

THE  
NAVAL HISTORY  
OF  
GREAT BRITAIN,

FROM THE  
DECLARATION OF WAR BY FRANCE IN 1793,  
TO THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE IV.

BY WILLIAM JAMES.

A NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS AND NOTES,

AND

AN ACCOUNT OF THE BURMESE WAR AND THE BATTLE  
OF NAVARINO,

BY CAPTAIN CHAMIER, R.N.

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VERITE SANS PEUR.

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IN SIX VOLUMES.

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ADMIRAL SIR EDWARD CODRINGTON

FROM A PORTRAIT BY SIR J. RAFAEL

1845. SCOTT'S ENGRAVERS.









CAPT. SIR NESBIT J. WILLOUGHBY









ADMIRAL, LORD DE SAUMAREZ.

FROM A PICTURE BY THOMAS PHILLIPS ESQ R.A.







ADMIRAL, SIR CHARLES BRISBANE,

ENGRAVED BY WILLIAM FARRINGTON AND G. SHELLEY.

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ADMIRAL, SIR MICHAEL SEYMOUR, BART.

Portrait of Admiral, Sir Michael Seymour, Bart.  
Engraved by J. G. Kneller.





## NAVAL HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

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### LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

As we are now entering upon the first exploit of one of the far-famed American 44-gun frigates, we conceive it will be useful to examine, a little more minutely than we have done, the force and qualifications of a class of ship, little known in Europe, until the President brought herself into notice in the manner we shall presently have to relate.

In our account of the action between the *Constellation* and *Insurgente*, we mentioned that, in March, 1794, when a rupture was expected with the regency of Algiers, the government of the United States ordered the construction of four frigates of 44, and two of 36 guns; and we stated that one class was to mount 56 guns, including 30 long 24-pounders on the main deck, and the other 48 guns, including 28 long 18-pounders.\* But we are inclined to think that this was not the armament originally intended for these ships; and our opinion is founded on the following facts. Soon after the passing of the act of congress of the 27th of March, 1794, the differences with Algiers were amicably settled; but in the course of the same year, feeling an interest in the success of republican France, the United States pushed their complaints against England to an extremity bordering on war. Now the Algerines possessed no stronger vessels than frigates, and those not of the first class; but England could send to sea a fleet of line-of-battle ships. It was this, we believe, that occasioned the American president to direct, as by a clause in the act he was empowered to do, that, instead of the four 44

\* See vol. ii., p. 322.

and two 36 gun frigates, two 74-gun ships, and one frigate of 44 guns, should be constructed.

An English shipwright, Mr. Joshua Humphreys, resident at Philadelphia, was required to give in an estimate of the cost of building a 74-gun ship, to measure 1620 tons American, which, as we shall by and by show, is about 1750 tons English. He did so, and computed the expense, without reckoning the guns, at 342,000 dollars. Upon this estimate, as it appears, the timbers were prepared for two 74s; one to be built at Philadelphia and named United-States, the other at Boston, and named Constitution. The 44-gun frigate was to be built at Baltimore, and to be named Constellation. Scarcely, however, had the keels of any of these ships been laid down, ere Mr. Jay's treaty restored the amicable relations between England and America, and occasioned a stop to be put to their construction.

As the most eligible mode of converting the timbers prepared for the two 74s, it was resolved that, although begun as line-of-battle ships, they should be finished as frigates. This was to be done by contracting the breadth of the frame about three feet and a half, and discontinuing the topside at the clamps of the quarterdeck and forecastle. As these enormous "frigates," although intended to mount 62 guns, were to rate only of 44, it was decided that the frigate originally intended to class as a 44 should bear the designation of a 36. The United-States was launched on the 10th of May, 1797, and cost, exclusive of her ordnance, 299,336 dollars; and the Constitution was launched on the 21st of October, in the same year, and cost 302,718 dollars. This, in either case, was not much below the original estimate, even had the ships been completed as 74s, and shows what a slight change had been effected in their construction. The Constellation was built under the personal direction of Commodore Truxton, who first commissioned her, and was launched on the 7th of September, 1797. Owing partly to the dearness of materials, and, partly, we believe, to some expensive alterations in her construction, the Constellation cost the enormous sum of 314,000 dollars.

When, in the spring of the year 1798, the expense of building these frigates, two of "44," and one of "36 guns," came to be submitted to congress, some explanation was required; and on the 1st of April the secretary at war delivered in a report, of which the following is an extract: "It appears, that the first estimate rendered to congress was for frigates of the common size and dimensions, rated at 36 and 44 guns, and that the appropriations for the armament were founded upon this estimate. It also appears, that, when their size and dimensions came to be maturely considered, due reference being had to the ships they might have to contend with, it was deemed proper, so to alter their dimensions without changing their rates, as to extend their sphere of utility as much as possible. It was expected, from

this alteration, that they would possess, in an eminent degree, the advantage of sailing; that, separately, they would be superior to any single European frigate of the usual dimensions; that, if assailed by numbers, they would be always able to lead ahead; that they could never be obliged to go into action but on their own terms, except in a calm; and that, in heavy weather, they would be capable of engaging double-decked ships. These are the principal advantages contemplated from the change made in their dimensions. Should they be realized, they will more than compensate for having materially swelled the body of expenditures."

In the course of the year 1798, two more 44-gun frigates were built; one, the *President*, at New-York, the other, the *Philadelphia*, at Philadelphia. Of the latter we know very little, on account of her loss already mentioned;\* but of the former we are enabled to furnish some far from unimportant particulars. Being constructed of timbers prepared for them alone, these frigates were more handsomely moulded than their two predecessors. The *President*, indeed, was considered to be the most beautiful and the best sailing of all the American frigates; and, being lower in the water than either the *United-States* or *Constitution*, was a much more deceiving ship. Her scantling is represented not to have been so stout as theirs; which may have been one reason that she cost only 220,910 dollars, while they cost, as we have seen 300,000.

With respect to the materials of which the ships were constructed and the pains taken in building them, we can but repeat our former remarks on the same subject. Every thing that was new in the navies of England and France was tried, and, if approved, adopted, no matter, it falling so light from the paucity of individuals, at what expense. There were no contractors, to make a hard bargain pay, by deteriorating the quality of the article; no deputies, ten deep, each to get a picking out of the job. The executive government agreed directly with the artisan; and not a plank was shifted, nor a long-bolt driven, without the scrutinizing eye of one of the captains or commodores; of him, perhaps, who expected, at no distant day, to risk his life and honour on board the very ship whose equipment he was superintending.

As the number and nature of a ship's guns depend, in a very great degree, upon her size and scantling, we must endeavour to convey an idea of the dimensions of the American 44-gun frigate, before we enter upon the subject of her armament. The *United-States*, *Constitution*, and *President* measure within a few fractions of a ton the same; namely, from 1444 to 1445 tons American. We say "tons American," because although the American standard of weights and measures, the pound and the

\* See vol. iii., p. 292.

foot, for instance, is the same as the English, the mode of casting the tonnage of a ship is widely different. This will appear evident when it is known, that the American frigate *President*, according to the official register in the office at Washington, measured 1444 tons and a fraction;\* whereas, when subsequently measured at Portsmouth dock-yard, she was found to be 1533 tons and a fraction.

The *President's* "keel for tonnage," as given in an American publication, is 145 feet; but the English mode of casting the tonnage makes it 146 feet,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  inches. In both cases, it is a mere calculation, intended to allow for the rake or inclination of the ship's stem and stern. The first multiplier of the Americans is the breadth across the frame, or moulded breadth, by them usually called the breadth of beam, but the first multiplier of the British is the extreme breadth, or that produced by adding to the moulded breadth double the assumed thickness (in ships of the higher classes five inches) of the plank on the bottom. The second multiplier of each is the respective half-breadths. The American divisor is 95; the British 94. Thus:

	Ft.in.	Ft.in.	Ft.in.	Tons.
Am.method	145 0	$\times 43 6$	$= 6308 \times 21 9$	$= 137198 \div 95 = 1444 18-95$ ths.
Brit. ditto...	146 $7\frac{1}{2}$	$\times 44 4$	$= 6502 \times 22 2$	$= 143044 \div 94 = 1533 25-94$ ths.

As it is not generally known, even among the most experienced naval officers of either nation, that any difference exists in the mode of measuring British and American ships of war, the reduction in the alleged tonnage of the latter greatly facilitates the deception, eulogized for its "advantages" by the American government, and to the influence of which upon the European world the American flag owes so much of its glory.

If we consider, that it is only to add about four feet to the extreme breadth of the *President*, to make her a larger ship than the generality of British 74s, and that her yards are as square, and her masts as stout as theirs, some idea may be formed of the size and formidable appearance of the American 44-gun frigate. In point of scantling, also, that which is acknowledged to be the lightest built of these frigates is at least equal to a British 74 of the largest class. This is proved by taking the thickness of the topsides at the midship maindeck, and foremost quarterdeck, port-sill. In the *President*, the maindeck port-sill measures 1 ft. 8 in., and, in any British 74 of 1800 tons, 1 ft. 7 in.; and, while in the latter the quarterdeck port-sill measures only 1 ft. 1 in., it measures in the former 1 ft. 5 inches.

Now for the armament of these 44-gun frigates. Having had ocular proof of the manner in which the *President* was fitted, we shall take her for our guide. This beautiful ship has, or rather had, for she has long since been taken to pieces, 15 ports and a bridle of a side on the main deck, eight of a side on the

\* Clark's Naval History of the United States, vol. ii., p. 240.

quarterdeck, and four of a side, without reckoning the chase-port, on the forecastle. This gave the ship 54 ports for broadside guns; but she had the means of mounting 62 broadside guns. For instance, instead of her gangway, or passage from the forecastle to the quarterdeck, being of the usual width of four or five feet, it was ten feet. This deviation from the common plan was to allow room for the carriage and slide of a 42-pounder carronade; and a novel and very ingenious method was adopted, to obviate the necessity of uniting the quarterdeck and fore-castle barricades, or bulwarks, and consequently of destroying that single-decked appearance which, for the purpose of deception, it was necessary to maintain. Between the two barricades the same open or untimbered space remained, as is seen in any other frigate; but the stanchions for supporting the hammock-cloths were of extraordinary stoutness, and so arranged along the gangway as to form ports for four guns. The breechings were to pass round the iron stanchions, chocks were fitted to the deck to receive the carriages, and the guns could be as effectively mounted as any in the ship.

We formerly doubted if these eight gangway guns were put on board the President or either of her class-mates; but it has been asserted by British officers, who visited some of the large American frigates during the war with Tripoli, that they at that time mounted guns along the whole extent of their spar-decks. If so, the ships probably landed them upon the return of peace with the Barbary states. The ships were then found to work so much better, that it was decided, we believe, not to supply these eight singularly constructed ports with guns, but merely to add two carronades to the 54 guns, which the ship could mount in the regular way. This was done by fitting the gangway or entrance port to receive a carronade; making nine of a side on the quarterdeck. So that the American 44-gun frigate mounted, with her 30 long 24-pounders on the main deck, 18 carronades, 42-pounders, on the quarterdeck, and six carronades, 42-pounders, and two long 24-pounders on the forecastle; total 56 guns. This is the number invariably assigned as the force of each of the three "44-gun frigates" in Mr. Clark's *American Naval History*.\*

The maindeck guns of the United-States were English sea-service guns, measuring nine feet and a half in length, and weighing about 50 cwt. Those of the Constitution were English land-service, or battery guns, in length 10 feet, and in weight about 54 cwt.; but the guns of the President were of American manufacture, measuring eight and a half feet, and weighing only 48½ cwt. We may here mention that, although the four masked or gangway ports were left vacant, a case might occur, in which they would be of essential benefit. For instance, suppose the

\* Clark's *Naval History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 171, and vol. ii., p. 22.

ship to be attacked in port, and to be moored in such a manner as to be only assailable on her outer side: she could easily transfer from the opposite side four of her carronades, and thus present a broadside force of 32, or, admitting that some inconvenience would arise from the closeness of the aftermost of those four guns to the temporary gun in the gangway port, of 31, heavy guns.

For the purpose of showing that, if the President and her two formidable class-mates had been equipped with the whole of the 62 guns which they were constructed to carry, they would have required no addition to their established complement of men, we will state a few facts relative to the composition of American crews. When, in the year 1794, the Americans began arming against the Algerines, the following were ordered to be the proportions, in which the different ratings or classes of a crew of 370 men were to bear to each other: officers and petty officers 66, able seamen 150, ordinary seamen 100, marines 54. Here, be it observed, are wanted two ratings, either of which usually forms no inconsiderable proportion of a British crew, landmen and boys. In later years, however, a few boys or lads were admitted; and, estimating the crew of an American 44-gun frigate at 475 men and boys, we may venture to give the following as its organization: officers and petty officers 80, able seamen 180, ordinary seamen 145, marines 65, boys 5. But, in reality, the distinction between the able and the ordinary seaman was merely nominal, the fastidiousness of the American government requiring the latter to be nearly equal in qualifications to the former. Nor was it enough to be a practised seaman: the volunteer must also, in age, stature, and bodily vigour, be able to stand the test of the strictest scrutiny.

While, therefore, the officers, or the greater part of them, were native Americans, the petty officers consisted, almost wholly, of the first order of British seamen; of whom, also, the bulk of the crew was composed. Owing to the absence of any restraint similar to that imposed by the game-laws of England, the American peasant is a sportsman from his infancy. Hence, the marines consisted of native Americans; not only as being the best marksmen, especially with the rifle, but because the British marine corps, to its credit, afforded very few deserters. It may now be understood what is meant, when it is stated, that an American ship of war is manned with a picked crew.

Having now, as we trust, clearly shown, that those who called the American 44-gun frigate a "line-of-battle ship in disguise," did not commit the gross mistake with which they were charged, we shall offer a word or two on the subject of the American 36-gun frigate. Even here was a frigate more than equal to any French or English frigate of the largest class, carrying long 18-pounders; and, be it remembered, in the year 1811, France did not own any, and England only three frigates (Cornwallis, Inde-



fatigable, and *Endymion*), that carried long 24-pounders. Upon a certain occasion, which will soon pass in order of detail, the Americans loudly proclaimed, that the *Chesapeake* was the very worst frigate they possessed. The *Chesapeake* was a 36-gun frigate, and, as we have elsewhere shown, had the ports for mounting on her two broadsides 54 guns.\* For a short time, we believe, the ship did mount that number of guns, with a crew of about 440 men. Besides the *Constellation* and *Chesapeake*, built in 1797, there were the *Congress* and *New-York*, built in 1799. Had the Americans possessed no stronger frigates than the heaviest of these, Europeans would not have been so surfeited with tales of American naval prowess.

On the 10th of May, 1811, the United States' 44-gun frigate *President*, Captain Charles Ludlow, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore John Rodgers, with sails unbent, and the principal part of her officers on shore, lay moored off Annapolis in the *Chesapeake*; when, at 3 P. M., the commodore came unexpectedly on board, and immediately all hands went to work bending sails and getting the ship ready for sea. The surgeon, too, began preparing his plasters and splinters, and rubbing up his instruments of amputation; rather an extraordinary occupation on board a neutral frigate. All this bustle and preparation was not, however, without an object. On the 1st of the month, in the forenoon, the British 38-gun frigate *Guerrière*, Captain Samuel John Pechell, cruising off Sandy-Hook, boarded the American brig *Spitfire*, from Portland bound to New-York, and impressed out of her a man named John Deguyo, a passenger and a native citizen of the United States. The *Guerrière* had also impressed, or did shortly afterwards impress, from vessels that she boarded off the coast, two other native American citizens, Gideon Caprian and Joshua Leeds. That John Deguyo was a native American, or, at all events, that he was not a British subject, is clear from the circumstance, that on the 12th of June the *Guerrière* discharged him into the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Gorée*, Captain Henry Dilkes Byng; and, on the 30th, the latter put him on board an American ship for a passage to the United States. Caprian was also discharged, but not Leeds, because he had entered.

The *Spitfire* arrived at New-York on the same day, or the day after, Deguyo had been pressed out of her; and the occurrence, within five or six days at the furthest, must have been known at Washington. The written orders to Commodore Rodgers were probably, as Mr. Secretary Munroe asserts, "to protect the coast and commerce of the United States;" but the officers who arrived from Washington on the 11th of May, to join their ship, must have brought some verbal orders of a more particular nature; for one of the *President's* officers, in a letter to a friend

\* See p. 332.

says: "By the officers who came from Washington we learn, that we are sent in pursuit of the British frigate, who had impressed a passenger from a brig." This British frigate was reported to be the *Guerrière*; and the American officer anticipates, with a refusal on the part of her commander to deliver up the man, an engagement between the *President* and a British frigate "exactly her force."

On the 12th of May, at daylight, the *President* got under way, and began working down the bay. On the 13th the commodore spoke a brig, which had, the preceding day seen a ship, supposed to be the *Guerrière*, off Cape Henry. But, if the date and place are correct, it could not have been the *Guerrière*; as, at noon on the 12th, she was nearly abreast of Cape Roman, South-Carolina. An extra quantity of shot and wads were now got on deck, and the ship was cleared for action. In the evening the wind shifted to a fair quarter, and the *President* ran before it. On the 14th the American frigate was off Cape Henry; but no British frigate was there. The commodore now stood slowly to the north-east, expecting every moment to discover the object of his pursuit. The 15th passed without any occurrence; but on the 16th, at about 25 minutes past meridian, Cape Henry bearing south-west distant 14 or 15 leagues, the wind a moderate breeze from the northward, the *President*, from her mast-head, discovered a vessel in the east quarter, standing towards her under a press of sail.

The vessel thus descried was the British ship-sloop *Little-Belt*, Captain Arthur Batt Bingham, mounting 18 carronades, 32-pounders, and two nines, with 121 men and boys, on her return to the southward from off Sandy-Hook; where she had been seeking the *Guerrière*, for whom she bore despatches from the commander-in-chief at Bermuda, Rear-admiral Sawyer. The *Little-Belt* had discovered the *President* since about noon, and considering her suspicious, had hauled up on the starboard tack in chase. Captain Bingham, in his letter, says, it was "eleven" when he descried the *President*; the *Little-Belt's* log says, "half past." Even the latest of these times would, according to the letter of Commodore Rodgers, make it 40 minutes after the *Little-Belt* had descried the *President* before the latter discovered her: a circumstance not very probable; although it does appear, that the American ship did not keep the best look-out; otherwise, when first seen by the *President*, the *Little-Belt* would have been steering south, instead of towards the *President* or north by west, a deviation from her course caused solely by the latter's appearance. We have therefore, as on other occasions, paid less attention to the absolute, than to the relative time.

At 1 h. 30 m. P.M. each ship, the two then about 10 miles apart, supposed the other to be a vessel of war. The *President* thereupon hoisted her ensign and commodore's pendant, and

edged away, as if to meet the Little-Belt. The latter, about the same time, made her number, and afterwards the customary signal (No. 275), calling upon the stranger, if a British ship of war, to show hers. The non-compliance with this signal indicating that the President was, what by her colours she appeared to be, an American frigate, the Little-Belt, at 1 h. 45 m. p. m., hoisted her colours, wore, and resumed her course to the southward under all sail. "Being," as Commodore Rodgers says, "desirous of speaking her, and of ascertaining what she was," the President crowded sail in chase. Observing this, the Little-Belt made the private signal. Finding it unanswered, Captain Bingham felt assured that the stranger, notwithstanding her persisting to chase, was an American frigate, and therefore, hauling down both ensign and signal, continued his course round Cape Hatteras.

Although the wind, since 1 p. m., had been gradually falling, the superior sailing of the President brought her, by 6 h. 30 m. p. m., so near to the Little-Belt, that Captain Bingham, wishing before dark to remove all remaining doubts on either side, shortened sail, rehoisted his colours, and hove to on the larboard tack.

To avoid being taken by surprise, the Little-Belt double-shotted her guns, and got all clear for action. The President, by the manner of her approach, appearing as if she intended to take a raking position, the Little-Belt, to frustrate that design, wore three times. This brought the latter upon the starboard tack; and at a few minutes past 8 p. m., when the two ships were about 90 yards apart, Captain Bingham hailed the President in the customary manner, but received no answer, probably because he was not heard. The President still advancing, as if desirous to pass astern of the Little-Belt, the latter wore a fourth time, and came to on the larboard tack. The President now hauled her foresail up, and also hove to on the larboard tack, distant about 80 yards from the sloop's weather-beam. Captain Bingham, standing on the gun abaft the larboard gangway, hailed, "Ship a-hoy!" "Ship a-hoy!" was repeated from the neutral frigate. "What ship is that?" asked Captain Bingham. "What ship is that?" repeated Commodore Rodgers. At this instant a gun was fired, let us for the present say, by each ship; and, let us also say, that both guns went off by accident.

Each ship believing the other to have fired first, and that intentionally, and neither being disposed to brook the slightest insult, the two began a furious engagement; which lasted, including an intermission of a few minutes, about half an hour.\* The Little-Belt, owing to the loss of her after-sail and the damaged state of her rigging, having fallen off, so that no gun

\* Captain Bingham says "three quarters;" some of the American officers, "a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes."

would bear, ceased firing; and the *President*, finding that to be the case, did the same. Shortly afterwards Commodore Rodgers, hailing the *Little-Belt*, learnt, what he and his officers must have known before, that she was a British ship, but did not, it appears, hear her name; and, to a question, desiring to know if his antagonist had struck, was answered by Captain Bingham in the negative. The latter then asked the name of the American frigate; but the same cause, the increased freshness of the wind, that had prevented the commodore from hearing the whole of the answer to his question, kept Captain Bingham in ignorance of the name, though not of the nation, of the ship by which the *Little-Belt* had been so battered and ill-used.

The damages of the *Little-Belt* were indeed, as might be expected, of a very serious description. The greater part of her standing and the whole of her running rigging were cut to pieces: not a brace nor a bowline was left. Her masts and yards were all badly wounded, and her gaff was shot away. Her upperworks were completely riddled, and her hull in general much struck: several shot were sticking in her side, and some had entered between wind and water. Nothing, we conceive, but the lowness of her hull in the water, and the consequent difficulty of hitting it, prevented the sloop from being sunk. The loss on board the *Little-Belt* bore a proportion to her damage: she had one midshipman (Samuel Woodward), seven seamen, and one marine killed, two seamen mortally, her acting master (James M'Queen), seven seamen, one boy, and two marines severely, and her boatswain (James Franklin), five seamen, two boys, and two marines slightly wounded; total, 11 killed and mortally wounded, and 21 wounded severely and slightly. The *President* appears to have had her sails and rigging slightly injured, and to have received one 32-pound shot in her foremast and another in her mainmast: her loss is also represented not to have exceeded one boy wounded.

After the action the *President* wore, and, running a short distance to leeward of the *Little-Belt*, came to the starboard tack, to repair her trifling damages. This done, the frigate filled and lay to on different tacks, in order to wait until daylight should afford the commodore a clear view of what his prowess had effected. The *Little-Belt* brought to on the larboard tack, and commenced her more serious occupation of repairing damages and stopping leaks. During the night the sloop's topgallant-masts were got on deck, and the cut rigging partially repaired.

At daylight on the 17th the *President*, now about nine miles to windward, bore up under topsails and foresail, and, to all appearance, ready to renew the action. At 8 A. M. the American frigate passed within hail, and the commodore said: "Ship ahoy! I'll send a boat on board, if you please, sir."—"Very well, sir," was Captain Bingham's reply. The boat came, under the command of the first Lieutenant John Orde Creighton, with

a message from the commodore, to the effect, that he lamented much "the unfortunate affair," and that, had he known the British ship's force was so inferior, he would not have fired into her. On being asked why he had fired at all, the lieutenant replied, that the Little-Belt had fired first. This was most positively denied on the part of Captain Bingham. Lieutenant Creighton, in the name of the commodore, then offered every assistance, and suggested that Captain Bingham had better put into one of the ports of the United States. This the latter declined. The boat returned. The President made sail to the westward, and the Little-Belt, as soon as she was able, to the northward. On the 23d the latter was joined by the *Gorée*, Captain Byng, and on the 28th the two vessels anchored in Halifax harbour.

In discussing the merits of the action between the Little-Belt and the President, we shall consider it in the double light of an attack by a neutral upon a belligerent, and an engagement between an American frigate and a British sloop of war. We shall begin by freely admitting, that the act of the *Guerrière*, in pressing a native American citizen out of an American coaster, in the very mouth of an American port, was an act unjustifiable, unnecessary, and impolitic; and that this wanton encroachment upon neutral rights, coupled with many others which had been practised along the same coast, was a sufficient ground for the government of the United States to take every measure, short of actual war, for protecting their commerce and citizens from a repetition of such acts of violence.

Well, the American frigate sails forth, in diplomatic language, "to protect the coast and commerce of the United States," but, in reality, to speak the British frigate *Guerrière*, to demand from her the American citizen whom she had impressed, and, in case of refusal, to endeavour to take that American citizen by force of arms. We must suppose that a refusal was anticipated; or why were such preparations made? why such quantities of ammunition brought upon deck; and why did the commodore, as the President was descending the bay, so significantly question his people as to their readiness for action?

A ship is descried, a man of war, "from the symmetry of her upper sails" and her making signals,\* she is supposed to be the British frigate *Guerrière*, and that supposition is confirmed in the mind of the captain of the President, from her proximity to the coast, and every person on board is so fully engrossed with the idea of that frigate, as to be incapable of bestowing a thought upon any other. Chase is given. The ships approximate, so that the upper part of the Little-Belt's stern shows itself to those on board the President.† Still the delusion continues. As evening approaches, the British sloop discovers her broadside.

\* Official letter of Commodore Rodgers.

† Ibid.

“Nevertheless,” says the commodore, “her appearance indicated that she was a frigate.” Had the *Little-Belt* been a deep-waisted or frigate-built ship, such a mistake might have happened; but she was a low flush vessel, similar in size, number of ports, and general appearance, to the American sloop *Hornet*. The ships mutually approach within hailing distance. Captain Bingham hails, let us admit, without being heard. Commodore Rodgers hails, and is hailed back. “Having,” he says, “asked the first question, I of course considered myself entitled, by the common rules of politeness, to the first answer: after a pause of 15 or 20 seconds, I reiterated my first inquiry of ‘What ship is that?’”

Let us also pause; and, leaving “the rules of politeness” to serve the commodore on some other occasion, examine upon what more stable ground he claims the privilege of being first answered. The *President* was a neutral, the *Little-Belt* a belligerent ship: one was at peace with all the world, the other at war with the greater part of it. The belligerent vessel has an unquestionable right to conceal her condition, to wear false colours, give a false answer, or no answer at all; in short, to practise every artifice to deceive or mislead her supposed enemy; and she is to take every ship she meets as an enemy, until the contrary be shown. A neutral vessel, on the other hand, armed or unarmed, has no motive, and therefore no right, to practise deception: she is bound to observe common civility, if not “politeness,” to every ship she meets; and, when questioned as to her name or national character, is bound to give it with frankness, because she has nothing to dread from the most ample disclosure of her situation. Hence Commodore Rodgers, waving the law of politeness, should have conformed to the law of nations, and have answered Captain Bingham’s hail, although under the impression that he himself had asked the first question. But, in truth, the American frigate at this moment was, to all intents and purposes, a ship of war: she was not only armed, but prepared, for battle, and was resolved to have a battle with the ship, the little ship, that now so opportunely lay under her guns.

From the numerous contradictions and cross swearings that have grown out of this case, it has hitherto been a disputed point who fired the first shot. Having, however, learnt by experience, not to place implicit reliance in all that an American says or swears, we shall not let the subject pass without such a scrutiny, as may satisfy the minds of some, although it may not remove the doubts of all. The principal officers examined upon oath, at the court of inquiry held upon Commodore Rodgers, were the acting captain, three out of the five lieutenants, two officers of marines, the master, and the chaplain. Captain Ludlow is “uncertain which fired the first gun, but the second gun was from the *President*.” The first lieutenant believes the first

shot was fired from the Little-Belt. The second lieutenant is sure it was; and so swears the junior lieutenant. Both officers of marines and the master depose to the same effect. The chaplain thinks the gun came from the Little-Belt, as he felt no jar in the President. With respect to the second gun, or that admitted to have been fired by the President, the lieutenant of marines swears it went off "in six seconds," and the master "in three or four seconds," after the first, or Little-Belt's gun.

So that the two guns were fired within, taking the lowest estimate, three seconds of each other. Might not the guns have been fired at the same instant? In short, might there not have been one gun, and one gun only fired? If so, that must have been the President's gun, because one of her guns is admitted to have gone off by accident; while the most positive denial exists as to the occurrence of any accident of the kind on board the Little-Belt. Moreover the captain, two lieutenants, master, and surgeon of the latter have solemnly declared, that the first gun was fired from the President. In this they are borne out by two British seamen, who, in company, as they say, with nearly 300 more, were on board the President during the action; and who, fearing a rupture with their native country, deserted from the frigate soon after she arrived at New-York, and proceeded to Halifax, Nova-Scotia. One of these men, William Burnet, swears that he was stationed at the second division of guns on the main deck; that, while the commodore was hailing the second time, a gun in his division went off, he thinks by accident; that he was then looking at the Little-Belt through one of the ports, and is positive that she did not fire. The other man, John Russell, corroborates his shipmate's testimony, and adds, that a man got entangled in the lanyard of the lock and thus occasioned the gun to go off. Burnet swears also, that Lieutenant Belding, who commanded in his division, knew and declared that the President fired the first shot, and, just before dark, saw with his glass, and observed to him, that the Little-Belt's colours were British. Burnet states likewise, that the ship was a small ship. It is therefore easy to conjecture, why Lieutenant Belding was not summoned to give his evidence at the court of inquiry: perhaps the other absent lieutenant might have been equally unfit for a witness in the commodore's cause.

Not a doubt, therefore, remains upon our mind, that the first gun was fired, unintentionally we admit, by the American frigate; and, had the British sloop immediately opened her fire in return, being satisfied at the time that it was a neutral man of war she was engaging, we should have no hesitation in saying, that Captain Bingham acted with precipitation: that he ought to have repeated his hail, or sent an officer on board, to demand an explanation. As it was, however, both parties appear to have given a simultaneous vent to their fury; one, as Lieutenant

Creighton swears Captain Bingham informed him, on the supposition that he was defending himself against an avowed enemy; the other, according to the American version of the proceeding, with the intention of chastising the insolence of a pretended friend.

In awarding this "chastisement," Commodore Rodgers tells us, he was governed by "motives of humanity and a determination not to spill a drop of blood unnecessarily;" and yet his own captain swears, that the commodore's orders were "to fire low and with two round shot." His subordinate officers and men, emulous to please, fired low enough, and loaded their guns, not only with round and grape shot, but with "every scrap of iron that could possibly be collected." The consequences of this humane and magnanimous conduct on the part of, in the words of an American editor, "one of the largest 44s that ever floated," against a ship, that was considerably less than one third of her size, and not one fourth equal to her in point of force, have already been detailed.

True it is, that one of the President's officers has sworn, that he "thought the Belt a heavy frigate until next day," and another, that he "took her for a frigate of 36 or 38 guns." The commodore, too, confesses himself to have been similarly deceived. What must have been the astonishment of all these swearers, when "the next day" discovered their late antagonist to be a ship scarcely exceeding in length the space between the President's bows and her gangway ladder, and whose topmast heads ranged very little higher than their ship's lower yard-arms. That such a mistake should have happened seems unaccountable; especially when there was light enough for Captain Ludlow to see that his opponent's "gaff was down, and her maintopsail yard on the cap," and when the distance between the two ships is admitted not to have exceeded 70 or 80 yards. However, the American commodore, in all he said was believed, and for all he had done was commended, in the quarter to which alone, beside his conscience, and that probably was not an oversqueamish one, he considered himself responsible. On the other hand, the captain, officers, and men of the Little-Belt, for the spirit and firmness they had manifested throughout the whole of the unequal contest, which, according to our contemporary, "it was the misfortune of Captain Bingham" to be engaged in,\* were greeted with applause by every generous mind, some in America not excepted; and on the 7th of February, 1812, as a proof that the lords of the admiralty were far from displeased with his conduct, Captain Bingham was promoted to post-rank.

On the 2d of February, at 5 P. M., the three French 40-gun frigates *Renommée*, Commodore François Roquebert, and *Cloinde* and *Néréide*, Captains Jacques Saint-Cricq and Jean-

\* Brenton, vol. iv., p. 555.



François Lemaresquier, sailed from Brest, each having on board 200 troops and a supply of munitions of war, bound, in the first instance, to the Isle of France; the capture of which in the preceding December, was of course unknown, although as a contingency provided against, by the port of Batavia's being named for the succedaneous destination. Bad weather nearly separated the frigates the first night; and a continuance of contrary winds occasioned the squadron to be 18 days going the first 200 leagues of the voyage. On the 24th of February, by some Lisbon newspapers found on board a Portuguese ship, the French commodore gained intelligence, that an attack was intended, and had perhaps already been made, upon the island to which he was first destined. The favourable change in the wind was taken immediate advantage of, and all sail crowded upon the three ships. On the 13th of March the frigates crossed the line; on the 18th of April, in latitude  $38^{\circ}$ , doubled the Cape of Good Hope; and on the 6th of May, at 11 P. M., being the ninety-third day since their departure from Brest, arrived within five miles of Isle de la Passe, situated, as already known, at the entrance of Grand-Port, or Port-Sud-Est. Soon after midnight a boat from each frigate was despatched to the shore, to gain intelligence.

The night was calm, and yet not a musket could be heard. This encouraged the hope, that the island was still in French possession. Daylight on the 7th arrived, and the colours hoisted at the fort upon Isle de la Passe were French; but they were unaccompanied by the private signals. This gave the first serious alarm to commodore Roquebert and his companions. At sunrise five sail successively hove in sight to leeward; and about the same time was observed, at Isle de la Passe and along the coast, the signal of three French frigates being to windward: a signal fully understood by the latter, as being made according to the code in use at the island previously to its surrender.

Two of the five sail thus seen were unarmed vessels, probably coasters; but the remaining three were the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigates Phœbe and Galatea, Captains James Hillyar and Woodley Losack, and 18-gun brig-sloop Racehorse, Captain James de Rippe, part of a squadron which had been ordered by Rear-admiral the honourable Robert Stopford, the commander-in-chief on the Cape station, to cruise off the Isle of France, to endeavour to intercept these very frigates, and two others, in all probability, the new 40-gun frigates Nymphé and Méduse, from Nantes, of whose expected arrival intelligence had been received. The British ships were presently under all sail upon a wind in chase; the Galatea's gig, with the intelligence, having previously been despatched to Captain Charles Marsh Schomberg, of the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Astrea, lying in Port-Louis.

In the course of the forenoon the Renommée's boat returned on board, with information of what had befallen the colony; the details of which were communicated by two negroes whom the

boat had brought off. The boats of the *Clorinde* and *Néréide* appear to have been captured. The three French frigates now tacked and stood to the eastward, followed by the two British frigates and brig-sloop. At 3 p. m. the French hoisted their colours, and the British soon afterwards did the same. At sunset the French squadron bore south-east of the British, distant about three leagues, the wind a moderate breeze from the same quarter.

On the 8th, at 4 a. m., the distance between the two hostile squadrons was distinguished to six or seven miles; and at 8 a. m. the French frigates bore up, and, with a light air of wind, stood towards the *Phœbe* and *Galatea*. These, with the *Racehorse*, shortly afterwards wore and steered to the westward, in the direction of *Isle Ronde*, then distant five or six leagues. Wishing, with the odds against him, to have a commanding breeze to manœuvre with, and expecting every moment to be joined by the *Astrea* from *Port-Louis*, Captain Hillyar rather avoided than sought an engagement; and towards evening, when the two squadrons were scarcely five miles apart, Commodore Roquebert, considering it, as he states, unsafe to follow the British ships into the current that runs between *Isle Ronde* and *Isle Serpent*, discontinued the chase and hauled up to the eastward.


On the 9th, at daylight, the two squadrons regained a distant sight of each other; but, the *Phœbe* and *Galatea* bearing up about noon to join the *Astrea*, the French ships disappeared. The three British frigates then steered for *Port-Louis*, and on the 12th came to an anchor off the harbour. It appears that, at one period, while the two squadrons, before the junction of the *Astrea*, were in the presence of each other, the ship's company of the *Galatea* went aft and requested their captain to bring the enemy to action. In order to concert with his senior officer upon that or some other subject, Captain Losack went on board the *Phœbe*; and, on his return, the crew of the *Galatea*, supposing their wishes were about to be gratified, gave him three cheers.

Commodore Roquebert reduced the crews of his ships to two-thirds allowance of provisions, and resolved to attempt a surprise upon some post on the windward side of *Isle Bourbon*. Having, by the 11th, passed 20 leagues to windward of the *Isle of France*, the three French frigates bore up for *Isle Bourbon*, and on the same night made the land. The boats of the squadron, having on board a division of the troops, attempted to disembark at a post that was known to be weakly manned, but were prevented by the heavy surf. Thus disappointed, the French Commodore stood across to the coast of *Madagascar*, to endeavour to obtain a supply of provisions. On the 19th the ships made the *isle of Prunes*, and the same evening surprised the small settlement of *Tamatave*, in *Madagascar*; the garrison of which consisted of about 100 officers and men of the 22d


regiment, and except a small proportion, were sick with the endemial fever of the country. This settlement had been taken from the French on the 12th of the preceding February, by the above detachment of British troops, sent thither by Mr. Farguhar, the governor of the Isle of France, in the 18-gun brig-sloop Eclipse, Captain William Jones Lye.

On the 20th, at daybreak, Captain Schomberg, with his three frigates and brig-sloop, and who, very judiciously, had sailed from Port-Louis on the 14th direct for this spot, discovered himself to M. Roquebert; then, with his three frigates, close to the land near Foul point, and directly to windward of the former. The British ships immediately made all sail in chase, with a light breeze from off the land, or from the west by north; but the French ships continued lying to, to await the return of two of their boats from Tamatave. The Renommée's boat at length came off; and at noon the French Commodore formed his three frigates in line of battle, placing the Renommée in the centre, the Clorinde ahead, and the Néréide astern. The British, in the mean while, were closing their opponents as fast as the light and variable winds would permit, formed in the following order: Astrea, Phœbe, Galatea, in line ahead, and the Racchorse nearly abreast of the Phœbe or centre-ship, to leeward.

At 3 h. 50 m. p. m. the French frigates, being on the larboard tack, wore together, and, after keeping away for a short time, hauled up again on the same tack. The British ships were now approaching on the opposite or starboard tack; and, as soon as the Astrea, who was considerably ahead of her second 'astern, had arrived abreast of the Renommée, the latter opened her fire at long range. At a few minutes before 4 p. m. the Astrea returned this fire; as did also the Phœbe and Galatea, as they advanced in succession. Thus:



Having passed out of gun-shot astern of the *Néréide*, the *Astrea* prepared to tack and renew the action; but, as was to have been expected so near to the land, particularly Madagascar, the cannonade produced an almost instantaneous calm to leeward. Having, in consequence, missed stays, the *Astrea* attempted to wear, and had scarcely accomplished that, ere there was an entire cessation of the breeze. From their weatherly position, the French ships of course felt its influence the longest; and the breeze did not quite leave them until the *Clorinde* and *Renommée* had bore up and stationed themselves, in a most destructive position, across the starboard quarters and sterns of the *Phœbe* and *Galatea*. Now was the time for the *Racehorse*, with her facility of sweeping, to have distinguished herself, by taking a position close athwart the hawse of the *Néréide*, between whom and the *Astrea* a distant and partial cannonade was maintained. The *Racehorse* did begin sweeping, but stopped to engage long before her shot could reach the French frigate; and, in consequence, the *Astrea* made the brig's signal to engage more closely, and, as it was never answered, kept it flying. Owing to the leeward position of the *Galatea*, and the efforts of the *Phœbe*, by backing her sails, to support her consort, these two ships lay nearly abreast of each other, in the manner represented in the following diagram:



On the starboard quarter of the *Phœbe* lay the *Renommée* and on her starboard bow the *Néréide*; who had just cleared herself from the *Astrea* and *Racehorse*, then upwards of a mile and a half ahead of their two consorts, and like them in an ungovernable state for the want of wind. At 6 h. 30 m. P. M. a light air from the south-east enabled the *Phœbe*, who had hitherto been able only to bring her bow guns to bear on the *Néréide* and her quarter ones on the *Renommée*, as the swell hove her off and brought her to, to close the *Néréide* in a raking position; and whom, at the end of 25 minutes, the *Phœbe* completely silenced, but was then obliged to quit, as the *Renommée*

and Clorinde were fast approaching to the support of their nearly overpowered consort.

These two frigates, in the mean time, having kept their broadsides to bear by the aid of their boats, had terribly battered the Galatea. The cutter of the latter having been cut adrift by a shot while towing astern, the jollyboat was got ready to tow the ship's head round; but a shot sank her just as the tow-rope was being handed on board, and, scarcely were the tackles got up to hoist out a third boat, when a shot carried away the foreyard tackle. Some seamen now got sweeps out of the head; and at length the Galatea was enabled to open her broadside upon her two antagonists, particularly upon the Renommée, who received the greater portion of her fire. About this time, as already mentioned, a light breeze sprang up; and, while the Renommée and Clorinde made sail to support the Néréide, the Galatea, with her masts much wounded, and her hull greatly shattered, hauled towards the Astrea and Racehorse, and at 8 p. m. ceased firing. At 8 h. 30 m. p. m., just as the Galatea, under a press of sail, was passing to leeward of the Astrea, and Captain Losack had hailed Captain Schomberg, to say that his ship had suffered considerably, the Galatea's fore topmast fell over the larboard bow and the mizen topmast upon the main yard. Having at this time three feet 10 inches water in the hold, her foremast, main yard, main topmast, and bowsprit badly wounded, and her rigging of every sort cut to pieces, the Galatea hailed the Racehorse for assistance, and Captain De Rippe sent on board a midshipman and 10 men. Captain Losack then made the night-signal of distress to the commodore. The Astrea immediately closed the Galatea; and, hailing, was informed, that the latter was in too disabled a state to put her head towards the enemy and renew the action.

The Astrea then wore round on the larboard tack; and Captain Schomberg ordered the Racehorse to follow him closely, as he intended to renew the action as soon as the Phœbe was in a state to give her support. This frigate was promptly reported ready; and at about 8 h. 25 m. p. m. the Astrea, Phœbe, and Racehorse bore up towards the enemy, whose lights were then visible in the west-north-west. It appears that, after the Renommée and Clorinde had obliged the Phœbe to quit the Néréide, the latter, on account of her disabled state, was ordered by the commodore to make for the land; while the Renommée, followed by her remaining consort, hauled up in line of battle to renew the engagement. Shortly afterwards the Clorinde lost a man overboard, and, in bringing to to pick him up, necessarily dropped astern of her leader. Captain Roquebert, however, in the most gallant manner, stood on his course, and at 9 h. 50 m. p. m. came to close action with the Astrea, whom, with a heavy fire of round, grape, and musketry, the Renommée attempted to lay athwart hawse; but, aware of the numerical superiority of

her opponent, the *Astrea* avoided coming in contact. After an animated cannonade of about 25 minutes, during which the *Phœbe* fired a few raking shot at the *Renommée*, and the *Racehorse* discharged a whole broadside directly between the masts of the *Astrea*, and set her mainsail on fire, the French ship made the signal of surrender. Captain Hillyar now ordered the *Racehorse* to take possession of the *Renommée*; but the brig, just at this moment losing her fore topmast from a wound it had received, was unable to do so. Captain Schomberg then sent on board the prize, in a sinking boat, Lieutenant Charles Royer,\* Lieutenant of marines John Drury, and five seamen; and the *Astrea* and *Phœbe* made all sail after the *Clorinde*, who had shamefully kept aloof during her commodore's gallant action, and was now under a press of canvass on the larboard tack, endeavouring to effect her escape.

Captain Schomberg says: "Another frigate, on closing, struck, and made the signal also; but, on a shot being fired at her from her late commodore, she was observed trying to escape;" and, in another place, "The ship that struck and escaped was *La Clorinde*." Nothing of this appears in the French accounts. On the contrary, the complaint there is, that the *Clorinde* avoided closing. If we are of opinion that the French ship did not surrender, it is not because the French captain has said so, but because we cannot discover that the *Clorinde* was so pressed, as to render such a step necessary. That will be more apparent, when we come to state her loss. Moreover it was dark; and our experience in investigating accounts has taught us, that mistakes of the kind are frequently made, even where the action is fought in broad daylight. The chase of the *Clorinde* was continued until 2 A. M. on the 21st; when, finding that, on account of the perfect state of her rigging and sails, the *Clorinde* gained considerably on the *Astrea* and *Phœbe*, the two latter wore, to cover the captured ship, and form a junction with the *Galatea*. At this moment the fore topmast of the *Phœbe*, from the wounds it had received, fell over the side.

The principal damages of the *Astrea* were in her sails and rigging, and they were not material. Out of her complement (admitting all to have been on board, which we rather think was not the case), of 271 men and boys, she had two seamen killed, her first lieutenant (John Baldwin), 11 seamen, three marines, and one boy wounded; total, two killed and 16 wounded. The *Phœbe*, besides the loss of her fore topmast, had her three masts and bowsprit badly wounded, her sails and rigging much cut, and her hull struck in several places; and her loss, out of a complement the same as the *Astrea's*, consisted of seven seamen killed, one midshipman (John Wilkey, severely), 21 seamen (one mortally and nine severely), and two marines wounded; total, seven

\* Called Rogers in the gazette-letter.

killed and 24 wounded. The disabled state of the *Galatea's* masts and rigging has already been described. The ship had 55 shot-holes in her hull, 29 on the starboard and 26 on the larboard side; and her stern was also much shattered. Her loss, out of a complement the same as that of either of her consorts, was her first lieutenant of marines (Hugh Peregrine), eight seamen, and five private marines killed, her captain with a lacerated wound by a splinter, but his name does not appear in the official return, second lieutenant of marines (Henry Lewis), 14 seamen (two mortally), five private marines, severely, and her first lieutenant (Thomas Bevis), two midshipmen (Henry Williams and Alexander Henning), 17 seamen, four private marines, and three boys slightly wounded; total, 16 killed and 46 wounded. The *Racehorse*, notwithstanding that some chance shot had knocked away her fore topmast, appears to have escaped without any loss.

With respect to the French ships, the *Renommée*, according to the French official account, sustained a loss, out of a complement, including troops, of 470 officers and men, of 93 killed and wounded. Among the former, was her gallant captain, M. Roquebert, and among the severely wounded, Colonel Barrois, the senior officer of the troops; also her first lieutenant, Louis-Auguste Defredot-Duplanty, who only went below to have his wound dressed, and fought the ship in the bravest manner. The *Néréide*, upon the same authority, had her captain and 24 seamen, marines, and soldiers killed, and 32 wounded; and the *Clorinde*, occasioned probably by the fire of the *Galatea* when the latter got her broadside to bear, had one man killed and six wounded. The British official account states the killed and wounded of the *Renommée* at 145, and that of the *Néréide* at 130.

The relative force of the parties in this contest requires a few observations. The three British frigates were all of the same class, and of nearly the same size, the *Astrea* measuring 956, the *Phœbe* 926, and the *Galatea* 945 tons. The fore-castle and quarterdeck establishment of the *Astrea* and *Galatea* was, 14 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines, making the total number of guns 42. The *Phœbe* appears to have mounted two more nines, making her number of guns 44. The complements have already been enumerated. With respect to the *Renommée*, *Néréide*, and *Clorinde*, they were not quite so formidable as some of the French frigates which have been named in these pages. When it is known that the French 36-pounder carronade weighs seven per centum more than the English 42, it will be readily conceived, that 10 or 12 of the former were too much for the quarterdeck of a French frigate of 1080 or 1100 tons; especially, in the usual contracted state of that deck and the comparative flimsiness of its barricade. It appears, therefore, that in the year 1810 the establishment of the French 40-gun

frigate was altered, from twelve 36-pounder carronades and four or six eights, to fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two eights; and even the French 24-pounder carronade weighs within about 120 pounds of the English 32, and so nearly agrees with the latter in size, as to be easily taken for a carronade of that caliber. According to this statement of the guns on each side, the broadside force of either the *Astrea* or *Galatea* was 467 lbs., and that of any one of the three French frigates 463 lbs. The complements of either of the latter, even without the troops, far outnumbered that of either of the three British frigates. In point of size, the French frigates had also the advantage; the *Renommée* measuring 1073, the *Clorinde* 1083, and the *Néréide* 1114 tons.

The difference in guns, men, and size, therefore, between a British 18-pounder 36 and a French 40-gun frigate, rendered the parties in this action, notwithstanding the presence of the brig, who, it is clear, might have been in Port-Louis harbour, about equally matched; that is, making due allowance for the side which possessed the inferiority in number of men. Had the *Renommée* not have been somewhat roughly handled by the *Galatea*, and had the *Clorinde*, when the *Renommée* was attacked by the *Astrea* and *Phœbe*, given to the former the support that was in her power, the French commodore's ship, in all probability, would have effected her escape; and that without the slightest disparagement to the *Astrea*. The resolute conduct of the *Néréide*, in not surrendering to the *Phœbe* after having sustained so heavy a loss in killed and wounded, redeems, in some degree, the previous shyness, on two occasions, of Captain *Lemaresquier*;\* unless we are to consider that, as he fell in the action, the credit of not striking the colours is due to the next officer in command, Lieutenant *François Ponée*. With respect to the *Clorinde*, the behaviour of her captain on the present, perfectly agrees with his behaviour on a former occasion. *M. Saint-Cricq* abandoned his commodore in March, 1806; † he does the same in May, 1811: then his heels could not save him; now they do save him. Upon the whole, if some glory was lost to the French navy by the misconduct of the *Clorinde*, more was gained to it by the acknowledged good conduct of the *Renommée* and *Néréide*.

On the 21st, at daylight, the *Astrea*, *Phœbe*, and *Racehorse* discovered the *Renommée* and *Galatea* to windward; and their bearings, as taken on board the *Racehorse*, were, *Galatea* south-west by south, *Renommée* south-west by west. A very singular circumstance appears to have prevented the *Galatea* from joining her three consorts to leeward. It will be remembered, that only two officers and five men were sent to take possession of the *Renommée*, who had then a crew of nearly 400 effective officers

\* See vol. v., pp. 178, 229.

† See vol. iv., p. 226.



and men. In this state of things, the surprise is, that the French did not retake their ship. It appears that the crew wished to do so; but that Colonel Barrois, who, according to the etiquette of the French service, was now the commanding officer, acting upon a principle of honour which some of the French naval captains would do well to imitate, refused to give his sanction to the proceeding. Hence Lieutenant Royer and his few hands remained throughout the night in quiet possession of the prize; but were not permitted, when daylight came, to hoist the English over the French flag, nor to make any signal, either to the *Galatea* who was to windward, or to the *Astrea* and her consorts, who were at a great distance to leeward of them. Not knowing, of course, that the *Renommée* had been captured, and getting no answer to his signals, from this ship for the reason already stated, nor from the *Astrea* and *Phœbe* because of their great distance off, Captain Losack doubted if it was not the French squadron of which he was in sight; and, while the *Renommée* bore up to join the *Astrea* and *Phœbe*, the *Galatea* made the best of her way to Port-Louis.

Having taken out the prisoners from the *Renommée*, and placed on board a proper prize-crew, Captain Schomberg now first learnt the situation of Tamatave. The damaged state of the *Phœbe* not admitting her to beat up quickly against the wind and current, Captain Schomberg despatched the *Racehorse* in advance, to summon the French garrison to surrender. On the evening of the 24th the brig rejoined the *Astrea*, with the intelligence of the arrival of the *Néréide* at Tamatave. As this was the nearest port in which he could get his ship repaired, Lieutenant Ponée had proceeded straight thither, and immediately moored the *Néréide* in the most advantageous manner for resisting the attack which he hourly expected to be made.

The *Astrea*, *Phœbe*, and *Racehorse* immediately made sail for Tamatave, but were prevented by a strong gale from getting a sight of the French frigate, until the afternoon of the 25th; when, no one in the British squadron possessing any local knowledge of the spot, and it being considered impracticable to sound the passage between the reefs without being exposed to the fire of the frigate and a battery of 10 or 12 guns, Captain Schomberg sent Captain De Rippe, with a flag of truce at his brig's mast-head, and a summons of surrender to the French commanding officer. In that summons the latter is informed, that the "*Renommée* and *Clorinde* have struck after a brave defence." The inference here intended is pretty clear, and a ruse may be allowed in such cases; but an officer should be cautious how he signs his name to a document bearing upon the face of it what may afterwards subject his veracity to be called in question.

Lieutenant Ponée, like a brave man, refused to surrender unconditionally; but proposed to deliver up the frigate and fort

to the British, on condition that he, his officers, and ship's company, and the troops in garrison on shore, should be sent to France, without being considered as prisoners of war. The terms were agreed to; and on the 26th the fort of Tamatave and its dependencies, the frigate and a vessel or two in the port, were taken possession of by Captain Schomberg; who, having first, as a precautionary measure on account of the number of prisoners in the two frigates, caused the guns on the battery to be spiked, went into Tamatave with his squadron.

Having thus disposed of two of M. Roquebert's three frigates, we will endeavour to show what became of the other. Captain Saint-Cricq made so good a use of the entire state of the *Clorinde's* rigging and sails, that by daylight on the 21st he had run completely out of sight of both friends and foes. After ruminating awhile on his "melancholy" situation, the French captain bent his course towards the Seychelle islands; under one of which he anchored, and on the 7th of June set sail on his return to France. On the 26th the *Clorinde* reached the island of Diego-Garcia; and, having obtained some cocoas and a supply of wood and water, sailed thence on the 28th, and on the 1st of August rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Between the 23d of August and 16th of September, Captain Saint-Cricq fell in with several English and American provision-laden merchant vessels, and from among them supplied the principal part of his wants.

On the 24th, when close to the port of her destination, the *Clorinde* was very near sharing the fate of her late consorts. At daylight she was discovered and chased by the British 80-gun ship *Tonnant*, Captain Sir John Gore; who ineffectually endeavoured to cut her off from entering the passage du Raz. At noon the *Tonnant* fired a shot at the *Clorinde*; and at about 1 h. 30 m. P. M., when the *Saintes* islands bore north-east by north four miles, discharged her broadside. The British 80 continued the chase, in a fresh gale at north-west and heavy sea, and passed through the Raz. At 2 P. M., when running, under a press of sail, between the *Vieille* rock and *Pointe Carnarvan* and coming up fast with the frigate, the *Tonnant* lost her main topmast and fore and mizen topgallantmasts by the violence of the wind.

The latter nevertheless opened a smart fire upon the *Clorinde*, then within little more than pistol-shot distance; but the frigate, having judiciously reduced her sails when the squall came on, now possessed them all in a perfect state, and soon outran her pursuer. After receiving a few harmless shot from the battery on *Pointe Trépassée*, the *Tonnant* gave over the chase; and at 5 P. M. the *Clorinde* anchored in the road of Brest.

It unfortunately happened, that the action off Madagascar was not allowed to pass without a charge, an implied charge, at all events, of misconduct on the British side. Having previously stated, in his official letter, Captain Losack's report of the dis-

abled state of his ship, Captain Schomberg says: "I am, however, called upon by my feelings, and a sense of duty, to bear testimony to the meritorious conduct of the officers and ships' companies of his majesty's ships *Phœbe* and *Astrea*." Not a *maravedi*, in the way of praise, is bestowed upon the *Galatea* or *Racehorse*. Admitting the brig to have been a little shy, what had the frigate done to deserve such treatment? The *Galatea* was certainly more struck in the hull than either of her two consorts, and had lost two of her topmasts, when they had every topgallantmast standing. The *Galatea* had also lost nearly four times as many men in killed and wounded as the *Astrea*, and a third more than the *Astrea* and *Phœbe* united. We can hardly suppose that Captain Schomberg expected the *Galatea*, in such a state of disability, to renew the action, but merely wished her to put her head the right way. That was not done, although we see no reason, judging from the *Galatea's* previous conduct, to doubt that the attempt was made. It was this apparent omission, coupled with the circumstance of hoisting, in the presence of the enemy, a signal of distress, when not reduced to the emergency of being actually sinking or on fire, that called down upon the *Galatea's* captain, officers, and crew, the severe punishment inflicted by Captain Schomberg.

Although the account of this action, given by our contemporary, partakes largely of the inaccuracies that pervade all his accounts of proceedings in the vicinity of the isles of France and Bourbon, Captain Brenton has, we are assured, stated one fact correctly. "Captain Losack, on his return to England, demanded a court-martial, which the lords commissioners of the admiralty, judging no doubt from the log-books, did not think proper to grant, and informed Captain Losack, that they were satisfied with his conduct."\* But in a case like this, in which the courage of a naval officer is publicly impugned, the approbation, if it amounts to that, of the lords commissioners of the admiralty is of very little value: the opinion of the profession at large, that by which alone the character of the officer is to stand or fall, is not moved a jot by it. We think, with submission, that the board of admiralty should not have refused Captain Losack's application. A court-martial would have completely settled the point; and, admitting that the captain, as the director of the movements of the ship, was the responsible party, why did not the first lieutenant, on behalf of the remaining officers and crew of the *Galatea*, as was done in the instance of the *Uranie*,† apply to have Captain Losack brought to trial? In a case like this, no efforts should be spared to get redress; and, had redress been zealously and pertinaciously sought by Captain Losack, we cannot think but that he would have eventually obtained it.

\* Brenton, vol. iv., p. 561.

\* See vol. iv., p. 339.

It was not during many months that the captain of the *Clo-rinde* was allowed to enjoy the ease and comfort, the good cheer and safe quarters, of a home-port. On the 13th and five succeeding days of March, 1812, Captain Saint-Cricq was tried by a court-martial, for not having done all in his power in the action in which the *Renommée* had been captured; for having separated from his commodore in the heat of the battle, when he ought to have closed him, &c.; and for having omitted to proceed to Java, as prescribed by his instructions dated December 22, 1810, in case of inability to enter the Isle of France. Upon these charges the French captain was found guilty, and sentenced to be dismissed the service, degraded from the legion of honour, and imprisoned for three years.

The *Néréide* and *Renommée*, being both new frigates, and the first a particularly fine one, were added to the class of British 38s; the *Néréide*, under the name of *Madagascar*, and the *Renommée*, under that of *Java*. Lieutenants John Baldwin and George Scott, first of the *Astrea* and *Phœbe*, were each deservedly promoted to the rank of commander; but Lieutenant Thomas Bevis, the first of the *Galatea*, and who was wounded in the action, still remains a lieutenant. This, surely, is an extension of the blasting effects of the charge against the *Galatea* never contemplated by its author.

COLONIAL EXPEDITIONS.—EAST INDIES.

On the 18th of April, the expedition destined for the conquest of the Dutch island of Java having, under the personal directions of Captain Christopher Cole of the 36-gun frigate *Caroline*, by the express orders of Vice-admiral Drury issued during the illness that terminated his life, completed its preparations, the first division of the troops, commanded by Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, sailed from Madras roads under the convoy of the *Caroline*, and on the 18th of May anchored in the harbour of Penang or Prince of Wales's island, the first point of rendezvous. On the 21st the second division of the troops, commanded by Major-general Wetherall, and escorted by the British 38-gun frigate *Phaëton*, Captain Fleetwood Broughton Reynolds Pellew, arrived also, having quitted Madras about six days after the *Caroline*. On the 24th the *Caroline* and *Phaëton*, with their respective charges, sailed from Penang, and on the 1st of June arrived at Malacca, the second rendezvous. Here the expedition was joined by a division of troops from Bengal, and by Lieutenant-general Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and Commodore William Robert Broughton of the *Illustrious* 74, the military and naval commanders-in-chief. The whole of the troops thus assembled, including 1200 too sick to proceed, amounted to 11,960 officers and men, of whom very nearly half, or 5344, were Europeans.

On the 11th of June the fleet, leaving behind the 1200 sick, sailed from Malacca, and in a few days entered the straits of Singapore. Having cleared these, and passed Timbalan and a number of other islands, the expedition arrived on the 3d of July at the High Islands, which had been appointed the third rendezvous. On the 10th the fleet quitted the High Islands, and on the 20th reached Point Sambar, at the extremity of the south-west coast of the island of Borneo, the fourth and last point of rendezvous. Quitting Sambar on the following day, the 21st, the fleet arrived on the 30th off Boompies island, which lies nearly abreast of Indramayo river on the Java coast. Here the two commanders-in-chief waited awhile, in expectation of being joined by some frigates with intelligence.

We will take this opportunity of narrating two or three creditable little affairs, that occurred on the Java coast, while the expedition was on its way from Madras and waiting off Boompies island. On the 23d of May, at daylight, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Sir-Francis-Drake, Captain George Harris, being about 13 miles to the north-east of the port of Rembang, island of Java, on her way to Sourabaya, discovered, lying at anchor about three miles nearer to the shore, a flotilla of Dutch gun-vessels, consisting of 14, nine of them felucca, and the remaining four prow, rigged. On seeing the frigate, the gun-vessels weighed and stood for Rembang, but were so closely pressed, that by 7 A. M. three or four broadsides brought five of the feluccas to an anchor under the Drake's guns, and they were immediately taken possession of. The others, finding themselves cut off from their port, furled sails, and pulled up in the wind's eye directly for the shore.

Shoaling his water considerably, Captain Harris despatched Lieutenants James Bradley and Edward Brown Addis, Lieutenant of marines George Loch, midshipmen George Greaves, John Horton, and Matthew Phibbs, also Lieutenant Knowles, Mr. Gillman, and 12 privates of the 14th regiment of foot, in four six-oared cutters and a gig, to board the gun-vessels; the Drake keeping under way, and working to windward, to cover the boats. By 8 A. M., notwithstanding a sharp fire of grape from several pieces of ordnance, Lieutenant Bradley and his party, without the loss of a man, made prizes of the remaining nine vessels, the crews of which leaped overboard or fled to the shore in their boats just as the British were ready to spring on board. The gun-boats had only been launched 15 days, and were large vessels measuring 80 feet overall, and 17 broad; fitted to carry a 7-inch howitzer and a 24-pounder carronade aft, and to pull 30 oars. Only one of the vessels, however, was found with her guns on board; and it was supposed, either that the crews had thrown the guns overboard, or that the vessels were proceeding to Sourabaya to be fully armed and equipped.

The small British squadron cruising off Batavia was under the

orders of Captain George Sayer, of the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Leda*. Since Sir Edward Pellew had proved that Batavia and Sourabaya were assailable anchorages, the harbour of Marrack, situated about 74 miles to the westward of Batavia, was the only spot to which the French frigates, daily expected with troops, could run for safety. The anchorage was defended by a strong fort, standing upon a promontory, and mounting 54 pieces of cannon, 18, 24, and 32 pounders, with a garrison of 180 soldiers. Captain Sayer resolved to make a night-attack upon this fort with the boats of the *Leda* and of the 74-gun ship *Minden*, Captain Edward Wallis Hoare. The force, with which the attempt was to be made, was to consist of 200 seamen and marines and 250 troops, the latter to be embarked in the flat-boats which the two ships had on board; and Lieutenant Edmund Lyons, of the *Minden*, who had previously reconnoitred the fort, was, at his particular request, to lead the party. A few hours before the boats were to push off from the *Minden*, intelligence reached Captain Hoare, of the arrival of a battalion of Dutch troops at the barracks situated about half a mile in the rear of the fort. Under these circumstances, the attack was deemed too hazardous, and the *Leda*'s boats returned to their ship.

On the 25th of July Captain Hoare, by Captain Sayer's direction, detached Lieutenant Lyons with the *Minden*'s launch and cutter, containing 19 prisoners, with orders to land them at Batavia; and, while there and on his return down the coast, to gain all the information possible as to the movements in that part of Java. On the 27th Lieutenant Lyons landed his prisoners at Batavia; and, from a conversation which he held with an intelligent resident, was fully persuaded that the Dutch had no intimation of the expedition being near Java, and did not expect to be attacked during the present monsoon. Conceiving that an attack at the north-western extremity of Java would draw the Dutch troops in that direction, and ther by operate a favourable diversion, Lieutenant Lyons, on the morning of the 29th, determined to make a midnight attack upon Fort Marrack. This would appear, indeed, a rash undertaking for two boats' crews of 35 officers and men, especially when a force of 450 men had been thought inadequate to the service; but Lieutenant Lyons was one of the officers who, about a twelvemonth before, had accompanied Captain Cole in the storming of Belgica:\* he therefore made light of difficulties, which to many, and those brave men too, would have seemed insurmountable.

Having made, during the day, every necessary arrangement, Lieutenant Lyons, at sunset, placed his two boats behind a point, which sheltered them from the view of the enemy's sentinels. At half an hour past midnight, the moon sinking in the horizon,

\* See vol. v., p. 321.

the boats proceeded to the attack, and, on opening the point, were challenged by the sentinels, who almost at the same instant fired their pieces; a proof that all hopes of a surprise had vanished. Still resolved, Lieutenant Lyons ran the boats aground, in a heavy surf, under the embrasures of the lower tier of guns; and he and his gallant fellows, placing the ladders, sprang up them in an instant. Some of the first that gained the walls killed three soldiers, who were in the act of putting matches to the guns; and in a few minutes the British found themselves in complete possession of the lower battery. Lieutenant Lyons now formed his men, his 34 men; and, leading them on, stormed and carried the upper battery. On reaching the summit of the hill, the little band of British perceived the Dutch garrison drawn up to receive them. The sailors fired, then rushed to the charge; Lieutenant Lyons calling out, that he had 400 men, and would give no quarter. On hearing this, the Dutchmen fled in a panic through the postern gateway at the rear of the fort.

At 1 A. M. on the 30th the Dutch opened a fire on the fort from a small battery in the rear, also from two gun-boats at anchor in the harbour. This fire was returned by a few guns; and, in the mean while, the remainder of the small party of British were employed in disabling the other guns, and in destroying as much as practicable of the battery. The first shot, fired at Fort Marrack from the battery in the rear, had struck the top of the postern or gateway through which the garrison had retreated; the second shot went through the gate; and the third shot, taking the same direction, convinced Lieutenant Lyons that the Dutch had previously ascertained the range. The situation of the British was now critical and alarming, as the barracks in which was a whole battalion of Dutch troops was only half a mile distant, and the drums were heard beating to arms. At this moment midshipman William Langton, the second British officer in command, and who had greatly distinguished himself in the assault, suggested to Lieutenant Lyons to open the gate, and allow the shot to pass harmlessly through. This was done, and in the course of half an hour the enemy directed his shot considerably to the right of the gate; which left no doubt that the troops were advancing to the attack. Two 24-pounders, loaded almost to the muzzles with musket-balls, were now placed near the entrance of the gateway. This was hardly done when the enemy's column was seen advancing; and, lest the guns should be fired too soon, Lieutenant Lyons held one match and Mr. Langton the other. The head of the enemy's column, on arriving within about 10 yards of the gate, perceived that it was open. The Dutch troops immediately shouted, cheered, and rushed on. At that instant the two guns went off, and the gate was shut. The foremost of the assailants were mowed down by the murderous

discharge; and those behind, seeing the gate shut, fled *pêle-mêle* down the hill, leaving the handful of British withinside to destroy the fort at their leisure.

This service was completed by dawn of day, and the last shot fired from the last gun that was spiked had sunk one of the two gun-boats. Lieutenant Lyons now deemed it prudent to retire. He did not do so, however, without leaving the British flag flying on the fort; and which flag had been hoisted under a heavy fire, in the most gallant manner, by midshipman Charles Henry Franks, a lad only 15 years of age. On coming to their boats, the British found the barge bilged, and beat up so high in the surf as to leave no prospect of getting her afloat. The whole 35, including Mr. Langton, slightly wounded with a bayonet, and three seamen also slightly wounded, embarked in the cutter, carrying with them the Dutch colours. Thus to see them carried off as a trophy by a single boat's crew, an undeniable proof of the few men by whom the fort had been carried, must have been to the Dutch a truly mortifying sight.

But for one circumstance, we should probably have had to state that, for having thus accomplished, with 35 men, that which had been deemed too hazardous to undertake with 450, Lieutenant Lyons was immediately promoted to the rank of commander. The bar was, that he had acted without orders. Captain Hoare called upon Lieutenant Lyons to state his reason for making an attack, "the success of which," says the former in his letter to Commodore Broughton, "so very far surpasses all my idea of possibility with so small a force, that comment from me would be superfluous." "I have only to add, that his conduct on every former occasion, since he has been under my command, has merited my warmest approbation and esteem." Commodore Broughton, we believe, considered the undertaking as a rash one, and would not forward the account to the admiralty; but the commodore's successor on the station, Rear-admiral Stopford, was of a very different opinion, as is evident from his reply to a letter of Captain Sayer's, requesting that Lieutenant Lyons, in the expedition of which we shall presently give an account, might act as his aide-de-camp at the batteries of Batavia. "I beg," says the rear-admiral, "you will tell Mr. Lyons from me, that I consider myself fortunate and happy in procuring the services of an officer who so eminently distinguished himself by his gallant and successful attack on Fort Marrack, and I fully approve of his remaining with you."

During the night of the 30th the 18-gun brig-sloop *Procris*, Captain Robert Maunsell, in obedience to orders from Captain Sayer, stood in and anchored near the mouth of Indramayo river, and at daylight on the 31st discovered lying there six gun-boats, each armed with two guns, a brass 32-pounder carronade forward, and a long 18-pounder aft, and a crew of 60 men, protecting a convoy of 40 or 50 prows. The brig immediately



weighed, and ran into a quarter less than three fathoms' water, but was then scarcely within gun-shot. Finding that the fire of the *Procris* made very little impression upon the gun-boats, and considering it an object of importance to attempt their destruction, Captain Maunsell proceeded to the attack in his boats; embarking in them, in addition to their respective crews, Lieutenants Henry J. Heyland and Oliver Brush, and 40 privates of the 14th and 89th regiments, detachments from which happened to be on board his vessel.

Although opposed by a heavy fire of grape and musketry, the British boats succeeded in boarding and carrying five of the Dutch gun-boats; the crews of which, after throwing their spears at the assailants, leaped overboard. The sixth gun-boat would have shared the same fate, but caught fire and blew up before the British could get alongside of her. This exploit was performed without any loss of life on the British side, and with no greater loss in wounded, than one master's mate (William Randall), seven seamen, one boy, and two soldiers. Captain Maunsell speaks in the highest terms, as well of the troops and their officers, as of his first lieutenant George Majoribanks, and the three master's mates George Cunningham, William Randall, and Charles Davies.

Having waited until the 2d of August without being joined by the expected ships, the expedition set sail, but had not proceeded far before the frigates hove in sight; and Colonel Mackenzie, the officer who had been deputed to reconnoitre the Java coast, reported, as the most eligible spot for the disembarkation of the army, the village of Chillingching, about 12 miles to the eastward of Batavia. The commander-in-chief concurring, the fleet proceeded in that direction; on the 3d, in the evening, made Cape Carawang; and on the 4th, early in the morning ran in for the mouth of Marandi river. Here the ships anchored during the interval between the land and sea breezes; and, weighing on the return of the latter, again stood in, and, before 2 P. M., were at anchor abreast of Chillingching.

So complete had been the arrangements, and so well chosen was the spot, that before dark the whole of the effective portion of the British infantry, amounting to upwards of 8000 men, of whom, as already stated, about half were Europeans, landed, without loss or opposition, covered on the left by the 36-gun frigate *Leda*, Captain Sayer, who, being well acquainted with the coast, ran close in, and on the right by the frigates *Caroline*, *Modeste*, and *Bucephalus*, also the ship and brig sloops and honourable company's cruisers attached to the expedition. "The rapid approach of the fleet had prevented the enemy from ascertaining the intended place of landing in time to send a force thither to guard it: this being noticed by Captain Cole, he made the signal from the *Caroline*, for the advance of the army

to land immediately, then hoisted out his boats, tripped his anchor, and dropped the *Caroline* nearer to the shore. No time was occupied in arranging the order of the boats, they being ordered to shove off when manned and filled with troops. His example being followed by Captains Elliot and Pelley, and the boats of the other men of war being sent to assist in conveying the troops, about 8000 soldiers, with their guns, ammunition, and provisions, were landed in safety by half-past six o'clock. Soon after dark the British advanced guard had a skirmish with the enemy's patrols, who, but for Captain Cole's alacrity and promptitude in making the above signal, without waiting to complete the arrangement of boats, &c., as usual in such cases, would have taken post in a wood at the back of the beach, and might have occasioned great loss to the invading army."\*

General Daendels, the late governor-general of Java had recently been superseded by General Jansens; and the latter, who had only been apprized of the intended attack since the 1st or 2d of the month, was now with his army, amounting to between 8000 and 10,090 effective troops, native and European, shut up in the strong hold of Meester-Cornelis, an intrenched camp, situated about nine miles from the city of Batavia, and defended by two rivers, one on the east, the other on the west, with a number of redoubts and batteries guarding each pass. The circumference of these fortified lines was nearly five miles, and there were mounted in different parts of it 280 pieces of cannon.

On the 6th the *Leda* and small cruisers proceeded off the entrance of the river Anjole, or Antziol, distant about two miles from the capital; and the fleet anchored off Tonjong-Prioch; where, in the course of the day, the advance of the British army, under the command of Colonel Gillespie, took post. On the 7th, in the night, the advance crossed the river Anjole on a bridge of flat boats, prepared by the navy, under the direction of Captains Sayer, Mauhsell, and Reynolds. On the 8th, in the morning, a flag of truce was sent into the city of Batavia, and a deputation came out from the inhabitants, requesting to surrender at discretion, and put themselves under the protection of the British. The lieutenant-general and commodore having agreed to respect private property, the advance under Colonel Gillespie took immediate possession of the city; and the men of war and transports removed to the anchorage before it.

On the 9th Rear-admiral the Honourable Robert Stopford joined the expedition, and superseded Commodore Broughton in the command of the fleet, which now consisted of the

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 515.

## Gun-ship

74	{	Scipion . . . . .	Rear-adm. (r.) the Hon. Rt. Stopford.
			Captain James Johnson.
		Illustrious . . . . .	Commodore Will. Rob. Broughton.
			Captain Rob. Worgan Geo. Festing.
		Minden . . . . .	" Edward Wallis Hoare.
		" . . . . .	" Henry Heathcote.

## Gun-frig

44		Akbar . . . . .	Henry Drury.
38	{	Nisus . . . . .	Philip Beaver.
		Présidente . . . . .	Samuel Warren.
		Hussar . . . . .	James Coutts Crawford.
			Fleetw. Broughton R. Pellew.
36	{	Phaëton . . . . .	George Sayer.
		Leda . . . . .	Christopher Cole.
		Caroline . . . . .	Hon. George Elliot.
		Modeste . . . . .	James Hillyar.
		Phæbe . . . . .	Charles Pelly.
			William Jones Lye.
32	{	Doris . . . . .	Henry Folkes Edgell.
		Cornelia . . . . .	John Edgecumbe.
		Pysché . . . . .	George Harris.
		Sir-Francis-Drake	

Slps.	{	Procris . . . . .	Robert Maunsell.
		Barracouta . . . . .	William Fitzwilliam Owen.
		Hesper . . . . .	Barrington Reynolds.
		Harpy . . . . .	Henderson Bain.
		Hecate . . . . .	Henry John Peachey.
		Dasher . . . . .	Benedictus Marwood Kelly.
			Samarang . . . . .

*Company's cruisers*, Malabar (Commodore John Hayes), Aurora, Mornington, Nautilus, Vestal, Ariel, Thetis, and Psyche; making, with the transports and captured gun-boats, a total of nearly a hundred sail.

On the 10th a smart skirmish took place between the advanced division of each army; which ended in the defeat of the Dutch, and in the occupation by the British of the important post of Weltevreden, distant about six miles from the city on the road to Cornelis. Preparations were now made to attack General Jansens in his intrenched camp at the latter place, distant about a league beyond Weltevreden. On the 20th, in the night, the British army broke ground within 600 yards of the enemy's works; and on the evening of the 21st the batteries, mounting 20 long 18-pounders, together with eight howitzers and mortars, were nearly completed. To assist in erecting and fighting these batteries, 500 seamen had been landed from the squadron, under the orders of Captain Sayer, assisted by Captains Festing, Maunsell, Reynolds, and Edward Stopford: the latter a volunteer from on board the Scipion, where he was waiting to join his ship the Otter. A detachment of marines, under Captain Richard Bunce of that corps, had also been disembarked from the ships, to increase the strength

of Sir Samuel's army, already considerably reduced by sickness.

On the 22d, early in the morning, the Dutch made a sortie, attacked the works of the British, and gained a momentary possession of one of the batteries; but the former were at length repulsed and driven within their lines. Being thus foiled, the Dutch began to open from their redoubts a tremendous fire. Thirty-four heavy guns, 18, 24, and 32 pounders, bore upon the British front, and kept up an incessant and very destructive cannonade. On the 23d neither party fired; but on the 24th a severe cannonade began on both sides, and continued throughout that and the following day, with much mutual slaughter, and to the evident disadvantage of the Dutch, many of their guns being dismounted and their front line of defence much damaged. In this state of things, an assault was resolved upon, and that truly gallant officer Colonel Gillespie was intrusted with the command of the principal attack. At midnight on the 25th the troops moved off, and, after a most desperate struggle, in which the British seamen and marines bore a distinguished part, carried all before them. Nearly 5000 troops, including three general officers, 34 field-officers, 70 captains, and 150 subaltern officers, were taken prisoners, more than 1000 were found dead about the works, and many others must have fallen in the pursuit.

General Jansens made his escape with difficulty during the action, and reached Buitenzorg, a distance of 30 miles accompanied by a few cavalry, the sole remains of his army. The Dutch commander-in-chief quitted Buitenzorg, a little while before the British cavalry entered the town, and fled to the eastward. The loss to the British army including the natives attached to it, from the 4th to the 27th of August inclusive, amounted, according to the official returns, to 141 killed, 733 wounded, and 13 missing; and the loss to the British navy, between the same dates, amounted to 11 seamen and four marines killed, Captain Stopford (right arm carried off by a cannon-shot) one lieutenant (Francis Noble), two lieutenants of marines, (Henry Elliot and John Stepney Haswell), two master's mates (John Dewdney Worthy and Robert Graham Dunlop), 29 seamen and 20 marines wounded, and three seamen missing; making the total loss of the two services, up to the 27th of August, 156 killed, 788 wounded, and 16 missing.

The two new French 40-gun frigates *Nymphe* and *Méduse*, which, under the orders of Commodore Joseph-François Raoul, of the former, had escaped from Nantes in the spring of the year, were at this time lying in the harbour of Sourabaya. Rear-admiral Stopford, on the day after his arrival in Batavia road, despatched four frigates, the *Akbar*, *Phaëton*, *Bucephalus*, and *Sir-Francis-Drake*, to look after these French frigates, and watch the different entrances by which they might effect their

escape. On the 30th of August the Akbar, who had been in company with the Bucephalus at an anchor off the east end of Java, weighed and sailed to the westward.

On the 3d of September, at 3 P. M., the two French frigates, having received on board several of General Jansen's aides-de-camp, and others of the principal fugitives from Cornelis, weighed and began warping themselves into the outer road. The Bucephalus saw the manœuvre, and instantly weighed and made sail close to the enemy. On the 4th, at daylight, the Barracouta joined the former, and at 10 A. M. the British frigate and brig wore and stood towards the two French frigates; who, during the night, had warped themselves considerably ahead, and were now under sail working out of the harbour, with the wind a moderate breeze at north-east. The Bucephalus and Barracouta immediately proceeded in chase; and at midnight the two French frigates bore from the first, who was far ahead of her consort, north-west half-west distant three or four miles. By daylight on the 5th the Bucephalus was ahead of the Barracouta six or seven miles, and the French frigates on the former's lee bow, the weather nearly calm. At 5 h. 30 m. A. M. a breeze sprang up from the eastward; and at sunset the French frigates bore north-east by north distant seven or eight miles. During the 6th, 7th, and 8th nearly the same distance was preserved between the two French frigates and the one British frigate, which, accompanied by a brig sloop of war, was so earnestly pursuing them; but, at midnight, notwithstanding all her efforts to keep up, the Barracouta dropped entirely out of sight of her consort.

The Bucephalus, now entirely alone, persevered in the chase during the whole of the 9th, 10th, and 11th, and at 6 A. M. on the 12th saw the island of Great Pulo-Laut, bearing east-south-east, and her enemy south, distant about four leagues, with the weathergale in his favour. At 9 A. M. the two French frigates bore down, with the apparent intention of embaying the British frigate between Borneo and Paulo-Laut; but the Bucephalus wore and bore up, in order to keep off shore. The Nympe now signalled the Méduse; and shortly afterwards the two frigates wore, and made all sail in line abreast after the Bucephalus, then within four miles of them, steering west by north, and soon under an equal press of sail with her pursuers. By noon the Nympe had got ahead of her consort, and was gaining on the Bucephalus, now steering about west by south. At 1 P. M. the latter commenced firing her stern-chasers; and shortly afterwards the Nympe returned the fire with her bow-chasers, yawing occasionally, as she advanced on the British frigate's larboard quarter, to get her foremost maindeck guns to bear. This yawing necessarily checking her progress, the Nympe dropped a little astern. At 2 h. 30 m. P. M. the Méduse got up on the starboard or lee quarter of the Bucephalus, and,

after receiving a few of the latter's shot, yawed also, and fired her broadside. By this time the *Nymphé* had hauled to windward, on the larboard quarter of the *Bucephalus*, out of gun-shot; and, the *Méduse* dropping also out of gun-shot on the opposite quarter, the British frigate ceased firing. At 4 p. m. two shoals were discovered right ahead of the *Bucephalus*. Confiding in his skill and experience, Captain Pelly passed between the shoals, in the hope of decoying both or one of the French frigates upon them; but they, seeing the danger in time, shortened sail and tacked to the north-east, and at dark were lost sight of, at daylight on the 13th the island of Arentes bore from the *Bucephalus* south-south-west: and at 11 a. m. the two French frigates were again seen at a great distance in the north-east, but shortly afterwards wholly disappeared.

The *Bucephalus* had not a man hurt, and sustained very slight damage in her rigging, sails, masts, or hull. To what extent her shot had injured the *Nymphé* and *Méduse* is not known; but it was evident that the rigging and sails of the *Nymphé* had in some degree suffered. Admitting that these frigates were justified in using the utmost despatch to get away from the Java coast, and from the fleet that was hovering near it, what had they to dread on reaching the coast of Borneo? It is true that Commodore Raoul then chased in his turn; but he desisted from pursuit on the first appearance of danger from shoal water, and abandoned a British frigate which, obstinately defended as she undoubtedly would have been, must have ultimately been his prize.

The conduct of Captain Pelly on the other hand, was in the highest degree praiseworthy: he was induced to chase an enemy more than doubly superior to himself, in the hope of being able to separate one French frigate from the other, or of falling in with a consort, with whose assistance he might have a fair prospect of conquering the two; and his perseverance in chasing, and success in keeping sight of, two French frigates, during so many days and nights, afforded a decided proof both of his gallantry and his seamaanship. Of the *Nymphé* and *Méduse*, we have nothing further to state, than that they made their long voyage in safety, and arrived at Brest on the 22d of December.

While these two French frigates were meditating an escape from the channel formed by the west end of the small island of Madura, the two British frigates *Sir-Francis-Drake* and *Phaëton* lay unconsciously at anchor off the east end, close under the isle of Pondock. They were not, however, lying inactive, as the following details will show. On the 29th of August Captain Harris, the senior officer, having resolved to attack the fort of Samanap, the capital of the island, sent the *Dasher* sloop round the south end of Pulo<sup>1</sup> Lanjong, to gain an anchorage as near as possible to the fort, and in the evening, accompanied by Captain Pellew, proceeded with the boats of the two frigates, in two

divisions. On the 30th, at daylight, the boats sailed through the channel formed by the east end of Madura and Pulo 'I Lanjong, and by 30 minutes past midnight effected a landing, without discovery, at a pier-head about three miles from the fort.

At 1 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 31st, two columns, composed each of 60 bayonets and 20 pikemen, flanked by a 12, 4, and 2 pounder field-piece, having in reserve the marines of the Hussar, began their march, in the utmost order, towards the fort. Silence among the men was so rigidly observed that, notwithstanding the governor had intimation of the Dasher's having weighed and being seen entering the harbour, and that the British boats had been seen standing in for the town, the Dutch garrison at the fort did not discover the approach of the storming party, until the outer gate, which had been left open, was passed. The gallantry of the rush at the inner gate prevented the Dutch from securing it, and only allowed time for two or three guns at the south-west bastion to be fired. The assault was as sudden as it was resolute; and by 3 h. 30 m. A. M., after a 10 minutes' feeble struggle with 300 or 400 Madura pikemen, who with their chief were made prisoners on the ramparts, the British became masters of the fort of Samanap, a regular fortification, mounting sixteen 6-pounders.

On the appearance of daylight, observing French colours flying on a flagstaff at the east end of the town, and perceiving the natives begin to assemble in numbers, Captain Harris despatched Captain Pellew, at the head of a column of 100 bayonets and one field-piece, with a flag of truce to the governor, calling upon him to surrender in 10 minutes, and promising that private property should be respected. To this was received an answer, requiring Captain Harris to evacuate the fort; and Captain Pellew sent intelligence, by midshipman John William Oldmixon, described as an intelligent young officer, that the Dutch force appeared to be about 2000 men, protected by four field-pieces in front, and posted on a bridge, possessing every advantage of situation, the troops of an enemy having to advance along an even and straight road for a quarter of a mile before they could force the bridge.

Not at all daunted by this alleged superiority of force, Captain Harris sent orders to Captain Pellew, to advance when the first gun was fired from a column that the former would lead out of the fort, and with which he meant to turn the enemy's left wing. Accordingly, with 70 small-arm, and 20 pikemen, supported by a 4-pounder field-piece (leaving in the fort, as a reserve, 40 or 50 men), Captain Harris proceeded to put his bold plan into execution, and soon had the satisfaction to observe the Dutch governor, whose force, as acknowledged by himself, consisted of 300 muskets, 60 artillerymen, and from 1500 to 2000 pikemen, armed each with a long pike, a pistol, and a crees, draw off two

field-pieces and break his line, in order to oppose the small but resolute column advancing against his left. Both British columns discharged their volleys nearly at the same time, and, for nearly five minutes, a sharp fire was given and returned; but as Captains Harris and Pellew and their respective parties advanced nearer, the Dutch gave way, and an animated charge by the British left them masters of the field, the colours, and the guns. The governor and the other Dutch inhabitants were made prisoners; and Captain Harris accepted a flag of truce from the rajah of Samanap, who was present, on condition that none of the inhabitants of the district should again arm themselves against the British.

This very gallant exploit was not achieved without a loss on the part of the latter of three men killed and 28 wounded; and the loss on the opposite side, although it could not be ascertained, was known to be severe, including among the killed the commander-in-chief of the native troops, second in rank to the rajah, and his two sons. This success was followed up by the total overthrow of the French authority in Madura and the adjacent isles. The spirited conduct of Captain Harris, in bringing matters to such a close, proves that his own element is not that alone in which a naval officer, possessing zeal, activity, and judgment, may be enabled to distinguish himself.

Among the wounded in storming the town of Samanap, was Lieutenant Roch of the Sir-Francis-Drake's marines, who was speared twice by two natives, while resolutely endeavouring to wrest the colours out of the hands of a French officer. During the time that Captain Pellew, by the direction of Captain Harris, was negotiating with the governor of Madura, Lieutenant Roch, with a column of marines, destroyed, in the face of the enemy, a fort at the mouth of the river, which leads, as we suppose, to Samanap, mounting twelve 9-pounders.

In order to intercept the retreat of General Jansens from Cornelis to the eastward, Rear-admiral Stopford, on the 31st of August, detached the Nisus, Présidente, and Phœbe frigates, and Hesper sloop, to Cheribon, a seaport about 35 leagues to the eastward of Batavia. On the 3d of September, at dark, the three frigates anchored off the port; and at daylight on the 4th Captain Beaver, having despatched Captain Warren with a flag of truce to summon the French commandant of the fort to surrender, weighed with the frigates, and anchored as near the fort as the depth of water would admit; when, instantly, the French colours were hauled down and the British hoisted in their stead. The marines of the three frigates, amounting, including a party belonging to the Lion 64, to 180, immediately landed, and took possession of the fort. Just at that moment General Jamelle, the commander-in-chief of the French troops, who had arrived at the landroosts from Buitenzorg, was, while changing horses to proceed to the eastward, taken prisoner by Captain



Warren, with the aid of his gig's crew ; as were also an aide-de-camp of General Jansens and a lieutenant of infantry.

Hearing from the French general, that 350 infantry and 350 cavalry were hourly expected to arrive at Cheribon from Buitenzorg, Captain Beaver landed 150 seamen to garrison and defend the fort ; leaving the marines to act offensively against the enemy in the field, should occasion require it, and placing three launches, with carronades, in the river, to enfilade the two chief approaches to it. On the 5th, in the morning, the *Hesper*, who had been delayed by bad sailing, joined the *Nisus*, *Présidente*, and *Phœbe*. On the two following days a quantity of treasure and valuable stores, and several prisoners, were brought from Carang-Sambang, a place about 35 miles in the interior, by a detachment of seamen and marines sent thither for the purpose. On the 11th, by 1 A. M., all the seamen and marines that had been landed were re-embarked, having made about 700 prisoners, including 237 Europeans ; and at 4 A. M. the *Nisus* and *Phœbe* weighed and steered for Taggal, a port about 20 or 25 leagues further to the eastward. On the 12th the *Phœbe* arrived off the harbour ; and, landing some seapoys and a detachment of seamen and marines, Captain Hillyar took quiet possession of the fort and public stores.

While the British navy was thus effectually lending its aid, by subduing and taking possession of the different sea-defences of this valuable colony, the commander-in-chief of the British army was pressing close upon General Jansens ; so close that, on the 16th of September, the latter, then at the fort of Salatiga, about 30 miles to the southward of Samarang, which is 343 miles east from Batavia, proposed to capitulate ; and on the 18th the island of Java and its dependencies were surrendered to the British arms.

## BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

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THE abstract, showing the state of the British navy at the commencement of the present year,\* so nearly resembles the last, as to call for no additional remarks.†

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the beginning of the year 1812, was,

Admirals	62
Vice-admirals	65
Rear-admirals	60
" superannuated	31
Post-captains	777
" "	32
Commanders, or sloop-captains	566
" superannuated	50
Lieutenants	3163
Masters	567

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same year, was 145,000.‡

With respect to the fleets of the powers at war, another inactive year passed; and yet France continued adding to her already powerful navy new line-of-battle ships and frigates. On the 19th of March, Russia declared war against France; and on the 18th of July a treaty of peace was signed at Orebo between Russia, Sweden, and Great Britain. The Scheldt fleet, of from

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 20.

† See Appendix, Nos. 1 and 2.

‡ See Appendix, No. 3.

16 to 20 sail of the line and eight or nine frigates and smaller vessels, evinced, several times, an inclination to put to sea, but was too narrowly watched by the indefatigable officer that cruised off Flushing, Vice-admiral Sir Richard John Strachan. Towards the end of the year, however, a want of men, owing to the frequent draughts made to supply the army, contributed to keep the French fleet stationary. A squadron of seven, and latterly of nine, sail of the line in the Texel threatened also to sail out, but was restrained from the attempt, by the dread of encountering the British force stationed off that port. At Amsterdam, in the beginning of October, the keels of two 74-gun ships, the *Audacieux* and *Polyphème*, were ordered to be laid down, to commemorate the entry of Buonaparte into Moscow; but, before probably a timber belonging to either ship was set up, the French emperor's forced exit from the Russian capital had also taken place.

The French squadron at anchor in the port of Lorient, consisted of five line-of-battle ships, one only of which, the *Vétéran*, had ever been at sea. This ship had, but when we are unable to state, managed to effect her escape from the neighbouring port of Concarneau, where she had been so long blockaded. In the months of February and March, four of those ships, the *Eylau*, of 80, and the *Guilemar*, *Marengo*, and *Vétéran*, of 74 guns, with two ship-corvettes, under the command of Vice-admiral Allemand, lay watching an opportunity to elude the vigilance of a British squadron, of the same numerical force, under Captain Sir John Gore, of the 80-gun ship *Tonnant*, having with him the 74-gun ships *Northumberland*, *Colossus*, and *Bulwark*, Captains the Honourable Henry Hotham, Thomas Alexander, and Thomas Browne. On the 9th of March, early in the afternoon, leaving her three consorts lying to off the island of Hedic, the *Tonnant* made sail and worked up through the *Taigneuse* passage against a fresh north-east wind, in order to reconnoitre the port of Lorient. At 6 p. m. Sir John discovered that M. Allemand had effected his escape; and at 8 p. m. the *Tonnant* anchored for the night off the south-east point of Groix. At daybreak on the 10th the *Tonnant* weighed and made sail towards Lorient; and at 8 a. m. clearly observed that there was no ship of war in the port, except a two-decker, with topgallantmasts pointed and rigged, fitting at the arsenal. Having now ascertained, beyond all doubt, that the French admiral had sailed, Sir John bore up to join his squadron, then just visible in the south-south-west.

M. Allemand had, in fact, put to sea on the night of the 8th; and, but for his extraordinary good fortune, might, as we shall presently see, have terminated his cruise in Portsmouth or Plymouth, instead of in Brest, whither, it appears, he was bound. On the 9th, at 1 p. m., when about seven leagues to the southward of the Penmarks, these four French sail of the line

and two corvettes were discovered by the British 38-gun frigate *Diana*, Captain William Ferris, but were lost sight of in the evening. On the 10th, however, at 9 A. M., when close hauled on the starboard tack with the wind at north-east, the *Diana* regained a sight of the French squadron, then on her weather bow, 12 or 13 miles distant, steering the same course as herself, north by west. The frigate continued sailing parallel with the French ships, to watch their manœuvres, until 3 P. M.; when the 74-gun ship *Pompée*, Captain Sir James Athol Wood, joined company to leeward. At 4 P. M. Captain Ferris hove to to communicate with his superior officer; and, at 4 h. 30 m. P. M., the British 74 and frigate filled and made all sail on the starboard tack. Shortly afterwards the *Diana*, who still kept to windward of the *Pompée*, observed two vessels on her weather beam, to windward of the French squadron; the ships of which immediately bore up, under all sail, evidently to avoid them.

These two vessels were the British 74-gun ships *Tremendous*, Captain Robert Campbell, and *Poictiers*, Captain John Poer Beresford, chasing the French squadron, which they had discovered since daylight, when cruising six or seven leagues west-south-west of Ushant. At 11 A. M. Captain Campbell had detached the *Poictiers* in chase of a ship to the eastward, which proved to be the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Myrtle*, Captain Clement Sneyd; and whom Captain Beresford, on joining him at 1 P. M., sent to warn an English convoy, then seen in the north-east, standing to the westward, of the presence of an enemy's squadron. At 4 P. M., the *Poictiers* having rejoined the *Tremendous*, the two 74s resumed the chase of *M. Allemand*, and were descried by the *Diana*, in the manner we have just related.

As the French ships, when they bore up to avoid the *Tremendous* and *Poictiers*, steered in a direction to cross the bows of the *Diana* and *Pompée*, the two latter, at 6 h. 15 m. P. M., tacked to the south-east. Soon afterwards the *Diana* lost sight of the *Pompée* in the south-south-east, and about the same time observed and answered the night-signal for an enemy made by her two friends to windward. The *Pompée* also observed the flashes of guns and rockets, which were the signals made by the *Tremendous* and *Poictiers*; but it does not appear that she answered them. Towards midnight the wind shifted to the north-north-west; and, at about 30 minutes past midnight, the *Pompée* suddenly discovered two ships in chase of her in the south-east. The British 74 immediately bore up and made all sail, altering her course frequently to avoid her pursuers; one of whom got near enough to fire three or four shot at her. On this the *Pompée* started 80 tons of water, and then gained so rapidly upon the two supposed enemy's ships, that at daylight on the 11th they were no longer to be seen. In the course of the forenoon of that day the *Diana*, and in the evening the *Bulwark* and

Colossus, joined company with the *Pompée*; as, on the following, did the *Tonnant*, *Tremendous*, and *Poictiers*. The two latter had lost sight of the French ships at dark on the 10th; but, having again discovered them at daylight on the 11th, had chased them until 2 P. M.; when, foggy weather coming on, the *Tremendous* and *Poictiers* shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack.

Thus left to himself, M. Allemand cruised about at his leisure, and on the 15th of March, in latitude  $47^{\circ} 39'$  north, longitude  $10^{\circ} 20'$  west, fell in with and chased the British 12-pounder 36-gun frigate *Nijaden*, Captain Farmery Predam Epworth; but the frigate, although frequently fired at by the French van-ship, and a good deal damaged in her sails and rigging, managed to effect her escape. Captain Epworth, also, by his signals, prevented the *Northampton*, *Monarch*, and *Euphrates*, homeward-bound Indiamen, from becoming prizes to the French admiral; towards whom they were unsuspectingly steering until apprized of their danger by the *Nijaden*. After making a few inconsiderable prizes, the French squadron bent its course towards Brest, and on the evening of the 29th anchored in the road; a matter of just boast to M. Allemand, as two or three British squadrons, besides the one he had escaped from, were anxiously looking out for him.

The account we have given of the escape of the French admiral from the *Pompée*, *Tremendous*, and *Poictiers*, although the only account to be seen in print, is far from being so full and clear as it might have been made, could we have gained a sight of the minutes of the court of inquiry which, it appears, was held at Portsmouth on the subject. We turned to the biography of Sir James Athol Wood in the work of Mr. Marshall; but, although 13 closely printed pages are devoted to an account of the rear-admiral's professional life, not a line is spared to throw some light on the proceedings of the *Pompée* in the spring of 1812.

In the latter part of the present year the *Ocean*, and four of the six two-deckers which, with her, had so nearly been destroyed by the British in 1809, were again in the road of Isle d'Aix, watching an opportunity to proceed to Brest; whither the *Courageux* and *Polonais*, in the port of Cherbourg, were also waiting to get; and where Buonaparte wanted once more to assemble a respectable fleet. The French port, which at this time, owing to the powerful fleet at anchor within it was a much more important station than Brest, now claims our attention.

The British Mediterranean fleet still continued its listless task of watching a superior, though, excepting a little demonstration now and then off the port, inactive enemy. On the 3d of January 14 sail of the line, four frigates, and several corvettes, under Rear-admirals Lhermite, Baudin, Violette, and Duperré,

weighed from Toulon road, sailed out, and sailed in. Once or twice also during the month of May, this manœuvre was repeated, under Vice-admiral Emeriau himself; but the French admiral took care to sail out only when the wind was quite in his favour, and Sir Edward Pellew, if in sight at all, at a great distance to leeward.

On one occasion, however, a few shot were exchanged, and a British frigate was rather critically circumstanced. On the 28th of May, at 7h. 30m. A. M., the 38-gun frigate *Menelaus*, Captain Sir Peter Parker, Bart., being on the look-out off Cape Sicie, discovered a French frigate and brig in Hyères bay, standing under all sail, with the wind at east-south-east, for the *Petite-Passe*. The *Menelaus* immediately made sail to cut off the two vessels from entering Toulon; whereupon the latter, which were the 40-gun frigate *Pauline* and 16-gun brig *Ecu-reuil*, from the Adriatic, shortened sail to the topsails, and hauled upon a wind, to wait for the protection of their fleet, which had just then weighed from the road, to the number of 11 sail of the line and six frigates. As soon as they observed that the fleet was sufficiently advanced to cover them, the *Pauline* and *Ecu-reuil* bore up and steered for Toulon. The *Menelaus*, nevertheless, boldly stood on; and at 9h. 30m. A. M.; when close under *Pointe Ecampebarion*, the batteries of which had already opened upon her, commenced firing at the French frigate and brig, within musket-shot distance. In less than half an hour a shot from one of the batteries cut the fore topmast of the *Menelaus* almost in two, and obliged her to wear and stand out. By this time the two advanced line-of-battle ships of the French fleet were nearly in the wake of the British frigate, and the British in-shore squadron of four sail of the line, consisting of the *Repulse*, *Centaur*, *Malta*, and *Kent*, under Rear-admiral *Hallowell*, was hull-down to leeward. But, by extraordinary good management, notwithstanding that her fore topmast was only held together by fishes of capstan bars, and that her rigging and sails were greatly damaged, the *Menelaus* got clear off without losing a man.

On the 15th of August the 74-gun ship *Ville-de-Marseille*, and on the 6th of December the 130-gun ship *Montebello*, were launched at Toulon; thus making the French force in the port 18 sail of the line, including five three-deckers. At Genoa there was the new 74-gun ship *Agamemnon*; besides the 40-gun frigates *Galatée*, launched May 3, and *Driade*, launched October 7; and at Naples, the *Capri* 74. There were, also, at these two ports and at *Spezzia*, three or four sail of the line on the stocks.

Venice was now becoming an important naval dépôt. On the 6th of September, 1810, a fine 74-gun ship, the *Rivoli*, was launched at the arsenal at *Malamacca*, about five miles distant from the city, and was floated over the bar, that crosses the

passage at about midway, by means of a camel, or water-tight box, the same as is used at Amsterdam and St.-Petersburg. This ship put to sea, for the first time, in February of the present year; but it was only, as we shall presently show, to fall into the hands of a British ship of the same force. In the latter end of 1811 or beginning of 1812 two other 74s were launched at Malamacca; the *Mont-St.-Bernardo* and *Regenitore*. The first was commissioned under French colours, and in July bore the flag of Rear-admiral Duperré; the other under Venetian colours, and was commanded by Captain Paschaligo, the gallant captain of the *Corona* in the action off Lissa. On the 2d of August the *Castiglioni* 74 was launched, and, as soon as she could be fitted was commissioned by the late captain of the *Danaé*, whose frigate had recently been burnt by accident in the port of Venice. The *Castiglioni* afterwards received the flag of Rear-admiral Duperré. On the 15th the *Reali-Italiani* 74 and *Piane* frigate were launched; but the 74 was only completed as high up as her main deck. There were eight other two-deckers on the stocks, two of which were in a forward state; but a scarcity of timber, owing to the poverty of the local government, greatly retarded the progress of the workmen.

#### LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 27th of March, at 8 h. 30 m. A. M., the town of Dieppe bearing south-west distant four or five miles, the British brig-sloop *Rosario*, of eight 18-pounder carronades and two long sixes, Captain Bootey Harvey, observed a flotilla of 12 brigs and one lugger standing alongshore. This was the 14th division of the Boulogne flotilla, commanded by Capitaine de vaisseau Louis-Pierre-François-Ricard-Barthelemi Saizieu. Each brig mounted three long 24-pounders and an 8-inch brass howitzer, with a complement of 50 men. The commodore had sailed from Boulogne at 10 P. M. on the 26th, and was bound to Cherbourg. As the *Rosario* made sail to cut off the leewardmost of these 12 brigs, the whole, by signal from the commodore, formed in line, and severally engaged the British brig while passing on the opposite tack; and when the *Rosario* luffed up to cut off the sternmost brig, the remaining 11 and the lugger bore down to support their friend and close with the daring enemy.

Finding them thus determined to support each other, and the *Rosario's* small force not justifying the risk of being laid on board by several such opponents at once, Captain Harvey, with the signal flying for an enemy, bore up to a brig which he then observed in the offing. The moment the latter, which was the brig-sloop *Griffon*, of fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two sixes, Captain George Trollope, answered the signal, the *Rosario*

again hauled to the wind, and at 40 minutes past noon recommenced harassing the rear of the flotilla, then endeavouring, under all sail, to get into Dieppe. The Rosario tacked and wore occasionally, in order to close, receiving each time the fire of the whole line. At 1 h. 30 m. P. M., being far enough to windward, the Rosario most gallantly ran into the body of the French flotilla, and, by cutting away the running rigging of the two nearest brigs, drove them on board of each other: she then, backing her main topsail, engaged them within musket-shot, until they were clear, and afterwards stood on and engaged a third brig; who, losing her mainmast and fore topmast by the board, dropped her anchor. Passing her, the Rosario drove the next brig in line on shore. Two more brigs of the flotilla yet remained to leeward. Bearing up for these, the Rosario, at that time not more than three quarters of a mile from the shore, ran the nearest brig on board, and quickly carried her.

So far the Rosario had acted alone, the Griffon, with all her exertions, not having yet arrived within gun-shot. While, however, the Rosario was bearing away with her prize, clear of the batteries, Captain Harvey passed and hailed his friend, directing him to chase the remaining brig of the two which the Rosario had last attacked with so much success. The Griffon immediately proceeded on the service, and drove the French brig on shore near St.-Aubin, under a very heavy fire from the batteries. Seeing no probability of the Griffon's being able to destroy the brig, Captain Harvey, who was occupied in removing his prisoners and repairing the running rigging of the Rosario, signalled the Griffon to attack the remaining nine brigs of the flotilla in the south-east, then anchoring close in-shore. In obedience to this signal, the Griffon ran in-shore of one of the brigs at anchor near the centre, and, in the most gallant manner boarded and carried her. Captain Trollope then cut the cables of his prize, and stood out with her, in the face of a heavy fire from the batteries, and from the remaining eight French brigs.

Finding as the Griffon passed him, that she was too much disabled in her rigging immediately to renew the attack, yet determined, although his prisoners already equalled his sloop's company, to have another of the brigs, Captain Harvey ran on board the brig which the Rosario, by her fire, had previously dismasted; and which, unknown to him at the time, on account of the darkness of the evening, had just been abandoned by her crew. While, with their three prizes, the Rosario and Griffon stood out to the offing, leaving two other brigs on shore, the French commodore, with the seven remaining brigs of his flotilla, got under way and entered Dieppe. In this truly gallant exploit, no other loss appears to have been sustained on the British side, than one midshipman, Jonathan Widdicomb Dyer, who conducted himself most nobly, and four men wounded, on



board the *Rosario*. It is pleasant to be able to state, that merit met its reward: Captain Harvey was made post, and Mr. Dyer a lieutenant, on the same day, the 31st of March.

On the 3d of May, in the afternoon, receiving a telegraphic communication from the 18-gun brig-sloop *Castilian*, Captain David Braimer, at Dungeness, that the 16-gun brig-sloop *Skylark*, Captain James Boxer, and 14-gun brig-sloop *Apelles*, Captain Frederick Hoffman, were on shore to the westward of Boulogne, Captain Alexander Cunningham, of the 10-gun brig-sloop *Bermuda*, accompanied by the *Rinaldo* of the same force, Captain Sir William George Parker, got under way and hastened towards the French coast, in the hope to be able to render assistance to the two brigs, particularly the *Apelles*, whose fate was more uncertain than that of her consorts.

On the 4th, at daybreak, the *Rinaldo* discovered and chased the *Apelles*, which had just been got afloat by the French, from a spot about five miles to the eastward of Etaples, and was now steering alongshore under jury-sails. At 9 A. M. the *Bermuda* and *Rinaldo* closed with the brig, and, after a few broadsides, drove her on shore under a battery about two miles nearer to Etaples. As the tide was falling, Captain Cunningham discontinued the attack, in consequence of the advantage which the French would have in placing their field-pieces and small-arm men close to the *Apelles* at low-water mark. Before the tide served to renew the attack, Captain Cunningham was joined by the *Castilian*, also by the 14-gun brig-sloop *Phipps*, Captain Thomas Wells.

At 2 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Bermuda*, followed in line of battle by the other brigs, stood in close under the battery; each sloop, as she got abreast of the *Apelles*, pouring in her broadside. By these vigorous means, the French troops who were on board the *Apelles* were driven out of her. The boats of the squadron, as had been previously arranged, under the orders of Lieutenant Thomas Saunders, first of the *Bermuda*, then pushed for, and, covered by the fire of the sloops, boarded the grounded brig; and, although for a considerable time exposed to a galling fire of shot and shells from the battery and from a collection of field-pieces on the beach, Lieutenant Saunders and his party, by 4 P. M., succeeded in getting the *Apelles* afloat and restoring her to the service. Notwithstanding the unremitting fire kept up from the shore, not a man either in the brigs or in the boats was hurt on the occasion.

Four of the French soldiers, not having time to escape, were taken in the *Apelles*; as well as the whole of her late crew, except Captain Hoffman and 19 men. The officers and crew of the *Skylark*, after having set their vessel on fire, also arrived in safety on board the little squadron. For his zeal and promptitude in executing this service, Captain Cunningham was shortly afterwards promoted to post-rank.

On the 9th of January the two French 40-gun frigates *Arienne* and *Andromaque*, and 16-gun brig-corvette *Mamelouck*, under the orders of Commodore Martin Le Foretier, sailed from Nantes upon a cruise. On the 15th, at noon, in latitude  $44^{\circ} 10'$  north, longitude  $14^{\circ} 14'$  west, they fell in with the British 24-pounder 40-gun frigate *Endymion*, Captain Sir William Bolton. In about an hour afterwards the latter, who was to leeward, exchanged numbers with the 50-gun ship *Leopard*, Captain William Henry Dillon, having under her protection a convoy from Lisbon. At 2 P. M. the *Endymion*, one of the fastest sailing ships in the British navy, tacked after the two French frigates and brig, and at 4 P. M. was joined in the chase by the *Leopard*; who had previously signalled her convoy to make the best of their way into port. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. the French vessels were observed to be under easy sail, as if in no dread of being overtaken. At 5 P. M. the *Endymion* ran the *Leopard* out of sight, and at 8 P. M. the French squadron ran her out of sight.

Having thus effected their escape, the French frigates very soon commenced their depredations upon commerce; plundering and destroying, not only English merchant vessels, but those of Spain, Portugal, and the United States of America. Intelligence of all this reaching the board of admiralty, the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, Admiral Lord Keith, then resident at Plymouth, was directed to order the officer in command off the port of Brest, to detach a force to endeavour to intercept these French frigates on their return to France.

The vessel, which Rear-admiral Sir Harry Neale selected to cruise off the port of Lorient for the purpose in view, was the 74-gun ship *Northumberland*, Captain the Honourable Henry Hotham; and certainly an officer possessed of more zeal, ability, and local as well as general experience, could not have been chosen. On the 19th of May the *Northumberland* parted company from the *Boync* and squadron off Ushant, and made sail for her destination. On the 22d, at 10 A. M., the north-west point of Isle Groix bearing north distant 10 miles, and the wind a very light breeze from west by north, the *Northumberland* discovered the three objects of her search in the north-west, crowding all sail before the wind for Lorient. Captain Hotham endeavoured to cut off the French squadron to windward of the island, and signalled the British 12-gun brig *Growler*, Lieutenant John Weeks, then about seven miles in the south-west, to chase; but, finding it impossible to accomplish that object, the *Northumberland* pushed, under all sail, round the south-east end of Groix, and, hauling to the wind close to leeward of the island, was enabled to fetch to windward of the harbour of Lorient before the French squadron could reach it.

Seeing himself thus cut off from his port, M. Le Foretier, at 2 h. 30 m. P. M., signalled his consorts to pass within hail, and then hauled up on the larboard tack to windward of Pointe

Taleet. Meanwhile the Northumberland, eager to close, continued beating to windward between Groix and the continent, exposed to the batteries on each side, when unavoidably standing within their reach. At 2 h. 49 m. p. m., the wind considerably fresher than it had been and blowing about west-north-west, the Arienne, Andromaque, and Mamelouck, formed in close line ahead, bore up, under every sail, with the bold intention, favoured by the wind and covered by the numerous batteries along that part of the coast, to pass between the Northumberland and the shore.

The British 74 immediately stood in as close as she could to Pointe de Pierre-Laye, and there, with her head to the shore and main topsail shivering, took her station, ready to meet the frigates; but these hauled so very close round the point, following the direction of the coast to the eastward of it, that Captain Hotham, being ignorant of the depth of water so near the shore, did not think it practicable, consistent with the safety of the Northumberland, whose draught of water was nearly 25 feet, to lay the leading frigate aboard, as had been his intention. The Northumberland therefore bore up, and, steering parallel to the French squadron, at the distance of about 400 yards, opened her broadside; receiving in return, as well from the two frigates, as from three batteries on the coast, a very animated and well-directed fire.

Captain Hotham's object now being to prevent the French frigates from hauling outside the dry rock Graul, the Northumberland had not only to steer sufficiently near to that rock, to leave her opponents no room to pass between it and her, but to avoid running on it herself: a most difficult and anxious duty, the clouds of smoke, as they drifted ahead of the ship, totally obscuring the rock from view. However, by the care and attention of Mr. Hugh Stewart, the master, the Northumberland passed the rock, within the distance of her own length, on the south-west side, in a quarter less than seven fathoms' water; and the two French frigates and brig, as their only alternative, were obliged to steer inside of it. Here there was not water enough to float them; and at 3 h. 45 m. p. m. the two frigates, and in five minutes afterwards the brig, grounded, under every sail, upon the ridge of rocks extending from the Graul to the shore.

The Arienne lay nearest to the main land; the Mamelouck in a transverse direction upon that frigate's starboard bow, and the Andromaque ahead of, and considerably without, both her consorts. Having, in the course of a 21 minutes' cannonade, had her sails and rigging considerably damaged, the Northumberland now left the two frigates and brig to the effects of the falling tide, it being then one quarter ebb, and hauled off to repair her rigging and shift her fore topsail, which had been rendered entirely useless.

At 4 h. 22 m. P. M., having repaired her principal damages, the Northumberland tacked, and began working up, against a fresh west-north-west wind, to engage the enemy again, and avoid falling to leeward of the Graul. At 4 h. 48 m. the Mamelouck cut away her mainmast by the board; and just then the Growler was seen rounding the south-east end of Groix under a press of sail. At 5 P. M. the Growler joined, and opened an occasional fire upon the grounded vessels, all of which had by this time fallen over upon the larboard side, or that nearest the shore. At 5 h. 23 m. P. M. the mainmast of the Arienne went by the board. At 5 h. 28 m. P. M. the Northumberland anchored in six and a half fathoms' water, Pointe de Pierre-Laye bearing north-west half-north, the citadel of Port-Louis north-west three quarters north, and the Graul rock north half-east 400 yards distant; having, by means of a spring, brought her broadside to bear, at point-blank range, upon the two French frigates and brig, lying in the position already described, with their copper exposed to view.

At 5 h. 34 m. P. M. the Northumberland opened her starboard broadside, receiving in return a fire from three or four guns of the Andromaque, and a heavy fire from three batteries on the main; but of which batteries one only, in the judicious station Captain Hotham had chosen, was able to reach the ship. At 5 h. 55 m. the Andromaque caught fire in the fore top. At 6 P. M. the flames were spreading fast: her fore topmast then fell, and several boats began pulling from the ship to the shore. At 6 h. 45 m. the main and mizen masts of the Andromaque went by the board. Having kept up a deliberate and careful fire until 6 h. 49 m. P. M., which was near the time of low water, and observing the visible effects of it to be, that the crews had quitted their vessels, that the bottoms of the latter were pierced through with shot so low down as to ensure their filling on the rising tide, and that the hull of the Andromaque was already in flames, the Northumberland got under way, and stood out of gun-shot of the nearest battery.

The fire from this single battery had done the Northumberland as much injury in the hull, as all the fire to which, in running along the coast engaging the ships and batteries, she had previously been exposed. Her loss, in consequence, amounted to four seamen and one marine killed, one lieutenant (William Fletcher), three petty officers, 19 seamen, and five marines wounded; of whom four were wounded dangerously and 10 severely. The Growler, who, when the Northumberland ceased firing, had stood in and opened her fire upon the Arienne and Mamelouck, to prevent their crews from returning on board, suffered neither damage nor loss.

At about 8 P. M. the Andromaque blew up, with an awful explosion, leaving no remains of her visible. At 8 h. 10 m. P. M. the Northumberland anchored out of reach of the batteries on

both sides, although a battery on the isle of Groix continued throwing shells. At about 9 p. m. a seaman belonging to a Portuguese vessel, which had been taken by the French squadron, having jumped overboard from the Andromaque just before she blew up, swam on board the Northumberland. At 10 p. m. the Arienne was seen to be on fire; and at 11 h. 30 m. p. m. the flames burst forth from the ports and other parts of the hull, with unextinguishable fury. The Mamelouck was at this time on her beam ends, with her bottom completely riddled. Nothing further remaining to be done, the Northumberland, at about 30 minutes past midnight, got under way, with a light air from the northward, and accompanied by the Growler, stood out to sea. Being retarded in her progress by the calm state of the weather, the Northumberland, at 2 h. 30 m. a. m. on the 23d, witnessed the explosion of the Arienne; and, before the day was over, a third fire and explosion announced that the Mamelouck had ended her career in a similar manner.

A fine French two-decker, with sails bent and topgallant yards across, in the harbour of Lorient, lay a mortified spectator of this gallant achievement, by which two French 40-gun frigates and a 16-gun brig were driven on shore and destroyed, under the fire of at least one heavy French battery, by a British 74 and gun-brig. Mortified, indeed; for, in the state of the wind, the commanding officer of the port could do no more than send boats to assist in removing the crews of the wrecks. With upwards of 900 men including soldiers on board, what was to hinder these two frigates and brig, when all hopes of escape by running had vanished, from boarding a ship having a crew of about 600 men? Even had the attempt failed, it is not probable that more than one frigate would have been captured: the other, in the confusion, with the brig, might have reached Lorient; and certainly the loss of men would not have been by any means so great as was sustained by the grounded vessels, both from the fire of the Northumberland and Growler, and from the hurried endeavours of the panic-struck to reach the shore.

The two French frigates and brig, thus effectually destroyed, had themselves destroyed 36 vessels of different nations, and had taken the most valuable part of their cargoes on board. The frigates, in consequence, were very deep; but, had they drawn no more than their usual water, they still could not have passed clear, as is evident from the brig grounding so close to them. We are happy to be able to state, that Lieutenant Weeks of the Growler, and Lieutenant John Banks, first of the Northumberland, were each promoted to the rank of commander, for the part they had performed in Captain Hotham's exploit.

On the 3d of July, in the afternoon, the British 16-gun brig-sloop Raven, Captain George Gustavus Lennox, while hauling over the Droograan, observed 14 brigs, of the French flotilla

out of the Scheldt, exercised to leeward of the Weiling. Thinking it practicable to cut off some of them, Captain Lennox stood into the Weiling, and at 6 h. 15 m. p. m. began firing occasionally at the flotilla in passing. The wind blowing strong on the shore, the superior sailing and working of the Raven enabled her to overtake seven of the brigs; four of which she compelled to anchor close to the surf under the batteries. The remaining three the Raven drove on shore; and at daylight the next morning they were still lying on the beach, apparently bilged, with the sea beating over them. Only one shot struck the Raven, and that did not hurt any one. This dashing little service was performed in sight of the French fleet lying at Flushing; and it must have greatly mortified the French admiral and his captains to see 14 of his brigs, armed each with three or four long 24-pounders, unable, or rather unwilling, to prevent three of their number from being driven on shore by a single British brig, mounting fourteen 24-pounder carronades.

On the 21st of July, as the British schooner *Sealark*, of ten 12-pounder carronades and 60 men and boys, Lieutenant Thomas Warrand, was cruising off the Start, a signal was made from the shore of an enemy in the south-east quarter. The *Sealark* immediately made all sail in the direction pointed out, and after a three hours' run discovered a large lugger, under English colours, chasing and firing at two ships, apparently West-Indiamen, standing up Channel. As soon as the lugger, which was the *Ville-de-Caen*, of St.-Maloës, mounting 16 long 4 or 6 pounders, with a crew of 75 men, commanded by M. Cochet, discovered that the schooner approaching her was a cruiser, she quitted the merchantmen and altered her course to starboard, under all possible sail. Finding the *Sealark* gaining on her, the lugger shortened sail, and wore repeatedly to get to windward of the schooner.

Fearing the lugger might succeed and thereby effect her escape, Lieutenant Warrand gallantly ran the *Ville-de-Caen* on board, between her fore and main chains. A close and furious engagement now commenced, both with great guns and musketry, the privateer's men using a profusion of hand-grenades to set the schooner on fire: instead of which, however, the lugger set herself on fire. Seeing this, Mr. James Beaver, the *Sealark*'s acting master, at the head of a few men, sprang on board, and almost instantly carried, the *Ville-de-Caen*, after an action, nearly the whole time sides touching, of one hour and 30 minutes.

The *Sealark* had her captain's clerk (John Purnel), five seamen, and one marine killed, her commander, one midshipman (Alexander Gunn), 17 seamen, and three marines wounded: a very serious loss, it must be owned, especially as several of the wounds were dangerous. The loss on the part of the *Ville-de*

Caen amounted to her captain and 14 men found dead on her deck, and 16 wounded, most of them severely. The gallantry of this little action obtained for the Sealark's commander that reward, the prospect of which is a never-failing stimulant to deeds of valour, promotion. The case of Captain Palmer of the *Alacrity*\* may seem to militate against this principle; but, if we are rightly informed, and we see no reason to doubt our authority, he had his post-captain's appointment in his pocket when he began the action with the *Abeille*.

On the 6th of July, in the evening, as the British 64-gun ship *Dictator*, Captain James Patteson Stewart, accompanied by the brig-sloops *Calypso*, 18, Captain Henry Weir, and *Podargus*, 14, Captain William Robilliard, and gun-brig *Flamer*, Lieutenant Thomas England, was off Mardoe on the Norway coast, the mast-heads of several vessels were seen over the rocks, known to be a Danish squadron, consisting of the new 40-gun frigate *Nayaden*, carrying 24-pounders on the main deck, and 48 guns in all, and the 18-gun brigs *Laaland*, *Samsøe*, and *Kiel*. Having a man on board the *Podargus* acquainted with the place, Captain Robilliard volunteered to lead in after the enemy; but the *Podargus* unfortunately took the ground, just as she had entered the passage. Leaving the *Flamer* to attend her, Captain Stewart stood on with the 64 and the remaining brig. By 7 h. 30 m. P. M. the two vessels, the *Calypso* leading, had arrived within a mile of the Danish frigate and her consorts, then running, under a press of sail, inside the rocks. Shortly afterwards the engagement began between the Danish squadron and several gun-boats on one side, and the *Dictator* and *Calypso*, which latter, having grounded for a short time, was now astern of her consort, on the other. At 9 h. 30 m. P. M., after having run 12 miles through a passage, in some places scarcely wide enough to admit the *Dictator's* studding-sail booms to be out, Captain Stewart had the satisfaction to run his ship with her bow upon the shore, and her broadside bearing, within hailing distance, upon the Danish frigate and three brigs, all of whom had anchored close together, with springs on their cables, in the small creek of *Lyngøe*.

The *Calypso* closely followed the *Dictator*; and such was the well-directed fire opened from the two British vessels, especially from the 64, that the *Nayaden*, according to the British official account, was "literally battered to atoms," the three brigs compelled to haul down their colours, and such of the gun-boats, as were not sunk, to seek their safety in flight. Scarcely had the action ended, and the *Dictator* got afloat, than the gun-boats rallied; but the latter were so warmly attacked by the *Calypso*, that they soon ceased their annoyance. Meanwhile the *Podargus* and *Flamer*, which latter had also grounded, were warmly

\* See vol. v., p. 367.

engaged with the shore-batteries and another division of gun-boats. At length, by the indefatigable exertions of their respective officers and crews, both the Podargus and Flamer got afloat, very much cut up. At 3 A. M. on the 7th the Dictator, Calypso, and the two prize-brigs, the Laaland, commanded by Lieutenant James Wilkie of the Dictator, and the Kiel, by Lieutenant Benjamin Hooper of the Calypso, in attempting to get through the passages, were assailed by a division of gun-boats from behind the rocks, so situated that not a gun could be brought to bear upon them from either vessel. In this attack, both prize-brigs, already complete wrecks, grounded; and, notwithstanding every exertion on the part of the lieutenants and men placed in them, they were obliged to be abandoned: that, too, without being set on fire, owing to the wounded men of their crews remaining on board.

In this very bold and well-conducted enterprise, the British sustained a loss as follows: Dictator, three seamen, one marine, and one boy killed, one midshipman (John Sackett Hooper), one captain's clerk (Thomas Farmer), 16 seamen, two boys, and four marines wounded; Podargus, her purser (George Garratt), one first-class volunteer (Thomas Robilliard), and six seamen and one marine wounded; Calypso, one seaman and two marines killed, one seaman wounded, and two missing; and Flamer, one seaman killed, and one midshipman (James Powell) wounded; total, nine killed, 35 wounded, and two missing. The Danes acknowledged a loss, in killed and wounded together, of 300 officers and men. For their gallant conduct on this occasion, Captain Weir was immediately, and Captain Robilliard in the ensuing December, promoted to post-rank, and the Dictator's first lieutenant, William Buchanan, was made a commander.

On the 19th of June the British 10-gun brig-sloop Briseis, Captain John Ross, by the orders of Rear-admiral Thomas Byam Martin, stood into Pillau roads in the Baltic, to communicate with the British merchant ship Urania, and found that she was in possession of the French troops, and that they intended to destroy her if the Briseis approached. Captain Ross accordingly tacked and stood off, and at midnight detached the pinnace, under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Jones, the 2d, with midshipman William Palmer and 18 men, to endeavour to recapture the ship.

The instant she got within gun-shot of the ship, the pinnace was fired at by the French on board, who had six carriage-guns and four swivels mounted. But every obstacle was overcome by the gallantry of Lieutenant Jones and his small party; who gave three cheers, boarded over the small-craft that were alongside, and drove the French troops off the decks into their boats which were on the opposite side. The cable was then cut, and the Urania was brought out, together with a French



scout that had been employed in unlading her. In executing this dashing service, the British had one seaman killed, and Mr. Palmer and one seaman slightly wounded.

On the 16th of July Captain Timothy Clinch, of the 18-gun ship-sloop *Osprey*, cruising in company with the 10-gun brig-sloops *Britomart* and *Leveret*, Captains William Buckley Hunt and George Wickens Willes, detached a boat from each, under the respective commands of Lieutenants William Henry Dixon of the *Britomart*, William Malone (2) of the *Osprey* and Francis Darby Romney of the *Leveret*, in chase of a French lugger privateer about nine leagues to the north-west of the island of Heligoland.

At 1 h. 30 m. P. M., when the three boats were about five leagues off, the lugger came to an anchor; but, shortly afterwards, on perceiving the boats, she got under way and made sail. Lieutenant Dixon then cheered the boats, and sailed on until 3 h. 30 m. P. M.; when the *Britomart's* boat, being ahead, opened her fire, at about musket-shot distance, and received from the lugger, after she had hoisted French colours, a fire in return which wounded one man. The *Osprey's* boat then closed; but Lieutenant Dixon considered the lugger too powerful to be attempted without the aid of the *Leveret's* boat, then about half a mile distant. As soon as the latter came abreast of the two remaining boats, it was arranged that the *Britomart's* boat should attack the larboard, the *Leveret's* the starboard side, and the *Osprey's* the stern, of the French lugger.

The British then cheered and prepared for boarding. At this moment the oars of the *Leveret's* boat got foul of the *Britomart's* boat, and occasioned the former to drop astern. Lieutenants Dixon and Malone now grappled the lugger's stern, and, after a 10 minutes' obstinate struggle, made good their boarding. But it was not until after a 10 minutes' further resistance on the lugger's deck, that her colours were hauled down. Even then the French crew continued firing pistols up the hatchway, and wounded one or two of the British. These at length silenced the enemy's fire, and hoisted the English ensign. The lugger proved to be the *Eole*, of *Dunkerque*, pierced for 14 guns, but having only six mounted, with a crew on board of 31 officers and men. In this very spirited enterprise, the British sustained a loss, in the two boats that made the attack, of two seamen killed, Lieutenant Dixon (slightly) and 11 men wounded.

On the 1st of August, as the British 38-gun frigate *Horatio*, Captain Lord George Stuart, was in latitude 70° 40' north, running down the coast of Norway, a small sail was seen from the mast-head close in with the land; and which, just before she disappeared among the rocks, was discovered to be an armed cutter. Considering it an object of some importance to attempt the destruction of the enemy's cruisers in this quarter, Lord George despatched the barge and three cutters of the *Horatio*,

with about 80 officers and men, commanded by Lieutenant Abraham Mills Hawkins, assisted by Lieutenant Thomas James Poole Masters, and Lieutenant of marines George Syder, to execute the service. Gaining information on shore, that the cutter had gone to a village on an arm of the sea about 35 miles distant over land, Lieutenant Hawkins detached one of the cutters, under master's mate James Crisp, to disperse some small-arm men collected on the shore, and, with the remaining three boats, proceeded for the creek in which the Danish cutter lay.

On the 2d, at 8 A. M., Lieutenant Hawkins discovered the vessel, which was the Danish cutter No. 97, of four 6-pounders and 22 men, lying at anchor in company with the Danish schooner No. 114, of six 6-pounders and 30 men, commanded by Lieutenant Buderhorf of the Danish navy, the commodore, and an American ship of 400 tons their prize. On the approach of the British boats, the Danish vessels presented their broadsides with springs on their cables, and were moored in a capital defensive position. The British, nevertheless, advanced to the attack, and at 9 A. M. received the fire of the Danes; whom, however, Lieutenant Hawkins and his party, assisted towards the end by Mr. Crisp's boat, completely subdued, after a most sanguinary combat.

The British lost in this affair Lieutenant Syder, seven seamen, and one marine killed, Lieutenants Hawkins and Masters, assistant surgeon James Larans (mortally), the boatswain (William Hughes), one midshipman (Thomas Fowler, severely), nine seamen (one mortally), and two marines wounded; total, nine killed and 16 wounded. The loss on the Danish side was also very severe; amounting to 10 killed and 13 wounded, including the commander of the schooner and the cutter severely, and some other officers. Both the British and the Danes fought in the bravest manner, and between them sustained a loss, for which the prizes were a poor compensation. As a reward for his gallantry, Lieutenant Hawkins was made a commander in the ensuing December.

On the 4th of July, at 6 P. M., Calais cliff bearing south by east distant four miles, the British gun-brig Attack, Lieutenant Richard William Simmonds, observed a transport-galliot, a sloop, and a privateer come out of Calais harbour and endeavour to run alongshore. Knowing that the least manifestation of a pursuit would induce the vessels to put back or run themselves on shore, Lieutenant Simmonds made sail to windward, in the hope to decoy the vessels far enough from the French coast to enable him to cut them off. Having proceeded to a sufficient distance, the Attack detached the gig, with six men, commanded by Mr. Couney, the second master.

At midnight, when within half gun-shot of the French shore, the gig discovered the galliot in tow of the privateer. Un-

daunted by the inequality of force, and regardless of a galling fire of musketry, Mr. Couney boarded the transport on one side, as a detachment from the privateer did on the other; but, as soon as Mr. Couney had killed one of their men, the Frenchmen retreated to their vessel and sheered off, leaving the seven British in possession of the prize. The situation of Mr. Couney and his six men was extremely critical even after he had recaptured the galliot; for, independent of the fire of the privateer's musketry, the vessel was exposed to a continued fire of round and grape from the French batteries; nor could the Attack, on account of the calm state of the weather, approach to co-operate with her gig's crew in this very gallant little exploit. Fortunately neither Mr. Couney, nor one of his six men, was hurt on the occasion.

On the 16th of August, at 11 p. m., Foreness in the Cattedgat bearing west-north-west distant six or seven miles, the Attack observed two vessels approaching supposed to be gun-vessels. The brig immediately cleared for action, and in about 20 minutes, when nearly becalmed, was attacked by a division of Danish gun-boats, supposed, in the darkness that prevailed, to be 10 or 12 in number. The engagement continued until 1 h. 40 m. a. m. on the 19th, when the gun-boats ceased firing. A light breeze springing up, the Attack set all sail and got out her sweeps, in the hope to be able to join the Wrangler gun-brig, Lieutenant John Campbell Crawford, whom another division of gun-boats had also been attacking. But, owing to a strong south-east current and a total cessation of the breeze, Lieutenant Simmons could not succeed. Shortly afterwards the Wrangler entirely disappeared.

The Attack had already had her main boom shot away, her foremast and bowsprit badly wounded, two guns dismantled, a great number of shot-holes between wind and water, and her sails and rigging cut to pieces. At 2 h. 10 m. a. m., while the British gun-brig, with only 49 men on board, was employed in refitting herself, 14 Danish gun-vessels, each armed with two long 24-pounders and two howitzers, and with from 65 to 70 men, besides four large row-boats carrying swivels and howitzers, formed in a crescent, within pistol-shot, upon her larboard beam, bow, and quarter, and commenced a heavy fire of round, grape, and grenades. The Attack immediately returned the fire, and continued defending herself until 3 h. 20 m. a. m.; when, being a complete wreck and in a sinking state, the British brig hauled down her colours, with two seamen killed, and 12 wounded. The Danes were honourable enough to pay a high compliment to Lieutenant Simmons for his gallant defence of the Attack; and, at the court-martial subsequently held upon him and his officers for the loss of their brig, the most honourable acquittal was pronounced.

On the 4th of June, in the night, Captain the Honourable

Duncombe Pleydell Bouverie, of the 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Medusa*, sent the boats of the frigate, under the orders of Lieutenant Josiah Thompson, to cut out the French store-ship *Dorade*, of 14 guns and 86 men, commanded by a lieutenant de vaisseau, lying at an anchor in the harbour of Arcasson. In spite of the rapidity of the tide and the intricacy of the navigation, and although discovered and hailed before they arrived within musket-shot, the boats succeeded in getting alongside the ship. The Frenchmen were found at their quarters, and perfectly prepared to defend their vessel; but nothing could resist the impetuosity of Lieutenant Thompson and his men, who rushed on board and carried *Dorade* after a desperate struggle in which the whole of her crew, except 23 men, were either killed or compelled to jump overboard: among the latter was the French commander, severely wounded.

The ship had on board a full cargo of ship-timber, and had been since April, 1811, watching an opportunity to escape. At daylight on the 5th the prize was got under way; but, after proceeding about a league down the harbour, the ship grounded on a sandbank. As the tide was then running out with great violence, Lieutenant Thompson was obliged, after taking out the wounded of her crew, to set the *Dorade* on fire; and the ship soon afterwards blew up. This done, the boats returned to the *Medusa*, having sustained, in performing their gallant exploit, no greater loss than five men wounded.

Here is another of the abstracted cases. How justly proud might every lieutenant, master's mate, and midshipman have been who assisted in capturing the *Dorade*; and yet not one is named except the officer who commanded the party. "Captain Bouverie," says the abstract, "highly commends the conduct of Lieutenant Thompson and the other officers and men employed on this occasion." To "the other officers," this recommendation could be of no avail, as they were not named; not at least in the Gazette, the only record preserved. And, even had they been named, what could they expect, when their commanding officer, he who so gallantly led them up the side of the enemy's ship, bears still the same rank he bore then?

The manner in which the British 74-gun ship *Magnificent*, Captain John Hayes, on the night of the 16th of December in the present year, was saved in a gale of wind on the coast of France is so extraordinary, and at the same time so creditable to the nautical skill and presence of mind of her captain, and to the expertness, alacrity, and good discipline of British seamen, that we shall be doing, not merely an act of justice to the officers and crew of the *Magnificent*, but a service to the whole profession, by giving all the publicity in our power to an account of the circumstance, which has already appeared in a popular periodical work devoted to naval subjects. "The ship was anchored in the evening between the reef of Chasseron, and the reef of

Isle de Ré, nearly mid-channel, in 16 fathoms' water, in the entrance to Basque road; the courses reefed, and top-gallant-yards down. At 8 o'clock, the weather appearing suspicious, and the wind beginning to blow, the top-gallant-masts were got down on deck: at half-past, it came on squally, and the ship was veered to a cable and a half. At 9, she was found to be driving, and in only 11 fathoms' water; the small bower was instantly let go, which brought her up in 10 fathoms. Yards and topmasts were immediately struck, as close down as they could be got. The moon was not to be seen, yet it was not a dark night: it just gave sufficient light to show us our dangerous situation; the sea breaking on the reef, with great violence, about a quarter of a mile astern, and on the starboard quarter. As soon as the top-masts were down, orders were given to heave in upon the best bower, which appeared to be slack, as though the anchor had broken. Three quarters of a cable were got in, when the stock appearing to catch a rock, it held fast: service of course was put in the wake of the hawse, and the cable secured. The inner cable of the best bower was unspliced, and bent to the spare anchor; and a leads-man was kept in the chains to heave the lead, the same as though the ship had been under way, in addition to the deep-sea lead, attended at the gangway by a quarter master, when it was discovered by the man in the chains, that there was a large rock under the ship's bottom, of three fathoms in height: in fact the ground was covered with rocks, and the ship in the midst of them, with the wind at W.S.W. blowing a gale, with small rain and a heavy sea. In this state we remained, with people stationed with axes to the sheet and spare anchors, till daylight when the man at the deep-sea lead declared the ship to be driving. The spare anchor was directly cut away, and the range taken out; when the ship brought up again, and when the ebb tide made, she took the whole cable service, and rode with the best and small bowers ahead, and the spare anchor broad on the starboard bow. The gale appeared to increase; the sea was high; and, as it broke sometimes outside the ship, it proved she was in the midst of rocks, and that the cables could not remain long without being cut. The wind at this period was west, and St.-Marie church bore east, and the distance where the ship would have gone to pieces, about one cable's length; the shoalest part of the reef about two cables, lying in a S.S.E. and N.N.W. direction. The wind now came to W.b.N.; but to counteract this favourable change, it was a lee tide, and a heavy sea setting right on the reef, and neither officers nor men thought it possible, in any way, to cast her clear of the reef, and to make sail, more particularly as the yards and topmasts were down. The captain, however, gave orders to sway the fore-yard two-thirds up; and, while that was doing, to get a hawser for a spring to cast the ship by from the starboard quarter to the spare cable; while this was doing, the spare cable parted, and we had only the

sheet anchor at the bows ; but, as she did not drive, that was not let go. The main yard was now swayed outside the topmast, two-thirds up the same ; as the fore-yard and the spring brought on the small bower cable, people were sent on the yards to stop each yard-arm of the topsails and courses with four or five spun-yarn stops, tied in a single bow, and to cast off and make up all the gaskets : the people were then called down, except one man to each stop, who received very particular orders to be quick in obeying the commands given them, and to be extremely cautious not to let a sail fall, unless that sail was particularly named : if particular attention were not paid to this order, the ship would be lost. The yards were all braced sharp up for casting from the reef, and making sail on the starboard tack. The tacks and sheets, topsail sheets, and main and mizen-stay-sail hal-yards were manned, and the spring brought to the capstan and hove in. The captain now told the people, that they were going to work for life or death ; if they were attentive to his orders, and executed them properly, the ship would be saved ; if not, the whole of them would be drowned in five minutes. Things being in this state of preparation, a little more of the spring was hove in ; the quarter-masters at the wheel and bow received their instructions. The cables were ordered to be cut, which was instantly done ; but the heavy sea on the larboard bow would not let her cast that way. The probability of this had happily been foreseen. The spring broke, and her head paid round in towards the reef. The oldest seaman in the ship at that moment thought all lost. The captain, however, gave his orders very distinctly, to put the helm hard a-starboard, to sheet home the fore-topsail,\* and haul on board the fore tack, and aft fore-sheet, keep all the other sails fast, square the main and mizen topsail yards, and cross jack-yard, keep the main-yard as it was. The moment the wind came abaft the beam, he ordered the mizen-top-sail to be sheeted home, and then the helm to be put hard a-port—when the wind came nearly aft—haul on board the main-tack, aft main-sheet, sheet home the main-topsail, and brace the cross-jack-yard sharp up. When this was done (the whole of which took only two minutes to perform), the ship absolutely flew round from the reef, like a thing scared at the frightful spectacle. The quarter-master was ordered to keep her south, and the captain declared aloud, ‘ The ship is safe.’ The gaff was down, to prevent its holding wind, and the try-sail was bent ready for hoisting, had it been wanted. The main and mizen staysails were also ready, but were not wanted. The fore-top-mast stay-sail was hoisted before the cables were cut : thus was the ship got round in less than her own length ; but, in that short distance,

\* “ The yards were all braced up for the starboard tack : consequently, when she cast the other way, the foresail and foretopsail were set as flat a-back as they could be ; and they were not altered in bringing her to her course ; the way she was managed it was not necessary.

she altered the soundings five fathoms. And now, for the first time, I believe, was seen a ship at sea under reefed courses, and close reefed top-sails, with yards and topmasts struck. The sails all stood remarkably well; and by this novel method, was saved a beautiful ship of the line, and 550 souls. I cannot find any man or officer who ever saw a ship in the state before; yet all seemed surprized that they should never before have thought of it. Indeed it has ever been the prevailing opinion (perhaps for want of giving the subject proper consideration), that a ship with yards and topmasts struck was completely disabled from making sail, except with staysails.”\*

The British squadron, stationed off the north coast of Spain, to co-operate with the loyal Spaniards and guerillas in expelling the French from their country, was commanded by Captain Sir Home Popham of the 74-gun ship *Venerable*; who had under his orders, among some other vessels whose names do not appear, the 38-gun frigates *Surveillante* and *Rhin*, Captains Sir George Ralph Collier and Charles Malcolm, 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Medusa*, Captain the Honourable Duncombe Pleydell Bouveric, and 10-gun brig-sloop *Lyra*, Captain Robert Bloyc.

In the middle of the month of June a small body of French troops held possession of a hill-fort at Lequertio, mounting three 18-pounders, and calculated to resist infantry, and another body, of about 200, was posted in a fortified convent within the town, the walls of which were impervious to any thing less than an 18-pounder. The convent might have been destroyed by the ships; but as the town would have materially suffered, and as the guns of the *Venerable* made no visible impression on the fort, it was determined to erect a battery on a hill opposite to the latter, which the enemy considered as quite inaccessible to cannon and in that confidence rested his security.

Accordingly, on the forenoon of the 20th, a gun was landed, chiefly by the exertions of Lieutenant James Groves of the *Venerable*, notwithstanding the sea was breaking with such violence against the rocks at the foot of the hill, that it was doubtful whether a boat could get near enough for that purpose. The gun was then hove up a short distance by a movable capstan; but this operation was so tedious, that it was at length dragged to the summit of the hill by 36 pair of bullocks, 400 guerillas, and 100 seamen headed by Captain Bouveric. The gun was immediately mounted; and at 4 p. m. fired its first shot. It was afterwards so admirably served, that at sunset a practicable breach was made in the wall of the fort, and the guerillas volunteered to storm it. The first party was repulsed, but the second party gained possession without any considerable loss: several of the French troops escaped on the opposite side and got into the convent. In the course of the evening, the sea abating a

\* See Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix., p. 21.

little, a landing was made on the island of San-Nicolas, although with some difficulty, by Lieutenant Dowell O'Reilly of the *Surveillante*; a detachment of marines from that frigate, the *Medusa*, and *Rhin* also landed, with a carronade from each ship. Captain Malcolm now took command of the island, and Captain Sir George Collier of the *Venerable's* battery on the hill. On the 21st, at daybreak, a 24-pounder was brought to the east side of the town within 200 yards of the convent, and another was in the act of being landed on San-Nicolas to bombard it in that direction, when the French commandant beat a parley and surrendered, with the remainder of his troops, amounting to 290.

The squadron afterwards proceeded along the coast to the westward, and destroyed the batteries at Bermeo, Plencia, Algorta, Bagona, el Campillo las Queras, and Xebiles. On the 6th of July the *Venerable* arrived off Castro; and on the 7th the French were driven out of the town by the fire of the squadron. On the 8th a party landed and took possession of the castle of Castro. On the 10th the squadron proceeded off *Puerta Galletta*, to co-operate in an attack upon it with the Spanish troops under General Longa; but, the enemy being found stronger than the Spaniards had expected, the attack was abandoned. During the morning, Captain Bloye landed with a party of marines, and knocked the trunnions off the guns in the Bagona battery; he also destroyed one gun mounted on a height.

On the 18th, early in the morning, one 24-pounder under Lieutenant Groves, and a howitzer under Lieutenant Thomas Lewis Lawrence, of the marine artillery, were landed from the *Venerable* near Guetaria, and mounted on a hill to the westward of the town, under the directions of Captain Malcolm; while Captain Bouverie landed a medium 24-pounder and a 12-pounder carronade from the *Medusa*, and, after many difficulties, mounted these two guns on the top of a hill to the eastward. At noon the *Venerable* opened her fire and continued it until sunset; when the guns of the enemy opposed to those of the *Venerable* were silenced, and the *Medusa's* two guns were got in readiness to open the next morning. During the night, however, intelligence was received of the approach of between 2000 and 3000 French troops. In consequence of some delay on the part of the Spaniards, Captain Bouverie had to destroy his two guns: after which he and his party re-embarked. Captain Malcolm met with so much detention, that he was obliged to leave in the hands of the enemy a midshipman and 29 men.

On the 30th of July and on the 1st of August a combined attack was made on the town of Santander and the castle of *Amo*, by the detachment of marines serving on board the squadron, placed under the orders of Captain Willoughby Thomas Lake, of the 74-gun ship *Magnificent*, and Captain Sir George Collier, and acting in conjunction with the guerillas under General Porlier. The castle was taken possession of by



the marines ; but, the garrison of Santander having received reinforcements which made it stronger than had been expected, General Porlier was unable to advance upon the place ; and the marines, who had pushed on to co-operate in the attack, were obliged to fall back upon the castle, with some loss. Captains Lake and Sir George Collier were among the wounded ; as was also Captain of marines Christopher Noble, who was taken prisoner. On the 3d the French evacuated the town of Santander, and a detachment of marines from the British frigates in the harbour immediately took possession of it.

In the month of May the British force stationed off the coast of Grenada, to assist the Spanish patriots, consisted of the 20-gun ships Hyacinth and Termagant, Captains Thomas Ussher and Hamilton, and gun-brig Basilisk, Lieutenant George French. In consequence of the destruction, by the Hyacinth, on the 20th, of the castle at Nersa, the guerillas, on the 25th, came down from the mountains and entered the town ; and Captains Ussher and Hamilton went on shore and waited upon the guerilla leader. By him they learnt that the French had retreated to Almunecar, a town about seven miles to the eastward ; and that they had a force of about 300 men, against whom the guerillas meant immediately to march.

In order to co-operate effectually with them, Captain Ussher, at 4 P. M. on the 26th, bore up for Almunecar ; and, anchoring his two ships and brig within point-blank range, silenced the castle in less than an hour. The guerillas not advancing as was expected, Captain Hamilton, at 8 P. M., went in his gig back to Nersa, and returned at 4 A. M. on the 27th, with information that the guerillas were waiting for an expected reinforcement. At 7 A. M. the French troops, having during the night mounted a howitzer in a breach made by the ships in the covered way to the castle, reopened their fire ; but, by 10 A. M., the castle was again silenced, and the French were driven with great loss into the town, where they fortified themselves in the church and houses. Desirous of sparing the unfortunate inhabitants, Captain Ussher ceased firing ; and at 2 P. M., after having destroyed a privateer, of two guns and 30 or 40 men, at anchor under the castle, weighed and ran down to Nersa, for the purpose of concerting plans with the guerillas.

Having arrived at Nersa, Captain Ussher embarked 200 guerilla infantry on board his little squadron, and stood back with them towards Almunecar, having directed his cavalry to hasten through the mountain. The delay occasioned by a calm acquainted the French troops with the combined movement ; and, joining a corps of 200 men at Notril, the whole detachment retreated upon Grenada. On arriving at his anchorage before the castle, Captain Ussher detached Lieutenant Francis Brockell Spilsbury and a guerilla officer, with directions to hoist the respective flags on the castle, and then to demolish the works.

After considerable difficulty, owing to the strength of the works, the service was effectually executed.

