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In the beginning of 1857 the clouds that presaged the
awful storm of mutiny which Sir Charles Napier had foretold and
temporarily averted seven years earlier, were ominously gathering over
the Bengal Presidency. On the 19th of February the first flash of actual
outbreak burst forth at Berhampore. The revolt spread to Bar-rackpore,
and in the course of a few weeks it became apparent that the spirit of
insubordination was gradually bnt surely ripening throughout the Bengal
army. In the middle of May the crisis which had been threatening for
three months came to a head at Meerut. The revolt of the native troops
at that great station was consummated in rapine and slaughter. Delhi,
with its vast munitions of war unprotected save by a handful of devoted
European soldiers, fell into the hands of the insurgents. The pensioned
King of Delhi was drawn from his senile obscurity and proclaimed Emperor
of India, and the great city became the capital of a rival power and the
centre of attraction to the revolted army. The native regiments in the
stations of the North-West Provinces broke out successively into revolt
and hastened tumultuously to Delhi, which soon contained within its
walls a turbulent mass of many thousand mutinous soldiers. Within a
month after the outbreak at Meerut British authority had become almost
extinct throughout the North-West Provinces. From Meerut to Allahabad,
among a population of some thirty millions and throughout an area of
many hundred miles, there remained no vestige of British occupation,
save where at Agra the British residents were waiting anxiously for the
signal to withdraw from their bungalows into the shelter of Akbar’s
fort, and the hapless people closely beleaguered in Wheeler’s miserable
entrenchment at Cawnpore. Across the Ganges throughout Oude, British
men, women, and children were being mercilessly slaughtered by revolted
sepoys; and Henry Lawrence, himself in the midst of troops scarcely
caring to cloak their mutinous intentions, had soon sadly to realise
that all Oude was gone except the Lucknow Residency, where he was to die
after having exhausted himself in successful exertions to make that
position defensible by the brave and steadfast men who survived him.
While on the march from Umballa towards Delhi the
Commander-in-Chief in India, General the Hon. George Anson, died of
cholera at Kurnal on May 27th. Tidings of this misfortune did not reach
the War Office until July 11th. On that same afternoon Sir Colin
Campbell was sent for by Lord Panmure, who made him the offer of the
high command rendered vacant by Anson's decease. Campbell promptly
accepted the offer and expressed his readiness to start that same
evening if necessary. He stipulated successfully that his friend Colonel
Mansfield, then Consul-General at Warsaw (afterwards Lord Sandhurst),
should be offered the appointment of chief of staff with the rank of
major-general. This settled, Campbell had an interview with the Duke of
Cambridge, then as now Commander-in-Chief, who approved of the selection
of Major Alison1 as military secretary, and of Sir David Baird and
Lieutenant Alison as aides-de-camp.
It had been arranged at Sir Colin’s interview with Lord
Panmure that he should start next morning. He was ready and his modest
kit complete; but sundry matters intervened delaying his departure for a
few hours. The Queen, for one thing, had desired that he should wait on
her. The Duke of Cambridge brought him to Buckingham Palace; and, so Sir
Colin wrote in his journal, “Her Majesty’s expressions of approval of my
readiness to proceed at once were pleasant to receive from a Sovereign
so good and so justly loved.” He left London by the continental night
train, full of a justifiable elation. “Never,” he wrote, “did a man
proceed on a mission of duty with a lighter heart and a feeling of
greater humility, yet with a juster sense of the compliment that had
been paid to a mere soldier of fortune like myself in being named to the
highest command in the gift of the Crown.” Hurrying through Paris he
found time to breakfast with General Yinoy his old Crimean friend, and
reaching Marseilles on the morning of the 14th he immediately embarked
for India on a vessel which was in readiness with its steam up. During
the voyage he prepared a strategic scheme, the essence of which was a
great concentric advance upon the Central Indian States, to be
undertaken by the -whole. Now General Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., G.C.B.
disposable military forces of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, that
would effectually engage the whole rebel strength of those turbulent
territories, and so in some degree divert the severe pressure of the
Gwalior Contingent on the left flank of the long and precarious main
line of communication. This object obtained, Bengal and the Punjaub once
more united by the reconquest of the intervening territory, and the left
flank and rear of the reconquered base secured by the reduction of
Central India, the most arduous work of the war could be safely
undertaken; the vast, populous, and bitterly hostile province of Oude
might then be subdued, with the result of securing non-molestation on
the right flank of the region through which the principal line of
communication must pass. The operation of this grand strategic scheme
was weakened and retarded by various causes; but the sound wisdom of
Campbell’s prescient conception was ultimately in great measure
vindicated.
The new Commander-in-Chief landed at Calcutta on the 13th
of August and became Lord Canning’s guest at Government House. The
situation which confronted him was gloomy almost to utter hopelessness.
It was true, indeed, that John Lawrence was holding the Punjaub in his
strong hand, and was pressing forward all his available reinforcements
to strengthen the British force contending against overwhelming odds
before the walls of Delhi. But meanwhile that force was little over four
thousand strong, and it seemed more than doubtful whether it could hold
its ground until reinforcements should reach it. The garrison at Agra
was isolated and cut off from all communication. That of Lucknow, hemmed
within the feebly-defensive position of the Residency and its environs
by many thousands of fierce and relentless enemies, encumbered also with
a great company of helpless women and children, had numbers wholly
inadequate to man the defences and was maintaining an almost hopeless
resistance against overwhelming odds. Havelock, at the head of less than
two thousand brave men, had fought his way from Allahabad to Cawnpore,
too late to save the lives of the hapless women and children who had
been reserved from the massacre of the men of Wheeler’s command only to
endure a crueller fate. His gallant and persistent efforts to relieve
Lucknow had failed and he had been obliged to fall back to Cawnpore,
where with an attenuated force he was maintaining himself precariously
in the face of the threatening attitude of the revolted Gwalior
Contingent on the further hank of the Jumna.
