


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MEMOIRS
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR HENRY HAVELOCK, K.C.B.







H. Adlard sc.

Genl. Gumbel

MEMOIRS

OF

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK. K.C.B.

BY

JOHN CLARK MARSHMAN



Third Edition

LONDON

LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER

1867





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THE esteem in which the character and services of General Havelock continue to be held by his fellow-countrymen has been manifested by the exhaustion of the former editions of his Memoirs, and it has appeared advisable to issue another and a popular edition, with the view of placing them within the reach of a larger number of the public. The compiler has not felt it necessary to yield to the advice of those who consider that the disparaging remarks which have recently been made on his professional and his religious character should be noticed in the next edition of his Life. The simple, unvarnished narrative of his deeds during the appalling difficulties of the Mutiny, and the exposition of his familiar correspondence, will be found to furnish the best vindication of his character. Whatever feelings may have been excited under the idea that his merits have been over-estimated by his country, must be left to the ameliorating influence of public opinion.

JOHN CLARK MARSHMAN.

London, May 1st, 1867.

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MEMOIRS

OF

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK, K.C.B.

CHAPTER I.

Havelock's Lineage and Parentage.—His early Education and Removal to the Charter House.—He prepares for the Bar.—Enters the Army, and embarks for India.—His Religious Exercises during the Voyage.—Is engaged in the first Burmese War, and is deputed to Ava.—Appointed Adjutant of the Depôt at Chinsurah.—Publishes his Campaigns in Ava.—Character of that Work.—His Marriage.—Joins the Baptist Community.—Rejoins his Regiment.—Religious Instruction of his Men.

HENRY HAVELOCK was born at Bishop Wearmouth, a suburb of Sunderland, on the 5th of April, 1795. The family, as may be inferred from the name, was of Danish lineage. One of the oldest lays in England is that of Havelock the Dane, who is supposed to have held sway in the eastern counties before the arrival of Hengist and Horsa. Tradition, however, assigns a more modern origin to the family, and traces it up to Guthrum, the Danish king of East Anglia, who was converted to Christianity in the days of Alfred. The seal of the corporation of Great Grimsby, moreover, exhibits the figure of Grime, the founder, in the centre, and that of a crowned youth in the background, who is designated Haflok, and who was said to have been the lost child of a Norse sea-king, and became a great warrior. But the theatre on which Henry Havelock was called to act during the Indian mutinies required men, and not pedigrees, and

Lineage and
family of
Henry
Havelock.

it is therefore of little moment whether he was descended from Havelock the Dane, or from King Guthrum, or from a Norse sea-king; the admiration of his countrymen is based on his own achievements, not on any of the deeds of his remote ancestors. Havelock's great-grandfather was one of the victims of the South Sea Bubble; his grandfather settled in Sunderland, and engaged largely in the commerce by which the town was rising to importance. He bequeathed a lucrative business to his son, William Havelock, who embarked likewise in shipbuilding, and is still remembered as having constructed the largest vessel, the *Lord Duncan*, which had at the time ever been launched at the port. In August, 1787, he married Jane, the daughter of Mr John Carter, a solicitor of Stockton-on-Tees. Havelock's mother was the great-niece of William Ettrick, Esq., of High Barnes, Bishop Wearmouth, a gentleman of ancient descent, who married a daughter of Richard Wharton, Esq., member for Durham. Mr William Havelock's two elder sons, William and Henry, the subject of this memoir, were born at Ford Hall, Bishop Wearmouth. Having amassed a considerable fortune, he migrated to the south, and purchased Ingress Park, near Dartford, where two other children, Thomas and Charles, were born. All the sons embraced the profession of arms.

After the removal of the family to Ingress Park, Henry Havelock and his elder brother were placed under the tuition of the Rev. J. Bradley, the curate of Swanscombe, and one of Havelock's earliest recollections was the pride he felt in riding on his pony to school. The notices which have been preserved of him at this early period are scanty, but they are not without interest as exhibiting the germ of those qualities, by which his character was subsequently distinguished. On one occasion, he had climbed up a tree to obtain a bird's nest, when the branch broke, and he was thrown violently to the ground. "Were you not frightened?" said his father, on meeting him immediately after. "No," replied he, "I had too much to think of to feel terrified."

Havelock at school. Early development of his character.

I was thinking of the bird's nest I had lost." His master one day observed that he had a black eye, and insisted on knowing the cause of it. He had, in fact, interfered to defend a younger boy from the tyranny of a bully, and had received a severe blow for his pains. But he maintained an imperturbable silence, and rather chose to submit to a severe castigation than inculcate a schoolfellow by confessing the truth. He remained at Mr Bradley's seminary five years, during which period he read the newspapers of the day with avidity, and manifested a very strong interest in the records of Napoleon's movements and successes; and there can be little doubt that the enthusiasm thus early imbibed contributed in no small degree to those military propensities which he subsequently exhibited. To his excellent mother he was indebted for those early religious impressions which are so often found to triumph over the assaults of scepticism on the inquiring mind of youth, and to exercise a permanent and salutary influence on the character of the man. She was accustomed to assemble her children for the reading of the Scriptures. Havelock took his share in these devotional exercises, and the truths of the Bible, thus imprinted on his memory with his earliest and dearest associations, continued to be his support and solace through life.

Before the age of ten, Havelock was sent with his brother William to the Charter House, and placed in the boarding house of Dr Raine, the head master. Dr Raine is described as "a man to be praised as often as he is named, and who was only permitted to die unmitred, because his political principles were too liberal to suit the taste of the reigning faction of the day." Havelock continued there for seven years, and he never recurred to this period of his life without a feeling of delight and gratitude. He regarded the tuition and associations of the Charter House as having contributed essentially to the formation of his character as a man. He never admitted that the severity of its discipline, or even the hardships of fagging, which were severely imposed on him, furnished any argument against the system of public

Havelock removed to the Charter House.

schools. Indeed, he was often inclined to trace his propensity to strict discipline in the army to his Carthusian experience of its benefits. At the Charter House Havelock exhibited all that power of application which characterized him through life. He never allowed himself any relaxation while anything remained to be done. He became an accomplished, though by no means a profound, Latin and Greek scholar; and not only appreciated the beauties of the classic authors, but to a considerable degree imbibed the spirit of their writings. To this early familiarity with the matchless models of antiquity, is to be traced the purity and vigour which marked, not only his more elaborate compositions, but his familiar correspondence. The early religious impressions which he had received under the tuition of his mother, were revived and deepened at the Charter House. In a memorandum which he drew up many years after, he remarked that the "most important part of the history of any man is his connection, through faith, with the invisible world." So, of Henry Havelock, it may be recorded that there were early indications of the stirring of the good Spirit of God within his soul, though Satan and the world were permitted for many years to triumph. Four of his companions united with him in seeking the seclusion of one of the sleeping rooms for exercises of devotion, though certain in those days of being branded, if detected, with the epithet of methodist and canting hypocrites." But such was the native resolution of his character, that no strength of opposition, or keenness of ridicule, would have induced him for a moment to forego these meetings. From his earliest years the performance of what he considered "duty," was the moving principle of action, and he would no more have flinched from it in the cloisters of the Charter House, than he subsequently did amidst the severest shower of bullets. His sober and contemplative disposition procured him among his companions the *sobriquet* of "Philosopher," abbreviated into "Phlos," the name by which he was known in the school.

At Christmas, 1809, Havelock went home, as usual, for the holidays, and found his mother in very indifferent health. This was a cause of great anxiety to his affectionate disposition, and of disappointment to both, as he had been accustomed, on such occasions, to pass the evening with her and the family in reading aloud to a late hour. On the 6th of January, 1811, her health was so far restored as to enable her to join in the amusements of Twelfth-night with her assembled family. On the following morning, however, after breakfast, while Havelock was reading the Scriptures to her, in company with his sister Jane, she suddenly exclaimed, "I am very ill," and fell from her chair in a fit of apoplexy. After raising her up and ringing for assistance, he continued to watch over her for several hours before medical attendance could be procured. She rallied for the time, but, though her reason was not impaired, her speech became almost unintelligible, except to his quick and anxious ear. He tended her with the greatest affection, and she seemed happy only when he was by her side. Early in February the time arrived for him to return to the Charter House, and their farewell was melancholy in the extreme, for, though he buoyed himself up with the hope of seeing her again, she felt, and expressed the conviction, that it was their last meeting. She appeared to lose all cheerfulness after he was gone; silent sadness took possession of her mind, and on the 26th of the month she sunk into the grave. He was summoned back from school, without being informed of the death of the mother he so tenderly loved, and he came home unconscious of the event, rushed into the chamber, and asked the nurse if he might see her. She withdrew the curtain, and he bent over her, supposing that she was only asleep. He kissed her cold lips, and then only discovered that she was no more. His affliction was more intense than that of his brothers or sisters, and the shock which he received he did not recover for years.

Havelock returned to the Charter House, and endea-

voured to forget his grief in a more intense application to his studies. In April he was the fourth in the fifth form; "of which," as he remarked, "Walpole, a grandson of Sir Robert, was first; Hare second; John Pindar third; and Havelock fourth. It consisted of some thirty boys, and lower down in it were Connop Thirlwall, and Hinds." In 1811, Havelock passed, in due course, into the sixth form. In August of that year Dr Raine died; and so strong was Havelock's esteem for him as a scholar, and his affection for him as a man, that the place seemed to have lost its chief attraction. He was succeeded by Dr Russell, who introduced many changes into the rules of the school, tending to subvert the system to which, in Havelock's estimation, the Charter House was indebted for the high character it had attained. He, therefore, persuaded his father to remove him; and at the close of 1811 took leave of the school, with a mind richly stored with secular knowledge, a heart imbued with Divine truth, and a spirit of the strongest resolution. Of his contemporaries many have since risen to great eminence in Church and State, and it was a source of no small delight to Havelock, in future years, to watch the growing celebrity of the associates of his happy Carthusian school-days. In 1850, he drew up a memorandum of his own career for his friend Sir William Norris, in which he thus adverts to his companions at the Charter House forty years before:—

"My most intimate friends were Samuel Hinds, William Norris, and Julius Charles Hare. Hinds, a man of taste and a poet, spent his early years in travelling, married in France, distinguished himself in one of the colonial assemblies of his native island, Barbadoes, at the period of slave emancipation, and died at Bath about 1847. Norris, now Sir William Norris, was called to the bar, appointed successively advocate-fiscal, or queen's advocate, puisne judge, and chief justice of Ceylon, and subsequently recorder of Penang. Hare went to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1812, graduated B.A. in 1815, and subsequently as M.A., and became a fellow and tutor of Trinity. He is well known to the literary and religious world, by his joint translation with Connop

Thirlwall of part of the Roman History of Niebuhr, by some volumes of sermons, and several polemical pamphlets. Nearly contemporary with me and the boys just named were Connop Thirlwall, now Bishop of St David's; George Waddington, Dean of Durham, distinguished as a scholar and a man of letters; George Grote, the historian of Greece; Archdeacon Hale, now Master of the Charter House; Alderman Thompson, member for Northumberland; Sir William Macnaghten, the talented but unfortunate envoy at Cabul; the Right Hon. Fox Maule, now secretary-at-war; Eastlake, the painter; and Yates, the actor."

Havelock's mother had always designed him for the profession of the law. So strong was her confidence in his abilities, that she always affirmed that he would rise to the head of the profession, and often remarked, "My Henry will one day sit on the woolsack." On leaving the Charter House, he retired to Ingress Park, where he remained till the summer of 1812, giving his time to the study of the classics and the acquisition of general knowledge. His father's fortunes had been for some time on the decline. Rejecting the remonstrances of his friends, he continued to embark in speculations he was unable to manage, and was at length reduced to such a state of embarrassment, as to be under the necessity of parting with Ingress Park, which was purchased by Government for £50,000. The family removed to Clifton, and it became necessary for Havelock, now in his eighteenth year, to make choice of a profession. Whenever the subject was introduced by his father, he invariably evinced his determination to follow the oft-expressed wishes of his mother, and go to the bar. At the beginning of 1813, he was accordingly entered of the Middle Temple, and became a pupil of Chitty, the most eminent special pleader of the day. The companion of his studies was Mr, afterwards Sir Thomas, Talfourd, the author of "Ion." A congeniality of tastes led to a very intimate friendship, and they were accustomed to ramble together for hours, after the labours of the day were completed, and their conversation turned much oftener on the beauties of poetry than on the pleas of the court. It was

Havelock
prepares
himself for
the bar.

from Talfourd that Havelock imbibed that love of the Lake school, which he never lost. After having pursued his legal studies for more than a twelvemonth, his father, owing to an unhappy misunderstanding with his son, withdrew his support, and Havelock was obliged to relinquish the pursuit of the law. The loss of occupation affected his health, and he was obliged to leave London for Brighton; but the change proved of little benefit, and he returned to his family at Clifton, without any settled plan of life.

Havelock had been induced to make choice of the law, in obedience to his mother's wishes; he was now obliged to relinquish the study of it through his father's displeasure, and he had a profession to choose. His earliest predilections had been for a military life, and they were now revived and confirmed by the conversation of his brother William, of the 43rd, fresh from the field of Waterloo. William had joined the British army in Spain in time for the gallant but fruitless action which General Craufurd fought on the banks of the Coa, had accompanied his regiment in the memorable retreat to the lines of Torres Vedras, and was in the hottest of the fight at Busaco and Salamanca. At the battle of Waterloo he was aide-de-camp to Baron Charles Alten, who had succeeded to the command of the light division in Spain on the death of General Craufurd. In gratitude for the services rendered to the Baron on the field of Waterloo, where he was severely wounded, he offered to use his influence in favour of his young friend, in any way he might point out. William Havelock, finding on his return to England that his father continued to reject every overture for enabling his brother Henry to resume his studies at the Middle Temple, advised him to choose the army for his profession; and having nothing to ask for himself of the Baron, proposed to solicit his influence to procure him a commission. The offer was gladly accepted; the Baron obtained the commission; and Henry Havelock, at the age of twenty, became a soldier. In the course of the year 1815, he was appointed second lieutenant in the

Havelock
enters the
army.

95th, or Rifle Brigade, and was some time after attached to the company of Captain Harry Smith, also one of the heroes of the Peninsula and of Waterloo, and subsequently the conqueror at Aliwal, on the banks of the Sutlege. His education in the practical duties of a soldier was pursued under the tuition of Captain Smith, whom in his subsequent correspondence he designated his "guide, philosopher, and friend," and to whom he always felt the strongest attachment and gratitude.

Having thus embraced the profession of arms, Havelock determined to master the principles of the military art. While others were enjoying the lazy leisure of the barrack, he was diligently employed in the study of Vauban, and Lloyd, and Templehoff, and Jomini. He read every military memoir within his reach. He examined the details of the most memorable battles and sieges, and the position and movements of the contending forces. He endeavoured in every case to ascertain the cause of failure or of success, and was not satisfied till he had discovered what he deemed the turning point in every engagement. After his arrival in India, he often entertained his friends at Serampore by fighting over again, when the cloth was removed, the most memorable battles of Marlborough and Wellington, of Frederic the Second and Napoleon, calling up from his tenacious memory the strength and disposition of the different divisions, and tracing their evolutions on the table, till he came to the critical moment when the fortune of the day was decided by some masterly movement. It was during this period of compulsory inactivity that he accumulated that fund of professional knowledge which contributed so largely to the success of his military operations in India. He likewise continued to cultivate the classics, reading them not only as a matter of taste and enjoyment, but also with a view to make himself master of the military strategy of the ancients. He became perfectly familiar with the history of every British regiment, and was enabled to refer from his own recollections to the date and the scene of their respective achievements. In the memorandum of

Havelock's
military pur-
suits for eight
years.

his career to which allusion has been made, he remarks with his usual modesty, "He now acquired some knowledge of his profession, which was useful to him in after days;" but the fact is, that few officers had ever become so thoroughly proficient in their profession as Havelock in the period between his entering the army and embarking for India. During the eight years of his military life in England, he was stationed sometimes in Ireland and occasionally in Scotland, and appears to have been present at what he facetiously termed the battle of Glasgow Green, in the suppression of a riot, in 1820. In the year 1821, he made a pedestrian tour through France, Italy, and part of Germany.

Havelock's elder brother William had proceeded to Bombay with his regiment, the 4th Dragoons, in 1821. His younger brother Charles, having obtained a cornetcy in the 16th Lancers, had also gone to the Bengal Presidency in 1822. Seeing no prospect of active service in Europe, he determined to follow their example, and seek employment in the ever busy scenes in India. After having exchanged on half pay to the 21st Regiment, he obtained a lieutenancy in the 13th Light Infantry, which had been ordered to Calcutta. To qualify himself for service in India, he went up to London and attended the lectures of Dr John Gilchrist, formerly professor of Hindostanee in the college of Fort William, Calcutta, and in 1822 the ablest and most popular oriental lecturer in England. Havelock applied with his accustomed assiduity to the study of Persian and Hindostanee, and was pronounced by the learned orientalist to be entitled to the "mark of a full moonshee." The 13th, which was now to receive into its ranks the soldier whose name will long continue to be associated with its renown, had been distinguished by its services in Egypt. It was at this time commanded by Major Robert Sale, afterwards Sir Robert Sale, the hero of Jellalabad; and immediately under him was the gallant and daring Dennie. Havelock was in his twenty-eighth year, and at the bottom of the lieutenants, when he embarked for India in the *General*

Havelock em-
barks for
India.

Kyd, in January, 1823. He was diminutive in stature, but well-built, with a noble expanse of forehead, an eagle eye, a countenance remarkably comely, which, moreover, exhibited that union of intellect and energy which never fails to command deference.

The religious impressions induced by his mother's early instructions, and deepened in the Charter House cloister, in which he and his piously-disposed schoolmates assembled for devotional exercises, had been weakened during eight years of military life in England. The influence of the new associations into which he was thrown had tended to deaden his spiritual feelings, and religion had lost much of its power on his mind and his spirits. He never yielded to the temptations which surrounded him. He was not only strictly moral in his conduct; but eminently pure in his principles. He was too high-minded to give countenance to those who scoffed at religion and ridiculed its consistent professors; but his religion, bereft of vitality, became a formal routine of duty, from which the warmth of holy affection was entirely absent. At one time he appears to have been led by the recklessness of speculation to the verge of Unitarianism, and began to admit doubts of the Divinity of the Saviour. But he was not satisfied with himself: he felt a longing for some substantial foundation on which to rest his religious views and hopes—some solid principles to regulate his conduct and to animate his soul; and it was during the voyage to India that he happily found the object of his search. Through the instrumentality of a fellow-passenger, he was drawn to a more earnest perusal of the Holy Scriptures, and led to an exclusive and quickening reliance on the merits of the Atonement. This happy change, which brought his soul under the omnipotent influence of Divine truth and love, and diffused joy and peace through his mind, is thus described by himself:—"It was while the writer was sailing across the wide Atlantic towards Bengal, that the Spirit of God came to him with its offer of peace and mandate of love, which, though for some time resisted, at

His religious
views during
the voyage.
Lieut. Gard-
ner.

length prevailed. Then was wrought that great change in his soul which has been productive of unspeakable advantage to him in time, and he trusts has secured him happiness in eternity. The *General Kyd*, in which he was embarked, conveyed to India Major Sale, destined thereafter to defend Jellalabad: but she also carried out a humble, unpretending man, James Gardner, then a Lieutenant in the 13th Foot, now a retired Captain, engaged in home missionary work, and other objects of Christian benevolence, at Bath. This excellent friend was most influential in leading Havelock to make public avowal, by his works, of Christianity in earnest."

Lieutenant—now Colonel—Gardner, on discovering the state of Havelock's mind, entered into religious conversation with him, and endeavoured to lead his thoughts and inquiries into a right channel. Havelock borrowed, in the first instance, the *Life of Henry Martyn*, and read it with great interest. He then perused Scott's "Force of Truth," diligently comparing the extracts given from the Scriptures with the context. Thus did Lieutenant Gardner become his evangelical instructor, resolving his doubts as they arose, and leading him gradually to embrace Christian truth in all its breadth, with simplicity and affection. Before the voyage terminated Havelock had added to the qualities of the man and the soldier the noble spirit of the Christian; and thus was he accoutred for that career of usefulness and eminence which has endeared him to his fellow-countrymen. Vital religion became the animating principle of all his actions, and a paramount feeling of his duty to God rectified and invigorated the sense of his duty towards man.

During the voyage Havelock was not idle. Lieutenant Gardner and several other officers, discovering that he had cultivated Hindostanee under so eminent a master as Dr Gilchrist, solicited him to aid them in the study of that language. He acceded to their request, and consented to allot a portion of each day, Sundays excepted, to the lecture, but only on condition that he should be formally recognized as the head

Havelock gives instruction in Hindostanee during the voyage.

of the class, and that they should manifest the earnestness of their purpose by punctual attendance, and yield implicit obedience to his authority as professor. "No master," remarks Lieutenant Gardner, "could have been more formally installed in his office, and no professor could have exercised his authority more decidedly. This continued without interruption to the close of the voyage, when we presented him with a scarce and valuable Hindostanee dictionary, in several volumes, with an appropriate acknowledgment of his much-valued services, which he duly acknowledged in terms suited to his dignity as professor." This incident, trifling in itself, is interesting as an index of the character which he subsequently exhibited when invested with higher responsibilities—an amiability of disposition, a rigid punctuality, and a determination to enforce discipline. During the voyage it was remarked that though he was anxious to contribute to the general cheerfulness of the party, he sought no intimacy except where he could receive or impart benefit.

The *General Kyd* reached Calcutta in May, 1823. The barracks in Fort William were at the time so crowded that it was found necessary to allot a single bed-chamber and sitting-room to two subalterns, the senior having the selection of his companion. Havelock arrives in Calcutta. His associations. Havelock was annoyed at an arrangement which threatened to inflict an unwelcome associate on him, and to interfere with his course of study and devotion. To avoid this inconvenience, he requested Lieut. Gardner to become the joint occupant of the rooms. They continued thus associated for some weeks, enjoying the delightful intercourse of kindred minds. Havelock's mode of stating his opinions was always ardent, and sometimes peremptory. From the innate ascendancy of talent, he seemed, with all his kindness of disposition, to claim a natural superiority over others; and it required great tact and prudence to guide his mind in the pursuit of divine truth. In his companion, Lieut. Gardner, great judgment and a large Christian experience were happily blended with the highest respect for the character of his friend. Owing to

this happy combination of qualities, their intercourse was of essential benefit to Havelock, who, on taking leave of him when he was furnished with a separate suite of apartments, said, "Give me your hand; I owe you more than I owe to any man living." In Calcutta, Havelock became a regular attendant at the Mission church, under the ministry of the Rev. Thomas Thomason, and cultivated the acquaintance of the venerated Dr Corrie, then Archdeacon of Calcutta, and subsequently Bishop of Madras. He also had the happiness of enjoying the ministry of Bishop Heber, who was in the habit of preaching in a large barrack-room in the fort, before the establishment of a separate church and chaplain. Havelock likewise visited the missionaries at Serampore, and took a special interest in their pious and energetic labours. He was thus associated from the period of his arrival in India with the most eminent members of the religious community, and took a decided position as the bold and unflinching champion of Christian truth. There were some who did not hesitate to jeer him as a religious enthusiast, but he stood so high in public estimation, for his sterling attainments, and his strength of character, that contempt for the methodist was lost in admiration of the soldier. Having experienced the blessings of religion on his own mind, he was anxious to communicate them to others. During his residence of eleven months in the fort, he assembled as many men of his own regiment, the 13th, as chose to attend for religious instruction. He was thus enabled to acquire a beneficial influence over the well-disposed men of the corps, and to attach them to himself by the strong ties of respect and affection, and diffuse among them the leaven of piety and temperance.

Before Havelock had been a twelvemonth in India, the note of war was sounded, and he was called to embark in his first campaign. The British government in India had been at peace for five years. Lord Hastings, notwithstanding the magnitude of his military expeditions in Nepal and Central India, had bequeathed an overflowing treasury to his successor, a blessing so

The first Bur-
mese war.

rare that it appeared to overwhelm the minds of the public functionaries. Various schemes were devised to relieve this superfluity; and, among others, it was proposed to pay off the debts of the Civil Service, which exceeded a million; but while this plan was under consideration, the Burmese war came, and swallowed up all the savings of former years, and converted the surplus into a deficit, which has never been extinguished. It was about the period of the battle of Plassey, while Clive was establishing British authority in the valley of the Ganges, that an ambitious and successful chieftain, of the name of Alompra, extended his authority through the valley of the Irawaddy, and founded the Burmese empire, as it has been usually termed, which stretched from the borders of China to the Bay of Bengal. Of all Asiatic dynasties, that of Alompra had uniformly manifested the most remarkable spirit of arrogance in its foreign relations. Its intercourse with neighbouring sovereigns was always marked by the most contemptuous estimate of their strength, and by an overweening conceit of its own power. The presumption of the court of Ava, in reference to the rulers of British India, had reached its climax towards the close of Lord Hastings' administration; and Lord Amherst, on assuming the government, may be said to have found a Burmese war, as a legacy from his predecessor. The King of Ava, after having conquered Assam, and overrun the little principality of Cachar, on our eastern frontier, which was known to be under our protection, proceeded to demand the cession of the eastern districts of Bengal, which he claimed up to the Pudma, as the ancient patrimony of the Burmese crown. At the grand council held at the capital of Ava, Bundoola, the greatest of their generals, declared that from the moment of their resolution to invade Bengal "it was taken from under the British dominions, and had become, in fact, what it had ever been in right, a province of the Golden King." There were also acts of positive aggression—the seizure of an island belonging to us on the Aracan coast, and the capture of one of our European pilots,—which could not be overlooked; thus, the first

Burmese war grew out of the insolent demands and the ambitious aggression of the Burmese court. Lord Amherst, therefore, issued a declaration of war in April, 1824, against the Burmese monarch, and prepared to support it by a powerful armament. An army of 10,000 men was embarked in a fleet of more than forty vessels, for the invasion of Burmah, through the port of Rangoon, and placed under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell.

Havelock's military talents had become known to the members of Government during his residence in Fort William, and he was nominated to the post of Deputy assistant Adjutant-General of the expedition. The ardent hope he had so long cherished of active employment in his profession was thus accomplished, and the opportunity was now afforded him of acquiring a practical knowledge of the art of which he had been for nine years studying the principles. But through some mismanagement in the marine department, the vessel in which he was to embark did not leave the river before the 29th of April, more than a week after the fleet had sailed for the rendezvous at Port Cornwallis, in the Andaman Islands. A succession of light winds and calms retarded his progress down the Bay, and it was not till the 12th of May that the vessel he was in came up with a government cruiser off the Andamans, when he received the mortifying intelligence that the expedition had sailed to Rangoon on the 5th of the month. He hastened onward with all sail, but found, on reaching Rangoon, that the town had been captured a week, and that he had missed the opportunity of being present at the opening of the campaign. In a letter to his friend Lieut. Gardner, who had been prevented from accompanying the expedition by severe illness, he gave a vivid description of the scene around him, which is interesting as conveying his impressions and feelings when placed for the first time on the theatre of war :—

“After two hours' sail amidst a deep silence that convinced us that Rangoon had fallen, suddenly we beheld the gilded spires of

countless pagodas, mingling in the air, with a small forest of masts, a fleet riding at its ease, which we could no longer doubt was a victorious one.

Havelock's
description of
the scene of
warfare.

“To accoutre, collect baggage, and leap into boats was the next task. We rowed on, and perceived that the centre of the town was protected by a stockade, as it is the fashion to call it, but in fact by a species of defence of which, I think, I may give you some idea, by saying that it is most like a park paling in England, forty or fifty feet in height, and loopholed at the top, and fabricated of massive timbers instead of plank, platforms within affording the garrison the means of pouring forth in safety a deadly fire. We see moored on shore captive war boats, and the houses on the banks filled with all the speaking apparatus of a military hospital; while officers and men, wet and dirty, with bespattered jackets and faded forage caps, are bustling on the wharves and jetties.

“We land at a ghaut or quay, where dismantled guns with shattered painted wheels, cracked and splintered pillars, and dismantled cranes told half the tale of wreck and discomfiture. We make our way to the best *pucka*, or brick-built house, and find there the general officers and staff. Salutations and explanations over, we hear from a hundred mouths the narrative which I will endeavour to digest for your information.

“The Burmese government in Rangoon had not the slightest intelligence of the meditated descent before the 10th of May, the day on which the fleet entered the river. In the midst of our success, therefore, let us remember that they have been taken by surprise. There was no viceroy in the country, a new one being on his way from Amerapoora. The command devolved on the Reywoon or admiral. This worthy's first order was to cut some strong spars of wood, to which to tie his expected captives; his next to seize the English in the city and the suburbs; and our American friends did not escape. His last order was at least amply obeyed. The prisoners were chained two and two, their hands bound behind them with cords, tightened until they became implements of torture as well as of security. They were led to the hall of execution, their clothes torn off, their necks bared, the sharpened knives made ready, all in train for the bloody business of decapitation. Mr Hough and Mr Wade, the two missionaries, were chained together, and carried in this state past their own house. Mid-day on the 11th the fleet hove in sight. The *Liffey* anchored opposite the central fort or jetty. It

opened on her, firing about a shot a minute. In the hope that they would speedily see the folly of continuing so unequal a contest, the frigate answered for some minutes shot for shot; at length, perceiving them thus bent on destruction, she commenced in earnest, not by a salvo or broadside, but in one long, loud, steady, continuous roar, killing, shattering, crashing, splintering, and dismantling. At this moment the *Larne* took her station, and bellowed forth in similar strains against an adjacent portion of the town. In a few moments the guns of this sort of forts were strewn about the platform. The Reywoon took to horse, and made off with his armed followers; and the whole population of Rangoon, partly from the force of panic, and partly in obedience to the spiteful orders of their chief, rushed after him into the neighbouring jungles. An hour elapsed ere boats could be procured in sufficient numbers to land simultaneously. The 41st was then pushed on shore below the town; the 13th into the ruined fort; and the 38th above it. They met with little opposition, and by dusk the army found itself in quiet possession of Rangoon, with scarce any being but themselves within its walls. Their first task was the joyful liberation of the English and American prisoners.

“We see droves of bullocks in front of our lines, but cannot venture far into the jungles to shoot them. Our *own* tables are, indeed, now pretty plentifully supplied with the wild poultry which throngs the woods, but this does nothing for the true object of an officer’s care, the strength of the private soldier. It is in vain for those who admire the conduct of Rostopchin at Moscow, to vituperate this barbarous Reywoon, as far as the principle of his defence is concerned; but he is said to have had recourse to truly savage measures to compel the natives to adhere strictly to his plan of migration. Their wives and children were seized, and a cruel death inflicted on those whose fathers, husbands, and brethren did not follow them.

“You will prefer to any details of petty warfare, some account of the missionaries who are established in the suburbs of this singular town. You have heard already the trials to which they were subjected at the period of our descent. The mission, on the whole, has not been rapidly successful. They do not number more than eighteen converts since its first establishment, but they have given proofs of deep sincerity and piety. Mr Judson is now on his third visit to Amerapoor, the capital. He is said to have established himself

Havelock’s
notice of the
missionaries
in Burmah.

in the good graces of the monarch, but his friends tremble to think of the fate to which the first rumour of hostilities may subject him. But they have not forgotten the hope that cannot die, effectually strengthened by the recollection of their own recent and most providential escape. The political agent, Major Canning, assures me that he does not consider him in danger, and I did not venture to ask him for what multiplication of salary he would be content to place himself in his situation.

“The boast of Rangoon is its suburb, eastward and northward. Escaping by the eastern gate, you find yourself, for the distance of half a mile, on a good road, amidst groves of palmrya, acacia, bamboo, mangoe, and a variety of fruit trees. The road now begins to ascend, and for upwards of a mile and a half is skirted by small pagodas and low arched temples of Gaudama. Midway up the hill, which forms our position, is a temple occupied by the head-quarters of the 13th. It is a large square apartment, with vaulted ceiling, curiously gilt, and adorned with clumsily carved cornices and ornaments. A vast image of the god has now received, in its arms, the colours of the corps, and the regimental jest is to introduce you to the new ensign. . . . Half a mile on is the crowning splendour of this haughty hill of ‘devil worship’—the grand pagoda,—its name, Dagon, reminds us of the rebuke of the uncircumcised. It stands on a vast square platform of raised earth, faced with brick, of 200 yards in every direction. The pagoda itself, of burnished gilt, rises to the height of 360 feet above the level of the platform. All around are the houses of the priests, and the temples of the idol. This country, defective in laws, sciences, and warlike resources, and civil government, seems to have lavished all its wealth on its hierarchy. The whole slope of our position is covered with houses for priests and sheds for devotees, which afford shelter for 6000 men. We have scarcely a tent pitched in our lines. Imagine for yourself our regiment in the ‘sanctum sanctorum’ of Guadama. Desecrated by the purpose to which it has been turned, this hill is yet delightfully healthy.”

And of the magnificent Shoe-Dagon pagoda.

The temple of Gaudama was now, however, to be consecrated to the service of the living and true God. Amidst his anxiety for the physical comfort of his men, Havelock did not neglect their spiritual interests. There was no chaplain with the British

Havelock has Christian worship in the Shoe-Dagon pagoda.

force, either from Madras or Bengal, but Havelock was at his post when in the field, as he had been in the barracks. Amidst the general revelry of a conquering host, which no effort can adequately restrain, he assembled the men whom he had brought under his influence for devotional exercises, and had obtained permission to occupy one of the cloisters of the Great Pagoda. An officer who had accompanied the expedition, stated to the writer of this memoir, that passing on one occasion round the temple, he heard the sound of distant psalmody, and threading his way through the passages to the spot from which it proceeded, found himself in a small side chapel, with little images of Boodha in the usual sitting posture arranged round the room. An oil lamp had been placed in the lap of each figure, and the pious soldiers of the 13th were standing up, around Havelock, singing a Christian hymn amidst those idolatrous associations. It would be difficult to picture to the mind a more delightful or romantic episode in this scene of warfare and desolation.

Rangoon had been occupied on the 11th of May, and the enemy had at once disappeared, but their presence in the vicinity of the town was felt by stealthy attacks Action of the 28th of May. on our position from the thick and almost impenetrable jungle round it. They had made an incursion on the 27th of the month, and it was resolved to send out a force the next day, to chastise and dislodge them. Havelock was in high spirits in the prospect of being for the first time in actual conflict with an enemy. Great was his disappointment, therefore, when Colonel Tidy, the head of the Adjutant's department, accosted him as he was proceeding to join the column, and stated that as his own position required him to be in attendance on the Commander-in-Chief, it was necessary for Havelock to return to Rangoon and conduct the official details of the office. The enemy, though contemptible in the open field, was valorous behind stockades, and the engagement was well contested. A contempt of the foe had led to the neglect of any reconnaissance, and the troops toiled wearily through intricate jungle and brushwood, across drenched paddy fields, and

over swollen rivulets, amidst heavy rain. At one time, the General himself had to wade through water up to the shoulders, and the howitzer which accompanied the force was buried in the mud. The enemy's position was for a time concealed by a thick mist, and a spattering fire was the only indication which the troops had of the proximity of the Burmese. It was at length found that two large stockades, on the edge of the jungle, bristling with advanced abattis, strongly compacted of earth, were filled with the enemy. The 13th and 38th, the two regiments which bore the brunt of the campaigns, availing themselves of an opening left for ingress and egress, rushed upon the stockades, and carried them at the point of the bayonet, at the same time setting fire to the wooded defences. The loss of the enemy was great, for an order had been issued to the troops, not to encumber themselves with prisoners. "Lieut. Alexander Howard," wrote Havelock, "who was a volunteer for the day, and had been seen cheering on the men with very distinguished gallantry, unluckily rushed upon an angle where the Burmese, pent like rats in a corner, were struggling desperately to escape from the British bayonet. As he pushed on, sabre in hand, three balls struck him on the side, and at the same moment a Burmese speared him in the back. Dennie tells me he found him expiring, his sabre yet clenched in his hand, fallen and lying over a dead Burman, in whose skull was a frightful gash." Howard's remains were interred the same evening, in a corner of the enclosure of one of the pagodas. As he lay before the door, it was proposed to strip and reattire the body. Havelock pointed to his gory side, and said, "You can affix no brighter ornament than that to the body of a brave soldier; had we but his own good sword, and the spear of his enemy, his obsequies would be complete."

On the 5th of July Havelock found himself for the first time intrusted with the responsibilities of command. A little before sunset, a party to which he had been attached was sent to capture a stockade, "which," as he wrote to Lieut. Gardner, "was situated

Havelock
finds himself
for the first
time in com-
mand.

in the midst of a jungle horribly thick and tangled, and most disrespectfully near our position. The senior officer, who had just risen from a sick bed, was exhausted by fatigue, and unable to act, and I, as the only staff officer present, seized the reins at rather a critical moment. The troops did not support me, as older soldiers would have done; not that they evinced any disposition to go about, but they stood wasting ammunition in an exposed situation, when they should have pushed *en avant*, and used their bayonets, as I bid them do. I had sixteen of my friends of the 13th killed and wounded, and poor Barrett's right arm shot off. After this my pioneers (Madrasses) fairly flung down the ladders and would not budge, though I coaxed, harangued, and thrashed them by turns, all under the best fire our feeble enemy could keep up, and within pistol-shot of the work. At length, with European aid, I got my ladders fixed, and carried my point just when darkness rendered the capture useless." On the 8th of July there was "a grand field-day of stockades, the best which the force had made." Havelock was personally engaged throughout the day with his own corps, the 13th, which led the column. It was in this engagement that Colonel Sale, as Havelock wrote, broke his own sabre over the skull of a leader, a man of rank and a noted swordsman, and then, seizing his weapon, nearly cleaved his body at one stroke.

The rains had now set in with their usual violence at Rangoon. The troops, cooped up in that unhealthy town, soon fell victims to disease, which created greater havoc in their ranks than the weapons of the enemy had done. By the end of July nearly one half the force was in the grave or in hospital. Havelock was prostrated by a severe attack of liver complaint, and was ordered by a medical committee to quit the field and return to Bengal. In Calcutta his complaint baffled the skill of the ablest of the faculty, and they at length prescribed a visit to England, as affording the only chance of saving his life. To return home at such a period, however, was to relinquish all prospect of taking an active share in the campaign, at a time when he was panting for profes-

Havelock's health fails, and he is obliged to leave Burmah.

sional occupation. With great reluctance they yielded to his importunate request to be allowed to substitute a short trip by sea to Bombay for the voyage to England, on his engaging faithfully to embark for Europe if the shorter excursion failed to restore health. He hoped thereby to recover sufficient strength to resume his place in the force before the war was brought to a close, which, in the dilatory manner in which it was conducted, was not likely to be accomplished for more than a twelvemonth. He embarked for Bombay in January, and was received with great cordiality by the Governor, the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Colville. From Bombay he proceeded to Poonah, and passed several weeks with his brother William, then in the 4th Dragoons. Regular exercise, vacation of mind, and the society of one dear to him, combined with skilful medical treatment, repaired the ravages made by toil, fatigue, and disease on his feeble frame. From the time of his landing at Bombay his progress towards convalescence, though slow, was uninterrupted. The voyage seemed to give him a new lease of life, and he was thus enabled to pass through thirty-two years more of Indian labour. He left Bombay on the 17th of May, 1825, reached Madras on the 29th, and, after spending a fortnight there, found himself on the 22nd of June again on the soil of Burmah. In announcing his return to his friend Lieut. Gardner, he remarked—

“ Thus have I lost sight of one of the most singular and imposing spectacles of barbaric strategy on record, in my absence, during the investment of Rangoon by the *levée en masse* of the Burmese empire under the Muha Bundoola. Letter to Lieutenant Gardner. The rest of the campaign consisted of a series of jungle skirmishes, some of them daring and brilliant, but the loss of my share in which, I the less regret, as they promise hereafter to be abundant. Let me not ungratefully forget to commemorate the abundant compensation which a gracious Providence vouchsafed to devise and work out for me, under the decree of loss of health and interruption of professional prospects, which, in mercy and not in anger, was permitted to go forth against me. I may mention as slight advantages the having been compelled within a

few months to visit the three great capital cities of British supremacy in the East; the periplus of all the peninsula, and the ancient island of Serendib (Ceylon), as it is called in the Arabian fictions; a sight of the greater ghauts of Malabar, the Indian Apennines, the finest range I have seen since I left the Alps. . . . And still greater than these, the having made the acquaintance of two such men as the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone and Reginald Heber, both of whom I found at Bombay.

“Farewell. I have this moment received an order to move on Prome. Write, and requite me for this tedious recital, by just as ample an account of your own proceedings and prospects. Rely on it you will not weary me. Meanwhile think of me as of one who sincerely, I trust, faithfully prays for you, and who, though he humbly endeavours to regard all men as brethren, is to you, what he does not subscribe himself to many, and lightly and without meaning to none,—Your friend,

“HENRY HAVELOCK.”

Havelock joined the army at Prome in the beginning of August, and omitted no opportunity which the intervals of military duty allowed of collecting his men for religious exercises. Whatever reproach he might incur for his methodism, it was readily admitted that no men were more orderly and steady, or more ready for duty, than those who met him to read the Bible and sing psalms. This was singularly exemplified on one occasion during the campaign. A sudden attack was made on an outpost at night, and Sir Archibald Campbell ordered up some men of another corps to support it, but they were not prepared for the call after a carouse. “Then call out Havelock’s saints,” he exclaimed, “they are always sober and can be depended on, and Havelock himself is always ready.” The saints got under arms with promptitude, and the enemy were at once repulsed.

The army continued to advance towards the capital, and fought two engagements with the enemy at Napadee and Patanago, in both of which Havelock took an active part. The Burmese were as usual defeated with great loss. The king, impoverished by the war, and humiliated by defeat, now found

He resumes the instruction of his men on his return.

The army advances to the capital. Peace with the Burmese. Havelock at Ava.

it necessary to sue for peace. He released Dr Price, one of the American missionaries at Ava, who had been placed in confinement at the commencement of hostilities, and treated with great barbarity, and sent him down to the British camp, in company with his own plenipotentiaries, to negotiate a treaty, which was at length completed and signed. But it soon became apparent that, with the usual duplicity of Asiatic monarchs, he had entered upon these negotiations only to gain time to assemble another army for a final struggle. A body of 18,000 men, styled "the retrievers of the king's glory," was sent down to attack the British troops, and protect the capital. Sir Archibald Campbell's force had been reduced by sickness to 1800, but he had with him twenty-eight guns, "which," according to Havelock's description, "poured a continuous storm of shot and shell among the enemy. The deafening peals succeeded each other with a rapidity which suggested the image of unchecked vengeance falling in thunder upon the heads of these deceitful barbarians." The Burmese were signally defeated, all their standards were captured, and they fled in dismay to the capital, with the tidings of their own discomfiture. The king now found it necessary to accept the terms of peace which had been proposed by the British commander. Dr Price was again sent in all haste to the English camp in company with Mr Judson, the father of the American Mission in Burmah, who had also been treated with atrocious severity during a long captivity in Ava. "It was curious," remarks Havelock, "to see a staunch republican, like Dr Price, thus converted into a representative of the Burman despotism." The two American missionaries, and the Burmese envoys, at length completed the treaty of Yandaboo, which was signed on the 24th of February, and by which the king was compelled to cede the provinces of Assam, Aracan, and Tenasserim, and to pay an indemnity of one million towards the expenses of a war which had cost us thirteen millions. Havelock was selected by Sir Archibald Campbell to proceed to Ava, and receive the ratification of the treaty from "the golden foot," and with him were associated Captain Lumsden and Dr

Knox. After many delays, the British representatives were admitted into the royal presence. "The monarch of Ava," says Havelock, "seated on his throne of state, surrounded by the ensigns of royalty, environed by the princes of the royal house and lineage, and attended by the high ministers and chief officers of the realm, received, with every mark of gracious consideration, our congratulations in the name of the Commissioners, on the pacification happily concluded between the two states, accepted their presents, directed suitable returns to be made, and, in conclusion, caused the British officers intrusted with this charge to be invested with the insignia of titles and honorary distinctions;" and thus ended the first Burmese war.

The army immediately marched down to Rangoon, and embarked for Calcutta and Madras. The force being thus broken up, Havelock's appointment as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General ceased, and as there was no recognition of his services, with the exception of the fillet of gold leaf which had been placed on his forehead at the Court of Ava, when he was invested with the title of a Burmese noble, he prepared to return to his duty as a Lieutenant of His Majesty's 13th Foot. During the campaign, however, he had formed the acquaintance of Colonel Willoughby Cotton, commanding one of the divisions of the army, as Brigadier-General. The Colonel had many opportunities of appreciating his great military talents, and considered it a pity that a man so highly gifted should be entombed among the subalterns of a regiment of foot. Having been nominated to the command of a large detachment of troops proceeding to Cawnpore, Colonel Cotton obtained for his young friend the temporary appointment of interpreter. Havelock, after his return from Burmah, soon found his way to Serampore, and renewed his acquaintance with the missionaries. On his journey to Cawnpore, he commenced a correspondence with the compiler of this memoir, which was continued for a period of thirty years, with unabated affection, and ceased only the day before he was attacked by the complaint which terminated his existence.

Havelock proceeds with Col. Cotton's detachment as interpreter to Cawnpore.

“My dear Marshman,—I write to enclose a soldier’s mite towards the building of your new chapel at Serampore. Had the British army on reaching Yandaboo manœuvred in two columns on both banks of the Irawaddy, instead of turning diplomatists, I might by this time have been in a condition to have sent you a larger offering, but could not have accompanied it with greater solicitude for the success of all objects cognate to that to which I beg you to devote this trifling one. I move in the humble post of interpreter, which is not very flattering to the vanity of the ex-Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the first British army which extended our conquests beyond the Ganges eastward; but I am not in despair of something better awaiting me on our north-west frontier. Do me the favour to present my kindest regards to the whole of your kind and hospitable circle. Serampore is one of the points in this land of my (I hope not dishonourable) exile, to which my thoughts will ever revert with a feeling of very deep interest.”

These expectations were not at the time to be fulfilled. Our north-west frontier was to enjoy a period of repose for eleven years. The “something better,” which Havelock was looking forward to in 1826, did not arrive till 1838, when he found himself again under the command of Colonel—then Sir Willoughby—Cotton, marching across the Indus to the conquest of Cabul. This long period of repose from the active duties of the field presents few incidents of interest in Havelock’s career, but it was not a season of inactivity. His mental constitution admitted of no cessation of labour, and he only exchanged the labours of the camp for the drudgery of the cantonment, or the office. With the arrival of the detachment at Cawnpore, his appointment as interpreter ceased, and he returned to his regiment at Dinapore, and resumed his duties as a Lieutenant. To relieve the monotony of a subaltern’s life, he began to compile a narrative of the Burmese expedition, and had made some progress in his manuscript when he was again appointed to the more agreeable duties of a staff situation. Colonel Cotton had been placed in command of the depôt of King’s troops, then recently established at Chinsurah, about twelve miles above Serampore, and he solicited his

Appointed
Adjutant of
the depôt at
Chinsurah.

cousin, Lord Combermere, the Commander-in-Chief, to bestow the post of Adjutant on his friend Havelock. It was one of the few staff appointments in India which could be held by an officer of the Royal army, and it was conferred not less as an acknowledgment of Havelock's services, than as the result of personal solicitation. He left Dinapore on the 15th of March, 1827, and in the course of the year sent the following letters to Serampore, in reference to his proposed compilation :—

“The course of events seems about to carry me again into your neighbourhood. I have just been appointed to the adjutancy of the King's depôt at Chinsurah, and propose to start by dawn on the 15th. This little appointment is pleasing to me, as it relieves me from the tedium of regimental life, as it is offered to me in some sort as a requital for services, and as it will, I trust, afford me the opportunity of cultivating my acquaintance with yourself and your kind family.

“I have for two months been condemned to rather a monotonous state of existence in this very uninteresting cantonment. Some portion of its weariness I have endeavoured to dispel by attempting a sketch of the military events of the first war against the barbarians of Ava. The scribbled pages have gradually increased in number. At length I have been emboldened to think of making their contents public. If I print I should like to see my title-page sanctioned with the name of Serampore. Still, I am half afraid of the storm of hostility which the free discussion of recent events might draw upon a subordinate officer. Men of years and of rank are so unwilling ever to be proved in the wrong ; and I cannot, in common honesty, attempt to show that in 1824, '25, and '26 they were always in the right. I have indeed left the Government untouched. I have judged measures by the rules of the only art which I pretend ever to have studied. My details and criticisms are purely military. I believe that one volume octavo will embrace all that I have written, or shall write, on this topic.

“It would not, I presume, occupy many weeks to get it through the press at Serampore. Public curiosity will not demand more than 300 copies. I know no man whose advice I should value more on such a subject than your own. Tell me what you think of the state of public opinion in India. Do the Indian com-

Correspondence regarding the history of the Burmese campaigns.

munity care one straw about the Burman war? Do they care enough to induce them to read 300 pages about it?"

On the same subject he wrote again:—

"23rd April, 1827.

"I do not think I have in a single sentence of my work committed myself against the Government. The generals I have not treated quite so well. As regards them, I shall perhaps have to modify and soften down, before I can venture to print. But were the manuscript carried *in statu quo* to the press, it is not impossible that I might find my name omitted in the army list of some subsequent month for having presumed to think that a brigadier-general can do wrong; but I should have no apprehension whatever of the peaceful shades of Serampore being disturbed by the fulmination of the Bengal Government.

"Perhaps, however, I exaggerate the danger, rather than the causes of offence. No man is a fair critic in his own case. Nothing but despair of your being able to decipher my villanous autograph prevents me from submitting the manuscript to your judgment on this head. Your kind offer to usher my first historical essay into the world demands my warmest acknowledgments. I must mention to you, however, a difficulty which was suggested to me in Calcutta: copyright, it appears, is not protected in India. If my work published here were to excite any interest in England, the first copy which reached that country would be reprinted in London, the work pirated, and the old case occur

'Hos ego versiculos feci, tulit alter honores,
Sic vos non vobis,' &c."

"June 18th, 1827.

"I wish to print my pages uniformly with the Napoleon Memoirs. I hope neither you nor the world will attribute this species of imitation to vanity; I think it the best form of military history. It is, in fact, a very trifling improvement on the plan of the Commentaries of the Roman dictator. Each campaign should form a book, of which the subdivisions are numbered in Roman capitals. Each left-hand page should be headed, 'Campaign of the Monsoon;' 'Campaign of 1825, 1826,' &c. &c. Each right-hand page with the name of the scene of action, —Rangoon, Prome, Meeaday, Pagghan-myo."



“September 18th, 1827.

“Do me the favour kindly to correct the little bit of Homer in the 114th page now returned. I have no copy of the original in my possession, nor a Greek book of any kind. The passage is, I think, in book A of the Iliad.”

“January 12th, 1828.

“I wish the copies to be lettered on the back, ‘Campaigns in Ava’ above, and ‘Havelock’ below. ‘Snodgrass’s Burman War,’ or ‘Havelock’s Campaigns,’ appears to me nonsense. It was Lord Amherst’s war, and they were Sir Archibald Campbell’s campaigns.”

Havelock’s first work, the “Campaigns in Ava,” was published at Serampore early in 1828. For thirteen years he had made the military art his constant study, and he had recently enjoyed the first opportunity of testing his knowledge by the lessons of actual warfare. The work was, therefore, not only a narrative of military movements, but a record of the judgment which he had been led to form of the strategy of the campaigns. Though he had endeavoured to avoid the charge of pedantry, it was freely brought against his work, partly from its peculiar arrangement, but chiefly from the use of the word “barbarian,” which he had applied to the Burmese, and which was treated as a conceited adoption of the term employed by Cæsar in designating the Gauls. These, however, were but superficial defects; the narrative was not only clear, but luminous; all cumbersome details were avoided, and the reader was presented with the salient points of each manœuvre and action. In this, his maiden work, he exemplified the remark of one of his most distinguished commanders in after days, that more knowledge was to be obtained of the real position of affairs from six sentences of Havelock, than from as many pages of another writer. The style was sententious and classical, but would have been greatly improved if he had been enabled to give it some of the ease of his familiar correspondence. It was considered so close an imitation of the models of antiquity, that Havelock was, either in joke or

Publication
of the “Cam-
paigns in
Ava.”

earnest, called the modern Thucydides. But the work was chiefly remarkable for its bold strictures on the tactics of the commanders. It did not fail to give offence by the fearless exposition of errors which it is usual to gloss over in official despatches. No military commander is disposed to tolerate the criticism even of his victories, least of all when their character is equivocal, and the errors of his strategy have been retrieved by the cowardice of the enemy, or the devotion of his own troops. Havelock had reckoned upon a "storm of hostility," though he could scarcely have anticipated its virulence; but he was determined to brave obloquy in the cause of truth, and in the performance of what he considered his duty. The book made many enemies, and created a prejudice against him which repressed his professional prospects. Some time after its appearance, his brother William, having visited England, and called at the Horse Guards, saw the "Campaigns in Ava" lying on the table of the officer to whom he addressed himself. "Are you the author of that work?" was the first inquiry. "It is from the pen of my younger brother." "Is he tired of his commission?" was the curt and significant rejoinder. The work was, however, unquestionably one of the best models of military history which had ever appeared in India, and its merits were fully appreciated by those whose opinion was of any real value. In his second military history, published thirteen years after, he thus refers to the "Burmese Campaigns":—

"My former effort as an author had not met with that species of reward which is commonly looked for in the present day. No enterprising publisher had taken under his auspices my 'Memoirs of the Three Campaigns.' It had been printed in a distant land, and thus placed beyond the reach of the praise or blame of the constituted critics of Britain; and in consequence of the short memories of a large proportion of my subscribers, the proceeds of the publication had scarcely defrayed the cost of giving it to a limited number of readers. Yet a counterpoise to these mortifications was not wanting. A few officers of rank, whose discernment and candour I could not doubt, even in my own case, had

characterized the performance as honest and faithful ; three commanders-in-chief in India had spoken favourably of it to others, as well as to myself. And I have been deceived, if, when war was likely to be renewed in the Burman empire, and information regarding it had become valuable, a fourth general, placed in the same situation of responsible control above adverted to, did not find, or profess to find, in the pages of the neglected lieutenant, developments of fact and reasoning which he had in vain sought in books on the same topic, that had enjoyed the sunshine of a more brilliant popularity."

The book brought him neither profit nor promotion. It might reasonably have been supposed that in a service like that of India, where the discovery and the employment of talent is essential to the success of government, an officer who had exhibited no ordinary military abilities during the war, and subsequently in his commentaries on it, would not have been allowed to pine in obscurity. Yet during the eleven years of neglect he was doomed to experience from this time, not a repining note ever escaped his pen. He found ample solace in the conscientious performance of the duties of his station.

Havelock remained at Chinsurah for three years, taking charge of the recruits as they arrived from England, and superintending their discipline and transport to their regiments. He was a frequent visitor at Serampore, and cultivated the society of Dr Carey, Dr Marshman, Mr Mack, and the writer of this Memoir. On the 9th of February, 1829, he was married to Hannah Shepherd, the youngest daughter of the Rev. Dr Marshman, whose memory is revered by the Christian world, as one of the Serampore missionaries, the great pioneers of Christian civilization in the north of India. This connection was the source of unalloyed happiness to him for twenty-nine years. It was delightful to witness a man of Havelock's strong character, unbending himself amidst the endearments of domestic life, and exhibiting the great soldier and the stern disciplinarian, as the most affectionate of husbands and the most exemplary of parents. But even on his wedding-day he manifested that resolute submission

Havelock's
marriage.

to the claims of duty which was the main spring of his conduct through life. On the morning fixed for the wedding, he was summoned to attend a military court of inquiry in Fort William, which was to be held at noon. It was in vain that his friends urged on him that so important an event as his marriage would be considered an ample justification of his absence. He maintained that as a soldier he was bound to obey orders, regardless of his own convenience. The marriage was therefore solemnized at an earlier hour, after which he proceeded to Calcutta in a swift boat, attended the court, and returned to Serampore in time for the nuptial banquet. From the period of Havelock's arrival in India, and the commencement of his Indian allowances, he had determined to devote a tenth of his income to objects of piety and benevolence. On his marriage he resolved to adhere to the same rule, from which he never swerved, even when his resources were reduced to the scanty pay of a lieutenant.

For several years Havelock had been investigating the question of infant and adult baptism. He had debated the subject with Mr Judson, the American missionary, after he joined the English camp, on being liberated from captivity, and his previous views were shaken. He endeavoured to bring the subject under discussion at Serampore, but found that it was the only topic on which his friends were unwilling to enter. They considered it their mission to evangelize the heathen, not to bring Christians to the adoption of their own denominational views, however conscientiously they were maintained as a component part of Gospel truth. Havelock was thus left to his own researches, and he was at length led to the conviction that baptism by immersion, after a confession of faith, was in accordance with Scripture teaching and apostolic practice. He determined, therefore, to join the Baptist community, and was accordingly baptized by the Rev. John Mack, in the chapel at Serampore. This change of views entailed the loss of some cherished friendships, but he considered himself in the path of duty, and, with his characteristic fearlessness,

Havelock
joins the Baptist
community. His
catholicism.

was equally proof against the displeasure of friends and the raillery of enemies. But though his sentiments regarding this particular ordinance were thus changed, there was no contraction of his Christian sympathies. Consorting more intimately with those whose opinions on this point coincided with his own, he was free from the restrictions of sectarianism, and rejoiced in the fellowship of all those who held the same Christian principles, and were animated with the same Christian hope. His views on this subject were clearly enunciated in an address which he delivered at a subsequent period at a meeting of the Evangelical Alliance at Bombay.

“But while he should part with his Baptist principles only with his life, he declared his willingness cordially to fraternize with every Christian who held by the Head, and was serving the Redeemer in sincerity and truth. And here he would protest against this being alleged, as adversaries would insinuate, that where men of various denominations met, as this evening, in a feeling of brotherhood, they could only do this by paring down to the smallest portion the mass of their religion. On the contrary, he believed that all brought with them their faith in all its strength and vitality. They left, he thought, at the door of the place of assembly, the husks and shell of their creed, but brought into the midst of their brethren the precious kernel. They laid aside, for a moment, at the threshold, the canons, the articles, and the formularies of their section of Christianity, but carried along with them, up to the table at which he was speaking, the very essence and quintessence of their religion.”

Havelock's tenure of his Chinsurah appointment was now drawing to a close. The debt entailed by the reckless expenditure of the Burmese war had terrified the India House, and a system of the most stringent economy was enforced on the government in India. A Committee was appointed in Calcutta to devise plans of retrenchment, and to cut down the public establishments; and among other measures of economical reform, the abolition of the depôt of King's troops at Chinsurah was recommended. It was a measure of very doubtful policy, because the recruits must

Havelock
loses his ap-
pointment,
and rejoins
his regiment.
Illness of his
eldest child.

have been located on their arrival either in Fort William or at Chinsurah, and the former was as unhealthy as the latter was salubrious. But parsimony overruled expediency; the depôt was removed to Fort William in the first instance, and Havelock was required to exchange a comfortable residence at Chinsurah for "two shell-proof dungeons on the ramparts of the fort," to which he removed, with his wife and child. "It is said," he wrote, "that the decree for the extinction of the depôt, or approving of its suspension, has passed Council; but the strong remonstrances of Lord Dalhousie, and perhaps a sense of the real injustice and impolicy of the measure, appear to have made the Vice-President pause before he carried it into effect. My own opinion is that the establishment will stand." But it was nevertheless abolished, and at the beginning of 1831 Havelock was sent back to his corps to fill the subordinate post, and live upon the limited pay of a subaltern; but he hoped, he said, on his arrival at the cantonment, "to put all things on a footing of exemplary economy, which was more than had been achieved by any of his name, and to mark the effect of the great financial scheme in which you have offered me such handsome assistance." He travelled to the station by water, and on entering the Ganges was alarmed by the illness of his child, then under twelve months of age. The danger arose from approaching dentition; and no medical aid was nearer than forty miles. "To render the case more distressing," he wrote, "we were entirely destitute of the only remedies which we believed likely to be effectual. We had no calomel and no lancet, and no skilful hand to use it; and the young sufferer grew worse every hour. The danger seemed imminent, and our distress was not trifling. I therefore determined myself to try my skill as an operator; and with a very indifferent substitute for a lancet, and, I fear, not a very steady hand, succeeded in giving relief to my first patient. I should think this a very tedious story to write to one who did *not* know how the human heart, even the heart of one who has passed through many scenes of suffering and danger, attaches

itself to these little ones in their years of helplessness. My clumsy attempts were certainly blessed beyond our hope, for the little sufferer soon became calmer and calmer, and his fever sensibly diminished."

Havelock had never allowed his active engagements in India to deaden his interest in whatever could conduce to the welfare of his native country; and his extensive reading qualified him to form an accurate judgment of the character of events at home. In India, the party distinction of Whig and Tory is but feebly appreciated, while a partiality for liberal measures in every department pervades all classes of society. Havelock's political predilections were, therefore, more Liberal than Conservative, and he hailed with delight the prospects of reform and improvement which at this time dawned upon England and Europe. In his letter to Serampore, on his way to Dinapore, after stating his own enlarged views on parliamentary reform, he remarked, "It will be long, however, before an unreformed House will vote for anything like this, and less ought not to satisfy the people. The alternative, it is to be feared, is to be found in the enactment of the 'three days,' or, something more terrific. A minister proposing real reform might yet retrieve all. . . . The most glorious intelligence is, however, from Bologna and Modena. Let us hope that the moment is not far distant which will fulfil the presage of the Italian poet:—

' Virtù contro al furore
Prenderà l'armi, et fia il combatter corto;
Che l'antico valore
Negli Italici cuor non è ancor morto.' "

On his arrival at Dinapore, he resumed the religious instruction of his men, which he was enabled to continue without interruption for three years. His ministrations are thus described in a letter to Dr Marshman:—

"The dissenting privates of the 13th meet for social worship, morning and evening, in their chapel. There are also in the

Havelock's
remarks on
English and
European
politics.

Religious in-
struction of
his men.

building small places for retirement for private devotion, to which many resort. There is also public worship on the sabbath before noon, and in the evening. I think the congregation on the latter occasion fluctuates between fifty and sixty, sometimes, however, exceeding this latter number; and it is admitted by those who, without any prepossession in favour of the faith, have the best opportunities of judging of the fact, that instances of immorality or neglect of duty among this body in the course of a year are very rare. The frequenters of this chapel are reckoned among the best behaved men in the regiment. We have no minister. Ward — Lieutenant Ward of the 68th Native Infantry—supplies the place of one on the sabbath morning, and I do my best, ineffective as it is, for the men's instruction in the evening. I have, I think, on three occasions read them a sermon, but as often as seven times preached to them, that is, read to them a discourse composed by myself. I would gladly know from you what is your opinion. Is this an heresy? Is it contrary to Scripture, since I have not been 'separated' to the work, but belong to a secular and active calling? The men listen gladly, and the rehearsing the sentiments of another from a printed book appears to me to be a spiritless action, which does not move and awaken as does the declaration of his own views in an address indited by the speaker. This is all I have to say in my *defence*, if the act needs one. We have no minister, or I should not dream of intruding into the sacred office. I shall esteem your opinion a great favour."

Towards the close of 1831, the 13th moved up to the cantonment at Agra. A second son was born to him on the river, and owing to the difficulty of obtain-
 ing immediate medical aid, Havelock felt an Birth of Havelock's second son. intense degree of anxiety. After all apprehensions had been removed, he wrote, "It is wise not to over-contrive things, or to be too careful; doing our best to have much left, trustingly, in the hands of Him who is wise. I have in vain endeavoured to express before God, who knows the heart, and I cannot, my dear Marshman, develope to you my sense of the mercy of which we have been the objects at this juncture, in regard to the arrival of the young heir to vicissitude and trouble, and I hope to compassion and grace also. I can make nothing yet out of

the features of my younger hope, only that his nose is large, and the cast of his countenance grave. But resemblance to either parent is not by me traceable, unless in the fact of nasal longitude, which is a characteristic of my father's family. Neither have we yet fixed on a name for him. The lady says, Lionel, but that signifies 'little lion,' and there have been lions and tigers enough, and too many, of my race already. I wish the next generation to be lambs."

Soon after the arrival of the regiment at Agra, arrangements were made by Government for the formation of a camp of exercise; on which Havelock remarks:—

"In coming to Agra, you will remember that we reckoned on repose for some years, and, as usual, without our host. Orders have already been issued for preparing a spot, or two spots, for one or two large camps. Two points are indicated, one within seventy miles of Agra, another in the Dooab, in the vicinity of Mynpooree or Etawah. The fact is, that there are all around extensive plains imperfectly cultivated, so that the choice of the site of a camp of exercise can only be embarrassing, if at all, from the number of eligible spots which present themselves; but there are rumours that the real object of the gathering is a descent on the territories of Scindiah. Now, in the terms of our strategical cant, Agra and Etawah are the natural points of concentration for the Meerut and Cawnpore forces, as connected with the line of invasion by Attair and Dhoulpore. I almost suspect that this is the thing projected. However, whether to fight or to play at soldiers, I have little doubt that the 1st of November will see us under canvas."

But there was to be no war with Gwalior for twenty years. Lord William Bentinck's pacific administration was interrupted by only one brief expedition, which ended in making the Rajah of Koorg an exile, and his daughter a Christian. The differences with Scindiah's cabinet were, for the present, accommodated by negotiations. The Governor-General, accompanied by his lady, and escorted by a splendid military array, of which the 13th formed a part, proceeded to Gwalior, and completed his amicable arrangements. Lord William Bentinck showed particular atten-

Expected
operations in
the field.—
Lieut. and
Mrs Havelock
at Gwalior.

tion to that corps on the line of march, and became personally acquainted with the merits of the "neglected lieutenant." Lady William likewise selected Mrs Havelock to accompany her in her interview with the princess, and to act as her interpreter; and the intercourse thus commenced exercised an auspicious influence on Havelock's future prospects. It was on this occasion, in the presence of a submissive court, that Lord William Bentinck gave audience to the plenipotentiaries whom the King of Ava had sent to Bengal. They had arrived in Calcutta some months before, and Lord William directed that they should be conveyed up the country, and received with distinction at the military stations. To impress them with a sense of our power, and deter their Court from future hostilities, several regiments were brought together, and the envoys were received in full Durbar with an imposing appearance of military pomp. It was in the state tent at Gwalior that Havelock renewed his acquaintance with the "barbarian" ministers, with whom he had exchanged the ratification of the treaty of Yandaboo, six years before, at Ava. The pious soldiers did not neglect their religious duties, on the line of march, but assembled for devotional exercises under Havelock's directions, sometimes under the shade of a tree, and sometimes in the open air. Soon after the return of the regiment to Agra, their little chapel was completed, and Havelock thus wrote to Serampore:—"This and various other little circumstances have created a considerable stir of curiosity in the minds of men of various grades, regarding the nature and pretensions of our little church. I never seem to notice this, but I am convinced of the fact. We have always met with kindness from our earthly superiors, and I think there is a growing anxiety to discover our *secret*—for it is such to many; what it is that enables us to brave reproach, and keeps us together. 'Silver and gold we have none,' and yet we grow and flourish. This is in some sort regarded as an enigma."

The dissenting soldiers had hitherto been required to be present at the service of the Church of England, while

Havelock's efforts to obtain religious liberty for the soldiers.

the Roman Catholic soldiers were exempted from this compulsory attendance. Havelock was anxious to secure the same privilege for Protestant nonconformists. On the 13th of October, therefore, he presented a memorial on the subject to Lord Hill, the Commander-in-Chief, through the officer commanding his own regiment, by whom it was forwarded to Lord William Bentinck. He stated in the memorial, that in conformity with the requirements of the articles of war, he had, when on duty with his own or any other regiment, invariably attended Divine service according to the forms of the Church of England. He did not pretend that this constrained attendance had been in any respect painful to him, inasmuch as he admitted that he had been enabled, with very great delight and spiritual comfort, to join in the greater number of the prayers of the Liturgy of that Church; still he had felt it a hardship to be deprived of the privilege of assembling at the hour best fitted for the purpose with the members of his own Church, and of the benefit of attending the ministrations of his own minister; and to be constrained, on some occasions, to hear from the pulpit a condemnation of the principles which he revered. He further represented that he was not on this occasion pleading his own cause alone, but that many faithful soldiers of His Majesty would thankfully receive the same relief which he now sought, and which was already secured to the Roman Catholic soldiers by the regulations of the army. He stated that he had never sought permission to absent himself from the worship of the Church of England, of the officer commanding the 13th Light Infantry, but "now, under a firm conviction that his gracious master, the King, was disposed to respect the religious scruples of all his subjects, and to afford all opportunities and facilities of which the nature of military duty would permit, to worship Almighty God according to their consciences, he humbly requested that the disadvantages under which he laboured in this respect might be represented to His Majesty."

It was during this period that Colonel Sale, who com-



manded the 13th, made the remark which has been inadvertently attributed to Lord William Bentinck. Havelock's religious meetings among the men had irritated some of his brother officers, and a strong feeling of opposition to him had grown up in the regiment. On one occasion, while Havelock was confined to his couch for several days by illness; it was reported that one of his "saints" had been found drunk, and it furnished matter of triumph to his opponents. On his recovery he requested a full investigation of the case in the presence of the Colonel, when it was discovered that there were two men of the same name in different companies in the corps, and that the man who had been intoxicated did not belong to Havelock's company, or assemble with his little congregation. It was then that Colonel Sale exclaimed, in his blunt manner, "I know nothing about Baptists, but I know that I wish the whole regiment were Baptists, for their names are never in the defaulters' roll, and they are never in the congee—or lock-up—house." The influence of Havelock's Christian exertions, combined with his sound judgment and vigour of mind, was powerfully felt, not only in his own regiment, but beyond its circle; and it has been well remarked by a Presbyterian clergyman, who enjoyed much domestic intercourse with him, that "he was, in the highest and best sense of the word, a noble Christian missionary, recommending, both by precept and example, the gospel of Christ to all around. In him the military character was so clear and so fully developed; he was such a stern and rigid disciplinarian; and his command over his soldiers was so absolute, that worldly men easily tolerated the saint in their admiration of the soldier." His character was well defined in one expressive sentence, when Lord Hardinge said of him, he is every inch a soldier, and every inch a Christian.

CHAPTER II.

Havelock endeavours in vain to obtain a Company by Purchase.—Is appointed Interpreter to the 16th Foot; and Adjutant of the 13th Light Infantry.—Mrs Havelock's Life endangered by the burning of her Dwelling.—Havelock is at length a Captain.—The Affghan War.—Eldred Pottinger at Herat.—Havelock accompanies the Army to Affghanistan.—Candahar.—Ghuznee.—Cabul.—He publishes a Narrative of the Campaign.—Appointed Persian Interpreter to General Elphinstone.—His Religious Services at Cabul.—Perils of our Position in Affghanistan.—He proceeds with General Sale's Brigade, which is attacked throughout the Passes.—Insurrection at Cabul.—Murder of the Envoy.—Sale's Brigade advances to Jellalabad.

HAVELOCK had now been seventeen years in the army, and was still only a junior lieutenant. "If I stand fast in the world, however," he writes about this time, "I see that some of the acquaintances of my youth are pushing on. George Grote, the banker, was about two forms above me at school, and I knew him intimately. Fox Maule, who has just married Abercromby's niece, I knew as an urchin; and Lord Edmund Hay, who appeared in the last Gazette as a lieutenant-colonel by purchase, was two steps below me, as second lieutenant, in the Rifle Brigade. . . . I am, I believe, one step nearer a company than when I wrote to you last, and, perhaps, the coronation may give me another. Any augmentation in the army *might possibly* create a third, by restoring to the 13th the company cut off so cruelly in 1829, so that after all I may be a *real* captain at forty; at all events I am a pretty contented brevet at thirty-seven." But he could not fail to perceive how highly detrimental it was to his prospects to find others continually purchasing over his head. An effort was now made by his friends at Serampore to prevent this disheartening supersession, and Messrs Alexander and Co., the most eminent of the great

Havelock endeavours to obtain a company by purchase.

agency houses in Calcutta, consented to hold themselves in readiness to make good the value of a company whenever it might be required. The engagement was duly communicated to the regimental agent in England, and the dread of being again superseded was removed. But while Havelock's letter of grateful acknowledgment was on its way from Agra to Calcutta, the firm was swept into the Insolvent Court by the commercial crisis which at this time extinguished the chief mercantile establishments in Calcutta. His friends then applied to Messrs Mackintosh and Co. for similar aid, and it was cheerfully offered; but before their letter of credit could reach London they likewise had been obliged to suspend payment. A third application was made to the house of Messrs Fergusson and Co., which seemed likely to survive the general wreck, and they cordially responded to the request. Havelock's pulse now beat high with hope. He considered himself satisfactorily enrolled as a candidate for the first vacant company. "Such," he writes to Serampore, "are now my prospects, and on a bountiful Providence we must rely to guide us through all attendant difficulties, as he guards us from the greater dangers of unbelief and presumption." But the cup was dashed to the ground when it appeared to approach his lips. Before his communication could reach England this firm was likewise obliged to bend to the adversity of the times. The disappointment was grievous to Havelock's feelings, for supersession is perhaps the most bitter ingredient in a soldier's lot.

Thus deprived of the prospect of a company in his own corps, Havelock determined to seek an interpretership in one of the royal regiments. With this view he endeavoured to perfect himself in the Hindo-^{Is appointed interpreter to the 16th foot.} stanee and Persian languages, and then appeared for examination before a Station Committee. He passed the ordeal with credit, and then obtained permission to proceed to Calcutta and pass the higher examination at the college of Fort William, while his family proceeded to the sanatorium of Cherra-poongee, for the health of his third and infant son, Ettrick. He was at once pronounced

qualified for the appointment by his knowledge of the native languages. Soon after the interpretership of H.M.'s 16th Foot having become temporarily vacant, he was appointed to the post, and started for Cawnpore in June, 1834. He had scarcely reached the station when he heard of the death of the infant, and immediately wrote to Serampore :—

“I have been favoured in having been actively occupied with rather a troublesome court-martial, and it is probable that its proceedings will keep me at work to-day and part of to-morrow. This is better than having, in such seasons, too much leisure for recalling past events and images. But I feel myself so entirely surrounded by mercy that I could not under any circumstances be unhappy, though my human hopes have been so rudely dashed.”

A few weeks after he wrote to a friend suffering under a similar bereavement :—

“On taking up the ‘Hurkaru’ of the 20th this morning, the afflicting intelligence caught my eye of the death of your little girl. I hasten to offer my condolences; what are they worth? Positively nothing in the estimation of a father, since they cannot restore to him his departed child, nor reverse the decree of ‘Thou shalt go to her, but she shall not return to thee.’ Yet I have felt the voice of friendship to be soothing under such circumstances, and the assurance of sympathy to relieve the feeling of desertion and loneliness which with me has supervened on the first shock of this bereavement. I have not adverted to higher consolations, only because I know you have them ready at hand. You will feel, as I have felt, in the midst of the like sorrow, that I ought to check the sigh which intimated a desire to detain in such a world one who was pure and sinless, but yet for whom Jesus died, whose inheritance therefore was secure and imperishable, beyond doubt or surmise or misgiving, as glorious as everlasting.”

Havelock did not long hold the post of interpreter to the 16th. An officer of that regiment had qualified himself for its duties, and passed his examination in the College, and was accordingly nominated to the

Appointed to
the adjutancy
of the 13th.

appointment. Havelock now prepared to return to the duties of a subaltern in his own corps ; and on the 24th of January wrote, " I have every prospect of reaching Agra a full lieutenant of foot, without even the command of a company, and not a rupee in the world besides my pay and allowances, nor a rupee's worth, except my little house on the hill, and some castles in the air, even less valuable. Nevertheless, I was never more cheerful, or fuller of health and hope, and of humble dependence on Him who has so long guarded and guided me."

Meanwhile the adjutancy of the 13th became vacant, and Havelock made official application for it, through his colonel, to Lord William Bentinck, who, in addition to the office of Governor-General, had recently been appointed Commander-in-Chief. Lord William was no stranger to Havelock's character as a Christian, or his merits as a soldier. Havelock had been more particularly brought under his notice by an application he had recently presented through the commander of the regiment, that he and the Baptist soldiers, whose numbers had increased, should be permitted to assemble in their own chapel for Divine service, in accordance with their own tenets, instead of being marched on Sundays at church parade to the service of the Church of England. The memorial, to which reference has been made at the close of the previous chapter, was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief in England, with, as it was understood, a strong recommendation from Lord William Bentinck, who was always in advance of his age ; but the concession was not extended to dissenting soldiers before the month of July, 1839. Mrs Havelock had in the mean time returned from Cherra-poongee to Serampore, and ventured to second her husband's request in a letter to Lord William Bentinck, in which she pleaded his claim to the vacancy, on the ground of his qualifications and his past services. Lord William Bentinck requested her to cross over to Barrackpore Park. She was received by Lady William with the cordiality of a friend. While engaged in conversation with her, Lord William Bentinck entered the room with a packet of letters in his hand, and

referring to the subject of her communication, stated that he was anxious to read some letters to her which had been placed in his hands on the matter. Perceiving Mrs Havelock's perturbation, he said, "Before I allude to this correspondence, I give you the assurance that I have bestowed the adjutancy of the 13th on your husband, because he is unquestionably the fittest man in the corps for it." He then proceeded to read portions of the letters which had reached him. They were written by officers, whose ill-will had been roused by Havelock's religious exertions. They described him as a methodist and a fanatic, whose character as an officer was lowered by familiar intercourse with the men, and whose strong religious views would prevent him from acting with impartiality as adjutant. Lord William Bentinck said that from the inquiries he had made, he found that the men who were under the influence of Havelock's instructions were the most sober, and orderly, and best behaved among the men; he wished him to continue his religious exertions, and, if possible, convert the whole regiment; but, pointing to the letters with a smile, he added, "The adjutant must not preach."

On receiving the appointment to the adjutancy, Havelock proceeded from Cawnpore, which he was subsequently His exertions as adjutant. to enter as a conqueror, to Agrá, where he was soon after joined by Mrs Havelock. He continued in the discharge of his duties as adjutant with exemplary fidelity for three years and a half. A month or two after, he wrote: "I do not know whether you have observed it, but it is a thing to be recorded,—at last I have got a regimental step. I am now second, without expense or effort. We are now thinking of subscribing to get old K. to purchase too. It is expected that two more companies will shortly go in this way, which will of course be picked up by two boys, if nothing is done to prevent it. Yet the dread of getting ever so little in debt deters me from taking any step. But if something is not done, I must really live and die a lieutenant." It will be readily believed that with Sale for its colonel, and

Havelock for its adjutant, few regiments in India were in a state of higher efficiency than the 13th. He continued his religious instruction among the men with unabated zeal. But though he freely associated with them in the sanctuary, there was no relaxation in the duties exacted of them. Since the days of the Commonwealth, few men have ever succeeded like Havelock in combining the fellowship of religious communion with the strict discipline of military command. No soldier who knelt at the same altar with him was ever allowed to forget that, beyond that hallowed boundary, he was his master. The affectionate devotedness of the men was never dissociated from the awe with which he inspired them as their military superior. Through his exertions, chapels were erected near the regimental barracks, both for the Baptist soldiers and for the members of the Church of England, at which the attendance was large, as well on week days as on the Sabbath. The chapels afforded the men opportunities for devotional retirement and reading, which were to them a source of great enjoyment; and those who witnessed his exertions, averred that the influence of his Christian character, and the interest which he took in everything tending to the moral elevation of the men, had produced the most gratifying results. He had always felt the importance of sobriety to the welfare of the men, and to the consummation of military discipline. When invested with the authority of adjutant, he redoubled his efforts to promote habits of temperance among them. It was through his influence that a Temperance Society was formed in the regiment, of which Colonel Sale, and his own Christian friend, Captain Chadwick—a second Gardner in the corps—enrolled themselves as members. A coffee-room was built, and every accommodation provided which could attract the men from the canteen. In that coffee-room, Havelock was accustomed frequently to address them, with the view of encouraging sobriety and mental improvement.

Towards the end of 1836, the regiment having been

removed to Kurnaul, Mrs Havelock proceeded with her infant family to the hill station of Landour. On the 18th of October, on a calm moonlight night, a cry of fire was raised, and she was suddenly awaked from slumber by the crackling of bamboos and the blaze of the burning bungalow. She rushed out with the infant in her arms, and endeavoured to escape, but fell into the flames, and was rescued from destruction only through the exertions of a faithful native servant, who lifted her up, and wrapping her in his own blanket, conveyed her to a neighbouring hut; but the infant was so severely injured that she survived only a few days. The native servant then rushed back to the house, and at the imminent risk of his life, rescued the two boys, the elder of whom was severely burnt before assistance could reach him. Two of the servants, however, perished in the flames. A brother officer at the station sent Havelock the first intelligence of the calamity, and informed him that his wife was lying at the point of death. He was astounded by the blow, and it required all the strength of Christian principle to sustain his mind; but his letter to her parents was written in a spirit of calm resignation to the will of the Almighty. His men, on hearing of the calamity, came in a body to condole with him, and solicited permission to contribute a month's pay to make up his pecuniary loss. The offer was necessarily declined, but it afforded him the most gratifying token of their affectionate esteem. He hastened to the scene of desolation, but the medical attendant gave him no hopes of Mrs Havelock's recovery; and he wrote to Dr Marshman to prepare him for the next communication, which would, in all probability, announce the loss to him of an affectionate daughter, and to Havelock himself of a most devoted wife. For three days, during which he never left her couch, it appeared as if every moment would be her last; but, under the blessing of God, some symptoms of convalescence appeared on the fourth day, and she was at length completely restored to health. In the course of the ensuing year he lost his father, at the age of eighty; and his father-

Mrs Havelock's bungalow at Landour burnt, and her life endangered.

in-law, Dr Marshman, who died at Serampore at the age of seventy, after thirty-eight years of service in the cause of evangelization in India, to which he had devoted a fortune of forty thousand pounds.

At length, the long-coveted grade of captain came to the "neglected lieutenant," at the age of forty-three, without purchase. In his correspondence with the writer, after repeated disappointments, the couplet of Lord Byron—

Havelock is promoted to a captaincy.

"Nought's permanent among the human race,
Except the Whigs *not* getting into place"—

had frequently been the subject of a parody—

"Nought's permanent among the human race,
Except that Havelock ne'er will get that place!"

On his promotion to a company, in 1838, he wrote:—

"You have already been made aware that our old poetic saw, touching the contrariety in the nature of things to the attainment of unbought promotion in the 13th has lost its edge; and seemed for some days to have given way to the old, and if not infallible, yet piquant maxim, 'It never rains, but it pours.' My name, which had already remained in the grade of subaltern for nearly twenty-three years, and in that of lieutenant seventeen years, has been printed as captain in the 'London Gazette,' in succession to two several vacancies within a month. I ought to be thankful for the accession of rank, late as it has come, and for the prospect of a better provision for my family during my life-time and after my death. But how soon do the germs of discontent spring up in the corrupt human heart. I am ready to repine, did not faith forbid: 1st, Because I have only got advancement at last by the death of a dear friend; 2ndly, Impatience suggests that as things at present stand, it would have been better that I should not have been promoted till this war were over. As adjutant, I should have taken a great interest in the discipline and conduct of my corps. I hope I may not take less as a captain; but as regards the field of exertion, a captain is nearly as absolute a cipher as a lance corporal; not so an adjutant. I had reason to have expected superior staff employment—knowing that I stood strongly recommended for the post of

brigade major to the brigade to which my regimental commander might succeed ; but it has been ordered otherwise, and Sir Henry Fane has given the place to the claims of an older captain, who had served in the Peninsular war. I have no right to repine at this, but cannot help seeing that the safest rule is to allow commanders to select those whom *they* esteem fittest for the work ; and if this had been adhered to, I should now have been the brigade major of the 1st brigade. Thus have I scribbled on, knowing that you take an interest in all that concerns me. Understand me, I do not repine, and will not, by God's grace, repine at aught that may occur ; I only wish you, as the friend from whom I keep nothing, to know all about the bearings of my state and progress. I have indeed most abundant cause to be thankful. The sheet will never last at this rate. I must condense. I am ordered to the wars, with my sixty light infantry soldiers. What is to become of Hannah and my boys ? This question has been debated in all possible forms, and, all other plans being rejected, the choice now lies between Landour and Serampore ; and the question will be decided in favour of the latter, if you inform me that my hopes on one point are likely to be fulfilled. The thing nearest to my heart of earthly things is, the education of my boys. Mack is coming out. Will he, can he be persuaded to take Harry in hand, and fit him for the military college ? My views regarding the boy know no divarication. I have one object,—that he should be taught Greek enough, in which I have already entered him, to read the New Testament in the original, and be well crammed for Sandhurst."

Mr Mack, who reached India at the close of the year, took both the boys under his care, and laboured assiduously to impart to them the rudiments of Latin, Greek, and the mathematics, while their father was engaged in the field.

The war in which Havelock was now about to take part, was the expedition to Affghanistan, which began in in-
The Affghan war. justice, and ended in the most signal disaster, and which stands forth in the history of British India as the most stupendous act of fatuity to be found on its pages. England and Russia are the two European powers which exercise a paramount influence on the des-

tinies of Asia. By the impulse of progression inherent in their position, while England had been extending her Indian dominions westward, Russia had been advancing eastward with a steady pace. Since the peace of Tilsit, the influence of Russia had been steadfastly pushed on towards our frontier in India, and some even of the most sober of Indian politicians had predicted that the period was not far distant, when it must be decided on the banks of the Helmund, or the Indus, or the Sutlege, whether the empire of Hindoſtan should be Anglo-Saxon or Cos-sack. Russia had wrested some of her fairest provinces from the feeble kingdom of Persia, and had acquired that predominance in her councils which is conceded by fear to an imperious neighbour. Every movement of Persia in the direction of India was, therefore, considered by the Indian authorities as bringing Russian influence and intrigue nearer to our possessions in the East. In 1837, the schemes of Russia assumed a more vigorous and demonstrative character, and the apprehensions of the cabinet in Calcutta were concentrated on the movements in Central Asia.

The city of Herat, which has been justly regarded as the key of India, was at this time under the government of Shah Kamran, an independent ruler, of the Siege of Herat. Suddozye branch of the ruling family of Affghanistan. That province lies on the confines of Persia, and the King of Persia had for some time advanced a claim to it as the ancient patrimony of his crown; the acquisition of it thus became the salient point of Persian politics. An unsuccessful attempt was made to obtain possession of it in 1833. In 1837 the Persian monarch, acting under the influence of the Russian ambassador, determined to make another effort to acquire the city and the principality. The expedition was considered through Central Asia as the triumph of Russia, by whom it was instigated, over the influence of England, by whom it was deprecated. A large Persian army was collected for the siege of Herat, and the ulterior views of the Shah towards India were not disguised; it became necessary,

therefore, for the British Government to look to the safety of its north-west frontier. Captain Alexander Burnes, who had explored the regions of Central Asia, and was well acquainted with the character of its rulers, was deputed by the Government of India to Cabul, nominally on a commercial mission, but really with the object of watching the course of political events under the new aspect of affairs. On his arrival at Cabul, he found that the machinations of Russia had been extended to the court of Dost Mahomed, the Barukzye chief of Affghanistan. The Dost was at the time smarting under the loss of the province of Peshawur, of which Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Punjab, had recently despoiled him, and was anxious to obtain some assistance from the Government of India against this formidable neighbour. He had steadily resisted the overtures of Persia and Russia, and was anxious to connect himself with the lords of India; but Captain Burnes was, unfortunately, without authority to conclude any political arrangement with him. After two months had been wasted in idle and tantalizing visits, he was startled by the sudden appearance of a Russian envoy, with a direct communication from the Emperor at Petersburg to the chief of Cabul. Captain Burnes addressed the Government of India with great urgency, and endeavoured to arouse it to the imminent danger of the negotiations thus pushed up to the borders of India, and the necessity of securing for England that alliance with the Dost which Russia was so assiduously courting. But Lord Auckland was led to reject the salutary counsel of Captain Burnes, and instructed him to require Dost Mahomed to abstain from all foreign alliances, promising in return, simply, to restrain Runjeet Singh from all further aggressions—an offer without any value, for the Dost apprehended no new encroachment on his barren and uninviting territories. The contemptible return offered for so weighty a requisition at a time when Russian diplomatists were scattering magnificent promises through Central Asia, only served to irritate the Affghan ruler. He deter-

Mission of
Captain
Burnes to
Cabul.
Russian in-
trigues there.

mined, however, to make a final effort to conciliate Lord Auckland, before he threw himself into the arms of Russia; and addressed a letter to him, couched in language all but humiliating, and besought him to redress the grievances of the Affghans, and "give him a little encouragement and power." But the Government of India, acting under a most unaccountable spirit of infatuation, turned a deaf ear to his advances. Captain Burnes, finding that there was no prospect of any favourable result of his mission, quitted Cabul. The Russian envoy, who had been treated with studied neglect during these negotiations, was now admitted to the Cabul durbar, and caressed. He promised everything which the British representative had been unable to grant. He engaged to furnish Dost Mahomed with an abundant supply of money, and even to propitiate Runjeet Singh; and thus was Russian influence established in full vigour in Affghanistan. It is due to the memory of Havelock, and others who defended the policy pursued by the Indian Government towards Dost Mahomed, to state that they were but partially acquainted with the real merits of the question, and conscientiously believed that the ruler of Affghanistan had, of his own free will, lent himself to the designs of Russia, and become a participator in projects incompatible with the security of our eastern dominions. That opinion was fortified by the documents presented to Parliament, which were garbled to such an extent as to convey an impression of the policy and views of Dost Mahomed diametrically opposed to the truth. It is only within the last twelve months that the friends of the late Sir Alexander Burnes have succeeded in obtaining from Parliament an un mutilated edition of his despatches, by which his character has been triumphantly vindicated, and the folly of the Indian Government unequivocally established.

The Shah of Persia sat down before Herat on the 23rd of November, 1837. This event, coupled with the arrival of a Russian envoy at Cabul, created the greatest sensation throughout India. The

Effect on
India of Rus-
sian intrigues
in Central
Asia.

most exaggerated reports were industriously diffused of the approach of a mighty and invincible host of Persians and Russians to the banks of the Indus. Inflammatory papers, emanating from Persia, were distributed throughout India. The feeling of alarm was greater than had been felt since the threatened invasion of the Affghans at the beginning of the century. In the remote provinces of the Deccan, men began to bury their jewels in the earth. The crisis was portentous, and demanded the most decided measures. Unfortunately, the course which was obvious and safe, and most likely to be efficacious, was rejected, and the course which was tortuous, perilous, and costly, was adopted. Had Captain Burnes been nominated political envoy at this crisis, and authorized to offer a moderate subsidy to Dost Mahomed, and a supply of arms, as well as the interposition of our good offices with Runjeet Singh, Affghanistan would have been hermetically sealed against the machinations of Russia; and India would have been freed not only from danger, but alarm. But in an evil hour, it was resolved to dethrone Dost Mahomed, and seat a prince friendly to our interests on the throne of Cabul. Shah Soojah, who had been twice expelled from the kingdom, and had lived a pensioner on our bounty for more than twenty years at Loodiana, was to be drawn from obscurity, and reinstated in Affghanistan. A tripartite treaty was negotiated by Mr Macnaghten at Lahore, between Runjeet Singh, the British Government, and Shah Soojah, by which the two former engaged to assist the latter in ascending the throne of his ancestors. There was nothing in this treaty, however, to bind the English Government to send an army across the Indus to effect this object. At first, the aid to be given to Shah Soojah was limited to a supply of money, an accredited agent, and a body of officers to drill his levies. Shortly after, the assistance was swelled to the loan of two regiments. At length, Lord Auckland allowed his more sober judgment to be overruled by the ambition of his secretaries, Mr Macnaghten and Mr Colvin, and it was resolved to send a grand expedition, con-

sisting of twenty thousand men, across the Indus, by the most circuitous route and through the most difficult passes, to seat Shah Soojah on the throne of Cabul, and to raise the siege of Herat. On the 13th of September, 1838, the Commandet-in-Chief, Sir Henry Fane, published his Orders for organizing the army of the Indus; but by the time the troops were assembled the original and dominant cause of the expedition had disappeared.

A month before the investment of Herat by the Persian army, a young English soldier, Eldred Pottinger, arrived in the city, and took up his residence, unnoticed, in a caravanserai. He was a lieutenant in the Bombay Artillery, a nephew of Colonel, afterwards Sir Henry, Pottinger, the Resident in Scinde, by whom he had been sent to explore the various provinces of Central Asia. He travelled at first in the disguise of a horse-dealer, but on his arrival in Cabul, assumed the character of a Mahomedan Syud, and made his way in this dress through the wild district of the Hazaras to Herat. The Shah Kamran, and his minister Yar Mahomed, to whom he introduced himself as a British officer, were but too happy to avail themselves of his military skill for the defence of the city. For six months, he enabled them to baffle all the efforts of the besiegers, who found at the end of April that they had made no progress in their operations, though a European army might have mastered the city in as many hours. During the month of April, Mr, now Sir John, McNeil, the British minister to the Court of Persia, joined the besieging camp, presented his credentials to the king, and on the part of his own Government, entered his protest against the continuance of the siege. Soon after, Count Simonich, the representative of Russia, arrived in the camp, and not only encouraged the Persian monarch to persist in his operations, but took an active part in them. Mr McNeil, finding all his efforts counteracted by the ascendancy of the Russian minister, and seeing himself treated with increasing indignity, sent a final remonstrance to the Shah, and then retired from the scene.

Lieut. Pottinger's defence of Herat. The siege is raised.

On the 24th of June, the most vigorous assault in the course of the siege was made, under the immediate direction of a Russian general, and the city was on the point of being captured, when it was saved by the extraordinary gallantry of young Pottinger. The Persians were repulsed with great slaughter, and the Russian officer was killed. Under the advice of Mr McNeil, Lord Auckland, likewise, sent a small expedition, consisting of two steamers and five companies of Sepoys, to take possession of the island of Karrack, lying on the Persian coast. Rumour swelled the dimensions of the force, and it immediately became current through Persia that the English had captured the town of Bushire, and were in full march on the capital. The fears of the Shah were excited by the prospect of an English invasion in the most vulnerable part of his dominions, where the allegiance of his subjects was feeble, and, with the view of propitiating the Governor-General, orders were issued to abandon the siege. The Persian army was withdrawn from Herat on the 9th of September, 1838, eight months and a half after the commencement of the siege. The Russian minister retired with the Shah to his capital, and the fabric of Russian intrigue in Central Asia fell at once to the ground. The disposition of Dost Mahomed towards us ceased to be an object of any importance, and the expedition might have been relinquished with perfect safety. It ought at once to have been renounced, but Lord Auckland had committed himself by a manifesto dated at Simlah, the 1st of October, before the retirement of the Persians from Herat was known, in which he announced it to be the determination of Government "to raise up a lasting barrier against hostile intrigues and encroachments at Cabul;" and it was determined that the expedition should proceed across the Indus, to seat our puppet on the throne. But the force was reduced to one half its original proportions, and as there was no longer any grand achievement in prospect at Herat, Sir Henry Fane relinquished the command of the army, and the Bengal division was intrusted to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who

immediately obtained permission to appoint Havelock as his second aide-de-camp, all other staff appointments having been previously filled up. Havelock was thus rescued from the uninteresting duty of commanding sixty men, and placed in a position, on the staff of his old commander, which afforded larger scope for his military talent.

The Bengal army, about 9500 strong, marched from Ferozepore on the 10th of December, and moved down the Indus to Bukker, where it crossed that river and pursued its route to Cabul; but the object of the expedition was not accomplished by the capture of it, before the 8th of August, 1839. Eight months were thus wasted on an expedition which might have been completed in eight weeks. The direct route from Ferozepore to Cabul lay through the Punjab; but though Runjeet Singh was not only our ally, but a party to the tripartite treaty, he was little disposed to allow British troops to march across his territories. The army was, therefore, obliged to take a most circuitous route through sterile and hostile countries, and to thread its way through the most tremendous defiles, by which great loss of time, and a still greater loss of money, was incurred. It would be foreign to the object of this work to give the minute details of an expedition of which Havelock was only the historian. Those who are anxious to understand this portion of our Indian career will find their wishes amply gratified by the perusal of Kaye's "History of the War in Afghanistan," the most interesting of all the works which have hitherto appeared on British Indian history. In addition to the charm of its style, it is the only historical work as yet published which is based—not on glozing despatches and mendacious blue books but—on the original correspondence of the actors, the only genuine source of history. The expedition was marked by only one achievement of any interest, and the movements of the troops were rendered memorable only by the unexampled difficulties of the route, and the obstacles created by the stupendous passes they were obliged to traverse.

The Bengal
army breaks
ground on the
10th Decem-
ber, 1838.



