

EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH'S
HEIRLOOMS.

Book No. 1261

THE
MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE'S
ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH
INDIA.

VOLUME THE FIRST,

Containing the Acquisition and Administration
of the Punjab.

By

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TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
SIR JOHN L. M. LAWRENCE, Bt., G.C.B., S.I.,
WHO BORE A CHIEF PART IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE
PUNJAB,
THIS VOLUME,
WHICH RECORDS ITS ANNEXATION AND GOVERNMENT,
IS INSCRIBED
WITH
THE RESPECT AND ADMIRATION
OF
THE AUTHOR.

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
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OUTLINE MAP OF THE PUNJAB



Military Outposts
SCALE.
0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Administration of British India, under the Marquis of Dalhousie, consummated a policy, and closed a period. Its record is that of the last eight of the "Hundred Years," and the century of the Company's Empire has few or none so rich in events, and rife with consequence. Beneath his rule the territory of "the British Merchants trading to the East," received its latest extension; and at his departure, the sun of their power verged to a stormy setting.

Chap. I.
Policy and
period of the
Administra-
tion.

With the period terminates also that policy which began in disaster, and ended in undesired gains. Against the reservations of the Charter of 1834, Lord Auckland diverged from the safe action of his predecessors, who, led by events rather than leading them, had yet enlarged the circuit of a factory into the circum-

Chap. I. ference of a continent. There are political as well as moral sins, which seem past redemption, and the Affghan war, which cost an army and created an Indian deficit, must almost rank as one. The acts of Lord Dalhousie were in a great measure attempts to rectify this mistake. In the eight years of his viceroyalty the historian has to recount, and the moralist must criticise, the assumption of four kingdoms—the abolition of three thrones. In the case of the Punjab, at least, no retreat but one was possible from a situation so grave that of two succeeding governors it had made the civilian warlike, and the soldier peaceable. The Khyber Pass condemned the outset of a course which issued against hope in the battle of Goojerat. The same reaction of power brought about, if it could not justify, such measures as added Pegu, Nagpore, and Oudh to our roll of empire, and struck from that of Indian houses the Princedom of Sattara, of Jhansi, and Berar.

Purpose of
the work.

The following pages will review these measures, and recount the later events of this political period. They aim to do so with the single desire to set forth the truth, attaining the farthest mark of the author if they come to be accepted as annals, nowhere avoidably incorrect, of the past, and contributions, offered as incomplete, to the future. The writer of contemporaneous history vainly denies a bias which his pages, in spite of

him, evince; and these may disclose the sympathy which residence among the natives of India has awakened for them in the author's mind. He confesses to approach this labour with a conviction that India should be ruled for the Indians, and that no imperial necessity can be stronger than imperial obligations. Yet the East is not as the West, and in benevolence of motive, rectitude of action, and advantage of result, all Oriental policy may find a final justification.

Lord Dalhousie landed in Calcutta in January of 1848, and left the shores of India in March of 1856. The retrospect of a government which thus ended, as it were, but yesterday, must miss the comprehensive outlines, visible by distance and to that opinion which experience has made keen-sighted. But proximity to events, if it conceals their contour, will disclose their details; and a history of our own time finds its character and scope assigned by the distinction. It has to fix the colours of the present, before they pass into the uniform hue of the past—after-writers, disposing its information with larger knowledge, will pronounce the decisions which would be premature now. Observing this limitation, the annalist of these eight years may address himself to a well-defined task. Between the close of the Dalhousie Government and the present day, the great mutiny has intervened. Happily terminated, and fruitful perhaps of good, it yet divides

Chap. I what has been from what is to be by a chasm as deep and abrupt as it is narrow. In this sharp boundary the epoch has for its narrator something of past definiteness as well as of present distinctness. To a certain extent he knows the development of the drama while he watches its action. For whether as sequence or consequence, the mutiny followed upon Lord Dalhousie's administration; and its close was signalled by a transfer of government, and a reversal of policy. With this knowledge, the faults or defaults, if there be any, that rendered such a revolution possible, will not be unregarded, since he stands informed of the point upon which posterity will question history. At the same time, what will be a spectacle to after periods, has been a reality to his—it has acted and suffered in the tragic story, and wrought the issue out in a hard and angry success. No judgment is yet so quiet, no heart so forgetful, that it can undertake to give true delivery in so near a case. The Queen of England has been proclaimed Empress of Hindostan, and what has passed is partly forgotten in the good promise of the present. But not so completely that decision can crown discussion, or that men may absolutely conclude upon the actions of a governor-general, very sedulous of the approval of the public, and worn out in their service.

It lies, however, out of the plan of this work to blend the political biography of Lord Dal-

housie with the record of his Eastern administration; and this course if not chosen would be imposed. Sensitive beyond most public characters to the opinion of his country, the Marquis has appended to his will a codicil by which all those private papers which would throw light on his public conduct, are sealed up from use for fifty years. By such posthumous patience he has interposed between his death and the final estimate of his life the interval of a long generation, appealing for justice to a calmer and less prejudiced day. This care to guard his memory from a hasty verdict commands our respect, and so far answers its purpose, that any adverse judgment upon what admits of discussion in his policy must be taken as delivered without full hearing. Whatever in these pages is so advanced, bears such a reservation. But reverence for the dead does not and must not preclude the discussion of their deeds, and the praise or blame awarded to James Ramsay by posterity concerns history in one sense but indirectly.

It is due, however, to custom, to say something of the birth and antecedents of the principal figure in the events to be described; although to recount Lord Dalhousie's advantages of ancestry and relationship, may abate the admiration really deserved by his ability. The Latin poet makes his hero blush for these accidental distinctions.¹

Antecedents
and character
of Lord Dal-
housie.

¹ " *Nam genus, et proavos, et quæ non fecimus ipsi
Vix ea nostra voco.*"—Ovid, *Met.*

Chap. I. The Scotch peer started far forward in the race of life, but he kept the lead well; and if his name had not been honoured to his hand, he had the talent to have rendered it so. The Ramsays are of Saxon origin, but have figured in Scottish annals for more than six centuries. The mother of the Marquis, a Brown of Colston, could trace her blood from the ancient Counts of Poictou through twenty-three titled branches in England, Scotland, and France. A century and a half ago, Allan Ramsay apostrophised the Mæcenas of his clan in verses¹ which, subtracting the fervid partizanship of a Northern Horace, yet preserve the record of true liberality and magnificence. Nor was the name new to India, where the father of the Governor-General, the ninth Earl Dalhousie, had held the chief command of the British forces, not resigning the post till 1832. James Andrew Ramsay, the tenth Earl, and first and last Marquis, was born in 1812, at Dalhousie Castle; where he also died.² He was educated at Harrow and Oxford, and took his degree in the same term with his destined successors, Lords Canning and Elgin. The death of two elder brothers raised him from the cadetship of the family to the courtesy-title of Lord Ramsay, under which he contested Edinburgh, without success, against Sir John Campbell (afterwards

¹ Commencing thus—

Dalhousie, of an auld descent,

My pride, my stoup, mine ornament,

² December 19, 1860.

Lord Chancellor) and Mr. Abercromby. When the new Parliament was summoned, on the accession of Her Majesty, he entered it as member for the county of Haddington, but was shortly afterwards called to the Upper House upon the death of his father. His administrative and business faculties had been recognized, before this, by the chiefs of party, and Sir Robert Peel found an office in his Cabinet for the young statesman whose gifts were as high as his connections.¹ As Vice-President of the Board of Trade, at the time when the railway system was inaugurating a new era in intercourse, Lord Dalhousie obtained the opportunity of educating himself for the government of an empire needing nothing so much as the development of its internal resources. The superb series of public works, with which his administration enriched India, owes its inspiration to this apprenticeship at home. It had extended over a period of five years, when Lord Hardinge's departure from India vacated the Governor-Generalship, the most exalted office filled by an uncrowned head, and only not despotic in name. It was offered to Lord Dalhousie then thirty-six years of age, and accepted; and the new Governor-General sailed for Calcutta in November of 1847.

The prescription, which limits to the wearer of a title the post founded and filled by a mer-

¹ Lord John Russell pressed him to retain office in his Cabinet also, but without success.

Chap. I. chant's clerk, perhaps came never so nearly to selecting the man best fitted for it by power and love of work. By nature, as much as by rank, a lord, the new Viceroy assumed his duties with views as large, and ambition as noble. An autocrat in power, he prepared to make himself the same in labour, ranging with incredible industry from the highest to the lowest concerns of state. No one before ever gathered up the thousand reins of Indian Government, and handled them with so sure and nervous a grasp as this last of the Company's Governors. Too proud to be wholly dutiful, his enthusiasm for the art of governing supplied the place of Cornwallis's conscientiousness, or Bentinck's philanthropy, and prompted him to unsparing sacrifice of self. A desire to do all things greatly, and the assurance of great gifts, made him impatient of intermediate forms and the obstructive help of subordinate mediocrity. Summaries and reports delayed, rather than assisted, a comprehension which seized by instinct the salient threads of knotty state matters; and often his impatient pen struck out the cumbrous sentences compiled in hours, to substitute in as many minutes the telling diction of the master-mind. "*L'etat c'est moi*" became in Lord Dalhousie's mouth the just expression of a pervading and pertinacious activity, which found its leisure in change of labour. He had, in no

scant measure, the two gifts which govern men, a just judgment of character, and a suave and winning address, adapting itself with plastic ease to plain minds and polished. He chose too carefully the comrades of his policy to have the need or the desire to change them often, and those so associated with the Viceroy became sincerely attached to the man. Although boasting his Scotch extraction, and something of a clansman in patronage, his education and training had freed his mind from the shackles which hamper Scotch thought. Not distinguished as a scholar, he had still a powerful and cultivated intellect. He wrote a lucid and statesmanly English, and many of his official papers may take place among the classics of the country. What this industry and these parts effected, may be gathered from the record of his administration, and will find a summary more naturally elsewhere. But the key to his public conduct would be missing, if no notice were taken of his singular regard for public opinion. The passion for approval and consent, visible in his last anxious act, was conspicuous at every stage of his career; and sprang from something deeper than vanity in one who had witnessed the omnipotence of the popular will, preparing in 1848 to shake the powers of earth. By speeches, by minutes, by reports, in journals and in state documents, before and after action, he constantly strove to keep the public with

Chap. I. him. If this salutary habit was not the result of conviction, it was at least well learned from that great political master, whose wisdom knew how to confess error, and did not pretend to govern a people, without the people's aid and the people's approbation.

Events preceding Lord Dalhousie's accession.

It will be useful briefly to recount the events preceding Lord Dalhousie's accession, and influencing his policy. To do so, it is necessary to look back to the appointment of Lord Auckland in 1835. In that year our frontier on the North did not pass the desert-strip along the Indus and its affluent, the Sutlej, from the Indian Ocean to the highlands of Gurwhal. The commercial character of the Company had just suffered extinction by the Charter of 1833. Ostensibly there remained to it the control of political and administrative affairs, but in subordinating her masters, the Home Government had brought India into the circle of European politics, and an independent policy there was no longer easy. The change soon made itself apparent. On insufficient grounds the Ministry conceived the idea that Russia meditated dangerous advances; and they determined to anticipate an attack, which to await would have been to baffle. The support they relied on was as vain as the evidence which satisfied them was vague. On the side of prudence were the *bourans* of the northern plains, their blinding drifts of dust and snow,

bitter frosts, salt lakes, and steep defiles, natural enemies to the invaders of Hindostan—on the side of an offensive movement not much more than the nervousness of a minister. Lords Durham and Clanricarde, ambassadors at St. Petersburg, protested uselessly against the apprehension; the Muscovite Ambassador in London declared his master innocent of any hostile design; and the Czar went so far as to change the staff of his Eastern embassy. The English Government refused to be re-assured, and persisted in construing the attack upon Herat by the Shah of Persia as a first step in the interests of Russia. Yet if the penetration of an envoy could be cheated, and the word of a Russian deceive, facts might have seemed to reprove precipitation. The Shah could not take Herat, and the English force despatched to Karrack was sufficient to raise the siege, and could even have seized the Persian capital. Sir A. Burnes, who had been sent to Cabul, found Dost Mahommed inconveniently reasonable, and willing to remove every cause of suspicion. He wanted Peshawur, which had been an Affghan fief, but he wanted the friendship of the English only less. His desire to recover the territory wrested from the Dooranee throne by the Sikhs was resented as an affront to our ally Runjeet Singh, and the presence of a Russian major at his court was held to implicate him in the Russian plot. In vain Burnes deprecated

Chap I. the perilous quarrel with a well-disposed man : in vain he suggested compromise upon compromise, and declared Dost Mahommed's pretensions reasonable, and his the only natural authority in Affghanistan.¹ His representations were set aside—a serious but pardonable independence, if they had not since been tampered with, and their author's reputation offered up on the altar of ministerial consistency. History, at last informed, rescues from unfair neglect the memory of a public servant as faithful to his duty as he was singularly fitted for it;² and pronounces the official records

¹ "From what I have seen and heard, I have good reason to believe that Dost Mahomed Khan will set forth no extravagant pretensions, and act in such a manner as will enable the British Government to show its interest in his behalf, and at the same time preserve for us the valued friendship of the Seikh chiefs."—*Vide first despatch, of Burnes from Cabul.*

² In a recent debate, the opinion of Burnes was treated as not commanding attention by the nature of his experience and service. The contrary appears to be strikingly the case, from the subjoined *résumé* of his career up to the Cabul Mission. At sixteen, a youth without interest, without patronage, and without friends—save such as he might acquire by his own unaided merits. At seventeen, selected to be an interpreter of Hindustani. At eighteen, chosen by the judges of the Sudder Dewance Adawlut, their interpreter of Persian documents. At nineteen, quartermaster of brigade. At twenty, Persian interpreter to a force destined to invade Scinde. At twenty-one, deputy assistant quartermaster general. At twenty-two, distinguished for his geographical researches and elaborate reports furnished upon the places he had surveyed. At twenty-three, engaged upon an exploration of the north-western frontier of the Bombay Presidency. At twenty-four, in political employment under Colonel Sir Henry Pottinger. At twenty-five, charged with an important mission as the representative of both the Indian and Home Governments, to the Court of Runjeet Singh. At twenty-six, the projector and head of an exploring party, whose route extended from the banks of the Indus to the shores of the Caspian. At twenty-eight, the bearer of the manuscripts and maps he had himself prepared—furnishing the proof of his courage, his sagacity,

of the time unworthy of firm reliance. The burden of perverting past documents, and of throwing doubt on those to come, is heavy, and rests, with that of the subsequent disaster, on statesmen to whose easy honesty of intention a generous nation has pardoned their infatuation. In October of 1837, Lord Auckland issued a proclamation to the troops at Simla, which announced the alliance of the British with Runjeet Singh and the Shah Soojah. By the terms of this we were to depose the rulers of Cabul and Candahar, and set up in their place a sovereign, for twenty years a stranger to the studies of government, and not less unwelcome to his subjects than the cares of state to his own declining age. The rest of the story is too well known. The Auckland war cost the British forces 5,000 lives, 60,000 camels, £12,000,000¹ sterling, and that which outweighs even the first and dearest item, the reputation of invincibility which in the impressible East had become a bulwark to our fortunate power. To carry on the war, 50,000 men were added to the army and a

The Affghan war.

and his powers of observation—to the Court of Directors, and the Cabinet Ministers of the Crown.