Through the gloom there was one gleam of sunshine. The
fortress of Allahabad, with its magazines of military stores, remained
in British possession. At the point where the Ganges and the Jumna blend
their waters, distant by land five hundred miles from Calcutta, it was a
position of the highest strategical importance, forming as it did an
advanced base for operations in the regions beyond having for their
object the relief of beleaguered places and the restoration of commimi
cat ions with Delhi and the Punjaub. From Calcutta to Allahabad there
were two available routes; by the Ganges a distance of eight hundred
miles, to accomplish which by steamer required from twenty to thirty
days; by the land route of five hundred miles, one hundred and twenty of
which was by railway and three hundred and eighty by the Grand Trunk
Road. The troops as they landed were despatched up country in
detachments by one or other of those routes. The common objective for
the time was Allahabad, where Sir James Outram, who had returned from
the command of the Persian expedition and had left Calcutta on the 6th
of August to assume the command of the combined Cawnpore and Dinapore
divisions along with the civil appointment of Chief Commissioner in
Oude, was to collect the detachments of reinforcements as they arrived,
preparatory to moving upward to Cawnpore there to join Havelock and
advance with him to attempt the relief of the beleaguered garrison in
the Residency of Lucknow.
But the troops, which as soon as possible after landing
at Calcutta should have been pushing straight up country to Allahabad
either by land or by water, suffered unavoidable detentions by the way.
So disturbed was the country that posts had to be maintained to keep the
routes open, and their occupation absorbed a certain proportion of the
scanty European force. The mutinies of native troops at Dinapore and
Bhagulpore caused the temporary detention by the local authorities of
important reinforcements; and it was not until the first week of
September that Outram was able to collect his scattered detachments at
Allahabad. After a sharp and successful fight on the way he reached
Cawnpore on September 15th; bringing reinforcements which raised to a
strength of about three thousand men the force of which he chivalrously
waived the command in favour of Havelock. Ten days later was
accomplished what is commonly though erroneously styled the First Relief
of Lucknow,—not a “relief ” in any sense of the term, but simply a great
augmentation to the defensive strength of the garrison which had been
holding the weak position of the Residency with a heroism so staunch.
Sir Colin found Calcutta all but entirely bare of
material for a campaign; nothing was in readiness for the equipment of
the troops fast converging on his base on the Hooghly. Means of
transport there were scarcely any; horses for cavalry or artillery there
were none; ammunition for the Enfield rifles was deficient; flour even
was running out; guns, gun-carriages, and harness for the
field-batteries were either unfit for active service or did not exist.
Prompt and active were the exertions made by the energetic Chief and his
subordinates to cope with needs so pressing. Horses were purchased no
matter at what cost; ammunition was gathered in far and wide; flour was
commissioned from the Cape; field-guns were cast at the Cossipore
foundry; gun-carriages and harness were made up with all possible haste.
The Commissariat and Ordnance departments were stirred from their
lethargy and stimulated to an activity previously undreamed of; and the
whole military machine was set throbbing at high pressure. As the
falling of the Ganges gradually made the river route precarious, great
exertions were made to quicken and extend the means of transport by the
Grand Trunk Road, for which purpose the Bullock Train, as it was called,
was established. Relays of soldiers travelled up night after night in
bullock-waggons, halting during the heat of the day at prepared
resting-places. Ultimately this system was so perfected that two hundred
men were daily forwarded from the end of the railway at Raneegunge; and
they reached Allahabad after about a fortnight’s travel, perfectly fresh
and fit for immediate service.
In the midst of the pressure of his preparations Sir
Colin found time to write with soldierly appreciation and cordiality to
the principal officers now under his command. His first message to
Outram concluded with the words, “ It is an exceeding satisfaction to me
to have your assistance, and to find you in your present position.” To
Havelock he wrote: “ The sustained energy, promptitude, and vigorous
action by which your whole proceedings have been marked during the late
difficult operations deserve the highest praise. I beg you to express to
the officers and men under your command the pride and satisfaction I
have experienced in reading your reports of the intrepid valour they
have displayed upon every occasion they have encountered the vastly
superior numbers of the enemy, and how nobly they have maintained the
qualities for which British soldiers have ever been distinguished—high
courage and endurance.” To Archdale Wilson, commanding the force before
Delhi, he sent on August 23rd some words of generous encouragement, the
first communication which had reached that officer from any military
authority for many weeks: “I must delay no longer to congratulate you on
the manner in which the force under your command has conducted itself
and upheld the honour of our arms. You may count on my support and help
in every mode in which it may be possible for me to afford them.” And
when on September 26th the happy news reached him that Delhi, the head
and heart of the rebellion as it was then considered to have been, was
once more in the occupation of a British garrison, the Chief promptly
telegraphed to Wilson, “Accept my hearty congratulations on your
brilliant success.”
It seems quite clear that Sir Colin regarded it as
virtually certain that Outram, who assumed command when Havelock and he
had fought their way into the Lucknow Residency, would succeed in
speedily effecting the relief and withdrawal of the garrison which was
still holding that precarious position. But his confident hope for the
prompt relief of Lucknow was doomed to early and utter disappointment.
Outram’s column had proved to he simply in the nature of a
reinforcement, and that, too, with no corresponding addition to the
supplies of the original garrison. The beleaguerment was close; the
position environed by some sixty thousand aimed and rancorous enemies.
Outram sent word on October 7th, just a fortnight after his entry, to
the effect that by eating his horses and gun-draught bullocks he would
he able to subsist for a month; and he added that a force equal at least
to two strong brigades would be required for the extrication of the
garrison.