At length, after a toilsome march of four months and a half, the force reached Candahar, on the 25th of April, on half rations and in a state of complete exhaustion. Happily for our interests, the city was found to have been evacuated by the Affghan chieftains, in consequence of the treachery of one Hajee Khan, a traitor of the deepest dye, who had been induced by our gold to desert his masters. Before reaching Candahar, Havelock wrote thus to Serampore:—

Force arrives
at Candahar.
Havelock's
letter.

“Well, here we are, playing the game up to this hour of the army without an enemy, and the enemy without an army. A pretty considerable march we have made of it to Bukkur, and through Shikarpore and Cutchee up the Bolan pass, and through a most wicked defile, called the Kojuck pass, to these plains. With reference to the object which induced our Government to send us out of our own provinces, you will see that we have done something. We are within *five* marches of the western capital of the patronized monarch, and all accounts concur in showing that the Candahar chiefs have been unable to collect more than two or three thousand horse to make head against us. Our siege train is across the Kojuck pass; the chiefs have no infantry, and no guns, except those mounted on their walls. It is hardly to be doubted that the game of the Barukzyes is up at Candahar. In truth, my dear Marshman, it is time that we should have either a battle, or that which I have grown wise enough to know is a much better thing, a general break up of hostility in the way of timely submission to the Shah. At Candahar, we hope to find supplies, but at present grain sells in our camp at a seer and a half the rupee—a pound and a half for a shilling. Our Sepoys are on half rations, and our camp followers on quarter rations, and even at this rate we have not provisions for above ten days.”

The army rested at Candahar for two months, waiting for the gathering in of the harvest. In the mean time, Sir John Keane, having come up with the Bombay division, assumed the command of the expeditionary force. The army marched towards the capital on the 27th of June, and on that same day death closed Runjeet Singh's checkered and successful career of ambition at Lahore. The only fortress of importance

March from
Candahar.
Capture of
Ghuznee.

between Candahar and Cabul was Ghuznee, the pride and boast of the Affghans, which, having never been captured, was considered impregnable. During our inactivity at Candahar its defences had been repaired and strengthened, its garrison increased to 3000 men, under the command of Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, and provisions laid in for six months. These preparations were but imperfectly known to Sir John, and he was assured by his political associate that the fort would be abandoned on the first appearance of our troops, and he was therefore persuaded to leave his siege guns at Candahar. Havelock, whose information was generally more accurate than that of others, felt assured that the fortress would be defended, and he endeavoured to impress on Sir John Keane the importance of taking on the battering train. These heavy guns had been dragged with vast labour through the terrific defiles of the Bolan and Kojuck passes, at it appeared preposterous now to advance without them at a time when they might be invaluable. He adduced the case of Napoleon at Acre, of Wellington at Burgos, and of Lake at Bhurtpore, "who had each found cause to rue the hour in which they attacked fortifications, unprovided with a sufficient number of guns of breaching calibre." Sir John Keane, however, listened to the advice of the over-confident politicals, and left the guns at Candahar. But it was found on reconnoitring Ghuznee that the enemy were prepared to defend it to the last extremity, and the wisdom of Havelock's counsel was discovered when it was too late. It was impossible to breach the solid walls with the feeble artillery Sir John Keane had brought with him. Any attempt to carry the fortress by escalade must have occasioned great delay and a fearful slaughter, and it would have been perilous to wait for the arrival of the guns. In this dilemma the ready genius of Captain Thomson, of the Bengal Engineers, rescued the expedition from its perilous position. He advised that a bold attempt should be made, under cover of night, to blow up the only gate which had not been walled up. Under his direction, nine hundred pounds of

powder, enclosed in twelve bags, were conveyed during the night of the 22nd July to the Cabul gate, while the attention of the enemy was distracted by a simultaneous discharge of guns and musketry in other directions. The weather was boisterous, and the enemy were unable to hear the trampling of feet, or to discover the approach of the party. Everything conspired to the success of the project. "The powder exploded, shivered the massive barricade in pieces, and brought down in hideous ruin, into the passage below, masses of masonry and fractured beams." The forlorn hope rushed in, followed by the main column under Colonel Sale, and the British standard was planted on the citadel by the gallant Ensign Frere, of the 13th. Sir John Keane was on a neighbouring elevation, watching with painful anxiety the success of the attempt on which the fate of the expedition seemed to hang. At the first streak of dawn he requested Havelock to ride down to the gate and bring him tidings of the progress of the project. He reached the spot immediately after the explosion, and, plodding over the débris of the battlements, entered the gate, and saw Colonel Sale on the ground, struggling desperately with a powerful Affghan, and calling out to Captain Kershaw, who came up at the moment, to "do him the favour to pass his sword through the body of the infidel." After seeing Sale in safety Havelock rode back to Sir John Keane, and reported the complete success of the enterprise. None of the excesses which invariably attend the capture of a town by assault, were committed on this occasion. "The self-denial, mercy, and generosity of the hour," remarks Havelock, "may be attributed to the fact of the European soldiers having received no spirits since the 8th of July, and having found no liquor among the plunder of Ghuznee. No candid man of any military experience will deny that the character of the scene in the fortress and citadel would have been far different if individual soldiers had entered the town primed with arrack, or if spirituous liquors had been discovered in the Affghan depôts."

The force marched towards Cabul on the 31st of July, but it met with no further resistance. The fall of Ghuznee sealed the fate of Affghanistan. Dost Mahomed, deserted in his utmost need by his mercenaries, as well as by his native troops, abandoned his fine park of artillery, his capital, and his throne, and fled westward towards the inaccessible passes of Bameean. Shah Soojah entered Cabul on the 8th of August, accompanied by British officers and surrounded by the imposing array of military pageantry. From his own subjects he received no demonstrations of loyalty. The inhabitants of Cabul preserved a dead and ominous silence. It was with a feeling of deep irritation that they watched the long files of infidel soldiers, on whose shoulders the Shah had been raised to the throne, defiling through the streets of their capital. The object of the expedition had now been accomplished. A friendly power had been substituted for a hostile power in Affghanistan, and a barrier, which was fondly believed to be permanent, had been established against schemes of aggression on the north-west frontier. The time had, therefore, arrived when "Shah Soojah, being secured in power, and the integrity of Affghanistan established, the British army was to be withdrawn." But our difficulties in Affghanistan were only just commencing. Lord Auckland found, to his great mortification, that if our army were withdrawn the work which had been accomplished at so vast a sacrifice of treasure would be undone in a month. The throne, which had been established by British bayonets, must be maintained by the same agency, and at the expense of the Indian treasury. It was found, when too late, that it was easier to get into Affghanistan than to get out of it. It became necessary, therefore, to retain a British force in the country, to uphold the authority of our protégé, and to garrison the most important fortresses. The command of the army of occupation was given to Sir Willoughby Cotton, and he was allowed a Persian interpreter on his staff. With a generous importunity he

Capture of
Cabul. Have-
lock returns
to the pro-
vinces.

pressed Havelock to accept the appointment, in conjunction with the post he then held of aid-de-camp, but he was induced to decline the offer.

The position which Havelock had occupied on the general's staff had given him the best opportunity of tracing the origin and progress of events during the campaign. He had kept a diary of the movements of the force, and he was anxious to publish a history of the war, before the interest attached to these operations should subside. Sir John Keane, on hearing of his design, gave him free access to the records in his office. Instead, therefore, of accepting the proposal of Sir Willoughby, he resolved to hasten to Calcutta, and prepare his work for the press.

"As regards myself," he writes to Serampore, "I have once more commenced the labours of authorship, and in a few weeks hope to have ready for the press, 'Personal Narrative of the Marches of the Bengal Troops of the Army of the Indus.' I have determined to publish in London. Burnes, of whom I see much, and who is not going to publish himself, tells me that Murray would give a good price if the work were despatched speedily. The money is of course *now* the whole inducement. I am too old for fame. Now, answer me on this topic *shairp*, as the above-named traveller and diplomatist is wont to say. I will, if you please, send the papers down to you, and you can hastily look through them; but, mind, *shairp* is to be the word in the whole transaction. An early sale is the thing desired, as *bare* lucre for my boy's education is the only object. One topic more; in preference to every other plan and project, I would like employment in another Burmese war, if there is to be another, and if you can manage among your friends at the Presidency to get me into it on the staff."

With this manuscript in his portfolio, Havelock turned his back on Affghanistan, and hastened to Serampore.

On his arrival at Ferozepore, in January, 1840, he had the happiness of making the acquaintance of Captain Henry Lawrence, then an assistant of Mr George Clerk, in the political department. The mutual esteem contracted in this first interview gradually ripened

Havelock re-
turns to
India.

into the most solid friendship. Men like Havelock and Lawrence are naturally drawn towards each other by the attraction of genius, but in this case there was the additional bond of a complete community of feeling on the great question of religion. In the course of his journey towards Serampore, Havelock reproached himself bitterly with the step he had taken, and on his arrival at Lahore on the 30th December, wrote thus :—

“ My last, dated Peshawur, will have informed you of my intention of marching for the provinces the next day, and too late have I found out that never in my life have I made so false a move. I was long in doubt about it, and at last decided wrong. From the moment it was decided that Sir Willoughby Cotton was to assume the command in Affghanistan, I ought to have made up my mind to remain there with him. Instead of this, swayed by the lesser motive of sending off my unfortunate publication in proper form to England, I have made a sad sacrifice of worldly advantages and military prospects ; neither am I satisfied at all with the course I have taken as regards the claims of gratitude which Sir Willoughby had on me. He always deprecated my return to Hindostan, not only attaching a value to my services, which my modesty was bound to repudiate, but pointing out the step as highly injurious to my prospects. About this time the aid-de-camps to brigadiers were abolished, and I much apprehended that I should not long stand as second aid-de-camp to a major-general. This, and the desire to bring out my book, as you had proposed, decided me, and I urged the measure of my *rook sut* (leave to depart), and left Peshawur. I have by this step lost my only military patron, my situation as aid-de-camp, and a post as interpreter, which a day or two after was sanctioned by the Governor-General, a place made purposely for me. The two situations, with my pay and allowances, would have been equal to 819 rupees a month. I have never been very fond of money, but my children need it. Moreover, I am not quite free from self-reproach in the matter, which of all things I dread.”

In reply to this letter, he was advised to send down his manuscript, and to return to Cabul ; to which he replied :—

“ Believe me sincere when I add that I am grateful for your advice to myself ; but, in a word, though I believe I shall regret

to the latest moment of my life having, under a false impression as to my line of duty, left the army and Sir Willoughby's staff, yet I cannot see that any advantage would arise from my now returning. I went away with the avowed intention of preparing my book for publication at Serampore; and though Sir Willoughby might well, and doubtless did, reckon me a great fool for taking my departure on such an errand, leaving, as it turned out, such advantages behind me, yet he would esteem me little less than a madman, I think, if I were to rush back again across the frontier, my meditated purpose incomplete. He, moreover, has nothing now, I apprehend, to give in the way of staff employment. I may as well, therefore, wear out my leave of absence in preparing my unlucky memoir for transmission to London, with the intent of then re-joining my corps, and taking the command of a company of light infantry, amidst the mews of Cabul, or going to its dépôt at Kurnaul, as I may be required to do."

The work was set in type at Serampore, and despatched with all speed to England. So intensely did he give up his mind to this labour that, during his residence at Serampore, he was generally at his desk before four in the morning. It was published by Colburn in London in two duodecimo volumes. But it fell stillborn from the press. Parliament and the public were satisfied by the assurances of the ministry that the war was a just and necessary war. The laurels of the expedition had been distributed. Lord Auckland had been created an earl, Sir John Keane a peer, and Mr Macnaghten a baronet; and the interest in these transactions had died out. The only feeling of disappointment manifested by Havelock was expressed in the following sentence: "Thacker has evidently done his best in the matter, and it is well to have had the publication, such as it is, launched at once; but I think the whole affair from beginning to end a pretty intelligible hint to me to stick, for the remainder of my life, to my own trade, and have nothing more to do with authorship." But, whatever may have been Havelock's mortification at this want of success, no one who can appreciate his military commentaries will regret that he bestowed his time on the compilation of this work, rather than on the dull duties of Persian inter-

Havelock
publishes the
Personal Nar-
rative in Eng-
land.

preter at Cabul. It is the standard history of that expedition, remarkable for the clearness of the narrative and the style, its vivid descriptions, and the honesty and impartiality of its strictures on the tactics of the campaign. In few military memoirs will be found passages more attractive from their graphic touches than Havelock's record of the passage of the Bolan pass, the capture of Ghuznee, and the entry of Shah Soojah into Cabul. It was in reference to the memoirs of campaigns like his own, by those who were personally engaged in them, that Havelock subsequently remarked, "When the triumphs of war have been achieved, I know no more ennobling employment to which a man can devote the leisure of peace than committing to paper, with the frankness of a soldier, the candour of a gentleman, and the moral courage of a freeborn Englishman, his recollections of the interesting events in which it has been his good fortune to take part. God be praised, the military commentator need not dread in this land the secret dungeon of Bülow. Our institutions and public opinion secure to us the liberty of printing; and common sense, unawed by a few who have not kept pace with their age, recognizes in the nineteenth century the perfect compatibility of the most implicit obedience in the ranks and in the field, with thorough independence of spirit in the republic of letters. Contemporary memoirs are the means of which the future historian gladly avails himself, or of which he bitterly laments the want, when he comes to trace with an impartial hand the picture of events which have influenced the happiness of large portions of the human race. Thus only can posterity arrive at that truth, which we fear it is, in these days, the almost recognized task of despatches, manifestoes, blue books, speeches in favour of parliamentary votes of thanks, and holiday harangues after public dinners, to conceal from the readers and auditors of our times."

In the month of June, 1840, Havelock returned to Cabul in charge of a detachment of recruits for Affghanistan. During the voyage on the river he renewed his intercourse with his old commander in

Havelock returns to Cabul. Letters to General Smith.

the Rifle corps, Major-General Harry Smith, now Adjutant-General of Queen's troops in India.

" Benares, September 5, 1840.

" My dear General,—I cannot refrain from writing you one line on the strange state of public affairs. A pretty business they have made of it beyond the Indus. So it appears that Shah Newaz Khan, the Beloche, whom they set up in the place of the former Begler Beg, Mihrab Khan, who fell sword in hand, has turned traitor, and admitted his countrymen hostile to us into Khelat, which we shall therefore have to *retake*. Nearer to our frontier a young gentleman, politically employed, intelligent, but wholly inexperienced, has been soldiering on his own account, and got terribly thrashed, as the accounts say. So fresh exertions must be made to enable us to hold Affghanistan, and a Beloche campaign seems unavoidable. General Ventura, when I saw him last year at Peshawur, held forth to me with much energy on the importance of our tenure of Khelat, as the centre of Belochistan. Look at the map, and you will see that he was not far wrong, for not only does it turn everything, defensively considered, which might advance against us from Herat, but it is to be recollected that sooner or later the hour of conflict with Persia will arrive, and then who can estimate the advantage of our having Belochistan properly in hand? . . . But I forget in my belligerent enthusiasm, that I am prating to my master, which I pray you to pardon."

" October 3, 1840.

" If one of our majors would wisely consider himself *passé*, in point of health, as others think him, I have the money ready for him, and I am not sure that at this moment there is even one before me prepared. But he is a game old fellow, and will I suppose struggle on as long as there is war a-foot, and then others will step in. I feel that it is time I ought to be trying to ascend the ladder, if ever, for as the *battle of Glasgow Green* was fought in 1820, I fear I must now be not very far from forty-six. Having been just five times purchased over in my own corps, it is not unfair to use money as an engine in my turn, if opportunity offer."

Havelock, on arriving at Ferozepore with his recruits, met with General Elphinstone, who had been appointed to the chief command in Affghanistan, on the retirement of Sir Willoughby Cotton. At this

Havelock is appointed Persian inter-

period, there was no military post of greater responsibility in the Indian empire, or which required more military experience and energy, than the command in Affghanistan; and the appointment of General Elphinstone to this important office by Lord Auckland was one of the most fatal errors of his reign. Though a man of the most amiable disposition and the greatest personal intrepidity, he was so complete a martyr to gout as to be physically incapable of any exertion, even if he had been eminent for his professional qualifications. He immediately appointed Havelock his Persian interpreter, and ever after placed the most perfect confidence in his military judgment. Havelock never alluded to his urbanity and generosity of feeling without lively gratitude, though he could not but deeply regret that Government should have thought fit to select for this weighty command an officer who was utterly incapacitated for it by disease.

Havelock reached Cabul at the beginning of the year 1841, after an absence of fifteen months, and was astounded at the measures which had been intermediately adopted. In his narrative of the war, and his remarks on the course to be pursued for our security in Affghanistan, he had affirmed that the safety of our position in the capital depended, in a military point of view, on our retaining a firm hold on the Bala Hissar. He described it as the key of Cabul, from which the troops who held it ought not to suffer themselves to be dislodged but by siege, awing the turbulent populace of Cabul by their mortars and their howitzers. On his return, he found that instead of being held in strength by our troops, it was occupied by the King's seraglio. The troops were lodged in the cantonment which had been built at a little distance from the city. It was scarcely capable of defence, being surrounded by a low rampart easily surmounted, and commanded by neighbouring heights and buildings on every side. The provisions of the force were, moreover, stored in a small fort detached from the cantonment. Havelock considered that an error of the gravest character had been committed in the choice of such a position for the garrison,

preter to
General
Elphinstone.

Havelock at
Cabul.

and his opinion was fatally verified before the close of the year.

During the six months of Havelock's second residence in Cabul, he revived the religious services with his ^{Havelock's religious services.} men, in which several of the officers of the ~~garrison~~ likewise assisted. Of the meetings which he held, and their interesting character, as well as their beneficial result, there is a very pleasing record from the pen of the late Sir John Login, one of the officers attached to the Herat Mission, an intimate friend of Havelock, who was passing through Cabul on his way to India :—

“In May, 1841, Havelock was on the staff of General Elphinstone ; but as his old regiment, the 13th, was then at Cabul, he was able to meet the men again, and, assisted by some officers of artillery—which will always, I trust, have good men and true in its ranks, like many I could name, along with Henry Lawrence—he was able to assemble them on sabbath evenings for Divine service, and to meet them occasionally during the week in a tent which had been set apart for the purpose. On many of these occasions I had the satisfaction of being present during my stay in Cabul, up to September, 1841, and I have to this day a very vivid recollection of the fervour with which all joined in the service, and the heart with which they sung the hymns which Havelock read out to them, and amongst others,—

‘Ye nations round the earth, rejoice
Before the Lord, your Sovereign King ;
Serve Him with cheerful heart and voice,
With all your tongues his glory sing.’

“On the last sabbath evening that I was among them, among the officers who were present on that occasion I can remember Dawes, Richard Maule, Vincent Eyre, and, I think, Eldred Pottinger of the artillery ; and I perfectly recollect thinking at the time that I was among soldiers of the *right sort*, and that when their services were required they might be depended on. That I was not wrong in this confidence, the defence of Jellalabad by these very men, a very short time afterwards, can testify. Many of the men present were serjeants and corporals, who had served under Havelock when adjutant.”

Our position in Affghanistan was now daily becoming

more perilous. The difficulties of that position may indeed be said to have begun when our success was completed by the victorious occupation of the capital. It was soon discovered that the whole expedition was an egregious and irretrievable blunder. The restored monarch was from the first regarded with ill-disguised antipathy by his subjects, doubly so from the foreign aid with which he had mounted the throne and was maintained on it. As Christians, we were regarded with that intense hatred which Mahomedans entertain towards all Infidels, and the Shah was upbraided with having been the instrument of introducing them into the country. Our presence in Affghanistan was a source of irritation which no exercise of political virtue could mitigate. The vigorous measures which we were constrained to adopt to ensure any degree of tranquillity, served to increase our unpopularity. The various tribes in that region of mountains and defiles had for ages maintained a lawless independence, and were indignant at the restraints we imposed on their turbulence. The chiefs were in a state of permanent hostility to us, and though they proffered submission on the approach of our troops, resumed their sullen opposition as soon as they were withdrawn. In the thirty months in which we occupied Affghanistan, there was no repose for our military or political officers. Even when there was an occasional gleam of sunshine, there always appeared to be a storm looming in the distance. In the course of the year 1840, Dost Mahomed, after having encountered our troops at Purwundurra, surrendered himself to the envoy and was conveyed to Calcutta; but he left behind him a son, Akbar Khan, a youth of restless and fiery disposition, who was incessantly intriguing for our expulsion, and proved a more troublesome enemy than his father. Our Government, from first to last, was a government of sentry-boxes. Most gladly would Lord Auckland have washed his hands of the connection so inauspiciously formed; but in the false position in which we had placed ourselves, we could not retire from the country without disgrace, or continue to hold it with-

Peril of our position in Affghanis-tan.

out the prospect of insolvency. The original cost of the expedition had been prodigious, but it was the continual drain on the revenues of India that was found to be insupportable. We were obliged to maintain an army of twenty thousand men beyond the Indus, without the blessing of security, or the prospect of a termination of our difficulties. The revenue of the country was scarcely £150,000, and the annual cost of our armament exceeded this sum tenfold. To add to these embarrassments, our troops were separated from their own territories by many hundred miles; the intervening space was occupied by doubtful friends or positive enemies, and there was interposed between our garrison in Affghanistan and the Indus, the most formidable mountain passes, which a handful of resolute and well-equipped men might hold against a whole army.

The Envoy, however, was full of confidence, and amidst all the outbreaks and alarms of the year—the third of our occupation — endeavoured to persuade himself that the country was settling down into tranquillity. He had just been nominated to the more dignified office of Governor of Bombay. He had made arrangements for quitting Cabul in November, and was desirous of bequeathing the Government he had constructed to his successor in the most secure and satisfactory state; and, though it was resting on a volcano, seemed to resent every report of disaffection. General Elphinstone, whose gout was excruciating, had sent in his resignation, and was preparing to leave the country. The Supreme Government was calling aloud for retrenchments. The treasury in Calcutta had been exhausted by the demands of Affghanistan; and the subscriptions to the loan, which it had been found necessary to open, were coming in but slowly, so general was the mistrust of our policy. The Envoy was constrained to respond to the call, and determined to relieve the military establishments in Affghanistan of the charge of three regiments, whose presence, in the assumed quietude of the country, was no longer deemed necessary by him. At the same time, by

Sir William
Macnaghten
appointed
Governor of
Bombay.

an act of unaccountable rashness, it was resolved to curtail the allowances granted to the Ghilzye chiefs, to whom the mountain-passes between Cabul and Jellalabad belonged. Of these mountaineers Havelock had remarked, that "to the politics of Affghanistan they were magnanimously indifferent. They cared not which of their rulers, whether Barukzye or Suddozye, lorded in the Bala Hissar, provided they were left in the undisturbed enjoyment of their ancient privileges of levying tribute from caravans, or of mercilessly plundering all who resisted the exaction; or received from the existing Government a handsome annual stipend, in commutation of the sums raised in virtue of their prescriptive rights." The native rulers at Cabul had always found it more advantageous to subsidize these mountaineers than to attempt to coerce them. On the establishment of Shah Soojah, their annual stipend was fixed at £8000. Their part of the compact had been fulfilled with the most exemplary fidelity. "They had," as Havelock remarked, "prevented even a finger from being raised against our posts, courtiers, and weak detachments. Convoys of all descriptions had passed through these terrific defiles, the strongest barriers of mountains in the world, with little or no interruption from these predatory tribes. The transmission of letters to our own provinces was as regular as between Calcutta and any station in Bengal."

It was now resolved to reduce their stipends by one half. The chiefs were summoned to Cabul, received the intimation with apparent acquiescence, made their salaam, and returned to their mountains, where they immediately blocked up the passes, and plundered a caravan. The tocsin of alarm and indignation was now sounded from peak to peak, and all communication with India was at once cut off. The 35th Native Infantry was under orders to return to Hindostan, with a squadron of cavalry, and a detachment of Broadfoot's Sappers, and two guns, and it was supposed that this force would be sufficient effectually to chastise, as the Envoy said, the "impudence of these rascals," and re-open

The stipends of the Ghilzyes stopped, and the insurrection begins.

the communication with India. But the force was attacked with great fury on the first night of its march by the infuriated Ghilzyes, aided by a rabble which had flocked from Cabul to the scene of plunder. This was the first of that series of calamities which terminated in our expulsion from Cabul. Havelock had written to General Smith two months before :—"The Court of Directors is tired of the expense of hostilities, and will back out as best it may, and we shall rub on until fresh aggression forces us into the field." We were now forced into the field in real earnest. The crisis of our policy had arrived, but the Commander of the forces, owing to physical weakness, was in no condition to cope with it. "He had," as Havelock wrote, "been confined for five months to his couch, or his chamber, by one of the most fearful visitations of sickness which mortal man ever endured. He obtained some relief as the weather grew cooler, but the attack had reduced him to a state of the most pitiable debility of mind and body, of which he was painfully conscious." Captain Broadfoot, on the eve of his departure from Cabul with the 35th, waited on him for instructions. He was in bed, suffering intense pain, but insisted on getting up and being helped into his sitting-room. He was greatly exhausted by the exertion, and it was fully half an hour before he could fix his attention on business. On Captain Broadfoot's taking leave of him, he said, "In case you go with the detachment, as I hope you will, pray clear the passes quickly, and let me get away, for if anything were to turn up, I feel myself unfit for it, body and mind, and I have told Lord Auckland so."

As soon as the attack on the 35th was announced at Cabul, General Sale, who had been appointed to command the brigade returning to India, was ordered to move out with the 13th Light Infantry, and assist in clearing the passes. Havelock had a "most indignant recollection of his absence from Purwundurra in the previous year, when his regiment was engaged, and he was determined not to allow the present opportunity of active service to escape him." He, there-

General Sale's
brigade pro-
ceeds to the
passes. Have-
lock accom-
panies it.

fore, "obtained permission of General Elphinstone to attach himself temporarily to General Sale's brigade." The force left Cabul at short notice, and indifferently equipped. As soon as it entered the Khoord Cabul pass, a storm of fire was poured down from the heights on both sides. The General then sent up his skirmishers, who dislodged the enemy, driving them from rock to rock, while the main body pushed through the defile. This infuriated onslaught of the enemy, in which General Sale received a serious wound, gave him a foretaste of the opposition he was likely to encounter as he ran the gauntlet of the fearful defiles between Cabul and Peshawur. Leaving the 35th Native Infantry beyond the Khoord Cabul pass, he marched back to Bootkhak, and from thence sent despatches to the capital, with a report of his engagement with the enemy; stating, at the same time, that it was impossible for him to move forward without reinforcements and additional carriage cattle. Knowing the feeling of security which pervaded the minds of Sir William Macnaghten and General Elphinstone, he requested Havelock to take charge of his despatches, and in a personal conference to enforce the necessity of immediate aid. It was his importunity, aided by the conviction of the Envoy and the General, that they could not leave Cabul till the passes were clear, which procured a large reinforcement, and, what was equal, if not greater, value, a plenteous supply of cattle. After passing a week in Cabul, and seeing to the despatch of men and supplies, Havelock again obtained permission of General Elphinstone to join the fighting brigade; and he left the Envoy and the General, on the morning of the 19th, "calmly busied in their preparations to leave Cabul, the one for Bombay, and the other for England." Not a syllable was breathed by either of any expected insurrection at the capital. They both considered the Ghilzyes a race of hereditary robbers and arrant cowards, and the rising a local and temporary *émeute*. There was not even a ripple on the tranquil surface of the waters, to indicate the approach of that tempest which was so soon to lash them into fury.

During Havelock's residence of a week in Cabul, it was an object of serious consideration whether it was his duty to remain with General Elphinstone, or offer to return to General Sale. On the morning of his departure, or of a preceding day, he came, in the course of his Scripture reading, to the passage in the 39th of Jeremiah,—“Go and speak to Ebed-melech the Ethiopian, saying, Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel; Behold, I will bring my words upon this city for evil, and not for good; and they shall be accomplished in that day before thee. But I will deliver thee in that day, saith the Lord: and thou shalt not be given into the hands of the men of whom thou art afraid. For I will surely deliver thee, and thou shalt not fall by the sword, but thy life shall be for a prey unto thee: because thou hast put thy trust in me, saith the Lord.” It has been supposed from this circumstance that Havelock opened his Bible to divine the course he ought to pursue, from the nature of the passage which might first catch his eye; and that having received some vague intimations from his moonshee of the coming storm, he determined to provide for his personal safety by leaving the city. It can scarcely be necessary to defend a man of Havelock's character from any suspicion of such superstition or cowardice. He read the 39th of Jeremiah on that morning simply because he had read the 38th chapter on the preceding day. At that time the post of danger was with General Sale's brigade in the passes; the abode of safety was apparently at the capital, which was in a state of unruffled tranquillity. Sir Alexander Burnes had assured him that there was no fear of any insurrection. Havelock was anxious for action, and he went where he thought it was most likely to be found, to the Khoord Cabul camp. Writing to General Smith, on the 25th of November, he says:—“Sir Boyle Roche, the Irish member, long since decided that a man could not be in two places at once, unless he were a bird. As I am an unfeathered biped I must be content to be here, though I should like also to be at Cabul, where the crisis is so interesting. If you have got any of my former letters

Havelock's
supposed rea-
sons for leav-
ing Cabul.

you will be aware that, while profound peace reigned in that capital, I was permitted to attach myself to Sir Robert Sale's column; and that, the insurrection having broken out while its head-quarters were at Gundamuck, I have been inseparable from its fate and fortunes since." But in after days, when the terrific scenes at Cabul rose to view, and he recalled to mind the remarkable passage which was incidentally presented to him on the morning of the 19th of October, he could not help noticing its singular, and to a certain degree, its prophetic correspondence with subsequent events.

Strengthened by these reinforcements Sir Robert Sale pushed forward, and having rejoined Colonel Monteith, advanced on the 22nd October, with the whole body of troops, arranged to meet every emergency, ^{Sir Robert Sale advances.} through seventeen miles of defiles, to the valley of Tezeen. The force was incessantly attacked, and it now appeared certain that throughout the whole range of mountains the inhabitants were universally in arms, and determined to oppose the progress of our troops. Sir Robert Sale felt that though everything appeared peaceful at the capital, he had acted wisely in refusing to advance without reinforcements. The next morning, the fort of Meer Afzul Khan was attacked and carried, and he sent a submissive letter to Captain Macgregor, the political agent, which led to a conference with him and other Ghilzye chiefs. A convention was patched up, and it was agreed that their allowances, which had been curtailed, should be restored, and that no chief should be held responsible for robberies committed beyond his own boundary. Hostages were given by the Affghans, ten in number, who subsequently accompanied the force, and a supply of provisions and forage was sent into the camp some little time after. At Tezeen, General Sale determined to send back the 37th Native Infantry to Cabul, together with half Broadfoot's sappers and half the mountain train, partly from the deficiency of camels, and partly in compliance with his promise to General Elphinstone. Havelock prepared to return to Cabul with this detachment, and resume his duties with the General-in-

Chief. "But General Sale was lying at the time on his pallet in the fort of Meer Afzul Khan at Tezeen, suffering intense agony from the wound he had received at Khoord Cabul. When he heard of my intention to return, he at once interposed, represented to me that, rendered helpless in some measure by the severe fracture he had sustained, and invested with an important command, he could not consent to be deprived of the services of an additional staff officer; that General Elphinstone's permission to me was indefinite; that the Cabul staff was large, and the capital still tranquil; whereas the conduct of the Ghilzyes was in more than one respect suspicious. My remonstrances were perpetually met and overborne by the same arguments. Finally, General Sale, loading himself with all the responsibility of the measure, told me that I *must* accompany him, and that Captain Paton should be the bearer of his reasons for requiring this. Thus I was brought to take part in the celebrated passage of the Ghilzye defiles by General Sale." Such is the record of this transaction by Havelock, but it may now be remarked, without any appearance of invidiousness, that General Sale's importunity arose from the value he attached to Havelock's services at this crisis. A braver soldier than the General never drew sword; he was not only distinguished by personal courage, but was the cause of valour in others, for his undaunted bravery never failed to inspire his men with enthusiasm in the presence of an enemy. At the same time he was not eminent as a strategist, and sometimes shrunk from the responsibility of action, and was therefore anxious to retain near him one on whose military judgment and spirit, eighteen years of experience had taught him to place the most implicit reliance.

The troops moved on from Tezeen through the Ghilzye defiles, but it soon became evident that the treaty with chieftains was so much waste paper; the hostages afforded no protection from attacks. "The mountaineers, writes Havelock, "attacked our rear-guard in march on the 26th at Sei Baba, on the 27th at Kutu Sing, and on the 28th on approaching Jugdulluk.

The brigade
moves from
Tezeen to
Gundamuck.

They were repulsed on every occasion ; but on nearing Soorkab, a perfect ocean of baggage began to flow over the mountain, and the rebels took heart, resumed the initiative in their fashion, and fell upon the rear. By the praiseworthy exertions of Captains Backhouse, Broadfoot, and Fenwick, order was restored, and the rear-guard extricated from the defile. Our bane throughout has been our superfluous baggage and heavy camp equipage, which may, and must in Affghanistan, be reduced in quantity and form. Sepoys' *pals* sufficed for our British soldiers in Ava, and might here, while the whole of the tents, baggage, and ammunition ought to be carried on ponies (yaboos), not camels, and the greater portion of all but the ammunition left in depôt, when a rapid dash into a mountainous country is meditated."

At length, after eighteen days of harassing warfare through these tremendous passes, the troops found a brief repose at Gundamuck. It was one of the halting-stations of the rulers of Cabul on their way to the winter residence at Jellalabad ; and the troops were delighted to exchange the bleak and barren rocks which they had been so long traversing, for the verdant lawns and fruitful orchards of this valley. A cantonment which had been erected there, was, at the time, occupied by a corps of Khyber rangers, a regiment of Janbazes, or Affghan horse, and some Affghan jezailchees, or riflemen. During this protracted mountain warfare, our troops had suffered severely, both in numbers and *morale*. The conflict had been against a foe invisible till his presence was felt, and whom it was difficult to pursue, through the rapidity of his movements, in a region entirely unknown to us, but in which he was perfectly at home. It was with the view of counteracting the dejection and reviving the spirits of the men, as well as from military considerations, that Havelock advised Sir Robert Sale to attack the fort at Mamoo Khail, about three miles from Gundamuck, belonging to Meer Afzul Khan. This chieftain had received many favours from Shah Soojah, and had been appointed to an office of dignity at his court, but had come

The brigade reaches Gundamuck. Capture of the Mamoo Khail fort.

down from Cabul to aid the rebellion. The General rejected Havelock's advice. About the 4th of November, information was brought to Captain Macgregor, the political agent, that though there were only thirty men in the fort, the chief was making great efforts to provision and garrison it, and that large reinforcements were expected, after which the whole country would rise on us. Captains Broadfoot, Backhouse, and Dawes were dining with him when this notice was brought to him, and it appeared to the whole party that the immediate capture of the fort was indispensable. Captain Macgregor went to the General's tent, and endeavoured to persuade him to order the attack; but he met with no success. Returning to his friends, they concurred with him that another effort should be made to send troops against the fort; and as it was known that the General placed great dependence on Havelock's judgment, "Backhouse and I," remarks Broadfoot, "though it was midnight, went and turned out Havelock, who went to the General. The immediate move he could not accomplish, but he got us off on the afternoon of the next day," and the fort was captured without much resistance.

The instructions of General Elphinstone to Sir Robert Sale were, to await his further orders at Gundamuck. The force reached that place on the 30th of October. Sir Robert Sale at Gundamuck. It was expected that as soon as the preparations of the Envoy and the General at Cabul were complete, they would move down to Jellalabad through Gundamuck. Sir Robert Sale adhered to the letter of his instructions, and took up his position there. Early in November, the post from Cabul was interrupted, and the most sinister reports began to circulate through the country. They were unhappily confirmed on the 10th. The insurrection had broken out at Cabul on the morning of the 2nd of November, when Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother, and Lieut. William Broadfoot were murdered. Two hundred resolute British soldiers, well commanded, would have extinguished the revolt in two or three hours; but no troops were sent to quell it from the cantonment, where a body of 5000 men was stationed within two miles of the scene of massacre;

and the small force sent by the orders of the Shah was repulsed. An emergency which demanded union, energy, and confidence, found Colonel Shelton, the second in command, at variance with his chief, the envoy at variance with the General, and the General himself scarcely able to move from an attack of gout. To add to the difficulties of the crisis, the political and military authorities appeared from the first to have resigned themselves to a feeling of despondency. The revolt was thus allowed to grow to a head, and within three days the cantonment itself was besieged by an armed rabble, and the magazine fort, in which the winter provisions of the force had been stored, was captured. A letter was received by Sir Robert Sale at Gundamuck, from the Envoy, referring to former letters which had never arrived. It alluded in the most desponding language to the progress of the revolt, described the embarrassment of their position, and reiterated, in pressing terms, the request he had previously made for the immediate return of Sale's brigade. There was a short postscript from his secretary, Captain George Lawrence, simply stating that "they were in a fix." At the same time, General Elphinstone, in his communication to Sir Robert Sale, directed him to return to Cabul, "provided the sick and wounded could be placed in security with the irregulars at Gundamuck."

The important question now arose, whether the brigade should remain at Gundamuck or return to Cabul. A council of war was held, and some of its members were for retracing their steps to Cabul; but Havelock, whose opinion carried no little weight, though he had no vote in the assembly, urged the most forcible reasons against such a movement. It was evident, he said, that the British hold on Cabul was shaken, if not from the force of circumstances, yet by the loss of moral courage in those who were at the head of affairs. How was the garrison of the cantonment to be aided, since it apparently could not and would not aid itself? Yet, how again could it be in peril? It consisted of between five and six thousand men, having a good artillery, and immense

Council of
war at Gun-
damuck.
Havelock's
advice.

munitions of war. It could surely fight battles against an armed population, and maintain its superiority over them with a high hand, dictating to the city, enforcing the supply of provisions by the terror of its arms, and rectifying by the art of the engineer the defects of its military position. The winter had set in at this time with unusual rigour. The tops of the lower mountains, even of the Suleiman range, were already white with snow. The cold at Gundamuck was intense. The force was badly clothed; it had lost a great portion of its camp equipage; its camel-drivers had nearly all deserted with their animals. The brigade was without the means of transporting its ammunition, provisions, or intrenching tools, except by giving up, at this inclement season, the remainder of its tents. It had not cartridges for more than three battles, and might have to fight its way every march out of eight. The *morale* of the troops was yet low. They had reached Gundamuck a dispirited if not a beaten force. On several occasions, the Affghans, though worsted, had asserted in the conflict their superior skill in mountain warfare. He observed, finally, that it was not possible to deposit the sick and wounded in safety. They exceeded three hundred in number, and to leave them at Gundamuck, either with or without the Affghan irregulars, was to abandon them to certain destruction. The council came to the conclusion, therefore, that it was not possible to march back to Cabul. Neither did Havelock consider it advisable to remain at Gundamuck. The country was so far open, that

Resolution to
advance to
Jellalabad. it was not presently to be apprehended that the Affghans would venture to attack the force; but it was in their power to hem them in, to cut off their supplies, and even to turn the watercourse which descended from the Suleiman range, and eventually oblige them to decamp to a disadvantage. Captain Macgregor had moreover received intelligence, that the tribes around Jellalabad were threatening to occupy it or to burn it down. The value of this place, considering our military position at this time in Eastern Affghanistan, was inestimable. We had a division of troops, as Havelock remarked, at Cabul, in which an

insurrection was now raging. Our nearest station in India was Ferozepore, which was separated from the mouth of the Khyber pass by a distance of thirty-five marches, and the whole of this space was occupied by the cities, forts, and armies of a powerful but doubtful ally, whose troops were organizing yearly revolutions, whose politics were as shifting as the sands of the Sutlege, and whose government was fast verging to a state of servile subjection to its own instruments. The formidable pass of the Khyber was held by one hundred Affghan riflemen, of Captain Ferris's corps, at the fort of Ali Musjeed, in which they had a scanty and uncertain supply of water. Three marches in advance, and off the direct road, were the head-quarters of Captain Ferris's regiment, in an open cantonment and without ammunition for forty-eight hours' contest. There was also a detachment at Gundamuck. Such were the military dispositions for linking Cabul with India. Well might Havelock exclaim, on reviewing the subject some years later, that "a plain unvarnished description of our position beyond the Indus, in December, 1841, exhibited one of the most stupendous instances of human rashness and imbecility on record in history." The occupation of Jellalabad he stated to be an object of immense advantage; it would place the communication with Cabul on the one side, and Peshawur on the other, on a more secure footing; it would create a well-defended fortress, on which the Cabul garrison might retire, and would prove the key of Eastern Affghanistan, if the Government should send means and reinforcements across the Khyber. It was, therefore, resolved to move on Jellalabad.

With regard to the Affghan irregulars, to whose care General Elphinstone at one time thought our sick and wounded might be intrusted, Sir Robert Sale at first determined to take them with his force, and to abandon the cantonment of Gundamuck to its fate. But the messenger who brought intelligence of the out-
The Affghan irregulars at Gundamuck.
 break at Cabul had journeyed, for his own security, in company with emmissaries sent from Cabul to excite the

Affghan irregulars to rise against the infidel "Feringees." The chief native officer of the corps, though he had been brought up in the family of Shah Soojah, had been gained over by the insurgents. Lieut. Dowson, their commandant, expressed his confidence in their fidelity; Havelock and Broadfoot, however, urged that their complicity in the conspiracy at the capital was so palpable, that Sir Robert Sale would be fully justified in disarming and dismissing the whole body. He was finally persuaded, contrary to the advice of these officers, to adopt a half-measure, which met with the usual success of such expedients. He deposited a considerable portion of his camp equipage at Gundamuck, and left it, as well as the cantonment, to the guardianship of the irregulars, on whose camp he had pointed his guns only the night before. The brigade marched out of Gundamuck on the morning of the 11th November. During the day, a distant fire of musquetry was heard behind, and then there was a lurid blaze, followed by a violent explosion. It was the revolt of the Affghan levies at Gundamuck, who threw off the mask as soon as Sir Robert's force was out of sight. They rose on their European officers, plundered their baggage, set fire to the cantonment, and blew up the magazine, sending a number of their own companions into the air. Captain Burn and the other officers, though pursued by the insurgents, succeeded in reaching the British camp.

Sir Robert Sale renewed his march the next morning, but the whole armed population of the district was already on the alert. The Affghans crowned each height as soon as our picquets were withdrawn, swarmed like hornets round the camp, and were only repelled by the most strenuous efforts. They permitted the advanced guard and the main body to pass through the town of Futtehabad without interruption. Bodies of them even came in the guise of unarmed suppliants to beg for protection. But no sooner had the rear-guard passed the houses and fort of this town, than a destructive fire was opened upon it. Captain Broadfoot and his sappers turned fiercely round more than once, and inflicted venge-

Sir Robert
Sale reaches
Jellalabad.

ance for this treachery, and Colonel Dennie in the end drew the enemy away from their walls into the open plain, and then the cavalry under Captain Oldfield and Lieut. Mayne charging among the Affghans with headlong valour, strewed the ground with a hundred and fifty slain. That night the force encamped under the walls of Jellalabad, and took possession of it the next morning.

CHAPTER III.

Defence of Jellalabad.—Captain Broadfoot's Character and Exertions.—Restoration of the Fortifications.—Repulse of the Enemy on the 1st of December.—Assassination of the Envoy at Cabul.—Straits of the Garrison.—The fatal Capitulation.—Extermination of the Army.—Dr Brydon's Escape.—Council of War at Jellalabad.—Negotiations with the Cabul Chiefs broken off.—Reinforcements from India.—Akbar Khan approaches Jellalabad.—The Earthquake of the 19th of February.—Destruction and Restoration of the Works.—General Pollock's Approach delayed.—Exhausted state of the Garrison.—Havelock advises an Attack on Akbar Khan.—Victory of the 7th of April.—Arrival of General Pollock.—Proclamation of Lord Ellenborough.—Death of General Elphinstone.—Advance on Cabul.—Battle of Tezeen.—Cabul re-occupied.—Release of the Prisoners.—Victory at Istaliff under Havelock's direction.—Army breaks up and returns to India.

JELLALABAD was the winter residence of the Affghan rulers, inferior in population and importance only to Cabul and Candahar. The valley in which it is situated is

Jellalabad.

about twenty-eight miles in length and three or four in breadth, fertilized by three streams, the largest of which is the Cabul river, and closed in by magnificent ranges of mountains. It is also well wooded, though arid and desert in the immediate vicinity of the town. The defences of the town, on the 13th of November, are thus described by Havelock, in the despatch he subsequently wrote for Sir Robert Sale: "The walls of Jellalabad were in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them. The *enceinte* was far too extensive for our small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2300 yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme; it had no parapet except for a few hundred yards, which there was not more than two feet high; earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There

was a space of 400 yards together, on which none of the garrison could show themselves excepting at one spot. The population within was disaffected, and the whole *enceinte* was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened at twenty or thirty yards." Within the town was the Bala Hissar, or citadel, which, though imperfectly fortified, was surrounded with a wall. Sir Robert Sale, being unable from his wound to make a survey of the suburbs himself, sent round the senior officers and his own staff to examine and report on the state of the works. So great was the mass of ruins which surrounded them, that only one officer, besides Captain Broadfoot, was enabled to complete the circuit. In reporting the state of the works to Sir Robert Sale, the officers stated that they were not defensible against a vigorous assault. It was then debated whether it would not be more advisable to abandon the town, and retire to the citadel. Havelock, Broadfoot, and Dennie, endeavoured to dissuade the General from relinquishing the town to a disloyal populace, because it would be a dangerous indication of timidity, and increase the embarrassments of their position. If they confined their efforts to the defence of the citadel, their operations would be cramped, and it would be difficult to obtain supplies. Captain Broadfoot also assured the General, as the result of his personal observation, that however dilapidated the works were at present, they might be completely restored by adequate exertions, and rendered secure against the attacks of the Affghans. It was, therefore, resolved to occupy the town, and improve the works.

The brigade was scarcely within the walls of the town, when the plain was darkened by masses of the enemy. Every valley had poured out its armed peasantry to attack the "Feringees." They had expected that the British troops would continue their progress towards India, and they expected a rich harvest from the plunder of their baggage in the passes between Jellalabad and Peshawur. The occupation of the town created surprise and mortification, and the Affghans

Boldness of
the enemy,
and their
defeat.

resolved to make a vigorous effort to dislodge the brigade. During the night of the 13th, our troops were unable to man the whole circuit of the walls; a line of 400 yards was without a soldier, and had the enemy attacked the works, the defence must have been reduced to a street combat. But the Affghans employed themselves, more advantageously for our interests, in setting fire to the various sheds and houses in the circle about the town. Around this conflagration some could be seen dancing frantically in groups, while others approached the walls, and poured forth imprecations on the infidels. It was obviously impossible to commence the repair of the defences till the plain was cleared of these hostile bands, which in the morning appeared to number 4000 or 5000. It was determined, therefore, to read them a salutary lesson regarding our power and resources, and Colonel Monteith was charged with the performance of this duty. He issued from the gate on the morning of the 14th November, with horse, foot, and artillery, 1100 in number, of whom 300 were Europeans, and fell on the enemy with such vigour and skill, that the masses broke up and fled, leaving 200 dead on the field. At noon, not an Affghan remained on the plain which had been covered with their ranks in the morning, and all molestation ceased for fourteen days.

On the morning of the 15th the work of clearing away the ruins and restoring the fortifications was commenced, under the direction of Captain Broadfoot. In the annals of British India, crowded as it is with records of the military genius, energy, and valour by which a great empire has been created and consolidated, there is no name more illustrious than that of George Broadfoot. Havelock, his bosom friend, remarks of him, "no person of common discernment could have enjoyed opportunities of knowing him intimately without perceiving that he was eminently, as old Paoli described the youthful Napoleon, 'one of Plutarch's men,' a man formed, if his life had been spared, to play a leading part in great events, and astonish those who gazed around and after him, by the vigour and grasp of his intellect, his natural talent for war and policy,

his cool and sound judgment, his habit and powers of generalization, his moral courage, and personal intrepidity, and his uncompromising love of truth." Captain Broadfoot was an officer of the Madras army, and had brought himself into notice, in the first instance, by his exertions in the commissariat at Moulmein. He was then selected by Lord Auckland for a post in Shah Soojah's force, and in that position had accomplished the difficult task of conveying the family of the Shah, consisting of 300 females besides children, and a valuable portion of the crown jewels, through the Punjab, then in a state of anarchy, and through the more perilous passes of the Khyber, swarming with hereditary robbers. "This measure," remarks Havelock, "was particularly memorable, for, from the moment that Shah Soojah had his women and numerous progeny and relatives in his own hands, instead of being, as it were, hostages in British India, he assumed an air of independence with the envoy, foreign to him before. The arrival, too, of his zenana was urged as the reason for the British troops, their magazines, and arsenal, being turned out of the Bala Hissar, the key of Cabul, an absurdity which, more than any other act, weakened our military position, and led to the ensuing disasters." Soon after Captain Broadfoot's arrival in Cabul he commenced the task of forming one of the most extraordinary regiments that ever was arrayed on a battle-field,—the sappers and miners of Shah Soojah's force. They were instructed in all the duties of entrenching and siege operations, and were encouraged to become superior light troops. In their ranks were not only Hindostanees of every province, but Ghoorkas, and men from Cabul, Peshawur, Eusofzye, and Hazara. Many of the men thus enlisted were desperate and intractable characters, but they were soon moulded by the talent of their chief into daring, skilful, and obedient soldiers. Captain Broadfoot was on his side like a father to these men, in attention to their real wants, while he exacted from them the most implicit obedience to his orders, and punished their faults with a severity which many would have deemed ferocious. It was his

practice, when men presented themselves for enlistment in active times, to attach them to himself as probationers. The ordeal was sharp ; for, ever foremost in danger himself, he led these expectants into the thickest of the fire, and the slightest disposition to shrink from it was fatal to their hope of enrolment. On the 7th of October, Captain Broadfoot was directed to prepare a portion of his sappers to accompany Colonel Monteith's column proceeding to Hindostan. The arsenal at Cabul, under Lieut. Vincent Eyre, though filled with vast stores of shot, shell, and small arms, was deficient in entrenching tools. Captain Broadfoot called on General Elphinstone to receive his orders, but was told that Colonel Monteith had been ordered out without consulting him, and that he was little more than chief constable under the Lord-Lieutenant. The General advised him to wait on the envoy, who would inform him of the nature of the service on which he was to be employed, and enable him to provide himself with the requisite implements. The envoy said he had resolved to send Colonel Monteith simply as a demonstration ; he expected the submission of the rebels that evening ; there would be no fighting ; it was a peaceable march to Jellalabad ; and as to sappers, twenty men with pickaxes would be enough—all they were wanted for would be to pick stones from under the gun-wheels. But Captain Broadfoot was determined not to move without his implements, and sent to some of the artificers of Cabul to make him mining tools. They were found busily employed in forging arms—for what purpose too soon became evident—and refused to work for the "Feringees." Captain Broadfoot then applied for the aid of Sir Alexander Burnes, who, though he assured him that he was going to encounter a tempest in a teapot, issued orders to the workmen, but they were scornfully rejected. Captain Broadfoot then planted one of his own sappers over each smith, and in a very short time obtained a large supply of the best tools which had been seen in Cabul. These tools, which were sufficient to supply the whole of the 13th when that noble regiment became one large working party,

now proved the salvation of Jellalabad. Captain Broadfoot himself remarks, "When the Cabul insurrection broke out, it seemed as if Providence had stiffened my neck on that occasion, for Burnes strongly advised me not to take the tools, or I should make enemies."

Captain Broadfoot commenced his operations at Jellalabad on the 15th. He was indefatigable in his exertions; the day was spent in superintending the progress of the work, and the evening was devoted to his plans and calculations. Working parties were told off, who laboured with little intermission, from dawn to dusk. Officers and men worked with emulation, and in a few weeks the ramparts were ready to receive the guns, and everything around the town that could afford cover to the enemy was, as far as possible, cleared away. An indefensible heap of ruins was, as if by a magic wand, transformed into a fortification proof against any but siege ordnance. On entering the town, it was found that the provisions in store were sufficient only for two days, and the men were put on half rations; but happily there was no liquor to stupefy them, and they were found to work more energetically and cheerfully on half rations without any artificial stimulant, than they could have done on full rations and drams. Captain Macgregor, the political agent, was, however, very successful in his negotiations for provisions, which were the more readily supplied after the victory of the 14th of November.

There were not wanting, however, subjects of disquietude. The Khyber rangers and jezailchees, who had hitherto continued faithful, and combated for us with much gallantry, began to waver; and on receiving their pay, 400 of them went over to the enemy. Information was also received that Captain Ferris, who held the post at Pesh-bolak, about twenty-five miles east of Jellalabad, had been attacked by his Affghan mercenaries, and obliged to abandon his encampment, with all the stores and ammunition it contained. Thus one of the two posts which protected the communication between Jellalabad and Peshawur, was lost to us; and it was doubtful whether

Repair of the
defences of
Jellalabad.
Supply of provisions.

Loss of Pesh-
bolak, and let-
ters from Cab-
ul.

the other at Ali-musjid could be much longer maintained. A letter was at the same time received from General Elphinstone, written after he had been made acquainted with Sir Robert Sale's reasons for proceeding to Jellalabad and not to Cabul, which he stated were satisfactory. It was written in French, and concluded with the remark, "Notre péril est extrême." He again implored Sir Robert to come to his assistance, "provided the sick and wounded could be placed in safety with their allies, the Sikhs." Havelock, in recording these events, adds, "God's special Providence alone can extricate us from these difficulties. We trust, through His goodness, that our spirits will rise, instead of sinking under them, and that we shall be strengthened to retrieve all gloriously."

On the 29th November, large bodies of Affghans poured down upon the plain before Jellalabad from the lateral valleys, and opened a desultory fire on the town. Our troops were directed to stand on the defensive. The chief cause of anxiety to Sir Robert Sale was the deficiency of ammunition, which a single prolonged engagement would go nigh to exhaust. The men were therefore directed to husband their cartridges, and not to expend a single useless shot. This inactivity emboldened the enemy, who approached the walls so near as to interrupt the daily labours of the workmen, and it became necessary to disperse them. Colonel Dennie therefore sallied out from the gates soon after midday on the 1st December, with 300 men from each regiment. The Affghans fired a single volley, and then broke and fled. The troops followed them up; the guns dealt destruction among the fugitives; the cavalry galloped in pursuit of them, driving some into the river, and cutting down others, till 150 bodies strewed the plain. As the result of this spirited and successful repulse, the garrison enjoyed a long period of repose.

On the 17th December the most unfavourable rumours were current regarding the state of affairs at Cabul. It was even reported that the British chiefs had entered into a convention with the enemy, and agreed to

Fresh attack
and repulse of
the enemy on
the 1st De-
cember.

Sinister ru-
mours from
Cabul. Sir

a compulsory evacuation of the country. These reports were premature, but, coupled with the intelligence that the three regiments which had advanced from Candahar to the relief of the capital, had been arrested by the severity of the weather, and obliged to return, and that the garrison at Ghuznee was besieged, produced no little depression in the minds of the defenders of Jellalabad. On this occasion Havelock remarks: "There are certainly indications of something extraordinary having occurred. These are to be traced in the renewal of the attempt to tamper with our sepoy, and the hints dropped in the bazaars. If a compact has been entered into, no faith will be kept by the Affghans, and our troops will be attacked in the passes; but whatever be the result of that contest, it is our duty to die behind the walls of Jellalabad, rather than abandon the country."

Robert Sale's orders to the troops.

A day or two after, a letter was received from General Elphinstone, congratulating the troops on the success of their efforts on the 14th November and the 1st December. Sir Robert Sale was advised by Havelock to take advantage of the circumstance, and issue a General Order to the troops, which might serve to infuse animation into their minds; and he penned the following notification for the General:—

"Major-General Sir Robert Sale has much pleasure in communicating to the garrison of Jellalabad, the intelligence he has received of the exhilarating effect produced on their comrades at Cabul, by the news of their successes under these walls of the 14th ult., and the 1st instant. Engaged as they are in a most arduous contest with superior numbers, it must have been encouraging to them to hear that we had beaten the same enemy when opposed to us in the proportion of five to one of those actually in the field. The Major-General has it in command from General Elphinstone, to convey to the whole of the officers and men his hearty congratulations and cordial approbation of their conduct; and in doing this feels assured, that no soldier within this fortress will think any sacrifice or exertion too great which has for its object to bring the present conflict against a sanguinary and treacherous foe to an honourable and satisfactory conclusion."

On the 29th of December, Havelock wrote to General Smith, his old commander in the Rifle Brigade, and now Havelock's letter to General Smith. Adjutant-General of Queen's troops, in reference to his own prospects, on the appointment of another commander in Affghanistan. "I do not hear who is to be appointed chief in Affghanistan. He ought to be a man of energy and large views. I am not ill pleased at having been temporarily attached to Sir Robert Sale, who is a gallant old soldier, and has for a course of years always expressed himself satisfied with my poor services. I should like much to be instrumental, in an honourable way, in bringing this business to a successful close, and shall be thankful if you will assist me in my being appointed to aid General Elphinstone's successor. I have not youthful zeal enough left for the command of sixty soldiers. Widen my sphere a little, and I do not despair of being useful for the next ten years, if spared so long, by God's blessing."

On the last day of the year a spy in the political department brought intelligence of the murder of the envoy, Assassination of the envoy. Letter from Major Pottinger. Akbar Khan's proclamation. and of the capitulation of the Cabul force, but it was received with incredulity. The envoy might have fallen by an act of treachery; but it appeared to the gallant garrison of Jellalabad impossible that 5000 British troops, with arms in their hands, should have consented to so dishonourable a surrender. All doubt, however, was soon after removed by the receipt of a letter from Major Pottinger, on the 2nd of January, relating to the assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, the state of starvation to which they had been reduced, and the capitulation which had been entered into under the pressure of imperious necessity. The feeling of indignation created by this intelligence, was mingled with the conviction that their own salvation must henceforth depend, under Providence, solely on their own exertions; and every officer and man in the garrison seemed to be inspired with the enthusiastic resolution to perish sword in hand, rather than basely to lay down his arms. Havelock sent the gloomy tidings to General Smith, and said, "And now, my dear general, and captain of former days, one

word from myself. There is a force at Jellalabad, which would, I trust, sooner bury itself under its ruins than be saved by a convention, and which ardently desires, when reinforced, to be led against the treacherous and sanguinary foe, which has butchered our ambassador, and must be defeated, if we would save our own in India. Offer your services to the Commander-in-Chief (if he does not come himself), and place yourself at its head. I am sure our soldiers would follow you everywhere." A day or two after a copy of the proclamation, which Akbar Khan had been dispersing by stealth through the valley, was brought to the garrison, and Havelock sent the purport of it to General Smith. In it the Affghans were told that the people of Islam had risen to a man against the infidels; that at the first outbreak of their just indignation, Sikunder Burnes Sahib—Sir Alexander Burnes,—and many others, were slain; that between Cabul and Gundamuck thousands of the Kafirs had perished, and around the capital a Colonel Sahib and many other chiefs; and finally, the Lord Sahib—Sir William Macnaghten—had been put to death. He declared his intention of exterminating the intruders, the rule of the Koran never being forgotten, "Those who resist," he said, "I will kill; those who ask mercy, I will pardon." In conclusion, he called on all Sirdars to muster their clans, and be careful that the Feringees got no supplies; and above all, to surround Jellalabad, and cut off the retreat of Macgregor.

In letters written at the beginning of the year, Havelock stated his own views of the exigencies of the garrison at Jellalabad. He had heard that four regiments of native infantry and a small body of irregular horse had been sent across the Sutlege to their relief. In addition to this reinforcement, they required, in his opinion, eight 18-pounders, four mortars, and a chaplain. "We have," he said, "no chaplain or minister of God's word in this country. This aid ought to be afforded us. An active, unencumbered man, who would really labour to disseminate religious instruction among our soldiers, would be useful. He must be one

Havelock's requirements for Jellalabad; eight 18-pounders and a chaplain.

who would not disdain to offer his exhortations in any kind of hut, house, or tent, or the open air, sooner than lose his opportunity. I do not build much on divine service parades, but they are a part of our military system, as it stands, and must not be neglected. But great good is to be expected from the voluntary attendance of soldiers on effective preaching; and there is a disposition in this force to take advantage of such openings, and I am happy to say that it is manifested by some of the best soldiers we have."

On the 8th of January a private letter was received from Major Pottinger, written in French, dated the 28th December, in which he stated that their position was daily becoming more perilous, that they had been obliged to surrender the forts around the cantonments, and had been driven by the want of provisions to enter into negotiations with the enemy, whose promises deserved little confidence. The next day came an official communication, signed by him as political agent, and by General Elphinstone, and dated the 29th of December. It was brought into the cantonment by three Affghans of some note. It stated that the British authorities at Cabul had found it necessary to conclude an agreement for the evacuation of Affghanistan, in pursuance of which they requested that the troops at Jellalabad would commence their return to India on the receipt of the letter, leaving all guns, the property of Dost Mahomed, with the new governor appointed by the existing authorities at Cabul, as well as such stores and baggage as they were unable to carry away. "Everything," it observed, "had been done in good faith; you will not be molested on your way; and to the safe-conduct which Akbar Khan has given I trust for the passage of the troops under my immediate orders through the passes." A council of war was immediately held, and the question raised by this letter was warmly debated. Havelock and Broadfoot urged that obedience was not due to an order written under compulsion, and by a superior officer who was no longer a free agent; that a General who capitulated must

Private and
public letter
from Major
Pottinger.

be considered as having thereby abdicated his command, and that his capitulation could be binding only on those who were in the same predicament with himself. Sir Robert Sale energetically repudiated every idea of retiring from Jellalabad; and it was unanimously resolved not to bring further disgrace on their country, by abandoning the fortress they now held. As the communication from Cabul was written under the dictation of Akbar Khan, and the reply was intended for his eye, it dwelt more particularly on the truculent proclamation he had dispersed through the valley. To avoid compromising the Cabul garrison, it was moreover written in very guarded language, and inquired what was the nature of the security which was to be given for their safe conduct to Peshawur.

Scarcely had the reply been despatched than a letter was received from Colonel Wylde, who had been sent with reinforcements from India, as soon as the insur-
re^{Progress of}
re^{events from}
ction was known to the public authorities. ^{the 9th Janu-}
The expedition was sent in haste, without guns, ^{ary to the}
and without adequate equipment, and it proceeded with ^{13th.}
the most provoking tardiness, at a time when hours were invaluable. After a dilatory march, Colonel Wylde at length arrived at Peshawur, but informed Sir Robert Sale in this letter, that he could not advance for want of carriage, and that he was, moreover, waiting the result of certain negotiations which the political agent at Peshawur, Captain Mackeson, had opened with the Afredees for a free passage through the Khyber pass. The political agent himself likewise wrote to Jellalabad, "that he considered it a false move to attempt to force the pass without the aid of the second reinforcement expected from the provinces, which included European troops and cavalry." On the 10th a letter arrived from Cabul, stating that they were in the most deplorable condition; their sick and wounded had been sent into the city, their guns and ammunition surrendered, and their funds, to the extent of £80,000, expended in endeavouring to purchase the forbearance of the Affghan chiefs; they were completely in the hands of their enemies, and the whole force was re-

duced to the lowest state of depression. On the 11th, Sir Robert Sale received a letter from Colonel Wylde, stating definitively that it was out of his power to make any advance, and that the garrison of Jellalabad must provide for its own safety. The disappointment was keenly felt, more especially at this period of deep anxiety; and the conduct of the Government of India was severely reprobated, in having intrusted the relieving force to so incompetent an officer. Havelock, in particular, expressed his great regret that the charge of the reinforcements had not at this critical juncture been intrusted to a man of energy like General Smith. There can be little doubt, that if, on the first intelligence of the outbreak, a large force, of all arms, had been equipped as Mr George Clerk would have equipped it, and pressed forward, with the speed with which General Smith would have marched, every obstacle would have been overcome, and the relieving force would in all probability have reached Jellalabad in time to save the Cabul garrison. But there was no earnestness at headquarters; and an inadequate force, wretchedly equipped, was sent on leisurely, under a commander without spirit; and it broke down at the mouth of the first defile. On the 12th of January a feeling of deep gloom, mingled with an anticipation of some dire calamity, overspread the garrison; a letter was received from the retiring force, announcing that it had left the cantonments, but instead of being allowed to push through the Khoord Cabul pass, on which its safety depended, had been detained two days at Bootkhak. The letter stated that the troops were escorted by a thousand of Akbar Khan's horse, and that he had sent messengers to the Ghilzye chiefs to rouse their fanaticism, and induce them to attack and plunder the now helpless force. On the 13th of January, the worst fears of the garrison were realized by the arrival of Dr Brydon, the sole survivor—excepting the few prisoners in the hands of Akbar Khan—of an army of 5000 men and 10,000 camp followers, who had fallen victims to the treachery of the Affghans and the snows of the passes. It is unnecessary to enter into any detail of this un-

exampled calamity, which is but too well known to all who take an interest in the history of the Affghan war, or have read Kaye's vivid description of the fatal retreat; but Havelock's notes on the subject, in his memorandum-book, will still be read with interest.

"About 2 P. M. on the 13th January, some officers were assembled on the roof of the loftiest house in Jellalabad. One of them espied a single horseman riding towards our walls. As he got nearer, it was distinctly seen that he wore European clothes, and was mounted on a travel-hacked yaboo, which he was urging on with all the speed of which it yet remained master. A signal was made to him by some one on the walls, which he answered by waving a private soldier's forage cap over his head. The Cabul gate was then thrown open, and several officers rushing out, received, and recognized in the traveller, who dismounted, the first, and it is to be feared the last, fugitive of the ill-fated force at Cabul in Dr Brydon. He was covered with slight cuts and contusions, and dreadfully exhausted. His first few hasty sentences extinguished all hope in the hearts of the listeners regarding the fortune of the Cabul force. It was evident that it was annihilated. Countenances full of sorrow and dejection were immediately seen in every corner of Jellalabad; all labour was suspended; the working parties recalled; the assembly sounded; the gates were closed, and the walls and batteries manned, and the cavalry stood ready to mount. The first impression was, that the enemy were rapidly following a crowd of fugitives in upon the walls, but three shots only were heard in the direction of Char Bagh; and when the effervescence in some measure subsided, not an Affghan could be discovered in that quarter, though numerous telescopes were directed to it. But the recital of Dr Brydon filled all hearers with horror, grief, and indignation."

In the hope of recovering a few more fugitives, the cavalry patrolled in the evening two miles beyond Char Bagh, but in vain. A large light was exhibited at night on a bastion of the Cabul gate, and four buglers of the 13th sounded the signal to "advance" every half-hour for three nights. The sound, which had so often awaked the animation of the soldier, now fell with a melancholy accent on the ear in the still night air. It was sounded to the dead.

Within a week after the arrival of Dr Brydon, Havelock wrote to Serampore :—

“A wide and sweeping destruction has overtaken our force which formerly garrisoned Cabul. Their retreat was not a military operation in any way. Had they retired as a column, ever so late, they might indeed have lost their cannon and one half their force ; but they could have arrived under these walls with their colours, some show of discipline, and the other half of the force of every arm. But they credulously confided in Affghan faith, moved in the power and at the dictation of Akbar Khan, took up the positions which he pointed out, forbore to fire on the partisans whom he had arrayed to destroy them ; and, as much to the last the dupes of intrigue and treachery as the victims of the sword, cold, hunger, and fatigue, have been engulfed in the eastern Ghilzye mountains. One fugitive alone has reached us alive.

“This has rendered our task a difficult one, but I trust we look its asperities in the face like soldiers. We can no longer trust our Affghan Irregulars, and are getting rid of them. We must, by God’s help, strive to defend an extensive *enceinte*, of which the parapets are not simply cannon proof, with an insufficient supply of ammunition, which can last only by being husbanded ; and only two, not strong, regiments of infantry, one European and the other native, a good artillery, and 200 horse. We have full six weeks’ provisions, but forage for only about three weeks longer than we can command the country around us. We have embodied our camp followers already to upwards of a thousand, and are arming them with muskets, jezails, swords, spears, and even stones for the defence of the walls. Akbar Khan has been at Lughman, and is now at Tigree, raising followers. I think we can, by God’s blessing, if besieged with guns protract our defence full forty days. We are resolved on every effort to save for Government Jellalabad and Eastern Affghanistan. If it cannot then relieve us, we sink, but we shall, I trust, die like soldiers.”

The events of this week of gloom produced a feeling of the deepest solemnity on the minds of the garrison. No such a disaster had ever befallen us in any period of our Indian history. An entire British army had disappeared ; the corpses of the friends and

Troops assembled for Divine service.—
Havelock’s letters.

comrades whom the troops had left three months before at Cabul lay unburied in the snow, and they themselves were in daily expectation that the enemy, glutted with the slaughter and plunder of the Cabul army, would pour down on the valley of Jellalabad and assault them. These circumstances were well calculated to dispose the garrison to devotional exercises. On the Sunday after the arrival of Dr Brydon, the whole force assembled for Divine service in one of the open squares of the Bala Hissar, and Havelock, standing up in the midst of men and officers, read the Church service, only substituting for the Psalms of the day the 46th Psalm, "which," he remarked, "Luther was wont to use in seasons of peculiar difficulty and depression." And as that band of heroes raised their voices to heaven with the supplication,—“God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble. Therefore will we not fear, though the earth be removed,”—there arose in their minds a sublime feeling of dependence on the God of battles, a noble spirit of self-devotion, and a stern determination to defend the battlements around them to the last extremity. On the 25th of January, Havelock wrote :—“Our only friends on this side of the Sutlege are our own and General Pollock’s bayonets. Thus while Cabul has been overwhelmed by the billows of a terrific insurrection, Candahar, Khelat-i-Ghilzie, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad stand like isolated rocks in the midst of an ocean covered with foam, while against and around them the breakers dash in wild fury, and the shrill cry of the sea-fowl is heard above the roar of the tempest. . . . The heart of our garrison is good, and we are ready, with God’s help, for a manful struggle, if the Government will support us with vigour. We are ready to fight either in open field, or behind our walls, or both. But in March we shall have famine staring us in the face, and probably disease assailing us. Our position is, therefore, most critical ; but there is not, I trust, an ounce of despondency among us.”

On the 26th of January, a public letter was received from Shah Soojah at Cabul, written by the moonshee of

Council of war, to consider the surrender of Jellalabad.

the Cabinet in red official ink. It intimated that a treaty was subsisting, which bound the English to evacuate Affghanistan; and then inquired what were the intentions of the English General. The messenger who conveyed it was well known to Captain Macgregor, and brought him a verbal message from the Shah, that he was so far in the hands of the dominant faction at the capital, as to be compelled to act towards us in a manner which seemed to be hostile, but he was anxious to ascertain what were our real views, that he might second them to the extent of his ability. The next day a council of war—designated by Havelock their jackdaw Parliament—was called by Sir Robert Sale, to give its sanction to the evacuation of Jellalabad, on which he and the political agent had resolved. There was, however, nothing in the communication from Cabul to render it necessary to discuss such a measure. The treaty was that which General Elphinstone and Major Pottinger had signed under compulsion, and both the military and political chief had repudiated its obligation, even before it was known to have been infamously violated by the Affghans. When the requisition which accompanied the copy of the treaty, and which was received at Jellalabad on the 8th of January, became public in Sir Robert Sale's force, there was a burst of indignation at the disgrace of the capitulation, and a unanimous resolution was expressed not to abandon Jellalabad, as Cabul had been abandoned. To these views Sir Robert Sale had given his cordial adherence. On the evening of Dr Brydon's arrival, moreover, Captain Broadfoot had requested Havelock to discuss the question of their position under its new aspect with Sir Robert Sale, and to advise him, if he was not prepared to defend Jellalabad to extremity, to retreat that night, while it was still possible. Sir Robert Sale assured Havelock that he had resolved to maintain his ground in that fortress at all hazards, and a communication to this effect was sent to the Commander-in-Chief in India. It is difficult, therefore, to account for this change of opinion in that brave soldier, but by a reference to the notice he had

intermediately received of the views of the Government of India regarding the course of policy which it was intended to pursue in Affghanistan. The first intelligence of the insurrection at Cabul, of the murder of Sir Alexander Burnes, and the siege of the cantonment, had completely prostrated the spirits of Lord Auckland. The affairs of Affghanistan had occupied his attention intensely for four years. His Affghan policy was the only memorable transaction of his vice-royalty. He had been created an earl for its success, and was on the eve of retiring from office, which he hoped to hand over to his successor, who had condemned his proceedings, under auspicious circumstances. Suddenly Affghanistan had become an active volcano, and his whole policy had exploded. It was a great crisis, not only for our position in India, but throughout Asia. The supremacy of England in the East had been rudely shaken, and upon Lord Auckland devolved the duty of restoring it. Unhappily, his mind, instead of rising to a level with the crisis, sunk into a state of despondency, and he contemplated these melancholy events chiefly as they afforded a convenient opportunity for retiring from all connection with that country. He seemed to forget that to allow ourselves to be ignominiously expelled from Affghanistan, without any attempt to retrieve our prestige, was to descend from the throne of India. Instead of ordering troops and guns to the scene of danger with energy and promptitude, he dwelt only on the idea of withdrawing from Affghanistan with the smallest amount of danger. He considered it impossible that any succour he could send would be in time for the relief of Cabul; and even in reference to Jellalabad he merely remarked that "it might be well perhaps that two or three regiments should be assembled at Peshawur. An advance to Jellalabad could only be intended to give security to Sale, and, with the aid of the Sikhs, one brigade with artillery should be sufficient. If all should be lost at Cabul, we will not encounter new hazards for reconquest." These sentiments show the depth of depression to which the mind of Lord Auckland was reduced by

this calamity. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Jasper Nicholls, had always disapproved of the expedition to Affghanistan, and was lukewarm in sending forward reinforcements in support of a policy he condemned. Both the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were thus opposed to any vigorous effort to retrieve our position in that country. They were perfectly justified in repudiating every idea of sending a second expedition to support the throne of our puppet, Shah Soojah; but in their anxiety to escape from a country in which our honour had been entombed, they were not sufficiently alive to the necessity of restoring our reputation in the eyes of Asia, and rescuing our officers and their wives from captivity. The military and political chiefs at Jellalabad were necessarily anxious to adapt their measures to the views which had been communicated to them, and were thus induced to propose the abandonment of Jellalabad, and to advocate a measure which, under other circumstances, they would have spurned with indignation.

At this memorable council of war, held on the 27th of January, Sir Robert Sale said that he had called the officers together to discuss the measure on which Captain Macgregor and he were agreed. Captain Macgregor then explained the circumstances in which they were placed, without hope of any succour from their own Government, and stated that, though he reserved his right to act as he thought fit, he was anxious to hear the opinions of those present on the question. Captain Broadfoot urged with great vehemence that there was no ground for concluding that the Government of India had abandoned them, though its measures were very feeble. He insisted on the production of the letter from Calcutta, which was accordingly read; and it was found that the expressions employed in it were sufficiently strong to justify Captain Macgregor's assertion. The indignation against the Governor-General and the Government, including the Commander-in-Chief, but chiefly the Governor-General, went beyond all bounds. To men who had been labouring for ten weeks under the most appalling difficulties to hold Jellalabad for their Go-



vernment, and to maintain the honour of their country, it was intolerable to hear that their own rulers now coolly contemplated the policy of abandoning them to their fate. Captain Broadfoot urged that there was a new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, expected from England, and that the Duke, now in power, would never sanction so feeble and disreputable a policy. His warmth, however excusable under the excitement created by the Government letter and the proposal for evacuation, served to damage his cause, and to give an advantage to his opponents who were in favour of a capitulation, and who formed the great majority of the council. As the passions of the members were too much excited for a calm deliberation of the question, the council was adjourned to the next day. Havelock had attended the meeting as a member of the General's Staff, but he had no vote. His voice had always been for holding out to the last extremity. In the course of the evening Captain Broadfoot discussed the subject anew with him, and at the request of his friend he drew up a memorandum enumerating, in calm and forcible language, all the reasons which led him to consider the surrender of Jellalabad unadvisable and imprudent. Fortified by this opinion, Captain Broadfoot renewed his opposition to the humiliating proposal when the council met again. Captain Macgregor again produced and read the reply which he proposed to send to Shah Soojah, the purport of which was, that we held Jellalabad and the country only for him, and were now ready to return to India if he wished it. We proposed, therefore, to evacuate Jellalabad and Affghanistan forthwith, and to march out with our colours, arms, and ammunition, under an escort commanded by one of the king's sons. We required that Mahomed Akbar Khan should evacuate Lughman before we retired from Jellalabad; we offered to give four hostages as a token of our sincerity, and required that hostages should be given to us, to be exchanged for our own at Peshawur; at the same time we were to be assisted with supplies and carriage. Captain Broadfoot reprobated any treaty whatever with the treacherous Affghans, but the majority of

the members were opposed to his and Havelock's views, and it was voted to treat. Captain Broadfoot then combated the terms of the reply, item by item, but succeeded only in expunging the proposal to give hostages, though Captain Macgregor had offered to become one of them. Finally, he urged the necessity of insisting on the release of all our prisoners, as an indispensable condition of our retirement; but this proposal was overruled from the assumption that they would assuredly be surrendered on our reaching Peshawur. It was then determined that the letter should be transmitted to Cabul, on which Captain Broadfoot rose and ironically congratulated them on the figure they would cut if a relieving force should be marching into Jellalabad, as they were marching out of it.

These successive meetings of the council of war produced a depressing effect on the troops, who were imperfectly acquainted with its proceedings. Colonel Dennie, on leaving the second council, very imprudently announced to inquirers that it had been resolved to retire from Jellalabad, and abandon the country; on which Havelock rushed after him, and entreated him to spare such discourse, remarking that it was a most difficult task to keep up the spirits of the men, notwithstanding the resolution manifested by the officers, but if they were once possessed with the idea of our being about to surrender the town to the enemy, they would sink into a state of indifference, and thus enhance the difficulties of our position. To counteract the despondency of the men, Captain Broadfoot summoned them the next morning to increased exertion, and set the whole garrison to the completion of the ditch round the ramparts. Arduous labours soon restored their cheerfulness. After the letter had been despatched to the capital by the political and military chiefs, the course which was to be pursued when the reply arrived became a subject of earnest debate. Havelock gave it as his opinion, that if the conditions were accepted without hesitation, there was no course left to them but to vindicate their character for good faith by evacuating the town, and retiring to Peshawur.

Disheartening effect of the councils of war.

wur, holding themselves ready to fight if any of the conditions were infringed. But, if the answer was delayed, or appeared to be evasive, or was clogged with any restrictions or reservations, they should consider themselves at liberty to act according to their own discretion.

The reply came from Cabul on the 8th of February, and was to the effect that, if the officers were sincere in their intentions, they must affix their seals to the document. Since the despatch of the letter, Reply from Cabul. Negotiations broken off. however, the members of the council had discussed their former proceedings among themselves. Some of them had begun to feel a degree of compunction at the pusillanimity which had been manifested, and were now disposed to adopt the nobler resolution to hold out to the last. To this happy result the incessant representations of Havelock and Captain Broadfoot had in no small degree contributed. But it was doubtless promoted by the successful issue of two recent forays, which had put the garrison in possession of 170 horned cattle, and more than 700 head of sheep. A spirit of increasing confidence was thus diffused through the force. Despatches had also been received from Captain Mackeson at Peshawur, in the postscript of one of which he announced the birth of the Prince of Wales. The garrison were determined that no sense of difficulties should be allowed to damp their loyalty, and at ten o'clock a royal salute was fired from the ramparts of Jellalabad. Before the echo of the salute from hill to hill had died out, a council of war was held to deliberate on the reply from Cabul. General Sale and Captain Macgregor requested the officers, in accordance with the requisition of the Cabul chiefs, to affix their seals to the document, but they were now found to be opposed to any confirmation of the treaty, and were anxious to break off the negotiations and retrieve their honour. Captain Broadfoot urged that the reply, which implied a doubt of their sincerity, liberated them from all obligations. His views were adopted by the majority, and a letter drawn up by Colonel Monteith was sent to Cabul, which

left them free to act according to their own judgment, without any breach of faith.

Thus a negotiation which at one time threatened to compromise both the national honour and the safety of the garrison, was brought to a happy termination, chiefly, if not entirely, through the firmness of Havelock and Broadfoot. It was on this occasion, more especially, that the correctness of Broadfoot's opinion of his friend, written three months before in a letter to his family, was substantiated: "The whole of the officers in the garrison would not compensate for Havelock's loss. Brave to admiration, imperturbably cool, looking at his profession as a science, and, as far as I can see or judge, correct in his views." The same day on which this wise and spirited decision was adopted, intelligence was received from Peshawur, that large reinforcements were coming up to the succour of the garrison, through the Punjab. There was no more talk of a surrender.

The Government of India, on receiving intelligence of the entire annihilation of the Cabul force, was roused by the magnitude of the calamity to some appearance of energy. India looked with anxiety for the decision of its rulers at such a crisis. A proclamation was accordingly issued, in which the Governor-General assured the subjects of the Crown, that he considered the calamity which had overtaken the British arms only "as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British Indian army." But after this spasmodic ebullition of vigour, the Government relapsed into that faint-heartedness, which had from the commencement of these difficulties reigned at the Council Board in Calcutta. Lord Auckland soon after abandoned every idea of retrieving our honour, or even rescuing the captives, except, perhaps, by the humiliating device of a ransom; and wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, that his sole object in sending on a second brigade under General Pollock, was to withdraw the garrison at Jellalabad from its perilous position, and to retire from the country. The

Despatch of
Pollock's bri-
gade. Ap-
pearance of
Akbar Khan.
Spirit ra-
tions.

appointment of General Pollock, an officer of experience and ability, to the command of this important expedition, not only gave satisfaction, but inspired confidence. On the 13th of February, intelligence was received in Jellalabad of his arrival at Peshawur, invested with full military and political powers in Affghanistan.

The spirited proclamation of Government, and the news of General Pollock's advance, came most opportunely to sustain the spirits of the noble garrison, for their great foe, Akbar Khan, now made his appearance in the valley. Had he come down upon Jellalabad fresh from his triumph at Cabul, with the guns he had wrested from our army, and roused the fanatic mountaineers to a vigorous attack on the town, its peril would have been indeed great. But his advance was providentially impeded for more than a month by differences with the chiefs at Cabul, and during this period the defences had been thoroughly repaired, the ditch all but completed, provisions had been laid in, and reinforcements under an able commander had reached Peshawur. When, therefore, on the morning of the 15th of February, his camp was descried on the hither bank of the river, its appearance excited more curiosity than apprehension. "At length," writes Havelock, "our redoubted enemy approaches."

Approach of
Akbar Khan.

"A single poled English tent is observed among others, which is ascertained to be the canvas abode of Mahomed Akbar Khan. Our telescopes distinctly notice three or four other tents of white canvas; the rest are of black felt. . . ."

"I ought before to have noticed that from the time of this force entering Jellalabad, our British soldiers have had no spirit rations, a great part of the not very ample supply of our commissariat having been lost in the descent of the Huft Kotul. . . . Without fear of contradiction, it may be asserted, that not only has the amount of laborious work they have completed without this factitious aid been surprising; but the State and the garrison have gained full one-third in manual exertion by their entire sobriety. Every hand has been constantly employed with the shovel and pickaxe. If there had been a

Great tem-
perance of
the garrison.

spirit ration, one-third of the labour would have been diminished in consequence of soldiers becoming the inmates of the hospital and guard-houses, or coming to their work with fevered brain and trembling hand, or sulky and disaffected, after the protracted debauch. Now all is health, cheerfulness, industry, and resolution."

On the 19th of February, a letter was received from General Pollock, in which he conveyed to Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor the satisfaction with which the Government had heard of the judicious and spirited reply sent by them to the instructions from Cabul to evacuate Jellalabad; he also stated that he would not hesitate to move on at once, at all risks, if it were necessary, to save the garrison from annihilation, but he considered it more advisable to concentrate his whole force at Peshawur, provided the garrison could hold out long enough to enable him to do so. Sir Robert Sale determined to send him a statement of his resources, and his means of resisting an attack, and to point out, that in a month the whole of the horses of his cavalry and artillery must perish, after which a retreat, even upon the advancing force of General Pollock, would be impossible. Sir Robert was seated by the side of Havelock—who was employed in writing the letter—and of Captain Wade, when the house was violently shaken. The motion was prolonged and increased in vehemence. The books on the writing-table began to dance before their eyes, and they were obliged to sally forth to avoid being crushed under the ruins of the house. The shocks continued without intermission with frightful violence. A dense cloud of dust obscured the sky. A confused rumbling sound was heard around them, wildly mingled with the crash of falling houses, and the outcries of the garrison followers, and the people of the town. The violence of the agitation under their feet increased, and the very foundations of the earth seemed to be shaken. Then there was a lull, and the hope arose in every mind that the violence of the phenomenon was expended. But in the twinkling of an eye, the elemental uproar was renewed with indescribable

The earth-quake of the 19th of February.

fury, and every hope of their surviving to tell the tale seemed to vanish. The earth was now agitated with a kind of ground swell, so forcible, that it was impossible for them to keep their footing. The wrench of nature seemed so violent, that they looked for the earth to open under their feet. All faces at this crisis "gathered blackness," and thoughts of the impending dissolution of nature crowded into their minds. A sense of giddiness, blindness, and bewilderment had seized on all, when, after some long and fearful heaves, the agitation subsided. They faltered thanks to Heaven for life, and as they rushed out of the court-yard, thought what had become of the labour of their hands, and where were their defences. The effect produced on the fortifications was thus described in the official despatch written by Havelock :—

"The earthquake shook down all our parapets which had been built with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable break in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Cabul gate to a shapeless mass of ruins." "We knew," he also wrote privately, "that the enemy had seven miles to march from Umur Khail, and guessed that he was not in less consternation than ourselves. His camp could scarcely have escaped the shock ; but it was necessary to guard against a sudden rush being made upon our walls by parties of his people, who might have been concealed behind the hills. As soon as the agitation subsided, the troops were assembled at their alarm posts by sound of bugle ; but after a short pause, to ascertain that no foes were near, piled their arms, resumed their entrenching tools, and set themselves with determination to the task of restoring the defences. Temporary parapets were thrown up of loose clods, the earth cleared out of the ditch, gabions filled to block up the main breaches, and palisades fixed to impede the progress of assailants through others. In a few hours the walls wore a more encouraging aspect . . . The energy with which our troops of all arms laboured in restoring the defences exceeds all calculation, and begs all commendation. They worked like men struggling for their existence, but with as much cheerfulness and good-humour as industry and perseverance. They had no rum to paralyze their nerves, sour their tempers, or

predispose them to idleness and sullen discontent. A long course of sobriety and labour has made men of mere boys of recruits, and brought the almost raw levy, which formed two-thirds of the array of the 13th, to the firm standard of the Roman discipline. They are now instructed to entrench themselves nightly, as well as to fight a battle every day."

Captain Broadfoot was standing on the ramparts when the earthquake occurred, and on seeing the defences fall one after another, said to a friend near him, "Now is the time for Akbar Khan." He hastened down when the shocks had ceased, and made immediate arrangements for repairing the injury. Through his scientific genius and indomitable energy "the parapets were entirely restored by the end of the month, the Cabul gate again rendered serviceable, the bastions either restored or the curtain filled in where restoration was impracticable, and every battery re-established." So rapidly were the works restored that the enemy, seeing in a few days no trace of the effects of the earthquake, declared that Jellalabad was the only place in the valley which had escaped, and through the effect of English witchcraft. The injury inflicted on Jellalabad was indeed slight compared with that which was felt in the neighbourhood of Akbar Khan's camp, where houses and forts had been prostrated. More especially, in the valleys yet red with the blood of our slaughtered officers, men, and followers, there had been a general destruction of towers, walls, and tenements, under the ruins of which no small number of the cruel and treacherous inhabitants had perished with their whole families. Akbar Khan, far from being able to take advantage of the dismantled state of Jellalabad, was scarcely able to keep his troops together, and restrain them from quitting his standard to condole with their suffering families, or to repair the injuries of the catastrophe.

On the 7th of March a letter was received from the durbar at Cabul, categorically demanding the evacuation of Jellalabad. No council of war was held; the reply which was sent simply referred the Cabul

Restoration
of the works.
Effects of the
earthquake
in the valley.

The garrison
again ordered
to evacuate.

cabinet to General Pollock, now the chief political authority in Affghanistan. The messenger, a nobleman of Herat, who had accompanied Major Pottinger to Cabul, and had frequently visited Havelock at the capital, having now renewed his intercourse, informed him that if the order was not complied with a large army would be immediately sent from Cabul, with a powerful artillery, to expel them from the town. Thus, in addition to the assaults of Akbar Khan, they had now the prospect of being attacked by another and more formidable foe, the levy *en masse* of the capital, accompanied by the guns taken from our force. Havelock, in noticing these fresh difficulties, remarks, "Que de choses paraissent impossibles, et que cependant ont été faites, par des hommes resolu, qui n'avaient plus d'autre ressource que la mort!" At the same time a letter was received from Colonel Palmer at Ghuznee, informing Sir Robert Sale that after a siege of four months he had been constrained, for want of water, to capitulate; and the officers of the 27th Native Infantry, among whom was a nephew of Havelock, were now in the hands of the enemy.

Jellalabad—the alternative.

The subject of greatest anxiety in the garrison at this time was the subsistence of the cavalry and artillery horses. Foraging parties were sent out daily under an escort, and constantly attacked by the enemy. On the 10th of March the Affghans planted their advanced parties so near the walls, that it was suspected they intended to mine the fortress; it was resolved, therefore, to make a vigorous sally. Colonel Dennie took the command of a body of about 800 men, and issuing from the gate, drove off the enemy, and ascertained beyond doubt that there had been no attempt to undermine them. Akbar Khan then drew out his whole army and advanced to the attack. The guns from the ramparts poured a destructive fire on him, and our horse and foot attacked him with such impetuosity that he was obliged to fly, leaving more than a hundred dead on the field. The whole force had now been employed without cessation for three weeks in restoring the defences, and as it did not seem probable

Foraging parties attacked by Akbar Khan, who is repulsed.

that the enemy would venture another attack after their recent defeat, it was determined to permit the wearied troops to enjoy the luxury of rest from their labours on the Sabbath of the 13th of March,—an announcement most acceptable to the soldiers of the 13th, many of whom joined Havelock in devotional exercises.

On the 17th of March, information was received from General Pollock, of the 8th of the month, that he did not expect the arrival of the regiment of dragoons which had been sent to reinforce him before the 20th, when he would certainly advance, and hoped to achieve a signal victory under the walls of Jellalabad. He wished to know whether Sir Robert could hold out to the last day of March. In a post-script to his letter, he added that the only object of his advance was to rescue the garrison from its peril, and that it was then to return with him across the frontier. This was the last order issued by Lord Auckland before he resigned the government. In the paroxysm of vigour created by the unparalleled disgrace and disaster we had suffered at Cabul, he announced to India that “active measures would be steadily pursued to assist such operations as might be required for the maintenance of the honour and interests of the British Government.” That resolution soon faded, and General Pollock was now instructed to withdraw his own brigades and that of Jellalabad to India; leaving our officers and their wives, the widows and the children, in the hands of the enemy; our prestige, which had always been a tower of strength, annihilated; and our national honour trampled in the dust. “It is to be feared,” wrote Havelock, on hearing of this determination, “that Government is infected with the dangerous timidity which teaches them to despair of regaining their power in this country, and that they will adopt pusillanimous measures, which will endanger their empire in India.” Sir Robert Sale’s reply, dated the 17th of March, was sent in French.

“Mon Général,—J’ai reçu aujourd’hui votre lettre du 6^{me}, avec un *post-scriptum* du 8^{me}. Assurez-vous que je

General Pollock's approach delayed.

garderai secret le propos du Gouvernement. Je puis bien, si le veut le bon Dieu, maintenir ma poste ici jusqu'au dernier de Mars ; et quand vous arriverez avec les dragons, je serai prêt à faire tout ce que vous ordonnerez ; mais il faut encore vous prévenir que mes troupes manquent entièrement des tentes et des animaux pour transporter cet équipage et leur bagage."

The state of the garrison of Jellalabad was now daily becoming more critical. The European troops had been for many days on reduced rations of salt meat, without vegetables, and it was doubted whether even this allowance could be continued beyond the second week of April. The officers were also on short commons. They had excellent bread, and plenty of good water ; wine and beer were unknown ; roasted corn had long been substituted for tea and coffee ; their sugar had failed them, but there was no lack of tobacco. The native troops were ill off with their diminished rations of *ottah*. Akbar Khan did not venture to attack the garrison after the severe lesson he had received on the 10th ; but he established so strict a blockade that it was no longer possible to obtain either provisions or forage. Sir Robert Sale had directed all the camels to be destroyed, with the view of preserving the *bhoosa* for the cavalry and artillery horses. To crown their difficulties, a letter arrived from General Pollock, with intelligence that the 3rd Dragoons had been detained by rain, and that he could scarcely expect them before the 28th or 29th of March. He was desirous of moving immediately on the arrival of that corps ; but, as it would be necessary to maintain posts in his rear as he advanced, it was desirable to await the arrival of the 31st Foot, which was not expected to reach Peshawur before the middle of April, and he was desirous of knowing whether Sir Robert Sale could hold out till the 26th of that month. The General in his reply pointed out the privations and risks to which the garrison must in that case be subject, but added, "more than all this, we dread failure on your part in forcing the passes." Havelock on receiving this intelligence recorded in his note-

Exhausted
state of the
garrison of
Jellalabad.

book : "It is hardly to be doubted that General Pollock will await the arrival of the 31st before he advances. Meanwhile we must be patient, and put our trust in God." But when the prospect of relief was thus postponed, he evidently considered their position all but desperate, and the letter he wrote had all the appearance of a farewell letter to his friends in India. It was addressed to General Smith.

"Jellalabad, 30th March, 1842.

"My dear General,—Kindly forward this to Marshman, after perusing it. We still hold our own, by God's blessing, but shall have grain provisions on a reduced rate for men, and corn for troops only to the 13th proximo. Existence may be supported by one contrivance and another ten days longer, but the most sanguine cannot hope to protract that term. You will see then how much depends on General Pollock's success in forcing or turning the Khyber; the latter might, I think, be done by the Kupper route; but then, like Napoleon by the Great St Bernard, the movement might be too late, and Jellalabad, like Genoa, be lost. All is in the hands of God. I wish Marshman clearly to understand, that if I fall in this struggle, which humanly speaking is so probable, my wife and children will, as regards worldly prospects, have to depend entirely on the money lodged for the purchase of my majority, and the small pension of my rank. I trust he will be able to make arrangements to prevent their experiencing want, until the question of the issue of this siege and of Havelock shall have been decided. He can write to England, that I am at present in the highest health and spirits, and relying fully on the merits of the Redeemer, and will be well pleased, if it be His will, to end my days in so honourable an enterprise as the defence of Jellalabad.

"Believe me, my dear General,

"Most faithfully, your old subaltern,

"HENRY HAVELOCK."

"The month of April," writes Havelock, "commenced auspiciously; for a long time large flocks of sheep have been seen grazing within cannon-shot of the place, and hopes were sometimes entertained of capturing them. It was, however, commonly observed, that considerable bodies of horsemen were posted in some secure place. The near approach of these cattle was,

Capture of
500 sheep.

therefore, viewed as a means of decoying our troops into an ambushade. But on the 1st of April, the opportunity seemed irresistible. The 'fleecy people' were again seen in large numbers on the Cabul side; the ruined forts were but thinly manned, and the enemy's parties of horse appeared to be small." The gates were thrown open, and as the bugle sounded, every trooper in their little body, and 200 of the 13th, and the same number of the 35th, with the Sappers, marched forth in the highest glee, and after a very brief and feeble resistance on the part of the enemy, drove in a flock of more than 500 sheep and goats, a circumstance which elevated, in no common degree, the spirits of the soldiers, who had been some days on half-rations of salt meat. Two days after, a letter from General Pollock announced that he had determined to advance to the relief of the garrison, without waiting for the arrival of the 31st; but from the report he gave of the temper of his native troops, whose imaginations invested the Khyber defiles with every image of terror, it was feared that the attempt would be attended with no inconsiderable risk.

