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Scotland and the Commonwealth
Letters and Papers relating to the Military Government of Scotland, from August 1651 to December 1653. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by C. H. Firth, M.A. (1895)


On August 3,1651, Perth surrendered to Cromwell, and on the following day he began his pursuit of Charles n. Monk, who then held the rank of Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, was left behind to complete the conquest of Scotland. The forces at his disposal for this task were not more than ten thousand men, if indeed so many, but as there was no organised army to meet him in the field his numbers were for the moment sufficient. Garrisons had been left in Leith, Edinburgh, and Perth, and probably also in Burntisland and some smaller places. Monk’s field force consisted of four regiments of horse and three of foot with some troops of dragoons and the greater part of the train of artillery. Cromwell estimated the numbers of Monk’s force at 4000 or 5000 men, but Downing the Scoutmaster-General mentions 7000 or 8000. The discrepancy can be explained by supposing that Downing included in his total some of the recently established garrisons.

Monk’s first object was to capture Stirling. The town surrendered on August 6, at the first summons, and the castle, unable to resist Monk’s well served artillery, yielded on August 14 (pp. 1-4). During the siege Colonel Okey and his regiment of horse were despatched into Lanarkshire, and having dispersed some new levies and captured the King’s Commissioners at Paisley, rejoined Monk at Stirling (pp. 5, 316). From Stirling Monk set out for Dundee, which he summoned on August 26, and stormed on September 1. Between four hundred and five hundred soldiers and townsmen were killed, or according to a later account nearly eight hundred. The town was plundered for a day and a night, but except during the first heat of the storm no bloodshed seems to have taken place (pp. 7-12).1 A few days before its fall, on the night of August 27, Colonel Matthew Alured and eight hundred of Monk’s cavalry surprised and captured, at Alyth in Perthshire, the Scottish Committee of Estates. Eight noblemen, including the Earl of Leven and the Earl Marischal, and a number of gentlemen of rank, fell into Alured’s hands. This was, in Chancellor Loudoun’s words, a sad disaster and blow, for it deprived Scotland of the central authority necessary to unite the national efforts against the English invaders (pp. 9,23,320). At Alyth and Worcester so many prisoners of rank were taken, that an English newspaper scoffingly observed: ‘all the nobility of Scotland that are at liberty may all sit about a joint-stool’(Mercurius Politicus, Sept. 11-18, 1651). St. Andrews, which had at first refused Monk’s summons, yielded on August 30 (pp. 7, 8, 10). Aberdeen was occupied about the 10th of September and Montrose about the same time (pp. 14, 15). The news of the rout of the Scottish army at Worcester reached Monk’s camp on August- 9, but even before it could produce its results in putting an end to further resistance he had practically accomplished his task. At first the very completeness of the victory rendered it difficult for the Scots to credit the reports which came to their ears. It seemed incredible that no portion of the defeated army should have succeeded in effecting its return, and rumours ‘of some good success of their forces in England ’ found ready credence.

The progress of Monk’s conquests was retarded by his own serious illness and by the paucity of his forces (pp. 14, 323, 337). But in October and November several new regiments of horse and foot and a large number of recruits for the old regiments arrived in Scotland which enabled Monk to extend his quarters. The Marquis of Huntly signed articles of capitulation for himself and his forces on November 21, and Lord Balcarres followed his example on December 3 (pp. 21, 339, 340). Colonel Fitch occupied Inverness about the end of November (pp. 28, 342). Colonel Overton landed in Orkney about the middle of February and established a garrison there with scarcely any resistance (pp. 34, 36). The last castles which held out for Charles ii. surrendered one after another. Dumbarton Castle capitulated at the beginning of January 1652. The Bass, which was summoned on October 27,1651, surrendered in April 1652 (pp. 322,333-335, Commons Journals, vii. 127). On February 18,1652, Monk left Scotland, and retired to Bath to try the effect of the waters in perfecting his cure. He was succeeded in command by Major-General Richard Deane, who carried out and completed the subjugation of the country. Brodick Castle, in the island of Arran, was occupied on April 6, 1652, by a detachment from the garrison of Ayr (p. 38)Dunnottar Castle, besieged by Colonel Morgan, was surrendered to him on May 26, 1652, and with it fell the last place in Scotland which displayed the standard of Charles II.

Deane now had before him the more difficult task of pacifying the country, and reducing the Highlanders to obedience. The Mosstroopers, as the English termed generically all the little bands of mounted men who carried on a partisan warfare in the Lowlands, had been a source of great annoyance to the invaders ever since 1650. They infested the country round the English garrisons, intercepting the posts, cutting off small parties of men, and murdering stragglers (pp. 8, 28, 318,332). But now the cessation of warfare and the vigorous measures of Deane put a stop to their activity, and until the rising of 1653 commenced little more is heard of them. The reduction of the Highlands, especially of the western portion, was a much more difficult business. On June 9, 1652, Deane appointed Colonel Robert Lilburne to command an expedition to march through the Highlands and to enforce their submission to the authority of the Commonwealth (p. 45). Deane himself with a second division of the army set out at the same time for Inverary. Some account of the incidents of his march and of its results is given in the letters from contemporary newspapers reprinted in the Appendix (pp. 360-367). One important result was a final and definite agreement with the Marquis of Argyll. For some months Argyll had attempted by every diplomatic artifice to maintain a neutral and independent position and to avoid committing himself to the acceptance of the English Government. During the siege of Dundee he had been reported to be raising forces for its relief, but it was subsequently asserted on his behalf that he had made no levies since Charles ii. left Scotland (pp. 17, 20). After its fall on October 15, 1651, he addressed a letter to Monk proposing a treaty. i I desire to know from you, as one having cheife trust in this kingdome; if it were not fit that some men who have deserved trust in both kingdomes may not meet to good purpose in some convenient place, as a meanes to stop the shedding of more Christian blood?’ Monk curtly replied that he could admit of no such treaty without order from the Commonwealth of England (pp. 333, 335). At the time when Argyll wrote, Chancellor Loudoun and the remnant of the Committee of Estates were endeavouring to procure the assembly of a Parliament, and that body had been summoned to meet on November 15 (pp. 19, 20, 26). Supported by its authority the Marquis evidently designed to treat with Monk, and the letter was meant to draw from him an implied permission for their meeting. But the English Parliament was resolved not to recognise any kind of assembly which claimed to represent the Scottish nation, whether styling itself Parliament or Committee of Estates. On November 19 the Council of State had been ordered ‘to prevent all public meetings of any persons in Scotland for the exercise of any j urisdiction other than such as is or shall be from the Parliament of England, or from such persons as shall have authority under them1 (Cal. State Papers, Dom. 1651-2, p. 26). When Argyll sought to treat for his personal submission, the first condition imposed upon him was to prevent the intended meeting of the Scottish Parliament, or at least not to take part in it himself (pp. 19, 338). An interview was arranged to take place on November 19, 1651, between Argyll and two of Monk’s officers ; but when the day came the Marquis pleaded illness and postponed it (Several Proceedings in Parliament, pp. 1775,1795). The relations between him and the new government were further complicated by the arrival of the Commissioners despatched by the English Parliament in December 1651 to treat of the union of the two nations. On March 18, 1652, the Marquis had a conference with the English Commissioners at Dumbarton, in which he renewed his old proposal that a number of select persons might be permitted to meet together for discussion, but was obliged to submit to the method of procedure preferred by the Parliamentary Commissioners (Report on the MSS. of the Dulce of Portland, i. 635). After some further letters, in which he expressed a general desire to do all which with a safe conscience he might for the peace and union of this island, and to clear himself from any suspicions of a desire to raise fresh troubles, the correspondence dropped (pp. 37, 40, 42). On April 26 the deputy for the shire of Argyll accepted the tender of the union on behalf of its inhabitants, and engaged for them to obey the authority of the English Parliament exercised in Scotland (p. 42, cf. Portland MSS. i. 638, 644). His attitude is described in a letter from Edinburgh, dated April 27, and printed in Several Proceedings in Parliament. ‘ Arguill is now again seeking to come in, the pitcher goes often to the conduit, but at last is dasht in peeces. He solicites hard and sends letter after letter, and one messenger after another, using all the means he can through his best policy to obtaine some singular act of favour. But I cannot understand that he will much advantage himself by his policy, for we are, I hope, sufficiently satisfied of his put offs and overreaching intentions, which will be a snare probably to himself. His curiosity in aiming too high will cause such delayes, as will give us opportunity when grasse is more grown to fall to action. For we shal shortly be enabled to come upon him and the rest that stand out with a double infall; I hope we shall find no very great difficulty to reduce his country.’ As expected, the march of Deane and Lilburne into the Highlands brought Argyll’s hesitation to an end. He was obliged to declare his acceptance of the Union and his submission to the Parliament of England, which was at once published in the newspapers (p. 50). A week later, on August 19, 1652, an agreement was signed between Deane and Argyll (p. 48). In the speech in his own defence made by Argyll, April 9, 1661, he relates his dealings with Deane, and asserts that this agreement was extorted from him by threats (Wodrow, Church History, ed. 1828, i. 144). It was something between a treaty and a capitulation. Argyll, wbile generally accepting the English Government, was permitted to make certain reservations with regard to its religious policy and his own action concerning it. One clause stipulated that either himself or his eldest son should repair to England as a hostage, if summoned by the Parliament. Another clause allowed the establishment of English garrisons in Argyll’s country, but as soon as Deane’s troops withdrew three of the five garrisons he left behind were immediately surprised by the Highlanders. Argyll professed his disapproval of these acts, released the prisoners, and restored the captured posts (pp. 366, 368). In the end, however, they were not reoccupied, and the only places permanently held in his country by the English were Dun-staffnage and Dunolly. In a supplementary treaty it was agreed that ‘ except on some urgent occasions to march through the country for the peace of the island, or reducing some that are refractory,’ no more forces should be brought into his country (pp. 55, 60; cf. Spottiszcoode Miscellany, ii. 79, 81, 91, 93). He had therefore reaped some profit by the little outbreak of the Highlanders, and it is not unlikely that he had inspired it. The general result of all his manoeuvres was that though forced to submit, and regarded with considerable suspicion by reason of them, he still retained some shadow of independence.