The sudden and pressing danger threatening Outram’s
isolated and beleaguered force in Lucknow imposed on the
Commander-in-Chief the most urgent exertions. Every military department
was stimulated to the utmost; the whole resources of the Government were
thrown into violent action. Stores, provisions, carriages, ammunition,
guns, all were hurried forward upon Allahabad. But the available
resources were sadly limited. The infantry were straggled in small
detachments all along the Grand Trunk Road from Calcutta to Cawnpore. No
cavalry existed except some two hundred men of the military train, and
there were scarcely any horses for the field-batteries which were being
organised at Allahabad. All told, the troops on the up-country march
constituted a force hardly equivalent to a single weak brigade, less
than half the strength which Outram had specified as requisite for his
extrication. To relieve Lucknow in time seemed a sheer impossibility and
disaster to the garrison there inevitable.
Fortunately, while every nerve was being strained to
succour Outram from below, the welcome tidings were received that
invaluable co-operation was approaching from the opposite direction. As
soon as Delhi had fallen General Wilson had sent out in pursuit of the
fugitive rebels a mixed column under the command of Colonel Greathed.
The strength of this force amounted to two thousand eight hundred men,
of whom nine hundred and thirty were Europeans. It was made up of two
troops and one battery of artillery with sixteen guns, the Ninth Lancers
three hundred strong, the Eighth and Seventy-Fifth Regiments four
hundred and fifty strong, two hundred native sappers, four hundred Pun-jaub
cavalry, and two regiments of Punjaub infantry twelve hundred strong.
Marching down the Gangetic Doab, Greathed defeated bodies of mutineers
at Bolund-shuhur, Malaghun, and Allyghur. Failing to overtake the main
body of fugitives which had crossed his front towards Oude, he pushed on
to Agra by forced marches, and had barely pitched his camp there when he
was suddenly attacked by the Indore brigade. Recovering from their
momentary surprise, the British troops notwithstanding their exhaustion
met the hostile onslaught with vigour, and after a sharp engagement
routed the enemy with heavy slaughter and the capture of thirteen guns
and a great quantity of baggage and stores in the lengthened pursuit
following on the combat. During the march from Agra down the Doab
Colonel Hope Grant overtook the column, and having taken command of it
in virtue of seniority arrived at Cawnpore on October 26th. Four days
later, at the head of the Delhi column reinforced by several companies
of the Ninety - Third Highlanders and some infantry detachments, he
crossed the Ganges into Oude. Strictly enjoined to refrain from any
serious operation pending the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, Grant
halted at Bunfcera, six miles short of the Alum Bagh, with the garrison
of which position he established communications. As the reinforcements
and supplies reached Cawnpore they were sent forward to the depot-camp
at Buntera. The arrival of this Delhi column was of priceless value to
Sir Colin, on whom his all but utter want of cavalry and his deficiency
in field-artillery had hitherto weighed sorely. The column had come well
provided with carriage, a hardly less valuable acquisition than the
cavalry and artillery it brought. Now fihe Chief had to his hand the
elements wherewith to organise a field-force strong enough to justify
the opening of active operations at an early date.
Sir Colin left Calcutta on the 27th of October, and
hurried with all speed to the seat of war. On the way he narrowly
escaped falling into the hands of a body of mutineers who were crossing
the road just as he came up. At Allahabad on November 1st intelligence
reached him that Outram considered himself able to hold out on further
reduced rations until beyond the middle of the month,—a welcome
announcement, since it afforded Sir Colin more time to complete his
arrangements and gave opportunity for the arrival of reinforcements
still on the way. On the morning of the 3rd he reached Cawnpore, where
he remained a few days to get the engineer train and commissariat in
trim for the projected operation.
That operation was of the most difficult and embarrassing
character. Its urgent objective was the relief of Lucknow, whence came
an importunate cry for succour. Yet to attempt the immediate relief of
Lucknow was at the imminent risk of the sacrifice of his communications;
and the result of relieving the city at the cost of the forfeiture of
his communications, would he simply to find himself in the air, hampered
by a great convoy of sick and wounded, of women and children, his scanty
force ringed around by vast hordes of enemies. For, as he knew, at
Calpee on the Jumna, forty miles south of Cawnpore and directly on the
flank of the road between Allahabad and Cawnpore, was gathering the
revolted Gwalior Contingent, a large force under the Nana Sahib, and
portions of the Dina-pore mutineers—a collective body at least triple
his own strength, having the obvious intention of striking at Cawnpore
and his communications so soon as he should be fairly committed to the
Lucknow enterprise. Of this eventuality he had no alternative but to
take the risk, leaving in Cawnpore General Windham with a few hundred
men to remain on the defensive in an intrenched position and not to move
out unless compelled by threat of bombardment.
On the 9th Sir Colin reached the camp at Buntera, where
he placed Hope Grant in divisional command, reserving to himself a
general superintendence of the operations. During the halt there the
brave Kavanagh, who had volunteered to pass from beleaguered Lucknow
through the hostile lines in the guise of a native scout, came into camp
with despatches for the Chief. The scheme of operations settled on was
to skirt the city from the Alumbagh to the Dilkoosha; thence to advance
upon the Martinifere and the line of the canal; to follow the right bank
of the Goomtee seizing the barracks and the Secundrabagh; thence under
cover of batteries to be opened on the Kaiserbagh to carry the remaining
buildings; and after effecting a junction-with the Residency to withdraw
its garrison. A message was sent in to Outram informing him that the
Commander-in-Chief would leave the Alumbagh on the 13th; that he hoped
to gain possession of the barracks and the Secundrabagh on the 14th; and
on the 16th to carry out the women and children and the sick and
wounded.
