at what happened in a few years under the Nabob Walajah and his son Amdut ul Omra. Family *jagheers* were granted to the amount of above six lacs of pagodas, and containing a population of above six hundred thousand persons. Of these *jagheers*, only about one-fourth was *altamgha* ; but the whole might have been so, and the state would have been deprived of every kind of aid from more than half a million of its subjects. Many of the *jagheers*, too, might have been held, as was actually the case, by persons who, though attached to the donor, were inimical to his successor ; but, when once granted, they could not, according to the opinion of the Court, have been resumed. If, therefore, the increase of *altamghas* during successive reigns, might, if not checked, have materially impaired, if not altogether exhausted, the resources of

the state, and as the evil could only be remedied by resumption, it seems to follow, from the reason of the thing, that the sovereign must have had the right to resume as well as to grant.

The next ground on which the Company's right to resume the grant to Asim Khan has been denied by the Court, is that of the usage and custom of the country. The usage of the country is undoubtedly the rule by which the question ought to be decided; and, in a case of this kind, the common practice of the Native princes must be admitted to be the usage. It can easily be shown that princes resumed altamghas at pleasure. It cannot be shown, that when they were disposed to resume, the act of resumption ever was or could be prevented. It may be said that they were despots, and acted unjustly. Had they seized private property, they would have been regarded as unjust by the country; but no injustice was attached to the seizure of an altamgha, as the people knew that it was a grant of public revenue. The princes were, it is true, despotic; but they were liberal, and even profuse in their grants, and the grants themselves grew out of their very despotism; for it was because they found no difficulty in resuming, that they made none in granting. Altamghas were not, in fact, more respected than money pensions, which, though every day liable to resumption, are frequently continued for generations. The resumption and renewal by the Amdut of the grant to Asim Khan, the favourite minister of his father and himself, is a strong proof of the practice of the country, and of the opinion of the public. If altamghas were not resumable, it may be asked what has become of them. Their very scarcity is a proof of the usage to the contrary. There is not one in the Carnatic older than Walajah. Where are all those of his predecessors, which, according to the Chief Justice, ought to have been protected by usage, and by the Mohammedan law? The right of resumption never was doubted in the Carnatic until called in question by the Supreme Court. The Company's Government could have had no doubt of it, when, in 1801, they resumed all jagheers, though they afterwards continued most of the old ones, but none of the altamghas to the Nabob's family. The usage is shown by Walajah himself, who certainly best knew what it was in his own dominions; but his opinion is in direct opposition to that of the Court. In his letter to Government, of the 18th October 1790, he says, "I am Prince of the Carnatic, and for these forty years I have granted, resumed, and altered jagheers, from time to time, in such manner as I have thought proper." The right of resump-

tion is in Native states the usage and the constitution, and it ceases only when the Government is too weak to enforce it; and when this happens, the Government is soon overthrown, and a new one arises, and maintains itself by exercising the right of grant and resumption.

It is not easy to collect written documents respecting altamghas, because most of these grants have long since been resumed; but enough still remain to show what were the opinions of the Nizam and Walajah on the subject, and their practice ought certainly to be received, as the best proof of what was the usage of the country. The Nizam granted altamgha sunnuds to several members of Walajah's family, and resumed them again. On the death of Amdut ul Omra, the Nizam resumed the altamgha jagheer which he held of him, and regranted it to his successor, Asim ul Dowlah, on whose decease he resumed it again. The jagheer of Ejmangunlah was held many years by Hissam ul Mulk, the third son of the Nabob Walajah, under an altamgha grant from the Nizam, as was also the Kiladaree of Gumpoore, under a similar sunnud, by his younger brother, Missun ul Mulk; but, on the death of the Nabob Amdut ul Omra, both these grants were resumed by the same Soubahdar of the Deccan, who granted them, and conferred by a new sunnud on the late Nabob Asim ul Dowlah. Walajah was so sensible of the little respect paid to altamghas, that when he granted one to Reisul Nissa Begum, he made his son, the Amdut, put his seal and signature to it, as affording the only chance of its being continued after his own death. No case can evince more strongly the insecurity of altamghas beyond the pleasure of the donor than this, of a father requiring confirmation from a son to such a grant. But, notwithstanding all this precaution, the grant was, soon after the death of Walajah, resumed by the Amdut, in consequence of the misconduct of the officer placed in charge of the estate by the Begum, and was not restored until she had consented to dismiss him from her service.

Walajah had no confidence in altamghas since. Though he had obtained one from Ahmed Shah, Emperor of Delhi, for the Carnatic, he did not think it sufficient, and afterwards solicited and obtained grants from Salabut Gung and Nizam Alli Khan, Soubahdars of the Deccan. The very circumstance of such extensive provinces as the Deccan and the Carnatic being disposed of by altamgha sunnuds, indicates clearly the political nature of these grants; and Walajah's application to every succeeding

superior for a new one, shows that he considered them as liable to be resumed at pleasure. He knew that this must either be the case, or that they must be maintained by force. The usage, in this respect, has probably arisen from necessity; for, as *altamghas* are chiefly given to members of the reigning family, and to the higher officers of state, and as they are usually for extensive districts, it is obvious that, in every case of a new dynasty, and in every instance of disputed succession in an old one, which is so common in India, the new Prince could not be secure, unless he had the power of resuming the *altamghas* of all who he supposed were not well affected, and of rewarding his adherents by new grants. This has been the usage with regard to all large grants; the small ones of a few hundred rupees are, from their insignificance, sometimes neglected, and allowed, like charity lands, to pass through several generations.

There is nothing either in existing records, or in the state of the country, to support the opinion that *altamghas* were not resumable at pleasure. The *altamgha* was so far different from a common grant, that it was not for any specific period; and that it frequently, but not always, contained the words, "from generation to generation." It was therefore a grant that the donor was anxious should be durable; and his son might on this account continue it, if he had no cause of being dissatisfied with the *jagheerदार*; but the next prince could hardly show the same forbearance, as he would probably have new favourites to provide for, by the resumption of old grants. If we examine Mr. Falconer's report on the *jagheers* of the Carnatic, we find no old *altamghas* on the list. The whole of the *altamghas*, sixteen in number, are by *Walajah* and his son. The old grants which have passed through several generations, are not *altamgha*, as might have been expected from the principle of their not being resumable, but common *jagheer* grants, neither hereditary, nor for life, but temporary. Many of these common *jagheerदारs* were *killedars* of strong forts, and, from this circumstance, held their *jagheers* longer than they would probably have done under the dynasty by which they were granted; because, in the convulsions attending the decline of the Mogul power, their forts enabled them to secure terms for themselves. But even after the new Government became strong, and could easily have removed them, they frequently permitted these to remain, either on account of family alliances, out of respect for their high birth, or some other cause. The greater part of the *jagheers* of *Asim Khan* were held

under a royal firman, not altamgha, by Mulk Mohammed Ali Khan, with the fort of Mustaphaghur. Though the grant was merely temporary, yet it continued in the family, and descended lineally from father to son, for three generations, till 1780, when the jagheerdar having died during Hyder Ally's invasion of the Carnatic, his family was sent into captivity in Mysore by that prince. The jagheerdar of Awelwandah and several others, held by the common tenure, have in the same way descended through several generations. It appears from these facts, that in the Carnatic, altamgha grants, so far from being irresumable, have not been so much respected as many of the ordinary jagheers. It would not weaken the argument, even if it could be shown that, in other parts of India, the practice was different, because the question before us regards the usage in the Carnatic only; but I believe that it was nearly the same throughout India: we know, at least, that it was so in the Peishwah's dominions; for the commissioner at Poonah, in answer to a reference made to him on the subject, has stated that he has not been able to find a single altamgha in the Deccan, and has transmitted a list of five hundred and fifty-nine jagheers, resumed by the Peishwah's Government within the last fifty years, none of which are altamgha. Of these, he observes, three hundred and sixty-four were resumed for reason assigned, usually offences against the state; and one hundred and ninety-five without any reason assigned. In the Nizam's dominions, too, the resumption of jagheers appears from the note of his minister, Chundoo Lal, transmitted by the resident, to have been regulated, as in the Carnatic, by the will of the Prince. It is stated, that "altamgha jagheers which are granted to children generally, without any specification of names, are continued to the descendants of the deceased person; but if any great fault has been committed, or there are no descendants, the jagheer is resumed." It is also stated, that the sons sometimes share equally; "but if one is found fit, and another unfit, the sovereign exercises a discretion, and continues the jagheer as he may think proper, in consideration of the merits of the persons;" and it is added, "there are no persons to whom jagheers have been continued, without some change or modification." What is here said corresponds very nearly with the practice of the Company, and the Nabob in the Carnatic, with regard to the jagheers of Kullum Oolla Khan and others. When any great fault is committed, the jagheer is resumed. The sovereign exercises his discretion, in renewing or continuing the jagheer to all

the sons, or to one son in preference ; and no jagheers are continued without some change.

The next ground on which the Chief Justice maintains that altamghas are not resumable, is that of the Mohammedan law. The Advocate-General cites Mohammedan law authorities, to show that the King has power to grant or resume kheraj or the sirkar's share of the produce of the land. The Chief Justice did not think that the authorities cited by the Advocate-General, forbidding the alienation in perpetuity, were conclusive ; but admitted, that if he had adduced instances of similar grants having been resumed, it would have greatly aided his case. The Advocate-General, had time been allowed, might easily have adduced instances of similar grants in the Nabob's family having been resumed by the Nizam.

The law-officers of the Sudder Adawlut, in answer to the queries from the Advocate-General, observe, in speaking of the Mohammedan law authorities " respecting lands belonging to the State, and the private property of princes," that there " is so much discrepancy of opinion among these learned personages, respecting the legality or illegality of grants of land, and of the revenues of lands belonging to the State, by the sovereign, to individuals, that it is next to impossible to come to any determination, or to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion." The discrepancy here complained of is not to be wondered at,—it could not have been otherwise ; for, as no person had ever seen the Mohammedan law applied in the case, the question was not one concerning any political matter of fact, but was one of mere theory. As to what would be the operation of the Mohammedan law, if made applicable where it had never before been permitted to enter, as it was never used in the continuance or resumption of altamghas by the sovereign, every attempt to ascertain its operation must always bring us back to the usage of the country, by which alone the transaction was regulated. The Indian princes consult no law, either in granting or resuming : they grant from favour or political expediency, and resume at pleasure. Their right to resume is never questioned ; and as there is no tribunal that can take cognizance of it, it is evident that it is regulated by no law but their will. If it be said that this right, though it could not be denied or opposed, was not exercised, we shall find that this assumption is not supported by facts, and that it is at variance with the usage of the country. It is useless to consult Mohammedan lawyers regarding this usage ; for the resumption of

grants is a question which was never submitted to them by any sovereign ; and when we seek legal opinions on matters of policy, which never were, nor ought to be, subjected to legal discussion, we must expect endless conflicting opinions, all equally well supported by texts and quotations from Mohammedan or Hindoo law. It is not necessary to go to Arabia, or even to Hindostan, to discover the usage of the Carnatic ; we ought to search for it on the spot in the South of India, and to look for it in the history of the Deccan and the Carnatic. If we adopt this course, we shall see, as has already been observed, that altamgha grants were not more inviolable than common jagheers. If they were, what has become of them all ? There are none in Mysore, none in the Ceded Districts, and none in the Carnatic, of an earlier period than a few years before the death of Walajah. We must admit either that former princes in these countries never granted altamghas, or that they have been all resumed. But we have no reason to suppose that altamghas were not granted under former princes, or to doubt that their disappearance is owing to their having been resumed by their successors. It was in fact because such resumptions were considered as an ordinary transaction, that they excited little attention and were soon forgotten, and the very record of them lost.

It has been seen that altamgha and all other jagheers were resumed. It ought to have been shown by those who disputed the right of the Nabob and the Company to dispose of the jagheer of Asim Khan, when and where resumption was, or could be hindered by the Mohammedan law.

The last ground of objection made by the Chief Justice to the resumption of Asim Khan's jagheer, is Lord Clive's proclamation. He remarks, that it has been argued, that by the words of the proclamation, " all jagheerdars may rest satisfied that their interest will sustain no injury from the temporary arrangement made by the Company," Lord Clive renounced his right, if he had any, to resume. He states also, that the words of the re-grant have raised in his mind, as in that of the Sudder Adawlut at Calcutta, a strong doubt whether Lord Clive did himself intend to resume the grant in question at all. The proclamation of Lord Clive cannot be regarded as any thing more than a general assurance of attention to the interests of the jagheerdars. This was fulfilled by allotting a provision for them. But the assurance was not intended to preclude Lord Clive from exercising the authority always exercised by the Nabob, of limiting or extending the

jagheers at discretion. Lord Clive was the best judge of his own intentions ; and, if we are to judge of them from his own acts, he leaves us no ground to join in the doubts of the Chief Justice. He certainly did intend to resume the grant, for he resumed the customs, salt and saltpetre belonging to the jagheer, and continued the land-rent only ; and the new grant which he issued for the land-rent was not a renewal of the old *altamgha*, but a common jagheer grant. Kullum Oolla Khan is the heir of Asim Khan. It was not in the name of the other sons and heirs, because Lord Clive knew that Asim Khan was desirous that the jagheer should be conferred on his eldest son. His Lordship also knew that it was only on account of the high character and long services of Asim Khan, that the jagheer had been originally granted ; that the respectability of the family could only be maintained by giving the undivided jagheer to the eldest son, and that the Nabob approved of the measure. The original grants both of Walajah and the Amdut left the division of the jagheer to Asim Khan to be made as he chose, and he never expressed a wish to make any. The *sunnud* of Lord Clive states expressly, that it is on account of “ the respectable character and commendable conduct of the said Beharder (Asim Khan), and a well-founded expostulation that his son Kullum Oolla Khan will pursue the same laudable line of conduct, that the jagheer is renewed.”

I expect that the answers to the queries respecting *altamghas*, transmitted to various public officers, will contain different opinions as to their being renewable or not. They will vary according as they are founded in the usage of one province or another, or on the opinions of Native lawyers, or on extensive or limited observation. We are too apt to be carried away by supposed analogies, and to build up systems of uniform practice, where none ever existed, or ever were thought of ; and much of the argument on the present occasion seems to have arisen from this cause. The conflicting opinions may be easily accounted for, by considering what really took place. The small *altamghas* were frequently neglected on account of their insignificance, and allowed, like common charity or *enau*-lands, to continue for two or three generations, and to be regulated by the laws of private property. But the greater *altamghas* were, from their nature, objects of state jealousy, and were resumed or transferred at the discretion of the sovereign, to punish one person, or to reward another : they could not be left as private property, without danger to the State.

I have now delivered my sentiments on the principal objections made by the Chief Justice to Lord Clive's grant to Kullum Oolla Khan. The sum of what I have said is this: That the grant of the Amdut to Asim Khan was resumed by Lord Clive: that the grant by his Lordship to Kullum Oolla Khan, was a new grant different in its nature from the old one by the Nabob: that the Nabob of the Carnatic had a right to resume the altamgha of Asim Khan, and that the Company's Government had the same right: that this right was founded on the reason of the thing, and in the custom of the country: that it was not affected by the Moham-medan law of inheritance: that this law was applicable only between individuals when the sovereign permitted the altamgha to descend in this way in the family, not between the sovereign and the individual when it was resumed: that the thing granted to Kullum Oolla Khan was public revenue, from all cognizance of which the Court are precluded by their charter, and that even if it had not been public revenue, the resumption was an affair of state, which, whether right or wrong, did not come within the jurisdiction of the Court, and for which, as well as for all other political acts, the Government in this country are amenable only to the Superior Government at home.

Although Government, at the commencement of the trial in the Supreme Court, were not fully aware of the important political considerations which it involved, they soon saw them; and on the 8th of January 1819, they tell the Advocate-General, that "they attach a high degree of importance to the principles in dispute,—the right of the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the matter; and secondly, the denial of the authority of Government to revoke grants of the nature of that now called in question." It is absolutely necessary, both for the good government of the country, and the security of the revenue, that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be more strictly limited and more clearly defined; and that it should be completely debarred from all cognizance, in any shape, of the acts of Government. If the Supreme Court are permitted to set aside, by their decrees, the orders of Government, we shall weaken, and at last perhaps destroy, that authority which, our own safety demands, should in this country be strengthened by every possible means. The proceedings of the Court on the present occasion have ruined the first private family in the Carnatic, and lowered the Government in the eyes of the people; and if measures of prevention be not adopted, the evil will increase every day. Most of the old

wealthy families of Madras have already been impoverished by their litigations in the Court. The attorneys and law dubashes now look to the provinces ; and if the doctrine maintained by the Court continues to be acted upon, its jurisdiction will in time reach to every zemindar, jagheerdar, and official landholder under this Presidency ; because, Madras being the capital, many of the great proprietors and principal inhabitants will occasionally visit this place and reside in it for a time, and thus become amenable ; and every person also holding an official or charitable grant, which it may be deemed expedient to assess or resume, will be able to bring his case before the Court, as a complaint against European oppression.

