| This occurrence completely changed the aspect of affairs,
and every member of the council who had formerly advocated a night attack now warmly
opposed it. Charles, bent upon his purpose, resolutely insisted upon the measure, and said
that when the march was begun the men who had gone off would return and follow the rest.
The confidence which he had in the bravery of his army blinded him to every danger, and he
was prompted in his determination to persist in the attempt from an idea that Cumberland's
army having been that day engaged in celebrating the birth-day of their commander, would
after their debauch fall an easy prey to the Highlanders. Finding the prince fully resolved to make the attempt at all hazards, the
commanding officers took their stations, waiting the order to march. The watchword was,
"King James the VIII.," and special instructions were issued to the army, that
in making the attack the troops should not make use of their fire-arms, but confine
themselves to their swords, dirks,and bayonets; and that on entering the Duke of
Cumberland's camp they should cut the tent strings and pull down the poles, and that
wherever they observed a swelling or bulge in the fallen covering, they should strike and
push vigorously with their swords and dirks. Before marching, directions were given to
several small parties to possess all the roads, in order to prevent any intelligence of
their march being carried to the Duke of Cumberland.
In giving his orders to march, Charles embraced Lord George
Murray, who immediately went off at the head of the line, about eight o'clock, preceded by
two officers, and about thirty men of the Macintosh regiment, who from their knowledge of
the country were to act as guides. Though the whole army marched in one line, there was an
interval in the middle as if it consisted of two columns. The Athole men led the van, and
next to them were the Camerons, who were followed by the other clans. The low country
regiments, the French piquets, and the horse, formed the rear. Lord John Drummond was in
the centre, or at the head of the second column; and the Duke of Perth and Charles, who
had Fitz-James's and other horse with him, were towards the rear. Besides the party of
Macintoshes, who served as guides in front, there were others of the clan stationed in the
centre and rear, and generally along the line, to prevent any of the men from losing their
way in the dark. The plan of attack, as laid down by Lord George murray, was as follows:-
The army was to have marched in a body till they passed the house of Kilraick or
Kilravock, which is about ten miles from Culloden, on the direct road to Nairn
(Click here for Map). The army was then to have been
divided, and while Lord George Murray crossed the river Nairn with the van, making about
one-third of the whole, and marched down by the south side of the river, the remainder was
to have continued its march along the north side till both divisions came near the duke's
camp. The van was then to have re-crossed the river, and attacked the royal army from the
south, while the other part was to have attacked it at the same time from the west. With
the exception of Charles, who promised upon his honour not to divulge it to any person,
and Anderson, who acted as guide at he battle of Preston, no person was made privy to the
plan, as its success depended upon its secrecy.
In the outset of the march the van proceeded with
considerable expedition, but it had gone scarcely half a mile when Lord George Murray
received an express ordering him to halt till joined by the rear column,which was a
considerable way behind. As a halt in the van always occasions a much longer one in the
rear when the march is resumed, Lord George did not halt but slackened his pace to enable
the rear to join. This, however, was to no purpose, as the rear still kept behind, and
although, in consequence of numerous expresses enjoining him to wait, Lord George marched
slower and slower, the rear fell still farther behind, and before he had marched six miles
he had received at least fifty expresses ordering him to either halt or to slacken his
pace. The chief cause of the stoppage was the badness of the roads.
About one o'clock in the morning, when the van was opposite
to the house of Kilravock, Lord John Drummond came up and stated to Lord George Murray
that unless he halted or marched much slower the rear would not be able to join. The Duke
of Perth having shortly thereafter also come up to the front and given a similar
assurance, his lordship halted near a small farm-house called Yellow Knowe, belonging to
Rose of Kilravock, nearly four miles from Nairn, and about a mile from the place where it
was intended the van should cross the river, In the wood of Kilravock the march of the
rear was greatly retarded by a long narrow defile occasioned partly by a stone wall; and
so fatigued and faint had the men become, by the badness of the road, and want of food,
that many of them, unable to proceed, lay down in the wood. This circumstance was
announced to Lord George Murray by several officers who came up from the rear shortly
after the van had halted. Nearly all the principal officers, including the Duke of Perth,
Lord George Murray, Lord John Drummond, Lochiel, and General O'Sullivan, were now in the
van, and having ascertained by their watches, which they looked at in a little house close
by, that it was two o'clock in the morning, they at once perceived the impossibility of
surprising the English army. The van was still upwards of three, and the rear about four
miles from Nairn, and as they had only been able to advance hitherto at a rate little more
than a mile in the hour, it was not to be expected that the army in its exhausted state
would be able to accomplish the remainder of the distance, within the time prescribed,
even at a more accelerated pace. By a quick march the army could not have advanced two
miles before day-break; so that the Duke of Cumberland would have had sufficient time to
put his army in fighting order before an attack could have been made. These were
sufficient reasons of themselves for abandoning the enterprise, but when it is considered
that the army had been greatly diminished during the march, and that scarcely one-half of
the men that were drawn up the day before on Drummossie moor remained, the propriety of a
retreat becomes undoubted. |