On the afternoon of the 11th Sir Colin’s little army, all
told barely four thousand five hundred strong, was formed up on the
plain for the inspection of its Chief. A spectator has graphically
depicted the scene. The field-guns from Delhi looked blackened and
service-worn ; but the horses were in good condition and the harness in
perfect repair; the gunners bronzed, stalwart, and in perfect fighting
case. The Ninth Lancers, with their gallant bearing, their flagless
lances and their lean but hardy horses, looked the perfection of regular
cavalry on active service. Wild and bold was the bearing of the Sikh
horsemen, clad in loose fawn-coloured dress, with long boots, blue or
red turbans and sashes, and armed with carbine and tulwar. Next to them
were the worn and wasted remains of the Eighth and Seventy-Fifth
Queen’s, who with wearied air stood grouped under their colours. Then
came the two regiments of Punjaub Infantry, tall of stature, with fierce
eager eyes under their huge turbans,—men swift in the march, forward in
the fight, and eager for the pillage. On the left of the line, in
massive serried ranks, a waving sea of plumes and tartan, stood the
Ninety-Third Highlanders, who -with loud and rapturous cheers welcomed
the veteran commander whom they knew so well and loved so warmly. Till
he reached the Highlanders no cheer had greeted Sir Colin as he rode
along the line of men to whom as yet he was strange. But the
Ninety-Third were his old familiar friends. “Ninety-Third” so ended his
little speech—“You are my own lads, I rely on yon to do yourselves and
me credit.” “Aye, aye, Sir Colin” answered a voice from the ranks, “Ye
ken us and we ken you; we’ll bring the women and bairns out o’ Lucknow
or we’ll leave our ain banes there!”
The expected reinforcements having joined, the column,
Sir Colin riding at its head, began the flank march towards the
Dilkoosha at daybreak on the morning of the 14th. No opposition was met
with until the advance approached the Dilkoosha park, whence came a
smart fire which was soon overpowered. The Dilkoosha was promptly
occupied and the straggling enemy hurried down the slope towards the
Martiniere, whence presently came a heavy fire of artillery and musketry
which was beaten down by Travers’ heavy guns. At the approach of the
British skirmishers the Martinifere was evacuated, and all the ground on
the hither side of the canal was won. The field-hospital and
commissariat were installed in the Dilkoosha and headquarters were
established in the Martini^re, the wood to the west of which was
occupied by Hope’s brigade with guns on the higher ground on its left.
An attack on the position made by the enemy in the afternoon met with
defeat, and they were driven back across the canal by a couple of
regiments which made good a lodgment on its further side.
At the 15th the advance halted to admit of the closing up
of the rearguard, which had been constantly engaged with the enemy
during the previous day and did not reach the Dilkoosha until late next
morning. The nearest road from Sir Colin’s position to the Residency was
by the Dilkoosha bridge, the Begum’s palace, and the Huzrut Gunj,—the
road followed by the Seventy-Eighth Highlanders in the first relief; but
it was manifestly extremely dangerous. Another road, starting also from
near the Begum’s palace and passing between the barracks and a suburb,
led straight to the Secundrabagh. This was the route traversed by Outram
and Havelock’s main force on the 25th of September, and it was
recommended in the plan Outram had sent out by Kavanagh. But Sir Colin
was assured that this road also would present formidable obstacles to
his advance; and he could not afford to run the risk of compromising his
scanty resources, already diminished by the detachments he was obliged
to leave in his rear. He wisely resolved to make a detour to his right
and approach the Secundrabagh by the open ground near the river. In the
afternoon a reconnaissance was made by the Commander-in-Chief of the
position opposite his left, the intention being to impress the enemy
with the belief that his advance was to be made in that direction. The
massing of all his artillery on that point and the maintenance upon it
of a fire of mortars during the night, together with the entire absence
of outposts on his right, were measures intended to contribute to that
conviction.
By daybreak of the 16th the army was in motion. The
enterprise before it was arduous in the extreme. After the subtraction
of the details necessary to hold the Alumbagh, the Martinifere, and the
Dilkoosha, there were available for the relief operations only the
Ninety-Third, part of the Fifty-Third, two weak Sikh regiments, two
provisional battalions of detachments, and portions of the Twenty-Third
and Eighty-Second regiments—in all not above three thousand bayonets.
Opposed to this handful was a host of some sixty thousand armed men
concentrated in a central position of great strength. The task would
have been rash even to madness but for Campbell's great strength in
artillery, on which he chiefly depended for overcoming the obstacles
which interposed between him and the garrison he had come to relieve.
That artillery comprised the gallant Peel's naval brigade, consisting of
six 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, and two rocket-tubes; the sixteen
field-guns of Greathed’s column, a heavy and a light field-battery and a
mortar-battery of the Boyal Artillery, one half field-battery of the
Bengal Artillery, and two native Madras horse-artillery guns—in all
thirty-nine guns and howitzers, six mortars, and two rocket-tubes.
The line of Campbell’s advance was from his extreme right
along the right bank of the river for about a mile, and then by a narrow
and tortuous lane through thickly-wooded enclosures and between low
mud-houses until the vicinity of the rear of the Secundrabagh should be
approached. A strong advance-guard of cavalry with Blunt’s troop of
Bengal Horse Artillery and a company of the Fifty-Third led the way.
Hope’s and Bussell’s brigades followed, the ammunition and engineer park
came next, and Greathed’s brigade brought up the rear. After passing the
village of Sultangunge the lane by which the force was advancing turned
sharp to the left, when the rear of the Secundrabagh became immediately
visible, from the loopholes in which and from the adjacent huts on
either side of the lane came a brisk fire. The moment was extremely
critical; for the movement in advance was checked, while the cavalry,
jammed and helpless in the narrow lane, hindered the passage forward of
the artillery and infantry. Sir Colin pushed to the front regardless of
the enemy’s fire, thrust the cavalry into the side alleys of the
village, and ordered a company to line and cover the continuation of the
lane passing along the west side of the Secundrabagh and debouching into
the open space in its front. He himself then brought up to the front of
the building two of Travers’ 18-pounders, which promptly set about
battering a breach in the south-west bastion of the Secundrabagh.
