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THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
EDWARD CAIRD, LL.D., D.C.L.

PUBLISHED BY
MACLEHOSE, JACKSON & CO., GLASGOW
Publishers to the University

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON
New York - - *The Macmillan Co.*
Toronto - - *The Macmillan Co. of Canada*
London - - *Simpkin, Hamilton and Co.*
Cambridge - - *Bowes and Bowes*
Edinburgh - - *Douglas and Foulis*
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PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Aet. circ. 50

THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
OF
EDWARD CAIRD

LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A.

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
GLASGOW AND MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

BY

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GLASGOW

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DEDICATED TO
OLD FELLOW PUPILS AND FRIENDS
OF EDWARD CAIRD

PREFACE

CAIRD himself has written of Carlyle: "The ordinary gossip of biography is interesting enough, but I must profess for myself an entire disbelief that any important additional light is thrown by it upon the character of men who have otherwise expressed themselves so fully as he." There were well-known reasons why the friends of Carlyle should prefer to judge him by his teaching rather than by the "gossip" of his biographers. There are none such in the case of Caird. It is in this conviction that the editors have ventured to disregard his warning and in the first part of this book put together the main facts of a life which, though singularly devoid of "events" in the ordinary sense, yet in its even flow and its encounter with men and things so accurately reflects the spirit of the man. Their hope is that it will assist those who had the good fortune to know him to recall, those who had not, to realise how entirely of one piece were the teaching and spirit of his writings with those of his life and daily conversation.

He has said in the same essay that "The best way of dealing with a great author is, in the first instance, to go to him without much criticism and with a receptive mind, and to let his way

of thinking permeate into our minds, until it becomes part of their very substance. For, till we have done so, our criticism will not be adequate ; it will be wanting in sympathy, and it will rather tend to defend us against his spirit than enable us to appreciate it. When, however, we have for a long time submitted to such a powerful influence, when we have learned to live in the atmosphere of our author's ideas, so that we can almost anticipate the turn his thoughts will take on any occasion it is advisable for us to change our method, to put him, so to speak, at arm's length and to attempt calmly to estimate what we have got from him, and so to determine his proper place among the inhabitants of our private Walhalla—among the company of the wise to whom we return ever again and again, as the permanent possessions of our intellectual life." It is in some such spirit and after having had to submit themselves to some such discipline that the writers have added the short appreciation of Caird's Philosophy which follows the Life and Letters, and which they desire herewith to dedicate to all old fellow-pupils in Glasgow and Oxford.

It may seem that some apology is needed for the delay in the publication of this volume. Owing to circumstances over which the writers had no control, among these the War and illness, the work of its preparation has once and again had to be postponed. Perhaps the delay is not without compensation if it has enabled both writer and reader to view Caird's work from a greater distance and in better perspective.

For the earlier part of the " Life " up to Caird's

election to the Mastership of Balliol and for Chapter I. of the "Philosophy," the first of the editors is responsible; for the last chapter of the "Life," for the editing of the Letters, and for the remaining chapters of the "Philosophy," the second. For assistance in obtaining materials for the Oxford period they have to thank many Oxford friends and contemporaries, including the present Master, Mr. Urquhart and Mr. Lindsay, Fellows of Balliol, Professor J. A. Smith, Mr. F. J. Wylie and Principal Ernest Barker. But thanks are especially owed to Principal H. J. W. Hetherington of University College, Exeter, who not only devoted much time to interviews and the verification of references in Oxford, but read the whole of the MS. of Chapter III. of the "Life," Chapters II.-VIII. of the "Philosophy," and assisted the writers with many valuable criticisms and suggestions—acting, in fact, as a third editor of the book. They have further to thank Professor J. S. Mackenzie for reading the whole book in proof and for his generous encouragement; and Mr. John W. Harvey for preparing the Index and improving the accuracy of the text.

MICHAELMAS, 1921.

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I
LIFE

J.M.C.

A

CHAPTER I

SCHOOL AND COLLEGE, 1835-1864

AMONGST the minor writings of Edward Caird are two memoirs. One of them introduces the Gifford Lectures of his brother, Principal John Caird ; the other, the Lectures and Essays of Professor William Wallace on *Natural Theology and Ethics*. We can infer from these his conception of the biography of a scholar and teacher, and conjecture what kind of account of his own life, if any, he could have tolerated.

Both memoirs are brief, and both are at once frank and reticent. He calls his brother's " a short sketch," and tells us that he undertook it " with much hesitation." " I have to remember," he adds, " that he was a man of much reserve, which even after his death I am bound to respect." Speaking of the quiet and uneventful life of a College Tutor and University Professor and of Wallace's devotion to his academic duties, he remarks that " an elaborate biography of him would be out of place."

All who knew Edward Caird, even a little, will understand how the memory of his personality imposes upon the present writers the same respectful reserve. The materials at their disposal, whether in the way of striking events or of correspondence,

are not large. Considered in their relation to his power and his influence upon his time, they are extraordinarily scanty. This arose from the uniquely impersonal attitude of his spirit. He was probably as little occupied with himself or the centre of his own thoughts as it is given to any man to be. He did not consider or value events in their bearing upon himself, nor give them a personal turn or colouring. His interest was in his work ; he was from year to year habitually, fully, and most placidly immersed in teaching or writing on philosophical, religious and ethical subjects : he affirmed causes, at times with impervious resoluteness and perseverance, but he did not assert himself. In matters that concerned his own " personality " he was patient and passive : he neither pressed himself upon nor drew back from the notice of men, but accepted without comment and apparently without thought the place which his influence made for him, and which it pleased others to assign. His character was massively simple, and he was as frank as a landscape, and just as willing to be overlooked. It followed that although his life was full, it was not full of events that disturbed its course, or that usually attract the attention of men. Incidents were deprived of the complexity with which the passions of men charge them, and therefore of most of their interest, by the tranquillity of his temperament, the balance of his judgment and the singularly impersonal attitude of his mind. But his emotional nature was deep : his feelings on some sides were easily touched, for he had no protection against the affection of his friends ; but they were under the control of a will whose reserve of strength

was great, and when stirred they checked rather than freed his utterance.

The account of such a life is not easy to write. It is not in our power, perhaps it is impossible, to revive his presence in the minds of his friends, far less to convey to those who did not know Edward Caird the conviction which was and will remain practically universal amongst his pupils, that he was a man of quite unusual moral stature.

Edward Caird was born in Greenock on the 23rd day of March, 1835, the fifth of seven sons, six of whom lived till they were more than seventy years of age. His father was John Caird, partner and manager of a firm of engineers in that city, who died in the prime of life in 1838, when his son Edward was too young to form any impression, or retain any memory of him, and there is little known of him. But he seems to have been a man of sterling rectitude of character, impressively methodical in his ways, and a great reader of religious and theological books. These he studied with conscientious care, making notes and extracts: and he read nothing else. From him there came, no doubt, something of that regard for religion, and that impulse towards culture, which characterized all his sons.

Edward Caird's mother was Janet, daughter of Roderick and Isabella Young of Paisley. She is described as "the most even-natured, placid and contented spirit possible," who met great and grave responsibilities without anxiety, and with a courage that never flinched. She was left a widow with six sons, the eldest of whom was not eighteen years old

and the youngest was an infant, and her means, although not straitened, were narrow. There was a Mr. Weir who, whether he was formally appointed or not, acted as guardian, and deserves to be held in memory for his faithful and effective friendship to Mrs. Caird and her boys. But, undoubtedly, her mainstay was her own natural optimism. It gave her courage not to stint the education of her sons. She sent every one of them to the Greenock Academy, and started them well on their several ways of life. Most characteristically, she expected good of them as a matter of course, and took their success for granted. Nor was her faith misplaced. She saw them all prosper beyond the common lot of men, and more than one of them became a leader of his times. But she accepted their achievements without the least excitement. It was the delight of her declining years to read the novels of Sir Walter Scott, and, in particular, to listen to the reading of them by her son Edward, when from time to time he visited her in her old home. She died in her ninetieth year, the music of her tranquil life continuing to the end like that of a murmuring brook on its way to the sea.

There is no evidence of that rigorous discipline on the part of Mrs. John Caird which was supposed in those days to be salutary if not essential for boys. She naturally trusted to gentler methods; and in particular left to her children, unurged and in every way uncelebrated, the example of her own strong and peaceful ways. But, of course, there was rigour, even gloom and mourning in the schools of those days, "as the mourning of Hadadrimmon in

the valley of Megiddon," and the Church also had its comminatory doctrines and its undiluted terrors for evil-doers : so that school and Church together supplied to the young Cairds all that the gentleness of their mother may have left lacking. One way or another, her experiment was altogether successful. Four of her sons entered into business and prospered therein. She saw them grow into able and cultured men, just and honourable in their dealings, notably kind in their judgment of their fellows, and faithful in the round and inconspicuous duties of good citizenship. The town of Greenock is rightly proud of all the Cairds.

The remaining sons were John and Edward. Of John Caird, the eldest of the family, it is not necessary for us to say more than a few words. His memory is sacred to the Scottish people, and his influence a rich inheritance. He liberalized and humanized their theology, and helped to secure their religious faith against scepticism by revealing to them its intrinsic reasonableness. He was in some respects more richly endowed with natural gifts than any of his brothers, and probably the greatest preacher in his day, at the least in Scotland. "He was essentially a speaker," his brother says, "and even when he wrote there was in the flow of the sentences something that reminded one of spoken words. His powers of thought and imagination seemed always to be working towards such an arrangement and exposition of his theme as would be effective in addressing an audience."¹ His choice of words was as "inevitable" as that of the poet,

¹ *Memoir*, cxi.

but it was the orator's choice of words, and the words were such as would "carry" and gather power with their flight. The students of the University of Glasgow remember him as their revered Principal, who might occasionally be seen crossing the College Quadrangle with short, swift steps, as if desiring not to be seen;¹ but on the opening and closing days of the long winter session, and at intervals on Sundays, swayed the congregations which thronged the great Hall of the University with a grave and sustained eloquence not equalled by, nor hardly comparable in kind to, anything in their experience. By his attainments as a scholar and reflective thinker, by his simple devotion to the retired interests of a studious life, and, above all, by the humility of his spirit and the exceeding beauty of his character, he stood for the University, and for the great city in which he dwelt, as one who in his own person represented the real aim and final purpose of the institution over which he presided.

John Caird's influence upon the life of his brother Edward was of the greatest importance; but not in childhood. John was withdrawn from school to enter into his father's office the year that Edward was born, and after eighteen months spent in the different departments of the engineering works he became a student in the University of Glasgow. Moreover, Edward passed the early years of his childhood under the care of his aunt, Miss Jane Caird, who had virtually adopted him, and who lived in another part of the town. The child was

¹ "He was, I think, the most modest man I ever knew in his estimate of his own abilities and acquirements," says his brother.

delicate and retiring and little given to games ; and his strong-minded and deeply religious aunt was devoted to him, and, possibly, all too one-sidedly mindful of his spiritual welfare. She regularly took him with her to the religious services which were about as numerous as their length would permit : patches, and not merely symbols, of eternity they must have seemed to the boy. But once at least—as he told the story long afterwards with a gleeful touch of innocent wickedness—he “ succeeded in making himself so objectionable as to be told to go out.” On another occasion, when a great storm broke over the Firth of Clyde in the night, the little boy went barefooted into his aunt’s room and told her to “ Ask God to stop that wind.” The incident is suggestive of her influence and of the mind she was helping to form within her little ward. At the Disruption Miss Jane Caird became an ardent adherent of the Free Church : and there is no doubt that the attitude of being at ease in Zion which she would have attributed to her nephews, would have given her real pain had she lived, for they continued in the “ Erastian Kirk,” and the eldest of them, with Dr. Norman Macleod, helped it most of all others at this crisis of its history.

Edward Caird received his first education in the Greenock Academy. The head-master was Dr. Brown, described by him as a teacher of the old school, a man of much vigour and individuality, full of enthusiasm for the classics, and of contempt for any training not based on the classics, and a profound believer in the “ tawse.”¹ He is said to have

¹ *Memoir of Principal Caird*, p. x.

accounted for the success of John Caird by saying, "That's because I thrashed him well." Inaccuracies in Greek or Latin grammar were regarded by the old dominie as symptoms of a lazy and lying spirit. Want of punctuality in the mornings he sought to correct by ridicule. He locked the school doors punctually at the stroke of eight, and opened them after prayers were over. Then the late-comers entered and slunk into their seats to the cry of "Sleepy! Sleepy!" shouted by the whole school led by the Rector, who "had instructed them to jeer." And "he had nicknames for all the boys." Nevertheless, whether in virtue of or in spite of the severity and the crudity of some of his methods, Dr. Brown, according to the testimony of his old pupils, "left his mark as a splendid schoolmaster." "The energy which he threw into his work and the interest which he took in the after career of his boys won their regard, and for many years after his death, until, in fact, the number of the survivors had become very small, they held an annual dinner in his memory."

The ways of Dr. Brown did not suit Edward Caird. The boy was delicate and timid, and as always, even to the end of his days, easily repelled by any stridency of demeanour. But while he instinctively withdrew from all roughness, he could be very tenacious in passive resistance. "Dr. Brown could never have made anything of Edward," said Mr. Colin Caird; and according to another brother, "He never learned his lessons," and "showed no special interest in books or studies." But in 1847 he fortunately came under influence of a very dif-

ferent kind. A new master was appointed to the Academy who understood the boy at once, and was understood by him. Caird threw off his listlessness, applied himself with earnestness to his studies, "became a lover of books, reading with eagerness everything that came in his way," and "rose in the school," carrying away prizes—in Mathematics, amongst other subjects. The change was so marked that it seemed to be "the result of some inward conviction or resolution." And its effects were not temporary; the boy had been led by his more gentle teacher into the learner's way of life, and he was sustained therein afterwards by his counsel and friendship. For they became fast friends, and used to take walks together—a rare relationship in Scotland in those days between a boy and his master.

This new master was David Duff, son of Provost Duff of Greenock. He was one of those inconspicuous great men who devoted themselves to scholarship and the ministry in Scotland, and whom Dr. Johnson came very near treating with respect. Mr. Duff was a fellow-student with Principals Caird and Rainy in the University of Glasgow, completed his Arts curriculum when he was nineteen years old, and accepted the Rectorship of Greenock Academy when he was only twenty-three. In 1855 he became Minister of the United Presbyterian Church in Helensburgh, whence he was called to the Professorship of Church History in the United Presbyterian Hall in Edinburgh. He died in 1890.

We have an interesting and self-revealing sketch of Dr. Duff's character from both John and Edward

Caird. Speaking of him as a fellow-student the former said, "I cannot remember that during our College life he betrayed a special aptitude for any one particular line of study, but his general force of intelligence was such that no subject came amiss to him. . . . I can recall many an hour in which, greatly to the advantage of his companion, we worked together, preparing for the oral and written examinations of the Natural Philosophy Class, and even still I remember the impression of power and subtlety of thought, of rapid insight and ingenuity, of easy mastery of difficulties on his part, which the process of combined study left on my mind. . . . He looked on with placid contentment while men far inferior to him in ability, but eager for distinction, were carrying off prizes and rising in College fame, and what honours he did win seemed to be won almost involuntarily and without effort. To this hour I recall the feeling of shame that came over me when I was voted on one occasion a place above him and the inclination I had to rise and say 'You are committing a great mistake.' . . . These recollections of long vanished years bring back to me the impression of a character far removed from commonplace, in which the youth was father to the man. Strength combined with simplicity, solidity with gentleness, thoughtfulness with a quiet humour, which touched but never trespassed the border of cynicism, a certain robust conscientiousness, with forbearance to the faults and foibles of others, a loyal and generous friend, a kindly and sweet-natured companion—such are some of the traits which live in my recollection of the friend of

the past. . . . I never knew a man of so much intellectual power who was so unassuming, so absolutely destitute of show and self-assertion. I never knew one who had so keen an eye for what is pretentious, absurd and grotesque in human character, who was yet so absolutely devoid of malice and bitterness."

The same qualities of mind and character which drew forth the inevitable eloquence of John Caird's warm-hearted tribute appealed to his brother. "Unambitious and retiring by nature, with little regard for show and appearance and an extreme dislike of pushing and conflict, he yet made such an impression upon those with whom he came in contact, that he seemed the natural person to choose for positions in which sound judgment and fairness of mind were above all required. His tolerant disposition made it difficult to rouse him to antagonism, but he was capable of even fierce indignation at any acts of meanness or cruelty. When he was at the head of the Grammar School in Greenock he showed great capacity for entering into the minds and feelings of his pupils; and I can say for myself that he was the first teacher who awakened me to any living interest in the work of the school. He had that sympathetic perception of character which generally goes with a keen sense of humour; but with all his subtle insight into the foibles of those around him, there was no bitterness but only charity in his laugh."¹

"To Dr. Duff I owe a great deal, as he was the first teacher that really awakened my mind, and the

¹ *The Magazine of the U.P. Church* for 1st October, 1890.

kindest friend and counsellor during my College course and afterwards. There were very few persons in the world for whom I had so great admiration and regard.”¹

Probably it would not be wrong to say that, when Edward Caird left the care of Dr. Duff, the main direction of his life had been already determined. He entered the University of Glasgow in the beginning of the winter session of 1850-51, and attended classes, first in Arts and then in Divinity, to the end of session 1855-56, and again in 1858-59. His course was suspended not only in 1856-57, but also in 1857-58; for, although his name is in the University Album as a student of Theology, it is absent from the class lists of that year. Moreover, in the year 1851-52 he enrolled in the Greek class only, and in a record of his attendance which he wrote in 1859 he omits it, probably because he did not complete the session.

The interruptions in his course were due to imperfect health. Otherwise his college career was that of the characteristically persevering and capable Scottish student, and was marked by the usual academic achievements. These were modest at first. In the Junior Greek and Latin Classes, which in those days were rudimentary and attended by very young boys, he was awarded the third and the seventh prizes. In 1852-53 he was given the first prize for “general eminence” in the senior Latin Class, and he also won the Latin “Blackstone” and the Cowan Gold Medals—blue ribbons in those

¹ Letter written from Tighnabruaich, on the occasion of Dr. Duff's death, to his son.

days in the "Humanity" and Greek of the University. Later in his career we find him taking the Coulter Prize for the best translation "with illustrative notes" of Plato's *Meno*, and in the Divinity Classes he gained the first prize for translating portions of Calvin's *Institutes*, and for his Essays in Ecclesiastical History, and also for his attainment in Hebrew. He does not seem to have distinguished himself in the Mathematical or Physical departments of the Arts curriculum, and there is no record of any special achievement in the classes of Logic or Moral Philosophy, nor any evidence that he was much influenced by the Professor of either of these subjects.

Professors of Scottish Universities are mostly "celestial bodies"; but "there is one glory of the sun and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars." Not all of them are always revered by all their pupils. Caird was the least given to autobiography, and he rarely referred to his student days in Glasgow; but he retained the profound respect of a good student for a great teacher, and he never spoke of Weir or Lushington without some hint of his reverence for their refined humanity. There were some others whom he remembered with gratitude qualified by humour, and he delighted at rare intervals to refer to one or two of the more quaint and antique of the theological Professors. One of them, he said, was engaged for the greater part of his life upon a book which, according to the author, "began with the Infinite and Absolute and went right on," but it did not get beyond the first sentence. The same Professor used

to object to all proposals for the increase of scientific teaching in the College on the ground that "it was not consistent with the idea of a University as it existed in the Divine Mind." And he held the Medical Faculty in horror and fear—as "an exacting and expensive Faculty, not only of doubtful benefit, but a detrimental and deteriorating influence in the history of the University."

Amongst his class fellows who afterwards became more or less eminent in their own spheres, one names first his most intimate College companion, Alexander M'Quisten, afterwards Minister of Inverkip, and his life-long friend, John Nichol, first Professor of English Literature in the University of Glasgow. Besides these were Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman; John G. Paton, the missionary; George Monro Grant, Principal of the University of Kingston, Canada; Sir Archibald Lawrie; Sheriff Guthrie; and David Binning Monro, Provost of Oriel.

The College authorities did not foster social intercourse amongst the students, nor furnish them with opportunities of knowing one another, except as competitors in the class-rooms. But the students associated themselves into groups and circles; for they had some common purposes, and common views, and common enthusiasms. Caird belonged to a group which according to Nichol was "especially pervaded by the idea of a mission to impose a higher tone into the Rectorial Elections; the conduct or misconduct of which (for we were always defeated) brought us still closer together. We were all, or thought ourselves to be, keen 'Radicals': believing in the 'people,' 'progress,' 'free education,' 'wider

suffrage,' 'rights of men,' 'rights of women,' etc., etc. . . . At the same time, with whatever degree of consistency, we were flaming 'hero worshippers,' and fought and fell, in championing as our Nominees, in succession, John Wilson, Alfred Tennyson and Thomas Carlyle. For the last, in 1854, our energies and eloquences secured sixty votes, 'under penalties' of being publicly held up as 'Deists,' 'Atheists' and 'Pantheists.' . . . We were ridiculously in earnest, and, perhaps, there is no reason to be ashamed of having been once enlisted in a troop of boy-fanatics, looking for neither pension, nor place, nor popularity." Nichol mentions "the leading spirits," John Service, the humorous mentor of their extravagances; John M. Ross, "the fine English" scholar and critic; George Palmer, most brilliant of Welsh wits; their "great scholar, George Rankine Luke, at once the purest and most commanding spirit among his contemporaries, and long associated with the latter was our philosopher in chief, Edward Caird."¹

Whether on account of rapid growth or excessive study, or both, Caird's health was not good during the latter portion of his first period in the University of Glasgow, and in the beginning of the winter of 1856 he was sent, under the care of his aunt, Miss Jane Caird, to St. Andrews. It was the second session of Principal John Tulloch, whose appointment raised great hopes amongst the young men in the Church of a more humane and reasonable theology than that prevailing at the time. It is possible that this no less than the sea air attracted

¹ *Memoir of John Nichol*, pp. 114, 115.

Caird to the ancient city. He was awarded the second of two foundation bursaries in St. Mary's College, and presumably attended the classes of Hebrew, Church History and Divinity; but no class roll was kept in those days. There is evidence that he enjoyed his life there—"delivered from St. Rollox¹ and the Glasgow Divinity Hall,"² and that "he impressed his fellow-students both by his great ability and by his modesty and simplicity."

Tulloch's teaching cannot have been fully formed at the time; but his tendency to treat theological questions in relation to philosophy was with him from the first. That the supernatural is simply the spiritual manifesting itself in a marked way was a doctrine his students remembered from him. He lectured on Comparative Religion, but probably at a later period than this: his students, however, must always have learned that there were other manifestations, besides Christianity, of the religious instinct which is common to mankind and that the others also have to be studied by one seeking to know what religion is. Tulloch had a great gift of cultivated and eloquent speech, both in oral addresses and in writing; he always stood for breadth and freedom; but he had little sympathy with Biblical Criticism, and rather held aloof from those who devoted themselves to this side of religious progress. His students had an immense admiration for him.

The Professor of Hebrew was Alexander F.

¹ A chemical factory whose high chimney in the north of Glasgow, with its malodorous smoke, was a symbol of the industrialism of the time.

² G. R. Luke's letter to Nichol, *Memoir*, p. 148.

Mitchell, transferred in 1868 to the more congenial subject of Church History, a painstaking teacher and one of the influential leaders of the Church of Scotland. The Professor of Church History in Caird's time was George Buist, appointed as early as 1823. He dealt with the subject in a way which even then, in the middle of last century, was antiquated. "Much of the time of his class," said Professor Menzies, "was devoted to the history of the Old Testament." According to Caird, he began his lectures on Church History with the Creation and ended them with Og, King of Bashan, the scriptural record of whose height which was "like the height of the cedars" did not satisfy the Professor. He told his students that his "stature was so large that while his feet were in the torrid zone and his body in the temperate, eternal snows rested on his head."

At this time the chair of Moral Philosophy was occupied by Professor Ferrier, one of the most brilliant of Scottish metaphysicians. He lectured on "Knowing and Being" and on "The History of Philosophy" in alternate years, and in his hands the latter subject served as a fresh and most stimulating introduction to Greek thought, and also to English thought from Locke onwards. But it is not known whether Caird attended his class, nor whether Ferrier had any part in deepening Caird's lay interest in Philosophy or introducing him to the great German Idealists of whom Ferrier was one of the first competent readers in this country.

In the spring of 1857 Caird left St. Andrews without having regained his health, and stayed with his brother John, who was at the time minister of

the beautiful parish of Errol in Perthshire, and already becoming known throughout Scotland as a preacher. At that time John Caird's style of oratory was much more dramatic than in his later years, and his power over his audiences was greater. "Had he taken to the stage," said Edward Caird, "he would have been easily the greatest actor of his time."¹

Caird's long stay with his brother was fortunate in every respect. He was placed under the medical care of Dr. Wylie, a wise and experienced general practitioner, and a keen sportsman, well known throughout the Carse of Gowrie for the uniqueness of his ways and picturesque character, and much loved. Dr. Wylie used to take him on long drives as he visited his patients, amusing him and relieving himself by drawing upon an inexhaustible store of anecdotes. The treatment was successful, and Caird's health was restored and established; from that time onwards until nearly the closing years of his life his arduous work was rarely interrupted by illness of any kind.

The second circumstance, of hardly less significance and value, was that at this time the two brothers were first drawn together into that intimate communion of convictions, interests, and aims, which lasted all their lives. There were no crises in the life of Edward Caird, or at least none of their excitement. His days were linked each to each in natural piety, and the events of his career matured

¹ At Lady Yester's Church, in Edinburgh, a great portion of the morning congregation used to sit through the interval between the services in order to have room at the later performance.

rather than happened. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that, during his prolonged residence with his elder brother, the course of his life took one of the most important of its quiet windings. The notion of becoming a minister of the Church of Scotland, probably entertained by him, and of him, from boyhood, lost its hold upon him at this time. He returned to the University of Glasgow and attended the Divinity Classes, carrying off the prizes in 1858-59, but he had already begun to look towards Oxford and the life of a scholar and teacher. There is no direct evidence of the causes of his change of purpose. But it is highly probable that the gifts of his brother as a preacher would lead him to disparage his own. Eloquence and emotional fervour and dramatic excitement were alien to his temperament. To his own deep regret at times "he was unable to speak when he felt strongly"; and some of his old students in Glasgow can remember the impression made on rare occasions by such a silence.

There was at this time no slightest suspicion of the orthodoxy of John Caird, nor any occasion for it. But the influence of Carlyle was abroad, and it was an excitement and inspiration in the minds of the best youth of the time to which there has been no parallel since. Nichol, as we have seen, spoke of himself and his comrades in College as "flaming hero-worshippers," and one of his early articles on Carlyle shows that the phrase, for all its extravagance, was fitting. Some embers of that early fire are still glowing in Caird's addresses on *The Genius of Carlyle*, delivered many years afterwards, when

he was Professor in Glasgow. He calls him "the greatest literary influence of his own student days." "Every new generation," he says, "has a language of its own, and is spoken to, if not with the most permanent power, at least with the greatest immediate awakening effect, by the writers who are fighting their way to recognition, rather than by those who have already achieved the position of classics and authorities. And, undoubtedly, at that time Carlyle was the author who exercised the most powerful charm upon young men who were beginning to think. It is hardly possible for those who now for the first time take up Carlyle's works to realise how potent that charm was." Caird and Carlyle were temperamentally different: there were elements in the genius and character, as well as in the literary methods of the prophet, which repelled the philosopher. Caird's sympathy obviously flows much more reluctantly towards him than to Goethe, or Wordsworth, or Abraham Lincoln, or any other of the leaders of men of whom he has written. Nevertheless his influence coming at that time was, in all probability, the most powerful, as well as the most stormful and revolutionary force ever let loose upon Caird.

If later reflexion and fuller knowledge revealed to him that the coming of Carlyle brought no breach in the continuity of the ethical or religious history of the world, and that his way of expressing his thoughts was much more original than his doctrine, yet the new words were suited to the time. If it was Puritanism over again, "it was Puritanism idealised, made cosmopolitan, freed from the narrowness which

clung to its first expression, or with which time had encrusted it." To effect such a change in such stubborn material was no small or easy task.

If, again, Carlyle's doctrine like an early growth had to decay, and be turned into black soil for Caird's mind, nevertheless its virtue was never exhausted. It enriched the whole domain of Caird's interests, whether in philosophy or in ethics, or in social and religious matters. He came to know better and learn more from the Idealists than Carlyle himself, who owed to them the main substance of what remained of his positive convictions. In fact, Carlyle was neither the guide nor the companion of Caird in the speculative ventures of his maturer years, but it was he who pointed, as through the iron bars of a prison-house, the way out of the narrow and cramping orthodoxies into the broad, generous, natural-supernatural world outside. And Caird knew this. His gratitude is critical rather than impulsive, and judicious rather than vehement; but it is real and it is felt; and his estimate of his own debt and that of his times—and ours—to Carlyle may be quoted and remembered with profit.

"It would scarcely be too much to say that then this country was still outside of the main stream of European culture. It would certainly not be too much to say that its intellectual horizon was then closed in by many limits which now, partly by Carlyle's own agency, have ceased to exist. To name only a few points, Carlyle was the first in this country who discovered the full significance of the great revival of German literature, and the enormous reinforcement which its poetic and philosophic idealism had brought to the failing faith of man.

He was at least the first who, in a definite and effective way, in broad and powerfully drawn outlines, represented to us the new ideas about man and his world which that literature contains. He spoke, therefore, from what was recognisably a higher point of view than that of the ordinary sects and parties which divided opinion in this country, a higher point of view than any of the prevailing orthodoxies and heterodoxies. He spoke, besides, not only for himself, but as representing the weight of a new learning and culture of which we were ignorant; and, in addition to his own great genius, he had the advantage of being thus the first from whom we heard the great words of Goethe and Fichte, of Schiller and Richter and Novalis. Nor was he content to speak of the significance of German thought from an abstract point of view; he was continually trying to show what it meant *for us*. By the aid of the clue it put into his hands he gave us a new interpretation of history, and especially of those two great revolutions—the English and the French Revolution—from which the political, social, and religious history of this country and of modern Europe take their new beginning. He broke through the narrow limits of the conventional dignity of history, not only by an imaginative presentment of the facts which made them spring into life again, as if they were taking place before our eyes, but by what was almost a new kind of insight into those inner forces of belief and passion which are called into action whenever men are freed from the yoke of habit by the shock of revolution. His prophetic tones, his humour and pathos, his denunciations of cant and formalism, even the strange tricks he played with the English language, seemed to make literature a living thing, and to realise the conception of his first great book—to strip from humanity all that the tailor has done for it, and to let us see the bare sinews and muscles of the Hercules, the passions

that are hidden by the conventionalities of society, the eternal faiths and hopes, without some form of which it is impossible for men to live and die. Nor was he merely a student who cast new light on the past; he was inspired with a passion for social reform, which, at least in this country, was then felt by few. He expressed, almost for the first time in English, that disgust at the mean achievements of what we call civilisation, that generous wrath at the arbitrary limitation of its advantages, that deep craving for a better order of social life, which is the source of so many of the most important social and political movements of the present day."¹ "As Goethe," in the strange tale which Carlyle has translated, "pictured the transformation of the fisherman's hut into the altar of a new Temple of Civilisation, so Carlyle seemed to change the old banner of the Covenant into a standard for the forward march of mankind toward a better ideal of human life. Thus at once widening our horizon and enkindling our enthusiasm, speaking to us in the name of a wider culture, and at the same time reviving the freshness of our earliest faith, and reuniting for us the light and the heat which were becoming divided in our inner life—what wonder that Carlyle was listened to with passionate admiration and reverence, such as is felt by the young only for a great teacher who meets and answers the questions which they are led by the spirit of the time to ask."²

We have no direct evidence to show that Caird at any time gave up the principles of his religious and ethical faith; *that* heavy price he was most probably not called upon to pay for his intellectual freedom. But if he ever was, in the words of Carlyle, "led

¹ *Essays on Literature*, by Edward Caird, vol. i. pp. 231-235, "The Genius of Carlyle."

² *Ibid.* p. 235.

into the wilderness, there to do battle with the spirit of denial," or if he ever heard the " Everlasting No " pealing through his mind, it was during this period, when the course of his attendance at the Scottish Universities was interrupted by bad health, and all serious study was supposed to be suspended. It is not likely that his change of view was superficial, or that he would abandon lightly his purpose of being a Christian minister. But the spirit of reconciliation was always strong in him, and the " thoughts " which then seemed to be so paradoxical to older men, and which young men accepted from Carlyle with a keen sense of their own " intellectual audacity," found easy and peaceful lodgment in Caird's tranquil soul.¹ Moreover about this time, probably owing to Carlyle, he had begun his acquaintance with Goethe, in whom he found a wisdom that was calm, and with the idealistic philosophers whom he regarded as engaged in the same service as Goethe, namely, that of " widening the world without going beyond it." In fact, when in his twenty-sixth year he began his second undergraduate course, he had already settled *one* of the great issues of life ; he knew the standard around which henceforth his battle was to be fought.

Caird was elected to the Snell Exhibition on the 28th April, 1860, along with John Purves, who became Classical Lecturer first in Wadham and afterwards in Balliol College. He matriculated in Balliol on the 13th of October the same year. Amongst those who came to the same College at the same time were Sir Courtney P. Ilbert, Clerk to the

¹ *Essays*, p. 236.

House of Commons, and Canon T. L. Papillon, the editor of Virgil. John Addington Symonds had entered Balliol two years before ; and within Caird's undergraduate years Evelyn Abbot, Sir W. R. Anson, the Marquess of Lansdowne, Canon Sanday, E. J. Myers, Thomas Case and J. L. Strachan-Davidson came to the same College. The Rev. Robert Scott—of "Liddell & Scott"—was Master, Jowett was prominent amongst the Fellows, and W. L. Newman, editor of *Aristotle's Politics*, was lecturing on Greek History.

College life in Oxford is found trying, as a rule, by the older Scotch students who go up from time to time and recommence their undergraduate course. Caird was so much more mature in mind as well as older in years than his fellows that he might well have exhibited something of the usual impatience and tendency to revolt. But he was almost as fortunate in his circumstances as he was in his temperament : he found old friends there and was taken up almost at once by his real peers, namely, by some of the younger Fellows of his own and other Colleges.

In a letter written to a friend about the middle of his first term he says, " I am now fairly inducted into the mysteries of English College life, and find it on the whole pleasanter than I expected it to be to one beginning so late. I was intimate with Luke and some of the older men before I came up, which made things easier for me. Luke has behaved, as usual, with the greatest kindness in helping me over any small difficulties a freshman meets with. He is on the whole the most congenial spirit I have met

with here. . . . I have been very fortunate in this latter respect (Greek and Latin Composition), having got for my tutor the very best man in the University—Jowett, to whom it is pleasant in every way to be attached, both in regard of studies and of general intercourse. He has spoken to me very encouragingly and seems to think I have good prospects of success in the work.”

His companions in College, much younger though they were, reflected Caird's tolerant and kindly spirit, proving anew how a man's world is very much a sounding-board that gives him back his own voice. The Rev. T. L. Papillon, Hon. Canon of St. Albans, formerly Scholar of Balliol and Fellow of Merton and New College, tells us of Caird as he appeared to the ordinary undergraduate. “ My first meeting with Edward Caird was when we matriculated at Balliol on the same day of October 1860, in company with other freshmen of that term. Boys as most of us were fresh from school, we wondered who this grave and reverend signor with a marked Scotch accent and a companion less old-looking than he, but obviously older than the rest of us, could be, until we discovered that they were the two ‘ Snell ’ Exhibitioners of that year, Caird and Purves. I can recall but little of Caird during my undergraduate time. He was no longer young as we were—perhaps never had been young as an English public school boy is young—and he had few tastes or pursuits in common with our volatile youth. . . . But I remember that we both liked and respected him, and found him at times an agreeable companion ; nor do I think that the most irreverent

of us ever laughed at 'Old Caird.' He went up for the Final Schools eighteen months before I did ; for he had come up a ready-made philosopher. He soon became in demand as a coach in Moral Philosophy and Logic ; and I coached with him in the latter of these subjects before I went in. It was not my strong point, and I think that he was at times over my head, but I have always been grateful for the clearness and patience with which he helped me over uncongenial ground."

We have testimony to the same purpose from J. L. Strachan-Davidson. In his Memorial Address delivered in Balliol on 8th November, 1908, he says :

" I have spoken of Caird as Master. . . . But my knowledge of him stretches far beyond that period, to the time when we were undergraduates together, and to the time immediately following when I was his pupil. The impression which I had of him then has only been confirmed and deepened by longer experience. He had studied for some years with a view to following his brother's steps, and entering the ministry of the Church of Scotland. But before actually taking Orders, he came to the conclusion that he could work and teach better in the station of a layman. Thus when he came to Oxford he was considerably older than most of us in years and still more so in mental development. In fact he never really was an undergraduate in the sense in which most of us understood the term. His most intimate associates were to be found amongst distinguished graduates more of his own age, most of them already Fellows of Colleges, who welcomed him at once as one of themselves ; such were Nichol,

Luke, Monro, Bryce, Dicey and above all, Green. Caird and Green were kindred souls, with strong resemblances in the essential points of character, with like aims in life and keenly in sympathy in that which we call Philosophy, that is to say, in their appreciation of the great facts and great problems of existence and of thought."

But though Caird's associates were already Fellows of Colleges, and his mind was mature, he faithfully did the usual work of the undergraduate, and distinguished himself in it. In 1861 he was awarded the "Pusey and Ellerton Scholarship"—founded for the promotion of sound Theology, through a solid and critical knowledge of Hebrew.¹

He gained the Jenkyns Exhibition, and a First Class in Classical Moderations in 1862, and a First Class in the Final School of Literae Humaniores in 1863; and he graduated B.A. in the same year.

The most unique and probably the most appreciated of the honours that fell to Caird during his undergraduate days was his election as a member of the Old Mortality Club. He spoke of its meetings, many years afterwards, as for some of its members the very salt of their University life. This Club was founded by Nichol in 1857, and called by that name because "every member of the Society was, or had lately been, in so weak and precarious a condition of bodily health, as plainly and manifestly to in-

¹ It is interesting to note that amongst the winners of the same scholarship within the next four years after Caird were T. K. Cheyne, Professor of The Interpretation of Scripture in Oxford and Canon of Rochester, and S. R. Driver, Professor of Hebrew in Oxford and Canon of Christ Church.

stance the great frailties and so to speak, mortality, of this our human life and constitution."

The Club was not well named. Its members, so far from being good instances of the frailty of human life, must have been endowed with more than the average amount of vigour and vitality. "By those men who were either original members, or were elected during its earlier years, at least seven Professorships, one place in the Cabinet, one Judgeship and two headships of Colleges have been filled."¹ Amongst these earlier members were Professor Dicey himself, Professor Nichol (the first chairman), Professors Green, Caird, Esson, Bywater, Viscount Bryce, Mr. Pater and Rankin Luke. The object of the Society as defined by itself was "the stimulating and promoting of the interchange of thought among its members, on the more general questions of Literature, Philosophy and Science, as well as the diffusion of a correct knowledge and critical appreciation of our Standard English Authors."² Except that there is little evidence of its interest in or knowledge of "Science," the Club seems to have attained its object, after the manner of the associations of able young men which, from time to time, arise and decay and die in the Universities. So long as they last, their value, at their best, exceeds almost every other University influence. "The free discussion of everything in heaven or earth, the fresh enjoyment of intellectual sympathy, the fearless intercommunion of spirits, the youthful faith that the key of truth lies very near to our hands,

¹ Prof. Dicey, quoted in *The Memoir of John Nichol*, p. 147.

² *Ibid.* p. 146.

give a unique zest and charm to those meetings of students with students before the inevitable parting of the ways of manhood has come."¹

Of the part taken by Caird in the discussions of the Old Mortality Club we know little further than that one of the scientific members writes that "he made his mark at the ordinary meetings and country excursions by his papers and talk on high philosophy." But we know how he was regarded by its members from Professor Dicey. "My great impression about him in his youth was, I think, that of every man who knew him—that of his admirable maturity of mind which, of course, is a very different thing from the pre-maturity, if I may use the term, one sometimes finds in young men, and which during youth sometimes gives them great influence amongst contemporaries. Then, connected with this maturity, was a kind of quiet natural dignity and sweetness—and, certainly to my mind, an almost visible 'unworldliness,' in the best sense of the term." We knew in other ways that he was at this time "unworldly" almost to the point of losing contact with the things that can be touched; and that "he hardly knew how he was fed and clothed."²

There was an essay written for the Old Mortality Club, parts of which the writer heard many years afterwards, in which Caird insisted upon the idea

¹ Prof. Dicey, quoted in *The Memoir of John Nichol*, p. 151.

² This phrase was used of him by his brother, the late Mr. Colin S. Caird. Professor Dicey remained to the end one of Caird's most intimate and valued friends. Writing in August, 1920, he says of him, "Edward Caird is one of the few men among those who have exercised great influence as a teacher, of whom it is hardly possible to speak too highly."

of a Suffering God—a God not only manifesting Himself, but participating and “involved” in the movement of man’s history. That essay leaves an impression of inspired fervour, and could have been written only by one who dwelt night and day in the inner tabernacle. He was not more earnest than Green in maintaining that “The real is the rational” and that the rational is the spiritual; but one thinks of him as more “rapt” by the vision.

By a happy touch of love and poetic insight Green has been compared to Sir Bors :

“ Sir Bors it was
Who spake so low and sadly at our board ;
And mighty reverend at our grace was he ;
A square-set man and honest.”¹

Caird is not so inevitably comparable to any of the Knights of the Round Table, and yet one somehow thinks of him at that period as like Sir Galahad—the quest of Idealism already begun, and the assurance of its truth like the Holy Grail never

“ Failing from his side, nor coming
Cover’d, but moving with him night and day.”

“Knights of the Spirit” these two men were rightly called, and they went forth to battle, side by side, and fought for the same causes with the same weapons. Indeed, so fully did they share the same convictions, entertain the same purposes and seek to render the same services to their time, that we can learn more fully from Green’s *Memoir* than from any other source what events mattered for Caird at

¹ See the incomparable *Memoir of T. H. Green* by R. L. Nettleship, p. clxi.

this time and what meaning they carried for him. For Caird also was a philosophic, religious, and political "radical." He, too, "saw in history the self-development of an eternal spirit, because he regarded religion as the highest form of citizenship, because he believed reason to be at once the most human and the most divine thing in man."¹ Their faith was a levelling faith, but it "levelled upwards" and not downwards, and was a faith in reason and religion and morality and in nothing else. For these rendered to them the meaning of reality, and through them they took the side of the inevitable, and were as industrious as Time in its service. They both construed the social necessities of their age in the same way. They would confer on every man the right, and impose on every man the duty, of making the most of his own personality; and they found the means of the realization of personality in social service.

Referring on one occasion to the Old Mortality Club, Caird recalled that "The great contest of North and South in the United States was then beginning, and Nichol and Green showed themselves from the first well informed as to the nature of the struggle, and zealously maintained the justice of the Northern cause. They were, I think, among the earliest to recognise the genius for democratic leadership which lay hid under the rough exterior and Yankee humour of Lincoln." He was unconsciously describing himself in these words, as we find from the description given of him by his brother, Mr. Stuart Caird, who says, "I remember that my brother followed with keen interest such great

¹ Green's *Memoir*, p. xxv.

political events as the Garibaldi rising in 1859 and the American Civil War. He strongly advocated the cause of the North, and though that was the unpopular side here, this fact only seemed to add to his enthusiasm. He followed the course of the war week by week, and rejoiced when any success attended the Northern armies : and he soon became familiar with the record and exploits of the Northern Generals, and confidently predicted their ultimate triumph. In regard to the Garibaldi rising, I remember that on more than one occasion my brother—full of admiration for this brave man and his cause—urged me to throw in my lot with Garibaldi as a volunteer : but in this matter my enthusiasm was not equal to his own.” Caird and Green had the same views, not only on foreign, but also on home affairs ; they had the same distrust not only of Louis Napoleon, but of Palmerston, and the same admiration not only for Abraham Lincoln, but for John Bright. But similar as was their whole attitude towards the problems of human life, their methods of operation, whether in the speculative or the practical sphere, were in strong contrast. In fact, they were complementary opposites. The power and the presence of the negative was most evident in Green, while Caird always sought the positive, which gave the negative its force. Where the one distinguished, the other sought unity. Green, we are told, “seemed more anxious to find out the inadequacy, confusion, or possible aberrations of a theory than to elicit its truth.” Caird sought the truth that lay hid in the doctrines he deemed erroneous, and treated the errors themselves as

truth in the making, abstract statements summoning forth their opposites, and pointing towards a unity beneath the opposition. Green in his Introduction to *The Treatise on Human Nature* will hardly allow Locke or Hume to take a step without being held up. Caird will show us Comte or Kant as "almost persuaded" to be Hegelians. Green could denounce: "Fools talk at Oxford of the formation of a volunteer rifle corps being desirable in order that the gentry may keep down the Chartists. . . . I should like to learn the use of the arm that I might be able to desert to the people." Again, "It is not a republic that is answerable for this war (the American Civil War), but a slave-holding, slave-breeding, and slave-burning oligarchy on whom the curse of God and man rests." No one can quote such utterances from Caird. For him, so far as that is possible, "Evil was nil and nought, silence implying sound."¹ There was little of the spirit of dissent in him, whether in religion or in aught else. If he could not find the germ of good in things evil, he not only turned away from them, but seemed to delete them.

One thinks of Green as the stoutest of foot soldiers, with dented targe and notched sword, winning no inch of way except foot to foot against the enemy and by means of the hardest blows; and of Caird as placed in the midst of the utmost press of the

¹ Strachan-Davidson's *Address*, p. 4: "To him," said his successor, the late Master of Balliol, "the ideal and spiritual world was the actual and the natural, but it was nature informed and transformed, by the spirit. To him the spirit was the essential, and the flesh and the matter but an accident. He believed that nothing was of real importance but goodness. Thus he moved in a plane above human disputations, in close communion with his God."

fight bearing aloft the standard of the king, almost oblivious of even the need of courage, and with the light of victory always resting on his brow. It is unprofitable to ask whose service was fullest or best; but the contrast is interesting and throws light on both, as well as upon what occupied their thoughts as early members of the Old Mortality Club.

CHAPTER II

FELLOW OF MERTON, 1864-66

ON the 18th of May, 1864, after an examination in which, according to one of the examiners, he showed unprecedented "ability, originality and literary style," Caird was elected Fellow of Merton. He was appointed tutor immediately after his election, and retained his tutorship till 6th May, 1868. In the minutes of the College Register for the 6th May of the previous year appears the following statement: "A letter was read from Mr. E. Caird stating that as he was about to find himself in circumstances inconsistent with the tenure of his fellowship, he should feel obliged if the Warden could bring before the College his request for the usual year of grace. A year of grace was granted to commence from this day."¹

We have seen that he "came in demand as a 'coach' as soon as he had ceased to be an undergraduate, and that Mr. Papillon, who had entered Balliol on the same day as Caird 'coached with him in Logic.'" In the summer of 1865 Mr. Papillon was himself elected Fellow at Merton, and on coming into residence there in October of that year found

¹ The circumstances inconsistent with his Fellowship (in which he was about to find himself) were his proposed marriage.

Caird already established as tutor. He says : " In the daily society of the Common Room—which at Merton in those days was very sociable in its character—I got to know him much better than I had done at Balliol, and to appreciate the geniality and kindness, not untinged with humour, that underlay his somewhat grave exterior.

" Merton was at that time a small College with a connection largely among the aristocracy and country gentlemen. Many of its undergraduates were public school men of this class from Eton and elsewhere ; hunting and sporting men, who came to the University to enjoy themselves, and found in the Head of their College a more or less sympathizing spirit ; young men who were pleasant enough to deal with and not difficult to manage by tutors who took them in the right way. Caird, with his grave manner and Scotch accent, was somewhat outside their experience, quite unlike the average public school master or college tutor ; and might have been expected to have but little influence over creatures so much outside of *his* experience. But my impression is that he got on very well with them, that they respected him and recognised his interest in them, and that he was by no means the least popular of the College Staff."

Another of his colleagues at Merton has kindly given us his reminiscences of Caird at this period :¹

" In 1866 he was examiner when Creighton, afterwards Bishop of London, was elected Fellow, and in 1867 when Professor Wallace was elected.

¹ Letter from W. Esson.

“ During the early years of his Glasgow Professorship he usually came to Oxford during the summer term, teaching and delighting his many friends.

“ During Caird’s tutorship several distinguished men had the advantage of his teaching—Creighton, Saintsbury, Coplestone, Diggle.

“ I had many illuminating and stimulating walks and talks with Caird during his time at Merton, but most delightful of all was a tour with him in Germany in 1865. Four of us met at Dresden in that year—Caird, Payne, Maurice and myself. I remember that we were looked upon by the police as Anarchists and were subject to special supervision. The quartette stayed in Dresden a few weeks and then paired off. Caird and I visited Weimar, and were charmed with the little theatre there in which native singers sang sweetly native opera ; saw the stains of ink from the inkpot with which Luther demolished the devil ; ate Schinken and black bread at Wilhelmshöhe ; turned to the Rhine and traversed its windings to Mainz and Cologne and so to Antwerp, whence we took boat to London. Many of the excursions we made were on foot, as became young bachelors with not much coin in their pockets. Caird was then 30 and I was 27. We usually occupied the same bedroom and had many discussions, lasting far into the night, upon life, thought, and the cosmos, I on the side of Physics, he combating my views and overwhelming me with metaphysics, always genially and humorously. It is my misfortune that I have a more vivid memory of humorous than of serious events. How the confusion of tongues came upon him at Antwerp, and asking the waiter, ‘ Avez-vous . . . zwei Betten ! ’ he received the answer, ‘ Yess, zare, we āve ! ’

“ Caird stands out in my memory as a staunch fighter for freedom. Many battles we had in those days with ignorance and prejudice. One such, for



MAURICE CAIRD

PAYNE 1866

ESSON

the removal of the clerical restriction on fellowships, was bitterly fought but ultimately won."

Bishop Creighton always said that the one (among his teachers) to whom he owed far the most was Dr. Edward Caird, then Fellow and Tutor of Merton, his tutor when he was reading for his final schools.¹

The late Master of Balliol, Mr. Strachan-Davidson, was also Caird's pupil at Merton, and he writes : " It was Green who first sent Evelyn Abbot and myself to Caird as pupils. We soon felt that we were in the presence of a great teacher, who had a great message for us. It was as if the little universe, which each of us builds up about himself, the barriers, the *flammantia moenia mundi*, were receding and opening up to us fresh worlds of thoughts and fresh aspects of truth. Caird told me how he prepared his Logic Lectures. He used to think them over a pipe the night before and then rise at five in the morning and write them."

The charm of Professor Saintsbury's testimony is an ample apology for quoting in full two letters from him. The first is undated ; the second was written by him to the *Glasgow Herald* after Caird's death.

" Caird came to Merton with a reputation of great shyness and 'innocence.' You may know the story (how far true, of course, I cannot say) of his first Balliol wine, when he is said to have produced two bottles, held them up to the light, shaken them, and then turning to the company, said, ' This is port, and this is sherry. Which will ye have ? ' He certainly was (though nearly thirty I believe) curiously unconventional though not in the least

¹ *Life of Bishop Creighton*, vol. i. pp. 26, 27.

uncouth; very slow in speech, and with an odd half apologetic manner. And he had rather bad luck to be junior fellow and thus specially charged with police duty when, in the first term and the second or third week of his first year as tutor, the quasi-historical bonfire row of November 1865 took place. But he was never in the least unpopular even with junior men who were not reading for Greats: while with the few Postmasters and others who were, he became at once a great favourite. When, too, a year after his own election, Creighton was elected, the two with Papillon began a system of entertaining senior undergraduates, not at the usual dreary breakfasts and formal luncheons, but at common room dinners with other fellows, which if not exactly a novelty had certainly not been common in Merton before, if it was anywhere. I think this was Creighton's idea, but the others joined cordially in it. With regard to his pupils in the regular tutorial interview there was absolutely no trouble that he would not take, and as soon (which was very soon) as the ice of shyness was broken, he was as easy to get on with as any man of one's own year. I only wish I could give you the letters which he wrote me on two successive occasions when I competed unsuccessfully despite his help for Merton fellowships. One thing which (naturally) I see more clearly than I did then, but which I did see, was that he had very considerable critical faculty of the purely literary kind which was then, if not exactly rare, only beginning to be exercised in Oxford. The older Greats coaches rather discouraged literary expatiation in modern tongues."

"In the obituary notices of the late Edward Caird I have seen little said about his two years' tenure (1864-66) of a fellowship and tutorship at Merton College, Oxford. There was nothing surprising in this, for it is a long time ago, and probably not many people now remember much about it, while

the period itself was very short compared with those of his Professorship and Mastership. But as I was in residence at Merton during the whole of it, and actually his pupil for the greater part of the time, it may be worth while to say a very few words about it. The circumstances were not quite ordinary, either on his own part or on that of the post. The first Commission had 'hen-roosted' the wealthier colleges very freely for the foundation of University professorships; and to restore the financial equilibrium elections to fellowships had for a time been in great part suspended. This created a dearth of junior fellows at the very time when, in consequence of the new arrangements as to honours schools, and otherwise, tutors were urgently wanted. On the other hand, Caird himself was in a peculiar position, being some seven years older than most men of his standing at Oxford; and it was said (with what truth I know not) that one college at which he presented himself as a candidate for a fellowship had frankly applied the principle of 'weight for age.'

"But Merton made no such difficulties, indeed a recruit of such capacities for 'Greats' Philosophy teaching must have been very welcome there. He could not, however, have had many pupils within the walls; for the college, though not so small as it had recently been, was still small and socially given, in fact, rather 'lively.' Indeed, one of Caird's yearly official experiences was that of doing police duty on the very day, November 5th, on which I write this, but 43 years since—an occasion commemorated in prose in the *Life of Bishop Creighton*, and in verse in a very rare and precious booklet never, I think, yet catalogued. Hardly anybody but 'Postmasters' (scholars) read for Greats Honours, and I can remember not more than one or two men besides Creighton, the present Metropolitan of Calcutta and myself, who at one time benefited by Caird's labours. But a new thing—the 'Inter-

Collegiate ' Lecture—was coming upon Oxford, and though I do not know that Caird's were the first examples of it in the University, they were certainly the first in Merton. We did not ourselves much like the innovation. Under the then Oxford system (especially in ' select ' colleges), lectures, and especially Greats Honours lectures, were conducted, not, I think, without efficiency, but certainly with comfort. The two or three men attending sat very often, if not always, in their tutor's private rooms at his own table, and the thing was almost an agreeable discussion of the kind that Mr. Verdant Green imagined the course of undergraduates to be. To change this for a continuous sermon in a bare apartment hastily provided with uneasy chairs and wretched little examination desks was not delightful, and one did not regard the outer barbarians who shared these occasional privileges with much affection.

“ Of the quality of Caird's lecturing, however, there could be no doubt. As far as I can make out from the testimony of his Glasgow students it was scarcely so stimulating or interesting as it became later. Perhaps he was not so much at home with his audience ; perhaps, like all craftsmen of any worth, he profited by his first experience. I remember it as solid (with exceptions, especially in dealing with Spinoza) and a little indigestible. It was in private work with him that he really came out. He was always, I suppose, shy and rather constrained in manner. I saw next to nothing of him in middle life, but not very long ago when I met him in Christchurch Meadows he seemed to me not much altered. But this constraint and shyness did very little harm. He was liked, I think, even by the general run of undergraduates who had much more to do with the river and cricket and the hunting field than with *literae humaniores* ; but those who were brought into close contact, without, I think, a

single exception, liked him warmly for his simplicity, his bonhomie, his interest in them and their work.