The powers of the Supreme Court and of the Government should never be suffered to come into collision ; and both the Court and the Government will thus be enabled the more efficiently to discharge their respective duties, and to command the respect of the natives. But, in order to attain these objects, it will be necessary—

1st, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court all civil suits between native and native, except where both parties agree to submit to their decision.

2nd, To alter the present boundaries of the local jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, so as to include the fort and town of Madraspatnam, but to exclude Chepauk and Triplicane.

3rd, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court all lands situated beyond the limits of the Court.

4th, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court all acts done by the Government as a Government, and making such acts cognizable only by the superior authorities in England.

5th, To vest in Government the powers now exercised by the justices, of assessing the inhabitants of Madras for paving, lighting, and cleansing the streets, or at least to vest in it the power of exempting from the tax all such Bramins, priests, and other privileged persons as, from the usage of the country, are exempted from such taxes.

If suits between native and native are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it will check litigation, and lessen greatly the expense where it actually occurs, and save thousands from ruin. The local boundaries of the Supreme Court are far too extensive ; they seem to have been fixed at first without much consideration ; they reach to a distance of five miles from Madras, and include several populous villages which ought never to have

been within them. They contain a population of above five hundred thousand persons. The line proposed by Mr. Stratton ought to be the new boundary. It runs along the river at the Government-house to Cochrane's canal, and would place about two hundred thousand natives under the jurisdiction of the Company's Court. It would also enable us to accomplish a most important object, in withdrawing the Nabob, with all his relations and adherents, from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That jurisdiction has, for many years, been a source of constant complaint from his Highness. While it exists, it cannot be otherwise; for, whatever may be the forbearance of the judges, and their attention to native prejudices, circumstances must occur almost every day, offensive to the Nabob, and to every Mussulman of rank. The authority of the Nabob over his family and dependents has been impaired by political events, and still more by the interference of the officers of the Court. Daughters of Wajajah have turned prostitutes, and been released from the custody of their husbands and the Nabob, by *habeas corpus*. Other women of rank have been encouraged, by their example and their impunity, to follow the same courses. The disgrace of these women is felt, not only by their own families, but by every Mussulman here, as a degradation of their caste. The Mussulman population of Triplicane, always distressed and dissatisfied since the assumption of the Carnatic, has had its discontent increased by these transactions; and it is therefore desirable that the cause of them should be removed, by placing the Nabob without the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It is also chiefly for the purpose of removing the causes of discontent, that I have proposed that Government, rather than the justices, should possess the authority of taxing the inhabitants of Madras, for paving, cleansing, and lighting the streets. The majority of the justices is composed of men either not in the Company's service, or who, having always resided at Madras, know little of the native usages. Bramins, priests, and other privileged persons, have in consequence been subjected to this house-tax, from which they are every where else exempted by the custom of the country; and the Hindoo population has been rendered discontented as well as the Mohammedan. The discontent has shown itself only in complaint and clamour; but for this we are indebted to the presence of a military force. Had the same measures been attempted to be carried into execution when there was none, they would have been resisted by insurrection. The Advocate-General has given

it as his opinion, that Government has no authority over the assessment, as it is by the act of Parliament committed to the justices alone. Government has requested, and the justices have agreed, that the privileged classes should be exempted; but nothing final has yet been done; and whatever may be done will always be liable to alteration, at the discretion of the justices. Government is placed in the extraordinary situation, not of being restrained from taxing, but from relieving its subjects from taxation. The justices, although they are themselves nominated by Government, can levy taxes without its consent; and though it may be convinced that the laying of a tax may excite discontent, and even occasion disturbance, it can only obtain a remission of it by application to the justices. Government should never be obliged to solicit. Such a proceeding must always weaken the respect by which it ought to be supported. If the framers of the act did actually intend to exclude Government from all authority over the assessments, they must have supposed that the justices had a common feeling with the people, and were more likely than Government to protect them from undue exactions. Nothing can be more erroneous than such an opinion. The justices can neither from their habits nor situation have any such feeling. They have no common interest with the people. Government has, and to it therefore should be confided the direction of the assessment; or, at all events, the power of modifying or remitting it, whenever it is apprehended that it may excite disaffection or outrage. It seems to be contrary to every sound principle of policy, that a body of justices should be able, by an injudicious application of a tax, to produce disturbance in the country, and that Government should not have the means of preventing it.

The inconvenience which has arisen from the suits relative to the jagheer of Kullum Oolla Khan, naturally leads to the consideration of the means by which the extension of the evil to all other jagheers and enaum lands may most easily be obviated. These means appear to be, 1st, To prohibit the Supreme Court from all interference regarding such lands; and 2nd, To rescind Regulation XXXI. of 1802. Enough has already been said concerning the interference of the Court. The regulation in question was too readily adopted, when we had little experience, and the sooner it is repealed the better. All Native states exercise, in the most unlimited manner, the right of granting and revoking enaums at pleasure; sometimes at once, sometimes gradually, by

a small quit-rent at first, and then raising it to a greater, next to a half, and so on to the full rate of assessment. In India, revenue always follows the population and the produce, wherever they go. This is the usage, and it cannot be relinquished without endangering the future resources of the country; because, as the Government waste-lands, together with the jagheer and enaum lands, are equal to from one-fourth to one-half of the whole of the lands in cultivation, if they were permanently exempted from the payment of revenue, they would gradually, instead of lying half waste and poorly cultivated, as at present, become completely cultivated, by drawing off the cultivators and stock from the lands now paying revenue, which would be proportionably diminished. If an effect of this kind has not already been experienced, in provinces containing a large proportion of jagheer and enaum, it is because it is prevented by the usage of transferring the assessment from the deserted to the newly cultivated lands. Whenever it is found that the revenue of a district has been considerably diminished by the abandonment of assessed, and the occupation of waste lands belonging to jagheerdars or enaumdars, an assessment, proportionate in some degree to the loss, is imposed on the jagheer or enaum. It is this which guards the public revenue from loss, by former profuse grants; and if this power were relinquished, we should have no means of saving it from very considerable defalcation. The smaller enaums, though they separately contain only a few acres each, are very extensive collectively. They have, for the most part, been granted without authority, by heads of villages and revenue servants; and when they have escaped notice for a few years, and have afterwards been discovered, they have been allowed to continue, from charitable or interested motives, and they have, from various causes, a constant tendency to increase.

The investigation of enaums was therefore, among the Native Governments, like an inquiry into the state of the nation; and it is advisable that we should occasionally investigate and resume, in order to prevent the abuses and increase to which enaums are liable from neglect.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

VIII.

MINUTE ON THE STUDY OF THE NATIVE LANGUAGES BY OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

7th November 1823.

G. O. March, 17th, 1823
 Commander-in-chief to Government, 17th October 1823.

THE orders issued by His Excellency the Commander-in-chief respecting the qualifications required in officers before they can be appointed interpreters to Native corps, will, no doubt, have the effect of inciting young officers to study the Hindoostanee language, and of fulfilling the instructions of the Honourable Court of Directors, as far as is practicable with the means in his Excellency's hands. It is well known, however, that though many officers of the army are sufficiently acquainted with that language for carrying on their ordinary duties, very few of them have such a knowledge of it as would enable them to interpret to a court-martial; and it would therefore, at most stations, be difficult, if not impossible, to find a committee capable of deciding whether an officer was sufficiently versed in Hindoostanee to be eligible to the office of interpreter.

The knowledge which many of our Native troops have of English, and Hindoostanee not being the prevailing language of the Peninsula, are perhaps the chief causes of the superiority of the Madras officers generally to those of Bengal, in the knowledge of Hindoostanee; but, whatever may be the causes, the fact is certain; and if it has not been thought safe to trust to the opinion

G. O. By the Commander-in-chief in India, 17th February 1823.

of a military committee there on the fitness of an interpreter, without the check of the College examiners, it seems to be still more necessary here to have recourse to the same precaution.

Unless this is done, we do not take the measures necessary for accomplishing the object proposed by the instructions of the Honourable Court, in which they say, "We rely upon your care and vigilance that no officer be selected for the important situation of interpreter, who is not fully qualified to perform all the duties of it, especially the serious and responsible duties of interpreter to courts-martial." I would therefore suggest that officers, who may be declared by a committee of officers to be fit for the duties of interpreter, shall be eligible to hold the office, but shall not be confirmed in it until they shall have been examined by the

College committee, and receive from it a certificate of their competency.

With regard to the furnishing of college-books to the officers engaged in the study of Hindoostanee, as proposed by his Excellency, I am of opinion that a reference should be made to the College to ascertain the names of the books, the number of copies of each that can be furnished, and the prices, and we can then determine whether the books should be lent or issued to the officers on their paying for them.

The measure recommended by the Commander-in-chief, in his minute, would undoubtedly greatly promote the important object of encouraging the study of the Hindoostanee language among the junior officers of the army; but there is an objection to it which Government cannot remove; namely, that its expense would exceed that of the former system of granting rewards for proficiency, which was abolished by order of the Honourable the Court of Directors, first in 1814, and finally in 1818. It is observed, that though two moonshees to each corps may now be necessary, in consequence of the great number of young officers, one may hereafter be found sufficient.

This reduced number would, however, occasion an annual expense of 24,360 rupees, which would still exceed the probable charge under the former system: it would be nearly equal to fourteen donations, which is perhaps a greater number than would be given one year with another; we ought not therefore to revive a charge which has already been discontinued by the Honourable Court, without their previous sanction; but the object in view is so essentially useful to the army, that it may be advisable to bring it again to the notice of the Honourable Court.

It is not necessary to specify all the difficulties which a young officer on this establishment has to overcome in learning the Hindoostanee language; but among them may be mentioned, that of his seldom hearing the language spoken, as his Native servants speak English, and the language of the Carnatic is Tamul; and in none of the provinces under the Madras Government is Hindostanee the language of the people.

The chance of obtaining the appointment of interpreter is not of itself a sufficient inducement for a young officer to incur the expense and the labour of studying a language which he finds he can do without; but the inducement might be rendered more effectual by carrying into execution the instructions of the Ho-

Court of Directors, 4th Feb. 1815, para. 281. Honourable Court,—that a competent knowledge of Hindoostanee shall be an indispensable qualification in every candidate for a staff-appointment.

I would therefore recommend that the paragraph in question should be adopted as a rule, and published to the army.

It is not necessary that the same proficiency should be required from every staff-officer as from the interpreter; but he should have that knowledge of Hindoostanee which may enable him to discharge his duty efficiently.

Some officers have a talent for acquiring languages, who are in all other respects unfit for a staff employment, and cannot therefore be reckoned in the number of those who are eligible to it. There are other officers who, though they study Hindoostanee, with the hope of obtaining a staff-appointment, would study it without any such object, and would think the expense well compensated by the satisfaction of being able to communicate with the natives, and by the superior advantage it gives them in the discharge of their public duties. But it is notwithstanding certain, that the number of officers who acquire a moderate knowledge even of Hindoostanee is very inadequate to the demand of the service, and that stronger motives than now exist are requisite, in order to procure a sufficient supply. There are two ways of effecting this: one is by providing moonshees and books for the students; the other is by reviving the donation of five hundred pagodas: the donation has this advantage, that while it is the cheapest of the two, it is paid only for proficiency; in the other case, the expense is the same, whether there be proficiency or not.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, November 1823.

I concur entirely with His Excellency the Commander-in-chief in the observations in the minute regarding the importance to the public service of young officers acquiring a knowledge of the Native language, and that the expense which might be incurred in promoting this object would be a judicious sacrifice; but, as the Honourable the Court of Directors have repeatedly ordered the allowance formerly granted to be discontinued, and have said that the quarter-mastership and other staff-offices ought to form a sufficient incitement to the study of the Hindoostanee language, I do not think that the necessity of the case is so urgent as to

justify our acting contrary to their orders. We have not, in the present instance, the same causes as in that of the Judge-Advocate, to expect that the Honourable Court would view with indulgence our acting without waiting for their sanction. There was no encouragement whatever for men to qualify themselves for the office of Judge-Advocate, and this most serious inconvenience had been felt from irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings of courts-martial. We cannot say that there is no encouragement to the study of Hindoostanee, when we know that it opens the road to almost every staff-appointment. Some immediate or certain pecuniary aid would no doubt increase the encouragement, and produce a greater number of students ; but still we find that, without this aid, it has a very great effect, and of this there can be no better proof than the list brought forward by the Commander-in-chief of fifteen officers examined in the current year, since the beginning of May. I am persuaded that we shall have as great, or even a greater proportion every succeeding year, because, besides the incitement held out by the new office of regimental quartermaster, there is the additional one of knowing that an acquaintance with the Hindoostanee language will now form an essential part of the qualifications for many other staff-employments.

If the Honourable Court authorize any expense on account of the students, it might be done either by restoring the former donation, or by granting such a sum as may be equivalent to the charges incurred by the officers on account of moonshees and books. I cannot recommend the plan of fixed moonshees to corps ; it would lead to much inconvenience, and probably to disputes and references. An officer will not do much good with a public moonshee, whom he can have only at a particular hour : if his wish is to make rapid progress, he must have a moonshee of his own, whose service he can command at all hours.

The Commander-in-chief is undoubtedly the proper authority, by which officers are to be selected for the situation of quartermasters ; but Government does not fulfil the instructions of the Honourable Court, if it does not see that these officers have a competent knowledge of the language ; and the only way in which it can satisfy itself in this respect, is by the report of men qualified to judge. The officers at this Presidency who conducted the examinations are perfectly qualified, and we may safely trust to their opinion ; but this is an accidental circumstance, and their successors may not be equally qualified ; but Government should

not be satisfied with any authority, however respectable, when it can get a better. That of a permanent body, like the College, is unquestionably to be preferred to that of a committee of officers. Examinations have sometimes been made at the Presidency by a committee composed of one or two members of the College with the Judge-Advocate-General, or some other officer conversant with Hindoostanee; and I see no objection to this mode being still adopted. It is, I believe, well understood, that young officers who must attend to their military duties, as well as to the language, are not expected to undergo the same rigid examination as civil servants, who are excused from all public duty while prosecuting the study of the country languages.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

IX.

MINUTE ON INCREASING THE NUMBER OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS EMPLOYED IN THE ARTILLERY.

21st January 1823.

I HAVE carefully examined the plan proposed by His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, for augmenting the establishment of the European officers with the corps of artillery; and though the inconveniencies from the present want of officers, pointed out in that document, are in general undeniable, it appears to me that they may be removed by a much smaller increase than that which has been proposed.

2. It is certainly desirable that the artillery corps should always have at its head, in this country, an officer of the rank of major-general, and that when such an officer can be found qualified for the command, it ought not to be left to one of inferior rank; but where all the major-generals may have lost their health from long service, the situation of commandant may sometimes, with more advantage, be confided to a field-officer.

3. Among the evils resulting from the want of officers, it is stated that the horse brigade is the only corps of artillery commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, while two battalions are commanded by majors, and one by a regimental captain; but I do not consider this as any material objection, because captains are usually from fifteen to twenty years, and majors from twenty to thirty years' standing in the service, and must then be just as

competent to command a corps as they ever can be at any future period. In the infantry and cavalry, as well as in the artillery, a corps is frequently commanded by a major or a captain, and without any injury to the service; and no reasonable augmentation that could be made could secure to us the actual presence of a lieutenant-colonel with every corps.

4. Another of the inconveniencies stated to result from the want of officers is, that twenty-one companies are commanded by subalterns. We cannot say that there is a want of officers, merely because there is not always a captain to each company. The command of a company is not so important or difficult, that it may not with safety be entrusted to a subaltern of from ten to fifteen years' standing. An officer must have served to very little purpose, who is not in that time qualified for a higher command than that of a company.