On the 13th of February, at daybreak, the British 38-gun frigate *Apollo*, Captain Bridges Watkinson Taylor, while rounding Cape Corse, fell in with and chased the French frigate-built store-ship *Mérimos*; pierced for 36, but mounting only 20 guns, long 8-pounders, with a crew of 126 men, commanded by Capitaine de frégate *Honore-Cyprien Courdouan*, in company with a ship-corvette. After the *Apollo* had closed from to-leeward, and killed six and wounded 20 of the crew of the *Mérimos*, that ship hauled down her colours. Notwithstanding the signals for assistance made to her from the *Mérimos*, the corvette, with the help of boats from the island of Corsica, effected her escape. Although, in consequence of the calm state of the weather and her proximity to the shore, the *Apollo* was exposed, during four hours, to a fire from a battery on the cape and another on the islet of Giraglia, she did not have a man hurt.

On the 16th of February the British 74-gun ship *Victorious*, Captain John Talbot, accompanied by the 18-gun brig-sloop *Weasel*, Captain John William Andrew, arrived off Venice, to watch the motions of the new French 74-gun ship *Rivoli*,\* Commodore *Jean-Baptiste Barré*, and two or three brigs of war, lying ready for sea in that port. Foggy weather made it the 21st, before Captain Talbot was enabled to reconnoitre the port. On that day, at 2 h. 30 m. p. m. the *Victorious* descried a brig in the east-north-east, and at 3 p. m., in the same direction, a large ship, with two more brigs, and two settees. The ship was the *Rivoli* herself; the three brigs were the *Jéna* and *Mercure* of 16, and the *Mamelouck* of eight guns; and the two settees were gun-boats; all about 12 hours from Venice, bound to the port of Pola in Istria, and at this time steering in line of battle; the two gun-boats and one brig ahead, then the *Rivoli*, and astern of her the two remaining brigs. The British 74 and brig were presently under all sail in chase, and soon began to gain upon the French squadron.

At 2 h. 30 m. a. m. on the 22d, perceiving that one of the two brigs in the rear had dropped astern, and that the *Rivoli* had shortened sail to allow her to close, Captain Talbot hailed the *Weasel*, and directed Captain Andrew to pass the *Victorious* if possible, and bring the sternmost brig to action. Captain Andrew was so prompt in obeying the order, that at 4 h. 15 m. a. m. the *Weasel* overtook the *Mercure*, and engaged her within half pistol-shot. After the action between these two brigs had lasted about 20 minutes, the brig that had been in company with the *Mercure*, the *Jéna*, shortened sail, and engaged the *Weasel* distantly on her bow. Thus opposed, the latter still continued a close and well-directed fire upon the *Mercure* until

\* See p. 44.

another 20 minutes had elapsed; at the end of which the French brig blew up. In an instant the Weasel lowered down her boats, but only succeeded in saving three men, and those much bruised. In the mean while, taking advantage of the darkness of the morning and the damaged state of the Weasel's rigging, the Jéna had made off, and soon disappeared. At daylight, however, the British brig regained a sight of both French brigs, one a short distance astern of the other; and, having by this time refitted herself, she crowded sail in pursuit, sweeping occasionally, owing to the lightness of the breeze; but the Jéna and Mamelouck outtailed the Weasel, and kept gradually increasing their distance.

At 4 h. 30 m. A. M., just a quarter of an hour after the Weasel had begun her engagement with the *Mercure*, the *Victorious*, having a light air of wind on her larboard beam, arrived within half pistol-shot of, and opened her starboard guns upon, the *Rivoli*; who immediately returned the fire from her larboard broadside, and continued, with courses clewed up, but royals set, standing on towards the gulf of Triest. A furious engagement now ensued between these two line-of-battle ships, interrupted only when, for a few minutes together, the fog or the smoke hid them from each other's view. In the early part of the action, Captain Talbot received a contusion from a splinter, that nearly deprived him of his sight, and the command of the ship devolved upon Lieutenant Thomas Ladd Peake, who emulated his wounded chief in bravery and judgment. After the mutual cannonade had thus continued for three hours, and the *Rivoli*, from the superior fire of the *Victorious*, had become unmanageable and reduced to such a resistance as two quarter-deck guns only could offer, Lieutenant Peake, by signal, recalled the Weasel, to have the benefit of her assistance, in case either ship, the *Victorious* herself being in a disabled state, and both ships at this time in seven fathoms' water off the point of Groa, should happen to get aground. Having bore up in obedience to the signal, the Weasel stood across the bows of the *Rivoli*; and, at 8 A. M., when within musket-shot distance, poured in her broadside. This the brig, wearing or tacking as necessary, repeated twice. Meanwhile the *Victorious* maintained a steady cannonade, and at 8 h. 45 m. A. M. shot away the *Rivoli*'s mizen mast. In another quarter of an hour the French 74 fired a lee gun, and hailed the *Victorious* that she had struck. Point Legnian then bore from the latter north-north-west distant seven miles.

The *Victorious* had her rigging cut to pieces, gaff and spanker-boom shot away, her three topmasts and mainmast badly wounded, her boats all destroyed, except a small punt belonging to the ward-room officers, and her hull struck in several places. Out of her actual crew of 506 men and boys (60 of the men sick, but only a few absent from their quarters),

she had one lieutenant of marines (Thomas H. Griffiths), and 25 seamen and marines killed, her captain (slightly), one lieutenant of marines (Robert S. Ashbridge, mortally), two master's mates, (William H. Gibbons and George Henry Ayton), two midshipmen (Henry Bolton and Joseph Ray), and 93 seamen and marines wounded; total, 27 killed and 99 wounded. The Weasel had the good fortune not to have a man hurt, either in her forty minutes' engagement with the *Mercure*, or her very spirited, and in all probability, not ineffective cannonade of the *Rivoli*.

According to the letter of Captain Talbot, the *Rivoli* had on board 862 men; but the French officers have deposed to only 810, including 59 men late belonging to the French frigate *Flore* wrecked near Venice. Out of her (taking the smallest amount) 810 in crew and supernumeraries, the *Rivoli* lost 400 men in killed and wounded, including her second captain and the greater part of her officers. Not only had her mizenmast been shot away, but her fore and main masts were so badly wounded, that they fell over her side in a few days after the action. In her hull the *Rivoli* was dreadfully shattered; as, indeed, the severity of her loss would indicate.

The *Victorious* was a 74 of the 18-pounder class, and was consequently armed on her first and second decks in the manner represented at N or O in the first Annual Abstract. On her quarterdeck and forecastle, the *Victorious* appears to have mounted 18 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 18-pounders, and on her poop six 18-pounder carronades; total 82 guns. The *Rivoli*, on her first and second decks, was armed exactly the same as the French 74 in the little table at p. 54 of the first volume, and appears to have mounted on her quarterdeck and forecastle 12 long 8-pounders and eight iron carronades, 36-pounders; total 80 guns, all of French caliber.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		VICTORIOUS.	RIVOLI.
Broadside-guns . . . . .	{ No.	41	40
	{ lbs.	1060	1085
Crew . . . . .	No.	506	810
Size . . . . .	tons	1724	1804

This may be considered as at least an equal match; for the slight overplus that appears in the right-hand set of figures is amply compensated by the ineffective state of the *Rivoli's* crew. These had but just quitted port for the first time since they had assembled; and yet they fought their ship most bravely, as the length of the action, coupled with their severe loss, testifies, and far from unskilfully, as the loss sustained by their antagonist clearly demonstrates. The *Rivoli's* commander had the good fortune to be captured by an officer, who could fully appreciate merit in an enemy; and accordingly Captain Talbot, in his

official letter, expresses himself thus: "I feel great satisfaction in saying, that the conduct of Commodore Barré, during the whole of the action, convinced me I had to deal with a most gallant and brave man, and in the manœuvring of his ship a most experienced and skilful officer. He did not surrender his ship until nearly two hours after she was rendered unmanageable, and had 400 killed or wounded," &c.

Placed under the charge of Lieutenants Edward Whyte and John Townshend Coffin, the Rivoli was conducted by the Victorious to Port St.-George, island of Lissa; where both ships arrived on the 1st of March. The Rivoli was afterwards added to the British navy, and Captain Talbot, at a subsequent day, was knighted for his gallantry in capturing her. Lieutenant Peake also received the promotion, which was due to him upon the occasion; and, in the month of September, Captain Andrew, of the Weasel, obtained his reward in a post-captain's commission.

On the 16th of April the British 18-gun brig-sloop Pilot, Captain John Toup Nicolas, observing nine coasting vessels hauled up on the beach under the town of Policastro near Cape Palinuro, anchored close to the shore, and opened her fire, in order to drive away any armed force collected for their protection. Captain Nicolas then detached the boats, with a party of seamen and the marines, under the orders of Lieutenant Alexander Campbell, assisted by acting master Roger Langlands. Through the gallantry of these officers and their men in keeping in check a body of about 80 of the enemy, the whole of the nine vessels were launched and brought off without a casualty, and that in the short space of four hours. On the 28th the Pilot fell in with and harassed a large convoy laden with timber protected by 14 gun-boats and several scampavies; but, from its being perfectly calm, they effected their escape.

On the 14th of May the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Thames, accompanied by the Pilot, attacked the port of Sapri, defended by a strong battery and tower, mounting two 32-pounders, and garrisoned by an officer and 38 men. After being battered for two hours within pistol-shot, the garrison surrendered at discretion; "but," says Captain Napier, "in consequence of their gallant defence, I allowed them to march out with the honours of war, but not to serve against us in this expedition." The British found 28 vessels laden with oil, some of them nearly a quarter of a mile in the country; all of which were launched and the battery blown up before sunset. Captain Napier speaks in the highest terms of Mr. Langlands, who, by his able disposition of the Pilot's marines placed under his command (no officer of that corps being on board the brig), kept upwards of 200 armed peasantry in check, and had only one man wounded. In a month or two afterwards, Mr. Langlands was promoted to the rank of lieutenant.

On the 29th of April Captain Patrick Campbell, of the 74-gun ship *Leviathan*, detached the boats of that ship and of the 38-gun frigate *Undaunted*, Captain Richard Thomas, under Lieutenant Alexander Dobbs, to attack a French privateer and several merchant vessels in the port of Agay. Lieutenant Dobbs, without any loss, boarded and carried the privateer, a brig of 14 guns and 80 men, lying aground, but could not get her afloat. Four of the merchant vessels were brought off; but, during the endeavours to get off the privateer, two men were killed and four wounded by the fire of the enemy on the shore; who also succeeded in extinguishing the fire which had been put to the brig.

On the same day the boats of the *Undaunted*, with those of the 38-gun frigate *Volontaire*, Captain Charles Bullen, and 18-gun ship-sloop *Blossom*, Captain William Stewart, placed under the orders of Lieutenant John Eagar of the *Undaunted*, attacked a French convoy of 26 vessels at anchor near the mouth of the Rhone, brought out seven, burnt 12, including a national schooner of four guns and 74 men, and left two stranded on the beach. This spirited and important service was performed without any loss, the boats having been ably covered and protected by the fire of the *Blossom*.

On the 9th of May the British 74-gun ships *America* and *Leviathan*, Captains Josias Rowley and Patrick Campbell, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Eclair*, Captain John Bellamy, fell in with a French convoy of 18 deeply laden vessels, which took shelter under the town and batteries of Languelia. The two captains concurring in opinion as to the practicability of bringing out or destroying the vessels by getting possession of the batteries, the marines of both ships, about 250 in number, were, at daybreak on the 10th, landed to execute the service, under the orders of Captains Henry Rea of the *America*, and John Owen of the *Leviathan*, assisted by Lieutenants John Nearne, William Beddeck Cock, Paul Kyffin Carden, and John George Hill. Unfortunately the landing was not effected without an accident of a very serious nature. The yawl of the *America* was sunk by a chance shot from the only gun that could bear on the boats; and, before assistance could be afforded, 10 marines and one seaman were drowned.

A party, under Captain Owen, was detached to carry a battery of five 24 and 18 pounders to the eastward; which he performed in a very spirited and judicious manner, the French officer who commanded falling in the attack. The main body of the marines, in the mean time, rapidly advancing through a severe fire of grape, carried the battery adjoining the town of Languelia, consisting of four 24 and 18 pounders and one mortar, although protected by a strong body of the enemy posted in the wood and in several contiguous buildings; upon the latter of which the guns of the battery were immediately turned with much effect.

The French troops were now driven from the houses lining the beach by the fire of the *Eclair*, who had swept in for the purpose. The boats of the squadron, under Lieutenant William Richardson, assisted by Lieutenants Bouchier Molesworth and Robert Moodie of the *America*, and Alexander Dobbs and Richard Hambly of the *Leviathan*, also by master's mate John Harvey, and several other young officers not named in the despatch, then proceeded to bring out the vessels. These were secured by various contrivances to the houses and beach, and the sails and rudders of most of them removed on shore. After considerable exertions, 16 laden settees were towed off, another was burnt in the harbour by the boats, and a second, making the 18th, was too much damaged by shot to be got afloat. The marines of the squadron were re-embarked in the most perfect order, under cover of the fire of the *Eclair*, the only vessel enabled by the light and baffling winds to get close enough to act. This was accomplished without molestation from the French troops on the spot, although a strong party was advancing from the town of Allassio to reinforce them.

Exclusive of the heavy loss sustained at the onset of this dashing enterprise, one sergeant of marines, three privates, and one seaman were killed, and 18 marines and two seamen wounded; total killed and drowned 16, wounded 20.

Another French convoy, of 18 square and lateen rigged vessels, having assembled at Languelia and Allassio, Captain Campbell of the *Leviathan*, having under his orders the *Impérieuse*, Captain Duncan, 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Curaçoa*, Captain John Tower, and brig-sloop *Eclair*, detached the marines under Captain Owen, who, covered by the fire of the *Eclair*, effected a landing between the two towns. Scarcely had the marines formed on the beach, ere they were attacked by treble their number; but nothing could withstand the bravery of the officers and men, who dashed at the French troops with the bayonet, and drove them from two batteries into the town, killing many and making 14 prisoners.

After spiking the guns, consisting of nine and a mortar, and destroying the carriages, the marines embarked; but, although the three ships had anchored within less than musket-shot of the two towns, and the *Eclair* had kept on her sweeps, going where she could be of most effect, and although the launches and other boats, under the command of Lieutenant Dobbs, had with their carronades maintained a heavy fire, the French troops could not be expelled from the houses so as to enable the boats, without a very great risk, to bring off any of the vessels; which were made fast to the shore in all manner of ways, and had their sails unbent and rudders unshipped. The loss already incurred was sufficiently severe, amounting to one seaman and three marines killed, and Lieutenant William Walpole, one seaman, and nine marines wounded.

On the 11th of June the French brig-corvette *Renard*, of fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two long sixes, commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Charles Baudin des Ardennes, and schooner *Goéland*, of twelve 18-pounder carronades and two sixes, commanded by Enseigne de vaisseau Belin, along with some gun-boats, and a convoy of 14 vessels laden with naval stores for Toulon, sailed from the port of Genoa. On the 15th M. Baudin and his charge were driven for shelter under the island of Sainte-Marguerite by a British squadron, consisting of the *America* 74, Curaçoa frigate, and brig-sloop *Swallow*, of sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two long sixes, Captain Reynolds Sibly. While the 74 and frigate kept in the offing on account of the shoal water, the *Swallow*, by signal, stood in to reconnoitre the convoy. On the 16th, at daybreak, the vessels of the latter were observed to be getting under way; and the *Renard* and *Goéland*, having a light breeze in-shore, soon made all sail in chase of the *Swallow*, who lay nearly becalmed. At about 6 A. M., however, finding that the *Swallow* was benefiting by a light breeze which had just sprung up from the south-west, the French brig and schooner hauled their wind, tacked, and used every exertion, by sweeps and boats to effect their escape. Having at last accomplished their object, they and their convoy stood towards the bay of Fréjus.

Captain Sibly had now very small hopes of bringing on an action; when, at a few minutes past noon, on the breeze freshening, the *Renard* and *Goéland*, having received on board from Fréjus a number of volunteers, with a detachment of soldiers, again stood off on the starboard tack, the schooner keeping a little to windward of her consort. The *Swallow* being at this time ahead on the opposite tack, the two parties neared each other fast. At 1 P. M., finding she could weather the *Renard*, the *Swallow* closed, and, passing her to windward within 30 yards, gave and received a broadside. Captain Sibly then wore close under the French brig's stern, in the hope of keeping her head off shore; but, having had her own head-braces shot away, the *Swallow* was not able to lie so close to the wind as her captain intended. The *Renard* consequently got round on the larboard tack, and in that position was furiously cannonaded by the *Swallow* to leeward. The *Goéland*, meanwhile, had taken an annoying position out of the reach, except occasionally, of the British brig's guns. After the *Swallow* had sustained, during 40 minutes, the close and determined attacks of her two opponents, the larger of whom made several attempts to board, the proximity of the shore, and the strength of the batteries that lined it, compelled Captain Sibly to haul off and rejoin his commodore in the offing. The *Renard* and *Goéland* then stood on under all the sail they could set, and were presently at anchor with their convoy in the bay of Grimaud.

The *Swallow* was much cut up in sails, rigging, masts, and



hull; and, of a crew of 109 out of 120 men and boys, lost six seamen and marines killed, and 17 wounded, including the purser, Mr. Eugene Ryan, who had gallantly volunteered to serve on deck. The *Renard* was much injured in her masts and most severely shattered in her hull; especially on the starboard side. Her loss, out of the 94 men that constituted, as it appears, her regular crew, was 14 men killed and 28 wounded; including among the latter her gallant commander, who was struck by a splinter upon the stump of the arm which some years before he had honourably lost. The total number of persons on board the *Renard* at the commencement of the action, consisting partly of troops as already mentioned, is represented to have been 180. The loss sustained by the *Goéland*, whose crew is stated to have consisted of 113 men, does not appear in M. Baudin's letter; and yet, as the schooner, at one time in particular, was exposed to a close and well-directed fire from five of the *Swallow's* carronades, loaded each with 64 pounds of double cannister and 32 of musket-balls, making 96 pounds in all, a considerable slaughter must have ensued.

That this was an affair very creditable to Captain Sibly, the officers, and crew of the *Swallow*, cannot admit a doubt; and that the latter would have made a prize of the *Renard*, had she not run for protection to the batteries, is, from a review of all the circumstances, equally clear. And yet some dozens of cases have been passed over, to celebrate this as an action glorious, in the extreme, for the navy of France. "The *Renard*," says a well-known French writer on English subjects, "of the same force as the *Abeille*, escorting a convoy in the gulf of Genoa, meets the *Swallow*, of the same force as the *Alacrity*. A frigate and an English ship of the line are in view; it matters not: the *Swallow* must fly, or be taken, before she can be succoured. A furious combat ensues between the two brigs, and the *Swallow* avoids her inevitable capture, only by flying for protection, under all sail, to the two large vessels, who are also crowding all sail to save her."\* This is M. Dupin; who reads English, and writes liberally, except when national self-love interposes to screen truth.

On the 10th of August the British 20-gun ship *Minstrel*, Captain John Strutt Peyton, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Philomel*, Captain Charles Shaw, observed three small French privateers in the port of Biendom, near Alicant; where they were protected by a castle mounting 24 guns. As a further security, two of the vessels were hauled on shore, and a battery formed with six of their guns, which were manned with their united crews, amounting to 80 men, chiefly Genoese. Under these circumstances, the British ship and brig could only blockade the privateers; and,

\* For the original passage see Appendix, No. 4.

to do this more effectually, a boat was sent from one or the other of them every night, to row guard near the shore.

On the 12th of August a boat, with midshipman (or rather lieutenant, for he had been promoted since the 21st of the preceding march, but had not yet received his appointment) Michael Dwyer and seven seamen, departed from the *Minstrel* upon this service. Considering that, if he could take the battery on the beach, he might succeed in capturing the privateers, the midshipman questioned the Spaniards, who came off in boats from the town; and they all agreed in the relation that the French had retreated, leaving but 30 men in the battery and 20 in the castle. Relying upon the tried courage and steadiness of his seven men, Mr. Dwyer resolved, notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy, to attempt carrying the battery by surprise. With this view, at 9 h. 30 m. P. M., he and his little party landed at a spot about three miles westward of the town; but scarcely had they done so, than they were challenged by a French sentinel. The midshipman, with much presence of mind, answered in Spanish that they were peasants. The British were suffered to advance, and, arriving at the battery on the beach, attacked it without hesitation. After a smart struggle, the garrison, consisting not of 20, but of 80 Genoese, abandoned the battery to Mr. Dwyer and his seven men.

The British were a few minutes only in possession, before they were surrounded by 200 French soldiers. Against these Mr. Dwyer and his seven men defended themselves until one of the latter was killed, the midshipman shot through the shoulder, and a seaman through the eye, and all their ammunition expended. The moment the firing ceased, the French rushed upon the garrison with their bayonets. Mr. Dwyer was too weak, from loss of blood, to sustain a hand-to-hand fight; and, after he had been stabbed in 17 places, and all the men except one severely wounded, the French recovered possession of the battery. The gallant fellow who was wounded in the eye, on recovering from the stupefaction caused by the wound in his head, deliberately took his handkerchief from his neck, and, binding it over the wound, said, "Though I have lost one eye, I have still one left, and I'll fight till I lose that too."

The admiration of Captain Foubert and his troops, a detachment from the 117th regiment of voltigeurs, at the invincible courage of the little band of British, was unbounded; and when the latter, in their wounded state, were conveyed to the headquarters of General Goudin, the French commanding officer in this quarter, the same benevolence and solicitude were shown to them by him and his suite. The general sent an invitation to Captain Peyton to visit him on shore, and receive in person as well his brave boat's crew, as the congratulations of the general and the other French officers on having such men under his

command. Captain Peyton accepted the invitation, dined with the French general, and received back his midshipman and six out of his seven men. Thus is it ever, that the brave sympathize with the brave; and he who gallantly does his duty, meets far from the most inestimable part of his reward, in the admiration which he elicits from the breast of his enemy.

On the 11th of August, the *Menelaus*, Captain Sir Peter Parker, observed several small vessels and a large brig running alongshore; on perceiving the frigate they hauled up for Port St.-Stefano, in the bay of Orbitello. Reconnoitring the harbour, a battery of two guns, one of four guns, a tower with one, and a citadel of 14 guns were seen; and although so well defended, and within half musket-shot of the shore and batteries, Sir Peter Parker resolved to cut them out. He stood out to sea that his preparations for the attack might not be noticed by the enemy, as well as to lead them to suppose that, discouraged by the strength of the place, he had given up the intention of attack. At dark he again stood in for the bay, in the hope, by storming the town, of carrying the vessels. The service being of a most desperate nature, to which, in the event of failure, an imputation of rashness might possibly attach, Sir Peter resolved to head the attack himself. The boats left the *Menelaus* at 11 p. m., but failed in their endeavours to reach the port, and returned under a heavy fire from the citadel and batteries. Foiled, but not discouraged, he deferred his attack until the night of the 13th, when he again left the ship with two gigs, two cutters, a launch with an 18-pound carronade, carrying 130 seamen and 40 marines. The force opposed to the above was 400 men, who manned the batteries, and many inhabitants of the town who had armed to repel the intruders. The plan suggested was that Lieutenants Beynon and Wilcocks, of the marines, were to storm the batteries, while Sir Peter Parker pushed on and secured the vessels. They approached the shore under a heavy fire; the marines landed in spite of all opposition, charged up a hill and drove before them about 90 of the enemy into the four-gun battery, which was instantly stormed and taken; the guns were spiked, and the marines re-embarked. Sir Peter, in the mean time, boarded and carried the brig, and scuttled and destroyed the other vessels; the brig was brought out, although she was close under the guns of the citadel, and moored to the shore by six cables, with the loss of one midshipman (Thomas Munro) killed, and five seamen wounded.

On the 29th of September, in the evening, having received information that the French had laden six vessels with shells at Valencia for Peniscola, Captain Peyton despatched the boats of the *Minstrel*, under Lieutenant George Thomas, assisted by midshipmen William Lewis, B. S. Oliver, and Charles Thomas Smith, to endeavour to bring them out; keeping the ship close in shore to cover and protect the boats. Although the vessels

were moored head and stern to the beach, between two batteries of two 24-pounders and two mortars, with a strong garrison in the Grao, and had their sails unbent and rudders unshipped, Lieutenant Thomas and his party gallantly succeeded in bringing out four of them. A fifth was also in the possession of the British; but, owing to the wind suddenly shifting round to the south-east with a heavy squall, this vessel grounded, and was retaken with three men in her. With that exception, the loss sustained by the British amounted to only one seaman severely wounded.

On the 31st of August, as the British 38-gun frigate *Bacchante*, Captain William Hoste, lay at anchor off Rovigno on the south-west coast of Istria, information arrived, that several vessels, laden with ship-timber for the Venetian government, were at Port-Lemo. Captain Hoste, on the same evening, despatched the *Bacchante's* boats, five in number, containing 62 officers and men, under first Lieutenant Donat Henchy. O'Brien, assisted by Lieutenant Frank Gostling, Lieutenant of marines William Haig, master's mate George Powell, and midshipmen James Leonard Few and Thomas William Langton.

Having captured two merchant vessels at the entrance of the port, Lieutenant O'Brien received information, that the vessels, which he was going to cut out, lay under the protection of a French xebec of three guns, and two gun-boats. Notwithstanding this unexpected force, he left his two prizes in charge of Mr. Langton and six seamen, and, with the remaining 55 men, dashed on to the attack. The skill and gallantry of the commanding officer and his party carried all before them; and the British captured, without the loss of a man, as well the timber-vessels, seven in number, as the French xebec *Tisiphone*, of one 6 and two 3 pounders and 28 men, a gun-boat of one 8 and two 3 pounders and 24 men, and another of one 8-pounder and 20 men, intended for the protection of the trade on the coast of Istria, from Pola to Triest.

On the 3d September, off the mouth of the river Mignone near Civita Vecchia, the *Menelaus*, Captain Sir Peter Parker perceived a large letter of marque at anchor, pierced for 14 guns and protected by two strong batteries. As soon as it was dark, two boats were despatched, the crew of which succeeded in boarding and bringing out the *St.-Juan*, and notwithstanding the heavy fire not a man was killed or wounded. The following day the *Menelaus* drove three sloops of war into Port Hercule, and on the 5th at the mouth of the lake of Orbitello, Sir Peter cut out, in the most gallant and masterly style under a very heavy fire, a large French ship, strongly defended by a tower, having previously anchored the *Menelaus* under the fire of the latter. In this last occasion the *Menelaus* lost one seaman killed, and Sir Peter Parker was wounded by a splinter which struck him on the breast.

On the 18th of September, at daybreak, cruising off the coast of Apulia, the Bacchante discovered and chased an enemy's convoy between the islands of Tremitti and Vasto, standing alongshore to the north-west. Baffling winds and calm weather preventing the frigate from closing, Captain Hoste despatched his boats, six in number, containing 72 officers and men, under the command, as before, of his first lieutenant, assisted by Lieutenant Silas Thomson Hood, second of the Bacchante, instead of Lieutenant Gostling. On the approach of the boats, the 18 merchant vessels anchored, and hauled themselves aground, leaving outside for their protection eight armed vessels, each mounting one long 12-pounder, three of them with three swivels each and 16 men, the remainder with 12 men; making in all, eight long 12-pounders, six swivels, and 104 men. Besides these, there were the crews of the merchant vessels, who, having disembarked, lined a thick wood, well adapted for bush-fighting and completely commanding the coast.

In this situation, the convoy and vessels of war confidently awaited the British boats; but the officers and men in these, led on as they were, were not to be so daunted. Pushing through a heavy fire of grape and musketry, the seamen rushed like lions to the attack, boarding and carrying the vessels, and driving their crews over the sides in every direction; while the marines, headed by their intrepid leader, Lieutenant Haig, landing, forced the fugitives from the wood, and secured the possession of the whole convoy and the armed vessels protecting it. To enhance the valour of this second exploit of Lieutenant O'Brien and his brave associates, it was achieved with so trifling a loss on their part, as two seamen wounded, and those not dangerously.

On the 16th of September, in the evening, the British 74-gun ship Eagle, Captain Charles Rowley, having anchored off Cape Maistro near Ancona, the latter despatched Lieutenant Augustus Cannon, with the three barges, to intercept the enemy's coasting trade. On the morning of the 17th Lieutenant Cannon perceived a convoy of 23 sail, protected by two gun-boats, standing towards Goro. As the barges intrepidly advanced, the convoy, each vessel of which was armed with a 6 or an 8 pounder, drew up in line of battle, under cover of a 4-gun battery and the beach lined with armed people, having also the two gun-boats advanced in front.

The British, in the most gallant manner, and notwithstanding that their boats, owing to the shallowness of the channel, grounded frequently in their advance, attacked and carried the largest gun-boat; and then, turning her guns upon the second gun-boat, captured her and all the convoy but two, which effected their escape. Not being able to man all his prizes, Lieutenant Thomas Colson Festing, who had succeeded to the command in consequence of Lieutenant Cannon having been mortally wounded, burnt six

and brought out the remaining 17, including the two gun-boats. Besides Lieutenant Cannon mortally wounded, and who died on the 22d, there was one seaman killed, another mortally, and three slightly wounded. Lieutenant Festing, it appears, still holds the same rank that he did, when he succeeded to the command in this successful and truly gallant exploit.

On the 2d of February, as the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Southampton*, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, was lying in the harbour of Port-au-Prince, the capital of Petion's dominions in the island of Saint-Domingo, intelligence arrived, that a large frigate, a corvette, and a brig of war, belonging neither to Petion, nor to his rival chief Christophe, but to a third party, formed out of revolvers from both, were cruising on the south side of the adjacent island of Guanaboa. Although bound by his instructions to respect the flags of Petion and Christophe, Sir James had received no orders to acknowledge any other Haytian flag; he considered also that, if the squadron was allowed to quit the bight of Leogane, the commanding officer would be less scrupulous about the national character, than about the lading, of the merchant vessels he might fall in with; in short, that M. Gaspard, well known as an experienced privateer's man, might feel it to be his interest to turn pirate.

Those, who communicated the information respecting this frigate, pointed out, in reference to the *Southampton*, her superior force, particularly in men, of whom the number was stated to be upwards of 600. Far from deterring such a man as Sir James Lucas Yeo, all this stimulated him the more to execute a service which, hazardous as it might be, a sense of duty taught him was necessary; and accordingly, in the night, the *Southampton* weighed her anchor, and proceeded in quest of this formidable frigate and her two consorts.

Some account of the force of the two frigates may here be introduced. The *Southampton* was at this time the most ancient cruiser belonging to the British navy, having been built since the year 1757.\* The *Améthyste* was the late French frigate *Félicité*, captured in June, 1809, when armed en flûte, by the British frigate *Latona*.† She was deemed unfit for the British navy, and was sold, as already stated, to an agent of Christophe's: to whose little navy she was afterwards attached. Treachery, or something of the kind, subsequently removed her into the possession of M. Borgellat; who had assumed the command of the department of the south in Saint-Domingo, upon the death of the revoler Rigaud. The frigate's name was then changed from *Améthyste* to *Heureuse-Réunion*; but, in all the accounts respecting her, she is called *Améthyste*. The *Southampton* mounted 38 guns, including ten 24-pounder carronades and two sixes; and the *Améthyste*, 24 guns, consisting of 18 long French

\* See vol. i., p. 28.

† See vol. v., p. 166.

12, and eight long 18, pounders on the main deck, and four long 12-pounders and 14 carronades, 24-pounders, on the quarterdeck and forecastle.

On the 3d, at 6 A. M., having arrived off the south side of Guanaboa, the Southampton fell in with the Améthyste, the corvette, and the brig. On hailing the Améthyste, Sir James was answered, "From Aux-Cayes." He then sent on board, to request the captain of the frigate to wait upon him with his papers. Captain Gaspard declined doing this; but sent his first lieutenant, with a paper, purporting to be an order to cruise, and signed, "Borgellat, general in chief of the south of Hayti." Knowing of no authority that this M. Borgellat had to send armed vessels to sea, Sir James replied, that he felt it to be his duty to conduct the frigate and the two vessels in her company to Port-Royal, Jamaica, that the British commander-in-chief on the station might determine upon the validity of M. Borgellat's claim; and he gave the captain of the Améthyste five minutes to consider the message. A lieutenant of the Southampton accompanied the lieutenant of the Améthyste back to his ship, in order to wait the time; but, before three minutes had elapsed, Captain Gaspard acquainted the former, that he would rather sink than comply with the demand: he requested, however, that, if the British captain really meant to enforce his demand, he would fire a gun ahead of the frigate.

As the boat of the Southampton pulled round her stern towards the opposite gangway, the unsuccessful result of the mission was communicated. Off went the bow gun; and in another instant, then just 6 h. 30 m. A. M., the second and remaining guns upon the Southampton's broadside followed in rapid succession. The fire was returned; the action proceeded; and, aware of what was the chief arm of her strength, the Améthyste made several efforts to board; but the Southampton, by her superiority in manœuvring, frustrated every attempt. It had always been an essential point in Sir James Yeo's system of discipline to practise his men at gunnery; and they now gave unequivocal proofs of the proficiency to which they had attained. Before the cannonade had lasted half an hour, the main and mizen masts of the Améthyste had fallen; and her hull soon became riddled from stem to stern. Still the desperate crew continued a feeble and irregular fire. The two consorts of the Améthyste, in the mean time, had made sail, and were running for shelter under the batteries of Maraguana. At 7 h. 45 m. A. M., desirous to put an end to what now could hardly be called a contest, Sir James Yeo hailed to know if the Améthyste, whose colours had long been shot away, had surrendered. Some one on board replied in the affirmative; and the Southampton ceased her fire. Scarcely had she done so, ere the foremast and bowsprit of the Améthyste went by the board.

A proof of the inexperience of the crew of the latter, and of

confusion into which they had been thrown by the smart and destructive fire of their antagonist, may be seen in the Southampton's loss; which, out of a crew of 212 men and boys, amounted to only one seaman killed, and a midshipman and nine seamen and marines wounded. On the other hand, the Améthyste, out of a crew of 700 men (Frenchmen, Americans, Haytiens, a motley group of almost every nation), had 105 killed and 120 wounded, including among the latter her captain, M. Gaspard. The whole of the surviving crew, except about 20 men, were landed at Maraguana, Petite-Goëve, and Port-au-Prince; and the frigate, under jury-masts, fitted to her while she lay in Port-au-Prince, proceeded, in company with the Southampton to Port-Royal, Jamaica. On a subsequent day the Améthyste was restored to Christophe; and the conduct of Sir James Yco, in all he had done, was approved by his commander-in-chief.

When the belligerents of Europe, opposed to England, had their commerce swept from the ocean by the armed ships of the latter; when there was every probability that Buonaparte would soon be compelled to curb his ambitious temper and restore to Europe the blessings of peace, neutral America stepped forward, and hired herself to be the carrier between the colony and the parent-state. The consequence in a little time was, that although not a single merchant vessel belonging to France or to Holland crossed the Atlantic or doubled the Cape of Good Hope, the products of the western and the eastern world sold cheaper in their markets than they did in those of England, who sent her ships wheresoever she pleased. Thus relieved, France pushed on the war with vigour, and neutral America prospered by fanning the flames. This moral and religious people actually grew rich and great, commercially great at least, out of that which depopulated Europe, which robbed the wife of her husband, and the child of its father.

Every citizen of every town in the United States, to which a creek leads that can float a canoe, becomes henceforward a "merchant;" and the grower of wheat or tobacco sends his son to the counting-house, that he may be initiated in the profitable art of falsifying ships' papers and covering belligerent property. Here the young American learns to bolt custom-house oaths by the dozen, and to condemn a lie only when clumsily told, or when timorously or inadequately applied. After a few years of probation, he is sent on board a vessel as mate or supercargo; and, in due time, besides fabricating fraudulent papers and swearing to their genuineness, he learns (using a homely phrase) to humbug British officers, and to decoy, and make American citizens of, British seamen. The merchant's hope of gain, in these trips to and from the port of one belligerent, resting mainly on a quick passage and a careful avoidance of the cruisers belonging to the other, the American vessel is constructed and



fitted in the best manner for sailing ; and, having no convoying ship of war to show him the way, the American master becomes, of necessity, a practical navigator of the first order.

When England, at length, began her attempts to check this intercourse between her enemy and neutral America, neutral America grumbled, and, resorting to new subterfuges, went on. Other restrictions followed. Then came loud complaints, mixed with threats. Napoléon, next, began to feel the effects of England's restrictive system. Her proclamation, issued on the 16th of May, 1806, declaring the ports of France from the Elbe to Brest in a state of blockade, provoked the French emperor, on the 21st of the succeeding November, to fulminate from Berlin his sweeping decree ; declaring the British islands in a state of blockade ; ordering all British letters, subjects, and property to be seized ; prohibiting all trade in British produce and manufactures ; and pronouncing all neutral vessels, that had touched in England, or in any of her colonies, liable to confiscation.

This was, at once, an extinguisher upon all neutral nations ; it was tantamount to a declaration of war against neutral America ; but neutral America blamed, not her dear France, but England. There can be no doubt that, in retaliation for such a violation of all public law, England would have been justified in laying waste the French coast with fire and sword ; but she contented herself with issuing, on the 7th of January, 1807, an order in council, directing that no vessel should be permitted to trade from one port to another, in the possession of France or her allies. Finding that this order did not produce the expected effect, England, on the 11th of November in the same year, issued another ; in which, imitating France in her extravagant tone, she declared all the ports of her enemies, both in Europe and the colonies, in a state of blockade. This was followed by the Milan decree of December 17, 1807 ; by which every vessel that should have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or paid any tax to the English government, was declared to be denationalized, and to have become British property, and therefore lawful prize ; and every ship sailing from England or her colonies, or from any other country occupied by her troops, was also to be made lawful prize ; but, says the arch framer, " these measures shall cease to have any effect, with respect to all nations, who shall have the firmness to compel the English government to respect their flag."

The object of this proviso was too palpable to be misunderstood. Accordingly, after a few years of growling and snarling ; when, owing to the vigour of the British arms by sea and land, not a colony remained to France or her allies in either hemisphere ; when, the neutral trade being extinct, American ships were rotting at their moorings, and the untrodden wharfs of New York and Philadelphia becoming choked with grass and weeds, America boldly cast off her neutral disguise, and resolved, in the language of the noble race she had displaced, to " take

up the hatchet" and go to war. With whom, was the next point to be considered. This, like every thing else in the United States, was to be settled by a calculation of profit and loss. France had numerous allies; England scarcely any. France had no contiguous territory; England had the Canadas ready to be marched into at a moment's notice. France had no commerce; England had richly-laden merchantmen traversing every sea. England, therefore, it was, against whom the deadly blows of America were to be levelled.

On the 14th of April, at a secret sitting of Congress, an act passed, laying an embargo on all ships and vessels of the United States, during the space of 90 days; for the purpose, no doubt, of lessening the number of vessels that would be at the mercy of England when war was formally declared. By the end of May most of the fastest sailing ships, brigs, and schooners in the American merchant service were fitted or fitted as privateers; and many lay ready to sail forth, the instant the tocsin of war should be sounded. They had not to wait long. The president's message to congress of the 1st of June was the preparative; and an act of congress, which passed on the 18th, declaring the "actual existence of war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America," struck the blow.

Although New-York is 240 miles from Washington, the American seat of government, Commodore Rodgers received his instructions in sufficient time to get under way from the harbour of the first-named city on the morning of the 21st, with the President and United-States frigates, the latter commanded by Commodore Stephen Decatur, the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Congress, Captain John Smith, 18-gun ship-sloop Hornet, Captain James Lawrence, and 16-gun brig-sloop Argus, Captain Arthur Sinclair; and, by evening, the American squadron was clear of Sandy-Hook lighthouse.

The first object of Commodore Rodgers was to get possession of a fleet of about 100 sail of homeward-bound Jamaica-men, known to be not far from the coast, under the protection of so comparatively small a force as the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Thalia*, Captain James G. Vashon, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Reindeer*, Captain William Manners. This fleet had sailed from Negril bay, Jamaica, on the 20th of May, under the additional convoy, as far as Cape Antonio, of the 64-gun ship *Polyphemus*, Captain Cornelius Quinton, and had passed Havana on the 4th of June. On the 23d, at 3 A. M., the commodore spoke an American brig, bound from Madeira to New-York, and was informed by her that, four days before, in latitude  $36^{\circ}$ , longitude  $67^{\circ}$ , she had passed the Jamaica fleet, sailing to the eastward. In that direction the American commodore immediately steered.

At 6 A. M., Nantucket shoal bearing north-east distant 35 miles, and the wind blowing moderately from the west-north-

west, a large sail was descried in the north-east, standing directly for the American squadron. This was the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Belvidera*, Captain Richard Byron; who, until her discovery, a few minutes before, of the strangers' approaching her, had been lying to, waiting to intercept the French privateer-schooner *Marengo*, hourly expected from New-London. At 6 h. 30 m., just as the *Belvidera*, having arrived within six miles, had made out the three largest ships to be frigates, they and the sloops, by signal from the commodore, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack in chase. The British frigate immediately tacked from the strangers; and at 8 h. 15 m. A. M., finding the private signal not answered, Captain Byron made all sail, keeping away to about north-east by east. At 11, A. M. the wind began to decrease and draw more to the westward. At 11 h. 30 m. the *Belvidera* hoisted her colours; and immediately afterwards the American squadron did the same, the two commodores also displaying their broad pendants.

Having now ascertained that the squadron approaching belonged to a "friendly power," Captain Byron would probably have shortened sail, to allow the American van-ship to close; but a New-York pilot-boat had a few days before spoken the *Belvidera*, and informed her of what was likely to happen. Coupling this with the persevering efforts of the American commodore in the chase, Captain Byron no longer doubted the hostility of his intentions. The *Belvidera*, as a matter of course, had cleared for action and loaded her guns, and had shifted to her stern ports two long 18-pounders on the main deck and two 32-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck; but, although the cartridges of the guns were pricked, the priming was not laid on. This was done by Captain Byron's express orders, to prevent the possibility of any such charge being brought against the *Belvidera*, as had been made so much of in the case of the *Little-Belt*.

The wind, which since 2 P. M. had veered to west-south-west, and was therefore nearly aft in the course the ships were steering (about north-east), began gradually to fall. This of course favoured the ships astern: and at 4 h. 20 m. P. M., being the van-ship of her squadron and distant about 600 yards astern, or rather, about half a point on the larboard and weather quarter of the *Belvidera*, the *President* opened a fire from her bow guns. The first three shot all took effect in the British ship's hull: one struck the rudder-coat, and the others entered the counter and transom, but hurt no one, the men being above at quarters. A fourth shot struck the muzzle of the larboard chase 18-pounder, and, breaking into several pieces, killed one seaman, wounded mortally another, severely two others, and slightly a lieutenant (William Henry Bruce), in the act of pointing the gun, and two seamen standing near him. In five minutes after the *President* had commenced her fire, the *Belvidera* returned it from her stern;

chasers. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. one of the President's 24-pounders burst: by which accident 16 persons were killed and wounded, including among the latter the commodore himself severely in the leg; and the main and fore-castle decks near the gun were so much shattered, as to prevent the use, for a considerable time, of a chase-gun on that side.

After having, owing to the accident, suspended firing for 10 minutes, the President put her helm a-starboard and discharged her starboard main-deck guns; the shot from which (all single) did considerable injury to the rigging and sails of the *Belvidera*, but scarcely touched her hull. The most serious accident, which now befel the *Belvidera*, was the frequent breaking of the long-bolts, breeching-hooks, and breechings, of the long guns and carronades; by a blow from one of which latter, Captain Byron received a severe contusion in the inside of his thigh, a little above the knee. Nothing, however, could exceed the alacrity of the crew, as well in refixing and securing the guns, as in splicing and knotting the damaged rigging. In the mean while the captain and his senior lieutenant, John Sykes, personally superintended the pointing of the quarter-deck chase-carronades; while the 18-pounders in the cabin were equally well served under the direction of Lieutenants Bruce and the Honourable George Pryce Campbell. This was a duty of some importance, as it was upon the nicety of the aim that their hopes of escape in a great degree rested.

At 5 P. M., being much annoyed by the steady stern-fire of the British frigate, the President again put her helm a-starboard, and fired her main-deck guns, at the distance, now, of rather less than 400 yards: she then renewed her course in the *Belvidera*'s wake, receiving, as before, an animated fire from the latter's stern-chasers. Notwithstanding that the *Belvidera* had by this time had several of her backstays, main shrouds, and studding-sail halliards shot away, and her cross-jack yard badly wounded, the crew, under the direction of Mr. James Kerr, the master, repaired the one and fished the other; so that the ship had lost very little of her advantage in the chase.

At 2 h. 20 m. P. M. the President again endeavoured to free herself from the galling stern-fire of her persevering opponent (who, from her two cabin 18-pounders; fired upwards of 300 round shot), by luffing up athwart the *Belvidera*'s stern and discharging two broadsides; neither of which, however, produced much effect. About this time the *Belvidera* gave a broad yaw to starboard, with the intention of firing her broadside; but, the President quickly answering her helm, no guns would bear with effect, and none were discharged. Yet Commodore [redacted], in his journal declares, that the *Belvidera*'s "four most guns were fired, without bearing within 25 or 30 degrees of the President."

Finding that the President was now getting so near, that she

had it at her option to run alongside and bring on a close action, the *Belvidera*, at 6 h. 25 m. P. M., cut away one bower, one stream, and two sheet anchors; and, in five minutes more, the latter got so far ahead of the *President*, owing chiefly to her yawing about instead of steering a direct course, that the American frigate ceased her fire. This apparently shy conduct on the part of the *President*, coupled with the damaged state of her rigging and sails, enabled the *Congress* to get abreast of her; and at 6 h. 30 m. P. M. that frigate opened her fire, but, finding her shot fall short, almost immediately desisted. In the mean time the *Belvidera*, for the same reason, had ceased her fire; and, to get clear of this second opponent, started 14 tons of water, and threw overboard her yawl, barge, gig, and jollyboat. The good effect of this was soon visible; and the British crew now devoted their principal attention to fishing their ship's main topmast, which was badly wounded. By 8 P. M. the *Belvidera* was two miles ahead of the American van-ship. At 11 P. M. Captain Byron altered his course from north-east to east-south-east, and set his starboard studding-sails. At 11 h. 25 m. P. M. the *President*, who was still the leading frigate of her squadron, and now about three miles astern of the *Belvidera*, shortened sail, and at midnight lay to, in company with the *Congress*, to await the coming up of her remaining friends.

The force of the *President* has already been fully described. The *Belvidera* measured 946 tons, and was armed precisely according to the establishment of her class, with 42 guns, including 14 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines. The *Congress* was a remarkably fine ship, about the size of the British frigate *Cambrian*, or from 1150 to 1170 tons; and carried the same armament as the *Chesapeake* when she was attacked by the *Leopard*,\* with four 32-pounder carronades in addition, making 50 guns in all. Some accounts give the *Congress* 52 guns. Her complement was 440, with scarcely a boy among them.

The principal damages of both ships have already been stated. The *Belvidera*'s loss, besides that sustained at the commencement of the attack, amounted, out of 230 men and boys of her complement, to 17 wounded; making her total loss two killed and 22 wounded, the greater part slightly. According to the American official account, the *President* lost, altogether, two midshipmen and one marine killed, the commodore, one lieutenant, one lieutenant of marines, three midshipmen, and 12 seamen wounded, one mortally, and several severely; making her total loss in killed and wounded 22, of which number six had suffered by the *Belvidera*'s fire. This was paying rather dear for the day's amusement; but the 15 hours' dance, which the *Belvidera* had led the commodore, did him more injury than her guns or his

\* See vol. iv., p. 331.

own: it lost him the Jamaica fleet, by carrying his squadron too far to the northward. At daylight on the 23d, when the commodore began chasing the *Belvidera*, the American squadron was in latitude  $39^{\circ} 26'$  north, longitude  $71^{\circ} 10'$  west; and at noon on that day the Jamaica fleet was in latitude  $39^{\circ} 35'$ , longitude  $61^{\circ} 38'$ .

Having repaired the most material of her damages, the *Belvidera* steered towards Halifax, and on the 27th anchored in the harbour, in company with two or three American merchant vessels, which, on receiving so unequivocal a proof that war had been declared by the United States, Captain Byron had ventured to detain! but all of which Rear-admiral Sawyer restored, considering that the affair, after all, might have originated in some mistake of the American commodore's. On the evening of the same day on which the *Belvidera* anchored in Halifax, the Mackerel schooner was despatched to England with the intelligence, and arrived at Portsmouth on the 25th of July.

It took the President a full day to repair her damages. That done, the American squadron proceeded in quest of the Jamaica fleet. On the 1st of July, a little to the eastward of the bank of Newfoundland, the squadron fell in with a fleet, not of ships, but of cocoa-nut-shells, orange-peels, &c.;\* and the commodore and his officers promised themselves a West-India dessert to their next day's dinner. They longed in vain; and, after being thus tantalized from the 1st to the 13th, they steered for Madeira, and thence for the Azores. To increase the misfortunes of the cruise, the scurvy broke out among the men, and conferred additional value upon the limes, that were known to be in such profusion on board the Jamaica ships. The squadron captured six or seven small merchantmen, and recaptured one American vessel; but, although he chased the British 38-gun frigate *Statira*, Captain Hassard Stackpoole, for several hours, Commodore Rodgers returned to Boston without one national trophy to signalize his maiden cruise. He arrived there on the 29th of August; just six days after the *Thalia*, having brought home her charge in safety, had anchored in the Downs.

One of the two great blows against England, the subjugation of the Canadas and the capture of a West-India fleet of more than 100 sail, contemplated by Mr. Madison was thus warded off; and to the judgment and promptitude of Captain Byron on his first falling in with the American squadron, to the skill of the *Belvidera*'s officers and crew in pointing their guns and working their ship, and to their bravery and perseverance in defending her during a long and arduous chase, while engaged with a force so greatly superior, is the nation indebted for the little mischief done

\* Official letter of Commodore Rodgers.

to British commerce by a formidable American squadron, possessing the singular advantage of having its hostile intentions unknown.

Had the President, when she fell in with the *Belvidera*, been cruising alone, we can readily imagine, judging from what took place in the *Little-Belt's* case, that Commodore Rodgers would have magnified the British frigate into a line-of-battle ship, and have done his utmost to avoid her; but we are quite at a loss, we confess, to account for the Commodore's irresolution in not closing with the *Belvidera*, when he had a squadron of friends close at his heels. It was that irresolution which produced those many yawings and traverses in the President's course; and it was those yawings and traverses that, coupled with the masterly manner in which the *Belvidera* was handled, saved her from being captured. Meaning, some have thought, to compliment, others to *quiz*, his political opponent, the democratic commodore, Captain Isaac Hull of the *Constitution*, a staunch federalist, says to the secretary of the American navy: "I am confident, could the commodore have got alongside the *Belvidera*, she would have been his in less than *one hour*."

A contemporary informs us, that Lieutenant Sykes "was promoted to the rank of commander, as a compliment, not only to his captain and himself, but to the officers and ship's crew, which certainly would not have been done, had there been any want of discipline observable in the ship."\* With respect to the *Belvidera's* first lieutenant, Captain Brenton has been misinformed. Lieutenant Sykes was not made a commander until the 2d of November, 1814; and, as he had then been a lieutenant more than 19 years, he was entitled to the promotion upwards of two years before, even had he not distinguished himself in the *Belvidera*, and been recommended to the admiralty by her captain as "an excellent officer." Our contemporary's mysterious allusion about "want of discipline," we do not understand.

It was intended that the frigate *Essex* lying at New-York should form part of the squadron of Commodore Rodgers, but she could not be got ready in time. The *Essex* was the smallest frigate belonging to the United States, measuring only 867 tons. Her armament consisted almost wholly of 32-pounder carronades: she mounted 24, with two long 12-pounders, on the main deck, and 16, with four long 12-pounders on the quarterdeck and fore-castle; total 46 guns. The rate of the *Essex* in the American navy-list was of "32 guns;" and her complement, as subsequently acknowledged by Captain David Porter, who so long commanded her was 328 men. The usual addition of, "and boys," as applied to the crew of an American ship, would convey a very erroneous impression; therefore we do not use it. But, to those acquainted with the usual composition of the crews of British ships of war, it will appear the most extraordinary circum-

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 47.

stance, that, out of those 328 men, Captain Porter himself should have declared (and for which the American government must have been not a little displeased), in his famous "Journal of a Cruise," there were but 11 landsmen. This is a most important fact, and deserves to be held in remembrance by all who desire to judge fairly in those encounters between British and American ships, of which we shall soon have to give some account.

Having the authority of a respectable eye-witness for the accuracy of as much of the following account as relates to the proceedings on shore, we feel bound to give it insertion; if but to show the importance that was attached to the retention of British seamen on board the American ships of war, as well as the barbarous means to which an American officer could resort, to punish a native of England for refusing to become a traitor to his country. A New-York newspaper, of June 27, 1812, contains the following as the substance of the formal deposition of the victim of Captain Porter's unmanly treatment. "The deposition states, that John Erving was born in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England; that he has resided within the United States since 1800, and has never been naturalized; that, on the 14th of October, 1811, he entered on board the *Essex*, and joined her at Norfolk; that Captain Porter, on the 25th of June, 1812, caused all hands to be piped on deck, to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and gave them to understand, that any man who did not choose to do so should be discharged; that, when deponent heard his name called, he told the captain, that being a British subject he must refuse taking the oath; on which the captain spoke to the petty officers, and told them they must pass sentence upon him; that they then put him into the petty launch, which lay alongside the frigate, and there poured a bucket of tar over him, and then laid on a quantity of feathers, having first stripped him naked from the waist: that they then rowed him ashore, stern foremost, and landed him. That he wandered about, from street to street, in this condition, until Mr. Ford took him into his shop, to save him from the crowd then beginning to gather; that he staid there until the police magistrate took him away, and put him into the city prison for protection, where he was cleansed and clothed. None of the citizens molested or insulted him. He says he had a protection, which he bought of a man in Salem, of the same name and description with himself, for four shillings and sixpence, which he got renewed at the custom-house, Norfolk. He says he gave, as an additional reason to the captain, why he did not choose to fight against his country, that, if he should be taken prisoner, he would certainly be hung."

This, having been copied into other papers, met the eye of Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, of the 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Southampton*, then attached to the Jamaica station. Persons,



acquainted with that officer, can judge of his feelings upon reading an account of the ill-treatment of a British sailor. Some expression, marking his abhorrence of the act and his contempt for the author, did very likely escape Sir James; and that, in the hearing of one or more of the American prisoners then on board the *Southampton*. Through this channel, which was none of the purest, the words probably became what they appeared in a Philadelphia newspaper, the "Democratic Press," of the 18th of September, 1812, a sort of challenge, couched in vulgar terms, from the *Southampton* to the *Essex*. It has been thought that Mr. Binns himself was at the bottom of it, to give his friend (but not countryman) Captain Porter an opportunity of blustering himself into more creditable notice, than the affair of John Erving was calculated to gain for him. At all events, a formal acceptance, by Captain Porter, of the alleged challenge, went the round of the American newspapers.

Although, according to the best of our inquiries on the subject, no such message was sent by Sir James Yeo, the *Southampton* cruised, for several weeks, along the southern coast of the United States, in the hope of falling in with the *Essex*, the nature of whose armament Sir James fully knew. The *Southampton* had 212 men and boys, and in reference to the quality of her crew, was well manned. All that her captain and his officers wanted was the weather-gage, to enable the *Southampton* to choose her distance, and bring her long 12s into fair competition with her opponent's short 32s; or else to afford the British seamen an opportunity of getting on board the American ship early in the action, and of deciding the contest by their favourite mode, a hand-to-hand struggle.

It was on the 3d of July that the *Essex* sailed from New-York. On the 11th at 2 A. M., in latitude, by her reckoning, 33°, longitude 66°, the *Essex* fell in with a small convoy of seven British transports, going from Barbadoes to Quebec, under the protection of the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Minerva*, (same force as *Southampton*,) Captain Richard Hawkins, and succeeded in cutting off the rearmost vessel, a brig, No. 299, having on board 197 soldiers. At 4 A. M., observing a strange ship very close to one of the brigs of her convoy, the *Minerva* wore to reconnoitre the intruder. Finding, however, after a while, that, by continuing in chase of the American frigate and her newly made-prize, he would run the risk of losing the remaining six vessels of his convoy, Captain Hawkins left the brig (captured, by the *Minerva*'s reckoning, in latitude 34° 3' north, longitude 66° 39' west) in the quiet possession of the *Essex*, and resumed his course towards Quebec.

Captain Porter was discreet, as well as shrewd, enough to chuckle at this: and, disarming and paroling the soldiers, and ransoming the vessel, he allowed the latter to proceed with the intelligence of the outrage she had suffered. He of course

obtained from his prize the name of the convoying frigate, whose protection was of so much use to her, and by the first opportunity wrote home an account of his exploit; concluding with the, as applied to a British ship, most galling words: "We endeavoured to bring the frigate to action, but did not succeed." This letter appeared in several English, as well as American newspapers; but we can find no explanation of the circumstance out of which it originated. Had Captain Porter really "endeavoured" to bring the *Minerva* to action, we do not see what could have prevented the *Essex*, with her decided superiority of sailing, from getting alongside of her. But no such thought, we are sure, entered the head of Captain Porter. This will be clear to all, as we proceed in our analysis of that gentleman's claim, or claims rather, for they are numerous, to wear the laurel.

On the 13th of August, but in what spot off the American coast nowhere appears, the *Essex* fell in with the British 16-gun ship-sloop *Alert*, Captain Thomas Lamb Poulden Laugharne. The ship, thus raised to the dignity of a sloop of war, had, eight years before, carried coals from Newcastle to London. In the year 1804 twelve of these craft were purchased for men of war; and the *Oxford* collier became the *Alert* sloop, fitted with 18-pounder carronades, the highest caliber she would bear. Had she been a little smaller, and rigged with two masts instead of three, the *Alert* would have been a gun-brig; but her unfortunate mizenmasts exalted her above scores of vessels, any one of whom, among the two classes next below her in our abstracts, except perhaps the *Alacrity*, would have gloried in having such a ship to contend with: nay, some of the *Alacrity's* fine class would not have declined a combat with two such opponents. By the end of the year of 1811, ten of these choice men of war had either been broken up, or converted to peaceable harbour ships. But there were two that yet remained; and, as if it was supposed that they in reality possessed the qualities of which their names were significant, the *Avenger* and *Alert* sailed for the station of North America, the very month before the United States declared war against Great Britain.

When the American frigate *Essex*, as we have stated, fell in with the *Alert*, the latter was in search of the *Hornet*; such another sloop of war as the *Little-Belt* or *Bonne-Citoyenne*, and who of course would, or at least ought to, have captured both the *Alert* and *Avenger*, had she encountered them together. Either mistaking the *Essex* for what she was not, or aiming at a still higher flight than the *Hornet*, the *Alert* bore down upon the former's weather quarter, and opened her puny fire. In a quarter of an hour, the *ci-devant* collier had seven feet water in her hold, three of her men wounded, and her colours down, and had neither hurt a man, nor done any other injury, on board the *Essex*.

The conspicuous gallantry of Captain Laugharne entitled him

to a better ship than the *Alert*, a better first lieutenant than Andrew Duncan, who gave him no support, and a better crew than his officers and men, who, except Johanson Clering the master, and William Haggarty the purser, went aft to request their captain to strike the colours. Captain Porter disarmed his fine prize, and sent her with the prisoners, 86 in number, as a cartel, to St.-John's, Newfoundland; where, on the 8th of October, Captain Laugharne and his officers and men were tried for the loss of their ship. The captain, master, and purser, were most honourably acquitted; the first lieutenant was dismissed the service; and the remaining officers and crew obtained, with their acquittal, the marked disapprobation of the court. On her return to a port in the United States, being found unfit for a cruiser, the *Alert* was laid up in ordinary, but, after the lapse of some months, was fitted as a store-ship. The moment, however, that her sails were unfurled, her creeping, collier-like pace betrayed her origin, and sent back the *Alert* to New York, to grace the harbour as a block-ship, and to be pointed out to the citizens as one of the national trophies of war.

As Captain Porter was a great favourite at the city of Washington, Mr. Clark, who was patronised by all the great men there, could do no less than insert in his book any little tale which the former might wish to see recorded in the naval history of his country. "On the 30th of August," says one of those tales, "the *Essex* being in latitude 36° north, longitude 62° west, a British frigate was discovered standing towards her, under a press of sail. Porter stood for her under easy sail, with his ship prepared for action; and, apprehensive that she might not find the *Essex* during the night, he hoisted a light. At 9, the British vessel made a signal: it consisted of two flashes and a blue light. She was then, apparently, about four miles distant. Porter stood for the point where she was seen until midnight, when, perceiving nothing of her, he concluded it would be best to heave to for her until morning, concluding she had done the same; but, to his great surprise, and the mortification of his officers and crew, she was no longer in sight. Captain Porter thought it to be not unlikely, that this vessel was the *Acasta*, of 50 guns, sent out, accompanied by the *Ringdove*, of 22, to cruise for the *Essex*."\*

It did not perhaps occur to Mr. Clark, that ships usually carry log-books, in which are entered every day's proceedings, with the latitude, longitude, &c.; and that these can be referred to, in case the false assertions of any historian, or paragraph-writer, or American captain, may be worth the trouble of disproving. Considering what a formidable man Captain Porter was, nothing less than the *Acasta* "of 50 guns," and *Ringdove*, "of 22," could be sent out to cruise for the *Essex*. Unfortunately for

\* Clark's Naval History of the United States, vol. i. p. 180.

the fame of the captain of the *Essex*, on the 30th of August, 1812, the day mentioned, the *Acasta* was cruising in the latitude of  $43^{\circ}$  north, longitude  $65^{\circ} 16'$  west; and the *Ringdove*, whose force, by-the-by, was only 18 guns, was lying at an anchor in a harbour of the island of St.-Thomas. It was certainly very modest of Captain Porter, to "think it not unlikely," that one of the finest 18-pounder frigates in the British navy, accompanied too by a sloop of war, would be sent out to "cruise for the *Essex*." The fact is, the ship, which Captain Porter fell in with, was the 18-gun sloop *Rattler*, Captain Alexander Gordon; and who, we believe, not considering himself a match for the American frigate, rather avoided than sought an engagement with her.

On the 4th of September, at noon, in latitude  $39^{\circ} 11'$  north, longitude  $70^{\circ} 22'$ , the *Essex*, then having under her convoy the American merchant ship *Minerva*, fell in with "two ships of war" to the southward and westward. These two "ships of war," as Captain Porter declared them to be,\* were the British 38-gun frigate *Shannon*, Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, and the merchant ship *Planter*, which she had just recaptured from the Americans. The *Shannon*, as may be supposed, was soon under all sail in chase; but in a little time the wind, which had been blowing right aft, headed the ship flat aback. With the wind thus suddenly changed in her favour, the *Essex*, keeping the *Minerva* close astern of her, bore down, as if to bring the *Shannon* to action; but at 4 h. 30 m. P. M., just as she had got within about 10 miles of the British frigate, the *Essex* suddenly hauled up, and, after making some private signals, crowded sail to get away; leaving the poor merchant ship, whom she had thus led into danger, to shift for herself.

The *Shannon* continued chasing to-windward, under a press of canvass, until dark; when, losing sight of the *Essex*, the former tacked and seized the merchant ship. Captain Broke intended to burn the vessel directly, that the *Essex* might see the flames, and perhaps bear down to revenge the indignity offered to the American flag; but the night becoming dark and squally, Captain Broke would not risk his boats in removing the crew. Consequently the *Minerva*, in ballast only, was not burnt until the following morning; and by that time the *Essex* had made so good a use of her sails, that she was no longer to be seen by the *Shannon*. This was the last exploit Captain Porter performed in this his first cruise; and three days afterwards, namely, on the 7th of September, the *Essex*, "covered with glory," anchored in Delaware bay.

On the 28th of June, which was the day after the *Belvidera* had arrived at Halifax with the account of the unexpected attack made upon her by an American squadron, Vice-admiral

\* Clark's Naval History of the United States, vol. i. p. 180.

Sawyer despatched the 18-gun brig-sloop *Colibri*, Captain John Thompson, as a flag of truce to New-York, to obtain an explanation of the matter. On the 9th of July the *Colibri* anchored off Sandy-Hook, and on the 12th weighed and sailed on her return; having on board, besides a copy of the declaration of war, the British ambassador, Mr. Foster, and consul, Colonel Barclay. On the day previous to the arrival of the *Colibri* at Sandy-Hook, the British 4-gun schooner *Whiting*, Lieutenant Lewis Maxey, from Plymouth, with despatches for the American government, arrived in Hampton roads, ignorant of the war. As Lieutenant Maxey was proceeding on shore in his boat, the American privateer-schooner *Dash*, Captain Garroway, bound on a cruise, got possession of him, and then ran alongside the *Whiting*; and, having upwards of 80 men in crew, captured her, without opposition. The despatches had previously been sunk. The *Whiting* was only 75 tons, and mounted four caronades, 12-pounders, with a complement of 18 men and boys. Of these, a third were absent in the boat; and those in the schooner had not the least suspicion of being in an enemy's waters. The *Dash* mounted one heavy long gun upon a pivot carriage. This, and a suppression of the principal circumstances, enabled the American writers to state, with some degree of exultation, "The British schooner mounts four guns, the *Dash* only one." The *Whiting* was afterwards restored, but was captured on her way to England by the French privateer brig *Diligent*.

On the 17th the *Colibri* returned to Halifax; but, having in the mean time received positive intelligence that the United States had declared war, Rear-admiral Sawyer had, since the 5th, despatched to cruise off the American coast, under the orders of Captain Broke, all the effective ships which were then in the harbour, consisting of the *Shannon* and *Belvidera*, the 64-gun ship *Africa*, Captain John Bastard, and the 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Æolus*, Captain Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, in latitude  $41^{\circ}$ , longitude  $66^{\circ}$  or nearly abreast of Nantucket island, the squadron was joined by the 38-gun frigate *Guerrière*, Captain James Richard Dacres, then on her way to Halifax to refit.

When it is known, that the *Guerrière* had nearly expended, not only her water and provisions, but her boatswain's and carpenter's stores; that her gunner's stores were also deficient; that what remained of her powder, from damp and long keeping, was greatly reduced in strength; that her bowsprit was badly sprung, her mainmast, from having been struck by lightning, in a tottering state, and her hull, from age and length of service, scarcely seaworthy, no one will deny that this rencounter with a squadron, the commodore of which had orders to supply her with three months' provisions and take her under his command,

was rather unfortunate : in fact, such was the state of general decay in which the *Guerrière* at this time was, that, had the frigate gone into Portsmouth or Plymouth, she would, in all probability, have been disarmed and broken up.

On the 14th, when arrived off Sandy-Hook, Captain Broke received the first intelligence of the squadron of Commodore Rodgers having put to sea ; and, as may be supposed, a sharp look out began immediately to be kept by each of the British ships. On the 16th, at 3 P. M., when the British squadron was abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues off shore, a strange sail was seen, and immediately chased, in the south by east or windward quarter, standing to the north-east. This sail was the United States' 44-gun frigate *Constitution*, Captain Isaac Hull, from Chesapeake bay since the 12th, bound to New-York. The chase continued throughout the afternoon and evening, in light winds ; and at 10 P. M. the *Guerrière*, who since dusk had lost sight of her consorts to leeward, found the *Constitution* standing towards her, making signals. These two frigates continued to near each other, and at 3 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 17th were only half a mile apart ; when, observing on his lee beam two other frigates, the *Belvidera* and *Æolus*, and astern of them three more vessels, the *Shannon*, *Africa*, and a schooner, none of whom answered or appeared to understand his signals, Captain Dacres concluded that they were the squadron of Commodore Rodgers, and tacked. The consequence of this mistake was, that at daylight the *Guerrière* and *Constitution* were nearly two miles, instead of only half a mile, from each other.

At daylight it was quite calm. The *Constitution*, while she steered, kept her head to the southward. At this time the *Belvidera* was about four miles on her lee quarter, or bearing about north-east by north ; the *Guerrière* at some distance astern of the *Belvidera* ; the *Shannon* upon the latter's weather quarter, or about west-north-west, distant two miles ; and the *Æolus* at no great distance from the *Shannon*. The *Africa* was considerably astern of these two ships, and gradually losing ground in the chase. At 5 h. 30 m. A. M., the *Constitution* no longer steering, the boats were sent ahead to tow the ship's head to the southward. At the same time a 24-pounder was hoisted up from the main deck ; and that and the fore-castle 24-pounder were got aft to be used, along with the quarterdeck 24-pounder, as stern-chasers. The taffrail was then cut away, to give the three guns room, and two more 24-pounders were pointed through the stern ports on the main deck. At about 5 h. 45 m. the *Belvidera* and other British ships began towing with their boats. At 6 A. M. the *Constitution* got her head to the southward, and set up gallant studding-sail, and staysails. At 7 A. M., having a few minutes before sounded in 26 fathoms, Captain Hull, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Charles Morris, first of the ship,

got out a kedge, and began warping ahead. At 7 h. 30 m. the Constitution hoisted her colours, and fired one shot at the Belvidera.

At 9 A. M. a light air sprang up from the south-south-east, and the ships all trimmed sails on the larboard tack. The Belvidera gaining, the Constitution started a portion of her water, and threw overboard some of her booms. At 10 h. 30 m. the breeze freshened; but, in a few minutes, again subsided to nearly a calm. Observing the benefit that the Constitution had derived from warping, Captain Byron did the same; "bending all his hawsers to one another, and working two kedge anchors at the same time, by paying the warp through one hawse-hole as it was run in through another opposite."\* The effect of this was such, that the Belvidera, by 2 P. M., got near enough to exchange bow and stern chasers with the Constitution, but without effect on either side. At 3 P. M., a light breeze having sprung up, the Constitution rather gained, and the firing ceased. During the afternoon and night the chase continued, to the gradual advantage of the American frigate.

On the 18th, at daylight, the Constitution bore from the Belvidera south-west distant four miles, and the Shannon bore from the latter north-east distant six miles. At 4 h. A. M. the Belvidera tacked to the eastward, with a light air from the south by east; and at 4 h. 20 m. the Constitution did the same. At 9 A. M. an American merchant ship was seen bearing down towards the squadron: upon which the Belvidera, by way of a decoy, hoisted American colours. To counteract the effect of this ruse, the Constitution hoisted English colours, and the merchant vessel hauled off and escaped capture. At 4 P. M., owing to the permanency of the breeze, the Constitution was seven miles ahead, and at daylight on the 19th had attained double that distance. The British squadron persevered until about 8 h. 30 m. A. M.; then gave up the chase, and stood to the northward and eastward; latitude at noon the same day  $38^{\circ}$  north, and longitude  $71^{\circ} 20'$  west.

On the 29th of July, in latitude  $40^{\circ} 44'$ , longitude  $62^{\circ} 41'$ , Captain Broke fell in with the expected homeward-bound Jamaica fleet, consisting of about 60 sail, under convoy of the 38-gun frigate Thetis, Captain William Henry Byam; and on the 6th of August, having escorted it over the banks of Newfoundland, to about latitude  $43^{\circ} 20'$ , longitude  $50^{\circ}$ , he stood back towards the American coast. On this or the following day the Guerrière parted company for Halifax, to obtain that refit which could now no longer be postponed. Indeed, the ship was in a far less effective state than when she had joined the squadron, having sent away in prizes her third lieutenant (John Pullman), second lieutenant of marines, three midshipmen, and

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 627

24 of her best seamen ; thus leaving herself with only 250 men and 19 boys.

On the 19th of August, at 2 A. M., latitude, by her reckoning,  $40^{\circ} 20'$  north, longitude  $55^{\circ}$  west, standing by the wind on the starboard tack under easy sail, with her head about west-south-west, the *Guerrière* discovered a sail on her weather beam. This was the *Constitution* ; who, after her escape from the *Guerrière* and her consorts on the morning of the 19th of July, finding herself cut off from New-York, had proceeded to Boston ; where she arrived on the 26th. On the 2d of August Captain Hull again set sail, and stood to the eastward, in the hope of falling in with the British 38-gun frigate *Spartan*, Captain Edward Pelham Brenton, reported to be cruising in that direction. Having run along the coast as far as the bay of Fundy without discovering the object of her pursuit, the *Constitution* proceeded off Halifax and Cape Sable, and then steered to the eastward in the direction of Newfoundland. Passing close to the isle of Sable, the American frigate took a station off the gulf of St.-Lawrence, near Cape Race, for the purpose of intercepting vessels bound to, or from Quebec and New-Brunswick. On the 15th Captain Hull captured, and on account of their small value burnt, two merchant brigs and a bark ; and on the 17th recaptured from the British ship-sloop *Avenger*, the American brig *Adeline*, on board of which he placed a prize-master and six or seven men, to take her to Boston. Having received intelligence that the squadron which, by a display of so much skill and perseverance, the *Constitution* had already once evaded, was off the Grand Bank, Captain Hull changed his cruising ground, and stood to the southward. On the 18th, at midnight, an American privateer gave information, that she had the day before seen a British ship of war to the southward. The *Constitution* immediately made sail in that direction ; and, in the course of a few hours, Captain Hull found he had not been misinformed.

The *Guerrière*, when she arrived on the North-American station, was armed the same as the other frigates of her class, with 46 guns, including 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines on her quarterdeck and forecastle. Like most French ships, the *Guerrière* sailed very much by the head ; and, to assist in giving her that trim, as well as to obviate the inconvenience of a round-house which intervened between the foremost and bridle ports on each side, and prevented the gun stationed at the former port from being shifted to the latter when required to be used in chase, two additional 18-pounders, as standing bow-chase guns, were taken on board at Halifax ; thus giving the *Guerrière* 48 guns, including 30 long 18-pounders on the main deck. The main fact, that, for any use they could be in either broadside, these bow guns might as well have been in the hold, is not the principal point cleared up by the explanation. Those who are aware, that no frigate in the British navy, except the *Acasta* and



Lavinia, and none at all belonging to the French navy, mounts as her establishment 30 long 18-pounders on the main deck, would have a right to consider the *Guerrière* as a frigate of a superior class and description; and so, for that very reason, is she still generally considered, as well on this as on the opposite side of the Atlantic. We are surprised that neither of our contemporaries, both of whom have given proofs that the first edition of this work has been occasionally consulted by them, has thought it worth his while to point out so important a peculiarity in the *Guerrière's* armament.\*

We have already, at some length, shown how particular the Americans were in manning their ships; and how easy, having so few ships to man, it was to supply them with picked crews. For many years previous to the war, America had been decoying the men from British ships, by every artful stratagem. No ship, that anchored in her waters, could send a boat on shore, without having the crew assailed by a recruiting party from some American frigate fitting in the vicinity. Many British seamen had also entered on board American merchant vessels; and the numerous non-intercourse and embargo bills, in existence at different periods during the four years preceding the war, threw many merchant sailors out of employment. So that the captains of the American frigates, when preparing for active warfare, had to pick their complements from a numerous body of seamen. Highly to the credit of the naval administration of the United States, the crews of their ships were taught the practical rules of gunnery; and 10 shot, with the necessary powder, were allowed to be expended in play, to make one hit in earnest.

Very distinct from the American seaman, so called, were the American marines. They were chiefly made up of natives of the country; and a deserter from the British would here have been no acquisition. In the United States, every man may hunt or shoot among the wild animals of the forest. The young peasant, or back-woodman, carries a rifled-barrel gun, the moment he can lift one to his shoulder; and woe to the duck or deer that attempts to pass him, within fair range of his piece. To collect these expert marksmen, when of a proper age, officers were sent into the western parts of the Union; and, to embody and finish drilling them, a marine-barrack was established near Washington: from which dépôt the American ships were regularly supplied.

With respect to a British ship of war, her case was widely different. Although the captain was eased of much of his trouble, by having, in proportion to the size and mounted force of his ship, a considerably smaller crew to collect, by having about one-twentieth part of that crew to form of boys and widows' men, or

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 52. Marshall, vol. ii., p. 974, note.

men of straw, and by being permitted to enter a large proportion of landsmen, a rating unknown on board an American ship of war; still was the small remainder most difficult to be procured, even with all the latitude allowed in respect to age, size, and nautical experience. Sometimes when a captain, by dint of extraordinary exertions, had provided himself with a crew, such as a man of war's crew ought to be, the admiral on the station to which he belonged would pronounce the ship "too-well manned," and order a proportion of her best men to be draughted on board the flag-ship at her moorings, to learn to be idle and worthless: sending, in lieu of them, a parcel of jail-birds and raw hands, to make those among whom they were going nearly as bad as themselves.

There was another point in which the generality of British crews, as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient; skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamen were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some ships could be named, on board of which not a shot had been fired in this way for upwards of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's: the instructions, under which he was bound to act, forbade him to use, during the first six months after the ship had received her armament, more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of her upperdeck guns; and, after those six months had expired, he was to use only half the quantity. Considering by this, either that the lords of the admiralty discouraged firing at marks as a lavish expenditure of powder and shot, or that the limits they had thus set to the exercise of that branch of naval discipline destroyed its practical utility, many captains never put a shot in the guns until an enemy appeared: they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails, and in decorating the ship. Others, again, caring little about an order that placed their professional characters in jeopardy, exercised the crew, repeatedly in firing at marks; leaving the gunner to account, in the best manner he could, for the deficiency in his stores. As the generality of French crews were equally inexperienced with their British opponents, the unskilfulness of the latter in gunnery was not felt or remarked: we shall now have to adduce some instances, in quick succession, that will clearly show, how much the British navy at length suffered, by having relaxed in its attention to that most essential point in the business of war, the proper use of the weapons by which it was to be waged.

That our opinion on this subject is in perfect accordance with what was the opinion of a British officer of the first rank and distinction, will appear by the following quotation from the work of a contemporary: "The Earl of St.-Vincent," says Captain Brenton, "in a letter to the author in 1813, thus expresses himself, 'I hear the exercise of the great gun is laid aside, and is

succeeded by a foolish frippery and useless ornament.' How far this may have been the case," proceeds Captain B., "in the Mediterranean, or East or West Indies, with ships of the line, we shall not say; but certainly on the coast of North America it was not so, the ships on that station being kept constantly in exercise under the daily expectation of a war."\* Notwithstanding this to us wholly unexpected dissent on the part of Captain Brenton from an opinion given by Earl St.-Vincent, we shall consider the latter to be the highest authority on the subject; especially as the former, in including the Mediterranean among the stations on which ships of the line were neglected to be exercised, has overlooked the very strict and commendable attention paid to that important branch of discipline by Vice-admiral Sir Edward Pellew.

We have already given the best account, which the imperfect state of the American records has enabled us to give, of the construction, size, and established armament of the three American 44-gun frigates. We have now to notice a slight alteration, that was afterwards made in the armament of the Constitution. In the summer of 1811, when that frigate was fitting for sea at Norfolk, Virginia, Captain Hull considered that her upperworks would not strain so much as they had been found to do, if her 42-pounder carronades were exchanged for 32s. This he got effected; and on or about the 31st of July the Constitution sailed for Cherbourg, with those guns and a reduced crew of 380 men on board. On the 6th or 7th of September the Constitution reached her destination, and in a month or two afterwards returned to her anchorage at Norfolk.

Having discovered that 380 men, even in peaceable times, were not enough for so large and heavily rigged a ship as the Constitution, Captain Hull, during his stay in the Chesapeake, enlisted as many more as restored his complement to 476. But, finding probably that the removal of six tons from the Constitution's upper battery afforded the ship great relief in a heavy sea, Captain Hull did not take back his 42-pounders. He contrived, however, to reduce the inequality of force, by opening a port in the centre of the gangway for one of the two 24-pounders on the upper deck; or rather, as to be precise we should designate them, the two English long 18-pounders (battery-guns, we believe), bored to carry a 24-pound shot. We formerly noticed the extraordinary size and weight of the Constitution's main-deck 24-pounders. It appears that the guns were mounted on very high carriages, which the height of the deck, represented to the water's edge, described as the lowest ship of the three. This goes far to reconcile the statement we

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 44.

have often heard made, that the Constitution's maindeck battery was upwards of 10 feet from the water; a height which, at a long distance, gave her a decided advantage in the range.

It is a remarkable fact, that no one act of the little navy of the United States had been at all calculated to gain the respect of the British. First, was seen the Chesapeake allowing herself to be beaten, with impunity, by a British ship only nominally superior to her. Then the huge frigate President attacks, and fights for upwards of half an hour, the British sloop Little-Belt. And, even since the war, the same President, at the head of a squadron, makes a bungling business of chasing the Belvidera. While, therefore, a feeling towards America, bordering on contempt, had unhappily possessed the mind of the British naval officer, rendering him more than usually careless and opiniative, the American naval officer, having been taught to regard his new foe with a portion of dread, sailed forth to meet him, with the whole of his energies roused. A moment's reflection taught him, that the honour of his country was now in his hands; and what, in the breast of man, could be a stronger incitement to extraordinary exertions? Thus situated were the navies of the two countries, when, with damaged masts, a reduced complement, and in absolute need of that thorough refit, for which she was then, after a very long cruise, speeding to Halifax, the Guerrière encountered the Constitution, 17 days only from port, manned with a full complement, and in all respects fitted for war.

It was, as we have already stated, about 2 P. M. that the Guerrière, standing by the wind on the starboard tack, under topsails, foresail, jib, and spanker, with the wind blowing fresh from the north-west, discovered the Constitution bearing down towards her. At 3 P. M. each ship made out the other to be an enemy's man of war; and at 3 h. 30 m. each discovered, with tolerable precision, the force that was about to be opposed to her. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. the Guerrière laid her main topsail to the mast, to enable the Constitution the more quickly to close. The latter, then about three miles distant, shortened sail to double-reefed topsails, and went to quarters. At 4 h. 45 m. P. M. the Guerrière hoisted one English ensign at the peak, another at the mizen topgallantmast-head, and a union jack at the fore; and, at 4 h. 50 m. P. M. \* opened her starboard broadside at the Constitution. The Guerrière then "filled, wore, and, on coming round on the larboard tack, fired her larboard guns, "her shot," says Captain Hull, "falling shot;" a proof, either that the Guerrière's people knew not the range of their guns, or that the powder they were using was of an inferior quality: both causes, indeed, might have co-operated in producing the discreditable result.

\* In noticing the time, we shall generally, as on former occasions, take the mean of the two statements.

At 5 h. 5 m. P. M., having run up one American ensign at the peak, lashed another to the larboard mizen rigging, and hoisted a third flag at the fore topgallantmast-head, the Constitution opened her fire; and, it is believed, none of her shot fell short. To avoid being raked, the *Guerrière* wore three or four times; and continued discharging her alternate broadsides, with about as little effect, owing to her constant change of position and the necessary alteration in the level of her guns, as when her shot fell short. After the Constitution had amused herself in this way for half an hour, she set her main topgallantsail, and in five minutes, or at about 5 h. 45 m. P. M.,\* brought the *Guerrière* to close action on the larboard† beam; both ships steering with the wind on the larboard quarter. At 6 h. 5 m. P. M. a 24-pound shot struck the *Guerrière*'s mizenmast and carried it away by the board. It fell over the starboard quarter, knocked a large hole in the counter, and, by dragging in the water, brought the ship up in the wind, although her helm was kept hard a-port. By this accident to her opponent, who had then sustained only a very slight loss, the Constitution would have ranged ahead; but, bearing up, she quickly placed herself in an admirable position on the *Guerrière*'s larboard bow. Now the American riflemen in the Constitution's tops had an opportunity of co-operating with their friends on deck; and a sweeping and most destructive fire of great guns and small-arms was opened upon the British frigate, whose bow guns were all she could bring to bear in return.


At 6 h. 15 m. P. M. the two ships fell on board each other, the *Guerrière*'s bowsprit getting foul of the Constitution's starboard mizen rigging. The crew of the latter now prepared to board the *Guerrière*; but, in addition to the impracticability of the attempt owing to the motion of the ships, a slight pause was created by the fall of some of the American leaders: a shot from a British marine brought down the first lieutenant of marines while leading forward his party; another well-directed musket-shot passed through the body of the first lieutenant of the ship while at the head of the boarding seamen; and a third shot entered the shoulder of the master, as he was standing near Lieutenant Morris. The riflemen in the Constitution's tops, in the mean time, continued their unerring fire. Among those who suffered on the occasion was Captain Dacres himself, by a ball fired from the enemy's mizen top, which inflicted a severe wound in his back, while he was standing on the starboard fore-castle hammocks animating his crew. Although suffering greatly, he would not quit the deck. At about the same moment the master was shot through the knee, and a master's mate, Samuel

\* See diagram at p. 100.

† "Starboard," by mistake, in the gazette account.

Grant, was wounded very severely. In a few minutes the two ships got clear. Having disentangled her bowsprit from her opponent's mizen rigging, the *Guerrière* now came to a little, and was enabled to bring a few of her foremost guns on the starboard side to bear. Some of the wads from these set fire to the *Constitution's* cabin, but the flames were soon extinguished. The *Guerrière's* "bowsprit, at that moment striking the taffrail of the *Constitution*, slacked the fore stay of the *Guerrière*, and, the fore shrouds on the larboard or weather side being mostly shot away, the mast fell over on the starboard side, crossing the main stay: the sudden jerk carried the mainmast along with it, leaving the *Guerrière* a defenceless wreck, rolling her maindeck guns in the water."\*

At about 6 h. 23 m.† the *Constitution* ranged ahead; and the *Guerrière* soon began clearing away the wreck of her masts, to be ready to renew the action. Just, however, as she had succeeded in doing so, her spritsail yard, upon which she had set a sail to endeavour to get before the wind, was carried away. The *Guerrière* now lay an unmanageable hulk in the trough of the sea, rolling her maindeck guns under water: to secure which required increased efforts, the rotten state of the breechings, as well as of the timber-heads through which the long-bolts passed, having caused many of them to break loose. While the British frigate was in this state, the *Constitution*, at 6 h. 45 m. p. m., having rove new braces, wore round and took a position, within pistol-shot on her starboard quarter. It being utterly in vain to contend any longer, the *Guerrière* fired a lee gun, and hauled down the union jack from the stump of her mizenmast. The following diagram will show the progress of this action, from the time the two ships closed to the moment of the *Guerrière's* surrender.



Much to his credit, the moment the *Constitution* hoisted her colours, Captain Dacres ordered seven Americans, that belonged to his reduced crew, to go below: one accidentally remained at

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 51.

† See diagram.

his gun, the remainder went where they had been ordered. This just left 244 men and 19 boys. Out of this number, the *Guerrière* had her second lieutenant (Henry Ready), 11 seamen, and three marines killed, her captain (severely), first lieutenant (Bartholomew Kent, slightly), master (Robert Scott), two master's mates (Samuel Grant and William John Snow), one midshipman (James Enslie), 43 seamen, 13 marines, and one boy wounded; total, 15 killed and 63 wounded, six of the latter mortally, 39 severely, and 18 slightly. Out of her 468 men and boys, the *Constitution*, according to Captain Hull's statement, had one lieutenant of marines (William S. Bush) and six seamen killed, her first lieutenant (Charles Morris, dangerously), master (John C. Alwyn, slightly), four seamen (three of them dangerously), and one marine wounded; total, seven killed and seven wounded. But several of the *Guerrière's* officers counted 13 wounded; of whom three died after amputation. An equal number of killed and wounded, as stated in the American return, scarcely ever occurs, except in cases of explosion. In the British service, every wounded man, although merely scratched, reports himself to the surgeon, that he may get his smart-money, a pecuniary allowance so named. No such regulation exists in the American service; consequently, the return of loss sustained in action by an American ship, as far as respects the wounded at least, is made subservient to the views of the commander and his government.

Although Captain Hull does not give his prize any guns at all, no other American account gives the *Guerrière* less than 49 guns. It is true that, besides the 48 guns already specified, the ship had an 18-pounder launch carronade, mounted upon the usual elevating carriage for firing at the tops; but the priming iron, when put into the touch-hole just before the action commenced, broke short off and spiked the gun. In this state it was found by the captors. Consequently, as the two bow 18-pounders were equally useless, the *Guerrière*, out of her 49 guns, could employ in broadside only 23. We have already shown that the American 44-gun frigate, without making any use of her concealed gangway ports, could present 28 carriage-guns in broadside; but the *Constitution* could, and did, as we now verily believe, present one gun more.\* Of the fact of one of her two upperdeck 24-pounders being stationed on the forecastle and the other on the quarterdeck, we have not a doubt, from the following entry in the log of the *Constitution* when she was pursued by the British off New York, and was about to open a fire from her stern-chasers. "Got the forecastle gun aft." But the disparity in her action with the *Guerrière* is sufficiently great without adding this gun to the *Constitution's* broadside:

\* See p. 97.

we shall therefore, as in common cases, take no more than half the mounted number.

As it would be not only unjust, but absurd, to compare together the totals of two crews of men and boys, in a case where each opponent uses the latter in so very different a proportion as the British and the Americans, we shall, making an ample allowance for those in the American crew, exclude the boys altogether from the estimate.

This action affords a strong practical proof of the advantages possessed by a large and lofty ship. While the main deck of the *Guerrière* was all afloat with the roughness of the sea, the *Constitution's* main deck was perfectly dry. If that was the case before the fall of the *Guerrière's* masts had destroyed her stability, what must it have been afterwards? It is thus consideration that renders the tonnage so important an item in any statement of comparative force. The relative scantling is another essential point, for which the one-third disparity in size between these figures will partly allow. By an unfortunate typographical (as we take it) error, Captain Brenton represents the *Constitution* as "an American frigate of the same force as the *President*, though inferior (superior) as to scantling."\* Now, the extraordinary thickness and solidity of the *Constitution's* sides had long obtained her, among the people who best knew her, the name of "Old Ironsides." We have already shown that the *President*, an acknowledged lighter ship, possessed stouter sides than a British 74: we may therefore consider, that the top-sides of the *Constitution* were at least equal in thickness to the topsides of a British 80.

With respect to the advantages of stout scantling, we are willing to take the opinion of the Americans themselves. A letter from Mr. Paul Hamilton, the secretary of the American navy, written a few months after the *Guerrière's* capture, and addressed to the "Chairman of the naval committee of the house of representatives," contains the following paragraph: "A 76 is built of heavier timber, is intrinsically much stronger than a frigate in all her works, and can sustain battering much longer, and with less injury. A shot, which would sink a frigate, might be received by a 76 with but little injury: it might pass between wind and water through a frigate, when it would stick in the frame of a 76." Nor is this merely the opinion of Mr. Secretary Hamilton: it is the result of "a very valuable communication received from Charles Stewart, Esquire, a captain in the navy of the United States, an officer of great observation, distinguished talents, and very extensive professional experience; in whose opinion," adds Mr. H., "I believe all the most enlightened officers in our service concur." By a singular coincidence too, subjoined to this highly complimented officer's

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 49.



communication to Mr. Hamilton, are the signatures of Captain Hull and his first lieutenant to a brief but comprehensive sentence of approval: "We agree with Captain Stewart in the above statement, in all its parts."\*

We have before remarked upon the great care and expense bestowed by the Americans in equipping their few ships of war. As one important instance may be adduced, the substitution of fine sheet-lead for cartridges, instead of flannel or paper. This gives a decided advantage in action, an advantage almost equal to one gun in three; for, as a sheet-lead cartridge will hardly ever leave a particle of itself behind, there is no necessity to 'sponge the gun, and very seldom any to worm it: operations that, with paper or flannel cartridges, must be attended to every time the gun is fired. The advantage of quick firing, no one can dispute; any more than, from the explanation just given, the facility with which it can be practised by means of the sheet-lead cartridge. The principal objection against the use of this kind of cartridge in the British navy is its expense: another may be, that it causes the powder to get damp. The last objection is obviated by filling no more cartridges than will serve for present use; and, should more be wanted, the Americans have always spare hands enough to fill them.

Although, in the American accounts of actions, no other description of cannon-shot is ever named as used on board their ships, than "round and grape," it is now so well known as scarcely to need repetition, that the Americans were greatly indebted, for their success over the British, to a practice of discharging, in the first two or three broadsides, chain, bar, and every other species of dismantling shot, in order to cut away the enemy's rigging, and facilitate the fall of his masts. As an additional means of clearing the decks of British ships of the (seldom over numerous) men upon them, the carronades when close action commenced, were filled with jagged pieces of iron and copper, rusty nails, and other "langridge" of that description. Of the riflemen in the tops we have already spoken; but even the remaining musketry-men of the crew were provided in a novel and murderous manner: every cartridge they fired contained three or four buck-shot, it being rightly judged, that a buck-shot, well placed, would send a man from his quarters as well as the heaviest ball in use. We mention these circumstances, not to dwell, for a moment, upon their unfairness, but merely to show the extraordinary means to which the Americans resorted, for the purpose of enabling them to cope with the British at sea. Now, then, for the

\* Clark's Naval History, vol. ii., pp. 236, 246.

## COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		GUERRIERE.	CONSTITUTION.
Broadside-guns . . .	No.	24	28
	lbs.	517	768
Crew (men only) . . .	No.	244	460
Size . . . . .	tons	1092	1533

Even this statement, with the one-third disparity in guns, and nearly two-fold disparity in men, which it exhibits, will not convey a clear idea of the real inequality of force that existed between the *Guerrière* and *Constitution*, without allowance is made for the ineffective state in which the former commenced the action. There is one circumstance, also, which has greatly contributed to mislead the judgment of the public in deciding upon the merits of this and its succeeding fellow-actions: a belief, grounded on the official accounts, that British frigates, of the *Guerrière's* class, had frequently captured French frigates, carrying 24-pounders on the main deck. But, in truth, the *Forte* is the only 24-pounder French frigate captured by a British 38-gun frigate; and the *Forte*, in point of force and readiness for action, was not to be compared with the *Constitution*.\* That even French 18-pounder frigates were not, in common cases, captured by British frigates of the same class, without some hard fighting, and a good deal of blood spilt on both sides, these pages afford many proofs. Upon the whole, therefore, no reasonable man can now be surprised at the result of the action between the *Guerrière* and *Constitution*. Nor was there in the conduct of the *Guerrière*, throughout the engagement, any thing that could militate, in the slightest degree, against the long-maintained character of British seamen. With respect to Captain Dacres, he evinced a great share of personal bravery on the trying occasion; and we confess ourselves to have been among the number of those who did not recollect that, although the *Guerrière* had made herself very obnoxious to the Americans, it was before Captain Dacres was appointed to her.

The chief cause of quarrel between the Americans and the *Guerrière* undoubtedly arose while Captain Pechell commanded her; but still it was the same ship, or, to those who doubted that fact, a ship of the same name, which Captain Hull had captured. Most desirable, therefore, would the *Guerrière* have been as a trophy; but the shattered state of her hull precluded the possibility of getting the ship into port. At daylight, on the day succeeding the action, the American prize-master hailed the *Constitution*, to say that the *Guerrière* had four feet water in the hold, and was in a sinking condition. Quickly the prisoners were removed out of her; and at 3 h. 30 m. P. M. having been set on fire by Captain Hull's order, the *Guerrière* blew up.

\* See vol. ii., p. 232.

Having by the evening repaired her principal damages, including a few wounds in each of her three masts, the Constitution made sail from the spot of her achievement, and on the 30th anchored in the harbour of Boston. As may well be conceived, Captain Hull and his officers and crew were greeted with applause by their native and adopted countrymen. He and they also received, at a subsequent day, the thanks of the government, accompanied by a present of 50,000 dollars.

It is a singular fact, that in the letter published in the "National Intelligencer," as that transmitted by Captain Hull to his government, not a word appears respecting the force of the ship which the Constitution had captured. Captain Hull's letter is in this respect an anomaly of the kind. Perhaps, as the American newspapers had frequently stated, that the Constitution mounted 56 guns, and as dead ships, like dead men, "tell no tales," Captain Hull thought it better to leave his friends and countrymen to form their opinion, relative to the force and size of his prize, out of the following sentence: "So fine a ship as the Guerrière, commanded by an able and experienced officer." If Captain Hull did practise this ruse (and the men of Connecticut are proverbially shrewd), the effect, as we shall presently see, must almost have exceeded his hopes.

When the British says to an American officer, "Our frigates and yours are not a match," the latter very properly replies: "You did not think so once." But what does this amount to? Admitting that the force of the American 44-gun frigate was fully known before the Guerrière's action, but which was only partially the case; and admitting that the British 38-gun frigate was considered able to fight her, all that can be said is, that many, who once thought otherwise, are now convinced, that an American and a British ship, in relative force as three to two, are not equally matched. The facts are the same: it is the opinion only that has changed. Man the Constitution with 470 Turks or Algerines; and even then she would hardly be pronounced, now that her force is known, a match for the Guerrière. The truth is, the name "frigate" had imposed upon the public; and to that, and that only, must be attributed the angry repinings of many of the British journalists at the capture of the Guerrière. They, sitting safe at their desks, would have sent her and every soul on board to the bottom, with colours flying, because her antagonist was "a frigate;" whereas, had the Constitution been called "a 50-gun ship," a defence only half as honourable as the Guerrière's would have gained for her officers and crew universal applause.

Captain Hull, and the officers and men of the Constitution, deserve much credit for what they did do; first, for attacking a British frigate at all, and next, for conquering one a third inferior in force. It was not for them to reject the reward presented by the "Senate and house of representatives of the United States,"

because it expressed to be, for capturing a frigate (now for the effect of Captain Hull's "fine ship *Guerrière*"), "mounting 54 carriage-guns," instead of, with two standing bow-chasers and a boat-carronade included, 49. Smiling in their sleeves at the credulity of the donors, the captain and his people, without disputing the terms, pocketed the dollars. But is a writer, who stands pledged to deal impartially between nation and nation, to forbear exposing this trickery, because it may suit the Americans to invent any falsehoods, no matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant character upon themselves?

The author of the American "Naval History," Mr. Clark, remarks thus upon the *Guerrière's* capture: "It has manifested the genuine worth of the American tar, and that the vigorous co-operation of the country is all he requires, to enable him to meet, even under disadvantageous circumstances, and to derive glory from the encounter, with the naval heroes of a nation which has so long ruled the waves."\* But was it really "American tars" that conquered the *Guerrière*? Let us investigate, as far as we are able, this loudly-asserted claim. Our contemporary says, "It appeared in evidence on the court-martial, that there were many Englishmen on board the *Constitution*, and these were leading men, or captains of guns. The officers of the *Guerrière* knew some of them personally, and one man in particular, who had been captain of the fore-castle in the *Eurydice*, a British frigate, then recently come from England. Another was in the *Achille* at Trafalgar; and the third lieutenant of the *Constitution*, whose name was Reed, was an Irishman. It was said, and we have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were 200 British seamen on board the *Constitution* when she began the action."† One fellow, who after the action was sitting under the half-deck busily employed in making buck-shot cartridges to mangle his honourable countrymen, had served under Mr. Kent the first lieutenant. He now went by a new name; but, on seeing his old commanding officer standing before him, a glow of shame overspread his countenance.

In the latter end of the year 1816 a work issued from the Washington press, entitled "A register of officers and agents, civil, military and naval, in the service of the United States, &c." "Prepared at the Department of State, by a resolution of congress." Affixed to the list of names in this official document, is one column headed, "State or country where born." Turning to this column in the "Navy department," we find that, out of the 32 captains, one only, "Thomas Tingey," has "England" marked as his birthplace. There was another, we know; but he had died about a twelvemonth before, Captain Smith of the *Congress*. Three blanks occur; and we consider it rather

\* Clark's Naval History of the United States, vol. i., p. 174.

† Brenton, vol. v., p. 54.

creditable to captains "John Shaw," "Daniel T. Patterson," and "John Orde Creighton," that they were ashamed to tell where they were born. Of the 22 masters commandant, one only appears to have been born out of the United States, and that is "George C. Read," of "Ireland;" the same, no doubt, mentioned by Captain Brenton, as the third lieutenant of the Constitution in August, 1812. Of the 160 lieutenants, there appear to be only five born out of the United States; of which five, "Walter Stewart," "William Finch," and "Benjamin Page, jun." are stated to be of "England," and "James Ramage," of "Ireland." To 17 names, all English and Irish, appears no birthplace. We shall pass over the surgeons, their mates, the pursers, chaplains, and midshipmen; among whom we find, besides a few blanks, only eight of England and Ireland. As we descend in the list, the blanks in the column of "Country where born" increase surprisingly. Now, as the native American seaman usually carries about him his certificate of citizenship; and, as scarcely any man is to be found who, if he can speak at all, cannot answer the question, "Where were you born?" we must consider that the birthplace is purposely omitted, because, being a native of Great Britain or Ireland, and probably a deserter from the British navy, the fellow is ashamed or afraid to avow it. Hence, out of the 83 sailing masters, we find eight born in England, Scotland, Ireland, and Bermuda, and 15 without any birthplace assigned to them. Among the 20 boatswains, one is stated to have been born in England, four in the United States, and the rest nowhere. Of the 25 gunners, three appear to have been born in the United States, one in Germany, another in Portugal, and the remaining four fifths in some nameless country. Of the 18 carpenters, 11 sail-makers, and four master's mates, 33 in all, five only have been able or willing to enable the Washington state-clerk to fill up the important blank.

Can any one, after the analysis we have given of this curious American state-document, entertain a doubt that, during the late war between Great Britain and the United States, one third in number, and nearly one half in point of effectiveness, of the seamen that fought in the ships of the latter were bred on the soil, and educated in the ships, of the former? This may appear very discreditable to British seamen, considered as a body; but it should be recollected, that the total of the seamen belonging to the American ships of war formed only a small portion of those employed in the British navy. Moreover, a large proportion of the deserters and renegades, that entered the service of the United States, were Irish Roman catholics. It is for this reason, that an American captain can sometimes assert, with no great degree of untruth, that he has few "Englishmen" among his crew.

There were, it appears, on board the Constitution, so many

men whom the crew of the *Guerrière* considered as their countrymen, so many who felt, as well they might feel, some degree of compunction at their fallen state, that Captain Hull was afraid the two bodies united would overpower him and his Americans, and carry the *Constitution* to Halifax. He very naturally, and very properly, we think, "kept his prisoners manacled and chained to the deck during the night, and the greater part of the day."\* One reason for doing this, might be to render more alluring the offer of liberty made to those who would turn traitors. Being perfectly aware, that all the British whom they could persuade to enter, would fight in the most desperate manner rather than be taken and turned over to their certain and merited fate, Captain Hull and his officers, as well while the *Constitution* was steering for Boston, as after she had arrived there, used every art to inveigle the late *Guerrière's* crew to enlist in the American service. Eight Englishmen, however, were all that remained in the United States; and only two of those entered on board the *Constitution*.

On the 2d of the succeeding October, a court-martial assembled on board the *Africa* 64, Halifax harbour, to try the captain, officers, and late crew of the *Guerrière*; when, as may be anticipated from the details already given, the following sentence of acquittal was pronounced: "Having attended to the whole of the evidence, and also to the defence of Captain Dacres, the court agreed, that the surrender of the *Guerrière* was proper, in order to preserve the lives of her valuable remaining crew; and that her being in that lamentable situation was from the accident of her masts going, which was occasioned more by their defective state than from the fire of the enemy, though so greatly superior in guns and men. The court do, therefore, unanimously and honourably acquit the said Captain Dacres, the officers and crew, of his majesty's late ship the *Guerrière*, and they are hereby honourably acquitted according. The court, at the same time, feel themselves called upon to express the high sense they entertain of the conduct of the ship's company in general, when prisoners, but more particularly of those who withstood the attempts made to shake their loyalty, by offering them high bribes to enter into the land and sea service of the enemy, and they will represent their merit to the commander-in-chief."

In his official letter, dated at Boston, September 7, Captain Dacres compliments Captain Hull and his officers, for their treatment of his men, "the greatest care being taken to prevent them losing the smallest trifle." But, considering perhaps that, in an enemy's country, it would be unwise to commit complaints to the chance of leading to further oppression, Captain Dacres remained silent about the attempts to inveigle his crew, until he addressed the members of his court-martial at Halifax. The

concluding passage of that address is in the following words: "Notwithstanding the unlucky issue of this affair, such confidence have I in the exertions of the officers and men who belonged to the *Guerrière*; and I am so well aware that the success of my opponent was owing to fortune, that it is my earnest wish, and would be the happiest period of my life, to be once more opposed to the Constitution, with them under my command, in a frigate of similar force to the *Guerrière*."

That the captain of the *Guerrière* should have expressed such an opinion on such an occasion is allowable enough; but we are surprised to find that opinion seconded by the captain of the *Spartan*, a frigate of the same force as the *Guerrière*, a frigate which the Constitution herself had just come from seeking when she fell in with the latter. "Thus far," says Captain Brenton, "the two ships had fought with an equal chance of success, when the day was decided by one of those accidents to which ships of war are ever liable, and which can be rarely guarded against."\* He then describes the fall of the *Guerrière*'s mizenmast. We are stopped, however, in the comments we were going to make, by observing, at the conclusion of the account of the *Guerrière*'s capture, the following paragraph, whether in confirmation or contradiction of the former passage, let others decide: "The inference is erroneous (that our navy was declining and our officers and men deficient in their duty), founded on a supposition, that, if two ships happen to be called frigates, the lesser one, being manned and commanded by Englishmen, ought to take the greater, though a ship very nearly double her force, in size, guns, and men: we need scarcely enter into any argument to prove the fallacy of such an expectation."\*

On the 12th of September the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Frolic*, Captain Thomas Whinyates, quitted the bay of Honduras, with about 14 sail of merchantmen under convoy, for England. On arriving off Havana, the master of a Guernsey ship informed Captain Whinyates of the war with America, and of the *Guerrière*'s capture. Having been five years in the West Indies, and being very sickly in her crew, the *Frolic* was by no means in a fit state to encounter an enemy's vessel of a similar class to herself. However, there was no alternative; and the brig proceeded on her voyage along the coast of the United States.

On the night of the 16th of October, in latitude 36° north, longitude 64° west, a violent gale of wind came on, which separated the *Frolic* from her convoy, carried away her main yard, sprung the main topmast, and tore both topsails to pieces. By dark on the evening of the 17th, six of the missing ships had joined; and on the 18th, at daybreak, while the *Frolic*, in a very turbulent sea, was repairing her damages, a sail hove in sight to windward, which was at first taken for one of the convoy. But

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 50.

† Ibid., p. 54.

the near approach of the stranger, and her not answering signals, soon marked her for an enemy: whereupon, removing her main yard from off the casks and lashing it to the deck, the Frolic hauled to the wind under her boom mainsail, and (her fore topmast having been sprung previously to the gale) a close-reefed fore topsail, in order to let her convoy pass sufficiently ahead to be out of danger.

At a few minutes before 11 A.M., apprehensive that the strange ship of war might pursue the merchantmen instead of himself, Captain Whinyates hoisted Spanish colours as a decoy; having two days before passed a convoy under the protection of a Spanish armed brig, and which convoy, it was imagined that the strange vessel might also have seen. The latter, which was the United States' 18-gun ship-sloop Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, five days only from the Delaware, immediately hoisted her colours, and bore down for the Frolic, then awaiting her approach on the larboard tack. On arriving within 60 yards of the Frolic, the Wasp hailed: whereupon, quickly exchanging her colours to British, the brig opened a fire of great guns and musketry. This was instantly returned by the Wasp; and, as the latter dropped nearer to her antagonist, the action became close and spirited. In less than five minutes after she had commenced firing, the Frolic shot away the Wasp's main topmast; and, in two or three minutes more, the latter's gaff and mizen topgallantmast also came down. The sea was so rough, that the muzzles of the guns of both vessels were frequently under water. Still the cannonade continued, with mutual spirit; the Americans firing, as the engaged side of their ship was going down, the British, when their engaged side was rising. The consequence was, that almost every shot fired by the Wasp took effect in her opponents hull; while most of the Frolic's shot passed among the rigging or over the masts of the Wasp.

Being in a very light state from a deficiency of stores, and being unable, on account of the sprung state of her topmasts and the want of a main yard, to steady herself by carrying sail, the Frolic laboured much more than the Wasp, and experienced, in consequence, greater difficulty in pointing her guns with precision. In a minute or two after the Wasp's main topmast had come down, the Frolic's gaff head-braces were shot away. Having now no sail whatever upon the mainmast, the brig had lost the means of preventing the Wasp from taking a position on her larboard bow. A ship would not have been so circumstanced, even had she lost her mizenmast by the board; as she could still have set a trysail upon her mainmast.

Thus, in less than 10 minutes after the action had commenced, chiefly by her previous inability to carry sail, the Frolic lay an unmanageable hulk upon the water, exposed to the whole raking fire of her antagonist, without the possibility of returning it with more than one of her bow guns. The Wasp continued pouring



in broadside after broadside, until, believing that he had so thinned the deck of the British brig, that no opposition could be offered, Captain Jones determined to board and end the contest. The Wasp accordingly wore, and, running down upon the Frolic, soon brought the latter's jib-boom between her fore and main rigging, and two of her own carronades in a direction with the bow ports of her defenceless antagonist. Having so fine an opportunity of further diminishing the strength of his opponent, Captain Jones would not board until a raking fire was poured in: it was poured in, and swept the whole range of the Frolic's deck.

A British seaman belonging to the Wasp, named Jack Lang, was now about to spring on the brig's bowsprit and put a stop to the carnage; but Captain Jones, observing that some one yet lived on the Frolic's deck, pulled him back, and ordered another broadside to be fired. At length, when the action altogether had lasted 43 minutes, and when the American ship had had nearly the whole firing to herself for 33 minutes, the officers and men of the Wasp, led by Lieutenant George William Rodgers, boarded the Frolic. The Americans, according to their account, did not see a single man alive upon the Frolic's deck, except the seaman at the wheel and three officers. Two of those officers were Captain Whinyates and his second lieutenant, Frederick Boughton Wintle; both so severely wounded as to be unable to stand without supporting themselves. Contrary to the American statement, however, 17 of the Frolic's men were also on deck. The remainder of the survivors were below, attending to the wounded, and performing other necessary duties. Lieutenant James Biddle, first of the Wasp, had now the honour of striking the Frolic's colours, as they were lashed to the main rigging.

The Frolic was of course much shattered in her hull; and her two masts, from the wounds they had received, fell over the side in a few minutes after her surrender. Out of her 92 men (including one passenger, an invalided soldier) and 18 boys, the Frolic had 15 seamen and marines killed, her commander, two lieutenants (Charles M'Kay, mortally, and Mr. Wintle), master (John Stephens, mortally), and 43 seamen and marines wounded. The Wasp received a few shot in her hull, one near her magazine; and her three lower masts were wounded, but, owing chiefly to the goodness of the sticks, none of them fell. The American sloop began the action with a crew of 138, one of whom was a lad of 17 or 18 years of age, the remainder young and able-bodied seamen, with, as subsequently proved, many British among them; and even the midshipmen, of whom the Wasp had 12 or 13, while the Frolic had but one, and he a boy, were full-grown men, chiefly masters and mates of American merchantmen. Out of this fine crew, the Wasp had eight killed, and about the same number wounded.

The Frolic was armed like every other vessel of her class, with 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long sixes. The brig had also the established 12-pounder carronade for her launch, mounted on the usual elevating carriage; and she had likewise on board a second 12-pounder carronade, taken out of some prize probably, but it was dismounted and lashed upon the fore-castle. As the boat carronade, when used at all in action, can only be fired *en barbette*, we shall not consider it as worthy a place among the broadside-guns. The Wasp mounted 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two brass long 12-pounders, exclusively of two brass 4-pounders, one of which was usually mounted in the fore, and the other in the main top; but, in consequence of the gale, they had been brought on deck. Although, strictly speaking, there was not a single boy belonging to the Wasp, we shall allow three. The following, therefore, will be the

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		FROLIC.	WASP
Broadside-guns . . . .	No.	9	9
	lbs.	262	268
Crew (men only*) . . .	No.	92	135
Size . . . . .	tons	384	434

With her masts entire, and a healthy instead of a debilitated crew, the Frolic would have encountered a tolerably equal opponent. As the matter stood, her officers and men deserve great credit for maintaining a resistance so long after their vessel had become unmanageable and defenceless. Surely, there was nothing in the result of this action, that could cast the slightest slur upon the British naval character; and yet, with the wonted exaggerations of American officers, the latter made it, as we shall see presently, a victory over a superior force.

Captain Jones, however, was not allowed to carry his trophy, his "22-gun sloop of war," into port; for, in the course of a few hours after the action, the British 74-gun ship *Poictiers*, Captain John Poer Beresford, heaving in sight, captured one vessel and recaptured the other. With a just appreciation of the merits of Captain Whinyates, Captain Beresford continued him in the command of the *Frolic*. At the court-martial which was subsequently held upon the captain, officers, and crew of the *Frolic*, for the loss of their vessel, they were, as a matter of course, most honourably acquitted. Captain Whinyates, although he was unacquainted with the circumstance, had been made a post-captain since the 12th of the preceding August.

A word or two upon the American official account of this action. Captain Jacob Jones describes the vessel he captured, as "the British sloop of war *Frolic*, of 22 guns, 16 of them 32-pound carronades, and four 12-pounders on the main deck, and two 12-

\* See p. 102.

pounders, carronades on the topgallant forecastle; making her," says Captain Jacob Jones, "superior in force to us by four 12-pounders." Unfortunately for Captain Jacob Jones, Lieutenant Biddle, without his privity, wrote a letter to his father in Philadelphia, in these words: "The Frolic was superior in force to us: she mounted 18 32 lb. carronades, and two long nines. The Wasp, you know, has only 16 carronades." Mr. Biddle being a man of some note, got his son's letter into the Philadelphia papers as quickly as Mr. Paul Hamilton, the secretary of the American navy, could get the letter of Captain Jacob Jones into the "National Intelligencer." Here was a business! Comments are unnecessary. Suffice it that neither letter contained a word relative to the disabled state of the Frolic when the action commenced; and that the Congress of the United States, willing believers in a matter so flattering to their self-love, voted 25,000 dollars, and their thanks, to Captain Jacob Jones, the officers, and crew of the Wasp; also a gold medal to Captain Jones, and silver medals to each of the officers, in testimony of their high sense of the gallantry displayed by them in the capture of the British sloop of war Frolic, of "superior force."

On the 8th of October the American Commodore Rodgers, with the same three frigates he commanded before,\* accompanied by the brig-sloop Argus, Captain Arthur Sinclair, sailed from Boston upon his second cruise against British men of war and merchantmen. On the 10th, at 8 A. M., when in latitude 41° north, longitude 65° west, steering to the westward, with a light northerly wind, the squadron discovered ahead the British 38-gun frigate Nympe, Captain Farmery Predam Epworth. The Nympe hauled on the starboard tack in chase: and at noon, finding the private signal not answered, Captain Epworth made out the three ships and brig to be American cruisers. At 4 h 30 m. P. M. the Nympe boarded a Swedish brig from the island of St.-Bartholomew to New-York; and which, at 8 P. M., was boarded by the American squadron. With the intelligence thus gained, Commodore Rodgers proceeded in chase; but in the course of an hour, lost sight of the British frigate.

On the 12th of October the frigate United-States parted company; and we shall at present follow her fortunes. On the 25th, soon after daylight, in latitude 29° north, longitude 29° 30' west, this American 44, being close hauled on the larboard tack with the wind blowing fresh from the south-south-east, descried on her weather bow, at the distance of about 12 miles, the British 38-gun frigate Macedonian, Captain John Surman Carden. The Macedonian immediately set her fore topmast and topgallant studding-sails, and bore away in chase, steering a course for the weather bow of the stranger.

While the tracks of the two ships are thus gradually ap-

\* See p. 80.

proximating, we will give an account of the force of each. In addition to her 28 maindeck long 18-pounders, the Macedonian mounted on the quarterdeck and forecastle 16 carronades, 32-pounders, fitted with their chocks outside (a new, but as far as we can learn, not much approved principle), the two long 12-pounders, and two brass long French 8-pounders (the captain's private property), total 48 guns, exclusive of the usual 18-pounder launch carronade. The crew of the Macedonian at this time consisted of 262 men and 35 boys. To account for this extraordinary proportion of boys, we must state that, shortly before the Macedonian sailed on her last cruise, 12 supernumerary boys were put on board, by way, possibly, of "strengthening" her crew. With respect to the quality of the 35 boys, very few of them, it appears, were worth ship-room. It has already been shown, that the established armament of the United-States was 56 guns, long 24-pounders, and 42-pounder carronades.\* Subsequently the ship appears to have landed two of her 42s, and to have received on board, in lieu of them, a travelling 18-pounder carronade; making her carriage-guns, in all, 55. She also mounted a brass howitzer in each top. With respect to crew, the United-States victualled 477 men and one lad or boy.

At about 7 h. 30 m. A. M. the two ships were not above three miles apart. Having by this time hoisted her ensign and broad pendant, the United-States was known to be one of the American 44s; but, having on board one of Commodore Rodgers's spy-glasses, Commodore Decatur mistook the Macedonian for a much larger ship, a sail of the line probably. The United-States accordingly wore round on the starboard tack, keeping a point or two off the wind. Having sailed from Portsmouth as long ago as the 29th of September, Captain Carden, although he knew of the war, had received no information of the *Guerrière's* capture. The Macedonian had since been at Madeira, where she had heard that the American frigate *Essex* was cruising; but, even had the force of the United-States in guns and men been at this time fully known, such was the confidence of victory on board the Macedonian, that every officer, man, and boy, except perhaps the eight foreigners, who requested and were allowed to go below, was in the highest spirits.

As, from sailing better than the United-States, the Macedonian gradually advanced more fully into view, the American officers seem to have fallen into the opposite mistake. They now believed the Macedonian to be a 32-gun frigate; and, with the determination to attack her, the United-States, at 8 h. 30. m. A. M., wore round the larboard tack, and hauled sharp up. This brought the two ships, at 8 h. 45 m., into the relative positions marked in the diagram at p. 116. Knowing that the greatest force of his ship lay in her quarter, and the smallest force of the enemy's

\* See p. 5.

ship in her bows, the first lieutenant of the Macedonian wished that the latter should continue her course, so as to pass ahead of the United-States, in the manner represented by the strong line in the diagram. But, Captain Carden having decided to keep the weathergage, the Macedonian hauled close to the wind. At 9 A. M., when abreast of the United-States on the opposite tack, the Macedonian received her passing fire; but it did not produce the slightest effect, the principal part of the shot falling short of, and the rest going over her.

The rubicon being now passed, the Macedonian wore in pursuit; and, owing to her superiority of sailing already noticed, reached, at about 9 h. 20 m. A. M., a position on the larboard quarter of the American frigate. Here a broadside was exchanged: by that discharged from the Macedonian, the mizen topgallantmast of her opponent was shot away; and, by that from the United-States, the Macedonian lost her gaff halliards and mizen topmast, the latter falling into the main top. "This," as a contemporary well observes, "produced an equality in the rate of sailing, and the United-States kept her enemy in one position on the quarter in a running fight."\* The United-States steered about two points off the wind, and, by her diagonal fire, soon cut away the chock off, and dismounted, every carronade upon the starboard side of her opponent's quarterdeck and forecastle, besides shattering the Macedonian's hull, and disabling a great portion of her crew. Having by this means reduced his antagonist to the use of her maindeck battery only, and increased the disparity that previously existed to more than double, Commodore Decatur, at about 10 h. 15 m. A. M., laid his main topsail to the mast, and allowed the Macedonian, now that it was too late, to come to close action.


By a few minutes past 11 A. M. the Macedonian had had her mizenmast shot away by the board, and which had fallen over the starboard or engaged quarter, her fore and main topmast shot away by the caps, and her main yard in the slings, her lower masts badly wounded, rigging of every sort destroyed, a small portion only of the foresail left to the yard, and two guns on the main battery, and all on the upper but two, disabled. The ship had also received upwards of 100 shot in her hull, several of them between wind and water; and had all her boats, except the jolly-boat towing astern, destroyed, and more than a third of her crew killed and wounded. Owing, likewise, to the heavy sea and her dismasted state, the Macedonian rolled her maindeck guns under water; while the United-States, having no sail that she could not set but her mizen topgallantsail, remained perfectly steady.

In this defenceless state, the men of the Macedonian still possessed the spirit of British seamen; and, at 11 h. 10 m., when the United-States was making sail, to get from under the

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 50. See also diagram at p. 116.

lee of her opponent, and the British frigate, as a last resource, had put her helm a-weather, with the intention of laying the American frigate on board, "every man was on deck," says Lieutenant (now Captain) Hope, "several who had lost an arm, and the universal cheer was, 'Let us conquer or die.'"\* Fortunately, considering the unnecessary carnage that must have ensued, the fore brace was at that moment shot away, and the yard, swinging round, threw the ship up in the wind. The United-States then stood athwart the bows of the Macedonian, without firing a shot; having, it appears, expended all her cartridges. This circumstance, being unknown on board the Macedonian, led to a very erroneous impression; and the crew continued to cheer after an enemy, who, until the United-States hove to out of gun-shot, they supposed was making off. As soon as she had refilled her cartridges and refitted her rigging, the United-States tacked, and at about noon stationed herself in a raking position across the stern of her defenceless antagonist; who, having no means of making a further resistance, struck her colours.

The following diagram is intended to represent the movements



of the two ships, from the time that the Macedonian hauled up

\* Marshall. vol. ii., p. 1018.

to pass to windward of the United-States, to the termination of the contest.

Of her 254 men (deducting the eight foreigners who refused to fight) and 35 boys, the Macedonian had her boatswain (James Holmes), one master's mate (Thomas James Nankivee), her schoolmaster (Dennis Colwell), 23 seamen, two boys, and eight marines killed, her first lieutenant (David Hope, severely), third lieutenant (John Bulford, slightly), one master's mate (Henry Roebuck), one midshipman (George Greenway), one first-class volunteer (Francis Baker), 50 seamen (two mortally), four boys (two with each a leg amputated), and nine marines wounded; total, 36 killed and 68 wounded.

The United-States is represented, by her captain and his officers, to have had her masts and rigging not materially injured, and to have received only nine shot in her hull. "It is remarkable," adds one of her officers, "that, during an action of one hour and a half, and a fire which I believe was never equalled by any single deck, not an accident occurred, nor a rope-yarn of our gun-tackle strained." Her loss, from the same authority, amounted to no more than five seamen killed, Lieutenant John Musser Funk and one seaman mortally, and five others badly wounded. The slightly wounded, as in all other American cases, are omitted.

With respect to the damage sustained by the United-States, although Commodore Decatur makes very light of it, Captain Carden represents, that the United-States "was pumped out every watch till her arrival in port, from the effect of shot received under water, and that two 18-pounders had passed through her mainmast in a horizontal line."\* The masts of the American 44, it should be stated, are as stout as those of a British 74-gun ship; and, to render them still more secure from the effects of shot, four large quarter-fishes are girthed upon them. Although none of her masts, except her mizen topgallantmast, were shot away, the rigging of the United-States was much cut. The reason that the American frigate had to refill her cartridges, all of which had been expended in the action, has already appeared;† and one of her officers, in a letter to a friend, exhibits the practical advantages of sheet-lead cartridges in the statement, that, during the time the Macedonian was firing 36 broadsides, the United-States fired 70. But an allowance must here be made for the inability of the Macedonian, during a third at least of the action, to bring more than a few of her bow-guns to bear.

We shall, as in the case of the *Guerrière*, exclude from the broadside force, the Macedonian's boat-carronade. We might be justified in doing the same with the two French 8-pounders; for, it appears, they "were only fired once, the solder, by which pieces of metal for securing the locks had been affixed to them,

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 1012.

† See p. 103.

having run the first discharge, and filled the touch-holes.\* With respect to the United-States, we shall exclude her top-guns, although, during the time the close action lasted, they were used incessantly and with considerable effect, the shot from them frequently passing through the Macedonian's decks as she rolled; but the travelling carronade, having a port expressly fitted for its reception,† we shall estimate as a part of the broadside force, and consider to have been an 18-pounder, although we are doubtful if it was not a 24. Captain Carden appears to think that he has underrated the crew of the United-States, and that the number, instead of being 478, as expressed in his official letter, ought to be 509, "the officers' names not being entered in her victualling book."\* We differ from him on this point, and shall abide by his official statement; allowing four boys, although one only was seen, and he was at least 17 years of age.

Upon the authority of a statement made by Captain Carden, Mr. Marshall has represented the size of the United-States to be "1670 tons," as "taken from the register of New-York dock-yard."\* In the first place, there was no national dock-yard at New-York, until long after the United-States was launched. Secondly, that frigate, as we have already shown, was built at Philadelphia. Thirdly, 1670 tons, American measurement, which the statement must mean, if it means any thing, would be equal to 1800 English; thus swelling the American 44-gun frigate to a most extravagant size indeed. In direct opposition to this, a British officer of distinction was informed by an officer belonging to the United-States, at a time when there was no motive to deceive, that that frigate measured between 1400 and 1500 tons; which, allowing for the difference already pointed out between British and American tonnage, nearly agrees with our account. Had the note subjoined by Mr. Marshall, in support of the accuracy of the "1670" set forth in his text, run thus, we think it would come near to the truth: "Taken from the columns of the New-York 'Daily Advertiser;'" for we recollect seeing some statement of the kind in a New-York paper, but then it was in the form of an extract from an English paper, and was merely given at length, in order that the American editor might expose its absurdity.

Mr. Marshall has also inserted the following passage respecting the scantling of the United-States. "The United-States was superior to any ship of her class in the American navy. Her sides, on the cells of her maindeck ports, were of the same scantling as our 74-gun ships on their lowerdeck port-cells, composed of live-oak; and her sides such a mass of this wood, that carronade grape would scarcely penetrate them. She was termed the 'Waggon of the American navy,' from her thick scantling,

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 1018.

† See p. 5.



having been originally intended for a larger class ship; and her masts were precisely of the same dimensions as those of our then second-class 74s.\* Into this subject we have already fully entered; but we believe the nickname of Wagon was given to the United-States on account of her being in comparison with her two class-mates, a slow sailer; and we well remember asking an American the reason of her being so named, and receiving for a reply, "Because she was built by an Englishman." In further proof that the United-States was built of larger scantling than the President, Commodore Chauncey, as we stated more than nine years ago, in a conversation respecting the capture of the President, held with some British naval officers since the peace, declared, that he would much rather fight a battle in the frigate United-States, because her sides were stouter than those of the President, and she would, he thought, stand a longer battering.

## COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		MACEDONIAN.	UNITED-STATES
Broadside-guns . . .	No.	24	28
	lbs.	528	864
Crew (men only) . . .	No.	254	474
	lbs.	1081	1533

A greater disparity in broadside weight of metal, than even in the Guerrière's case: what then must have been the disparity when the Macedonian's carronades had become disabled? There was, however, in this case, no deteriorated powder to weaken the effect of the remaining guns; and yet the shot from them made very little impression upon the hull or masts of the United-States. This state of impunity, as well as much of the opposite effect produced on board the British frigate, was attributable, after the first opportunity of closing had been missed by the Macedonian, to the Parthian or retreating mode of fighting adopted by her antagonist. Had the United-States brought to in a bold, and, considering her great superiority of force, becoming manner, the action would have been sooner decided, and the disparity between the two ships, in point of execution, not have been so great. No imputation rests upon the Macedonian's crew, for, to the very last, they behaved well; nor could the gallantry of the first lieutenant, David Hope, be well exceeded: he was severely wounded in the leg at the commencement, and more severely still in the head towards the close, of the battle, and then taken below, but was soon again on deck, filling his post as became a brave officer.

The crew of the United-States were the finest set of men ever seen collected on ship-board. Had Captain Decatur and his five lieutenants been below in the hold, there were officers enough among the ship's company to have brought the action to the same successful issue. As it was, however, the American

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 1013.

captain and the American officers gained all the credit, and pocketed the principal part of the cash; while the poor silly Britons, whose prompt attention to the sails, and steady perseverance at the guns, had contributed so mainly to the victory, slunk away in the back-ground, disowned by those whom they had so effectually served, and scorned and scouted by those, against whom they had so traitorously fought.

That a very great proportion of the crew of the United-States were British seamen, will have been assumed from our previous statements on the subject. That such was the fact was proved, by several of the Macedonian's men recognising old shipmates. One of the officers' servants, a young lad from London, named William Hearne, actually found among the hostile crew his own brother! This hardened traitor, after reviling the British, and applauding the American service, used the influence of seniority, in trying to persuade his brother to enter the latter. The honourable youth, with tears in his eyes, replied: "If you are a d—d rascal, that's no reason I should be one." It appears, likewise, that one of the Macedonian's quartermasters had served his time with many of the crew of the United-States, out of the ports of Sunderland, Shields, and Newcastle. The great proportion of British seamen among the crew of the American frigate accounted for so many of her guns being named after British ships, and some of the most celebrated British naval victories. "Captain Carden," says Mr. Marshall, "observing 'Victory,' painted on the ship's side over one port, and 'Nelson' over another, asked Commodore Decatur the reason of so strange an anomaly; he answered, 'The men belonging to those guns served many years with Lord Nelson, and in the Victory. The crew of the gun named Nelson were once bargemen to that great chief, and they claim the privilege of using his illustrious name in the way you have seen.' The commodore also publicly declared to Captain Carden, that there was not a seaman in his ship, who had not served from five to 12 years in a British man of war."\* After reading this, we naturally take up the "Register," which has already been so useful to us, to see of what state Commodore Decatur was a native: we find, as we expected, that he did not come so far north as Captain Hull, having been born in Maryland, Virginia.

"The manner," says Mr. M., "in which Captain Carden was received by his generous enemy after the surrender of the Macedonian, is worthy of mention. On presenting his sword to Commodore Decatur, the latter started back, declared he never could take the sword of a man who had so nobly defended the honour of it, requested the hand of that gallant officer, whom it had been his fortune in war to subdue, and added that, though he could not claim any merit for capturing a ship so inferior, he felt assured Captain Carden would gain much, by his persevering

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 1019.

and truly gallant defence. The commodore subsequently gave up all the British officers' private property, extending his generosity to even a quantity of wine, which they had purchased at Madeira for their friends in England."\* That Commodore Decatur should have held out his hand to Captain Carden, will not be considered surprising, when we state that, not many months before, the two officers had met as friends in Chesapeake bay; nor will it appear extraordinary that, on seeing his old acquaintance, the former should have "started back," especially when he recollected the opinion which Captain Carden, in some friendly disputation about the relative force of their two frigates, had given, respecting the comparative effectiveness of 18 and 24 pounders. Commodore Decatur's treatment of the Macedonian's late officers, and his behaviour about the wine, was certainly very creditable to him: we may perhaps come to something presently, which will be, in the language of the law, a good set-off.

With the profusion of stores of every sort which was to be found on board the American frigate, with so many able seamen that could be spared from her numerous crew, and with all the advantages that a fortnight's calm weather gave him, it took the whole of that time to place his prize in a seaworthy state; a clear proof how much the Macedonian had been shattered. That service accomplished, the two frigates, the Macedonian under the command of Lieutenant William Henry Allen, late first of the United-States, made sail towards the coast of America. Owing to adverse and baffling winds, the ships were until noon on the 4th of December, ere they came in sight of New-London lighthouse, on their way through the Sound to New-York. Singular indeed was it, that these two frigates, one so crippled in her masts, should have been, during a passage of more than five weeks, not merely unmolested, but, as far as we know, unseen, by a single British cruiser. On her arrival at New-York, the Macedonian was of course purchased by the American government, and, being nearly a new ship (built in 1810), became a great acquisition to the republican navy; in which, under the same name, she was rated as a 36-gun frigate, and was the smallest ship of her class.

It was not enough for the lieutenants, petty-officers, and seamen of the frigate United-States, to try the effect of their eloquence upon the late crew of the Macedonian; Commodore Decatur must use his personal endeavours to inveigle them into the service of their country's enemy. On arriving off New-London, as if the shrewd-inspiring air of Connecticut had already begun to exert its influence, the commodore sent the British officers on shore on their parole; meaning to carry the Macedonian's late crew with him to New-York. These he threatened

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 1014.

to put in the prison-ship there, if they did not immediately enlist. Fortunately for the poor fellows, some delay arose in the two ships moving from before New-London; and, in the mean time, the British officers on shore became acquainted with the very honourable scheme of an American officer, "who," says Captain Brenton, "was an ornament to his country."\* The officers remonstrated with the commodore on the subject, and returned on board. The consequence was, that the seven or eight foreigners, who were fiddlers and trumpeters on board the Macedonian, and three or four others of her late crew represented as Americans, were all that entered the American service.

In his letter to the secretary of the American navy, Captain Decatur gives his prize, "49 carriage-guns;" thus officially reckoning, for the first time, we believe, a boat-carronade found on board a captured frigate. He describes the Macedonian to be of the "largest class." What then must the United-States be, that was full one-fourth larger? He says: "The enemy, being to windward, had the advantage of engaging us at his own distance, which was so great, that for the first half hour we did not use our carronades, and at no time was he within the complete effect of our musketry and grape; to this circumstance, and a heavy swell, which was on at the time, I ascribe the unusual length of the action." In answer to this, Captain Carden says, that one of the first shot that struck the Macedonian was a 42-pounder, which killed the sergeant of marines.† "The damage," says the commodore, "sustained by this ship was not such as to render her return into port necessary; and, had I not deemed it important that we should see our prize in, should have continued our cruise."

Not a word is there in Commodore Decatur's letter to lead the public to suppose, that he had captured a ship of "inferior force."‡ What he may have said in private was one thing; what he was magnanimous enough to tell to the world is another. His end was answered. The national legislature of the United States voted their thanks to Commodore Decatur, his officers, and crew; also a gold medal to the commodore, and silver medals to each of the officers, in honour of "the brilliant victory gained by the frigate United-States over the British frigate Macedonian." A special committee also determined, that the Macedonian was quite equal to the United-States; and, an act of congress of the 28th of June, 1798, having provided that, "if a vessel of superior, or equal force, shall be captured by a public-armed vessel of the United States, the forfeiture shall accrue wholly to the captors," the amount of the Macedonian's valuation, 200,000 dollars, was paid over to Commodore Decatur, his officers, and crew.

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 61.

† Marshall, vol. ii., p. 1013.

‡ See p. 120.

In March, 1813, Captain Carden, his officers, and surviving crew arrived from the United States at the island of Bermuda, and on the 27th of the succeeding May were tried for the loss of their ship. The following was the sentence pronounced: "Having most strictly investigated every circumstance, and examined the different officers and ship's company; and having very deliberately and maturely weighed and considered the whole and every part thereof, the court is of opinion; that, previous to the commencement of the action, from an over anxiety to keep the weathergage, an opportunity was lost of closing with the enemy; and that, owing to this circumstance, the Macedonian was unable to bring the United-States to close action until she had received material damage. But, as it does not appear that this omission originated in the most distant wish to keep back from the engagement, the court is of opinion, that Captain John Surman Carden, his officers, and ship's company, in every instance throughout the action, behaved with the firmest and most determined courage, resolution, and coolness; and that the colours of the Macedonian were not struck, until she was unable to make further resistance. The court does therefore most honourably acquit Captain John Surman Carden, the officers, and company of his majesty's late ship Macedonian, and Captain Carden, his officers, and company, are hereby most honourably acquitted accordingly. The court cannot dismiss Captain Carden, without expressing their admiration of the uniform testimony which has been borne to his gallantry and good conduct throughout the action, nor Lieutenant David Hope, the senior lieutenant, the other officers and company, without expressing the highest approbation of the support given by him and them to the captain, and of their courage and steadiness during the contest with an enemy of very superior force; a circumstance that, whilst it reflects high honour on them, does no less credit and honour to the discipline of his majesty's late ship Macedonian. The court also feels it a gratifying duty to express its admiration of the fidelity to their allegiance, and attachment to their king and country, which the remaining crew appear to have manifested, in resisting the various insidious and repeated temptations which the enemy held out to them, to seduce them from their duty; and which cannot fail to be duly appreciated."

Of all the cases recorded in these pages, none are so difficult to render intelligible as those in which British ships are defeated; first, because there is seldom any official letter, and next, because there is never any log, to refer to for particulars. It is true that, in each of the three frigate cases with America, an official letter was allowed to appear in the London Gazette; but, of all three (including, with the letter of Captain Dacres, his address to his court-martial), the letter of Captain Carden is the most barren of details. It happens, also, that the letter of

Commodore Decatur, and the other American accounts of this action, are equally brief and unsatisfactory. Thus limited in means, we drew up and published our first account nearly nine years ago. It now appears, for the first time, that we overrated the Macedonian's force by giving her 18 carronades, 32-pounders, instead of 16, with two long twelves; making a difference in the broadside-force of just 21 lbs. This very important oversight, and the strictures we were induced to pass upon what we supposed to be the unskilfulness of the Macedonian's crew, have given rise to a very intemperate letter. The mistake about the guns is too trivial to notice; but we readily acknowledge, that we were wrong in supposing that the crew of the Macedonian were unpractised or inexpert gunners: we have shown, we trust pretty clearly, what it was that occasioned their powder and shot to be so wastefully employed. The very first clause in the sentence of the court-martial fortunately bears us out in our statement; and we certainly feel much indebted to Captain Carden, as well for the opportunity he has afforded us of amending our former account in that important particular, as for the stimulus he has given us to seek and obtain some additional facts connected with the action between the Macedonian and United-States.

We have, as will be seen, borrowed a few paragraphs relating to this action from each of our two contemporaries, the post-captain and the lieutenant. The latter, whether he intends to bestow his praise or his censure, always alludes to us in a becoming manner, by name; but the former usually prefers the indirect and, he will excuse us for adding, American fashion, of leaving his meaning to be "guessed" by the epithet he applies. Accordingly, Captain Brenton says: "It need scarcely be noticed, that Captain Carden has been accused by a very incompetent judge of running down to bring his enemy to action, in a heedless and confident manner. He ran into action as his brother officers had done, and will do again, to fight his enemy and decide the day as quickly as possible: how could Captain Carden have closed sooner, &c." "His conduct has therefore been most cruelly misrepresented." "A court-martial acquitted him, his officers and crew, of all blame for the loss of the ship."\* If we add a very fine compliment to Commodore Decatur, and an account of his death, which took place 10 or 12 years afterwards, we have nearly all that is comprised in Captain Brenton's account of the Macedonian's capture. Not a word is there to show on which tack the ships fought; when they began; or when they ended, the action, or how long it continued.

Commodore Rodgers and his two frigates and brig-sloop now demand our attention. The *Argus* parted company on the same day as the *United States*. On the 15th, when near the great

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 60.

bank of Newfoundland, the President and Congress fell in with and captured the Jamaica homeward-bound packet *Swallow*, with a considerable quantity of specie on board. On the 31st, at 9 A. M., latitude  $32^{\circ}$ , longitude  $30^{\circ}$ , they fell in with the British 36-gun frigate *Galatea*, Captain Woodley Losack, having under her charge two South-sea whalers, the *Argo* and *Berkeley*, with which she had sailed from the island of Ascension on the 3d. At this time both parties were standing on the starboard tack, the *Galatea*, with the *Berkeley* in tow, to windward. Casting on her tow, the *Galatea* bore down to reconnoitre; and at 10 A. M., discovering that the two strangers were enemies, she made the signal to her convoy to make the best of their way into port. Having arrived within about four miles upon the weather beam of the President, who with the Congress in close line astern of her, was still on the starboard tack hastening to get to windward, the *Galatea* hauled up on the same tack. The two American frigates now displayed their colours, and the commodore hoisted his broad pendant. Fortunately for the *Galatea*, Captain Losack had heard of the war three days before from the outward-bound Indiaman *Inglis*.

At about noon the President tacked, as if to get into the wake of the *Galatea*; who began to be apprehensive that she should be placed between her two enemies, and was only relieved when she observed the Congress tack in succession. Shortly afterwards the *Galatea* herself tacked, and did so again upon the American ships tacking towards her. The *Galatea* now edged away, to get upon her best point of sailing; and just at this moment the *Argo*, having bore up, in the vain hope of crossing the hawse of the American frigates and escaping to leeward, was intercepted by them. After the two frigates had lain to a long time, and witnessed, with apparent unconcern, the gradual departure of the *Galatea*, the President filled and made sail, but in such a manner as clearly indicated, that the commodore did not like to proceed in chase of the sister-ship of the *Belvidera*, unaccompanied by his consort. The President set her topmast studding-sails, then her topgallant, and lastly her lower studding-sails, and, as soon as it became dark, took all in and hauled to the wind. The *Galatea* of course escaped, although, being 93 men short of complement, she could scarcely have resisted with any effect, an attack by the smaller of the two American frigates.

From the 1st to the 30th of November the President and Congress did not see a sail. They subsequently cruised between Bermuda and the Capes of Virginia, and on the 31st of December anchored in the harbour of Boston; having, in the course of their 84 days' unsuccessful cruise, been as far to the eastward as longitude  $22^{\circ}$  west, and to the southward as latitude  $17^{\circ}$  north. Soon after the arrival of these frigates at Boston, 25 of the crew of the Congress went on the quarterdeck to

deliver themselves up as Englishmen. Captain Smith, who though an Englishman by birth, was an American by education, cunningly answered, "Very well; you shall go in the first cartel to Halifax, and be put on board the guardship there." The men replied, "Oh, no, we don't wish to be sent to a man of war, as we are nearly all deserters from the king's service, but we wish for our discharge to go on shore." This the American captain refused, saying, "If you are Englishmen, you shall be sent to an English man of war." They added: "Rather than be punished for our desertion, we will remain where we are." They consequently all took the oath of allegiance to America, except five, who, having never been in a British ship of war, departed with some prisoners which the two frigates had made in their cruise. Had those 20 men succeeded in obtaining their discharge, so as to have gone ashore and got to England in the best manner they could, it was understood that nearly 100 more on board the Congress would have immediately followed their example.

Aware of the injury that would accrue to British commerce by the presence of an enemy's squadron in the South Seas, the American government ordered Commodore William Bainbridge, in the absence of Captain Hull, who wished to attend to his private affairs, to proceed thither with the Constitution, and the Hornet, Captain James Lawrence; calling off St.-Salvador, on the coast of Brazil, for the Essex, Captain Porter, who had been directed to join them at that rendezvous. On the 27th of October the Essex sailed from the Delaware; and on the 30th the Constitution and Hornet sailed from Boston. Towards the latter end of December Commodore Bainbridge arrived off St.-Salvador; and, not finding the Essex at the rendezvous, sent the Hornet into the port to make inquiries respecting her. On the 29th of December, at 2 P. M., latitude  $13^{\circ} 6'$  south, longitude  $30^{\circ}$  west, while lying to about 10 leagues off the coast, waiting to be joined by the Hornet, then seen approaching from the coast, the Constitution descried in the offing the British 38-gun frigate Java, Captain Henry Lambert, having in tow the American merchant ship William, which she had recently captured.

A little of the previous history of the Java may render more intelligible the details that are to follow. On the 17th of August, in the present year, the late French frigate *Renommée*,\* under the name of Java, was commissioned at Portsmouth by Captain Lambert, in order to carry out to Bombay the newly appointed governor, Lieutenant-general Hislop, and suite, together with a supply of stores, particularly of copper, for the Cornwallis 74, and Chameleon and Icarus 10-gun sloops, building at Bombay. There was no difficulty in commissioning the ship, in calking her sides and decks, in fitting up her accommodations, in putting

\* See p. 25.



on board her 46 guns, or her stores for the voyage, or for the new ships building; but there was a difficulty in providing her with a crew. Officers, and a few petty-officers, were soon obtained. The ship's 50 marines also came on board; and, although 18 of the number were raw recruits, they were upon the whole a good set of men. Then came about 60 Irishmen who had never smelt salt water, except in crossing from their own shores to England. As a fine addition to a crew that, in less than a month after the ship sailed, might have to fight an American frigate similar to that which had taken the *Guerrière*, a draught of 50 disaffected wretches came on board from the 18-gun ship-sloop *Coquette*, lying at Spithead. Pressgangs and the prison-ships furnished others not much better. As to boys, the established number, 23, was easily filled up; and, at length, 292, out of a complement of 300, men and boys were got together.

Feeling as every brave officer must feel, Captain Lambert remonstrated about the inefficiency of his ship's company; but he was told that a voyage to the East Indies and back would make a good crew. It was in vain to urge the matter further; and, as some slight amendment to the *Java's* crew, eight seamen were allowed to volunteer from the *Rodney* 74. Thus, out of a complement of 300 men and boys, the whole number of petty-officers and men, exclusively of those of the former that walked the quarterdeck, who had never been present in an action, amounted to fewer than 50. Here was a ship's company! As several officers and men were to come on board as passengers, some hopes were entertained that these might compensate for the worthlessness of the crew; but of the 86 supernumeraries, a very large proportion turned out to be marine-society boys.

Manned in this way, with a total of 397 persons of every description, the *Java*, on the 12th of November, set sail from Spithead, having in charge two outward-bound Indiamen. On the 12th of December the *Java* captured the American ship *William*, and placed on board a master's mate and 19 men, (the latter of some experience, undoubtedly, or they would have been of no use there,) with orders to keep company. On the 24th, being rather short of water, and being unable, without much difficulty, to get at what remained in the hold, on account of some articles of stores that lay over the casks, Captain Lambert determined to put into *St.-Salvador*. With this object in view, the *Java* altered her course; but the two *Bombay* ships, not wishing to go so far out of their way, parted company, and proceeded alone on their voyage.

Hitherto, owing to the necessity, in a newly fitted ship, of setting up the rigging, to the length of time, that a crew so inexperienced as the *Java's* would expend in the operation, to the number of other extra duties required on board a fighting ship so loaded and lumbered as the *Java*, and, particularly, to a succession of gales of wind since the day of departure, the men had

only been exercised occasionally at training the guns. But, as the ship was now approaching a coast, where there was a probability of falling in with an enemy's frigate, French or American, Captain Lambert, on the 28th, ordered the crew to be exercised at firing the guns. Accordingly, for the first time since she had become a British frigate, the *Java*, on that evening, discharged six broadsides of blank cartridges. With the majority of the crew, of course, those six broadsides were the first they had ever assisted in firing. What a crew to go into action, not with an American frigate a third superior, but with a French frigate barely their equal! Previously to his departure from Portsmouth, Captain Lambert had actually declared to some of his friends, that, owing solely to the ineffective state of his crew, he did not consider himself equal to any French frigate he might meet.

Having no private brass guns, like the *Macedonian*, and no pair of long 18-pounders forward to bring down her head like the *Guerrière*, the *Java* mounted no more, including 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines, than her 46 guns and a boat-carronade. Since her action with the *Guerrière*, either because the ship was beginning to hog; or for some unexplained reason, the *Constitution* had disarmed herself of two of her 32-pounder carronades, and taken on board one 18-pounder carronade fitted on a travelling carriage; and for which, as has already been shown, she had more than one pair of spare ports.‡

Casting off the *William*, with directions to her to proceed to *St.-Salvador*, the *Java*, soon after 8 A. M., with the wind blowing moderately from the north-east, bore up in chase of the *Constitution*, then in the south-south-west, standing on the larboard tack. At 10 A. M. the *Java* made the private signals, English, Spanish, and Portuguese, in succession; none of which were answered. At 10 h. 45 m. the *Constitution* tacked to the northward and westward, and stood for the *Java*; whom Captain Bainbridge took for his expected consort the *Essex*. At noon, when about four miles distant, the *Constitution* hoisted the private signal. Having kept it flying 10 minutes, and finding it not answered, the *Constitution* wore from the *Java*, as the American account states, to avoid being raked; and, again setting her mainsail and royals, kept away about two points free, in order, as Commodore Bainbridge says, to draw the *Java* from her consort the *William* merchantman, then standing in for the land, and supposed probably to be another ship of war.

Hauling up, the *Java* steered a course, parallel to that of the *Constitution*, and gained upon her considerably; but, the breeze freshening, the *Java*, who was then going ten knots, lay over so much, that she was obliged to take in her royals. At about 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Constitution*, who found no inconvenience from carrying her royals, hoisted a commodore's pendant at the main, one American ensign at the mizen peak and another at

the main topgallantmast-head, also an American jack at the fore. At 1 h. 40 m., by which time the Java had closed her within two miles, the American frigate shortened sail to top and topgallant sails, jib, and spanker, and luffed up to the wind. The British frigate now hoisted her colours, consisting of an ensign at the mizen peak, one union jack at the mizen topgallantmast-head, and another lashed to the main rigging; and, putting herself under top and topgallant sails, jib, and spanker, the Java stood for the Constitution, then bearing about three points\* on her lee bow.