Havelock had for several days urged Sir Robert to make a bold attack on Akbar Khan's camp, which had been pitched within two miles of the town of Jellalabad, and thus raise the siege by their own exertions. But Sir Robert, though the bravest of the brave, sometimes shrunk from the responsibility of taking the initiative in a daring enterprise. This deficiency was generally supplied by the well-tempered boldness and consummate judgment of Havelock, but on this occasion the General turned a deaf ear on his advice. On the evening of the 5th of April, a Cashmerian, who had been often employed as a spy by Captain Macgregor, and had been made prisoner by Akbar Khan, escaped from his camp, and came to Havelock with the intelligence that it was generally reported and believed in the enemy's camp, that General Pollock had met with a reverse. Trusting, it was said, to the treacherous assurances of the Afredees, he had advanced into the pass, and, after having been engaged with the mountaineers the whole day, had been

Havelock
urges Sir
Robert to
attack Akbar
Khan.

obliged to retreat. Towards midnight, another spy from the enemy's camp asserted that General Pollock had lost guns, and that the heads of some of his soldiers had been brought to Akbar Khan. Havelock took the reports to Sir Robert Sale in the dead of night, and again importuned him to move out with his entire force, and boldly attack the enemy, but met with no success. On the morning of the 6th, a salute was fired from Akbar Khan's camp, in honour of the victory which was said to have been gained over the English general. This circumstance was well calculated to depress the minds of the garrison. "Coupled," writes Havelock, "with the news of the preceding night, the event did at first create some feelings of gloom. It seemed as if the tide of events had set in uniformly against us, and that our hopes of succour, which had been some days sanguine, had once more vanished, and that we were consigned to a new succession of privations and labours, terminating in inevitable and utterly ruinous disaster. Destruction to the many and captivity to the few, were the mildest terms we could hope from our sanguinary foe. But with these painful feelings, there sprang up in every breast a growth of brighter and more worthy sentiments, and all burnt with the desire to be led against the enemy, and try their mettle in the open field. Sir Robert Sale in a few hours came to the decision, that their ardour should not be damped, and as evening approached, issued his written orders for a general attack on the enemy's camp the next morning." It has been supposed that this attack was determined on in a council of war; but councils of war never vote for fighting. The fact was that the senior officers were resolved to fight; and Abbot had even taken down his guns for the conflict without orders. On the evening of the 6th they waited on Sir Robert Sale, and, in strong language, urged an attack on Akbar Khan. The two principal advisers of Sir Robert, Captain Wade and Havelock, voluntarily absented themselves on this occasion. "I love the old soldier," wrote Havelock in a letter to Serampore, "and rejoice that, though he did not listen to my single voice,

he was swayed by the united opinion of some older and some younger men, since it redounded to his own reputation and to the good of his country." The plan of the action was immediately drawn up by Havelock, and is thus recorded in his note-book:—

"Three columns of infantry were to be formed. The centre, under Colonel Dennie, was to consist of the 13th, 500 strong; the left, of the 35th, under Colonel Monteith, mustering the same number of bayonets; and the right, under Captain Havelock, composed of one company of the 13th, another of the 35th, and the detachment of Sappers under Lieutenant Orr, the whole amounting to 360.—Captain Broadfoot was lying on his couch, unable to move, from the effects of a dangerous wound he had received in a sortie on the 24th of March.—These were to be supported by the fire of six guns of the light field battery, to which Captain Backhouse was temporarily attached, and with which Captain Macgregor volunteered his services, as well as by the whole of our small body of cavalry. The right column, under Havelock, was to lead the attack; and penetrating between the restored works within 800 yards of the place, preserve the appui of the river, strive to drive before it the enemy's skirmishers, and thus prepare the way for the uninterrupted advance of the two other columns up to the centre of the enemy's position. This they were to assault and endeavour to penetrate, while the advanced column made a simultaneous attack on the extreme left of the Affghans. All three assailing columns were then to work in combination towards our own left, since it was supposed that on the enemy's extreme left his chief forces lay."

In the intermediate space between Jellalabad and the enemy's encampment there stood several small forts, which had previously occasioned considerable annoyance, and it was distinctly agreed that the order of operations should not be disturbed by an attempt to attack any of them.

At early dawn, without bugle or drum, the troops fell into their ranks and marched out of Jellalabad. Akbar Khan, though he had sent several emissaries during the previous night to spread a report through the town that he was preparing to fly, was found to be perfectly ready to receive them. His troops, about

Engagement
of the 7th
April.

6000 in number, were drawn up before his camp, his left resting on the Cabul river. Havelock moved on rapidly in advance with his column, and, driving the skirmishers before him, pushed on towards the enemy's camp, the other columns following him. At the distance of about three-quarters of a mile from Jellalabad, however, a flanking fire was opened from one of the forts on the centre column, which Sir Robert Sale accompanied. He directed Colonel Dennie to storm it; rushing in with his men of the 13th, he passed the outer wall through an opening, but found himself exposed to a murderous fire from the inner keep, where he was mortally wounded by an Affghan marksman, and in him fell one of the most gallant soldiers in the British army. This false move deranged the order of battle, and well nigh cost us the day. Sir Robert Sale sent orders to Havelock, whose column, owing to this divergence, was greatly in advance of the others, to halt. He replied, "that he would halt where he was, but that he heard Akbar's drum beating, and should soon have his whole force upon him." Akbar Khan, seeing Havelock unsupported, brought down his formidable cavalry, said to be 1500 in number, upon that feeble column of 360 men. Havelock posted the company of the 13th in a walled enclosure on his right, to pour a flanking fire on the enemy, and formed the rest into square. That he might be able to command both parties, he himself remained outside the square till the horsemen were close upon them. His men commenced firing without orders, and his horse, fresh from long confinement, and thus placed between two fires, threw him, and galloped back; thereby creating an impression that he had been slain. He must have fallen under the swords of the Affghans, had not a sapper and two men of the 13th rushed forward and rescued him. The enemy's horse, who had charged with much resolution, approached within thirty yards; their leader was shot as his spear-head touched the bayonets of the square, but exposed as they were to a heavy fire in front and flank, they were shaken, pulled up, and retired in confusion. Looking back, and seeing that

the centre column had now abandoned its unsuccessful attempt on the fort, Havelock reformed his column and resumed his advance for a few hundred yards. Again the hostile horse came swooping down upon him. He cautioned his men to reserve their fire till they were within thirty yards of the enemy, and throwing the whole column into one square, awaited the attack, which was more feebly made and more easily repulsed than before. Sir Robert Sale then sent Backhouse's guns to his assistance, and the little column, loudly cheering them as they came on, advanced against the enemy's encampment, and penetrated it, capturing two guns and driving the Affghans headlong into the river. The other columns now came up; Akbar Khan's camp was attacked on three points: "in a short time," says the despatch, "the enemy were dislodged from every part of their position, their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman by 7 A.M. We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards; recaptured four guns lost by the Cabul and Gundamuck forces, the restoration of which to our Government is matter of much honest exultation among our troops; seized and destroyed a great quantity of *matériel* and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy's tents. In short, the defeat of Akbar Khan in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal." The field was strewed with the bodies of the Affghans, while the loss on our side amounted to only ten killed and fifty wounded. The victors conveyed in triumph to the town as much of the baggage, horses, arms, and cattle, as they had occasion for. Not the least valuable acquisition of the day was the magazine, plentifully stored with powder, shot, and shells. Anxiety was now exchanged for security, and want for abundance. The chiefs throughout the valley hastened to make their submission to those who were now lords of the ascendant, and the villagers poured supplies into the market which was established outside the walls.

Thus had the garrison of Jellalabad, after having been

isolated in a hostile country for five months, surrounded with infuriated enemies, and menaced with destruction, achieved its own relief, unaided, except by its own good sword. In the previous history of British India, there had been no example of such a siege, or such a deliverance. In the contemplation of this triumph, it is impossible to avoid contrasting the events at Jellalabad with those at Cabul. In the one case 5000 British troops, with every advantage on their side, were beleaguered by an armed rabble in their own cantonment on the third day of the insurrection; entered into a disgraceful capitulation at the end of six weeks, and were eventually annihilated. In the other, 2000 troops of the same mettle, after sixteen days of a severe conflict in the most tremendous mountain defiles, took up a position in a dilapidated fortress, and, after having repelled every assault for five months, accomplished their own deliverance. The cause of disaster at Cabul, and of success at Jellalabad, is to be attributed exclusively to the character of the commanders. At Cabul there was a chief conspicuous for his personal intrepidity, but enfeebled in mind and body by disease, to a degree which incapacitated him to act with the vigour which the crisis demanded. With him was associated Colonel Shelton, an officer of rare courage and many military virtues, but disqualified, by infirmity of temper, from acting in concert with others. There was, therefore, discord where unanimity was essential to safety. So completely was the force demoralized by the incapacity and dissensions of the leaders, that even the presence of the heroic defender of Herat could not arrest its fate. On the other hand, the garrison of Jellalabad was under a leader who, though sometimes morbidly diffident when under the pressure of responsibilities, had the good sense to avail himself of the counsels of the noble spirits around him. It is no disparagement of the merits of Macgregor and Monteith, of Abbott and Backhouse, to say, that the successful defence of Jellalabad was due to the surpassing genius of Broadfoot, and to the judicious and bold counsels of Havelock.

Remarks on
the event.

While the garrison of Jellalabad was thus engaged in vanquishing its redoubted foe, General Pollock was advancing through the passes to its succour. By one of the most masterly military manœuvres ever witnessed in India, he forced his way through the gorge of the Khyber pass on the 5th of April. At early dawn two columns ascended the heights on either side, and chased the astonished Afredees from hill to hill. Their position, which they considered impregnable, was thus turned; the barricades they had established at the entrance of the defile, attacked in rear and in front, were thrown down; and the army passed through with trifling loss. Our troops had foiled them in their own mountain warfare, and chased them from their own fastnesses, and they offered little resistance to the subsequent progress of the force. By the 10th, General Pollock, having reached the midway station between Peshawur and Jellalabad, heard how Sir Robert Sale had defeated Akbar Khan, and become master of his position. He therefore moved forward more leisurely, with his long convoy of munitions of war and provisions. On the 16th of April, nine days after the "crowning mercy," as Havelock termed the victory of the 7th, the relieving force approached Jellalabad. Numbers of its garrison came out to welcome their comrades, the band of the 13th playing the old Jacobite air, by no means inappropriate to the occasion, "Oh! but ye've been long o' coming." It was a season of thrilling delight to both forces, but of peculiar exultation to the garrison which had been so long beleaguered, and were now enabled to receive their friends with all the animation of victors. General Pollock had brought with him a large supply of provisions for the famishing garrison, but found that, with the exception of wine and spirits, they had supplied their own wants by their own exertions. Their bronzed countenances bore the stamp of robust health. Constant exertion, combined with the absence of liquor, and not less the consciousness of noble achievements, gave them an air of life and confidence very different from the depression which was expected to be seen in a body which

Advance of
General Pol-
lock to Jella-
labad.

had so long struggled for existence. Sir Robert Sale had generously written to General Pollock to appoint Havelock Persian interpreter on his staff, as a reward for his services, and the General had cheerfully promised him the office; but the Commander-in-Chief had selected him for the more important post of Deputy-Adjutant-General of the infantry division. By the death of Colonel Dennie, and the retirement of the officer next in rank, Havelock's position in his own corps, the 13th, now entitled him to the command of it; but, actuated by the principle on which he always acted, of endeavouring to extend as much as possible the sphere of his public usefulness, he made his choice of the more responsible office which had been conferred on him by Sir Jasper Nicholls.

Lord Ellenborough, who had been appointed Governor-General in succession to Lord Auckland, proceeded to India by the Cape, and did not reach Calcutta before the 28th of February. His first state paper in reference to the deplorable events in Afghanistan was dated on the 15th of March: he therein announced his determination to re-establish our military reputation by the infliction of some signal blow on the Affghans, which might make it apparent to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we had the power of inflicting punishment on those who committed atrocities and violated faith. On hearing of the victory gained by the Jellalabad garrison on the 7th of April, he issued a notification, in which their services were thus nobly commemorated:—

“That illustrious garrison which, by its constancy in enduring privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now, sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant leader, Major-General Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the standards of their boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, and recaptured four guns which, under circumstances which can never occur again, had during the last winter fallen into their hands.

“The Governor-General cordially congratulates the army on

Lord Ellen-
borough,
Governor-
General.—
His proclama-
tions.

the return of victory to its ranks. He is convinced that there, as in all former times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and native troops, mutually supporting each other, and evincing equal discipline and valour, are led into action by officers in whom they justly confide.

“The Governor-General directs that the substance of this notification, and of Major-General Sir Robert Sale’s report, be carefully made known to all troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be fired at every principal station of the army.”

But, on the same day on which this proclamation was issued, a communication was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, desiring him to order General Pollock and General Nott, commanding at Candahar, to withdraw from Affghanistan as speedily as possible. To narrate how the Governor-General vacillated in his Affghan policy for sixteen weeks, from the 15th of March to the 4th of July, belongs to the province of the historian, and not of this biographer. It is sufficient here to state that, after the two Generals had been kept in a state of the most embarrassing anxiety regarding the future movements of their troops, the 4th of July terminated all their doubts. On that day an official letter was sent to General Nott, stating that the determination of Government regarding his retirement from Affghanistan remained without alteration, but, in a private communication, he was authorized to use his own discretion as to the route he should pursue, and informed that he was at liberty either to retire backwards by the way the army had entered Affghanistan, or forward, by the route of Cabul and Jellalabad. This was the device adopted for authorizing him to recapture Cabul, and to restore the prestige of our arms, leaving the responsibility of the movement on his shoulders. A copy of this letter was sent to General Pollock, and permission was given him “to advance to the capital and co-operate with General Nott, if he should determine to retire by that route.” The inconvenience of this policy is manifest, as General Pollock was unable to make any movement in advance, until he could learn the intentions of General Nott, whose first letter announcing his determination to move on

Cabul, dated on the 27th of July, did not reach General Pollock's camp before the middle of August.

On the 28th of April, Havelock conveyed to General Smith the intelligence of the death of General Elphinstone :

"I fear," my dear General, "you will think I am growing a bad correspondent, but you are aware that Adjutant-general ^{Death of} for nine regiments is not quite a sinecure. We are ^{General} resting on our oars, to be sure, but, in India, when ^{Elphinstone.} they spare the cartridge paper, they begin to pull away upon the foolscap. . . . On the evening of the 25th, Captain Mackenzie, a very noble fellow of the Madras army, rode into this camp on two days' parole from the Affghans, and gave us the melancholy intelligence that General Elphinstone had expired on the 23rd, in a fort in the Ghilzye hills, to the southward of Tezeen. To that secluded spot, Mahomed Akbar had removed his prisoners by short marches after his defeat on the 7th instant. The poor General felt himself unequal to the effort in his weak state, but could obtain no respite from his jailors. Heavy rain fell in the valley. Mahomed Akbar, though wounded, displayed so much of gallantry and humanity, as to descend from his *chowpan*, and give place in it to Ladies Macnaghten and Sale. But General Elphinstone rode on horseback, supported by an Affghan on either side. His ailments had fearfully increased when he reached the destination of the party, and it soon became apparent that he could not survive. His mind was wrought into a frame at least of resignation and submission to the Divine will by prayer and reading the Scriptures. He had committed an error fatal to his worldly reputation in so long delaying to leave Cabul, after his dreadful fit of sickness had reduced him to a state of bodily infirmity which could not fail to superinduce more or less of imbecility of purpose. But Mackenzie, himself a very gallant fellow, assures us that the General's conduct during the insurrection was personally intrepid in the extreme. He wavered, however, in his resolutions, or rather plans, and fell back perpetually for advice and support on councils of war. The moment of action seems perpetually to have been lost ; and the insurrection, which might have been crushed at first, by one vigorous effort, increased daily in strength and importance. Small detachments were sent out to effect considerable things, and not very well handled on many occasions. The troops lost confidence to a degree unheard of in our armies, and a strict blockade ef-

fecting the rest, and brought on the sad events of the convention, the daring seizure and murder of the envoy, the evacuation of the cantonment, and the destruction of the force."

The force to which Havelock was attached remained inactive in the valley of Jellalabad from the 15th of April to the 10th of August, waiting till the decision of Government and of General Nott should enable it to advance. In this interval he maintained a constant correspondence with General Smith. On the 6th of May he wrote :—

Havelock's
letters to
General
Smith.

"Our fourth brigade came in yesterday, and the force of all arms, with the exception of a battering train, is fully sufficient for the conquest of eastern Affghanistan, but then it must be managed *secundum artem*, not on the basis of little political schemes. The safest way to act (in the humble opinion of a captain of foot) is, to conquer and keep the whole country; in every event it is best to manœuvre as if this was our object; for all *bridle-in-hand* plans will involve something faulty in strategy. The first object is, to subdue the Khyber; the second, to vanquish and beat down the eastern Ghilzyes. When we may be said thus to have battered the great gate of Cabul, and blown in its intrenchments, the insurgents at the capital will succumb like mice. But the Affghans are shrewd fellows, and will smile at our advancing on their great city, while the Khyberees and Ghilzyes are in force in our rear. Remember, in this country there are no standing armies; but a large and well-armed population is ready to start up and defend the tract of country it belongs to at the nod or beck of an influential chief. Hence it is to be inferred, that we must subdue these militias, destroy their forts, and disarm them, before we can push on safely against the Bala Hissar."

"June 11th, 1842.

"Most truly you may say, 'three's about' ought not to be the word, but I fear it is the only one we shall get. If public accounts do not wholly deceive us, this will not satisfy the desires of a high-spirited nation, which will be broken-hearted when it hears that its armies have retired, leaving behind their cannon, standards, sick and wounded, and helpless women in the hands of a barbarous enemy, whom it has been shown, by God's blessing, it could beat in the proportion of full four to one. I know

not what insanity can have seized our civil ruler and military leader ; but I must be silent, though in grief and shame."

"June 14th, 1842.

"I will state the views of your second lieutenant of 1819—1820. Presuming that the Government is invincibly averse to the conquest of Affghanistan, I would say that they might thus with safety and honour confine themselves to the object of compelling the Affghans to restore all they took from us in the day of successful treachery. Let them complete the equipment, with carriage, of the forces at Jellalabad and Candahar, give each a battering train, and authorize the leaders to push the war to extremity, provided the Affghans do not accede to terms the most moderate. Say to the ruler *de facto*, whomsoever he may be, It is our desire to leave your country, nor further intermeddle with your factions, but surrender to us our cannon and other *matériel*, our colours, hostages, and prisoners, and we depart. If not, war to extermination. Remember too that a single shot fired at our retreating columns will bring us back to Cabul to exact retribution for the insult. It would be worth the while of the ruling Barukzyes, whether Akbar Khan, or Mahomed Zeman Khan, to purchase our absence at this price. A battering train, cattle, and the will on the part of Government to persevere, are all that we require to carry through this limited project. We have troops, field artillery, and supplies in abundance."

A letter from General Nott, dated the 27th of July, at length reached General Pollock about the middle of August, announcing his determination to *retire* by way of Cabul ; in other words, to advance to the capital and recover our honour. Ample supplies of every description had been poured into General Pollock's camp, through the energetic efforts of the Governor-General, and Mr George Clerk, the political Resident on the north-west frontier, and Mr Robertson, the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, and the General was enabled to advance towards Cabul on the 20th of August. His force, consisting of about 8000 men, was concentrated at Gundamuck on the 23rd. In the adjoining valley of Mamoo Khail, about two miles distant, the chiefs, having sent away their women and children, collected the inhabitants, and prepared for a stout resistance. These men had

General Pollock advances towards Cabul.

been among the most ferocious butchers of our countrymen in their retreat from Cabul, and it was deemed advisable to inflict a severe retribution on them. Captain Broadfoot and Havelock accompanied the expedition detached for their punishment, the one with his spirited Sappers, the other as Adjutant-General of the division. The forts were captured with little difficulty. The villagers were hunted out of the valley, and the smoke of every fort, village, and hut ascended to heaven. Then came the destruction of the crops, vines, orchards, watercourses, and whatever had contributed to the loveliness of the valley in which "man alone was vile." General Pollock halted at Gundamuck till the 7th of September, waiting for intelligence of General Nott's movements, in order that they might reach the capital simultaneously.

On the 8th of September, the first division of General Pollock's army approached the hills which overlook the pass of Jugdulluk. Eight months before, the Affghans had on this spot gloated on the massacre of the Feringees, and they now assembled again in large numbers to dispute the entrance of the pass, and to renew the scene of slaughter. But they had a different General to deal with, and a victorious and not a dispirited army to encounter. They were driven like sheep from hill to hill, and totally discomfited. The victory on this occasion was won almost exclusively by the soldiers of the 13th, many of them the raw recruits whom Havelock had brought up from Calcutta in the preceding year, and whom five months of hard service at Jellalabad had turned into veterans. This defeat filled Akbar Khan and his confederates with dismay, and he sent Major Troup, one of his prisoners, to open a negotiation with General Pollock, and prevent his advance on the capital, but he found that it was too late. The two Generals, the one from Jellalabad, and the other from Candahar, were now running a race for Cabul, and it was not to be expected that any proposals from the trembling chiefs would arrest their progress.

Akbar Khan sent his prisoners towards the inaccessible

regions of the Hindoo Koosh, and collected his entire force for a final and decisive conflict. He had determined to select the formidable defiles of the Khoord Cabul for this life or death struggle, but General Pollock having advisedly rested at Tezeen on the 12th of September, the halt was attributed to pusillanimity, and Akbar Khan was induced to forego the advantage of those defiles, and advance to meet him, where the ground was less favourable to his operations. As the British columns moved forward, they found the road strewed at intervals with the mangled remains of their fellow-soldiers, who had been slaughtered in the retreat, and the sight seemed to inflame their minds almost to frenzy. It was in this state of frantic excitement that they encountered the army of the chief who had been the principal instigator, if not actor, of that bloody tragedy. The valley of Tezeen is completely surrounded with hills, and they now swarmed with Affghans, who had hastened from Cabul and the surrounding country, to play their last stake. Their horse, intent on plunder, was the first to advance to the conflict, but the European dragoons and the Native cavalry speedily routed them with great slaughter. Then the artillery was brought to bear on the enemy, both in the valley and on the heights, and did the greatest execution. The infantry in two divisions, the Jellalabad column on the right and two other regiments on the left, clambered up the hills with the utmost alacrity. The enemy with their long range jezails poured a murderous fire on them as they ascended, but our troops continued to advance with a steady pace, and drove the Affghans from every point till the hills were perfectly clear of them. The finest sight of the day was Captain Broadfoot and the diminutive Goorkahs of his corps of Sappers pursuing the enemy from crag to crag, and climbing heights which appeared inaccessible, till they stood on the highest point of the Huft Kotul, and were enabled to look down on the enemy they had chased. Havelock was in his element, and was described by those who were in the field, as present wherever the fire was hottest, and the resistance

Defeat of
Akbar Khan
at Tezeen.

most resolute. The enemy fought not only with valour, but with the energy of despair, but nothing could withstand the onslaught of our troops. One such day at Cabul, and there would have been no capitulation and no extermination. The victory was complete; the last hope of the insurgents had vanished, the doom of the capital was sealed, and its inhabitants, so brave in the hour of our depression, as Havelock had predicted, "cowered like mice." Two days after, General Pollock's force was triumphantly encamped at Cabul, on the spot which had so recently been the scene of our humiliation.

Akbar Khan, after his defeat at Tezeen, fled to the Ghorebund valley, intending to retire to the region of the Hindoo Koosh, whither he had previously sent the prisoners. The first object of General Pollock, after reaching Cabul, was to deliver them from captivity. Accordingly, Sir Richmond Shakspeare, his military secretary, who had already acquired a European reputation by the romantic deliverance of the Russian captives at Khiva, whom he conducted across the steppes of Tartary to Orenberg, was despatched with 600 horse to overtake the convoy of prisoners. Fearing that he might be attacked on the route, a second force was sent, and Sir Robert Sale started immediately after, with his brave 13th, to rescue his wife and daughter, and their companions in adversity. "Who could have dreamt," writes Havelock, "that Akbar Khan, who had shown himself so accomplished in every art of Affghan stratagem, in destroying our troops, and getting these very people into his power, should have intrusted his treasure to a man like Saleh Mahomed, a twice-sold traitor, who had been the native commandant in Captain Hopkins's corps, and deserted him on the appearance of Dost Mahomed Khan!" The prisoners, under the conduct of this man, were conveyed from fort to fort, each more comfortless than the last. While they were confined at Bameean, Saleh Mahomed produced a letter from Akbar Khan, directing him to convey them to Kooloom, and make them over to the chief of that principality. The prisoners had now no pros-

pect before them but that of a hopeless captivity among the Usbeks, but the feeling of despair was of short duration. Saleh Mahomed had some time before sounded Captain Johnson as to the reward he might expect, if he procured the release of the captives. He now produced a letter from Mohun Lall, an *élève* of the Delhi College, who had been Sir William Macnaghten's moonshee, offering him a donation of £2000, and a pension for life of £1200 if he would restore the prisoners. He said he was willing to accede to the proposal if three of the gentlemen, whom he regarded as the chiefs of the party, would swear by their Saviour to make good to him the sum which had been offered. The engagement was readily signed by four of them. Saleh Mahomed now openly avowed his defection from Akbar Khan. The commander of the fort was deposed, and Major Pottinger, taking the conduct of affairs into his own hands, began to provision it and to prepare for its defence, and issued proclamations calling on the surrounding chiefs to make their submission. On the 15th of September, a horseman galloped in from Cabul, with the news of Akbar's defeat at Tezeen, and his flight. The prisoners now determined not to lose a day in starting for General Pollock's camp. They commenced their joyous march on the morning of the 16th, and three hours after noon the next day perceived a body of horsemen winding down the pass, in front, and immediately after Sir Richmond Shakspeare was in the midst of them. All their anxieties were now at an end, and they pushed forward with a light foot and still lighter heart towards the capital. On the morning of the 20th a cloud of dust was seen in the distance. It was raised by the troops who accompanied Sir Robert Sale, and in a few moments the gallant old soldier was locked in the embrace of his wife and daughter. On the 21st, the little band of prisoners, on whose fate the eyes of India had been fixed with the most intense and painful interest for eight months, passed through the city towards the cantonment. Havelock came out to greet them, and to inquire whether his nephew, Lieut. Williams, the grandson of Dr Marsh-

man, who had been besieged for four months with his corps, the 27th, at Ghuznee, and had, on its fall, been transferred to Akbar Khan, was among them. A tall figure clad in an Affghan dress, with a beard which had not been touched for many months, stepped forward and shouted "Here I am, uncle."

In the mean while, Ameenoollah, one of the most inveterate of the Affghan leaders, had collected the scattered remnants of the Affghan troops in the Kohistan, or mountainous region to the north of the capital, Operations in the Kohistan —Istaliff. with the intention of continuing the struggle. It was in the Kohistan that Captains Rattary and Coddington had been murdered and the Goorkah regiment annihilated during the insurrection. It was deemed necessary to break up this hostile gathering, and to inflict some signal retribution on those who had so treacherously murdered our men and officers. General M'Caskill's division was therefore sent to attack Istaliff and reduce the Kohistan. This valley, for the salubrity of its climate, the luxuriance of its orchards, and the loveliness of its aspect, was considered one of the most delightful in that part of Affghanistan. The beautiful town of Istaliff, built on terraces on the slope of a hill, was esteemed the virgin fortress of the country. The Affghans, considering it a retreat secure from assault, had therefore collected in it their treasure, their wives, and their children. Since the appointment of Havelock as Deputy-Adjutant-General of the division, General M'Caskill had conceived the highest opinion of his abilities, and, not having sufficient confidence in his own military judgment, had intrusted the entire management of this expedition to his superior skill. The following is the memorandum drawn up by Havelock:—

"Camp, near Istaliff, Sept. 28, 1842.

"Memorandum for the operations of to-morrow."

"At four in the morning the reveillé will sound, upon which tents will be struck, and the baggage be loaded. As soon as it is daylight the assembly will be heard, when regiments will fall in on their own parades. The baggage and camp equipage will then proceed under Quarter-master sergeants to the fort on the

right flank of the encampment. The whole will be guarded by a wing of the 42nd Native Infantry, and two Ressalehs of Captain Christie's cavalry, under an European officer, Major Clarkson commanding.

"The force will then be formed in two columns of attack, consisting, the right, of Brigadier Tulloch's brigade, and the left of that of Brigadier Stacey. Captain Backhouse's mountain train will be attached to the former, and Captain Blood's whole battery and the two 18-pounders to the latter, which will take up a position on the Charekar road. The cavalry, united under Major Lockwood, will form the reserve, to which will be added a wing of Her Majesty's 41st regiment, under Major Simmons.

"The attack will be made from our right by Brigadier Tulloch's brigade, in columns at quarter distance with deploying intervals, covered by skirmishers, endeavouring to seize the ridges of the hills on the enemy's left, and thus turning by that flank his whole position.

"Brigadier Stacey's brigade will adopt a similar formation in the plain, but will not attack, until it sees the Affghans' left turned, when it will move on and co-operate with the right column in mastering the hills. The cavalry and reserve will be ready to support this movement and protect the guns.

"Captain Blood's battery will in the mean time have opened as heavy a fire as possible on the most favourable points, with the view of diverting the attention of the enemy.

"If the hills are carried the columns will be steadily reformed and await further orders.

"Lieutenant Mayne will accompany the right column, and point out its track, and Major Sanders will be pleased to aid in directing the left."

The force was accompanied by Captain Broadfoot, who advanced to the front with his noble Sappers, and drove the enemy before him. "The enemy's position," writes Havelock, "in gardens and behind enclosures and walls, backed by a town the flat roofs of which were occupied by rifle-men, and behind which rose tremendous ridges of mountains, was strong, and the levies congregated for its defence were numerous and full of audacity and excitement, but the rapid advance of one column, aided by the manœuvres of another, quickly dislodged them. The

ground would not permit the use of artillery (except the little mountain train), but the pace of the Sappers, the 26th N. I., and the gallant old 9th, was so good that the Affghans could not face them in the vineyards, and, once thrown into confusion, could never be rallied. Our troops indeed behaved everywhere well, and there was far less of outrage of every kind, and above all to the women, than is seen ninety-nine times out of one hundred in cases of towns and cities stormed." Ameenollah was the first to decamp, and he was followed by the whole body of his troops, and by the entire population, men, women, and children, who were seen in their white dresses covering the slope of the hill in their precipitate flight. The victory, which was most complete, was due as much to military strategy as to military valour. It was one of the most brilliant episodes of the expedition, and Havelock regarded it with a feeling of just exultation. It was the first opportunity he had enjoyed of directing, under his own exclusive control, the military operations of a force in the field upon a large scale. The General did not interfere with the operations of the day. During the action he was seated under a tree with a basket of Cabul plums near him, and when the officer sent by Havelock galloped down to announce the victory, said, "Indeed! Will you take a plum?" For Istaliff General M'Caskill was decorated with the cross of the Bath, but Havelock got nothing. To this neglect he sometimes facetiously alluded by quoting the words in Ecclesiastes, "Now there was found in the city a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city; yet no man remembered that same poor man." But those who were aware that both the plan and the execution of this successful engagement were his own, were led to entertain the highest opinion of his professional abilities. Major Pottinger, who had witnessed his masterly movements during the day, came up to him after the action, and said, "Oh, if we had only had you with us at Cabul things would have worn a very different aspect." Havelock replied with his usual modesty: "I will not under-

The victory
of Istaliff
Havelock's
own.

take to say that I could have saved Cabul, but I feel confident that George Broadfoot would have done it." The town was partially burnt, while Charekar, where the Goorkah regiment had been butchered, and Lughmanee and Oppian, the ancient Oppiana, as Havelock observes, were destroyed, and the expedition returned to Cabul on the 7th of October.

Our national honour having now been vindicated, our military prestige restored, and the captives recovered, the troops were to bid adieu to Affghanistan, in the ^{Return of the army to India.} fervent hope that they might never see it again. The most memorable tokens of retribution were inflicted on the capital which had witnessed the assassination of our Envoy, and exulted in our humiliation, and the army commenced its return to India on the 16th of October. Lord Ellenborough awaited the return of the victorious troops on the banks of the Sutlege, and received them at the foot of the bridge of boats over that river with all the pomp of a Roman ovation. On the 17th of December the "illustrious garrison of Jellalabad" defiled over the bridge. "I crossed it," wrote Havelock, "in the suite of Sir Robert Sale, borrowed for the hour as a part of the triumphant pageant with which India's ruler greeted him who was truly regarded as, under Providence, its preserver. Thus auspiciously terminated my four years' connection with Affghanistan." And thus terminated the Affghan war, in which every principle of equity and justice was sacrificed to considerations of policy, and that policy so fatally false that its success only served to augment our danger. The expedition is memorable in our Indian annals as having inflicted on us the most astounding disaster which had ever befallen our arms, and entailed on the Indian exchequer the loss of thirteen millions.

CHAPTER IV.

Havelock returns to his Regiment.—Appointed Persian Interpreter to the Commander-in-Chief.—The Gwalior Campaign.—Battle of Maharajpore.—The Mutinies.—Origin of the first Sikh War.—Battle of Moodkee—of Ferozeshuhur—of Sobraon.—Havelock's Description of the Sikh Sirdars.—He is appointed Deputy-Adjutant-General at Bombay.—Extracts from his Bombay Correspondence.—The Second Sikh War.—Havelock's Remarks on the Campaign.—Death of his Brother, Colonel Havelock.—Havelock's Remarks on the Battle of Chillianwallah.—Havelock endeavours to join the Army in the Field.—Battle of Goojerat.

THE army which had re-established our reputation in Afghanistan and in Central Asia, returned to the provinces of India and was broken up. Havelock's practical knowledge of the science of war had ^{Havelock returns to his corps.} been greatly enlarged, and his military judgment matured, by the conflicts in which he had borne a share. But there was no recognition of his services on the part of Government. The credit of all that he had done at Jellalabad belonged to Sir Robert Sale; the merits of Istaliff were necessarily ascribed to General M'Caskill. The closing of the campaign brought valuable appointments, most richly deserved, to Broadfoot, Macgregor, and Lawrence. To Havelock it brought only the loss of his appointment, which was abolished, as being no longer necessary, and the prospect of a reduction of allowances from 800 to 400 rupees a month. In the anticipation of this visitation he wrote to General Smith, as the troops were marching back from Cabul: "Now in a word I will tell you what I want. I desire not to have to starve on 400 rupees a month when I return to the provinces, and to have some better employment than looking at the shirts and stockings of No. 4 company of the 13th, though they *did* pitch it into Akbar Khan's horse in such good

style in the hour of need. I desire also to go down to Allahabad to meet my wife, if the 13th is to be in the upper provinces. If you *can* aid me in these two matters I know you *will*. I shall also be glad if you can send one single line down to Serampore, which will inform them where the 13th is likely to be, and my wife will shape her course accordingly." But this application was of no avail, and, after crossing the Sutlege, Havelock was doomed to return to regimental duties. After four years of active service amidst the most animating scenes, in which it had fallen to his lot to devise and execute important military operations, there was nothing for him but to rejoin his corps, and assume "the oversight of the shirts and stockings of No. 4 company of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry." At the station to which the regiment was sent on its return from Affghanistan, he at once recommenced the religious instruction of the soldiers. He had laboured to sustain their minds by the truths of the Gospel amidst the dangers of Jellalabad, and he now drew the survivors around him, and endeavoured to strengthen their Christian principles amidst the more dangerous leisure of the barrack-room. It was while thus employed in his regiment that he wrote to Major Broadfoot:—

"Let me ask, my good friend, what it is you mean by *prejudices* against me. Tell me plainly; I am not aware of any. Old — and others used to tell me that it was believed at the Horse Guards and in other quarters, that I professed to fear God, as well as honour the Queen, and that Lord Hill and sundry other wise persons had made up their minds that no man could be at once a *saint* and a soldier. Now, I dare say such great authorities must be right, notwithstanding the example of Colonel Gardiner, and Cromwell, and Gustavus Adolphus (all that I can think of just now); but if so, all I can say is, that their bit of red ribbon was very ill bestowed upon me, for I humbly trust that, in that great matter, I should not change my opinions and practice, though it rained garters and coronets as the rewards of apostasy. So, if these be the grounds of prejudice, they are likely to be sempiternal."

After Havelock had been some time with his regiment he was joined by Mrs Havelock. She had embarked with the children for England at the beginning of the preceding year, and heard of the assassination of ^{Return of Mrs} Havelock. Sir William Macnaghten, and the increased perils of the garrison of Jellalabad, by the last post which reached the vessel before the pilot left her at the Sandheads. The voyage was therefore a period of deep anxiety, and it was with no ordinary feelings of gratitude and joy that she was now enabled to rejoin her husband after the dangers which he had encountered. In the month of April they proceeded on leave to Simlah, and in the repose of that sanatorium he contemplated the publication of a supplementary volume of his history of the first Affghan campaign. "I am most desirous," he says, "of writing something about our late affairs in Affghanistan, but I feel like a man worn out, after the prolonged harass of past events." But he was effectually dissuaded from his purpose at the time by the opinion of his friend Major Broadfoot, who said that if he "intended to write the whole truth regarding their doings at Jellalabad he must quit the army; if any portion of the truth was to be withheld, his memoir had better not be published." "I believe," he writes to Major Broadfoot, "your advice is good as to memoir writing, and I have almost resolved finally to act on it, and publish nothing." Those facts have now been fully submitted to the public in Mr Kaye's second edition of the "War in Affghanistan;" but it will at once be apparent to every reader of that admirable work, that if any officer had ventured the year after the events to publish the facts it discloses, he must have resigned his commission.

Havelock was now in his forty-eighth year and the twenty-eighth of his service, but still among the captains of his corps, and he was naturally anxious to obtain the grade of field-officer. One of the majors of his corps then in England had expressed a wish to retire on half-pay, and Havelock made an effort to obtain a majority by purchase. In this he was

Havelock's efforts to obtain a regimental majority.

not successful ; but in the course of the year he obtained the great object of his desire, a regimental majority, by the retirement of an officer above him. Before the close of the year he was unexpectedly relieved, by the exercise of private friendship, from the routine of regimental duty, to which he was never afterwards obliged to return. On the retirement of Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Commander-in-Chief, his appointment was conferred on Sir Hugh Gough, as the reward of his services in the expedition to China. Lord Ellenborough being at the time absent in the upper provinces, Mr Wilberforce Bird, the senior member of council, took his place at the head of the Government in Calcutta. Mr Bird was one of the oldest and most cordial friends of the compiler of these Memoirs, and, at his especial solicitation, recommended Havelock for the post of Persian interpreter to the new Commander-in-Chief on his arrival in Calcutta. Mr Bird's influence was successful, and Havelock was nominated to the post, which, though one of subordinate importance, placed him at the head-quarters of the army in an interesting and advantageous position, at one of the most stirring periods of our Indian history.

After eight months of repose at Kussowlie and Simlah, Havelock joined the camp of the Commander-in-Chief at Cawnpore on the 23rd of October, and found himself again involved in all the excitement of active service. The Mahratta court at Gwalior had been led to adopt a line of policy inimical to British interests, and in opposition to existing engagements. The tone of the princes of India had, in fact, become more lofty and assuming after we had lost our prestige in the defiles of Afghanistan, and the antagonism which we could have afforded to despise in the days of our unimpaired grandeur assumed a serious aspect when it was founded on the idea of our abasement. Lord Ellenborough had directed a force to be assembled on our frontier facing the Mahratta territory, to be styled the Army of Exercise ; but when it was gradually increased to three divisions of infantry, three brigades of cavalry, with six troops and batteries of

Is appointed
Persian in-
terpreter to
the Comman-
der-in-Chief.

Havelock takes
part in the Gwa-
lior campaign.

field artillery, there could be little doubt that active operations were intended. The negotiations proved unsatisfactory, and the army was ordered to take the field. The arrangements of the campaign were thus made by the Commander-in-Chief: General Grey was to take the lead with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, and, crossing the Jumna at Calpee, to threaten the Gwalior territory from the south. Two divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, with suitable artillery, were to be united under the personal command of Sir Hugh Gough, and move down on Gwalior from the northward. This plan of operations appeared to Havelock's experienced eye liable to serious objections, and his views were thus recorded in his note-book before the campaign opened:—

“When it was determined to act on a double line of operations, it was much to be desired that the two lines should be contiguous. But when Sir Hugh resolved himself to move by Agra and Dholepore, directing General Grey to act from Calpee, he gave the Mahrattas all the advantages of their central position. An additional chance was afforded by dividing General Grey's force between Koonch and Jhansi: They had thus the opportunity of leaving a garrison at Gwalior, and falling successively on General Grey's brigades, while they were separated from each other seven marches, with the whole force of Scindia's army, exceeding 20,000 men. Thus the rule was doubly sinned against which asserts, that it is contrary to all true principles to make corps which have no communication act separately against a central force whose communications are open. By the plan devised, General Grey and Sir Hugh Gough were from the beginning out of communication, and unable to assist each other. Their forces separately amounted to 12,000 and 7000. Why fight the Mahratta with 12,000 when 19 might have been united to crush him; and why separate 7000 men which might have been opposed by 20,000, on two several lines of operation? Moreover, by moving on Koonch and Jhansi, General Grey exposed his left flank and rear to the hostile chiefs of Bundelkund. If reverse overtook either of his brigades (and in war, discomfiture must always be reckoned possible) what security had he for being able to operate a retreat on Calpee?”

The campaign, however, proved eminently successful.

There was no military talent at Gwalior, and, in fact, no General-in-Chief, to take advantage of this defect in our arrangements. General Grey was attacked by Battles of Punniar and Maharajpore. a small section of the Mahratta force, and defeated it at Punniar on the same day on which the battle of Maharajpore was fought by Sir Hugh Gough. Accompanied by the Governor-General, he advanced from the north towards the capital. The enemy awaited his approach at the position they had selected, which was reconnoitred on the 28th of December; but during the night, they unwisely, and without any ostensible reason, quitted that strong position, and took up another three or four miles in advance of it. No second reconnoissance was made on the morning of the 29th, and our army thus encountered them much earlier than was expected. So completely was our force taken by surprise, that the ladies rode into the field on elephants; but the cannon of the enemy soon obliged them to retire. The Mahrattas fought with the most determined gallantry, and fully sustained the reputation of their army, which had been disciplined by French officers. Havelock was in the thickest of the engagement by the side of the Commander-in-Chief, and the cool intrepidity with which he moved on amidst the balls which ploughed up the ground around him was especially remarked. The 56th Native Infantry, who had been brigaded with H. M.'s 39th, were advancing on the enemy, but at so slow a pace as to exhaust the patience of Sir Hugh. "Will no one get that Sepoy regiment on?" he repeatedly exclaimed. Havelock offered his services, and riding up, inquired the name of the corps. "It is the 56th Native Infantry." "I don't want its number," replied he. "What is the native name?" "Lamboorunke-pultun—Lambourn's regiment." He then took off his cap, and placing himself in their front, addressed them by that name; and in a few complimentary and cheering words, reminded them that they were fighting under the eye of the Commander-in-Chief. He then led them up to the batteries, and afterwards remarked that "whereas it had been difficult to get them forward before, the difficulty

now was to restrain their impetuosity." The field was bravely contested—our loss exceeded a thousand men in killed and wounded—but the victory was complete, and it placed the crown of Scindia at our feet. The kingdom was not dismembered, and the dynasty was spared; but the well-equipped army of the Gwalior state, which had always been a source of anxiety to our Government from the proximity of its head-quarters to Agra, the capital of the North-West Provinces—the distance being only sixty miles—was disbanded, and its formidable artillery transferred to our own arsenals. Havelock was always opposed to wars of aggression or aggrandisement, but he considered it both just and politic, when we were forced into hostilities by the conduct of native rulers, to complete the work, and remove all occasion for a second war. "As regards politics," he wrote soon after the battle, "I was at first angry enough at the old raj"—government—"not being smashed outright; and in a conversation with the great lord over the grave of General Churchill—who had fallen in the action—told him with a magniloquent emphasis that this ought to have been a war of subjugation; but the fact is, that he could not go farther than his ministerial friends at home would support him in advancing." Havelock had evidently no share in the Maharajpore despatch; it wanted his fine Roman hand. He was suspected of having contributed some military strictures which had recently appeared in the papers, and, though he was entirely innocent of the charge, it rendered his position at head-quarters embarrassing; but his discretion after the engagement was as exemplary as his gallantry during its continuance. "Seeing a disposition," he writes, "to identify me with any remarks on military matters you might publish, I felt compelled to apply to myself, until the storm had blown over, the advice of Matthew Prior's stroller—

'Mind neither good nor bad, nor right nor wrong,
But eat thy pudding, slave, and hold thy tongue.'

Some day or other I may be able to give you my opinion

at large both of the strategy and tactics of our brief and brilliant campaign, and its principal fight.”

The affairs of Gwalior having thus been satisfactorily settled, and a British contingent established in the room of the Mahratta army which had been disbanded, the Commander-in-Chief made a tour through the independent states of the north-west, and Havelock marched in his suite. The whole party then retired for the season to the cool mountain retreat at Simlah, where he again enjoyed a brief interval of repose. In one of the letters written from that sanatorium to Serampore about the middle of the year, he said :—

“Yesterday, we got a long and kind letter from you, from which I learned with pleasure that you had resolved, God willing, on a period of vacation in September or October. But Egypt was named as your destination. Now I hasten to say, let Pharaoh and his host, or his worthy, if not lineal, successor, the old Pasha, take care of Egypt. That country, honoured of late by being made a type of Scinde, will remain where it is, until the time arrives, in God’s mercy, for your overland journey to England. It lies in the way to that object of your desires, but the Himalayan mountains, which are yet more worthy of a visit, do not, and to them you must bend your steps, and not to Egypt, when the holiday time comes. Steam and night dawks will bring you speedily to their base, and we will soon *jampan* you up from Kalka to Simlah. There is a small but not comfortless apartment in our cottage for you, and need I say to the kindest friend of my days of humility, and the steady friend of those of comparative prosperity, that he shall there find a hearty welcome? October is here the most delightful month of the whole year. You will see Simlah in perfection, and not soon forget it. So let the dust of Cheops rest, and defer the day when from the top of those pyramids forty centuries shall *look down* upon you, and come to us when you keep holiday.”

At Simlah, Havelock had the happiness of renewing his intercourse with Major Broadfoot. On the termination of the Affghan war, Lord Ellenborough had acknowledged his services by conferring on him the valuable and lucrative office of Commissioner of

Havelock at Simlah. Letter to Serampore.

Havelock’s intercourse with Broadfoot.

the Tenasserim Provinces. After holding it for about fifteen months, he was appointed to the more distinguished post of Governor-General's Agent on the North-west Frontier, at that period a most arduous and responsible office. It embraced the management of our relations with the government of the Punjab, where a feeble and dissolute court and an insubordinate army, striving to obtain the ascendancy, imperilled the tranquillity of our own provinces. Major Broadfoot had thus raised himself by the buoyancy of his own genius in the course of four years from the obscure rank of a lieutenant, escorting Shah Soojah's family to Cabul, to the most important post in the North-west, after that of the Lieutenant-Governor. But the situation was not above his merits, nor were his talents unequal to the situation. The period of Major Broadfoot's sojourn at Simlah was passed in the society of the friend he most esteemed, and to whom this intercourse afforded the highest enjoyment. When temporarily separated, they maintained an uninterrupted correspondence; and it was in one of his letters to Broadfoot that Havelock remarked, "You are quite right; in public affairs, as in matters eternal, the path of popularity is the broad way, and that of duty the strait gate, and few there be that enter therein. I shall have been half a century in the world if I am spared another month, and I end in opinion where I begin. Principles alone are worth living for, or striving for."

After the close of the Gwalior campaign, a spirit of insubordination began to manifest itself among the Sepoys of the native army. For several years a feeling of disaffection had been growing in their ranks. The mutinies. They had no grievances to complain of, but they had been placed in a false position by the mistaken kindness of Government. No troops, no Asiatic troops at least, can stand being pampered. But the Sepoys had been surfeited with flattery, and sweetmeats, and donations, to keep them in good humour. They had thus been encouraged in the supposition that they were necessary to the State, and became less amenable to control when inflated with this conceit of their own importance. The

spirit of insubordination was soothed when it should have been crushed at once; and it therefore burst forth repeatedly from time to time, till at length the whole of the Bengal army was extinguished in a blaze of mutiny. On the present occasion the most lenient measures were adopted, when the exigency required the most stern and uncompromising energy. Havelock, always an unflinching disciplinarian, was indignant at the feeble course which was pursued, and in his intercourse with his superiors, as well as his correspondence, urged the necessity of adopting the mode pursued by Sir Edward Paget, the Commander-in-Chief in 1824, by whose orders the mutinous 47th Native Infantry had been decimated at Barrackpore. "It is believed," he writes on the 20th of August, "that thirty-nine of the 64th mutineers are capitally sentenced. At least, the course of their trials justified this expectation. They ought *all* to be executed." But only six of them suffered the extreme penalty of the law, and an impression of the timidity of Government was thus diffused through the native army, which laid the foundation of future calamities.

In June, 1844, Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and the war with the Sikhs was postponed for a twelvemonth.

Recall of Lord Ellenborough. Origin of the first Sikh war. To explain the antecedents of a campaign in which Havelock bore so conspicuous a share, it may be expedient to remark that when the pacification of Europe, on the downfall of Napoleon, deprived the officers of the French army of a sphere of active employment, Allard, Court, Ventura, Avitabile, and other officers, men of enterprise and genius, proceeded to India in quest of service among the native princes, and found their way to the court of Runjeet Singh, who hastened to employ them in organizing his army. The Sikhs are without question the finest soldiers in India, as much superior to the Rajpoot as the Rajpoot is to the Bengalee. The Punjab army, after receiving the advantage of European instruction and equipment, became the most efficient body of troops which had ever served under any native prince. With their aid Runjeet Singh had been

enabled to subdue all his rivals, and establish a powerful monarchy in the country of the five rivers. Both he and his native commanders, with every confidence in themselves and in their troops, continued to entertain a profound dread of British prowess, and shrunk from collision with the power which had demolished every other throne in India. But the prestige of British power had been lost in the mountains of Afghanistan; we had ceased to be considered invincible, and the Khalsa army, as Runjeet Singh's troops were designated, became daring and defiant, and eager to try conclusions with us in the field. The Sikhs had humbled the Affghans, and wrested the province of Peshawur from them; the Affghans had baffled the English, and destroyed an entire army; the conclusion was inevitable, that the Sikhs might encounter the English with perfect confidence. Runjeet Singh died while the British force was marching towards Cabul, and the government of the Punjab, no longer controlled by his iron hand, fell at once, as usual in India, into a state of the most direful confusion. Revolution succeeded revolution, and at every successive stage the army became more audacious, and the feeble court more pusillanimous. At length, the troops ceased to yield obedience to the civil power; they established an organization of their own, and their movements were regulated by *punches*, or councils of five, of their own selection, who dictated their own terms to the ruling, but no longer governing, authorities at the capital. The youthful son of Runjeet Singh occupied the throne, the queen-mother was regent, and her brother the chief minister. But he had rendered himself generally contemptible by his debaucheries, and was detested by the soldiery, who put him to death with the most revolting barbarity. The queen—whom Sir Henry Hardinge was accustomed to style the Messalina of the north—then resigned herself to the ascendancy of her paramour, Lall Singh, and the question of invading the British territories began to be openly discussed in the cabinet. In these difficult circumstances, Major Broadfoot exhibited talents of the highest order as a diploma-

tist. But, notwithstanding all his tact, he could obtain only evasive answers to his representations, and he warned his Government to prepare for a conflict which appeared to him inevitable. Lord Ellenborough had been succeeded as Governor-General by Sir Henry Hardinge, a Peninsular hero, who came out to India with the firmest resolution to avoid war. While these portentous deliberations were openly carried on at Lahore, he continued to cherish the hope of being able to maintain peace. He massed twenty-five regiments of cavalry and infantry, and a powerful artillery, on points some miles within our frontier; but he sent no additional troops to guard the banks of the Sutlege, lest he should afford the Sikhs a pretext for commencing hostilities, and incur the charge of having precipitated the war by his own military demonstrations. The queen repeatedly importuned him to aid her in curbing her insubordinate troops; but, of course, without success. Their demands on the paralysed Government became at length so pressing and exorbitant, that there appeared no other alternative for preventing the dissolution of all government in the Punjab, and the establishment of a military despotism, than to find them occupation across the Sutlege. It was resolved, therefore, to launch them on the British provinces, and endeavour to avert the plunder of Lahore by the sack of Delhi. The plan of operations was settled in the Durbar on the 17th of November, and four divisions of troops, each consisting of 12,000 men, were ordered to move down on four points to the Sutlege. To stem the torrent of invasion, Major Broadfoot recommended the most prompt and energetic measures to his Government; but Sir Henry Hardinge, still clinging to the hope of peace, informed him that he should not consider the advance of the Khalsa army to the banks of the Sutlege as a justification of hostilities, and troops which had been ordered from Meerut towards the banks of that river were countermanded. Major Broadfoot was instructed to send another remonstrance to the Sikh Durbar, and Sir Henry determined to allow full time for a reply, before he adopted further measures

of precaution. The only reply to Major Broadfoot's remonstrance was an order to the troops to cross the Sutlege. On these transactions, Havelock remarks that "Sir Henry Hardinge had delayed to the latest hour, compatible with the safety of the British dominions, his declaration of hostilities, and out of his extreme jealousy of the reputation of his country for justice and good faith, had exceeded in moderation the boundaries of prudence."

The exposed and isolated position of the Ferozepore cantonment had, from the time of its occupation, been an object of apprehension to Government. It was ^{The Ferozepore cantonment.} evident to any military eye, that the Sikhs could at any time cross the river above it, and envelope it with their troops before any succour could reach it. Lord Ellenborough had wisely intended to strengthen it by fortifications; but was not at liberty to carry the plan into execution. Sir Henry Hardinge, having resolved on his arrival to avoid every appearance of hostility at which the Sikhs might be expected to take umbrage, was not in a position to remedy the evil. The cantonment at Ferozepore was therefore liable at any moment to fall into the hands of the Sikh soldiery stationed within fifty miles of it. It was at this time occupied by Sir John Littler, with a body of troops not exceeding 5000; and it was filled with the wives and families of British officers and soldiers. The Sikh army, estimated at 60,000, with a magnificent artillery sufficient to crush Sir John Littler's force, or at least so to cripple it as to render it a woeful day for British India, crossed the river, and found our Government totally unprepared for the invasion; and, if any of the French generals, who had one by one quitted the service, had been at the head of the expedition, it might have swept unchecked down to Delhi.

The British force was collected, or collecting, at Umballa, a military station a hundred and eighty miles from Ferozepore, when the news arrived that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlege, and established itself on British territory. Major Broadfoot, with an energy that overleaped

The British force advances toward the frontier in haste.

all obstacles, threw provisions into the various places on the route which our army must necessarily pursue. The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief started with the troops which had been hastily assembled, with the addition of some corps drawn by forced marches from the hills, and the garrison of Loodiana, an accession obtained on the route, and moved down with rapid strides to the rescue of Sir John Littler. Such a march had not been known in India since the days of Wellesley and Lake. Hours and even moments were deemed precious, and the distance of a hundred and eighty miles was accomplished, by an army heavily encumbered with baggage, in seven days. All guns of larger calibre than field artillery were left behind.

The force reached the walled village of Moodkee on the 18th of December. The cavalry and infantry came up in

The battle of Moodkee.

succession, the infantry completely exhausted by a march of several leagues over a sandy plain, the most fatiguing of all ground for an army. In front of Moodkee there was a tank, or pond, to which men, horses, and camels rushed impetuously under the pressure of a thirst which appeared to be insatiable. The camp was marked out, pickets were posted, and the troops, who had been fasting since the preceding evening, began to prepare their meal. But it was not to be an evening of repose. A hasty note from Major Broadfoot, who had been scouring the country, announced that the enemy's horse was approaching. "The news," remarked Havelock, "produced the electric effect which it is apt to cause even in the breast of old soldiers at the opening of a campaign. How thrilling then the sensation in the hearts of novices! The ideas are wonderfully concentrated, and visions of glory and of slaughter, of distant home and its endearments, of duty sternly performed and nobly rewarded, of wounds, death, and—of judgment, pass rapidly through the brain." The main body of the Sikhs had entrenched themselves at Ferozeshuhur, about eight miles from Moodkee, while a large force under Tej Singh blockaded Sir John Littler at Ferozepore.

Lall Singh, commanding at Ferozeshuhur, had been led to suppose that the British force now approaching consisted only of the advanced guard, accompanied by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief. He therefore pushed forward with his horse, and four companies from each battalion of foot, to surprise the camp of the civil and military chief of British India. Major Broadfoot, who had ridden forward to reconnoitre, far in advance of our army, scanning with his practised eye the scene before him, divined what the rolling clouds of dust rising to the sky betokened, and galloped hastily back and warned the General to be ready for immediate action. Many were incredulous, but the Major emphatically repeated that the dust was raised by "many squadrons and many battalions;" and "there," said he, "is the whole Sikh army in the midst. My political functions have now ceased, and I make over the frontier to the military authorities." The flower of the Sikh infantry took up a position in a dense low forest, with guns in the intervals of their masses, and flanked by cavalry. Sir Hugh Gough was partaking of a late breakfast, with Havelock and the rest of the staff, when the approach of the Sikhs was announced. He immediately leaped on horseback, rode to the front, and made his dispositions. Our horse artillery and cavalry were pushed forward, on either flank, and the infantry advanced in the centre. It was verging towards four o'clock, and scarcely an hour of daylight remained. The horse artillery opened fire, and it was steadily replied to by the well-trained and most efficient horse artillery of Runjeet Singh. Our cavalry attacked the enemy's horse on either flank and drove them back into the forest, where it got entangled and suffered rather severely. Then came the conflict, the first which had taken place between the renowned infantry formed under Allard, Court, and Ventura, and our own native battalions; and the superiority of the Sikh over the Sepoy became at once palpable. One native regiment turned suddenly to the rear, notwithstanding the most strenuous efforts of its officers. Havelock was sent by the Commander-in-Chief to bring it back; and

he did so, sarcastically assuring the Sepoys that "the enemy was in front and not behind them." Even one of her Majesty's regiments staggered under that deadly fire; but Sir Hugh Gough, with his staff, placing himself in front, led it on again to the conflict. The intensity, rapidity, and precision of the hostile fire, dealing unexampled destruction through our ranks, proved that we had a foe to cope with such as we had never encountered in India before, and that the struggle before us was to be no child's play. Sir Hugh Gough, with Havelock by his side, was seen everywhere, rallying the disheartened, encouraging the steadfast, and leading on the impetuous to victory. The evening now suddenly closed, and the fire of the Sikhs ceased at once. Lall Singh and his cavalry fled, and the Sikh infantry withdrew under cover of night, leaving the British masters of the plain, of the forest, and seventeen guns. In this engagement Havelock had two horses shot under him. His favourite charger "Feroze," which had carried him at Jellalabad and through the Affghan campaign, was struck down by a round shot. As he disentangled himself with some difficulty from his prostrate charger, Major Broadfoot came up, condoled with him on the loss, and mounted him on a pony belonging to one of his escort. He had not proceeded far when this animal was also disabled by a musket ball in the mouth. Major Broadfoot, happening to come up again, mounted him a second time, jocularly remarking that it "appeared to be of little use to give him horses, as he was sure to lose them."

The army rested two days at Moodkee, and was reinforced by two regiments brought down by forced marches from the hills. On the 20th of December, Sir Battle of Ferozeshuhur. Henry Hardinge, who had placed himself under Sir Hugh Gough, and taken the second command, intimated to Sir John Littler at Ferozepore that it was intended the next day to manœuvre on the enemy's right, to enable him, if he found it practicable, to unite his division with the main army. The camp equipage was left at Moodkee, and the troops advanced, light and unencumbered, but

without food or tents, towards the Sikh encampment at Ferozeshuhur, which they reached a little before noon, after a heavy march over a sandy plain. Sir John Littler, leaving a regiment in the entrenchment at Ferozepore, and another in the fort to guard his munitions of war and his female charge, marched out unperceived by Tej Singh's beleaguering force, and joined Sir Hugh Gough about noon. The divisions advanced with great steadiness upon their camp, about half-past three in the afternoon; but the fire from the enemy's batteries, mounted, not with ordinary field artillery, but with siege guns of large calibre, proved to be destructive beyond all expectation. Each brigade, as it advanced up to the batteries, was met by a tremendous fire, which could be silenced only by the cold steel. The 62nd, which formed the European portion of one of Sir John Littler's brigades, mowed down by grape and round shot, was checked and ordered to retire. "It was beaten, but not in the eye of candour, disgraced. It left seven brave officers and seventy-six men prostrate, within fifty paces of the entrenchment." Sir John M'Cas-kill's brigade stormed the battery before it, the 9th Foot losing Colonel Taylor, who had fought so bravely in America, in Ava, in the Khyber, at Mamoo Khail, and Istalif. General Gilbert's brigade obtained possession of two batteries; but when this and the other brigades had mastered these fearful obstacles at the point of the bayonet, and at a terrific sacrifice of life, they found themselves exposed to a musketry fire, which was a very tempest of iron hail. The entrenchments were at length carried at three points, but everywhere a deadly fire was maintained by the Sikhs. General Sir Harry Smith's division was then called up, and, overcoming every obstacle, penetrated to the village of Ferozeshuhur, in the centre of the hostile camp, where he planted the colours of the 50th with his own hand. Night had now set in, and in some measure parted the combatants. The expense magazines of the enemy were exploding in every direction, their camp was on fire in several places, and the troops who had won the entrenchment were compelled to retire. The British battalions,

shattered, wearied, and dispersed, bivouacked on the edge of the position of which half an hour more of daylight would have put them in full possession. Havelock, constantly by the side of the chief, was in the thickest of the engagement; and when night put an end to it, Sir Henry Hardinge remarked to him, "Another such action will shake the empire." Havelock, writing the next day to Serampore, to assure his friends of his safety, said, "India has been again saved by a miracle."

The morning dawned heavily, after this "night of horrors," as it was justly termed, on the scattered and dispirited troops, who had thrown themselves on the ground, without food or water, the weather also being intensely cold. The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, who had not broken their fast for many hours, collected the dispersed troops at the earliest dawn, and led them a second time against the enemy's entrenchments. But the second action was more brief and decisive than the first. Lall Singh, the commandant, had lost heart, and after a show of resistance, fled to the Sutlege with his whole force; and by eleven in the morning the victory was complete. The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief passed in front of the ranks, and received a hearty cheer from the victorious troops; but it had hardly died out when a cloud of dust announced the approach of another foe. This was Tej Singh, who, finding that Sir John Littler had eluded his vigilance, marched down to Ferozeshuhur at three in the morning; but he was too late for the succour of Lall Singh. He found the British reposing under their blood-stained laurels; Ferozeshuhur was won; the Sikh general's tremendous batteries, his ample munitions of war, his camp, his treasure, and his standards, were all in the hands of the victors. The legions which had defended this Roman encampment with a Roman courage, were scattered like chaff before the wind, and the army of Ferozeshuhur was in full flight to the fords of the Sutlege. The British troops, who had tasted no food for a day and a half, and were completely exhausted with two engagements, were

Engagement
of the 22nd De-
cember.

totally unprepared for a third encounter with 30,000 fresh troops. Their ammunition, moreover, was entirely exhausted; but, happily, Tej Singh was ignorant of these circumstances, and, through the special mercy of Providence, after having made a hasty and unsuccessful attempt to regain the position at Ferozeshuhur, withdrew his army to the Sutlege, and passed over as soon as he found that all the Sikh fugitives were safely across.

This double engagement had cost us 909 killed, and 2378 wounded; and of this number 1875 belonged to the eight European regiments who were engaged.

So sanguinary an action gave rise to much animadversion. But Havelock maintained that the commanders had only a choice of difficulties before them, and adopted that which appeared to be least perilous. It was said that the object of the advance having been accomplished by the relief of Sir John Littler's division, the army might have retired to its encampment at Moodkee, prevented the march of the enemy on Delhi, and, on the arrival of the reinforcements, constrained the Sikhs to move out to certain destruction, or have stormed the entrenchment, with the aid of battering guns and a larger force.

“But,” he observed, “though such a plan offered great advantages, the nature of our original defence of the frontier rendered it hardly feasible, for it would have hazarded the safety of Ferozepore, with its indifferent entrenchments, guarded by only one regiment, and its defenceless town, garrisoned only by another. Within the field-work were valuable munitions, and our women.” It was objected, moreover, that the attack of the enemy's entrenchments after the junction of Sir John Littler, when the troops were jaded by a long march, was totally inadvisable. But Havelock considered it of the last consequence to strike a blow at the Ferozeshuhur force—in the full confidence of success—before it could be reinforced by the army blockading Ferozepore. “Attack,” he said, “in the forenoon of a long march! It was one of those cases in which it would have been better to have attacked at midnight, rather than not to have anticipated the junction of

Havelock's
remarks on the
engagements.



the two armies. The object was to defeat the one before the other could come to its aid. No sacrifice is too great to complete such a manœuvre. Every risk must be run, and every fatigue endured to attain such an object in war. The entrenched camp was attacked and carried. The resistance was, indeed, terrific, and the loss on our side tremendous. But—this is war.” “Nor,” he remarked, “must it be forgotten, that though Sir Hugh Gough’s army, after a harassing march, was not in the best condition for so serious an encounter, its condition for fighting would not have been improved by a bivouac, through a night of bitter cold, without food, shelter, or water; during which time the Sikh army of Ferozepore might have joined that of Ferozeshuhur, and thus diminished the chance of success.” It was well remarked by Havelock that another half hour of daylight would have made us complete master of the enemy’s entrenchments, which we were obliged to abandon after they had been carried. Sir John Littler’s force joined the main body at noon; yet, on the shortest day of the year the engagement did not begin till half-past three, though the affair at Moodkee, three days before, might have taught the value of moments of daylight. The cause of this fatal procrastination has never been satisfactorily explained.

In these battles Havelock was deprived of two of his most intimate friends, Sir Robert Sale and Major Broadfoot. It was under Sir Robert that he had commenced his military career in India twenty-two years before. They had shared together the dangers of the Burmese campaign. They had fought side by side in the terrific defiles of Afghanistan, and in the defence of Jellalabad, and it was with no ordinary sense of affliction that Havelock now stood over his grave. Broadfoot had been wounded early in the action, but refused to retire while he could sit on his horse; a second shot terminated his existence, and he fell in the entrenchment he was attacking, by the side of Sir Henry Hardinge, who, in announcing the sad event to his family, said, “You and I have sustained an irreparable loss. Your able

Death of Sir
Robert Sale
and Major
Broadfoot.

and distinguished brother fell by a grape shot in the battle of Ferozeshuhur, while bravely animating his troops to do their duty. The first shot threw him off his horse by my side. I in vain entreated him to retire. His invincible courage induced him to remount, and he was killed as we took the battery in our front. His abilities were of the highest order, and in all the relations of life, whether public or private, the force of his character was felt and appreciated. I never can replace him. . . . Scarcely a day passes in the midst of these stirring scenes which does not remind me of the loss the service has sustained. The Arab on which he was mounted has had two balls extracted, and will recover. I am now the owner of the animal, and he will always be a favourite of my stud." Havelock always considered Broadfoot the foremost man of his age, both as a soldier and a statesman. Though differing in their religious views, they both possessed the same nobleness of soul, the same indomitable energy and courage, and the same strength of character; the tie which bound them to each other was the sympathy of great and kindred minds. Both were formed to act a prominent part in great events.

The important office of Governor-General's Agent on the North-west Frontier, vacant by the death of Major Broadfoot, was conferred on another of Havelock's friends, Captain Henry Lawrence, whose qualifications for this post he thus describes :—

“ When the fatal volley out of the Sikh tents at Ferozeshuhur, which terminated the mortal career of George Broadfoot, deprived
Captain Lawrence succeeds Major Broadfoot. Sir Henry Hardinge of the services of that eminent man, he called to his counsels Henry Lawrence, enlightened, virtuous, energetic, experienced, and resolute, for nothing more distinguished than his friendly feelings towards the Sirdars and people of the Punjab. He had laboured among the Sikhs as assistant to Sir George Clerk, a diplomatist second to none who came before him or went after him in practical knowledge of the country of the five rivers, or influence over its chiefs. In his school, Lawrence had studied and become intimately acquainted with the history, polity, statistics, habits,

and prejudices of the Sikhs, and, like Malcolm in Persia, and Pottinger in Scinde, and other generous and distinguished men, whose fortune has led them to prolong their intercourse with the populations of India, he had learned to regard them with feelings of partiality, as men in some sort confided to his protection."

The tide of invasion had thus been stemmed. Of the 60,000 Sikhs who had poured down on the British territories a month before, none remained on the left bank of the Sutlege on the 23rd of December. But we had been so severely crippled in the actions of Moodkee and Ferozeshuhur, in which a fifth of the force had been killed or wounded, as to be unable to follow up these hard-won victories. Orders were therefore despatched in all haste for reinforcements, and a requisition was made for the siege train from Delhi. The army was condemned to a long period of inaction, while the train was moving up; and the Sikhs, attributing our inertness to fear, crossed the Sutlege again, insulted our posts, and threatened the cantonment of Loodiana. Sir Harry Smith was sent with a large force to dislodge them. He encountered the Sikh army at Aliwal, and inflicted a signal defeat on it; the invaders were driven into the Sutlege, in which no small number of them perished.

The Sikhs were, however, permitted a third time to cross the river, and establish themselves in our territory, near the village of Sobraon. They erected the most formidable entrenchments on both banks of the Sutlege, and mounted them with seventy pieces of cannon, connecting the two camps by a bridge. It was necessary to dislodge them, and the morning of the 10th of February was fixed for the battle. Though the army had for seven weeks been waiting the arrival of the siege guns from Delhi, they were, after all, left behind at Ferozepore, and the mortars and howitzers alone taken into action. They did great execution, but unfortunately the ammunition was soon exhausted, and it was necessary to bring the issue of the conflict to the arbitrement of musketry and the bayonet. The engagement begun at nine

Reinforce-
ments order-
ed up, and
the siege train
from Delhi.
Aliwal.

Battle of So-
braon.

in the morning, and in two hours the Sikhs were in full flight across the bridge, which was swept by our field artillery. The first fugitives, regarding only their own safety, destroyed its connection with the farther bank. Our field artillery and infantry pushed the crowded and helpless masses, thus cut off from all hope, into the stream, and mercilessly plied them for upwards of an hour with grape and volleys at half musket range. The Sutlege was choked up with the bodies of the slain. So fearful a carnage had not been seen in India for a century; but the victory was dearly bought by the loss of 2400 on our side; and it was painful to reflect how large a portion of these casualties might have been spared if our heavy guns, and mortars, and howitzers, had all been brought to bear for a sufficient time on the batteries of the enemy. Havelock was engaged throughout the action, and his horse was shot under him. It was a hair-breadth escape, as the ball struck the saddle cloth, and passed within an inch of his thigh. The charger fell dead, but he himself escaped unhurt. At a subsequent period Havelock wrote in reference to this action:—"The latter events on the Chenab convince me more strongly than ever, that if a plan which I put on paper, with a diagram, had been followed in February, 1846, the victory of Sobraon would have been achieved with a third of the loss on our side. It embraced the project of turning the right by a bridge at Ferozepore, and communicating with the turning columns higher up by means of pontoons."

This was the last of the four battles of the Sutlege, which, in the space of fifty-five days, broke the power of the Khalsa army, and placed the Punjab at our disposal. The unprovoked invasion of our territories, with the object of sacking our cities and subverting our power, gave us a clear and unequivocal right, after our successive victories, to incorporate the kingdom of the five waters with our own empire. Havelock's views extended to the entire and immediate annexation of the country. He was convinced that this must be the eventual issue of our conflict with

Havelock's opinion regarding the Punjab. The native Government retained.

the Sikhs, and he was anxious to avoid the cost and carnage of a second war. But while he advised the subjugation of the country, he fully appreciated the circumstances which recommended a different course. The *morale* of the British army at this juncture was low. The European regiments had been fearfully thinned in these actions, and their military spirit greatly diminished in spite of their successes—"exhausted, rather than sunk." The season of heat and prostration was rapidly approaching. How was this large army, between the Sutlege and the Ravee, to be sheltered and fed during the period when the climate would reduce it to a state of inaction? Even after the battle of Sobraon, the Sikh army was 14,000 strong, with forty pieces of cannon. These questions were the subject of frequent discourse between Sir Henry Hardinge and Havelock, who records, that, "scrupulous in his integrity, he was willing rather to defer conquest to a distant day, when he could personally gain nothing by it, than permit his country to incur the odium of ambitious projects. Moderation, after as well as before victory, was the prevailing feature of his policy." The Government of the Punjab, therefore, obtained a respite. The settlement made by the Governor-General provided that the Sikh Durbar should pay a million and a half towards the expenses of the war; that the Jullunder Doab and the cis-Sutlege districts should be ceded to the Honourable Company; that Golab Singh should be rewarded with Cashmere, and be raised to the rank of an independent sovereign; and that the rest of the Punjab should remain with Duleep Singh, the son of Runjeet Singh, to be administered by a Council of State. The British troops were to occupy the capital for some months, to effect the consolidation of the new system of Government; and Captain Lawrence was nominated the representative of the Government of India at Lahore.

Havelock proceeded in the suite of Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh to Lahore, and had an opportunity of witnessing the ceremonies by which the new Govern-

ment was installed; and his graphic description of the scene will be read with no little interest. description of the Sikh Sirdars.

“The treaty was ratified in full Durbar on Monday, the 9th March, under a salute of siege ordnance. Commonly, field artillery suffices for such purposes, but this compact may be esteemed one of the great guns of the Company bahadoor; and twenty-four and thirty-two pounders have risen in estimation since first we felt the force of such arguments in conflict with the Sikhs at Ferozeshuhur. Maharaja Golab Singh was present at this Durbar, and as he is no more to be seen but as an independent sovereign, I may as well describe to you the ruler of Jummo, now lord of the mountains from Mundee to Cashmere. He is neither so handsome as either Dhyan Singh, the pink of Lahore courtiers, or his brother Soochet, or his nephew Heera Singh, but he is like both brothers. His dress is remarkably plain, even slovenly, but the checkered volume of his life is to be read in his astute and glozing countenance. If a painter sought to embody all the smooth cunning of Asiatic intrigue in one face, he would throw away his sketches as soon as he saw that of Golab Singh, cease to draw on his imagination, and limn the countenance of the Rae Sahib, as the people of Lahore call him, with minute fidelity. He would feel that he never could surpass the mock humility, the insinuating smile, the pride subdued by cunning, of the physiognomy before him. On the morning of the 10th, the troops were a second time reviewed. This time all the Sikh Sirdars of distinction attended, and saw the 22,000 soldiers and the 101 pieces of cannon of their victors pass by them in gallant yet grim array. The centre of attraction was the Rae Sahib in his plain suit of yellow, and his unadorned, but no doubt carefully loaded and capped, pistol stuck in his belt. . . . Sir Charles Napier returns to Scinde the day after to-morrow. I paid my respects to him finally on Monday morning. He was very courteous, and chatted about my brother Will, whom all Peninsular officers know, and dear old Sir Robert Sale, and the volunteers of the 13th, who fought so gallantly in Beloochistan. It is impossible to conceive, without seeing it, a frame so attenuated and shattered, and yet tenanted by a living soul, as this old soldier's. He speaks readily and fluently, and will, if spared, and again actively employed, shine more and more, in, I think, the second rank of commanders. Of Sir Henry Hardinge, it was

remarked to me by George Broadfoot, before his heroic death, 'I am myself only a learner in war, but here we have a fine and finished soldier. He is saving India.'

He then proceeds to describe the chief men of the Durbar :—

"1. Raja Lall Singh Misr is a man of low extraction. He is the paramour, or rather the most favourite paramour, of the Muharanee. He is the Orlof—I would rather say, the Potemkin—of the Punjab. He is marked with the small-pox, and rather what we should call in England an ugly dog; but tall and graceful, with a winning smile, which shows constantly an indifferent set of teeth, and insinuating manners. He has no reputation for talent; but his position in the affections of the Ranee will make him Wuzeer. 2. Dewan Deena-nath will look after the finances, which will certainly require careful watching. He is a heaven-born Muhajun (banker) and trader. His countenance looks like the rectangular columns of a Hindoo account-book. 3. Tej Singh is of small stature, and his lineaments, which are more scarred by small-pox than those of Lall Singh, are not pleasing, but he is the best soldier of all the Sirdars. When at Peshawur he executed a brilliant *chupao* against the robber chief who had defied Avitable for years; and, to be just to an enemy, the manner in which he covered the retreat of the Sikh army, after their defeat at Ferozeshuhur, was really able. He would perhaps have tried to crush Sir John Littler at Ferozepore, but that his co-adjutor was Lall Singh, whose only firm resolution was never to fight when he could help it. 4. Runjoor Singh, brother of Lehna Singh, for whose benefit Sir Harry Smith established an '*école de natation*' at the ghat near Aliwal, is an ass, and looks like one. He is young, and of that order of mind which experience will not improve. 5. The Fukeer Noorooddeen, brother of the celebrated Azeezooddeen, has all the courtly eloquence for which that mouthpiece of old Runjeet was renowned. He is a shrewd and wealthy man, and will be useful to the Government. The people whom I have described are not very good materials even for Asiatic rule; but there are no better to be found. It remains to be seen whether the army can be so remodelled as to cease to be dangerous to its own master and mistress. It will hardly attempt anything against us. If a tolerable discipline can be substituted for the power of the deliberative committees, the

Punches, things may go on in the Punjab as in any other Asiatic Government, which is not saying much."

He concludes this picture of the Punjab dignitaries with this remarkable postscript :—

"I entered upon this campaign, fancying myself something of a soldier. I have now learnt that I know nothing. Well! I am even yet not too old to learn."

Havelock returned from Lahore to Simlah in the suite of Sir Hugh Gough. It was not unnatural for him to expect that, after having fought side by side with his chief in three of the severest battles in the annals of India, he would have been recommended to the Horse Guards for one of the vacancies created by the casualties of the campaign, but he forbore from motives of delicacy to solicit it. Sir Henry, now created Lord Hardinge, entertained the same expectation; but not seeing it likely to be realized, addressed the Duke on the subject, and suggested that some suitable token of acknowledgment should be bestowed on Havelock for his public services, and his extraordinary military merits. The Duke, who had previously given a commission to his eldest son, responded at once to the request, and nominated him to the post of Deputy Adjutant-General of Queen's troops at Bombay. Havelock immediately proceeded toward Calcutta, spending a week at Serampore with his friends and relatives. Mrs Havelock's mother, Mrs Marshman, then in her eightieth year, was descending gently into the tomb, after forty-six years of active and continuous exertion in the cause of Indian benevolence. The parting farewell between her and Havelock was solemn and affectionate. They both felt that it was their last interview on earth. He embarked for Bombay in January, in company with Sir George Clerk, whom he had known and learned to appreciate during the Affghan war, and who had now been appointed Governor of the Bombay Presidency. On his arrival there, Havelock assumed the duties of his office, which he continued to discharge, for nearly three years,

with a degree of punctuality and promptitude seldom exceeded. Nothing could be more effective than the mode in which the business of the office was conducted. He was as exact in the performance of his duties at the desk as he had been in the field, and never allowed any arrears to accumulate. This period was marked by no event of any note, and a few brief extracts from his correspondence will serve to show the state of his health and feelings. Three months after he had settled at Bombay, he experienced a very severe attack of intermittent fever, which drove him at once to the sanatorium of Muhabuleshur. The cool and bracing air of the mountain, and the cessation of official toil, restored his vigour for a time, but he was soon after attacked by a fever of a different type, attended with alarming congestion of the liver. On the 29th of April he wrote :—

“I am thankful to Almighty God that I am enabled to say that, by His blessing, I am now decidedly better ; but I must be off to England early in 1848. The fact is, my constitution has been insensibly but deeply undermined by eight years’ heavy and harassing work : and a continued residence of twenty-four years in India, and ‘abominable eating and drinking,’ as Abernethy used to call luxurious feeding ; for I have passed from the most ascetic habits, to feasting with rulers, and from cold water and three fasts in the week, to washing down pomfret and iced delicacies with champagne and golden sherry. My Simla physician, and others, recommended a generous diet, as an antidote against the periodical returns of a complaint which they considered constitutional, but which only arose from a course of the worst water which was ever drunk by an army, during our contests with the Sikhs. I certainly took some draughts of fluid out of the central well of Ferczeshuhur, which my horse refused with a shudder of disgust.” [He always considered that the well had been poisoned.] “The sense of thirst was intolerable : but I am digressing. It is now plain, that, whatever may be the cause, my liver has been much affected, and that the genuine and strong drink, though administered quite *secundum artem*, was so much poison. The recovery of my health, and with it I hope of my finances, is now in the hands of a higher power. . . I see that the rumour of Lord Har-

Havelock's
correspond-
ence while at
Bombay.

dinge's return to England is revived. The Punjab being so far settled, it might be a happy time for retirement in next cold weather, leaving the affairs of Lucknow and Hydrabad to be settled by the new Governor-General. Misrule has proceeded to such lengths at both capitals, that some remedy must be soon applied. Treaties are sacred things, but no treaty can bind the British Government to connive so long at villany, as to become an accomplice in it. . . I have felt during some portions of this sickness a longing for a Christian's rest, relying on the Christian's hope ; but the sight and the thought of my unprotected wife and children makes me wish for life, though with labour and vexation, until their lot is more settled."

Soon after Havelock's arrival at Bombay, Sir Willoughby Cotton was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and Havelock was thus a third time placed under his command. On the 8th of July he writes :—" I was once more hailed by my ancient master, Sir Willoughby, on the 27th ultimo. He is of more portly dimensions than of yore, but looking far better than when I met him last on the Ravee."

On the 27th August he writes :—

" August 27, 1847.

" Hannah is quite convalescent, though still thin ; the girls are healthy, and the boy grows fat ; all which are causes of gratitude to God. For myself, I cannot boast. I am presently convalescent, and see little of doctors, get on pretty well with easy time of peace work, take a good deal of exercise, and am happy in the use of a tolerable public library, and have improved in flesh and spirits since I descended from the mountains to the table land of the Deccan. But I have no doubt whatever that my old liver, and probably other viscera beyond my anatomical skill to particularize, have sustained serious, if not fatal, injury, from the circumstance of long, and rather, on the whole, arduous service in India ; and that I have no business in that country beyond the going home time by the Red Sea, of next cold season, and no right ever to return to it, if a year's residence or two, at the utmost, does not restore me to perfect health. So, as far as both will and duty are concerned, I should say, to England I must go. But as for the means of going, difficulties accumulate around me every day. I shall not be out of the hands of the Simlah Jews before February next. The expense of living and

marching here, though conducted with the utmost economy, are necessarily heavy; and Harry and Joshua have to be provided for and educated. Moreover, I lost, by accidental rupture of the intestines, in fourteen hours, my ever to be lamented horse 'Magician,' for whom I gave 1400 rupees last year on the banks of the Sutlege, and his place has to be supplied, where, I know not. So that if there were not an over-ruling Providence to untie knots, it would be Macbeth's case:—"There is nor flying hence, nor tarrying here."

"September 18, 1847.

"The whole of the members of the faculty whom I have consulted since 1824 have assured me that the functions of the great organ in question, the liver, were deranged; and hard work, great exposure to the sun, or any untoward accident of climate, would soon finish the story in ruptured abscess and death. But it behoves me to consider that this catastrophe may happen in England as well as in India. There I should die in poverty and among strangers. Here I am at least known, and have the means of living, while my life is spared, in comfort; and from the moment that I embark for England, what is to become of the education of my children? Nevertheless, I believe I shall see it my duty to be off, if I am spared so long, in March next. I do not think my health will much improve in India until I have tasted of a change. So I suppose I must endeavour to go, and leave the event to God. I have backed out of every expense that can be spared; see no company, and never dine even with a secretary, with no one, in short, but the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor. But my unavoidable expenses are heavy. Horses, uniform, houses at three several places, and long tours, eat up money awfully; and then supervene education bills, and the allowance to my ensign of foot."

"September 28, 1847.

"I do not doubt that the advantages of sea air round the Cape would balance the irritation which a long sea voyage would produce on the spirits of one who has ever hated that element ardently, and not less, confinement in any shape. The Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the waters between the Straits of Gibraltar and the pier at Southampton, will be quite enough of salt water for me. I wish this measure could be avoided, but the wish is vain. I shall not be fit again for Indian service without two years' cooling and quiet in England. Lord Hardinge writes to me that he has 52,700 men and 120 guns (ten regiments of

European cavalry and infantry) between Meerut and Lahore. But all is tranquil, and he looks forward to seeing the country, when he is gone, flourish, after the completion of the Bengal Railway and the Ganges Canal."

"October 2, 1847.

"Why is it supposed that Sir Harry Smith's nomination to the Cape is a questionable appointment? The private feeling that I have in his favour is the recollection that, when I was a boy, he was one of the few people that ever took the trouble to teach me anything; and while all the rest around me would have persuaded me that English soldiering consisted in blackening and whitening belts with patent varnish and pipe clay, and getting prematurely* every kind of mercenary manoeuvre, he pointed my mind to the nobler part of our glorious profession. But as a public man I shall ever acknowledge his merits. He is an excellent soldier, one of the few now extant among us who have set themselves to comprehend the higher portions of the art. He has a natural talent for war, and it has been improved by the constant reflection of years, and much experience. To conclude that because he has been educated in camps, he is unfit for civil government, is as premature as the prophecy of some, that the Duke could never make an effective minister of the Crown, or a useful parliamentary leader. He has done both, and there is no species of business which Harry Smith's mental tact will not enable him to grasp. So I venture to predict that if his life be spared, and health preserved, he will be, perhaps not a popular (oh! how I detest that word 'popular' as applied to public men and acts), but a good Governor, both as regards the views, if they be sound, of the Home Government, and the interests of the colonists."

"November 24, 1847.

"Now I must tell you, that at the very outset of our tour, from mismanagement of flannels, and sleeping in wet tents, and in very bad encamping ground, I have had, I think, the worst attack of liver I have ever experienced. The symptoms were not remarkably violent or troublesome, but they were more clearly indicated than during any previous illness. So, though I am now very much better indeed, thanks to God's preserving mercy, yet I feel quite sure that I cannot remain another year in India without running the greatest risk of leaving poor Hannah and my five boys and girls without a sixpence in the world but my

* Not distinctly legible.

major's pension, £70 per annum, and a thousand pounds in the funds. But I feel it my duty to be off in March. I feel myself to be in the hands of a gracious God, and, relying on the merits of the Redeemer, look forward calmly and joyfully to the event of my own departure and dissolution; but it behoves me to think of the interests of your dear sister and the rest whom God has given me. If I were to die to-morrow, the Queen's Widows' Fund would send home Hannah and the three children here in India, and land them in any spot in England they would name; but here the advantage would cease. If I can raise the means of returning to England, the doctors seem to think that a year's absence would entirely restore my health, and that two would make me as good a man for Indian work as I have ever been. To my post I could then return without let or hindrance. The difficulty lies in going to, returning from, and living in England. There my sixteen shillings, my pay per diem, will give us bread and salt, but would not give my boy education, or my girls instruction of a tolerable kind. If I go to England at all, I must lay my account in finally sacrificing my prospects in the army by purchase, by expending before I returned the thousand pounds placed in the funds for that purpose. I am, as regards worldly goods, in an evil case somewhat, and also in a strait between two; but a merciful God will solve the enigma, and I trust, if He wills that I die in India, give me a death of hope, and eternal life after earthly dissolution, and will put it into the hearts of others to devise something for those whom I leave—with a bleeding heart I write it—almost penniless.

“If it pleases God to spare me to return to India, to the one object of doing something for those dear children—putting aside all thought of war or policy, with reservation only to my eternal hope—my life should be devoted. But what are human resolves or aims? All is in the hands of God, and He will deal mercifully and wisely with us for His Son's sake.”

“February 16, 1848.

“I have had the satisfaction of paying the Simla bank its last instalment, and am panting for the luxury of feeling that I do not owe a sixpence in India; and if life be spared me, this shall by God's blessing be achieved. An elephant load of office papers is awaiting for me, and I must close.”

“March 18, 1848.

“Now I must announce to you briefly, but at once, that I have given up my passage for the first of April, and determined, by

God's help, to try another year in India. It would take much time fully to explain this change. But the chief reason is, that I found myself, at the last moment, or, at least, in the last month, so much better, that my doctor gave me the opinion that I might stay without much risk; so I thought it to be *my duty* to try and spend one year more in India, a year of the strictest self-denial and economy, for my children's sake. I have been told, however, that I must remain constantly ready to start at a fortnight's notice, or less, if my constitutional disorder should unfortunately blaze out."

" March 31, 1848.

" If I remain well at Mahabuleshur, I hope to finish my sketch of Broadfoot, and then take in hand the defence of Jellalabad and the Gwalior (Maharajpore) campaign. Meanwhile, I who never before addressed a more formidable body than the soldiers of the old 13th, or the guests at a mess-table, have been seduced into making a speech, and in a crowded town-hall. At the request of Mr Legeyt (a relative of the Conollys), I gave Sir Erskine Perry a memorandum of all I knew of Sir George Clerk, and was then asked to second the address to him." In seconding the address Havelock said:—" Now, of the defenders of Jellalabad, Sir Robert Sale, Colonel Dennie, and greater than either—greater than any and all that fought for the defence of that old wall—Major George Broadfoot, are in their soldiers' graves! But if it were possible to recall them (for the sake of India, would it were!), or if I could summon round this table my surviving comrades of Jellalabad, by acclamation they would corroborate that which I now tell you,—that in moments such as I have endeavoured to describe, the hopes and expectations of that garrison of succour from beyond the Sutlege were mainly built on the energy, perseverance, and address of him who is known to you, gentlemen, and admired by you, as the Governor of Bombay; but who was best known to that garrison, as he will probably be best known in history, by the title of George Clerk of Umbala."

The second Sikh war, which Havelock's knowledge of Indian politics, and his singular foresight, led him to predict in March, 1846, overtook the Government within two years. The arrangement made by Lord Hardinge, of the government of the Punjab under native rulers, was not, from the nature of the case, likely

The second
Sikh war.

to be permanent. A year had scarcely elapsed, before the administration was threatened with dissolution by intrigues. The Sirdars felt that the presence of a British army was indispensable to the support of their authority, and the British Government felt that it was necessary to assume the direct control of affairs if the country was not to be abandoned to anarchy. A new convention was, therefore, formed in 1847, by which the entire supervision of the administration was confided to the British Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, and his council. Havelock expressed his deep regret that the new arrangement was not consolidated by placing British garrisons in Govindgur, Attock, Peshawur, and Mooltan, by levelling every other fortification, and disarming the whole population. More especially did he consider it an act of great indiscretion to leave a formidable Sikh force at Peshawur, on the Affghan frontier, bound to us by no other tie than its own doubtful sense of fidelity, or its attachment to its able commander, Colonel George Lawrence. At the beginning of 1848 Lord Hardinge returned to England, with such entire confidence in the stability of his policy, that he stated, on embarking, that another shot would not be fired in India for seven years. This confidence he was fully justified in entertaining, inasmuch as he had passed the year before his departure in making arrangements for securing the tranquillity of the Punjab, and for the instant repression of the first movements of rebellion. He had judiciously disposed 52,700 troops and 120 pieces of cannon between Meerut and Lahore, and had drawn up an admirable paper of instructions for the guidance of the Resident at Lahore, which seemed to embrace every possible contingency. The failure of his health constrained Sir Henry Lawrence to relinquish his post at Lahore, and he accompanied Lord Hardinge to England. To supply his place, it was determined to adopt the unusual course of deputing a member of the Supreme Council to manage the administration of the Punjab, and Sir Frederick Currie was selected for the post.

Sir Frederick Currie, on his arrival at Lahore, found

himself reposing on no velvet cushion. Sawun Mull, the governor of Mooltan, was assassinated in 1844, and his son, Moolraj, was allowed to succeed him on the payment of a large fine. He had expressed a wish to be relieved of the Government, and two English officers accompanied the new Sikh Governor to receive charge of the province. They were murdered on their arrival, and before the end of April the province of Mooltan was in a blaze of insurrection. This was the first overt act of opposition to the Government we had established in the Punjab, and should have been met with promptitude and decision. Contrary to the advice of Sir Frederick Currie, it was treated with levity and irresolution, and a second Sikh war soon became inevitable. Havelock remarks on this event:—

Outbreak at
Mooltan.
Havelock's
opinion.

“The opposition might have been foreseen ; why was it precipitated ? If we were not prepared to go to war in April, we ought not to have meddled with the affairs of the successor of Sawun Mull—who was, in his own estimation, little less than an independent sovereign—till October. But, in fact, the whole of the dispositions of Lord Hardinge for the support of his policy had reference to the very case of such a rebellion. He had put it fully in the power of the Resident to environ the walls of Mooltan in June, at the latest, with four European battalions, and a due proportion of native troops : some two European regiments might then, as afterwards, have been drawn from Scinde ; the rest, as Napoleon said of Saragossa, ‘ would have been an affair of artillery.’ But the authorities doubted and consulted ; and the result of their deliberations was for delay, and a campaign on a grand scale, at a favourable season. The question was important, and may be thus stated : If Mooltan were promptly besieged and taken, the rebellion would be at once trampled out. But the march up through Scinde and Lahore, in May, would have decimated the troops. The little war at Mooltan neglected, might in a few months assume formidable proportions, and burst out into a conflagration, the flames of which the whole armies of two Presidencies might find it difficult to extinguish.

“The military Commander and the Resident had scarcely ceased to bandy arguments, when a man of genius, acting in the

spirit of Lord Hardinge's instructions, cut the gordian knot. A lieutenant in the Company's service—Herbert Edwardes—employed as a political assistant in a remote part of the country, with an energy and military enterprise to which India had afforded no parallel since the days of Clive, and evincing a moral courage just so much greater than that of Clive, as his position was inferior to that of the wonderful founder of our eastern empire, when he ventured on the overwhelming responsibility of his greatest achievement, the march on Moorsheadabad—this gifted lieutenant, overleaping all considerations which could embarrass him in the discharge of an important duty to the state, raised an auxiliary force, united it to a portion of the Khalsa troops, called to his aid an allied native sovereign, encountered Moolraj in the open field, and drove him within his fortress."

The Resident at Lahore was constrained to second this daring effort. A small division of British troops, under General Whish, with a battering train, at length Siege of Mooltan. Revolt of Shere Singh. marched against Mooltan, accompanied by a large Sikh contingent under Shere Singh, whose father, a chief of doubtful allegiance, commanded a still larger force at Peshawur. Moolraj defended himself against these united forces with admirable skill and resolution. The siege languished; the Punjab wavered, and the tide appeared to be turning against us. Shere Singh went over with all his troops to the enemy, and the British general was in his turn besieged in his camp. But Shere Singh did not long remain with his new ally. He had plans of ambition of his own, and marched northward to join his father, who had by this time raised the standard of revolt. He planted himself between the Chenab and the Jhelum, invited to his camp the disbanded soldiers of the old Khalsa army, and the numerous disaffected spirits throughout the Punjab, and soon found himself at the head of a formidable force in the heart of the country. At length, at the beginning of the cold season, the Commander-in-Chief took the field in person, and began to draw his forces to a head. His army was essentially weak in infantry. The continued siege of Mooltan detained a large and important body under its walls,

The Commander-in-Chief takes the field in person.

to which point the Bombay reinforcement was also marching up through Scinde. Lord Gough had around his standards only four regiments of British infantry, and eleven native regiments. In artillery, the balance, which in the first Sikh war inclined towards the enemy, was now restored with a great superiority. Sixty-four field pieces, and a tremendous battery of eighteen-pounders and large howitzers were attached to the force. Three noble regiments of British horse, and five regiments of native light cavalry and irregular horse, completed the equipment. But the deficiency of infantry was undeniable and irremediable, save at the hazard of endangering the safety of Lahore.

On the general plan and first movements of the campaign, Havelock recorded the following remarks:—

“ Shere Singh, with a considerable force of Khalsa troops and armed peasantry, and gaily equipped, and effectively, though not handsomely mounted Ghorchurras, and supported by a formidable artillery, boldly assumed the line of the larger river, the Chenab. It seems strange that the Commander-in-Chief should not have been impressed with a conviction of the extreme hazard of the attempt to force successively the banks of three great rivers, since Peshawur might be considered the objective point, with the aid of an infantry, gallant and disciplined, but numerically so inadequate to carrying on war with a high hand. Shere Singh, by moving to the northward, had compelled the British to operate upon two lines. They were combining at once from Bombay and Bengal against Moolraj, and at the same time had to confront the insurrection in the superior delta of the five rivers. For this extensive and dangerous operation the force of infantry was visibly feeble. Rivers too had to be passed, and the pontoon train was glaringly deficient. Under these circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief would, it may well be argued, have exercised a sound discretion if he had determined to act offensively on one line only at a time; if he had restricted his own efforts to preventing Shere Singh from detaching a single soldier to the relief of Moolraj, awaited its fall, which was a matter of calculation, and then, as was ultimately done in fact, have thrown his united forces with irresistible power on Shere Singh. If any such plan ever presented itself to his mind, or

Havelock's
remarks on
the plan of
the campaign.

was suggested to him, it may be easily supposed that a leader of his sanguine temperament rejected it with disdain. Doubtless, he thought of bursting with headlong force the barriers of the Chenab, the Jhelum, and the Attock; and his ultimate success will suffice in the eyes of the unreflecting to justify this resolve. But fair military considerations seem to lead to a different conclusion, and to teach, that it was precisely because he persisted in thus operating on a double line, with insufficient forces and remarkable want of caution, that the period between approaching the Chenab and conquering at Goojerat, exhibited such a spectacle of abortive exertion and useless slaughter. While he combated alone, the power of the British in India, and the reputation of their arms, was exposed to no small hazard. It was only when reinforced by the troops which the fall of Mooltan set free, that the British leader marched to easy and assured victory. In estimating, however, the advantages of cautious and defensive manœuvres on the Chenab, it is not to be forgotten how tremendous a clamour would have been raised against such a campaign by idle cavillers, and the press of India, which constitutes a power not to be despised, because its influence stealthily communicates itself to the Government. The most enlightened critic of Indian military history always used to laud to the skies the gradually progressive operations of Ochterlony against the Goorkahs. But he would add with emphasis, 'Remember, even Ochterlony could not have carried out his plan if India had then had a press.' Yet neither he nor I ever doubted that the freedom of the press had proved an inestimable blessing to India, as well as England, though in time of war it had its inconveniences."