Burnes was thirty when he returned to India. His great abilities, united with unaffected modesty, and a singular charm of manners, had secured him the patronage of two Administrations, the highest honours of the leading learned societies in Europe, and the admiration and friendship of the most distinguished men of the age.

¹ An authority, second to none living, bids me double these numbers, and add the deficit, which cripples India, to the total cost of that unhappy enterprise.

Chap. I. contingent from Bombay was despatched by a detour of 900 miles, through the Indus Valley, thus preparing a cause of quarrel with the Scinde Ameers. The army united at the mouth of the Bolan pass under Sir J. Keane, and though not seriously opposed, effected the passage in such confusion that Shah Soojah's force was reduced by two-thirds. The Khan of Khelat declined to assist an expedition doomed by its own contrivers. "You may take Candahar and Ghuznee," he said, "and even Cabool, but you cannot conquer the snows; and when they fall, you will neither be able to maintain your army, nor to withdraw it." Candahar and Ghuznee yielded, Cabool surrendered, and the English were masters of Affghanistan, but on so insecure a tenure, that in fourteen months they were thirty-three times engaged with Affghan troops, and thirteen times without profit. Upon the withdrawal of a portion of the expedition, the unpopularity of the imposed sovereign began to be shown, and the Affghans learning a lesson from our fears, made overtures to the Czar. In 1840, a Russian army did, as a counter-demonstration, march upon Khiva. It was buried in the snow-drifts, or perished of famine on the foodless steppes of Mid-Asia, comparatively few survivors returning, to humble Russian hope, and calm English apprehensions.

A period of quiet ensued, during which Dost Mahomed, a prisoner in our hands, was the lion

of the entertainments at Government House—playing chess with the sister of the Governor-General, and a deeper game elsewhere with larger pieces. The English minister had but just pronounced Affghanistan tranquil as Wales, when the storm, dreaded by nearly all except the state pilots, burst upon the ship of state. The hill-tribe of the Ghilzies rose and compelled the capitulation of Ghuznee; an armed rabble stormed Burnes's house at Cabul, and shot the envoy dead in his own balcony. The Resident, Sir W. Macnaghten, was murdered, and his grey head made a football by the soldiers of the son of Dost Mahomed, Afzul Khan. The garrison retiring with their unwieldy train of women, children, and followers, were lighted by the glare of burning cantonments, and the retreat to Jellalabad rivalled in horrors that from Moscow. Harassed, pillaged, outraged, the fugitives one by one sank down in the snows to die, or gained the shelter of the bare rocks to perish as surely of hunger. The irritated Affghans had sworn that of all the English force but one man should pass the defile alive, and that he should thenceforth sit at its entrance lopped into a ghastly trunk, and bearing on his breast the inscription—“*The Feringhees came to Cabul a lakh of men, and this is what is left of the Feringhees.*” The savage design was not far from fulfilment: only one horseman made his

Chap. I. way good to the gates of Jellalabad to report a disaster which has its place in history, where the shamed Roman registered the disgraces of the Caudine Forks.

Conduct and courage retrieved what was retrievable, for Nott maintained himself at Candahar, and Pollock forced the Khyber, thanks to that simple valour¹ which before and since has rescued elaborate error. Sale was relieved at Jellalabad, and Cabul retaken; but the spirit of vengeance for a ruined army had to content itself with the destruction of a city bazaar, and the plunder of a stately mausoleum.² The mantle of Lord Auckland seemed for a time to clog even his successor's energy, and the release of 200 English prisoners stands due to the loyal disobedience of Nott and Pollok, in disregarding the order to evacuate Affghanistan, five times repeated. The time arrived when it could be

¹ Not of the British only. A regiment of native infantry, the 16th B. N. I., won from General Nott the long-remembered name of "noble sepoys."

² A lively, if inexact, French writer comments on these acts as follows:—"En abandonnant a la fureur des Cipahis les magnifiques restes d'une cité bâtie, embellie avec les fruits du pillage des vielles cités arianes: en promenant enfin, comme un trophée expiatoire les dépouilles arrachées au cercueil du Gusnevide, Lord Ellenborough était mu par une pensée politique. Il a pu esperer que l'Inde, au spectacle de ses vielles injures vengées par ses chefs Européens tressaillerait peut-être, sinon de gratitude, au moins de sympathie, et que les Cipahis comprendraient la solidarité du drapeau. Vaine esperance! nulle fibre patriotique n'a vibré au cœur glacé de l'Inde: les Cipahis n'ont rien compris."—Lanoye's *l'Inde Contemporaine*.

obeyed with a minimum of dishonour. The prisoners came in;—Shah Soojah's assassination removed the embarrassment of his friends, and Dost Mahomed was permitted to resume the crown of Cabul under a proclamation that "British principle and policy forbade us to thrust a ruler on a reluctant people." Other nations beside the Affghans might suspect a morality learned only by disaster, and professed so late.

Sir Charles Napier—the vainest and the greatest of his name—styled his annexation of Scinde, "the tail of the Affghan war." It at any rate sprang from the wake of discord left behind us in 1839, when a passage was forced to the Cabul valley up the river of the Ameers, and through unwilling Beloochistan. In the broken waters of Lord Auckland's unhappy time, the treaty with the Scinde Princes had gone down along with less and greater things. Defeat enjoined defiance; having sought more than our right and failed in Affghanistan, we dared not accept less than our right and retire from Scinde. Nor was it admissible to have the disaffected Ameers between our frontier and our elated foes. Lord Ellenborough adopted one course open to him, and gave Sir Charles Napier commission to solve the difficult problem with a soldier's logic.¹ This

The annexation of Scinde.

¹ In believing the Scinde war a consequence of our Affghan policy, I reluctantly dissent from a very high authority. Yet

Chap. I. is not the place to blame the annexation of Scinde, or to praise the masterly combinations which effected it. The Cæsar of that campaign has left his own commentaries, less valuable for their recital of the desert-march to Emaumghur, and the desperate fights of Meeanee and Hyderabad, than for their records of an earnest and sometimes erring spirit striving to find out justice and to do it. Those will admit that the natives were gainers, who follow with disapprobation the steps of their subjection, and weigh the exact legalities of Ameers, equal in unfitness, if not in defect of title, for rule.

A.D. 1845.

Scinde was annexed—the Auckland policy, invented to defend existing boundaries, had to culminate in the extension of them. The Court of Directors, alarmed at the martial tendencies of their civilian Viceroy, replaced him with a soldier, taught, like the Master of war, to dread victory only less than defeat. In 1845, they recalled Lord Ellenborough, and despatched as Governor-General the predecessor of Lord Dalhousie, Sir Henry Hardinge.

The first
Punjab war.

But the Nemesis of incapacity demanded more trouble and blood: Punjab battles were to rise out of the Affghan error, as Meeanee and Hy-

Kurrachee once opened, its commerce must, sooner or later, have demanded an open river, which the Ameers would never have refused, if the Affghans had not shown them that we were not invincible.

drabad had arisen.¹ The death of Runjeet Singh compromised relations with the Five Rivers, and deprived us of our one ally, at the very time when we had made ourselves dependent on him. No longer guided by Runjeet's rough hand, and alarmed at our encroachments in Gwalior and Scinde, the Sikhs soon resolved to anticipate the attack they expected. Cabul and the Khyber Pass had shown us vulnerable; European drill and discipline, thoroughly studied, had given them confidence;² and an occasion of defiance was arranged for rather than awaited. "You are thus much better men than the sepoy," said a Sikh trooper to an Englishman, marking off his arm at the elbow, "but only thus much," marking off a finger-joint, "than Runjeet's Sikhs." With enemies so daring, and a past which forbade concession, Sir H. Hardinge could not long avoid the deprecated war. It began on the part of the Punjabees by the passage of the Sutlej, and the battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Buddiwal, Aliwal, and Sobraon, carried through and successfully for us terminated its first act. The second was reserved for that Viceroyalty which forms the subject of this work, and issued in an

¹ I again encounter the opinion I chiefly respect, but the Khalsa army would surely never have crossed the Sutlej, if the English name had never been humbled in Affghanistan. In 1809, Runjeet did not dare to brave the power, which Lal Singh bearded in 1845.

² The author of "The Punjab and Delhi," observes, that many of the Sikhs enlisted by Nicholson in the time of the mutiny, still recollected the French drill and French words of command.

Chap. I. administration of the annexed Punjab, which, yet more than its deviction, does honour to Lord Dalhousie's rule. A due attention must be given, therefore, to the country and people of that "Punjab," which engaged the first cares of the Governor-General, occupied them longest, and repaid them most richly.

CHAPTER II.

THE Punjab—the Land of the Five Waters— Chap. II.
lies at the gate of Hindostan. That chain of ^{A description} mountains which divides Asia, and to which _{of the Punjab} Arabian geographers have given the expressive title of “The Stony Girdle,” breaks upon its north-western frontier into gloomy and perilous passes, admitting the Kafilas of Persia and Affghanistan to the banks of the Indus. By these roads the conquerors of classical and mediæval times have found their entry, and the track of Alexander through the Hindoo Khoosh to Taxila,¹ was followed nearly step for step by Tamerlane and Nadir Shah in marching to Attock. Lying under the shadow of the Khyber, like Lombardy beneath the Pennine Alps, the valleys and uplands of the Five Rivers have tempted the invader with nearly as fair an aspect, and furnished fields for quite as many battles.

In form, the country is a great triangle, its base resting on the Himalayan chain and Cash-

¹ South of the Indus the roads to the Hydaspes were two, one towards the present Jhelum, the other to Jelalpoor. The further course of Alexander is difficult to trace.

Chap. II. mere, and its apex directed due south-west. This configuration is natural to the land enclosed by the head waters of a great river, as also to the reserved delta at its mouth. The five streams which confer its name, counting them from north to south, are the Upper Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravee and the Sutlej,¹ the Indus and Sutlej constituting respectively the western and eastern boundary. These five streams converge at the point of the Punjab into one magnificent river, which bears their united waters from Mithunkote to Kurrachee, giving its native name to the country through which it passes; and that by which Europe has known it to the Peninsula of Hindostan. The four divisions enclosed by the five convergent streams are called doabs—lands of two waters. The westernmost, lying on the great river, is known as the Sind Saugor Daub, or “Ocean of the Indus,” being to a great extent inundated at certain seasons. To this succeed the Jetch, or Chuj, the Rechna, and the Barea Doabs.² The most important in position and population is the easternmost, the Barea Doab—the great Manjha, or midland home of the flower of the

¹ The Beas which bounds Jullundhur on the west, is a feeder of the Sutlej.

² These unmeaning words will be better recollected on observing that they unite the initial letters of the rivers of each doab. Thus the *Rechna* Doab is that between the *Ravee* and the *Chenab*; the *Barea* that between the *Beas* and *Ravee*.

Sikh people, comprehending their two chief cities of Umritsur and Lahore, with the Moslem capital Mooltan. Chap. II.

The region thus defined is 345 miles in its greatest length, and contains an area of 50,400 square miles, with a population of about 4,000,000. Along its base from the hills of Peshawur and Hazara, to Loodhiana, measures more than 200 miles. It presents a great variety of feature, alternating from luxuriant cultivation to wild uplands of grass and tamarisk, and dead expanses of desert. Throughout the upper belt of the doabs the soil and climate are alike excellent. Valleys, rich as that of Kangra, slope down from the mountains, green in the spring with grain, and in summer with rice. On these terraces plants of all latitudes find a home, and wheat and barley grow with the mulberry, the tea plant, and the vine. Receding from the watered vales, the country passes into thin pastures or sandy scrub, except along the banks of the chief rivers. The rivers and the mountains are indeed the presiding influences of the province. Where the first take their course, they create and irrigate broad zones of rich alluvial soil, in which the sugar cane, indigo, cotton, wheat, and maize are produced. The acacia forests of other Indian rivers are indeed wanting to their banks, and even fire-wood has to be obtained from the central plains, though towards

Chap. II. Mooltan the palm and date groves again appear.¹ Two harvests in the year clothe these treeless riverains, maintaining an active and skilful peasantry. What remains of fertility to the Punjab lies under and is due to the Himalaya. Its lower range overhangs the districts of Wuzeerabad, Sealkote, and Deenanugger, and constitutes also the Kangra highlands already spoken of. Myriads of hill-streams intersect and water these uplands, facilitating a cultivation which extends to and enriches the sister capitals of Lahore and Umritsur.