5. The number of officers employed as commissaries of ordnance, is urged in support of the propriety of an augmentation; but the establishment of officers, when full, is so ample, that it may, without impairing the efficiency of the corps, furnish these commissaries. Besides, in cases of emergency, these ordnance officers are always available for service with the artillery, as they may be ordered to deliver over charge of the stores to an assistant-commissary or conductor, and join their corps.

6. In support of the expediency of the proposed augmentation of European officers with the Golundauz corps, it is observed, "that such a corps, being composed of natives, is as much, if not considerably more dependent upon its European officers than any other." This is a principle which has never yet been admitted with regard to our other Native troops, and to the justness of which I cannot assent. I am so far from thinking that the efficiency of Native troops is increased in proportion to the increased number of European officers, that I think that the number of officers may be too great, and that, when this is the case, it injures the discipline of the corps, and lessens the respect of the Natives for their European officers. Native troops are quiet, orderly, and easily managed. The Native officers are well acquainted with all their duties, and expert in their execution. They conduct almost all the inferior details, and leave but little for the European officer to do. They are, however, apt to grow indolent and careless when left to themselves, and European officers are therefore absolutely necessary to direct them, but not many; one to a company is quite enough for every useful purpose.

7. The only increase of European officers which is really wanted, is to the Golundauz corps, and it should consist of two captains, two first and two second-lieutenants; this, added to the present establishment, would give two European officers to each company, and, allowing for absentees on staff and other duties, would probably always secure the presence of one with each company. Were the corps of Golundauz to remain together in a body, I should consider the present establishment of European officers as quite sufficient. It is only because it is broken into detachments that I recommend an augmentation.

8. There seems to be no sufficient cause for increasing the European officers of the foot-artillery. The present establishment is, one captain, two first, and two second-lieutenants to each company, which, if kept complete, would be an adequate allowance both for ordnance and artillery duties, even if the commissaries of ordnance were exempted from acting as regimental officers. But I am satisfied that they ought to act both as ordnance and regimental officers. There is no commissary where there is not a detachment of artillery; and there can be no necessity for employing any other officer than him to command it. I see nothing serious in the objections stated to this measure. I cannot admit that each of the "two situations require the full and undivided attention of one officer;"—any commissary has ample time for them both. There is no difficulty in his leaving "the charge of his stores, and marching with the artillery, if called upon for service. He has an assistant-commissary, or conductor, competent to the charge, and his making it over to him happens frequently. The check required by the Regulations to be exercised by the commanding-officer of artillery over the commissary is not a material objection, as the issues to the detachment of artillery are very trifling, and their expenditure may, if necessary, be ascertained from his orderly-book, as the issues to all the other troops must be verified by their commanding-officers respectively, and as the commissary is under the check both of the commandant of the station and of the Military Board. The union of the ordnance and artillery has grown out of the experience of its convenience. It is the system best adapted to the nature of the service in this country; and I am convinced that their separation would be attended not only by great expense, but with great detriment to the service.

9. We have, no doubt, too few artillery officers at present;

but this has arisen, not from a defective establishment, but from that establishment not having been kept complete from home. There are now thirty-six officers wanting to complete it. Had this number been sent out, it would have supplied, twice over, all the deficiency occasioned by officers being employed in the ordnance, and on duties belonging neither to the ordnance nor artillery.

10. We have here the same proportion of artillery officers with relation to the strength of the corps, as in Bengal; and the inconvenience felt from the detachment of artillery officers on extra duties, is not greater here than there, as appears from the annexed abstract:—

Bengal officers employed in ordnance	8
On other duties, not artillery	13
	21
	Total
	21
Madras officers, ordnance	11
On the other duties, not artillery	6
	17
	Total
	17

Nothing but the strongest necessity ought to induce us to increase the establishment of European officers with any particular branch of the service, not only because it increases our expense, but because it alters the relative chance of promotion between the different branches of the army, which ought to be kept as equal and as permanent as possible.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

X.

MINUTE ON THE IMPOLICY OF MIXING EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS, THROUGH DISTRUST OF THE FIDELITY OF THE LATTER.

Dated 18th February 1823.

1. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief has dissented from my proposal of relieving the European corps at Quilon, by a battalion of sepoys instead of his Majesty's 41st regiment now in Fort St. George, on the following grounds:—1st, The danger from the disturbed state and actual rebellion in which the country has been within these few years. 2ndly, The treacherous character of the inhabitants rendering it unsafe to place any confidence in the present apparent tranquillity. 3rdly, That it was in Travancore that the most recent attempt was made to alienate the minds of our Native troops, and that, by withdrawing the Europeans, they would again be exposed to similar temptation. 4thly, The expediency of having European corps with all large bodies of Native troops, not only in order to check incipient discontent, but, in a military point of view, to assimilate discipline, and accustom them to place confidence in each other.

2. These arguments are all entitled to the highest respect; and were I not satisfied that some of them have not the same force which they would have had some years ago, I would not have recommended the present measure. There has been no rebellion, or rather insurrection, in Travancore for above twelve years; and it ought certainly to create no anxiety now. Such disturbances have occurred in many other districts as well as Travancore, without creating any apprehension *now* for their tranquillity.

They are the consequences which, in almost all countries, usually follow, for a time, the establishment of a foreign dominion. Malabar was agitated by rebellion, and is now perfectly quiet; and though one regiment of Europeans is stationed there, it is not entirely for the purpose of keeping the country in subjection, but also for that of more general service, as it can, in case of emergency, be readily moved either to Mysore, or by sea to Bombay and Canara, which, in the early part of our Government, though disturbed by insurrections, and occupied by a large

European and Native force, has long since been left to the care of a single battalion of sepoy.

3. With regard to the treacherous character of the natives of Travancore rendering it unsafe to trust them, I can see nothing in all the transactions of that country to justify the opinion that they are more treacherous than the inhabitants of Malabar and Canara, or that they differ materially from them in their general character.

4. As to Travancore having been the place where the most recent attempt to alienate the minds of our Native troops was made, that event took place in 1812, and ought to excite no apprehension of such attempts being repeated, when the causes which produced them no longer exist. When we advert to these causes, we shall see nothing extraordinary in the attempts, and nothing which might not have happened in any other country as well as Travancore. We had begun, as allies, by furnishing troops for the protection of that province, and we had finished, in a very few years, by reducing it to subjection. In such circumstances, it was not all extraordinary, but was perfectly natural, that the Dewan should wish to recover his rank and power, and the independence of his country, by the expulsion of the invaders, and that, in order to give him a better chance of success, he should endeavour to seduce our Native troops. He prevailed on a few to join in his projects; and his gaining these few seems to have been occasioned by the guard from one of the battalions being left too long near him without being relieved, which gave him opportunities of tampering with them. It is true that, under the influence of alarm, and the credulity which usually attends it, the conspiracy was by many believed to have been extensive, and to have extended to all the corps in Travancore. But Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the Commander-in-chief at the time, after a full and able investigation of the evidence, has recorded his opinion, that the conspiracy was of the most contemptible kind;—that three, out of four corps, had no share in it; and that in the fourth corps it was confined to one jemadar, and a few non-commissioned officers and sepoy of bad character.

MINUTE, SIR S. AUCHMUTY.

8th Feb. 1813.

5. With respect to the expediency of keeping one European corps with all large bodies of Native troops, in order to

“ I have now gone through a large mass of evidence, and my opinion is, that the conspiracy was

check incipient discontent, I have great doubt of the policy of the measure, because I think that it would show suspicion, without being efficacious in preventing the danger apprehended; for it is remarkable, that in the only instance in which a conspiracy against the lives of the European officers was carried into execution, a European regiment was present, with only two battalions of sepoy; and yet that regiment was so far from being able to protect the European sepoy officers, that it lost a great part of its own officers and men, and was saved from destruction only by the timely arrival of troops from Arcot. I do not, from this, mean to infer, that European troops may not be useful on such occasions, but that they do not furnish such security as can be entirely depended upon, or as ought to be purchased by any great sacrifice of convenience or economy. I think that the best way of ensuring the fidelity of our Native troops is to show no distrust, but confidence at all times; to treat them well; to keep them occupied; to relieve the different stations regularly; to bring all the corps at certain fixed periods, back to their respective Native districts; and to take care that none of them be permitted to remain too long in any place where they are likely to be tampered with by any Native chief.

6. It appears to me, that in all our cantonments our European corps are so situated as to be exposed to great danger, and to be incapable of acting efficiently in the event of any general conspiracy among the Native troops. The European barracks are so near those of the sepoy, as to be always liable to surprise. In order to be secure, they ought to be at some distance from them: this would enable the European corps to guard against surprise, and more effectually to overawe any combinations of Native troops.

7. It will be obvious, from what has been said, that I do not consider it to be necessary that an European regiment should continue in Travancore. Were it necessary, I should not object to the expense which it would involve; but as it is not, I am unwilling that Government should incur an expense for barracks of not less than rupees 12,100,15,4, more especially when we have barracks for a complete regiment at Wallajahabad, Arnee, and Vel-

lore, without a single European soldier in either of them. There are also other reasons for withdrawing the European regiment from Travancore. In that remote situation, it is not easily available for general service, not only on account of the distance, but of the violence of the monsoon rendering all access to Quilon by sea impracticable during several months in the year.

It is likewise desirable, on account of the tranquil state of the country and of the propriety of our gradually relinquishing all interference with its government, that we should, by degrees, reduce our force there, and begin by removing the European part. The force to be permanently stationed at Quilon should not be more than what the Dewan or the Rajah, when he comes of age, may deem sufficient to secure the stability of his power. I shall probably, on some future occasion, state my reasons for thinking that Travancore may, with safety, be left entirely to the management of its own rulers.

8. For the present, I would recommend that the European regiment be replaced by a sepoy corps, which I have no doubt we shall be able to withdraw next year without any inconvenience. As it is believed that the 69th regiment will be ordered home in the course of the year, it ought to halt and remain either at Arnee or Wallajabad, until the time of its embarkation. We shall thus avoid the inconvenience and expense of marching it into Fort St. George, and then out again, in order to be drafted, and much of the irregularity which always attends the drafting of Europeans so near both to the black town and to the artillery cantonments at the Mount.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XI.

MINUTE ON THE HALF-CASTE POPULATION.

14. THE allowance to the European wives of soldiers, and to their children, has now become a charge of considerable magnitude in India. It appears to require the attention of the Honourable Court of Directors; and it would be desirable that they should fix the rates, and, if practicable, equalize them at the different Presidencies. They ought not to be more than is absolutely necessary; and upon this principle they are undoubtedly

too high at present. The coming out of European women to this country should be restricted as much as possible ; for the climate and the way of living are unfavourable to every decent woman who is the wife of a soldier.

15. I have already stated my sentiments on the allowance to half-caste women and children. The measure would in time lead to so much expense, and produce so much distress, and is altogether so extravagant and impolitic, that I should consider myself as wanting in my duty, if I did not recommend to the Honourable Court not to sanction it in any shape, or in any degree, but to reject it entirely. In speaking of the half-caste population, I have chiefly spoken of them as depending on us, not as what they would be if left to themselves, but as what they are made by our injudicious interference. If we limit our care of them to the support of schools, and leave them in every thing else to their own exertions, they will become a numerous, industrious, and useful race of men ; but they must expect, like every other great population, to have among them every gradation of condition, from independence and affluence to poverty and hard labour. They are at present, as far as regards the means of living, in better circumstances than the people of England. Comparing them with an equal number of the people of England, there are among them a smaller proportion subjected to extreme poverty, and a greater who live comfortably. This may last while their number is small, and employment easily found ; but it must gradually cease as they become numerous ; and they must then, like every other great community, have their full proportion of poor. There is no cause why they should not by their own exertions become a thriving people ; they are not at present so well qualified as the Hindoos for hard labour, but they will gradually acquire the habit of labour from necessity ; and they have the advantage of having fewer prejudices, and a better education, and this advantage of education will always continue. The influence of the superior schools at the Presidency will extend to those at a distance, and the acquisition of knowledge will no doubt be encouraged, both by the aid and example of the most respectable part of their own community.

16. It is rather from the desire of concurring, in some degree, in the sentiments of the Commander-in-chief, than from any conviction of the expediency of the proposed increase, that I now agree to adopt some part of it, instead of previously referring the whole subject for the orders of the Honourable Court, as suggested in my former minute.

XII.

MINUTE ON NATIVE EDUCATION.

10th March 1826.

THE Board of Revenue were directed by Government, on the 2nd July 1822, to ascertain the number of schools, and the state of education among the natives in the provinces; and with their letter of the 21st of February last, they transmitted the reports on this subject which they had received from the several collectors. From these reports, it appears that the number of schools, and of what are called colleges, in the territories under this Presidency, amount to 12,498, and the population to 12,850,941; so that there is one school to every thousand of the population. But as only a very few females are taught in schools, we may reckon one school to every five hundred of the population.

2. It is remarked by the Board of Revenue, that of a population of twelve millions and a half, there are only 188,000, or one in sixty-seven, receiving education: this is true of the whole population, but not as regards the male part of it, of which the proportion educated is much greater than is here estimated; for, if we take the whole population, as stated in the Report, at 12,850,000

And deduct one-half for the females, the remaining
 main population will be 6,425,000
 And if we reckon the male population between the
 ages of five and ten years, which is the period
 which boys in general remain at school, at one-
 ninth, it will give 713,000

Which is the number of boys that would be at school, if all the males above ten years of age were educated; but the number actually attending the schools is only 184,110, or little more than one-fourth of that number. I have taken the interval between five and ten years of age as the term of education; because, though many boys continue at school till twelve or fourteen, many leave it under ten. I am however inclined to estimate the portion of the male population who receive school education, to be nearer to one-third than one-fourth of the whole, because we have no returns from the provinces of the numbers taught at home. In Madras, the number taught at home is 26,963, or above five times greater than that taught in the schools. There

is probably some error in this number ; and though the number privately taught in the provinces does certainly not approach this rate, it is no doubt considerable ; because the practice of boys being taught at home by their relations or private teachers, is not unfrequent in any part of the country. The proportion educated is very different of different classes : in some it is nearly the whole ; in others it is hardly one-tenth.

3. The state of education here exhibited, low as it is, compared with that of our own country, is higher than it was in most European countries at no very distant period. It has, no doubt, been better in earlier times ; but, for the last century, it does not appear to have undergone any other change than what arose from the number of schools diminishing in one place and increasing in another, in consequence of the shifting of the population from war and other causes. The great number of schools has been supposed to contribute to the keeping education in a low state, because it does not give a sufficient number of scholars to secure the service of able teachers. The monthly rate paid by each scholar is from four to six or eight annas. Teachers, in general, do not earn more than six or seven rupees monthly, which is not an allowance sufficient to induce men properly qualified to follow the profession. It may also be said, that the general ignorance of the teachers themselves is one cause why none of them draw together a large body of scholars. But the main causes of the low state of education are the little encouragement which it receives from there being but little demand for it, and the poverty of the people.

4. These difficulties may be gradually surmounted. The hindrance which is given to education by the poverty of the people may, in a great degree, be removed by the endowment of schools throughout the country by Government ; and the want of encouragement will be remedied by good education being rendered more easy and general, and by the preference which will naturally be given to well-educated men in all public offices. No progress, however, can be made without a body of better instructed teachers than we have at present. But such a body cannot be had without an income sufficient to afford a comfortable livelihood to each individual belonging to it ; a moderate allowance should, therefore, be secured to them by Government, sufficient to place them above want ; the rest should be derived from their own industry. If they are superior both in knowledge and diligence to the common village schoolmasters, scholars will flock to them, and augment their income.

5. What is first wanted, therefore, is a school for educating teachers, as proposed by the Committee of the Madras School Book Society, in the letter of the 25th October 1824, which accompanied the second Report. I think that they should be authorized to draw seven hundred rupees monthly from the treasury, for the purposes which they have stated; namely, for the payment of the interest of money employed in building, and the salaries of teachers, five hundred; and for the expenses of the press, two hundred. I would next propose that Government should establish in each collectorate two principal schools, one for Hindoos, and the other for Mohammedans; and that hereafter, as teachers can be found, the Hindoo schools might be augmented, so as to give one to each tishildary, or about fifteen to each collectorate. We ought to extend to our Mohammedan the same advantages of education as to our Hindoo subjects, and perhaps even in a greater degree, because a greater proportion of them belong to the middle and higher classes; but as their number is not more than one-twentieth of that of the Hindoos, it will not be necessary to give more than one Mohammedan school to each collectorate, except in Arcot and a few other collectorates, where the Mohammedan population is considerably above the usual standard.

