



# THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK

May 31–June 1, 1916

*THE DISPATCHES*

OF

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicoe

AND

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY

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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

ON May 31, 1916, the German High Sea Fleet was brought to an engagement off Jutland Bank, on the coast of Denmark. Earlier in the day Admirals von Scheer and Hipper had put out from their bases upon 'an enterprise directed northward', in the language of the German Admiralty.<sup>1</sup> The phrase, if it does not conceal indefinite purpose, certainly connotes an enterprise other than the engagement on May 31, though the semi-official narrative of the battle, published on June 5, announced Admiral von Scheer to have left port 'to engage portions of the British Fleet, which were repeatedly reported recently to be off the south coast of Norway'.<sup>2</sup> Having regard to the patent facts of the naval situation, the statement is merely bombastic, except in so far as the surprise and destruction of a scouting battle-cruiser squadron may have been hoped for.

The 'enterprise directed northward' perhaps contemplated interference with the flow of munitions to Archangel from British ports, and therefore the delaying of the imminent Russian offensive. In fact, the latter began immediately after the veritable issue of the Battle of Jutland, at first confused by Teutonic hysteria, was recognized; though the coincidence may be due rather to the crippling of Germany's naval strength and her consequent inability to give naval support to Hindenburg in the Baltic. It may have been an additional purpose

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 1; published in the English press on June 3.

<sup>2</sup> *The Times*, June 6.

of the adventure to place swift commerce-destroying cruisers on the Atlantic. The fact that Germany recently, under pressure from Washington, reluctantly had abandoned her submarine warfare upon enemy and neutral shipping may have imposed the necessity to devise other means to disturb the tightening blockade, whose severity the *Möwe* incident itself accentuated.

But, on the whole, the 'enterprise directed northward' associates itself most obviously with a Teutonic disposition, which the war has exposed more than once, to obtain a political effect by theatrical means. Obviously, and without reflection upon the bravery of the German High Sea Fleet, a formal engagement with the Grand Fleet was the last thing it desired, except upon terms not likely to be afforded it. It is therefore not an extravagant supposition that the assembling of the Fleet for the first time in full panoply, reinforced by all the resources of German shipyards over a prolonged period of industrial activity and naval quietude, was intended primarily for home applause and encouragement and the impressing of neutrals. The unchallenged sweep of the second of the world's navies from its North Sea ports through the Skager Rack into the mined waters that protect its Baltic base at Kiel would afford an indisputable evidence *urbi et orbi* of Teutonic vigour and vitality, even upon the element of the arch-enemy. A vigorous naval offensive in the Baltic probably was contemplated as the conclusion of the adventure.


But whatever its inspiration, the 'northward enterprise' resulted in the first fleet action fought by the German navy in its brief history (a fact which accounts for Germany's deportment after the event), the first fought by the British navy since Trafalgar. Readers of the dispatches printed in these pages will have no

difficulty in concluding, and decisively, that whatever may have been the object of the High Sea Fleet in leaving port, the condition in which it returned thither was the result of an engagement alien to its original purpose.


The course of the battle, whose periods and events are detailed in the Admirals' dispatches, was first unfolded in outline in an announcement issued by the British Admiralty at 9.50 p.m. on June 4, published in the Press the following day: 'The Grand Fleet came in touch with the German High Sea Fleet at 3.30 on the afternoon of May 31. The leading ships of the two fleets carried on a vigorous fight, in which the battle cruisers, fast battleships,<sup>1</sup> and subsidiary craft all took an active part. The losses were severe on both sides; but when the main body of the British Fleet came into contact with the German High Sea Fleet, a very brief period sufficed to compel the latter, who had been severely punished, to seek refuge in their protected waters.' The terse statement is the epitome of Sir John Jellicoe's dispatch of June 24.

The German interpretation of the battle has not been marked by similar consistency. The German Admiralty's first announcement, on June 1, reported: 'During an enterprise directed northward our High Sea Fleet encountered on May 31 the main part of the English fighting Fleet, which was considerably superior to our own forces. During the afternoon a series of heavy engagements developed between Skagerak and Horn Reef, which were successful for us and which also continued during the whole of the night. . . . The High Sea Fleet returned to our ports during the day.' Apart from assertions of British losses, the announcement made no claim to

<sup>1</sup> i. e. the Fifth Battle Squadron; 4 ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class attached to Beatty's command.







*Note.*—The British Battle-cruisers were led by Vice-Admiral Beatty in *Lion*, the British Battle Fleet by Admiral Jellicoe in *Iron Duke*, the German Battle-cruisers by Admiral Hipper, and the German Battle Fleet by Admiral von Scheer. The chart is diagrammatic only, a general indication of the course of the Battle.



a victorious decision. On June 5, evidently in answer to the British Admiralty's communication published that morning, stating that the High Sea Fleet, heavily punished, had sought shelter in its protected waters, the German Admiralty issued a semi-official message, published in the press of June 6, which alleged that the battle was the issue of the High Sea Fleet's resolution 'to engage portions of the British Fleet, which were repeatedly reported recently to be off the south coast of Norway.' The communication, informed, as is evident from Sir John Jellicoe's dispatch, by full knowledge of the chart and tactics of the engagement, concluded indefinitely: 'The battle against superior British forces lasted until darkness fell.' It alleged, however, very heavy British losses, and conveyed the inference, not definitely stated, that the High Sea Fleet had emerged victorious. A few days later the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* published an inspired semi-official 'explanation' of the 'victory'.<sup>1</sup> By that time the extravagant claims of the German Admiralty, and their patent incongruity with facts, had laid the Wilhelmstrasse's assertions under heavy suspicion. The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* therefore was employed to 'explain' the battle of May 31. For the earlier part of the engagement the semi-official communication of June 5 was followed almost literally. But the conclusion of the battle at length was represented with gratifying clearness. By means of destroyer attacks, the 'explanation' stated, 'the English Main Fleet is driven away to


<sup>1</sup> The article was published in *The Times* of June 28. The date of the Hamburg paper's issue is not stated. Its statements and diagrams have been incorporated into the notes in the following pages. The present writer acknowledges the courteous permission of *The Times* to use its translation of the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* 'explanation'.

the east,<sup>1</sup> whence it will afterwards have taken a north-westerly course homewards.' A chart showing the homeward course of the beaten enemy, and a German arrow issuing triumphant from Wilhelmshaven in his rear, clinched the gratifying fiction.<sup>2</sup>

Such are the two contradictory versions of the battle. It remains to analyse the narrative of the only one of the belligerents who has dared to make public the official dispatches of his Admirals.

The battle exhibits four phases, periods of fighting which Map II, a reproduction of the official chart, illustrates and clarifies.

PHASE I. 3.30 (*Lion*)—4.52 (*Hipper*) p.m. Throughout the eighty-two minutes of this phase the advanced



*Note.*—Both Jellicoe and von Scheer actually were far distant.


squadrons (*Beatty* and *Hipper*) of the two fleets alone were in action, on a SSE. course towards Admiral von Scheer's approaching Battle Fleet and away from Sir John Jellicoe's distant but following Grand Fleet.

PHASE II. 4.52 (*Hipper*)—6 (*Lion* and *Iron Duke*) p.m. Throughout the sixty-eight minutes of this

<sup>1</sup> See the diagram, *infra*, p. 52.    <sup>2</sup> See the diagram, *infra*, p. 57.


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phase Beatty's Cruiser Squadrons and the Fifth Battle Squadron of the *Queen Elizabeth* class were in action with the entire German High Sea Fleet on a NNW. course towards *Sir John Jellicoe's* approaching Fleet.



Note.—Jellicoe actually was distant.

PHASE III. 6.0 (*Lion* and *Iron Duke*)—9.24 (*Lion*) p.m. During the three hours and twenty-four minutes of this phase Jellicoe's battleships, in pursuit of the fleeing



enemy, made the most of the last hours of daylight, low visibility, and misty atmosphere, to bring the German Fleet to action. At 9.24 p.m. the British Fleet was between the Germans and their bases, and disposed

tselF to renew the engagement at daylight on the morrow.

PHASE IV. 9.24 (*Lion*) p.m., May 31—11 a.m., June 1. During the night attacks were conducted by the Flotillas upon portions of the German Fleet. Jellicoe and Beatty remained in the proximity of the battlefield, and near the line of approach to von Scheer's bases, until 11 a.m. the next morning. The Germans, however, already had gained their ports under the cover of darkness.

#### PHASE I

(See Map II : 3.30—4.52 p.m.)

On the early afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, the Grand Fleet, which had left its bases on the previous day 'in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea', was divided into two bodies—the advanced, under Sir David Beatty's command, and the rear or main, under Sir John Jellicoe. The former, scouting ahead of the latter, consisted of two Battle-cruiser Squadrons (1st and 2nd), three Light-cruiser Squadrons (1st, 2nd, and 3rd), units of four Flotillas of Destroyers (1st, 9th, 10th, and 13th), and was supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, which consisted of four fast battleships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class, *Valiant*, *Barham*, *Warspite*, and *Malaya*. The composition of Beatty's force explains its strategic employment. Having more pace than the battleships of the main fleet, it was designed to feel for the enemy's battle-cruiser screen, and to draw it on until, being too far engaged to break off, the main fleet could arrive to deliver the *coup de grâce*.