The British army was now advanced towards the Chenab. Shere Singh, with his large body of Khalsa troops, armed peasantry, and well-equipped horsemen, and a powerful artillery, occupied both banks of that river. His main body was encamped on the right bank, protected by batteries mounting not fewer than twenty-eight guns, which were well covered from any fire that could be opened from the left bank, and indeed invisible from it. Having boats on the river, and the command of the ford, he had pushed a considerable body of his troops across the river. The British army having arrived in front of his position, there was a reconnoissance in force,

Engagement
of Ramnuggur.
Death of Wil-
liam Havelock.

with cavalry and horse artillery. We were provoked by the Sikh fire into a contest under every possible disadvantage, on ground where nothing but disaster could occur. Our troops were bewildered, and the State was deprived by death of the services of Colonel Cureton and Colonel William Havelock. The death of his brother was a most severe stroke to Havelock, and immediately after hearing of his loss, he sent the following letter to his intimate friend, Colonel Birch, the Judge-Advocate-General of the Bengal army.

“Bombay, Dec. 7, 1848.

“My dear Birch,—Your letter of the 23rd ultimo only reached me yesterday. Your kind heart had anticipated my wishes ; for on the 4th instant, having seen a hurried newspaper account of the affair of the 22nd, I wrote to ask of you to give me every particular of my brother's death. My will has been wholly resigned to that of God since I first heard of the event ; and my mind supported by his Spirit, though harassed and thrown for a moment into suspense by the doubts which succeeding statements expressed of William's fate. To me it did not appear doubtful, though many of those numerous persons who knew and esteemed him here were striving to persuade me to hope. As regards the operation, it must be clear to any unprejudiced person that it ought never to have been undertaken. You may remember our pickets being driven in some weeks before Sobraon ; it was the commencement of the enemy's successful attempt to establish himself on the left bank. The reason which I gave then against attempting counter-manceuvres is perfectly applicable to the case of the Chenab. The enemy had a powerful artillery on the right bank, and until its fire could be subdued, were fairly to be considered the proprietors of the stream, and of as much ground beyond it as could be swept by the fire of their guns.

“Their horse, pushed forward on the left bank, were intended to bravado and decoy, and should have been simply let alone, or cannonaded when convenient and possible, by guns out of reach of those of the enemy.

“The stream of the Chenab is, according to my recollection, not more than four hundred yards in width, perhaps less. A battery of twenty-eight guns, intrenched on its right bank, is therefore a front of fortification, covered by a ditch of the specified breadth, and not to be approached by armed bodies.

The same reason exists for not attacking its outwork on the left bank—I mean, the little intrenchments in the broken ground. I see that you, and possibly others, have formed the opinion that my brother's impetuosity led him farther than he ought to have gone. It may have been so. Old Will was a fox-hunter before he was a soldier, and has been a hog-hunter since, and would lightly esteem a ditch or *nullah*, manned by a few irregulars, which would have made others pause. The case of White pulling up, and Havelock dashing on, finds a parallel which will suggest itself to all readers of military history, in the story of Talavera, where Arentschild would not make the plunge, and Seymour would, losing all but Portarlington's squadron of the 23rd in the onslaught.

“It was natural that an old Peninsular officer, who had not seen a shot fired since Waterloo, should desire to blood the noses of his young dragoons. But his proposal should have been negatived at once, if not according to military rule, which it is clear it was not. Whether he went too far or not, and whether the scheme of the attack originated with him or not, are minor questions. The Commander-in-Chief, and the General of Division, were both in the field, and, as I believe, on the spot. Neither the public nor posterity will consent to fix the responsibility on any shoulders but those of the seniors; it is the irreversible decree of military responsibility that there it must rest, and history will have it so. The faults of execution, if it be clear there were any, do not account alone for the disaster, since it can be shown that to attack at all was objectionable on fair military grounds. I do not make these remarks in a carping or selfish spirit, irritated at a loss which comes home to my own door; but because all these events are lessons to soldiers, which they must not lose, and all military matters must be judged of by certain unchangeable rules.

“I may well grieve for the loss of the brother who was brought up with me in the nursery, and was nine years my schoolfellow; but though it be decided in Bengal that the same acts which would be lauded as heroism in Anglesey, or Joachim Murat, or Auguste Caulincourt, are mere rashness in Will Havelock, I cannot quite think so; nay, strange old man that I am, my grief is more than half-absorbed in admiration; and I proudly parody the saying of the English nobleman, and would scarcely give my dead brother for any living soldier at the three Presidencies.

“ Brave officers have fallen, but the mode of retrieving this surely lies on the surface. I trust no attack will be made in front on Shere Singh’s position. But if a force were intrenched at Ramnuggur, with heavy guns that could take care of themselves and reach and repress the insults of bodies of horse, a place to cross would easily be found. There are in all rivers spots where the salient bend is towards the advancing party. If one of these were selected, twelve miles above Shere Singh’s encampment, and the circumference surrounded by a rapid march with horse artillery, and the pontoon bridge quickly thrown while the Shere was amused at Ramnuggur, there would be a noble force across, and leave the Singh little chance but having his intrenchment taken in reverse, or coming out to fight a battle which would be fatal to him, while an attack in front would be nearly so to us. Cureton is indeed a loss. His long experience had made him a first-rate out-post officer ; and few others in India, or in England, could move bodies of cavalry better.

“ Ever, my dear Birch, faithfully yours,

“ H. H.”

A few months after his brother’s death Havelock drew up a memoir of his career, after he had received a more detailed report of the action in which he fell ; and it was published in Dr Buist’s Annals of the year. It combined in one portraiture the warm affection of a brother with the lofty enthusiasm of a soldier, and the impartial judgment of a military critic. The termination of his career on the sands of Ramnuggur is thus mournfully described :—

Havelock’s remarks on the death of his brother.

“ On the morning of the 22nd of November he seemed a good deal excited. This may be pardoned in an old *sabreur*, whose enthusiasm had been pent up without vent or safety-valve in his bosom since the battle of Waterloo. He is said to have worried Cureton with entreaties to be allowed to attack the Sikh horse, who were caracolling in front of the 14th, and more than once to have exclaimed, that this day ‘ he hoped to win his golden spurs.’ Alas, he won nothing but his soldier’s grave, and every brave man’s sympathy. A troop of our horse artillery had, by opening against the right bank, showed the position of the enemy’s guns ; and a steady charge of the 3rd Light Dragoons, aided by light cavalry, had chastised on one point the presumption of the Sikhs.

Cureton had given his consent to another body of these being attacked by the 14th ; and the Commander-in-Chief, riding up to Will Havelock, had said, 'If you see a favourable opportunity of charging, charge.' 'The gallant old Colonel,' remarks one who was present, 'soon made the opportunity.' And so it was ; for not many minutes after, Will Havelock, 'happy as a lover,' sitting as firmly in the saddle as when he overleaped the abbatis on the Bidassoa, placed himself in front of his cherished dragoons, and remarking, 'We now shall soon see whether we can clear our front of those fellows, or not,' boldly led them forward to the onset. All who beheld it have spoken with admiration of the steadiness and the gallantry of this glorious gallop. The Sikhs made a show of standing the charge, *à pied ferme*, and some of them must have stood well, for sabre cuts were exchanged with effect. Captain Gall, while grasping a standard, had his right hand cut through by the stroke of a Sikh, which he delivered with the hissing sound of an English pavior driving home a stone. Young Fitzgerald's skull was cleft to the brain by another blow from one of the enemy ; but the mass of the Sikhs opened out right and left, and gave way before their victors.

"Thus the first charge seemed to have ended, in which Havelock was not even wounded. We pretend not certainly to know by whose order a second was hazarded, but it seemed certain that it was executed ; and even regarding the first there had been misapprehensions, for, as Cureton watched its progress, he exclaimed, 'That is not the body of horse I meant to have been attacked ;' and riding to the front, received in his gallant breast a fatal matchlock ball.

"We hasten to the end, narrating as it has to us been narrated. Again the trumpets of the 14th sounded, and, overturning at first all that opposed them, onward in the direction of the island they took their course. The Sikh battery opened on them a heavy fire, and there was a descent of some four feet into the flat ; but Havelock, disregarding all opposition and all difficulties, and riding well ahead of his men, exclaimed, as he leapt down the declivity, 'Follow me, my brave lads, and never heed their cannon-shot.' These were the last words he was ever heard to utter. The dragoons got amongst broken ground, filled with Sikh marksmen, who kept up a withering fire on the tall horsemen, throwing themselves flat on their faces whenever they approached them. After many bold efforts the 14th were withdrawn from the

ground, but their commander never returned from that scene of slaughter.

“It is not yet known exactly how he fell. Probably his charger was struck down by a cannon-shot, and then he would have to contend against fearful odds : in fact, his orderly has related that he saw him lying in the nullah with several dead Sikhs around him, and that, being wounded himself, he could not go to his Colonel's aid. Another dragoon beheld him contending against several of the enemy. Havelock died, and his body remained in the sandy level, in the power of the Sikhs. He is said to have slain several of them with his own hand on this day. We need not be supposed to borrow from the romantic tale of Roland and Amadis if we credit this assertion, for even the stag at bay will fiercely turn upon his hunter—what, then, the lion in the tiger's den ! And we know that few had learnt in youth to wield sabre or rapier like Will Havelock,—and at fifty-six his eye had lost nothing of its native quickness.

“When Lord Gough's operations had put the British in possession of the right bank of the Chenab, and not till then, Havelock's body was found. It was recognized fully by the pious care of the Rev. W. Whiting, chaplain with the force. Deep cuts on one leg, both arms, and the fingers of the right hand, attested the severity of the conflict in which he had sunk. The Sikhs had in their barbarous fashion decapitated the gallant slain, and eleven of his noble dragoons who had fallen around him. In one of three tombs which are to be seen near the Imambarah at Ramnuggur, from which Runjeet Singh used to review his troops—the two other sepulchres being those of Cureton and Fitzgerald,—lies the mortal body of William Havelock.

“The best and bravest of England's chivalry need not disdain to make a pilgrimage to this spot. They will see there the remains of a gallant young soldier—a gallant soldier's son. There, too, lie Cureton and Havelock, whom so many Peninsular dangers had spared. Neither of these men was perhaps fitted to be a general, in the highest sense, or understood the higher tactics ; but Cureton had few equals in all the duties of a regiment, a brigade, or a divisional command—few could move considerable bodies of cavalry like him : and if in these particulars Havelock was his inferior, he was not unskilled in them, and possessed above most men the valuable power of imparting to others the ardour which ever burnt in his own bosom. Therefore it was that, on the

day of Ramnuggur, his beloved dragoons so cheerfully mingled their blood with his blood, and so nobly followed wherever their commander led, though it was into the gulf of inevitable destruction !”

After the unfortunate action of the 22nd November, the Commander-in-Chief waited the arrival of his heavy guns, which came up on the 30th. He then wisely determined to send Sir Joseph Thackwell to cross the Chenab at a ford higher up. This movement was effected on the 2nd of December. As soon as the intelligence reached Lord Gough, he commenced a heavy cannonade on the enemy's encampment across the river, and the Sikhs were obliged to withdraw two miles from the river-bank. Under cover of the night, the British batteries were pushed so close to the margin as to command the ford. “This advance,” remarked Havelock, “by successive lodgments, whereby the mastery of the river was transferred from the hands of the Sikhs to those of the British, and the ford hermetically sealed, is to be regarded as a very splendid military operation.” Sir Joseph pursued his march on the 3rd of December, and was attacked about two in the afternoon by the enemy. At the village of Sadoolapore he sustained for two hours the heavy cannonade of the Sikhs ; his artillery then opened with deadly effect, and by half-past four the hostile cannon began to slacken, and then ceased. Sir Joseph, having the example of Moodkee and Ferozeshuhur before him, wisely determined to avoid storming the enemy's position at night. “He had profited by experience,” remarked Havelock, “and would not, amid the shades of night, precipitate his brave troops, broken and wearied, into a labyrinth of tents, waggons, and tumbrils, among exploding mines and expense magazines.” About midnight it was apparent that the Sikhs were in full retreat. They moved off in silence, but the barking of dogs in their rear betrayed the movement. At daybreak on the 4th, Sir Joseph put his troops in motion, but found that Shere Singh had already deserted his camp, blown up his magazines, and

Battle of Sadoolapore.
Shere Singh
relinquishes
his position.

was in full retreat on the Jhelum. "Thus," wrote Havelock, "were the Sikhs dislodged from the banks of the Chenab. The British career in India has been attended with such great and wonderful successes, as entirely to vitiate the judgment of the European community. Nothing but a grand victory, whenever there is collision with the enemy, will satisfy a public mind so marvellously spoilt by good fortune. Howbeit, war is not a romance, but always matter of nice calculation, of fluctuating chances; a picture not seldom crowded with vicissitudes, and oftentimes a season of patient waiting for small advantages. So the passage of the Chenab to the politicians of India was a great disappointment. But it may be predicted that the deliberate judgment of those who have meditated much on military operations will be widely different from this crude condemnation. They will recognize in Lord Gough a laudable combination of enterprise and caution, presenting a favourable contrast to the school-boy skirmish at Ramnuggur; and Sir Joseph Thackwell will be adjudged to have most meritoriously carried out his portion of the operation."

For four weeks after the successful action at Sadoolapore, and the retirement of Shere Singh, the British army, still waiting for the troops which would be released by the capture of Mooltan, remained in a state of inactivity. After various movements, it was encamped at Dinghee, on the 12th of January. Shere Singh, with an army which had been in the mean time augmented in numbers and confidence, had taken up one of the strongest positions which could be found, with his back resting on the Jhelum. The 13th witnessed the battle of Chillianwalla, the most sanguinary and the most unsatisfactory which we had ever fought in India. Havelock's commentary on this memorable engagement will be deemed valuable by all military readers:—

Battle of Chillianwalla.
Havelock's
remarks.

"Fortune," says Havelock, "so to speak, has ever favoured the leader, Lord Gough, and never smiled on him more propitiously than now. The advance beyond Dinghee was a false move. He was about to attack with an insufficient force one of the strongest

positions the Sikhs had ever taken up, but now a counter-move of the enemy gave him a grand and unexpected advantage ; for as he got closer to Chillianwalla it became evident that the rebel force had abandoned their intrenchments, and marched forth to meet the British in the field. A picket of the Sikhs was driven in from a low bare hill, and when this was ascended by the staff, a distinct view was obtained of the enemy's line ; covered indeed by thick jungle, but ready to combat without the aid of intrenchments. It had been determined to defer the attack till the next morning, and to make a careful reconnoissance before the assault ; and the Quarter-Master-General had been ordered to mark out a position for the encampment. This duty was already commenced and in progress, when a few shot from the horse artillery the enemy had pushed to the front fell near the British commander, and the order was issued for an immediate attack."

This decision Havelock was unable to commend.

"In 1845, before a sword had ever been drawn against the Sikhs, the natives best acquainted with them had warned the British that they were not to be dreaded as assailants, but that they always defended a position with an obstinacy hardly to be overcome by human effort. At Moodkee, at Ferozeshuhur, and at Sobraon, the justice of this remark was fully confirmed. It was always therefore desirable so to manœuvre as to force the Sikhs to take the initiative. Now at the village of Chillian this advantage had been fortuitously gained. But the advantage was neglected. There can be no doubt that if the British army had taken up the most favourable ground, as Sir Joseph Thackwell had done at Sadoolapore, with its infantry and cavalry screened as much as possible, and our powerful artillery used in answer to that of the Sikhs, to which it was numerically and in calibre superior, the happiest results would have followed. The Sikhs would have threatened and cannonaded, but not attacked ; the artillery would have been ruined, and if they had not decamped during the night they might, at daylight perhaps, have been assailed in their turn with much advantage. But orders were given to prepare for immediate action. The Sikhs had now opened a continuous roar of fire from a jungle so thick that nothing was offered as a mark to the British artillery, which loudly replied, but the flash and smoke of the hostile cannon. This cannonade lasted, according to the official despatch, about an hour. About half-past three P.M.,

in the middle of January, General Campbell's division was ordered to advance against the enemy's line. At Moodkee the troops had fallen into confusion in a fight protracted after nightfall. At Ferozeshuhur an encampment nobly stormed by the British had slipped through the grasp of its victors, through the disadvantage of night settling down upon the last efforts of the troops, yet the same risks were to be here again encountered."

Though the particulars of this disastrous day are fully known to the public, yet Havelock's description of the rout of Pennycuick's brigade and of the cavalry division will be read with interest :—

"The brigade of Pennycuick was, however, destined to meet with a terrific repulse. Its advance was daring in the extreme, but over-impetuous. Its British regiment, the 24th, advanced with an ardour that seemed to promise victory; but while yet at a distance from the enemy it broke into too rapid a pace, outstripped its native regiments, and rushed breathless and confused upon the enemy's batteries. Close to the position it received a deadly shower of grape, and, while shattered by its fatal effects, was torn to pieces by a close fire poured in by the Bunnoo troops from behind a screen of jungle. The native regiments, when they came up, were unable to restore the battle. The brigade was thrown into utter confusion. The most desperate efforts of the officers availed not to restore order. Brigadier Pennycuick was slain in the forefront of the fight. Colonel Brookes, the commander of the 24th regiment, fell among the guns. The Sikhs, seeing their advantage, rushed forward sword in hand, cut down their wounded opponents with savage fury, and speedily converted the rude repulse into incurable rout. The colours of the gallant 24th fell into the hands of the enemy, but not until 23 officers and 459 non-commissioned officers and privates had fallen or received wounds."

In regard to the movement of the cavalry brigade at Chillianwalla, Havelock has remarked :—

"To protect the extreme flanks of the infantry, it was determined to bring up the fine cavalry into first line. This collocation of horse has hitherto been deemed faulty in tactics, though circumstances of ground may render it unavoidable. It has ever been deemed preferable to keep cavalry in second line, and

sheltered as much as possible from the influence of artillery and musketry fire, until the moment of rapid action arrives. But the brigades of horse were in first line at Maharajpore and here again, as it would appear, at Chillian, on a field of battle covered with dense forest. Now cavalry is essentially an attacking, not a defensive force. It gives no fire that is worthy of the name. Its mode of operation is rapid, vehement, advancing in compact order whether of line or column, thereby bearing down and sweeping away the resistance opposed to it. If, therefore, it be used in ground where this powerful action cannot be sustained, it is rendered inoperative or worse. Its province is to meet hostile cavalry on a plain, sometimes to charge in unfavourable ground in a mass upon a point, but above all to improve and complete victory by riding down defeated or disordered infantry. If these first principles are undeniable, it may be deduced how little was to be expected from the co-operation of horse in this forest fight, in which it was the destiny of the British to be engaged. It needed no prophetic glance to anticipate that some of the evils which arose at Ramnuggur from the exposure of a valuable cavalry regiment to unapproachable artillery fire might at Chillian once more result from their entanglement in the recesses of a forest. But the actual mischief certainly exceeded any estimate that could have been previously formed, and in the sequel it will be seen how marked is the difference even on the most unfavourable ground between the ignorant and the skilful handling of brigades of cavalry." "The cavalry commander advanced his four cavalry regiments into a dense forest at a wall formed in one line. The forest was thick, yet not a skirmisher was sent forward to explore the way. The twelve pieces of artillery were so disposed in rear of the left of the cavalry, that they could not open fire from a single gun. No reserve, second line, or supporting column provided against temporary reverse, though this is an indispensable rule in cavalry arrangements, and not only did the extended line overlap the infantry, but the line was by the trees and clumps of brushwood speedily broke into an infinite series of small sections doubled behind each other. . . . This was the state of things when a small body of Ghorchurras, intoxicated with the stimulating drug which Asiatic heroes called to the aid of their valour, rode in a mass upon the centre, wounded the brigadier, and caused a sensation of terror among the native troops. The cavalry soldier that deliberates is lost. From alarm not checked by nobler considerations, and converted on the instant into bold advance, by the example of

superiors, the transition is as easy and seductive as the deceitful path which leads to the shades of Avernus ; and in this crisis, from the centre, whence it ought to have come, there issued no rallying word. But by some mortal man, whether, according to one narrative, an officer of light cavalry, or another the serjeant-armourer, or Vulcan of the dragoons, the fatal order 'Threes about !' was given. The British line turned to the rear, moved off confusedly, and there, while the Ghorchurras followed in their track, fairly galloped through the forest in panic as shameful as that of Preston Pans, or the 'canter of Coltbrigg.' Nor was their flight the end of the disaster, for the able and original disposition, on which it had supervened, having posted twelve guns, where the British dragoons were alone in their line of fire, the mass of fugitives of the 14th came at racing speed headlong amidst the cannon and waggons ; and the Ghorchurras, rapidly pursuing, entered the ranks of the artillery along with the flying dragoons. . . . It is but just at the same time to record that irrefragable and most circumstantial evidence has been adduced that Lieut.-Col. King did all that the bravest of men could do to rally his panic-stricken men. When they fled, he kept ever during the miserable rout nearest to the foe, and re-formed his squadrons the moment they could be halted. His conduct throughout the campaign was consistently gallant."

After having described the part sustained by each portion of the force in this furious struggle, Havelock proceeds to remark :—

"Such in its chief details was the battle of Chillianwalla, one of the most sanguinary ever fought by the British in India, and the nearest approximation to a defeat of any of the great conflicts of that power in the East. The British drove the Sikhs from their position, but they were unable to hold the ground which they had won. The victors retired some hours after the close of the day to their own camp ; the vanquished traversed in detachments the scene of the conflict throughout the night. Twelve pieces of cannon were the trophies of British valour ; four guns of the Horse Artillery were captured by the Sikhs, and the colours of three regiments were lost in the action. The battle had been fought with the view of 'effectually overthrowing the army of Shere Singh' before it could be reinforced by the troops under his father. That army was not effectually overthrown. It sustained a heavy loss, but retired without interruption not more than three miles

from the field of battle, and Chutter Singh joined his son three days after the fight. Eighty-nine officers and 2357 fighting men was the price paid by the British for these doubtful advantages. If moral superiority be regarded, the results of the battle were yet more disheartening to our countrymen. The character of the Sikhs for prowess was considerably elevated; the reputation of the British cavalry was grievously tarnished. In India, nevertheless, Chillianwalla was declared by the highest authority to be a victory, and the sound of cannon announced the triumph at every station in the three Presidencies. But even here we were anticipated; for Shere Singh fired his salute on the evening of the fight. His great guns again shook the welkin when his father joined him. But if in India Chillianwalla was decked out by the trappings of victory by the Government, while public opinion deplored it as a calamity and a reverse, in England the intelligence of this great combat excited in every breast, from the court to the cottage, sentiments of alarm and indignation. British cannon had been captured, British standards had been lost, British cavalry had fled before the enemy. The Indian press had spoken in no measured terms of the conduct of the fight, indeed, of the whole campaign, and its deepest tones of vituperation were echoed by the journalists of England. The common people, whose guesses at truth are often shrewd, felt that they had lost sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, and suspected, though they could not define the grounds of their belief, that in this instance deficiency of skill was the cause of their bereavement. The higher classes were not less loud or unanimous in their condemnation. Many individuals knew that after the battle of Maharajpore, the great captain of the age had highly applauded the gallantry of the troops, but freely criticised the manœuvres of the General. The Court of Directors saw already in terrific vision their glittering empire escaping from their grasp, and had become willing, in their perplexity and dismay, to accept of the services of that general, who, in the exultation of victory, had scoffed at their authority, defamed their civil servants, and arraigned themselves of incapacity. The ministers of the Crown and the illustrious head of the army were agreed on the necessity of a change in that command. Within three days of the arrival in London of the details of the sanguinary engagement, Lord Gough had been doomed to taste the bitterness of recall. Revert we now to the theatre of war on which the object of all this distrust and obloquy was destined still to play a glorious part and achieve a victory over his enemies in the field, and to magnify himself at

the expense of those who, acknowledging his private virtues, and admiring his martial qualifications, his quick perceptions, his untiring energy and indomitable valour, yet doubted whether nature had designed, or education or experience had qualified, him for extended and independent command."

Havelock had exchanged from the 13th into the 39th, and then into the 53rd, in which regiment he was second major, at the beginning of 1849. On the 5th of Feb. it was reported in the papers that his corps, the 53rd, was to be immediately ordered into the field, to take part in the Punjab campaign. He was determined, he said, "that no one of his name should appear to be slow to answer the call of duty," and he made immediate arrangements for joining the regiment. The report was confirmed a week after, and he received intelligence that six companies had actually proceeded towards the camp; he, therefore, sought and obtained permission from Sir Willoughby Cotton, the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, temporarily to relinquish his staff-appointment. He started for the Punjab without delay, and on reaching a staging bungalow on the 3rd of March, wrote: "Thus far have I got on my way towards the Punjab, and thus far, thank God, in good health. I have only one stray military remark to make on the campaign; throughout, Lord Gough has not had troops enough. Doubtless this has arisen from the error in judgment of not at once finishing off Mooltan, which would either have obviated a campaign on the rivers of the Punjab, or have left us abundant forces for a single line of operations. We have been operating on two at once, and for this we lacked troops. Chillianwalla has been a dead loss to us in forces and in reputation." On the 12th of March, half way between Indore and Agra, he received an official letter from head-quarters, peremptorily ordering him back to Bombay, and censuring Sir Willoughby Cotton for having permitted him to quit his post, and reprimanding him for having done so, without Lord Gough's leave. Had he been allowed to reach the army, his rank would have entitled him to the command of a brigade. The reason as-

signed in the official communication for remanding him to Bombay, was that if he joined the force about to cross the Jhelum, it would interfere, owing to his army rank, with the arrangements already completed under Lord Gough's orders; "in other words," said Havelock, "I am not wanted as a Major, and shall not be appointed as a Brigadier." However severe the disappointment, Havelock took the whole blame of it to himself.

"I have no cause," he writes, "to arraign Lord Gough's conduct in ordering me back to Bombay. I have coolly weighed the matter, and as I never *like to lie* myself out of scrapes, I freely confess the fault has been my own. The fact is, I allowed my mind to be biassed on the subject of the 53rd going on service without me, and acted wrong, though under the strongest sense of duty. On hearing the first report of my regiment being ordered forward to Lahore, I ought to have simply written through Sir Willoughby for Lord Gough's permission to join it. All this I see clearly now, but what is the use of after wisdom? Neither Sir Willoughby nor I saw it at the time. My pecuniary loss will be most heavy, and my position deteriorated, as, besides the loss of reputation attending every error, I have got a reprimand, and shall get another from the Horse Guards. The latter might displace me, but I do not think they will carry matters so far, the error being on the side of fight. But now, am I to sit down in despair? Not I, by God's blessing. If health and life be spared I hope to retrieve all yet. I will labour hard, and cut down my expenditure to the lowest scale."

The second Sikh war was brought to a triumphant issue by the decisive victory of Goojerat. The British army, which from the first had been deficient in infantry, was so seriously weakened by the casualties at Chillianwalla, that the Commander-in-Chief was obliged to confine himself for a time to defensive operations, while he awaited the fall of Mooltan and the accession of the besieging troops. At length, Moolraj, after having sustained in the citadel of Mooltan, to which he had retired, the most awful fire of ordnance, direct and vertical, which had ever in India been concentrated upon the same narrow circuit, had been constrained to sur-

Battle of Goojerat. Havelock's remarks.

render. The army of Mooltan was brought up by rapid marches to reinforce Lord Gough's force, and enable it to attack the Sikh phalanx, which had broken up from Russool, and after various marches and counter-marches in the Dooab of the Chenab and the Jhelum, had taken up a strong position at the town of Goojerat. Strengthened by the addition of the troops from Mooltan, the British army now, combined under the command of Lord Gough, was sufficiently strong to crush any opponent. Happily, with the army from Mooltan came General Cheap of the Engineers, who had conducted the scientific branch of the second siege of that fortress with consummate skill and brilliant success. He now took charge of the engineering department in the action about to be fought. On this, the occasion of our last struggle, for the time, with the Sikhs, we enjoyed the advantage of a complete reconnoissance, and it was determined to reverse the principle of our previous engagements, and instead of trusting the issue of the conflict to "cold steel," to bring our artillery, the most powerful which had ever been deployed by us on any field in India, into full play. The army of Shere Singh was estimated at 60,000; but we again borrow Havelock's vivid description of the engagement:—

"At half-past seven in the morning of the 21st of February, the British advanced to the combat in the most perfect order, and as they approached Goojerat, the drums of the Sikhs were heard to beat to arms. The morning was clear and cloudless, and the sun shone brightly on the extended line of bayonets and sabres. The Singhs, ever ready with their guns, seemed as usual anxious to have the first blow, and opened their batteries on the British at an unusually long range. The infantry was halted beyond the reach of their round shot, and the artillery, protected by skirmishers, pushed boldly to the front. A cannonade was commenced about nine A.M., of which the oldest and most experienced soldiers in the army had never witnessed the parallel for magnificence and effect. It continued somewhat more than two hours and a half, the field artillery firing at the rate of about forty rounds each sixty minutes, and its results exceeded the most sanguine expectations, even of those who had most boldly advocated this mode of reading warriors, who piqued themselves on

their artillery powers, a great and abiding, it might be, a final lesson. Notwithstanding the quickness with which the Sikh guns were served, it was soon seen that neither human fortitude nor the best material could permanently withstand the storm. Numerous guns were dismounted, and the fire of the formidable line, before a musket had been discharged, evidently slackened. Then the infantry deployed, and commenced a steady advance, the heavy guns as well as field batteries keeping pace with the troops, and unlimbering for effective action in successive positions. . . The cavalry, which had been wisely restrained from taking too prominent a part in the action until the enemy's centre was forced, and his infantry signally defeated, was at length called upon to exercise its most terrific function of improving victory. The Sikh line was broken and in flight, and its fragments pursued by four steady divisions of infantry. Then from either flank the horse, unbroken and in perfect order, swept forward to do the work of final retribution. The two columns speedily got into communication. Onward they moved in union, cutting down, dispersing, riding over, and trampling the flying or scattered infantry, capturing guns and waggons, strewing the path with dead and dying; forward they moved in their irresistible course, and converted a beaten army into a shapeless, hideous mass of helpless fugitives. It was not until half-past four that they drew rein and halted, by which time the army of Shere Singh was a wreck, deprived of baggage and standards, its camp given up to the spoiler, and fifty-three pieces of its cannon in the hands of its pursuers. Such was the battle of Goojerat, of which we may fully confirm Lord Gough's own unassuming judgment, when, in privately announcing his resignation to the chairman of the Court of Directors, he called it 'his last battle and his best.' We may say much more of it. Compared with any of the conflicts and achievements of Clive, of Coote, of Cornwallis, or any other commander, it stands out in very bold relief indeed, not only as regards the importance of its results, the utter quelling and quenching the power and spirit of Runjeet Singh's great armament, terrible in the death-throes of its expiring wrath, but with reference to the magnitude of the forces arrayed on either side, and the great confidence which had been imparted to the enemy by preceding events. The most striking point of contrast in which it can be viewed, is with some of the previous actions of the same noble and distinguished commander. For here the ground had been deliberately and effectively reconnoitred, an early

hour in the morning was chosen for the period of attack, the troops were brought up fresh to the mighty contest, and if in their disposition there was nothing of the originality of genius, if there was none of that combination which doubles the power of every soldier in the field, yet the imposing array of the British took its field in a grand and magnificent manner, and the means employed were all calculated to produce the desired effect, and did produce it. Above all, the arm in which the English host had, beyond a dispute, a preponderating power, the artillery, was well posted, and allowed ample time to develop its irresistible strength. In fact, by it this battle was won. Although the enemy was pursued with skill and enterprise by Sir Walter Gilbert, yet the game of real war was at an end. Goojerat had smitten the rebellion with paralysis. Civilized nations which have fortresses and organized military establishments, are often seen to rally and to prolong the contest, after the most stupifying defeats. There is a principle of cohesion in the European character, which renders this possible. Asiatics, more easily excited by success, sink into utter prostration under calamity. Goojerat had driven the rebels to despair. Indeed it was no small glory to them to have so long resisted the British power, but a review of the last events of the campaign fully corroborates the opinion, that though more caution at its commencement might not have shortened the duration of the struggle by a day, it would have diminished the British losses by more than half, and saved their army from disaster little short of defeat."

With this battle fell the throne established by Runjeet Singh. So rapidly had our success at Goojerat followed our disappointment at Chillianwalla, that Lord Dalhousie was without instructions from England regarding the course he was to pursue. Constrained thus to choose his own policy, he wisely determined to annex the Punjab to the British dominions, to dismantle the fortresses and disarm the people. For several years he devoted himself most assiduously to the construction of a system of legislation and administration, in which the errors we had fallen into in the older provinces should be avoided, and the experience we had been acquiring for a century, embodied. A form of government was thus established, simple and vigorous, under the influence of which the

prosperity of the country and the welfare of the inhabitants have been promoted beyond precedent. So completely was the Punjab amalgamated with our empire, that eight years after a hostile Sikh army had streamed over the Sutlej and shaken our empire to its centre, another Sikh army was seen to cross that river to restore our authority in the provinces which had revolted from us. Under the admirable arrangements of Lord Dalhousie and Sir John Lawrence, the country which had been the source of danger became the element of our strength, and Delhi was saved from Lahore when Calcutta could afford no aid.

CHAPTER V.

Havelock is obliged by ill Health to visit England.—His Correspondence after his Arrival.—Presented at the Levée by the Duke.—His Opinion of Sir Robert Peel.—Meeting with Sir W. Norris and Archdeacon Hare.—Letter from the Archdeacon.—Visits the Baths of Germany.—His Opinion of the Court of Directors, and the Court of Proprietors.—Endeavours to obtain the Rank of Brevet-Colonel, but in vain.—Returns to Bombay.—Seeks Employment in the Burmese War.—Appointed Quarter-Master-General of Queen's Troops in India.—Visits Serampore for the last time.—Proceeds to Simla.—Promoted to the Rank of Brevet-Colonel.—Appointed Adjutant-General of Queen's Troops.—His Letters to his Family.—Returns to Calcutta.—Tours with the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson.

IN the month of April, Mrs Havelock was constrained, in consequence of the alarming indisposition of her eldest daughter, to embark with her family for Eng-
land. Had Havelock been in a position to follow the dictates of prudence, which the state of his health strongly recommended, he would have accompanied her. He had been twenty-six years in India without any opportunity of recruiting his strength by a visit to England. His constitution, which was feeble when he landed, had been shattered by six years of severe military campaigning. Indeed, the marvel was, that with the seeds of disease in him, he should have been enabled to survive the wear and tear of the Sikh and Affghan wars. At Bombay, as he said, "he could act for himself, and live as a Christian ought to do;" but it was a life of extreme, perhaps also of imprudent, abstemiousness, as well as of incessant official toil. In September of the present year, however, he experienced so serious an attack of illness, that his medical advisers considered it no longer safe for him to remain in India, and he was obliged, therefore, though not without great reluctance, to make up his mind to return forthwith to England. On the 10th of September he wrote to Serampore:—

Mrs Havelock
embarks for
England.
Havelock
follows her.

“I am feeling very feeble to-day, and must therefore be brief. I wish my *last* letter from India could impress on you the necessity of not doing that which I have done, wearing mind and body to rags with over hard work in a bad climate. I have had a severe return of my vertigo and palpitation of the heart. Two doctors had before agreed that I must go to England at once. It was now, therefore, decreed to assemble a board, and to make me strike work without delay. So, I have got leave, and propose, if life and strength be spared, to embark for Suez on the 1st of October. I am now paying the penalty for three years of carelessness for the future at Simla. At Bombay I have done my best to retrieve all, but sickness or death, as God shall order, has overtaken me in the midst. The doctors do not tell me that they suspect any organic disease of any kind, but that my disorder is an enfeebled constitution, the result of upwards of twenty-seven years of hard work under an Indian sky. I have for the present saved the life of my dear Pussy [the eldest daughter] by sending her home in April, and if I sink myself here, or on the journey, I still hope to pay everybody. For Hannah and my children there will remain my pension of £100 per annum and—faith in God.”

Havelock embarked for England in October, 1849, and reached London on the 5th of November. The following extracts from his correspondence, during his residence of two years in England, and on the continent, will serve as an index to his feelings and opinions:—

Havelock embarks for England. His correspondence.

“London, 7th Nov., 1849.

“I have much cause to be thankful for the circumstances of my voyage and journey. I reached this truly splendid capital on the anniversary of the meditated treason by gunpowder, some hours short of one month and two days after leaving the Apollo Bunder at Bombay. The Red Sea was like a mill-pond, but hot as had been the rocks at Aden. In Egypt I found the fervours of an Indian sun. But tired in Alexandria of being cooped up on board ship, I took the French steamer to Malta and Marseilles, travelled through France to Boulogne, and by steamer across the channel, and up the Thames by Ingress Park (now the seat of Alderman Harmer) to London Bridge. In health and strength I have, by God’s blessing, greatly improved.”

His earliest visit was to his sister, Mrs Creak, at Ply-

mouth. He also lost no time in renewing his correspondence with his old friend, Gardner, who has been already mentioned as his fellow-passenger to India in 1823, from whose spiritual counsel he had derived so much benefit.

“Plymouth, 24th Nov., 1849.

“My dear Gardner,—I hope you will not judge of my sentiments on receiving yours of the 19th, with reference to the length of time it remained without an answer. It is indeed a delight to me to be once more in the same land and neighbourhood with you, and to communicate with you again. But I wished to be able to say something approaching to decision on the subject of migrating to Bath, before I wrote to you.

“I will confess I do not like either the climate or the localities of this town, and the damp and constant rain are not very pleasing to one who has already got through one *monsoon* in the year 1849. But I find that some arrangements have been made regarding the education of my children, which bind us almost irrevocably to the spot until the end of the year, if we are so long spared. After that time, I shall be at liberty to think of a change, and I shall indeed rejoice if it be one which brings me nearer to you.

“We have ordinances here and faithful preaching, no slight blessings. But of the climate, I think as I thought of Devonshire twenty-seven years ago,—it is relaxing and enervating even in winter. Be assured that, as an old Indian, I have learnt the necessity of taking good care of my health. It has improved by my return to England, but had been so shattered by the last three years in the East that the faculty did not promise me any considerable change for the better for the first six months. I seem, however, to myself, to gain strength daily, though the progression is not rapid.

“I sympathize sincerely in all your distresses, bereavements, and losses. I too have my cares, regrets, and troubles. But we are journeying on, I trust, to the land where none of these exist, and to which the Saviour, who has been our hope on earth, shall there give us a glorious welcome.

“Should we finally be able to emigrate in your direction, Mrs Havelock and I will ask your kind assistance in obtaining for us such information as we may stand in need of. I have returned from India as poor, the increased claims on me considered, as I

went to it ; but as full of hope, for time and eternity, as in the year in which our acquaintance first commenced."

"Plymouth, 3rd January, 1850.

"The 25th of December and the 1st of January, of which I wish you and yours holy and happy returns, have found Hannah and me, and all our tribe still here. I am not enamoured of the locality as such, at all, at all ; but it is recommended by various considerations. I ought, though I fear I do not, class first in my heart and mind, the excellent preaching of the Gospel which we enjoy under Mr Nicholson. In purity, faithfulness, and simple eloquence, it is not to be anywhere surpassed. Next, though the climate is damp and relaxing, yet my physician doubted, and we also doubt, whether we could venture to face the severer cold of any more northern or eastern county.

"Plymouth, 21 Feb., 1850.

"Lord Hardinge having in a letter to us given me renewed encouragement to come and see him, I accepted the invitation of some kind friends of George Broadfoot, who reside in Regent's Park, and set out for a week's visit to London. Lord Hardinge received me very kindly the next day. He had just been visited by Sir William Gomm, whom he asked me to meet on the following Monday. The Viscount is looking stouter than when he was in India, though there he was not in bad case. I saw the proof prints of the picture of himself, sons, and nephew, on the field of Ferozeshuhur, and had a good deal of chat about Indian affairs. He complained of Captain Cunningham's 'History of the Sikhs,' yet urged me to plunge into histories. I could only reply that I could not afford to part with my bread."

Havelock was presented at the levée in March, by the Duke of Wellington. He was also elected a member of the Senior United Service Club, and invited to meet Lord Gough at a public dinner. He was also present at the banquet given to him by the Court of Directors at the London Tavern. The following letter describes his feelings on these occasions :—

Presented at
the levée by
the Duke of
Wellington.

"Plymouth, 4th April, 1850.

"I have made two very interesting visits to London, the exciting cause in chief being my desire to do something for my son Joshua. The late reductions have so clogged the wheels of appointment and promotion at the Horse Guards, that I resolved to besiege the India House. I have personally asked the aid of eighteen of the

directors. This is a pretty extensive canvass, and though I have got little but civil speeches, without the slightest promise of an appointment, I am resolved, by God's blessing, to persevere. I was elected unexpectedly a member of the Senior United Service Club, and invited to meet Lord Gough, by whose side I had ridden in four general actions, at the banquet given him by the Court of Directors. I cannot describe to you my feelings at finding myself among so many old acquaintances, many of whom I had not seen for nearly thirty years, at the levée and at these two great dinners. There was also interest of another kind. In looking at the Duke of Wellington, and listening to his speech, nearly all that we have read of the ruined powers of Marlborough, after his first paralytic seizure, seemed His remarks on the public men of the day. to be realized. I never witnessed so affecting a spectacle of mouldering greatness. He is so deaf, that he seemed to me to utter prolonged inarticulate sounds without being aware of it. He begins, but rarely concludes a sentence, and where he breaks off in a period, the spectator doubts from his manner whether he will commence another, or fall down apoplectic in the next effort to begin one. The Marquis of Anglesea spoke clearly and with a fine aristocratic intonation and emphasis. Lord Hardinge's voice was sonorous as a bell, and his few short sentences put you in full possession of all that he meant to say. At the London Tavern, Lord John Russell delivered himself in brief, slow, and measured periods, taking time to think as he spoke; it was a pleasure to listen to him. But when Sir Robert Peel arose, and began to wind forth his classical and persuasive words, easily, fluently, rhetorically, and energetically, you saw before you at once the man fitted to govern this great country, ever ready for every emergency, with a large and strong grasp of mind, and inward sense of superiority, calculated to subdue everything but the prejudices of the pocket. You could hardly be restrained from exclaiming aloud, Why is not that man perpetual Prime Minister of England?

“England appears to me to be more intensely aristocratic than ever. The great changes are, the rapidity of communication by locomotives, the extraordinary increase of the power of the press, the improved morality and decency of habits of the middle and lowest classes, and the accumulation of unions for the promotion of industry, comfort, and decidedly of religion. Into the midst of this, a conqueror, old or young, a Lord Gough, or a Major Edwardes, dropt suddenly, becomes, as formerly, a nine days'

wonder, but the mercurial surface of society will not long retain the impression. The wealthy and the great, under any pretext, are entirely wrapt up in themselves and their own interests. Avarice is the great idol, greater even than fame just now."

"Plymouth, 6 June, 1850.

"You will be sorry to hear that I have not since March been favourably advancing towards recovery. There seem to be paradoxes in the frame as well as the mind of man. Winter was pointed out to me by the faculty as my great enemy. But I faced the cold weather manfully and improved every day. Spring has brought back my Bombay enemies, a disordered liver and shivering ague fits. I am now better, however, and have on the whole gained strength, so will not despair of being once more fit for service in India, though I must not be sanguine."

A few months after his arrival in England, he received the following letter from his old schoolfellow at the Charter House, Sir William Norris, who had retired from public life, after having filled in succession the offices of Chief Justice of Ceylon, and Recorder of Penang :—

Renewal of
his inter-
course with
Sir William
Norris and
Archdeacon
Hare.

"Barrow Green House,
22nd May, 1850.

"My dear Havelock,—After a separation of nearly forty years, about half of which I have passed in the far East,—and you I dare say a larger portion, I address you with the familiarity of an old friend and schoolfellow, of whose existence you may be ignorant, and whose name may perhaps have faded from your memory. And yet why should I suppose you have forgotten me, since you, as I left you at the Charter House in 1810, are to this moment as fresh in my mind's eye as if I had seen you but yesterday? Nor were your own gallant exploits, or those of your brother, 'poor Billy,' at all necessary to keep you alive in my recollection. If then you feel disposed for a brief renewal of our ancient fellowship, I trust you will contrive to pay me a visit here, there being no probability of my wandering to your distant locality, while business or pleasure must, I suppose, be occasionally calling you to London.

"I opened a communication some time ago with our old friend and schoolfellow Hare, now Archdeacon of Lewes, and Rector of Hurstmonceaux, from whom I was grieved to learn that our poor dear Sam Hinds (whose cousin and namesake is the lately pro-

moted Bishop of Norwich) departed this life little more than two years ago. Hare gave me an interesting little history of some of our old schoolfellows,—Thirlwall, Grote, Waddington, and others,—and spoke in his letters with great interest of you, whom, until he heard the contrary from me, he had supposed to be no longer in the land of the living.”

“Plymouth, 25 May, 1850.

“My dear Norris,—Since my return to my native land in November last, after an absence of only two months short of 27 years, I have met with no more refreshing incident Letter to Sir W. Norris, May 25th, 1850. than the receipt of your friendly letter of the 22nd instant. It assured me that the lapse of forty years had not sufficed to efface from your remembrance the traces of our early amity, and at the same time touched to strong vibration a chord which the damps and heats of India have not deprived of sensation, by the mention of so many names sacred to recollection, as associated with the trials and enjoyments of the period between the cradle and twenty, which many maintain to be the most arduous period of existence. I can truly say that I have not forgotten any of the Carthusian demigods of my early veneration; and you, Sir Recorder, as little as any of them. Our friends are in fact to us ever the valued epitome of our kind. The rest may, and ought to be, the objects of our Christian benevolence, but it is only in the society of a chosen few that we ever feel quite at home, and I have often therefore ventured to repine that in the lands in which my lot has been cast, I have never been permitted to meet a single associate of my youth.* So be assured I do not exaggerate the estimate of my privilege in at last hearing from you. Of you I had heard before, for Marshman, whom I hastily visited on my way to Bombay, narrated to me the circumstance of meeting with you in Calcutta, and I then rejoiced to hear that you had not forgotten me. As he gave you the outline of my struggles in India, this will obviate the necessity of any egotistic detail. I will only say, that I wish I had in my heart a hundredth part of the thankfulness to Almighty God which is due to Him who shielded my head in twenty-two Indian fights, among them four of Gough's smashing combats, and has brought me back alive to this island, after enduring for more than a quarter of a century the fervours of an Indian sun. If I continue to mend, I hope to be in London in June, and then I will say, with the same frankness with which you have invited us, that nothing can give Mrs Havelock and my-

* He appears to have inadvertently forgotten Sir William Macnaghten.

self greater pleasure than to come down on a visit to Lady Norris and yourself to Barrow Green.

“I am most curious to hear all that you have learnt of those who, boys in our boyhood, have since become distinguished men. Thirlwall, Grote, and Waddington, as historians, have taken a high rank. You would hear how far Sir William Macnaghten had reached in his line when he was cut off. I think often of the quintet who used to read a sermon by stealth in the dormitories. Pindar, the only one of them to whom I have not already referred, is, I hear, or was lately, residing at Bath; and all, even poor Hinds, have been spared to complete half a century.

The following letter was addressed to him by his old schoolfellow, Archdeacon Hare:—

“Athenæum, Waterloo Place,
June 3rd, 1850.

“My dear Phlos,—What a joy it is to know that you are in England, and that I may really hope to see you again, after a separation of nearly thirty-eight years, for so long is it since we parted at the Charter House; and though I did see you for a few moments at dear Sam’s lodgings five or six years after, that brief meeting has never counted as a reality in my memory. I have continually longed to know what had become of you, to know what fruit the bright and noble promise of your boyhood had borne. But I could learn nothing, except that you were in the army and had gone to India, which has been the grave of so many of our noblest English youth, as well as the field in which so many have unfolded the great qualities of their character; and as I did not hear of you among the latter, I concluded you must have been among the former. Once, indeed, your name reached my ears from thence. In Lushington’s admirable book on the Affghan wars (as I thought it), he spoke of a work by a *Lieutenant Havelock*, if I remember rightly, but I felt sure your rank would have been higher; and though he spoke highly of the ability of the book, what he said of the manner in which the writer regarded the natives, pained me so that I made up my mind that the book could not be yours, and therefore never read it. Many a time have I read over the three letters I had from you in former years, in 1812 and 1813, but I became fully persuaded at length that they were the only traces I should ever find of you, till last Christmas brought me a letter from our dear

Letter from
Archdeacon
Hare.

excellent friend Daphne Norris, whom I had also long numbered among the departed, but who I found had been rising to the highest eminence in the Indian law, and whose letter showed that he had retained all the beautiful simplicity and modesty of his boyhood. From him I heard that you were living, that you were a Lieutenant-Colonel, and had had much to do in these grand Indian wars; that you had married the daughter of that excellent man, Marshman; and that you were coming to England before long. I have just heard from him, that you are living at Plymouth, having been in England since last November. It is a great shame that you should have been at home six months without letting me know of your return; you ought to have known that, even after a separation of thirty-eight years, it would be an exceeding delight to me to see again the dearest of all my old school friends. How soon will that be? Are you to be in London before we leave it? At all events you must bring your wife and children to Hurstmonceaux, and pay us a long visit in proportion to your absence. I long to see what you look like after so many years, and fancy you something like Lord Hardinge, whom I saw the other day at the grand dinner given to your noble old hero, Lord Gough, at the Mansion House. It was a magnificent sight, and many of your comrades were there. For myself, my life has been greatly blest in many ways. I have, of course, had my share in the sorrows of this life. You know that I went to Cambridge in 1812. There I continued with an interval of two years, partly as student, and partly as tutor, till 1832. Then I became Rector of our old family living, Hurstmonceaux, the place where I had spent my childhood; and there hope, God willing, to continue till I exchange the pulpit in the church for a bed in the church-yard. Meanwhile, I have been bearing my part in adding to the number of books under the weight of which men are acquiring a universal intellectual dyspepsia, and some of these I will send you when I know more of your whereabouts, that you may know, after so many years, under what constellation of thought you may expect to find me.

“God bless you. Tell me how your health has borne the Indian climate. Give my love to your wife and children, and believe me,

“My dear Col. Phlos,

“Ever your affectionate friend,

“J. C. HARE.”

In July Havelock paid a visit to his friends, Sir William Norris and the Archdeacon, and Sir William commemorated, with poetic elegance, "the meeting of the three friends." In this tasteful effusion he brought up in review the names and the bright career of the most eminent Carthusians of his day.

Havelock thus describes his feelings on meeting with his old friends :—

" Barrow Green House, 17th July, 1850.

" Here Hannah and I have been sojourning with my excellent friend Sir William Norris, Archdeacon Hare and his lady being also inmates of this delightful old country residence. This meeting with the kind and valued associates of my youth, who have lived on into advanced years, useful in their generation, honoured and worthy of more honour, has been to me and mine a source of much pure delight. My friend Hare resides in the rectory of Hurstmonceaux, which is very prettily situated, and has been decorated by his fine taste with works of art, not ordinarily seen in the abode of a country clergyman. He has a library of about 12,000 volumes. Norris resides in an old manor house, the property of a family of the name of Masters. It is situated in the most beautiful part of Surrey. Both have been kind beyond description to us all."

" 12 August, 1850.

" My dear Norris,—As regards autobiography, or a few memorials of my somewhat chequered life, it has been my oft-times deferred and renewed purpose to do something of the kind in a didactic way ; for though I am nobody, it has pleased God to make me the partaker of the fortunes, at various periods and in various climes, of men who have established their claim to be reckoned, each in his way, somebody. A little sketch for you I will at all events set about at once."

Havelock resided for some weeks at 16, Albert Terrace, Bayswater, and was then ordered by his medical adviser to repair to Schwalbach, situated between Ems and Wiesbaden, the last new favourite of the German springs for the restoration of debilitated constitutions. He started for the continent in the middle of August, and his first letter was from the—

Havelock goes to Germany.

“Field of Waterloo, August 17, 1850.

“I have lived, after twenty-two fights, to write to you from this spot, where a battle was fought which was, perhaps, worth them all. We have given a day to the field. There we found Hougoumont looking nearly as it must have looked the day before the great conflict, excepting that the low forest has been cleared away, from which Prince Jerome's troops issued against it. La Haye-Sainte, Braine-la-Leud, La Belle-Alliance, and Fischermont, do not in reality destroy a single vision of the reader of the bulletins, the despatches, Siborne, and Alison; but the gasconading Belgians have perpetrated an awful atrocity against one of the fairest monuments of history. They have cut down and scooped out the earth of the position between the points of Hougoumont and La Haye-Sainte, for the purpose of building it up into a vast pyramidal mound, which they have surmounted with their national lion.”

“Ems, 27 August, 1850.

“My dear Norris,—As soon as we had reached this place of our temporary sojourn, I set apart a few hours to give you, according to your desire, a short sketch—a sketch or map—of my rather busy life. I have dotted things down most hastily, without the least pretension to lucid arrangement or attention to style, jumping as you see from the first to the third person, and back again,—‘wild without rule or art.’ Very much indeed is left to the imagination, but if this sketch were filled up with details, even in the hasty manner of my short memoirs of my late brother, it might make a volume, perhaps not wholly without interest.”

“Ems, 14 Sept., 1850.

“I was in such haste to get to the waters, that I passed by Bonn without stopping an hour, though Hare had given me an introduction to Chevalier Bunsen, whom I should have found there or at Cologne, holiday-keeping. All our party were as much delighted with the banks of the Rhine as Childe Harold had prepared us to be. I have placed myself under the medical charge of Dr Soëst, whose praises were sung to me by Sir Willoughby Cotton, in the Deccan, when I proposed to come home early in 1848. I found him at Ehrenbreitstein, and he visits this place daily. I have gone, and am going, through a course of Homburg saline and Ems alterative waters, and take the mineral baths. Soëst fixed Saturday week for the termination of this act of the training, and then dictates a fortnight's residence at the new place of resort,

Langen-Schwalbach ; which is now pronounced to possess in the fountain of the Stahl-brun the finest tonic in Europe. The last stage of cure is to devour all the grapes of all the vineyards between Frankfort and Baden-Baden ; but as I must return to England to look after my son Joshua's interests with the Court of Directors, I shall not perhaps be able to perpetrate this last finishing enormity of fashionable empiricism."

" Bloomsbury Street, Bedford Square,
5th Nov., 1850.

" You will perceive that we have changed our residence, which is soon explained. This is the time for the distribution of the patronage of the East India Company. So, after drinking the waters of Ems and Schwalbach, and taking baths at Schlangenbad with much advantage, and visiting Frankfort, Mayence, and Wiesbaden, we descended the Rhine to Bonn, where we found the opportunity of leaving our three younger children under the kind charge of Mrs Brooks, the widow of an officer of the Bombay army. We are not without hope of obtaining a cadetship for my second son, and I expect to get audience of the chairman, Mr Shepherd, the day after to-morrow. You shall hear the result. . . . I have said that I have profited much in point of health by the waters and baths of Nassau. Yesterday I saw Martin, who approved of all Soëst's treatment, and thought me much, indeed wonderfully, better, but he and the German sage both agree that another year's drinking and bathing is indispensable to my complete restoration. We are close to Bloomsbury chapel, and not very far from the India House, and when I am in aristocratic mood, I can migrate occasionally to the Senior United."

" Bloomsbury Street, 12th Nov., 1850.

" My dear Norris,—I was present last evening at the very interesting ceremony of commencing the building of a new chapel of our denomination, at Hammersmith. I have had few opportunities of witnessing such things since I came to England, and was pleased with the earnestness of all in the great cause of vital religion. My impression was, that while such a spirit pervades even a portion of the people, the Pope has not a chance, and that we do not need the patronage of Her Majesty's ministers and of acts of parliament, coadjutors whom I ever regard with suspicion."

Letter to Sir
W. Norris,
Nov. 12, 1850.

“ Bloomsbury Street, 12th Nov., 1850.

“ My dear Norris,—Your kind letter of the 9th duly reached me, and Mrs Voigt soon after brought me up your thoughts in blank verse. They are very modest thoughts of your-
 self, thoughts certainly not beyond the deservings of our Letter to Sir
W. Norris,
Nov. 12, 1850.
 valued friend the Archdeacon, and very flattering and even exalting thoughts of the old Major of Foot. It is in great truth a solid encouragement to any man to find himself thus remembered and scanned through the softening and improving medium of an enduring friendship, after a separation which it almost makes one giddy to think had stretched out through forty years well told. Well nigh forgotten by the Government which I have served thirty-four years, and requited by the ill-will of some of the ‘geese whom I have helped to make half eagles,’ it is consolatory to me to receive the cordial hero worship of the muse of Barrow Green.”

“ 13th November, 1850.

“ My dear Norris,—I have let my unfinished letter run into another day, whilst I was wooing the Directors, I fear, without prospering in my suit. . . . The honest and reasonable portion of the indignation excited at the present moment against the interference of the Pope, is, as it appears to me, national and not religious. Our sturdy middle and lower classes, in particular, deprecate in high strains the exercise of any power emanating from an Italian prince in these realms. But as regards religion, there is no fair ground for interposition. . . . As there hath been long, is now, and probably will be for much time to come a Pope, I see not, if he be a conscientious Pope, how he could neglect the duty of interference with his numerous and increasing family of Papists in England. He does not appear to have presently meddled with any one else but those who call him their spiritual father. As for the matter of future conversion, he is perpetually bound to attempt it. I do not see that he has done anything against the Queen’s supremacy. She is supreme in religion only over the members of the Established Church, not the Papists. But when Parliament meets, I hope the bench of bishops may be invited to lay their hands on their hearts, and say whether they verily believe that the forward movement on the part of Rome has, or has not, been brought about by acts of some of their own body, or of some of their own clergy, with their connivance, or in consequence of their supineness; whether the movement is not to be accounted for in a very different way from that of the false prophet to the mountain,

and whether it is not precisely because they would go to Rome that Rome has come to them.

“Badly have I repaid your soft verse with my crabbed prose; yet believe me, ever your faithful friend,

“H. H.”

* “Bonn, Prussia, 16th January, 1851.

“Your letter of the 20th November has found me once more established on the margin of the truly noble Rhine. I was gratified to find from it how pleasant and interesting your visit to Ceylon had been. The hearts of all well-wishers to India are with you when it is announced that you have at last commenced your railway, and that there will soon be a station within three quarters of mile of the old house at Serampore. The advantages of an electric telegraph in keeping the affairs of your vast Indian empire in hand, may be appreciated by comparison, when I advert to the fact of our having yesterday, the 15th of January, got by such means, viâ Trieste to London, and thence to us by rail, a *precis* of intelligence from Bombay of the 17th December.

“I told you in my last letter, how well the chairman of the court, Mr Shepherd, had behaved to me in nominating my son Joshua a Bengal cadet. But no sooner had I received this boon, than farther reflection convinced me that, under the present circumstances, chiefly with reference to my expected return to India, I ought to have sent the boy to Bombay. So I determined not to permit the dread of being accused of vacillation to prevail over my conviction, and went down to Shepherd again. He was closeted with Lord Hardinge, as it happened, and when his Lordship came out, he congratulated me on my good fortune in having got a Bengal cadetship, and when I told him my change of purpose, fought the battle of the Supreme Présidency manfully. But I would not give in. An exchange was effected, and on the 20th Joshua took his departure for Bombay.

“I have had very serious thoughts of retiring altogether. The sale of my majority would only give me £5000, and on the interest of this I could not live. But I might get from the regiment about £2000, to retire on full pay for life, to which privilege a limited number of old officers are admitted. I could just exist on it, shut out, of course, from all further hope of promotion or

* It may be necessary to remind the reader, that all Havelock's letters which are given without any distinct address, were addressed to the writer of this Memoir.

or professional exertion ; and in case of my death, my family would still be entitled to the same scale of pension, viz. £70 per annum for Hannah, and £20 to each of the three young children till they reached the age of fourteen. To adopt this course may appear to be prematurely throwing up the game, but it is to be considered on the other side that the expense of my return to India will be considerable, and that the result might be, I will not say, death in harness in a few months, but the even more appalling alternative, as far as the interests of my family are concerned, of being compelled to return once more to England by absolute inability to work. I have no active disease of any kind, and eat, drink, sleep, and walk like a man of forty ; but I have too good ground for fearing that the sun of India would at once bring back my nervous affections, which have been coaxed away by a change of climate, but not subdued. I trust I shall be guided to act aright.

“My frequent visits to the India House during the last year have made me pretty well acquainted with the leading men and the constitution of the Government. Shepherd, though only a ship-captain of yore, brought forward by Sir Charles Forbes, is decidedly one of the best men of business among them, perhaps the best. The intervention of the Court, as a body, between the Ministers and India, is advantageous to the country as preventing party influences reaching it, saving the patronage from being entirely jobbed away for votes in parliament, and affording a chance of some knowledge of India being brought to the task of governing it. But the privileges of the proprietors of stock are a pure and unmixed mischief. As a Court their proceedings are, and ever have been, absolutely ludicrous ; as a constituency, they are disposed rather to elect jobbers than the many great and good men who have subserved the interests of their country in India, and would display the most useful talent in managing its affairs if they belonged to its home government. The Company has long since ceased to trade, yet city interest continues to return merchants, bankers, shipowners, and captains, with now and then a petulant old soldier, who never commanded in any battle in India, but is connected with the proprietorial families.”

“Bonn, 4th February, 1851.

“Personally I have much reason to be grateful for the usage I met with at the India House. Though a Queen’s officer, my claim on the score of services was everywhere listened to with attention, and my name and career seemed to be more familiar to

the bankers, merchants, civilians, and ship-captains of Leadenhall-street, than to the martinets and aristocratic soldiers of the Horse Guards, whose more immediate concern they were. Shepherd, to whom I was personally unknown, I must ever praise, for the handsome, disinterested way in which he took my case in hand. My success was after all a 'near thing.' The chairman had promised his last disposable cadetship to Coutts Majoribanks, of the great banking shop in the Strand, and it was only through that gentleman's accepting for the youth he patronized an Indian navy appointment, that Shepherd could at last serve me. I shall ever look back on the period of my solicitation among the circular cells of the twenty-four with sentiments of gratitude for their consideration, and patient attention to my claims, even when they were unable to do anything to meet my wishes. The chairman was particularly kind. He not only took much trouble to hunt up an appointment for me, but bore my change of mind with exemplary patience. He invited me down to the Addiscombe examinations, which interested me much, and where I met Frederick Abbott, Herbert Edwardes, and many other old acquaintances. . . . All this notwithstanding, and though Alison has praised the constitution of the Court of Directors as the best form of government that human ingenuity could devise for the supervision of a distant, extensive, and growing empire, it does appear to me that these rulers ought to be elected by a larger and more independent body of electors. At present, a considerable number of the votes is, under the name of the 'house interest,' in the hands of the body already elected. Each director, too, comes into office laden with promises and engagements, and a class of persons is elected who may be characterized as honest, painstaking, right-minded, and even able men, but in many cases devoid of that local information so needful for the discharge of their duties. We have lately been given to understand that the Board of Control undertakes to do the peace and war business, but this only increases the necessity for having men in the Court who might have minds large enough to form their own opinions on great political questions. But no one can feel more deeply than myself how valuable the body is, as interposing between the utter misgovernment of a Secretary of State's office, and preventing the patronage from being wholly bartered for party interests. I would desire only to see the composition of the Court improved, which I think can only be effected by a change in the elective constituency. As to the qualifications of the elected, it might also include the

lawyers and merchants of the Presidencies, as well as the servants, civil, military, and naval, covenanted and uncovenanted, of the Company, but a specific residence in India should be held indispensable. Perhaps election for life would after all be preferable, and the evil of superannuation be more tolerable than that of continual change."

" Bonn, 19th April, 1851.

"I mentioned in one of my letters that I had escaped the horrors of being once more purchased over in my old age, by the kindness of Norris, who had lodged the money for my lieutenant-colonelcy. We were too late however. Byrne had already come under an engagement to retire, and Major Mansfield had, as I am informed, unconditionally paid him all the money over and above the regulated price. When I became aware of this, I was of course in a dilemma. It would have been hard upon old Byrne, who is about half a degree more broken than myself, to stop the purchase in this stage, and if I had taken the lieutenant-colonelcy, it must have been at the expense of Major Mansfield, who had without reservation paid heavily for it in hard cash, and would not have got it after all. Fortunately there was time to withdraw my name once more from the purchase list. I suppose Byrne's resignation will arrive viâ Southampton, and that on the Friday thereafter I shall see a youth of some sixteen years standing in the army, gazetted over my head as lieutenant-colonel. Major Mansfield is, as I am told, for I never made his acquaintance, a clever man and a good officer. I was purchased over, as I used to say, by three sots and two fools, so that I presume I must persuade myself that it is a pleasant variety to be superseded by a man of sense and gentlemanly habits. Be this as it may, the horror of an old soldier on the point of having his juniors put over him is so sensitive, that if I had no family to support, and the right of choice in my own hands, I would not serve one hour longer. As the case stands, I have only to reconcile myself as speedily as possible to the dispensation. The thing is of the Lord. My health, God be praised, is considered to be firmer ; I myself almost hope it is so. But a week's Indian sun may tip me over again. However, it seems to be my duty, if I can find the means, once more to renew the struggle at Bombay. As soon as I succeed in paying off every claim, and accumulating a small sum over and above my full pay, or the price of my commission, I shall consider I have laboured enough, and have a right to get into some little nook

like this which we now inhabit, to wear away my remaining days in peace, and in hopes of a better kingdom.”

“Kissengen, 19th July, 1851.”

“Here I and mine are in a new locality. Up to the beginning of this month, or thereabouts, I had made such advances in health, that every one around me was remarking how stout, young, and hale I was looking. But it was soon observed that I was getting too stout, and I began to suspect myself that there was disorder lurking under the rapid increase of *embonpoint*. At last, after a short excursion up the Rhine, and walking with great delight up to the top of Drachenfels and back, inflammation made its appearance in one of my feet, and the German leech whom I consulted, considered it to be a critical demonstration of something wrong in the constitution, and he was of opinion that the waters of this place were the only sovereign remedy in this case. I have now been drinking the waters and taking baths at intervals for a week, but these processes and the strict regimen on which I am kept, have lanked my cheeks again effectually, and I am looking once more the image of Bombay in the month of May. But I trust I have made some advances towards cure, though I cannot hope for any permanent result under a month. It was so utterly inexpedient that I should return to India in the first week of October, the very worst month of the year at Bombay, that I wrote to the Adjutant-General to extend my leave to the end of 1851, proposing to leave England on the 20th November. To this the great iron Field Marshal at once assented,—‘with the understanding that he embarks in the November steamer,’ being however appended as a ‘but’ subjunctive.”

“Nuremberg, 16th August, 1851.

“We came from Kissengen in alternate sunshine and storm up the valley of the Main and Reignitz to Bamberg, from one of the towers of which poor Berthier, ‘the goose converted into half an eagle’ by Napoleon, broke his neck, and passed on at once by rail to this far more illustrious Jellalabad of Gustavus. It has recovered the horrors of the thirty years’ war, and is now flourishing. I have seen Wallenstein’s position at Zindorf. The efforts made for the defence of the city are truly astonishing. The Imperialist and the Swede, the latter much the greatest man, were both, I suspect, rather resolute and enterprising warriors than grand masters of their art. But Gustavus’s upholding the Pro-

testant faith by his determined hold on this place as a centre of operation, ranks full as high as an achievement, as either the fights of Leipsic or Lutzen, which were simply parallel assaults in line ; or the passage of the Lech, which indicated successful daring rather than skill."

"Bonn, August 17th, 1851.

"My dear Norris,—The secret of the intended brevet of the 9th November has already so far transpired, as to justify its being accepted as truth, that it will be large, and lead to the vacating of a great many good situations, and create much regimental promotion. Four or five Queen's A. D. C. will almost without doubt reach the rank of Major-General, and therefore vacate their posts in the suite of Her Majesty. I really am not ambitious enough to desire such an eminence, if there were any other road by which I could attain the rank of Colonel before extreme old age, or even hope to enjoy the competence of a Major-General. But there is none. My obtaining this step by special brevet would leave me just where I am as to staff employ, and I should be no worse off as to regimental promotion. While on foreign service in India, the ceremony even of attending at court is dispensed with ; so the thing resolves itself into the honour and the rank of Colonel. I hope I am not disloyal when I attach the higher value to the latter ; for whatever my rank, I am Her Majesty's servant, which I ought to consider honour enough ; but the rank of Colonel improves the hope of ultimate promotion and command in India. I believe if votes were collected from among those with whom I have served in India, the majority would decree that my services entitle me to ask for the step—I almost think the opinion would be unanimous. But this will little avail without some powerful intercession. Will you venture on trying what can be done through the Chancellor ? He must have had many a more hopeless *case* in hand during his experience. His personal influence with the Queen is good, owing to his connection with the late Duke of Sussex, and this is a species of interest to which the Horse Guards cannot turn a deaf ear, though to claims of service they often, alas, do ! Hart's Army List tells better than I can tell, where I have been, and what done and won. So I can only say, I leave my case in your hands, if you think you can do anything in it."

"Bonn, September 2nd, 1851.

"I must not attempt to form a judgment of what the deluge

of saline water which I swallowed at Kissengen has done for me, as I am told the effects are not to be appreciated until a full month has elapsed from the period of being steeped in diurnal brine, and pouring muriate of soda fresh from the bowels of the earth down the human throat. But I have to be thankful to Almighty God for feeling at the time present as well as an old Indian and not very youthful person can hope to feel at his years, and under his circumstances. If it be the will of Providence, I shall embark at Trieste on the 27th November, and hope to land at the Apollo Bunder ('erit mihi magnus Apollo') on or about the 26th December. 'Let not him who putteth on his armour boast like him who putteth it off.' But we will see what can be done to work our way to freedom from liabilities, and the prospect of repose in a Swiss or Tyrolese cottage thereafter. Of England I must never venture to think.

Havelock did not, however, obtain the rank of Colonel on this occasion. If it had been bestowed upon him, he would have been placed in a position in the army to entitle him, six years after, in the height of the India mutiny, to a higher command than that of Brigadier-General. He paid a parting visit to England, took leave of Lord Hardinge, Sir W. Norris, and other friends, and returned to Bonn to prepare for his voyage to India. He felt that it would be imprudent for him to take out his family, consisting of two daughters, whose education was not finished, and his youngest son, under five years of age, whose education had not begun. It was, therefore, determined that Mrs Havelock should remain for some time in Europe. To a man of Havelock's warm domestic sympathies, this separation was a source of the most poignant regret; but he submitted to it with resignation, as a matter of Christian duty. With a heavy heart he quitted Bonn on his way to Trieste, and travelled leisurely through Germany, visiting the battle-field of Leipsic, the gallery at Dresden, the monuments at Prague, and the objects of interest at Vienna. He wrote daily to his wife during the journey, and in his letter from Frankfort, said:—

“ I arrived here this evening, and hope to get on to Leipsic tomorrow; but have really lost all desire to see anything, or inquire

about anything, for I have no one to whom I can communicate my feelings of pleasure or pain. I ought not to write thus, however, because it will grieve you. I have commenced this journey under God's guidance, and not an effort on my part shall be spared to do something for you and my little ones. If you knew what I have endured since I parted with you, I fear it would give you pain, but my God will support me. Remember, I am not the only one who sinks thus when separated from those dearest to him. Read the account of the great Marlborough under such circumstances. But I have Jesus Christ to trust to, and His presence to comfort me; yet in this mortal state we do feel keenly. Pray for me."

He wrote to Mrs Havelock in the same strain from Leipsic on the 30th October:—

"The bitterness of parting, my position after so many years, which renders it unavoidable, and, I fear, not a few doubts about the worldly future, passed in rapid succession through my brain, which, without being in the least fevered, was so wrought upon that I never slept a single second. But I did indeed find sweet relief in the thought of meeting you in that better kingdom, for all earthly meetings are uncertain, and only terminate in longer or shorter separations. . . . I know not what lies before me, but I *do* feel that we are both in the path of sacred duty."

On reaching Vienna he wrote to her again:—

"Vienna is a very splendid capital in population and extent—the streets well-built and clean; the public buildings stately, though generally without architectural beauty; and the environs highly picturesque. The churches are many of them magnificent; and the cathedral of St Stephen's, the spire of which I ascended this morning, is far finer than Cologne or Ulm. The presence of the mighty Danube gives the city a noble air. The Belvedere palace and its gardens are grand, though not highly tasteful. The gallery in it is filled with a very numerous collection, in strikingly good preservation, rich in two splendid Raphaels, two excellent Correggios, a masterpiece of Titian, and a perfect galaxy from the studios of Rubens, Vandyke, and the great Venetians; one very fine Murillo; and numerous pictures of Jordaens, and the Bolognese and Flemish schools. There is likewise a charming Pietro Perugino, and a good Francia. But the collection is too

numerous, that is, it has too many second and third-rate pictures in it. But tell my girls I have now done with pictures, and begin to wish that I had left Europe without seeing any, for I fear such sights may unfit me for the stern duties which lie before me. Let them turn their hearts and minds to the great business of salvation, and learn to be practical persons, building their hopes of earthly satisfaction only on a sense of duty faithfully discharged, and their expectations of eternal blessedness on the merits of the Saviour.

“Now—though the word tears my heart-strings—adieu! May God grant us a happy meeting sooner than we expect! but if never on earth, in the presence of Jesus I trust we shall meet.”

Havelock reached Bombay in December, 1851. The voyage had improved his health, and he resumed his duties in high spirits.

“I am thankful to say,” he writes on the 6th of January, “that my general health has been good since I reached India. My work, too, has been light, indeed the mere pretext for work; but I suppose hard work and harass will come in due time, whilst my nervous distemperature can end anywhere, but especially in a tropical climate, only in sudden death, or the loss of faculties and all bodily activity. Presently, however, I am well, and ought for this to be abundantly thankful, leaving future evils to the ordering of our great task-master. I allude to them only because it is my old soldier’s habit never to suffer myself or friends to be taken by surprise. The Commander-in-Chief came down from Muhabuleshur a few days after I landed. He is certainly not so fresh and active as when, a major at the head of a battalion of the 5th, he repulsed the French cavalry at Elboden (see Napier); but *this* I am the less careful to remark, as all my sensations assure me that I am not quite the same man who, on the 7th April, 1842, with a handful of troops, held in check the flower of the Affghan horse. I can hardly guess how I should feel now with my back to the Urbab’s fort, where Dennie fell.”

The allusion here made is to the battle of Jellalabad on the 7th of April, 1842, and it shows how keenly Havelock appreciated, after ten years, the hazardous position in which he was placed on that day when Sir Robert Sale

diverted the troops to the attack of the fort, and left him with only a single company of Europeans to face Akbar Khan's force, and to sustain the charge of his Affghan cavalry.

Havelock had not been more than a month at Bombay before all his military ardour was revived by the reports which came from Calcutta, of misunderstandings with the Burmese, and the prospect of immediate hostilities. It was on the plains of Burmah that he had earned his spurs, and his bosom swelled with the hope of being again employed on active service in that country. On hearing that an expedition was inevitable, he drew up a plan of the campaign, as he would have arranged it, and sent it to Serampore. It combined a thorough knowledge of the country and of the enemy, with that larger military experience which he had more recently acquired on so many fields. He concluded by saying, "As regards my being employed, I can only say that, old as I am, I am quite ready, at the shortest notice, for an encounter with the new generation of Woongees, Muha Mengees, Muha Thilwas, Bundoolas, and Tharawaddys. But I suppose Government will employ the Queen's troops nearest at hand, that is, on or near the coast, and their brigadiers will, of course, be selected from those regiments. This is the invariable custom, from which I cannot expect that the consideration of my local experience or renown would induce Lord Dalhousie to deviate. I am, however, ready for anything." He considered it his duty to offer his services to Government, but with little chance of success. His application did not reach Lord Dalhousie—who was his own war minister throughout this brief campaign, and brought it to a successful issue in eight months, at a cost of less than a million—till after all the arrangements had been completed, and it consequently fell to the ground.

In April Havelock writes to Serampore: "Of the hospitality of the people of Bombay I have every reason to speak with gratitude since my return. I go quite as much into society as is good for me, and believe that I have benefited in health and spirits

He seeks employment in the expedition to Burmah.

Havelock's son appointed to the adjutancy of his corps.

from seeing something of the world once or twice a week around the festive board. Balls I wholly repudiate, and make up for my absence from Government-house on such occasions, by being very regular in attendance at receptions. By the 'Aukland' just in, came, God be praised, good news of all dear to you and dear to me at Bonn. By that vessel came also the Gazette, announcing my son Harry's nomination to the adjutancy of the 10th Foot. He may well be glad to get that before twenty-two, which I gladly accepted at forty. He leaves me for Kurachee, whence he will steam to Mooltan, and dawk to Lahore and Wuzeerabad on the Chenab, where Colonel Franks—a hero of Sobraon, Mooltan, and Goojerat, and who recommended Harry to Lord Fitzroy Somerset—and his band of heroes are to be found."

The affection which he bore to his children is vividly exhibited in the following letters to the "mighty" Georgy, as he was in the habit of calling his youngest boy :—

Havelock's
letter to his
boy Georgy.

"5th June, 1852.

"My dear George,—This is your birthday, and I sit here in sight of the house in which you were born, five years ago, to write you a letter. My office is gone to Poonah, and I have nothing to do but to think of you. But your brother Joshua is very busy in the next room, reading Mahratta with his pundit. However, he says that he too will scrawl a note for you as soon as his daily studies are over. I dare say Harry is remembering you too, but he, you know, is a long way off from us now, in the Punjab.

"Now, though a little boy, you ought to have wisdom enough, when you get these lines, to call to mind how very good God was to you on this day, in preserving the life of your dear mamma, who was so sick that no one thought she would recover. At that time, too, I was in very poor health, but am now so much better, by God's mercy, that I have not had any suffering to complain of since I returned to India, or indeed since I saw you last, when I got on board of my steamer at Bonn, to go up to Mainz, on my way to India. They tell me that now-a-days it is the fashion for little boys like you to do no work until they are seven years old. So if you are spared, you have two more years

of holiday; but then you must begin to labour in earnest, and I will tell you what you will have to learn: the first thing is to love God, and to understand his law, and obey it, and to believe in and love Jesus Christ, since he was sent into the world to do good to all people who will believe in Him. Then, as it is likely you will be brought up to be a soldier in India, you will have to be taught to ride well, and a little Latin, and a great deal of mathematics, which are not very easy; and arithmetic, and English history, and French and German, and Hindostanee, and drawing and fortification. Now, you will say, this is a great deal, quite a burden, and a cart-load of learning. But, if you are, from the very first, very industrious, and never let any day, but the sabbath, pass over without four hours' diligent study, at least, you will soon find that the mountain of learning before you is cut down into a very little hill indeed.

“5th June, 1856.

“Do you, my little George, though you should be the lowest man in India, in rank and worldly endowments, take care that you have Jesus for your friend, and He will exalt you to share His glory in His kingdom. I am gratified by all that your mamma tells me of your conduct and application to your studies. But remember that this is a *fast* age. Every one is going at a tremendous gallop, so you must not move slowly, if you would, like your brothers, become an officer, and be a credit to your *name* and country. . . I have just returned from the tomb of the great man after whom you are named—Major George Broadfoot. He is called in the inscription on it, from the pen of his friend Colin M'Kenzie, ‘the foremost man in India,’ and truly in intellect and resolution he was.

“Read all the accounts of the battles of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann, and if by God's blessing we meet again, I will explain them to you.”

Havelock was now placed under a new master. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Grey,—whom he describes as “the descendant of the Grey of Groby, who signed his name to the warrant for the execution of Charles the First, immediately under that of Cromwell,”—was obliged, by an apoplectic visitation, to return to England. He was succeeded by Lord Frederick Fitzclarence. “We are all pleased with our new chief,”

Lord Fred.
Fitzclarence
Commander-
in-Chief at
Bombay.

writes Havelock. "Like his uncle Frederick, who did not make much of his French and Dutch campaigns, but managed affairs well at the Horse Guards, he is exceedingly energetic and persevering. I like a man who begins by trying to establish a normal central school for a hundred soldiers' children at Poonah, and is going to see three stations, in a parenthesis, next week. He has the duties and the interior management of a regiment at his fingers' ends, and is at once most zealous and most gentlemanly in his department."

The writer of this Memoir having returned to England at the beginning of 1853, Havelock thus wrote to him on the 23rd of February :

"As I am resolved to keep up a regular correspondence with you during your *furlough*, as the Honourable the East India Company calls it, I will not risk failure by not beginning well. So without delay I reply to the first letter received from you since you left the shores of India. I most cordially sympathize in your delight at having got rid for a while of Indian labour, and seeing Egypt and England before you. Does it not look like a dream? To me it seemed like a most lovely vision, though I was ill, and my prospects in every way depressing. . . . I think you will find it pleasant and convenient to belong to the Oriental Club, or the Athenæum, if you can get into the latter in reasonable time. But you will judge for yourself. Remember only, I forewarn you, England is as comfubical as ever. Nobody knows anybody without an introduction ; and the first thing is the purse, the second the tailor, and the third the address on your card."

Three months after, the India bill having been mooted in Parliament, he writes again :—

"If I had £2000 a year, I would live as my wife and children are now living, in a fraction of a house in a town on the Continent. Wealth and luxury in England outstare and outvote every other qualification. It is a land for millionnaires only. All others lose caste the moment they touch its shores, as the chains of a slave are said to fall off by a similar contact. . . . As regards the future government of India, I confess my predilection

Havelock's
correspondence
with the
writer in
England.

in favour of some such plan as Lord Ellenborough proposed, getting rid of the double government, putting an English politician—if acquainted with India, so much the better—at the head (what a head Lord Dalhousie would make!), and giving him advisers selected by the Crown from the services for life, independent, and exercising the patronage. But I see clearly that we are to have no such thing; and we must therefore be thankful for having a third of the Directors men of experience, and appointed, that is, selected, not elected by that most despicable constituency, the proprietors, whose elections are the essence of ill-working jobbery, and the meetings in their Court a very ill-enacted farce. As for the Bill itself, there are good principles in it, but they are not carried far enough. The appointment of a proportion of old Indians in the Court is good. But the truth is, that the best measure would have been abolishing the Court of Proprietors and their powers, and constituting a council, nominated by the Crown, of men of experience, independent because possessing the patronage, and headed by a minister who could not have bullied them while their hands were so strong.”

Towards the close of the year, another brevet was talked of “so loudly, that it was difficult to disbelieve it,” though Havelock hardly credited it. “If,” he writes, “it went to the extent talked of, I should be Expected brevet of the 9th November. at once well up among the full colonels. It would also promote Mountain, and create a vacancy in the adjutant-generalship. This mail, therefore, carries a few straightforward lines from me to Lord Hardinge, asking, in such case, not to be forgotten.” There was, however, no brevet.

“Your interview,” he writes on this occasion, “with Lord Hardinge on my behalf demands my thanks; my mind is relieved by the results. If a *junior* officer had been made Adjutant-General for want of due representation of my claims, I think I should for half an hour have been very miserable. All now is as right as it can be, under the circumstances. If there had been a brevet, it might, and probably would, have lifted me to the rank of full Colonel, and perhaps have made me Adjutant-General. Three years hence, if I survive, I shall be sixty-two, so that I could not hope to be Major-General before seventy-one, an age I have no right to look to reach; for though I find sharp riding at

our recent Chobham agreed with me as well as in 1846, yet I do not think so well of my physical constitution. . . . I am glad you like Bonn, a place which, like its sister city of Cologne, is susceptible of improvement by a diligent system of conservancy, as we call it in India ; but which, nevertheless, I am happy to find you agree with me in liking, on the score of the beauty of its vicinity, and you might have added, the salubrity of its atmosphere, and having within its walls some estimable people. It must have been a great happiness to Hannah to have had you and your wife, even for so short a period, in the scene of our many tranquil days. She will have told you how like an accident it was that we ever came to reside there. But now you will have returned to London, or its 'say-bathing' suburb Brighton ; how different now from

' Brighton, resource of the town-jaded lass,
With waters as clear and pellucid as glass,
But not quite so fit for reflection,'

as Horace Smith sung in 1812."

Within six weeks of the date of this letter Colonel Mountain was no more. A nobler or more accomplished soldier, and a more amiable and estimable man, has seldom adorned the ranks of the British army. He died, as Oglander of the same corps, the Cameronians, had died some years before, amidst the regrets of all who had enjoyed opportunities of appreciating his singular worth. Havelock looked forward, not without some hope, to the succession. Lord Frederick Fitzclarence generously offered to back his application at Court, if, as he said, Havelock "really thought his words could prevail beyond his own deeds." He had already, he said, when the question of the brevet was under consideration, taken the liberty of telling Lord Hill, that though he should much regret to lose him, he hoped that consideration would not prevent his lordship's giving him higher place. "I hope," writes Havelock to the compiler of this Memoir, "that you will see Lord Hardinge. A very few words are sufficient. 'Mountain is no more ; there is the vacancy ; you know Havelock's services, now is the time to promote him.' Alas ! Lady Lawrence died

Havelock
seeks appointment
of Adjutant-General
of Queen's
troops.

at Mount Aboo on the 14th of January. What words to write!"

At the interview which Havelock had urged in this letter, and which would have been solicited and granted even if he had not suggested it, Lord Hardinge, with a generous cordiality, admitted the claim of Havelock, from his long services and his military abilities, to the post of Adjutant-General of her Majesty's forces in India. He said that, when Cureton fell in 1849, he had represented to the Duke that Havelock was the fittest man for this office. But now there were other claims pressed on him from influential quarters. Colonel Markham, he remarked, was a formidable competitor. His conduct before Mooltan had given him a high position in military estimation, and made him aide-de-camp to the Queen, which of itself seemed to place him in the foremost rank of candidates. The claims of Colonel Lugard were also backed by the Commander-in-Chief in India, who had nominated him temporarily to the vacant appointment. Lord Hardinge said, in conclusion, that he would give his best consideration to the matter, but was unable to bind himself by any promise. This was understood to dispose finally of the question, and Havelock was advised to prepare himself for disappointment. He wrote in reply, on the 26th of April, 1854:—

“I have to thank you for the gallant and judicious fight you have made for me at the Horse Guards. Every point in my favour you pressed home and handled well. Nevertheless, I see almost beyond a doubt that Markham is to be the man. He is the son, I believe, of a bishop, or archbishop, who was a tutor to some of the Royal family, and is, moreover, I fancy, backed by Lord Raglan. I saw him at Bombay, and a fine chivalrous fellow he certainly is; and we fully agreed, that we were not to quarrel about it, whichever might be appointed. So I am bent up to make the most of Bombay, if three years more of Indian life should be vouchsafed to me, and then I must endeavour either to get the value of a lieutenant-colonelcy and retire, or seek home employment, a recruiting district, with £700 a year, or a home staff appointment. . . . You see, I take at last a mercantile view

of the profession of arms. How can I help it? I have soldiered with heart and soul for thirty-nine years, and my country's generals neglect me.

"I was inexpressibly shocked by Talfourd's sudden death on the bench. He was born, like myself, in 1795, and in April, 1813, he repeated to me, on the spot where it was written, Wordsworth's sonnet on Westminster Bridge, which made me a Laker for life. Old Thompson too is gone—the alderman and member of parliament,—who reposed in the same apartment with my brother Will, Macnaghten, Babington the physician, Grote the historian, and myself."

Lord Hardinge, finding himself under the necessity of appointing Colonel Markham adjutant-general, was determined, however, not to neglect Havelock. He made arrangements by which the Quartermaster-generalship of the Queen's troops in India became vacant, and nominated Havelock to the post. At the same time Colonel Lugard was made aide-de-camp to the Queen, and received the appointment of deputy adjutant-general at Bombay. When communicating this arrangement to the writer of these Memoirs, at the Horse Guards, Lord Hardinge facetiously remarked, "You used to say in India that there were only two sinecures there, a lady's watch and the Quartermaster-generalship of Queen's troops. I have appointed your own brother-in-law to the latter. There's poetical justice for you." On hearing of the appointment, Havelock wrote:—

"Our express has just brought me yours of the 8th April, announcing that I am appointed the successor of Nicholls, Whittingham, and Sale, an elevation which I did not look for when I was lacqueying the heels of the last-named, as his adjutant, or writing his despatches. I thank God for the provision which this, in His goodness, promises for my family; and as I see there is a little disappointment lurking in your mind because I was not made adjutant-general (perhaps in my mind also), I must hasten to say, that if the Bengal pay and audit book, and my recollections, are to be trusted, the pay is precisely the same as that of adjutant-general. I may reckon it an additional mercy, that in my sixtieth year I am, for once in my life, to have no work, with nearly £3000 a year."

On receiving the appointment, Havelock left Bombay by the first steamer for Calcutta. "Yesterday," he writes on the 30th of May to Mrs Havelock, "I took my leave of Joshua. I put him on board his boat, and he and I parted with 'words and thoughts,' as Wordsworth says, 'too deep for tears.' God bless him. If I were a beggar on a dunghill, it ought to be riches to me to have such a son. He is pious, without an ounce of affectation; a genuine child of God's own sonship. He has very good abilities, good health, good habits. He is laborious, modest, self-denying, conscientious to the last scruple." On his way from Calcutta to Simla, Havelock called at Serampore, and visited "all its well-known spots; the printing-office, the manufactory, the college, all venerated scenes." But of all the friends who had welcomed him on his first visit in 1824, there was not one left. To him Serampore had been the magnetic pole of attraction for thirty years, the source of sympathy in sorrow, and of gratulation in prosperity; and it was with painful solemnity of feeling that he now moved from spot to spot, amidst its hallowed recollections, the only survivor of a generation that was past. "I went," he wrote to Mrs Havelock, "to the chapel, and saw the monumental slab to your dear mother's memory, on the same wall with that of Carey, Marshman, Ward, and Mack. I read two chapters in the Bible at the table before the pulpit, and prayed alone."

Havelock proceeds to Calcutta, and visits Serampore.

While Havelock was proceeding to Simla, the London Gazette of the 20th of June announced the brevet which brought him on the roll of full colonels. He reached the head-quarters of the army on the 8th of July, and was duly installed in the office of Quartermaster-general.

Havelock proceeds to Simla.—Promoted to the rank of brevet colonel.

"My duties," he writes, "are literally *nil*. My work averages two returns and two letters *per mensem*; but time never hangs heavy on my hands. I ride, when it does not rain a deluge, and when it does, am never without indoor occupation. Books attract me, even more than when I was a boy. But I am seriously thinking of your grave proposal of setting to at posthum-

ous histories. Markham is a fellow whom one knows in three minutes, and likes all one's life afterwards. He is a rough-going, off-hand soldier. I have learned up here how well Lord Hardinge behaved about the adjutant-generalship, when Mountain's promotion was expected. When no option was left him as to appointing Markham, he secured me the other berth, which, under the circumstances, was doing much. Lugard has great claims, and, to make amends for his disappointment, has been very deservedly made A. D. C. to the Queen, which brings him in at the tail of the brevet, and gives him a rank he might otherwise not have attained for the next eight years. Lord Hardinge wrote him a very handsome letter on the occasion, which I have seen here.

"The Dissenters have indeed gained a victory in the Oxford affair, which was the Sebastopol of High Church,—rather, I should say, the Cronstadt. In 1850, Peto drove Brock and me home in his carriage, after laying the first stone of the Hammer-smith chapel. I opened out about the Baptists claiming the right of education and its fruits for their children at the two old universities. Brock thought they had enough in London; and Peto, then member for Norwich, assured me that such a proposition would not command six votes in the House of Commons.

"I approach with pain the subject of Hannah's desire to come out to India. If it could be treated as a matter of inclination, I presume there could be no doubt, and would be no delay; God knows, I have had enough of solitary life. But as a matter of duty, the question is far less *tangible*. . . . But the strongest objection to any one coming out, is the precarious state of my health; the question is not, when they are to come to me, but when shall I be compelled to return to them. I am quite ready, if it be God's will, to die in India for my family; but I cannot esteem it wise to bring them out to return on the Queen's Widows' Fund and my pension. I dare not now tell my doctor all my symptoms, lest he should send me summarily to England."

Colonel Markham did not long retain the office of Adjutant-General. He was promoted in a few months to the rank of Major-General, which obliged him to vacate it, and Lord Hardinge immediately nominated Havelock to the post. In March, 1855, while at Simla, he heard of the death of Arch-

Havelock Adjutant-general of Queen's troops. Death of Archdeacon Hare.

deacon Hare, and immediately wrote to Sir William Norris :—

“A fortnight ago, the Home News apprized me of the death of our dear friend Hare, an event which deeply affected me, though I feel that our loss is his exceeding great gain. Yes,—the quintet who read sermons together is now reduced to a trio, I think of sexagenarians ; at least, I shall enter that rank, if spared to the 5th of April next. I had written to Mrs Havelock, on learning that the archdeacon had left us for a better world, expressing my desire to know the particulars of his being called away. With these, and the mournful tale of his being committed to the earth, you have now supplied me ; and much food for meditation, and many topics for faithful prayer, they afford. He has been taken away from the evil to come ; for he was frail in body, and, as I could see when we were with him in Sussex, deeply pained by the theological strifes and backslidings of many with whom he was associated. Yet who shall forbid you and me to mourn for our old schoolmate, whose society was restored to us so unexpectedly, after a separation of forty years ! On my last flying visit to Hurstmonceaux, he told me, as I left his house, that he thought we should ‘next meet where we should part no more.’ These were his very words,—I trust to be verified.”

On the anniversary of his wedding day in 1855 he writes thus to his wife :—

“9th Feb., 1855.

“Notwithstanding the reproach under which I live of being nonobservant of notable days, I have not forgotten that, twenty-six years ago, not having been able to muster moral courage to run away against the tide in an Indian canoe, I consented to give ‘hostages to fortune,’ and braved the worst dangers and difficulties of domestic life. I have not repented,—that I will seriously assert and maintain. On the contrary, my submission to the ‘yoke’ has been the source of nearly all the satisfaction and happiness which retrospect presents to me on the chequered map of my sixty years’ existence. So, madam, all hail ! best of mothers and not worst of wives ; accept my congratulations, and give me credit for the sincerity and warmth of the affection which urges me this day to pray for your temporal and eternal blessedness, and points to you as the foundation of my best recollections and hopes.”

Letter to Mrs Havelock, on his wedding day.

On the expiration of Sir William Gomm's term of service as Commander-in-Chief, General Anson was appointed his successor. The Governor-General, having determined that the Commander-in-Chief should henceforth remain at Calcutta, instead of proceeding to the north-west provinces and Simla, all the establishments at head-quarters were directed to move down to Calcutta, to await General Anson's arrival. On the 29th of January, 1856, Havelock writes from Delhi : " Here we are, on our way to the City of Palaces. I only wait to see my ponderous office establishment fairly started by bullock train, to be off myself in the somewhat lighter carriage, which may carry me in six days to General Anson's antechamber. He was sworn in, I hear, on the 24th instant."

Havelock returns to Calcutta—his correspondence.

Havelock reached Calcutta in the beginning of February, and found his new chief a man of the most active habits and untiring industry ; but " since he came here he has been so exhausted by supreme and legislative council work, as to have scarcely time or strength to glance at the discipline and wants of my poor regiments." . . . On his route he wrote to Mrs Havelock's sister, Mrs Brandis, who was on her way to Burmah,—Dr Brandis having been appointed superintendent of forests:—" So you are by this time on your way to the Shwey-dagon pagoda, which for many months was the first object I gazed upon on arising in the morning. You must let me know how you like Rangoon, and your husband his new, and I should say interesting, appointment. I do not consider Rangoon an unhealthy place. Our armies suffered there from causes which affect great masses, indifferently cared for ; but not individuals in civil life. If I am promoted to Major-General I hope to see Hannah and the girls ; but to that beautiful place, Calcutta, if it please God, they do *not* come—ever. It is only fit for Government secretaries and pariah dogs. I, as a soldier, go whither I am ordered ; but I will not, if I can help it, bring them to that Elysium."