The centre of each doab presents a very different appearance. Large wastes overspread them where thin grass and thorn-bushes struggle through the sand, and where the only roads, at the time written of, were those made by camels, cattle, and their wandering owners. The villages here were ill-built and few, though the corn patches about them, and the ruins of temples, tanks, and even cities,² sufficiently testified to the latent capacity of the soil. Abandoned to nature, these inland steppes supplied only forage

¹ "There," says the Punjab Blue Book, "the date and palm trees are clustered into dense groves, or extend into stately avenues for miles." The writer of this admirable report, a good example of the work which Indian officers can produce, has permitted his fancy in this one respect to outstrip his facts. The "groves" grow on paper, and the avenues are invisible in driving dust.

² Between the Indus and the Ravee only, Major Smyth gives 3,756, for the number of groups of ruins which he had noted as existing. Doubtless many of these were inconsiderable.

and fuel to the centres of population. They maintained sheep and goats, with buffaloes of a fine breed,¹ and reared camels for the caravans of Affghanistan. This description applies to the easternmost doabs: in that of the Sind Saugor, a tract far less productive occupied the centre, containing no fixed human habitation except the fort of Munkhere. But a range of hills crosses this sandy desert, affording inexhaustible veins of rock-salt, and thus conferring on the division a great importance. The salt hills extend from Pind Dadun Khan on the Jhelum to the Indus, and pass beyond that river to the Suliman range. They thus separate the southern desert of the Sind Saugor from a rocky northern plateau which shows considerable cultivation, and contains the populous towns of Rawul Pindee and Chukawul.

Besides the territory thus delineated, the Punjab of the Sikhs included Cashmere, the Jummoo territory to Spiti and Tibet, the trans-Indus frontier and the Hazara highlands in the west; and to the East the Jullundhur Doab with Kangra and Noorpoor. These last, with the frontier, are better known as the cis- and trans-Sutlej states, and in amalgamation with the Punjab proper retained their separate system of revenue. The Hazara district is a series of valleys

¹ The cattle of the Punjab are far inferior, however, to many Hindostan breeds. Those of Hansi and Hissar have been introduced, with good results from the cross.

Chap. II. and ridges among the Dond and Suttee hills, containing but the one tract of level ground, on which stands Hurreepore, the capital. A home of robbers, the land abounds with crags and caves; and Moguls, Doorannees, and Sikhs have in turn paid black mail to the bandits of the Gundgurh mountain, and the marauders of the Bangra and Khagan passes. North-west of this rugged district, but beyond the Indus, opens the fair valley of Peshawur, overhung by the Khyber and Khuttuk ranges, and watered by the river of Cabul. It includes the divisions of Husht-nugger (Octopolis), Eusufzye, Doaba, and Peshawur proper. The whole basin is the outpost of the peninsula, and the nation which holds the fort of Peshawur, and which, keeping the mouth of the Khyber at Jamrood, can guard the Indus at Attock—that nation garrisons Hindostan.¹

South of Peshawur, on the trans-Indus fron-

¹ The garrison would, however, be occupying an outwork at Peshawur: the Indus is certainly our natural and, perhaps, our best strategical line. "I myself," writes to me a chief personage of this history, "think that we would be in a better position without either Peshawur or Kohat in the event of a great invasion from the west. There are several Passes feasible to an army coming down on India. The Khoorum Pass through Kohat, the Gwaleyree Pass on Dera Ismail Khan, for instance. Kohat and Peshawur are expensive and troublesome places to hold, and ten to one the people will side with whatever party is not in possession. If we held the line of the Indus in great strength, and left the country on the right bank to the people, we might then advance, and meet invasion as their backers, either at the mouth of the Khyber, or await the invaders on the Indus, as might be expedient at the time. If we hold the right bank, we have no such choice.

tier, and approached from it by long passes through the Afreedee hills lies Kohat—then Bunnoo, watered by the Khoorum, and with pasturage on its upland “thuls,” as well as corn and cane on the irrigated grounds. The road from its capital, Dhuleepgurh, to the far less productive valley of Tank, crosses the sandy hollow of Murwut. From Tank to Mithunkote the Suleiman range closes in upon the river, contracting to a strip the “Mehra,” or barren plain, between them. The entire belt from Bunnoo to Scinde, bears the name of “Deerajat,” the camping-ground of the Affghan invaders, who left their names to the towns of Deera Ismail, Deera Futteh, and Deera Ghazee Khan.

The traveller who should pass from Simla or Loodhiana to Peshawur by the new military road through Umritsur, Lahore, and Wuzeerabad, would observe in succession all the features we have described. Leaving the wooded slopes of the Himalayan spurs, he would three times cross from river to river over an intervening waste, would reach beyond the Jhelum the rocky tablelands which distinguish the Sind Saugor Doab, and find, past Attock, the green gardens of Peshawur. He would encounter as great a variety of inhabitants. About Umritsur, and at their other centres at Goojeranwalla, Goojerat, and Jullundhur, the flower of the population is Jat. Brave soldiers in war, and patient workmen in peace,

Its popula-
tion.

Chap. II. they formed the core of the Sikh commonwealth, and the strength of its army. In the north they were mainly followers of Nanuk, the Gooroo of the Sikh sect and its founder. In the south, the influence of Aurungzebe is still acknowledged by their common profession of Islamism; and at Mooltan accordingly, the pure Mussulman race of Pathans has a higher social consideration. These Pathans are the men who resisted Runjeet Singh with a remembered gallantry, and furnished Edwardes with the finest part of his levies.

The Gujurs,
Dogras, &c.

The Gujurs are met in pastoral as well as arable districts, and represent the aboriginal stock. In a land which has seen more pitched battles than Bœotia, that “dancing-floor of Mars,”¹ and which lies, like the strangers’ quarter of an eastern city, close at the gateway of India, the representation is not exact. They are an industrious tribe, and practised in agriculture. The Dogras, more famous by name than number—of whom the Maharajah Golab Singh was chieftain—the Raen Mussulmans, best market-gardeners of India, and the Rajpoots, complete an enumeration of the principal races following arms and agriculture. The third estate, that of mercantile men, is supplied by the Khutrees,² whose profession as scribes

¹ *Ἄρειος ὀρχήστρα.*

² Under and beyond these, Major Smyth gives the names of more than 200 castes of Hindoos, Mahommedans, and Sikhs inhabiting the Punjab.

and traders, although looked down upon by the martial Punjabees, constituted them the main representatives of mental cultivation. Chap. II.

The Sikhs formed but a small portion of the religious community, though their influence was supreme. They are the disciples of a religious reformer, who propounded his articles of faith at the close of the fifteenth century. It was originally a pure deism, including a belief in the transmigration of souls, and a scrupulous reverence for the cow. These tenets set forth, with others in the *Grunth* or sacred Sikh book, and an inveterate hatred of their Mohammedan compatriots,¹ sufficed to distinguish all who had received the "Pahul"² at the holy tank of *Umritsur*. Under *Runjeet Singh*, in 1790, and in the stern school of *Affghan* invasion, they learned the use of arms, and how to constitute that *Khalsa* army whose battle-shout³ has turned many a field. Prætorians in peace, as they were bold legionaries in war, the real power of the state came to rest with them, and the security of a government varied with the extent of its liberality in gifts of golden bangles and extra pay to the army. The Sikhs.

¹ *Runjeet Singh* even abolished the Mahommedan names of districts and villages; thus *Russulnuggur* on the south bank of the *Chenab*, was named by him *Ramnuggur*, and heavy fines were exacted for an obstinate memory.

² The mystical cup of water, stirred with a sword, wherein the initiated Sikh pledged himself.

³ *Wah! Gooroo ji ko futteh! Ho! victory to the Gooroo!*

Chap. II. The Sikh Hindoos, and Hindoos of other denominations made up a third of the population. The remaining two-thirds were Mahomedans proper, or Hindoo converts to the faith of the Prophet. The first have their chief seat along the trans-Indus frontier, the last occupy the two doabs between the Chenab and the Indus. The Hindoo, unless a Sikh, is the peaceful and indifferent subject of any ruling dynasty—the true Mussulman everywhere retains the traditions and ambitions of his proud blood, regarding all governments with equal animosity, which keep him from his arrogated heritage of empire.

British relations with the Punjab.

Such was the country and such the people to whose subjection and settlement the first years of Lord Dalhousie's administration were destined. It will yet be necessary to trace with a light hand the chain of events which connected them with the English in India. Our first introduction to the Punjab was in 1803, when the Marquis of Wellesley made overtures to Runjeet Singh for assistance in the then waging Mahratta war. In 1805, Holkar and Ameer Khan flying before Lord Lake and a British army, approached the Sikh frontier. Runjeet tried to temporize, but the plain speech of the English rulers, and their evident ability to support it, commanded his adhesion and friendly action. In 1809, to check the too vagrant

inroads of the Sikhs southward, the British Government announced itself the protector of the cis-Sutlej states, and advanced a force upon Umballa. A spirit less ardent than that of the "Lion of the Punjab" might have resented it, as the Sikhs had all along maintained the Jumna to be our proper boundary. But Runjeet Singh measured his strength wisely, and a slight yet suggestive incident probably confirmed his submission. Mr. Metcalfe had gone as an envoy to Umritsur, and was in the company of the Sikh Maharajah on the opening day of the Mohurrum. His escort, principally consisting of Mussulman Sepoys and Sowars, had made preparation to keep the great festival of Hassan and Hoossein. The procession was barely started, when a body of fanatic Sikhs, known as "Akalees,"¹ under the leadership of Phoola

¹ It was an Akalee, and one of Phoola Singh's, who mounted the breach at Mooltan, with forty of his comrades, and took that city for Runjeet, in 1818. The death of Phoola Singh himself illustrates the courage of these Sikh free-lances. A battle was fought in the year mentioned, on the banks of the Cabul river, in which victory seemed to have declared against the Khalsa. The Sikhs under Ventura and Allard, three times failed to drive the Affghans from the Peree hill. A shameful defeat appeared inevitable, and Runjeet vainly adjured his troops, "by God and by their Gooroo," to redeem the day for him, although the Maharajah had dismounted and thrown himself in their path of flight. At this crisis he saw with equal surprise and delight the black flag of Phoola Singh and his Khalsa moving up the foot of the disputed hill. A match-lock ball had shattered the knee-cap of the chief, but he had returned from the rear, and seated on an elephant, was leading his band along the slope. The Affghans met them half way with their war-cry of "Allah, Allah!" the Akalees answered with

Chap. II. Singh, attacked it with a hot fire of matchlocks. Although very unequal in numbers, the Envoy's escort had no idea of submitting to this outrage, but drew up their little force of two companies and a troop, in the solid order of the English army. A fierce struggle ensued, and the Sikhs being in the end beaten off, the gallant guard resumed and completed their celebrations in perfect quiet. Runjeet in person witnessed the discomfiture of his Akalees, and the triumph of British discipline, and secretly withdrew from his half-conceived intent of disputing the East with us, until he had enlisted on the side of his wild levies something of the science of the West. With this view he invited to his capital some of those restless spirits whose hopes of European distinction were closed by Waterloo, and committed to their hands the training of his Khalsa¹

the "Wah Gooroo ji," and springing to the ground, let their horses loose into the ranks of the enemy. Phoola Singh received a second wound but still pressed forward upon the yielding Affghans, and when his mahout, also three times hit, hesitated to proceed, he shot the man dead, and goaded the elephant forward with his sword-point. The victory was purchased by his life, but his tomb at Nowshera, on the Cabul river, is a place of pilgrimage to this day. The Akalees resemble, in some respects, the Ghazees of the Mussulman. Their designation signifies the "Immortals," and their especial practice was to hurl themselves on the lines of an enemy while forming, frequently deciding the engagement at its very commencement. They wore a high head-dress, being thus distinguished from the "nee-mall" Singhs, or Sikhs with a low turban.

¹ A name signifying "elect," conferred on themselves by the followers of the Gooroo, in the spirit common to religious monopolists of Europe as well as of Asia.

army. Ventura, Allard, and Avitabili were followed in this occupation by many skilful officers,¹ who won reward and honour by strenuous and successful labours. Runjeet could thus leave behind him a well-drilled army of 85,000 regular troops, with horse and camel-artillery;² a perfect weapon, except that, like an ill-mounted sword, it galled the hands of those who were to wield it.

The annals of the Lahore Court, from the death of Runjeet Singh in 1839, to the first Sikh war in 1845, present a series of crimes and intrigues. In the keen game for place, the lives of friends, and even kinsmen, counted for pawns, to be sacrificed without hesitation for an advantage or an escape. The foremost figure on the blood-stained board is the Dewan's, Dehan Singh, the Minister of Runjeet, whose plentiful talent so nearly equalled his heartless ambition, that only Golab Singh, his brother, comes near such bad pre-eminence.³ Aspiring to unlimited power as

Events leading to first Sikh war.

¹ In the appendix to his work on the Lahore family, Major Smyth gives a doubtful list of thirty-nine of these. The names of nine Frenchmen occur in it, and of three Americans.

² The camels carried *zumbooraks*, swivel-guns of small bore.

