| Accordingly, on the morning of the 14th,
Charles ordered the drums to beat, and the pipes to play, as the signal for summoning his
men to arms. After those who were in the town had assembled in the streets, the prince
mounted his horse, and putting himself at their head, led them out to Culloden, about four
miles from Inverness. Leaving part of his men in the parks around Culloden house, Charles
went onward with his first troop of guards and the Mackintosh regiment, and advanced
within six miles of Nairn to support the Duke of Perth, but finding him out of danger, he
returned to Culloden, where he was joined by the whole of the duke's forces in the
evening. Lochiel also arrived at the same time with his regiment. That night the
Highlanders bivouacked among the furze of Culloden wood, and Charles and his principal
officers lodged in culloden house. Having selected
Drummossie moor for a field of battle, Prince Charles marched his army thither early on
the morning of the 15th, and drew his men up in order of battle across the moor, which is
about half a mile broad. His front looked towards Nairn, and he had the river of that name
on his right, and the inclosures of Culloden on his left. This moor, which is a heathy
flat of considerable extent about five miles from Inverness and about a mile and a half to
the south-east of Culloden house, forms the top of a hill which, rising at Culloden, dies
gradually away in the direction of Nairn. The ascent to the moor is steep on both sides,
particularly from the shore. In pitching upon this ground, Charles acted on the
supposition that the Duke of Cumberland would march along the moor, which was better
fitted for the free passage of his army than the common road between Nairn and Inverness,
which was narrow and inconvenient.
In expectation that the Duke of Cumberland would advance,
Charles sent forward on the road to Nairn some parties of horse to reconnoitre, but they
could observe no appearance of any movement among the royal troops. The ground on which
the army was now formed had been chosen without consulting Lord George Murray, who, on
arriving on the spot, objected to it, on the footing that though interspersed with moss
and some hollows, the ground was generally too level, and consequently not well suited for
the operation of Highlanders. He therefore proposed to look out for more eligible ground,
and at his suggestion Brigadier Stapleton and Colonel Ker were sent about ten o'clock to
survey some hilly ground on the south side of the water of Nairn, which appeared to him to
be steep and uneven, and of course more advantageous for Highlanders. After an absence of
two or three hours, these officers returned and reported that the ground they had been
appointed to examine was rugged and boggy, that no cavalry could act upon it, that the
ascent on the side next to the river was steep, and that there were only two or three
places, about three or four miles above, where cavalry could pass; the banks of the river
below being inaccessible. On receiving this information, Lord George Murray proposed, in
the event of Cumberland's forces not appearing that day, that the army should cross the
water of Nairn, and draw up in line of battle next day, upon the ground which had been
surveyed; and that, should the Duke of Cumberland not venture to cross after them and
engage them upon the ground in question, they might watch a favourable opportunity of
attacking him with advantage. In the event of no such opportunity offering, his lordship
said he would recommend that the army should, with the view of drawing the duke after
them, retire to the neighbouring mountains, where they might attack him at some pass or
strong ground.
This proposal met with the general approbation of the
commanding officers; but Charles who, two days before (when a suggestion was made to him
to retire to a strong position till all his army should assemble), had declared his
resolution to attack the Duke of Cumberland even with a thousand men only, declined to
accede to it. His grounds were that such a retrograde movement might discourage the men,
by impressing them with a belief that there existed a desire on the part of their
commanders to shun the English army; that Inverness, which was now in their rear, would be
exposed, and that the Duke of Cumberland might march upon that town, and possess himself
of the greater part of their baggage and ammunition. |