“ On one occasion a rash neophyte informed him that he had not only consulted but bought Prantl’s *Geschichte der Logik* and proposed to read it through. Caird looked at him with a mixture of admiration and sympathy, and said, ‘ Ye’ll find it pretty tough. I never got through it myself.’ On another, a youngster, with a youngster’s fancy for paradox, brought him an essay on the ‘ Comparative Inferiority of Interest in Fact, Truth, Actuality, etc.’ For, the ingenious youth proceeded to demonstrate, all these things necessarily represented a combination of causes and circumstances which must have worked themselves fully out to produce them, and so had lost interest—become in a way dead, while Falsehood, Fiction, etc., were free from this drawback and still enjoyed the exciting chance of being realised. Now the average don would either have laughed heartily, or have sneered, or have solemnly ‘ jobated ’ on the subject of intellectual frivolity. Caird listened to it all with the utmost patience and interest, reflected for some time, and then said : ‘ I should like ye to take up some physical science. You’re one of the people, you know, who get into logical coaches and don’t care where they go for the pleasure of driving.’ He nearly always could, and (which is quite a different thing in pastors and masters) always when he could, would tell you what you wanted to know, and not merely what he wanted to say. And I still have (or ought to have) in a letter which he wrote me, on an occasion to me sufficiently disgusting, one of the kindest and wisest documents of marked wisdom and kindness that I ever received myself, or read as having been addressed to others.

“ In after years I saw, as I have said, little of him ; and there were a good many points on which

we should not have agreed. But among teachers of my youth I can hardly remember anyone to whom I owe more cordial thankofferings for education and fostering care than I do for those brief months to Edward Caird.”¹

¹ *Glasgow Herald*, 6th November, 1908.

CHAPTER III

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN GLASGOW,
1866-1893

ON the 28th day of May, 1866, Edward Caird was elected Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow from an unusually large and interesting field of candidates. It included amongst other men who afterwards attained a measure of eminence, Principal Shairp, Professor Robert Flint, Principal Cunningham, Professor Calderwood, Mr. J. Hutchison Stirling, the author of the *Secret of Hegel*, and Professor Nichol.

Nichol had occupied the Chair of English Literature in the same University since 1862 in a pre-eminently brilliant way; but, in 1864, from a doubtful diagnosis of his own real taste, or from setting an artificial value on the subject, he desired to be transferred to the Chair of Logic. He was rejected in favour of Professor Veitch. Green was rejected at St. Andrews the same year. He wished to succeed Ferrier in the Chair of Moral Philosophy, but was "charged with heresies against which he had been declaiming in a humble way for the last six years." It is intelligible that, when the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow became vacant and both Nichol and Caird were possible candidates,

“ the continued competition for vacant Scottish Professorships should become painfully interesting ”¹—especially to Jowett, who was an active earthly Providence in such matters. Jowett was disposed at first to press Nichol’s claims ; but he discovered that “ the chances were against him or rather that the case was hopeless ” ; so he thought that “ under the circumstances Caird had better stand.” Caird was unwilling. “ I would rather have no professorship while the world standeth,” he wrote to Jowett, “ than do anything unkind to Nichol.” But his generous reluctance to compete against his friend met with an equally generous response. Nichol withdrew, and in doing so told the University Court that “ if elected to the chair, Mr. Caird would prove to be one of the best teachers as well as one of the most eminent of the Professors who had ever filled it.” And Nichol knew that it was the Chair of Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid.

On the 21st of June, 1866, Caird’s essay having been sustained by the Senate, “ he took the oath and was formally admitted into his office.” The following November at the close of his Introductory Lecture delivered, according to Dr. Macleod Campbell of Row,² to a most cordial and expectant audience, he indicated in a word his deep satisfaction in his appointment and his sense of his new responsibilities. “ In the past my ambition never reached higher than to teach Philosophy in a Scottish University, above all in this University to which I owe so much ; and now there is almost nothing

¹ Jowett’s *Life*, i. 339. ² *Life of Dr. Macleod Campbell*, ii. p. 58.

which I would not give for the assurance that I should be able to teach it well." There can be no doubt that, so far as his "station and its duties" are concerned, he had come to his own. The glamour of the office was never false to him, nor did it pass away even when he returned to Balliol. On the presentation of his portrait at the close of twenty years' service, he still considered himself so fortunate in the work he had to do as "almost to fear the nemesis that falls upon him who is too prosperous." "For I think that the lot of a Professor in a University like this is a peculiarly favoured one. On the one hand he is brought into contact with many of the ablest young men in the country just at the time when their minds are opening to the great interests of literature and science and life. And, on the other hand, he is to them, in a sense, the representative of the great tradition of human knowledge. And the teacher, who thus becomes the means of communication whereby the great store of intellectual wealth accumulated by the labours of the past is handed down to new minds, stands in a highly privileged position. If in such a position a teacher should fail, he has little right to throw the blame on his office. I, at least, am not disposed to seek refuge or excuse for any of my shortcomings in the difficulties of my position, for I feel bound to say on this occasion that, if fortune had given me the power of choosing my place and work in life, I do not think that I should have chosen any other than that which has fallen to me."¹

Caird quotes from a letter of Hegel, written to his

¹ *Presentation of the Portrait of Ed. Caird*, p. 11.

friend Niethammer, that "When a man has got work which suits him and a wife whom he loves he may be said to have made up his account with life." On the 8th May, 1867, after the close of his first session as Professor, he was married to Miss Caroline Wylie, eldest daughter of Dr. John Wylie, minister of the Parish of Carluke in Lanarkshire. Dr. Wylie was a courteous and gallant old gentleman with the fine manners and speaking the dignified language of an earlier period, military in bearing and soldier-like in temperament. He shared the friendship and the views, and would fain have shared the fate, of Dr. Campbell of Row. He was a true pastor of his flock, and knew and cared for his parishioners even in the smallest details of their lives. "The ladies of the manse lived, like the minister, for the people; but the manse had a social and intellectual outlook much wider than is generally found in country parishes. Mrs. Wylie was a woman of rare gentleness and purity of spirit, the centre of a delicate and most kind and charitable atmosphere."¹ Such were the traditions which Mrs. Caird carried with her into her new home and dedicated anew. Her husband was able all his life long to give himself entirely to his duties as teacher and writer on Philosophy, and as a good citizen, remembering naught else; for he was cared for in every detail of his daily life by her love, inspired by her enthusiasm for good causes, and upheld by her splendid courage.

In the Scottish Universities certain circumstances combine to give to a Professor, with the gift and

¹ Letter, Prof. Menzies.

passion for teaching, a rare opportunity. He enjoys complete freedom as a thinker and teacher, can deal with his subject without regard to any considerations except the good of the students, and without any limitations except those which spring from his own shortcomings. He meets his students in large classes, as a rule, for attendance at the lectures is compulsory, being a condition of graduation. The compulsion, which is neither a profit nor a joy to anyone where the teacher is incompetent, gives the true teacher a continuous and cumulative chance of making his mind tell. For his students come from a strong race, are capable of a slow-burning but enduring enthusiasm, and are, the great majority of them, impelled by disposition, climate and circumstances to work hard. The Scottish student, moreover, is a protestant by nature. His first impulse, unlike that of the Celt or the Southern Saxon, is to differ, owing to his sense of independence, rather than to assent from excess of agreeableness. He thus offers the best of all remedies against the dictatorial dogmatism which "the profession" is prone to foster. He is too shy and too cautious to offer opposition in class, nor is he invited to do so where the classes are large; but he will canvass his professor's views amongst his fellows outside, and the implicit resistance which the good teacher (who is always sensitive to his students' moods) must feel is a challenge. Even when the professor is more concerned to teach his students to think than to equip them with his own opinions, the situation becomes interesting, and the ardour grows as the long winter session goes on lengthening.

These opportunities fall more freely to the Professor of Moral Philosophy than to anyone. He has, moreover, the chance of being inspired because he speaks to young men unconsciously already equipped with a philosophy. They may hardly know what the word means, but they have been accustomed to listen to ethical, religious, and even to metaphysical doctrine; for they come to him inured (and without always being indurated) to such subjects by the long, earnest, argumentative prelections of the Scottish pulpit. It is thus not surprising that Caird, in whom the instinct of the teacher was powerful, should on entering upon his work desire above all else to do it well, and, on parting with his Scottish students and returning to Balliol, entertain grave doubts. Writing in April, 1894, to an intimate friend, he says: "I had an almost overpowering reception from the students at my last appearance to receive the farewell degree Glasgow gave me. . . . I feel almost traitorous in leaving. I hope I may prove right in venturing on the new life. It will be my own fault if I do not, for everyone from S. D.¹ downwards is doing everything to help me."

In other respects the duty of a Professor of Moral Philosophy as a teacher is not to be distinguished from that of a Professor of Physics or Botany. He must above all else inculcate in his pupils that attitude of mind which we call "scientific." This means, amongst other things, that whatever value he may set upon right conduct, and however convinced he may be that right conduct can flow only from right prin-

¹ Strachan-Davidson.

principles, he must treat such principles as hypotheses, deserving of respect only in so far as they seem to account for or explain facts. He may know well that ethical principles are not worth much unless they ratify themselves in experience as well as in discussion, and believe with Kant that there is no truth which is valid in theory that is not also valuable in practice ; but he must all the same have the same "scorn of immediate consequences," or the same faith that the "longest way round" in this matter is "the shortest way home"¹ as the scientific man has.

Now the maintenance of this purely theoretic attitude, which is willing to put all things unreservedly to the test of observation and reasoning, is much more difficult in matters that pertain to moral conduct than in any others. It is not without a certain reluctance that a teacher, who believes that nothing except morality signifies much, makes young minds acquainted with the sorrows and the perils of doubt. But there is no thinking where there is no doubt ; and no growth, or acceptance of what is wider and wiser, except through the painful transmutation of the experience that went before. Philosophy is the reflective reconstruction of experience, and reconstruction implies analysis and destruction and the change which pulls down as well as that which builds.

The responsibilities of a teacher of ethical theory are commensurate with the difficulties of his task, but they are also a measure of the greatness of his opportunity. If he succeeds, he can signify much

¹ A favourite expression of Caird's.

in the life of his students and, through them, in the life of the community. "I shall have my hand on the heart of England," said Caird to a friend when he went to Balliol; and only that could compensate for taking his hand from the heart of Scotland. It is not a mere paradox to say that the Professor of Ethics *ought* to exercise more power than any other teacher except the metaphysician and the poet; but no one will believe the statement except poets and metaphysicians. And the greatest ethical teacher, in all ages, has some of the powers and exercises something of the function and influence of all three.

The difficulties of the situation are twofold: they arise, on the one hand, from the nature of the facts with which the moral philosopher deals, and, on the other hand, from the habits of the mind which it is his task to inspire and guide. Ethical facts do not give that peremptory evidence of their existence which physical facts do; and the ethical character of events is very easily overlooked altogether. Moral character, to begin with, is built up inadvertently: it is a by-product of the will, and it moves in pursuit of natural satisfactions. Spiritual meanings have to insinuate themselves into the ordinary consciousness. The plain man making his livelihood does not know at first that there is any treasure hid in his field; and it is often long before he finds and knows it for what it is. The moral aspect is not only intangible, but relatively negligible. Even educated men can offer purely economic solutions of social problems, and talk of "wealth" as if it were not relative to human powers and uses; and a whole nation may regard morality as a

secondary concern. But although moral character is at first built up unconsciously, and moral ends are implicit within our natural pursuits, it must be admitted on the other hand that a moral fact does not attain fulness of reality until it is not only recognized but comprehended. It is only as known in its relations to the invisible world of wills that it sheds its character as a natural event and becomes an expression of freedom. In a word, moral facts are products of a will which knows the good and ensues it.

From this arises a paradox, familiar enough to the philosopher, but embarrassing to him as a teacher of youth. It is that theory always seems to come too late for practice in morals ; that the moral life, or the moral experience, must be there before it can either understand or be understood. Hence it has been concluded that Ethics is not a proper or really possible subject of enquiry for young minds. The discussions of moral facts that are significant and of issues which are weighty to the reflective thinker, who has lived amidst the invisible forces of the moral world, may easily seem to his students to be of things impalpable and remote. The distinctions he draws, the definitions he suggests, the truths he expounds, the proofs he offers seem either idle or obvious. A moral philosophy class-room can be the most dreary place in a University—strong as the statement is. On the other hand, it may be the scene of an interest which is shallow and of activities which are disputatious. It engenders a spirit, not of doubt, but of irreverence towards the truth. Thus anything may be negated because no positive under-

lies the negative; everything may be questioned because the questions do not *arise* but are invented, and, consequently, are not stages through which the truth moves but obstacles in its way. Doubts and dogmatisms clash, but they are all petty and none of them are ever either solved or justified; because all things are reduced by such mental flippancy to the same low level of irresponsibility towards truth.

It follows that moral facts are more at the mercy of man than any others. They derive their being and significance more entirely from the personality from which they issue, and are great or small according to their context in the *character* of the teacher who imparts and of the pupils who receive. Of the way in which Caird met the responsibilities and the opportunities of his calling as a teacher we shall find full evidence. Here we shall only say that his Moral Philosophy class-room in the University of Glasgow was to his students for all the years of his teaching a veritably sacred place. They knew that there they were in the midst of great issues, and that the doctrines they heard were neither to be lightly accepted nor lightly set aside.

The reality of moral facts, and the practical power of moral conceptions, broke upon them, and something of the stable majesty of the moral world was exposed before their mind's eyes. Moreover, to them at least, the doctrine of their teacher was new: so new and so potent as to compel a critical return upon familiar beliefs and to demand that the facile convictions of tradition and common opinion should be reinterpreted and, if held at all, held in a different fashion. Caird himself, on the rare occasions, such

as the Annual Class Suppers, when he struck a personal note, did what he could to dispel their notions of his originality. His method of teaching, or rather the very presupposition that underlay his whole method, led him to treat philosophy in the same spirit as the scientific man treats nature. Philosophy was the self-expression of the growing spirit of mankind, and the great philosophers were its organs. He had no more desire to be *inventive* in morality than the scientific man has to invent the laws of nature. He was as anxious to moderate the enthusiasms of his pupils, and to be regarded as merely the medium through which greater minds spoke, as others have been to represent that their "Realism" or "Pragmatism" was new, while other theories were only "Neo-." "It is one of the great sayings of Heraclitus," said Professor Mackenzie, "that Wisdom is common, but the many think they have a wisdom of their own." Edward Caird never thought he had a wisdom of his own. And his aim was always to lead us, not to any wisdom that was peculiarly his, but to the wisdom of the wise of all time, and that, I think, was certainly one great source of the influence which he wielded over his students. All he could accept from the goodwill of his pupils was, as he said, "a kind of hope that he may have contributed to the great stream of intellectual life which is flowing through the University from generation to generation." "As teachers," he continued, "we stand, as it were, between the past and the future. We see the new forces which are gradually coming into existence; and, as a German poet says, we see that, as the old fighters are beginning to fail

and sink, Nature has ever a new supply of combatants to take up the great battle against ignorance and evil.

‘Wo immer müde Fechter
 Sinken im muthigen Strauss,
 Es Kommen neue Geschlechter
 Und Kämpfen es ehrlich aus.’¹

There is no need to decide a controversy of this grateful character between a teacher who denies his own originality and pupils who affirm it ; it is better that it should continue.² Moreover, philosophy, being concrete like poetry rather than abstract like the sciences, has a right to borrow uniqueness from the individuality of its exponents : and it is always personal and new when it is living. Caird continued to be to his students a revealer of new regions of thought ; and day by day they felt that the spirit of discovery and adventure was abroad. Nor was this due merely to their ignorance or inexperience. On the contrary, the doctrines that were strange and inspiring to them were also unintelligible and undesirable to their elders. It is true that Carlyle had already “discovered the full significance of the great revival of German literature, and the enormous reinforcement which its poetic and philosophic idealism had brought to the failing faith of man.”³ “His prophetic tones, his humour and pathos, his denunciation of cant and formalism, even the strange

¹ *Presentation of Portrait.*

² “The valiant of this land
 In reverential modesty demand
 That all observance due to them be paid
 Where their serene progenitors are laid.”

Wordsworth, *Ode.*

³ Caird's *Essays*, vol. i. pp. 232-3. On Carlyle's influence on Caird himself see above, p. 31 ff.

tricks he played with the English language, seemed to make literature a living thing." He had given to those who could catch it "a clue to the new interpretation of history, and especially of those two great revolutions—the English and the French Revolution—from which the political, social and religious history of this country and of modern Europe take their new beginning." He was, perhaps, the greatest as well as the most obvious of the forces which caused the "times" to pass through the most momentous of all changes, namely, that of changing their *attitude of mind* towards the profounder realities of life. But the change had only begun when Caird entered upon his Professorship. "The narrow ways of thinking on religious and social philosophy" had not become grass-grown; "the narrow canons of literary criticism against which he protested so vehemently" had not lost their authority; the country was not as yet "opened up to cosmopolitan influences, nor drawn into the wider current of the great European movement of life and thought which began with the French Revolution." Carlyle had startled the minds of men rather than convinced them. He had flung explosives and flashlights into the darkness around, but there was no steady vision nor quiet possession of the new country. After the denunciatory prophet there was room and need for the placid teacher and the steadying strength of demonstrated truth. Moreover, to a degree even greater than usual, Carlyle employed the conceptions which were to rule the new era *against* the existing ways of life and forms of belief rather than evolved their significance constructively. He was engaged

mainly in "stripping from humanity all that the tailor has done for it":¹ nor did he always remember that the clothing of society is a skin and part of the living structure. "He expressed almost for the first time in English that disgust at the mean achievements of what we call civilization, that generous wrath at the arbitrary limitation of its advantages, that deep craving for a better order of social life, which is the source of so many of the important social and political movements of the present day."² His work has been far greater than the gratitude of his country—as yet: and we can insist on its value without ceasing to maintain that he remained "strongly individualistic in his turn of mind," "and had at least no firm grasp of the organic unity or solidarity of human life, and of the creative powers which arise not from the individuals taken separately, but from the way they act and react upon each other in society."³

On account of all these things the situation in which Caird found himself on taking up his work amongst his students was more than ordinarily prolific in opportunities. It was the dawn of a new day, and the morn was full of enterprise to his own spirit first, and through him to the young minds he so superbly taught.

"The meagre, stale, forbidding ways
Of custom, law and statute, took at once
The attraction of a country in romance!
[And] Reason seemed the most to assert her rights
When most intent on making of herself
A prime Enchantress."⁴

¹ *Essays*, i. p. 233.

² *Ibid.* p. 234.

³ *Ibid.* p. 264.

⁴ *The Prelude*, p. 729, book xi. lines 110-5.

A statement and examination of the substance of Caird's teaching will be made later : at present it is necessary only to indicate its general character, and more especially what it signified to his students, and on what kind of presuppositions in their minds it operated.

The parentage of the pupils of a great teacher is generally recognizable, even apart from his doctrines ; as you can tell in what workshop a journeyman has spent the years of his apprenticeship by the way in which he handles his tools. It is not theories only that he conveys to them, but also to a not inconsiderable extent, a method of thinking, and even a way of taking life. He passes them through the main crises of his own experience ; they fight his intellectual battles over again. And, as we have seen, it was no insignificant crisis through which Caird and the more thoughtful young men of his day had passed, and through which he was to guide his students. He had been made aware first by Carlyle and then by Carlyle's idealistic leaders of " New forms in poetry, new methods in science, new ideas in history and philosophy,"¹ and these had overpowered in him the older spirit and its ways. Moreover, if one is permitted to make use of the doubtful idea that there are any new beginnings in philosophy, or in the continuous life whose meaning it expresses and treasures up for use, we may attribute the new trend of reflective thought mainly to Kant : and, as we shall see, it was, above all other things, the task begun by Kant which was continued by Caird. Kant himself called the change

¹ Caird's *Essays*, i. p. 236.

of point of view "Copernican," meaning thereby that the necessities of spirit had logical priority over those of sense and natural things. But it was Copernican in more and deeper senses than Kant himself could know ; and it was to carry more consequences, both in the theoretical and the practical life of men, than have even yet been realized. It implied not only that religion and morality and all the rights and privileges of a nature that is rational could be placed beyond the reach of the engines of scepticism, safe from all attack, but that these had themselves to be reinterpreted and to take a wider meaning. In the last resort, for Kant, the interests of man were moral : the truth was to be known for the sake of the good ; the knowable universe existed in order to furnish a fit frame for the moral life ; and the ultimate necessity for the existence of God lay in the demand for the realization of a complete good. But the moral life was, ultimately, intensely individualistic for Kant. Every man was set to seek his own perfection, and the pursuit was solitary. He stood alone, with no strength save his own, under the thunder of the categorical imperative. But his strength was sufficient. "He could because he ought." If, in one sense, he might be held to be an ephemeral phenomenon amongst phenomena, in another the whole natural scheme was a thing lighter than vanity in the presence of his spirit. And if he had intercourse with his fellows in society it was that of a king with kings.

But all this Kantian teaching had to be changed as well as adopted. The individual had to suffer at least temporary dethronement. Psychology

was to cease to play the rôle of Metaphysics ; man had to be *derived* and to appear as mediated by the natural scheme. Morality had to be both naturalized and socialized : it must cease to be either an exception or an antagonist to the scheme of things, and lose its defiant character. Moral goodness, which is the *becoming* morally good, must itself be a process of the good. The movement must be seen as the very best thing that could take place, and as that in which the world of the real reveals its true character, and reaches its full fruition. Hence, Religion, too, must attain a new character. It must derive its value not from the failure of morality, but from its success : it must be recognized as that which inspires morality, namely, the sense of infinite companionship—" If God be with us who can be against us ? "

Now this change, though it involves the whole outlook, of Philosophy, Morality, and Religion, comes in the last resort to one thing only : man, as an individual, instead of being the centre around which the Universe revolves, is now caught up in its career. It verily is a Copernican change, a new spiritual astronomy destined to make many beliefs obsolete, and to be received reluctantly. It is difficult for man to give up, or even to postpone, his self in any department. He seems to stand naturally at the centre of things : East and West, and North and South, seem inevitably to begin where he is, and the zenith is always immediately above his head. The difficulty is especially great, if the promise that he will receive his self back enriched is uncertain and given in indefinite language. And that the

promise has, thus far, not been free from these defects, it is hard to deny : for the votaries of this way of thinking are not seldom given to accentuate the negative side of the process of morality, and to make much of its contradictions, and pains, and perils, while the Absolute in which is the ultimate truth and reality of things is apt to be an empty maw.

But the mental displacement which the adoption of the new doctrine entailed, and the difficulties of reconciling it with their inherited scheme of belief, and all the other remoter consequences, were hidden from Caird's students. So long as they were with their teacher they were swept along in his course, and could sustain themselves at the elevation of his philosophy. That the new doctrine carried with it a vast enlargement of the field of vision was felt at once by them. He placed them from the beginning at a point of view whence the life of mankind could be contemplated as one movement, single though infinitely varied, unerring though wandering, significant yet mysterious, secure and self-enriching although tragical. There was a general sense of the spiritual nature of reality and of the rule of mind though what was meant by spirit or mind was hardly asked. There was a hope and faith that outstripped all save the vaguest understanding, but which evoked a glad response that somehow God was immanent in the world and in the history of all mankind, making it sane. There was a feeling that morality, instead of being a hopeless struggle against the overwhelming odds of a nature innately and irretrievably corrupt, might be a series of hard-won

triumphs and a sure advance. And Religion, instead of being an artifice for making the descending sword of an angry God fall on the innocent instead of the guilty, a scheme to wrench into rightness what had fallen out of gear, came like the light of the natural dawn upon the face of things, revealing them as they are, and bringing out the benevolent trend and eternal goodwill of the whole scheme of both Nature and Spirit.

It was not a matter for wonder that they received the doctrine with enthusiasm, and forgot themselves in the sense of their partnership in a universal enterprise. Response to the generosity of a scheme that conjoined their aim with the trend of things and brought the Universe over to their side in making for its fulfilment was easy. Youth does not count the cost. They were not aware of the depth of renunciation which the new doctrine entailed, nor of the price at which the wider spiritual freedom was to be bought. Least of all could they anticipate the resistance that would be offered by the old philosophy, ethics, and theology in which they had been nurtured, and which had passed so completely into the substance of their minds as to lose the aspect of theories, capable of being questioned, and to seem to be necessary, intuitive and axiomatic. At first the inconsistency between the old and the new was not felt, or not felt to be vital, and the ideas of their teacher found easy lodgment side by side with the traditional beliefs that ruled them in their ordinary life, and which were taken to be true as a matter of course. But the peace could not last.

The young student of philosophy is apt at first to treat philosophy as a collection of theories, for and against each of which there are a number of arguments: all of them to be committed to memory, like the conjugation of a verb or a list of names of plants. He is not aware that philosophy is a way of thinking, and that its themes can become a power in his life and reevaluate its interests; and he has at first no prejudice against them any more than against twice three being six. The knowledge of them is merely a mental adornment which he can wear and air in the eyes of his comrades, not without pride.

This attitude is of course radically unphilosophical, but its very shallowness brings a certain receptiveness and impartiality of mind, and it was rather fostered than hindered by Caird's way of teaching. He spoke of things that occupied ancient thought in a little country long ago; and the matters discussed—"the One," "the Many," "the Unlimited," and so forth—seemed to be as remote from the working faith and living creeds of the present world as the phantasies of the old astrologers. His method was always historical, and he conveyed his own views through the medium of other minds. It was also impartial in spirit and intention, and extraordinarily magnanimous. No arguments were given with more scrupulous care or greater force than those for a theory which he could not adopt; so that he never gave the philosopher criticised the advantage of suffering injustice. Indeed, he had no delight in refutation. It was quite alien to his temperament to be on the watch for the weaknesses of either men

or doctrines. What he sought in a theory was the truth which it contributed to the growing inheritance of civilization. His method was consistently positive. He regarded the movement of human experience, and of philosophy which expressed its meaning, as continuous ; and therefore the more true a theory the more surely would it be recast and thereby taken up as an element in a wider and wiser doctrine.

For these reasons he most rarely referred to the philosophical views which were current in Scotland in his time, whether as conscious doctrines or as unconscious assumptions implicit in the traditional morality and religion. Session after session passed and no allusion, near or remote, was made to the " Scottish School " of Common Sense, whose psychological doctrines were confused with Metaphysics, and in the agnosticism of which there was supposed to be support for religious faith. No Scottish name later than that of David Hume passed his lips. He spoke of Kant, and often quoted Goethe and referred to Hegel, substituting, as was supposed, for the wholesome home-made doctrine, theories which were somehow both " unintelligible jargon " and also unsettling and dangerous. There were some who expressed contempt for his doctrines. There was also much righteous indignation, some holy pathos, and strong resolution that come what may their ego should not be conjured away. There was even a passing notion in one of the Scottish churches that is most on its guard against more truth, of supplying the students of theology with a Moral Philosophy of its own or more consonant with its creeds. But Caird made no

response to any of these matters: the southern side of the quadrangle of the University gave back no echoes. He went on his way stating the truth as he knew it, trusting its defence to itself. He did not even apply it in any way to the student's experience nor give any hint as to the reconstruction which its adoption would necessitate. He let the new views and the old slumber side by side in the student's mind—until that was impossible; and he relied for the application of the truth upon the life which was in it, just as the sower trusts the seed and the soil.

This method was in great part natural to him, a mere matter of mental disposition. He did not love controversy. "Can't you philosophise without fechtin'?" he wrote to one of his pupils¹ who was rash enough to desire to enter the list against Mr. Bradley and his Absolute. He was once, and only once, tempted to reply to a criticism which was more vigorous than courteous; and the occasion gave him great pain. His critic's methods drew from Caird a rebuke which makes the controversy memorable. "Under the torrent of contemptuous words—some of them fearfully and wonderfully made—which he was pleased to pour upon me, I feel almost inclined to say with Falconbridge:

'Zounds! I was never so bethumped with words
Since first I called my brother's father "dad."'

Dr. Stirling is undoubtedly a man of great philosophical powers. I have always regarded him as in some sense a master in philosophy: but I think

¹P. 191 below.

it were well if he could learn to use the language of those who can afford to respect others because they respect themselves."

But his usual way was to withdraw from, and say nothing of, what could not commend itself to his taste. During his tenure of the office of Master of Balliol, he was induced to read a paper at a meeting of a philosophical society in Oxford. He found something to commend in the comments of all the speakers except ——'s. Of him he said not a word. On the way home with one of the College tutors he was very silent until they reached the door of Balliol Lodge, when he turned round and said, "I was glad to get that shot at ——."

The historical, positive, non-controversial way of teaching, which was the natural expression of Caird's patient nature and grave dignity of character, was also a matter of deliberate choice. He knew how difficult it is for those who are most earnest in regard to morality and religion, and therefore most worth teaching, to be even relatively impartial. Their opinions are convictions, and their creeds a practical faith; and if they endeavour to reason, it must be *towards*, as well as from, foregone conclusions. Such an attitude of mind is, of course, directly opposed to the very spirit of philosophy, and bars all enquiry and progress at the threshold. Some measure of mental detachment must therefore be secured, and some measure of the sincerity and freedom of enquiry if the reflective reconstruction and the consequent renewal and reinforcement of moral and religious experience are to result. Hence the value of the historical method. The principles

of his Idealism, which otherwise would only have raised the dust of controversy in the Scottish student's mind, gained unimpeded entrance so long as they came by way of Greece and in the garb which Plato and Aristotle gave them. The refutation of the students narrow "orthodoxies" was far on the way before the presence of negation was detected; the mental process induced was assimilative rather than critical, and the result was conciliation. The narrower views were put in a wide context, and at once transformed and enriched.

One of the most eminent of his pupils, Professor John Watson, refers as follows to the conciliatory method which was characteristic of Caird's whole mode of thought: "In his Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, this note of Universality was what made it for some of us 'epoch making.' The whole point of view, to those who were accustomed to the rather close and stifling atmosphere of evangelical theology, was the revelation of a new method of conciliation, which at once preserved the truth of the old and universalised it. Christianity was presented, not as something exceptional in the history of man, but as the culmination of a long process of development, and as owing its form to the influence of Greek modes of thought. Greek philosophy and Christian thought were represented as mutually supporting each other, not as occupying separate and irreconcilable regions. All this is now familiar to us, but to the Scottish undergraduate of those days it seemed the disclosure of a new world of ideas. The effect of Caird's teaching was to bring philosophy into

close touch with life, as the highest precipitate of the experience of the race. Not unnaturally his influence was at first looked upon with a good deal of doubt and apprehension, especially by less open minds, lay and clerical ; but among his students at least the spirit of ' watchful jealousy,' if it ever existed, gradually disappeared as the lineaments of the new world became more visible, and it was discovered that his philosophy, while it dissolved merely traditional ideas, really placed religion upon a more impregnable foundation. The older men, and especially the older clergymen, who found their favourite formulas quietly set aside, might grumble and prophesy the ' coming in of infidelity, like a flood,' but the younger men, more alive to the changed aspect of the world, and the necessity of a reconstruction of belief, felt that the new philosophy enabled them to preserve the essence of religion, while giving to it a more rational form."

The extraordinary efficacy of the method of peaceful penetration and the significance of the message of Caird, both to his students and to the religious life of Scotland, are indicated in the following letter from one of his pupils, now a distinguished author, who calls himself a " Parish Minister."

" Anyone who came under the influence of Caird, about thirty-five years ago now, not only passed through a personal experience of a unique kind, but also (perhaps unwittingly) passed through what was an historical transition in the development of modern Religious thought. Caird was the prophet of the present liberal life in the Church. He it was who ' came to the help of the Lord ' when the Church was in danger, in that greatest of all dangers, of

losing the minds and hearts that were most needed for her work. There were timid souls then who dreaded the direction and influence of his teaching. But they could not judge the signs of the times or see the need of a new spirit to reanimate the Christian Church, in preparation for the work of the modern world, and for the faith of the modern mind. Who have been able best, and without strain, to meet the changed positions and the advancing claims of the Scientific and Social world, but those whom Caird prepared for the inevitable transition ?

“The ‘liberal’ Theological movement which, about the same time, was forced upon the Church from within, was not sufficient in itself to create the new attitude of mind that was needed toward all religious thought and teaching ; it had only more or less to do with the relaxation of certain Doctrines, and reinterpretation of certain statements of the Creed. It was a movement that sought chiefly to abolish certain obstacles to a wider reception of the traditional creed, and did not attempt otherwise to open up a new path from the outside world toward the Church. This is what Caird did. His aim was not necessarily to lighten the burdens of Theological dogma : but to offer a new reconciliation of thought and faith altogether. It was a reconciliation that met men before they entered the Church at all ; that attracted, fascinated and conquered them ; that made Theology for them once more the Queen of the Sciences ; that opened the Church again as the supreme sphere of wide thought and great action ; that raised her again in the estimation of a new era of the world’s history ; that built again her towers and bulwarks.

“Under his influence Divinity students thought no longer of ‘obstacles’ to faith, or how they might evade the Christian creed. The hearts of all became fired for service ; enthusiasm, not apology, was the attitude of their minds. No one now can estimate

the glory of this transition in the experience of those who then regarded Church doctrine with dismay, and questioned themselves about any scope for modern conditions of thought and work which the Church could still afford. The enthusiasm was all the greater, that the new spirit came free from outside the Church. It led to pure and unselfish allegiance, without constraint, subterfuge, or ambiguity. There was passionate joy in the new conviction, passionate confidence in the new outlook.

“How absurd it seems now to think of the supposed ‘negative’ attitude of Caird on religious subjects. It was just the absence of all negation or apology that carried the hearts of his students captive. He was constructive, and enthusiastic, in every word that he uttered. The whole scope of his teaching was reverent, elevating, purifying, and inspiring. There was no trace of a destructive or revolutionary tendency; doubt or negation was never suggested; every spiritual ideal of life was built up and fortified; every thought was led on to Christian life and social activity. We went from him to the Divinity Hall established and grounded in deep spiritual principles, prepared for Theological studies, in the possession of active formative convictions, which already tended toward the great mental reconciliation with which he had inspired us.

“Caird’s method was peculiarly his own. He was the champion of the ‘critical’ school; yet, somehow, he never seemed to criticise! He was supposed to ban accepted views; yet in reality he often blessed them. His students were impressed rather with the conception of a mind and character given to simplicity, to exposition, to illustration; and not at all to the delight of battle. If there was one thing he made us ashamed of it was of any petty or conceited critical spirit. One could not well see or trace the action of his mind, or the actual

process by which he unfolded his subject. It may be said frankly that, at the time, we did not fully understand his method, or what conclusion he was likely to reach. His work seemed just a survey of the history of thought. But by degrees we found that we had gained not only that, but also the dawning conviction that the survey *was* the criticism after all. Just as he used to encourage us by saying that the good was always the most effective criticism of the bad.

“ The characteristic of his system which from point to point became most apparent, and to Divinity students most attractive, was the reiterated necessity for certain spiritual presuppositions and postulates, as a preliminary to the possibility of any knowledge of experience, or of any order in life. And, where this demand of reason was insisted on as the foundation of the system, the kingdom of life which was built up upon it could not fail to contain also many of the postulates of modern religious thought. Such a system tended above all things to unity between reason and religion, between faith and life. It was, however, the restored unity of the Gospel, not the accepted unity of the Church. It was the unity of spiritual reconciliation, not that of doctrinal exclusion. The old idea of religious progress, more by separation than by assimilation, became to us doomed. Henceforth the progress of the spiritual Kingdom could only be conceived or preached as one in which the whole of life and the whole of thought co-operated together to a religious end.

“ Nothing that he ever said broke in upon the Christian conscience. Such teaching as : that revelation cannot act outside the sphere of reason, or it becomes incomprehensible ; that the Spiritual and the Rational can never be opposed to one another ; that revelation is Spirit, and must be *to* Spirit, in whatever external form ; that the action of Spirit in history cannot be erratic ; that there can be no

isolation of any subject for exclusive treatment apart from the ordinary conditions of reason and life ; that we cannot divide up the human consciousness into separate compartments, such as will, thought, feeling ; that arbitrary or traditional methods of thought must give way to methods in which organic relations and groupings are supreme : —such ideas as these were the extremity of any ‘negative’ statements one is able to remember, in relation to methods of study and thought that bore at least on religious history or theological doctrine. And these are now largely the unexpressed creed of almost the whole Church.

“The *effect* of Caird’s teaching was more a spirit than an argument. It came into life quite as the Wordsworthian ‘sense of something far more deeply interfused.’ One tried afterwards, in new conditions, to find for oneself the progress of his thought as easy as once it looked. This was a vain hope ; but the spirit of it all was never lost. Men had come under a new impulse, and the inspiration of that remained. They might fail in an intellectual attempt to verify all the conclusions over again : but the truth had once been revealed to their spirits, they had one vision of ‘the pattern on the Mount,’ and that never faded. Nor was the vision a dream only : but that permanent illumination of the Spirit, which compels, and commands, and guides, quite as truly and legitimately as does the authority of Reason. To those who were not to be philosophers (perhaps the most of us !) there came at least the revelation such as Poetry brings, the help which Religion offers ; to most of us, therefore, ‘the better part,’ which certainly was never taken away. It breathed a sense of unity and universality into life and thought, gave a grasp of the inner meaning and movement of things, and an intellectual harmony with the eternal Purpose, which was at the centre of all.

“ The new fervour was quite of the nature of the Wordsworthian influence in the intellectual sphere. It was the gift of a guiding spirit, and of a reasoned view of things ; its spiritual tendency opened up the meaning of the common world, and gave beauty to the common things of life ; revealed their endless relations and latent spiritual purpose. Nor was this merely a whimsical ‘ subjective ’ position, the intellectual fabrication of an ideal universe ; but the calm interpretation and comprehension of the world as it lies about us. It depended on the spiritual element involved in all experience. Everything became in its proportion a vehicle of the Spirit, and God was found here too, in a rational universe, still to be ‘ greatest in the least.’

“ The reasoned hold we got of such a system of thought as Caird expounded may have been possibly at the time indefinite. But, indefinite or not, what a spirit and conviction it all was to put into the hearts of those who were going forth into life, ‘ not knowing whither they were going,’ but *now* were going with a transcendent spiritual view of life to guide them. And chiefly was it so for those whose destiny (so many of them !) lay in the rural Manses of Scotland : what an unspeakable gift and endowment for direction and help in the days when they were called upon to declare to their fellowmen the mainstay and support of an eternal and divine purpose at the heart of the world. The texts of the Bible, and the life of Christ, had become theirs in a new and unexpected way, as interwoven with the very fabric of the Universe.

“ By degrees this inspiration of Caird’s thought became transformed in Manse, and Church, and Parish, into a definite point of view. The spiritual power of reconciling and reconstructing daily experience proved itself valid ; and the spiritual Ideal at the root of religious teaching triumphed. As the creation of this spiritual Ideal, life assumed form

and proportion, realised within itself the power of an infinite aim, and looked out on the world with absolute confidence. This gift of a point of view, from universal Thought to concrete Life, permanent, illuminating, self-sufficing, was in the end Caird's greatest gift to his disciples. Such a view of life as Caird's philosophy presented did not come to us as though an invention of the Master, as though devised and established by uncommon means: it seemed only to be the outcome of a clear and natural elucidation of the universe that had been waiting for our recognition! There was nothing forced or artificial in its demonstration, no claim of originality, no elaborate justification: it seemed simply to fit into life, and make life and the world new.

“From how few teachers do students receive as their instruction a permanent point of view. With all their getting, how seldom they get this: how seldom the value of such a thing enters into the teacher's mind. How few seem fitted to estimate truly the position of a method compared with mere information. All is lost and confused in a mass of instruction. It is for this reason, for his clear delineation and practical application of a method of thought, that Caird's students regarded him as a Master and themselves as Disciples. Their student-time was not merely a prescribed period of study, a compulsory effort to gain information, a strenuous attempt to get through examinations. There was something Socratic in the relation between them and the Master: a relation which can only be described by the term Discipleship. The Master's work was a spiritual exposition of life; and the Disciples' acquisition was a spiritual point of view.”

It would be easy to quote further from the mass of testimony borne by his students to the influence which Caird exerted over them, and it would be

pleasant to dwell on the happy memories of the Moral Philosophy Class. "Most of us," said Dr. James Bonar, "will agree that we can never fully estimate or measure what we owe to Edward Caird. In things of the spirit it is hard to say what we did *not* owe to him in the form in which we now have it." "One remembers," said Professor MacCunn, "the fresh living thought daily renewed, the luminous exposition, the sympathy, and the endless trouble which Caird took over our endless essays; his unfailing encouragement too, and also the Socratic discipline. . . . These were the days in which he used to advise us to read Ferrier. I remember him once quoting Ferrier with that peculiar smile with which he used at times to spring a paradox upon us. 'It was important,' he quoted, 'that philosophy should be true and it was important that it should be reasoned; but it was more important that it should be reasoned than that it should be true.' That was the spirit of his teaching. He gave us courage to believe that what was true could be reasoned; he gave us almost courage to believe that what was reasoned must be true. It was this, I think, which carried us captive in those days."

"The effect of Caird's imaginative thought, as I make bold to call it, although there were very few images in his exposition, would be acknowledged by many successive years of students. It should not be forgotten here," continues Professor W. P. Ker, "how long the succession is. It begins, before Glasgow in those Merton days which were so well described by Mr. Saintsbury two years ago, and after Glasgow, again, it is continued in Oxford.

Last Sunday I heard one of the young Balliol men, a man who listened to Caird's lectures thirty years after I did, and he spoke of Caird in the same way as we do here."

It is not easy to tell the secret of the extraordinary influence which he exercised over his students. He was not eloquent, like his brother, Principal Caird; there was none of the sudden splendours which his life-long friend Professor Nichol flashed every now and then into his lectures; there was neither art nor passion, unless perfect sincerity of soul and simplicity of manner be an art, and unless "the pure eloquence of reflective thought" be a passion. Against the power of these his ardent young hearers knew no defence. There was nothing to rival the sway of their reverence for his strong, calm, thought-laden personality except their affection. An old student is inevitably a witness tainted by his memories. But I may quote the words of a friendly intruder into the old class-room with its bare walls and its flaring gas-lights. He sat on one of the wooden benches which are crowded every morning during the long and often severe winter with young and vigorous life, capable of being irrepressible enough at times—at *other* times and in *other* places. "Years ago," says Canon Rawnsley, "on a visit to Glasgow University, he allowed me to accompany him on a dark and bitterly cold day to an early morning lecture. I had been at one of Professor Blackie's lectures a year or two before, and I could not help being struck with the different feeling towards their master that the men had. At Pro-

fessor Blackie's lectures constant interruptions had taken place, which he had taken in the best possible part. Here no interruption seemed possible. The men from first to last seemed to feel that they were in the presence of a master mind, who was so dead in earnest that interruption or flippant folly was out of the question. I stayed behind to talk with the men after he had left for breakfast, and two or three of them spoke with such enthusiasm that years after, when he became Master of Balliol, though personally it was delightful to me to think of, I had a real heartache for those Scotch Students. . . . The secret of his power was his approachability. The same thing that made him a favourite with the humble farmer or lodging-house keeper in Cumberland, or the Welsh cottager or quarryman, made him also beloved of those Scotch Students, and this approachability was born of extraordinary simplicity mingled with wonderful humility."

It is doubtful if a better audience exists anywhere in the world than a large class of students in a Scottish University. It is all alert to every element both of strength and weakness in the teacher's character and ways, responds instantaneously and makes its own use of every event that happens, and attends the teacher with glee through his blunders, and with pride when he proves at all worthy of his work. It is a severe, and it is also a generous judge. It can be mercilessly inconsiderate towards oddities and helplessness, it knows precisely how they will break out, and when to expect them, and it is infinitely inventive in playfulness ; but it is good-natured and can be extraordinarily

generous, and appreciative, and eager to know. The notion that the Scottish student is apt to be disorderly in class is quite wrong : if he is tempted by his teacher he will certainly fall, but not otherwise. But there are different degrees and different kinds of order. They vary from the order of " the whipper-in amongst his dogs " to that of a most happy company in earnest and eager search for truth under a guide who is adored. The order in Caird's class was absolute : no one ever thought of it or of the possibility of its opposite. An old student writes that he once heard him " raise his voice " ; and " then it was only because he did not understand what the class meant. It was on the morning when it was announced in the papers that the University of St. Andrews was about to confer on him the degree of LL.D. The class ' roughed ' when he had called the roll, and continued to rough till he twice called ' Gentlemen '—the second time sternly. Nobody had the sense or courage to get up and explain. So the noise ceased, and the lecture went on. Next morning he had himself heard the news, and he made handsome acknowledgment and apology to the class." Two other old students, both now eminent in literature, relate an incident in which the order of his class successfully sustained an almost incredible strain. By a Spooneristic slip of the tongue " Caird again and again during the class hour spoke of the relations of ' bowl and soddy ' instead of soul and body." This was, of course, not for an instant lost on the students ; Caird observed a certain spirit of levity breaking out every now and then, was puzzled at it, put up his eyeglass and looked at the

class in his gentle, enquiring way, and went on. The utter reverence of the students for their beloved teacher, and their care lest he should be in anyway hurt, were his ample defence. The Scottish student is the product of the best Scottish home, that is, of the home that is on the rise. But I must try to describe "a class hour," were it only for the pleasure of dwelling for a moment on a happy memory.

The class met daily, except Saturdays, during the long and generally severe winter session at eight o'clock in the morning—the door of the class-room closing with the last stroke of the College bell. The students on meeting invariably found Caird's tall figure already present on the platform, his roll-book and the notes of his lecture ready. The door being closed he stood up, the lively murmuring talk of the students was instantly stayed, and he gave forth with quiet, earnest, and trustful reverence the beautiful prayer whose phrases he had culled from the devotional literature of the Christian Church from St. Augustine down, and which has probably been heard since from every pulpit in Scotland.¹

A few minutes served to call the roll, for each bench had its censor, and only the names of the absentees were called; and the lecture began. The first sentences summarized the lecture of the previous day, and while engaged on this résumé Caird

¹ Old students of Edward Caird may be pleased to see the prayer in print. It was as follows: "Almighty, and Everlasting God, in Whom we live and move and have our being, Who hast created us for Thyself, so that we can find rest only in Thee: Grant unto us purity of heart and strength of purpose, so that no selfish passion may hinder us from knowing Thy Will, no weakness from doing it; but in Thy light may we see light clearly, and in Thy service find perfect freedom."

consulted, more or less casually, the manuscript on the desk. After that he merely glanced at it in passing as he walked to and fro on the platform. And matters began to glow as with a steady, strong oak-wood fire. There were no bursts of eloquence, nor any startling passages or excitement: it was not the orator, but the teacher who was at his work. The voice was pleasantly tuneful and easily heard, the face was quiet and earnest, the sincerity of utter simplicity was manifest, and the impression was of a great and good man saturated with much reflexion on the subjects that mean and matter most for humanity. He "talked" out of the fulness of his mind with the greatest informality and with entire lucidity. After expounding a subject in one way, it was his common habit to say, "Let me put it in another way," and then would follow a second or third illustration of the theory, or of the process of moral experience which he was explaining. Meantime the students, one and all, strove hard to take down in writing what they heard—not word for word, if they were wise, but the substance. The consequence was that their notes of his lectures, even though they could not write shorthand, were as a rule very complete, and showed both the elasticity of his actual method of delivery and the strictly ordered form of the skeleton of thought which he thus clothed with words and illustrations. He always looked at his audience in speaking. From time to time one caught his eye and he seemed to be speaking straight to one's self, smiling when, on making his point, he clinched it with a short quotation from Shakespeare or Goethe or the Bible.

Reference has already been made to the "second hour," when he called up his students one by one and subjected them to the "Socratic method." Only those who have tried that method know its difficulty—how hard it is to extract out of another's mind the best that it knows, which is the essence of the method. The difficulty is greatest of all in the case of the Scottish student, for he is reticent and shy, and extraordinarily cautious lest he should incur the ridicule of his fellows. The process can be cruel in some hands, and it is at the best apt to be something of an ordeal for the student if "the oral Examination" is at all sustained and real. Occasionally one saw Caird fail for the same reason as the gods fail, overcome by density or ignorance and resolute taciturnity.¹ But it was not often. As a rule the student left that class, too, enriched, and always with his self-respect unviolated and intact. He had been guided step by step, and through him the class, to see some fresh aspect, or new application, and significance of the truths he had heard in the lectures, or had caught a glimpse of their systematic coherence. Sometimes the second hour was spent in a less trying fashion. The best students were asked to read, and the class to listen to excerpts from their essays; and Caird made a few illustrative and always encouraging remarks; for he knew the value of the method of heartening, and seized every chance of using it. The Essays had already been read and annotated by him—in a hand

¹ Combined, sometimes (to do the students justice) as in the case of the numerous Maclachlans, Macdonalds and Camerons with unfamiliarity with the English tongue. J. H. M.

for the most part either illegible to the student or decipherable only by exhausting all the probabilities. The amount of work of this kind which was done by him was stupendous and very costly to him; but it impressed the students with the personal interest he took in their intellectual development. "Here," to quote Professor Watson, "was a man who did not treat them merely as recipients of so many lectures a session, but as fellowmen, whose destiny it was his care to direct to the best issues. In the class he was often content to accept any answer that seemed to show even a remote apprehension of the problem dealt with. No one could be more frank in his criticism of essays, but one felt that he had so complete a sympathy with struggling and half-articulate thoughts that even his severest remarks had no sting in them. At the same time, I have known him to resent what seemed to him a tendency to 'flippancy,' and I can remember one occasion on which he demanded an apology from a student on that ground. This, however, was the solitary case of the kind that occurred in my day. As a rule Caird was so appreciative of one's very humble efforts that one felt impelled to do his very best. I remember at a Class Dinner being much struck with the hearty way in which he privately expressed his appreciation of several of the speakers, hitting off their special gifts in a few masterly touches. When I was leaving for my present sphere of labour, he sent me a note full of wisdom and kindness, recommending among other things the 'idealisation' of my students, and I may say that whatever manner of success has attended

my efforts has been largely due to my imitation of his own practice in this regard.

“ His unwearied efforts on behalf of his students were shown in a very practical way, by the institution of an advanced or honours class in Moral Philosophy. Before he came to Glasgow, no lectures were given in philosophy beyond those to the ordinary pass classes. I am not sure but I was the occasion—it was nothing more—for the establishment of an honours class in Moral Philosophy. After I had passed out of the ordinary class, I wished to make a closer acquaintance with the Philosophy of Hegel, and, beginning with the *Phänomenologie*, naturally found myself struggling in what seemed to me a trackless bog. When I communicated my difficulties to Caird, he eagerly offered to read the *Wissenschaft der Logik* with me—an offer which I was only too glad to accept. My friend James Thomson¹

¹ James Thomson was a man of great natural gifts, the first of the brilliant students whom Caird held in exceeding affection. He died young from consumption, which developed in the train of excessive work and poverty. Caird was much affected by his death, and at the request of the subscribers wrote the touching words inscribed on the tablet set up in Old Cumnock Parish Church, and also in the little town of Badenweiller, in the Black Forest, where Thomson died:

“ IN MEMORY OF
JAMES THOMSON, M.A.,
CLARK SCHOLAR
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
AND
ONE OF ITS MOST DISTINGUISHED STUDENTS
WHO DIED AT BADENWEILLER, SOUTH GERMANY
3RD AUGUST, 1876, AGED 31 YEARS.
THIS STONE IS ERECTED BY HIS FRIENDS AND FELLOW STUDENTS
TO EXPRESS THEIR ADMIRATION
FOR HIS HIGH GIFTS OF INTELLIGENCE
THEIR LOVE
FOR HIS SINGULAR GENTLENESS
AND PURITY OF NATURE
AND
THEIR SORROW FOR HIS EARLY DEATH.”

expressed a desire to be allowed to do the same work, and we both read, I think in the session of 1871-72, parts of the *Logik* and the *Phänomenologie*. Caird also instituted a regular Honours Class, and was followed by Veitch in Logic—I fancy as a counterblast to Caird's Idealism."

In his Introductory Lecture, technically the first of his class lectures as Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, Caird "roughly indicated the subjects of which it was the business of his chair systematically to treat." The accuracy of the sketch is most striking. It is a forecast of the themes which were to occupy him theoretically during all the years of his labour in Glasgow, and it is an expression both of the principles and of the spirit of the work of his after-life. He recognized both his opportunities and its responsibilities. "I cannot but remember," he said, "the great memories that belong to my place, and the names of those who, with how much stronger hands, have laboured here before me. I cannot but remember how, in their day and generation, they made it a source of light to their country and to the world." He stood in a great succession. Amongst his predecessors, as we have seen, were Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid. All of these in their day moved their world. Hutcheson inaugurated a new era for Scottish thought, brought back the love of beauty, revealed anew the sane mind of Greece, and above all set his task and gave many of his weapons to Adam Smith. Adam Smith changed the mind and much of the practice of the world in matters of commerce and industry; and Thomas Reid was the

founder of the Scottish Common-Sense School, and in his way one of the masters of the mind of his time, and of another great teacher, Sir William Hamilton. Caird had nothing of the eloquence of Hutcheson, which was said to "delight and to dazzle," nor did he claim, as we have seen, to originate any school of thought, either in Economics or in Philosophy. So far from wishing to dazzle and delight, or endeavouring in any other way to impose himself upon others, his respect for the privacy, the responsibility and the sacredness of personality, was scrupulous to excess, if excess is possible. He was loath to advise even when asked, and he never urged. He held that "one man can't *really* advise another," and that it is better to stand by and let the soul and the truth grapple. And yet it was precisely by invading the innermost recesses of the characters of his pupils that once more his "place became a source of light to his country and the world." Herein lay the ultimate secret of his power: it was in his utter simplicity and modesty, and reverence for every human soul. So that his influence entered within as peacefully as the light, and was no less welcome. His pupils, many of them now themselves responsible for the teaching of Philosophy and Literature in the colleges of the British Empire and America, would delight in saying deliberately with Dr. James Bonar that "Caird entered into their life as no other Professor ever did. To say that he was the best lecturer on philosophy we ever heard, would not exhaust the subject. There is hardly any speculative truth to which we are arrived, or think ourselves arrived by

our own study, that has not owed the shape of it, if not the substance, to the impulse given by Edward Caird." ¹

It is not possible to separate the impulse from the doctrine, nor the truth spoken from the spirit of loyalty to it; and yet it is the impulse and the spirit that one would fain accentuate in this case. Philosophy as taught by him was a passionately practical purpose. "Eager, attentive and critical," said one of his latest pupils in Glasgow, "it was only a small proportion of Caird's hearers who attended his classes as a perfunctory discipline, or regarded his lucid teaching as an easy path to a degree. The Scottish student has none of that shyness of general principles, that shrinking from large discussions, which seems inherent in the English temperament. The day's lecture formed the topic of talk for eager knots of young men in the 'Union' and Quadrangles, for anxious midnight debates at serious gatherings in the simple students' lodgings, where older men from the Highlands or from Wales, working in spare hours to earn their University fees, would discuss the new light with lads fresh from a secondary school." ²

It was in just such lodgings on a Sunday morning in the beginning of the winter session of 1879 that the seething zymosis resulted in the proposal for founding *The Witenagemote*—a society which in many respects resembled *The Old Mortality*—and which

¹ "Recollections of Three Universities" in *The University Monthly* for April, 1912.