At 2 h. 10 m. P. M., when by her slanting course the Java had approached within half a mile of the Constitution, the latter opened a fire from her larboard guns; the shot from which, as a proof of their good direction, splashed the water against the Java's starboard side. Not being so close as he wished, Captain Lambert stood on until within pistol-shot on the Constitution's weather or larboard bow; when, at 2 h. 20 m. P. M., having received a second broadside, which, because the guns were now elevated too much, as before they had been too little, passed over her, the Java discharged a broadside in return. Almost every shot of this broadside took effect. The Constitution had her wheel knocked away, besides receiving other damage, and lost four men killed and several wounded.

Dreading a repetition of this warm salute, the American frigate, having fired her third broadside without much effect, wore in the smoke to get further to leeward. As soon as she discovered that her wary antagonist was running before the wind, the Java made sail after her; and at 2 h. 25 m. P. M.,\* the Constitution, and then the Java, having come round on the starboard tack, the two frigates again exchanged broadsides. Again the Constitution wore to get away. The Java wore also; and at 2 h. 35 m., passing slowly under the latter's stern, with her larboard main yard-arm over the Constitution's taffrail, which, owing to the height of her lower battery from the water and her being nearly eight feet between decks, was nearly as high as that of the 74-gun ship Plantagenet,† the British frigate might have raked the American frigate in a most destructive manner.‡ But, either panic-struck at the sight of so large and formidable a ship, or unable, from sheer ignorance, to appreciate the value of the opportunity thus afforded them of reducing the strength of their antagonist, the Java's crew did not fire a gun, except the 9-pounder on the forecastle; and that was pointed and discharged by Lieutenant James Saunders, one of the supernumerary officers. The Constitution had now the weather-gage; but this did not suit her long-shot tactics: the American frigate therefore made sail free on the larboard tack, followed by

\* See diagram at p. 133.

† Built, as well as the *Courageux*, without a poop.

‡ See diagram.

the British frigate ; who, at 2 h. 40 m. luffing up, crossed again, but in an oblique manner, the Constitution's stern, and fired, this time, two or three of her foremost starboard guns.

At 2 h. 43 m. P. M., feeling ashamed of thus avoiding an antagonist so much inferior in size and force to himself, or impelled by his officers, some of whom, perhaps, hinted at the powerless state of the Java's battery, as recently witnessed, Commodore Bainbridge, as he tells us in his journal, "determined to close with the enemy notwithstanding his raking." The Constitution accordingly hauled on board her fore and main tacks, and luffed up for her opponent. On arriving abreast of the Java, who had stood on upon the larboard tack, and now lay close to windward, the Constitution shortened sail and engaged her. At 2 h. 52 m. P. M., having shot away the head of the Java's bowsprit,\* the American frigate repeated her favourite manœuvre of wearing ; and, owing to the smoke, was not perceived until nearly round on the starboard tack. Having now neither jib nor foretopmast staysail, the Java, as the quickest mode to get round in pursuit, hove in stays, hoping to do so in time to avoid being raked ; but, from the operation of the same cause that had brought her so readily to the wind, the want of head-sail, the ship paid off very slowly. At 2 h. 55 m.,† luffing sharp up, the Constitution set the Java's men a good example, by discharging, within the distance of about 400 yards, a heavy, but, as it happened, not a very destructive, fire into the British frigate's stern. This salute the Java, as she fell off, returned with her larboard guns. Immediately on receiving their fire, the Constitution wore round on the larboard tack, and was followed by the Java ; who, as quickly as she could, ranged up alongside to windward, as yet, not much the worse for her 40 minutes' engagement with an antagonist, that ought, in the time, to have knocked her to pieces.

At 2 h. 58 m. P. M., being again abreast of each other, and within pistol-shot distance, the two frigates mutually engaged : so much, however, to the disadvantage of the Java, that, in the course of 10 minutes, her rigging was cut to pieces, and her fore and main masts badly wounded, her master carried below wounded, and several other officers and men killed or wounded. In this state, Captain Lambert determined on boarding, as the only chance of success left. With such intent, the Java, at 3 h. 8 m. P. M., bore up, and would have laid the Constitution on board at her larboard main chains, had not the foremast at that instant fallen, and which, by its weight and the direction of its fall, crushed the fore-castle, and encumbered the principal part of the main deck. The remains of the Java's bowsprit, passing

\* The American account says the jib-boom had just before got foul of the Constitution's mizen rigging, but this fact does not appear in the English account.

† See diagram.

over the Constitution's stern, caught in her starboard mizen rigging, and brought the ship up in the wind, whereby the opportunity to rake, as well as to board, was lost.

The Java now lay at the mercy of her antagonist; who, at 3 h. 15 m. P. M.,\* wearing across her bows, raked her with a very heavy fire, and shot away her main topmast; the wreck of which and of the foremast rendered useless the greater part of the starboard guns. Running past her unmanageable, and now nearly defenceless, opponent to leeward, the Constitution, at 3 h. 20 m. P. M., luffed up and raked her on the starboard quarter; then wore round on the larboard tack, and, resuming her position, fired her larboard broadside with most destructive effect. At 3 h. 30 m. P. M.,† Captain Lambert fell, mortally wounded in the left breast by a musket-ball from the Constitution's main top, and was carried below. The command of the Java then devolved upon Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads; who, although he had been painfully, but not dangerously, wounded since the commencement of the action, still remained on deck, animating the surviving officers and crew by his noble example.

At 3 h. 50 m. P. M. the Java had her gaff and spanker-boom shot away, and at 4 h. 5 m. her mizenmast. All this while, the Constitution lay on the Java's starboard quarter, pouring in a tremendous fire of round, grape, and musketry. The Constitution, from the damaged state of her rigging, ranging ahead, and the Java, from the fall of her mizenmast, falling off a little, the two frigates again became opposed broadside to broadside. Whether inspired by the intrepid conduct of the Rodney's eight seamen and a few others (who almost fought the main deck), or recovered from their panic by knowing that the chief of the slaughter had hitherto fallen among their comrades on the deck above, the men at the Java's 18-pounders began blazing away with the utmost animation; blazing, indeed, for, the wreck lying over the guns on that side, almost every discharge set the ship on fire. Having effectually done her work, the Constitution, at 4 h. 25 m. P. M.,‡ made sail ahead out of gun-shot, to repair her damages; leaving the Java a perfect wreck, with her mainmast only standing, and that tottering, her main yard gone in the slings, and the muzzles of her guns dipping in the water from the heavy rolling of the ship in consequence of her dismasted state. Mistaking the cause of the Constitution's running from them, or becoming more attached to their new occupation by the few hours' practice which they had had, the tyro ship's company of the Java cheered the American frigate, and called to her to come back.

While, with far more care than appeared to be requisite, considering that the loss of her maintopsail yard, with some cut rigging, was the only visible injury she had sustained, the Con-

See diagram.


† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

stitution lay at a distance on the Java's weather and larboard bow, getting ready to give the finishing blow to this, by her means chiefly, protracted contest, the Java, with one union jack lashed to the stump of her mizenmast, and another, where, notwithstanding the assertion of Commodore Bainbridge, that it was down when he shot ahead, it had remained during all the action, in her main rigging, was busied in clearing away the wreck of her masts and putting herself in a state to renew the action, as soon as her antagonist, with whom the option lay, should re-advance to the attack. The Java's first endeavours were to get before the wind: with this view, a sail was set from the stump of the foremast to the bowsprit; and, as the weather main yard-arm still remained aloft, the main tack was got forward. A topgallantmast was also got from the booms, and begun to be rigged as a jury foremast, with a lower studding-sail for a jury foresail; when, owing to the continued heavy rolling of the ship, the mainmast was obliged to be cut away, to prevent its falling in-board. This was at 4 h. 40 m. p. m.; and in half an hour after that service had been executed, the Constitution wore and stood for the hulk of the Java; whose crew, with very creditable alacrity, had reloaded their guns with round and grape, and seemed, notwithstanding their almost hopeless state, far from dispirited.

At 5 h. 45 m. p. m., full three hours and a half from the commencement of the action, the Constitution placed herself in a very effectual raking position, close athwart the bows of her defenceless antagonist. Having, besides the loss of her masts and bowsprit as already mentioned, had six of her quarterdeck, four of her forecastle, and several of her maindeck, guns disabled, the latter chiefly from the wreck lying over them, all her boats shot to pieces, her hull shattered, and one pump shot away, and having also much water in the hold, the British frigate, as a measure that could now no longer be delayed, lowered her colours from the stump of the mizenmast; and at 6 P. M. the Java was taken possession of by the Constitution.

The following diagram is meant to illustrate the numerous evolutions in this action, from 15 minutes after its commencement at 2 h. 10 m., to the Java's surrender at 5 h. 45 m. p. m. Some of the dates will be found slightly to disagree with those specified either in the British or the American official accounts. This has been done to bring the two accounts nearer together, but great care has been taken in marking the relative time, which is by far the more material consideration. The remarks formerly made respecting the impracticability of giving the proper elongation to the tracks, or dotted lines, apply to this diagram, to the second or lower compartment of it especially.



Out of her crew, supernumeraries included, of 354 men and 23 boys, the Java had three master's mates (Charles Jones, Thomas Hammond, and William Gascoigne), two midshipmen (William Salmond and Edward Keele), one supernumerary clerk (Thomas Joseph Matthias), 12 seamen, and four marines killed, her captain (mortally), first lieutenant (already named), master (Batty Robinson), second lieutenant of marines (David Davies), boatswain (James Humble, severely), four of her midshipmen, 55 seamen (one mortally), four boys and 21 marines (with the killed, just half the number on board) wounded; and, of her supernumeraries, one commander (John Marshall), one lieutenant (James Saunders), Captain Wood, aide-de-camp to General Hislop, one master's mate (William Brown), and nine seamen also wounded: total, 22 killed and 102 wounded; two mortally, five dangerously, 52 severely, and 43 slightly.

The midshipman Keele was not killed outright, but died the day following. He was only thirteen years of age, and it was the first time he had ever been at sea. He had his leg amputated, and anxiously inquired, soon after the action was over, if the ship had struck. Seeing a ship's colour spread over him, the gallant youth grew uneasy, until he was convinced it was an English flag. The following is the account, which Mr. Humble, the boatswain, gave of himself at the court-martial: "I was down about an hour, when I got my arm put a little to rights by a tourniquet being put on it—nothing else; my hand was carried away, and my arm wounded about the elbow. I put my arm into the bosom of my shirt, and went up again, when I saw the enemy ahead of us, repairing his damages. I had my orders from Lieutenant Chads, before the action began, to cheer up the boarders with my pipe, that they might make a clean spring in boarding."

The Constitution received several shot in her hull, and also in her masts, particularly her fore and mizen masts; but these, the mainmast especially, were far too stout even to require fishing in consequence. Out of her eight boats, it is acknowledged that the ship, when the action ended, had only one left in a state to take the water; a tolerable proof that her damages were by no means so trifling as was afterwards represented by the Americans. From the same cause, the loss on board the Constitution, although stated by Commodore Bainbridge at only nine killed and 25 wounded, must have been quite as much as the British official account makes it: 10 men killed, her fifth lieutenant, Mr. John C. Aylwin (the same who was wounded as master in the Guerrière's action), and four men mortally wounded, the commodore wounded slightly, and about 42 others, most of them severely. Having none of her men absent in prizes, the Constitution had on board her full complement, besides two or three supernumeraries; making 477 men and three (as we shall say, although one only, a lad of 17, was seen) boys. By adding about 100 men to the Guérieré's crew, the "Comparative force" in her action will suffice to refer to on the present occasion.\*

The Constitution captured the Java certainly, but in so discreditable a manner, that, had the latter been manned with a well-trained crew of 320 men, no doubt remains in our mind, and we have considered the subject seriously, that, notwithstanding her vast superiority of force, the American frigate must either have succumbed or have fled. Indeed, if American report be worth attending to, Captain Bainbridge, once during the heat of the action, had an idea of resorting to the latter alternative; but his first Lieutenant, Mr. Parker (a native of Great

\* See p. 104.



Britain, we have been informed\*), succeeded in dissuading him from the measure.

If, on coming on board the *Constitution*, the surviving British officers were surprised at the immense force, both in matériel and personnel, to which they had so long been opposed, the American officers, on boarding the *Java*, were mortified at seeing the little screwed-up ship (her sides tumbled in so, that she appeared, at the gangways, scarcely wider than the *Hornet*), which had given them so much trouble to take. The thing, however, was done; and it only remained, by arts which none know better than Americans how to practise, to swell the victory into one of the grandest triumphs that any nation, except America, had hitherto gained.

Lieutenant Parker, the prize-master of the *Java*, having reported to the commodore her disabled condition, received orders, as soon as he had removed the prisoners and their baggage, to set the ship on fire. This tedious service, with only one boat to perform it, being at length accomplished, the *Java*, on the forenoon of the 31st, was set on fire; and the *Constitution* retired to a distance to avoid the effects of the explosion. Now occurred a curious scene on board the *Constitution*. The *Java* was burning without the customary emblem of her newly-acquired national character. Not finding, as he had expected, an American flag among the *Java*'s signals, and deeming it necessary, owing to the present distance between the ships, to send for one, Lieutenant Parker left the *Java* burning without any colours at all. Scarcely had Commodore Bainbridge recovered from the rage into which this, in point of national etiquette, very serious event had thrown him, than one of the two or three deserters, that had already entered on board the *Constitution*, informed him, that the *Java* had an immense quantity of specie in her hold. After a while some of the late officers of the *Java*, pitying the acuteness of his feelings, assured the American captain, that the cases contained neither gold nor silver, but copper.

At about 3 P. M. the *Java* exploded; and that evening the *Constitution*, having quite refitted herself, made sail for St. Salvador. Although entirely dismasted, the *Java* was not in such a damaged state in the lower part of her hull, but that the crew of a British frigate would have refitted her sufficiently for the voyage to America. But why did not Commodore Bainbridge take her with him into that port? He carried thither, as a prize, the English schooner *Eleanor*; and the *Hornet* went in there with her recapture, the *William*. There is a mystery about the destruction of the *Java*, which we cannot penetrate. Shortly after the *Constitution* had made sail from the scene of her exploit, her consort, the *Hornet* hove in sight. Another British frigate to a

\* His name does not appear in the "Register" of 1816.

certainty! Here was a scene of bustle and confusion. The swearing and blustering of officers, and the free-and-easy non-chalance of the men, almost made the British officers smile notwithstanding their recent misfortunes. At length the *Hornet* approached near enough to be recognised, and some degree of order was restored.

The manner in which the *Java's* men were treated by the American officers reflects upon the latter the highest disgrace. The moment the prisoners were brought on board the *Constitution*, they were handcuffed. Admitting that to have been justifiable as a measure of precaution, what right had the poor fellows to be pillaged of almost every thing they possessed? True, Lieutenant-general Hislop got back his valuable service of plate, and the other British officers were treated civilly. Who would not rather that the governor's plate, at this very time, was spread out upon Commodore Bainbridge's sideboard, than that British seamen, fighting bravely in their country's cause, should be put in fetters, and robbed of their little all? What is all this mighty generosity but a political juggle, a tub thrown to the whale? Mr. Madison says to his officers, "Never mind making a display of your generosity, where you know it will be proclaimed to the world. If you lose any thing by it, I'll take care Congress shall recompense you twofold. Such conduct, on the part of an American officer of rank, will greatly tend to discredit the British statements as to any other acts of yours not so proper to be made public, and will serve, besides, as an imperishable record of the national magnanimity and honour." One object the *Constitution's* officers missed by their cruelty. Three only of the *Java's* men would enter with them: the remainder treated with contempt their reiterated promises of high pay, rich land, and liberty. Partly as a compliment for restoring his plate, and partly to induce Commodore Bainbridge not to put into effect his threatened intention of retaining Lieutenant Chada as a hostage for the due observance of the terms on which the other officers and men were paroled, Lieutenant-general Hislop presented the former with an elegant sword.

On the 3d of January, in the morning, the *Constitution* and *Hornet* arrived at St.-Salvador; where lay the *William*, recaptured by the latter. On that same day the commodore disembarked the prisoners received out of the *Java*, 355 in number, and Captain Lawrence landed the 20 officers and men whom he had found on board the *William*; making a total, out of the original crew of the *Java*, of 375, or with the 22 killed, of 397, men and boys. The death of Captain Lambert and of one seaman, and the delivery up, to the governor of St.-Salvador, of nine Portuguese seamen, reduced the number of prisoners out of the two prizes to 364. But the number paroled by Commodore Bainbridge is officially reported by himself at 361. How is this? Why the commodore states that he allowed, "three passengers,

private characters, to land without any restraint." But who were these "three passengers, private characters," so generously exempted from parole? No others it would seem, than the three sailors of the *Java*, who had been fools enough to enter the American service. To deduct them from the amount of prisoners received, would be making the *Java's* complement appear three men short of what, by a proper arrangement of the figures it could be proved to have been. To confess the fact, would never do. Therefore, the whole of the *Java's* passengers, naval, military, and civil, were paroled as "officers, petty officers, seamen, marines and boys," and the hiatus made by the three traitors was cleverly filled up by three nominal "passengers, private characters, whom the commodore did not consider prisoners of war, and permitted to land without any restraint;" and of whom, of course, no further account was taken. So that, as Commodore Bainbridge officially declared, that the *Java* "certainly" had 60 killed; and, as he took no notice whatever of the recaptured ship *William*, his 361 paroled and 12 unparoled prisoners showed, in the clearest manner, that the *Java*, when the action commenced had 433 men. But the commodore merely gives his prize "upwards of 400 men." What greater proof, then, can there be, of Captain Bainbridge's modesty, as well as of his scrupulous regard not to overstep the bounds of truth?

On the 4th the young and gallant Captain Lambert breathed his last, and on the 5th was buried with military honours in Fort St.-Pedro, attended by the governor of St.-Salvador, the Condé Dos Arcos, and the Portuguese in general, but not (will it be believed?) by either Commodore Bainbridge or Captain Lawrence, or by any of their respective officers. But the commodore afterwards made some amends for a piece of disrespect so marked and public, by writing the following private note to Lieutenant-general Hislop. "Commodore Bainbridge has learned, with real sorrow, the death of Captain Lambert. Though a political enemy, he could not but greatly respect him for the brave defence he made with his ship; and Commodore Bainbridge takes this occasion to observe, in justice to Lieutenant Chads, who fought the *Java* after Captain Lambert was wounded, that he did every thing for the defence of that ship, that a brave and skilful officer could do, and that further resistance would have been a wanton effusion of human blood."

On the 6th, requiring more repairs than she could obtain in any foreign port, the *Constitution* got under way from St.-Salvador, and breaking up her cruise to the Pacific, bent her course towards home; leaving the *Hornet* to blockade in the port the British sloop of war *Bonne-Citoyenne*. We shall by and by set this matter right, confining our attention at present to the *Constitution*; who, without any further event of consequence, anchored, on the evening of the 15th of February, 1813, in the harbour of Boston. The reception given to Commodore Bain-

bridge, his officers, and crew may readily be conceived; as well as the exaggerated accounts that were published of his victory. We shall merely state, that the Congress of the United States voted 50,000 dollars, and their thanks, to the captain, officers and crew of the Constitution; also a gold medal to Commodore Bainbridge, and silver medals to each of his officers, with suitable devices.

At this moment our eyes light upon a passage in a book before us, giving an account of the reception of Commodore Bainbridge by the citizens of Boston, and we cannot resist the temptation of placing it before the British public. "On the following Thursday (that succeeding the frigate's arrival), Commodore Bainbridge landed at the long wharf from the frigate Constitution, amidst acclamations, and roaring of cannon from the shore. All the way from the end of the pier to the Exchange coffee-house, was decorated with colours and streamers. In State-street they were strung across from the opposite buildings, while the windows and balconies of the houses were filled with ladies, and the tops of the houses were covered with spectators, and an immense crowd filled the streets, so as to render it difficult for the military escort to march. The commodore was distinguished by his noble figure, and his walking uncovered. On his right hand was the veteran Commodore Rodgers, and on his left Brigadier-general Welles; then followed the brave Captain Hull, Colonel Blake, and a number of officers and citizens; but the crowd was so immense that it was difficult to keep the order of procession. The band of music in the balcony of the State Bank, and the music of the New-England guards, had a fine effect."\* Here was a compliment to the British navy!

The surviving officers and crew of the Java, having quitted the Brazils in two cartels, arrived at Portsmouth early in April; and, on the 23d of the same month a court-martial sat on board the Gladiator in the harbour, to try them for the loss of their ship. The court agreed, that the capture of the late Java was caused by her being totally dismasted in a very spirited action with the United States' ship Constitution, of considerably superior force; in which the zeal, ability, and bravery of the late Captain Lambert, her commander, was highly conspicuous and honourable, being constantly the assailant, until the moment of his much-lamented fall; and that, subsequently thereto, the action was continued with equal zeal, ability, and bravery, by Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, the first lieutenant, and the other surviving officers and ship's company, and other officers and persons who were passengers on board her, until she became a perfect wreck, and the continuance of the action would have been a useless sacrifice of lives; and did adjudge

\* Naval Monument, p. 279.

the said Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, and the other surviving officers and ship's company to be most honourably acquitted. Rear-admiral Graham Moore was the president; who, in returning Lieutenant Chads his sword, addressed him nearly as follows: "I have much satisfaction in returning you your sword; had you been an officer who had served in comparative obscurity all your life, and never before heard of, your conduct on the present occasion has been sufficient to establish your character as a brave, skilful, and attentive officer."

On the 8th of September, at 3 p. m., the British schooner *Laura*, of 10 carronades, 18-pounders, and two short nines, with 41, out of a complement of 60, men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Charles Newton Hunter, while in the act of taking possession of her fourth prize, an American ship bound into the Delaware, then three leagues off in the north-west, discovered about three miles to leeward a large armed brig, with a French ensign and pendant. This was the French privateer *Diligent*, Captain Grassin, whose regular armament was 16 carronades, French 24-pounders, and two long 12-pounders, with a crew of at least 120 men; but, owing to a recent gale, three of the guns had been shifted to the hold, and, from manning a prize or two, the crew of the brig had been reduced to 97 men. Having recalled her boat and men from the American ship, the *Laura*, with the wind from the north-east, bore up for the *Diligent*, whose name and full force in guns and men, had been communicated to Lieutenant Hunter by the third prize he had sent away.

At 3 h. 55 m. p. m., being within musket-shot on the starboard and weather quarter of the *Diligent*, the *Laura* opened a fire from her bow guns, and received the broadside of the French brig. At 4 p. m. the two vessels got fairly alongside each other, and, while the *Diligent* manœuvred occasionally to gain the wind, the *Laura* tried to prevent it by lulling, as well as she was able, her opponent's sails. At 4 h. 30 m. p. m. the *Diligent* set her courses and tried to tack, and the *Laura* put her helm down to effect the same object; but, the wind falling light, both vessels missed stays, and, in paying off, became mutually engaged yard-arm and yard-arm. At 4 h. 45 m., having had her peak-halliards shot away, the *Laura* fell a little off the wind and fore-reached; and the *Diligent* grazed the schooner's larboard quarter. Shortly afterwards, dropping astern, the brig caught the breeze, and, having the superiority of sailing, drew up on the weather quarter of the *Laura*. At this time, owing to the low firing of the two vessels, neither had materially suffered in rigging or sails. The *Diligent*, now in her turn, took the wind out of the *Laura*'s sails, and ran her bowsprit over the starboard taffrail, with her jib-boom between the topping-lifts and through the mainsail. Here the brig held fast.

The *Diligent* now, under the fire of her two bow guns and her numerous musketry, made repeated attempts to board; but the *Laura*, although, from having 25 American prisoners to guard below, she could muster no more than 34 officers and men on deck, resisted every attempt. At 4 h. 55 m. Lieutenant Hunter, after having been several times slightly grazed, received a musket-ball near the left ear, which, passing obliquely down the lower part of the back of the head, made its way out. He of course fell, and from excess of bleeding was incapable of further efforts. Unfortunately no officer was left to take the command, the principal officers being absent in the three prizes, and Mr. John C. Griffith, a young midshipman who had been but a short time at sea, having been previously wounded. In this situation, there was no possibility of opposing further resistance to the overwhelming crew of the *Diligent*; who accordingly rushed on board and hauled down the *Laura*'s colours.

The *Laura* had 15 killed and severely wounded, including, as already stated, her commander and his only remaining officer. The *Diligent*, as acknowledged by Captain Grassin, had nine killed and 10 badly wounded; a decided proof that the *Laura*'s small crew had made the best possible use of their 18-pounder carronades. Captain Grassin carried his prize to Philadelphia, and behaved to Lieutenant Hunter in the most honourable and attentive manner. Lieutenant Hunter was landed and taken to the hospital; and, on subsequently reaching Halifax, Nova-Scotia, was tried for the loss of the *Laura* and most honourably acquitted. The president, Vice-admiral Sawyer, then returned Lieutenant Hunter his sword with a very handsome eulogium.

## BRITISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES.

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IN the abstract of the British navy for this year will be found, among the "Ordered to be built" ships, four first-rates. Two of these were similar to the *Caledonia* and *Nelson*; the *Britannia*, building at Plymouth, and the *Prince Regent*, at Chatham. The other two were of rather a smaller class; the *London*, building at Plymouth, and the *Princess-Charlotte* at Portsmouth.\* To the fine class of N or middling 74s, as many as 11 new individuals have been added. By the addition of these and of other large ships, and by the gradual reduction of the O or small-class 74, and of the 64, although the number of cruising line-of-battle ships is three less than are to be found in Nos. 9 and 16 Abstracts, the tonnage of the 124 in No. 21 Abstract exceeds that of the 127 in No. 9 by 8564, and in that of the 126 No. 16 by 5585, tons. This makes the average burden of the 124 line-of-battle ships, belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the present year, 1830 tons and a fraction; whereas the average, at the commencement of the year 1802, was 1740, and, at the commencement of 1793, only 1645 tons; an unequivocal testimony of the improved state of the British navy.†

On the 26th of January in this year a small increase took place in the complements of the different classes of frigates; occasioned, in all probability, by the war with America. As far back as October and December, 1804, the large class of 38s had been ordered to have their complements augmented from

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 21.

† See Appendix, Nos. 4 and 5.

284 to 300 men and boys ; but on the 24th of June, 1806, the order was rescinded, and the 38s were again established with 284, and the 18-pounder 36s with 274, men and boys. Subsequently, by special orders, most of the large 38s obtained a complement of 300 ; and the order of January, 1813, gave to the whole class 320, including five additional marines ; also to the 18-pounder 36s 284, and to the 18-pounder 32s 270, men and boys. The 24-pounder 40-gun class, including the new ships building, were also increased from 340 to 350 men and boys ; and the 18-gun quarterdecked ship-sloops, from 121 to 135. Still, the boys were in far too great a proportion in all the classes. In action they are of no use, because of their physical incompetency ; and out of action their services are not required, on account of the number of abler hands ready to do the work. Boys would, doubtless, learn more of practical navigation, and become, in the end, better seamen, by passing their teens in a merchant vessel ; for this plain reason, that, instead of spending their time in comparative idleness, they would be employed in assisting the few hands on board to perform the duties of the ship.

A glance at the "Increase" compartment of this and the preceding year's Abstract will show, at once, what a stir the recent successes of the Americans were making in the English dock-yards. In our view of the case, nearly the whole of that stir, with the heavy expense consequent upon it, was unnecessary. Paradoxical as it may seem, we boldly make the assertion, that the way to strengthen the British navy was to break up, not to build, ships. The matériel and personnel were more than ever out of their due proportions. The mode, that should have been adopted, was to break up, lay up, or, at all events, to disarm and put out of commission, 40 or 50 ships ; and, after sweeping from the service and lodging in the hospitals or elsewhere, the old, the infirm, and the ineffective, to put on board the remaining ships adequate crews of able-bodied, stout-hearted British seamen. Let these be practised at the guns, and well officered ; and then let it be seen what enemy's ship, with a fifth of numerical superiority, could stand against them. Those, however, who possessed the power to direct these matters, acted as if they thought, that an increase of wood and iron would effect more than an increase of flesh and blood ; and now let us see whether, proceeding upon that notion, they went the right way to "fashion the means to the end."

But first we will endeavour to show, that the plan of disarming a great many of the higher rates might have been carried into effect, without detriment to the general service of the navy. For this a few facts will suffice. The disaffected and ill manned state of the French fleet in the Scheldt would have admitted of less than half the number of ships that blockaded Flushing, and the almost equally ill manned, though perhaps not disloyal,



condition of the French fleet at Toulon was keeping before that port, for the most part as mere lookers-on, 10,000 or 12,000 of the best seamen in the British navy; three fourths of whom were on board three-deckers, ships that, under existing circumstances, were useless any where but on that station. Allowing, even, that both the Flushing and the Toulon stations required a numerical force of ships outside nearly equal to that within, a dozen or two of large transports, with a double row of painted ports, would keep the enemy in harbour as effectually as the same number of well-appointed 74s. With respect to the Mediterranean fleet, it was particularly to be regretted that, while there was such a dearth of seamen in the home ports and on the North-American station, so many thousands of the very best of seamen, who, under the wise regulations of Sir Edward Pellew, had been daily improving themselves in the neglected art of gunnery, should be denied the power of showing their proficiency where it was so much wanted.

We have already given a very full account, not only of the exploits, but of the force in guns, men, and size, of the American 44-gun frigates; and we will now, as far as lies in our power, point out the steps that were taken by the British admiralty, to put a stop to their further successes. The *Majestic*, *Goliath*, and *Saturn*, three of the small-class 74s, were cut down, fore-and-aft, to the clamps of the quarterdeck and fore-castle. Each ship was allowed to retain her first-deck battery of 28 long 32-pounders, and, in lieu of her 28 long 18-pounders on the second deck, she received an equal number of 42-pounder carronades, besides two long 12-pounders as chase-guns, making 58 guns on two flush decks, with a net complement of 495 men and boys. This, although a reduction in her numerical force of 22 guns (16 on the quarterdeck and fore-castle and six on the poop), gave the ship, even if armed with the full establishment of long guns and carronades assigned to her class, a slightly increased weight of metal in broadside. The advantages contemplated from this alteration in the construction were, superiority in sailing, an equal degree of force, and, with the aid of a black hammock-cloth thrown over the waist-barricade, such a disguised appearance, as might induce the large American frigates to come down and engage. The three 64s reduced in the year 1794\* were converted into real frigates; inasmuch as, excepting the portion of bulwark that lay abaft the gangway-entrance, they were cut down level with the upper deck, and were armed precisely as any frigate of similar dimensions would have been. But these rasé 74s were no more frigates, although frequently so called, than the nine 56 and 54 gun ships purchased into the service in 1795.† The latter, although much smaller and more lightly armed than the rasés, were never considered as any other

\* See vol. i., p. 401, note W\*. † See vol. i., p. 403, note R\* and S\*.

than two-decked ships. It is but justice to Captain William Jayman, of the navy, to state, that, in a pamphlet entitled "Precursor to an Exposé on Forest Trees and Timber," &c. published in January, 1813, he recommends the small-class 74 to be cut down, precisely as the Majestic and her two companions were; and, among his six profile views of ships, that officer gives one of the 74 rasés, in illustration of his remarks. The only point wherein he appears to differ is, in arming the lower deck with long 24 instead of 32 pounders, and the upper, with 68 instead of 42 pounder carronades.

It is evident, from the description we have given of the cut-down 74, that she was much more than a match for the heaviest of the American 44s. The command of the Majestic was given to Captain John Hayes, and that of the Goliath to Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland. It was intended, we believe, that Captain Lord Cochrane should have commanded the Saturn; but, unfortunately for himself and his country, his lordship was about this time expelled from the service of which he had hitherto been so bright an ornament. The command of the Saturn, after some delay in consequence of this untoward event, was given to Captain James Nash. These three ships were well manned, especially the Majestic and Saturn. The crew of the latter consisted chiefly of west-country volunteers, induced to enter from a belief that Lord Cochrane was to be their captain; and we are convinced that, if the Majestic and Saturn had fallen in with the President, Constitution, and United-States sailing in company, Captain Hayes would have attacked them, and, we think, with success. As, however, no glory could have accrued from the capture of an American 44-gun frigate by a British cut-down 74, supposing them to have been singly opposed, the utility of reducing the Majestic and her two companions from their former rank in the service has often been questioned.

But some ships were built, to answer the same purpose as the three rasés. They, also, claim a few remarks. The Leander was constructed of pitch-pine, from a draught prepared by Sir William Rule, the ingenious architect of the Caledonia and many other fine ships in the British navy; and the Newcastle was constructed of the same light wood, from the draught of M. Louis-Charles Barrallier, then an assistant surveyor under Sir William, but now the principal naval architect for the French at Toulon. The first of these ships measured 1572, the other 1556 tons; and they were both constructed of very thin and inadequate scantling. The establishment of each ship was 30 long 24-pounders on the first or "upper" deck, and 26 carronades 42-pounders, and two, afterwards increased to four, long 24-pounders on the second or "spar" deck; total, at first 58, then 60 guns, with a net complement of 480 men and boys. The Leander and Newcastle, therefore, in the disposition of their guns, perfectly agreed with the cut-down 74s; and yet they

were officially registered as "frigates," but, by way of salvo for their anomalous structure "with spar decks," was superadded. If, by "frigate," is meant a ship with a single battery-deck from stem to stern, is it not a sufficient stretch of the term, to apply it to a vessel that has two additional short decks, upon which are mounted nearly as many guns as she carries on her whole deck? But must a ship, having two whole decks, upon each of which an equal number of guns is mounted, be called a single-decked vessel? And yet, in official language, the *Leander* and *Newcastle* are not two-decked ships, otherwise their lower battery-deck would not be called their upper deck, nor their upper, their spar deck; neither would their depth of hold be measured from the deck below the first battery-deck, nor the length of the same deck be registered as the "length of gun-deck." These are the only points, in which these frigates with spar decks differ from the cut-down 74s, and from the 56 and 54 gun ships already mentioned.

The command of the *Leander* was given to Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, a name of frequent occurrence in these pages; and the command of the *Newcastle*, to Captain Lord George Stuart. Great difficulty was experienced in getting these two ships manned; and certainly the crew of the *Leander*, after it was obtained, was a very indifferent one, containing, besides many old and weakly men, an unusually large proportion of boys. This ineffectiveness of the *Leander's* crew has recently been contradicted; but we allude to the period of the ship's arrival at Halifax, Nova Scotia. We were then on board the *Leander* several times, and not only witnessed the quality of her crew, but heard the officers complain, as well they might, of their great inferiority in that respect to the ships against which they were expected to succeed. When she quitted Spithead for Halifax, the *Leander* was so lumbered with stores, that the ship would scarcely have made the voyage, had she not received a refit in Cork; and even then it was fortunate, much as was to be expected from her captain and officers, that the *Leander* did not encounter one of the American 44s.

Another ship, of the same force in guns, and nearly so in men, as the *Leander* and *Newcastle*, was produced by raising upon the *Akbar*, formerly a teak-built Indiaman, and more recently known as the 44-gun frigate *Cornwallis*. The *Akbar* proved a very indifferent cruiser, sailing heavily, and rolling to such a degree, that she was constantly carrying away or springing her masts. The ship actually stowed 450 tons of water; while the *Caledonia*, a ship of double her measurement, could not stow more than 421 tons. The *Akbar* has since been converted to the only purpose for which, and carrying a cargo, she was ever adapted, a troop-ship.

If it was deemed necessary to build or equip ships to oppose the large American frigates in fair combat, they should have

been frigates, not two-decked ships like the *Leander*, *Newcastle*, and *Akbar*. There was a frigate laid down in the year 1813, which would have answered every purpose; but, after the draught of the *Java* had been prepared as that of a regular frigate, to carry 52 guns, the pen of authority filled up the gangway with a barricade and a row of ports, and hence the *Java* was built as a 60-gun two-decked ship, similar to the *Newcastle* and *Leander*. If the American frigates, of 1533 tons, could not carry, with ease, their gangway guns, and the two last-named British 60-gun ships, averaging 1564 tons, found some inconvenience in carrying theirs, how could it be expected that the *Java*, of 1458 tons, could bear the eight additional guns ordered for her?

Even as a frigate mounting 50 guns, the *Java* might have been as effectively armed as if she had mounted 52, simply by carrying, like the *Constitution*,\* one of her chase 24-pounders on the fore-castle, and the other on the quarter-deck. No ship, no British ship at all events, is so well manned as to be able, if attacked by two opponents, to fight all her guns at once: hence, there is no real loss of force in subtracting the two guns. Nor would there be any difficulty, that a little practice could not soon overcome, in shifting the travelling gun, during an action, from one side of the deck to the other. The governing principle should be, to possess the greatest real, with the least numerical, force; and this is chiefly attainable by the power to present in broadside a greater proportion than half the number of guns mounted by the ship.

Our objection to the cut-down 74s and the two-decked 50s, the latter especially, is to their denomination as frigates, and not to the manner in which their guns are mounted. Admitting that, in former times, when British, like French ships, fell in so at their topsides, that, after the boats and booms were stowed in the waist, a mere gangway, or passage from the quarter-deck to the fore-castle, was all the space which could be spared on each side, now that British ships are built nearly wall-sided, what is to prevent the gangway, or waist deck from receiving as many guns as its length will admit? These four or five guns, from their midship position, would be the most efficient of any in the tier to which they belonged. Nor, if the light and but equivocally useful carronades on the poop were withdrawn, would the numerical gun-force of the ship be greatly augmented. The addition to her force is not all the advantage the ship would acquire: weight would be taken from the extremity, the weakest extremity, unless the ship has a round stern, and be shifted to the centre, where it can best be borne.

Any objection to the plan, because of the new nomenclature it would introduce, meets an answer in the present mode of

\* See p. 101.

classifying the British navy. A three-decker, certainly, would be called a four-decker, a two-decker, except of the R and U classes in the Abstract, a three-decker, and a quarter-decked one-decker, or regular frigate, a two-decker; but is not the old 98 now called a 104, the old 38 a 46, and, a much greater advance in figures, the old 24 a 34? If England does not adopt the plan, other nations will. America, indeed, has already begun to build flush three-deckers, or ships, in the disposition of their guns, not unlike the Swedish Chapman's 94-gun ship mentioned at a former page.\* France has already built a few flush two-deckers, similar to the *Leander's* class; and, if she follows the advice of a very ingenious writer on naval affairs of her own, she will by-and-by have flush three and flush four decked ships. "We ought, for the future," says M. Dupin, "to construct our line-of-battle ships without a poop, and compensate that reduction by continuing the battery from the fore-castle to the quarterdeck. We should then have ships of the line with four, and with three, complete batteries." "Nous devrions à l'avenir ne construire que des vaisseaux sans dunette, et compenser cette suppression, en continuant la batterie des gaillards, depuis l'avant jusqu'à l'arrière. Alors nous aurions des vaisseaux à quatre et à trois batteries complètes."†

Our remarks on this subject, as well as those we formerly submitted on the equalization of the calibers of guns,‡ are merely thrown out as loose hints, to be taken advantage of, if thought worthy, by the abler heads of those to whom the subject professionally belongs. We are aware of one objection to placing guns in the waist: the inconvenience, while those guns are in use especially, of working the sails. It is a rare innovation that produces good without some alloy of evil; and perhaps a clever rigger could dispose the ropes and halliards in such a manner, that the force of that objection would be considerably weakened.

Resuming our subject, we have to notice that, besides the two anomalous classes of "frigates," the cut-down 74 and the 50, a few ships were constructed, to which the name of frigate properly applied, and which, with a little more care in constructing and equipping them, would have been able to cope with the *President* or either of her class-mates. The *Endymion* is already known to us as a remarkably fine frigate; but she mounted only 26 guns on the main deck. Another pair of guns on that deck were deemed indispensable; and as fine a frigate as ever swam, having the ports for that number of 24-pounders, was then lying among the ordinary in *Hamoaze*. The *Egyptienne*, of 1430 tons, was this frigate; but, to save expense we suppose, it was

\* See vol. v., p. 12.

† Dupin, *Force Navale*, tome ii, p. 156.

‡ See vol. iv., p. 280.

determined to build ships from the draught of the *Endymion*, and to bring the 13 maindeck ports as much closer as would admit a 14th to be added. This was done; and in a short time appeared the *Forth*, *Liffey*, *Severn*, *Glasgow*, and *Liverpool*. The three first were built of fir, and the two last of pitch-pine; and the force of the class was 28 long 24-pounders on the main deck, and 20 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long nines, on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 50 guns; with a complement of 350 men and boys. The chief complaint against these frigates was, as may be conjectured, that their quarters were rather confined. A class like the *Egyptienne*, mounting the same number and nature of guns as the *Forth's* class, with a crew of 420 good men, would have been quite as heavy a frigate as the British, with a due regard to their established character on the ocean, ought to have constructed, if they constructed any at all, to meet the large American frigates.

But the rage for frigate-building in this year did not stop at the *Endymion's* class. As many as 26 of the two principal 18-pounder classes were ordered to be built, chiefly, for expedition-sake and to save expense, of the red and yellow pine. Some of these, too, were to be fitted with medium 24-pounders instead of their long 18s, and were to have a complement of 330 men and boys. The six and a half feet, 33 cwt. 24-pounder, or *Gover's* gun, not having been found heavy enough to fire two shot, some guns of the same caliber were constructed, from a foot to a foot and a half longer, and weighing from 40 to 43 cwt. One description of these guns was found fully to answer; and we shall by and by have more to say of them. As it turned out, no shot fired from a long or a medium 24-pounder, except in the single instance of a British ship which had been in the service since the year 1797, struck or fell on board an American frigate. The promulgated intention, to arm British frigates with such guns, was quite enough to inspire the Americans with caution; and accordingly the *Javá* was the last British frigate they captured or brought to action, but not, as we shall hereafter see, the last they fell in with. After all, therefore, it is a question, whether it would not have been sufficient, without cutting down *Majestics* and *Goliaths*, or building *Leanders* and *Newcastles*, to have made the *Macedonian's* fine class as effective as it ought to have been; and, as the chief means of doing so, to have given to each 38-gun frigate, sent cruising to the westward, a well-trained crew of 370 men.

Some of the minor classes of ships of war now claim our attention; and we shall soon have a set of cases to record, which will show that the Americans as much outbuilt the British in their "sloops," as they had outwitted and outfought them in their "frigates." The two principal classes of sloops of war, at this time belonging to the British navy, were the quarterdecked 18-gun ship-sloop, of about 430 tons, mounting 18 carronades,

32-pounders, on the main deck, and on the quarterdeck and forecastle six carronades, 12 or 18 pounders, and two sixes, total 26 guns, with 121 men and boys; and the well-known 18-gun brig-sloop, mounting no more guns than she rated. As a match for the first class, it was proposed to congress, in November, 1812, to build a few sloops of war to mount 16 long 12-pounders on the main deck, and 12 carronades, 24-pounders, on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 28 guns; with a complement of 180 men. The size is not mentioned, but a ship, so armed, could not measure less than 560 or 570 tons. Whether it was decided to vote all the British quarterdecked ship-sloops "small frigates," and consequently superior to any vessels bearing the denomination of "sloops," or whatever else may have been the reason, the American quarterdecked sloop was laid aside, and the preference was given to a flush-decked ship, to mount 20 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 18-pounders, with a crew of 175 men, and to measure 509 tons American, or 540 tons English. These were to rate of 18 guns, and to be considered as a fair match for the British 18-gun brig-sloop, which, from the concurrent testimony of such men of veracity as Captain David Porter and Captain Jacob Jones,\* mounted 22 guns.

Three of the new American sloops were soon afloat, the Peacock, Wasp, and Frolic; and, to be ready to meet these upon equal terms, 18 flush ships were ordered to be built of fir, with all possible despatch. Having in their possession the Andromeda (late the American merchant ship Hannibal), of 24 guns on a flush-deck, an extraordinary fine ship of 812 tons, the late French corvette Bonne-Citoyenne, and the two ships built after her, the Hermes and Myrmidon, the British could be at no loss for a proper model. Well, what did they do? Why, one of the lords of the admiralty recommended a draught to be prepared upon the reduced lines of the Bonne-Citoyenne. To what extent the reduction went, and whether an augmentation of size would not have better answered the intended purpose, will be seen by the following statement.

	Length of main deck.		Breadth extreme.		Tons.	No.	
	ft.	in.	ft.	in.		guns.	men.
Bonne-Citoyenne.....	120	1	30	11	511	20	135
Proposed draught.....	115	6	29	8	455	22	135
American Frolic.....	119	6	32	0	540	22	175

Where so much deference was officially due, science had to bow the head, and Sir Joseph Yorke soon had the satisfaction of seeing his "improved Bonne-Citoyennes" afloat and fitting in all the principal dépôts of Great Britain. To diminish a vessel's capacity, and at the same time to increase her armament, was an

\* See pp. 89, 112.

odd way of improving her qualities. Scarcely were the twenty 32-pounder carronades and two long nines brought on board, than two of the carronades were sent on shore again, as having no proper ports fitted to receive them. Already the remaining 20 guns were too close together, to render the quarters sufficiently roomy. With these, however, the ships went to sea; and they were soon found neither to work well, nor to sail well. The utility of their stern-chase ports may be judged when it is stated, that, owing to the narrowness of the ships at the stern, there was no room to work the tiller while the guns were pointed through the ports. Of this discreditable oversight and its evil consequences, we shall hereafter have to give a practical illustration.

Of the relative stoutness of the spars of the British and American sloops of war, thus pitted against each other by the order of the board of admiralty, some idea may be formed, when it is stated, that the girth, just above the deck, of the mainmast of one of the latter, the *Frolic*, was 7 feet 8 inches; whereas the mainmast established upon the former class measured, at the same place, only 5 feet 8 inches. The *Cyrus*, if not most of the others, was "doubled," so as to increase her beam about 10 inches, and enable the ship to keep the sea in a gale of wind; and we remember seeing the *Medina*, at the king's dock-yard in Halifax, Nova-Scotia, having her lower masts fished, to prevent them from snapping in two with the weight of the top-gear above.

While the cutting-down system was pursuing, a mode presented itself of quickly getting ready a few ships, equal in size and force to the large American sloops. The 10 ships of the *M* class in the Abstracts averaged 534 tons, and mounted 22 carronades, 32-pounders, on the main deck. By having their quarterdecks and forecastles cut away, these ships would have been much improved in sailing, and seaworthiness; and then, with two long 9 or 12 pounders in lieu of their two foremost carronades, and with their complement increased to 173 men and boys, they would have been far superior vessels to those built under the auspices of the gallant admiral. Even a precedent was not wanted. The *Hyæna*, of a similar construction to the ships of the above-mentioned class, was, when taken by the French in 1793, cut down to the clamps of her quarterdeck and forecastle, and became a very fast-sailing and successful privateer. On her subsequent recapture by the British in 1797, the *Hyæna* was allowed to remain as a flush-ship, and was armed precisely in the manner above recommended.\* The height between the decks of ships of war must, for obvious reasons, be nearly the same; consequently the proportion of top-weight increases, as the length, breadth, and below-water depth of the

\* See vol. ii., p. 90.



vessel diminishes. This is the reason that frigate-built ships below 580 or 600 tons, carrying eight or ten guns upon the quarterdeck and forecastle, are usually so crank and unsafe; and one cause of their sailing so ill is, that their masts must be shorter, and their sails smaller, to counteract the strong heeling propensity of their hulls.

Fortunately for the honour of the captains appointed to the new 20-gun ships, some newspaper of the day exaggerated their force and size, and extolled them as very formidable vessels. The consequence was, that the *Wasp*, *Frolic*, *Peacock*, and *Hornet* avoided every three-masted man of war they fell in with; confining the exercise of their prowess to the British brig-sloop, the utmost extent of whose force was well known to them. While we are making this assertion, we bear fully in mind the braggadocio that took place between the *Hornet* and the *Bonne-Citoyenne*; but we shall very soon establish the fact, that the behaviour of the Americans on the occasion was nothing but braggadocio, and that of the most despicable kind.

The schooner-classes of the two navies will require but a few words. None can compete with the Americans in the size, beauty, swiftness, or seaworthiness of their schooners. They will arm a schooner of 200 tons, with seven guns, including a traversing 18 or 24 pounder, and give her a crew of at least 100 able-bodied men. If this schooner is captured by the British and deemed eligible for the navy, her bulwarks are raised, and pierced with ports fore and aft, 14 carronades, 18 or 12 pounders, are crowded upon her deck, and she is established (there is no crowding here) with a crew of 45 or 50 men and at least six or seven very young boys. The tophammer necessarily diminishes the vessel's rate of sailing; and another impediment frequently arises from the inexperience of her commander, in the art of working to advantage a schooner-rigged vessel.

To whatever is classed under one head, people are apt, and very naturally, to attach an idea of equality; and the stronger party is sure to triumph in his victory, until the weaker party has shown the disparity of force against which he had to contend. It too frequently happens, that this is not done; and, before it can be done with effect, two operations are necessary: the removal of one impression, and the substitution of another. The *President* and the *Southampton*\* are "frigates;" the *Peacock* and the *Childers*† are "sloops of war;" and the following statement will show, that one "man-of-war schooner" may differ in force and size from another, to even a greater extent than in the case of the frigate or the sloop. The American privateer-schooner *Harlequin*, of Boston, measured 323 tons, and mounted 10 long 12-pounders, with a crew of 115 men. Her mainmast was 84 feet, and her fore yard 64 feet, in length. Her bulwark was of

\* See pp. 5 and 7.

† See vol. v., p. 28.

solid timber, and four inches higher, and two inches thicker, than that of the British 18-gun brig-sloop. The Whiting schooner and her class, on the other hand, measured 75 tons, and mounted four 12-pounder carronades, with a crew of 20 men and boys; and her bulwark, if it deserved the name, consisted, with here and there a small timber, of an outside and an inside plank.

We trust that the importance of the subject, into which we have entered at such length, will be received as an excuse for this digression; but, in reality, it is only the concentration of remarks which would otherwise have been scattered over our accounts of the different American actions, and perhaps not so well understood, nor so usefully applied. Previously to quitting the topic of improvements in ship-building, we have one more observation to make. It has already been stated, that the American government is in the habit of appointing an experienced naval captain, to superintend the construction of each of their larger ships of war. This, although accomplished with ease in a small navy like that of the United States, would be quite impracticable in a navy like that of England. But, as in most of the higher classes of British ships it is usual to construct many individuals from one draught, might not that draught, with an accompanying exposé, showing the size of the intended scantling, the number and nature of the ordnance, the length and diameter of the masts and yards, and, in short, every other particular calculated to dispense with the actual inspection of a model, be submitted to a committee of experienced naval officers? Had any three captains, or commanders, been consulted, when the *Bonne-Citoyenne's* beautifully proportioned form was proposed to be shortened and contracted for "improvement," the British navy would never have owned such ships as the *Cyrus* and her 17 class-mates.

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the beginning of the year 1813, was,

Admirals . . . . .	64
Vice-admirals . . . . .	69
Rear-admirals . . . . .	68
"    superannuated	28
Post-captains . . . . .	802
"    "    "    "	32
Commanders, or sloop-captains . . . . .	602
"    superannuated	50
Lieutenants . . . . .	3268
Masters . . . . .	629

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same year, was 140,000.\*

\* See Appendix, No. 6.

Owing to a deficiency of seamen and the disaffected state of those that remained, the Scheldt fleet, numerically strong as it was, gave, during this year, very little trouble to those that blockaded it; nor did the Brest squadron, or fleet, as it now might almost be called, make any attempt to put to sea. On the 27th of August the newly-formed port of Cherbourg was opened, with great pomp, under the eyes of the empress Marie-Louise; and on the 12th of October the 80-gun ship *Zélandais*, the first line-of-battle ship constructed at Cherbourg, was launched: another was also getting ready with all possible despatch. Since the 28th of May the French 74-gun ship *Régulus*, from Rochefort, had anchored in the river of Bordeaux; and, according to the French accounts, she was the first ship of her class, that had ever entered the Gironde.

Toulon was now the only French port to be looked to for any operations of importance between the fleets of England and France. The British Mediterranean fleet remained in the able hands of Vice-admiral Sir Edward Pellew, and the fleet in Toulon was still under the command of Vice-admiral the Comte Emeriau. The flag of the latter was flying on board the 130-gun ship *Impérial*, and the flag of the second in command, the Baron Cosmao-Kerjulien, on board the *Wagram*, of the same force. On the 15th of August the 130-gun ship *Héros* was launched; making the sixth three-decker in the port. Not being able to discover the launching of any three-decker in Toulon named *Impérial*, we consider that the *Austerlitz* had recently changed her name; especially as, at the latter end of 1812, the flag of Vice-admiral Emeriau was flying on board of her. The addition of the *Héros* makes the total number of line-of-battle ships 21; all, except the *Héros* and *Montebello*, at anchor in the inner and outer roads, in company with ten 40-gun frigates and one 20-gun corvette. On the stocks there were two 80s, and one 74, the latter in a very forward state.

Although a dearth of seamen, owing to the draughts sent away to the army, prevented the Toulon fleet, as a body, from making any serious attempt to put to sea during the year 1813, large divisions of it, when the wind would serve also for returning, frequently weighed from the road, and exercised in manœuvring between the Capes Brun and Carquaranne. In the latter part of October the British fleet was blown off its station by a succession of hard gales, which lasted eight days; and it was only on the evening of the 4th of November, that the in-shore squadron, consisting of the 74-gun ships *Scipion*, *Mulgrave*, *Pembroke*, and *Armada*, Captains Henry Heathcote, Thomas James Maling, James Brisbane, and Charles Grant arrived off Cape Sicie. The main body of the British fleet at this time consisted of the

Gun-ship		
120	Caledonia . . . . .	} Vice-adm. (r.) Sir Edward Pellew, bt. Rear-adm. (w.) Israel Pellew. Captain Jeremiah Coghlan.
	Hibernia . . . . .	
112	San-Josef . . . . .	} Rear-adm. (b.) Sir Richard King, bt. Captain William Stewart.
100	Royal-George . . . . .	
98	Boyne . . . . .	} T. Fras. Ch. Mainwaring. George Burlton. John Erskine Douglas. Robert Rolles. John Maitland.
	Prince-of-Wales . . . . .	
	Union . . . . .	
	Barfleur . . . . .	
74	Pompée . . . . .	} Sir James Athol Wood.

On the 5th, at 9 h. 30 m. A. M., Vice-admiral Comte Emeriau, in the *Impérial*, with, according to the French accounts, 12, and according to Sir Edward Pellew's letter, 14 sail of the line, six frigates, and the *Victoire* schooner, got under way with a strong east-north-east wind, and stood to the usual spot for exercise. Captain Heathcote's squadron was off Cape Sicie; and the main body of the British fleet, consisting, as already shown, of nine sail of the line, had just hove in sight from the southward, standing under close-reefed topsails, to reconnoitre the port. At 11 h. 30 m. A. M., just as the French advanced squadron, of five sail of the line and four frigates, under Rear-admiral the Baron Cosmao, had got a little to the south-east of Cape Sepet, the wind suddenly shifted to north-west. This unexpected occurrence, while it set the French ships to trimming sails to get back into port, afforded to the leading British ships a prospect of cutting off some of the leewardmost of the former, the names of which were as follows :

Gun-ship		
130	Wagram . . . . .	} Rear-adm. le Baron Cosmao-Kerjulien. Captain François Legras.
74	Agamemnon . . . . .	
	Ulm . . . . .	} Jean-Marie Letellier.
	Magnanime . . . . .	} C.-J.-César Chaunay-Duclos.
	Borée . . . . .	} Laurent Tourneur.
Gun-frig.	Pauline . . . . .	} Jean Michel Mahé.
	Melpomène . . . . .	
	Pénélope . . . . .	
	Galatée . . . . .	
40	Pauline . . . . .	} Etienne-Stanislaus Simiot. Charles Beville. Edme-Louis Simonot. Jean-Bapt. Bonafoux-Murat
	Melpomène . . . . .	
	Pénélope . . . . .	
	Galatée . . . . .	

The British in-shore squadron immediately stood for the French rear; and at 34 minutes past noon the leading British ship, the *Scipion*, opened a fire from her larboard guns upon the nearest French ships, which were then standing on the opposite or starboard tack; as did also, in succession the *Mulgrave*, *Pembroke*, *Armada*, and *Pompée* (who had just joined), as they followed the *Scipion* in line astern. At 40 minutes past noon, having passed over, the *Scipion* wore, to bring her starboard broadside to bear; and in two minutes afterwards the first French shot that took effect carried away part of the *Pembroke's*

wheel. The five British 74s, having wore round and come to, continued the cannonade with their starboard broadsides, and were then not more than a mile distant from the shore near Cape Sepet.

At 45 minutes past noon the advanced squadron filled and stood on; and at 1 P. M. the *Caledonia*, *Boyne*, and *San-Josef*, who were far ahead of the remainder of their fleet, stood in-shore athwart the bows of the former. In four minutes the *Caledonia* opened a heavy fire from her larboard guns upon the sternmost French ship, the *Wagram*; who, being then on the starboard tack, returned the fire with her larboard guns. The *Boyne* and *San-Josef*, as they arrived in succession, also got into action with the French rear. Having reached the wake of the *Wagram*, the *Caledonia* wore, and came to on the starboard tack, still engaging; but the French ships, having the weathergage, in a few minutes got out of gun-shot, and the firing, in which the batteries had slightly participated, ceased.

The casualties, on either side, arising from this skirmish, were not of any serious amount. The *Caledonia* received one shot through her mainmast and three or four in her hull; had a shroud and some backstays cut, and her launch and barge destroyed, with three seamen slightly wounded. One unlucky shot, which fell on the *San-Josef's* poop, struck off the leg of each of two fine young officers, Lieutenant of marines William Clarke, and midshipman William Cuppage, and slightly wounded one marine and one seaman. The *Boyne* and *Scipion* had each one man wounded slightly; and the latter had another killed by an accident. The *Pembroke* had three men slightly wounded by shot, and the *Pompée* two men slightly burnt by accident; total, 12 wounded by the enemy's fire, and one killed and two slightly wounded by accident. The *Armada* escaped without any loss, but one of the enemy's shot passed through the bows of her launch and lodged in the booms.

The *Agamemnon* appears to have been the greatest sufferer among the French ships: she had her masts, rigging, and sails a good deal damaged, and received several shot in her hull, by which nine men were slightly wounded. The *Wagram* also suffered, but in a less degree, and had only two men wounded. A shot, that entered the roundhouse of the *Borée*, wounded two seamen, and carried away the wheel; a splinter from which slightly wounded Captain Mahé. The *Ulm* had one man severely and another slightly wounded. Of the four advanced frigates, the *Pénélope* and *Melpomène* were the most engaged: both received damage in their sails, rigging, and hull, and the latter had one man wounded; making the total loss on the French side 17 wounded. Leaving a small squadron off Toulon, Sir Edward Pellew soon afterwards steered for Minorca, and on the 15th of the same month anchored in Port-Mahon. On the 5th

of December the French fleet in Toulon received an accession of force in the new 74-gun ship *Colosse*; and the close of the year left Comte Emeriau still at his anchorage in the road.

LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 14th of March Lieutenant Francis Banks, of the *Blazer* gun-brig, commanding the small British force stationed off the island of Heligoland, having received information of the distressed state of the French at Cuxhaven and of the entrance of the Russians into Hamburgh, took the *Brevdrageren* gun-brig, Lieutenant Thomas Barker Devon, under his orders, and proceeded to the river Elbe, with the hope of intercepting such of the enemy's gun-vessels as might attempt to make their escape. Early on the morning of the 15th the two brigs entered the river, and found the French flotilla of 20 gun-vessels stationed at Cuxhaven in the act of being destroyed. On the 16th, by invitation from the shore, Lieutenant Banks landed, and with a detachment of 32 troops, which he had embarked at Heligoland, took possession of the batteries of Cuxhaven, and on the next day concluded a treaty with the civil authorities, by which it was agreed that the British flag should be hoisted in conjunction with the colours of Hamburgh.

On the 20th, while the two gun-brigs were lying at anchor off Cuxhaven, Lieutenant Devon volunteered, with a boat from each brig, to go up the river in quest of a privateer of which information had just been received. Accordingly, in the night, taking with him the *Brevdrageren's* gig containing a midshipman and eight men, and the six-oared cutter of the *Blazer*, containing 11 men, commanded by Mr. William Dunbar, her master, Lieutenant Devon proceeded to execute the service he had undertaken.

On the 21st, at daylight, the two boats found themselves off the Danish port of Brunsbutfel, situated about 70 miles up the river, and close to two large galliots at anchor. Under the supposition that these were merchant vessels, Lieutenant Devon, followed by the cutter at some distance, advanced to examine them. On the near approach of the gig, the two vessels were found to be gun-boats; the nearest of which instantly hoisted Danish colours, hailed, and opened a fire, which, luckily for the people in the gig, passed over their heads. In this critical situation, Lieutenant Devon considered that there was no safety but in resolutely boarding. He accordingly dashed alongside, and, in the smoke of the second discharge, which passed as harmlessly as the first, and amidst a degree of confusion among the Danes caused by the explosion of some cartridges, Lieutenant Devon, his brother, midshipman Frederick Devon (a youth only 12 years of age), and eight men, captured, without the slightest

casualty, the Danish gun-boat *Jonge-Troutman*, commanded by Lieutenant Lutkia of the Danish navy, and mounting two long 18-pounders and three 12-pounder carronades, with a crew of 26 men; of whom two were wounded.

Mr. Dunbar arriving up, the prisoners were secured under the hatches, the cable cut, and sail made after the other galliot, the commander of which, on seeing the fate of his commodore, had cut and steered for *Brunsbüttel*, about four miles distant. The prize-galliot soon gained upon her late consort; and, the wind being light, the *Blazer's* cutter was despatched to cut off the fugitive from her port. This Mr. Dunbar gallantly accomplished, and with his 11 men captured, without opposition, the Danish gun-boat *Liebe*, of the same force as the *Jonge-Troutman*, and commanded by Lieutenant Witt, also of the Danish navy. This, it must be owned, was altogether a very gallant exploit, and Lieutenant Devon well merited the praises that were bestowed upon him for his conduct on the occasion.

Early in the month of October Captain Arthur Farquhar, of the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Desirée*, arrived at Heligoland, and assumed the command of the British naval force on that station. By this time the French had regained possession of Cuxhaven. After performing several important services up the Weser and Ems, Captain Farquhar, on the 30th of November, with a small squadron of gun-brigs and gun-boats, successfully co-operated with a Russian force in an attack upon the heavy batteries that defended Cuxhaven. Crossing the Elbe, Captain Farquhar afterwards ascended to *Gluckstadt*, and co-operated with a detachment of the Crown Prince of Sweden's army in reducing that important fortress. On the 5th of January, 1814, after an investment of 16, and a bombardment of six days, *Gluckstadt* surrendered by capitulation.

The British squadron which, besides the *Desirée*, was employed on the occasion, appears to have been, the 10-gun schooner-sloop *Shamrock*, Captain John Marshall, brig-sloop (late gun-brig) *Hearty*, Captain James Rose, gun-brigs *Blazer*, Lieutenant Francis Banks, and *Redbreast*, Lieutenant Sir George Morat Keith, and gun-boats, No. 1, Lieutenant David Hanmer, No. 2, master's mate Thomas Riches, No. 3, Lieutenant Charles Henry Seale, No. 4, Lieutenant Andrew Tullock, No. 5, midshipmen John Hallows, No. 8, Lieutenant Richard Roper, No. 10, Lieutenant Francis Darby Romney, and No. 12, Lieutenant John Henderson. Captain Farquhar, in his despatch, speaks also in high terms of Captain Andrew Green, who commanded a party of seamen and marines on shore, and of his assistants, Lieutenants Charles Haultain and John Archer and midshipman George Richardson; likewise of Lieutenant Joshua Kneeshaw. The loss sustained by the flotilla amounted to three men killed, and 16 wounded, including Captain Rose, midshipman Richard Hunt, and captain's clerk John Riches.

On the 16th of December, 1812, the French 40-gun frigate *Gloire*, Captain Albin-Réné Roussin, sailed from Havre, with a very strong south-east wind, which carried her as far as the *Lizard*, and there left her, on the afternoon of the 17th, entirely becalmed. On the 18th, at daylight, the *Gloire* found herself nearly in the midst of nine vessels, the greater part of them evidently merchantmen. Two of the number, however, were vessels of war: the nearest was the British 18-gun ship-sloop *Albacore* (sixteen 32, and eight 12, pounder carronades and two long sixes, with a crew of 121 men and boys), Captain Henry Thomas Davies; and, about four miles to the westward of her, was the 14-gun brig-schooner *Pickle*, Lieutenant William Figg. At 8 A. M. the *Gloire*, who had been standing on the starboard tack, wore with a light air of wind and edged away for the *Albacore*, then bearing from her north-east by north. Each ship soon ascertained that the other was an enemy; and at 9 A. M. the *Gloire* hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, and made all sail to escape. Judging by this, probably, that the apparent French 40-gun frigate was an *armée en flûte* or large store-ship, Captain Davies crowded sail in chase, followed, at some distance, by the *Pickle*; the latter and the *Albacore* making repeated signals, to apprise the vessels in sight of the presence of an enemy.

At 10 h. 12 m. A. M., having by carrying down the breeze arrived within carronade range on the French frigate's weather quarter, the *Albacore* opened her fire; whereupon the *Gloire* hoisted French colours and fired in return, hauling up a little, to bestow a raking broadside upon her unequal antagonist. To avoid this the *Albacore* tacked. The breeze soon afterwards fell to nearly a calm; and at 11 A. M., finding her antagonist much too strong for her, the *Albacore* discontinued the action, with her fore spring-stay shot away, her rigging a good deal damaged, and, what was the worst of all, with the loss of one lieutenant (William Harman) killed and six or seven men wounded. Strange to say, the French frigate herself did not seem disposed to renew the action, but wore and made all sail to the westward.

At 1 P. M., the *Pickle* having closed and a light breeze having sprung up from the southward, the *Albacore* again made sail, and at 3 P. M. was joined in the chase by the 12-gun brig-sloop (late gun-brig) *Borer*, Captain Richard Coote, and 4-gun cutter *Landrail*, Lieutenant John Hill. At 5 P. M. the *Albacore* began firing her bow-chasers; as, on coming up, did two out of her three (for the *Landrail* to have fired her 12-pounder carronades would have been a farce) formidable consorts. To this alarming cannonade, the *Gloire* replied with her stern-chasers, and continued running from the "*escadrille*," as if each of her four pursuers had been a frigate like herself. Thus the chase continued, but without any firing after 7 P. M., until midnight on the 19th;



when this dastardly French frigate, who, it appears, did not have a man hurt on the occasion, had run herself completely out of sight. Captain Davies merited great praise for his gallantry and perseverance; and there cannot be a doubt that, by the boldness of the *Albacore* in chasing and attacking the *Gloire*, several merchant vessels were saved from capture.

On the following day, the 20th, the *Gloire* captured the *Spy* armed store-ship, from Halifax, Nova-Scotia, and, disarming her, sent her to England as a cartel. Captain Roussin then steered for the coast of Spain and Portugal, and on the 28th, off the rock of Lisbon, was chased for a short time by two ships of war. On the 1st of February he arrived to windward of Barbadoes, and returned soon afterwards to Europe. On the 25th, in the chops of the Channel, the wind blowing a gale with a raging sea, the *Gloire* fell in with the British 14-gun brig *Linnet*, Lieutenant John Tracey. Bearing up under her foresail and close-reefed main topsail, the *Gloire*, at 2 h. 30 m. P. M., arrived within hail of the *Linnet* and ordered her to strike. Instead of doing so, the brig boldly crossed the bows of the French frigate, and, regardless of a heavy fire which the latter commenced, got to windward of her. As the *Gloire* outsailed the *Linnet* on every point, all that Lieutenant Tracey could now do, was to endeavour to outmanœuvre her. This he did by making short tacks; well aware that, owing to her great length, the frigate could not come about so quickly as a brig of less than 200 tons. In practising this manœuvre, the *Linnet* had to cross the bows of the *Gloire* a second and a third time (the second time so near as to carry away the frigate's jib-boom), and was all the while exposed to her fire; but which, owing to the ill-direction of the shot from the roughness of the sea, did no great execution. At length, at 3 h. 30 m. P. M., having succeeded in cutting away some of the *Linnet*'s rigging, the *Gloire* got nearly alongside of her; but the resolute lieutenant would not yet haul down the British colours. The *Linnet* suddenly bore up athwart the hawse of the frigate; and the *Gloire*, had she not as suddenly luffed up, must, Captain Roussin says, have passed completely over the brig. Being now under the guns of the *Gloire*, two of the latter's broadsides carried away the fore yard, gaff, and bowsprit of the *Linnet*, and compelled the brig to surrender. Such seamanship and intrepidity, on the part of Lieutenant Tracey, show where the *Gloire* would have been, had he encountered her in a frigate. To do M. Roussin justice, he complimented his prisoner highly for the skill and perseverance he had shown; and all must allow, that the captain of the *Gloire* was an excellent judge of the best means to effect an escape.

On the 27th the *Gloire* and her prize anchored at Brest; and Lieutenant Tracey and his officers and crew remained as prisoners until the spring of the ensuing year. On the 31st of

May, 1814, a court-martial was held on board the *Gladiator* at Portsmouth, to try the late officers and crew of the *Linnet* for her loss. On that occasion, Lieutenant Tracey received, with an honourable acquittal, the most unqualified praise for his conduct; and in 11 days afterwards, as we see by the list, was deservedly made a commander.

On the 17th of April, in the morning, the British 16-gun brig-sloop *Mutine*, Captain Nevinson De Courcy, cruising in the bay of Biscay, discovered and chased a strange ship on her lee bow. At 2 P. M. the ship, which was the *Invincible* privateer, of Bayonne, Captain Martin Jortis, mounting 16 guns (twelve French 18-pounder carronades and four long sixes), with a crew on board of 86 men, partly Americans, hoisted French colours, and commenced a fire from her stern-guns; which, disabling the *Mutine* in her sails and rigging, occasioned her to drop astern. The *Mutine* immediately commenced refitting herself, and at 8 h. 40 m. again arrived within gun-shot; when the *Invincible* hoisted a light and opened a fire from her broadside. In this way the running fight was maintained until 10 h. 45 m. P. M.; when, the ship having had her main topgallantmast and jib shot away, the *Mutine* was enabled to close. Still it was not until after a spirited resistance of 50 minutes, which made it 11 h. 30 m. P. M., that the *Invincible* hauled down her colours. The *Mutine* is represented to have had two men wounded in the action, but the loss, if any, sustained by the *Invincible* appears to have been omitted in Captain De Courcy's letter.

On the 9th of September, at 3 P. M., the British schooner *Alphea*, of eight 18-pounder carronades, and 41 men and boys, Lieutenant Thomas William Jones, fell in with and chased the French 14-gun privateer schooner *Renard*, Captain De Roux, belonging to Cherbourg, and acknowledged to have had on board a crew of 50 men. At midnight the *Alphea* commenced firing her chase-guns; and at 1 A. M. on the 10th a close and spirited action commenced. After a while, the *Alphea*, by the calm and the heavy swell that prevailed, became forced under the bows of the *Renard*. The crew of the privateer immediately threw into the *Alphea* several hand-grenades and made an attempt to board, but were gallantly repulsed by the crew of the British schooner; which latter then poured in a most destructive fire of grape-shot, that swept the whole of the *Renard's* fore-castle. A second boarding attempt was made, and the Frenchmen were again beaten off.

The two schooners soon afterwards burst the grapplings by which they had been held together, and separated to a short distance; both still maintaining a furious cannonade. At 3 h. 30 m. A. M., owing in a great measure to the number of hand-grenades which had been thrown into her, the *Alphea* blew up; and along with her, perished the whole of her gallant crew. Three or four men were seen on a piece of the wreck, but the *Renard*

having had her jollyboat sunk by shot as it was towing astern, and her launch cut to pieces as it lay on the booms, could render no assistance; nor could the poor fellows find their way to the privateer, although repeatedly hailed to do so, as they had lost their eyesight by the explosion.

The loss on board the *Renard*, as acknowledged by her officers, amounted to five men killed and 31 badly wounded, including the captain with the loss of an arm, and three of his lieutenants. There was also a fourth lieutenant, who took the command when Captain Le Roux was wounded. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the "50 men" refer to the sailors only, and that, officers included, the *Renard* had from 70 to 80 men. As mounting "14 guns," this schooner must have been about 200 tons measurement: whereas the *Alpea* one of the Bermudian vessels was only 111 tons. The execution admitted to have been done by the *Alpea* to her antagonist, was highly creditable to the gunnery of the British crew, and renders it probable that, had not the fatal accident happened, the *Alpea* would have made a prize of the *Renard*, although the latter was so much superior to her in force. It was, indeed, a lamentable occurrence; and, to heighten the misfortune, Lieutenant Jones was a very deserving officer.

In the early part of October the French brig-corvette *Flibustier*, mounting fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two long sixes or eights, and commanded by Lieutenant de vaisseau Jean-Jacques-Léonore Daniel, lay at St.-Jean-de-Luz, about three leagues north-east of the bar of Bayonne, watching an opportunity to put to sea, with treasure, arms, ammunition, salt-provisions, and a few troops, for the garrison of Santona. The near approach of the Marquess of Wellington's army at last made it necessary to move; and, taking advantage of the dark and stormy state of the weather, the *Flibustier*, at midnight, on the 12th, attended three "trincadores," or armed fishing-boats, weighed and stood alongshore to the south-west. At daylight on the 13th the French brig, then lying becalmed close under the heights near the mouth of Bayonne river, was seen and chased by the British schooner *Telegraph*, of twelve 12-pounder carronades, Lieutenant Timothy Scriven, also by the 18-gun brig-sloop *Challenger*, Captain Frederick Vernon, and 12-gun brig *Constant*, Lieutenant John Stokes; the latter about six, the former upwards of eight, miles distant in the offing.

Favoured by a partial breeze, the *Flibustier*, who had by this time anchored under the distant protection of some batteries; and at 6 h. 45 m. P. M. the schooner commenced cannonading the brig in a raking position ahead. The *Flibustier* returned the *Telegraph's* broadside with such of her guns as would bear. The action continued in this way until about 7 P. M.; when finding the two British brigs in the offing approaching to take a part in the combat, the French brig

set herself on fire. The schooner continued discharging her guns for about half an hour longer. Lieutenant Scriven then ceased firing, and sent his boats to endeavour to save the vessel, whose crew had already reached the shore in their boats. The schooner's boat got on board; and so, it is believed, did some boats from the Challenger and Constant, but too late to save the Flibustier; which at about 8 h. 10 m. P. M. exploded, in sight of the English and French armies encamped on the east side of the Adour. The Telegraph had not a man hurt, nor, as it appears, a spar or a shroud shot away.

For his gallantry in advancing to attack a force so much superior to his own, Lieutenant Scriven was promoted to the rank of commander; and the Telegraph, by his continuing to be captain of her, became a sloop of war. Lest we should appear to have underrated the force of the Flibustier, we are bound to state, that the official account of her destruction assigns her a force of 16 carronades and two nines, with a brass howitzer, and four brass 3-pounders. The swivels and howitzer she may have mounted; but we doubt if the Flibustier carried more than 14 carronades, chiefly because we know not of a single instance (the Abeille, as already stated, had been a foreign-built vessel\*), in which a regular French brig-corvette mounted more than 16 guns, similar to the Oreste, and a great many others that have appeared in these pages. Moreover, very little time was allowed for the British, to take an accurate account of the force of the Flibustier.

On the 30th of September the two Franco-Batavian 40-gun frigates Trave and Weser, Captains Jacob Van-Maren and Paul-Roelof Cantz-Laar, put to sea from the Texel, on a cruise off the Western Isles. On the 16th of October a violent gale of wind dismasted both frigates, and separated them from each other. On the 18th, towards 1 A. M., latitude  $47^{\circ} 30'$  north, longitude  $9^{\circ} 18'$  west, the British 18-gun brig-sloop Scylla, Captain Colin Macdonald, fell in with the Weser, then with the loss of her main and mizen masts and fore topmast, steering east by north, on her way to Brest. After hailing the frigate several times, the Scylla received a broadside from her. On this the brig made sail ahead. At daylight both vessels hoisted their colours; but Captain Macdonald judged it not prudent to attack a ship that, although crippled in her masts, was so decidedly his superior in guns and men; especially, as the Scylla might herself get crippled, and, in the severe state of the weather, be thereby prevented from keeping sight of the frigate: a service on which the brig now assiduously employed herself.

On the 19th, at daylight, having passed the night in burning blue lights, firing guns, and throwing up rockets, to indicate that she was in chase of an enemy, the Scylla found herself alone,

\* See vol. v., p. 368.

the thick weather obscuring the Weser from her view. Steering, during that day and night, a course deemed the most likely to rejoin the French frigate, the *Scylla*, at daylight on the morning of the 20th, fell in with the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Royalist*, Captain James John Gordon Bremer. The latter, volunteering, the two brigs, with the wind from the south-west, bore away to seek and engage the enemy, then supposed to be in the east-north-east. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the Weser was discovered in the north-east, and chased; latitude at noon  $48^{\circ} 28'$  north, longitude  $6^{\circ} 18'$  west. At 3 h. 30 m. P. M. the two brigs opened their fire, the *Royalist* stationing herself on the frigate's starboard bow, and the *Scylla* on her starboard quarter. At 5 P. M., being much cut up in their sails and rigging, and the *Scylla* having her mainmast shot through, and the *Royalist* five men badly wounded, the two brigs hauled off to repair their damages.

Since 1 h. 30 m. P. M. a sail had been observed to leeward. This was the British 74-gun ship *Rippon*, Captain Sir Christopher Cole, using her utmost efforts to take a part in the action. Captain Macdonald now detached Captain Bremer to reconnoitre the ship to leeward. The *Royalist* accordingly bore up, and the *Scylla* continued following the French frigate. On the 21st, at a little before daylight, the *Royalist* spoke the *Rippon*, and again made all sail on a wind to close the *Scylla* and frigate. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Scylla*, taking a raking position, recommenced firing at the Weser; and the *Royalist*, placing herself on the latter's larboard bow, soon joined in the action. In 10 minutes, finding that the *Rippon* was nearly within gun-shot on her lee quarter, and that all hopes of escape were at an end, the Weser fired her larboard guns at the *Royalist*, and, standing on towards the *Rippon*, hauled down her colours. A boat from the *Royalist* immediately boarded the French frigate; and the *Rippon*, on arriving up, took the prize in tow, and conducted her to Falmouth.

In this creditable performance on the part of the two brigs, the *Scylla* had two seamen wounded, and the *Royalist* two seamen killed, her first lieutenant (James Waring), master (William Wilson, severely), five seamen, one marine, and one boy wounded; total, on board the two brigs, two killed and 11 wounded. As a proof that the carronades of the brigs had produced some effect, the Weser, out of a crew of 340 men and boys, had four men killed and 15 wounded.

On the morning of the same day on which the Weser was captured, the British brig-sloop *Achates*, of fourteen 24-pounder carronades and two sixes, Captain Isaac Hawkins Morrison, standing to the south-south-east with the wind at south-west, fell in with the *Trave*, upon her weather beam. The *Achates* immediately made sail in chase, and, as soon as she had fore-reached sufficiently, wore and stood for the French frigate. At 7 h. 50 m. A. M. the *Achates* gallantly engaged the *Trave* in



der's larboard quarter, the French captain hailed the supposed merchantman to bring to, and strike.

With her numerous crew all ready, the Neptune then put up her helm, to lay her anticipated prize on board. The Thunder at the same moment put her helm down, and had barely time to fire her four carronades and a volley of musketry, when the lugger fell on board. A portion of the British crew were on her decks in a trice; and, after a severe conflict, in which four Frenchmen were killed and 10 wounded, including one mortally and five very severely, the Thunder made a prize of the Neptune, and that with so slight a loss as two men wounded.

On the 1st of November, in the morning, St.-Vallery on the coast of France bearing south-south-east distant five miles, the 16-gun brig-sloop Snap, Captain William Bateman Dashwood, discovered five French armed luggers, three in the north-west close to windward, and two considerably to leeward. The Snap immediately wore and stood for the three weathermost luggers, but Captain Dashwood had very soon the mortification to observe their separation, and then their escape by superior sailing. At 9 A. M. the Snap bore up in pursuit of the two leewardmost vessels, and, after using various deceptions, enticed one alongside. The British brig immediately opened her fire, and, at the end of a 10 minutes' cannonade, captured, without the loss of a man, the French privateer Lion, of Boulogne, mounting 16 guns, with 69 men; of whom the captain and four men were killed, and six severely wounded.

The British squadron, stationed off the north coast of Spain to assist the patriots, was under the command of Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, of the 38-gun frigate *Surveillante*. In the early part of May the force detached off the port of Castro de Urdeales consisted of the brig-sloops *Lyra*, Captain Robert Bloye, and *Royalist* and *Sparrow*, Captains James John Gordon Bremer and Joseph Needham Tayler. Although every thing was done by the three commanders and their respective officers and crews, in landing guns and bringing them into operation, the French force in the neighbourhood was too powerful to be resisted. By great exertions the garrison, consisting of about 1150 men, was embarked on board the brigs and conveyed to Bermeo. The loss sustained by the little squadron, in the service it had performed, amounted to 10 wounded, including Lieutenant Samuel Kentish and midshipman Charles Thomas Sutton (leg amputated) of the *Royalist*.

The principal object now was to blockade the port, and prevent the French garrison from getting any supplies. This was so effectually done, that on the 22d of June, after committing upon the inhabitants enormities of the most revolting description, the French evacuated the town and retired to Santona. The *Sparrow* having just at this moment arrived off the port, Captain Tayler very properly garrisoned the castle; and such

was the precipitate flight of the French commandant, on observing the approach of the British brig, that he fled without destroying the artillery or powder.

On the 10th of July, at 10 A. M., the breaching batteries, raised by the army of General Graham on the Choze sand-hills, were opened against the walls of St.-Sebastian's; and a detachment of seamen was landed from Sir George Collier's squadron to co-operate in the attack, under the orders of the first lieutenant of the *Surveillante*, Dowell O'Reilly. The loss sustained by this detachment, up to the evening of the 21st of July, amounted to two seamen killed, Lieutenant Robert Graham Dunlop, and five seamen wounded. The squadron stationed off St.-Sebastian's consisted, besides the *Surveillante*, *Lyra*, and *Sparrow*, of the 38-gun frigates *Révolutionnaire* and *Présidente*, Captains John Charles Woolcombe and Francis Mason, brig-sloops *Beagle*, *Despatch*, and *Challenger*, Captains John Smith, James Galloway, and Frederick Vernon, schooners *Holly* and *Juniper*, and two gun-boats.

On the 31st of August two divisions of boats from the squadron, placed under the orders of Captains Galloway and Bloye, were sent to make a demonstration on the back of the rock of St.-Sebastian's. The plan succeeded, and a large proportion of the garrison was diverted from the defence of the breach which, on the preceding day, had been made in the walls. The men-of-war brigs also weighed with a light breeze, and stood into the harbour. At 11 A. M. the assault by the breach took place, and at 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the town was entered and possessed; but the citadel still held out. Captain Smith of the *Beagle* was slightly wounded, also three or four of the seamen. On the 8th of September the breaching and mortar batteries opened a most ruinous fire upon the castle of La Motte, or citadel of St.-Sebastian's; and in a very short time General Rey, the governor, sent out a flag of truce to propose terms of capitulation, which were immediately agreed to. In addition to the ships already named, there were present co-operating in the attack, the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Magicienne*, Captain the Honourable William Gordon, and the gun-brig *Constant*, Lieutenant John Stokes. Among the naval officers who distinguished themselves on the occasion, Captain Sir George Collier names Lieutenant the Honourable James Arbuthnot of the *Surveillante*, also midshipmen Digby Marsh, George Harvey, Henry Bloye, and William Lawson.

On the 18th of March the British 38-gun frigate *Undaunted*, Captain Thomas Ussher, chased a tartan under the battery of Carri, situated about five leagues to the westward of Marseille. Light winds preventing the ship from getting up, Lieutenant Aaron Tozer offered his services to destroy the battery. The boats under his orders, assisted by Mr. Robert Clennan the master, acting Lieutenant Thomas Salkeld and Lieutenant of Marines Harry Hunt, pushed off accordingly to execute the



service. The British landed, and in a few minutes afterwards carried the battery, mounting four 24-pounders, a 6-pounder field-gun, and a 13-inch mortar; and this although the French troops were strongly posted behind palisades, and stood until the marines were in the act of charging bayonets, when they turned and suffered a severe loss. The guns at the battery were all destroyed, the tartan brought out, and the boats returned to the ship with no greater loss than two men killed and one wounded.

On the 30th, while the Undaunted was in company with the 38-gun frigate *Volontaire*, Captain and senior officer the Honourable Granville George Waldegrave, and the 18-gun brig-sloop *Redwing*, Captain Sir John Gordon Sinclair, 14 merchant vessels were discovered at anchor in the harbour of Morgion, situated between Marseille and Toulon. Lieutenant Isaac Shaw, first of the *Volontaire*, assisted by Lieutenants of marines William Burton and Harry Hunt, proceeded with the boats of the three ships, to endeavour to cut out the convoy.

On the 31st, in the morning, Lieutenant Shaw and his party landed at Sourion, and, marching over the hills at daylight, carried the two batteries of the place in the rear, after a partial resistance from 40 French troops stationed at them. Five 36-pounders in one battery, and two 24-pounders in the other, were thrown into the sea, one mortar well spiked, and all the ammunition destroyed. The boats, under Lieutenant Dey Richard Syer, although elsewhere opposed by two field-pieces, brought out 11 vessels, tartans and settees, laden with oil, and destroyed some others. The whole service was accomplished with so slight a loss as one marine killed, and two marines and two seamen wounded. The names of no other officers present, than those above given, appear in Captain Waldegrave's letter, except mid-shipman Charles Wyvill, on whom great praise is bestowed.

On the 2d of May Captain Robert Hussey Moubray, of the 74-gun ship *Repulse*, detached 100 marines from that ship, under Captain Edward Michael Ennis, along with the marines of the *Volontaire* and *Undaunted*, to destroy some newly erected works in the vicinity of Morgion; while the boats of the squadron, under Lieutenant Isaac Shaw, first of the *Volontaire*, covered by the launches with their carronades and by the brig-sloop *Redwing*, brought out some vessels that were in the harbour. The detachment of marines landed, and drove a detachment of French troops to the heights in the rear of the harbour; where they were kept in check until the vessels were secured, and the batteries, on which were found nine gun-carriages and a 13-inch mortar, were blown up and destroyed. On this occasion Lieutenant Shaw was wounded; and in the boats two men were killed and three wounded. The vessels brought out were six in number, all laden, but small.

Between the 10th and 15th of May, through the judicious

management of Captain Charles Napier of the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Euryalus*, the French coasting trade, to and from Toulon to the eastward, was collected in Cavalarie road, to the number of upwards of 20 sail. Judging this convoy to be a proper object of attack, Captain Edward Brace, of the 74-gun ship *Berwick*, detached for the purpose the boats of the two ships under the orders of Lieutenant Henry Johnston Sweedland, assisted by Lieutenant Alexander Sandiland, first of the *Euryalus*, and, among others, by midshipmen John Monk and Maurice Crawford, containing, along with a detachment of seamen, the whole of the marines of the 74 and frigate, commanded by Captain William T. I. Matthews.

On the morning of the 16th the united detachments landed, and in 20 minutes were in possession of the batteries, and had begun to open a fire from them upon the retreating enemy. The French national xebec *Fortune*, carrying 10 long 8-pounders and four swivels, with a crew of 95 men, commanded by Lieutenant Félix-Marie-Louis-Anne-Joseph-Julien Lecamus, tried to effect her escape; but the *Euryalus*, pushing close in, cut her off. The French crew then abandoned her, leaving her, with a hole made through her bottom by a shot from one of her guns and a train laid to her magazine, at anchor with a spring on her cable, under the fire of the *Euryalus*, the captured fort, and the launches. The vessel was promptly boarded by a division of the boats, and just in time to preserve her from blowing up or sinking. The vessels found in the harbour amounted to 22, of different descriptions. The whole were either taken or destroyed; and the object of the enterprise was fully accomplished, with no greater loss than one marine killed and one seaman missing.

On the 18th of August an attack was made upon the batteries of Cassis, a town between Marseille and Toulon, by the *Undaunted* frigate, *Redwing* brig, and 16-gun brig-sloop *Kite*, Captain the Honourable Robert Cavendish Spencer, accompanied by a detachment of boats from the three first-named vessels, and from the *Caledonia*, *Hibernia*, *Barfleur*, and *Prince-of-Wales* line-of-battle ships, part of Sir Edward Pellew's fleet. Owing to light winds, the *Undaunted* could not take up the anchorage that Captain Usher intended; but the *Redwing* and *Kite*, in spite of a fire from four batteries that protected the entrance of the bay, swept themselves in, and took a most judicious position for covering the marines; who, led by Captain Jeremiah Coghlan, of the *Caledonia*, carried the citadel battery by escalade. The marines then drove the French before them, at the point of the bayonet, and pursued them through the batteries to the heights that commanded the town. The boats, under the direction of Captain Sir John Sinclair of the *Redwing*, then entered the mole, across the entrance to which two heavy gun-boats were moored, and captured them, a third gun-boat, and 24 merchant settees and tartans.

The loss sustained by the British in executing this dashing enterprise was rather serious, amounting to four marines killed, one lieutenant (Aaron Tozer), one petty officer, and 14 marines wounded. In his official letter, Captain Ussher mentions, besides those already named, the following officers as having behaved with distinguished gallantry: Lieutenants Joseph Robert Hownam and Joseph Grimshaw, Captains of marines Thomas Sherman and Thomas Hussey, and Lieutenants of marines Harry Hunt, Robert Turtliff Dyer, William Blucke, John Maule, Thomas Reeves, Alexander Jarvis, Edward Mallard, and Samuel Burdon Ellis. Lieutenant Hunt, it appears, was the first who entered the citadel battery, by a ladder, under a galling fire.

On the 26th of February, in the morning, the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate *Thames*, then Captain Charles Napier, and 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Furieuse*, Captain William Mounsey, having on board Lieutenant-colonel Coffin and the second battalion of the 10th regiment of foot, bore up for the narrow entrance (about a quarter of a mile across) to the harbour of the island of Ponza on the coast of Naples; and, giving and receiving a fire from the batteries on each side, anchored close across the mole-head. Colonel Coffin and the troops were then landed, and pushed for a tower into which the enemy had retreated. The appearance of the troops, aided by the severe fire of the ships, induced the governor to hoist a flag of truce. This led to a capitulation, and the island on the same day surrendered to the arms of his Britannic majesty. Nor did the British lose a single man in either service, although the batteries mounted ten 24 and 18 pounders and two 9-inch mortars; and although the *Thames* was hulled three times and the *Furieuse* twice, besides having their sails and rigging a good deal cut.

A convoy of 50 sail of armed vessels, chiefly Neapolitan gun-boats, having assembled at *Pietra-Nera* on the coast of Calabria, to be ready to transport to Naples timber and other government property, Captain Robert Hall, who commanded the Sicilian flotilla stationed at Messina, volunteered, with two divisions of gun-boats and four companies of the 75th regiment, under the command of Major Stewart, supplied by Lieutenant-general Lord William Bentinck at Palermo, to destroy the enemy's works. On the night of the 14th of February Captain Hall proceeded to the attack; but, owing to light and contrary winds, the boats did not arrive at *Pietra-Nera* until nearly daylight on the 15th; when Major Stewart, with about 150 men, and an auxiliary party of seamen commanded by Lieutenant Francis Le Hunts, landed, and, without waiting for the remainder of the force intended to be employed, pushed up a height, the possession of which a complete battalion, with two troops of cavalry and two pieces of artillery, were prepared to dispute.

Assisted by a corporal's detachment of the rocket corps, the British troops charged the height in the most determined manner, and succeeded only after as determined a resistance, the French colonel-commandant, Roche, and most of his officers, being killed or made prisoners, and the height literally covered with dead. The division of the flotilla under Captain Imbert had by this time commenced a most destructive cannonade on the batteries; which held out with such obstinacy, that Captain Hall was obliged to order them to be successively stormed. This service was performed by Lieutenant Le Hunte, with a party of seamen, in a very gallant style. At 8 A. M. every thing was in the possession of the assailants; the most valuable of the enemy's vessels and timber launched, and the rest on fire. Upwards of 150 French were killed and wounded, and 163 made prisoners including several of the principal officers. Major Stewart, whose behaviour is highly praised by Captain Hall, fell by a musket-shot while, in company with the latter, pushing from the shore after the troops had embarked. The loss on the part of the navy amounted to only one boatswain and one seaman killed and seven seamen wounded.

On the 6th of January, at daybreak, as the British 38-gun frigate *Bacchante*, Captain William Hoste, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Weasel*, Captain James Black, were lying becalmed about five leagues to the south-east of Cape Otranto, at the mouth of the Adriatic, five gun-vessels were discovered; three in the south-west, steering towards Otranto, and two in the south-east, steering to the eastward. Ordering, by signal, the *Weasel* to attend to the latter, Captain Hoste sent the *Bacchante's* boats, under the command of Lieutenant Donat Henchy O'Brien, assisted by Lieutenants Silas Thomas Hood and Frank Gostling, Lieutenant of marines William Haig, master's mates George Powell and James M'Kean, and midshipmen the Honourable Henry I. Rous and William Waldegrave, Thomas Edward Hoste, James Leonard Few, and Edward O. Pocock, in pursuit of the division in the south-west. At 8 A. M. Lieutenant O'Brien in the barge captured the sternmost gun-boat, mounting two guns, one French 12, and one 6-pounder, both on pivots, and manned with 36 men, commanded by the senior French officer of the three, all of whom were ensignes de vaisseau.

Leaving, to take possession of the prize, the first gig, commanded by midshipman Thomas Edward Hoste, Lieutenant O'Brien pushed on after the two remaining gun-vessels, then sweeping with all their strength towards the coast of Calabria. Sending his prisoners below, and fastening the hatches over them, young Hoste, with his seven men, in the most gallant manner, loaded and fired the bow-gun at the retreating gun-boats; which, in a little time, were also captured. This dashing enterprise, with Lieutenant O'Brien's usual good fortune, was achieved without any loss, although the shot from the gun-

vessels cut the oars from the men's hands as the boats were pulling towards them. For his gallantry on the above and several other occasions, Lieutenant O'Brien was promoted to the rank of commander.

The Weasel not being able to overtake her two gun-vessels, two of her boats under Lieutenant Thomas Whaley and midshipman James Stewart, and a boat belonging to the Bacchante under master's mate Edward Webb, proceeded in chase. The Bacchante's boat, taking the lead, soon overtook, and, although she carried only a 3-pounder in the bow with 18 men, captured, in spite of a warm opposition, the sternmost French gun-boat, armed the same as that already described, and having 40 men actually on board. Leaving the captured vessel to be taken possession of by the boats astern, Mr. Webb pushed after the remaining gun-boat, and carried her in the same gallant manner, and with equal impunity as to loss.

On the 14th of February, early in the morning, the Bacchante sent her barge, armed with a 12-pounder carronade and manned with 23 officers and men under Lieutenant Hood, in chase of a vessel seen by the night-glass to be sweeping and steering for Otranto. After pouring in a destructive fire of round shot and musketry, Lieutenant Hood, assisted by Lieutenant of marines William Haig and master's mates William Lee Rees and Charles Bruce, boarded and carried the French gun-vessel Alcinous, of two long 24-pounders and 45 men, last from Corfu. The only person hurt on the British side was Lieutenant Hood, who received a severe contusion on the loins by a fall; so severe, indeed, that this gallant young officer became eventually deprived of the use of both his legs. The loss on the French side amounted to two killed and nine wounded, and the gun-boat was so shattered by the carronade, that she had three feet water in her hold. As soon, therefore, as the prisoners were removed, it was found necessary to set the prize on fire.

Notwithstanding that an officer of acknowledged merit is now walking on crutches, in consequence of an incurable lameness produced by the wound he received in this truly gallant enterprise, no other notice was taken in the London Gazette of Captain Hoste's letter on the subject, than a statement, that two letters, dated on the 14th of February, had been received: "One, reporting the capture, off Otranto, of l'Alcinous French gun-boat, carrying two guns and 32 men, and of eight trading vessels under her convoy from Corfu; the other, stating the capture of la Vigilante French courier gun-boat, from Corfu to Otranto with despatches, and having on board, as passenger, the general of artillery Corda and his staff."

On the 11th of May, receiving information that a convoy of enemy's vessels were lying in the channel of Karlebago, Captain Hoste proceeded thither; but, on account of a contrary wind and strong current, the Bacchante did not arrive there until the

morning of the 15th. As the port of Karlebago offered excellent shelter for enemy's vessels, Captain Hoste resolved to destroy the works that defended it. The governor refusing to accede to the terms offered, the *Bacchante* anchored within pistol-shot of the battery, which mounted eight guns; and, after a good deal of firing, a truce was hung out, and the place surrendered at discretion. The marines, and a detachment of seamen under Lieutenant Hood, landed and took possession. The guns of the place were embarked, the public works destroyed, and the castle blown up; and the *Bacchante* retired with the loss of four seamen severely wounded, two of them with their arms shot off.

On the 12th of June, at daylight, the *Bacchante* discovered an enemy's convoy under the town of Gela-Nova, on the coast of Abruzza. As the frigate was six or seven miles to leeward of them, with a light breeze and a strong current against her, Captain Hoste detached the boats under Lieutenant Hood, with discretionary orders, either to attack the convoy or to wait till the *Bacchante* arrived. Lieutenant Hood took with him Lieutenant Frank Gostling, acting Lieutenant Edward Webb, Lieutenants of marines Charles Holmes and William Haig, master's mate William Lee Rees, and midshipmen James Rowe, Thomas Edward Hoste, Francis George Farewell, the Honourable William Waldegrave, Thomas William Langton, James M'Kean, and Samuel Richardson.

Lieutenant Hood found the enemy much stronger than had been expected, consisting of seven large gun-boats, mounting each one long 18-pounder in the bow, three smaller gun-vessels, with a 4-pounder in the bow, and 14 sail of merchant vessels, four of which also had guns in the bow: and the shore astern of the vessels was lined with troops intrenched on the beach, having with them two field-pieces. This, "says Captain Hoste," was the force opposed to a frigate's boats; but no disparity of numbers could check the spirit of the brave officers and men employed on this service. The attack was determined on instantly, and executed with all the gallantry and spirit which men accustomed to danger and to despise it have so frequently shown; and never was there a finer display of it than on this occasion." The boats, as they advanced, were exposed to a heavy fire of grape and musketry; and it was not until they were fairly alongside the gun-boats, that the crews of the latter slackened their fire: they were then driven from their vessels with great loss. The troops on the beach, stated by the prisoners to amount to 100 men, fled on the first fire, and their two field-pieces were destroyed by the British marines. In performing this very brilliant exploit, the boats of the *Bacchante* sustained a loss of two seamen and one marine killed, and five seamen and one marine wounded.

On the 22d of April, at daybreak, the brig-sloop *Weasel*,

cruising about four miles to the east-north-east of the island of Zirana, discovered and chased a convoy, close to the main land, making for the ports of Trau and Spalatro. As the brig approached, the vessels separated in different directions, the greater part, with 10 gun-boats, bearing up for the bay of Boscalina. These the Weasel continued to chase under all sail; and at 5 h. 30 m. A. M. they anchored in a line about a mile from the shore, hoisted French colours, and commenced firing at her. The wind blowing strong from the south-east, which was directly into the bay, the sails and rigging of the brig were considerably damaged before she could close. At 6 A. M., however, the Weasel anchored with springs, within pistol-shot of the gun-boats; and a furious action commenced. At the end of 20 minutes the latter cut their cables, ran closer in, and again opened their fire. This increased distance not suiting her caronades, the Weasel cut her cable, ran within half pistol-shot of the gun-boats, and recommenced the action. Three large guns, at the distance of 30 yards from each other, and 200 or 300 musketry, on the heights immediately over the British brig, now united their fire to that of the gun-boats. The engagement continued in this way until 10 A. M.; when three of the gun-boats struck their colours, two were driven on shore, and one was sunk.

The remaining four gun-boats were now reinforced by four more from the eastward; who anchored outside the Weasel, and commenced firing at her. This obliged the brig to engage on both sides, but the outer gun-boats afterwards ran in and joined the others; all of whom now placed themselves behind a point of land, so that the Weasel could only see their masts from her deck. Here the gun-boats commenced a most destructive fire, their grape-shot striking the brig over the land in every part. At this time the Weasel's crew, originally short by the absence of several men in prizes, was so reduced, that she could with difficulty man four guns; the marines and a few of the seamen firing musketry, her grape being all expended. The action lasted in this way until 3 P. M., when the gun-boats discontinued their fire. At the expiration of 40 minutes the engagement recommenced, and continued, without intermission, until 6 h. 30 m. P. M., when the firing entirely ceased on both sides.

The Weasel was now in a very critical situation: she was but a few yards from a lee-shore, almost a complete wreck, with the whole of her running, and the greater part of her standing, rigging cut to pieces, most of her sails shot from the yards, her masts shot through in several places, her anchors all destroyed or rendered unserviceable, her hull pierced with shot, five of which had entered between wind and water, and her two pumps shot away between the decks, so that the crew could with difficulty keep the brig free by constantly bailing at both hatches.

In addition to all this, the Weasel had already lost 25 men in killed and wounded. Captain Black, nevertheless, after dark, sent his boats, and destroyed, besides the gun-boats that had struck and gone on shore, eight of the convoy; the boats bringing away some of the enemy's anchors, by the aid of which the brig was enabled to warp herself out.

On the 23d, at daybreak, having warped herself about a mile from the land, the Weasel was again attacked by the gun-boats, who, taking a raking position, annoyed the brig much; especially as, her last cable being half shot through and the wind blowing strong in, she could not venture to bring her broadside to bear upon them. All this day and night the Weasel continued warping out from the shore, but very slowly, her people being reduced in numbers and exhausted with fatigue. On the 24th, at noon, the French opened a battery, which they had erected, on a point of the bay close to which the Weasel was obliged to pass; and at 1 p. m. the gun-boats pulling out in a line astern, recommenced their fire. The wind was now moderate, and shortly afterwards it fell calm. At 5 p. m. the gun-boats, having got within range, received the contents of the brig's larboard broadside and sheered off; but, owing to the calm, the Weasel was unable to follow up her advantage, and they effected their escape.

In this very gallant, and, considering the extrication of the vessel from such a host of difficulties, admirably conducted enterprise, the Weasel had her boatswain (James Toby), three seamen, and one marine killed, and her commander badly wounded by a musket-ball through the right hand; but, with a modesty that did him honour, Captain Black would not suffer the surgeon to insert his name in the official report. The brig's remaining wounded consisted of her first lieutenant (Thomas Whaley, severely), one master's mate (William Simkin, severely), one midshipman (James Stewart), 19 seamen, and two marines wounded. The loss sustained on the part of the French gun-boats, and at the batteries on shore, could not be ascertained, but must have been severe.

On the 2d of February, at daylight, Faro bearing south-south-east distant six miles, the British 18-gun ship-sloop Kingfisher, Captain Ewell Tritton, discovered several trabaccolos near Melara steering to the southward. There being little wind, Captain Tritton detached the cutter and pinnace, under acting Lieutenant George H. Palmer and Mr. John Waller the gunner, to intercept the vessels. After a five hours' chase, the two boats succeeded in capturing one trabaccolo, and in running nine on shore near St.-Catharine's in the island of Corfu, five of which were totally destroyed. In executing this service, the two boats were exposed to a heavy fire of musketry from the heights and from a one-gun battery, and sustained a loss, in consequence, of two men killed and seven severely wounded.



On the 6th of January at 2 P. M., a division of the boats of the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Havannah*, Captain the Honourable George Cadogan, placed under the orders of Lieutenant William Hamley, attacked and carried the French gun-boat, No. 8, of one long 24-pounder and 35 men, although the vessel was prepared in every respect and was supported by musketry from the shore to which she had been made fast. Lieutenant Hamley had no expectation of meeting an armed vessel, until, upon opening the creek in which the gun-boat lay, the boats were fired upon, and desired by the troops drawn up on the beach to surrender. Three merchant vessels were taken at the same time; and the British loss amounted to one master's mate (Edward Percival) killed and two seamen wounded.

On the 22d of March the boats of the *Havannah*, under the same commanding officer, assisted by Lieutenant of marines William Hockly, captured, under the town of Vasto, a large trabaccolo, mounting three long French 8-pounders, and destroyed a similar vessel laden with oil. On the 26th, Lieutenant Hamley, assisted again by Lieutenant Hockly, captured five armed trabaccolos and five feluccas laden with salt, near the town of Fortore. In both instances, the vessels were hauled aground, and were under the protection of a strong body of military and some guns on the beach. No greater loss, notwithstanding, was sustained by the British in either enterprise, than two men slightly wounded. On the 17th of June, in the morning, the boats of the same frigate, still commanded by Lieutenant Hamley, landed and brought off, from under the town of Vasto and from the fire of eight guns, 10 sail of merchant vessels; and that with no greater loss than three men slightly wounded.

On the 21st of December, 1812, the British 38-gun frigate *Apollo*, Captain Bridges Watkinson Taylor, accompanied by the brig-sloop *Weasel*, chased a trabaccolo under the protection of the tower of St.-Cataldo. As this tower was reputed to be the strongest between Brindisi and Otranto, Captain Taylor resolved to attempt its destruction. The boats of the two vessels were accordingly detached on that service, under the orders of Lieutenants George Bowen and Michael Quin. The enemy became so much discouraged at having Murat's Neapolitan colours cut down by the first shot from the *Apollo's* barge, that the tower was carried without the assistance of the ships or the slightest loss. It contained a telegraph, three carriage-guns, and three swivels, and was blown up.

On the 18th of January, 1813, Rear-admiral Thomas Francis Freemantle, the British commander-in-chief in the Adriatic, detached the *Apollo*, accompanied by the *Esperanza* privateer and four gun-boats, having on board 250 troops under Lieutenant-colonel Robertson, to attack the island of Augusta. On the 29th the island surrendered; and Captain Taylor bestows great praise

upon Lieutenant Bowen, first, and Mr. Thomas Ullock, purser, of the Apollo, who served on shore; also, for their gallantry in the frigate's barge, launch, and yawl, midshipmen William Henry Brand, William Hutchinson, and William David Folkes. Colonel Robertson having left a garrison in Augusta, the Apollo and small vessels sailed, on the 1st of February, for the neighbouring island of Curzola; and, on the same night, 160 soldiers, 70 seamen, and 50 marines, with a howitzer, landed at Port Bufalo, and surprised and carried a hill that commanded the town. Finding that, notwithstanding the British had got their field-guns to this spot and that the advance was already in possession of the suburbs, the enemy appeared determined to hold out, Captain Taylor took off the Apollo's seamen, and on the morning of the 3d attacked and silenced the sea-batteries. This led to an immediate capitulation. The loss to the British on the occasion amounted to two seamen killed and one slightly wounded, and the Apollo had her mainmast badly wounded and her rigging much cut.

On the night of the 11th of April Captain Taylor sent three boats of the Apollo, and two belonging to the 32-gun frigate Cerberus, Captain Thomas Garth, cruising in company, to take temporary possession of the Devil's island near the north entrance of Corfu; by which the boats captured a brig and trabaccolo going into Corfu with grain. On the 14th the two frigates chased a vessel, which, on its falling calm, escaped into Malero. Perceiving that the five boats were proceeding to attack her, and fearing from the natural strength of the island that they would not succeed, Captain Taylor sent to desire that the boats would wait until the Apollo came up. The message, however, arrived too late, and Lieutenant Edward Hollingsworth Delafosse, first of the Cerberus, and Mr. Ullock, purser, of the Apollo, were wounded. On the arrival of the Apollo, Captain Taylor landed the marines; who, after some skirmishing, captured the island, and found eight vessels laden with grain, but scuttled.

On the 24th of April, at daylight, observing a felucca run into St.-Cataldo and disembark troops, Captain Taylor landed 30 marines under Lieutenants John Tothill and Colin Campbell, who, by a steady charge, dislodged them from a strong position, made 26 prisoners, and killed one and wounded several. The boats in the mean time brought out the vessel, and the whole service was executed without loss.

On the 17th of May, while cruising off Otranto the Cerberus discovered an enemy's vessel close to the land a little to the southward of Brindisi; and which, upon being chased, ran herself on shore under a martello tower. Captain Garth immediately despatched three boats belonging to the Cerberus, under Lieutenant John William Montagu, and two belonging to the Apollo, under Lieutenant William Henry Nares, to attempt to

bring out the vessel. This, after receiving her fire, they accomplished without any loss, and drove some of the enemy's troops, who had come down to protect her, a considerable way up the country. The vessel was armed with a 6-pounder in the bow and a swivel. On the next morning the boats brought off a gun from a martello tower a little further to the southward.

On the 27th, observing a convoy collected in Otranto, which it was thought would push for Corfu the first north-west wind, Captain Garth, on the following morning, took a station off Faro, to endeavour to intercept them, and sent the barge and pinnace of the *Cerberus* and the barge and gig of the *Apollo*, under Lieutenants Montagu and Nares, close in shore. At about 1 A. M. the vessels came out, protected by eight gun-boats. Notwithstanding this strong force, and that they were aided by three more gun-boats from Faro, and the cliffs covered with French troops, the four British boats attacked them in the most determined and gallant manner. Lieutenant Nares, in the *Apollo's* barge, boarded and carried one gun-boat, and midshipman William Hutchinson, in the *Apollo's* gig, actually boarded and carried another before the barge of the *Cerberus* could get alongside. In boarding another gun-boat, Mr. Thomas Richard Suett, master's mate of the *Cerberus*, was shot through the heart. This, with one seaman killed, and one marine dangerously wounded, was the extent of the British loss. The gun-boats taken had each a 9-pounder in her bow and two 4-pounders abaft, and were carrying troops to Corfu. Four of the convoy were also taken.

On the 17th of June, at 9 P. M., Captain John Harper, of the 18-gun brig-sloop *Saracen*, accompanied by Lieutenant William Holmes and Lieutenant of marines Edward Hancock, put off with his boats containing 40 men, and at 11 P. M. landed upon the island of Zapano. After a difficult march of three miles, Captain Harper surprised and took prisoners a corporal's guard that was in advance. Pushing for the guard-house and commandant's quarters, he then carried the whole by the bayonet, without loss, and took 36 prisoners, including the commanding officer of the two islands of Zapano and Mezzo. The remaining 16 officers and men of the garrison effected their escape.

On the 29th of April the boats of the 74-gun ships *Elizabeth* and *Eagle*, Captains Edward Leveson Gower and Charles Rowley, under the orders of Lieutenants Mitchell Roberts and Richard Greenaway, assisted, among others, by Lieutenant Thomas Holbrook, fell in, off Goro, with a convoy of seven armed merchant vessels, laden with oil. Four of them were captured, and the remaining three ran themselves on shore into a tremendous surf, under the protection of a two-gun battery, two schooners, and three settee gun-boats, that opened a most galling fire. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, one of the vessels was brought off, and another destroyed, without a casualty.

On the 8th of June, observing three vessels, supposed to contain powder, within the town of Omago on the coast of Istria, Captain Gower, after the two ships had fired for some time, detached the marines, under Captain John Hore Graham and Lieutenants Thomas Price and Samuel Lloyd, who soon drove the enemy, consisting of 100 French soldiers, out of the town; while the boats of the *Elizabeth* and *Eagle*, under Lieutenants Mitchell Roberts, Martin Bennett, Richard Greenaway, and William Hotham, destroyed a two-gun battery and brought out four vessels. This service was executed with no greater loss than one man wounded.

On the 20th, at daybreak, Captain Gower caused to be landed at Dignano, opposite to the Prioni islands, 50 seamen from the *Elizabeth*, under the orders of Lieutenants Roberts and Bennett, and the marines under Captain Graham and Lieutenant Price; who, assisted by Lieutenant Henry Richard Bernard with a division of armed boats, took possession of the town, and made prisoners of the French troops within it, without the slightest loss.

On the 3d of July, in the morning, Rear-admiral Fremantle, with the 74-gun ships *Milford* (flag), Captain John Duff *Markland*, *Elizabeth*, and *Eagle*, *Bacchante* frigate, and gun-brig *Haughty*, Lieutenant James Harvey, got under way, with a light breeze at south-west, from an anchorage about four miles from Fiume; and, leaving a detachment of boats and marines with the *Haughty* to storm the battery at the mole-head as soon as the guns were silenced, proceeded to attack the sea-line batteries of the town, mounting 15 heavy guns. A shift of wind to the south-east, aided by a strong current from the river, broke the ships off, and the *Eagle* could not fetch the second battery, opposite to which she anchored; and against which she presently so well-directed a fire, that the fort soon became silenced.

This being communicated by telegraph, Rear-admiral Fremantle made the signal to storm; when Captain Rowley, leading in his gig the first detachment of marines, took possession of the fort and hoisted English colours; while Captain Hoste, with the marines of the *Milford*, took and spiked the guns of the first battery, which had been under the fire of the *Milford* and *Bacchante*, and early evacuated. Leaving a party of seamen to turn the guns of the second battery against the others, Captain Rowley, without losing time, boldly dashed on through the town, although annoyed by the enemy's musketry from the windows of the houses, and a field-piece placed in the centre of the great street; but the marines, headed by Lieutenants Samuel Lloyd and Edmund Nepean, and the seamen from the boats, proceeded with such firmness, that the French troops retreated before them, drawing the field-piece until they came to the square; where they made a stand, taking post in a large house. At this time the boats under Captain Markland, with their

carronades, opened upon the gable end of it with such effect, that the French gave way at all points, and forsook the town in every direction. Captain Hoste, with his division, followed close to Captain Rowley; and, on their junction, the two captains took possession of the two batteries, along with the field-piece, stores, and shipping; but no prisoners were made, the governor and every officer and man of the garrison having ran away.

Considering that the number of troops in the town, besides the natives, was about 350, the loss on the British side, in amounting to only one marine killed, and Lieutenant Lloyd and five seamen and marines wounded, was comparatively trifling. Although the town was stormed in every part, such was the prudent management of Captains Rowley and Hoste, that not an individual was plundered, nor was any thing taken away, except what was afloat and in the government stores. Ninety vessels were captured. More than half of these were restored to the proprietors; 13, laden with oil, grain, powder, and merchandise, were sent to Lissa, and the remainder destroyed. The guns on the batteries were rendered useless, and 500 stands of arms and 200 barrels of powder were brought off.

On the 5th the British squadron moved from Fiume to Porto-Ré; at which place Captains Hoste and Markland landed with the marines, and found the forts abandoned by the enemy. The boats went up to Bocca-Ré, where a convoy of 13 sail had been scuttled; and, after rendering the guns, 10 in number, useless, and destroying the carriages and works, the two captains returned to their respective ships.

On the 7th, at 11 A. M., the *Eagle* attacked the fortress of Farasina, mounting five 18-pounders. After some resistance, the works were stormed and carried, under cover of the ship's fire, by a party of seamen and marines, under the command of Lieutenants Greenaway and Hotham and Lieutenant of marines Samuel Lloyd. The guns were disabled and the works laid in ruins; and at 2 P. M. the party re-embarked, with no greater loss than midshipman John Hudson slightly wounded.

On the 2d of August, in the evening, while the *Eagle* and *Bacchante* were sailing along the coast of Istria, a convoy of 21 sail was seen at anchor in the harbour of Rovigno. Conceiving the capture of the vessels feasible, an attack was determined on; and, the *Bacchante* leading in, the two ships opened their fire on the batteries. After some resistance, the batteries were abandoned; whereupon Captain Hoste landed with a detachment of seamen and marines, drove the enemy out of the town, disabled the guns, and destroyed or brought off the whole of the vessels; and that with so slight a loss as one marine wounded.

On the 4th of August, in the evening, the boats of the 74-gun ship *Milford* and brig-sloop *Weasel*, under Captain Black of the latter, accompanied by Lieutenant John Grant, and Lieutenant of marines Kenyon Stevens Parker, left the *Milford* about seven

leagues from the island of Ragosniza, and, having passed the sea-battery within pistol-shot unperceived, landed at the back of the island. At daylight on the 5th, the French troops were saluted with a cheer from the British at the top of the hill; who, quickly descending, entered the battery at the rear, where it was open, and carried it without much resistance. Six 24-pounders and two 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch mortars were mounted on the battery. These were disabled, a newly erected signal tower demolished, and the seamen and marines returned on board without any loss.

On the 5th of October Rear-admiral Fremantle, with the *Milford*, *Eagle*, and some smaller vessels, arrived off and blockaded the port of Triest, while a detachment of Austrian troops from the main body under General Count Nugent invested the town by land. On the 10th the French unexpectedly opened a masked battery of two guns upon the *Milford*, whose stern was towards the shore. Captain Markland in a few minutes got a spring upon the cable, and in a quarter of an hour disabled both guns, and killed two and wounded seven of the men stationed at them, while not a man was hurt on board the *Milford*. On the same day Captain Markland landed with the marines and two field-pieces; and on the 11th General Nugent returned from Gorizia, having obliged the viceroy to pass the Isongo. It was then determined to lay siege to the castle. By the 16th the British had 12 guns in two batteries, which opened their fire and continued it nearly the whole day. Towards evening the French were driven from the windmill, and the Austrians took possession of the fort, and of two howitzers advanced there. The fire was continued with increased effect until the 29th, when Colonel Rabie, the French commanding officer, surrendered on a capitulation.

Captain Rowley commanded one of the batteries on shore, and was accompanied by Lieutenants William Hotham and Charles Moore, and midshipman Edward Hibbert. Captain Fairfax Moresby, of the brig-sloop *Wizard*, also commanded a battery, and, having been ordered to form another battery of four 32-pounders within breaching distance, he did so in the course of 56 hours, under every disadvantage of weather, and without any other assistance than 50 men from the *Milford* and 20 from his own sloop. Mr. William Watts, acting master of the *Wizard*, and who was severely wounded, is also spoken highly of in the rear-admiral's despatch; as is likewise Captain David Dunn, of the armed en flûte 32-gun frigate *Mermaid*. Captain Markland, as has been already mentioned, was also on shore in command of the marines. The loss of the British on this occasion amounted to 10 seamen and marines killed, and 35 wounded, including Mr. Watts, and a midshipman of the *Wizard*, Edward Young.

On the 12th the *Bacchante* arrived off Ragusa, and was joined by the *Saracen* and three gun-boats, with a detachment of the garrison of Curzola on board: and, from the information of

Captain Harper and the insurrection of the Bocchese, Captain Hoste lost no time in proceeding to Castel-Nuova. On the 13th, in the morning, the Bacchante and Saracen forced the passage between that castle and the fort of Rosas, and, after some firing, secured a capital anchorage for the squadron about three miles above Castel-Nuova. At 10 p. m., Captain Hoste detached Captain Harper with the two Sicilian gun-boats, the launch and barge of the Bacchante and the boats of the Saracen, to capture the enemy's armed naval force represented to be lying between the island of St.-George and the town of Cattaro.

On going through the passage of Cadone, the boats received a heavy but ineffectual fire from the island of St.-George; and at midnight, when within four miles of Cattaro, Captain Harper found the enemy's four gun-boats in a state of revolt, and instantly took possession of them. He then landed and summoned the inhabitants, who immediately, at his request, armed en masse against the French. Having brought about this change, Captain Harper hoisted the English and Austrian flags on board the four captured gun-boats, and manning them with part English, proceeded down to attack the island of St.-George. On the 13th, at 6 a. m., a heavy and well-directed fire was opened from the gun-boats under the command of Lieutenant Frank Gostling of the Bacchante, upon the island, and returned from the batteries. In 15 minutes, however, the French were driven from their guns, and were eventually compelled to surrender at discretion. The possession of this island was of great importance, as it commands the narrow channel to the narrow branch of the river that leads up to Cattaro.

On the 16th of September, at daylight, the British 18-gun brig sloop Swallow, Captain Edward Reynolds Sibly, being well in-shore between the river Tiber and D'Anzo, discovered a brig and xebec between herself and the latter harbour. Captain Sibly immediately despatched after them three of the Swallow's boats, under the orders of Lieutenant Samuel Edward Cook, assisted by muster's mate Thomas Cole and midshipman Henry Thomas. After a row of two hours, the boats overtook, close under D'Anzo, the French brig Guerrier, of four guns and 60 stands of small arms; and notwithstanding that numerous boats and two gun-vessels had been sent from D'Anzo to her assistance, and kept the brig in tow until the British were alongside, Lieutenant Cook and his party gallantly carried her; but, in doing so, he sustained a loss in his own boat, of two seamen killed and four severely wounded.

On the 5th, in the morning, the 74-gun ship Edinburgh, Captain the Honourable George Heneage Lawrence Dundas, 38-gun frigates Impérieuse, Captain the Honourable Henry Duncan, and Resistance, Captain Fleetwood Broughton Reynolds Pellew, sloops Swallow, Eclair and Pylades, the two latter commanded by Captains John Bellamy and James Wemyss,

assembled off the port D'Anzo, where lay a convoy of 29 vessels, which for several days past had been watched by Captain Duncan. The necessary arrangements having been made by that officer for the attack, Captain Dundas merely added the force of the Edinburgh to it. The place was defended by two batteries, mounting two heavy guns each, on a mole, a tower to the northward of this with one gun, and a battery to the southward with two guns, to cover the mole.

At 1 h. 30 m. P. M., every thing being prepared, the ships bore up, and took their stations as follows: The *Impérieuse* and *Resistance* against the mole batteries; the *Swallow* against the tower; the *Eclair* and *Pylades* against the battery to the southward, and the *Edinburgh* supporting the two last-named ships. Soon after the ships had opened their fire, which they did together by signal, a detachment of seamen, under Lieutenant Eaton Travers, of the *Impérieuse*, and the marines under Captain Thomas Mitchell, landed in the best order close under the southern battery, which Lieutenant Travers instantly carried, driving the French in all directions. Lieutenant David Mapleton having also taken possession of the mole-head, the convoy, 20 of which were laden with timber for the arsenal at Toulon, were brought out without any loss. Before leaving the place, the British blew up all the works; and the ships received no greater injury than a few shot in their hulls and some damaged rigging. It appears that Captain Duncan had gained some very material information respecting the strength of D'Anzo by a gallant exploit performed a few nights previously by Lieutenant Travers; who, at the head of a single boat's crew, stormed, carried, and destroyed, a tower mounting one gun, and brought off the guard as prisoners.

On the 14th of October, at 1 P. M., the 36-gun frigate *Furieuse*, running along the coast towards the island of Ponza, observed, in the harbour of Marinelo, situated about six miles to the eastward of Civita Vecchia, a convoy of 19 vessels, protected by two gun-boats, a fort of two long 24-pounders, and a strong fortified tower and castle. It appearing practicable to cut them out, Lieutenants Walter Croker and William Lester, and Lieutenants of marines James Whylock and William Davis, gallantly volunteered to storm the fort on the land side, while the frigate anchored before it. This service was promptly executed; and, after a few broadsides from the *Furieuse*, the battery was carried, and the guns spiked, by the party on shore.

The French troops retreated to the strong position of the castle and tower overlooking the harbour; whence they kept up a constant fire of musketry through loopholes, without the possibility of being dislodged, although the *Furieuse* weighed and moved in, so that the whole fire of the ship was directed upon it. Nothing could damp the ardour of the party on shore, who, together with Lieutenant Lester in the boats, lost not a moment



in boarding and cutting the cables of 16 vessels under a most galling fire. Two of the vessels sank at the entrance of the harbour, but the remaining 14, deeply laden, were brought out. The loss to the British in performing this service, which was over in three hours, amounted to two men killed and 10 wounded.

On the 8th of November, at 8 h. 30 m. p. m., the boats of the 74-gun ship *Revenge*, Captain Sir John Gore, under the orders of Lieutenant William Richards, assisted by Lieutenant Thomas Blakiston, Captain of marines John Spurin, and master's mates and midshipmen Thomas Quelch, William Rolfe, Henry Fisher, Benjamin Mainwaring, John Harwood, Valentine Munbee, George Fraser, Robert Maxwell, Charles M. D. Buchanan, and John P. Davey, were sent into the harbour of Palamos, to endeavour to cut out a French felucca privateer. At 11 p. m. Lieutenant Richards and his party boarded and carried the privateer, without having a man hurt, and by 1 a. m. on the 9th had brought her alongside the *Revenge*.

On the 9th Captain Ussher sent the boats of the *Undaunted*, under the orders of Lieutenant Joseph Robert Hownam, assisted by Lieutenant Thomas Hastings and Lieutenant of marines Harry Hunt, also the boats of the *Guadcloupe* brig, under Lieutenant George Hurst and Mr. Alexander Lewis the master, into Port-Nouvelle. The batteries were stormed and carried in the most gallant manner, and two vessels captured and five destroyed, without a casualty.

On the 26th of November, off Cape Rouse, island of Corsica, the boats of the British 74-gun ship *Swiftsure*, Captain Edward Stirling Dickson, under the orders of Lieutenant William Smith, the 4th, were detached in pursuit of the French privateer schooner *Charlemagne*, of eight guns and 93 men, who was using every exertion by sweeping to effect her escape. On the approach of the boats, the privateer made every preparation for resistance, and reserved her fire till the boats had opened theirs; when the schooner returned it in the most determined manner for some minutes, until the boats got close alongside. The British then boarded the *Charlemagne* on the bow and quarter and instantly carried her; but not without a serious loss, having had one midshipman (Joseph Douglas) and four seamen killed, and two lieutenants (Rose Henry Fuller and John Harvey, the latter mortally), one lieutenant of marines (James Robert Thompson), one midshipman (—— Field), and 11 seamen wounded.

On the 25th of November, 1812, the two new French 40-gun frigates *Aréthuse*, Commodore Pierre-François-Henry-Etienne Bouvet, and *Rubis*, Captain Louis-François Ollivier, sailed from Nantes on a cruise. In January these two frigates, accompanied by a Portuguese prize-ship, the *Serra*, steered for the coast of Africa, and on the 27th, when off Tamara, one of the Isles de Los, the *Rubis*, who was ahead, discovered and chased a brig,

which was the British gun-brig *Daring*, Lieutenant William R. Pascoe. The latter, when at a great distance, taking the *Rubis* for an English frigate, sent his master in a boat to board her. On approaching near, the boat discovered her mistake and endeavoured to make off, but was captured. The *Daring* was now aware of her perilous situation, and crowded sail for Tamara, followed by the *Rubis*; whom the lightness of the breeze delayed so much, that the brig succeeded in running on shore and her crew in setting her on fire. The two French frigates, at 6 P. M., came to an anchor in the road of Isle de Los. Here Captain Bouvet learnt, that Sierra-Leone was the rendezvous of two British frigates and several sloops of war; that one of the former had recently quitted the coast, and that the remaining frigate, reported to him as larger and stronger than either of his own, still lay at anchor in the river.

In the course of six days, the French commodore refitted his ships, and supplied them with water and provisions for six months. Having also sent to Sierra-Leone to exchange the few prisoners in his possession, consisting, besides the boat's crew of the *Daring*, of the master and crew of a merchantman he had taken, Captain Bouvet, on the 4th, weighed and made sail with his two frigates. At 4 P. M. the *Aréthuse*, who was ahead, struck on a coral bank, but forcing all sail, got off immediately, with no greater damage than the loss of her rudder. The two frigates then reanchored, but driving in a gale of wind, were obliged, at 3 A. M. on the 5th, to get under sail; the *Aréthuse* contriving a temporary rudder while her own was repairing.

At daylight, when the gale had abated, the *Aréthuse* found herself lying becalmed within four leagues north-east of the island of Tamara; and Captain Bouvet was surprised to discover his consort still among the islands, covered with signals, which the distance precluded him from making out, but which were judged to be of melancholy presage. At 8 A. M. the *Aréthuse* anchored in 12 fathoms. At 11 A. M. the *Rubis* was observed to fire several guns, and at noon to have the signal flying, that the pumps were insufficient to free her. Captain Bouvet immediately sent his longboat with two pumps; but at 2 A. M. on the 6th the officer returned, with information that the *Rubis* had struck on the rocks, and that her crew were removing to the Portuguese ship. At daylight, by which time she had repaired and reshipped her rudder, the *Aréthuse* discovered a large ship to windward. This was the British 38-gun frigate *Amelia*, Captain the Honourable Frederick Paul Irby, from Sierra-Leone.

It was at 3 h. 30 m. P. M. on the 29th of January, that Lieutenant Pascoe and a part of his crew joined the *Amelia*, then reported off Free-Town, Sierra-Leone, bringing information, that he had left "three French frigates" at anchor in Isle de Los road. The *Amelia* began immediately to bend sails and clear

for action, and in the evening was joined by the Hawk merchant schooner, with some more of the Daring's men. On the morning of the 30th the Amelia's launch-carronade was put on board the Hawk, and Lieutenant Pascoe, having volunteered, was despatched in her to reconnoitre the French ships.

On the 2d of February, at noon, Lieutenant Pascoe returned, with intelligence of the names of the two French frigates and their prize; and also of Captain Bouvet's intention to proceed immediately to sea, to intercept the British homeward-bound trade. On the 3d, at 8 A. M., the cartel-cutter, noticed as having been despatched by Captain Bouvet, arrived with prisoners, including the crew of the Daring's boat: and at 10 h. 30 m. the Amelia, with a debilitated crew, for whose recovery she was about to proceed to England, got under way, and made sail, against a west-south-west wind, for the Isles de Los, in the hope of falling in with some British cruiser that might render the match more equal, and prevent the two French frigates from molesting several merchant vessels that were daily expected at Sierra-Leone.

On the 5th, at 8 A. M., the Amelia got a sight of Isle de Los; and at 8 P. M., when standing to the north-east, and then distant three leagues west-north-west of Tamara, she observed a strange sail in the north-east, or right ahead, making night-signals. Supposing this vessel to be one of the French frigates, the Amelia tacked to the westward, the wind now blowing fresh from the north-west. On the 6th, at daylight, the Amelia again tacked to the north-east, and at 9 A. M. spoke the Princess-Charlotte government-schooner from Sierra-Leone, the vessel that had been making signals the preceding night. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M. the French ships were observed in the north-east, at anchor off the north end of Tamara: one, the Aréthuse, considerably to the northward of the other, who appeared to be unloading the prize, but was really removing into the latter her own crew. At 10 A. M. Captain Irby despatched the Princess-Charlotte to Sierra-Leone, with directions for any British ship of war that might arrive there to repair immediately to him. The Amelia then bore away for Tarmara to reconnoitre the enemy.

At 2 h. 30 m. P. M. the two French frigates were observed to interchange signals; and at 3 h. 20 m. the Aréthuse weighed and made sail on the starboard tack, with a moderate breeze at south-south-west. The Amelia thereupon shortened sail, and hauled to the wind on the same tack as the Aréthuse. In a few minutes the latter tacked to the westward, to avoid a shoal, and the Amelia did the same. At 6 P. M. the Arethuse bore from the Amelia north-north-east distant six miles; at which time the Rubis, as supposed, but probably the Serra, was observed to have her topsails hoisted. At 6 h. 30 m. P. M. the north end of Tamara bore from the Amelia east-south-east distant five leagues. At 8 P. M. the Amelia lost sight of the Aréthuse; and at 8 h. 30 m., in order to keep off shore during the night, Captain

Irby tacked to the south-south-west, with the wind from the westward. At 6 h. 45 m. A. M. on the 7th the *Amelia* discovered the *Aréthuse* about eight miles off in the south-east; but a calm, which came on at 8 A. M., kept both frigates stationary. At noon a light breeze sprang up from the west-north-west: whereupon the *Aréthuse* stood towards the *Amelia*, on the larboard tack, under all sail; the latter making sail also, in the hope to draw the *Aréthuse* from her consort, still supposed to be in a condition to follow and assist her.

At 5 P. M., finding the wind beginning to fall, and conceiving that he had drawn the *Aréthuse* to a sufficient distance from her consort, Captain Irby shortened sail, wore round, and, running under his three topsails with the wind on the starboard quarter, steered to pass, and then to cross the stern of, the *Aréthuse*; who was standing, under the same sail, close hauled on the larboard tack. To avoid being thus raked, Captain Bouvet, at 7 h. 20 m. P. M., tacked to the south-west, and hoisted his colours; as the *Amelia* previously had hers. It was now a fine moonlight night, with the wind very moderate, and the sea nearly as smooth as a millpond. At 7 h. 45 m., just as the *Amelia* had arrived within pistol-shot upon her starboard or weather bow, the *Aréthuse* opened her fire; which was immediately returned. After about three broadsides had been exchanged, the main topsail of the *Amelia*, in consequence of the braces having been shot away, fell aback. Owing to this accident, instead of crossing her opponent as she intended, the *Amelia* fell on board of her; the jib-boom of the *Aréthuse* carrying away the *Amelia*'s jib and stay, and the French ship's bumpkin or anchor-flook, part of the British ship's larboard fore-castle barricade.

The *Aréthuse* now opened a heavy fire of musketry from her tops and mast-heads, and threw several hand-grenades upon the *Amelia*'s decks, hoping, in the confusion caused by such combustibles, to succeed in an attempt to board; for which purpose several of the *Aréthuse*'s men had stationed themselves in her fore rigging. A man was now seen on the spritsail yard of the *Aréthuse*, making strenuous efforts to get on board the *Amelia*. Scarcely had the poor fellow called out, "For God's sake! don't fire, I am not armed," when a musket-ball from a British marine dropped him in the water. It was afterwards ascertained, that one of the crew of the *Aréthuse*, a *Hamburgher*, had formerly belonged to the *Amelia*, having been taken out of one of her prizes on the coast of Spain and forced to enter on board the French frigate. It appears that the man was so desirous to get back to his ship, that he requested a settler at the *Isle de Los* to secrete him till an opportunity offered of his reaching *Sierra-Leone*. The probability therefore is, that the man so shot, while upon the spritsail yard of the *Aréthuse*, was the unfortunate *Hamburgher*.

Finding that, owing in a great degree to the steady and well-

directed fire kept up by the Amelia's marines, her object could not be accomplished, the Aréthuse threw all aback and dropped clear. In doing this, her spritsail yard knocked Lieutenant William Reeve, who had been invalided from the Kangaroo sloop, from the break of the forecastle into the waist. Setting her main topgallant and middle staysails (her jib for the time being disabled), the Amelia endeavoured again to get her head towards the bow of the Aréthuse. The Amelia at length did so, but, in attempting a second time to cross her antagonist, a second time fell on board of her; and the two ships now swang close alongside, the muzzles of their guns almost touching. This was at about 9 h. 15 m. p. m., and a scene of great mutual slaughter ensued. The two crews snatched the sponges out of each other's hands through the portholes, and cut at one another with the broadsword. The Amelia's men now attempted to lash the two frigates together, but were unable, on account of the heavy fire of musketry kept up from the Aréthuse's decks and tops; a fire that soon nearly cleared the Amelia's quarterdeck of both officers and men. Among those who fell on the occasion were the first and second lieutenants (John James Bates and John Pope), and a lieutenant of marines. Captain Irby was also severely wounded, and obliged to leave the deck to the command of the third lieutenant, George Wells; who, shortly afterwards, was killed at his post, and Mr. Anthony De Mayne, the master, took the command.

The mutual concussion of the guns at length forced the two frigates apart; and, in the almost calm state of the weather, they gradually receded from each other, with, however, their broadsides still mutually bearing, until 11 h. 20 m. p. m.; when both combatants, being out of gun-shot, ceased firing. Each captain thus describes this crisis. Captain Irby says: "When she (the Aréthuse) bore up, having the advantage of being able to do so, leaving us in an ungovernable state, &c." Captain Bouvet says: "At eleven o'clock the fire ceased on both sides; we were no longer within fair gun-shot, and the enemy, crowding sail, abandoned to us the field of battle."—"A onze heures, le feu cessa de part et d'autre; nous n'étions plus à bonne portée, et l'ennemi se couvrit de voiles, nous abandonnant le champ de bataille."\*

The damages of the Amelia, although, chiefly on account of the smooth state of the sea, they did not include a single fallen spar, were very serious; the frigate's masts and yards being all badly wounded, her rigging of every sort cut to pieces, and her hull much shattered. But her loss of men will best show how much the Amelia had suffered. Of her proper crew of 265 men, and 30 (including, as if 18 were not already enough, 12 esta-

\* Mon. April 29. An English translator of Captain Bouvet's letter has rendered "Nous n'étions plus à bonne portée" by "We were no longer in good condition." See Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix., p. 385.

blished supernumerary) boys, and her 54 supernumerary men and boys, composed chiefly of the Daring's crew, the Amelia had her three lieutenants (already named), second lieutenant of marines (Robert G. Grainger), Lieutenant Pascoe, late commander of the Daring, one midshipman (Charles Kennicott), the purser of the Thais (John Bogue, of his second wound), 29 seamen, seven marines, and three boys killed, her captain (severely), Lieutenant Reeve, invalided from the Kangaroo sloop, the master (already named), first lieutenant of marines (John Simpson), purser (John Collman), boatswain (John Parkinson, dangerously), one master's mate (Edward Robinson), four midshipmen (George Albert Rix, Thomas D. Buckle, George Thomas Gooch, and Arthur Beever), 56 seamen (two mortally), 25 marines (three mortally), and three boys wounded; total, 51 killed and died of their wounds, and 90 wounded, dangerously, severely, and slightly.

The Aréthuse, as well as her opponent, left off action with her masts standing; but they were all more or less wounded, and her rigging was much cut. Her hull must also have suffered considerably; as her acknowledged loss, out of a crew, including the boat's crew of the Rubis, of at least 340 men and boys, amounted to 31 killed, including 11 of her officers, and 74 wounded, including nearly the whole of her remaining officers.

The guns of the Amelia (late French Proserpine\*) were the same as those mounted by the Java, with an additional pair of 32-pounder carronades, or 48 guns in all. The guns of the Aréthuse were the same, in number and caliber, as the Java mounted when captured as the French Renommée.† Although the total of men and boys on board the Amelia would be 349, yet, if we are to allow for the number of her men that were unable to attend their quarters, and for the feeble state of many of the remainder, among whom, including the Daring's, there were nearly 40 boys, 300 will be an ample allowance. The Aréthuse has been represented to have had a crew of 375 or 380 men, but we do not believe she had a man more of her proper crew than 330; making, with the boat's crew of the Rubis, 340. The Aréthuse was the sister-frigate of the Renommée: consequently the tonnage of the Java will suffice.

#### COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		AMELIA.	ARETHUSE.
Broadside-guns . . . . .	{ No.	24	22
	{ lbs.	549	463
Crew . . . . .	No.	300	340
Ships . . . . .	tons	1059	1073

Here was a long and bloody action between two (taking guns

\* See vol. i., p. 122.

† See p. 21.

and men together) nearly equal opponents, which gave a victory to neither. Each combatant withdrew exhausted from the fight; and each, as is usual in the few cases of drawn battles that have occurred, claimed the merit of having forced the other to the measure. But it must now be clear, from the *Amelia's* damaged state, that Captain Bouvet was mistaken when he said, that she crowded sail to get away; it is much more probable, as requiring no other effort than shifting the helm, that the *Aréthuse*, as Captain Irby states, bore up.

Viewing the relative effectiveness of the two crews, one debilitated by sickness, the other, as admitted, in the full vigour of health; considering that, although both frigates sustained an almost unparalleled loss of officers, the captain of one of them only was obliged to give up the command; considering, also, the difference in the numerical loss, 141 and 105, a difference mainly attributable, no doubt, to the fatigued state of the *Amelia's* crew at the latter part of the action; we should say, that the *Aréthuse*, had she persevered, or could she, being to leeward, have done so, would, in all probability, have taken the British frigate. In saying this, we are far from placing every French 40-gun frigate upon a par with the *Aréthuse*: she was excellently manned, and was commanded by one of the best officers in the French navy. The chief part of the crew of the *Aréthuse* may, it is true, have been conscripts; but, then, they were conscripts of the year 1807, and were under an officer capable, if any officer was so, of making them good seamen.

With respect to Captain Irby, his critical situation, without reference to the state of his crew, must not be overlooked. The *Amelia* commenced, gallantly commenced, the action, under the impression that another French frigate, also equal in force to herself, was, although out of sight, at no great distance off. If, then, there was a probability of the approach of the *Rubis* when the action began, how must that probability have been heightened after the action had lasted three hours and a half, both ships remaining nearly stationary the whole time, and the wind, when it afterwards sprang up, drawing from the eastward, the direction in which the *Rubis* had been last seen? In addition to all this, the *Amelia* had on board a considerable quantity of gold dust, belonging to merchants in England. Upon the whole, therefore, both frigates behaved most bravely; and, although he had no trophy to show, each captain did more to support the character of his nation, than many an officer who has been decorated with the chaplet of victory.

Previously to quitting the action of the *Amelia* and *Aréthuse*, we would request the boasters in the United States of America to compare the execution here done by an 18-pounder French frigate, with the best performance of one of their huge 24-pounder frigates; bearing in mind, that it was done against an opponent, not only equal to herself in force, but equally able to

manceuvre by the possession of her masts; that it was done in a fair side-to-side action, neither frigate, during the three hours and a half's engagement, having had an opportunity to give one raking fire. It will, no doubt, also strike Commodores Decatur and Bainbridge, that, so far from constantly evading the close assaults of his antagonist, Captain Bouvet remained nearly in the same position from the commencement of the battle to its termination.

Both frigates found ample employment, during the remainder of the night, in clearing the decks of the dead and wounded, and in securing their damaged masts. At daylight on the 8th they were about five miles apart, the *Aréthuse* to the eastward of the *Amelia*, and both nearly becalmed. On a light breeze springing up, the *Amelia*, having bent a new foresail and fore topsail made sail, before it to the southward, on her way to Madeira and England; and the *Aréthuse* stood back to Isle de Los, to see what had become of Captain Ollivier and his people. On the morning of the 10th the *Aréthuse* was joined by the *Serra*, with the late crew of the *Rubis*, stated then to consist of 300 men.

Taking half the number on board his frigate, Captain Bouvet, with the *Serra* in tow, steered for France. On reaching the latitude of Madeira, however, Captain Bouvet removed every man out of the *Serra*, and destroyed her, as she retarded the *Aréthuse* in her voyage. On the 18th of March, in latitude 33° 30' north, longitude 40° west, the French frigate fell in with and boarded the *Mercury* and another cartel, having on board the surviving officers and crew of the late British frigate *Java*; and on the 19th of April, after having made in the whole about 15 prizes, the *Aréthuse* anchored in St.-Malo; as on the 22d of the preceding month had the *Amelia* at Spithead.

Another pair of French 40-gun frigates had been nearly the same route as the *Aréthuse* and *Rubis*, but during a two months and a half's cruise, had not encountered a single hostile vessel of war. The *Hortense* and *Elbe*, Captains Pierre-Nicolas Lahalle and Jules Desrochers, sailed from Bordeaux on the 7th of December, 1812; and steering for the coast of Africa, anchored on the 4th of January between the Bissagot islands, a little to the northward of Sierra-Leone. They sailed soon afterwards, cruised a short time off the Azores, and on the 15th of February succeeded in entering Brest.

While, in the early part of December, 1812, the United States' frigate *Constitution*, Commodore Bainbridge, and ship-sloop *Hornet*, of eighteen 32-pounder carronades and two long 12-pounders, Captain James Lawrence, were waiting at St.-Salvador, to be joined by the *Essex*,\* an occurrence happened,

\* See p. 138.



which the characteristic cunning of Americans turned greatly to their advantage. In the middle of November the British 20-gun ship *Bonne-Citoyenne*, of eighteen 32-pounder carronades and two long 9-pounders, Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene, having, while coming from Rio-de-la-Plata, with half a million sterling on board, damaged herself greatly by running on shore, entered the port of St.-Salvador, to land her cargo and be hove down.

When the ship was keel-out, the two American ships arrived in the port. The American consul and the two American commanders now laid their heads together to contrive something which, without any personal risk to any one of the three, should contribute to the renown of their common country. What so likely as a challenge to Captain Greene? It could not be accepted; and then the refusal would be as good as a victory to Captain Lawrence. Accordingly, a challenge for the *Hornet* to meet the *Bonne-Citoyenne* was offered by Captain Lawrence, through the American consul, to the British consul, Mr. Frederick Landeman; commodore Bainbridge pledging his honour to be out of the way, or not to interfere.

Without making the unpleasant avowal, that his government, upon this occasion, had reduced the vessel he commanded from a king's cruiser to a merchant ship, Captain Greene transmitted, through the consular channel, an animated reply; refusing a meeting, "upon terms so manifestly disadvantageous as those proposed by Commodore Bainbridge." Indeed, it would appear, as if the commodore had purposely inserted the words, "or not interfering," lest Captain Greene, contrary to his expectation, should accept the challenge. For, had the two ships met by agreement, engaged, the *Constitution* looked on without interfering, and the British ship been the conqueror, the pledge of honour, on the part of both American commanders, would have been fulfilled; and can any one for a moment imagine, that Commodore Bainbridge would have seen the *Bonne-Citoyenne* carry off a United States' ship of war, without attempting her rescue? It was more than his head was worth. Where was the guarantee against recapture, which always accompanies a serious proposal of this sort, when a stronger force, belonging to either party, is to preserve a temporary neutrality? The bait, therefore, did not take: the specie remained safe; and the American officers were obliged to content themselves with all the benefit they could reap from making a boast of the circumstance. This they did; and, to the present hour, the refusal of the *Bonne-Citoyenne* to meet the *Hornet* stands recorded in the American naval archives, as a proof of the former's dread, although the "superior in force," of engaging the latter. The two ships, as has just been seen, were equal in guns, and not very unequal in crews; the *Hornet* having 171 men and two boys, the *Bonne-Citoyenne*, including 21 super-

numeraries, 141 men and nine boys. But this inferiority was in a great degree compensated, by the pains which Captain Greene had taken to teach his men the use of their guns.

After the Constitution had sailed for Boston as already stated,\* the Hornet continued blockading the Bonne-Citoyenne and her dollars, until the arrival, on the 24th of January, of the British 74-gun ship Montagu, Captain Manley Hall Dixon, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Manley Dixon. The American sloop, on being chased, ran for the harbour: but, night coming on, the Hornet wore, and, by standing to the southward, dexterously evaded her pursuer. Escorted by the Montagu, the Bonne-Citoyenne, with her valuable cargo on board, put to sea on the 26th of January; and on the 22d of February, in latitude  $5^{\circ} 20'$  south, longitude  $40^{\circ}$  west, the rear-admiral left Captain Greene to pursue his voyage alone. Sometime in the month of April, having stopped at Madeira by the way, the Bonne-Citoyenne arrived in safety at Portsmouth.

After escaping from the Montagu, the Hornet hauled her wind to the westward, and on the 14th of February, when cruising off Pernambuco, captured an English brig, with about 23,000 dollars in specie on board. Having removed the money and destroyed the prize, Captain Lawrence cruised off Surinam until the 22d; then stood for Demerara, and on the 24th chased a brig, but was obliged to haul off on account of the shoals at the entrance of Demerara river. Previously to giving up the chase, the Hornet discovered a brig of war, with English colours flying, at anchor without the bar. This was the brig-sloop *Espiègle*, of sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two sixes, Captain John Taylor, refitting her rigging.

At 3 h. 30 m. P. M., while beating round Caroband bank to get at the *Espiègle*, the Hornet discovered a sail on her weather quarter bearing down for her. This was the British brig-sloop *Peacock*, of sixteen 24-pounder carronades and two sixes, Captain William Peake; who had only sailed from the *Espiègle*'s anchorage the same day at 10 A. M. At 4 h. 20 m. P. M. the *Peacock* hoisted her colours; and at 5 h. 10 m., having kept close to the wind to weather the *Peacock*, the Hornet tacked for that purpose and hoisted her colours. At 5 h. 25 m., in passing each other on opposite tacks, within half pistol-shot, the ship and brig exchanged broadsides. After this, the *Peacock* wore to renew the action on the other tack; when the Hornet, quickly bearing up, received the *Peacock*'s starboard broadside; then, at about 5 h. 35 m., ran the latter close on board on the starboard quarter. In this position, the Hornet poured in so heavy and well-directed a fire, that at 5 h. 50 m., having had her commander killed, and being with six feet water in the hold and

cut to pieces in hull and masts, the Peacock hoisted from her fore rigging an ensign, union down, as a signal of distress. Shortly afterwards her mainmast went by the board.