After the victory of Worcester the English Parliament seemed for a moment disposed to treat Scotland simply as a conquered country, and to annex it to England. On September 9, 1651, a committee was appointed ‘to bring in an Act for asserting the right of this Commonwealth to so much of Scotland as is now under the forces of this Commonwealth,’ and to consider ‘ how the same may be settled under the government of this Commonwealth.’ An Act ‘ asserting the title of England to Scotland ’ was read a first time on September 30 (Commons Journals, vii. 14, 22). But it was eventually decided to adopt a more politic method of uniting the two countries, and on October 23 eight Commissioners were appointed to proceed to Scotland in order to settle the civil government of the country and to prepare the way for a union. The persons selected were Chief-Justice Oliver St. John, Sir Henry Vane, Richard Sal way, Colonel George Fenwick, Major-Generals Lambert and Deane, Alderman Robert Tichborne, and Lieutenant-General Monk (Commons Journals, vii. 30). Their instructions, which were drawn up after many deliberations and with extraordinary precautions to keep them secret, were delivered to the Commissioners on December 18 (ibid. 44, 47, 49, 51, 53). The Commissioners arrived in Scotland by the middle of January, and on March 16, 1652, Vane was able to report to Parliament that the greater part of the shires and boroughs of Scotland had assented by their deputies to the tender of union (ibid. 105, 107, 110, 113).

The next step was the drawing up of a ‘ Declaration of the Parliament of England,’ in order to the uniting of Scotland into one Commonwealth with England (March 25), followed by an Act for the incorporating of Scotland into one Commonwealth and free state with England, and for abolishing the kingly office in Scotland. This Act was read a first and second time on April 13, 1652. The completion of the Act and the settlement of the details were deferred till the twenty-one deputies of Scotland, summoned to appear in London by October 1, had been afforded the opportunity to set forth their views to the committee which the English Parliament had appointed to discuss the matter. These conferences, which began in October 1652, were continued till the dissolution of the Long Parliament in April 1653, and the deputies themselves remained in England till August 1653. The union was finally accomplished by the Instrument of Government in December 1653, which determined that Scotland should be represented by thirty members in the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and by an ordinance of the Protector’s dated April 12, 1654, for completing and perfecting the union which the Long Parliament had designed.

On the history of these lengthy and complicated negotiations the papers printed in this volume throw little light. There are occasional mentions however of different steps in the proceedings summarised above. The first letter of the English commissioners after their arrival in Scotland is printed on p. 31. Two newsletters contain accounts of the proclamation issued by the Commissioners for the abolition of the kingly power in Scotland, and of the parliamentary declaration concerning the union of the two nations (pp. 35-41). Colonel Lilburne criticises with severity the character of the deputies sent from Scotland to negotiate with the Parliament (p. 136). There is also a long narrative addressed by the Earl of Loudoun to Charles n. relating the procedure by which the consent of Scotland to the union was obtained, and dwelling on its illegality and invalidity (pp. 208-213).

The theory of the statesmen of the Commonwealth was that the union was so great a boon to Scotland that it ought to be thankfully accepted by the nation, and that it would be so accepted. ‘ This proposition of union, writes Ludlow, ‘ was cheerfully accepted by the most judicious amongst the Scots, who well understood how great a condescension it was in the Parliament of England to permit a people they had conquered to have a part in the legislative power (.Memoirs, i. 298). This view is illustrated by the pained surprise with which the author of the newsletter describing the proclamation of the union at Edinburgh notes the absence of any sign of rejoicing amongst the auditors, and by the letter of Captain Hill to the gentlemen of Badenoch (pp. 41, 269). But in truth even those who had accepted the union acquiesced in it rather than welcomed it. It promised a certain amount of self-government instead of military rule, and it was well to choose the least of two evils. In the opposition to the union political and religious motives were combined. The desire to preserve the independence of the nation in its integrity was strengthened by a natural doubt whether the terms of the proposed incorporation would be fair to the weaker nation. ‘ As for the embodying of Scotland with England,1 said Mr. Robert Blair, c it will be as when the poor bird is embodied into the hawk that hath eaten it up1 {Life of Robert Blair, p. 292). Both parties in the Church denounced the union in their official manifestoes on the ground that it meant the destruction of the freedom of the Church, and would open the door to unlimited toleration. In the declarations of Glasgow, Kirkcudbright, and other districts against the ‘ Tender1 the religious objection holds an equally prominent place (Report on the Portland MSS., i. 628, 630, 634).

On the other hand, with those who willingly accepted the union one of the guiding motives was hostility to the Presbyterian Church system. At first, therefore, the royalists showed themselves more ready than the Church party to submit to the new government, and so to accept the union. ‘ If any merit favour here,’ said an English newsletter, dated January 1,1652, ‘ it is those whom they call more malignant, who, as they are the most considerable party, soe have already done more reall and visible service than the whole generation of Presbyterians’ (pp. 29, 339, 355). The most remarkable exposition of the views of this class is to be found in Sir Thomas Urquhart’s Book, the Discovery of a most Exquisite Jewel, published in 1652. Urquhart’s tract purported to be ‘ a vindication of the honour of Scotland from that infamy whereinto the rigid Presbyterian party of that nation, out of their covetousness and ambition, most dissembledly hath involved it.’ In it he asserted that ‘ a malignant and independent will better sympathise with one another, than either of them with the presbyter.’ He concluded by recommending the close union of the two countries, a union which should be ‘ not heterogeneal (as timber and stone upon ice stick sometimes together) bound by the frost of a conquering sword ; but homogeneated by naturalisation, and the mutual enjoyment of the same privileges and immunities.’ After quoting at some length Bacon’s arguments on the subject, he urged on the English government the advisability of preferring ‘rather to gain the love and affection of the Scots, thereby to save the expense of any more blood or money, than for overthrowing them quite in both their bodies and fortunes, to maintain the charge of an everlasting war against the storms of the climate, the fierceness of discontented people, inaccessibility of the hills, and sometimes universal penury, the mother of plague and famine; all which inconveniencies may be easily prevented, without any charge at all, by the sole gaining of the hearts of the country.’