² *The Nation*, May 11, 1907. H. N. Brailsford.

included amongst its earliest members Professors MacCallum and Anderson of Sydney, Professors Sonnenschein and Muirhead of Birmingham, Professor Mackenzie of The Welsh University, Professor Kilpatrick of Toronto, Professor Pringle Pattison of Edinburgh, Professors Smart, Denney, and Jones of Glasgow, Professor Herkless of St. Andrews, and others distinguished for *not* being professors. It was the most informal and the most ardent of all student societies, meeting where it could, for there was as yet no "Union," and keeping no minutes. The discussion began anywhere and went everywhere; the disputants, ere long, breaking up into small knots, and getting engaged like Homer's heroes in "single combats." Occasionally Caird came amongst what he called his "young lions," placid and massive and much loved, and the evenings were altogether memorable.¹

The society was called *The Witenagemote* on the humorous suggestion of Professor MacCallum, with whose account of what Caird meant for his students I shall bring this aspect of his life to a close. "I have not been unmindful of your message about Caird. Only, my dear Jones, I can't write anything. I have tried once or twice, and nothing that comes from my pen is suitable. It falls into the strain of

¹ One of these comes back vividly to my mind. Caird was expected to give a "paper." I do not remember on what subject, but he had been so "thrang" at the end of the session with examination papers that he had not had time to write anything. Instead, he brought down the MS. of T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, and read parts of the chapter in which Green compares Aristotle's with Modern Conceptions of Courage and Temperance. The text with the comments were perhaps an epoch in more lives than that of the writer. J. H. M.

general eulogy, which, however heart-felt, will be better done by better men than I. I can't get hold of individual reminiscences that would give significant glimpses of the man. This is partly what I expected, for I always felt his influence to be pervasive like the air rather than to be recognized as acting at this or that point. What *was* his influence? Looking back I feel pretty sure that in the first place, when I was a raw student in his class, it was to give me some idea of the whole of things. I remember feeling as I followed his course of lectures, like Faust, when he opens the book at the symbol of the Makrokosm.

“ ‘Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt,
 Und in dem andern wirkt und lebt!
 Wie Himmelskräfte auf und nieder steigen
 Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen!
 Mit segenduftenden Schwingen
 Vom Himmel durch die Erde dringen,
 Harmonisch all' das All durchdringen.’¹

“Faust goes on: ‘Welch Schauspiel! aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!’ And since those days ‘the vision splendid’ has often faded for me, but never entirely, and in these last years it becomes clearer again, and then it was really ‘Himmelskräfte’ that lived in his Universe; he showed us that the whole was a spiritual whole. That is the second aspect of his influence that made itself felt in all sorts of ways, in thought, in action, in character. It is curious to me to notice how I have sometimes chosen the more magnanimous course or resisted the temptation to scamp my work by the thought of what he would

¹ *Werke*, vol. v. p. 22.

have done in the circumstances. But this is not the kind of influence of which one can say 'Lo here, or Lo there,' and if one brought one's self to state it in public at all it would not be convincing.

"So, my dear friend, I can give you nothing, and my inability is a grief to me ; for fain would I unite with you and his other disciples in doing honour to my Master, who is my Master in more ways than I can tell."

CHAPTER IV

UNIVERSITY AND SOCIAL REFORM

THE seven-and-twenty years during which Edward Caird filled the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow were amongst the most eventful in its history. " They witnessed, over and above the routine of its daily life from session to session, all the discussions raised and changes initiated by two Universities' Commissions (one of Inquiry in 1876, another Legislative and Executive in 1887)—the prolonged concomitant agitation of all manner of academic grievances, real or alleged—the strenuous warfare long waged between extra-mural and intra-mural interests—the vehement assaults on the administration of the Senate, and the transference of its patronage and financial and executive powers to the Court—new privileges claimed for and conceded to the students in the recognition of their Representative Council—the recasting of the whole system of Degrees in Arts, with its introduction of manifold options—the adjustment of the marvelously complicated Ordinances, almost every clause of which had to be fought over in Council, Senate and Court—the debates over tests and degrees in the Faculty of Theology—the fuller equipment of the Faculty of Law—the creation of a new Faculty of

Science—the disposal of questions emerging in the Faculty of Medicine as to the affiliation of Colleges, the relations of clinical to systematic teaching and of the University to the Western Infirmary and the requirements by the Medical Council—the provision of new Chairs and Lectureships, and the relative development of technical, tutorial and laboratory instruction—last, but not least, the admission of women as students, and its conditions, whether generally or with special reference to the position of Queen Margaret College.”¹

It was natural that changes of such magnitude and involving so many different and conflicting interests should occasion much controversy. “There was division of opinion as to policy amongst the professors themselves,” and the professors as a whole, as constituting the Senate, were “subjected to violent attacks in the University Council and elsewhere.”

The discussion was conducted by some of the cruder advocates of the more revolutionary changes in such a way as to make it extraordinarily difficult for Caird to co-operate with them. He did not love controversy. He could respect persons whose opinions he was unable to share. He wished others could do the same. On the other hand, there were certain far-reaching changes which he earnestly desired. He was a reformer. His views were positive and he held them strongly. These views rested ultimately on the breadth of his social sympathies and the value he set on character. His belief in the value of higher education for every one

¹ Dr. W. Purdie Dickson's letter, p. cxv. John Caird's *Memoir*.

who could avail himself of it was invincible—women and working men could benefit by it and had a right to it. His attitude towards the claims of exclusive privilege, whether academical or political or other, was always critical and sceptical.

The consequence was that he could not be said to go in this controversy either with the Senate or with its critics. He belonged neither to the gods nor to the enemies of the gods; and neither the conservative nor the revolutionary party could dictate his policy. But neither could he be dealt with as with "a compromising moderate" aiming at a judicious mixture of right and wrong. His conceptions were never extravagant, but his wisdom was not that of the moral mediocrity which calculates and counts the cost of doing right or wrong, and which we call prudence. Once he had formed a clear and definite opinion as to the need of a change in order that the uses of the University might be extended, his resolution to uphold it was immovable. He would listen placidly to the arguments of opponents, and then exhibit an obstinate reasonableness and a patience that was inexhaustible. If he replied at all, it was, as a rule, in a quiet sentence—brief and conclusive and memorable.

These characteristics were observed afterwards by his friends, and his critics, in Oxford, when he was Master of Balliol. "His extreme width of sympathy," says Mr. Bosanquet, "and his gentleness and modesty in personal intercourse might have suggested that he was wanting in fire and strength and definiteness. But the fact was far otherwise, and the story is at least true to character which

ascribes to an Oxford resident, after a public discussion in which Caird had taken part, the observation, 'I saw then that the man could fight' "1

It may, I believe, be said that by necessity of disposition, no less than by training and habit of thought, there were some causes whose appeal to him was imperative and to which his loyalty was lifelong. He supported them unswervingly on all occasions that offered, sought to advance them both in Glasgow and in Oxford, and, as was natural, in these matters got much of his own way. The first of them to which a brief reference must be made was *The Higher Education of Women*.

The history of the slow process by which women were admitted to University Classes and Degrees is connected with that of the movement for "University Extension." That movement began in Cambridge in 1872, and was first taken up in Scotland by the University of St. Andrews, which instituted courses of lectures in Dundee and continued them there until a College was established.

But single courses of lectures to women had been given in Glasgow as early as 1845. The lecturer was Professor Hutton Balfour; and the subject being Botany, no harm to the women was expected to ensue. In 1868, two years after Caird's appointment to his chair, and from that time until 1877, short courses of lectures were given to women by four of the young Professors at the University. These were Young, Veitch, Nichol and Caird. They

¹ *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. iii.

were the real "pioneers to a University Extension Movement, of that form of it, too, which has achieved by far the most important practical results in Scotland."¹ In 1877 these courses were placed on a systematic basis: the Glasgow Association for the Higher Education of Women was formed under the chairmanship of Principal John Caird.

Principal Caird, both by temperament and by his position in the University, was led as a rule to mediate between opposing (and sometimes contending) parties rather than to press his own opinions. It is all the more interesting to note how he took, on this matter, an unambiguous and firm stand on the side of his brother. "He took every opportunity of pleading publicly for the extending to them [women] all the privileges of the University," says Edward Caird. "He was unwearied in the discussion of the well-worn commonplaces as to the capacity of women for such education and its importance to them. Perhaps," he continues, "I may venture to recall the fact that many years ago, before my brother was Principal, I had the pleasure of voting with him, in a minority of two, in opposition to a proposal to petition Parliament against some Bill that favoured the admission of women to medical degrees."² Presumably the occasion referred to was April, 1874, the year after John Caird was appointed Principal, when a Bill for admitting women to the Scottish Universities was introduced into Parliament. Professors Cowan and Berry moved that the Senate

¹ Prof. Wenley, *The University Extension Movement in Scotland*, p. 8.

² *Memoir of Principal Caird*, p. cviii.

petition against the Bill. Caird moved and the Principal seconded an amendment: "That whereas it is not desirable that the Senate should commit itself to the principle that this University has nothing to do with the higher education of women, and whereas a simple petition against the Bill without any qualifying clause would be understood in that sense, the Senate should not so petition; but should take exception to special points in the Bill, and, in particular, to the extraordinary powers it would confer on the University Court." But no sweetening, such as that of the last clause, could make the proposal palatable to the Senate. Only the two brothers voted for their motion, and E. Caird took the further step of formally dissenting from the decision of the majority.

It is not necessary to follow in detail the varying fortunes of the question of educating women; it is enough to note one or two of the more prominent and amusing events. We find that in February of the following year, 1875, the process just described was repeated. The same Professors moved and seconded the petition against the Bill, Caird was again in a minority of two—*this* time with Professor Young—and both dissented from the finding of the majority, which had now grown from 13 to 16. In April, 1877, Caird, still unrepentant, submitted to the Senate the petition of the newly formed *Association for the Higher Education of Women*, of whose committee he was convener, asking for the institution of examinations for women. The Senate was obdurate. But some of the Professors, including Caird, not only agreed to lecture for the Association, but obtained

permission to use their own class-rooms for that purpose. Matters seemed to be advancing. Then came one of the little precious things that variegate the history of learned bodies. In November of the same year the following question was solemnly addressed by the Senate to the Principal : " Whether he was aware that Dr. A. B. M'Grigor had delivered on the 13th *ultimo* in the University an opening address in connection with courses of lectures to be delivered by certain Professors to ladies ; that Dr. M'Grigor did so in his official robes as Dean of Faculties ; that he claimed to appear on behalf of the Principal ; and that (without any authority) he gave expression in the name of the University to good wishes and welcome to the Ladies' Educational Association ? " Whether the Principal *was* aware or not, and what happened to Dr. M'Grigor, is not recorded.

In March, 1878, a charge of £20 was made upon the Association for the use of the lecture-rooms, and the Senate declined to establish any scheme of examination. Then there came " the evening and the morning of a new day." The Senate began to relent. The boon of examination was granted to the women and " Higher Certificates were issued." But precautions were taken, and the resolution of the Senate is interesting as marking the road which has since been travelled. " Resolved as follows : The Senate enacts that no women's classes shall meet or disperse at the hours, but only at the quarter and half-hours ; but grants the use of rooms free of charge "—Professor Berry still " standing on the burning deck " and dissenting.

Then followed struggles as to the academic recognition which, in lieu of degrees, might be granted to women. Many alphabetical combinations were proposed, such as L.A., A.A., Sch.A., but none was adopted. They agreed to speak simply of "A Certificate in Degree Subjects."

At last, in 1883, the Association for the Higher Education of Women developed into the Queen Margaret College, and Caird was appointed a representative of the Senate on its governing board. "By this time," to quote his words, "the debate about the education of women generally, as well as about their medical education, had gradually worn itself out in the long period between 1867, when the first steps in the direction of such education were taken in Glasgow, and 1889, when the University Bill was passed; and the clause in that Bill empowering the Commissioners to open up all degrees in arts and medicine to women was accepted as settling the matter, without, so far as I know, a dissentient voice." The Commissioners put the power that had been given into use. In February, 1892, they issued an Ordinance enabling the Scottish University Courts to make provision for the education of women within the Universities, and under that Ordinance Queen Margaret College was incorporated in the University of Glasgow. At the beginning of the following session, one year before Caird left Glasgow for Oxford, women were admitted as matriculated students, and the year after his departure they attended his successor's lectures in Moral Philosophy in his old class-room along with other students. The struggle had lasted for about

twenty-five years of his professorship, and he had been in it, I believe, and at the front, at every stage and on every occasion.

Caird's interest in other aspects of University reform bore the same character of patience and persistency, and his efforts in the end were followed by a success which was analogous. In pursuit of these ends he took a large share for a considerable time in the work of the General Council of the University—most probably not from natural inclination. But he had identified himself strongly with the University, and, as Professor, he enjoyed greater freedom of action than was possible for the Principal, whose opinions he shared and for whose sake, no doubt, he often stood in the fighting line.

The Council, which legally but hardly practically, consists of the whole body of graduates, works naturally by means of committees, or, perhaps it should be said, "is *worked by* its committees." The most important of these is the Business Committee, of which Caird was made a member in October, 1881, and convener from October, 1884, until 1888, when he retired. This was the agitated period of University change to which reference has already been made; and Caird spent much time and thought over the policy of the Council and much labour in guiding opinion.

The first record of his participation in the deliberations of the Council is that of October, 1877, when he proposed two resolutions; one bearing upon the reduction of the expenses of contested parliamentary elections in the Universities of Glas-

gow and Aberdeen, and the other upon the teaching of Theology. His action in regard to the first matter led to enquiry into the comparative expense of parliamentary elections in University and in other constituencies, and to the expression of an opinion—nothing more being possible—against paid canvassing. In 1881 Caird, *more suo*, returned to the matter, and proposed a clause making paid canvassing illegal. His motion as to Theology was to the effect that “the teaching of it in the University should cease to be confined to members of the Established Church.” It was defeated. But he returned to this matter also, and repeatedly. At one time it appeared that what he desired would be brought about, and he proposed a resolution “approving generally of a measure widening the conditions of tenure of the Theological Chairs, welcoming the removal of restrictions, but opposing any proposals which might tend to remove the study of Theology from its place among the other studies of the University.” But nothing was done. The Chairs of Theology have, so far, stood out of the stream of change, and are “the same yesterday and to-day.”

It is not necessary to give a detailed account of his long and exacting labour in connection with the University Bills successively introduced, but only to speak very shortly of the matters in which he was specially interested.

In 1885, a few months after Caird was made Convener of the General Council, a number of graduates who were dissatisfied with the provisions of the Scottish Universities Bill of 1884, and who

were directly and deeply interested in certain changes not provided for in that Bill, formed an Association, which was called *The University Council Association of Glasgow*. The chief objects "to be aimed at in the immediate future" were (1) "the amending of the Constitution of each University, so as to transfer the executive and administrative power to a body representative in large measure of the General Council and capable, from its composition as a whole, of acting always in the public interest; and (2) the breaking down of the present monopoly of teaching whether as regards the right to teach or the subjects to be taught."¹ The Committee empowered to frame rules for the Association prepared a circular "with such explanatory matter as might seem expedient." In that circular attention is drawn to the powerlessness of the General Council, and to the need of giving it a "large representation on the Executive." By thus reforming the Constitution, so as "to transfer the controlling power to a body that has no private or corporate interests of its own to serve," it was considered that "the monopoly of teaching might be broken down." "The ancient right of all graduates to teach under control of the University" had already been "partially restored in connexion with the Faculty of Medicine"; and, in spite of fettering conditions, the experiment had been amply justified by the result. And now the time had come for a determined effort to put the unendowed teachers on a level in other respects with the endowed teachers. The same reason which

¹ *Minute Book of the University Council Association of Glasgow*, p. 3.

existed for open teaching in Medicine existed also, they said, for open teaching in all the Faculties ; and such open teaching was the one means of raising Scottish education to an enviable height.

No indication was given either then or, so far as I can learn, at any other time of the measure or kind of control which the University was to exercise over " the open teaching " ; and the experiment of permitting all graduates to teach, all on the same level, except for the endowments, was never carried out. But the prospect was exciting, if remote : it looked alluring, at least to those who desired to teach, and very much the opposite to those who were teaching already. So the trouble between the Senate and its critics began and grew.

The Association held many meetings, was active in propaganda, and kept the attention of the public well directed upon the contrast between those who had, and those who were supposed not to have, " private or corporate interests of their own to serve." Meantime the Business Committee of the General Council was also considering the provisions of the University Bills, and in April, 1886, Caird as Convener presented its report to the Council, in which a wide-spreading scheme of reform was embodied. The Report was adopted, the Council even refusing to reconsider the condemnation of extra-mural teaching which the Report contained and which the Association was not able " to allow to pass unchallenged."

Standing thus as a leader of the movement for reform, and being " anxious not to divide the forces of those who wished for the improvement of the

existing system," Caird enquired, on his own behalf and on that of others, whether membership of the Association was open to those who held that the extra-mural system was not the only, or the best, method of adding to the teaching staff. He received the necessary assurance, and published the correspondence. His name was added to the list of the members of the Association, and several other graduates who shared his views sent in their names for enrolment.

It was halcyon weather. The difference of view as to extra-mural teaching was successfully obscured and suspended, and Caird was forthwith made a member of the innermost committees of the Association, there to be managed and used. But the experiment was not prosperous; he did not prove either malleable or ductile.

On the question of the reconstruction of the University Court and the transference to it of the control of the finance of the University there was no significant difference of view. Caird did not lay much stress on the matter. "I have no objection whatever," he said, "to an increase in the number of the representatives of the Council as long as the claims of the Senate are fairly considered." Accordingly this change was successfully brought about: the Senate was relieved of responsibilities and the Court was endowed with powers. And it is not at all certain that the change has done more harm than good. The members of the Senate continue to be interested in the prosperity of the University, and the Court obtains the information it needs, and, on the whole, does what is reasonable

But the question who should be allowed to teach, and under what conditions, was not settled as easily as was that of financial control. The Association, on the whole, continued to be interested mainly in "breaking down the monopoly of teaching by the University staff" by extra-mural methods; while Caird, as Convener of the General Council's Business Committee (and otherwise) strongly urged the institution of new Chairs and Lectureships, and a large increase of the junior staff *within the University*. Ultimately, when the Association took upon itself, against its recognized principle (as Caird believed), to approve a Bill constituting a College which was neither duly endowed nor duly incorporated into a College of the University, he withdrew from the Association. And he carried with him in his advocacy of the inner extension of University teaching so many of those who, to use the familiar language of the Association, "had no interest of their own to serve," that a new Association of Graduates was founded to uphold precisely those principles which he had consistently advocated. This new body called itself "The Glasgow University Club," and Caird was present at its foundation. Amongst its objects were the securing of endowments for new professorships in the University, and the reform of the University "on the principle of expansion within its organization, and under the control of the University Court." Thus, to quote the words of one of its most prominent members, "At the time when there was a deadlock between the rigid ideas of monopoly alike in teaching and in subject, and the extreme idea of unlimited com-

petition, the Club prescribed what some called a *via media*, but what I have always held to be a higher idea, and that was the expansion of the University itself, and within its own system." The Club, beyond all doubt, exercised a real influence upon events. It had rallied around Caird, and it carried his main conceptions to a triumphal issue. There ensued a rapid and large development of teaching power in the University. A great many lecturers and assistants were appointed, more subjects were taught, and the ways in which subjects might be chosen and grouped for degrees are now not easily numbered. In consequence the work done in the University is more advanced as well as more varied. The students are older when they enter the University, and have learnt more in the schools; and a very considerable portion of the care and teaching resources of the University is now directed upon the Honours Departments. Moreover, the influence exerted by the large younger staff of Lecturers and Assistants upon both the Professors and the undergraduates is, to put it modestly, informing for the latter and stimulating for both.

In 1884 Caird found himself involved in a lawsuit which created a considerable interest in Scottish academical circles and whose issues were not unimportant for Scottish learning.

A student who had attended the Moral Philosophy Class during the winter session of 1881-2 lithographed and published the notes which he had taken of Caird's lectures. Early in 1883 an interdict was granted against this publication—the student, as

defender, consenting to it. But on the 20th October of the same year there was advertised in a Glasgow newspaper : " A CRIB OR AUXILIARY. AID TO THE STUDY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. *The only work of the Kind on Development of Thought, and specially designed for Students preparing for Examination.*" This *Crib or Auxiliary* consisted of three pamphlets written by the same student and issued by the same bookseller ; and it was contended that it was " nothing more nor less than an attempt to evade the interdict by reproducing the lectures with colourable alterations." Caird resolved to apply once more for the protection of the law. The case was tried before one of the Glasgow Sheriffs and decided in Caird's favour. But appeal was made to the Second Division of the Court of Session. That Division considered the questions submitted to have such significance as to make it advisable to obtain the opinions of all the judges. With the opinion (which was divided) before them, the Judges of the Second Division reversed the decision of the Sheriff.

Caird himself would have been willing to allow the matter to rest at this point. But his fellow Professors in Glasgow and, indeed, in all the Scottish Universities recognized the consequences which would flow if the finding became law. They persuaded Caird to appeal and subscribed funds for carrying the case to the House of Lords.

Up to that time it was doubtful what protection the law afforded to unpublished work once it was delivered in public by way of lectures. It was argued that the right of a matriculated student to

attend a Professor's lectures carried with it the right to publish them. Once delivered, they were not the private property of the Professor. Evidently such a state of matters was in many respects undesirable.

If, on the one hand, a Professor, who might have been in the habit of reading the same MS. from year to year, would find himself anticipated in an unenviable way, and possibly brace himself up to the sticking point and write new lectures, on the other hand, other Professors, still living and growing, would be loath to give in their lectures thoughts which, just because they were new to themselves and imperfectly mastered, would be for the students the most stimulating. And if a Professor did give to his students what he intended to publish, he might still desire to have the matter in his own control. It is conceivable that he might not like to appear in the garb made for him by his students, and the student by publishing his notes might hurt his Professor's reputation without making an enviable one for himself.

Of personal interest, in the ordinary sense of that phrase, the case never had much for Caird at any time. Long before the House of Lords delivered its verdict it had ceased to occupy him. He had dismissed it completely from his thoughts, as was his rare habit with disagreeable matters which he could not remedy. It was only on account of its importance to University teaching generally that he consented to continue the case, just as it was on account of his own students that he sought the interdict at first. He was in the habit of constantly

recasting his lectures—even when the course as a whole followed the same main lines. And, further, as we have seen, he by no means confined himself to his MS. when he was lecturing. He omitted and he amplified, interpreting at the moment as a great teacher must the degree in which his students were following his thoughts, and catching inspiration in their companionship. Of all Professors he was one of the least likely to find himself anticipated in his class by students possessing ancient manuscripts of his lectures.

But, on the other hand, there was amongst the Arts students the greatest eagerness to acquaint themselves with his views, if possible before they entered his class. There, more than anywhere else, was the real measure of a student's powers to be found. There was no such "royalty" as that of Caird's medallist. There, too, they would find themselves within the power of forces that were new, thoughts deemed adventurous and even dangerous, but by no means the less interesting on that account. On the other hand, past students were unusually unwilling to part with their notes. Old notes were much prized but very rarely seen: sometimes borrowed, but, I believe, never sold. So that a lively market for any *Crib or Auxiliary* was secure. There is no doubt that the students would have made use of it; and, in Caird's opinion, there was little doubt that the consequences for the student would have been mischievous. It was that consideration which was decisive for him, and it was on that account that he sought the interdict. *The Aids*, he believed and told the Court, would confuse and mislead, and

thereby tend to obstruct, if they did not even defeat, what was undoubtedly the central purpose of his life and one of the most sacred of his ambitions, namely, to be a helpful teacher of the youth of Scotland in that most spiritual of all matters, namely character. "The effect of lectures," he said to the Court in giving his testimony, "as distinct from books, to a great extent depends on the way in which they are spoken and heard. The students hear my lectures, then they make attempts to reproduce them. They take down notes, which I consider to be a valuable exercise for their minds. If they can save themselves that trouble by taking up some convenient crib . . . they would really be destroying the work of the class. It would be taking away the freshness of personal address, and would at the same time be furnishing the students with something that they ought to do for themselves." Moreover he held that that particular crib was based on unintelligent notes, and was further confused by the attempts made to conceal its origin ; and his objection to it was the more grave on that account, because the use of it could not fail to have bad effects upon the students.

The question of his own reputation had little, if indeed any, weight with him. The leading ideas of the "Crib," the selection of topics discussed, certain recurrent words and phrases, were, he held, recognizably his own ; but anybody who was tolerably intelligent and had heard his lectures would say that they had been derived from him through a confusing medium. As to persons who had never heard the lectures, he thought they would be very

much puzzled by the strange nature of the *Aids*; but if they knew his general tone of thought, they would detect "frequent traces of his ways of thinking and putting things, though he did not think that they would attribute them to him without some explanation."

But while the risks to his own reputation were negligible, so great was his desire to prevent the interposition of any medium of the kind between his teaching and his students that, even while the matter was *sub judice*, he took their protection into his own hands. He set himself at once to open up his subject on a new method and changed the whole setting of his doctrine. He contrived always to bring before successive generations of students the ethical issues which he deemed to be fundamental; and he always presented his own ideas, if it was possible, through the illustrative medium of the history of reflective thought. But each year he wrote afresh the whole substance of his winter's course of about 120 lectures, making at one time the teaching of Aristotle, at another of Kant, at another the history of philosophy the starting-point and dominant feature. It was a vast and continuous labour. It precluded him entirely, during the whole winter session, from attempting to carry forward any work he might be preparing for publication. It also left him only a very busy man's leisure for the services he was impelled to render as a citizen in a large and vigorous community.

Nevertheless these services were both varied and important. Most great cities are rich in oppor-

tunities for the good citizen, and in none were they more ample, or more pressingly inviting to the good citizen, than in Glasgow. The exceeding wretchedness of the conditions of life in some parts of the city had been allowed to continue in existence side by side with much beneficence, social enterprise and an uncommon capacity for making civic adventures pay. Caird's sympathy was strong with the poor, and with every one held down and deprived of healthy citizenship whether by lack of education, or votes, or even of character. He showed his humanitarian and progressive tendencies soon after his appointment in Glasgow by publicly supporting a movement for extending the franchise, and by his interest in popular education. Professor Watson recalls a meeting held in 1869 or 1870 in the City Hall, of which Lord Kelvin was chairman, and at which Nichol, Ramsay and Caird spoke. "The only political meeting," he had ever known, "called by Professors, and at which they were the chief and almost the only speakers." Its object was to retain Bible teaching in the schools. Kelvin "regarded the Bible not as a Sectarian but as a National book"! Nichol began his speech, most characteristically, by expressing his satisfaction at finding himself "for the first time in his life in agreement with his fellow citizens." Caird compared the framer of the Bill they were opposing to Bunyan's Mr. Facing-both-ways, and wound up his speech with the declaration which met with general applause—"We demand no more, and will take no less."

Mr. Foster's Education Bill interested Caird in another way and for another reason. It gave to

women, for the first time, the right to sit as members of School Boards. He took a leading part in persuading his fellow-citizens to cast their votes for the women candidates. But on this matter he failed to carry with him his friend and fellow-progressive, Professor Nichol, who was hardly less active on the opposite side. And their influence, at least as regards one of their colleagues—the charming and punctilious James Thomson, brother of Lord Kelvin—was so evenly balanced that he spent the School Board election day consulting them alternately, finding scruples against each course in turn. He ended the day by a visit to Nichol, rejecting his advice, resolving to vote, and driving wildly to the polling booth to find it just closed.

Scottish education interested Caird at this time in all its stages; and he was especially active in enlarging the opportunities of women, and of working men in large industrial centres, by means of Extension Lectures. But his social efforts were not confined to Education. There were two movements which owed their existence mainly to him, and their prosperity, in very great part, to the thought and unremitting care spent upon them by him and Mrs. Caird until they left Glasgow for Oxford. The first of them was "*The University Settlement Association.*" It was founded in 1886, and its aims were similar to those of the Toynbee movement in London—a social experiment upon which Caird set a very high value. It was intended, amongst other things, to provide, in one of the poorest and most crowded parts of the city, a centre for social work for University students. They were to reside there. But the residential part

of the project was not fulfilled for lack of funds. The present Students' Settlement in Possil Road, which has done such admirable service both to the students in residence and to the neighbourhood, was established in 1889 by another organization. But the other objects at which Caird and his friends aimed were successfully carried out. The Association had premises at first in *Parson Street*, where Caird on the very first evening came into interesting and benevolent contact with samples of the city's wretchedness. In 1892 the Association moved into more commodious premises. Toynbee Hall, in Cathedral Street, was formally opened and dedicated to the good of the poor of the district. Caird was the principal speaker at the inauguration, and he explained the objects which the institution was intended to secure. His short speech was a model of strength and wisdom. "Hitherto," he said, "the attention of the benevolent public had been directed mainly to charitable and religious work, which was not only valuable but absolutely necessary. But that work, as ordinarily understood, was not sufficient. The general condition of the life of the poor could not be raised unless they were given the opportunities of social and intellectual progress and of contact with things that are beautiful. They must be provided with the means of rational and refined amusement. The middle and upper classes enjoyed advantages which the poor could not possess, and they ought to feel a generous shame that the heritage of humanity was, so much, the possession of the few. They should do their best to bridge the gulf that separated the well-to-do from the poor, and

foster mutual understanding and goodwill by social intercourse; so that the nation might be one body and its members bound together in one fellowship. He desired to associate three names with the opening of the Toynbee House: the first was John Ruskin; the second was Thomas Hill Green, who had done more perhaps than any other man in the last generation to infuse a higher tone into the public spirit of the people; and the third was Arnold Toynbee, a young man who burned with zeal for the good of his fellows, and whose short life was an appeal to the conscience of the nation in the direction of social work."

Professor Cappon describes an evening spent with Mr. and Mrs. Caird in the Settlement. "They were the heads of one of the circles or 'families' that undertook to entertain one evening a fortnight at a house in the East End which had been bought and fitted up for the purpose. I remember criticising the movement with a young scholar's pedantry as having 'nothing organic' in it, to which he replied in his quiet way that perhaps, like missions, it was of most benefit to the philanthropist himself. Nevertheless, I went with his 'family' as well as with another (the *Kränzchen*¹) to which I belonged. The entertainment, after a preliminary service of tea and cake, was mainly musical, with occasional diversion in the way of games. On one occasion I remember a somewhat faking performance in thought-reading which Caird and I did together,

¹ A private society for the reading of German plays, new and old; chiefly memorable for the interest in it and constant presence at its meetings of Sir William Ramsay the chemist.—J. H. M.

either he or I being blindfolded. But for him there was an element of genuine experiment in it; for I noticed more than once that he had a keen though unspoken interest in experiments on the sub-conscious. He enjoyed, too, in his quiet way the humour of incidents and accidents in such affairs, as when a glib little machinist made himself the spokesman of the East Enders at the close of the evening and complimented Mr. and Mrs. Caird and the entertainers on being able to enjoy themselves 'without orgies,' that being evidently the East Ender's notion of 'Society's' way of amusing itself. The little man sang for us, too, with the heartiest ardour, *The Lass of Ballochmyle*, its passionate strains pealing over us in a way that was apt to provoke a smile. Nichol's eye would have been dancing, but you could hardly tell from Caird's steady composure how much he was seizing of the humour of the situation. There was a simple, grave *bonhomie* about him in such scenes."¹

It was on such occasions as these and in such an environment that one saw best those qualities which led Mr. Bosanquet, speaking of Caird before the British Academy, to make the startling remark that "he seemed almost a perfect character." He refers more particularly to the width of his sympathy, his gentleness and modesty. Something of the great beauty of his character was felt even by some rather crude members of the circle. They found him absolutely simple, unassuming and unobtrusive, with a natural reverence in him towards all human beings. His whole nature lay open before them,

¹ *The Queen's Quarterly*, Kingston, Ont.

like a flower passive to wind and rain as well as sunshine, protected by nothing except its own quiet nobility.

Mr. and Mrs. Caird, however, knew the members of their "Circle" more intimately than at these entertainments and cared for them in many ways, and they were adored.

The second social movement to which reference has been made was *The Women's Protective and Provident League*. This society was founded in 1888, and it owed both its existence and its policy, in great part, to the inspiration and guidance of Caird. Its object was to ameliorate the economic conditions under which, in the various trades, women and children worked. It was the first association in Scotland which had such a purpose, and the history of the Women's Industrial Movement as a whole in that country points back to it as of genuine significance. Out of it was evolved *The Glasgow Council for Women's Trades*, now known as *The Scottish Council for Women's Trades*, which has done more than any other agency for the improvement in Scotland of the industrial position of women.

Both friends and critics of the movement attribute much of its success to the fact that it consistently followed the lines which Caird laid down. One of the latter, a fellow-citizen well known for the simplicity and fulness of his trust in the beneficial operation of the economic *Law of Supply and Demand*, accused Caird of being "the principal teacher of what is called the new or sympathetic economy," and of having "blessed the movement" called the *Women's Protective League*—a movement

which " had done much harm " ; for " many men of means, possible employers, said they would be most unwilling to go into the employment of women in Glasgow, with the probability of being annoyed and the possibility of being abused and ruined by this ' Society.' " ¹ This letter was written on the occasion when Caird advocated the extension of the Factory Acts so as to make them applicable to laundries. And in one respect it exactly hits the mark. It verily was a " new and sympathetic economy " which Caird desired and at bottom sought for through all his social efforts in this field—an " economy " which should no longer be a theory that, in its evaluation of human wants and human efforts to supply them, *left out the human qualities*.

Not even yet have we realized, realized theoretically not to say practically, the abstract and false character of current economics. But we have advanced so far as to make it difficult to call back the mood of the public mind which could regard as blameworthy his balanced and placid advocacy of the industrial protection of women. Such was the case nevertheless. Old students of his classes who carried with them into their business life their real reverence for their teacher, regarded him with a " countenance more in sorrow than in anger " like Hamlet's father's ghost ; and solaced themselves while excusing him with the notion that " from the practical point of view " he was amiable and innocent. They were not aware that so far from being naïve and impracticable in these matters of social well-being, he was, with a few others, engaged in changing the

¹ See letter by Mr. T. S. Cree, *Glasgow Herald*, 17th March, 1894.

mind of his times, and, on that account, liberating a social force which is destined to revolutionize the conditions of labour and of life for countless women, and possibly, by degrees, to help to sweeten the relations between Capital and Labour.

When the *League* was first founded its activities were mainly provident : it secured sick and out-of-work benefit to the working women who were members of it. The transition from a mainly provident to a mainly protective character was more difficult than it had proved in the case of men workers. For obvious reasons, which it is not necessary to attempt to recount here, the obstacles in the way of combining women together in self-defensive organizations were greater, and yet it was believed that the remedy for evils and wrongs, recognized even by some of the employers of women, was to be sought only in such combination. In an appeal which bears the name of Caird as one of the Members of Council, and is the obvious expression of his views, it is argued,

“ First : that the wages of many working women, both factory workers and particularly needle-women, are quite inadequate to maintain them in health and honesty : and, second, that in the absence of organization, this inadequate wage is always being reduced yet further by the blind competition among the women themselves. . . . Charitable gifts cannot remedy the evil, as they tend to lower wages and so to increase poverty. The single employer cannot remedy it : he must either reduce wages when other employers do so or be undersold by them. . . . It is only as members of a Trade Union that women can refuse to accept lowered wages.”

If it is asked, Why, then, not leave the women to form their own Unions and combine in their own defence? The answer given is that "In many instances, as in the case of those seamstresses who are the victims of sweating, women are too helpless to combine, unless aided by such an Association as the League." On the other hand, where there is a level below self-help, there is the more direct and imperative obligation on others. "It is the duty of those who have more time, wealth and education to teach them the proper use of combination, its legitimate power, and its wise limitation." Society as a whole is responsible for the errors and extravagances of Trades Unions, and especially the more privileged classes. Finally, the real and legitimate purpose of trade combinations is suggested. It is to substitute methods of reason for those of force in trade disputes. "It is not the object of *The League* to promote strikes, but, on the contrary, to exhaust all the resources of arbitration and reason rather than allow questions of wage to be settled by the arbitrament of the stronger." The League had acted on these principles. It was contended that "The record of work done already by the League is sufficient proof of its earnest desire to save both sides from the wasteful methods of strikes and lockouts."

But even with the help of the League, and its wise and restrained advocacy, combination amongst women workers was weak and its results inadequate. The League sought other means of attaining its ends, and turned its attention to the possibilities of improving the condition of women workers which legis-

lation might offer in *The Factory and Workshop, The Shop Hours and Public Health Acts*. And the first step was obviously to turn the mind of the public towards this overlooked region of needs and wrongs. Then began that long series of investigations into the state of women's labour, which the Scottish Council continued under the direction of Principal Sir George Adam Smith, who succeeded Caird in the Council when the latter left Glasgow for Oxford. "The condition of our women-workers is a heavy responsibility for all of us. It is surely the duty of every man and woman to know what that condition actually is, and to try to improve it." This consciousness of social responsibility and sense of "*the duty to know*" are most characteristic of Caird; and his trust was always full in the public will towards the good which it recognized. Hence his emphasis throughout upon the need of teaching, and of laying the facts bare before the public mind.

The first of the investigations, which was directly inspired by Caird, was that to which we have already referred—the laundry workers. The conditions were found to be appalling. Women worked from fifteen to seventeen hours a day for the most meagre wages; and "individual employers in competition with each other were," as Caird said in a resolution he drafted for the League, "altogether unable to remedy these conditions, even when willing." There was no remedy except in the legislative regulation of hours and conditions of women's labour. He therefore moved that "There is an urgent necessity that the Laundries should, without delay, be brought under

the Factory and Workshop Acts with a view to the limitation of the hours of labour and the securing of healthy conditions in which the work is carried on." This was done by the Government, though by no means "without delay."

In 1892, when the Royal Commission on Labour was sitting, Caird moved on the Council of the League that "In the interests of working women it is desirable that special means should be adopted for laying before the Royal Commission on Labour full information regarding the condition and work of women in this country, and the grievances under which working women suffer." He suggested that "Women Sub-Commissioners should be appointed to enquire fully into these subjects and lay the result of their enquiries before the Commission." This recommendation also was adopted, and four women were appointed Sub-Commissioners.

In the autumn of 1891 he spoke in Greenock on the work of the League, and accentuated the value of such societies as agents for "the moral discipline and intellectual development of the working men and women of the country." And he constantly attended meetings, public and private, large and small, bringing to all of them the grave counsel, the largeness of sympathy, and the clearness of mind that would permit of no confusion of issues or neglect of those which were ethical, and which made him so powerful in determining the direction of the activities of the Scottish Women's Industrial Movement. "I have known him," says one who was long associated with him in his work, "spend two long evenings in successive weeks, and that at the

height of a busy winter's session, in disentangling the moral issues from the technicalities of some obscure industrial dispute, just as carefully, patiently, and sympathetically to a group of working girls, as if he were dealing with problems in his class-room." "It was always with relief that a perplexed Committee heard that Caird was to attend their meeting. They knew that however technical the case before him might be, and however involved the worker's presentation of it, he would at once lay his finger on the essential points, weigh in an even balance the respective rights and duties of the employers and workers, and set before them both a plain issue of right and wrong."

Speaking from the chair of the first Annual Meeting of the Council after Caird's death, Principal Sir George Adam Smith gave expression to the value of the service rendered by him to this important and significant movement towards social well-being. "We have lost this year," he said, "the man who did perhaps more than any other to start our work seventeen years ago, and whose inspiration and guidance were dominant through its earlier years. . . . Though Dr. Caird left us very soon after the investigations began which have formed the bulk of our Council's work during the last fifteen years, it was his insistence from the first on the indispensableness of a thorough exploration of the facts of this field, virtually unknown at the time, which sent us on our work across it. I found the influence of his character and counsel active when I joined the Executive." He proposed that "The Scottish Council for Women's Trades record their grateful

memory of the work and influence of Professor Edward Caird, one of their founders and, during the first stages of their adventure in that untried field of social effort, their wisest counsellor and guide. His wide sympathy and consciousness of duty towards the workers, his wise insistence on the need of thorough investigation of the facts of their industries, his clear and convincing presentation of the moral issues involved, and the detailed and arduous service which he gave to these and other departments of our work, were all equally conspicuous. His example was as rich as his counsel, and we have never ceased feeling the power of both." He called Caird "one of the greatest citizens Glasgow ever had," and there was none to question the justice of the tribute.

CHAPTER V

MASTER OF BALLIOL, 1893-1908

The Oxford to which Caird returned in 1893 was a very different place from the Oxford which he had left in 1866. The years between had seen the great revival of Philosophy, which has deserved the name of the Second Oxford Movement. The Idealism which had been discarded or perverted in Germany had been welcomed and reinterpreted to finer issues in England. Though it had found an early home in St. Andrews, where it had lighted up Professor Ferrier's class-room, and in Edinburgh, where it was expounded with a certain Gothic force by Dr. Hutchison Stirling, it was in Oxford that it gathered volume, and it was from Oxford that it spread first to Glasgow, then to other Universities in England, the Colonies and the United States of America. Emanating from Balliol in the early sixties, the new impulse was carried to other Colleges in the next few years, and by the middle of the seventies, when the present writer went up to Oxford, it was running its strongest.

Jowett, who bore somewhat the same relation to this movement as John Henry Newman bore to its predecessor, was still at the Master's Lodge in Balliol,

somewhat amazed at the vigorous ways of his own offspring, ready to jest at them himself, but equally ready to defend them against unsympathetic attacks by others. T. H. Green was lecturing to large audiences as Fellow, afterwards (from 1878) as Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy. F. H. Bradley was at Merton, little seen but already felt as a power in philosophy of the first magnitude. His brother, A. C. Bradley, was at Balliol, as yet mainly engaged in the work of a philosophy tutor. Beside him was R. L. Nettleship, with his "fine intuitions and sudden insights" and his rare power of stimulating thought in others, the living embodiment to all who knew him of the Platonic union of music and gymnastic. Bernard Bosanquet was Fellow and Tutor of University College, laying the foundations of his own refined and comprehensive version of the teaching of Hegel and Green. William Wallace was with Bradley at Merton engaged in the congenial task of giving solidity to the new thought by his translations and expositions of Hegel's *Logic* and *Philosophy of Mind*.


But this Augustan Age was of short duration. The deaths in the prime of their powers of Green and Nettleship made an irreparable gap, and in the next few years the ranks of this brilliant group were further thinned by the removal of many of them to other spheres as teachers or writers.

Meantime newer movements had sprung up, inspired from quite other sources, appealing to the "young and virile," and threatening both flanks of the older Idealism with their excursions and alarums. William Wallace, it is true, remained—himself in his

own field a host. But Wallace was a man who, like Nettleship, "sought no disciples," while his innate sympathy with all the rebels in philosophy from Epicurus to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche unfitted him to command the movements of a philosophy of "the centre." It was thus that by the beginning of the nineties a place had become vacant that many felt could only be filled by the recall of one of the old leaders.

Jowett's death in 1893 seemed to offer the opportunity for the return of the teacher who, more than any other, represented the older tradition, while still himself in the full vigour of his powers. But the situation was a delicate and difficult one, and might well have discouraged those who took the initiative, had they faltered in their conviction of the fitness of the hour and the man. It was not merely in philosophy that the University had changed during the thirty years that had elapsed since Caird left Oxford. The academic atmosphere and particularly the whole system of College and University teaching had changed. Even when he had been in Oxford Caird had been "the old young man," and had never entered wholly into the public school spirit which is dominant in the University. True, in Balliol there had always been a strong infusion of students from the other side of the Tweed.¹ But as the College had increased in numbers, this had become a very small fraction of the whole. On the other hand, Mr. Strachan-Davidson had been a Fellow of the

¹ As a witty Scotsman once said when asked by my wife if he also was at Balliol: "Yes. All good Scotsmen go to Balliol—even in this life."



MASTER OF BALLIOL

Aet. circ. 60

College since 1866. During Jowett's latter-day illnesses, the administration had largely fallen into his hands. He was a distinguished scholar and writer on Roman Law and Constitution. He was the University delegate for the superintendence of India Civil Service Candidates. In polish and grace of manner and speech he might well have been reckoned "the first gentleman" in the University. To Balliol men for a whole generation

"He was a verray perfight gentil knight,"

and would have made, as afterwards he did, an admirable Master. It was little wonder that he should have had a strong and united group of supporters in the College who were opposed to bringing in anyone "from the outside." All this was well known to Caird's friends. They knew further that Caird himself was willing to consider an invitation only if it were unanimous, and the outlook was not promising. When it came to an actual vote, they found themselves opposed by a minority who declared their determination not to give in. It was only after some days, and largely through the wise intervention of Sir William Markby, that other counsels prevailed and a unanimous vote was obtained. It was greatly to the credit of the leader of the opposition that he afterwards cordially admitted that the majority had been right.

The view taken of the appointment in the University reflected the division of opinion in the College, though probably in the reverse proportion of the sides. In an article on it at the time in the *Oxford Magazine* the editor wrote: Caird's "influence in

Glasgow might fairly be compared with that of Thomas Green in Oxford, as his teaching belongs in its general character to the same type. His personal qualities have in spite of a certain shyness of manner contributed almost as much as his lectures and writings to establish his unique influence in Scotland. He has specially attracted and attached to himself all the more promising among the younger men of speculative ability in Scotland. Even to those of his pupils who do not fully understand his utterances, the power and strength of his character become apparent. It is the part of the *Magazine* not to reflect upon the election but to reflect Oxford opinion upon it, and it cannot forbear therefore saying that the alternative appointment, which it was understood would have been from among the resident Fellows, would have been most warmly welcomed and approved in the University at large." The decision thus arrived at was accepted by none more wholeheartedly than by the Senior Fellow himself. From the beginning to the end he gave the new Master the most loyal support. Caird's letters are full of acknowledgments of the debt he owed to him as a devoted friend and coadjutor in the work of the College.

The receipt of the invitation raised many points that called for consideration on Caird's part. He was deeply rooted in Glasgow. He was surrounded by a multitude of sympathetic friends. His brother, the Principal, was beginning to feel the weight of years and leant increasingly on him. He was

leaving a sphere of work in which he had been a great and conspicuous success for what, looked at even in the most hopeful light, was something of a venture. Financially the change would be a loss. His income would be less, while the calls upon it would be greater. Not least he had as an inmate of his house an invalid sister of his wife's to whom he was not less attached than she was, and it was uncertain how the change to a new climate and new surroundings would suit her. It is not surprising that he should have hesitated. "It is hard in many ways," he wrote to an old pupil, "to leave Glasgow, and I may say that nothing would have made me do it except what has happened—a unanimous call to the College of Jowett and Green."

But the "College of Jowett and Green" was itself a consideration serious enough to give pause even to a more self-confident man than Caird. Green's work he might well desire and hope to be able to carry on in the spirit in which it had been begun. Seldom have there been in the history of philosophy two men who so entirely entered into each other's mind and so entirely understood each other, seldom, I think, two such friends as Caird and Green. The death of his old brother-in-arms had come as a stunning blow to Caird.¹ One can well understand the attraction to him of a place and a work so intimately associated with Green's memory. But the College

¹ The friend who saw him off in Glasgow on his journey to Oxford to attend Green's funeral found him so "bewildered with grief" that he thought it well to ask the guard to see that he changed at Crewe.

and the office of Jowett were a different matter. Readers of Jowett's Biography have learned in some degree to understand the unique influence that Jowett exercised on the College and through it on the country at large. During his Mastership the College had come to take a leading place, not only as a home of the best contemporary scholarship, but as a training ground for civil servants, lawyers and statesmen. This had been due in part to his own life-long connexion with Balliol, in part to his peculiar gifts as tutor, writer and Professor of Greek, in part to the particular kind of ambition with which he succeeded in inspiring the best men. Caird in 1893 was practically new to the College. Such influence as he might have over the coming generation must take its beginnings from his appointment as Master. To this he came with quite different, to others as well as himself it might seem, quite contrary qualities. He has himself, in a short but particularly self-revealing paper on Jowett,¹ tried to indicate the qualities which were the source of his influence. Some of these, Jowett's devotion to public ends, the possession of that peculiar kind of sympathy which is only given "in the highest terms and is at the same time a demand that we should continue to deserve it," the tenacity of conviction and the courage "which prevented him from being ever less than himself," were indeed such as Caird himself possessed in no less degree. In regard to others there could hardly be a greater contrast. Of Jowett's intellectual methods Caird

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1897, "Professor Jowett."

has said : " his treatment of great questions never took the form of an attempt to think them out consecutively but of a series of glances at truth from various points of view somewhat inconsistent with each other." He has himself told us that his habit was to put down the thoughts that struck him and trust to their heat to fuse them together.¹ Caird was nothing if not systematic as a thinker and writer. He always spoke as from the centre of his subject. His thought was always consecutive. And this made demands upon hearer and reader to which sometimes comparatively few were able to respond.

Of Jowett's influence over men's after-careers it is difficult to speak. Caird touches on it finely in the article above referred to. Those who had known him in earlier days at Balliol seem to have been struck by a certain change in his attitude to his old pupils in this respect. I remember Professor John Nichol saying that when he first knew Jowett it was as the crowned leader of a forlorn hope in the spiritual world. " Now he is a teacher of leaders in this world and measures everything by their success." This is not a fair judgment. In some respects it is the opposite of the truth. To the end it was often the ugly duckling for whom Jowett cared most. Where conviction was concerned he never resented a man's taking his own way, however unpromising

¹ This, I think, may be exaggerated. If sometimes ready to treat system as " the last infirmity of noble minds," Jowett knew well enough how to insist upon it with his pupils. Even of metaphysics he used to say that a little good metaphysics was necessary as a protection against bad.

it seemed. Caird's own judgment is here the truer one: "He was always hopeful where he saw any kind of energy, and he often showed an unusual liking and tolerance for *mauvais sujets* who had this redeeming quality." Yet in the importance which Jowett attached to definiteness of aim in life, and in the undoubted worldly success of old Balliol men,¹ there was enough to give colour to such a view. Could a Scotch Professor who had spent his life remote from the great world of Church and State in the study of Transcendental Philosophy hope to maintain the reputation of a College built on these foundations? Of this we may only say that it was altogether consistent with Caird's own estimate of Jowett's work, and significant of it that the one thing which could and did sustain him in his critical choice was his conviction that the reputation which Jowett had built up had its real foundation, not in the worldly success of a select few of his pupils, but in the spirit of consecration to truth and to the higher forms of social service which Jowett had cherished in himself and his colleagues, and had made a tradition in the College.

The purpose of this chapter will best be served by passing in review, without strict adherence to the order of time, the different aspects of Caird's work during this period of his life.

¹ The art. "Benjamin Jowett" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1902) enumerates as among the list of his old pupils and life-long friends a Speaker of the House of Commons, three Viceroys of India, two cabinet ministers, four judges, several canons, and a dean. Brought up to date, it would have to include a Prime Minister, three or four more cabinet ministers, one archbishop, two or three bishops.

We have already seen how the eyes of the teachers of Philosophy in Oxford were turned to the new Master of Balliol. They were awaiting a leader and were prepared to welcome him as such. Caird himself was ready enough—in experience and distinction none readier. But an Oxford College is a jealous and exacting mistress. Jowett had been Professor of Greek and was able to unite the rôles of College lecturer and teacher of teachers. Caird had no such advantage, and when the claims of the Schools and the College to his undivided allegiance were pressed upon him by Strachan-Davidson, who acknowledged no other for himself or his colleagues, he was only too willing to fall in with his views and devote his whole energies to the nearer task. His immediate co-option as a member of the Board of Faculty of *Literae Humaniores*, and his acceptance of the examinership for Greats, further immersed him in the work of the Schools, and it was with some bitterness of disappointment that the younger generation of lecturers and teachers saw him give to the College what they thought was meant for the University.

It is necessary to bear these facts in mind in order to understand the action of a number of philosophical teachers in presenting a memorial three years afterwards to Caird asking him to become a candidate for the Whyte's Chair of Moral Philosophy, rendered vacant in 1897 by the lamentable death of Professor William Wallace, and their disappointment at his failure to be elected. Those who are curious as to the cross-currents in University politics at that time may be referred to the articles that were written in

some of the monthlies and quarterlies, and in the *University Magazine* of 1898-99. Caird showed how serenely above this atmosphere he lived by refusing to read a word that was written on either side, and no good purpose would be served by reviving the controversy in these pages.

Before coming into residence he had already paid a visit to Balliol in his new capacity at the end of 1893, and in a happy speech had indicated the part he proposed to take in the work of the College. Any coldness that the *Oxford Magazine* may have shown at the news of the election is made up for by the warmth of its appreciation of Caird on this occasion :

“ Professor Caird made his first official appearance at Balliol on Wednesday evening at Hall. He found many of his new subjects collected to hear him and paid them a delicate compliment by the slight nervousness which marked his speech. After a graceful and much applauded allusion to the viceroy, he dwelt on his earlier connexion with the College and the debt he owed to the late Master, to Green, Henry Smith and W. Newman, and promised to pay his ‘ dues of nurture ’ by taking his share in the work of tuition and lecturing. The new Master’s speech was worthy of his reputation as a Scotchman and a philosopher.”¹

On coming into residence in the Summer Term of 1894, he lost no time in redeeming his promise, and the *Magazine* of May 2nd has the note : “ The crowds at the Master of Balliol’s lectures are reported to be excessive and scarcely to be contained

¹ *Oxford Magazine*, December 6, 1893.

in Balliol Hall. Three generations of Greats men are all to be seen." This was only what his friends expected. On the other hand, no one could expect that he should repeat in Oxford the kind of success he had achieved in Glasgow during the last quarter of a century. In Scotland the whole University system is different. The professorial lectures have always had much more importance than in the older Universities in England. In Caird's day Moral Philosophy was an integral part of the course which every candidate for the Master's degree had to take. Caird's mode of treating the subject fell into line with the religious and theological preoccupation of the Scottish mind, and with the particular philosophical needs of the time. It was thus that the Glasgow Chair became in his hands the centre of a peculiarly vigorous intellectual life, which spread from the University to the manses, school-houses and professional homes throughout the whole country, and that from these again there came fresh bands of "young students eager to live through the experiences of the Moral Philosophy Class."¹

In Oxford everything was different. There was another system, other students. More particularly the novelty of the teaching had largely worn off. By the writings of Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Wallace, and Caird himself, the main doctrines of Idealism had been made familiar to all students of philosophy. They had received fresh interpretations, which in their turn had called forth energetic reactions, and in their older form they had to main-

¹ So one who himself belonged to the younger generation.

tain themselves not only against the new developments, but against opposing schools of thought. Perhaps if Caird had been free to devote himself to the work, he might have been able again to reunite the scattered rays of philosophical thought and under the new circumstances once again to touch them to new issues. Perhaps it was too early. Perhaps it was too late. At any rate, as we have seen, Fate or Strachan-Davidson had decreed otherwise, and Caird's work in the University was in the main to place his great reputation and his genius as a lecturer at the service of the candidates for degrees.

Most of his lecture courses were specially announced as "for fourth-year students." The general scheme was Logic in the Michaelmas Term, Principles or History of Ethics in the Spring Term, Plato or Aristotle in the Summer Term. But the latter two were frequently varied, and there was a good deal of Kant in them all. The lectures he gave in Ethics were especially popular. The course was the easiest and the most helpful to students. Those in Logic and on Kant were often difficult, and sometimes the men could make very little of them. He became very absorbed in lecturing, seeming to be rethinking each point as he went along, and not having the College bell, as in Glasgow, to warn him of the time, he had to rely upon his watch. On one occasion, having forgotten his own, he asked a student for the loan of his. The student explained that it was half an hour slow and was proceeding to put it on when Caird took it from him saying that he would remember that it was slow. He

didn't and lectured—without any awareness of the fact—for an hour and a half.¹

Yet it would be a mistake to think of Caird during these years in Oxford as merely a glorified Greats lecturer. "The sense of an exalted quest," writes Mr. Bosanquet of him in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*,² "and the continuous labour and struggle to apprehend things from the centre was the life and spirit of Caird's philosophical productiveness." A great teacher knows, like Moses, how to strike living water from the rock. Caird's concernment with the School teaching of Oxford led him to re-read the whole of Greek philosophy from a new point of view, and when he was invited for the second time to give the Gifford Lectures in 1900 he was prepared to set the crown on his philosophical work by the delivery and publication of what is perhaps the most remarkable of all his books. Writing of *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* in the article just quoted, Bosanquet says of it: "This crowning effort to treat thoroughly from the standpoint of the metaphysic of religion and not of mere antiquarian learning the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was very probably stimulated by his return to Oxford in 1893 and the need of adapting his teaching to the Oxford curriculum. In any case it was a remarkable achievement for a man then over sixty-five to carry through the study of Greek philosophy from Plato to Plotinus and St. Augustine; considering that this was accomplished with

¹ The incident was related by Mr. H. W. Garrod to Principal Hetherington.