The main or Battle Fleet itself was accompanied by one Battle-cruiser Squadron (3rd), two Cruiser Squadrons (1st and 2nd), one Light-cruiser Squadron (4th), and three Destroyer Flotillas (4th, 11th, 12th).

The German dispositions were of a similar character ; the advanced body, consisting of battle-cruisers, light-cruisers, and destroyers, under Admiral Hipper, scouting ahead of the main Battle Fleet, under Admiral von Scheer.

In general terms the fleets were approaching one another from their respective bases, the Germans from Wilhelmshaven and Heligoland ; the British from Scottish harbours.

From 3.30 to 6.0 p.m., in other words, throughout the duration of the first two phases of the battle, the British Battle Fleet was not engaged.

From 4.52-6.0 p.m. the Battle-cruiser Fleet, whose units, though swifter, were less heavily armoured than the heavy ships opposed to them, were in action with the whole of the German Fleet that was out.

At 2.20 on the afternoon of May 31 Beatty's Battle-cruiser Fleet was on a northerly course to join the Battle Fleet when the *Galatea*, on the east of the screen of light-cruiser scouts preceding Beatty's advance, reported enemy ships to starboard, off the Danish coast. Beatty altered course immediately towards Horn Reef, with the intention of cutting the enemy from his bases and forcing an engagement. At 3.31 p.m. the enemy was sighted, and proved to be Hipper's five battle-cruisers, supported by light-cruisers and destroyer flotillas. Forming line of battle, Beatty put himself on a course to close with the enemy, then 23,000 yards (13 miles) distant, and action began at 18,500 yards (10½ miles). Hipper, however, properly fulfilling his functions as an advanced

force, declined Beatty's invitation to close, and, turning about, steamed southward towards his main fleet, some 40 miles in the rear.

Fully realizing that Hipper was drawing him towards the enemy's battleships, but hopeful of forcing him into action before von Scheer could support him, and in any event calculating that unless he clung to Hipper the main fleets could not be brought to action at all, Beatty took the risk of encountering the main German Battle Fleet, and set his course also southward.

For more than an hour the two Battle-cruiser fleets steamed SSE, on parallel courses distant from 18,000 yards ( $10\frac{1}{4}$  miles) to 14,500 yards ( $8\frac{1}{4}$  miles).<sup>1</sup> At 4.8 p.m. the heavy ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action at a long range of 20,000 yards ( $11\frac{1}{3}$  miles), while the destroyer flotillas of both fleets engaged. For half an hour the fight between the battle-cruisers was 'very fierce and resolute', though the enemy's fire, at first effective, depreciated considerably in accuracy and rapidity as the engagement proceeded. The visibility, however, was becoming considerably reduced, and the ships were indistinctly seen. At 4.38 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was reported ahead. The British destroyer flotillas were recalled at once, and four minutes later (4.42 p.m.) von Scheer was sighted south-eastward. Beatty's first task was accomplished. He was in contact with the enemy Main Fleet. It was now his function to draw it into touch with his own.

<sup>1</sup> See diagram on p. 27; also the German diagram on p. 28.



## PHASE II

(See Map II, 4.52-6.0 p.m.)

Immediately upon sighting the German Battle Fleet, Beatty 'altered 16 points in succession to starboard', i.e. turned about from the direction of the approaching battleships, 'and proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the [British] Battle Fleet.' A few minutes later (4.52 p.m.) Hipper also went about, and for more than an hour the two fleets retraced their path. But the position was vitally altered. Hipper now was supported by his main body. Beatty, though drawing his adversary towards Jellicoe, was for the moment engaging the whole German High Sea Fleet. The opportunity, possibly, was that which the German 'enterprise northward' had contemplated.<sup>1</sup>

By 5 p.m. Beatty's squadrons were disposed to meet the new situation. In his rear was the Fifth Battle Squadron,<sup>2</sup> a position whence its 15-inch guns could engage the battleships closing the German line. The British Light-cruiser Squadrons and Destroyer Flotillas took station to cover the heavy ships. From 5-6 p.m. the battle continued on a northerly course, the two fleets steaming on parallel lines distant from one another about 14,000 yards (8 miles). Weather conditions were becoming increasingly difficult. The enemy was frequently invisible through mist, while the British ships were silhouetted against the clear western horizon. None the less, and in spite of inferiority of metal, Beatty's superior speed enabled him to control the fight.

At 5.50 p.m., after the action had continued on a northerly course for more than an hour, the approach of Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet was heralded. At that

<sup>1</sup> See diagram, *infra*, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> See diagram, *infra*, p. 34.




hour Rear-Admiral Hood, commanding the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, was sighted ahead on *Lion's* port (western) bow. Six minutes later, at 5.56 p.m., the leading battleships of the Grand Fleet were discerned due north at a distance of five miles. Simultaneously (5.55 p.m.) Jellicoe's First Cruiser Squadron, under Sir Robert Arbuthnot, came into action ahead of the advancing German line. Beatty's second task was fulfilled. The main fleets were in touch. The German 'enterprise', if Beatty's destruction was its purpose, conclusively had failed.

## PHASE III

(See Map II, 6.0-9.24 p.m.)

At 5.50 p.m. the strategic situation reached its crisis. Thousands of tons of shot-belching gun-platforms, after racing up and down the North Sea for two and a half



hours, were now brought together on a common point of action.

Beatty and the German Fleet to the SE. of him were

running on their parallel northerly courses. Ahead of them were the main British Battle Fleet, five miles distant, and Arbuthnot's armoured cruisers on its port bow. Nearer at hand, Hood was approaching Beatty ahead of Jellicoe, 'bringing his Squadron into action in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors.' It was a moment for rapid decision. The enemy, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and facing the immediate onslaught of Jellicoe's heavy ships, was hauling off to eastward with an eye to his mined waters. In the gathering mists and darkness it was possible after all that he might elude an engagement. In this situation Beatty once more showed his 'fine qualities of gallant leadership and correct strategic insight'. Altering his course due east, he threw himself at highest speed across the front of the German van. The effect of the movement was instant and determining. The head of the German line, driven first eastward and then south-westward, was 'crumpled up', leaving the enemy's battleships as targets for the majority of the British battle-cruisers and Fifth Battle Squadron, their outline being temporarily distinct against the western horizon on the new course upon which Beatty had driven them. Still more important was the fact that the new bearing of the British line compelled the enemy to haul off to the open sea, away from his mined waters, if he insisted on avoiding action.

Such was the situation when Sir John Jellicoe came on the scene at 6 p.m. On receipt of Beatty's report (6.14 p.m.) of his position and that of the enemy Battle Fleet, Jellicoe, like Beatty, turned his course eastward and deployed in battle order. Being in the position of a 'chasing' or 'following' fleet, he could not rely on speed to force von Scheer to an engagement before

nightfall. Therefore it was imperative to prevent him from closing action by escape to his own waters. Beatty's force alone was unable to hold von Scheer. Hence Jellicoe's change to an easterly course.<sup>1</sup> His handling of the delicate situation was masterly in its sureness and decision.

From 6.17 to 8.20 p.m. the two Battle Fleets were in action intermittently, as the light allowed, at ranges between 9,000 yards (5 miles) and 12,000 yards (6¾ miles). The British course was consistently hauled round to the west in an effort to close. But Jellicoe's efforts were frustrated by the enemy, who 'constantly turned away and opened [increased] the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt', favoured by the conditions of visibility, which rapidly deteriorated as the evening advanced. In consequence the Battle Fleet lost its initial and favourable position on the bow of the enemy, but remained between him and his bases.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, Beatty's squadrons ahead of Jellicoe were endeavouring to establish contact with the fleeing enemy. At 7.14 p.m. he was again in sight at a range of about 15,000 yards (8½ miles). The sun was then descending below the clouds, and the increased visibility permitted half an hour's effective gun-practice. But the enemy's destroyers at the head of the line 'emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away'. At 7.45 p.m. they were again lost sight of. Once more, after 8 p.m., contact was re-established and further punishment was inflicted before 'the mist came down'. At 9 p.m. the enemy was completely out of sight of Jellicoe. Half an hour later (9.24 p.m.) Beatty

<sup>1</sup> See Map II, 6 p.m. (*Iron Duke*).

<sup>2</sup> See diagram, p. 50.

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also reported that no ships were visible, and concluded that the enemy was well to the north-westward. The Fleet therefore was disposed for the night, manœuvring between the enemy and his bases, with intention to renew the combat at daybreak.

### PHASE IV

(See Map II, 9.24 p.m., May 31–Daylight, June 1).

In spite of baffling atmospheric conditions, the third phase of the battle had made it conclusively a British victory. The earlier loss of the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable*, and more recent losses in Arbuthnot's First Cruiser Squadron,<sup>1</sup> were more than balanced. The head of the enemy's line had been crumpled up, his fire had become ineffective, and his guns' crews, who had fought well in the earlier stages of the battle, had become demoralized. From 8.20 p.m., when the intermittent engagements between the two Battle Fleets came to an end, the German High Sea Fleet was no longer an ordered body, but a scattered mass of units intent upon a *sauve qui peut*. From that hour the British ships never once were in contact with an organized Fleet. The victory was not complete, but it was indisputable and considerable.