The way to effect this was a union of such a nature that Scotland should possess ‘ the same privileges and immunities that Wales now hath ... to enjoy everywhere in all things the emoluments and benefits competent to the free bom subjects of England; and to this effect to empower that nation with liberty to choose their representatives to be sent hither to this their sovereign parliament, that the public trustees of England, Scotland, and Wales may at Westminster jointly concur for the weal of the whole isle, as members of one and the same incorporation.’ . . . ‘ By which means, patching up old rents, cementing what formerly was broken, and by making of ancient foes new friends, we will strengthen ourselves, and weaken our enemies; and raise the isle of Britain to that height of glory, that it will become formidable to all the world besides. In the meanwhile, the better to incorporate the three dominions of England, Scotland, and Wales, and more firmly to consolidate their union, it were not amiss (in my opinion) that (as little rivers which use to lose their names when they have run along into the current of a great flood) they have their own peculiar titles laid aside, and totally discharged into the vast gulf of that of Great Britain ’ (Sir Thomas Urquhart’s Tracts, Edinburgh, 1782, pp. 145, 153, 163-5).

The eight Commissioners of the Parliament, however, were not merely sent to set on foot the negotiations for the union, but also charged to settle the civil government of Scotland. Their proceedings in this part of the mission were reported to the English Parliament by Oliver St. John on 14th May 1652. On January 31, 1652, the Commissioners published a declaration abolishing all jurisdictions derived from the King, and stating their intention of appointing persons to administer justice for the time being until new judicatories and courts of justice could in a more solemn way be established. In pursuance of this plan they appointed seven Commissioners for the administration of justice, four of whom were Englishmen and three Scots. Their installation, which took place on May 18, 1652, is described in a newsletter of that date (p. 43).

For the last few months the administration of the law had been interrupted. ‘ Fra the incuming of the Englische army to Scotland to this very day, the last of December 1651, thair wes no supreme judicatories in Scotland, sik as Secreitt Counsell and Sessioun to minister justice, so that the pepill of the land for laik of the Scottis laws did suffer much1 (Nicoll’s Diary, p. 69). For a short time a kind of rough justice, both civil and criminal, was administered by a committee of English officers. A newsletter from Edinburgh, dated December 29,1651, says : ‘ This day, according to custom, diverse Scottish suiters made their addresses to the honourable committee of officers at Leith, where all just expectations were duly satisfied with quick despatches in point of justice (whereas some suits before had hung 16 years without any period put to it in their old Judicatories), which doth much cheare up the Scottish people that they begin to read the Lord’s dispensations of love and kindnesse towards them, in finding far more respect and justice from their supposed enemies than ever they did from their own countrymen ’ (Several Proceedings in Parliament, January 1-8, 1652). Nicoll, who copies this passage, also observes :

‘In these tymes the Englische commanderis haid great respect to justice, and in doing execution upon malefactouris, such as theves, harlotes, and utheris of that kynd, by scurgeing, hanging, kicking, cutting of thair eares, and stigmating of thame with het yrnes ’ (pp. 69, 89). The appointment of the seven Commissioners put an end to these military tribunals, and substituted regular civil courts for them. The Commissioners began by imposing on the Writers to the Signet an oath of fidelity to the Commonwealth, and by issuing a proclamation that all legal documents should henceforth be drawn up in English (Nicoll’s Diary, pp. 94, 96). Their justice is praised by Nicoll, who writes : ‘ To speak treuth, the Englisches wer moir indulgent and merciful to the Scottis, nor wes the Scottis to their awin cuntriemen and nychtbouris, as wes too evident, and thair justice exceidit the Scottis in mony thinges, as wes reportit. They also filled up the roumes of justice courtes with very honest clerkis and memberis of that judicatory (p. 104). The best account of the reforms attempted and the changes introduced in the administration of justice at this time and during the next few years is contained in Mr. iEneas Mackay’s Life of the First Lord Stair (pp. 58-62). The orders of the Commissioners for the regulation of fees and the custody of deeds which are printed in this volume are from broadsides in Clarke’s collection (pp. 276, 283).

Amongst the papers printed are a certain number of letters to the Commissioners from the commander of the English army of occupation, recommending the temporary suspension of legal proceedings against certain persons (pp. 77, 239, 262). Politically the severe impartiality with which the new judges enforced the law led to one evil consequence. During the long wars the nobility and gentry had incurred many debts, and they were now generally insolvent. As soon as peace was restored and the new judicatories established, their creditors began to press them hard and to put the laws in motion against them. It was held by the English officers that the too great rigidity with which the judges enforced the law in this matter of debt was one of the chief causes which swelled the ranks of the royalist rising headed by Glencairne (pp. 267, 289, 296).

The remainder of the work of the eight Commissioners may be more briefly summarised. A Court of Admiralty for Scotland was set up at Leith, new sheriffs were commissioned for all the counties in Scotland, and oaths of fidelity to the Commonwealth were imposed on the sheriffs, the magistrates of the boroughs, and other persons in public employment (pp. 35, 39; Portland MSS., i. 629, 632;Commons Journals, vii. 106). The judges, visitors, and sheriffs appointed by the Commissioners were to hold office till November 1, 1652, but their term was subsequently extended, by an Act of Parliament, to May 1, 1653 (p. 135 ; Scoble, Acts and Ordinances, p. 210).

Besides organising the government by establishing judges and other magistrates, the Commissioners were empowered to settle the financial system of Scotland. The English troops were generally living upon free quarter, or upon roughly levied assessments on the districts in which they were quartered. Lambert and Deane, in December 1651, began the work of reducing and regulating these assessments. On February 18, 1652, the Commissioners ordered a general assessment of 10,0001 per month to be levied on Scotland, authorising Major-General Deane to apportion the amounts to be levied on particular districts, and to make the necessary abatements for localities which had suffered during the war. But the total of the abatements made was not to excede £2000 per month. On October 26, 1652, Parliament approved the order of the Commissioners, and continued the assessment to May 1653. On May 3, 1653, the Council of State continued the assessment till the following November; and on November 12 of the same year, the Barebones Parliament extended it to June 1654 (Commons Journals, vii. 195, 350; Cal. State Papers Dorn., 1652-3, p. 303). Nominally the total of the assessment came to £10,016 per month. In practice, as arranged by the Commissioners of the different shires met at Edinburgh in July 1653, the total amounted to i?8500 (p. 170). The valuation of the respective shires was based on earlier valuations made in 1629, 1644-5, and 1649 (p. 172.) A small quarto volume amongst William Clarke’s collection, Number xxm. in the catalogue of the manuscripts of Worcester College, gives the valuation of each particular parish. The table printed here on p. 170 gives the proportions at which the different counties of Scotland were assessed; whilst the second table on p. 174 shows the sums levied on the burghs included in the counties, with the abatements allowed, and the names of the collectors. Other papers show how disputed assessments were settled (pp. 173,180, 219).

Respites were sometimes granted, and, in the case of Argyll, payment in kind allowed (pp. 204, 222). Two letters of Colonel Lilburne’s are of special interest in connection with the assessment. In one he asserts the inexpediency and almost impossibility of raising the tax above £8500 per month. In another he enlarges on the difficulty of collecting it, caused by Glencairne’s rising (pp. 287, 307).

During 1652 and 1653 the commander-in-chief of the English forces in Scotland was also the head of the financial administration. Major-General Deane, as has been stated, was the person specially charged with the original distribution of the monthly assessment. He had also the responsibility of determining the expenditure not only of that tax, but of other revenues. On 11th November 1652, the Parliament voted that all the public revenue of Scotland, arising by way of assessment, custom, late king’s revenue, sequestrations, or otherwise, shall be issued forth by warrant, under the hand of the commander-in-chief in Scotland, until the first of May next. He was authorised to defray from these sources the salaries of the judges and other officials, and to spend a certain sum on fortifications; and also by way of loan upon account, for supply of the army and forces, for the preventing free quarter, and for carrying on other necessaries and public services in Scotland; and the remainder to be applied for payment of the forces in Scotland {Commons Journals, vii. 213). Lilburne, who succeeded Deane as commander-in-chief in December 1652, and held office till April 1654, exercised the same powers.