³ The rise to power of these two brothers, and of the third, Suchet Singh, is a story marvellous among the wonders of Hindoo intrigue. In 1812, they were soldiers of fortune in Mean Singh's "misl," or band, receiving four rupees a day. In 1847, Meean Goolanloo, the Rajpoot, better known as the Maharajah Goolab Singh, was lord of Cashmere and Jummoo, acknowledged by the English; while his brothers had been also kings in all but name. The characters of the two who figure in these and subsequent events, is thus drawn with the vigorous outlines of one often near their persons. "Goolab Singh is avaricious and cruel by nature, deliberately committing the most horrible atrocities for the purpose of investing

Chap. II. Regent of Runjeet's son, the young Dhuleep Singh, he is said to have removed in one day

his name with a terror that shall keep down all thoughts of resistance to his sway. With all this he is courteous and polite in demeanour, and exhibits a suavity of manner and language that contrasts fearfully with the real disposition to which it forms an artfully designed but still transparent covering. He is an eater of opium, he tells long stories, keeps irregular hours, sleeps little, has a mind unsettled, of good memory, free, humorous and intimate even with the lowest and poorest classes of his subjects. The partaker and often the companion of their toils and labour, their free, jocose, and humorous neighbour, their kind and continual visitor—yet in reality a leech, sucking their life's blood. Still he must be accounted the very best of soldiers, and, for an Asiatic and an unlettered, uneducated man, he is an able, active, bold, energetic, but wise and prudent commander. He looks more to the future, its wants and requisites, than either to the present or past—slowly goes on and feels his way as he goes—always ensuring supplies and resources—quick in taking opportunities—fond of the defensive though ready to assume the offensive when opportunity offers or requires—but always considering arms as his last resource.”

The character of the second brother is thus sketched by the same hand:—“Rajah Dehan was active, enterprising, princely, energetic and intrepid to a degree; unconscious of all personal danger; despising the habits of the indolent Asiatic life; ever employed in bold and manly pursuits; well accustomed to endure all sorts of privations and fatigue; remarkable for his adroitness in the use of all warlike weapons; expert, quick, agile in all his movements; of a most determined and resolute disposition, but when required to yield, no one able to do so with a better grace; the master of a most winning, gentle, affable, sedate, yet dignified and commanding address; ambitious to a degree that knew no bounds; quick of parts; of deep discernment; discreet, prudent, careful, and ever scrupulous of offending without just cause. Always studying, and seldom failing to gain the respect and good wishes of all around; mild and polite even to the meanest class; extremely laconic in speech; generally silent, thoughtful, and reflective; an enemy to the sensualist, libertine, or debauchee, and of regular and moderate habits himself. He believed but little in either the Jothushee or Nejumee. He despised Brahmans and their tenets as false and foolish, and more than once, speaking in private on caste and religion, &c., he acknowledged that he believed the Europeans knew more about the right way than any

two among the obstacles between the boy and the throne, Kurruck Singh, the successor of Runjeet being despatched by poison,¹ and his son, Nao Nehal Singh, murdered by the fall of an arch, artfully contrived,² as he was returning from his father's obsequies.

The death of Kurruck Singh, and of his son Nao Nehal, left no nearer representative of Runjeet in the path of the Dewan, than the Ranee Chud Kour,³ the widow of Kurruck. The brothers, had, however, another obstacle to remove, in the person of Shere Singh, a reputed

native. But though he may be said to have possessed all those and many other fair qualities, still the good traits in his manifold character seemed to be but as a well-assumed and well-fitting cloak, to screen a Machiavelian spirit, made up with a most dissembling, faithless, subtle disposition. And all for what? Ambition! he was ever determined and indefatigable to gain his end, but blind to the sacrifice it required. Even to his own life, person, honour, and character, as well as to that of his wife, sons, and family; all were shamefully sacrificed to the one consuming passion—ambition and the thirst for aggrandizement."

¹ It is declared that the acetate of lead (*sapheda kaskaree*) and corrosive sublimate (*rus camphoor*) were the drugs employed, and the symptoms of the Rajah's dying agony seem to confirm this.

² The body of the Prince was taken up and placed in a palanquin to be carried into the fort. A sight of it was denied to the Queen Mother, "though she beat the fort gates with her hands for admission." This points to violence as being necessary to complete the stratagem, especially as the palki bearers disappeared. On the other hand, there is grave reason to doubt whether Dehan Singh had any share in the death of the Prince. The same fall of masonry killed his own son. The ex-ruler of Cashmere, his natural enemy, declared him guilty in the presence of Sir John Lawrence, but the Rajah Deena Nath, who was close by at the catastrophe, and Noor-o-deen, brother of the Chief Secretary, held the opposite opinion.

³ "Kour" answers to princess, the masculine title being "koon-war."

Chap. II. son of Runjeet, by the Ranee Metaub, but owning no prouder paternity, if court scandal must be believed, than that derived from the washerman, afterwards the "mooktear," of the Princess. The policy of the brothers was to supersede the Ranee by the advancement of Shere Singh, retaining him upon the "gadi" only so long as their plans might require for development. The Sikh army, the real repository of power, acted and was acted upon by "Punches."¹ Dehan Singh managed those of Lahore, while his brother Golab affected a convenient opposition, and swayed the Dogra contingents. To such reckless perfection of duplicity did they proceed, that the Dogra chief sustained a tremendous siege in the fort of Lahore, and defended it triumphantly against the troops of Shere Singh,² for whom all the while, in due course of their tortuous policy, a fatal success was reserved. When the time ripened, Shere Singh was raised to the throne, and a jagheer, adjoining Golab Singh's frontier,

¹ These "army committees" took their origin from a proposal made by Dehan Singh, when certain military grievances were under discussion, that each company, troop, and gun, should send two men to Durbar to represent the army. The Sikhs called that meeting "the birthday of the Punches." The deputations became an institution, and their head men, acting by subordinates or "kur-punches," could bend the Khalsa to any measure or master.

² It is stated that Shere Singh, while still an aspirant to the throne, made overtures to the British Government for an armed interference in his favour, which were well entertained, and a force was under preparation for the purpose.

and entrusted to his charge, was allotted to the superseded Ranee. She did not long enjoy such a pittance as percolated through her guardian's hands. An offer of marriage made to her by Shere Singh,¹ threatened to necessitate an account of his stewardship, which it was desirable to avoid. Working always by other hands, and in this case by their victims', the Dewan and Golab readily enlisted the pride of the widowed Ranee against the proposals of Shere Singh, inflaming on the other side the Rajah's indignation at finding them rejected. The Durbar had occasion to remove to Wuzeerabad, and Shere Singh chose it as suitable to his blind revenge. Heavy bribes corrupted the fidelity of the chamber-women of the Ranee, and four of them despatched their mistress by dashing her brains out with a rough stone, while engaged behind her in dressing her hair.

No bar but the life of Shere Singh now prevented the proclamation of the infant Dhuleep and delayed the Dewan's regency, played for with such patient cruelty. The brothers found ready assassins in two chiefs of the Scindawalla house, Ajeet and Lena Singh, but their plot in this instance was undermined by a counter-plot. The Scindawallas engaged to take the life of

Murders of
Shere Singh
and Dehan
Singh.

¹ Hindoo custom would have permitted her reception into the Zenana, by the *chudur dalna*, or ceremony of throwing the sheet over the head.

Chap. II. the Rajah, but only as part of a secret plan of their own, which included the death of the Dewan in its provisions. The Maharajah was in Durbar when Ajeet Singh approached him with a smiling obeisance. "See, Rajah!" he said, "I have bought this beautiful English gun for 1,400 rupees. I would not sell it again for twice so much." The Maharajah stretched out his hand to examine the piece, careless of the barrels bearing upon him, and the hammers at full cock. A treacherous pressure of the triggers discharged four bullets into his breast, and with the scream, "*Ei ka dagga?*"—"what villainy is this?"—Shere Singh fell back a corpse. Thus much being done in the Dewan's interest, there remained the deed to be accomplished for their own. Hastening out from the city with a strong escort, the murderers encountered Dehan Singh, with an affability which did not quiet his rising suspicions. It was too late to show them, and he accompanied the Scindawallas to Lahore where, as they protested, the Sirdars only awaited his direction. At the entry of the fort which had witnessed the success of so many of the intriguer's machinations, Ajeet Singh, engaging him at the time in diverting conversation, gave a signal by bending the fingers of the hand behind him, and a shot from a heavy piece brought the Dewan to the ground. He was despatched with sword blows, and his body flung

into the ash-pit of the gun-foundry. He died on the very eve of the triumph of his pitiless policy, for Golab Singh and the Khalsa had made all safe, except his life. Enriched by the Dewan's hand, the soldiers refused to listen to his assassins, and clamoured for their blood. The Dewan's widow stationed herself at the foot of the funeral pile, declaring that she would not mount it till some one should bring her the head of Ajeet Singh. The fort where Ajeet had found refuge was quickly stormed, and Heera Singh, the son of the Dewan, presented the bleeding token of revenge to the expectant Suttee. She placed the "*kulgi*," the warrior-plume of her slain husband, on the turban of her step-son, and gratefully praising his dutiful promptness, took her seat upon the pile with thirteen of her women, and bade them apply the fire. The excitement of the troops was easily maintained by gifts and permission of plunder, and the young Dhuleep Singh was proclaimed by acclamation, with Heera Singh for his Wuzeer.

Dhuleep Singh at this date was a child of tender years, but his accession gave unlimited influence to a very notorious personage, his mother, the Ranee Chunda.¹ History follows

Proclamation
of Dhuleep
Singh.

¹ A wife of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh and the least scrupulous of a corrupt Zenana. One account declares her father to have been a Jat Sikh of the Oolak caste, another makes him of no higher rank than dog-keeper in the service of Runjeet.

Chap. II. reluctantly in the unclean and winding ways of a Hindoo Messalina, and those also live to whose natural sentiment respect is due. Disregard must be shown, therefore, to the Zenana-stories which throw suspicion on the legitimacy of the young Rajah. It was certainly as assured or more so than that of Shere Singh,¹ Peshora Singh, and other princes, born in the palace walls, and recognized by Runjeet. The protection extended by the late Dehan Singh to the Ranee and her son, had sufficiently identified her cause with the Khalsa's, and no excesses of the Queen Mother were likely to shake the devotion of a not censorious soldiery.² These increased perhaps, rather than diminished it. Withdrawn from intrigues of her own seeking, by the watchful and unwelcome addresses of Heera Singh and the Pundit Jellah, she found confidence to appeal to the army through her brother Jewahir, and the Wuzeerate of Heera Singh ended in his head being set on the Loharee gateway, and the elevation of Jewahir Singh as Minister at Lahore.

Wuzeerates
of Jewahir
Singh and
Lal Singh.

The brother of the Ranee Chunda encountered in turn his own rival, in the person of Peshora Singh, another of Runjeet's adopted sons, whose

¹ It is denied, however, that Runjeet Singh ever recognized Shere Singh by adoption.

² Sir J. Malcolm paid the Mohammedans no compliment in comparing the morals of the Sikhs to theirs (*vide* "Sketch of the Sikhs," p. 63).

father's rank was not much superior to his mother's, the slave woman of Sahib Singh. It was no part of Golab's policy to allow an extension of the Ranee's influence, and the Khalsa Panches were soon won by large gifts to secure the downfall of her brother. The treacherous murder of Peshora Singh in the fort of Attock, by the orders of the Wuzeer, did not avert his ruin. At a general review, Jewahir Singh, with his sister and the little Maharajah, were to pass along the Khalsa line. The Minister knew his danger, but trusted to escape by braving it. The Ranee scattered largesse and ornaments from the howdah, and the peril seemed nearly past. They had reached the last division, when a crowd of armed men broke out from the ranks, and compelled the mahout to make his elephant kneel. Roughly ordered to deliver up the boy-king, Jewahir surrendered him reluctantly as his last protection, passionately imploring the soldiers meanwhile to hear his defence. They refused, with tumultuous shouts, to listen to a word. A bayonet thrust under the left arm caused Jewahir to stagger over the rail of the howdah, and before he could recover himself, a matchlock-man discharged his bullet through the Wuzeer's temples. The blood of her brother sprinkled the Ranee's embroidered robe, and the terrified Dhuleep Singh. As for the Princess, her rage set itself no bounds; and the assassins,

Chap. II. like base metal, quickly hot and cold, repented of their act, and before long delivered up one of its instigators. But her demand for the punishment of the prime mover of the plot—the agent of Golab Singh—was evaded; and the Ranee, conscious of inability to cope with the Dogra Prince, rested content with the preferment of Lall Singh,¹ replacing a brother with a paramour.

¹ Lall Singh was the son of a Kotree Brahman, who obtained his first preferment at Court as Treasury clerk in Runjeet Singh's "toshah-Khana," after the conquest of Cashmere.

CHAPTER III.

THE dark and turbid stream of Punjab intrigue at last emerges here into the light of a larger history. To purchase and preserve the favour of the avaricious Khalsa, had become almost as ruinous as to defy it, and the Ranee and her advisers now seem to have conceived the resolution of breaking its power. No rival force was at hand for employing, such as that with which the Roman Emperor crushed his Prætorians, or the Egyptian Pasha his Mamelukes, but over the Sutlej lay the British stations, and an army whose encroachment was every day reported and resented.¹ It was given out that the British intended to seize the independent state of Bhawulpore, and the Sikh royalties on that side of the river. “Wherefore else,” it was plausibly asked, “had the Feringhee strengthened Ferozepore, and concentrated munitions of war there?” “And why else

Chap. III.

First Punjab war.

¹ On several occasions, Lall Sing in open durbar produced and read papers purporting to be letters from Kardars of the country beyond the river, in which it was stated that the British army was already advancing gradually, and was creating disturbance and annoyance in the river-side states. There is no doubt that the belief of our hostility had grounds, though insufficient to justify it.