About the same time Havelock wrote thus to Colonel Franks, who had in 1852 selected his eldest son, then

Lieutenant in the 86th Foot, for the adjutancy of his own regiment, the 10th Foot. Shattered health, and a young soldier's not censurable desire to take part in the Crimean war, had induced him at this time to seek leave of absence to England.

Letter to Colonel Franks.

“Camp Kalka, 9th Jan. 1856.

“My dear Colonel,—Your letter of the 2nd instant has found me here.

“I have ever considered it a great privilege for my son to have served under a commanding officer whose praise, when earned, I should consider valuable, as coming from one who has really maintained a strict and effective discipline in his regiment, and despised that factitious reputation too often obtained in our army by the contemptible arts of concealing and conniving at acts of indiscipline.

“Your letter to my son would reach him at Bombay, for he was not to embark till the 4th of this month. He will carry it as a proud, and I trust useful, testimonial to the Horse Guards; and lay it before Lord Hardinge. Should you be employed in Russia, I should form the hope, from what I saw of him at Simla, that he would make an effective staff officer.”

It has been already stated that Havelock at one time despaired of reaching the rank of Major-General before the age of seventy; but, now, at the close of 1855, it threatened to come upon him earlier than was desirable, in reference to his position as adjutant-general.

Havelock's rank as a colonel.

“I am just now,” he writes on the 27th December, “at a moment of great interest as regards promotion. A certain reading of the Horse Guards circular of the 5th of May, 1855, would make me a Colonel of the year 1850, upon my Muharajpore brevet; that is, put me at once up to very near the top of the list, and bring me far nearer the rank of Major-General than would be financially desirable for me. But there is no waiving rank in the army, and a reference was made through Sir William Gomm on the point by the last mail. Now supposing that I am thus created ‘le général malgré lui,’ my next endeavour would of course be to get employment, for I cannot afford to be on the shelf a week. Go therefore to Lord Hardinge on the receipt of this. He

will have learnt how I stand, and if I am to be put up under the memorandum, ask him, first, whether he would object to my retaining my present office with the rank of Major-General, against which there is no rule in our service, for my term of five years; and if he deems this impossible, solicit him to appoint me Major-General in Bengal. I feel that I can and will look after the regiments as sharply as any other. If this cannot be, then I am ready for employment in the Crimea, or at home. I have named the appointments in the order in which I may be supposed to be fit for them, but I am ready for any, or all, and have served an apprenticeship for all."

Lord Hardinge, with his wonted kindness, set Havelock's mind at rest on the subject, dating his colonel's commission from a period which would enable him to enjoy the office of adjutant-general for the full period of five years. On receiving this intimation Havelock wrote:—

"Calcutta, 21st April, 1856.

"I thank you for the trouble you have taken in seeking an interview with Lord Hardinge. I have got the official decision that my commission as colonel is not to be antedated, which I suppose settles the question. But I could, if it were worth while, set his Lordship right as to my having first asked for the boon, and then deprecated it. 'Deprecate,' quotha, why if I had got this lift up, which I must have done, if the brevet of June 1854 had not taken me in, it would have made up for all the evil success of my forty-one years of service, for I should have got the rank of Major-General in decent time after all, and before some twenty Crimean heroes are put up over my head at the end of the war, which may keep me a colonel all my life. But there is no getting you civil gentlemen to take any but a *mercantile* view of these affairs; so I must be content and cheerful, if I can, having bread to eat while I have got a few teeth to eat withal. . . . They pay me some four hundred *per mensem* less here than in the mountain; and I need not tell you what a cool pleasant climate it is in April, and everything here, rent and every other charge, though I live just like the subalterns at the club,—is more expensive than at Simla; yet I hope to accumulate a little month by month."

On the subject of his son George's education he writes to Mrs Havelock in May of this year:—"I wish to draw

your attention particularly to the boy's military education. The Germans are good mathematicians; but every nation has its own peculiarities, and an English officer would, I suspect after all, be best trained in England. I wish this boy to have advantages I never possessed, in a really good military education; and let his riding be well attended to."

On the 3rd of July Havelock writes:—"The supreme council has accorded to General Anson a rather reluctant permission to tour in a scrambling way from September 1856 to March 1857, promising to extend the term to March 1858, if, on reference, the Court approves. So, I suppose, in September we start by steam. Thank God, my health remains good, and I am too old a soldier, so long as I have health, to trouble my head about any change; but I will not bring Hannah and the girls to such a scene of perpetual transition, nor to Calcutta, where I rub along well enough at a club, but could no more afford to set up house in Chouringee, than to buy a deer park in Staffordshire." He wrote again on the 16th of July, 1856:—

His son
George's educa-
tion.

The Com-
mander-in-
Chief author-
ized to tour.

"We are to steam up to Berhampore, Dinapore, the studs, Benares, and Allahabad. Thence dawd to Cawnpore, and visit Lucknow. Then again dawd to Meerut, and, taking it for a centre, visit Agra, Delhi, Umbala, and Ferozepore. The next year to Peshawur, returning to Calcutta in March, 1858. If by God's goodness I live through all this, and two years in Calcutta after it, I shall be entitled to say, 'Enough of India for this second visit.' Something goes up to book—steady; but, as usual, embroidered tunics, expensive houses, and perpetual locomotion, eat into the vitals of the purse. I hope you will thoroughly enjoy your progress to the Eternal City, and I think you are quite right in contesting Ipswich, if there is a dissolution." . . . "I scrape together something towards keeping my wife and children out of the Union when I can no longer labour, but slowly, and at some expense of constitution; though, God be praised, I have not looked at a doctor since I left Simla last year. But I am grey-bearded, and nearly toothless."

During his progress up the river he wrote to Mrs Have-

lock by every mail. On the 27th September he writes:—
Havelock's letters to Mrs Havelock. “Since the 22nd we have been slowly steaming this sacred stream, or rather buffeting the waves of this inland sea, the banks of which you and I knew in the days of our humility. I pointed out, as we passed, every well-known spot in Serampore to Seymour; walked over every foot of Chinsurah with General Anson and suite, and we coaled this morning at the ghat of William Carey, the Missionary. You well remember our visit of 1834. The same God protects us now. . . . May God, if it be His pleasure, grant us once more on earth a happy meeting; if not, may we meet and be for ever united.”

On the 13th of October he wrote to her:—“I am cut to the heart by the poor account you still give of your health; but I trust your projected trip in Switzerland will, by God’s blessing, give you strength again, and that you will many years be enabled, in His good providence, to watch over our two dear girls, and the mighty George’s education. . . . God knows how my heart yearns to see you all again; but my duty is here, and I have several difficulties. If by God’s aid I can surmount them all, I shall, at the end of my three years’ labour and self-denial, feel entitled to look upon you again. God grant it may be in health, tranquillity, and competency; if it be God’s pleasure, may you and I have one more happy meeting on earth; if not, a far happier in heaven!”

On the 5th of November he writes again:—“I hold to my purpose as strongly as ever, I trust, in drawing on the Bank of Faith, but have learned in my old age that there is another establishment, too much before neglected, to which God’s Spirit strongly invites attention, viz. the Bank of Providence.” His last letter, before embarking on the Persian expedition, was dated from Delhi, the 13th of December:—“You have done your duty nobly to your children, as ever, so especially since I left you for India in October, 1851. This I fully acknowledge on earth, and God’s righteous verdict will corroborate it in heaven. But you must postpone all plans of coming out to India.” But Havelock was not to meet on earth the object of his

affectionate solicitude. When all further expectation of active duty had vanished from his mind, he was suddenly called into the field; and the last year of his life was distinguished by a series of military exploits, which have rendered his name a "household word" in every circle in his native land, and surrounded his memory with the lustre of national gratitude.

CHAPTER VI.

Origin of the Persian War.—Havelock recommends General Outram for the Command of the Expedition.—Is appointed to command the Second Division.—Battle of Khooshab.—Havelock arrives at Bushire.—Expedition up the Euphrates.—Mohumra—Strength of the Fortifications.—Havelock's Plan of Attack—Its successful Result.—Expedition to Ahwaz.—Peace with Persia.—Havelock returns to Bombay.—Hears of the Revolt of the Bengal Army.—Origin and Character of the Mutiny of 1857.—Mutiny of the 19th and 34th.—Outburst at Meerut.—Occupation of Delhi by the Insurgents.—Havelock embarks in the *Erin*, and is wrecked off Ceylon.—Reaches Madras, and accompanies Sir P. Grant to Calcutta.—His Memorandum on the Bengal Mutinies.—Is appointed to command the movable Column.—His Opinion of the 78th Highlanders.

At the beginning of the year 1857, Havelock was unexpectedly called into active employ, and for the first time, after forty-two years of service, and in the sixty-second year of his age, was placed in a position which afforded scope for his extraordinary military talents. While he was touring with the Commander-in-Chief in the north-west provinces, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, despatched a telegram to General Anson, to request that he might be nominated to the command of a division in the expedition which Government was sending to Persia. Havelock accepted the appointment with alacrity.

It has been already stated, that the war in Afghanistan in 1838 grew primarily out of our differences with the court of Persia. Under the encouragement of Russia, the Shah had been induced to lay siege to Herat; it was abandoned, in compliance with the demands of the British Government, which were enforced by the occupation of Karrack. But the influence of England was not restored at the court of Teheran by this accommodation of differences; the counsels of Russia

Havelock embarks on the Persian expedition.

Origin of the dispute with Persia.

still continued to predominate, while we were regarded with feelings of repugnance, bordering on hostility. The Persian monarch was still bent on the acquisition of Herat, and the British Government was equally determined to prevent the occupation of that town by a power so subservient to the views of Russia. In 1852, in spite of the remonstrances of our minister at Teheran, a Persian army was a second time despatched against Herat, and the town and province were annexed by proclamation to the Persian dominions. England again protested against this proceeding, and threatened to take possession of Karrack. In January, 1853, the dread of hostilities with England induced the Shah to yield to our wishes, and relinquish his hold on Herat. By the treaty which was then concluded, he bound himself not to send troops into that principality, except when it might be invaded by a force from Cabul, Candahar, or any other foreign territory, and not to interfere in its internal affairs, and to abandon every claim of sovereignty over it.

Soon after, a new cause of discord arose between the Persian court and Mr Thompson, who had been left in charge of the British mission during the absence of our minister. It grew out of the appointment, as first Persian secretary of the embassy, of one Mirza Hashem, a young Persian, connected by marriage with the royal family. The Persian Government refused to recognize the nomination, on the ground that, having once been in the employ of the Shah, the Mirza could not accept any other service till he had received a formal discharge. Mr Thompson then announced his intention to send him as British agent to Shiraz. Mr Murray, who had been appointed British minister at the Persian court, gave his sanction to this appointment on his arrival at Teheran, but was informed by the Persian Government that if the Mirza attempted to proceed to Shiraz, he would be apprehended and detained. This threat was followed up by the seizure of his wife. Mr Murray demanded her immediate release, but the prime minister refused to entertain any question regarding a lady of the royal family. On Saturday, the 17th of November,

1855, Mr Murray informed him that if the lady was not surrendered by Monday morning, he should suspend friendly relations with the court. No regard was paid to this intimation, and on the 20th Mr Murray struck his flag. The Persian ministers then published a vindication of their own proceedings, in which they affirmed that these altercations had their origin in the personal attractions of the Mirza's wife. They stated that they could not consent to the dishonour of sending a Persian lady to the British mission, and that Mr Murray had made this the pretext for withdrawing the mission towards the Turkish territories. These slanderous insinuations, which were subsequently supported by the Shah himself, were indignantly and successfully repelled by Mr Murray. It was, however, much to be regretted that the British representative should have been mixed up with this wretched affair, and that any pretext, however flimsy, should have been afforded to the Persian cabinet to proclaim through Central Asia that the diplomatic relations between the courts of London and Teheran had been broken off by negotiations which had reference to a Persian beauty.

During these transactions the town of Kars, after a heroic defence by General Williams, was obliged to capitulate. It was known throughout Asia that

Fall of Kars,
and the oc-
cupation of
Herat by the
Persians.

England and Russia had for some time been at war, and the fall of this town was represented in Persia and the surrounding countries, as the triumph of Russia over England. Under the influence of this event, and of the irritation occasioned by Mr Murray's retirement, the king of Persia determined to repudiate the treaty of 1853, and despatch an army again for the conquest of Herat. The original dispute regarding Mirza Hashem and his wife was thus thrown into the shade by a more weighty transaction. The negotiations of Persia and England were now transferred to Constantinople, where the Persian representative placed himself in communication with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. After several notes had passed between them without any satisfactory result, Lord Clarendon, on the 11th of July, 1856, stated in peremptory

language, that unless reparation was promptly made for this breach of treaty and the hostile occupation of Herat, and the Persian troops were immediately withdrawn from that territory, the British Government would adopt other measures.

Instructions were soon after forwarded to India, to make preparations for an expedition to occupy the island of Kar-rack and the city of Bushire; and as there ap-
 appeared no disposition on the part of Persia to War with Persia. comply with the demands of the British Government, the Governor-General issued a declaration of war on the 1st of November.

While the organization of this expeditionary force was under discussion in Calcutta, the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, requested Havelock's sentiments as to the fittest man to command it, and mentioned the name of General Stalker. Havelock stated that, without any disparagement of the merits of this officer, he considered General Outram to be suited above all other men for this important enterprise; and it was partly under the influence of this suggestion that the offer was made to him by the Home Government. He was an officer of the Bombay Presidency, and had been employed for a quarter of a century in various military and diplomatic functions, which he had executed with such zeal and success as to secure the confidence of the public authorities, both in England and in the East. Eighteen years before this period he had attracted the admiration of India by the pursuit of Dost Mahomed after the capture of Cabul. In his history of the Affghan campaign, Havelock had said of this exploit: "Captain Outram followed the fugitives from the 3rd to the 9th of August (1839). The British troops endured the greatest privations, having lived on parched corn for several days, their horses picking up scanty and indifferent forage in the small spots of cultivation in a mountainous tract. Holding cheap these difficulties, Captain Outram pursued his arduous course . . . and tracked the footsteps of the Ameer by Kaloo, up the tremendous passes of Hajee Guk to Bameean, leav-

Havelock points out General Outram for the command of the expedition.

ing close on his right the awful eminences of Koh-i-baba, twenty thousand feet in height." General Outram's chivalrous bearing in the field had procured for him throughout India the title of the Bayard of the East; but he was as much distinguished by his high sense of honour as by his courage. His valour was conspicuous in the campaign which terminated in the annexation of Scinde, though he reprobated the policy in which the war originated. But when the prize money came to be distributed, he refused to accept his share of it, as having been acquired in a quarrel which he deemed unjust, and he divided the whole amount, about £3000, among the different benevolent institutions in India. General Outram, who was in England when the war with Persia broke out, was at once appointed by the Court of Directors to the chief command of the expedition, and at the same time invested with political powers. The appointment was the most judicious which could have been made. While his military talents qualified him to direct the operations of the army, his diplomatic experience eminently fitted him for the management of negotiations with an oriental court. It is not unworthy of notice that our diplomatic relations with Persia have always been most successfully maintained when entrusted to a soldier, and moreover to a soldier who has served in India.

General Outram, on receiving the appointment, lost no time in proceeding to Bombay. In common with all those who were acquainted with Havelock, he entertained the highest opinion of his military abilities. Though entirely ignorant of the fact that his own appointment had been recommended by Havelock to the Commander-in-Chief in India, he advised Lord Elphinstone to propose that he should be appointed to the command of the second division, the first having previously sailed under the orders of General Stalker, and occupied Bushire with little opposition. Havelock felt that the offer would place him in a sphere of action according with his own aspirations, and afford him that chance of useful service in a more enlarged and important sphere,

Sir James
Outram re-
commends
Havelock to
the command
of a division.

which he had so long coveted. He therefore accepted it with great delight.

On the 6th of January he wrote to the compiler of this Memoir :—" Lord Elphinstone, at Sir James Outram's request, has telegraphed to General Anson to offer me the command of a division in the Persian expedition. I accepted it, and expect to start immediately. If, by God's blessing, I succeed, I trust they will make me a major-general, which is £400 a year, with the hope of a regiment, or £500 a year more. If I am unfortunate, I need not tell you the fate of a British general under such circumstances. I trust in God and will do my best. The inducement is the hope of promotion in days when fifteen Crimeans, ten junior to me, have been made major-generals at one swoop." Writing on the same subject to Mrs Havelock, he said :—" The command is responsible, but my trust is in God. It is a rare thing for an officer in the Bengal Presidency to be summoned to command Bombay troops. I never should have solicited such a command, and would, in truth, rather have been employed in the north-west provinces, where it is not unlikely that a force may hereafter be employed. But when the post of honour and danger was offered me by telegraph, old as I am, I did not hesitate a moment. The wires carried back my unconditional and immediate acceptance." Having completed his arrangements, he started from Agra on the 12th of January, and was expected to reach Bombay on the 26th, and Lord Elphinstone had made provision for his last day's journey accordingly. But he was so anxious to enter upon his work, that he pushed on night and day, travelling in an open mail cart, without springs, upwards of 100 miles a day. Undeterred by accidents, in one of which he received bruises and contusions, which might well have afforded an excuse for delay to a much younger man, he surprised his friends by his arrival in Bombay on the 21st, where he was cordially greeted and most hospitably entertained by Lord Elphinstone. Sir James Outram had embarked two days before, and Havelock, though prepared himself to start immediately, was detained in the

harbour to the 29th, by an accident to the engines of the steamer. As the vessel steamed out the usual salute was fired from the battery; "the first expense of the kind," he remarks, "to which I have ever put the Government." He did not reach Bushire before the 15th of February.

Sir James Outram had arrived at that port with the greater part of the second division on the 31st of January.

Sir James marches into the interior, and beats the enemy at Khooshab. In his usual spirit of enterprise, he determined to advance at once into the heart of the country, and strike a blow at the enemy. The Persians were posted at Brasjaon, about fifty miles from Bushire, in an intrenched camp defended by eighteen guns. The General appeared before their encampment on the 5th of February, when, to the disappointment and chagrin of his troops, they were seen in full retreat, at a pace which rendered pursuit hopeless. The whole of their camp equipage, grain, and munitions of war fell into the hands of the General, who reserved what he was able to carry, and destroyed the remainder, blowing up 36,000 pounds of powder. The force commenced its return to Bushire on the evening of the 7th of February. The enemy, however, commenced an attack on the British line of march shortly after midnight, at the village of Khooshab, and the next morning suffered a signal defeat.

The troops returned to Bushire, where Sir James was constrained to await the arrival of reinforcements. He had seen enough of the country to render it evident that the difficulties of the route into the interior, in the direction he had pursued, and the want of carriage, would render an advance impracticable. It was therefore determined to transfer the scene of action to the Euphrates, which appeared to present greater facilities for striking a heavy and decisive blow at the power of the Persians. They were known to have established strong fortifications at Mohumra, a position on the Shat-ool-arab, the name given to the Euphrates after its junction with the Tigris. The right bank of that stream was, moreover, Turkish territory, where ample supplies of provisions and cattle could be procured. Arrangements were therefore

Intended expedition to Mohumra.

made to transport the army to Mohumra, to operate on the Euphrates, and endeavour to penetrate to Ispahan by that route. In the prospect of this expedition Havelock wrote to Mrs Havelock :—" Our expedition against that point will sail in a few days. Pray that I may faithfully discharge every duty to the end. I have good troops and cannon under my command ; but my trust is in the Lord Jesus, my tried and merciful friend. . . . If I fall in the discharge of my duty the sovereign will provide for your wants." While lying at Bushire he received a letter from Major Balcarras Ramsay, of H.M.'s 75th, to which he returned the following reply :—

" My dear Ramsay,—I am much gratified by your kind, and I am sure sincere, congratulations on my nomination, unsought and unexpected, to the command of a division with this force. The enterprise in which we are engaged is interesting in the highest degree, and unless cut short by some caprice of public opinion, or unsound political combination, is almost sure to lead to important results. Nearly half my two brigades are still on the sea, but the absent regiments drop in by degrees, in spite of adverse winds, tempestuous weather, and imperfect steam power.

" You must not repine if denied for the present the opportunity of encountering the risks of actual service. What if you should behold a force assembled to penetrate to Herat by the Bolan ? The 75th would then have a chance, and who more likely than yourself, when called to the front, to obtain staff appointment and win distinction in the field ? I beg my kindest regards to Mrs Ramsay, and remembrances to all friends in Calcutta, Birch in particular, and Rice, and Thompson, and all that remember me at the United Service Club.

" Ever believe me most sincerely yours,

" H. H."

The Persians had been improving the fortifications of Mohumra for several months. Batteries had been erected, of solid earth, twenty feet thick, and eighteen feet high, on the northern and southern points of Strength of Mohumra. the angle formed by the junction of the Raroon with the Shat-ool-arab. These, with other earthworks, armed with cannon, commanded the entire passage of the latter river,

and were so skilfully and judiciously placed as to sweep the whole stream, and command the opposite shore; indeed, everything that science could suggest and labour accomplish in the time appeared to have been done by the enemy, effectually to prevent any vessel from passing above their position. The troops had been gradually forwarded from Bushire, in vessels which anchored several miles below the fortification at Mohumra, and they were joined by Havelock on the 15th of March, in the *Berenice*, with the head-quarters of the 78th Highlanders and the staff of his division. He was in daily expectation of the arrival of Sir James Outram and the rest of the force; but on the 16th intelligence was received that he had been detained at Bushire by the death of General Stalker, whom he had intended to leave in command of that post. This unexpected calamity determined Sir James to remain at Bushire; but, happily, he was joined immediately after by General Jacob, an officer of surpassing ability, with his far-famed Scinde horse, which was the admiration of India. The charge of this important post was at once placed in his hands, and Sir James prepared to proceed forthwith to Mohumra.

Meanwhile, Havelock had strained every nerve to collect the most accurate information regarding the position and strength of the enemy. He obtained important details from the commander of the French frigate *La Sibylle*, who had visited the Persian encampment; but that officer considered the position of the enemy too strong to be carried by the naval and military force now assembled. On the 18th of March Havelock invited the gentlemen who were possessed of the most accurate local knowledge, to a conference; Captain Kemball, the political agent; the Rev. George Badger, chaplain at Aden, distinguished by his acquaintance with the language, habits, and customs of the neighbouring tribes; and Captain Selby, of the Indian navy. On the strength of the information derived from them, he drew up the following plan of operations, which is valuable as exhibiting that high

Havelock's
plan for the
attack of Mo-
humra.

order of military talent, in which every detail is pre-arranged, and every contingency provided for:—

“ 1. At a conversation this morning on board the H. C. ship ‘Comet,’ with Captain Kemball, the Rev. George Badger, and Captain Selby, Indian Navy, much information was given by these gentlemen regarding the enemy’s troops and batteries, at and near Mohumra; and the following plan of attack appeared feasible to the naval and military officers. The substance of Captain Kemball’s information has been drawn up by that officer, who has promised me a copy of it, to be hereafter appended to this memorandum.

“ 2. The enemy has thrown up a work containing four guns on the river’s edge at Buerda. This must be silenced and dismantled by the combined fire of the whole of the armed vessels with us. This is considered very easy of accomplishment.

“ 3. The armed vessels, transports, &c., would then proceed up the river, and at the point marked A on the plan (a sheltered spot on a high bank), the infantry and artillery of the force would be transhipped into vessels as under-mentioned:—

Steamer, Victoria	140 horses.
„ Assyria	60 horses, artillery, and staff.
„ Napier	90 artillery.
„ Berenice	180.
„ Comet and boats	260 of the light battalion.
„ Lady Falkland	300 of the 26th N. I.
„ Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy	300 of the 26th N. I.
„ Hugh Lindsay	600 of H. M. 64th regiment.
„ Pioneer	700 light battalion.
Flat Ethersey	860 of the 78th.
„ Meteor	200 sappers.
Boats from Transports	750 Doolie wallas, or native bearers, attached to the hospital litters.
Paddle-box boats from Ajdaha	28 horses, staff.

“ Doolies to be lashed to the sides of small steamers, or taken in the Berenice.

“ 4. The transhipment of the horses during the day, that of the men the next morning at 2 o’clock, each soldier having with him

his arms, ammunition, canteen filled with water, great coat, blanket, and three days' provisions.

"5. At daylight the following men of war will proceed to their stations, and commence to batter and shell the enemy's fortifications at the intersection of the Hafir, and the Shat-ool-Arab.

H. C. S. S. Clive	South battery.
H. C. S. F. Assaye	North "
H. C. S. F. Semiramis	" "
H. C. S. Falkland	" "

and the H. C. S. frigates Feroze and Ajdaha will protect, at points B and C, the disembarkation of the troops, on the intermediate bank.

"6. The opening of the cannonade of the armed vessels is to be the signal for the steamers and boats conveying troops to weigh and proceed, led by the H. C. S. Comet up the track designated in the plan. The steamers Berenice and Victoria, will at the same time proceed with the utmost despatch up the track marked *h, k, l*. The troops will land and form as quickly as possible, and as soon as they are established on shore, will be put in march against the Shahzada, under instructions to be delivered on the ground.

"7. The general idea of my attack would be to manœuvre to gain the right flank of the Mirza, when the left brigade, under the protection of the twelve guns massed in our centre, would assail that point, our right being refused. As soon as the left brigade should produce a decided impression on the enemy, the right brigade would in its turn advance and attack. The light infantry battalion and the detachment of Scinde horse would be kept in second line, to act when the favourable moment arrived, and protect the rear.

"I entertain the strongest opinion of the success which might reasonably be expected from such a combined attack.

"H. HAVELOCK,

"Brigadier-General."

This outline of operations was sent to Sir James Outram and received his sanction, though the distribution of the troops among the vessels was subsequently modified. In the letter which accompanied the plan Havelock said that the means which had

Sir J. Outram approves of the plan. Instructions for the action.

been originally destined for this object were ample ; that with twelve guns, and a little cavalry, he trusted the victory would be ours ; but “the more cavalry the better.” On the 19th he was informed that the encampment of the enemy, two miles from the fort, was not intrenched, but that large reinforcements were hourly expected, and he therefore urged the utmost expedition on the General. Sir James was again detained at Bushire by the death of Commodore Ethersey, the chief of the naval department, and did not reach the rendezvous on the river before the 22nd. He brought with him some additional Scinde horse, and a detachment of the 14th Dragoons ; the arrangements for the attack were, therefore, made without delay. The whole force consisted of 4886 men, of whom, independently of the artillery, 1623 were Europeans. The troops were in the finest health and spirits, and eager to be led against the enemy. The 25th was employed in the transshipment of horses and stores ; and when all the dispositions were completed, Havelock issued the following instructions regarding the movement of the troops the next morning :—

“ 1. The troops on landing will be formed in two lines, the first consisting of the two brigades of infantry, with the artillery in the centre between them ; the second of the cavalry, a squadron in rear of the inner flank of each brigade, at three hundred paces distant.

“ 2. As soon as the troops have reached ground on which they can freely manœuvre, the left brigade to advance transversely to their original front in open column of companies, left in front, the artillery following in column of half batteries.

“ 3. The right brigade to be moved in the same order, until the head of the column reaches the left of the original line, when it will wheel into line, and advance in that order.

“ 4. Thus the troops will be conducted to the attack of two sides of the camp, the right brigade being held in reserve, until the left, having wheeled into line, has successfully assaulted the enemy, the artillery opening on the enemy in the space between the two brigades.

“ 5. The cavalry will move in second line, a squadron in rear of the centre of each brigade of infantry, whether in line or in column.”

At daybreak on the morning of the 26th, four mortars, which had been placed on a raft anchored in the river under shelter of a low island, and exposed, if discovered, to immediate capture, opened fire, and continued the action for an hour and a half. Soon after sunrise the frigates were abreast of the works, but the *Semiramis*, the leading vessel, grounded as she attempted to enter the Hafir channel. The other vessels poured an incessant shower of shot and shell into the enemy's intrenchment for two hours, and it was a matter of surprise that the Persians were able to stand this awful fire for so long a period, our artillery being, at least, four times as powerful as theirs. The 68-pounders were seen to cut large date trees, eighteen inches in diameter, as though they had been mere twigs, and the effect of their rushing sound in that dense wood must have been appalling. By nine, the enemy's fire, which had been visibly slackening for some time, ceased almost entirely, and the steamers, with troops on board, moved up the river to the point of debarkation. The *Berenice*, with Havelock and the Highlanders and a company of Sappers, led the way. Her decks were crowded, and he took his station on the paddle-box, that he might be able more effectually to command the men, and keep them down while passing within a hundred yards of the enemy's batteries. A single round shot would have created no little havoc in that dense mass of defenceless men, but no lives were lost, though the hull of the vessel was repeatedly struck and the rigging cut. The other vessels and boats followed in excellent order, and Sir James came up as the Highlanders were landed. By half-past one all the troops were ready to advance, with the exception of a portion of the Dragoons and four horse artillery guns, detained on a spot which had become isolated by the rising of the tide. Just at this time, according to some accounts, a shell from one of the steamers struck the great magazine in the centre of the north fort, and it blew up with a tremendous explosion, and contributed to increase the confusion and dismay of the enemy. Our troops were immediately formed, and began to advance towards

Successful at-
tack on Mo-
humra.

the Persian encampment, in which the Shahzada, a prince of the blood royal, commanded in person. But they had no sooner made their appearance than the enemy were seized with a panic, and precipitately abandoned their camp and fled. The white tents were standing, but the tenants had vanished, as if by the stroke of a magic wand. Previous to decamping the Persians blew up some of their magazines; but several others, together with immense stores of grain, and all their tents and baggage, fell to the victors. Sixteen guns were also captured on the fortifications; but, owing to the deficiency of cavalry, from the detention of the dragoons, contrary to Havelock's expectations, it was impossible to pursue the enemy with effect, though the Scinde horse followed them for several miles.

Havelock gives the following description of the engagement in a letter to his wife on the 28th of March:—

“Our expedition against this place has been entirely successful, but the victory was won by the Indian navy; the troops of my division, which landed in the best order, and in the highest spirits, had not a shot to fire. The Persians were commanded by the Shahzada,”—a prince of the blood,—“and their works were formidable; but in three hours and a half they were so hammered by our war-ships, that the enemy abandoned them in dismay, suffering great loss; and before my regiments and cannon could be landed in the date groves, intersected by water-courses, and my columns formed, they were in full retreat, followed by a handful of cavalry. I had not a single casualty in my crowded troop-ship, and in the Scindian, in which Harry was embarked, the only man killed was his head servant. I had hoped that my troops would have won laurels, but Providence decreed it otherwise. We must be ever thankful for the preserving mercies of this day, the 26th of March. The cannonade was warm, and my steamer, the *Berenice*, crowded with Highlanders, led the troop-ships to the point where we landed. I felt throughout that the Lord Jesus was at my side. . . . The work inspires and animates me, and God is with me. I never felt better in my life, praised be God. . . . Sir James Outram commands in chief, both naval and military forces, the troops being all under my immediate orders. He and I are the best friends.”

Havelock's
description of
the engage-
ment.

In a letter of the same period to the compiler he says : "The Shahzada had four and a half miles the start of us, and as I had only a mere handful of Irregular Cavalry, it was impossible to bring him to action against his will. His army was speedily in a state of dissolution. The whiz of his bullets in passing over my crowded steamer, and the sense of the same protecting and guiding Providence was all that I had to remind me of former days. It is waxing hot in the plains, under the mere ghosts of tents such as we pitch in Bengal. Harry and I have kept our health so far ; I am sixty-two, but I think can campaign as merrily as in 1846. The recoil on the constitution may however be more severe. I have written to General Anson, that I am ready for China as soon as this is over."

Three days after the engagement at Mohumra, an expedition was sent a hundred miles up the Karoon to Ahwaz, Expedition to Ahwaz. to which the enemy was reported to have retreated. It was successful beyond expectation. The Arab tribes in the vicinity, who had hastened to witness the conflict, beheld the extraordinary spectacle of 7000 Persian infantry, with five or six guns, and a host of cavalry, flying in dismay from a detachment of British infantry only 300 strong, with three steamers and three gunboats. The report of this success had scarcely reached Mohumra, and raised the expectation of future triumphs over the Persians, when intelligence was received from Europe which at once extinguished all these hopes. As Havelock had drawn up his troops for church parade on the morning of Sunday, the 5th of April, Sir James rode Peace with Persia. up and informed him that a treaty of peace had been signed with the Persian ambassador at Paris, on the 4th of March, and that their labours in the field were at an end. "The intelligence," writes Havelock, "which elevates some and depresses others, finds me calm in my reliance on that dear Redeemer who has watched over me, and cared for me when I knew him not, threescore and two years,"—it was the anniversary of his birthday. Thus ended this expedition to Persia, which,

in the course of six months, had cost England and India a sum little short of two millions, with no result but that of demolishing the reputation of the Persian army, and demonstrating its utter inability to cope with the troops of a European power. In the three actions at Khooshab, Mohumra, and Ahwaz, the Persians had fled disgracefully at the sight of a British force.

The conclusion of peace with Persia was a most providential event for the interests of our eastern empire. The small body of European troops in India, though inadequate to the protection of our vast territories, had been weakened by the withdrawal of two regiments of horse to the Crimea, and had now been still further reduced by the despatch of four other European regiments and the greater part of the 14th Dragoons to Persia. The storm which was about to burst on British India, and render the services of European troops inestimable, was already lowering. The first intimation of it was received by Havelock in a letter from General Anson, dated "Head-quarter Camp, the 15th of March:"—"We have been," he writes, "and still are in trouble here with disaffection in regiments, on account of the cartridge question. The 19th Native Infantry are in open mutiny, a stronger case than any I know on record in India; the Government will deal with it, I hope, judiciously. I only know the facts, but very few particulars, as to who or what is to be blamed. There are generally in these matters faults everywhere; but open mutiny cannot be passed over, or even partially excused." Fortunately for the interests of India, while the impending danger was treated with the most contemptuous indifference in Calcutta, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, was fully awake to the greatness of the crisis. A month before the outbreak at Meerut, he sent a pressing request to Sir James Outram to send back all the European troops without a moment's delay, peace having been concluded with Persia. His letter was accompanied by a communication from the Governor-General, authorizing Sir James to use his own discretion in the matter; and he deter-

The peace fortunate for the interests of British India.

mined at once to send back every European regiment, with the exception of the artillery; retaining the native troops till the treaty was ratified and Herat evacuated. The second division, which Havelock had commanded, was thus broken up, and as no Queen's troops were to remain in Persia, his occupation necessarily ceased. On the 9th of May, Sir James Outram issued a "Field Force Order," in which he returned "his thanks to the officers and men, and more especially to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., for the zealous and valuable assistance he has afforded at all times in command of the second division."

Havelock quitted Mohumra on the 15th, and reached Bombay on the 29th of May, where he heard, as he said, Havelock quits Mohumra, and reaches Bombay. "the astounding intelligence that the native regiments had mutinied at Meerut, Ferozepore, and Delhi; and that the fortress of Delhi, one of the few we possessed in India, was in the hands of the military insurgents, while disaffection seemed to be spreading throughout the upper provinces." His first impulse was to join the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, then marching on Delhi, with the least possible delay, and resume his duties as Adjutant-General of the army. But the monsoon had set in above the Ghats, the garrison of Agra had been disarmed, and great doubts were entertained of the fidelity of the troops in Central India, through which his road would lie. After long consultation with Lord Elphinstone and Colonel Melvill, the military secretary to the Government, it was decided that the route by Indore was not safe without a strong escort, which could not be spared. The 64th and 78th Highlanders, which had formed a part of his division in Persia a month before, had been sent round to Calcutta without landing at Bombay. "So I am proceeding," he writes, "by sea, prepared to give Lord Canning and Birch strong advice, if they consult me. This is the most tremendous convulsion I have ever witnessed, though I was in the thick of Cabul affairs: the crisis is eventful."

The Sepoy mutiny of 1857 was the most stupendous event in the annals of British India after the sack of Cal-

cutta, a hundred years before, and the battle of Plassey, which gave the sovereignty of India to Great Britain, and established the supremacy of Europe in Asia. Indeed, it would be difficult to find in the history of any nation a similar instance of the revolt of an army of a hundred thousand men against a well-established Government, whose only fault was that of having manifested too great a deference to their prejudices and humours. There is no previous example of an army thus proclaiming a war of extermination against its indulgent masters, and requiting their kindness by acts of the most atrocious barbarity. In any attempt to trace the origin of this convulsion, it must not be overlooked that there is no satisfactory evidence to connect the native princes with it. Some of the landholders of inferior note undoubtedly abetted the revolt, after it had become successful. When the strong Government which had held the passions of men in check was dissolved, many dreams of ambition were unfolded, and some of the zemindars in disorganized districts made a bold stroke for power and plunder. They fancied that the old days had returned, when daring spirits might take advantage of public commotions to carve out principalities for themselves. But all the great princes of India, with the exception of the King of Delhi, remained faithful to us, and to their own interests. The mutiny was simply a revolt of the army against the constituted authorities; and if there had been no military rising, there would have been no appearance of any social insurrection.

Various grounds of national discontent have been discovered since the mutiny, and set down as concurrent causes of it, with the view of condemning the Government of India. But it was impossible for a foreign and civilized and progressive rule like ours to be established in a semi-barbarous country like India, without coming into collision with the prejudices of the natives. Aliens in race and religion, in language and in habits, there could be no common bond of sympathy, and no link of attachment between the conquerors and the conquered. A

certain degree of disaffection was therefore inseparable from the existence of a Government such as ours. We could not take a step in the career of improvement without rousing the indignation of influential classes, whose happiness and dignity were identified with the perpetuity of institutions which we considered barbarous. But all these causes of alienation might have existed without creating an insurrection, though they would doubtless have increased our difficulties whenever it broke out. Nor were the causes of disaffection towards us stronger than those which must always have existed towards the tyrannical Government of the Mahomedans. Some have been so venturesome as to charge the mutiny on our alleged interference with the religion of the people. But, in a country where the Mahomedan conquerors had offered the most flagrant insults to the religion of the vanquished Hindoos, demolishing their shrines, and treading their most revered images under foot, without having for centuries excited even an *émeute*, it would be preposterous to suppose that forty millions of Hindoos would, on religious grounds, rise in revolt against a Government which had been neutral, even at the expense of its own character and dignity, and had carried the principle of toleration even beyond the limits of rectitude. Notwithstanding these assumed causes of disaffection, there was throughout the country a general feeling of acquiescence in our administration, under which India had enjoyed a degree of general prosperity, unknown for eight centuries. Life and property, which had always been insecure under former dynasties, were placed under the safeguard of the law; wealth was more generally diffused among the people; and at the period of the outbreak, there was every reason to believe that the various provinces of our Indian empire were settling down into the same state of permanent tranquillity and consolidation, which had characterized the Roman empire for more than two centuries.

The rule of England in India was suddenly shaken to its foundation by the revolt of the army. The immediate cause of that revolt was the greased cartridges; but many

predisposing causes had been gradually at work, and had prepared this body of mercenary soldiery for the crowning act of rebellion against its foreign masters. In India, the principle of military subordination is rather the exception than the rule. From time immemorial the native princes have been accustomed to dread their own armies, who were found to be less obedient in proportion to the laurels they had gained. Runjeet Singh, the last successful soldier of fortune in India, always declared that he dreaded the instruments of his elevation more than he dreaded his rivals or his enemies. No sooner was the iron hand of his despotism removed by death, than his army revolted against his feeble successor, and was prevented from plundering Lahore only by having the current of its cupidity dexterously turned upon the British provinces. Our own Sepoy army had been for more than twenty years in a state of chronic mutiny. In 1824, the 47th Native Infantry refused to march to Burmah, but, through the energy of Sir Edward Paget, was decimated before it was disbanded. The next exhibition of a mutinous spirit was unfortunately handled with less resolution, and the spirit of insubordination gained strength. At each successive act of indiscipline the Sepoys became more exacting, and the Government more yielding; till at length the obedience of the native army was little more than nominal. Our native troops were cajoled by concessions, and pampered by sweetmeats. The flattery distilled into their ears would have turned the heads of any body of troops, even if they had not been the Asiatic mercenaries of a foreign conqueror. They were encouraged in the belief that it was to their prowess alone that we owed the empire of India; and they came at length to the conclusion, that as they had once conquered India for us, they might now conquer it for themselves.

For this audacious attempt our Government had created the most tempting facilities by reducing the strength of its European force. To provide against the dis-
affection of the native soldiery, it had always
been considered prudent to maintain a due proportion of

Paucity of
European
troops.

European troops ; but in the augmentation of the native army, which the expansion of our dominions had rendered necessary, this precaution had been gradually lost sight of, and no corresponding addition had been made to the European corps. Success and tranquillity had engendered a presumptuous confidence, and in the hundredth year of the empire we believed it to be impregnable. Even after the proportion had been reduced to the ratio of one European corps to five native corps, and two regiments had been permanently established in Burmah, it was not deemed hazardous to send two corps to the Crimea, and four on the Persian expedition. At the beginning of 1857, the number of European troops in Bengal and the north-west provinces, among a population of fifty millions, did not exceed 4500, and nearly all the treasuries and the arsenals were without the protection of Europeans. The danger of revolt was, moreover, indefinitely increased by the constitution of the native Bengal army. High-caste Brahmins and Rajpoots were gradually allowed a numerical preponderance in each regiment. They were exceedingly difficult of management, from their lofty religious pretensions, which continually clashed with the requirements of military discipline. Unhappily, Government had always considered it less troublesome, and perhaps more safe, to humour than to control their caste prejudices. The low-caste men in each corps yielded a more implicit obedience to those who thus stood above them in the social scale than to their military superiors, and a more powerful influence than that of the commanding officer was thus established in the bosom of every regiment. To crown the difficulty of governing such an army, more than forty thousand of the troops had been recruited from the single province of Oude, and they were drawn not only from the same district, but often from the same village and the same family ; and that powerful bond of union which is created by local associations, and the ties of relationship, was thus firmly established in the Bengal army. It was, in fact, composed of groups of brotherhoods. The same sympathies pervaded the whole mass ; the chord which

was touched in one regiment immediately vibrated through every other; and a community of feeling on any question affecting their privileges or prejudices might be created within ten days between the Sepoys at Peshawur and those at Barrackpore, though separated from each other by a distance of fifteen hundred miles.

The year 1857, destined to be one of unexampled atrocities, dawned tranquilly on the rulers of India, and the empire was supposed to be in a state of the most profound repose. Suddenly, from a cause apparently insignificant, the spark was applied to the mine on which we had been slumbering, and in a few months India was in a blaze. It had been determined to improve the efficiency of the native army by the introduction of the Enfield rifle, the cartridges of which required to be lubricated. They were made up for the rifles in the laboratory at Dumdum. On the 22nd of January, Captain Wright informed Major Bontein, commanding the depôt of musketry at that station, that a very unpleasant feeling existed among the Sepoys who had been sent there for instruction, regarding the grease used in preparing the cartridges. It appears that a mechanic attached to the magazine, had asked a Sepoy of the 2nd Grenadiers for water from his lotah, or brass water-pot; the Sepoy refused it, on the ground that he did not know to what caste he belonged; when the mechanic immediately retorted, "You yourself will soon have no caste left, for you will be required to bite cartridges smeared with the fat of pigs and cows." However indifferent a Hindoo may be on the subject of his religious belief, he is frantic on any question of caste; and the man who would not hesitate to lampoon his gods for a consideration, would regard the attempt to touch his lips with a piece of beef as an inexpressible offence. It was then discovered, for the first time, that a report had been disseminated through the native army, that it was the design of Government to destroy the caste of the Sepoys by constraining them to bite off the end of greased cartridges. General Hearsay, commanding the Presidency division, fully estimating the gravity of the crisis, lost not an hour

in addressing the Deputy Adjutant-General of the army on the subject; and with the view of eradicating this impression from the minds of the Sepoys, proposed that the ingredients used in the preparation of the musket cartridge should be procured from the bazaar, and the Sepoys be allowed to make it up themselves. The Deputy Adjutant-General allowed three days to elapse before he forwarded the letter to the Military Secretary to Government, who replied on the 27th, that the Governor-General in Council sanctioned the proposal, and that it might be carried into effect, not only at Dumdum, but also at the stations of Umbala and Sealkote in the north-west. It was now, however, too late to remedy the mischief. By means of that active correspondence which was maintained with each other by men of the same caste and family in the various regiments, the alarm had already spread throughout the army, and it was universally believed that the greased cartridges were intended to destroy their caste, with the view of compelling them to embrace Christianity. General Hearsay held a court of inquiry at Barrackpore, to ascertain the cause of this universal disaffection, and he informed Government that although the men expressed themselves perfectly satisfied, the conviction that grease was used in the composition of the cartridges was now so deeply rooted in their minds, that it would be both idle and unwise to attempt to remove it. The spirit of mistrust and disaffection had, in fact, reached that point at which every effort to correct it by explanation only tended to confirm it, with the additional mischief of being regarded as an index of pusillanimity. On the 10th of February, the Sepoys at Barrackpore held a meeting on the parade ground at night, to concert a general rising, when they proposed to murder all the Europeans, plunder the station, and proceed where they liked. General Hearsay again addressed the Supreme Government in Calcutta in urgent terms, and affirmed that they had been dwelling at Barrackpore on a mine ready for explosion. He pointed out the extreme danger arising from the presence of four or five disaffected native

regiments so close to the metropolis, and quoted Sir Charles Metcalf's memorable remark, that we should wake some morning and find India lost to the Crown of England.

At length, on the 19th of February, the mutiny burst forth at Berhampore. The 19th Regiment broke out into open revolt, seized their muskets, and rushed with loud shouts on the parade ground. Colonel Mitchell, who commanded the regiment, had not a single European in the cantonment; but, with the aid of two guns, and a hundred and sixty irregular horse, who, from the circumstance of their enlistment and organization, were, in the early stages of the mutiny, better affected towards Government than the Sepoys of the line, managed to smother the flame without bloodshed. Government determined to make a signal example of the mutineers, and to crush this insubordinate spirit in the bud. Her Majesty's 84th Foot was ordered up from Rangoon, and on its arrival in Calcutta, the 19th was directed to proceed from Berhampore to Barrackpore. All the regiments at Barrackpore were, however, tainted with disaffection, but the 34th took the lead in the revolt; and on Sunday, the 29th of March, a Sepoy of the name of Mungul Panday, infuriated with intoxicating drugs, rushed on the parade ground, and called on his comrades to come forward in defence of their religion. The European sergeant-major of the regiment advanced to seize him, while the quarter-guard witnessed the scene without moving. The adjutant of the regiment then came to the rescue, but the Panday shot his horse, and then commenced a hand-to-hand conflict with both European officers. The Sepoys of the regiment, instead of supporting their officers, attacked them from behind, and they must have fallen victims to this murderous onslaught, had not General Hearsay rescued them by his personal resolution and gallantry.

On the arrival of the 19th at Barrackpore, the Queen's 84th, a wing of the 53rd, two batteries of artillery, and the Governor-General's body-guard were assembled on parade. General Hearsay, in

Mutiny of the
19th, at Ber-
hampore.

Leniency to-
wards the
mutineers of
the 19th.

obedience to the orders of the Governor-General, then read the public Order which had been passed on the occasion. It stated that the native officers and men of the regiment had been guilty of open and defiant mutiny, and that the punishment decreed by the Supreme Government was, that they should be discharged from the service, be deprived of their arms, receive their arrears of pay, and be required to take their departure from the cantonment. It was, moreover, directed, that this sentence—so utterly inadequate to the offence—should be read at the head of every regiment in India. Five weeks were then allowed to pass over without any decision on the conduct of the 34th Regiment. During this period of inaction the spirit of insubordination was rising to maturity throughout the Bengal army. On the 9th of May all the disposable troops, European and native, were assembled at Barrackpore to witness the punishment of the mutinous 34th. Four hundred of the most culpable in that corps were ordered on the parade; their crime, which was described to be the most heinous of which a soldier could be guilty, was then circumstantially detailed, after which they were paid up their arrears, and discharged from the public service, with orders to be conveyed to Chinsurah, to which place their families and their baggage were to be sent after them. Thus, on the spot where, thirty-three years before, the mutinous 47th had expiated their crime under showers of grape and the sabres of the cavalry, the 19th and the 34th, guilty of a more atrocious revolt, were punished only by discharge from the service, accompanied by the receipt of all their arrears to the uttermost farthing! The conduct of Government in 1824 nipped mutiny in the bud, while the conduct of the public authorities in 1857 rendered a revolt throughout the army, in the existing state of feeling, inevitable. Government now considered the mutiny at an end, and arrangements were made for sending the 84th back to Rangoon, when the telegraphic wire flashed the portentous news from Meerut, that the storm, which had been lowering for three months, had burst forth, and that the revolt of the Bengal army had begun.

On the 8th of May, cartridges were served out to the 3rd Cavalry at Meerut. They refused to accept them, though it was distinctly explained that they had not been smeared with grease. In fact, the army was ^{Mutiny at Meerut.} now ripe for mutiny. On the 9th, eighty-five of the recusants were tried by court-martial, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for terms varying from five to ten years. All the troops, European and native, were drawn up on parade, and the delinquents were stripped of their uniform and ironed. They were then marched off to jail, uttering imprecations on the Government. A deep feeling of resentment was manifested by the native troops while the irons were placed on their comrades; but no attempt at resistance was made. There were at the time two native infantry regiments at that station, and one of cavalry, and two European corps, with two troops of European horse artillery and a field battery. The European troops could easily have exterminated the native force; but, unhappily, the station was under the command of a worn-out and imbecile septuagenarian, General Hewitt, whose name has obtained a most unenviable notoriety in Indian history. Though it was evident that the native troops were in a state of the most perilous excitement, no precautions were adopted to prevent mischief, and thirty-two hours were passed in a state of total inactivity, while the Sepoys were planning the revolt. At length, at six in the evening of Sunday, the 11th of May, as the bell was tolling for church service, incendiary fires became visible in various directions. The incensed troopers of the 3rd Cavalry rushed to the jail, where no European guard had been stationed, knocked off the irons of their companions, and proceeded to liberate all the prisoners. Simultaneously with the forcing of the jail, the two infantry regiments assembled tumultuously on their parade, seized their arms, and massacred Colonel Finnis and other officers, who were endeavouring to appease them. The Sepoys, and the convicts, joined by the mob, now rushed into the houses of the Europeans, and indiscriminately massacred all they could seize, without regard to sex or

age, aggravating murder by outrages still more revolting. After they had plundered or destroyed the property, they set fire to the bungalows, and the cantonment was soon in a blaze. With two thousand European troops, who could have quelled the insurrection within an hour, the station was for two hours the scene of unchecked plunder, massacre, and havoc. When the destruction was complete, and every European man, woman, and child, within reach of the native troops, had been mercilessly butchered, they prepared leisurely to leave Meerut, and take the road to Delhi, distant about forty miles. It was at this stage of the catastrophe that the European troops were first brought into action; but it was now too late. The dragoons and the riflemen overtook and shot down a few of the mutineers in the rear, but without impeding the progress of the mass. Handled with the most ordinary skill, the European troops at the station might have effectually prevented the march of the mutineers to Delhi; but they were under the command of—General Hewitt. Though the intervening country was most favourable for the action of cavalry and artillery, the two arms in which we had the preponderance, and the route lay over two rivers, at each of which their progress might have been easily arrested, they were allowed to proceed to Delhi without a blow. On their arrival, they found no difficulty in persuading the two regiments stationed there to unite with them, and enact the same scenes of violence which they had perpetrated at Meerut. Every European found in the city, with here and there an exception, was put to death under circumstances of unexampled barbarity. There was not a single company of British troops to guard the arsenal, the second in magnitude and importance in the Bengal Presidency; and after a brief defence by the feeble handful of Europeans who hastened to its protection, it fell into the hands of the insurgents, with its almost inexhaustible stores and munitions of war. The pensioned King of Delhi was drawn from his obscurity, and proclaimed emperor of India; and a notification was issued, announcing that the Mogul dynasty again occupied its

ancient capital. Delhi thus became the seat of a rival power, and the centre of attraction to the revolted army. The native regiments at the stations in the neighbouring districts broke successively into revolt, and marched to Delhi, which soon contained within its walls a body of more than twenty thousand mutineers. Within a month after the outbreak at Meerut, the British authority had become extinct throughout the north-west provinces. From Meerut to Allahabad, among a population of 30,000,000, and through a territory many hundred miles in extent, there did not exist the vestige of a Government which on the 1st of January was considered unassailable—with the exception of the fort of Agra, and the closely beleaguered intrenchment at Cawnpore.

Havelock embarked on the 1st of June, in the *Erin* steamer at Bombay, for Galle, in the hope of meeting with the steamer proceeding from Suez to Calcutta. On the night of the 5th, the vessel approached the coast of Ceylon, going at the rate of eleven knots an hour; when, on a fine moonlight night, after Havelock had retired to his cabin, he felt a smart concussion, about one in the morning, which was repeated a moment after, and convinced him that the ship had struck. Immediately after, his son, who had accompanied him and was sleeping on deck, came down into the cabin and said, "Get up, sir, the vessel is ashore." He arose, and having dressed himself, proceeded on deck, and found that the vessel, after having struck on a reef of rock, had glided into deep water. The forepart had at once filled, and it was expected that she would go down head foremost; but she was driven on by the waves, and struck again and again, and at length one long surge fixed her firmly on the reef. The deck presented a scene of wild confusion. The commander had sprung from his bed, overwhelmed by the misfortune. The crew of Lascars would obey no orders; indeed, few were given, and nothing could induce them to go aloft, and send down the upper masts and yards. Havelock is reported by one who was on deck to have addressed the few European sailors

Havelock embarks on the *Erin* at Bombay, and is wrecked.

on board, "Now, my men, if you will obey orders, and keep from the spirit cask, we shall all be saved." The vessel continued to strike heavily for four hours, and those on board, momentarily expecting her to go to pieces, looked anxiously for daylight. Guns were fired, and blue lights burned, which brought the judge of the district and a crowd of men to the beach. One bold native was prevailed on to swim through the roaring surf with a line to the vessel. A hawser was then drawn on shore, and communication established with it. At dawn canoes pushed off to the vessel, and the passengers, crew, and specie were all saved. On reaching the land, Havelock, according to the statement of an eye-witness, called on those who had accompanied him to kneel down, and return thanks to Almighty God for their deliverance. "The madness of man," he wrote, "threw us on shore; the mercy of God found us a soft place near Cultura." From that town he proceeded to Galle, and finding the *Fire Queen*—which had been sent from Calcutta in quest of any available troops,—lying in the harbour and about to return, immediately embarked in her.

On his arrival at Madras, on the 13th of June, the flags of the shipping and on Fort St George, flying half-mast high, gave him the first intimation of the death of General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief. He had sunk under an attack of cholera on the 26th of May, at Umbala, on his way to the siege of Delhi, and the Governor-General had telegraphed to Madras to request Sir Patrick Grant, the Commander-in-Chief at that Presidency, to come up to Calcutta without delay, and assume the direction of military operations at this eventful crisis. Sir Patrick was an officer on the Bengal establishment, and had raised himself in former years, by his own talents and merit, to the important post of Adjutant-General of the Bengal army. After having retired to England, he was selected to command in chief at Madras, and was the first soldier in the service of the East India Company ever elevated to a post which had,

Havelock reaches Madras, and accompanies Sir Patrick Grant to Calcutta.

to that time, been invariably conferred on an officer of the royal army. His large military experience, more especially of the character and peculiarities of the native army which was now in a state of revolt, recommended him as the fittest man to assume the command of it at this emergency. He was an old comrade of Havelock's, and they had fought side by side at the battle of Maharajpore, and in the Sutlege campaign. He entertained, and had often expressed, the highest opinion of his friend's military abilities, and now requested him to proceed to Calcutta, and assist in quelling the mutiny, instead of returning to Bombay. Havelock's post of Adjutant-General of Queen's troops required him to be at the side of the Commander-in-Chief in India, wherever he might be. By the death of General Anson, Sir Henry Somerset, who was at the head of the Bombay army, succeeded to the supreme command by virtue of his rank, and it then became Havelock's duty to join him; but he was induced by Sir Patrick to proceed to Calcutta. The convulsion which now shook our Indian empire to its foundation, had been the subject of deep reflection with Havelock, and his mind revolved the means of restoring it to its former integrity. He had employed the leisure of the voyage from Bombay to Galle, in drawing up a memorandum on the subject, which he intended to transmit on his arrival in Calcutta to General Anson; but on hearing of his death, and the appointment of Sir Patrick Grant to the command of the Bengal army, he submitted it to him, after having added two paragraphs at Madras. It must be borne in mind that this paper was written only three weeks after the mutiny had broken out, and before it was known to have extended to more than half a dozen of the military stations at the Bengal Presidency. Keeping this fact in view, it will readily be admitted that the memorandum affords strong evidence of that grasp of mind which enabled him habitually to comprehend at a glance the full bearing of a military question, and, on this occasion, of his clear perception of the exigencies of the present crisis.

“Memorandum regarding the Mutinies of the Native Soldiery in Bengal.

“Steamer *Erin*, Malabar Coast,
June 3, 1857.

“Lord Elphinstone communicated to me at Bombay the contents of a series of telegrams from the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, and from Colonel Durand, officiating Governor-General’s agent for Central India, with copies of despatches from the Chief Commissioner in the Punjab, and from the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army, the latter including several military reports, as well as letters from the Commissioner in Scinde, and the Major-General commanding at Kurachee. The purport of these does not differ much in substance from the newspaper statements. It is evident that there has been mutiny and devastation at Ferozepore, where the native regiments doubtfully contended for the mastery with H. M.’s 61st regiment, and that there has been a bloody massacre at Meerut. The perpetrators of this infernal outrage marched upon Delhi in the night, where the same scene of lawless violence and murder was repeated by the garrison, who, in conjunction with the Meerut mutineers, have taken possession of the fortress and arsenal, after destroying the bridge of boats and attempting to seize the powder magazine, which was blown up to save it from their hands. A detachment at Muttra has possessed itself of the treasure. The same has been done at Boolundshuhur, by some body of the mutineers. The native troops at Agra have been disarmed; those at Mhow are distrusted. The mingled vigour and moderation of Sir Henry Lawrence have hitherto kept tranquil the province of Oude. The Nusseree battalion, charged with the duty of escorting the siege train from Philour, marched to Syree, and then mutinously returned to Jutog, where it remained moody and suspected within a few miles of Simla.”

After some remarks on the siege of Delhi, he proceeds to observe:—

“After retaking Delhi, his Excellency should despatch a sufficiency of British troops to Ferozepore, to enable Brigadier Innes to take the initiative, and attack and annihilate the native troops there. The British troops, including the 61st, should then march towards Delhi, and onward to Cawnpore, whither his Excellency would have proceeded, to support that important and

ill-protected point. The British troops must continue to campaign, regardless of season.

“The insurrection must have assumed a new phase before I can reach Calcutta. Much that I have above counselled, or something similar to it, may have been carried out. But some general principles may be laid down for the suppression of the insurrection. It is clear that no regular Native Infantry regiment can now be trusted. All are in heart implicated in the treason, if not in act. All must henceforth be jealously watched by the British troops. Every overt act must be visited with prompt attack and bloody overthrow. To enable Government to do this, it must at once establish an ascendancy of British infantry and artillery at the head-quarters of all the divisions, especially at Calcutta and at Allahabad, where the forts must be intrusted entirely to British troops; and at Dinapore and Cawnpore, where the British troops must be strongly reinforced. No piece of cannon must be henceforth intrusted to a native.

“I would recommend that the three battalions of the Hon. Company’s European infantry should be called on to volunteer into the artillery with a liberal bounty, that the regular cavalry should be dismounted, and their horses reserved for the additional cavalry regiments that ought to be demanded from England;* that the detached corps of Native Infantry should everywhere be drawn into division head-quarters, and encamped in assailable positions within the stations, without access to any means of transport, the British troops, foot and artillery, remaining in barracks, but on the *qui vive*, and plentifully supplied with carriage (camels, &c.). Many regiments are necessary for these arrangements; for there should be two regiments at or near Fort William, two at Dinapore, one at Allahabad, three or four at Cawnpore, two or three at Meerut, one at Benares, two at least at Agra. The most unusual means must be resorted to, in order to shelter these troops, which must be put up in private bungalows, stables, &c., or kept under canvas, without reference to the season. The whole of the Enfield rifles must be given over to the British troops. It must be proclaimed, that if the disbanded Sepoys are harboured in any of the invalid villages, or by invalided soldiers, the sponge will be applied to the pensions of the harbourers. These men must report themselves periodically to collectors,

* Havelock, in a note in the margin of the copy, has written in his own hand, “Erase—their conduct has been hitherto good.”

under pain of summary commitment to jail with hard labour for a year. But there must be no more disbandments for mutiny. Mutineers must be attacked and annihilated; and if they are few in any regiment, and not immediately denounced to be shot or hanged, the whole regiment must be deemed guilty, and given up to prompt military execution. It may be hoped that the Punjab will remain tranquil, and if so, the reinforcements from Bombay, Pegu, Ceylon, and the force destined for China, will suffice to overpower all resistance from Fort William to the Sutlege. But much depends on prompt action. The time for threats or promises is gone by; the slightest overt act must be followed by the same retribution which in 1824 Sir Edward Paget dealt out to the 47th Native Infantry, thereby putting back mutiny in Bengal eighteen years.

“It is easy to dispose of the greased cartridge question. It has been said that no native soldier should again be trusted with the charge of a piece of ordnance. Neither can he be safely trusted with an Enfield or Minie rifle. All these weapons should be given over to the British troops, and, as an earnest of this intention, the native portion of the details at the depôts of instruction be at once sent back to their regiments. As they are to have no rifled muskets, the native soldiers will not need greased cartridges; and to put an end to all suspicion as to the preparation of the musket cartridges, the practice might be resumed of sending the materials to regiments to be made up. The new instruction to tear, not bite, the cartridge, seems under such arrangements supererogatory.

“A movable column has been established to keep the Punjab in awe; Sir Henry Barnard’s force will perform this office from the Sutlege to Allahabad. It might perhaps be desirable to form a third, to overawe the lower provinces.”

After his arrival at Madras, he added two paragraphs to the memorandum:—

“The measure of success reported from Delhi to Madras is gratifying; but much evidently remains to be done in order to restore even a temporary ascendancy of our arms. It seems more probable that battering in breach and a bombardment of the town should be tried, instead of an effort against the gates; and these are the safer modes of acting.

“The death of General Anson on the 26th of May is a heavy misfortune, let faction view it as it may; but the Government

have met the crisis with the utmost sagacity and promptitude by summoning to Bengal the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, the officer in India who has by far the most extensive and varied knowledge of the composition and peculiarities of the Bengal army; and by appointing Sir Henry Barnard, an officer of Crimean experience and reputation, to command the besieging army."

The two Generals landed in Calcutta on the 17th of June, five weeks after the outburst at Meerut, and found that it had been followed by the defection of all the troops in the north-west provinces. The two Generals reach Calcutta. The advice they were enabled to give to the Government amidst these scenes of confusion and bewilderment was most important and valuable. In the memorandum which Havelock had drawn up on board the *Erin*, a fortnight before, he had recommended the formation of a movable column to overawe the lower provinces. Since that suggestion was penned, the British authority had become extinct in the districts above Allahabad, except in the little garrison of Cawnpore, which was menaced with instant destruction, and the Residency at Lucknow now threatened by an insurgent force. The organization of this movable column had now become a question of immediate necessity, and it was required, not so much to maintain, as to restore our authority in the revolted districts.

Three days after Havelock's arrival in Calcutta, he was selected for the command of this column, which was to be formed at Allahabad, and to consist of the 64th Havelock appointed to command the movable column. and the 78th Highlanders, in addition to other troops. Thus, by a singular coincidence of circumstances, the gallant soldiers whom he had commanded on the Euphrates, and whom the cowardice of the Persians had deprived of laurels at Mohumra, were now reassembled under his command, on the banks of the Ganges, to encounter a foe more worthy of their steel. Of the 78th Highlanders Havelock had formed a very high estimate, and in his confidential report of that corps, made before leaving Persia, a copy of which was found among his papers, had said:—

“There is a fine spirit in the ranks of this regiment. I am given to understand that it behaved remarkably well in the affair at Khooshab, near Bushire, which took place before I reached the army; and during the naval action on the Euphrates, and its landing here, its steadiness, zeal, and activity under my own observation were conspicuous. The men have been subjected in this service to a good deal of exposure, to extremes of climate, and have had heavy work to execute with their intrenching tools, in constructing redoubts and making roads. They have been, while I have had the opportunity of watching them, most cheerful; and have never seemed to regret or complain of anything but that they had no further chance of meeting the enemy. I am convinced the regiment would be second to none in the service, if its high military qualities were drawn forth. It is proud of its colours, its tartan, and its former achievements.”

Havelock's opinion of the Highlanders.

The opportunity was soon to be afforded to Havelock to draw forth those high military qualities which he had so confidently predicted, and the succeeding narrative will show that the achievements of the Highlanders in 1857 added fresh lustre to the renown they had acquired at Maida and Assaye. The object of Havelock's appointment was thus described in the instructions he received in Calcutta: that “after quelling all disturbances at Allahabad, he should not lose a moment in supporting Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, and Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawnpore; and that he should take prompt measures for dispersing and utterly destroying all mutineers and insurgents.” It was likewise stated to be of the utmost importance that no delay should arise in carrying out these measures. “It was not possible at the moment to give him any more precise or definite instructions, but he must necessarily be guided by circumstances; and the Commander-in-Chief had entire confidence in his well-known and often proved high ability, vigour, and judgment.” A cursory view of the scene of action in which Havelock was now to be engaged, and the position of affairs at Benares, Allahabad, Cawnpore, and Lucknow, may be useful in elucidating his movements.

CHAPTER VII.

Position of Affairs at Benares—at Allahabad—at Cawnpore—at Lucknow.—The Oude Mutiny.—Resources placed at the Disposal of General Havelock.—He reaches Benares, and assumes the Command of the Army.—Proceeds to Allahabad.—Letter from Sir Henry Lawrence.—Detachment sent on to Cawnpore.—The Cawnpore Massacre.—The General starts for that Place.—March of the first three Days.—Battle of Futtehpore.—Remarks on it.—Order of the Day.—Disarming of the Irregular Cavalry.—Action at Aong—at Pandoo nuddee.—The Battle of Cawnpore.—Final Charge and Rout of the Enemy.—Remarks on the Battle.—Night of the 16th July.—The Order of the Day after the Battle.—The General's private Letters respecting it.

IN the great revolt which now convulsed the empire, it was naturally to have been expected that the turbulent city of Benares would be among the first to rise against us. That city is considered the most sacred spot in India, the citadel of Hindooism, crowded with magnificent temples, and filled with wealthy devotees, nobles, and princes from every province in Hindostan. It had always been the focus of political intrigue among the Hindoos in the north-west. It was inhabited by a martial and irritable population, little short of two hundred thousand. It contained no fortress, or other defensive inclosure, and the chief post of authority was necessarily an office of pre-eminent difficulty. Happily, it was at this crisis in the hands of a man fully equal to its exigencies, Mr Henry Carre Tucker, a member of the Civil Service; to whose judgment, resolution, and energy the Government was indebted for the maintenance of its authority in the city and surrounding district during the rebellion. The native force consisted of the 37th Native Infantry, the Loodiana Sikh corps, and a detachment of the 13th Irregular Cavalry. To check their disposition to fraternize with the mutineers, there were only three guns of

Major Olpherts's battery, and 190 European Infantry of H.M.'s 10th Foot. It was of the utmost importance that this small force should be strengthened without delay, as the loss of Benares at this juncture would have involved the most momentous consequences. The 1st Fusiliers had been ordered up from Madras, and they arrived in Calcutta towards the end of May, under the command of Colonel Neill. It was determined to push them up the country without delay, and they were forwarded a hundred and twenty miles by rail to Raneegunge, and from thence by other conveyances to their destination. Colonel Neill inaugurated his arrival, and gave the public the first promise of that promptitude and decision of character, which have since earned him the high position he occupies in the annals of the mutiny and the esteem of his fellow-countrymen, by a display of vigour which was at the time as invaluable as it was appropriate. Reaching the terminus opposite Calcutta with his men just as the train was starting, and the railway officials refusing to wait a moment, he directed his soldiers to seize the engine driver and stoker, and detain them until his troops had taken their seats. This energetic act, apparently insignificant at the time, is said to have proved the salvation of Benares. The Colonel arrived at that station, with forty men of his regiment, in the forenoon of the 3rd of June. It was not a moment too soon; the native troops had planned a general rising for the next night. Brigadier Ponsonby, commanding the station, was incapacitated by illness from acting with the energy which the crisis required. Colonel Neill's arrival threw matters into strong hands, and before dusk in the evening the outbreak was quenched in the blood of a hundred of the insurgents slain, while twice the number were disabled by wounds.

After having, by examples of extraordinary severity, and the unrestrained use of the gallows, struck terror into the malcontents at Benares, Colonel Neill proceeded to Allahabad, eighty miles distant, which had in the mean time become the scene of one of those awful tragedies which had hitherto marked the progress of

Colonel Neill sent with the Fusiliers to Benares.

State of affairs at Allahabad.

the mutiny. Allahabad, situated at the junction of the Ganges and the Jumna, had always been considered the key of the lower provinces. The fortress contained an arsenal second in importance only to that of Delhi, with 40,000 stand of arms, and a vast collection of cannon and military stores. The treasury at the station was also rich and tempting. In that spirit of fatal security which preceded and accelerated the mutiny, this important post had been left without any European artillerymen, and, excepting the magazine staff, without a single European soldier. At the period of the mutiny the garrison consisted of the whole of Brasyer's Ferozepore regiment of Sikhs, and 100 men of the 6th Native Infantry; the remainder of the corps being cantoned in the station without the fort. Thus from the 11th of May, the date of the outbreak at Meerut, this great fortress and most important strategical point had been at the mercy of the native force. If they had made up their minds at once to cast in their lot with their comrades who were contesting the empire at Delhi, and had taken possession of the fort, there would have been no base of operation for the force destined to reconquer the north-west provinces farther north than Benares. Happily, at the distance of sixty miles lay the fortress of Chunar, garrisoned by a small body of European artillerymen, invalided from active service, but still effective for garrison duties. On the 19th of May, the authorities in Calcutta were advised to order about seventy of these men, the youngest above fifty years of age, to proceed by steamer to Allahabad. Their arrival saved the fort.

The 6th Native Infantry had manifested an ostentatious loyalty by volunteering to march to Delhi and fight their mutinous comrades. The Governor-General directed his thanks to be publicly conveyed to them for their fidelity to the Government; the troops were assembled on parade on the evening of the 6th of June, and gave three cheers as the Order was read to them. The officers then left the parade with the strongest confidence in their men, and with a feeling of pride that

Revolt of the
6th Native
Infantry at
Allahabad.

their regiment should have been conspicuous for its good faith amidst universal disaffection. Four hours afterwards, fourteen of them paid the penalty of their generous credulity with their lives. They were barbarously murdered as they sat at dinner, or shot down as they hastened to their lines, on an alarm raised to decoy them there by the treacherous Sepoys. The fort was saved by the veteran invalids, under their commander, Captain Hazlewood, and Lieut. Brasyer, who was in command of the Sikhs. In the outbreak at Benares, two days before, the Loodiana corps of Sikhs, under the influence either of premeditated design or an unaccountable panic, had opened fire on the European troops, which was returned, and great numbers of them had been shot down. Their brethren at Allahabad had been exasperated by the report of this slaughter, and, being doubtful of the treatment they themselves might receive, were disposed to turn against us and join the insurgents. But Lieut. Brasyer's extraordinary influence over them and his great personal intrepidity kept them steady; and through their instrumentality, and the aid of the invalid artillery, the 100 Sepoys of the 6th, who were in the fort and ready to open the gates to their comrades, were disarmed. Immediately after the mutiny, the native soldiers liberated the inmates of the great jail, who joined them in massacring all the Europeans whom they could discover. The demon of destruction seemed now to be let loose on the unfortunate station, and the greatest atrocities were committed without any check, till the arrival of Colonel Neill. Every European house and establishment was plundered or burnt. The rails of the railway were torn up, the station committed to the flames, and the engines battered to pieces with shot, the ignorant natives being afraid to approach them. But the greatest of all losses was that of 1600 bullocks, which had been collected by the Commissariat and which disappeared in the confusion, thus crippling to a fatal extent the means of locomotion for the troops to be employed in the restoration of order. After five days of unrestrained licence, Colonel Neill arrived at

Allahabad, and a wing of the Fusiliers was soon after collected there; 2000 of the rebels, who had intrenched themselves near the fort, were immediately attacked and dispersed, and the wavering Sikhs confirmed in their loyalty. The disaffected portion of the town was burnt, every malignant who could be identified was executed, and a salutary dread was diffused through the neighbouring country, and along the great trunk road.

At the distance of 120 miles from Allahabad, on the right bank of the Ganges, lay the military cantonment of Cawnpore, one of the most important stations in the Bengal Presidency, the connecting link between Allahabad and Agra and Delhi. It had never hitherto been left without a European regiment, and was often protected by two. In June, 1857, however, there were only 200 European soldiers and ten guns. It was under the command of Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, a soldier of great Indian experience, in whom Government reposed high and well-merited confidence. About the middle of May, perceiving a growing spirit of disaffection in the four native regiments under his command, he had taken the precaution of throwing up an intrenchment as a place of resort in case of extremity; but so great was his confidence in the loyalty of the troops in whose ranks his life had been passed and his honours gained, that he regarded this intrenchment rather for its moral effect than as a refuge for safety in danger, the possibility of which his faith in the native soldier prevented him from entertaining. The work was therefore never rendered actually defensible, nor was it adequately provided with water and supplies. His position in a military point of view was, moreover, embarrassed by the women and children of the 32nd Foot, quartered at Lucknow, the ladies of the station, and other female fugitives from the surrounding districts. On the night of the 6th of June, the native regiments broke out into open mutiny, burnt down the lines, and plundered the treasury of £170,000. Glutted with this booty, they proposed to march to Delhi, which had become the magnet of the dis-

affected, and join their mutinous brethren; but they were persuaded by Nana Sahib to take service under his standard, and complete the extermination of the English.

Nana Sahib, whose name will ever be conspicuous in the annals of crime, as the personification of perfidy and cruelty, was the adopted son of Bajee Row, the Peishwa, or head of the ancient Mahratta confederacy. In the year 1818, while at peace with the British Government, the Peishwa, by an act of the basest treachery, had endeavoured to destroy Mr Mountstuart Elphinstone, the Resident at his court, at Poonah; but the assault was gallantly repelled, and he was obliged to fly from his capital, and was hunted through the country for several months, by Sir John Malcolm. His power was finally crushed at the battle of Ashtee. But just at the period when he was brought to bay, and must have surrendered at discretion, he was admitted to terms, and by an act of unwise prodigality pensioned with an annuity of £90,000. This provision he lived to enjoy for thirty-two years, and, after having received from the British Government a sum exceeding two millions and a half sterling, died at Bithoor, about sixteen miles above Cawnpore, which had been assigned as the place of his residence. Of these accumulations, he bequeathed a large portion to his adopted son, Nana Sahib, who had the assurance to demand the continuance of the pension. It was, as a matter of course, refused, and from that time he conceived the most frantic hostility to the English. His feelings were, however, artfully dissembled, and he freely associated with and gave entertainments to the European community at Cawnpore, by whom he was regarded as a liberal and enlightened native nobleman. When the spirit of disaffection first appeared among the native troops at Cawnpore, the Nana manifested the most friendly disposition towards Sir Hugh Wheeler, and at his request afforded every assistance for the safeguard of our treasury, which remained for several days under the protection of 600 of his men and two of his guns. But no sooner had the Sepoys at Cawnpore broken into open mutiny, than he threw off the mask

and took the lead in the hostile movement. Having obtained the larger share of the plunder of the treasury, and persuaded the mutineers to place themselves under his command, he proclaimed himself Peishwa, and raised the ancient national Mahratta standard. The indiscriminate destruction of the European and native Christians, under every form of barbarity, who had not taken refuge in the intrenchment to which Sir Hugh Wheeler had retired, now became the pastime of this fiend in human shape. A hundred and twenty-six fugitive English ladies, and English gentlemen, and children had escaped from the insurgents at Futtyghur, and were proceeding down the river to Allahabad, when the boats were descried by the Nana's followers at Bithoor and brought to, and the whole party was ruthlessly murdered. The revolted Sepoys, swelled in number by the recruits enlisted by Nana Sahib, and aided by the large resources of the Cawnpore magazine, which Sir Hugh Wheeler had attempted in vain to blow up, now closed round the intrenchment. The sufferings of the ill-sheltered inmates, from the combined effect of exposure, privation, and ceaseless watching night and day under arms, and of the fire incessantly concentrated on them from a powerful artillery, present perhaps the most dismal page in the history of British India. On the day on which General Havelock in Calcutta received his appointment to the command of the column collecting at Allahabad for the relief of Cawnpore, the garrison was driven, after a defence the record of which is imperishable, to entertain thoughts of a capitulation, not for their own sakes, but for that of the helpless women and children. Four days afterwards, this band of Englishmen, bright in their valour, and of English women, still brighter in their fortitude, by an act of the most atrocious perfidy, had ceased to exist.

Turning now to Lucknow, the capital of Oude. That kingdom was annexed to the British dominions at the beginning of 1856, under the express orders of the home authorities, after the receipt of a report made by Sir James Outram, the Resident. The

Position of affairs at Oude and Lucknow.

equity of this proceeding has been questioned by some, and vindicated by others, and as arguments are advanced on both sides of the question, it will probably continue for some years to exercise the ingenuity of those home politicians who take, or affect, an interest in Indian politics. The settlement of this doubtful point, must, therefore, be left to the future historian, whose judgment will be free from contemporary prejudices or sympathies. The salient points of the case are these; that we made a treaty with the reigning family in Oude, by which the ruler bound himself to govern the country with justice and equity, and we engaged to support his throne with the full weight of our authority, which was then omnipotent in India. But for many years the obligations of the monarch had been entirely forgotten. The sovereigns of Oude had been punctiliously faithful in their allegiance to the paramount power, but they had totally neglected the corresponding duty they owed to their own subjects, and resigned themselves to voluptuous indolence. The talookdars had covered the land with fortresses, which they filled with their adherents, and were thus enabled to resist the public authorities, and oppress the people with impunity. They created a solitude around them; and the province, which is justly esteemed the garden of India, was fast relapsing into a desert. There had been no example of such misgovernment in Hindostan for a century. The only effective check on the oppression of native rulers in India is the dread of insurrection, but this had been entirely removed in Oude by the presence of our troops. Repeated warnings had been given to the kings of Oude by the Governor-General, but without effect. The increasing anarchy of the kingdom at length threatened the tranquillity of our own contiguous provinces. It became necessary for the Government of India to proceed from advice to action, and it was resolved to annex the province to the British dominions and assign a suitable pension to the King. An attempt has been made to connect the mutiny of the Bengal army with the policy of annexation, but it has failed, chiefly from the incontrovertible fact, that in the existing condition of our

native army, there must sooner or later have been a mutiny, whether Oude had been annexed or not. At the same time it was manifest that, whenever it did occur, there would be a convulsion in this province, which was inhabited by the families of 40,000 of our native soldiers. As soon, therefore, as our authority was subverted in the north-west provinces, the native army in Oude, which we had taken over with the kingdom as it stood, and re-organized as a local force, manifested the strongest sympathy with their relatives in our own revolted army, and went into rebellion. It was part of the policy of Lord Dalhousie to disarm the population, and dismantle the fortresses of the talookdars ; but he left India within two months of the annexation, and that precautionary measure was not carried out. When our prestige in Oude was once shaken, the talookdars were among the first to rise against the foreign power which threatened to restrain their violence. Five thousand European troops would have been amply sufficient to maintain our ascendancy, but there were not a thousand British bayonets and sabres to hold in check a local army of 20,000 men, an insubordinate nobility, and a disaffected city with a population of 300,000, every male of whom possessed arms, and had been trained to their use from his childhood, in the chronic warfare which was the normal state of the province. Sir Henry Lawrence, one of the ablest officers of Government, and animated by the most benevolent sympathies towards the natives, was offered the post of Resident, and, though broken in constitution, had too high a sense of duty to refuse the responsibility. He entered on his duties towards the end of March, 1857, while the discontent on account of the greased cartridges was ripening into revolt. He was indignant at the leniency shown to the mutinous 19th, and began to draw from it a gloomy foreboding for the future. The effect of that fatal measure was more particularly felt in Oude, where our authority was not yet firmly established ; and the spirit of insubordination was rapidly stimulated when the fact became known. "Is it true," said a native officer of one of the local corps to his

European superior, "that the mutinous regiment has been paid up and dismissed? Within two months there will be mutiny from Calcutta to Peshawur."

On the 2nd of May the first symptoms of mutiny were exhibited at Lucknow among the native troops, but they were suppressed without bloodshed, by the tact and resolution of Sir Henry Lawrence. He saw the storm lowering, and endeavoured to prepare for it with his usual forethought, by collecting supplies, and fortifying the Residency and Muchee Bhawun as military posts; while at the same time he omitted no opportunity of conciliating the influential men in the city, and the faithful among the troops, by holding Durbars and distributing dresses of honour. But nothing could now avert the headlong progress of revolt. The explosion at Meerut, and the establishment of a rival authority at Delhi, spread the contagion of mutiny among the Sepoys in Oude; and on the 30th of May, the regiments at the capital appeared in open rebellion. Their example was followed by the troops at the out-stations in the province, which fell one by one into the hands of the insurgents; and our authority in Oude, which had been supreme for eighteen months, was soon confined to the circle round the Residency.

The rebel troops, from 20,000 to 25,000 strong, gradually collected at Nawaubgunge, about eighteen miles north-east of Lucknow. Mr Gubbins, the Financial Commissioner, and second in position to Sir Henry, who rendered the most important services during the subsequent protracted siege, which have not hitherto been appreciated as they deserve, had charge of the intelligence department, and received information early on the 29th of June, that about 3000 of the enemy's force had advanced to Chinhut, eight miles from the Residency. He recommended an immediate attack on this body, before it could be reinforced, under the impression that to defeat it by a vigorous blow would produce a great moral effect, and improve the position of affairs at the capital. A reconnoissance was accordingly made, but the attack

Mutiny at
Lucknow, on
the 30th of
May.

Action at
Chinhut.

was unhappily delayed for many hours, during which time the whole body of the enemy, with more than twenty guns, had joined the encampment at Chinhut. Our troops marched out rather late on the morning of the 30th of June; and being exposed without food to the scorching rays of the sun, were exhausted before they reached the scene of action. Some of the native artillery drivers deserted to the enemy with their guns, or treacherously overturned them, and the whole of the native cavalry took to flight. Our small body of troops, exposed to twenty times their number, encountered a serious reverse. Sir Henry Lawrence, who accompanied the force, did all that the greatest valour or the most brilliant personal example could effect, but the troops were overpowered and discomfited, and retreated fighting every inch of the way, closely pursued by the enemy, who were checked only as they reached the iron bridge by the guns from the Residency. The effect of this action was disastrous beyond calculation. Our authority in the city, which had hitherto been well maintained, was extinguished; all the workmen deserted the Residency fortifications on which they had laboured steadily; the collection of supplies was stopped; and within a few hours the Residency itself was placed in a state of siege, from which it was not relieved for four months and a half.

Such was the torrent of revolt which Havelock found himself suddenly called upon to stem. The resources which the Government of India were able to place at his disposal for the accomplishment of this arduous task were singularly inadequate to the exigency. His column was to consist of four European regiments, to be gradually collected at Allahabad; but when he marched out of that station to the recapture of Cawnpore on the 7th of July, he had not more than 1400 European bayonets under his command; and, until the arrival of reinforcements with General Outram, ten weeks after, was never able to muster a larger number around the colours. Of these only one-fourth were armed with the Enfield rifle, the remainder still carried the old musket. Not only had

Resources
placed at the
disposal of
Havelock.

he no horsed guns, but no cavalry. Captain Maude, who commanded the artillery, had been directed to leave his guns at Ceylon, and brought only thirty men with him, and he was obliged to equip six guns hastily taken from the arsenal at Allahabad as he best could. To supply the deficiency of artillerymen, thirty-one privates were selected from the 64th Foot, who happened to have some knowledge of gun drill; and it was with these half-trained gunners and the sexagenarian Chunar invalids, and the handful of royal artillerymen, that the force took the field. The guns, moreover, were drawn by undersized cart bullocks, unaccustomed to the work, and totally unfitted for it; and neither the commanding officer nor his subordinates, from their ignorance of the language, were able to communicate with the native drivers, except through an interpreter. To crown Havelock's difficulties, the season of the year in which he was obliged to march was the month of July, when sweltering heat alternates with drenching rain, and which had always been considered impracticable for military operations. He was thus required to open a campaign at a time when it had been deemed necessary, according to immemorial usage in India, to bring it to a close. But he had now attained the summit of his wishes,—the independent command of a force which he could wield according to his own military judgment,—and the difficulties of the enterprise only served to strengthen his ardour. He entered upon his duties in the same spirit of dependence on Divine aid, and of personal resolution, which had marked his previous career in subordinate positions. "I was yesterday" (June 20th), he writes to Mrs Havelock, "reappointed Brigadier-General, and leave for Allahabad by dawk as soon as possible. Sir Patrick Grant lost no time in recommending me for this important command, the object of which is to relieve Cawnpore, where Sir Hugh Wheeler is threatened, and Lucknow, where Sir Henry Lawrence is pressed. May God give me wisdom to fulfil the expectations of Government, and to restore tranquillity in the disturbed districts!" He selected Lieut.-Colonel Fraser Tytler for the post of

Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-master General, and Captain Stuart Beatson for that of Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant General, and appointed his son, Lieut. Henry Havelock, Adjutant of the 10th Foot, his aide-de-camp. Knowing that the large supply of commissariat draught cattle at Allahabad had been entirely lost during the sack of the cantonment, he feared lest the progress of his column should be delayed for want of carriage, and he represented to Government that the carts and bullocks on the grand trunk road were no longer necessary for the transport of troops, as there were no more to forward at present. He also stated, that the rains having now set in and the rivers being open, the water route would be preferable for the subsequent conveyance of reinforcements. On the road between Calcutta and the Soane there were three large rivers, always subject during the rains to the most violent freshes, on the banks of which troops might be detained for several days, wet, hungry, and possibly sick; whereas in the steamers they would reach Allahabad in eighteen days, with their baggage and tents, and in health and spirits. He therefore proposed that the carts and bullocks should be made over for the transport of ammunition, stores, and perhaps food, for the use of his column. He even went so far as to suggest that it might be advantageous to forward the entire establishment of conveyances from the different stations to Allahabad. At all events, he requested permission to appropriate all such as he found collected at and about Benares, as "he felt confident that unless every measure be adopted in anticipation, to render the column perfectly and instantly efficient in this most important respect, delay was likely to occur at a moment when every hour was precious, and pregnant with the fate of our countrymen." He likewise solicited orders to make a liberal but discreet use of secret service money, to be accompanied by a voucher from himself, on honour. It is partly to this circumstance that the singular accuracy of his information is to be attributed, as he was thus enabled to keep his scout department in a state of the highest effi-

ciency, through the bountiful rewards he bestowed on his spies.

Havelock left Calcutta on the evening of the 25th of June, and reached Benares on the 28th, the day after the

Havelock
reaches Ben-
ares on the
28th June.

Cawnpore garrison had been annihilated. At that station he assumed the command of the expedition, and saw the first of the troops who were to compose his column, and minutely inspected their condition. A few hours after his arrival he telegraphed to Sir Patrick Grant, that he had no cavalry on which he could depend; that such a force as his, on such an enterprise, must be seriously crippled for want of this arm, since without a body of horse he should be unable even to reconnoitre. His first duty was to endeavour to supply this deficiency, and he asked permission to form a corps of volunteer cavalry, consisting of "officers of regiments which had mutinied, or had been disbanded; of indigo planters, of patrols, of burnt-out shopkeepers; in short, of all who were willing to join him." The same evening he despatched a special messenger to Captain Maude, commanding the small detachment of Royal Artillerymen whom he had passed the previous day on the road, requesting him to hasten his progress, and authorizing him to seize and appropriate the first seven carriages of the Transit Company he should meet; to put four artillerymen in each, allowing them only to halt for cooking, and directing the drivers to gallop with all good speed to Allahabad. Till they arrived he was unable to man a single

Inspects and
addresses the
troops at
Benares.

gun. The next morning he inspected the troops at the station on parade, and congratulated those who had distinguished themselves in suppressing the outbreak on the 4th of June. By that day's post he brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the gallant conduct on that occasion of the artillery under Major Olpherts, and of the detachment of the 10th Foot, under the command of Captain Norman, whose united efforts appeared, from the concurrent testimony of the officers who were present in the action, to have been the means of saving the station. He particularly noticed the

exemplary conduct of Staff-Sergeant Bird of the Artillery, and expressed his hope that some suitable acknowledgment might be bestowed on him. He was soon after rewarded with a commission. After having examined more particularly the condition of the small body of European troops to be left at the station, and given instructions for their guidance in case of emergency, he started in the evening for Allahabad, in company with Mr Riddell, the Postmaster-General, and reached it early on the morning of the 30th of June.

On the night of his arrival at Allahabad, Havelock received a letter from his old friend and companion, Sir Henry Lawrence, written immediately on hearing of his appointment. It conveyed to him a very accurate picture of the position of affairs at Lucknow,—before the unfortunate affair at Chinhut, which occurred three days after its date.

Havelock receives a letter from Sir H. Lawrence.

“Lucknow, 27 June, 1857.

“My dear Havelock,—Captain Barrow’s letter to Mr Gubbins of the 23rd, enclosing one to Mrs Court from Colonel Neill, giving the G. G.’s message, has just arrived. I recommend that no more than two Goorkah regiments come from Nepal. Indeed I would rather not see more than one regiment in Oude, and would rather have none yet; it may be injurious that they should witness the disorganized state of the country. Once we have a thousand more Europeans here we shall be all right. It will be a different thing if we are allowed to recruit in Nepal. In that case, I should be happy to have 2000 or 3000 of them, but that will take time. I wrote to you fully to-day”—[the letter never reached the General],—“so need only repeat that we are snug enough in the city, and still hold the cantonment with 200 Europeans, and about 150 Sepoys. This enables us to get supplies. Two irregular corps still stand by us, and will probably continue to do so, as Delhi has fallen,* but we do not reckon on them. I am very glad to hear you are coming up: 400 Europeans with four guns, 300 Sikhs, with 100 cavalry, will easily beat everything at Cawnpore, *as long as Wheeler holds his ground*; but if he is destroyed, your game will be difficult. I have a long letter from him of the 24th; he had then provisions for *eight or*

* It did not fall, however, before the 14th September following.



ten days. I am offering large bribes to parties to supply him, but am not sanguine of success. It is therefore *most important* that your detachment should not lose an hour. This is important on your own account, and of vital importance on Wheeler's. We are threatened by about ten regiments, which are concentrating about eighteen miles off. The talookdars and zemindars are feeding them, but few have openly joined them. They have two of our nine-pounder batteries, and many native guns. Our position is safe enough, though they may knock the houses about our ears. If the irregulars and police are staunch, we will save the city from plunder. On your approach to Cawnpore, I will endeavour to co-operate with you; but as long as so strong a force of mutineers is close by, it will be impossible, as I have two positions to hold, and am unable to concentrate into one. Endeavours have been made to induce me to send 200 Europeans to Cawnpore, which would have been simply sacrificing the whole, and endangering Lucknow. I have been very anxious for the health of Europeans coming up at this season, but your long experience prevents the necessity of a word of advice. I enclose a memorandum of events; kindly send this on to the G. G. Read and pass on the enclosed to the Commander-in-Chief.

“Your detachment should be quickly followed by another 300 or 400 Europeans, with four guns. Recollect that you cannot reckon on supplies at Cawnpore.

“Yours, very sincerely,

“H. M. LAWRENCE.

“Pray see to the Europeans having proper clothing. The 84th came here in cloth. Our full strength is now 630 H. M.'s 32nd; 50 H. M.'s 84th; and 64 European artillerymen; total 744 Europeans.”

In the memorandum which accompanied this letter, Sir Henry Lawrence stated that “the rebel force at Cawnpore, according to all accounts, was composed of about 3000 infantry and 1000 cavalry. Wheeler had written to him in a most determined tone, and would no doubt hold out to the last. Please God the force from Allahabad, now we hope on its way”—[this alluded to the force which Colonel Neill had promised on the 18th to send], “may arrive in time to save his gallant band. Wheeler mentions having sent off five different communications to Allahabad. We hold the Residency, Muchee Bhawun, and the cantonments, and are strong in the two former positions. Would that we could

succour Wheeler, but the enemy hold all boats on the Cawnpore side. We are threatened on all sides by mutinous regiments of all arms, the nearest force being nineteen miles off, at Nawaubunge, and daily increasing in numbers. The whole of Oude is more or less in a state of anarchy; all our outposts are gone; and Lucknow and its vicinity is the only position which represents the British Government. An addition of one European regiment and 100 artillerymen would enable us to go anywhere, and re-establish order in Oude; but till this reinforcement arrives, we can only maintain ourselves in Lucknow alone."

The General found on reaching Allahabad that, under the express sanction of the authorities in Calcutta, arrangements had already been completed by Colonel Neill, for the despatch of a strong detachment to the relief of Cawnpore, and it had been ordered the evening before his arrival to march on the afternoon of the 30th. It was placed under the command of Major Renaud, of the Madras Fusiliers, a judicious and most enterprising officer, and consisted of 400 Europeans, 300 of the Ferozepore Sikhs, 120 Native Irregular Cavalry, and two 9-pounders. The whole body commenced its march at 4 P.M. of the 30th. On the 3rd of July the General sent 100 Europeans, in the only steamer at his disposal, up the Ganges, to communicate with Major Renaud's column during its progress, and to cover its flank. The equipment of that column had exhausted all the carriage at the station. The districts to the west and north of Allahabad were in the hands of the enemy, and it was only in the direction of Benares, that a supply of carts, bullocks, hackeries, camels, and other means of transport could be procured. They came up tardily, notwithstanding the exertions of the local and commissariat officers, and the General was impatiently detained at Allahabad for seven days after the departure of Renaud's column.

Despatch of a
detachment
to Cawnpore.

Meanwhile, authority was received from Calcutta to raise a body of Volunteer Cavalry, and it was placed under the command of Captain Lusada Barrow, of the 5th Madras Light Cavalry. The 78th Highlanders had left India for the Persian expedition in

The Volun-
teer Cavalry.

their woollen clothing, and arrived with no other dress in Calcutta; but no arrangements were made there to furnish them with garments suited to the month of July, although there was the complete establishment of the army clothing agent at the Presidency. Every exertion was therefore made by the General to supply them with a lighter dress, fitted to a march with the thermometer above 100°. Native contractors were set to work with all promptitude, but in spite of every exertion, many men were obliged to leave Allahabad in their woollen tunics; and the 78th Highlanders fought every battle in this campaign in that dress. The morning after his arrival at Allahabad, the General made the circuit of the fortifications in company with Lieut. Patrick Stewart, of the Engineers, and after having diligently inspected them, gave minute instructions for strengthening certain weak points, of which he left written details with Colonel Neill.

At 1 A.M. on the 3rd of July, Lieut. Chalmers of the 45th Native Infantry, and one of the first of the officers who had volunteered to serve as a private in the Volunteer Cavalry, rode in from Major Renaud's detachment with intelligence of the destruction of Sir Hugh Wheeler's force at Cawnpore. In the afternoon of the same day, two spies, who had been sent by Sir Henry Lawrence to Cawnpore, and had witnessed the massacre, came into Allahabad, and confirmed the dismal intelligence. They were separately and minutely examined by the General and the officers of his staff, and as no discrepancy was discovered in their testimony, it was considered to be authentic. Sir Hugh had informed Sir Henry Lawrence, on the 24th of June, that his provisions would last for eight or ten days; but the incessant shower of balls and red-hot shot which the insurgents poured into the intrenchment became intolerable, and the besieged were driven at last most reluctantly to a compromise, by the heart-rending sight of the torture endured by the women and children, and by the absence of any intelligence of an attempt to relieve them. There is no record of such fearful sufferings as that garrison endured with

Intelligence
of the Cawn-
pore massa-
cre.

the most exemplary fortitude during the last ten days of its existence. Of the 870 persons who had survived the desolating cannonade of more than three weeks, 330 were women and children. When reduced to the last extremity, Nana Sahib sent a message to Sir Hugh Wheeler, offering the garrison a safe-conduct to Allahabad, with permission to take their baggage, arms, and ammunition with them, on condition that he would capitulate. Sir Hugh most reluctantly accepted the overture, but only because it held out a hope of saving the heroic women and the tender children from a lingering death. The Nana took an oath on the water of the Ganges, the most sacred that a Hindoo and a Brahmin can utter, to be faithful to his engagement. Boats were provided by him, and the women and children were conveyed to them in vehicles, in some cases with every expression of sympathy and solicitude for their welfare. Every heart now beat high with the certainty of deliverance; but no sooner had the whole party been seated in the boats, than three signal guns were fired, and a destructive fire was opened on the helpless fugitives from cannon planted on the shore, and hitherto concealed along the bank, as well as from the firelocks of the Nana's soldiers. The shrieks of the women and cries of the children were drowned by the rattle of musketry, and the roar of the guns, and the yells of the hell-hounds now let loose on them. The massacre was a preconcerted perfidy; it has since become evident, by the discovery of the document, that an order had been sent to the commandant of the mutinous 17th Native Infantry, and some irregular cavalry then on the Oude bank, to fire on any of the fugitives who might attempt to land. The whole party was treacherously butchered, with the exception of two hundred and ten women and children, who were taken back to the town and reserved for future destruction. This atrocity was perpetrated on the 27th of June, before General Havelock had assumed charge of his column, and while he was on his journey from Calcutta to Benares. It appears that Colonel Neill had written to Sir Henry Lawrence from Allahabad, on the 18th

of June, and again on the 23rd, to announce his intention to despatch immediately a force of 400 Europeans and 300 Sikhs for the relief of Cawnpore. That force did not march out of Allahabad before the 30th. Whether it would have been in time to avert the massacre if it had been sent forward according to Colonel Neill's original resolution, may be a questionable point.