² 1907-8, p. 383.

a thoroughness and mastery of detail, a soundness of judgment and a lucidity of exposition, which made it the best complete textbook on the subject in English or perhaps in any language."

The position of the new Master in his own College was a peculiarly difficult one for reasons which have been already mentioned. The general administration had of recent years devolved upon the Senior Fellow. Had either had a spark of even that diviner form of jealousy that leads a man to magnify his office, difficulty might have become disaster. As it was, the men were well matched in the most completely self-forgetful devotion to the good of the College. Caird recognized the situation from the first. In one of his letters he explains that Strachan-Davidson has "to run the ship." What place he intended to assign to himself in this nautical simile is not perhaps very clear. Anyway he was to have his house close to the hurricane deck and to hold himself ready for emergencies. He was in constant communication with his lieutenant on the details of administration, and was always there to sympathise and advise with his colleagues in cases of doubt or difficulty. They on their part placed the highest value on his advice. They recognized that there is a kind of practical insight which goes with a certain aloofness from practical details, and that, given *σοφία* of the right sort, *φρόνησις* is the natural fruit of it. If the ideal philosopher king is still to seek, Caird showed how there might be a philosopher Master. Many instances of this higher kind of

practicality could probably be mentioned by those who worked with him at this time. One it will be sufficient and may be legitimate to mention here. It was a question of the election to Honorary Fellowships of two men who, though they had become distinguished in after-life, had only obtained seconds in the schools, one of them not graduating at all. The matter was debated at a College meeting which the Master was unable to attend owing to a cold that confined him to bed. There was grave doubt as to whether the College might not be letting itself down by electing them. Finally it was decided to consult the Master by note. A letter was sent in to the Lodge explaining the situation. In a few minutes the reply came scribbled in pencil: "University honours are good things, but once achieved they should never be mentioned again."

When we turn from the Master to the College tutor, it has at once to be admitted that he was never quite able to adapt himself to the Oxford form of tuition. It was not only that the Oxford to which he returned was different in this respect from the Oxford he had left in 1866, but a long habit of lecturing to large classes and returning exercises and essays *en masse* had in a way unfitted him for the individual dealing which is the strength of the Oxford system. When his own pupils came to read the weekly essay, which has long been a feature of Balliol,¹ his custom was to take a few pencil notes, and when they had done to make remarks

¹ Examples of the subjects he set were: "Virtue is Knowledge"; the Socratic Method; Poetry a Noble Lie; Knowledge and Opinion; The Possibility of Knowledge with special reference to Plato's *Meno*.

often at some length of his own. There was little discussion of the kind that those of us who were pupils of Green and Nettleship remember to have been so stimulating.

The difficulty he experienced in putting himself into the attitude of discussion with others came to a large extent from the innate dislike of anything approaching controversy in philosophy already referred to. It is true that a method such as that, which by the time of his return to Oxford had become a deeply rooted habit of mind, was open to misunderstanding, and there were not wanting those who were ready to interpret it as the mechanical application of the same rigid formulæ to every problem that occurred. There could be no greater mistake. Caird's thought was a living, pulsating part of his being, and if he found it difficult to bring it to bear upon a problem at precisely the point required by a pupil or critic, it was because of the pressure in his own mind of the more ultimate philosophical question that was involved in the matter under discussion. It was possible on occasions for an importunate friend to break down this division by pressing a special difficulty, but we can understand how even a scholar of Balliol might lack the hardihood that was necessary for this attempt.

No one in Oxford had a better opportunity than Mr. J. A. Smith of observing Caird's method of thought, and no one has expressed it better than in these words written after his death :

“ His philosophy was not for the leisure moments, but the serious and strenuous work of his life. It

was said once of him that ' his intellect worked like a conscience ' ; happy are they whose consciences work as his intellect did, *ohne Hast, ohne Rast !* He lived habitually and of choice with the great minds of the world, and sought with patient labour to grasp the substance of their teaching, and having grasped it to make the grasping of it easier for others. As he read (and he read widely) he analysed and annotated, he compared passage with passage, and where others would have lost the wood for the trees, he condensed the several contributions of the world's great thinkers into forms easily portable and yet capable of re-expanding at need into the wealth of its original detail. His own thinking showed its originality not so much in any novelty of substance as in the illuminating insight which arose from the setting of all that came to hand in due order and organic interconnexion. Moving on the heights, he saw under the apparently capricious undulation of history the mightier movements that transform the world. . . . Whatever may have been the case with his pupils, the formulae in which he summed up the results of unremitting mental toil and the severest self-discipline never became to him keys to be mechanically applied in unlocking all difficulties. In his employment of them they approved themselves vital principles of thought and life."¹

Contact with a mind like this could not fail to make a deep impression on the better men among his pupils, and many of them realized the value of these short individual talks. Caird always gave of his best, and his best was very good.

In his more general relations with the undergraduates he tried to carry on Jowett's practice of trying to get to know them individually with con-

¹ *Oxford Magazine*, November 12, 1908.

siderable and sometimes to them surprising success. Unfortunately he had no "small talk" and he made no effort, as Jowett certainly sometimes did, to *make* it. But "as the men got to know him, his gentleness and the warmth of his interest in them took the place of easy approachableness and conventional graces. At any rate there never was any doubt as to the affection which the whole College bore to him." If Caird was undemonstrative in the return of this affection, it was with the undemonstrativeness of the secret lover. Nothing delighted him more than to stand at the window of the Lodge overlooking the garden quadrangle and feel the young life that was surging about him, all the better pleased if reminded by the Doric accent of Scotch undergraduates of his old home at Gilmorehill.¹

It is difficult to estimate the value of the assistance which Mrs. Caird was able to render her husband in promoting the social life of the College and in carrying on the traditional hospitality of the Master's House. If Strachan-Davidson was his vicegerent in the College, she was his major-domo at the Lodge.

One original institution deserves mention in this connexion, the Sunday morning breakfast parties at the Master's Lodge to which men and women students were invited in order that they might meet one another on easy terms. These functions witness at

¹ That the Master, generally known by his look as "ever calm and kind," knew how to be severe when occasion required it, is illustrated by the undergraduate who, on being summoned before him for some offence, went up to his study jaunty and impenitent. All he could be got to say when he came down was: "He can speak very differently from what he looks."

any rate to the seriousness with which the Cairds took this side of their duties. I have heard them described by Miss Ethel Sidgwick, who, with her sisters, was a frequent guest on these occasions. If anyone could have made them "go," these ladies could have done it. But they had to confess that ease was not their leading feature. Mrs. Caird chatted away at one end of the room and all went well. But this extended but a short distance down the table, and conversation languished towards the other end till it died away in the benevolent but prolonged silences of the Master.

Those who were at Balliol in the later seventies will always cherish two things as among their most vivid memories, the College sermons that Jowett delivered on Sunday evenings before Hall twice or thrice a year, and the two memorable occasions on which T. H. Green addressed the senior members of the College in the lecture room in the Front Quadrangle upon "Faith" and the "Witness of God." It was a happy inspiration that led Caird to seek to carry on the practice of Jowett in the spirit of Green by delivering an annual lay sermon in Balliol Hall after dinner on the first Sunday of Michaelmas Term.

These sermons were in the literal sense household words, but they were spoken with the wide outlook that a cosmic philosophy gives upon the world of men and things. Though given to members of the College, they were open to others, and many others came. All who heard them speak of the deep

impression which they made. Here they felt was a man of the ripest scholarship and the greatest distinction in the philosophical world, a man of the most absolute simplicity and sincerity, speaking out of the fullness of the experience of a long life and with a complete mastery of graceful, adequate literary expression, of the things that really matter for time and for eternity. It is probably true to say that from no series of University sermons did fewer go empty away.¹ Spoken to all classes and conditions of University students, they showed how religious subjects could be treated without offending the conscience of any or even remotely stirring the dregs of theological controversy. A text from Scripture was usually taken, but this was only the starting-point for a direct address to the modern mind. The subjects dealt with were such as Duty to Self and Duty to the College, Freedom and Truth, Salvation Here and Hereafter, The Great Decision, True Purity, Courage. Only in the last two of them, on Immortality and the Faith of Job, did he permit himself to go beyond what might be called ethical interpretations of religious doctrine and to raise questions of religious philosophy. In that

¹ To one familiar with the sermons of his brother, Principal John Caird, perhaps taking him all in all the greatest preacher which Scotland has produced, still more to one who had heard him in the pulpit, there could hardly have been a greater contrast in style and method. The Principal took his packed and overflowing congregations by storm. The appeal to the emotions was sometimes overwhelming; the suppressed excitement often intense. The Master made no such appeal. He sought no oratorical effect. His was the still small voice of which he speaks at the end of the sermons. Yet it was the same message in both. It was deep calling unto deep. In both it was *fides quaerens intellectum*—and finding it.

upon "Immortality" he expresses himself more fully than in any other place in his writings on the grounds for a belief in personal survival. In that on the "Faith of Job" more simply and directly than anywhere else he sums up the whole burden of his own teaching on the meaning of human experience and the right attitude of the student to the problems of his time. After speaking of the deepening of the ground of faith in the supremacy of Good in the world which our growing knowledge and experience has brought with it, he ends the series upon the note that gives the key to the spirit in which he had himself worked and taught :

"I think that the poem of Job contains another lesson for us as students in these days of criticism and discussion. It is that true religion goes with that thorough intellectual integrity which does not seek to blink any difficulty or to hide from itself any reasonable ground of doubt. It can hold firmly to that faith in the wisdom and goodness of God, the meaning of which has been progressively revealed to us by Judaism and Christianity, and, indeed, by all the spiritual life of mankind in the past; but it will not fear to acknowledge any of the facts of life or any of the discoveries of science or criticism, which seem to run counter to the particular forms with which that belief may have been associated in the past. Rather, it will be ready to search such difficulties to the bottom, in the confidence that, even if it has to reconsider some of these forms, it will in the end find some deeper and wider form in which its hope and its faith can be vindicated and expressed. 'He that believeth will not make haste.' He will recognise that religion is a living and growing thing, and that the very difficulties which try us most are the means whereby

our thoughts of God and man are widened and deepened. He will reject at once the counsel of those who, at the shaking or disproof of any of the elements of the creed they have inherited, are ready at once to give up all faith in God and spiritual things; and also the counsel of those who, like Job's friends, protect their belief by shutting their ears to all difficulty or even by the distortion of facts that cannot be denied. He will, like Job himself, seek to combine the steadfastness of heart that clings firmly to the essential faith, which is at the root of all spiritual life, with that willingness to learn from new experiences, with that openness of mind which Christ declared to be the mark of the character free from hypocrisy. For it is to one who is thus at once firm in the faith and sincere in his allegiance to the truth that God will speak—if not from the whirlwind and the earthquake, yet in that still small voice which will enable him to understand his own life and the life of the world."

Of a piece with the Sermons was the Address which he delivered in Balliol on "Christianity and the Historical Christ" as President of the Society of Historical Theology. This was reported in the *Magazine* of October 28, 1896:

"Much as the audience assembled in the Balliol Fellows' Common Room differed in point of academic standing from that group of intending B.A.'s who gathered twenty years ago to hear the late Professor T. H. Green's lay sermon on Faith, and although the Master of Balliol inevitably suited his manner and matter to his audience, yet there was a striking harmony between the spirit of this recent address and of that discourse. The Master also showed how much in accord he is with the highest tradition of his College by making a very telling turn in his argument hang upon some striking extracts from

notes found among Jowett's papers. After a plea for those features in the ideal of Christ and Christianity which have been evolved by the mediaeval and modern history of the Church, and a studiously temperate protest against the thought that 'the whole movement by which the doctrinal system of Christianity was established' was unnecessary, and a caveat addressed to those 'who are so zealous against the idea of a Christianity without Christ, that they are in danger of teaching a Christ without Christianity,' the Master, using Tennyson's words, declared that we must look to the Christ that is, and 'the Christ that is to be,' as much as to the Christ that has been, as the centre of our hopes for humanity."

In Glasgow Caird had been a warm supporter of all progressive causes, and he felt that he was only carrying on the work of Green and Toynbee in interesting himself in all the social movements which they had initiated. Though the *Alma Mater* of University Settlements, Oxford city had none of its own. But Caird did not lack opportunities of showing his sympathy with institutions to which he looked as one of the chief means of closing the gulf that existed between different social classes and as effective centres of social work on modern lines.¹

On February 27th, 1895, he took the chair at an important meeting, called in the interests of University Settlement work in large towns, at which Canon Barnett and the present Archbishop of York were

¹ I can remember in the early days of the Glasgow Settlement, in the foundation of which he took a leading part, the energy with which he once exclaimed: "Class distinctions have become something purely artificial and must be broken down."

the main speakers. Another pious duty to the memory of Green he performed in becoming a Governor of the Oxford High School for Boys, attending faithfully on every Speech Day and school event, and sometimes giving addresses to the boys — on one occasion a lecture upon Abraham Lincoln not hitherto published.

He also accepted an invitation to become Visitor to Manchester College after the death of Professor Max Müller, and in the words of Dr. Estlin Carpenter, till recently Principal, "gave to the College without hesitation his unflinching moral support," saying of its action in retaining a member of the Church of England among its teachers: "This proves that Manchester College is the most truly liberal institution in the country."

But the movement which claimed his most immediate personal assistance was that for the improvement of the conditions of women's education in Oxford. Shortly after he came into residence he joined the Association for the Education of Women, and was President of it for the last ten years of his life.¹ For many years he was also the Vice-President of the Council of Somerville College and Chairman of the Oxford Home Students' Committee which controlled the women students in Oxford who were not members of Colleges. He admitted women to all his lectures, and often took essays from the women students in philosophy.

Needless to say he was in favour of conferring

¹ Miss Rogers, the Secretary to which the Association owes so much, said of him that "he was one of our quietest and strongest and most faithful friends."

degrees upon women, and was one of the hundred and forty resident Masters of Arts who in May, 1895, presented a memorial asking the Hebdomadal Council to prepare a scheme to admit women to the degree of B.A. or to confer a diploma upon them.

The battle has been fought and won in Oxford, but it is fitting that we should recall the part played by the early leaders who first mobilized the forces that won it. Others who signed the memorial were Sir Henry Acland, Sir Frederick Pollock, Professor Max Müller, Professor Dicey, Professor Wallace, Cook Wilson and York Powell. In February, 1896, Caird wrote a long letter to the *Times* powerfully stating the arguments on which the case rested: the handicap from which women suffered who had to fight their way in the professions, particularly that of teaching, in not having the official recognition, signified in the eyes of the world by a University degree; and the unanimous testimony of Universities, which had granted the degree, to the effect which it had had in raising the standard of women's education. "Women," he urged, "are none the worse for having ordinary as well as ideal motives to help them to study rightly, and on the whole they will be likely to work much better if they have the inducement of a degree."

On March 3rd a series of resolutions was submitted to Congregation, the first of which had been previously approved by a meeting at Balliol attended by the above signatories as well as by the President of Magdalen College and the Principal of Brasenose and others. It claimed that "women who have kept

residence at Oxford for twelve terms, in a place of residence approved by the University, and who have passed, under the same regulations as apply to undergraduates, all the examinations required" should be admitted to the degree of B.A. At the meeting of Congregation this resolution was rejected by 215 to 140, and the question of conferring some sort of modified recognition was adjourned for a week. Caird was confident that full recognition would come sooner or later, and was opposed to all compromise, as likely to have the effect of closing the question for a generation. He spoke amid some interruptions. Once the Vice-Chancellor called him to order on the ground that what he was saying was irrelevant. To this Caird instantly retorted: "Mr. Vice-Chancellor, what I have just said is perfectly relevant to what I am about to say." The whole discussion attracted a good deal of attention, much of which was concentrated on Caird.¹

These were matters of social and educational reform on which it was generally felt that Balliol

¹ The following doggerel appeared in *The Westminster Gazette* of March 6th :

" Do as we dared,"
 Cries Balliol C—rd,
 " To help the women race, O ! "

" But we are scared
 Lest rule be shared
 By petticoats," screamed C—se, O.

" Nay, not Degree,"
 Says B—t—r, " she
 For B.A. must read Homer ! "

So on March 3
 They all agree
 To grant her a Diploma.

would be less than itself if it was not in the forefront. Imperial politics was a different matter, and when the Boer War broke out in 1899 Caird's radicalism placed him in a difficult position. He was strongly opposed to the war, and, supported by Mrs. Caird, showed where his sympathies lay by taking the chair for Miss Hobhouse on one occasion when she visited Oxford in connexion with her efforts on behalf of the Boer women and children in the concentration camps.

These were matters of violent party feeling at the time, and the Cairds perhaps hardly realized the construction that might be put on such action in an Oxford College which is nothing if it is not above political party. This had only to be pointed out to the Master to be frankly recognized.

In these incidents no matter of conscience was involved. It simply was not right that the Master's House should become in any way a centre of pro-Boer agitation. But an occasion soon arose on which Caird felt that really serious issues were involved and on which, though it wore the appearance merely of a political controversy, he thought it his duty to take his stand along with others in an unpopular cause. In 1892 the degree of D.C.L. was offered to Mr. Cecil Rhodes. At that time he was unable to come to Oxford to receive it. The custom under such circumstances is that the recipient may indicate his desire to come to Oxford on a subsequent occasion for this purpose. In 1899, when among others Kitchener was to receive the degree, Rhodes wrote to propose that he should present himself. But many things had happened

since the date of the offer of the honour, and there was a lively opposition which threatened to take the form of a veto by one of the Proctors. It was only the presence of the Prince of Wales at the Encaenia that in the end prevented matters from being carried to this extremity. There were those who resented the course which Caird took in joining in the opposition, as detrimental to the interests of the College. But Caird was secure enough in his belief that in this he was only expressing the spirit of freedom and loyalty to principle which had made Balliol great in the past. It should be added with regard to these dark years that, once the war was entered upon, no one watched its progress with greater anxiety than Caird did. It was observed by his friends that never had they seen him more depressed by any events, either public or private, than he was by the disasters that befel the British arms in the early phases of the war.

I have tried in this sketch to show how the work of Caird as Master appeared to those who saw him day by day going in and out among them. It may be interesting in conclusion to get an impression from a stranger who visited him there from the United States and could report authoritatively on how it appeared from the other side of the Atlantic. Professor Robert Mark Wenley had been a student of Caird's in early days in Glasgow, but had spent most of his life since then as teacher and administrator in the University of Michigan. In an article in the *Harvard Theological Review* of April, 1909, he sums up his impressions in these words :

“ His power within Balliol rooted in his char-

acter ; within the University, in his outstanding position as a representative of his subject. With regard to the latter the University had good reason for its estimate. In the United States, at all events, Oxford at once moved to a higher plane by the mere fact of his presence. Unquestionably, he made common cause with a party that counts numerous enemies, and identified himself with unpopular causes open to easy ridicule—degrees for women, female suffrage, radicalism in social, political, and theological controversies. Moreover, he advocated all with a serene simplicity devoid of anything like calculated worldly wisdom, so that, likely enough, his practical interferences were not always well timed. I understand that his activity at the time of the South African War was particularly resented. So summing everything ‘ his work was with Balliol and in a secondary sense with the teaching of philosophy in Oxford. Under his rule the first did not lose prestige, and the second most assuredly developed.’ . . . His domination in Glasgow did not, simply because it could not, repeat itself at Oxford. Nevertheless, he maintained Balliol’s leadership in a crisis that might readily have proved fatal, and lent additional fame to the university as a home of philosophical inquiry. It was no common feat for a student by nature and nurture to effect so much. And the outcome ran favorable, because motivated, not merely by a rare intellect, but by a *humane* being, whose forgetfulness of self, sacrificial devotion to truth, persistent energy, and incapacity for anything petty or mean, could not but win upon others. . . . Caird’s magnificent integrity touched his Headship to fine issues, whereof Balliol and the Empire will yet learn in years to come. Briefly, the magnitude of the man developed a new magnitude in the office, no matter how greatly it had been filled in the immediate past.”

The illness which ultimately caused him to retire from the Mastership began with a paralytic stroke in 1905.¹ Writing of his sister-in-law, Miss Wylie, in 1892, he speaks of her life as "darkened with the sense of a losing battle and a narrowing of the circle of effort which is perhaps the worst of trials." This is not an inapt description of his own declining years. He had travelled little abroad,² and it was hoped that the change aided by what had hitherto been a sound constitution might still lead to complete recovery. A sum of money was subscribed by his friends in order that he might travel with his wife with every comfort. They were accompanied by Mr. J. A. Smith and his sister, who devoted themselves with untiring affection to their charge in a prolonged visit to Italy. Notwithstanding these advantages it cannot be said that the journey did him much good. He was devoted to natural scenery, and had returned again and again in his vacations to the most beautiful spots in the English Lakes, but he was always singularly indifferent to the "sights" of cities. Even the art and antiquities of Rome failed to attract him. Only when something came before him that touched on the life of St. Augustine, Dante, or some of his

¹ When he began to feel unwell he mentioned the circumstance to his friend, Mr. J. A. Smith, giving as proof that something was wrong that he found that after reading a page of a philosophical book on which he was engaged he was able to recall little or nothing of its contents. Some of us felt that if we were to apply the same standard to ourselves we should never be out of the doctor's hands.

² Among other short visits was one he paid to a brother-in-law in Petrograd. On the sea voyage he was very ill and kept to his berth, where he was found deeply immersed in Tacitus's *Histories*.

literary or philosophical masters, did he seem to waken up to any real interest. After a long day of sight-seeing he would turn in the evening to Dante's *Paradiso* and read (preferably aloud, translating canto about with Mr. Smith)¹ long into the night as though this were the real object of his visit to Italy. My wife and I happened to be in Rome at the time staying at a neighbouring pension and saw much of his party. While the Smiths went for a short visit to Assisi, we were alone with the Cairds for some days. On one occasion a visit was proposed to the *Mons Sacer*, the scene of the Secession of the Plebs. We walked from the tramway terminus to within half a mile of the historic spot, but it was a warm afternoon and the ladies proposed to sit by the wayside while we went on and satisfied our curiosity. But the Master was entirely indifferent, and I had to go on alone. That his sense of humour, on the other hand, had not forsaken him was shown when on the same or another afternoon we visited the part of the Pincian Hill rendered hideous by the German Emperor's pretentious memorial to Goethe. On seeing it the Master burst out into hearty laughter, and at tea afterwards on the terrace he seemed his old self for the first time since we had met.

I did not see him again till he had retired from

¹ After the fatigues of the day this was no small tax on his companion. When he mentioned it one evening when, leaving the Cairds for a few minutes, he accompanied us to our Pension, my wife said hopefully, "Well, but even the *Paradiso* comes to an end." Smith replied gloomily, "Yes, but he has *Vergil* at the bottom of his trunk."

the Mastership¹ and was living at 12 Bardwell Road. The change was distressing. He could still read and talk a little to his friends, but he was suffering from progressive paralysis complicated with Bright's disease, and the oak was bending to its fall.

In the *Oxford Magazine* of November 5, 1908, appeared the obituary notice :

“ Balliol College.—Died at 12 Bardwell Road on the evening of Sunday, Nov. 1, Edward Caird, M.A., Hon. D.C.L., Fellow of the British Academy, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, Honorary Fellow and late Master of Balliol College, Honorary Fellow and formerly Fellow of Merton College, formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Aged 73.”

In the same number, under the legend *Il maestro di color che sanno*, occur the verses :

Now is this summer aftermath, this hour
 Of autumn's fullness and last mellow fruit,
 Clouded. From life's pure height hath failed a
 power ;
 A master of the wise is fallen, mute.

On wisdom's way, as who must highly seek,
 With many a traveller keeping open tryst,
 High seer or subtle Teuton, sage antique,
 Still widening to the spiritual Christ,

¹ In reference to this event the Oratio Procuratoria in Convocation, March 18th, 1907, contained the feeling words : Balliolenses hic dolor invasit, ut valetudinis causa Magister se abdicaret, philosophorum eruditissimus, qui sapientiam Aristoteleam cum hodierna doctrina feliciter ipse coniungendo demonstraverat esse et inter philosophos, qui regnare calleant.

He thought life throughly, knew all being blent ;
 So large a faith and liberal watched unroll
 One Reason deep divinely immanent ;
 So clear a hope would clasp afar the whole.

True arbiter of time, he caught the breath
 Of reconciling calm beyond the strife
 Of voice and vision ; yea, and under death
 Divined the spirit's spring, the unfolding life.

What mastery his that worked a gentle rule
 By knowledge nobly lived ! His life how broad,
 That brake the limit of each lesser school,
 And wrought for reason one high human road !

True master thou of those that know and hope,
 Whose wise years mingled with the wine of youth,
 Leader unlost, upon the sunward slope,
 Of souls that freely climb fresh opening truth,

Here, in still autumn's lingering prescient pause,
 Death lays in love a reconciling palm
 On that broad brow, and more divinely draws
 Life's veil. God's light is thine, His gracious calm.

We, half-forlorn, although our spirits live
 Rich heritors of all thy lips bequeath,
 We, poorer now, disciples, debtors, give
 Out of our poverty love's reverent wreath.

R. F(ANSHAWE).

He was taken to his last resting-place, as was most fitting, beside Green and Henry Smith and Jowett, their peer in the service of his College and University.

In the following number of the *Magazine*, Professor J. A. Smith, who saw more of him than any of his Oxford friends in these last years, gave fine expression to what his pupils and friends in all parts of

the English-speaking world felt of the singular unity of the outward and the inward man in him :

“ This is not the time to attempt a summary, or even a characterization, of his contribution to philosophy. His works remain, and will for long speak for themselves to future generations of students. For the present, his friends who knew him in the flesh will rather recall how his inmost thought reflected itself in his outward life and personality. So closely were these united, that it would be idle to distinguish them into cause and effect. The outer and the inner life were each in its own way the expression of the same spirit, a spirit of beautiful serenity, of a large-hearted reasoned faith in God and all goodness. With all its amplitude of view his soul ‘ the lowliest duties on herself did lay,’ and all his friends can recall acts of the kindest and most delicate service. No man of our generation was more free from self-seeking, from vanity or personal ambition. Small and mean things vanished in his presence. He loved great things and great men, and above all he loved truth, and sought single-heartedly to win and communicate it. To us—his fellow countrymen and contemporaries—he gave the ungrudging help and service of a richly endowed nature. And now he is fallen asleep, leaving to the world as a public possession the example of a great and noble life, and to his private friends the memory of one who by his unaffected wisdom, his inexhaustible kindness, his great-hearted generosity, his unfailing serenity of temper and unmalicious sense of humour won their hearts to admiration and love.”

The memorial tablet in Balliol Chapel contains these words :

Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρὴ ἐνέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν



MRS. EDWARD CAIRD

Circ. 1912

οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελείται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα.¹

Two years later a notable gathering of his Scottish pupils and friends, including Professors John MacCunn, John Watson, William P. Ker, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, J. S. Mackenzie, J. H. Muirhead, took place in the old class-room at Glasgow, when his successor in the chair, Sir Henry Jones, presided at the unveiling of a portrait tablet with the inscription :

ἄνθρωπος τῶν τότε ὄντων ἐπειράθημεν ἄριστος καὶ ἀλλῶς φρονιμώτατος καὶ δικαιοτάτος.²

The words have probably been used of many since they were written by Plato of Socrates. Of none, not even of Socrates himself, were they ever written more truly.

¹ Plato, *Apology*, 41 D.

² *Phaedo*, 118.

II
LETTERS

II

LETTERS

THE difficulty Caird experienced in adjusting himself to the requirements of ordinary conversation was not compensated, as it so often is, by an easy flow in letter-writing. He was not a good correspondent. The "events," of which the good letter-writer knows how to make so much, had little interest—did not, in fact, *happen*—to him. On the other hand, his habitual reserve made the communication even to his intimate friends of the inner happenings which constituted his real life more than usually difficult. To this reserve there were, however, at least two exceptions. Owing to the calls made upon her by the illness and losses of her friends, Mrs. Caird was often absent from home for considerable periods. During these Caird wrote to her every day, often several times a day, and letters covering the whole of his married life were carefully preserved by his wife. By a deplorable mistake these letters were destroyed after Mrs. Caird's death.

The other exception was a correspondence with Miss Mary Sarah Talbot begun in 1882 and continued till near the end of Caird's life. Miss Talbot was the second daughter of Admiral John Talbot.

She was born in March, 1842, and died at Clifton, Bristol, in January, 1915. Her mother was a permanent invalid, to the care of whom her daughter ungrudgingly devoted herself, sacrificing her own personal happiness—with it, it is said, also the happiness of another. Fortunately most of Caird's letters to her have been preserved, and, apart from the light they throw upon his own life—particularly upon the Balliol period—they deserve publication as a memorial to the beneficent influence this retired and heroic woman by her courage and devotion exercised through the Dean and the Master upon the life of a great Oxford College. In most cases portions referring to more private matters of no general interest have been omitted. With them have been included six or seven letters of exceptional philosophical interest written to Sir Henry Jones in 1893.

GREENOCK, *May 7th*, 1890.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

I should sooner have thanked you for the kind congratulations you sent about the Gifford Lectureship. Your interest and sympathy in my work is always very grateful to me and encouraging when I feel doubtful about it. After all what reward should one care for but the recognition of kindred souls in the same journey? If some of the brothers who have seen us did not love us, it would be hard to believe in the love of God. It would be very difficult for me to do so at all at any rate.

The task set me is a very pleasant one, at least so far as the preliminary work goes. As yet I have formed no plan but intend to go on for some time, reading and thinking about all kinds of religions.

My first thought is to get some clear ideas as to development in its application to religion. For I "divine" (as Plato puts it) that it is through that idea mainly that we can find ourselves again in living relations to the religious life of the past, now that the mere external props of supernaturalism and authority have given way. This has particularly been "borne in" upon me in looking at the Old Testament in the new light of Kuenen, Wellhausen, etc., who have—it seems to me—turned the story of Israel from an unintelligible series of facts and assertions into a real evolution of a natural religious consciousness.¹

Remember me kindly to Mr. Wilson.² I hope we shall be more successful in getting him to Glasgow another year.

I am glad to hear that you have so many good friends and public interests in your life. I read with great pleasure of your work in connection with the Women's Union. I hope you will not overtax your health, and that you will not grudge yourself some time for *θεωρία*. For those who have any turn for that, like you, its fertilising power is necessary to keep existence green.

Believe me, ever, my friend, Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

P.S. Fanny would join with me in regards, but I write from Greenock where I have come for a day or two to get some walking and blow off the mists of the session.

GLASGOW, *June 3rd*, 1891.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

It is curious that we should be crossing each other in the sending of books. Jones's book on

¹ The Lectures he gave were published in the two volumes on *The Evolution of Religion*.

² The Rev. J. M. Wilson, Archdeacon of Rochdale.

Browning ¹ I think you will like, and some things in it will perhaps meet some of your difficulties. Chapter IX, especially, on the relation of the intellectual and moral ideal seems to me to show real original force. Jones is one of the best men we have had here in my time, with a remarkable combination of Celtic fervour and lecturing power with capacity for philosophy.

I shall read the book ² which you sent me carefully (much thanks for it). From the glimpses I have taken the author seems to have thought out things for himself in his own way, and when there is that fundamental qualification, the result has always a real interest.

As to the points you mention I could only say, (1) that the accusations that Hegel resolves everything into a play of categories means no more than that he does not believe in a "thing in itself." The writer who said that "in Him we live and move and have our being" is a Monist in the same sense as Hegel.

(2) If it be meant that Hegel tries "to spin the universe out of his brain," it is against his own account of his method and also his own practice. Speaking of Aristotle in his *History of Philosophy*, Hegel describes philosophy as simply completed experience—*i.e.* "thinking things together" and in the beginning of the "Philosophy of Nature" he says that philosophy is not "standing on one's head for once in a way for a variety" but that it is because the completed work of science still leaves us with a riddle, that we see that it is necessary to apply higher categories. His *Logic* is just a long attempt to show the breaking down of all "categories of the finite" in the idea of an organic unity of spirit, and the *Phenomenology* certainly shows that all dualistic

¹ *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher* (James MacLehose & Sons, 1891).

² Indications insufficient to identify.

points of view, from that of the sensuous consciousness onwards, are vexed with a contradiction which draws us to monism. Again, as to the practical application—in which Hegel is represented only by notes of his lectures, we can see at least that his attempt to show an organic unity and development in history, in the history of Art, of Philosophy and Religion—was based on as complete a study of the facts as was possible to him at that time. And, indeed, his work has transformed the method of dealing with all these subjects.

(3) I am engaged with another subject at present, and cannot at once read the book, with the attention it deserves, but I have dipped into it, and I came upon the passage which seemed to show that the author regarded the individual consciousness of self—as a primary truth in a sense that his consciousness of the world and of God are not primary. I may be wrong in interpreting this passage, and it is unfair to say anything on a casual view, but if I am right in my impression, I think there is a fundamental error here. We are conscious of ourselves in relation to, and distinction from a world, and therefore, implicitly, of a unity which is beyond this distinction, *i.e.* of God. This is the circle out of which we never get, and within which all knowledge and all our scepticism is necessarily included. Any attempt to establish a dualism which is not merely the relative difference of the elements in this unity seems to me to refute itself—of course I do not give this as a criticism of the book, but merely of the position itself which may not be rightly apprehended.

I am not quite sure what you are pointing to at the end of your letter. Is it this question as to the sense in which spiritual life is one in all who share in it? I should like you to state it more fully.

We had a good meeting and the League¹ elected

¹ The Women's Protective and Provident League. See p. 118 foll.

a branch for weavers in the East End of Glasgow. The newspaper contains only some of my remarks—which were suggested greatly by your paper; but Mr. Tait and others spoke well.

Believe me ever, my dear friend, Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

Excuse this scrawl. When I try to think as I write, I get too careless. I hope you will be able to make me out.

GLASGOW, *October 9th*, 1891.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

First, for a little gossip—I would have liked to introduce you to my two Keswick friends, Rawnsley and Anderson. Perhaps you may see them before you leave. They form a fine contrast of the active and contemplative spirits in extremes—Rawnsley, almost wearing himself out with the effort to do everything for everybody, and Anderson, meditating on Art and Religion all his life, without yet having found an utterance for any of his thoughts.

We got home in time for the meeting of the Protective League Council, and had a full statement from Mr. Tait of all the reasons for appointing women Sub-commissioners. Thereafter, we agreed to petition the Commissioners to do so, and a short statement of reasons has been drawn up, which I will send you when it is ready. We are also to write about the matter to all the M.P.s and Commissioners whom we can get at.

In writing about this, I cannot but express again my sympathy with you in being cut off from so many of your wider interests, and especially I feel how hard it must be for you to disappoint those who have learnt to trust in you. But, after all, the one thing we do not know is just what effect particular

lines of action, in the complexity of things, will produce and we must fall back on the idea that we are soldiers under orders, who have to wait for the word of command, and the faith that in some way, whatever good is in us, will have an outlet found for it better than we could contrive. I can recall once or twice, when it "was borne in upon me" to take a course that seemed to take me away from practical efficiency, and when the result turned out very differently. What we *do* or *can* know is the nature of the good itself as the designer gradually reveals it to us. You know Goethe's "Mason's Song" which Carlyle is so fond of quoting. He versifies it roughly in "Past and Present"; but perhaps the almost literal prose I append gives more exactly the force of it.¹

I shall send you some of the Gifford Lectures of last year which I promised, whenever you like. I suppose I had better wait until you get home. Fanny postpones writing—as I am doing it, but you will hear from her by-and-bye.

I am glad you had the pleasant quiet time with Davidson. With the love of all your friends round you, I hope you will have patience to give yourself the much needed rest, and give time for the blessing of God to grow out of the earth again.

My very dear friend, I seem to have said nothing of what I had to say; but remember that, even if you are able to do nothing for a while but exist, you will be a great sustainment to the life and work of a number of us.

With kindest regards to Dr. and Mrs. Slack and to her of the open eyes of faith.²

I am, Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

¹ Caird's version lost.

² Miss Ethel Slack. See pp. 175, 185, 208.

KESWICK, *October 28th*, 1891.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

I doubt whether I can say anything in the space of a letter that would have weight against Mr. Schiller's objections. Where the whole point of view is so different, every word is apt to raise more questions than it answers. I can only indicate where I think the issue lies. Mr. S. seems to me always to take his stand in difference as his *fact*, and to look upon the attempt to reach unity as involving a *mauvais pas* which must necessarily end in an abstraction or a hypothesis; whereas to me difference always seems to presuppose and explicate unity—which is the fact below all other facts. This, I think, is why he supposes I would mean by "eternal" either nothing or "logical validity."¹ Thus, if I used Spinoza's phrase "looking at things *sub specie aeternitatis*" I would mean looking at them from the point of view of the whole, *i.e.* recognising the unity which, whether recognised or not, is always presupposed in my knowing them in distinction from, and in relation to each other. So, *e.g.* if I know the self and the not-self in distinction and relation—and *only* so—I imply their unity as manifesting itself in their difference, and in the connection that maintains itself thro' it. And it seems to me that the chief business of philosophy is to take this fact into account, and see what change it makes in our view of things. If this point of view were taken as our starting point, the main difficulty that would then arise, would be to avoid the all-leveilling abstraction into which Spinoza—against his better mind—seems to fall. For then—as we can in some sense attribute everything to the unity it might seem as if we could attribute nothing to it. Here the evolutionary view of nature and spirit—which is

¹ Of course, however, a logic implies a metaphysic.—[CaIRD's own note.—ED.]

characteristic of the later German idealism—as I understand it—seems to me to meet the difficulty. For the result of it seems to me to be that we can take the highest moral and spiritual result of the process as being that in which the meaning of it and of the whole universe is most explicit. I do not underrate the difficulties of this view, and I do not believe in any philosophy that is—as it has been put—“cocksure of everything.” But—to take the most weighty of the objections indicated in Mr. S.’s letter—the frightful depths of the evil and misery of human life—I cannot but think that the spirit that condemns it, or perhaps I should say that the ideal which underlies such condemnation is the witness that the evil is not the ultimate fact. Do we find that those who have the deepest consciousness of such evil, and the most intense desire to overcome it, ever believe in it as ultimate? It has not been my experience.

I have not tried to do more than to indicate where the issue seems to me to lie.

EDWARD CAIRD.

GLASGOW, *Nov. 17th*, 1891.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

I was very glad to get your letter—as I always am—and especially to hear that you felt yourself a degree better. I hope the effort to get home will not hurt you, and shall anxiously wait to hear that you have got over it well.

I wish I could have had time to read over the lectures to you and to get your impressions and talk the points over with you as they came. Now I can only say a word or two on those you raise.

(1) The Spencer difficulty you have, I think, seen through for yourself. It is true he gets at the Infinite as a residuum of abstraction; but his way of stating it as a *presupposition* gives, I think, suf-

ficient ground for the use I have made of him. He presents as an abstract unity what he ought, I think, on his own showing to regard as a concrete principle—a principle that explains at once the difference and the relation of the two subordinate principles.

(2) The question of animal intelligence is, as you say, too extensive to discuss. Of course the animal cannot be conceived to have a consciousness of the object like ours any more than a consciousness of the self—(as these are determined in relation to each other). We must somehow think of the unity of sensation as broken into two by the rise of such a division of self and not-self as we find even in the lowest human consciousness. I have said a little upon this in my *Kant* (vol. i. p. 393 foll.).

(3) As to the “uniqueness” of Christianity and even of Judaism, I think it is hardly possible to reconcile it with the nature of Christianity itself. It could only be tolerated in its natural meaning by minds to whom the life and history of most other nations was a blank—or at least not sympathetically entered into as we are now obliged to enter into it. By saying that it is difficult to reconcile such a view with Christianity, I mean that the “uniqueness” almost inevitably leads to the idea of an outside God interfering with the world, instead of—what the Logos idea expresses—one who reveals himself *in*, as well as *to* His creatures. As you put it, it is only thus that man’s discovery of God can fall together with the process of God’s life in man—the former being always a return, at an ever higher level, upon the principle that was the moving force of his life from the beginning. (I am not sure whether this quite meets the point you indicate.)

The love of God embraces all loves, yet it is not a rival of any. It is a natural help to some to bind it to the highest love we know: yet even Christ’s disciples could hardly have identified him with God—(if his immediate disciples ever did so) till he was

gone—and I think that when he was gone, it became gradually more easy to do so by the same tendency which in some degree we have all experienced in relation to friends who have gone and whom we revere and love. “Though mixed with God and nature then, I seem to love thee more and more.” “Behold I dream a dream of God, And mingle all the world with thee.” But after all, however much our dearest may be to us as revelations of God, they cannot be substitutes for Him; nor can even the highest be identified with Him except by an illusion, for which, however necessary it may be in the gradual development of man, a price has to be paid—not perhaps by pure souls like Ethel Slack whose life is far away from the jingle of controversy, but by those who wear [out] their intellects in maintaining impossible dogmas and narrow their sympathies to ecclesiastical channels. I have—as you know—the greatest reluctance to say anything that would annoy or perplex the good people, but I feel that the time has come for the old bottles to be broken, and that it is the new wine of Christianity itself that must break them, if Christianity and humanity are ever to be one.

I have let my pen run on just as the thoughts came. It is no effort but a pleasure to write to you as I always feel I can do so without fear of being misunderstood or of meeting anything but sympathy—and there are not many in the world to whom we can do so unreservedly. As one gets older such sympathy becomes more and more precious.

I have given two lectures at St. Andrews—and have had the pleasure of finding Jones gaining golden opinions there both from his colleagues as far as they know him and still more from his students whose ears his persuasive Celtic tongue has caught. He is working for them with all his might. I will send you his introductory Lecture when it comes out. Me he treats like the most devoted of sons.

Fanny is plunging with renewed energy into the winter's work and has so many things to think of that I often am afraid she may do too much ; but she has laid in a stock of vigour in the hills like myself.

The Commission on the Scottish Universities has issued an Ordinance which will no doubt soon pass into law opening degrees in Arts and Medicine to women ; and no doubt degrees in science will soon also be opened in all the Scottish Universities. Fanny sends her love. I hope you will write to me whenever you feel any impulse to it.

Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

The last accounts of Jowett are favourable. Mrs. Green has gone home to her aunt but visits him daily. She says he " was never less than himself " at the worst when suffering from continued sleeplessness. He is now able to see people to some extent and read letters, etc.

GREENOCK, *December 30th*, 1891.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

Annie ¹ showed me your letter the other day. I am afraid from what it says or indicates, that you have been suffering much pain and discomfort. I write a line just to express my great sympathy with you in being forced to bear so much and to do so little. But even if you can do nothing but stretch out your hand occasionally to your friends, you do much to make life a good thing for them, and so to speak, keep its air from getting too cold. I know that your letters to Annie are what most of all comforts and supports her under the sense of continual loss of power. And tho' I know you do it for love of

¹ His invalid sister-in-law, Miss Wylie.

herself I often feel as if you had done something for me. I owe you much gratitude and love. However, we must put these things into a common fund which grows by being divided. I had hoped that the summer visit would have done Annie some good, but she has been losing ground ever since we came back to Glasgow.

Fanny is well, but to the care of her three sisters is now added anxiety about the poor Fitzgeralds, so that things are not very bright for her. And she makes the sorrows of others her own; so that I often think she feels for everybody but herself, and fear she may overdo it. But enough of this grumbling. We all have our love and peace—and how many have the loss of that added to all other losses. And these shadows *are* shadows that can darken earth and not heaven. Goethe has a little piece of poetry—in which he enumerates all the things that the years have taken away from him, and asks what remains. His answer is “Mir bleibt genug, mir bleibt Idee und Liebe” “I have enough left, I have still thought and love.” Perhaps small philosophers like me find their way too early into the Nirvana of thought to feel enough the sorrows of love, as others do. I sometimes feel as if I was callous, when I can absorb myself so completely in my work, and get too rapidly to the idealistic proof of good in evil. But the limitations of our natures are useful in the long run, and there is no good in murmuring against them. I therefore go on to smoke my opium pipe, and I would like also to hand it on to you who have a little of the same weakness, I think—after all “Idee” does not destroy “Liebe,” but perhaps makes it deeper and it is *not opium*, but ambrosia.

As usual, when I begin to write to you, my pen runs away with me and perhaps you can see some sense in the above.

I came down here to spend a few days with a

brother—the only one younger than myself, who lives (except for business) a very retired bachelor existence.¹ I go back to Glasgow to-morrow.

I have got about half of the Gifford lectures done. The audience has not been large, but seemed interested. But I do not know many of my hearers, which makes it a less real business than dealing with one's own class.

Do not trouble to answer this, or to write—except when you quite wish to do so. Annie shows me your letters mostly, and I thus get the necessary news of you.

With all the good wishes of Xmas, believe me, my dear friend, Yours very affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

GLASGOW, *February 16th*, 1892.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

I could not make much of Mr. Schiller's answer without going into too many details, in fact, without writing a treatise. I scarcely think he has yet caught the idea of the presupposed unity, and, perhaps from the brevity of my statement he seems to suppose that I first get the idea of unity, and then empirically add that it is concrete and self-evolving. Of course, the kind of unity reached is determined to be concrete by the very way in which it is reached. But, I do not suppose there would be any use in stating these things in the brief way in which one is forced to state them in a letter—when the question is so fundamental.

February 17th.

My lectures in St. Andrews went off fairly well. The audience was attentive tho' not large. I am at present using them as a basis for some lectures to my higher class, but if you would like to see the

¹ Mr. Stuart Caird.

2nd course, I shall send them to you after I am done with this use of them. They will need a good deal of revising before I print them, and I should be glad of any suggestions from you.

I do not know that the "uniqueness" of Jesus in one sense impresses me less, when it ceases to be a difference of *kind*. In fact the latter stands in the way of any rational meaning of the former. What can he be more than the "firstborn of many brethren"? That does not itself make him less. Even St. Paul's divinely conditioned Messiah, who gives us his pre-existent state of glory, is a picture of self-sacrifice, which does not move one like that of one who—with the usual dim lights of mortality—makes the "great renunciation" for his fellows. The only thing to be said on the other side is based upon the idea that such a man does not reveal God—which again is itself due to a false way of thinking of God as purely a transcendent Being, after the Jewish method: a Being who does not reveal Himself in ordinary men.

You know of the sad tragedy of Mrs. Fitzgerald and Nelly. Mrs. F. is not yet showing any recovery of body or mind, tho' no immediate danger is feared. One does not know whether to wish that she should recover what would be so much a power of suffering. These things and many others make life a trial of faith—much more than any difficulties about the old creed and the new. And there is nothing for it but to hold to the universal, which must include the meaning of these things also, however hard it may be to see it in detail.

Fanny keeps well, which she would need to do, as she is the support of so many, not to speak of her having to keep an inert philosopher in order. She sends her love.

Ever, my dear friend, Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

GLASGOW, *May 14th*, 1892.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

I am sending you to-day my second course of lectures which you can keep for a month, at least. I shall not begin to revise them for the press before that.

Mr. Wilson's discourse was very interesting, and in temper and direction everything that could be wished—tho' it is perfectly true, as you say, that he does not quite realise all the difficulties of his premisses—or perhaps the whole width of his conclusions. But everyone must grow in his own way and meet the truth as he is ripe for it.

I have been writing a lecture on President Lincoln—to be given in our Toynbee House next winter. I am immensely attracted by his homely humorous character, his power of rising under a moral inspiration and the mixture of common sense with the essence of Christianity which pervades his remarks.

I am presently going to set to work on the revision of the lectures with the aid of Jones's criticism. If you would pick as many faults as possible and generally abuse me a little where you find defects, I shall be obliged much.

It is not so easy to put down the pen when I begin to write to you, my very dear friend, but I find I must stop. I hope you are gradually wearing out of the tedious illness, but you must try to bear it in the thought of how much you can be to us all in spite of it.

Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

GLASGOW, *June 3rd*, 1892.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

Jones, who is going over my Gifford lectures in order to find any holes in them that need to be stopped up, writes asking for some of the second series. If you have done with the earlier ones, would you kindly send him two or three of them? There is no hurry and I would like you to note any points of criticism that occur to you.

I have considerably altered the earlier lectures in detail. You and Jones also criticised me as having conceded too much to Spencer, and I found on examining that some things I said might be misleading, as they did not sufficiently mark the distinction between his point of view and mine—or at least not at first.

As to what you say of the belief in the resurrection in your last letter, I do not think I can say more than what is in one of my lectures. I quite understand how the craving for some external point on which to rest the spirit's bow should make it difficult to give up that one miracle. Or again it may seem that, as you put it, this one exception may be conceived as itself natural. But there is no real evidence for anything except visions such as St. Paul's—who (in what is the earliest record) puts the appearance to the other Apostles on a level with that to himself. And theoretically I think that the objections are great. Any necessity for an irruption of the spiritual into the natural world, would seem inconsistent with the idea that the latter is spiritual in its own right—as the common doctrine of the divinity of Christ can only be very artificially reconciled with the idea of the revelation of God in man.

Yours very affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

[Address indecipherable.]

August 22nd, 1892.

MY DEAR MISS TALBOT,

I suppose the answer to your first point in your former letter—if we go back to first principles—is that philosophy *is* nothing but the facts brought to complete self-consciousness, and that, if philosophy pretended to be anything else, it would be nothing at all. If there were nothing but philosophy, there would be no philosophy, or, if it were an *a priori* different from the *a posteriori*, the two would have no relation. In one sense it is true that “I have assumed *a priori* that an external revelation is impossible,” as I have not directly argued that question. But the whole argument is an attempt to show that *securus judicat orbis terrarum*, that the real evolution of history points to and guarantees a certain result, and in fact that any *a priori* argument that supports this result could only be the abstract statement of the historical process.

To answer anyone who says “This is not Christianity, but a philosophical substitute” my only way is to try to analyse the historical facts so as to show the ideal kernel and how its development accounts for what the objector calls Christianity, as a state of development. If this analysis be rejected I should have a right to ask him what *he* considers the essential principle of it, if it is not a heap of unconnected particulars. I should like to make this point more palpable in the lectures, if I knew how. Is it what you were intending?

I am afraid the lectures will only address a very small number who have already drifted away from ordinary Christianity, but who are anxious to preserve its moral essence. I am greatly encouraged in the hope that they may be of some use to them by what you say.

I should be glad of more criticisms or an answer

to the above if what I have said does not meet your view. It is always a great pleasure to get your letters.

We are in a beautiful region, and have expatiated freely over the hills, much to the benefit of our bodies and, I hope a little of our souls. We had a visit from Professor Watson (of Kingston, Canada) one of my earliest pupils in Glasgow. And perhaps the man of "driest light" that I know. I do not know anyone who sees his way more clearly through any philosophical entanglement. I always feel braced by his conversation. It is a pity his health enables him to do little more than get thro' his teaching work. He is now, however, engaged in a work on the idea of Evolution in its modern application¹—which I think will be a great contribution to philosophy.

I am occasionally doing something to the lectures, but mainly engaged in trying to write a course of lectures for my higher class. It is so far mainly a discussion of metaphysical difficulties about "thought and reality."

We go to Keswick at the beginning of next month. I wish we were to meet you again, but I suppose you must not venture any "outfling" for some time.

I am ever, my dear friend, Yours very affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

GREENOCK, *December 29th*, 1892.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I hope to send you soon my Gifford lectures. I am not able to judge these objectively at all, but I confess to having more of a personal interest in them than other things I have written, as I have put more of my own experience into them. And I suppose there are others who have had to fight with the

¹ His *Mill, Comte and Spencer*. An Outline of Philosophy published 1895.

same Giant Despair to whom they may be of some use.

As life gets on to the inevitable end, I think one gets to look at things more simply, and to rid oneself of unnecessary encumbrances. There cannot well be anything in the shadows around us that we should fear, nor anything better to hope than the love that clasps our hands together. And if there is any key at all to the mystery of life, it is in the things we feel and know to be best in it. We need not ask questions about the future state or trouble ourselves about the answer, but wait in tranquillity, and confidence in the justice of God, who has not made the world for nothing, or lighted the fires of spiritual life in order to produce nothing but ashes. In the meantime there is work to do. I think there is perhaps a kind of Stoical-Epicurean-Christianity which may serve these latter days better than more apparently aspiring doctrines.

Ever, my dear friend Mary, Yours affectionately,
EDWARD CAIRD.

GREENOCK, *February 25th*, 1893.

MY DEAR MARY,

The book ¹ has been very well received so far, and with little of the irritation on the part of the orthodox which I had been prepared for. The only instance, indeed, is one which will amuse you. A friend of mine heard a sermon of a good minister in Edinburgh, in which he quoted some words of mine as to the truth of St. Paul's view in the 8th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, adding "a tribute from a quarter from which we should least have expected it." Besides this, the only other criticism is one in the *Scottish Leader*—an Edinburgh radical paper—which speaks, in very moderate terms of the

¹ *The Evolution of Religion.*

inadequacy of my view of Christ—which is, no doubt, the point that is most likely to offend the best of them. I did not send my book to our good friend Dr. Slack, for this reason, tho' Ethel—with her earnest eyes and persistent questioning—dragged out of me my ideas on this point “ Don't you believe ? ” etc.

The greatest of all difficulties in the whole theory, and what I was thinking of in the note you refer to, is just what you point out, viz. the union of the conception of God as a self-determining principle manifested in a *development* which includes nature and man, with the conception of Him, as in a sense eternally complete in Himself. I have got some ideas on this ultimate antinomy but I have not yet got them clear or co-ordinated in my own mind so that I could state them satisfactorily. A clearer conception of the idea that “ God is love ” going beyond Himself to be Himself, would probably contain the solution of such difficulties, if one could get it realised and stated. In the meantime, I can more easily state the vital *objections*, to any *other* theory than show the positive truth of this.

I am afraid you have been feeling greater exhaustion lately, and would like to associate myself with Annie's remonstrances against your engaging yourself to do any work which will involve a regular return of something that must be done at a definite time. I hope—after you have given it a first push—that the “ Trades Union Record ” will go on of itself, and be mainly supported by those it immediately represents. This is to be desired as well for its own means as for your relief. Indeed, it is scarcely worth carrying on, if it needs to be permanently supported by the work of others than those who feel where the shoe pinches for themselves. It is impossible, as you say, for anyone to adopt the tone of partially unreasonable self-assertion, which yet seems necessary for the telling statement of the case of Labour,

as against an opposite unreason. *You* will do good work by putting in a word of impartial or rather sympathetic reason from time to time, but they must speak for themselves to be heard. And *my* impartial reason prescribes that you should do no more—altogether apart from the personal affection of one of the friends who want you *for their own sake* to take care of yourself. For, of course, as becomes a philosopher, I keep my feelings and my reason in water-tight compartments, and never allow them to communicate with each other. But I allow the friend to say that we cannot afford to have you running any risks.

I agree with you much about "Tess." The power is undoubted, but the thing is too raw and horrible sometimes—partly, I think, because the catastrophe is not sufficiently motived in the character of Tess as shown to us. We are told of a similar story about an ancestor, but one does not feel throughout that there is that instability or overbalance in her nature that could produce the failures and then the explosive recoil. This, I think, is the main defect of the book; or at any rate it impressed me so in reading it.

Rawnsley gave us a flying visit on Thursday; he is looking overtired, and complaining of want of sleep, but can hardly be persuaded to let drop any of his activities extending from the roads and bridges to the souls of his parishioners.

Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

I forgot to say that my "Comte"¹ is passing thro' the press for a second edition. I do not know whether you have it—at any rate I think you had it not from me, so I shall send you a copy. I have not altered it except verbally.

¹ *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte.*

GLASGOW, *June 2nd*, 1893.

MY DEAR MARY,

Fanny is well and has, as usual, the care—if not “of all the churches” at least of all the invalids, which is perhaps as hard a thing to face. I am pottering away at Psychology, reading a good deal, but getting on very slowly. I do not see exactly where I am going—but Cromwell says that that is a good state to be in. “One never goes so far as when one does not know where one is going.”