Chap. III. had that 'brother of the devil,' Napier of Scinde, given out that his legions wanted occupation, and might find it in the Punjab?" The eager spirits of the soldiery were easily stirred into enthusiasm. On a day declared auspicious by the astrologers, Rajahs Lall Singh and Teja Singh met their boisterous partisans at the tomb of the Maharajah Runjeet. The Grunth was read, the sacrament of the "Gurree Persauth"¹ administered, and war was solemnly determined upon. The sirdars and the head men of the Panches placed one hand on the holy book, and one on the hem of Runjeet Singh's grave-canopy, while they swore faithful service to the Maharajah Dhuleep, and obedience to Teja Singh as their commander-in-chief. Eighty thousand fighting men were quickly transported over the Sutlej, with swarms of camp followers, greedy for British booty. Lall Singh himself led the cavalry, twenty-two thousand in number. Either event seemed to promise fairly for the Ranee. If the British were defeated, the popularity of the conquering Court would defy intrigue, and a reverse at their hands might be controlled within safe limits, and would send the Khalsa home a dejected and manageable body.

¹ A ceremony observed at all great assemblies of the Sikhs. Bread and wine were partaken, the first a fine dough, sweetened with sugar and raisins, and slightly baked. The communicants struggled fiercely for their share of the elements, and the officiating Goro was sometimes trampled down by the excited and impatient soldiers.

Lall Singh exhibited in his command the arts of a traitor, or the indecision of a coward. At Ferozeshuhur he was the first to turn his horse's head; and Teja Singh also, arriving on the field with twenty-five thousand fresh troops, dared not, or did not desire to attack the few and wearied victors.¹ Lall Singh and his men flying past the Sutlej, found the gates of Lahore closed against them. The Ranee, terrified by the angry messages of the Sutlej army, which by that time suspected treachery, had stationed strong guards on her walls, and forbidden the ingress of any armed Sikh. But the event of the war is that which connects it with our subject, the duplicity of its conduct was not doubted by the least suspicious Sikhs. At Moodkee, Ferozeshuhur, and Aliwal they were met, and with every advantage worsted, till Sobraon placed their country at our

Chap. III.

Treachery of
Sikh leaders.

¹ "It was on this occasion," says an author, quoted before, "while Teja Singh was assuring the troops that unless they retired, their bridge of boats and the whole line of the river in their rear would be immediately occupied by the British, that an old Sikh horseman, a soldier of the times of Runjeet, galloped up to him, and, drawing his sword, strove by threats and fierce invectives to induce the Sirdar to order the advance instead of the retreat of the army. He pointed to the exhausted British forces unable to fire a shot, and asked what was to be feared from them, who, he declared, would not be able to stand a vigorous charge from the fresh troops now opposed. The conduct and language of this brave old trooper induced Teja Sing with joined hands solemnly to protest and swear by the name of God and his Gooroo, that he had no other intent in retiring than that of saving the troops by preventing their retreat from being cut off by the British. But the old horseman, still convinced of the treachery of the Sirdar, cursed him as a traitor and a coward before the whole army, and then quietly returned to his post in the ranks."

Chap. III. feet. The retreating army had vainly invoked the aid of the one Punjabee who could have rallied them, the wily Golab Singh. The game was played faster than he wished, but its issue was not doubtful to him, and he had no intention of striking against the strongest. At the outbreak of the war he had been summoned from Jummoo to the Court, and had repaired thither with no great alacrity. Invited, implored, compelled to assume the Wuzerate, he contrived to evade its active duties just long enough to be still on the point of starting from Lahore, when the first fugitives came in from Sobraon. The advance of the British forces, and the despair of the Court, gave him the occasion and the office which he desired, and he met the English general at Kussoor, as an envoy requesting peace. The conqueror granted it on terms too easy, if sterner could have been enforced or accepted. The young Maharajah made a formal submission—the protected or cis-Sutlej states were annexed, as well as the Jullundhur Doab,¹ with the Alpine region between the Beas and the Sutlej, and a fine was levied to meet the expenditure of the war. As the Lahore treasury, however, was exhausted, Cashmere and the Jummoo territory were allowed to become Golab Singh's, upon his payment of

A.D. 1846.
February 10.

Treaty of
Kussoor.

¹ With the Jullundhur Doab, the Spitee and Penee Valleys fell to the British. The inhabitants of these Himalayan uplands are Tartars, who thus for the first time came under our direct rule.

the deficiency.¹ It was stipulated that a British resident should be established at Lahore, and a force of ten thousand men maintained there for twelve months, to second his efforts in the restoration of order. So fell the real independence of Runjeet Singh's kingdom, baptized and buried in blood, and ruined by treachery, as it had been reared by it to a power vast enough to challenge the British. Chap. III.

The convention approached its term without much progress having been made to a safe settlement of a country now become our frontiers. The Wuzeer, Lall Singh, was detected in a treasonable plot, and banished from the dangerous temptations of his office and mistress.² A new arrangement was made, by which the guardianship of the infant Maharajah became altogether vested in the British Government, his kingdom to be administered during minority A.D. 1846.
December.
Treaty of
Byrowal and
British Re-
gency.

¹ The revenues of the country would have liquidated the fine, and a most important strategic position have been gained, if circumstances as well as the rights of victory had permitted the annexation of Cashmere. Peshawur is almost less important, since an invading army may approach by Nagyr and Iskardoo as easily as by the Khyber, and the Cashmere ascents are gentler for him. The valley possesses besides a climate adapted to Europeans, and so far from tropical that the natives have a curious habit of carrying little earthen chafing dishes full of live charcoal, under their clothes, for warmth. Lord Hardinge's moderation was undoubtedly inspired by his position. Four pitched battles had reduced his European troops to three thousand men, and Golab Singh was anxious to be a friend, and strong enough to be an embarrassing enemy.

² He had intrigued to prevent Golab Singh's accession to the throne of Cashmere.

Chap. III. by a council of Sikh Sirdars under the British Resident.¹ To this important appointment the force of ten thousand British troops was still to give efficiency, and the illustrious name of Sir Henry Lawrence first represented the Councils of Calcutta in the palace at Lahore.

First effect
of Lord Har-
dinge's policy

The real or apparent forbearance² of Lord Hardinge in recognizing the title of the young King, produced its good effect. On the troubled sea of Asiatic intrigue calm never settles, but it rose at this time, in low and infrequent waves only, the relics of past storms, rather than the forerunners of one to come. Promotion and pay were now divided to the Khalsa by English hands, and the regular distribution of the rupees did away with one chronic source of disorder. The Sikh soldiers at Bunnoo, under Lieut. Edwards, and at Peshawur, with Major Lawrence, were useful and orderly. Even the seizure of cows' flesh, prepared for food, at the gate of a Sikh city failed to move an indignation stronger than the dread and the respect of English tolerance.³ No

¹ Known as "the Treaty of Bhyrowal."

² A speech delivered at the farewell banquet to the Marquis of Tweedale at Madras, rejects the second epithet. It praises Lord Hardinge with festal fervour, because "cradled almost from his infancy in the arms of war, and naturally loving military glory with all a soldier's ardour; at a time when empire was within his grasp, and the flush of victory was yet upon his brow, he withstood the most splendid of temptations, and did not yield to the most legitimate of opportunities; but exhibited the spectacle of a man preferring obedience to duty to the love of power and fame."

³ A letter from Lahore, about this date, states that the Sirdar Teja Singh had of his own accord proposed to license the killing of cows at Lahore, a grace not ever demanded by Colonel Lawrence.

prescient suspicion could attach to the Mooltan Sirdar, Moolraj Singh, busy as ever and anxious among his account-books and goods. The despatches of the Governor-General to the secret committee announce unbroken quiet, while designs for the abolition of forced labour, for the regulation of revenue, and for the marking out of canals, occupy all his attention. The official locusts of the land, Runjeet's Kardars—whose extortion had replenished his coffers, and beggared his people—were under process of extermination. The Punjab had an uneasy rest, and Justice for the first time visited it in the steps of the "Sahib lôg," blind to the glitter of the rupee, and bearing an even balance.¹

Chap III.

But the restless machinations of the Ranee Chunda perturbed, though they could not break up, the political slumber. Constant in her amours to nothing but inconstancy, she had surrounded herself with new lovers, and was concocting with their assistance fresh intrigues. One of her slave-girls, despatched to Mooltan to procure the white âk branch,² potent for Hindoo incantations, carried at the same time incendiary communications to Moolraj. Another, the favourite

Intrigues of
the Ranee
Chunda.

¹ "There is no form of oppression," writes the Lahore Resident, "which has not been common here. All classes of officials from highest to lowest have regarded office for what was to be obtained from it, considering the people as just so many cows to be milked."

² A plant identified with the English "swallow-wort."

Chap. III. Mungeela,¹ brought with her to the palace, from Benares, the consolations and aspirations of the banished paramour, Lall Singh. Reproved for the open indecorum and treason of her durbars, she replied to the Resident in a strain of irony, especially bitter against the Sirdars of the Council. No veil, or only the transparent one of a Persian word, concealed her pretensions. "So long," she wrote, "as the Maharajah is sovereign of his own kingdom, it is the same as if I were sovereign myself."² Her maternal influence was employed in every possible way against the Council of Regency, and at last so openly as to necessitate stringent action on the part of the Sirdars, or the resignation of their posts. The Resident had announced a grand durbar for the installation of Teja Singh, as Rajah of Sealkote, as well as to confer distinctions on fourteen chieftains, including Heera Singh, the brother of the Rancee. Every Hindoo formula of respect was observed for the event, and the court astrologer discovered, from the nicest calculation, the fortunate moment of time for the imposing ceremony. The Rancee Chunda, however, was

¹ Originally a slave-girl, the daughter of a water-carrier. She rose to the exercise of unlimited influence over the Rancee her mistress, and the Prince Teja Singh.

² The sentence puzzled the Moonshees by its artfulness; the original might bear the less arrogant construction of, "Until the Maharajah comes to his kingdom, you may say that I am the head." By the Treaty of Bhyrowal, the Maharancee was specially excluded from all share in the administration of public affairs.

bent on thwarting the Resident and the sooth-sayers, and when Teja Singh bowed before the Maharajah to receive the saffron spot upon the forehead, which would denote him Rajah, the little Prince folded his arms in token of refusal, and flung himself back in the velvet chair with a tutored obstinacy not to be shaken. In this insult the Sirdars read the declared enmity of the Ranee, and their apprehensions of her designs and of her partisans, found further grounds for confirmation.¹ Soon after, indeed, a conspiracy was detected against the lives of the Resident and the obnoxious chiefs, in which her Highness's secretary was deeply implicated. No alternative remained, and the Ranee was removed with every reasonable consideration, and confined in the fortress of Sheikhopoor. The proclamation which notified this separation of the Maharajah and his mother, was received with a striking outward indifference.

Yet neither the frequent change of guard, nor the abrupt reduction of her state allowance to the limits of a private expenditure, could break the wilful spirit of the Queen Mother. An attempt to bribe her sentinels with necklets of pearl and gold, was denounced by the warden of the fort, a Sirdar named Shere Singh, and

¹ At the fireworks which celebrated the evening of the durbar, Heera Singh, the Ranee's brother, was overheard addressing the Maharajah thus:—"Your Highness is out of spirits—I'll bring a company or two soon, and show you some much finer sport."

Chap. III. the cannon of the battlements were removed to Lahore, as a measure of precaution. The Ranee was counselled to abandon her restless hopes, but the feminine ambition which disappointment could not cool, was not likely to subside for menace. The disaffected of the country gravitated to her as the natural centre of a licentious system, and their devotion was animated by her unabating courage. News presently reached the Resident¹ that emissaries of the Queen were active among the Khalsa, and that a Fakeer had arrived in Cashmere with letters from her to Golab Singh. Increased vigilance was ordered, and the Ranee's reception chamber was closed to suspected visitors. The Council of Regency were anxious indeed to remove beyond the Punjab the soured spirit which caused its ferment.

December,
1847. De-
parture of
Lord Har-
dinge.

But here this outline has reached and included the closing days of the Hardinge administration. Writing on the Ganges, in the last month of 1847, the Governor-General was able to report the Punjab to the secret committee as perfectly tranquil. His successor, Lord Dalhousie, is approaching Calcutta by sea, while Lord Hardinge descends to that city by the great river, to surrender his trust. But for the perilous passions of the Queen Mother, he could boast

¹ At this time Mr. John Lawrence, acting in the absence of his brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.

to make over the peninsula free from any disturbing cause. He had satisfied directors and ministers alike. He had conciliated the Court to his Indian policy, without compromising the traditions of the soldier. In forty-two months, the stormy times of Lord Ellenborough had become forgotten in the calm weather of success, and the little cloud which was growing to break in war, might well be overlooked. The victories which his courage had secured, his forbearance was pronounced to have utilized; and our supremacy beyond the Sutlej was declared with complacency to be as real, as if it were loaded with the responsibilities of annexation. At Lahore, the bayonets of the English had taught tolerance to the Sikhs, dull learners under milder teaching. The Mahommedan cry to prayer, the evening and morning "*azan*," which Lahore had never before permitted, sounded openly from her minarets, in discordant harmony with the Khalsa drums and Hindoo tom-toms. In her bazaars, the Sikh endured to see the Moslem butchers slaughter the sacred animal and the Feringhee feed upon it with a shudder instead of a curse and blow. At Calcutta, an annual deficit of two millions sterling was to be exchanged for the financial triumph of a balanced budget. True, the economy was declared costly, and is said to have been dearly paid for at Mooltan and Attock. Yet the mili-

Chap. III. tary retrenchment which, disbanding 50,000 men, still left the army stronger by 70,000 than that enrolled at the last Indian peace, should surely escape censure as excessive. From 1837 to 1846, the Indian army had been increased by 120,000 men, and nearly 1,000 officers, exhausting for maintenance £10,000,000 sterling annually. So vast a host cannot but fall from triumphs in war to turbulence in peace, the peril of mercenaries being ever proportioned to their effectiveness. In the still superb army which Lord Hardinge delivered to Lord Dalhousie, and which some have thus held unwisely diminished, was strength equal not only to the needs of the empire, but almost to its ruin. Lord Dalhousie in adding to its numbers helped to prepare a stupendous imperial danger. This record will indeed exhibit the new Viceroy too busily engaged in employing the instruments of empire to examine them as was demanded, and turning from him, in an hour of offended dignity, the one self-conscious genius who might possibly have reformed the army, and perpetuated the Company's rule. If the destinies of the nation can ever really follow the fortunes of the man, Sir C. Napier might perhaps have altered India's. The student of this epoch observes its tremendous overhanging menace unregarded except by one of the few most competent to have dispelled it, and grieves to see

him harshly relegated to his leisure. Napier, arriving too late to win Goojerat, would perhaps have averted Cawnpore, if the proud spirits of the soldier and the statesman could have found room together in the wide east. But history is full of these riddles, only clear, if at all, when read backwards, and by the light of a later day than that which propounded them.