Not the least convincing proof of defeat is the fact that the German Admiralty, in the semi-official 'explanation' of the battle published by the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, deliberately falsifies the log of its own fleet from the moment, at 6.15 p.m., when Hipper went

<sup>1</sup> *Defence, Black Prince, Warrior.*

about and Jellicoe's battleships came into action. Ignoring the actual chart of the action thereafter, the 'explanation' presents a diagram<sup>1</sup> which places the German Fleet 'facing the whole of the English Fleet' upon the position where the main fleets first came into action, and dispersing it eastward and northward, instead of, as was the actual fact, *itself being chased south-westward!* The deliberate falsification of the battle chart has the greater significance because to that point the German diagrams tally closely with the chart provided by Sir John Jellicoe and printed here as Map II. The fact that the two charts generally agree to the point at which, for the superior British Battle Fleet, the engagement really began, and become irreconcilable at that precise moment, is a clear guide to the relative credibility of the two versions.

During the night of May 31, while the British heavy ships were not attacked, the Destroyer Flotillas delivered gallant and successful attacks upon scattered units or bodies of the enemy, but not without serious loss, the *Tipperary* and *Ardent*, among other destroyers, being lost at this period. At daylight on June 1 the Grand Fleet was to the south-westward of Horn Reef, and remained in the proximity of the battle-field and near the line of approach to the German ports until eleven o'clock in the morning, 'in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft.' A Zeppelin was sighted early in the morning, and the Fleet's position was known to the enemy.

But as the enemy 'made no sign', the Commander-

<sup>1</sup> See *infra*, p. 52. The chart is for 10 p.m., German summer time, i.e. 8.6 p.m., G. M. T.

in-Chief was 'reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port', a conjecture which was confirmed by subsequent events. Course was thereupon shaped for the distant British bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, June 2. Fuel and ammunition were taken on board, and at 9.30 p.m. the same evening the Fleet was reported once more ready for action.



# THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK

MAY 31—JUNE 1, 1916

## I. ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicOE'S DISPATCH

*Iron Duke,*

24th June, 1916.<sup>1</sup>

SIR,—Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on **31st May**, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.

The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.<sup>2</sup>

In the early afternoon of Wednesday, **31st May**, the 1st and 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons, and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas,<sup>3</sup> supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward

<sup>1</sup> The times throughout are Greenwich mean time.

<sup>2</sup> The German semi-official communication of June 5 alleges: 'The German High Sea forces pushed forward in order to engage portions of the British Fleet, which were repeatedly reported recently to be off the south coast of Norway.'—*The Times*, June 6.

<sup>3</sup> Under the immediate command of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.



of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 3rd Battle-cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light-cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.<sup>1</sup>

The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle-cruisers.<sup>2</sup> This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.

The Battle-cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron<sup>3</sup> under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service.

[*The enemy sighted*]

The following extracts from the report of Sir David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene :—

‘ At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from *Galatea*<sup>4</sup> (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.,

<sup>1</sup> Under the immediate command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.

<sup>2</sup> See Map II, 3.30–4.40 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> Four battleships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class: *Warspite*, *Valiant*, *Barham*, *Malaya*.

<sup>4</sup> Light armoured cruiser, *Arethusa* class, 3,750 tons, 410 ft. long, 29 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

A.D.C.), indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to SSE., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base.<sup>1</sup>

'At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward,<sup>2</sup> and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers.

'After the first report of the enemy, the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle-cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach.<sup>3</sup> They engaged enemy light-cruisers at long range.<sup>4</sup> In the meantime the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron

<sup>1</sup> Vice-Admiral Beatty's Report states that he was 'steering to the northward to rejoin your [Sir John Jellicoe's] Flag' when the enemy's advent was signalled, his light-cruisers being disposed in a screen ahead from E. to W. : the *Galatea* was on the eastern or starboard wing.

<sup>2</sup> The German semi-official communication locates the position at 'some 70 miles off the Skager Rack'. The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt's* semi-official 'explanation' defines it more closely as '70 nautical miles to south-west of the Skager Rak'.—*The Times*, June 28.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. on an eastward course towards the enemy.

<sup>4</sup> 'At 4.35,' [i.e. 2.41 p.m., G. M. T.] says the German semi-official account, 'four small cruisers of the *Calliope* class were sighted by our cruisers. The latter at once pursued the enemy, who ran away with all speed northwards.'

had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle-cruisers by the time we turned to ESE., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light-cruiser Squadrons was excellent, and of great value.

[*Scouting by a seaplane*]

‘ From a report from *Galatea* at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light-cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered *Engadine*<sup>1</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to NNE. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was well under way ; her first reports of the enemy were received in *Engadine* about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light-cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light-cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

<sup>1</sup> Seaplane carrier.


[*Beatty begins the action*]

' At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots, and formed line of battle, the 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle-cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to ESE., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke.<sup>1</sup> The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing NNW., 10,000 yards.<sup>2</sup> The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind SE. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

' At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the south-

<sup>1</sup> i. e. diagonally astern of *Lion*, instead of her being in line ahead of the squadron.

<sup>2</sup> This was the position of the British and German Battle-cruiser Squadrons at 3.30, when both went south on a parallel course:—




## 28 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK

ward, and subsequently the mean direction was SSE., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.<sup>1</sup>

[*The Queen Elizabeths come into action*]

'At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. The

<sup>1</sup> The German semi-official communication in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* offers a diagram of the situation at this point: (1)=Hipper's cruisers, (2)=the British light-cruisers in their alleged northward flight, (3)=Beatty's battle-cruisers:



The plan represents Hipper (1) as *turning to meet* Beatty. Cf. Map II. The semi-official 'explanation' states that on sighting Beatty (3) 'our cruisers take a course towards the new opponent, this becoming a course towards the south', at 5.20 p.m., i.e. 3.26 p.m., G. M. T.

destroyer *Landrail*<sup>1</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart), of 9th Flotilla, who was on our port beam, trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of *Lydiard*<sup>1</sup> (Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith) and *Landrail* undoubtedly preserved the battle-cruisers from closer submarine attack. *Nottingham*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Charles B. Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

[*A Destroyer Engagement*]

'Eight destroyers<sup>3</sup> of the 13th Flotilla, *Nestor* (Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), *Nomad* (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), *Nicator* (Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta), *Narborough* (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), *Pelican* (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie), *Petard* (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson), *Obdurate* (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams), *Nerissa* (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with *Moorsom*<sup>4</sup> (Commander John C. Hodgson), and *Morris*<sup>4</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham), of 10th Flotilla, *Turbulent* (Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), and *Termagant* (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy

<sup>1</sup> Destroyers of the 'L' class, 965 tons, 29 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>2</sup> A light cruiser, *Chatham* type, 5,440 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Particulars of these new vessels are not published.

<sup>4</sup> Displacement 1,000 tons, 4-inch armament.



with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m., simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy Destroyers. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner, and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light-cruiser and fifteen destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle-cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers was rendered less effective, owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.

' *Nestor*, *Nomad*, and *Nicator*, gallantly led by Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of *Nestor*, pressed home their attack on the battle-cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. *Nomad* was badly hit, and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently *Nestor* and *Nicator* altered course to the S.E., and in a short time, the opposing battle-cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships.<sup>1</sup> Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo

<sup>1</sup> i. e. of Admiral von Scheer's approaching Battle Fleet, exposed to view when Hipper's battle-cruisers went about.



attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, *Nestor* was badly hit and swung to starboard, *Nicator* altering course inside her to avoid collision, and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. *Nicator* made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. *Nestor* remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen.<sup>1</sup> *Moorsom* also carried out an attack on the enemy's battle fleet.

' *Petard*, *Nerissa*, *Turbulent*, and *Termagant* also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. *Petard* reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while *Nerissa* states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham and other Officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.

' From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-

<sup>1</sup> *Nestor* eventually sank. *Nomad* also was lost.

eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct.<sup>1</sup>

[*The German Battle Fleet sighted*]

' At 4.38 p.m. *Southampton*<sup>2</sup> (Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted SE. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet.<sup>3</sup> The enemy battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. *Southampton*, with the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within

<sup>1</sup> Of the action between 3.48-4.43 p.m. the German 'explanation' states, 'Our cruisers have advanced to 13 kilometres from the English battle-cruisers and destroyers, which meanwhile have moved southwards, and open fire on southerly to south-easterly courses. In the course of this fight two English battle-cruisers [*Queen Mary, Indefatigable*] and a destroyer were sunk.'