Of the sources of revenue enumerated in this order, the rents due to the late king and other public revenues were collected by the Auditor-General, John Thompson (p. J.81). The sequestrations were under the management of three Commissioners, sitting at Leith: Richard Saltonstall, Samuel Dis-browe, and Edmund Syler (pp 74, 152). These sequestrated lands formed the fund from which the services of English officers and officials were rewarded by Parliament. Major-

General Lambert was voted lands to the value of JP1000 a year, Lieutenant-General Monk, and Colonels Whalley, Ingoldsby, Overton, and Pride, 500t a year a piece; Colonels Okey and Lilburne, 3001; Mr. John Weaver, JP250; Colonel Alured, J?200. Maj or John Cobbett, who very nearly captured Charles 11. at Worcester, obtained =f?100 a year from the same source; and the widow of Major Rookesby, killed at Dunbar, JP300 a year ((Commons Journals, vii. 14, 77, 132, 191, 247, 278).

In execution of these votes, Colonel Ingoldsby was given the manor and park of Hamilton (p. 74); whilst Whalley got the manor and lands of Liddington, and Monk, Kineale {Portland MSS., i. 658). From the sequestrations also were derived the expenses incurred in building the citadels at Inverness, Ayr, and other smaller forts. There are a few references to these works amongst the papers now printed (pp. 17, 28, 36) Clarke’s collections contain plans of the citadels, which it is hoped to reproduce in a later volume. Two thousand pounds a month was the amount which the commander-in-chief was empowered to spend for this purpose. During 1652 and 1653, however, the actual sum expended on fortifications came to between JP4000 and JP5000 per month (pp. 152, 288.) Contingencies and accidental expenses were charged on the same fund. On September 17, 1652, Parliament voted JP1000 from the sequestrations for the relief of the poor at Glasgow, which had lately been devastated by a great fire (p. 359; cf. Commons Journals, vii. 183).

The cost of the army of occupation was only in part defrayed by the taxation of Scotland. The greater part of it fell upon England, and was paid by remittances from the English treasury (p. 111). The reports made to Parliament in September 1651 and April 1652, give the total cost of the army in England and Scotland, but are so stated that it is difficult to ascertain the cost of the portion of the army actually stationed in Scotland {Commons Journals, vii. 25,127). In February 1652 there were in Scotland nine regiments of foot, seven regiments of horse, one regiment of dragoons, and a train of artillery. In June of the same year the regiments of foot had been raised to eleven; and by September there were five regiments of horse instead of seven. During the first four months of 1653, there were eleven regiments of foot, and five of horse, besides dragoons and artillery. But in pursuance of a plan of economy set on foot by the committee of the army in England, the number of men in the different companies and troops had been considerably reduced (pp. 53, 71, 80, 113-115: cf. Commons Journals, vii. 241). Before the reductions in August 1652, the pay of the army in Scotland had amounted to 36,000t per month, but by February 1653, this sum had been reduced to about 29,0001. In February 1653, when the reductions, not only in the number of regiments, but in the numbers of the rank and file in the various regiments, had taken effect, the strength of the army of occupation came to rather more than 12,000 foot, and about 2200 horse. When Glencairne’s insurrection broke out, Lilbume found the forces at his disposal insufficient for the task of holding the country and maintaining order. The numbers of the cavalry in particular were quite unequal to the work before them; and his letters are full of complaints of his deficiency in this respect. In answer to his complaints, two regiments of horse and a regiment of foot were sent to Scotland in January 1654 (pp. 271, 273, 275, 286, 298, 305).

The discipline maintained in the English army during its occupation of Scotland is praised by Burnet, Nicoll, and others. Plundering, violence, or other misconduct on the part of the soldiers was rigidly punished (pp. 2, 15, 16, 323, 326). After the storm of Dundee the soldiers, in accordance with the usual custom in the case of towns taken by assault, were allowed to plunder for twenty-four hours, but as soon as that fixed period was over all licence was at once repressed. Monk’s proclamations on the subject are given in the Appendix (pp. 324, 325). Amongst the proclamations issued by Colonel Lilbume in 1653 are orders against killing rabbits and pigeons, stealing cabbages and fruit from gardens, exacting money from persons who had not paid their taxes, and quartering soldiers an undue length of time in the same place (pp. 139, 142, 155, 162). Amongst William Clarke’s papers is a small quarto volume containing reports of proceedings at courts-martial held at Dundee from September 17, 1651, to January 10, 1652 (Worcester College mss., No. xxi.). It records the punishment of various soldiers for robbery, horse-stealing, and similar crimes, and also the trials of others for immorality. Illicit relations with Scottish women were visited with severe penalties. In January 1652 the Governor of Leith issued a proclamation that in respect much wickedness appeared in that garrison by the sin of uncleanness, chiefly occasioned by Scottish and English women and maidservants drawing and vending wine, beer, and ale, that no inhabitant of that garrison whatsoever retain or keep any Scottish or English women or maidservants longer than the second of February next, upon pain of paying 20 shillings sterling per diem for every day after that they shall so keep them {Several Proceedings in Parliament, p. 1875). Marriages were also very frequent, and an order was issued that no soldier of the garrison of Leith and Edinburgh should marry any Scottish woman without the leave of the governor or some other superior officer (p. 334). Other proclamations issued by the governors of Leith and Edinburgh fixed the price of bread and hay, and ordered the lighting and cleaning of the streets (pp. 344, 346-8).

The maintenance of strict discipline in the army was not only necessary for the sake of the army itself, but an essential condition of the success of the policy adopted by the Commonwealth. Its general aim was to reconcile Scotland to the union by evenhanded justice and good government. The statesmen of the Commonwealth trusted to gain the support of the lower and the middle classes by freeing them from the yoke of the clergy and the great Lords. ‘ Free the poor commoners, and make as little use as can be either of the great men or clergy,1 was the advice tendered to the English Government in Mercurius Scoticns (p. 339). Similar advice had been tendered to Cromwell by one of his correspondents shortly after the battle of Dunbar. ‘ You have tried all brotherly ways to the Kirk and state, but without success. I humbly conceave that your honour hath not fallen upon the right way; for our best security and doing good to that poore and crafty people their bate must be freedome and proffitt, to which end wayes and meanes should be used to make that people, especially the common sort, to be assured that it will be for their freedome and proffitt to submitt to or joyne with us, and that we will manumitt them, and mayntayn them in it, and acertayne there estaites and tenures freer and easier than to there Lords; if they shall not speedely come in and comply with us, they must expect the severity of warr to an obstinate people. This to be held forth to them in some particulars in print1 (Original Letters and Papers of State addressed to Oliver Cromwell, edited by John Nickolls, 1743, p. 29). In the ‘Declaration of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England concerning the settlement of Scotland,1 published on February 12, 1652, this policy was plainly set forth. While the estates of those noblemen and gentlemen who had taken part in Hamilton’s expedition in 1648, or had fought for Charles ii. in the late war, were to be confiscated for the use of the State, an amnesty was promised to the vassals and tenants whom the influence of their lords had led astray. If within thirty days they should put themselves under the protection of the Commonwealth of England and conform to the government it set up, they ‘ shall not only be pardoned for all acts past, but be set free from their former dependences and bondage services; and shall be admitted as tenants, freeholders, and heritors, to farm, hold, inherit and enjoy, from and under this Commonwealth, proportions of the said confiscated and forfeited lands under such easie, rents and reasonable conditions as may enable them, their heirs and posterity, to live with a more comfortable subsistance than formerly, and like a free people delivered through God’s goodness from their former slaveries, vassalage, and oppression.’ The Long Parliament was too much occupied with other business to carry out this scheme, and it was reserved for the legislation of the Protectorate to attempt it. But the military administrators of Scotland during 1652 and 1653 seem to have accepted the principle on which the scheme was based, and to have aimed at conciliating the people of Scotland as far as the necessities of their position permitted. Apart from national feeling, however, two causes prevented this policy of conciliation from succeeding. The first cause was the extremely burdensome nature of the taxation which the maintenance of so large an army in Scotland made necessary. Even under the Protectorate, when the development of the revenue from, the customs and excise had rendered it possible to reduce the monthly assessment, officials of the English Government admitted that Scotland was more heavily taxed than England and had not gained pecuniarily by the union. The second cause was the opposition of the Church, which kept alive amongst the people the feeling of hostility to the government and to the union.