Both the Hornet and Peacock were immediately anchored; and every attempt was made to save the latter, by throwing her guns overboard, by pumping and bailing her, and stopping such shot-holes as could be got at; but all would not do, and in a very few minutes after she had anchored, the Peacock went down in five and a half fathoms' water, with 13 of her men, four of whom afterwards got to the fore top and escaped, as well as three men belonging to the Hornet. An American lieutenant and midshipman, and the remainder of the Hornet's men on board the Peacock, with difficulty saved themselves by jumping, as the brig went down, into a boat which was lying on her booms. Four of the Peacock's seamen had just before taken to her stern boat; in which, notwithstanding it was much damaged by shot, they arrived in safety at Demerara.

Of her 110 men and 12 boys, the Peacock lost, about the middle of the action, her young and gallant commander and four seamen killed, her master, one midshipman, the carpenter, captain's clerk, and 29 seamen and marines wounded; three of the latter mortally, but the greater part slightly. The principal damages of the Hornet are represented to have been one shot through the foremast, and her bowsprit slightly wounded by another: her loss, out of a crew of 163 men and two boys, the Americans state at one seaman killed, and two slightly wounded; also one mortally, and another severely burnt by the explosion of a cartridge.

The Hornet had three lieutenants, a lieutenant of marines, and a great show of full grown young midshipmen; and her men were all of the usual class of "American" seamen. Her established complement was 170, but she had on board, as was frequently the case in American ships of war, three supernumeraries. On the other hand, eight men were absent in a prize. This reduced the Hornet's crew to 165; among whom we will suppose, although none were discoverable, there were three boys. The Hornet, it will be observed, mounted one gun more of a side than the Wasp, and the latter was 434 tons: the former, therefore, could not well have been less than 460 or 470 tons.

#### COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		PEACOCK.	HORNET.
Broadside guns . . . . .	{ No.	9	10
	lbs.	192	297
Crew (men only)	No.	110	162
Size . . . . .	tons	386	460

This is what the Americans, now for the first time pretending to believe, that "24-pounders are as good as 32s," call an equal

match; or rather, as a brass swivel or two were stuck upon the capstan, or somewhere about the quarterdeck, of the Peacock, by way of ornament, these and the boat-carronade were reckoned in, and the Hornet was declared to have gained a victory over a superior British force.

If, in their encounter of British frigates, the Americans were so lucky as to meet them with crippled masts, deteriorated powder, unskilful gunners, or worthless crews, they were not less fortunate in the brigs they fell in with. There was the Frolic, with her main yard gone and topmasts sprung; and here is the Peacock, with 24 instead of 32 pounder carronades, the establishment of her class, and with a crew that, owing to the nature of their employment ever since the brig had been commissioned, in August, 1807, must have almost forgotten that they belonged to a man of war. The Peacock had long been the admiration of her numerous visitors, for the tasteful arrangement of her deck, and had obtained, in consequence, the name of the yacht. The breechings of the carronades were lined with white canvass, the shot-lockers shifted from their usual places, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating screws. If carronades, in general, as mounted in the British service, are liable to turn in-board or upset, what must have been the state of the Peacock's carronades after the first broadside? A single discharge from them, in exercise, would have betrayed the very defective state of their fastenings; and the feelings of Englishmen might then have found some relief in the skill, as well as gallantry, evinced in the Peacock's defence. The firing of the Hornet was admirable, and proved that her men, to the credit of Captain Lawrence and his officers, had been well taught what use to make of their guns: at the same time, it must be admitted, that the Peacock, Frolic, and all the brigs of their class were mere shells; especially, when compared with such a ship as the Hornet, whose scantling was nearly as stout as that of a British 12-pounder frigate.

The wreck of the Peacock was visible for a long time after the action, and bore from Point Spirit, which is about six miles to the eastward of the entrance to Demerara river, north-east by east distant six leagues; making the distance between the Espiègle and Peacock, during the action, nearly 24 miles. This confirms the statement of Lieutenant Frederick Augustus Wright, the late senior lieutenant of the Peacock, that the Espiègle "was not visible from the look-outs stationed at the Peacock's mast-heads for some time previous to the commencement of the action, and gives rather an awkward appearance to Captain Lawrence's statement, that the Espiègle lay about six miles inshore of him, and "could plainly see the whole of the action." If another confirmation were wanted, it is to be found in the log of the Espiègle; by which it appears that, although pieces of

wreck passed her on the morning of the 25th, Captain Taylor did not know that an action had taken place, until informed, the same afternoon, by the governor of Demerara, of the Peacock's destruction.

It was fortunate, perhaps, for the character of the British navy, that the disordered state of her rigging prevented the *Espiègle* from sailing out to engage the ship, which, at noon on the day of action, she plainly saw, and continued to see for nearly an hour, until the *Hornet* tacked and stood to the south-east; as, at the court-martial subsequently held upon him, Captain Taylor was found guilty of having "neglected to exercise the ship's company at the great guns." It seemed hard, however, to punish the *Espiègle's* commander for a piece of neglect, which prevailed over two thirds of the British navy; and to which the admiralty, by their sparing allowance of powder and shot for practice at the guns, were in some degree instrumental.

Much good as, we flatter ourselves, we have done to the cause of truth, by analyzing the American accounts of their naval actions with the English, the inattention of a contemporary may throw some doubt upon the accuracy of our statement respecting the relative force of the parties in the case that has just been detailed. Captain Brenton, with a particularity not common with him, states that "the force of the Peacock was sixteen 32-pound carronades and two long sixes.\* Admitting that neither our former work on the subject published nine years ago, nor the first edition of the present work, and into which, we know, our contemporary has occasionally dipped, was deemed of sufficient authority, what has Captain Brenton to say to Lieutenant Wright's letter, published in all the London papers? Nay, what objection has he to offer to the official statement of Captain Lawrence himself, "She (the Peacock) mounted sixteen 24-pound carronades and two long nines!"

The counter-statement of our contemporary, it is true, may have little weight in this country; but not so in the United States, not so among a people whom we are, and long have been, labouring so hard to convince of the inutility, even in a profit-and-loss point of view, of telling a falsehood. There the high rank and presumed practical experience of the author, and his long list of kings, princes, princesses, dukes, and officers of the navy, for subscribers, will produce their full effect: the Americans will be convinced that, in the hurry of the moment, Captain Lawrence made a mistake respecting the force of his prize. By the way, Captain Brenton is not the only British officer who has given the Peacock 32-pounder carronades: a post-captain, who, about 18 months ago, volunteered to correct the mistatements of a very captivating writer, both for and against the Americans, did the same. That the established

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 111.

armament of the Peacock's class was 32-pounders, there cannot be a doubt; any more than that the brig, being new and built of oak, was well able to bear them. But Captain Peake probably considered that 24-pounders gave a lighter appearance to his deck, and took up less room. We know not what other reason to assign for the change.

We left in the port of Boston the three American frigates Constitution,\* President, and Congress,† A fourth, the 36-gun frigate Chesapeake, Captain Samuel Evans, sailed from Boston on the 17th of December, 1812; ran down past Madeira, the Canaries, and Cape-de-Verds; thence on the equator between longitudes 16° and 25°, where the American frigate cruised six weeks. The Chesapeake afterwards steered for the coast of South America, and passing within 15 leagues of Surinam, was on the same spot on which the Hornet had, the day previous, sunk the Peacock. The frigate then cruised off Barbadoes and Antigua, and, steering homewards, passed between Bermuda and the Capes of Virginia. Standing to the northward, the Chesapeake passed within 12 leagues of the Capes of Delaware and 20 of New-York, and on the 18th of April, 1813, re-entered Boston by the eastern channel; having, during her 115 days' cruise, recaptured one merchant vessel and captured four, been chased by a British 74 and frigate, and chased on her part, for two days, a British brig-sloop.

Among the captains of British 38-gun frigates who longed, ardently longed, for a meeting with one of the American 44s, was Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, of the Shannon. This desire was not founded on any wish for a display of personal valour, but in order to show to the world, what apparent wonders could be effected, where the ship and the crew were in all respects fitted for battle. It was not since the late American war, that Captain Broke had begun to put his frigate in fighting order, and to teach his men the art of attack and defence. From the day on which Captain Broke had joined her, the 14th of September, 1806, the Shannon began to feel the influence of her captain's proficiency as a gunner and zeal for the service.

The laying of a ship's ordnance, so that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direction, is justly deemed a most important operation; as upon it depends, in a great measure, the true aim and destructive effect of every future shot she may fire. On board the Shannon, at her first outfit, this was attended to by Captain Broke in person; and his ingenious mode of laying ships' ordnance has since received the highest commendation. By thoughts from other ships, and the usual means to which a British man of war is obliged to resort, the Shannon got together a crew; and, in the course of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent regulations of Captain Broke, an undersized,

\* See p. 138.

† See p. 125.

not very well disposed, and, in point of age, rather motley, ship's company became as pleasant to command, as they would have been dangerous to meet. In August, 1811, the Shannon sailed for the coast of North America; and, had this frigate, in the excellent order in which she was kept, met the Constitution in August, 1812, we verily believe — But the Shannon and Constitution did not meet; therefore the thing was not tried.

On the 21st of March, 1813, accompanied by the Tenedos, of the same force, and kept in nearly the same order, Captain Hyde Parker, the Shannon sailed from Halifax on a cruise in Boston bay. On the 2d of April the two frigates reconnoitred the harbour of Boston, and saw the President and Congress, the latter quite, and the former nearly ready for sea. The Constitution was at this time undergoing a large repair; and her decks were being lowered, to render her more snug, and give her a smaller and more inviting appearance. Captains Broke and Parker having resolved, if in their power, to bring the President and Congress to action, the Shannon and Tenedos took a station to intercept them. It was in this interval that the Chesapeake escaped into the port in the manner related; and on the 1st of May foggy weather, and a sudden favourable shift of wind, enabled the President and Congress to elude the vigilance of the two British frigates and put to sea.

Captains Broke and Parker very soon discovered the chance they had missed, and sadly disappointed they were. There now remained in Boston only the Constitution and Chesapeake. The first, as has been stated, was undergoing a serious repair; but the Chesapeake had only to get in new main and mizen masts, and would be ready for sea in a week or two. Having obtained a furlough to enjoy his share of prize-money, Captain Evans was succeeded in the command of the Chesapeake by Captain James Lawrence, the late fortunate, highly applauded, and, we readily admit, truly gallant, commander of the Hornet.

As two frigates were not required to attack one, and as the appearance of such a superiority would naturally prevent the Chesapeake from putting to sea, Captain Broke, on the 25th of May, took a supply of water and provisions from the Tenedos, and detached her, with orders to Captain Parker not to rejoin him before the 14th of June; by which time, it was hoped, the business would be over. On the 26th the Shannon recaptured the brig Lucy, and on the 29th the brig William, both of Halifax. Aware of the state of incapacity to which some of the British frigates on the station had reduced themselves, by manning and sending in their prizes, Captain Broke destroyed all he captured. We believe he had sacrificed not fewer than 25 sail of prizes, to keep the Shannon in a state to meet one or the other of the American frigates. Being resolved to have a meeting with the Chesapeake, nothing but the circumstance of the two recaptures belonging to Halifax could induce Captain

Broke to weaken the Shannon's crew by sending them in. The master of the *Lucy*, assisted by five recaptured seamen belonging to some ship on the station, carried in that vessel; and a midshipman and four of the Shannon's men took charge of the *William*. On the 29th, in the afternoon, the Shannon boarded the *Nova-Scotia* privateer brig *Sir-John-Sherbrooke*, and took from her 22 Irish labourers, whom the brig, three days before, with 30 more (then volunteers on board herself), had recaptured in a prize belonging to the American privateer *Governor-Plumer*; bound, when the latter fell in with her, from Waterford to *Burin*, Newfoundland.

Before we proceed further, let us show what guns were mounted by the two frigates, whose mutual animosity was on the eve of being quenched by the capture of one of them. On her main deck, the Shannon was armed the same as every other British frigate of her class, and her established guns on the quarterdeck and forecastle were 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and four long 9-pounders, total 48 guns. But Captain Broke had since had mounted a 12-pounder boat-carronade through a port purposely made on the starboard side of the quarterdeck, and a brass long 6-pounder, used generally as an exercise gun, through a similar port on the larboard side; besides which there were two 12-pounder carronades, mounted as standing stern-chasers through the quarterdeck stern-ports. For these last four guns, one 32-pounder carronade would have been more than an equivalent. However, as a 6-pounder counts as well as a 32-pounder, the Shannon certainly mounted 52 carriage-guns. The ship had also, to be in that respect upon a par with the American frigates, one swivel in the fore, and another in the main top.

The armament of the *Chesapeake*, we have already on more than one occasion described: she had at this time, as afterwards found on board of her, 28 long 18-pounders on the main deck, and 20 carronades, 32-pounders, and one long shifting 18-pounder, on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 49 guns; exclusively of a 12-pounder boat-carronade, belonging to which there was a very simple and well-contrived elevating carriage for firing at the tops, but it is doubtful if the gun was used. Five guns, four 32-pounder carronades and one long 18-pounder, had, it was understood, been landed at Boston. Some have alleged, that this was done by Captain Lawrence, that he might not have a numerical superiority over his antagonists of the British 38-gun class: others say, and we incline to be of that opinion, that the recapture was ordered by the American government, to ease the *Shannon*, whose hull had already begun to hog, or to arch in the

On the 1st of June, early in the morning, having received no answer to several verbal messages sent in, and being doubtful if any of them had even been delivered, Captain Broke addressed



to the commanding officer of the Chesapeake a letter of challenge, which, for candour, manly spirit, and gentlemanly style, stands unparalleled. The letter begins: "As the Chesapeake appears now ready for sea, I request you will do me the favour to meet the Shannon with her, ship to ship, to try the fortune of our respective flags." The Shannon's force is thus described: "The Shannon mounts 24 guns upon her broadside, and one light boat-gun, 18-pounders upon her main deck, and 32-pound carronades on her quarterdeck and forecastle, and is manned with a complement of 300 men and boys (a large proportion of the latter), besides 30 seamen, boys, and passengers, who were taken out of recaptured vessels lately." After fixing the place of meeting, and providing against all interruption, Captain Broke concludes thus: "I entreat you, sir, not to imagine that I am urged by mere personal vanity to the wish of meeting the Chesapeake; or that I depend only upon your personal ambition for your acceding to this invitation. We have both noble motives. You will feel it as a compliment if I say, that the result of our meeting may be the most grateful service I can render to my country; and I doubt not that you, equally confident of success, will feel convinced, that it is only by repeated triumphs in *even combats* that your little navy can now hope to console your country, for the loss of that trade it can no longer protect. Favour me with a speedy reply. We are short of provisions and water, and cannot stay long here."

This letter Captain Broke intrusted to a Captain Slocum, a discharged prisoner, then about to proceed, in his own boat to Marblehead, a port a few miles north of Boston. Shortly afterwards the Shannon, with colours flying, stood in close to Boston lighthouse, and lay to. The Chesapeake was now seen at anchor in President roads, with royal yards across and apparently ready for sea. The American frigate presently loosed her fore topsail, and, shortly afterwards, all her topsails, and sheeted them home. The wind, blowing a light breeze from west by north, was perfectly fair. At about 30 minutes past noon, while the men of the Shannon were at dinner, Captain Broke went himself to the mast-head, and there observed the Chesapeake fire a gun, and loose and set topgallantsails. The American frigate was soon under way, and made more sail as she came down, having in her company numerous sailing pleasure-boats, besides a large schooner gun-boat, with, we believe, Commodores Bainbridge and Hull, and several other American naval officers on board. While at the Shannon's mast-head, Captain Broke saw that Captain Slocum's boat had not reached the shore in time for the delivery of his letter of challenge to the commander of the Chesapeake. Notwithstanding this, there cannot be a doubt, that Captain Lawrence had obtained the consent of Commodore Bainbridge, whose orders from the government at Washington were to despatch the Chesapeake to sea as soon as she was

ready), to sail and attack the Shannon, in compliance with one or more of the verbal challenges which had been sent in. It was natural for the conqueror of the Peacock to wish for an opportunity to capture or drive away a British ship, that had repeatedly lay to off the port, and, in view of all the citizens, had used every endeavour to provoke the Chesapeake to come out and engage her.

At 0<sup>55</sup> m. p. m., Cape Ann bearing north-north-east half-east distant 10 or 12 miles, the Shannon filled, and stood out from the land under easy sail. At 1 p. m. the Chesapeake rounded the lighthouse under all sail; and at 3 h. 40 m. p. m. hauled up, and fired a gun, as if in defiance; or, perhaps, to induce the Shannon to stop, and allow the gun-vessel and pleasure-boat spectators an opportunity of witnessing how speedily an American, could "whip" a British frigate. Presently afterwards the Shannon did haul up, and reefed topsails. At 4 p. m. both ships, now about seven miles apart, again bore away; the Shannon with her foresail clewed up, and her main topsail braced flat and shivering, that the Chesapeake might overtake her. At 4 h. 50 m. the Chesapeake took in her studding-sails, topgallantsails, and royals, and got her royal yards on deck. At 5 h. 10 m. p. m., Boston lighthouse bearing west distant about six leagues, the Shannon again hauled up, with her head to the southward and eastward, and lay to, under topsails, topgallantsails, jib, and spanker.

At 5 h. 25 m. the Chesapeake hauled up her foresail; and, with three ensigns flying, one at the mizen royal-mast-head, one at the peak, and one, the largest of all, in the starboard main rigging, steered straight for the Shannon's starboard quarter. The Chesapeake had also, flying at the fore, a large white flag, inscribed with the words: "SAILORS' RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE;" upon a supposition, perhaps, that this favourite American motto would paralyze the efforts, or damp the energy of the Shannon's men. The Shannon had a union jack at the fore, an old rusty blue ensign at the mizen peak, and, rolled up and stopped, ready to be cast loose if either of these should be shot away, one ensign on the main stay and another in the main rigging. Nor, standing much in need of paint, was her outside appearance at all calculated to inspire a belief, of the order and discipline which reigned within.

At 5 h. 30 m. p. m., to be under command, and ready to wear if necessary, in the prevailing light breeze, the Shannon filled her main topsail and kept a close luff; but, at the end of a few minutes, having gathered way enough, she again shook the wind out of the sail, and kept it shivering, and also brailed up her driver. Thinking it not unlikely that the Chesapeake would pass under the Shannon's stern, and engage her on the larboard side, Captain Broke divided his men, and directed such as could not fire with effect to be prepared to lie

down as the enemy's ship passed. But, either overlooking or waving this advantage, Captain Lawrence, at 5 h. 40 m., gallantly luffed up, within about 50 yards, upon the Shannon's starboard quarter, and, squaring his main yard, gave three cheers.

The Shannon's guns were loaded thus: the aftermost main-deck gun with two round shot and a keg containing 150 musket-balls, the next gun with one round and one double-headed shot, and so alternately along the broadside. The captain of the 14th gun, William Mindham, had been ordered to fire, the moment his gun would bear into the Chesapeake's second maindeck port from forward. At 5 h. 50 m. P. M. the Shannon's aftermost maindeck gun was fired, and the shot was seen to strike close to the port at which it had been aimed.\* In a second or so the 13th gun was fired: then the Chesapeake's bow gun went off; and then the remaining guns on the broadside of each ship as fast as they could be discharged.

At 5 h. 53 m. P. M., finding that, owing to the quantity of way in the Chesapeake and the calm she had produced in the Shannon's sails, he was ranging too far ahead; and, being desirous to preserve the weathergage in order to have an opportunity of crippling the Shannon by his dismantling shot, Captain Lawrence hauled up a little.† At 5 h. 56 m., having had her jib-sheet and fore topsail-tie shot away, and her helm, probably from the death of the men stationed at it, being for the moment unattended to, the Chesapeake came so sharp to the wind as completely to deaden her way; and the ship lay, in consequence, with her stern and quarter exposed to her opponent's broadside. The shot from the Shannon's aftermost guns now took a diagonal direction along the decks of the Chesapeake; beating in her stern-ports, and sweeping the men from their quarters. The shot from the Shannon's foremost guns, at the same time, entering the Chesapeake's ports from the mainmast aft, did considerable execution.‡ At 5 h. 58 m. an open cask of musket-cartridges, standing upon the Chesapeake's cabin-skylight for the use of the marines, caught fire and blew up, but did no injury whatever. Even the spanker-boom, directly in the way of the explosion, was barely singed.

As the Shannon had by this time fallen off a little, and the manœuvres of the Chesapeake indicated an intention to haul away, Captain Broke ordered the helm to be put a-lee; but, scarcely had the Shannon luffed up in obedience to her helm, than the Chesapeake was observed to have stern way, and to be paying round off. The Shannon immediately shifted her helm a-starboard, and shivered her mizen topsail, to keep off the wind again, and delay the boarding, probably until her guns had done a little more execution among a crew, supposed to be at least a

\* See diagram at p. 204.

† See diagram:

‡ Ibid. But in this position, the engraver has not copied the drawing quite so faithfully as he might have done.

fourth superior in number. At that moment, however, the Shannon had her jib-stay shot away; and, her head-sails being becalmed, she went off very slowly. The consequence was, that, at 6 P. M., the Chesapeake fell on board the Shannon, with her quarter pressing upon the latter's side, just before her starboard main-chains. The Chesapeake's foresail being at this moment partly loose, owing to the weather clue-garnet having been shot away from the bits, the American frigate forged a little ahead, but was presently stopped, by hooking, with her quarter port, the flook of the Shannon's anchor stowed over the chess-tree.

Captain Broke now ran forward; and observing the Chesapeake's men deserting the quarterdeck guns, he ordered the two ships to be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, the maindeck boarders to be called, and Lieutenant George Thomas L. Watt, the first lieutenant, to bring up the quarterdeck men, who were all boarders. While zealously employed outside the bulwark of the Shannon, making the Chesapeake fast to her, the veteran boatswain, Mr. Stevens (he had fought in Rodney's action), had his left arm hacked off with repeated sabre cuts, and was mortally wounded by musketry. The midshipman commanding on the forecastle, Mr. Samwell, was also mortally wounded. Accompanied by the remaining forecastle party, about 20 in number, Captain Broke, at 6 h. 2 m. P. M., stepped from the Shannon's gangway-rail, just abaft the fore rigging, on the muzzle of the Chesapeake's aftermost carronade, and thence, over the bulwark, upon her quarterdeck. Here not an officer or man was to be seen. Upon the Chesapeake's gangways, about 25 or 30 Americans made a slight resistance. These were quickly driven towards the forecastle, where a few endeavoured to get down the fore hatchway, but, in their eagerness, prevented each other. Several fled over the bows; and, while part, as it is believed, plunged into the sea, another part reached the main deck through the bridle-ports. The remainder laid down their arms and submitted. Lieutenant Watt, with several quarterdeck men, and sergeant Richard Molyneux, corporal George Osborne, and the first division of marines; also Lieutenant Charles Leslie Falkiner, third of the Shannon, with a division of the maindeck boarders, quickly followed Captain Broke and his small party. Lieutenant Watt, just as he had stepped on the Chesapeake's taffrail, was shot through the foot by a musket-ball fired from the main top, and dropped on his knee upon the quarterdeck; but quickly rising up, he ordered Lieutenant of marines James Adams to point one of the Shannon's 9-pounders at the enemy's top. In the mean time Lieutenant Falkiner and the marines, with the second division of which Lieutenant John Law had now assumed, rushed forward; and, while one party kept down the main deck who were ascending the main hatchway, another party ordered a destructive fire still continued from the main and main-top. The Chesapeake's main top was presently stormed

by midshipman William Smith (now lieutenant *e*) and his top-men, about five in number; who either destroyed or drove on deck all the Americans there stationed. This gallant young man had deliberately passed along the Shannon's fore yard, which was braced up to the Chesapeake's main yard, which was nearly square; and thence into her top. All further annoyance from the Chesapeake's mizen top had also been put a stop to by another of the Shannon's midshipmen, Mr. Cosnahan, who, from the starboard main yard-arm, had fired at the Americans, as fast as his men in the top could load the muskets and hand them to him.


After the Americans upon the forecastle had submitted, Captain Broke ordered one of his men to stand sentry over them, and then sent most of the others aft where the conflict was still going on. He was in the act of giving them orders to answer the fire from the Chesapeake's main top (this was just before Mr. Smith's gallant and successful exploit), when the sentry called lustily out to him. On turning round, the captain found himself opposed by three of the Americans; who, seeing they were superior to the British then near them, had armed themselves afresh. Captain Broke parried the middle fellow's pike, and wounded him in the face; but instantly received, from the man on the pikeman's right, a blow with the but-end of a musket, which bared his skull, and nearly stunned him. Determined to finish the British commander, the third man cut him down with his broadsword, but, at that very instant, was himself cut down by Mindham, the Shannon's seaman, already known to us. Captain Broke was not the only sufferer upon this occasion: one of his men was killed, and two or three were badly wounded. Can it be wondered, if all that were concerned in this breach of faith fell victims to the indignation of the Shannon's men? It was as much as Captain Broke could do, to save from their fury a young midshipman, who, having slid down a rope from the Chesapeake's fore top, begged his protection. Mr. Smith, who had just at that moment descended from the main top, assisted Mindham and another of the Shannon's men in helping the captain on his legs. While in the act of tying a handkerchief round his commander's head, Mindham pointing aft, called out, "There, sir, there goes up the old ensign over the yankee colours." Captain Broke saw it hoisting (with what feelings may well be imagined), and was instantly led to the Chesapeake's quarter-deck, where he seated himself upon one of the carronade slides.

The act of changing the Chesapeake's colours had proved fatal to a gallant British officer, and to four or five fine fellows of the Shannon's crew. We left Lieutenant Witt, just as, having raised himself on his legs after his wound, he was hailing the Shannon, to fire at the Chesapeake's mizen top. He then called for an English ensign; and, hauling down the American ensign, bent, owing to the ballasts being tangled, the English flag below

instead of above it. A few seconds before this, the Chesapeake's quarter gallery had given way, and the two ships were gradually separating. Observing the American stripes going up first, the Shannon's people reopened their fire; and directing their guns with their accustomed precision at the lower part of the Chesapeake's mizenmast, killed their own first lieutenant (a grape-shot took off the upper part of his head) and four or five of their comrades. Before the flags had got half-way to the mizen peak, they were lowered down and hoisted properly; and the aggrieved and mortified men of the Shannon ceased their fire.

An unexpected fire of musketry, opened by the Americans who had fled to the hold, killed a fine young marine, William Young. On this, Lieutenant Falkiner, who was sitting on the booms, very properly directed three or four muskets, that were ready, to be fired down. Captain Broke, from his seat upon the carronade-slide, told Lieutenant Falkiner to summon the Americans in the hold to surrender, if they desired quarter. The Lieutenant did so. The Americans replied, "We surrender;" and all hostilities ceased. The Shannon was now about 100 yards astern of the Chesapeake, or rather upon her larboard quarter. To enable the Shannon to close, Captain Broke ordered the Chesapeake's main yard to be braced flat aback, and her foresail to be hauled close up. Almost immediately afterwards Captain Broke's senses failed him from loss of blood; and the Shannon's jollyboat just then arriving with a fresh supply of men, he was conveyed on board his own ship.

Between the discharge of the first gun, and the period of Captain Broke's boarding, 11 minutes only elapsed; and, in four minutes more, the Chesapeake was completely his. The following diagram will explain the few evolutions there were in this quickly decided action.



Now for the damage and loss of men sustained by the respective combatants. Five shot passed through the Shannon; one only below the main deck. Of several round shot that struck her, the greater part lodged in the side, ranged in a line just above the copper. A bar-shot entered a little below the water-mark, leaving a foot or 18 inches of one end sticking out. Until her shot-holes were stopped, the Shannon made a good deal of water upon the larboard tack; but, upon the other, not more than usual. Her fore and main masts were slightly injured

by shot; and her bowsprit (previously sprung) and mizenmast were badly wounded. No other spar was damaged. Her shrouds on the starboard side were cut almost to pieces; but, from her perfect state aloft, the Shannon, at a moderate distance, appeared to have suffered very little in the action.

Out of a crew, including eight recaptured seamen and 22 Irish labourers two days only in the ship, of 306 men and 24 boys, the Shannon lost, besides her first lieutenant, her purser (George Aldham), captain's clerk (John Dunn), 13 seamen, four marines, three supernumeraries, and one boy killed, her captain (severely), boatswain (William Stevens, mortally), one midshipman (John Samwell, mortally), and 56 seamen, marines, and supernumeraries wounded; total, 24 killed and 59 wounded.

The Chesapeake was severely battered in her hull, on the larboard quarter particularly. A shot passed through one of her transoms, equal in stoutness to a 64-gun ship's; and several shot entered the stern windows. She had two maindeck guns and one carronade entirely disabled. One 32-pounder carronade was also dismounted, and several carriages and slides broken. Her three lower masts, the main and mizen masts especially, were badly wounded. The bowsprit received no injury; nor was a spar of any kind shot away. Her lower rigging and stays were a good deal cut; but neither masts nor rigging were so damaged, that they could not have been repaired, if necessary, without the ships going into port.

Out of a crew of at least 381 men and five boys or lads, the Chesapeake, as acknowledged by her surviving commanding officer, lost her fourth lieutenant (Edward I. Ballard), master (William A. White), one lieutenant of marines (James Broom), three midshipmen, and 41 petty officers, seamen, and marines killed, her gallant commander and first lieutenant (both mortally), her second and third lieutenants (George Budd and William L. Cox), acting chaplain (Samuel Livermore), five midshipmen, her boatswain (mortally), and 95 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded; total, 47 killed and 99 wounded, 14 of the latter mortally. This is according to the American official account; but, it must be added, that the total that reported themselves, including several slightly wounded, to the Shannon's surgeon, three days after the action, were 115; and the Chesapeake's surgeon wrote from Halifax, that he estimated the whole number of killed and wounded at from 160 to 170.

Of the Chesapeake's guns we have already given a full account: it only remains to point out, that the ship had three spare ports of a side on the forecastle, through which to fight her shifting long 18-pounder and 12-pounder boat-carronade. The former is admitted to have been used in that way; but, as there is some doubt whether the carronade was used, we shall reject it from the broadside force. This leaves 25 guns, precisely the number mounted by the Shannon on her broadside.

The accuracy of Captain Broke's statement of his ship's force is, indeed, worthy of remark: he even slightly overrated it, because he represented all his guns of a side on the upper deck, except the boat-gun, as 32-pounder carronades, when two of the number were long nines.

This will be the proper place to introduce an account of some of the extraordinary means of attack and defence, to which, in their naval actions with the British, the fears of the Americans had compelled them to resort. Among the Chesapeake's "round and grape" (the only admitted cannon-shot used on board an American ship), were found double headed shot in abundance; also bars of wrought iron, about a foot long, connected by links and folded together by a few rope-yarns, so as, when discharged from the gun, to form an extended length of six feet. Other bars, of twice the length, and in number from three to six, were connected at one end by a ring: these, as they flew from the gun, expanded in four points. The object of this novel artillery was to cut away the shrouds, and facilitate the fall of the masts; and the plan was, to commence the action with the bar and chain shot, so as to produce, as early as possible, that desirable result: after which, the American ship could play round her antagonist, and cut her to pieces with comparative impunity.

So much for the matériel of her opponent; nor was his personnel forgotten. The canister-shot of the Chesapeake, when opened, were found to contain in the centre angular and jagged pieces of iron and copper, broken bolts, and copper and other nails. The musket-cartridges, as we formerly noticed, contained each three buck-shot loose in the powder; and several rifled-barrel pieces were found among the small-arms. As British seamen were well-known to be terrible fellows for getting on board an enemy, something was to be done to check them in their advance. Accordingly, a large cask of unslacked lime was brought on board the Chesapeake, and placed on the fore-castle with the head open, in order that the American crew might scatter the lime by handfuls over the assailants. A bag of the same was placed in the fore top. We do not, however, believe, that Captain Lawrence had any hand in this contrivance. One of the Shannon's early shot struck the cask, and scattered the contents, as if in retribution, over the faces and into the eyes of the projectors. We ourselves saw the remains of the lime on and about the Chesapeake's fore-castle: we recollect also observing, that the quarter-deck and fore-castle barricades of the American frigate were lined with strong netting, to catch the spin-

Lieutenant Budd, when called upon to certify, as for the 106 men with which the Chesapeake went into action, swore to 881; but even admitting his own account of the killed and mortally wounded to be correct, the Chesapeake certainly had five men more. For instance, the prisoners out of



the ship, mustered at Halifax, including 91 severely and slightly wounded, and four that were sick, amounted to 325; which number, added to 61, the acknowledged amount of the killed and mortally wounded, makes 386. This was three short of the number, appearing by the Chesapeake's books to have been victualled by her on the morning of the action, and as many as 54 short of the regular complement established upon the ship. Several of the Chesapeake's petty officers, indeed, after their arrival at Melville-island prison, near Halifax, confessed that 30 or 40 hands, principally from the Constitution, came on board; but whose names, in the hurry and confusion, were not entered in the purser's books. In confirmation of several men having joined the ship a very short time before the action, a number of bags and hammocks were found lying in the boats stowed over the booms; and, in direct proof that some of the Constitution's men were on board the Chesapeake, three or four of the Guerrière's Americans, who, after that ship's capture, had enlisted on board the Constitution, were among the prisoners taken out of the Chesapeake, and were immediately recognised by their former shipmates, now, as stated before, serving on board the Shannon. But, as the American officer swore that the Chesapeake commenced action with only 381 men, we shall give her no more; and, although not above one boy, that would rate as such in a British ship, was to be seen on board the Chesapeake, we shall allow her five.

In one of the lockers of the Chesapeake's cabin, was found a letter dated in February, 1811, addressed by Robert Smith, Esq., then secretary at war, to Captain Samuel Evans at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for manning the Chesapeake, and enumerating the different classes, or ratings, at a total of 443. The Chesapeake was manned in April, 1811; and as, in the American naval service, the men enlist for two years and sign articles for that period, the ship would require to be remanned in April, 1813, the very month, as we have seen, in which the Chesapeake returned to Boston. The greater part of the crew then re-entered; and, as may be supposed, a very large proportion of those who accepted their discharge were, or rather had been, British men-of-war's men. In order to fill up the deficiency, four houses of rendezvous were opened. The moment a man declared himself a candidate, he received a dollar, and accompanied an officer to the ship. There he was examined as to his knowledge of seamanship, age, muscular strength, &c., by a board of officers, consisting of the master, surgeon, and others; if approved, the man signed the articles and remained where he was; if rejected, he returned to the shore with a dollar in his pocket. So fastidious was the committee of inspection, that frequently, out of five boat-loads of men that would go off to the ship in the course of the day, three would come back,

not eligible. The features of the American war would have borne a very different aspect, could British ships have been manned in a similar way.

As far as appearance went, the Chesapeake's was a remarkably fine crew; and a clear proof of the stoutness of the men was afforded, when, in the middle of the night after the action, in consequence of a strong manifestation of a desire to retake the ship, the irons, which the Americans had got ready for the wrists of the Shannon's crew, and which, to the number of 360, were stowed in a puncheon, with the head off, standing under the half-deck, came to be put upon the wrists of the Chesapeake's crew. None of the Americans found them too large, and many, when not allowed to choose such as fitted them, complained that the manacles hurt them on account of their tightness.

Among the 325 prisoners, whose names were set down in the agent's book at Halifax, about 32, including the gunner, were recognised as British seamen. This fellow was an Irishman, and went by the name of Matthew Rogers; by which name, but with, of course, a blank for his birth-place, he stands in the Washington "Register" formerly noticed by us. It is probable that, had the Chesapeake been taken when Captain Evans commanded her, five times 32 traitors would have been found on board of her. Nay, the men who, when the first party from the Shannon rushed on board, leaped from the Chesapeake's bows into the water were, it is natural to conjecture, deserters from British ships of war. That they were not all Americans, the following anecdote will prove. One of the Shannon's men, when in the act of cutting down one of the Chesapeake's men, was stopped by the imploring ejaculation, "Would you, Bill?" "What, Jack!" "Ay, Bill, but it won't do; so here goes." Overboard the poor fellow sprang, and was seen no more! This man's name was John Waters, a fine young Bristolian, who had deserted from the Shannon, when at anchor in Halifax harbour, on the 3d of the preceding October. We naturally turn to the return of loss at the foot of the American official account; but we search in vain for the name of "John Waters." It is true that he most likely went by another name; but, as it is customary to report men who fall or leap overboard, or who are not actually slain or wounded in the action, under the head of "Missing," and no such head appearing in the American returns, we conclude that all the men of the Chesapeake, whose shame-stricken consciences prompted them to commit self-destruction in the manner of poor Waters, were purposely omitted. We are therefore more than ever convinced, that, when she commenced engaging the Shannon, the Chesapeake had on board upwards of 400 men. But, as we said before, the American sworn amount only shall be introduced into the

## COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		SHANNON.	CHESAPEAKE.
Broadside-guns . . . . .	} No.	25	25
	} lbs.	598	590
Crew (men only) . . . . .	No.	306	376
Size . . . . .	tons	1066	1135

It is clear from this statement, that the "superiority of force," little as it may have been, was on the side of the Chesapeake. That we will not, for a moment, dwell on; nor shall the American star and chain shot, and hogshead of lime, be allowed to disturb the equality and fairness of the action. But Captain Broke did something more than capture an American frigate of equal force: he sought and commenced the attack close to an American port filled with armed vessels, and beat his ship in 11, and captured her in 15 minutes: thereby proving, that the bard, who eight months before had sung,

And, as the war they did provoke,  
We'll pay them with our cannon;  
The first to do it will be BROKE,  
In the gallant ship the SHANNON,\*

was not a false prophet.

Thus was the spell broken; and we may remark, that the Chesapeake was not finally subdued by a superiority in that quality which constituted the forte of the Shannon, her gunnery. No, it was by boarding; by Captain Broke's quick discernment in catching, and his promptitude and valour in profiting by, the critical moment, when the Chesapeake's men were retreating from their quarters. Gallant, truly gallant, was the behaviour of Capt. n Lawrence. His first lieutenant, Augustus Charles Ludlow, emulated his commander; and both deserved a better crew than the Chesapeake's; a crew that (oh, woful addition!) consisted, within about a twelfth part, of native Americans.

Owing to Captain Broke's incapacity from his wound, Lieutenant Provo William Parry Wallis, second of the Shannon, took charge of her, and Lieutenant Falkiner, third of the Shannon, remained in charge of the Chesapeake. Having repaired the damage done to their respective rigging, and the Shannon having fished her mizenmast, the two frigates made sail for Halifax; and on the 6th, at 3 h. 30 m. P. M., the prize, followed by her captor, passed along the wharfs of the town, amidst the cheers of the inhabitants, as well as of the crews of the ships of war that were lying in the harbour. Captain Lawrence had died on board the Chesapeake of his wounds two days before: and Captain Broke, in a state of severe suffering from his wounds, was removed from the Shannon to the house of the commissioner, Captain the Honourable Philip Wodehouse.

\* Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii., p. 422.

Lieutenants Wallis and Falkiner were both deservedly made commanders. Of the acting master, Henry Gladwell Etough, Captain Broke in his official letter speaks in high terms; also of Lieutenants of marines James Johns and John Law, and midshipmen William Smith, Hugh Cosnahan, John Samwell, Henry Martin Leake, Douglas Clavering, George Raymond, and David Littlejohn: likewise of Mr. Aldham the purser, and Mr. Dunn the clerk, both of whom were killed at the head of the small-arm men. Mr. Etough, and Messieurs Smith and Cosnahan, were promoted to lieutenants. For his important achievement, and, in respect to its effect on the public mind, a most important achievement it was, Captain Broke was created a baronet; he received, also, the formal thanks of the board of admiralty, and the warm congratulations of every well-wisher to England: and his trophy, the Chesapeake, in a name by which, coupled with that of the Shannon, she will long be remembered both in England and America, was added to the British navy.

As a matter of course, a court of inquiry was held, to investigate the circumstances under which the Chesapeake had been captured. Commodore Bainbridge was the president of the court; and the following is the first article of the very "lengthy" report published on the subject: "The court are unanimously of opinion, that the Chesapeake was gallantly carried into action by her late brave commander; and no doubt rests with the court, from comparison of the injury respectively sustained by the frigates, that the fire of the Chesapeake was much superior to that of the Shannon. The Shannon, being much cut in her spars and rigging, and receiving many shot in and below the water line, was reduced almost to a sinking condition, after only a few minutes cannonading from the Chesapeake; whilst the Chesapeake was comparatively uninjured. And the court have no doubt, if the Chesapeake had not accidentally fallen on board the Shannon, and the Shannon's anchor got foul in the after quarter-port of the Chesapeake, the Shannon must have very soon surrendered or sunk." Some very singular admissions of misconduct in the officers and crew follow; and then the report proceeds as follows: "From this view of the engagement and a careful examination of the evidence, the court are unanimously of opinion, that the capture of the late United States' frigate Chesapeake was occasioned by the following causes: the almost unexampled early fall of Captain Lawrence, and all the principal officers; the bugleman's desertion of his quarters, and inability to sound his horn; for the court are of opinion, if the horn had been sounded when first ordered, the men being then in their quarters, the boarders would have promptly repaired to the spar deck, probably have prevented the enemy from boarding, certainly have repelled them, and might have returned the boarding with success; and the failure of the boarders on both decks, to rally on the spar deck, after the enemy had boarded,

which might have been done successfully, it is believed, from the cautious manner in which the enemy came on board."

It was certainly very "cautious" in Captain Broke, to lead 20 men on board an enemy's ship, supposed to be manned with a complement of 400; and which, at the very moment, had at least 270 men without a wound about them. The court of inquiry makes, also, a fine story of the firing down the hatchway. Not a word is there of the "magnanimous conquered foe" having fired from below, in the first instance, and killed a British marine. Captain Broke will long have cause to remember the treatment he experienced from this "magnanimous conquered foe." So far, indeed, from the conduct of the British being "a most unwarrantable abuse of power after success," Lieutenant Cox of the Chesapeake, in the hearing of several English gentlemen, subsequently admitted, that he owed his life to the forbearance of one of the Shannon's marines. When the American officers arrived on board the Shannon, and some of them were finding out reasons for being "taken so unaccountably," their first lieutenant, Mr. Ludlow, candidly acknowledged, that the Shannon had beaten them heartily and fairly.

Although it would not do for an official document, like that we have just been quoting, to contain an admission, that any portion, any influential portion at least, of the crew of an American ship of war consisted of British seamen, the journalists, pamphleteers, and historians of the United States did not scruple to attribute to the defection of the latter, the unfortunate issue of the business with the Chesapeake. "There are no better sailors in the world," says an American writer, "than our own; and it seems hard that the war should be carried on for nothing but British sailors' rights, and that those same sailors should desert us in the moment of conflict. Cowardice is a species of treason. If renegade Englishmen are permitted to fight under our flag, it becomes prudent not to mix our own people with them to be destroyed; for, at the critical moment when the boarders were called, the foreigners all ran below, while not a native American shrank from the conflict." A writer in a Boston paper, after he has insisted, that the "native Americans" on board the Chesapeake "fought like heroes," and that the British part of the crew "behaved treacherously," very naturally asks, "Can any of your correspondents inform us, whether any Americans were on board the Shannon?" We may answer, Yes, there were some (prisoners), in her hold; although not so many, by several scores, as were in the hold of the Chesapeake, in a very few seconds after the Shannon's boarders sprang upon her quarterdeck.

But, had the Chesapeake, instead of 32, mustered 100, British men-of-war's men in her crew, we have not a doubt that the same result would have ensued. However expert and courageous these renegades may be when sheltered behind a bulwark,

they become paralyzed with shame, they sink into the veriest cowards in nature, when opposed face to face to their shipmates of former days, their partners in scenes which they *can* remember with credit. The American commanders have tact enough to see this: hence arises the preference they give to a cannonade engagement; hence the repugnance they invariably show, unless with a twofold superiority, to grapple with their British antagonists.

Previously to our dismissing the action of the Shannon and Chesapeake, we shall confer a service on the profession, by stating as much as we know of the means taken by Captain Broke, to endow his men with that proficiency at the guns, the effects of which were so decisive and astonishing. Every day, for about an hour and a half in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the state of the weather, the men were exercised at training the guns, and, for the same time in the afternoon, in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket, &c. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both with great guns and musketry; and Captain Broke, as an additional stimulus beyond the emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that put a shot through the bull's eye. As the Shannon was always clear for action, and had on deck a sufficient quantity of ammunition for two or three broadsides, it was impossible to take her by surprise; nor could the officers well complain of the want of a few of their cabin conveniences, when the cabin of their chief was so completely stripped of every thing which was not absolutely indispensable, of every thing that could not be removed at a moment's notice.

The Chesapeake's late captain was buried at Halifax on the 8th, with military honours such as a post-captain in the British navy of less than three years' standing would be entitled to; and, unlike poor Captain Lambert at St.-Salvador,\* Captain Lawrence was followed to his grave by all the naval captains in port. Lieutenant Ludlow died of his wounds while at Halifax, and was also buried with military honours. On the 10th of August a cartel arrived from Boston, and applied for and carried away the remains of the late captain of the Chesapeake and his first lieutenant, to be deposited, with suitable ceremony, in their own country.

On the 1st of May, as already stated,† Commodore Rodgers, with the President and Congress frigates, the latter still commanded by Captain Smith, sailed from President roads, Boston, on his third cruise. On the 2d the two American frigates fell in with and chased the British 18-gun brig-sloop Curlew, Captain Michael Head; but, by knocking away the wedges of her masts, and using other means to increase her sailing, the brig effected her escape. On the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' north,

\* See p. 187.

† See p. 199.

longitude  $60^{\circ}$  west, the Congress, whether by intention or accident is not stated, parted company.

The commodore now proceeded alone; pleased, no doubt, at the prospect thus afforded him, of rivalling his brother commodores in the capture, single-handed, of a "large-class" British frigate, and, like each of them, of being hailed on his return as one of the first of naval conquerors. The President cruised along the eastern edge of the Grand Bank of Newfoundland, so as to cross the tracks of the West-India, Halifax, Quebec, and St.-John's trade. Having reached latitude  $48^{\circ}$  without meeting any thing, the commodore stood to the south-east, and cruised off the Azores until the 6th of June; when, learning from an American merchant vessel, that she had, four days previous, passed a homeward-bound West-India fleet, the President crowded sail to the north-east. Commodore Rodgers, however, was too late; and, even had the President got among the merchant ships, the admirable sailing of their escort the Cumberland 74, Captain Thomas Baker, might have made the commodore regret that he had acted upon the information of his countryman.

On the 13th of June, being then in latitude  $46^{\circ}$  north, longitude  $28^{\circ}$  west, the disappointed commodore resolved to shape a course towards the North Sea, in the hope of falling in with vessels bound from St.-George's Channel to Newfoundland; but, to his "astonishment," no prize fell in his way. The President subsequently made the Shetland islands, and on the 27th of June put into North-Bergen for provisions and water. Water was all the commodore could obtain; and, provided with a supply of that wholesome article, the President quitted North-Bergen on the 2d of July, and stretched over towards the Orkney islands; and thence towards the North-Cape, for the purpose of intercepting a convoy of 25 or 30 sail, which the commodore had understood would leave Archangel about the middle of the month, under the protection of two British brig-sloops.

On the 19th of July, when off the North-Cape, in company with the privateer-schooner Scourge, of New-York, and in momentary expectation of meeting the Archangel fleet, Commodore Rodgers was driven from his station by, in the language of his official letter, "a line-of-battle ship and a frigate," but, in the language of truth, by the British 12-pounder 32-gun frigate Alexandria, Captain Robert Cathcart, and 16-gun ship-sloop Spitfire, Captain John Ellis. As the commodore is very brief in his account of this meeting, we shall take our narrative from the logs of the two British ships. On the day in question, at 2h. 30m. P. M., latitude at noon (the mean of the two ships' reckonings)  $71^{\circ} 52'$  north, longitude  $20^{\circ} 18'$  east, the Alexandria and Spitfire, standing south-east by south, with a light wind from the northward, discovered a frigate and a large schooner in

the north-north-east. The two British ships immediately hauled up in chase, and at 5 h. 30 m. P. M. tacked to the west-north-west, making the Russian as well as English private signals. At 6 h. 15 m. the President and her consort, who had hitherto been standing towards the two British ships, tacked from them to the north-west, under all sail, followed by the Alexandria and Spitfire. At 7 h. 30 m. P. M. the Spitfire was within five miles of the President, who then bore from her north-north-west. In order that there may be no doubt of identity in this case, we subjoin a brief extract or two from the letter of Commodore Rodgers. "At the time of meeting with the enemy's two ships, the privateer-schooner Scourge, of New-York, had fallen in company."—"I stood towards them until, making out what they were, I hauled by the wind upon the opposite tack to avoid them."

The lightness of the night in these latitudes enabling the British frigate and sloop to keep sight of their enemy, no interruption occurred in the chase. On the 20th, at 4 h. 30 m. P. M., finding that the Spitfire, as well as the President, was gaining upon her, the Alexandria cut away her bower-anchor. At 4 h. 40 m. the Scourge parted company from the President, who was now nearly hull-down from the leading British ship. A schooner being unworthy game when a frigate was in sight, the Alexandria and Spitfire continued in pursuit of the President. "Their attention," says the commodore, "was so much engrossed by the President, that they permitted her (the Scourge) to escape, without appearing to take any notice of her."

At 6 P. M., when the Alexandria bore from the Spitfire full two miles south-south-east, the President bore north distant only six miles. From this time the American frigate continued gaining upon the Spitfire until 1 h. 10 m. P. M. on the 21st; when, thick weather coming on, the latter lost sight both of her consort and her chase. The discharge of four guns, however, by the Alexandria, enabled the Spitfire to close. The two British ships again making sail, the sloop, at 2 h. 15 m. P. M., again got sight of the President, in the west-south-west, and at 4 P. M. was once more within six miles of her; which, says the commodore, "was quite as near as was desirable." The chase continued, during the remainder of the 21st, to the advantage of the American frigate, until 8 A. M. on the 22d, when the Spitfire, a fourth time, got within six miles of the President; who again, by the most strenuous efforts, began increasing her distance.

At 8 P. M., when nearly hull-down from the little persevering sloop, and quite out of sight from the Alexandria, the President fired a gun, hoisted an American ensign at her peak, and a commodore's broad pendant at her main, and hauled upon a wind to the westward. Captain Ellis continued gallantly to stand



on, until, at 6 h. 40 m. P. M., Captain Cathcart, who was then eight miles in the east-north-east of his consort, considerably signalled the Spitfire to close. As soon as the latter had done so, sail was again made; and the chase continued throughout that night, and until 10 A. M. on the 23d; when the President had run completely out of sight of both "the line-of-battle ship and the frigate," or, as an American historian says,<sup>7</sup> of the "two line-of-battle ships,"\* which had so long been pursuing her.

Among the prisoners on board the President at the time of the chase, were the master and mate of the British snow *Daphne*, of *Whitby*. According to the journal of these men, published in the newspapers, they, as well as many of the President's officers and men, were convinced that the chasing ships were a small frigate and a sloop of war. They describe, in a ludicrous manner, the preparations on board the President, to resist the attack of this formidable squadron. During each of the three days a treble allowance of grog was served out to the crew, and an immense quantity of star, chain, and other kinds of dismantling shot got upon deck, in readiness for action. It appears also that, when the *Eliza-Swan* whaler hove in sight a few days afterwards, she was supposed to be a large ship of war, and the ceremony with the grog and dismantling shot was repeated. After a very cautious approach on the part of the President, the chase was discovered to be a clump of a merchantman, and made prize of accordingly.

In the above, as the American commodore accurately states it, "80 hours' chase," what a contrast appears in the gallantry of one party, and the pusillanimity of the other. Will any one pretend, that the flight of Commodore Rodgers was all the effect of delusion? What! mistake a ship of 422 tons for a frigate of 662 tons for a "line-of-battle ship"? Well was it for the commodore that he did not belong to the British navy. Well was it, too, for Captains Cathcart and Ellis, that the *Alexandria* sailed so ill; for it was physically impossible that she and the *Spitfire* should have come off victorious. Yet, that gallantry, which had urged their captains to the pursuit of so formidable a ship, a ship known by her ensign and broad pendant to be a similar frigate to those that had captured, in succession, the *Guerrière*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*, would have impelled them to stand by each other, until both ships had either been buried in the deep, or become the trophies of the American commodore.

Overjoyed at his escape, Commodore Rogers determined to quit a region where constant daylight afforded an enemy so many advantages over him: he therefore crowded sail to the westward. On the 2d of August, after the President had been

\* Naval Monument, p. 280.

four or five days in a good position for intercepting the trade passing in and out of the Irish Channel, a rumour of "superior force in that vicinity," another "line-of-battle ship and frigate" probably, rendered it expedient for the commodore to shift his cruising ground. He then made the circuit of Ireland; and, getting into the latitude of Cape Clear, steered for the banks of Newfoundland. Here Commodore Rodgers was near being gratified with the sight of a real line-of-battle ship and frigate, the *Bellerophon* 74, Captain Edward Hawker, bearing the flag of Vice-admiral Sir Richard Goodwin Keats, and the *Hyperion* 36, Captain William Pryce Cumby.

With this intelligence, the President bent her course towards the United States; and on the 23d of September, when a little to the southward of Nantucket, succeeded in decoying and capturing the British 5-gun schooner *Highflyer*, tender to the *San-Domingo* 74, and commanded by her second lieutenant, William Hutchinson. That was not all. Owing to a great deal of cunning on one side, and a tolerable share of imbecility on the other, Commodore Rodgers obtained the stations of the different British men of war on the American coast; and taking his measures accordingly, was enabled, on the same day, to enter unobserved the harbour of Newport, Rhode-island.

The Congress frigate continued cruising, without effecting any thing of consequence, until the middle of December; when Captain Smith succeeded in reaching, unobserved as it also appears, the harbour of Portsmouth, New-Hampshire. One of her officers, when writing to a friend announcing his return says: "The Congress has 410 of her crew on board, all in good health: she lost four men by sickness, and has manned a prize with a few others." The officer's friend carried this letter to a newspaper editor, and he gave it immediate insertion. There cannot therefore be a doubt, that the Congress had quitted port with at least 425 men; and the Congress and Chesapeake were of the same class. Some months after the arrival of the Congress at Portsmouth, the *Tenedos* cruised off the port; and, during a long blockade, Captain Parker used every means in his power to induce the Congress to come out and engage him. But the fate of the Chesapeake had put a stop to the future cruises of the American 18-pounder frigates, and the Congress, after a while, was disarmed and laid up.

On the 5th of August, off the southern coast of the United States, the British schooner *Dominica*, of 12 carronades, 12-pounders, and two sixes, with, as an extra gun, a 32-pounder carronade upon a traversing carriage, Lieutenant George Wilmot Barrett, having under her convoy the king's packet *Princess-Charlotte*, bound from St.-Thomas's to England, fell in with the French, or rather, the Franco-American, privateer-schooner *Decatur*, of six 12-pounder carronades and one long 18-pounder traversing carriage, commanded by the celebrated Captain Do-

minique Diron.\* We have no other details than those furnished by the American papers; but we suppose that Lieutenant Barretté, the moment he discovered the privateer approaching, hauled off from the packer to meet her.

Commencing the attack from to-windward, at a distance that best suited her long 18-pounder, the Decatur gradually closed with the Dominica, and made an attempt to board, but was repulsed. A second attempt met the same fate; but, after the contest had lasted three quarters of an hour, the Decatur ran her jib-boom through the Dominica's mainsail, when a third attempt, made by the whole of the French crew, succeeded; that is, the privateer's men gained a footing upon the Dominica's deck. Here a sanguinary conflict ensued; in which Lieutenant Barretté, although he had been wounded early in the action by two musket-balls in the left arm, fought in the most gallant manner; and, refusing to surrender, was killed. Emulating the example of their youthful commander (he was not 26), the remaining officers and men made a noble resistance against double their numbers. Owing to the crowded state of the Dominica's deck from the presence of the boarders, and the valour of the British crew in persisting to struggle with the latter, fire-arms became useless, and cutlasses and cold shot were the chief weapons used. At length, the Dominica's brave crew became diminished to about a dozen effective men and boys; and the Decatur's, then six times more numerous, hauled down the British colours.

Of her 57 men and nine boys, the Dominica had her commander, master (Isaac Sacker), purser (David Brown), two midshipmen (William Archer and William Parry), and 13 seamen and boys killed and mortally wounded, and 47 severely and slightly wounded, including every other officer (her sub-lieutenant was absent) except the surgeon and one midshipman. One of her boys, not 11 years old, was wounded in two places. Poor child! it would have suited thee better to have been throwing dumps than "cold shot;" to be gamboling in the nursery, rather than "contending for victory" upon a man of war's deck. Out of a crew of at least 120 men, the Decatur had four killed and 15 wounded.

It appears that Captain Diron, by his masterly manœuvres, prevented the Dominica from making any effectual use of her guns, relying for success upon the arm in which he knew he was almost doubly superior. The Dominica was captured by a privateer, certainly, but under circumstances, that reflected an honour rather than a disgrace upon the British character. The following paragraph forms a part of Captain Diron's account in the Charleston papers; nor have we been able to discover a contradiction to the serious charges it contains: "During the com-

\* See vol. iv., p. 268.

bat, which lasted an hour, the king's packet *Princess-Charlotte* remained a silent spectator of the scene; and, as soon as the vessels were disengaged from each other, she tacked and stood to the southward."

On the 5th of September, at daylight, as the British brig-sloop (late gun-brig), *Boxer*, of 12 carronades, 18-pounders, and two sixes, Captain Samuel Blyth, was lying at anchor near Penguin point, a few miles to the eastward of Portland in the United States, the American gun-brig *Enterprise*, of 14 carronades, 18-pounders, and two nines, Lieutenant-commandant William Burrows, was seen in the south-south-east. At 7 h. 30 m. p. m., leaving her surgeon, two of her midshipmen, and an army officer, a passenger, on shore at Manhegan, "shooting pigeons," the *Boxer* got under way, and, at 8 h. 30 m., hoisting three English ensigns, bore up for the *Enterprise*, then standing on the larboard tack. At 9 a. m. the latter tacked and stood to the southward. At 9 h. 30 m., when the two brigs were about four miles apart, it fell calm; and at 11 h. 30 m. a breeze sprang up from the southward, which placed the American brig to windward. At 2 p. m. the *Enterprise* made sail on a wind, to try her rate of sailing with the *Boxer*; and, in half an hour, having clearly ascertained his advantage in this respect, as well as that the *Boxer* was inferior in size and force, Lieutenant Burrows hoisted three American ensigns, and firing a shot of defiance, bore up to engage.

At 3 h. 15 m. p. m. the *Boxer*, being on the starboard tack, fired her starboard broadside, and immediately received the larboard broadside of the *Enterprise* in return; the two brigs then not more than half pistol-shot apart. In the very first broadside, an 18-pound shot passed through Captain Blyth's body, and shattered his left arm. The command of the *Boxer* then devolved upon her only lieutenant, David M'Creery. At about the same time a musket-ball fired from the *Boxer* mortally wounded Captain Burrows. At 3 h. 30 m. p. m. the *Enterprise*, now commanded by Lieutenant Edward R. M'Call, ranged ahead, and, rounding to on the starboard tack, raked the *Boxer* with her starboard guns, and shot away her main topmast and foretopsail yard. The American brig then set her foresail, and, taking a position on the starboard bow of her now wholly unmanageable antagonist, continued pouring in successive raking fires until 3 h. 45 m., when the *Boxer* surrendered.

† The *Boxer* was much cut up in hull and spars, and, out of her 60 men (12 absent) and six boys, lost, besides her commander, three men killed, and 17 men wounded, four of them mortally. The *Enterprise* suffered very little injury in her hull and spars; but her rigging and sails were a good deal cut. Out of her 120 men and three boys, the American brig lost one man killed, her commander, one midshipman (both mortally), and 11 men wounded, one of the latter mortally.

The established armament of the Boxer was 10 carronades; and that number, with her two 6-pounders, was as many as the brig could mount with effect or carry with ease. But, when the Boxer was refitting at Halifax, Captain Blyth obtained two additional carronades: had he taken on board, instead of them, 20 additional seamen, the Boxer would have been a much more effective vessel. Against the English 18-pounder carronade, complaints have always been made, for its lightness and unsteadiness in action; but the American carronade of that caliber is much shorter in the breech, and longer in the muzzle: therefore it heats more slowly, recoils less, and carries farther. The same is the case, indeed, with all the varieties of the carronade used by the Americans; and they, in consequence derive advantages in the employment of that piece of ordnance, not possessed by the English; whose carronades are notoriously the lightest and most inefficient of any in use. If the English carronade, especially of the smaller calibers, had displayed its imperfections, as these pages have frequently shown that the English 13-inch mortar was in the habit of doing, by bursting after an hour or two's firing, the gun must either have been improved in form, or thrown out of the service. While on the subject of carronades, we may remark, that even the few disadvantages in the carronade, which the Americans have not been able entirely to obviate, they have managed to lessen, by using, not only stouter, but double, breechings; one of which, in case the ring-bolt should draw, is made to pass through the timber-head.

Although it was clearly shown, by the number of prisoners received out of her, that the Boxer commenced the action with only 66 men and boys, Captain Isaac Hull was so officious as to address a letter to Commodore Bainbridge at Boston, purposely to express his opinion, that the British brig had upwards of "100 men on board; for," says Captain Hull, "I counted upwards of 90 hammocks." As the American public did not know that, in the British service, every seaman and marine has two hammocks allowed him, this statement from one of their favourite naval officers produced the desired effect all over the republic, Washington not excepted.

The Boxer measured 181 tons and a fraction, the Enterprise at least 245 tons; and, while the bulwarks of the latter were built of solid oak, those of the former consisted, with the exception of one timber between each port, of an outer and an inner plank, pervious to every grape-shot that was fired. As a proof of the difference in the size of the two vessels, the mainmast of the Enterprise was 15 inches more in circumference than that of the Boxer, and her main yard upwards of 10 feet longer.

We will, however, admit that, but for the twofold disparity in their crews, these two vessels would have been a tolerably fair

match. It was not in number of men only, that the disparity existed ; an acting master's mate, Hugh James, and three seamen, as proved at the court-martial assembled to try the surviving officers and crew for the loss of the Boxer, deserted their quarters in the action. So that, as the two midshipmen were absent, Lieutenant M'Creery was the only officer left after the death of the captain, and the latter, it will be recollected, was killed in the first broadside ; whereas the Enterprise, after her gallant commander fell, had still remaining two lieutenants, one or two master's mates, and four midshipmen. Her crew, also, had evidently been well practised at the guns ; but the Boxer's men appear to have known very little what use to make of their guns. The sentence of the court-martial refers particularly to this disgraceful circumstance. Upon the whole, the action of the Boxer and Enterprise was a very creditable affair to the Americans ; but, excepting the Frolic's action, and that was a case *sui generis*, it was the first engagement in which an American vessel had succeeded against a British vessel nearly equal to her in guns ; and, even in this case, the American vessel was doubly superior in crew, better formed in every respect, nearly a third larger, and constructed, as we have already stated, of much stouter scantling.

On the 7th of September the gallant commanders of the two brigs were buried at Portland with military and civic honours ; and the few surviving officers of the Boxer, to testify their regard for their late commander, caused a tombstone, with a suitable inscription, to be placed over his grave. None of the praises lavished upon the " fine brig of war Boxer " could gain her a place among the national vessels of the United States. She was put up to auction, and sold as a merchant brig ; for which service only, and that in peaceable times, she was ever calculated.

On the 12th of August, at 6 h. 30 m. A. M., the British 18-gun brig-sloop Pelican, Captain John Fordyce Maples, anchored in Cork from a cruise. Before the sails were furled, Captain Maples received orders to put to sea again, in quest of an American sloop of war, which had been committing serious depredations in St.-George's Channel, and of which the Pelican herself had gained some information on the preceding day. At 8 A. M., having supplied herself with a few necessary stores, the Pelican got under way, and beat out of the harbour against a very strong breeze and heavy sea ; a proof of the earnestness of her officers and crew.

On the 13th, at 7 h. 30 m. P. M., when standing to the eastward with the wind at north-west, the Pelican observed a fire ahead, and a brig standing to the south-east. The latter was immediately chased under all sail, but was lost sight of in the night. On the 14th, at 4 h. 45 m. A. M., latitude  $52^{\circ} 15'$  north, longitude  $5^{\circ} 50'$  west, the same brig was seen in the north-east,

separating from a ship which she had just set on fire, and steering towards several merchantmen in the south-east. This active cruiser was the United States' brig-sloop *Argus*, Captain William Henry Allen, standing close hauled on the starboard tack, with the wind a moderate breeze from the southward. The *Pelican* was on the weather quarter of the *Argus*, bearing down under a press of sail to close her; nor did the latter make any attempt to escape, her commander, who had been first lieutenant of the United-States in her action with the *Macedonian*, being confident, as it afterwards appeared, that he could "whip any English 22-gun" (as all the British 18-gun brigs were called in America) sloop of war in 10 minutes. Let us now show the force of each of these anxious candidates for the laurel crown.

The *Pelican* mounted the usual establishment of her class, 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long sixes, with a 12-pounder boat-carronade. But, unfortunately, Captain Maples, when recently at Jamaica, had taken on board two brass 6-pounders. As there were no broadside ports for them, these surplusage guns were not thrown into the hold along with the ballast, but were mounted through the stern-ports, to the perpetual annoyance of the man at the helm, without a redeeming benefit in contributing, in the slightest degree, to the brig's actual force. Of her established complement of 120 men and boys, the *Pelican* had on board 101 men and 12 boys; and, among her absentees, was her second lieutenant. The *Argus* mounted 18 carronades, 24-pounders, and two long English 12-pounders, the same, we believe, that had belonged to the *Macedonian*. On quitting the United States upon this cruise, the *Argus* mustered 157 men and boys; but she had since manned so many prizes as to reduce her crew to 127, or, as acknowledged by her officers, 125, a number that included about three lads or boys.

At 4 h. 30 m. A. M., being unable to get the weathergage, the *Argus* shortened sail, to give the *Pelican* the opportunity of closing. At 5 h. 55 m. A. M., St.-David's Head bearing east distant about five leagues, the *Pelican* hoisted her colours. The *Argus* immediately did the same, and at 6 A. M., having wore round, opened her larboard guns within grape-distance; receiving in return the starboard broadside of the *Pelican*. In about four minutes Captain Allen was severely wounded, and the main braces, main springstay, gaff, and trysail-mast of the *Argus* were shot away. At 6 h. 14 m. the *Pelican* bore up, to pass astern of the *Argus*; but the latter, now commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Watson, adroitly threw all aback, and frustrated the attempt, bestowing at the same time a well-intended, but ineffective raking fire. At 6 h. 18 m., having shot away her opponent's preventer-brace and main topsail-tie, and thus deprived her of the use of her after-sails, the *Pelican* passed

astern of and raked the *Argus*, and then ranged up on her starboard quarter, pouring in her fire with destructive effect. In a short time, having by this vigorous attack had her wheel-ropes and running rigging of every description shot away, the *Argus* became entirely unmanageable, and again exposed her stern to the broadside of the *Pelican*; who, shortly afterwards, passing the broadside of the *Argus*, placed herself on the latter's starboard bow. In this position the British brig, at 6 h. 45 m. A. M., boarded the American brig, and instantly carried her, although the master's mate of the *Pelican*, Mr. William Young, who led the party, received his death-wound from the fore top of the *Argus*, just as he had stepped upon her gunwale. Even this did not encourage the American crew to rally; and two or three, among those who had not run below, hauled down the colours.

On board the *Pelican*, one shot had passed through the boatswain's and another through the carpenter's cabin. Her sides were filled with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much injured: her foremast and main topmast were slightly wounded, and so were her royal-masts; but no spar was seriously hurt. Two of her carronades were dismantled. Out of her 101 men and 12 boys, the *Pelican* lost, besides the master's mate, Mr. Young, slain in the moment of victory, one seaman killed, and five slightly wounded, chiefly by the American musketry and langridge; the latter to the torture of the wounded. Captain Maples had a narrow escape: a spent canister-shot struck, with some degree of force, one of his waistcoat buttons, and then fell on the deck.

The *Argus* was tolerably cut up in her hull. Both her lower masts were wounded, although not badly, and her fore shrouds on one side were nearly all destroyed; but, like the *Chesapeake*, the *Argus* had no spar shot away. Several of her carronades were disabled. Out of her 122 men and three boys, to appearance a remarkably fine ship's company, the *Argus* had six seamen killed, her commander, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and three seamen mortally, her first lieutenant and five seamen severely, and eight others slightly, wounded; total, six killed and 18 wounded.

We shall not, of course, reckon as a part of the *Pelican*'s broadside force the two 6-pounders in her stern-ports, nor, for the reason formerly stated, the 12-pounder boat-carronade. Although a trifle shorter on deck than the *Pelican*, the *Argus* carried her 10 guns of a side with ease; first, because, being of a smaller caliber, they took up rather less room, and next, because her tiller worked on the 'tween decks, and admitted her aftermost port to be carried nearer to her stern by several feet. The American writers dwell upon the number of prizes which the *Argus* had previously made, partly with the view of raising an inference, that she had reduced her ammunition to an in-



adequate amount. The fact is that, after her action with the Pelican, the Argus had more powder left than was supplied to the Pelican at her first outfit; and the American brig's round, grape, and canister shot, exclusive of bars of iron, old iron, rusty nails, bayonets lashed together with rope-yarn, and other species of American langridge, weighed 22 cwt. With respect, also, to muskets, pistols, swords, and pikes, nearly twice as many were found on board the Argus, as were allowed to a British brig-sloop of the Pelican's class.

The Argus was built at Boston in the year 1799 or 1800: she measured 298 tons American, or 316 English; and her qualifications as a cruiser called forth the following encomium from the editor of the National Intelligencer: "She is admitted to be one of the finest vessels in the service of her class, and the model of such a vessel is certainly inestimable." But the Argus at that time had not been captured by the British. In point of length, the two brigs were the same, within about four feet in favour of the Pelican; who had also three feet more beam, and consequently was of greater measurement by nearly 70 tons. But, while the main yard of the Pelican was 54 feet 7 inches in length, that of the Argus was 55 feet 2 inches. In point of scantling the Argus had also the advantage in a slight degree.

## COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

	PELICAN.		ARGUS.
Broadside-guns.....	No.	9	10
	lbs.	262	228
Crew (men only).....	No.	101	122
Size.....	tons	385	316

We will set the Americans a good example by freely admitting, that there was here a superiority against them; but then, even after she had captured the Argus, the Pelican was in a condition to engage and make prize of another American brig just like her. The slight loss incurred on one side in this action is worth attending to, not only by the boasters in the United States, but by the croakers in Great Britain.

Despatching his prize, with half her crew, including the wounded, and a full third of his own, in charge of the Pelican's first and only lieutenant, Thomas Welsh, to Plymouth, Captain Maples himself, with the remaining half of the prisoners, proceeded to Cork, to report his proceedings to Admiral Thornborough. On the 16th the Argus arrived at Plymouth; and soon afterwards, for the promptitude, skill, and gallantry which he had displayed Captain Maples was most deservedly posted. Captain Allen had his left thigh amputated by his own surgeon; and, notwithstanding every attention, died on the 18th of August, at Mill-Prison hospital. On the 21st he was buried with high military honours, and attended to his grave by all the navy, marine, and army officers in the port.

A court of inquiry was of course held on the surviving officers and crew of the *Argus*, for the loss of their vessel. The court declared, "it was proved that, in the number of her crew, and in the number and caliber of her guns, the *Pelican* was decidedly superior to the *Argus*." How it was "proved" that the *Pelican* had more men than the *Argus*, or what was the number that either vessel carried, the court did not deem it worth while to state. Nor does Lieutenant Watson in his official letter, and which doubtless was before the court, make the slightest allusion to any superiority on the part of the *Pelican* in number of men. But the court was not aware, perhaps, that Lieutenant Watson, and the two officers next in rank to him, had solemnly sworn, in a British prize-court, that the *Argus* went into action with 125 men. Lieutenant Watson officially enumerates the *Pelican's* guns, boat-carronade and all, at 21; and, many months before the sitting of the court, that officer, Lieutenant William Henry Allen the younger, and the brig's master, had sworn that the *Argus* mounted 20 guns; a very "decided" superiority certainly. Upon the whole, we must conclude, that these American courts of inquiry are less scrupulous about the truth, than the expediency, of the decisions they pronounce; and yet some persons may consider it not very wise in the Americans, looking back on their previous boastings, to make the "caliber of guns" a subject of investigation.

Unfortunately, the capture of frigate after frigate by the Americans could not persuade the British government, that the United States were in earnest about going to war. Hence, instead of one of the 10 or 12 dashing flag-officers, whose names have recently figured in these pages, being sent out to fight the Americans into compliance, a superannuated admiral, whose services, such as they were, bore a very old date, arrived, early in March, 1813, in Chesapeake bay, to try the effect of diplomacy and procrastination. Had not Sir John Warren's second in command, Rear-admiral Cockburn, been of a more active turn, the inhabitants of that very exposed part of the American sea-frontier, the coast around the bay in which the two admirals had cast anchor, would scarcely have known, except by hearsay, that war existed. But, before we proceed to give an account of the proceedings of Rear-admiral Cockburn in the rivers at the head of the Chesapeake, we have to relate a boat-attack that took place a few weeks previous to his arrival on the American coast.

On the 8th of February, at 9 A. M., while a British squadron, consisting of the 18-pounder 36-gun frigates *Maidstone* and *Belvidera*, Captains George Burdett and Richard Byron, and 38-gun frigates *Junon* and *Statira*, Captains James Sanders and Hazard Stackpole, was at anchor in Lynhaven bay, a schooner was observed in the north-west, standing down Chesapeake bay. Immediately the boats of the *Belvidera* and *Statira* were

detached in chase. Shortly afterwards, on Captain Byron's making the signal, that the chase was superior to the boats, a fresh force of boats was sent, making nine in all, under the command of Lieutenant Kelly Nazer.

On seeing the boats approaching her, the schooner, which was the *Lottery*, of six 12-pounder carronades and 28 men, Captain John Southcomb, from Baltimore bound to Bordeaux, made all sail to escape; but soon found herself becalmed. At 1 P. M. she opened from her stern-chasers a well-directed fire upon the headmost boats, or those first detached. These rested on their oars until their comrades came up; when the whole rushed forward, and, through a very animated fire of round and grape, boarded the schooner, but did not carry her until after a most obstinate resistance, in which Captain Southcomb was mortally wounded, and 18 of his men also wounded, many of them dangerously. The British sustained a loss comparatively slight, having had only one man killed and five wounded.

This was a very gallant resistance on the part of the *Lottery*; and Captain Southcomb, until he died, was treated with the greatest attention by Captain Byron, on board of whose frigate he had been brought. Captain Byron then sent the body of the *Lottery's* late commander on shore, with every mark of respect due to the memory of a brave officer; and he afterwards received a letter of thanks from Captain Charles Stewart of the American 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Constellation*, at an anchor in St.-James river leading to Norfolk, watching an opportunity to put to sea. The *Lottery* was a fine schooner of 225 tons, pierced for 16 guns, and afterwards became the *Canso* in the British service.

Just as Sir John Warren, with the 74-gun ships *San-Domingo*, bearing his flag, Captain Charles Gill, and *Marlborough*, bearing Rear-admiral Cockburn's flag, Captain Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross, accompanied by the *Maidstone* and *Statira* frigates and *Pantome* and *Mohawk* brig-sloops, had arrived abreast of the river *Rappahannock*, in their way up the Chesapeake, five large armed schooners were discovered, and were immediately chased into the river by the frigates and smaller vessels. It now falling calm, the boats of the two line-of-battle ships and frigates, consisting of the *San-Domingo's* pinnace, with 23 officers and men and a 12-pounder carronade, under Lieutenant James Polkinghorne and midshipman Robert Amyett Newman, *Maidstone's* launch, with 21 officers and men and a 12-pounder carronade, under Lieutenant Matthew Liddon, *Marlborough's* barge and cutter, with 40 officers and men, under Lieutenant George Constantine Urmston and James Scott, and *Statira's* cutter with 21 officers and men, under Lieutenant George Bishop, total 105 officers and men were immediately detached in pursuit.

After rowing 15 miles, Lieutenant Polkinghorne found the four schooners, which were the *Arab*, of seven guns and 45 men,

Lynx, of six guns and 40 men, Racer, of six guns and 36 men, and Dolphin, of 12 guns and 98 men, drawn up in line ahead, and fully prepared to give him a warm reception. He, notwithstanding, dashed at them. The Arab was boarded and carried by the Marlborough's two boats; the Lynx hauled down her colours just as the San-Domingo's pinnace arrived alongside; and the Racer was carried by Lieutenant Polkinghorne, after a sharp resistance. The guns of the Racer were then turned upon the Dolphin; and the latter was gallantly boarded and carried by the Statira's cutter and Maidstone's launch.

The loss sustained by the British in this very gallant boat-attack amounted to one seaman and one marine killed, Lieutenant Polkinghorne, another lieutenant (William Alexander Brand), one lieutenant of marines (William Richard Flint), one midshipman (John Sleigh), and seven seamen and marines wounded. The loss sustained by the Americans was six men killed and 10 wounded. The captured schooners were very fine vessels and of large dimensions for schooners, each measuring from 200 to 225 tons. The Racer and Lynx, under the names of Shelburne and Musquedobit, were afterwards 14-gun schooners in the British service. Because, probably, these four formidable schooners were only privateers, the gallantry of Lieutenant Polkinghorne in capturing them with a force so decidedly inferior, did not obtain him a commander's rank until upwards of 14 months afterwards.

Rear-admiral Cockburn was now directed, with a squadron of small vessels, to penetrate the rivers at the head of the bay, and endeavour to cut off the enemy's supplies, as well as to destroy his foundries, stores, and public works; particularly a dépôt of flour, military and other stores, ascertained, by the information of some Americans, to be at a place called French-town, situated a considerable distance up the river Elk. Accordingly on the evening of the 28th of April, taking with him the brigs Fantome and Mohawk, and the Dolphin, Racer, and High-flyer tenders, the rear-admiral moved towards the river. Having anchored the brigs and schooners as far within the entrance as could be effected after dark, the rear-admiral took with him in the boats of his little squadron, commanded by Lieutenant George Augustus Westphal, first of the Marlborough, 150 marines, under Captains Marmaduke Wybourn and Thomas Carter, and five artillerymen, under Lieutenant Robertson, of that corps, and proceeded to execute his orders.

Having, owing to ignorance of the way, entered the Bohemia, instead of keeping in the Elk river, the boats did not reach the destined place till late on the following morning. This delay enabled the inhabitants of French-town, to make arrangements for the defence of the stores and town; for the security of which a six-gun battery had lately been erected. As soon as the boats approached within gun-shot of it, a heavy fire was opened upon

them. Disregarding this, however, the marines quickly landed; and the American militia fled from the battery to the adjoining woods. The inhabitants of the town, which was situated at about a mile distant, having, as far as could be ascertained, taken no part in the contest, were not in the slightest degree molested; but a considerable quantity of flour, of army-clothing, saddles, bridles, and other equipments for cavalry; also various articles of merchandise, and the two stores in which they had been contained, together with five vessels lying near the place, were entirely consumed. The guns of the battery, being too heavy to be carried away, were disabled; and the boats departed, with no other loss than one seaman wounded in the arm by a grape-shot. The Americans lost one man killed by a rocket, but none wounded.

The rear-admiral's system, and which he had taken care to impart to all the Americans captured by, or voluntarily coming on board, the squadron, was to land without offering molestation to the unopposing inhabitants, either in their persons or properties; to capture or destroy all articles of merchandise and munitions of war; to be allowed to take off, upon paying the full market price, all such cattle and supplies as the British squadron might require; but, should resistance be offered, or menaces held out, to consider the town as a fortified post, and the male inhabitants as soldiers; the one to be destroyed, the other, with their cattle and stock, to be captured.

As the boats in their way down the Elk, were rounding Turkey point, they came in sight of a large estate, surrounded by cattle. The rear-admiral landed; and, directing the bailiff, or overseer, to pick out as many oxen, sheep, or other stock, as were deemed sufficient for the present use of the squadron, paid for them to the full amount of what the bailiff alleged was the market price. Not the slightest injury was done; or, doubtless one of the industrious American historians would have recorded the fact. Having learnt that cattle and provisions, in considerable quantity, were at Specucie Island, the rear-admiral, with the brigs and tenders, proceeded to that place. In his way thither, it became necessary to pass in sight of Havre de Grace, a village of about 60 houses, situated on the west side of the Susquehanna, a short distance above the confluence of that river with the Chesapeake. Although the British were a long way out of gun-shot, the Americans at Havre de Grace, as if inspired by the heroism of their townsman, Commodore Rodgers, fired at them from a six-gun battery, and displayed to their view, as a further mark of defiance, a large American ensign. This determined the rear-admiral to make that battery and town the next object of attack. In the mean while, he anchored off Specucie Island. Here a part of the boats landed, and obtained cattle upon the same terms as before. A complaint having been made, that some of the subordinate officers had destroyed a number of turkeys, the rear-admiral

paid the value of them out of his own pocket. The Americans as they were driving the cattle to the boats, jeered the men, saying, "Why do you come here? Why don't you go to Havre de Grace? There you'll have something to do." About this time a deserter gave the people at Havre de Grace, who had already been preparing, notice of the intended attack.

After quitting Specucie Island, the rear-admiral bent his course towards Havre de Grace; but the shallowness of the water admitting the passage of boats only, the 150 marines and the five artillerymen embarked at midnight on the 2d of May, and proceeded up the river. The Dolphin and Highflyer tenders attempted to follow in support of the boats, but shoal water compelled them to anchor at the distance of six miles from the point of attack. By daylight, the boats succeeded in getting opposite to the battery; which mounted six guns, 12 and 6 pounders, and opened a smart fire upon the British. The marines instantly landed to the left; which was a signal to the Americans to withdraw from their battery. Lieutenant Westphal, having in the mean time stationed his rocket-boat close to the battery, now landed with his boat's crew, turned the guns upon the American militia, and drove them to the extremity of the town. The inhabitants still keeping up a fire from behind the houses, walls, and trees, Lieutenant Westphal, by the admiral's orders, held out a flag of truce, and called upon them to desist. Instead of so doing, these "unoffending citizens" fired at the British lieutenant, and actually shot him through the very hand that was bearing the flag of truce. After this, who could wonder if the British seamen and marines turned to the right and to the left, and demolished every thing in their way? The townspeople themselves had constructed the battery; and yet not a house in which an inhabitant remained was injured. Several of the inhabitants, principally women, who had fled at first, came again into the town, and got back such articles as had been taken. Some of the women actually proceeded to the boats: and, upon identifying their property, obtained its restoration.

Many of the inhabitants who had remained peaceably in their houses, as a proof that they were well informed of the principle upon which Sir George Cockburn acted, frequently exclaimed to him: "Ah, sir, I told them what would be the consequence of their conduct. It is a great pity so many should suffer for a headstrong few. Those who were the most determined to fire upon you the other day, saying it was impossible you could take the place, were now the first to run away." Several of the houses that were not burnt did, in truth, belong to the chief agents in those violent measures which had caused such severity on the part of the British; and the very townspeople themselves pointed out the houses. Lieutenant Westphal, with his remaining hand, pursued and took prisoner an American captain of militia; and others of the party brought in

an ensign and several privates, including an old Irishman, named O'Neill. After embarking the six guns from the battery, and taking or destroying about 130 stands of small-arms, the British departed from Havre de Grace.

One division of boats, headed by the rear-admiral, then proceeded to the northward, in search of a cannon-foundry, of which some of the inhabitants of Havre de Grace had given information. This was found, and quickly destroyed; together with five long 24-pounders, stationed in a battery for its protection; 28 long 32-pounders, ready for sending away; and eight long guns, and four carronades, in the boring-house and foundry. Another division of boats was sent up the Susquehanna; and returned, after destroying five vessels and a large store of flour.

On the night of the 5th of May, the same party of British marines and artillerymen again embarked in the boats, and proceeded up the river Sassafras, separating the counties of Kent and Cecil, towards the villages of George-town and Frederick-town, situated on opposite sides of the river, nearly facing each other. Having intercepted a small boat with two of the inhabitants, Rear-admiral Cockburn halted the detachment, about two miles from the town; and then sent forward the two Americans in their boat, to warn their countrymen against acting in the same rash manner as the people of Havre de Grace had done; assuring them that, if they did, their towns would inevitably experience a similar fate; but that, on the contrary, if they did not attempt resistance, no injury should be done to them or their towns; that vessels and public property only would be seized; that the strictest discipline would be maintained; and that whatever provision, or other property of individuals, the rear-admiral might require for the use of the squadron, would be instantly paid for in its fullest value. The two Americans agreed in the propriety of this; said there was no battery at either of the towns; that they would willingly deliver the message, and had no doubt the inhabitants would be peaceably disposed.

After waiting a considerable time, the rear-admiral advanced higher up; and, when within about a mile from the towns, and between two projecting points of land which compelled the boats to proceed in close order, a heavy fire was opened upon them from one field-piece, and, as conjectured, 300 or 400 militia, divided and intrenched on the opposite sides of the river. The fire was promptly returned, and the rear-admiral pushed on shore with the marines; but, the instant the American militia observed them fix their bayonets, they fled to the woods, and were neither seen nor heard of afterwards. All the houses, excepting those whose owners had continued peaceably in them, and taken no part in the attack, were forthwith destroyed; as were four vessels lying in the river, together with some stores

of sugar, of lumber, of leather, and other merchandise. On this occasion, five of the British were wounded. One of the Americans, who entreated to have his property saved, wore military gaiters; and had, no doubt, assisted at the firing upon the British. Agreeably to his request, however, his property was left untouched.

On his way down the river, the rear-admiral visited a town situated on a branch of it. Here a part of the inhabitants actually pulled off to him; and, requesting to shake hands, declared he should experience no opposition whatever. The rear-admiral accordingly landed, with the officers, and, chiefly out of respect to his rank, a small personal guard. Among those that came to greet him on his landing, were observed two inhabitants of George-town. These men, as well as an inhabitant of the place who had been to George-town to see what was going on, had succeeded in persuading the people to adopt, as their best security, a peaceable demeanour. Having ascertained that there were no warlike stores nor public property, and obtained, upon payment of the full value, such articles as were wanted, the rear-admiral and his party re-embarked. Soon afterwards a députation was sent from Charles-town, on the north-east river, to assure the rear-admiral, that the place was considered as at his mercy; and, similar assurances coming from other places in the upper part of the Chesapeake, the rear-admiral and his light squadron retired from that quarter.

Persons in England may find it difficult to consider, as soldiers, men neither imbodyed nor dressed in regimentals. That circumstance has not escaped the keen discernment of the American government. Hence the British are so often charged, in proclamations and other state-papers, with attacking the "inoffensive citizens of the republic." The fact is, every man in the United States, under 45 years of age, is a militiaman; and, during the war, attended in his turn, to be drilled or trained. He had always in his possession either a musket or a rifled-barrel piece; knew its use from his infancy; and with it, therefore, could do as much execution in a smock frock or plain coat, as if he wore the most splendid uniform. These soldiers in citizens' dresses were the men whom Rear-admiral Cockburn so frequently attacked and routed; and who, when they had really acted up to the character of non-combatants, were invariably spared, both in their persons and properties. The rear-admiral wished them, for their own sakes only, to remain neutral; but General Hull, in his famous proclamation, prepared with so much care at Washington, invited the Canadian people to become open traitors to their country; and visited, upon the heads of those that refused, all the horrors and calamities of war."

On the 12th of June the boats of the 18-pounder 32-gun frigate *Narcissus*, Captain John Richard Lumley, containing



about 40 men, under the command of Lieutenant John Crie, first of that ship, and of Lieutenant of marines Patrick Savage, were despatched up York river, in the Chesapeake, to cut out the United States' schooner Surveyor, mounting six 12-pounder carronades. Captain Samuel Travis, the American commander, had furnished each of his men with two muskets; and they held their fire until the British were within pistol-shot. The Americans then opened; but the boats pushed on, and finally carried the vessel by boarding, with the loss of three men killed, and six wounded. Captain Travis had five men wounded. His crew amounted to only 16; and so gallant was their conduct, as well as that of their commander, in the opinion of Lieutenant Crie, that that officer returned Captain Travis his sword, accompanied by a letter, not less complimentary to him, than creditable to the writer.

Admiral Warren, who had quitted the Chesapeake for Bermuda, returned to his command early in June, bringing with him, according to newspaper-account, a detachment of battalion-marines, 1800 strong, 300 of the 102d regiment, 250 of the Independent Foreigners, or Canadian chasseurs, and 300 of the royal marine-artillery; total 2650 men. On the 18th of June the Junon frigate anchored in Hampton roads, and Captain Sanders despatched his boats to capture or destroy any vessels that might be found at the entrance of James river. Commodore John Cassin, the naval commanding officer at Norfolk, observing this, directed the 15 gun-boats at that station to be manned with an additional number of seamen and marines from the Constellation frigate, then moored at the navy-yard, also with 50 infantry from Craney Island, and despatched them under the command of Captain Tarbell, to attempt the capture or destruction of the Junon.

It was not till about 4 P. M. on the 20th, that this formidable flotilla, armed with upwards of 30 guns, half of which were long 32 and 24 pounders, and manned with, at least, 500 men, commenced its attack upon the Junon, then lying becalmed. Captain Sanders warmly returned their fire with his long 18-pounders, hoping that they would soon venture to approach within reach of his carronades. This the gun-boats carefully avoided; and, between them and the frigate, a distant cannonade, very slightly injurious to either party, was maintained for about three quarters of an hour. A breeze now sprang up; which enabled the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate, Barrosa, Captain William Henry Shirreff, and the 24-gun ship Laurestinus, Captain Thomas Graham, lying about five miles off, to get under way, in the hope to have a share in the amusement. The Junon, also, was at this time under sail, using her best efforts to give a more serious complexion to the contest; but Commodore Cassin, who, as he assures us, was in his boat during the whole of the action, considering that the flotilla had done enough to entitle him to display both his fighting, and his epistolary, qualifications, very

prudently ordered the 15 gun-boats to make the best of their way back to Norfolk.

The appearance of the two frigates and sloop in Hampton roads soon brought to Norfolk and its vicinity as many as 10,000 militia; and the works, recently constructed there, were all manned, ready for defending that important post. At Hampton, also, a militia force had assembled; and batteries were erecting, in case that town should prove the object of attack. On the 20th of June 13 sail of British ships, consisting of three 74s, a 64 armée en flute, four frigates, and five sloops, transports, and tenders, lay at anchor, the nearest within seven, the furthest off within 13, miles of Craney island. An assemblage of boats at the sterns of several of the ships, on the afternoon of that day, gave no very unequivocal notice to the people on shore, that some expedition was on foot. Accordingly, Craney island being rather weakly manned, the commanding officer at Norfolk sent 150 of the Constellation's seamen and marines to a battery of 18-pounders on the north-west, and about 480 Virginia militia to reinforce a detachment of artillery stationed with two 24 and four 6 pounders on the west, side of the island. Captain Tarbell's 15 gun-boats were also moored in the best position for contributing to the defence of the post.

After two days' parade of boats and bustle among the British ships, a division of 17 or 18 boats, at daylight on the morning of the 22d, departed with about 800 men, under Major-general Beckwith, round the point of Nansemond river, and landed there at a place called Pig's point, near to the narrow inlet separating the main from Craney island. Owing to some error in the arrangements, unexpected obstacles presented themselves. An attack from that quarter being therefore considered hopeless, and the position itself not tenable, the troops, in the course of the day, re-embarked and returned to the squadron.

A second division of boats, 15 in number, containing a detachment of 500 men from the 102d regiment, Canadian chasseurs, and battalion-marines, and about 200 seamen, the whole under the command of Captain Samuel John Pechell, of the San-Domingo, arrived, at about 11 A. M., off the north-west side of the island, directly in front of the battery manned by the Constellation's men. Great difference of opinion prevailed among the officers engaged in the expedition, about the propriety of making the attack at that time of tide, it being then the ebb. Captains John Martin Hanchett, of the Diadem, the Honourable James Ashley Maude, of the Nemesias, and Romilly of the engineers, were decidedly against it. Captain Pechell was for it; and he, being the senior officer, carried his point. Captain Hanchett then volunteered to lead the boats to the attack; which he was permitted to do. Captain Hanchett's boat was the Diadem's launch, carrying a 24-pounder carronade, the only boat so armed in the division. He had taken his station about 60 yards ahead of the other boats; and was pulling, under a

very heavy and long-continued fire from the batteries, directly in front of them, when his boat unfortunately took the ground, at the distance of about 100 yards from the muzzles of the enemy's guns. Captain Hanchett, who had been previously standing up in his boat, animating his men to hasten forward, had wrapped round his body a union jack, and prepared to wade on shore to storm the American battery.

At that instant one of the seamen, having plunged his boat-hook over the side, found three or four feet of slimy mud at the bottom. A check being thus effectually given to a daring enterprise, in which all were so ready to join, Captain Hanchett waved his hat for the boats astern to keep afloat. In the hurry of pulling and the ardour of the men, this warning was disregarded; and one or two of the boats grounded. Two others, owing to their having received some shot that had passed through the sails of the *Diadem's* launch, sank.

In the mean while, the Americans at the battery, well aware of the shoal, had anticipated what had happened; and, feeling their own security, poured in their grape and canister with destructive effect. A 6-pound shot, which had passed through a launch on the starboard side of Captain Hanchett's boat, and killed and wounded several men, struck that officer on the hip, and he instantly fell; but was quickly on his legs again. While he was assisting to save the men that were struggling in the water, in consequence of their boat having been sunk, a langridge shot entered his left thigh. While, also, the men from the sunken boats, and who consisted chiefly of the Canadian chasseurs, or Independent Foreigners, were struggling for their lives in the water and mud, the *Constellation's* marines, and the American infantry, waded a short distance into the water, and deliberately fired at them. Huddled together, as the boats were when they struck the ground, and that within canister-range of a battery which kept upon them an incessant fire of more than two hours' duration, it required no very expert artillerists to sink three of the boats, and to kill three men and wound 16; especially when aided by the muskets of those humane individuals who waded into the water to fire at the drowning crews. Including 10 seamen, 62 were officially reported as missing. Of these, it appears, 40 gained the shore, and "deserted" to the Americans. As more than that number of missing appear to have belonged to the two foreign companies, this creates no surprise; especially, as the only alternative left to the men was to become prisoners of war.

The policy of attacking Craney island, as a means of getting at Norfolk, whither the *Constellation* frigate had retired for shelter on the first arrival of the British in the Chesapeake; has been much questioned; but there can be only one opinion, surely, about the wisdom of sending boats, in broad daylight, to feel their way to the shore, over shoals and mud-banks, and that in the very teeth of a formidable battery. Unlike most

other nations, the Americans in particular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this nature, always rest their hopes of success upon valour rather than numbers. But still, had the veil of darkness been allowed to screen the boats from view, and an hour of the night chosen, when the tide had covered the shoals with deep water, the same little party might have carried the batteries; and a defeat, as discreditable to those that caused, as honourable to those that suffered in it, might have been converted into a victory. As it was, the affair of Craney island, dressed up to advantage in the American official account, and properly commented upon by the government-editors, was hailed throughout the union as a glorious triumph, fit for Americans to achieve.

On the night of the 25th of June, the effective men of the 102d regiment, Canadian chasseurs, and battalion-marines; also, three companies of ship's marines, the whole amounting to about 2000 men, commanded by Major-general Beckwith, embarked in a division of boats, placed under the orders of Rear-admiral Cockburn, and, covered by the brig-sloop Mohawk, and the launches of the squadron. About half an hour before daylight on the 26th, the advance, consisting of about 650 men, with two 6-pounders, under Lieutenant-colonel Napier, landed two miles to the westward of Hampton, a town about 18 miles from Norfolk, and separated from it by Hampton roads. Shortly afterwards, the main body, consisting of the royal marine-battalion under Lieutenant-colonel Williams, landed; and the whole moved forward. As might be expected, the town, and its seven pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the British, after a trifling loss of five killed, 33 wounded, and 10 missing. The Americans admit a loss of seven killed, 12 wounded, 11 missing, and one prisoner.

A subject next presents itself for relation, upon which it is painful to proceed. As soon as the Americans were defeated, and driven from Hampton, the British troops, or rather, the foreign troops, for they were the principals, forming part of the advanced force, commenced perpetrating upon the defenceless inhabitants acts of rapine and violence, which un pitying custom has, in some degree, rendered inseparable from places that have been carried by storm; but which are as revolting to human nature, as they are disgraceful to the flag that would sanction them. The instant these circumstances of atrocity reached the ears of the British commanding officer, orders were given to search for, and bring in, all the Canadian chasseurs distributed through the town; and, when they were so brought in, a guard was set over them. The officers could do no more: they could not be at every man's elbow, as he roamed through the country in search of plunder; and plunder the soldier claims as a right, and will have, when the enemy has compelled him to force his way at the point of the bayonet.

No event of the war was so greeted by the government

editors, as the affair at Hampton. All the hireling pens in the United States were put in requisition, until tale followed tale, each outdoing the last in horror. The language of the brothel was exhausted, and that of Billingsgate surpassed, to invent sufferings for the American women, and terms of reproach for their "British" ravishers. Instances were not only magnified, but multiplied, tenfold; until the whole republic rang with peals of execration against the British character and nation. A few of the boldest of the anti-government party stood up to undeceive the public; but the voice of reason was drowned in the general clamour, and it became as dangerous, as it was useless, to attempt to gain a hearing. The "George-town Federal-Republican," of July 7, a newspaper published just at the verge of Washington city, and whose editor possessed the happy privilege of remaining untainted amidst a corrupted atmosphere, contained the following account: "The statement of the women of Hampton being violated by the British, turns out to be false. A correspondence, upon that subject and the pillage said to have been committed there, has taken place between General Taylor and Admiral Warren. Some plunder appears to have been committed, but it was confined to the French troops employed. Admiral Warren complains, on his part, of the Americans, having continued to fire upon the struggling crews of the barges, after they were sunk."

On the 11th of July Sir John Warren detached Rear-admiral Cockburn, with the Sceptre 74, into which ship he had now shifted his flag, the Romulus, Fox, and Nemesis, frigates armed en flûte, the Conflict gun-brig, and Highflyer and Cockchafer tenders, having on board the 103d regiment, of about 500 rank and file, and a small detachment of artillery, to Ocracoke harbour, on the North-Carolina coast, for the purpose of putting an end to the commerce carried on from that port by means of inland navigation, and of destroying any vessels that might be found there. During the night of the 12th, the squadron arrived off Ocracoke bar; and, at 2 A.M. on the 13th, the troops were embarked in their boats; which, accompanied by the Conflict and tenders, pulled in three divisions towards the shore. Owing to the great distance and heavy swell, the advance division, commanded by Lieutenant Westphal, first of the Sceptre, did not reach the shoal-point of the harbour, behind which two large armed vessels were seen at anchor, until considerably after daylight: consequently, the enemy was fully prepared for resistance.

The instant the British boats doubled the point, they were fired upon by the two vessels; but Lieutenant Westphal, under cover of some rockets, pulled directly for them, and had just got to the brig's bows, when her crew cut the cables and abandoned her. The schooner's colours were hauled down by her crew about the same time. The latter vessel proved to be the

Atlas letter of marque, of Philadelphia, mounting 10 guns, and measuring 240 tons; the former, the Anaconda letter of marque, of New York, mounting 18 long 9-pounders, and measuring 387 tons. In the course of the morning the troops were landed, and took possession of Ocracoke and the town of Portsmouth, without the slightest opposition. The inhabitants behaved with civility, and their property, in consequence, was not molested. After remaining on shore for two days, Rear-admiral Cockburn, with the troops and seamen, re-embarked without loss or molestation. Not, as it would appear, because he had performed the service intrusted to him, but, on account of his "not feeling himself competent to the attack on Newburn, now that its citizens were preparing to receive him." No sooner had the British soldiers and seamen departed, than the American militia flocked to the post; thus presenting us with a new system of military defence. Both the prizes were afterwards added to the British navy, the Anaconda, by her own name, as an 18-gun brig-sloop, and the Atlas, by the name of St.-Lawrence, as a 14-gun schooner.

On the 11th of July, at 9 A. M., the two United States' gun-vessels Scorpion and Asp got under way from Yeocomico river, but soon afterwards were chased back by the British brig-sloops Contest, Captain James Rattray, and Mohawk, Captain the Honourable Henry Dilkes Byng. The two brigs then came to anchor off the bar; and, seeing that one of the two enemy's vessels, a schooner, was considerably in the rear of her consort, Captain Rattray despatched in pursuit of her the cutter of each brig, under the orders of Lieutenant Roger Carley Curry, assisted by Lieutenant William Hutchinson, and by midshipmen George Morey, — Bradford, and Caleb Evans Tozer.

Lieutenant Curry pushed up the narrow inlet of Yeocomico, and, when about four miles from the entrance, found the American schooner, which was the Asp, of one long 18-pounder, two 18-pounder carronades and swivels, hauled up close to the beach, under the protection of a large body of militia. The British boats, however, persevered in their attack, and after a smart struggle, in which they had two men killed and Lieutenant Curry and five men wounded, carried the vessel. The American commanding officer, Lieutenant Segourney was killed, and nine out of his 25 in crew were either killed or wounded. The British set fire to the Asp, but not effectually, as the Americans afterwards extinguished the flames and preserved the vessel.

In the month of July Captain Sanders, with his frigate the Junon, and the ship-sloop Martin, Captain Henry Fleming Senhouse, of 16 carronades, 24-pounders, and two long nines, was stationed in Delaware bay. On the 29th, about 8 A. M., the Martin grounded on the outer ridge of Crow's shoal, within two and a half miles from the beach; and, it being a falling tide, could not be floated again before the return of flood. The

water ran so shoal, that it became necessary to shore the ship up; and the same cause prevented the Junon from afterwards anchoring nearer to the Martin than a mile and three quarters. This afforded to the flotilla of American gun-boats and block-vessels then in the Delaware, a fine opportunity to destroy the British sloop. They accordingly, 10 in number, advanced, and deliberately took up an anchorage about a mile and three quarters distant, directly on the Martin's beam, on the opposite side to the Junon, and so as to bring the latter in a line with the sloop. Thus, by anchoring at the distance of three miles from the frigate, which, it was well known, could not approach nearer on account of the shoals, the American gun-boats had no force but the Martin's to contend with.

All this while, crowds of citizens, on foot, on horseback, and in carriages, were hastening to the beach, in the hope to see verified, in the speedy destruction of the Martin, the wonderful accounts they had heard of American prowess on the ocean. The Martin got her topgallantmasts struck, and her sails furled; and, although he despaired of saving his ship from so formidable a force, Captain Senhouse resolved to defend her to the last extremity. The gun-boats commenced the fire, and the Martin returned it, at first with her carronades; but, finding they could not reach, Captain Senhouse had the two 9-pounders transported from their ports, one to the topgallant fore-castle, the other to the poop. Between these two guns, and all the guns of the American flotilla, was the fire maintained for nearly two hours, without the slightest injury to the Martin. At about 2 P. M. the sternmost gun-boat in the line having separated a little from the rest, Captain Sanders made a signal for the boats manned and armed. Accordingly, three boats were despatched from the Martin, containing 40 officers and men, and four from the Junon, containing 100 officers and men, the whole under the orders of the Junon's first Lieutenant Philip Westphal. On the approach of the boats, the gun-vessels turned their fire from the Martin against them, but at too great a distance to be effective. The single gun-boat, which was the principal object of attack, kept up a spirited fire, but was quickly boarded and overpowered. The British boats, in this affair, lost three killed and mortally wounded, and four slightly wounded; the gun-boat, seven wounded. The last discharge from the gun, mounted on board the gun-boat, broke its carriage. That prevented the British from returning the fire of the remaining gun-boats, which had dropped down in line, hoping to retake the prize; but which the captors towed off in triumph. As, in their attempt to save their companion, the gun-boats passed the bow of the Martin, the sloop fired upon them with effect; and the Junon opened her fire, but her shot scarcely fell beyond the Martin.

Some of the gun-boats having grounded, the remainder anchored for their mutual protection. The tide had drifted the

ship's boats, as well as the captured vessel, to a considerable distance. The gun-boats that had grounded got off, and the whole, as if to renew the attack upon the change of tide, anchored within two miles and a half of the Martin, now weakened by the absence of 40 of her best hands. However, at 5 P. M., to the surprise of the Martin's officers and crew; and, as it afterwards appeared, to the extreme mortification of the spectators on shore, this formidable flotilla weighed and beat up, between the Martin and the shore, without further molesting her, and arrived in safety, soon afterwards, at their station near the mouth of the river.

The force that attacked the Martin, consisted of eight gun-boats and two block-vessels. The latter were sloops of 100 tons each, which had been coasters. Their sides had been raised, heavy beams laid across, and the whole planked in, on the top, on each side, and at the ends; leaving only loopholes for musketry (through which pikes might be used in repelling boarders), and three ports of a side: in these were mounted six long 18-pounders. The covering extended the whole length of the vessel, and was large enough to contain 60 men, the number stated as the complement of each. The gun-boats were sloop-rigged vessels, averaging about 95 tons, and mounted each a long 32, and a 4-pounder on traversing carriages, with a complement of 35 men, the exact number found on board the prize. Each gun-boat and block-vessel was commanded by an experienced merchant-master; and the whole flotilla by Master-commandant Samuel Angus, of the United-States' navy.

On the 24th of May the frigate United-States, still commanded by Commodore Decatur, accompanied by the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Macedonian, Captain Jacob Jones, and 18-gun ship-sloop Hornet, Captain James Biddle, all provisioned and stored for a cruise in the East Indies, quitted the harbour of New-York through Long-island Sound, the Sandy-Hook passage being blockaded by a British force. Having found in his ship a disposition to *hog*, Commodore Decatur had put on shore six of his carronades; thus reducing the force of the United-States from 54 to 48 guns. It was, however, asserted, and, we believe, stated in the New-York papers, that the commodore had taken on board eight medium or columbiad 32-pounders, and sent an equal number of 24-pounders from his four midship ports on each side to the Macedonian; and that, of the latter's eight long 18-pounders removed to make room for the 24s, two were mounted on board the Hornet in lieu of her 12-pounders.

Just as the United-States, towards evening, arrived abreast of Hunt's point, her mainmast was struck by lightning. The electric fluid tore away the commodore's broad pendant and cast it upon the deck: it then passed down the after-hatchway, through the wardroom into the doctor's cabin, put out his



candle and tore up his bed, and, entering between the skin and ceiling of the ship, ripped off two or three sheets of copper just at the water's edge. No further trace of it could be discovered. The Macedonian, who was about 100 yards astern of the United-States, on seeing what had happened, hove all aback, to save herself from the justly dreaded explosion of the latter. Fortunately, not a man was hurt on the occasion. Commodore Decatur soon afterwards anchored under Fisher's island, near the entrance of New-London river, to be ready for a start the first opportunity.

On the 1st of June, very early in the morning, the American squadron got under way and stood out to sea; but at 9 A. M., just as they were clearing the Sound, the ships were discovered by the British 74-gun ship Valiant, Captain Robert Dudley Oliver, and 18-pounder 40-gun frigate Acasta, Captain Alexander Robert Kerr. The two British ships gave chase, and the three American ships put back; both parties hauling to the wind under all sail. At about 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the American squadron bore up for New-London; and the United-States and Hornet, being too deep for their trim, started their water and threw overboard a part of their provisions. At 2 h. 15 m. P. M., being far ahead of the Valiant, and just within gun-shot of the United-States, the Acasta fired a bow-chaser at the latter, just as the Macedonian was rounding New-London lighthouse. The United-States returned the shot with one from her stern. Instead, however, of bringing to and trying to cut off the British frigate from her consort, as many of the spectators on shore expected to see done, Commodore Decatur stood on, and anchored with his squadron in the river. Having shortened sail, the Acasta hauled to the wind, and tacked, and soon afterwards, with the Valiant, anchored off Gardner's island, distant about 12 miles from New-London.

Having no persons on board acquainted with the navigation of the Sound, the British ships, particularly the 74, chased with much less effect than they otherwise would. It was not, of course, known to Captain Oliver, that he might even have followed the American squadron into New-London; and that, had the United-States and her companions ascended the river beyond his reach, he might, with very little risk, there being no battery of any consequence, have placed the Valiant and Acasta against the town, and blown the houses about the ears of the inhabitants, if they refused to deliver up the ships.

For several weeks previous to this event, the New-York and Boston papers had been filled with panegyrics on their "naval heroes," whose valour they depicted as impetuous, amounting almost to rashness. Some of the papers, as if a little ashamed of what they had said, now added "a rasée" to the two British ships, and gave that as a reason that the American commodore suffered his squadron to be chased into New-London.

In a week or two afterwards two merchants of New-York, encouraged by a promise of reward from the American government, formed a plan for destroying the British 74-gun ship *Ramillies*, Captain Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, as she lay at anchor off Fisher's island. A schooner named the *Eagle* was laden with several casks of gunpowder, having trains leading from a species of gunlock, which, upon the principle of clock-work, went off at a given period after it had been set. Above the casks of powder, and in full view at the hatchway, were some casks of flour, it being known at New-York that the *Ramillies* was short of provisions, and naturally supposed that Captain Hardy would immediately order the vessel alongside, in order to get the ship's wants supplied.

Thus muderously laden, the schooner sailed from New-York and stood up the Sound. On the 25th, in the morning, the *Eagle* approached New-London, as if intending to enter that river. The *Ramillies* detached a boat, with 13 men under Lieutenant John Geddes, to cut her off. At 11 A. M. Lieutenant Geddes boarded the schooner, and found that the crew, after having let go her only anchor, had abandoned their vessel and fled to the shore. The lieutenant brought the fatal prize near to the *Ramillies*, and Sir Thomas ordered him to place the vessel alongside of a trading sloop, which had been recently captured and lay a short distance off. The lieutenant did as he was ordered; and at 2 h. 30 m. P. M., while he and his men were in the act of securing her, the schooner blew up with a tremendous explosion. The poor lieutenant, and 10 of the fine fellows who were with him, perished; and the remaining three men escaped only with being shockingly scorched.

We shall not trust ourselves to comment upon this most atrocious proceeding. In the following remarks on the subject by a contemporary, we perfectly concur: "A quantity of arsenic among the food would have been so perfectly compatible with the rest of the contrivance, that we wonder it was not resorted to. Should actions like these receive the sanction of governments, the science of war, and the laws of nations, will degenerate into the barbarity of the Algerines; and murder and pillage will take place of kindness and humanity to our enemies."\*

The northern frontier of the United States, as is almost too well known to need repetition, bounds on the British provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. The line, or barrier, as far as we need take notice of it, consists of a rapid river, the St.-Lawrence, and the navigable lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron. From Québec to Kingston, which stands at the entrance of Lake Ontario, the distance is about 180 miles, but the water communication is interrupted by shoals and rapids. Lake Ontario is

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 120.

about 180 miles long and 50 broad, and is navigable for ships of any burden. The strait of Niagara, in length about 36 miles, but interrupted at one part by its famous falls, connects Ontario with Lake Erie; which is about 220 miles in length, and about 40 broad, and is also navigable for large ships. Of Lake Huron, it will suffice to say, that it is connected with Erie by the river Detroit; on which river stands the British post of Amherstburgh, distant just 800 miles from Quebec.

The regular force, scattered over the Canadas at the breaking out of the war, consisted of between 4000 and 5000 men, chiefly fencible and veteran or invalid troops. The British commander-in-chief was Lieutenant-general Sir George Prevost. Ontario was the only lake that contained any armed vessels belonging to the British. These consisted of the Royal-George, a ship of 340 tons, mounting 20 guns, a brig of 14 guns, and two or three smaller vessels; all manned by Canadians, and commanded by a provincial officer, named Earle. The force of the Americans on this lake, at the commencement of the war, consisted of only one solitary brig, the Oneida, of 16 guns, commanded by Lieutenant Melancthon Thomas Woolsey, of the national navy. The principal port of the British was Kingston; that of the Americans, Sackett's-Harbour.

On the 15th of July, 1812, Commodore Earle, with his squadron, appeared off Sackett's-Harbour, with the avowed intention of taking or destroying the Oneida; but a fire from two or three guns, mounted on a point of land near the harbour's mouth, was sufficient to deter the Canadian (we will not call him British) commodore from attempting that, with his five vessels, which the Royal-George alone, well manned and appointed, might easily have accomplished. Emboldened by the dastardly behaviour of his opponent, Lieutenant Woolsey fitted out a captured British merchant schooner with one long 32-pounder and two sixes; and, manning her with about 30 seamen and a company of riflemen to act as marines, sent her, under the command of Lieutenant Henry Wells, to Ogdensburg, on the St.-Lawrence. On her way thither, the Julia encountered, and actually beat off without losing a man, the Moira of 14, and the Gloucester of 10 guns.

Notwithstanding the glaring incompetency of Earle, Sir George Prevost neither removed nor censured him. About this time the British 20-gun ship Tartarus, Captain John Pasco, arrived at Quebec from Halifax; and, had the governor-general of British America but given his sanction to the measure, the captain would have laid his ship up, and, with his officers and men, have proceeded straight to Kingston, and superseded Earle in the command of the squadron. Instead of this, an attempt was made to hire sailors at Quebec, at one half of the wages which the merchants were giving; as if sailors could be of any use, without an officer capable, or willing (for, we believe, Earle,

as well as Sir George, was born on the wrong side of the boundary line), to lead them against the enemy.

In the month of October, 1812, Commodore Isaac Chauncey arrived at Sackett's-Harbour, as commander-in-chief; and, having brought with him a number of officers, and between 400 and 500 prime sailors, from the Atlantic frontier, was enabled, by the 6th of November, to appear on the lake with the *Oncida* and six fine schooners, mounting altogether 48 guns, including several long 24 and 32 pounders; and many of the guns, being mounted on pivot or traversing carriages, were as effective as double the number. With this comparatively formidable force, Commodore Chauncey chased the *Royal-George* into Kingston, cannonaded the town and batteries, and possessed the entire command of the lake. On the 26th of November the *Madison*, a fine ship of 600 tons, pierced to carry 24 guns on a flush deck, was launched at Sackett's-Harbour; and, as soon as she was fitted, the commodore shifted his broad pendant to her. Soon afterwards Sir George Prevost ordered two ships of war to be built, to mount 24 guns each; one at Kingston, the other at York, an unprotected port at the opposite extremity of the lake.

On Lake Eric, while the Americans possessed only one armed vessel, the *Adams*, a small brig mounting six 6-pounders, the British colonial authorities, by hiring or purchasing some merchant vessels and arming them, had assembled a force, consisting of one ship of 280 tons, the *Queen-Charlotte*, mounting 16 light carronades, a brig of 10 guns, a schooner of 12, and three smaller vessels, mounting between them seven guns. These six vessels were manned by 108 Canadians, and subsequently by 160 soldiers in addition. On the 16th of July, at the surrender of Detroit, the *Adams* fell into the hands of the British, and was afterwards named the *Detroit*, and sent down the lake, manned by a small Canadian crew. Early in the month of October, 1812, the American government sent Lieutenant Jesse D. Elliot, and between 50 and 60 petty-officers and seamen, to superintend the construction of some schooners at Black-Rock. On the 9th Lieutenant Elliot, with the whole of his seamen and about 50 soldiers, boarded and carried the *Detroit*, and a merchant brig, the *Caledonia*, of one or two swivels, in her company. The former the Americans were afterwards obliged to burn, to save her from falling into the hands of a detachment of soldiers from Fort Erie; but the *Caledonia* and her valuable cargo, they carried safe to Black-Rock.

On the 25th of April, 1813, having received a reinforcement of seamen, Commodore Chauncey sailed from Sackett's-Harbour with his fleet, now augmented to 10 vessels, on board of which was a body of troops under General Dearborn, to attack the port of York, and destroy the ship of war there building. The

Americans landed and drove away the few British troops at the post; but, previously to their retreat, the latter saved the Americans the trouble of burning the ship on the stocks, by destroying her themselves. Commodore Chauncey took away a considerable quantity of naval stores and a small unserviceable 10-gun brig, the Gloucester, and returned to Sackett's-Harbour in triumph.

On the 6th of May the British troop-ship Woolwich, Captain Thomas Ball Sullivan, arrived at Quebec from Spithead, having on board Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, four commanders of the navy, eight lieutenants, 24 midshipmen, and about 450 picked seamen, sent out by government expressly for service on the Canada lakes. Such was the zeal of the officers and men to get to the scene of action, that they departed, the same evening, in schooners for Montreal. In four or five days they reached Kingston; and, although the number of seamen was not half enough to man the vessels in the harbour, now augmented by the 24-gun ship Wolfe, launched on the 5th or 6th of May, Sir James Yeo, with the aid of the provincial sailors already on the lake, and of a few companies of soldiers, was ready, by the end of the month, to put to sea with two ships, one brig, and three schooners, besides a few small gun-boats.

Sir George Prevost now allowed himself to be persuaded to embark 750 troops on board the squadron, for the purpose of making an attack upon Sackett's-Harbour; but, to mar the successful issue of the plan, he resolved to head the troops himself. On the 27th of May, when an excellent opportunity was afforded by the absence of the American squadron at the opposite end of the lake, the British squadron, in high glee, sailed from Kingston, and with a fair wind stood across to the enemy's dépôt. At noon the squadron arrived off Sackett's-Harbour, and lay to, with every thing in readiness for the troops to disembark. Sir George hesitated, looked at the place, mistook trees for troops, and blockhouses for batteries, and ordered the expedition to put back.

Just as the ships had turned their heads towards Kingston, and, with the wind now changed, were beginning to sail before it, about 50 Indians, brought off a party of American soldiers from the shore near Sackett's-Harbour. Encouraged by this, Sir George permitted the squadron to begin working its way back to the American port. On the morning of the 29th some of the lighter vessels got close to the shore, and the troops were landed. They drove the Americans like sheep, compelled them to set fire to the General-Pike, a new frigate on the stocks, the Gloucester, captured at York, and a barrack containing, among other valuable articles, all the naval stores taken on the same occasion. At this moment some resistance unexpectedly made at a log barrack caused the British commander-in-chief to sound a retreat. The indignant, the victorious, officers and men

were obliged to obey the fatal bugle, and the British retired to their vessels; and the Americans, as soon as they could credit their senses, hastened to stop the conflagration. The General-Pike, being built of green wood, was saved; but the Gloucester, and the barrack containing the stores, were entirely consumed.

That Sir George Prevost was as fond of writing official letters, as he was of substituting the first personal pronoun for the third, has already appeared in these pages;\* but, in the present instance, contrary to all precedent, he required his adjutant-general, Colonel Edward Baynes, to pen the despatch. That obedient gentleman did so; and the European public scarcely knows at this hour, through whose fault it was, that Sackett's-Harbour was not taken from the Americans in May, 1813. The Canadian public, besides being in the secret, were less surprised at the result of the enterprise; because they knew that Sir George, a few months before, had rejected an excellent opportunity of marching across the ice to Sackett's-Harbour, and destroying the whole American lake-navy at a blow.

On the 3d of June Sir James Yeo sailed from Kingston with his squadron, composed of the ship Wolfe, of 23 guns and 200 men, ship Royal-George, of 21 guns and 175 men, brig Melville, of 14 guns and 100 men, schooners, Moira, of 14 guns and 92 men, Sidney-Smith, of 12 guns and 80 men, and Beresford, of eight guns and 70 men, together with a few gun-boats. On the 8th, at daylight, the squadron arrived in sight of the American camp at Forty-mile creek; but, as it was calm, the only vessels that could get close to the shore were the Beresford, Captain Francis Brockell Spilsbury, and the gun-boats, commanded by Lieutenant Charles Anthony, first of the Wolfe. A spirited attack by the schooner and gun-boats compelled the American troops to make a precipitate retreat, and all their camp equipage, provisions, and stores fell into the hands of the British. Sir James then landed the troops that were on board his squadron, and steered to the westward. On the 13th he captured two American schooners and some boats containing supplies. Receiving information from the prisoners, that there was a dépôt of provisions at Genessee river, Sir James proceeded thither; and, landing some seamen and marines, brought off the whole. On the 19th he took another supply of provisions from Great Sodus, and on the 29th reanchored in Kingston.

All this while Commodore Chauncey was waiting at Sackett's Harbour for the General-Pike to be got ready for sea. At length, towards the latter end of July, that fine ship was armed, manned, and stored. The Pike alone was nearly a match for the whole of Sir James Yeo's squadron: she measured about 850 tons, and mounted 26 long 24-pounders on a flush deck, another 24-pounder on a pivot-carriage upon her forecastle, and a second,

\* See vol. v., p. 207.

similarly mounted, upon her quarterdeck; and her crew, including some soldiers serving as marines, amounted to 400 men. With this ship, the Madison, Oneida, and 11 fine schooners, Commodore Chauncey sailed from Sackett's-Harbour for the head of the lake. On the 8th of August, in the morning, while the American fleet lay at anchor off Fort Niagara, the British squadron hove in sight; and, that a better opinion may be formed of the situation of the parties, we will state the force of each. The British had six vessels, mounting 92 guns; of which, two were long 24-pounders, 13, long 18-pounders, five, long 12 and 9 pounders, and 72, carronades of different calibers, including six 68-pounders; and the vessels were manned with 717 officers and men. The Americans, by their own admission, had 14 vessels, armed, also by their admission, with 114 guns; of which, seven were long 32-pounders, 32, long 24-pounders, eight, long 18-pounders, 19, long 12 and 9 pounders, and 48, carronades, 40 of which were 32 and 24 pounders. Nearly one fourth of the long guns and carronades were on pivot-carriages, and were consequently as effective in broadside as twice the number. The 14 American vessels, thus armed, were manned with 1193 officers and men.

Commodore Chauncey immediately got under way, and stood out, with his 14 vessels, formed in line of battle; but, as the six British vessels approached, the American vessels, after discharging their broadsides, wore and stood under their batteries. Light airs and calms prevented Sir James Yeo from closing; and during the night, in a heavy squall, two of the American schooners, the Hamilton and Scourge, upset, and their crews unfortunately perished. On the 9th the two parties were again in sight of each other, and continued manœuvring during that and the succeeding day. On the 10th, at night, a fine breeze sprang up, and Sir James Yeo immediately took advantage of it, by bearing up to attack his powerful opponent; but, just as the Wolfe got within gun-shot of the Pike and Madison, these two powerful American ships bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, and made sail for Niagara; leaving two fine schooners, the Julia and Growler, each armed with one long 32 and one long 12 pounder on pivots, and manned with a crew of 40 men, to be captured without an effort to save them. With his two prizes, and without the loss of a man, and with no greater injury to his ships than a few cut ropes and torn sails, Sir James Yeo returned to Kingston.

The "United States' Gazette," of September 6, gave a letter from one of the General-Pike's officers. The writer, having previously stated the American force at two ships, one brig, and 11 schooners, says: "On the 10th, at midnight, we came within gun-shot, every one in high spirits. The schooners commenced the action with their long guns, which did great execution. At half-past 12, the Commodore fired his broadside, and gave three

cheers, which was returned from the other ships, the enemy closing fast. We lay by for our opponent, the orders having been given, not to fire until she came within pistol-shot, though the enemy kept up a constant fire. Every gun was pointed, every match ready in hand, and the red British ensign plainly to be descried by the light of the moon; when, to our utter astonishment, the commodore wore, and stood S.E., leaving Sir James Lucas Yeo to exult in the capture of two schooners, and in our retreat; which was certainly a very fortunate one for him." No wonder, an order soon afterwards issued from Washington, that no officer should write, with the intention of publication, accounts of the operations of the fleet and army. Sir James could not have had his assertions more ably supported, than they were by the Pike's officer. The latter was mistaken, however, as to any "execution" having been done by the American squadron. The captured schooners of course made no resistance; although the American editors trumped up a story about their desperate defence; how they tore and ripped up the enemy, &c.

The Pike's officer has described two other "chases;" differing chiefly from the last, in no loss having been suffered, or even shot fired. He says: "We proceeded directly for Sackett's-Harbour; where we victualled; and put to sea, the next day after our arrival, August 14. On the 16th we discovered the enemy again, again hurried to quarters; again got clear of the enemy by dint of carrying sail, and returned to Sackett's-Harbour. On the 18th we again fell in with the enemy steering for Kingston, and we reached the harbour on the 19th. This is the result of two cruises; the first of which, by proper guidance, might have decided in our favour the superiority on the lake, and consequently in Canada." This is what many of the American editors called "chasing the British commander all round the lake." Commodore Chauncey, although he had lost four of his 14 vessels, appeared in September with 11 sail; having brought out with him, the Schooner Elizabeth, of about the same force as the Growler or Julia, and the new schooner Sylph, mounting, at that time, four long 32-pounders upon pivot-carriages, and four long sixes. This schooner was described by the Americans as upwards of 400 tons. She was afterwards converted into a brig.

On the 11th of September, while the British squadron lay becalmed off Genessee river, the American fleet of 11 sail, by the aid of a partial wind, succeeded in getting within range of their long 24 and 32 pounders; and during five hours cannonaded the British, who did not fire a carronade, and had only six guns in all the squadron that could reach the enemy. At sunset a breeze sprang up from the westward, when Sir James steered for the American fleet; but the American commodore avoided a close meeting, and thus the affair ended. It was so



far unfortunate for Sir James Yeo, that he had a midshipman (William Ellery) and three seamen killed and seven wounded. In his official letter on the subject of this action, Commodore Chauncey most uncandidly says: "I was much disappointed that Sir James refused to fight me, as he was so much superior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upwards of 20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot."

Another partial engagement took place on the 28th of September. Commodore Chauncey, having the weathergauge, kept his favourite distance, and one of his shot carried away the Wolfe's main topmast; which, in its fall, brought down the mizen topmast and cross-jack yard. It was this, and not, as Mr. Clark says, "a manœuvre of the commodore's," that "threw the British in confusion." Even with this great advantage, Commodore Chauncey would not venture within carronade-range. Mr. Clark, in describing this action, speaks of the British "frigate" Wolfe; upon which he had previously mounted "36 guns." Only two shot from the Americans did any material damage; the one already mentioned, and another that struck the Royal-George's fore topmast, which fell, upon her anchoring. Mr. Clark says: "Prudence forbade any further pursuit on the part of the Americans;" and the editor of the "History of the War" another American publication, adds: "The commodore was obliged to give up the chase; his ship was making water so fast, that it required all his pumps to keep her clear, and others of his vessels were much damaged. The General-Pike suffered a considerable loss of men; among whom were 22 killed or wounded by the bursting of a gun." Other American accounts stated the commodore's loss in men, at upwards of 60 killed and wounded. It was therefore the damages and loss sustained by the American squadron, and not the "British batteries on Burlington heights," upon which not a musket was mounted, that "obliged the commodore to give up the chase." The effect produced by Sir James's few long guns gave a specimen of what his carronades would have done, had his opponent allowed them to be used.

In the month of May, 1813, Captain Robert Heriot Barclay was appointed to the command of the British flotilla on this lake; an appointment which had been declined by Captain William Howe Mulcaster, another of Sir James Yeo's commanders, on account of the exceedingly bad equipment of the vessels. These, owing to the loss of one of them, now consisted of five; and they were not equal in aggregate tonnage or force to a British 20-gun ship. With a lieutenant, and 19 rejected seamen of the Ontario squadron, Captain Barclay, towards the middle of June, joined his enviable command; and, with the aid of the seamen he had brought, a ship was forthwith laid down at Amherstburgh, intended to be of 305 tons, and to mount as many as 18 guns.

Since the latter end of March Captain Oliver Hazard Perry,

of the United States' navy, had arrived at the port of Erie, with a numerous supply of officers and seamen, to equip a flotilla; and, by the time Captain Barclay arrived, the American force consisted of one brig, the Caledonia, six fine schooners, and one sloop, mounting 15 heavy long guns, all on traversing carriages. Two brigs, of about 460 tons each, to mount 18 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long twelves, had also been laid down at Presqu'isle, and were in a state of some forwardness. The destruction of these vessels on the stocks, would have enabled the British to maintain the ascendancy on the lake, and would have averted the fatal blow that was afterwards struck in this quarter. Colonel Proctor, the British commanding officer at Amherstburgh, saw this; as well as the facility with which the thing might be done, if Sir George Prevost would send him the long promised supply of troops, and about 100 sailors. He wrote letter after letter to Sir George on the subject, but all in vain. The latter, when he had exhausted his excuses, became petulant and rude. The two American brigs were launched; and, although they had to pass a bar, with their guns and stores out, and almost on their beam-ends, the Niagara and Lawrence, by the beginning of August, were riding on the lake, in readiness for action.

By the latter end of August, the Detroit, as the new ship was named, was launched; and the next difficulty was to get guns for her. For this, the fort of Amherstburgh was stripped, and 19, of four different calibers, were obtained. It will convey some idea of the expense of hastily fitting vessels at this distance from home, to mention, that every round shot cost one shilling a pound for the carriage from Quebec to Lake Erie, that powder was ten times as dear as at home, and that, for anchors, their weight in silver would be scarcely an over-estimate. But, were the Americans on this lake any better off? In five days an express reaches Washington. It would, under the most favourable circumstances as to weather and despatch in office, take as many months to get an article ordered from England, or even permission to stir a peg out of the common routine of service. The American vessels were therefore completely at home, while the British vessels were upwards of 3500 miles from home; penned up in a lake on the enemy's borders, inaccessible by water, and to which the land-carriage, for heavy articles, ordnance and naval stores especially, was most difficult and tedious.

Early in September, Captain Barclay received a draught of seamen from the Dover troop-ship; and many of these would have scarcely-rated as "ordinaries" on board the regular ships of war. He had now 50 British seamen to distribute among two ships, two schooners, a brig, and a sloop, armed altogether with 63 carriage-guns. It must have been the incredibility of this that induced some of the British journals, in their account

of the proceedings on this lake, to state "150," instead of 50 seamen. It is asserted, on the express authority of Captain Barclay himself, that no more than 50 seamen were at any time on board the Lake Erie flotilla; the complements having been made up by Canadian peasants and soldiers, men that, without disparagement to either, were sorry substitutes for British sailors. On the other hand, the ships of the Americans, as their newspapers informed us, were equipped in the most complete manner; and through the same channel we learned, that large draughts of seamen had repeatedly marched to Lake Erie from the sea-board. The best of riflemen were to be obtained on the spot. What else was required, to render the American ships in these waters quite as effective as the best appointed ships on the ocean?

On the 9th of September Captain Barclay was lying, with his little squadron, in the port of Amherstburgh, anxiously waiting the arrival of a promised supply of seamen. Almost surrounded by hostile shores, his people on half-allowance of food, not another day's flour in store, a large body of Indians, whose friendship would cease, with the least abridgment in their accustomed supply, close in his rear; alike hopeless of succour and of retreat, what was Captain Barclay to do? Impelled by dread of famine, and, not improbably, of Indian treachery too, he sailed out in the evening, to risk a battle with an enemy's fleet, whose force he knew was nearly double his own.

The following statement will place the fact of superiority beyond a doubt:

BRITISH.		AMERICANS.	
Long guns	No. No.	Long guns	No. No.
24 pdrs. . . . .	2	32 pdrs. all on pivots . . .	3
18 " on pivot . . . . .	1	24 " ditto . . . . .	4
12 " 2 on pivots . . . . .	8	12 " 4 ditto . . . . .	8
9 " ditto . . . . .	12		
6 " . . . . .	8		
4 " . . . . .	2		
2 " . . . . .	2		
	— 35		— 15
Carronades		Carronades	
24 " . . . . .	15	32 " 2 ditto . . . . .	38
18 " . . . . .	1	24 " ditto . . . . .	1
12 " . . . . .	12		
	— 28		— 39
	—		—
Total . . . . .	63		54
	—		—
Half of guns not on pivots . . . . .	29		20
Pivot guns . . . . .	5		14
	—		—
Broadside-guns . . . . .	{ No. 34		34
	{ lbs. 459		928

But this is supposing, that the two squadrons were fitted in an equal manner; whereas, however incredible it may appear, before they could fire a single great gun on board the *Detroit*, the men were obliged to discharge a pistol at the touch-hole! By adding 80 Canadians, and 240 soldiers from the Newfoundland and 41st regiments, to the 50 British seamen, the crew of Commodore Barclay's squadron is made to amount to 345; whereas Commodore Perry had picked crews to all his vessels, particularly on board the *Lawrence* and her sister-brig, and his total of men amounted to at least 580.

On the 10th, soon after daylight, Commodore Barclay discovered the American squadron at anchor in Put-in bay, and immediately bore up, with the wind from the south-west, to bring the enemy to action. Commodore Perry thereupon got under way to meet the British; who, at 10 A. M., by a sudden shift of wind to south-east, were thrown to leeward of their opponents. Commodore Barclay, who carried his broad pendant on board the *Detroit*, so stationed his vessels, that those which were the nearest to an equality of force in the two squadrons might be opposed together. The schooner *Chippeway*, commanded by master's mate J. Campbell, was in the van. Then came, in succession, the *Detroit* and *Queen-Charlotte*, the latter commanded by Captain Robert Finnis, brig *Hunter*, Lieutenant George Bignell, schooner *Lady-Prevost*, Lieutenant Edward Buchan; and the sloop *Little-Belt*, by whom commanded we are not aware, brought up the rear.

At about 11 h. 45 m. A. M. the action began; and the *Detroit* became closely engaged with the *Lawrence*, Commodore Perry's brig, supported by the schooners *Ariel* and *Scorpion*. Although the matches and tubes of the *Detroit* were so defective, that pistols were obliged to be fired at the guns to set them off, the seamen, Canadians, and soldiers plied their guns so well that, in the course of two hours, they knocked the *Lawrence* almost to pieces, and, after driving Commodore Perry out of her, compelled her to surrender; but, having sailed with only one boat, and that being cut to pieces, the *Detroit* could not take possession of the American brig, and the latter, as soon as she had dropped out of gun-shot, rehoisted her colours.

In the mean time the *Queen-Charlotte*, with her 24-pounder carronades, had been opposed by the *Niagara*, supported, as the *Lawrence* had been, by two schooners with heavy long guns. In a few minutes Captain Finnis was killed; and his successor in the command, Lieutenant John Stokes, was struck senseless by a splinter. The next officer, provincial Lieutenant Irvine, was without any experience, and therefore comparatively useless. The *Queen-Charlotte* soon afterwards struck her colours. From having kept out of the range of the *Charlotte's* carronades, the *Niagara* was a fresh vessel, and to her Captain Perry proceeded. As soon as he got on board, the American commodore, accom-

panied by some of his schooners, bore down, and took a raking position athwart the bows of the already disabled Detroit. In a short time Lieutenant John Garland, first of the Detroit was mortally, and Captain Barclay himself most severely, wounded. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant George Inglis; who fought his ship in the most determined manner, until, out of the 10 experienced British seamen on board, eight were killed or wounded, and every hope of success or of escape had fled: he then ordered the colours of the Detroit to be struck. The Hunter and Lady-Prevost surrendered about the same time; as did the Chippeway and Trippe, as soon as some of the American vessels overtook them on their retreat.

The loss on the British side amounted to three officers and 38 men killed, and nine officers and 85 men wounded. The officers killed were, Lieutenant S. J. Garden, of the Newfoundland regiment, and John Garland, the first lieutenant, on board the Detroit; and the captain of the Queen-Charlotte. The officers wounded were Captain Barclay most dangerously in his left or remaining arm, Mr. John M. Hoffmeister, purser of the Detroit, Lieutenant John Stokes, and midshipman James Foster, of the Queen-Charlotte, Lieutenants Edward Buchan and Francis Roulette, and master's mate Henry Gateshill, of the Lady-Prevost, and master's mate J. Campbell, commanding the Chippeway. The loss on the American side, as taken from Captain Perry's letter, amounted to 27 killed and 96 wounded, including 22 killed and 61 wounded on board the Lawrence.

The fact of this brig having surrendered is admitted by Captain Perry himself, in the following words: "It was with unspeakable pain, that I saw, soon after I got on board the Niagara, the flag of the Lawrence come down, although I was perfectly sensible that she had been defended to the last, and that to have continued to make a show of resistance, would have been a wanton sacrifice of her brave crew. But the enemy was not able to take possession of her, and circumstances soon permitted her flag again to be hoisted." The chief fault to be found with Captain Perry's letter is, that it does not contain the slightest allusion to the bravery of Captain Barclay, or the inferiority of his means of resistance.

As the Americans are by this time pretty well ashamed of all the bombastic nonsense circulated by the press of the United States, day after day during many months of the war, on the subject of Captain Perry's "Nelsonic" victory, we shall not rake the trash up again; but we fear that the professional, and therefore presumably correct, dictum of a contemporary, that, "in number and weight of guns, the two squadrons were nearly equal,"\* will make the Americans imagine, that they really had some ground for their extravagant boasting. However, on

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 132.

referring again to our contemporary's account, we feel satisfied that little harm will arise; for, should the evident partiality that is shown to Sir George Prevost miss being seen, the statement, that "both the Detroit and Queen-Charlotte struck to the United States' ship St.-Lawrence, Commodore Parry," will satisfy the American reader, that Captain Brenton knew very little about the action he was attempting to describe.

On the 16th of September, 1814, Captain Barclay, and his surviving officers and men, were tried by a court-martial on board the *Gladiator* at Portsmouth, for the loss of the late Erie flotilla, and the following was the sentence pronounced: "That the capture of his majesty's late squadron was caused by the very defective means Captain Barclay possessed to equip them on Lake Erie; the want of a sufficient number of able seamen, whom he had repeatedly and earnestly requested of Sir James Yeo to be sent to him; the very great superiority of the enemy to the British squadron; and the unfortunate early fall of the superior officers in the action. That it appeared, that the greatest exertions had been made by Captain Barclay, in equipping and getting into order the vessels under his command; that he was fully justified, under the existing circumstances, in bringing the enemy to action; that the judgment and gallantry of Captain Barclay in taking his squadron into action, and during the contest, were highly conspicuous, and entitled him to the highest praise; and that the whole of the other officers and men of his majesty's late squadron conducted themselves in the most gallant manner; and did adjudge the said Captain Robert Heriot Barclay, his surviving officers and men to be most fully and honourably acquitted." Rear-admiral Edward James Foote, president.

Notwithstanding this flattering testimonial, notwithstanding the severity of his wounds, wounds by one of which his right arm had been entirely lost, many years before the Lake Erie defeat, and by two others, received in that action, his remaining arm had been rendered permanently motionless, or nearly so, and a part of his thigh cut away, Captain Barclay was not confirmed as a commander until the 19th of November, 1813; and was only promoted to post rank in 1824.

The first naval event of the late war upon Lake Champlain, a lake, all, except about one-twentieth part, within the boundaries of the United States, occurred on the 3d of June, 1813. Two American armed sloops appeared in sight of the British garrison at Isle-aux-noix. Three gun-boats immediately got under way to attack them; and the crews of two batteaux and of two row-boats were landed, to annoy the enemy in the rear, the channel being very narrow. After a contest of three hours and a half, the two sloops surrendered. They proved to be the *Growler* and *Eagle*, mounting 11 guns, and having a complement of 50 men, each; both under the command of Lieutenant

Sidney Smith, of the United States' navy. The British had three men wounded; the Americans, one man killed, eight severely wounded, and, including the latter, 99 prisoners. No British naval officer was present. The feat was performed by detachments of the 100th regiment, and royal artillery, under the direction of Major Taylor, of the former.

On the 1st of August, some officers and seamen having arrived from Quebec, Captain Thomas Everard, late of the 18-gun brig-sloop *Wasp*, with the two prize-sloops, three gun-boats, and several batteaux, containing about 1000 troops under the command of Colonel Murray, entered the American port of Plattsburg. Here the colonel landed with his men; and, after driving away the American militia at the post, destroyed all the arsenals, block-houses, barracks, and stores of every description, together with the extensive barracks at Saranac. The two enterprising officers then proceeded off Burlington and Swanton, in Vermont; where they seized and destroyed several sloops laden with provisions, and did other considerable injury. At this time the United States' troops at Burlington, distant only 24 miles from Plattsburg, under the command of Major-general Hampton, amounted to about 4000 men. Although a letter written by an inhabitant of Burlington, and published in most of the American papers, declares that the British troops "did no injury whatever to private property," an American historian states thus: "They (the British) wantonly burned several private store-houses, and carried off immense quantities of the stock of individuals."\*

As a proof that a little energy on the part of the Americans might have averted the Plattsburg misfortune, it appears by a statement, published in the United States within three weeks after the above affair happened, that the American naval force on Lake Champlain then consisted of the *President*, of 12 guns, the *Commodore-Preble* and *Montgomery* of 11 guns each, the *Frances*, of 6 guns, two gun-boats, of one 18-pounder each, and six scows, of one 12-pounder each.

\* *Sketches of the War*, p. 156.

## BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

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THE remarks which we ventured to submit, when commencing with the important operations of the preceding year, have left us little to do in ushering the present year into notice, beyond pointing to the usual Annual Abstract,\* and to the prize and casualty lists attached to it.†

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the beginning of the year 1814, was,

Admirals	. . . . .	65
Vice-admirals	. . . . .	68
Rear-admirals	. . . . .	76
" superannuated	29	
Post-captains	. . . . .	798
" " "	37	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	. . . . .	628
" superannuated	50	
Lieutenants	. . . . .	3285
Masters	. . . . .	674

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the year, was 140,000 for seven, and 90,000 for six, lunar months of it.‡

Although we can afford to say very little on the subject, it may be necessary to state that, during the preceding year, in consequence of treaties among them, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden, allied themselves with England, Spain, and

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 22.

† See Appendix, Nos. 7 and 8.

‡ See Appendix, No. 9.



Portugal, against France. A counter-revolution took place in Holland, and the prince of Orange landed there from England, and was proclaimed sovereign prince of the United Netherlands. Before the present year was many days old, Murat deserted his old benefactor, and made peace with England. All these events, many of which are highly interesting to the historical reader, will be found amply detailed in other works exclusively devoted to the subject: our business is with occurrences that take place upon a different element, and to them we return.

On the 12th of February a French squadron, of three sail of the line and three frigates, under the command of Rear-admiral the Baron Cosmao-Kerjulien, sailed from Toulon to meet a newly-built French 74 expected from Genoa. Matters in France were getting so near to a crisis, that the *Moniteur* could find no room in its pages for an account which, otherwise, would have been allowed a conspicuous place: hence, we can give the names of only one line-of-battle ship and one frigate, the *Romulus* and *Adrienne*. On the 13th, at a few minutes after daybreak, this squadron, then steering to the southward, was discovered by Sir Edward Pellew's fleet. At 7 h. 55 m. A. M. the six French ships tacked together, and, with a strong east wind, steered for Porquerolles on their return to Toulon. At 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the ships entered the bay of Hyères by the Grande-Passe, and, in about an hour afterwards, quitted it by the Petite-Passe, still under all sail.

The British fleet, consisting of the following 15 sail of the line, besides the *Unité* frigate and *Badger* brig-sloop, was also under all sail, advancing to cut off the French squadron from the road of Toulon, towards which it was now steering:

Gun-ship			
120	{ Caldonia . . . . .	{ Vice-adm. (r.) Sir Edward Pellew, bt.	
		{ Rear-adm. (w.) Israel Pellew.	
		{ Captain Edward Lloyd Graham.	
	{ Hibernia . . . . .	{ Vice-adm. (w.) Sir Wil. Sidney Smith.	
		{ Captain Thomas Gordon Caulfield.	
112	{ <i>Sa-Josef</i> . . . . .	{ Rear-adm. (b.) Sir Richard King, bt.	
		{ Captain William Stewart.	
100	{ <i>Royal-George</i> . . . . .	"	T. Fras. Ch. Mainwaring.
	{ <i>Boyne</i> . . . . .	"	George Burlton.
	{ <i>Ocean</i> . . . . .	"	Robert Plampin.
98	{ <i>Prince-of-Wales</i> . . . . .	"	John Erskine Douglas.
	{ <i>Union</i> . . . . .	"	Robert Rolles
	{ <i>Barfleur</i> . . . . .	"	John Maitland.
	{ <i>Duncan</i> . . . . .	"	Robert Lambert.
	{ <i>Indus</i> . . . . .	"	William Hall Gage.
74.	{ <i>Berwick</i> . . . . .	"	Edward Brace.
	{ <i>Swiftsure</i> . . . . .	"	Edward Stirling Dickson.
	{ <i>Armada</i> . . . . .	"	Charles Grant
	{ <i>Aboukir</i> . . . . .	"	George Parker.

At 30 minutes past noon the leading ship of the British fleet, the *Boyne*, opened a fire upon the second French ship from the rear (believed to have been the *Adrienne* frigate), which was

immediately returned by the squadron, then running before the wind, at the rate of 10 knots, for Cape Carquaranne. The Boyne carried a press of sail, in the hope of cutting off or driving on shore the sternmost French ship, the *Romulus*; but the latter kept so close to the shore, as to render the attempt impracticable, without the Boyne herself going on shore. The Boyne, therefore, had no alternative but to lay close alongside the French 74; who, as well as her five companions, was now steering straight for Cape Brun. A steady and well-directed fire, within half pistol-shot distance, was maintained by the Boyne; but to which the *Romulus* scarcely returned a shot, until she got abreast of Pointe Sainte-Marguerite. Being by this time nearly unrigged by the Boyne's fire, the *Romulus* now hauled dead-in, to run on shore between the batteries of Brun and Sainte-Marguerite. At this instant, Sir Edward Pelew, in the *Caledonia*, who was close astern of the Boyne, waved to Captain Burlton to haul out. No sooner had the Boyne made a movement in obedience to this order, than the *Romulus*, putting her helm a-starboard, shot round Cape Brun; and, notwithstanding a broadside from the *Caledonia*, and her evidently disabled state from the Boyne's previous fire, succeeded in entering the road of Toulon; where the remaining ships of the French squadron were just about to anchor.

The French batteries, particularly those of Cape Brun and Cape Sepet, opened a very heavy and destructive fire upon the Boyne as she stood out to the southward. The Boyne at length got clear; and the *Caledonia*, running up alongside of her, greeted the *Victory*'s sister-ship, who had just acted so nobly in emulation of her, with three hearty cheers; a salute which the men of the Boyne were not slow in returning. The fire from the French batteries and ships, particularly the former, had shot away the Boyne's mizentopsail yard, and main and spring stays, greatly damaged her running rigging and sails, badly wounded her foremast, fore yard, and bowsprit, disabled two of her guns, and struck her hull in several places under water. Her loss on the same occasion amounted to one midshipman (George Terry) and one seaman killed, one midshipman (Samuel Saunders), 32 seamen, six marines, and one boy wounded; total, two killed and 40 wounded. The *Caledonia* received no damage; and her loss was confined to one seaman killed by an explosion.

The *Romulus* is acknowledged to have sustained a loss, in killed and badly wounded, of 70, and the *Adrienne* of 11. The *Romulus*, undoubtedly, was manœuvred in a very skilful manner; and her captain, whose name we regret not being able to give, deserved credit, as well for that, as for his bravery in not striking his colours to so powerful an opponent as the Boyne. According to the French papers, the 74 from Genoa succeeded in entering Toulon on the following day, the 14th; making 23 sail of the line, including six three-deckers, afloat in the

road and harbour, besides two or three two-deckers on the stocks.