6. We have twenty collectorates. The number of tishildaries is liable to change; but it will be sufficient for the present purpose to estimate them at fifteen on an average to each collectorate, or three hundred in all. This would, according to the plan proposed, give about forty collectorate and three hundred tishildary schools. The monthly salaries of the teachers of the collectorate schools might, on an average, be fifteen rupees to each, and those of the tishildary nine rupees to each. These allowances may appear small, but the tishildary schoolmaster, who receives nine rupees monthly from Government, will get at least as much more from his scholars; and, considering all circumstances, his situation will probably be better than that of a parish schoolmaster in Scotland.

7. The total expense of the schools will be as follows:—

Madras School-Book Society, per month	Rs. 700
Collectorate schools, Mohammedan, 20 a. 15 Rs.	300
Ditto, Hindoo, 20 a. 15 Rs.	300
Tishildary schools, 300 a. 9 Rs.	2,700

Per month 4,000

Per ann. Rs. 48,000

This expense will be incurred only by degrees, because it will be long before a sufficient number of qualified teachers can be obtained. The charges for the Madras School Book Society and the collectorate schools are all that will probably be wanted before the sanction of the Honourable Court can be received. The sum for which we ought to request their sanction, ought not to be less than half a lac of rupees. None of the endowments in the collector's Report are applicable to the present object. They do not exceed twenty thousand rupees in all; and only a small portion of them are public grants, and this small portion belongs chiefly to teachers of theology, law, and astronomy. Whatever expense Government may incur in the education of the people, will be amply repaid by the improvement of the country; for the general diffusion of knowledge is inseparably followed by more orderly habits, by increasing industry, by a taste for the comforts of life, by exertions to acquire them, and by the growing prosperity of the people.

8. It will be advisable to appoint a Committee of Public Instruction, in order to superintend the establishing of the public schools, to fix on the plans most proper for them, and the books to be used in them; to ascertain in what manner the instruction of the natives may be best promoted, and to report to Government the result of their inquiries on this important subject.

9. We must not be too sanguine in expecting any sudden benefit from the labours of the School Book Society. Their disposition to promote the instruction of the people, by educating teachers, will not extend it to more individuals than now attend the schools. It can be extended only by means of an increased demand for it, and this must arise chiefly from its being found to facilitate the acquisition of wealth or rank, and from the improvement in the condition of the people rendering a larger portion of them more able to pay for it. But though they cannot educate those who do not seek, or cannot pay for education, they can, by an improved system, give a better education to those who do receive it; and by creating and encouraging a taste for knowledge, they will indirectly contribute to extend it. If we resolve to educate the people, if we persevere in our design, and if we do not limit the schools to tishildaries, but increase their number so as to allow them for smaller districts, I am confident that success will ultimately attend our endeavours. But, at the same time, I entirely concur in the opinion expressed in the Fifth Report of the Calcutta School-Book Society, when speaking of the system,

that "its operation must therefore of necessity be slow; years must elapse before the rising generation will exhibit any visible improvement."

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

XIII.

MINUTE ON PUBLIC SERVANTS BEING PERMITTED TO HOLD LANDS.

In Consultation, 11th July 1826.

1. I HAVE examined with attention the voluminous proceedings of the Board of Revenue, on the question of public servants being landholders, and the sale of Merasi lands in Tanjore for arrears of revenue, and the purchase of them by public servants and their connections.

2. The report of the sub-collector, Mr. Roberts, points out very distinctly the abuses which this practice has occasioned, and while it is authorized, the ease with which they may be committed, and the difficulty of preventing them.

3. I concur entirely in the sentiments expressed by the Board of Revenue, regarding the possession of lands by public servants, either by inheritance or private purchase, in the district in which they are employed, and the sale of lands by public auction for arrears of revenue to them and their connections. There is no prohibition against the possession of private property in land by public servants, in the districts in which they serve. It is however better on the whole, even in districts permanently settled, that a proprietor of land should hold no high office in the district in which his land lies. In districts not permanently settled, the possession of land ought not to cause the removal of a tishildar or other principal servant; but it ought to be sufficient to prevent the owner from being appointed to any high office in his own district. An influential officer, like a tishildar, ought not to be permitted to purchase land in his own district, when sold either by private or public sale, without previously resigning his office. Should he purchase without resigning, he should be dismissed from

office ; and if the purchase be of land sold for arrears of revenue, the sale should be null. It may be thought that there could be no harm in allowing him to purchase land when sold by private sale. But it appears to me to be objectionable on two grounds : first, on that of his becoming a landholder in his own district ; and secondly, on that of its leaving an opening for converting into a private, what would otherwise have been a public sale. In all unsettled districts, but especially in Tanjore, where the settlements fluctuate annually according to prices ; and in many villages, both according to prices and to produce, the principal revenue servants have many means of causing the sale of lands and villages, without appearing to be concerned in it. They may overrate the produce and the prices. They may prevent remission where it is necessary, by underrating the loss of crop from want of water or other causes ; and they may insist on punctual payment of the kist when the delay of a month or two would have saved the land-owner from great loss ; and he may, in this manner, often be obliged to sell his land, in order to avoid a distress by attempting to retain it. I believe that it is generally understood by the revenue servants, that they are not to purchase land in the districts in which they serve, and that this circumstance restrains them ; but were this check removed by such purchases being openly authorized by Government, they would soon be carried to an extent which would be extremely injurious both to the landholders and to the public revenue.

4. The question of revenue officers being proprietors of land in their own districts, is, however, of much less consequence than that of they and their relations being the purchasers of land sold by public auction for arrears of revenue. Wherever such a practice is suffered to exist, it must tend to facilitate the oppression of the land-owners, to spread corruption among the revenue servants, and to destroy the confidence of the people in the protection of the Government. The statement given by the Board of Revenue sufficiently proves how rapidly such a mischievous practice increases when it meets with any encouragement, as in Tanjore. It appears that land belonging to nine hundred and fifteen individuals, bearing an assessment of rupees 1,00,523, has been sold on account of arrears amounting to rupees 3,09,544, and produced at sale, rupees 120,384 : that these arrears have been accumulating from so old a date as 1801-2, the first year of the Company's undivided administration of the province : that of this land thirty-two lots

Board of Revenue,
August 8, 1825,
para. 13, 14, &c.

were purchased by public servants and their relations and connections: that of these lots only four were purchased previous to 1820, and the remaining twenty-eight between 1820 and November 1823. That the assessment upon the land thus sold was rupees 37,571—the arrears due, rupees 1,23,193—and the purchase-money, rupees 44,101; and that though in general the purchase-money was less than the arrears, yet in two cases it was more than five times the amount.

5. The purchases made by the public servants and their connections, from 1820 to November 1823, show how rapidly the evil was increasing, until it was checked by the petitions of the inhabitants; and the two instances in which land is sold for more than five times the amount of the arrears, would probably not have occurred, had the public servants not been concerned; and farther explanation respecting them ought to be required.

6. The detail given by the Board of Revenue of the circumstances under which the villages of Tenderah and Paravalunden were sold, exhibits very distinctly the abuses with which the practice of selling lands for arrears of revenue has been attended in Tanjore. The village of Tenderah was sold in April 1823, for arrears to Venkat Row, the late Dewan of Travancore, who is related both to the head serishtadar of Tanjore and to the tishildar of the district in which Tenderah is situated.

7. These arrears commenced so early as 1801-2, and amounted, at the time of sale, to chuckrums 63,844, of which more than one-half, or chuckrums 3,73,743½, accrued while the village was under sequestration, and managed by sirkar servants. During the period of sequestration, which, with an interval of two years, lasted six, the whole of the proprietor's share of the produce was taken by the sirkar for arrears. The cultivators who had received tuckavi received no part of the cultivator's share, and in three of these years not one individual in the village received any share of the produce of his labour; and yet in each of these six years there is entered a balance against the village, on account of revenue, and in five years of the six on account of tuckavi. The particulars of the arrears and sale of Paravalunden are nearly similar to those of Tenderah.

8. The system followed with regard to these arrears has been unjust and oppressive to the inhabitants, and has, no doubt, been likewise injurious to the revenue. The Meerassadars ought to have been liable only for such arrears as rose while the villages were

in their own hands. The arrears which occurred under sequestration ought to have been borne exclusively by Government. The cultivators who received tuckavi, were no doubt answerable for it; but accidents often happen, which render them unable to pay it; and when this accrues, it should be remitted. A measure so harsh as the seizure of their whole share of the produce for its liquidation, ought never to be resorted to.

Govt. to Board of Revenue 9th August 1821. 9. The balances of fuslies 1211 and 1212 are included in their arrears, though they were ordered by Government to be struck off; and no cause is assigned for their having been retained. The Board of Revenue recommended that after remitting star pagodas 62,467,29,37 on account of fuslies 1218 and 1219 in the province of Tanjore, leaving a balance of star pagodas 10,947,15,15, the collector should exercise his discretion in collecting it. The balance on this account, however, notwithstanding the sale of so much land, is still rupees 19,413, which I think ought at once to be remitted. The principle stated by the Board of Revenue, in recommending a remission of star pagodas 59,108 out of a balance of star pagodas 86,597,35,51 on account of the lease from fusly 1220 to 1224, due from villages originally rented, but afterwards assumed and managed by the sirkar servants, namely, "that the deficiency which then occurred could not in fact be regarded in the light of a balance so much as an unavoidable reduction in the settlement," is perfectly correct.

10. The custom of keeping the accumulating balances of a great number of years standing, against districts, is productive of many serious evils, and is scarcely ever attended with any real advantage. We see how small a portion of them has been recovered in Tanjore after the lapse of so many years, and the adoption of such rigorous measures; and if we could trace all the effects of this recovery, we should probably find that it had been obtained partly out of the current year's revenue, and partly by disabling the proprietor from carrying on his cultivation to the usual extent, and that Government had, in fact, gained little or nothing by the recovery. We see that these old balances are good for little else than furnishing the means of corrupting the revenue servants, and of oppressing the inhabitants; and I am therefore of opinion that a period ought to be limited beyond which no balance of land revenue should be demanded. It ought perhaps

in no case to exceed two years after the close of the year in which the balance became due; but in general it might probably with advantage be confined to the commencement of the kists of the ensuing year, or to the first six months of that year. This rule might be applicable not only to all unsettled districts, but, with some exceptions, to all under temporary leases. The Board of Revenue might be desired to take the subject into consideration, and report their sentiments regarding it; and in the mean time the remissions recommended by them in 1816, on account of the triennial and quinquennial leases in Tanjore, ought to be authorised.

Board of Revenue,
8th August 1825,
para. 38.

11. I entirely agree with the Board of Revenue in their remarks on the conduct of the revenue servants of Tanjore in the sale of lands for arrears of revenue, being injurious to the inhabitants, and calculated to throw discredit on the Government, and on the propriety of annulling, as far as may be practicable under the Regulations, all sales of Merasi land, for arrears of revenue, and particularly such as have been made to the public servants of the revenue, and their connections.

12. The Board of Revenue, in their proceedings of the 19th June, continue their observations on the sale of lands in Tanjore. It appears that purchases by public servants had begun so far back as 1812. The then collector said that the purchase by public servants of lands exposed for public sale had been repeatedly and publicly prohibited, and he recommended, and the Board directed the servants concerned to be dismissed, and suits to be instituted for annulling the sales. These measures, and the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, which were conveyed to the present collector, and his attention particularly called to the paragraphs which prohibited the sale of Merasi lands, ought to have made him more cautious in authorising their sale. But he seems to have considered this severe measure rather as the ordinary way of recovering balances, than as one which was to be resorted to only in extreme cases; and I agree with the Board in thinking, that the two villages which he was anxious to sell for arrears, were not such urgent cases as to require an immediate decision, and make them anticipate the full consideration of the general question, as in one of the villages the arrears were very trifling, and in the other, the last item comprising the arrears, had become due seven years ago, and ever since that time the revenue had been punctually realized.

Bd. of Rev. 19th
June, 1816, para.
3 and 6.

Board of Revenue,
para. 23 and 28.

Para. 33, 34. 13. The collector observes, that what is usually termed sequestration in Tanjore, is nothing more than the superintendence of the sirkar servants, as the Meerassadar continues to manage the land, and to cultivate it with his own people. The Board of Revenue object to such a nominal system of sequestration. It would be certainly more complete if the land were taken entirely out of his hands; but this may be often inconvenient; and as the sirkar servants superintend the cultivation, and reaping, and measuring, there is such a degree of interference, or sequestration, as ought to exempt the proprietor, after the delivery of the sirkar share of the produce, from every other demand; and the sale of lands, under such circumstances, on the plea of their not having yielded the amount at which they had been estimated or assessed, is a severe and unjustifiable measure.

14. The collection of old arrears is destructive of exertion and of agricultural enterprise: but it appears that no less than four hundred and seventy-four villages have been sold, either in whole or in part, for arrears of which a very considerable part is of an old date.

The particulars are as follow:—

	Villages.	Meerassadars.	Rupees.
Sold entire,	170	740	135,628
Sold in part,	304	1289	143,824
	<u>474</u>	<u>2029</u>	<u>279,452</u>

Board of Revenue, para. 44 and 49. The balances for which they were sold amounted to rupees 810,836. The sales yielded rupees 359,188, or considerably less than half the balances. Mr. ---'s sales have not only been much more extensive than those of all his predecessors, but they have been for older arrears, and have been rendered still more objectionable by the great purchases of the public servants. Those of Narhari Row alone pay a revenue of rupees 17,479 : 8:—those of all the other servants, rupees 30,502 : 13,11. The first purchase, with one single exception, was made by the serishtadar Goonda Punt, in August 1820, and was soon followed by many others, but all small in comparison with those of Narhari Row, which included the two whole villages of Paravalunden and Tenderah, whose affairs have been so fully investigated by the Board of Revenue. It appears that these villages are held by Kisnah Row, the second son of Goonda Punt; that Kisnah Row was adopted by Narhari Row, who is son-in-law of Venkal Row, the

Board of Revenue,
para. 54, &c.

late Dewan of Travancore ; that Sreniwas Row, the purchaser, is the son of Venkal Row ; and that Goonda Punt endeavoured to get the villages at a low assessment through the application of the Dewan at Madras, who repeatedly urged the subject under the plea that the villages were for himself, while, in fact, they were purchased for the serishtadar's son, Kisnah Row.

15. The transactions regarding these two villages show to what an extent the frauds of the public servants may be carried, if not completely put a stop to by adequate measures.

Para. 68. The Board of Revenue should be therefore authorized to annul the sales to public servants and

Para. 70. their relations ; to dismiss the serishtadar and his deputy ; to require the collector's report on

the other servants ; to prohibit private purchase of land, on pain of dismissal from office ; and to call on the collectors for a report

Para. 73 and 75. on old balances, in order that such as cannot be collected may be written off. I concur in the

Para. 78. opinion of the Board of Revenue, that the power

of sale cannot be relinquished in districts settled rayetwar, without endangering the realization of the revenue, but that it should be cautiously exercised.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

XIV.

MINUTE ON PROMOTION OF NATIVES.

27th April 1827.

1. THE appointment of Mr. Cassmajor to the office of Resident at Mysore, seems to present a fit occasion for revising the local administration of Seringapatam, which the great changes which the place has undergone have, for some time past, rendered every day more necessary. The great importance of Seringapatam, when it fell into our hands, required that its civil administration should be vested in an European officer ; but since that time, from the fall of the Poona States and other causes, it has lost almost all its political and military importance. It is no longer a principal military station ; its garrison consists only of a part of a local corps—its numerous population, originally drawn together by its having been the seat of Government, has been for

many years dispersing itself over the country, and the portion which is left is still diminishing every day, from the want of employment and the insalubrity of the climate.

2. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the employment of a civil servant exclusively for the management of the civil duties of Seringapatam is unnecessary. I think that the island of Seringapatam should be annexed to the collectorate of Coimbatore;—that all judicial authority in the island should be entrusted to an intelligent native;—that his jurisdiction should extend over the districts of Kolligall and Sattigall;—that he should exercise all the powers, civil and criminal, of an assistant judge;—and that his court should remain at Seringapatam until it can be conveniently removed to Kolligall.

3. Seringapatam is itself extremely unhealthy; and we are not sure that Kolligall is favourable to the European constitution. It is therefore desirable, for this cause alone, even if there were no other, that natives, who are less liable to suffer from the climate, should be employed instead of Europeans. Should the experiment, in the present instance, prove successful, as I am confident it will, the employment of Native judges may then, by degrees, be extended to some other remote and unhealthy districts, such as Soondah, and in time to every place where their services may be useful.