The policy of the English government in religious matters had been set forth by the Commissioners of the Parliament in a declaration published in February, 1652: 4 We declare that for promoting of holiness and advancing the power of godliness, all possible care shall be used for the publishing of the Gospel of Christ in all parts of this land, and provision of maintenance made and allowed to the faithful dispensers thereof, together with such other encouragements as the magistrate may give, and may be expected by them, who demean themselves peaceably and becomingly to the government and authority by which they receive the same. . As also, that care shall be taken for removing of scandalous persons who have intruded into the work of the ministry, and placing others fitly qualified with gifts for the instructing of the people in their stead. And that such ministers whose consciences oblige them to wait upon God in the administration of spiritual ordinances, according to the order of the Scottish Churches, with any that shall voluntarily join in the practice thereof, shall receive protection and encouragement from all in authority, in their peaceable and inoffensive exercising of the same; as also shall others who, not being satisfied in conscience to use that form, shall serve and worship God in other Gospel way, and behave themselves peaceably and inoffensively therein. We shall likewise take care, as much as in us lies, that in places of trust throughout this nation, magistrates and officers fearing God may be set up, who, according to the duty of their places, may be a terror to all evil-doers, and even to them whose licentious practices (though under pretence of liberty and conscience) shall manifest them not to walk according to godliness and honesty.1

Before this declaration was issued, the protection afforded by Monk and other officers to Sir Alexander Irvine of Drum against the Presbytery of Aberdeen, and Monk’s general order against imposing oaths and covenants, had shown the policy which the new government intended to follow in dealing with the coercive jurisdiction of the Church. In the ‘Epistle Liminary ’ to Sir Thomas Urquhart’sDiscovery of a most Exquisite Jezvel, etc., he mentions a Diurnal being brought to him which contained the relation of the irrational proceedings of the Presbytery of Aberdeen against Sir Alexander Irvine of Drum, together with his just appeal from their tyrannical jurisdiction to Colonel Overton.’ The Diurnal referred to was evidently that entitled Several Proceedings in Parliament, for January 22-29, 165£, from which the documents reprinted in the Appendix have now been extracted (pp. 348-354). They supplement the papers printed in Whitelocke’s Memorials and in the Spalding Miscellany 011 the same case.

The next important step in religious policy was the appointment by the Commissioners of the English Parliament of nine Commissioners for visiting and regulating the universities and schools of Scotland, with power to remove scandalous ministers and decide causes concerning the maintenance of the clergy. The inaugural declaration of the Commission is dated June 4, and their first meeting took place on June 7 (p. 43). On August 2, 1653, the Commissioners issued a proclamation forbidding ministers to preach or pray for Charles the Second, and several persons were arrested for disobedience to the order (pp. 192, 222, 225). Their other proceedings are not mentioned in these papers. Baillie’s letters, however, contain a long account of their dealings with the University of Glasgow.

More serious in its consequences was the prohibition of the meetings of the General Assembly of the Church, and the forcible dissolution on July 20, 1653, of that which had met at Edinburgh. Colonel Lilburne seems to have acted on his own responsibility, but his conduct was evidently approved by his superiors in England. He was half inclined to prevent the holding of provincial assemblies also, but hesitated to do so without definite orders, thinking, as he wrote, that ‘ the people are not well able to bear any more against their ministers ’ (pp. 161-3, 192). This was the more surprising, because in July 1652 the General Assembly had been suffered to sit and to deliberate without molestation (Nicoll, Diary, pp. 97, 99, 110).

At the commencement of the English occupation the English governors, viewing the dissensions which divided the Church of Scotland, had hoped to find allies in the Remonstrants. English officers and newspaper correspondents wrote with favour of the ministers who opposed the proceedings of the General Assembly, without inquiring too closely into the principles which dictated their opposition (pp. 317, 327). But the protests of the Remonstrants against the subordination of the Church to the State and against the toleration of sectaries guaranteed by the English army soon showed the groundless nature of these hopes (pp. 33, 108). Colonel Lilbume long continued to believe that 4 the people in the west, who have always been accounted most precise,’ would come round and accept the new regime, and reported that they professed to disapprove of the rising headed by Glencaime (pp. 127, 242, 271). In the end, however, he had to confess that even the Remonstrants shared the general antipathy of the Scots to their English rulers. 4 Even in all these people there is a secret antipathy to us, do what we can to oblige them, unless in some few that are convinced, and those but a few ’ (p. 266). The attitude taken up by Mr. Andrew Cant was typical. 4 Colonel Overton,’ says a newsletter, 4 at his late being at Aberdeen, hearing of some incivilities offered by some souldiers to Master Andrew Cant, went to his house, and told him he was sorry any injury should be done unto him, who he heard was a friend to us; to which Air. Cant replyed in plain Scottish that he was a lying knave that told him so, for he neither respected him nor his party ’ {Several Proceedings in Parliament, December 18-24, 1651).

The declaration of February 12, 1651, had promised on behalf of the Commonwealth countenance and protection to those who preferred some 4other gospel way’ than the Presbyterian. The propagation of Independency in Scotland was the earnest desire of many of the English officers. It was suggested that able preachers from England should be stationed in the great towns, 4 which might convince the people to draw them off from the leven of their pharisaical and rigid presbyterian teachers ’ (p. 339). The Commissioners of the Parliament were empowered to take four chaplains with them on their mission, and three of the persons suggested, Mr. Caryll, Air. Oxenbridge, and Mr. Lockyer, accepted the employment offered them {Cal. State Papers, Dorn. 1651-2, p. 28; Several Proceedings in Parliament, April 29-May 6, 1652). The report of the Commissioners which Vane presented to the Parliament on March 1652 asked, that 4 twelve or more ministers be speedily sent down to reside in the several garrisons and other convenient places in Scotland.’ Parliament referred the proposal to the Council of State, which duly recommended it to a Committee, but no steps were taken to carry it out (Cal. State Papers, Dom. 1651-2, p. 191; Commons Journal, vii. 108; Portland MSS., i. 632). However, the hopes of the officers in Scotland were from time to time raised by the willingness which many Scots showed to hear the army chaplains in private meetings, and by successful disputations between an occasional chaplain and a Scottish minister. If but few converts were to be made in the south, it was reported that in the north, in Sutherland, there was ‘ a very precious people,’ and when Deane marched into the Highlands news came from his forces that ‘ some of the Highlanders have heard our preaching with great attention and groanings, and seeming attention to it’ (pp. 31, 53, 364). In the end a few Independent congregations, or ‘gathered churches,’ were established in the Lowlands in the course of 1652 (p. 370). ‘There are two eminent ministers in Scotland,’ said a newsletter, written in April 1652, ‘ that were, one of them, of the Assembly, have already joined with gathered Churches, a great change, yet more there are that are going about the same work. This gives satisfaction to many (other-wayes averse) that gathered Churches in England chuse ministers for their pastors, and that Churches joyn in a public way of fellowship. But they like by no means to hear of such as gather Churches in private, without the approbation of other Churches, and have no pastors ’ {Several Proceedings in Parliament, 29th April-6th May 1652). Robert Pittilloh, in his Hammer of Persecution, published in 1659, enumerates the names of eight ministers who became converts to Independency about this period, and complains that they were not sufficiently protected and favoured by the government, and that after Cromwell became Protector they were even actively discouraged by his policy. ‘ Before this day there had been thousands in Scotland separated from the National Church, who would have jeoparded their lives for the godly in England, if they had met with that freedom and encouragement which justly they expected when first the English came to Scotland’ (pp. 10-13). In the letters of Colonel Lilburne, written during 1653, a similar complaint is made, and he also points out that ‘ the poor congregated people ’ were the special prey of royalist plunderers (pp. 123, 127, 265).