Yet to assure justice to Lord Hardinge, and to illustrate events which accuse others of supineness rather than him of shortsightedness, it is enough to epitomise his parting precautions for the defence of the frontier. Well aware that the Sikhs were to be trusted as far as their fears, Lord Hardinge doubled the garrison of the north-west. He left on this and that side of the Sutlej more than 50,000 men and 60 guns. Of these, there were 9,000 at Lahore, and nearly as many at Ferozepore — both forces being capable of employ in the Punjab almost at a day's notice. Nearly one-fifth were Europeans; while three moveable brigades of 3,400 men each, with 12 guns and a due proportion of cavalry—their cattle being regularly mustered once a month and a report of their state of efficiency sent in to head-quarters—were to be kept ready to start in any direction, or on any service, literally at a moment's warning. Provision had been made, besides, for pushing on the reserves in the Jullundhur and at other

Parting dis-
positions of
Lord Har-
dinge.

Chap. III stations in the east and south, to reinforce the moveable columns, should it be found requisite for them to take the field. Three regiments of European dragoons were in hand. Three regiments of European infantry could be sent from the hills, and one from Umballa—making in all seven regiments of European infantry and three of cavalry available for service, with 70 guns in addition to the 36 attached to the moveable columns. In all, a force of 20,000 men was afoot, of whom one-third were Europeans, with 100 guns, still leaving 20,000 regular native infantry, and 7,000 cavalry, regular and irregular, as reserves, close at hand. General Little, soon afterwards succeeded by General Gilbert, commanded at the capital, with Brigadiers Campbell and Wheeler under him: officers whose names are their credit and commendation. Not only was the frontier force thus strengthened, but its ancient rival had been removed. The Sikh army, which in 1844 had amounted to 85,000 men with 350 guns, all between the Ravee and Sutlej, and within two forced marches of our frontier, was reduced to 24,000¹ men and 50 guns, scattered over the

¹ This may be considered the maximum. The authority to which I most readily defer writes me that it is in excess. "Their pay passed through our hands, and therefore it is clear the rolls did not show fewer than existed; by these I should say 24,000 was beyond the mark. Our officers in the second Sikh war greatly over estimated the number of their enemies."

whole face of the country. There were at Ramnuggur and Shahpoor about 4,000, and betwixt the Jhelum and Indus about 6,000. Beyond the Indus there were about 7,000, of whom 5,000 were at Peshawur. At Lahore itself there were 2,000, at Govindghur 600. At Mooltan were about 6,000 troops belonging to the Nazim, not included in the Durbar muster-roll.

And if Lord Dalhousie's predecessor had not failed to provide carefully for the exigencies of defence, neither had his warlike pre-occupations excluded civil and social matters from such consideration as a soldier has to bestow. The Government resolution of October, 1844, marks an epoch in Indian educational history, and dignifies an administration engaged with an arduous war. If, still further to relieve the tedious splendour of military successes, some triumph is asked for humanity—some progress achieved in that amelioration of India, which is the purpose of our victories, and is to be their apology—it may be found in the order gracing Lord Hardinge's departure by the final abolition of Suttee. This rite, arising in high and affectionate sentiments, and observed with heroic contempt of pain, had degenerated into an engine of priestly power and show. Already sentenced by Lord W. Bentinck, the last act of Lord Hardinge

Chap. III. did judgment upon a custom where bigotry had overgrown intense and splendid faith.

Accession of
Lord Dal-
housie.

Thus, then, in seeming fair weather, did Lord Dalhousie take the helm from the hands of Lord Hardinge. Those who remember the time, will not need to learn how deceptive was the calm; no settled quiet of summer weather, but the "*burra choop*,"¹ the hush before the bursting of the monsoon, when destruction gathers breath for her next work. But no ill-omens appeared: the augurs of the modern day welcomed the new Viceroy in the press of either country, and presaged for him fortune, and the closed gates of Janus.² The youngest Governor-General ever yet installed, appointed to that all but regal dignity by a ministry of different political traditions from his own, and entering upon it at an hour of general tranquillity, his haruspices might well look carelessly to the birds. They certainly failed to announce in the youthful proprætor the last of the Company's rulers, in whose time the golden fruit of empire, full-

¹ "The great silence," an Hindustani expression to describe the oppressive stillness before the periodical storms.

² Such extracts as the following might be indefinitely multiplied from the journals of the time:—"It may be doubted whether any Governor-General has ever sailed for India with a fairer prospect before him."—*Friend of India*.

"Everything seems to favour the new ruler. Light dawns from all quarters upon his path. India is in the full enjoyment of a peace, which, humanly speaking, there seems nothing to disturb."—*Morning Herald*.

grown and ripened, should fall from the tree which had produced it, and turn out to be attacked and rotting at the core. But no such unwelcome presentiment marred the greeting of the new Governor at Chandpalghat.¹ Congratulations and thundering salutes conducted him to the council-chamber, where the many-coloured public waited to scrutinize and salute their new master. The lieges of his capital city keep none but peaceful and pleasant tasks for him. He comes, say they, from the school of European commerce with the character and antecedents of an administrator, and such an one the times demand. The extension of commerce, not of territory, the march of reform, not of menacing armies, will engage the placid years of this administration. "No Governor-General has ever taken charge of the Government of India, under such peculiar and advantageous circumstances. The youngest ruler who has assumed the responsibilities of this empire, he receives it from his predecessor in a state of tranquillity which has hitherto no parallel in our Indian annals. He arrives at a time when the last obstacle to the complete, and apparently the final, pacification of India has been removed, when the only remaining army which could create alarm has been dissolved, and the peace of the country

Chap. III.

¹ On Wednesday, 12th of January, 1848.

Chap. III. rests upon the firmest and most permanent basis. The chiefs whose ambition or hostility have been the source of disquietude to his predecessors have one and all been disarmed. Not a shot is fired from the Indus to Cape Comorin against our will.”¹ Lucan contrasted such aspirations with similar disappointments when he exclaimed despondingly,

“*Heu ! faciles dare summa Deos ; eademque tueri
Difficiles !*”

¹ “Friend of India,” January 20, 1848.

CHAPTER IV.

THE quiet which had succeeded so much disturbance in the Punjab, extended with slight exceptions, at the accession of Lord Dalhousie, to the whole peninsula. His first despatches on Sikh affairs contain no comments on what was too ordinary to demand them; and his first public appearance as Viceroy took place on the peaceful occasion of a distribution of prizes to native students. The field, rather than the scope and nature of his duty, seemed altered. Internal intercourse and those social questions, which had occupied the Minister at Westminster, engaged also the Governor-General of an empire profoundly reposing. In accordance with the spirit of a time—so soon to suffer change—the earliest labour of the administration is the establishment of an electric wire from Calcutta to Kedgerie. Designs of the same pacific character everywhere engage its officers, and engross their correspondence. A revenue survey is actively proceeding in the Jullundhur Doab,¹ and the newly acquired riverains, where

Chap. IV.

General aspect of affairs at the accession of Lord Dalhousie.

¹ Also called the "Bist Doab," as included between the *Beas*

Chap. IV. more moderate exactions are rewarded by a larger and readier revenue than that extorted by the Kardars. British power acting by the hands, and speaking by the voice of a native Durbar, keeps the outward peace of Dhuleep Singh's dominions. Lahore, the turbulent, makes no sign, though Lord Hardinge, taking home with him Henry Lawrence, has taken away the one strong arm which might have sustained his Punjab policy. To Henry Lawrence, succeeds John Lawrence, his brother by blood and talent; both illustrious in a house, which like the Fabian, has a prescription to serve and save the state. Upon his return from this acting appointment to the Doab of Jullundhur, Sir Frederick Currie assumes the important post. Scientific men, under Dr. Flemming, are examining and reporting upon the resources of the country. Major Napier, with able assistants, is stretching his chains over the land, and opening up disused canals; while the imposing array of British troops at the new Resident's review, affords an apparent guarantee to these campaigns of peace. If any interruption threatens, it is in no graver form than a foray of frontier tribes, chronically at feud—the frenzy of some fanatic Akalee,¹

and Sutlej. A popular legend derives the name from a demon of gigantic size, but it is of course connected with the word *Jal*, water.

¹ Thus Gunda Singh, an Akalee, with some followers, seized a building near the tank at Umritsur, and held it against a com-

whose trade of cutting throats seems gone, and the unresting conspiracies of the Ranee Chunda in her forced seclusion at Sheikhopoor. Chap. IV.

The cloud on the clear sky rose from Mooltan. Mooltan and
Moolraj. That city is the capital of the province so named, and next to Lahore, Umritsur, and Peshawur, the most important of the Punjab. Its position upon the Chenab, and in the highway of the Lohanee trade from central Asia to Hindostan, long ago made it metropolitan. Every western invader in his turn has coveted the protection of its fortress or the wealth of its bazaars. Good reason indeed is given for supposing it to be the scene of Alexander's struggle with the Malli, but if the Ionian and Macedonian hoplites never spent staters and daries in its busy streets, the soldiers of Tamerlane's grandson, Mahmoud of Ghuznee, have scoured them, and Ahmed Shah, the Dooranee Sultan, devoted them to plunder. In later times, Runjeet Singh coveted the river-side city, and made repeated efforts to wrest it from Surfuraz Khan, the Affghan feudatory. After three failures his troops carried the walls, stirred into mad valour by an Akalee, who mounted the breach almost alone, and planted the black banner upon its crest. Mooltan thus became subject to the Sikh chieftain, for whom it was

pany for three days. The threat to blow the tower up enforced his submission.

Chap. IV. held by Sawun Mull. At Runjeet's death, this governor had acquired so great wealth and influence in office, that his subordination to the Lahore Court was almost nominal. Sawun Mull was pistolled in Durbar, by design or accident, and the accession of his son, the Dewan Moolraj, was accepted as a matter of course by the Lahore Government of 1844, too much embarrassed already to refuse the recognition demanded chiefly as a form. Afterwards, when opportunity suggested the claim, the Lahore Durbar demanded a price for its confirmation of the Dewan's Nizamut. Hindoo custom, and the practice of the Punjab, made such a demand legal, since an installed Sirdar always paid a "nuzzurana" before entering upon his province. Well aware of the prosperous operations of the father, the Durbar fixed the son's nuzzurana at the sum of one crore of rupees.¹ The demand had been contracted to eighteen lakhs, and payment was hesitatingly promised, when the first Sikh war intervened. Under the British Regency the new Durbar again pressed for payment, and Moolraj eventually produced the sum required; acknowledging too the suzerainty of the Lahore

¹ Writing on Khalsa times to the Secretary to Government, Sir John Lawrence remarks with force:—"When it is considered that Sawun Mull collected his fortune of ninety lakhs in less than twenty years, and not engaged in any trade or speculation, that he bore the character of being just and considerate to the people, and faithful to his master, what a picture it portrays of Punjab Government!"

Government, by the surrender of a part of his province, and the engagement to pay nineteen lakhs yearly on account of what remained.¹ To consent to such terms, was to relinquish the ambition of a lifetime, but the Mooltan Kardar was not now prepared to refuse. Sawun Mull had been noted for his intense hatred of the English, and any share of that enmity which Moolraj inherited could not have been diminished by conditions, ascribed by him to English inspiration, and reducing him from the throne of a prince, to the stool of a Kardar.

Unable, as he presently declared, to keep to his agreement, Moolraj would have made overtures to the Durbar for some modification of it. But despairing of success, he communicated to the Resident his desire to resign Mooltan. With that proposal he coupled the conditions that a jagheer should be given him, that no charges should be entertained against his administration, and that only one year's account should be called for at his hands. The Resident, acting for the Council, was firm almost to harshness, and would accept nothing but unconditional resignation, if Moolraj still persisted in that step. He intimated that accounts for ten years would be called for, with the view to a prospective settlement. "How can I produce my father's papers?"

Resignation
of Moolraj.

¹ These terms were made in 1846 at Lahore, to which city Moolraj came on the guarantee of Sir John Lawrence.

Chap. IV. asked the embarrassed Dewan; "the ants have eaten them, or if the ants have left any, they are useless for your purpose—I am in your hands." His despair was coldly construed into resignation.¹ and official notice was given him that a British Resident and a Sikh Sirdar would shortly arrive to relieve him of the charge of Mooltan. The trader-prince thus found himself baffled in every point. No real desire could have moved him to resign, but he chafed in the narrowed limits of his authority, and nervously dreaded those courts of justice which the English were establishing in the country. The new Adaw-lutees would give a voice to his enemies, perhaps even to his victims, and there might be much in Mooltan annals which were best kept from inquisitive English justice. Had the Durbar amnestied all the past in accepting his resignation, his gains would have been secure, and private ease have consoled Moolraj, for power embittered by family feuds, burdensome to his failing health, and curtailed of its former greatness. As matters stood, he had lost all. His fort and palace were to be surrendered—accounts kept

¹ The Persian document containing the Dewan's resignation is said to have been accidentally burned when the Residency caught fire. As the Dewan afterwards denied an unconditional surrender, the point might be recalled in his favour, especially as he neither examined nor understood the English counterpart handed him by Sir J. Lawrence. It must not, however, be conceived that any pressure was put upon Moolraj, who had the paper of course in Persian. The conduct of the Resident was perfectly straightforward, and nothing is more embarrassing to a native.

by the sword's point had to be submitted to the auditor's pen, and enemies must henceforth be met by argument, who had hitherto been silenced by force. The horizon of his future life was already as dark with danger as rebellion could make it, and if the Dewan had not determined on resistance as he rode, yet its master, in and out of the gate of Mooltan, it was because his courage needed opportunity to make it equal to his anger and despair. Chap. IV.