So much for our domestic news. As to your question about the maintenance of the individual life, I am not sure that I can see my way positively to it from any philosophical principles, tho’ I do not see how the realisation of good can be possible without it. But without trying to discuss it in a “high priori way” one might look at the question psychologically, and ask whether the movement to the perfection of intelligence and character—so far as we actually see it—is a movement that tends to the extinction or to the production of individuality. In one sense it seems to lead away from selfishness to a consciousness of self as an organ of a higher power, but just that spirit of mind seems to be most fertile of individuality and new life, and farthest away from the *Nirvana* of the drop of water that is to lose itself in the undistinguished ocean. It is the savage, and selfish man that seems to be merely an *espèce*, one of a lot, that is on the borders of being lost in a genus, and the more he fights for himself, the less there is to fight about. If we are to generalise from this, we should gather that the more life loses itself, in one sense, in the universal, the more it becomes individualised; and progress can never mean the extinction of individual life, but must be the removal of hindrances to it.

Fairbairn’s review¹ is somewhat vague—at least

¹ Cf. Caird’s *Evolution of Religion* in *The Critical Review* (T. & T. Clark) for April, 1893.

I could not get any clear meaning out of parts of it. As to the point you mention, it is difficult without specification to say what he means by the environment, and what by the thing itself. Of course, any theory that treated man's life as an *actus purus*, that did not struggle with and assimilate or conquer its environment would be hollow. But, if it is meant that there is some environment that cannot be assimilated or taken up into the life in any way, then so far the result would be irrational and there would be no organic development.

Seth's book¹ is a reaction from Idealism upon common sense. He says that he combines Idealistic Ontology and Realistic Epistemology—which really seems to mean a dualism of knowledge with a faith that somehow the dualism is not absolute tho' for us in thinking it is so. He represents and tries to make rational a very common state of mind, and so finds a good deal of acceptance.

I am, Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

GLASGOW, *July 12th*, 1893.

MY DEAR JONES,

I saw your paper in *Mind*,² which contains also a very laudatory article on my book by McTaggart of Cambridge. I begin to think I am a very successful impostor. Your paper reads very well, tho' rather antagonistic. Bradley has a very clever answer to James.³ I have got his book on Thought and Reality,⁴ but have as yet read only a part of it.

¹ Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison)'s *Hegelianism and Personality*, 2nd ed. 1893.

² "Idealism and Epistemology," N.S. No. 7, July, 1893.

³ "Professor James on Simple Resemblance," *ibid.* p. 366.

⁴ *Appearance and Reality*, 1st ed. 1893.

It is, of course, very able, and throws more light on his general point of view than anything yet published. I think you would need to consider it very carefully before saying anything about him. I will write you more about it when I have got it read. It brings out his view of an ultimate unity towards which we tend, but which we only seem to apprehend as we see the contradiction of everything short of it. "Every truth is so true, that any truth must be false." It is, part of it at least, Hegel's dialectic turned backward, and raises questions on every page. But this is a first impression from glancing here and there thro' it, and it will take some time for one to orientiren in it.

The sad news of Lushington's ¹ death came to-day. I know he was very weak and in danger before. And Henry Nettleship—R. L.'s brother—died a few days ago after a long struggle with typhoid. It's a sad world for those who live long in it.

Give my love to your wife, and let me hear soon from you.

Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

THE HOTEL, MARDALE GREEN,
PENRITH, *August 1st, 1893.*

MY DEAR JONES,

I am reading Bradley carefully (after a first canter over his book). The separation of positive and negative makes his book much more sceptical in appearance than it is really. And in the first part, which alone I have studied carefully there is a tendency to think that the difference of the identity is *its* difference—as if one began with the *Wesen* with-

¹ Edmund Law Lushington, Tennyson's son-in-law, for many years Professor of Greek in Glasgow.

out seeing how it came out of *Seyn*¹—which makes the contradiction seem more deadly than it really is, seeing we actually go back to bare identity of self-consistency as our standard.

Again in treating of object and subject the way in which the consciousness of the latter presupposes that of the former seems left out of account—and so the self appears in a perplexing way as the *whole* we ultimately reach and as that we start with. At least I am not able to unravel the thought here. But I cannot say I can see his thought as a whole yet.

We have had fair days mixed with rainy ones and yesterday caught a thorough “droomin” which however has not done any harm to us.

With best salutations to your wife, Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

MARDALE GREEN,
August 28th, 1893.

MY DEAR JONES,

The wife has received Mrs. Jones' letter, and will answer soon. No apology was needed for leaving my resplendent merits unmentioned; nor perhaps would I feel quite comfortable at being set up in comparison with Bradley and Bosanquet, whose work has perhaps been more thorough than mine. I should say more than “perhaps,” were it not that I disagree with them, and cannot see that their view is ultimately valid. In any case, I like the positive “good” better than the comparative “better”—perhaps not entirely because the former is nearest to the superlative.

¹ In the sphere of Being (*Seyn*) the reference of one term to another is only implicit; in Essence (*Wesen*) on the contrary it is explicit. In Being everything is immediate, in Essence everything is relative. Hegel's *Science of Logic*, § III.

As to Lotze¹—see you do *justice* to his valiant effort to be at once a scientific man and a philosopher in times when the latter was no credit, and also to the great solidity and critical watchfulness of the man.

Bradley is like him with more of the dualistic. I have just got thro' a very careful reading of him, and am trying to write something. I think I see the general key to his position, but by no means can yet apply it to all his puzzles. The comparison with Spinoza I find very fertile.

I forget now whether finally it was arranged that I should come at the beginning or the end of your Session to lecture your men. If it was at the beginning I could say something about Bradley, I think. But if the end I suppose you will have quite sufficiently dozed them with him, and I must look for something else. The difficulty will be to reduce things within any reasonable space for a lecture.

I do not think you should fire at Seth thro' Bradley any more than directly. Surely you can keep out of his line altogether after what you have done in liberating your soul in *Mind*. And if you take Bradley, you will be likely to be, or be thought to be, attacking Seth. Can't you philosophise without "fechtin'"? Is Donnybrook essential to the beatific vision? Ask your wife what she thinks of this. Best love to her.

Ever yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

(*Letter Card.*)

[ABERGELE], *August 29th*, 1893.

DEAR JONES,

I send your proofs; the article seems to me very good. The last page requires a little looking

¹ *The Philosophy of Lotze* was published by H. J. in 1895.

into—as to the language. There are some sentences which need breaking up.

I have got in Bradley to the chapters on Self. It seems to me (1) that B. gives no clear answer to the question he raises in p. 110 as to the identification of the Subject with the Object self—He takes the Subject as the “whole felt mass” (why Subject rather than Object if it is before reflexion?). How can the Subject be for himself except in the *return* upon self?—a return which at the same time determines that from which the return is made. (2) B. keeps the battle in the air, so to speak, between feeling and thought, criticising each by means of the other—or both by means of an ideal which for him logically can only be the abstraction from both, tho’ he takes it as if it were their concrete unity. Is not this the exact antinomy criticised in my Kant?¹ The logical failure seems mainly to be the separation of negative and positive, regressive and progressive, aspects of thought—B. comes near seeing it, I think, in his treatment of “possibility and chance” as opposite abstractions which in their extreme annihilate themselves—But this annihilation is taken as the mere negative of each. What do you say to this?

Ever yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

[Undated.]

MY DEAR JONES,

I am trying to yield myself to Bradley as much as possible and see him better now, but, tho’ I think there is a fundamental incoherence I can’t quite satisfy myself as to his error; for he so oddly brings in, in a secondary way, the points one would allege against him. So far as I see all your points are good, tho’ I am not sure we have got to the bottom of it. I will, however, go over your points.

¹ Vol. i. 187 *seq.*

1. Coenaesthesia is for B. one of the points in subjective feeling which is most difficult to make objective—but he does not of course take *it* as=the unity of feeling. B. always has this residuum in the background tho' in judgment it lies in the object as reality, and, in his treatment of experience generally, in the subject. Observe the equivalence of the two names experience and reality as indicating his ultimate "attributes," as we might say, of his Absolute. (This Absolute is to be "all the attributes" and yet *none* of them—like Spinoza's. We might perhaps say that his theory is a new Spinozism.) But to return to your point. B. himself says of unity of feeling "We hardly possess it as more than that which we are in the act of losing." Yet he does not see that *it* is not the "that" any more than the "what" and in the first chapter of [Principles of] Logic at the end he treats the *fact* as if it remained the same, while the idea separates from it—not seeing that we have neither *reality* nor *idea* until we have them reciprocally qualified and that the transition from a mere unity or difference of feeling to the unity or difference of thought does not leave the former outside either on the side of the Subject or of the Object. It is the unity so divided. It, of course, does divide itself but neither is it in union with itself. For us it is only possible to describe it as union of feeling of self and of the object or of the U[nity] and the P[lurality].—If we take it even as merely pleasure or pain it has obviously both difference and unity in it.

2. I think you are right in saying "Judgment is the ontological process of the development of the 'that' using the intelligence as its instrument." Perhaps B.'s error is that he takes pure thought as in the Logic of Hegel, yet does not see that this thought posits its own opposite and therefore transcends the opposition. It comes, he thinks, as an external given from which thought starts by abstraction. The "thing in itself" must remain so unless

thought posits it—this B. seems to see,—but if it posits it, it must be taken as not positing another which is not *its other*.

I find my time's up for post and will perhaps send some more criticisms by and by. These are to be taken not as my conclusive judgement but as a little tauting about.

Ever yours,

E. CAIRD.

In answer to a long letter in which Henry Jones develops a vigorous attack on Bradley's doctrine of the incommensurability of thought and reality, and his deduction from it "that in the end no possible truth is quite true" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 544) :

[Undated.]

DEAR JONES,

So far as I see all this is right. The last remark is very good, as it points to the unexplained or imperfectly explained *double name* of experience and reality in which there is a considerable confusion hid. It really involves that Berkeley is right. B. has great difficulty with Solipsism.

But, you wretch, I wanted you to defend B. against my objection and you go over to the side of the angels, instead of acting as Devil's advocate, and I shall have to try to blacken my own face in order to understand the negro.

I am going over the book again and discussing each chapter as it comes, and have got as far as Motion and Change ; the defect so far is that he keeps out of sight the immanent dialectic by which the immediate—or what is taken as immediately given—shows itself as mediated by an other. Hence he takes the two sides as given together, as tho' contradictories and inseparable. But if the first unity

is not seen as itself producing or necessitating the difference the last unity can hardly be reached.

Ever yours,

E. C.

THE HEADS, KESWICK,
Friday [otherwise undated].

MY DEAR JONES,

Thanks for your remarks on Bradley which I agree with. I do not think I will trouble him more at present. His ultimate difficulty is apparently to admit "process" in the absolute, and I do not think he avoids the abstraction of the mere negation of process. But it is hard to see thro' all his turnings and windings.

Bosanquet is here and I have had some talk with him, but mostly on very general terms.

Ever yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

THE HEADS, KESWICK,
Sept. 26th, 1893.

MY DEAR MARY,

We have had our time here saddened with the death of the good doctor¹ as you know. Yet I would not willingly have missed the last few days of such a great heroic soul. I saw more of him I think than any but his own family, and found him always with the humorous word on his lips and the eager interest in persons and things which he expressed as far as his strength would let him. I had always to determine for myself how much he could stand and break away. His last word during the night before his death, was to his good servant, Frances, to whom he quoted words that had been taught to a parrot about which they used to laugh.

¹ Dr. Slack of Ambleside.

As she did something for him he said, with a smile, "There's a deal of trouble in life, Mrs. MacConachy." So far as any one could take the bitterness out of death to those whom he was leaving, he did it.

Now to answer your questions. I have mislaid my copy of McTaggart's pamphlet¹ before finishing the reading of it, but so far [as] I got, it seemed to be a sort of anticipation of Bradley, based on Bradley's former utterances about perception. B. in his *Logic* tries to show that perception—or, as he now puts it, feeling—is in immediate contact with reality, and that thought breaks the contact, leaving on the one side "this" to which, on the other, our ideas are attached as predicates in judgment. But judgment can never heal up the division between idea and existence which it pre-supposes. To this I would answer that we never have the "this" given apart from the predicate attributed to it, the particular apart from the universal. Judgment may be viewed—if you like—as reality coming to self-consciousness, but not as a reality outside, to which an idea is externally attributed. Of course mere thought would not be reality, but there is no such things as "mere" thoughts, *i.e.* we do not have thoughts first and then ask how to throw a bridge between them and the real. If this were the case we could never make the bridge. But we are never *outside* reality as thinking, and therefore do not need to consider how we are to get in.

I suppose that McTaggart supposes reality to be in the immediacy of feeling, and that we, as finite subjects, are somehow out of it, and that we are to get back by losing ourselves in love. But it seems to me that, on this road, we must go further. For feeling still supposes difference of feeling and felt—and certainly love does. Hence there seems no end except in the lion's den "to which the feet point all

¹ *The Further Determination of the Absolute*, printed for private circulation this year; afterwards published, with alterations, in *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*.

inwards," *i.e.* in the Absolute of Spinoza. In short, this is the way of abstraction, which McTaggart is forced to take, just because he has begun by setting up absolute division between the different "this-es."

Love is a loss of self in others or in God; but the self cannot be lost. It lives in losing itself, and therefore dies to live. This is the first answer to all theories that reduce the concrete whole to an abstraction, and therefore find heaven in Nirvana. What love bereft of knowledge would be, Plato has told in the *Philebus*.

Bradley is more subtle and requires more care in dealing with him, and his work is quite full of suggestion. But he ends in the same negative unity—as the refuge from, what seems to me at least, a self-made contradiction.

I think you are quite right in referring the tendency to glorify the subconscious to the same source. It is a deceptively easy escape from difficulty to go backwards and not forwards; but it ends, I think, in nothingness, or the painful effort, to extract the highest out of the lowest, instead of interpreting the latter by the former. No doubt, many good men have taken this road, but so far as they got anything, it was by putting *in* the meanings which they thought they got *out*.

I have gone over Bradley carefully, and have found him very suggestive, but most often by the way of opposites. He suggests endless questions—which is perhaps one of the best things a book can do for us. If you read it, I should be glad to exchange thoughts as you go on. Don't think that it is any trouble to me, for that kind of thing never is—even apart from the pleasure of hearing from you.

Fanny tells me she is also writing to you. She says sarcastically "You are addressing her mind" but does not tell me what she is addressing. I shall, however, say no more about ourselves or about Desmond Hill, as she will no doubt tell you every-

thing. I feel very sorry to leave good Mrs. Slack and dear Ethel of whom I have seen a good deal.

It is very sad work this strike,¹ and makes one long for some better solution of such difficulties.

It is certainly hard to find any substitute for the old words of Christian comfort, but I suppose Christ is little to man except as they find him interpreted by nearer instances of goodness. And perhaps, in the long run, the not having to rely on such foreign and distant supports so much may make us more anxious to provide more direct ones.

I must stop, my dear friend. It is always easy to write to you—as easy as sympathy and love can make it.

Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

On a slip in this letter, but written in another hand :

Love is knowledge of life—with its changing, growing developments it adds to our own life the fullest form of knowledge. Why is the feeling of love to be assumed as divorced from knowledge? We do not deny rationality to beauty because of the feeling associated with it. Is love then less rational?

GLASGOW, *December 13th*, 1893.

MY DEAR MARY,

I hope you will not “mister” me, else I shall be obliged in self-defence to “Miss” you. I have already rebelled against the title in private letters from S. D.² and reduced him to “CaIRD” again. If I could have my will, I should abolish the

¹ The great coal dispute of that year which lasted sixteen weeks, and was terminated by the appointment of a Board of Conciliation under the Chairmanship of Lord Rosebery on November 17th.

² J. L. Strachan-Davidson, a life-long friend of Miss Talbot's.

whole mass of official designations from the top to the bottom, and call every one by his bare name as the Greeks and Romans did. The only use of them is as a kind of hedge, which you can take down for your friends.

Excuse this hurried note which has been written in the Examination Room, with my students all scribbling for their life, about me.

I have a note from S. D. this morning in which he says he is sailing to-morrow for the Mediterranean. I hope he will get rested and refreshed in the holidays.

I hope you are getting a little better. It's very good and very wicked of you to be so deeply interested in what happens to your friends as to hurt yourself—as I fear you have done this time. If you were a perfect character you would not do it, but I am glad you are not.

I shall write again when the Xmas holidays give me more time.

Ever my dear friend, Yours affectionately,
EDWARD CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE.
April 17th, 1894.

MY DEAR MARY,

I owe you many thanks for your kind welcome to Balliol but have not been able to send them till now.

I had an almost overpowering reception from the students at my last appearance to receive the farewell degree Glasgow gave me. Fanny is ordering some newspapers with the account of it, and will send you one. I felt almost traitorous in leaving. I hope I may prove right in venturing on the new life. It will be my own fault if I do not, for everyone, from S. D. downwards, is doing everything to help me.

It is a great loss the College has sustained in Lord

Bowen¹—and also a great loss to the Memoirs of Jowett in which he was to take a part. There is none among the eminent Balliol men who have quite the same claims to the office of visitor, tho' there are a number of distinguished men—the Speaker² among them.

I hope you are really feeling better. I am glad to think that you are not so far off, that I may have opportunities of seeing you.

At present I am pressed with many things and thoughts as you can imagine, but hope to write you more fully by-and-bye, when I see my way better, as I know you will let me tell you my affairs without being wearied.

Ever my dear friend, Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

S. D. is looking much better than when I saw him last.

BALLIOL COLLEGE.

June 27th, 1894.

MY DEAR MARY,

I am almost ashamed I have left your last letter so long unanswered. Even now, I can only write an apology for a letter, but I am going to Wales to-morrow to give the closing address of the Session at Bangor, and did not wish to let you wait any longer without a word.

I should perhaps have written sooner—tho' generally the business letters have been so many that by the end of them, the virtue—what there was—seemed to have gone out of me. My impressions also were and are rather confused and I can only say that by

¹ Charles Synge Christopher Bowen (Baron Bowen); b. Jan. 1, 1835; elected Fellow of Balliol while still an undergraduate, 1857; died April 10, 1894.

² Arthur Wellesley (afterwards first Viscount) Peel, Speaker of the House of Commons, 1884-95.

the Grace of God and the help of Davidson—as I told him the other day—I have got thro' my 1st term. He has been everything to me, teaching me my new duties and supporting me every way. He has an admirable way with the men, which I cannot attain. I am afraid he has done a good deal of my work as well as his own this term. I am afraid I could write a dissertation on my own incompetence for the work I have undertaken, if I write on in my present mood, so I shall wait for a better season to send you my thoughts when they have got clearer.

Fanny is well, tho' she has hardly put down deep roots here and feels the hurry of this place along with the anxiety for her sister¹ much.

I shall be glad to make Schiller's acquaintance. There is a naive desire to say "Let us all be miserable together" in his letter.

I have no plans at present except to remain here till the middle of August and the end of the meeting of the British Association.

Excuse this hurried note, and believe me, ever, my dear friend,

Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

GLASGOW, *August 28th*, 1894.

MY DEAR MARY,

I should like much to have at least a glimpse of you this summer, but I am afraid I will not be able to come to Keswick, as I have to pay visits to relatives that will take all the time I can spare from other work. I am getting ready to lecture on Logic—which I have not hitherto done—but it seems what best I can do to help the men who are going in for the final School. And I find it interesting to work out the subject.

You cannot say anything too strong for me about

¹ Miss Annie Wylie, who accompanied them to Oxford.

S. D.'s goodness and transparent rectitude of character. His singleminded devotion to the College and interest in the men have been continually present to me, and towards myself he has been everything that is loyal and kind. I often wish I could do more in return.

My own work I feel to be very difficult and sometimes almost impossible. I do not know whether I should have ventured to accept it, if I had seen all that it included. My own incapacity for affairs and for society is a greater hindrance than I had expected, and there are other difficulties that trouble me. But I merely mention these things, because I do not like to hide myself from you. I am beginning to gather myself together, and to say to myself with Goethe "Das Muss ist hart, aber nur beim Muss kann man zeigen wie es inwendig mit ihm steht." One can always go on, and there are occasional clearnesses in the sky in front.

I feel so much is necessary as a kind of apology for my not writing oftener to you. It is a great encouragement to know that one has a friend like you, but utterance does not come easy, and I am hearing of you always from Annie—who, I am sorry to say, has not had a good summer, tho' she has enjoyed some things about the Oxford life.

I was very glad to see your friend Miss Sharp and also Schiller. I liked very well what I saw of him, but we did not get to any philosophical converse. I enjoyed much a visit of the Barnetts and especially Mrs. Barnett's energy and unceremoniousness.

I shall have nearly a month here, *i.e.* in Scotland.

It is a great rest to be out of the work for a little to measure things properly, and "let God's blessing come out of mother earth." I am quoting I think from somebody, but I cannot remember whom.

I trust, dear friend, that you are gaining a little strength and making way tho' slowly. There is no chance, I suppose, of your being in Clifton at the time of the next meeting of the College. I did not

go to the last, as I heard from the Principal that there was no business of importance, and I found it difficult to get away. I shall try to see your friend, Fanshawe,¹ when I go.

I am sorry Fanny cannot get away for a little, but of course she is needed. She has not got a servant for Annie yet.

Yours very affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

121 ELDON STREET,
GREENOCK, *Sept. 11th*, 1894.

MY DEAR MARY,

It was very good of you in your own troubles to send a word of encouragement to me. Your faith in me is a great help, even though it partly comes of you not knowing—well! what a *duffer* I am in some ways, and how little faculty I have for some of the duties of my place. But I must gather myself together and do them at least no worse than I can help.

I am glad there is some chance of my seeing you at Clifton. Fanny has not been able to find for me the notice of the meetings, and I do not know exactly when the next is. But if you are there I shall offer to come to you—if it be only for a day. But you will not hesitate to put me off, if you do not feel equal to it.

I am very glad that you had such a time of open sympathy with S. D. both for his sake and for yours. Where do the words occur "They shall sit on thrones regarding each other. All grudges (or veils, is it?) shall be taken away from their hearts." The true communion of friends who trust each other is the best we have in this world and brings us nearest to the light.

I think you will like to see the enclosed letter, sad as it is. It is very characteristic of his generous

¹ See above, p. 160.

rebellious soul. He¹ has now got to the East, but is not better—and I fear will never be. The doctors who have seen him—I can perceive—have the greatest apprehensions.

Ever, my dear friend, Yours very affectionately,
E. CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE,
December 24th, 1894.

MY DEAR MARY,

I must send you a word of Christmas greeting. I am glad to hear that your long struggle is rewarded by some advance to recovery in Mrs. Talbot. I hope now you will be able to take more rest.

S. D., as you know, has gone off to the S[outh]. He was fairly well, but was looking a little tired with the term's work, and all his friends here thought he had better go S. rather than go to see his sister in Ireland, as he had at one time proposed. I need not say how good he has been, and how he has helped me to feel more in my place here than I did at first. There is no one left in College but ourselves now. I think even Conroy, who stayed to experiment with some new physical apparatus (a "new plaything" he called it) is gone now. He is to be away next term by medical orders tho' rather as a precaution. He is a very genuine character—with the manners of a gentleman of the old school and simplicity of heart of a child.

We shall have a quiet Xmas, a little enlivened by the presence of Costelloe² whom I think you know about. He is to be here with his two children in lodgings. He is a man who is thought bumptious and pushing by many (and there is some truth in that view of him) but he has borne misfortune well,

¹ Sir John Conroy, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol, 1890-1900 (?)

² Benjamin F. C. Costelloe, an old pupil of Caird's in Glasgow.

and I think has the grit of character sound in him. His lot is a rather trying one, as there are many people who are willing to misinterpret things ; and it has only made him to devote himself more to public work, in the London County Council and otherwise.

I am mainly turning over various books about Ethics to give a little freshness to what I say next term. I am only learning the right way to get at the men here, but it does not look quite so hopeless as it did.

Fanny sends her love.

Ever, my dear friend, Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

121 ELDON STREET,
GREENOCK, *April 13th*, 1895.

MY DEAR MARY,

I was very glad to hear from you as I always am. I wish there was some spiritual telegraph thro' which the unwritten letters could reach you, and then you would hear from me very often.

I was very sorry to hear of your friend's sad loss. "Man is one world and hath another to attend him." Doesn't George Herbert say something like that? But what a blank space it is when the two worlds that have become one are apparently disjoined again. And "das Todte festzuhalten" is like trusting the universal when all the particulars have disappeared, or at least no new ones for us can take the place of the old. Yet that seems the one thing we have continually to be experiencing—on a small scale if not on a large one. It is easy to say nothing good can perish, but we seem to see it always dissolving away in what is not the same for us. This idea as to the "how" of any redress of the infinite losses that seem to come of all our gains, gets dimmer the more one gets to understand them. Yet one cannot

wish that the meaning of this life should be spoiled for us by the knowledge of another, for which we crave in our weakness. On the whole there is *no* consolation except that what is lost, is lost in God, and must somehow be found there.

I am to be here till Monday. Then after that with my brother (the Principal) in Glasgow. It is the worst side of the Oxford change that it separates me from him in his old days, (he is fifteen years older than me). I am afraid he feels it a good deal when University troubles harass him.

I have been lazy and almost torpid this vacation, but have enjoyed it, reading only a little Plato in the mornings, (I am to lecture on him next term) and some light literature. I began to read Balfour,¹ but was interrupted and hope to get at [him] again next week. It seemed to me rather external and abstract. The part I read was the account of naturalism, which would hardly be accepted by any as an account of their creed. He seems—from what I have read—to be making the demand for a creed that would satisfy all our spiritual wants, while at the same time repudiating all the grounds of our right to make such a claim. But I must read him thro' before making any further criticism.

Bradley's book² is of quite a different order, full of suggestion and criticism—tho' there always seems to me to be two Bradleys, one an idealist and the other a sceptic who can never be satisfied; whose intellect is "all blade and no handle." The end of the book is a kind of reversion to Spinoza, and I think a manifest self-contradiction. For the very idea which is set up as the test of truth seems to be finally dissolved in the absolute—which, as with Spinoza, is presented as complete reality and yet as the negative of all the "reals" we know.

¹ *The Foundations of Belief*, published this year.

² *Appearance and Reality*.

We are again at a loss in Balliol for a theological tutor as Rashdall—whom we elected—is going to New College where he will have the work of tuition for Greats in philosophy. This is what he wants and we could only give him a little of it. But it is very difficult to find a man who is religious in feeling without being an ecclesiastic—and who could reinforce us in other ways.

I hope S. D. will be with you some time this vacation. I think we are getting to know each other better, and he was even more of a support to me than ever last term. I do not know a more generous and genuine man.

I hope, as the warm weather gets on, you will feel better and stronger. Remember you are one of those who keep our hearts warm to do our best and take care of yourself. I think I may say Balliol College needs you, if S. D. or I are any good in it.

Believe me ever, my dear friend, Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE,
June 4th, 1895.

MY DEAR MARY,

I write a word to say how much we have enjoyed the visit of your sister ¹ and the Archdeacon. I had a strange feeling of mixed familiarity and unfamiliarity with her appearance and the tones of her voice. I liked much her frankness and geniality, and undisguised—I was going to say fetish—worship of her husband, only that the archdeacon does not deserve to be called a fetish. He gave a first-rate sermon to the undergraduates, and was surrounded by his old pupils whose regard for him was evidently very warm. I think they enjoyed their visit, and we

¹ Wife of the Rev. J. M. Wilson, Archdeacon of Rochdale.

certainly are very glad to have them among our friends both for your sake and their own.

Ethel Slack was here last week—as transparent a disciple of St. Francis as ever. You know Heine's song "Du bist wie eine Blume."

I am happy to think that you are gaining a little by degrees. Should you not try to get away a short time at least from Bristol during the summer? I am afraid I cannot say that Oxford in the middle of the summer is a place for fresh air, unless there are some special exhilarating influences in Balliol quadrangle. But if you could be transported here, it would give great joy. We shall be here till the beginning of August at least, as I am examining. My toils begin next week and there will be a large number of papers to read this time, as 169 men (or rather 168 men and 1 woman) are in for honours. We are getting additional examiners as the number is unprecedented.

We are threatened with the loss of Hardie,¹ who thinks of standing for the Edinburgh Chair of Latin. It will be a great loss to the College and one very difficult to replace, and S. D. and I are in great searchings of heart over it. He has not yet definitely said he will go in, but I think he will.

Annie is fairly well, tho' last night she did not feel equal to coming upstairs to dinner with the Wilsons and others. We had the Sidgwicks, Dicey, Wallace, and an American pair, Professor Dewey and wife. He wrote a good handbook of Ethics and one of Psychology.

Excuse this very hurried note, my dear friend, and believe me, ever,

Yours very affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

¹ William Ross Hardie elected at this time to the Chair of Latin in Edinburgh University.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, *August 8th, 1895.*

MY DEAR MARY,

We are just going off for Eskdale—tomorrow early, but I write a line to let you know about S. D. He has had a good deal of pain and is rather worn down with it. But I believe there is nothing dangerous in his ailment, and he is now slowly recovering. He thinks of going to some place on the Fife coast to get the sea-breezes, as soon as he feels a little better. Meantime Conroy stays with him in College.

We are rather glad to get away to the hills. Fanny has had a good deal to do and is tired, and I am also. The Schools work was heavy, especially at the end, and there were some difficult cases which gave me some anxiety. Balliol has got six first this time, and—it is my painful duty to add—no other College more than three. Four of them were matters of course, the other two rather narrowly gained.

Excuse this hurried note and believe me ever, my dear friend,

Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

WARDEN'S LODGE, TOYNBEE HALL,
WHITECHAPEL, E.

Sunday, October 6th, 1895.

MY DEAR MARY,

I have intended to write you for a while past, but have been moving about so much that I have never got time. I had a pleasant time with Fanny in the Lakes. The beauty and peace of the hills was a quiet rest after the nightmare of the Schools. Then I circulated among relatives for three weeks in Scotland, and then went to deliver a lecture at Aberystwyth to inaugurate the new University of Wales. I shall send on to you a report of it as soon as I get it back from the reporters.

J.M.C.

o

S. D. is, I think, much better tho' I am afraid not very strong, but we are lessening his work in lecturing and Conroy and I will "keep an eye on him"—as the schoolboy defined one's duty to one's neighbour—during term to try and prevent his overworking. Though he is a masterful person, as we Scots say, and rather made to manage other people than to be managed.

I am sorry to hear you have so much anxiety about your brother. I do not wonder at men of energy being somewhat pessimistic when they cannot get working steadily for the weight of the flesh and its weaknesses.

The Barnetts have not, I believe, made your acquaintance. He is a very good man, full of life and ingenuity for new ways of helping everybody. And she is the same in her way. I like her very much, tho' she is too unceremonious for some peoples' nerves. But that quality is to me a blessing, as it cuts short the preliminaries to friendship.

I am much refreshed and quite ready for work, tho' it is not always easy to see how to make oneself of some use in such a position, when one's duties are not so distinct as that of a Tutor or Professor. The tradition of the College, however, helps one a good deal.

Jowett's sermons are out. I am not sure that the best selection has been made for general purposes. But it is a book almost exclusively of Chapel sermons, full of the wants and dangers of young men—which will appeal to the old Balliol graduates.

I am going to try something in the way of a Lay-Sermon in Hall—as I have not the qualification to speak in Chapel as former Masters did. I will send you it after it has served its purpose. It is about the corporate life of College—and the reconciliation of the Apostle's two texts "Bear ye one another's burdens" and "Every man must bear his own burden."

It is pleasant here to see how the Barnetts keep everything going about them, and give to so many the directions needed to set them working. It is a great power, and one can scarcely estimate how much such people do in the course of a few years.

I gave the lecture on Lincoln, and had a good audience who stood an hour and a half of it with patience. Several of my old pupils, Bonar,¹ Macdonald² and Miss Conn—who first got the medal which they have got up for the Moral Philosophy Class in Glasgow, turned up. L. Courtney was in the chair.

I am going out with the Canon to see some of Whitechapel—so must conclude this note.

Ever, my dear Mary, Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

THE UNIVERSITY, GLASGOW.

January 18th, 1896.

MY DEAR MARY,

I am very glad to see, by a letter of yours which Annie has sent me, that your anxiety about your brother is in great degree relieved, and that he is able to go on with his work. I have been greatly refreshed by moving about among my brothers here and other friends, and am to return to Oxford on the 21st. I have a note from S. D. dated January 6th. He seems to have enjoyed Cairo life and is much refreshed and strengthened, though a little troubled by a "coldish wind and dust with it" which they have had for the last few days.

I gave a lecture to the students here on the new light thrown upon Plato's development, partly through the minute study of the changes in his language which have been going on of late years. The students received me kindly, and I have been

¹ James Bonar, LL.D.

² The Right Hon. J. M. Murray Macdonald, M.P.

renewing old times generally by being plunged into Glasgow University affairs. I attended also a meeting of students about residential halls and spoke. It was pleasant to feel the old life about one again. I also repeated the Welsh lecture to a general audience with many friends in it. Several of the ladies pleased me by the warmth with which they spoke of Fanny and their loss of her help in various things in which she interested herself.

My brother is giving the second course of Gifford lectures.¹ You know I have a feeling almost as if I had deserted him, especially as he feels now more easily disturbed than he used to do—when matters are not going smoothly. He is, however, very well at present.

Jones² and Adamson³—the occupants of the two philosophical chairs here—seem to be giving great satisfaction. I think that they will work well together, especially as they supplement each other, Adamson being a man of great learning and a strongly analytical and critical spirit, while Jones is—as you know—a fervid Celtic idealist.

I am afraid from your letter that you have had rather too much to think of for brothers and friends. You must defend your rest so as to grow in strength—for there are many of us will need you more and more as life goes on.

Ever my dear friend, Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

GREENOCK, *April 15th*, 1896.

MY DEAR MARY,

I am delighted to hear that there is a good prospect of your coming to Oxford next term. It will be a great joy to us all, and I hope nothing will

¹ Published as *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* in 1899.

² Henry Jones succeeded Caird in the Chair of Moral Philosophy.

³ Robert Adamson, Professor of Logic.

occur to prevent it. You ought to be welcome at Balliol College if anywhere in the world, and both the Dean and Master will be glad to run your messages.

The College has been doing extremely well this year—in fact, so far as the University Scholarships are concerned, it could hardly have done better. And the men who have come in during the last two years are, many of them, very promising. The men going in this year for Greats are not as good as last year, an unusual number being poised between first and second class—somehow falling short of decided excellence, tho' good men. The men who have given us reason for anxiety in other ways have not been many. S. D. backs up everything good in the College, with his usual energy and practical power, and in spite of the natural difference of a Roman Conservative and a Scotch Radical, we almost always find ourselves seeing eye to eye about College affairs. If I ever make things go wrong, indeed, it will not be for want of the most loyal backing on his part and indeed on that of all the tutors.

I am at present looking over the proofs of the Life of Jowett, which is beginning to go thro' the press. I think it will be full of interest, tho' it is difficult for me to judge how it will impress strangers. I never read any set of letters that were so individual and unconventional in expression, all written as with a fresh eye on the object, and often with a humorous vigour of language that is refreshing. One criticism amused me much, about Ward, the Roman Catholic, editor of "The Tablet." Jowett says that he has much sympathy with men like Pascal and Newman, who seem to be holding on to the Church as the one thing between them and despair, but [as] for Ward's "Concentrated scepticism with a ponderous front of dogmatism" he cannot endure it. Isn't that good? Jowett's strength lies in a kind of intuitive sagacity and that comes out strongly in his letters.

I have been reading another biography which paints a man whom it is very difficult for me to be fair to, Manning. I suppose in some things he did as good work as was possible for such a jealously ambitious man to do, but his absolute resolve to keep Newman inactive, and his intriguing management of Pio Nono show how a man may deceive himself. He does not seem to have had any doubts in his life except as to the exact body that possessed Apostolic succession; and a man who goes thro' the world nowadays without doubt, mustn't he be, in Aristotle's language, either a god or—the other thing?

I go to Oxford on Saturday. Tho' I do not often write, you are one of the circle that are always with me. And Annie keeps me always in touch with you. I hope you will have no recurrence of pain or illness to prevent you coming.

Ever, yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

EXAMINATION SCHOOLS,
OXFORD, *June 9th*, 1896.

MY DEAR MARY,

I take a spare time in the Schools in the midst of 143 men and 6 women—who are rapidly providing me with materials for reading—to write a word to you. I was very glad to hear that you were not more tired after the interviewing of the last week which we all gave you, and also to think that you will be the better for the "Ausflug" as soon as you have got over the fatigue. S. D. and I were congratulating each other upon your visit, while you were in the train, so I hope your ears did not tingle with all the things we said of you. If the prescription of our society agrees with you, you must take it oftener, say once a term! You cannot come too much to Balliol.

Pickard-Cambridge has finally elected to come to us. I think he is doing right. He will be a great addition of strength to us, and I do not think he is quite the man to lift on his shoulders a College of third-class men. He would probably have found it almost intolerable in the long run in spite of his conscientiousness. The friendship I formed for him while he was my pupil will also make his coming very pleasant to me—as one always seems to get into closer relations and find a kind of support in one's own pupils, which is not to be got from others. One "has watched them growing" which somehow lets one behind the scenes.

Have you lately read Goethe's *Iphigenie*? I happened to take it up this week—being led thereto by a new life of Goethe—and was much struck by the beauty of it—like a subdued dream of Greek tragedy dreamt in the atmosphere of Christian thought. Curiously it is the most Christian in feeling of all Goethe's works and there are exquisite melodies occasionally in the lines.

I think much of all you told me of yourself, your brother and of other things. Who is it calls Antigone "die schwesterlichste von Seelen"? At any rate you are that to me.

Yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

I hope this note is not unreadable. We get quills in the schools which makes me worse than usual.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, *November 3rd*, 1896.

MY DEAR MARY,

The enclosed will let you see a little plot which Markby suggested and which, of course, I eagerly went into to secure the portrait of S. D. by Herkomer for Balliol. I am told it is a very good portrait, but have not seen it yet. It is coming

to my house to be inspected immediately. We have confined ourselves to old Balliol men with the exception of Mrs. [T. H.] Green. We shall not have the slightest difficulty in getting the money. I do not know what your feeling would be, still I think that if you wish to give it, I would like a contribution from you. But I should quite understand if you had any feeling against it. I only mention it, lest you might not like to be left out.

I was very glad to have your letter, and that you liked the sermon.¹ There was a good deal of latent abuse of myself in it, and one generally finds that in such a case one hits someone else as well.

S. D. was not looking so well at the beginning of term, but he says he feels quite well now. I think we are soon about to get a Junior Dean appointed—Urquhart²—whom we shall ask to relieve him of the work of going out at night when there is any noise in the quadrangle. Urquhart is popular with the men, and well suited for that kind of work.

I hope to see you when I come on the 17th. I am to be with Sir E. Fry; but I shall endeavour to look in upon you before driving out, and at any rate to see you in a less hurried way the next day—if Mrs. Talbot is so well that you can give me an hour or two.

I do not know much of Meredith's poetry, though I read some very good verses by him some time ago—in spite of obscurity. I think his novels always have the interest of a real dramatic problem which he tries to untie tho' one is jarred by the extraordinary style in which his characters talk as if they were perpetually setting conundrums to each other.

The College is going on well—We shall not have so good a set for "Greats" next year—at least I do not think there is likely to be many "firsts," perhaps

¹ Above, p. 210.

² Francis Fortescue Urquhart, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, probably the first member of the Roman Communion to be elected to an Oxford Tutorial Fellowship in modern times.

not more than one. But we shall make up in the History School. And the year after will be very good.

My brother seems to be going on well, doing his regular work, but not allowed to preach or lecture yet.

Fanny sends love.

I am, my dear friend, Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY, *January 13th*, 1897.

MY DEAR MARY,

I have had a pleasant time here on the whole, tho' the weather here almost precluded walking. My brother seems to me much as he was when I was here last, but much progress could not be hoped for in winter. He is, however, more sensitive than ever to the usual fears and difficulties of university business, and apt to lose his sleep over them. It is impossible but that there should be hot controversies and collisions between so many teachers, each set on his own subject, and moderating between them is apt to take a good deal out of any one whose nerves are not at their best. No one, I think would be willing that he should resign—so far as I know; and I am afraid for himself—if there were nothing else—that resignation would take interest out of life. But it is possible he may not feel able to go on.

I have been very torpid this vacation. Before I left Oxford, however, I had to write a discourse for the "Civic Society" which is being founded here. I wrote it rather against the grain and don't think it well done. My object is to show that in several matters we are getting beyond the abstractness of socialism and individualism—that we are all really, whatever we call ourselves, both Socialists and Individualists and that the idea of the organic nature

of society and of its development affords a common basis on which the members of a Civic Society may discuss each particular measure for the welfare of the community. I give the discourse next Monday and hope it will at least give a start to the Society, tho' it contains nothing that has not often been said.

With much love which the years increase,
I am, Ever yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

121 ELDON STREET, GREENOCK,
April 18th, 1897.

MY DEAR MARY,

I have been going about among relations and doing little—except reading one or two dialogues of Plato with a view to next term's lectures. I was a little tired when I started as I had read thro' all Wallace's¹ manuscripts so far at least as to see what could possibly be considered with reference to publication. I have sent the parts selected—in which there are many good things—to Bosanquet, whom I have asked to give me an independent opinion. I think we can get together a good volume.² It was a sad thing to see so many studies left in a state in which they could not be used by any one else.

You have no doubt heard of the invitation I had from the philosophical lecturers to stand for his chair, and of S. D.'s conveying the wish of the College to me. It was exceedingly kind and gratifying that they all are so cordial with me—whatever may be the event. I shall at any rate send in my name, and should like the official relation to the good men in other Colleges. Professor Cook Wilson has been exceedingly kind about the whole matter.

¹ Professor William Wallace, who had died of injuries received in a bicycle accident.

² See list of Works.

I am afraid I am a very successful impostor so far.¹

I hope you are suffering less from headaches. I am afraid you have been allowing your friends to victimise you too much. I should recommend a change to Oxford, where at least you will find other torturers for a time. Won't you come some time this term? We all want you much.

I go to Dundonald to-morrow for a few days, then return here and go to my brother in Glasgow at the end of the week. I shall probably return to Oxford on Monday.

I am too stupid to write about anything but events. Have you seen Jowett's Life² yet? It has been well received so far.

Ever, my dear friend, Yours very affectionately,
E. CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, *August 7th*, 1897.

MY DEAR MARY,

I am ashamed to let the horrid scrawl of my Hegel lectures³ be sent to you. They were got together very hurriedly in the week before they had to be given, and much knocked about in the effort after clear exposition. They seem to have served their purpose fairly well. At least the audience were very attentive. Please keep them till we return to Balliol.

I have been reading a good deal of Plotinus, whose writings are a kind of philosophical religious poem. The style is very loose, but there are very striking flashes of insight and imagination. His influence through Augustine has been very great upon religious thought. What I wanted was to trace the growth of

¹ See p. 136 above.

² By Evelyn Abbott and Lewis Campbell. 1897.

³ Two Lectures on Hegel unpublished.

reflexion upon religion beginning with Plato and acting thro' Plotinus upon Christian theology.

We start for the North to-morrow. Fanny is going to her sister [Mrs. Sime] and I to Jones in the Highlands. I shall be 10 days with him enjoying the moors and hills and then at Greenock. Perhaps Fanny and I may get off somewhere for a few weeks before next term begins.

S. D. writes rather dispiritedly about Abbott, though the accounts are better the last day or two.

The Extensionists are having an orgy of lectures and conferences. Yesterday Mrs. Toynbee gave the Co-operators afternoon tea in the Fellows Garden. I made acquaintance with some of them, especially Halstead who is an able man. He had read my Hegel and asked intelligent questions about points raised in the lectures.

Ever, my dear Mary, Yours very affectionately,
E. CAIRD.

121 ELDON STREET,
GREENOCK, *August 27th*, 1897.

MY DEAR MARY,

Many thanks for your kind letter. I knew that Annie was not well and that there are dangers in her state, but I hoped the change would do her more good. Fanny's load between her sisters and what I put on her is too great, and sometimes makes me very anxious, perhaps because she bears it so well—But it is hard to speak of this.

I had 10 very good days in the Highlands, ending with an ascent of Ben Riach(?), one of the Grampians—along with Jones and three old pupils (now ministers) who did everything they could to spoil me.

I have promised to repeat the Hegel Lectures to Somerville College sometime, but hardly like to let you copy them. I do not like to make any one but

my wife into a " machine " as Wordsworth gracefully calls his.

I have done some I.C.S. [Indian Civil Service] papers and am beginning to think of a subject for my annual lay-sermon. One that suggested itself was a contrast of the two ideals, represented in the extremes by the monk with the three vows and the other, represented by Henry V. in Shakespeare.

" If it is a sin to covet honour,
I am the most offending soul alive ! "

And then to ask how they are related and how they can be combined or pass into each other. How can the strong competitive sense of honour and civic duty be baptized and the monk made a man of the world ? I do not see how to do it yet. Can you give me a text ? If the sight of the struggle for existence repels us, does not the sight of what the church often makes of self-renunciation often raise a longing for unregenerate nature ? Isn't there something in Jowett's saying that Voltaire did more good than all the Fathers of the Church ? However, if I go on, I am afraid my unregenerate nature will have too much to say. But we want a Christianity more set upon realising the " life " in " dying to live," and also more tolerant of what Jones called the " natural order of the moral categories " in the development of man.

Thanks, dear friend, for all your loving trust and goodness to me.

Ever, dear Mary, yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

In a letter of October 13th he writes from Balliol :

I am not satisfied with my lay-sermon, and am afraid I have tried to discuss a too complicated question. But my aim was to go as far as I could in admitting the legitimacy of the new demands on

life, while maintaining the other or negative aspect of morality. However, you will see what I have said. It is useless to preach to the new generation, unless one shows that one understands their aims and desires. But it is difficult to express the truth in these things within any reasonable limits of discourse.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, *November 21st, 1897.*

MY DEAR MARY,

We are to have a revival of the celebration of St. Catherine's Day (25th Nov.) in Balliol this week, with the Archbishop of Canterbury¹ to preach the sermon. I have a grudge against him for his doings about *Essays and Reviews*; but I suppose I must not keep it up, as he is so kindly assisting us. His son² comes here next year. It will be a pleasant thing for the undergraduates to remember. We have a general dinner in Hall, at which I shall have to speak to the toast: Floreat Domus de Balliolo; and then the Archbishop's health will be proposed by the oldest Scholar.

I thought I had sent you a copy of the paper on Jowett from the *International Journal*.³ If not, I shall send it to you. It is a very insufficient study of the man.

November 29th.

This letter, as you see, was begun some time ago, but interrupted. Since then we have had St. Catherine's day but no Archbishop. We had a very pleasant evening in Hall in which the Scholar proposed Domus, and I responded. The men were very cordial, especially when I spoke of the union in the College, and of the Dean. I think it will be a

¹ Frederick Temple.

² Frederick Charles Temple, afterwards District Engineer, Behar, India.

³ See above, p. 132.

good thing for the men to remember as their day, if we have it regularly. It was a good idea of Palmer's.¹

The scholarship competition was perhaps not as good as it has sometimes been, but I think we have got good men, the first of them a Pickard-Cambridge,² the last boy of that good stock.

The term has run away with unusual speed, and I have found the work easier, tho' there was plenty of it. I have undertaken to be Chairman of the Association for Education of Women, in place of Mr. Grose, who is now Registrar of the University and found it incompatible with the other duties. The work has so much got into routine that there will not be much to do.

I intend to stay at home during the vacation, as there is a good deal to be seen to about Wallace's manuscript, which I am getting ready for press.

Ever, my dear Mary, Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

121 ELDON STREET, GREENOCK,
April 15th, 1898.

MY DEAR MARY,

I am glad to say that at the beginning of this week my brother began to show decided symptoms of improvement and that it has been going on since. I just came down here to get a few walks and refresh for the next term. Of course it will be with a further abatement of strength, and he must now "rest and be thankful" with what he has done. He had already taken a house down here before his illness, and whatever doubt might remain in his mind then about retiring is now gone.

I remain here till Monday, and then go up to Glasgow for a few days before returning to Oxford

¹ Edwin James Palmer, Fellow and Chaplain of Balliol, 1896-1908, afterwards Bishop of Bombay.

² W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, Fellow and Tutor of Worcester College.

(on the 22nd). The weather is fine, and yesterday I had a beautiful walk down the Clyde seeing the early green of the pasture and river and distant hills with a curtain of mist on them. There is something about the scenery one has been early accustomed to that gives it more meaning, tho' the Clyde is beautiful for everyone.

I am very glad to hear that your brother is holding out. I should hope that your presence would enable him to do more. I confess the solitary man is not a very complete creature, in spite of the Stoics whom I have been studying for summer course of lectures. Their melancholy lucidity (especially in Marcus Aurelius) and belief that everything must go right in general while everything in particular is going wrong—has a strange old world effect.

Give my regards to Mrs. Talbot. Thanks again, my very dear friend, for your goodness and sympathy.

With much love,

I am, yours ever affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

DUNGOURNEY, GREENOCK.

August 4th, 1898.

MY DEAR MARY,

You were very kind, as always, to send me such sympathy in your letter.¹ It has been a very sad time—such a break seems to tear up some of the roots of one's being. We had such close companionship for many years that it was one of the hardest things in going to Oxford to want the almost daily talk over things with my brother. Our sympathy has to cross a greater division now—or perhaps not—for what does one know? He is at rest at least, and has done his work well.

¹ Dr. John Caird died July 30th, 1898.

His wife is bearing up almost more than I expected. But I fear that she may feel it more after the excitement of letters, etc., is over. We intended to have a private funeral, but were obliged to change our plans for the general wish to pay him this last respect. I shall send you a paper with an account of it.

Fanny has not been able to get down, as she had to start Annie and shut up house for the summer, but she comes to-morrow night and will be with Isabella here for a time.

I have nearly finished the proofs of Wallace's mss. and written a short Memoir of him. I shall have now to look into my brother's mss.—as one gets old, the tragic of life increases but also its greatness.

You would see the College has done well, tho' we had one or two disappointments. I have had many kind letters from Davidson and other fellows—as well as from several of the men—a very kind one especially from Tovey.¹ He is a very good boy and I hope will be a great man yet. Every good judge speaks highly of his promise in music.

My very dear friend, I thank you much for your love and sympathy.

Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

BALLIOL, *December 2nd*, 1898.

MY DEAR MARY,

You have given me and the College a most delightful gift. I am very much in love with St. Katherine and am prepared now to believe in her existence on the slightest evidence; or rather on the evidence of the picture. The subject is not her examination at the end of her studies but her

¹ Donald Francis Tovey, Professor of Music in Edinburgh University, since 1906 organiser with the co-operation of Joachim and others of the "Chelsea Concerts" in London, Berlin and Vienna, composer and well-known writer on musical subjects.

refutation of all the learned men whom the emperor Maxentius brought to convert her from Christianity—before her martyrdom. After breaking the wheel by her prayers, she was beheaded and her body carried to Mount Sinai by the angels—to the site of the monastery. There is also the story of her marriage with the Saviour—which I think is repeated in regard to Katherine of Siena. Altogether she seems to have occupied the highest place next to the Virgin in the imagination of the Middle Ages. I do not think she is mentioned by Dante, probably because she would have occupied the same place he assigns to Beatrice.

The Dean was much amused with your message. He has not yet come over to behold the Saint.

We had a hard time of it at the Scholarship Examination, for there were 42 candidates and so good that 17 had to be considered almost till the end. The result was very encouraging and I think we have got very good men. We were specially pleased that A. L. Smith's son¹ got a scholarship and I was very glad also that F. D. Maurice's grandson²—the son of the General—got another. The General curiously wrote me after the election that he had been reading my brother's addresses and sermons,³ with which he was greatly delighted. Moreover he said that he had not read anything that moved him so much since his father's death.

I shall be here till about the 27th when I go to Isabella—my brother's widow—in Edinburgh. She has just got into her house. Then I shall go on to Colin who is very solitary now, and feels it much.

I am glad you like the Sermons¹ so much. I think

¹ A. L. F. Smith, scholar and athlete, afterwards Fellow and Dean of Magdalen, at present Assistant Director of Education in Mesopotamia.

² A very promising scholar drowned in Germany while still an undergraduate.

³ John Caird's *University Addresses* and *University Sermons* both published in this year.

they are a more adequate expression of his mind than I had expected ; but I can hardly read without hearing them, and am not able to judge them.

I am, dear Mary, Yours with much love,

EDWARD CAIRD.

DUNGOURNEY, GREENOCK,
January 17th, 1899.

MY DEAR MARY,

I was very glad to get your kind note, and especially to hear that there is hope of our seeing you in Oxford.

I have spent my time in Scotland half with Isabella and half with my brother Colin.

Both expect me to write a biographical sketch of my brother, which will be a very difficult thing to do. I had put off deciding about it till I saw them, but they had evidently assumed I should write it, so I must make the attempt. I shall not do it till summer, but I am collecting what information I can about his earlier life. He was 15 years older, so that my intimate knowledge of him did not begin till he was a considerable time a clergyman.

I am very happy to hear that you feel stronger and more able for the new year. I hope, my dear Mary, that you may have the best of blessings—that of feeling yourself a source of strength and peace to those you love. I need not say how much you are to me. We must close together, as the ranks get thin.

I left Fanny just after Xmas with her house full of invalids.

S. D. I hear, is to be home on the 23rd. He seems to have got much good of this short visit to Egypt. Conroy will be absent next Term. We had to drive him away to take care of himself. Abbott was very well when I saw him last, and I hear continues so. S. D. writes me to take care of myself, as it would never do for the "only able-bodied man in the

College " to be laid up. This is a high responsibility which I am fulfilling admirably at present.

Jones has been overworking and caught a chill which has laid him up for the past week. I have been scolding him much for taking up too many things beyond his Chair. I hope and think, however, it is nothing serious. Professor Murray¹ pleased me much by saying how much Jones's influence is growing in Glasgow, but he must resist the pressure it brings on him to be useful in all directions.

Murray and Bradley² I fear, will both resign at the end of this session. They are both very delicate men, and are unable to stand the strain of the long session. Glasgow is rapidly becoming an altered place.

They are putting a window in the Bute Hall in my brother's memory, or rather 2 windows one above, the other below the gallery in the same line. I have suggested the main design, which with a few modifications has been accepted. In the upper window which has two divisions, there are to be 4 philosophers and 4 theologians, thus

Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel.

Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Aquinas.

(Chrysostom is put in as a speaker.) In the lower window there are 4 spaces which are to have allegorical figures, Philosophia, Theologia, Jurisprudentia, Medicina. The window is to be done by Morris & Co. who have done already a beautiful window on the other side of the Hall.

I am ever, my dear Mary, Yours very affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

My main reading of a serious kind has been in St. Augustine, about whom I have written something, but only in the way of a study.

¹ Gilbert Murray, who succeeded Sir Richard Jebb as Professor of Greek in Glasgow.

² Andrew C. Bradley, Professor at that time of English Literature at Glasgow University.

DUNGOURNEY, GREENOCK, N.B.

April 4th, 1899.

MY DEAR MARY,

I am very glad to hear you are getting on towards recovery, though slowly. You must just make it a duty to entrench yourself in weakness—if I may so express it—from time to time, when you feel things too heavy.

I have had some quiet days here with my brother, usually getting a walk in the afternoon, tho' it has been wet; and reading Plato in the morning—on which I am to lecture next term. I want to get some theory of his development, assisted by the new attempt to determine the order of his dialogues by linguistic peculiarities.

An old lady—who belonged to my brother's congregation in Edinburgh many years ago—has given me a number of letters written to her—upon religious subjects mainly—which will assist me to understand what was his way of looking at things before I had grown old enough to know him well. They are more in the usual language of Christian experience than he would have used later, though with more effort to get beyond the words than is common. The old lady has treasured them as the very centre of her religious life.