By the end of 1652 Scotland seemed to be completely pacified. ‘ All things at present are in a strange kind of hush,’ declared a letter from Edinburgh (p. 369). The English government felt itself able to release a number of important prisoners on parole, and also to set at liberty the ministers taken at Alyth, or for other reasons confined in England, pp. 9, 193, 342). But from June 1652 the royalists had been making preparations to take up arms once more, and in February 1653 the movements of the Highlanders began to attract the attention of Colonel Lilburne, who had just succeeded Major-General Deane as commander-in-chief in Scotland (pp. 79, 82, 85). During the first months of 1652 the hopes of Charles ii. seem to have been confined to the retention of Dun-nottar and to the safe transport of the regalia and the personal property which the king had left in that stronghold. ‘ In this castle,’ wrote Hyde to Nicolas, ‘ besides the crown and sceptre, there are all the king’s rich hangings and beds, plate, and other furniture, to so good value, that it is avowed by very good men, who are to be believed, that if all were at Amsterdam it would yield ^20,000 sterling, and the king is pressed to send a frigate to bring all this away, which you will easily believe he very much desires to do, but knows not which way to compass it.’ Charles also desired to send some provisions to the garrison of Dunnottar, in order to enable the governor to hold out. ‘ The preservation of this place,’ explains Hyde, ‘ being the foundation of all the hope for Scotland ; for there is room enough within this castle to receive an army, and it is in the very centre of the kingdom, so that as soon as the summer is over, any little succors or great supplies of men from Norway may be landed there, and there will be care taken to that purpose.’ 'If you shall be able,’ promised the king to the governor, ' to defend and keep the place till the beginning of the next winter, we make no question but that we shall transport such supplies to you as shall not only be sufficient to enlarge your quarters, but by the blessing of God to free your country from the tyranny of those rebels’ (Clarendon State Papers, iii. 56, 60, 61). The king selected as his agent Major-General Vandruske, a Dutch soldier, who had served some time in Scotland, and charged him not simply to relieve Dunnottar, but to repair to the Highlands and consult with Glengarry, Pluscardine, and other royalists {ibid. pp. 69, 72; Col. Clarendon Papers, ii. 124). But the difficulty of raising money to procure a ship and provide supplies prevented Vandruske from starting, and the fall of Dunnottar put an end to the scheme.

In the summer of 1652 the King’s hopes suddenly revived. In May 19 took place the collision between Blake and Tromp in the Downs, followed a few weeks later by open war between England and Holland. If the Dutch chose to aid Charles with ships and men he might succeed in recovering Scotland. But, at all events, the war gave an opportunity for a successful insurrection in Scotland. About June there came a representation 4 from diverse of the most considerable nobility,’ giving Charles an account of the condition of Scotland, and urging him to action (p. 137)The King at once resolved to send an agent to Scotland to take the command of the royalists and manage the intended rising. For this purpose he selected Middleton, who, having been taken prisoner at Worcester, had escaped from the Tower and had joined his master at Paris. Besides his qualifications as a soldier and the soundness of his political views, Middleton had the advantage of being thoroughly in the confidence of Hyde and the English royalists. 4 He is the soberest man I have met with,’ wrote Hyde to Nicholas, 4 and very worthy of any trust, having the greatest sense of the errors he hath formerly committed, and the best excuses for them that I have found from any 1 (Clarendon State Papers, iii. 56; cf. p. 53 post). On June 25, 1652, Middleton was commissioned as Lieutenant - General of the King in Scotland, and accredited to the Scottish nobles (p. 46).

In November Captain Smith, who had been despatched from Glengarry and other Highland chiefs in the preceding July, reached Paris with another appeal to the King. Charles replied by drawing up a commission to Glengarry and five others (Dec. 30, 1652), appointing them commissioners for the government of his forces in Scotland, and authorising them to choose a person to act as commander-in-chief till Middleton should arrive (pp. 65-70; cf. Cal. Clurendon Papers, ii. 158). Soon after Smith’s arrival, and before he had left Holland for Scotland, there came two more messengers. One, Captain Strachan, came from the Earl of Glencaime, who offered to join the Highlanders in arms, and to raise levies of his own to join them. The King at once instructed Glencaime to take command of the forces raised in the Highlands till Middleton’s coming, and gave him an absolute commission as interim commander-in-chief (March 14, 1653). But as it was important not to disaffect the Highlanders, Charles instructed him not to produce this commission except in the last resort, and provided him with a letter recommending the chiefs to elect him their commander (pp. 99, 103, 138). A little later came letters from Lord Balcarres and a messenger named Malcolm Roger. Finally, in September 1653, arrived Colonel Bampfield furnished with letters from Seaforth and Balcarres urging the King to trust the bearer, and setting forth his great services to the royalist cause in Scotland (pp. 97, 107,120,128,130,183). There were signs, however, that the religious dissensions and personal jealousies which had been so fatal to the royalist cause in the late war would be an equal hindrance to the success of the intended rising. Middleton was regarded as not Presbyterian enough to be thoroughly trusted by the Church party, and while the King had no difficulty in composing a singularly pious letter to the Moderator of the General Assembly, he found it impossible to draw up a public declaration which should satisfy the ecclesiastical party without alienating his other supporters (pp. 47, 106, 293). There was evidence of a certain jealousy between the Highland royalists and their allies from the Lowlands. It was hinted that Glengarry would not be commanded by Middleton in the Highlands and a suggestion was made that the command should be divided (pp. 139, 311). Glengarry desired to be rewarded by being created Earl of Ross, a demand which, if granted, would entail similar demands from others, and cause some heartburnings amongst other associates who deemed their services equally great (pp.. 309, 310, 313). The selection of Bampfield as the agent of Glengarry and Balcarres was extremely distasteful to the King, who thoroughly distrusted Bampfield, and had gone so far as to send orders to Scotland for his arrest (pp. 94, 104, 310,

312). Glencairne and Balcarres were not on good terms with each other (p. 247). But in spite of his distrust Charles was obliged to receive Bampfield and listen to his proposals (pp. 287-9). All he could do was to warn his friends in Scotland not to trust Bampfield, and to urge Balcarres to co-operate cordially'with Glencairne and Middleton. In the beginning of November he despatched three new agents to Scotland, Colonel William Drummond to Glencairne with special instructions to effect a reconciliation between him and Balcarres (p. 246); Colonel Norman Macleod to the Highlanders to induce them to accept Glencairne as their general (p. 250); and Captain Shaw to Loudoun and Lord Lorne (p. 253). They were charged to announce Middleton’s speedy arrival in Scotland, and to give hopes that he would be followed by Charles himself (pp. 245, 249).

The necessity of Middleton’s immediate presence in Scotland was evident, but many causes combined to delay his departure. In the autumn of 1652, soon after his arrival in Holland, he fell seriously ill (pp. 52, 60). He was charged to raise money to procure arms and war material for the Scottish royalists, but the King was scarcely able to send him money for his personal expenses (p. 60). There were hopes of obtaining a loan from the Princess of Orange, but the King’s main reliance was on gifts from Scottish soldiers and merchants in foreign countries, or from well-disposed foreign princes (p. 51). Negotiations for these contributions took time and brought little into the royal exchequer. Middleton wrote to the Count of Oldenburg (p. 54), entered into a negotiation with the Count of Waldeck for transporting German troops to Scotland (p. 123), and applied to the States General of the United Provinces for arms and money (pp. 157, 233). Applications were also made to Scots in French, Swedish, or Imperial service (pp. 61,157, 233). The King himself wrote to the Duke of Courland to engage him to further Middleton’s appeal to Scots under his government (p. 78), and sent Lord Wentworth to negotiate in Denmark (pp. 106, 109, 246). The Earl of Rochester had been despatched, in December 1652, to negotiate with the princes of Germany and the Diet at Frankfort (p. 52; cf. Clarendon, Rebellion xiv. 55).

From these different sources Middleton laboriously got together a small fund for his intended expedition. General Douglas collected 5200 rixdollars in Sweden and sent them to Charles, whilst Sir James Turner raised about the same amount in Germany (pp. 54, 261). Rochester obtained a grant of about £10,000 from the Diet, but it was mostly consumed by the expenses of his mission (Clarendon Rebellion, xiv. 103). A Veil-affected Scots in Holland gave something, and something too was supplied by the Princess of Orange and by the province of Holland itself (pp. 61, 105, 238).