Immediately on receiving what he considered indubitable evidence of this massacre, the General telegraphed the dismal tidings to Sir Patrick Grant.

"If the report," he said, "be correct, which there is too much reason to believe, we have lost Cawnpore, an important point on the great line of communication, and the place from which alone Lucknow can be succoured, for it would hardly be possible at this season of the year to operate on the cross roads. My duty is therefore to endeavour to retake Cawnpore, to the accomplishment of which I will bend every effort. I advance along the trunk road as soon as I can unite 1400 British infantry to a battery of six well-equipped guns. Lawrence is confident of holding out for a month. Lieut.-Col. Neill, whose high qualities I cannot sufficiently praise, will follow with another column as soon as it can be organized, and this fort left in proper hands. I should have preferred to move the whole of the troops together, but the relief of Lucknow is an affair of time, and I cannot hazard its fall by waiting for the organization of Neill's column. We urgently want here more artillerymen, both for the equipment of field batteries, and the defence of this place. I would also observe that, with every hope of ultimate success, it appears to me on the cards, that for some weeks or months we might possess nothing within the Jumna but the forts of Agra, Allahabad, and Chunar. I would therefore suggest that gun-boats and armed steamers be sent up speedily to aid in keeping open the navigation of the Jumna and the Ganges. The arrival of the troops from China, and the complete success of Sir Henry Barnard, would speedily change the whole state of affairs. But we cannot fix a date for either of these events, and it seems reasonable to provide against the worst that may happen in the mean time."

The General communicates the intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief.

Lieut. Chalmers was sent back to Major Renaud, with an acknowledgment of his letter of the previous day, which,

as the General remarked, appeared to leave no doubt of the destruction of the Cawnpore force. "Halt, therefore," he said, "at Lohanga, and keep a good look-out to rear, front, and flanks. I will then strongly reinforce you with the column that is to march to-morrow, the 4th instant. Burn no more villages, unless actually occupied by insurgents, and spare your European troops as much as possible." But the General had reckoned without his host, when he determined to start on the 4th. The carriage cattle, which was indispensable to the success of his operations, came in slowly by driblets, and it was beyond his power to expedite the collection of them. Impatient as he was to advance, he was detained three days longer at Allahabad, during which time he received a small reinforcement of the 78th Highlanders, fresh from the banks of the Euphrates, under the command of Colonel Hamilton. But he was mortified to discover that the officer in command of the irregular cavalry which had accompanied Major Renaud, had been permitted to take with him from Allahabad more than thirty of the best Government stud horses for the use of his men, in lieu of their own hacks, and to mount any recruits he might pick up on the route. The horses thus made over to men of doubtful fidelity were urgently required by the General for the teams of his guns, as well as for his volunteer cavalry, the ranks of which had begun to fill, as soon as Government had sanctioned its formation.

It was felt to be a very serious misfortune, that at this critical juncture the rail from Allahabad to Cawnpore was not found complete. The work might have been finished, without any difficulty, at the beginning of the year, but it had been retarded by the injudicious interference of the controlling officers of Government, who were simply military engineers, with the civil engineers of the railway establishment. If the Company had been in a position to open it at the expected time, it is possible that the massacre of Cawnpore might have been prevented, and the relief of Lucknow effected before the whole country was in a state of revolt. Only

Incompletion
of the rail-
road to Cawn-
pore.

forty miles had been completed to Lohanga; but the portion of the line near Allahabad had been seriously injured by the insurgents. The General considered it of the greatest importance to his future operations to keep even this limited section open for the transmission of stores and troops. Mr Betagh, the resident engineer, was therefore directed to proceed on a tour of inspection, and on his return from Lohanga was officially complimented by the General on the judgment, promptitude, and vigour which he had exhibited in this enterprise. Owing to the destruction of the engines, it was impossible to use the line as a railway, but it was found invaluable as a tram-road; and a corps of native labourers was organized for the draught of the carriages.

During his detention at Allahabad, the General had omitted no effort to provide for the efficiency of the force. He attended himself to the minute details of every arrangement. Two or three times during the day he received reports from the heads of departments, and likewise personally inspected the progress of equipment. His orders were always distinct and concise, and generally conveyed in writing; but he saw to the execution of them himself. On the 7th, the organization of the force was completed; the baggage lay on the ground ready packed, and only awaiting the means of transport; and the distribution of the carriage, as it arrived, was finished only a few moments before the column commenced its march. The force consisted of about a thousand bayonets, from four European regiments; the 64th, the 78th Highlanders, the 84th Foot, and the 1st Madras Fusiliers, with 130 of Lieut. Brayser's Sikhs, about eighteen Volunteer Cavalry, and six guns. This little band was at length enabled to start on the expedition at four o'clock in the afternoon. It was a dull and dismal day, and the force began its march under the most unpromising auspices. As the column defiled through the town, the natives are said to have hastened to their doors, and greeted it with malignant scowls, though the remembrance of Colonel Neill's executions effectually pre-

The General starts for Cawnpore on the 7th of July.

vented any tangible demonstration of hatred. But the troops were soon subjected to a more serious inconvenience than the malice of a disaffected population. They had not marched a quarter of a mile before they encountered "the soldier's greatest enemy,"—a deluge of rain. The column was halted for the night, after it had marched about three hours. The draught cattle, entirely unused to work, had not been able to keep up with the troops; the tents had not all arrived; and too many of the men were constrained to pass the night without shelter on the saturated earth.

As the General had no doubt that Cawnpore had fallen, and Sir Henry Lawrence's exigency did not appear from his letter of the 27th of June, written before the conflict at Chinhut, to be pressing, the troops March of the first three days. advanced leisurely for the first three days, making only ordinary marches of about eight miles a day. The 64th and the 78th Highlanders were robust and well-seasoned soldiers, but they had been cooped up in steamers for more than six weeks, and required some practice to regain the facility of marching. Among the Madras Fusiliers, however, there were nearly three hundred recruits, totally unaccustomed to the hardships of a campaign, and the road was lined with the disabled and foot-sore men of this regiment on the first march; it became necessary therefore gradually to inure them to the severe duties before them. The report of the fall of Cawnpore, which the General had telegraphed to Calcutta, was not at first credited by the public authorities there. Colonel Neill had at the same time telegraphed to Sir Patrick Grant, that he believed the report to be a mere artifice of the enemy, to prevent the advance of our force. The Commander-in-Chief, adopting this view of the case, had requested the General to order Major Renaud to push on with his detachment; and he accordingly proceeded cautiously beyond Lohanga. But fresh evidence of the truth of the report was now brought in, and the position of Major Renaud became an object of much solicitude to the General, who had received accurate intelligence of the movements of the enemy after the

massacre, and he considered it necessary to advance with forced marches to his support. And here it may be remarked, that the General always regarded his intelligence department of paramount importance, and spared no effort to obtain the most authentic reports of the position and movements of the enemy. By a liberal use of the secret service money which had by his forethought been placed by Government at his disposal, he was able to command the services of numerous spies, whose reports were collated and sifted with great judgment by himself and his staff, more especially under the active and intelligent superintendence of Colonel Tytler, the Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General. This department was, therefore, seldom at fault, and he was never taken by surprise. Indeed, it was found on more than one occasion that, notwithstanding the superior advantages possessed by the enemy for obtaining information from their sympathizing countrymen, they were often less accurately apprized of his movements than he was of theirs. He was now informed that the insurgents were advancing in great force and with rapid strides on Major Renaud's column. Nana Sahib, after the massacre of Sir Hugh Wheeler's force, had proclaimed himself Peishwa, or sovereign of the Mahrattas, and had fired a royal salute on his accession to that dignity. He had advised the troops collected around his standard to advance, and annihilate the handful of Englishmen moving up towards Cawnpore; to take possession of Allahabad, and then to sweep down on Calcutta, and assist him in establishing a Hindoo dynasty in our own metropolis. The General considered it imprudent to order Major Renaud to fall back on the main body, lest the moral effect of any such retrograde movement at this juncture should prove injurious. He directed him, therefore, to halt immediately on the arrival of his communication. The enemy's force now moving down to Allahabad was estimated at the time at 3500 regular Sepoys, strengthened by a mass of new levies, with guns freely drawn from the magazine at Cawnpore. Major Renaud's force consisted only of 400 Europeans, some

irregular cavalry, and 300 Sikhs. The fidelity of the latter, which had not been tested in a conflict with the enemy, was doubtful, and the fact of their forming nearly one half the force was supposed by the General to present a strong temptation to go over to the enemy; the irregular horse was more than suspected of sympathy with the mutineers, and half the gunners were natives. The destruction of Major Renaud's column appeared, therefore, inevitable, if it came into collision with the rebel force; and such a disaster at the commencement of operations might be irretrievable. On the 11th of July the General's little band had marched fifteen miles from Synee, and the men had suffered severely from fatigue and exposure. The medical officers urgently advised him to halt, and allow them to rest, but he felt the preponderating necessity of rescuing the advanced column from its perilous position. The troops therefore struck their tents at eleven P.M., and marched at midnight; and about an hour after, in the clear moonlight, came up with the Major's detachment, which, after the junction, marched on with them to Belinda, about four miles short of Futtehpore, reaching it about seven in the morning.

After these fatiguing marches, the General, no longer anxious regarding Major Renaud's detachment, was desirous of halting on the 12th, and giving the troops the repose they needed before their first encounter with the enemy. There was an impression in ^{Battle of} Futtehpore. the camp that the rebels might be expected to arrive at Futtehpore in the course of the day, and halt there. Colonel Tytler was sent on to reconnoitre, and having advanced two miles, met two spies who had been sent by Sir Henry Lawrence to Cawnpore, with instructions to proceed on to General Havelock, and deliver the information they could collect. They related that the enemy had just arrived at Futtehpore, and were employed in encamping themselves. Colonel Tytler sent them on immediately to the General, and continued his own advance towards the enemy's position. As soon as he and his escort were perceived, the rebels, supposing that they had before them only the

weak column of Major Renaud, rushed forward to engage it, without giving themselves time for any formation. This precipitation proved fatal to them. Our men had been marching and under arms for nine hours, and were preparing to cook a meal; the two spies were making their report to the General, when a 24-pounder shot, which the enemy aimed at Colonel Tytler, came on with its whizzing sound, and struck the ground within two hundred yards of the spot where the General was standing. The troops immediately left their cooking utensils and flew to arms, and fell into their ranks. The enemy's horse then came rushing across the plain in frantic haste, with loud cheers and shouts, till they were near enough to perceive the British phalanx. Instead of the handful of which they expected to make an easy prey, they suddenly discovered the British regiments and eight guns, drawn up in perfect order, and steadily awaiting the attack, on which they at once drew rein, as if struck by a palsy. "It would have been injurious to the *morale* of my troops," wrote the General, "to allow them to be thus bearded, and so I determined at once to bring on a general action." But the report of this, the first of the General's series of victories, must be given in the words of his own despatch. After noticing his junction with Major Renaud, he proceeds to say:—

“Our information had been better than that of the enemy, for when Lieut.-Col. Tytler pushed a reconnoissance up to the town they evidently supposed they had only Major Renaud's gallant but small force in their front; for after firing on the Lieut.-Col. and his escort, they insolently pushed forward two guns, and a force of infantry and cavalry cannonaded our front, and threatened our flank.

“I wished earnestly to give our harassed soldiers rest, and so waited until this ebullition should expend itself, making no counter-disposition beyond posting a hundred Enfield riflemen of the 64th in an advanced copse. But the enemy maintained his attack with the audacity which his first supposition had inspired, and my inertness fostered. It would have injured the *morale* of

Despatch on
the battle of
Futcheepore.

my troops to permit them thus to be bearded ; so I determined at once to bring on an action.

“Futtehpore constitutes a position of no small strength. The hard and dry grand trunk road subdivides it, and is the only means of convenient access, for the plains on both sides are covered at this season by heavy lodgments of water, to the depth of two, three, and four feet. It is surrounded by garden enclosures of great strength, with high walls, and has within it many houses of good masonry. In front of the swamps are hillocks, villages, and mangoe-groves, which the enemy already occupied in force.

“I estimate his number at 3500, with twelve brass and iron guns.

“I made my dispositions. The guns, now eight in number, were formed on and close to the chaussée in the centre, under Captain Maude, R.A., protected and aided by one hundred Enfield riflemen of the 64th. The detachments of infantry were, at the same moment, thrown into a line of quarter distance columns, at deploying distance, and thus advanced in support, covered at discretion by Enfield skirmishers. The small force of volunteers and irregular cavalry moved forward on the flanks on harder ground.

“I might say that in ten minutes the action was decided, for in that short space of time the spirit of the enemy was entirely subdued. The rifle fire, reaching them at an unexpected distance, filled them with dismay ; and when Captain Maude was enabled to push his guns through flank and swamps, to point blank range, his surprisingly accurate fire demolished their little remaining confidence. In a moment three guns were abandoned to us on the chaussée, and the force advanced steadily, driving the enemy before it at every point.

“Major Renaud won a hillock on the right in good style, and struggled on through the inundation. The 78th in extension kept up his communication with the centre ; the 64th gave strength to the centre and left ; on the left, the 84th and regiment of Ferozepore pressed back the enemy's right.

“As we moved forward, the enemy's guns continued to fall into our hands, and then in succession they were driven from the garden enclosures, from a strong barricade on the road, from the town wall, into, and through, out of, and beyond the town. They endeavoured to make a stand a mile in advance of it. My troops were in such a state of exhaustion, that I almost despaired

of driving them farther. At the same time, the mutineers of the 2nd Cavalry made an effort to renew the combat by charging, with some success, our irregular horse, whose disposition throughout the fight was, I regret to say, worse than doubtful. But again our guns and riflemen were with great labour pushed to the front. Their fire soon put the enemy to final and irretrievable flight, and my force took up its present position in triumph, and parked twelve captured guns.

“I must endeavour in this hasty despatch to do justice to those who led the troops to this easy victory. First on the list, I must place Major Renaud, whose exertions at the head of the advanced column I cannot sufficiently praise. His coolness and conduct in the action are equally entitled to my highest commendation. I hope that it will be in the power of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to bring speedily to the notice of his Royal Highness, the General Commanding-in-Chief, the courage and skill of Captain Maude, R.A. I have seen some artillery fights in my time, but never beheld guns better served, or practice more effective than that of my battery under this officer.

“Colonel Hamilton led his Highlanders well, and they followed him full of spirit and devotion. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct in this combat of Major Sterling at the head of the 64th; of Lieutenant Ayton, in command of the 84th detachment; of Captain Brasyer, of the regiment of Ferozepore; of Captain Barrow, leading the Volunteer Cavalry; and Lieut. Palliser, at the head of the Irregular Horse.

“I have next to speak of the staff: Captain Beatson, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, has given me entire satisfaction in the performance of his ordinary duties, and I was much gratified by his boldness and activity in the fight. Lieut.-Colonel Tytler is indefatigable and most intelligent in a sphere of duty entirely new to him. Captain M'Bean's commissariat arrangements, chiefly with the advanced column, have hitherto been every way successful. My orders were conveyed in the field boldly, actively, and intelligently by my aid-de-camp, Lieut. Havelock, 10th Foot, and the following officers:—Lieut. Morland, 1st Fusiliers; Lieut. Moorsom, H. M. 52nd Light Infantry; Captain Sheehy, H. M. 81st regiment; Captain Russell, Engineers; and Captain M'Bean.

“I enclose the list of casualties, the lightest, I suppose, that ever accompanied the announcement of such a success. Twelve British soldiers were struck down by the sun, and never rose

again. But our fight was fought, neither with musket nor bayonet, nor sabre, but with Enfield rifles and cannon: so we lost no men.

“The enemy’s fire scarcely touched us; ours, for four hours, allowed him no repose.”

The battle of Futtehpore was the first action with the rebel soldiery in which our arms had been triumphant. Hitherto events had gone uniformly against us. For two months the insurgents had spread desolation through our fairest provinces, and a feeling of deep despondency pervaded the whole of the European community in India. This victory was the first check in their rampant career which they had received in the open field, and it brought the first ray of hope to the minds of our fellow-countrymen in India. To use the emphatic language of Lord Ellenborough in his notification after the battle of Jellalabad, in which, though unknown to him, Havelock had borne so great a share, “Victory now returned to the ranks of the army.” This was, moreover, the first engagement in which Havelock had been his own general, and not merely the military mentor of others. He immediately sat down and wrote thus to his wife on the Rhine:—

“One of the prayers oft repeated throughout my life since my school days has been answered, and I have lived to command in a successful action. I must refer you for the particulars to my despatch. I will here only say, that I marched down on this place yesterday morning, Sunday the 12th (battle of the Boyne), with harassed troops, intending to attack the enemy next day; but their fate led them on. Out they sallied and insulted my camp; whereupon I determined to try an immediate action.

Letter to
Mrs Havelock,
after
the battle.

“We fought, and I may say that in ten minutes the affair was decided; for in that short time our Enfield rifles and cannon had taken all conceit of fight out of the mutineers. Among them was the 56th, the very regiment which I led at Maharajpore. I challenged them: ‘There’s some of you that have beheld me fighting; now try upon yourselves what you have seen in me.’

“But away with vain glory! Thanks to Almighty God, who

gave me the victory. I captured in four hours eleven guns, and scattered the enemy's whole force to the winds. I now march to retake Cawnpore, where, alas! our troops have been treacherously destroyed; and to succour Lawrence at Lucknow. Norris would have rejoiced, and so would dear old Julius Hare, if he had survived to see the day. Harry was in the thickest of the fight, but, God be praised, escaped unhurt."

The troops, wearied by a march of twenty-four miles, and an engagement of four hours, without having tasted food since the preceding afternoon, sank down exhausted on the ground, a mile beyond the spot where the enemy had made their last stand. The next day, the 13th of July, the force obtained repose, and the General issued the first of his spirit-stirring orders:—

Order of the
day to the
troops after
the battle.

"General Havelock thanks his soldiers for their arduous exertions of yesterday, which produced in four hours the strange result of a rebel army driven from a strong position, eleven guns captured, and their whole force scattered to the winds, without the loss of a single British soldier. To what is this astounding effect to be attributed? To the fire of British artillery, exceeding in rapidity and precision all that the Brigadier has ever witnessed in his not short career; to the power of the Enfield rifle in British hands; to British pluck, that great quality which has survived the vicissitudes of the hour, and gained intensity from the crisis; and to the blessing of Almighty God on a most righteous cause, the cause of justice, humanity, truth, and good government in India."

It was a novelty in India to see an Order of the day ascribing victory to "the blessing of Almighty God;" but if any were disposed to ridicule this revival of Cromwell's Puritanism, they were soon satisfied that it was also accompanied with no small portion of the military genius and energy of the Puritan generals. The General proceeded to promote Kalka Singh, a private in the Native Artillery, to a superior grade for his conspicuous gallantry; and he ordered the gratuity of a month's pay to be issued to the bullock-drivers, who were not enlisted soldiers, but natives picked up by the commissariat officers wherever

they could be found, for their excellent conduct in action; and a larger donation to their sirdars, or chiefs, "whose behaviour had been particularly conspicuous." The day of repose was passed by the General in reorganizing his Artillery. Eleven guns had been captured from the enemy; and those of larger calibre were now exchanged for the lighter pieces brought from Allahabad. Two 9-pounders and a 24-pound howitzer were added to the train, which brought its strength up to ten serviceable guns; the rest of the captured cannon, for which he had no draught cattle, were burst.

Colonel Neill was apprehensive of an attack on Allahabad, and had importuned the General to send back the invalid artillerymen and the Sikh regiment. But he considered that the defeat of the enemy at He sends back 100 Sikhs. His care of the artillerymen. Futtehpore would greatly diminish the risk of an attack on Allahabad from above, while the arrival from time to time of small detachments of European troops from Calcutta would serve to increase its security. He was anxious, moreover, to spare his European troops all unnecessary exposure to the sun, and required the Sikh troops for fatigue duties. He, therefore, sent back only a hundred of them, directing that one half the number should be employed in guarding the railway station at Lohanga, and the other in reinforcing the garrison at Allahabad. But he peremptorily refused to part with a single artilleryman, although the Commander-in-Chief, not acquainted with the exigencies of his position, had expressed his hope that "the veteran artillerymen, whose infirmities, poor fellows, disabled them from any exertion in rapid marching, might have been sent back to Allahabad, and their places supplied, if necessary, from the European Infantry, who were the greatest proficient in the gun drill." But the General had now ten guns with his force, and only seventy regular artillerymen, including the invalids, and thirty-one trained infantry. He replied, therefore, to Sir Patrick Grant, that he could not dispense with the services of the old gunners, and that he had always husbanded their strength, never allowing them to be fa-

tigued by marching, but conveying them on ambulances in the rear of their guns, thus bringing them up fresh and vigorous into action.

On the 14th, the troops marched forward without meeting an enemy. The misconduct of the small body of Ir-
Disarmament
of the Irregu-
lar Cavalry. regular Cavalry had now become so palpable, that the General deemed it no longer safe to take them into action. In the engagement of Futtehpoore, they had been ordered to charge the mutinous 2nd Cavalry, but only twelve followed their commanding officer, Lieut. Palliser, whose blind confidence in his men and gallant spirit carried him headlong into the midst of the enemy, without a glance behind to ascertain if he was supported. There he was overpowered, and knocked off his horse, and would inevitably have been cut to pieces, had he not been rescued by the devoted gallantry of his native Ressildar, who sacrificed his own life in endeavouring to save that of his leader. The remainder of his corps either turned to the rear, or joined the ranks of the enemy. This exhibition of treachery produced a hasty order from Captain Beatson to the skirmishers of the Madras Fusiliers, to fire upon them, but it was immediately recalled. On the line of march, on the 14th, the Irregular Cavalry were placed over the baggage; but they created a false alarm, and endeavoured to drive it to the rear, evidently with the view of plundering it, and making off to the rebels. When the force halted on the 14th, the General directed that they should all be dismounted and disarmed, and that their horses should be made over to Captain Barrow, for his Volunteer Cavalry. The composition and the services of this gallant body are thus graphically described by one of its own officers:—"New to the country, new to the service, unaccustomed to roughing it, brought up in every luxury, and led to believe that on their arrival in India they would have the same, these young officers (deprived of employment by the mutiny of their regiments) willingly threw themselves into the thick of the work, often without a tent or cover of any sort to shelter them from the rain or sun, with bad provisions and hard work. Side by

side with the privates they took their turn of duty, and side by side with them they fought, were wounded, and some of them died. When we got into Lucknow, and were useless as cavalry, they cheerfully took the musket, and night and day, at one of the most important posts, did sentry duty with the men. Well and nobly they did their duty; and proud may those boys be when they point to the medal on their breast and say, 'I won this while serving as a private in the field.'"

Early on the morning of the 15th, the little force again began its march, and arrived in front of the village of Aong a little after daybreak, when it was found that the enemy were in position with two 9-^{Action at Aong.} pounders, behind an intrenchment thrown up across the road. After a reconnoissance, the General gave Colonel Tytler the command of a strong advanced guard, consisting of about a third of the force, while he himself took charge of the main body to protect the baggage, which the enemy's cavalry, hovering on both flanks, showed a determination to attack. Colonel Tytler found the enemy strongly posted in gardens and enclosures. On the advance of the Volunteer Cavalry, the two guns of the enemy behind the intrenchment opened fire. Some delay having necessarily occurred while the Colonel was completing his dispositions, the rebel Sepoys, misinterpreting the cause of it, advanced boldly to the attack, as if confident of victory, and took the initiative by moving forward to a village about 200 yards in front of their position. The Madras Fusiliers were ordered to drive them out, which they quickly accomplished in the most gallant style, under the command of Major Renaud. But the success was dearly purchased by the loss of that able and intrepid soldier, who received a wound in his thigh, of which he died three days after. Colonel Tytler then gradually advanced his whole force, and plying the rebels with his superior artillery, whenever the ground would admit of its use, drove them from their position, which they abandoned with precipitation. Meanwhile large bodies of the enemy's cavalry repeatedly essayed to cut in on the main

force, under the personal command of the General, and plunder the baggage, but every assault was repelled, and not a single article was lost. The cavalry of the rebels, seeing the infantry routed, followed them in their flight, and the road was thickly strewed for miles with abandoned tents, carts, baggage, and military stores. It was on such occasions that the want of cavalry was most acutely felt. Two squadrons of British dragoons on this day would have been worth a brigade of infantry.

The troops were now halted for breakfast, for which a five hours' march and a fatiguing action had given them a keen relish. From the commencement of his advance from Allahabad, the bridge over the Pandoo nuddee, or river, which lay in his route to Cawnpore, had been an object of great anxiety to the General. This little stream, though only sixty or seventy yards wide, and generally fordable, was now swelled by the periodical rains, and had become impassable. In a military point of view it was still more formidable from the circumstance of its flowing at the bottom of a deep ravine. The General had no pontoons, and, amidst a hostile population, there was no hope of being able to procure boats. If therefore the fine masonry bridge over it were broken down, his progress to Cawnpore might be indefinitely retarded. The appearance of the enemy at Aong, a few miles distant from it, assured him that up to the period of the engagement the bridge was entire. But while the force halted for its meal, information was brought by his spies, that the enemy, after having been routed by Colonel Tytler, who had lost sight of them while halting for the main body, had rallied at the bridge head, on the farther side of the river, and were preparing to blow it up. He felt that not a moment was to be lost; and though the troops were completely exhausted by a long march and a severe action under a nearly vertical sun, and had been unable to prepare a meal, he called on them to rise and advance. In the unquestioning spirit of confidence which his well-known care for their welfare, equally with his own self-denying example, inspired, they sprung up with the

Battle of the
Pandoo nud-
dee.

greatest alacrity. Those who know British soldiers can estimate the value of the cheerful obedience which they now displayed, and which is always exhibited under a leader who has shown himself worthy of the men he commands. After another march of two hours, they came suddenly under fire from the bridge head, and found that the enemy were fully prepared to receive them, and to dispute the passage of the river. The rebels had for some days been diligently employed in intrenching themselves on the opposite side of the stream, where they had planted a 24-pounder gun, and a 24-pounder carronade, which swept the bridge and the great trunk road for 2000 yards beyond it. The approach to the bridge and the position of the enemy were immediately reconnoitred, and the plan of attack decided on. At Captain Maude's suggestion, it was resolved to envelope the bridge in an artillery fire, for which its position on a salient bend afforded great facilities. Three guns were therefore posted in front of it, and two on the right, and three on the left. The Madras Fusiliers, as being the best marksmen in the force, and, moreover, armed with the Enfield rifle, were pushed on through the ravines; and lining the bank above and below the bridge, opened a galling fire, and picked off the enemy's gunners, among whom and a large body of horse supporting them, the bullets were seen with glasses to fall like a shower of hail; our guns at the same time did great execution, and increased the confusion of the rebels. Suddenly a cloud of white smoke was seen to arise from the bridge, and float for some seconds over it. It was caused by the attempt of the enemy to blow it up, but their train had been hastily and clumsily laid; the effect of the explosion was therefore incomplete, and no other damage was done but to create a cavity in one of the arches. Our shrapnell bullets soon after smashed the sponge staffs of the rebel gunners; or, as some who were present affirmed, they themselves broke their staffs and spiked the guns. Be that as it may, their fire, hitherto steadily maintained, suddenly slacked, and the right wing of the Fusiliers, seizing the moment, rapidly closed, and,

nobly led by Major Stephenson, who had succeeded Major Renaud in the command of the regiment, dashed across the bridge amidst a shower of bullets, and captured the guns. The day was now won, and the enemy in full retreat on Cawnpore. Had the advance of the General been delayed a single hour, the passage of the river would have been rendered impracticable, except after a serious and perhaps fatal delay. In these two actions fought on the same day, our loss in killed and wounded did not exceed twenty-five. At two in the afternoon, the troops, now utterly exhausted, threw themselves on the ground, a mile on the Cawnpore side of the river. The bridge was unhappily very narrow; the partial damage it had sustained increased the difficulty, and it was long before the commissariat cattle, slowly defiling across it, could reach the encamping ground. Night had set in before the bullocks could be slaughtered and skinned, and the meat delivered to the men, who were, in many cases, too wearied to rise and care for a meal. Many of them were obliged to content themselves with biscuit and porter. The night was insufferably hot, and much of the meat which had thus been neglected to be cooked was spoiled before morning, and then thrown away by the men in disgust.

The resistance which the General had already experienced from the mutineers in three encounters, led him to apprehend that it would be more determined in proportion as he advanced. He therefore wrote to Colonel, now created Brigadier-General Neill, whom he had left in charge of Allahabad, to make the most strenuous exertions to push up a reinforcement of 300 Europeans, and if that number could not be spared, of 200 at the least. He said it was his intention to advance towards Lucknow, without any loss of time, but a small force must be left at Cawnpore to maintain the line of communication, and he was unable to spare a single soldier from his force, which was scarcely adequate to the task before it. After the two engagements at Aong and Pandoo, he wrote again in more pressing terms for reinforcements. By sickness, the result of fatigue and ex-

The General
urges General
Neill to
send rein-
forcements.

posure, by sun-stroke, and by casualties in the field, his little army had been materially weakened, and if he had to leave a detachment at Cawnpore, he feared he should not have a sufficient force of British bayonets for so difficult an enterprise as the invasion of Oude. Since his previous communication, the Enfield rifle had been used so unsparingly in the two engagements of the day, that his stock of Enfield ammunition was beginning to run short, and an ample supply must therefore, if possible, be sent on. The stores of rum were also greatly diminished. "If the road behind me," he said, "is open, as I believe it to be, I trust, with the assistance of the rail, you will be able to prevent the necessity of our being reduced to half-rations of rum, which would be a most trying deprivation to troops exposed to the fatigue and hardships that my men have endured, I am happy to say, hitherto, with the most creditable cheerfulness. In conclusion, I recapitulate my immediate and pressing wants. They are, 1. Enfield ammunition. 2. Gun ammunition. 3. European soldiers. 4. Field artillery. 5. Commissariat stores." This requisition for spirits may appear inconsistent with the opinion which the General had formerly expressed on this subject. But it may be remarked that while, as a general rule, he considered that the habitual use of rum was not indispensable to the vigour of the soldier, and tended rather to diminish his efficiency, he felt that the rule must bend to circumstances. The abstinence which was highly beneficial in a Jellalabad winter might be fatally imprudent, under peculiar circumstances, in the month of July on the plains of India. His men had been accustomed to the stimulant; he was now obliged to tax their strength to the utmost limit of human endurance, and he considered the aid of spirits necessary to sustain their physical powers.

Early on the morning of the 16th the troops rose and fell into their ranks. It was reported in the camp that the women and children, 210 in number, who had survived the massacre of the 27th of June, were still alive at Cawnpore, and that town was

Battle of
Cawnpore,
16th July.

only twenty-three miles distant. The animating hope of rescuing them from destruction, banished every sense of fatigue. As the day advanced, the heat became more intense than had been experienced since the troops marched from Allahabad, and the rays of the sun darted down as if they had been concentrated through a lens. But they marched sixteen miles before they came to a halt at the village of Maharajpore, where they rested for three hours and obtained a meal, though in too many cases it consisted, as before, where the meat had become offensive, only of biscuit and porter.

The Volunteer Cavalry, who had been thrown out as an advanced picket, sent in two travellers they had met in their progress. They turned out to be two Sepoys of the Bengal army, who continued faithful to the Government. One of them had come down from Delhi, and gave the latest account of the progress of the siege; both had marched with the rebels from Cawnpore the previous day, and spent the night in their camp. They were intimately acquainted with the force and position of the enemy, of which they gave the minutest details. The Nana had come out in person with a body of 5000 men and eight guns, to play his last stake for power. The position which he had chosen was most formidable. His left, covered by the Ganges, a mile distant, and by the high ground sloping towards it, was defended by four 24-pounders. The road to the cantonment of Cawnpore divided his left from his centre, which was posted in a low hamlet. Here a 24-pounder howitzer and a horse 6-pounder were planted and intrenched. The great trunk road ran between his centre and his right, which was behind a village encompassed with mangoe groves, surrounded by a mud wall, and defended by two 9-pounders. The railroad embankment lay to the right of it. The two roads converged about 800 yards in front of the enemy's position, which extended over a mile and a quarter in the form of a crescent, the centre more retired than the flanks. The Nana calculated that our force would necessarily come up the grand trunk road to this point of convergence, and all his artillery was

laid and pointed to sweep it, the range having been carefully measured and marked off. His infantry was massed in support of the guns to defend this strong position, and the mutinous 2nd Cavalry was placed in the rear of the enemy's left. It was evident that any attempt to carry this position by a *coup-de-main* would entail a most serious loss of life, for the artillery of the enemy equalled our own in number, and outweighed it in calibre, and they enjoyed the immense advantage of an entrenched cover. It would have been the case of Ferozeshuhur over again; the General, therefore, determined to turn their position. The Volunteer Cavalry was directed to bring in some of the neighbouring villagers, who were minutely and separately questioned as to the nature of the ground on both the enemy's flanks, and the by-roads leading to their camp. From a careful collation of these reports, it appeared that the ground lying between the enemy's left and the river was more elevated, while that on their right was low and swampy, and moreover commanded by the railway embankment. The General resolved, therefore, to select their left flank for his attack, and to leave his field hospital, baggage, and camp followers in an enclosure at Maharajpore, with a strong guard and two guns. This conclusion was apparently opposed to the rules of war, from which, under ordinary circumstances, he never deviated. He must thus abandon all communication with his rear, and leave it exposed, with his carriage, to the assaults of the enemy, and at the same time fight with his back to a river. But he considered the present as one of those exceptional cases which creates its own rule. Moreover, in front of the enemy's left, and nearly parallel with it, ran a line of thick groves, which would effectually screen the turning movement from view; and most skillfully were his plans laid to take advantage of this circumstance. Having determined on his course of operation, commanding officers of detachments were summoned; and the General, standing in the midst of them, rapidly traced a rough diagram of the projected movements on the ground with the point of his scabbard, and in a few brief

words explained his intentions. After this exposition of his plan, he satisfied himself by questions that it was clearly comprehended by the officers, and invited the fullest inquiry from them as to any point which remained doubtful. They then returned to their respective corps, and the troops fell in. With a commander so bold and yet so perspicuous in his orders, the troops marched as to assured victory. During the three hours' halt they had taken a hasty meal. Porter had been served out equally to all the regiments, but some of the recruits of the Madras Fusiliers, not as yet inured to campaigning, and who had tasted no meat for forty-eight hours, found the porter too strong for them, and staggered under the effects of it. But no one who heard their cheers as they marched off, and marked their invigorated step, when they subsequently came into close contact with the enemy, could doubt the beneficial result of this stimulant.

A column of subdivisions was now formed in front, one wing of the Madras Fusiliers heading it, the other covering the left flank in skirmishing order; then came in succession, with the guns at intervals, the 78th Highlanders, the 64th, 84th, and the Sikhs. The Volunteer Cavalry advanced in front of the infantry with orders, when they reached the point of divergence, to continue their march deliberately along the road to attract the attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe that our troops were moving onward in the teeth of their guns. For three miles the column moved steadily on the road, and then wheeled to the right, while the Volunteer Cavalry drew the fire of the enemy's guns on itself. The infantry marched for a thousand yards under shelter of the groves, and unperceived by the enemy; but a gap in the trees at length betrayed the movement, and they opened with every gun that could bear on the flank of the 78th Highlanders, and the 64th, and inflicted some loss. Not a shot, however, was fired in return; the column advanced silently and compactly as if on parade, and the stillness was only broken by the bursting shells of the enemy, and the imprecations of the bullock-drivers, as they urged

their cattle to the utmost speed. At length the movement became intelligible to the enemy, who appeared to be filled with surprise and consternation, and made a hasty attempt to change front and meet it; but it was now too late. The rear of our column having cleared the groves, the companies wheeled at a bound into line. The force at once advanced in direct échellon of battalions from the right, the 78th, the leading battalion, being supported by four guns on each flank, and by the whole of the Madras Fusiliers in skirmishing order. Our artillery at once opened fire, pushing forward as rapidly as the exhaustion of the cattle and the broken nature of the ground would permit. By this master-stroke, the fire of the enemy's centre and right was neutralized, as they could not use their guns without endangering their left. But it soon became evident to the General that this action must be decided, not by artillery, but by the bayonet. The three 24-pounders of the enemy's left, rapidly and skilfully served, carried death through the ranks. Sheltered as they were by the trees and buildings amidst which they were posted, our light pieces in vain endeavoured to silence them. To delay the advance of the infantry would have been to afford the enemy the opportunity they coveted of changing their position, and bringing their remaining guns into action. The General felt that the result might confidently be committed to that splendid regiment, the Highlanders, now pressing on in a compact mass without firing a shot. While the guns continued to vomit forth grape, they advanced with a firm tread directly upon them, and, when within eighty yards of the muzzle, changed their pace into a charge. Then, with their gallant old commander, Colonel Hamilton, a dozen paces in their front, and their bagpipes blowing the pibroch in their rear, they raised a shout which thrilled through the hearts of all who heard it, and hurled themselves as one man on the village, and silenced the guns. This charge, one of the most magnificent in this campaign, is thus described by the General:—"The opportunity had arrived for which I have long anxiously waited, of developing

the prowess of the 78th Highlanders. Three guns of the enemy were strongly posted behind a lofty hamlet well intrenched. I directed this regiment to advance, and never have I witnessed conduct more admirable. They were led by Colonel Hamilton, and followed him with surpassing steadiness and gallantry under a heavy fire. As they approached the village, they cheered and charged with the bayonet, the pipes sounding the pibroch. Need I add that the enemy fled, and the village was taken, and the guns were captured? The enemy's left was now crushed. Rushing in confusion to the rear, their infantry appeared to break into two bodies; one taking the road to the Cawnpore cantonment, and halting at the distance of a few hundred yards, the other falling back to the centre of their position, and rallying round and behind the howitzer placed there. Five minutes elapsed in reforming the troops, breathless and broken by the rush. The General then placed himself in their front, and pointing to the masses of the enemy, and to the howitzer, said, "Now, Highlanders, another charge like that wins the day." It was answered with a shout. Bursting at a run from the shelter of a low bridge and causeway, behind which they had been re-formed, the Highlanders, now aided by the 64th, fell on the village and captured the howitzer. The Volunteer Cavalry, who had been steadily advancing on the Cawnpore road, came up at this moment, burning with impatience for an opportunity to distinguish themselves. Captain Beatson, the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, had been attacked with cholera early in the day, but was determined not to lose his share of the engagement; and, being too ill to mount his horse, had placed himself on a tumbril in rear of the Volunteer Cavalry; and ordered them to charge the body of the enemy now presented to their view. They were only eighteen sabres, all told; but not a man paused to count the odds. Led by their noble commander, Captain Barrow, with waving swords and loud cheers they dashed on, and deep did they dye their swords in the blood of the enemy. At length the little band was obliged to pull up, when they

found their number diminished by one-third; one trooper had been killed, and another wounded; two horses were killed, and two unable to move from wounds. As they drew rein, they were rewarded for their gallantry by the ringing plaudits of the infantry, who had witnessed their exploit, and the approving smile of the General as he exclaimed, "Well done, Gentlemen Volunteers; you have done well. I am proud to command you." At the same time the 64th and 84th, and the Sikhs, pushing further to the left, encountered the right of the enemy's position, overcame all opposition, and captured the two guns which strengthened it.

The bullocks exhausted with dragging the guns through swamps and over heavy ground, were scarcely able to move, and fell gradually into the rear, and the Volunteer Cavalry was left to support them, and to protect the captured guns. As our troops were halted for a few moments to re-form, a heavy fire was opened on them from the village in which the fugitives had rallied. "The General," says Major North, "who seemed to be gifted with ubiquity, and the clear tone of whose voice raised to the highest pitch the courage of the men, hurried towards the Highlanders, and said, 'Come, who'll take that village, the Highlanders or the 64th?' There was no pause to answer. The spirit of emulation was a-flame in every breast, kindled by his calm words. We (the Highlanders), eager for approval, went off quickly in the direction indicated, moving onward in a steady compact line, our front covered by the Light company, and pushing the enemy's skirmishers through the village, from whence they were compelled to fly. The Madras Fusiliers drove them from the plantation."

One effort still remained to be made, as arduous as any of the struggles of the day. The enemy appeared to be in full retreat to Cawnpore, followed by our exhausted troops, when a reserve 24-pounder The final charge, and rout of the enemy. planted on the road, and aided by two smaller guns, reopened a withering fire on our advancing line. It was here that the Nana had determined to make his final

stand for the possession of Cawnpore, from which fresh troops had poured forth to his assistance. He was seen riding about among his soldiers, the band and the buglers striking up as he approached. The greatest animation pervaded the enemy's ranks. The din of their drums, the shouts of their cavalry, and the booming of their guns, were sufficient to affect the minds of the troops, lying down as they were to afford time for our own guns, which were a mile in the rear, to come up. This temporary pause in our advance emboldened the enemy; their infantry prepared to advance; and the cavalry stretching out in the form of a crescent menaced the small body of our troops, whom the casualties of the day, and large detachments, had reduced to about 800. The General's horse had been shot, but he mounted a hack, and coming up in front of that rain of fire, in a clear and firm tone issued the order to rise for a last advance. "At the word forward," says an eye-witness, "the ardour and impetuosity of the troops rose to a height almost resembling frenzy. The 64th was the leading regiment of the échellon, and as it advanced, the gun swept its ranks, and from thirty to forty fell before the corps reached the muzzle." The General, describing the scene, said:—

"But the final crisis arrived. My artillery cattle, wearied by the length of the march, could not bring up the guns to my assistance, and the Madras Fusiliers, the 64th, 84th, and 78th detachments, formed in line, were exposed to a heavy fire from the 24-pounder on the road. I was resolved this state of things should not last; so calling upon my men, who were lying down in a line, to leap on their feet, I directed another steady advance. It was irresistible. The enemy sent round-shot into our ranks until we were within three hundred yards, and then poured in grape with such precision and determination as I have seldom witnessed. But the 64th, led by Major Sterling and by my aide-de-camp, who had placed himself in their front, were not to be denied. Their rear showed the ground strewed with wounded; but on they steadily and silently came, then with a cheer charged and captured the unwieldy trophy of their valour. The enemy lost all heart, and after a hurried fire of musketry gave way in

total rout. Four of my guns came up, and completed their discomfiture by a heavy cannonade; and as it grew dark the roofless barracks of our artillery were dimly descried in advance, and it was evident that Cawnpore was once more in our possession."

Such was the battle of Cawnpore, in which 1000 British soldiers and 300 Sikhs, fighting under a deadly sun, with the aid of only eighteen horse, against a superior artillery and numerous cavalry, drove from a position skilfully selected and strongly intrenched, a body of 5000 native troops trained and disciplined by our own officers. The mutineers rallied twice after their first discomfiture. Their heavy artillery was admirably served, and their cavalry, though never trusting themselves within sword's length of our troops, made several attacks on our detachments, and throughout the fight hovered on our rear, and slaughtered the wounded who fell behind in the rapid advance. Still cherishing the dream of empire, which their success against Wheeler's little band had inspired, they fought with a determination which they have not subsequently displayed since their cause became hopeless. But nothing could overcome the steady courage of our indomitable infantry; fasting, foot-sore, and scarcely able to bear the weight of their arms, under a sun which claimed its victims almost as fast as the enemy's grape-shot, they fought and conquered without a moment's check, strong in their confidence in themselves and in their leader, and animated with the hope of rescuing their tender country-women and the helpless children from destruction. The defeat of the 16th of July was the heaviest blow the mutiny had yet received, and it taught the natives of the north-west that they had to deal with a nation that might be surprised, but could not be conquered. It is no exaggeration to say that in no engagement ever fought by us in India, was there a greater combination of heroic valour and consummate generalship. With 10,000 such troops under such a leader as Havelock, whose glance sufficed to rouse the enthusiasm of his soldiers, the mutiny would scarcely have survived the year in which it arose.

Remarks on
the battle of
Cawnpore.

The troops bivouacked on the night of the 16th on the bare ground, without food or tents. When the arms were piled, the General called the officers of the Highlanders together, and assured them that he had never seen a regiment behave more steadily or gallantly, and that if ever he reached the command of a regiment, it would be his request that it should be the 78th, and he desired them to convey this assurance to their men. No fire was lighted, and a dead silence pervaded the line. The baggage had been left at Maharajpore, and as it would have been imprudent to move it during the darkness, in the presence of the enemy's superior cavalry, it did not come up till the next morning. The only food which the General tasted was part of a biscuit which happened to be in his son's pocket, and of a bottle of porter which Colonel Tytler gave him. To be ready for any emergency that might arise during the night, he slept with his bridle on his arm, his horse standing ready saddled behind him. The bugler who had accompanied him on horseback through the perils of the battle, lay near him. He belonged to the 78th Highlanders, and an anecdote regarding him is not undeserving of remembrance amidst the events of the day: As the enemy's first gun was fired, the General gave him his watch to mark the time. The bugler noted the moment before he put it into his pocket, and as the last shot was sent after the retreating enemy, took the watch out again, and coolly said, "Two hours and forty-five minutes, Sir!" The men lay on the ground behind their piled muskets. About midnight there was an alarm that the enemy were advancing, and the whole line instantly stood to arms without noise or confusion. It proved to be false, but the instantaneous readiness of the men showed the admirable state of discipline which the force had attained.

It has been remarked that the General ought to have entered Cawnpore immediately after the action, instead of bivouacking two miles from it; but this was physically impossible, and it would have been an act of indefensible temerity to have at-

Reasons for not entering Cawnpore on the night of the 16th.

tempted it. The battle did not terminate till after dark. The loss during the day amounted to one-tenth of the force : a large detachment had been left at Maharajpore to protect the baggage, which was repeatedly threatened by the enemy's cavalry during the engagement : one whole regiment and part of another was guarding the captured guns far in the rear, some of the men had straggled, and others were attending the wounded. From these various causes, the number collected together at the halting ground did not exceed 800. The enemy when last seen were massed together, and their cavalry had been riding about in the rear, sabring the wounded who fell in their way. The men had marched twenty miles in the hottest day of the hottest season of the year, and had been engaged for nearly three hours in a severe action. Many had received no sustenance for four and twenty hours beyond a biscuit and some porter; and the Fusiliers, young in the field, and not so well accustomed to provident arrangements as the two Persian regiments, had been without a meat meal for more than double that period. The whole force was in truth so completely "done up," that it was impossible for them to advance a step farther. Under these circumstances the General did not deem it prudent to peril the safety of his men, in the narrow and intricate streets of a military cantonment in a dark night.

The following is the Order of the day issued by the General after the battle of Cawnpore :—

"Cawnpore, won by Lord Lake in 1803, has been a happy and peaceful place ever since, until the wretched ambition of a man whose uncle's life was, by a too indulgent Government, spared in 1817, filled it, in 1857, with rapine and bloodshed. When, soldiers, your valour won the bridge at the Pandoo nuddee, you were signing the death-warrant of the helpless women and children of your comrades of the 32nd. They were murdered in cold blood by the miscreant, Nana Sahib, whose troops fled in dismay at the victorious shout of your line, on the evening of the memorable 16th.

The General's
order of the
day on the
battle of
Cawnpore.

"Soldiers! your General is satisfied, and more than satisfied,

with you. He has never seen steadier or more devoted troops ; but your labours are only beginning. Between the 7th and the 16th you have, under the Indian sun of July, marched 126 miles, and fought four actions. But your comrades at Lucknow are in peril ; Agra is besieged ; Delhi is still the focus of mutiny and rebellion. You must make great sacrifices if you would obtain great results. Three cities have to be saved ; two strong places to be deblocked. Your General is confident that he can effect all these things, and restore this part of India to tranquillity, if you only second him with your efforts, and if your discipline is equal to your valour.

“ Highlanders, it was my earnest desire to afford you the opportunities of showing how your predecessors conquered at Maida ;—you have not degenerated. Assaye was not won by a more silent, compact, and resolute charge, than was the village near Jehajmow on the 16th instant.

“ 64th, you have put to silence the jibes of your enemies throughout India. Your fire was reserved till you saw the colour of your enemy’s mustachios—this gave us the victory.”

In his letter to Mrs Havelock on the subject of this engagement, written at Cawnpore, he said :—

“ On the 16th I recaptured this place, defeating the usurper, Nana Sahib, in a pitched battle, and taking all his guns. I lost a hundred men. I never saw so brave a youth as the boy Harry ; he placed himself opposite the muzzle of a gun that was scattering death into the ranks of the 64th Queen’s, and led on the regiment, under a shower of grape, to its capture. This finished the fight. The grape was deadly, but he, calm as if telling George stories about India. Lawrence had died of his wounds. Mary Thornhill—the General’s niece—is in great peril at Lucknow. I am marching to relieve it. Trust in God, and pray for us. All India is up in arms against us, and everywhere around me things are looking black. Thank God for his special mercies to me. We are campaigning in July.”

To the compiler of this narrative, he wrote on the same subject :—

“ I consider Cawnpore my best fight, not only on account of its results, but because it was won, by God’s blessing, *non vi sed*

arte. I had good information derived from my spies. The enemy had established heavy batteries at the intersection of the grand trunk road with the direct route to Cawnpore cantonment. If I had attacked them in front I should have lost 300 men. But pursuing the direct road from the village of Maharajpore where I had halted, I diverged near Ahirka, and, like old Frederick at Luthen, marched in open column across the country against the rebel's left. Their surprise was great when they saw my force steadily debouching in that direction. The manœuvre compelled them to withdraw their heavy guns to a new position, and place them in reverse. Meanwhile I fell successfully on the several villages in which they had artillery, and captured them. Their force renewed the fight with increased numbers and fresh guns for the defence of the cantonment, and my wearied troops were at one time overtaken a little. But they moved steadily on, and the mutineers dared not cross bayonets with them. Again there was a lull, for our artillery had fallen far into the rear. The enemy's reserve guns were telling severely on our soldiers, and they had a long line. I saw that the longer the men looked at it, the less they would like it. So I called them to spring to their feet and advance. Harry wheeled his horse in the centre of the leading regiment, right opposite to a 24-pounder, which poured forth round-shot and then grape. On we went, the *niggers* took to flight, and Cawnpore was ours. Our artillery came up and completed the confusion by a fierce cannonade. I had only a handful of Volunteer Cavalry, or few would have escaped from that field. I bivouacked in good spirits, though without dinner, my waterproof coat serving me for a couch on the damp ground.

“So you see I am become my own trumpeter, in my old age.”

CHAPTER VIII.

The third Cawnpore Massacre.—Death of Sir Henry Lawrence.—Bithoor evacuated by the Nana.—Death of Captain Beatson.—Intrenchment constructed at Cawnpore.—The Force crosses the Ganges.—Difficulties of the Advance into Oude.—Action at Onao—at Busseerutgunge.—The General retires to Mungulwar.—He is disappointed in Reinforcements.—Mutiny of the Dinapore Sepoys.—The General's second Advance.—Second Battle at Busseerutgunge.—The General constrained to retire a second time.—Correspondence with Sir Patrick Grant on the subject.—The Goorkah Auxiliary Force.—Communication established between the two Banks.—Action at Boorhiya.—The Troops recross the Ganges.—Battle at Bithoor.—Remarks on the Campaign.—Captain Havelock and the Victoria Cross.—A Christian Minister joins the Force.

IMMEDIATELY after the force had bivouacked for the night, spies were sent into Cawnpore to ascertain the position of affairs. They returned before daybreak, with the report that the insurgents had abandoned the town and cantonment, and with the heart-rending intelligence that the women and children, for whose rescue the troops had made such extraordinary efforts, had been massacred. The General was not, however, without his suspicions that the disappearance of the enemy's force might have been contrived to ensnare his troops, and Colonel Tytler was sent forward with two companies of the 84th and some horse to ascertain the truth of the statement. He had advanced to a point within a mile of the great magazine, at the western limit of the cantonment, when there was a sudden concussion resembling that of a violent earthquake, and a dense cloud of smoke was seen to rise in the air, followed by a deafening report, as if a hundred cannon had been discharged simultaneously by an electric current. It was the explosion of the magazine, blown up by a body of the enemy's horse, who had been left behind for this

The troops
enter Cawn-
pore.

object, and who galloped off immediately after they had fired the train. Colonel Tytler returned to the General and announced that the rebels had entirely evacuated the town, and that the mournful report brought by the spies of the slaughter of the captives was too strongly corroborated by his inquiries. The troops now advanced to the Sevada plain east of Cawnpore. Some of them hastened to Wheeler's encampment, and to the building where the women and children had been confined, and were struck with horror at the sight which met their eyes. The pavement was swimming in blood, and fragments of ladies' and children's dresses were floating on it. They entered the apartments, and found them empty and silent, but there also the blood lay deep on the floor, covered with bonnets, collars, combs, and children's frocks and frills. The walls were dotted with the marks of bullets, and on the wooden pillars were deep sword cuts, from some of which hung tresses of hair. But neither the sabre-cuts nor the dents of the bullets were sufficiently high above the floor to indicate that the weapons had been aimed at men defending their lives; they appeared rather to have been levelled at crouching women and children begging for mercy. The soldiers proceeded in their search, when, in crossing the court-yard, they perceived human limbs bristling from a well, and, on further examination, found it to be choked up with the bodies of the victims, which appeared to have been thrown in promiscuously, the dead with the wounded, till it was full to the brim. The feelings of those who witnessed this spectacle it is easy to conceive, but impossible to describe. Men of iron nerve, who, during the march from Allahabad, had rushed to the cannon's mouth without flinching, and had seen unappalled their comrades mowed down around them, now "lifted up their voices and wept." But the feeling of anguish which this sight created in their breasts soon gave place to sterner thoughts, and a burning desire was kindled in their minds to avenge these foul murders on their inhuman authors. It is related that the Highlanders, on coming to a body which had been barbarously

The third
Cawnpore
massacre.

exposed, and which was supposed to be that of Sir Hugh Wheeler's daughter, cut off the tresses, and reserving a portion to be sent to their own families, sat down and counted the remainder, and swore that for every hair one of the rebels should die.

It was ascertained on further inquiry that when intelligence reached Cawnpore of the second defeat of the insurgents on the 15th of July, and the forcing of the Pandoo-nuddee, and, also, of the steady and irresistible advance of the British force, the Nana and his adherents were filled with the deepest consternation. In a hurried council which was held, various plans of action, all dictated by terror, were discussed by the men who now felt that the hour of retribution was approaching. The Nana, actuated by a feeling of revenge for the defeat of his army, resolved to wreak his vengeance on the helpless women and children in his power. The Cawnpore rebels were equally anxious to remove out of the way all who could identify the perpetrators of previous atrocities, and it was determined to put the defenceless prisoners to death. An order was sent to the Sepoys on guard to butcher them, but they refused to carry it into execution, though they are said to have fired one random volley on them. The men of the Nana's guard were then sent down, and they massacred in cold blood two hundred and twelve unresisting women and children. In the annals of human guilt, there is no blacker page than that in which the atrocious murders of Cawnpore are inscribed. And it can be no matter of surprise that those feelings of goodwill towards the natives, which a long period of kindly intercourse had created in the minds of their European masters, should have given place to feelings of mistrust and even detestation after the deliberate perpetration of such crimes. A century will scarcely suffice to restore that confidence in the native character which the atrocities committed during the mutiny at various stations, and more especially at Cawnpore, have so completely obliterated.

The General had no sooner arrived at Cawnpore than he received intelligence of the death of Sir Henry Law-

rence. Their acquaintance had commenced sixteen years before, amidst the embarrassments in Afghanistan, and it had gradually ripened into a sacred friendship, under the influence of that mutual appreciation and esteem by which great minds are attracted to each other. The one was more distinguished as a soldier, the other, as a statesman; both were equally conspicuous for generosity of disposition, a lofty and disinterested public spirit, and a high tone of religious character. After the death of Broadfoot, there was no one, beyond the circle of his own family, in whom the General reposed such entire confidence, or to whom he could so unreservedly unbosom himself, as Henry Lawrence. The last letter which the General wrote to his friend was dated from Allahabad the 6th of July: "I march towards Cawnpore to-morrow with a thousand Europeans and six guns, and if safely united to Major Renaud's force, shall muster about 1500 Europeans and eight guns. With these I am ready to fight a battle to relieve Cawnpore, and, holding that place with a detachment, to march to your aid." He little thought at the time that the friend whom he was addressing and to whose succour he was hastening was already in his grave. Sir Henry Lawrence was struck on the morning of the 2nd of July, while seated in his room, by the fragment of a shell from the howitzer which had been lost at Chinhut. It soon became apparent that the wound was likely to prove mortal, and Sir Henry immediately called together the chief officers of the garrison, and, in the most calm and collected manner, dictated a series of instructions on every point connected with the defence of the Residency, and delegated the command to Major Banks and a military council. In this remarkable document he likewise directed that no inscription should be placed on his tomb but this: "Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty. May God have mercy on him." Seldom has a nobler sentiment been uttered by a statesman and a soldier in the prospect of dissolution. Great as Sir Henry had shown himself in all the arduous and responsible positions

Death of Sir
Henry Law-
rence.

he occupied during life, he was still greater in his last moments, as he lay on the couch of death, writhing with pain, yet thinking only of the perils of those he was about to leave, and labouring to provide for their safety. He lingered for two days, and expired on the morning of the 4th of July. The death of his bosom friend deeply affected the mind of the General. He had hastened on by forced marches, in the hope of being able to advance promptly to the relief of the garrison of Lucknow, and grievously was the exultation of his triumphant entry into Cawnpore damped by the intelligence that Sir Henry Lawrence was no more.

The troops entered Cawnpore on the morning of the 17th, and the men were sheltered in the stables of the 2nd Cavalry, till the tents could come up from Maharajpore. The General's first care was to visit the sick and wounded—many of whom were suffering from fearful mutilations and consequent amputations—to attend to the supply of their wants, and to speak words of consolation to the brave men who had fought three actions in thirty-six hours. Standing beside the litter of a soldier of the 64th, whose thigh had been awfully shattered, and whose recovery the surgeon mournfully pronounced to be hopeless, he said aloud, in that tone which had so often animated his men in the heat of battle, "He will recover, doctor, he has a heart in that chest," pointing to the sufferer's stalwart frame, "as big as a cart-wheel; that will yet carry him through." The evening of the 17th brought with it a general depression of spirits, now that repose had succeeded the over-strained exertions of the last four days. The hearts of the men were oppressed with the remembrance of that well of horrors. Their thoughts reverted to the officers and the dear comrades struck down by their side, whose faces they should never see more. A deep silence pervaded the encampment, except when it was broken by the melancholy sounds of the Highland pipes, as the burying parties conveyed the bodies of those who had fallen by the sword, or by cholera, to their last home. It was, moreover, re-

The gloom of
the 17th of
July.

ported in the town that the Nana had established himself at Bithoor, with forty-five guns and 5000 men. The announcement was sufficient to appal the stoutest heart, for the little force had been fearfully reduced in numbers by the casualties of the field, by sun-stroke, and disease. The General deemed it impossible, with the light artillery of the column, to make any impression on a position such as Bithoor had probably been converted into, when strengthened by the resources of the Cawnpore magazine, with its hundred guns. As he sat at dinner with his son, on the evening of the 17th, his mind appeared for the first and the last time to be affected with gloomy forebodings of the possible annihilation of his brave men in a fruitless attempt to accomplish what was beyond their strength. After musing long in deep thought, his strong sense of duty, and his confidence in the justice of the cause, restored the buoyancy of his spirits, and he exclaimed, "If the worst comes to the worst, we can but die with our swords in our hands."

The Nana's movements were at this time unknown, but it appeared not improbable that, with the strong force he was reported to possess, he might make an attempt to regain Cawnpore; the General, therefore, marched his troops, on the morning of the 18th of July, to the civil station of Nawaubgunge, to the west of Cawnpore, where he took up a position which might defy all the attacks of the enemy. It interposed between Bithoor and Cawnpore, covering the city and its resources in its rear, with the Ganges on its right and the canal on its left, while a network of ravines in front extended down to the river. On the 15th he had directed the officers commanding the infantry detachments to select a hundred of their men, who appeared to be best suited for cavalry. He now inspected them in person, and made choice of forty-one, to whom the horses of the Irregular Horse were made over, and his cavalry was thus raised to sixty. When the whole body was drawn up on parade, the General complimented those who had accompanied him from Allahabad on the noble spirit they had

Reorganiza-
tion of the
Volunteer
Cavalry.

exhibited in the field, and more particularly on the brilliant charge they had made in the battle of Cawnpore; and he held out to the emulation of those now joining it the example of the Agra Volunteer Horse, whose gallant conduct in recapturing the guns of the revolted Kotah Contingent had just been announced from that station.

The General was, moreover, determined that the tendency to dysentery and cholera, which had appeared in the camp, should not be aggravated by intemperance, to which the town of Cawnpore presented no ordinary temptation, filled as it was with the plunder of the European shops, and of large private stores of beer and spirits. He issued orders, therefore, to the commissariat officer to buy up, without any delay, all the wine, beer, spirits, and liquor of every description which could be found in the town. In the telegram which announced this order to Sir Patrick Grant, he said: "It will thus be guarded by a few men. If it remained in Cawnpore it would require half my force to keep it from being drunk up by the other half, and I should scarcely have a sober soldier in camp." During the morning of the 18th two messengers came in with letters from Delhi, the first the General had received from the north-west since he left Calcutta. From them he learned that the city had not fallen, that Sir Henry Barnard had died, and that General Reid, who succeeded him, had been obliged, from ill-health, to relinquish the command, which had thus devolved on General Wilson; that little progress had been made in the siege, and that he must dismiss all hope of receiving any reinforcement from that quarter. He likewise received letters from Agra, announcing the disastrous result of the sortie made by Brigadier Polwhele on the 6th of July.

But these depressing tidings were counterbalanced by the reports brought in at night by the spies whom the General had sent to Bithoor immediately on taking up his position at Nawaubgunge. They stated that the defeat of the Nana in the battle of Cawnpore had completely broken up his army. The

He buys up
all the wine
and spirits in
Cawnpore.

Bithoor abandoned
by the
Nana.

panic-stricken Sepoys deserted his standard in crowds, and hastened across the river, and the Nana himself fled from the field on a swift elephant, with a few followers who still adhered to him, and hastened to take refuge in Oude. Bithoor was evacuated. The son of the Peishwa's old general, Narayun Rao, who had been placed in confinement by Nana Sahib, had regained his liberty on the flight of his oppressor, and now sent messengers with the spies to make his submission to the General, and to invite him to take possession of the town. On receiving this intelligence, the General directed Major Stephenson to proceed thither on the morning of the 19th, with his Madras Fusiliers, the Sikhs, and the newly organized cavalry, with two guns. He found the town abandoned by the enemy, with every appearance of haste. The Nana's palace was filled with the plunder of the cantonment and civil station of Cawnpore—wearing apparel, kid gloves, portmanteaus, books with the names of the owners, and champagne and domestic stores of every description; but neither the treasure which he had appropriated to his own use from the plunder of the Cawnpore treasury, nor his personal jewels, were to be found; they had been thrown into wells, and were not discovered till several months afterwards. Major Stephenson burnt down the palace, blew up the magazine, and returned to Cawnpore with twenty guns of various size and calibre.

On the morning of the 19th of July the little force had to deplore the loss of one of its most valuable officers, Captain Beatson, the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General. His exertions in the action of the 16th Death of Captain Beatson. aggravated his complaint, and he expired three days after;—as gallant and noble a soldier as any recorded in the annals of the Indian army. It was only a month before his death that he returned to Calcutta from the Persian Gulf, when deprived of the hope of distinction by the sudden termination of the war, and heard of the mutiny of a wing of his regiment. In the hope of obtaining an opportunity of field service at this period of action, he lost no time in addressing his friend, Captain

George Delane, in command of the Governor-General's body-guard. The letter is interesting as an indication of his zeal and energy.

"My dear Georgius,—I shall soon have no regiment, as the other wing is sure to go. What then is to be done? No troop, no appointment, no employment. What is Havelock's army going to do—when is he going up—of what is it to be composed? Are there any appointments vacant in it? Does he want a Deputy Adjutant-General, or an extra aide-de-camp, or a Deputy Judge-Advocate-General? I want something to do, and if something does not offer within forty-eight hours, I shall get up to Allahabad, the best way I can, and serve as a volunteer with any other fellows I can get to join me."

Captain Delane sent the letter to the General, who though personally unacquainted with Captain Beatson, was no stranger to the high character he bore in the army as an able as well as a gallant officer and an accomplished scholar. It was just such spirits as Stuart Beatson, with a combination of military ardour and professional experience that the General required for his daring enterprise, and he immediately nominated him to the head of his Adjutant-General's department, an appointment which the judgment and gallantry exhibited during his brief career with the force more than justified. In his despatch after the battle of Cawnpore, the General thus refers to his loss. After recording that "Lieut.-Colonel Tytler's zeal and gallantry had been beyond all praise," he says, "It was my desire to have offered my thanks in like terms to Captain Beatson, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, but I can now only record my opinion over his grave. He was attacked by cholera on the morning of the fight, and though he did his duty throughout it and bivouacked with the troops, he sunk in three days under the violence of the disorder."

The General now found it necessary to adopt the most stringent measures to check the spirit of plunder. A victorious army can with difficulty be restrained from the licence of depredation; but in the present instance the spoliation of the

Provost-Marshal appointed to prevent plunder.

natives assumed a meritorious character in the eyes of the European troops. They were exasperated beyond bounds by the perfidious and brutal massacre of their fellow-countrymen and women, and they considered the plunder of the town in which these atrocities had been perpetrated, an act of righteous retribution; but the General was determined to subdue this propensity, not only among his European troops, but more especially among the Sikh soldiers, the most adroit and inveterate plunderers in India. He appointed Lieut. Morland, of the 1st Fusiliers, Provost-Marshal, with full powers to inflict the penalty of death on any soldier, European or native, who might be detected in plundering. But the licence was not so easily bridled, and the General was obliged to reiterate the order in sterner language. "The marauding in this camp exceeds the disorders which supervened on the short-lived triumph of the miscreant Nana Sahib. A Provost-Marshal has been appointed, with special instructions to hang up, *in their uniform*, all British soldiers that plunder. This shall not be an idle threat. Commanding officers have received the most distinct warning on the subject."

General Neill arrived at Cawnpore, from Allahabad, on the 20th of July, but was unable to bring with him any larger reinforcement than that of 227 men. The General was impatient to hasten to the relief of Lucknow, but he felt that to leave Cawnpore before he had made adequate provision for its defence would be an act of signal imprudence, and involve the most serious risk to his own operations. At the distance of seventy miles, the Nawaub of Futtyghur, after having massacred all the Europeans, men, women, and children, within his reach, had raised the standard of revolt, and assembled under it two regiments of native infantry, some of the revolted Oude troops, and a rabble of armed followers. Before the revolt, Futtyghur was the great military workshop of the north-west provinces, filled with large establishments for the manufacture more particularly of gun-carriages, and for the supply of clothing; and from

Provision for
the defence of
Cawnpore.

these stores the Nawaub was enabled to furnish himself amply with munitions of war of every description. Nana Sahib, moreover, was across the Ganges at Futtehpoore Chourassee, where he was endeavouring to reassemble his scattered troops. Though he was not likely again to try conclusions with the General in the field, he might take advantage of his absence and endeavour to regain possession of Cawnpore. On the opposite bank of the river the district of Oude teemed with a martial and a hostile population. The General apprehended that if Cawnpore, thus exposed to danger on various sides, were left without the means of defence, it might again fall into the hands of the insurgents, in which case, his communication with Allaha-bad and the lower provinces would be cut off, and his return across the river, if it should become necessary, very seriously impeded.

The General was unable to spare more than 300 men for the defence of Cawnpore, and he resolved, therefore, to construct a field-work, which, with even so small a garrison, might bid defiance to any hostile attack, as well as guard the passage of the river. Happily a spot was found admirably adapted for both these objects. At a little distance from the common ferry there was an elevated plateau, about two hundred yards in length and a hundred in breadth, situated on the bank of the river, and likewise sufficiently raised to command the surrounding country. At the distance of about five hundred yards from it there was an island in the river, partly submerged at this season of the year. Between it and the Oude bank lay two smaller islands of alluvial land, thrown up by the action of the river, but covered with water two or three feet deep, and visible only from the reeds which sprung up on them. The General was of opinion that these islands might be turned to good account, if he was obliged to recross the river, while the intrenchment on the right bank would effectually cover that operation. On this mound, accordingly, a field-work, capable of accommodating, and also of being defended by, 300 men, was commenced on the 19th, and pushed on with

Construction
of an in-
trenchment
at Cawnpore.

extraordinary vigour. Native labourers, to the number of 3000 or 4000, were engaged from the town, and their punctual services secured by the order which the General enforced, that they should be regularly paid every evening. Those among the European soldiers who possessed any mechanical skill were sent to their assistance, and encouraged by a gratuity of sixpence a day. The Irregular Cavalry, who had been disarmed for their disaffection on the line of march, were likewise set to work on the intrenchment. The progress which had been effected by the evening of the 20th was sufficient to satisfy the General that by the time the troops, stores, and baggage had been crossed into Oude, the field-work would be strong enough to protect itself. He determined, therefore, to send over the first detachment the next morning.

The passage of the Ganges was a most difficult and hazardous undertaking. It was upwards of 1600 yards wide, and at this season swelled by the rains to a rapid and impetuous torrent. All the means and appliances which would ordinarily have been available for this operation, at a large military station like Cawnpore, were now wanting. The bridge of boats established by our Government, which was entire on the 3rd of June, was broken up by the rebels after the commencement of the mutiny, and the materials were scattered. All the ferry-boats had likewise been destroyed or removed. Fortunately, the little steamer, the "Berham-pooter," which had been sent up with a hundred of the Madras Fusiliers, under Captain Spurgin, to co-operate with the land column, had reached the station, and was now employed up and down the river in endeavouring to collect boats. Not more than twenty, however, could be obtained where they were formerly counted by hundreds; and the boatmen, who had been actively engaged in aiding the mutineers, were prompted to conceal themselves from the dread of punishment. To have committed the management of the boats to inexperienced peasants, on a broad river running like a sluice, would have been to expose them and their precious freight to the risk of de-

Difficulty of
crossing the
Ganges.

struction. After considerable difficulty a small number of the old boatmen were collected, and induced to accept service on the tacit understanding that their past misconduct would be overlooked. To secure their services they were embodied as a corps, upon fixed pay.

Soon after midnight of the 20th of July rain began to pour, and continued without intermission for the next ^{Crossing of} three days. It had been arranged that the ^{the troops.} Highlanders should cross at daybreak, and the General was so anxious to obviate every obstruction, that he determined to superintend their embarkation himself. Leaving General Neill in charge of the encampment, he rode down to the ferry, a distance of four miles, in a deluge of rain, at one in the morning, and did not return till he had seen the troops and three guns safely across. Owing to the small number of boats available, the detachment was weak, too weak to furnish a baggage guard, and it was thought imprudent to hamper it with tents. Indeed, the enterprise of crossing the river with so weak a force, into a province filled with a hostile and armed population, was one of the boldest movements of the General during this campaign. For aught he knew, there might be an insurgent army hovering about the bank, and the little force might at any moment be attacked by overwhelming numbers; he therefore gave the officer in command of the detachment the most precise instructions for his guidance under any emergency that might arise. The spot at which the Highlanders landed was a swamp immediately under a ridge of low sand hills, and they crept for shelter from the rain into some fishermen's huts. The second detachment was not landed before the evening of the 21st. During the operation the steamer was found to be so deficient in power, and so unmanageable in the impetuous current of the Ganges, that it became necessary to dispense with her services, and to depend entirely on the boats, though they were generally eight hours in accomplishing the trip. The 84th and three additional guns were sent across on the 22nd. The Madras Fusiliers,

being armed with the Enfield rifle, had been employed as skirmishers, and had thus borne the brunt of fatigue in the four preceding actions; it was, therefore, deemed advisable to afford them as much rest as possible to recruit their strength, and they were accordingly sent over with the last detachment. While the troops were thus engaged in crossing the river in successive parties, the works at the intrenchment were pushed on with the utmost speed. In it were deposited the guns and stores which had been dug out of the ruins of the magazine, as well as the commissariat supplies which the town and the country around had furnished. On the 25th the General visited it for the last time, and feeling confident that it was sufficiently advanced to resist any attack, crossed the river himself, and joined the force on the Oude bank. The next morning he marched the troops, among whom the cholera was beginning to make great havoc, to a more healthy position, three miles in advance. Meanwhile, Colonel Tytler, aided by Lieut. Moorsom, who had been appointed by the General to act as deputy Quarter-master-General, was employed on the right bank night and day, sometimes under a broiling sun, and then in a drenching rain, in superintending the transport of the stores and the *matériel*. At length, after a week of incredible difficulties, overcome only by the indomitable energy and perseverance of that officer, the whole of the force and the munitions of war were assembled on the Oude bank, prepared to advance to Lucknow. Some of the General's staff were anxious that General Neill should accompany the column, to take his place if he were disabled by any casualty; but, after carefully weighing the importance of the position at Cawnpore, the necessity of receiving, equipping, and forwarding reinforcements, and completing the establishment of a communication across the river, and, generally, of maintaining our authority on the right bank of the Ganges, he determined to leave General Neill in charge of the intrenchment, with the sick and wounded, there being no other officer to whom he could intrust these responsibilities

with equal confidence. Lieut. Moorsom was at the same time directed to construct a road, or rather causeway, across the islands.

The enterprise on which the General now entered was one of no common difficulty, and, but for the great object before him, that of rescuing the beleaguered garrison from destruction, must have appeared rash even to presumption. No one but an officer who combined military genius with inflexible resolution and the strongest self-reliance, would have ventured on such an expedition. But however inadequate his force might be to the magnitude of the object, the men had unbounded confidence in the General, notwithstanding, perhaps even *in consequence* of, his iron discipline; and he had perfect confidence in men whose valour, energy, and spirit of endurance had been demonstrated in their arduous march to Cawnpore, and four severe engagements with the enemy. The following letter will show that the General himself was not unconscious of the difficulties before him. It was written on the 28th of July, in reply to a telegram, in which Sir Patrick Grant had inquired whether the risk he incurred in leaving a large and rapid river in his rear, with the most imperfect means of crossing it, was not too much for him to attempt:—

“In reply to your Excellency’s telegram of the 26th, I beg to state that I should consider it certain that I must incur the risk of serious loss in an attempt to recross the Ganges to Cawnpore, even supposing that I had been reinforced by the remnant of the garrison of Lucknow. The chances of relieving that place are at the same time hourly multiplying against us. I will not now enter into all the details, but specify only that Nana Sahib has succeeded in collecting 3000 men and several guns, and is on our left flank at Futtehpoore Chourassee, with the avowed intention of cutting in upon our rear, when we advance towards Lucknow. The difficulties of an advance to that capital are excessive. The enemy has intrenched and covered with guns the bridge across the Sye at Bunnee, and has made preparations for destroying it if the bridge is forced. I have no means of crossing the canal near Lucknow, even if successful at Bunnee. A direct attack at

Difficulties of
the advance
into Oude.

Bunnee might cost me a third of my force. I might turn it by Mohan, unless the bridge there also were destroyed. I have this morning received a plan of Lucknow from Major Anderson, engineer in that garrison, and much valuable information in two memoranda, which escaped the enemy's outpost troops, and were partly written in Greek character. These communications, and much information orally derived from spies, convince me of the extreme delicacy and difficulty of any operation to relieve Colonel Inglis, now commanding in Lucknow. It shall be attempted, however, at every risk, and the result faithfully reported. Our losses from cholera are becoming serious, and extend to General Neill's force, as well as my own. I earnestly hope that the 5th and the 90th can be pushed on to me entire, and with all despatch, and every disposable detachment of the regiments now under my command be sent on. My whole force only amounts to 1500 men, of whom 1200 are British, and ten guns imperfectly equipped and manned. I am very thankful for your Excellency's kind interposition at the Horse Guards regarding my promotion to Major-General."

The whole force was assembled at Mungulwar on the 28th. This village is situated six miles from the river, on a ridge extending five miles, and elevated about 200 feet above the surrounding country. It was ^{Battle of} Onao. a position of great strength, where our little force might have defied all the armies of Oude. The column started at daybreak on the morning of the 29th, and advanced to the town of Onao, a distance of about three miles, and seldom had the General been so staggered by any difficulty as by that which now presented itself to his view. In his despatch, he has thus described the enemy's position:—"His right was protected by a swamp which could neither be forced nor turned; his advance was drawn up in a garden enclosure, which in this warlike district had purposely or accidentally assumed the form of a bastion. The rest of his [advance] force was posted in and behind a village, the houses of which were loop-holed. The passage between the village and the town of Onao is narrow. The town itself extended three-quarters of a mile to our right. The flooded state of the country precluded the possibility of turning in this direction. The

swamp shut us in on the left. Thus an attack in front became unavoidable. It was commenced by the 78th Highlanders and 1st Fusiliers, with two guns, and soon became exceedingly warm. The enemy were driven out of the bastioned enclosure; but when our troops approached the village, a destructive fire was opened upon them from the loopholed houses. It became necessary to bring up the 64th, under Colonel Wilson, K.H. Here some daring feats of bravery were performed. . . . The village was set on fire; still its defenders resisted obstinately. Finally, the guns were captured, and the whole force was enabled to debouch between the village and the town of Onao." Meanwhile, the main body of the enemy, with a numerous artillery, was hastening forward to occupy Onao. It became evident to the General that unless he could establish his force beyond the town, before the enemy entered it, he should run every risk of being arrested on his first day's march. His troops pushed forward and gained a space of dry ground, about half a mile in extent; besides this spot and the high-road, the eye could discern nothing but swamps for miles around. It was to the occupation of this position, on the Lucknow side of the town, before the enemy could reach it, that the success of this action was to be attributed. The General drew up his force in line, with four guns in the centre and two on each wing, all bearing on the high-road in front, by which the insurgents were rapidly rushing down in great confusion. He had invariably acted on the maxim, that when the enemy are committing an error, it is an act of folly to arrest their progress. Our fire was, therefore, reserved till they halted in front of the line, and began the action. Our artillery was admirably served, and tore through the dense column of the enemy's infantry and guns massed on the narrow road. They now perceived their error, and endeavoured to correct it by deploying their force; but the impracticable marshes on either side engulfed their cannon as soon as they were drawn off the road. Our Enfield rifles were rapidly emptying the saddles of the enemy's cavalry; the artillery kept

up an incessant fire on their infantry, and they began to retreat in great haste. To allow them no time to recover themselves, two guns were pushed forward, and the skirmishers, wading up to the knee and sometimes to the waist, on both sides of the road, completed their discomfiture. Their artillerymen, however, stood to their guns to the last. This was the first occasion on which our troops had come in contact with the artillery of the Oude force, now in rebellion, and the high opinion which General Anson had expressed of their efficiency when he reviewed them the previous year at Lucknow was fully justified. After the annexation, no effort had been spared by the government of the province to bring this artillery to a state of the highest efficiency, and some of the ablest of our artillery officers had been employed in giving instruction to the gunners of three batteries attached to the "Oude Irregular Force," as it was termed, who now turned against us, and afforded us an opportunity of testing the excellence they had attained under this tuition. Fifteen guns were captured in the action at Onao, but they were necessarily destroyed, there being no carriage for their conveyance. The loss of the rebels was computed at 300.

After pursuing the enemy for some distance, the troops halted for three hours and partook of a meal. The bugle then sounded again, and they fell into their ranks, and marched forward about six miles, to Busseerutgunge, a place which has been rendered memorable in this campaign as the scene of three actions. It was a walled town, intersected by the high-road to Lucknow. In the rear of it lay a jheel, or sheet of water, about 150 yards in width, and six or seven feet deep, over which the road was carried by a causeway. The main gate, at the hither entrance of the town, was defended by an earthwork, a trench, and four guns, and flanked on each side by turrets, which were loopholed, as were also the walls. The gate was likewise completely covered by a large building within the town. It was a formidable position, and it became manifest to the General that an

Battle of
Busseerut-
gunge.

attempt to assail it in front, unsupported by a flank movement, would entail a serious loss of life. He, therefore, directed the 64th to march round the town on his left, and endeavour to interpose itself between the farther gate and the causeway. Three guns, posted on the high-road, were now brought to bear on the earthwork and the gateway in front, while a converging fire was directed on the same point from the other guns on the right and left. It was arranged that as soon as our guns appeared to tell on the enemy's defences, and the 64th had reached a point on a line with the town, the 78th Highlanders and the Madras Fusiliers, always companions in these actions, should endeavour to storm the gateway, while the 84th and the Sikhs stood ready to support either the storming or the turning party, as occasion might require. As the Highlanders and Fusiliers advanced, the enemy's guns sent repeated and heavy discharges into their ranks, and they were ordered to lie down, while our cannon again plied the defences with energy. The enemy's fire appeared now to slacken, and the two corps, having received the order to rise, sprang to their feet, and with a shout which struck terror into the rebels, cleared the trench and rushed in at the gate.

The enemy, bewildered by the impetuosity of the charge and the flank movement of the 64th, became utterly disheartened, abandoned their guns, and fled in confusion through the town, and over the causeway, hotly pursued by the victors. If the 64th had continued to advance, as the General had expected, the loss inflicted on the enemy during their retreat would have been more signal. But that regiment was annoyed by a fire from the walls, and paused to return it; and, acting under some mistake regarding fresh instructions, failed to reach its appointed destination. The General sent his aide-de-camp at full gallop to hasten its advance, but the opportunity was lost, and could not be recovered. With the exception of three hours given to rest and refreshment, the troops had now been incessantly engaged in marching and fighting from sunrise to sunset; the night was closing

in, and the General did not deem it prudent to allow them to proceed in pursuit of the enemy over the causeway, though he himself rode to a considerable distance in advance, in search of a position for his advanced cavalry post. As he returned to the causeway, the weary soldiers who were grouped on it, leaning on their arms, suddenly caught a glimpse of him, and in an instant there was an enthusiastic shout through their ranks, "Clear the way for the General!" A bright smile stole over the stern features of the old chief, as he exclaimed, "You have done that *well* already, men." This unexpected compliment electrified the troops, and as his form gradually disappeared, "God bless the General!" burst from a hundred lips. This was the second instance, during the campaign, of two actions and two victories on the same day. The troops bivouacked for the night between the jheel and the town. On retiring to his tent, the General penned the following Order of the day, which was issued the next morning:—

"Soldiers, your General thanks you for your exertions to-day. You have stormed two fortified villages, and captured nineteen guns. But he is not satisfied with *all* of you. Some of you fought as if the cholera had seized your minds as well as your bodies. There were men among you, however, whom he must praise to the skies. Private Patrick Cavanagh, of the 64th, died gloriously, hacked to pieces by the enemy when setting a brilliant example to his comrades. Had he survived, he should have worn the Victoria Cross, which never could have glittered on a braver breast. But his name will be remembered as long as Ireland produces and loves gallant soldiers.

The General's
Order after
the two
engagements.

"Lieut. Bogle, 78th Highlanders, was severely wounded while leading the way at Onao into a loopholed house filled with desperate fanatics. A special report of his gallantry will be sent to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief. The 'hero of Inkermann' well knows how to appreciate heroes.

"Major Stephenson, in command of the regiment which the rebel chiefs know and fear as 'the Blue Caps,' showed throughout the day how the calmest forethought can be united with the utmost daring.

“Lieut. Dangerfield has merited the cross reserved for the brave. He was the first to mount the barricade at this place.”*

The evening passed cheerily in the camp, amidst the exultations of this double triumph, but the morning brought gloomy tidings and revelations, which constrained the General to reflect on the propriety of continuing to advance under existing circumstances. The opposition he had encountered in these, his first operations in Oude, was likely to increase as he penetrated into the province. During the engagement of the previous day, a large body of troops had been perceived hovering on his left, without taking any part in the action, and were now reported to consist of the force which Nana Sahib had been collecting at Futtehpore Chourassee. He also learned that the insurgents in our own provinces had been strengthened by the revolt of three Native regiments at Dinapore; and the hostile force in his rear thus assumed a more formidable appearance. It was, moreover, reported that a third of his gun ammunition had been expended in the attack on Onao and Busseerutgunge, and the army had as yet advanced only one-third of its way to Lucknow. Eighty-eight had been killed and wounded in the two actions of the previous day, and as many disabled by fatigue, exposure, and the ravages of cholera. These invalids and the wounded required the whole of the sick-carriage of the force; there was not an unoccupied doolie in the camp. This was by far the most serious difficulty which presented itself to the mind of the General. It was impossible for him to advance without conveyance for the wounded, unless it was intended to abandon them to destruction on the road. Under the influence of these considerations, and more especially of the last and most important of them, he felt it to be his duty to retire to his impregnable position at Mungulwar, send back his sick and wounded to Cawnpore, and augment his force by all the reinforcements he could obtain, before he again advanced to Luck-

* In his report to the Madras Government Major Stephenson stated that this honour was equally divided between Lieuts. Dangerfield and Hargood.

now. This decision was fortified by the assurance he had received that the besieged garrison at the Residency was, for the present, sufficiently supplied with provisions, and that the pressure of the siege would be in some measure relaxed by the diversion of a large body of the rebels to watch his movements. On his return to Mungulwar, he wrote to General Neill that, though everywhere successful, he urgently required another battery and a thousand British bayonets before "he could do anything for the real advantage of Lucknow." He requested him to keep Captain Crommelin well supplied with workmen to complete the bridge; and urged him to push forward every available soldier and gun, as it was his intention to advance to Lucknow on their arrival.

The reinforcements which he expected to receive consisted of the 5th Fusiliers from the Mauritius, and the 90th Foot, originally embarked from England for China, and the remaining detachments of the corps then under his command. But he was destined to a bitter disappointment. He was informed by Sir Patrick Grant that there was other work cut out for the 5th and the 90th, and that he could expect no reinforcement for some weeks. To explain the cause of this lamentable occurrence, it is necessary to advert to the progress of events at Dinapore. That military station is in the immediate neighbourhood of Patna, the old Mahomedan capital of Behar, a province filled with bigoted Mahomedans, who had always manifested a spirit of haughty disaffection to our rule. In the cantonment at Dinapore there were three Native regiments, an entire European corps—the 10th—and a wing of the Queen's 37th. In the paper which General Havelock drew up on the 3rd of June, on board the *Erin*, when he had heard of the revolt of only a fourth of the Native army, he recorded his opinion that no confidence could any longer be placed in any regular corps of Native Infantry. The same conclusion was likewise forced on the public, as regiment after regiment joined the insurgents; but the Government of India continued

The General disappointed in his hopes of reinforcements.

Mutinous disposition of the three regiments at Dinapore.

to cherish more favourable views, and believed that every regiment which had not actually revolted was faithful, though scarcely a week elapsed without some new defection. In no instance was this fatal credulity more disastrous than in the case of the Dinapore regiments. Unfortunately that station was at this time under the command of General Lloyd, who, though not without some claim to consideration for his recent services in the easy suppression of the Santal insurrection, was unfitted for any military responsibility at this eventful crisis. While the disaffection of the Native regiments at Dinapore was manifest to all around him, he continued to assure Government that their fidelity was beyond suspicion. The merchants of Calcutta, who had made advances on the produce of Behar to the extent of nearly a million sterling, necessarily became anxious for the safety of their property, if 3000 Native troops, with arms in their hands, should break out into open mutiny, and disperse over the country. They, therefore, presented a memorial to Government, entreating that the Native corps, which were ripe for mutiny, should be disarmed. The European troops at the station might at any time have effected this object, but if a stronger force was deemed necessary, it would have been easy to detain at Dinapore, for two or three days, some of the detachments proceeding upwards in the steamers. But the Government placed confidence in the flattering reports of General Lloyd, and the request of the merchants was disregarded.

The mutiny, which the Sepoys at Dinapore had long planned, at length came to a head. On the 25th of July an order was issued to remove the percussion caps from the regimental magazines, and the Sepoys at Revolt of the three regiments. once broke out into open rebellion. One regiment rushed to the tumbrils which contained them and prevented their removal, retiring to their lines with derisive shouts. The European troops ought to have been called out at once, and the mutinous regiment subjected to immediate execution; but General Lloyd gave the Sepoys four hours to consider whether they would obey his

orders or not, and then retired to a steamer, and took lunch and a siesta. The Sepoys availed themselves of this interval to fill their pouches with ammunition, and then prepared to leave the station. The 10th Foot and the wing of the 37th were then called to arms, but there was no one to direct their movements; the General was not to be found, and the second in command was gone in search of him. Some of the European officers of the Native regiments went down to the lines and endeavoured to reason with their men, but they were fired on, and obliged to retire. As the mutinous corps were leaving the station, the 10th Foot moved out against them with artillery, but the main body was already beyond their range. The guns opened upon their rear, but did no serious damage. There were no cavalry to pursue the mutineers, and they spread over the district, swelling the tide of revolt, and indefinitely increasing the embarrassments of the time.

The position of General Hayelock was greatly imperilled by this fresh mutiny. An addition of 3000 troops, well armed and disciplined, was thus made to the body of insurgents, and the European troops which were on their way to reinforce him, and enable him to advance to Lucknow, were detained to protect the districts and towns menaced by this new brood of rebels. Instead, therefore, of receiving an accession of two regiments, with which he might have relieved the Residency, the whole of the additional force he was able to obtain from Cawnpore did not exceed 257, a number barely sufficient to fill up the casualties created by the sword and the pestilence. On the 3rd of August the General received half of Captain Olpherts' battery, consisting of three-horsed 9-pounders, and likewise two 24-pounders. The men who now joined him were reported to have conducted themselves in a satisfactory manner, with the exception of the native Gun Lascars, whose conduct on the line of march had been mutinous; and he felt that he could not afford to have a single traitor in his camp. The whole detachment was therefore drawn up on parade, when he came forward and

Small reinforcements sent to the General.

congratulated the British artillerymen on having joined a body which had six times encountered the enemy, and defeated them on every occasion. "Men," said he, "you may go from left to right of that line, and every soldier you meet is a hero." Then, turning to the native Lascars, he upbraided them as miscreants and traitors to the fostering Government which supported them. The European troops were ordered to disarm them, and they were sent across the Ganges to General Neill, to be employed in working at the intrenchment.

Although the General's column was no stronger with these reinforcements than when he started for Lucknow The General's second advance. the first time, he determined to make another effort to reach it. He considered it a paramount duty not to relinquish the enterprise while there appeared the remotest possibility of success. The detention of the 5th and the 90th, on whose assistance he had calculated, so far from shaking his determination, only served to confirm it. Having been assured, after the Dinapore mutiny, that he was not to expect any reinforcements for two months, he felt that if the Residency was to be relieved at all, the attempt must be made with the troops then under his command. While the General was encamped at Mungulwar, General Neill reported that the insurgents were again gathering at Bithoor, that they were supported by the zemindar of Sheorajpore, and that he was consequently beginning to feel some anxiety for his own position at Cawnpore. He hoped, therefore, that an effort would be made to disperse the rebels before the second advance to Lucknow was commenced. But the General informed him that he would not allow his mind to be diverted from the great object before him, which Government continued to press on him with much earnestness, and which he was resolved, if possible, to accomplish at all hazards, and that he could not engage in two operations at the same time. The zemindar and the other insurgents "he would smash on his return." The troops left with General Neill to guard the intrenchment, now approaching completion, amounted to 300, and they would

be augmented by detachments coming from below. This force the General considered sufficient to defeat an enemy, even in the open field. But he cautioned General Neill against assaulting forts, as likely to entail defeat. He concluded by saying, "I simply hold you responsible for the defence of my communications, while I advance to and return from Lucknow."

On the evening of the 4th of August the General moved from his encampment at Mungulwar, and bivouacked for the night a mile beyond Onao. The column Second battle of Busseerutgunge. marched the next morning and approached Busseerutgunge, when the videttes of the enemy were descried by the Volunteer Cavalry, who led the advance. The troops were then halted, and a reconnaissance pushed up to within musket-shot of the town. The information thus gained, combined with the knowledge of the locality which the General had acquired after the first engagement, enabled him to form his plan of action with confidence. On the right of his force, as it approached the town, there was a strip of land beyond the marsh, of greater consistency than was usually found in this part of the country during the rains. He determined to take advantage of this circumstance to send detachments to sweep round the town, and take up a position behind it between the farther gate and the causeway, as had been attempted without success in the first action at this place. The left wing was, therefore, directed to engage the enemy in front, while the right made the circuit, and advanced on their rear. The turning force consisted of the 78th Highlanders, the 1st Fusiliers, and the Sikhs, with Captain Maude's battery, and a troop of the Volunteer Cavalry. When its leading subdivision had advanced to a point parallel with the town, the heavy guns, which had been playing on the defences in front, were pushed along the road and brought within three hundred yards of the gate, and their shot and shell swept through the town, or exploded within it. It may here be remarked that the General invariably avoided an assault in front, except when the swampy nature of the ground at this season of the year

permitted no other mode of attack. He always endeavoured to protect his infantry from the enemy's guns, and never allowed them to move to the charge until his own artillery had performed its work, by silencing, as far as possible, the enemy's fire. Acting on this rule, his artillery thundered at the gateway without pause, and the enemy, bewildered by this fierce cannonade, and by the flank movement towards their rear, began to fly through the town. As they rushed out at the farther gate, they came under the fire of the turning column commanded by Colonel Hamilton, while Captain Maude's four guns poured a withering fire on the fugitives as they were massed on the causeway, or endeavoured to save themselves by plunging into the swamps. Then the left, consisting of the 64th and 84th, were pushed to the front, leaped over the trench, and bayoneted those who still continued to defend the gate.

The enemy were now in full retreat, but as our troops defiled over the causeway in the pursuit, they were galled by a fire from the village of Beejpurree, where a portion of the enemy had rallied to defend the passage and brought a heavy cannonade to bear upon it. At the same time they showed a disposition to make a stand in a village on the left, which the 84th were directed to attack, while the Fusiliers, who had been in the rear, were ordered to storm Beejpurree. Attached to the turning column, they had enjoyed no opportunity of taking an active share in the labours of the day, which they had invariably done heretofore. As Lieut. Havelock rode up to them with the General's orders to advance, a voice exclaimed, "Ah, thought they could not do without us in front, at last." Under the command of their gallant leader, Major Stephenson, the men rushed with a shout on the village and speedily cleared it of the enemy. In consequence chiefly of the admirable manner in which Captain Maude's guns were handled, our loss in this action did not exceed twenty-five, of whom only two were killed; while the rebels, on their part, lost about 250. They did not pause till they had put five miles of ground between themselves and their

conquerors, who, having no cavalry, were unable to complete the victory by the capture of the cannon, which the enemy were thus enabled to carry off. On this occasion, perhaps, more than on any other, was the want of cavalry bitterly deplored. It was owing to the absence of the means of pursuit, that the enemy, though completely discomfited, were still enabled to retire with impunity to another position previously chosen and strengthened, and had leisure to prepare for another engagement. Immediately after the action, the General wrote to General Neill, "I owe the Blue Caps"—the Madras Fusiliers—"thanks; they owe me nothing. If I might select for praise without being invidious, I should say they and the Highlanders are the most gallant troops in my little force, and from their superior weapons they are the most effective."

While the troops halted for their meal, about two miles beyond the scene of action, the General deliberated on his present position, and the prospects before him.