<sup>2</sup> A light cruiser, *Chatham* class, 5,400 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> The German semi-official communication describes the situation at 4.42 p.m.: 'Soon afterwards [after the *Queen Elizabeths* came into sight] the German main force entered the fight. The enemy at once turned to the north, and the five [*sic*] vessels of the *Queen Elizabeth* class followed the English battle-cruisers.' It misrepresents the object of Beatty's movement: 'At the greatest speed the enemy attempted to evade our extremely effective fire by assuming *échelon* formation, trying thereby on an eastern course to overtake our advanced end [of the line]. Our fleet followed at top speed the movements of the enemy. In the course of this phase of the fighting one cruiser of the *Achilles* or *Shannon* class and two destroyers were destroyed.' The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* provides the following diagram of the turning

13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. *Southampton's* reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, in *Barham* (Captain Arthur W. Craig), this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading

movement : (1)=Hipper, (2) = Beatty, (3) = 5th Battle Squadron (*Queen Elizabeths*), (4)=German Battle Fleet :—



ships of the enemy Battle Fleet.<sup>1</sup> *Fearless*<sup>2</sup> (Captain (D) Charles D. Roper), with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. *Champion*<sup>3</sup> (Captain (D) James U. Farie), with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.<sup>4</sup>


‘The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> Evan-Thomas, in Beatty’s rear on the southward course, would meet Beatty and Hipper when the course was changed to the north. He engaged the latter as he passed him on his port bow, and then, altering course 16 points, i. e. putting about, turned up astern of Beatty and engaged the German Battle Fleet on a parallel course to starboard. See note 4, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> Light cruiser, *Boadicea* class, 3,440 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Light cruiser, *Calliope* class, 3,800 tons, 29 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>4</sup> Beatty’s formation was as follows :—



Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by *Princess Royal*<sup>1</sup> (Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O.) and *Tiger*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. *Onslow*<sup>3</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey) and *Moresby*<sup>3</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been detached to assist *Engadine* with the seaplane, rejoined the battle-cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of *Lion*<sup>4</sup> (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.). At 5.10 p.m. *Moresby*, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the sixth ship in the line. *Moresby* then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined *Champion*. In corroboration of this, *Fearless* reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.

‘ At 5.35 p.m. our course was NNE., and the

<sup>1</sup> Battle-cruiser, 26,350 tons, 660 ft. long, 28½ knots, 13.5 inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> Battle-cruiser, 27,000 tons, 660 ft. long, 28½ knots, 13.5 inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Destroyer.

<sup>4</sup> Beatty's Flagship. Same class as *Princess Royal*: see note 1 *supra*.

estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light-cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.<sup>1</sup> Possibly Zeppelins were present also.

[*The Battle Fleet in sight*]

' At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north 5 miles.<sup>2</sup> I thereupon altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the *Koenig* class.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The advanced squadron of the Battle Fleet, under Hood.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. five miles distant to the north.

<sup>3</sup> The semi-official 'explanation' in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* gives the following version of the situation described by Admiral Beatty, with an explanatory diagram :


' The five [*sic*] big ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class have attached themselves to the enemy cruisers. The whole combined German fleet (1) is now steering northwards, and in face of its attack the enemy (2) immediately turns away to the north, and attempts at the highest speed to escape from our extremely effective fire, and at the same time, with an easterly course, and employing its speed, which is superior to that of our fleet as a whole, to pass (3) the head of our line, while the German Battleship Squadron in the rear of the line cannot



[*The Onslow in action*]

' At about 6.5 p.m. *Onslow*, being on the engaged bow of *Lion*, sighted an enemy light-cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. *Onslow* at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. *Onslow* then closed the enemy battle-

yet get into action with the enemy. Our fleet, the cruisers still leading, follows the movement of the enemy at highest speed. An English cruiser of the *Achilles* class and two destroyers are sunk. This period of the battle lasts some two and a half hours.



' Meanwhile, there approaches from the north, presumably coming from Norwegian waters, the English main force, consisting of more than 20 battleships (4).'


The course of the German fleet is purposely drawn to suggest its valiant assault upon an overwhelmingly powerful enemy.



cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed with the light-cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused *Onslow* to stop.

At 7.15 p.m. *Defender*<sup>1</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers, by a shell which damaged her fore-

See Map II. The position at 6 p.m. was as follows, approximately :—



<sup>1</sup> Destroyer of the 'I' class, 762 tons, 27 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

most boiler, closed *Onslow* and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m. 1st June, when *Onslow* was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey, of *Onslow*, and Lieutenant-Commander L. R. Palmer, of *Defender*, for special recognition. *Onslow* was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron as follows :—

“ Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the *Derfflinger*<sup>1</sup> to attack her.”

*Proceedings of Battle Fleet and Third Cruiser  
Squadron*

On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying cruiser and destroyer force, proceeded at full speed on a SE. by S. course to close the Battle-cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the older battleships were

<sup>1</sup> Battle-cruiser, 26,200 tons, 689 ft. long, 26½ knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

severely tested. Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.

[*Hood reinforces Beatty*]

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., which was in advance of the Battle Fleet, was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty.<sup>1</sup> At 5.30 p.m. this squadron observed flashes of gun-fire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the *Chester* (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light-cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy odds, and, although the ship suffered considerably in casualties, her fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m. she rejoined the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle-cruisers, the squadron taking station ahead of the *Lion* at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle-cruiser Fleet. He reports as follows:—

‘ I ordered them to take station ahead, which


<sup>1</sup> Hood eventually took station ahead of Beatty in *Lion*.

was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the ESE. in support of the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the enemy battle-fleet.<sup>1</sup>

By 6.50 p.m. the battle-cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about

<sup>1</sup> Map II elucidates the situation at this point. At 6.10 p.m. Hood's Third Battle-cruiser Squadron sighted Beatty and proclaimed the advent of Jellicoe and the Battle Fleet. Simultaneously the whole German fleet began to go about on a south-westerly course. Beatty, at highest speed, to clear the path for the advancing battle-ships, steamed ahead of the German line, Hood at 6.21 taking station ahead of *Lion* in that operation. From 7 p.m. the two fleets were again on a parallel course, Beatty (leading the new course) and Jellicoe standing between the Germans and their bases.

The position at 7 p.m. was as follows:—



NNW. 3 miles, and I ordered the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority over them. From the report of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle-cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships.<sup>1</sup> The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.

‘ From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third Light-cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy,<sup>2</sup> at 6.25 p.m. attacked with the torpedo. *Falmouth*<sup>3</sup> (Captain John D. Edwards) and *Yarmouth*<sup>4</sup> (Captain Thomas D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo

<sup>1</sup> See paragraph 3 on p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> See diagram, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Light cruiser, 5,250 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>4</sup> Light cruiser, of *Falmouth* class. See preceding note.

hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light-cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. *Indomitable*<sup>1</sup> (Captain Francis W. Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the *Derfflinger*<sup>2</sup> class fell out of the enemy's line.'

[*The Battle Fleet arrives*]

Meanwhile, at 5.45 p.m., the report of guns had become audible to me, and at 5.55 p.m. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam,<sup>3</sup> although in the mist no ships could be distinguished, and the position of the enemy's battle fleet could not be determined. The difference in estimated position by 'reckoning' between *Iron Duke*<sup>4</sup> (Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B.) and *Lion*,<sup>5</sup> which was inevitable under the circumstances, added to the uncertainty of the general situation.

Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.,

<sup>1</sup> Battle-cruiser, 17,250 tons, 530 ft. long, 26 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> Battle-cruiser, 26,200 tons, 689 ft. long, 26½ knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> i. e. over an angle of 90° on the line of course.

<sup>4</sup> Battleship, 25,000 tons, 645 ft. long, 22 knots, 13·5-inch and lesser armament. Admiral Jellicoe's flagship.

<sup>5</sup> Battle-cruiser, 26,350 tons, 660 ft. long, 28½ knots, 13·5-inch and lesser armament. Vice-Admiral Beatty's flagship.



and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O., were seen to be in action, and reports received show that *Defence*,<sup>1</sup> flagship (Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and *Warrior*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Vincent B. Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light-cruiser at this time. She was subsequently observed to sink.

At 6 p.m. *Canterbury*<sup>3</sup> (Captain Percy M. R. Royds), which ship was in company with the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, had engaged enemy light-cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat destroyer *Shark*<sup>4</sup> (Commander Loftus W. Jones), *Acasta*<sup>5</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and *Christopher*<sup>5</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement the *Shark* was sunk.

At 6 p.m. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle-cruisers, were sighted by *Marlborough*<sup>6</sup> bearing before the starboard beam of the battle fleet.

At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-cruiser Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle-cruisers, and at 6.14 p.m. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.

At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle-cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron,

<sup>1</sup> Armoured cruiser, 14,600 tons, 490 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> Armoured cruiser, 13,550 tons, 480ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Light cruiser.

<sup>4</sup> Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>5</sup> Of same class as *Shark*.

<sup>6</sup> Battleship, 25,000 tons, 645 ft. long, 22 knots, 13.5-inch and lesser armament.

great care was necessary to ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.

[*The Battle Fleet deploys*]

I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle-cruisers ahead of the battle-fleet.

The divisions of the battle fleet were led by :

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Vice-Admiral SIR CECIL BURNEY, K.C.B.,  
K.C.M.G.

Vice-Admiral SIR THOMAS JERRAM, K.C.B.

Vice-Admiral SIR DOVETON STURDEE, Bt.,  
K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.

Rear-Admiral ALEXANDER L. DUFF, C.B.

Rear-Admiral ARTHUR C. LEVESON, C.B.

Rear-Admiral ERNEST F. A. GAUNT, C.M.G.