4. At present, the highest Native officers in the judicial department act immediately under the eye of the European judge. The highest Native judicial officer who is entrusted to act for himself at a distance from the judge, is the District Moonsiff; but his situation is a very subordinate one: in criminal matters he has no jurisdiction, and in civil it is limited to suits of rupees five hundred. The District Moonsiffs, by their general good conduct, have become a very important part of our judicial system: they have fully realized all the expectations which were formed of their utility; and the public benefit which has resulted from their employment, ought of itself to be a sufficient motive for our availing ourselves of the services of Natives in a higher judicial station than that of District Moonsiff. That office, though no doubt respectable, is still very subordinate, and ought to be rather the beginning than the limit of Native promotion. We ought to look forward to a time when Natives may be employed in almost every office, however high, and we ought to prepare them gradually for such a change, by entrusting them with higher

duties from time to time, in proportion as experience may prove their being qualified to discharge them.

5. The employment of Natives in high offices will be as much for our own advantage as for their's: it will tend both to the economy and efficiency of the administration of public affairs. Every time that a Native is raised to a higher office than had before been filled by any of his countrymen, a new impulse will be given to the whole establishment; the hope of attaining the higher office will excite emulation among those who hold the inferior ones, and improve the whole. But this improvement will take place in a much greater degree when the new office is one of a high and independent nature, like that of a judge. The person who is appointed to it will be conscious that he enjoys some share in the administration of the affairs of his country; he will feel that his own rank and character have been elevated by his having been selected for the high office which he holds, and his feelings will pervade every class of the department to which he belongs. I do not mean to say that we are not to expect misconduct in a Native judge; we shall certainly meet with it in him, as in all classes of public servants; and when we do, it must be punished by dismissal: but this ought not to discourage us from continuing the office; for I am convinced that the instances of misconduct will not be numerous,—that they will become more rare every day, and that they will weigh nothing in comparison with the advantages to be derived from the employment of Native judges.

6. I think that the Native judge ought to have all the powers of an assistant judge, because to give him less would not answer the purpose either of enabling us to withdraw the European judge from Seringapatam, or to make the experiment of improving the Native branch of the judicial department, by the employment of a Native judge; and because it would lead to unnecessary embarrassment and confusion, by involving the necessity of creating a new office with judicial authority, different from that of any other existing judicial office; whereas, by giving him the same powers as an assistant judge, his office will differ from that of an assistant judge merely in having jurisdiction over a smaller territory.

As the Native judge will receive no fees, his pay, in order to be suitable to his station, and to render his office an object of ambition to all Native judicial servants, ought not to be less than rupees 300 per month.

The selection for the office of Native judge should be made by the Provincial Court, or by the Sudder Adawlut, from among the District Moonsiffs or the officers of the courts, according as the person best qualified may be found among the one or the other.

It would perhaps be advisable that all prisoners committed for trial by the Native judge should be sent to the gaol of Coimbatore or Salem, because it would greatly extend the distance of the circuit, and prolong its duration, were the court of circuit to visit Kolligall or Seringapatam. It is in fact only the prisoners belonging to Seringapatam who have ever been tried any where else than at Salem, or Coimbatore; and the Seringapatam prisoners would be less liable to sickness in the gaol of either of these places than in their own.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort St. George, 6th April 1827.

XV.

MINUTE ON THE MODE OF REMUNERATING OLD AND FAITHFUL NATIVE SERVANTS.

In Consultation, 9th March 1827.

THE Honourable the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 11th June 1823, have desired, "That should the original Native Pension Fund not have been abolished, it be continued under the regulations submitted to Government on the 25th of March 1817, subject to such amendments as may be deemed advisable;" but that, in the event of its having been abolished, Government should consider and adopt the best means of reinstating it."

It is the duty of Government to carry into effect the intentions of the Honourable Court, as far as may be now practicable. But after again reading every document connected with the subject, from first to last, I still continue to think that the measure is not only unnecessary, but hurtful to the public service. I think also, that even if the measure were in itself without objection, we have not in this country the means of conducting it properly, or so as that it shall not produce more evil than good.

The Honourable Court do not think that the
Para. 31, 32, 33. Native servants, except in very few instances, have the means of laying up any provision for their families; and they believe that those who have, are more disposed, while in

office, to spend the surplus in charity and maintaining poor relations, than in saving. They do not admit that public servants ought to be assimilated to private, in being left to depend upon parsimony and their relations, and think that they have a claim to a certain extent upon the State. I never saw any objection to this claim to a certain extent; but I saw very serious objection to its being, by means of a Pension Fund, artificially augmented to an unmanageable extent, which it has been for some years. Long before the establishment of the Pension Fund, claims of real distress were heard, and, I believe, better satisfied than at present, because they were not overwhelmed with a mass of those of another description; and the claims of long and meritorious service were not less attended to than now. The Pension Fund will not provide better for either of these classes than was done without it. But it will certainly do what was not done before,—it will provide for the families of the thoughtless and improvident, at the expense of the careful and frugal; and I agree with the Committee of 1817 in thinking, that it will, among the great body of the Native Servants, have a bad effect in lessening their provident habits. I cannot concur in the opinion of the Honourable Court, that saving is very rare among our Native servants. I believe that it is very general, even among those whose pay is small; and that there are few who, when old, have not, either from their own savings or the aid of children or relatives, the means of subsistence, or whose families, after their death, have not, from some helps, the means of maintaining themselves. If we suppose with the Honourable Court, that few servants can save, there would then be few whose families would not require pensions, and pensions could only be given to a few, by withholding them from many who required them as much as themselves. This is, I believe, what does happen, and what must always in a great degree happen, in the distribution of pensions, founded on our imperfect estimate of the circumstances of our Native servants.

The stoppage for the Pension Fund is said by the Honourable Court to be only the enforcement of a moral obligation. It is a nice point to determine where Government ought to interfere in the enforcement of moral obligations. In many cases, it is best to leave the observances of them to the discretion of the party; and the present appears to me to be one of those cases. Were it certain that Government could discover the objects really entitled to the pension, and grant it accordingly, there might be some

ground for interference ; but as it has no means of effecting this, there can be none, more especially as there can be little doubt that it will often add to the distress of some families, by bestowing on others the stoppages made from their salaries, which might otherwise have been saved for their own benefit. One main objection to the Pension Fund is, that after appropriating the whole, whatever may be its amount, we shall not provide for all the families claiming aid, but, on the contrary, we shall have more families claiming aid, on account of distress, than if no such fund had ever existed. In little more than eight years from the commencement of the payment of the pensions till 1819-20, they had reached the sum of rupees 92,61,26,10 ; and with the charges (rupees 4,957,15) exceeded the sum originally allotted for their payment, (composed of the whole of the annual interest of the capital, and one-half of the annual subscription,) in the sum of rupees 70,73. There were then two hundred and ninety new claims for decision ; and had the payment of pensions not been limited, there can be no doubt that the new claims would, in a very few years, have swallowed up the remaining half of the subscription. We should then have had no means of paying now, except from the lapse of old pensions, while there would have been no sensible abatement of the claims of distress. Much distress has been relieved by the fund ; but more, I imagine, has gone unrelieved. The system itself produces and augments distress, by encouraging thousands to depend on the fund, rather than on their own exertions. If we persevere in attempting to carry on such an unmanageable plan, we shall receive no gratitude for what we give, but much censure for what we withhold : and the censure will not be without ground ; for we shall, from our ignorance, as often reject as take the real objects of charity.

The Pension Fund, among its disadvantages, has a tendency to prevent the dismissal of bad servants ; for, though a servant is found to be unfit for his duty from negligence, incapacity, or other cause, there is often a reluctance on the part of his superior to dismiss him, because it is thought hard to deprive a man of employment after he has paid stoppages for several years. There is also another inconvenience attending the stoppages ; namely, that in many instances it is doubtful whether they are real or nominal. The rates of pay are so various and fluctuating in every rank above that of a peon, that there is reason to apprehend that they will be gradually increased, so as, at least, to counter-

balance the stoppage. At the Presidency, where the duties are of a more fixed and uniform nature, this is not so easy; but in the provinces the case is different, and the fluctuation in the rates of pay must long continue there, because it will be very long before such an uniform system of order can be introduced as will enable us to fix the rates of pay for any considerable time. Our knowledge of every district is more or less imperfect. Investigations must be carried on to enable us to bring them into better order; and the pay of the Natives employed must be regulated by their qualifications, and not by any invariable scale.

I have hitherto been speaking of the Family Pension Fund. I shall now make a few short remarks on the proposed Superannuation Fund, which was disapproved of by the Committee of 1817. I have strong objections to both funds; but of the two, I have the least to the superannuation, because it is much simpler, much easier in its management, and much less liable to abuse, than the other; as we can always ascertain when a servant is superannuated, though we cannot whether a family be in distress or not. But, notwithstanding these advantages, I am averse to the introduction of this fund; because I am averse to every new establishment whose utility is not obvious. Superannuated servants, having claims upon the State, know that they will always be attended to; and it would be better that they should be defrayed from the treasury, than from a subscription fund. The pension in this way would be more honourable, and more acceptable to the pensioner. If it be given from a fund, however moderately and cautiously given at first, it will soon be given with profusion, and exhaust the fund. The heads of departments and officers who recommend, would be partial to their own servants. The very circumstance of there being a fund for the purpose would make them more liberal in proposing the reward, would make them gradually become less severe in their estimate of public merit, and, in time, think it hard to exclude almost any man of a tolerably fair character. It may be said, that Government can prevent any unnecessary expenditure in this respect. It certainly can, if it give sufficient time to the subject; but if we are to judge from experience in all similar matters, it certainly will not, because it could not possibly find time for the requisite inquiry. Were superannuation to be determined solely by length of service, the difficulty would be lessened. But as decay of sight and other infirmities must have a place, the difficulty will continue. There is in the system itself a principle of profusion,

in the encouragement which it gives to constant claims. Government cannot be always on its guard, or at leisure to examine them in detail, and they will undoubtedly soon swallow up the fund.

The Family Pension Fund was never thought of until August 1807, when it was first suggested by the Committee of Finance. No inconvenience had ever been felt from the want of it, during the long previous existence of our Native establishments. No recommendation of it, no call for it, had ever come from any quarter. The opinions of every Committee employed upon the fund have been against it. The Committee of 1813 pointed out the great difficulty of deciding upon claims, and how little aid could be derived from the recommendations of heads of offices. The Committee of 1817 expressed great doubts of the utility of the institution. They showed that it occasioned great and continually increasing labour, and that from the lapses annually accruing in a body of thirty-six thousand subscribers, it would in time become a business of immense detail, and that it tended to corrupt the moral feelings of the natives; and they requested that some other permanent arrangement might be made for the management of the fund, as it occupied too much of the time required for their other duties. When I hear such opinions from a committee composed of men remarkable for their application to public business, I am satisfied that, by establishing a Pension Fund, we are needlessly involving ourselves in a mass of useless and interminable labour, which will waste the time of many public servants, which will lead to expenses which we do not foresee, and which Government will not be able to prevent, or even check, in any degree, without neglecting its more important duties.

As I disapprove entirely both of the Family and Superannuation Pension Funds, I have thought it right to state the grounds of my opinion; but as the Honourable Court have directed their continuance or reinstatement, it only remains for the Board to carry their orders into effect in the way most likely to produce the benefit contemplated, with the least injury to the service, and the least waste of public labour. I am not aware that any better plan can be devised for this purpose than that which has been already suggested, of excluding the lower classes of servants from the Family Pension Fund, and not admitting any claim to superannuation until after thirty years' service. It will not be sufficient to exclude peons and servants whose pay is under three

pagodas. The exclusion ought to extend to all servants whose pay is less than pagodas eight, or rupees twenty-eight, and to all who do not belong to establishments of a permanent nature, whatever the amount of their pay may be.

XVI.

ON THE ABOLITION OF ZILLAH COURTS.

30th January 1827.

1. I HAVE considered with attention the letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors in the judicial department, dated the 11th April 1826. Some of the measures recommended in this letter may be immediately adopted with advantage; but there are some which it would not be advisable to adopt, and others which it may be found useful to introduce hereafter, when the system is more consolidated and better understood, but which it would be inconvenient to carry into effect at present.

2. The Honourable Court, after noticing the abolition of the zillah courts, between February 1821 and March 1823, observes, that the local and superior judicial officers should have been required to report their opinion, before measures of such extreme importance were decided on. The abolition was not hastily adopted; it had been frequently discussed among the members of Government, who were unanimous in their opinion regarding its expediency. Had the members of Government been men of little experience, and unacquainted with the operation of the judicial system, I should undoubtedly have thought it necessary to make a reference to the judicial officers; but Messrs. Stratton and Thackeray, the two civil members, were, from their general knowledge of the service, and experience in the judicial line, at least as competent as any of the local officers to form a just opinion on the subject under consideration; and to have waited, under such circumstances, to collect opinions from every quarter, would have been a mere waste of labour. There are some cases in which it is useful to have the opinion of every local officer; there are others in which that of only one or two of the most intelligent can be of the smallest use; and there are some in which none is necessary. I considered the present to be a case

in which Government could have derived no aid from other opinions in forming its own ; for it possessed in itself as extensive a knowledge of the localities of every district under this Presidency, and of the character and customs of the inhabitants, as could have been obtained anywhere else ; and as it had before it the periodical returns of the business done in the several courts, it was enabled, by observing what was done in some of the larger and more populous zillahs, to determine how far some of the smaller ones might be united, without detriment to the due administration of justice.

3. It is obvious too, that on such a question as that of the reduction of the number of zillahs, an impartial opinion could hardly have been expected from the judicial officers. They must be supposed to be, like other men, favourable to the branch of service to which they belong ; and, however conscientious, they may be liable to be influenced, without being sensible of it, by their wishes and their interests. Had the number of zillah courts been double or even treble of what it actually was, I am satisfied that not a single reduction would have been recommended.

4. Petitions against the abolition of the courts are in general of little weight. They prove nothing against the measure—they arise out of partial local interests. In whatever town or village a zillah court is established, it is beneficial to the inhabitants, not only for the sake of justice, but because it adds to the value of their houses and other property—gives them additional employment, and a better market for their produce. The removal of the court will of course be a loss to the inhabitants of that place and its neighbourhood, and produce petitions ; but the same thing would happen if the court were not reduced, but removed within the same zillah, from a small town to a larger one, more conveniently situated for the population of the zillah. Or even if, on removing the court, two courts instead of one were established in the same zillah, the inhabitants of the place from which the court had been removed would still complain. Had the courts been originally three times as numerous as they were, the reduction of any one of them would have produced petitions. Government cannot act upon such petitions, but must look to the wants of the whole country, and be guided by them in distributing the courts.

5. On the introduction of the judicial system, the courts were established at once, without any previous knowledge of the num-

ber that would be requisite. It was soon discovered that there were too many, and several were reduced. Longer experience showed that the business of some courts was much less than that of others; that the business of all had considerably diminished by the operation of the Regulations of 1816 and subsequent enactments; and that a farther reduction could be made without inconvenience, and without imposing upon the courts more labour than they formerly had. It was upon this ground that the reductions from 1821 to 1823 were made; and it is to be regretted that any expression in the minute proposing them should have led the Honourable Court to think that they were connected with the establishment of sub-collectors. There was no connection between the two measures; the sub-collectors would have been appointed had there been no courts to reduce, and the courts would have been reduced even if there had been no intention of appointing sub-collectors. But it was regarded as a satisfactory circumstance, that while we were increasing the expense of one branch of the service, we could lessen that of another, without impairing its efficiency. If we compare Bengal and Madras with respect to their relative extent of territory and amount of revenue, property, and population, and if we take into the account the relief which the Madras zillah courts have derived from the regulations of 1816, I believe it will appear that Madras has as large a proportion of zillah courts as Bengal.