I shall be here till the 18th or thereabouts. I get your letters sent to Annie. I hope your rest will gradually bring back strength.

Believe me ever, my dear Mary, Yours very affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

121 ELDON STREET, GREENOCK, N.B.

August 23rd, 1899.

MY DEAR MARY,

I have received from Annie your note about your brother. I was very glad to see that you can look forward to this marriage as likely to give a great

support to your brother's life, which is so difficult. It seems to ordinary prudential minds a great risk for life to both, but after all, if there are such deep relations established between human beings, the one risk is not to make of life what it can be.

I have been working, as you know, at my brother's lectures and at a biographical introduction. I have not got the length of sending either to the printers. The memoir has been a very difficult task. I had to consider constantly what I could rightly say. I do not feel sure that I have conveyed what I intended, tho' Jones, to whom I sent it for criticism, seems to think it errs only in reticence and restraint. I was as open, however, as I could get myself to be. And I think that those whom it is worth speaking to will be able to see what he was—so far as is possible thro' the medium of my words.

Have you seen Ward's Gifford Lectures? ¹ He puts some things very well, and, as he works up to Idealism by gradually finding that no other ground will support him, he is likely to produce more effect upon the ordinary scientific naturalist. His attack on Spencer is very effective and often amusing. On the other hand, he does not seem quite master of the idealistic point of view he has reached, and wavers between Kant and a more thorough Idealism in rather an uncertain way.

We shall go back to Oxford in the middle of next month at latest, and have a quiet month there before the term. I hope, my dear friend, you will soon manage to give us a little time. The Dean, the Master and all the Fellows will be prepared to lay carpets under your feet and canopies over your head, if you will visit us. And I, among others, have no end of things to say to you that cannot be put on paper.

Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 2 vols., London, 1899.

GREENOCK,
January 18th, 1900.

MY DEAR MARY,

I have been, besides seeing my friends, working at Plotinus and have read a good part of him this vacation. He certainly represents the *abstract* religious view of life more thoroughly than any one, and, I think, by opposition throws much light upon the Christian view of it. And besides he has genius and insight, and sometimes he hits upon very remarkable ways of expressing the highest things. All this, in spite of the style of an extempore preacher, whose sentences often have no beginning or end. But real insight and vision redeem everything. And his work also is very valuable for the light it throws on the tendencies that were warping the Christian dogma, and the more or less successful resistance made to them.

I have had wretched weather here and had very few walks, but feel somewhat refreshed for the term by contact with my mother earth all the same. Remember we are expecting a visit from you the coming term.

The War is a continual load. I have many doubts as to the necessity of it, and no doubt that the diplomacy was mismanaged. On the other hand, the Boers also mismanaged theirs, and they seem to represent many corrupt and unprogressive influences, so that one can decently hope we are less undeserving of success, and that some good may come of all the bloodshed. I should have said before the war that we were in the wrong, but the great preparations of the Boers make one think that war was really inevitable, as it was less reckless on their side than it seemed.

Anyhow one hopes that we will have henceforth less of that light-hearted Jingoism than before,

realising what war is more nearly and the responsibility of entering upon it.

I am, my dear Mary, Yours affectionately,
EDWARD CAIRD.

You know we are to have your brother to preach next term.

BALLIOL COLLEGE.
May 3rd, 1900.

MY DEAR MARY,

I cannot refrain from sending a word of sympathy to you. I was very glad to hear from the Dean that your brother is better and hope the improvement may continue. I had intended to write you long ago how much we enjoyed his visit here, and how well he got on with the men. I am sure he did good to them, as it does to everyone to see a man so simply in earnest about his work and so capable of doing it. I trust your anxiety may soon be relieved, and that you may be able to take some needed rest. I hope you will come here for a little, and be taken care of, instead of taking care.

We are working away here as usual. S. D. seems very well and much the better of the holidays—also Abbott.

I have been working (apart from College) mainly at the Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy—with which I begin my Gifford Lectures. I see my way to a certain extent, but have one or two difficulties to think about. Aristotle is specially difficult to get a clear view of. He is so laconic and yet powerful on ultimate questions.

But I must not trouble you with these things and write mainly to express the loving sympathy with which we try to enter your troubles.

Ever, my dear Mary, Yours very affectionately,
E. CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE. *September 24th, 1900.*

MY DEAR MARY,

I was very sorry to see in your letter to S. D. that your brother has had a relapse and has had to sacrifice his new appointment. I think there is nothing harder to bear than these thwartings of illness to one who only wants to do the work for which he is fitted. It is more trying to be ineffectual than to have almost any other kind of misfortune. At least it requires more faith to stand it, either for oneself or for others in whom one is deeply interested. But I trust your brother may find some other opportunity as soon as he is able for it.

We had a few very pleasant days at Derwent Hill. S. D. and the Strachans were there. The former is looking stronger than I have seen him do for a long time. He is here now mainly to see Conroy, who is, I fear, not in a good way, and is going to Italy on Thursday. I fear he will not be able to live here again, which is a great deprivation to him of life-interest. However, we shall see what a complete winter abroad does for him. It is sad that he has no relation who could look after him a little. He said to me that it was a great comfort that he had no one who was in any way dependent on him—rather a cold comfort in this world.

I am afraid you have a little too much of the opposite kind of comfort for your strength, my dear friend. I do not know where you get the energy to do all you do. It is a reproach on the inertness of strong people who have no aches and pains.

We—of this household—are all well. Fanny sometimes looks tired after all she has had to think of, but she is well. In the College we are still anxious about Paravicini,¹ who is not quite recovered—tho' I have not seen him yet—and about A. L.

¹ Francis de Paravicini, Fellow of Balliol for a whole generation (1878-1908)—died 1920.

Smith, who has had a bad turn of what looks like rheumatic gout.

God bless you, my dear Mary, and give you all the courage you need. By the way, I am trying to write a sermon on true courage for my boys, but cannot get the right note yet.

With much love from all here,

I am, Yours very affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE.

November 22nd, 1900.

MY DEAR MARY,

I should like to write just a word of sympathy. Though what words can express never seems quite the right thing, they have to serve for the look and clasp of the hand sometimes.

I know well what alternations of hope and fear are in such an illness, and can feel what the loss of a brother is to one's life. We can only fall back on the central faith that there is a deeper meaning in all these apparent losses both for those we love and for ourselves, and listen, as we best can, for the peace of God that realises itself by means of them all. In the night of sorrow "uns Herr Gott hält die Wacht."

Be sure, my dear Mary, of my constant love and sympathy,

Ever yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

121 ELDON STREET, GREENOCK.

January 3rd, 1901.

MY DEAR MARY,

I think you have heard all about Conroy's death and my having to telegraph to S. D.—he went out of Egypt. I trust he is getting much needed refreshment from his stay with friends in Egypt.

Conroy's was a very beautiful nature, in which there was as little of self as ever falls to the lot of a human being. In some ways he had an almost womanly tenderness and purity of mind. I got to know him very well during his illness at the beginning of last year, when almost everyone at first was away from College, and I saw him every day. It is a hard blow to S. D. but we must try to make up all we can. Abbott was very well when I left, and shows great power of recovery.

I give my Gifford Lectures next week and the following one; and there is also to be a ceremony at the unveiling of the window memorial of my brother.

The years bring much sadness as our friends fall around us, and we draw near to the inevitable end; but there is no reason in anything we have seen to distrust the divine greatness in man and his destiny, or the love of God.

My dear friend, I wish I could do something to make your heart warm as you have been trying to make the hearts of others. Believe in my constant love and thanks for the support you have often given me.

Ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

DUNGOURNEY, GREENOCK.

January 5th, 1902.

MY DEAR MARY,

Let me send a belated word of good wishes for the New Year.

We had a pleasant gathering yesterday of the four brothers who still remain out of our family of six—We are all of us over sixty-five—or rather the youngest is just approaching that age—so that we may be said to have got into the front rank when the shots come thickest, but I think there is some work in us all yet.

You have probably heard from the Dean. I have a letter from him just after his arrival at Cairo, in which he seems in good spirits, tho' not satisfied that the hereditary rights of Balliol to the Ireland have been challenged this year. I think he will come back refreshed.

I begin my Gifford Lectures next Wednesday. I am afraid they will not be very lively for the audience. I have, indeed, to get over too much ground for the number of lectures.

The Scottish professors have a philosophical society which meets twice a year for discussion and a dinner after it. This year it was Jones who was the host and I was invited, or rather I should say I am an Hon. Member. A. J. Balfour is also an Hon. Member and was present. We had an interesting discussion on the possibility of separating Ethics from Metaphysic. Balfour raised some interesting points about the difficulty of connecting our ultimate philosophical view of reality with life—at least that was what it practically came to. At the dinner I had some talk with Haldane (M.P.) who was present. I think he has very good ideas as to the educational needs of the country and will probably make himself felt on that subject in the future.

I have been reading a new *Leben Jesu* by Holtzmann. It is not a great or original book, but it shows very fairly how much criticism has done to bring us nearer the facts of the life. I cannot but think that Christ becomes much greater in reality when we recognise him as a great moral genius (if one might use the word) working his way to a higher conception of spiritual reality, with the common limitations of men in relation to the future expansion of his own thought. We can get so far as to have the glimpse of a gradual though never quite complete conquest over the apocalyptic view—of a Messiah bringing in a catastrophic judgment of the world—by the idea of spiritual development. I should have liked to

talk over the book with you, if our enemies—time and space—would allow.

My dear friend, I hope your delightful visit to us will be soon renewed. I write now from the wish not to let another year begin without saying again how much I value your interest in all my doings.

I am, my dear Mary, Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE,
March 31st, 1902.

MY DEAR MARY,

I enclose the address in Fanny's writing, which probably will be safer than my own.

I am pleased to hear that you find something to respond to in my lectures—I am afraid I cannot expect such elective affinities in many places, but it is a great encouragement when one does find them. I hope to get the lectures ready in the course of the summer. In glancing over them I find there are some places where the thoughts are not clearly worked out, and which I would like to improve so far as I can.

S. D. had been troubling himself a good deal about some College matters while I was away and did not write to me till the last. I think, between getting them off his mind and the sea, he will soon be all right. I told him always to speak in future.

I have been looking over McTaggart's works, on the "Dialectic" and "Cosmology."¹ He has applied for Cambridge D.Litt. and I was asked to report on him. It was a good deal a matter of form, I suppose, with a man of his standing, but I had some difficulty in doing justice to him, and yet pointing out his perversions of Hegel. He has very curiously turned Hegel upside down, and proved

¹ *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Camb. 1896, and *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, Camb. 1901.

to his own satisfaction that Hegelian dialectic leads to a system of mysticism—in some points not unlike that of Plotinus. Of course, *that* also was in Hegel as an element, but McTaggart has curiously selected it out again.

I am afraid you have to give a greater part of your time and thoughts than ever to Mrs. Talbot—now she is so frail and suffering. No one can ask you not to give yourself away—as you get so much by giving—but I hope you will always be unselfishly-selfish or selfishly-unselfish enough not to overtax the spring on which we all hope to draw in our turn.

We are very quiet now—no one in College but ourselves. My sister-in-law is with us. Colin, however, looks after her, and keeps her up, and he is the most healthy-minded soul I have ever met with. Everybody seems a nervous patient beside him, and his heart is “at leisure for itself” to be always thinking of others.

I go on the 18th to give an address to Mackenzie’s men at Cardiff. I have not been able to think of anything special for them, and shall shape the first Gifford lecture into something suitable.

Yours affectionately,

E. CAIRD.

BOUQUÉRON, PRÈS GRÉNOBLE.

July 28th, 1903.

MY DEAR MARY,

Fanny is writing you about our life here, with Jones and his family. We have had a very pleasant time, only marred for me by mosquitoes, which are continually making a good meal on my face and hands. It is a very beautiful place, high on the hill above Grenoble with grand views of the Alps all round us. We have made some excursions in the neighbourhood, one to a place which is

a kind of summer resort to which Frenchmen take as much of the town as they can contrive. We are looking forward to a longer excursion to the Grande Chartreuse, from which the monks have been expelled along with their liqueur manufactory. It is now occupied by soldiers. Jones and I have had a great deal of interesting philosophic talk, and criticism of each other's performances. He is writing a book which will criticise Balfour, James and Ward. He is stating his position very fully and showing in a very interesting way the relations of these writers to Idealism, and their misconceptions of it. I think it will be a very effective book, and will clear the air of some misconceptions. The positive light he throws upon Idealism by contrast is also very useful.

As to Ritschl, he has been a very influential writer. Harnack in a modified way represents his philosophy. In English there is a fairly good book by Garvie,¹ a man who studied in Glasgow. It rather tends to modify his peculiarities, but you could get a good notion of Ritschl through it. There is also a book by Professor James Orr,² also a Glasgow man, and now in the Free Church College, Edinburgh, but I have not read it. I have no doubt it will be fairly good. Neither of these men are quite free from commonplace, but they do their work well. There is a German book by Pfeleiderer which contains some good criticism. These are all I remember at present. Ritschl and his school all seek to free theology from philosophy and not by means of it, which leads to a curious mixture of reason with unreason; but they have so much force and have had such great influence that it is well worth while to try to understand them.

I have been reading a clever book by Chesterton

¹ *The Ritschlian Theology*. A. E. Garvie. 1899.

² *The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith*. James Orr. 1877.

upon Browning¹—almost too clever, but he has some very good points, and might do much if he could get rid of epigrams.

I am getting on well with the Aristotelian part of my Gifford Lectures—which was the part I felt least satisfactory. It is very difficult to gather up the tendencies of Aristotle, but I think it is coming out clear, though it will be rather heavy reading. I am also reading Plotinus. I think I shall not have very much to do in that part. I am rather anxious to finish this book this vacation, as it has taken so long; and I want to get to other things.

The Jones family are very interesting; they are full of interest in the insects, butterflies, etc. of the place and seem to have microscopic eyes for them; but Fanny will tell better about them.

I hope you are having a good summer and that you will be able to meet the Dean at Derwent Water. He is off to Norway, which I hope will do him much good.

Ever my dear Mary, Yours very affectionately,
E. CAIRD.

DUNGOURNEY, GREENOCK.

January 6th, 1905.

MY DEAR MARY,

It was very good of you to write me such a heart-warming letter. I have been very idle and am feeling much better. Between you and Jones I almost feel that I have something yet to say. It is a great help to hear that you have got so much, whether by the alchemy of your mind or not, out of what I have written. There is no one with whom I have deeper sympathy and whose kind feeling I value more.

As to the review, Kant uses the term "Regulative" of the ideas which in the Critiques he speaks of as stimulating and directing enquiry, but not capable

¹ *Robert Browning* (English Men of Letters). 1903.



MISS MARY SARAH TALBOT

of becoming in themselves source of knowledge for want of corresponding intuitions. In the last of the Critiques he comes nearer admitting that experience can in some sense fill up the program of our ideal or at least can be regarded from that point of view. And in his *Idea of Universal History* he gives a view of man's life as a process towards an ideal to which he is ultimately led by desires that immediately have other objects, or in Goethe's language that Saul goes out to seek his father's asses and finds a kingdom. This comes very close to the idea that there is a βούλησις at the back of all our ἐπιθυμίαι—the idea which runs thro' Hegel's Philosophy of History. The higher categories underlie the lower and ultimately break thro' to the surface.

I have been reading Renan's little life of his sister. It is an idyllic, almost too idyllic, picture. I rather think he deteriorated after her death, as some of his later utterances were in a much lower key.

I shall be 70 next March. The limits of the world are closing in—but some things, *Idee & Liebe*, make one feel that we belong to a wider realm. You know Goethe's little poem :

Mir bleibt genug ; mir bleibt Idee und Liebe.

Ever, my very dear friend, Yours affectionately,
E. CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, *January 14th*, 1906.

MY DEAR MARY,

I am much pleased that you liked my "Jobation."¹ I had avoided anything doctrinal in previous discourses, and thought I would try to put things in a way that would avoid either orthodoxy or heresy and found it easier than I expected.

I have had a good deal of quiet reading this vacation, mainly in the Gospels, and the early

¹ See *Lay Sermons*, "The Faith of Job."

development of Christianity. The only outcome of it as yet is some notes in the direction of combating the Ritschl-Harnack view of the development of doctrine, which takes Christianity practically as an eternal something which is debased or secularised by being brought into relation with Greek philosophy and Roman organisation, and which we have to free from philosophy and politics to get it pure. Harnack's book on Christianity¹ with all its merits really gives, as the eternal, a quite modern version of it, without the peculiarities of the first century and with a good many of the adaptations of the 19th. I think that what you say of the lectures you heard disentangling the eschatological from the other elements is true; but though Christ's doctrine contained in germ the principle that frees us from that element, I am afraid it would be unhistorical to suppose that he did not conceive himself to be engaged in a real fight with demons, who have got a hold of men's life, and whom he meets with a heroic "Hold thy peace and come out of him." In reading especially Mark's Gospel one gets this sense of the human strain overcome by faith and courage—which makes one use the word "hero" rather than any other. In any case there is the great difficulty of seeing the essential truth of the good tidings and yet realising that we are dealing with a man of a time when the whole ordinary view of life was demonic and angelic.

However I must postpone talking these things over till I see you. I am delighted to hear that you will soon come to us, and I hope you will stay a reasonable time when you come, in spite of all the other people who want you!

Believe me, my dear Mary, ever yours affectionately,

EDWARD CAIRD.

¹ *Das Wesen des Christentums*. Adolph von Harnack. Leipzig, 1900. (Eng. tr. by Saunders. 1901.)

III
PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

THE SPIRIT OF CAIRD'S PHILOSOPHY

It is peculiarly difficult to give an adequate account of the doctrine of Edward Caird, although it is easy to make a clear and complete list of his dominant conceptions. He was occupied with matters whose significance and character as well as value are intensely personal, that is to say, with Art, Morality, Philosophy and Religion. The power of all of these was present in all his work. No one who knew him, either directly or through his books, would separate his philosophy from his religion or either of them from his practical life and personal character. And it was no novice either in Philosophy or in the Art of Literature who characterized his thought as "imaginative"—"the thought which takes fire from its own movement and attains, though not in a poetic way, something like the effect of poetry."¹

On this account the teaching of Caird, however much he insisted upon referring back all his doctrines to previous philosophy, was unique and original. And it was incommunicable except by means of his own writings. There can be no substitute for his works. No doubt this is true, in a certain degree,

¹ Professor W. P. Ker, *Memorial Speech at Glasgow*.

of all effective thinkers in every department of knowledge. Even a mathematician or chemist has his own "style," and leaves the impress of his own personality upon his work. But natural science leaves less scope for the play of personality than the humanities, and the intrusion of the individuality of the scientific man into his results is a more risky matter. The personal equation must be detected, measured and discounted. But it is not so with the Artist. A poem is the more valuable the more fully it is freighted with the poet's personality. We would not have Browning like Wordsworth, or Wordsworth like Milton or Spenser. We want them as they are, even although we have Shakespeare. Every true poet, however minor, has something fresh in his song, and reflects some facet of the world's beauty not seen before. And in this respect philosophy goes with poetry rather than with science. Even when employing the same method, and making use of the same logic to establish and expound the same elemental principles, philosophers may maintain their own unique individualities. And the representation of the truth which they make will be all the fuller for their differences.

Scientific opinions regarding the same natural facts and laws must not only agree but coincide, and the more rigorously the more abstract the matter with which they deal. But it is not so with poets. They do not sing in unison. Their agreement is the richer agreement of harmony, for in their domain there is room for what is free and varied and irresponsible and wild, and yet not lawless. And in like manner it is not a defect in

philosophers that their doctrines are not impersonal, like the multiplication table, or touched with tame sameness as if they were written by abstract spirits standing outside the stream of time. On the contrary a philosophical system, like a poem, may be all the truer for bearing the marks of a veined humanity, and for being specifically the exponent of an age or the expression of a stage or type of civilization.

There is another respect in which philosophy is more akin to Art than to Natural Science. In a way that is more discernible than explicable a work of art, if it is beautiful and satisfies, stands forth complete, needing neither a before nor an after, nor any kind of context in order to be justified. In like manner a system of philosophy must have the same self-justifying wholeness. It must expound its own presuppositions, be ruled by its own end, and hold all its elements in stable, reasoned equipoise. But a scientific truth rests on assumptions which travel beyond the science ; it starts from hypotheses and deals with abstractions, and is therefore endlessly relative, making perpetual reference to something further which is beyond, and in which its abstractness may find its completing and correcting context. In consequence a scientific man can continue the work of a predecessor, and the progress of natural science is steady, its light gradually and securely broadening from age to age. But there is no continuity of that kind amongst poets, nor amongst philosophers ; and therefore not the same kind of advance. A fragment left by a dead poet, whether in verse or stone, a " Khubla Khan " or a Cam-

panile, remains a fragment to the end of time ; and a flaw in a philosophical system cannot be patched up. The whole must be re-created, according to the law which rules in all spiritual matters. No true poet was ever an imitator, even though he may have "ransacked the ages and spoiled the climes" : nor is a true philosopher ever a mere commentator. His system *in principle* must be complete ; all its contents must be deemed to be nothing more nor less than elements of one articulated truth, however imperfectly ideas have been followed into their consequences, and though it remains but a rational faith. Philosophy never can be eclectic ; and its authority like that of the moral law must be universal and admit of no compromise.

Now, such systematic wholeness and rounded completeness, *in principle*, strongly marked the teaching of Edward Caird. Its unity was no less dominant than that of a poem, and it was much more in evidence. Indeed, "Some folk thought," as Professor MacCunn said, "that Caird made too much of system, and was in fact wedded to system. The same critics said of his books that he went on repeating his system and repeating the formulae of his system. . . . But why did he repeat himself ? Because he had worked his way, not easily, to central convictions, and when a man has got central convictions, I do not see very well how he can avoid repeating them in all their manifold applications. . . . And why was he enamoured of system (for he was enamoured of system) ? Never for a moment . . . because he allowed his system and his formulae to

come between him and the realities of experience : no, but because he was not content with convictions however strongly held. He was not content to be a man of intuitions like Jowett, to whom he owed so much, or like Carlyle, to whom he was fond of referring ; nothing would content him but to be a man of coherent convictions. We cannot regret that. For it was that which made him one of the masters of constructive thought of his generation. . . . It is upon his power of construction as a thinker that his reputation and influence will in the future mainly rest." ¹ It was the singleness and systematic wholeness of his doctrines which made them impressive and new in his class-room. " He gave us of his best unstintedly," says another witness, " never making the mistake of ' talking down ' to his audience, but rather seeking to stimulate his hearers by his confidence in their powers. . . . The effect thus produced, I believe, on the majority of the class was as if we were witnessing the creation of a new world. The deadweight of custom and tradition was insensibly lifted, and we felt that for the first time we had begun to see things as they are." ² " One remembers the fresh and living thought daily renewed, the luminous exposition, the sympathy. . . . I fear we were convinced we comprehended the whole message through and through. But whatever we thought then, what we think now is that it has taken all the intervening years to enable us fully to understand the vitality and the value of the thought to which it was then our privilege to listen. We thought we appreciated

¹ *Memorial Speech.*

² *Ibid.*

him then, we appreciate him better now in the light of the intervening years and the hours of thought, and, I may add, the experience of life which the years have brought us." ¹

In all these fundamental respects there can be no doubt of the fresh impulse which Caird gave to philosophic thought in the English-speaking world. Dr. Bonar "affirmed deliberately that there was hardly any speculative truth at which he had arrived or thought he had arrived, by his own study, that had not owed the shape of it if not the substance to the impulse given by Edward Caird." "What was it," another teacher of philosophy asked himself, "that you learned from Caird? My own answer is Dr. Bonar's, 'I do not know what I did not learn.'" ²

But with the constructive power and systematic unity manifested in his doctrine, and with its originality as the connected body of the living convictions of a great personality, ruling his outlook and recreating the whole world for him and for his followers, there went what is often assumed to be an opposite and antagonistic quality. Caird was one of the greatest and most effective borrowers of his time. He entered more fully and profitably into the philosophic inheritance of the Western world, and especially of the Idealistic tradition which is the capitalized experience of the greatest speculative thinkers, whether poets or philosophers or religious teachers, than any other British philosopher. It is possible to sympathize with the view of one of his most competent and loyal critics that "One can

¹ *Memorial Speech.*

² *Ibid.*

hardly claim for Caird the supreme kind of originality. He was an interpreter rather than a creator." ¹ "Caird's work, when I saw most of him," said another of his disciples, "had still been mainly that of a teacher and interpreter of a philosophical system which combined and reconciled the work of Kant and Hegel. He had not invented a new logic or developed a new method." ² I can add that I have read more than once everything that Caird has written, and although very imperfectly acquainted with the literature of philosophy, I believe it would not be difficult for me to find the sources of all his significant views. Not only did he invent no new logic or develop no new method, he revealed no new law in Metaphysics, issued no new precept in Ethics, announced no new principle in Religion, discovered no new fact anywhere whether in the realm of individual psychology or that of human history. Critics not in sympathy with his views have stigmatized them as Hegelian. But no one who knows anything of Hegel at first hand, or the meaning of a genuinely philosophic discipleship, can regard it as derogatory to be called a Hegelian, any more than a Platonist, Aristotelian or Christian. Caird was the disciple of Plato and Aristotle and the Greek poets no less than of Hegel and Goethe; of Plotinus and Dante and the Middle Ages no less than of Carlyle and Wordsworth and of Modern Times;

¹ J. S. Mackenzie, "Caird as a Philosophical Teacher," *Mind*, vol. xviii. N.S. 72. In a letter to the editor Professor Mackenzie disowns in Caird's case the distinction he here makes between interpretation and creation.

² Professor Cappon's "Edward Caird, a Reminiscence," *Queen's Quarterly*.

and of Jesus of Nazareth above all others: for undoubtedly his whole developed nature worked within as well as upon the fundamental presuppositions of the Christian religion. But real discipleship is living discipleship, and is never mimetic or repetitive. Speaking of the so-called Hegelians, he says: "There are few, if any, in any country who could now take up the same position towards Hegel which was accepted by his immediate disciples. To us, at this distance of time, Hegel, at the highest, can be only the last great philosopher who deserves to be placed on the same level with Plato and Aristotle in ancient, and with Spinoza and Kant in modern times, and who, like them, has given an 'epoch-making' contribution to the development of the philosophic, or, taking the word in the highest sense, the idealistic, interpretation of the world. In other words, he can only be the last writer who has made a vitally important addition to the proof that those ideas which are at the root of poetry and religion are also principles of science. But, like these earlier philosophies, like every other spiritual influence, the Hegelian philosophy has to die that it may live; to break away from the accidents of its first immediate form that it may become an element in the growing life of man."¹

This last sentence answers the question of the originality of a speculative thinker by exposing its futility. It indicates that in the region of poetry and religion, and of all that is veritably spiritual, all that is built for ever, is for ever building. What is, is in virtue of unremitting self-renewal; the philo-

¹ E. Caird's *Hegel*, p. 223.

sophic principles which are permanent are thought over again and lived over again in every age. The great thinker is the organ which expresses, and in whose living experience is realised anew, the ancient wisdom of his world. He attains in virtue of what is not his own but what belongs and is essential to the common life of man; and he attains on *its* behalf, focussing it anew that it may set forth on fresh adventures. No man can separate the old from the new or the original from the borrowed, because the distinction is transcended. The more original a man, the more heavy the tribute he exacts from the world, and the more intimate his dependence. He cannot go before it: he can only set free its significance. His temper "is one of resolute docility, not indeed towards the words of his teachers—for it is far from desirable that he should accept *them* without reaction—but towards the facts, ideas and principles of which their words and all words are but the imperfect expression." And he is "utterly careless as to any originality of his own."¹ And if he be "the greatest revolutionist the world ever saw" (which Caird called Jesus of Nazareth), he insists that he has come not to destroy the Law or the Prophets, but to fulfil. "In a sense, all moral truth is implicitly contained in the first experiences of a self-conscious being, and, therefore, glimpses of the highest to which man can rise may be expected in the earliest stages of human development. In this region originality consists only in the deepening and widening of generally recognised truths, or in applying with clear consciousness and systematic

¹ *Lay Sermons*, p. 39.

purpose, ideas which were before apprehended as passing lights of intuition." ¹ Again and again Caird returns to this conception of the poet and philosopher, and all other workers in the region of things of the spirit, as "Strong only as they do the deed or speak the word for which their contemporaries were waiting." "It is not the individual," says Goethe, "that can effect anything, but only he who unites with many when the hour is ripe." ² Even the poetic process, where, as we have seen, the creative power of man is most in evidence, and there are no laws except the self-imposed laws of the spirit of beauty, is "a process of widening nature without going beyond it." The poetic creation "has all the colours of life, and almost shames the so-called facts of every day by the sturdy force and reality of its presence. Thus before Shakespeare's characters most ordinary human beings seem like the shadows of the dead in Homer. It is not that in these dramas a different life is set before us from that which men everywhere lead, but the passions and characters which, in conflict with each other and with circumstances, gradually work out their destiny, are in the poet's mind put into a kind of forcing-house, and made with rapid evolution to show their inner law and tendency in immediate results." ³

"It is indeed only the greatest poets who are capable of thus making themselves, as it were, into organs by which nature reaches a higher develop-

¹ *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 89.

² *Lay Sermons*, p. 12.

³ *Essays in Literature and Philosophy*, p. 57.

ment."¹ The reason why great poetry appears to be "inevitable," why the significant principles of philosophy are universal and necessary, why the imperatives of moral duty are categorical and exclude all conditions and exceptions is the same as that which makes religious service and adoration perfect: there is in them all the submission of the self to the rule of the world's permanent powers. "His word was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary with forbearing, and I could not stay." When man as poet or prophet, philosopher or king, is at his best, then most of all has he "come to serve"—to speak the thoughts and do the work of the Sender.

Now in all this we are at the heart, not only of the doctrine of Edward Caird, but of that which was deeper and which determined his research, namely, his method of thinking and his experience. It might be maintained that he had nothing to say except this—that the law of all finite life is that of living through dying, of conserving in merging, of gaining in giving. Nay, for him, the inmost throb of the universal life of the spirit which dwells in all things and *is* through dwelling therein, was this return through outgoing, this spendthrift self-enrichment. For "the almighty power is an all-embracing love." It is "the Being who sustains the natural and the moral order of our life," faith in whom is "the central principle of religion."² The play of affirmation and negation in Logic, of transience and per-

¹ *Essays in Literature and Philosophy*, p. 57.

² *Lay Sermons*, p. 300.

manence, sameness and change, of subjective and objective, of unity and difference in the individual soul and in the general life of man—this is not only the way in which finite spirit loses itself as such to find itself again as the organ of the Infinite, but it also is the self-revealing nature of the metaphysically real. His philosophy and religion worked together to remove the barrier between the divine and human, and maintain at the same time the “Transcendence of Mysticism and the Immanence of Pantheism,”¹ raised to the higher level of self-conscious rational experience. The veil that separated nature from man’s life and God was rent in twain from the top to the bottom, so that the inner light shone forth and nothing remained any more either secular or merely natural. The study of reality was the contemplation of the divine, and for him, as for Aristotle, philosophy was theology and theology was philosophy. “The greatest theme of modern philosophy,” he said, “is the problem of the relation of the human to the divine, of the spirits of men to the Absolute Being.”² And the solution of that problem is the world process; the process of the discovery of truth and the learning of goodness, which at the same time is the self-revelation and highest realization of the eternally real. “God is manifested in man under the ordinary conditions of human life, whenever man gives himself to God. The power that builds and holds the universe together is shown in a higher form than in any creative act, in every man that lives not for himself, but as an

¹ *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii. p. 229.

² *Ibid.* pp. 360-1.

organ and minister of divine love to men.”¹ Difference must remain, the finite must be real ; but all differences must be transparent, conceived and comprehended in the light of one principle. “ God must be clearly conceived as the unity presupposed in all being and all thought, the One who is alike beyond mere subjectivity and mere objectivity.”² The last dualisms of permanence and change, progress and perfection, rest and activity, of thought and being, of the subjective and objective, must be overcome. Idealism must prove the most rigorous Realism, and spirit find itself in opposites which derive from it their very resistance and whose resistance is forced to yield it praise. “ The unity is not a static but a dynamic unity, that is, a unity realised in the process of the Christian life, the process of self-surrender and self-sacrifice through which humanity becomes—what potentially it is—the highest organ of the divine manifestation.”³

What Caird endeavoured to prove is amply, overwhelmingly evident. He wanted to constrain the discrete, confused, conflicting contents of the finite mind to yield to the view of philosophy their reference—the reference which was their essence and true being—to the unity that lives and moves in all. But he was the exponent of no facile Monism ; such a Monism he knew “ to be the grave of any true and comprehensive attempt to discover the ideal meaning of the Universe.” As in philosophy, so also as regards religion and morality : the idea of the unity of the divine and human, and of the

¹ *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii., p. 362.

² *Ibid.* p. 213.

³ *Ibid.* p. 362.

operation of the ideal of perfection within the blundering deeds of man, was all in all to him. But he knew that that unity may itself "become the most shallow of illusions, if it be taken as a static identity, and if it be not recognised that the realisation of it involves the overcoming of the deepest of all antagonisms."¹ Perfect idealism, to show itself stronger than all the materialism in the world, must deprive matter of none of its meaning. It must endow it with more. *Das Ernst des Negativen*, the reality of sin and misery, must have full justice done to it, but the positive overreaches it and transforms it unto good. "The prayer, 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,' with its reduction of evil to ignorance, is perhaps the most victorious assertion of the relativity of evil that ever has been made."²

Now, there is nothing unique in this problem by which the philosophic work of Caird can be distinguished. It is the problem of the One and the Many with which philosophy has been engaged from of old, whether interpreting the rational experience of man or the order of reality. What marks his philosophical endeavour is, on the one hand, the persistence and the directness of his dealing with this central issue in every department of man's theoretical and practical life. He is *always* in the presence of the ultimate, universal, immanent, self-differentiating Unity. Not Spinoza nor Plotinus regarded finite objects more constantly *sub specie aeternitatis*. Only, as distinguished from the latter,

¹ *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii. p. 371.

² *Ibid.* p. 365.

he would not engulf but "consecrate life and its secular interests" and thereby conserve them; and, as distinguished from the former, he would interpret and make intelligible the *Deus sive Natura*, reconciling without abolishing their distinction and thereby transcending it.¹ How far he solved the problem, I do not ask at present. My purpose now is to indicate its character, and to suggest the greatness of his service to philosophy in that, more than any other, he concentrated the reflective thought of his time upon this issue, and determined that those who came after should be engaged either in interpreting his idealistic principles or in denying their validity.

To estimate the extent of this service one has to ask how precisely he conceived of the problem of philosophy as it presented itself to him in his time; wherein it seemed to him that the philosophical tendencies then prevalent failed to find any satisfying solution of it; what was the central principle and hypothesis in the light of which he sought to correct or supplement their conclusions and to verify this hypothesis in detail in the different fields of philosophy.

¹ *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii. p. 214.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

“THE most attractive thing about Caird,” writes the most recent historian of philosophy, “is his lively sense of the problems he is discussing.”¹ This is true, not only of particular discussions throughout his works, but of his philosophy as a whole. The central problem is always before his mind. The *need* for philosophy, as he himself tells us, arises “out of the broken harmony of a spiritual life, the different elements or factors of which seem to be set in irreconcilable opposition to each other; in which, for example, the religious consciousness, the consciousness of the infinite, is at war with the secular consciousness, the consciousness of the finite; or, again, the consciousness of the self with the consciousness of the external world.” The *task* of philosophy is “to gain or rather perhaps to regain such a view of things as shall reconcile us to the world and ourselves”—a task the difficulty of which consists in “carrying out to their legitimate consequences what seem to be our most firmly based

¹ Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy*, Eng. Tr. p. 266.

convictions as to any of these factors in our intellectual life, without rejecting in whole or in part the claims of the others.”¹

That the need out of which philosophy springs is no merely theoretic one is obvious when we consider the intimate relation between this inner harmony and our outward action. For “it is impossible, so long as our ultimate thought of the world is in discord with itself, that our lives can be what human lives have sometimes been—impossible that we can rise to that energy of undivided will and affection, that free play of concentrated intelligence, that sense of the infinite resources of the spirit that moves us, out of which the highest achievements of men at all times have sprung.”²

The great ages of philosophy, in which, as Caird believed, our own must be included as one, have been those in which this inner discord has been most keenly felt; but there are features of the present time, which make the problem to which it gives rise, particularly difficult and insistent. The only period at all comparable to it was perhaps the age in Greece in which Plato and Aristotle sought to “build up again in the soul of the philosopher the falling edifice of Greek civilisation, to restore its religious and political life by going back to the ideal principle on which it rested.” But it is impossible to accept their results as a solution of our problem, for two main reasons.

¹ *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time*, p. 6.

² *Ibid.* p. 9. Cp. *Social Philosophy of Comte*, pp. 160 and 181.

In the first place the terms of the problem had not yet been developed so as to give full play to the "pass and fell incensed points of mighty opposites." On the one hand, the morality and religion with which the new thought came into collision was a merely national one. They were founded in the wood, hay and stubble of mythology and tradition, and were thus incapable of offering any effective resistance to the newer thought as represented by the Sophists. On the other hand, the Sophistic thought itself was merely analytic and destructive. It contained no constructive principle by means of which it could substitute any positive system of its own for that which it had undermined. It was thus that the positive and the negative elements which Plato and Aristotle sought to reconcile presented themselves in an imperfect form, and the reconciliation necessarily shared this imperfection. The new freedom of thought with its universal outlook was to be combined with the old limitations of Greek religion and civilization. But this was pouring new wine into old bottles. "The element of philosophy, in which the reconciliation was attempted, was itself fatal to the reconciliation aimed at."¹ In the second place, the philosophy itself, even in the hands of its greatest masters, failed to effect a reconciliation of the one fundamental antithesis whose terms it clearly recognized, the antithesis of form and matter, idea and reality, or, more generally, subject and object. While applying the Socratic dialectic to everything else, it never fairly succeeded in bringing to the bar of criticism its own

¹ *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time*, p. 28.

assumption of the existence of a fundamental dualism between these two terms.

Like though it is as an age of criticism and transition to the critical age in Greece, the present time differs fundamentally in these two respects. On the one hand, modern religion has its roots in no merely national culture with its imaginative mythology. It seeks to found itself on universal elements in human nature. It is ready to face the facts of life in their entirety, however dark and threatening these may be to its ideals. It has descended into hell—seeking to find the good *in* the evil, the ideal *in* the real, the divine *in* the human. Religion has thus nothing to fear from a science that opposes fact to fancy, nature to divinity. "It is not a dream that vanishes with a waking of the prosaic consciousness in either of its shapes, either as the distinct common-sense apprehension of fact or as the reflective analysis of thought."¹ It is to this that we owe the apparently paradoxical result that its ideals spread and increase their hold even among those who reject it, while "its fundamental conception of life penetrates and moulds the social and religious speculations of those who, like Comte, seem to have most thoroughly renounced it."

If the religious consciousness of to-day has quite other foundations than that of the ancient world, the powers, on the other hand, that assail it have renewed their strength not less. Thought can appeal to positive achievements in pure and applied science which witness to the greatness of the human mind.

¹ *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time*, p. 32.

The heavens declare the glory of Newton, and man begins to feel at home in the universe of finite fact as never before. What is true of the world of theory is true of the world of practice. The individual finds himself absorbed by a multitude of interests, industrial, social, political, artistic, "in pursuing one or other of which he may find ample occupation for his existence without ever feeling the need of any return upon himself or seeing any reason to ask himself whether this endless striving has any meaning or object beyond itself." In a word, "the world of finite interests and objects has rounded itself, as it were, into a separate whole within which the mind of man can fortify itself, and live *securus adversus deos*, in independence of the infinite."¹ As compared with the ancient, the modern conflict is thus a war of Titans. World faces world as never before.

What is true finally of religion, and of science and secular interests, is true of the opposition within the world of thought itself between subject and object. The achievement, it might be said, of mediaeval and modern thought is the consciousness of the subject with its claim to freedom and self-determination in face of the rigid determination of one finite thing by another in the field of nature.² Here, too, our own time feels the clash of "mighty opposites." On the one hand there are those who find it impossible to admit the truth of scientific

¹ *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time*, p. 23.

² The ancient world of course had its materialistic philosophy, but, as is well known, its materialism found a place for free will in the caprice of the atoms that formed the world.

methods of explaining physical events without extending them to mind, and thus reducing consciousness, thought, and will to the level of finite things among other finite things. On the other hand are those who, finding that the consciousness of the subject enters into all our experience, seek to reduce all that appears to be objective to states of the individual soul. It was not given to everyone to remain poised between these two conflicting currents, as Spencer and Huxley tried to do in Caird's time, assuring us that we may regard the world *either* as a collection of the phenomena of the mind *or* as a collection of phenomena of matter, but that we can never bring these two views together—"a view which supposes man to be afflicted with a kind of intellectual *strabismus* so that he can never see with one of his mental eyes without shutting the other."¹

There was a time when, secure in the intuitive grasp of the things of the spirit, men thought it possible to flout the representatives of modern knowledge as a new race of Sophists, "apostles of the dismal science" and "apes of the Dead Sea." But grateful as their own generation may have rightly felt to writers like Carlyle and Ruskin for their strong and confident utterance of primary truths of morality and religion, "it is, after all, a mark of weakness to address the modern world with the unguarded utterances of the ancient prophet."² More akin to the modern spirit, and by some identified

¹ *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time*, p. 8.

² *Ibid.* p. 41.

with it, is the attempt to find an answer to the problem by narrowing it, and thus lowering the claim that is made upon philosophy. It was thus that Comte sought to deal with it. By jettisoning the problem of unity in the great world without, Comte hoped to obtain a secure grasp of the unity of the world within. While to-day there are few who will call themselves Comtists, there are many, perhaps an increasing number, who are Positivists in the sense in which Comte used the word. The aim of his philosophy is to provide for the wants of the moral life, while at the same time renouncing all claim, on the part of so feeble a thing as man, to knowledge of a world whose immensity and immeasurable contingency become with the advance of science ever more apparent. Its device is to find in the life of humanity as a whole, as contrasted on the one hand with the exclusive ends of the individual, on the other with an all-inclusive God or Nature, the guiding principle of thought and action. If, as is admitted, it is an inextinguishable demand of the human spirit that it should be able to rise above its chance desires and interests through devotion to something at once greater and yet in its essence identical with itself, may it not be possible to find this object in the ever-increasing purpose of human history ?

In reply to such a claim it is possible to admit all that Positivism contends as to the material insignificance of man as an individual and at the same time to question the inference that is drawn from this admission. To the proposal to limit the demand for system and unity to the life of humanity there is

one fundamental objection. Man, it may be admitted, is a reed, but he is "a thinking reed." And this means, in the first place, not only that there is nothing with which he cannot put himself in relation, but that in the long run there is nothing from which he can withdraw himself or in which by the very nature of his thinking reason he does not seek to find a reflection of himself. In the second place, it means that in his dealings with any part of the universe so related to him, man can find its meaning only in its relations to all other things and ultimately to the thinking subject. To cut off any part from the whole, to which it belongs, is to evacuate it of its true significance. Positivism admits that this is true of the attempt to separate the individual from humanity. But it is equally true of the attempt to separate the life of humanity from the life of nature. In asserting the essential interrelation of man and nature there are of course serious difficulties, particularly the difficulty of the priority in time of the inorganic to the organic and of life to consciousness upon the earth. It is just such difficulties that Positivism seeks to avoid by its limitation of knowledge to phenomena and of the unity that is achievable to the "subjective" one of human society. But the attempt to achieve unity by thus arbitrarily restricting the range of the mind's demand for it must end in defeating itself. For human life becomes meaningless if taken apart from its setting in the world or apart from the double relation of spirit to the order of nature as at once contrasted with and akin to it. "In every similar division we are separating elements so correlated that the meaning

of each one of them begins to evaporate so soon as we realise what we have done in separating it from the rest."

In truth, the positivist attempt to solve the problem of philosophy by falling back from the assertion of system in the world to the assertion of it in the limited field of human life is a compromise, and "like most compromises unites the difficulties of both of the extremes it would avoid: the difficulties of an absolute philosophy, which seems to go beyond the limits of human knowledge, and the difficulties of a scepticism which leaves the moral and intellectual life of man without a principle of unity."¹

The problem, then, of philosophy in our time, stated in its most general form, is this: (1) Admitting the full force of the opposing claims of the consciousness of the object and the consciousness of the subject, as these make themselves known to the age in the inner conflict between freedom and authority in the moral life, is it possible to find a point of view from which these may be seen to be not two entirely separate and unrelated things but distinguishable elements in an indissoluble whole of thought and experience? (2) Will the principle or point of view, if it is discoverable, be capable of extension so as to unite also the consciousness of the finite with the consciousness of the Infinite, not as the mere negative but as the positive basis and as itself knowable in and through our knowledge of the finite?

¹ *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time*, p. 19.

It was Caird's profound belief that such a principle was discoverable, had indeed already been discovered by Kant, hesitating and ambiguous though Kant's statement of it had been. That belief was the source of the inspiration of all his work as a thinker and teacher.

CHAPTER III

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS

THE problem of philosophy rises out of the need of reuniting elements in human life which the reflective spirit of the time has seemed to break asunder. Once the first intuitive certainties of ourselves, the world and God have been attacked by doubt, there is no going back. It is reflection that has dealt the blow, and it is reflection which, like the spear of Ithuriel, must heal the wound that itself has made. This is why the modern spirit cannot be satisfied with any philosophy like that of the older Scottish school of Thomas Reid, which seemed merely to appeal from the philosophical scepticism of David Hume to the deliverances of "common sense." It was not that Reid was lacking in a sense of the end to be achieved—the re-establishment of faith in the world, the self and God—but that he had an imperfect idea of the seriousness and complexity of the task, and was too ready to short-circuit the road that philosophy had to travel in order to reach that goal.¹

¹ Professor Pringle-Pattison in the art. on "Thomas Reid" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* has sought to show that there is more in Reid's "common sense" and thus a greater continuity between the earlier and the later Scottish philosophy of reconciliation than is usually supposed.

It was to the metaphysical genius of Kant that we owe the first clear perception of the *impasse* to which rival tendencies in philosophy had brought the thought of his time ; and it was to Kant's stubborn industry that we owe the first sketch of the line philosophy must take in the solution of the problem that had thus been set it. It was Caird's conviction of the fundamental importance for all future thought and practice of realizing both what Kant had succeeded in doing and what he had failed to do, that led him to devote the main portion of his life to the exposition of Kant's teaching. Here, as throughout, he was content to develop his own views in the course of his commentary upon the views of others. It will serve to indicate at once the organic connexion between his thought and that of the great German Idealist and the extension he sought to give to the Kantian principle if we follow in outline Caird's view, in the first place, of what Kant actually did ; secondly, of what he failed to do and of what was necessary to complete his work.

The result of the first great movement of modern thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to work out into clearness in the abstract precisely those great oppositions, which, as we have seen, divide and distract the life of the modern world. On the one hand, there was the opposition between subject and object ; on the other, between the finite and the Infinite : the one, we might say, the more pressing in the world of knowledge ; the other the more pressing in the world of ethics and

religion. It is with the former of these oppositions that we are concerned in this chapter.

In the field of knowledge, the whole history of modern philosophy may be summed up in the conflict as to the place of the subjective or *a priori* and the objective or *a posteriori* element. The keynote of the *a priori* contention was struck in Descartes' emphasis on the element of thought as the first certainty and his doctrine of innate ideas; the keynote of the *a posteriori* in Bacon's emphasis on experience. As the starting point of the one was *cogito ergo sum*, so the starting point of the other might be said to be *experior ergo est*. These two movements took each its own course on the Continent and in England respectively. Since Caird wrote, it has become an oft-told tale in philosophy text-books. It is the issue of each that concerns us here.

Taking the more familiar first: Bacon claimed that experience is the sole source of knowledge; but he held also that man was the "interpreter of nature," and he was thus constrained to attribute to the knowing subject conceptions of "causes" and "natures" by means of which he was able to extract from experience a kind of knowledge that is not given in immediate perception. But it was not difficult for succeeding philosophers to show that if we are to remain true to the assumption that the sensory data are the sole source of knowledge these principles themselves must be the result of experience. If they cannot be discovered among the data of perception, they are without other warrant than the mind's own action. Locke and Berkeley repre-

sent stages in the advance of philosophy to this conclusion. It was the merit of Hume that he was the first fully to realize that these principles, notably that of causality, as they cannot legitimately be derived from the facts, cannot legitimately be used to interpret them. By tracing causation to habit and the tendency to confuse frequency of occurrence with universality and necessity, he was able to cast doubt, not merely, as Locke had done, upon the *a priori* origin of *some* of our beliefs, but upon the validity of *all* of them, including the most assured generalizations of science—ultimately also upon our own activity and personal identity.

Parallel with this development of philosophy in Great Britain and Ireland in the direction of an empiricism by which all knowledge was traced back to what is given in sensation, we have on the Continent the contrary movement represented by Leibniz which sought to show that all knowledge was *a priori*. The exposition of this movement is one of the most masterly pieces of analysis in Caird's works.¹ It is only possible here to note the ultimate result. As the *a posteriori* philosophy of Locke ended in the identification of reality with a mere succession of sensations and their faded counterparts or images, united with one another in no organic way but by the casual subjective bond of habit, so the *a priori* philosophy of Leibniz ended in the idea of truth as mere formal identity. Taking as its starting point the mere form of self-consciousness, "I am I," and excluding all difference from it,

¹ *Philosophy of Kant*, chapters v. and vi. condensed in the Introduction to the *Critical Philosophy of Kant*.

it leaves us in the end with a bare tautology which leads nowhere. It is thus that in these two movements "extremes meet and the ultimate result of Wolff (who carried out Leibniz's principle to its logical conclusion) has only a nominal difference from the ultimate result of Hume. If the scepticism of the latter dissolved reality into an unconnected flux of sensations, the dogmatism of the former reduced it to an endless tautology of thought, abiding with itself and never going out of itself. . . . A merely logical philosophy may die of inanition and a merely sensational philosophy of paralysis; but the nature of the disease that killed it matters little to the corpse."¹

What Kant aimed at doing was to save philosophy from these two fatal diseases by such a critical examination of knowledge as should assign to the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*—the subject and the object—their true place in it, and thus lead to a new integration of the work of thought. He sought to unite in a higher form of synthesis the partial truths of Locke and Leibniz. To understand precisely the sense in which Kant pointed the way to this new synthesis Caird held to be vital to a true comprehension of his work. This seemed to him to be wholly misconceived by critics who held that, while sharing with previous philosophy the distinction between what is given to sense perception and what is conceptually determined, he differed merely in insisting that the conceptual apparatus by which things are thus determined is supplied by the constitution of the mind and is thus *a priori*, as con-

¹ *Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 119-120.

trusted with the percept or the object-matter to which this apparatus is applied and which constitutes the *a posteriori* element. This Caird held was entirely to misread the point of the new synthesis, which it was Kant's merit to have effected.

Kant certainly held that in scientific induction, with its assumption of necessity and universality in the laws of nature it seeks to establish, principles are employed which cannot be derived from an experience that can give only frequency of occurrence, and that these principles, as contrasted with the matter of experience, can only be described as *a priori*. But his contention in reality went much further than this, seeing that he held that *it is only through the action of thought in conception that objects exist for us at all, even before the application to them of the principles of scientific induction*. Such application of the principles or categories of the Understanding is only a further step in the *a priori* synthesis which is already involved in the very perception of the objects.¹

The vital point that objectivity itself is not something given but something conferred by thought, or (if this is misleading), something which has meaning only to a thinking self-conscious mind, is obscured in Kant partly by the fact that his own thought develops as he proceeds, and as he comes to realize the full import of his principle,

¹ Art. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, "Metaphysics," ninth edition, vol. xvi. p. 97B. Cp. Caird's replies to Dr. J. Hutchison Stirling, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vols. xiii. 2 and xiv. 1—perhaps the simplest and clearest statement of the central difficulty in Kant and in Caird's own metaphysics.

partly by the way in which he permitted himself, to the end, to speak of what is *perceived* and what is *conceived*—"nature materially regarded" and "nature formally regarded" as though they were two different things. But that this antithesis is merely a survival and is wholly contrary to the spirit of his philosophy, Caird held to be abundantly clear to the reader who would take the trouble necessary to understand him. Even the often quoted phrase "perception without conception is blind, conception without perception is empty," while seeming to retain, in reality cancels the antithesis between a given object and a thought which moulds it to special purposes. If perception is really blind *it sees nothing*, just as conception, if it is really empty, *thinks nothing*. What Kant really did was not to carry on the old opposition between an *a priori* and an *a posteriori* element in knowledge, merely insisting on the impossibility of *science* without both (Hume had already seen this and had placidly accepted it), but to assign a wholly new sense to the distinction as merely one between two different aspects under which we may regard all experience, when once, through the dividing and unifying work of thought, the distinction between subject and object has emerged. In view of this transformation it might, we may now think, have been well to dispense with these terms altogether. Substance, causality, interaction are no more *a priori* than greenness or hardness or motion. If they are "forms of the understanding," they are also forms of the world it understands. What distinguishes them from the "given" matter of sense and feeling is that, as

representing a more developed stage of experience, they exhibit more clearly the features of the living thought that manifests itself in the whole process of knowledge.¹

So far Caird held it possible to follow Kant and to ascribe to him, on the ground of what he had thus done, the credit of initiating a new era in philosophy. "So much," he asserts, "has this fertile idea (of a new synthesis) changed the aspect of the intellectual world that there is not a single problem of philosophy that does not meet us with a new face; and it is perhaps not unfair to say that the speculations of all those who have not learned the lesson of Kant are beside the point."² But he held also that, great as was what Kant had accomplished, he nevertheless left his work incomplete in that he failed to recognize the full consequences of the principle which he had invoked. It was the task of his immediate successors, and particularly of Hegel, to bring his work to completion. This also is an oft-told tale which Caird did more than anyone else to make current among English students of philosophy.³ In stating the moral of it as shortly as is consistent with clearness, we come to the centre of Caird's own theory of knowledge.

¹ It is the failure to realize this that underlies the assumption that according to idealistic principles the relations of causality and the like are subjective in a sense in which colour, sound, form are not.

² *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 121.

³ See especially *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, art. "Metaphysics," *loc. cit.* pp. 86-7, 96-99; *Hegel*, chapter vi.

Kant had shown that the ordinary contrast between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, according to which experience was something given upon which thought had to work, was untenable. He did so by showing that thought enters into the very constitution of all we call experience. This did not mean merely that "categories of the understanding" were necessary to bind together the matter of experience and give it solidity. It meant, as we have seen, that thought was operative from the first, containing in itself and developing from itself at once the distinction and the unity of subject and object. But it was impossible to leave the matter there, for this in turn meant that underlying all our experience there was an ideal principle at work under the pressure of which the mind could never cease from the endeavour to realize a form of experience in which all differences should be seen as necessary elements in one coherent system of truth. As his own thought developed, the place of this ideal became clearer and clearer to Kant, until in the latter part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* it is seen to dominate the whole process of knowledge as an "idea of the Reason."

Having gone so far, it might have been expected that Kant should have gone one step further and shown that while in the most elementary forms of experience we can in a real sense be said to know objects, we know them only imperfectly so long as they fail to exhibit themselves as parts or necessary elements in the ideal whole to which reason points. Adopting Kant's later antithesis of apparent or

phenomenal and intelligible or noumenal reality we might have expected him to apply it to the different degrees in which this imperfection manifests itself, and to condemn the apparent or phenomenal, not because it contains too much, but because it contains too little of the element of thought and idea. Having once named *Consciousness* as in its nature and from the beginning a synthetic activity, what was there to prevent him carrying this principle to the end and seeing in the development of consciousness in scientific and philosophical experience what can only be interpreted as at once the fuller development of the nature of the thinking subject and the fuller revelation of the real object ?