Blunt’s troop of horse-artillery came tearing up at a gallop through a
heavy cross-fire till it reached the open space between that building
and the serai a couple of hundred yards to the southward. Blunt
gallantly maintained his fire in three different directions, sustaining
heavy losses in men and horses. The Ninety-Third now coming up, three
companies of that regiment cleared the serai and the adjacent buildings,
drove out the enemy holding those positions, and pursuing the rebels
across the plain seized and held the barracks while part of the
Fifty-Third in skirmishing order connected that post with the main
attack against the Secundrabagh. Sir Colin was near one of Blunt’s guns
when a bullet which had passed through a gunner struck him with great
force on the thigh, but it did not penetrate and he escaped with a
severe bruise.
While the 18-pounders were doing their work the infantry
were lying down behind an embankment waiting impatiently till their time
should come. After an hour’s battering a Sikh native officer, without
waiting for the word, sprang forward sword in hand followed by his men.
Sir Hope Grant1 states that the brave Sikh was
outrun by Sergeant-Major Murray of the Ninety-Third. Mr.
Forbes-Mitchell says that the Sikh officer was killed on the way and
that the two European officers of the Sikh regiment were wounded,
misfortunes which caused a temporary halt on the part of the Punjaubis.
“Then,” according to Forbes-Mitchell, “Sir Colin called to Colonel Ewart,
‘ Ewart, bring on the tartan!; his bugler sounded the advance, and the
seven companies of the Ninety-Third dashed from behind the bank. It has
always been a moot point who got through the hole first. I believe the
first man in was Lance-Corporal Donnelly of the Ninety-Third, killed
inside; then Subadar Gokul Singh, followed by Sergeant-Major Murray of
the Ninety-Third also killed, and, fourth, Captain Burroughs severely
wounded.”
The foremost men climbed in through the narrow breach.
The bulk of the Ninety-Third and the Sikhs entered by the great gate
further left after its massive locks had yielded to many bullets, and
they were followed by Bamston’s battalion of detachments. The
Fifty-Third broke in through a window to the right. The vast interior
garden in which the deadly strife was proceeding rang with the clash of
weapons, the crackle of musketry, the shouts and yells of the
combatants. The scene baffled all description. The enemy, caught in a
deathtrap, fought with the courage of despair. The conflict raged for
hours and the carnage was appalling. When the enclosure and buildings
were finally cleared of their ghastly contents, no fewer than two
thousand native soldiers were found to have been slain.
That Sir Colin’s temper was apt to break out in sudden
passion, he himself was very ready to admit; and if the passion were
causeless, he was equally ready to make amends for the outburst.
Forbes-Mitchell tells a story of him which illustrates both
characteristics. Colonel Ewart, he says, in the fighting inside the
Secundrabagh had captured a regimental colour from two native officers,
both of whom he had killed notwithstanding that he had been himself
severely wounded; and seeing that the fight was over, Ewart, bareheaded,
covered with blood and powder-smoke, his eyes still flashing with the
excitement of the fray, ran up to where Sir Colin sat on his gray
charger outside the gate of the Secundrabagh and called out “We are in
full possession of the place, sir! I have killed the two last of the
enemy with my own hand, and here is one of their colours! ” Sir Colin
had been chafed by events, and he turned angrily on Ewart. “Damn your
colours, sir I’ he thundered—“it is not your place to be taking colours;
go back to your regiment this instant!” Ewart turned away, much
disconcerted by the reception given him by the Chief; but
Forbes-Mitchell adds that he subsequently heard that Sir Colin sent for
the colonel later in the day, apologised for his rudeness, and thanked
him for his services.
Some distance beyond the Secundrabagh, and about one
hundred yards right of the road towards the Residency, was the Shah
Nujeef, a great mosque and tomb surrounded by a high loopholed wall
fringed by trees, jungle, and enclosures. About midway between the two
places lay a village to left of the road. Having drawn off his brigade
from the Secundrabagh Hope cleared and occupied this village, while Peel
brought up his heavy guns and placed them in battery within short range
of the Shah Nujeef. The defence of that strongs hold was most obstinate,
the enemy maintaining from it a severe and incessant musketry-fire which
cost Peel very heavy loss. The attack had lasted for nearly three hours,
yet no impression had been made on the massive structure; and Peel was
enduring a double cross-fire from the left hank of the Goomtee and from
the Kaiserbagh in addition to the injury wrought him by the garrison of
the Shah Nujeef. A gallant attempt made by Barnston’s battalion of
detachments to .clear the outlying enclosures failed; Barnston was
struck down, and the determined attempt then made by Wolseley to
escalade could not succeed, he and his men were raked by a storm of
missiles,—grenades and round-shot hurled from wall-pieces, arrows and
brickbats, burning torches of rags and cotton saturated with oil. A
dangerous crisis was imminent. Retreat was not to he thought of, even
had it been possible, which it was not. The veteran Chief was equal to
the occasion. He sent orders to Middleton’s light field-battery to
advance, to pass Peel’s guns on the right, and, getting as near as
possible to the Shah Nujeef, to open a quick and well-sustained fire of
grape. Peel, for his part, was to redouble his fire ; and the Chief rode
back to the village occupied by the Ninety-Third to tell his favourite
regiment that no matter at what cost the Shah Nujeef must he taken, and
since the place had withstood gun-fire the cold steel would have to play
its part. Many words were not needed, for Sir Colin and the Ninety-Third
understood each other • and so, announcing to the regiment that he would
himself head its advance, he led it out from the village into the open,
ready to press forward at the word.
Middleton’s battery came up grandly. With loud cheers,
the drivers waving their whips, the gunners their caps, it galloped
through the storm of fire to within pistol-shot of the wall, and poured
in round upon round of grape. Peel, manning all his guns, worked them
with swift measured energy. The Ninety-Third, with flashing eyes and
ardent step, the Highland blood throbbing in every vein, came rolling
forward in a great eager wave, the war-loving veteran of many battles
riding at its head. As he approached the nearest angle of the enclosure
the men began to fall fast, but without a check its foot was reached.