6. The Honourable Court have quoted some reports of judicial
 Para. 11, 12, officers, regarding the great distance which wit-
 13, 14. nesses have sometimes to travel. A case is stated
 in Canara, in which some of the witnesses resided at the distance
 of two hundred, and others of two hundred and sixty miles from
 the zillah courts. Mangalore, the Court station, is about fifty
 miles from the southern extremity, and one hundred and sixty
 from the northern extremity of Canara, and about two hundred
 and ten from the most distant part of Soondah. There was a
 zillah court at Honawur, which was abolished many years ago
 by a former Government; and had the remaining court been
 then transferred from Mangalore to Cundapoor or Burroor, where
 the collector's cutcherry was for some years, though it would
 have been equally distant from the northern and southern points
 of Canara, it would have obviated, as far as regards distance,
 every material inconvenience which has been since experienced.
 Canara is a long narrow tract of country, not more than twenty
 or thirty miles in its average width; and Soondah, which is

situated above the Ghauts, is almost an entire jungle, thinly peopled, and very unhealthy. In such districts, therefore, as Canara and Soondah, the partial evil of distance cannot be removed without giving to them more courts than the amount of their population and property requires. The pressure of business at Canara is much greater than in any other zillah, and has frequently engaged the attention of the Board; and though I have little doubt that it grew out of the misconduct of the Court at a former period, yet I am convinced that it can now be remedied only by the aid of an assistant-judge. A case is brought forward as one of great hardship in Chicacole, where some rayets travelled three times from Aska and Gomsoor to the zillah court, making a distance of a thousand miles. These are evidently extreme cases, which seldom happen. Gomsoor is a remote, unhealthy, hill zemindary, over which our courts have a very imperfect authority.

7. Such complaints are not peculiar to this country. In all countries we have the same, or perhaps greater, aversion of prosecutors or witnesses to attend the courts, and leave their homes and business; and the same complaints of distance and detention. In many of our old zillahs, the Court station was not central, but at one extremity of the district, like Masulipatam. It would be an useless multiplication of courts to attempt to bring every remote corner of a district within a limited distance of them. The people of India, both from habit and climate, attach much less importance to distance than we do;—they travel at little expense, as they pay nothing on their journey for their accommodation. They would, no doubt, rather travel forty or fifty miles to a court than eighty or a hundred; but it is the leaving their homes, and the time they are to be absent from them and their business, which they think most of. A man who has to go fifty miles knows that he can reach the court in two or three days,—if a hundred, in as many more; but he can form no guess how long he will be detained there;—it may be one, two, or three weeks, or as many months. And it is this which they chiefly complain of, and from which no increase of courts could afford more than a very trifling relief.

Para. 16, 17.

8. It is observed by the Honourable Court, that as the average of suits instituted in the zillah courts did not exceed the value of one hundred and seventy-five rupees, most of them might have been carried to the district moonsiffs, had the parties wished it. It is not easy to ascertain

the motives which may have led to this preference. In some instances it may have been the belief that the case would have been better examined in the zillah court,—in others, it may have been the contrary. The character of the court, and the case being a plain or intricate one, would often influence the suitor in his choice of a court. In many cases, recourse was no doubt had to the zillah judge, because the suitors resided in the town which was the station of the zillah court: but one thing is clear, that, as all causes coming before the district moonsiffs might have gone to the judge, and as so small a proportion of them did go, the moonsiff's court is much more popular than the zillah court. It cannot be denied, that the abolition of the zillah courts was attended with inconvenience from the loss of the services of the sudder ameens. But it was soon remedied by the appointment of additional moonsiffs.

Para. 20. 9. It is apprehended by the Honourable Court, that when, in consequence of the late reduction of the zillah courts, "access to justice becomes very difficult, crimes are winked at or compromised, prosecutions are prevented, information is suppressed, and acts of fraud and violence, scarcely less terrible to the community in their commission than in their discovery and its consequences, must necessarily increase, although the Government may not be aware of the sufferings of the people." There is no cause, I think, for the apprehension here expressed. When, at an earlier period, several zillah courts were reduced, and Cuddapah and Bellari, each more extensive than any of the enlarged zillahs, were left with one zillah court each, no such apprehension was entertained, and no such consequences followed; and there is no reason to believe that they are more likely to follow in the recently enlarged zillahs. Crimes have not increased, they are gradually diminishing, and will continue to diminish. If the Honourable Court suppose that crimes can be prevalent without the knowledge of Government, or that the sufferings of the people can be concealed from it, they have formed an opinion of the state of things under this Presidency which is far from being correct; there can hardly be any crime, and there can be no suffering of the people, concealed from Government. There may be a very few exceptions in some of the hill zemindaries, where the authority of Government scarcely reaches, but in all other districts the detailed nature of our internal administration, and the innumerable body of rayets who hold their lands immediately of Government, bring us into such

universal and direct intercourse with the people, as to preclude the possibility of their sufferings being concealed from us.

Para. 22. 10. It is remarked by the Honourable Court, that the village moonsiffs, estimated to amount to fifty thousand, are vested with much uncontrolled power, and are subject to great temptations, which too many of them are unable to resist; that the fear of prosecution in the zillah courts was an useful check upon them, and that the late reduction of courts will remove this check. This opinion is not supported by any experience we have yet had. The village moonsiffs are so far from abusing their power, that very few of them act at all; their dread of being summoned on some false complaint or other to the zillah court is so great, that most of them avoid exercising the authority intrusted to them. This unwillingness was foreseen at the time the regulation was passed, but not to the extent it has since been found to exist. Had they been left, according to ancient usage, responsible, in the first instance only, to their tishildar, they would, in general, have discharged the duties of the petty jurisdiction assigned to them; but the fear of the court is so great, that only a small portion of the more intelligent venture to act at all; the abolition of the courts has not made them more confident; and it will yet be a very long time before they acquire confidence sufficient to enable them to become so useful in their subordinate station as they ought to be.

Para. 22. 11. It is stated very justly by the Honourable Court, that in order to form a just estimate of the merit due to the district moonsiffs, from the small proportion of appeals made from their decision, we ought not to compare the number of appeals with the number of decisions, but with the number of suits appealable; and that, if this were done, the result would be less favourable to the moonsiffs. It is also remarked, that many appeals are prevented by expense and other obstacles; but this surely is not peculiar to the moonsiffs, more than to the zillah and provincial courts. Even if we take only the appealable suits, the proportion of appeals will still be so small as to be very creditable to the moonsiffs. The records of the Government-offices do not supply the information required, as they do not distinguish between the suits above and below twenty rupees; and as it would take a considerable time to get it from the provinces, it will suffice, for the present purpose, to exhibit the returns which I have obtained from two of the nearest zillahs, Combaconum and Cuddapah.

	Number of Suits of 20 rupees and upwards instituted in the District Moon-siff's Court.	Number of such Suits settled by Ra-zeenamah.	Number of such Suits decided on the merits.	Number of such Suits decided and appealed to the Zillah Courts.
Combaconum	{ 1825 1764 1826 1620	491 491	640 618	57 137
Cuddapah . .	{ 1825 — 1826 1357	— 455	— 653	— 33

There is, I think, no sufficient foundation for the supposition that great abuses are practised by the district moonsiffs in the decision of suits under twenty rupees, from their not being appealable. Their proceedings are public, they are known to the whole district; and were they unjust, their courts would soon be deserted, and their fees would be lost. The cause of this would soon be known to the superior court, and they would be dismissed from office. The collectors and magistrates can take up complaints against them; and as they have every facility in learning the conduct of the moonsiffs towards the inhabitants, it is impossible that abuse of authority in giving unjust decisions can long remain undiscovered. Suits under twenty rupees can hardly afford a bribe to corrupt the moonsiff; and it is very improbable that the trifle which could be given should ever, except in very rare cases, tempt him to sacrifice his place and all his prosperity in life. The district moonsiffs are disliked by the servants of the zillah courts, because they carry off much of their former business; and they are still more disliked by the tishildars, because they exercise a new authority in the district superior to theirs, and occasionally summon them before them. It was therefore apprehended, that, unless the moonsiffs were strongly supported, and guarded from all unnecessary interference, as far as it could be safely done, they would meet with so much counteraction and opposition as would render them quite inefficient. It was with the view of giving them weight and character among the people, that it was thought advisable to vest them with authority to decide, without appeal, suits under twenty rupees. This measure has answered the expectations entertained of it. The moonsiffs' courts have now acquired the confidence of the people, and are eagerly resorted to by them; but though they are now so firmly established as not to require the same support as at first, and

though their authority might not be shaken by making suits not exceeding twenty rupees appealable, such a change would, I think, be highly inexpedient, as it would only tend to multiply business without any adequate advantage ; and as it is impossible that the present exemption of petty suits from appeal could be materially abused by the moonsiffs, without complaint and discovery ; and as no such complaints have yet appeared, I am of opinion that the present system ought not to be disturbed. Should any evil be found to arise from it on future experience, Government has the remedy in its own hands, and ought then to apply it, and not before.

Para. 25. 12. Among the evils supposed to have been occasioned by the consolidation of zillah courts, are the diseases, and even loss of life, to which prisoners are said to be exposed, by being sent from the hilly parts of Rajahmundry to gaol at Masulipatam. I regarded this statement, at the time it was brought forward, as undeserving of attention, and as being founded in prejudice in favour of a favourite medical station, and in a want of due investigation. Government has often had cause to question the correctness of medical theories respecting the health of prisons : they are often at variance with each other. A prison is said to be unhealthy, because it is too little ventilated, or too low, or too much exposed ! while, after all, the unhealthiness is merely casual, and originates in causes not known ; and perhaps affects the habitations of the people, and the barracks of the military, as much as the prison. I doubt the authority both of the medical officer and the foudary adawlut, when they tell us that prisoners confined at Rajahmundry cannot be removed to the sea-coast without danger to their lives, more than those apprehended in the neighbouring districts. In every district under this Presidency, except Tanjore and the Jagheer, there are unhealthy hilly tracts, as well as in Rajahmundry ; yet it has never been thought necessary to have particular prisons for the offenders from such tracts in these districts. The district of Rajahmundry is in general open, the population among the hills is very small, the great mass of the people, and Rajahmundry itself, are in the open country. Ganjam and Vizagapatam are both more hilly and unhealthy than those of Rajahmundry ; and yet no objection has ever been made to bringing prisoners from the interior of these districts to the coast. The districts of Masulipatam are as unhealthy as those of Rajahmundry. They are mixed with each other : the hill inhabitants of the one are sent without hesitation

to Masulipatam on the sea-shore; but the hill inhabitants of the other, it is said, can only, with safety to their lives, be sent to Rajahmundry. The real hill inhabitants, those who actually reside upon the hills, are very few, and they would probably suffer from confinement in any gaol; but the people who fill our gaols are those of the plains, and of the valleys among the hills, and they are so much the same race, that no line could possibly be drawn so as to distinguish which of them should, for the sake of health, be sent to one gaol, and which to another.

Para. 26, 29. 13. The Honourable Court have adverted at considerable length, and with just severity, upon the conduct of the native police officers in extorting confessions from prisoners, and they specify some very atrocious cases, among which are the murder of a man by a peon, in endeavouring to extort a confession, and the maiming a prisoner by a potail, in torturing him for the same object. In both these cases, however, it is satisfactory to know that the offenders were convicted and punished, one capitally, and the other with two years' imprisonment and hard labour. The judge who reports, fears that cases of forced confession are too common, even among the officers of Government; but observes, that the proof is difficult. When violence really takes place, the proof cannot be difficult; but I believe that, in a great proportion of the cases where it is charged, none has been used. It is much more general in Malabar and Canara than in other zillahs, and the difference is probably owing to the people of Malabar and Canara still retaining much of the turbulent and vindictive character which they acquired while divided into petty states, and little restrained by any regular authority from exercising acts of outrage on each other.

14. It is, no doubt, too certain that many irregularities are used in obtaining confessions, and that in some instances atrocious acts are committed; but when we consider the great number of prisoners apprehended, and the habits of the people themselves, always accustomed to compulsion where there is suspicion, how difficult it is to eradicate such habits, and how small the proportion of cases in which violence has been used is to the whole mass, the number of these acts is hardly greater than was to be expected, and is every day diminishing. The prohibition against forced confessions is known to all native police officers; and it seems extraordinary that they should ever employ force, for they know that they have much to lose and nothing to gain by such conduct; but some of them, in spite of every injunction to the

contrary, when they believe that a prisoner is guilty, think it right to extort a confession. Police officers in general, however, will not gratuitously expose themselves to loss of place, and their families to ruin, by such conduct. Prisoners are sometimes hurt by attempting to escape, and notorious offenders are sometimes roughly treated by the villagers who assist in securing them; the marks thus caused are sometimes exhibited as evidence of extorted confession. Wherever there is proof of force having been used for such a purpose, the police officer should be invariably punished, and dismissed from the service. But great caution is necessary in believing the accusation of force; it should always be very clearly established, before it is entitled to credit. Police matters are so public, that the charge of violence, when true, can hardly be concealed. There are two things in which there is constantly very great exaggeration—the number of persons concerned in a robbery, and the number of extorted confessions: only a small part of the alleged cases of extorted confessions are ever substantiated. The circuit court say that the proof is difficult: I believe that, when true, the proof is easy, and that the difficulty lies in by far the greater part being unfounded. The charge is easily made, and the effect of its receiving belief from the court of circuit is so generally known, that offenders very frequently bring it forward in some stage of the trial. It is a point which demands the greatest possible circumspection on the part of the magistrate. If he lets the person escape who has been guilty of extorting confession, he encourages one of the worst offences against the administration of justice. If he punishes the police officer charged with this offence in only a very few instances, on false evidence, he will effectually deter the whole body from the zealous exercise of their duty, and let loose a host of robbers upon the community. No number of zillah courts would prevent the excesses complained of among the native police: were we to double the number, it would have no effect in restraining them. They can only be checked, and effectually put down, by the vigilance of the magistrates,—by never letting them pass unpunished,—by the police officers finding from experience that they never could gain any thing from the use of force, but would certainly suffer disgrace and punishment,—and by time working a change in their habits.

15. The irregularities committed by the police are now much more difficult of concealment than when the offices of zillah-judge and magistrate were united in one person, confined to a fixed

station ; and though too many of the police officers are still frequently guilty of such irregularities, yet the conduct of the great body of them is highly useful and meritorious, and its effects are becoming every day more evident in the increasing tranquillity of the country, and the gradual diminution of organized bands of robbers. The amelioration, though occasionally retarded by the misconduct of local officers, continues to advance, and is gradually diminishing the number of crimes.

Para. 28, 29. 16. The cruelties reported by the circuit judge to have been inflicted on certain inhabitants by the Parbutti and Holkars, in Malabar, were investigated by the collector, and found to be without proof. The observation quoted from the report of the Board of Revenue, as to the " rayets not being in that state of ease and security in which the justice and liberality of the British Government means to place them," was made by the Board, from perceiving that the courts could give no effectual security to the great mass of rayets from the exactions of the village and district officers. The subject had frequently, during a long course of years, been brought to the notice of Government ; and as it was manifest that the evil could only be remedied by empowering the collector to enforce the summary restitution of all such illegal exactions, a special Regulation was enacted for that purpose. It is not more courts that we want for the protection of the rayets from exactions, and of the inhabitants in general from theft and robbery, but more systematic experience, and, consequently, more aptitude among our local officers, both Native and European, for the discharge of their several duties. I therefore entirely agree with

Para. 36. the Honourable Court, that a system of training is as necessary in the judicial as in the revenue line ; and that an intermediate class of functionaries, similar to that already established in the revenue, should be introduced into the judicial department. I have long thought that some of the senior registrars should receive higher allowances and extended jurisdiction ; but the appointment of assistant civil and criminal judges is a much better measure.

17. I think that five assistant judges will be sufficient for every object. Canara is the district in which an assistant judge is most wanted : the pressure there has frequently been the subject of deliberation at the Board, and of correspondence with the Sudder Adawlut. Next to Canara, the want of an assistant judge is greatest in Malabar ; and after Malabar, the district which at

present most requires help, is Cuddapah ; but I imagine that the pressure there is only temporary ; that it has arisen in a great degree out of the disorders caused by the famine in 1823-4, and that it will soon cease. Salem, both from its great extent and population, ought to have an assistant judge, either at Coimbatore or any other convenient station. Masulipatam, for the same reasons, should have an assistant judge ; but I am not sure that it may be advisable to transfer the zillah judge to Rajahmundry, and station the assistant at Masulipatam. The towns both of Rajahmundry and Masulipatam are situated on the extremity of their respective districts, but Rajahmundry is central to both.

18. I concur also with the Honourable Court, in thinking that the native judicial officers of the assistant judges should, in the first instance, be taken from the officers of the reduced zillah courts, as far as they may be properly qualified, and that the vacancies which may occur afterwards should be filled from the list of district moonsiffs, in order that we may have a gradation of Native as well as European officers. Such gradation is desirable in every department : it encourages good conduct, and secures to the public the services of zealous and experienced servants. It should however be understood, that merit alone can entitle any individual to promotion.