In the action of the morning the enemy, though signally defeated, had succeeded in carrying off their guns, and had established them five miles distant, at Nawaubgunge. Unfortunately the General possessed no map of the route on which any dependence could be placed. While in Calcutta he had sought for one in the Quarter-master-General's office, but nothing could be discovered except a rough plan of the high-road to Lucknow, sketched ten years before, which was not only imperfect, but so inaccurate as to be worse than useless for military purposes. The line from Cawnpore to the capital of Oude had been scientifically surveyed four months before by the engineer of the Oude Railway Company, but he perished with General Wheeler's force, and all his papers and plans were destroyed in the sack of Cawnpore. The General was, therefore, obliged to depend for his knowledge of the route on the report of his scouts. They stated that the position at Nawaubgunge was as strong as that at Busseerutgunge, and that the entire line of road to Lucknow was dotted with posts equally difficult, that the bridge over the Sye at Bunnee

The General
deliberates
on his future
course.

was broken up, and the passage of the river guarded by a large force and heavy artillery. The General calculated that he had three strong positions to force before he could reach the city of Lucknow, and that his losses would probably fall little short of 300, thus leaving him only 700 British bayonets for the attack on that city, with its encircling canal, its intrenched and barricaded streets, its loopholed houses, temples and palaces defended by a warlike population, and an army of soldiers disciplined to perfection by our own officers. Every village was opposed to us, and the landholders—of which class many of those who had fallen in the action of the morning consisted—had universally risen against us, and collected bands of two and three hundred partisans to oppose our progress.

The aspect of affairs in the rear was equally gloomy. The General's force was too small to permit him to leave detachments for the maintenance of posts as he advanced, and Nana Sahib, who was in force within a distance of twelve miles, would not fail to occupy Busseerutgunge and intercept his communication with Cawnpore. The Gwalior Contingent, moreover, had now mutinied in a body. It was a compact little army in itself, with horse, foot, and twenty-four field guns, thoroughly organized and equipped, and the native subalterns, owing to the paucity of European officers, took a more active share of the government of the different corps, and were consequently more efficient. It was, therefore, a more formidable enemy than any mere assemblage of single regiments of the line. It was now said to be approaching Culpee, on the Ganges, within fifty miles of Cawnpore. The Dinapore mutineers were likewise reported to be advancing westward by Mirzapore to join the standard of Nana Sahib. The General had been warned to expect no reinforcements for two months, and, to crown his difficulties, the cholera had broken out in his camp with increased virulence. His men were dying hourly around him, and while he was deliberating on his course, the survivors employed the brief halting time in digging graves for their comrades who had fallen victims to it during the

day. Thus surrounded by difficulties, and assailed by an irresistible enemy within his camp, the mind of the General was a prey to conflicting anxieties. To relinquish the attempt to relieve Lucknow was to abandon the garrison, the women, and the children to destruction, to sacrifice the soldier's brightest hope of distinction, and to tarnish by a single act the reputation of a whole life of honourable exertion. The Government and the public might dwell more on his last failure than on all his previous victories. On the other hand, he reflected that his own little army was the only body which represented the authority of Government throughout the north-west provinces. It was the nucleus of the force to be hereafter collected to re-conquer them, and its destruction in a fruitless enterprise would send every wavering chief into the ranks of rebellion, and render the restoration of our power tenfold more arduous. At the same time, the extinction of his column would so greatly embolden the besiegers of the Residency, and at the same time so completely cripple its defenders, as to render their ruin inevitable.

After carefully weighing all these considerations, the General came to the painful conclusion, that it was his paramount duty to relinquish the attempt to relieve Lucknow till he was adequately reinforced. He never called a council of war. Independently of his own spirit of self-reliance, his experience of the mischief which had attended these councils in Affghanistan was sufficient to deter him from any such attempt to divide the responsibilities of his post. But he did not act without conferring with the officers on his staff, Colonel Tytler, Lieut. Havelock, and Captain Crommelin, on whose judgment he set great value. He called them together after the action, and inquired their views, and they unanimously concurred with him in the opinion that to advance to Lucknow under present circumstances would be a gainless sacrifice of the lives of men who had so heroically maintained the honour of the British army in seven engagements. Colonel Tytler was especially opposed to the advance, and maintained that however urgent the

He relinquishes the enterprise for a time.

Government might be for the relief of the Residency, they could never desire or expect him to risk the destruction of his force in a case like the present. It was, therefore, determined to retire to Mungulwar.

The little army retraced its steps with ill-suppressed reluctance. This was the only occasion on which any appearance of discontent was manifested in its ranks. The men could not comprehend the necessity of a retrograde movement, when they had beaten the enemy in every encounter, and were burning with impatience to advance to Lucknow. The General immediately on reaching Mungulwar sent a communication to Colonel Inglis, stating that stern and inevitable necessity had constrained him to retire to that position and wait for reinforcements before he again attempted to advance to Lucknow. "When further defence," he wrote, "becomes impossible, do not negotiate or capitulate. Cut your way out to Cawnpore. You will save the colours of the 32nd, and two-thirds of your British troops. Blow up your fortifications, treasure, &c., by constructing surcharged mines under them, and leaving slow matches burning."

On his return to Mungulwar, the General immediately telegraphed the intelligence of this movement to the Commander-in-Chief.

"I must prepare your Excellency for my abandonment, with great grief and reluctance, of the hope of relieving Lucknow. The only three staff officers in my force whom I ever consult confidentially, but in whom I entirely confide, are un-
 Correspondence with Sir Patrick Grant on this movement.
 animously of opinion that an advance to the walls of Lucknow must involve the loss of this force. The only military question that remains, therefore, is, whether that, or the unaided destruction of the British garrison at Lucknow would be the greatest calamity to the State at this crisis. The loss of this force in a fruitless attempt to relieve Colonel Inglis, would of course involve his fall. I will remain, however, to the latest moment in this position,—at Mungulwar,—strengthening it, and hourly improving my bridge communication with Cawnpore, in the hope that some error of the enemy

may enable me to strike a blow against them, and give the garrison an opportunity of blowing up their works and cutting their way out.

“The enemy is in such force at Lucknow, that to encounter him, five marches from this position, would be to court annihilation.”

The next day he again wrote as follows :—

“I have not troubled you with requisitions for troops, but cholera is making fearful ravage among my people. I could not for the little enterprise of yesterday muster more than 1018 British infantry. I have had ten fresh cases of this dreadful disorder to-day in one regiment. Work, your Excellency tells me, is cut out for the 5th and the 90th. Can I not have the 10th Foot, which the outbreak at Dinapore has set free? If I had them I could smash everything around me, and then move on to Agra, and effect something that would be valuable. At the present rate of my losses I shall soon be reduced to inactivity. Could not the wing of the 90th be sent me; or if no new regiments can be pushed up, cannot, as originally proposed, the 64th, the Highlanders, and the Fusiliers, entire, be placed at my disposal?”

A day or two after he again wrote :—

“If reinforcements of the 10th, the 37th, and of the regiments now with me, could be sent up, I may hope to do much. Without them, I will do my best. It cannot be much. The garrison of Allahabad is reduced to 358 men; far too low. But how am I to reinforce them? Cholera still continues to ravage my ranks. My bridge communications are nearly complete. Then I shall be in a position to act on either bank. I will not to the last abandon all hope of relieving Lucknow, if accident should render it possible.”

A few days subsequently he wrote more fully on the subject, in reply to a letter from Sir Patrick, and clearly explained his reasons for having retired :—

“I have this morning received your letter of the 8th instant. It was with the deepest reluctance that I was compelled to relinquish, as impracticable and hopeless, the enterprise of the relief

of Lucknow, but my force, diminished to 900 infantry, was daily lessened by the inroads of cholera. I should have had at least two battles against superior forces to fight, before I could have approached the Dil koosha park, which is the direction in which I would have endeavoured to penetrate; and to win my way up to the Residency through a fortified suburb would have been an effort beyond my strength. The issue would have been the destruction of this force, as well as of the gallant garrison; a second loss of Cawnpore, and the abandonment of all this portion of the Dooab [or, the tract of country lying between the Ganges and the Jumna], to the insurgents. I have, therefore, judged that I was consulting the best interests of the State by attempting only that which my force was capable of accomplishing, left as it was without the hope of reinforcement. Had I prolonged my operations in Oude, General Neill would have been in danger of being overpowered here, and thus my line of communication with Allahabad have been entirely interrupted. The resolution which I took was the most painful I have ever had to form in my life; but imposed on me by imperious circumstances I could not control. . . . With any hope of reinforcement I would have made the attempt; without it I felt assured that it would be madness. The whole of my staff concurred in this view of the case. My retirement from Oude was in every way prosperous.

“My force was indeed so low, that it barely sufficed to guard the artillery. Sickness had so weakened the men that they were not capable of an ordinary march of ten miles, and afterwards of fighting a battle. The spirits of two of my regiments have sunk under privation and sickness. When I have overcome the enemy's artillery fire, my wearied infantry can scarcely muster strength to capture their guns, and, as I have no cavalry, the mutineers resist as long as they have the power, and then retire without fear of pursuit. Each battle cost me from fifty to a hundred men, and I should have reached the capital of Oude with a mere skeleton force. When I finally advanced, resolved if possible to win, General Neill sent me the most pressing representations regarding his danger from the Saugor troops, which were assembling at Bithoor in his front. To have lost Cawnpore while I was endeavouring to regain Lucknow, would have been an irreparable calamity. I had not force to carry out the task intrusted to me. If troops can be sent me I will answer for success in every direction, but I cannot accomplish anything without reinforcements.

“Of Tytler’s gallantry and sound judgment I have given my sincere opinion on all occasions, and I have derived the greatest assistance from him. He was even stronger than myself in his conviction of the hopelessness of attempting, with my means, to penetrate to Lucknow. Every step that I took towards that capital exposed me to the danger of having my flanks and rear irretrievably jeopardized. The people have unfortunately never been disarmed, and every zemindar has guns and muskets at his disposal. I could not have won my way back through the strong positions of Busseerutgunge and Onao, which it had cost me so dear originally to win.”

At the same time he wrote to Mrs Havelock :—

“I know not when I may have leisure to write a line to you again, so I shall avail myself,—not of a Sabbath day’s rest, for that I have not,—but of an accidental cessation of work, to give you my views. I have fought seven fights with the enemy, and by God’s blessing have beat him in every one of them. . . . Things are in a most perilous state. If we succeed at least in restoring anything, it will be by God’s *special* and *extraordinary* mercy. Harry is safe and well. He is my Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, and my right hand. His talents, courage, activity, and energy, exceed everything that I ever witnessed at his age. . . . I must now write as one whom you may never see more, for the chances of war are heavy at this crisis. Thank God for my hope in the Saviour. We shall meet in Heaven.’

While the General was encamped at Mungulwar, he was informed by Mr Tucker, the Commissioner of Benares, that Mr Wingfield, who was the representative of our Government with the auxiliary force of ^{The Goorkah auxiliary force.} Goorkahs, whom Jung Bahadoor, the *de facto* ruler of Nepal, had placed at our disposal, had determined, on hearing of the halt at Mungulwar, and the consternation created in Behar by the Dinapore mutiny, to march this contingent direct to Allahabad. Mr Tucker stated that if the Goorkahs could be induced to leave their sick, who amounted to several hundred, in hospital, and push forward with speed, they might afford the General substantial assistance; but they insisted on dragging their sick and

their baggage of every description with them, and, therefore, crept on at the rate of about six miles a day. Though their effective force did not exceed 2000, he had no doubt that, if once united to his army, they would prove invaluable. But it was much to be doubted whether they would not have proved rather a hindrance than a help. However valiant before an enemy, it was scarcely to be expected that they would have submitted to the long marches, the severe privations, and the strict discipline to which the General's little army had been accustomed for more than a month, and which had brought it up to such a state of efficiency as few soldiers had ever before attained in India. Since the commencement of the mutiny, moreover, the General had contracted an incurable mistrust of all native troops. In his reply to Mr Tucker, therefore, he said that he had received no instructions regarding the Goorkahs, and would not interfere with the movements of troops who had not been placed under his command. "I have," he said, "no confidence in these or any other native troops at this crisis. There is only one way in which faithful adherence could be hoped from them. If their sick and wounded were kept as hostages they would not dare to desert or to betray us. They shall not enter Allahabad, or any place under my control, until I receive Sir Patrick Grant's instructions. I will this day instruct Colonel O'Brien, the commandant at Allahabad, to this effect. I will not have that fortress betrayed to the enemy. I will write at once to the Commander-in-Chief for orders regarding them." In his letter to Sir Patrick he said, "I think just this of the Nepalese Goorkahs. They may or may not obey their *own* government, and *it* may or may not be faithful to us. Thus there is a double ground of suspicion. But I am told they are brave troops. If their sick and wounded were in a depôt of mine, say Allahabad, as hostages, I should but partially trust them. I could march with them, the Sikhs, and a small British reinforcement, to Lucknow, or to Agra, and thence to Delhi; but they must march with me, and not on a separate line of operations. Shall

I summon them to join me?" The Goorkahs, however, remained at Goruckpore, and neither came to Allahabad, nor took any part in the General's campaign.

It was now the General's intention to hold Mungulwar, which was secure from any attack the enemy might make with any force, and also gave him the opportunity of operating, at his own choice, on either bank. As long as he continued in the territory of Oude he felt that the pressure on the Residency would be alleviated by the dread of his movements, and the necessity of detaching a large body of the insurgents to watch them. At Mungulwar he was prepared, if reinforced, to advance to Lucknow, or to send over a detachment, if needed, to the succour of Cawnpore. To secure the easy passage of the river, Lieut. Moorsom had been diligently employed for a week in constructing a road across the island swamps, and in establishing bridges of boats between them. Captain Crommelin, now relieved from field duty, assumed the superintendence of the works on the 7th of August, and urged them forward with that indomitable energy which had characterized all his exertions since he joined the force. While the workmen were employed in completing the roads and connecting the three islands with each other and with the Oude bank, rafts were constructed of the strongest boats that could be procured for the passage over the main channel, about five hundred yards wide, between the larger island and the Cawnpore bank. Four boats lashed together, and covered with planks, formed a floating platform, which could accommodate an entire battery, and which the steamer was to be employed in towing across. This work will not fail to be regarded as one of the greatest triumphs of field engineering over natural difficulties ever exhibited in India. It was carried on for the most part in the water, and either under a broiling sun, or amidst incessant rain. But from the day the column started from Allahabad, there had been no relaxation of toil in any department, in sun or in rain, by day or by night, except what was indispensable for repose. The General allowed

Communica-
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two banks.

himself no respite and little rest, and his example seemed to animate all those who were under his command.

The communication between the two banks of the Ganges was now complete. The General was particularly anxious to remain in Oude, but General Neill was menaced by the 42nd Native Infantry, which had rebelled at Saugor, and by other insurgents, who were collected about eight miles from his position, and he urgently demanded a reinforcement. The General replied that ill as he could spare a detachment, he was prepared to assist him with 300 bayonets and three guns, but the troops must cross the river under cover of the night, lest the movement should be discovered by the enemy; the blow must be struck the next morning, and the troops returned without any delay. "The operation," he remarked, "on both banks of this river is one of great delicacy, and a miscalculation of time, even of twelve hours, may endanger both detachments, as the enemy would be sure to attack me as soon as they heard that the force had been weakened by a detachment." The next day General Neill informed him that the insurgents were reported to have retired to some distance, and that the reinforcement was no longer necessary. But on the 11th he despatched the following communication in all haste. "One of the Sikh scouts I can depend on has just come in, and reports that 4000 men and five guns have assembled to-day at Bithoor, and threaten Cawnpore. I cannot stand this; they will enter the town, and our communications are gone; if I am not supported I can only hold out here; can do nothing beyond our intrenchments. All the country between this and Allahabad will be up, and our powder and ammunition on the way up, if the steamer, as I feel assured, does not start, will fall into the hands of the enemy, and we will be in a bad way. J. E. N."

The General was now constrained to submit to the necessity of breaking up his position at Mungulwar, and recrossing the river with his whole force to Cawnpore. Having formed this determination,

General Neill
pressed by
the insur-
gents.

Reasons for
recrossing the
river.

he lost no time in carrying it out. On that same day he proceeded to send across the baggage and spare ammunition, and, in fact, everything, with the exception of the men, their arms, and bedding, and the guns. But in the course of the day a succession of spies brought him information that about 4000 of the enemy, with some guns, had come down to Busseerutgunge. To have attempted to cross the river with his artillery, while so large a hostile force hung upon his rear, would have been fraught with difficulty, if not with hazard, as the enemy would not have failed to attack his column during the operation of crossing. It would, moreover, have been universally reported through Oude that the British troops had been ignominiously chased out of the province by the insurgents. The moral effect of such a report, to which the sudden disappearance of his force from the left bank would have given credibility, must have been detrimental in the highest degree to our interests. He determined, therefore, to take the initiative and strike a blow at the enemy, which should convince them that it was from no dread of their prowess that he retired to Cawnpore.

On the afternoon of the 11th the little army moved on to Onao, and bivouacked under trees, in a deluge of rain. Marching again at dawn, the General found the enemy prepared for the third time to meet him ^{Action at Boorhiya.} on the old battle-field of Busseerutgunge. But they varied their mode of defence by intrenching the village of Boorhiya, about a mile and a half in advance of it. This position had been chosen with great skill, and fortified with more than usual assiduity. Their right rested on a village on the main road, where they had established a battery; their left on a mound about 400 yards distant, on which they had posted three guns. The 78th Highlanders, the Fusiliers, the Sikhs, and a portion of the Volunteer Cavalry, formed our right wing, and steadily advanced till their progress was suddenly arrested by an unforeseen obstacle. In front of the enemy's left lay a morass, covered with green vegetation, which pre-

sented the deceptive appearance of dry ground. The snare thus laid by the rebels was not discovered till the troops were on the verge of the swamp. They were immediately withdrawn; the 78th Highlanders moving on to the main road, while the Fusiliers, supported by four guns, passed round to the right. The enemy's guns were admirably served, and their fire was the severest our men had hitherto encountered. All the efforts of our artillery, though superior in number, were unable for some time to make any impression on them, sheltered as they were by earthworks, and it was found necessary at length to have recourse to the bayonet. The infantry of the enemy, posted behind the guns, continued to maintain a galling fire, but nothing could withstand the impetuosity of our troops. The Highlanders, now reduced in number to about a hundred, marched up to the guns, and when within a hundred yards of them, changed their pace into a rush, with their usual cheer, and, aided by a flank movement of the Fusiliers, mastered them, and bayoneted the gunners. The rebel infantry broke and fled, and the Highlanders instantly turned the captured guns on them and increased the confusion and slaughter. Our troops pursued them with unslackened energy through the town of Busseerut-gunge, and over the causeway, which was now a third time the scene of their defeat. The loss on our part amounted to thirty-two, while that of the enemy fell little short of ten times that number.

The object of the General having now been attained by the discomfiture of the rebels who were pressing on him in Oude, his troops immediately retraced their steps to Mungulwar. During the night the remainder of the ammunition and the heavy guns were sent across the river, and on the morning of the 13th the troops marched down to the ferry. Just before day-break the rain poured down in torrents, as if the windows of heaven had been opened, and the ground was so completely saturated, that the greatest difficulty was experienced in drawing the guns through the mire. The Madras Fusiliers, the Volunteer Cavalry, and four guns formed a

The force
recrosses the
Ganges.

rear-guard to cover the embarkation; but so effectual had been the lesson of the previous day that not a single rebel Sepoy ventured to make his appearance. Owing to the skilful exertions of Captain Crommelin, and the admirable arrangements of Colonel Tytler and Captain Moorsom, the whole force crossed the river in as many hours as the operation had three weeks before required days, and without a single accident. As the last division of the troops defiled over the bridges, they were successively broken up, and such of the boats of which they were composed, as were not embedded in the mud, were conveyed, together with the rafts, to the Cawnpore bank, and laid up for future use. Immediately on reaching Cawnpore the General issued the following Order of the day:—

“The exertions of the troops in the combat of yesterday deserve the highest praise the Brigadier can bestow. In this, our eighth fight, the conduct of the artillery was admirable. The Fusiliers and the Highlanders were, The General's Order of the day. as usual, distinguished. The Highlanders, without firing a shot, rushed with a cheer upon the enemy's redoubt, carried it, and captured two of the three guns with which it was armed. If Colonel Hamilton can ascertain the officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier, who first entered this work, the Brigadier will recommend him for the Victoria Cross.”

Colonel Hamilton reported that it was difficult to decide to whom this honour belonged, as it appeared to be divided between Lieut. Campbell and Lieut. Crowe. The gallant Campbell was smitten down the next day by cholera, and the distinction fell to the lot of Lieut. Crowe.

On the 14th of August the General transmitted the following telegram to Sir Patrick Grant:—

“Brigadier-General Neill brought me this morning a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, in which his Excellency, after mentioning that he had heard of my return to within six miles of Cawnpore, desired him to deliberate Conference with General Neill. with me and report the result of our deliberations. The subject of these was evidently to be the feasibility of my attempt-

ing the relief of the garrison of Lucknow with my present force. I told General Neill that if his Excellency required it absolutely, or he thought it practicable, I would order my bridges over the islands of the Ganges to be restored, and march immediately. He replied that he conceived the attempt without reinforcements could only terminate in disaster, without the possibility of relieving the garrison, which would be injurious to our interests in this part of India. I concurred in this opinion."

During the 14th and 15th the cholera continued to rage without cessation among the troops. The Superintending-Surgeon represented to the General that, at the present rate of casualties, the whole force would be annihilated in six weeks, and he urged some repose for the troops; but the General felt that there could be no repose while 4000 of the insurgents were collected at Bithoor and threatened Cawnpore. Having disposed of the enemy on the left bank of the Ganges, and effectually divested them of all desire to meet him again in the field, he determined to crush the rebels on the right bank, and free the city of Cawnpore from annoyance. He telegraphed the medical report to Sir Patrick Grant, remarking that there had been ten fatal cases of cholera on that day, the 15th, in one regiment alone, and that of the British force with him, numbering 1415, no fewer than 335 were disabled by sickness or wounds. "But," he added, "I do not despair. I march to-morrow against Bithoor, but it seems advisable to look the evil in the face; for there is no choice between reinforcements and gradual absorption by disease. The medical officers yesterday recommended repose; but I cannot halt while the enemy keeps the field, and, in truth, our health has suffered less fearfully even in bivouac than in Cawnpore."

Nana Sahib was still across the Ganges in Oude. Indeed, after the signal defeat inflicted on him on the 16th of July, he never ventured to place himself within reach of the General. But the mutineers of the 17th, the 42nd, and a few of the 31st Native Infantry, with the troopers of the 2nd Cavalry, and the 3rd Irregulars, strengthened by a portion of the Nana's troops,

Assemblage
of the insur-
gents at Bi-
thoor.

Battle of Bi-
thoor.

and two guns, had taken possession of Bithoor, and it became necessary to defeat and disperse this force, preparatory to marching upon Lucknow. To protect his men from the fatal effects of the sun, the General had invariably commenced his marches during the night ; but after their arrival in Cawnpore, they were unavoidably dispersed in various localities. Hence, some time was lost in assembling the whole body of the troops on the morning of the 16th of August, and they were unable to move from the ground till within half an hour of sunrise. The march was long, and the column was eight hours in reaching Bithoor. The rays of the sun during that day were found to be more fierce than on any previous occasion, and the men were consequently prostrated by the fatigue of their long march.

Bithoor was found to be one of the strongest positions the enemy had yet taken up. The plain before it was covered with dense plantations of sugar-cane and castor-oil, interspersed with villages. A nullah or rivulet, not fordable, flowed in front of the town, and after describing a curve, emptied itself into the Ganges. It was spanned by a narrow stone bridge, which was defended by a breast-work thrown up on its flank, and completely commanded by some elevated ground and strong buildings beyond it. Contrary to their usual practice, the enemy had neglected to avail themselves of the military advantages of this position, and, instead of disposing their main force behind the stream and the bridge, had committed the great error of placing their troops in front of it in the thickets, with the bridge, which afforded them the only means of retreat, in their right rear. On the advance of the troops a considerable body of horse appeared on our left. Some shells were immediately sent among them to drive them back, and also to unmask the number of the enemy's artillery, which at once returned the fire, and showed that there were only two guns in position. The General now determined to advance in direct *échelon* from his right. The 78th Highlanders, the Madras Fusiliers, and Captain Maude's battery formed the right wing ; the 64th, the

84th, the Sikhs, and Captain Olpherts' battery, the left. As the Fusiliers moved in extended order on the extreme right, they were suddenly assailed by a sharp fire from some high cultivation, and a village which had been concealed by it. Their gallant commander, Major Stephenson, at once wheeled two companies to the right, and came to a hand-to-hand conflict with some companies of the 42nd, who fought with the greatest resolution, and are said to have even crossed bayonets with their European opponents. But they were speedily routed with great slaughter, and the Fusiliers rejoined the right wing which was now pressing on to the intrenchment. The enemy retired behind the defences they had thrown up, from which they maintained a steady fire with the two guns, which were admirably and obstinately served. The fourteen guns, on our side, including the 24-pounders, poured an incessant fire on them, advancing up gradually till the intervening space did not greatly exceed four hundred yards, but they were still unable to make any impression on the enemy's pieces—another instance of the tenacity, so often exhibited during this campaign, with which the natives of India cling to their guns when in a sheltered position. At the same time, so severe a storm of musketry was poured on our troops from the rifles of the enemy behind the breastwork, that the General remarked that he had seen nothing to equal it since the day of Ferozeshuhur. It was necessary now to have recourse to the bayonet, which in a short time drove the enemy over the bridge and through the town. "I must do the mutineers," writes the General in his despatch, "the justice to pronounce that they fought obstinately; otherwise they could not for a whole hour have held their own, even with such advantages of ground, against my powerful artillery fire." The enemy was now in full retreat, but our troops were too exhausted to pursue them. Here again the General had reason to deplore the want of cavalry. "Had I possessed cavalry," he said in his despatch, "not a rebel or mutineer would have reached Sheorajpore alive." He had been indefatigable in his

efforts to augment his handful of Volunteer Horse, which, though not exceeding eighteen when first formed, had now been increased to the number of eighty. But this gallant little squadron was too valuable to be hazarded in an unequal contest with the enemy, though it was impatient to be let loose on them. After the engagement the General rode along the line, and though the men were scarcely able to stand from exhaustion, they sent forth the most enthusiastic cheers. "Don't cheer me, my men," he exclaimed, "you did it all yourselves." The troops bivouacked for the night in the gardens of the house erected for the British representative, who resided at Bithoor in the days of Bajee Row.

The General now received intelligence from his spies that the main body of the insurgents had fled towards Futtyghur, but that a large detachment had branched off to Sheorajpore, about twelve miles The troops return to Cawnpore. from Cawnpore. He would willingly have given his men a day of rest,—and they never needed it more,—but he was apprehensive lest the rebels in that village should cut in on the town and plunder it during his absence, and he deemed it important to retrace his steps without delay. The little army, therefore, moved back to Cawnpore on the morning of the 17th. Though it was a march of only sixteen miles, so completely were the men exhausted by previous exposure and fatigue, that many fell on the road never to rise again, the victims of cholera and *coup de soleil*. On reaching Cawnpore, the troops were at first encamped on the Sevada plain, but as the situation was found to be damp and unhealthy, they were speedily removed to the stables of the Light Cavalry, which, by drainage and other sanitary arrangements, had in the mean while been rendered not only habitable but comfortable. There they gradually recovered their health and strength, but not before five or six officers and a still greater number of the men had fallen a prey to disease. The day after the action at Bithoor the General issued the following Order of the day, which has a peculiar and melancholy interest, as being the last which came from his pen.

“The Brigadier-General congratulates the troops on the result of their exertions in the combat of yesterday. The enemy were driven, with the loss of 250 killed and wounded, from one of the strongest positions in India, which they obdurately defended. They were the flower of the mutinous soldiery, flushed with the successful defection at Saugor and Fyzabad; yet they stood only one short hour against a handful of soldiers of the State, whose ranks had been thinned by sickness and the sword. May the hopes of treachery and rebellion be ever thus blasted! And if conquest can now be achieved under the most trying circumstances, what will be the triumph and retribution of the time when the armies from China, from the Cape, and from England shall sweep through the land? Soldiers! in that moment, your labours, your privations, your sufferings, and your valour will not be forgotten by a grateful country. You will be acknowledged to have been the stay and prop of British India in the time of her severest trial.”

With the battle of Bithoor the General's first campaign for the relief of Lucknow may be said to have closed. Remarks on this campaign. With it also terminated his independent command, and the freedom of acting on his own individual and unfettered judgment. This brief campaign, extending from the 12th of July to the 16th of August, has no parallel in the military history of British India. On no former occasion had European troops been required to march and fight in circumstances so adverse, under a deadly sun or amidst torrents of rain, often fasting for twenty-four hours, and generally without tents, with no bed after their victories but the saturated ground, and no shelter but that which the trees afforded, carrying with them their sick and their wounded, and all their supplies, and suffering more from pestilence than from the weapons of the enemy. It was under all these disadvantages that, in this brief period of five weeks, they had fought nine actions against overwhelming odds, with troops disciplined, and for the most part armed, like themselves, and had been everywhere victorious, without a single check. A large portion of the Fusiliers consisted of raw recruits, who had never before heard the whistle of

an enemy's bullet, but such marching and such fighting had turned the survivors into hardy veterans, ready for any exigency. So great was the confidence the men had acquired in themselves, in their comrades, and in their leader, that they never considered a discomfiture possible, and never marched to action without the confident assurance of victory. These men have truly been described, by one of the officers who served under him, as "Havelock's Ironsides." With a sufficient body of such troops, he would, probably, have been enabled to justify the remark made to the writer by Lord Hardinge, when returning to England in 1848, "If ever India should be in danger, the Government have only to place Havelock at the head of the army, and it will be saved." This great opportunity did not fall to his lot; still, the spectacle of this little band of British heroes,* which never exceeded fourteen hundred, isolated in the centre of revolted provinces, pressed by a mutinous and successful army, yet victorious in every encounter, and nobly sustaining the national honour in this fiery trial, was calculated to fill every British bosom with exultation, and to give renewed animation to the Government in this contest. Nothing, moreover, served more effectually to impress the natives of the north-west provinces with a conviction of the superiority of the English race, and of the certainty of its ultimate triumph, than the attitude and the victories of General Havelock, by which the prestige of British power, which they supposed to have become for ever extinct, was not only restored but augmented.

After the action of Cawnpore on the 16th of July, the General determined to recommend Lieut. Havelock, his

* Since the publication of the work, the author has received from a political officer, who held one of the highest official positions at Agra during the mutiny, the following remarks on the effect produced by Havelock's victories in the north-west Provinces:—"Our position at Agra enabled me to estimate the heroism of that unparalleled advance, and to estimate also the magical effect it produced throughout northern India. The advance of that forlorn hope to Cawnpore, the further attempt to march to Lucknow, the little band beating back the hosts of rebels, and scattering them like spray before the bows of a ship, the prudence which dictated a retreat on Cawnpore, and the final relief of Lucknow, are passages which, for depth of interest, have no equal in our annals."

Recommendation of Lieut. Havelock for the Victoria Cross.

aid-de-camp, for the Victoria Cross for his conduct on that occasion. But Lieut. Havelock, fearing that his father might be suspected of partiality, prevailed on him to suppress the telegram which he had prepared for the Commander-in-Chief. On the return of the troops to Cawnpore after the battle of Bithoor, the General resolved no longer to withhold this act of justice from his son, who did not, however, become acquainted with the fact till after his death, when he heard of it for the first time from his aid-de-camp, Lieut. Hargood. The telegram ran thus:—"I recommend to your Excellency, for the Victoria Cross, Lieut. Crowe, of the 78th Highlanders, who was the first to enter the redoubt at Boorhiya, the intrenched village in front of Busseerutunge, on the 12th instant. I also recommend for the same decoration Lieut. Havelock, 10th Foot. In the combat at Cawnpore he was my aid-de-camp. The 64th regiment had been much under artillery fire, from which it had severely suffered. The whole of the infantry were lying down in line, when, perceiving that the enemy had brought out their last reserved gun, a 24-pounder, and were rallying around it, I called up the regiment to rise and advance. Without any other word from me, Lieut. Havelock placed himself on his horse in front of the centre of the 64th, opposite the muzzle of the gun. Major Stirling, commanding the regiment, was in front, dismounted; but the lieutenant continued to move steadily on in front of the regiment at a foot pace, on his horse. The gun discharged shot till the troops were within a short distance, when they fired grape. In went the corps, led by the lieutenant, who still steered steadily on the gun's muzzle until it was mastered by a rush of the 64th."

The Victoria Cross was conferred on Lieut. Havelock in March, 1858, and affixed to his breast by her gracious Majesty, in person, at Buckingham Palace, on the 8th of June, 1859, on his return from India, after he had attained the brevet rank of Lieut.-Colonel. The officers of the 64th, on seeing the notification of this honour in the *Gazette*, which reached India after Major Stirling, as well

as General Havelock, had passed from the scene, addressed a letter of expostulation to Sir Colin Campbell, the Commander-in-Chief in India, by whom it was forwarded to his royal highness the Duke of Cambridge, apparently without further inquiry. Sir Colin's communication to the Duke conveyed reflections on the conduct both of father and son, which in a Life of the General may not be passed over without examination. But it would be difficult for the writer of these pages to offer any remarks on so delicate a subject, which could be considered altogether exempt from the bias of affection to his brother-in-law and nephew, and he gladly avails himself of the observations published on this question by one to whom no such suspicion can possibly attach, and whose impartiality—writing as he does from the opposite side of the Atlantic—cannot but be considered unimpeachable. The following extracts are, therefore, offered to the reader from the admirable "Life of General Havelock," recently presented to the world by Mr Headley, an American military writer of great and just celebrity.

"This decoration was an object of great ambition among the younger officers, and often stimulated them to deeds of desperate daring; the selection therefore of his son, by Havelock, as one worthy to receive it, naturally caused dissatisfaction among some . . . The officers of the 64th Regiment pretended that the despatch reflected on them, and finally made their grievances known to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell. They complained that young Havelock, who was entirely disconnected with the corps, had taken advantage of his position, as member of the staff, to usurp the place of their proper officer, and, in so doing, had robbed the regiment of its well-deserved honours. Besides, they said it reflected on the courage and ability of Major Stirling, as if he were not doing his duty, or that his regiment refused to follow him. He was on foot, they said, because his horse had been wounded by a shell bursting near him. In reply to a statement embodying these views, Sir Colin Campbell sent a letter to the Adjutant-General, which was laid before the Duke of Cambridge, in which he requested that some step should be taken to relieve

Mr Headley's
remarks on
this transac-
tion.

Major Stirling from the implied censure contained in Havelock's despatch. He took occasion also to reflect very severely both on young Havelock and his father. He says, 'This instance is one of many in which, since the institution of the Victoria Cross, advantage has been taken by young aids-de-camp and other staff officers to place themselves in prominent situations for the purpose of attracting attention. To them life is of little value, as compared with the gain of public honour, but they do not reflect, and the generals to whom they belong do not reflect, on the cruel injustice thus done to gallant officers, who, beside the excitement of the moment of action, have all the responsibility attendant on this situation.' Further on, referring to Havelock's despatch, he says, 'By such despatches as the one above alluded to, it is made to appear to the world that a regiment would have proved wanting in courage, except for an accidental circumstance; such a reflection is most galling to British soldiers, indeed, is almost intolerable, and the fact is remembered against it by all the other corps in Her Majesty's service. Soldiers feel such things most keenly. I would, therefore, again beg leave to dwell on the injustice sometimes done by general officers when they give a public preference to those attached to them, over old officers who are charged with the most difficult and responsible duties.' This certainly is severe language in a Commander-in-Chief, when applied to any Major-General, but doubly so when used towards one who has just closed a long and brilliant career in death. With regard to the censure passed on young Havelock, we have nothing to say, for if he never has any more serious charges brought against him than that, in a critical moment, he placed himself in front of a regiment, and walked his horse straight up to the muzzle of a twenty-four pounder, he will need no defenders. The more complaints of that kind the better.

"But with regard to the implied censure of the noble old veteran, whose lips, dumb in death, could make no reply, there is much to be said. Sir Colin Campbell could have corrected any wrong impression, and healed any wounded feelings of the regiment, if they really existed, without casting disrespect on one, around whose grave the tears of the civilized world were yet falling.

"There is no need, however, in this case, to appeal to that generosity which spares the dead, nor that chivalric feeling which screens the brave. Havelock in life would not have wished the one, and dead, he needs not the other. Let us see whether

there is any truth in the charge, that Havelock 'made it appear to the world that the regiment would have proved wanting except for an accidental circumstance.' In his despatch reporting the battle of Cawnpore, Havelock says: 'Nor was the gallant 64th behind. Charging with equal bravery another village on the left, and firing four volleys as they rapidly advanced up the rising ground, they soon made the place their own, and captured its three guns.' Again: 'But the 64th, led by Major Stirling and my aid-de-camp, who had placed himself in their front, were not to be denied. Their rear showed the ground strewn with wounded; but on they silently and steadily came; then, with a cheer, charged and captured the unwieldy trophy of their valour.' And in the General Order issued the morning after the battle, he says, '64th, you have put to silence the jibes of your enemies throughout India. Your fire was reserved till you saw the colour of your enemies' moustaches—this gave us the victory.' Now, after such eulogiums, both in public despatches and General Orders, how can it be said that Havelock had 'made it appear to the world, that the regiment would have proved wanting in courage, except for an accidental circumstance?' It will require more acute optics than even Sir Colin Campbell possesses, to discern how a regiment '*can be galled* by such public eulogiums, or how such disparaging language can be *remembered against it by all the other corps of Her Majesty's service.*' He intimates that Havelock had done this regiment injustice, when the truth is, he covered it with glory, and that he had 'given occasion for other corps to speak against it,' when he openly declared to them and the world that they had '*for ever put to silence the gibes of their enemies.*' Neither a few envious officers of the 64th Regiment, nor the letter of Sir Colin Campbell, can alter the record. It is to be feared that this gallant chief, whose deeds have been the admiration of the world, received the statement of officers, not as complaints which should be investigated, but as a verdict to be published . . .

"This whole matter, when investigated, instead of showing that Havelock deserved censure, furnishes another illustration of his inflexible justice and truth. In his first public despatches he lavishes praise on the 64th Regiment, and caused their commander to be promoted to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel. What more could be done? Did the troops wish for more glowing eulogiums? Did Major Stirling expect more than one promotion for one battle? The Victoria Cross was designed especially

for deeds of personal heroism ; and who ever presumed to say it was not well bestowed on young Havelock ? Major Stirling received the substantial honour of preferment—young Havelock only the empty one of a badge ; and what inducement, indeed, would the latter have to peril his life in the desperate onset, and furnish a lofty example to troops, if, because his father happened to be the Commander-in-Chief, he was to be entirely overlooked ? Havelock felt that in recommending his son to the Victoria Cross, which he had so nobly earned, it was incumbent on him to go more into particulars than in any other case, in order to relieve himself from the suspicion of partiality. His straightforward soul never dreamed that his truthfulness would be tortured to his discredit. . . . If an officer never gets worse treated after a battle than to be immediately promoted, and a regiment has no heavier load of obloquy to carry than the lavish praises which Havelock bestowed on the 64th, they may rest quite easy about their reputation.” *

* Nothing could be more foreign to the General's character than the spirit of nepotism. On this point he was sensitive to the verge of injustice. This feeling was fully exemplified on the occasion of the battle of Futtehpore. In the original draft of his despatch he had written, “ I shall incur risk of imputed partiality when I further record that the boldness, and activity, and quick perception of Lieut. Havelock, 10th Foot, my son and A.D.C., on this his first *action on shore*, inspired me with the hope that he will do his country good service long after I am in my grave.” But the fear of being supposed to be swayed by feelings of paternal partiality induced him to omit it in the revised despatch.

It required, moreover, the strongest solicitation on the part of Sir James Outram to prevail on the General to recommend his son for the Victoria Cross for his gallantry at the Charbagh bridge. On the 12th of October Sir James wrote to him to recommend as “ deserving the high distinction of the Victoria Cross two officers of whose heroic gallantry, on the 25th September, he was an admiring witness, but who, having on that occasion been under his—the General's—command, could only through himself receive the reward they so justly merit.” One of the officers was the ever intrepid Captain Maude, of the Royal Artillery. After detailing his great services on the 25th, Sir James remarks :—“ This was no reckless or foolhardy daring, but the calm heroism of a true soldier, who fully appreciated the importance, the difficulties, and the dangers of the task he had undertaken. But for his nerve and coolness on this trying occasion, the army could not have advanced ; and I shall be glad to learn that you agree with me in considering that he has fully and honourably earned a right to the Victoria Cross, which our gracious sovereign has instituted as a reward for valour.”

To support his recommendation of Lieut. Havelock for the same honour, he writes : “ Not less deserving of this proud distinction, in my opinion, is Lieut. Havelock ; and I trust I may, without giving offence, beg you, as my friend and comrade, as well as my official colleague, not to allow the name of this

Throughout this campaign the General had reason to lament the absence of any provision for the spiritual wants of his soldiers, at a time when they more particularly stood in need of the consolations of religion. A Christian minister joins the force. The chaplain at Cawnpore had fallen in the massacre, and it was impossible, during the present emergency, to obtain the services of another. Mr Henry Carre Tucker, on hearing of the General's return from Oude, inquired by telegram whether it would be agreeable

gallant young officer to militate against his just claims. Throughout the tremendous fire of guns and musketry which the enemy directed across the Charbagh bridge, Lieut. Havelock, with the Madras Fusiliers, stormed the bridge, took the guns, and cleared the streets sufficiently to allow of the troops in rear closing up. I cannot conceive a more daring act than thus forcing the bridge; and the officers who led the Fusiliers on that occasion, in my opinion, most richly deserve promotion. But hazardous as was their position, they, being on foot, and therefore not readily distinguished from their men, risked little comparatively with Lieut. Havelock, the only officer on horseback, who cheered the men on at their head, and became the target of the enemy's musketry. I shall feel truly delighted to learn that you accept my recommendation of this brave officer, and I shall deeply regret having divested myself of the command during the advance on Lucknow, if, from what I must regard as a morbidly sensitive delicacy, you withhold from Lieut. Havelock, because he is your relative, the reward to which as a soldier he has so unmistakably established a first claim."

This testimony of Sir James is equally honourable to father and son, and may serve to relieve the memory of the one, and the character of the other, from the unfriendly remarks of Sir Colin. The General replied "that when the merits of his son were thus pointed out to him, he ought not to deprive him of that reward from any consideration of his relationship, and that the value of the decoration would be much enhanced to him by its being virtually awarded by an unprejudiced judge, as well as by one, he trusted he would permit him to add, whose proved gallantry and devotion to the service peculiarly fitted him to judge of these qualities in another." The General accordingly recommended Capt. Maude and Lieut. Havelock for the Victoria Cross. His recommendation was successful in one case, but not in the other. Intermediately, the Cross had been bestowed on Lieut. Havelock for his services at the battle of Cawnpore, but Sir James, in a letter to him of the 16th August, 1858, expressed "his disappointment on seeing Maude alone honoured with that high distinction," and remarked, "True, it had intermediately been conferred on you for *previous* services, but I had hoped that the brilliant action which I had brought to notice would have secured for you the additional clasp or bar, which is authorized under the provisions of the Royal Warrant of the 29th January, 1856, for those who, after having received the Cross, shall again perform an act of bravery." Whether this omission originated in India or in England is immaterial, but this transaction will be sufficient to show that when Sir Colin Campbell taxed General Havelock with favouritism, he adopted a harsh and hasty conclusion, which will not stand the test of investigation.

to him to receive the aid of one of the missionaries at Benares, to which he immediately replied in the affirmative. Mr Tucker then telegraphed that Mr Gregson, a Baptist missionary, was ready to proceed to his encampment. "I cannot," said he, "get a Church of England man. There is a good moderate Baptist, the Rev. John Gregson, who would, I believe, volunteer to attend your force, and give spiritual advice to the sick and the wounded, without touching on mere denominational distinctions. He is a pious good man, and if you will take him as chaplain, I will pay his salary and expenses, as it would not be fair to his Missionary Society to let them pay for him whilst he is not employed on missionary work. He would, I think, be popular with the soldiers." The telegraph clerk ignorantly changed the word Baptist to Papist, an error similar to that which had occurred at the beginning of the century in the case of the Serampore missionaries. The General felt some surprise that no Protestant minister should have offered his services, but he had as much consideration for the claims of the Roman Catholic soldiers, who composed the greater part of his force, as for those of another creed, and he telegraphed in reply, "Send him up immediately." Mr Gregson was detained for some days at Benares for a steamer. On his arrival at Cawnpore the General asked him to breakfast, and was agreeably surprised to find that his new chaplain was a Protestant and of the same denomination as himself. Mr Gregson immediately entered on his duties, and was indefatigable in his labours, both in the cantonment and in the hospital. The men gratefully availed themselves of his ministrations, and he soon acquired their confidence and affectionate esteem. When the troops subsequently marched on their arduous enterprise to Lucknow, he was particularly anxious to accompany them, but the General deemed it more advisable for him to continue his services among the many sick and wounded, whom he left in the intrenchment at Cawnpore.

CHAPTER IX.

Sir Colin Campbell arrives in Calcutta as Commander-in-Chief August 13th.—The General, returning from Bithoor, hears that he has been superseded.—Sir James Outram appointed to command the Force.—Remarks on this Transaction.—The General is pressed by the Enemy, and contemplates the necessity of retiring to Allahabad.—Sir Colin pushes on Reinforcements.—The General's valedictory Correspondence with Sir Patrick Grant.—Other Routes for reaching the Residency proposed and abandoned.—Detention of a portion of the Reinforcements.—The General's Remarks on the Cause of the Mutiny.—Arrival of Sir James at Cawnpore with Reinforcements.—He restores the Command to the General.—The Force crosses the Ganges.—Action at Mungulwar, and at the Alumbagh.—The three Modes of entering Lucknow.—Determination to advance over the Charbagh Bridge.

ON the 13th of August Sir Colin Campbell arrived in Calcutta, to assume the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army. He was one of the veterans of the Peninsula, and had also served for many years in various posts of importance in India, in which he had obtained much local experience and a high military reputation. He subsequently distinguished himself in the Crimea, where he acquired that position in the estimation of the public and of the military authorities in England which led to his present appointment. When intelligence of the death of General Anson reached London, the vacant post in India was at once offered to Sir Colin, and he embarked for Calcutta at twenty-four hours' notice. On hearing of his arrival the General sent him a telegraphic communication, with a brief narrative of the labours and successes of his little force since he had left Allahabad, and a report of his present position and his future prospects. The telegram concluded with these words:—"I am ready to fight anything, but the above are great odds, and a battle lost here would do the State infinite damage. I solicit your Excellency to send

Sir C. Campbell arrives as Commander-in-Chief.

me reinforcements. I can then assume the initiative, march to Lucknow, to Agra, to Delhi, wherever my services may be required. With 2000 British soldiers nothing could stand before us and our powerful artillery. I shall soon have equipped eighteen guns, six of siege calibre. But I want artillerymen and officers."

Sir Colin immediately sent back the following telegram:—

"I received your despatches by telegraph of the 12th instant and of the 6th instant, reporting the successful results of the attacks made on the enemy by the force under your command, of those days respectively. The sustained energy, promptitude, and vigorous action by which your whole proceedings have been marked, during the late difficult operations, deserve the highest praise, and it will be a most agreeable duty to me to make known to his Lordship, the Governor-General, the sense I entertain of the able manner in which you have carried out the instructions of General Sir Patrick Grant. I beg you to express to the officers and men of the different corps under your command, the pride and satisfaction I have experienced in reading your reports of the intrepid valour they have displayed upon every occasion they have encountered the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and how nobly they have maintained those qualities for which the British soldiers have ever been distinguished—high courage and endurance.

"I entirely concur in the soundness of the view you have taken of your position in your telegraph of the 6th instant from Mungulwar, and of all the reasons which influenced you to defer for the present active operations."

The first intelligence which reached the General on his return from Bithoor, after his ninth triumph over the rebels, was, that the Government of India had thought fit to deprive him of his command. A copy of the Government Gazette was received at Cawnpore, from which he learned that he had been placed under the directions of an officer of superior rank. Sir James Outram had recently arrived from Persia, and on the fifth of August was gazetted to "the military command of the united Dinapore and Cawnpore divisions,"

The General
deprived of
his separate
command.

the latter being the old military circle in which the sphere of the General's operation lay. This appointment necessarily gave rise to an impression in India that Government resented his having failed to accomplish the relief of Lucknow, when he retired for the first time to Mungulwar, and had taken the earliest opportunity of placing the control of the expedition in other hands. A feeling of indignation was aroused by this supersession of a General in the midst of his victorious career, and there were some who went so far as to arraign what they considered the injustice of Government in visiting him with their displeasure for not accomplishing an object which could not be accomplished without the reinforcements which that Government had neglected to supply. The supersession likewise created no little disgust in England, where the announcement of victory on victory by each successive mail had begun to attract public attention to the merits of the General. But there does not appear to have been any intention on the part of Government to supersede him. Three days after Sir James Outram had been placed over his head, Sir Patrick Grant wrote to him, "I leave you to the unfettered exercise of your own judgment, assured that you will do whatever is best for the public service; and God grant that you may be able to avert from Lucknow the frightful atrocities committed at Cawnpore." Lord Canning is known to have entertained the same high sense of the value of his services, and to have expressed the confidence reposed in him in still stronger language. The adoption of this harsh measure, which could be interpreted only as a withdrawal of confidence, at a time when the hopes of Government, as well as of the public, were centred on the General's exertions, and his uninterrupted success was the object of general admiration, can be explained only by regarding it as one of the most inconsiderate acts of this year of confusion and error.

It has been subsequently stated, in explanation, that Sir James Outram, being at the time Chief Commissioner in Oude, it was in the natural course of things to invest

him with military authority in that province also. But it does not appear that he was considered as the Chief Commissioner on the date of his military appointment, since he was "re-appointed to be Chief Commissioner in Oude, vice Major-General Sir Henry Lawrence, K.C.B., deceased," on the 11th of September, five weeks afterwards. There was, moreover, at the time no occupation for a civil commissioner, Government having resolved to withdraw the garrison from the Residency, and to leave the re-establishment of its authority in the province to a future campaign. Some consideration was, unquestionably, due to the feelings of the General, who had brought back victory to the British standards, and this step was calculated to wound them to the quick. Neither was this supersession softened by any explanatory communication, and the General was left to learn from a printed copy of the "General Orders" that he had ceased to direct the future movements of his victorious army, and was henceforth to act under the orders of another. The circumstance, likewise, of appointing Sir James Outram, at the same time, to the command of the Dinapore and the Cawnpore divisions, appeared to place in the same category of censure the general whose imbecility had occasioned the mutiny at Dinapore, and the general whose valour had given the first check to the rebels. No such indignity was intended, but the inference was inevitable. The appointment was still more liable to objection from the effect it might have on the fortunes of the campaign at this critical juncture. It was impossible for General Havelock, when placed under the control of another, to act in the same spirit of daring enterprise which he had exhibited when acting on his own responsibility. The presence of a superior reduced him to the subordinate position of a general of brigade, and necessarily neutralized those qualities which had given so peculiar a character of mingled boldness and caution to his career. No two men could have been selected more likely to act in harmony, and to obviate the effects of this egregious blunder, than

Remarks on
this transac-
tion.

Outram and Havelock. General Havelock's zeal and public spirit, and more especially his deep sense of duty, would not allow him to slacken his efforts, though they had been so ill-requited; but there was little political wisdom in thus shackling his movements. If, instead of making this uncalled-for appointment, Government had pushed on the 5th, and the 90th, and other detachments, and Havelock had found 2500 men assembled under his command on his return from Bithoor, he could have resumed his advance to Lucknow before the enemy had recovered from the four heavy blows which he had recently inflicted on them in Oude, the siege of the Residency would probably have been raised, and the beleaguered garrison withdrawn, three months earlier.

Notwithstanding the appointment of a superior officer to command the force, there was no relaxation of the General's preparations for the relief of Lucknow.

But the difficulties which were accumulating around constrained him to contemplate the painful contingency of being obliged to abandon Cawnpore and retire to Allahabad. These embarrassments arose from the continued diminution of his own troops, and the increase of the rebels in his rear and front and on both flanks. Soon after his return from Bithoor, it was found that, exclusive of the garrison maintained in the intrenchment, and 100 men sent to destroy the boats of the Oude insurgents at Dalamow, his effective European strength did not exceed 685 bayonets. This was the whole number left out of 1700 who had successively joined his column. The sword and disease had destroyed or disabled the rest. After the last fight at Bithoor, scores of men, who had hitherto been kept up by the excitement of action, and by the hope of striking a blow for their besieged countrywomen, sunk under the reaction of that compulsory inactivity which had succeeded to tension almost too great for the human frame. At the same time, large bodies of the enemy were preparing to assail his position from Futtyghur, from Culpee, and from the districts to the south. These difficulties were aggra-

The General constrained to contemplate the contingency of retiring to Allahabad.

vated by the continued detention of the reinforcements, upon which he had been led to calculate. Sir Colin Campbell assumed the command of the army on the 17th of August, and two days after communicated by telegram to the General the admiration with which he regarded his proceedings and the conduct of the men under him. The General seized the opportunity of placing before him the exigencies and perils of his position, and of importuning him for reinforcements.

“Cawnpore, August 21st, 1857.

“I cannot express the gratification with which I have perused your Excellency’s telegram of the 19th instant, which has just reached me. The approbation of so distinguished a soldier of my operations and views, thus conveyed to me, more than repays me for the labours and responsibilities of this arduous campaign, undertaken, of necessity, at a most unpropitious season. My soldiers will as highly value and deeply feel the value of your Excellency’s commendation.

“I find I have not sufficiently explained the danger to which I am exposed, should the enemy at Gwalior take the initiative, and move on Culpee with his imposing force. It is to my left rear; and a force is at the same time endeavouring to cross from Oude to Futtehpoore. This would cut in on my rear, and prevent even the advance of my reinforcements. I have sent a steamer down to destroy his boats, but have no news of its success. The Furruckabad force would also assail me in front, and this column, hitherto triumphant, would be destroyed. The Gwalior force already on the Jumna is 5000 men, with 30 guns. The force threatening Futtehpoore by Dalamow ghat, may at any moment, by the fall of Lucknow, be swelled to, 20,000, with all the disposable artillery of the province. The Furruckabad force is 12,000 men, with 30 guns. If I do not get any promise of reinforcement from your Excellency by return of telegraph, I must retire at once towards Allahabad. I have no longer here a defensible intrenchment; that on the river being taken in reverse by the enemy now assembling on the right bank of the Ganges. I am for the present enabled to give them shelter from the extreme inclemency of the weather, and some repose, of which they stand in need; but sickness continues to thin our ranks; we lose men by cholera to the number of five or six daily.

The General
represents his
difficulties to
Sir Colin
Campbell.

“I will frankly make known to your Excellency my prospects for the future. If I can receive prompt reinforcements, so as to make up my force to 2000 or 2500 men, I can hold this place with a high hand; protect my communications with Allahabad, beat anything that comes against me, and be ready to take part in active operations on the cessation of the rains. I may be attacked from Gwalior by the mutinous contingent, with 5000 men and 30 guns, or by the large forces which are assembling at Furruckabad under its rebellious Nuwaub, which has also a formidable artillery; but as they can hardly unite, I can defeat either, or both, in successive fights. But if reinforcements cannot be sent me, I see no alternative but abandoning for a time the advantage I have gained in this part of India, and retiring upon Allahabad, where everything can be organized for a triumphant advance in the cold season. It is painful to reflect that, in this latter event, Cawnpore and the surrounding country, in fact the whole Doab, would be abandoned to rapine and misrule, and Agra will feel unsupported. I do not consider that our force before Delhi would be compromised, for in truth the base of its operations is, strange to say, the Punjab.

“I have endeavoured fairly to state my case, and must leave the decision of the important question involved in it to your Excellency. I do earnestly hope that you will be able to decide for prompt reinforcements.* My communications with Allahabad, at present endangered, will be quite safe as soon as detachments begin again to press upwards towards me.”

Sir Colin had anticipated the General's request for reinforcements. As soon as he had taken over the command of the army, it was determined that the troops despatched to his aid should no longer be diverted from the great object of relieving Lucknow, and frittered away in the protection of towns and districts. To use the expressive language of one who was in a position to learn the real cause of the detention of these troops, “Herculean were the efforts of the Commander-in-Chief to tear the 5th and the 90th Regiments from the reluctant grasp of the civil authorities.” The earnest-

* This despatch does not exactly correspond with the telegram published in the Blue Book, but I have preferred to give the version found in the General's papers.

ness and energy of Sir Colin overcame every obstacle; and in reply to the General's representation, he was enabled to inform him that a steamer, with the headquarters and about seven companies of the 90th had left Dinapore for Allahabad on the 14th, and were to reach that station on the 21st or 22nd. He had also telegraphed orders for a considerable portion of the 5th, which had been detained at Mirzapore, to proceed to Allahabad, if General Outram had not given instructions to the contrary. He likewise informed the General that a battalion of Madras Infantry, and six 6-pounders, would leave Raneegunge—the railway terminus—immediately, and proceed by land to Benares. The letter was couched in the most friendly terms, and assured the General that it was “an exceeding satisfaction to have the pleasure of renewing his acquaintance with him, and to find himself associated with him in the present service, and that he was most sensible of the advantage and value of his presence in the very important position in which he was placed at this moment.” It concluded with the remark, “the interest felt for you is of the warmest kind, and for the brave troops who have proved themselves worthy of having you for their chief. May God speed you, my dear General!”

Having thus obtained the assurance of prompt reinforcements, the General no longer meditated the necessity of retiring to Allahabad, which, indeed, he would have strained every nerve to avoid, though he felt himself compelled to lay it before the Commander-in-Chief, as one of the possible contingencies of his position. He offered his cordial thanks to Sir Colin for the succour which was promised, and hoped that it would only prove the advanced guard of a stronger force, which was most urgently needed. He required another company of artillery to work his heavy guns, and cavalry to improve success. His infantry was good, but worn by the war, and suffering fearfully from cholera and dysentery. He expected shortly to have eighteen guns equipped, six of siege calibre, drawn by elephants, but to man them he

The General resolves to hold his position at Cawnpore.

had been obliged to draw on the infantry. Happily, he had discovered that twenty Sikhs in the Ferozepore regiment had formerly been attached to Runjeet Singh's well-trained artillery. They were at once incorporated with his own gunners, and he designed to leave them to work the guns in the intrenchment at Cawnpore, while he marched to Lucknow. To fill up the ranks of his Volunteer Cavalry, he had been obliged to put foot soldiers on such horses as he could pick up. He added :—

“As I have been forty-two years a soldier, and made things military my study all that time, I hope I may be permitted to say that I should have deprecated beyond anything the late dissemination of our forces in Behar. We were strong enough to hold the fortresses of Fort William, Allahabad, and Agra, and to keep open our communications to Allahabad, and the Grand Trunk Road, but no more. . . . The facility with which I could strike one blow at Busseerutgunge on the 12th of August, and another at Bithoor, on the 16th, will show how deadly the attacks of our British troops become where the force is kept together. Whenever my reinforcements arrive I can renew my attempts to relieve Lucknow, and I should hope for success, by God's blessing. I only fear that the place may fall before my operations can be resumed.”

Sir Patrick Grant, having put Sir Colin in full possession of all the military arrangements which had been made during his tenure of office for the suppression of the mutiny, embarked to resume the command of the army at the Madras Presidency. On leaving Calcutta, he sent the following valedictory letter to the General :—

Valedictory
correspond-
ence with
Sir P. Grant.

“Calcutta, August 18th, 1857.

“My dear Havelock,—I have made over the command of the army to Sir Colin Campbell, who was appointed Commander-in-Chief in India within one hour of the receipt in London of the intelligence of General Anson's death; that is to say, on the afternoon of the 11th of July, and on the forenoon of the day following the hardy veteran was on his way to Marseilles, to catch the packet. I have remained here for a few days to make Sir Colin *au fait* of all that has been done during my short

period of office. I have now accomplished that purpose, and shall start for Madras on the 22nd instant. I have not failed to place before the Commander-in-Chief your explanation of the reasons which determined you a second time to fall back upon the Ganges, instead of prosecuting your advance to relieve Lucknow, and they have satisfied him, as they did me, that you have exercised a wise military discretion, and have chosen the lesser of two great evils. It is now quite clear to me that you could not have relieved the garrison of Lucknow, and it is equally evident, that a failure would have consummated the destruction of both forces. God grant the garrison may be able to hold out till you can be sufficiently reinforced to relieve it effectually! If, unhappily, this may not be, we shall at least have the satisfaction of feeling that every possible effort to save them has been made, and that we have nothing with which to reproach ourselves. In a few months we shall have some 20,000 British troops in India, when our supremacy will be established more firmly than ever; but still we shall require native troops of some description. The nature of the climate is such that we cannot do without them, though the old feeling of confidence between us and them can never be restored. It is still incumbent on us, as a measure of sound policy, to treat them with considerate, even-handed justice, and to avoid subjecting them to uncalled-for degradation. And now, my dear Havelock, allow me to thank you heartily and cordially for your invaluable services while we have acted together on this occasion; and pray believe me, always,

“Most sincerely yours,
“PATRICK GRANT.”

Before this letter reached the General, he had already sent his farewell communication to Sir Patrick:—

“Cawnpore, August 23rd, 1857.

“My dear Sir Patrick,—The General Orders announce to me your return to Madras, and I cannot refuse myself the satisfaction of offering to you my grateful acknowledgments for the honourable position in which your kind selection placed me, which has given me the gratifying opportunity of nine times meeting in fight and defeating the enemies of British India. As deeply do I feel the fair, honourable, and soldier-like support you gave me at a painful crisis, when imperious circumstances compelled me



to retire from Oude, a movement to be justified on the soundest principles, and executed without disaster, but sure to be misrepresented by all the malevolent in the land.

“The Colonel—Colonel Tytler—continues well, and has fairly earned my commendations and entire confidence.

“Ever I remain,

“Yours sincerely,

“H. HAVELOCK.”

“I had just finished and closed my letter of this morning to you, when yours of the 18th was put into my hands. I have little more to add to my former communication, and I will not wander into needless repetitions. The support you and Sir Colin have given me when I most needed it, demands my gratitude through life. I consulted nothing in shaping my movements but the honour and interests of my country, and the lasting reputation of our arms. It is matter of the highest satisfaction to me that my resolutions have received the stamp of your approbation. I have only to add my sincere wishes that your career at the head of the Madras army may be as successful as I am sure it will be honourable, and that you may return to your native country as happy and prosperous as your efforts to serve the State have been faithful and persevering.

“Sincerely yours,

“H. HAVELOCK.”

The first instalment of the reinforcements, which the General had been expecting with deep anxiety, at length arrived at Allahabad. But there seemed to be a fatality attending all their movements. No sooner had they reached that station than the commandant informed him that their services were required to protect his position against the Dinapore mutineers, who were said to be hovering about it. The General immediately sent him the most positive orders not to detain them “for an hour, for any purpose whatever. Push them on with all speed. I will not permit the troops of this column being diverted to the purpose of casual operations by the officers under my command.” But the commandant still continued to urge the importance of attacking and dispersing the mutineers, on which

Attempt to detain the reinforcements at Allahabad.

the General sent him a second telegram in language still more peremptory: "Whatever may be your opinion of the probable success of your operations against the Dinapore mutineers and its consequences, I consider I am the best judge how the reinforcements sent to me by the Commander-in-Chief are to be employed, and I desire that they may be pushed forward without any delay, or further remonstrance or remark." The troops were accordingly sent on. An insurgent chief had, in the mean while, collected 1000 men and four guns on the Oude bank, opposite Futtehpore, with the view of crossing the Ganges and cutting off the communication between Allahabad and Cawnpore. The steamer, which was sent down with a hundred men, succeeded in capturing or destroying the whole flotilla of boats which had been collected for this object. The reinforcements, therefore, reached Cawnpore without any interruption.

On the 23rd of August the General received a letter from Colonel Inglis, dated the 16th of that month, which gave a most deplorable account of the position of the Lucknow garrison:—

Letter from Colonel Inglis at Lucknow. "A note from Colonel Tytler to Mr Gubbins reached last night, dated Mungulwar the 4th instant, the latter part of which is as follows, 'You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out, if we cannot force our way in.' We have only a small force. This has caused me much uneasiness, as it is quite impossible, with my weak and shattered force, that I can leave my defences. You must bear in mind how I am hampered; that I have upwards of 120 sick and wounded, and at least 220 women and about 230 children, and no carriage of any description, besides sacrificing twenty-three lacs of treasure, and about thirty guns of sorts.

"In consequence of the news received, I shall soon put this force on half rations. Our provisions will last us then till about the 10th of September.

"If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forward. We are daily being attacked by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have already weakened our posts, and I have every reason to believe they are

carrying on others. Their 18-pounders are within 150 yards of some of our batteries, and from their position, and from our inability to form working parties, we cannot reply to them, and consequently the damage done hourly is very great. My strength now in Europeans is 350, and about 300 natives, and the men are dreadfully harassed; and, owing to part of the Residency having been brought down by round shot, many are without shelter. Our native force having been assured, on Colonel Tytler's authority, of your near approach some twenty-five days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and if they leave us, I do not see how the defences are to be manned. Did you receive a letter and plan from me from this man, Ungud? Kindly answer this question.

"Since the above was written, the enemy has sprung another mine, which has caused us a great deal of trouble and some loss. I trust that you will lose no time in coming to our assistance, regardless of any letters you may receive from Mr Gubbins. Military men are unanimous regarding our position.

"Yours truly,

"I. INGLIS,

"Brigadier.

"To General Havelock."

To this communication the General immediately replied :—

"My dear Colonel,—I have your letter of the 16th. I can only say, hold on, and do not negotiate, but rather perish sword in hand. Sir Colin Campbell, who came out at a day's notice to command, on the news arriving of General Anson's death, promises me fresh troops, and you will be my first care. The reinforcements may reach me in from twenty to twenty-five days, and I will prepare everything for a march on Lucknow."

Sir James Outram arrived at Dinapore on the 17th of August. Sir Colin Campbell assumed the command of the army in Calcutta on the same day, and on the 18th urged Sir James, in a telegram, to send on the 90th and the 5th to Allahabad without delay. But there was to be a fresh disappointment. The 90th, which was despatched upwards in the steamers on the 14th, had been recalled, and relanded

Sir James
Outram ar-
rives at Dina-
pore and
proposes
another route
to Lucknow.

by the civil authorities, under the influence of some new panic. On the 19th Sir James addressed a letter to the Governor-General, stating that as General Havelock had "again retired from the attempt, and recrossed the Ganges to Cawnpore, unable, he imagined, to cross the Sye in the face of the enemy, the bridge having been destroyed, he intended, if practicable, to organize a column to advance to Lucknow through Juanpore, between the Sye and Goomtee rivers, as the only course now left by which there could be any hope of relieving our garrison in Lucknow." Having despatched this communication by post, unwilling to trust it to the telegraph wires, Sir James proceeded in the steamers with the troops to Benares, where he expected to receive the decision of the civil and military authorities in Calcutta. The route from Benares to Lucknow, through Allahabad and Cawnpore, was one of 250 miles; while the direct line through Juanpore was only 150 miles in length; but at this period of the year the country was under water, and the shorter route was altogether impracticable. Sir James's letter appears to have reached Calcutta on the 24th, and Sir Colin Campbell lost no time in sending his opinion on the subject by telegraph as well as by the post.

To this plan of Sir James's there appeared to be two serious objections; the first arose from the extreme exigencies of General Havelock's position. "So inadequate," says the Commander-in-Chief, "does General Havelock consider his force to be for the defence of his post, that he states in his telegraph, dated August 21, 12.30 P.M., that if not assured of reinforcements by return of telegraph, he will retire to Allahabad; hope of co-operation from him (by a force equal to accomplish the movement you propose, by crossing the Ganges at Futteh-pore), is not to be entertained." The second objection was thus urged: "The march from Benares, by the most direct route to Lucknow, is a long one, some 150 miles, and the population, through which you would pass, hostile. Its great recommendation, I presume to be, that you would turn, or rather, come in rear of the many

nullahs, which I am told interpose between Cawnpore and Lucknow; this would be an important advantage. But if the force you propose to collect at Benares were to be moved by the river to Cawnpore, and united to Havelock's reduced numbers, do you think it would be equal to force its way over the numerous nullahs, full of water at this season, on the road from the latter place to Lucknow? By this route all encumbrances, such as sick, &c., would be left at the different stations or posts along the road, and the troops, in being conveyed by steam, would suffer less than if obliged to march, and reach Cawnpore many days earlier, besides relieving Havelock's anxiety about his post." Sir Colin stated that "these remarks or suggestions were not made with any view to fetter Sir James's judgment or perfect freedom of action," and that "the measures he might deem most advisable to pursue would, he might venture to say, receive the approval of the Governor-General." The Governor-General, likewise, in a telegram of the next day, laid the same objections to the adoption of the Juanpore route before Sir James, adding, "the road by Juanpore may have advantages of which I am not aware, and I am confident that your deliberate judgment will decide for the best." As the direction of the expedition had now been taken entirely out of the hands of the General, it was not deemed necessary to make any communication to him regarding this project, although it must have most materially affected his plans.

Another plan which was contemplated for the relief of the garrison was incidentally communicated to him by Mr Tucker, at Benares, on the 23rd of August: "It is the intention of Sir James Outram to ascend the Gogra, and relieve Lucknow by Fyzabad, and Sir James desires your co-operation, by making a demonstration of recrossing the Ganges." Second plan for relieving the Residency. The Gogra falls into the Ganges a little above Patna. The General perceived many objections to this project, and still considered that the most effectual mode of relieving Lucknow was to concentrate all the troops at Cawnpore, and ad-

vance along the high-road to the capital, to which there was no physical obstacle, except the Sye, if it was found that the bridge on that stream had been broken down. But, having now been entirely superseded in his command, he did not offer any strictures on the scheme, and simply informed the Commander-in-Chief that "if speedily and strongly reinforced, he might even do more by striving to regain his strong position at Mungulwar, or more nearly approaching Lucknow, but he must have fresh troops to enable him to do either of these."

But both these plans were given up as soon as Sir James Outram learnt that the General might be obliged to retire to Allahabad if not reinforced, and that it was impossible for him, with his weak force, to cross the Ganges and co-operate in either of them. The 90th and the 5th were, therefore, ordered to proceed forthwith to Allahabad.

The cholera still continued to rage in the encampment at Cawnpore, and the minds of men who had been undaunted by the enemy's cannon, were beginning to sink under the oppression of this pestilence. So severe was the visitation, that the General was under the necessity of sending an unofficial memorandum to the commanding officers of regiments—not, however, to be entered in the order-book—desiring that funeral ceremonials should be abridged, as a "contrary course, in times of epidemic, was calculated to depress the spirits of the troops." As soon, moreover, as the high-road to Allahabad was freed from danger, the General determined to send his invalids to that station; it would afford them superior accommodation, and his force would thus be enabled to advance with greater confidence to Lucknow. The arrangements, made under his own eye, for their convenience and comfort on the line of march were precise and particular, and the instructions provided for every emergency. The party consisted of 212 European and twenty-eight native invalids, who were conveyed in sixty-three country carts and twenty commissariat waggons, under the escort of Captain Brasyer and his

Ravages of the cholera. Invalids sent to Allahabad.

Sikhs. Two European surgeons, thirteen native doctors, and nine native compounders, accompanied the detachment, which was directed to proceed in four marches to Lohanga, at which place they would obtain the convenience of the railway carriages. The convoy reached Allahabad in safety, and the rapid convalescence of the men testified to the wisdom of this measure.

The General throughout his march had strictly repressed every attempt to offer violence to the religious feelings and prejudices of the natives. He had reprimanded two officers for having thoughtlessly entered a temple at Onao, which the natives considered an act of desecration. An anonymous communication was at this time placed in his hands, evidently from a native pen, that a Highlander had spit in the face of an idol set up in the bazaar at Cawnpore, and he considered it advisable to issue an order prohibiting insults to any object of idolatrous veneration :—

Order regard-
ing temples
and mosques.

“ It having been reported to the General that a soldier while on sentry offered an insult to some object of idolatrous worship in the town of Cawnpore, the troops are warned to abstain from such practices in the case either of Hindoo temples or Mahomedan mosques. The brutal villany of the population of this place has been evinced by their having reduced to ashes and otherwise desecrated three Christian churches during the brief licence which supervened on the usurpation of Nana Sahib, happily cut short by our victory at Cawnpore. But we must not imitate these wretches. It has always been the wise policy of the British Government to refrain from interference with the superstitions and false religions of the land, and recent provocations and atrocities must not lead us to depart from this line of conduct.

“ The assertion that Enfield rifle cartridges were given to the native troops with a view of compelling them to violate by their use the rule of caste, is the lying pretext of deliberate mutiny. But *real* cause of jealousy and alarm is afforded to the inhabitants of towns and villages, whenever their idols and their temples (however degraded and vile in themselves) are subjected to wanton insult and outrage.”

A letter from the General to his family will exhibit the

state of his mind during this period of excitement and danger. On the 27th of August he wrote to Mrs Have-lock :—

“ It is an age since I have had a letter from any of you ; none, I think, since I left Calcutta. Here I am in the midst of most exciting affairs, which hardly give me breathing time, but I snatch half an hour to tell you that, by God’s blessing, Harry and I are still alive and well. We have fought nine fights with the enemy, everywhere defeated him, and captured forty-two pieces of cannon. Sir Henry Lawrence, the most amiable of men, was badly wounded on the 2nd of July, and died on the 4th. . . . Troops are coming up to me, but I fear it will be too late, and that the place will fall before I can enter Oude. . . . This campaigning in the rains is trying work. Cholera carries off my brave British troops, and it is only here that I have been able to give them a little repose from the most harassing duties and operations. I have had for two months the power of life and death in my hands, for all the provinces are under martial law. I trust God has enabled me to use it discreetly. . . . Love to the dear children.”

The General had been in constant communication with Mr Muir, the Secretary to Government at Agra, a relative of his niece, Mrs Thornhill, then in the garrison at Lucknow, and on the 25th of August wrote to him, “ For reasons which I cannot at present divulge, the relief of Lucknow became, as a military operation, impracticable. I was obliged, as a General, to come to this painful conclusion, however, as a man, my feelings might prompt me to a different course. May that Providence which, in its inscrutable decrees, has imposed on me this necessity, continue to watch over those most dear to us. I gave the troops in Oude a parting thrashing on the 12th ; and at Bithoor, on the 16th, dispersed the mutineers from Saugor and took their guns.”

The General had inquired of Mr Tucker, at Benares, where a communication was likely to reach Sir James Outram, under whose command he had been placed, and immediately on learning that he had reached that station, took the initiative

Letter from
the General
to his family.

Letter to Mr
Muir.

Sir James
Outram an-
nounces the
approach of
reinforce-
ments.

in communicating with him relative to the arrangements for advancing to Lucknow. On the 28th of August a telegram from Sir James gave him the most exhilarating intelligence he had received for many weeks. It announced the approaching departure of the reinforcements which had been so long and so anxiously looked for, and which consisted of 1268 men of the 90th and the 5th Fusiliers, including 66 artillerymen, as well as the detachments which had hitherto been detained at Mirzapore and Chunar. On hearing of the arrival of Captain Peel of the *Shannon* in Calcutta, with his naval brigade, the General advised that it should be pushed on to Allahabad, and thus enable some of the troops employed in guarding that fortress to take the field. He was now informed that a body, little short of 500, would be relieved and sent forward to join his force as soon as the marines arrived at Allahabad. It was in this, his first communication with the General, that Sir James announced his determination to leave the relief of Lucknow in his hands. "I shall join you with the reinforcements. But to you shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already struggled so much. I shall accompany you only in my civil capacity as commissioner, placing my military service at your disposal should you please, serving under you as volunteer." In reply to this communication, the General remarked that the reinforcements enumerated in the telegram would "reduce the relief of Lucknow to a certainty, if the garrison could hold out in the mean time." He also stated that whenever the first detachment reached him, he proposed to recross the Ganges, and resume his strong position at Mungulwar, which would constrain the insurgents to send a large force against him, and thus bring immediate relief to the besieged garrison.

Sir James Outram reached Allahabad on the 1st of September, but his first telegram to the General conveyed the disheartening news that a considerable portion of the reinforcements he had announced was no longer available, as it was now required for local exigencies near Allahabad. The unfortunate

Detention of
a portion of
the reinforce-
ments.

mutiny at Dinapore was destined to entail a long succession of difficulties, and to hamper the operations for the relief of Lucknow at every stage, and thus afford another exemplification of the remark, that it is never possible to calculate the extent of mischief which may arise from a single error. The revolt of those regiments let loose the disaffected in the Behar districts, who had been held in check for ten weeks after the outburst at Meerut. Revolt of Koer Singh. Among others, Koer Singh, the zemindar of Jugdespore, in the province of Behar, who had been permitted by the injudicious kindness of Government to surround himself with the military array of a chieftain, though only a simple zemindar, was emboldened by the defection of the Dinapore troops to appear in open revolt, and proclaim himself King of Shahabad. Though verging on eighty years of age, he buckled on his armour with all the ardour of a young warrior, boldly took the field, and during the twelvemonth in which he baffled the strategy of more than one of our generals, exhibited astonishing military talent. Two detachments which were sent against him were destroyed almost to a man, and he proved to be the most formidable enemy the Government had encountered in the lower provinces. He was now reported to be approaching Allahabad, and it was deemed necessary to leave a portion of the newly-arrived troops to watch his movements. The General was, therefore, informed by Sir James that he could bring with him only the 5th and the 90th; and, as a portion of this latter corps had not yet arrived at Allahabad, he would be unable to advance before the 5th of September. The entire strength of the detachments now about to proceed to Cawnpore—the first effective reinforcement the General was to receive during the two months which had elapsed since he started on his expedition—amounted, including artillerymen, to 1449. But to the arm in which he was deplorably weak there was no addition. Not a single cavalry sabre accompanied the column.

Sir James took his departure from Allahabad with the detachments during the 5th September, determined to

push on to Cawnpore by forced marches, in order, if possible, to accomplish the distance of 126 miles in six days. Considering the valuable time which had been lost in forwarding these reinforcements, this resolution was wise, and it was moreover strengthened by the information which the Commander-in-Chief had given Sir James, that, according to the latest advices from Lucknow, the relief must be accomplished on or before the 10th. But the General immediately wrote to him representing, as the result of his own experience, that it would be impossible at this season of the year to make marches of such length, without throwing a number of the men into hospital, and rendering it necessary to halt the troops after their arrival, and recruit their strength. Whatever time might be gained by the rapidity of the march, would thus be lost by subsequent detention. His own little army was now freed from cholera, and the men had derived great benefit from the repose they had enjoyed. The advance to Lucknow would not, under existing circumstances, be a difficult operation, but it could only be undertaken with the view of relieving the gallant garrison. The reconquest of the province would require a full division of British troops. This letter did not reach Sir James till after he had commenced his march, and the advice it contained had been anticipated by the early occurrences on the route. Forty men of the 90th had been disabled, and three had sunk under fatigue and disease. Sir James had, therefore, been already compelled to curtail his marches, and he informed the General that as he should move on more leisurely, he did not expect to reach Cawnpore before the 15th of the month, but he was prepared to advance with greater speed if the presence of his troops at Cawnpore was urgently required. To this communication the General replied, "I entirely agree with you on the expediency of sparing the 5th and the 90th Light Infantry on the line of march. If they get knocked up by sickness, or even fatigue, we shall at least have to halt them here for some days, which will in itself be an evil. When last in Oude I had no tents, but put

up my men under trees or in villages. As we shall, however, have unacclimated troops on this occasion, I think it would be best to put them under canvas. But that point can scarcely be settled until I learn what opposition we are likely to meet with in crossing. I will only further add that in marching with them myself, I should closely watch the sick list, and the appearances of our John Bull troops, and reduce their marches so that the great point may be secured of their reaching Cawnpore in pluck and strength for a short but arduous campaign in Oude."

On the 8th of September the General received a communication from Colonel Inglis, dated the first of the month, with a detail of the lamentable condition and the dismal prospects of the garrison. It was under the influence of the information conveyed in this letter that all the General's subsequent movements were regulated.

Letter from
Colonel In-
glis of the 1st
September.

"Lucknow, Sept. 1st, 1857.

"Your letter of the 22nd has duly reached me, in reply to mine of the 16th ultimo.

"I regret your inability to advance at present to our relief; but in consequence of your letter I have reduced the rations, and with this arrangement, and our great diminution in numbers from casualties, I hope to be able to hold on from the 20th to the 21st instant. Some stores we have been out of for the last fifteen days, and many others will be expended before the same date. I must be frank, and tell you that my force is daily diminishing from the enemy's musketry fire, and our defences grow weaker daily. Should the enemy make any determined efforts to storm this place, I shall find it difficult to repulse them, owing to my paucity in numbers and the weak and harassed state of the force. Our loss, since the commencement of hostilities here, has been, in Europeans alone, upwards of 300. We are continually harassed in countermining the enemy, who have above twenty guns in position, many of them heavy ones.

"Any advance of your force towards this place will act beneficially in our favour, and greatly inspirit the native part of my garrison, who hitherto have behaved like faithful and good soldiers.

“ If you can possibly give me any intimation of your intended advance, pray do so by letter. Give the bearer the pass-word ‘ Agra,’ and ask him to give it to me in person, and oblige me by forwarding a copy of this to the Governor-General.”

While the General was waiting for reinforcements at Cawnpore, he communicated to the compiler of these memoirs his own views of the cause of the mutiny, and of the course to be adopted for restoring and maintaining British authority in India.

The General's remarks on the cause of the mutiny and the means of suppressing it.

“ I consider that the whole Bengal army, the Contingents included, has mutinied ; that the Bombay army will mutiny, and that the Madras army has a good mind to mutiny, which it will do or not, as things are managed here.” After alluding to the siege of Delhi, he proceeds to remark :—“ If I could get 4000 men together, and move up the Allyghur road, I should not despair of changing the face of affairs. But my lot is cast for Lucknow. The enterprise of crossing the Ganges, opposed by double my numbers, is not without hazard. But it has to me, at sixty-three, all the charm of a romance. I am as happy as a duck in thunder.

“ I conceive the causes of this grand mutiny to be pretty much as your letter describes them. The fact stated in a few words is, that this vast body of mercenary soldiery felt its power, and formed the guilty determination of using it. It was met with words when it should have found bayonets and grape-shot, and the peril of its temporary successes has been and is great.

“ I know it is proposed, when the danger is over, to reconstruct the Native army. The attempt is ridiculous. British troops can keep the field, as we have shown. So they can hold India. But it would ease them to embody some Sikhs and Affghans, and other borderers, to be employed at a distance from their own land (I have a small Sikh battalion with me). Thus we may govern the land. The completion of the rail will multiply the British force by ten. This is far better than to be again betrayed by men who should be disarmed and compelled to re-enter and be absorbed in the rural population.”

Sir James Outram continued to advance by moderate marches, but he was not to reach Cawnpore without an

The enemy endeavour to obstruct Sir James's progress.

attempt on the part of the enemy to obstruct his course. The General informed him that some of the Oude zemindars had crossed over in the neighbourhood of Futtehpoore, with the view of cutting in between his column and Cawnpore, adding, in a postscript, "forewarned is forearmed." Major Eyre, who had won the admiration of all India by his brilliant relief of Arrah, and now commanded Sir James's artillery, was sent against these insurgents, with 150 of the 5th Fusiliers, mounted on elephants, and two guns. At Hutgaon he was joined by Lieut. Johnson the commandant, and Lieut. Charles Havelock, the second in command of the remnant of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, forty in number, who had continued faithful to Government. They had hastened from Benares by forced marches to overtake Sir James Outram, and when they joined Major Eyre had been twenty-four hours in the saddle, and required rest. The Major halted his little force till an hour after midnight, when it recommenced its march, and came up at daybreak with the enemy, who immediately fled to their boats, and endeavoured to recross the river. Lieut. Johnson, with prompt decision and great judgment, dismounted the greater portion of his men, and by a continued carbine fire, succeeded in preventing the removal of the boats till the European Infantry could come up. They arrived soon after, and plied their rifles on the thickly crowded boats with deadly effect. But the insurgents continued to defend themselves with great vigour, till the guns were brought to bear on them, which constrained them to leap into the river, in which nearly the whole body perished. In announcing this brief and brilliant action to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir James stated that a general insurrection would have followed throughout the provinces of the Doab, had the enemy not been destroyed, as they were the advanced guard of a more formidable body of invaders.

Meanwhile, the General, who had maintained a daily correspondence with Sir James since his arrival at Allahabad, was indefatigable in his endeavours to provide

against every contingency which might retard his advance. Strenuous endeavours were made to complete the equipment of his artillery. By dint of exertion his little band of Volunteer Cavalry had been increased to 109, and to them would now be added the forty Irregular Horse under Lieut. Johnson. Four of the iron boats of the Ganges Canal had happily been discovered, which he determined to take with him to cross the Sye and the Goomtee, and suitable carriages were constructed for them to be drawn by twenty bullocks. His spies constantly supplied him with reports of the number and the movements of the enemy on the opposite bank. They were said to amount to 8000, with eighteen guns, strongly intrenched at Mungulwar. He had now before him the task, at all times hazardous, of crossing a broad and rapid river, in the face of a superior force. He carefully reconnoitred the Oude bank for many miles up and down the stream; the insurgents were thus induced to develope their numbers, and he came to the conclusion that he should not fail to encounter opposition, at whatever point he might land. After repeated communications with Sir James on the subject, it was decided to select the route across the islands—over which a road had been formed—and which might easily be connected with each other and with the opposite shore, by the floating bridges constructed by Captain Crommelin.

The General's
preparations
for entering
Oude.

The General was anxious to make up for the valuable time which had been wasted during the month of compulsory inactivity, and determined that not a moment should be lost in advancing to the Residency, where, according to the latest account, Colonel Inglis could not hold out beyond the 20th or 21st. But the enemy had collected a large force on the opposite bank, and might be expected to bring their guns to bear on the workmen while employed in laying the bridge, who would, in that case, have deserted their work, and the progress of the force would have been seriously impeded. The General, therefore, resolved to send over in succession two strong detachments to occupy the sand-hills, and cover

Arrange-
ments for
crossing the
Ganges.

the construction of the bridge. Boats were accordingly collected and prepared for the immediate embarkation of the men, and the guns and ammunition were placed on board. Meanwhile, the first detachment of the reinforcements reached Cawnpore early on the 15th, and the General issued orders for the troops to embark at daybreak the following morning. No tents were to accompany the column, and the officers were to instruct their native followers to take seven days' provisions with them. The General had previously submitted to Sir James the plan which he had drawn up for the organization of the force. He advised that Colonel Wilson should be left in command of the intrenchment, with about 300 Europeans, and a sufficient body of invalid and sick gunners to serve the artillery, in conjunction with the Sikh artillerymen, who had now been brought up to a high state of efficiency. The relieving force was to be formed into two wings, as their strength did not appear to justify their being called brigades; one was to be placed under the command of General Neill, the other under that of Colonel Hamilton of the 78th Highlanders. Sir James, on the receipt of this sketch, renewed the assurance that he intended to leave the command of the expedition in the hands of the General, and that every arrangement regarding the force should be regulated by his judgment; but he was anxious that the two divisions of the force, instead of being designated wings, should have the organization of brigades.

Sir James Outram arrived at Cawnpore after the last division of the reinforcements, at dusk on the 15th. The veterans of nine fights welcomed their comrades with enthusiasm, and a feeling of the highest animation and confidence pervaded the encampment that night. The meeting between the two generals was most cordial. Three months before they had parted on the banks of the Euphrates, on the abrupt termination of the Persian expedition, little dreaming that they should next be associated in the more arduous task of restoring British supremacy in our own revolted provinces. After the arrival of Sir James, the order for the advance of the

Arrival of Sir James Outram with reinforcements.

troops on the following morning was countermanded, and it was arranged that the passage of the river should be postponed till the bridge communications had been completed.

The next morning, the 16th of September, Sir James issued his first and his last Division Order, before the occupation of Lucknow. After detailing the ar-
Sir James Outram restores the command of the expedition to General Havelock.
 rangements for the constitution of the force, which had been sketched by the General, he transferred the command of the enterprise to him. "The important duty of first relieving the garrison of Lucknow has been intrusted to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B.; and Major-General Outram feels that it is due to this distinguished officer, and the strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that object, that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement. Major-General Outram is confident that the great end for which General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and so gloriously fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.

"The Major-General therefore, in gratitude for, and admiration of, the brilliant deeds in arms achieved by General Havelock and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion; and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity as Chief Commissioner of Oude, tendering his military services to General Havelock as a volunteer.

"On the relief of Lucknow, the Major-General will resume his position at the head of the force."

The General made his grateful acknowledgments for this act of generosity in the following Order: "Brigadier-General Havelock, in making known to the co-
The General's acknowledgments.
 lumn the kind and generous determination of Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., to leave to it the task of relieving Lucknow, and of rescuing its gallant and enduring garrison, has only to express his hope that the troops will strive by their exemplary and gallant conduct in the field, to justify the confidence thus reposed in them." In confirming this Order, Sir Colin Campbell

thus expressed his admiration of the conduct of Sir James : “ Seldom—perhaps never—has it occurred to a Commander-in-Chief to publish and confirm such an Order as the following one, proceeding from Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B. With such a reputation as Major-General Sir James Outram has won for himself, he can afford to share glory and honour with others. But that does not lessen the value of the sacrifice he has made with such disinterested generosity, in favour of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., commanding the field force in Oude.”

This act of generosity has been the theme of general applause, and it is certain that the moral elevation which it gave to Sir James’s character has been incalculably more valuable than any military renown which he could have acquired by the most brilliant success in command of the expedition. Even his warmest admirers were not prepared for an act of such singular disinterestedness. As long as the memorable events of the mutiny live on the page of history, and the memory of Havelock continues to be cherished as a national heritage, this deed will be held in grateful remembrance. The names of the two generals are inseparably linked together by this association of military genius with professional magnanimity. We even cease to regret the conduct of the Government of India, in capriciously taking out of the hands of Havelock “ the crowning glory” of relieving Lucknow, since it afforded an opportunity for the display of such rare virtue in restoring it to him. It is gratifying to our national feelings to see this noble conduct as warmly appreciated in the United States as it has been in England. Mr Headley, the American biographer of Havelock, thus alludes to it in his own glowing language, and we willingly accept his verdict as the suffrage of his countrymen :—

“ Never before was so remarkable an Order issued to an army by its commander—the days of chivalry can furnish no parallel to it. There is a grandeur in the very simplicity and frankness with which this self-sacrifice is made, while the act itself reveals a nobleness of character, a true greatness of soul, that wins our unbounded admiration. To waive his rank and move on with

Remarks on
this act.

the column as a spectator would have shown great self-denial, and elicited the applause of the world; but not satisfied with this, he joined the Volunteer Cavalry, and though covered with well-earned laurels, stood ready to win his epaulettes over again. All his illustrious deeds in the field, which have rendered his name immortal, grow dim before the glory of this one act. When they shall be forgotten, it shall remain the best eulogium that could be pronounced on his name. Kings may confer patents of nobility, but the loftiest titles can add nothing to the grandeur of such a character. Men, by their illustrious deeds, often excite the *admiration* of the world, but few ever win its *affections*. Decorations and external honours may dazzle and attract the eye—but they do not gain the heart. Outram has won the love of all true men in both hemispheres, and sits enthroned where outward signs of greatness pass but for little.”

The operation of re-establishing the floating bridges commenced on the morning of the 16th, and was completed in three days, by the energetic exertions of Captain Crommelin. Crossing the Ganges. Fortunately the enemy, contrary to all expectation, offered no molestation, and the communication with the Oude bank was effected without any attempt to interrupt the work. The force now about to make the third attempt to reach Lucknow consisted of the General's veterans, fearfully reduced in number, a detachment of 200 or 300 men who had come up with Colonel Stisted, and the reinforcements brought by Sir James, constituting in all a force of 2500 men, besides about 400 left to guard the intrenchment. The troops took fifteen days' provisions with them. So complete were the arrangements for crossing the river that the whole force passed over on the 19th without a single casualty. No sooner had the troops been established on the Oude bank than a letter was received from Colonel Inglis at Lucknow, written on the 16th of September:—

“The last letter I received from you was dated the 24th ultimo, since when I have received no news whatever from your camp, or of your movements, but am now daily expecting to receive intelligence of your advance in this direction. Since the date of my last letter”—that of the 1st of September—

“the enemy has continued to persevere unceasingly in their efforts against this position, and the firing has never ceased night or day. They have about sixteen guns in position around us, many of them 18-pounders. On the 5th instant they made a very determined attack, after exploding two mines, and succeeded for a moment in almost getting into one of our batteries, but were eventually repulsed on all sides with heavy loss. Since the above date they have kept up a cannonade and musketry fire, occasionally throwing in a shell or two. My weekly losses continue very heavy, both in officers and men. I shall be quite out of rum for the men in eight days, but we have been living on reduced rations, and I hope to be able to get on as * till about 1st proximo. If you have not relieved us by that time, we shall have no meat left, as I must keep some few bullocks to move my guns about the position. As it is I have had to kill almost all my gun bullocks, for my men could not perform the hard work without animal food. There is a report, though from a source I cannot implicitly rely on, that Man Sing has just arrived at Lucknow, having left part of his force outside the city. It is said that he is in our interests, and that he has taken the above step at the instigation of British authority. But I cannot say for certain whether such is the case, or whether he is really in Lucknow at all, as all I have to go upon is bazaar rumour. I am most anxious to hear from you of your advance, to enable me to reassure my native soldiers.”

The enemy who were expected to dispute the landing of the troops, only brought down two guns, and the resistance they offered was little more than nominal. The 5th Fusiliers, who were well-trained riflemen, soon succeeded, with the aid of the guns, in driving the advanced guard of the enemy back to their encampment. The heavy guns, consisting of four 24-pounders, and two 8-inch howitzers, together with the baggage, were safely crossed over on the 20th. The two brigades of the force occupied an alignment, with the right centre behind the sand hills, and the left resting on the Lucknow road. The Volunteer Cavalry was sent out, under Colonel Tytler, to reconnoitre, and came upon the

First operations in Oude.

* This word is illegible.

enemy's advanced position at Sainjunnee, about two miles in front of Mungulwar; they were fired on by two guns, and then retired leisurely to camp. The object of the reconnaissance was complete, it having been found that the enemy still held Mungulwar. The camp-followers, who were grazing the cattle in the rear, between the column and the river, hearing some talk about sowars, or horse-men, fancied that the enemy's cavalry was coming down on them, took fright and rushed in wild confusion into the camp, and the General was obliged to take immediate steps to ascertain the cause of alarm, and to repress it.

Towards the evening the force was visited by its old enemy, a deluge of rain, from which the Sepoys' "pals," which had been substituted for the large Euro-^{Action at}pean tents, afforded them some shelter. ^{Mungulwar.} The men sprung to arms at the appointed time the next morning—all bugle calls having been prohibited during the march—and advanced against the enemy's position. Their right rested in a village and walled enclosure; their centre and left were covered by a line of breast-works, behind which six guns were posted, the high-road intersecting their position. The General, according to his usual tactics, determined to turn their flank. The heavy battery was deployed on and across the road, to engage them in front, supported by the 5th Fusiliers as skirmishers. The main force then diverged to our left. Under this double attack the enemy soon lost heart and took to flight. Sir James Outram then placed himself at the head of the little troop of horse, with as much ardour as when he started in pursuit of Dost Mahomet nineteen years before. The mist which had obscured the morning now resolved itself into a merciless torrent of rain, but nothing could check the impetuosity of this gallant little band. Raised now for the first time to a strength which gave them the hope, so long denied, of being able to close with their slippery foe, they rapidly overtook a large mass of the fugitives, and dashing in among them, completed their discomfiture. After some pause, they resumed and continued the pursuit almost up to Bussee-

rutgunge, a distance of eight miles, and came on two of their field pieces. The defenders were cut down, and the guns captured. A hundred and twenty of the enemy perished under their sabres, and the regimental colours of the 1st Bengal Native Infantry were recovered. From this gallant and important exploit, it may readily be inferred how much more complete would have been the General's previous triumphs if he had been able to reap the full fruits of victory by such pursuit of the enemy. Thus were the rebels driven, with trifling loss on our part, from a position which a thousand British troops could have defended against the whole army of Oude.

The troops bivouacked for the night beyond Busseerutgunge, and on the 22nd marched, through a deluge of rain, to the Sye. After their defeat at Mungulwar, the enemy fled with such precipitation towards Lucknow, that they cast many of their guns into wells, and neglected to destroy the bridge over that stream; and our force was thus delivered from one of the most formidable difficulties on the route. The men were sheltered partly at Bunnee and partly at a village beyond the Sye. A royal salute was fired at the halting ground, in the hope that the sounds might reach the Residency, about sixteen miles distant, and cheer the hearts of the garrison by the prospect of immediate assistance, but in this hope the General was disappointed. The force recommenced its march on the morning of the 23rd, and encountered no opposition till it arrived in the vicinity of the Alumbagh, when the cavalry, which was in advance, came in sight of the strong position the enemy had taken up, and immediately retired to the main body to announce it to the General. The troops were at once halted for a reconnoissance. The centre and right of the enemy were found to be posted on some mounds, and their left rested on the Alumbagh, a pleasure-garden of one of the princes of Oude. It contained a large palace, and a park laid out with great taste, and the usual number of out-offices for a numerous body of followers and dependents. It was enclosed by a high wall,

Progress of
the troops.
The Allum-
bagh.

with turrets at each angle. Its tranquil and lovely aspect formed a singular contrast to the fierce warfare of which it was now to be the scene.