On the 5th of January, after a 10 days' cannonade, the fortress of Cattaro in the Adriatic, surrendered to the British 38-gun frigate *Bacchante*, Captain William Hoste, and the 18-gun brig-sloop *Saracen*, Captain John Harper. The loss on the occasion was comparatively trifling, amounting to only one seaman killed, and Lieutenant of marines William Haig, slightly wounded. Captain Hoste, in his letter to Rear-admiral Fremantle on the subject, speaks in high terms of the following officers: Captain Harper, Lieutenants John Hancock and Charles Robert Milbourne, acting Lieutenant William Lee Rees, Mr. Stephen Vale, the *Bacchante's* master, Lieutenant Haig, and midshipman Charles Bruce. On the 28th Ragusa surrendered to the *Bacchante* and *Saracen*, and to a body of British and Austrian troops who were besieging the fortress; and on the 13th of February, the island of Paxo surrendered, without resistance, to the British 38-gun frigate *Apollo*, Captain Bridges Watkinson Taylor, and a detachment of troops under Lieutenant-colonel Church.

In the course of January and February, indeed, by the active and gallant exertions of the different ships composing the squadron of Rear-admiral Fremantle in the Adriatic, aided by detachments of Austrian troops, every place belonging to the French in Dalmatia, Croatia, Istria, and the Frioul, with all the islands in that sea, surrendered to the allies; as, in the month of March and April, did Spezzia and Genoa to a small squadron under the command of Sir Josias Rowley, aided by a detachment of British troops and a division of Sicilian gun-boats. At Genoa the British gained possession of the French 74-gun ship *Brilliant* ready for launching, another 74 in frame, and four brig-corvettes, of which the *Renard* that had engaged the *Swallow* was one. The *Brilliant* was a ship of 1883 tons, and, being built of good oak, became an acquisition to the British navy; in which she still continues under the name of Genoa.

In order to co-operate with the British army under the Marquess of Wellington, which, on the 20th of February, had reached the banks of the Adour, a small squadron had been stationed off the mouth of the river, under the command of Rear-admiral Charles Vinicombe Penrose; who, to get nearer to the scene of operations, had embarked on board the 24-gun ship *Porcupine*, Captain John Coode. On the morning of the 23d, which was as early as the ships and the boats collected for the service could arrive off the river, the latter were detached to endeavour to find a passage through the tremendous surf that beats over the bar. At this time the British troops were seen from the ships, crossing over to the north side of the river, but greatly in want of the boats intended for their assistance. Thus stimulated, Captain Dowell O'Reilly, of the 10-gun brig-

sloop *Lyra*, in a Spanish-built boat selected as the most safe for the purpose, and having with him the principal pilot, was the first to make the attempt to cross the bar, but the boat upset. Captain O'Reilly, however, and we believe the whole boat's crew were so fortunate as to gain the shore. Lieutenant John Debenham, in a six-oared cutter, succeeded in reaching the beach; but, as it was scarcely possible that one boat in 50 could then have crossed, the other boats returned, to await the result of the next tide. The tide being at length at a proper height, and all the vessels well up for the attempt, several boats drew near the bar, but hauled off again, until at last Lieutenant George Cheyne, of the 10-gun brig-sloop *Woodlark*, in a Spanish boat, with five British seamen, crossed the surf and ran up the river. The next was a prize-boat, manned from a transport, closely followed by a gun-boat, commanded by Lieutenant John Cheshire, who was the first that hoisted the British colours in the Adour. The remainder of the boats and vessels followed in rapid succession, "the zeal and science of the officers triumphing over all the difficulties of the navigation;" but this arduous and most perilous undertaking was not accomplished without a heavy loss of life. Captain Elliot of the brig-sloop *Martial*, Mr. Henry Bloye, master's mate of the *Lyra*, and 11 seamen of the *Porcupine*, *Martial*, and *Lyra*, drowned: three transport boats lost, number of men unknown; also a Spanish *chasse-marée*, the whole crew of which perished in an instant.

The British army afterwards crossed the Adour and invested Bayonne; and, early in March, a detachment under Marshal Beresford moved forward towards Bordeaux. On the 21st Rear-admiral Penrose, with the 74-gun-ship *Egmont*, to which he had now shifted his flag, anchored in the Gironde. On the 2d of April Captain Coode of the *Porcupine*, who had ascended the Gironde above Pouillac, detached his boats under the orders of Lieutenant Robert Graham Dunlop, in pursuit of a French flotilla which was observed proceeding down from Blaye to Tallemont. On the approach of the boats, the flotilla ran on shore; and about 200 troops from Blaye lined the beach to protect the vessels; but Lieutenant Dunlop, landing with a detachment of seamen and marines, drove the French with great loss into the woods, and remained until the tide allowed the greater part of the vessels to be brought off. One gun-brig, six gun-boats, one armed schooner, three *chasse-marées*, and an imperial barge, were captured; and one gun-brig, two gun-boats, and one *chasse-marée* burned. This service was performed with the loss of two seamen missing, and 14 seamen and marines wounded. On the evening of the 6th the 74-gun ship *Centaur*, Captain John Chambers White, anchored in the Gironde, in company with the *Egmont*; and preparations were immediately made for attacking the French 74-gun ship *Régulus*, three brig-corvettes, and other vessels lying near her, as well as the batteries that

protected them; but at midnight the French set fire to the *Régulus* and her companions, and the whole were destroyed. Before the 9th the batteries of Pointe Coubre, Pointe Nègre, Royan, Sonlac, and Mèche were successively entered and destroyed by a detachment of seamen and marines under Captain George Harris of the 38-gun frigate *Belle-Poule*.

The entry of the allies into Paris on the 31st of March, and the preliminary treaty entered into between England and France on the 24th of April, put a temporary stop to the miseries of war in Europe. Louis XVIII. landed at Calais from Dover the same day; and on the 28th of April Napoléon embarked at Fréjus in Provence on board the British 38-gun frigate *Undaunted*, Captain Thomas Ussher, who, on the 4th of May, landed his passenger in safety at Porto-Ferraro in the Isle of Elba.

In the succeeding August the Scheldt fleet was divided in the following manner: 12 sail of the line were allowed to be retained by France; three were restored to Holland, as having formerly belonged to her; and seven others were also given to her, to be held in trust, until the congress at Vienna should decide how they were to be disposed of. The ships, generally, were a good deal broken in the sheer, and having been constructed of green wood, were in bad condition. The nine sail of the line, including two three-deckers on the stocks, were to be broken up.

#### LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

On the 20th of October, 1813, the two French 40-gun frigates *Iphigénie* and *Alcmène*, Captains Jacques-Léon Émeric and Alexandre Ducrest de Villeneuve, sailed from Cherbourg on a six months' cruise. The two frigates proceeded first off the Western Isles, and then to the coast of Africa; where they captured two guineamen, laden with elephants' teeth, &c. After taking out the most valuable parts of the cargoes, Captain Émeric burnt the ships. From Africa the *Iphigénie* and *Alcmène* sailed to the Canary Isles, in the vicinity of which they took six other prizes. On the 16th of January, at 7 A. M., when cruising off these islands, the two French frigates fell in with the British 74-gun ship *Venerable*, Captain James Andrew Worth, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Philip Charles Durham, on his way to take the chief command at the Leeward-Islands, 22-gun ship *Cyane*, Captain Thomas Forrest, and prize-brig *Jason*, a French letter-of-marque captured 17 days before, and now, with two guns (having thrown 12 overboard in chase) and 22 men, in charge of Lieutenant Thomas Moffat, belonging to the *Venerable*.

The two frigates, when first descried, were in the north-east;

and the *Cyane*, the wind then blowing from the east-south-east, was ordered to reconnoitre them. Having shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, the *Cyane*, at 9 A. M., ascertained that they were enemies, and made a signal to that effect to the *Venerable*, who immediately went in chase. The chase continued throughout the day, so much to the advantage of the 74, that, at 6 h. 15 m. P. M. the *Venerable* arrived within hail of the *Alcmène*, the leewardmost frigate. After having hailed twice in vain, the *Venerable* opened her guns as they would bear; when the French frigate immediately put her helm up, and, under all sail, laid the British 74 on board, Captain Villeneuve, as was understood, expecting that his commodore, in compliance with a previous agreement, would second him in the bold attempt. According to another statement, and which has more the air of probability, the object of the *Alcmène* in bearing up was to cross the 74's bows, and by disabling her bowsprit and foremast, to deprive her of the means of pursuit. Whether Captain Emeric had agreed to co-operate or not, the *Iphigénie* now hauled sharp up, and left the *Alcmène* to her fate. A very short struggle decided the business, and before 6 h. 25 m. the French colours were hauled down by the British boarders, headed by Captain Worth. The conflict, although short, had been severe, especially to the *Alcmène*; who, out of a crew of 319 men and boys, lost two petty officers and 30 seamen killed, and 50 officers and men wounded, including her gallant commander. The *Venerable*'s loss consisted of two seamen killed and four wounded.

During the time that had thus elapsed, and the additional time required to shift the prisoners and repair the trifling injury done to the 74's rigging by the frigate's attempt to board, the *Cyane* and *Jason* had gone in chase of the *Alcmène*'s fugitive consort. At 10 P. M. the little *Jason*, having outrun the *Cyane* in the chase, commenced firing at the *Iphigénie* with her two guns, both of which Lieutenant Moffat had now got on the brig's larboard side. Such was the slow sailing of the *Iphigénie*, or the unskilfulness of those that manœuvred her, that at 45 minutes past midnight the *Cyane* got near enough to open a fire from her bow guns, and received in return a fire from the frigate's stern-chasers, which cut her rigging and sails a good deal. At 4 h. 30 m. A. M. on the 17th the *Cyane* gallantly fired three broadsides at the French frigate, but soon found the latter too heavy for her and dropped astern. At 5 h. 45 m. A. M. Captain Forrest despatched the brig in search of the admiral, and continued his pursuit of the *Iphigénie*; who shortly afterwards hauled close to the wind on the larboard tack, and fired three broadsides at the *Cyane*, nearly all the shot of which, fortunately for the latter, either went over her masts or between them. At 9 A. M. the *Iphigénie* bore up and steered south-west, still followed by the *Cyane*.

The chase thus continued, the latter losing sight occasionally and again recovering it, during the remainder of the 17th, and the whole of the 18th and 19th. In the evening of the latter day the Cyane dropped astern; but the Venerable was now fast coming up, and, at daylight on the 20th, was within two miles of the French frigate. The Venerable, from whose mast-head the Cyane was now not to be seen, presently opened a fire from her bow guns, and received in return a fire from the stern and quarter guns of the Iphigénie. Having thrown overboard her boats and cut away her anchors without effect, the French frigate, at 8 A. M., discharged her starboard broadside and struck her colours.

Neither the Venerable nor the Iphigénie appears to have suffered any loss from the other's fire: and the Cyane, whose gallantry and perseverance in the chase were so creditable to Captain Forrest, seems also to have escaped without loss. The same good fortune attended the Jason; who with her two guns (6-pounders probably), gave so good an earnest of what Lieutenant Moffat would have done, had he commanded a vessel that mounted 20. The Iphigénie and Alcène, being nearly new frigates, were both added to the British navy; the first under the name of Gloire, the latter under that of Dunira, afterwards changed to Immortalité.

In the latter end of October, 1813, the two French 40-gun frigates Etoile and Sultane, Captains Pierre-Henri Phillibert and Georges Du-Petit-Thouars, sailed from Nantes on a cruise. On the 18th of January, at 4 A. M., latitude about 24° north, longitude (from Greenwich) 53° west, these two French frigates discovered in the north-west the British 24-pounder 40-gun frigate Severn, Captain Joseph Nourse, escorting a convoy from England to the island of Bermuda, and steering west by north, with the wind a light air from the south-east. At 7 h. 30 m. A. M. the Severn proceeded in chase; and at 8 h. 40 m., finding the strangers did not answer the private signal, the British frigate bore up north by east, and made all possible sail from them, signalling her convoy to take care of themselves.

At 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the Severn commenced firing her stern-chasers at the leading enemy's frigate, and at noon lost sight of her convoy steering to the westward. At 4 h. 5 m. P. M. the headmost French frigate, the Etoile, hoisting her colours and broad pendant, began firing her bow guns. A running fight now ensued, which, without doing the slightest injury to the Severn, lasted until 5 h. 30 m. P. M.; when the Etoile then distant less than two miles (the Sultane astern of her about one), ceased firing. The chase continued all night, rather to the advantage of the Severn. At 8 A. M. on the 19th the two French frigates gave up the pursuit, and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack.

The Etoile and Sultane afterwards proceeded to the Cape de

Verds, and anchored in the port of English-Harbour, island of Mayo. On the 23d of January, at about 9 h. 55 m. A. M., the two British 18-pounder 36-gun frigates *Creole*, Captain George Charles Mackenzie, and *Astrea*, Captain John Eveleigh, rounding the south-east end of Mayo on their way from the neighbouring island of Fort-aventura, with the wind at north-east, blowing fresh, discovered over a point of land the mast-heads of the two French frigates, and of two merchant ships, one brigantine, and one schooner, lying in their company. At 10 h. 15 m. the two British frigates having cleared the point, wore and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, under their topsails. On a supposition that the strangers, whose hulls were now plainly visible, were Portuguese or Spanish frigates, the *Creole* hoisted the Portuguese, and the *Astrea*, by signal from her, the Spanish, private signals. No answer being returned, the strange frigates were considered to be enemies; and at 11 h. 30 m. A. M. the *Creole* and *Astrea* wore and made sail for the anchorage in which they lay.

At noon, when the two British frigates were about a mile distant from them, the *Etoile* and *Sultane*, having previously hoisted their topsail yards to the mast-head, cut or slipped, and made sail free on the larboard tack, with a strong wind still from the north-east. The two former now set topgallantsails in chase; and the *Astrea*, owing to a gust of wind suddenly striking her, had the misfortune to split all three topsails, the mizen topsail very badly, to replace which a fresh sail was soon got into the top. At about 30 minutes past noon the south-west end of the island of Mayo bore from the *Creole*, the leading British frigate, east-north-east distant four miles. In another quarter of an hour the *Creole*, both British frigates having previously hoisted their colours, fired a shot ahead of the sternmost French ship, the *Sultane*, then on the former's lee or starboard bow. The two French frigates immediately hoisted their colours. The *Creole* continued firing her bow guns occasionally at the *Sultane* until 1 P. M.: when the former discharged a few of her larboard guns, and then, as she ranged up on the *Sultane*'s lee beam, received the French ship's first broadside.

The *Astrea* also opened her fire in crossing the stern of the *Sultane*, and then gallantly passed between the latter and the *Creole*, just as the two ships had exchanged the fourth broadside. After giving and receiving two broadsides within pistol-shot, the *Astrea*, at 2 h. 15 m. P. M., stood on to engage the *Etoile*, then about half a mile ahead of her consort, with her mizen topsail aback. Having extinguished a fire that had caught in the fore-topmast staysail and mizen chains, the *Creole*, at 2 h. 30 m., recommenced the action with the *Sultane*, and presently shot away her mizenmast. About this time the wadding from the French ship's guns again set the *Creole* on fire, in the fore-castle, beams, and on the booms. The flames were again extin-



guished, and the action continued for nearly half an hour longer; making about two hours from its commencement. Having now had every brace and bowline, tack, and sheet shot away, her main stay and several of her shrouds cut through, her three masts, particularly her foremast, badly wounded, the Creole put her helm a-lee, and, steering to the north-west in the direction of the island of St.-Jago, abandoned the contest.

It took the *Astrea*, when, at 2 h. 15 m., she had quitted the *Sultane*, until 2 h. 30 m. before she got alongside of the *Etoile* to leeward. After an exchange of broadsides, the *Astrea*, having from the great way upon her ranged too far ahead, luffed up and raked the *Etoile* on her starboard bow. The *Astrea*, just at this moment losing her wheel, fell round off; and the *Etoile*, wearing, passed close astern of her, separating her from the boat she was towing, and poured in a most destructive raking fire; which cut the *Astrea's* lower rigging to pieces, shot away both deck-transoms and four quarterdeck beams, burst a carronade, and ripped up the quarterdeck in all directions. Backing round, the *Astrea* soon got her starboard guns to bear; and the two frigates, each with a fresh side opposed to the other, recommenced the action, yard-arm and yard-arm. In a few minutes Captain Eveleigh fell, mortally wounded by a pistol-shot just below the heart, and was carried below.

The command now devolved upon Lieutenant John Bulford; and the engagement between the *Astrea* and *Etoile* continued in this close position, with mutual animation, although it was no cheering sight to the *Astrea*, at about 3 p. m., to observe her consort, on the starboard tack, apparently a beaten ship, and the *Etoile's* consort approaching to double the force against herself. At 3 h. 5 m. p. m. the topsail, which lay in the *Astrea's* mizen top to replace the split one, caught fire, but the flames were soon extinguished. Seeing the near approach of the *Sultane*, the *Astrea* would have boarded the *Etoile*, and endeavoured to decide the contest that way; but the motion of the ships was too great, and the British frigate could only continue to keep her antagonist, under her guns to leeward. At 3 h. 30 m. the *Sultane*, as she passed to leeward, raked the *Astrea*, and did her considerable damage. In five minutes the *Sultane* wore from the *Astrea*, and stood before the wind, leaving the latter and the *Etoile* still in close action.

At 3 h. 45 m. the *Etoile* also wore round on the starboard tack; and in five minutes afterwards the *Astrea's* mizenmast, with the topsail a second time in flames, went by the board, carrying some of the firemen with it. In a short time after she had wore and ceased firing, the *Etoile* stood towards her consort, who was waiting for her under easy sail; and the *Astrea*, having by this time had the whole of her lower and topsail braces shot away, and being otherwise greatly damaged in rigging and sails, was in too unmanageable a state to follow. At 4 h. 15 m. the

Sultane's main topmast went over the side;\* and the *Astrea*, having soon afterwards partially refitted herself, wore round on the starboard tack with her head towards San-Jago. At this time the *Creole* was not visible to the *Astrea*; and the two French frigates were about four miles distant in the south-west, steering south by west. At 4 h. 30 m. p. m. the *Creole* was discovered under the land, standing into Porto-Praya bay; where at 4 h. 45 m. she anchored, and where, in about an hour afterwards, the *Astrea* joined her.

The principal damages of the *Creole* have already been related: her loss, out of a complement of 284 men and boys, amounted to one master's mate, seven seamen, and two marines killed, and 26 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded. The *Astrea*, besides the loss of her mizenmast and the damage done to her rigging and sails, had her fore and main masts wounded, and was a good deal struck about the stern and quarter. Her loss, out of the same complement as the *Creole's*, consisted of her commander and eight seamen and marines killed, and 37 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded, four of them dangerously and 11 severely; making the loss on board the two British frigates 19 killed and 63 wounded. The two remaining masts of the *Sultane*, and all three masts of the *Etoile*, were badly wounded; and, that their hulls escaped no better is most likely, because the acknowledged loss on board of each, out of a complement of 340 men and boys, was about 20 men killed and 30 wounded, or 40 killed and 60 wounded between them.

Here were two pairs of combatants, about as equally matched, considering the character of the opponent parties, as could well be desired; and who fought so equally, as to make that a drawn battle, which, under other circumstances, might have ended decisively. Had the *Creole*, having already witnessed the fall of the *Sultane's* mizenmast, been aware of the tottering state of that frigate's main topmast, Captain Mackenzie would not, we presume, have discontinued the engagement, simply for the preservation of his wounded foremast; especially when the *Creole's* main and mizen masts were still standing, as well as all three of her topmasts, and when, by his early retirement, he was exposing to almost certain capture a crippled consort. No frigate could have performed her part more gallantly than the *Astrea*; but two such opponents, as the one that had so long been engaging her, were more than she could withstand. Fortunately for the *Astrea*, both French frigates had seemingly had enough of fighting; and the *Etoile* and *Sultane* left their sole antagonist, in a state not less of surprise than of joy at her extraordinary escape.

On the 26th of March, at 9 A. M., these two frigates (the

The logs of the *Creole* and *Astrea* concur in stating it to have been the mainmast that fell, but both ships were mistaken.

Sultane with jury topmasts and mizenmast), when about 12 leagues to the north-west of the Isle de Bas, steering for Saint-Malo, in thick weather, with a moderate breeze at south-west, fell in with the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Hebrus, Captain Edmund Palmer, and 16-gun brig-sloop Sparrow, Captain Francis Erskine Loch. The latter was so near to the French frigates that, in crossing them, she received seven or eight shot from each; which greatly damaged her rigging and sails, killed her master, and wounded one seaman. The brig now tacked towards the Hebrus, who was on her weather quarter, standing on the larboard tack. The latter, as she passed the French frigates to windward on the opposite tack, exchanged distant broadsides with them, and fired her weather or larboard guns as a signal to her consort, the 74-gun ship Hannibal, Captain Sir Michael Seymour. At 9 h. 30 m. A. M., the Hebrus again tacked, and in 10 minutes afterwards, on the fog clearing, observed the Hannibal coming down under a press of canvass. At 10 A. M., being joined by the 74, the Hebrus crowded sail after the two French frigates, then bearing from her south-east by east distant about four miles. At 11 A. M. the wind suddenly shifted to the north-north-west, and blew very fresh. On this the two French frigates, finding their pursuers rapidly approaching, separated: the Sultane changed her course to east by north, and the Etoile hauled up to south-east. Directing by signal the Hebrus, as the best sailing ship, to chase, in company with the Sparrow, the most perfect frigate, the Hannibal herself went in pursuit of the other.

At 2 P. M. the Hebrus lost sight of the Hannibal and Sultane, and at 5 P. M. of the Sparrow; and the Etoile then bore from her south-east by east, distant three miles. Soon afterwards the Etoile gradually hauled up to east-north-east, but was still gained upon by the Hebrus. About midnight the French frigate reached the Race of Alderney; when, the wind getting more northerly, the Hebrus came up fast, and took in her studding-sails. At 1 h. 35 m. A. M. on the 27th, having run the length of Point Jobourg, the Etoile was obliged to attempt rounding it almost within the wash of the breakers. At 1 h. 45 m., while, with her courses hauled up, the Hebrus was following close upon the larboard quarter of the Etoile as the latter wore round the point, the French frigate opened a fire upon the British frigate's starboard bow. This fire the Hebrus quickly returned within pistol-shot distance, running athwart the stern of the Etoile, to get between her and the shore; and that so closely, that her jib-boom passed over the French ship's taffrail. The Hebrus was now in eight fathoms' water, and the land within musket-shot on her starboard beam. At 2 h. 20 m. A. M., while crossing the bows of the Hebrus to get again inside of her, the Etoile shot away the British frigate's fore topmast and fore yard, and crippled her mainmast and bowsprit, besides doing considerable injury to her rigging, both standing and running.

It had been nearly calm since the commencement of the action, but at 3 A. M. a light breeze sprang up from the land. Taking advantage of this, the Hebrus succeeded in pouring several raking fires into her antagonist, and at 3 h. 45 m. shot away her mizenmast by the board. At 4 A. M. the Etoile ceased firing; and, after a close and obstinate combat of two hours and a quarter, hailed to say that she had struck. No sooner was possession taken of the prize, than it became necessary to turn the heads of both ships off the shore, as well to prevent them from grounding, as to get beyond the reach of a battery, which, having been unable in the darkness of the morning to distinguish one frigate from another, had been annoying them both with its fire. The tide fortunately set the ships round Pointe Jobourg, and at 7 A. M. they anchored in Vauville bay, about five miles from the shore.

Although the principal damages of the Hebrus were in her masts and rigging, her hull had not wholly escaped, as is evident from her loss; which, out of a crew of about 284 men and boys, amounted to one midshipman (P. A. Crawley) and 12 seamen killed, and 20 seamen, two marines, and three boys wounded; four of the number dangerously, and six severely. The Etoile's principal damages lay in her hull, which was extremely shattered, leaving her at the close of the action with four feet water in the hold: her loss, in consequence, out of 327 men and boys (including the wounded in the former action), amounted to 40 killed and 73 wounded.

The guns of the Hebrus, one of the new yellow-pine frigates, were the same as those of the Belvidera.\* The Etoile mounted 44 guns, including 14 carronades, 24-pounders, and two 8-pounders on the quarterdeck and forecastle. Of her acknowledged crew of 327, we shall allow 12 for the badly wounded, and not yet recovered, of the action of the 26th of January.

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		HEBRUS.	ETOILE.
Broadside-guns . . . . .	{ No.	21	22
	{ lbs.	467	463
Crew . . . . .	No.	284	315
Size . . . . .	tons	939	1060

As the crew of the Hebrus was quite a new ship's company, with scarcely a single draught from any other ship, while the crew of the Etoile had been formed out of the united ships' companies, of the Aréthuse and Rubis, and had even since fought a creditable, if not a victorious, action with an equal force, a great share of credit is due to Captain Palmer, his officers, and crew, for the successful result of this action; con-

\* See p. 83.

sidering, especially, how near it was fought to the French shore, and how critically circumstanced the Hebrus was, both during its continuance and at its termination. We formerly concluded, that the stock of ammunition on board the Etoile must have been considerably diminished when she fell in with the Hebrus; but it has since been proved to us, that, after her capture by the latter, the Etoile had a considerable quantity of powder and shot left: consequently we erred in our supposition, and are extremely gratified, that the inaccuracy has been pointed out in time to be corrected in these pages. We must not omit to mention, that Captain William Sargent, of the navy, who was a passenger on board the Hebrus during the action, evinced much skill and intrepidity; as is very handsomely acknowledged by Captain Palmer in his official letter.

The Hannibal was not long in overtaking the disabled frigate of which she went in chase. At 3 h. 30 m. P. M. on the 26th the Sultane hoisted her colours and fired a gun. At 4 h. 15 m., having received two chase shot from the Hannibal, as an earnest of what would presently follow, the French frigate, keeping away a little, discharged her starboard broadside and surrendered.

The leaks of the Etoile, from the well-directed shot of the Hebrus, were so serious, that the ship could not be kept free on a wind, so as to reach Portsmouth: Lieutenant Robert Milborne Jackson, the prize-master, was therefore obliged to bear away for Plymouth; where, on the 29th, the prize anchored in safety. The Sultane was carried to Portsmouth; and both the latter and her late consort, being new frigates, were added to the British navy, the Sultane in her own name, and the Etoile under the name of Topaze. The first lieutenant of the Hebrus, Mr. Jackson, who, besides his good conduct in the action, had, as we have seen, some difficulty in getting his charge into port, was promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 5th of January, at 10 A. M., the island of Saint-Antonio, one of the Cape de Verds, bearing south-east by south distant eight or nine leagues, the British 38-gun frigate Niger Captain Peter Rainier, and 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Tagus, Captain Philip Pipon, with a convoy in company, steering to the westward, discovered nearly ahead the French 40-gun frigate Cérés, Captain Hyacinth-Yves-Potentien le baron de Bougainville; which, in company with the Clorinde, of the same force, Captain René-Jean-Marie Denis-Lagarde, the senior officer, had sailed from Brest in the early part of December. Both British frigates proceeded in chase with a light breeze from the east-south-east, the Niger leading. Towards evening the Cérés gained in the pursuit; but, on the Niger's throwing overboard 800 shot, the latter got near enough, at 11 P. M., to fire three shot from her bow-chasers.

On the 6th, at 1 h. 30 m. A. M., the Niger fired two more

shot, which the *Cérés* returned from her stern guns. As the day opened, the wind drew to the north-east; which so favoured the *Tagus* that, at 7 h. 30 m. A. M., she passed the *Niger*, and was gaining fast upon the French frigate. At 8 h. 15 m., desirous to try a different point of sailing, the *Cérés* shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. As a proof that the French frigate gained little by this, in half an hour the *Tagus* got within gun-shot, and, hoisting her colours, opened a fire, which the *Cérés*, hoisting hers, presently returned. A running fight now commenced between the *Tagus* and *Cérés*, and continued until 9 h. 30 m. A. M.; when, having had her main topmast shot away, the French frigate fired a broadside and surrendered. At this time, owing to some damage done to the rigging of the *Tagus* by her opponent's stern-chasers, the *Niger* had headed her consort, and was in the act of opening a heavy fire upon the *Cérés*.

Besides the loss of her main topmast, the rigging and sails of the *Cérés* were a good deal cut, and some of her lower masts injured. The damages of the *Tagus* were confined to her rigging and sails; and neither the French nor the English sustained a greater loss than one man wounded. Being a fine new frigate of 1074 tons, the *Cérés* was added to the British navy, under the name of *Seine*, a *Ceres* being already in the service.

It is uncertain on what day, previous to the capture of the *Cérés*, her consort, the *Clorinde*, parted company; but we find the latter on the 25th of February, in latitude 47° 40' north, longitude (from Greenwich) 9° 30' west, on her way to Brest, after a tolerably successful cruise. It was at 2 P. M., when standing close hauled on the starboard tack, with the wind at south-west by south, that the *Clorinde* was descried by the British 24-pounder 38-gun frigate *Eurotas*, Captain John Phillimore, then on the former's weather beam steering by the wind on the larboard tack. The *Eurotas* quickly bore up in chase; and at 2 h. 30 m. P. M. the *Clorinde*, whose national character and force was by this time ascertained, also bore up, under a press of sail.

While the chase is going on, we will proceed to point out some peculiarities in the armament of one of these ships, a knowledge of which will be necessary, to render fully intelligible the details we have to give of the action fought between them. At the commencement of the year 1813, under the head of "British and American navies," we stated that, among the means taken to meet the large American frigates on equal terms, some of the British 38-gun class were mounted with medium 24-pounders and allowed an increased complement of men. The first two frigates so fitted were the *Cydnus* and *Eurotas*, both built of red pine and recently launched. The *Cydnus* was fitted with the 24-pounder of General Blomefield, measuring 7 ft. 6 in., and weighing about 40 cwt.; and the *Eurotas*, after

having, by mistake we believe, received on board a set of long or 49 cwt. 24s, was fitted with the 24-pounder of Colonel Congreve, measuring also 7 ft. 6 in., and intended to weigh 41 cwt. 1 gr. 12 lb., but actually weighing only 40 cwt. 2 qrs. 21 lb. With 28 of these guns on the main deck, 16 carronades, 32-pounders, two long nines, and the usual 18-pounder launch-carronade, on the quarterdeck and forecastle, as her regular establishment, and with, we are inclined to think, one additional 24-pounder upon General Blomefield's principle, the Eurotas, commanded by Captain John Phillimore (promoted from the Diadem troop-ship, which he had commanded since June, 1810), sailed from the Nore in the middle of the month of August, bound off Brest.

On the 30th the Eurotas joined the blockading squadron, which was under the command of Commodore Pulteney Malcolm, in the 100-gun ship Queen-Charlotte, Captain Robert Jackson. On some day in September (we believe the 14th) Captain Phillimore invited the commodore and all the captains of the squadron on board the Eurotas to witness a trial of her 24-pounders. The guns were tried eight times, with the full allowance of powder, and double-shotted; and they stood remarkably well. Commodore Malcolm said he should like to have Colonel Congreve's 24-pounders on the Queen-Charlotte's second and third decks; and every one of the captains went away pleased with the gun. The following captains, with the exception of one or two, but which we cannot say, were present at this successful trial of the guns of the Eurotas: Captains Willoughby Thomas Lake, Robert Lambert, Thomas Elphinstone, Sir Michael Seymour, Henry Vansittart, George M'Kinley, George Tobin, George Harris, and Robert Jackson. Captain Phillimore subsequently declared that, if well manned, he could fight both sides of the Eurotas with ease; was delighted with the guns in a gale of wind; and found that, when the Eurotas was carrying a press of sail off Ushant, the guns did not work in the least, nor the ship seem to feel the smallest inconvenience from them.\* On the 25th of November the Eurotas sent six of her 24-pounders on board the Cydnus, and received in exchange the same number of the latter's guns; but on the 5th of the ensuing February, when the two ships again met, the Eurotas received back her six 24s and returned to the Cydnus those belonging to her. We must now show what ensued between the Eurotas and the French frigate Clorinde; whose force it may be necessary to state, was 28-long 18-pounders, 14 carronades, 24-pounders, and two long 8-pounders, total 44 guns.

At 4 P. M. the wind shifted to the north-west and fell considerably; but the Eurotas, nevertheless, gained in the chase. At about the same time the Clorinde, then not quite four miles

\* For a copy of a letter from Captain Phillimore, stating most of these particulars, see Appendix, No. 10.

distant in the east-north-east, suddenly shortened sail, and endeavoured to cross the hawse of her pursuer. This only hastened the junction; and at 4 h. 45 m. the Eurotas fired a shot and hoisted her colours, as did also the Clorinde. At 5 p. m., having bore up, the Eurotas passed under the stern of the Clorinde and discharged her starboard broadside. Then, luffing up under the Clorinde's quarter, the British frigate received so close and well-directed a fire, that in the course of 20 minutes, and just as she had reached the larboard bow of her antagonist, her mizenmast fell by the board over the starboard quarter; and, nearly at the same time, came down the fore topmast of the Clorinde.

The French frigate now, shooting ahead, endeavoured to cross the bows of the Eurotas, with the intention of raking her. To evade this, and at the same time lay her antagonist on board, the Eurotas put her helm hard a-port and luffed up; but, being obstructed in her manœuvre by the wreck of the mizenmast, she could only pass close under the stern of the Clorinde, and pour in her larboard broadside. The two frigates again got side by side, and cannonaded each other with redoubled fury. At 6 h. 20 m. p. m. the Eurotas, then close on her opponent's starboard beam, had her mainmast shot away; and which, fortunately for her, fell over the starboard or unengaged quarter. Almost at the same instant the mizenmast of the Clorinde came down. At 6 h. 50 m., the two ships being nearly in the same relative position, the foremast of the Eurotas fell over the starboard bow; and in a minute or two afterwards the mainmast of the Clorinde shared the same fate. The Eurotas was now quite, and the Clorinde almost, unmanageable. At 7 h. 10 m. p. m., being then on the larboard bow of the Eurotas, the Clorinde set the remains of her foresail and her fore staysail and stood to the south-east, out of gun-shot.

Captain Phillimore, who since the early part of the action had been dangerously wounded in the shoulder by a grape-shot (the loss of blood from which, according to a published statement,\* had caused him to faint three times on deck), now consented to go below; and the command of the Eurotas devolved upon Lieutenant Robert Smith. The boats' masts were immediately stepped on the booms, and the sails set, to endeavour, with a light westerly breeze, to keep after the enemy, still in the south-east. The wreck of the masts were also cleared away, and preparations made for getting up jury masts: and in the mean while the ship laboured much, owing to her dismasted state and a heavy swell from the westward.

By great exertions throughout the night, the Eurotas, at 5 a. m. on the 26th, got up a spare main topmast for a jury mainmast, and at 6 h. 15 m. a fore topmast for a jury foremast, and a rough spar for a mizenmast; the Clorinde still preserving the

\* Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi., p. 184.



same line of bearing as on the preceding evening, but having increased her distance to nearly six miles. At 11 h. 30 m. A. M. Lieutenant Smith spoke the English merchant schooner *Dun-garvon*, from Lisbon bound to Port-Glasgow, and requested her master to keep between the *Eurotas* and *Clorinde*, and, in the event of the *Eurotas* not overtaking the *Clorinde* before night, to show a light and fire guns. At noon the *Eurotas* and *Clorinde* were about eight miles apart; but in so different a state with respect to ability to renew the action, that while the latter had only partially cleared away the wreck of her main and mizen masts, the former had jury-courses, topsails, stay-sails, and spanker set, going, with a northerly wind, six and a half knots through the water, and evidently gaining in the chase.

But at this moment, Captain Phillimore justly observes, "to the great mortification of every one on board" the *Eurotas*, two sail were descried on the lee bow. The nearest of these was the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Dryad*, Captain Edward Galwey; the other the 16-gun brig-sloop *Achates*, Captain Isaac Hawkins Morrison. At 1 h. 15 m. P. M. the *Clorinde* hoisted French colours aft and English forward, and despatched a boat to the *Dryad*, who then shortened sail and hove to to receive it. The purport of Captain Denis-Lagarde's communication, as it has appeared in print, was to require terms before he would surrender. The doubt expressed by the French officers as to the ship in sight to windward being that which had reduced the *Clorinde* to such a state, was far from unreasonable; considering that, not only had a night intervened, but the ship now seen was masted, rigged and under sail, while the ship engaged the evening before had been left as bare as a hulk. The French lieutenant was quickly sent back to the *Clorinde* to get ready her "resources," and the *Dryad* filled and stood towards her, to give her an opportunity of trying the effect of them. At 1 h. 35 m. P. M., having placed herself on the *Clorinde*'s quarter, the *Dryad* fired one shot into her; when the French frigate hauled down her colours, and was taken immediate possession of. At this time the *Eurotas* was between four and five miles off to windward, and the *Achates* about the same distance from the *Clorinde* to leeward.

Out of a complement on board of 329 men and boys, the *Eurotas* had two midshipmen (Jeremiah Spurking and Charles Greenway), one first-class volunteer (John T. Vaughan), 13 seamen, four marines, and one boy killed, her commander (very severely), one lieutenant of marines (Henry Foord), one midshipman (John R. Brigstock), 30 seamen, and six marines wounded; total, 21 killed and 39 wounded. Out of a crew on board numbering, according to the depositions of Captain Denis-Lagarde and his two principal officers, 344 men and boys, the *Clorinde* had 20 officers and men killed and 40 wounded. From the

great proportion of killed, it is probable that the severely wounded only are here reckoned. They may have amounted to 20 more; making the killed 30, and the wounded 60.

In the letter which Captain Galwey, with a proper feeling, permitted Captain Phillimore to write, the latter states, that the *Clorinde* had "a complement of 360 picked men," and that "M. Gerrard," one of the French officers, calculated their loss at 120 men. With respect to the complement, judging by the number of men usually found on board frigates of the *Clorinde*'s class, and allowing, if necessary, that some may have been absent in prizes, we consider the sworn amount, 344, and that for which the head-money was afterwards paid, as likely to be the most correct. In regard to the alleged declaration of "M. Gerrard," unless the slightly wounded were in a very unusual proportion, the statement extracted from the *Dryad*'s log is more to be depended upon; especially, as it specifies both killed and wounded, and accords exactly, as we shall proceed to show, with the number and distribution of the prisoners. Owing to there being three British men of war in company, it is natural to suppose, that all the prisoners would be taken out of the French ship, with the exception of the badly wounded. Accordingly, out of the 314 assumed survivors of the French crew, the *Dryad* received on board 125, the *Eurotas* 92, and the *Achates* 57; leaving on board the *Clorinde*, by a singular coincidence, the exact number stated by the French officers as the amount of their wounded. Every one of those officers, not left in the *Clorinde*, appears to have been on board the *Dryad*; among whom we find, Captain Denis-Lagarde, M. Joseph Lemaitre, his first, and M. Vincent Moulac, his second, lieutenant; but we do not see in the list the name of "Gerrard," nor any name resembling it. This person, therefore, was probably one of the wounded left on board the *Clorinde*.

Although we are by no means satisfied, that the *Eurotas* did not mount one of General Blomefield's 24-pounders in addition to her established armament already particularized, we shall not include that gun, nor, of course, the 18-pounder launch-carrouade, in the following

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		EUROTAS.	CLORINDE.
Broadside-guns . . .	{ No.	28	22
	{ lbs.	601	468
Crew . . . . .	No.	329	344
Size . . . . .	tons	1084	1088

Had the *Eurotas* been armed the same as the generality of her class, this would have been a tolerably fair match; but the British ship's 24-pounders destroyed the equilibrium. Yet, with a distance which would even have suited carronades, and

with the exclusive advantage of two raking fires, those 24-pounders did not do so much execution, in proportion to the time they were acting, as had been done on many other occasions by an equal number of 18s. The ship, it is true, had not been quite 10 months in commission, and had not had her guns on board many days over six months; but even the shorter of those two periods was long enough for the men to have been taught as much of practical gunnery, as should have enabled them, in a close action of nearly two hours with an inferior antagonist, to have done greater execution, in reference to what they themselves suffered, than appears to have been inflicted by the Eurotas upon the Clorinde.

But, deficient as the crew of the Eurotas may have been at their guns, they were by no means so at the various other duties of their calling. The quickness, with which the seamen refitted their ship, was as great a proof of their spirit as it was of their skill; and, contrasted with the evidently unprepared state of the Clorinde, 16<sup>h</sup> hours after the battle, showed, in a very clear manner, the superiority of a British over a French crew. It was the capability to go ahead and manœuvre, thus given, that would again, in a short time, have brought the Eurotas alongside of the Clorinde; and it was a perfect readiness to renew the action, with, owing to the preceding day's two hours' practice at the guns, an actual increase of power, that would have made the Clorinde the prize of the Eurotas, even had the Dryad not interposed her unwelcome presence.

The arrival of the Dryad and Achates, although it certainly robbed the Eurotas of her trophy, went a very little way towards dignifying the surrender of the Clorinde; who, notwithstanding her captain's previous threat, did not fire a shot in return for the one discharged at her by the Dryad.\* We formerly expressed a belief, that the Achates alone would have produced the same result; but, much as was to be expected from the tried gallantry of the brig's commander, we now, looking at the number of unwounded prisoners received out of the Clorinde, and the impunity with which her principal officers escaped, think otherwise. Nor do we feel disposed to award so much credit to M. Denis-Lagarde, as we formerly did; not only because of the tameness of his surrender, but because, with so many officers and men in an effective state, he ought, in the 18 hours that had elapsed, to have cleared away his wreck, and partially refitted his ship. The dismasted state of the Eurotas, and her serious loss in men, prove that the French crew knew in what way to handle their guns; and considering how long the Clorinde had been in commission, and how many months of the time at sea,\* we must suppose that her men were competent to perform the

\* See vol. v., p. 187, and this volume, p. 15.

other duties of men-of-war's men, had their officers issued the proper directions. With good management, therefore, the *Clorinde* might have effected her escape before the *Dryad* and *Achates* fell in with her; and, even had the prevailing westerly wind begun to blow strong, soon after the close of the action, and lasted through the night, the probability is, that the French frigate, unfitted as she was, would still have gained a port of France.

Taking the prize in tow, the *Dryad* proceeded with her to Portsmouth; and the *Clorinde* was afterwards added to the British navy by the name of *Aurora*, a *Clorinde* (also a French frigate) being already in the service. For his gallantry in this action, and his unremitting exertions in getting the ship cleared, masted, and under sail in so short a space of time, Lieutenant Robert Smith, first of the *Eurotas*, was deservedly promoted to the rank of commander. A litigation afterwards took place on the subject of the head-money for the crew of the *Clorinde*; and it was at length decreed to the *Dryad*, as having been the actual captor.

With the exception of the particulars entered into respecting the guns of the *Eurotas*, and respecting the state of the prisoners received out of the *Clorinde*, the above account of the action between these frigates is essentially, and almost verbally, the same as that given in the preceding edition of this work. The accuracy of that account having been publicly impugned, we are bound, either to admit that we are misinformed on the subject, or to bring forward such proofs, as will place beyond the reach of further contradiction the validity of our statements. As far as we have been able to glean them, the following are the principal, if not the only, objections that were raised: 1. That the *Eurotas's* 24-pounders were experimental guns, and proved defective in some (but what, we cannot say) particular, when tried in the action. 2. That the crew of the *Eurotas* had been taught how to fire with precision; consequently, that the comparatively slight execution done by the *Eurotas* to the *Clorinde* did not arise from the inexpertness of her men, but from the ineffectiveness of her guns. Unfortunately, the newspapers of the day used their endeavours to circulate a much more important objection than either of these; no less than that the maindeck guns of the *Eurotas* were 18, and not 24 pounds. Let us hasten to do Captain Phillimore the justice to state, that he never made, although we do not remember that he contradicted, an assertion which could have been so easily refuted. A contemporary saw the paragraph, and, putting aside the newspaper, kept it until he could give the statement again to the public, with a post-captain's name as a voucher for its accuracy, in the following words: "A frigate-action, of an interesting nature, was fought in February, 1814, between the *Eurotas*, a

British ship, of 44 guns, 18-pounders, and La Clorinde, of the same force.”\*

Taking the two serious objections in the order in which they are stated, we shall begin with the quality of the guns. As far as a trial before the action could speak for the Congreve 24-pounders, we have already shown, that Captain Phillimore himself, Commodore Malcolm, and several experienced post-captains, were “delighted with them.” Now for their behaviour in the action. The moment we learnt that Captain Phillimore had a complaint to allege against the guns, for some ill quality or deficiency that discovered itself in the action between the Eurotas and Clorinde, we turned again to the official letter. Finding no complaint there, we once more looked into the ship’s log; knowing that, there at least, a minute of the circumstance ought to have been noted down. Not a word could we discover on the subject. We then took the pains to ascertain, if any official report, complaining of the guns, had reached the navy board. Except an application, made in March, to have the breeching-bolts of the carronades, and the cat-heads, of the Eurotas made different from those of any other ship in the service, and a refusal of both requests, we could find no correspondence between Captain Phillimore and the commissioners of the navy.

Pursuing our inquiries, we at last discovered that, on the 15th of March, 1814, an examination took place of the officers of the Eurotas on the very subject on which we desired information; and the following (all we have been able to procure) is a transcript of what purports to be the testimony of the second lieutenant of the Eurotas, Richard Wilcox Graves: “That, when the said guns were tried at Sheerness against the common 24-pounder long gun, they seemed to carry the shot, both double and single, as far as the latter; that they bounded a little more than the long gun, but not dangerously so; that they can be worked with two men less than the common long gun, are easier to train, and embrace a larger range or circle; that, in the action, one bolt only was drawn on the main deck, and one seizing broken, the latter of which might have been badly made; that, upon the main deck, two shot were fired from each gun in the first three rounds, and one round and one grape during the remainder of the action; that the quantity of gunpowder was 8 lb., which was considered 2 lb. too much, no difference of range being perceived when the guns were fired with only 6 lb.; that there is only one gun on board the Eurotas, similar to those on board the Cydnus, upon Lieutenant-general Blomefield’s principle, on account of there not being a complete set at Woolwich when the Eurotas was fitted out.”

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 189.

From the time of her action, except to land them when docked to have her damages repaired, the Eurotas retained these same guns, until Captain James Lillicrap paid the ship off on the 6th of January, 1816; when the Eurotas landed her "28 Congreve's 24-pounders" at the arsenal at Woolwich. Consequently, there could have been no well-grounded complaint against the guns, otherwise the board of admiralty would not have suffered the Eurotas again to go to sea with them on board. On the contrary, the lords of the admiralty were so pleased with the report made of the 40 cwt. Congreve 24-pounder, after a series of experiments tried at Sutton Heath, that, in the latter end of the year 1813, they ordered 300 more of the same description of gun to be cast; and, as a proof that the behaviour of the guns in the action of the Eurotas with the Clorinde, rather confirmed than lessened the previous good opinion entertained of them, the board of admiralty, on the 28th of April, 1815, ordered that all the first-rate ships in the British navy should thenceforward be established, upon their upper or third decks, with the Congreve 24-pounder.

After this full exposition of the perfect adequacy of the Eurotas's 24-pounders to perform, in a close contest especially, quite as well as any guns of the same caliber, we might answer the second objection, by simply pointing to the execution done by English 24 and 32, against French 18 and 24 pounders, and *vice versa*, as unfolded in our detailed account of this action; but we shall not blink the question: we stated, that the ship's company of the Eurotas had not been sufficiently practised at the guns, and we are prepared to prove our assertion. We must premise that, at the time the Eurotas was commissioned and armed with 24-pounders, three American 24-pounder frigates had recently captured three English 18-pounder frigates, and that with such impunity as to indicate, that the art of gunnery had been much neglected in the British navy. The degree of attention paid by a captain to the exercise of his men, which would be commendable in 1811, would scarcely deserve any praise at all in 1813. And even in the latter part of 1813, a captain of a 38-gun frigate, armed in the usual manner of her class, might allege, as some excuse for not troubling himself more than he had been accustomed to do about the expertness of his crew at the guns, that the board of admiralty had issued an order; that no British 18-pounder frigate was voluntarily to engage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America. But here was a frigate, fitted out purposely to be a match for one of those frigates; and we have not a doubt that, before he fell in with the Clorinde, Captain Phillimore expressed a strong desire to encounter the Constitution. Under these circumstances, no pains should have been spared to make the crew of the Eurotas expert gunners. We have seen the means that Captain Broke took

to teach his men how to point their guns with effect, and we have seen in what a short space of time those guns, thus skilfully directed, tore to pieces an equal antagonist.

Knowing that it is customary to minute down in the log when the men are exercised at great guns and small arms, we naturally turn for information to the log of the Eurotas, and find that, from the 13th of August to the 25th of February, the crew were so exercised, including thrice in firing at a mark, 24 times; which is at the rate of about once in eight days, or, admitting we may have overlooked an entry or two, once a week. It is evident, however, from the statement we have already given, that when the day of trial came, the English crew failed in accomplishing as much as might have been expected of them. But, that the men wanted neither zeal nor capacity, has already appeared in the quickness with which they refitted their ship, to go again in pursuit of their enemy. Some persons have urged as an excuse for the crew of the Eurotas, that a heavy sea was raging, which prevented them from pointing their guns with precision; forgetting, that the crew of the Clorinde laboured under precisely the same inconvenience. We need not refer to many pages back, to show what was performed, about a month afterwards, by a British frigate with 18-pounders, and two guns less of a side than the Eurotas, against a French frigate equal in force to the Clorinde; and the Hebrus was not put in commission until five months after the Eurotas, and was not by any means so well manned, the principal part of the latter's crew having been draughted from the Quebec, Arethusa, and Cornelia frigates.

We trust, that we have now completely established the accuracy of our former statement, that the guns of the Eurotas, in her action with the Clorinde, did not perform so well as they ought; and that the fault lay, not in the guns themselves, but in the manner in which they were handled. In conclusion, we beg to observe, that, if the slight superiority in execution which the Eurotas's 24-pounders proved themselves to possess over the 18-pounders of the Clorinde, were not clearly shown to have arisen from adventitious circumstances, with what face could we, as we so strenuously have done, deny to the Americans the greater part of the credit which they take to themselves, for having, with their 24-pounder frigates, so completely beaten the 18-pounder frigates of England? Why was the armament of the Eurotas changed from 18 to 24-pounders, if not to give the ship an increase of force?

On the 12th of March, at 2 P. M., latitude 43° 16' north, longitude 10° 56' west, the British 18-gun brig-sloop Primrose, Captain Charles George Rodney Phillott, while lying to on the larboard tack with the wind from the north-east by east, discovered, and at 2 h. 30 m. made sail after, a vessel on the lee bow, standing to the south-west. This vessel was the British brig-

packet Duke-of-Marlborough, Captain John Bull, from Falmouth with a mail, bound to Lisbon. At 4 h. 20 m. P. M., observing that the strange brig had altered her course to avoid her, the Primrose fired a gun and hoisted her colours, a small blue ensign, at the gaff-end, and continued in chase. Shortly afterwards, when the Marlborough was about seven miles distant, the blue ensign was hauled down, and, that the stranger might see it more distinctly, a large red one hoisted in its stead. At 6 h. 50 m. P. M. the Primrose fired a shot at the strange brig, which, from her yawing about, was supposed to be a captured English merchantman; any thing, in short, but a king's packet, as she had no lower studding-sails or royals set.

On first observing herself chased by the Primrose, whom she took for an American privateer, the Marlborough had hoisted the private signal, but the end-on position of the two vessels, their distance apart, and the circumstance of the flags being only half the established size, prevented the Primrose from making them out. After being up about two hours, by which time the Primrose had approached to within five miles, the private signal was hauled down, and the ensign and pendant only kept flying. As soon as it became dark the private night-signal was made, or rather was attempted to be made, for it appears that no one on board the packet, except the gunner, knew the difference between a blue light and a false fire. At 7 h. 55 m. P. M., the Marlborough opened a fire from one of her two brass 9-pounders out of the stern ports, which was so well directed, that it cut some of the rigging about the bowsprit and foremast of the Primrose, and passed through her main course. The fire was repeated from both stern guns, and continued to be destructive to the rigging and head-sails of the Primrose; who, from the breeze freshening, was now fast approaching.

At 8 h. 15 m. P. M., ranging up on the Marlborough's larboard quarter, at the distance of about 100 yards, the Primrose shortened sail; and Captain Phillott hailed once, and his second lieutenant, who had a loud voice, twice. The only answer returned, was the discharge of three guns, and immediately afterwards of the packet's whole broadside; whereby the master, Mr. Leech, and two men were mortally, and three slightly, wounded on board the Primrose. The latter now began firing as her guns could be brought to bear; but, owing to the manœuvres of the Marlborough, the Primrose found a difficulty in firing with any effect. The Primrose then steered for the packet's quarter to run her on board, but was prevented from doing so by a boom or spare-yard that had been rigged out from her stern. The sloop's head-braces being at the same time shot away, her head-sails came aback, and she was unable for the moment to close. Quickly refitting herself, the Primrose again made sail, and, closing, reopened her fire. That of the Marlborough soon slackened; and, on Captain Phillott again hailing,



the painful truth came out, that his antagonist was a British packet.

The damages received by the Marlborough, as admitted by Captain Bull and his officers, were of a very serious nature. Two 32-pound shot had passed through just below the water's edge; and the packet, in consequence, had three and a half feet water in the hold, and by its rapid increase, was reduced to nearly a sinking state. Her masts also were much injured, and her standing and running rigging nearly all shot away. Her loss, on this unfortunate occasion, amounted to Adjutant Andrews of the 60th regiment, and another passenger, killed, and the master and nine or ten men wounded. Except a shot through her mainmast, the principal damage sustained by the Primrose has already been related: her loss amounted to one seaman killed, her master (Andrew Leech, dangerously), one master's mate (Peter Belcher severely), and 12 seamen and marines wounded. At the request of Captain Bull, the carpenter of the Primrose and one of his mates were sent on board the Marlborough, to assist in stopping her leaks.

The facts above detailed differ materially from those we inserted in the first edition of this work; but we shall be exonerated from blame when we mention, that our first statement was grounded upon an apparently authentic account, already before the English public; and which account, owing probably to the absence of the Primrose on a foreign station, was not contradicted. The minutes of a court of inquiry, held upon Captain Phillott, on the subject of this unfortunate encounter, have since been put into our hands; and it is thus that we have been enabled to give the only correct account of the transaction which has appeared in print.

On the 2d of February, at 8 P. M., latitude at noon that day  $36^{\circ} 41'$  north, longitude  $22^{\circ} 11'$  west, the British 56-gun ship *Majestic*,\* Captain John Hayes, steering east-half-north with the wind a moderate breeze from the south-south-east, on the lookout for the American frigate *Constitution*, which had sailed from Boston bay on the 1st of January, discovered on her weather bow a ship, evidently a cruiser, standing towards her. In about 20 minutes the stranger, which, as afterwards ascertained, was the American privateer *Wasp*, of Philadelphia, mounting 20 guns, found her mistake; and wearing, stood to the north-east under all the canvass she could set. The *Majestic* made sail in chase, and continued the pursuit until daylight on the 3d; when, having got within four miles of the *Wasp*, she descried, about three leagues off in the south-south-east, three ships and one brig, of a very suspicious appearance, the ships especially. At 7 A. M. the *Majestic* made the private signal, and, receiving no answer, shortened sail to reconnoitre the strangers. These were not, as

\* See p. 145. But the *Majestic* mounted only one 12-pounder chase-gun.

conjectured, an American squadron, but the two French 40-gun frigates *Atalante* and *Terpsichore*, from Lorient on the 8th of January, and their prizes, a large richly-laden Spanish ship, captured the day previous, named the *San-Juan-de-Baptista*, carrying 20 guns and 50 men, and an unarmed merchant brig. At 7 h. 30 m. the four vessels stood towards the *Majestic*. Having again made the private signal without effect, Captain Hayes, at 8 h. 30 m. A. M., gave up the chase of the *Wasp*, and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, with a light breeze from the north-north-east, more distinctly to make out the character of the strangers in the south.

At 9 A. M. the *Majestic* tacked to the westward. At 9 h. 15 m., just as she had got upon the beam of the weathermost ship, which was the *Terpsichore*, the latter made to her consort the signal for an enemy. Captain Hayes being determined to force these ships, now clearly seen to be large frigates, to show their colours, the *Majestic*, at 10 A. M., tacked, hoisted her colours, and bore up for the *Terpsichore*. In five minutes the latter shortened sail, for the *Atalante*, who was some distance astern, to close; and on the *Majestic's* evincing an increased eagerness to get alongside of her, the *Terpsichore* wore and stood towards her tardy companion, with the signal flying, "The enemy is inferior to us." The French commodore answered this with, "Make more sail." Thinking his signal had been misunderstood, Captain Breton repeated it, but merely obtained a repetition of the answer to his first signal.

As soon as the *Terpsichore* had joined the *Atalante*, which was at about 11 h. 30 m. A. M., the two frigates, formed in line ahead, with the Lima ship and merchant brig on the weather bow, seemed resolved to withstand an attack. But the *Majestic* by her bold approach, extinguished the last remnant of resolution in the poor commodore; and at 11 h. 45 m., the *Atalante* crowded sail nearly before the wind to the south-south-east. In a minute or two the *Terpsichore* hoisting French colours followed her consort. Both French ships carried their larboard studding-sails; and the *Atalante*, ludicrously enough, still kept the signal flying, "Make more sail." The armed ship and merchant brig, meanwhile, had hauled up to the eastward, also under a press of canvass.

Towards noon the wind freshened and the *Majestic* gained upon the *Terpsichore*. At 2 h. 15 m. P. M. the latter opened a fire from her stern chase-guns. At 3 P. M., being in a good position, going at the rate of 10 knots an hour, the *Majestic* commenced firing her bow guns with considerable effect, almost every shot striking. After a running fight, which lasted until 4 h. 49 m. P. M., the *Terpsichore* fired a few of her aftermost guns at the *Majestic*, who was then within musket-shot distance, and struck her colours, but did not shorten sail. The *Majestic*, in consequence, fired another shot or two; when, at 4 h. 56 m., the

French frigate let all fly and brought to. The wind increasing and the prize being in a state of confusion, Captain Hayes felt himself obliged to stay by her, and to suffer the other frigate, with the ship and brig, to escape. The sea, indeed, got up so very fast, that out of 317 prisoners, 100 only could be removed; and, in effecting that, the jollyboat was stove and two of the prisoners drowned. The previous loss on board the *Terpsichore*, out of a crew of 320 men and boys, amounted to three men killed and six wounded. The *Majestic* did not lose a man.

We much regret our inability to give the name of the senior officer of these two French frigates, the captain of the *Atalante*. We should like to hold up to contempt the officer who could tamely suffer his consort to be cannonaded by an enemy's ship for one hour and three quarters, when in a very few minutes, he might have placed himself within a few yards of the attacking force. Not a single shot did he bestow, even in defence of a prize that, besides her valuable cargo, had on board 600,000 dollars in specie.\* Captain François-Désiré Breton deserved a braver commodore; for no one surely will say, that two French 40-gun frigates (without reckoning the 20-gun ship) ought not to have attacked the *Majestic*? Admitting that the nature of her metal would have justified a retreat, Monsieur whoever he was should at least have waited till he had ascertained whether that metal was light or heavy.

The conduct of the *Majestic*, in unhesitatingly bearing down to the attack, even when the want of colours and the haze of the weather rendered it doubtful whether two of the four strangers were not American frigates, places the gallantry of Captain Hayes in a conspicuous light. Even had they been the *Constitution* and *Essex*, as Captain Hayes, before the *Terpsichore* showed her colours (one frigate, from her style of painting, appearing much larger than the other), conjectured they were, so excellent a crew had the *Majestic*, and so well skilled were they in fighting the powerful guns which this fine ship mounted,

\* The captain of the *Atalante's* name was Mallet; he was chased into Concarneau bay, on the 25th of March, 1814, by the *Menelaus*, Captain Sir Peter Parker. On the 26th, Lieutenant Seagrove and midshipman Frederic Chamier were sent in with a flag of truce, conveying a challenge to Monsieur Mallet, inviting him to weigh, and not to allow a frigate of equal force to keep him skulking behind the rocks and batteries of Concarneau; but, as has been shown before, the French captain was not very eager for any combat. He returned the following answer:

“Monsieur,—La frégate l'*Atalante*, que je commande ne peut sortir d'un Port Français que par un ordre de mes chefs; je le réclamerai, mais je ne peux pas assurer que le l'obtiendrai.

“J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

“MALLET,

“Capitaine de frégate,

“Chevalier en la Légion d'Honneur.”

“à Monsieur,  
Le Baronet Peter Parker.

that the result would scarcely have been doubtful: at all events, the captain and his officers, would have considered such a meeting as the most fortunate epocha of their professional lives.

On the 14th of February, off Lorient, the prize to these French frigates the San-Juan, was recaptured by the British 38-gun frigate Menelaus, Captain Sir Peter Parker, the Rippon 74, Captain Sir Christopher Cole, in sight. On the same, or the preceding day, the Atalante succeeded in entering the port, towards which the Lima ship was steering when fallen in with, Lorient.

On the 5th of December, 1813, the American frigate President, Commodore Rodgers, sailed from Providence, Rhode-Island, upon her third cruise; but not unseen, for the British frigate Orpheus, Captain Hugh Pigot, obtained a distant view of her, and hastened with the information to her consort, the 74-gun ship Albion, Captain John Ferris Devonshire. On the 25th, in latitude  $19^{\circ}$  north, longitude  $35^{\circ}$  west, the President fell in with, chased, and on making them out to be frigates, and concluding them to be British, ran from, the two French 40-gun frigates Nymphe and Méduse, from Brest upon a cruise since the latter end of November. Had these ships really been British, the President would have had a narrow escape, the headmost frigate having thrown several shot over her. By altering her course in the night, the American frigate at last got clear, and, steering to the south-west, cruised to windward of Barbadoes until the 16th of January. The commodore then ran off Cayenne; thence off Surinam, Berbice, and Demerara, and between the islands of Tobago and Grenada; thence across the Caribbean sea, along the south-east side of Porto-Rico, through the Mona-Passage, and down the north side of Jamaica.

Striking soundings off St.-Augustine, the President, on the 11th of February, passed Charlestown; and, on arriving off the Delaware, fell in with, in a fog, "a large vessel, apparently a man of war." This ship "disappearing," the President stood on to the northward. "From the Delaware," says the commodore, in his letter to the secretary of the American navy, "I saw nothing, until I made Sandy-Hook, when I again fell in with another of the enemy's squadrons; and, by some unaccountable cause, was permitted to enter the bay, although in the presence of a decidedly superior force, after having been obliged to remain outside, seven hours and a half, waiting for the tide."

The "decidedly superior force" is thus explained in a letter from one of the President's officers: "After passing the light, saw several sail, one large sail to windward; backed our main topsail, and cleared ship for action. The strange sail came down within gun-shot, and hauled her wind on the starboard tack. We continued with our main topsail to the mast three hours, and, seeing no probability of the 74-gun ship's bearing down to engage the President, gave her a shot to windward, and hoisted our colours; when she bore up for us, reluctantly.

When within half gun-shot, backed her main topsail. At this moment, all hands were called to muster aft, and the commodore said a few, but impressive words, though it was unnecessary; for, what other stimulant could true Americans want, than fighting gloriously in the sight of their native shore, where hundreds were assembled to witness the engagement? Wore ship to engage; but, at this moment, the cutter being discovered coming back, backed again to take in the pilot, the British 74 (strange as it must appear) making sail to the southward and eastward. Orders were given to haul aboard the main and fore tacks, to run in; there being then in sight from our deck a frigate and gun-brig. The commander of the 74 had it in his power, for five hours, to bring us at any moment to an engagement, our main topsail to the mast during that time.”\*

“It was,” adds the American writer who was so fortunate as to be favoured with a copy of this genuine American epistle, “afterwards ascertained, that the ship, which declined the battle with the President, was the Plantagenet 74, Captain Lloyd. The reason given by Captain Lloyd for avoiding an engagement was, that his crew were in a state of mutiny.” Another American historian says: “Captain Lloyd, after returning to England, accounted for his conduct by alleging a mutiny in his ship, and had several of his sailors tried and executed on that charge.”† We are here forcibly reminded of the old Munchausen story, where one man declares that he drove a nail through the moon, and his companion, determined both to back and to outdo him, swears he clenched it.

To Captain Lloyd's regret, even had the Constitution been in company with the President, the Plantagenet (whose crew was one of the finest and best disposed in the service), at noon on the 18th of February, the day on which this “strange” event happened, was in latitude 25° 27' north, longitude 43° 45' west, steering east-south-east, or towards Carlisle bay, Barbadoes. No: it was the British 38-gun frigate Loire, Captain Thomas Brown, that lay off the Hook. At 9 h. 40 m. A. M. the Loire first descried the President in the north-north-west, and, with the wind from the west-south-west, made all sail in chase; but at 10 h. 30 m., making out the President to be what she was, the Loire shortened sail and hauled to the wind. The fact is, that out of her complement of 352 men and boys, the Loire had 75 of her best men, including of course several officers and petty officers, absent in prizes; and, of the remaining 277, nearly 20 were boys, and about 40 too sick to attend their quarters: consequently, the effective crew of the Loire did not exceed 220 men. Had the Loire been fully manned, we may readily infer what course Captain Brown would have pursued; and, as his complement was ample, and he had been particular in exercising

\* Naval Monument, &c., p. 235.

† Sketches of the War, &c., p. 240.

his men at the guns, if the President, contrary to what her movements indicated, had waited to engage, Commodore Rodgers, in all probability, would have found the conquest of a British 18-pounder frigate, by an American 44, not so easy a task as he had been led to expect.

We formerly noticed the sailing, on the 27th of October, 1812, of the United States' 32-gun frigate *Essex*, Captain David Porter, from Delaware bay, on a cruise in the Pacific, conjointly with the *Constitution* and *Hornet*.\* Not finding either of these ships at the appointed rendezvous, Captain Porter resolved to proceed alone round Cape Horn; and on the 14th of March, 1813, having previously captured the British packet *Nocton* and taken out of her 11,000*l.* sterling in specie, the *Essex* arrived at Valparaiso, on the coast of Chili. Captain Porter here refitted and provisioned his frigate, and then cruised along the coast of Chili and Peru, and among the Gallapagos islands, until October; by which time he had captured 12 British whale-ships.

Having taken several American scamen out of a Peruvian corsair and decoyed several British seamen out of his prizes, Captain Porter armed and manned two of the whale-ships as cruisers. One of them, late the *Atlantic*, but newly named the *Essex-Junior*, was armed with 20 guns (10 long 6-pounders and ten 18-pounder carronades), and manned with a crew, officers included, of 95 men; and Lieutenant John Downes, who had the command of her, taking under his charge the *Hector*, *Catherine*, and *Montezuma*, proceeded with them to Valparaiso. On the return of the *Essex-Junior* from this service, the *Essex*, with the remaining three prizes (three having been sent to America, and two given up to the prisoners), steered for the island of *Nooaheevah*, one of the *Marquesas*. Here Captain Porter completely repaired the *Essex*; and, sailing thence on the 12th of December, in company with the *Essex-Junior*, returned, on or about the 12th of January, 1814, to Valparaiso.

On the 8th of February, at 7 A. M., the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Phœbe*, Captain James Hillyar, accompanied by the 18-gun ship-sloop *Cherub*, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, when standing in towards the harbour of Valparaiso, in quest of the *Essex* and the three ships which Captain Porter was represented to have armed, discovered the *Essex-Junior* off the port, and, shortly afterwards, the *Essex* herself and two of her three prizes, the *Montezuma* and *Hector*, at anchor within it. At 11 h. 15 m. A. M. Captain Hillyar spoke the *Essex*; and at 11 h. 30 m. the *Phœbe* and *Cherub* anchored at no great distance from her. The established force of the *Phœbe* was precisely what we supposed it to be in May, 1811;† but, profiting by the example of the *Arcton*, Captain Hillyar had since mounted one swivel in the fore-castle, two in the main, and one in the mizen top of the *Phœbe*,

See p. 126.

† See p. 21.

and had also fitted her 18-pounder boat-carronade, and another carronade, a 12-pounder, as broadside-guns. The force of the *Cherub* was 18 carronades, 32-pounders, on the main deck, and on the quarter-deck and fore-castle six carronades, 18-pounders, and two sixes. The 46 guns of the *Essex* have already been described.\*

On the 9th, at 9 A. M., Captain Porter began his attempts upon the loyalty of the *Phœbe's* seamen, by hoisting at his fore topgallantmast-head a white flag, with the motto, "FREE TRADE AND SAILORS' RIGHTS." This, in a little while, the *Phœbe* answered, with the *St. George's* ensign, and the motto, "GOD AND COUNTRY, BRITISH SAILORS' BEST RIGHTS: TRAITORS OFFEND BOTH." On this the crew of the *Essex* manned her rigging and gave three cheers, which the *Phœbe's* crew presently returned. On the 12th Captain Porter's motto mania returned, and the *Essex* hoisted a flag inscribed with the words, "GOD, OUR COUNTRY, AND LIBERTY: TYRANTS OFFEND THEM."

On the 15th, at 7 A. M., the *Essex-Junior* was towed out of the harbour. At 8 A. M. the *Phœbe* and *Cherub* weighed and stood after her; and at noon, finding she could not escape, the *Essex-Junior* returned to the anchorage, passing ahead of the *Phœbe* within pistol-shot. On the 23d, when the two British ships were cruising in the bay, the *Essex* weighed and stood out, but in about an hour resumed her station in the harbour. On the 25th Captain Porter had his prize, the *Hector*, towed out to sea and set fire to. On the 27th, at about 6 h. 45 m. P. M., when the *Phœbe* was about four miles west-north-west of the anchorage, and the *Cherub* about six miles north by west of her, the *Essex* and *Essex-Junior* got under way with a light breeze from the westward, and stood out towards the British frigate. On seeing them approach, the *Phœbe* backed her main topsail and hoisted her colours. At this moment, by a mere accident as it appears, a gun went off from the *Phœbe's* windward side. This was at once interpreted by Captain Porter into a challenge. At 7 h. 20 m. P. M., as the *Phœbe* was in the act of wearing to bring her starboard guns to bear, the *Essex* and *Essex-Junior* hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, and the former fired one gun to windward. Soon after this little flourish, Captain Porter and his lieutenant stood for the anchorage, followed by Captain Hillyar under all sail.

Beyond a second attempt of the *Essex-Junior* to escape, made and frustrated on the 3d of March, nothing further of consequence happened until the 28th of the month, when the *Essex* put in practice a well-concerted plan for freeing herself from the further annoyance of her watchful enemy. It was the intention of Captain Porter, as he himself states, to allow the *Phœbe* and *Cherub* to chase the *Essex* out of the bay, in order to afford to

\* See p. 85.

the *Essex-Junior* the opportunity of getting to sea; and, if the plan succeeded, the two American ships were to effect their junction at the Marquesas. The wind being, as it usually is, to the southward, any scheme that would draw the two British ships to the north-east or the lee side of the bay, could not fail to favour the escape of the two American ships. Accordingly, from about midnight to past 1 A. M. on the 28th, a quantity of blue-lights and rockets were burnt and thrown up in the north-east and in the north. The *Phœbe* and *Cherub*, as may be supposed, chased in those directions; but, finding no answer returned to the lights they each hoisted, the two captains suspected who were the makers of the signals, and again hauled to the wind. Daylight found the *Essex* and *Essex-Junior* at their moorings, and the two British ships rather too close to the port, to justify the American ships in attempting their escape.

A fresh south-south-east wind now blew, and so increased towards 3 P. M., that the *Essex* parted her larboard cable, and dragged her starboard anchor out to sea. Sail was presently set upon the ship; and seeing a prospect of passing to windward of his two opponents, Captain Porter began to chuckle at his good fortune in having been blown out of the harbour. Just, however, as the *Essex* was rounding the point at the west end of the bay, the accomplishment of which would have set Captain Porter free, a heavy squall struck the ship and carried away her main topmast. The *Essex* now bore up, followed by both British ships, and at 3 h. 40 m. anchored within half a mile of the shore, in a small bay about a mile to the eastward of Point Caleta. The *Essex* then hoisted one motto-flag at the fore, and another at the mizen, topgallantmast-head, and one American ensign at the mizen peak, and lashed a second in the main rigging. Not to be outdone in decorations, the two British ships hoisted their motto-flags, with a handsome display of ensigns and union-jacks.

At 4 P. M., when the *Phœbe* was standing towards the starboard quarter of the *Essex*, at about a mile distant, a squall from the land caused the ship to break off, and prevented her from passing, as had been Captain Hillyar's intention, close under the American frigate's stern. At 4 h. 10 m., having fetched the near as the wind would permit, the *Phœbe* commenced firing her starboard guns, but with very little effect owing to the great distance. In five minutes more the *Cherub*, who lay on the *Phœbe*'s starboard quarter, opened her fire; the *Essex* returning the fire of both ships with three long 12-pounders run out of her stern ports. At 4 h. 30 m. P. M. the two British ships, being very near the shore, ceased firing, and wore round on the larboard tack. While the *Phœbe* was wearing, a shot from the *Essex* passed through several folds of her mainsail as it hung in the clew-garnets, and prevented it from being reset in the strong wind which was then blowing. Her jib-boom was also badly wounded,



and her fore, main, and mizen stays shot away. Having, besides increasing her distance by wearing, lost the use of her jib, main-sail, and main stay, the *Phœbe* was now at too great a distance to fire more than one or two random shot. At 4 h. 40 m. the *Phœbe* tacked towards the *Essex*; and Captain Hillyar soon afterwards informed Captain Tucker, by hailing, that it was his intention to anchor, but that the *Cherub* must keep under way.

On closing the *Essex* at 5 h. 35 m., the *Phœbe* recommenced a fire from her bow guns; which was returned by the former, the weather at this time nearly calm. In about 20 minutes the *Essex* hoisted her flying jib, cut her cable, and, under her fore-sail and fore topsail, endeavoured to run on shore. This exposed her to a tolerably warm carronade from the *Phœbe*; but the *Cherub*, owing to the baffling winds, was not able to get near. Just as the *Essex* had approached the shore within musket-shot, the wind shifted from the land, and paid her head down upon the *Phœbe*. That not being a course very desirable to Captain Porter, the *Essex* let go an anchor, and came to within about three quarters of a mile of the shore.

The object now was to get the specie and other valuables in the ship removed on shore; and, as the boats of the *Essex* had been nearly all destroyed, it was considered fortunate that Lieutenant Downes was present with the three boats from the *Essex-Junior*. A portion of the British subjects belonging to the crew took this opportunity of effecting their escape; and others, alarmed by Captain Porter's report that "flames were bursting up each hatchway," flames of which not a trace could afterwards be discovered, leaped overboard to endeavour to reach the shore. In the midst of all this confusion, at about 6 h. 20 m. P. M., the *Essex* hauled down her numerous flags, and was taken possession of just in time to save the lives of 16 of her men, who were struggling in the waves: 31 appear to have perished, and between 80 and 40 to have reached the shore.

The damages of the *Phœbe* were trifling. She had received seven 32-pound shot between wind and water, and one 12-pound shot about three feet under water. Her main and mizen masts, and her sails and rigging, were rather seriously injured. Out of her crew of 278 men, and 22 boys, total 300, the *Phœbe* had her first lieutenant (William Ingram) and three seamen killed, four seamen and marines severely, and three slightly wounded. The *Cherub's* larboard foretopsail sheet was shot away, and replaced in five minutes: several of her lower shrouds were cut through, also the main topmast-stay, and most of the running rigging; and three or four shot struck her hull. One marine killed, her commander severely, and two marines slightly wounded, was all the loss which that ship sustained; making the total loss on the British side five killed and 10 wounded. When the *Essex* was boarded by the British officers, buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck, and most of the

prisoners were in a state of intoxication. This decided proof, that "American sailors want no grog," accounts for the *Phoebe* and *Cherub* having sustained their principal injury during the first three broadsides. Afterwards, the firing of the *Essex* became very irregular; and nearly all her shot went over the British ships.

The damages of the *Essex* were confined to her upperworks, masts, and rigging. "The battered state of the *Essex*," says Captain Porter, "will, I believe, prevent her ever reaching England." There is strong reason to believe that the greater part of the *Essex*-Junior's crew came on board the *Essex*, and returned when the colours were about to be struck; but we shall consider the American frigate to have commenced action with only 260 men, and five lads or boys. Out of this number, the *Essex*, as far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned), had 24 men killed, including one lieutenant, and 45 wounded, including two acting lieutenants and the master. But Captain Porter, thinking by exaggerating his loss, both to prop up his fame and account for the absentees of his crew at the surrender, talks of 58 killed and mortally wounded, 39 wounded severely, and 27 slightly. How then did it happen, that 28 dead (Lieutenant Wilmer had been previously knocked overboard and drowned) were all that were found on board the *Essex*, or that were reported as killed to the British? As only 42 wounded were found in the *Essex*, and only three were acknowledged to have been taken away by Lieutenant Domes, what became of the remaining 21? The loss, too, as we have given it, is quite as much as from the damages of the *Essex* one might suppose that she had sustained. But it is Captain Porter, the author of the "Journal of a Cruise into the Pacific, &c.," who has made these extraordinary statements; therefore, no more need be said about them.

For having done what was done, no merit is claimed by the two British captains. They had heard so much of American prowess, that they expected little short of being blown out of the water; and yet, after the *Essex* had struck, the *Phoebe*, without the assistance of the *Cherub*, was ready to tackle with another American frigate of the same force. On the 31st of May the *Phoebe* and *Essex*, the latter commanded by Lieutenant Charles Pearson, set sail for England; and on the 13th of November, having stopped some time at Rio-Janeiro, the two ships anchored in Plymouth sound. Lieutenant Pearson was immediately promoted to the rank of commander.

Let us now endeavour to trace what became of the 12 whaleships captured by the *Essex*. On the 25th of July, 1813, Captain Porter despatched home the *Georgiana* armed with 16 guns, manned with a lieutenant and about 40 men, and laden with a full cargo of spermaceti oil, which would be worth, in the United States, about 100,000 dollars. She was captured in the

West Indies, by the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Barossa*. The *Phoebe*, taken also with a full cargo of oil, was retaken by the *Essex* frigate; and the *Essex*, her leader, having on board "All the oil of the other prizes," by the *Belvina*. The *Essex* and *Charlton* were given up to the prisoners. The *Montezuma*, it is believed, was sold at Valparaiso. The *Hector* and *Catherine*, with their cargoes, were burnt at sea. The *Atlantic*, afterwards called the *Essex-Junior*, was disarmed by the orders of Captain Hillyar, and sent to America as a cartel. The *Sir Andrew Hammond* was retaken by the *Cherub*; the *Greenwich*, burnt by the orders of the American officer in charge of her, and the *Seingspatang*, taken possession of by her American crew. The mutineers carried her to New South-Wales; whence she was brought to England, and delivered up to her owners, on payment of salvage. Thus have we the end of all the "prizes taken by the *Essex*, in the Pacific, valued at 250,000 dollars;" and, as another item on the debit side of Captain Porter's account, the *Essex* herself became transferred to the British navy.

At the risk of being charged with impiety, we must express a wish that, instead of announcing his success in the words: "It pleased the Almighty Disposer of events to bless the efforts of my gallant companions, and my personal, very humble ones, with victory," Captain Hillyar had stated, in a plain manner, the surrender of the *Essex*, and left the public to judge, by what means, others than the well-directed 18-pounders of the *Phoebe*, the comparatively unimportant event had been brought about. It was only a few months before, that an American commander announced his success over a Lilliputian British fleet on Lake Erie, in the following words: "It has pleased the Almighty to give to the arms of the United States a signal victory over their enemies on this lake." We remember, also, when looking over the log-books of British ships, and some hundreds have passed under our inspection, once coming to the words, "Mustered the crew and read prayers for the victory." And what was the "victory"? Why, the success of three ships over one, and that not until after the sacrifice of nearly 100 lives. In our view of the matter, appeals to the Deity on such occasions of blood and carnage are, to say the least of them, quite at variance with the spirit of true religion.

The best part of Captain Hillyar's public letter is, we think, the following passage: "The defence of the *Essex*, taking into consideration our superiority of force, the very discouraging circumstance of her having lost her main topmast, and being twice on fire, did honour to her brave defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter, and those under his command. Her colours were not struck, until the loss in killed and wounded was so awfully great, and her shattered condition so seriously bad, as to render further resistance unavailing." Captain Hillyar penned this encomium two days after the action, and

nothing could better evince the goodness of his heart; but he soon found that he had praised the unworthy. As one proof among many that could be adduced, Captain Porter, in a letter dated in July, accuses Captain Hillyar of acting towards him with "perfidy." Yet the conduct of this same slanderer of a gallant British officer, of this same Captain David Porter, of whom few in his own country will venture to speak well, is declared by our contemporary to have been "perfectly honourable."\*

Early in the month of February the first launched of the American "18-gun" ship-sloops, of which we formerly gave some account,† the Frolic, commanded by master-commandant Joseph Bainbridge, sailed from Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On the 20th of April, at daylight, latitude 24° 12' north, longitude 81° 25' west, the Frolic fell in with the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Orpheus, Captain Hugh Pigot, and 12-gun schooner Shelburne, Lieutenant David Hope. When the chase commenced, both British ships were to leeward; but, in an hour or two, the schooner weathered the American ship. At a few minutes past noon the Orpheus, then on the Frolic's lee quarter, standing upon the opposite tack, fired two shot, both of which fell short. However, they produced as good an effect as if they had struck the American ship between wind and water; and, in about half an hour, just as the Shelburne was closing her, down went the "star-spangled banner" and its stripes from the Frolic's mizen peak. As soon as the Orpheus, who was but an indifferent sailer, could get near enough to take possession of her, this fine American sloop of war was found with 171 officers and men, all "high-minded Americans," on board.

According to the report of the British officers, this gentle surrender was attended with a circumstance in other respects disgraceful to the Frolic's officers and crew. The locks of the great guns were broken, and the muskets, pistols, pikes, swords, bar and chain shot, &c., were thrown overboard, together with the pendant that was struck! A Nassau paper of the 25th of April, adds: "The purser's store-room was next sacked; then the men got into the gun-room and the captain's cabin, and pillaged them. In short, the ship we are told, bore the semblance of a town given up to the pillage of soldiery." Perhaps these gentlemen were determined that as their ship had not behaved like a man of war, they would destroy all appearance of her having been one.

We should not have hesitated to call a French, or even a British captain, who had acted as master-commandant Joseph Bainbridge of the United States' navy did in this instance act, a ———; but we will not again soil our pages with a name that, in the few instances in which it occurs, has not, we trust, been

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 161.

† See p. 148.

wrongfully applied. The court of inquiry, which sat upon the Frolic's loss, "honourably acquitted" the officers and crew. One excuse was, that the lee guns of the American ship had been thrown overboard. So they were, but not until long after the Orpheus had begun chasing her. Captain Bainbridge might as well have urged, that he had no locks, pistols, &c., because he and his crew had destroyed and thrown them overboard just before possession was taken.

The master-commandant, who performed this exploit, is the brother of the commodore, who did so much for the national glory by capturing the Java; and, from his great interest (a sway that even republics can feel), the former is now a captain. Let, then, Captain Joseph Bainbridge, if the subject be not a sickening one to him, turn over these pages, and count how many instances he can find of conduct like his own. Enough of such a character: suffice it, that the British became possessed, at an easy rate, of a finer 22-gun ship than any they had previously owned; a vessel with excellent quarters, and of extraordinary large scantling. The Frolic, or Florida, as she was newly named, came into British possession very opportunely for elucidating the merits of the three actions which we have next to record.

On the 23d of February the British 18-gun brig-sloop Epervier, Captain Richard Walter Wales (sixteen 32, and two 18-pounder\* carronades), cruising off Cape Sable, captured, without opposition, the American privateer-brig Alfred, of Salem, mounting 16 long 9-pounders, and manned with 108 men; the British 38-gun frigate Junon, Captain Clotworthy Upton, in sight about 10 miles to leeward. On his way to Halifax with his prize, Captain Wales discovered that a part of his crew had conspired with the late crew of the Alfred, to rise upon the British officers, and carry one vessel, if not both, into a port of the United States. As the readiest mode to frustrate the plan, Captain Wales persevered against a gale of wind, and on the 25th arrived at Halifax. He immediately represented to the commanding officer of the port, the insufficiency of the Epervier's crew for any service; and, in particular, expressed his doubts about their loyalty, from the plot in which they had recently been engaged. However, the affair was treated lightly; and on the 3d of March the Epervier, without a man of her crew being changed, sailed, in company with the Shelburne schooner, for the "protection" of a small convoy bound to Bermuda and the West Indies.

Having reached her outward destination in safety, the Epervier, on the 14th of April, sailed from Port-Royal, Jamaica, on her return to Halifax; and, as if the reputation of her officers

\* These Captain Wales had taken on board at Halifax, in lieu of the two long sixes and launch-carronade.

and of the flag she bore was not enough for such a crew as the *Epervier's* to be intrusted with, the brig took on board at Havana, where she afterwards called, 118,000 dollars in specie. On the 25th of April the *Epervier* sailed from Havana, in company with one of the vessels, an hermaphrodite brig bound to Bermuda, which she had convoyed from Port-Royal. On the 29th, at about 7 h. 30 m. A. M., latitude  $27^{\circ} 47'$  north, longitude  $80^{\circ} 7'$  west, a ship under Russian colours, from Havana bound to Boston, joined the *Epervier*, then steering north by east, with the wind about east-south-east. Shortly afterwards a large ship was discovered in the south-west, apparently in chase of the convoy. At 9 A. M. the *Epervier* hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, so as to keep between her convoy and the stranger; whom we may at once introduce as the United-States' ship-sloop *Peacock*, of 20 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 18s, Captain Lewis Warrington, from New-York since the 12th of March.

No answer being returned to the brig's signals, the English ensign and pendant flying on board the *Peacock* did not remove the suspicions of her being an enemy; and accordingly the *Epervier* made the signal to that effect to her convoy. At 9 h. 40 m. A. M. the *Peacock*, who had approached rapidly on account of the wind having veered to the southward, hauled down the English colours, and hoisted the American flag at almost every mast and stay. At 10 A. M., when within half gun-shot of the *Epervier*, the *Peacock* edged away, as if to bring her broadside to bear in a raking position. This the brig evaded by putting her helm up, until close on the *Peacock's* bow, when she rounded to and fired her starboard guns. With this their first discharge, the three aftermost carronades became unshipped by the fighting-bolts giving way. The guns, however, were soon replaced; and, having, when she got abaft the beam of her opponent, tacked and shortened sail, the *Epervier* received the broadside of the *Peacock*, as the latter kept away with the wind on the larboard beam. Although the first fire of the American ship produced no material effect, a continued discharge of star and bar shot cut away the rigging and sails of the brig, and completely dismantled her. Just as the *Epervier*, by a well-directed fire, had brought down her opponent's fore yard, several of the carronades on the larboard side behaved as those on the starboard side had done, and continued to upset, as often as they were replaced and discharged.

In the midst of this confusion, the main boom, having been shot away, fell upon the wheel, and the *Epervier*, having had her head-sails all cut to pieces, became thrown into a position to be raked; but, fortunately for the brig, the *Peacock* had too much head-way, to rake her with more than two or three shot. Having by this time shot away the brig's main topmast, and rendered her completely unmanageable, the *Peacock* directed

the whole of her fire at her opponent's hull, and presently reduced the *Epervier's* three waist guns to the disabled state of the others. At 11 A. M., as if the defects in the fighting-bolts were not a sufficient disaster, the breeching-bolts began to draw. There being no immediate remedy here, an effort was made to get the brig round, in order to present a fresh broadside to the enemy; but it was found impracticable, without falling on board the *Peacock*.

As a last resource, and one which British seamen are generally prompt to execute, Captain Wales called the crew aft, to follow him in boarding; but these gentlemen declined a measure so fraught with danger. The *Epervier* having now one gun only wherewith to return the fire of the 11 guns of her antagonist; being already with four feet and a half water in her hold, and her crew falling fast beneath the heavy and unremitting fire of the *Peacock*, no alternative remained but to strike the colours, to save the lives of the few remaining good men in the vessel. This was done at 11 h. 5 m. A. M., after the firing had lasted an hour; during three quarters of which the vessels lay close together, and during more than half of which, owing to the defects in the brig's armament, the successful party had it all to himself.

Besides the damages already detailed, the *Epervier* had her fore rigging and stays shot away, her bowsprit badly wounded, and her foremast cut nearly in two and left tottering, and which nothing but the smoothness of the water saved from falling. Her hull, as may be imagined, was pierced with shot-holes on the engaged or larboard side, both above and below water. The brig's loss, out of a crew of 101 men and a passenger, and 16 boys, amounted to eight killed and mortally wounded, and 15 wounded severely and slightly, including among the former her very gallant first lieutenant, John Hackett; who, about the middle of the action, had his left arm shattered, and received a severe splinter-wound in the hip, but who yet would hardly suffer himself to be carried below. Captain Warrington states, we believe with truth, that the *Peacock's* principal injury was the wound in her fore yard. Not a shot, by his account, struck the ship's hull; and her loss, in consequence, out of a crew of 185 picked seamen, without a boy among them, amounted to only two men wounded, neither of them dangerously.

A statement of comparative force would, in this case, be next to a nullity; as how could we, with any show of reason, confront eight carronades that overset the moment they were fired, with 10 carronades that remained firm in their places to the last. For any damage that such a vessel as the *Epervier* could have done to her, the *Peacock* might almost as well have fought with the unarmed Russian ship that had just quitted the former's company, and then have boasted, as Captain Warrington did,

how many shot the Peacock placed in her antagonist's hull, and how free from any she escaped in her own.

At the time she engaged the Peacock, the Epervier had but three men in a watch, exclusively of petty officers, able to take helm or lead; and two of her men were each 70 years of age! She had some blacks, several other foreigners, lots of disaffected, and few even of ordinary stature: in short, the crew of the Epervier was a disgrace to the deck of a British man of war. Had, instead of this, the Epervier been manned with a crew of choice seamen, equal in personal appearance to those received out of the Chesapeake and Argus, after they had been respectively carried by boarding, we might have some faith in Captain Porter's assertion, that British seamen were not so brave as they had been represented. But, shall we take the Epervier's crew as a sample of British seamen? As well might we judge of the moral character of a nation by the inmates of her jails, or take the first deformed object we meet, as the standard of the size and shape of her people.

We must be allowed to say that, had the Epervier's carronades been previously fired in exercise, for any length of time together, the defect in the clinching of her breeching-bolts, a defect common to the vessels of this and the smaller classes, nearly all of them being contract-built, would have been discovered, and perhaps remedied. Even one or two discharges would have shown the insufficiency of the fighting-bolts. We doubt, however, if any teaching at the guns could have amended the Epervier's crew: the men wanted, what nature alone could give them, the hearts of Britons.

On the 28th of June, at daylight, latitude  $68^{\circ} 36'$  north, longitude  $11^{\circ} 15'$  west, the British 18-gun brig-sloop Reindeer, Captain William Manners, steering with a light breeze from the north-east, discovered and chased in the west-south-west the United States' ship-sloop Wasp, Captain Johnston Blakeley. The latter was the sister-ship to the Peacock and armed every way the same. The Reindeer, built of fir in 1802, was a sister-brig to the Epervier, but not so heavily armed, having, on account of her age and weakness, exchanged her 32-pounder carronades for 24-pounders; 16 of which, with two sixes and a 12-pounder boat-carronade, formed her present armament.

By 1 P. M. the two vessels had approximated near enough to ascertain that each was an enemy; and, while one manœuvred to gain, the other manœuvred to keep, the weathergage. At 2 P. M. the Wasp hoisted her colours, and fired a gun to windward; and immediately the Reindeer, whose colours had been previously hoisted, fired a gun also to windward, as an answer to the challenge. At 3 h. 15 m. P. M., being distant about 60 yards on the Wasp's starboard and weather quarter, the Reindeer opened a fire from her boat-carronade mounted upon the top-



gallant fore-castle. This she repeated four times; when at 3 h. 26 m., putting her helm a-lee, the Wasp luffed up and commenced the action with the after carronade and the others in succession. The Reindeer returned the fire with spirit, and a close and furious engagement ensued.

After the mutual cannonade had lasted about half an hour, the Reindeer, owing to her disabled state, fell with her bow against the larboard quarter of the Wasp. The latter immediately raked her with dreadful effect; and the American riflemen in the tops picked off the British officers and men in every part of the deck. It was now that Captain Manners showed himself a hero. The calves of his legs had been partly shot away early in the action; yet did he keep the deck, encouraging his crew, and animating, by his example, the few officers remaining on board. A grape or canister shot passed through both his thighs: he fell on his knees, but quickly sprang up; and, although bleeding profusely, resolutely refused to quit the deck. Perceiving at this time the dreadful slaughter which the musketry in the Wasp's tops was causing among his crew, this gallant young officer called out to them, "Follow me, my boys, we must board." While with that object in view climbing into the Reindeer's rigging, two balls from the Wasp's main top penetrated his skull, and came out beneath his chin. Placing one hand on his forehead, and with the other convulsively brandishing his sword, he exclaimed, "O God!" and dropped lifeless on his own deck!

To live with fame

The gods allow to many; but to die

With equal lustre is a blessing Heaven

Selects from all the choicest boons of fate,

And with a sparing hand on few bestows.—*Glover.*

Having lost, besides her captain, nearly the whole of her officers and more than half her men, the Reindeer was wholly unable to oppose the Wasp's overwhelming numbers. Accordingly, at about 4 p. m., the American crew rushed on board, and received possession of their hard-earned trophy from Mr. Richard Collins, the captain's clerk, the senior officer alive on deck.

In a line with her ports, the Reindeer was literally cut to pieces: her upperworks, boats and spare spars were one complete wreck. Her masts were both badly wounded; particularly her foremast, which was left in a tottering state. Out of her crew of 98 men and 20 boys, the brig had her commander, purser (John Thomas Barton), and 23 petty officers, seamen, and marines killed, her first and only lieutenant on board (Thomas Chambers), one master's mate (Matthew Mitchell), one midshipman (Henry Hardiman), her boatswain (all badly), and 37 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded; total, 25 killed, and 42 wounded, 27 of the number dangerously and severely. One of the men was wounded in the head by a ramrod; which,

before it could be extracted, required to be sawed off close to the skull. The man, notwithstanding, recovered. After receiving this desperate wound, he, like his gallant chief, refused to go below; saying to those who begged him to leave his gun: "If all the wounded of the Reindeer were as well able to fight as I am, we should soon make the American strike."

The sails and rigging of the Wasp were a good deal cut. "Six round shot and many grape," Captain Blakeley says, struck her hull. We should imagine, from the Wasp's acknowledged loss, that a few more had either perforated her thick sides or entered at her port-holes. One 24-pound shot passed through the centre of the foremast: and yet it stood: a tolerable proof of its large dimensions. Out of 173 men and two boys in complement, the Wasp had two midshipmen and nine seamen and marines killed and mortally wounded, and 15 petty officers, seamen, and marines wounded severely and slightly. Doubtless, a great part of the Wasp's loss arose from the determined efforts of the Reindeer's crew to board; but how, taking the relative numbers as they at first stood, could 98 men succeed against 173?

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		REINDEER.	WASP
Broadside-guns . . . . .	{ No.	9	11
	{ lbs.	198	338
Crew (men only) . . . . .	No.	98	173
Size . . . . .	tons	385	539

Notwithstanding this decided disparity of force, the weaker party was the assailant; nor can the British commander be accused of rashness, both vessels being "sloops of war." The force employed by the Wasp, stationed upon a floating body, varying a trifle in construction, would have entitled the Reindeer to seek her safety in flight. But, had she run from the Wasp, Mr. Madison would have exulted as much, in announcing that a British ship had been chased, as captured, 'y an American ship "of the same class;" and even Britons would have considered the act as a stigma upon the national character. This may be pronounced one of the best-fought sloop-actions of the war. The British crew had long served together, and Captain Manners was the idol and delight of his men. They were called the pride of Plymouth. Gallant souls! they wanted but as many more like themselves as would have brought them in number within a fourth of their opponents; and the Americans would have had to rue the day that the Wasp encountered the Reindeer.

On the 29th, in the afternoon, on a breeze springing up, the foremast of the prize went by the board; and on the same evening, finding the Reindeer too much shattered to keep the sea, and too old and worthless, had she been otherwise, to be

worth carrying into port, Captain Blakeley set fire to and destroyed her. The *Wasp* then steered for Lorient, to refit and renovate her crew, and on the 8th of July anchored in that port.

It will appear surprising, that an action so pregnant with circumstances calculated to excite the sympathy of the brave of all nations, an action in the conduct of it from first to last, so highly honourable to the character of the British navy, as that of the *Reindeer* and *Wasp*, should be altogether omitted by an English naval historian; by a writer, especially, who claims the honour to belong to that very profession of which the gallant *Manners* was a member. But every friend to the memory of the youthful hero, every well-wisher to the cause of the British navy, will rejoice to find, that Captain Brenton has not even glanced at the action of the *Reindeer* and *Wasp*, when he discovers that, in the *Avon's* case (to which we shall come presently), the *Wasp* is described as a "brig, mounting eighteen 32-pounder carronades and two sixes, with 140 men.\*" Recollecting the mistake about the force of the *Peacock*, the *Hornet's* opponent,† we have not a doubt that Captain Brenton would have made a similar mistake respecting the *Reindeer*; and then, what with underrating the force on one side, and overrating it on the other, the merits of the action would have been entirely changed.

On the 27th of August the *Wasp*, thoroughly refitted and manned, sailed from Lorient to resume her cruise; and on the 1st of September, at 7 p. m., latitude 30° north, longitude 11° west, going free on the starboard tack, with the wind at south-east, Captain Blakeley fell in with the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Avon* (sixteen 32-pounder carronades and two sixes), Captain the Honourable James Arbuthnot, nearly ahead, steering about south-west. At 7 h. 34 m. p. m. the *Avon* made night-signals to the *Wasp*; which the latter at 8 p. m. answered with a blue-light on the fore-castle. At 8 h. 38 m. the *Avon* fired a shot from her stern-chase gun; and still running on to the south-west, fired a second shot from her starboard and lee side. At 9 h. 20 m., being then on the weather quarter of the *Avon*, the *Wasp* was hailed by the latter, "What ship is that?" and answered by the question, "What brig is that?" The *Avon* replied with her name, but it was not heard on board the *Wasp*. The former again asked, "What ship is that?" and was told to heave to and she would be informed. The question was repeated, and answered to the same effect. An American officer then went forward on the *Wasp's* fore-castle, and ordered the *Avon* to heave to; but the latter declined doing so, and at 9 h. 25 m. p. m. set her larboard foretopmast studding-sail.

At 9 h. 26 m. p. m. the *Wasp* fired her 12-pounder carronade: whereupon the *Avon* commenced the action by a discharge from

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 141.

† See p. 195.

her larboard guns. The Wasp then kept away, and, running under the brig's lee, at 9 h. 29 m., opened her broadside. Almost the first fire from the American ship, consisting of star and bar shot, cut away, with other parts of her rigging, the slings of the brig's gaff; and, on the immediate fall of the latter, the boom-mainsail covered the quarterdeck guns on the side engaged, the only ones that would at this time bear. Shortly afterwards the brig's mainmast fell by the board. Thus rendered completely unmanageable, the Avon lost all advantage to be derived from manœuvring; and, what with the wreck lying upon some of her guns, and the upsetting of others from the usual defects in their fastenings, the brig could make little or no return to the animated fire maintained by the Wasp; who, on this occasion (recollecting what she had lately suffered by allowing the British an opportunity to board), fought much more warily than in her action with the Reindeer.

At 10 h. 12 m. P. M., according to Captain Blakeley's minutes, but at a time much nearer 11 P. M., as will presently be proved, the Wasp hailed the Avon, to know if she had surrendered, and received an answer in the affirmative. When, says Captain Blakeley, "on the eve of taking possession," the Wasp discovered "a sail close on board of her." This sail was the British 18-gun brig-sloop Castilian (same force as Avon), Captain David Braimer. It was exactly at 11 P. M. that the Castilian came near enough to ascertain that one vessel was a dismasted brig (supposed to be the Avon), and the other a ship. The Castilian immediately chased the Wasp, then without either light or ensign. After having hailed several times without effect, the Castilian, at 11 h. 40 m. P. M., fired her lee guns into, or rather, as it proved, over, the weather quarter of the Wasp; who, although this second opponent had only cut away her lower main cross-trees and damaged her rigging, did not return a shot, but made all sail before the wind.

Repeated signals of distress having by this time been made by the Avon, the Castilian tacked and stood towards her; and on closing, at 11 h. 55 m., Captain Braimer was informed by Captain Arbuthnot, that the Avon was sinking fast. The Castilian immediately hoisted out her boats to save the people; and at 1 A. M. on the 2d, just as the last boat had pushed off from the Avon, the British brig went down: an irrefragable proof, that she had not surrendered until every hope of success or escape had vanished. Hoisting in her boats, the Castilian filled and made sail to the north-east, in search of the Wasp; but the latter had already run out of sight. As a reason for this, Captain Blakeley has alleged that he discovered two other vessels, besides the Castilian, in chase of him.

Out of her 104 men and 13 boys, the Avon lost her first lieutenant (John Prendergrast) and nine seamen, and (marines killed and mortally wounded, her commander, second

lieutenant (John Harvey), one midshipman (John Travers), and 29 seamen and marines wounded severely and slightly. According to Captain Blakeley, the *Wasp* received only four round shot in her hull, and, out of her acknowledged complement of 173 men, had but two killed and one wounded. The gallantry of the *Avon's* officers and crew cannot, for a moment, be questioned; but the gunnery of the latter appears to have been not a whit better than, to the discredit of the British navy, had frequently before been displayed in combats of this kind. Nor, from the specimen given by the *Castilian*, is it likely that she would have performed any better.

The *Wasp*, unfortunately for her brave officers and crew, never reached a port of the United States: she foundered, as is supposed, between the 15th, when she was off Madeira, and the end, of September. To the merit justly due to the captain of the *Wasp*, for his conduct in his two successful actions, America must be contented to divide her claim; as Captain Blakeley was a native of Dublin, and, with some English and Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to have in his crew a great many Irish. The construction of so fine a ship as the *Wasp*, and the equipment of her as an effective man of war, is that part of the merit, and no small part either, which belongs exclusively to the United States.

On the 12th of July the British cutter *Landrail*, of four 12-pounder carronades and 19 men and boys, commanded by Lieutenant Robert Daniel Lancaster, in her way across the British Channel with despatches, was chased by the American privateer schooner *Syren*; and maintained with her a running fight of one hour and 10 minutes, and a close action, within pistol-shot, of 40 minutes, in all two hours. The *Landrail* then surrendered, with the loss of seven men wounded. Her sails were riddled with shot-holes, and her hull much struck. The *Syren*, whose force was one long 18-pounder on a travelling carriage, four long 6-pounders and two 18-pounder carronades, with a crew of 75 men, had three men killed, and 15 wounded, including some of her principal officers; a tolerable proof of the execution that may be done by two 12-pounder carronades, if well pointed. The action certainly reflects great credit on Lieutenant Lancaster and his ship's company, or rather, his boat's crew.

Although the *Landrail* had not even room for another gun beyond the four she mounted, the American historians, in the first instance, gave her 10 guns, and afterwards, by way of amending their statement, 8 guns; at which the *Landrail* now stands in their prize-lists. The *Landrail* was recaptured on her way to the United States, and carried into Halifax, Nova-Scotia: consequently her valuable services as a cruiser were not lost to the British navy.

Much about the time that the *Landrail* encountered the *Syren*, the *Ballahou* of the same class as the former, but rigged

as a schooner, and commanded by Lieutenant Norfolk King, fell in with the American privateer schooner Perry, and, after a chase of 60 minutes, 10 of which they closely engaged, was captured. It is not known what loss was sustained on either side. The prize was carried into Wilmington, North-Carolina. The Ballahou's original armament consisted of four carronades, 12-pounders; but, according to the American papers, two only were mounted, the remaining two having been placed in the hold on account of bad weather. Her complement, admitting all to have been on board, was 20 men and boys. In an American prize-list now lying before us, the Ballahou appears with 10 guns. The Perry mounted five guns, one, a long 18 or 24 pounder, upon a pivot, and had a complement of 80 men. The Landrail and Ballahou were each under 76 tons; the Syren and Perry of at least 180 tons each.

After 15 or 16 precious months had been wasted in the experiment, the British government discovered that Admiral Sir John Warren was too old and infirm to carry on the war, as it ought to be carried on, against the Americans. Sir John was therefore recalled, and in the summer of 1814 Vice-admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane arrived at Bermuda to take the command on the coast of North-America. During the preceding winter the command of the British forces in the Chesapeake had been intrusted to Captain Robert Barrie, of the 74-gun ship *Dragon*. In the latter end of May Rear-admiral Cockburn in the 74-gun ship *Albion* (into which he had shifted his flag from the *Sceptre*), Captain Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross, arrived in the bay and relieved Captain Barrie. The first operation of any importance in the bay of Chesapeake, after Rear-admiral Cockburn's arrival, was an attack upon a strong American flotilla fitted out at Baltimore, and intrusted to the command of a brave officer of the revolutionary war, Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland. This flotilla consisted of the commodore's vessel, the *Scorpion* sloop, mounting eight carronades and a heavy long gun upon a traversing carriage, and 16 gun-boats, with one long gun in the bow and another in the stern, the largest of the vessels carrying 32-pounders and 60 men, and the smallest, 18-pounders and 40 men.

The first sight gained of this flotilla, by the British, was on the 1st of June, when it was proceeding from Baltimore, past the mouth of the river Patuxent, to "scour the bay." The British vessels consisted of the *St.-Lawrence* schooner, of 13 guns, and 55 men, and the boats, in number seven, of the *Albion* and *Dragon*, under the command of Captain Barrie. The Americans had the honour of seeing this trifling force retreat before them to the *Dragon*, then at anchor off Smith's point. That ship got under way, and, with the schooner and the boats, proceeded in chase; but the shallowness of the water shortly compelled the *Dragon* to reanchor. In the mean time the flotilla had run

for shelter into the Patuxent. By way of inducing Commodore Barney to separate his force, Captain Barrie now detached two boats to cut off a schooner under Cove point; but, not considering that his orders to give protection warranted such a risk, Commodore Barney allowed the vessel to be burnt in his sight.

On the 6th the flotilla retreated higher up the Patuxent: and, being joined on the day following by the 38-gun frigate Loire, Captain Thomas Brown, and 18-gun brig-sloop Jasseur, Captain George Edward Watts, Captain Barrie proceeded up the river with them, the St.-Lawrence, and the boats of the two 74s. The flotilla retreated about two miles up St.-Leonard's creek, where it could be reached by boats only; but the force of the latter was not equal to the attack. Captain Barrie endeavoured, however, by a discharge of rockets and carronades from the boats, to provoke the American vessels, which were moored in a close line abreast across the channel, to come down within reach of the guns of the ship, brig, and schooner, at anchor near the mouth of the creek. At one time the American flotilla got under way, and chased the boats to a short distance, and then returned to their moorings. With a view to force the flotilla to quit its station, detachments of seamen and marines were landed on both sides of the river, and the American militia, estimated at 300 or 400, retreated before them to the woods. The marines destroyed two tobacco-stores, and several houses converted into military posts; but still the flotilla remained at its moorings.

On the 15th of June the 32-gun frigate Narcissus, Captain John Richard Lumley, joined the little squadron; and Captain Barrie, taking with him 12 boats, containing 180 marines, and 30 of the black colonial corps, proceeded up the river to Benedict. Here the men disembarked, and drove into the woods, without a struggle, a number of militia, who left behind a part of their muskets and camp equipage, as well as a 6-pounder field-piece. After spiking the latter, and destroying a store containing tobacco, the British again took to their boats, except five or six men, who had probably strayed too far into the woods.

After quitting Benedict, Captain Barrie ascended the river to Lower-Marlborough, a town about 28 miles from the capital of the United States. The party landed, and took possession of the place; the militia, as well as the inhabitants, flying into the woods. A schooner, belonging to a Captain David, was captured, and loaded with tobacco. After this, having burnt, at Lower-Marlborough, and at Magruders, on the opposite side of the river, tobacco-stores, containing 2800 hogsheads, and loaded the boats with stock, the detachment re-embarked. The Americans collected a force, estimated at about 350 regulars, besides militia, on Holland's cliffs; but some marines, being landed,

traversed the skirts of the heights, and re-embarked without molestation, the American troops not again showing themselves, till the boats were out of gun-shot.

The blockade of Commodore Barney's flotilla, and the depredations on the coasts of the Patuxent, by Captain Barrie's squadron, caused great inquietude at Washington. At length an order reached the American commodore, directing him to destroy the flotilla, in the hope that the British, having no longer such a temptation in their way, would retire from a position so near to the capital. The order was suspended, owing to a proposal of Colonel Wadsworth, of the engineers; who, with two 18-pounders upon travelling carriages, protected by a detachment of marines and regular troops, engaged to drive away the two British frigates from the mouth of the creek. The colonel established his battery behind an elevated ridge, which sheltered him and his men; and, on the morning of the 26th of June a simultaneous attack by the gun-boats and battery was made upon the Loire and Narcissus. Owing to the effect of the colonel's hot shot, the impracticability of bringing a gun to bear upon his position from either frigate, and the want of a sufficient force to storm and carry the battery, Captain Brown retreated with the Loire and Narcissus to a station near Point Patience; and, with the exception of two barges, which put back, disabled apparently by the shot from the frigates, the American flotilla moved out of the creek, and ascended the Patuxent. The frigates sustained no loss on this occasion; but Commodore Barney admits a loss of one midshipman and three men killed, and seven men wounded.

On the 4th of July the 40-gun frigate Severn, Captain Joseph Nourse, joined the Loire and Narcissus; and Captain Nourse immediately despatched Captain Brown, with the marines of the three ships, 150 in number, up St.-Leonard's creek. Here two of Commodore Barney's barges were found scuttled, owing to the damage they had received in the action with the frigates. The barges, and several other vessels, were burnt, and a large tobacco-store destroyed. Soon after this, the British quitted the Patuxent.

On the 19th of July Rear-admiral Cockburn, having been joined by a battalion of marines, and a detachment of marine artillery, proceeded up the river Potomac, for the purpose of attacking Leonard's town, the capital of St.-Mary's county, where the 36th United States' regiment was stationed. The marines of the squadron under Major George Lewis, were landed, whilst the boats pulled up in front of the town; but, on discovering the marines, the enemy's armed force quitted the place, and suffered the British to take quiet possession. A quantity of stores, belonging to the 36th regiment, and a number of arms of different descriptions, were found there and destroyed; and a quantity of tobacco, flour, provisions, and other articles,



were brought away in the boats; and in a schooner which was lying off the town. Not a musket being fired, nor an armed enemy seen, the town was spared.

A body of militia having assembled at a place called Nominy ferry, in Virginia, a considerable way up Nominy river, Rear-admiral Cockburn, on the 21st, proceeded thither, with the boats and marines; the latter commanded by Captain John Robyns, during the illness of Major Lewis. The enemy's position was on a very commanding eminence, projecting into the water; but, some marines having been landed on its flank, and they being seen getting up the craggy side of the mountain, while the main body was disembarking at the ferry, the Americans fell back, and, although pursued for several miles, escaped with the loss of a few prisoners. The Americans had withdrawn their field-artillery, and hid it in the woods; fearing that, if they kept it to use against the British, they would not be able to retreat with it quickly enough to save it from capture. After taking on board all the tobacco and other stores found in the place, with a quantity of cattle, and destroying all the store-houses and buildings, the rear-admiral re-embarked; and dropping down to another point of the Nominy river, observed some movements on shore. Upon this he again landed with the marines. The Americans fired a volley, but, on the advance of the marines, fled into the woods. Every thing in the neighbourhood was therefore destroyed or brought off; and, after visiting the country in several other directions, covering the escape of the negroes who were anxious to join him, the rear-admiral quitted the river, and returned to the ships with 135 refugee negroes, two captured schooners, a large quantity of tobacco, dry goods, and cattle, and a few prisoners.

On the 24th of July the rear-admiral went up St.-Clement's creek, in St.-Mary's county, with the boats and marines, to examine the country. The militia showed themselves occasionally, but always retreated when pursued; and the boats returned to the ships without any casualty, having captured four schooners, and destroyed one. The inhabitants remaining peaceably in their houses, the rear-admiral did not suffer any injury to be done to them, excepting at one farm, from which two musket-shot had been fired at the admiral's gig, and where the property was, in consequence, destroyed.

On the 26th the rear-admiral proceeded to the head of the Machodic river, in Virginia, where he burnt six schooners, whilst the marines marched, without opposition, over the country on the banks of that river; and, there not remaining any other place on the Virginia or St.-Mary's side of his last anchorage, that the rear-admiral had not visited, he, on the 28th, caused the ships to move above Blackstone's island; and, on the 29th, proceeded with the boats and marines, up the Wicomoco river. He landed at Hamburg and Chaptico; from which

latter place he shipped a considerable quantity of tobacco, and visited several houses in different parts of the country; the owners of which living quietly with their families, and seeming to consider themselves and the neighbourhood to be at his disposal, the rear-admiral caused no further inconvenience to them, than obliging them to furnish supplies of cattle and stock for the use of his forces, for which they were liberally paid.

On the 2d of August the squadron dropped down the Potomac, near to the entrance of the Yocomico river, which the rear-admiral entered on the following day, with the boats and marines, and landed with the latter. The enemy had here collected in great force, and made more resistance than usual, but the ardour and determination of the rear-admiral's gallant little band carried all before it; and, after forcing the enemy to give way, the marines followed him 10 miles up the country, captured a field-piece, and burnt several houses, which had been converted into dépôts for militia arms, &c. Learning afterwards that General Hungerford had rallied his men at Kinsale, the rear-admiral proceeded thither; and, although the position of the Americans was extremely strong, they had only time to give the British an ineffectual volley before the latter gained the height, when the Americans again retired with precipitation, and did not reappear. The stores found at Kinsale were then shipped without molestation; and, having burnt the storehouses and other places, with two old schooners, and destroyed two batteries, the rear-admiral re-embarked, bringing away five prize schooners, a large quantity of tobacco, flour, &c., a field-piece, and a few prisoners. The American General Taylor was wounded and unhorsed, and escaped only through the thickness of the wood and bushes, into which he ran. The British had three men killed, and as many wounded. Thus 500 British marines, and 200 seamen and marine-artillery, penetrated 10 miles into the enemy's country, and skirmished, on their way back, surrounded by woods, in the face of the whole collected militia of Virginia, under Generals Hungerford and Taylor; and yet, after this long march, carried the heights of Kinsale in the most gallant manner.

Coan river, a few miles below Yocomico, being the only inlet on the Virginia side of the Potomac, that the rear-admiral had not visited, he proceeded on the 7th to attack it, with the boats and marines. After a tolerably quick fire on the boats, the enemy went off precipitately, with the guns. The battery was destroyed, and the river ascended; in which three schooners were captured, and some tobacco brought off. On the 12th the rear-admiral proceeded up St.-Mary's creek, and landed in various parts of the country about that extensive inlet; but without seeing a single armed person, although militia had formerly been stationed at St.-Mary's factory for its defence, the inhabitants of the state appearing to consider it wiser to submit, than to attempt opposition. On the 15th of August the rear-admiral

again landed within St.-Mary's creek; but found, in the different parts of the country, the same quiet and submissive conduct on the part of the inhabitants, as in the places visited on the 12th.

Some hints thrown out by the British commissioners at the conference at Ghent, coupled with the rumoured destination of British troops shipping in the ports of France, induced the American commissioners to intimate to their government, that an attack upon the federal city would probably be made in the course of the summer of 1814. This notice reached Mr. Madison on the 26th of June; and, on the 1st of July, he submitted to his council a plan for immediately calling 2000 or 3000 men into the field, and holding 10,000 or 12,000 militia and volunteers, of the neighbouring states, in readiness to reinforce that corps. On the next day he created into a military district, the whole state of Maryland, the district of Columbia, and that part of Virginia north of the Rappahannock river, embracing an exposed coast of nearly 1000 miles; vulnerable at every point, and intersected by many large rivers, and by the Chesapeake bay. On the 4th of July, as a further defensive preparation, the president made a requisition to the several states of the union, for 93,500 militia, as authorized by law; designating their respective quota, and requesting the executive magistrates of each state, to detach and hold them in readiness for immediate service. Of these 93,500 militia, 15,000 were to be drawn from the tenth military district, or that surrounding the metropolis, for whose defence they were intended.

On the 2d of June the British 74-gun ship *Royal-Oak*, Rear-admiral Pulteney Malcolm, Captain Edward Dix, accompanied by three frigates, three sloops, two bomb-vessels, five ships armed en flûte, and three transports, having on board a body of troops under Major-general Ross, sailed from Verdon road at the mouth of the Gironde. On the 24th of July the squadron arrived at Bermuda, and there joined Vice-admiral Cochrane, in the 80-gun ship *Tonnant*. On the 2d of August, having received on board the *Tonnant* Major-general Ross and his staff, Sir Alexander sailed, in company with the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Euryalus*, Captain Charles Napier, for Chesapeake bay; and on the 14th of August arrived, and joined the *Albion*, Rear-admiral Cockburn, off the mouth of the Potomac. On the next day Major-general Ross accompanied by Rear-admiral Cockburn, went on shore to reconnoitre.

The rear-admiral's knowledge of the country, as well as the excellent plan he adopted to prevent surprise, enabled the two officers to penetrate further than would otherwise have been prudent. The thick woods that skirt, and the numerous ravines that intersect, the different roads about Washington, offer important advantages to an ambushing enemy. Rear-admiral Cockburn, therefore, in his frequent walks through the country,

invariably moved forward between two parties of marines, occupying, in open order, the woods by the road-side. Each marine carried a bugle, to be used as a signal, in case of casual separation, or the appearance of an enemy. It was during the excursion with General Ross, that Rear-admiral Cockburn suggested the facility of an attack upon the city of Washington; and General Ross determined, as soon as the troops should arrive from Bermuda, to make the attempt.

On the 17th of August Rear-admiral Malcolm arrived with the troops, and joined Vice-admiral Cochrane off the mouth of the Potomac; and the whole proceeded to the Patuxent, situated about 20 miles further up the bay. In the mean time Captain James Alexander Gordon, of the 38-gun frigate Seahorse, with some vessels of the squadron, had been detached up the Potomac, to bombard Fort Washington, situated on the left bank of that river, about 14 miles below the federal city; and Captain Sir Peter Parker, with the 38-gun frigate Menelaus, had been sent up the Chesapeake, above Baltimore, to create a diversion in that quarter. The direct route to Washington, from the mouth of the Potomac, was up that river, about 50 miles, to Fort-Tobacco; thence, over land, by the village of Piscataway, 32 miles, to the lower bridge across the eastern branch of the Potomac; but, as no doubt could be entertained that this bridge, which was half a mile long, and had a draw at the west end, would be defended, as well by a body of troops, as by a heavy sloop of war and an armed schooner, known to be in the river, a preference was given to the route up the Patuxent, and by Bladensburg; where the eastern branch, in case of the bridge at that spot being destroyed, could be easily forded.

Commodore Barney's gun-boats were still lying in the Patuxent. An immediate attempt against this flotilla offered two advantages; one, in its capture or destruction, the other, as a pretext for ascending the Patuxent, with the troops destined for the attack of the federal city. Part of the ships, having advanced as high up the river as the depth of water would allow, disembarked the troops, about 4000 in number, on the 19th and 20th of August, at Benedict, a small town, about 50 miles south-east of Washington. On the 20th, in the evening, Rear-admiral Cockburn, taking with him the armed boats and tenders of the fleet, having on board the marines under Major Robyns, and the marine-artillery under Captain James H. Harrison, proceeded up the river, to attack Commodore Barney's flotilla; and to supply with provisions, and, if necessary, afford protection to the army, as it ascended the right bank. The boats and tenders were separated into three divisions. The first division was commanded by Captains Thomas Ball Sullivan and William Stanhope Baddock, the second, by Captains Rowland Money and James Somervell, and the third, by Captain Robert Ramsay; and the whole was under the superintendence and immediate manage-

ment of Captain John Wainwright, of the *Tonnant*. The frigates *Severn* and *Hebrus*, Captains Joseph Nourse and Edmund Palmer, accompanied by the brig-sloop *Manly*; Captain Vincent Newton, had been also directed to follow the boats up the river as far as might prove practicable.

On opening the reach above Pig point, the rear-admiral, who had just before been joined by Captains Nourse and Palmer with the boats of their two frigates, which they could get no higher than Benedict, discovered Commodore Barney's broad pendant in the headmost vessel, a large sloop, and the remainder of the flotilla extending in a long line astern of her. The British boats now advanced as rapidly as possible; but, on nearing the flotilla, the sloop bearing the broad pendant was observed to be on fire, and soon afterwards blew up; as did 15 out of the 16 remaining gun-boats. The one in which the fire had not taken was captured. The rear-admiral found 13 merchant schooners, which had been under Commodore Barney's protection. Of these, such as were not worth bringing away, were destroyed. The remainder were moved to Pig point, to receive on board the tobacco which had been there found.

The destruction of this flotilla secured the right flank of the army under Major-general Ross; who, on the afternoon of the 22d, with the troops, arrived and encamped at the town of Upper Marlborough, situated about four miles up the western branch of the Patuxent. The men, therefore, after having been nearly three months on board ship, had, in less than three days, marched 40 miles; and that in the month of August, when the sultriness of the climate could scarcely be tolerated. While General Ross and his men were resting themselves at Upper Marlborough, General Winder and his army, now joined by Commodore Barney and the men of his flotilla, were lying at their encampment at the long Old-Fields, only eight miles distant. On the next morning the American troops were reviewed by Mr. Madison, "their commander-in-chief, whose martial appearance gladdened every countenance and encouraged every heart."\* Soon after the review, a detachment from the American army advanced along the road to Upper Marlborough; and, after exchanging a few shots with the British skirmishers, fell back to the main body.

On the 23d, in the morning, Rear-admiral Cockburn, having left at Pig point, directly opposite to the western branch, the marines of the ships under Captain Robyns, and two divisions of the boats, crossed over, with the third division to Mount Calvert; and proceeded, by land, to the British encampment at Upper Marlborough. The little opposition experienced by the army in its march from Benedict, and the complete success that had attended the expedition against Commodore Barney's flotilla,

\* Wilkinson's Mem., vol. i., p. 766.

determined Major-general Ross to make an immediate attempt upon the city of Washington, distant from Upper-Marlborough not more than 16 miles. At the desire of the major-general, the marine and naval forces at Pig point were moved over to Mount Calvert; and the marines, marine-artillery, and a proportion of the seamen under Captains Palmer and Money, joined the army at Upper-Marlborough.

As if by concert, the American army retired from the long Old-Fields, about the same time that the British army advanced from Upper-Marlborough; and the patrols of the latter actually occupied, before midnight, the ground which the former had abandoned. The American army did not stop until it reached Washington; where it encamped, for the night, near the navy-yard. On the same evening upwards of 2000 troops arrived at Bladensburg from Baltimore. On the 24th, at daylight, General Ross put his troops in motion for Bladensburg, 12 miles from his camp; and, having halted by the way, arrived, at about 11 h. 30 m. A. M., at the heights facing the village.

According to a letter of General Armstrong, the American secretary at war, to the editor of the "Baltimore Patriot," General Winder had under his command, including the 15,000 militia he had been directed to call out, as many troops and seamen, as would make his total force, when assembled, 16,300 men; but an American writer gives the details of the general's force, in which he includes 600 seamen, and makes the total amount to only 7593 men. Of artillery, the American army had on the field not fewer than 23 pieces, varying from 6 to 18 pounds. This army was drawn up, in two lines, upon very commanding heights, on the north of the turnpike-road leading from Bladensburg to Washington; and, as an additional incitement to glory on the part of the American troops, their president was on the field.

The affair (for it hardly deserves the name of battle) of Bladensburg, ended, as is well known, in the rout of the Americans; from whom 10 pieces of cannon were taken, but not above 120 prisoners, owing to the swiftness with which the enemy went off, and the fatigue which the British army, about 1500 of whom only were engaged, had previously undergone. The retreating American troops proceeded, with all haste, towards Washington; and the British troops, including the rear-division, which, just at the close of the short scuffle, had arrived upon the ground, halted to take some refreshment. Had it not been for the American artillery, the loss of the British would have been very trifling. Under these circumstances, the loss, on the part of the army, amounted to one captain, two lieutenants, five sergeants, and 56 rank and file killed, two lieutenant-colonels, one major, one captain, 14 lieutenants, two ensigns, 10 sergeants, and 155 rank and file wounded, total, 64 killed and 185 wounded. The loss sustained by the naval department amounted

to only one colonial marine killed, one master's mate (Jeremiah M'Daniel), two sergeants, and three colonial marines wounded ; making a total of 65 killed and 191 wounded. The officers of the navy and of the marines, who, besides Rear-admiral Cockburn, were present in the battle, appear to have been Captain Edmund Palmer, with his aide-de-camp, midshipman Arthur Wakefield, Lieutenant James Scott, first of the Albion, acting as Rear-admiral Cockburn's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant John Lawrence, of the marine artillery, and Lieutenant of marines Altheatan Stephens.

As soon as the troops were refreshed, General Ross and Rear-admiral Cockburn, with about 1000 men, moved forward from Bladensburg, and at 8 p. m. arrived at an open piece of ground, two miles from the federal city. The troops were here drawn up, while Major-general Ross, Rear-admiral Cockburn, and several other officers, accompanied by a small guard, rode forward to reconnoitre. On arriving opposite to some houses, the party halted ; and, just as the officers had closed each other, in order to consult whether or not it would be prudent to enter the heart of the city that night, a volley was fired from the windows of one of two adjoining houses, and from the capitol : which volley killed one soldier, and General Ross's horse from under him, and wounded three soldiers. Rear-admiral Cockburn instantly rode back to the detachment stationed in advance, and soon returned with the light companies. The house was then surrounded ; and, after some prisoners had been taken from it, set on fire : the adjoining house fell with it. The capitol, which was contiguous to these houses, and which, according to an American writer, was "capable of being made an impregnable citadel against an enemy, with little artillery, and that of the lighter class," was also set on fire.

We are obliged to pause an instant, in order to correct a very serious mistatement, which, as the book in which it appears with two or three others, lay open before us, we at first took to be the splenetic effusion of an American writer. But we owe an apology to the Americans ; for the statement emanates from the pen of a British naval officer, and here it is : "A little musketry from one of the houses in the town, which killed the general's horse, was all the resistance they met with. This was quickly silenced ; the house burnt, and the people within it put to death."\* When it is considered, who are usually the inmates of a dwelling-house, the statement, that "the people within it were put to death" and that for "killing a horse," is calculated to fill the mind with horror, and to call forth execrations against the monsters who could perpetrate such an act. Fortunately for the fame of the general and admiral who presided on the occasion, the account we have just given, and the substance of

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 166.

which we published eight or nine years ago, is a faithful relation of all that occurred.

Scarcely had the flames burst out from the capitol and the two contiguous houses, than an awful explosion announced, that the Americans were employed upon the same business in the lower part of the city. By this time the remainder of the British forces from Bladensburg had arrived at the encampment. At 10 h. 30 m. P. M., after a party had been sent to destroy the fort and public works at Greenleaf's point, Major-general Ross, and Rear-admiral Cockburn, each at the head of a small detachment of men, numbering together not more than 200, proceeded down the hill towards the president's palace. Finding it utterly abandoned, and hearing probably that a guard of soldiers, with "two pieces of cannon, well mounted on travelling carriages,"\* had been stationed at, and but recently withdrawn from, this the American "commander-in-chief's" head-quarters, Rear-admiral Cockburn directed it to be set on fire. A log-hut, under similar circumstances, would have shared the same fate, and the justice of the measure not been disputed. Why, then, in a country where "equality of rights" is daily preached up, should the palace be held more sacred than the cottage? The loss of [the one falls, where it ought, upon the nation at large; the loss of the other, a lamentable case at all times, solely upon the individual proprietor. To the building, containing the treasury and war offices, the torches of the conquerors were next applied. On arriving opposite to the office of the "National Intelligencer," the American government-paper, Rear-admiral Cockburn observed to the inhabitants near him, that he must destroy it. On being told, however, that the adjoining buildings would be likely to take fire, he desisted. The rear-admiral, then, wishing the inhabitants "good night," and assuring them that private property and persons should be respected, departed to his quarters on the capitol-hill. Early on the next morning the rear-admiral was seen walking about the city, accompanied by three soldiers only. Indeed, General Wilkinson says: "A single sentinel who had been accidentally left on post near the office of the National Intelligencer, kept undisturbed possession of the central part of the metropolis until the next morning; of which there are several living witnesses."† At this time too, it appears an American force of more than 4000 combatants, was posted upon the heights of Georgetown, which is a continuation of the city to the westward.

During the morning of the 25th the secretary of state's office was burnt, and the types and printing materials of the government-paper were destroyed. A serious accident had happened

\* Testimony of Mr. William Simmons, before the American committee of investigation.

† Wilkinson, vol. i., p. 791.



to the party sent to Greenleaf's point. Some powder, concealed in a well, accidentally took fire, killing 12, and wounding 30, officers and men. The extensive rope-walks, at some distance from the city, were destroyed by the British; and so was an immense quantity of small arms and heavy ordnance, as well as the great bridge across the Potomac; a very prudent military measure, especially as the Americans had themselves destroyed the two bridges crossing the eastern branch. A party, under Captain Wainwright, destroyed the few stores and buildings in the navy-yard, which had escaped the flames of the preceding night. As the British were in haste to be gone, and as the vessels, even if they could have been floated in safety down the Potomac, were not wanted, it was very considerate in the American government to order the destruction of the frigate, of 1600 tons, which was nearly ready to be launched, and of the fine sloop of war, *Argus*, ready for sea; and whose 20 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 18-pounders, would have assisted so powerfully in defending the entrance to the city by the lower bridge.

According to the official estimate of the public property destroyed, the value has been much overrated. It appears not to have exceeded 1,624,280 dollars, or 365,463*l.* sterling. With respect to private property, we have only to quote passages from American prints, to show how that was treated. One newspaper says: "The British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peaceable citizen is molested." A writer from Baltimore, under the date of August 27th, says: "The enemy, I learn, treated the inhabitants of Washington well." That the British officers did all they could to secure the inhabitants from injury, both in their persons and properties, may also be gathered from the acknowledgment from Mr. Thompson, another American writer, that "the plunder of individual property was prohibited, and soldiers, transgressing the order, were severely punished."

On the 25th, at 8 P.M., the British left Washington, by the way of Bladensburg. Here such of the wounded as could ride, or be transported in carriages, were provided with 30 or 40 horses, 12 carts and waggons, one coach, and several gigs. With these, preceded by a drove of 60 or 70 cattle, the troops moved leisurely along. On the 29th, in the evening, they reached Benedict, 50 miles from Washington, without a single musket having been fired; and, on the following day, re-embarked in the vessels of the fleet. No complaints, that we can discover, have been made against the British, during their retreat across the country; although, as an American writer has been pleased to say, "General Ross scarcely kept up his order, sufficiently to identify the body of his army."

Of the many expeditions up the bays and rivers of the United States during the late war, none equalled in brilliancy of ex-

ecution that up the Potomac to Alexandria. This service was intrusted to Captain James Alexander Gordon, of the 38-gun frigate *Seahorse*, having under his orders the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Euryalus*, Captain Charles Napier, bomb-ships, *Devastation*, *Ætna*, and *Meteor*, Captains Thomas Alexander, Richard Kenah, and Samuel Roberts, rocket-ship *Erebus*, Captain David Ewen Bartholomew, and a small tender, or despatch-boat. On the 17th, at 9 h. 15 m. A. M., the squadron got under way from the anchorage at the entrance of the Potomac, and, without the aid of pilots, began ascending the intricate channel of the river leading to the capital of the United States. On the 18th the *Seahorse* grounded, and could only get afloat again by shifting her guns to the tenders in company. That done, and the guns returned to their places, the squadron again stood up the river. On the 25th, while passing the flats of Maryland point, a squall struck the squadron: the *Seahorse* had her mizenmast sprung; and the *Euryalus*, just as she had clewed up her sails to be in a state to receive it, had her bowsprit and the head of her foremast badly sprung, and the heads of all three topmasts fairly wrung off. Such, however, was the state of discipline on board the ship, that in 12 hours, the *Euryalus* had refitted herself, and was again under way ascending the river.

On the 27th, in the evening, after each of the ships had been aground not less than 20 times, and each time obliged to haul themselves off by main strength, and after having for five successive days, with the exception of a few hours, been employed in warping a distance of not more than 50 miles, the squadron arrived abreast of Fort Washington. The bomb-ships immediately began throwing their shells into the fort, preparatory to an attack the next morning by the two frigates. On the bursting of the first shell, the garrison was observed to retreat; but, supposing some concealed design, Captain Gordon directed the fire to be continued. At 8 P. M., however, all doubts were removed by the explosion of the powder magazine, which destroyed the inner buildings. On the 28th, at daylight, the British took possession of the fort, and of three minor batteries, mounting altogether 27 guns, chiefly of heavy caliber. The guns had already been spiked; and their complete destruction, with the carriages, was effected by the seamen and marines of the squadron. These forts were intended for the defence of Alexandria, the channel to which the British began immediately to buoy. A flag of truce now came off with a proposal to capitulate; and one hardly knows which to admire most, the prudence of Captain Gordon, in postponing his answer to the common council of Alexandria, until, says he, "I was enabled to place the shipping in such a position, as would ensure assent to the terms I had decided to enforce," or the peremptory and humiliating conditions which he did enforce. It was in vain that the Americans had sunk their vessels; they must get them up again, and put them in the

state in which they were, when the squadron passed the Kettle Bottoms ; the owners of the vessels must send on board their furniture without delay ; merchandise removed must be brought back ; and the merchants load their own vessels, which will be towed off by the captors !

The last article of the capitulation provides, that British officers are to see the terms " strictly complied with." One of the officers sent on this service was midshipman John Went Fraser of the *Euryalus*, a mere stripling. Having strayed alone to some distance from his boat, two American naval officers rode at, as if to run over him ; one, a very powerful man, caught the youth by the shirt-collar and dragged him, almost suffocating, across the pommel of the saddle, galloping off with him. Fortunately the shirt-collar gave way, and the lad fell to the ground. He was quickly upon his legs again, and ran towards a landing-place, where his boat was waiting ; the American pursuing him. The boat and the men in it were hid under a steep bank or wall, and, on that account, could not level their carronade at the honourable gentleman as he approached. The instant he saw the boat's crew, he turned pale with fright ; and rode off in a contrary direction, as fast as his horse could carry him. The American editors thought this a good joke ; and very readily informed us, that one of these worthies was the famed Captain David Porter, the other, and he that committed the atrocious and dastardly assault, master-commandant John Orde Creighton, an American by adoption only, and, we rather think, an Irishman. The first of these officers, for his " brilliant deeds at Valparaiso," had recently been appointed to the new frigate at Washington, whose name, to commemorate the exploits of Captain Porter's favourite ship, had been changed from the *Columbia* to the *Essex*, and his gallant brother-horseman had been appointed to the new corvette *Argus* ; both of which ships, it will be recollected, were burnt, and their intended commanders thrown out of employment, by the entry of the British into Washington, a few days previous. This is what infuriated the two heroes, and determined them to sacrifice the first straggling Briton they could find. At the time this outrage was committed, a flag of truce was flying before Alexandria ; whose inhabitants, in a body, disavowed the act, reprobating it as became them. Such conduct on their part alone prevented Captain Gordon from enforcing the last article of the treaty.

After the British had retired from Washington, the Americans recovered a little from their panic ; and took strong measures to oppose Captain Gordon's return down the Potomac. Commodore Rodgers, with a chosen body of seamen from the *Guerrière* at Philadelphia, Captains Perry, Porter, and other " distinguished officers," a party of officers and men from the *Constellation* at Norfolk, the men that had belonged to Commodore Barney's flotilla, regular troops, riflemen, artilleryists, and militia, all

flocked to the shores of the Potomac, to "punish the base incendiaries." The American newspaper-editors, for some days, feasted their readers with the anticipated destruction of the British squadron. "It is impossible the ships can pass such formidable batteries, commanded by our naval heroes, and manned by our invincible seamen. We'll teach them how to draw up terms of capitulation."

On the 31st, early in the morning, the British 18-gun brig-sloop *Fairy*, Captain Henry Loraine Baker, after having fought her way up the river past a battery of five guns and a large military force, joined Captain Gordon with Vice-admiral Cochrane's orders for him to return. On the same day, without waiting to destroy those remaining stores which he had not the means of bringing away, Captain Gordon weighed on his return, accompanied by 21 sail of prizes, many of which, having been sunk by the enemy, had been weighed, masted, hove down, calked, rigged, and loaded, all within three days. Contrary winds again compelled the British to resort to the laborious task of warping the ships down the channel of the river, and a day's delay occurred by the grounding of the *Devastation*. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the Americans attempted the destruction of the bomb-ship, by means of three fire-vessels and five row-boats, directed in person by Commodore Rodgers; but their object was defeated by the promptitude and gallantry of Captain Alexander, who pushed off with his own boats, and, being followed by those of the other ships, compelled the renowned commodore to face about, and fly under as much alarm towards, as about 13 months before he had fled from, an Alexandria. The cool and steady conduct of midshipman John Moore, of the *Seahorse*, in towing the nearest fire-vessel on shore, while the others were removed from the power of doing mischief by the smaller boats of the *Devastation*, is spoken of in high and just terms of commendation by Captain Gordon.

Notwithstanding that the *Meteor* and *Fairy*, assisted by the despatch-boat, a prize gun-boat, and a boat belonging to the *Euryalus*, with a howitzer, had greatly impeded the progress of the Americans in their works, the latter were enabled to increase their battery from five to 11 guns, with a furnace for heating shot. On the 3d of September, the wind coming to the northwest, the *Ætna* and *Erebus* succeeded in getting down to the assistance of the *Meteor* and her companions. On the 4th the frigates and prizes reached the same spot; but the *Devastation*, in spite of the utmost exertions in warping her, still remained five miles higher up the river. This was the moment that the Americans made their greatest efforts to effect the destruction of the British squadron. The *Erebus*, who had been placed by her commander in an admirable position for harassing the workmen employed in the trenches, was attacked by three field-

pieces; which, before they were beaten off, did the ship considerable injury. A second attempt was now made to destroy the *Devastation* by fire-vessels; but, owing to the alacrity with which Captain Baker with the boats of the squadron went to her assistance, the American boats and fire-vessels retreated, and the ship was saved. In consequence of the Americans having sought refuge under some guns in a narrow creek, thickly wooded, and from which it was impossible to dislodge them, Captain Baker sustained a serious loss, including among the killed his second lieutenant, Charles Dickinson.

On the 5th, at noon, the wind coming fair and every suitable arrangement having been made, the *Seahorse* and *Euryalus* anchored within musket-shot of the batteries, while the whole of the prizes passed between the frigates and the shoal. The three bombships, the *Fairy* and the *Erebus*, firing as they passed, anchored in a favourable position for facilitating, by means of their force, the further removal of the frigates. At 3 P. M., having completely silenced the fire of the American batteries, the *Seahorse* and *Erebus* cut their cables, and the whole squadron proceeded to the next position taken up by the American troops; who had here two batteries mounting from 14 to 18 guns, on a range of cliffs about a mile in extent, and close under which the ships were obliged to pass. It was not intended to make the attack that evening; but, the *Erebus* grounding within range of the batteries, the frigates and other vessels were necessarily called into action. On this occasion the fire of the *Fairy* produced the most decisive effect, as well as that of the *Erebus*, while the *Devastation*, *Ætna*, and *Meteor* threw their shells with admirable precision. In consequence of these vigorous measures, the American batteries, by 8 P. M., were completely silenced. On the 6th, at daylight, the British squadron again got under way; and, so satisfied were the whole of the parties on shore that their opposition was ineffectual, that they allowed the British to pass without further molestation. On the 9th the *Seahorse* and her companion sailed out of the Potomac, and came to an anchor in safety at the spot whence they had weighed 23 days before.

The toil and fatigue undergone by the officers and men, and the deprivations they so cheerfully submitted to, were equalled only by their gallantry in defeating the batteries on shore, and their skill and perseverance in surmounting the difficulties of a most intricate and dangerous navigation. Happily, the loss in this daring enterprise did not exceed, on board all the vessels, seven killed, including the *Fairy's* lieutenant already named, and 35 wounded, including Captains Napier and Bartholomew, Lieutenant Reuben Paine, and master's mate Andrew Reid, all slightly. Of the captains and other officers associated with them, and of Lieutenants Henry King, first of the *Seahorse*, and Thomas Herbert, first of the *Euryalus*, Captain Gordon, in his

official letter, speaks in the highest terms; also of the master of the Seahorse, Mr. Alexander Louthean, "for both finding and buoying the channel of a navigator, which no ship of a similar draught of water had ever before passed with her guns and stores on board." It was stated by a seaman of the Seahorse, who had served on board the President, that that frigate did not accomplish the same task under a period of 42 days, and then not without taking out her guns.

We formerly noticed that Sir Peter Parker, of the Menelaus frigate, had been detached on service up Chesapeake bay. Having but recently arrived on the North American station, Sir Peter was not aware of the ambushing tricks to which a small invading force would be exposed, in a country so filled with woods, ravines, and defiles; and where local knowledge, and skill with the rifle, were an overmatch for all the valour he could bring against them. Information having reached the ship, then at anchor off Moor's fields, that 200 American militia were encamped behind a wood distant about a mile from the beach, Captain Parker, at 11 p. m. on the 30th of August, was induced to land with 104 seamen, and 30 marines, in two divisions, one commanded by Lieutenant Henry Crease, with midshipman Henry Finucane, the other by Lieutenant Robert Pearce, and midshipman Frederick Chamier.

It appears that Colonel Read, the commander of the American force, stated that 170 Maryland volunteers, having been apprized of the intended attack, had retired to a small open space, surrounded by woods, distant four or five miles from his first encampment. Thither, having alarmed a small cavalry picket, the heedless seamen and marines, headed by their undaunted chief, proceeded. The enemy, with some pieces of artillery, was found drawn up in line in front of his camp. The British commenced the fire; and, charging, drove the Americans through their camp into the woods. It was about this time that Sir Peter received a mortal wound from a buck-shot, which divided the femoral artery, and which occasioned his bleeding to death before medical assistance could be procured. Secure behind the trees, the Americans levelled their pieces with unerring aim; while the British, deceived by the apparent flight of their wary foe, rushed on through the woods, until, bewildered and embarrassed, the survivors of this adventurous band were compelled to retreat to their ship; bringing away, however, the body of their lamented commander, and all their wounded but three. The British suffered a loss of 14 killed, including Sir Peter Parker and midshipman John T. Sandes, and 27 wounded, including both lieutenants of marines, Benjamin George Benyon and George Poe.\* The Americans, as a proof how little they exposed them-

\* Amongst the wounded was James Perrin, the midshipman's servant. He called to Mr. Chamier to give him some water, saying he thought he

selves, sustained a loss of not more than two or three men killed and wounded.

At the head of a narrow bay or inlet of the Patapsco river, and distant from its confluence with the Chesapeake about 14 miles, stands the city of Baltimore, containing about 50,000 inhabitants. It is nearly surrounded by detached hills; one of which, Clinkapin hill, situated on its eastern side, commands the city itself, as well as the approach to it by land, from the Chesapeake. Its water approach is defended by a strong fortification, named Fort M'Henry, situated at the distance of about two miles from the city, upon the point of the peninsula that forms the south side of the bay or harbour; which, at its entrance, is scarcely a quarter of a mile in width. As an additional security, the Patapsco is not navigable for vessels drawing more than 18 feet water; and, just within the harbour, is a 14 or a 15 feet bar.

The arrival of troops in the Chesapeake, and the subsequent operations of the British in the Patuxent and Potomac rivers, could not do otherwise than cause serious alarm at Baltimore, distant from Washington but 35 miles. The panic-struck inhabitants believed that the British troops would march across the country, and attack them in the rear, while the squadron was cannonading them in front. The numbers of the British on shore were too small to warrant such an enterprise; but, had it been risked, and had the fleet made a simultaneous movement up the bay, there is little doubt that Baltimore would have capitulated. Fortunately for the city, the military and naval forces within it were becoming hourly more powerful; and, far from desponding, the generals and commodores used their utmost exertions, in strengthening the defences and improving the natural advantages of the position. Upon the hills to the eastward and northward of the city, a chain of palisadoed redoubts, connected by breast-works, with ditches in front, and well supplied with artillery, was constructed; and works were thrown up and guns mounted at every spot from which an invading force, either by land or water, could meet with annoyance. The Java frigate, of 60 guns, and two new sloops of war, of 22 guns each, the Erie and Ontario, were equipping at Baltimore. There were also in the harbour several gun-boats, armed each with a long French 36-pounder, besides a carronade; as well as several private armed vessels. So that the Americans, including their field and regular battery guns, had an immense train of artillery to put in operation against an enemy. As to troops, exclusively of the 16,300 militia, regulars, and flotilla-men, which General Winder had been authorized to assemble for the defence of the 10th military district, volunteers were flocking in from Pennsylvania; and the

could hold out till he shot an American. He kept his fatal resolution too well; for, on the approach of a former foe to assist him, he shot him dead, and instantly expired himself.

seamen and marines of Commodore Rodgers, and Captains Perry and Porter, had just arrived from the banks of the Potomac.

If any southern town or city of the United States was an object of immediate attack; it certainly was Baltimore. The destruction of the new frigate and sloops, and of the immense quantities of naval stores, at that dépôt, would have been seriously felt by the American government. Yet were the British ships, that had on board the troops, waiting in the Patuxent, until the passing of the "approaching equinoctial new moon" should enable them to proceed, with safety, upon the "plans which had been concerted previously to the departure of the Iphigenia," or, in other words, upon the expedition to New Orleans. On the 6th of September came a flag of truce from Baltimore; and instantly all was bustle and alacrity on board the British squadron. The Royal-Oak 74, and troop-ships stood out of the Patuxent; and Vice-admiral Cochrane, quitting his anchorage off Tangier island, proceeded with the remainder of the fleet up the bay to North point, near the entrance of the Patapsco river. On the 10th and 11th the fleet anchored; and, by noon on the 12th, the whole of the troops, marines of the fleet, black colonial marines, and seamen, numbering altogether 3270 rank and file, had disembarked at North point, in order to proceed to the immediate attack upon Baltimore by land; while some frigates and sloops, the Erebus rocket-ship, and five bomb-vessels, ascended the Patapsco, to threaten and bombard Fort M'Henry, and the other contiguous batteries. The seamen, 600 in number, were under the orders of Captain Edward Crofton, assisted by Captains Thomas Ball Sullivan, Rowland Money, and Robert Ramsay, and the marines under Captain John Robyns.

Immediately after landing, the British moved forward to the city. On arriving at a line of intrenchments and abattis, thrown up between Black river and Humphries's creek on the Patapsco, and distant about three miles from the point of landing, some opposition was expected; but the American dragoons and riflemen, stationed there, fled without firing a shot. At this time Major-general Ross and Rear-admiral Cockburn, with a guard of 50 or 60 men, were walking together, considerably ahead of the advanced or light companies, in order to reconnoitre the enemy. At about 10 A.M., after having proceeded about two miles from the intrenchment, and some distance along a road flanked by thick woods, they encountered a division of American infantry, riflemen, cavalry, and artillery, numbering about 370 men. A short skirmish ensued, and the Americans fell back; most of them taking to the woods. After saying to Rear-admiral Cockburn, "I'll return and order up the light companies," Major-general Ross proceeded to execute his purpose. In his way back, alone, by the same road along which he and his party had just passed, the major-general received a musket-bullet



through his right arm into his breast, and fell mortally wounded. The firing had at this time wholly ceased; and the expiring general lay on the road, unheeded, because unseen, either by friend or foe, until the arrival at the spot of the light companies, who had hastened forward upon hearing the musketry. Leaving some attendants in charge of the lamented chief, the officer commanding rushed on; and it was then that Rear-admiral Cockburn learned the loss which the army and the country had sustained.