That he did not draw this conclusion is known to every student of Kant. Instead of holding that reflective experience, as it develops into science and philosophy, is an ever closer approximation to knowledge of objects as they are in reality, he takes the contrary line, and, for the very reason that these objects are mixed up with thought, maintains that we fail of real knowledge of them. Instead of taking the distinction of appearance and reality as one that holds *within* knowledge and applying it to different *stages of knowledge*, he takes it as a distinction *between* our knowledge of "objects," as they appear to us who know them, and "*things*, as they are in themselves." Instead of condemning experience at any particular stage because it fails to correspond to its own ideal, he condemns it at every stage because it involves an element of the ideal in it. It is this failure to carry out the logic of his own principle, by abolishing

the whole notion of things in themselves distinct from objects, that is the cause of the ambiguity of Kant's answer to the main problem of philosophy as it was defined by Caird.

It is true that Kant held that, by proving that the world which we know is a world only as it exists for us as thinking subjects, he had cut away the ground from any purely materialistic philosophy which should seek to treat mind as simply an object among other objects—its phenomena as simply phenomena having a place among other phenomena of experience. On the other hand, Kant used the same argument to destroy the hopes of any philosophy which might seek to make capital out of this result, in favour of a more thorough-going Idealism which should lay claim to a knowledge of reality as it is in itself. Kant himself, indeed, did not stop here. Driven on by his own logic he makes admissions in his later works which clearly point beyond these conclusions. With these we are not here concerned, but with the underlying reason of this ambiguity and with the more consistent Kantianism, in which Caird found the key to the problem which Kant had failed in the end to solve.

There is probably no reader of Caird who has not felt baffled and irritated at one time or another by his use of the term "self-consciousness" and his constant appeal to the "unity of self-consciousness" as the key to all mysteries. The word itself is ambiguous. In its popular sense, it means an exaggerated sense of self-hood that prevents the

unhappy victim of it from realizing or exhibiting the self that he really is. It need hardly be said that this is not its philosophical meaning. It is, in fact, nearly the opposite of this. Self-consciousness to Caird is our normal consciousness developed into the form in which we are first fully aware of what we really are. This, of course, is an ideal to which individual consciousness approximates in various degrees, but we can realize enough of it to be able to analyze its contents.

Of these the first and most obvious is the consciousness of something opposed, something given and so far independent of us—the so-called object. But along with this there is involved the consciousness of a subject in contact with and reacting upon the object. Subject and object may thus be thought of as opposite poles between which the field of experience lies. But this is a simplification which requires to be corrected by further analysis. For, along with the consciousness of opposition between subject and object, there goes a consciousness of their essential relation to each other. As the deepest element in consciousness we have the sense that they are not simply opposed to each other, but that the subject sees its own face only as reflected in the object, and *vice versa* that the object reveals its true nature only as it is apprehended by a subject. It is for this reason that to contemplate our world from either aspect must end in throwing a new light on the other and raising it to a higher power. "To contemplate our experience as inner experience is simply to enrich our outer experience by bringing in the thought of its

relation to feeling in ourselves as sensitive subjects.”¹ *Vice versa*, to contemplate it as *outer* experience is to enrich our inner experience by bringing in the thought of its relation to a real objective world of which it is the revelation in and to us. It is in the light of this movement of conscious experience, from object to subject and thence to the unity of the two, that we must read Caird’s constant insistence that consciousness of self is not a consciousness we realize by withdrawing from all objects as into a solitude out of which nothing can come, but that it is the “transparent unity-in-difference” which “contains all the keys by which we may unlock the secrets of the world . . . the brief abstract of the whole process of knowledge and so of all knowable reality; for as it is the first unity out of which all the principles of knowledge must be developed, so it is itself the final unity in which they are summed up and brought to completion.”²

All this Caird held that Kant in a sense had seized. Kant saw that self-consciousness is the key to the world as we know it, and that the Categories are “first elements in the idea of self-consciousness, fragments of the idea of self-consciousness.” He had broken the spell that sets subject and object in irreconcilable opposition to each other. On the other hand he is himself still under the spell of the opposition of knowing and being. He does not see that self-consciousness is the synthetic unity of this opposition as of all others, and that the opposition is overcome in every act of concrete experience.

¹ *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. p. 646.

² *Op. cit.* p. 413.

And the reason of this arrest in his thought, to repeat it, is that, while in dealing with our ordinary experience and with the sciences, which are merely an extension and systematisation of ordinary experience, he realizes, as none before him had done, that the thinking self is no mere empty form to be reached by abstraction from the object, but a synthetic principle in the construction of experience—he is still haunted by the ghost of the error he had so far successfully attacked. It rises before him when he finds himself face to face with the ultimate distinction between knowledge and reality, and deceives him into representing each of them as merely the negative of the other. What Caird sought to do, following the greatest of Kant's successors, was once for all to lay this ghost. His philosophy was Kantian in that it accepted Kant's fundamental principle of synthetic or organic unity as the key to all knowledge. It was *neo-Kantian* or Hegelian in that it sought to carry this principle to its legitimate conclusion by finding in it also the key to all reality.

Though he thus rested for his first principle on what seemed to him the inner meaning of the greatest movement in modern philosophy, Caird was aware that it was only a great hypothesis, to be verified like other hypotheses by the success with which it could bring harmony into the facts of experience. "The important thing in philosophy," he reminds us,¹ "as is often forgotten, is not vague general views but the patient labour by which they are

¹ Review of Green's *Introduction to Hume's Treatise on Human Nature* published in the *Glasgow Herald*.

developed and worked out to their utmost consequences." His own contribution to the philosophy of his time was the skill and consistency with which he worked out the implications of Kantian idealism thus amended in the different fields of human experience. Before following him in this labour it is necessary to dwell for a moment longer on this emendation.

In the theory of the nature and implications of self-consciousness briefly stated above there are two points which idealistic writers have not always been careful enough to distinguish. In the first place we have the doctrine that man's conscious life is dominated by the assumption or the ideal of a unity in which the elements of experience are related to one another as organic parts of a systematic, ultimately logical, whole. This side of the theory has been taken up and developed with fertile results by many idealistic writers since Caird wrote in every department of philosophy, and may be said to be justified of its children.

But the theory of the unity of self-consciousness, as above outlined, has another and even more fundamental meaning. It is possible to hold to the idea of organic unity as the underlying assumption of all thought and experience, and yet to fail to apply it to the ultimate antithesis of subject and object, thought and reality. It was to cut the ground under any such ultimate dualism that Caird constantly returned to the point that this antithesis itself is one that only holds within a wider unity by whatever name we call it, thought, or spirit,

self-consciousness or feeling. It is this part of his teaching that has been the main stumbling-block and rock of offence, not only to realistic opponents, but to idealistic sympathizers. Nevertheless it is the central and differentiating mark of Caird's Idealism, and it is essential for our purpose here to understand what he meant by it.

It need hardly be said that he did not mean that subject and object were merely verbal correlatives, though this fallacy has often been attributed to him. He does not, as he has been accused of doing,¹ begin by defining a subject as that to which an object is presented, and an object as that which is presented to a subject, and then proceed, on the ground of this question-begging definition, to proclaim that these two exist in essential and indissoluble connection with each other. What he taught was the precise opposite of this. It was that the antithesis between subject and object emerged at a certain stage in the development of experience and was bound up with its very nature. Subject and object are correlatives in language because they are correlatives in reality. We do not go from a relation we establish in our thinking to the assertion of a relation in reality, but from the relation in reality to a relation in our thought. We not only cannot think object apart from subject, subject apart from object, but we cannot think at all except upon the assumption of an identity underlying the difference.

Equally little did he mean by the unity of subject and object in self-consciousness an absolute experi-

¹ E.g. by Professor A. C. Pigou, *The Problem of Theism*, p. 8.

ence in which the duality has disappeared. It was here that he found himself, with all his great admiration for Mr. F. H. Bradley's metaphysical genius, at issue with his central contention. Starting from the conception of complete harmony of content as the ideal of knowledge and the test of truth and reality, Bradley finds in the antithesis of a subject or self that seeks to be at one with its object and an object which maintains itself in independence of it, a fatal bar to any such harmony on the plane of self-conscious intelligence. It is only at a higher level at which the antithesis has disappeared by some unknown and to us unintelligible process of transformation that the final or absolute unity is attained. On such a view it is clear that it is impossible to find the types of all reality in mind and will as these reveal themselves in human experience; and this not because our self-conscious experience is that of finite minds drawing their being from their communion with an infinite mind, but just because it is self-conscious experience.

Such an interpretation of the principle of self-consciousness seemed to Caird little else than the suicide of knowledge. The unity which is the ideal of knowledge and the ultimate test of reality cannot, any more than the unity which is our ideal of love, be one in which all difference between subject and object, self and other, has disappeared. The difference is as essential as the unity: it is essential *to* the unity. For the unity, of which we are in search, is the unity of an individuality that maintains itself, not only in spite of the difference, but in and through the difference. To give up this ideal, or to use it

as a means of cutting away the ground on which all self-conscious experience rests, is to give up everything. It is this that Caird meant when in a letter¹ he described Bradley's critical method as "all blade and no handle." It is our self-consciousness that puts the standard or test of organic unity into our hands, and the test is a deadly one if it only cuts the hand that uses it. What it is necessary to emphasize in the face of this suicidal use of the principle of unity is the positive character of the relationship between self and object that underlies the negative and is the logical *prius* of it. Each stands opposed to the other, *yet each contains the secret of the other's life*. "Objects can be recognised as real only if, and so far as they have that unity in difference, that permanence in change, that intelligible individuality, which are the essential characteristics of mind."² *Vice versa*, it is only as subjects realize in themselves that which is permanent amid change, that which is one in the many, that they attain unity with themselves and rise to a sense of their own individuality and permanence.

It is this reciprocity of relation between knowledge and reality that has been the central light of all the seeing of idealistic writers since Plato, and that flashes out in all their deepest utterances. It is implied in Plato's theory in the *Meno* that the soul in knowing anything may be said to know all things, seeing that "all things are akin," and that in *knowing* it participates in the *being* of things. It is still

¹ See above, p. 206.

² *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. i. p. 193.

more explicitly contained in Aristotle's doctrine that the reason in a true sense *is* all things that it knows.¹ It is implied, however little he realized its full significance, in Kant's doctrine that the Self, instead of being as he sometimes seems to think, an empty form that recedes from its relation to the object into itself, is a centre of activity whose nature it is to go out of itself to objects and other selves, and to return thence with a new consciousness of itself and of that which is other than itself.² Anything that falls short of this, as Kant's in the end does, is to Caird at least an arrested form of Idealism; anything that goes beyond it and denies the element of difference is an Idealism that has gone to seed. In either case it is one that must fail to satisfy the demands that are made upon philosophy by the humanistic spirit of our age.

If it be urged against a theory that finds in self-consciousness so interpreted the very type of reality, that it must in consistency deny reality to anything that is not self-conscious and assert the paradox that "every object thinks," Caird was prepared to admit with Plato and Bradley that there may be different degrees, or, as he preferred to express it, different *kinds* of reality—a doctrine which he found himself the freer to maintain in view of the place which he assigned to the idea of evolution as the key to the interpretation of the different forms under which reality is revealed to us.

¹ See Arist. *de An.* iii. 4. *δυνάμει πῶς ἔστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς* and Caird's treatment of it in *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, i. pp. 332 foll.

² See especially *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. p. 407 foll.

It is the tenacity with which he held to this interpretation of Idealism and the consistency with which he expounds it that constitutes the chief importance for our time of Caird's metaphysical philosophy. What it meant for him will be best seen if we follow some of the applications which he made of it in the main departments of philosophy.

CHAPTER IV

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

WE have seen how Caird conceived the main problem of modern philosophy as that of "gaining or regaining such a view of things as shall reconcile us to the world and to ourselves." The need of this reconciliation has arisen from the threat to "the mighty hopes that make us men" which the victorious advance of the physical sciences seems to involve. While material knowledge marches steadily along "the secure path of science," the claims of the spirit seem more and more to find their defenders rather in the "undrilled battalions of unscientific opinion than in the rival army of science."¹ Such a state of things is fatal to man's spiritual unity. But neither can it be good for science and knowledge themselves, seeing that it awakens in many of the best minds of the age a distrust of all rational explanation of the world in which they live, and forms a standing invitation to them to fall back on unreasoning faith. Already in Kant's time this conflict had become the main problem of the age. Kant's solution of it consisted rather in a species of *disarmed* neutrality than in any real reconciliation of the conflicting claims. Materialism was met by

¹ *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. p. 41.

the proof that its concepts, valid though they were for the explanation of *phenomena*, were inapplicable to things as they are in themselves. At the same time, philosophy was warned off the disputed territory, as equally impotent to establish any positive conclusions as to the reality of spirit. The position was clearly an unstable one, and since Kant's time there has been a constant renewal on the part of science of the attempt to find "natural law in the spiritual world" and to assimilate the mental to the physical order. On the other hand, this attempt has been as constantly met by "obstinate questionings that refuse to be kept within the lines laid down for them by the Critical Philosophy." Caird's own reading of Kant's principle seemed to him to carry us beyond this see-saw. On the one hand, it vindicated the claim of the sciences to a knowledge of the real as opposed to the world of mere appearance and left them free to carry out their own assumptions to the utmost limit of their applicability. On the other hand, it enabled him to find implied in the ideal of the sciences themselves a deeper principle which set a limit to these assumptions.

The principle that Kant had established (to repeat it) was that all knowledge reflects the unity of the mind itself. This did not mean merely that psychologically every act of knowledge involves a reference to the experience of the knowing subject as a whole, as understood in the modern doctrine of apperception—important as this is in view of any attempt to reduce knowledge to a mere succession of sensations with their accidental associations. It meant further that, from the side of logic and epistemology,

in every act of knowledge a multiplicity of aspects is brought together in a form which reflects the nature of the mind itself, functioning through its categories or principles of interpretation. Further still, it meant that this unity provides us with an ideal of the form that completely satisfying knowledge must ultimately take. "Our faculty of knowledge," said Kant himself, "feels a higher want than merely to spell out phenomena according to their synthetic unity in order to be able to read them as experience." It feels the want to see the world as a whole of interconnected parts and ultimately as one with the intelligence which apprehends it.

Where Kant faltered was in his conceiving of this ideal as nowhere verified in actual experience. In his own language it was not a "constitutive" but merely a "regulative" principle. It inspires and guides the procedure of the sciences without ever being found as an element in the actual constitution of nature. To Caird, on the contrary, it was "the latent assumption," which every intelligence carries with it in all its reflective dealings with its experience from the simplest to the highest, that the world is one and that to see it in its unity is to see it as it really is in itself. Science begins in wonder, in other words, in the first clash of this "latent assumption" with the apparent incoherence that early experience reveals. In saying this, Idealism has no quarrel with the familiar fact that science has its origin in practical needs and to the end is never wholly divorced from them. It merely calls attention to the equally familiar fact that to seek for unity is itself,

as Kant calls it, a want, which, if not practical in the ordinary sense, is as fundamental as those we ordinarily call practical.

While all science is thus a search for systematic unity in experience, it is the search for a unity of elements which must first be seen in their no less essential differences. Science must be analytic before it can be synthetic. It must be abstract before it can be concrete. And this means not merely that it must reduce the things and events with which it deals to their ultimate elements before it can unite them, but that it must limit itself in the first instance to some one cross-section or rather layer of the solid world, some particular aspect of the things about us, before, by piecing these again together, it can gather the lesson of the full nature of the whole of which they are the parts. It was in this way that reflection first struck into "the secure path of science," and it is in this way that one after another of these aspects of things (their numerical and geometrical relations, their material structure and determinate motions, their qualitative diversities) came to attract attention. It is thus that the several sciences have arisen and, so far as they have been true to their ideal and method, they have gone on conquering and to conquer.

The danger is that these conquests should blind them to the limiting conditions under which their triumphs have been won and that they should forget the rock whence they were hewn. It is indeed natural, and in a sense right, that they should to some extent forget, seeing that "science requires rather the thorough and unhesitating application of a category

than the perception of its limits." Yet the limits are there. Nothing exists that falls only under one category or mode of explanation, or exists in only a single relation to other things. "There is no aspect or element of the real world which exists alone. Of none of them can we say what it would be or whether it could be at all, if the others were removed."¹ Things are more than the numerical aggregates, or than the changing forms of energy, or than the combinations of chemical elements that mathematics and mechanics and chemistry respectively assume. It might, indeed, be claimed by these sciences that this fact constitutes no real limit: that, while account must of course be taken of these other relations, this merely means that the problem, which science as a whole has to face in carrying out its principles, becomes more complex and difficult as the scope of their application widens. This, as a matter of fact, is the claim that has been persistently put forward by mechanical physics in modern times. The answer of Idealism to it is not to appeal *against* science to some other principle, such as revelation or faith, brought in from without to limit its claims, but to appeal to science itself, recalling it to its own principle, the faith or the ideal which inspires it. If it is true to itself it will admit, in the first place, that the ideal is to render the world intelligible to thought, to attain such a conception of the world as will show it to be a system of inwardly related parts, revealing itself in changing forms, yet maintaining itself through them in its own individuality. In the second place, it will admit that this ideal is unrealiz-

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 322.

able so long as the thinker remains within the limits of any single category or relation.

It is for this reason that we fail to make the world intelligible to ourselves if, for example, we treat it as merely an accidental collection of things acting upon one another *from without*, or again as a series of changes, in which the cause merely *disappears* in the effect.¹ So far as scientific thought is arrested at this point of view (and mechanics is right in requiring that for its special purpose it should be so arrested), the mind in the pursuit of its own ideal will be driven on by the scientific impulse itself to cancel the self-imposed limitations of the mechanical sciences and seek for categories more adequate to the solution of their own problems. This is not due merely to the *greater number* of the phenomena to be explained in the concrete world, but to successive changes in the *character* of the phenomena to be explained. And it points to two things. It shows first that "the general faith that the world is an intelligible system requires to be justified in a different way in every new science. Physics and chemistry have secrets which cannot be unlocked with a mathematical key; nor would biology ever have made the advance, which in this century it has made, without the aid of a higher conception of evolution than that which reduces it to a mere 'mode of motion.' And if the effort, which is now being made to explain the nature and history of man, is to succeed it undoubtedly will require a still higher conception or principle of

¹ *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii. p. 519.

explanation.”¹ It points, secondly, to the fact that not only are we unable to apply our science, but we cannot know what its results really mean unless we reverse the process of abstraction with which we began and reinstate the elements which we left out of account.² And if this is so, it seems to follow that ultimately every object requires the highest principle to explain it, “at least,” Caird adds, “for a philosophy which accepts the principle of evolution,” as most present-day philosophers do. If we would understand what the results of the sciences really mean, we must look back upon these results and re-read them in the light of the self-conscious intelligence, which, as Plato says of the Good, is the principle alike of the being of the world and of our knowledge of it.

Returning to the question of the general character of scientific knowledge and the relation of the special sciences to one another, we shall recognize that, while as specializations or divisions of knowledge they are necessarily abstract, and for this reason must individually fail to give us the key to the explanation of the world they have divided between them, they nevertheless may differ in the degree of their abstractness. Modern attempts at a logic of the sciences, such as those of Comte and Spencer, have made us familiar with this view of them as forming a hierarchy of growing concreteness from mathematics to sociology. This will not, however, mean, as these philosophers supposed, that the later and more concrete sciences differ from the earlier

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 5 and n, quoted below.

² *Op. cit.* p. 323.

and more abstract merely in embracing a wider range of facts to be correlated under the same principle as suffices in the case of the earlier. There is a hierarchy also of *principles*, each of which is higher than its logical predecessor in so far as it corrects the abstractness of its point of view—the last the highest in the sense that it alone presents us with an idea that is adequate to interpret to us the whole fullness of reality. In order to do so it must be able to carry us beyond that last of all abstractions, the abstraction of the object of knowledge from the knowing mind. It is thus that we must conceive of a philosophy of the human spirit, not as something which has to be vindicated *against* the advance of the special sciences, but as something which is already vindicated *in* it. Spirit is justified of *all* its children. To complete the justification, more, certainly, is required of a philosophy of knowledge than a demonstration of “the general idealistic view of the world.” There remains for philosophy the Herculean task of seeking to trace the inner connexion of the principles of which science avails itself at different levels of interpretation. Caird was well aware of this, and held that Hegel had done a lasting service to philosophy in pointing it out, however defective his own attempt to perform this task may ultimately be judged to be.

While he had the utmost sympathy with younger men, who, like Dr. M'Taggart and Mr. Bradley, sought to revise or supplement Hegel's work, Caird himself never attempted anything of the kind. He seemed to feel that the more pressing work of philosophy in his time was to insist on the central principle of Idealism, as he had come to understand it, and to

apply it to the reinterpretation of man's moral, social and religious life. He was perhaps confirmed in this view by his conviction that, valuable as was the work of these two distinguished writers, they both seemed to him to have failed (though in different ways) at a crucial point to realize the full strength of the principle of self-consciousness as the uniting focus of all differences the clue to the solution of all ultimate problems. Bradley's "Absolute" had become more and more like Spinoza's Substance in which all differences were lost. M'Taggart's community of souls made perfect in *love* had left the relation of reason and will to this all-absorbing principle in the last instance inexplicable.¹

Before following Caird in his application of the principle of self-consciousness in other fields, it may serve further to bring out the significance of his view of it, if we contrast it shortly with the contemporary attempt to solve the same problem in a different way by carrying the war into the camp of science and attempting to dissolve the conception of mechanism itself by "letting contingency into the very heart of things."² Though the view has had distinguished representatives in England, the clearest statement of it is probably that contained in Émile Boutroux's book on the *Contingency of the Laws of Nature*, first published in 1874. It is impossible here to follow the detailed

¹ Caird's criticism of Dr. M'Taggart is contained in an unprinted manuscript of his report as examiner for the Doctorate of Letters upon his book *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*: see p. 237. For criticism of Mr. Bradley, see above, p. 286.

² Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 280 (3rd ed.).

exposition.¹ The essence of it is that science, in offering a mechanical explanation of things, fails to grasp the essence of that which it analyzes. There is in nature even in its lowest and simplest forms an element of spontaneity or accident which science fails to take into account. This failure, moreover, is inevitable, seeing that it follows from the very idea of what constitutes intelligibility, viz. reduction to exact equivalence ($A=A$). *A fortiori* it is impossible for science by such a logic to explain higher and more complex forms of reality, such as are found in life and mind.

Boutroux's view, as thus stated in condensed form, bears an apparent resemblance to Caird's. It recognizes that reality shows a progress from lower to higher forms, and insists with him that the higher cannot be explained in terms of the lower, the fuller in terms of the emptier. On the other hand, the ground of this contention is not, with Boutroux, that science is abstract, in that it isolates one phase or aspect of the world, but that this aspect has no real existence except in the mind of the scientist. There is no rigorous conformity to law in nature answering to the logical rigour of science with its definitions, postulates, hypotheses and proofs. In attacking, therefore, the conceptions of science, philosophy is tilting at a windmill. These conceptions correspond to nothing in nature herself, but are artificial constructions of science, "a well-made language," devised to serve her own ends, but without roots in the nature of things.

¹ For a brilliant review of it, with which Caird would have heartily agreed, see Guido de Ruggiero's *Modern Philosophy*, p. 160 foll. (Eng. Tr. Allen & Unwin, 1920).

A view of this kind, resolving, as it does, all scientific and ultimately all philosophical truth into what happens to work in the sense of what saves work, however satisfactory it may seem to the distinguished mathematicians and physicists¹ who have adopted it, is in fundamental contradiction to Caird's view of the relation between reason and thought on the one hand, and reality on the other, as he, after Kant, conceived it. Instead of seeing that thought and reality are indissolubly connected from the first, the theory conceives of thought as a merely formal activity approaching a ready-made reality from the outside and endeavouring to fit nature's concrete phenomena into its own abstract formulae. Instead of a reason immanent in Nature, we have a reason brought in from the outside, and the whole work of Kant is destroyed. The theory makes a false start in attributing to science as the principle of its logic the empty formula $A=A$. It ends, as was only to be expected, in reducing the laws of nature to statistical statements of average results whose "truth" (if this can have any meaning) is guaranteed by their utility. The significance of a view like Caird's consists in its offering another alternative to the choice here offered, between the interpretation of science as mere tautology or as mere economy. Thought in general is never merely analytic and tautological. It is always in search of unity in difference, when it is not in search of difference in unity. The thought of the physical sciences is the search for a particular kind of unity in a particular kind of difference. Economy in application—the

¹ *E.g.* M. Henri Poincaré.

degree in which a formula *works* for particular purposes—is an excellent practical test. But the real test of its *truth* is the degree in which it *works in* with experience as a whole ; in other words, the degree in which it fits into the general scheme of consistent judgments which all thought and all science assume as their ideal goal.

If it be asked how far, upon such a view as this, mechanical explanations of phenomena ought to be carried and what it is that sets a limit to them, Caird's answer to the first question is that they must be carried to their utmost limits in every field of investigation. To forestall the results of the physical sciences in their analytic work of tracing the material conditions of events and to appeal prematurely to final causes, as Socrates, for instance, is represented as doing in a well-known passage in the *Phaedo*, is to "pluck the unripe fruit of wisdom" and to condemn ourselves to failure. "Teleology may not under all circumstances be a barren study, but it must be barren to anyone who is not prepared to go through the patient labour of dissection and analysis."¹ We have got to realize the magnitude and slowness of the mining process of science before we can hope to reach the end or ultimate result of philosophy. "It is just when analysis has done its work as completely as possible, that we become clearly conscious that no final account (of the actions of man or any other being) can be given, till we have discovered the one principle that manifests itself in all its differences and binds them into one organic

¹ *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. i. p. 134.

whole." It was for this reason that Caird was prepared to see in the critical and apparently destructive work of science a necessary phase in the process by which the human mind advances to sound constructive results. "The revolt of science against a premature teleology was a necessary step in the very history of the process by which in modern times philosophy has been advancing to a more complete teleological view of the universe."¹

The answer to the second of the above questions is that what limits the mechanical principle is not some unintelligible surd that escapes all law or rational explanation, but the fact that a mechanical law remains itself unintelligible unless it be taken as a partial statement of a higher law. The difficulty which the "philosophy of contingency" seeks to meet is a self-made one and largely arises from the narrow meaning assigned to "law," as something pressing upon things from the outside. So soon as we substitute for this (largely metaphorical) use of the word the idea of law as simply a principle of explanation, we shall be prepared to admit that the reign of law is universal and that nothing happens without a cause, while at the same time insisting that there are many kinds of law and many kinds of cause. As a matter of fact, as we have seen, each new level of existence requires a new law or principle of explanation. As Caird himself says in a passage which anticipates the above criticism of the kind of arrested Idealism which this philosophy represents: "If we try to dispense with such a principle, we shall find many a phenomenon escaping

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 133 and 135.

into contingency and defying all our efforts to find a place for it in our imperfectly conceived cosmos. What is worse, the attempt to subject facts to an insufficient theory is apt to awaken a revolt against the very idea of law and even to call forth a denial of the possibility of any rational explanation of the facts in question. And the only result that can emerge will be an unprofitable controversy between those who would solve the difficulty by means of an inadequate principle and those who maintain that it cannot be solved on any principle whatever, or, in other words, that we must be content with a faith that cannot be rationally justified.”¹

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, i. pp. 6 and 7. The general harmony of the above view with current theories of “relativity” hardly requires to be pointed out.

CHAPTER V

ETHICS

It may seem surprising that though engaged during a long life in teaching Moral Philosophy Caird left no systematic work upon Ethics. Even his public class teaching in Glasgow was mainly historical, and consisted rather in a review of older theories than in an independent development of one of his own. This omission indeed towards the end of his life he intended to supply, but it is doubtful whether he would have added anything material to what may be read by the attentive student between the lines of his criticism of others. He believed in Jowett's dictum that "moral philosophy should be largely historical," and seemed always to find himself more at home in bringing out the essential truth that underlies the great classical writers than in developing his own ideas in detail. The method gave scope to the power, in which he was not excelled by Hegel himself, of criticising philosophies from within. He never sought to refute a theory by a logic alien to its own—holding, as he did, that a philosophy which did not refute itself was either irrefutable or not worth refuting. It is to be remembered, moreover, that in Ethics, as elsewhere, his main interest tended to centre round the single point of the

meaning and implications of the principle of self-consciousness. When these were understood in all their significance there remained little else to say. A recent writer¹ has mentioned, as a current criticism of the Idealistic Philosophy, that it has "much to say but little to teach." With regard to Caird the epigram might have some point if it were inverted. He had much to teach but little to say. Here at any rate we must be content to try to indicate what he regarded as the central principle of a sound and comprehensive Ethics.

We have already seen how the problem presented itself to him, as the vindication of the authority of the self-imposed law of duty or right over the law of the merely sensitive nature which we have in common with the lower animals. It is in the power of being determined by such a law, in other words of being *self*-determined, that human freedom consists. The question therefore of the "freedom of the will" was not one, as is sometimes said, that Ethics can afford to neglect. On the contrary, it is quite central to the whole discussion. If there is no self-determination, no power of determining conduct by the idea of a *self* other than the fragment of our nature which finds satisfaction in the objects of our relatively isolated and casual desires, all *moral* distinctions fall to the ground. The ultimate problem of Ethics is therefore that of the real operation in human conduct of the idea or consciousness of such a self and the relation of it to the objects of instinct and appetite, passion and desire, which are

¹ G. S. Brett in *History of Psychology*, vol. iii. p. 90.

the springs of unreflective action. So stated this was to Caird merely another form of the problem of the relation of self-consciousness to the consciousness of objects in knowledge. The difficulties we encounter, or rather which we make for ourselves, in trying to answer the one are, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as those we encounter in trying to answer the other. The solution of them is to be sought in the same fundamental criticism of the assumption in which these difficulties have their root.

In the case of knowledge, we have seen what this assumption consisted in, namely, that in subject and object we have at the outset two essentially different things existing side by side (in the modern phrase, "compresent" with each other), and that the problem is to define the contribution which each of them independently makes to what we call experience. In the endeavour to solve this problem thinkers, in so far as they were in earnest and refused to rest content with a mere unresolved dualism, were inevitably driven to choose between an empiricism which gave all (or, at least, all that was worth having) to the object, and an idealism which reduced the object to a fiction of the mind ultimately traceable to the fixity of its own habits or the confusion of its own ideas. In the one case knowledge was the passive reception of something given ready-made from without; in the other it was a private possession of a subject enclosed within itself. In both cases the general result was the same: the denial of the possibility of the knowledge of a real world. In the one case we have a mere succession of particular impressions and memories unfocussed

in that integral, internally coherent form we call experience ; in the other we have a subject without windows or doors opening on nothing beyond itself. The only way out of this *impasse* was to return to the initial assumption and to revise it in the light of a more thoroughgoing analysis. What such an analysis reveals is not two realities, a subject and an object, existing independently of each other, but two sides of one reality : an object, which comes to be an object only through the activity of the subject ; and a subject, which only manifests itself in active communion with an object.

In Ethics the place of the antithesis between object and subject is taken by the opposition between the passions (including instincts, appetites and desires), each with its own externally given object, and the reason or conscience with its claim to dominate and supersede the motive which these supply by an inner, self-given and universal law. In Ethics also, corresponding to the two opposite lines on which the solution of the problem of knowledge was sought, we have successive attempts to resolve this dualism by subordinating everything to passion or everything to reason.

On the one hand there was the theory that the will can respond to no object except in so far as appetite and passion are enlisted on its side : in Hume's phrase, that reason neither is nor can be anything more than " the handmaid of the passions." It is easy to see where such a theory leads. It is true that a being who, like man, has the power of thought and language, can abstract from particular satisfactions the pleasure which is a

common feature of them and, by making this into an object, set the idea of happiness as a sum total of satisfactions against the satisfaction of momentary desire. But if this emendation meets some of the more obvious difficulties of the "handmaid" theory, it leaves the position essentially the same. For, in the first place, it makes no real difference in the motives of action. The only motives are the natural inclinations which man shares with the animal creation. Reason contributes nothing except the power of conceiving their objects in the abstract and of ordering details so as to secure a maximum of satisfaction in them. In the second place, there would be no real unity introduced in this way into human life. The idea of "happiness" in Caird's words "would afford no principle of unity to mark out the compass and articulation of a definite whole so that every part might have its destined place. It would be merely 'a general title' under which many particulars could be brought, or an indefinite aggregate of similar parts, which have no essential relations, and which, therefore, form only a quantitative whole, *i.e.* do not, properly speaking, form a whole at all. Viewing it as an end, we could not tell that any element was essential to it; and, viewing action as a means to its attainment, we could not say that any action would finally help or hinder it. In any case the influence of this 'ideal of the imagination' (as Kant would call it) would not be different in character from the influence of the desires of particular pleasures, though it might introduce some external restraint of one desire with a view to the gratification of another, or of all desires with a

view to a (doubtfully calculable) sum of gratifications."¹ Herewith finally would disappear all claim to the universality which is an essential feature of the moral consciousness. Appeal doubtless is made to experience, and this is something that is open to all. But "the experience in question would be good only for the individual and for the individual only at a particular time."

Opposing this experiential theory we have, on the other hand, the attempt to assign to reason, as an independent factor in human nature, the power of determining conduct in its own right in defiance of the claims of natural appetite and desire. It was along this line that the Stoics, in the ancient world, Kant, in the modern, sought to make room for the autonomy of the will and to vindicate the reality of a universal law of Duty essentially opposed to the call of particular desires. As developed by these philosophers, this theory contained an essential element of truth. By assigning to the rational self the rôle of an autonomous principle, requiring the subjection of the natural inclinations to a law of its own, it cuts away the roots of the attempt to find an immediate identity between the spiritual and the natural, and seeks to provide a place for a true *moral* order, an order which *ought* to be, as contrasted with the order that *is*. With this aim a true ethics must be in essential sympathy. All true moral growth involves a definite break with the life of mere natural impulse. The whole truth at once of Christianity and of moral philosophy seemed to Caird to be summed up in the principle that we

¹ *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii. p. 182.

must "die to live," die to the "law of the members" in order to live to the "law of the mind." "This discord of the universal form of reason with the content derived from the particular passions is the essential element of the truth which is contained in all ascetic systems of Ethics."

None the less, he held that these systems had failed equally with all forms of naturalism (though in an opposite way) at the crucial point. This failure was veiled in Kant himself by a depth of moral insight which carried him beyond the strict logic of his premisses. But with all the justice that we can do him (and no one has done him more justice than Caird) we have to acknowledge in the end the essential formalism and barrenness of his system. The reason was that it shared "the congenital fault of all merely negative systems which forget that a negative implies a positive, and that, if we attempt to treat a negative relation as negative only, it ceases to be a relation or indeed to be anything at all."¹ As contrasted with naturalism it is necessary to emphasize the fact that in every human consciousness "there is a more or less distinctly perceived antagonism between the immediate gratification of impulse and the realization of the self, and so between that which men feel *inclined* to do and that which they conceive they *ought* to do. What ascetic systems do is to sharpen the antagonism to a point at which reason appears as just the negative of passion."² To remain at this point is as disastrous as never to have reached it. For to deny the place of passion and desire is to cut

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 201.

² *Ibid.* p. 200.

oneself off from all concrete human interests, to shut the spirit up in the cell of its own self-contained independence, instead of finding a home for it in the wide world of human good. In opposition to all this we must maintain that "the moral ideal has no meaning except as it expresses, not only 'the spirit of the years to come yearning to mix itself with life,' but also the spirit which is already mixing itself with life, which only as it does so mix, can be present to the consciousness of men as their moral ideal."¹

The error which underlies both of these one-sided theories, like that which underlies the corresponding theories of knowledge, consists in the false opposition of the terms of the problem. It was not perceived that, as elements in the nature of a being capable of self-consciousness, the character of the inclinations is altered and the distinction between them and "reason" is already in principle overcome. In human desire, even in its simplest form, as distinguished from mere animal appetite, we have an implicit reference of the object to a self; in the more complicated and self-conscious form (as in deliberation or temptation) we have the explicit distinction between some particular object and a permanent self which seeks its satisfaction in it. When therefore we speak, as we do in such a case, of the opposition between inclination and reason, it is not an opposition between a merely natural and a spiritual self, but between a self (which is by its very nature spiritual) as imperfectly realized in some particular object and a self which can only be

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 240.

fully realized in a form of life in which all particular objects are subordinated to the good of the whole.

From the first we are in a world of real objects or things desired. From the first, also, we are in a world of ideals. Even when there is no sense of opposition between the actual and the ideal, and we seem to be following mere natural inclination, yet, in so far as the impulse comes before us as *our* inclination, the ground of the opposition is implicitly present. As Caird puts it: "The very introduction of the particular object as an element into self-consciousness—and it must be so introduced, if represented as an end for me—involves that it is subjected to a kind of unconscious criticism, in which it is compared with the idea of good."¹ As a matter of fact, the conditions of this criticism are always present, if not in the stirring of an inward "conscience" in the individual, yet in the requirements of a social life which exercises a curb on natural selfishness. "In such a community, even if it be of the most elementary form, even if it be confined to the simplest domestic or tribal ties, there is a beginning of that separation of the natural from, and its subordination to the spiritual, of which the highest moral life can be nothing more than the development."²

It has often been asked whether there is anything really original in the Idealist Philosophy of Caird and Green. Real originality is a severe, in the end

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 284.

² *Op. cit.* p. 235. See *Gorgias*, 466 E, where it is said of tyrants οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὡν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ποιεῖν μέντοι ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτιστον εἶναι and Caird's comment on it: *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, i. p. 101.

perhaps an ambiguous test. Applied in the sense of absolute newness, who would stand before it? But if it be taken to mean, as it ought to be, the discovery of new significance and new applications of what is old and familiar, it has a wider range. The perception that what man as a self-conscious being really seeks is not to satisfy his *desires* but to satisfy *himself*, and that he can only satisfy himself by the highest and most comprehensive of goods is as old as Plato's distinction in the *Gorgias* between what men desire and choose and what they *will*. It was a new application of this principle, amounting to a new departure, when it was seized upon and developed by Green in the masterly chapters at the beginning of the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, and not less brilliantly applied by Caird in his criticism of Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*. Their own moral philosophy is sometimes represented as an attempt to "found ethics upon metaphysics." That there can be no true and satisfying ethical theory which is not organically connected with a true theory of knowledge and reality was of course the conviction of both Caird and Green. But, so far as this particular doctrine of the nature of will and desire is concerned, what we find in both of them is only a particularly penetrating piece of psychological analysis, which it is not too much to say has been supported and confirmed by the best writers in this field since their time.¹

¹ See, for instance, Stout's *Manual of Psychology*, bk. iv. chap. x. Readers familiar with recent developments of the psychology of feeling and instinct can hardly fail to recognize how much Caird's whole treatment of desire has in common with them. If some of the writers, to whom we owe these developments, had been more

Returning to the problem as stated at the outset, we shall be prepared in the light of this analysis, while rejecting the error, to do justice to the truth that Naturalism and Formal Idealism respectively contain. Naturalism is right in its contention that thought or reason in itself can provide no motive of action. All action springs from felt want in man and animal alike. But in man want comes as a tension of feeling between the present state and the idea of an object, in attaining which the tension will be relieved and his want will be satisfied. In this tension, which can only exist in a being with the capacity of thought (though there is no need to limit it to man), there lies the promise and potency of determination by the idea of a self as something more than and, it may be, opposed to the satisfaction of the particular want. Without this power of setting the self, as a universal, against the particular object, morality is impossible; with it, morality is already there in germ. On the other hand, it is in the recognition of the necessity of this negative attitude to the claim of mere feeling that, as already said, the truth of the opposite theory lies. In being conscious of myself, I am conscious of what is more than any particular inclination or aggregate of inclinations: *their* satisfaction is not the satisfaction

careful to read the results of their analysis in the light of his central doctrine that a being with the capacity for self-consciousness can never be a mere meeting ground of *forces* but is always, potentially at least, the centre of a growing more or less systematized world of *interests*, they would have been saved from a good many mistakes, and would have greatly added to the philosophical value of their work. I may perhaps be allowed to refer to what I have said on this point in *Social Purpose*, p. 66 foll.

of *me*. What it fails to recognize is that this something more is not a self, which is to be realized in independence of all objects of desire, but one that is to be realized in an organized whole of objects, the ideal of which is latent in every being who has capacity of self-consciousness. Hence the law which the individual lays down for himself is not that he should cease to desire but that he should cease to take his desires at their face value, unchecked by the idea of the whole in which his "good" consists and to which particular objects only contribute the constituent elements. True, there is no desire which is not related to some sort of whole and there are degrees of comprehensiveness—of reality, as Plato would have said—in the objects of desire. But this merely means that the check or the denial is always of a form of the self: it is the denial of it at a lower level in order to affirm it at a higher. The higher and completer the good that is conceived of the deeper the denial. But we never overleap the world of the self within which the soul lives and moves and has its being, as some theories of self-transcendence suggest. It is "more life and fuller that we want." The want can never be satisfied till all things are ours and we are God's, or rather, as Caird puts it, till all things are ours *because* we are God's.¹ But in being God's we are only more truly our own because more truly individualized, more truly self-conscious because knowing ourselves as we are known.

But, before passing from the moral to the religious consciousness, which is its fulfilment, and to which

¹ *Hegel*, p. 215.

it leads, we have to follow the application which Caird makes of this idea of the good as essentially self-realization in his philosophy of society. If the idea of the self as a whole is the clue to the moral life, and if, as Caird held, "the moral ideal has no meaning except as it expresses the spirit which is already mixing itself with life and which, only as it does so mix, can be present to the consciousness of men as their moral ideal," there can be no true study of the individual moral consciousness which is not also a study of social consciousness.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

IN a sense Caird's interest in political and social philosophy may be said to have been secondary to his interest in ethics and religion. Even in his masterly little book on *Comte's Social Philosophy* he is occupied far more with Comte's general philosophy and his religion of humanity than with the "Positive Polity." Of Green perhaps it might be said that the opposite was true, and there is no respect in which the work of the two thinkers more finely dovetailed than in this. Yet Caird was not less convinced than Green that the key to man's ethical life was to be found in his membership in an organized community, and no writer has made more effective use of this idea than he has in his philosophy of religion and particularly in his interpretation of Christianity. Perhaps it is not too much even to say that his whole conception of human civilization is set in the framework of the conflict between the growing sense of the freedom of the individual and the claim of a unitary society to the allegiance of its members, which is the fundamental problem of political philosophy.

At the beginning, as for instance in Greece, the natural unity of society easily secured both in fact

and theory the dominance of the idea of the community as against the first stirrings of individualism in ethics and politics. What strikes Aristotle in the exacting communism of the Platonic Republic is not so much the suppression of individual liberty as the suppression of subordinate forms of social life which are necessary to make the unity truly organic. It was not till the break up of this natural political community that pluralistic ideas rose to the dignity of an independent philosophy in the teaching of the Stoics and Epicureans. Even so, the form which Roman civilization took was such as largely to reconcile Stoic and Epicurean alike to the legal unity it imposed. In the modern world the opponents have met in far more deadly grip. It is no longer Greek meeting Greek—the undeveloped idea of the individual meeting the undeveloped idea of the State—but the clash of opposites rendered mighty by the ranging of new forces on either side. On the one side, we have the rise of the nation, with all the power that the exigencies of the new environment force it to seek ; on the other, the sense of freedom and individuality partly inherited from Germanic ancestors, but chiefly owing its power to the very civic civilization which it challenged. It was in this war of elements that modern social philosophy had its birth, and from Hobbes to the present day it has been seeking for the idea that will reconcile and reunite them. Various and complicated as political theories have been, they fall naturally into two main groups according as, starting from the independence of the individual, they have sought to explain or explain away the claim of the whole

as something entirely secondary ; *or*, starting from the idea of the whole, they have sought to subordinate the claims of the individual spirit to its necessities. How little the most celebrated of them have succeeded is shown by the inevitableness with which the element they severally seek to subordinate forces itself to the front and extremes meet within them. Theories, like those of Rousseau and Kant, which have set out from the idea of the freedom and autonomy of the individual, have ended in the open or thinly veiled assertion of a despotic right of the community to compel men to be free. Theories, on the other hand, which, like Plato's and Comte's, begin by giving everything to society, end by refusing to forces within society—Plato to the family, Comte to the working classes—the legitimate expression which is its only defence against rebellion and anarchy, and so by undermining the authority they seek to establish.

In Caird's time political thought was still in the main divided along these lines. On the Continent, and particularly in Germany, it was dominated by the conception of the supremacy of the State—the result partly of historical circumstances, partly of exaggerated claims put forward by philosophers and historians. In England and America the prevailing theory was individualistic, as formulated in the teaching of books like Mill's *Liberty* and Spencer's *Man versus State*. In each case, as was to be expected, this oneness was met by violent forms of reaction : on the Continent by the internationalism of Marx or by secret anarchical propaganda ; in England by the advocacy of a

bureaucratic socialism, which threatened the freedom not only of individuals but of subordinate forms of social organization—even the Trade Union itself—with strangulation. The time seemed ripe for a social philosophy which should seek to unite the elements of truth which these rival philosophies contained, and offer some reliable guidance to a generation stirred with new hopes and a new spirit of constructive reform. It was this timeliness that gave the application of the principle of philosophical Idealism to social and political problems by Caird and Green its peculiar significance. The influence of T. H. Green on contemporary social and political movements is well known. Caird's work, as already said, was less conspicuously political. On the other hand, it may be said that the firmness with which he had grasped the central principle of Idealism and the fullness and consistency with which he expounded it served at once to deepen the foundations and to extend the application of the new teaching.

He recognized clearly the difficulty of the task. "The difficulty," he warns us, "of a consistent Idealism seems to reach its highest point when we consider the relations of self-conscious beings."¹ Such an Idealism requires us to maintain that, as there is no consciousness of the subject except in union with an object, so there is no consciousness of the self except in union with other conscious selves. Yet how can this be? "Here we have, it would seem, inner lives on both sides, which are reciprocally manifested only through an external

¹ *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii. p. 368.

medium, and which are not, therefore, in any direct contact with each other. How can we say that in any sense there is in such lives a unity which transcends and subordinates the differences? Do we not doubtfully infer the inner life of another from what he lets us see outwardly, which may be more or less deceptive, and which we may more or less skilfully interpret? And how can our communion in such circumstances be so intimate as to constitute a common moral life."¹

Caird's answer to this difficulty was in the first place to submit the psychological process by which we come to know other minds to the same kind of minute analysis as he had already applied to our knowledge of material things and to our apprehension of objects of desire. He points out that it is a fundamental error to represent the process by which we come to know external objects as essentially different from that by which we know other persons. "It is altogether an illusion to hold that we take the body of a man as at once given in perception and his soul as reached by inference from that body." In both cases there is a process of interpretation. "We are quite as much going beyond our inner self and using the analogy of what is within to interpret that which is without, when we refer our perceptions to inorganic substances acting on each other in space and time, as when we see in them the manifestation of the thought and will of self-conscious beings like ourselves."² All that can be said is that in the latter case the process is much more complex than in the former. But

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.* p. 370.

there is a deeper misunderstanding than this. The very ideas of interpretation and inference involve a misapprehension. They seem to assume that we know the self first and proceed to interpret things in the light of it. As a matter of fact, the starting point of knowledge is an undifferentiated feeling in which neither subject nor object has as yet appeared. The beginning of differentiation is given in the transition of feeling into consciousness of an object felt. "Feeling" contains in itself the germ of the consciousness of self in distinction from and in relation to such an object, but this consciousness is a further stage of development and, however much the consciousness of the object may seem historically to precede the consciousness of the subject, the process is throughout bilateral. What holds of the knowledge of objects holds of our knowledge of persons. "We find ourselves in others before we find ourselves in ourselves; the full consciousness of self comes only through the consciousness of beings without us who are also selves. Self-consciousness in one is kindled by self-consciousness in another, and a social community of life is presupposed in our first consciousness of ourselves as individual persons." What has led philosophers astray is the general tendency of scientific reflection to harden the just distinction between elements—in this case that between individual and society—into an opposition in which all sense of their essential relationship to each other is lost.

But the psychological account of the process by which we come to know other self-conscious beings is only part of the solution of our problem. Taken

by itself such an account merely establishes a *de facto* relation between self and society ; it does not answer the question of the *rightfulness* of any particular relation of the one to the other. By what right does society through its laws and systems of government exercise constraint over the lives of individuals ? If, as our analysis of the moral consciousness has shown, that only can be right which can be required of a man in the name of his own nature as a self-determining being, how can it ever be right for him to submit himself to the constraint of a law which is imposed upon him from without ?

It was this question that earlier political theory sought to answer by representing the will that is embodied in law and government as one that previously existed in the individual but had been transferred by him to the community by a species of contract. The theory cannot be met by ironically asking, with Carlyle, " What pray may have been the date of the contract ? " The transference, according to Rousseau and even to Hobbes, is an ideal one : it is not what each can be said at any time to have willed but what each would will if he had the opportunity. But that this defence merely evades the real difficulty is clearly seen at both extremes of the civic consciousness. At the one end of the scale we have the *conscience* which finds itself in opposition to the law of society as failing to represent the law of the spirit ; at the other end we have the *crime*, which is at war with it, as exercising restraint upon natural self-will. Yet the theory points to a fundamental truth in its insistence on the distinction between an explicit and an implicit

will. The mistake is in the interpretation of the nature and content of the latter. The error of all "contract" theories is that they assume that the nature of man as a self-conscious, rationally determined being is something realized in an isolated individual life, which has no essential relations to other self-conscious beings. They are thus led to conceive of the law as simply devised to confine individuals within definitely determined limits and prevent collision with one another. In law as thus negatively conceived it is impossible to see more than a species of compromise between the complete self-determination, which is the ideal of individual life, and claims arising from the accidental circumstance of the existence of other selves. Law and government upon such a view can have no essential relation to the ends of the individual as a self-contained personality, existing in his own right. It is only a further consequence of this that the sphere of law is itself necessarily conceived of as limited to the policeman's duty of keeping order and as incapable of making any positive contribution to the development of human personality.

It is quite otherwise if, rejecting the initial assumption of independent individuals, we conceive of the system of laws which establishes negative or limiting relations between citizens as founded on a prior *positive relation* of community in a form of life which is the condition of their realizing their nature as rational self-conscious beings. This means, indeed, that we must refuse to accept as adequate the conception of each man as an end in himself standing in reciprocal relations to others, who are in like

manner ends in themselves. It brings before us the truth that each can only be an end as he makes himself a means to the ends of society. But this is only to say that we must advance from the mechanical notion of social life as consisting in the reciprocal action of independent persons to the organic conception, according to which each is at once dependent and independent—at once a member of a whole and having a place and function independent of every other.¹ From the point of view thus reached there is a very real sense in which as self-conscious beings we may be said to impose law on ourselves and, in our lives as members of society, to will that this law should be supreme over ourselves and others. This does not mean that we assign any absolute value to the law as it actually exists, as though it were the final and satisfying condition of our freedom. What it means is that its defect, where it is defective, is not that it constitutes a restraint on what we will to do as isolated individuals, but that its restraints are misplaced and constitute a hindrance to the realization of the essentially social self, the development of whose capacities is the ultimate end of all law.

So interpreted, law and liberty, association and freedom no longer appear as terms of an antithesis. Each taken by itself and both together taken apart from the particular circumstances of the case are mere abstractions. "Freedom and association are not opposed but interdependent ideas, in such a sense that, separated from each other, they lose all their meaning. If anyone asserts the liberty of the

¹ *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii. p. 361 n.

individual, we cannot really say what is the value of the liberty he asserts until we know what is the nature of his social relations to those with whom, or against whom, he enjoys his freedom. If anyone asserts the unity of society, we need to ask what is the nature of the society he would maintain; how far it secures its unity by a mere despotic suppression of differences, and how far, on the other hand, it calls forth the individual and independent energies of its members. It is as useless in the abstract to denounce anarchy and individualism as it is in the abstract to denounce social pressure. And we may fairly set the anathemas of Rousseau and Diderot on the one side against the anathemas of Carlyle and St. Simon on the other. Individual liberty is valuable just in proportion to the lower or higher form of society as a member of which the individual enjoys it. And social unity is valuable in proportion as it leads to, or rests on, a higher form of individual freedom. We may admit, indeed, that the first essential of human civilization is the establishment of some kind of authority, some social pressure which shall put an end to the savage and almost brutal struggle for existence. Some kind of unity to limit individualism is the first requirement of human life, but that being granted, every step in advance consists in this, that the unity should be secured with less and less sacrifice of individual energy."¹ The authority, it is true, must always remain, and with it the power of enforcing it against those who so far forget their nature as social beings as themselves to appeal to

¹ *The Moral Aspect of the Economical Problem*, pp. 12 and 13.

force. But it will have no terror for others. What these fear is the guilt or the forgetfulness and not the penalty. To them law and authority are merely the negative conditions of a social life whose service is perfect freedom.

With this finally goes an enlarged conception of the sphere of the public authority. On such a view of the relation between society and individual it is impossible to lay down *a priori* any limits to social "interference." There are some things which the law by its very nature cannot do. It cannot "force men to be free." Man can only be free in being a law to himself. On the other hand, there is no limit to the extent to which the public authority may remove obstructions to the development of the capacities in the exercise of which true freedom consists. And where it may it must.¹

It was along such lines that Caird (in general agreement with Hegel) sought for the ground of social and political obligation. In recent times suspicion has been thrown upon the politics of Hegelian Idealism as in great measure the source of the immoral theory of the State which was so largely responsible for the Great War. It is, I think, impossible entirely to exonerate Hegel from the charge of making exaggerated claims for the authority of the State and of using phrases which, if taken without qualification, would mean little less than that might is right. On the other hand, against a view such as Caird's no similar accusation can be brought. Approaching the subject with quite other

¹ *Individualism and Socialism*, p. 18.

political traditions and having drunk more deeply of the humanitarian spirit of Kant, perhaps also having learned more thoroughly the main lesson of Kant's philosophy, he was under no similar temptation to exaggerate the ethical value of the National State. He realized with Kant that the full development of man's capacities as a self-conscious being was only possible in a society which reached beyond all merely natural limits of family, race or nation, and which could transcend and transform these natural ties, as individual morality transcends and transforms the natural instincts. He saw, moreover, more clearly than Hegel that although, as a matter of fact, no higher unity than that of the national or imperial State had yet taken organized form upon earth, yet the State in modern times no longer represents the highest moral unity of which we can conceive. While, therefore, he was prepared to maintain that the State (and he says the same of the Family) is that as against which individuals have no right, seeing that it is that from which all their rights are derived, he adds that this is only so far as it is "the ultimate social universal." And he ends by pointing out that "the very anticipation of a higher moral unity, however vague, leads to a kind of emancipation of the individual from the State and so causes an apparent separation of Law and Morals."¹

Caird nowhere attempted to apply these principles in detail to contemporary social or political problems,

¹ See *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii. p. 376, and what he says of the modern spirit in *The Moral Aspect of the Economical Problem*, *init.*

but in the two lectures already quoted in *The Moral Aspect of the Economical Problem* (1888) and *Individualism and Socialism* (1897) he tried to show their bearing upon the chief controversy of his time. He held that the result of experience and reflexion in his own time had been greatly to abridge the difference of outlook between individualist and socialist, and that it was a mistake to pay too much attention to the more violent utterances that come from conferences of socialists on the one side, or the uncompromising assertions of the representatives of Leagues for the Defence of Liberty and Property on the other. "The real drift of opinion is not permanently affected by partisan vehemency." "There is a great and growing force of thought and experience, which is steadily beating down the noise of faction and gaining ground for wider and more comprehensive views," and leading us away from "the falsehood of extremes." Here as elsewhere he found in evolution a "reconciling idea" which enables us to do justice to both the aspects of social life and rise above their opposition. With regard to the *end* of society, this principle teaches us to look for it in the utmost development of individual capacity, the "utmost strengthening of individual independence" and at the same time in "a close interdependence and connection of all the individuals with each other such that the common good of society shall evoke the greatest devotion on the part of the members of it." With regard to the *means* by which, in the course of history, the progressive spirit in man has sought to further this end, evolution teaches us to find it on the one hand in the emancipa-

tion of individuals from direct social pressure, on the other in the limitation of "the worst form of competition, which is war, and also of the next worst form of competition, which is fraud and the exploitation of the weak by the strong." For these we have to seek to substitute a form of competition "which is only the natural process whereby the individual is pressed up or down, till he finds his proper place—the place where he can best serve the community." Evolution warns us doubtless that "great social changes cannot be the creation of a day or a year but only of the slow working of man's new circumstances upon his thoughts and of the continuous reaction of his thoughts upon his circumstances." But it teaches us also that "human nature is extraordinarily flexible, that it is even capable of the most fundamental changes by the growth of new habits and ways of life; that human life and character may be, to a degree not easily calculable, remoulded by the new ideas that are now pouring in upon us from so many sources, and that more perfect relations of men with men may be established in the future society than have ever yet been imagined." In this sense Caird held that there might only be a verbal antithesis between evolution and revolution. In revolution, indeed, which takes violence for its watchword, he saw only the raw haste that is "half-sister to delay." But it followed from his view of the organic nature of human life that the change of any element in man's being necessarily involves the correlative change of all the other elements. "Hence of *his* changes we might say that, more than any other kinds of change they are revolutions, transitions

in which 'old things pass away and all things are made new.' "

These hopes were shared by many others in his time who spoke and wrote of progress and social evolution. Where he differed from and advanced beyond most of them was in finding the guarantee of progress not in any biological law of natural selection, nor in the development of an irrational "sympathy," but in the very nature of man as self-conscious intelligence. He would have accepted Bosanquet's dictum that the will contains the principle of progress in itself. But he would have added that it is a will which can only realize itself through the willingness to undertake the burden and the labour of thought which in modern politics is the prime condition of creative reform.