In Scotland the movements of Glengarry and the Highland chiefs began to excite the suspicions of the government in February 1653. Colonel Lilbume received information of their meetings from the Marquis of Argyll and from Sir James MacDonald of Sleat (pp. 79, 82, 84, 85). At the end of May the Earl of Seaforth began hostilities by seizing some English sailors who had gone ashore at the island of Lewis (pp. 140, 148). Seaforth had opened communications with the King in the previous month, and had been added by him to the council which was intrusted with the control of the movement (pp. 127, 137, 200). About the middle of June Lord Balcarres and Sir Arthur Forbes wrote to Lilburne complaining that the capitulation made with them in December 1651 had not been observed, and declaring themselves released thereby from any obligation to the English government. This was practically a declaration of war, so far as they were concerned (pp. 146,147). An important meeting of the royalist leaders took place at Lochaber in the beginning of July, and Glencairne, who now assumed the leadership, wrote to Middleton charging him to apply to the States of the United Provinces for assistance (pp. 144,150,157,184). According to the English newspapers the King’s standard was set up at Killin on July 27 (p. 186). One after another royalist Lords began to join Glencairne, and little bands of mounted men made their way from the Lowlands to the rendezvous in the Highlands. The Earl of Athol, who seems to have hesitated a little at first, now announced his adhesion in a letter to Charles, and endeavoured to rouse the gentry of Blair Athol (pp. 141, 150, 183, 193, 271). Lord Kenmore joined with a hundred horsemen, and was henceforth one of the most active leaders of the insurrection. He set to work to levy supplies, to raise recruits, and to force neutrals to take up arms for the King (pp. 186, 191-195, 205, 228, 231). The Earl of Roxburgh and Lord Newburgh wrote to Charles to promise their support and to protest their fidelity (pp. 190, 200 More important was the adhesion of Lord Lome and the consequent division amongst the Campbells. The Marquis of Argyll himself remained firm to the government. He had informed Lilburne of the first symptom of the rising, and protested his disapproval of it (pp. 88, 161). Sir Robert Murray, however, assured Charles that Argyll took this course merely from motives of self-preservation, and that if it could be done securely and effectively he too would appear for the King’s service (p. 134). Lord Lome, on the other hand, was ‘ invincibly constant and faithful6 to the King, and resolved at any risk to draw his sword for his master (ibid.). In a letter, probably written in 1649, he had promised to serve the King even against his father, and he now kept his word.

Madame,—I am sorry there Matie3 have so hard thoughts of my father, who hath, and I am persuaded will be, ready at all occasions to approve himselfe a loyall subject and a very true and reall ser[vant] and well wisher of the King and his family, and if ther were no other thing to speake for him I conceive that first his declaration with the publique against the present proceedings in England and change of government, and againe his particulare oath given latly in Parliament against the calumnies laid upon him that he approved of the way was taken ther, may sufficiently justifie him in that point. Neverthelesse, that I may satisfie your La. desire more fully, I protest to you before God I am so farre loyall to his Matie that if I thought my father meant otherwise then he professes, and were, as some have beene pleased to call him, ane enemie to Monarchicall Government or the King’s Matie, I would not only differ from him in opinion as your La. desires me, but allso quite all the interest I have in him rather then prove disloyall to my lawfull prince or to the goverment we have lived so happily under these many hundreth yearss, and for any further declaration then this I hope your La. will not expect it of me, for I am shuch a stranger to home that these two yeares I have but seldome heard of the state of my parents health. That which I desired was to have had the honour to kiss his Maties hand, and indeed I will take it for a great one if it be granted, and if otherwise, I shall no lesse then before wish and pray for the prosperity of there Maties familie. Now, for all the ties and obligations your La. hath beene pleased to lay upon me long since, and at this present, I shall take some more fit occasion then this to testifie my thankfullnes and to approve my selfe, Madame, Your La. most humble servant,    Lorne.

In April 1653 Lome wrote to Charles protesting his inviolable fidelity (pp. 120, 254). In July he openly joined the insurrection, in spite of his father’s curse and a letter of warning from the chief gentlemen of his clan (pp. 165-169). Campbell of Auchinbreck was his chief supporter amongst his kinsmen (pp. 169, 261). Campbell of Glenorchy, on the other hand, remained firm to the policy of Argyll, and suffered considerably for his adherence to the English government (pp. 197, 222; cf. Thurloe Papers, vi. 352). In October Lorne and Kenmore marched into Argyll’s country and attacked the Lowland planters in Cantire (pp. 241-3). Argyll, who protested that his clansmen were unwilling to oppose his son, retired to Carrick (pp. 257, 261). Colonel Lilburne was half inclined to suspect him of ‘juggling’ in the matter, and to doubt the reality of his protestations, (pp. 243, 244). But the material assistance which Argyll gave to Colonel Cobbett in his expedition to the western isles was some evidence of his sincerity (pp. 221, 275).

The commander-in-chief of the English army in Scotland, Colonel Lilburne, had at first judged the royalist movement of little importance. He thought Glengarry was preparing to resist a possible attack rather than concerting a general insurrection (p. 79). When convinced that the design extended further than he thought, he believed that the victories of the English fleet over the Dutch had completely discouraged the party who were plotting against the government (pp. 122,151). In June he reported his belief that the chief aim of the leaders of the movement was simply to make a demonstration which would give Charles more reputation abroad (p. 147). ‘The people,’ he wrote on July 12, ‘are more apt to be quiet than they are able to provoke them to new troubles ’ (p. 160). By August, however, he was convinced of the reality of the danger, and in October he was writing urgently for reinforcements (pp. 190, 238, 265).

The measures by which Lilburne endeavoured to meet the insurrection, and to combat the general disaffection which gave it strength, may be summed up as follows. He began by arresting Pluscardine, and Sir John Mackenzie, and ordering the arrest of other Highland chiefs (pp. 83,140,148, 153). He revised an old law requiring the chiefs of clans to give security for their peaceable behaviour, and issued proclamations against vagrants, and against all persons who helped or harboured the adherents of the rebellion (pp. 149,155, 229). The dissolution of the General Assembly was accompanied by an order that its members should leave Edinburgh within twenty-four hours, and was intended to prevent any correspondence between the Assembly and the Highland royalists (pp. 163-5). He recommended to his superiors in England the immediate sequestration of the estates of the chiefs of the movement, and the offer of rewards to any person who brought them in dead or alive (pp. 149, 295, 303). At the same time, in order to relieve the country of the unemployed fighting men, who might otherwise join the royalists now in arms, he suggested that leave should be given to well-affected persons to raise regiments for the service of foreign princes in amity with England (pp. 227, 231, 295). In addition to this, he advised that legal proceedings for the recovery of debts should be moderated, or temporarily suspended, lest debtors should be driven to take arms by desperation (pp. 267, 289, 295). Moreover, the passing of the Act of Union, which was still under discussion, was to be accompanied by a general Act of Oblivion for the past, and a free pardon to all who laid down their arms and submitted.

Lilbume’s military measures were hampered by the want of ships, of men, and of money. On the Earl of Seaforth’s declaration for the king, Colonel Ralph Cobbett was ordered to reduce Lewis, Mull, and the smaller western islands, and to establish garrisons at Duart Castle, Eileandonan Castle, and Stornoway (pp. 149, 186, 202, 221, 275). The English government feared an attempt of the Dutch to obtain possession of Shetland, Orkney, or Lewis, and ordered Lilburne to secure the islands by fortifications and garrisons. This fear was by no means ungrounded, for Glencairne and Middleton, with the full approval of the ministers of Charles II., were seeking to win Dutch help by offers of ports and fishing stations in any island they preferred (pp. 158, 236; cf. Clarendon State Papers, iii. 119). There was an English fort already at Kirkwall, and Lilburne proposed to establish another at Bressay Sound. But his difficulty was that he could not spare men enough for strong garrisons in the islands, while weak ones were of little use, and exposed to much danger (pp. 227, 231, 232). For the safety and supply of such distant ports, he needed a squadron of ships ; but he had not enough for his ordinary needs, and was quite unable to prevent Middleton from sending supplies to the Scottish royalists. In spite of repeated appeals, the ships he demanded never came, no doubt because they were all employed by the necessities of the war with the Dutch in the Channel (pp. 238, 290, 308).