19. Some advantages might result from carrying into effect the suggestions of the Honourable Court, regarding
 Para. 38 and 44. the zillah judges holding alternate sessions at different places within the zillah ; but I imagine that they would be at least counterbalanced by the inconveniences which would attend the measure. The visiting and inspecting of the district moonsiffs by the zillah judge might be useful ; but, on the other hand, the general progress of business would probably be retarded by his absence from the court station, by the time spent in travelling, and by the partial hindrance of the moonsiffs' proceedings while engaged with him. The same object might perhaps be attained by sending occasionally for such of the moonsiffs as most appeared to require instruction, and employing them for a time under his own eyes at the court station. His travelling for the purpose of learning the state of the police, and hearing complaints against it, and communicating his information to the magistrate and the provincial court, would do no good, and might often lead to inconvenient interference, by diverting his attention from the duties more properly his own to those which did not belong to him. It will be much safer to leave the supervision of the

police to the magistrate and the court of circuit. Before coming, however, to any final resolution on the question of the zillah judge visiting the stations of the district moonsiffs, it may be advisable to refer it for the opinion of the judicial department.

Para. 43. 20. The Honourable Court are apprehensive that the allowing fees to the district moonsiffs "may have conduced rather to the quick dispatch, than to the satisfactory adjustment of the business before their courts;" and they observe, that the number of suits appealed should be contrasted with the number appealable, before it can be proved that their proceedings are of a satisfactory character. We have not, as already stated, before us the documents required for making this comparison; but it is sufficiently evident, from the continued resort of the people to the courts of the district moonsiffs, that their decisions are in general satisfactory.

21. As the Honourable Court disapprove of the abolition of fees on suits under ten rupees, which was done with the view of leaving no inducements to the district moonsiffs to use any undue means for drawing such petty suits into their own courts, and as the abolition of the fees does not appear to have had any material effect in any way, it seems proper that they should be restored.

Para. 43 to 50. 22. In order to encourage the district moonsiffs not only to dispose of their business without delay, but also to weigh maturely the merits of each particular case, the Honourable Court recommend that their payment by fees should be abolished, and that they should receive a salary somewhat higher than the average amount of their present salary and fees together; and that "no suit instituted in a district moonsiff's court should be subjected to a higher fee than two and a half per cent.," which reduction, they expect, will bring a large addition in the district moonsiff's court. I do not think that the reduction of fee to two and a half per cent. would increase the business in the district moonsiff's court, because I am convinced that all which now goes there would go even if there were no fees. The business in these courts is more likely to diminish than to increase: some of the moonsiffs already complain of having too little business. It does not appear therefore to be necessary to give them a salary in place of fees, to enable them to weigh cases more maturely. Such a plan may be proper at a future period, but not for many years: it is not suited to the present habits and opinions of the people. The moonsiff system is both popular and

efficient far beyond every expectation that was formed of it, and is becoming more so every day. It is better not to disturb it, but to let it go on as at present until it shall have acquired more firmness by time, by the improved judicial knowledge of the moonsiffs, and the increased respect of the people. If the fee should have a tendency, in some cases, to stimulate the moonsiff to too hasty decisions, it is to be recollected that it is checked by the fear of suitors not coming to his court. If his decisions were wrong, either from haste or any other cause, the people would soon discover it, and carry their suits to the zillah court, if they could not be settled in the village. If the business were in any case actually too great for him to get through properly, the inconvenience could always be easily remedied, by appointing an additional moonsiff. But though I would not think it safe to shake the public confidence in the moonsiff system by so great an innovation as the substitution of salary for fees, I highly approve of the recommendation, that the fee in the district moonsiff's court should not exceed two and a half per cent. I think, however, that it would be more convenient to make the fee half an anna per rupee. The difference is trifling, and the calculation would be more easily understood by the poorer classes of the people. The charge of half an anna is so slight, that it may be adopted for every sum cognizable by the district moonsiff. The decrease of receipt which will be occasioned by the lowering of the fee, should be borne by Government, and it should in no way affect the income of the moonsiff, who should continue to receive, as at present, one anna per rupee.

23. I am doubtful of the propriety of leaving to the district moonsiffs a discretion of admitting pauper cases into their courts; but the subject may be referred for the opinion of the judicial department.

Para. 51. 24. The granting rewards to meritorious moonsiffs and to head police officers for exemplary discharge of their duty, as recommended by the Honourable Court, will no doubt be productive of considerable public benefit, and ought therefore to be carried into effect. It does not appear to be necessary to attach higher allowances to certain districts, in order to reward extraordinary merit in moonsiffs, by appointing them to them. In almost every zillah, there are at present one or two moonsiffs' districts, in which the allowances from fees are considerably higher than in the rest, and to which the more meritorious moonsiffs may be nominated as vacancies occur. It is not

so much an addition to the pay of the moonsiffs, as a higher class of native judicial officers, that we want. I have frequently thought, that in each zillah one, or, in some cases, two native judicial officers might be invested not only with civil, but criminal jurisdiction, and be placed over a large district somewhat in the same manner as is now proposed with regard to assistant judges. Such an office would give great respectability to the native judicial department, and would encourage the exertion, and secure the services of men of integrity and talent in the administration of justice. The subject, however, requires too much consideration to be hastily adopted; but I shall endeavour at some future time to submit to the Board some proposition regarding it.

Para. 52. 25. The half-yearly statements of prisoners, noticed by the Honourable Court, do not exhibit a diversity in the administration of the same laws, but merely an error in the mode of preparing the statements, which either the provincial court, or the Sudder Adawlut, might at any time have ordered to be corrected, but which seems to have escaped their attention until it was pointed out to them by Government.

Para. 53, 54. 26. The Honourable Court are of opinion, that as individuals who may have suffered wrong from the magistrates or the police, have no means of appeal against their proceedings during the periods when the judges of the provincial courts are not on circuit; that the judges of the provincial court should have the same authority as the judges on circuit now have to receive and pass orders on petitions against the magistrates and police officers; that the magistrate should transmit, monthly, a statement of all petitions against the police officers to

Para. 55. the provincial court; and that the control of all the criminal and police proceedings of all the local authorities, should be immediately in the hands of the judges of the provincial courts.—I apprehend that the alterations here proposed would, if carried into effect, produce more harm than good. There is hardly any case, I believe, except that of vagrants, or persons of bad character confined on suspicion, in which the interference of the provincial court could possibly afford any relief. In other cases, the term of imprisonment would have expired, and the prisoner been released, before the court could receive the petition, make the necessary inquiry, and communicate their orders to the magistrate. The release of vagrants and suspicious characters would, with more advantage, be left, as it

now is, to the magistrate and circuit judge: no possible benefit could in any case be derived from the interference of the provincial court which could compensate for the inconvenience which it would produce. The magistrate's own character, the reports of his conduct by the circuit judge and the Foujdary Adawlut, and the danger of his being removed from his office by Government, are all securities against his committing any act of oppression in the interval between the departure and arrival of the circuit court. I am therefore of opinion that no change ought to be made; but that if any is made, it ought to be, not by giving any new power to the provincial court, but by authorizing the circuit judge to pass orders on petitions from every zillah within his range, during the whole course of his circuit, without any reference to the particular zillah in which he may be at the time.

27. The control of the magistrates and of the police ought not, I think, to be in the hands of the provincial court. The proceedings of both are already sufficiently under check, and to multiply checks would only tend to embarrass the operations of the police, and to divert the provincial court from their proper business, without producing the smallest increase of real control. The magistrates are interested with the direction of the police. All charges against them are cognizable by the court of circuit, and, when necessary, are referred to the Sudder Adawlut and to Government. Government ought to reserve to itself, as much as possible, the immediate control of the magistrates. By delegating it to too many intermediate authorities, it becomes more circuitous and less efficient, and will augment rather than lessen the business of Government.

28. The Honourable Court appear to think that there is a restriction upon receiving complaints against the native heads of police. I know of no restriction: all persons who are punished or injured by the police officers are perfectly free to petition against them.

29. I have not hesitated, in the course of this minute, to avail myself of the permission of the Honourable Court, to dissent from their opinions where I could not agree with them. The Court do not seem to be acquainted with the change which has taken place, and which is still going on, in the character of the people, and the state of the country, from the operation of the courts, of a standing army, and of a strong Government. They reason throughout their dispatch as if the reduction of certain zillah courts had left such zillahs unprotected

by law, instead of being, as they were when incorporated with other zillahs, from the effects of the moonsiff system, of the magistrates' increased jurisdiction, and of other causes, as much protected by the zillah court, and as completely under its control, as they were in their separate state when first established. It is unquestionably the duty of Government to establish all the judicial courts that may be necessary for the due distribution of justice ; but it has also another duty,—not to waste the resources of the country in useless and expensive establishments. The judicial establishments of this Presidency were at one time on a scale of extravagance far beyond that of any other country, or what the resources of any country could maintain. They have since been reduced at different times, and are now at a standard more proportionate to the wants of the people ; and any temporary pressure which may arise will be easily relieved by the appointment of an assistant judge, without the necessity of any additional zillah courts. In every country some districts must be far from the principal courts, because no country can afford to maintain expensive judicial courts, merely because some individuals of such remote districts may otherwise have to travel an inconvenient distance once or twice in the course of their lives. Expensive establishments, when once sanctioned, are not easily put down. There is never any difficulty in finding plausible reasons to keep up a lucrative office ; and if the office be judicial, the protection of the people can always be brought forward in defence of it ; but the people would be much more solidly protected by abolishing the expensive establishment, and remitting the amount in their assessment.

30. I shall now recapitulate the several points which I have in this minute recommended for the approval of the Board.

1st, That assistant judges be appointed to certain districts, and that a regulation be framed defining their duties and relation to the zillah judge.

2nd, That the suggestion in the letter of the Honourable Court, regarding the zillah judges holding sessions with their district moonsiffs, be referred for the opinion of the Sudder Adawlut and subordinate courts.

3rd, That the district moonsiffs be authorised to levy fees on suits under ten rupees.

4th, That all suits in the district moonsiffs' courts shall pay a fee of half an anna per rupee, and no more ; and that one

anna per rupee shall be paid to the district moonsiff by Government.

5th, That the discretion proposed by the Honourable Court to be allowed to district moonsiffs in admitting pauper suits, be referred to the Sudder Adawlut.

6th, That honorary rewards be granted to meritorious district moonsiffs and native heads of police, at the close of each year.

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO.

GLOSSARY.

ABWAB. (A gate, door, or way.) Items of taxation, cesses, imposts, taxes.

ABKARRY. Taxes or duties on the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs.

ADAWLUT. Justice, equity, a court of justice.

ALTHAMGA. A royal grant in perpetuity ; perpetual tenure.

AMEER. A nobleman.

AMEER UL OMRAH. Noble of nobles, lord of lords.

AMLAH. Agents, officers ; the officers of government collectively.

ANNA. The sixteenth part of a rupee.

AUMANY, AUMANI, or AUMANIE. Trust, charge.

AUMEEN. Trustee, commissioner, a temporary collector, or supervisor, appointed to the charge of a country on the removal of a Zemindar ; or for any other particular purpose of local investigation or arrangement.

AUMIL. Agent officer ; native collector of revenue.

AUMILDAR. Agent, the holder of an office.

BABOO. Master, sir, a Hindoo title of respect paid to men of rank, or high in office.

BICE. A man of the third Hindoo cast, who by birth is a trader or a husbandman.

BUNDOOBUST. Tying and binding. A settlement. A settlement of the amount of revenue to be paid or collected.

BUNJARY, or BENJARY. A corruption of the Sanskrit word vanij.—A merchant, a grain merchant. The Bunjaries are merchants, who, in the Peninsula, follow camps, and supply armies with grain and other provisions.

BURGUNDASSES, or BURKANDAZES. Men armed with matchlocks.

CANIATCHY, or by mistake **CALIATCHY**. A term used in Malabar, signifying landed inheritance or property, having nearly the same signification as the Persian word Meerassee.

CANONGOE. An officer of the government, whose duty was to keep a register of all circumstances relating to the land revenue, and, when called upon, to declare the customs of each district, the nature of the tenures, the quantity of land in cultivation, the nature of the produce, the amount of rent paid, &c.

CAURY, or **CARI**. Mohammedan judge or justice, who occasionally officiates also as a public notary, in attesting deeds, by affixing his seal thereto.

CHOKEEDAR. A watchman.

CHOKY, or **CHOKEE**. A chair, seat. Guard, watch.

CHOULTRY. A covered public building, generally of hewn stone, often richly carved and ornamented, for the accommodation of travellers.

CHOUT. A fourth: a fourth part of sums litigated.

CHOWDRY. A permanent superintendant and receiver of the land revenue under the Hindoo system, whose office seems to have been partly superseded, by the appointment, first, of the *Crorie*, and, afterwards of the *Zemindar*, by the Mohammedan government.

CHUBDAR. Staff-bearer.

CHUCKEES. Extra assessments in Canara under the former governments.

CHUCKER. A wheel, a circle. Extra assessment in Canara of 1720.

CHUCKLA. A division of a country consisting of several *pergunnahs*, sometimes equal to a moderate-sized English county, and of which a certain number constituted a *circar*, or chiefship.

CIRCAR. Head of affairs. The state or government. A grand division of a province. A head man.

COOLIES, *sing.* **COOLY**. Labourers, porters.

COOLWAR, or **CULWAR**. A statement of the *Ryots* holding lands; or a settlement made with the *Ryots* individually.

Coss. A corrupt term used by Europeans to denote a road measure of about two miles; but varying in different parts of India.

COWL. Word, saying; promise, agreement, contract, engagement.

COWRY. A small shell which passes as money.

CRORE. Ten millions.

CURNUM. Accountant of a village who registers every thing connected with its cultivation and produce; the shares or rents of the Ryot, with the dues and rights of government in the soil. It answers to the term Putwarry in the Bengal provinces. The term is peculiar to the Peninsula.

CUTCHERRY. Court of justice; also the public office where the rents are paid, and other business respecting the revenue transacted.

CUTWAL. The chief officer of police in a large town or city, and superintendent of the markets.

DAROGAH. A superintendent, or overseer, of any department; as of the police, the mint, &c.

DECOITS. Gang robbers.

DECOITY. Gang robbery.

DESMOOK. Head man of a district. Collector of a district or portion of a country; an officer corresponding with Zemindar, but more antient.

DESMOOKEE. The office or jurisdiction of a Desmook.

DESPONDEAH, or DESPANDEAH. Register of a district, who, in the Peninsula, performs the same duties as the Canongoe of the Bengal provinces.

DEWAN. Place of assembly. Native minister of the revenue department, and chief justice in civil causes within his jurisdiction; receiver-general of a province.

DEWANNY. The office or jurisdiction of a Dewan.

DEWANNY COURT OF ADAWLUT. A court for trying revenue and other civil causes.

DOWLE. Form, manner. An estimate.

DOWLE BUNDOBUST. Literally, estimate, settlement.

DUBASH. One who speaks two languages; an interpreter.

DUFFADAR. The commander of a party: also of Peons.

DUFTER. Register, record, office.

DUFTER BUND. An office-keeper. Allowance to the office-keepers of the cutcherries, an item of the Muscorat.

DURBAR. The court; the hall of audience; a levee.

ENAUUM. Present, gift, gratuity, favour. Enaums are grants of lands free of rent; or assignments of the government's share of the produce of a portion of land, for the support of religious establishments and priests, and for charitable purposes; also to revenue officers, and the public servants of a village.

ENAUMDAR. Holder of any thing as a favour. A person in the possession of rent-free, or favourably rented lands; or in the enjoyment, under assignment thereof, of the government dues from a particular portion of land, granted from charity, &c.

FAQUEER. A poor man, mendicant, or wandering beggar of the sect of Mohammed.

FASL, or FASAL. Season, crop, harvest.

FIRMAUN. Order, mandate. An imperial decree, a royal grant or charter.

FOUJDAR. Under the Mogul government, a magistrate of the police over a large district, who took cognizance of all criminal matters within his jurisdiction, and sometimes was employed as receiver-general of the revenues.

FOUJDARRY. Any thing appertaining to a Foujdar, as his office, jurisdiction, court, and the like. Also the produce of fines, confiscations, and chout, in the Foujdarry courts.

FOUJDARRY ABWAB. Foujdarry assessments. Assessments made by the Foujdars.

FOUJDARRY COURT. A court for administering the criminal law.

FUSLY. What relates to the seasons: the harvest year.