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CHAPTER VII

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

IN the justification of the religious consciousness philosophy in Caird's view finds its highest work. The book in which he set himself this task was at once recognized by the critics on its appearance in 1893 as his most original and telling contribution to the philosophy of his time. "We believe," wrote Dr. M'Taggart on the publication of the two volumes of Gifford Lectures entitled *The Evolution of Religion*, "that it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this book. It cannot fail to be of the highest value to specialists. But it may well be destined to work more honourable because more needed. It may serve, as no English book has yet served, to mediate between philosophy and life."¹ We have already seen that this is precisely how Caird conceives of the service of philosophy. Religion as "the elevation of the soul to God and the surrender of the will to the inspiration which the consciousness of God brings with it," needs no help from philosophy. It needs no proof of God and defies all criticism of the grounds of its own possibility. Yet in the development of the human mind a time inevitably comes when questions are raised to which

¹ *Mind*, N.S. vol. ii. p. 383.

religious experience itself provides no sufficient answer and men are constrained to advance from religion to theology. Once these questions have arisen it is impossible to regain the intuitive certainty into which they have broken. Such certainty as we may receive must come with an admixture of reflection, which, if it does not detract from its force, must alter its character. Such a time pre-eminently is the present when the whole view of the world on which traditional religions both in the East and West are founded has been changed owing to the advance of science and historical criticism, and when "the hard labour of distinguishing in the traditions of the past between the germinative principles out of which the future must spring, and those external forms and adjuncts, which every day is making more incredible, must be undertaken by anyone who would restore the broken unity of man's life."¹ Build or rebuild our temple we must, but "the spirit of the time compels us to build it with arms in our hands, to maintain our religious life amid the jar of controversy and with the consciousness of many difficulties which demand, but cannot always obtain from us a rational solution."²

It is important to realize at the outset precisely what is the object of our search. We set about our task in the wrong way if we seek for some common element of belief shared by all forms of religion from the grossest orgiastic fetishism to the purest and soberest monotheism. There is no such

¹ *Comte's Social Philosophy*, p. 187.

² *Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 38.

common belief to be found. Even the belief in a Divine Being must prove elusive as a distinguishing mark of the religious consciousness, seeing that some of the greatest religions have been without it. Even were it possible to find such a common element it would be no use to us, so different and disconnected are the forms in which it must appear. What we want is, as Caird expresses it in the above passage, a "germinative principle." In the forms through which any living thing such as a plant passes—seed, root, stalk, flower and fruit—it is vain to look for a common quality. What we have is a series of phases which a single life-principle exhibits in the course of its development. It is the same with religion. Here as elsewhere Caird finds the clue in the idea of evolution "the most potent instrument for bringing back difference to identity which has ever been put into the hands of science."¹ The task of a philosophy of religion is that of tracing a single principle through all the divergent forms it assumes at different stages of the development of human consciousness in general. Difficult and complicated though this task must be, it has one advantage which is of great importance. For, just as we cannot know what the seed is till we know what in the end it develops into, so in seeking to understand the nature of religion we must look to its later developments rather than to its first beginnings: to Christianity rather than to Judaism, to Buddhism rather than to the Vedas, to the forms of worship of civilized peoples rather than to the superstitions of savages.

So conceiving of his problem, Caird was prepared

¹ *Op. cit.* i. p. 26.

to find the clue both to the principle itself and to the law of its development in his general theory of the nature of human consciousness and the presuppositions on which all knowledge and action rest. All intelligent knowledge and action are a movement between the two poles of subject and object, self and the world. But the indissoluble relation in which these factors stand to each other is only comprehensible, as we have seen, on the assumption that underlying their diversity there exists an all-inclusive unity which constitutes the ground of the reality of both. Embracing the world of knowledge and practice like a crystal sphere, "bathing it like a transparent sea," this unity is apt, by reason of its very transparency, to escape our notice. It is only at a certain stage of our development that we become conscious of it at all, only at a much later stage still that we become conscious of its real nature. But the fact of it is there from the first as the seed of a specific form of consciousness, which in due course puts forth first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear, in the mind of the individual and of the race.

A theory like this which traces the source of religion to the consciousness of an Infinite or Absolute underlying all finite knowledge reminds us of the similar theory of Herbert Spencer which was the foundation of his religious agnosticism, and, superficially regarded, might seem in all essentials identical with it. In reality, in one fundamental respect the theories are diametrically opposed. True, Spencer agrees with Caird, in opposition to such writers as Max Müller, in holding that the idea of the Absolute is a positive one and not merely the negative of the

relative or the finite. But here the agreement ends. The process by which the mind reaches beyond the finite to the Infinite and the significance which attaches to the idea of the Infinite are entirely different. According to Spencer all knowledge proceeds by dividing and relating. Subject is divided from and related to object; objects are separated from and related to one another. But seeing that in his view to divide and to relate is to limit and so to falsify the Infinite, the further we go in this direction the further we depart from the reality whose essence it is to be undivided and unrelated. In order, therefore, to reach the Absolute the mind, according to Spencer, has to retrace its steps and to cancel the lines of division which it has made and the relations it has established, till we arrive at a mere blank, of which every definite predicate, even the predicate of existence in so far as that implies a relation, must be denied. Instead of being the fullest, God and the Absolute, so conceived, are the emptiest of all ideas. Caird's view both of process and result is quite different. All thought is indeed, as Spencer held, a process of relating or rather of seeing things in their relations. In the form familiar to us in science, it is the search for the universal law or principle which is manifested in particular properties of things and explains them to us by bringing them into organic relation with one another. It thus always presupposes in its object *the existence of a real whole* of systematically related parts which is the source alike of the being of the particular facts and of our knowledge of them.

What is true of the principles or universals of science is true of the ultimate principle or universal which underlies all existence. This is not something that is to be reached merely by abstraction from all the characters of finite things, but, on the contrary, by a synthetic act whereby we seek to see them in organic relation to one another as manifestations of a single principle. It is in the light of this presentiment or ideal of a completely transparent unity in things that we condemn any particular form of consciousness as finite and inadequate. This in a sense Spencer admits, inasmuch as he argues that it is our consciousness of the Infinite which enables us to assign limits to human consciousness and to condemn it as knowledge of the merely finite or relative. But how, it may be asked, can we have an idea of the Infinite which enables us to see the defect of the finite without enabling us to see anything more? "A consciousness which apprehends a limit must reach beyond it: it cannot be shut out from the positive knowledge of that which gives it the power to detect and look down upon its finitude. . . . To say, as Mr. Spencer says, that all things are knowable *through* the idea of the infinite, but that the infinite is *itself* not knowable, to say that our consciousness of it is the condition and limit of all our other consciousness, but that it cannot itself be determined as an object, is simply to deny us the power of reflexion."¹ If, as in one sense is true, the object of this consciousness, which is the light of all our seeing, hides itself from us, it hides itself not in darkness but in excess of light.

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 108-9.

A theory so ambiguous in the sphere of knowledge as Spencer's is has applications not less disquieting in the field of practice. As the relations and conditions under which things are known to the intelligence cannot without illusion be supposed to hold of the absolute reality, but, on the contrary, carry us further from it the further the process is carried, so determinate relations and activities of the moral life cannot without a corresponding error be taken as realizing any part of the nature of the Infinite, but, on the contrary, must be regarded as entirely indifferent, if not as opposed to it. It is on this ground that Caird feels himself justified in representing the practical difference between Herbert Spencer's and his own position as equivalent to the difference between "a quietism which despairs of all finite interests and dissolves them and itself in the absolute" and "a faith which loses all things in God to find them again transformed, a faith which rises above the immediate disappointments of finite existence, and rekindles the love of life on the altar on which it is consecrated to God."¹

From the above view of the nature of the Infinite it follows that the development of religion, so far from being towards the recognition of the unknowableness of God, is towards a fuller knowledge of Him, which is at the same time a fuller knowledge of ourselves. It is in the firmness with which this principle is grasped and the subtlety with which the transition from one stage to another of the development is traced that the originality of this

¹ *Loc. cit.* p. 113.

book consists. The character and order of these stages follow from the general order of human knowledge. While the "order of reality" is from God to subject and thence to the world of objects, the "order to us" is from the object to the subject and thence to God. "Man looks outwards before he looks inwards and inwards before he looks upwards." In the first of these stages, which Caird calls that of Objective Religion, the consciousness of God appears in the form of an attempt to elevate finite objects into the place of the Infinite. It is illustrated throughout the whole scale of the earlier forms of religion, from the fetishism of the savage up to the cosmism of the Vedic Hymns. The important thing to realize is the inner contradiction with which by their very nature these merely objective religions are vexed—owing to the hopelessness of the attempt, which they represent, to enclose the whole infinite meaning of the world in finite and even material things, and the dwarfing and distortion of the consciousness of the self and of God by the mould into which it is forced by them.

But already at this level the spirit asserts its power. Whereas, in the earlier forms of objective religion, the tendency is to select objects which are furthest from humanity—stones, trees, animals—as the emblems of deity, in the later the gods are spiritualized and tend to take the form, as in Greece, of ideal embodiments of human qualities. It is thus that the way is prepared for the second stage, in which man begins to free himself from the superstitious dread of outward things, while, at the same time, the poetic halo vanishes from nature, and

lament is heard that "A glory has passed from the earth and the great god Pan is dead." Realizing that God is a spirit and dwells apart, man withdraws from what is merely natural, whether in the world of things or of his fellow-men, in order that he may hear His voice. It is this stage that is represented by the great Subjective Religions of Buddhism in the East, Judaism and Stoicism in the West. Brought near to ourselves in some forms of Protestant Christianity, it has found its most impressive philosophical exponent in the Idealism of Kant.

The sympathy and insight with which Caird treats this phase of religious consciousness is only what might be expected from a philosopher who seeks to do full justice to the negative element in moral and religious consciousness, the necessity of dying to the merely natural in order to live in the spiritual.¹ With all its defects this form of religion marks an essential step in the soul's progress to spiritual freedom. While it narrows and darkens man's life with the fear of a God who is the searcher of hearts and before whom evil cannot stand, it brings with it also a sense of nearness and an overpowering longing for closer union with Him. "He who fears God and nothing but God is not far from the love that casts out fear."² For here, as in the case of objective religion, the real nature of the relation between the Infinite and the finite is at war with the imperfect form in which the relation presents itself and carries with it the assurance that in the fullness of time the soul will rise to a higher conception and God will at last be known "*in the true form of his idea.*"

¹ Cp. p. 309 above.

² *Op. cit.* p. 195.

Such a conception, which Caird hails as the idea underlying what he calls the Absolute Religion, is the only one that the modern mind can accept. "No one who has breathed the atmosphere of modern science, literature or philosophy can any longer consent to worship as God an object or power of nature." Equally repellent is the idea of God as merely a person among other persons, however exalted He be above them; or as a Will external to our wills, however pure and holy it may be in contrast to them. On the other hand, the idea of God as an all-embracing spirit is one which is involved in all modern philosophy and theology. Even those who reject it would fain believe in it, seeing that it provides the only way man possesses of interpreting to himself "the strange, precarious destiny, which it is given him to fulfil in this world."¹ These reject it not because it is not good enough but because it is too good to be true, seeing that it claims to unite elements which (like the knowledge of self and the knowledge of the material world) seem to contradict each other, while it is itself in flagrant contradiction to the axiom that human knowledge is only of the phenomenal. Once let these obstacles to the absolute or truly synthetic view be removed (and Caird held that a true Idealism is able to remove them) the path lies open to a reconciliation of man's deepest longings with the most whole-hearted loyalty to scientific truth.

After what has already been said of Caird's view of the nature of this ultimate synthesis it is unneces-

¹ *Op. cit.*, ii. p. 318.

sary to dwell upon it here. The interest of the reader of these volumes centres in the place assigned in the whole movement as above sketched to Christianity. It may seem a far cry from a complicated philosophical theory of the Absolute to the simplicity of the Gospels. But the main burden of these *Lectures* is that it is in the teaching of Jesus that we have the first explicit recognition and the clearest and most attractive statement of the true relation of God to the world. Owing to "some supreme depth and delicacy of spiritual insight in the Founder of Christianity," Caird held that, in the best authenticated sayings of the Gospels, there is to be found "a new organic conception of human life in its relations to nature and to God, which taken in its entirety has no previous counterpart and which indeed constitutes the greatest step which has been gained in the spiritual development of man."¹ Noble as was the spirit of the later prophets of the Old Testament, it was never strong enough to get beyond a merely negative statement of the relation between the national and the true conception of God and his Kingdom or to rise to a new conception of the Hope of Israel.

It is here that the teaching of Jesus shows its originality. For, *in the first place*, it broke down once for all the partition which the Jewish religion had built up between the natural and the spiritual. God is no longer conceived of as separate from the things which He has made, but as revealing Himself in them. As a recent writer puts it, "The

¹ *Op. cit.* vol. ii. p. 90.

Founder of Christianity looked out upon the external world with free and friendly eyes."¹ St. Paul has here caught the true spirit of his Master when he speaks of "the whole creation groaning and travailing in sympathy with us until now"²—waiting, as we may say, for the revelation of the spirit in man, even as man also waits and longs for a fuller revelation of the spiritual principle in himself. *In the second place*, while in the Old Testament we have the prophecy of a society knit together by no merely national bond but by the acceptance of the divine law of righteousness and charity, it was a society with its centre still in Jewry. It was Christianity that first fairly cut asunder the connexion of the spiritual with its natural root and conceived of a society in which there is neither Jew nor Greek. Here again St. Paul was only developing the teaching of the Gospels in his idea of Christendom as "a body fitly framed and knit together through that which every joint supplieth unto the building of itself in love."³ Confused at first with the hope of an immediate Messianic kingdom, obscured for centuries by the conflict first between Church and Empire, then between nations and civilizations filled with the spirit of rivalry, the idea of an organic unity of

¹ He adds: "I doubt whether such disinterested apprehension of floral beauty—so free from moralising or allegory—as that of the text 'Consider the lilies of the field' can be found outside, or prior to, the Christian intelligence." Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*, p. 129. What is said in the text remains true on the whole even when we take into consideration all that has, since Caird wrote, been brought to light of the literature of the centuries intervening between the Old and the New Testaments.

² Rom. viii. 22.

³ Eph. iv. 16.

humanity has worked, is working and is bound more and more to work, like a secret leaven, in the hearts of men.

Taking a still wider view, Caird tried to show that Christianity came at one of the great crises of the spiritual history of mankind. The first century of our era was a time in which the sense of alienation from the world of nature and of natural social and political ties had given rise to a profound yearning for a reunion or *atonement* with God.¹ For the healing of the wounds of the spirit of man no facile optimism could suffice. The healing touch could come only from one who had himself plumbed the depths of human evil and suffering. Jesus, indeed, was "the greatest optimist that the world has ever seen." But his was no mere temperamental optimism that makes it easy to declare with Emerson that "evil is good in the making." Nor was it the doctrinaire optimism of a philosophy that "heals the hurt of man too slightly." In his life he was the Man of Sorrows; in his death no one had more cause to realize the depths of human malice. Yet the faith that even the greatest of sufferings can be turned into blessing, that in the vilest of men there is a root of good, is the keynote of all his words and actions. It is this combination of a knowledge of the worst with faith in the reality of a principle

¹ For a brilliant account of this period, published since Caird wrote, see Professor Gilbert Murray's *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, especially III. "The Failure of Nerve." Nothing could be more instructive in connexion with the subject of the present chapter than a study of the contrast between Caird's view of the religious significance of this "Failure of Nerve" and that of the present occupant of Jowett's Chair.

which overreaches and overpowers it that gave its unique character and power to the religion of Jesus. It is this that enables us to see in Christianity not merely a new moral doctrine or the story of a great moral example, but the explicit assertion of the true nature of the Spirit that reveals itself in human experience.

To one who realizes all this the controversies that envelop the articles of the traditional creeds and the decay of the hold that they have on the modern mind need be no source of disquiet. The belief in the revelation of a divine spirit in man and nature is the one "article of a standing or a falling Church." "It is the rock upon which the Christian Church is really founded and from which it could be built up if every ecclesiastical organisation that exists were destroyed."¹ What form the new fabric would take in such an event Caird did not consider it his duty to try to indicate. What he was sure of was that there would be in it some real continuity with the past, some real development from it in the direction of a better understanding, and a more resolute endeavour to mould civilization in the spirit, of the fundamental faith. In words which more than any others might be taken as a statement of his own hopes, he sums up his conclusions on the whole matter: "The infinite pitifulness of Jesus to the sorrows and evils of humanity, his absolute confidence in the possibility and even the necessity of their being remedied and the way in which he bases his confidence on the love of God to man and in his own unity as man with God—these taken together

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 320.

make up a faith beyond which religion cannot go, except in two ways, namely, in the way of understanding them more adequately and of realizing them more fully." ¹ He was sufficient of an optimist to believe that in both these respects his own time had gone beyond any previous age.

There were many at the time at which Caird wrote, and there are probably more to-day, who would be ready to accept this account of the fundamental meaning of Christianity. But there are others who would resent the prominence assigned to the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth as compared with the Hope of Immortality, which they conceive it to have been the chief work of Christianity to have brought to light. To them the proof of Christian truth seems to be bound up with the proof Christ gave of his own resurrection and personal life in God, and any philosophy which is silent upon this, still more any philosophy which rejects it as incredible, must appear to be self-condemned. Caird is not silent upon it. He expresses in more than one place his sympathy with those who desired to be directly convinced of the reality of the life beyond the grave and of a world in which love would be perfected—the craving, as he expresses it in a letter, ² “for some external point on which to rest the spirit’s bow.” What he feared was to give any occasion for the belief that faith in the reality of a divine power ordering the life of man with a view to the realization of the highest good, depended in any way on empirical proof of the survival of the soul. This

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² See above, p. 181.

seemed to him a complete reversal of the true order. "The religious man," he held emphatically, "believes in a future life for himself and mankind because he believes in God; he does not believe in God because he believes in a future life in another world."¹ Christ's own teaching on this he held to be of a piece with the wholly subordinate place he assigned to miracles as a proof of his divine mission. Christ's own faith in the life beyond is founded on the nature of a God who "is not the God of the dead but of the living." Even so Jesus has little to say of it, and the writer who insists that he "does not proclaim resurrection; *he denies death* and asserts the indestructibility of all life that remains in communion with God," touches the heart of his teaching on the whole subject. In the same spirit Caird appeals to "that unbelief in death which seems to be the necessary characteristic or concomitant of true spiritual life." Any more positive belief, he held, may easily degenerate into an unhealthy preoccupation with a future salvation, which prevents us from seeking for the salvation of mankind in the present world. From this point he thought that the absence of reliable empirical evidence may not be altogether a loss. With regard to the recorded appearances of Christ after the Crucifixion, he thought not only that there was no real evidence for anything except visions like that of St. Paul, but that the appeal to all "irruptions of the spiritual into the natural world" was "inconsistent with the idea that the latter was spiritual in its own right"—just as the ordinary doctrine of the divinity of Christ

¹ *Op. cit.* ii. p. 242.

was inconsistent with the idea of the revelation of God in man.

On the wider question of the survival of the individual Caird was ready to acknowledge that he saw no way of establishing it as a deduction from philosophical principles except in so far as it seems a postulate of the realization of the good. But apart from *a priori* proof he thought that on psychological grounds it may be urged that all progress in intelligence and character as a matter of fact is in the direction of the production, not the extinction, of individuality. In one sense doubtless such a progress leads away from the self towards devotion to a wider life of which it becomes the organ. But it is just in such devotion that its strength is renewed and it advances to new levels of intensity and individuality of life. Generalizing from this it seems possible to maintain that the more life loses itself in the universal the more it is deepened and enriched in the individual.¹ Death, of course, is not of itself a form of self-transcendence in this sense, but it was open to an Idealism such as Caird's to maintain that in an order essentially moral, death may very well be the supreme summons of the soul to such self-renewal—*mors ianua vitae*.

¹ In letter of date June 2nd, 1893, p. 187 above.

CHAPTER VIII

IDEALISM AND RECENT THOUGHT

CAIRD'S philosophy was an attempt to do justice to different elements in human experience which certain tendencies in the thought of his time had severed and treated in abstraction from one another. On the one hand was the Idealism commonly called Subjective, which, with its sceptical corollaries, had infected English philosophy from the time of Berkeley. On the other hand, there was the Realism or Naturalism which sought to eliminate the element contributed by the subject and to explain everything in terms of nature conceived of as a mechanical system and held to be not only the one thing that could be known, but the ultimate reality of things. Against the first Caird maintained the doctrine of the essential intelligibility or rationality of a universe in the fullest sense objective. Against the second he asserted the necessity of interpreting the Whole, within which Nature and Mind appeared as related elements, by the light of and therefore as kindred to our own highest or self-conscious experience.

In the seventies and eighties, thanks to the brilliant group of writers of whom, after Green's death, Caird was the acknowledged leader, this new synthetic

philosophy may be said to have become the dominant one in England, Scotland and America. But it was not likely that a theory which rested on two such "tremendous assumptions" should remain long unchallenged. Thanks greatly to the impulse given by these writers themselves, the latter part of the nineteenth century was a time of bold initiative and adventure in all branches of philosophy. New materials from the physical and mental sciences had accumulated and lay ready to the hand of the older modes of thought, which had been scotched but not killed by the prevalent philosophy. While therefore Caird and his colleagues were occupied in vindicating the real against the idealists, the ideal against the realists, of the middle of the century, new levies of these opposing schools were taking the field with strength recruited from new areas of thought and experience.

It is a dangerous thing to attempt to outline the answer that a great thinker would have given to problems which were not directly before him. His spear is his own and had better be left resting where he laid it down. Yet it may be legitimate for those who seek to "carry on" in the spirit if not in the letter of his work, to ask how far the principles which he sought to apply to the solution of the main problem of his time are available for the solution of the same problem in the new form which it has assumed in our own.¹

¹ Detailed defences of Caird's Idealism against Pragmatism on the one hand and the New Realism on the other will be found in Professor John Watson's articles on "The Idealism of Edward Caird" in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. xviii. Nos. 2 and 3, and in Professor J. S. Mackenzie's article "Edward Caird as a Philosophical Teacher" in *Mind*, N.S. vol. xviii. No. 12, with which may be taken his article

Taking the theory known as Pragmatism or Personal Idealism as representative of the new subjectivism, there is much in its initial contentions with which, so far as they had been developed, Caird found himself in sympathy. Readers of William James and Dr. Schiller may recall the extent to which their teaching had its origin in a reaction against the rigidity with which the doctrine of the unity and intelligibility of the world seemed to infect the course of things—the “block universe” of James’s *Will to Believe*. From the time of Parmenides and Plato the snare of the “friends of ideas” has been to interpret the real world as an eternal presence from which all movement and process, all real multiplicity and change are excluded. Even writers so keenly alive to the dynamic aspect of things as T. H. Green have not escaped the tendency to regard the Eternal Thought as something that man merely “reproduces.” But it was in Mr. Bradley’s theory of the Absolute, in which all relativity and with it all difference seemed to disappear in a unity of which nothing could be thought—nothing even felt but a vague presentiment—that

on “The New Realism and the Old Idealism,” *Mind*, vol. xv. In the present chapter, in comparing Caird’s philosophy with Pragmatism, I have tried to do justice to a side of it which these writers seem to me to have passed over somewhat too lightly. In comparing it with Realism I have had chiefly in view the most recent developments of that movement. In trying to bring out the “instability” of the results attained by both these movements I have found much assistance in Professor Kemp Smith’s Inaugural Lecture on *The Present Situation of Philosophy*. It is unfortunate that names so ambiguous as Realism and Idealism require to be used. No one more regretted this ambiguity or would have been better content to drop them altogether than Caird.

Idealism seemed to have met its doom and, in swallowing up everything else, to have swallowed up itself.

With this criticism Caird had much in common. Bradley had reached his results by the rigid and uncompromising application of the test of comprehensiveness and internal consistency to all forms of finite experience. Caird was prepared to accept this criterion as the test of ultimate reality ; but he held that it was a criterion put into our hands by our own self-conscious experience. In this, he maintained, and not in something beyond and altogether transcending it, we have the type of the all-including *because* all-relating experience, which we must conceive of as the ultimately real. To use this criterion *against* self-consciousness itself was, as we have seen,¹ to put a mine below the whole fabric of knowledge and to surrender everything. The result in his view could only be the destruction in the name of Hegel of Hegel's whole work, which consisted precisely in the vindication of the reality of Nature and Man against the opposing one-sided theories of Fichte and Schelling. It is in the light of this difference with Bradley that we have to read the growing emphasis which, in his later works, Caird laid upon Evolution, with all that it implied, as the key to the interpretation of the relation of the one and the many—the central identity and the ever-changing form of the life of the world.

It was only another application of the same principle when, in opposition to another contemporary development of Idealism, he rejected the attempt to represent the ever-moving, self-transcending dialectical move-

¹ P. 286 foll. above.

ment of thought as due to the limitations of our finite knowledge. Caird's main objection to the brilliant work of Dr. McTaggart on the *Hegelian Dialectic* which he was the first to recognize,¹ was its tendency to represent the Dialectic as something merely subjective. To Caird, as I think it could be shown to have been to Plato, and certainly as it was to Hegel, Dialectic was the living pulse of reality, the principle and soul of the evolutionary movement. In a real sense he held with Heraclitus that all things were becoming and they became, because they included within themselves elements of opposition that were ever driving them beyond themselves in the search for the unity that would reconcile them. Caird differed from Heraclitus, or at any rate from the popular interpretation of Heraclitus, in holding that the principle of unity was rooted in things at least as deeply as the principle of difference, and that, as Pascal said of man's relation to God, man would not seek it unless in a sense he had already found it.

In the light of these contentions it is not difficult to see how far Caird was prepared to accept, and at what point he was bound to part company with current Pragmatism. With the letter of its formulae he had no particular quarrel. A "block-universe"—a closed and self-contained Absolute—is no part of Idealism as he conceived it. There is no ready-made reality, no shining world of eternal forms beyond all relation to self-conscious thought. On the contrary, Idealism is committed to the view that truth and reality live and live only, as Schopenhauer held, in "will and idea." Everywhere the world is

¹ See above, p. 298.

in the making. Its reality consists in the making. There is no store of capitalized energy in the spiritual world independent of the activity of the spirits (whatever their stage of development) which embody it any more than there is any capitalized store of heat independent of the motions and straining of the material particles in which heat manifests itself. If it be true that the finite spirit lives and moves and has its being in the Infinite Spirit, it is no less true that the Infinite Spirit lives and moves and has its being in the finite. If God is necessary to us, we are no less necessary to God.¹

But while ready to agree with Pragmatism in its rejection of a ready-made universe of reality, Caird wholly rejected the limited application that Pragmatism has made of this principle. The world of reality is indeed in a process of becoming,—if what we have said is true,—it may even be said *to be* a process of becoming. Moreover, it is a process dependent on the action and passion of individuals, and therefore one in which, in James's phrase, the individual "makes a difference." The question is how much difference? To James, approaching the subject as he does from the side of Ethics,² it seems all important to emphasize the possibility of obstruction to the good. To Caird, on the other hand, approaching it from the point of view of "all time

¹ On this aspect of Idealism I know nothing better than the essay on "Progress as an Ideal of Action" by Professor J. A. Smith in *Progress and History* (Oxford University Press, 1916).

² His recently published *Letters* throw an interesting light on this. See especially *Letters to Shadworth H. Hodgson*, vol. i. pp. 245 and 256. "What I care for is that my moral reactions should have a real outward application."

and all existence," the difference caused by individual failure and sin seems necessarily limited. It can never amount to the stultification of the whole process; though to our seeing it may amount to the stultification of it in the life of the individual himself and of others whom his evil infects. The reason is that that which is revealed in the whole process is a *Natura sive Deus* which is greater than the individual, not as something outside of him, but as the deepest in himself bearing continual witness to his spirit that he is Its and It is his. To deny this is to escape one abstraction only to fall into another. Pragmatism escapes the abstraction of a ready-made universe facing the individual only to fall into the abstraction of individuals who have no hold on anything beyond themselves—no place in a world of permanence at all—but are left, as Plato would have said, washing about in a region between being and nothingness.

To interpret the purposeful side of reality, on which Pragmatism rightly insists, merely in terms of the momentary needs and activities of the individual is to lose the clue to the whole constructive work of thought in science, art and philosophy. It is to part company with the conviction that lies at the root of all the great religions of the world and to leave ethical and social practice itself without either inspiration or guidance. As a matter of fact Pragmatism itself, when faced with the issue here involved, recoils from the gulf that opens at its feet and is fain to acknowledge, with William James in his realistic mood, "the lopsided equation of the universe and the knower" as "perfectly paralleled by the

no less lopsided equation of the universe and the doer." ¹

In a like sense and with like qualifications Caird was prepared to accept the Pragmatist's formula of "working" as the test of truth. In contrast to theories that define truth either as the correspondence of our ideas with a ready-made (and by some mysterious process already known) world of fact or as the formal agreement with abstractly stated premises, Idealism agrees that truth consists in a quality of our ideas, which is revealed to us by the furtherance they afford us in the realization of our ends. But the truth of this definition altogether depends on the nature and scope of these "ends." The test of the ultimate truth of an idea, theoretical or practical, can never be that it works within some particular area or at some particular time. We want, indeed, to know, as Dewey says, "here and now," we want something that will solve for us a present problem; something moreover, as we have seen, that lives only in and for the apprehending mind, in other words, that needs the self-transcending activity of thought. But the test to which the apprehension has to submit—the ultimate area of the working—can be nothing less than the whole system of already apprehended truth, theoretic and moral. It is its harmony with *human experience as a whole*, not with any arbitrarily isolated fragment of it, that gives it its validity. The need it satisfies is no merely accidental one, but the need, which is bound up with the ideal of thought and will, to be at one with itself and the world it inhabits. It is this that

¹ *Will to Believe*, p. 84.

forces us to maintain that truth, while like goodness and beauty it is an *achievement* of the individual mind, is at the same time a *revelation* to it of a world unrealized as yet but awaiting realization in and through a fuller experience.

It is true that leading idealistic writers have permitted themselves to speak of reality as a "construction," and there is a sense in which such language may be justified. But it is open to misunderstanding, and so far as I know is never used by Caird. If he has anywhere used it, he would be willing to accept the witty and comprehensive emendation suggested by a recent realistic writer: "*For* constructing, where possible, *read* finding."¹

On grounds such as these Caird would have held that current Pragmatism is in a position of unstable equilibrium. *Either* it must advance to a more consistent Idealism, as indeed in some of its best exponents, notably in Professor Dewey, it is always on the point of doing; *or*, taking the opposite line of "radical empiricism," it must end by accepting the sensation, whether (with Berkeley and Hume) as a psychical event, or (with its realistic opponents) as a physical reaction to stimulus, as the ultimate reality.

The New Realism not less than Pragmatism has had its origin to a large extent in the reaction of modern thought against what have seemed to be the dogmatic assumptions and the sceptical conclusions of Absolutism. The difference is that while in the case of Pragmatism the reaction has been in the

¹ Professor Laird's *Study in Realism*, p. 201.

interest of greater scope for human freedom and a cavalier-like assertion of the "will to believe," in the case of the New Realism it has been in the interest of a more rigorous logical method and a more puritanic abstinence from premature assumptions as to the unity of the world and the subordination of particular truths to a whole of truth, which transcends and, in transcending, cancels them. The dogma of the unity of the world, it holds, is contradicted by the manifest pluralism and unrelatedness of things ; the dogma of one sole and ultimate truth amounts in the end to the paradox that an absolute whole of truth may emerge from an aggregate of partial untruths. As against the first of these dogmas Realism takes its stand on the ultimate independence of things relatively to one another and to the mind which knows them ; as against the second it asserts the priority both in knowledge and reality of concrete truths to any abstract and absolute " truth."

After what has been already said it is easy to see that there is much in these contentions with which Caird would have had little quarrel. He would have agreed with Realism in much of its criticism of any form of Monism which leads to the suspicion that any particular truth is infected with a germ of untruth simply because it is not the whole truth. A particular judgment, he would have held, may be *part of the truth* without being a *partial truth*, in any sense which makes it a "partial untruth." A scepticism of this kind is a perversion of the fact, with which Realism itself acknowledges it has to reckon, that there are wider outlooks on things, which throw new light on established truths, and,

without cancelling them, show us where they lead and what they must ultimately be taken to mean.¹

Similarly in regard to the ultimate unity and essential interrelatedness of the world as a whole, Caird was ready to admit that this in the last resort was an assumption and as such a matter of faith. He would merely have added that it is an assumption which we are bound by the very nature of intelligence itself to make, a faith on which all science and philosophy rest and which for this reason "is the opposite not of knowledge but of sight."

We come to the real issue only when the question is raised as to the terms in which we are to interpret this unity. The claim of Idealism is that we can make the world as a whole intelligible to ourselves on no other condition than that on which we make the parts of it intelligible. This we can only do in so far as we are prepared to interpret more elementary and disconnected experiences in the light of a more unified and systematized experience such as we find in the higher attainments of theory and practice. These give the standard and type of what we must most surely believe as to the real world. There can be no other of the reality of the world as a whole, or as it is in itself. It is on the plane of these achievements that is most fully revealed both what the finite subject and what the infinite world in their true nature are. It is on this ground that Idealism is bound to reject any attempt to represent knower and known as two wholly independent realities, and finds the clue to the nature of that which is known in the higher forms of self-conscious thought and

¹ See, *e.g.*, Professor Laird's chapter on "The Larger Outlook," *op. cit.* p. 180.

will, rather than in the observable relations of a plurality of reals acting externally upon one another. How, we may ask, does the New Realism meet the issue as thus stated ?

To the question as so put the answer is far from clear, nor does it become clearer as the philosophy develops. Already there is manifest a deep division on the fundamental question as to whether we have any direct knowledge of mind or subject at all. As though conscious that, once admitted, the claims of the subject must prove fatal to the first principles of Realism, one wing has found safety in denying them altogether. Not only is the physical wholly independent of the mental, but we have no other means of knowing either of the existence or the nature of the mental except in terms of the physical. Consciousness, on this view, is merely the response to outward stimulus which a living body makes when it has reached a certain level of integration—an iridescence which appears on the surface of the bodily life, and which is better left out of account in psychological study.¹

With a development of this kind Idealism can clearly have little in common. As an experiment in method there is no reason to anticipate that the hypothesis of the sole substantiality and knowability

¹ Realism from the first has had no difficulty in assigning sensations to the objective side of experience. With this as a starting-point the James-Lange theory of the emotions opened the way to the objective treatment of feeling, Behaviourism to that of conation. Images seem still to offer difficulty to some Realists, *e.g.* to Mr. Bertrand Russell. But, as a witty Pragmatist has said, "They seem a poor thing to run a mind for," and to a robust realism there is no valid reason why this last refuge of the 'subject' should be treated otherwise than as an observable object.

of the object will not prove as suggestive and as fertile as the opposite hypothesis of the sole substantiality and knowability of the subject has proved to be. On the other hand, there is every reason to expect that the main result, as in the other case, will be the *reductio ad absurdum* of the hypothesis itself, if taken as more than a psychological experiment. So taken not only must it appear to be in flagrant conflict with the common sense to which Realists make their first appeal, it would have to fight its way back through the whole body of philosophical achievement since the time of Descartes. Most serious of all from the point of view of the realistic movement itself, it would be brought face to face in the end with the apparition of a new form of monism, differing only from that against which it is in revolt in being physical and mechanical instead of metaphysical and logical.

But Realism, as it has developed in England, has in the main assumed a form which brings it into sharp antagonism with these contentions of its own left wing. "Behaviourism" (to give its psychological title to the extremer form of doctrine) is admitted to have its uses. As a protest against the subjectivism of Berkeley it is lauded as "an interesting experiment in exorcism." On the other hand, as a philosophical theory of the nature of the world which is revealed in experience it has no real standing ground. "It is the merest bigotry to assume that physics and chemistry are the only genuine sciences."¹ It is true that the things which confront consciousness are not themselves consciousnesses. But in

¹ Laird, *op. cit.* p. 186.

our feelings and strivings we have genuinely subjective elements carrying with them the consciousness of a subject or a personality which feels and strives. With this admission Realism has opened a breach in its defences which, it may safely be predicted, it will find it difficult to close. It has learned indeed to dispose of the subjectivism that finds in the secondary qualities and the images, by means of which significance comes to be assigned to presented objects, proof of the "transference of the inner to the outer." But it is met with other factors in objects as they are supposed to be given, which it finds it impossible to treat as purely objective. There are, to go no further, the qualities ("tertiary" in psychological analysis, but asserted by Idealists from the time of Plato to be primary in reality)—goodness, beauty and truth. The attempt has been made to meet this difficulty by drawing a distinction between the reality and the valuation of these qualities. But the distinction is extremely difficult to maintain,¹ and others have preferred to admit their essential dependence upon mind.

¹ "A visible world which there is no one to see is not, in my opinion, as it is in that of many, an expression without a meaning, because I do not believe that surfaces and colours, light and shade, depend for their existence upon the observer. Whether a beautiful world which there is no one to appreciate has a meaning is a point on which, for myself, I am most doubtful, *i.e.* I cannot feel sure that beauty is a character of things independent of their relation to a contemplating mind. But a world in which beauty has value or is good although there is none to value it or find the good in it does seem to me a contradiction." L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, p. 115. Professor Hobhouse is a severe critic of some aspects of Idealism, but in Ethics at least there is no more admirable statement of its fundamental principle than in the pages which follow this quotation.

But the Realism, as it might be called, of the Right does not stop here. Even more significant is the line of thought by which it is led to seek in the subject for the key to "the categorical features that may be shared by the mind with things."¹ Causal action seems to be given us as a feature of the physical world; but if all we knew were the physical world, this, it is contended, would be the obscurest of relations. It is in our own will, interpreted as the process wherein we experience the continuous transition from the idea of an end into the consciousness that we are ourselves in the act of realizing it, that we have the type of all such activity. To find causality in nature therefore is "merely to verify under obscurer conditions, what is manifest in the working of the mind." It is even suggested that the help which the study of mind gives in tracing the relations of things may extend beyond this and give us the clue to the relations of the various grades of existence to one another.²

A further step still is taken when it is suggested that the standard of these grades is individuality, and that while other things are individual "a *person* is distinctively individual in a way that is matched by nothing else that we know."³ To this Idealism would merely add that the *principle* of the individuality of persons can, in the last resort, be none other than the thought which enables them to maintain within the unity of self-consciousness all the distinctions, including that between itself and existence, which make themselves felt in experience. In all

¹ S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, i. p. 9.

² Alexander, *loc. cit.*

³ Laird, *op. cit.* p. 177.

this Realism is clearly on an inclined plane, and it becomes increasingly difficult to discover what it regards as crucial.

There are, however, two points on which the more recent statements insist as differentiating marks. In the first place, it is in the particular and preeminently in the particular self, and not in any Whole of which the particulars are supposed to be parts, that the type of individuality is to be sought. Particular things and *a fortiori* persons have, it is true, social and cosmical relations in realizing which alone they can realize themselves. But in realizing these relations they retain their own self-hood, and no attempt to dissipate this in any supposed more perfect individuality of the universe is to be tolerated.¹ In the second place, priority both in time and reality belongs not to the mind or the subject but to the object. The most that can be claimed for mind is that it is more highly endowed than anything else we know of. It has no prerogative being or reality, which should make other reality in some way dependent for existence upon it.²

With regard to the first of these contentions Caird, at any rate, would have had no difficulty in accepting it as thus generally stated. He was never more in earnest than in maintaining that the world is an *organic* whole, and that this can only mean that it is a whole of parts which are themselves individuals. To destroy the individuality of the parts would be to destroy the individuality of the whole. The nature of the universe, he held, cannot fall short of the nature of our own highest experiences, and it is

¹ Laird, *op. cit.* p. 178.

² Alexander, *op. cit.* i. p. 9.

to such a unity of individualities that all these experiences point. In the love which is the highest of all, to take a single instance, the soul indeed seeks to be one with its beloved, but the oneness which it desires and attains is a oneness which not only leaves its own self-hood intact, but raises this self-hood to a higher power through the strength and stability which great passion and great passion alone can give. The point at which an Idealism like Caird's would have parted company with the ordinary realistic statement of this principle would have been the assumption of a hard core of individuality in things belonging to them independently of their power to enter into specific relations with other things. What is here true of things in general is true *a fortiori* of persons. It is in the soul's power of focussing and responding to the influences that come to it from without that its individuality consists. Its power of unified response to what is other than itself is the precise measure of the strength and stability of its own self-hood. Even the organic feelings to which psychology points as the psychic stuff of individuality—what are they but the soul's capacity of responding to, and assimilating to its own substance the impulses that come to it from its other, the body? Purged of this prejudice in favour of an ultimate "solid simplicity" constituting the individuality of things, Caird would have had no difficulty in agreeing with the realist's polemic against attributing to the whole any individuality which involved the weakening or denial of that of the parts.

The question of the priority of mind is a more

difficult one, partly on account of the ambiguity of the terms, partly of its own inherent complexity.

Priority in time of the physical to the mental, though asserted by realists as a fact, can hardly be what is here important. The general acceptance of the idea of evolution, with its implication that a principle, which is more than any of the forms through which it passes, may require a process in time to display the fullness of its nature, has, I take it, undermined the force of the argument from priority in time. What is meant by the New Realism is presumably priority in being or importance for interpretation. We have already seen how difficult Realists themselves find it to maintain this priority. In their own despite they find themselves constrained to attribute to mind not only a higher *endowment* than to other things but a *power of endowing* other things with attributes difficult to reconcile with this contention. If this is not strictly true of substance and causality, which are still held to exist independently of mind, it has been asserted in the latest exposition to be true of truth, beauty and goodness. Come by the knowledge of these attributes as we may, give them what name we may, Realism, in order to maintain its fundamental principle, is pledged to show that they are as entirely secondary as the mind on which they depend for the true interpretation of what is ultimately real in the world.

It is in this light, I think, that we must read Professor Alexander's realistic metaphysics, the aim of which is to find the source and ultimate type of reality in an entity which less than any other exhibits the

character of an organic interrelation of parts, less than any other, therefore, the character of self-conscious mind. In spite of the apparent approximation of such a philosophy in its treatment of beauty, goodness and truth to Idealism it would seem in reality to be the express denial of its fundamental principle of the essential unity of subject and object. Even so it is important to realize the precise point of divergence. The quarrel of Idealism with such a philosophy is not that it finds the promise and potency of mind and even the whole "fullness of the Godhead bodily" in Space-Time substance, but that it inverts the order of interpretation which we have been taught by evolutionary science to regard as the true one. Instead of interpreting the beginning by the end, the most abstract and schematic by the most concrete and articulate, the space-time "matrix," from which the process starts, by the spirit and Deity with which it ends, the theory interprets these emergent entities, with the "values" which for the first time emerge with them, as merely phenomenal—ultimately, we must say, *epiphenomenal*—aspects of the real. It is here that Idealism stands at the opposite pole of speculation, and if this newest realism with its large outlook and metaphysical subtlety had performed no other service than to make this clear, the present generation would be deeply indebted to it.

For the purpose of this sketch we might be content to leave it there were it not that the conclusions, to which Realism in this its latest phase in England points, serve to illustrate at a deeper level the cleavage

that traverses the whole realistic point of view and threatens it from within. It is not merely that other recent realistic writers insist upon the objective, independent reality of truth, beauty and goodness,¹ but that the most distinguished representative of the school in this country has, in what is perhaps its best known, certainly its most eloquent manifesto, staked his whole faith on their supreme reality. In his essay *The Free Man's Worship* ² Mr. Bertrand Russell has celebrated the triumph of Spirit over Nature and sought to build its temple on the sense of its own freedom in the world of truth and goodness which is its own creation. It is true that the writer draws a hard and fast line between the two domains, but philosophy surely is justified in asking whether there is any such absolute opposition between them. Granted, as is assumed, that this power of self-assertion against the merely natural and of self-recovery from it, is itself the outcome of a universal process, do we not interpret the nature and the cosmos, whose process it is, more truly if we read back the end into the beginning? So read, Nature will appear, if not less the opposite of Spirit, yet an opposite that is related to spirit as that which by very opposition awakens it to a knowledge of the true being at once of itself and of the world which it inhabits. And if this is so, have we not in the experience which Mr. Russell celebrates, the witness of an underlying unity revealing itself not only in spite of but in and through the difference?

Be all this as it may, enough has perhaps been said to show that, different though the problems

¹ *E.g.* Laird, *op. cit.* chap. vii. "Values." ² *Mysticism and Logic.*

of our day may be from those of Caird's, different as may be the terms in which our conclusions will have to be expressed from those which he made current, the principle he borrowed from the great line of Idealists and particularly from Kant, has lost none of its significance as an instrument of analysis and criticism. Taking his work for what in essence it was—the persistent attempt to free the principle from ambiguity and to correct the misapplications to which this ambiguity had led—we may say of it, at least as truly as of that of any other modern philosophy, *stat mole sua*.

APPENDIX

A

On being received officially into Balliol :

“ At my first appearance in this position, it is not fitting that I should say much ; but there are just two things that I should like to say.

In the first place, I wish to express my sense of the great honour which your Fellows have done me in electing me to be the head of a College, which has so long been a leader in education and liberal culture. In particular, I have a deep feeling of obligation to my old friend Mr. Strachan-Davidson for the magnanimous way in which he has joined in inviting me to fill this office, and for the warm and cordial welcome he has given me. As I am compelled to be absent for some time to complete my work for another University, it gives me great pleasure that the first act I have to perform as Master is to appoint him as my Vicegerent.

In the second place, let me say that I have at least one qualification to be Master of this College, namely, that there can hardly be any man living who owes more to it. Balliol College gave me the best of teachers ; for Jowett was my Tutor, and his almost fatherly kindness has followed me ever since the time when—not, I confess, without some feeling of apprehension—I used to carry my essays and compositions to his rooms for criticism. Balliol gave me also the best of friends ; for in Green I found one whose brotherly sympathy and inspiring example has stimulated me, more than any other

single influence, in the prosecution of my philosophical work. When I was an undergraduate, I had here the advantage of listening to prelections on scholarship by Riddell and by Archdeacon Palmer, whose name I am glad to find still associated with the College. I also heard lectures on scientific method from Henry Smith, a man whose mathematical genius could be appreciated only by the few, but whose bright intelligence and wit were a delight to all who knew him. And what to me, from the nature of my own studies, was of great importance, I had the opportunity of learning what is meant by a living study of history from the luminous and comprehensive teaching of Mr. Newman, who alone of my old teachers is still a Fellow of this College. Lastly, I may mention that, at the beginning of my career as a teacher, Balliol College gave me the best of my Pupils, among whom I need only name Mr. Strachan-Davidson and Mr. Abbott.

In the *Republic*¹ Plato speaks of what a man owes to the Society that has educated him. To such a Society he is bound to pay his *τροφεία*, his dues of nurture; and the best way in which he can pay them is, Plato thinks, by doing something for the education of those who come after him. If I have to pay my dues of nurture to Balliol College, I am conscious that it will take me the whole exertion of whatever powers I possess for the rest of my life. And I can only say that, with all my heart and to the best of my ability, I am willing to pay them. So soon as I have discharged my remaining obligations to Glasgow University, I hope to take my place along with the band of able teachers who conduct the studies of this College, and with them to do what I can to maintain the great tradition of liberal culture which it has inherited from Jowett and Henry

¹ P. 520 B.

Smith, and the no less great tradition of philosophic teaching which it has inherited from Green and Nettleship."

B

From an undated speech at a Balliol Gaude :

"I have now the pleasant duty of proposing our perennial toast: *Floreat domus de Balliolo*. We have great pleasure in welcoming back so many old and distinguished sons of Balliol. Your presence here is an indication that you do not wish your connexion with the College to become a mere memory, but that you still feel yourselves Balliolenses, and keep up a continuous interest in its life. In truth the College, as we have it in the great English Universities, is a thing unique of its kind. It binds together the social and intellectual life, and mingles work with pleasure, in a way perhaps not paralleled in any other country. It is a little Republic, the ideal at least of which, as the ideal of Plato's, is to exist *πρὸς τὸ εἶ ζῆν*, for a complete human development, and which in that view does not forget to combine *γυμναστική* with its *μουσική*. It gives its members the sense of belonging to a society with memories of a great past, and it prepares them by loyalty to the narrower community for a wider patriotism. It has often struck me during the last few years that whatever may be said against College life, it (like the public school) is a great nursery for public servants, and that it does much to create in its members that temper, combining individual independence with trust in each other, which is the best tradition of our civil service. It has often also been brought to my notice that in one, who has had such an education, there is no motive to which one can appeal with more certainty of response than the sense of what is demanded of a representative of the English nation, who may be called to maintain

the honour and justice of England in the face of other nations. There may be a higher motive than this, but it is a good basis, I think, for everything higher, and perhaps no wider motive would be quite healthy without this. Another good characteristic of College life I may mention. I think there is no place in the world where young men are able to feel more completely the joy of their youth. The text, "Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth," which by the way is the text of one of the late Master's most remarkable sermons, is in no danger of being disobeyed here. The beauty of the place, the traditions of its old Colleges, the pleasure of the first taste of manly freedom, the opportunity for forming friendships with others upon whom, as upon ourselves, all the great interests of life, political and social, literary and scientific, are just opening up, the joys of the field and the river, the growing sense of their own powers, and the growing capacity of understanding and appreciating the powers of others : all these things—with the absence of the serious cares of existence—make the three or four years spent here a time of happiness that is keenly enjoyed, and the memory of which is cherished through life. I think also—if I may speak for a moment from the point of view of the teachers—there is no more interesting sight than to witness the development of men under these influences. Especially in the last years before the Schools, when their work is beginning to be gathered to a focus, the minds of able young men often make such an astonishing start forward that you can almost see them growing. And I may add, it keeps one young to see it."

C

Another Gaude speech, also undated (1899?) :

"It is my privilege to ask you to drink to our perennial toast : *Floreat domus de Balliolo*. Speaking

to those who for the most part were undergraduates here at a time when I was a professor in distant northern regions, I cannot exactly appeal to common memories of fellowship in work and enjoyment. But, though my early experiences of Balliol and Oxford belong to an earlier date than those of most of you—as far back as 1860—the unity and continuity of the life of the college has been such that Balliol men of one generation can feel many common sympathies with those of another. There was at both dates the same spirit in the college, and it was due to the same influences ; above all to the influence of its last Head. One has heard of uncrowned kings, about whom there may be some difference of opinion, but it was not so with us. In my day Jowett was undoubtedly the uncrowned king of Balliol, and his influence was then perhaps as powerful and all-pervading as it ever became. Having had Jowett for tutor, I can only say for myself and for many of my contemporaries that we received from him an impression of marked individuality and originality of character, of great freedom and purity of mind, and of singular devotion to public ends, which has been one of the most precious of our spiritual possessions. And those of us especially who afterwards became teachers had also set before them an ideal of education and educational work which has always been a great stimulus in all their efforts in teaching others. The secret of Jowett's influence could only be fully appreciated by those who felt it, but it is a matter for congratulation that two distinguished members of the college have reared so adequate a memorial to his name, a memorial which is now completed by the publication of his Letters.¹

And beside Jowett there are other great Balliol teachers who continued to influence the life of the

¹ *Life and Letters of B. Jowett.* By Evelyn Abbott and Lewis Campbell. 1897-1899.

college from my time to yours. I am afraid that before your day Newman had already taken from the college to give up to mankind those remarkable powers of philosophical exposition and historical criticism which are shown in his edition of the *Politics* of Aristotle. But you had still the genial presence of Henry Smith, whose great mathematical originality was only equalled by the brightness and fineness of his wit and his single-minded devotion to the service of the University. Another influence I must mention which in my time was only known to his intimate friends, but which in your day did as much as even that of Jowett to elevate the life of the college and to bring to bear upon its teaching the power of a deeply idealistic but at the same time thoroughly practical philosophy, viz. that of T. H. Green ; and only second to it was that of the gentle, courageous spirit of Lewis Nettleship, who was afterwards his biographer, and did much to maintain the same tradition of efficient philosophical teaching in the college.

These are the links that bound the life of the college in your time to the past. But I must not forget those who bind it to the present, though I cannot here speak with the same freedom. I shall not venture in the presence of two of them to say how much the college owed them and still owes to Mr. Strachan-Davidson, to Mr. Abbott, to the Baron de Paravicini and to Mr. Forbes. The first two, I am proud to remember, were for a short time my pupils ; and since I have returned to the college they have aided me by their advice and support in a way for which I shall always feel the deepest gratitude.

It is through such influences as these that the same spirit has been maintained in the college from year to year, so that we might say, in the language of Wordsworth, that the days of Balliol are 'bound each to each by natural piety.'

Of another link between the present and the past I am reminded by the presence of our illustrious guest, the recent Governor-General of India.¹ The college has for many years given many of its most distinguished sons to the public service at home and in India. Some one said recently that at least a sixth of the public service of India was composed of Balliol men, and we all know that the last three Governors-General are members of the college.² It has thus been the privilege of the college to carry a step farther that education for public service which is begun, in many cases at least, in the great public schools of the country. It has been its work to widen by knowledge and soften by the influences of a larger social life that wholesome but perhaps somewhat barbaric sense of honour which the schoolboy brings with him to the University: seeking to make it grow into that devotion to public ends, that strong sense of justice and that patriotic desire to fulfil all the responsibilities of empire to those who are subjected to our rule, which is characteristic of our best public servants. I know how difficult the task is, and that to perform it perfectly is hardly possible even by our utmost efforts, but it is an ideal which the tutors of this college have, I know, always before them. And I think that, if some of us were ever inclined to forget it, we should be brought back to a sense of our duty by the practical sagacity and tried experience of Sir William Markby and by the virtue of that ancient Roman, the Dean.

I ask you to drink in the loving cup which will be passed round to the prosperity of the College, *Floreat domus de Balliolo.*"

¹ Lord Elgin, who retired after five years' administration, in December 1898.

² Lord Lansdowne, the Earl of Elgin and Lord Curzon.

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