As soon as the British main body, now under the command of Colonel Brooke of the 44th regiment, closed upon the advance, the whole moved forward; and, at about two miles further, and about five from the city, came in sight of the American army, drawn up, with six pieces of artillery, and a body of cavalry, numbering in the whole about 4500 men; and backed, in case of a retreat, by at least 8000 more, and these hourly augmenting, and by heavy batteries in all directions. As the British advanced to the attack, the Americans opened a fire of musketry from their whole line and a heavy cannonade from their field-pieces, and then retreated to a wood in the rear. From this position the Americans were quickly expelled, chiefly by the bayonet, leaving all their wounded and two of their guns in the possession of the British. The latter, however, were too much fatigued to follow up their victory on that evening.

The British loss amounted to one general-staff, one subaltern, two sergeants, and 35 rank and file killed, seven captains, four subalterns, 11 sergeants, and 229 rank and file wounded, of the army. The navy lost one captain's clerk (Arthur Edmondson), five seamen, and one marine killed, one captain of marines (John Robyns), one lieutenant (Sampson Marshall, severely), one midshipman (Charles Ogle), 30 seamen, and 15 marines wounded; making the total loss of the British on shore amount to 46 killed, and 300 wounded. The great disproportion of wounded arose from the employment, by the enemy, of buck-shot; and the magnitude of the loss, altogether, to the enemy's sheltered position. The loss of the Americans upon the field, according to their own account, was 20 killed, 90 wounded, and 47 missing. The last item is evidently erroneous, as the British commanding officer carried away with him about 200 prisoners.

Early on the morning of the 13th, leaving a small guard at a meeting-house, from which the enemy had been driven, to protect the wounded, Colonel Brooke moved forward with the army, and at 10 A. M., occupied a favourable position, about two miles to the eastward of Baltimore. From this point, the strong defences in and around the city were plainly visible; and arrangements were made for storming, during the ensuing night, with the co-operation of the fleet, the American intrenched camp; at which lay General Stricker and his army, now reinforced by

Douglas's brigade of Virginia militia, under General Winder, and the United States' dragoons, under Captain Bird.

In their way up the Patapsco, several of the frigates and other vessels had grounded; and one or two of the frigates did not get off until the next day. On the 13th, at about 9 p. m., the Meteor, Ætna, Terror, Volcano, and Devastation, bomb-vessels, Captains Samuel Roberts, Richard Kenah, John Sheridan, David Price, and Thomas Alexander, and the Erebus, rocket-ship, Captain David Ewen Bartholomew, came to anchor in a position, from which they could act upon the enemy's fort and batteries, the frigates having already taken their stations outside of all. On the 13th, at daylight, the bombardment commenced upon, and was returned by, Fort M'Henry, the Star Fort, and the water batteries on both sides of the entrance. At about 3 p. m. the four bomb-vessels and rocket-ship weighed, and stood further in; the latter, to give effect to her rockets, much nearer than the others. The forts, which had discontinued their fire on account of the vessels being out of range, now recommenced a brisk cannonade; but which, although persevered in for some hours, did not injure a man on board any of the vessels: two of the bombs only were slightly strack. The close position of the Erebus led the commander-in-chief, whose ship, the Severn, with the other frigates, was at anchor in the river, to imagine that Captain Bartholomew could not maintain his position. The vice-admiral, therefore, sent a division of boats to tow out the Erebus.

On the 13th, in the middle of the night, a division of 20 boats was detached up the Ferry branch, to cause a diversion favourable to the intended assault upon the enemy's intrenched camp at the opposite side of the city. The rain poured in torrents, and the night was so extremely dark, that 11 of the boats pulled, by mistake, directly for the harbour. Fortunately, the lights of the city discovered to the crews their perilous situation, in time for them to get back in safety to their ships. The remaining nine boats, consisting of one rocket-boat, five launches, two pinnaces, and one gig, containing 128 officers, seamen and marines, under the command of Captain Charles Napier, passed up the Ferry branch to a considerable distance above Fort M'Henry, and opened a heavy fire of rockets and shot upon the shore; at several parts of which they could have landed with ease, had the whole of their force been together. After having, by drawing down a considerable number of troops to the beach, effected their object, the British stood back with their boats. When just opposite to Fort M'Henry, one of the officers caused a rocket to be fired. The consequence was, an immediate discharge of round, grape, and canister, from the fort and water batteries below; by which one of the boats was slightly struck, and a man mortally wounded. Not another casualty occurred.

It appears that, on the evening of the 13th, after the boats had been ordered upon this service, Vice-admiral Cochrane sent a messenger to acquaint Colonel Brooke, that, as the entrance to Baltimore by sea was entirely obstructed by a barrier of vessels, sunk at the mouth of the harbour, defended inside by gun-boats, a naval co-operation against the city and intrenched camp was found impracticable. The heavy rain, at this time falling, greatly increased the difficulty of ascending the steep hill, upon which the camp was situated; and both commanders concurred in the propriety of immediately withdrawing the troops and ships. On the 14th, at 1 h. 30 m. A. M., the British troops commenced retiring, and halted at three miles distance. In the course of the evening they retired three miles further, and encamped for the night. Late on the morning of the 15th, they moved down to North point; and, in the course of that day, re-embarked, without having experienced, during their slow and deliberate retreat, the slightest molestation from the enemy. Since 7 A. M. on the preceding day, the rocket-ship and bomb-vessels had been called off from the American batteries; which, notwithstanding the long continued bombardment, lost only four men killed and 24 wounded. The ships afterward stood down the river, and joined the remainder of the squadron at anchor off North point.

No Briton but must regret, that any plan of "ulterior operations" should have obtruded itself, to check the progress of the attack. With respect to naval co-operation, it is well known, that the gallant commanders of the *Severn*, *Euryalus*, *Havannah*, and *Hebrus* frigates, volunteered to lighten their ships, and lay them close alongside Fort M'Henry. The possession of this fort would have enabled the British to silence the batteries on the opposite side of the bay, and, indeed, have placed the city completely at their mercy. The very advance of the frigates to their stations would probably have led to the destruction of the *Java*, *Eric*, and *Ontario*; and then the British might have retired, "holding in view the ulterior operations of the troops," with something more to boast of than, not merely an empty, but, considering what had been lost by it, a highly disastrous, "demonstration."

On the 19th of September Sir Alexander Cochrane, with the *Tonnant* and *Surprise* frigate, sailed for Halifax, to hasten the construction of the flat-bottomed boats, intended to be employed in the great expedition on foot; and on the same day, the *Albion*, Rear-admiral Cockburn, sailed for Bermuda, leaving the *Royal-Oak* 74, Rear-admiral Pulteney Malcolm, with some frigates and smaller vessels, and the ships containing the troops, at anchor in the river Patuxent. On the 27th the Rear-admiral removed to the Potomac; where, on the 3d of October, the troops were placed into boats, and sent up Coan river. In their way up, two soldiers were wounded, and Captain Kenah of the

Ætna, a gallant young officer,\* killed, by musketry from the shore. Against so powerful a force, when once landed, the few militia could not be expected to stand: they fired a volley and fled, and the troops advanced past Northumberland court-house, five miles into the interior. After taking and scuttling two or three worthless schooners, and, according to the American editors, plundering the inhabitants, the troops re-embarked, and stood down the river to their ships. The latter soon afterwards descended the Potomac; and on the 14th, taking with him the Royal-Oak, Asia, and Ramillies 74s, one or two frigates, and all the troop-ships and bombs, Rear-admiral Malcolm quitted the Chesapeake for the grand rendezvous at Negril bay, Jamaica.

In our account of the last year's proceedings before the blockaded port of New-London, we related the disgraceful attempt made to destroy the British 74-gun ship Ramillies, and her crew of 590 or 600 men, by an explosion-vessel fitted out at New-York.\* We remember frequently hearing it said, that the plan originated with "mercenary merchants;" and it was even hinted, that the projectors were adopted, not native, Americans, the latter being, too "high-minded" to countenance such a proceeding. Above all things, no one, who wished to escape a tar-and-feathering, dare have whispered a supposition, that an American naval officer would lend his ear to so dishonourable a mode of freeing himself from the presence of his enemy. Those, the most ready to fly out on these occasions, did not of course recollect the attempt made in the bay of Chesapeake, with the sanction, if not under the direction, of Captain Charles Stewart of the American navy, to blow up the Plantagenet 74, by a torpedo conducted by Mr. Mervine P. Mix, one of the Constellation's midshipmen; nor of a second plan to blow up the Ramillies, projected by that "excellent man," that "ornament to his country,"† Commodore Stephen Decatur, but of which, very fortunately, Sir Thomas Hardy received intelligence in time to place him on his guard. Nay, an officer and boat's crew from the Ramillies actually succeeded in capturing one of the crew of the frigate United-States, who was to conduct the whale-boat containing the torpedo, and which whale-boat lay for several weeks, waiting a fit opportunity to push off, at Southold on Long island.

The British force at anchor off New-London in January, 1814, consisted, besides the Ramillies, of the 24-pounder 40-gun frigate Endymion, Captain Henry Hope, and the 38-gun frigate Statura, Captain Hassard Stackpoole. In the hearing of an American privateer-captain, named Moran, about to quit the Ramillies for the shore, Captains Hope and Stackpoole, happened to express a desire to meet the United-States and Macedonian. This soon became known all over New-London. Feeling his

\* See p. 240.

† Brenton, vol. v., pp. 61, 202.

consequence likely to be lowered in the opinion of the citizens, Commodore Decatur resolved to put in immediate practice an epistolary stratagem; which, managed as he intended it should be, could not fail to redound to his advantage. On the 14th of January, making the subject of the above reported conversation the ground of the application, the American commodore sent to Captain Hardy a written proposition for a contest between the United-States, of "48 guns and a boat-gun," and the *Endymion*, of "50 guns," and between the *Macedonian*, of "47," and the *Statira*, of "50 guns." Captain Hardy readily consented that the *Statira* should meet the *Macedonian*, as they were sister-ships; but, quite contrary, as may be supposed to the wishes of Captain Hope, he refused to permit the *Endymion* to meet the United-States, because the latter was much the superior in force.

Through the medium of Captain Biddle, the bearer of his proposition, Commodore Decatur had agreed, that the crews of the *Endymion* and *Statira*, both of which were short of complement, should be made up from the *Ramillies* and *Borer*; and, had it been finally settled that the meeting should take place between the *Macedonian* and *Statira*, Sir Thomas Hardy meant, as we have understood, to include himself among the volunteers from the *Ramillies* to serve on board the latter. This would undoubtedly have been a very hard measure upon Captain Stackpole; but we do not see how Sir Thomas Hardy, having consented that a ship, other than the one he commanded, should meet in single combat the ship of an enemy, could well have acted otherwise.

When Commodore Decatur wrote his letter about capturing the *Macedonian*, he did not mention, although he took care to reckon, that ship's boat-gun; but now he tells us, that the 49th gun of the United-States is a "12-pound carronade, a boat-gun." We have already shown, that the reduction of that ship's force did not go quite the length it purported to go, and that the *Macedonian*, although she may have mounted but 47 guns, was more effectively armed than when she mounted 49.\* The armament of each of the two British ships is easily stated. Until the latter end of the year 1812, when she went into dock at Plymouth, the *Endymion* mounted, with her 26 long 24-pounders on the main deck, 14 carronades, 32-pounders, on the quarterdeck, and four of the same caliber and two long nines on the forecastle; total 46 guns. In May, 1813, the *Endymion* had her quarterdeck barricade continued a few feet further forward, to admit an additional carronade of a side; which, with two additional carronades on the forecastle, and, in lieu of her two 9-pounders, a brass long French 18-pounder as a bow chase-gun and for which there was no broadside-port, gave the *Endymion* 49 guns. Her net complement consisted of 347 men and

\* See p. 338.

boys. The *Statira* mounted the 46 guns of her class, and two light boat-guns, with a net complement (when filled) of 317 men and boys. The crew of the *United-States* was about 480, and the crew of the *Macedonian* from 430 to 440 men.

Commodore Decatur, however, declined a meeting between the *Macedonian* and *Statira*, from the alleged apprehension, that the latter might be overmanned; thereby tacitly admitting, what went rather against the previous claims of himself and his brother conquerors, that three men were better than two. Thus ended this vapouring affair. Commodore Decatur then sent the correspondence to a newspaper-editor; and he and Captain Jacob Jones were bepraised on all sides for the valour they had displayed. According to one of the swaggering statements made on the occasion, Captain Jones harangued his men, and pretended to lament the loss of so fine a ship as the *Statira*; which, he assured them, would have been their prize in a very short time. He had also the hardihood to tell them, that it was all owing to the refusal of the British, who were "afraid to contend with Americans upon equal terms."

Shortly after this business was broken off, a verbal challenge passed between the commanders of the *Hornet* and *Loup-Cervier*, the late American *Wasp*. The latter vessel soon afterwards foundered at sea, and every soul on board perished: nothing respecting this challenge has therefore been made public on the British side. The American "Port-folio," for November, 1815, in which the "Life of Captain James Biddle" is given, contains some account of it. It is there stated, that "Captain (William Bowen) Mends, of the *Loup-Cervier*, said that, if Captain Biddle would inform him of the number of souls he commanded, he, Captain Mends, pledged his honour to limit his number to the same; but that Commodore Decatur would not permit Captain Biddle to acquaint Captain Mends with the number of his crew, and meet him on the terms stated: because it was understood that, in that case, the *Loup-Cervier* would have a picked crew from the British squadron." What do we gather from this? Why, that the Americans with all picked men on their side, were afraid to meet an equal number of British, because they *might have* picked men on theirs. Commodore Decatur's amended proposition was: "The *Hornet* shall meet the *Loup-Cervier*, under a mutual and satisfactory pledge, that neither ship shall receive any additional officers or men, but shall go into action with their original crews respectively." Was this fair? The *Hornet's* "original crew" was 170, including about three boys; the *Loup-Cervier's* original crew 121, including 18 boys. So that, deducting the boys, the numbers would stand: Americans, 167, British 103.

"The blockade of the American ships in New London having continued until the season had passed, in which Commodore Decatur could hope to effect his escape, the *United-States* and

Macedonian were moved up the river, to the head of navigation for heavy vessels, and there dismantled; and, while Captain Jones and the late crew of the Macedonian proceeded to reinforce the squadron under Commodore Chauncey on Lake Ontario, Commodore Decatur and his ship's company passed into the President, then at anchor in New-York, her late distinguished commander and his crew having been transferred to the new 44-gun frigate *Guerrière*, fitting for sea at Philadelphia, and armed on the main deck with 30 medium 32-pounders.

On the 7th of April, in the evening, Captain the Honourable Thomas Bladen Capel, of the 74-gun ship *Hogue*, commanding a small British squadron, consisting, besides that ship, of the *Endymion* and *Maidstone* frigates, and 14-gun brig-sloop *Borer*, Captain Richard Coote, despatched six boats, containing 136 men, under the orders of Captain Coote, assisted by Lieutenant Harry Pyne, and Lieutenant of marines Walter Griffith Lloyd, to attempt the capture or destruction of some American vessels near Pettipague point, about 15 miles up Connecticut river. On the 8th Captain Coote and his party reached the point, and, after a slight skirmish with some militia, destroyed all the vessels, 27 in number, afloat or on the stocks within three miles of the place, besides several boats and a considerable quantity of naval stores. Three of the vessels were large privateers, completely equipped and ready for sea; and the aggregate burden of the 27 was upwards of 5000 tons. In the evening, after dark, the boats dropped down the river, without rowing; and the British reached their ships with no greater loss than two men killed and two wounded. For this gallant and important exploit, Captain Coote obtained post-rank, and Lieutenant Pyne his commission as commander.

On the 14th of June Captain the Honourable Charles Paget, of the British 74-gun ship *Superb*, detached, under the orders of Lieutenant James Garland, all that ship's boats, and two boats from the 18-gun brig-sloop *Nimrod*, Captain George Hilton, to endeavour to destroy some newly-built ships and other vessels at a place called Wareham, at the head of Buzzard's bay in the state of Connecticut. Lieutenant Garland completely succeeded in his object, without incurring the slightest loss, and destroyed as many ships, brigs, schooners, and sloops, on the stocks and afloat, as measured in the aggregate 2522 tons; also a large cotton manufactory, with its contents, valued at half a million of dollars. The extreme intricacy of the navigation rendered it too hazardous to attempt the enterprise without the assistance of daylight. This, however, would necessarily expose the boats, upon their return down the narrow stream, to a fire of musketry from a numerous militia, which, on the first alarm, had collected from the vicinity. But the foresight and prompt resolution of Lieutenant Garland completely succeeded in obviating the danger that was thus to be apprehended; for, as soon as he had de-

stroyed the vessels and cotton manufactory, he ascertained who were the principal people of the place, and then secured them as hostages for a truce, until the boats were conducted back out of the reach of difficulty. This produced the desired effect, and the hostages were relanded at the first convenient spot.

We have already stated that the American frigate Congress was laid up, and have assigned a reason for her having been so. The only remaining 18-pounder frigate belonging to the United States, except the Macedonian in the mud of New-London river, was the Constellation at Norfolk. In the latter end of the year 1813, Captain Stewart was relieved in the command of that frigate by Captain Charles Gordon, and was promoted to the Constitution; which ship had been in a manner rebuilt, and was lying in President road, Boston, ready for sea.

It appears that this American frigate now mounted a pair of carronades fewer than she did in the Java's action.\* But the Constitution had not left either that pair or the pair of which she had previously disarmed herself, on shore, but had transferred them to the hold; so that, as she had the ports for them, they could be remounted in a very few minutes. To compensate for this slight reduction in her armament, the Constitution had taken on board a furnace for heating shot. Her officers stated, that it would heat shot to a white heat in 15 minutes, but that "hot shot were not to be used in action, unless the ship was assailed by a superior force." What an American captain would pronounce "superior force" may be partly imagined by the numerous American descriptions of "equal force" to be found in these pages. Upon her capstan the Constitution now mounted a piece resembling seven musket-barrels, fixed together with iron bands. It was discharged by one lock; and each barrel threw 25 balls, making 175 shot from the piece within the space of two minutes. What could have impelled the Americans to invent such extraordinary implements of war, but fear, downright fear?

Numerically, the Constitution was well manned, having a crew of 480, including three boys; but all the best hands out of her first crew had been draughted to the ships on the lakes, except a few sent on board the Chesapeake. The ship had now, therefore, what the Americans would call a bad crew, but what a British captain, judging from their personal appearance, would consider a tolerably fine ship's company. To give the men increased confidence in case of being boarded, they were provided with leather caps, fitted with narrow plates of iron, crossing at the top, and bending upward from the lower edge of the crown, to prevent a blow from striking the shoulder after having glanced on the head. Another strong symptom of fear; all the effect of the exertions making by the British, to meet the Americans on

\* See pp. 97, 128.



terms not quite so unequal as had been the case in nearly every action in which the latter had come off victorious.

On the 1st of January, 1814, after having suffered herself to be blockaded, for several weeks, by the 38-gun frigate *Nymphé*, Captain Farmery Predam Epworth, the *Constitution* escaped to sea unperceived from President road. On the 14th of February, to windward of Barbadoes, Captain Stewart captured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner *Picton*; and on the 23d, when running through the Mona passage on her way homewards, the *Constitution* fell in with the British 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Pique*, Captain the honourable Anthony Maitland. The *Pique* (late French *Pallas*\*) was a remarkably fine frigate of her class, measuring 1029 tons, and mounted, with her 26 long 18 pounders on the main deck, 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and four long nines on her quarterdeck and forecastle, total 46 guns, with an established complement of 284 men and boys.

When, at about noon, they first discovered each other, the two ships were steering to the north-west, with a light wind right aft. The *Pique* immediately braced her yards by, to allow the stranger, who was astern under a crowd of sail, to come up. At 4h. 30 m. p. m. the *Constitution* took in her studding-sails. Observing this, the *Pique* hauled to the wind on the larboard tack, and, hoisting her colours, made all sail to close. Almost immediately afterwards, and when bearing from the *Pique* south-east by south distant three miles, the *Constitution* took a reef in her topsails, hoisted her colours, and hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. The island of Zachee at this time bore from the *Pique* north by east distant 12 or 13 miles. The change of position of each ship afforded to the other a tolerable idea of the force which would be opposed to her. The *Constitution* counted 13 ports and a bridle on the *Pique*'s main deck, and saw at once that she was of a class inferior to the *Guerrière* and *Java*; and the *Pique* counted 15 ports and a bridle on the *Constitution*'s main deck, and therefore knew as well that she was one of the large class of American frigates.

We formerly noticed the directions given by the British admiral, that the 18-pounder frigates were not to seek an engagement with the American 44-gun frigates. A prohibitory order of this kind was in the possession of Captain Maitland; but was of course unknown to his crew. He had the good fortune to command one of the finest ship's companies in the British navy; and, as a proof how much British seamen had been "cowed by the successes of the Americans," the *Pique*'s men, on observing that it was not Captain Maitland's intention to become the assailant, went aft and requested him to bring the American frigate to action. Captain Maitland could do no less than read to them the instructions he had received, but entirely failed in

\* See vol. iii., p. 32.

persuading the Pique's crew that there had been any necessity for issuing them. Either just before, or just after, the reading of the captain's orders, the crew refused to take their supper-time grog: alleging as a reason, that they did not want "Dutch courage to fight a yankee frigate." Although it is true, that the Constitution was by no means so well manned as when she took the Java or *Guerrière*, and that the Pique had about 260 men, who, upon an average, were not more than 26 years of age, and the major part of them good seamen, yet the numerical disproportion was too great; and it was well that Captain Stewart thought the Pique's 18s were 24s, and therefore did not make an effort to bring her to action.

At 8 P. M., owing to thick squally weather, during which the wind shifted to the east-north-east, the two frigates lost sight of each other. At 2 A. M. on the 24th the Pique tacked to the south-east, and, crossing the bows of the Constitution, again discovered her, at the distance of about two miles on her lee beam. As each stood on her course, the Pique to the south-east, and the Constitution to the north by west, the two ships, by 3 A. M., had run each other quite out of sight. Those who have gone along with us thus far, in unravelling the American accounts, and exposing the little peccadilloes of the writers, professional and non-professional, will feel no surprise at being told, that Captain Stewart declared to his government, and through that channel to the public, that he had chased a British frigate, but that she had escaped from him in the dark.

On the 3d of April, at 7 A. M., having arrived off the port of Marblehead, in the state of Massachusetts, the Constitution fell in with the two British 38-gun frigates *Junon*, Captain Clotworthy Upton, and *Tenedos*, Captain Hyde Parker. The American frigate was standing to the westward, with the wind about north by west, and bore from the two English frigates about north-west by west. The *Junon* and *Tenedos* quickly hauled up in chase, and the Constitution crowded sail in the direction of Marblehead. At 9 h. 30 m., finding the *Tenedos* rather gaining upon her, the Constitution started her water, and threw overboard a quantity of provisions, spars, and other articles. At 11 h. 30 m. she hoisted her colours, and the two British frigates, who were now rather dropping in the chase, did the same. At 1 h. 30 m. P. M. the Constitution came to an anchor in the harbour of Marblehead. Captain Parker, whose ship now bore from Cape Ann north-north-east distant nine miles, was anxious to follow the American frigate into the port, which had no defences; but the *Tenedos* was recalled by signal from the *Junon*. A shift of wind to the south-east enabled the Constitution, at 6 P. M., to remove to Salem: where she lay much more secure. A short time afterwards the American frigate found an opportunity of quitting Salem unperceived, and anchored in the harbour of Boston.

On the 26th of August an expedition, under the joint command of Lieutenant-general Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, governor of the province, and Rear-admiral Edward Griffith, consisting of the 74-gun ship *Dragon*, Captain Robert Barrie, frigates *Endymion* and *Bacchante*, Captains Henry Hope and Francis Stauffell, 18-gun ship-sloop *Sylph*, Captain George Dickens, and 10 sail of transports with troops, sailed from Halifax, Nova-Scotia, bound to the river Penobscot, near the north-eastern extremity of the coast of the United States. On the 31st, when off the Metinicus islands, the expedition was joined by the 74-gun ship *Bulwark*, Captain Farmery Predam Epworth, frigate *Tenedos*, Captain Hyde Parker, and brig-sloops *Rifleman* and *Peruvian*, Captains Joseph Pearce and George Kippen. From the *Rifleman* intelligence was now received, that the United States' ship *Adams*, of 26 guns, Captain Charles Morris, had a few days before put into Penobscot, and, not deeming herself safe at the entrance of the river, had proceeded to Hamden, a place situated 27 miles higher up, where she had landed her guns and placed them in battery for her protection. The original plan of making Machias on the main coast the first point of attack, was now deviated from, and the general and admiral determined to ascend the river and endeavour to capture or destroy the *Adams*.

Towards evening the fleet, led by the *Tenedos*, made sail up the Penobscot with a fair wind, and by daylight on the 1st of September was off the fort and town of Castine. At 8 A. M. the men of war and transports came to anchor; and, after a slight show of resistance, *Castine* surrendered. The service of capturing or destroying the *Adams* frigate and the batteries erected for her defence was now intrusted to Captain Barrie; who, at 6 P. M., taking with him the *Peruvian* and *Sylph* sloops, a tender belonging to the *Dragon* commanded by acting Lieutenant James Pearson, and the *Harmony* transport, commanded on this occasion, by Lieutenant William Henry Woodin, containing between them about 600 troops under Lieutenant-colonel Henry John, proceeded with the utmost despatch up the Penobscot. Light variable winds, thick foggy weather, and a most intricate channel of which the British were entirely ignorant, made it 2 P. M. on the 2d before the *Peruvian* and her consorts arrived off Frankfort. At 5 P. M., having arrived off Ball's head cone, distant about five miles from Hamden, Colonel John and Captain Barrie landed to reconnoitre; and by 10 P. M. the whole of the troops were also landed. The troops bivouacked for the night amidst an incessant rain; and at 6 A. M. on the 3d the little party began their march towards Hamden. The larger vessels were kept in the rear in reserve; while the boats, commanded by Lieutenant George Pedlar first of the *Dragon*, assisted by Lieutenant the Honourable George James Perceval, of the *Tenedos*, and Lieutenant Francis Ormond, of the *Endy*

mion, and preceded, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile, by a rocket-boat under the immediate direction of Captain Barrie himself, advanced in line with the right flank of the army.

The American militia and crew of the Adams, to the number altogether, as reported, of 1400 men, had taken up a most excellent position on a high hill fronting the town of Hamden, with some field-pieces stationed in the woods on their right. About a quarter of a mile to the southward of the Adams frigate, and calculated to command both the highway by which the troops were advancing and the river, were mounted eight 18-pounders; and 15 more 18-pounders were mounted on a wharf close to the Adams, completely commanding the river, which at that spot was only 600 yards wide. The British force consisted, besides the 600 infantry and artillery under Lieutenant-colonel John, of 80 marines under Captain Thomas Carter of the Dragon, and about as many seamen under Lieutenants James Symonds, Samuel Mottley, and Henry Slade, all of the Bulwark, and Mr. John Spurling, that ship's master.

The moment the British boats arrived within gun-shot, the Americans opened a fire upon them both from the hill and the wharf. This fire was warmly returned, and the rockets evidently threw the enemy into confusion. In the mean time the troops, marines and seamen had stormed the hill with the utmost gallantry, and the American militia were in full retreat on the road to Bangor. Before the boats could get within grape-shot distance, Captain Morris, finding himself deserted by those who, doubtless, had a few minutes before, promised to do wonders, set fire to the Adams. The American militia made so good a use of their legs, that very few were taken prisoners. The only loss sustained on the part of the British was one seaman killed, Captain Gall, of the 29th, and seven privates wounded, and one rank and file missing. Two ships, one of them armed, were destroyed by the Americans at the same time as the Adams. The British immediately hastened on to Bangor, which also surrendered; and there one ship, one brig, three schooners, and a sloop were destroyed. A copper-bottomed brig, pierced for 18 guns, and the Decatur privateer, of 16 guns, were captured, but lost in descending the river. Several vessels, at the different towns on the banks of the river, were found on the stocks, but were all left untouched.

The Adams had been a 32-gun frigate, but was afterwards lengthened, so as to rate as a 36; and then, on account of some defect in her construction, was cut down to a corvette. She measured 725 tons American, or about 783 English. The Adams sailed upon her last cruise with an armament of four long 18-pounders, 20 columbiad, or medium guns of the same caliber, and two long 12-pounders, total 26 guns, and with a complement, according to a prisoner, who was some weeks on board of her, of

248 picked seamen, chiefly masters and mates of merchantmen. The Adams, therefore, was one of the most formidable "corvettes" that cruised on the ocean. While in the Irish channel, towards the end of July, she was chased by the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate *Tigris*, Captain Robert Henderson, and would probably have been caught, had not Captain Morris thrown overboard his quarter guns and a portion of his stores. Captain Brenton confounds the Adams with the "John-Adams," and gives the ship only "20 guns."\*

As at the close of the preceding year, the military and naval commanders-in-chief, upon the Canadian frontier of the United States, were Lieutenant-general Sir George Prevost and Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo. On the 15th of April were launched at Kingston, Lake Ontario, the British ships *Prince-Regent* and *Princess-Charlotte*. The first measured 1310 tons, and mounted 28 long 24-pounders on the main deck, four long 24-pounders, four carronades, 68-pounders, and 22 carronades, 32-pounders, on the upper or spar deck, total 58 guns, with a complement of 485 men and boys. The last-named ship measured 815 tons, and mounted 24 long† 24s on the main deck, and two more, along with fourteen 32 and two 68 pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 42 guns, with a complement of 315 men and boys. The six 68-pounder carronades were the same mounted in the preceding year on board the *Wolfe* and *Royal-George*. The latter, now named the *Niagara*, had replaced the two 68s with two long 18-pounders; the former, now the *Montreal*, her four, with the same number of 32-pounder carronades. The schooners *Maira* and *Sidney-Smith* had been altered into brigs, and their names changed to the *Charwell* and *Magnet*; as had been the names of the *Melville* and *Beresford* to the *Star* and *Netley*; but, it is believed, no alterations, beyond those already mentioned, were made in the armaments of any of the British vessels.

Before the end of March, Commodore Chauncey had succeeded in equipping two large brig-sloops, the *Jones* and *Jefferson*, each, as acknowledged, of 500 tons American, and therefore of at least 530 tons English. It has been stated, that these brigs carried 42-pounder carronades, and mounted 24 guns each; but they will be considered as having mounted the same as the ships *Frolic* and *Peacock*, with the addition of a long 24-pounder upon a traversing carriage. The *Sylph*, now a brig, mounted, in lieu of her former armament, 14 carronades, 24-pounders, and two long 12s. On the 1st of May, was launched at Sackett's-Harbour, the *Superior*, of about 1580 tons, mounting 30 columbiad or medium 32-pounders on the lower or main deck, two long 24s, and 30 carronades, 42-pounders, on the upper or spar deck, total 62 guns, with a complement of 550 men.

\* Brenton, vol. v., p. 171.

† Doubtful if not medium,

Oswego is situated on the river of the same name, near its confluence with Lake Ontario, and is distant from Sackett's-Harbour about 60 miles. At the mouth of the river there is a safe harbour, with two fathoms' water; the channel to which is completely commanded by a well-built fort, standing, near the state warehouses, barracks, and a few houses, upon a commanding height on the eastern shore of the river, having its front towards the lake. On the western bank of the river stands the town, consisting of about 30 houses. As this river afforded the only water communication between New-York and Sackett's-Harbour, the accumulation of naval stores in the warehouses of Oswego is readily explained, and gave to the post an importance which it would not otherwise possess. On the 3d of May, in the evening, a detachment of troops, numbering altogether 1080 rank and file, embarked in the vessels of Sir James Yeo's fleet, lying at Kingston; and, early on the following morning, Lieutenant-general Drummond went on board the *Prince-Regent*, as commander of the troops. The squadron, consisting of the *Prince-Regent*, Captain Richard James Lawrence O'Connor, bearing the broad pendant of Sir James Yeo, *Princess-Charlotte*, Captain William Howe Mulcaster, *Montreal*, Captain Stephen Popham, *Niagara*, Captain Francis Brockell Spilsbury, *Charwell*, Captain Alexander Dobbs, *Star*, Captain Charles Anthony, and *Magnet*, Captain Henry Collier, immediately stood out of the harbour; but, on account of light and variable winds, did not arrive off Oswego until noon on the following day.

Either suspicion, or direct information, of the attack had led to preparations on the part of the Americans. Since the 30th of April Lieutenant-colonel Mitchell had arrived from Sackett's-Harbour, with 300 heavy and light artillery, and several engineer and artillery officers. The batteries were repaired and fresh picketed, and new platforms laid for the guns; which were four in number, 24, 12, and 6 pounders; besides a 12-pounder, planted *en barbette* close to the lake-shore. The United States' schooner *Growler*, of three heavy guns, Lieutenant George Pearce, was lying in the harbour, preparing, under the superintendence of Captain Woolsey, to conduct to Sackett's-Harbour a division of batteaux laden with stores. Arrangements had also been made for assembling the militia of the district; and, no sooner did the British squadron show itself at 6 A. M., on the 5th, than alarm guns were fired, which soon brought to the post upwards of 200 militia; thus making a total force of at least 540 men. By way, also, of making this force appear treble what it was, in the hope thereby to daunt the British, and prevent them from attempting to land, the Americans pitched all their tents upon the opposite, or town side of the river, while they themselves remained in their barracks.

At 3 P. M. the ships lay to within long range of the shore; and the gun-boats, 11 in number, were sent in, under the orders

of Captain Collier, to induce the enemy to show the number and position of his guns. At 4 P. M., by which time the gun-boats had got within point-blank range, the Americans opened their fire, and a mutual cannonade was kept up until 5 h. 30 m. P. M.; when, having effected his object, Captain Collier stood back to the fleet. Preparations were now made for disembarking the troops on that evening, but, about sunset, a heavy gale from the north-west compelled the ships to gain an offing; in which effort, four of the boats, their crews being first taken out, were obliged to be cut adrift. As soon as the weather moderated, the squadron cast anchor about 10 miles to the northward of the fort.

On the 6th, in the morning, the ships having returned and every thing being ready, a division of about 770 men, including 200 seamen, armed with pikes, under Captain Mulcaster, embarked in the boats. Owing to the shoalness of the water off the harbour, the Prince-Regent and Princess-Charlotte could not approach near enough to cannonade the battery with any effect; but this service was most gallantly performed by the Montreal and Niagara, under a heavy discharge of red-hot shot, which set the Montreal on fire three times. The Magnet took her station in front of the town, on the opposite side of the river; while the Star and Charwell towed in and covered the boats, containing the troops. The wind was at this time nearly ahead; and the consequent tardiness in the approach of the boats exposed the men to a heavy and destructive fire from the enemy's batteries, and from upwards of 500 regulars and militia, drawn up on the brow of the hill. The British, nevertheless, effected their landing, and instantly formed on the beach. Having to ascend a steep and long hill, the troops suffered extremely from the enemy's fire. No sooner, however, had they reached the summit, than the 300 American regulars retired to the rear of the fort, and the 200 American militia fled, helter-skelter, into the woods. In 10 minutes after the British had gained the height, the fort was in their possession. Lieutenant James Laurie, of the marines, was the first man who entered it; and Lieutenant John Hewett, of the same corps, climbed the flag-staff under a heavy fire, and struck the American colours, which had been nailed to the mast; more, as it would seem, to give trouble to the British, than to evince a determination, on the part of the Americans, of defending the post with any unusual obstinacy.

The British loss in the affair of Oswego was rather severe. It amounted to one captain of marines (William Holtoway), and 14 non-commissioned officers and privates of the royal marines and De Watteville's regiment, and three seamen killed, one captain and one subaltern of De Watteville's, two captains (William Howe Mulcaster, dangerously, and Stephen Popham), one lieutenant (Charles William Griffith Griffin) and one master

of the navy (— Richardson), 51 non-commissioned officers and privates of the royal marines and De Watteville's, and seven seamen wounded, total, 18 killed and 64 wounded. The Americans stated their loss at one lieutenant and five men killed, 38 wounded, and 25 missing. The British captured 60 prisoners.

The British carried away with them seven long guns, 32 and 24 pounders, a great quantity of ordnance stores, and large rope, 2400 barrels of provisions, and three schooners. They destroyed three long 24-pounder guns, one long 12, and two long 6s, a schooner, the barracks, and all the other public buildings. One of the schooners was the Growler, late Hamilton. Besides the above, a quantity of cordage, and other naval stores, and three long 32-pounders, were sunk in the river by the Americans themselves. The guns and stores for the new ship *Superior*, had, unknown to the British, been removed from Oswego previously to the attack; and reached Sackett's-Harbour, chiefly by land conveyance. After departing from Oswego, Sir James anchored off Sackett's-Harbour, and blockaded a port which Sir George Prevost, with a portion of the large force then concentrated around him at his "camp of instruction" at Chambly, ought to have enabled him to attack.

By the capture of a boat from Oswego, containing two long 24-pounders and a 19½ inch cable for the *Superior*, Sir James became apprized that 18 other boats, similarly laden, were waiting at Sandy creek for an opportunity of reaching Sackett's-Harbour. He accordingly detached Captains Popham and Spilsbury, with 180 seamen and marines, to endeavour to cut out the vessels. On the 30th of May, shortly after daylight, the two captains arrived at, and began ascending the creek; and, when within a quarter of a mile of the enemy, Lieutenant Thomas S. Cox, with the principal part of the marines, was landed on the left bank, and Lieutenant Brown, with the cohort and small-arm party, accompanied by Lieutenant Patrick M'Veagh with a few marines, landed on the right bank. Just as the leading British boat, containing a 68-pounder in the bow and a 24-pounder in the stern, had arrived within sight of the American boats, the 68-pounder, the previous fire from which had dispersed a body of Indians from the banks of the river, became disabled, and the boat pulled round to bring the 24-pounder to bear. Considering by this that the British were on their retreat, the Americans to the number of 150 riflemen, 200 Indians, and a large body of militia and cavalry, unexpectedly rushed upon them. The British made a noble resistance, but were at length overpowered and made prisoners. As a proof that Captains Popham and Spilsbury and their party of seamen and marines made an obstinate resistance, their loss amounted to 18 killed, including Mr. Hoare, a master's mate of the *Montreal*, and 50 dangerously wounded, including Lieutenants Cox and



M'Veagh. Captain Popham concludes his official letter on the subject with this paragraph: "The exertions of the American officers of the rifle corps, commanded by Major Appling, in saving the lives of many of the officers and men, whom their own men and the Indians were devoting to death, were conspicuous, and claim our warmest gratitude."

On the 11th of June, the Americans launched at Sackett's-Harbour the Mohawk, of about 1350 tons, mounting 28 long 24-pounders on the main deck, two long 24s and 18 carronades, 42-pounders, on the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 48 guns, with a complement of 460 men. This made the British and American forces in this lake stand, in relative broadside force at, British 2752 lbs., and American 4188 lbs., and in number of men at, British 1517, American 2321. In the latter end of July Sir James Yeo raised the blockade of Sackett's-Harbour, and returned to Kingston; and on the 1st of August Commodore Chauncey sailed out of port, vexed at the unwillingness of the British to meet him on "equal terms."

Some operations on the upper lakes now demand our attention. The possession of Captain Barclay's fleet had not only given to the Americans the entire command of Lake Erie, and the large lakes, Huron and Superior, leading from it, but had restored to them the immense territory of Michigan, and gained over on their side the five nations of Indians, late the allies of the British. Had the spirit of the Americans, indeed, kept pace with the apathy and neglect, so conspicuous on the part of the British commander-in-chief, the province of Upper Canada could not have held out as it did.

After the capture of the British flotilla on this lake, Captain Perry retired to Lake Ontario, to serve under Commodore Chauncey, and the command on Lake Erie devolved upon Captain Arthur Sinclair. In the month of July, taking with him the two large brigs, Niagara and St.-Lawrence, and the Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, and Tigress, Captain Sinclair entered Lake Huron, and on the 4th of August failed in an attack upon the British port of Michilimacinae at the head of that lake. Having obtained intelligence that Lieutenant Miller Worsley of the British navy, with the north-west company's schooner Nancy, was at Nattawassaga, Captain Sinclair, first despatching the St.-Lawrence and Caledonia brigs, with a portion of the troops to co-operate with the American army at Fort Erie, proceeded with the remainder to attack a post deemed far less difficult of reduction, than the "Gibraltar" (Michilimacinae), from which he and Colonel Croghan had just been repulsed. The Nancy was lying about two miles up the Nattawassaga, under the protection of a block-house, situated on the south-east side of the river; which here runs parallel to, and forms a narrow peninsula, with, the shore of Gloucester bay. This enabled Captain Sinclair to anchor his vessels within good bat-

tering distance of the block-house. A spirited cannonade was kept up between the block-house, where, besides two 24-pounder carronades on the ground, a 6-pounder was mounted, and the three American vessels outside, composed of the Niagara, mounting, as formerly stated, 18 carronades, 32-pounders, and two long 12-pounders, and the Tigress and Scorpion, mounting, between them, one long 12, and two long 24 pounders. In addition to this force, a 5½ inch howitzer, with a suitable detachment of artillery, had been landed on the peninsula. Against these 24 pieces of cannon, and upwards of 500 men, were opposed, one piece of cannon, and 23 officers and seamen.

Further resistance was in vain; and, just as Lieutenant Worsley had prepared a train, leading to the Nancy from the block-house, one of the enemy's shells burst in the latter, and both the block-house and the vessel were presently blown up. Lieutenant Worsley and his men escaped in their boat up the river; and, fortunately, the whole of the North-west Company's richly laden canoes, bound across the lake, escaped also into French river. Having thus led to the destruction of a vessel, which the American commander had the modesty to describe as "his Britannic Majesty's schooner Nancy," Captain Sinclair departed for Lake Erie; leaving the Tigress and Scorpion to blockade the Nattawassaga, and, as that was the only route by which supplies could be readily forwarded, to starve the garrison of Michilimacinac into a surrender.

After remaining at their stations for a few days, the two American schooners took a trip to the neighbourhood of St.-Joseph's. Here they were discovered, on the 25th of August, by some Indians on their way to Michilimacinac. On the 31st Lieutenant Worsley and his men arrived at the garrison, bringing intelligence that the two schooners were five leagues apart. An immediate attempt to effect their capture was therefore, resolved upon; and on the 1st of September, in the evening, Lieutenant Worsley and his party, composed of midshipman Dobson, one gunner's mate, and 17 seamen, re-embarked in their boat; and Lieutenant Bulger, of the royal Newfoundland regiment, with two lieutenants, two sergeants, six corporals, and 50 rank and file, of his own corps, one hospital-mate, one bombardier, and one gunner of the royal artillery, with a 3 and 6 pounder, Major Dickson, superintendent of Indian affairs, four others of the Indian department, and three Indian chiefs, making a total of 92 persons, embarked on board three other boats. A body of Indians also accompanied the expedition in their canoes. It was sunset on the 2d, before the boats arrived at the Detour, or entrance of St.-Mary's strait; and not until the next day, the 3d, that the exact situation of the American vessels became known. At 6 p. m. the boats pulled for the nearest vessel, ascertained to be at anchor about six miles off. The Indians, who, as just stated, had quitted Michilimacinac with the expe-

dition, remained three miles in the rear; and at 9 P.M. the schooner appeared in sight. As soon as she discovered the boats, which was not till they had approached within 100 yards of her, the American vessel opened a smart fire from her long 24-pounder and musketry. The boats, however, advanced rapidly; and, two of them boarding her on each side, Lieutenant Worsley carried, in five minutes, the United States' schooner *Tigress*, of one long 24-pounder on a pivot-carriage, and 28 officers and men. The British loss was two seamen killed, Lieutenant Bulger, and four or five soldiers and seamen wounded; and the American loss, three men, including one or two officers, wounded.

On the 4th, early in the morning, the prisoners were sent in one of the boats, under a guard, to Michilimacinae, and preparations were made to attack the other schooner, which was understood to be at anchor 15 miles further down. On the 5th the *Scorpion* was discovered working up to join her supposed consort, the American ensign and pendant being still kept flying on board the *Tigress*. In the evening the *Scorpion* anchored at the distance of about two miles from the *Tigress*; who, just as day was dawning on the 6th, slipped her cable, and, running down under her foresail and jib, was within 10 yards of the *Scorpion* before any discovery was made. In five minutes more the deck of the latter was covered by the two lieutenants and their men, and the British flag was hoisted over that of the United States. The *Scorpion* was manned with 30 officers and men; and carried one long 24, and, in her hold, one long 12 pounder. Her loss amounted to two killed and two wounded; that of the British to one or two soldiers wounded, making the total British loss, in capturing the two vessels, amount to three killed and eight wounded. These two American "gun-boats," averaged, according to British measurement, 100 tons. They had on board abundance of shot, including some 32-pounders, and in small-arms, between them, 64 muskets and 104 cutlasses and boarding-pikes. As a proof of the value of these two schooners, now that they were afloat upon Lake Huron, their hulls and stores were appraised by the proper officers at upwards of 16,000*l.* sterling. In another point of view, they were still more valuable. Commodore Perry's victory left the Americans without an enemy to fear upon the lakes Erie and Huron; and yet do we find, still remaining on board of the four (including two that will be named presently) smallest of his nine vessels, three times as many experienced seamen, as were on board all the "very superior British fleet," which that "illustrious American commodore," after an obstinate struggle, succeeded in capturing.

On the 12th of August the three United States' armed schooners, *Somers*, *Ohio*, and *Porcupine*, each with 35 men commanded by a lieutenant, being stationed close to Fort Erie, then

in the possession of the Americans, for the purpose of flanking the British army in their approach against it, Captain Dobbs, of the Charwell, with a detachment of 75 seamen and marines from his vessel and from the Netley, Lieutenant Coples Radcliffe, lying opposite to Fort George, resolved to attempt their capture or destruction. For this purpose, the seamen carried the captain's gig upon their shoulders from Queenstown to Frenchman's creek, a distance of 20 miles. From this spot, by the aid of Lieutenant-colonel Nichol, the quarter-master general of the militia, five batteaux, as well as the Charwell's gig, were got across through the woods to Lake Erie, a distance of eight miles. Two of the American schooners, the Somers and Ohio, were presently carried, sword in hand; "and the third," says Captain Dobbs, "would certainly have fallen, had not the cables been cut; which made us drift to leeward of her among the rapids." It is almost impossible, without having been on the spot, to form an adequate idea of the rapidity, and of course the danger, of the Niagara stream, as it approaches the cataract.

The British loss was Lieutenant Radcliffe and one seaman killed, and four seamen wounded; the loss on the part of the Americans one seaman killed, three officers and four seamen wounded. When it is considered that, with the Porcupine, the Americans had a force of 92 lbs. weight of metal and 105 men, to oppose to 75 men, without any artillery whatever, the exploit of Captain Dobbs and his brave followers deserves every commendation. It proved that British seamen could find expedients to capture two out of three fine American armed schooners, in waters, where the gig and five batteaux of the conquerors were the only British vessels afloat.

About the middle of October, when the season for cruising on Lake Ontario was almost over; the British succeeded in getting ready their large ship the St.-Lawrence, of 2305 tons, and intended to mount 102 guns. A "peep into Kingston," by one of the American light vessels, gave Commodore Chauncey timely notice of this, and he retired to Sackett's-Harbour to stir out no more. The Americans now commenced building two "74-gun ships," each of whose broadsides would have about equalled that of the St.-Lawrence. To meet this on the part of the British, a 74 was commenced, and a frigate, like the Princess-Charlotte, constructed; but, before the lakes were open in the ensuing spring, peace came, otherwise, there is no saying whether the building mania would not have continued, until there was scarcely room on the lake for working the ships.

During the months of June and July, the Quebec papers were continually announcing the arrival of transports from the Garonne with troops; and those troops, too, such as, under the Marquess of Wellington, had hitherto carried all before them. So satisfied now were the Americans, that Sackett's-Harbour would be the first point of attack, even if Sir George had to cross the St.-

Lawrence, and march overland, that General Izard, on the 1st of September, broke up his encampment at Plattsburg, and marched there with between 3000 and 4000 regulars. If any thing could raise British courage beyond its accustomed height, it was, surely, the emulation which existed between the troops that had recently arrived from the Peninsula, and those that had been originally allotted for the defence of the Canadas; the one, highly jealous of the reputation they had already gained, the other, equally so, of their local experience, and of the dressing they had several times given to superior numbers of the very same enemy, against whom the two united bodies were now about to act. Under these circumstances, will any one, except an American, say, that 11,000 of such troops would not have beaten, upon any ground where evolutions could be practised, 17,000 of the best troops which the United States could have brought into the field? A British army, then, of 11,000 men, with a most excellent train of artillery, commanded in chief by Sir George Prevost, and, under him, by officers of the first distinction in the service, left their camp at Chambly, "with a view," says the American official account, "of conquering the country, as far as Crown point and Ticonderoga" on Lake Champlain.

In the early part of August the British naval force on Lake Champlain consisted of the brig-sloop *Linnet*, of 16 long 12-pounders and 80 men and boys, commanded by Captain Daniel Pring, cutter *Chubb*, of 10 carronades, 18-pounders, and one long 6-pounder, and 40 men and boys, Lieutenant James M'Ghie, cutter *Finch*, of six 18-pounder carronades, one medium or columbiad 18-pounder, and one 6-pounder, Lieutenant William Finch, and 10 gun-boats, mounting between them two long 24, and five long 18 pounders, and six 32-pounder carronades, and manned with 294 men and boys, of whom 30 were British sea men: the remainder, as was the case with the greater proportion of the crews of the three larger vessels, consisted of privates of the 39th regiment and Canadian militia, very few of which latter could speak a word of English. This would make a total of 48 guns and 444 men and boys; the greater part, as already stated, regular soldiers and Canadian militia.

The American force consisted of the ship *Saratoga*, mounting on a flush deck eight long 24-pounders, 12 carronades, 32-pounders, and six carronades, 42-pounders, total 26 guns, with a complement of 250 as her regular crew, besides a detachment of the 15th United States' infantry acting as marines, making a total of at least 300 men, commanded by Commodore Thomas Macdonough; brig *Eagle*, Captain Robert Henley, of eight long 18-pounders and 12 carronades, 32-pounders, total 20 guns, and 142 men as her regular crew, and at least 160, including her acting marines; schooner *Ticonderoga*, Lieutenant commandant Stephen Cassin, of eight long 12, and four long 18 pounders and five 32-pounder

carronades, total 17 guns, and a regular crew of 115, with about 15 acting marines, or 130 men in the whole; sloop Preble, of seven long 9-pounders and 45 men, and 10 gun-boats, mounting between them six long 24, six medium 18, and four long 12 pounders, and manned with 346 men; making a grand total of 86 guns and 981 men, the whole of the latter, excepting the regular troops (about 83 in number) acting as marines, seamen from the American ships of war laid up at New-London and other ports of the Atlantic frontier.

On the 25th of August a ship, which had been hastily constructed by the British, was launched in the vicinity of Isle-aux-Noirs; and on the 3d of September Captain George Downie, late of the Montreal on Lake Ontario, accompanied by his first lieutenant, arrived to take the command of the *Confiance*, as the new ship was named, as well as of the British squadron on Lake Champlain: which squadron, as soon as the *Confiance* could be armed and manned, Sir George Prevost had directed to co-operate with the British army, in the intended attack upon Plattsburg and the American shipping lying near it. On the same day that he arrived, Captain Downie detached Captain Pring with the flotilla of gun-boats to protect the left flank of the army; and on the 4th Captain Pring took quiet possession of Isle de la Motte, and constructed a battery of three long 18-pounders to support his position abreast of Little-Chazy, where the supplies of the army were ordered to be landed.

The approach of Sir George's army, by Odelltown, to the line of demarcation, was the signal for Major-general Macomb, with the few regulars of General Izard's army left under his command to retire from the neighbourhood of the lines towards Plattsburg; and the latter's abandoned camp was entered by Sir George Prevost on the 3d of September. From this position the British left division, of about 7000 men, composed of all but the reserve and heavy artillery, moved forward on the 4th, and halted on the 5th, within eight miles of Plattsburg; having taken four days to advance 25 miles along the lake-shore. On the 6th, early in the morning, the left division proceeded on its march, Major-general Power's, or the right column advancing by the Beckmantown road; and Major-general Brisbane's column, except one wing of De Meuron's regiment, left to keep up the communication with the main body, taking the road that runs parallel to Lake Champlain. At a bridge crossing a creek that intersects this road, the American general had stationed a small force, with two field-pieces, to abattis and obstruct the way. In the mean while the right column, meeting with no impediments to its progress, passed rapidly on, 700 American militia, upon whom, says General Macomb, "the British troops did not deign to fire, except by their flankers and advanced patrols," retreating before it. The rapid advance of Major-general Power secured Major-general Brisbane from any further

opposition than such as he might experience from the American gun-boats and galleys. Notwithstanding a heavy fire from their long 24 and 12 pounders, the bridge across the creek was presently reconstructed, and the left column moved forward upon Plattsburg.

The village of Plattsburg contains about 70 houses and stores, and is situated on both sides of the river Saranac, close to its confluence with Lake Champlain. The statement in the British official account, that, "the column entered Plattsburg," must, therefore, be understood to mean, either the township of that name, or the small portion of the village which was situated on the north side of the stream. It was to the south side that General Macomb, after taking up the planks of the bridge, had retreated; and it was on the elevated ridge of land forming its bank, that the Americans had erected their works. General Macomb mentions three forts, and two block-houses strongly fortified. One of the latter mounted three guns; and we believe there were from 15 to 20 guns in all, most of them of heavy caliber. There was, also, a large new stone-mill, four stories high, which formed an excellent position for the American riflemen. It was on the evening of the 6th, that the British left division arrived on the north bank of the Saranac. "But," says, an American writer, "not all the galleys aided by the armament of the whole flotilla, which then lay opposite Plattsburg, under Commodore Macdonough, could have prevented the capture of Macomb's army, after its passage of the Saranac, had Sir George Prevost pushed his whole force upon the margin of that stream. Like General Drummond, at Erie, he made a pause, in full view of the unfinished works of the Americans, and consumed five days in erecting batteries, and throwing up breastworks, for the protection of his approaches. Of this interval the American general did not fail to avail himself; and, kept his troops constantly employed in finishing his line of redoubts."\* The reader need scarcely to be reminded, that this is the same Plattsburg, at which Colonel Murray, with 1000 troops, landed; the river on which it stands, the same Saranac, up which the colonel ascended, three miles, to burn the enemy's barracks; and that those barracks were burnt, while an American regular army, more than twice as strong as General Macomb's, lay encamped in the neighbourhood.†

Sir George Prevost knew perfectly well, that the *Confiance*, although afloat and with Captain Downie's pendant flying on board of her, had scarcely men enough to get the rigging over her mast-heads, and that the shipwrights were still at work upon her hull; but he, notwithstanding, urged Captain Downie, both by letter and through the officers of his staff, to co-operate with the army. At length came an insinuation, that "the commander-in-chief hoped Captain Downie allowed himself to be

\* Sketches of the War, p. 319.

† See p. 253.

delayed by nothing but the state of the wind." The effect of this upon a spirit like that of the gallant first lieutenant of the *Seahorse* in July, 1808,\* may be partly conceived. On the 8th the wind proved fair; and immediately the *Confiance* and her consorts moved from Isle-aux-Noirs into Lake Champlain, and anchored abreast of the main body of the British army, to wait until the whole of her crew had arrived from Quebec, and until the carpenters had fitted the ring-bolts for her guns, and the joiners completed the magazine for the reception of the powder, without which those guns could be of no use. On the 9th Captain Downie received a draught of marines, numbering, with a few artillerymen and soldiers, 86 men; and, in the course of that and the following day, the whole of the petty officers and seamen intended for the ship came on board; forming a total of 270 officers, seamen, marines, and boys. The seamen, among whom were 19 foreigners, were men of inferior quality and bad character; who, as the term is, had "volunteered" from their respective ships, or, in plain words, had been dismissed from them in disgrace. Some, indeed, had been liberated from irons, for the very purpose of manning Captain Downie's ship. Ten ships of war at Quebec had furnished 118 of these "volunteers;" and some transports had lent 25 of their men. The men of the *Confiance*, therefore, were all strangers to each other and to their officers; and Captain Downie was acquainted with no officer on board his ship but his first lieutenant, and the latter with none of the other officers.

On the 10th, just as the last draught of the motley crew we have described was ascending the side of the *Confiance*, while the loud clank of the builder's hammer was still sounding in all parts of the ship, while the guns were being brecched and pointed through the ports, and while the powder, for the want of a place fitted for its reception, was lying in a boat alongside, an officer from Sir George Prevost came to solicit the instant co-operation of the British squadron. Relying upon the assurance now given by the commander-in-chief, that the army should attack the works of Plattsburg, while the squadron was attacking the American ships lying in front of them, Captain Downie in spite of the unprepared state of the *Confiance*, consented to go into action on the following morning. It was then agreed, that the *Confiance*, when rounding Cumberland head, which forms the northernmost point of Plattsburg bay, should scale her guns; and that, at that instant, the column of attack should advance to storm the American works. As it could not well be said, that the *Confiance* mounted any guns at all, until they were placed upon her broadside, and as that had only just been done when the ship was thus on the eve of going into action with a greatly superior force, we have deferred until now giving any

\* See vol. iv., p. 60.



account of the *Confiance's* armament. The ship mounted 26 long 24-pounders on the main deck, also two 32-pounder carronades through her bow, and two of the same through her stern ports. Upon the poop were mounted, *en barbette*, four 24-pounder carronades, and upon the topgallant forecastle, in the same ineffective manner, two 24-pounder carronades, and one long 24 on a traversing carriage; making a total of 37 guns.

On the 11th, at daylight, with the carpenters still working at his ship, Captain Downie made the signal to weigh. This was promptly complied with; and the *Confiance*, *Linnet*, *Chubb*, *Finch*, and 10 gun-boats, made sail towards Plattsburg bay! At 7 A. M. the American squadron was seen at anchor, in line ahead, abreast of the encampment of General Macomb's army. The *Eagle*, flanked by five gun-boats, was in the van; then the *Saratoga*; next to her the *Ticonderoga*; and lastly the *Preble*, also flanked by five gun-boats. It was Captain Downie's intention to lay the *Confiance* athwart the hawse of the *Saratoga*; that the *Linnet*, supported by the *Chubb*, should engage the *Eagle*, and the *Finch*, with the gun-boats, the *Ticonderoga* and *Preble*. While the squadron was lying to, that the commanding officer of each vessel might be informed of the plan of attack, Commodore Downie caused it to be made known to the different crews, that the army would co-operate with them. This was necessary, to inspire the men with confidence, in attacking a force so evidently superior. Lieutenant John Robertson, first of the *Confiance*, went to her crew while at their quarters, and explained particularly to the men the nature of the co-operation, as he had understood it from Captain Downie.

At 7 h. 40 m. A. M. the British squadron filled and made sail in order of battle; and the moment the *Confiance*, the leading ship, arrived abreast of Cumberland head, she scaled her guns as had been agreed upon; but the signal was not answered from the army. Sir George Prevost did, however, direct a signal to be made: it was for the army "to cook," instead of to fight; to give the men their breakfasts, instead of to deprive the enemy of the opportunity of taking his. To the honour of the soldiers and the officers in general, they all panted to rush forward; but, in truth, a third part of the troops would have done all that was required, and, in two hours from the time the *Confiance* scaled her guns, would have given a victory to both army and navy, instead of a flight to one, and a defeat to the other. Captain Downie now discovered, too late, the mistake into which his confidence had led him. The *Confiance* was already in the enemy's bay, and almost within gun-shot of his squadron.

At 8 A. M., favoured by a very light air, amounting almost to a calm, the American row-galleys and gun-boats commenced upon the *Confiance* a heavy and galling fire. Having by this means had two anchors shot from her bows, the *Confiance*, at 8 h. 10 m., was obliged to anchor within 400 yards upon the

beam, instead of, as had been intended, close athwart the bows, of the *Saratoga*. The *Linnet* and *Chubb* soon afterwards took their allotted stations, something short of that distance; but the cutter presently had her main boom shot away, and, drifting within the enemy's line, was compelled to surrender. The *Finch* had the misfortune, while proceeding to her station, to strike on a reef of rocks off Crabb island; where there was an American battery of two guns, which fired at the *Finch*, and wounded two of her men, the only loss she sustained. All the gun-boats, except the *Murray*, *Beresford*, and another, abandoned the object assigned them; that is, ran away, almost as soon as the action commenced. Within 15 minutes after the commencement of the action, fell the British commanding officer, the brave, the lamented Captain Downie. The way in which he met his death, is of too extraordinary a nature to be passed over. A shot from the *Saratoga* struck one of the *Confiance's* 24-pounders, and threw it completely off the carriage against Captain Downie, who was standing close in the rear of it. He received the blow upon his right groin, and, although signs of life remained for a few minutes, never spoke afterwards. No part of his skin was broken: a black mark, about the circumference of a small plate, was the only visible injury. His watch was found flattened, with the hands pointing to the hour, minute, and second, at which the fatal blow had been given.

At length, the greater part of the *Confiance's* guns on the larboard side having been disabled, Lieutenant Robertson, now the commanding officer, made an effort to wind the ship round, to bring her starboard broadside to bear; but, owing to the loss of her two anchors and the shameful flight of the gun-boats, this object could not be effected. Having nearly the whole of her guns on the engaged side in a similar state to those of the *Confiance*, the *Saratoga* let go a stern anchor, cut her bower cable, and, with great ease, wended herself round, so as to bring her larboard broadside to bear upon her antagonist, now lying in a defenceless state; and who, at 10 h. 30 m., after receiving several raking broadsides, hauled down her colours; thus affording the extraordinary instance of a ship being launched, fitted, fought, and captured, within the short space of 16 days.

A few minutes before the *Confiance* surrendered, unable to withstand the heavy and well-directed fire of the *Linnet*, the *Eagle* cut her cable and took up a fresh position between the *Ticonderoga* and *Preble*. The attention of the American commodore was now directed to the *Linnet*; who, although greatly disabled, continued the action with spirit. At 10 h. 45 m. A. M. after having, for upwards of 10 minutes, withstood the whole united force of the American squadron, the *Linnet* hauled down her colours. As the *Finch* had been compelled to strike before, and the *Chubb*, from having her cable cut, very soon after, the action had commenced; and as the gun-boats had all effected

their escape, the surrender of the *Linnet* gave a complete victory to the American squadron.

The brigade of the British army, which was stationed near the banks of the Saranac, on the opposite side of which, as already stated, lay the army, if it deserved such a name, of General Macomb, was commanded by Major-general Brisbane. It appears that, while the action between the squadrons was going on, this portion of the British army, either mistaking or disregarding Sir George's cooking signal, attacked the American works, and not only crossed the Saranac, but brought away some prisoners. This showed at once the practicability of the thing, and only wanted the quiescence, temporary or final, of the commander-in-chief, and the British army would have gained a victory in spite of Sir George Prevost; but who, nevertheless, with the assistance of "Mr. Secretary Brenton" in penning the despatch, would have got all the credit of it. Unfortunately, some one acquainted Sir George with what was going on at the banks of the Saranac; and, learning at the same time that the *Confiance* had struck her colours, he sent orders to Major-general Brisbane to desist from beating the poor Americans, to leave them in quiet possession of their half-carried works, and hasten after him out of the enemy's territory.

So certain was Commodore Macdonough, that, in a few minutes, the batteries at Plattsburg would be turned against the American squadron, that, before he took formal possession of the prizes, he removed his ships out of gun-shot. Lieutenant Robertson was then conveyed on board the *Saratoga*, to deliver up his sword. On that occasion, Commodore Macdonough spoke to him as follows: "You owe it, sir, to the shameful conduct of your gun-boats and cutters, that you are performing this office to me; for, had they done their duty, you must have perceived, from the situation of the *Saratoga*, that I could hold out no longer: and indeed, nothing induced me to keep up her colours, but, seeing from the united fire of all the rest of my squadron on the *Confiance*, and her unsupported situation, that she must ultimately surrender." Here is an acknowledgment candid and honourable in the extreme. Can this be the "T. Macdonough," whose signature appears to the two American official accounts of the action?

The loss on board the *Confiance* amounted to 41 killed, including her captain and another officer, and about 60, including one officer, wounded. The *Linnet* had her second lieutenant, boatswain, and eight seamen killed, one midshipman and 13 seamen and marines wounded; the *Chubb*, six seamen and marines killed, one officer and 15 seamen and marines wounded; and the *Finch* two seamen and marines wounded; total 57 killed and 92 wounded. The loss on the American side, has been officially reported as follows: *Saratoga*, 28 killed and 29 wounded; *Eagle* 13 killed and 20 wounded; *Ticonderago*.

six killed and six wounded; and Preble and the gun-boats five killed, and three wounded; total 52 killed and 58 wounded: a tolerable proof that the British, notwithstanding the many disadvantages under which they laboured, had made a good use of their ill-fitted guns.

Now for a comparative statement of the force engaged in this, viewed in its consequences on both sides of the Atlantic, very important lake action. As the Finch grounded opposite an American battery before the engagement between the squadrons commenced, we shall exclude her from the estimate; and so we shall one half of the British gun-boat force. Only three of the 10 gun-boats, indeed, came near enough to engage, while all the American gun-boats are admitted to have participated in the action. On the American side, we shall take no notice of the armed sloops Montgomery and President, the batteries on shore, or the "militia ready to assist."

With respect to the *Confiance*, although she mounted 37 guns, 17 only of them, as has already been shown, could be presented in broadside; and even four of these, on account of there being only a ridge-rope, or rail, along either side of the poop and top-gallant fore-castle, were disabled after the first discharge. Having no gun-locks on board (they being in the *Junon* frigate, which did not arrive at Quebec in time), Captain Downie attempted to substitute carronade-locks; which he contrived to fasten to the guns by means of copper hoops. But the plan was not found to answer, and matches were resorted to. Determined that the British should derive no advantage from publishing this fact, an American paper subjoins to an exaggerated account of the *Confiance's* force in guns, "with locks."

We have enumerated the guns of the *Confiance* at 37; but we should have stated, that the ship had two long 18-pounders among the ballast in the hold. These commodore Macdonough, in his official letter places on the "berth deck;" and in his statement of comparative force, actually carries them out as part of the *Confiance's* "39 guns." The substance of the following statement having appeared before the American, as well as the British, public more than nine years ago, and being, as far as we know, to this hour uncontradicted, we again submit it as the actual

COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

	CAPTAIN DOWNIE.	CAPT. MACDONOUGH.
Vessels.....No.	8	14
Broadside-guns.....	38	52
	765	1194
Crew..... Agg. No.	537	950
Size.....tons	1426	2540

This, without bringing in aid the shameful abandonment of the enterprise by the commander-in-chief of the Canadas, shows

that the squadron under Commodore Downie wanted a full third of being as strong as that under Commodore Macdonough. As was to be expected, however, the Americans claimed it as a victory obtained over a decidedly superior force; and, instead of attributing the retreat of the British army of 11,000 men to the imbecility (to say no worse) of General Sir George Prevost, they ascribed it all to the superior prowess of the American army, of less than 2000 men, under General Alexander Macomb.

Unfortunately, justice was interrupted in its course by the death of Sir George, before he could be tried upon the following charges brought against him by Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo: 1. For having, on or about the 11th of September, 1814, by holding out the expectation of a co-operation of the army, under his command, induced Captain Downie, late of his majesty's ship *Confiance*, to attack the American squadron on Lake Champlain, when it was highly imprudent to make such attack without the co-operation of the land forces, and for not having afforded that co-operation. 2. For not having stormed the American works on shore, at nearly the same time that the said naval action commenced, as he had given Captain Downie reason to expect. 3. For having disregarded the signal for co-operation, which had been previously agreed upon. 4. For not having attacked the enemy on shore, either during the said naval action, or after it was ended; whereby his majesty's naval squadron under the command of Captain Downie, might have been saved.

On the 28th of August, 1815, Captain Pring, and the surviving officers and crews late belonging to the British Lake Champlain squadron, were tried by court-martial on board the *Gladiator* at Portsmouth, and the following was the sentence pronounced: "The court having maturely weighed the evidence, is of opinion, that the capture of *H. M. S. Confiance*, and the remainder of the squadron, by the American squadron, was principally caused by the British squadron having been urged into battle previous to its being in a proper state to meet the enemy; by the promised co-operation of the land forces not being carried into effect, and by the pressing letters of their commander-in-chief, whereby it appears that he had on the 10th of September, 1814, only waited for the naval attack to storm the enemy's works. That the signal of the approach on the following day was made, by the scaling of the guns, as settled between Captain Downie and Major Coote; and the promised co-operation was communicated to the other officers and crews of the British squadron before the commencement of the action.

"The court, however, is of opinion, that the attack would have been attended with more effect, if a part of the gun-boats had not withdrawn themselves from the action, and others of the vessels had not been prevented by baffling winds from getting into

the stations assigned them. That Captain Pring of the *Linnet*, and Lieutenant Robertson, who succeeded to the command of the *Confiance*, after the lamented fate of Captain Downie (whose conduct was marked by the greatest valour), and Lieutenant Christopher James Bell, commanding the *Murray*, and Mr. James Robertson, commanding the *Beresford*, gun-boats, who appeared to take their trial at this court-martial, conducted themselves with great zeal, bravery, and ability, during the action: that Lieutenant William Hicks, commanding the *Finch*, also conducted himself with becoming bravery; that the other surviving officer's and ship's crew, except Lieutenant M'Ghie of the *Chubb*, who has not appeared here to take his trial, also conducted themselves with bravery; and that Captain Pring, Lieutenant Robertson, Lieutenant Hicks, Lieutenant Bell, and Mr. James Robertson, and the rest of the surviving officers and ship's company, except Lieutenant M'Ghie, ought to be most honourably acquitted, and they are hereby most honourably acquitted accordingly." On the 18th of the ensuing September Lieutenant M'Ghie was put upon his trial, and the following was the sentence pronounced upon him: "The court having heard the circumstances, determined that the *Chubb* was not properly carried into action, nor anchored so as to do the most effectual service; by which neglect, she drifted into the line of the enemy: that it did not appear, however, that there was any want of courage in Lieutenant M'Ghie; and, therefore, the court did only adjudge him to be severely reprimanded."

Upon the American accounts we shall bestow but a few words. Having seen the effects of Commodore Perry's puritanical epistle, Commodore Macdonough writes his letter in the same mock-religious strain: "The Almighty has been pleased to grant us a signal victory on Lake Champlain, in the capture of one frigate, one brig, and two sloops of war of the enemy." The *Confiance* a "frigate;" and the *Chubb* and *Finch* "sloops of war"! Yet, according to an American writer, Commodore Macdonough was "a religious man, as well as a hero, and prayed with his brave men on the morning of the victory."\*

In the very summer preceding the Lake Champlain action, some of the American newspaper editors were blaming Commodore Chauncey for not sailing out of Sackett's-Harbour, in the new ships *Superior* and *Mohawk*, after the latter had been launched nearly two, and the former upwards of three months. How did that cautious commander answer them? Why, by writing to the secretary of the American navy thus: "I need not suggest to one of your experience, that a man of war may appear to the eye of a landsman, perfectly ready for sea, when she is deficient in many of the most essential parts of her armament; nor how unworthy I should have proved myself of the high trust reposed in me, had I ventured to sea in the face of an enemy of equal force,

\* Naval Monument, p. 155.

without being able to meet him in one hour after my anchor was weighed." And yet, had poor Captain Downie acted with only half this caution, his fair fame would have been tarnished, and the very service to which he belonged scoffed at, by no less a man than the governor-general of the British North-American provinces.

On the 26th of September the British 74-gun ship *Plantagenet*, Captain Robert Lloyd, 38-gun frigate *Rota*, Captain Philip Somerville, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Carnation*, Captain George Bentham, cruising off the Western Isles, discovered at anchor in the road of Fayal the American privateer schooner *General-Armstrong*, of seven guns, including a long 24 or 32 pounder on a traversing carriage, and about 90 men, Captain Guy R. Champlin. Captain Lloyd sent Lieutenant Robert Faussett, in the *Plantagenet's* pinnace, into the port, to ascertain the force of the schooner, and to what nation she belonged. Owing to the strength of the tide, and to the circumstance of the schooner getting under way and dropping fast astern, the boat drifted nearer to her than had been intended. The American privateer hailed, and desired the boat to keep off, but that was impracticable owing to the quantity of stern-way on the schooner. The *General-Armstrong* then opened her fire, and, before the boat could get out of gun-shot, killed two and wounded seven of her men.

As the captain of the American privateer had now broken the neutrality of the port, Captain Lloyd determined to send in and endeavour to cut out his schooner; which had since come to again with springs close to the shore. Accordingly, at 8 P. M., the *Plantagenet* and *Rota* anchored off Fayal road; and at 9 P. M. four boats from the *Plantagenet* and three from the *Rota*, with about 180 seamen and marines, under the command of Lieutenant William Matterface, first of the frigate, pulled in towards the road. The *Carnation* had been directed to cover the boats in their advance; but, owing, as it appears, to the strength of the current and the intricacy of the navigation, the brig did not arrive within gun-shot of the American schooner, and therefore was not of the slightest use. At midnight, after a fatiguing pull against a strong wind and current, the boats got within hail of the *General-Armstrong*, and received from her, and from a battery erected, with a portion of her guns, on the commanding point of land under which she had anchored, a heavy fire of cannon and musketry. In about half an hour, this fire sank two of the boats, and killed or disabled two thirds of the party that had been detached in them. The remainder returned, and at about 2 A. M. on the 27th reached the *Rota*.

The loss appears to have been of the following lamentable amount: the *Rota's* first and third lieutenants (William Matterface and Charles R. Norman), one midshipman, and 31 seamen and marines killed, the *Rota's* second lieutenant (Richard

Rawle), first lieutenant of marines (Thomas Park), purser (William Benge Basden), two midshipmen, and 81 seamen and marines wounded. Among the langridge which the Americans fired, were nails, brass buttons, knife-blades, &c.; and the consequence was, that the wounded, as on former occasions recorded in this work, suffered excruciating pain before they were cured. Soon after daylight the Carnation went into the road to destroy the privateer, but the Americans saved the British the trouble by setting fire to her themselves.



## BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS.

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Two circumstances, in the abstract for the commencement of the present year,\* indicate the return of peace; the small number of line-of-battle cruisers in commission, and the great number of ships sold, taken to pieces, or otherwise removed from the service.†

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the beginning of the year 1815, was,

Admirals	. . . . .	70
Vice-admirals	. . . . .	73
Rear-admirals	. . . . .	76
" superannuated	35	
Post-captains	. . . . .	824
" "	39	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	. . . . .	762
" superannuated	60	
Lieutenants	. . . . .	3211
Masters	* . . . .	666

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same year, was 70,000 for three, and 90,000 for ten, lunar months.‡

On the 2d of January, 1815, his royal highness the prince regent was pleased to advance the splendour, and to extend the limits, of the most honourable military order of the bath, "to the end that those officers, who have had the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by eminent services during the late war,

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 23.

† See Appendix, Nos. 11 and 12.

‡ See Appendix, No. 13.

may share in the honours of the said order, and that their names may be delivered down to remote posterity, accompanied by the marks of distinction which they have so nobly earned." The order of the bath was thenceforward to be composed of three classes. The first class was to consist of knights grand-crosses, and was limited to 72; of whom 12 might be persons who had rendered eminent services to the state in civil and diplomatic employments. The second class, limited to 180, exclusive of 10 foreign officers holding British commissions, was to consist of knights-commanders; and the third class of companions of the bath.

The qualifications of a companion of the bath are thus defined: "No officer shall be nominated a companion of the said most honourable order, unless he shall have received, or shall hereafter receive, a medal, or other badge of honour, or shall have been especially mentioned by name in despatches published in the London Gazette, as having distinguished himself by his valour and conduct in action against his majesty's enemies, since the commencement of the war in 1803, or shall hereafter be named in despatches published in the London Gazette, as having distinguished himself." This was all very proper; but, suppose the board of admiralty should neglect to publish in the "London Gazette" despatches, incontestably showing, that an officer had "distinguished himself by his valour and conduct in action"? For instance, had Captain Manners of the *Reindeer*, after having been hewed and hacked as he was, escaped the two bullets that passed through his head, would he not have deserved to be made a companion, at least, if not a knight-commander, of the bath? But the account of the *Reindeer's* action did not appear in the Gazette: therefore Captain Manners, had he survived, would not have been officially qualified to receive an honour, designed by the sovereign for the exclusive reward of gallantry. Nay, there would have been another impediment in the way. The order descends no lower than post-captains: whereas, in the French navy, even an *enseigne de vaisseau* is deemed eligible to bear an order; and, in a navy-list of a recent date now before us, the names of several of that class appear with an honorary distinction affixed to them.

The sudden return to France, of Napoléon from the island of Elba, again sent Lord Exmouth (the new title, which, since the 14th of May, 1814, had been deservedly bestowed upon Sir Edward Pellew) to the Mediterranean; but, before the admiral had well got to his station, the battle of Waterloo was fought, and shortly afterwards the cause of all this new commotion surrendered himself into the hands of the British. The registers and histories of the period will give the particulars of these important events. It will be enough for us to state, that Buonaparte embarked from Elba on the 24th of February in an armed brig, landed on the afternoon of the 1st of March in the gulf of Juan, near Cannes, and on the 21st entered the capital of France

amidst the greetings of at least 200,000 of the inhabitants. The battle of Waterloo was fought, as need scarcely be stated, on the 18th of June; and on the 15th of July, finding he could not evade the British cruisers and get to the United States, Buonaparte surrendered himself to Captain Frederick Lewis Maitland; of the *Bellerophon* 74, lying in Basque roads. The latter ship immediately conveyed her important charge to Torbay, and then to Plymouth; where the *Bellerophon* arrived on the 26th. On the 7th of August the ex-emperor was removed to the 74-gun ship *Northumberland*, Captain Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir George Cockburn, K.C.B. On the 8th the *Northumberland* sailed for the island of St.-Helena, and, on the 16th of October there safely disembarked the "general" and his few attendants. Europe being thus freed, all parties felt seriously inclined for peace; and on the 20th of November treaties were entered into at Paris between the different powers.

During the short interval of renewed war, that had preceded the execution of these treaties, one or two naval occurrences happened, which require our notice. On the 30th of April, a few miles to the northward of the island of Ischia, the British 74-gun ship *Rivoli*, Captain Edward Sterling Dickson, after a running fight and brave defence of 15 minutes, captured the French 40-gun frigate *Melpomène* Captain Joseph Collet, from Porto-Ferraio to Naples, to take on board Napoléon's mother. The frigate was very much cut up in hull, masts, and rigging, and had six men killed and 28 wounded. The *Rivoli*, on the other hand, had only one man mortally, and a few others slightly wounded.

On the 17th of June, at daylight, the British brig-sloop *Pilot*, of 16 carronades, 32-pounders, and two sixes, Captain John Toup Nicolas, [being about 50 miles to the westward of Cape Corse, observed and chased a ship in the east-north-east. This proved to be the French Buonapartean corvette *Légère*, of 20 carronades, 24-pounders, and two 12-pounders on the main deck, with four or six light guns, probably brass 6-pounders on the quarterdeck, Capitaine de frégate Nicolas Touffet. At 2 p. m. the *Légère* hauled towards the *Pilot*, and, hoisting a tri-coloured pendant and ensign, fired a gun to windward. At 2 h. 30 m., after some manœuvring on both sides to get the weather-gage, the *Pilot* placed herself close on the *Légère*'s weather beam, and hoisted her colours. Observing that the corvette was preparing to make sail to pass ahead, and being at the same moment hailed, "Keep further from us," the *Pilot* fired a shot through the *Légère*'s foresail. A broadside from the French ship immediately followed, and the action commenced within pistol-range. The brig's shot, being from her lee-guns and directed low, evidently struck the hull of her opponent in quick succession, while the *Légère*'s shot passed high, and chiefly disabled the *Pilot*'s rigging and sails.

By 4 P. M. the fire of the *Légère* had considerably slackened, and at 4 h. 30 m. she hauled up her mainsail, and backed her mizen topsail, in order to drop astern. Captain Nicolas endeavoured also to shorten sail; but, having had every brace, bowline, and clue-garnet cut away, the Pilot unavoidably shot ahead. The brig, then, as the only alternative, put her helm up to fire into her opponent's bows. Of this movement on the part of the Pilot, the *Légère* took immediate advantage, by hauling close to the wind, and making off with all the sail she could carry. The yards of the Pilot being wholly unmanageable, her main topgallantmast over the side, her maintopsail yard shot away in the slings, and her stays and the chief part of her standing as well as running rigging cut away, the brig was not in a condition for an immediate pursuit. In about an hour, however, the Pilot got another maintopsail yard across, and the sail set, and by 7 P. M. was going seven knots by the wind in chase of the French corvette, then bearing on her weather bow about six miles distant. The Pilot continued the chase until the 18th, at daylight; when, to the mortification of all on board, it was found that the *Légère* had eluded them in the night.

The principal damages sustained by the Pilot have already been described: her loss amounted to one seaman killed, another mortally wounded, and her first lieutenant (Keigwin Nicolas, the captain's brother), purser (Thomas Rowe), 10 seamen, and two marines wounded. The damages of the *Légère* were almost wholly in her hull and lower masts; and her loss is represented to have amounted, out of a crew that probably was not less than 170 men, to 22 killed and 79 wounded, 64 of them severely.

Even half this loss would show that the guns of the Pilot had been ably managed; and, indeed, the action throughout reflects very great credit upon Captain Nicolas, his officers, and brig's company.

According to the following statement, which has appeared in print, the Pilot was better provided against accidents by shot than any of her unfortunate sister-brigs; such as the *Avon*, *Peacock*, and others. "On rejoining the Pilot (end of 1814), Captain Nicolas applied to the admiralty to have that sloop altered agreeably to a plan he proposed; and by which a shot-hole could be immediately stopped, between wind and water, in any part of the ship: and which, in the former arrangement of the store and bread rooms was impossible. This, it had been confidently asserted, was the principal cause of the capture of the *Avon* and *Peacock*. The admiralty not only complied with his request, but ordered all the 18-gun brigs then under repair at Portsmouth to be fitted on the same plan."\* It is very probable that some improvement had also been made in the fastenings of the Pilot's carronades.

\* Naval Chronicle, vol. xl., p. 427.

The news of the landing of Napoléon in France soon became known at the two principal islands of the French in the West Indies. At Martinique, the governor, the Comte de Vaugiraud, was favourable to Louis XVIII.; but the governor of Guadeloupe, Vice-admiral the Comte Linois, so often named in these pages, was a stanch Buonapartist. The British naval and military commanders-in-chief at the Leeward islands were Rear-admiral Sir Philip Charles Durham, K. C. B., and Lieutenant-general Sir James Leith. Sometime in the month of June, at the request of the Comte de Vaugiraud, a body of British troops landed at Martinique, to aid him in preserving the island for King Louis; and in the month of August Sir Philip Durham and Sir James Leith, assisted by the French Royalist comte, landed a body of troops on the island of Guadeloupe. On the 10th of August, after a skirmish, in which the British army lost 16 killed and about 50 wounded, the Comte Linois surrendered the island by capitulation, and was afterwards, with his adjutant-general, conveyed to France by virtue of one of the articles of the treaty.

The treaty of peace between France and the allies, which was signed at Paris on the 30th of May, 1814, and interrupted for a short time as has already been briefly noticed, was again signed at Paris on the 20th of November, 1815. Of this treaty, it will be only necessary for us to state that, by the 8th article, France received back from Great Britain (not the first time that the latter has ceded by the pen what she had won by the sword) all her colonies, fisheries, factories, and establishments of every kind, as they were possessed by her on the 1st of January, 1792, in the seas, or on the continents, of America, Africa, and Asia; except Tobago and Sainte-Lucie, and the Isle of France, Isle Rodrigue, and the Sechelles.

#### LIGHT SQUADRONS AND SINGLE SHIPS.

In our account of the unfortunate "demonstration" before the city of Baltimore, we mentioned, as one cause of the abandonment of the enterprise, and of the tepidness with which it had been conducted, an "ulterior object" in the view of the naval commander-in-chief. The ulterior object was the city of New-Orleans, the capital of the state of Louisiana. It stands upon the left bank of the river Mississippi, 105 miles, following the stream, and 90 miles, in a direct line, from its mouth. The population of the city, in 1814, was estimated at 23,242 persons. The line of maritime invasion extends from Lake Pontchartrain, on the east, to the river Têche, on the west, intersected by several bays, inlets, and rivers, which furnish avenues of approach to the metropolis. But the flatness of the coast is every where unfavourable for the debarkation of troops; and the bays and inlets being all obstructed by shoals or bars, no landing can be

effected, but by boats, except up the Mississippi; and that has a bar at its mouth, which shoals to 13 or 14 feet water. There were not, it is true, any American 74s, or 60-gun frigates, building or lying blockaded at New-Orleans; but those who suggested the expedition well knew that, as the cotton crops of Louisiana, and of the Mississippi territory, had been for some years in accumulation, the city warehouses contained merchandise to an immense amount. Indeed, considering that New-Orleans was the emporium of the annually increasing productions of a great portion of the western states of the republic, the enormous sum of 3,000,000*l.* was perhaps not an over estimate of what, in the event of even a temporary possession of the city, would have been shared by the captors.

Before we say the little we mean to say on the subject of the attack upon New-Orleans, an unsuccessful enterprise upon a small scale in the vicinity, and which, according to chronological order, should have been included in the preceding year's narrative, requires to be briefly noticed. On the 12th of September, 1814, early in the morning, Captain the Honourable Henry William Percy of the British 20-gun ship *Hermes*, having under his orders the 20-gun ship *Carron*, Captain the Honourable Robert Churchill Spencer, and 18-gun brig-sloops *Sophie* and *Childers*, Captains Nicholas Lockyer and John Brand Umfreville, anchored off the coast of West Florida, about six miles to the eastward of Mobile point, for the purpose of making an attack upon Fort Bowyer situated on that point, and mounting altogether 28 guns, including 11 long 32 and 24 pounders. The ships afterwards got under way and stood towards Mobile point; but, owing to the narrowness of the channel and the intricacy of the navigation, they did not arrive, until the afternoon of the 15th, in the neighbourhood of the fort.

The *Hermes* at last gained a station, within musket-shot distance; the *Sophie*, *Carron*, and *Childers* anchoring in a line astern of her. Previously to this, a detachment of 60 marines and 120 Indians, with a 5½-inch howitzer, under the orders of Major Edward Nicolls, had disembarked on the peninsula. Sixty of the Indians, under Lieutenant Castle, were immediately detached, to secure the pass of Bonsccours, 27 miles to the eastward of the fort. The great distance at which the *Carron* and *Childers* had unavoidably anchored confined the effective cannonade, on the part of the British, to the *Hermes* and *Sophie*; nor was the fire of the latter of much use, as, owing to the rottenness of her timbers, and her defective equipment, her carronades drew the bolts, or turned over at every fire. The *Hermes*, before she had fired many broadsides, having had her cable cut, was carried away by the current, and presented her head to the fort. In that position the British ship remained from 15 to 20 minutes, while the raking fire from the fort kept sweeping the men from her deck. Shortly afterwards the *Hermes* grounded,

directly in front of the fort. Every means were now used to get the ship afloat, but without effect. All the boats were destroyed except one; and, with that one, Captain Percy removed to the *Sophie* the whole of his surviving crew, and then set the ship on fire. The *Hermes* and *Sophie* alone sustained any loss. The first had 25 men killed and 24 wounded; the other six killed and 16 wounded; total, with one marine killed on shore, 32 killed and 40 wounded. The Americans acknowledged a loss of only four killed and four wounded.

On the 8th of December Vice-admiral Cochrane, in the *Tonnant*, with several other ships, arrived and anchored off the *Chandeleur* islands. On the same day two American gun-boats fired at the 38-gun frigate *Armide*, Captain Edward Thomas Troubridge, as, accompanied by the *Seahorse* frigate and *Sophie* brig, she was passing down, within the chain of small islands, that run parallel to the shore from Mobile towards Lake Borgne. Three other gun-boats were presently discovered cruising in the lake. On the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the remainder of the men of war and troop-ships arrived; the 74s anchoring off *Chandeleur* islands, and the frigates and smaller vessels between Cat island and the main, not far from the entrance to Lake Borgne. The bayou Catalan, or *Bienvenu*, at the head of Lake Borgne, being the contemplated point of disembarkation, the distance from the anchorage at Cat island to the bayou 62 miles, and the principal means of transport open boats, it became impossible that any movement of the troops could take place until these gun-boats were destroyed. It was also an object to get possession of them in a serviceable state, that they might assist, as well in transporting the troops, as in the attack of any of the enemy's forts in the route. Accordingly on the night of the 12th, 42 launches, armed with 24, 18, and 12 pounder carronades, and three unarmed gigs, carrying, altogether, about 980 seamen and marines, under the orders of Captain Lockyer, assisted by Captains Henry Montresor and Samuel Roberts, of the brig-sloop *Manly* and bomb-vessel *Meteor*, in three divisions, each commanded by a captain in the order named, pushed off from the *Armide*.

The American gun-boats, which were the object of attack, consisted of No. 156, mounting one long 24-pounder on a traversing carriage, four 12-pounder carronades, and four swivels, with 41 men on board, commanded by Lieutenant-commandant Thomas Ap Catesby Jones; No. 23, mounting one long 32-pounder on a traversing carriage, six long 6-pounders, two 5-inch howitzers and four swivels, with 39 men on board, commanded by Lieutenant Isaac M'Keene; No. 162, one long 24-pounder, four 6-pounders and four swivels, with 35 men, commanded by Lieutenant Robert Spedden; Nos. 5 and 163, each armed with the same carriage-guns No. 23, the first with 36 men, commanded by sailing-master John D. Ferris, the other with 31 men, commanded

by sailing-master George Ulick; schooner Seahorse, of one 6-pounder and 14 men, sailing-master William Johnson; and sloop Alligator, of one 4-pounder and eight men; sailing-master Richard S. Sheppard. We have taken the number of men from the American official account; but Captain Lockyer's letter makes the number greater. And, as Lieutenant Jones did certainly mistake the force of his little squadron in guns, there is every probability that he also underrated the number of his men.

On the 13th, at 10 A. M., from his anchorage at the Malheureux islands, Lieutenant Jones discovered the boats advancing towards Passe Christian, as he supposed, to disembark troops. He immediately detached the Seahorse to bay St.-Louis, to destroy the stores there; and at 3 h. 30 m. P. M., when the flood-tide made, got under way with the remaining vessels and stood towards the Petites-Coquilles. At about 3 h. 45 m. Captain Lockyer despatched some boats to cut out the Seahorse, who had moored herself advantageously under the protection of two 6-pounders mounted on a commanding point. It appears that, after sustaining a very destructive fire for nearly half an hour, the boats were repulsed; considering his position untenable against a greater force, Mr. Johnson set fire to his vessel and the warehouses containing the stores, and the whole were consumed.

On the 14th, at 1 A. M., Lieutenant Jones moored his five principal gun-vessels with springs on their cables and boarding-netting triced up, in a close line abreast, athwart the narrow channel called Malheureux-island passage, and made every preparation to give the British boats a warm reception. At about 9 h. 30 m. A. M., observing the Alligator trying to rejoin her five consorts at anchor, Captain Lockyer detached Captain Roberts with a few boats to take her. This was speedily accomplished without much opposition. Having arrived within long gun-shot of the enemy, and the men having pulled 36 miles, a great part of the way against a strong current, Captain Lockyer brought the boats to a grapnel and allowed the crews to take their breakfasts. This done, at about 10 h. 30 m. A. M. the boats weighed, and took again to their oars; pulling against a strong current of at least three knots an hour, and being exposed all the while to a heavy and destructive fire of round and grape from the long guns of the American flotilla.

At about noon Captain Lockyer, and Lieutenant George Pratt, in the second barge of the Seahorse, closed with the gun-boat of the American commodore; and, after an obstinate struggle, in which the greater part of the officers and men in the boat were either killed or wounded, including among the wounded the captain himself severely, and Lieutenant Pratt mortally, succeeded in boarding her. Seconded, then, by the Seahorse's first barge commanded by midshipman George Robert White, and by the boats of the Tonnant under Lieutenant James Barnwell Tattnell, the British soon carried the gun-boat. Lieutenant Tatt-



nall had his boat sunk alongside ; but, getting on board another, gallantly pushed on to the attack of the remaining four gun-vessels. Upon these the guns of No. 156 were now turned ; and, in the course of five minutes, with the assistance of the second and third divisions of boats under Captains Montresor and Roberts, they were all secured.

The loss on the British side was extremely severe, occasioned, except in the instance of Captain Lockyer's boat, and those already named as supporting him in the attack upon No. 256, by the heavy fire opened upon the boats in their tedious advance against the current. Three midshipmen (Thomas W. Moore, John Mills, and Henry Symons), 13 seamen, and one private marine were killed, and one captain (Nicholas Lockyer), four lieutenants (William Gilbert Roberts, John Franklin, Henry Gladwell Etough, and George Pratt, the latter mortally), one lieutenant of marines (James Uniacke), three master's mates (Mark Pettel, James Hunter, and John Sudbury), seven midshipmen (John O'Reilly, Robert Uniacke, Peter Drummond, George Ward Cole, William Grove White, David M'Kenzie, and — Pilkington, the latter mortally), 50 seamen, and 11 private marines wounded ; total, 17 killed and 77 wounded. The loss on board the American flotilla was comparatively trifling, amounting to six men killed and 35 wounded, including among the latter Lieutenant Jones, the commanding officer, who conducted himself with great bravery. For the gallantry which they displayed on the occasion, Captains Lockyer, Montresor, and Roberts were deservedly made post ; and some of the lieutenants and midshipmen also received a step in rank.

The obstacle to a passage through the lakes being now removed, the disembarkation of the troops commenced. On the 16th the first division, consisting of the 85th regiment, landed at Isle-aux-Poix, a small swampy spot, at the mouth of the Pearl river, about 30 miles from the anchorage, and nearly the same distance from the bayou Catalan, or Bienvenu, intended as the point of disembarkation. Various causes delayed the arrival of the boats at the fishermen's village, near the entrance of the bayou, until midnight on the 22d ; at which time the advance, consisting in all of 1688 men, under the command of Colonel Thornton of the 85th regiment, commenced ascending the bayou Mazaut, or principal branch of the Bienvenu ; and, at 4 A. M. on the 23d, landed at the extremity of Villeré's canal, running from the Mazaut towards the Mississippi. We must not, however, trench upon the province of the military historian. We shall, therefore, merely state, that on the 8th of January, 1815, an unsuccessful attack was made by the British army, under Major-general Sir Edward Pakenham, upon the strongly fortified position of the American Major-general Jackson ; and that the loss on the part of the former, amounted to the enormous total, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of nearly 2000 men, including among

the killed the brave commander-in-chief. The full details of the action have already appeared in a work devoted exclusively to the subject of the military operations of the late American war; and to that, on account more particularly of the quantity of naval matter yet to be included in this volume, we must beg to refer the reader.\*

Early in the month of December Rear-admiral Cockburn, in the *Albion*, from Bermuda, bringing with him the *Orlando* frigate and some smaller vessels, arrived in the Chesapeake, but merely to carry away the colonial marines; with whom, on the 14th, the rear-admiral steered towards Amelia Island, in East Florida; having left orders for Captain Barrie to follow, with the *Dragon*, *Hebrus*, and *Regulus*. Captain Barrie accordingly departed soon afterwards, leaving a few frigates and sloops in the Chesapeake; and on the 10th of January, arrived off Cumberland island, the southernmost of the chain along the coast of Georgia, and separated by Cumberland sound from Amelia island.

Rear-admiral Cockburn not having yet arrived, Captain Philip Somerville of the 38-gun frigate *Rota*, as the senior officer, determined upon employing the two companies of the 2d West-India regiment, and the detachments of royal marines which had recently arrived on that coast, in a combined attack upon the frontier-town of the state of Georgia, *St.-Mary's*, situated a few miles up the river of that name, dividing the United States from East Florida. On the 13th an attack, with about 700 troops, marines, and seamen, under the command of Captain Barrie, was made on the fort, or key to the entrance of the river, at Point Petre. This fort mounted two 24, two 18, one 9, and two brass 6, pounders; from which, however, scarcely a single discharge was made, ere the garrison abandoned the post, and fled to the woods in the rear. On the 14th, the combined forces, accompanied by the bomb-vessels *Devastation* and *Terror*, Captains Thomas Alexander and John Sheridan, ascended the river to *St.-Mary's*. Contrary to expectation, here, also, no resistance was made; and the town, the shipping in the harbour, and the merchandise in the stores, were taken quiet possession of. Soon afterwards an expedition of boats went a considerable distance further up the river, and brought down the *Countess-of-Harcourt* Indianan, which had been captured and carried in there by a Charlestown privateer; also a beautiful gun-boat, named the *Scorpion*, a present from the town of *St.-Mary's* to the United States.

On the 15th of January Rear-admiral Cockburn, who had been blown off the coast by strong north-west gales, arrived and took the command; and on the 22d, after removing the guns, and destroying the fort and barracks, at Point Petre, the British

\* James's Military Occurrences, vol. ii., p. 355.

descended the river to Cumberland island ; of which immediate possession was taken. The troops and marines were here encamped ; and the rear-admiral established his head-quarters at a very large house, surrounding it with the ordnance brought from Point Petre. On the 22d of February eight launches, two pinnaces, and one gig, containing 186 officers, seamen, and marines, under the command of Captain Phillott, of the *Primrose*, assisted by Captain Bartholomew, of the *Erebus*, ascended the St.-Mary's river, without opposition, 120 miles ; when a heavy fire of musketry, opening upon them from each side, compelled the British to retreat. While daylight lasted, a spirited fire was kept up by the boats ; but, unfortunately, after dark, the men could not be restrained from firing, by which they exposed themselves to the view of the enemy. The river, in some parts, was so narrow, that a couple of stout trees, many of which were on the banks, felled and thrown across, would have completely cut off the retreat of the boats. That not having been done, the boats got back to the island, with four killed, and 25 wounded, including among the latter the two captains ; also lieutenant of marines John Fraser, and midshipmen James Everingham and Jonathan Haworth Peel.

Rear-admiral Cockburn remained at his fortified house on Cumberland island, awaiting the arrival of some troops, to aid in making an attack upon the town of Savannah in Georgia ; when, on the 25th of February, the American general in the vicinity apprized him, that peace had been concluded between the United States and Great Britain. Such was the fact. The treaty had been signed at Ghent on the 24th of December, 1814, and was ratified by the president at Washington on the 18th of February, 1815. Of its terms, we shall merely say, that "Free trade and sailors' rights," the avowed object of the war, remained precisely in the same undefined state, as before it was declared by Mr. Madison and his senate. "Canada," said an American writer at the early part of the war, "must be conquered, or we shall stand disgraced in the eyes of the world. It is a rod held over our heads ; a fortress which haughtily frowns upon our country, and from which are disseminated throughout the land, the seed of disaffection, sedition, and treason. The national safety and honour and glory are lost, if we do not win this splendid prize." And yet, in spite of Sir George Prevost and his acts, Canada remained unconquered. Although an end had been put to hostile operations on shore, we have still two or three naval actions to record.

We formerly stated, that Commodore Decatur had removed with his crew on board the *President* frigate at New-York. This ship, like the *United-States* and *Constitution*, had made some reduction in her armament : she had landed two of her 42-pounder carronades ; which, we believe, were put on board

the brig-sloop the Syren, then fitting for sea in the port. The American government being still determined upon an expedition to the East Indies, a squadron consisting of the President, Peacock, and Hornet, with the Macedonian and Tom-Bowline brigs, laden with stores for their use, was ordered to proceed to the bay of Bengal. On the night of the 18th of November the Hornet, which had been left at New London as a guard-ship, succeeded in eluding the blockading force, and reached New-York.

The British squadron which, towards the close of the year 1814, cruised off the port of New-York, was commanded by Captain John Hayes, of the 56-gun ship Majestic, who had under his orders the 40-gun frigate Endymion, Captain Henry Hope, and the 38-gun frigate Pomone, Captain John Richard Lumley. Between the time of her quitting Halifax and her junction with Captain Hayes, the Endymion had experienced a serious misfortune. On the 9th of October, when off the shoals of Nantucket, she fell in with the American privateer brig Prince-de-Neufchatel, of 18 guns and 120 or 130 men. It being calm, Captain Hope detached his boats, under the orders of Lieutenant Abel Hawkins, first of the Endymion, to capture the privateer. The boats were repulsed, after sustaining the loss of Lieutenant Hawkins, one midshipman, and 26 seamen and marines killed, the second lieutenant, one master's mate, and 35 seamen and marines wounded: besides which the launch was captured, and the crew made prisoners. So determined and effective a resistance did great credit to the American captain and his crew. On the 31st the Endymion fell in with the 56-gun ship Saturn, Captain James Nash, bound to Halifax; and, sending on board, with her surgeon and his servant, 28 wounded officers and men, received from the Saturn, to replace the severe loss she had sustained, one lieutenant, four midshipmen, and 33 seamen and marines.

On the 13th of January, 1815, Captain Hayes was joined by the 38-gun frigate Tenedos, Captain Hyde Parker. Although at this time close off the Hook and in sight of the American squadron at anchor near Staten island, the British ships were the same evening blown off the coast by a violent snow-storm. On the next day, the 14th, the weather became more moderate; but, the wind blowing fresh from the west-north-west, the squadron could not get in with the Hook. Having no doubt that Commodore Decatur would take advantage as well of the favourable state of the wind as of the absence of the British squadron, Captain Hayes, in preference to closing the land to the southward, stood away to the northward and eastward, with the view of taking a station in the supposed track of the American squadron on its way out; and, singular enough, at the very instant of arriving at that point, about an hour before daylight

on the 15th, Sandy-Hook bearing west-north-west distant 15 leagues, the principal object of search to all the British captains made her appearance very near them.

Considering the chance of escape greater, by taking a separate departure with the ships of his squadron, Commodore Decatur, on the afternoon of the 14th, weighed and put to sea with the President and brig Macedonian, having left directions with Captain Warrington, to join him at the island of Tristan-d'Acunha, with the Peacock, Hornet, and Tom-Bowline. At 8 h. 30 m. P. M., owing partly to a mistake in the pilots and partly to the ship's increased draught of water from the quantity of stores on board of her, the President struck on the bar, and did not get off for an hour and a half. Having, besides some trifling damage to her rudder, shifted her ballast and got herself out of trim, the President would have put back, but the strong westerly wind prevented her. Accompanied by the brig, the American frigate now shaped her course along the shore of Long island for 50 miles, then steered south-east by south, until, at 5 A. M. on the 15th, she encountered the Majestic and her companions. Three of the ships appearing right ahead, the President hauled up, and passed about two miles to the northward of them; and at daylight Commodore Decatur found himself, as he states, chased by four ships; the Majestic about five miles astern, the Endymion a little further in the same direction, the Pomone six or eight miles on his larboard, and the Tenedos barely in sight on his starboard quarter. The Tenedos, indeed, having parted from her squadron the preceding evening, was taken for a second enemy's ship, and Captain Hayes ordered the Pomone, by signal, to bear away in chase of her. Consequently the President, at first, was pursued by the Majestic and Endymion only.

These and the American frigate were soon under all sail, steering about east by north, with the wind now at north-west by north. At 6 h. 30 m. A. M. the Majestic fired three shot at the President, but, owing to the distance, without effect; nor, for the same reason probably, were they returned. Towards noon the wind decreased; and the Endymion, in consequence, began to leave the Majestic and gain upon the President. At 1 h. 15 m. P. M. the American frigate commenced lightening herself, by starting her water, cutting away her anchors, throwing overboard provisions, spare spars, boats, and every article of the sort that could be got at: she also kept her sails constantly wet from the royals down. At 2 P. M. the President opened a fire from her stern guns; which, at 2 h. 30 m., the Endymion returned with her bow-chasers. At 2 h. 39 m. P. M. a shot from the President came through the head of the larboard fore lower studding-sail, the foot of the mainsail, and the stern of the barge on the booms, and, perforating the quarterdeck, lodged on the main deck, without doing any other damage. Towards 5 P. M.,

owing to the advance of the *Endymion* on her starboard and lee quarter, the *President* luffed occasionally, to bring her stern guns to bear, and was evidently much galled; whereas the greater part of her shot passed over the *Endymion*.

At 5 h. 30 m. p.m., the *Endymion* having for the last 20 minutes maintained a position within half point-blank shot on her quarter, the *President* brailed up her spanker, and bore away south, to bring her antagonist upon her beam and endeavour to effect her escape to leeward. Putting her helm hard a-weather, the *Endymion* met the manœuvre; and the two frigates came to close action in a parallel line of sailing. At 6 h. 4 m. p.m. the *President* commenced with musketry from her tops, and the *Endymion* returned the fire with her marines; hauling up occasionally, to close her antagonist, without losing the bearing of her broadside. The two ships were now not more than half musket-shot apart; the *Endymion* with her rigging and sails considerably cut, and the *President* with the principal part of her damage in the hull, as betrayed by the slackened state of her fire.

At 6 h. 45 m. the *President* hauled up, apparently to avoid her opponent's fire. Profiting by this, the *Endymion* poured in two raking broadsides; then hauled up also, and again placed herself on the *President*'s starboard quarter. At 7 h. 15 m. the *President* shot away the *Endymion*'s boat from her larboard quarter, also her lower and maintopgallant studding-sails. From 7 h. 18 m. to 7 h. 25 m. the *President* did not return a shot to the vigorous fire still maintained by the *Endymion*. Recommencing, then, the *President* shot away the *Endymion*'s maintopmast studding-sail and main brace, and at 7 h. 32 m. hauled suddenly to the wind, as if to try the strength of her antagonist's masts. Having no fear for these, the *Endymion* trimmed sails, and, hauling up, bestowed another raking fire; to which the *President*, now evidently much shattered, replied with a discharge from one stern gun. In 10 minutes the American frigate kept more away, firing only at intervals; and at 7 h. 58 m. ceased altogether and showed, or appeared to show (for we are doubtful of the fact), a light. Conceiving that the *President* had struck, the *Endymion* also ceased firing, and began to bend new sails, her present ones having been cut into ribands by the *President*'s bar and chain shot; one of which had torn away 12 or 14 cloths of her foresail, stripping it almost from the yard.

While the *Endymion* was thus compelled to drop astern, the *President* continued her course to the eastward, under a crowd of canvass, much relieved, no doubt, by the absence of the former. At 11 h. 15 m. p.m. the *Pomone* gained a position upon the *President*'s larboard quarter, and, luffing up, fired her starboard broadside, but did little or no damage. The *President* immediately shortened sail and luffed up also, as if to pour a broadside into the *Pomone*. Instead of that, however, the

American frigate hailed that she had surrendered, and hoisted a light in her mizen rigging. Not hearing the hail, and mistaking the object of the light, the Pomone fired a second broadside, acknowledged to have been as ineffectual as the first. On this, the President luffed up still sharper, as if to lay the Pomone on board, and instantly hauled down her light, again hailing that she had surrendered. At this time the Tenedos, who had been hailed by the Endymion and informed that the only two boats her misfortune with the Neufchatel had left her were destroyed, ranged up on the President's starboard side, and, hailing, was answered: "The American frigate President: we have surrendered." Captain Parker immediately sent a boat and took possession; as did nearly at the same moment, Captain Lumley of the Pomone. At a few minutes before 9 p. m., having in the short space of 54 minutes, besides repairing her running rigging, bent new courses, main topsail, jib, foretopmast staysail, and spanker, and trimmed them to the wind, the Endymion went again in chase, as fresh as when she began the action. At 9 h. 45 m. the Endymion was hailed, as just mentioned, by the Tenedos, and was not very far astern of the latter at 11 h. 30 m. p. m., when the President struck.

The principal damages sustained by the Endymion have already been detailed. Her fore topmast was struck badly, but none of her other masts in any serious degree. Out of her 319 men and 27 boys in crew, the Endymion had 10 seamen and one sergeant of marines killed, and 12 seamen and two private marines wounded. If the high firing of the President displayed its effects in the disordered rigging and sails of the Endymion, the low firing of the Endymion was equally conspicuous in the shattered hull and lower masts of the President. The starboard side of the ship was riddled from end to end, particularly near the quarter. Almost every port-sill and port-timber, both on the main and the quarter deck, exhibited marks of shot. Three shot had entered the buttock, one of which had passed into the after magazine. Several shot had entered between wind and water, and some under water, which had cut the knees and timbers much. A great many shot had also passed through the ship, between the main and quarter decks and in the waist; but, as a proof of the slight effect of the Pomone's fire, one shot only had entered on the larboard side: it passed through at the tenth port, and carried away the upper sill, clamp, and diagonal knees. With so many shot-holes in her hull, the President might well have six feet water in the hold. Five or six of her guns were completely disabled. Out of her 465 men and four boys in crew, the President had three lieutenants, and 32 petty officers, seamen, and marines killed, her commander (slightly), master, two midshipmen, and 66 seamen and marines wounded; total, 35 killed and 70 wounded.

Of the Endymion's force in guns we have already given a

full account. Her brass 18-pounder on the fore-castle, we shall not include in the broadside force, because it could not, by possibility, be used there, without displacing one of the 32-pounder carronades.\* The boat-carronade we shall also reject, for the reason formerly given. That leaves the *Endymion* with 24 guns upon her broadside. Her established net complement was 347 men and boys; but her loss by the *Neufchatel*, and the deficiency with which she had originally quitted port, left the *Endymion* with the number already stated.

The President had landed in all, four of her 24 carronades,† one pair at the beginning of the war and the other pair recently; but, like the *Constitution*, the President now fought one of her two upper-deck 24-pounders through a spare port on her quarter-deck, and the other through a spare port on the fore-castle. She mounted also upon a travelling carriage, a brass 8-inch howitzer; for which there was a spare port at the gangway. We shall consider this gun, although of a 68-pound caliber, merely as a 24-pounder. In her fore top the President mounted two brass 4-pounders, in her main top the same, and one in her mizen top. These guns, although they were evidently used, and must have produced some effect on the *Endymion's* deck, we shall not reckon as a part of the President's force. This leaves the American frigate 53 guns on her decks, and 28 of them in broadside.

The number of prisoners delivered to the agent at Bermuda was 434. Add to these, beside the 35 acknowledged by the President's officers to have been killed, six or seven too badly wounded to be removed, and we have 475 as the President's complement; just two less than were named in her watch-bill. Yet Commodore Decatur and two of his officers swore before the surrogate, that the President had "about 450, but certainly not 460, men when the action commenced." The consequence of this oath, this American oath, was, that the captors got head-money for 450 men only; when there was proof positive that 469, and every probability that 477, men were in the ship at the time stated. We shall take the number of which there was that proof, 465 men and four boys. The President's ship's company were a remarkably stout set of men, and a great many British deserters were discovered among them; but, as the news of the peace very soon arrived, the men were not molested.

On the 17th, in a violent storm from the eastward, the *Endymion* lost her bowsprit and her fore and main masts; the latter chiefly from the shrouds giving way where they had been knotted after the action. The ship was also obliged to throw overboard the whole of her quarter-deck and fore-castle guns. In the same gale, the President carried away all three of her masts.

\* See p. 323.

† See p. 5.



Several of her guns were also thrown overboard; and, in the battered state of her hull by the Endymion's fire, it was considered a mercy to the people on board that she did not founder. On the 25th the two ships arrived at Bermuda. We will now give the

## COMPARATIVE FORCE OF THE COMBATANTS.

		ENDYMION.	PRESIDENT
Broadside-guns . . . . .	No.	24	28
	lbs.	664	852
Crew (men only) . . . . .	No.	319	465
Size . . . . .	tons	1277	1533

As soon as the gale of wind had dismasted and otherwise disabled the Endymion, so as to leave an inference that the shot of the President had mainly contributed to reduce her to that state, Commodore Decatur wrote his official letter. In a very few days after his arrival at Bermuda, the communicativeness of one of his officers made him regret that he had despatched the letter. Mr. Bowie, the President's schoolmaster, when deposing before the surrogate relative to the capture of the ship, says: "When the Endymion dropped astern, we were confident of escaping. Shortly after, discovered two ships coming up (Pomone and Tenedos), when Commodore Decatur ordered all hands below to take care of their bags. One of the ships commenced firing; and Commodore Decatur called out, 'We have surrendered,' and gave this deponent the trumpet to hail, and say, they had surrendered. The Pomone's fire did damage to the rigging, but neither killed nor wounded any person. The President did not return the Pomone's fire, but hoisted a light in the mizen rigging, as a sign of submission." Again: "When the two ships were coming up, a light was hoisted in the mizen rigging of the President, as this deponent conceived at the time, as an ensign or flag, but, as he afterwards had reason to believe, as a sign that they had surrendered; for this deponent observed to the commodore, that, as long as that light was hoisted, the ships would fire: upon which Commodore Decatur ordered it to be taken down." To counteract the mischievous tendency of Mr. Bowie's averment about the harmless fire of the Pomone; Commodore Decatur wrote from New-York a supplementary letter, commencing: "I omitted to state, that a considerable number of my killed and wounded was from the fire of the Pomone." The one shot that entered on the larboard side might, to be sure, have killed and wounded a few men; but then, says, or rather swears, Mr. Bowie, "the men were all, just then, down below taking care of their bags." Oh! Mr. Bowie, Mr. Bowie, you were but half an American; and no wonder we do not find your name among the officers belonging to the United States' navy in April, 1816.

Although Commodore Decatur's first official letter is a very long one, and contains a great many inaccuracies, we shall notice only two paragraphs. One is: "I remained with her (the *Endymion*) in this position for half an hour, in the hope that she would close with us on our broadside, in which case I had prepared my crew to board; but, from his continuing to yaw his ship to maintain his position, it became evident, that to close was not his intention." The other: "It is with emotions of pride I bear testimony to the gallantry and steadiness of every officer and man I had the honour to command on this occasion; and I feel satisfied that the fact of their having beaten a force equal to themselves, in the presence, and almost under the guns of so vastly a superior force, when, too, it was almost self-evident that, whatever their exertions might be, they must ultimately be captured, will be taken as evidence of what they would have performed, had the force opposed to them been in any degree equal."

Passing over the illiberal insinuation cast upon a gallant British officer, upon one especially, who, as the commodore acknowledges, paid every attention to himself and his officers, "that delicacy and humanity could dictate," by the words, "it became evident, that to close was not his intention," we come to an inquiry into the fact, of whether or not Commodore Decatur did intend "to board the *Endymion*." An extract or two from his own letter will, we think, establish the point. He states, that at 8 h. 30 m. the *President* "completely succeeded in dismantling her," the *Endymion*, whom he had previously shown to be on his lee quarter; and yet it was not until 11 p. m. that "two fresh ships of the enemy came up." What was to have prevented Commodore Decatur, had such been his intention, from boarding the *Endymion* during this long interval? The truth is, such an idea never entered his head, until some one, after the affair was over, pointed out to him what a chance he had missed of distinguishing himself. Admitting that Commodore Decatur had succeeded in capturing the *Endymion*, of which there is a very strong doubt, by boarding, he would, it is true, have been able to hold possession for only a quarter of an hour or 20 minutes. Still he would have had all the credit of the thing; and the subsequent capture of the *President* and recapture of the *Endymion*, by a force so overwhelming as that which was approaching, would not, in the slightest degree, have detracted from his merit.

Although the *President* did not inflict upon the *Endymion* above one-fourth of the numerical loss which she herself sustained; although, while the latter did not have a single warrant-officer touched, the former had three lieutenants killed, and her master and two midshipmen wounded; although the hull of the British ship was very little struck, and that of the *President* was shattered from stem to stern; although, in short, very little

injury was done to the *Endymion* more than her own active crew replaced in less than an hour, still the President had "beaten" the *Endymion*. When Commodore Decatur was writing his official letter, he had been two days on board the *Endymion*, and had found time enough to discover, that her wounded men occupied "the starboard side of the gundeck from the cabin bulkhead to the mainmast;" and yet he had the hardihood to declare to his government and the world, that the *Endymion*, the ship he had so "beaten," was equal in force to the President.

On the 17th of April a court of inquiry was summoned at New-York, to investigate the circumstances under which the President had been captured. After what has already appeared in these pages on the subject of American courts of inquiry, after Captain Joseph Bainbridge could be honourably acquitted for the manner in which he gave up the *Frolic*, we cannot be surprised that the court should decree, that the "*Endymion* was subdued," that the "proposition to board her" was "heroic," and that Commodore Decatur "evinced great judgment and skill, perfect coolness, the most determined resolution and heroic courage," and so forth.

Although, by a sort of endemial tack at telling his own story, the commodore may have raised himself in the esteem of Americans, the manner in which he yielded up the President, coupled with the shifts and quirks, and the misrepresentations to which he afterwards resorted, have sunk the name of Decatur, in the opinion of every well-informed European, quite as low as that of Rodgers, Bambridge, or Porter. The case of the *Endymion* and President has been compared with that of the *Eurotas* and *Clorinde*.\* Both the French and the American frigate, it is true, were about equally battered in hull; but there was this difference in the conduct of their commanders: Captain Denis-Lagarde, when he surrendered, had only his foremast standing; whereas Commodore Decatur had all his three royal-masts on-end, and even the sails set upon them.

If we have been, or shall again be, a little more severe upon the Americans, generally, than accords with the impartial character of these pages, they have themselves, and themselves only, to thank. Have they not been trying to persuade the rest of the world, that their naval officers and seamen surpass all others; that they are, in short, "invincible?" Who has ever heard an American acknowledge, that any ship of his was taken by an equal force? Where can an American be found, who will not persist in declaring, that an equal force captured the *Guerrière*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*, the *Frolic*, *Peacock*, and their sister-brigs? One fact is remarkable. Where the Americans have met a decidedly superior force, or an equal force that

\* See vol. iv., p. 60.

routed them about in an unexpected manner, they have invariably dropped their crests, and have lost the respect of their conquerors by the tameness of their surrender.

It would be an injustice to Captain Hope, not to notice the peculiar modesty of his official letter. He speaks of the cool and determined bravery of his officers and ship's company on the "fortunate occasion;" says, truly, that, "where every individual had so conspicuously done his duty, it would be injustice to particularize;" and, in proof of the exertions and abilities of his men, appeals to "the loss and damages sustained by the enemy's frigate." In his letter to Rear-admiral Hotham, enclosing that of Captain Hope, Captain Hayes does ample justice to the *Endymion*; confirms every statement in her log-extract, which is the groundwork of our account; and emphatically adds: "When the effect produced by her well-directed fire upon the *President* is witnessed, it cannot be doubted, that Captain Hope would have succeeded either in capturing or sinking her, had none of the squadron been in sight." The senior lieutenant on board the *Endymion*, William Thomas Morgan, was deservedly promoted to the rank of commander.

On the 8th of March, after having undergone a partial repair, the *President*, accompanied by the *Endymion*, sailed from Bermuda for England; and on the 28th both ships arrived at Spithead. The *President*, of course, was added to the British navy; but her serious damages in the action, coupled with the length of time she had been in service, prevented her from being of any greater utility, than that of affording to Englishmen, many of whom, till then, had been the dupes of their transatlantic "brethren," ocular demonstration of the "equal force" by which their frigates had been captured.

On the 26th of February the British schooner *St.-Lawrence*, of 12 carronades, 12-pounders, and one long 9-pounder, commanded by Lieutenant Henry Crammer Gordon, while proceeding with despatches from Rear-admiral Cockburn, relating to the peace between Great Britain and the United States, fell in with the American privateer-brig *Chasseur*, of six long 9-pounders, and eight carronades, 18-pounders, commanded by Captain Thomas Boyle. The brig attacked the schooner, and an engagement ensued; which, the Americans state, lasted at close quarters only 15 minutes, when the *St.-Lawrence* was carried by boarding. No British official account has been published; but unofficial accounts state, that the action continued much longer.

The *St.-Lawrence* was a good deal cut up; and, according to a *New Providence* paper, lost out of her crew (exclusive of some passengers) of 42 men and nine boys, six men killed and 18 wounded. The Americans made the killed, as they generally do, much greater. The *Chasseur* was also injured in her hull and spars; and lost, by the American returns, out of a comple-

ment of 115 men, five men killed and eight wounded. Men are not in the best trim for fighting, just upon receiving the news of peace. Sailors are then dwelling upon their discharge from servitude, the sight of long absent friends, and all the ties of their homes and families. But even that, although it perhaps contributed to weaken the efforts, could not impair the courage, of the crew of the *St.-Lawrence*: they defended her, until nearly half their numbers were killed or wounded.

The British force stationed in Boston bay in the beginning of December, 1814, consisted of the 50-gun ship *Newcastle*, Captain Lord George Stuart, 18-pounder 40-gun frigate *Acasta*, Captain Alexander Robert Kerr, and 18-gun brig-sloop *Arab*, Captain Henry Jane. On the 11th, when this squadron was cruising off *St.-George's* shoals, the *Newcastle* parted company, to reconnoitre the road of Boston. On the 12th Lord George discovered lying there the 44-gun frigate *Constitution*, Captain Charles Stewart, in apparent readiness for sea, and the *Independance* 74, with her lower yards and topmasts struck. The *Newcastle* then steered for Cape Cod bay; where, in a few hours, after having grounded for a short time on a shoal, she came to an anchor. On the 13th one of her men, from a boat sent on shore, deserted to the Americans. On the 16th the *Acasta* arrived, and anchored near the *Newcastle*.

On the 17th, having ascertained, in all probability from the *Newcastle's* deserter, that the two blockading frigates were not in a situation to offer him any annoyance, Captain Stewart put to sea. The *Constitution* stood across the Atlantic to the coast of Spain and Portugal, and cruised for some time off the rock of Lisbon. In the latter end of January, or beginning of February, Captain Stewart stretched over to the Western isles, and was tracked and followed by the British 38-gun frigate *Tiber*, Captain James Richard Dacres. The latter boarded two or three neutral vessels, which had been boarded by the American frigate only a few hours before. At one time, it appears, the *Constitution* actually got a sight of the *Tiber*, but did not shorten sail, because Captain Stewart, as he is said to have subsequently admitted, thought it probable that the ship was the *Eurotas*, or some other of the newly fitted 24-pounder frigates, detached in pursuit of him.

On the 20th of February, at 1 p. m., the island of Madeira bearing west-south-west, distant 60 leagues, the *Constitution*, steering to the south-west with a light breeze from the eastward, discovered, about two points on her larboard bow, and immediately hauled up for, the British 22-gun ship *Cyane*,\* Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon, standing close hauled on the starboard tack, and about 10 miles to windward of her consort, the 20-gun ship *Levant* (18 carronades, 32-pounders, and two nines),

\* For her force, see vol. v., p. 174.

Captain and senior officer the Honourable George Douglas. At 1 h. 45 m. the Constitution got sight of the Levant, then bearing right ahead of her. At 4 p. m., having stood on to ascertain the character of the stranger, the Cyane made the private signal; and, finding it not answered, bore up for her consort, with the signal flying for an enemy. The Constitution immediately made all sail in chase, and at 5 p. m. commenced firing her larboard bow guns, but ceased soon afterwards, finding her shot fall short. At 5 h. 30 m., the Cyane having arrived within hail of the Levant, Captain Douglas expressed to Captain Gordon his resolution to engage the enemy's frigate (known from previous information to be the Constitution), notwithstanding her superior force, in the hope, by disabling her, to save two valuable convoys, that had sailed from Gibraltar a few days previous in company with the two British ships.

At 5 h. 45 m. p. m. the Levant and Cyane made all sail upon a wind, in order to try for the weathergage. In 10 minutes, finding they could not accomplish their object, the two ships bore up, with the view of delaying the commencement of the action until night; when they might hope, by skilful manœuvring, to engage with more advantage. The superior sailing of the Constitution defeating that plan also, the Levant and Cyane, at 6 p. m., hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, formed in head and stern line, at the distance of rather less than 200 yards apart. At 6 h. 5 m. the Constitution, all three ships having previously hoisted their colours, opened her larboard broadside upon the Cyane, at the distance of about three quarters of a mile on the latter's weather beam. The Cyane promptly returned the fire; but her shot, being all fired from carronades, fell short, while the frigate's long 24-pounders were producing their full effect. In 15 minutes the Constitution ranged ahead, and became engaged in the same manner with the Levant. The Cyane now luffed up for the larboard quarter of the Constitution: whereupon the latter, backing astern, was enabled to pour into the Cyane her whole broadside.

Meanwhile the Levant had bore up, to wear round and assist her consort. The Constitution thereupon filled, shot ahead, and gave the Levant two stern rakes. Seeing this, the Cyane, although without a brace or bowline except the larboard fore brace, wore, and gallantly stood between the Levant and Constitution. The latter then promptly wore, and raked the Cyane astern. The Cyane immediately luffed up as well as she could, and fired her larboard broadside at the starboard bow of the Constitution. The latter soon afterwards ranged up on the larboard quarter of the Cyane, within hail, and was about to pour in her starboard broadside; when, at 6 h. 50 m. p. m., having had most of her standing and running rigging cut to pieces, her main and mizen masts left in a tottering state, and other principal spars wounded, several shot in the hull, nine or

ten between wind and water, five carronades disabled, chiefly by the drawing of the bolts and starting of the chocks, and the *Levant* being two miles to leeward, still bearing away to repair her heavy damages, the *Cyane* fired a lee gun, and hoisted a light as a signal of submission.

It was not until 8 p. m. that the *Constitution*, having manned her prize and refitted some slight damages in her own rigging, was ready to bear up after the *Levant*, then in sight to leeward. At 8 h. 15 m., which was as soon as the *Levant* had rove new braces, the gallant little ship again hauled her wind, as well to ascertain the fate of her companion, as to renew the desperate contest. On approaching the *Constitution* and *Cyane*, the *Levant*, with a boldness bordering on rashness, ranged close alongside the *Constitution* to leeward, being unable to weather her; and at 8 h. 30 m. these two ships (the *President* and *Little-Belt* over again), while passing on opposite tacks, exchanged broadsides. The *Constitution* immediately wore under the *Levant's* stern, and raked her with a second broadside. At 9 h. 30 m., finding that the *Cyane* had undoubtedly surrendered, Captain Douglas again put before the wind; but, in the act of doing so, the *Levant* received several raking broadsides, had her wheel shot away, and her lower masts badly wounded. To fire her stern-chase guns, and steer at the same time, was impossible, owing to a sad mistake in the construction of this new class of vessel. Seeing the *Constitution* ranging up on her larboard quarter, the *Levant*, at 10 h. 30 m. p. m., struck her colours.

Out of her 115 men and 16 boys, the *Levant* had six seamen and marines killed, one officer and 15 seamen and marines wounded; and the *Cyane*, out of her 145 men and 26 boys, (making 42 boys between these two small ships!) had six seamen and marines killed and 13 wounded; total, 12 killed and 29 wounded. The *Constitution* had sailed on her last cruise with a complement of 477 men and three boys, but, having manned a prize with an officer and seven men, had on board only 469. Out of this number, she had six killed and mortally wounded and six others wounded severely and slightly. The wounded are rather out of proportion, but they are all that the Americans have acknowledged. The comparatively slight loss inflicted upon the two ships affords a clear proof, that the Americans had begun to relax in their gunnery; and, had the war continued, and the United States gone on equipping and manning new ships, some very unexpected reverses at sea would have followed.

The captain of an American frigate, who could solemnly declare, that a British frigate had run away from him, would naturally make a great boast of capturing these two sloops, as they may be called. Therefore Captain Stewart officially says: "Considering the advantages derived by the enemy, from a divided and more active force, as also their superiority in the

weight and number of guns, I deem the speedy and decisive result of this action the strongest assurance which can be given the government, that all under my command did their duty, and gallantly supported the reputation of American seamen." The term "speedy" may appear misapplied when, according to the "Minutes" published in the American papers, the action began at 6 h. 5 m. and ended at 10 P. M., or, as the British account states, at 10 h. 40 m. ; but, by a mode of reckoning peculiar to himself, Captain Stewart declares, that the action lasted only 40 minutes.

Let us suppose that the Peacock and Hornet, soon after leaving New-York together, had fallen in with the Endymion, to windward of them, and (the only improbable part of the supposition) had staid to engage the frigate until they were captured. How would the American citizens have behaved on this occasion? Why, they would have received Captains Warrington and Biddle precisely as they did Captain Stewart, and published accounts in every paper of the "heroic defence against decidedly superior force;" not failing to point out, as they did in the Essex's action, the great disparity between carronades and long guns, when the ship carrying the latter has the choice of distance. Mr. Madison, too, in his next speech to congress, would have declared, that the two little sloops continued the unequal contest, until, as he said of the Essex, "humanity tore down the colours which valour had nailed to the mast." How would Captain Hope have behaved? He would have told a plain tale of his good fortune, applauding the American commanders for having so long maintained a contest, in which, from the nature of their armament, and from their leeward position, they could not have hoped to succeed.

Before we attend to the further proceedings of the Constitution, we will dismiss all we have to state on the subject of her action with the two sloops. On the 28th of June a court-martial was held on board the Akbar at Halifax, Nova-Scotia, to try the two captains and their respective officers and ships' companies for the loss of the Levant and Cyane. They were all, except three seamen of the Cyane who deserted to the Americans, most honourably acquitted for the surrender of their ships, and justly applauded for the gallant defence they had made, against an enemy's ship so decidedly superior. With the exception of the three deserters, the two crews resisted the repeated offers made to them to enlist with the enemy. It was stated by the British officers, at the court-martial, that the crews of the two ships were, for three weeks, kept constantly in the Constitution's hold, with both hands and legs in irons, and there allowed but three pints of water during the 24 hours. This, too, in a tropical climate! It was further proved that, after the expiration of the three weeks, upon the application of Captain Douglas, one third of the men were allowed to be on



deck four hours out of the 24, but had not the means of walking, being still in irons; that, on mustering the crews when they were landed at Maranham, five of the *Levant's* boys were missing; that, upon application and search for them, two were found locked up in the cabin of the American captain of marines; and that a black man at Maranham was employed as a crimp, and enticed one of the *Levant's* boys to enter the American service.

On the 8th of March the *Constitution*, having in company, along with her two prizes, a merchant brig of which she intended to make a cartel, anchored off the isle of Mayo, one of the Cape de Verds; and on the next day got under way, and anchored, a few hours afterwards, in the harbour of Porto-Praya, island of Saint-Jago. While on his way to these islands, Captain Stewart had caused the *Cyane* to be painted so as to resemble a 36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his exploit, in the wondering eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston; not one in a hundred of whom, he knew, would trouble themselves to inquire any further on the subject. The American captain would doubtless have played off the same *deceptio visus* upon the *Levant*, had he not been aware, that no efforts of the painter could make a low flush ship of 464 tons resemble a frigate. On the 11th, at 15 minutes past noon, just as Captain Stewart had sent his master to bring the cartel brig under the stern of the *Constitution*, in order that the prisoners might be removed to her, three strange ships were discovered through the haze, standing into the harbour. These were the British 50-gun ships *Leander* and *Newcastle*, Captains Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B. and Lord George Stuart, and 18-pounder 40-gun frigate *Acasta*, Captain Alexander Robert Kerr. We will now step back for a moment, and endeavour to show what had brought these three ships to a spot so distant from the station on which they had hitherto been cruising, the north-eastern coast of the United States.

On the 19th of December the *Leander* sailed from Halifax bound off Boston, and on the 24th fell in with the *Newcastle* and *Acasta*. By their captains, it appears, Sir George was informed, that the *Constitution* had sailed from Boston, and the Congress from Portsmouth, New-Hampshire, and that the President was to join those ships "from the Delaware."\* Unfortunately, although it had been stated over and over again in the Halifax papers, neither of the three captains appears to have been aware, that the Congress had, some months before, been dismantled and laid up at Portsmouth, and that the President was not lying in the "Delaware," but in New-York. On turning to the *Newcastle's* log, to see who it was that had been playing off such a hoax upon Lord George, we find that, on the

\* Published letter of Mr. Thomas Collier.

22d, while the Newcastle and Acasta were lying at anchor in Cape Cod bay,\* the 18-gun brig-sloop Arab, Captain, Henry Jane, joined company, "with intelligence that the Constitution had sailed from Boston on the 17th instant." Not another word is there. This, however, was quite enough to hasten the two ships in getting under way, and to make their captains wish, no doubt, that they had kept under way in front of the port which they had been ordered to watch.

This story about the sailing of the American squadron, whether derived, in the first instance, from fishermen, cattle-dealers, or any other of the cunning New-England folk, was credited by Sir George Collier; and away went the Leander, Newcastle, and Acasta, in search of the Constitution and the "two other heavy frigates" that had sailed "in her company."† On the 4th of January, when off the Western Isles, the three ships fell in with a brig-prize belonging to the American privateer Perry; and, having chased under American colours, were taken for an American squadron. The consequence was, that the prize-master of the brig voluntarily came on board the Leander, and pretended to take that ship for the President, the Newcastle for the Constitution, and the Acasta, not for the Congress, but for the Macedonian. In short, the fellow would have said or sworn any thing, that he thought would ingratiate himself with his hearers. Mr. Marshall says, "Nothing could have happened better"‡ than this farcical interview with the American privateer's-man. On the contrary, looking to the serious impression it appears to have made on board the Leander, we should rather say, nothing could have happened worse.

On the 11th of March, at 0 h. 15 m. p. m., when, as already stated, they first discovered the Constitution, Cyane, Levant, and cartel brig, the three British ships were standing close hauled on the starboard tack, with a moderate breeze from the north-east by north; and the ships in Porto-Praya then bore from the Leander, the leewardmost ship of her squadron, north-east by north distant seven miles. In less than 10 minutes after she had discovered the approach of the British ships, the Constitution cut her cables and stood out of Porto-Praya on the larboard tack, followed by the Levant and Cyane. At 1 p. m., just as the Constitution had got upon the Leander's weather beam, the three British ships tacked in chase. At this time the strange squadron was about four miles in the wind's eye of the Acasta, the Acasta about one mile upon the weather quarter of the Newcastle, and the Newcastle about two miles ahead of the Leander. At this time, also, the Acasta made out the strangers to be "one large frigate and two sloops." The Newcastle has merely noted down in her log, that one ship was larger than the

\* See p. 371.

† Marshall, vol. ii., p. 533.

‡ Ibid., p. 534.

others; and the *Leander*, in her log, describes all three of the ships as "apparently frigates." But the *Leander's* first lieutenant on the occasion, the present Captain John M'Dougall, has subsequently stated as follows: "Weather very thick and hazy; took the two sternmost ships for frigates, the headmost, from appearance, a much larger ship, for the *Guerrière*; who, we understood, had long 32-pounders on her main deck."\*

At 1 h. 30 m. P. M. Captain Stewart found that the *Constitution* sailed about equal with the ships on her lee quarter, but that the *Acasta*, by luffing up, was gaining her wake and rather dropping astern. It was at the same time observed, that the *Cyane* was dropping astern and to leeward, and would soon be overtaken by the *Acasta*. At 1 h. 40 m., therefore, Captain Stewart made the signal for the *Cyane* to tack; expecting that the British commodore would detach a ship in pursuit of her, and that she would succeed in reaching the anchorage of Porto-Praya before the detached ship could come up with her; or, if no ship chased, that she would be able to double the rear of the British squadron and escape before the wind. The *Cyane*, just when bearing from the *Leander* north-north-east distant four miles, tacked accordingly; but no British ship tacked after her, Sir George rightly judging that she would reach the neutral port before either of the British ships could get within shot of her. The *Cyane* shortly afterwards bore away, and was seen no more. At 1 h. 45 m. the *Leander* hoisted her colours and fired a gun to windward; and then telegraphed that, in case of parting company, the Isle of Mayo was to be the rendezvous. Both the *Leander's* consorts also hoisted their colours, and the *Newcastle* scaled her guns. The *Constitution's* log notices the circumstance thus: "The ship on our lee quarter firing broadsides by divisions, her shot falling short of us." An officer of the *Constitution*, in a letter to a friend, says: "The shot fell short from 100 to 200 yards."† This would, indeed, have brought the ships near together; but the American officer must have greatly underrated the distance. For our part, we cannot see the necessity of scaling the guns at all: not only was the concussion calculated to check the ship's way, but it was very likely to calm the breeze, already beginning to slacken as the day drew towards its close.

At 2 h. 30 m. P. M., the *Constitution* having dropped the *Levant* considerably, the situation of the latter, in reference to the *Acasta*, became as critical as that of the *Cyane* had been. Captain Stewart accordingly made the *Levant's* signal to tack; and the *Levant* did immediately tack. At this time, says the *Acasta*, "the frigate had gained on us, but we had gained on the sloop." One of the *Constitution's* officers gives a different statement from that in the *Acasta's* log. He says: "The *Acasta*

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 536.

† Naval Monument, p. 182.

sailed faster than the Constitution, and was gaining on her."\* At all events the Acasta, although she might drop a little astern, was weathering upon the Constitution, and had now brought her to bear upon her weather cat-head. The instant the Levant tacked, the Leander made a signal, the nature of which we shall discuss presently; and, in obedience to that signal, the Acasta "tacked in chase of the sloop." In a minute or two afterwards, according to statements that have appeared in print, the Leander and Newcastle successively did the same. When the Newcastle tacked, the Constitution was five or six miles to windward of her, and, "in the prevailing haze, nearly out of sight" from the deck of the Leander; from whom the Newcastle then bore south-east by east, and the Acasta north-east.

At 2 h. 50 m. p. m., which was just 14 minutes after she had tacked, the Newcastle lost sight of the Constitution, owing to the increased haziness of the weather as the former approached the land, and the opposite course steered by the latter. The Levant, shortly after she had tacked, bore away for Porto-Praya road, and at about 3 h. 15 m. p. m. received from the Leander in passing an ineffectual fire. "At 4 h. 30 m.," says the Newcastle log, "saw her (Levant) anchor. Acasta fired a broadside. At 4 h. 56 m. tacked and fired our larboard broadside." An American account says: "The Levant ran into port, so as to run her jib-boom over the battery. The Acasta and Newcastle came in, and, although her colours were hauled down, fired at her a number of times. They were obliged to hoist and lower their colours twice; yet not a gun was fired from the Levant. Lieutenant Ballard, who commanded, had ordered his men to lie on the deck, by which they all escaped injury, although considerable damage was done to the town. It seemed unnecessary for two heavy frigates to fire into one sloop of war, who neither did nor could make any resistance."† When the Leander opened her fire she discovered, clearly enough, the force of the ship in pursuit of which the squadron had tacked. Sir George then made the signal for the Acasta to take possession of her. The Acasta did so; and, by 5 p. m., all three British ships had anchored in Porto-Praya road. On the 12th, at 6 h. 30 m. a. m., Sir George Collier went on shore to communicate with the governor, in consequence of the damage done to the houses of the town by the shot from the Acasta and Newcastle. At 11 a. m. Sir George returned; and shortly afterwards the British squadron, accompanied by the prize, got under way, and steered for the West Indies. We must now pay a visit to the Constitution.

The moment he saw how the Acasta was weathering him, and that he had no chance of escape by bearing up, as the Newcastle would inevitably intercept him, Captain Stewart con-

\* Naval Monument, p. 182.

† Ibid.

sidered the Constitution as within an hour or two of becoming a British prize. The American officers now questioned the British officers as to the manner in which the commodore of the chasing squadron would treat them; and, in short, began making, in regard to their clothes and other personal effects, such arrangements as they thought necessary, in the change they were about to undergo from freemen to captives. All this while Captains Douglas and Falcon and the late officers of the *Levant* and *Cyane* were blessing their stars at the good fortune that awaited them, although, as we can readily conceive, their delicacy forbade them from making a display of it before Captain Stewart and his officers. When the *Cyane* tacked, and the three British ships still continued in chase of the Constitution, not a doubt could remain that the English commodore, whoever he might be, was determined to have her. The *Levant* tacks; and (can it be possible?) all three British ships tack after her. Here is a change! The joy of Captain Stewart and his officers was now as extravagant as their fears had been well grounded. But what were *now* the feelings of Captains Douglas and Falcon and the other British officers? What were they indeed! "The British officers on board," says the Constitution's officer, "who had expressed the utmost confidence that the Constitution would be taken in an hour, felt the greatest vexation and disappointment, which they expressed in very emphatic terms."\* From the following passage in the same account, it would appear that some one of the British officers, to save as much as possible the credit of the service to which he belonged, pretended to understand the purport of a signal that was hoisted by the *Newcastle*, and of which we shall speak presently. Thus: "After the other ships tacked, the *Newcastle* made a signal that her foretopsail yard was sprung, and tacked also." In less than three quarters of an hour after the *Newcastle* had tacked from her, the Constitution was becalmed or nearly so. As soon as a breeze sprang up, Captain Stewart steered towards the coast of Brazil, and through the West Indies home; and, early in the month of May, "lucky Old Ironsides," as now she well might be called, anchored in Boston.

The three British ships, on being first discovered by the Constitution, were taken by the American officers for what, in reality, they were: the *Leander* and *Newcastle* for "ships of the line," or two-deckers, and the *Acasta* for a frigate. But the *Cyane*, according to her log, made out all three ships to be frigates, even before the Constitution cut her cables and made sail.† Yet, on board the *Leander*, the Constitution, of 1533, the *Cyane* of 539, and the *Levant*, a flush ship, of 464 tons, all put on the appearance of "frigates." Hence, when the *Cyane* tacked, "Sir George directed the *Acasta's* signal to be made to

\* Naval Monument, p. 182.

† *Ibid.*, p. 173.

tack after her, but countermanded the order, on observing that she would gain the anchorage before the *Acasta* could close with her.\* It was, therefore, the respect which the British commanding officer paid to the neutrality of the Portuguese port, that permitted the *Cyane* to go unpursued. But, in less than an hour, a second enemy's "frigate," the *Levant*, tacks, and the neutrality of the port does not save her from being pursued, or from being cannonaded, "with her jib-boom over the battery," by two of the three British ships that had tacked after her. How does Captain M'Dougall reconcile this ?

It appears, now, that it was not Sir George's intention that all three British ships should have tacked after the *Levant*. The signal was ordered to be for the *Acasta* alone to tack ; but, according to the published letter of Mr. Thomas Collier, "the midshipman, Mr. Morrison, whose duty it was to make the signal, did, by mistake, hoist the general signal," or, according to another statement, and one which bears the signature of the *Leander's* late first lieutenant, "in making the signal, the *Acasta's* distinguishing pendants got foul, and, before they could be cleared, the *Newcastle* mistook it for a general signal.† It is a point, we conceive, of very little consequence how the mistake arose. The fact is that, of all the three ships, the *Acasta* was the last that should have been ordered to tack after the *Levant*, even admitting that ship to have been the "*Constitution*, *President*, *Macedonian*, or *Congress*," simply because the *Acasta* was "weathering," "getting into the wake of," and the likeliest of any of the three to overtake and bring to action, the "*Guerrière*." On the other hand, that the *Leander* herself, if any ship did, was the most proper to have gone in pursuit of the supposed *Constitution*, *President*, *Macedonian*, or *Congress*, is clear ; first, because she was "falling to leeward" of the supposed *Guerrière*, and next, because she was the nearest of any of her squadron to the ship that, to the *Leander* at least, put on so fatal a disguise. Had we seen no other statement than is to be found in the three British ships' logs, we should consider that the *Leander* really did tack first ; for thus says her log : "Tacked ship to cut off ship from anchorage, and made signal for ditto." Sir George Collier was remarkable for the kindness with which he treated his officers, and for the, in this instance, most unfortunate, deference he was in the habit of paying to their opinions on points of service. By whose suggestion he tacked, let his late first lieutenant's own words determine : "When the *Acasta* had filled on the starboard tack, I observed to Sir George, that, if the ships standing in shore were really frigates, which it was impossible to ascertain, owing to the haziness of the weather, they would be more than a match for the *Acasta*. He replied :

\* See Captain M'Dougall's paper, in Marshall, vol. ii., p. 536.

† Marshall, vol. ii., p. 537.

‘It is true, Kerr can do wonders, but not impossibilities; and I believe I must go round, as, when the ship that tacked first hears the *Acasta* engaged, she will naturally come to her consort’s assistance.’\* Captain M’Dougall here says “it was impossible to ascertain” whether or not a low flush ship, of 464 tons, sailing for more than an hour, at the distance certainly not of more than five miles, upon the weather beam of the *Leander*, and consequently with her whole broadside exposed to view, and every port, one might suppose, as easy to be counted, as the ports of the *Leander* herself were by the British and American officers on board the *Levant*, was a “frigate;” and such a frigate as, with another like her, it would be “impossible” for the *Acasta* to cope with. Lieutenant Henry Richmond, who was a midshipman on board the *Leander*, appears to have sanctioned Mr. Thomas Collier in saying, that “all on board” the *Leander* fully believed that the *Constitution*, *Cyane*, and *Levant* were three American frigates. The only answer we shall give to this will be to subjoin the names of the five lieutenants, who belonged to the *Leander* at the time. 1st. John M’Dougall, 2d. William Edward Fiott, 3d. Robert Graham Dunlop, 4th. George William St.-John Mildmay, and 5th. Richard Weld. We believe it is not yet admitted by Captains Kerr and Lord George Stuart, that the *Acasta* was the first ship that tacked, or that the weather, at the time the *Constitution* was left to go her ways, was not sufficiently clear for the water-lines of all the ships to be seen.

Mention has been made of an optional flag. The following extract from the work of a contemporary will afford the requisite information on the subject: “Sir George Collier, confiding in the zeal and judgment of the captains under his orders, had previously informed them that, whenever a certain flag was hoisted with any signal addressed to either of them, they were at liberty to disregard the signal, if they considered that, by following the order conveyed thereby, the object in view was not so likely to be attained, as by acting in contrariety thereto. The flag alluded to was entered *pro tempore* in the signal books under the designation of the ‘optional flag.’ On its being hoisted with the *Newcastle*’s pendants as above stated, that ship made answer by signal, ‘The flags are not distinguishable.’”† We shall not stay to discuss this point, beyond suggesting the probability, either that the wrong flag was hoisted on board the *Leander*, or that it had got foul and was omitted to be cleared. If neither was the case, the *Newcastle* must have been nearer to the *Constitution* than she was to the *Leander*; for we observe by her log, that the *Newcastle* could distinguish the signal made by the *Constitution* to the *Cyane*, as being one not in the British naval code, also that the signal afterwards made by the *Consti-*

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 538.

† Ibid., p. 537, note †.

tution to the *Levant* was "the same signal as before." We have now a word or two to submit on the part performed by the *Acasta*.

In two respects, the *Acasta* possessed a decided advantage over her consorts. She was far more advanced in the chase, and sailed better on a wind, than either of them; and she had, from the first, made out exactly the force of the three strange ships: they were, according to her log, "one large frigate and two sloops." We believe, also, that the "large frigate" was all along supposed by her to be the *Constitution*. When the *Acasta* saw the signal made by the commodore, so far to leeward, for the squadron to tack, how happened it that no signal was made in answer, expressive of the probability that some mistake had been made, in supposing that the two ships which had tacked were worth a moment's consideration, and communicating, that the ship which they were all anxious to get hold of was ahead, and that she, the *Acasta*, was weathering her? Or, let us suppose that the *Acasta* had taken no notice of the *Leander's* signal, but had kept on her course, Captain Kerr, if we mistake not, had an honourable wound,\* which would have served him for an excuse, as a similar wound, and on a similar occasion, had once served the greatest naval captain of the age. "Leave off action? Now d—n me if I do! You know, Foley, I have only one eye,—I have a right to be blind sometimes."†

On the subject of the "optional flag," in reference to the *Acasta*, we shall quote from a contemporary: "The *Acasta's* log informs us, that the enemy's force was discovered to consist of one large frigate and two sloops, so early as 1 p. m., the time when the British squadron first tacked to the eastward. If so we are sorry that a signal to that effect was not made, by which Sir George Collier's mind would have been set at ease as to the capability of the *Acasta* to cope with the two ships which had put back; and the *Leander*, having nothing else to engage her attention, would of course have continued in pursuit of the other. It was very natural for junior captains to feel a delicacy in addressing signals to their commanding officer when in the presence of an enemy; but, as Sir George Collier had formed his opinion of the American's force from the report of Captain Kerr and Lord George Stuart,‡ he certainly could not have taken offence had he been informed that the *Acasta* alone was more than capable of annihilating the two ships which she had tacked after."§

One part of this statement we consider quite nugatory. What would have been the utility of the *Leander*, a ship confessedly

\* See vol. i., p. 101.