There, however, the gallant Scots were brought to a stand in face of a
loopholed wall twenty feet high. There was no breach and there were no
scaling-ladders. Unable to advance and resolute not to retire, the
Ninety-Third resorted to a stationary fire of musketry; but the garrison
of the place had all the advantage and the assailants suffered severely.
Of Sir Colin’s staff both the brothers Alison were struck down, and many
of the mounted officers, including Hope, his aide-de-camp, and his
brigade-major, had their horses shot under them. The aspect of affairs
had become exceedingly grave; the dusk was falling and the Shah Nujeef
still remained untaken. Just at this critical moment Sergeant Paton of
the Ninety-Third came running to Hope with the glad tidings that he had
found a breach in the northeast corner of the rampart near the river.
Hope quietly gathered a company and followed the sergeant through the
jungle to where the latter indicated the narrow fissure he had
discovered. He clambered up and then assisted Hope, Allgood, and others;
the soldiers followed in single file. A body of sappers hurried up and
enlarged the opening, and then the supports rushed in. The garrison,
taken by surprise, glided away amidst the rolling smoke into the dark
shadows of the night. The main gate was thrown open and at last the Shah
Nujeef was in British possession.
Enough had been done for one day. The Shah Nujeef was
garrisoned by the Ninety-Third, where also headquarters were established
for the night. The roads and positions in rear of that advanced post
were strongly held, and the wearied troop3 lay down to well-earned rest.
The relief of the Residency, a few hours before problematical in the
extreme, was now fairly assured. Taken between Campbell’s batteries and
Outram’s cannon, the enemy could not long maintain themselves in the
intervening buildings. In the early morning of the 17th Peel’s heavy
guns were already in steady action on the Hess House, a place of
considerable strength, with a ditch twelve feet broad backed by a
loopholed wall For several hours it was bombarded, until, the musketry
fire from it having been subjugated, about 3 p.m. it was successfully
attacked by Captain Wolseley3 with a company of
the Ninetieth and a detachment of the Fifty-Third. As Wolseley’s men,
flushed with success, followed their gallant leader in pursuit of the
fugitives across the open into the Motee Mahal, Lieutenant Roberts4 raised
the flag on the top of the Mess House, the specified signal which
notified to the Residency garrison the near approach of the relieving
force. On the 16th Havelock had made a sally the result of which was to
give him the possession of the advanced posts of the Herm Khana and the
Engine House ; and thus communication was opened between the two forces
as soon as the Motee Mahal had been carried. The meeting of Sir Colin
Campbell, Outram, and Havelock, commemorated in a well-known picture,
marked the virtual consummation of the operations for the relief. That
object had been accomplished at the cost of a loss of forty-five
officers and four hundred and ninety-six men.
It still remained, however, to withdraw from Lucknow the
garrison and its encumbrances. To effect this evacuation in security
required the utmost vigilance on the part of the troops and the greatest
nicety in their handling, for the enemy still held threatening positions
in overwhelming strength, and the long line from the Residency to the
Dilkoosha which had to be traversed by the garrison and its convoy, was
exposed to hostile fire at many points. From the 17th until the
evacuation on the night between the 22nd and 23rd, Campbell's force in
effect constituted a huge outlying picket which could not be relieved
until the ultimate withdrawal should have been effected. Sir Colin’s
first operation was to protect the left flank and left rear of his force
by a chain of posts extending from the barracks to Banks’ house, and
this was accomplished after some sharp fighting. To protect the women
and children from exposure to fire from the Kaiserbagh while crossing
the open space between the Engine House and the Motee Mahal, a flying
sap with canvas screens was constructed; and during the afternoon of the
19th their retirement as far as the Secundrabagh was accomplished in
safety. They were received by Sir Colin at his headquarters near that
building. To assure their safety he detained the ladies until nightfall,
when he sent them on to the Dilkoosha in doolies. The Government
treasure, the crown jewels of the King of Oude, and all the serviceable
guns were then gradually sent out; and at midnight of the 22nd the
withdrawal of the garrison began. In deep silence the original garrison
quitted the Residency and passed through the advanced posts to the rear.
Those in succession fell back until the ground had been abandoned as far
as the Secundrabagh, where Hope’s brigade was in position with fifteen
guns. The troops were then drawn back across the canal, Sir Colin
remaining with a detachment until the last gun was reported clear of the
last village. Before dawn of the 23rd the whole force was in its
assigned positions at the Dilkoosha and the Mar-tinifere. So adroit had
been the arrangements that the enemy continued to fire on the positions
for many hours after they had been relinquished. Thus terminated a
series of difficult and delicate operations, the entire success of which
was mainly owing to the steadfast adherence to Sir Colin Campbell’s
original design. Wisely planned and skilfully executed, it proved how
much a comparative handful of disciplined soldiers could accomplish
against stupendous odds and in difficult ground, under the guidance of a
leader who combined great experience in war with the full possession of
the confidence of his troops.
On the afternoon of the 24th, just as the life was
quitting the worn frame of the noble Havelock, the relieving force with
its unwieldy convoy began its march to the Alumbagh, its rear covered by
Outram’s division which closed up next day. It was not until midday of
the 27th that Sir Colin, leaving Outram at the Alumbagh with four
thousand men and twenty-five guns, put in motion towards Cawnpore his
own vast miscellaneous column of soldiers, Women and children, sick and
wounded, guns, treasure and material. When the camp at Bunnee was
reached in the evening, the sound of heavy firing was heard in the
direction of Cawnpore. For several days all communication with Windham
had been cut off; and when it was known that a cannonade had been heard
at Bunnee on the previous day, the conclusion became inevitable that the
Gwalior Contingent had caught at the opportunity to assail the feeble
garrison of Cawnpore. The apprehension of this had been haunting Sir
Colin ever since the rupture of communications some days back; but
nevertheless it must be said that there had been a certain measure of
deliberation since the accomplishment of the relief. The weakness of
Windham’s resources and the disastrous consequences of his being
overwhelmed by numbers, occasioned very serious disquietude. Cawnpore
and the bridge over the Ganges in hostile possession, it was but too
obvious that Campbell's force with its huge and helpless convoy would be
gravely compromised. A night-march made by such troops as could be
spared from eseort-duty might have saved some valuable hours, but the
force did not resume its progress until the morning of the 28th. The
thunder of the cannon waxed louder as the column advanced ; and note
after note from Windham, delivered by panting messengers, gave ominous
intimation how greatly endangered had become the situation at Cawnpore.