The Sirdar Kan Singh, "reported a brave soldier and intelligent man," was nominated by the Resident to replace Moolraj. Mr. Vans Agnew received appointment to accompany the Sirdar to Mooltan as Political Agent; and Lieutenant Anderson, an officer of much accomplishment and promise, was to be his associate in this office. An escort of horse, Ghoorka foot, and artillery—500 of all arms—accompanied the young officers and the newly elected Governor to Mooltan. They reached the city on the 14th of April, and encamped outside the north face of the fortress, at the Eedgah, a Mahomedan place of prayer. The official letter announcing their arrival, and their first interview with the Dewan in Kan Singh's tent, has the interest attaching to the last hours of a peace, and the last words of a life. It speaks with light carelessness of Kan Singh's seeming impatience to have the garrison transferred, criticizes

April, 1848.
Deputation
of Agnew and
Anderson.

Chap. IV. the fort with a sagacious eye, and briefly anticipates their quiet entry on the morrow. The next letter of Vans Agnew is a hurried scrawl in pencil, traced by a bleeding hand, announcing the attempted murder of himself and his companion, the rebellion of Moolraj, and the outbreak of the second Sikh war.

The assassi-
nation of the
political
agents.

It had been arranged in the interview with the Dewan, that the fort should be made over on the 19th. At sunrise on that day, accordingly, Sirdar Kan Singh and the English officers proceeded to the fort, with two companies, and twenty-five sowars. The Dewan met and saluted them at the Kummer Kota gate. At entering, the Jemadar of the post hesitated to admit the escort. "Let them pass in," said Moolraj, "the Saheb is our master now." The fort was then exhibited, the keys were handed to the officer of the Ghoorkas, the new sentries were posted, and the English gentlemen prepared to return to their encampment. The road lay through the Sikhee gate, where a narrow bridge spanned the deep ditch by the glacis. At this point Mr. Vans Agnew and Moolraj were riding side by side, Lieutenant Anderson and Kan Singh following at a little distance. At the foot of the bridge a sepoy rushed out upon Vans Agnew and stabbed him on the shoulder with a short spear. The officer was unarmed, but he struck at his assailant with a riding-stick, and dismounted to

close with him. Moolraj at this juncture spurred his horse over the bridge, and galloped out of sight, while Anderson and Kan Singh, who came hurrying up, were set upon by horsemen of Moolraj, and the first cut down. Some Ghorka soldiers took up Anderson, bleeding from four wounds, and bore him to the Eedgah, whither also Kan Singh, having procured an elephant, contrived to convey Vans Agnew. Moolraj had meanwhile hastened to the An-Khas, his summer palace, and as the wounded officers passed under its wall, his gunners manned a piece upon the parapet, and fired upon them. While his wounds were dressing, Agnew wrote a hasty note to Lahore and Bunnoo, and despatched a message to the Dewan, acquitting him of connivance in the attack, but requesting his immediate presence, and the punishment of the assassins. The reply of the Dewan was evasive, and such as to prepare the young officers for their fate. On the next morning the guns of the fort opened upon the Eedgah, and were replied to with effect by the Sikh artillerymen, the exchange of shots continuing all day. A last effort was tried by Vans Agnew. He forwarded to the chieftains under Moolraj the purwannahs of the Maharahaj, and called on them to obey and receive Kan Singh, the elected of their king. "Moolraj is our master," they replied. "Hindoo and

Chap. IV. Sikh, we are all sworn on the Grunth and Koran to obey him, and fight out his battle." Yet the two Englishmen did not despair; they trusted to defend the building till reinforcements might arrive. But treachery supported force; a deserter from the escort, returned in sight of them, loaded with golden chains and bracelets; and the profit of treason was too striking to resist. In vain Agnew also appealed to their avarice by gifts, as well as to their honour by reproaches; before evening all had deserted except Kan Singh, eight or ten of the cavalry, and the personal attendants of the English gentlemen.¹ These were grouped about the beds under

¹ As an account veracious on the face of it, and showing that Moolraj rather followed than led the rebellion at its outset, the letter may be quoted, which was addressed, after the above events, by the revolted escort to the troops under Edwardes.

"April 22, 1848.

"By the favour of the Holy Gooroo.

"Written by Esra Sing, Golab Sing, Gooldeep Sing, and the whole of the Khalsa troops under Kan Sing Man.

"Wah! Gooroo-je-Ko futteh, from all the Khalsa.

"The facts connected with the Khalsa are as follows:—We marched from Lahore with the Feringees, and arrived at Mooltan on Tuesday, the 8th of Barsukh (18th of April). On the following day, Dewan Moolraj went to the fort, accompanied by the Feringees and our troops, and, having made it over, placed two of our companies inside. One hundred men remained of those who had been stationed there previously. The Dewan then left the fort with the Feringees.

"The following scene took place:—A sepoy out of service thrust a spear at one of the Feringees, who fell from his horse, The sepoy then wounded the other Feringee twice with his sword. We afterwards went off, taking with us to our camp the Feringees and Sirdar Kan Sing; while Moolraj returned to his abode. Rungram (Minister of Moolraj) remarked to the Dewan, that they ought to go and see the Feringees.

the dome of the Eedgah, which another handful of such faithful followers might still have held. The noise of the city rabble approaching to consummate the day's work, was heard outside. Sirdar Kan Singh begged leave to wave a sheet and demand quarter. "Ask quarter for yourselves," replied Vans Agnew, "they will give none to us; but let them kill us, we are not the last of the English." By this time the mob burst in, with savage shouts; made Kan Singh their prisoner, and pushed aside the servants who still guarded their helpless masters. Lieutenant Anderson lay on his couch unable to move, and Vans Agnew was sitting by him, holding the hand of his friend. The quiet air of the Englishmen as they bade each other their eternal farewells, arrested for an instant the advance of the howling crowd. At the next, a deformed low-caste pushed to the front, and

"Moolraj then returned, unattended by any of his own sepoy, when a strange occurrence took place by the Gooroo's will.

"The whole of the Mooltan Sikhs, together with the Mussulman soldiers, went in a body to the Dewan, and said, 'We won't let you go;' to which he replied, that he must go.

"A sepoy then drew his sword, and wounded Rungram three times.

"In the confusion which ensued, Dewan Moolraj's horse reared and threw him.

"The soldiers, then, carried him and Rungram off to their quarters, where they told him that it was the Gooroo's order to expel the Feringees by force. The Dewan would not consent, that day. On the following morning, by God's will, the guns were fired, and the Gooroo ordered us to advance; for so it has been written in the Gooroo's writings. Upon this we obeyed his injunctions, and joining the Mooltanees, killed the Feringees."

Chap. IV. after insulting his victims with the fluent foulness of a native's tongue, he swung his sword round upon Agnew's neck, hacking the head away at the third blow. Anderson was despatched with the same brutality, and the two heads were carried away by the exulting murderers to the palace of the Dewan. They forced their way to the Diwan-Khana, and flung the tokens of their deed at the feet of Moolraj. His nature was a Sikh's nature, but it shrank from the cowardly murder which their taunts and threats, and his own half-willing complicity, already declared his. Hesitation was indeed no longer permitted to the Dewan, and he adopted the rebellion with the crime. The assassin of Vans Agnew received the horse and arms of his victim—golden bracelets and gifts of money rewarded others who had distinguished themselves by treason or violence. Agnew's head was flung to Kan Singh, with the contemptuous order to "carry back to Lahore the boy he had brought to govern Mooltan men." It is related that the Sirdar, recollecting the kindly nature of his murdered companion, shed tears at this last insult;¹ but such fidelity, if indeed ever shown, provoked only fresh indignities. When every ingenious

¹ Subsequent disclosures implicating the Sirdar in a plot against the British purse, forbid an absolute credit to this reported sensitiveness. The inhumanity of Moolraj is mitigated not only by the circumstances of his position, but by the private order which he is declared to have given to inter the dead bodies at the Eedgah, and to replace the silken shrouds stolen from them.

barbarity had been exhausted on the corpses, they were thrown aside, and found a kindly burial at the hands of some Affghan merchants, who wrapped them in their own silken shawls, and rudely imitating the processions they had seen in English funerals, interred them at the Eedgah, according to the custom, as they said, of Inglistan. I find no reason to justify the condemnation of the Resident for the despatch of this commission. To have attached British troops to the escort, would have been to provoke the outbreak, which no one dreamed of, least of all the able officers entrusted with the duty of relief. Many a duty of like nature had been so done, from which no evil resulted or was prophesied by those numerous seers whose predictions coincide with events in point of time as well as of fact. Mr. Agnew's worth and experience is apparent from his selection for such employment, and from the heroism of his last hours. Lieutenant Anderson, the brother-in-law of Sir J. Outram, and approved an able officer by Sir Charles Napier, did honour to his line, and deserved his reputation. The loss of such men, on such a mission, and the evidence afforded, by the treachery of their guards, of Khalsa disaffection, sent a shock through the quiet stations of the Punjab, and far away in Calcutta startled the Governor-General from his peaceful plans.

It would be to misunderstand the internal

Chap. IV. condition of the Punjab, at this date, as gravely
 Internal con- as some of those who governed it, if the murder
 dition of of the English agents were taken as an acci-
 Punjab. dental treason, breaking up, for one private dis-
 appointment, the otherwise established public
 peace. It appeared as such at first to those on
 the spot, but the light of later revelations, exhi-
 bits the then existing system of government as
 undermined, and treachery universal, but so
 well masked, that traitors failed to suspect its
 presence. The main plot did not perhaps include
 Moolraj among its supporters, arose assuredly
 without his cognizance, and was certainly not
 ripe at the time when the Mooltan Nizam re-
 belled. The confession made afterwards by the
 vakeel of the Ranee Chunda before his execu-
 tion, acquitted Moolraj himself of a share in the
 conspiracy; and if the tongue of a moribund
 Brahman speaks the truth doubtfully, the letters
 produced on the trial of her Highness's¹ priest,

¹ Their cryptographic phrases are curious. The Maharanee Chunda is called "the cow;" letters are "pictures;" but the sub-joined extracts will best exhibit them:—

"No. 17. Written to the Beebee Sahibjee and the Maharajah, by Shibdyal.

"The string has been put round the cow's (*Maharanee's*) neck by the Europeans, who are pulling her members to pieces. The master of the cow (*the Khalsa*) says—'Release my cow. Buy twelve rupees worth of grain' (*alluding to fixing twelve rupees as pay of sepoy's who join in the conspiracy*). I have made arrangements for killing Tej Sing, in concert with Mora, Chunda's brother.

"The butter-man receives ten rupees for each letter which he conveys to you in your butter, and the mehtar who forwards your letters to me takes five rupees for each letter.

"I have got an amulet made for you, at an expense of 200 rupees. Whatever wish you may imagine will be accomplished by it."

Shibdyal, will show how centralized was the intrigue. These had been discovered in an amulet upon his arm, addressed from the Sirdars to the Ranee, and proving the existence of an organized revolt. Hardly a name upon the Council of Regency escapes imputation in this correspondence, which observes all the precautions of ingenious treachery, but exhibits it everywhere active and hopeful. The probabilities seem strong that the act of a Mooltan soldier, apprehensive of dismissal under the new Nazim, compromised Moolraj, and precipitated him into a rebellion, not long evitable. That Kan Singh Man, if he grieved over his murdered friends, grieved also at the inopportuneness of their death. That the protective government had collapsed rather before the Sirdars and the Ranee expected, but in consequence of their overtures to Moolraj and other chiefs, and to the Sikh soldiers, all impatient of English order, and rendered hopeful by the departure of Henry Lawrence.¹

The conduct of Lord Dalhousie at this crisis, and of the Commander-in-chief, Lord Gough,

April, 1848.

The conduct of Lord Dal-

¹ Cf. the letters in cipher afterwards quoted.

"No. 27. Written by Shibdyal to Beebee Sahibjee.

"(After blessings.)

"The Rajahs have devised a scheme, in concert with John Lawrence (!) for making away with you, by putting something in your food.

"Rejas Tej Singh, Shere Singh, and Deena Nath have joined in the plan.