At 6.16 p.m. *Defence* and *Warrior* were observed passing down between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy fire. *Defence* disappeared, and *Warrior* passed to the rear disabled.<sup>1</sup>

It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy's light-cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found

<sup>1</sup> Both were of Arbuthnot's Cruiser Squadron, and were lost.

himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when *Black Prince*<sup>1</sup> (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 p.m.

The First Battle Squadron became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the *Kaiser*<sup>2</sup> class. The other Battle Squadrons, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on battleships of the *Koenig* class.<sup>3</sup>

At 6.6 p.m. the Rear-Admiral Commanding Fifth Battle Squadron, then in company with the battle-cruisers, had sighted the starboard wing-division of the battle-fleet<sup>4</sup> on the port bow of *Barham*,<sup>5</sup> and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the remainder of the battle-fleet, but on realizing the direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle-fleet.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Armoured cruiser, 13,550 tons, 480 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament, of Arbuthnot's Squadron.

<sup>2</sup> Battleship, 24,700 tons, 20½ knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Battleship, 25,800 tons, 20½ knots, 12-inch (? 14-inch) and lesser armament.

<sup>4</sup> See Map II, 6 p.m.

<sup>5</sup> Battleship, 27,500 tons, 25 knots, 15-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>6</sup> On first sighting the Battle Fleet on his port (left) bow, Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas assumed that it would continue its then course, and by altering his own to starboard proposed to place his squadron ahead of it. In fact, the Battle Fleet altered course to eastward (see Map II, 6 p.m.) and compelled Evan-Thomas to fall in astern, so that soon after 7 o'clock Beatty's squadrons were

An accident to *Warspite's*<sup>1</sup> steering gear caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy's line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Edward M. Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen from<sup>2</sup> the rear squadron, but never more than eight to twelve.<sup>3</sup>

The action between the battle-fleets lasted intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from SE. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations of course had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy)

leading Jellicoe and Evan-Thomas on a common course. See diagram, p. 41.

<sup>1</sup> Battleship, *Queen Elizabeth* class. See note 5, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. of the rear squadron of von Scheer's retreating Battle Fleet.

<sup>3</sup> When the British Battle Fleet came into action between 6-7 p.m., Beatty's heading-off movement sent the whole German Fleet about on a SW. course. Scheer's Battle Fleet would be in the rear of the procession, but at such a distance and in such climatic conditions that enabled him to escape a decisive encounter with Jellicoe's big ships, which were endeavouring to close, i. e. join action.

to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.<sup>1</sup>

At 6.55 p.m. *Iron Duke* passed the wreck of *Invincible*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Arthur L. Cay), with *Badger*<sup>3</sup> (Commander C. A. Fremantle) standing by.

During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle-cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line and at least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.

<sup>1</sup> See Map II: Scheer at 8.15, Jellicoe at 8.10 p.m. The German semi-official account purposely says little of the battle from the moment that Scheer headed for home: 'Soon afterwards fresh strong enemy forces appeared from the north, consisting, as was soon established, of more than 20 enemy battleships of the latest construction. As the head of our line temporarily came under fire from both sides [Beatty and Jellicoe] our line was turned round to a westerly course. Simultaneously torpedo-boat flotillas were sent against the enemy. They attacked with great spirit and visible success, three times running into this sector. . . . The battle against superior British forces lasted until darkness fell.' The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt's* diagram and explanation are given *infra*, note 2, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Battle-cruiser, 17,250 tons, 530 ft. long, 26 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Destroyer, class 'I', 799 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

*The Battle-cruisers in the Van.*

Sir David Beatty reports :—

‘ At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was south. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.46 p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the south-westward.

‘ Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to SW. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the *Koenig* class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward,<sup>1</sup> but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was SW., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing NW. by W. Again, after a very short time, the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

‘ At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and


<sup>1</sup> i.e. in the rear of the German fleet on its south-western course.



locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support.<sup>1</sup> We soon located two battle-cruisers and battleships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by *Lion*, and turned away eight points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. *Princess Royal*<sup>2</sup> set fire to a three-funnelled battle-ship. *New Zealand*<sup>3</sup> (Captain John F. E. Green) and *Indomitable*<sup>4</sup> report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and *Falmouth*<sup>5</sup> reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to the westward.

At 8.40 p.m., all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly

<sup>1</sup> The situation at 8.20 p.m. is represented in the following diagram :



<sup>2</sup> Battle-cruiser, 26,350 tons, 660 ft. long, 28½ knots, 13.5-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Battle-cruiser, 18,800 tons, 555 ft. long, 26 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>4</sup> Battle-cruiser, 17,250 tons, 530 ft., 26 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>5</sup> Light cruiser, 5,250 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.

' I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the north-westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. *Minotaur*<sup>1</sup> (Captain Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth) was at this time bearing north 5 miles, and I asked her the position of the leading battle squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing NNE. I kept you informed of my position, course, and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.

' In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Armoured cruiser, 14,600 tons, 490 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.


<sup>2</sup> Beatty's meaning is clear from Map II, *Iron Duke* 9 p.m., *Lion* 9.24 p.m. In a later paragraph, 'Night Dispositions', Jellicoe explains his reasons for the altered course to which Beatty conformed at 9.24 p.m. See *infra*, p. 57.

*Details of Battle-Fleet Action*

As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a 'following' or 'chasing' fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, but only one took effect (on *Marlborough*),<sup>1</sup> and even in this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The enemy's efforts to keep out of effective gun range were aided by the weather conditions, which were ideal for the purpose. Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Battleship, 25,000 tons, 645 ft. long, 22 knots, 13·5 inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* gives the following diagram of the



The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, came into action at 6.17 p.m. with the enemy's Third Battle Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle-cruisers and light-cruisers, which were also engaged. The fire of *Marlborough* (Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This ship commenced at 6.17 p.m. by firing seven salvoes<sup>1</sup> at a ship of the *Kaiser* class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, but reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser and

situation from the arrival of Jellicoe upon the scene. It is in fact wholly fictitious, and is intended to support the assertion that by an inferior German fleet 'the English Main Fleet is driven away to the east [*sic*], whence it will afterwards have taken a north-westerly course homewards.'

'Towards 10 o'clock [i. e. 8.6 p.m. Greenwich mean time] all the German ships (1) are together facing the whole English Fleet. At a distance of some 15 nautical miles the battle now pursues its course eastwards. While the English Cruiser Fleet (2) continues its attempts to catch up the head of our line, Admiral Jellicoe is striving to put himself with his large battleships (3) like the cross of a T in front of the head of our line. As the head of our line thus comes for a time under fire from both sides, Admiral Scheer throws the German line round on to a westerly course, and at the same time our torpedo-boat flotillas (marked with triangles in the sketch) are ordered to attack the enemy, and they do so three times in succession with splendid vigour and visible success. A number of the large English battleships suffer severe damage, and one sinks before our eyes. By these attacks the English Main Fleet is driven away to the east, whence it will afterwards have taken a north-westerly course homewards.'

Comparing the diagram with Map II it will be noticed that the German account deliberately falsifies the chart of the battle after the point marked 6.15 p.m. on its course in Map II.

<sup>1</sup> i. e. broadsides.

at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvos at a ship of the *Koenig* class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.

The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's return fire than the remainder of the battle-fleet, with the exception of the Fifth Battle Squadron. *Colossus*<sup>1</sup> (Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound) was hit, but was not seriously damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.<sup>2</sup>

In the Fourth Battle Squadron—in which squadron my flagship *Iron Duke* was placed—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee leading one of the divisions—the enemy engaged was the squadron consisting of *Koenig* and *Kaiser* class<sup>3</sup> and some of the battle-cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light-cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was effective. *Iron Duke*, having previously fired at a light-cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battleship of the *Koenig* class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo and only ceased when the target

<sup>1</sup> Battleship, 20,000 tons, 510 ft. long, 21 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. shots were falling on both sides of the ship, but not hitting her.

<sup>3</sup> The battleships of the *Koenig* class are, or were, *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Kronprinz*, *Markgraf*; and of the *Kaiser* class, *Friedrich der Grosse*, *Prinzregent Luitpold*, *König Albert*, *Kaiserin*.

ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organization of the flagship, so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.

The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed at enemy battle-cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.

The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the *Kaiser* or *Koenig* classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an enemy battle-cruiser which had dropped back apparently severely damaged.

During the action between the battle fleets the Second Cruiser Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., with the addition of *Duke of Edinburgh*<sup>1</sup> (Captain Henry Blackett) of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the van, and acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle-cruiser fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.

The attached cruisers *Boadicea*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.), *Active*<sup>3</sup> (Captain Percy Withers), *Blanche*<sup>4</sup> (Captain John M. Casement),

<sup>1</sup> Armoured cruiser, 13,550 tons, 480 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> Light cruiser, 3,330 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Light cruiser, 3,440 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>4</sup> Light cruiser, 3,350 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.



and *Bellona*<sup>1</sup> (Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton) carried out their duties as repeating-ships<sup>2</sup> with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.

The Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 p.m., and again at 8.18 p.m., when they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore James R. P. Hawksley, M.V.O., to attack. On each occasion the Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The *Calliope*<sup>3</sup> (Commodore Le Mesurier) was hit several times, but did not sustain serious damage, although I regret to say she had several casualties. The light-cruisers attacked the enemy's battleships with torpedoes at this time, and an explosion on board a ship of the *Kaiser* class was seen at 8.40 p.m.

During these destroyer attacks four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk by the gun-fire of battleships, light-cruisers, and destroyers.

After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy's tactics were of a nature generally to avoid further action, in which they were favoured by the conditions of visibility.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Light cruiser, 3,300 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. repeating signals, clouded by smoke, &c., to ships astern of the flagship.

<sup>3</sup> Light cruiser, 3,800 tons, 29 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.


<sup>4</sup> Compare with this statement the German semi-official 'explanation'

*Night dispositions.*

At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo-boat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night,

quoted in note 2, p. 52. That narrative continues: 'The German Fleet ceases its violent cannonade at 11.30 [9.36 p.m. G.M.T.], as the English had already stopped firing, and after nightfall there was nothing but the flash of their salvos to give us a target. As the enemy cannot be found again the main battle is broken off.'

The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* offers the following simple summary of the engagement!:



- Area of Battle
- Battlefield & Course of Main Action
- Course of German Fleet's Advance.
- Course of British Fleet's Retreat

The eastward bearing of the arrow indicating 'Course of Main Action' will be noticed. See diagram in note 2, p. 52.

with a view to its safety from such attacks, whilst providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases,<sup>1</sup> placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack, and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's heavy ships.

### *Night Attacks by Flotillas.*

During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore Hawksley and Captains Charles J. Wintour and Anselan J. B. Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.

It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla occurred,<sup>2</sup> including that of *Tipperary*,<sup>3</sup> with the gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken, and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.

Two torpedoes were seen to take effect on enemy vessels as the result of the attacks of the Fourth

<sup>1</sup> See diagram, p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> The German semi-official 'explanation' asserts that these losses were inflicted upon vessels detailed by Jellicoe 'to cover the retreat of the English'. It claims liberally 'several' cruisers and 'at least ten destroyers' as sunk.

<sup>3</sup> Destroyer, 1,430 tons.

Flotilla, one being from *Spitfire*<sup>1</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the other from either *Ardent*<sup>2</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), *Ambuscade*<sup>3</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or *Garland*<sup>4</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).

The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which consisted of six large vessels, besides light-cruisers, and comprised vessels of the *Kaiser* class, was taken by surprise. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack, made twenty minutes later by *Mænad*<sup>5</sup> (Commander John P. Champion) on the five vessels still remaining, resulted in the fourth ship in the line being also hit.

The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light-cruisers on reaching the rear of the line, but the *Onslaught*<sup>6</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.) was the only vessel which received any material injuries. In the *Onslaught* Sub-Lieutenant Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and reached her home port.

<sup>1</sup> Destroyer, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>2</sup> Destroyer, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>3</sup> Destroyer, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>4</sup> Destroyer, 964 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>5</sup> Destroyer. Details of construction not published.

<sup>6</sup> Destroyer. Details of construction not published.

During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, *Castor*<sup>1</sup> (Commodore James R. P. Hawksley), leading the flotilla, engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat-destroyer at point-blank range.

Sir David Beatty reports :—

‘The Thirteenth Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, in *Champion*,<sup>2</sup> took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At **0.30** a.m. on Thursday, **1st June**, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to *Petard*<sup>3</sup> and *Turbulent*,<sup>4</sup> switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire, which disabled *Turbulent*. At **3.30** a.m. *Champion* was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. *Moresby*<sup>5</sup> reports four ships of *Deutschland* class sighted at **2.35** a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by *Moresby* and *Obdurate*.<sup>6</sup>

‘*Fearless*<sup>7</sup> and the 1st Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the 31st May. At **6.10** p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, *Fearless* was unable to follow the battle cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the *Kaiser* class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not

<sup>1</sup> Destroyer. Details of construction not published.

<sup>2</sup> Light cruiser, 3,800 tons, 29 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Destroyer. Details not published.

<sup>4</sup> Destroyer, 1,430 tons.

<sup>5</sup> Destroyer. Details not published.

<sup>6</sup> Destroyer. Details not published.

<sup>7</sup> Light cruiser, 3,440 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after.'

There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them.

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light-cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for about 15 minutes at **10.20** p.m. with a squadron comprising one enemy cruiser and four light-cruisers, during which period *Southampton*<sup>1</sup> and *Dublin*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Albert C. Scott) suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. The return fire of the squadron appeared to be very effective.

*Abdiel*,<sup>3</sup> ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out her duties with the success which has always characterized her work.

#### *Proceedings on 1st June.*

At daylight, **1st June**, the battle fleet, being then to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At **2.30** a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag from *Marlborough* to *Revenge*,<sup>4</sup> as the former ship had some difficulty

<sup>1</sup> Light cruiser, 5,400 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> Light cruiser, 5,400 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>3</sup> Details not published.

<sup>4</sup> Battleship, 25,750 (?) tons, 15-inch and lesser armament.



in keeping up the speed of the squadron. *Marlborough* was detached by my direction to a base, successfully driving off an enemy submarine attack en route. The visibility early on **1st June** (three to four miles) was less than on **31st May**, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin until **9 a.m.** The British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battle-field and near the line of approach to German ports until **11 a.m.** on **1st June**, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as at **4 a.m.** the Fleet engaged a Zeppelin for about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British Fleet.

The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the destroyers *Ardent*<sup>1</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), *Fortune*<sup>2</sup> (Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry, and *Tipperary*<sup>3</sup> (Captain (D) Charles J. Wintour), were picked up, and the *Sparrowhawk*<sup>4</sup> (Lieutenant-

<sup>1</sup> Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>2</sup> Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

<sup>3</sup> Destroyer, 1,430 tons.

<sup>4</sup> Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

Commander Sydney Hopkins), which had been in collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, **2nd June**. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for *Warrior*,<sup>1</sup> which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of *Engadine* on her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light-cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.

Sir David Beatty reports in regard to the *Engadine* as follows :—

‘The work of *Engadine* appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed *Warrior* for 75 miles between 8.40 p.m. **31st May**, and 7.15 a.m., **1st June**, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship’s company.’

I fully endorse his remarks.

The Fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 p.m. on **2nd June** was reported ready for further action.

<sup>1</sup> Armoured cruiser, 13,500 tons, 480 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.

*Losses*

The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.

I deeply regret to report the loss of H.M. ships <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The class and displacement of the lost ships are as follows :—

		tons.
1. <i>Queen Mary</i>	Battle-cruiser . . . . .	27,000
2. <i>Indefatigable</i>	„ „ . . . . .	18,750
3. <i>Invincible</i>	„ „ . . . . .	17,250
4. <i>Defence</i>	Armoured cruiser . . . . .	14,600
5. <i>Black Prince</i>	„ „ . . . . .	13,550
6. <i>Warrior</i>	„ „ . . . . .	13,550
7. <i>Tipperary</i>	Destroyer . . . . .	1,430
8. <i>Ardent</i>	„ . . . . .	935
9. <i>Fortune</i>	„ . . . . .	935
10. <i>Shark</i>	„ . . . . .	935
11. <i>Sparrowhawk</i>	„ . . . . .	935
12. <i>Nestor</i>	„ . . . . .	1,000
13. <i>Nomad</i>	„ . . . . .	1,000
14. <i>Turbulent</i>	„ . . . . .	1,430

Total, 113,300

<i>Queen Mary</i>	<i>Defence</i>
<i>Indefatigable</i>	<i>Black Prince</i>
<i>Invincible</i>	<i>Warrior</i>
and of H.M. T.B.D.'s	
<i>Tipperary</i>	<i>Sparrowhawk</i>
<i>Ardent</i>	<i>Nestor</i>
<i>Fortune</i>	<i>Nomad, and</i>
<i>Shark</i>	<i>Turbulent</i>

and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Rear-Admiral Sir Robert ARBUTHNOT, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace HOOD, Captain Charles F. SOWERBY, Captain Cecil I. PROWSE, Captain Arthur L. CAY, Captain Thomas P. BONHAM, Captain Charles J. WINTOUR, and Captain Stanley V. ELLIS, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.

The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light-cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment, under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action.

[*The Personnel of the Fleet*]

The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise.

No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light-cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.

I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.

Details of the work of the various ships during action have now been given. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during action the officers and men of that department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships.

The artisan ratings also carried out much valuable work during and after the action; they could not have done better.

The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle-cruiser Fleet (the units of which were less heavily armoured than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, and the Flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas mentioned, as well as the individual vessels composing them, were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons of the Battle Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all the vessels were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and ability, quick judgement and decisions, and this was conspicuous throughout the day.

I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil BURNEY (Second in Command of the Grand Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas JERRAM, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton STURDEE, Rear-Admiral Hugh EVAN-THOMAS, Rear-Admiral Alexander L. DUFF, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. LEVESON, and Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. GAUNT, commanding squadrons or divisions in the Battle



Fleet. They acted throughout with skill and judgement. Sir Cecil Burney's squadron, owing to its position, was able to see more of the enemy Battle Fleet than the other battle squadrons, and under a leader who has rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear of the Battle Fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.