Leaving the infantry to hurry forward with the convoy and
heavy guns, Sir Colin pushed on rapidly with the cavalry and
horse-artillery. Leaving those in the Mungulwar camping-ground he
galloped on to Cawnpore with his staff*. Near the bridge an officer
reported to him that “Windham’s garrison was at its last gasp.” His
soldierly nature chafed by the flaccid despondency which tone and
expression alike disclosed, the hot old Chief spurred his horse across
the bridge and rode straight for the entrenchment. As lie passed, some
men whom he had commanded in the Crimea recognised through the gloom the
familiar face and figure; and cheer on cheer was raised as the word
passed like lightning that the Commander-in-Chief had arrived. No more
caitiff babble now of the garrison being “at its last gasp!” The feeling
was universal that with Sir Colin’s arrival disaster was no longer to be
dreaded; and the situation was already retrieved in spirit.
Windham had not followed the instructions given him by
the Commander-in-Chief before the latter crossed into Oude. He had
loyally forwarded to Sir Colin the reinforcements as they arrived, until
the communications were cut off between him and his Chief. Left then to
his own resources both moral and material, and aware that a rebel force
of trained soldiers, fourteen thousand strong with some forty guns, was
daily drawing nearer and nearer, he abandoned the defensive prescribed
to him, and on the 24th of November he pushed some six miles out into
the country with his mixed force of detachments, numbering all told less
than fourteen hundred men with eight guns. Accepting his challenge,
Tantia Topee, the rebel general, and the only real soldier the mutiny
produced, threw forward his advanced guard into a strong position lining
the dry bed of a mullah. That position Windham on the morning of the
26th carried at the first rush; but he found it necessary to withdraw in
face of the main body of the rebels, and he fell back nearer to his
base. At noon next day, skilfully withholding his infantry, the rebel
general opened a heavy cannonade on Windham’s front and flanks. For five
hours the British troops held their ground staunchly against
overwhelming odds, but at length they were forced to retreat. This
movement through narrow streets and broken ground was attended by
considerable disorder, and the camp-equipage had to be abandoned.
Reluctant to withdraw into the entrenchment, Windham during the night
between the 27th and 28th still held with his right the broken and
wooded ground between the city and the river, while his left stretched
into the plain beyond the canal. The fighting, renewed on the morning of
the 28th, proved disastrous to the attenuated forces of the defence.
Walpole on the left held his ground and even took the offensive, and
Carthew gallantly maintained his position on the right until it became
quite untenable. But the retirement of the latter gave possession to the
enemy of the Church and Assembly Rooms containing the stores and baggage
of the Commander-in-Chiefs army, which Windham bad omitted to remove
’within the cover of the entrenchment. Gradually the hostile batteries
closed in around Windham’s last defensive position near the bridge head,
and directed their fire also on the bridge itself. A sally was made
which for a time gave promise of a retrieval, but it was ultimately
repulsed with heavy loss and great discouragement. By nightfall the
garrison had been obliged to take shelter in the entrenchment; and when
Sir Colin rode into the work it had become the mark for the cannon-balls
and even the musketry-fire of the victorious rebels.
On the morning of the 29th Sir Colin’s artillery on the
left bank, aided by that of the entrenchment, gradually beat down the
fire which the enemy were directing on the bridge; and the crossing of
the troops then began. The passage of the vast convoy lasted unceasingly
for thirty-six hours. As the -women and children, the sick and wounded
crossed, the interminable courage swept by the rampart of the fort and
encamped on the plain among the mouldering remains and riddled walls of
the weak shelter wherein Wheeler’s people had fought and died. Day after
day the enemy cannonaded Sir Colin’s camp, but effective reprisals had
to be postponed until the convoy of families and wounded which had
started for Allahabad on the night of December 3rd should have been far
enough on the journey to be safe from danger at the hands of the rebels.
Meanwhile, the communications having been restored, the current of
reinforcements was resumed, and the eager soldiers needed only to
recover the fatigue of their march.
The enemy, whose forces were now increased to some
twenty-five thousand men, had their left strongly posted in the broken
ground of the old cantonments between the city and the river. Cawnpore
itself was occupied; and its face towards the canal, opposite the
advanced posts of the British camp, was thickly lined with troops. The
hostile right was behind the canal on the southern plain, the Calpee
road covered by the camp of the Gwalior Contingent. To fall on the
enemy’s right and prevent assistance being rendered it by their left,
was the governing idea of Sir Colin’s plan of attack. He determined to
throw the whole weight of his force on the rebel right on the plain, to
strike at the camp of the Gwalior Contingent, establish himself on its
line of retreat, and having thus separated it from the Bithoor force
constituting the rebel left, to effect the discomfiture of both bodies
in detail. The troops at his disposal amounted to five thousand
infantry, six hundred cavalry, and thirty-five guns.