FUSILY KHEREEF. The autumnal season or harvest, for rice, millet, &c.

FUSLY RUBBY. The spring season or harvest, for peas, wheat, &c.

FUTWAH. A judicial decree, sentence, or judgment; particularly when delivered by a Mufti or doctor of Mohammedan law.

GAM. A village.

GANGANAH. By villages, a settlement by villages. A term equivalent to Monzawar, used to designate a village settlement.

GATWALL. Who has charge of a pass in the mountains, or a landing-place on a river.

GENTOO. Indian. One of the aborigines of India. At Madras our countrymen use this term to designate the language and people of Tellingana.

GHEE. Clarified butter, in which state they preserve that article for culinary purposes.

GIRDAWAR, or GIRDWAR. An overseer of police, under whom the Gozendas or informers act, and who has the power to apprehend those whom the latter point out.

GOMASTAH. A commissioner, factor, agent.

GOOROO. Graves, a grave man; the spiritual guide of a Hindoo.

GOZENDA. An informer; a spy to discover public offenders.

GRAM, or GRAMA. A village.

GRAMA KHIRCH. Village charges or expenditure.

HAKIM. Commander, ruler, governor, master. The governing authority in a province.

HASTABOOD. Literally what is and was. A comparative account; an examination by measurement of the assets or resources of the country, made immediately previous to the harvest; also, in a more general sense, a detailed inquiry into the value of lands financially considered.

HAVELLY. House, habitation, domain. In Bengal the term is applied to such lands as are held by a Zemindar for his own benefit; but at Madras it designates such as are under the immediate management of government, without the intervention of Zemindars or Jaghiredars, the revenues of which are either farmed out on short leases, or collected by its own officers, without any other agency.

HINDOO, or HINDU. One of the aborigines of India, by the Persians called Hind.

HOBLY. A district.

HUZZOOR. The presence. The seat of government, or of the European authority in a collectorship.

JAGHIRE or JAGHEER. Literally the place of taking. An assignment of the Government share of the produce of a portion of land to an individual.

JAGHIRE BECKSHEE. A jaghire for the support of a General or Commander-in-chief.

JAGHIRE CIRCAR. The jaghire of the Government; the Company's jaghire under the Presidency of Fort St. George.

JAGHIRE DEWANNY. The jaghire of the Dewanny; i. e. of the office of Dewan held by the Company.

JAGHIRE TANAHAUT. Jaghires for the support of Tanahs, or small garrisons of Sebundy troops.

JAMMA. The whole, total, sum, amount, sum total, assembly, collection. The total of a territorial assessment.

JAMMABUNDY. A settlement of the total of an assessment, or a written statement of the same.

JAMMABUNDY NUCKDY. A money settlement of the total of an assessment.

JAMMADAR. A native officer so denominated.

KHALSA. Pure, unmixed. An office of Government, in which the business of the revenue department is transacted: the exchequer. When this term is applied to lands, it signifies lands the revenues of which are paid into the exchequer, as contradistinguished from jaghire, or other descriptions of lands, the government share of whose produce has been assigned to others.

KHALSA. The royal treasury or exchequer.

KHAREGE. What is excluded from the jamma or amount of the rental. Rents from the ryots enjoyed by particular individuals under assignments or grants from Governments, such as the nancar of Crories and Zemindars.

KHAS. Private, peculiar, particular, proper; revenue collected immediately by Government, without the agency of Zemindars.

KHEREEF. Autumn, autumnal harvest.

KHETERY. A man of the second or military tribe.

KHIRCH-GRAM. Expense of the village.

KILLADAR. Warder of a castle; commander of a fort.

KISMUT. Division, proportion, share, part; a division of country sometimes forming part of a circar, and including several districts, more or less; but more generally part of a pergunnah.

KIST. Stated payment, instalment of rent.

KISTBUNDY. A contract for the payment of a debt or rent by instalments.

KOOLCURNEY, KOOLKERNIM. A village accountant in the Northern Circars, who is generally a Brahmin.

KORAN. The book containing the religious precepts of Mohammed.

KULLAR. In the Ceded Districts, barren land.

LAC. One hundred thousand.—A lac of Bengal sicca rupees is, at 2*s.* 6*d.*, equal to 12,500*l.* sterling.

MALIK. Master, lord, proprietor, owner.

MAMOOL. Practised, established, usual, customary.

MARAH. Perquisites from the crop, fees in kind, so called in the Northern Circars; the same as Russoom.

MATHOTE, spelt also MATHOOT. Capitation, contribution, im-

position. An occasional impost or tax sometimes included in the Abwab.

MEERASS. Heritage, patrimony.

MEERASSADAR. The holder or possessor of a heritage. **Meer-ass.** The proprietor of land.

MEERASSEE. Hereditary, hereditary property.

MOCUDDIMS. Placed before, antecedent, prior, foremost. Head ryot, or principal man in a village, who superintends the affairs of it, and, among other duties, collects the rents of government within his jurisdiction. The same officer is in Bengal called also Mundul, and in the Peninsula Goad and Potal.

MOCURRER. Fixed, established, permanent.

MOCURRERY. As applied to lands, means lands let on a fixed lease.

MOFUSSIL. Separated, particularized, distinguished, divided into distinct parts, detailed. The subordinate divisions of a district, in contradistinction to the term Sudder, which implies the chief seat of government; also the country, as opposed to town; the interior of the country. As applied to accounts, the term signifies detailed, or those accounts which are made up in the villages and pergunnahs, or larger divisions of country, by the Putwarries, Canongoes, or Serishtadars. As applied to charges, it signifies the expense of village and pergunnah officers, employed in the business of receiving, collecting, settling, and registering the rents, such as Mocuddims, Putwarries, Peons, Pykes, Canon-goes, Serishtadars, Aumeens, &c.

MOFUSSIL. Provincial court of civil justice.

MOHRER or **MOHIR.** A writer, or clerk in an office.

MOLUNGEC. Manufacturer of salt.

MONIGAR. A surveyor, a supervisor, or manager.

MOOFTY. The Mohammedan law officer who declares the sentence.

MOOLERY. A learned and religious man. An interpreter of the Mohammedan law.

MOONSHEE. Letter-writer, secretary.—Europeans give this title to the native who instructs them in the Persian language.

MOOTAH. In the Northern Circars, a small district or subdivision of a country, consisting of a certain number of villages, more or less. A farm of several villages.

MOOTAHDARRY. What relates to a Mootahdar.

MOOTAH DAR. A person on whom the Zemindarry rights of a mootah are conferred by the government, under the conditions of a perpetual settlement.

MORAH. In Canara, rent in kind. A field, let to a tenant at will, is reckoned and called a field of so many morahs.

MUDHOORY. Applied to lands, means fresh, in contradistinction to Nemucky, or salt lands.

MUGS. Pirates from the coast of Arracan, who formerly committed great depredations in the river Ganges.

MULLA. A learned man, a schoolmaster.

MUNDUL. A circle, a division of country so called. The head man of a village; the same as Mocuddim.

MUNSIFF. A just and equitable man; native justice, or judge, whose powers do not extend farther than to suits for personal property not exceeding fifty rupees.

MUSNUD. The place of sitting; a seat, a throne, or chair of state.

MUTSEDDY. Intent upon. Writer, accountant, clerk in a public office.

NAIB. A deputy.

NAIB NAZIM. Deputy of the Nazim or governor.

NAIK. Leader, conductor, chief; petty military officer.

NAIR. Chief, head man. The Nairs are a peculiar description of Hindoos, principally of the military class, who hold lands in Malabar.

NAUNCAR, OR NANCAR. Allowance or assignment for bread or subsistence. An assignment of land, or the Government dues from a particular portion of land, calculated to yield five per cent. on the net receipts into the treasury, held by a Zemindar. The term is also applied to the official lands of the Canongoes and other revenue servants.

NAWAB. Very great deputy, vicegerent, viceroy. The governor of a province under the Mogul government, whom we call Nabob.—The title of a Nawab, by courtesy, is often given to persons of high rank or station.

NAZIR. A supervisor or inspector.

NAZIM. Composer, arranger, adjuster. The first officer or governor of a province, and minister of the department of criminal justice: styled also Nawab and Soubahdar.

NEEM TUCKY, OR NEEM TAUKA. A perquisite of half a

rupee in the hundred on the Assul jamma; an additional allowance to the Canongoes.

NESHT, or NISHT. Lost, deficient. Extra assessment in Canara for deficiencies of rent.

NIZAM. Order, arrangement. An arranger. Nizam ul Mulk, the administrator of the empire.

NIZAMAT. Arrangement, government. The office of the Nazim or Nizam. The administration of criminal justice.

NIZAMAT ADAWLUT. The court of criminal justice.

NULLA. A streamlet, rivulet, water-course.

NUZZER. A vow, an offering. A present made to a superior.

NUZZERANAH. By way of offering or present; any thing given as a present, particularly as an acknowledgment for a grant of lands, public office, and the like.

OMLAH. Officers, the civil officers of government. A head of Zemindarry charges.

PADDY. Rice in the husk.

PAGODA. A term unknown to the natives of India, given by Europeans to Hindoo temples: also to a gold coin, often with an image on it, properly called Hun or Hoon.

PARBUNNY. What relates to the Hindoo festivals at the new and full moon. A tax sometimes levied by Zemindars and farmers on the tenants.

PARIAR. A term used by Europeans in India to designate the outcasts of the Hindoo tribes, and the vilest things of their kind.

PEISHWA. Guide, leader. The prime minister of the Mahratta government.

PEON. A footman, a foot soldier. An inferior officer or servant employed in revenue, police, or judicial duties. He is sometimes armed with a sword and shield.

PERGUNNAH. A small district consisting of several villages, being a subdivision of a Chuckla.

PESHUSH. A present, particularly to Government, in consideration of an appointment, or as an acknowledgment for any tenure, tribute, fine, quit-rent, advance on the stipulated revenues. The tribute formerly paid by the Poligars to Government. The first fruits of an appointment, or grant of land.

PETTAH. The suburbs of a fortified town.

POLLIGAR. Head of a village district. Military chieftains in

the Peninsula similar to hill Zemindars in the Northern Circars ; the chief of a Pollum.

POTAL. Head man of a village who collects rents from the other Ryots therein, and has the general superintendence of its concerns. The same person who in Bengal is called Mocuddim and Mundul.

POTTAHS TANAJAT. Pottahs or leases given to the cultivators individually.

POLLAH. A lease granted to the cultivators on the part of Government, either written on paper, or engraved with a style on the leaf of the fan palmyra tree ; by Europeans called Cadgan.

POTTAHS TUCKA. Pottahs granted to small farmers.

PUNCHAYET. Five assembled. An assembly or jury of five persons to whom a cause is referred for investigation and decision ; an ancient Hindoo establishment.

PUNDIT. A learned Brahmin.

PUTWARRY. Village accountant ; the same as the Curnum of the Peninsula.

PYKE. A foot messenger. A person employed as a night-watch in a village, and as a runner or messenger on the business of the revenue.

RAJAH. King, prince, chieftain, nobleman. A title in ancient times given to chiefs of the second or military Hindoo tribe only.

RAJE. The title, office, or jurisdiction of a Rajah.

RANNY. Queen, Princess ; wife of a Rajah.

RAZENAMAH. A written testimonial given by a plaintiff, upon a cause being finally settled, that he is satisfied.

ROY ROWAN, or ROY ROYAN. A Hindoo title given to the principal officers of the Khalsa, or chief treasurer of the exchequer.

ROZINAH. Daily, daily allowance. Daily allowance to the Brahmins, &c. An item of the Muscorat.

RUSOOM. Customs, customary commissions, gratuities, fees, or perquisites. Sharers of the crops and ready money payments received by public officers as perquisites attached to their situation.

RYOT. Peasant, subject ; tenant of house or land.

RYOTWAR. According to or with Ryots. A Ryotwar or Kulwar settlement is a settlement made by Government immediately with the Ryots individually, under which the Govern-

ment receives its dues in the form of a money rent fixed on the land itself in cultivation, and not being a pecuniary commutation for its share of the produce, varying as the extent of the produce may vary in each year; but under an Aumanee settlement the Government receives its dues in kind from each cultivator.

SALAM. Salutation, or the form of saluting, generally by touching the forehead with the right hand.

SAWMY. Lord, master, owner, proprietor. A title given also by the Hindoos of the Peninsula to their gods.

SAWMY BOGUM. The lord's enjoyment or possession. The lord's right as proprietor. Quit-rent or acknowledgment of proprietary right in the Peninsula.

SAYER. What moves. Variable imposts, distinct from land-rent or revenue, consisting of customs, tolls, licences, duties on merchandize and other articles of personal moveable property, as well as mixed duties, and taxes on houses, shops, bazars.

SHAIKDAR. Title of an Aumildar, in the Northern Circars, in his capacity of Dewanny or financial delegate.

SHASTER. The instrument of Government, or instruction. Any book of instruction, particularly containing Divine ordinances.

SHERISTAH. A public record.

SHERISTADAR. Keeper of the records; or one who keeps a record of accounts or particular transactions. The recorder in a court of justice under the Company's government. A revenue accountant of a district, who checks the accounts of the regular village Curnum or accountant.

SHROF. A banker or money changer.

SIRDAR FOUJE. Captain of the military. Title of an Aumildar in his military capacity.

SIRDAR. Chieftain, captain, head man.

SUBAHDARRY. The office or jurisdiction of a Subahdar.

SOUCAR. A merchant or banker. A money lender.

SUBAH. A province, such as Bengal. A grand division of a country, which is again divided into circars, chucklahs, pergunnahs, and villages.

SUBAHDAR. The viceroy or governor of a province.

SUDDER. The breast; the fore court of a house. The chief seat of government contradistinguished from Mofussil, or interior of the country.

SUDDER DEWANNY ADAWLUT. The chief civil court of justice under the Company's government held at the Presidency.

SUDDER NIZAMUT ADAWLUT. The chief criminal court of justice under the Company's government.

SUNNOD. A prop or support. A patent, charter, or written authority for holding either land or office.

TALLIAR. A guard or watchman. A village police officer in the Peninsula who gives information of crimes and offences, and escorts and protects persons travelling to neighbouring villages.

TALOOK. The being dependent, dependence, a dependency. A district the revenues of which are under the management of a Talookdar, *q. v.* and are generally accounted for to the Zemindar within whose jurisdiction it happens to be included; but sometimes paid immediately to Government.

TALOOKDAR. The holder of a Talook, *q. v.* Talookdar are petty Zemindars; some of whom pay their rent, or account for the collections they make from the Ryots, through a superior Zemindar; and others direct to Government. Those denominated Muscoory are of the former description; and the latter are called independent Talookdars.

TALOOKDARRY. The jurisdiction of a Talookdar.

TANNAH. A station. A military post or station, often protected by a small fort. A petty police jurisdiction, subordinate to that of a Darogah.

TANNAHDAR. The keeper or commandant of a Tannah, *q. v.* a petty police officer whose jurisdiction is subordinate to that of a Darogah.

TANNAHJAT, or TANUCHAUT. Small provincial stations or garrison for Sebundy corps.

TEHSIL. Acquisition, attainment. Collection of the public revenues.

TEHSILDAR. Who has charge of the collections. A native collector of a district acting under a European or Zemindar.

TODDY. The juice of the palm tree, which in a fermented state is intoxicating.

TOPE. A grove of trees.

TOTIE. A village police officer, whose duties are confined more immediately to the village, but who also guards the crops and assists in measuring them.

TUCKAVY. Strengthening, corroborating, assisting. Assisting tenants with an advance of money for cultivation, when the necessary means are wanting.

TUNCAW. An assignment on the revenue for personal support, or other purposes.

TUNKEE. Small island.

VAKEEL. One endued with authority to act for another. Ambassador, agent sent on a special commission, or residing at a court. Native law-pleader under the judicial system of the Company.

VEDS. Science, knowledge. The sacred scriptures of the Hindoos.

ZEMINDAR. An officer who, under the Mohammedan government, was charged with the superintendence of the lands of a district; financially considered, the protection of the cultivators, and the realization of the Government's share of its produce, either in money or kind; out of which he was allowed a commission amounting to about ten per cent., and occasionally a special grant of the Government's share of the produce of the land of a certain number of villages for his subsistence, called *Nuncar*.

ZEMINDARRY. The officer or jurisdiction of a Zemindar.

ZILLAH. Side, part, district, division. A local division of a country, having reference to personal jurisdiction.

THE END.



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