[*Sir David Beatty*]

SIR DAVID BEATTY once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated the situations at once on sighting first the enemy's lighter forces, then his battle-cruisers, and finally his battle fleet. I can fully sympathize with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manœuvred, and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions,<sup>1</sup> have been of the very greatest value.

Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant

<sup>1</sup> A German attempt, on January 24, 1915, to raid the English coast was punished by Sir David Beatty, with the loss of a battle-cruiser to the enemy. On the preceding August 28, 1914, Beatty brought the Germans to an engagement in the Bight of Heligoland, which cost them at least three cruisers.

support afforded him by Rear-Admiral Hugh EVAN-THOMAS ; the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace HOOD brought his squadron into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C. PAKENHAM and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. BROCK, and the good work performed by the Light-cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan D. W. NAPIER, Commodore William E. GOODENOUGH, and Commodore Edwyn S. ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR. He states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I most fully endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff :—

[*The Staff*]

‘ I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. BENTINCK, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, the Hon. Reginald A. R. PLUNKETT, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy’s discomfiture ; my Secretary, Frank T. SPICKERNELL, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me ; my Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Ralph F. SEYMOUR, who maintained efficient

communications under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire.'

I cannot close this dispatch without recording the brilliant work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles MADDEN, K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of 21 months of war his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgement, his long experience in fleets, special gift for organization, and his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgement never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.

My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel HALSEY, C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also assists me in the working of the Fleet at sea, and to whose good organization is largely due the rapidity with which the Fleet was fuelled and replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance to me during the action.

Commander Charles M. FORBES, my Flag-Commander, and Commander Roger M. BELLAIRS, of my Staff, plotted the movements of the two Fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander the Hon. Matthew R. BEST, M.V.O., of my Staff, acted as observer aloft throughout the

action, and his services were of value. These officers carried out their duties with much efficiency during the action.

The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander Alexander R. W. WOODS, assisted by the other signal officers, and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. The signal departments in all ships deserve great credit for their work. My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert FITZHERBERT, was also of much service to me throughout the action.

The high state of efficiency of the W/T arrangements of the fleet, and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after the action, is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out by Commander Richard L. NICHOLSON. His services have been invaluable throughout the war.

A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all ships.

My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. SHARE, C.B., and Victor H. T. WEEKES, recorded with accuracy salient features of the action. Their records have been of much assistance.

To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. LEGGETT, I am indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout the operations.

In a separate dispatch I propose to bring to the notice of their Lordships the names of officers and men all of whom did not come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of specially distinguishing themselves.

I append the full text of Sir David Beatty's report to me, from which, as will be seen, I have made copious extracts in order to make my narrative continuous and complete.<sup>1</sup>

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. R. JELlicOE, Admiral,  
Commander-in-Chief.

### ENCLOSURE.

#### LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS PUT OUT OF ACTION,

31 MAY—1 JUNE, 1916<sup>2</sup>

#### BATTLESHIPS OR BATTLE-CRUISERS.

2 Battleships, *Dreadnought* type.

1 Battleship, *Deutschland* type.

(Seen to sink.)

<sup>1</sup> The list of ships and commanding officers which took part in the action has been withheld from publication for the present in accordance with practice.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Archibald Hurd writes in the *Daily Telegraph* of July 7, 1916: 'In the first place, it was officially stated by the Admiralty Staff that the High Seas Fleet had lost only "the small cruiser *Wiesbaden*" and "the *Pommern*", afterwards stated to be a pre-*Dreadnought* battleship. The cruiser *Frauenlob* and some destroyers were merely reported as "missing". Then it was admitted that the cruiser *Elbing* had gone, together with the *Frauenlob* and five destroyers. In order to delude the people of the German Empire and others, a positive announcement was made a day or two later that "no German naval units were lost other than those mentioned in the official German *communiqué*". It was at that time determined to brazen the matter out. It was not until a week after the battle that it was revealed

1 Battle-cruiser.

(Sunk—*Lützow*, admitted by Germans.)

1 Battleship, *Dreadnought* type.

1 Battle-cruiser.

(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port.)

#### LIGHT-CRUISERS.

5 Light-cruisers.

(Seen to sink ; one of them had the appearance of being a larger type, and might have been a battleship.)

that the battle-cruiser *Lützow* and the cruiser *Rostock* had also been destroyed, "military reasons" being pleaded in excuse for the policy of concealment. In short, from the first the enemy decided that the world should not know how seriously the High Seas Fleet had been handled and what grievous losses it had suffered.

'According to the Commander-in-Chief, it may be accepted as certain that the enemy lost the following vessels, apart from the *Seydlitz*, which ran on the German coast almost a total wreck :

	<i>Displacement</i> (tons).
2 Battleships <i>Dreadnought</i> type* . . . . .	47,900
1 Battleship <i>Deutschland</i> type . . . . .	13,200
1 Battle-cruiser, <i>Lützow</i> . . . . .	28,000
5 <i>Rostocks</i> (light-cruisers) . . . . .	24,500
6 Torpedo-boat destroyers (800) . . . . .	4,800
1 Submarine . . . . .	800
Total displacement . . . . .	119,200 ' /

\* It is believed that the two *Dreadnought* battleships were—one of the *Koenig* class of 25,400 tons, and the other of the *Helgoland* type of 22,500 tons.

'The list gives only vessels which were seen to sink or whose loss the Germans admit, and, in addition, it is positively affirmed that one battleship of the *Dreadnought* type and one battle-cruiser, together with three more destroyers, were so badly injured that they were probably unable to get back to port.' The *Seydlitz* was a battle-cruiser of 24,610 tons.



TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS.

6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers.

(Seen to sink.)

3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers.

(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port.)

SUBMARINES.

1 Submarine.

(Sunk.)

## II. SIR DAVID BEATTY'S REPORT

*Lion*, 19th June, 1916.

Sir,—I have the honour to report that at **2.37** p.m. on **31st May, 1916**, I was cruising and steering to the northward to join your Flag.

The Light-cruiser Screen was disposed from E. to W.

\* At **2.20** p.m. reports were received from *Galatea* (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.) indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to SSE., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base. At **2.35** p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward, and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at **3.31** p.m. Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers.

\* After the first reports of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle-cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the

\* Paragraphs prefaced by an asterisk \* are incorporated in Admiral Jellicoe's dispatch.

time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light-cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle-cruisers by the time we turned to ESE., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light-cruiser Squadrons was excellent and of great value.

\* From a report from *Galatea* at **2.25** p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light-cruisers, so at **2.45** p.m. I ordered *Engadine* (Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to NNE. This order was carried out very quickly, and by **3.8** p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in *Engadine* about **3.30** p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light-cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light-cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

\* At **3.30** p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed line of battle, the 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle-cruiser Squadron,

with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to ESE., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing NNW., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind SE. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

\* At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was SSE., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.

\* At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. The destroyer *Landrail* (Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart), of the 9th Flotilla, which was on our port beam, trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of *Lydiard* (Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith) and *Landrail* undoubtedly preserved the battle-cruisers from closer submarine attack. *Nottingham* (Captain Charles B. Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

\*Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, *Nestor* (Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), *Nomad* (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), *Nicator*

(Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta), *Narborough* (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), *Pelican* (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie), *Petard* (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson), *Obdurate* (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams), *Nerissa* (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with *Moorsom* (Commander John C. Hodgson) and *Morris* (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham), of 10th Flotilla, *Turbulent* (Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), *Termagant* (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy's destroyers. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light-cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle-cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.

\* *Nestor*, *Nomad*, and *Nicator*, gallantly led by Commander Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, of *Nestor*, pressed home their attack on the battle-cruisers

and fired two torpedoes at them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. *Nomad* was badly hit and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently *Nestor* and *Nicator* altered course to the SE., and in a short time, the opposing battle-cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and, their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo *Nestor* was badly hit and swung to starboard, *Nicator* altering course inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. *Nicator* made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain D, 13th Flotilla. *Nestor* remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. *Moorsom* also carried out an attack on the enemy's Battle Fleet.

\* *Petard*, *Nerissa*, *Turbulent*, and *Termagant* also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. *Petard* reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while *Nerissa* states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander BINGHAM and other Officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.



\* From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct.

\* At 4.38 p.m. *Southampton* (Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted SE. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet. The enemy battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. *Southampton*, with the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. *Southampton's* reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas in *Barham* (Captain Arthur W. Craig) this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

\* At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up

astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet. *Fearless* (Captain (D) Charles O. Roper), with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. *Champion* (Captain (D) James U. Farie), with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

\* The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by *Princess Royal* (Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O.) and *Tiger* (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. *Onslow* (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey), and *Moresby* (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been detached to assist *Engadine* with the seaplane, rejoined the Battle-cruiser Squadrons, and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of *Lion*

(Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.). At 5.10 p.m. *Moresby*, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the sixth ship in the line. *Moresby* then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke and rejoined *Champion*. In corroboration of this *Fearless* reports having seen an enemy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m. and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.

\* At 5.35 p.m. our course was NNE., and the estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received by his light cruisers, which had sighted, and were engaged with, the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron. Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the *Koenig* class.