At 10 a.m. of the 6th, while the troops of Sir Colin’s
left were being formed in order of battle on either side of the Grand
Trunk Road, Windham opened a fire of heavy artillery from the
entrenchment upon the enemy’s right between the city and the river, with
the object of concentrating their attention 011 that quarter and of
masking the main point of Campbell’s attack. When this cannonade
slackened Greathed, moving up to the line of the canal, engaged the
enemy holding the edge of the city with a heavy musketry-fire for the
purpose of detaining them in that position. On Great-hed’s left Walpole
with his riflemen and the Thirty-Eighth crossed the canal, skirted the
southern edge of the city, then bringing forward his right shoulder,
swept across the plain towards the enemy’s camp. Simultaneously the
columns of Hope and Inglis, forming in successive lines further to the
left under cover of - the heavy artillery and preceded by the Sikhs and
the Fifty-Third, drove the enemy across the canal, followed them up
closely, and pressed eagerly forward upon the camp of the Gwalior
Contingent, hurling back the foe in utter confusion. A battery galloping
to the front poured round after round of grape into the tents, which
were speedily cleared. So complete was the surprise, so sudden the
onslaught, that the ckwpallies were found baking on the fires, the
bullocks stood tied beside the carts, the sick and wounded were lying in
the hospitals. By noon the enemy were in full flight by the road to
Calpee. Such was the demoralisation that a pursuit by Sir Colin, his
staff and personal escort, along with Bourchiers field-battery, sufficed
to keep the fugitives on the run ; for the cavalry which was intended to
cut off the enemy’s retreat had missed its way, and only joined in the
pursuit some miles beyond the abandoned camp. Gun after gun was captured
in the chase. Sir Colin maintained the pursuit with the cavalry and the
horse-artillery along the Calpee road for fifteen miles, capturing
seventeen guns with their ammunition-waggons and a great booty of
material. The Gwalior Contingent, for the time being, was utterly
discomfited.
The defeat of the rebels would have been complete, but
for the escape of the Bithoor troops constituting the enemy’s left in
the ground between the city and the river. After the capture of the
Gwalior Contingent’s camp there had been assigned to General Mansfield,
Sir Colin’s Chief-of-Staff, the task of cutting off the retreat of the
rebel left along the Bithoor road. Mansfield advanced, with the Rifles
in skirmishing order followed by the Ninety-Third and covered by an
artillery fire, to a position near the Subadar’s Tank, where he halted
short of the road which was the enemy’s line of retreat. This passive
attitude not only permitted the escape of the enemy, but ..’emboldened
them 1 to venture an artillery - attack # Mansfield's stationary troops;
and the rebels were allowed jbogckrxy off their guns without hindrance
and to make retreat on Bithoor. Mansfield’s inaction rfwbuld have more
seriously detracted from the completeness of the British victory, but
for the success of the enterprise which Sir Colin committed to Hope
Grant on the 8th. That gallant soldier hurried in pursuit of the Bithoor
fugitives with some two thousand five hundred men and eleven guns.
On the early morning of the 9th he overtook them at Serai
Ghaut twenty-five miles above Cawnpore. Promptly opening fire on them,
he drove them across the river and captured fifteen guns. Of the forty
guns with which the rebels had advanced on Cawnpore, they had now lost
all but one. Sir Colin had disposed of some twenty-five thousand
enemies, including the formidable Gwalior Contingent, at the cost of
only ninety-nine casualties among the troops he had led to a success so
signal.
He was free at last to appreciate the virtue of the old
proverb, “All’s well that ends well.” But he had run great risks and had
narrowly escaped disaster. Nobly stimulated by an exigence in the
urgency of which he put faith, he had set aside ordinary military
considerations and concentrated every energy on the relief of a garrison
which he had been led to believe was in extremity. As a matter of fact,
there was no such imminency as had been represented to him. It must be
said that both the chiefs who successively conducted the defence of
Lucknow were unduly impatient of beleaguerment. Havelock sacrificed half
his scanty force in successive attempts to reach Lucknow, urged to try
and to try again by Inglis’ needless nervousness on the subject of
rations. Outram’s sole edible contributions to the resources of the
original garrison were the bullocks which had hauled his guns and
ammunition waggons; yet no approach to starvation threatened either the
original garrison or the so-called “ relieving force.” As a matter of
fact there was no resort to horse-flesh; and there never should have
been any occasion for reduced rations of farinaceous food, of which,
indeed, Sir Colin carried a way one hundred and sixty thousand lbs. The
commissariat had simply miscalculated \ and there was really no need
that Sir Colin should have strained every nerve for the immediate relief
of Lucknow, involving as it did the postponement of military
undertakings of more imminent importance. This fact impressed itself pn
the Commander-in-Chief; and the realisation that he had been influenced
by representations which circumstances did not warrant gave occasion to
a coolness on his part towards Sir James Outram.
It is fair, however, to state that Outram wrote from
Lucknow to Captain Bruce in the following terms:— “However desirable it
may be to support me here, I cannot but feel that it is still more
important that the Gwalior rebels should be first disposed of. . . . We
can manage to screw on, if absolutely necessary, till near the end of
November, on further reduced rations. . . . But it is so absolutely to
the advantage of the State that the Gwalior rebels should first be
effectually destroyed, that our relief should be a secondary
consideration." Had Outram written in this tone three weeks earlier, the
option would have been with Sir Colin to strike at Calpee before
undertaking the relief of Lucknow. But it was not until the 28th of
October, when Sir Colin had already taken his line, that Outram wrote as
above; and his communication was addressed neither to the
Commander-in-Chief nor to Brigadier Wilson in command at Cawnpore, but
to a subordinate officer. Outram adds that his letter, since it reached
Bruce on October 30th, was no doubt communicated to Sir Colin who did
not leave Cawnpore for Lucknow until November 9th. But a plan of
campaign cannot be altered at a moment’s notice and at the eleventh
hour. Nor is there any evidence that Sir Colin ever saw Outram’s letter
to Bruce. It is true that intelligence reached him at Allahabad on
November 1st that Outram “ was prepared, if absolutely necessary, to
hold out on further reduced rations till near the end of November; ” and
the announcement pleased him, as it afforded him a longer period in
which to make his preparations for the relief of Lucknow. But he wrote
to the Duke of Cambridge on November 8th that “all accounts from Lucknow
show that Sir James Outram is in great straits;” and his biographer
Shadwell testifies that “the urgent cry for succour which reached him
from Lucknow overbore every other consideration.” |