† See p. 376.

‡ See vol. iii., p. 72.

§ Marshall, vol. ii., p. 538, note\*.



“falling to leeward,” continuing in pursuit of the Constitution? No, the only ship, that could have pursued her with any chance of success, had been ordered by the Leander to tack from her. Most sincerely do we regret, on personal, as well as on public grounds, that this last and most triumphant escape of the Constitution, the first frigate of the United States that had humbled the proud flag of Britain, had not long ago, been brought under the scrutiny of a court-martial. The blame would then have fallen where it ought to have fallen; and, in the unpleasant task of detailing, what, the more it is investigated, the more it will show itself to be, the most blundering piece of business recorded in these six volumes, we should neither have had our statements called in question nor our motives misunderstood.

On the 20th of January, six days after the President and store-brig Macedonian had escaped from New-York, the Peacock, Hornet, and store-brig Tom-Bowline succeeded also in getting to sea. On the 23d the Hornet parted company from her two consorts, and proceeded straight to the island of Tristand’Acunha, the first rendezvous for the squadron. On the 20th of March Captain Biddle was informed of the peace by a neutral; and on the 23d, at 11 A. M., when just about to anchor off the north end of the above island, the Hornet fell in with the British brig-sloop Penguin, of 16 carronades, 32-pounders and two sixes, Captain James Dickinson.

Before narrating the action that ensued, it will, we consider, prove useful to point out a few of the circumstances under which the parties met. The armament of the Hornet has already, on more than one occasion been shown:\* she now carried in lieu of her two long twelves, two long 18-pounders; and, as these, owing to their great length, could not conveniently be fought through the foremost or usual long-gun ports, they were mounted amidships. She had musketoons in all her tops, each piece throwing 50 buck-shot at a discharge, and upon each quarter a 3 or 4 pound brass swivel, fitted on a chock. All this had been done to bring the Hornet nearer to an “equality” with the Loup-Cervier, in case the challenge, to which we have already alluded, had been accepted. Her crew, consisting at this time of 165 men (eight absent in a prize), had also, it may be presumed, been well culled preparatory to the expected contest. Each man had a boarding-helmet, similar to those we described as worn by the crew of the Constitution.†

The Penguin was commissioned, for the first time, in November, 1813; and, as a proof how much brigs of that class were wanted in the British navy, there were but 81 in commission on the 1st of the succeeding January. After having been run up by the contract-builder in the usual slight and hurried manner,

\* See p. 190.

† See p. 326.

to be ready on the emergency (there being, as already stated, no more than 81 such vessels in commission), the Penguin was to be manned with equal recklessness about consequences. In respect to captain and officers generally, the Penguin might compete with any brig of her class; but, as to men, when she did get them all on board, which was not until June, 1814, they were, with the exception, probably, of not being disaffected; a worse crew than even the Epervier's. Her 17 boys, poor little fellows, might do very well six or seven years to come. Her men, her misnamed "British seamen," consisted, except a portion of her petty officers, of very old and very young individuals; the latter pressed men, the former discharged ineffectives. Among the whole number, thus obtained, 12 only had ever been in action.

One might suppose, that a vessel so "manned," especially after a knowledge of the fact, that four of the same description of sloops had been captured each by an American sloop of the same nominal, whatever may have been her real, force, would have been sent to escort some convoy from the Downs along the English coast; a service in which, as against the pickaroons that usually infested the Channel, the appearance of a force was almost as effective as its reality. Oh, no. The aforesaid emergency required, that the Penguin should be sent to the Cape of Good Hope, to traverse the very track in which the Java had met, and been captured by, the Constitution. Accordingly, in the month of September, the Penguin sailed for her distant destination. While on the Cape station, she lost several of her men by sickness; and, previously to her being despatched by Vice-admiral Charles Tyler, the commander-in-chief at the Cape, in pursuit of the American privateer ship, Young-Wasp, the Penguin received on board from the Medway 74, as a loan for that special service, 12 marines: thus making her complement 105 men and 17 boys, or 122 in the whole.

Had the vessel in sight to windward been rigged with three masts instead of two, and had she, on her near approach, proved by her signals to be a British cruiser, Captain Biddle might have marked her down in his log as a "frigate," and have made off with all the canvass he could spread. Had the ship, nevertheless, overtaken the Hornet, and been, in reality, a trifle superior in force to her, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would have exhausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace, before he tried the effect of his artillery in a struggle for the honours of war. However, the vessel approaching was evidently a brig; and the utmost extent of a brig-sloop's force was thoroughly known.

When she first descried the Hornet in the north-west by west, the Penguin was steering to the eastward, with the wind fresh from the south-south-west. With all the promptitude that was to be expected from the gallant first lieutenant of the Cerberus

in the action off Lissa, Captain Dickinson bore up in chase. At 1 h. 45 m. P. M., Tristan d'Acunha bearing south-west distant three or four miles, the Penguin hoisted her colours, a St.-George's ensign, and fired a gun, to induce the stranger to show hers. The Hornet immediately luffed up on the starboard tack, hoisted American colours, and discharged her broadside; and the Penguin, on rounding to upon the same tack, fired hers in return. Thus the action commenced, within about pistol-shot distance. The Hornet's star and bar shot soon reduced the Penguin's rigging to a state of disorder; and a tolerably well-directed discharge of round and grape, meeting no adequate return, especially as the carronades, owing to their insecure mode of mounting, turned half round almost every time they were discharged, made a sensible impression upon the Penguin's hull. At 2 h. 15 m. P. M., as the Penguin drifted nearer, the Hornet bore away, with the semblance of retiring from the contest, but in reality to take a more favourable position for doing execution with her gunnery. Captain Dickinson, on this, bore up with the intention to board. Before, however, this gallant officer could put his plan into execution, he received a mortal wound.

Lieutenant James M'Donald, who now succeeded to the command, aware of the brig's disabled state, saw that the only chance of success was to attempt his captain's measure. Accordingly, at 2 h. 25 m., the Penguin ran her bowsprit between the Hornet's main and mizen rigging on the starboard side. The heavy swell lifting the ship a-head, the brig's bowsprit, after carrying away the Hornet's mizen shroud, stern-davits, and spanker-boom, broke in two, and the foremast went at the same moment, falling m-board directly upon the foremost and waist guns on the larboard or engaged side. These guns becoming, in consequence, completely disabled, and the after guns being equally so from the drawing of the breeching-bolts, an attempt was made to bring a fresh broadside to bear; but the Penguin was in too unmanageable a state to be got round. In this dilemma no alternative remained; and at 2 h. 35 m. P. M. Lieutenant M'Donald hailed to say, that the Penguin surrendered. After a lapse of 25 minutes, an officer from the Hornet came on board to take possession.

Out of a crew, as already stated, of 105 men and 17 boys, the Penguin lost her commander, boatswain, and four seamen and marines killed, four others mortally wounded, and her second lieutenant (John Elwin, very severely), one master's mate (John Holmes Bond), one midshipman (John Noyes, each of whom lost a leg), purser's clerk, and 24 seamen and marines wounded, for the most part slightly. Even the Hornet was beginning to fall off in her gunnery. Most of the Penguin's men were wounded by musketry; and the bowsprit, and the foremast along with it, fell chiefly owing to the two vessels getting foul in the manner they did, while so heavy a sea was running.

The *Hornet* received a few shot in the hull; one of which was so low down as to keep her men constantly at the pumps. Out of a crew of 163 men and two boys, the *Hornet* lost, by the acknowledgment of her officers, only two seamen killed and 11 wounded; but, according to the observation of the British officers, her loss was much greater. Just as Mr. Edward B. Kirk, one of the *Penguin's* midshipmen, and the very first prisoner that reached the *Hornet*, was stepping upon her deck, the crew were in the act of throwing a man overboard; but a struggle or convulsive twitch in the body occasioned his being hauled in again. The poor man's lower jaw had been nearly all shot away; yet he lived, and was walking about the deck in the course of a few days. This shows the hurry in which the American officers were, to get their killed out of the way before the arrival of the prisoners; and the time necessary to remove every appearance of blood and carnage contributed to the delay in sending for them. Even when the British did come on board buckets of water were dashing about and brooms at work on all parts of the deck. The *Penguin's* second lieutenant counted 16 of the *Hornet's* men lying in their cots; and several of her men told some of their former shipmates, whom they discovered among the *Penguin's* crew, that the *Hornet* had 10 men killed by the first and second broadsides.

We cannot, with any consistency, offer the trifling disparity of force in this action, as an excuse for the *Penguin's* capture. The chief cause is to be sought in that which cannot be made apparent in figures; the immense disparity between the two vessels in the fitting of their guns, and in the effectiveness of their crews. A ship's gun, cast adrift, not only becomes utterly useless as a weapon of offence or defence, but in the very act of breaking loose, maims and disables the men stationed at it; and, if the sea is rough, as Captain Biddle says it was in the present instance, continues to cause destruction among the crew, generally, until again lashed to the ship's side. How much is the evil increased, if, as in the *Penguin's* case, instead of one gun, several guns break loose. In the midst of all this delay and self-destruction, the enemy, uninterrupted in his operations, and animated by the feeble resistance he meets, quickens his fire; and, conquering at last, fails not to ascribe, solely to his skill and valour, that victory, which accident had partly gained for him.

We are inclined to think that the prize was not so "riddled in her hull," as to render her destruction on the morning of the 25th a matter of necessity. The fact is, that, just after the action had ended, the *Peacock* and *Tom-Bowline* hove in sight; and Captains Warrington and Biddle, having heard of the peace, were anxious to go to the East Indies as quickly as possible, in order to have their share of the few prizes yet to be taken.

The communicativeness of one of the American officers having conveyed to the ears of Lieutenant M'Donald the statement in Captain Biddle's official letter, that the *Hornet* had suffered so slightly in the action, Lieutenant M'Donald took an opportunity of mentioning the circumstance to the American captain; when, having drowned his native cunning in wine (some of poor Captain Dickinson's probably), Captain Biddle admitted the fact, but attempted to gloss it over by stating, that it was necessary to say so and so, and so and so, in order to make the thing be properly received in the United States. Here was an acknowledgment! How unnecessary, then, have been all our previous labours in detecting and exposing the misrepresentations contained in the American official accounts. Of course, we are saved all further trouble in showing, how completely Captain Biddle has mistated every important fact connected with the capture of the *Penguin*. Before, however, we dismiss this action, let us make one remark on the circumstance of Captain Biddle having been informed of the peace on the 20th, three days previous to the action; if that information was communicated in such a manner as to have satisfied Captain Biddle as to the fact, there is no excuse his fondest admirers could make, which should have screened him from the hands of the hangman; the action was disreputable; the slaughter criminal. His conscience, perhaps, at this moment is his best judge; and we are sincere when we say we hope he does not feel that sentence recorded against him, which he must feel if he fought that action, *knowing* the peace to have been signed.

On the 28th of April, at daylight, in latitude  $39^{\circ}$  south, longitude  $34^{\circ}$  west, the *Peacock* and *Hornet* bore down upon, in order to capture as an Indiaman, the British 74-gun ship *Cornwallis*, Captain John Bayley, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir George Burlton, K.C.B. The mistake was soon discovered, and a chase commenced, during which the *Peacock* separated to the eastward. In the afternoon the *Cornwallis*, when gaining fast upon the *Hornet*, had to heave to and lower a boat for a marine that had dropped overboard. This delay, aided by the unskilful firing of the *Cornwallis* on the following day, saved the *Hornet*; but the chase continued until 9 A.M. on the 30th, when the 74, finding further pursuit useless, shortened sail and hauled to the wind. The closeness of the chase, however, had effected enough to render the *Hornet*, as a cruiser, utterly useless. She hove overboard her guns, muskets, cutlasses, forge, bell, anchors, cables, shot, boats, spare spars, and a considerable portion of her ballast, and was of course obliged to steer straight for the United States.

The *Peacock*, after she had been compelled to part from her consort, pursued her way to the East Indies; and, on the 30th of June, being off Amjier in the Straits of Sunda, fell in with the honourable company's brig-cruiser *Nautilus*, of 10 car-

ronades, 18-pounders, and four long nines, commanded by Lieutenant Charles Boyce. On the Peacock's approach within hail, the lieutenant inquired if her captain knew that peace had been declared. Let us suppose, for a moment, that, just as the American commander was listening to the hail from the Nautilus, the latter became suddenly transformed into the British 22-gun ship Volage, Captain Joseph Drury, a sister-vessel to the Cyane, and at that time cruising in the East Indies. Captain Warrington would then have promptly hailed in turn, with the best speaking-trumpet in the ship; thanked Captain Drury for his politeness, and been the first to urge the folly, not to say wickedness, of wounding and killing each other, while any doubt existed about peace having been signed. But it was a vessel he could almost hoist on board the Peacock. He therefore called out: "Haul down your colours instantly." This "reasonable demand" Lieutenant Boyce very properly considered as an imperious and insulting mandate, and, fully alive to the dignity of the British flag, and to the honour of the service to which he was acknowledged to be an ornament, prepared to cope with a ship, whose immense superiority, as she overshadowed his little bark, gave him nothing to expect short of a speedy annihilation.

It will scarcely be credited that, about a quarter of an hour before this, Mr. Bartlett, the master of the Nautilus, and Cornet White, one of her passengers, in one boat, and Mr. Macgregor, the master-attendant at Anjier, in another, had gone on board the Peacock, in a friendly way, to communicate the news of peace. Scarcely had Mr. Bartlett stepped upon the American's ship's deck than, without being allowed to ask a question, he was hurried below. Happily, Mr. Macgregor met with rather better success. The instant he arrived on board, he communicated to the Peacock's first lieutenant, the most authentic information of peace having been concluded between Great Britain and America, grounded on no less authority than Mr. Madison's proclamation; which Mr. Macgregor had himself received from an American ship, passing the Straits on her way to China. What effect had this communication? Captain Warrington, whom the single word "Peace!" ought to have made pause, before he proceeded to spill the blood of his fellow-creatures, ordered Mr. Macgregor to be taken below.

Captain Warrington does not admit that Mr. Macgregor mentioned that peace existed; although the latter gentleman has sworn that he did, both to Captain Warrington's first lieutenant and to his purser. As to the imputed silence of Messieurs Bartlett and White, would two officers, who had voluntarily entered on board the ship of a nation, with whom they knew a peace had just been concluded, have acted in so senseless a manner as to suffer themselves to be made prisoners, without some such words as, "Peace is signed," bursting from their lips? Even the ceremony of gagging, however 'quickly performed,

could not have stopped an exclamation, which their personal liberty, and every thing that was dear to them as men, would prompt them to utter. The same motives would have operated upon the two boats' crews; and there cannot be a doubt, that they all gave some sort of intimation, that peace had been signed. But Captain Warrington, as the Peacock's purser could not help saying, wanted to have a little brush with the British brig. He saw what a diminutive vessel she was, and, accordingly, ordered his men to fire into her. They did so; and the Nautilus was soon compelled to haul down her colours. But this the brig did not do until her gallant commander was most dangerously wounded, one scaman, two European invalids, and three lascars killed, her first lieutenant (mortally), two seamen, and five lascars wounded. The wound of Lieutenant Boyce was of a most serious description. A grape-shot, that measured two inches and one-third in diameter, entered at the outside of his hip, and passed out close under the backbone. This severe wound did not, however, disable him. In a few minutes a 32-pound shot struck obliquely on his right knee, shattering the joint, splintering the legbone downwards and the thighbone a great way upwards. This, as may be supposed, laid the young officer prostrate on the deck. The dismounting of a bow gun, and four or five men wounded, appears to have been the extent of the injury sustained by the Peacock.

Fearful that these facts would come to light, Captain Warrington had additional reasons for endeavouring to lessen the enormity of his offence, by stating, in his official letter, that "lascars" were the only sufferers. Poor wretches! and were they to be butchered with impunity, because their complexion and the American captain's were of different hues? Whose heart was the blackest, the transaction in which they lost their lives has already shown to the world. Had the Volage, as we said before, been the vessel that had hove in sight, every man in the Peacock, in less than three minutes after the master-attendant at Anjier and the other British officers had come on board, would have been informed of the peace. Captain Warrington would have approached the stranger, if he approached at all, without opening his ports or displaying his helmets. In short, he that hectored so much in one case, would have cringed as much in the other: and the commander of the United States' sloop Peacock, would have run no risk of being by his government "blamed for ceasing," or rather, for not commencing, "hostilities, without more authentic evidence that peace had been concluded."

The first lieutenant of the Nautilus, Mr. Mayston, languished until the 3d of December, a period of five months, when a mortification of his wound carried him off. About a fortnight after the action, Lieutenant Boyce suffered amputation very near his hip, on account of the length and complication of the fracture.

The pain and danger of the operation was augmented by the proximity of the grape-shot wound. His life was subsequently despaired of; but, after a long course of hopes and fears to his numerous friends, this brave and amiable young man (or what Captain Warrington had left him) survived.

Of course, the American captain, who had himself escaped unhurt, the moment he was informed of the casualties on board his prize, either visited, or sent a condoling message to, her dreadfully mangled commander? Reader, he did neither. Captain Warrington, in the words of the poor sufferer, in his memorial to the court of directors, "proved himself totally destitute of fellow-feeling and commiseration; for, during the time he retained possession of the Nautilus," which was until 2 P. M. on the 1st of July, "he was not once moved to make a commonplace inquiry after the memorialist, in his then deplorable condition." No wonder, that, throughout civilized India, the perpetrator of this atrocious act is looked upon as a barbarian: let but the requisite publicity be given to the case of the Nautilus and Peacock, and the name of Warrington will be held in equal detestation throughout the civilized world.

On the evening of the 29th of December, 1822, the sloop *Eliza*, armed with one 18-pounder carronade, and with a complement of 24 men (including officers), commanded by Mr. Hugh Nurse, admiralty mate, anchored in compliance with orders received from Lieutenant Hobson, off Guajaba.

The next day (the 30th), a small vessel, felucca rigged, was observed standing towards the *Eliza* with a signal flying. Having approached her within five miles, the stranger tacked, and stood towards Green Key, still keeping the same signal flying. About five o'clock P. M. she was joined by a schooner, when both vessels stood towards the *Eliza*. Mr. Nurse on perceiving this, immediately prepared to slip and make sail: at 7 o'clock the schooner having taken an advantageous position upon the larboard bow of the *Eliza*, opened her fire upon her. The *Eliza* immediately slipped her cable and made sail to close, keeping up a return fire upon the schooner. The felucca had now got into action, and warmly supported her friend. At 7 o'clock, after several cool and steady manœuvres, in order to clear the shoals by which the *Eliza* was surrounded, Mr. Nurse found himself close to windward of the felucca; he instantly bore up, poured in a round of grape, followed up by a volley of musketry, and boarded her on the larboard bow. The enemy made a smart resistance, but Lieutenant Nurse, although he had received a gun-shot wound in the right shoulder, cheered on his gallant crew, and in five minutes was in possession of the vessel. The schooner seeing her comrade disposed of in this summary way, made sail and escaped, and as the prize was quite ungovernable, on account of the loss of her bowsprit, Mr. Nurse judged it prudent to anchor for the night. The next day, the *Eliza* with her



prize made sail towards Green Key, to attack the schooner, which was ascertained to be a pirate of five guns, with a complement of 37 men: she, however, had escaped during the night. In this gallant affair, which reflects the highest credit upon Mr. Nurse, the Eliza lost two men killed (John White and John Golf) and eight wounded. Amongst the severely wounded, were Mr. Nurse the commander, John M'Dermott who died of his wounds shortly afterwards, John Welsh, Edward Bambrill, and Benjamin Inkpen: slightly wounded, William Adams, William Watts, and Henry Wilmot. We give below the relative force of each vessel, and by so doing we shall afford the reader a better idea of the gallantry of this exploit, in which the Spaniards sustained a loss of nine killed. The remaining part of the crew of the felucca, with the exception of four made prisoners, jumped overboard.

ELIZA'S FORCE.		FELUCA LE FIRME UNION'S FORCE.	
One 18-pounder carronade.		One long 6-pounder on a pivot.	
COMPLEMENT.		Four small carriage-guns, 4-pounders.	
Midshipmen . . . . .	2	Crew . . . . .	37
Assistant Surgeon . . . . .	1		
Pilot . . . . .	1	The schooner El Diablero, about	
Men . . . . .	20	the same force as the felucca.	
	—		
	24		

In the official report Mr. Nurse mentions the services of Mr. George White, midshipman, whose bravery was highly conspicuous, and Mr. Clark, the assistant surgeon, who is since dead.

In March, in this year, Rear-admiral Sir Charles Rowley, the commander-in-chief in the West Indies, despatched Captain John Edward Walcott, in his majesty's frigate Tyne, having under his orders the sloop Thracian, Commander John Walter Roberts, to endeavour to extirpate the piratical vessels which infested the West India station, and which generally made the different ports of the island of Cuba their rendezvous. Captain Walcott commenced his arduous task of searching 400 miles of coast, in order to examine the different creeks and inlets where small vessels could be sheltered and concealed.

If Captain Walcott failed in discovering the object of his search, he had the gratification of gaining information that a piratical schooner had been seen off the east end of the island of Cuba, and that she did occasionally visit a harbour in that neighbourhood, in which she disposed of her plunder to many of the residents. It may here be remembered that Captain Walcott, during his examination of the different creeks, found on an island, situated within the harbour of Nerangos, a cargo consisting of 1100 casks of wine and spirits; and upon his own

responsibility, considering the concealment of the wine very suspicious, and believing it to be some of the captured property taken by the pirate, he embarked it. It was afterwards condemned, and sold at Jamaica for 6000*l.*, two thirds of which was deducted from the captors for government and colonial duties, thus leaving only 2000*l.* to be shared; whereas, had Captain Walcott failed to establish this cargo as the property of the pirates, he would have been liable to the full extent of 6000*l.*

On the 28th of March the Captain of an American pilot-boat confirmed the intelligence already received relative to the pirate. She was described as a schooner, named the *Zaragonaza*, of 120 tons, carrying one long 18-pounder on a swivel, four long 9-pounders, and eight swivels, commanded by a desperate character, named Cayatano Arogonex, having a crew of between 70 and 80 men. Captain Walcott further learnt from the informer that he had been detained on board this vessel, and that during the time of his detention information reached the commander of the pirate that several men, a part of the crew of a piratical vessel, captured during a former cruise of the *Tyne*, had been hung at Jamaica. These men had given some proofs of a merciful disposition, for previously to their capture they had taken a small vessel tender to the *Tyne* in which were Lieutenant Hobson and 20 men. According to the general custom of the bloodthirsty savages they proceeded in their preparations to hang their captives, and actually placed the rope round the neck of Hobson and his men. The "still small voice" of conscience, however, seems to have awakened the last slumber of mercy, and ultimately they not only spared the lives of Lieutenant Hobson and his men, but, after a few days detention, allowed them to return to their ships. The execution of their brother pirates at Jamaica, after this rare mercy, was viewed by Cayatano Arogonex as an infamous, ungenerous, savage act; and he resolved to take ample revenge upon all unfortunate men who should fall into his hands. He summoned his crew, and, with barbarous ferocity, excited them to bind themselves by the most sacred obligation, under the form of an oath, that henceforth no Englishman's life should be spared, and that to avoid the retaliation which would certainly ensue in the event of their capture, they swore, rather than surrender to be hung, to blow up their vessel, their crew, and their assailants. To crown this horrid act of determination it was requisite forthwith to procure a victim, that, passing the rubicon of crime, their consciences might become accustomed to the deed, and themselves cease to shudder at murder. A cry was raised to sacrifice the black cook, a native of Jamaica (and consequently if not an Englishman, one under the protection of the English flag), whom they had removed from a vessel they had captured. In

vain did the poor fellow implore their mercy. They dragged him from his occupation, and instantly spritsail-yarded him, having secured him in a position to offer the fairest mark; these infamous villains amused themselves for 20 minutes, slightly wounding him at every shot before their savage pastime was surfeited, and the *coup de grace* inflicted. Against these men Captain Walcott had now to act. The pirate, was cruising off the city of Baracoa, and was described as a very fast-sailing schooner; but as almost all the trade of Cuba, at least the coasting trade, is carried on in vessels of this description, Captain Walcott became apprehensive that she might, by disguise, escape his vigilance; he therefore offered the American pilot 1000 dollars to remain with him; for, independently of the disguise which might be practised, two men-of-war schooners, belonging to the Spanish government, were cruising off the coast, and by pursuing these the pirate might escape. The pilot, however, refused; for he declared it impossible to capture the schooner by the boats, and that failing of success he would become known as the informer, and be obliged to relinquish his situation as pilot in the old Bahama channel. On the 31st of March the Tyne and Thracian, being off Baracoa, the pirate was discovered. The English men-of-war were instantly disguised as merchant ships, their sails being set in a slovenly manner, and they stood in under easy sail to close with the schooner. For three hours this succeeded; at the expiration of that time the pirate was seen to crowd all sail for the harbour of Mata: the disguise was abandoned, and every stitch of canvass crowded in chase.

At 1 h. 30 m. p. m. the schooner anchored, and moored head and stern athwart the harbour, her broadside commanding the entrance which was not more than a cable's length, and wearing the royal colours of Spain. The boats of the Tyne and Thracian were instantly hoisted out, manned and armed, the total number of men being 47; and Captain Walcott duly considering all the consequences of failure from the information already given, resolved to head this desperate enterprise himself; leaving Captain Roberts in command of the ships, and desiring him to do his utmost to close with the pirate in order to afford all assistance. At 3 p. m. the boats arrived within gun-shot, when all thought of subterfuge was abandoned by the pirate, the black flag was hoisted, and a spirited cannonade commenced. Cayatano Arogonz by way of strengthening his position, had landed some of his crew with small-arms, and these men, sheltered by the trees which grew close to the shore of the harbour, opened a very harassing fire upon the assailants. In the mean time the boats continued to approach, and the crowded deck of the schooner became visible; for three quarters of an hour the English sustained the fire of the pirate and of the men on shore,

when a favourable opportunity occurred, three hearty cheers were given, the boats dashed alongside, and the panic-stricken pirates endeavoured to save themselves by flight. Twenty-eight men, however, were secured, amongst whom was their commander. Every word of information given by the pilot was now proved correct: her description, size, armament, &c.; and the hand of retributive justice rid the world of Arogonez and his men, for they were all hanged at Jamaica, and received more mercy in their expeditious death, than they had accorded to the poor cook.

It now becomes our cheerful duty to bestow on Captain Walcott and the officers under his command the praise they deserve. This attack took place in daylight, against a vessel advantageously moored, manned by a crew resolved to perish or to conquer; the boats were advanced in a calm, and for three quarters of an hour they were under a heavy fire. Every man must have done his duty, and it has been well designated by a contemporary historian, as one of the most brilliant actions in boat-service he ever remembered.\* Captain Walcott, in his official letter, mentions the excellent conduct of Lieutenants Amos Plynsell, and James Campbell, of Messrs. Robinson, Dawson, Shapland,† Gettings, and Dalycell, midshipmen; likewise of Mr. West the surgeon, and Mr. Graham assistant-surgeon, who volunteered their services. Of Captain Roberts he speaks in the highest terms, and Mr. Bull the acting master of the Tyne, receives his warmest thanks for the manner in which he piloted the ships through the constant intricate and dangerous navigation, and finally got them within gun-shot of the captured pirate; the loss sustained by the English was one man killed and five wounded, the Spaniards lost 10 killed and 15 wounded.

In giving our account of this action we consulted Captain Brenton's history, but were discouraged from gleaning any information from him, in consequence of two mistakes in the first line: he calls Captain Walcott a commander and a C.B.; he had been post more than a year, and to this day, although he merits a higher distinction, is not a C.B. He calls the Tyne a sloop; she is a frigate. He says, "both the British commanders were made post," whereas one was posted a year previously to the action, and the other succeeded to an invaliding vacancy. He finishes by calling Mr. Thomas Bull, Mr. Bull.‡

On the 31st of January, Captain James Ryder Burton, in command of his majesty's sloop Cameleon, of twelve 32-pounder carronades and 45 men, when in company with his majesty's

\* Brenton.

† Mr. Shapland being the senior midshipman in this affair was promoted, and Mr. Bull was confirmed as master of the Tyne.

‡ These inaccuracies would not have been pointed out or noticed but for Captain Brenton's diligent search of our pages, out of 2000 of which, he has discovered two typographical errors: unfortunately, the editor being more diligent, has found several more, which shall be rectified.

ship *Naiad*, Captain the Honourable Sir Robert Spencer, off Algiers, made signal for a suspicious sail to windward, which ultimately proved to be the *Tripoli*, an Algerine corvette, of 20 long 12-pounders and 150 men. When the *Naiad* hoisted her colours, she fired a shot ahead of the stranger. The *Tripoli*, in showing hers, fired a shot *at* the *Naiad*; the signal was instantly made to chase, and both British vessels tacked to that effect with the intention of cutting off the Algerine from entering the mole of Algiers. The *Naiad* having the advantage of the *Cameleon*, after an hour's chase, passed ahead of the *Tripoli* and fired into her, then tacked and stood out to sea. By this time the *Cameleon* got close up under the enemy's lee, so close, as not only to receive the fire of the Algerine, but likewise the grape and canister of the *Naiad*, which ship was to windward of both the *Tripoli* and *Cameleon*. The fire of both ships, ~~one~~ so very superior in force as the *Naiad*, soon riddled the Algerine, but she still continued running towards the Mole, and was within gun-shot of the batteries, which opened their fire upon the *Cameleon*. As Sir Robert Spencer considered he had sufficiently punished the insolence of the Algerine, the *Naiad* stood out to sea, and the *Cameleon* was recalled, as that sloop was now closely engaged with a very superior force in the *Tripoli*. Captain Burton, on perceiving the signal, desired his helm to be put a-lee with the intention of boarding the Algerine, but having too much headway, the *Cameleon* passed under the bows of the enemy, who put her helm a-weather and bore up close under the lee of the brig, receiving from the latter her broadside. In the mean time, the *Cameleon* braced her head yards round, and boxed off, then filled again in chase. Being now to windward, she availed herself of her position to run the Algerine on board, which she effected, placing her bowsprit between the fore and main mast of the *Tripoli*. Captain Burton headed his men, and soon drove the Algerines below; but in the act of taking his prize in tow, Sir Robert Spencer wore round, passed within hail, and desired Captain Burton to cut away the Algerine's anchor and abandon her. This was done, and both ships stood out. In this affair, it is necessary to state that the only credit which can be claimed by any one, is by Captain Burton. It is evident that the attacking force was sufficient to beat five vessels of the size of the *Tripoli*, but in the moment of boarding, the Algerine was three times more powerful in men than the *Cameleon*, and, although the *Tripoli* had been cut up severely by the *Naiad*, and although it is probable that the crew of the former were already beaten, yet the act of boarding so very superior a force, reflects the highest credit on Captain Burton, his officers, and men. For this action he received his post-rank shortly afterwards.

## STATE OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

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THE totals, in the two "ordinary" columns of the present abstract, decisively show the peaceable state of the navy at the beginning of the year 1816;\* and the totals, generally, differ but slightly from those of the abstract for the year in which the war had commenced.†

The number of commissioned officers and masters, belonging to the British navy at the beginning of the present year, was,

Admirals	. . . . .	67
Vice-admirals	. . . . .	68
Rear-admirals	. . . . .	75
" superannuated	32	
Post-captains	. . . . .	851
" "	36	
Commanders, or sloop-captains	. . . . .	812
" superannuated	80	
Lieutenants	. . . . .	4064
Masters	. . . . .	693

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same year, was 33,000.‡

Having brought to a close the wars of civilized nations, we have now to record the particulars of a short but decisive war

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 24.

† For the lists of casualties usually introduced in this place, see Appendix Nos. 14, 15, 16, and 17.

‡ See Appendix, No. 18.

carried on against barbarians. Partly to settle some differences with the regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, and partly, no doubt, to astonish Europe with the extent of their naval force, the United States, the moment peace with England permitted them, sent forth, in separate divisions, as fast as the ships could be got ready, nearly the whole of their Atlantic or sea navy. On the 17th of June, off Cape de Gatte, the first division, consisting of three frigates and three smaller vessels, under Commodore Decatur, in the new 32-pounder 44-gun frigate *Guerrière*, after a running fight, by one account, of 25 minutes, and by another account, of nearly two hours, captured the Algerine 18-pounder 40-gun frigate *Mezoura*. Mr. Madison, in his speech to congress delivered on the 5th of December, when referring to this "demonstration of American skill and prowess," says, "The high character of the American commander was brilliantly sustained on the occasion." With examples of this sort from the head of the government, no wonder that the people of the United States are such unconscionable braggarts.

The American squadron also drove on shore near St.-Xavier a small frigate or corvette. On the 30th Commodore Decatur concluded a treaty with the Dey of Algiers; by which all prisoners made on either side were to be restored, and all property given up, and no more tribute was to be demanded from the United States. The Algerine prisoners on board the squadron of Commodore Decatur amounted to 500, and the natives of the United States in the hands of the dey did not exceed 10: consequently his highness did not, in that respect, make a bad bargain. The American commodore afterwards sailed for Tunis and Tripoli, and obtained from those regencies payment of the few thousand dollars in dispute between the latter and some American citizens. In the case of Tripoli, 10 Danish and Neapolitan captives were given up by the bey, in lieu of a portion of the stipulated sum. In his letter to the American secretary of state, Commodore Decatur had the modesty to say, that the treaty he had concluded "placed the United States on higher ground than any other nation."\* One of the officers of his squadron concludes a letter to a friend with the following piece of pleasantry: "You have no idea of the respect which the American character has gained by our late wars. The Spaniards, especially, think we are devils incarnate; as we beat the English who beat the French, who beat them, whom nobody ever beat before; and the Algerines, whom the devil himself could not beat."†

‡ On the 23d of May, at Bona, near Algiers, the crews of between 300 and 400 small vessels engaged in the coral-fishery, while on their way to celebrate mass (it being Ascension-day), were barbarously massacred by a band of 2000 Turkish, Le-

\* Naval Monument, p. 299.

† Ibid., p. 295.

vantine, and Moorish troops. These atrocities committed on defenceless Christians having at length roused the vengeance of Britain, an expedition, of a suitable magnitude, was prepared to act against the forts and shipping of Algiers, and the command was intrusted to a most able officer, Admiral Lord Exmouth; who had already, a short time before, compelled the Dey of Tunis to sign a treaty for the abolition of Christian slavery, and to restore 1792 slaves to freedom.

On the 28th of July, at noon, a fleet, consisting of the following 19 men of war, also a naval transport, a sloop with ordnance stores, and a despatch-vessel weighed from Plymouth Sound with a fine northerly wind:

Gun-ship			
100	Queen-Charlotte	}	Adm. (b.) Lord Exmouth, G.C.B.
			Captain James Brisbane, C.B.
98	Impregnable . . .	}	Rear-adm. (b.) David Milne.
			Captain Edw. Bruce, C.B.
74	{ Superb . . . . .	}	Charles Ekins.
	{ Minden . . . . .		William Paterson.
	{ Albion . . . . .		John Coode.
50	Leander . . . . .	}	Edward Chetham, C.B.
Gun-frig.			
40	{ Severn . . . . .	}	Hon. Fred. Wm. Aylmer.
	{ Glasgow . . . . .		Hon. Anthony Maitland.
36	{ Granicus . . . . .	}	William Furlong Wise.
	{ Hebrus . . . . .		Edmund Palmer, C.B.
Gun-b.-slp.			
18	{ Heron . . . . .	}	George Bentham.
	{ Mutine . . . . .		James Mould.
10	{ Britomart . . . . .	}	Robert Riddell.
	{ Cordelia . . . . .		William Sargent.
	{ Jasper . . . . .		Thomas Carew.
Bb.	{ Belzebub . . . . .	}	William Kempthorne.
	{ Fury . . . . .		Constantine R. Moorsom.
	{ Itœla . . . . .		William Popham.
	{ Infernal . . . . .		Hon. Geo. Jas. Perceval.

At 5 P. M., when the fleet was off Falmouth, Captain Paterson was ordered to hasten off to Gibraltar, to have every thing in readiness against the arrival of the expedition. On the 9th of August, at 2 P. M., Lord Exmouth anchored with his fleet in Gibraltar bay, and found lying there, in company with the Minden, which had arrived only on the preceding night at 11, the following Dutch squadron:

Gun-frig.				
40	{	Melampus . . .	}	Vice-adm. Baron T. Van de Cappellen.
		Frederica . . .		Captain Antony-Willem De-Man.
		Diana . . . . .	Jakob-Adrian Van-der-Straaten.	
		Amstel . . . . .	Petrus Zievogel.	
30	Dageraad . . . . .	}	Willem-Augustus Vanderhart.	
		}	Johannes-Martinus Polders.	
Gun-corr.				
18	Eendragt . . . . .	}	Johan-Fred-Chr. Wardenburg.	

Immediately on being apprized of the object of the expedition, Vice-admiral Van de Cappellen solicited and obtained



leave to co-operate in the attack with his frigate-squadron. No time was lost by Lord Exmouth in sending on shore all articles of useless lumber and in getting on board fresh supplies of provisions and ordnance stores, it being the admiral's intention to sail on the 12th. On the 11th, however, a strong levanter set in; and, continuing over the 12th, kept the fleet from moving.

Owing to the highly commendable regulations put in force by Lord Exmouth, an unusual proportion of powder and shot had been expended by the fleet since its departure from England. Every Tuesday and Friday the signal was made for the fleet to prepare for action; when each ship, according to directions previously given, fired six broadsides. Besides this general exercise, the first and second captains of the Queen-Charlotte's guns were daily trained at a target made of laths, three feet square; in the centre of which was suspended a piece of wood of the shape and size of a bottle, with yarns crossed at right angles, so that a 12-pound shot could not pass through the interstices without cutting a yarn. This target, which was, in 1812, first introduced into the navy by Lieutenant George Crichton, then belonging to his majesty's ship *Rhin*, commanded by Sir Charles Malcolm, and which was shown to, and approved of by Sir James Brisbane, when fitting out the Queen-Charlotte, was hung at the foretopmast studdingsail-boom, which was rigged out for the purpose; and it was fired at from abreast of the admiral's skylight on the quarterdeck. By the time the fleet reached Gibraltar, the target was never missed, and the average number of bottles hit daily was 10 out of 14. The confidence this gave to the ship's company was unbounded; and, of their expertness against stone walls and living targets, we shall soon have to display the terrible effects.

On the 13th the 18-gun brig-sloop *Satellite*, Captain James Murray, arrived from Algiers; and on this day every captain in the fleet received a plan of the fortifications of the place, with full instructions as to the intended position of his ship. On the 14th, early in the forenoon, the wind having shifted to the southward, the Dutch squadron, and the whole British fleet, except the *Jasper* sent to England with despatches, and the *Saracen* left behind, consisting altogether of 23 ships and brigs, five gun-boats, and an ordnance sloop, fitted as an explosion-vessel under the personal direction of Lieutenant Richard Howell Fleming, of the Queen-Charlotte (who was to have the command of her), and Major Gossett of the corps of miners, weighed and stood into the Mediterranean.

Previous to the sailing of the fleet, each line-of-battle ship took charge of a gun-boat, and had their own launches fitted for howitzers. The flat-bottomed boats put in requisition were prepared for Congreve's rockets. On the 16th, early in the afternoon, just as the fleet had got within 200 miles of Algiers, the

wind shifted to the eastward; and in the evening the ship-sloop Prometheus, Captain William Bateman Dashwood, joined company direct from the port, having on board the wife, daughter, and infant-child of the British consul, Mr. M'Donell. The two former, disguised in midshipmen's clothes, had with great difficulty been brought off; but, owing to the treachery of Mrs. M'Donell's Jew-nurse,\* the infant, while on its way to the boat concealed in a basket, was detained by order of the dey: as were also the surgeon of the Prometheus, three midshipmen, and the remainder of the crews of two boats, consisting in all of 18 persons. "The child," says Lord Exmouth, "was sent off next morning by the dey; and, as a solitary instance of his humanity, it ought to be recorded by me." The consul himself was put in irons and confined in a small room on the ground-floor of his house; nor could the most urgent remonstrances on the part of Captain Dashwood induce the dey to release his prisoners.

Captain Dashwood confirmed all that the admiral had previously learnt about the preparations making by the Algerines to resist the attack; of which they had received intelligence, chiefly, as was suspected, from the French 40-gun frigate Ciotat, then at anchor in the bay. It appeared, also, that about 40,000 men had been marched down from the interior, and all the janizaries called in from the distant garrisons. The ships, consisting of four frigates, mounting 44 guns each, five large corvettes, mounting from 24 to 30 guns, and between 30 and 40 gun and mortar boats, were all in port. The fortifications of Algiers, for so small a place, were of considerable strength. Upon the various batteries on the north side of the city, including a battery over the north gate, were mounted about 80 pieces of cannon and six or eight enormous mortars; but the shoalness of the water would scarcely admit a heavy ship to approach within reach of them. Between the north wall of the city and the commencement of the pier which is about 250 yards in length, and connects the town with the lighthouse, were about 20 more guns, the greater part of them similarly circumstanced. At the north projection of the mole stood a semicircular battery, of two tiers of guns, about 44 in all; and to the southward of that, and nearly in a line with the pier, was the round or lighthouse battery, of three tiers of guns, 48 in all. Then came a long battery, also of three tiers, called the eastern battery, mounting 66 guns. This was flanked by four other batteries, of two tiers each, mounting altogether 60 guns; and on the south head of the mole were two large guns, represented to be 68-pounders and nearly

\* Upon the authority of Mr. Abraham Salamé in his very interesting "Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers," p. 15, note; but, according to Lord Exmouth, owing to the infant crying in the gateway, although the surgeon had administered something to compose it.

20 feet long. So that the different batteries on the mole mounted at least 220 guns; consisting, except in the case just mentioned, of 32, 24, and 18 pounders. South-west of the small pier that projects from the city to form the entrance of the mole, or harbour, and bearing, at the distance of about 300 yards, due west from the south mole-head, was the fish-market battery, of 15 guns, in three tiers. Between that and the southern extremity of the city, were two batteries of four or five guns each. Beyond the city, in this direction, was a castle and two or three other batteries, mounting between them 60 or 70 guns. Besides all the batteries we have enumerated, and which constituted the sea-defences of the port, there were various others at the back of the city, and on the heights in its environs: indeed, the whole of the guns mounted for the defence of the city of Algiers, on its sea and land frontiers, are represented to have exceeded 1000.

Having to beat against a head wind until towards midnight on the 24th, when it shifted to south-west, the fleet did not make Cape Cazzina, a high promontory about 55 miles to the westward of Algiers, of the bay of which it forms the northern point, until noon on the 26th; nor gain a sight of the city until day-break on the 27th. The ships at this time lying nearly becalmed, Lord Exmouth took the opportunity of despatching Lieutenant Samuel Burgess, in one of the Queen-Charlotte's boats, towed by the Severn, to demand of the dey certain conditions, of which the following is the substance: The abolition of christian slavery; the delivery of all christian slaves in the kingdom of Algiers; the repayment of all the money that had recently been exacted for the redemption of Neapolitan and Sardinian slaves; peace with the king of the Netherlands; and the immediate liberation of the British consul and the two boats' crews of the Prometheus. At 9 A. M., the calm retarding the progress of the frigate, the boat, by signal from the Queen-Charlotte, pulled for the shore, carrying a flag of truce. At 11 A. M., on arriving opposite to the mole, the boat was met by one from the shore, in which was the captain of the port. The demand was presented, and an answer promised in two hours. Meanwhile, a breeze having sprung up from the sea, the fleet stood into the bay, and lay to about a mile from the city.

At 2 P. M., no answer returning, Lieutenant Burgess hoisted the signal to that effect, and pulled out towards the Severn. The Queen-Charlotte immediately asked, by signal, if all the ships were ready. Almost at the same moment every ship had the affirmative flag at her mast-head, and the fleet bore up to the attack in the prescribed order. At 2 h. 35 m. P. M. the Queen-Charlotte anchored with springs about 50 yards from the mole-head. Just as the British three-decker was in the act of lashing herself to the mainmast of an Algerine brig fast to the shore at the mouth of the mole or harbour, and towards which Lord

Exmouth had directed his ship to be steered as the guide for her position, a shot was fired at the Queen-Charlotte; and almost at the same instant two other shot were fired from the opposite end of the mole at the Impregnable and ships near her, as they were advancing to their stations. Scarcely had these three guns been discharged, when Lord Exmouth, with characteristic humanity, waved his hand to a crowd of 200 or 300 soldiers and artillerymen, standing on the parapet of the mole, surveying the immense floating body so near to them. As the greater part of these were in the act of leaping through the embrasures into the lower battery, the Queen-Charlotte opened her starboard broadside. Thus the action commenced, each British ship taking a part in it the instant she could bring her guns to bear.

Next ahead of the Queen-Charlotte, or rather upon her larboard bow, lay the Leander, with her after guns on the starboard side bearing into the mouth of the mole and her foremost ones upon the fish-market battery. Ahead of the Leander lay the Severn, with the whole of her starboard guns bearing on the fish-market battery. Close to the Severn was the Glasgow, with her larboard guns bearing on the town batteries. In the rear of the Queen-Charlotte, inclining towards her starboard quarter, at the distance of about 250 yards, and within a very few of her allotted station, was the Superb, with her starboard broadside bearing upon the 60-gun battery, next to that on the mole-head. This ship was not as close to the Queen-Charlotte as her gallant commander intended her to be (by placing her flying jib-boom over the poop of the Queen-Charlotte), owing to the signal having been made "to anchor" instead of "prepare to anchor," as was directed by Lord Exmouth. Close astern of the Superb, in a north-easterly direction, the Impregnable and Albion were to have taken their stations in line ahead; but, not being sufficiently advanced when the firing commenced, the Impregnable was obliged to bring to considerably outside, not only of her proper station, but of the line of bearing (about south-east from the south angle of the eastern battery) within which the attacking force had been ordered to assemble. The Impregnable thus lay exposed, at the distance of about 400 yards, as well to the lighthouse battery of three tiers, towards which she soon sprang her starboard broadside, as to the eastern battery of two tiers. Observing what an open space there was between the Impregnable and her second ahead, the Superb, the Minden stood on and took up a position about her own length astern of the latter. The Albion, following, brought up, at first, close ahead of the Impregnable; but, finding herself too near to the three-decker, she filled, and at about 3 P. M. came to again, within her own length of the Minden. The latter, quickly passing her stream-cable out of the larboard gun-room port to the Albion's bow, hove the two ships close together. In this way the eight

heaviest ships of the fleet took their stations; the Queen-Charlotte, Superb, Minden, Albion, and Impregnable, from the mole-head in a north-easterly direction, and the Leander, Severn, and Glasgow, from the fish-market battery in a curved direction to the south-west.

The station assigned to the Dutch squadron was against the batteries to the southward of the city, and it appears to have been the intention of the Dutch admiral to place the *Melampus* in the centre of his five frigates; but the *Diana's* captain, not understanding exactly the orders given to him, did not go far enough to the northward. Seeing this, the baron gallantly pushed the *Melampus* past the *Diana*, and at about 3 p. m. anchored his frigate with her jib-boom over the taffrail of the *Glasgow*. The *Diana* and *Dageraad* anchored successively astern of their admiral. The two remaining Dutch frigates anchored further out; and the corvette *Eendragt*, as she had been directed, kept under way.

The *Granicus* and *Hebrus* frigates and the smaller vessels (except the bombs) being considered in the light of a corps de reserve, had not had any particular stations assigned to them, but were to bring up abreast of any openings they could find in the line of battle. Impelled onward by the ardent desire of filling the first of these openings, the *Hebrus* got becalmed by the heavy cannonade, and was obliged to anchor a little without the line, on the Queen-Charlotte's larboard quarter. The *Granicus*, finding herself shooting fast ahead, hove to, with the intention of waiting until her companions had taken their stations. As, owing to the dense smoke which prevailed, nothing beyond the distance of a cable's length could be seen, except the Queen-Charlotte's masthead flag, Captain Wise allowed 10 minutes to elapse for the ships to anchor. The *Granicus* then filled, let fall her foresail, set topgallantsails, and, soon gaining fresh way, steered straight for a beacon that, phoenix-like, seemed to live in the hottest of the fire. With a display of intrepidity and of seamanship alike unsurpassed, Captain Wise anchored his frigate in a space scarcely exceeding her own length between the Queen-Charlotte and Superb; a station of which a three-decked line-of-battle ship might justly have been proud.

The different sloops attached to the squadron also took their posts; the *Heron*, *Britomart*, *Prometheus*, and *Cordelia* remaining under way, and the *Mutine* anchoring on the larboard bow of the *Impregnable*. The four bomb-vessels were soon in their stations, at the distance of about 2000 yards from the enemy's works, and began their destructive discharges; as did also the battering flotilla, commanded by Captain Frederick Thomas Michell, consisting of gun-boats, mortar-boats, launches with carronades, rocket-boats, barges, and yawls, in number 55.

Such was the precision and destructive effect of the Queen-

Charlotte's fire, that her third broadside levelled the south end of the mole to its foundation: she then sprang her broadside, until it bore upon the batteries over the town-gate leading into the mole. Here gun after gun came tumbling over the battlements; and when the last gun fell, which was just as the artillerymen were in the act of discharging it, one of the Algerine chiefs leaped upon the ruined parapet, and shook his drawn cimeter at the ship, whose fatally pointed cannon had so quickly demolished that which, by its brave defenders at least, had been considered impregnable.

The excellent position of, and the animated fire kept up by, the *Leander* very soon cut to pieces the Algerine gun-boats and row-galleys; whereby their intention of boarding the nearest British ships was entirely frustrated. Towards 4 P. M. the *Leander*, by orders from the admiral, ceased firing, to allow the Algerine frigate moored across the mole, at the distance of about 140 yards from the *Queen-Charlotte*, to be set on fire. Accordingly, the flag-ship's barge, under the command of Lieutenant Peter Richards, assisted by Major Gossett, of the corps of miners, Lieutenant of marines Ambrose A. R. Wolrige, and midshipman Henry M'Clintock, proceeded to execute that service. A gallant young midshipman, Aaron Stark Symes, in rocket-boat No. 8, "although," as Lord Exmouth says, "forbidden, was led by his ardent spirit, to follow in support of the barge." His boat, being flat-bottomed, could not keep pace with the barge, and became exposed, in consequence, to a cannonade that wounded himself, and killed his brother officer and nine of the boat's crew. In about 10 minutes, Lieutenant Richards in the barge succeeded in boarding and setting fire to the Algerine frigate, and returned from the enterprise with the loss of only two men killed. The blaze was in a manner electrical; and Lord Exmouth testified his approbation, by telegraphing to the fleet, "Infallible."

At 4 h. 15 m. P. M., the Algerine frigate in flames drifting out towards the *Queen-Charlotte*, the latter shifted her birth to let the vessel pass. At 4 h. 24 m. Rear-admiral Milne sent a message to the commander-in-chief, communicating, that the *Impregnable* had sustained a loss of 150 killed and wounded (including a third of the number by the bursting of a shell from the enemy's works), and requesting that a frigate might be sent to divert some of the fire from the ship. The *Glasgow* was immediately ordered upon that service; but, the wind having fallen in consequence of the heavy firing, she was unable to do more than take up, after the lapse of nearly three quarters of an hour, a somewhat better position for annoyance than her former one. Here a short distance off the *Severn*, with her stern now towards that ship, the *Glasgow* became exposed to a severe raking fire from the fish-market and contiguous batteries; which dismounted two of her quarter-deck carronades, and in a few

minutes did her more serious injury than all she had previously suffered. At 7 P. M. the *Leander*, being greatly cut up by the fish-market battery and others on her starboard bow, ran out a hawser to the *Severn* and brought her broadside to bear upon them. About this time, by the incessant and well directed fire of the mortar, gun, and rocket boats, all the ships and vessels within the harbour were burning. The flames subsequently communicated to the arsenal and storehouses on the mole; and the city also, in several parts, was set on fire by the shells from the bomb-vessels.

The ordnance-sloop, which, fitted as an explosion-vessel, had accompanied the expedition from Gibraltar, for the purpose of being sent against the ships in the mole, was now, as they were all destroyed, placed under the directions of Rear-admiral Milne. Lieutenant Fleming, who during the action had been commanding with great credit a battering-boat stationed close under the stern of the *Queen-Charlotte*, proceeded, in company with Major Reed of the engineers, to take command of the explosion-vessel, and to place her where an officer, sent by Rear-admiral Milne, should point out. This officer was Captain Herbert Bruce Powell, a volunteer serving on board the *Impregnable*. In a short time the sloop was run on shore, close under the semicircular battery to the northward of the lighthouse. There, at a few minutes past 9 P. M., the vessel exploded; and, having been charged with 143 barrels of powder, must have operated very successfully as a diversion in favour of the *Impregnable*.

The whole of the ships kept up a tremendous fire upon the town and forts until about 10 P. M.; when the upper tiers of the batteries on the mole, being in a state of dilapidation, the fire from the lower tiers nearly silenced, and the ammunition of the attacking ships reduced to a very small quantity, the *Queen-Charlotte* cut her cables and springs, and stood out before a light air of wind, which, fortunately for the British, had just sprung up from the land. The remaining British ships, by orders of the admiral, began cutting also; but, owing to their disabled state, they made very slow progress, and the *Leander*, *Superb*, and *Impregnable* suffered much, in consequence, from the raking fire of a fort at the upper angle of the city. Before 2 A. M. on the 28th every British and Dutch ship had come to out of reach of shot or shells, the Algerine fleet and store-houses illuminating by their blaze the whole bay, and greatly assisting the former in picking an anchorage. As if to add to the awful grandeur of the scene, the elements began their war as soon as the ships and batteries had ended theirs. For nearly three hours the lightning and thunder were incessant, and the rain poured down in torrents. We are sensible that a diagram would have been particularly useful in this action, and had hoped to have been able to give one; but, on consulting the logs, we found the positions of very few of the

ships laid down with the requisite accuracy. - Nor could we rely upon any of the few plans that have been published, having discovered mistakes in every one of them.

Now for the account of casualties sustained on the part of the assailants. The Queen-Charlotte had seven seamen and one marine killed, three lieutenants (George Morison King, John Sampson Iago, and Frederick John Johnston, the latter mortally), one secretary to the admiral (Joshua Grimes), one captain of marine-artillery (Charles Frederick Burton), one lieutenant of marines (Patrick Robertson), her boatswain (William Maxwell), five midshipmen (George Markham, Henry Campbell, Edward Hibbert, Edward Stanley, and Robert Hood Baker), one secretary's clerk (Samuel Colston), 82 seamen, 24 marines, two marine artillery, five sappers and miners, and four boys wounded; Impregnable, one midshipman (John Hawkins), 37 seamen, 10 marines, and two boys killed, one master's mate (George Nepean Wesley), one midshipman (Henry Quinn), 111 seamen, 21 marines, nine sappers and miners, and 17 boys\* wounded; Superb, one master's mate (Thomas Howard), one midshipman (Robert C. Bowen), three seamen, two marines, and one rocket-troop killed, her captain (slightly), three lieutenants (Philip Thicknesse Horn, John M'Dougall, and George W. Gunning), two midshipmen (William Sweeting and John Hood Wolseley), 62 seamen, 14 marines, and two marine-artillery wounded; Minden, five seamen and two marines killed, one master's mate (Charles Calmady Dent), one midshipman (Charles G. Grubb), 26 seamen, and nine marines wounded; Albion, one assistant-surveyor (Thomas Mends), one midshipman (John Jardine), and one seamen killed, her captain (severely), one midshipman (John Harvey, mortally), 10 seamen, and three marines wounded; Leander, one captain of marines (James Willson), one lieutenant of marines (George Baxter), three midshipmen (— Lowdon, Richard Calthrop, and P. G. Hanwall), 11 seamen, and one marine killed, two lieutenants (Henry Walker and John Stewart Dixon), five midshipmen (Edward Aitchison, William Cole, Dawson Mayne, Henry Sturt, and George Dixon), one clerk (William W. Pickett), 69 seamen, 25 marines, four boys, and 12 supernumeraries wounded; Severn, two seamen and one marine killed, five midshipmen (James Foster, arm amputated, Charles Caley, William Ferror, Daniel M'Neale Beatty, and William A. Carter), 25 seamen, three marines, and one boy wounded; the Glasgow, nine seamen and one marine killed, one lieutenant (Edmund Williams Gilbert), her master

\* An extraordinary number to suffer on board one ship. It is perhaps full as extraordinary that, out of a total of 210 persons killed and wounded, three only should be officers: this is partly accounted for by the havoc which the bursting of the shell caused among the sailors on the main or third deck; but the small proportion of officers, with even those 50 men deducted, is surprising.



(Robert Fulton), one lieutenant of marines (Athelston Stephens, five midshipmen (John Duffell, George W. Hervey, Wynne Baird, George Henry Heathcote, and — Keay), 25 seamen, three marines, and one boy wounded; Granicus, two lieutenants of marines (William M. Morgan and William Renfrey), one midshipman (Robert Pratt) nine seamen, one marine, one marine-artillery, and two boys killed, one lieutenant (Henry Augustus Perkins), four midshipmen (Lewis Dunbar Mitchell, Lewis Tobias Jones, George R. Glennie, and Dacres Furlong Wise), 31 seamen, three marines, two rocket-troop, and one boy wounded; Hebrus, one midshipman (George H. A. Pococke) and three seamen killed, one midshipman (Aaron Sykes Symes), 10 seamen, one marine, two rocket-troop, and one boy wounded; Infernal, one lieutenant of marine-artillery (John James P. Bissett) and one seaman killed, one lieutenant (John Foreman), her boatswain (George Valentine), clerk (Matthew Hopkins), three midshipmen (James Barber, James M. Cross, and John H. Andrews), eight seamen, one marine-artillery, and two boys wounded.

None of the remaining three bomb-vessels, nor any of the sloops, appear to have incurred any loss. That sustained by the Dutch squadron amounted to 13 killed and 52 wounded; making the total loss, on the part of the allies, 141 killed and 742 wounded. The following statement will show, along with the names of the first lieutenants (and of some of the others in the flag-ships) of the British ships, the individual loss sustained by the two squadrons, and the quantity of powder and shot which each of the British and Dutch ships expended in the action.

The quantities marked with an asterisk are doubtful: the others are officially correct. The *Impregnable*, it is understood, fired two shot at a time; which accounts for her expenditure so greatly exceeding that of either of the other line-of-battle ships. The whole quantity of powder and shot expended in the engagement, according to Mr. Salamé's very interesting narrative, was upwards of 500 tons of the latter, and nearly 118 tons of the former. This includes, of course, the quantity expended by the sloops, most of whom fired when they could do so with effect. Mr. Salamé states, also, that the number of 13 and 10 inch shells thrown by the four bomb-vessels was 960.

Although none of the ships lost any spars, many, particularly the *Impregnable*, *Leander*, *Superb*, *Granicus*, *Glasgow*, and *Severn*, had their masts much injured. In hull, also, these ships, the first two especially, were considerable sufferers. The *Impregnable*, indeed, is stated to have received 233 large shot in her hull; a great many of them between wind and water. One 18-pound shot entered the bulwark, passed through the heart of the mainmast, and went out at the opposite side. The loss in killed and wounded, on the part of the Algerines, amounted, as represented by some accounts, to 4000 men, and, by others, to nearly 7000.

SHIPS.	First lieutenants.	Loss.		Powder.	Round-shot.
		K.	W.	lbs.	No.
Queen-Charlotte	{ Peter Richards 1st F. T. Mitchell 2d J. W. Cairnes 3d }	8	131	30 124	*4462
Impregnable . . .	{ J. B. Babington 1st Roger Hall 2d. . }	50	160	28800	6730
Superb . . .	Ph. Thicknesse Horn	8	84	*23200	*4500
Minden . . .	Joseph Benj. Howell	7	37	24536	4710
Albion . . .	Robert Hay . . .	3	15	*22520	*4110
Leander . . .	Thomas Sanders . .	17	118	21700	3680
Severn . . .	James Davies . . .	3	34	*12910	*2920
Glasgow . . .	George M'Pherson .	10	37	*13460	*3000
Granicus . . .	John Parson . . .	16	42	*9960	*2800
Hebrus . . .	E. Holling. Delafosse	4	15	9780	2755
Infernal . . .	John Foreman . . .	2	17		
	Total British loss	128	690		
Melampus . . . . .		3	15	} 46119	10148
Diana . . . . .		6	22		
Dageraad . . . . .		...	4		
Frederica . . . . .		...	5		
Amstel . . . . .		4	6		
	Total { Dutch loss	13	52		
	{ Allied loss	141	742		

As soon as daylight came, Lord Exmouth despatched Lieutenant Burgess with a flag of truce and a note to the dey, repeating the demands of the preceding forenoon; and the bombs were at the same time ordered to resume their positions, to be ready to renew the bombardment of the city in case of a non-compliance. The Algerine officer who came off to meet the boat, and who had been captain of one of the frigates that had been destroyed, declared that the answer had been sent on the preceding day, but that no boat was to be found to receive it. On this subject, Mr. Salamé says: "When we opened over the mole-head, I saw, as I thought, a boat coming out, which I supposed was that of the captain of the port, and told his lordship of it; but, on looking with a glass, we found the mistake."\* The fact of the boat's departure was, however, confirmed by the captain of the port himself, when, in an hour or two afterwards, he came off with the Swedish consul, to acquaint the British admiral that all his terms would be agreed to.

On the 29th, at 10 P. M., the captain of the port again came

\* Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers, &c., p. 37.

off, accompanied by Mr. M'Donell, the British consul. On the same afternoon Captain Brisbane went on shore; and, by the aid of the interpreter, Mr. Salamé, a conference was had with the dey at his palace. Several other conferences took place, in the three last of which Rear-admiral Sir Charles Vinicombe Penrose, who had arrived on the 29th in the 36-gun frigate *Ister*, was present; and the final result was, the delivery to the British of upwards of 1200 christian slaves, with an engagement (of no great value certainly) to abolish the practice of slave-making in future; the restoration of 382,500 dollars for slaves redeemed by Naples and Sicily; peace with the king of the Netherlands; the payment of 30,000 dollars to the British consul for the destruction of his effects, and a public apology to him, before the ministers and officers of the palace, in terms dictated by Captain Brisbane, for the detention of his person. Having thus accomplished, to the fullest extent, the object of his mission to Algiers, Lord Exmouth, at midnight on the 3d of September, weighed on his return, leaving the *Prometheus* to attend the British consul, and embark the few remaining slaves that were then on their way from the interior.

Those only, who may not be aware to what a pitch of extravagance the pretensions of the Americans have attained, will feel any surprise, that they should rank their performance at Algiers very little if at all below the glorious exploit we have just done narrating: as if the act of Commodore Decatur, in exchanging 500 Algerine prisoners for 10 slaves, citizens of the United States, could be compared with the act of Lord Exmouth; who, with cannon-balls only to give in exchange, obtained the freedom of, including the 1792 given up to the admiral in his spring visit to the bay of Tunis,\* upwards of 3000 slaves; not one of whom, as a proof how little of selfish feeling had actuated the framers of the expedition, was a native of the British isles. The release of so many christian slaves from the iron fangs of barbarians was, indeed, an act worthy of Britain; an act calculated to raise the character of her navy, high as it already stood, higher still in the estimation of the world. Nor will the triumph at Algiers pass to posterity, without the name of Exmouth, as the leader of the brave band by whose prowess it was gained.

For the skill and valour he had displayed in consummating this glorious achievement, Lord Exmouth was created a viscount of the United Kingdom. Rear-admiral Milne, also, was made a knight-commander, and Captains Ekins, Aylmer, Wise, Maitland, Paterson, and Coode, companions, of the Bath. All the lieutenants named in the list in the preceding page, and some others, including Lieutenant Fleming who commanded the explosion-vessel, were promoted to the rank of commanders;

† See p. 398.

and several of the master's mates and midshipmen obtained commissions as lieutenants.

The Dutch admiral behaved uncommonly well ; and the following has been adduced as an instance of his self-possession in the heat of the battle : About an hour after the firing had commenced, a lieutenant of the Queen-Charlotte went on board the *Melampus* with a message from Lord Exmouth. The baron himself attended the lieutenant to the gangway on his return, and rated the frigate's first lieutenant somewhat sharply, for his inattention in not having shipped the best man-ropes for the British officer's accommodation. Among the meritorious individuals concerned in this expedition, the interpreter must not be forgotten. The zeal, talent, and fidelity of Mr. Salamé appear to have merited all the praises officially bestowed upon him, as well by the commander-in-chief as by the officers, Rear-admiral Penrose and Captain Brisbane, present at the conferences with the dey.

## STATE OF THE BRITISH NAVY.

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THE abstract for the year 1817\* differs from all that have preceded it in the series, by the double arrangement of its classification, owing to the revival, by an order in council, of the ancient and only reasonable practice of rating the ships of the British navy; namely, according to the number of carriage-guns of every sort which they respectively mounted. The memorial from the board of admiralty to the prince regent, recommending the alteration, bears date November 25, 1816: and the order in council establishing the new ratings, according to the plan submitted, issued in the month of February, 1817. Although this memorial of the board of admiralty was not seen by us, until every abstract of the 28 was printed, and every note attached to them prepared, we find that we had anticipated nearly all the reasons urged by the board for the necessity of some amendment in the classification. The following are the two concluding paragraphs of this important memorial: "We trust that we shall be excused for observing to your royal highness, that it is wholly unworthy of the character of the royal navy of this kingdom to maintain this system, which though introduced by the accidental cause we have mentioned, and without any design of deception, yet may give occasion to foreign nations to accuse us of misrepresentation, when we state that a British frigate of 38 guns has taken a foreign frigate of 44, when in fact the British frigate was of equal, if not superior force. We therefore humbly recommend that your royal highness will be pleased to order, that the rule for stating the force of his majesty's ships, which prevailed prior to 1793, and which in fact never was formally

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract No. 25; also, in particular the notes belonging to it.

abrogated should be revived and established; and that in future all his majesty's ships should be rated at the number of guns and carronades which they actually carry on their decks, quarterdecks, and forecastles."

A reference to the early pages of this work will raise a doubt as to the correctness of this passage, "which prevailed prior to 1793," unless we explain that, as "guns" were the only species of ordnance named in the original order, fixing the rates of the ships, no ship in the British navy, prior to 1793, nor subsequently indeed, did mount more "guns," that is, long guns, than her established or rated number; but that, as far back as January, 1781, 429 ships belonging to the British navy carried from four to 12 pieces of carriage-ordnance, or, as the French expressively say, "bouches à feu," more than their rated number, will not, we presume, be disputed.\* We are sorry to observe that the new order confines the guns (for we must persist in including carronades within that term †) to the "decks, quarterdecks, and forecastles," because every ship belonging to the three higher rates of the navy still mounts six guns more than she rates. These guns, it is true, are 18-pounder carronades; but many of the 80s and first class 74s have carried 24-pounders, and may again if a war breaks out. Moreover, the public is informed by the admiralty navy-list, that "the force of each ship is stated according to the number of guns and carronades actually carried," without any exception as to the poop, or roundhouse: hence, when it becomes known, that the *Superb*, of "78 guns," mounts 84, and the *Bulwark*, of "76 guns," 82, what will people suppose, but that the new rating system, like the old one, carries concealment in the background? The best remedy is, in our opinion, to disarm the poop of the six 18-pounder carronades, and to level the barricade: the ships will experience no sensible diminution of force, and be much more snug and seaworthy.

Viewed as a whole, the new rating system is a very important state measure; but, as depending upon the guns which each ship is calculated to mount, the plan will require an active war to perfect it. Not having used carronades to the extent of the British, the French have little if any thing to alter in their system. If a French 74, when fitted out by the English, is mounted with 78 guns, it is not, in general, because she had carried that number in the French service; but because, for the accommodation of the far most important man on board a French ship, be the government a monarchy or a republic, two ports of a side were left vacant in the cabin. With respect to their frigates, the French more usually denominated them 44s than 40s; and even the latter came nearer to the mounted force of the ship, than was the case with the British 38s. But the

\* See vol. i., p. 36.

† *Ibid.*, p. 38.

Americans, how did they act? Why their rating system was founded upon deception, and deception alone. They built "44s," and mounted them with 56 guns; and they have since built "74s," and mounted them with 102 guns, on three flush decks: although, owing to inability to bear the weight, from some error in the construction of the hull, the two first-built ships went to sea with no more than 82 guns.

While on the subject of the American 74s, we will, having the means in our power, compare the force of one of the smallest of them with that of a British 74 of the middling class; a class that exceeds in number all the other line-classes in the British navy put together; and the only class of 74, which, in the event of a contest, the Americans would admit to be an equal match for a ship of theirs bearing the same denomination. Let us take the Albion. That ship mounts 28 long 32-pounders, weighing 55 cwt., upon her first deck, 28 long 18s upon her second deck, six long 12-pounders and 12 carronades, 32-pounders, on her quarterdeck and forecastle, and six 18-pounder carronades on her poop; total, 80 guns. Her net war complement is 594 men and boys, including 32 of the latter; and her measurement 1743 tons. The American 74-gun ship Franklin mounts 30 long 32-pounders, of 63 cwt., upon her first deck, 32 medium 32-pounders, of 52 cwt., on the second deck, and two of the same guns and 18 carronades, 32-pounders, on the quarterdeck and forecastle; total, 82 guns. Her complement actually on board in 1818 was 786 men and boys, including but eight or 10 of the latter; and she measures 2124 tons. Admitting then, these ships to be mutually opposed, the following would be their comparative force:

		ALBION.	FRANKLIN
Broadside-guns . . . . .	No.	40	41
	lbs.	982	1312
Crew . . . . .	No.	594	786
Size . . . . .	tons	1743	2124

So much for the equality of force between an American 74 and a British 74 of the class of the Albion; and yet, were a war to break out to-morrow, Sir William Hoste\* would consider himself peculiarly fortunate (and where is the captain of a British 74, indeed, who would not?) in falling in with the Franklin, commanded by the most renowned of the American commodores.

We will now proceed to state a few particulars respecting the construction, equipment, and qualifications of the Franklin, the result of an inspection of the ship when she lay at Spithead in January, 1818; and which particulars, to the British public at least, are as novel, as it is hoped they will prove interesting.

\* The Albion's captain till June, 1825.

The Franklin was laid down at Philadelphia in the summer of 1813, and launched in August, 1815. She is built of seasoned live oak, admirably put together, and, like the generality of Philadelphia ships, highly finished in every part; has a round bow, and works her cables, similar to other three-deckers, on the second deck. We call her a three-decker, because, in fact, her upper deck is continuous from stem to stern, similar to the first and second, with chocks and fittings for five ports of a side along the waist: so that the ship can mount 30 guns on this deck (called "spar deck" by the Americans), similar to the 44s.\* Her principal dimensions are as follows:

	ft.	in.
Length from fore part of the stem to the back of the port at the wing transom	} 197	0
Breadth extreme		
First-deck ports apart	8	6
Height of ditto from water	4	7
Draught of water abaft, with nine month's provisions on board	} 24	0

After what has appeared in these pages respecting the American frigates, no doubt can remain, that this American line-of-battle ship is well found in all her stores, and that her guns are properly mounted and secured. She is, to all appearance, a very snug ship, and has been pronounced to be a very stiff one; an excellent sailer on every point, and a good sea-boat. She is steered with an iron tiller 16 feet long. Her lower masts, in their naked state, are not stouter than those of a British ship of the same dimensions, but they have each, as we noticed in the frigates, immense quarter-fishes, that make them appear of an extraordinary size; and the whole of the rigging, both standing and running, is far stouter than would be established upon a similarly-sized ship in the British navy. Her galley, dispensary, capstan, and pumps, are all of the most improved construction: her pumps, indeed, are remarkable for their simplicity, the ease with which they are worked, and the quantity of water they discharge.

One error was committed by her architects. They did not calculate properly the bulk of water, that a hull so stoutly built, and so heavily laden with guns, would displace. Hence, her lower-deck ports are brought nearer to the water than was intended, or than is consistent with a due regard to the use of her lower battery in blowing weather. For instance, in the year 1818, the Franklin's midship lower-deck port was only 4 feet 7 inches from the water, while that of the British small-class 74 is usually 5 feet 10 inches; but the Franklin was then victualled for nine months, and had on board a quantity of stores for other ships in the Mediterranean. With six months' provisions on board, the height was stated to be about 5 feet 6 inches. The Independence, built at Boston, and launched eight or nine

\* See p. 4.



months before the Franklin, possessed the failing in a much greater degree; her ports were within 3 feet 10 inches of the water, and she was not considered safe to cross the Atlantic without half-ports.

However, the fault certainly increased the ship's stability; and the four last-built American line-of-battle ships, the Washington (the second), Ohio, Columbus, and North-Carolina are of greatly increased dimensions, and, even with their full establishment of guns, 102 in number, carry their ports at a proper height. We have recently gleaned a few particulars respecting the last-named ship, which is now in the Mediterranean under the command of our old friend Commodore Rodgers. The North-Carolina measures 206 feet on the gun-deck, and is 52 feet some odd inches in moulded breadth; which gives the ship about 53 feet 4 or 5 inches for her extreme breadth, and makes her measure about 2650 tons English. Her actual force at this time, according to the representation of a British officer who has recently been on board of her, consists of 34 medium 42-pounders on the first deck, 34 medium 32-pounders on the second deck, and 34 carronades, 42-pounders, on the third deck; total 102 guns. Her complement now on board is 1000 men. Her lower masts and topmasts are short, but of an immense stoutness. The mizenmast is within 4 inches of being equal in circumference to the Albion's mainmast. The masts have a fish on each side from the step to the head; and Commodore Rodgers told the post-captain who was paying him this visit, that, in an action in the Constitution when he commanded her, he had 32 shot through his mainmast, but did not lose it; which he attributed to the shortness of the mast, its size, and the strengthening fish. Had we been standing by the commodore, when he made this bounce, we should almost have been tempted to ask him what action it was in which he commanded the Constitution.

We have already compared together an American and a British 74: we will now give a figure statement, showing the relative force of an American 74 (for so the North-Carolina is officially rated) and a British 120. The force of the Caledonia has already been particularized;\* but her third-deck guns have since been changed from long 18 to Congreve's 24 pounders, and her present establishment gives her six, instead of two, poop-carronades, or 126 guns in all. The following, then, will be the comparative force of a British 120, and an American first-class 74, gun-ship:

		CALEDONIA.	NORTH-CAROLINA.
Broadside-guns . . . . .	{ No.	68	51
	{ lbs.	1648	1972
Crew . . . . .	No.	891	1000
Size . . . . .	tons	2616	2650

\* See vol. v., p. 408.

It was given out as the intention of the American government, had the treaty of Ghent been broken off, to have cut down the Franklin and Independence to frigates, and have sent to sea, to meet the two-deckers of England, the ships then building of the class of the North-Carolina. Had one of the latter captured or sunk a ship like the Albion, even the president, in his next speech to congress, would not have scrupled to tell the world, that an American 74 had vanquished a British 80.

The three remaining annual abstracts may be referred to together.\* As they call for no particular remarks, we shall merely state that the number of commissioned officers and masters belonging to the British navy at the commencement of the respective years 1817, 1818, 1819, and 1820, was,

	1817.	1818.	1819.	1820.
Admirals . . . . .	60	56	52	64
Vice-admirals . . . . .	62	61	59	65
Rear-admirals . . . . .	74	74	71	70
" superannuated	20	27	27	20
Post-captains . . . . .	854	883	865	837
" superannuated	32	31	29	29
Commanders or slp.-captains	829	813	768	780
" superannuated	100	100	100	100
Lieutenants . . . . .	4012	3949	3901	3848
Masters . . . . .	681	651	622	606

And the number of seamen and marines, voted for the service of the same four years, was, for 1817, 19,000, for 1818 and 1819, 20,000, and for 1820, 23,000.†

We would, most willingly, give an account of the improvements that have of late years been introduced into the British navy; but our limits restrict us to a few superficial remarks. A great change has doubtless taken place, as well in the contour, as in the arrangement of the materials that compose the fabric, of a British ship of war. The principle of the change, as respects the arrangement of the materials or timber, consists in the substitution of the triangle for the rectangle, with the view of conferring upon every part of the fabric a uniformity of strength. The frame of the hold consists of a series of triangles, united by trusses; and the openings between the ribs, or outer timbers, are filled with slips of wood, calked within and without, and rendered quite impervious to water; so that, should a vessel so constructed, lose her main keel and even a proportion of the plank from her bottom, she would still remain water-tight. As one instance, the British 20-gun ship *Esk*, Captain Edward Lloyd, while running between nine and ten knots, struck, near Bermuda, on a bank of coral and hard sand; where she lay,

\* See Appendix, Annual Abstract Nos. 26, 27, and 28; also Appendix, No. 19.

† See Appendix, No. 20.

beating heavily, 48 hours. When got afloat, the ship was found with her main keel rubbed off nearly its whole length (at one part the dead-wood was crushed up to the keelson), and yet it was not until 11 hours afterwards that the Esk began to be, and that only in a slight degree, leaky. The Vigilant revenue-cutter, driven, and apparently wrecked, upon a bed of shingles in Douglas bay, Isle of Man, and yet got off and brought in safety to Plymouth, is another remarkable instance. As a still more recent case, the 10-gun brig-sloop Frolic, employed in the packet-service, after lying eight hours on her beam-ends, upon the rocks off Sable-Island, beating violently, got safe into Halifax harbour.

The system of diagonal timbering, for which the British navy is indebted to Sir Robert Seppings, one of the surveyors on the establishment, was first commenced in the year 1800, upon the *Glenmore* 32. In 1805 it was further applied, at Chatham, to the *Kent* 74, to give auxiliary strength to that ship after her return from the Mediterranean. It was then introduced, to a certain extent, in the building of the *Warspite* 74; and, after the principle had been examined at the admiralty by a committee appointed for the purpose, directions were given to rebuild the *Tremendous* 74 to the full extent of the diagonal principle. This was done, and the principle was extended even to the decks. The *Tremendous* was found so completely to answer, that the diagonal system,\* both in building and in repairing ships, has since become general in the British navy. The *Howe*, launched March 28, 1815, was the first ship laid down and built upon the principle. A rumour for a short time prevailed, that this fine first-rate, just as she had entered one of the new docks at Sheerness, was infected with the dry-rot. So far from it, there is not at the moment we are writing this, from the best inquiries we can make on the subject, a sounder ship in the British navy.

Sir Robert's important improvement in giving to line-of-battle ships a circular bow, we have already slightly touched upon: † his ingenuity has since produced a more surprising, and an equally important, change at the opposite extremity of the ship, a circular instead of a square stern. To convey an idea of the advantages of this plan we shall make a quotation from a work that treats professionally on the subject: "The sterns are also formed circular, and to add to their strength, as many timbers as possible are run up: this presents a very formidable stern-battery, enables the guns to be run out so far as to prevent accidents to the stern by their explosion; the danger arising from

\* See a very valuable work recently published, with "Elements of Naval Architecture," entitled "An Appendix, containing the principles and practice of constructing ships, as invented and introduced by Sir Robert Seppings, surveyor of his majesty's navy, by John Knowles, F.R.S., secretary to the committee of surveyors of his majesty's navy."

† See vol iii., p. 375.

being pooped is considerably diminished, if not wholly prevented; and the obstruction to the ship's progress, which according to the old plan, was occasioned by the projection of quarter-galleries, when the ships were going on a wind, is removed. In fine, by this alteration, the ships are every way more seaworthy and better adapted for defence; qualities which are so essential and indeed indispensable in ships of war.\*

As a proof of the good opinion entertained of this plan by the lords commissioners of the admiralty, an order of the board, dated on the 13th of June, 1817, directs, that all new ships, down to fifth-rates inclusive, are to be so constructed, and all ships of the same rates receiving extensive repairs are also to have circular sterns, provided the timbers in the old or square sterns are defective. By this alteration in her construction, the ship becomes, beyond a doubt, a stronger vessel and a more efficient man of war: advantages which it will require something more than an unsightly appearance (and even that, we presume, is a remediable effect) to counterbalance. The number of ships belonging to the British navy, which on the 1st of January, 1820, were repairing, building, or ordered to be built, with circular sterns, amounted to 67,† and the number of ships building of teak, at the same date, amounted to 19.‡

On a former occasion, we ventured to suggest the advantages that might be derived, in the construction of ships of war, from the opinions of naval officers of experience.§ A post-captain of acknowledged nautical skill, and of tried gallantry, has recently proved himself a very eminent naval architect. "Captain Hayes," says Mr. Marshall, "is the author of a pamphlet on the subject of naval architecture, his proficiency in which important science is the result of many years' professional experience and deep consideration. His proposed system, we understand, meets a point hitherto considered impracticable, viz.: that of building a thousand vessels, if required, from a given section, without the variation of a needle's point, reducible from a first-rate ship to a cutter, each possessing excellent powers and advantages of every description in their respective class. Since the publication of the above pamphlet, in which he carefully abstained from saying, or even hinting that he had made any progress in the formation of such a system, two vessels have been built, in a royal dock-yard, on his projection: the first, a cutter of about 160 tons,|| is said to embrace stability under canvass with little ballast, great buoyancy, better stowage, and swifter sailing qualities, than any model yet designed by known schools of naval architecture. The second, a sloop of war,¶ is at present absent on her first experimental cruise, in company with two other ves-

\* See the work referred to in the first note of the preceding page.

† For a list of names, see Appendix, No. 21.

‡ Ibid., No. 22.

§ See p. 151.

|| The Arrow.

¶ The Champion.

sels of the same class, one of which was designed by Sir Robert Seppings, and the other built by the students of Portsmouth dock-yard, under the superintendence of Professor Inman.”\*

In the former edition of this work, we were induced to give a brief account of the first two expeditions to the polar regions, in search of a north-west passage. Other expeditions to the same spot have since been undertaken; and if we broached the subject at all, we could not expect to make it interesting, or even intelligible, unless we brought down occurrences to a date far beyond the period to which this work, by its title is restricted. Several works have been published exclusively on the subject of these expeditions, and they are in most people's hands: consequently there is the less occasion for us to deviate from our plan, and enlarge a volume already of a much greater bulk than any of its companions.

\* Marshall, vol. ii., p. 683.

## THE BURMESE WAR.

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NINE years had nearly elapsed, and Great Britain, her colonies and dependencies had remained in the enjoyment of peace; but, in the beginning of the year 1824, the governor-general of India, in council, decided upon attacking the territory of the Burmese, in consequence of their having committed on the south-east frontier of the possessions of the East India Company, several unprovoked aggressions. In detailing the operations in Ava, during the Burmese war, it is our intention to confine ourselves as much as possible to those actions in which the naval forces were mostly employed, giving a slight sketch of the military movements, as far as is requisite to elucidate the subject.

At this period Commodore Charles Grant, C.B., in the *Liffey* of 50 guns, was the senior officer in India, and, on being informed of the determination to resort to war, a part of the squadron under his command was placed at the disposition of the governor-general, for the purpose of affording every assistance in its power. The *Larne* sloop, under the command of Captain Frederick Marryat, having under his orders the *Sophie* brig, Captain George Frederick Ryves, was desired to proceed to the river Hooghly, and to place himself under the directions of the supreme government.

The command of the military department was intrusted to Sir Archibald Campbell, K.C.B.; a division of troops was embarked at Calcutta under Brigadier Michael M'Creagh, C.B., and another division at Madras under Brigadier-general William Macbean. On the 8th of April, Sir Archibald Campbell embarked with his staff on board the *Larne* and made sail for the appointed rendezvous of the Madras Division at Port Cornwallis;

thither the Bengal division had already sailed. Towards the end of April it arrived, and on the 2d of May the Madras division convoyed by the *Sophie* hove in sight off the harbour of Port Cornwallis. A slight delay took place in the departure of ships for their ultimate destination, Rangoon, which is the principal seaport in the dominions of the King of Ava; during the interval between the 2d of May and the 5th, on which day the fleet sailed, Commodore Grant, in the *Liffey*, anchored in Port Cornwallis and took command of the naval department, consisting of the *Slaney*, 20, Captain Charles Mitchell; *Larne*, 20, Captain Frederick Marryat; and *Sophie*, 18, Captain George Frederick Ryves. To these were added four of the company's cruisers, under Captain Henry Hardy.

The whole force consisting, in addition to those already named, "of 18 brigs, schooners, and other small-craft (formerly pleasure-yachts on the Ganges), each armed with two light carronades and four swivels, and manned with 12 lascars, under the command of an European; 20 row-boats, lugger rigged (formerly Calcutta pilot-boats), each carrying an 18-pounder in the bow, and manned with from 16 to 20 lascars; the *Diana* steam-vessel; and about 40 sail of transports, only one or two of which had English crews. The company's cruisers were manned with British sailors, Hindoos, and Mahometans, and all the row-boats were under the command of Mr. William Lindquist of the Bengal pilot-service. The total number of fighting men embarked at Calcutta and Madras in April, 1824, was 8701, of whom 4077 were British."\* "On the morning of the 5th of May," says Sir Archibald Campbell in his despatch, "we finally put to sea, detaching a part of my force under Brigadier M'Creagh, in the *Ernaâd* timber ship, under the escort of H.M. sloop *Slauey* against the island of Cheduba, and sending another detachment under Major Wahab of the Madras establishment, against Negrais, proceeding myself with the main body for Rangoon river, which we reached on the 10th, and anchored within the bar."

The principal point of attack, in the first instance, was Rangoon. This town stands on the Rangoon or Parnian river, and is situated to the eastward of Bassein or Negrais point; which latter place may be said to form the eastern point of the bay of Bengal, and is about 420 miles from Calcutta. Rangoon is 140 miles from Bassein point.

The Irrawaddi or Erawadi is a large and, in many places, deep river; it takes its rise about the 27° of north latitude, and 95° of east longitude: it runs nearly due south, gradually enlarging itself until it reaches Amarapura; there it turns in a westerly direction, running past the city of Ava, the capital of the country against which hostilities had been determined. It

continues in this direction about 60 miles, when it inclines to the south-west for about 100 miles until it passes Pagahm-mew, when it again runs nearly south 250 miles to Kewdowa, a town 70 miles to the southward of Prome; here the river branches off, the eastern arm running into the river Parnian, on which Rangoon stands, the western communicating with the Kindowa or Anowkiang, one branch of which becomes the Bassein or Negrais river. The town of Bassein stands mid-distance between Negrais point and Kendowa, the whole distance being between 160 and 160 miles; whilst Rangoon stands in the direction above-named from Kendowa, and distant about 80 miles. It will be seen hereafter, how well and ably Sir Archibald Campbell's views and plans were acted upon; that the junction of his forces on the Irrawaddi by the route of Bassein was effected nearly at the same time that the main body under his own command reached the point assigned. It is perhaps necessary to state, that, in consequence of the direction of the river, almost all operations were carried on near its banks, and that, as the army advanced, the boats or flotilla were always within communication, each supporting the other, and sharing the difficulties and dangers. The attacks were always made in conjunction, and we believe, throughout the whole war, there was not one place assaulted, attacked, or taken, at which assault, attack, or capture, the flotilla were not present. Indeed, from the nature of the country, there being no roads, and only narrow footpaths through the woods and jungles, it would have required immense labour to render them applicable to military purposes, and to carry on the war inland; besides which obstacles, the army were unprovided with land carriages, and not half supplied even with water conveyances; and here, again, it was by no means probable that the Burmese could be induced to render any assistance, they being principally in the pay of the court of Ava, to which and to the golden-footed monarch, as their king is titled, they pay the most submissive obedience. We think it right to mention this, as any one perusing Major Snodgrass's book would be inclined to view the operations of the naval department as very secondary indeed to their gallant brethren in arms, who, we are quite certain, do not begrudge the laurels justly won by the indefatigable exertions and unremitting toil of his Majesty's and the Honourable the East India Company's navy.

The *Liffey*, preceded by the *Larne*, until she grounded on a bank at noon, led the fleet up the Rangoon or Parnian river on the 11th of May, and anchored abreast of the town, opposite a battery of 14 guns; the river about this part is calculated to be about 700 yards wide, the town being situated nearly 28 miles from the sea: its defences are described as being "an enclosure of palisades or stockades, ten or twelve feet high, strengthened internally by embankments of earth, and protected externally,



on one side by the river, and at the western end by a morass, over which there is a bridge. The palisade encloses the town, in the shape of an irregular parallelogram, having one gate in each of three faces, and two in that of the north: at the river-gate is a landing-place, denominated the King's wharf, where stands the battery opposite which the Liffey anchored."\* From this battery a miserably directed and altogether insignificant fire was commenced, but which immediately was silenced by a few shot from the Liffey; in the mean time preparations were made to land the troops, during which the battery again opened its fire, and was as easily silenced as before; the troops were landed in three divisions, and the town was taken without the discharge of a single musket, the inhabitants, together with some British and American missionaries having been driven by the Burmese inland.

On the 16th of May Captain Richard Birch, who had been despatched for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from the village of Kemmendale, a war-boat station three miles above Rangoon, was landed with the grenadier company of his majesty's 38th regiment, by the boats of the Liffey, under Lieutenant James Wilkinson of that ship, about a mile from Kemmendine, where a party of the enemy had stockaded themselves. The position was attacked and carried in a gallant style. The men being re-embarked, the boats proceeded further up the river, when a heavy fire from another stockade was opened upon them; the boats instantly pulled towards the point, the place was assaulted and carried in spite of numerous difficulties, and 400 men who defended it, were driven from the stockade at the point of the bayonet, leaving 60 of the enemy killed. A third stockade was soon afterwards attacked and carried. In these affairs the army lost Lieutenant Thomas Kerr of the 38th regiment and one private killed, and nine wounded. In the naval department Lieutenant Wilkinson and nine of his crew were severely wounded.

Commodore Grant left Rangoon on the 31st of May, in consequence of severe indisposition, which on the 25th of July following proved fatal; the command of the naval department in the Irrawaddi (on a branch of which river Rangoon stands) now devolved on Captain Marryat. In Sir Archibald Campbell's despatch, dated the day after Commodore Grant sailed, the following description is given of the enemy:

"Every act evinces a most marked determination of carrying hostilities to the very last extremity; approaching our posts day and night, under cover of an impervious and incombustible jungle; constructing stockades and redoubts on every road and pathway, even within musket-shot of our sentries, and, from their hidden fastnesses, carrying on a most barbarous and ha-

\* Marshall.

passing warfare, firing upon our sentries at all hours of the night, and lurking on the outskirts of the jungle, for the purpose of carrying off any unlucky wretch whom chance may throw in their way."

Major Snodgrass gives an equally unpromising view of affairs. "The enemy's troops and new-raised levies," he says, "were gradually collecting in our front from all parts of the kingdom: a cordon was speedily formed around our cantonments, capable, indeed, of being forced at every point; but, possessing in a remarkable degree, all the qualities requisite for harassing and wearing out in fruitless exertions the strength and energies of European or Indian troops. I did from our view on every side in the darkness of a deep and, to regular bodies, impenetrable forest, far beyond which, the inhabitants, and all the cattle of the Rangoon district had been driven; the Burmese chiefs carried on their operations, and matured their future schemes with vigilance, secrecy, and activity. Neither rumours nor intelligence of what was passing within his posts, ever reached us. Beyond the invisible line which circumscribed our position, all was mystery or vague conjecture."\*

From the period when the English flotilla anchored in the Irrawaddi, small cargo boats were continually captured, and these were cut down into more manageable craft, in order to move the troops with greater facility, each being well able to hold 60 men. These boats very materially strengthened the English force, and gave a facility of movement to the land forces, excessively desirable in such a country, and with such an enemy as Sir Archibald describes above. The enemy, ever watchful on shore, were equally on the alert afloat. The narrowness of the river, and the immense assemblage of vessels stretching from shore to shore, offered a fine opportunity for the employment of fire-rafts. These destructive engines were launched above Kemmendine, and it required all the vigilance of active officers and men, to save the flotilla from nightly destruction. In order to frustrate, or rather, effectually stop this annoyance, it was deemed requisite to occupy the stockades near Kemmendine, which commanded the river. They were attacked and carried on the 10th of June.

The division under Brigadier M'Creagh, having been successful against the island of Cheduba, the European forces were re-embarked, and joined Sir Archibald Campbell at Rangoon. Major Wahab, and Captain Goodridge, having executed their orders likewise, joined the commander of the forces. In the first of these operations, Brigadier M'Creagh thus speaks of Captain Mitchell: "I must do myself the pleasure to acknowledge the cordial co-operation that I received from Captain Mitchell, of his majesty's ship *Slaney*, who accompanied me at the dis-

\* See Appendix to the Burmese War, No. 1.

embarkation, and to whose readiness in affording me every assistance his ship could supply, the service was importantly indebted; and the exertions of his seamen, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Matthews, in getting the guns landed, and assisting in the battery, contributed essentially to accelerate the result." In the capture of the island of Cheduba, the naval department sustained a loss of one marine killed, and the first lieutenant of the *Slaney* (Henry Bathurst Matthews) and four seamen wounded.

The rainy season had now set in, and that fearful malady, the cholera morbus, began to thin the ranks, and weaken the crews of the invading force. The enemy, as if aware that the climate was their best friend, and that the unremitting exertions of the English force, the constant exposure to the weather, the change of diet, and other circumstances would retard any advance, withdrew their forces to *Donoobew*, a town on the *Irrawaddi*, fortified strongly, and situated 20 leagues in a northerly direction from *Rangoon*.

With the exception of two fire-rafts destroyed by Mr. Henry Lister Maw, the naval aide-de-camp of Sir Archibald Campbell, and who had been left by Commodore Grant to fill that post, both the invaders and invaded remained without any offensive operations between the 10th of June and the 1st of July. On this last-named date, the Burmese forces were observed in motion; and, taking up a position so well covered by the jungles and thickets, as to render doubtful their numerical strength, they occupied the left of the British lines, drawing up in front of the *Kemmendine* stockade. After a brisk affair, the Burman forces took refuge in the jungle, leaving 100 dead on the field. In this affair, the naval forces were not idle. The enemy meditated an attack by fire-vessels at the same time, but the zeal and activity of Mr. Lindquist, who commanded the boats stationed off *Kemmendine*, rendered that manœuvre abortive, and in counteracting the plan of the enemy, evinced great courage, coolness and ability.

On the 8th of July Sir Archibald Campbell embarked 800 men in order to gain possession of a point of land above *Kemmendine*, from which the enemy launched their fire-rafts. For the result of this expedition, and for the handsome manner in which Sir Archibald Campbell mentions the exertions of the navy, particularly as relates to Captain Marryat (who, although unable from severe indisposition to participate in the action, yet lent his powerful talent in arranging the plan of attack) we refer our readers to Sir Archibald's despatch, in the appendix to the Burmese war, No. 2. It will be seen that the commander-in-chief refers to the forces under Brigadier-general Macbean, who had been detached on the 8th of July with 1500 men to *Kummeroot*, a stockaded position about five miles from the *Shwe-da-gon* pagoda, which stands about two miles and a half distant from

the town of Rangoon. The naval department had eleven men wounded ; but trivial as this may appear, it is evident from the letter addressed by Sir Archibald Campbell,\* to Captain Marryat, and likewise from the despatch from the secretary of government to Sir Archibald, that a very high idea had been formed, and justly formed, of the services of the navy on that occasion.† The best record of the services performed, notwithstanding the severe illness which was prevalent in the squadron, will be found in Captain Marryat's letter to Commodore Grant, dated 11th July, 1824.‡

On the 13th of July Captain Marryat, in the *Larne*, dropped down the river to the *Dalla* creek, to recruit his ship's company, but returned to his position off Rangoon on the 27th, during which time Lieutenant Dobson had captured thirty-five large boats, with various cargoes.

On the 4th of August 600 men, with some gun-boats, were detached up the *Syriam* river. Near the landing-place an old Portuguese fort was discovered, standing on the summit of a hill which commanded the entrance of the *Pegu* river. The troops were landed under cover of the fire from the *Jessy* and the *Powerful*. A deep nullah having for some time checked the advance of the British, Captain Marryat caused a bridge to be thrown across it, when, notwithstanding the heavy fire which the fort maintained, the advance was sounded, and the fort taken. The like success attended Lieutenant-colonel M. Kelly of the *Madras* European regiment, who was detached to the *Syriam* pagoda, which the Burmese seemed inclined to defend ; but they were driven from their stronghold without much opposition, leaving behind them some artillery and stores.

Lieutenant-colonel Kelly was embarked with 400 men on the 8th of August, with directions to proceed up the *Dalla* river, the boats being under the command of Lieutenant Fraser. Of this expedition, in which, says Mr. Marsball, "finer or more characteristic traits of British soldiers and sailors were never witnessed, the officers, less encumbered than their men, forming line breast deep in mud and water, and passing the scaling ladders from one to another to be planted against the walls of the stockade," the official despatch, in which Lieutenant-colonel Kelly bestows the highest encomiums on the naval officers employed, is the best history.§ Captain Marryat, in his official letter to the commodore, speaks highly of the gallantry of Lieutenant Fraser, Mr. Atherton, Messrs. Duffill, Winsor, and Norcock.||

At this period, August, 1824, the following ships composed the naval force in India : *Tees* (26 guns), Captain Thomas Coe, who, after the death of Commodore Grant, became the senior

\* See Appendix, No. 3. † Ibid., No. 4. ‡ Ibid., No. 5.

§ Ibid., No. 6. || Ibid., No. 7.

officer; Alligator (28), Captain Thomas Alexander, C.B.; Slaney (20), Captain Charles Mitchell; Arachne (18), Captain Henry Ducie Chads; Larne (20), Captain Frederick Marryat; Sophie (18), Captain George F. Ryves; Liffey (50), commanded, *pro tem.*, by Lieutenant George Tincombe.\* Of this force only the Larne was at Rangoon, the Sophie having been despatched to Bengal for provisions, &c.

The district of Tenasserim was now selected as the theatre of war, it having been found impracticable to carry on hostilities in the direction of Ava. A part of the 89th regiment and the 7th Madras native infantry, accompanied by the company's cruizers, with some gun-boats, were detached on the 2d of August, under the orders of Colonel Miles, C.B., from Rangoon. Tavoy was the first place attacked and taken; after which the forces embarked for Mergui, and arrived there on the 6th of October. The batteries were silenced in an hour, the troops were landed, escaladed a stockade, which defended the place, and took the town; after which Colonel Miles returned to Rangoon, having left a garrison in Mergui.

The enemy having returned and occupied some stockades in the Dalla creek, Captain Marryat, with two mortar-boats and some gun-boats, manned by the crew of the Larne, proceeded to dislodge them on the 2d of September. Major Richard Lacy Evans commanded the land forces on this occasion. At 6 A. M. the boats opened their fire on the stockade, and by 9 o'clock the magazine was blown up and the guns silenced, but the enemy still held possession of the stockades, and kept up a very galling fire of musketry. The Burmese had learnt from former attacks the necessity of widening their ditches in front of their stockades, and on this occasion it was found impracticable to fix the scaling ladders, the place being secure by the river side. Major Evans landed with 150 men, and, approaching through the jungles, advanced in their rear; the boats instantly dashed forward towards the main stockade, and the whole was soon carried. Higher up the creek, Captain Marryat and Major Evans destroyed 30 boats, laden with arms and ammunition. In this sharp and brilliant affair, Captain Marryat speaks highly of Lieutenant Fraser, Mr. Henry Hodder, acting master of the Larne, Mr. Duffill, and Mr. Alexander Cranley, midshipman. Sir Archibald Campbell, in detailing the account above mentioned, speaks in the highest terms of Captain Marryat.

The Burmese no sooner found the benefit which might accrue to their enemies, by the permanent occupation of a stockade which commanded the creek leading to Thontai (the capital of Dalla), than they resolved to attempt a recapture. They proceeded in their usual harassing manner, night after night, approaching under cover of the jungle, and keeping up a continued

\* Marshall.

fire of musketry which kept the British always on the alert, until the 5th of September, when they made a resolute attack on the shore side with about 1800 men, at the same moment that their war-boats endeavoured to board the Kitty gun-brig, which was stationed off the stockade. The signal for more assistance having been made, Captain Marryat, with the boats of the Larne, arrived in time to give most effectual aid, and to turn the scale of victory which at that moment seemed trembling in the balance. The enemy, seeing the reinforcement, instantly retired; Captain Marryat as speedily followed, and five vessels, which from their shattered state were unable to escape, fell into the possession of the boats' crews of the Larne.

In this affair the commander of the Kitty, Mr. Robert Crawford, behaved with uncommon bravery, and beat off the war-boats. "The spears," says Marshall, "remaining in her sides, the ladders attached to her rigging, and the boarding-nettings cut through in many places, proved the severe contest which had been maintained, and induced Captain Marryat to recommend the very meritorious conduct of Mr. Crawford to the favourable consideration of the governor-general in council." For the opinion of Sir Archibald Campbell upon this affair, and likewise on the general exertions of Captain Marryat and the officers and seamen under his command, we refer our readers to Nos. 8 and 9 in the Appendix. It will be seen by the letter of Sir Archibald Campbell, that, in consequence of the scurvy having broken out on board the Larne, Captain Marryat, knowing that active operations would be deferred for six weeks, had requested permission to remove his ship to Penang.

"At this period," says Marshall, "the European portion of the army, fit for active service in the field, was reduced to less than 1500; 749 British soldiers had fallen victims to the climate and upwards of 1000 were in the hospitals. Nearly one fourth of the Sophie's crew had died, and as many more were sick. On the death of Commodore Grant, Captain Coe assumed the command of the Liffey, and Captain Marryat was promoted into the Tees."\*

On the 28th of August Captain Chads received the first intimation of the death of Commodore Grant. The former being then at Madras, he sailed with money for the use of the army on the 3d of September, and, on the 15th, arrived at Rangoon, and took command of the naval forces.

Offensive operations began on the 19th of September against Penang, a point on which the enemy had established themselves, and from which they meditated, by fire-rafts, the destruction of the English naval force. Captain Chads commanded the naval department, consisting of nine gun-vessels and 16 row-boats, the boats of the Arachuc and Sophie, and the Diana steam-vessel:

\* Appendix, No. 10.

this last vessel had been brought by the recommendation of Captain Marryat, and was of the greatest use during this harassing warfare. Brigadier-general Hugh Fraser commanded the land forces. The expedition moved up the river on the 21st of September and returned to Rangoon on the 27th, having not only succeeded in their enterprise, but surveyed the river until it narrowed to 60 yards in breadth. Captain Chads's letter to Captain Coe gives an interesting account of the fatigues experienced on the expedition, and states that the naval casualty amounted to only four seamen of the *Arachne* wounded.\*

It was now that sickness began to spread itself around; the incessant rains contributed much to increase the epidemic malady which during this month is so prevalent in India. The hospitals were crowded, and, although every precaution was taken which prudence and foresight could suggest, yet the fever increased, and the patients, after suffering from the most overpowering exhaustion, generally died. Major Snodgrass mentions, that at this time it became necessary to remove the convalescent to Mergui and Tavoy, before mentioned as having been captured by the English, and there the change of climate contributed much to re-establish the army in efficiency. Floating hospitals were established at the mouth of the Rangoon river, and by the beginning of the month of October a very beneficial change had occurred in both the naval and military departments.

The enemy occupied a stockaded position near Annauben, and likewise held possession of the pagoda of Keykloo; these situations are about 14 miles distant from Rangoon. It was judged necessary to dislodge them, whilst another detachment, under Major Thomas Evans, was despatched to Than-ta-bain to make a simultaneous attack upon that strong position, which was 30 miles distant from Rangoon. The best reference to the active part taken by the navy is to be found in Major Evans's letter to the commander-in-chief; whilst the latter, in speaking of the meritorious exertions of the officers and seamen, pays the highest compliment to Captain Chads. The naval officers who were fortunate enough to participate in this expedition against Than-ta-bain were Lieutenants William Burdett Dobson, Augustus Henry Kellet, and George Goldfinch; Mr. Lett, master's mate, Messrs. James Ward Tomlinson, Archibald Reed, George Winson, Charles Mitchell, and Robert Murray, admiralty midshipmen.‡ Captain Chads speaks highly of Lieutenants Kellet, Goldfinch, and Dobson, and gives great credit to Mr. Winson of the *Sophie*, who had on this and on almost every occasion charge of the steam-boat.§

Lieutenant-colonel Smith who commanded the force sent

\* Appendix, No. 11.  
‡ Marshall.

† Ibid., No. 12.  
§ Appendix, No. 13.

against Keykloo, after a series of successes against stockades and breastworks, was repulsed in his attack upon the pagoda of Keykloo, with a loss of 21 officers and men killed, and 74 wounded. It appears from the report of Brigadier M'Creagh, that the enemy naturally ferocious, wreaked their vengeance upon the prisoners, and that 28 were found "fastened to the trunks of trees on the road-side, mangled and mutilated in every manner that savage cruelty could devise."

One hundred miles to the eastward of Rangoon, stands the city of Martaban. Lieutenant-colonel Godwin has given a graphic description of the appearance of this city, which we place before our readers. "The city rests at the bottom of a very high hill washed by a beautiful and extensive sheet of water; on its right, is a rocky mound, on which was placed a two-gun battery with a deep nullah under it. This battery communicates with the usual stockade of timber, and behind this, is a work of masonry, varying from twelve to twenty feet thick, with small embrasures for either cannon or musketry. The stockade runs along the margin of the water for more than three quarters of a mile, where it joins a large pagoda, which projects into the water in the form a bastion. The defences then continue a short distance, and end at a nullah, at the other side of which, all is thick jungle. The town continues to run in an angular way from the pagoda, for at least half a mile, and terminates in the house of the Mayoan, close to a stockade up the hill. The whole defence is the water line, with its flanks protected. The rear of the town and work is composed of thick jungle and large trees, and open to the summit."

Such was the place Sir Archibald Campbell determined to attack; for which purpose, 450 troops were placed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Godwin. The naval part of the expedition, consisting of six gun-vessels, seven gun-boats, an armed transport which held the troops, one mortar-boat, and thirty men from the *Arachne* and *Sophie*, was intrusted to Lieutenant Charles Keele.

On the 27th of October, on which day the squadron arrived at its destination, Lieutenant Keele destroyed 30 of the enemy's war-boats. On the 29th the first regular fire was opened from the enemy's stockade, which was answered in a very spirited manner from the boats. During the night Captain Thomas Kennan, who had the mortar-vessel under his directions, kept up a destructive fire, and on the 30th Lieutenant-colonel Godwin made a regular attack. Some misunderstanding arose as to the landing-place, which occasioned some delay, but Lieutenant Keele, having discovered in the nullah a boat, over which it was possible to pass to the fort, the boats pulled in, and, under a heavy and well-directed fire of musketry, the fort was stormed and carried, but not without a brave resistance on the part of the



enemy. Captain Burrowes of his majesty's 41st regiment, and Lieutenant Keele, R.N., had the honour of being first in the fort. The town was deserted by its inhabitants, and no resistance of any moment was offered after the fort had been captured. The whole was accomplished with the loss of seven killed and fourteen wounded. A vast quantity of stores, ammunition, &c., fell into the hands of the victors, and the honourable company's gun-vessel Phaëton, was recaptured. This vessel had put into Martaban by mistake; her captain was taken prisoner in Ava, and her crew were confined in irons. The navy lost, in this brilliant attack, two men killed and three wounded. In the official report made by Colonel Godwin, he speaks in the highest terms of the behaviour of Lieutenant Bazely of the Sophie, and of Lieutenant Keele; to the latter, the day following the engagement, the colonel wrote a note containing his warmest acknowledgments of the gallantry and judicious conduct of the lieutenant which tended so materially to the happy results of the day. Mr. Swinton, the secretary to government, conveyed the applause of the governor-general in council to those engaged in this affair, and, after paying a just compliment to Colonel Godwin, the letter concludes thus: "You will be pleased to convey to Lieutenants Keele and Bazely, of his majesty's sloops Arachne and Sophie, the acknowledgments of the governor-general in council for the zealous exertions of themselves, and the British seamen under their command."

In the present account of the war against Ava, we have derived but little assistance from the perusal of the work of Major Snodgrass. In every one of his descriptions, he seems to have forgotten that the navy participated otherwise than in a secondary manner, and, speaking of this attack on Martaban, the whole notice taken of the naval assistance rendered with such happy effect, according to Colonel Godwin, is summed up in these few words: "The intricate navigation of a shallow winding river, presented many impediments to an approach by water; the latter course (the approach by water), however, was at once resolved on, and, by toil and perseverance, the vessels were finally anchored nearly abreast of the town;" not another word, not a hint that it was owing to Lieutenant Keele's recommendation, that Colonel Godwin availed himself of the enemy's boat, which became a bridge, and not one remark upon the gallantry of that officer, who with Captain Burrowes led the assault, and was first in the place! It is our duty, as historians, to notice these glaring oversights; and since Major Snodgrass has omitted to mention the gallant services of the navy, we have thought it our duty to refer to the commander-in-chief's letters, and to those of Mr. Secretary Swinton, as conveying the just reward due to the exertions, the bravery, and the talent of those naval officers who shared in all the difficulties and dangers of the Burmese war.

The town of Yeh, situated to the eastward of Martaban, was next captured without resistance. "By the capture of these places," says Marshall, "the previous reduction of Mergui and Tavoy, and the voluntary submission of the whole coast of Tenasserim, the British obtained possession of very large stores of grain, ammunition, and ordnance, together with numerous boats for the conveyance of troops, and the command of all the Burman sea-coast from Rangoon to the eastward, a district ultimately ceded by treaty."

The month of November was passed off without offensive operations of any moment. Mr. Greer, of the Bombay marine, in a gun-boat, beat off two war-boats in a gallant style, the enemy being very far his superior in force; and on the 29th Captain Chads, with Lieutenant-colonel John Mallet of his majesty's 89th regiment, made a reconnoissance as far as the ancient capital of Pegu; it does not appear, however, that the English forces were engaged during this four-days expedition: the city was found a heap of ruins, with a few houses inhabited by some poor men and women.

The King of Ava, far from being overcome by the repeated reverses of his arms, now made a desperate effort to change the fortune of the war. To Maha Bandoola he intrusted the command of his army, and this general of high repute, who had been desired to sack Calcutta, and bring the governor-general in golden fetters to Ummerapoor, was recalled, with orders from his king to concentrate his force, amounting in all to about 50,000 men, at Donoobew.

It was on the 30th of November that Maha Bandoola made his approach towards Kemmendine, and, although Major Charles Yates was exposed to a serious attack by land and water, owing to Captain Goodridge of the Teignmouth having slipped his cable to avoid the enemy's war-boats and fire-rafts, which were floating down the river to the attack; yet the gallant major with a handful of Europeans nobly defended his post and repulsed his assailants. This was merely a prelude to the grand attack which commenced on the 30th. The object of Bandoola was to surround the British army, and crush them by his numbers. On each flank of the British line, the enemy were discovered emerging from the thick jungle, and they took up their position uninterrupted by the British, who had now only the narrow channel of Rangoon open in their rear. To check a division of the enemy's force, which had crossed to the Dalla side, the Arachne, under Captain Ryves (Captain Chads not having returned from Pegu), was placed a mile in advance of the fleet, and the Teignmouth was ordered back to support Kemmendine. The enemy commenced throwing up works with their usual rapidity, but Major Sale, with a detachment of his majesty's 13th regiment, and the 18th Madras native infantry, soon forced them to abandon their position, and, ultimately

destroyed their works. A party of the enemy having approached the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, were driven back by two companies of the 38th, under Captain Hugh Piper and Captain Christopher Wilson, while two companies of the same regiment were equally successful the following morning, in dislodging the enemy from a very strong position near the north gate of the pagoda.

On the night of the 1st of December, Kemmendine was again attacked, and at daylight the enemy commenced a regular attempt upon that place; in vain they approached this stockade, they were repulsed again and again. Our men wearied with the incessant fatigue, as darkness closed upon them, sought their wonted repose. Short was the time allowed them; the enemy, recruited by fresh troops, now made the most desperate effort; the flames of the fire-rafts illumined the scene; far and wide appeared the devastating enemy, whilst the roar of the cannon, and the roll of the musketry, conveyed to the ears of those near the pagoda, the tidings of this fresh and vigorous assault.

On the river the navy gallantly enacted their duty. The flaming rafts were towed clear of the vessels, and the war-boats which were ready to avail themselves of the confusion, retired without daring to attack. The gallant defenders of the fort were equally successful against their assailants, who were beaten back; and Major Gates added to his well-earned fame, by his intrepid and successful resistance. In endeavouring to give a proper description of the attacks which followed, we feel convinced that all our exertions would only appear a kind of shadow to those given so ably, so faithfully, and so graphically by Marshall; we therefore borrow from him the following account, admitting our obligation to that officer, and gladly bearing testimony to his patient research, and the excellent manner in which he has compiled his history.

“Things were in this state when Captain Chads returned from Pegu, at 8 A. M., on the 2d of December. He immediately sent the *Arachne's* pinnace up, under Lieutenant Kellett and Mr. Valentine Pickey, admiralty midshipman, to gain information and reconnoitre; and shortly after, three row-boats, under Mr. William Coyde, midshipman, with a party of seamen to fight their guns. This assistance was most timely, the garrison being pressed in every direction; from which critical situation, Lieutenant Kellett's highly judicious and determined gallant conduct immediately relieved them, by clearing both their flanks of the enemy, by showers of grape-shot. This service performed by the pinnace, with a single carronade, in the face of hundreds of the enemy's boats, was the admiration of the whole garrison; and Major Yates expressed himself to Captain Chads in terms the most gratifying, ‘for the able assistance Lieutenant Kellett had afforded him.’”

“ The Teignmouth shortly afterwards resumed her station, and was constantly engaged with the enemy’s war-boats, which had long guns in their bows, and annoyed her a great deal. In the afternoon, finding the Burmese were making every effort to gain possession of Kemmendine, and as that post was of the last importance, both in a military and naval point of view, Captain Chads ordered the Sophie up for its support, with three more gun-boats, and those already there, under Lieutenant Kellett, to remain. Observing, also, that the enemy upon the Dalla side had begun to throw up works, he likewise directed the Satellite, in charge of Lieutenant Dobson, with a party of seamen from the Arachne, to the support of the Good Hope transport, and several small gun-vessels, already for some time stationed there.

“ Early on the 3d of December, the Sophie took her station off Kemmendine. The enemy again brought fire-rafts down, with their war-boats firing shot over them, to prevent the approach of the British. The Sophie cleared the rafts, but the Teignmouth was touched by them, and on fire for a short time, sustaining, however, no serious damage. ‘ British seamanship,’ says Major Snodgrass, ‘ finally triumphed over every device of the crafty and ingenious enemy.’ During this day the Burmese war-boatmen became extremely daring, finding their shot went further than those of the British; upon which Captain Chads sent Captain Ryves two long 9-pounders, and enabled him to keep them further off. Still, however, they continued to evince surprising boldness, and it was thought right to endeavour to give them a check. Accordingly, the latter officer placed the whole of his disposable force of Europeans, about 80 in number (including Lieutenant Goldfinch, Messrs. Pickey, Coyde, Scott, and Murray, midshipmen; Lieutenant Curtis Clarke, of the Bombay marine; Mr. Lindquist, in charge of the row-boats; and Messrs. George Boscawen, midshipman in the hon. company’s service), under the orders of Lieutenant Kellett. This force was put into the Arachne’s pinnace and eight other boats, and, as the moon went down on the morning of the 4th of December, they shoved off, and pulling upon the contrary shore to the enemy, by daylight came abreast of and boldly made a dash at them: the Burmese were completely taken by surprise, but did not run till the British were within pistol-shot, when their confusion was great, and they fled with all haste, keeping up a smart fire. Lieutenant Kellett, in the pinnace, came up with some of the rearmost, which were soon run ashore and deserted; and Lieutenant Goldfinch, passing him whilst taking possession, captured one bearing the flag of the Burman chief, her crew also flying into the jungle. The chase was continued three or four miles, when Lieutenant Kellett judged it prudent to secure his prizes, having an enemy of considerable force in his rear, up another branch of the river. The result of this gallant attack

was the capture of seven war-boats, one of which was 96 feet long, 13 feet 6 inches in breadth, and 6 feet deep, pulling 76 oars, and, as did three of the others, mounting a long 9-pounder on the bow. 'Lieutenant Kellett's conduct on this, and on former occasions, speaks for itself, and,' says Captain Chads, 'I trust will meet with its due reward. Lieutenant Goldfinch is a valuable officer, and merits every praise; Lieutenant Kellett reports the high gallantry of every individual under his command. On their return, they cut adrift and brought down a large floating stockade from Pagoda point; and what adds to the value of this service is, that it was performed without the loss of a man.' In Sir A. Campbell's report to the Supreme Government, of the operations of his army at this period, we find the following passages:

"During the 3d and 4th the enemy carried on his labours with indefatigable industry, and but for the inimitable practice of our artillery, commanded by Captain Murray, in the absence, from indisposition, of Lieutenant-colonel (Charles) Hopkinson, we must have been severely annoyed by the incessant fire from his trenches.'

"The attacks upon Kemmendine continued with unabating violence; but the unyielding spirit of Major Yates and his steady troops, although exhausted with fatigue and want of rest, baffled every attempt on shore, while *Captain Ryves*, with his majesty's sloop *Sophie*, the honourable company's cruiser *Teignmouth*, and some flotilla and row gun-boats, *nobly maintained the long established fame of the British navy, in defending the passage of the river against the most furious assaults of the enemy's war-boats, advancing under cover of the most tremendous fire-rafts, which the unwearied exertions of British sailors could alone have conquered.*

"Sir Archibald next proceeds to acquaint the governor-general in council, that the 'intrepid conduct of Lieutenants Kellett and Goldfinch merits the highest praise;' and he then adds:

"The enemy having apparently completed his left wing, with its full complement of artillery and warlike stores, I determined to attack that part of his line early on the morning of the 5th. *I requested Captain Chads, the senior naval officer here, to move up to the Puzendown creek during the night, with the gun-flotilla, bomb-ketch, &c., and commence a cannonade on the enemy's rear at daylight. This service was most judiciously and successfully performed by that officer, who has never yet disappointed me in my most sanguine expectations.* The enemy was defeated and dispersed in every direction. The Cassay horse fled, mixed with the retreating infantry, and all their artillery, stores, and reserve depôts, which had cost them so much toil and labour to get up, with a great quantity of small-arms, gilt chatahs, standards, and other trophies, fell into our hands.

Never was victory more complete or more decided, and never was the triumph of discipline and valour, over the disjointed efforts of irregular courage and infinitely superior numbers, more conspicuous.

“The naval force employed in the Puzendown creek was composed of the steam and mortar vessels, a few of the gun-flotilla, and several transports’ boats, with about 40 European soldiers to make an appearance. Mr. Archibald Reed, admiralty midshipman, was with Captain Chads, and ‘rendered him much service.’ In the mean time, the *Satellite* was very closely and warmly engaged, as she had also been during the nights of the 2d, 3d, and 4th, with the enemy at Dalla, whose shot struck her in every direction, and greatly injured the rigging; but as Lieutenant Dobson had taken the precaution to stockade her all around with bamboo, she fortunately had not a man killed or wounded.

“The Burmese left wing thus disposed of, Sir Archibald Campbell patiently waited its effect upon the right, posted in so thick a forest as to render any attack in that quarter in a great measure impracticable. On the same day, he wrote to Captain Chads in the following terms:

“My dear Sir,—A thousand thanks for the essential diversion you made this morning to the left and rear of the enemy. Their defeat has been, indeed, most complete; the game is, I think, now up with them, and the further conquest of the country easy—thanks to all the good and fine fellows under our command by water and land.’

“On the 6th, in the morning, finding the enemy still persisting in his attacks on Kemmendine, Captain Chads sent the mortar-vessel up there, which rendered the post very essential service, and relieved the garrison considerably. The war-boats still continued in sight in great numbers, but at a respectful distance.

“On the same day Sir Archibald Campbell had the pleasure of observing that Maha Bandoola had brought up the scattered remnant of his defeated left, to strengthen his right and centre, and continued day and night employed in carrying on his approaches in front of the Shwe-da-gon pagoda. This he was allowed to do with but little molestation, as it was rightly imagined that ‘he would take system for timidity.’ On the morning of the 7th, he had his whole force posted in the immediate front of the British army—his first line intrenched so close, that the men in their barracks could distinctly hear the bravadoes of the Burmese soldiers. Upwards of thirty fire-rafts and large boats, all lashed together, and reaching nearly across the river, were brought down against the shipping; but, although the *Sophie* was touched by one of them, they were productive of no mischief.

“The time had now arrived to undeceive the enemy in their sanguine but ill-founded hopes. Sir Archibald Campbell made

his arrangements, and at 11 h. 30 m. A. M., every thing was in readiness to assault their trenches. A short but heavy cannonade ensued, and at noon the British columns moved forward to their respective points of attack. They were saluted, after a momentary pause, by a very spirited fire, in spite of which they advanced to the works, and quickly put their defenders to the route. The Burmese left many dead behind them, and their main force was completely dispersed. On receiving this information, Captain Chads sent every disposable man from the *Arachne*, under Mr. James B. Manley, acting master, with twenty sepoys, in the steam-vessel, up to Captain Ryves, to endeavour to intercept their boats and cut off their retreat; they had, however, already deserted the neighbourhood of Kemmendine.

“ ‘ Thus,’ says Captain Chads in his official report, ‘ has this formidable attack ended in the total discomfiture of the enemy; having called forth from the very small force I have the honour to command, in every instance, the greatest gallantry and uniform good conduct, *under the utmost exertions by day and night, the greatest part of them having been in the boats since the starting of the expedition for Pegu, on the 26th ultimo.*

“ ‘ From Captain Ryves I have received all the aid and counsel that a good and valuable officer could afford; his determined perseverance in holding his ground, when the fire-rafts came down, merit the highest commendation; and from his ready and zealous co-operation with the post at Kemmendine, that place was greatly relieved in the arduous contest it was engaged in.

“ ‘ Of Lieutenant Kellott I cannot speak in terms sufficiently strong to express my admiration of his uniform gallantry.

“ ‘ Lieutenant Goldfinch’s conduct has also been most conspicuous, together with that of all the midshipmen named in my reports, not one of whom but has shown individual acts of great bravery.

“ ‘ Also to Mr. Manley, the master, who has, from necessity, been frequently left in charge of the ship during my absence, I feel much indebted.’\*

“ In another despatch, addressed to Sir Archibald Campbell, the commander of the *Arachne* says:

“ ‘ It becomes a most pleasing duty to me to recommend to your favourable notice, officers in the honourable company’s service, whose good conduct has been conspicuous in the recent attack of the enemy. The first I ought to name is Mr. W. Binny, agent for transports of the Bengal division, in charge of

\* Lieutenant Keele was then at Martaban, where he remained in command of the naval detachment until all the European troops were ordered back to Rangoon, about the end of 1824.

the Good Hope transport—that ship, sir, with the British crew of the Resource, who handsomely volunteered, did all the duties of a man-of-war, in silencing the enemy's guns as they mounted them at Dalla. Mr. Hornblow, agent for transports of the Madras division, in charge of the Moira, has also shown very great zeal in forwarding all the late arduous services; and the British crew of his ship, in charge of the mortar-vessel, have continued their usual good conduct. In the attack on the enemy's war-boats, Lieutenant Kellett speaks in high terms of the gallantry of Lieutenant Clarke and Mr. Boscawen, of the H. C. cruiser Teignmouth, and Mr. Lindquist, in charge of the row-boats; this latter young officer I have also had much reason to be pleased with.'

"The loss sustained by the Burmese, from the 1st to the 7th of December, is supposed to have been at least 5000 men killed and wounded; but they suffered most in arms and ammunition, which they could not easily replace; 29 guns (of which eight were brass), 200 jingals, 900 muskets, 360 round shot, 2000 spears, and 5000 intrenching tools, fell into the hands of the conquerors; besides which, 10,000 pounds of gunpowder, many muskets, spears, swords, and other implements, of which no account appears to have been taken, were captured and destroyed. The British had not more than 26 killed and 252 wounded.

"On the 8th of December Sir Archibald Campbell reported to the governor-general in council, that *his 'obligations to Captains Chads and Ryves, and the officers and seamen of H. M. navy, were great and numerous. In Captain Chads himself,'* says the general, *'I have always found that ready alacrity to share our toils and dangers, that has ever characterized the profession he belongs to, and the most cordial zeal in assisting and co-operating with me on every occasion.'*

"On the evening of the same day, Sir Archibald Campbell found that the enemy's corps of observation on the Dalla side of the river had not been wholly withdrawn, probably from ignorance of what had taken place on the 7th, in front of the Shwedagon pagoda; and as he was well aware they would not remain long after the news of Bandoola's defeat reached them, he at once determined to assault their works. Detachments from three regiments were immediately ordered under arms, and Captain Chads was requested to make a diversion up the creek upon the enemy's right flank. After dark, all the boats assembled alongside the Good Hope transport; and, just as the moon arose, they moved across the river; the troops, under Major Charles Ferrior, of the 43d Madras native infantry, landed to the northward, whilst Captain Chads, accompanied by Lieutenant Kellett and Mr. Reed, proceeded up the creek, and opened fire; the Satellite doing the same to distract the enemy: the



troops then advanced, and jumped, without a moment's hesitation, into the trenches; many Burmese were slain in the short conflict that ensued; they were driven, at the point of the bayonet, into the jungle in their rear; and several guns, with many small-arms, taken. In this affair, the British had two killed, and several, including five of the naval detachment, wounded. Lieutenant Dobson having landed immediately after the troops, was one of the first to enter the enemy's works.

¶ "In a general order, issued at Rangoon, on the 12th of December, Sir Archibald Campbell again 'acknowledges his highest obligations to Captain Chads,' and 'requests that he will communicate to Captain Ryves, who so effectually supported the post of Kemmendine, his warmest thanks.' The passage concludes thus: '*the conduct of both officers and men during the whole affair was characteristic of the British navy!* WHAT CAN BE SAID MORE TO THEIR HONOUR?"

"On the evening of the 12th a deserter from the enemy informed Sir Archibald Campbell, that Maha Bandoola had re-collected his beaten troops, and received considerable reinforcements on his retreat; which latter circumstance had induced the chiefs (to whom he had for the present resigned his command) to determine on one more great effort to retrieve their disgrace. For this purpose, it afterwards appeared, they succeeded in forming a force amounting to between twenty and twenty-five thousand men; with which they returned to Kokeen, distant four miles from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, and immediately commenced intrenching and stockading with a judgment, in point of position, such as would do credit to the best instructed engineers of the most civilized and warlike nations. The deserter also declared it to be their intention to attack the British lines on the morning of the 14th (pronounced a fortunate day by their soothsayers), determined to sacrifice their lives at the dearest rate, as they had nothing else to expect than to do so ignominiously, by returning to the presence of their monarch, disgraced and defeated as they had been. This information was too circumstantially given to be disregarded, and Sir Archibald Campbell prepared accordingly: the enemy's movements, next day, left little doubt on his mind of the truth of the deserter's information. Previously to this, the Sophie had been recalled from Kemmendine, and the hon. company's cruiser Prince of Wales, commanded by Lieutenant William S. Collinson, ordered to relieve her. On the 13th the gallant defender of that post addressed two letters to Captain Chads, of which the following are copies:

"My dear Sir,—Mr. Midshipman Lindquist acquaints me, that I am to be attacked this night. May I beg Kellett and his brig, and his boats, and the Powerful? Alas! the dear Sophie has forsaken me, and no *prince* or potentate can replace

her in my confidence and affection. Prithee keep the Prince of Wales, and cheer my heart again with the presence of Sophie. Believe me ever your obliged and faithful,

‘ (Signed)

C. W. YATES.’

“ ‘ My dear Sir,—My little band are at their post. The fires of the enemy are all around me. I hope you will excuse my having detained Mr. Lindquist, and his three boats, until I hear from you. I have 200 natives short of the force I had the other day, and 27 Europeans. If the Prince-of-Wales comes, I can expect no aid, as her commander is junior to the captain of the Teignmouth, which ship, having twice deserted me, I cannot look for aid from.

‘ Yours ever faithfully,

‘ (Signed)

C. W. YATES.’

“ In consequence of this pressing request, Captain Chads sent the Sophie back to her former station; and with her, the steam-vessel, the mortar-boat, the Prince-of-Wales, and a detachment of seamen under Lieutenant Kellett. The commander-in-chief also directed 100 sepoy to proceed thither with Captain Ryves.

“ In the night of December 13th the enemy recommenced offensive operations, particularly by annoying the vessels off Kemmendine with immense fire-rafts, one of which consisted of upwards of sixty canoes, besides bamboo rafts, all loaded with oil and combustibles. On the 14th, about 2 h. 30 m. A. M., their emissaries succeeded in setting fire to Rangoon, in several places at once, by which one-fourth of the town, including the quarters of the Madras commissariat, was destroyed, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the garrison, the officers and men of the Arachne, and the well-disposed part of the inhabitants, to subdue the flames.

“ The 14th passed without any other attempts on the part of the enemy; during the day, however, he was seen above Kemmendine, transporting large bodies of troops from the Dalla to the Rangoon side of the river. For many urgent reasons, Sir Archibald Campbell determined to attack him on the following day, rather than wait his pleasure as to time and place of meeting.

“ Thinking it probable that the enemy’s preparations for fire-rafts might be destroyed, and as he had before sent a force up the Panlang branch of the river, without finding any thing, Captain Chads now resolved to despatch one up the Lyne branch, under Lieutenant Kellett, consisting of the steam-vessel, with forty marines and soldiers for her defence; the Prince of Wales, towed by the Diana; and the pinnaces of the Arachne and Sophie. He thus describes the result of this expedition, in an official letter to Captain Coe, dated December 16, 1824:

“ ‘ Before daylight yesterday morning, they proceeded with the first of the flood, and at a short distance above Pagoda point, saw large numbers of the enemy’s war-boats, at least 200, who retired in good order as they advanced, keeping up a smart fire

from their long guns, five boats having them mounted, and taking their distance that the carronades should not reach them; when about seven miles up, a raft was drawn right across the river, and set on fire by them, to prevent the advance of our vessels; but an opening was found, and Lieutenant Kellett, now seeing the river quite clear, with great judgment, decreasing the power of steam, deceived the enemy, and lulled them into security; when, putting on the whole force again, and casting off the Prince-of-Wales, he was immediately within grape and musketry distance; the enemy finding themselves in this situation, drew up in a regular line to receive him: this little band was not, however, to be daunted by their show of resistance, but nobly dashed on, although the Prince-of-Wales was out of sight; the heavy fire from the boats' carronades, and musketry, threw the enemy into confusion and panic, and they flew in all directions, leaving us in possession of three of their large war-boats; one belonging to the chief, mounting three guns, and pulling 60 oars; the other two, one in their bow, 9 and 6 pounders; with about 40 other boats of all descriptions, many of them loaded with ammunition and provisions for their army before Rangoon.

“The securing of thirty of these boats, and destroying the others, took up the whole of the flood; when Lieutenant Kellett, having most fully accomplished my instructions and wishes, returned, destroying, on his way down, quantities of materials for fire-rafts, and a great many canoes laden with earth-oil. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been very great; we, I rejoice to say, had not a man hurt, the steam-vessel having been stockaded to secure the people.

“I cannot find words sufficiently strong, in which to recommend Lieutenant Kellett's uniform gallantry to you; his conduct on this, as well as former occasions, proves him a most valuable officer. Lieutenant Goldfinch, of the *Sophie*, I have also frequently had occasion to name to you, and, with pleasure, I repeat my former recommendations; he was in the *Sophie's* pinnace, with Mr. Murray, midshipman. Mr. Tomlinson, admiralty midshipman, commanded the *Arachne's* pinnace; and Mr. Winsor, admiralty midshipman, was in charge of the steam-vessel, and showed his usual judgment and good conduct.

“Lieutenant Kellett speaks in the highest terms of the determined steady conduct of every man under him, soldiers, sailors, and marines; and feels much indebted to Lieutenant Collinson, commanding the *Prince-of-Wales*, for the able assistance that vessel rendered him.’

“During these operations, of which Major Snodgrass takes no notice, Sir Archibald Campbell attacked the enemy in the same direction, and gained a most brilliant victory. With only 1300 infantry, he stormed, and carried by assault, the most formidable intrenched and stockaded works which he had ever seen, de-

fended by upwards of 20,000 men, under the command of the Maha Silwah, an officer of high rank and celebrity, late governor-general of Assam. In the despatch announcing this great achievement, Sir Archibald says, '*Our gallant friends afloat were determined not to let the auspicious day pass without their share of its operations. Every day's experience of the zeal and cordiality with which Captain Chads, and every individual composing the naval part of the expedition, co-operates with me in carrying on the combined service, increases my sincere obligations, and merits my warmest thanks.*' The loss sustained by the British army, on the 15th of December, amounted to 18 killed and 118 wounded.

"Previously to the intelligence of Sir Archibald Campbell's last victory reaching Calcutta, the supreme government had issued a general order, of which we shall here give two extracts:

"The official despatches already published in an Extraordinary Gazette having announced the late brilliant achievements of the British arms at Rangoon, the Right Honourable the Governor-general in Council now proceeds to the discharge of a most gratifying duty, in signifying, in the most public and formal manner, his high admiration of the judgment, skill, and energy, manifested by Brigadier-general Sir Archibald Campbell, in directing the operations of the troops under his command, on that important and arduous occasion. \* \* \* \* \*

"The Governor-general in Council seizes this opportunity of expressing his warm acknowledgments to Captain Chads, of H.M.S. *Arachne*, the senior naval officer at Rangoon, and to Captain Ryves, of H.M.S. *Sophie*, for their distinguished personal exertions, and requests the former to convey to the officers and crews of H.M. ships, of the H.C. cruisers, as well as the officers and men of the transports who volunteered their services, the sense which government entertains of their gallant conduct in the several actions with the enemy's war-boats, when they so conspicuously displayed their irresistible and characteristic valour of British seamen.' "

This last successful enterprise of Sir Archibald Campbell produced a decided change in the aspect of the war; the enemy returned again to Donoobew, and Maha Bandoola ceased to make any offensive demonstrations. The inhabitants released from their worst enemies, their own troops, again occupied their habitations, and the country round Rangoon once more enjoyed the blessings of repose. Before the close of the year, the Larne returned from Calcutta; the naval force was augmented by 20 additional gun-boats, and the army received large reinforcements from Madras, Bengal, and Ceylon.

Although the arms of Great Britain had been every where victorious, very little progress had been made since the commencement of hostilities up to the opening of the year 1825:

Sir Archibald Campbell now determined to advance, if necessary, even to the capital, which was 600 miles distant, or from the brilliant success of his arms, to force the enemy to accede to his terms. With this intention in view, it became necessary to despatch an expedition, to compel the enemy to evacuate the old Portuguese fort and the Syriam pagoda before mentioned, of which they had again possessed themselves, and doubly stockaded, making it a formidable post to be left in the rear. In order to dislodge the enemy from these strongholds, Lieutenant-colonel R. Elrington, of his majesty's 47th regiment, with 200 troops, were embarked on board some good boats, the naval part of the expedition being intrusted to Lieutenant Keele. We have had frequent occasion to speak in high terms of this officer, but in all his brilliant exploits he never was more conspicuous than on the attack of the Syriam pagoda, the day after the surrender of the fort. The seamen as they manned the scaling ladders, were cheered on and headed by Lieutenant Keele, and he was the first person over the stockade: the enemy gave way before him, and the works were instantly destroyed.

In moving upon Ava it was decided not to take the road by Pegu and Tonghoo, for the army was destitute of sufficient carriage to enable it to advance in that line. It became therefore absolutely necessary to keep the troops on a parallel with the river, with a view to mutual co-operation and support, and likewise to receive by that communication, supplies for the army.

Captain Alexander, in the Alligator, arrived at Rangoon on the 22d of January, and, being senior to Captain Chads, the command of the naval department devolved upon him.

In order to command the navigation of the river Lyne, Lieutenant-colonel Godwin and Captain Chads, were detached with a sufficient force to ensure success. "The vessels employed consisted of the Satellite, Diana, Prince-of-Wales, 15 row gun-boats, seven boats belonging to his majesty's squadron, and several flats and canoes."\* The officers under Captain Chads, were Lieutenants Fraser, Dobson, Keele, and Kellett, acting Lieutenants William Hall and Goldfinch; midshipmen Pickey, Tomlinson, Scott, Reed, Norcok, Lett, Biffin, Wyke, Wimson, and Coyde. The surgeon of the Arachne, Mr. William Watt, volunteered his services and accompanied the expedition, which on the 5th of February, moved up the river towards Quangalee, or Than-ta-bain, a formidable stockade garrisoned by 2000 men; the place stands upon a peninsula, and every exertion of the enemy had been rendered to strengthen the position towards the water, but the rear was altogether unpro-

\* Marshall.

tected. Neither the *Diana* or *Satellite* opened their fire until within 40 yards of the stockade, although the enemy had fired upon them during their advance. The *Satellite* anchored by the stern and opened her broadside, whilst Captain Charles Graham on board the *Diana*, kept up a well-directed fire of rockets. The boats in three divisions, under Lieutenants Keele, Fraser, and Kellett, directly the enemy were observed in confusion, and the order was given to storm, pulled towards the stockade. Lieutenants Keele and Hall were the first to enter the position, and Captain O'Reilly, with the grenadiers of the 41st regiment followed, and ensured the victory. The loss sustained by the British in this affair amounted to three soldiers, four sailors, and two lascars wounded, one seaman was drowned. This formidable place having been taken, Captain Chads extended his operations up both branches of the river; one is called the Panlang branch, the other, the Lyne, being the main branch, was found perfectly navigable as far as Meondaga. In the course of this survey of the river, Captain Chads on the Lyne, and Lieutenants Keele and Kellett, on the Panlang, destroyed numerous fire-rafts, and captured or burnt great numbers of war-boats. That Captain Chads on this, as well as on every occasion, in which he was employed, conducted himself with courage, coolness, and ability, the extract of the letter in Appendix, No. 13. will sufficiently prove.

Sir Archibald Campbell on the return of the forces above mentioned, leaving Captain Ryves in charge of the shipping at Rangoon, began his march on the 13th of February. He had previously resolved on moving in two divisions, one of which consisted of 2468 men under his own immediate orders, the first and grand object being to drive Bandoola from Donoobew where that chief had concentrated his force. "The marine column under brigadier-general, now Sir Willoughby Cotton, consisted of 799 European infantry, 250 sepoy, 108 foot-artillery, and 12 of the rocket-corps: these were embarked in the flotilla, consisting of two mortar-boats, six gun-vessels, 30 armed row-boats, about 60 launches, flats, and canoes, and all the boats of the men of war remaining at Rangoon, containing every disposable officer and man of the *Alligator*, *Arachne*, and *Sophie*, the whole escorted by the *Diana* and *Satellite*, and under the command of Captain Alexander."\* This force was directed to pass up the Panlang river to the Irrawaddi, and driving the enemy from his stockades, to push on with all possible expedition to Donoobew.† A small division under Major Sale of 780 men, was destined to attack Bassein, and then to effect its junction with the other divisions at Donoobew. The *Larne* and *Mercury* co-operated with Major Sale. It will be seen by the above statement, that

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\* Marshall.

† Snodgrass.

the whole force when concentrated, would only amount to 4417, and that, taking in the rear-guard left at Rangoon, under Brigadier M'Creagh, consisting of 3781 men, the greatest number of troops under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell, consisted only of 8198. The enemy had more than 40,000 men under the command of a chief highly respected for his talents and his bravery, and who had risen in the estimation of his countrymen, from his numerous victories; such was Bandoola. Against the man who had under his command ten times as many men as himself, in a difficult, nay, almost unknown country, every place being well stockaded, and every leisure moment having been turned to some account in strengthening the positions, Sir Archibald Campbell advanced; not with the intention of merely marching a few miles to return again to Rangoon, but if it were requisite to dictate terms of submission to the King of Ava, in his own capital, and that capital 600 miles distant! Such an undertaking might well have caused uneasiness; but such was Sir Archibald's confidence in the officers and men of both navy and army who attended him in this dangerous and difficult expedition, that he never wavered as to his determination to advance, but merely hesitated by which of the roads he should approach the capital.

Major Snodgrass has given a beautiful description of the hardships endured by the division under Sir Archibald Campbell, after their arrival at their first day's encampment. "On reaching camp," he says, "the scene which presented itself was at once grotesque and novel; no double-poled tent bespoke the army of Bengal, or rows of well-pitched rowties that of the sister presidency; no oriental luxury was here displayed, or even any of the comforts of an European camp, to console the traveller after his hot and weary march; but officers of all ranks couching under a blanket or Lilliputian tent, to shelter themselves from a meridian sun, with a miserable half-starved cow or pony, the sole beast of burden of the inmate, tied or picketed in rear, conveying to the mind, more the idea of a gipsy bivouac, than of a military encampment. Nothing of the pomp or circumstance of war was here apparent, nor would even the experienced eye have recognised in the little group, that appeared but as a speck on the surface of an extensive plain, a force about to undertake the subjugation of an empire, and to fight its way for six hundred miles against climate, privations, and a numerous enemy.

The naval department sailed on the 16th of February, three days after the departure of the commander-in-chief, and the day following, the detachment destined to operate against Bassein moved towards its destination.

The day after the division under Brigadier-general Cotten and Captain Alexander set forward, they destroyed an unoccupied stockade at Thesit, and as they advanced up the river, a firing

commenced from a position which was instantly carried by the boats' crews of the Alligator. The division now continued its course, destroying some fire-rafts, which were rendered ineffectual from the activity and vigilance of the seamen. On the 19th the outworks of the stockade of Panlang, and shortly afterwards the stockade itself, was carried without much opposition; the garrison consisted, previously to the assault, of 4000 men, and a vast number of war-boats supported the stockade on the right. The place was afterwards garrisoned by the English; Captain David Ross, with 25 men, was left in command, and the Satellite was ordered to protect and shelter them.

Sir Archibald Campbell arrived at Meondaga on the evening of the 19th, and then taking the road by Sarrawah, continued his march in the direction of Donoobew. It was at Theeboon that Sir Archibald heard of the success of the second or marine division, and likewise that no delay had occurred, but that the boats had reached the Irrawaddi. On the 6th of March the white pagoda of Donoobew was seen by the flotilla. "Brigadier-general Cotton, and Captain Alexander proceeded to reconnoitre a succession of formidable stockades, commencing at the pagoda, and increasing in strength until completed by the main work, which was lofty, and situated upon a very commanding site; surrounded by a strong abbatis, with deep ditches, and all the customary defences: the guns appeared to be numerous, and the garrison were seen in crowds upon all the works."\* A reconnoissance was made on the left bank of the river, the enemy opening a heavy fire from about 30 pieces of heavy artillery. Bandoola himself was at Donoobew, and refused any kind of surrender which Brigadier-general Cotton thought fit to request by means of a flag of truce. The strength of the place having been ascertained, it was judged advisable not to attack the main work, and the landing was effected below the stockades, the flotilla commanding the river.

The first attack was made on the morning of the 7th, by a division of 500 men, which were divided into two columns, one under Lieutenant-colonel O'Donoghue, and the other under Major James Basden. The boats supported the columns as they advanced to the attack, and although the enemy made a good resistance, and were nearly 3000 in number, they were forced from the pagoda stockade, and according to the best accounts, about 450 were killed. The next attack was upon a second stockade, a few hundred yards from the pagoda, and here, although the British fought with a determination rarely if ever surpassed, they were met by an equal resistance, and after a long struggle, in which Captain Rose of the 89 was killed, and a heavy loss sustained, the attacking column was ordered

\* Marshall, vol. v., p. 166.



to retire, and early on the morning of the 8th, after destroying the arms, and spiking the cannon, captured at the first stockade, the troops were embarked, and fell back upon Youngyoun, a strong position, about nine miles below Donoobew. In this sanguinary conflict the naval department sustained a loss of two seamen killed, and thirteen wounded. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained, but from the vigour of the assault, and the steady perseverance of the troops, the fire from the boats, and the good direction of the mortars, many men must have been swamped.

About 25 miles above Sarrawah, a town which stands on the eastern bank of the Irrawaddi, opposite Kewdowa, stands the town of U-au-deet, and here it was that Sir Archibald Campbell, on the 11th of March, heard of the unsuccessful attempt of Brigadier-general Cotton, the commander-in-chief instantly decided upon advancing towards Donoobew; and after overcoming all obstacles, he crossed the Irrawaddi, mentioned "as one of the widest and most rapid rivers of the east,"\* on rafts and in canoes, and by the 18th the whole of his division had reached the right bank of the river. In the mean time Captain Alexander remained in great anxiety with the flotilla, about a mile from the white pagoda; by day great activity was required in the seamen, for not unfrequently batteries were opened upon them from positions hastily taken up by the enemy, and during the night the war-boats carried on a harassing, although unsuccessful attack. On the 25th Sir Archibald took up a position close to the main stockade, and from the judicious arrangements of Bandoola, it was evident that he intended making a serious resistance. The Burmese, flushed with their former success, opened their fire upon the English. The cavalry hovered on their flanks,† and it was evident that they courted rather than shunned the attack.

"The stockade of Donoobew extended for nearly a mile along a sloping bank of the Irrawaddi, its breadth varying, according to the nature of the ground, from five to eight hundred yards. The stockading was composed of solid teak beams, from 15 to 17 feet high, driven firmly into the earth, and placed as closely as possible to each other; behind this wooden wall the old brick ramparts of the place rose to a considerable height, strengthening the front defences by means of cross beams, and affording a firm and elevated footing to the defendants. Upwards of a hundred and fifty guns and swivels were mounted on the works, and the garrison was protected from the shells of the besiegers, by numerous well-contrived traverses and excavations."‡

On the 27th the garrison made a sortie on the right of the

\* Marshall,

† Snodgrass.

‡ Ibid.

British lines, during which the flotilla boldly advanced under a crowd of sail, and exposed to the fire of the enemy's works. The *Diana* with a mortar-boat and four gun-vessels, pushed by the stockade and formed a junction with Sir Archibald's division, whilst the infantry, cavalry, and war-elephants, advanced upon the English. "The British cavalry," says Major Snodgrass, "covered by the horse-artillery, was ordered to charge the advancing monsters: the scene was novel and interesting; and, although neither the elephants nor their riders can ever be very formidable in modern warfare, they stood the charge with a steadiness and courage these animals can rarely be brought to show. Their riders were mostly shot, and no sooner did the elephants feel themselves unrestrained, than they walked back to the fort with the greatest composure. During the heavy cannonade that took place between the flotilla and the stockade, Maha Bandoola, who was superintending the practice of his artillery, gave his garrison a specimen of the discipline he meant to enforce in this last struggle to retrieve his lost character and reputation. A Burmese officer being killed while pointing a gun, by a shot from the flotilla, his comrades instantly abandoned the dangerous post, and could not be brought back to their duty by any remonstrance of their chief: when Bandoola, stepping down to the spot, instantly severed the heads of two of the delinquents from their bodies, and ordered them to be stuck up upon the spot "pour encourager les autres."<sup>†</sup>

Between the 28th and the 31st the time was employed on one part in the construction of batteries, and on the other, in improving their defences; the approaches were made, and on the 2d of April the English took possession of the place without the loss of a man. Bandoola had been killed the night previously by a shell, and his troops, after the loss of their chief, made a precipitate retreat; leaving behind them 110 iron guns, 28 pieces of brass ordnance, and 269 jingals, mounted on the works, without disabling them in any way. A vast quantity of military stores fell into the hands of the conquerors, and the total loss sustained during the siege amounted to only 14 killed and missing and 69 wounded. The high sense of the services rendered by the naval department, during a period of six weeks, under every privation, surrounded by difficulties and dangers, exposed during that time in open boats, harassed day and night by the enemy, with all the vicissitudes of climate, all the annoyance of their cramped situation, is ably put forth in the letter of Sir Archibald Campbell,\* and in Captain Alexander's despatch to Captain Coe.<sup>†</sup>

Sir Archibald profiting by the panic, marched on the 3d of April towards Prome, while the water division kept up a constant

\* Marshall.