The enemy's line extended nearly two miles, and was supposed to consist of 10,000 men, while a body of cavalry, estimated at 1500, was massed on their right. The General was anxious to turn their right flank, but they had planted themselves, as on other occasions, behind a morass, and the turning movement could only be accomplished by a considerable circuit. To cover this operation, the General brought up his heavy battery of 24-pounders and his two 8-inch howitzers. The enemy's guns, which were masked by trees, had preserved silence during the reconnoissance; but as the advancing column came within their range a withering fire was opened, from which our troops suffered to some extent. But the heavy battery came up, and deploying on a dry spot to the left of the road, soon succeeded in silencing the rebel artillery and in driving back their cavalry. They stood the shock of this heavy ordnance—so rarely seen in the field—only for a few moments, and then broke up in confusion. Our troops and guns followed them as closely as the nature of the ground would permit. But one of their guns, planted on the road, and admirably served by the well-trained artillerymen of the Oude force, still continued to send destruction among our troops, when Lieut. Johnson, by an act of gallantry not surpassed in any action during this campaign, without waiting for orders, made a charge with twenty troopers of his Irregular Cavalry, sabred the gunners, and silenced the gun. Finding himself unsupported a thousand yards in advance of the force, and the enemy keeping up a galling fire from a neighbouring cover, he was compelled to abandon it and retire; but the dread inspired by this dashing charge deterred the enemy from serving it again, and the troops were free from molestation during their farther advance. The enemy were soon in full retreat; two of their guns, withdrawn from the field, were hastily placed in embrasures made through the

wall in the Alumbagh, and for a time continued to fire on our troops, but were speedily silenced by our field artillery; after which the insurgents, driven out by the 5th Fusiliers, hastily abandoned the building, and joined the fugitives, who were pressing back to the city. Five guns were left as trophies with the victors. As the rebels hurried across the country, Sir James Outram again placed himself at the head of the Volunteer and Native Cavalry, and pursued them to the Charbagh bridge, which spans the canal on the margin of the city. But as this position was well defended and fed with fresh troops from Lucknow, and night was, moreover, coming on, he prudently retired with his squadron. By the success of the day the force had obtained a firm base, from which its further operations towards the Residency could be concerted.

The pickets of our force were now posted in a walled garden, about a thousand yards in advance, and the troops prepared to bivouac for the night. As the line was formed, Sir James Outram caused to be announced to the troops the glorious tidings he had just received that Delhi had been successfully assaulted on the 14th of that month, and that the greater part of that city was in our possession. The intelligence was received by the men with repeated and hearty cheers. It came most seasonably to animate them in the arduous enterprise before them of rescuing the beleaguered garrison, the booming of whose guns from time to time told with what resolution they still held their own. As night set in the rain, which had held up during the day, came down again in torrents. The baggage and tents were considerably in the rear, and there was no shelter for the exhausted troops, who were constrained, after a hard day of marching and fighting, to seek what rest they could find on the soaked ground, with no covering but their great-coats. The General, who had ordered an extra ration of grog to the men, remained for two hours superintending the disposition of the line, placing the heavy guns in position to repel any night attack, and

Position of
the troops for
the night. In-
telligence of
the fall of
Delhi.

looking personally to every arrangement necessary for the security of the force now brought into immediate contact with the great body of the insurgents collected in Lucknow. In these labours he was most effectually aided by the energetic efforts of Colonel Tytler, and his two assistants, Captain Maycock and Lieut. Moorsom. With the first dawn of day he was again on horseback visiting the bivouac, which had been established on a ridge, as being better drained than the surrounding lowland. But, as the sun rose, the ridge became visible from the enemy's post in the gardens about the Charbagh, and they opened a heavy fire from guns screened by the trees. This fire did much damage, disabling eight men of the 78th Highlanders at two successive shots, and the line was, therefore, retired to a more secure position.

It was determined to halt the force at the Alumbagh on the 24th, to afford the troops some repose after the fatigues of the three previous days, and to complete the arrangements for advancing to the Residency. The tents were pitched about 11 A.M., and the men thus obtained the first opportunity they had enjoyed since they began their march on the morning of the 21st, of changing and drying their garments. The train of baggage and commissariat carts, extending over a mile and a half, was slowly wending its way up to the Alumbagh, when, a little after 11, a body of about 1500 of the enemy's horse, who had issued from the eastern suburb of the city, and passed round our rear, under cover of the trees and tall crops, and were not perceived till they were within 600 yards of the convoy, made a sudden rush on it. The men of the 90th, who formed the guard of that portion of the baggage which was now assailed, being new to the country, mistook the enemy's horse for our own Irregular Cavalry, and hesitated to fire on them. An officer and several men of the escort were sabred in the first moment of surprise. But as soon as the error was discovered, the rear-guard, rapidly reinforced from the camp, drove off the assailants, who left thirty men and horses on the field to attest the accuracy of our rifle fire.

Halt at the
Alumbagh on
the 24th.

The enemy's horse gave no further molestation during the day, though they continued to hover round the encampment till sunset, displaying a large green flag by way of bravado. Far greater annoyance was experienced from two of the enemy's 9-pounders placed near the Charbagh bridge, in a thick wood which afforded no mark to our guns but the white puffs of smoke as they rose above the trees. Our six heavy guns endeavoured to silence them from daybreak till near evening, but with little success. Fired with double charges, at a great elevation, the balls ricocheted through the camp, causing many casualties.

The 24th was passed by Sir James Outram in considering the route to be adopted for reaching the Residency. There were three modes of advancing to it from the Alumbagh. The first led direct from the Charbagh bridge through the heart of the city, for a mile and a half to the Bailey guard gate. But deep trenches had been cut across this road, and it was lined on both sides with strongly-built and loopholed houses filled with musqueteers, who likewise swarmed on the roofs. This route, generally known as the Cawnpore road, was at once abandoned, in consideration of the fearful sacrifice of life which the adoption of it must inevitably entail.

The second plan of approach was to make a *détour* from the right of the Alumbagh to the Dil-koosha palace and park, seize the strong defensive position which its massive building and encircling wall afforded, and, under this cover, bridge the Goomtee below the palace, where a salient bend, with its apex towards the city, would permit our guns to command the opposite bank by a cross fire. After crossing that river, the force would, on this plan, have skirted the left bank of the Kookrail nullah, or rivulet, gained the Fyzabad and Lucknow road at the Kookrail bridge, and following this route up to the iron bridge, have established itself on the northern bank of the Goomtee, within rifle-shot of the Residency. The concentrated fire of the Residency guns, and of the formidable 24-pounders of the General's force, would then have been

Three modes
of advancing
to the Resi-
dency.

able to overcome all opposition to a free intercourse with the garrison over the iron bridge. This route presented manifest advantages. The left flank of the force would throughout its march be covered by the river, while its right, abutting on the open plain, and supported by its powerful artillery, would be able effectually to subdue all resistance. The northern suburb of Lucknow does not present the same density of buildings or population as either of the other sides, and the houses consist chiefly of low mud huts. It had been repeatedly demonstrated during this campaign, that in anything like an open field fight the enemy were utterly unable to withstand our force, though their resistance in streets and houses was often most formidable.

North of the Goomtee, about 1200 yards from the head of the iron bridge, stood the Badshah-bagh, an enclosed palace and garden, which offered an admirable defensive position. The outposts of the Residency were within 500 yards of the iron bridge, and when the intervening space had been cleared of the enemy by a cross fire, the garrison might have been withdrawn over it to the Badshah-bagh without difficulty. At the same time, the occupation of that position would have enabled the Volunteer Cavalry, when increased by the junction of the fifty Sikh horse at the Residency, to make distant forays, and command supplies of food and carriage. If the garrison could once be extricated from its vicious position at the Residency, which exposed it night and day to a close musketry fire, the operation of retiring leisurely to Cawnpore would have presented no insuperable difficulty. The General had received an accurate map of the town and suburbs from Colonel Inglis and the engineer officers at the Residency in the beginning of August, and from that time had determined to adopt this route by the Dil-koo-sha. It was to carry out this object that he had brought with him four of the canal boats to cross the Goomtee. The feasibility of this plan was demonstrated in March, 1858, when Sir Colin Campbell advanced a second time to Lucknow. Sir James Outram, then commanding one

wing of his army, was detached by this circuitous route, and gained the iron bridge with little opposition and trifling loss. The position of the Badshah-bagh corresponded in every respect with that of the Alumbagh, and it may serve to illustrate the probable success of this mode of relieving the garrison, to refer to Sir James Outram's subsequent occupation of the isolated position of the Alumbagh for four months, during which period the whole army of Oude was unable to make any impression on it, or to hinder him from receiving convoys from Cawnpore, or foraging around, and drawing supplies from the adjacent country.

It appears evident, therefore, that if the General had been enabled to execute his plan of advancing to the relief of the Residency along the northern bank of the Goomtee, the march might have been accomplished with a small sacrifice of life. No power of the enemy could have dislodged our force from the Badshah-bagh; nor, after the iron bridge, by a simple engineering operation, had been converted into a safe means of transit for the garrison, could they have prevented our retiring to Cawnpore. Even if this retirement had not been deemed advisable at the time, the immediate pressure on the garrison would have been relieved by throwing in fresh troops, stores, and provisions, while our main body, keeping the open field, would have created a powerful and important diversion. But circumstances appeared to militate against the adoption of this course, which the General had contemplated for many weeks. The three days of incessant rain, which had annoyed the force on its progress, had soaked the ground, and after a reconnoissance, made under the directions of Sir James Outram on the 24th, it was reported to be absolutely impossible to move even the light field pieces across the country. This route was, therefore, abandoned. It might still have been adopted, if the force could have remained at the Alumbagh three or four days, till the ground had attained sufficient consistency for the transit of the guns. But the exigency of the garrison was believed to be so pressing, and its peril

so imminent, as not to admit of the delay of a single day. It was known to be on reduced rations; it was in hourly danger from the mines of the enemy, and still more from the defection of the few native Sepoys who yet remained faithful, and who might be expected to desert it any hour, if relief appeared to them hopeless.

There remained only the desperate alternative of forcing the passage of the Charbagh bridge, and advancing by a circuitous lane along the left bank of the canal, to the group of well-fortified palaces and buildings which lay to the east of the Residency. It was well known, from the reports of spies, that the farther bridge-head at Charbagh had been strongly intrenched, and that a battery of six guns had been established to sweep the approach to it. The lofty houses in its vicinity had been loopholed and barricaded, and the rebels evidently conceived that the entrance into the city at this point was thus hermetically sealed. This hazardous undertaking could be justified only by the hourly peril in which the garrison was supposed to stand. With any other troops than those now grouped around the Alumbagh, burning with impatience for the signal which should take them, at all hazards, to the rescue of their fellow-countrywomen and children, even the most sanguine commander might have paused before he committed his force in an enterprise in which the least check must involve not only its own annihilation, but likewise that of the garrison. But the victors of Cawnpore, of Onao, and of Bithoor, had shown themselves equal to any demand on their valour, and the reinforcements which had recently joined them were inspired with a feeling of the most ardent emulation.

Determina-
tion to ad-
vance to the
Residency
over the
Charbagh
bridge.

In the course of the day, therefore, Sir James resolved to enter the city over the bridge, and then turning to the right, to advance to the Residency by this route. The baggage, the sick and wounded, and the hospital, were to be left at the Alumbagh, under the charge of Colonel M'Intyre, of the 78th Highlanders, with six officers, forty-two non-commissioned officers, and 250 European

soldiers, chiefly footsore men, who had been disabled during the march. Owing, however, to some confusion in withdrawing the pickets on the morning of the 25th, the number left in the Alumbagh fell little short of 400. The troops were directed to take sixty rounds of ammunition in their pouches, and a reserve of the same quantity per man was to be conveyed on camels. The General had not forgotten Ghuzni, where the Affghan expedition had well nigh proved abortive from the absence of the heavy guns, which Sir John Keane had left behind him at Candahar, and he succeeded in overcoming Sir James Outram's objections to take the 24-pounders with the force. The parole of the day was "Patience."

CHAPTER X.

Advance to the Charbagh Bridge—and into the City.—The Generals rush to the Residency, and enter it in the Dark.—Losses in the Rear-guard, and among the Wounded.—Remarks on this Occurrence.—The General's Despatch on the Operations of the 25th.—Sir James assumes the Command of the Force.—Determines to remain at the Residency.—The Blockade.—Advance of Sir Colin Campbell's Force.—The General's operations to aid him.—His last Despatch.—The Meeting of the three Generals.—Sir Colin determines to retire to Cawnpore.—The General's Letters to his Family, November 19th.—His Illness.—His Death and Burial.—His Military Character.—His moral Courage.—His Christian Character.—Honours paid to his Memory in England, in France, in America.

ON the morning of the 25th September the General rose, as usual, before dawn, and passed some time in devotional exercises, commending his troops and himself to the Divine protection. To allow the men ^{Advance to the Charbagh bridge.} time for a cooked meal, as a preparation for the arduous duty before them, and to complete the arrangements for clearing off the camp ground into the Alumbagh, eight o'clock had been fixed for the hour of march. The troops were drawn up in front of the Alumbagh, and formed for the advance. "Toil, privation, and exposure," says Major North, "had left traces on the forms of the men, yet daring, hope, and energy seemed depicted in their countenances." A small table had been placed in the open field, at which the General and his immediate staff partook of a breakfast. A few minutes before eight Sir James Outram came down with his staff from the Alumbagh, and informed the General that he had thought it advisable to modify the plan resolved on the previous day, which provided that one of the brigades should diverge to the right; and it was now his intention that both brigades should proceed direct to the Charbagh. The map of the city was then spread out on the table, and as the two

Generals and their staff bent over it and traced the route, a nine-pound shot, from the enemy's battery, coming straight towards the table, fortunately struck the ground at the distance of about five yards from it, and rising, bounded over their heads, leaving them uninjured. Between eight and nine the welcome order to "advance" was given. Sir James Outram took the command of the first and leading brigade, with all the artillery, heavy and light. The second brigade, under the General, followed in support. Scarcely had Sir James's brigade passed our own advanced picket, than it was assailed by a heavy fire in front, and on either flank, and more especially by two guns planted near a house, called, from its colour, the Yellow House. "The enemy," says Sir James Outram, "had on that occasion flanked his road under cover of long high grass, and a murderous fire was poured on the column from a double-storied house, full of musqueteers, and from the loopholed walls of the large surrounding gardens, from two guns that raked the road from the right flank, and another that commanded his front. But steadily and cheerily Captain Maude pushed on with his brave men, and in the face of this desperate opposition did he bring them through, though not without the loss of one-third of his artillery force. . . . But for his nerve and coolness on this trying occasion, the army could not have advanced." The road leading from the Alumbagh to the city bends to the right, till it comes into a direct line with the bridge which spans the canal. It was here that the enemy had determined to make their stand, and dispute the entrance to the city. The bridge was defended by six guns on the Lucknow side—one of them a 24-pounder—which completely swept the passage across it, as well as the approach to it. All the houses near it were loopholed and filled with musqueteers. On coming under this destructive fire in front, while they were at the same time assailed from the wall of the Charbagh enclosure on the right, the troops were halted, and directed to lie down under such cover as they could find. The breadth of the road would only permit two

guns to be deployed. Two of Maude's guns were, therefore, brought up and planted, necessarily without cover, to reply to the fire of the six pieces of the enemy, well-sheltered behind a breastwork, and which poured grape on them at a distance of less than 150 yards. Sir James Outram, with one regiment, entered the enclosure to the right, resolved to clear it of the enemy, and to emerge on the margin of the canal, which there commands the opposite bank, and thus bring a flanking fire to bear on the defenders of the bridge. But it became every moment more apparent that Maude's two guns would not be able to silence the superior artillery of the enemy in their front. Almost every man at them was either killed or wounded, while Captain Maude himself, and his subaltern, Lieut. Maitland, each pointing a gun, remained unscathed; but he had repeatedly to call for volunteers from the infantry, to replace the gunners who fell around him. There was no appearance of the turning force under Sir James, which, having made a wider *détour* than was intended, had not then reached the point on the canal whence its fire would tell on the enemy. It was evident that this state of things could not last, and that recourse must be had to the bayonet. General Neill, who commanded the first brigade in Sir James's absence, was at length persuaded to allow a charge, and the 1st Madras Fusiliers were ordered to advance. Lieut. Arnold, a young officer ever conspicuous even among the daring spirits of that noble regiment, had been impatiently watching for the signal. At the first word, and without waiting for the regiment to rise and form, he dashed on to the bridge with some ten of his men. This act probably saved the regiment from a heavy slaughter. The enemy, suspecting from the movement among our troops that a rush was about to be made, reserved a full discharge of grape for the moment when the head of the column should appear on the bridge. Mistaking this little band, and the two mounted staff officers who accompanied it, for the main body, they fired. Arnold himself fell, shot through both legs; and his devoted followers were swept down almost to a man.

Colonel Tytler, the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, had his horse shot under him. Lieut. Havelock, the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, alone remained on the bridge, the mark for a hundred bullets. In this position he waved his sword, and called on the Fusiliers to advance. Thus animated, and nobly led by their regimental officers, they dashed forward with a cheer, without giving the enemy time to reload, advanced over the prostrate bodies of their comrades, and rushing on the guns amidst a storm of bullets, wrested them from the enemy, and bayoneted the gunners. Sir James, at the same moment, emerged from the Charbagh garden, on the margin of the canal, just in time to witness the rush of the Fusiliers, and the capture of the guns.

The attempt of the enemy to defend the entrance to the city was thus overcome; our troops had entered it. The Advance from the Charbagh bridge. 78th Highlanders were pushed forward on the Cawnpore road towards the Residency, to cover the passage of the troops and baggage, and allow of the captured guns and ammunition, which could not be removed, being thrown into the canal. The remainder of the troops turned short to the right, and began to thread the narrow lane before alluded to. The 78th Highlanders held their position at the head of the street, as the baggage, the wounded, and the followers defiled over the bridge. As soon as the enemy perceived that it was an unsupported rear-guard, it was assailed by overwhelming numbers, but continued firmly to hold its own. In this unequal struggle, which lasted nearly three hours, its ammunition was more than once exhausted and renewed. On one occasion the enemy, becoming more bold, brought two brass 9-pounders to bear on the Highlanders, but they immediately left the shelter of the houses, captured the guns, hurled them into the canal, and then calmly resumed their defensive position. Repeatedly tried through this campaign, and always found worthy of its high reputation, never did the valour of this gallant regiment shine brighter than in this bloody conflict. Two Victoria Crosses rewarded its exertions, and they were given by the election of the

corps. One was assigned to Lieut. and Adjutant, now Captain, Herbert M^cPherson, for his conduct in the splendid charge on the two guns; the other was bestowed by the universal acclamation of the soldiers on Assistant-Surgeon Valentine M^cMaster, for the devoted gallantry with which he risked his life in binding up the wounds and securing the retreat of the men under his charge, disabled by the bullets of the enemy. Lieut. Havelock, who had been directed to look to the safety of the convoy as it defiled over the bridge, had just seen the last waggon across, and given orders for the Highlanders to be withdrawn, when he received a wound in his arm, and was carried forward insensible in a doolie.

The main body, after having crossed the bridge, turned sharply to the right, and skirting the left bank of the canal, advanced slowly, but without any material opposition, till it had reached a point between the Motee muhal and the building which had been the mess-house of the 32nd. It was between this spot and the Residency, a distance of about three-quarters of a mile, that the strength of the enemy was concentrated, and here the real struggle of the day, after the forcing of the bridge, took place. At the Begum Kothee and the King's stables, which was the entrance of the main street from the east to the Residency, the enemy made a firm stand, but were soon driven in by the fire of the heavy guns. The troops then moved on amidst a fire from the Kaiser-bagh, or King's palace, "under which," as the General remarked, "nothing could live." Two of the heavy guns, under Major Eyre, opened on the Kaiser-bagh battery, and twice silenced it for a time. The troops then crossed a narrow bridge over a little nullah, which was completely commanded by the mess-house, the roof of which was swarming with musqueteers. The force was halted under the shelter of a wall of one of the palaces, to allow the long column, the progress of which had been impeded by the narrowness of the streets and by the heavy guns, to come up, and the troops obtained some respite. The Highlanders now came up to the position occupied by the

Generals. Having lost all trace of the main body, they had taken a more direct route to the left, which brought them up to the gate of the Kaiser-bagh, where they took the battery which was playing on the Motee muhal. It was at this time that the General first heard that his son had been wounded, but of the nature of the wound he could learn nothing.

The main body of the troops was now in the vicinity of the Fureed Buksh palace, about 500 yards from the Residency. They had been fighting throughout the day, with little rest and no refreshment, and were impatient to be led on to the goal of their hopes. Lieut. Moorsom, who had been sent to seek a safe line for farther advance, had not returned. Night was setting in, and Sir James was desirous of halting where they were, collecting the guns and wounded, and advancing to the Residency the next morning. But the General strenuously urged the importance of achieving an immediate communication with the beleaguered garrison, and his advice prevailed. The ever-ready and gallant Highlanders—as many of them as had survived the sanguinary conflict of the day—were called to the front, as well as the regiment of Sikhs. The General and Sir James, notwithstanding the wound the latter had received in the early part of the day, placed themselves at the head of this little band of heroes, accompanied by Lieut. Hudson, Lieut. Charles Havelock, and Lieut. Hargood, of the staff. As soon as this detachment had started, the 1st Madras Fusiliers were moved on in their wake, and as the last men of this corps were defiling through the arch into the street called the Khas bazaar, some rebels, who were secreted in a room above, and had not ventured to fire while our troops were passing, lest they should be discovered and slaughtered, began to ply their muskets, and one of them, distant only a few feet from General Neill, shot that gallant officer through the head as he approached the arch. The General fell from his horse, and never spoke more, and thus had the service to mourn,

The Generals
rush to the
Residency.

at this critical juncture, the loss of one of its noblest and most valuable officers.

The Highlanders and Sikhs, with the two commanders at their head, pushed on to the Residency through an incessant storm of shot. The loopholed houses on either side poured forth a stream of fire as they advanced. Every roof sent down a shower of missiles on them. Deep trenches had been cut across the road to detain them under the fire of the adjacent buildings. At every angle they encountered a fearful volley. Seldom have troops had such a gauntlet of fire to run, but officers and men, animated by the Generals, sternly moved on. "At length," writes the General, "we found ourselves at the gates of the Residency, and entered in the dark in triumph. Then came three cheers for the leaders, and the joy of the half-famished garrison, who, however, contrived to regale me, not only with beef cutlets, but with mock-turtle soup and champagne. I had little relish for delicacies, for you may conceive my anxiety about Harry. Till morning there were no tidings of him, when his cousin, young Bensley Thornhill, who had never seen him, volunteered to go out and look for him. He brought him in on a stretcher, carried by four Highlanders; but, alas! the gallant Thornhill paid dearly for his intrepid exertions. One ball struck him under the right eye and injured his skull; another smashed his right forearm to pieces. It was amputated, but he died, after lingering nine days in hospital, leaving my niece a young widow. . . . Harry had been shot by a musket-ball through the left elbow joint; but the wound healed wonderfully, and he will recover the use of the limb."

The two Generals reach the Residency.

The scene within the Residency has been eloquently described by a staff officer:—

"Once fairly *seen*, all our doubts and fears regarding them were ended; and then the garrison's long pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense burst forth in a succession of deafening cheers. From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sand-bags piled on shattered houses—from every post still held by a few gallant

spirits, rose cheer on cheer—even from the hospital many of the wounded crawled forth to join in that glad shout of welcome to those who had so bravely come to our assistance. It was a moment never to be forgotten. The delight of the ever-gallant Highlanders, who had fought twelve battles to enjoy that moment of ecstasy, and in the last four days had lost a *third* of their number, seemed to know no bounds. The General and Sir James Outram had entered Dr Fayrer's house, and the ladies in the garrison and their children crowded with intense excitement into the porch to see their deliverers. The Highlanders rushed forward, the rough-bearded warriors, and shook the ladies by the hand with loud and repeated gratulations. They took the children up in their arms, and fondly caressing them, passed them from one to another in turn. Then, when the first burst of enthusiasm was over, they mournfully turned to speak among themselves of the heavy losses they had sustained, and to inquire the names of the numerous comrades who had fallen in the way."

Sir James Outram and the General having thus led the way to the Residency with the 78th Highlanders and the Sikhs, the other portion of the force at the Fureed Buksh began to follow them. But the road was found to be intersected by numerous trenches, which the enemy had dug, and it was manifestly impossible to bring on the heavy artillery. Lieut. Moor-som, who was thoroughly acquainted with the localities, and who accompanied the remainder of the column, finding the progress of one of the guns thus arrested, offered to point out another and a safer path. The troops and guns were, therefore, withdrawn, and conducted by him through a route, which enabled them to reach the Residency during the night without loss. The rear-guard, consisting of the 90th, under Colonel Campbell, had been left with two of the heavy guns at the Motee muhal, to aid the advance of the 78th Highlanders, who had, apparently unknown to them, taken a different path, and joined the main body under the Generals. With this rear-guard were the spare ammunition waggons and the wounded. During the night of the 25th Lieut. Johnson, whose brilliant charge in the action at the Alumbagh has

Losses in the rear-guard and among the wounded.

already been mentioned, dismounted half his troop of Irregular Cavalry, and issuing from the Residency with the led horses, proceeded of his own accord, in the direction of the Motee muhal, to bring in as many of the wounded as he might find. He discovered no trace of an enemy in any direction, and it is highly probable that if advantage could have been taken of this circumstance, which, unhappily, was not known, the whole of the rear-guard, with the guns, the ammunition, and the wounded, might have reached the Residency before the morning in safety, and the unhappy loss which partially dimmed the triumph of the day, would have been avoided. On the morning of the 26th, Mr Bensley Thornhill, of the civil service, the husband of the General's niece, volunteered to proceed and bring in his cousin Lieut. Havelock, and the rest of the wounded. It was arranged that he should take the road contiguous to the river, which was wholly screened from the fire of the enemy, except on two points. Pursuing this route, he reached the Motee muhal in safety, but in guiding his charge to the Residency, lost his way, and inadvertently entered a square, where the convoy of litters was immediately enveloped by the enemy's fire. The escort, with a few noble exceptions, thinking only of their own safety, rushed on through the street faster than the litters could follow them. The doolie bearers threw down their burdens and fled, and the insurgents dashed forward and slaughtered the wounded to the number of thirty or forty. Two of the leading doolies were, however, forced on through the fire, and reached the Residency. One of them contained Lieut. Havelock, and a wounded soldier of the 78th Highlanders. They were saved from destruction by Private Henry Ward, who remained at the side of the doolie under an awful fire, and prevented the bearers from dropping their double load. For this act of intrepid gallantry the Victoria Cross has been awarded to him. The doolies which had not entered the square when the massacre commenced, immediately turned back, regained the right path, and reached the Residency later in the day without loss.

The enemy appeared to have been staggered by the bold and impetuous movements of the Generals on the 25th, and all opposition ceased at nightfall. But daylight disclosed to the rebels that the rear-guard at the Motee muhal was separated from the Residency and unsupported. A heavy fire was immediately opened on that position from the Kaiser-bagh and the neighbouring buildings which commanded it, and the troops were exposed to imminent peril. Reinforcements were promptly sent from the Residency, under the command of Colonel, now Sir Robert, Napier, who reached the scene of danger without difficulty, under the skilful guidance of Lieut. Moorsom. Of the heavy guns remaining with the rear-guard, one had been left in the road in front of the palace-gate, exposed to a fire from the enemy's riflemen, which nothing could survive. During the day, every gunner who approached it was shot down, and the attempt to withdraw it was abandoned till night. Under the able directions of Captain Olpherts, private Duffy, of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, by an act of the most extraordinary valour, crept out after nightfall and succeeded in attaching a drag rope to the gun, by means of which it was extricated from its perilous position. He thus earned the distinction of the Victoria Cross. During the night of the 26th the whole of the rear-guard, with the guns and the ammunition waggons, left the Motee muhal in silence, guided by Lieut. Moorsom, and reached the Residency, unperceived by the enemy, two or three hours before sunrise on the 27th, without a single casualty. Its previous loss was computed at sixty killed and wounded.

This was the only mischance which attended the General's progress from Allahabad to Lucknow, and it has consequently attracted a degree of notice disproportionate to its intrinsic importance in a long series of military operations. Two of his movements on that day have been considered open to objection; but these are purely military questions, which must be decided by military authorities. It would be presumptuous for a lay writer to usurp their office, and his duty must be

Remarks on
this occur-
rence.

limited to a simple notice of the reasons which appear to have swayed the General's mind, and which must, therefore, be candidly taken into consideration. It has been questioned whether it was wise to bring on four heavy guns and the cavalry through the narrow streets of a populous and hostile city, at the risk of impeding the advance of the force. But the General considered that any inconvenience which might be occasioned by the guns would be counterbalanced by their value in the progress of the column through a series of fortified palaces and buildings which possessed the strength of fortresses. He always held a strong opinion on the question of heavy artillery, based on the manifest difficulties which the want of it had entailed on Napoleon at Acre; on Wellington at Burgos; and on Lake at Bhurtpore. This view was fortified by his own observation of the all but fatal result of having left the heavy guns at Candahar when the army marched to Ghuznee. He had, therefore, formed the fixed determination on no occasion to leave them behind him when there might possibly be occasion for their use. He was imperfectly acquainted with the localities through which the force must pass, and Sir James Outram, who, on the strength of his superior local knowledge, had at first dissuaded him from this step, did not finally appear to oppose it with much determination. Moreover, those who attribute the loss sustained by the force to the encumbrance of these four guns, should not lose sight of the fact that, but for the aid of their powerful fire, the progress of the column might have been more than once completely checked during the day, or if success had been achieved by the bayonet alone, it would probably have been at a more serious sacrifice of life. With regard to the cavalry, it must be borne in mind that the object of this expedition was simply to withdraw the garrison to Cawnpore, and although the General was not able to accomplish his purpose of entering the Residency from the north, through the open country, he still considered that this would be found the most feasible mode of withdrawing from it. In that case the cavalry, raised to the strength

of 200 by the addition of the Sikh horse in the Residency, would have been found invaluable in making forays and obtaining supplies.

In reference to the successful importunity of the General with Sir James Outram to push forward to the Residency on the evening of the 25th, it is to be remarked, that he had no doubt, from the letters of Colonel Inglis, that the garrison was reduced to the greatest straits. They were exposed to the most serious danger from the enemy's mines, which might be sprung at any time. But their greatest peril arose from the anticipated desertion of the native troops, whose fidelity had hitherto been maintained by the hope that the garrison would be placed beyond all risk by the arrival of reinforcements, but who were likely to lose heart and desert when they found those reinforcements checked, and, for aught they knew, annihilated when almost within reach of them. Colonel Inglis had likewise stated that in their enfeebled state, they would not be able to resist any determined assault of the enemy. The General dreaded, therefore, lest the insurgents, finding the relieving column apparently brought to a standstill, should redouble their exertions, and by one vigorous onslaught overpower the garrison, and thus defeat the object for which such sacrifices had been made. He thought it would have been more advisable not to advance at all on that day, than after advancing, to stop at the threshold of the Residency. The rebel Sepoys, moreover, appeared for the moment to be panic-struck by the rapidity of our movements; and the General, taught by long experience the importance of following up such an impression, was anxious to take advantage of their terror, which he knew might as rapidly subside through our inaction. In that case, they might be emboldened to re-occupy the intervening buildings in great force, and render the approach to the Residency more perilous. These are among the reasons which appear to have influenced the General in deciding on these measures, and they will serve to assist professional judges in coming to a sound conclusion on them. The apprehension he entertained re-

specting the explosion of the mines appears to have been verified by the disclosures subsequently made at the Residency, which are thus described by Sir James Outram:—"Still much opposition had to be encountered ere we attained the Residency—just in time, apparently; for now that we have examined the outside of the defences, we find that two mines had been run far under the garrison's chief works—ready for loading—which if sprung, must have placed the garrison at their mercy."

The loss of life on the 26th is greatly to be deplored, but the massacre of the wounded cannot be attributed with equity to this movement, inasmuch as it would have been altogether avoided if Mr Thornhill had not missed his way. The contest to which the rear-guard was exposed was exceedingly severe, but it served to demonstrate the strength of opposition which the whole force would have encountered the next day, and to illustrate the peril which might have attended its remaining cooped up during the night between walls where it could not act, and where its numbers might only have served to render the effect of the fire opened on it at daybreak the more destructive. The question may therefore arise, whether the aggregate sacrifice of life would not have been greater if the movement to the Residency had not been accomplished on the evening of the 25th.

A day or two after the force had entered the Residency the General sent the following despatch to the Commander-in-Chief:—

The General's
despatch on
the operations
of the
25th.

"Residency, Lucknow, Sept. 30th, 1857.

"Sir,—Major-General Sir James Outram, having, with characteristic generosity of feeling, declared that the command of the force should remain in my hands, and that he would accompany it as Civil Commissioner only, until a junction could be effected with the gallant and enduring garrison of this place, I have to request that you will inform his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that this purpose was effected on the evening of the 25th instant. But before detailing the circumstances, I must refer to the antecedent events. I crossed the Sye on the 22nd instant, the bridge at Bunnee not having been broken. On the 23rd I found

myself in presence of the enemy, who had taken a strong position, his left resting on the enclosure of the Alumbagh, and his centre and right drawn up behind a chain of hillocks. The head of my column at first suffered from the fire of his guns, as it was compelled to pass along the trunk road between morasses ; but as soon as my regiments could be deployed along his front, and his right enveloped by my left, victory declared for us, and we captured five guns. Sir James Outram, with his accustomed gallantry, passed on in advance, close down to the canal. But as the enemy fed his artillery with guns from the city, it was not possible to maintain this, or a less advanced position for a time taken up ; but it became necessary to throw our right on the Alumbagh, and refuse our left, and even then we were incessantly cannonaded throughout the 24th ; and the enemy's cavalry, 1500 strong, crept round through lofty cultivation, and made a sudden irruption upon the baggage massed in our rear. The soldiers of the 90th forming the baggage guard received them with great gallantry, but lost some brave officers and men, shooting down, however, twenty-five of the troopers and putting the whole body to flight. They were finally driven to a distance by two guns of Captain Olpherts' battery.

“The troops had been marching for three days under a perfect deluge of rain, irregularly fed, and badly housed in villages. It was thought necessary to pitch tents, and permit them to halt on the 24th. The assault on the city was deferred until the 25th. That morning our baggage and tents were deposited in the Alumbagh under an escort, and we advanced. The 1st brigade, under Sir James Outram's personal leading, drove the enemy from a succession of gardens and walled enclosures, supported by the 2nd brigade, which I accompanied. Both brigades were established on the canal at the bridge of Charbagh.

“From this point the direct road to the Residency was something less than two miles ; but it was known to have been cut by trenches, and crossed by palisades at short intervals, the houses also being all loopholed. Progress in this direction was impossible ; so the united column pushed on, detouring along the narrow road which skirts the left bank of the canal. Its advance was not seriously interrupted until it had come opposite the King's palace, or the Kaiser-bagh, where two guns and a body of mercenary troops were intrenched. From this intrenchment a fire of grape and musketry was opened, under which nothing could live. The artillery and troops had to pass a bridge partially under its influence ; but were then shrouded by the buildings

adjacent to the palace of Fureed Buksh. Darkness was coming on, and Sir James Outram at first proposed to halt within the courts of the Mehal for the night ; but I esteemed it to be of such importance to let the beleaguered garrison know that succour was at hand, that with his ultimate sanction I directed the main body of the 78th Highlanders and regiment of Ferozepore to advance. This column rushed on with a desperate gallantry, led by Sir James Outram and myself, and Lieuts. Hudson and Hargood, of my staff, through streets of flat-roofed loop-holed houses, from which a perpetual fire was kept up, and, overcoming every obstacle, established itself within the enclosure of the Residency. The joy of the garrison may be more easily conceived than described ; but it was not until the next evening that the whole of my troops, guns, tumbrils, and sick and wounded, continually exposed to the attacks of the enemy, could be brought step by step within this *enceinte* and the adjacent palace of the Fureed Buksh. To form an adequate idea of the obstacles overcome, reference must be made to the events that are known to have occurred at Buenos Ayres and Saragossa. Our advance was through streets of houses such as I have described, and thus each formed a separate fortress. I am filled with surprise at the success of the operation, which demanded the efforts of 10,000 good troops. The advantage gained has cost us dear. The killed, wounded, and missing, the latter being wounded soldiers, who I much fear—some or all—have fallen into the hands of a merciless foe, amounted, up to the evening of the 26th, to 535 officers and men. Brigadier-General Neill, commanding 1st brigade ; Major Cooper, Brigadier, commanding Artillery ; Lieut.-Colonel Bazely, a volunteer with the force—are killed. Colonel Campbell, commanding 90th Light Infantry ; Lieut.-Colonel Tytler, my Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General ; and Lieut. Havelock, my Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, are severely, but not dangerously, wounded. Sir James Outram received a flesh wound in the arm in the early part of the action near Charbagh, but nothing could subdue his spirit ; and though faint from loss of blood, he continued to the end of the action to sit on his horse, which he only dismounted at the gate of the Residency. As he has now assumed the command, I leave to him the narrative of all events subsequent to the 26th.

“I have, etc.

“H. HAVELOCK,

“Brigadier-General, Commanding Oude Field Force.”

His letter to
the writer on
the same sub-
ject.

A few days after, the General sent the following letter to the writer, on these operations:—

“ Sir James Outram brought me up my reinforcements on the 14th and 15th of September. I threw a noble bridge of boats across the Ganges, and reached the farther bank with 2500 men, and eighteen guns, the troops in the highest order. Sir James announced that he would, after my former successes, leave to me the renown of relieving Lucknow; that he would accompany my force only as Chief Commissioner and as a volunteer. I beat the enemy on the 21st at Mungulwar, and again at the Alumbagh on the 23rd. The last is within four miles of the capital of Oude. . . . I had brought up canal boats from Cawnpore, intending to bridge the Góomtee, and coming round by its left bank to the north-west of the city, to have seized the iron and stone bridges, thus placing myself on the enemy's communications. I should have hoped from this plan great results. But it was doomed never to be tried. On the 25th we went to work in quite a different way. Sir James determined to move down straight to the Charbagh bridge across the canal, and thence turning to the right, to half circle round the city, and establish himself in the Fureed Buksh, a palace adjacent to the Residency. The Charbagh and its bridge was carried after a fierce struggle. Outram told me that Harry's conduct in leading the men across the canal was as gallant as anything at the bridge of Lodi, and, on his recommendation, the Victoria Cross has been awarded to him.

“ We got on without much difficulty until opposite the Kaiserbagh, the palace of the late king. There a fire was opened on us of grape and musketry, from an intrenchment, under which nothing could live. Fortunately, we were protected first by an embankment, and then by some lofty walls. But many men and officers fell, and among them General Neill. Just at this moment intelligence was brought me that the Assistant Adjutant-General (Harry) was wounded in the arm. The horse I rode was hit in two places, and I was compelled to mount another. Night was coming on, and Sir James was desirous of halting, and passing the dark hours in the palace of Fureed Buksh. But I so urgently represented the importance of achieving at once a communication with the beleaguered garrison, and restoring their confidence, that I prevailed. The Highlanders and regiment of Ferozepore Sikhs were called to the front. Outram and I and three of the staff rode at their head, and on we dashed through streets of loop-

holed houses, from the flat roofs of which a perpetual fire was poured. But our troops were not to be denied. We soon found ourselves at the great gate of the Residency, and entered it in the dusk in triumph. . . . I have only space to say that Mr Martin Gubbins has been to me and to my staff the kindest of men. Colonel Tytler and Harry, both wounded, have been cared for in his house like his children. I dine with him once a week, and he sends me excellent sherry, without which the doctors tell me I should not pull through. I came in with one suit of clothes, which I have hardly put off for six weeks."

On the morning of the 26th September Sir James assumed the command of the force. The functions which the General had exercised for twelve weeks ceased, and he fell back into a subordinate position. He had accomplished the object originally intrusted to him. He had relieved the garrison from the pressure under which it had so long suffered, and the imminent danger to which it had been daily and hourly exposed. His responsibility now terminated, and the history of subsequent operations must be viewed without reference to his agency. On the 26th the force at the Residency was reorganized. The troops were formed into two divisions, the one, commanded by Colonel Inglis, consisted of H.M. 32nd, the Madras Fusiliers, the 78th Highlanders, and the Volunteer Cavalry. The other division was given to Havelock, and comprised the regiments which had come up with Sir James Outram. To Colonel Inglis was assigned the charge of the old Residency, while Havelock's circle embraced the edifices, palaces, and gardens to the east of it, through which the relieving army had forced its way. From these buildings he was directed to expel the enemy, and the operation was completed in two or three days. In those gorgeous palaces the men, who had so recently been exposed to the severest hardships, now revelled in the enjoyment of luxuries, and one of the most poetical episodes of this expedition is the picture which has been drawn of the rough soldier reclining for a time on silken couches, and eating his reduced and miserable pittance of food out of dishes

Sir James
Outram as-
sumes the
command of
the force.
Operations at
the Residency

of the most costly and magnificent china. By the occupation of these buildings, the enemy were thrown back a thousand yards, and the Bailey guard gate, which had previously formed the extreme post of the Residency to the eastward, now stood in the centre. Greater accommodation was thus obtained for the augmented number of troops. But this extension of the circuit of defence was not without the serious disadvantage of requiring a large force to guard it. The position which Havelock was appointed to hold consisted of "a line of gardens, courts, and dwelling-houses, without fortified *enceinte*, without flanking defences, and closely connected with the buildings of the city and it was exposed to a close and constant musketry fire from loopholed walls and windows, often within thirty yards, from every lofty building within rifle range, and from a frequent and desultory fire of round shot and grape from guns posted at various distances, from seventy to five hundred yards." All the buildings lying between the Residency and the river were also occupied.

It was the original intention of the government of India and of Sir James Outram to withdraw the garrison and the sick and the wounded forthwith to Cawnpore. With this view the provisions, the baggage, and the bulk of the ammunition of the relieving column had been left at the Alumbagh, and the troops came on with nothing but the clothes on their backs and three days' sustenance. But the obstacles to the retirement of the garrison appeared constantly to multiply. Since the force had crossed the Ganges on the 19th it had been diminished by the loss of 535 killed, wounded, and missing,—more than one-fifth of its entire strength. The number of women and children at the Residency amounted to 700, that of the sick and wounded exceeded 500; without carriage they could not be removed, and every effort to obtain it by negotiation from the city or the country was found to be unavailing. So completely had the garrison become isolated, that all communication with the city had ceased. On the 2nd of

Determina-
tion of Sir
James to give
up the with-
drawal of the
garrison, and
remain in
Lucknow.

October Sir James was constrained to write, that "his hopes of a re-action in the city had been disappointed. The insurgent Sepoys had inspired such terror among all classes, and maintained so strict a watch beyond our pickets, that he had not been able to communicate with a single inhabitant of Lucknow since his arrival." On the other hand, the fears which had been raised regarding the exhaustion of the provisions in the Residency were found to be premature. Havelock had pressed forward in breathless haste, expecting to find the garrison scarcely less in peril from famine than from the weapons and mines of the enemy. But the head of the commissariat had been disabled by severe wounds early in the siege, and the dying injunction of Sir Henry Lawrence, "Take daily average of expenditure after the inventory of all supplies and food has been made," had consequently fallen into abeyance. Hence the pressing calls of Colonel Inglis for early relief were founded on the belief of imminent starvation; but on a more careful examination it was discovered that this alarm was entirely groundless. The grain in store sufficed not only to feed the old garrison, increased by 2000 new comers, for fifty-three days, but it is related that when Sir Colin Campbell withdrew from the Residency, he carried away a remnant of 160,000 lbs. of corn. It was found, moreover, that the additional gun-bullocks which accompanied the reinforcements would furnish a good supply of meat rations. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, Sir James came to the determination, apparently on the sixth day after his arrival, to remain at the Residency and await further reinforcements.

The position of the small detachment left at the Alumbagh created no small anxiety, and it was determined to make an effort to establish a communication with it. Sir James selected the Cawnpore road, which ran through the heart of the city, from the Residency to the Charbagh bridge, for his operations. The troops were obliged to work from house to house with the crowbar and pickaxe, and to contest every inch of the

Attempts to establish a communication with the Alumbagh.

ground. But on the 6th of October it was found that a large mosque, strongly occupied by the enemy, required more extensive operations for its capture than were deemed expedient; and after three days of energetic exertion, which entailed considerable loss of life, it was deemed advisable to abandon the design. The principal houses on the Cawnpore road, from which the garrison had been annoyed by musketry, were blown up, and the troops were gradually withdrawn to the circle, beyond which no subsequent effort was made to dislodge the enemy till the approach of Sir Colin Campbell. The great loss of life in the desultory operations between the 26th of September and the 6th of October, at several points of an extended circuit, and the reduction of the effective force by the numbers required to guard the new and extensive positions, left a remnant inadequate to the task of withdrawing the garrison, and from this time all attempts to break up the blockade were abandoned. The plan entertained from the first hour of entry, and frequently recommended by Havelock, for restoring our communications with the open country, and recovering our ascendancy in the field, will not here be considered undeserving of notice. He was anxious that the whole weight of the available force should be thrown towards the iron bridge to the north-west. Our outposts had been advanced to within 300 yards of it, and the artillery of the Residency completely commanded the passage to it. The strength of the enemy in that direction was insignificant, and the opposition was not likely to be serious. The acquisition of the iron bridge would at once have given us access to the open country to the north of the city, where the cavalry might freely forage and collect supplies; and, with the Badshah-bagh as a base, arrangements might gradually have been matured, even for the withdrawal of the whole garrison. Once in the open field with more than 2000 British bayonets, and 200 cavalry, and an irresistible artillery, the force would have been master of its own movements. The plan might or might not have been feasible, and there doubtless appeared impediments

to its execution, but a record of it could not be omitted in a memorial of the life and military opinions of Havelock.

In writing of their position after the 6th of October, Havelock stated that "they were as closely blockaded as Marshal Lannes's troops would have been if any portion of them had forced their way into Sara-gossa, and been there shut in by the Spaniards." ^{The blockade of the Residency.} During this period, the enemy made no attempts to advance their batteries, and the garrison obtained considerable relief from their attacks. The old post in the Residency, placed under Colonel Inglis, was kept on the alert by the musketry fire of the enemy on exposed points, and a distant cannonade. But their chief attention was directed to the new position which had been intrusted to Havelock, where the close contact of buildings still occupied by them afforded opportunities of constructing mines, and imposed on our officers, the incessant duty of undermining them. "I am aware," says Sir James Outram in his despatch, "of no parallel to our series of mines in modern warfare. Twenty-one shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3921 feet of gallery, have been executed. The enemy advanced twenty mines against the palaces and outposts; of these they exploded three, which caused us loss of life, and two which did us no injury; seven have been blown in; and out of seven others the enemy have been driven, and their galleries taken possession of by our miners; results of which the engineer department"—under the able direction of Colonel Napier and Captain Crommelin—"may well be proud. The reports and plans forwarded by Sir Henry Havelock will explain these operations." At length the powder of the garrison began to run short, and, with the view of economizing it, and, at the same time, of detecting and counteracting the efforts of the enemy, a gallery was constructed around the most exposed portion of Havelock's position, under the shelter of which the engineer officers could watch the progress of the enemy's operations and take measures to frustrate them. In these occupations passed the period of six weeks till the approach of Sir Colin Campbell. Havelock

visited his posts every morning on foot, a circuit of about two miles, and then proceeded to the residence of Sir James to make his report. Placed now in an inferior position by the supreme authority in the State, he endeavoured to do his duty as earnestly and as conscientiously as when the chief command was in his hands. No murmur of repining at the decision of his superiors ever escaped him. That spirit of cheerful subordination, which it had been his study to manifest throughout his military career, was never more strongly exhibited than when his devotion and obedience were so severely tested in this closing passage of his life. The influence of this example on those under him cannot be more eloquently described than in the letter of one of the officers, Lieut. Moorsom, who had daily opportunities of observing it: "Lucknow ought not to lessen your opinion of us, 'so noble, so enduring, so devoted, and so brave,' for all these were more fully exhibited there, and without a gloomy face or a grumble too, even when affairs looked gloomiest, and the poor fellows were smoking the bark and leaves of trees, drinking only water, and giving six shillings for two pounds of flour. In fact, they starved on three-quarter rations of meat and flour alone; worked like men working for their own and others' lives; were not a night off duty; perished with cold in their scanty summer clothing; and did all, and suffered all, with a cheerful face, inspirited by the General whom that two months killed." The comparative leisure which the General now enjoyed he devoted to reading, and more especially to Macaulay's History of England, which he borrowed from Mr Gubbins's library, and studied with intense pleasure.

The opportunities of communicating with our own provinces during the blockade were scanty, and Havelock's correspondence with his family was necessarily irregular. On the 10th of November he despatched a letter to Mrs Havelock, which did not, however, reach her till after the intelligence of his death.

Letter to Mrs
Havelock,
10th Novem-
ber.

"You will wonder at not receiving a letter by the last two

mails. It will be best to begin at the beginning of the story. Sir James Outram brought up my reinforcements on the 14th and 15th of September. I threw a noble bridge of boats across the Ganges, and reached the farther bank with 2500 men. Sir James announced that I should have the honour of relieving Lucknow, and that he would accompany my force only as Civil Commissioner and as a volunteer. I beat the enemy on the 21st at Mungulwar, and again at Alumbagh on the 23rd. . . . We penetrated through a long suburb, and passed, under the cover of buildings, a fire from the Kaiser-bagh, or king's palace, under which nothing could have lived. About this time an orderly brought up intelligence that Harry was severely wounded. Night was coming on, and Sir James wished to put the troops into a palace, and rest them; but I strongly represented the necessity of reinforcing the garrison, lest it should be attacked and surprised in the darkness. So the 78th Highlanders and the Sikh regiment of Ferozepore were called to the front. Sir James and I and two of the staff put ourselves at their head, and on we charged through streets of loopholed houses, fired at perpetually, and over trenches cut in the road, until we reached in triumph the beleaguered Residency. Then came three cheers from the troops, and the famished garrison found mock turtle soup and champagne to regale me with as their deliverer. But the rest of my force and the guns could not be brought in until the evening of the 26th, and by that time I had lost 535 killed, wounded, and missing. Since that night we have been more closely blockaded than in Jellalabad. We eat a reduced ration of artillery bullock-beef, chupatties, and rice, but tea, coffee, sugar, soap, and candles are unknown luxuries. . . . The noble conduct of Mr Gubbins I must next record. My head-quarters were established in the house of the late Mr Ommaney, who was killed during the siege. Gubbins sent to invite me and all my staff to come and live in his better house. To this I would not consent, but recommended to his care my two wounded officers, Colonel Tytler and Harry, and he has cared for them as if they were his children. I dine with him once a week, and he keeps me supplied with excellent sherry, without which it would have gone ill with me, for I find it not so easy to starve at sixty-three as at forty-seven. The enemy fire at us perpetually with guns, mortars, and musketry, but our casualties are not very numerous. I should have told you that Bensley Thornhill volunteered to go out and bring Harry in. Alas! he received one bad wound over

the eye, which injured the skull, while another ball broke in pieces his right arm. It was amputated. He lingered many days, and then died in the hospital, leaving Mary a young widow. Their only infant had died some time before. We are now daily expecting Sir Colin Campbell. . . . I visit the whole of my posts in the palaces and gardens with my staff on foot daily; but my doctor has advised me to take something strengthening until we can get upon good diet again."

At length, after many weeks of anxious expectation, the long-enduring garrison were gladdened by the approach of the Commander-in-Chief. He arrived in the neighbourhood of the Alumbagh, with a thoroughly-equipped force of 5000 men, on the 10th of November. Mr Cavanagh, an officer in the civil service of Government, volunteered to proceed from the Residency to his camp, with plans of the city and suggestions from Sir James Outram regarding the route which he should adopt in entering it. The number of the enemy's posts and pickets which Mr Cavanagh was required to pass rendered the enterprise one of very great hazard, but, having disguised himself as a native, he succeeded, after a series of perilous and romantic adventures, in reaching the Alumbagh, and it was with no small delight that the garrison beheld the signal hoisted at the palace which announced his arrival there. A semaphoric communication was soon after established between the Alumbagh and the Residency, under the direction of Lieut. Moorsom, and Sir Colin was enabled on the 12th to announce his intention to advance to the Residency by the Dil-koosha, at seven in the morning of the 14th.

Sir James Outram had determined, on hearing of the approach of the Commander-in-Chief, to co-operate with his force, by taking possession of the Hureen khana, or Deer house, and the steam-engine house, then occupied by the insurgents, which intervened between our extreme post and the Motee muhal. With this view Havelock was directed to establish a battery in his most advanced position, in a garden which was screened from the observation of the enemy

Advance of Sir
Colin Camp-
bell's force.

Preparations
to co-operate
with Sir
Colin.

on two sides by a high wall. A mine had been constructed under it, which it was intended to explode when the time arrived for unmasking the position. Sir Colin commenced his march towards the Residency on the 14th, and in the course of the day took possession of the Dilkoosha, and the Martiniere, which adjoined it, but not without a severe struggle. On the 15th he remained stationary, but was again in progress on the 16th, and encountered the most determined resistance from the insurgents, who were resolved to dispute every inch of the ground. On approaching the Secunder-bagh, it was discovered to be filled with rebel Sepoys, who, finding themselves hemmed in, fought with greater desperation than they had hitherto displayed, but were at length overpowered. The small enclosure was choked up with two thousand bodies; and thus were the atrocious massacres at Cawnpore considered to be avenged. After the capture of the Secunder-bagh, Sir Colin advanced to the Shah-nujeef, which was also strongly fortified and obstinately defended. That edifice was within a few hundred yards of the garden in which Havelock's supporting battery had been established. Orders were immediately given to explode the mines, but the effect was only partial. They had been charged on the 13th, in the expectation that Sir Colin would arrive at the Residency on the following day. During the three intervening days in which the bags remained under-ground, the powder became damp, and only two breaches were made by the explosion, which left a long strip of the wall still standing. It was necessary to bring the guns to bear on it, but, owing to their proximity, the balls passed through without shaking it, and it was not till after a long cannonade with reduced charges, that it crumbled away and left a clear field for the operation of the artillery, which now began to batter the Hureen khana and the steam-engine house. At the same time, a mine which had been run under the former exploded with effect. Columns had been formed to assault these buildings, after the heavy guns had rendered the breaches practicable. At half-

past three the bugle sounded the advance, and was answered by a loud cheer from the men, who were burning for action, after many weeks of confinement. A heavy fire of musketry was now opened from the Kaiser-bagh, on the right, but the troops rushed forward and cleared the steam-engine house of the enemy. The Deer house and the adjacent buildings were next assaulted, and were speedily in our possession. Night was now coming on, and the detachments were left to occupy the buildings, after Havelock had made suitable arrangements to protect them from any nocturnal attempt of the enemy. Sir Colin's force bivouacked for the night in the neighbourhood of the mess-house; and this building and the Motee muhal alone now intervened between the two forces.

On his return to the Residency Havelock wrote the following despatch, detailing the operations of the day. It is interesting as being the last he ever penned.

“Lucknow, November 16th, 1857.

“Sir,—I beg to report, for the information of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., the complete success of the operations in which the troops of my division were employed Havelock's despatch on his operations. under his own eye this evening, in capturing a succession of houses in advance of the palace of Fureed Buksh.

“I have given in the margin the details of the detachments employed.

“The nature of the enterprise may be shortly described as follows:—

“The progress of the relieving force under his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was anxiously watched, and it was determined that as soon as he should reach the Secunder-bagh, about three miles from the Residency, the outer wall of the advanced garden of the palace, in which the enemy had before made several breaches, should be blown in by mines previously prepared; that two powerful batteries erected in the enclosure should then open on the insurgents' defences in front; and, after the desired effect had been produced, that the troops should storm two buildings known by the name of the Hureen khana, or Deer house, and the steam-engine house. Under these also mines had been driven.

“It was ascertained about 11 A.M., that Sir Colin Campbell

was operating against the Secunder-bagh. The explosion of the mines in the garden was therefore ordered. Their action was, however, comparatively feeble, so the batteries had the double task of completing the demolition of the wall, and prostrating and breaching the works and buildings beyond it. Brigadier Eyre commanded in the left battery, Captain Olpherts in the right. Captain Maude shelled them from six mortars in a more retired quadrangle of the palace. The troops were formed in the square of the Chuttur munitz, and brought up in succession through the approaches. At a quarter-past three two of the mines at the Hureen khana exploded with good effect. At half-past three the advance sounded. It is impossible to describe the enthusiasm with which this signal was received by the troops. Pent up in inaction for upwards of six weeks, and subjected to constant attacks, they felt that the hour of retribution and glorious exertion had returned.

“Their cheers echoed through the courts of the palace, responsive to the bugle sound, and on they rushed to assured victory. The enemy could nowhere withstand them. In a few minutes the whole of the buildings were in our possession, and have since been armed with cannon, and steadily held against all attacks. It will be seen by the enclosed return, that the loss has been small.

“I received throughout the operations the most effective aid from my staff: Lieut. Hudson, Acting Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieut. Moorsom, 52nd Light Infantry, Acting Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General; Lieut. Hargood, 1st Madras Fusiliers, my aid-de-camp; and Lieut. C. W. Havelock, 12th Irregular Cavalry, my Orderly Officer.

“The officers of artillery, Brigadier Eyre, and Captains Olpherts and Maude, have earned my best thanks.

“I must commend all the officers in charge of detachments; but most prominently Colonel Purnell, 90th Light Infantry, whose conduct throughout the affair evinced the most distinguished gallantry, united to imperturbable coolness and the soundest judgment; as well as Lieuts. Russell, Hutchinson, and Limond, of the Engineers, and Captain Oakes (attached), who showed the way to the several points of attack.

“I have the honour to be,

“Sir,

“Your most obedient Servant,

“H. HAVELOCK,

“Major-General, Commanding Oude Field Force.”

The Commander-in-Chief's force was in motion on the morning of the 17th. The mess-house had been occupied Operations of the 17th November. on the previous day by the enemy's matchlock men, who were constrained by the shells thrown by Sir Colin's guns to abandon it. But it was believed to have been reoccupied by the insurgents during the night, and a heavy cannonade was accordingly opened upon it on the 17th from Sir Colin's batteries, and from the Residency, as well as from Captain Peel's 24-pounders. The balls and the shells fell on the devoted house with little intermission for six hours. At length the advance of Sir Colin's troops approached it, and leaping over the surrounding wall, rushed in at the door, and planted the British ensign on the roof. A heavy fire was still kept up by the enemy from the Tara-kotee, or observatory, in the vicinity of the mess-house, but they were speedily expelled from it. It only remained to clear the Motee muhal, which was found to be occupied by not more than a hundred of the rebels, who were soon overpowered, and obliged to make for the river, which some of them succeeded in crossing, but several were shot down by our riflemen as they endeavoured to wade through the stream. The enemy, however, continued to maintain a heavy fire from the Kaiser-bagh, at the distance of about 450 yards, which intervened between the Motee muhal and the Residency. Lieut. Moorsom, one of the ablest and most enterprising of the men whose military talents were developed by the mutiny, but whose bright career was soon after cut short by death, was the first to open a communication between the Residency and the relieving force. He crept cautiously along the road, which was commanded by the guns of the Kaiser-bagh, and, after having reached Sir Colin's post, returned with two officers.

Immediately after, the two Generals, with their respective staff, went forth on foot to greet the Commander-in-Chief, and passing unhurt through the first fire from the Kaiser-bagh, reached the Motee muhal Meeting of the Generals. in safety. There Havelock found some of the soldiers of his old regiment, the 53rd Foot, who, immediately on

seeing him, raised an enthusiastic cheer, and he addressed them "in that concise and soul-stirring language for which he was so well known to the soldiers." In passing on through the passages and courts of the Motee muhal, Havelock had the most narrow escape of his life from the enemy. A shell fell near him, and bounding against a wall, burst at his feet. He was prostrated by the concussion, but happily sustained no other injury. The party now rushed on one by one from the Motee muhal to the Commander-in-Chief's post in the mess-house, across an open road of about twenty yards, which was completely swept by the fire of the Kaiser-bagh. The Generals passed over unhurt, but Colonel Napier and Lieut. Sitwell were both wounded. The meeting between Sir Colin Campbell and Sir James Outram and Havelock was most cordial; but while Havelock was congratulating Sir Colin on his success, his aid-de-camp, Lieut. Hargood, who had followed him, came up and informed him that his son had just been struck down as he was crossing the dangerous passage. Though his father's heart must have been beating with anxiety to know the nature of the wound, he continued to converse with Sir Colin with singular self-command as though nothing had happened. The gallant and attached Hargood,* eager to relieve the distress which

* It would be unjust to pass over the reciprocal attachment which grew up between the General and his aid-de-camp, William Hargood. He was a lieutenant in the Madras Fusiliers, formed by nature for a brilliant career, which was unhappily cut short by death, after long privations and exposure. This officer's many noble qualities, his ardent courage, his constant readiness with pen or in the saddle, his untiring zeal, combined with his unselfish and amiable disposition, had gained the General's admiration and esteem. To such a height did this reciprocal regard grow, that the young aid-de-camp seemed to have no object in life so dear to him as the approbation of his chief, whose wishes he always endeavoured to anticipate, and whose words he hung on with the affectionate solicitude of a son. When Lieut. Havelock, as stated above, was struck down between the Motee muhal and the mess-house, at the meeting of the Generals, young Hargood, without the knowledge of the General, twice risked his life, by crossing and recrossing the stream of fire that poured from the Kaiser-bagh on that passage, to relieve the father's anxiety, by bringing him tidings of the nature of his son's wound. To others unbending, and sometimes stern, to him the General was always unreserved, the pledge of a confidence, which, if seldom given, knew no limit when it was found to be worthily bestowed.

he knew the father must feel, dashed across the exposed road to ascertain the nature of the wound, and recrossed it to give him the welcome intelligence that it was not dangerous.

The final relief of the beleaguered garrison was now accomplished. The casualties in Sir Colin's force during these operations were equal in number to the loss which Havelock had sustained in the two actions at Mungulwar and the Alumbagh, and in fighting his way to the Residency; but there was no power in the insurgent province and in the capital of Oude able to cope with the 6000 British bayonets and the powerful artillery now assembled in Lucknow. The Kaiserbagh was still held by the enemy, but it was cannonaded for three days by Peel's battery from the position of the Commander-in-Chief, and by Eyre's battery on the side of the Residency. Three effectual breaches were made, and it was the opinion of some of the officers of the garrison that it might at this time have been carried with ease. Lucknow would then have been at our feet. It is known that a Sikh spy brought intelligence to the Residency that the enemy had packed up whatever they deemed valuable, and were prepared to evacuate it on the first assault. This fact, however, was not generally known, or was not credited. Sir James Outram and Havelock were anxious that an attack should be made on the palace, which they felt would be successful, and that we should then continue to hold the town, for which they considered that two battalions of 600 men would be sufficient. They both waited on Sir Colin to represent their views, but he was of opinion that "four strong brigades would be required, unless it was wished that the garrison should be again besieged." He considered that "a strong movable division outside the town, with field and heavy artillery, in a good military position, was the real manner of holding the city of Lucknow in check." In addition to these general reasons, he was swayed more particularly by "the fact, that his force was deficient in infantry, and was in want of sufficient field and musket ammunition for prolonged operations."

Sir Colin
Campbell de-
termines to
retire.

He had started with three hundred rounds for his heavy guns, and he had now only eighty rounds left. This objection he considered unanswerable. Another and perhaps the strongest reason for his immediate retirement, was furnished by the perilous position of the garrison left at Cawnpore, which was now menaced by the whole of the Gwalior Contingent. This difference of opinion between Sir James Outram and Sir Colin was referred by telegraph to the Governor-General. Lord Canning immediately replied, that "the one step to be avoided was the total withdrawal of the British force from Oude, and that Sir Colin's proposal to leave a strong movable division, with heavy artillery, outside the city, and so to hold the city in check, would answer every purpose of policy."

Preparations were, consequently, made for the immediate removal of the women and children, the sick and the wounded, from the Residency, in which they had <sup>Withdrawal
of the garrison.</sup> been besieged for four months. This movement was not unattended with risk, as the convoy would be required to cross the line commanded by the guns of the Kaiser-bagh, while at the same time it would be exposed to a sharp fire from the enemy's batteries across the river. But by a masterly arrangement, which reflects the highest credit on Sir Colin's strategy, the whole body was conveyed in safety through these dangers to Sir Colin's encampment, where they received the most cordial welcome from the gallant old chief and his staff.

The determination of the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw his main body from Lucknow—leaving Sir James Outram with a powerful force at the Alumbagh—proved to be most opportune. On his arrival at Bunnee, on the evening of the 27th, the distant sound of heavy guns was heard in the direction of Cawnpore. Sir Colin hastened forward, and arrived there just in time to succour the force of General Windham, which had experienced the most disastrous reverses, and to save from destruction the bridge of boats, which was the sole means of communication.

On the termination of the blockade, and the evacuation

of the Residency, Mr Gubbins thus recorded in his journal his opinion of the important benefit which had been derived from Havelock's spirited and successful exertions to relieve the Residency, and which he was in a position the most favourable for appreciating: "We learned this morning, to our great satisfaction, that General Havelock had been informed by the Commander-in-Chief that the honour of Knight Commander had been conferred on him. He is now, therefore, Sir Henry. Never was this distinction more nobly earned. It is impossible to over-estimate the value of the services rendered by that gallant officer, and the army of heroes which he commanded, at that most critical period of the mutinies, the months of July and August. In braving the inclemency of the season, they, as well as the army of Delhi, achieved what it was till then believed that no Englishmen or other Europeans could do; and in putting to flight, with their small numbers, the masses of troops opposed to them, supported by so powerful an artillery, they taught all British soldiers to despise the foe; and thereafter, whatever the disparity of numbers, they always advanced to assured victory. A corresponding terror was struck into the ranks of the mutineers. As for our garrison, we owe our safety, under Providence, I feel assured, to the exploits performed by Havelock's army, for it was the knowledge of what they had effected, viz. the repeated defeats of the Nana and the occupation of Cawnpore, that kept up the hearts of our native troops, and prevented their deserting us. Long, therefore, will the recollection of the name of Havelock, and of the 78th Highlanders, the 1st Madras Fusiliers, and the 84th and 64th regiments, be cherished by all who formed part of the garrison of Lucknow. Little did we then think how soon our congratulations on this well-earned honour would be turned into mourning for the General's untimely death."

Havelock was apparently in good health when, on the 19th of November, he wrote to Mrs Havelock: "Sir Colin Campbell has come up with some 5000, and much

altered the state of affairs. The papers of the 26th September came with him, announcing my elevation to the Commandership of the Bath for my first three battles; I have fought nine since. . . . Dear Harry has been a second time wounded in the same left arm. He is in good spirits and doing well. Love to the children. . . . I do not, after all, see my elevation in the *Gazette*, but Sir Colin addresses me as Sir Henry Havelock. Our baggage is at the Alumbagh, four miles off, and we all came into this place with a single suit, which hardly any have put off for forty days." On the same day he wrote to the same effect, and nearly in the same language, to his present biographer. The letter was the mournful close of a correspondence of thirty years, in which there had never been a discordant note. He added: "We are getting out our women, children, ladies, and Martiniere boys, which will be a great load off our minds. Our treasure and crown jewels also go out to-day. The vicinity of the Gwalior force and other circumstances will prevent our keeping troops at Lucknow for the present, I fear; but reinforcements are approaching, which may alter the state of affairs."

Havelock's
letters to his
family, 19th
November.

The close of Havelock's career was now approaching. When he left Calcutta on the 23rd of June to assume the command of the expedition, those who saw his emaciated figure confidently predicted that he would be unable to stand the fatigue and exposure of the campaign for a single week. Yet, for ten weeks, he was the hardiest man in the force; and though his physical powers were taxed to the verge of human endurance, he was never incapacitated for duty a single hour. But when in Persia he said that he dreaded the recoil on his constitution when rest should succeed to labour; and his anticipation was fatally verified at Lucknow. During the blockade of the Residency he appeared gradually to lose his former vigour. The privations to which he was subjected, and the hard fare on which he was constrained to subsist, weakened his frame, and rendered it incapable of resisting the shock of any attack of disease. On the even-

Havelock's
illness.

ing of the 19th the wounded were removed to the Dil-koosha, and Lieut. Havelock, on leaving the Residency with the convoy, stopped his litter to take leave of his father, and found him seated alone in his chamber, reading Macaulay's History by lamp-light. On the morning of the 20th symptoms of diarrhœa made their appearance, but yielded to medicine. On the 21st, soon after dawn, his aid-de-camp, Lieut. Hargood, rode down to the camp for some arrow-root and sago, luxuries long unknown at the Residency. During the day, Havelock's complaint assumed a more serious aspect, and he was removed after nightfall in a doolie to the Dil-koosha, where a soldier's tent was pitched for him. He suffered severely from the jolting of the journey, though the change of air appeared at first to produce a beneficial result. On the 22nd, some of the enemy made an attack on the Dil-koosha; the bullets fell around his tent, and he was removed in his doolie to a more sheltered position. During the day he received the letters from his family, which had been detained at Cawnpore during the blockade, and his conversation was enlivened by allusions to the objects of his affection. He did not appear to be in any imminent danger, but he calmly assured those around him that it was the conviction of his own mind that he should not recover.

Early on the 23rd Mr Gubbins went to Havelock's tent, to inquire what benefit he had derived from his removal to the Dil-koosha. "I was directed," he says, "to a common soldier's tent, which was pitched near the one in which we had found shelter. Entering it, I found the General's aid-de-camp, Lieut. Hargood, and his medical attendant, Dr Collinson, lying down. They whispered to me in mournful accents the grievous news that Sir Henry's case was worse, and pointed to where he lay. It was in a doolie, which had been brought inside the tent, and served as a bed. The curtain on my side was down. I approached, and found young Havelock seated on the further side, upon the ground by his dying father. His wounded arm still hung in a sling, but with his other he

supplied all his father's wants. They told me that the General would allow no one to render him any attendance but his son. I saw that to speak was impossible, and sorrowfully withdrew." On this day Dr Collinson, his medical attendant, held a consultation with Dr Fayrer. Havelock was evidently worse, and he himself declared his case hopeless. His mind was calm and serene, supported by the strength of that Christian hope which had sustained him through life. Relying firmly and exclusively on the merits of the Redeemer, in whom he had trusted with unwavering confidence, he was enabled to look forward to the hour of dissolution with cheerfulness. Throughout the day he repeatedly exclaimed, "I die happy and contented." At one time he called his son to him, and said, "See how a Christian can die." In the afternoon, Sir James Outram came to visit his dying comrade, when he said, "I have for forty years so ruled my life, that when death came I might face it without fear." He enjoyed little sleep during the night of the 23rd. The next morning he appeared to revive, but at eight there was a sudden and fatal change; and at half-past nine, on the 24th of November, he calmly resigned his spirit into the hands of his Redeemer, in the blessed hope of immortality. Immediately after his death, the troops began their march to the Alumbagh, and conveyed with them, in the litter on which he had expired, the mortal remains of the noble chief who had so often led them on to victory. "On the low plain by the Alumbagh," says a writer in Blackwood, evidently on the information of one who was present, "they made his humble grave; and Campbell, and Outram, and Inglis, and many a stout soldier who had followed him in all his headlong march, and through the long fatal street, were gathered there to perform the last rites to one of England's noblest dead. As long as the memory of great deeds, and high courage, and spotless self-devotion is cherished amongst his countrymen, so long will Havelock's lonely tomb in the grave beneath the scorching Eastern sky, hard by the

Havelock's
death.

vast city, the scene alike of his toil, his triumph, and his death, be regarded as one of the most holy of the many spots where her patriot soldiers lie."

Havelock died at the advanced age of sixty-three, but in the noontide of his glory, before "envy had time to dim his laurels, or malice to tarnish his renown." His sun set amidst a constellation of victories, rendered more bright by the gloom which surrounded them. He affords the rare instance of a man, conscious of his own powers, and eager for an opportunity of exerting them, constantly beaten back by adverse influences, and, at the eleventh hour, when hope was well-nigh extinct, and he was looking forward only to the retirement of "a Tyrolese cottage, or a box on the Rhine," suddenly raised to supreme command, and reaching at once the summit of professional eminence. Even then, the adversity of circumstances with which he had been struggling through life, seemed to pursue him, and he returned from his ninth triumph only to hear that the direction of the enterprise he had so nobly conducted was taken from him. In other instances in India, with rare exceptions, the credit of successful operations, which is officially ascribed to the general-in-chief, has been assigned by those behind the scenes to the talents or the suggestions of subordinates. But it was the rare distinction of Havelock's career that the merit of his successes was never attributed to aught but his own individual genius, seconded most ably by the talents of his staff, and the valour of his troops. Throughout his brilliant career, from Allahabad to Lucknow, it was his mind that planned every movement, provided for every exigency, and improved every advantage.

Forced by circumstances to embrace the profession of arms, an honourable ambition led him to aspire to the highest distinction in it. By dint of severe application he obtained a complete mastery of the art of war. Nature had pre-eminently endowed him, among other military gifts, with a talent for strategy. In youth he delighted to marshal his mimic battalions, and fight the battles of Napoleon over again. This gift was

His military character.

improved by study. So familiar was he with the evolutions of great commanders, that whatever combination was required during the events of the day, he could at once call to mind, for his own guidance, the course they had pursued under similar circumstances. Hence he was never staggered by any difficulty, however unexpected, and was prepared for every emergency. He possessed what was considered by Napoleon—whose maxims were his favourite manual—the first qualification of a general, “a clear head.” His perception was quick, and he possessed the peculiar quality of judging soundly while he thought rapidly. Amidst the din and confusion of battle, he was, if possible, more cool, collected, and imperturbable than in ordinary circumstances, and though often taciturn in society, was remarked to be chatty and cheerful under fire. The most prominent feature in his military character was his self-reliance. He courteously accepted the advice and suggestions of others, though his inferiors, but he never doubted for a moment the soundness of his own decision, and he was thus enabled always to act with vigour and promptitude.

He was, in Carlyle's phrase, an “earnest man,” and he possessed, in a singular degree, the power of communicating his own earnestness to others. His enthusiasm infected all those under him, and there was no danger his men would not encounter when animated by the clear tones of his voice or the glance of his eagle eye. Every man felt that he was acting under the eye of a master spirit, whose approbation, from being rarely, and never undeservedly, bestowed, was the most valuable reward he could desire. The unbounded confidence which his soldiers felt in him inspired them with confidence in themselves. Even at the most difficult crisis he exhibited an example of serenity and calmness which buoyed up and inspirited others. Though by nature of a fiery temper, he had acquired, under the influence of religious principle and by conscientious habit, a spirit of self-control which nothing could disturb. His personal endurance of hardships was unflinching; and nothing served more to attach

the men to him, in spite of his stern and uncompromising character, than the constant evidence that the self-denial he exacted of others he invariably practised himself. Always a strict, and sometimes a stern, disciplinarian, by some he was deemed to err in being too severe in his exactions from those under his command. Yet, if he did not spare them when duty required the sacrifice, neither did he spare himself; and no general ever took greater precautions to husband the strength of his soldiers, or to prevent a needless waste of life, or more diligently strove to alleviate their sufferings and improve their condition. As an instance of his rigid adherence to the rules of military discipline, it may be stated, that although his son, Lieut. Havelock, as Sir James Outram remarked, had afforded valuable assistance to the General in the operations of the 16th and 17th, and was severely wounded on the latter day, his father never mentioned him in his despatch with the rest of his staff, and would not permit his name to be entered in the list of casualties, because he was not then officially released from the surgeon's list. Havelock never displayed any impatience of authority. The implicit obedience he exacted from those under him he unhesitatingly accorded to his own superiors.

In every military disposition he always calculated the possibility of failure, and endeavoured to provide against it. He thus incurred on some occasions the charge of over-caution when anticipated difficulties did not arise. Yet few men have ever so thoroughly combined the utmost daring with the utmost prudence. It was the rapidity and the dash of his movements from Allahabad, when he followed up the enemy without allowing them breathing time, and beat them in nine fields in five weeks, that gave the first check to the mutiny, and turned the tide of events in our favour. It was remarked of him by one of the most distinguished of his subordinates, General Neill, that "nothing could be more admirable or more instructive than the way in which he handled his troops." The little army under his command, notwithstanding its defective organization, resembled a machine over which

he had the most complete mastery, and which he worked with perfect ease. He did not, like his brother William, love danger for its own sake, but he manifested the greatest contempt for it when it was to be incurred in the execution of duty. His personal intrepidity in action was so prominent, that it was often said of him that there was little merit in his courage, because he did not know what the quality of fear was. Yet, those who knew him intimately affirmed that the reverse was the case, and that this intrepid bearing was only another proof how completely a paramount sense of duty could overcome all constitutional tendencies.

Regarding the higher and more important quality of moral courage, however, there could be no diversity of opinion. There was more moral courage in assembling his men to read the Bible and to ^{His moral} sing psalms, amidst the jeers of his brother officers, than ^{courage.} in leading them to storm a battery, amidst the bullets of the enemy. It demanded more moral courage to relinquish the advance on Lucknow than it required personal courage to encounter the greatest dangers in prosecuting it. In both cases he was actuated by a predominant sense of duty. His moral courage was proof against all censoriousness. When he felt himself in the path of right, everything else was a matter of indifference to him. He invariably maintained that if it were right to do a thing, it was right to face all its consequences. This sense of duty was the pole-star of his course through life. He had brought himself so habitually to act under the influence of this high principle, that his private feelings, tastes, and inclinations, and his personal comfort and convenience, became entirely subordinate to it. He was not insensible to military distinction; he valued more than most men the honours earned by military virtue and success, but even the brightest prospects of the soldier were light when weighed in the balance of duty. This imparted to his character that elevation which gave him so great an ascendancy over others. It was the conviction that he was a "man of principle" not less

than his high professional qualifications, which gained for him the confidence of others, whether above or below him.

Havelock's religion underlay his whole character. For thirty-five years of his life religion was the great principle which pervaded his mind and regulated all his conduct. It was this which enabled him to overcome the innate defect of his character, and to become eminent for qualities which nature had denied him. In all circumstances, in prosperity as well as in adversity, he was the bold and unflinching champion of Christian truth, though he never obtruded his religious views on others. The strength of his Christian character, aided by his high mental endowments and his great consistency of conduct, insured him the respect and esteem of those who slighted his religious feelings. His invariable dependence on Divine aid enabled him to exhibit the greatest serenity and vigour in the midst of difficulties. It was his constant aim to adorn his religious profession, and to demonstrate that spiritual-mindedness was not incompatible with the energetic pursuit of a secular calling—that “a saint could be a soldier.” More than any other chief did he appear to combine the great military talents of the generals of the Commonwealth with the fervour—though not the fanaticism—of their religious feelings; and it is, perhaps, owing in a great measure to this identity of character, that the name of Havelock is so warmly cherished by his fellow-countrymen.

Havelock was a man of thought as well as action. His literary tastes were as strong as his military. He was well read in English literature, and more particularly in history. His English style was pure and classical, and his despatches were models of military composition. To his knowledge of the ancient classics, which he continued to cultivate through life, he added a fair acquaintance with French and Italian, acquired by study, and improved during his continental tour. He possessed a most retentive memory, great powers of reasoning, a ready wit, and a natural aptitude for criticism.

His literary tastes and his personal appearance.

His taste in youth was for poetry and the drama; as he advanced in years his partiality for literature was in a great measure confined to military history, which had the same charm for him in the last days of his life as it had in his boyhood. All his habits were, regular and active. From the period of entering the army he was habitually an early riser, and he acquired to a remarkable degree the power of waking at a predetermined moment, and of taking sleep at any time by snatches. He was not only temperate but abstemious, perhaps beyond the bounds of prudence. His figure was slender, but well knit, erect, and graceful. His height five feet six inches. His countenance was an index of his mind. His features were regular, the forehead high and broad, the nose aquiline, the chin well developed, and the eyes of piercing intensity. His voice was clear and powerful, and audible to a great distance,—no small qualification in a general. Of his domestic virtues, as a devoted husband, an affectionate father, and a constant friend, no better evidence will be required than that which is afforded by the letters quoted in this volume.

The report of Havelock's early victories produced a burst of enthusiastic feeling through England. A bright ray of hope relieved the gloom of the mutiny. Even the dreadful intelligence of the Cawnpore tragedy was in some small degree alleviated by the report brought by the same mail, that the miscreant Nana Sahib had been routed, and Cawnpore recaptured by Havelock. His name at once flew through the land, and became familiar to every circle. "Nothing," said one of the most popular journalists, "surpasses, and few things can equal, his eight days' incessant march to Cawnpore, his winning four victories in twice as many days, his terrific strides across a swampy region, blistered by the heats of the Indian midsummer, his succession of rapid and overpowering blows." As each successive mail brought news of fresh victories, his fifth, his seventh, his ninth, he became the idol of the nation. The public eagerly inquired into his past his-

Effect in England of the news of Havelock's victories.

tory, and found that he was a man of great military endowments, who had been distinguished in many fights, but had till this time been repressed by the cold shade of adverse influences. Even his Methodism was deemed to brighten his renown. "We implicitly believe," said an influential journalist, "that none fear men less than those who fear God most. No soldiers ever show themselves more invincible than those who can pray as well as fight, nor have any swords proved more resistless than those wielded by the right hands that know their way through dog's-eared Bibles. This is evidently a Christian warrior of the right breed—a man of cool head and resolute heart, who has learned that the religion of war is to strike home and hard, with a single eye to God and his country." His exploits became the theme of admiration in every journal throughout the country. Meetings were at this period held in the principal towns in England, to organize auxiliary committees for the Indian Relief Fund, and on every occasion the name of Havelock was brought forward to stimulate exertion, and never was it mentioned without eliciting rapturous applause. Men of all ranks and classes, the statesman, the noble, the minister of religion, and above all, the middle class, who claimed him as their own, vied with each other in doing honour to the man who had so nobly maintained the honour of his country; and in a few weeks the "neglected lieutenant" rose by national suffrage to the pinnacle of renown. The military authorities, on the first report of his successes, bestowed on him a good service pension of £100 a year; but the nation murmured at the inadequate remuneration of services which it was declared at public meetings would in France have been honoured with a marshal's *bâton*. Honours now poured thickly on him. On the 26th of September he received the distinction of Knight Commander of the Bath. On the 29th of that month he was raised to the rank of Major-General. On the 26th of November, two days after his death, which was at the time unknown in England, the dignity of a baronet was conferred on him; and on the meeting of

parliament her Majesty sent the following gracious message to the House of Commons: "Her Majesty, being desirous of conferring a signal mark of her favour and approbation on Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, Bart., K.C.B., for the eminent and distinguished services rendered by him in command of a body of British and native troops in India, and particularly in the gallant and successful operations undertaken for the relief of the garrison at Lucknow, recommends to the House of Commons to enable her Majesty to make provision for securing to Sir Henry Havelock a pension of £1000 per annum for the term of his natural life." A similar message was sent also to the House of Lords, and the annuity was cheerfully and unanimously voted. But before the news of these honours—the first excepted—could reach India, Havelock had passed beyond the reach of human applause. He lived long enough to hear of his elevation to the honours of the Bath; and, after forty-two years of unacknowledged service, the heart of the veteran seemed to experience a glow of delight at the announcement of this unexpected dignity, but the honours conferred by his sovereign, and the applause of his countrymen, only served to render his loss more deplorable.

On the 7th of January, while the nation was eagerly expecting some fresh achievement from the great hero whom God had raised up at a great crisis, the telegram from India announced that "General The national lamentation for his loss. Havelock died on the 24th November from dysentery, brought on by exposure and anxiety." The national hopes were at once quenched in death, and one common feeling of grief pervaded the whole land, from the royal palace to the humble cottage. There has been no example of so universal a mourning since the death of Nelson. It was felt in every bosom that England had sustained the heaviest loss by the removal of one of her noblest sons. Every journal hastened to pay homage to his memory. In hundreds of discourses from the pulpit, on the succeeding sabbaths, ministers of every denomination made this national bereavement the subject of mournful com-

ment. The most eminent statesmen of the day, without distinction of party, united in paying the tribute of their respect to the memory of the General. It was the tears of a nation which bedewed his grave.

In his native town of Sunderland the news of his death created a feeling of intense regret. The minute-bell of the parish church was tolled throughout the day, and the union-jack was hoisted half-mast high on the tower. Her Majesty was graciously pleased to confer on Lady Havelock the rank of a baronet's widow, and to bestow the baronetcy, which the father did not live to receive, on his eldest son. On the assembly of parliament the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Gladstone, proposed that an annuity of £1000 a year should be granted to Lady Havelock, and an annuity of equal amount to the present Sir Henry. The vote was unanimously and cordially agreed to in both Houses. The Common Council of London, on the motion of Alderman Hale, directed that a bust of the General should be placed in the Guildhall. On the 19th of March a large meeting of noblemen and gentlemen was held at Drury Lane, to raise a Havelock Memorial Fund, of which his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge consented to become president. Subscriptions flowed in rapidly; and it was resolved to erect a statue of Havelock, on the site most cheerfully granted by Government in Trafalgar Square, side by side with that of our greatest naval hero.

This memorial of the career of Henry Havelock would justly be deemed incomplete without some record of the estimation in which his merits were held, after death had closed his labours, by the most eminent public writers of the day. To quote the eulogies which were pronounced on him in the various journals of England would, however, swell this work to a second volume. A few selections have, therefore, been made from the publications which represent the different shades of political opinion in the country, from which it will be apparent, that however

diverse their views on public questions, in the homage paid to the deceased General there was a feeling of perfect unanimity.

The following is an extract from an article in *The Times* :—

“The case of General Havelock was, indeed, in many respects, a remarkable one. He was a soldier from his youth upwards ; every thought of his clear mind, every emotion of his energetic will, for forty years had been devoted to the discharge of the duties of his profession. He had not attained to high rank or high command, for he had no family influence nor political interest at his back. It seemed pretty certain that he had reached the limits of any advancement possible under the circumstances of his peculiar case. In the early part of last year, Colonel Havelock was already far advanced in life, and India was to all appearance profoundly tranquil. He could have but little expectation that any great responsibility or any command of special importance would ever devolve on him. Duty, however, supplied the motive which ambition denied. What he had been when a humble subaltern, that he remained till the last. The great idea which ruled his life was to discharge his duty without sloth or stint. It was not very material to him that his capacity should ever be recognized, or his faithful service rewarded ; the one point was that his duty should be discharged, and that he should ever be found ready for action when summoned to the work. . . . It is idle to suppose that any desperate effort of frantic valour would have achieved the results which were obtained by this great soldier when the pinch arose and the pressure came. It was by consummate skill that Havelock turned the tide of battle in India ; it was by an intimate knowledge of the duties of his profession in the highest and in the minutest points. . . . It is mournful to think that even that spare sinewy frame, hardened, not weakened, by forty years of military service under an Indian sun, should at last have sunk under the anxiety of a struggle so prolonged. If Havelock did not actually fall under the death-shot of the enemy, he perished by disease aggravated by unsparing exertion. We must think of him upon his death-bed at the Dil-koosha, when he was about to resign his devout and fearless spirit into his Creator’s hands, as we think of Wolfe on the heights of Abraham, of Abercrombie on the Egyptian sands, of Moore on

the cliffs of Corunna. Never was there a more glorious death than that of this most gallant soldier, when he sank to his long rest, his duty discharged to the last."

The *Examiner* thus commemorated the merits of Havelock :—

"When parliament was voting inadequate rewards to this brave and triumphant soldier, his admiring country little dreamed that he was already gone where the voice of honour, though never louder or more universal, will not reach him. The tidings of his sad fate have afflicted the public more intensely than any event of the Indian struggle, if we except the news of its worst tragedies. We doubt if the people of England, in any of their wars, ever took a deeper interest in the fortunes and career of a general in the field than they took in Havelock's. In him they admired the union of the greatest qualities, both of the man and the soldier ; they saw the achievements of sheer personal merit ; an eminence due neither to wealth, patronage, or connections ; a man of genius and energy, winning the highest professional distinction with nothing but the brave heart and the wise head, proceeding from service to service, and victory to victory, proving his ability and prowess in a hundred Asiatic fields, until he reached the crowning honour of the post in which he fell, covered with as much glory as ever surrounded the name of a British hero."

The *Daily Telegraph* did not come behind any of its contemporaries in its admiration of the General :—

"General Sir Henry Havelock is dead, and a whole nation mourns his loss. No words less emphatic would express the profound and universal sorrow created by the announcement of his untimely fate, and which will long abide in the hearts of millions. The people had adopted him ; they had honoured him ; they saw and recognized a hero ; they generously acknowledged his great achievements, and for his ten victories won within a few weeks, his glorious march upon Cawnpore, and his succour of Lucknow, they had ranked him amongst the noblest in England's history. In cold and stolid language the telegraphic despatch informs us that this gallant spirit yielded to fatigue and anxiety on the 24th November. . . . To a memory so illustrious is due

the tribute of a national elegy. The plumes of ten brilliant triumphs nodded over the hearse of Havelock ; the praise and gratitude of the rescued garrison, the applause of the whole army, the deep and proud emotion of a hundred brothers in arms, and the regrets of noble-hearted women, solemnly accompanied him to the grave, and he lies where Lawrence, Neill, and Nicholson lay before him. . . . He it was who gave an example to the soldiers of British India, conquering dangers day by day, and hour by hour, with whatever means were at his disposal, exercising at once foresight, vigilance, promptitude, unwearied strength, and indomitable courage. . . . The reputation of Sir Henry Havelock will not decay with the generation that has witnessed his heroism. The baronets of his line may point centuries hence to the name of the noble warrior whose march from Allahabad to Lucknow was like the passage of a fiery star, swift, sweeping, irresistible, and they may well esteem such an origin as equivalent to that of the Nevilles and the De Burghs."

Even the humorous *Punch* became serious and solemn under the pressure of this national loss, and sounded this requiem over the hero's grave :—

"HE is gone. Heaven's will is best :
 Indian turf o'erlies his breast.
 Ghoul in black, nor fool in gold
 Laid him in yon hallowed mould.
 Guarded to a soldier's grave
 By the bravest of the brave,
 He hath gained a nobler tomb
 Than in old Cathedral gloom.
 Nobler mourners paid the rite
 Than the crowd that craves a sight.
 England's banners o'er him waved—
 Dead, he keeps the realm he saved.

"Strew not on the hero's hearse
 Garlands of a herald's verse :
 Let us hear no words of Fame
 Sounding loud a deathless name :
 Tell us of no vauntful Glory
 Shouting forth her haughty story.

All life long his homage rose
To far other shrine than those.
' *In Hoc Signo,*' pale or dim,
Lit the battle-field for him,
And the prize he sought and won,
Was the Crown for Duty done."

In a masterly article in *Blackwood's Magazine* on Lord Clyde's campaign, remarkable for its graphic descriptions, which none but an eye-witness could have drawn, the character of Havelock is thus depicted:—

"A true soldier in the highest sense of the word was Havelock. Severe in discipline and rigid in command, he looked for and exacted from all the full performance of their duty. When hardships were to be endured, he expected that they should be met without a murmur. Oftentimes regarded as unpitying by his men, he yet ever strove to alleviate their sufferings and improve their condition. Thoroughly acquainted with the principles of military science, he was able to combine the greatest daring with the greatest prudence; and greater even was his merit when, heedless of the clamours of his soldiers, he refused to move upon Lucknow until joined by Outram's reinforcements, than when, at the head of their united force, he poured along his 'march of fire.' For he too was assailed by the voice of calumny, and taunted with prudence and faint-heartedness by men who could neither emulate his courage nor fathom the high motives of his conduct. Though victorious in every action during his first advance, as soon as he became convinced that the masses with which he was hurtling were too numerous for his little band, he drew them back; and when the Gwalior Contingent first set out on their march towards Calpee, he was prepared, had he not been promised instant support, to have fallen back on Allahabad, rather than risk the fate of the empire which was intrusted to his keeping. In that resolution he showed a greater moral courage than, and equally great military genius as, when, bursting through the iron barrier of Lucknow, he wrested the sinking garrison from the hand of fate. Worn in body, high of courage, pure in heart, of an energy which no difficulties could daunt, of a resolution which no disasters could shake, he sealed his devotion to his country by his blood; and when the good labourer's

work was done, he went to receive his reward in the far distant land."

The *Quarterly Review* likewise came forward with the most hearty commendation of his virtues:—

"Among the invalids was General Havelock, now showing dangerous symptoms of dysentery, and there, on the 24th of November, he died. He had said to the young English volunteer, Lord Seymour, 'Tell them in England that here we fight in earnest.' His last letter was written on the 19th; it mentions that he had heard of his Commandership of the Bath for his first three battles; and he adds, 'I have fought nine since.' The last victory over the great destroyer yet remained, and it was complete. 'For more than forty years,' he said to Sir James Outram, 'I have so ruled my life, that when death came I might face it without fear.' The telegram told the sad news to England on the 7th of January. It seemed to dash down every satisfaction, to dim every triumph. Of itself, without favour, and without suggestion, public opinion, perhaps with some exclusive injustice, had made him the hero of the hour. It seemed as if all men felt a self-reproach that he had not been known before, and now, when he came back, how they would make it up to him! But this was not to be. Like so many regrets, these were only of use to those who felt them. Britain had lost not only a great defender in arms, but a man whose fame it would have been good for her to have been able to celebrate. The simplicity of his character, the absence of the gaudiness and glitter which too often accompany even true glory, the strong Puritan element which the dignity of his life at once attested and made respected, the self-reliance and patient duty of his whole career, made him perhaps the safest object of popular idolatry that the course of events ever offered to a free and moral nation."

A still higher compliment—as coming from a foreigner—was paid to the merits of the General by one of the greatest and most eminent men of France. In an article on the Indian debate, Count Montalembert says of him:—

"They have before them the example of the noble Havelock,

who, in a proclamation which he addressed to the soldiers whom he was leading against the murderers of Cawnpore, declares that it becomes not Christian soldiers to take heathen butchers for their models. This name of Havelock recalls and sums up all the virtues which the English have exercised in this gigantic strife . . . and on which there would be cast a stigma for ever by an obstinate perseverance in too cruel a measure of chastisement. Havelock, a personage of an antique grandeur, resembling in their most beautiful and irreproachable aspects the great Puritans of the seventeenth century, and who had arrived at the portals of old age before he shone out to view, and was thrown suddenly into a struggle with a great peril before him, and insignificant means wherewith to overcome it, surmounted everything by his religious courage, and attained, by a single stroke, to glory and that immense popularity which resounds everywhere where the English language is spoken; then died before he had enjoyed it, occupied, especially in his last moments, as he had been all his life, with the interests of his soul, and the propagation of Christianity in India."

But the most grateful tribute to the memory of this British hero, was the spontaneous homage paid to his character by the cities of New York, Boston, and Baltimore, where the flags of the shipping were hoisted half-mast from 9 A.M. to sunset. The feelings of the American branch of the Anglo-Saxon family on this occasion are thus described in the *New York Times* :—


"A mark of respect was shown yesterday to the memory of General Havelock, which was worth more than a peerage. The flags of the shipping in our harbour and on our public buildings were displayed at half-mast during the day, as a token of grief for his loss. It was a purely voluntary tribute paid to his memory by a people to whom he was a stranger, who were in no way interested in his career, and to whom even his name was unknown six months since. It was a tribute of respect which even the Duke of Wellington did not command, and which we believe was never before paid to a foreigner. But 'one touch of nature makes the whole world kin;' and the bravery and manliness of this true hero have touched the hearts of the people of this country, who have watched his career with eager solicitude

since the stirring events of the East Indian revolt have rendered his name as familiar here as it is in his own country ; and the intelligence of his death has produced as deep a feeling of regret as though he had been a countryman of our own. Six months ago Havelock was an unknown colonel in India, where he had nobly done his duty, and by slow degrees and hard fighting, at the age of sixty-two, had reached an elevation in military rank which many a young man has attained without fighting at all. But for the Sepoy revolt it is not likely that his name would ever have been heard in the New World. His position was an accidental one ; the command of the army was forced upon him by circumstances, and not conferred by the appointing power. But he proved himself equal to the emergencies ; the heroic qualities of his nature and his capacities as a soldier must often have been exhibited during his long and eventful military career, but they were never appreciated or acknowledged, and he would have passed away in the great caravan of undistinguished dead but for the Sepoy revolt. Certainly no English soldier ever before excited so marked a feeling of sympathy among the American people as has been done by General Havelock ; and we may feel proud that no considerations of national jealousy prevented a spontaneous expression of such generous impulses."



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