As soon as the insurrection began, Lilburne found his forces insufficient for the task of maintaining order over so large a country, and amid such general disaffection. The most serious weakness of his position was the deficiency in horse. Very many of the superior officers of his five regiments of horse were in England—of ten colonels and majors, only one was in Scotland (p. 241). From motives of economy the troops had been reduced to the lowest possible strength ; and Lilburne asserted that there were not in all Scotland ‘above 1200 or 1300 fighting horse ’ (p. 305). With this small number he had to prevent plundering raids by parties of royalists from the Highlands, to intercept the bands of horsemen who set out from the Lowlands to join Glencairne, and to keep down the mosstroopers, who began once more to infest the borders. His cavalry were worn out by the constant service required from them, and until the reinforcements which he urgently appealed for should arrive, Lilburne’s only resource was to seize all the horses he could obtain and mount a portion of his infantry (pp. 274, 299, 307).

So far as infantry were concerned, Lilburne’s eleven regiments were enough to meet any force which could be brought into the field against him, and his regiments were of excellent quality. But he had a very large number of garrisons to maintain, and as soon as the rising began he increased their numbers, and divided his regiments still more by occupying different houses and castles on the Highland frontier. These petty garrisons he held necessary, not only to protect the well-disposed from attack, but to prevent the ill-disposed from rising in arms (pp. 226, 240, 271). The result was that when he wished to collect a force for service in the field, he found himself obliged to choose between two alternatives : either he must denude Edinburgh and the south of Scotland of troops, or else by withdrawing his forces in the north, he must surrender that part entirely to the enemy. Unless reinforcements arrived, he thought of adopting the second alternative, and abandoning 4 all beyond Dundee except Inverness1 (pp. 271, 273, 305).

In the few encounters which took place in the course of 1653, the English had the advantage. A skirmish took place at Aberfoyle, which was claimed by Glencaime’s partisans as a victory, but Colonel Reade, who commanded the English, reported his loss as only three men killed (p. 204; cf. Military Memoirs of John Gwynne, pp. 160, 200). In December Captain Hart routed a party of a hundred horse, under Sir Arthur Forbes, at Borthwick Brae, whilst Captain Lisle, about the same date, beat up Lord Kinnoul’s quarters, and took a number of prisoners (pp. 303, 305; Gwynne1 s Memoirs, pp. 218, 221). But the real difficulty was to find the enemy. Lilburne made an attempt to pursue Lord Kenmore, and to force him to an engagement, but it was totally unsuccessful, for he found the ways 4impassable,1 and the places to which Kenmore retreated 4 unaccessible (pp. 240-243, 256). As to the smaller parties, who carried on a guerilla war in the Lowlands and on the borders, Lilburne found it impossible to get any knowledge of their movements, 4 they are soe subtle and cunning, and the country soe true to them’ (pp. 270,273,287, 307). Though the royalist army was small, and had no great success to boast of, yet, wrote Lilburne, 4 even this small appearance of this unconsiderable enemy heightens the spirit of the generality of people here, who have a deadly antipathy against us ’ (p. 271). If the royalists gained any real success, he expected that the rising would become general; 4 undoubtedly upon the least advantage of this nature they would increase exceedingly, and probably drive us into our garrisons, doe what we can with these forces ’ (p. 283). Lilburne’s position was undoubtedly difficult, and his difficulties were increased by the neglect with which his appeals and his proposals were treated by the home government. He complained that his letters were unanswered. The changes which followed the expulsion of the Long Parliament in April 1653, and the dissensions which led to the break up of the Little Parliament in the following December, seem to have disorganised the administration. With three different Councils of State in one year, no continuity of policy could be expected. Lilburne lost heart, and began to wish that some one else had the responsibility of a command for which he felt unequal. ‘ Being jealous of my own weakness, I am doubtful soe great affaires as are here to be managed may suffer for the want of one more fit to wrastle with them ’ (p. 302). Hearing that a commander-in-chief was to be sent to replace him, his only wish was that it should be 4 such a one as may pay these people for their knavery.’ 6 Monk’s spirit,’ he suggested, 'would doe well amongst them,’ and before long the Protector arrived at the same conclusion.

The papers printed in this volume are derived from four different sources. The bulk of them are from the manuscript collections of William Clarke, which are now in the library of Worcester College, Oxford. William Clarke, who was born about 1623, became in 1645 one of the assistants of John Rushworth, the secretary to General Fairfax and the New Model Army. He accompanied Cromwell to Scotland in 1650, and remained there as secretary to Monk in 1651. From 1651 to 1660 he was secretary to the different officers who succeeded each other in command of the English army in Scotland. He accompanied Monk to England in 1660, was knighted soon after the Restoration, was appointed Secretary at War on 28th January 1661, and was mortally wounded in the battle with the Dutch off Harwich on June 2, 1666. A life of Clarke is given in the Dictionary of National Biography, vol. x. p. 448, by Mr. Gordon Goodwin. Additional details respecting his career are contained in the preface to the two volumes of his papers, printed by the Camden Society in 1891-4. An account of his manuscript collections is given in Mr. Coxe’s Catalogue of Manuscripts in the possession of Oxford Halls and Colleges, 1852, vol. ii.

The papers from Clarke’s collection included in the present volume are printed from copies sometimes entered into letter-books, sometimes on loose sheets of paper. Many are derived from draughts full of erasures, and in other cases the letters seem to have been originally taken down in short-hand, and written out later. It is not surprising that errors and omissions of all kinds abound, and that mistakes about names are frequent. Most of the papers relating to the years 1651 and 1652 have been lost. For the years 1654 and 1655 the series is much more complete, but with the later years of the Protectorate the number of documents again diminishes.

To supplement the few papers relating to 1651 and 1652, and to supply the place of those missing, a few letters have been added from the Tanner Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. The great collection of letters officially addressed to the Speaker of the Long Parliament was borrowed by Dr. John Nalson about 1680 from the office of the Clerk of the Parliament, and was never returned. Part of it is now in the possession of the Duke of Portland, and is calendared in the first volume of Mr. Blackburne Daniel’s report on his manuscripts. Mr. Daniel traces the history of the collection in his preface (Thirteenth Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission,, Appendix, part i.). Bishop Tanner borrowed in Nalson’s own fashion from the papers Nalson had borrowed, and left his spoils to the Bodleian Library. The Tanner Manuscripts in the Bodleian are the second source drawn upon in this volume. They contain several letters addressed by William Clarke to Speaker Lenthall during 1651 and 1652. Two of these were printed in 1842 by Mr. H. Cary in his Memorials of the Civil War (ii. 327, 366), and are consequently omitted here. Three letters of Clarke’s, some communications between the Marquis of Argyll and the Commissioners of the Parliament, and several miscellaneous documents, have been inserted.

Of many of the letters addressed to the Speaker, and read in the House of Commons, the originals have not been preserved. Fortunately they were often printed in the official newspapers of the Parliament, and this third source has supplied five more letters from Clarke to Lenthall. Some letters from Monk and other officers have been also selected from the newspapers. To these there has been added a few extracts from the unique copy of the Journal called Mercurius Scoticus, which was published at Leith during the winter of 1651. It was probably edited by William Clarke, and is amongst his books in Worcester College Library. These previously printed letters have been relegated to the Appendix.

To represent the royalist as well as the republican view of events, and to furnish a more exact account of the movements and the plans of the King’s party, a large number of papers have been drawn from the correspondence of Clarendon in the Bodleian Library. From the beginning of 1652, the management of the affairs of Charles ii. was mainly in his hands, and the communications between him and the royalist leaders in Scotland give a more exact account of the origin and progress of the rising of 1653 than anything hitherto published. The part played by individual royalist leaders in that movement, and the reasons for its failure, are very clearly explained in these letters and reports.

The Editor hopes to put together from the Clarke and Clarendon Collections, a volume relating to the history of Scotland during the Protectorate, which will continue and complete the present one. He desires to express his sincere thanks to Mr. T. G. Law and Mr. Alex. Mill for their assistance in the editing of the present instalment of those papers. The Index is the work of Mr. Mill.

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