† Snodgrass.

communication with the land column, which had been increased by the junction of Brigadier M'Creagh, on the 12th of April, at Surawah, the whole force having again crossed the Irrawaddi. On the 24th the columns arrived in the neighbourhood of Prome, and, as the enemy did not wait to be attacked, but retired without any resistance on the approach of the English, the place was taken possession of the day following, although the different stockades mounted 100 guns, and were in excellent condition to withstand an attack. With Bandoola's death all the energy, or bravery, of the enemy seems to have vanished, and the British columns marched through a hostile country unmolested; but, as the rainy season was now about to commence, the army went into cantonments, and as far as the land column was concerned, there was a total cession of hostilities.

Major Sale's division, during the advance of the two former columns upon Prome, proceeded to attack Bassein, accompanied by the Larne, Captain Frederick Marryat, and the Mercury, Lieutenant Drummond Anderson. On the 24th of February the division arrived off the entrance of the Bassein river. It appears that on the 26th, as the ships advanced up the river, they were fired at from two stockades, which the enemy deserted directly the fire was opened upon them in return. On the 3d of March the ships arrived and anchored within three miles of Bassein, having experienced much trouble in warping up the narrow part of the river, and from the vessels constantly grounding. Bassein was at this time a heap of ruins, having been destroyed by the Burman chief, who had fled from the first stockade near the entrance of the river. Major Sale advanced about 130 miles towards Lamina without opposition; finding the place deserted, he returned on the 23d to Bassein, it being useless to attempt a pursuit of his flying enemies. The casualties in this expedition amounted to two wounded. Sickness and fatigue, however, decreased the ranks in a trifling degree.

Captain Marryat having dropped down the river to Naputtah, proceeded thence with a small body of men against Thingang. The enemy, however, declined all hostilities, and Captain Marryat's terms were accepted, by which 150 Naputtah men were released, and provided with canoes to return to their homes. The arms, &c., were surrendered, and the Wongeé of the town, a chief invested with a gold chattah, was delivered up as a prisoner.

Lieutenant Fraser, on the 30th, was despatched to Pumkayi. The same terms were offered and accepted as at Thingang. The whole coast from Negrais to Bassein, being now in possession of the English, was ultimately added to the conquered provinces, and "the enemy were deprived of all maritime possessions from Cape Negrais to Tenasserim."\*

\* Marshall.

Lieutenant Wilkinson having been despatched from Prome in order to reconnoitre the river, captured on the 1st of May, without any loss, eight war-boats, pulling each fifty oars, and laden with ordnance stores. It is a proof how inefficient the enemy were in regard to warlike operations, as practical gunnery for this service was performed in the face of, and under the fire of 500 musketeers, and yet not a man was hurt. Captain Alexander, in mentioning the gallant behaviour of Lieutenant Wilkinson, remarks, "that the capture of these boats liberated 3000 canoes, with families in them, driven before the retreating force of the Prince of Sarrawaddy."

The months of June, July, and August, were passed by Sir Archibald Campbell at Prome. Captain Chads returned, after the occupation of that place, to Rangoon. Captain Marryat, who was promoted to the command of the Tees, left the Rangoon about the middle of May. Captain Ryves was invalided. Lieutenant Edward Blanckley of the Alligator, was promoted to the Sophie, and departed from the station shortly afterwards, leaving the Alligator and Arachne, the only men-of-war, at Rangoon. Captain Chads desired both ships, during the wet monsoon, to be unrigged and secured by means of bamboos thatched with leaves. "The gun-boats were placed at equal distances, forming," says Mr. Marshall, "a chain of posts between Rangoon and Prome, by which means, provisions were forwarded to form a dépôt for the ensuing campaign under a safe protection.

The forces under Sir Archibald Campbell, previously to the opening of the campaign, amounted to only 6148 men. From this number he had to garrison Prome; he therefore ordered 2100 men to be sent from Rangoon and Donobew, which would swell his effective force to 8248 men. The enemy, who viewed with increased alarm the approach of the English towards their capital, were not inactive spectators of the coming storm; 40,000 men, under Memia-boo, the half-brother of the king, were collected and stationed at various cities, the principal force being concentrated at Meaday.

Before hostilities commenced, Sir Archibald Campbell addressed a letter to the court of Ava, dated the 5th of August, offering to enter into pacific negotiations but, previously to any answer being received, Memia-boo had advanced to Meaday, and it became necessary to check his approach to the British force at Prome. Brigadier-general Cotton was therefore sent in the Diana, with a small force, to reconnoitre. Captain Alexander commanded the gun-boats, and on the 15th of August the object of the expedition was fully answered. The town of Meaday stands on the left bank of the Irrawaddi; a nullah runs into the river immediately below it. The bank of the river was strongly stockaded, and the place altogether presented a

formidable appearance. The force of the enemy was estimated at between 16 and 20,000 men, and a general activity prevailed in order to render the position secure.

On the 6th of September the answer to Sir Archibald Campbell's letter to the court of Ava was delivered by two Burman deputies, under the protection of a flag of truce; they declared their readiness to enter into negotiations, and requested that two officers might be permitted to visit the Burman commander-in-chief, in order to carry into effect the terms about to be proposed to him. Lieutenant-colonel Tidy, the deputy adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Smith, of his majesty's ship *Alligator*, were appointed by Sir Archibald Campbell, and were accompanied by Mr. Sarkies Manook as interpreter.\* The principal conditions of peace offered by the English were the following: "The non-interference of the court of Ava, with the territories of Cachar, Munnipoore, and Assam; the cession of the four provinces of Arracan, and the payment of a certain sum as an indemnification for the expenses of the war, one moiety to be paid immediately, and the Tenasserim provinces to be retained until the liquidation of the other. The court of Ava was expected to receive a British resident at the capital, and consent to a commercial treaty, upon principles of liberal intercourse and mutual advantages."

There was a profusion of oriental folly and extravagance in the reception of the English commissioners. All the pomp, the show, and the outward profession of sincerity, was abundantly showered upon Colonel Tidy and his colleague; a jetty was built expressly for their landing; 2000 troops escorted them to their abode; compliments from the Kee-wongee were duly presented by the late governors of Prome and Sarrawaddy. The time between the 11th and the 16th, was thus occupied, when it was agreed that hostilities should cease until the 17th of October, that a Burman minister of high rank should meet Sir Archibald Campbell at Neoun-ben-zeik, a village equidistant from both armies, and that no advancing-movement should be made by the Burmese troops to swell the forces of Memia-boo, but that all the troops of Ava should be considered as partaking of the present neutrality.

Before the conference took place, Sir James Brisbane, Knight and C.B., in command of the *Boadicea*, which ship he had left at Rangoon, arrived at head-quarters, bringing with him the boats of his ship to assist in future operations. Sir Archibald Campbell and Sir James Brisbane proceeded on the 30th to the village above named, and the conference took place on the 2d of October. A house had been erected for the purpose, and two officers of rank were deputed by the Kee-wongee to wait upon the English commanding officers, and conduct them to the

\* Marshall.

house. On the part of the British, Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith were sent for the same purpose to the Kee-wongee; the first day was spent in useless compliments about the state of the king's health, and on the following day six officers, Sir Archibald Campbell, Sir James Brisbane, Brigadier-general Cotton, Captain Alexander, R.N., Brigadier M'Creagh, Lieutenant-colonel Tidy, and Captain John James Snodgrass, again met the Burman deputies. The principal objection, urged on the part of the Burmese, was the cession of territory, and much conversation took place upon the subject. The day finished by an extension of the armistice until the 2d of November, when the determination of the court of Ava was to be made known. In the mean time all American and English subjects detained at Ava were to be liberated, the British, on their part, liberating all Burmese then confined in Bengal. On the 3d of November Sir Archibald was informed that the court of Ava refused to listen to the terms; neither the cession of one inch of territory, nor the payment of the slightest pecuniary indemnity could be entertained. The answer given was, "If you wish for peace you may go away; but if you ask either money or territory no friendship can exist between us. This is Burman custom!" The armistice was finished, and both parties proceeded immediately to active and offensive operations, which commenced on the 15th of November on the side of the Burmese, and which gave them some confidence from the success of the enterprise. A division of the enemy having advanced within 48 miles of Prome in a north-easterly direction, four regiments of native infantry, under Lieutenant-colonel Robert M'Dowall, of the Madras establishment, were despatched to dislodge them. This was attempted in vain. The Burmese outnumbered their opponents by more than six to one, and Lieutenant-colonel M'Dowall, with 53 men, were killed, 110 wounded, and the remaining force obliged to withdraw.

That the Burmese had not been idle during the long and fruitless negotiation, is evident from the fact that shortly after the recommencement of hostilities, Prome was surrounded by 50,000 men, and the centre of the active force began to stockade and fortify the height of Napadee. On the opposite side of the river the enemy were equally active, and pushed a strong detachment forward in the hopes of regaining possession of Padoung-mew, a town on the western side of the Irrawaddi, which was bravely defended by 200 troops and a division of the flotilla under Lieutenant Kellett. The enemy made their attempt on the 25th of November but were repulsed with some loss, whilst the casualties of both army and navy amounted to one man being slightly grazed by a musket-ball.

In the naval department some changes had occurred. On the 7th of November Captain Alexander died, and was succeeded in command of the *Alligator* by Captain Chads; and on

the 14th the squadron received the additional aid of Captain John Fitzgerald Studdert, who arrived at Rangoon in his majesty's sloop the *Champion*.

On the 1st of December, measures having been taken for an attack on the enemy's lines, Sir James Brisbane, with the flotilla, commenced the action by a heavy cannonading of the enemy's centre, which was intrenched upon the Napadee Ridge, strongly defended as to natural position, and consisting of 30,000 men under the Kee-wongee. This attack was intended to withdraw the enemy's attention from Sir Archibald Campbell, who immediately sallied forth to attack Maha Nemiow, who commanded the left of the enemy's forces, and had under his command 14,000 infantry and 700 cavalry. Brigadier-general Cotton, who commanded the right division of the British forces, moved on towards Simbike, whilst the other division, under the commander-in-chief, forded the Nawine river, and continued along its banks. Stockade after stockade was taken without much resistance; the enemy were panic-stricken and deserted their strongholds, falling victims to their opponents, who mowed them down without resistance. The massacre amounted to 300 killed, amongst which was Maha Nemiow himself.

The English advanced upon Meaday, after an attack on Ze-ouke the following day. It is impossible to give sufficient credit to the troops, who cheerfully and without a murmur marched 20 miles, and, on the morning of the 2d of December, drove the enemy from all their strong positions. The flotilla gallantly performed its duties; 300 boats were captured, and stores, ammunition, and guns to a large amount taken.

The nature of this war of extermination can be well understood from the account of Major Snodgrass. We extract from his journal the account of the 19th of December. "Marched upon Meaday, where a scene of misery and death awaited us. Within and around the stockades, the ground was strewed with dead and dying, lying promiscuously together, the victims of wounds, disease, and want. Here and there a small white pagoda marked where a man of rank lay buried; whilst numerous new-made graves plainly denoted that what we saw was merely the small remnant of mortality which the hurried departure of the enemy prevented them from burying. The beach and neighbouring jungles were filled with dogs and vultures, whose growling and screaming, added to the pestilential smell of the place, rendered our situation far from pleasant. Here and there a faithful dog might be seen stretched out and moaning over a new-made grave, or watching by the side of his still breathing master; but by far the greater number, deprived of the hand that fed them, went prowling with the vultures among the dead, or lay upon the sand glutted with the foul repast.

"As if this scene of death had not sufficed, fresh horrors were

added to it by the sanguinary leaders of these unhappy men. Several gibbets were found erected about the stockades, each bearing the mouldering remains of three or four crucified victims, thus cruelly put to death, for perhaps no greater crime than that of wandering from their post in search of food, or, at the very worst, for having followed the example of their chiefs in flying from their enemies."

A part of Sir James Brisbane's letter to the admiralty, in which he mentions the gallant services of all under his command, and records the death of Captain Dawson, of the *Arachne*, will be found in the Appendix, No. 16. The command of the *Arachne* now devolved on Lieutenant Andrew Baird, of the *Boadicea*.

Victory followed victory in all directions. Brigadier-general Cotton was equally successful against Sudda-woon, who occupied the high banks on the west bank of the river. The flotilla, under Sir James Brisbane, again lent its powerful aid, and is highly spoken of by the brigadier-general in his report to the commander-in-chief, and it is gratifying to find that on every occasion the different services lent to each other the most efficient aid and cordial co-operation.

No time was lost by Sir Archibald Campbell. The panic-stricken enemy fled before him; the English advanced in two divisions as before, whilst a small force, under Brigadier Richard Armstrong, was embarked to act in co-operation with the naval forces under Sir James Brisbane. A line of communication having been established between Sir Archibald Campbell and the flotilla, the whole advanced. Both services had numerous obstacles to oppose, and both overcame all difficulties: the boats were kedged or tracked up the river in many places, owing to the rapidity of the stream, which rendered the former modes perhaps less fatiguing than eternally toiling at the oars. At Meong a junction with Brigadier-general Cotton's division with the flotilla had been arranged, but it was useless. No enemy remained to be opposed; every work, however strong, was abandoned. It appears, from Major Snodgrass's description, that a few resolute and well-trained men might have kept back the whole invading force. The river, in some places, is described as being so narrowed by shoals that the boats must pass, and did pass, within 200 yards of the banks, and the natural advantages, which had been increased by art, if properly defended, might have effectually stopped all progress towards the capital. On the 17th the united force came within sight of Meaday. It was evacuated by the enemy. Captain Chads was sent forward to reconnoitre, and although the enemy made sufficient resistance to kill two men and wound two others during the reconnoissance, they fled at the approach of the advanced guard.

Sir Archibald Campbell now marched upon Melloone, and



arrived before it on the 29th of December. On the 26th a flag of truce had been received on board the *Diana*, by Sir James Brisbane, bearing intelligence that Kolein Menghie had arrived at Melloone with power to conclude a treaty of peace. The flag required a cessation of hostilities for 25 *days*, but as Sir Archibald had discovered the bad faith of his opponents he offered 24 *hours* as the longest period, and in the mean time continued his march. Melloone was strongly occupied, but as the enemy did not appear disposed to exchange shots, Sir Archibald consented to an armistice, and once more negotiations commenced. The close of this year saw the British force of a few thousand men dictating peace as conquerors, although surrounded by an enemy nearly eight times their number, and threatening to advance upon a capital the population of which was above 150 times more numerous than our army. Such is the force of discipline, when opposed to lawless hordes. Sir James Brisbane, at the commencement of this year, was obliged from severe indisposition to retire to Pulo-Penang. He died on the 19th of December, 1826.

It was soon evident that the court of Ava was by no means disposed to fulfil its treaty. As long as the Burmese could gain time they were satisfied that some chance might turn the scale of victory, or that in the end, the tremendous superiority of number must triumph. Indeed, had they been commanded by any active man, with common sense, it is evident, that Sir Archibald's small force might have been kept eternally on the alert, and fatigued into a retreat. To the extreme ignorance of military tactics, must therefore be attributed the fact, that a band of men, far below 8000 in number, could advance or dream of advancing into a populous country, with at least 60,000 men under arms, and concentrated, with strongholds in their rear, stockaded, fortified, every munition of war at hand, recruits to supply casualties, ample provisions, in short all that could be required to carry on a desperate contest. On the other hand, it is true, the river afforded conveyance from Rangoon, of ammunition, &c., but the enormous fatigue attending such transport must be considered, and that, from the smallness of the force the stockades, which stood on the banks of the Irrawaddi, and which were taken by the invaders, could not be retained, and again fell into the enemy's hands. We have seen in the preceding pages that hundreds of war-boats thronged the river, that fire-rafts were daily constructed and nightly used, that such was the scarcity of fresh provisions even at Rangoon, that mutton was sold at five shillings the pound, a duck at eighteen, and all other articles on an equal ratio. Of the luxuries of life there were none; to this must be added that the seamen were absent from their ships a whole year, and as Marshall remarks, "were employed rowing and tracking their boats by day against a rapid stream, sleeping in them by night, protected from the in-

clemency of the weather by awnings only ; rarely meeting with a fresh meal, and at one period, upwards of two months without so great a luxury." These men well deserved the thanks which Sir Archibald Campbell and their own officers, so frequently bestowed upon them.

On the 18th of January the Burmese commissioners again endeavoured to gain time, and requested a further delay of a week : it was refused ; they had promised to evacuate Melloone on the 20th, they refused to comply with their own proposition, and war again became inevitable. Both parties laboured hard during the night ; the English in landing 28 guns, which were in battery by 10 o'clock the next morning ; the Burmese strengthening their already powerful defences. Before noon on the 19th the English opened their fire, and every prospect of any amicable arrangement had passed.

A brigade under the command of Lieutenant-colonel R. Sale, and a division under Brigadier-general Cotton were embarked in the boats under the command of Captain Chads. The first-named brigade assembled and carried the main face of the enemy's position ; Major William Frith, of his majesty's 38th regiment, heading the party, the lieutenant-colonel having been wounded in the boats. The enemy gave way immediately, but were interrupted in their retreat by Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Blair, of the 87th foot, who boldly attacked and dispersed them with considerable loss. Such was the daring of one side, and the imbecility of the other, that in four hours after the opening of the battery, Melloone was in possession of the invaders, and all the money, stores, ammunitions, 300 canoes in the hands of the victors, and this chef-d'œuvre of Burman fortification, strongly garrisoned was assaulted, and taken, with the trifling loss of nine men killed and 35 wounded.

The officers of his majesty's navy, who were employed in this gallant and apparently desperate service, were Lieutenants Grote and William Smith, of the *Boadicea*, Valentine Pickey, of the *Alligator*, and Messrs. Sydenham Wilde, William H. Hall, George Sumner Hand, George Wyke, Stephen Lett, and William Coyde (midshipmen).

Though the fall of Melloone convinced his majesty of Ava that his troops were unable, under any circumstances, to cope with his invaders, still it was considered that another chance should be taken, and Nie-Wooh-Breen (the king of hell), was in the well-fortified city of Pagahm-mew, with 16,000 men to turn the tide of victory. Sir Archibald Campbell now advanced to assault the place, and although the court of Ava had despatched Dr. Price, an American missionary, who was a prisoner at Ava, in conjunction with Dr. R. Sandford, of the royals, also a prisoner, both of whom arrived at head quarters on the 31st of January,—he did not delay his approach, although his force only amounted to about 2000 men

to face this formidable warrior. On the 9th of February the king of hell was defeated and Pagahm-mew taken, the British loss amounted to two men killed, and fifteen wounded. The enemy were dispersed in all directions, and now sued for peace in all sincerity, imploring Sir Archibald not to approach nearer the capital. After considerable difference as to the amount of money to be deposited as an indemnity, it was finally agreed that 25 lacs in money should be paid, and this sum was brought to Yandaboo, a place only 45 miles from the capital, by the missionary above mentioned, and paid over.

The definitive arrangement was left to the commissioners already named by Sir Archibald Campbell, and Captain Chads was requested to lend his talent towards the completion of the treaty. On the 24th of February the peace was signed, the principal conditions being as follows:\* “To abstain from all future interference with the principality of Assam, and its dependencies, and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar and Jynteea; to recognise Glumbeer Singh as Rajah of Munnipoore (should he desire to return to that country); to cede in perpetuity the provinces of Arracan, recently conquered by the British, including the four divisions of Arracan, Ramree,† Cheduba, and Sandoway, as divided from Ava by the Unnoupec-towmien mountains, and also the provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereunto appertaining (taking the Saluon, or Martaban river, as the line of demarcation on that frontier); to receive a British resident at Ava, and to depute a Burman minister to reside at Calcutta; to abolish all exactions upon British ships or vessels in Burman ports, that are not required from Burman ships or vessels in British ports; and to enter into a commercial treaty upon principles of reciprocal advantage; the King of Ava, ‘in proof of the sincere disposition of the Burman government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the nations, and as part indemnification to the British government for the expenses of the war,’ agreed to pay the sum of one crore of rupees, equal to about 1,000,000*l.* sterling (valuing the rupee at two shillings, the then rate of exchange), of which contribution the first instalment, amounting to 2,508,199 sicca rupees, was embarked at Yandaboo, brought down the Irrawaddi (a distance of 600 miles), and ultimately conveyed by Captain Chads to Calcutta, where it was landed from the Alligator, April 10th, 1826.”

Thus ended the Burman war. On the 8th of March the

\* Marshall.

† The harbour of Kheauk-pheo, at the north end of the island of Ramree is described as sufficiently large to accommodate the whole navy of Great Britain. The anchorage is from 8 to 15 fathoms throughout; and being landlocked on three sides, the west, east, and south, the harbour is completely secured against the S. W. monsoon.

troops were embarked, and by the 6th of May the whole force had returned to Rangoon, and sailed for their several destinations.

In conclusion, it becomes a pleasant duty to record the vote of thanks of both houses of parliament, to Sir James Brisbane, and the captains, officers, seamen, and marines, under his command, for their cordial co-operation, their skilful, gallant, and meritorious exertions, which greatly contributed to the successful issue of the war: and to add, that Captains Chads, Marryat, and Ryves, received the companionship of the Bath, and that every lieutenant, and passed midshipman, who were employed on this occasion, were promoted.

In the Appendix, No. 17, will be found the proclamation of the governor-general in council, and it is almost useless to add, that the Admiralty, and the East-India Company, expressed their approbation of the zealous and gallant conduct, displayed by Sir James Brisbane, Captains Chads and Marryat, and the other officers and men, during the long and arduous service in which they were employed. Our men suffered all the privations incident to a hostile country, all the miseries of sickness, and want of common comforts, with constant exposure to harassing attacks from an enemy vastly superior in numerical strength, who disturbed them by night, and attempted to starve them by day, and every officer and man deserved the thanks which a grateful country returned them for their active, persevering, and meritorious exertions.

# APPENDIX

TO THE

## BURMESE WAR.

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No. 1. See p. 424.

IN compliance with your orders, on the 9th instant, at 11 P. M., at the commencement of the flood-tide, I proceeded up the river in the honourable company's cruiser *Thetis*; accompanied by the *Jessey* [Penang cruiser], six of the gun-flotilla, six row-boats, and the Malay proa you were pleased to put under my command. At 2 A. M. the *Jessey* and the row-boats took up the position assigned them, about three-quarters of a mile below Kemmendine. The *Thetis* was anchored at the entrance of a creek about the same distance above Kemmendine, and abreast of the stockade from which the gun was taken on the 3d instant, but which has since been greatly strengthened. The gun-flotilla were to have been placed abreast of the opposite point, forming the entrance of the creek (distinguished by a pagoda), on which, since the 3d, there has been erected a formidable stockade; but in consequence of the ebb-tide making against them, with the exception of the *Robert Spankie* and two others, they failed in their endeavours to take up their position, and were brought up a short distance below the *Thetis*.

About 10 A. M. the batteries opened their fire against Kemmendine; the stockade on the pagoda point at the same instant commenced a fire of musketry, and from four small pieces, apparently 4 or 6 pounders, upon the *Robert Spankie* and the other two gun-vessels opposite to it, which was returned by them, and kept up on both sides for upwards of an hour. The stockades abreast of the *Thetis* not having fired a shot the whole time, and observing that the flotilla did not succeed in silencing the other, I took advantage of the flood-tide just then making, to drop abreast of it in the *Thetis*, and after a fire of half an hour, so far silenced the enemy that from this time they only fired an occasional musket at intervals when we had ceased, but altogether so badly directed, that we had only one man wounded, belonging to a row-boat at that time alongside the *Thetis*. Having observed a great number of boats, many of a large size, collected

about two miles above us, and considering it possible that at night, during the ebb, they might attack any of the flotilla that remained in advance, when we, from the rapidity of the current, could not render them any assistance, I thought fit to shift the Thetis, at the last of the flood, about a quarter of a mile above the point, directing the flotilla to drop with the ebb below the stockade on the opposite point, which they accordingly did.

At noon on the 11th, observing the signal agreed upon, when the general wanted communication with us to be made, I sent an officer to answer it, who returned with intelligence of the troops having possession of Kemmendine, and with a request from the general, that two of the gun-flotilla and two row-boats might be left at that place; I accordingly directed the flotilla, with the above exceptions, to proceed to Rangoon with the evening's ebb. At 6 P. M. the Thetis weighed, and, with the boats ahead to tow, began to drop down the river.

From the place where we had been at anchor we had seen a great smoke and flame, apparently proceeding from the back of the stockade on the pagoda point; but which, on our opening the entrance of the creek, we discovered to be a very large fire-raft, composed of a number of country boats fastened together, and rapidly drifting down with the stream. By endeavouring to avoid the raft, together with the effect of the strong current setting out of the creek, the Thetis unfortunately grounded on the opposite bank of the river, where, in spite of every exertion, she remained until high water next morning.

The raft grounded on the pagoda point, where it remained burning the whole of the night; although occasionally large masses separated from the main body and drifted down the river. The most dangerous of these masses were towed on shore by Mr. [George] Winsor, of the Sophie, in the Larne's gig, who described them to be composed of canoes, filled with tar, matting, bamboos, &c. During the night there were some shot fired at the Thetis from the stockades, but without effect. At daylight on the 12th, having succeeded in getting her afloat, we proceeded down the river and anchored at Rangoon.

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No. 2. See p. 425.

Having observed a disposition to recross part of their force to the Dalla side of the river, I determined, on the 8th instant, to make as general an attack as the very woody and inundated state of the country would possibly admit of. For that purpose, I formed the force to be employed into two columns of attack; one proceeding by land, under the command of that excellent and indefatigable officer Brigadier-general Macbean, for the purpose of surrounding the enemy on the land side; while I, with the other, proceeded by water to attack their stockaded position, along the banks of the river in front. To this post the enemy appeared to attach the greatest importance, and the stockades were so constructed as to afford mutual support, presenting difficulties apparently not to be overcome without a great sacrifice of lives. *I therefore resolved to try the effect of shelling,*

and consulted with Captain Marryat upon the employment of such armed vessels as he might select to breach, in the event of our mortar practice not succeeding. The shells were thrown at too great a distance to produce the desired effect, and the swampy state of the country would not admit of any advance. The armed vessels, viz., the *Satellite*, *Teignmouth*, *Thetis*, and *Jessey*, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Fraser, of H. M. S. *Larne*, now took their stations according to a disposition made by Captain Marryat, and opened a fire, which soon silenced that of 14 pieces of artillery, besides swivels and musketry from the stockades, and in one hour the preconcerted signal of 'breach practicable,' was displayed at the mainmast head. The troops, as previously arranged, entered their boats on the signal being hoisted. The assault was made in the best order and handsomest style: Major Wahab, with the native infantry, landed, and immediately attacked the breach, while Lieutenant-colonel (Henry) Godwin, almost at the same instant, pushed ashore a little higher up, and entered the work by escalade: the enemy kept up a sharp, but ill-directed fire, while the troops were landing; but, as usual, fled on our making a lodgment in the place. I now ordered Lieutenant-colonel Godwin to re-embark with the detachment of the 41st regiment, and attack the second stockade, which was immediately carried in the same style. The third stockade was evacuated by the enemy.

The cool and gallant conduct of all the troops on this occasion was, to me, a most gratifying sight. *To the officers and men of the breaching vessels every praise is due; and I much regret that severe indisposition prevented Captain Marryat from being present to witness the result of his arrangements.*

The inundated state of the country did not admit of any communication with Brigadier-general Macbean from the shipping, nor did I know the result of the operations of his column, until I returned to Rangoon in the evening. Nothing could be more brilliant and successful! He took, by assault, seven strong stockades in the most rapid succession, throwing the enemy into the utmost consternation; and he had also the good fortune to fall in with a large body flying from a stockade attacked by the shipping, of whom a great number were killed.

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No. 3. See p. 426.

Sir,—I request you will accept my very best thanks for your able arrangement and disposition of the vessels employed in the attack of the enemy's stockades yesterday; and I beg you will do me the favour of conveying them to Lieutenant Fraser, R.N., Captain Hardy, and the officers in command of the honourable company's cruisers *Thetis* and *Jessey*.

I had the greatest satisfaction in observing the general good conduct of the row-boats and the boats of the transports; they carried the troops up to the assault in very handsome style, and Captain O'Brien, of the *Moir*, was the first man who leapt on shore, and entered the breach with the foremost of the troops. I am, &c.,

(Signed)

A. CAMPBELL.

No. 4. See p. 426.

The Governor-general in Council unites with you in regretting, that the severe indisposition of Captain Marryat, the senior naval officer, prevented his witnessing the successful result of his judicious arrangements on the occasion alluded to. You will be pleased to assure Captain Marryat, that his lordship in council entertains the highest sense of his valuable services, and will not fail to bring them under the notice of his excellency Commodore Grant.

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No. 5. See p. 426.

I must now call your attention to the condition of H.M.S. Larne, whose crew I am sorry to say have been rendered quite inefficient by disease. Since we have been on this expedition, we have had 170 cases of cholera and dysentery. We have had 13 deaths—we have now 30 patients at the hospital on shore, and 20 in the sick list on board; our convalescents are as ineffective as if they were in their hammocks; they relapse daily, and the surgeon reports, that unless the vessel can be sent to cruise for a month, there is little chance of their ultimate recovery. When I sent away the expedition, under Lieutenant Fraser, on the 7th instant, I could only muster three officers and twelve men fit for duty.

The conduct of Lieutenant Fraser, in the several expeditions which he has commanded, has been that of a gallant and steady officer; and I am under the greatest obligations to Mr. Atherton, not only for his active services in the boats, but for carrying on the whole duty of the ship, during the absence and sickness of the other officers. The behaviour of Mr. John Duffill, master's-mate of this ship, and of Messrs. Winsor and Maw, midshipmen, lent from the Sophie and Liffey, has been very satisfactory, and I trust, that when future opportunities may occur, they will so distinguish themselves as to have a fair claim for promotion.

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No. 6. See p. 426.

I proceeded with the detachment you were pleased to place under my command, at 11 A. M., and after entering a large creek on the east side of Dalla, and proceeding about two miles, I observed two stockades, one on the right, and one on the left bank, immediately opposite to each other, both in commanding situations, particularly that on the left bank, which I instantly decided on attacking. The boats were hove-to for a short time, to make the necessary preparations for the attack; and as soon as these were completed, the whole moved on under a heavy fire from the guns and musketry of the enemy in both stockades. The landing was effected under an incessant fire from them, and after great labour and exertion in getting through the mud, which was remarkably stiff, and thigh deep, the scaling ladders were placed, and the stockade stormed and imme-



diately carried. Some of the troops then re-embarked, crossed the river, and took possession of the opposite stockade.

Our loss, although severe, is not so great as might have been expected from the nature of the ground we had to go over, and the sharp and severe fire kept up by the enemy until the scaling ladders were placed. The loss on the part of the enemy was but small, in consequence of the vicinity of the jungle, into which they escaped the moment our men entered their works.

Of the conduct of the troops, I cannot speak in too high praise, although it will be impossible for me to particularize the officers who so gallantly led their men to the assault, as they are too numerous; many of them assisted in carrying the ladders to the walls.

*I felt myself highly indebted to Lieutenant Fraser, and a party of seamen and marines of H.M.S. Larne, whose unremitting exertions throughout the affair, greatly contributed to the success of the day.*

It is with regret I have to report that Mr. Maw, R.N., your acting aide-de-camp, was severely wounded at the early part of the day, whilst he and Captain John Campbell, H. M. 38th regiment, your (second) aide-de-camp, who was a volunteer on the occasion, were cheering on some of the scamen who accompanied us.

I have further to report, that the enemy, previous to their flight, threw some guns into a wet ditch that surrounded the fortifications. We found but two small ones, which were brought away. All the houses in both stockades were destroyed by fire, and a part of the palisade pulled down, before the return of the detachment to camp.

No. 7. See p. 426.

The gallantry of the officers employed in this expedition, viz., Lieutenant Fraser, Mr. Atherton, and Messrs. Duffill, Winsor, and J. H. Norcock, deserves the highest encomiums. I am sorry that our list of killed and wounded is so heavy, but it will be accounted for when I state, that in these attacks the Lascars, who man the other boats, will not pull into the fire unless they are led by the officers and men of H. M. sloop the Larne. The conduct of Mr. Maw, midshipman of the Liffey, has, during the whole period of his service here, been a series of gallantry. I have great pleasure in transmitting a letter from Sir Archibald Campbell, relative to his conduct, and adding my testimony to that of the commander-in-chief.

I regret, says Sir Archibald, the severe wound received by Mr. Maw. Of this young man's gallantry of conduct and merit I cannot speak too highly: he has repeatedly distinguished himself by the most conspicuous and forward bravery.

No. 8. See p. 428.

Sir Archibald Campbell will take an early opportunity of communicating to Captain Marryat, R.N., how gratified he was by his prompt support at the point assailed, and the gallant pursuit of the

flying enemy by himself and his brave followers; and which he will not fail to request Captain Marryat to communicate to the officers and men of his majesty's navy, and also those of the transport service, who so handsomely came forward on this, as they have done on many former occasions.

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No. 9. See p. 428:

Under these circumstances, I most fully coincide with you in opinion, that no time should be lost in proceeding to Penang, where those comforts essentially necessary for the recovery of your crew are at present most conveniently to be had; aware as I am, that the most urgent necessity alone induces you to suggest the removal of the ship under your command. I feel fully convinced that you will not lose a moment in returning to partake of the further, and I trust more active, operations of the approaching campaign.

In taking I hope a very short leave of yourself, and the officers and men of the *Larne*, I shall not dwell, as I otherwise would, on the valuable and ready aid I have invariably received from you all, since the commencement of the present service, embracing duties of perhaps as severe and harassing a nature as ever were experienced by either sailors or soldiers, and under privations of the most trying nature. Any number of Malay sailors you may require, to assist in navigating the *Larne* to Penang, are at your service.

(Signed)

A. CAMPBELL.

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No. 10. See p. 428.

I have the honour to enclose sundry despatches from Captain Marryat, of his majesty's ship *Larne*, in command of the naval force in the river Rangoon, detailing various successful attacks on the enemy, while co-operating with the army under Sir Archibald Campbell; and I feel much pleasure in recommending to their lordship's notice that officer, as well as those named in the margin,\* to whose zealous exertions and cool intrepidity are to be attributed the successful results of the various attacks which they conducted against the enemy. I am pleased in having it in my power to recommend in the strongest terms, Mr. Henry Lister Maw, midshipman of this ship, who volunteered his services to Sir Archibald Campbell, and who accompanied him in all his operations; and I trust, from the high encomiums passed on his conduct, their lordships will be pleased to consider his services, and his having been most dangerously wounded.

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No. 11. See p. 429.

A chart drawn by Mr. Winsor, admiralty midshipman of the *Sophie*, to whom I feel much indebted for his exertion and ability, he having

\* Lieutenant William Burdett Dobson and Thomas Fraser, acting-Lieutenant George Goldfinch, Mr. Robert Atherton, and Messrs. John Duffill, George Winsor, and Charles Kittoe Scott.

had the arduous charge of the steam-vessel during the whole of the time, will enable you to judge of our progress; the *Satellite* was on shore three times, and the *Diana* once, but without the slightest injury. It now becomes a most pleasing duty for me to express the high satisfaction I feel at the conduct of the officers and seamen I had the pleasure to command; their privations and harassing duties were extreme, under heavy rains, guards by night from fire-rafts with the enemy's war-boats constantly watching close to them, and incessant towing of the flotilla by day; their high spirits were unabated; and without the utmost zeal and fatigue in the officers commanding the divisions, it would have been impossible to have advanced, manned as they are, with natives only. Lieutenant Dobson rendered me every assistance, and was of great service; he was severely burnt on the 22d. From the exemplary conduct of these officers and seamen, allow me, sir, to recommend them to your favourable attention. The casualties, I rejoice to say, have been very few—four seamen of the *Arachne* wounded.

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No. 12. See p. 429.

ENCLOSURE.

*Camp, Rangoon, Oct. 11, 1824.*

Sir,—In obedience to orders I had the honour of receiving from you, to feel the strength and disposition of the enemy upon the Lyne river, and to attack him as often as opportunities might offer of displaying the valour of the troops under my command, I embarked, on the morning of the 5th inst., with 300 men of his majesty's 38th regiment, 100 rank and file of the 18th Madras native infantry, and a detachment of Bengal artillery, under Captain Timbrell, on board a flotilla of gun-boats, &c. &c., under the immediate command of Captain Chads. The first day's tide carried us as high as Pagoda point, above Kemmendine, at the junction of the Lyne and Panlang rivers. Having been joined by the armed transport and flotilla, at 2 P. M. next day, the whole force proceeded up the Lyne river with a flowing tide. Bodies of the enemy were seen moving up on the right bank, while numerous war-boats hovered in our front, keeping up a continued but distant fire. After the flotilla anchored, the light boats in advance, under Lieutenant Kellett, of his majesty's ship *Arachne*, pursued the enemy's war-boats; and having closed with one carrying a gun and full complement of men, boarded and took her in the handsomest style, the Burmese jumping overboard to save themselves. On the 7th, after proceeding about four miles, I observed two stockades, which were taken possession of without loss, and we reached, with this tide, within a short distance of the large works and fortified village of Than-ta-bain, having in the course of the day destroyed seven of the newly-constructed war-boats. On reconnoitring the village, I found it was defended by three long breastworks, with a very extensive stockade, constructed of large teak-beams; and fourteen war-boats, each mounting a gun, were anchored so as to defend the approach to it.

Having consulted Captain Chads, we advanced to the assault, the steam-boat, with the Satellite and bomb-ketch in tow, and the troops in their boats ready to land when ordered. In passing the breastworks, we received a smart running fire from jingals and musketry, which was returned with showers of grape from the Satellite; and observing the enemy evidently in confusion, I directed the troops and scaling ladders to be immediately landed, and in a few minutes every work about the place was in our possession. During this night, some fire-rafts, of a most formidable appearance, were floated down the river; but very fortunately they passed without touching any of the vessels.

At six o'clock next morning, we again moved with the tide, and in passing a narrow neck of land at the junction of two rivers, were received with a brisk discharge of musketry from a long line of breastworks, and a cannonade from a very large stockade on our right. The fire of the latter was soon silenced by the well-pointed guns of the Satellite.

The troops and pioneers were ordered then to land, and this formidable stockade was carried by assault without a struggle. It is, without exception, the strongest work of the kind I have ever seen—the length of the front and rear faces is 200 yards, and that of the side faces 150. It is built of solid timber 15 feet high, with a platform inside all round, five feet broad and eight feet from the ground—upon this platform were a number of wooden guns, and piles of single and double headed wooden shot, and many jingals; below, we found seven pieces of brass and iron ordnance. In front, the stockade is strengthened by breastworks and regular demilunes, and would contain with ease above 2000 men. In the centre of this stronghold we found the magnificent bungalow of the kee-wongee, who, I presume, fled early in the day. I cannot doubt but the enemy's loss must have been severe, though we only found 17 dead bodies, which they had not time to carry off.

The advanced boats having pushed up the river some miles, without seeing any other works, I considered the objects you had in view fully accomplished, and we accordingly began to move back to Rangoon.

\* \* \* \* \* *I cannot adequately acknowledge my obligations to Captain Chads, for his zealous, judicious, and cordial co-operation; and the spirited conduct of Lieutenant Kellett, in command of the advanced boats, attracted the notice of every one.*

\* \* \* \* \* I need scarcely add, that every officer and man evinced, on all occasions, that cheerful readiness and determined valour you have so often witnessed. \* \* \* \* \* Much powder, and an immense quantity of petroleum oil, and warlike stores, were destroyed at the different stockades.

(Signed)

T. EVANS.

No. 13. See p. 429.

*Extract of a letter from George Swinton, Esq., to Sir A. Campbell, dated "Fort William, 18th March, 1825."*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch relative to the capture of the strong post of Than-ta-bain, or Quangalee, by a detachment of troops under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Godwin, aided by a party of seamen under Captain Chads and Lieutenants Keele and Hall. The governor-general in council is happy to observe, in the signal and complete success which attended the operations against Than-ta-bain, the same judgment, energy, and skill, on the part of Lieutenant-colonel Godwin, which distinguished his conduct on the occasion of his being detached against Martaban, and which again demand the unqualified approbation and applause of his lordship in council.

To Captain Chads, the governor-general in council desires to express his constant acknowledgments for the distinguished share he bore in the action. *His lordship in council has also noticed, with particular satisfaction, the characteristic gallantry displayed by Lieutenants Keele and Hall, who, with their boats' crews, were the first to enter the enemy's fort,* followed by Captain O'Reilly of the grenadiers of his majesty's 41st regiment. His lordship in council requests that these sentiments of the supreme government may be conveyed to Captain Chads and Lieutenants Keele and Hall, through the senior officer of his majesty's ships.

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No. 14. See p. 446.

I now beg leave to acknowledge my obligations to Captain Alexander, C.B., senior naval officer, and commanding the flotilla, for his hearty and cordial co-operation on all occasions since we have served together, and for his very great exertions on the present occasion, in bringing up stores and provisions. Since we have been before Donoobew, 11 of the enemy's large class war-boats have been captured by our advanced boats, under his own immediate orders; making, with others, evacuated by their crews, 38 first-rate war-boats now in our possession; and I have every reason to think that only five of the large squadron, the enemy had stationed at this place, have succeeded in escaping. A vast number of other boats of an excellent description, have also fallen into our hands. *By Brigadier-general Cotton, and all the officers embarked, the zeal and incessant labour of his majesty's navy are mentioned in terms of high admiration.*

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No. 15. See p. 448.

In my former despatch, dated Feb. 24th, I gave you the names of all officers and young gentlemen commanding boats, and I again request you will be pleased to recommend them to the favourable

attention of my lords commissioners of the admiralty, with the seamen and marines I have had the pleasure to command, their conduct having been such as to merit the highest encomiums—their privations, hardships, and fatigue, during upwards of six weeks, by day and night, in open boats, have been borne with cheerfulness, and every duty performed with alacrity.

Of Captain Chads I can only say, he has fully supported his former character, and has my best thanks. I trust I may be allowed to name my first lieutenant, Smith, an already distinguished officer. Mr. Watt, surgeon of the *Arachne*, a volunteer, has been of most essential service in attention to the sick and wounded.

No. 16. See p. 454.

I have much satisfaction in stating, that the whole of the officers and men employed in the flotilla conducted themselves throughout this service in a manner that reflects the highest credit on each individual, composed as this force is of various establishments. The officers of the honourable company's marine vied with those of the royal navy in gallantry and exertion. Captain Chads, of the *Alligator*, who commanded the light division, displayed the same zeal, judgment, and intrepidity, which have characterized his conduct since the operations in this quarter began. I have, however, the painful duty of announcing the death of Captain Dawson, of the *Arachne*, whose high professional character had induced me so recently to promote him to the rank of commander. The gallantry of this much lamented officer was conspicuous on all occasions; inviting, by his example, the exertions of all under his directions, he fell just as success had crowned our efforts.

No. 17. See p. 458.

The relations of friendship between the British government and the state of Ava, having been happily re-established by the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace, the governor-general in council performs a most gratifying act of duty, in offering publicly his cordial acknowledgments and thanks to Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell and the army in Ava, by whose gallant and persevering exertions the recent contest with the Burmese empire has been brought to an honourable and successful termination.

In reviewing the events of the late war, the governor-general in council is bound to declare his conviction, that the achievements of the British army in Ava have nobly sustained our military reputation, and have produced substantial benefits to the national interests.

During a period of two years, from the first declaration of hostilities against the government of Ava, every disadvantage of carrying on war in a distant and most difficult country, has been overcome, and the collective force of the Burman empire, formidable from their numbers, the strength of their fortified positions, and the shelter afforded

by the nature of their country, have been repeatedly assailed and defeated. The persevering and obstinate efforts of the enemy, to oppose our advance, having failed of success, and his resources and means of further resistance having been exhausted, the King of Ava has, at length, been compelled to accept of those terms of peace, which the near approach of our army to the gates of his capital enabled us to dictate. Every object, the governor-general in council is happy to proclaim, for which the war was undertaken, has been finally and most satisfactorily accomplished. \* \* \*

To the consummate military talents, energy, and decision, manifested by Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell, to the ardour and devotion to the public service, which his example infused into all ranks, and to the confidence inspired by the success of every military operation which he planned and executed in person, the governor-general in council primarily ascribes, under Providence, the brilliant result that has crowned the gallant and unwearied exertions of the British troops in Ava. Impressed with sentiments of high admiration for those eminent qualities so conspicuously and successfully displayed by Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell, his lordship in council rejoices at the opportunity of expressing to that distinguished soldier, in the most public manner, the acknowledgments and thanks of the supreme government, for the important service he has rendered to the honourable East India company, and to the British nation. The thanks of government are also eminently due to the senior officers, who have so ably and zealously seconded Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell in his career of victory. \* \* \*

Amongst those zealous and gallant officers some have been more fortunate than others in enjoying opportunities of performing special services. The ability with which Lieutenant-colonel Godwin, of his majesty's 41st, achieved the conquest of the fortified town of Martaban, and its dependencies, appears to confer on that officer a just claim to the separate and distinct acknowledgments of the governor-general in council. In like manner, Lieutenant-colonel Miles and Brigadier-general M'Creagh have entitled themselves to the special thanks of government for their services; the former, in the capture of Tavoy and Mergui; and the latter, in that of the island of Cheduba.

The limits of a general order necessarily preclude the governor-general in council from indulging the satisfaction of recording the names of all those officers whose services and exploits at this moment crowd upon the grateful recollection of the government, by whom they were duly appreciated and acknowledged at the time of their occurrence. His lordship in council requests that those officers will, collectively and individually, accept this renewed assurance, that their meritorious exertions will ever be cordially remembered. \* \* \*

The conduct of that portion of the naval branch of the expedition which belongs to the East India Company has been exemplary, and conspicuous for gallantry and indefatigable exertion; and it has fully shared in all the honourable toils and well-earned triumphs of the land force. \* \* \* The governor-general in council has not overlooked the spirit and bravery, characteristic of British seamen, manifested by several of the masters and officers of transports and

armed vessels, in various actions with the Burmese in the vicinity of Rangoon.

It belongs to a higher authority than the government of India to notice in adequate and appropriate terms, the services of his majesty's squadron, which has co-operated with his majesty's and the honourable East India company's land forces, in the late hostilities with the government of Ava. The governor-general in council, however, gladly seizes this opportunity of expressing the deep sense of obligation with which the supreme government acknowledges the important and essential aid afforded by his excellency Commodore Sir James Brisbane, in person, as well as by the officers, non-commissioned officers, seamen, and marines of his majesty's ships, who have been employed in the Irrawaddi. *Inspired by the most ardent zeal for the honour and interest of the nation and the East India company, his excellency, the naval commander-in-chief, lost no time in proceeding, with the boats of the Boadicea, to the head-quarters of the British army at Prome, and directing, in person, the operations of the river force, rendered the most essential service in the the various decisive and memorable actions which, in the month of December last, compelled the Burmese to sue for peace.*



## THE BATTLE OF NAVARIN.

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IN the year 1827 Great Britain was at peace with all the world. Although the political horizon had been occasionally clouded since the year 1815, no act of aggression had been committed by any of the European powers, and a general tranquillity prevailed: Greece was the only nation excepted. The inhabitants of that country had long groaned under the tyranny of the Turkish government; frequent insurrections of its unhappy inhabitants, in order to shake off the yoke under which they laboured, had been attempted, and as often repressed; acts of atrocious cruelty were daily committed by the imperious master, until the slaves (for in reality the poorer class of Greeks had been slaves to the Ottoman Porte) rose in greater numbers, and made a more desperate, and ultimately successful, opposition to their former conquerors. The disordered state of Greece afforded ample scope for piracies; vessels of different sizes were manned and armed, and fell alike upon the Turkish ship or the unprotected merchantman of other countries, which chanced to cross their tract. Commerce was interrupted—thousands of helpless creatures were butchered—the loss of life was immense, until Great Britain, France, and Russia determined to interfere and to put a period to the ravages of both parties. The high contracting powers came to the following determination:

“His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, &c., his Majesty the King of France, &c., and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary contest, which, by delivering up the Greek provinces and the isles of the Archipelago to all the disorders of anarchy, produces daily fresh impediments to the commerce of the united states, and gives occasion to piracies, which not only expose the high contracting powers to considerable losses, but, besides, render necessary burdensome measures of protection and repression; having, besides, received, on the part of the Greeks a pressing request to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte; and being animated by the desire of stopping the effusion of blood, and of

arresting the evils of all kinds which might arise from the continuance of such a state of things, have resolved to unite their efforts, and to regulate the operation thereof by a formal treaty, with a view of re-establishing peace between the contending parties, by means of an arrangement which is called for as much by humanity as by the interest of the repose of Europe."

Plenipotentiaries were nominated by the different powers to carry their determination into effect; one of the first measures to be adopted being "a *demand* of an immediate armistice between the two parties, as a preliminary condition indispensable to the opening of any negotiation." To carry these *demands* into execution, Great Britain had a squadron in the Mediterranean, under Sir Edward Codrington; the French, one under Admiral de Rigny; the Russians one also, under Admiral Heiden; but at this period neither the French or Russian squadrons had joined Sir Edward Codrington. The squadrons, when united, were placed under the orders of the first-named officer, who, with the ships under his command, was already actively employed in carrying his orders into effect.

It will be seen by the extract above, that the allied powers meditated a *mediation*, not an open warfare; the imposing force in the immediate vicinity to the scene of action was accounted sufficient to awe the Turks into submission, and no *positive* orders were, therefore, sent to Sir Edward Codrington, to have recourse to a violation of the peace existing between the Ottoman Porte and the high contracting powers; he was desired, as well as the other admirals, to correspond with the ambassadors at Constantinople, and to conform to their directions.

Feeling that a very great responsibility rested upon him, he applied to his excellency Mr. Stratford Canning for his opinion, apprehending that he could not prevent *all collision* between the contending parties, without actually having recourse to hostilities, or, by tampering with people in whom no trust could be reposed, lower the honour, the reputation of the British flag. The reply to his application was in these words: "You are not to take part with either of the belligerents; but you are to interpose your forces between them, and to keep the peace with your speaking-trumpet, if possible; but, in case of necessity, with that which is used for the maintenance of a blockade against friends as well as foes; I mean *force*." And in another confidential letter, dated 1st September, 1827, Mr. Canning further replied: "On the subject of collision, for instance, we agree, that, although the measures to be executed by you are not to be adopted by you in a hostile spirit; and although it is clearly the intention of the allied governments to avoid, if possible, any thing that may bring on a war, yet the prevention of supplies, as stated in your instructions, is ultimately to be enforced, if necessary; and when all other means are exhausted, — by cannon-shot."

The object of this history is truth. We have endeavoured, from its first page to its last, to cast aside all party feeling—all political controversy; our determination being to place before the reader, as far as our researches will permit, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; and as differences of opinion have existed in a great measure concerning the battle of Navarin, and much obloquy been lavished upon Sir Edward Codrington, for what was termed “an untoward event,” we feel it but due to him to place the answer of Sir Stratford Canning before the public; for although Mr. Canning’s letter referred principally to the prevention of supplies, and in answer to a letter as to the power of using force, which the original instructions seemed, in some measure, to negative; yet it gave this authority—to use force, if the admiral judged it requisite; and throughout the whole paragraph above quoted, implies, if not orders, that the admiral should use endeavours, even to cannon-shot, to carry that part of such orders into execution, and, consequently, to make any hostile demonstration he might judge requisite.

That Sir Edward Codrington felt that the speaking-trumpet was not to be cast aside hastily—that cannon-shot were not to be used, but in extremity—may be gleaned from his own letter to the different officers under his command:

“Asia, at sea, September 8, 1827.

“Sir,—You are aware that a treaty has been signed between England, France, and Russia, for the pacification of Greece. A declaration of the decision of the powers has been presented to the Porte, and a similar declaration has been presented to the Greeks.

“The armistice proposed to each, in these declarations, has been acceded to by the Greeks, whilst it has been refused by the Turks. It becomes, therefore, the duty of the allied naval forces to enter, in the first place, on friendly relations with the Greeks; and next to intercept every supply of men, arms, &c. destined against Greece, and coming either from Turkey or Africa in general. The last measure is that which requires the greatest caution, and above all, a complete understanding as to the operations of the allied naval forces.—Most particular care is to be taken that the measures adopted against the Ottoman navy do not degenerate into hostilities. The formal intention of the powers is to interfere as conciliators, and to establish, in fact, at sea, the armistice which the Porte would not concede as a right. Every hostile proceeding would be at variance with the pacific ground which they have chosen to take, and the display of forces which they have assembled is destined to cause that wish to be respected; but they must not be put into use, unless the Turks persist in forcing the passages which they have intercepted.

“All possible means should be tried, in the first instance, to

prevent the necessity of proceeding to extremities; but the prevention of supplies, as before mentioned, is to be enforced, if necessary; and when all other means are exhausted,—by cannon-shot.

“ In giving you this instruction as to the duty which I am directed to perform, my intention is to make you acquainted thoroughly with the object of our Government, that you may not be taken by surprise as to whatever measures I may find it necessary to adopt. You will still look to me for further instructions as to the carrying any such measures into effect.

“ I am, &c. (Signed) ED. CODRINGTON.”

On the 25th of September Sir Edward Codrington, in the presence of Admiral de Rigny, had an interview with Ibrahim Pacha, at Navarin. The pacha commanded the Turkish fleet, and was likewise commander-in-chief of the land forces, a considerable portion of which was at Patras. At this conference the orders of the British admiral were made known to the pacha, and much pains were taken by Sir Edward to make Ibrahim perfectly understand that he should put those orders in execution in the event of his non-compliance. After a short conference an armistice was agreed upon between the Turks and Greeks by land and by sea; both land and sea forces were to remain inactive at Navarin until further instructions should be received from Constantinople; and, in consequence of this armistice, a part of the Turkish fleet, then outside of the harbour, was allowed to join their admiral at anchor. At this interview Sir Edward Codrington wished the terms of the treaty, or armistice, to be placed on paper, but Admiral de Rigny mentioned that the request would be considered an insult by Ibrahim Pacha, the word of a Turk being considered by the Turks themselves, and generally so by those who have had intercourse with them, as an inviolable pledge. So cautious was Sir Edward Codrington not to give offence, that his own interpreter was not present.

On the following day the *Asia*, the flag-ship of Sir Edward Codrington, and the *Sirène*, a 60-gun ship, bearing the flag of Admiral de Rigny, were making preparations for putting to sea, when the dragoman of Ibrahim Pacha came on board the former ship. He stated “ that his master had received information that Lord Cochrane had made a descent upon Patras, and requested to be allowed to send a competent force to frustrate his lordship’s intentions.” A most decided negative was given by Sir Edward Codrington, who inquired if by this message he was to understand that Ibrahim Pacha no longer considered the treaty as binding. The reply given by the dragoman was. “ that if, at the expiration of an hour, he did not return, Sir Edward was to consider the treaty of the preceding day as still in force.” About sunset the *Asia* and *Sirène* put to

sea, the dragoman not having returned, and both admirals having the fullest confidence in the honour of Ibrahim. The Dartmouth was left to watch the Turkish fleet, and Sir Edward Codrington, having despatched some of his ships to Malta for supplies, shaped a course for Zante in the Asia.

On the 2d of October the Dartmouth was seen in the offing, and communicated the intelligence that a strong division of the Turkish fleet had weighed from Navarin, and were standing to the north-west towards Patras. Immediately the Asia, Talbot, and Zebra weighed, joined the Dartmouth, and soon came in sight of the Turkish squadron, consisting of 47 sail, amongst which were two double-banked frigates, one large frigate, seven brigs, and eight corvettes. The English squadron ranged up alongside, and the ships of both nations hove to. Sir Edward Codrington sent Captain Spencer, of the Talbot, to complain of this breach of faith, this sudden and unexpected violation of the treaty, and to make known the admiral's determination to fire into the first ship that might attempt to pass the Asia's broadside. The Turkish commander, Petrona Bey, replied that he was acting in obedience to the pacha's orders, and added that he was under the impression that Sir Edward Codrington had given Ibrahim leave to send a squadron to Lepanto. He then sent Reala Bey, the second in command, on board the Asia, to remonstrate, but without any effect; and when Reala Bey returned to his own ship, the Asia filled her main topsail, and fired a gun, on which the whole fleet stood towards Navarin. Some of the smaller vessels evinced a disposition to pass the English ships, but in this they were thwarted. Sir Edward Codrington's squadron kept in their rear until they were all clear of the gulf of Lepanto, but no sooner had both divisions arrived at the south end of Zante, than the English ships made sail, and passed ahead of the Turkish squadron, in order to look out for some assistance.

On the morning of the 3d of October the Turkish squadron were joined by 15 more ships, two having flags at the main, the whole under the command of Ibrahim Pacha, who came in sight round the north point of Zante; on his making a signal with a gun, the first division bore up to join him. Sir Edward Codrington immediately made the signal to prepare for action, and bore up also. A communication now took place between Ibrahim Pacha and the vice-admiral commanding the first detachment, after which the Ottoman fleet, in obedience to a signal from their chief, made sail for Navarin, although the wind was fair for Patras. The Asia and Talbot anchored in the entrance of the bay of Zante, in order to obtain coals, water, and other supplies of which they were much in want, the Dartmouth being desired to watch the Ottoman fleet.

The next morning the Dartmouth communicated that several of the Turkish ships had again sailed towards Patras. The

English admiral immediately put to sea, and at 6 P. M. was off Cape Papa, having the Talbot and Dartmouth in company. The largest of the Turkish ships were at anchor, the rest were working up to the anchorage, but without any colours flying. Several shots were fired by the English, in order to force the Turkish ships to show their flags; indeed, in this affair, the Asia fired 96 shots, and the Dartmouth 100.

That Ibrahim Pacha had no intention of fulfilling the treaty was evident. On two occasions his sacred promise had been violated, and now, finding that he could not succeed in effecting a junction with his army at Patras, and in relieving that place, he, on his arrival, with his whole fleet at Navarin, landed the troops he had embarked on board his ships, and wreaked his vengeance on the unfortunate Greeks of the Morea; neither women or children escaped his fury, villages were pillaged and burnt, the trees were destroyed, and a devastation commenced which would have ended in rendering the whole Morea a desert.

Captain Hamilton, in the Cambrian, was despatched to ascertain the truth of these reports, and, in his official letter to the English admiral, he thus describes the miseries of the poor unprotected wretches: "I have the honour to inform you that I arrived here yesterday in company with the Russian frigate Constantine. On entering the gulf we observed, by clouds of smoke, that the work of devastation was still going on. The ships were anchored off the pass of Ancyro, and a joint letter from myself and the Russian captain was despatched to the Turkish commander. The bearers of it were not allowed to proceed to head-quarters, nor have we as yet received any answer. In the afternoon we went on shore to the Greek quarters, and were received with the greatest enthusiasm. The distress of the inhabitants, driven from the plain, is shocking; women and children dying every moment of absolute starvation, and hardly any having better food than boiled grass. I have promised to send a small quantity of bread to the caves in the mountains where these unfortunate wretches have taken refuge. It is supposed that if Ibrahim remain in Greece more than a third of its inhabitants will die of starvation."

On the 13th of October Sir Edward was joined by the Russian squadron. On the 14th he arrived off Navarin, where the allied squadrons of France, Russia, and England were concentrated, and placed under his directions. We have thus far endeavoured to give our readers a perfect knowledge of events prior to the action, and we have entered into some details in order to show that Sir Edward Codrington evinced the greatest forbearance, and used every means in his power to avoid a collision, which an unpremeditated circumstance afterwards occasioned.

The combined squadrons consisted of the following ships and sloops:

## ENGLISH.

Gun-ship		
84	Asia .....	{ Vice-admiral Sir Edward Codrington. Captain Edward Curzon. Commander Robert Lambert Baynes.
74	{ Genoa .....	{ Captain Walter Bathurst.
	{ Albion .....	{ Commander Richard Dickenson. Captain John Acworth Ommanney. Commander John Norman Campbell.
Gun-frig.		
50	Glasgow .....	Captain Hon. James Ashley Maude.
48	Cambrian .....	" Gawen William Hamilton, C.B.
42	Dartmouth .....	" Thomas Fellowes, C.B.
28	Talbot .....	" Hon. Frederick Spencer.
Gun-brig		
18	Rose .....	Commander Lewis Davies.
10	{ Mosquito .....	" George Bohun Martin.
	{ Brisk .....	" Hon. William Anson.
	{ Philomel .....	" Viscount Ingestre.

## FRENCH.

Gun-ship		
74	{ Scipion .....	Captain Milius.
	{ Trident .....	" Maurice.
	{ Breslau .....	" De la Bretonniere.
60	Sirène .....	Rear-admiral H. de Rigny.
Gun-frig.		
44	Armide .....	Captain Hugon.

*Schooner*, Alcyon : Dauphinoise.

## RUSSIAN.

Gun-ship		
74	{ Azof .....	Rear-admiral Count de Heiden.
	{ Gargonte.	
	{ Ezekiel.	
	{ Alexander Newsky.	
Gun-frig.		
50	Constantine.	
48	{ Provernoy.	
	{ Elena.	
	{ Castor.	

The Ottoman and Egyptian fleets amounted according to the statement made by the capitan bey's secretary, to 65 sail; of which two were Turkish 84-gun ships, one 76-gun ship, fifteen 48-gun frigates, 18 corvettes, and four brigs. The Egyptian fleet consisted of four double-banked 64-gun frigates, eight corvettes, from 18 to 24 guns each, eight brigs, and five fire-vessels; making a total of 65 sail. There is a considerable discrepancy between the number of the Turco-Egyptian fleet as mentioned by the secretary of the capitan bey, and in Sir Edward Codrington's letter, dated 24th of October, addressed as a general order to the captains, commanders, &c., in which he states that "out of a fleet composed of *eighty-one* men of war, there remain only one frigate and 15 small vessels in a state ever to be again put to sea." The comparative force in guns has been mentioned as 1324 on the part of the allied fleet, and of 2240 on the part of the Ottoman fleet. It must, however, be

admitted, that this calculation cannot be relied upon, the comparative force being,

ALLIED FLEETS, ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND RUSSIAN.	TURCO-EGYPTIAN FLEET.
Sail of the line, including one 84, 11	Ships of the line, one of 84 guns. 3
Large frigates ..... 8	Large frigates ..... 15
Small ditto (the Talbot). ..... 1	Corvettes..... 18
Brigs ..... 4	36
24	The rest of the force is made up in gun-boats, schooners, and craft of all descriptions.

In former warfare, frigates never took part in a general engagement, and sloops, schooners, gun-boats, &c., were never fired upon without they were rash enough to court a return of shot. It will be in the memory of our readers, that at the battle of the Nile a frigate was sunk by one broadside of a line-of-battle ship, and, that consequently the vast superiority of force in the 11 sail of the line in still water, must be obvious to any man at all conversant in the destructive fire of an 80-gun ship; four line-of-battle ships were more than ample to destroy the 18 corvettes, when those corvettes were at anchor, and we state this without any fear of contradiction. We have seen the Glatton beat off six frigates; and the splendid attack of Captain Prowse in the 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Sirius, off Civita Vecchia in 1806, where he attacked one ship-corvette, three brig-corvettes, one bombard, one cutter, and three gun-boats, took the largest and drove the rest to seek shelter, may be found in our pages. The action of the Spartan in 1810, in the bay of Naples: and many, many other instances might be produced to show the destructive fire of one large vessel, against 10 times the number of guns in smaller vessels; but it is likewise to be borne in mind, that for five days previously to the action of Navarin, Monsieur Letellier, a French naval officer in the service of the Pacha of Egypt, had moored the Turco-Egyptian fleet in such a manner, that every broadside of both large and small vessels was directed towards the centre of the circle in which they were moored, and, as far as small vessels could be made effective, they certainly were rendered so on this occasion.

It was evident to the allied admirals that to keep an efficient force as a blockade, ready to thwart the intentions of Ibrahim Pacha during the winter, would be attended with great risk, if it was not physically impossible, and would also cause an enormous expense to their respective governments; and as the bay of Navarin was, at any rate, to them a neutral port, if not partially an English anchorage (for the island of Sphacteria, which belongs to the British, forms part of the bay of Navarin), it was resolved by the commander-in-chief, on the grounds which will be seen by a reference to his official letter, to anchor the three fleets in the bay, alongside of the Turco-Egyptian force, and then be



in readiness, to use other persuasions than the *speaking-trumpet*, should Ibrahim continue to violate the treaty. On the 20th of October, the weather being fine, the combined squadrons stood towards Navarin. The Turco-Egyptian fleet were at anchor, moored in the form of a crescent with springs on their cables, the larger ones presenting their broadsides towards the centre, the smaller ones in succession within them, filling up the intervals."\*

The printed instructions issued to all officers in His Majesty's navy, particularly desire that every ship approaching any ship of a different nation in time of peace or war, should be prepared for action, and it would be doing Sir Edward Codrington an injustice to state that he went into the anchorage unprepared; he *was* clear for action, but his lowerdeck ports, were not hauled flat against the ship's sides, but kept square as at sea in fine weather, and the ships were ordered not to anchor by the stern, which might imply a hostile intention, but to anchor with springs to their *anchors*. These little events we think proper to lay some stress upon, because they all prove to a certain extent a readiness to engage, but a determination not to become the assailants.

When three nations combine their squadrons, there must be, more or less, a jealousy; in regard to the English there could be none, because Sir Edward was a vice-admiral, and both De Rigny and Count de Heiden, were rear-admirals: but with the two latter, there might have existed some slight feelings of annoyance in regard to the post of honour, order of sailing, and so forth; to obviate this as much as possible, the vice-admiral determined that the order of sailing should be the order of battle; the English and French forming the weather or starboard line, and the Russian division forming the lee line. In this order they entered the bay of Navarin. "The *Asia* led in, followed by the *Genoa* and *Albion*, and anchored close alongside a ship of the line;" she was instantly moored with 30 fathoms on each cable. The *Genoa* came next, and was about to place her bow towards the bow of the *Asia*, when she was hailed by the vice-admiral and desired to take up her position with her head in the same direction as the *Asia*'s; this was done in good style, the *Genoa* passing very close to the vice-admiral, and taking up her appointed station. The *Albion* followed. The *Asia*'s opponent was the flag-ship of the capitan bey; the *Genoa* anchored close to another ship of the line, and the *Albion* close to a double-banked frigate. "The four ships to windward, part of the Egyptian squadron, were allotted to the squadron of Rear-admiral de Rigny; and those to leeward, in the bight of the crescent, were to mark the stations of the whole Russian squadron; the ships of the line closing those of the English line, and being followed up by their own frigates. The French frigate *Armide*, was directed to place herself alongside the outermost

\* Sir Edward Codrington's official despatch.

frigate on the left hand entering the harbour; and the Cambrian, Glasgow, and Talbot, next to her, and abreast of, the Asia, Genoa, and Albion; the Dartmouth, and the Mosquito, the Rose, the Brisk, and the Philomel, were to look after six fire-vessels at the entrance of the harbour.\* The Turco-Egyptian fleet did not witness this anchorage of the allied fleet without alarm; they were at quarters, their tompions out, and the guns nearly loaded to the muzzles, with shot, broken bars, rusty iron, and other materials.

On the fleet entering the bay, a boat was sent from a fort with a message from the commandant, "That as Ibrahim Pacha had not given any orders or permission for the allied fleet to enter, it was requested that they would again put to sea." Sir Edward Codrington in reply, said "that he was not come to receive orders, but to give them; that if any shot were fired at the allied fleet, the Turkish fleet would be destroyed."

The ships of the allied fleet had now anchored, the sails of many of the ships were furled, and on board the Asia, the band was desired to be sent on deck, every thing appearing to wear a peaceful aspect, when a firing of musketry was heard in the direction of the Dartmouth. This occasioned the action, and arose from the boats under the direction of Lieutenant Smyth being sent to one of the fire-ships, from the Dartmouth, to request that the fire-ships would move a little further from the allied fleet; and if we, as historians, are inclined to make any observations as to the commencement of the action, we should say, that if a fleet of a strange nation came to anchor in a bay where another fleet was at anchor, they should have selected (that is if no ulterior measures were premeditated) such berths as would not in any manner have interfered with the vessels previously at anchor; and the only reason which can be given for the allied fleet anchoring to leeward of the Turco-Egyptian fleet (for the wind blew into the bay) is, that had they anchored to windward, they must have been placed in a position to receive the whole fire of the Turco-Egyptian fleet, in consequence of the crescent form in which Mons. Letellier had moored the fleet with their broadsides all directed towards the centre. Besides, it appears that *boats* were sent, and the Turkish commander might be justified in believing that his vessel was to be taken possession of; for if a *request* is to be made, it would occur to a Turk or Christian, that one boat was as efficient as a dozen. The Turks, apprehensive that force was meditated, fired and killed Lieutenant G. W. H. Fitzroy and several of the crew. The Dartmouth immediately opened a *defensive* fire to cover her boats; the Sirène, Admiral de Rigny's ship, joined in the affair, with musketry only; one of the Egyptian ships fired a shot, which was the first round shot discharged, and struck the Sirène, "which, *of course*," as the

\* Sir Edward Codrington's official despatch.

vice-admiral states in his letter, "brought on a return, and thus very shortly afterwards, the battle became general."

"The *Asia*, although placed alongside the capitan bey's ship, was even nearer to Moharem Bey's, the commander of the Egyptian ships, and since his ship did not fire at the *Asia*, although the action was begun to windward, neither did the *Asia* fire at her. Moharem Bey, indeed, sent a message, that he would not fire at all, and therefore no hostility took place between Moharem Bey's ship and the English admiral's ship for some time after the *Asia* had returned the fire of the capitan bey. In the mean time, however, the excellent pilot, Mr. Peter Mitchell, who went to interpret to Moharem Bey, the vice-admiral's desire to avoid bloodshed, was killed by his people, in the boat alongside, whether with or without his orders is not known, but his ship soon afterwards fired into the *Asia*, and was consequently effectually destroyed by the *Asia*'s fire, sharing the same fate as his brother admiral on the star-board side, and falling to leeward a mere wreck."\* The action, now general, was well maintained by the Turks, and for four hours the firing continued, until, at the expiration of that time, the Ottoman fleet had been nearly destroyed: each ship, as she became disabled, was deserted by the crew, after having set her on fire, and the frequent explosions rendered the situation of the allied fleet dangerous in the extreme.

Captain Fellowes soon cleared the fire-ships, and saved the French admiral's ship, the *Sirène*, from being burnt. "The *Cambrian*, *Glasgow*, and *Talbot*, following the fine example of Captain Ilugon, of the *Armide*, who was opposed to the leading frigate of that line, effectually destroyed their opponents and also silenced the batteries."

The smoke was so thick during the action that the guns of the *Asia* were pointed from the flag at the mast-head of the capitan bey's ship. It was the only object discernible; occasionally the *Asia*'s fire ceased, in order to allow the smoke to clear away. At this interval her opponent fired single shot until the cable was either shot away or slipped, and she drifted to leeward out of fire. It was during the *Asia*'s engagement with the senior officer's ship, that her stern was exposed to the raking broadside of a frigate, and she received more damage from her than from her regular opponent. About 3 o'clock the *Asia*, having disposed of the capitan's ship, turned her broadside to Moharem's ship and his second ahead, both of which were soon destroyed. Moharem's ship was sadly disabled, and her second ahead, burning to the water's edge, blew up at her anchors.

The French division, under De Rigny, displayed equal valour and seamanship with their old enemies, the English. The French admiral anchored athwart hawse of the first Egyptian frigate. The three line-of-battle ships were to have filled up the

\* Sir Edward Codrington's public despatch.

space between their admiral and the *Asia*, but owing to some unforeseen circumstance they were prevented taking their proper station. The *Scipion*, on coming to her berth, was obliged to anchor, owing to a fire-ship being nearly athwart her hawse. The boats of the *Dartmouth* and *Rose* went instantly to her assistance, and towed the fire-ship from her position. The *Breslaw* ran towards the end of the bay, near the Russian division, and there most gallantly took her share in the fight. The *Sirène* having set fire to her opponent was in imminent danger of sharing the same fate; it is mentioned that a man from the French admiral's ship swam with a rope to the *Dartmouth*, and by this means the *Sirène* was warped from her perilous situation. The gallant conduct of Captain Hugon, of the *Armide*, we have before mentioned; his determination to place his ship in the hottest of the action rather blinded him to the disadvantageous position he took up. The *Rose*, Captain Davies, immediately went to his assistance, and this equally gallant conduct was acknowledged by Admiral de Rigny in a letter to the vice-admiral, bearing date the 23d of October.

It is impossible to convey to the reader an accurate idea of the services of each ship when the names and force of their opponents are unknown; it must therefore be sufficient to state, that the Russian division took up their appointed station, and that by their gallant conduct, and unflinching bravery, they added their share to the ruin and devastation around.

About 5 o'clock the firing along the whole line ceased. All further resistance would have been unavailing; but the destruction did not end with the firing. The Turks, apprehensive that the vessels would become prizes to their victors, set fire to and blew up many which were still in a state of efficiency, and this wanton act of egregious folly was not confined to a few instances. We have before remarked the passage in the vice-admiral's letter relative to the almost total destruction of the Turco-Egyptian squadron, which letter was written whilst the devastation was before his eyes; he was, however, in error when he asserted that only "one frigate and fifteen smaller vessels were all that remained of this large fleet which ever again could put to sea," for the *Pelican* sloop reconnoitred *Navarin* on the 14th of December following, and 29 sail were at anchor, amongst which was one line-of-battle ship and four frigates; two frigates fit for service, one of the Egyptian *rasées* in tolerable condition, five corvettes, 11 brigs, and five schooners; all, with the exception of the five first, which were reported much shattered, in a fit state for immediate service.\*

\* We have given this report of the *Pelican's* reconnoitre from Marshall's excellent work, but it is well known that several vessels joined the remains of the Turkish fleet at *Navarin* from *Modon*; so that the exact number of vessels left in a state "ever again to put to sea" remains uncertain, but by *all* accounts the destruction was not quite equal to the report.

In making our comments upon the battle of Navarin, we are bound to state that the circumstances connected with it must cause it to be considered in a very different point of view from a regular naval battle at sea, or in time of open war. The allies being obliged to enter the bay in apparent confidence of no hostile intention towards them, their being forced by circumstances not naval to expose themselves to the inner side of the circle formed by the Turkish fleet; the impolicy of anchoring in the centre of the bay, to which point the whole of the Turkish broadsides had been directed, and against which anchorage the fire-ships might have operated, are all circumstances not to be overlooked; but although Sir Edward Codrington states, in his despatches, that the object of the allied admirals was, by the imposing force of their squadrons, to cause a renewal of those propositions which had been broken through by Ibrahim going to Patras, and subsequently refused to be entertained by him, and as Ibrahim had submitted to be driven by so comparatively small a force from before Patras, there was no reason to expect that he would oppose the squadrons when united, and that their presence was the only chance of awing him into relinquishing his devastation of the Morea; yet it must be admitted that the action itself was occasioned by the allies having anchored to leeward of the fire-ships, and that their sending boats to remove vessels previously at anchor was the sole cause of the slaughter which ensued.

However much this country might have deplored the destruction of a fleet which would have materially assisted in checking the progress of Russian dominion in the East, yet they were not backward in the distribution of honours and the reward of promotions. The commanders were all advanced to the rank of captains; the first lieutenants of each ship were promoted to commanders; the captains had honorary distinctions conferred upon them, and there were more orders given for the battle of Navarin than for any other naval victory on record.

It was impossible for such a number of ships to be so closely engaged for so long a period as four hours, without considerable loss of men; indeed that loss, so severe in some ships, is the best proof of the gallant defence made by the Turco-Egyptian fleet. We regret we are unable to give the names of the French and Russian officers killed or wounded in this affair; but we are enabled to record the names of our own countrymen who fell or who suffered in the action. We therefore give the numbers of killed and wounded in the French, Russian, and English divisions, which were as follow:\*

\* An application was made to the admiralty to inspect the official returns, which was denied; we are therefore obliged to quote from the Gazette and the Annual Registers.

		FRENCH.		Killed.	Wounded.
<b>Gun-ship</b>					
60	Sirène .....	Rear-admiral de Rigny .....		21	42
74	{ Scipion .....	Captain Milius .....		2	36
		Trident .....	„ Maurice .....	...	7
		Breslaw .....	„ De la Bretonniere.....	1	14
<b>Gun-frig.</b>					
44	Armide .....	„ Hugon .....		14	14
	Alyone schooner.....			1	9
	Dauphinoise ditto.....			1	8
				40	130
Officers not included in the above.....				3	3
				43	133

		RUSSIAN.		Killed.	Wounded.
<b>Gun-ship</b>					
74	{ Azof.....	Rear-admiral Count de Heiden....		24	67
		Gargonte .....		14	37
		Ezekiel.....		13	18
		Alexander Newsky...		5	7
<b>Gun-frig.</b>					
50	Constantine.....			...	1
48	{ Provernoy.....			3	4
		Elena.....		...	5
		Castor.....		...	...
				59	139*

		ENGLISH.		Killed.	Wounded.
<b>Gun-ship</b>					
84	Asia .....	{ Flag-ship, Captain Ed. Curzon ... }		19	57
		{ Commander Robt. Lambert Baynes }			
74	{ Genoa.....	{ Captain Walter Bathurst..... }		26	33
		{ Commander Richard Dickenson... }			
		{ Capt. John Acworth Ommanncy... }			
		{ Commander J. Norman Campbell }			
10	Albion .....			10	50
<b>Gun-frig.</b>					
42	Dartmouth.....	Captain Thomas Fellowes, C.B....		6	8
48	Cambrian .....	Gawen William Hamilton, C.B....		1	1
50	Glasgow .....	Hon. James Asley Maude .....		..	2
98	Talbot .....	Hon. Frederick Spencer .....		6	17
<b>Gun-brig</b>					
10	Mosquito .....	Commander George Bohun Martin		2	4
18	Rose .....	„ Lewis Davies.....		3	15
10	Brisk .....	Hon. William Anson .....		1	3
10	Philomel .....	„ Viscount Ingestre.....		1	7
				75	197

The officers killed were, Captain Walter Bathurst, of the Genoa; Captain George Augustus Bell, Royal Marines; Mr. William Smith; Mr. Philip Dumaresk; Mr. John Lewis; Mr. Peter Mitchell; Captain C. J. Stephens; Mr. Edward R. Forster; Mr. Peter Brown; Mr. Charles Russell; Mr. A. J.

T. Rowe; Lieutenant G. W. H. Fitzroy, of the Dartmouth; Mr. Brown Smythe; Mr. W. J. Goldfinch; Lieutenant Philip Sturgeon, and Mr. Henry Campbell. The officers wounded severely were, Mr. J. H. Codrington; Mr. W. V. Lee; Mr. R. H. Bunbury; Mr. C. Wakeham, Mr. William Lloyd; Mr. Frederick Grey; Mr. Thos. Addington; Lieutenant-colonel Carador; Mr. Henry S. Dyer; Commander J. N. Campbell, of the Albion; Lieutenant J. G. Durban; Rev. E. Winder; Mr. W. F. O'Kane; Mr. James Stewart; Captain Thomas Moore; Mr. H. B. Gray; Lieutenant H. R. Sturt; Mr. James Chambers; Mr. Launcelot Harrison; Lieutenant Spencer Smith; Mr. John Dellamore; Mr. Joseph Gray; Lieutenant R. S. Hay; Mr. Alexander Calton; Lieutenant Mr. Lyons; Mr. Douglas Currie; Mr. William Williams; Mr. John Isatt.

The combined Turkish and Egyptian forces, with the list of vessels destroyed, is thus given by commander Peter Richards, who received his information from Monsieur Letellier, the French instructor of the Egyptian navy :

Line.	Double Frigates.	Frigates.	Corvettes.	Brigs.	Schooners.	Fire-brigs.	Trans- ports.		Total.	
							Austr.	Turk.		
2	...	5	12	...	..	...	...	...	19	} Capitan Bey's division from Alexandria. Moharem Bey's division, ditto. Tunician division, ditto. Tahir Pacha's division from Constantinople.
...	4	...	11	21	5	6	8	33	88	
...	...	2	...	1	...	...	...	...	3	
1	...	6	7	6	...	...	...	...	20	
3	1	13	30	28	5	6	8	33	130	} Total, transports included. Destroyed.
1	3	9	22	19	1	5	...	...	60	
2	1	4	8	9	4	1	...	...	29	} Remain, besides transports.

The killed were estimated at 3000 and the wounded at 1109; perhaps, if for the wounded we read killed, and for killed, wounded, it would be more correct.

“ LONDON GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

“ Admiralty-office, Nov. 10, 1827.

“ Despatches, of which the following are copies or extracts, have been this day received at this office, addressed to John

Wilson Croker, Esq., by Vice-admiral Sir Edward Codrington, K.C.B., Commander-in-chief of his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean.

“ His Majesty's ship *Asia*, in the Port of Navarin,

“ Sir,

Oct. 21, 1827.

“ I have the honour of informing his Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral, that my colleagues, Count Heiden and the Chevalier de Rigny, having agreed with me that we should come into this port, in order to induce Ibrahim Paeha to discontinue the brutal war of extermination which has been carrying on since his return here from his failure in the Gulf of Patras, the combined squadron passed the batteries, in order to take up their anchorage, at about two o'clock yesterday afternoon.

“ The Turkish ships were moored in the form of a crescent, with springs on their cables, the larger ones presenting their broadsides towards the centre, the smaller ones in succession within them, filling up the intervals.

“ The combined fleet was formed in the order of sailing in two columns, the British and French forming the weather or star-board line, and the Russians the lee line.

“ The *Asia* led in, followed by the *Genoa* and *Albion*, and anchored close alongside a ship of the line, bearing the flag of the *Capitana Bey*, another ship of the line, and a large double-banked frigate, each thus having their opponent in the front line of the Turkish fleet. The four ships to windward, part of the Egyptian squadron, were allotted to the squadron of Rear-admiral de Rigny; and those to leeward, in the bight of the crescent, were to mark the stations of the whole Russian squadron; the ships of the line closing those of the English line, and being followed up by their own frigates. The French frigate *Armide* was directed to place herself alongside the outermost frigate, on the left hand entering the harbour; and the *Cambrian*, *Glasgow*, and *Talbot* next to her, and abreast of the *Asia*, *Genoa*, and *Albion*; the *Dartmouth* and the *Musquito*, the *Rose*, the *Brisk*, and the *Philomel* were to look after six fire-vessels at the entrance of the harbour. I gave orders that no gun should be fired, unless guns were fired by the Turks; and those orders were strictly observed. The three English ships were accordingly permitted to pass the batteries, and to moor, which they did with great rapidity, without any act of open hostility, although there was evident preparation for it in all the Turkish ships; but, upon the *Dartmouth* sending a boat to one of the fire-vessels, Lieutenant G. W. H. Fitzroy and several of her crew were shot with musketry. This produced a defensive fire of musketry from the *Dartmouth* and *La Sirène*, bearing the flag of Rear-admiral de Rigny; that was succeeded by a cannon-shot at the rear-admiral from one of the Egyptian ships, which of course brought on a return, and thus, very shortly



afterwards, the battle became general. The *Asia*, although placed alongside the ship of the capitana bey, was even nearer to that of Moharem Bey, the commander of the Egyptian ships; and, since his ship did not fire at the *Asia*, although the action was begun to windward, neither did the *Asia* fire at her. The latter indeed sent a message "that he would not fire at all," and therefore no hostility took place betwixt our ships for some time after the *Asja* had returned the fire of the capitana bey.

"In the mean time, however, our excellent pilot, Mr. Peter Mitchell, who went to interpret to Moharem my desire to avoid bloodshed, was killed by his people in our boat alongside; whether with or without his orders I know not; but his ship soon fired into the *Asia*, and was consequently effectually destroyed by the *Asia*'s fire, sharing the same fate as his brother admiral on the starboard side, and falling to leeward a mere wreck. These ships being out of the way, the *Asia* became exposed to a raking fire from vessels in the second and third line, which carried away her mizenmast by the board, disabled some of her guns, and killed and wounded several of her crew. This narration of the proceedings of the *Asia* would probably be equally applicable to most of the other ships of the fleet. The manner in which the *Genoa* and *Albion* took their stations was beautiful; and the conduct of my brother admirals, Count Heiden and the Chevalier de Rigny, throughout, was admirable and highly exemplary.

"Captain Fellowes executed the part allotted to him perfectly, and, with the able assistance of his little but brave detachment, saved the *Sirène* from being burnt by the fire-vessels; and the *Cambrian*, *Glasgow*, and *Talbot*, following the fine example of Captain Hugon, of the *Armide*, who was opposed to the leading frigate of that line, effectually destroyed their opponents, and also silenced their batteries. This bloody and destructive battle was continued with unabated fury for four hours, and the scene of wreck and devastation which presented itself at its termination was such as has been seldom before witnessed. As each ship of our opponent became effectually disabled, such of her crew as could escape from her endeavoured to set her on fire, and it is wonderful how we avoided the effects of their successive and awful explosions.

"It is impossible for me to say too much for the able and zealous assistance which I derived from Captain Curzon, throughout this long and arduous contest; nor can I say more than it deserves for the conduct of Commander Baynes and the officers and crew of the *Asia*, for the perfection with which the fire of their guns was directed: each vessel in turn, to which her broadside was directed, became a complete wreck. His royal highness will be aware that so complete a victory, by a few, however perfect, against an excessive number, however individually inferior, cannot be acquired, but at a considerable

loss of life ; accordingly, I have to lament the loss of Captain Bathurst, of the *Genoa*, whose example on this occasion is well worthy of the imitation of his survivors. Captain Bell, commanding the royal marines of the *Asia*, an excellent officer, was killed early in the action, in the steady performance of his duty, and I have to mourn the death of Mr. William Smith, the master, admired for the zeal and ability with which he executed his duty, and beloved by all for his private qualities as a man. Mr. H. S. Dyer, my secretary, having received a severe contusion from a splinter, I am deprived temporarily of his valuable assistance in collecting and keeping up the general returns and communications of the squadrons ; I shall therefore retain in my office Mr. E. J. T. White, his first clerk, whom I have nominated to succeed the purser of the *Brisk*. I feel much personal obligation to the Honourable Lieutenant-colonel Cradock, for his readiness, during the heat of the battle, in carrying my orders and messages to the different quarters, after my aides-de-camp were disabled : but I will beg permission to refer his royal highness for further particulars of this sort to the details of the killed and wounded, a subject which it is painful for me to dwell upon. When I contemplate, as I do with extreme sorrow, the extent of our loss, I console myself with the reflection that the measure which produced the battle was absolutely necessary for obtaining the results contemplated by the treaty, and that it was brought on entirely by our opponents.

“ When I found that the boasted Ottoman word of honour was made a sacrifice to wanton, savage devastation, and that a base advantage was taken of our reliance upon Ibrahim’s good faith, I own I felt a desire to punish the offenders. But it was my duty to refrain, and refrain I did ; and I can assure his royal highness that I would still have avoided this disastrous extremity, if other means had been open to me. The *Asia*, *Genoa*, and *Albion*, have each suffered so much, that it is my intention to send them to England so soon as they shall have received, at *Malta*, the necessary repairs for their voyage. The *Talbot*, being closely engaged with a double-banked frigate, has also suffered considerably, as well as others of the smaller vessels ; but I hope their defects are not more than can be made good at *Malta*. The loss of men in the Turco-Egyptian ships must have been immense, as his royal highness will see by the accompanying list, obtained from the secretary of the capitana bey, which includes that of two out of the three ships to which the English division was opposed. Captain Curzon having preferred continuing to assist me in the *Asia*, I have given the charge of my despatches to Commander Lord Viscount Ingestre, who, besides having had a brilliant share in the action, is well competent to give his royal highness the lord high admiral any further particulars he may require.

“ I enclose, for his royal highness’s further information, a

letter from Captain Hamilton, descriptive of the proceedings of Ibrahim Pacha, and the misery of the country which he has devastated; a protocol of the conference which I had with my colleagues, and the plan and order for entering the port, which I gave out in consequence.

“ I have, &c.,  
 (“Signed) EDWARD CODRINGTON, Vice-admiral.

“ No. I.—(*Translation.*)

“The admirals commanding the squadrons of the three powers which signed the treaty of London, having met before Navarin, for the purpose of concerting the means of effecting the object specified in the said treaty, viz., an armistice *de facto* between the Turks and the Greeks, have set forth in the present protocol the result of their conference.

“Considering that after the provisional suspension of hostilities, to which Ibrahim Pacha consented in his conference of the 25th of September last with the English and French admirals, acting likewise in the name of the Russian admiral, the said Pacha did, the very next day, violate his engagement, by causing his fleet to come out, with a view to its proceeding to another point in the Morea:—

“Considering that since the return of that fleet to Navarin, in consequence of a second requisition addressed to Ibrahim by Codrington, who had met him near Patras, the troops of this Pacha have not ceased carrying on a species of warfare more destructive and exterminating than before, putting women and children to the sword, burning the habitations, and tearing up trees by the roots, in order to complete the devastation of the country:—

“Considering that, with a view of putting a stop to atrocities, which exceed all that have hitherto taken place, the means of persuasion and conciliation, the representations made to the Turkish chiefs, and the advice given to Mehemet Ali and his son, have been treated as mockeries, whilst they might, with one word, have suspended the course of so many barbarities:—

“Considering that there only remains to the commanders of the allied squadrons the choice between three modes of fulfilling the intentions of their respective courts, namely:

“1. The continuing, throughout the whole of the winter, a blockade, difficult, expensive, and perhaps useless, since a storm may disperse the squadron, and afford to Ibrahim the facility of conveying his destroying army to different points of the Morea and the Islands.

“2. The uniting the allied squadrons in Navarin itself, and securing, by this permanent presence, the inaction of the Ottoman fleets; but which mode alone leads to no termination, since the Porte persists in not changing its system.

“3. The proceeding to take a position with the squadrons in Navarin, in order to renew to Ibrahim propositions which, entering into the spirit of the treaty, were evidently to the advantage of the Porte itself.

“After having taken these three modes into consideration, we have unanimously agreed that this third mode may, without effusion of blood, and without hostilities, but simply by the imposing presence of the squadrons, produce a determination leading to the desired object.

“We have in consequence adopted it, and set it forth in the present protocol.—Oct. 18, 1827.

“(Signed) EDWARD CODRINGTON, Vice-admiral and Commander-in-chief of his Britannic Majesty’s ships and vessels in the Mediterranean.

LOUIS, Count de HEIDEN, Rear-admiral of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the Russias.

Rear-admiral H. de RIGNY, commanding the squadron of his most Christian Majesty.”

“No. III.

“*Statement made by the Secretary of the Capitana Bey in the Port of Navarin, Oct. 21, 1827.*

“3 Turkish line-of-battle ships:—1 Turkish admiral—84 guns, 850 men—650 killed—1 ditto, 84 guns, 830 men—1 ditto, 76 guns, 850 men, 400 killed.

“4 Egyptian double-banked frigates, 64 guns each, from 450 to 500 men.

“15 Turkish frigates, 48 guns, from 450 to 500 men.

“18 Turkish corvettes,—8 Egyptian ditto,—from 18 to 24 guns, 200 men.

“4 Turkish brigs,—8 Egyptian ditto,—19 guns, from 130 to 150 men.

“6 Egyptian fire-vessels.

“40,000 Egyptian troops in the Morea, 4000 of whom came with the above ships.”

Since the battle of Navarin no other action has occurred; our pages will therefore close with the strength of the navy in 1827, immediately after the promotion which took place on the 10th of January in that year.

Flag-officers	.	.	.	.	154
Captains	.	.	.	.	759
Commanders	.	.	.	.	1105
Lieutenants	.	.	.	.	2994
Masters	.	.	.	.	454
Medical officers	.	.	.	.	977
Pursers	.	.	.	.	758
Chaplains	.	.	.	.	69

## APPENDIX.

No. I. See p. 40.

A list of frigates late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1811.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
Gun-frig.	... Amazone .....	Destroyed, March 25, by her own crew, after having been driven on shore near Cape Barlleu, by the Berwick 74 and others. Captured, May 20, off Madagascar, by a British squadron under Captain Schomberg. Captured, May 26, at Tamatave, by the same. Captured, November 29, in the Adriatic, by the British frigates Alceste and Active. Wrecked, date unknown, in the Adriatic. Destroyed, March 13, after having been driven on the rocks of Lissa by a British squadron under Capt. Hoste.
}	(Z) Renommée .....	
	.. Néréide .....	
	40 } ... Pomone .....	
	.. Flore .....	
	.. Favorite .....	
}	(Z) Corona, ven. ....	Captured on the same occasion.
	32 (II) Bellona, ven. ....	

No Dutch, Danish, Russian, or Swedish vessel of war, above a sloop, captured, &c. during the year 1811.

An abstract of French frigates captured, &c. during the year 1811.

Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the French navy.	Total added to the British navy.
Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
5	2	1	..	..	8	4

## No. 2. See p. 40.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1811.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
			Wrecked, December 24; St.-George & Defence off the coast of Jutland, on passage from Baltic, Hero on the Haak sand, Texel: crew of latter perished, and both crews of former, except about eighteen men.
Gun-ship			
98	(H) St.-George	R. Car. Reynolds, r.-adm. Daniel O. Guion, captain.	Wrecked, December 24; St.-George & Defence off the coast of Jutland, on passage from Baltic, Hero on the Haak sand, Texel: crew of latter perished, and both crews of former, except about eighteen men.
74	(N) Hero	James Newman Newman	
	(O) Defence	David Atkins	
Gun-frig.			
38	(Z) Pomone	Robert Barrie	Wrecked, October 14, on the Needle rocks: crew saved.
	(A) Dover	Edward Tucker	Wrecked, May 2, in Madras roads: crew, except two, saved.
36	(B) Amethyst	Jacob Walton	Wrecked, February 16, in Plymouth sound: crew, except about thirty, saved.
	(C) Saldanha	Hon. William Pakenham	Wrecked, December 4, off Loughswilly, on the coast of Ireland: crew mostly perished.
32	(E) Tartar	Joseph Baker	Wrecked, August 18, on a sand in the Baltic: crew saved.
G.-bg.-slp.			
18	(Y) Alacrity	Nisbet Palmer	Captured, May 26, by the French brig of war Abeille, off Corsica.
	" Grasshopper	Henry Fanshawe	Captured, December 24, at Nieuve-Diep, Texel, whither she had been driven by stress of weather.
	" Pandora	John Ferguson	Wrecked, February 13, on the Scaw reef, Kattegat: crew saved, but made prisoners.
16	(a) Challenger	Goddard Blennerhasset	Captured, March 12, by a frigate and an armed store-ship, off Isle-de-France.
G.-brig			
12	(g) Fancy	Alexander Sinclair	Foundered, Decem. 24, in the Baltic: crew perished.
	" Firm	John Little	Wrecked, June 28, on a bank off the coast of France: crew saved.

## No. 2—continued.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Commander.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
Gun-brig.			
12	(g) Manly.....	Richard Wm. Simmonds	{ Captured, September 2, by three Danish 18-g. brigs, in the Baltic. Wrecked, December 25, (1810), between two rocks at Belle Isle, coast of France. Captured, June 29, by the Danes in the Baltic.
	„ Monkey.....	Thomas Fitzgerald . . .	
	„ Safeguard.....	Thomas England . . .	
10	(h) <i>Guachapin</i> .....	Michael Jenkins . . .	{ Wrecked, July 29, at Antigua : crew saved. Foundered at sea, Ja- nuary 8 : crew saved by an American vessel under her convoy.
	„ <i>Fleur-de-la-mer</i> ,	John Alexander . . .	
G.-cut.			
10	(l) Olympia.....	Henry Taylor . . .	{ Captured, March 2, by several French priva- teers off Dieppe. Wrecked, February 25, on Cape Sta -Maria. Wrecked, March 6, near New York.
	„ Shamrock.. ....	Wentworth P. Croke . .	
	„ Thistle .....	George M'Pherson . . .	
4	(o) Grouper.....	James Atkins . . .	{ Wrecked, October 21, off Guadaloupe: crew saved. Captured, July 15, by French national lug- ger Rapace, off Brest. Wrecked, May 2, in Madras roads: crew, except two, saved.
	„ Snapper .....	Henry Thrakstone . . .	
S.S. (r)	<i>Chichester</i> .....	William Kirby . . .	

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line.....	...	...	3	...	...	3
„ under the line.....	7	...	13	2	...	22
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>25</b>

No. 3. See p. 40.

For the pay and maintenance of 113,600 seamen and 31,400 marines.....	£	s.	d.
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.....	7,799,187	10	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including half-pay to sea and marine officers, superannuations, pensions, &c. ....	3,675,750	0	0
„ the expense of sea-ordnance.....	1,447,125	12	0
„ the superannuation allowances to commissioners, clerks, &c. ....	659,750	0	0
„ the extraordinary; including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work .....	61,975	0	3
„ the hire of transports .....	1,696,621	0	0
„ the maintenance of prisoners of war, in health and sickness .....	2,678,092	12	0
„ the same of sick and wounded seamen.....	968,742	0	0
„ the salaries, contingencies, &c. in the transport-office	280,316	4	0
	38,199	4	0
<hr/>			
Total supplies granted for the sea-service .....	£19,305,759	2	3

No. 4. See p. 141.

A list of French and Danish line-of-battle ships and frigates captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1812.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship	74 (M) Rivoli, F. . . . .	} Captured, February 22, by the British 74 Victorious, in the Gulf of Venice.
Gun-frig.	... Arienne, F. . . . .	
	... Andromaque, F. . . . .	} Destroyed, May 22, by the British 74 Northumberland, off Lorient.
40	... Danaé, F. . . . .	
	... Nayaden, D. . . . .	} Burnt by accident, at midnight, September 9, in the harbour of Trieste: crew perished. } Destroyed, along with four brigs, July 7, by the British 64 Dictator and three brigs in the creek of Lyngoe, coast of Norway.

No Dutch vessel of war, above a sloop, captured, &c. during the year 1812.

An abstract of French and Danish ships of the line and frigates captured, &c. during the year 1812.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F. & D. navies.	Total added to the British navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line....Fr.	1	2	..	..	..	1	1
Frigates.....	{	Da.	..	..	1	3	...
		Fr.	..	..	..	1	...
Total. . . . .	1	3	..	..	1	5	1



No. 5. See p. 141.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1812.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.	38 {	(Z) <i>Guerrière</i> ... Jas. Richard Dacres...	Captured, August 19, by the American 44-gun frigate <i>Constitution</i> , lat. 41° north, long. 55° west.
		„ <i>Java</i> ..... Henry Lambert .....	Captured, December 29, by the same frigate off St.-Salvador.
		„ <i>Laurel</i> ..... S. Campbell Rowley..	Wrecked, January 31, on the Govivas rock, in the Teignouse passage: crew saved, except 96 made prisoners.
		„ <i>Macedonian</i> , John Surman Cardan	Captured, October 25, by the American 44-gun frigate <i>United-States</i> , lat. 29° north, long. 29° 30' west.
36	(C) <i>Manilla</i> ..... John Joyce .....	Wrecked, January 28, on the Haak sand, Texel: crew, except twelve, saved, but made prisoners.	
28	(I) <i>Ba. Indoes</i> ... Thomas Huskisson...	Wrecked, September 28, on the north-west bar of Sable island: crew, except one, saved.	
G.-sh.-slp.	16 {	(Y) <i>Alert</i> ..... T. L. P. Laugharne..	Captured, August 13, by the American 32-gun frigate <i>Essex</i> , off the coast of North America.
		„ <i>Avenger</i> .... Urry Johnson.....	Wrecked, October 8, going into Newfoundland: crew saved.
G.-bg.-slp.	18 {	(Y) <i>Belette</i> ..... David Sloane.....	Wrecked, November 24, on the rocks, off the island of Lessoc in the Kattegat: crew, except five, perished.
		„ <i>Emulous</i> ... W. Howe Mulcaster.	Wrecked, August 3, on Sable island: crew saved.
		„ <i>Frolic</i> ..... Thomas Whinyates..	Captured, October 18, by the American ship-sloop <i>Wasp</i> , lat. 36° north, long 64° west, but recaptured same day by Poictiers 74.

## No. 5—continued.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
G.-b.-slp.			
16	(a) Fly .....	Henry Higman ....	Wrecked, February 29, on the Knobber reef, on the east point of the island of Anholt: crew saved.
	„ Magnet.....	F. Moore Maurice	Foundered, as is supposed, on her passage to Halifax.
	„ Skylark.....	James Boxer .....	Wrecked, May 3, near Boulogne: crew saved.
F.S. (c)	Ephera .....	Thomas Everard ...	Wrecked, December 26 (1811), near Cadiz: crew saved.
Gun-brig			
12	(g) Attack .....	R. W. Simmonds...	Captured, August 19, by a squadron of 14 Danish gun-boats, off Foreness.
	„ Encounter .....	Jas. Hugh Talbot .	Wrecked, July 11, in an attempt to cut out some vessels at San-Lucar, coast of Spain.
	„ Exertion .....	James Murray.....	Wrecked, July 8, in the river Elbe, and afterwards destroyed by the boats of that ship.
	„ Plumper .....	James Bray.....	Wrecked, December 5, in the bay of Fundy: crew part saved.
	„ Sentinel .....	W. Elletson King	Wrecked, October 10, on the shoals off the island of Rugen: crew saved.
Gun-cut.			
10	(l) Alban .....	W. Sturg. Key ....	Wrecked, December 18, near Aldborough: crew, except two, perished.
	„ Laura .....	C. Newton Hunter	Captured, September 8, by the Diligent, French privateer, coast of North America.
	„ Nimble.....	John Reynolds ....	Foundered, November 6, in a gale in the Kattegat: crew saved.
4	(o) Chubb.....	Samuel Nisbett....	Foundered, August 14, near Halifax: crew perished.
	„ Porgey .....	(name unknown) ..	Foundered, date unknown, in the West Indies.
	„ Whiting .....	Lewis Maxey .....	Captured, August 22, by the Diligent, French privateer, coast of North America.

No. 5—continued.

ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Totals
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line . . . . .	...	...	...	...	...	...
„ under the line . . . . .	8	...	14	4	...	26
Total . . . . .	8	...	14	4	...	26

No. 6. See p. 152.

For the pay and maintenance of 108,600 seamen and 31,400 marines . . . . .	£	s.	d.
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c. . . . .	7,530,250	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the salaries and contingent expense of the admiralty, navy-pay, navy, and victualling offices, and dock-yards; also half-pay and superannuations to officers of the navy and royal marines, their widows, &c. . . . .	1,700,135	11	0
„ the expense of sea-ordnance . . . . .	637,000	0	0
„ the superannuation allowances to commissioners, clerks, &c. . . . .	57,793	0	7
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work . . . . .	2,822,031	0	0
„ the hire of transports . . . . .	2,330,943	0	0
„ the maintenance of prisoners of war in health and sickness . . . . .	1,150,000	0	0
„ the same of sick and wounded seamen . . . . .	277,734	10	8
„ the salaries, contingencies, &c. in the transport-office, superannuations in ditto . . . . .	40,510	16	0
	1,291	13	4
Total supplies granted for the sea-service . . . . .	£20,096,709	11	7

No. 7. See p. 254.

A list of the ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1813.

Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship 74 (O) Captain . . . . . (in ordinary) . . . . .		Burnt, March 22, in Hamoaze.
Gun-frig. 38 (Z) <i>Dædalus</i> . . . . . Murray Maxwell . . . . .		Wrecked, July 2, off the island of Ceylon: crew saved.

No. 7—*continued.*

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-ship 32	(H) Southampton	Sir Jas. Lucas Yeo	Wrecked, November 27 (1812), on a reef of rocks, near Conception island: crew saved.
G.-sh. slp. 18	(R) Tweed	William Mather	Wrecked, November 5, in Shoal bay, Newfoundland: crew, except fifty-two perished.
	(S) Atalante	Frederick Hickey	Wrecked, November 10, off Halifax lighthouse: crew saved.
G.-bg slp. 18	(Y) Colibri	John Thompson	Wrecked, August 22, in Port Royal, Jamaica: crew saved.
	„ Ferret	F. Alex. Halliday	Wrecked, January 7, near Leith: crew saved.
	„ Peacock	William Peake	Captured, February 24, by the American sloop Hornet, off Demerara.
	„ Persian	Charles Bertram	Wrecked, June 16, on the Silver Keys, in the West Indies: crew saved.
10	(c) Sarpedon	Thomas Parker	Foundered, as is supposed, on the 1st of January.
	„ Rhodian	John Boss	Foundered, February 21, on her passage to Jamaica: crew saved.
Gun-brig 14	(f) Linnet	Joshua Tracey	Captured, February 25, by the French 40-gun frigate Gloire, near the Madeiras.
	(g) Boid	John Shekel	Wrecked, September 27, on Prince Edward's Island.
12	„ Boxer	Samuel Blythe	Captured, September 5, by the American 16-gun brig Enterprise, off Portland, United States.
	„ Daring	William R. Pascoe	Destroyed, February 7, by her crew, to prevent her capture by the French frigate, Rubis.
	„ Fearless	H. Lord Richards	Wrecked, December 8 (1812), off coast of Spain.
Gun-cut. 14	(i) Dominica	Geo. W. Barretté	Captured, August 5, by the American privateer Decatur, off Charlestown.

No. 7.—*continued.*

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-cut.			
10	(1) Algerine.....	Daniel Carpenter...	Wrecked May 20, in the West Indies. Destroyed, September 9, in action with French privateer Renard. Foundered, November 30 (1812), off St. Bartholomew's, in the West Indies, whilst in chase of an American brig: crew perished.
	„ Alpheia.....	Thomas Wm. Jones	
	„ Subtle.....	Charles Brown.....	
8 (m)	Highflyer.....	Wm. Hutclinson...	Captured, September 9, by the American frigate, President, off Nantucket.
S.S. (s)	Woolwich.....	Thos. Ball Sullivan	Wrecked, November 6, off Barbuda: crew saved.

ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line .....	...	...	...	...	1	1
„ under the line.....	5	2	11	3	...	21
Total.....	5	2	11	3	1	22

Although the total of this abstract corresponds with the total at the foot of the proper column of the Annual Abstract No. 22, the items do not quite agree; because, by mistake, the Peacock sloop has been inserted in the latter, and the *Dredalus* frigate in No. 23.

No. 8. See p. 254.

A list of French and American frigates captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1813.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun frig.		
40	{ (Z) Trave, F. . . . .	{ Captured October 23, by the British frigate <i>Andromache</i> , latitude 46° north, longitude 7° west.
	{ „ Weser, F. . . . .	
36	{ „ Chesapeake, A. . . .	{ Captured, October 21, by the British sloops <i>Scylla</i> and <i>Royalist</i> , Rippon in company, latitude 47° north, longitude 9° west.
	{ ... Rubis, F. . . . .	
		{ Captured, June 1, by the British frigate <i>Shannon</i> , in Boston Bay.
		{ Wrecked, February 5, off the Isles de Los.

No Dutch or Danish vessel above a sloop, captured, &c. during the year 1813.

No. 8—*continued.*

An abstract of French and American frigates captured, &c. during the year 1813.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the American and French navies.	Total added to the British navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
F.	2	...	1	...	...	3	2
A.	1	...	...	...	...	1	1
Total.....	3	...	1	...	...	4	3

## No. 9. See p. 254.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 86,000 seamen and 31,400 marines for seven, and of 74,000 seamen and 16,000 marines for six lunar months . . . . .	6,516,950	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c. . . . .	3,268,000	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the salaries and contingent expense of the admiralty, navy-pay, navy, and victualling offices and dock-yards; also half-pay and superannuations to officers of the navy and royal marines, their widows, &c. . . . .	1,730,840	12	8
„ the expense of sea-ordnance . . . . .	532,000	0	0
„ the superannuation allowances to commissioners, clerks, &c. . . . .	63,560	13	1
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work . . . . .	2,086,274	0	0
„ the hire of transports . . . . .	2,980,623	13	2
„ the maintenance of prisoners of war in health and sickness, and of sick and wounded seamen . . . . .	1,223,928	12	0
„ the salaries, contingencies, &c. in the transport-office, . . . . .	99,324	9	0
„ the provisions for troops and garrisons for the year 1814, . . . . .	810,569	0	0

Total supplies granted for the sea-service, £19,312,070 19 11

No. 10. See p. 269.

*Letter from Captain Phillimore to Sir William Congreve, Bart.*

H. M. S. Eurotas, Falmouth,  
October 11, 1813.

Dear Sir,

I am afraid you will attribute blame to me for not having written to you about your guns, but the fact is, I have been unwilling to give an opinion, till I had an opportunity of trying them ; and the chasing, in a ship of this sort, looking out from a fleet, is so very frequent, and the attention requisite to a new ship's company occupies a great deal of time ; but I hope you believe I am ready and willing to give any information you may like to write for. On the (my) arrival in the Brest squadron, I invited Commodore Malcolm, and all the captains, to come on board : we tried them eight times, with full allowance of powder, and double-shotted, which they stood remarkably well ; indeed, every one of them went away pleased with the gun.

If well manned I could fight both sides with ease, and I cannot express too strongly how delighted I am with them in a gale of wind ; we had a very heavy gale coming in here, and I had to carry a heavy press of sail off Ushant, the guns did not work in the least, and the ship did not seem to feel the smallest inconvenience from them. A few days before I left the fleet, Commodore Malcolm mentioned (in conversation to me) he should like them on the Queen Charlotte's main and middle decks. I write this in haste, being anxious to send many letters by this post.

Believe me, dear sir,

Yours faithfully,

(Signed)

J. PHILLIMORE.

No. 11. See p. 351.

A list of French and American line-of-battle ships and frigates, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1814.

	<u>Name.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
Gun-ship		
74 {	(M) Brilliant . . . . .	}
	... Régulus . . . . .	
		Captured, April 18, at the surrender of Genoa to the British. Destroyed, April 6, by the French in the Gironde, to prevent capture.

No. 11—continued.

	Name.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.		
40	(Z) Alcène . . . . .	Captured, January 20 and 16, by the British 74 Venerable and 22-gun ship Cyane, off Madeira.
	" Iphigénie . . . . .	
	" Cérés . . . . .	Captured, January 6, by the British frigate Niger and Tagus, off the Cape-de-Verds.
	" Clorinde . . . . .	Captured, March 26, by the British frigates Dryad and Eurotas, lat. 47° 40' north, longitude 9° 30' west.
	" Etoile . . . . .	Captured, March 27, by the British frigate Hebrus, off Cape La Hogue.
	" Sultane . . . . .	Captured March 26, by the British 74 Hannibal, off Cherbourg.
	" Terpsichore . . . . .	Captured, February 3, by the British 56-gun ship Majestic, latitude 36° 41' north, longitude 22° 11' west.
	" Uranie . . . . .	Destroyed, February 3, by the French at Brendici, to prevent capture.
32	(D) Essex, A. . . . .	Captured, March 28, by the British frigate Phœbe and sloop Cherub, off Valparaiso.
26	... Adams, A. . . . .	Destroyed, September 3, by her crew at Castine, in the Ponoiscot, to prevent capture.

An abstract of French and American line-of-battle ships and frigates captured, &c., during the year 1814.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the French and to the American navies.	Total added to the British navy.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.		
Ships of the line, F.	1	1	...	...	...	2	1
Frigates.....	F.	7	1	...	...	8	7
	A.	1	1	...	...	2	1
Total.....	9	3	...	...	...	12	9

In the annual abstract to which this list belongs, there appear to have been eight foreign frigates of the Z class added to the navy. This is a mistake. The Melpomène, one of the number, was not captured until 1815.



## No. 12. See p. 351.

A list of the ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1814.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-p.-sh.	22 (M) <i>Laurestinus</i> .....	Alexander Gordon .....	Wrecked, October 22 (1813), on the Silver Keys, Bahama Islands. crew saved.
	20 (P) <i>Hermes</i> .....	William Henry Percy.....	
Gun-sh.-slp.	{ (R) <i>Anacleon</i> .....	John Davis .....	Foundered, February 28, in the Channel.
18 {	(S) <i>Peacock</i> .....	Richard Coote .....	
Gun.-bg.-slp.	{ (Y) <i>Avon</i> .....	Hon. James Arbuthnot ...	Destroyed, September 1, by sinking, at the close of an action with the American sloop of war <i>Wasp</i> , Channel.
	„ <i>Crane</i> .....	Robert Staudley.....	
	„ <i>Epervier</i> .....	Richard Wales .....	Captured, April 29, by the American sloop-of-war <i>Peacock</i> , off the southern coast of the United States.
18 {	„ <i>Fantome</i> .....	Thomas Sykes .....	
	„ <i>Halcyon</i> .....	John Houlton Marshall...	Wrecked, May 19, on a reef of rocks in Anatto bay, Jamaica: crew saved.
	„ <i>Reindeer</i> .....	William Manners .....	Captured, June 28, by the American sloop of war <i>Wasp</i> , Channel.
	{ (u) <i>Goshawk</i> .....	Hon. William John Napier	
16 {	„ <i>Vautour</i> .....	Peter Lawless.....	Foundered, as is supposed, exact date unknown.
	„ <i>Pictou</i> .....	Edward Stephens .....	Captured, February 14, by the American frigate <i>Constitution</i> .

## No. 12—continued.

	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-cut.			
14	(i) <i>Racer</i> .....	Henry Freem. Young Pogson	Wrecked, October 10, in the gulf of Florida : crew saved.
10	(1) <i>Dart</i> .....	Thomas Allen.....	
	„ <i>Decoy</i> .....	John Pearce .....	Captured, March 22, by what exact force unknown.
	„ <i>Holly</i> .....	Samuel Sharpe Treacher.....	Wrecked, January 29, off St. Sebastian : crew, except the commander and five men, saved.
6	(n) <i>Rapide</i> .....	(name unknown) .....	Wrecked, date unknown on the Saintes.
4	(o) <i>Ballahou</i> ...	Norfolk King.....	Captured, April 29, by the American privateer Perry, off the coast of the United States.
	„ <i>Cuttle</i> .....	(name unknown) .....	Foundered, exact date unknown, on the Halifax station.
	„ <i>Herring</i> .....	John Murray .....	
	„ <i>Landrail</i> ...	Robert Daniel Lancaster ...	Captured, July 12, by the American privateer Syren, Channel,
T.S. (r)	<i>Leopard</i> ...	Edward Crofton .....	Wrecked, June 28, near the island of Anticosti, gulf of St. Lawrence : crew, except a few, saved.

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line.....	...	...	...	...	...	...
„ under the line.....	6	2	8	7	...	23
Total.....	6	2	8	7	...	23

Owing to the extreme inaccuracy of Steel's list of losses (in later years especially), and to the circumstance of the annual abstracts having been printed before the errors could conveniently be rectified, this abstract again differs, as well in its total, as in some of its items, from the annual abstract with which it corresponds in date.

## No. 13. See p. 351.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 55,000 seamen and 15,000 marines for three, and 70,000 seamen and 20,000 marines for ten lunar months . . . . .	4,759,125	0	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c. . . . .	2,386,500	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the salaries and contingent expense of the admiralty, navy-pay, navy, and victualling offices and dock-yards; also half-pay and superannuations to officers of the navy, &c. . . . .	2,278,929	11	11
„ the expense of sea-ordnance . . . . .	388,500	0	0
„ the superannuation allowances to commissioners, clerks, &c. . . . .	67,232	16	0
„ the extraordinaries; including the building and repairing of ships, and other extra work . . . . .	2,116,710	0	0
„ the hire of transports . . . . .	3,309,235	3	0
„ the maintenance of prisoners of war in health and of sickness, and of sick and wounded seamen . . . . .	337,653	16	5
„ the salaries, &c. in the transport-office . . . . .	97,245	2	9
„ superannuations in ditto . . . . .	2,811	12	
„ the provisions for troops and garrisons . . . . .	1,288,757	0	0
„ paying off navy-debt . . . . .	2,000,000	0	0
Total supplies granted for the sea-service . . .	£19,032,700	2	7

## No. 14. See p. 396.

A list of French and American frigates captured, destroyed, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1815.

<u>Name.</u>	<u>How, when, and where lost.</u>
Gun-frig. 40 (U) President, A. . . . .	{ Captured, January 15, by a British squadron, off Long-Island, United States. { Captured, April 30, by the British 74 Rivoli, off Ischia.
44 (Z) Melpomène, F. . . . .	

No. 15. See p. 396.

## RECAPITULATORY ABSTRACT,

Showing the number of French, Dutch, Spanish, Danish, Russian, Turkish, and American ships of the line and frigates, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and accidentally burnt, during the war (including that of Elba), commencing in May 1803, and ending in July 1815; also the number of captured ships added to the British navy during that period.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total lost to the F. Du. S. Da R. & A. navies.	Total added to the British navy.	
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.			
Ships of the line	F.	26	9	1	...	...	36	13
	Du.	...	3	1	...	...	4	
	S.	10	1	...	...	...	11	5
	Da.	18	...	...	...	...	18	15
	R.	1	...	...	...	...	1	
	T.	...	1	...	...	...	1	
Total.....	55	14	2	...	...	71	33	
Frigates.....	F.	55	15	4	...	1	75	46
	Du.	5	1	1	...	...	7	4
	S.	6	1	...	...	...	7	6
	Da.	9	1	...	...	...	10	9
	T.	1	4	...	...	...	5	
	A.	3	1	...	...	...	4	3
Grand total.....	134	37	7	...	1	179	101	

No. 16. See p. 396.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1815.

Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.		
38 (Z) Statira.....	Speelman Swaine.....	{ Wrecked, February 26, on a sunken rock, off the Isle of Cuba: crew saved. Captured, March 20, by the American frigate Constitution, sixty leagues west-southwest of Madeira: Levant recaptured March 11.
20 <sup>p-sh.</sup> (M) Cyane.....	Gordon Thomas Falcon.....	
22 (I) Levant.....	Hon. George Douglas.....	

No. 16—*continued.*

Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-sh.-slp. 18 (S) Sylph.....	George Dickens .....	Wrecked, January 17, on Southampton bar, North America: crew, except six, perished.
16 (T) Cygnet.....	Robert Russel.....	
Gun-brig-slp. 18 (Y) Penguin.....	James Dickinson.....	Wrecked, (date unknown) off the Courantine river: crew saved.
Gun-cut. 14 (i) <i>Dominica</i> .....	Richard Crawford.....	
12 (k) <i>St.-Lawrence</i> ...	Henry Gordon.....	Captured, March 23, by the American sloop Hornet, off Tristan d'Acunha.
10 (l) <i>Elizabeth</i> .....	Jonathan W. Dyer.....	
T. S. (g) Penelope.....	James Galloway.....	Wrecked, August 15, near Bermuda.
		Captured, February 26, by the American privateer-brig Chasseur, off Havana.
		Foundered, October (1814), by upsetting in chase of an American privateer.
		Wrecked, May 1, on the coast of Low Canada: part of crew perished.

## ABSTRACT.

	Lost through the enemy		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line .....	...	...	...	...	...	...
„ under the line .....	4	...	5	1	...	10
Total.....	4	...	5	1	...	10

For the reason that this abstract falls short by two of the corresponding annual abstract (No. 24), see remarks at foot of the abstract at bottom of p. 349.

No. 17. See p. 396.

## RECAPITULATORY ABSTRACT.

Showing the number of British ships and vessels of war captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the war, commencing in May, 1803, and ending in July, 1815.

	Lost through the enemy.		Lost through accident.			Total.
	Capt.	Dest.	Wrecked.	Foundered.	Burnt.	
Ships of the line .....	...	...	8	3	2	13
„ under the line .....	83	7	161	50	3	304
Total.....	83	7	169	53	5	317

## No. 18. See p. 396.

	£	s.	d.
For the pay and maintenance of 24,000 seamen and 9000 marines .....	1,839,337	10	0
„ the wear and tear of ships, &c.....	922,350	0	0
„ the ordinary expenses of the navy, including the sala- ries and contingent expense of the admiralty, navy- pay, navy, and victualling offices and dock-yards ; also half-pay and superannuations to officers of the navy and royal marines, their widows, &c.....	2,689,931	18	3
„ the expense of sea-ordnance .....	150,150	0	0
„ the superannuation allowances to commissioners, clerks, &c.....	72,707	3	4
„ the extraordinaries, including the building and re- pairing of ships and other extra work .....	2,102,563	0	0
„ the hire of transports .....	1,611,041	2	4
„ the maintenance of prisoners of war in health and sickness .....	69,820	0	0
„ the same of sick and wounded seamen.....	112,904	6	7
„ the salaries, contingencies, &c. in the transport-office.	61,303	15	3
„ superannuations in ditto.....	30,80	15	10
„ the provisions for troops and garrisons .....	479,156	0	0
<b>Total supplies granted for the sea-service .....</b>	<b>£10,114,345</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>

## No. 19. See p. 416.

A list of the ships and vessels, late belonging to the British navy, wrecked,  
&c. during the years 1816, 1817, 1818, and 1819.

1816.

New rating.	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig.			
42	(Y) Phœnix.	Charles John Austen.....	} Wrecked, February 20, near Smyrna, during a hurricane : crew saved.
32	(Z) Comus ...	J. John Gordon Bremer, C.B.	
Gun-sh.-slp.			
20	(F) Tay .....	Samuel Roberts, C.B.....	} Wrecked, November 11, off the Alacranes, Gulf of Mexico : crew saved.
Gun-b.-slps			
10	{ (L) Bermuda.	John Pakenham .....	} Wrecked, November 16, on her passage from the Gulf of Mexico : crew saved.
	{ „ Briseis....	George Domett .....	
Gun-cut.			
14	(O) Whiting..	John Jackson .....	} Wrecked, September 21, on Dunbar sand, harbour of Padstow : crew saved.

No. 19—continued.

1817.

New rating.	Name.	Commander.	How, when, and where lost.
Gun-frig. 46 (W)	<i>Alceste</i> .....	Murray Maxwell, C.B.....	Wrecked, February 18, off island of Pulo-Leat, China sea : crew saved.
Gun-bg.-slp. 16 (J)	<i>Julia</i> .....	Jenkin Jones.....	
10 (L)	<i>Jasper</i> .....	Thomas Carew .....	Wrecked, October 2, off Tristan d'Acunha : 55 of crew, including all the officers but captain and two midshipmen, perished.
Gun.-cut. 12 (Q)	<i>Telegraph</i> .....	John Little, C.B.....	
			Wrecked, January 21, on the point of Mount Batten, at the entrance of Catwater, crew of <i>Jasper</i> , except captain, lieutenant, and two seamen, perished : <i>Telegraph</i> had but one man saved.

1818 none.

1819.

Gun.-sh.-brig. 20 (E)	<i>Erne</i> .....	Timothy Scriven, C.B.....	Wrecked, June 1, on one of the Cape de Verds : crew saved.
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No. 20. See p. 416.

	1817.		1818.		1819.		1820.	
	Seamen	13,000	- -	14,000	- -	14,000	- -	15,000
	Marines	6,000	- -	6,000	- -	6,000	- -	8,000
		£ s. d.		£ s. d.		£ s. d.		£ s. d.
Pay and maintenance*...	975,650	0 0	1,134,000	0 0	1,085,500	0 0	1,263,275	0 0
Wear and tear.....	531,050	0 0	569,000	0 0	533,000	0 0	612,950	0 0
Ordinary, &c.....	2,476,150	4 8	2,480,680	17 3	2,483,013	12 7	2,480,566	3 11
Ordinance.....	49,400	0 0	91,000	0 0	91,000	0 0	104,650	0 0
Extraordinaries, &c.....	1,391,645	0 0	1,787,181	0 0	1,631,628	0 0	1,594,480	0 0
Transport-service.....	119,026	16 6	178,948	0 0	284,321	0 0	245,924	0 0
Prisoners of war, and sick and wounded seamen....	142,500	0 0						
Troops and garrison.....	300,000	0 0	320,000	0 0	419,319	0 0	389,300	0 0
Navy debt.....	1,660,000	0 0						
Total.....	7,645,422	1 2	6,847,809	17 3	6,527,781	12 7	6,691,345	3 11

No. 21. See p. 418.

A list of ships belonging to the British navy, building or ordered to be built, and repairing (the latter in italics), with circular sterns, on the 1st of January, 1820.

Gun-ship	Gun-ship	Gun-ship	Gun-frig.
120 (A) { Prince-Regent, Royal-George, St.-George.	60 (Q) { Chichester, Lancaster, Portland, Southampton, Winchester, Worcester.	Gun-frig 48 (V) { Druid, <i>Jason</i> , Madagascar, Manilla, Nemesis, Statira, Tigris	46 (W) { Hamadryad, Hebe, <i>Horatio</i> , Itona, Medusa, Melampus, Mercury, Mermaid, Minerva, Nereus, Pegasus, Penelope, Proserpine, Thalia, Thames, Thisbe, Unicorn, Venus,
110 (C) { London, Princess-Charlotte.			
84 (G) { <i>Asia</i> , Bombay, Formidable, Ganges, Goliath, Monarch, Powerful, Thunderer, Vengeance	46 (W) { <i>Æolus</i> , Amazon, <i>Aurora</i> , Cerberus, Cuce, Clyde, Dardalus, Diana, Fox.	42 (Y) { <i>Agle</i> , <i>Havannah</i> , <i>Owen-Glen-dower</i> .	
80 (H) { <i>Boscawen</i> , Hindustan, Indus.			
78 (I) { <i>Achille</i> , <i>Kent</i> , <i>Revenge</i> .			
74 { (N) ... Carnatic.			
{ (O) { <i>Bombay</i> , <i>Gloucester</i> , <i>Pembroke</i> .			

The orders to build the Bombay and Manilla have recently been countermanded; and the 60-gun ships have been reduced to 52-gun frigates.

No. 22. See p. 418.

A list of ships down to class Q inclusive, belonging to the British navy, built (in italics) or building of teak, on the 1st of January, 1820.

Gun-ship	Gun-frig.	Gun-frig.	Gun-b.-slp.
84 (G) { <i>Asia</i> , Ganges, Hindustan,	48 (V) { <i>Madagascar</i> , <i>Seringapatam</i> , Tigris.	28 (A) { Alligator, Samarang.	
80 (H) { <i>Indus</i> , Carnatic, Cornwallis,	46 (W) { <i>Amphitrite</i> .		
74 { (N) { <i>Haslings</i> , (O) { <i>Malabar</i> , <i>Minden</i> .	42 (Y) { <i>Loris</i> , <i>Salsette</i> .	10 (L) { <i>Chameleon</i> , <i>Sphinx</i> .	

N. B. In the "letters of reference" of Abstract No. 28, an error occurs, in consequence of each of the eleven letters next below T being placed one class too low, and the twelfth letter, F, being left out. In No. 27 they stand right.



## NOTES

to

## ANNUAL ABSTRACTS.

b.

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### NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 20.

<sup>a</sup> The Hogue, commonly called the *La Hogue*; an appellation sanctioned not only by Steel's, but, until very recently, by the admiralty navy-list.

<sup>b</sup> Number of hired vessels about 52.

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### NOTES TO ABSTRACT No 21.

<sup>a</sup> The *North*, built of fir. The remaining four in the "Building" column are the *Liffey* and *Severn*, also of fir, and the *Glasgow* and *Liverpool* of pitch-pine.

<sup>b</sup> Of these 14 frigates, two were ordered to be built of teak, four of oak, and the remainder of red pine.

<sup>c</sup> Of these 12 frigates, two were ordered to be built of oak, three of yellow, and the remainder of red pine.

<sup>d</sup> Late the *Hannibal*, American merchantman; an extraordinary fine ship, mounting 24 guns on a flush deck.

<sup>e</sup> Number of hired vessels about 52.

## NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 22.

<sup>a</sup> The Goliath, Majestic; and Saturn, three of the small-class 74s cut down, fore-and-aft, to the clamps of the quarterdeck and fore-castle.

<sup>b</sup> The Leander and Newcastle, built of pitch-pine.

<sup>c</sup> The Akbar, late Cornwallis; had been a teak-built Indiaman, purchased in 1801.

<sup>d</sup> Ordered to be built of teak; the Seringapatam at Bombay, and the Tigris to be framed there and brought to England by the former.

<sup>f</sup> Number of hired vessels about 47.

## NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 23.

<sup>a</sup> The Nelson; began building at Woolwich in December, 1809, launched July 4, 1814.\* Except that the area of the line of floatation and the depth of hold in the Nelson were greater, her draught was similar to that of the Caledonia.

*Principal dimensions of the Nelson.*

	ft.	in.
Length on the range of the first or lower gun-deck, from the rabbet of the stem to the rabbet of the stern-post	} 205	: 0 $\frac{3}{4}$
Breadth extreme . . . . .		
Depth of hold . . . . .	24	: 0
Burden in tons 2617 $\frac{4}{9}$		
Mainmast, { length . . . . .	123	: 9
{ diameter . . . . .	3	: 5
Main yard, { length . . . . .	109	: 3
{ diameter . . . . .	2	: 2
Bowsprit, { length . . . . .	75	: 1
{ diameter . . . . .	3	: 0 $\frac{7}{8}$

It here appears, that the Nelson's depth of hold is 10 inches greater than the Caledonia's, and that the former's masts and yards, wholly on account of the alteration made in her hull, are considerably larger. The main mast and yard of the San-Josef, a late Spanish three-decker of 2457 tons, were of the same dimensions as those of the Nelson; but the former's bowsprit was two feet 11 inches longer and two inches one-eighth thicker. The mainmast of the Commerce-de-Marscilles, the celebrated French three-decker brought from Toulon in 1793, was only one inch longer, and a quarter of an inch stouter, than the Nelson's; but the former's main yard was as much as eight feet one inch longer, and two inches and a half stouter, than that of the latter.

The Nelson not having yet been at sea, her qualifications as a sailer and sea-boat, although the highest expectations are justly entertained of them, cannot at present be stated.

<sup>b</sup> The hired vessels appear to have been all discharged.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 24.

<sup>a</sup> The Howe and St.-Vincent ; of a similar construction to the Nelson. The first, of 2619 $\frac{3}{4}$  tons, began building at Chatham in June, 1808, and was launched March 28, 1815 ; the second, of 2612 $\frac{9}{4}$  tons, began building at Plymouth in May, 1810, and was launched March 11, 1815. For the principal dimensions of these ships, and some account of their masts and yards, see the preceding page.

<sup>b</sup> One of these was the Isis, first built as a quarterdecked 50, of 1190 tons, draught-measurement, from the reduced lines of the late Danish 80-gun ship Christian VII. ; as were also the Salisbury, the single ship, of 1199 tons, in the first " Built" column of class T in No. 23 Abstract, and the Romney, the single ship, of 1227 tons, in the same column and class of the present abstract. After the Isis had been constructed, it was thought advisable to cut her in two, and add an additional port and space to her length ; and also, to take away her poop, fore-castle, and quarterdeck, or at least as much of the latter as reached from forward to about a beam afore the mizenmast. This made the Isis a flush two-decker, with a short quarterdeck, or large roundhouse, merely intended as a roof to the captain's apartments, and increased her measurement to 1321 tons. The number of guns she was to mount, in her old and in her new state, was the same, 58 ; but the alteration in her construction gave the Isis nearly a double superiority in force, as the following statement will show :

	Quarterdecked.			Flush.		
	Guns.		Pds.	Guns.		Pds.
First deck .....	22	long	24	28	long	24
Second deck .....	24	"	12	2	"	24
Quarterdeck .....	2	"	6	28	carrs.	42
Fore-castle .....	10	carrs.	24			
	<hr/>			<hr/>		
Broadside metal in lbs..	58	560		58	948	
Men and boys.....		350			450	

According to this, the Isis gained two additional ports of a side on her first, and three on her second deck, instead of one on each, as had previously been stated. The fact is, her foremost or bow-port (meant to be vacant) on the first deck was considered to be sufficiently aft to admit a standing gun, and a fresh chase-port was cut through further forward. This gave the ship 14 guns of a side on that deck. With respect to her second deck, the substitution of carronades for long guns caused the ports to be altered, and admitted them to be nearer together ; which at once gave the required number.

The second of the two ships in the " Built" column of this class was the Java, of 1458 tons, constructed from a draught prepared by the surveyors of the navy, and made a trifle shorter and narrower than the Leander and Newcastle, but established with precisely the same force in guns and men.

The principal dimensions of the Java were,

Length of lower deck . . . . .	171	ft.	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	in.
Breadth extreme . . . . .	43		6	
Depth in hold . . . . .	14		3	
Burden in tons 1458.				

## NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 25.

Whatever remarks may have suggested themselves upon the eligibility of this plan of reform in a national point of view, will be found in their proper place in the body of the work. Our present business is with the details of the system, particularly as they affect that arrangement or classification of the ships, which is the groundwork of these abstracts.

How to effect the change from one plan of rating to the other, without disorganizing the particular abstract, into which the new classification, from the date of its commencement, naturally fell, was long a subject of difficulty. At length, I decided to arrange the old and new classes in the manner adopted in the abstract before us, and to remove the ships to their new stations by the pair of converted columns; a method that, if not quite so intelligible as could be wished, possesses the merit of not disturbing, in the slightest degree, the arithmetical connexion of the figures.

Class A is the same in each rating. B receives the San-Josef, and parts with the building ships, London and Princess-Charlotte. C takes the latter, along with the Ocean, and gives up the San-Josef. D merely parts with the building ship Trafalgar. Old E is extinct. Old F, or new E, takes the last-named ship, and parts with the Ocean, and becomes exalted from the second to the first rate. Old G is extinct. Old H, or new F, receives, along with promotion, one ship, the Prince, from the last class but one (old A and new X) of the abstract. Old K divides into new G and H, comprising the whole of the second rate; and old L and M distribute themselves into the first five classes of the third rate, I, K, L, M, and N. Old O is new P; and old P, by transferring its six individuals to the hospital and receiving ship class, becomes extinct. It should here be remarked, that the official register of the new rating, as did that of the old, takes no note of the calibers of the guns, or of the size of the ships: hence, the seven new classes from I to P inclusive, form but three in the admiralty list.

The explanation, just given, of the process of removing the line classes may suffice, without investigating the remaining classes, further than to point out where, by the new arrangement, a class is raised above the heads of any other class or classes. Q, the first new under-line class, is an instance of this, having formerly rated three classes lower. The strict numerical gun-force is here, indeed, a little defective; as the ships of the next, or R class, carrying heavier metal and being, as well as larger, a full third stronger in frame, ought to take precedence of the ships of Q.

The comparison made, in a former note, between the Isis in her intended, and the same ship in her actual state of construction, will best explain, why a flush ship, of any given number of guns, ought to be classed above, and not with, a quarterdecked ship of the same number of guns. Thus, R and S 58s, in the new rating, rank above T 58; that is, they do so in the abstract before us. But, in the official register, where no such distinction is acknowledged, the ships are all huddled together in one class; even although the ships of T are established with a less complement, by 100 men, than those of R or S. It is also worthy of remark, that, as the quarterdecked ships, now that they have the whole of their guns enumerated, rank much higher than formerly; so, except in the case (Q) cited in the last paragraph, and in any other (old and new R for instance) wherein a pair of bow-chasers may have been omitted, the flush ships, mounting no additional guns, undergo no change in their classification. Thus, M and N, from being close neighbours, separate, the one into Z, the other into D, with three classes intervening.

In the old rating there are 50, and in the new but 42, cruising classes. According to the official register, however, there should be but 36 of the latter; the two classes distinguished by caliber (K and M), the two by size (O and P), and the three by decks (S, T, and E), not finding places in it,

while a 34-gun class, of one individual, is added. The reason for excluding the latter from the abstract will appear in a note to class Z, and that for admitting the whole of the former has already been stated. It should be mentioned that, when the new regulation was first adopted, two additional classes, an 82 and a 38, made their appearance in the list, and several of the ships in the other classes were differently arranged. But, shortly afterwards, the 82 was incorporated with the 80, and the 38 with the 42; and the other ships became, with the exceptions hereafter to be noticed, classed as they appear in this abstract.

But, besides the classes arranged under the head of "New Rating," the official list still contained a set of classes of the "Old Rating," such as the 98, the 64, the 50, the 38, the 36, the 32, and some others. The alleged reason for this was, that the ships composing those classes, being laid up for permanent "harbour-service," had no armament belonging to them. If entitled to no armament, why were they designated as 98, 64, 50 gun-ships, &c.? None of the ships in the new rating carry any guns until they are fitted for sea; and yet all alike bear a designation significant, not of their "ordinary," but of their commissioned force. The term is meant as descriptive of a class, composed of non-effective, as well as effective ships: why, then, not include the harbour-service ships among the former; or else, class them together as "harbour-service ships," without any reference to their original rank in the navy?

Having thus, in illustration of this rather complex abstract, entered, at a tolerable length, into the minutiae of the plan upon which the new classification of the British navy is conducted, I shall proceed to point out and explain two or three of the more important of those few cases in which I have been induced, chiefly for consistency sake, to remove ships from one class to another, without the authority of the official list.

<sup>b</sup> Until the new system, the *San-Josef* mounted, on every deck, the same number of guns as the *Ville-de-Paris*. It appears, however, that the former ship is to carry 30, instead of 32, guns upon the third deck. Considering this either as a mistake in the register, or as an alteration not likely to be enforced when the ship is again, if she ever should be, fitted for sea, especially as the *San-Josef* is still allowed her 850 men (50 more than a 110-gun ship's complement), I have classed her as a 112-gun ship. The new plan of substituting Congreve's 24-pounders for the guns on the third deck, by equalizing the calibers in the two ships, renders nugatory the distinction between the classes of old B and C, and occasions the *Ville-de-Paris* and *San-Josef* to approximate more closely than ever in their armament.

<sup>c</sup> The *Impregnable* registers as a 104; and yet the *Trafalgar*, the building ship associated with her, is constructed from the former's draught, somewhat enlarged it is true, but chiefly in breadth, to increase her stability. Of the two 106-gun ships in the official list, the second is the *Royal-Sovereign*, of 2175 tons, a ship armed precisely as the 104s, except in being ordered two additional carronades for her quarterdeck; an alteration, in a three-decker, too insignificant and precarious to warrant the sacrifice of consistency. This consideration has induced me to substitute the *Impregnable* for the *Royal-Sovereign*; and the latter accordingly remains with the 104s.

<sup>d</sup> The probability that the new plan of arming the third decks of three-deckers with Congreve's 24-pounders, instead of long 12 or 18 pounders, will extend to these ships, if any of them should hereafter be required, or be found serviceable enough, to go to sea, is the reason that I have abandoned the former distinction between 18 and 12 pounder ships, and classed them, as in the official list, together.

<sup>e</sup> One of these ships, the *Endymion* officially ranks as a 48. It is true that

she mounts one gun of a side on the main deck less than the other five ships ; but the latter were built from the same draught, and merely differ in being pierced for an additional port on the main deck. See p. 147. As the *Endymion* is old and nearly worn out, and her five class-mates, being built of soft wood, are not likely to survive her, I have chosen to retain the former with them, rather than remove her to a class, of which she would be the only individual. The official list contains a sixth 50-gun frigate, the *Acasta* ; but, as she carries 18-pounders on the main deck, and is much smaller, I have ventured to assign her another place : moreover, she is an old ship, and cannot last many years longer.

f These five ships are the *Acasta*, *Cambrian*, *Lavinia*, *Révolutionnaire*, and *Forte*. The first is the ship referred to in the latter part of the last note ; and the two next ships are officially classed as 48s : the two last-named, therefore, are the only cruisers of this class requiring to have their pretensions discussed. The *Révolutionnaire*, it is believed, usually mounted 18 carronades, besides two long guns, on her quarterdeck and forecastle, making 48 guns in all, and, being of 1148 tons, was well able to carry them ; but she now officially classes as a 46. The *Forte*, measuring 1155 tons, was built, plank for plank, from the draught of the *Révolutionnaire*, and consequently possessed the same capacities. Most unaccountably, however (unless it be considered as a peace-establishment), the *Forte* has been assigned but 14 carronades, and, on that account, though manned with a full complement of a 46, descends to a 44. Considering that a war would instantly restore the *Forte* to her proper rank by the side of her prototype, I have ventured so to place her.

g The *Seringapatam* and *Tigris*, building from the draught of the late French frigate *Présidente*, afterwards named *Picmontaise*. The two former, the first of 1152, the second of 1162 (occasioned by a slight increase in her length from being constructed with a circular stern) tons, are registered as 46s ; and yet, in January 1814, the *Présidente* appears to have mounted, along with her 28 guns upon the main deck, twenty 32-pounder carronades and two nines upon the quarterdeck and forecastle, total 50 guns.

In fact, the *Présidente* could have mounted (she was broken up in 1815) 30 guns on her main deck ; and so can with ease (they being pierced for 32) the two ships building from her. The official register classes as 48s the *Loire* and *Sibylle*. It is true that these ships, obtaining two additional carronades each, did mount 48 guns ; and so did the *Amelia*, *Africaine*, and *Madagascar*. The latter, indeed, mounted 50 guns. There would be an end to all useful classification, if such instances were not considered as accidental exceptions to the general rule.

h Take away the *Naiad* and *Phaëton*, and two foreign-built ships, the *Aleoste* and *Madagascar*, and, between any two of the remaining 34 frigates, no greater difference of size can be found than 39 tons. Nor does that occur in more than one instance. Generally, the ships do not disagree in size beyond 15 tons.

i Of these three ships, the only one officially classed as a 44 is the *Andromache*. The remaining two, the *Pique* and *Unité*, class as 42s. The latter certainly appears not to have mounted more than 42 guns (26 Gover's 24s on the main deck) ; but, being the largest ship of the three, the *Unité* can as well mount 44 guns as the *Andromache* herself, when named the *Princess-Charlotte*, did 46, and the *Pique* the same. Such was the official oversight as to the latter ship's proper classification, that, in the old rating, she ranked only as a 32, from the time of her capture in 1800 until the 9th of April, 1813, when an admiralty-order promoted the *Pique* to a 36, and this without at all augmenting her force, that already exceeding the establishment of her new

class. Were these three ships to be transferred to the class next below them, the average difference in size between the 37 cruisers of the latter and them would be as much as 95 tons. Moreover, the 44 is a class that will soon disappear from the list.

<sup>k</sup> The *Eurydice* and *Ganymede*. The first, of 521 tons, from mounting on her quarterdeck two more 18-pounder carronades than established upon the 32-gun class, officially ranks as a 34. The second ship, of 601 tons, with more reason (though mounting, like all these ships, but 22 guns on the main deck), classed also, for a while, as a 34. Subsequently, the *Ganymede* registered (by mistake, as it would appear) as a 26; and thus the *Eurydice* was left as the only 34-gun ship in the British navy. In point of size, the *Eurydice* is rather exceeded by each of the three ships, with whom she and the *Ganymede* are here associated. Upon the whole, these two ships cannot, with any regard to consistency or practical utility, be classed any where else than where I have ventured to place them.

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#### NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 26.

These six ships, the *Formidable*, *Monarch*, *Powerful*, *Thunderer*, *Vengeance*, and *Ganges* (since built at Bombay, of teak, and with a circular stern), are from the draught of the *Canopus*, late *Franklin*, captured at the battle of the Nile, and are constructing with diagonal frames.

<sup>b</sup> These five ships, the *Chichester*, *Lancaster*, *Portland*, *Southampton*, and *Winchester*, constructed with diagonal frames and circular sterns, agree in dimensions with the *Java*, except in being four inches broader.

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#### NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 27.

<sup>a</sup> An improvement upon the old quarterdecked (R) ship-sloop class, and established with twenty 32-pounder carronades on the main deck, and six 18-pounder carronades with two long sixes upon the quarterdeck and forecastle. One of them, the *Niemen*, was built of Baltic fir; and the single ship of this class, in the "Building" column of No. 26 Abstract, the *Atholl*, was constructing of larch, cut from the estate of the Duke of Atholl.

<sup>b</sup> Surprising, indeed, that the navy-board should continue adding new individuals by dozens at a time (see the preceding abstracts), to this worthless class.

There should have been a reference marked at the two "ordered" ships of class Q. One of them was named the *President*, built from the draught of the American frigate of that name. The other was the *Worcester*, similar to those noticed at the bottom of the preceding page.

## NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 28.

<sup>a</sup> The Royal-George (first named Neptune) and St.-George: the latter building at Plymouth, and the former at Chatham, upon the lines of the Caledonia, without, we believe, the alteration that had been adopted in the case of the Nelson. See p. 512.

<sup>b</sup> The Ocean. This ship was intended to be of the same dimensions as the Dreadnought, Téméraire, and Neptune, that averaged 2121 tons, but her draught was extended so as to make her 2276 tons. However, the plan was not found to answer; and, having failed as a 110, the Ocean is now to try her success as an 80.

<sup>c</sup> (misprinted <sup>b</sup>) The Hastings, built in India of teak, and purchased by the British government. The first instance, we believe, of the kind, except in the smaller classes.



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THE END.

## ERRATA.

### VOL. I.—PART I.

- Page 61, *for sale read sail.*  
 Pages 67 and 83, *for Howe read Hood.*  
 Page 110, *for Tortue captured by Polyphemus in 1796 read 1797.*  
 „ 215, *for Kepple's engagement in 1788 read 1778.*  
 „ 238, *for Villeneuve read Villaret.*  
 „ 248, *for British 17 sail of the line read 14*  
 „ 277, *for Sir Richard King read Sir Richard Onslow.*

### PART II.

- „ 298, *for maid (at bottom) read made.*  
 „ 311, *for frigate (at top) read frigates.*  
 „ 395, *for captured (Amethyst) read wrecked.*

### VOL. II.

- „ 14, *for four—four read fore—fore.*  
 „ 79, *delete four frigates.*  
 „ 89, *for p. 511 read p. 356.*

### PART III.

- „ 109, *for 82 guns read only 54 particularized.*  
 „ 112, *for total 300 line-of-battle read 100*  
 „ 164, *for fourteen 74s read thirteen 74s and one 50.*  
 „ 237, *for press read dress.*  
 „ 248, *for 1797 read 1793.*

### VOL. III.—PART IV.

- „ 56, *for 1779 read 1797.*  
 „ 161, *for property read propriety.*  
 „ 194, *for James read John.*  
 „ 205, *for spread read spared.*  
 „ 221, *for Lieutenant Wright read Captain.*

### PART V.

- Page 243, *for cutting out the Curieux read arming the Diamond-rock.*  
 „ 284, *for William read Charles.*

### VOL. IV.

- „ 79, *for first Lieutenant Edward F. Thomas read Edmund.*

### PART VI.

- „ 111, *for barronade read cannonade.*  
 „ 223, *for between a British 12, read 32*  
 „ 224, *for 21 men and boys read 121.*  
 „ 292, *for six 46 read six 36.*

### VOL. V.—PART VII.

- „ 62, *for the price read prize.*  
 „ 210, *for 1801 read 1809.*  
 „ 222, *for Blon (at top) read Blonde.*  
 „ 223, *for came lose read close.*  
 „ 239, *for wot new 10 read two new 40.*  
 „ 255, *for pos-sion read possession.*

### PART VIII.

- „ 258, (near top) *for Licutenant Hall read Captain.*  
 „ 352, (at bottom) *for see p. 211 read 210.*

### VOL. VI.—PART IX.

- Pages 128 and 137, *for Captain Bainbridge read Commodore.*  
 Page 158, *for Albacore called 16 guns read numbers 26.*  
 „ 178, *for s<sup>e</sup> presently so well read presented, or presently gave.*  
 „ 250, *for Commodore Perry read Captain.*  
 „ 252, *for Commodore Parry read Captain Perry.*

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