\* At about 6.5 p.m. *Onslow*, being on the engaged bow of *Lion*, sighted an enemy light-cruiser at a

distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. *Onslow* at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. *Onslow* then closed the enemy battle-cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the commanding officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the light-cruiser previously engaged, and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them, and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused *Onslow* to stop.

\* At 7.15 p.m. *Defender* (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers by a 12-inch shell, which damaged her foremost boiler, closed *Onslow* and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m. 1st June, when *Onslow* was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieut.-Commander J. C. Tovey of *Onslow* and Lieut.-Commander L. R. Palmer of *Defender* for special recognition. *Onslow* was possibly the destroyer

referred to by Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Light-cruiser Squadron as follows :—‘ Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again and made straight for the *Derfflinger* to attack her.’

\* At **6.20** p.m. the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron appeared ahead, steaming South towards the enemy’s van. I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At **6.25** p.m. I altered course to the ESE. in support of the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the Westward of South. At the same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the enemy Battle Fleet.

\* By **6.50** p.m. the battle-cruisers were clear of our leading Battle Squadron, then bearing about NNW. 3 miles from *Lion*, and I ordered the 3rd Battle-cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority



over them. From the reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle-cruisers. Before leaving us the 5th Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.

\* From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. NAPIER, M.V.O., the 3rd Light-cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at **6.25** p.m. attacked with the torpedo. *Falmouth* (Captain John D. Edwards) and *Yarmouth* (Captain Thomas D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy under-water explosion was observed. The 3rd Light-cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. *Indomitable* (Captain Francis W. Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the *Derfflinger* class fell out of the enemy's line.

\* At **7.6** p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was South. Subsequently signals were received up to **8.46** p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the South-



westward. Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to SW. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the *Koenig* class. No doubt more continued the line to the Northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was SW., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing NW. by W. Again, after a very short time, the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

\* At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the Westward and locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to West in support. We soon located two battle-cruisers and battleships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by *Lion*, and turned away 8 points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. *Princess Royal* set fire to a three-funnelled battleship; *New Zealand* (Captain John F. E. Green) and *Indomitable* report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line heeling over and on fire. The

mist which now came down enveloped them, and *Falmouth* reported they were last seen at **8.38** p.m. steaming to the Westward.

\* At **8.40** p.m. all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.

\* I continued on a south-westerly course with my light-cruisers spread until **9.24** p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the North-westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. *Minotaur* (Captain Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth) was at this time bearing North 5 miles, and I asked her the position of the leading Battle Squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing NNE. I kept you informed of my position, course and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.

\* In view of the gathering darkness, and of the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so.

\* The 13th Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, in *Champion*, took station astern

of the Battle Fleet for the night. At **0.30** a.m. on Thursday, **1st June**, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to *Petard* and *Turbulent*, switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire, which disabled *Turbulent*. At **3.30** a.m. *Champion* was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. *Moresby* reports four ships of *Deutschland* class sighted at **2.35** a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by *Moresby* and *Obdurate*.

\* *Fearless* and the 1st Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the **31st May**. At **6.10** p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, *Fearless* was unable to follow the battle-cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the *Kaiser* class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after.

The 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons were almost continuously in touch with the battle-cruisers, one or both squadrons being usually ahead. In this position they were of great value. They very effectively protected the head of our line from torpedo attack by light-cruisers or destroyers, and were prompt in helping to regain touch when the enemy's line was temporarily lost sight of. The 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron was at the rear of our battle line during the night, and at **9** p.m. assisted to repel a destroyer attack on the 5th Battle Squadron.

They were also heavily engaged at **10.20** p.m. with five enemy cruisers or light-cruisers, *Southampton*<sup>1</sup> and *Dublin*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Albert C. Scott) suffering severe casualties during an action lasting about 15 minutes. *Birmingham*<sup>2</sup> (Captain Arthur A. M. Duff), at **11.30** p.m., sighted two or more heavy ships steering South. A report of this was received by me at **11.40** p.m. as steering WSW. They were thought at the time to be battle-cruisers, but it is since considered that they were probably battleships.

\* The work of *Engadine* appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed *Warrior* for 75 miles, between **8.40** p.m. **31st May**, and **7.15** a.m., **1st June**, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship's company.

It is impossible to give a definite statement of the losses inflicted on the enemy. The visibility was for the most part low and fluctuating, and caution forbade me to close the range too much with my inferior force.

A review of all the reports which I have received leads me to conclude that the enemy's losses were considerably greater than those which we had sustained, in spite of their superiority, and included battleships, battle-cruisers, light-cruisers, and destroyers.

<sup>1</sup> Light-cruiser, 5,400 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

<sup>2</sup> Light-cruiser, of same class as *Southampton*.

This is eloquent testimony to the very high standard of gunnery and torpedo efficiency of His Majesty's Ships. The control and drill remained undisturbed throughout, in many cases despite heavy damage to material and personnel. Our superiority over the enemy in this respect was very marked, their efficiency becoming rapidly reduced under punishment, while ours was maintained throughout.

As was to be expected, the behaviour of the ships' companies under the terrible conditions of a modern sea battle was magnificent without exception. The strain on their moral was a severe test of discipline and training. Officers and men were imbued with one thought, the desire to defeat the enemy. The fortitude of the wounded was admirable. A report from the Commanding Officer of *Chester*<sup>1</sup> gives a splendid instance of devotion to duty. Boy (1st class) John Travers CORNWELL, of *Chester*, was mortally wounded early in the action. He nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded all round him. His age was under 16½ years. I regret that he has since died, but I recommend his case for special recognition in justice to his memory, and as an acknowledgment of the high example set by him.

In such a conflict as raged continuously for five hours it was inevitable that we should suffer severe losses. It was necessary to maintain touch with

<sup>1</sup> Light-cruiser, details not published.



greatly superior forces in fluctuating visibility, often very low. We lost *Invincible*, *Indefatigable*, and *Queen Mary*, from which ships there were few survivors.<sup>1</sup> The casualties in other ships were heavy, and I wish to express my deepest regret at the loss of so many gallant comrades, officers, and men. They died gloriously.

Exceptional skill was displayed by the Medical Officers of the Fleet. They performed operations and tended the wounded under conditions of extreme difficulty. In some cases their staff was seriously depleted by casualties, and the inevitable lack of such essentials as adequate light, hot water, &c., in ships damaged by shell fire, tried their skill, resource, and physical endurance to the utmost.

As usual, the Engine Room Departments of all ships displayed the highest qualities of technical skill, discipline, and endurance. High speed is a primary factor in the tactics of the squadrons under my command, and the Engine Room Departments never fail.

\* I have already made mention of the brilliant support afforded me by Rear-Admiral H. EVANTHOMAS, M.V.O., and the 5th Battle Squadron, and of the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral Hon. H. L. A. HOOD, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., brought his squadron into action. I desire to record my great regret at his loss, which is a national misfortune. I would now bring to your notice the able support rendered to me by Rear-Admiral W. C. PAKENHAM,

<sup>1</sup> The three battle-cruisers carried a total complement of 2,500 officers and men.



C.B., and Rear-Admiral O. de B. BROCK, C.B. In the course of my report I have expressed my appreciation of the good work performed by the Light-cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. NAPIER, M.V.O., Commodore W. E. GOODENOUGH, M.V.O., and Commodore E. S. ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR, M.V.O. On every occasion these officers anticipated my wishes, and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I desire also to bring to your notice the skill with which their respective ships were handled by the Commanding Officers. With such Flag Officers, Commodores, and Captains to support me my task was lightened.

The destroyers of the 1st and 13th Flotillas were handled by their respective Commanding Officers with skill, dash, and courage. I desire to record my very great regret at the loss of Captains C. F. SOWERBY (*Indefatigable*), C. I. PROWSE (*Queen Mary*), and A. L. CAY (*Invincible*), all officers of the highest attainments, who can be ill spared at this time of stress.

I wish to endorse the report of the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 5th Battle Squadron as to the ability displayed by the Commanding Officers of his squadron.

\* In conclusion, I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain R. W. BENTINCK, whose good judgement was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, Hon. R. A. R.

PLUNKETT, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture ; my Secretary, F. T. SPICKERNELL, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me ; my Flag-Lieutenant, Commander R. F. SEYMOUR, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances, despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these Officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire.

In accordance with your wishes, I am forwarding in a separate letter a full list of Officers and Men whom I wish to recommend to your notice.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

DAVID BEATTY,  
Vice-Admiral.

The Commander-in-Chief,  
Grand Fleet.

### III. THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY TO THE COMMANDER-IN- CHIEF OF THE GRAND FLEET

ADMIRALTY, July 4, 1916.

Sir,

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet on the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle-cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet.

2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and marines of the Grand Fleet on this, the first Fleet action which has occurred since the outbreak of the war, as a result of which the enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of the 31st May and 1st June gave ample proof of the gallantry and devotion which characterized all who took part in the battle; the ships of every class were handled with skill and determination; their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff; while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally conspicuous.

3. The results of the action prove that the officers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. The expectations of the country were high ; they have been well fulfilled.

4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

W. GRAHAM GREENE.