"Don't place reliance in any one; *but be wary until Currie Sahib comes.*"

Chap. IV.
 housie
 and of the
 Commander-
 in-Chief.

will always afford a thesis to those who love to construct hypothetical history, and speculate on the altered fortunes of the world, if Hannibal had marched to Rome from Cannæ. It stands, indeed, as quite possible that an instant movement of English troops from Ferozepore would have averted the second Sikh war. The Resident did not miscalculate the peril. "If this insult," he wrote to the Governor-General, "be not punished, and speedily, we may expect the Affghans to establish themselves on the Indus; the cis-Sutlej will not remain quiet, and thousands of Sikhs will join Moolraj in the Manjha, giving him out as the restorer of the Khalsa rule, prophesied by their priests." On the 24th of April, so soon as intelligence reached him, he applied to the General commanding the Lahore division to prepare a British column, and ordered all the disposable troops of the Sikh force to be held in readiness for a march on Mooltan at an hour's notice. When a later news-letter from Bahawalpoor announced the defection of the Sikh escorts, it seemed no longer prudent to despatch a native force. The Regency Sirdars, who showed no alacrity whatever in act or council, professed that their Sikhs could not be relied on, probably not relying themselves upon the complete readiness of the men for revolt. Upon Sir F. Currie's information, his resolve was wisely taken, to hold back the English

troops for the safety of Lahore, and not to increase the strength of Moolraj by sending his countrymen against him. He followed the course which remained, and, on the 27th of April, requested Lord Gough to forward aid from Ferozepore, representing the menace to English authority, apart from that of the Durbar, to be past prudent forgiveness. The siege train, his letter urged, was at Ferozepore; from that station to the Bahawulpore Ghât there existed excellent water-carriage by the Sutlej, and thence to Mooltan was but forty miles. The Nawab of Mooltan was our staunch ally, and supplies were assured. True, the season was one of intense heat, precluding the rains of the monsoon, but May and June would bring worse weather, and if the fort were strong, its defenders could have had no time to organize resistance, and might be crushed at a blow. With such eager desire to anticipate objections, and to present the political crisis in its just colours, the Resident made his application to the Commander-in-Chief; despatching a duplicate of his request, and the grounds for it, to the Supreme Government. Lord Gough's reply was cool and final. It reached the Resident by a letter, in which the conclusion not to move owed none of its cogency to the premises advanced. Mooltan is but sixteen marches from Ferozepore; sepoy forces in any heat might have attacked

Chap. IV. the fortress, nearly as well as Sikhs could defend it; and the Resident had offered to contribute the wing of an English regiment. The delay dreaded by Lord Gough in obtaining success could not entail worse consequences than the refusal to act at all, while, on the side of enterprise, were all the chances which fortune reserves to it. With the Hindoo, courage is elastic, and contracts as quickly as it expands; but it could not fail to swell at the spectacle of a power which had humbled the Khalsa, now consenting to wait for pleasant weather, before it punished, or stirred to punish, a Kardar of Runjeet for the murder of an English Resident. Not a line of Lord Gough's refusal seemed reasonable then; read now, it appears unhappy in the last degree. Worse befell than a failure to take Mooltan; the troops had to move in weather deadlier, or so considered, than April heat and dust, and to contest pitched battles for empire, instead of trench-fights for a fort. The responsibility of a decision which Lord Dalhousie accepted, rests also upon him; but this slackness of judgment is the first and last of a statesman new to his rule, and loth to surrender its peaceful purpose for the recognition and preparations of war. A civilian, not a soldier, the viceroy's unused ear mistook the language of the cannon firing on the Eedgah; but to the general who fought in the first Sikh war, they

should surely have spoken general rebellion. Indian critics, weighing the policy of the Commander-in-chief, cannot well be answered while they accuse it here of bidding murder go free in Hindostan because the sun was hot, and thereby renouncing English supremacy for half the sultry months of the eastern year.¹ Those, too who have witnessed a hot season passed in the repression of a mutiny, and British courage winning its best triumphs under a sun almost intolerable to the native-born, will be less easily persuaded of Lord Gough's judgment than they are satisfied of his spirit and good intentions. He elected to wait, and the Fabian policy would have cost more than Chillianwala if nothing but delay had opposed the Punic faith and force of the Mooltan chief. It may be, of course, if the force so carefully organized by Lord Hardinge for the purpose had been pushed up the Sutlej, that the repression of the rebellion would have been premature, and never have issued in measures which restored the Punjab to order, and made it a defence of the empire instead

¹ There are no local rains in Mooltan; it is beyond the limits of the monsoon, but so far within its influence, that the urgency of the heat is allayed, and the air is softened by rains over the neighbouring countries, and the inundations from the streams which flow through it. Lord Gough was not, it appears, aware that the two officers who had resided in Mooltan and its vicinity, Major Mackeson and Captain Cunningham, both wrote, in May, recommending operations in July and August, rather than during the prevalence of the hot winds of May and June.

Chap. IV. of its danger. But the plain counsels of a soldier contemplate no such distant contingencies, and must decline the credit of them. The rough logic of war, by which the world yet consents to reason, has at least simple rules for its dilemmas and processes; and a good general is he who trusts least to time and chance, which good sense and the Greek historian forbid him for allies. His measures, if mistaken, cannot be justified by their results. The act of the consumer of the Corinthian temple might as reasonably find excuse, because the fire produced and discovered the commixture of Corinthian bronze.

The move-
ments of
Edwardes.

Agnew's pencilled note reached Lieut. Edwardes at Deera Futteh Khan, upon the Indus, on the 22nd of April. Busy, like a hundred other officers, in the labours of peace, he was sitting in a tent full of Belûchi zemindars, who were either robbers, robbed, or witnesses to the robberies of their neighbours, taking evidence in a trial. Loud footsteps, as of some one running, were heard without, came nearer, and at last stopped before the door. There was a whispering, a scraping off of shoes, and brushing off of dust from the wearer's feet, and then the *pardah* at the door was lifted, and a runner, stripped to the waist and streaming with heat, entered, and presented a letter-bag, the crimson hue of which proclaimed the urgency of its con-

tents. "It was from the Sahib in Mooltan," he said, "to the Sahib in Bunnú; but the Sahib here might as well look at it."

The Persian superscription on the bag ran, "To General Cortlandt, in Bunnú, or wherever else he may be."

The air of the messenger, perhaps a vague presentiment of evil, induced Edwardes to open it, and he read in a few quiet words the catastrophe of a policy and the spilling of English blood. A hasty line was despatched promising succour to the officers, and preparations to march were instantly begun. Edwardes had with him 2 guns, 20 zumbooraks, 12 infantry companies, and 350 horsemen, for with such a train the collectors and the judges of the turbulent frontier had then to travel. By midnight of the same day he had collected the boats of every ferry within reach, and, on the 25th, had not only crossed the Indus with his force, but occupied Leia, the capital of the Sind Saugor Doab. Here he became aware of the death of the two English officers, and of the defection of their escort, and suspended his advance till news should come of some action from the side of Lahore. The reward of his soldierly promptitude was already obtained in its effect upon the excited population. The Doab had its first intelligence of the rebellion of Moolraj in the dust of Edwardes's advance; and with Leia in his

Chap. IV. hands, the "rubbee" crops just ripening for his commissariat and treasury, and General Cortlandt behind him with a body of 2,000 men, the game seemed yet too dangerous to join. Had tidings of any contemplated demonstration from Lahore or the cis-Sutlej reached the wavering partisans of Moolraj, the march on Leia, although retraced, must have averted the second Sikh war. To maintain the position without a diversion, was not possible; Edwardes soon discovered that his Sikhs had sold their leader's head to Moolraj for 12,000 rupees, and their own adhesion for as much more. Moolraj was advancing in the face of him with 4,000 men and 8 heavy guns. "I am like a terrier barking at a tiger," he writes, and the simile fairly describes the tenacity with which he strove to keep his ground. Of all the troops under him, only 300 Barukzyes and some of Lumsden's Guides could be relied on; the rest were soldiers of the Durbar, not to be trusted near their rebellious comrades. At last, a manifesto, addressed by Kan Singh Man and the Mooltan Sikhs to those under Edwardes,¹ reached his hands. It became clear that the Indus must again be placed between them, and even the Poorbeah troops implored their commander to retreat, while cossids brought news that Moolraj would reach Leia on the 1st of May.

¹ Quoted at page 67.

Retiring, therefore, from treachery, and not from Moolraj, Edwardes fell back to the river; but halted upon its bank in a half-moon, content with securing the means of passage. On the 3rd of May, a bold reconnoitre discovered the enemy still advancing. With deep reluctance Edwardes recrossed the river, conveying his yet more reluctant army of traitors with him, by sheer tact and judgment. On the farther bank the boats were placed in safety, and Cortlandt joined with his Mussulmans and 6 guns. Chap. IV.

On the 10th, a vakeel from Moolraj arrived at Edwardes's camp, where he and Cortlandt were busily enlisting all the Pathans they could find. The vakeel's overtures of surrender tended to nothing, unless to show how little heart Moolraj had yet in the revolt, and how large a place Edwardes's conduct had won him in the regard of his enemies. Yet farther to evince the effect of an energy but rumoured, the rebel troops in Leia fell back tumultuously to Mooltan, upon the report that English troops were in motion from Lahore. Edwardes immediately reoccupied the town with a body of cavalry, and these again had to yield to the return of the rebel forces. Being reinforced, however, by night, they attacked the enemy gallantly, took from him ten camel guns, and forced his leader to seek concealment in the high plants of a

Edwardes
enlists
Pathans.

Chap. IV. tobacco field, thus striking the first successful blow of the campaign. Yet Moolraj was again advancing, secure of his rear, and bent not only on fighting, but upon transferring the fight to the dangerous ground of the frontier. Edwardes entreated the assistance of some diversion,¹ and concentrated his own levies and Cortlandt's upon Deera Ghazee Khan.

March of
Bahawal-
poor allies.

But the dignity of justice and of the Government was no longer entirely relegated to the protection of a lieutenant of the Company's army. Edwardes had written, as indeed had Agnew, to our ally Nawab Khan, of Bahawalpoor, and the Resident now called upon that Prince for assistance. With a promptitude which must have seemed surprising to the Commander-in-chief, he sent a large force of fighting Pathans over the Sutlej, which moved at once in four divisions straight upwards towards Mooltan. It was accompanied by Lieutenant Lake, an able officer, and occupied Jelalpoor²

¹ "I have candidly laid the whole state of the case before you, and again repeat my conviction that, if a British force does not threaten Mooltan, or Bahawal Khan cross the Sutlej, General Cortlandt's force and mine must, sooner or later, be destroyed. If neither of these moves seems advisable, I can only assure you of my protracting what resistance is in my power, as long as possible. Circumstances, however, are much altered for the worse since it was determined to defer hostilities till the cold season. Dewan Moolraj was then merely holding a strong fort against the Sirkar. He is now in the field, hunting the Royal armies."—*Letter to Resident.*

² Jelalpoore Peronwalla, 40 miles from Mooltan.

on the third of June. This advance and the success at Leia had strengthened Edwardes, and the capture of Deera Ghazee Khan by a volunteer force of Cortlandt's Affghans, gave him a strong position upon the Indus, in face of which Moolraj had to relinquish his designs on the Derajat. The Dewan by this time was thoroughly committed to rebellion, and employing all the resources of wealth and the persuasions of religion to equip his fortress and fill it with Sikh defenders.

Meantime, at Lahore, the plot had been discovered, which, by its extent and nature, justified the caution of the Resident in retaining his English troops. A faithful Sowar had given information that tempting offers were being made to seduce the Lahore garrison; and his disclosures led to the arrest of a Sikh general and Gunga Ram, the vakeel of the Queen Mother. Papers were found upon them, involving all the Sirdars of the Council in the conspiracy, except Teja Singh, and proving the Ranee Chunda to be the instigator and supporter of the design. It had been maturing ever since the departure of Henry Lawrence, and had reached such ripeness that the troops for Mooltan were prepared to join Moolraj so soon as the British brought them within sight of that city. Kan Singh Man, the nominated successor of Moolraj, was vaguely named among the

Chap. IV.

June 3, 1848.

Conspiracy
at Lahore.

Chap. IV. conspirators, as one whose purpose of seizing Agnew and Anderson had been anticipated by their murder at Mooltan. Such were the revelations made by the prisoners on the eve of their execution. It took place at the Delhi gate of Lahore, in presence of two companies from each native regiment. An incident of the scene is related which seems to show how little of the secret was known. The wife of the Sikh chief was present at the gibbet, and begged the bracelet of her husband as a relic of him. It was detached and presented to her; upon which she instantly pressed a concealed spring, and, taking out a small paper, tore it into a hundred pieces, some of which she swallowed, exclaiming, "Ah! you would have given half the Punjab to have read that paper." It needed nothing like this to confirm the Resident's apprehensions of the Queen Mother. He had seen reason to believe that she was still actively intriguing with Golab Singh, whose fidelity could be trusted just so far as it might prove consistent with his interest. Her correspondence with Moolraj was also before him. Altogether, it was not longer tolerable to retain in the Punjab a woman who was the torch of sedition, dangerous by her very presence in the midst of inflammable material. To have brought to trial the widow of the great Runject Singh would have irritated the Sikhs, and her conviction could only have

Banishment
of the Maha-
ranec.

strengthened their sympathies. It was accordingly determined to remove her quietly from Sheikhoopoor to Benares by way of Ferozepore, and the transfer was effected without disturbance.¹ The Ranee was permitted to retain her servants, and to take all her personal property and jewels, and the officers of her escort observed towards her the attentive consideration which the excesses of the woman had almost forfeited to the misfortunes of the Queen. Lord Dalhousie, communicating this measure of precaution to the Secret Committee, adds, that he had thought fit to reduce her already limited allowance. Thus the Maharanee of the Punjab passes from the scene, her greatness shorn and her lovers lost, a prisoner in the cloisters of Benares, instead of mistress of the Punjab plains, as her restless heart had hoped, and Sikh caprice promised.

The measures of Edwardes, conceived with judgment and executed with spirit, had by this time secured the trans-Indus frontier. He had recruited his force with 3,000 Pathans, whose love of fighting became legitimate without suffering abatement. The victory at Deera Ghazee

Further
movement of
Edwardes.

¹ The removal was but barely in time for the purposes of the Government. On the Ranee being taken by the escort from Sheikhoopoor, one of her slave-girls remarked: "It is well for you that you have come now; an hour more, and it would have been too late."

The intercepted letter of Shibdiyal, the Ranee's priest, advising her Highness to make immediate preparations for flight, accounts for this speech.

Chap. IV. Khan had given him the river and a fleet of thirty-nine boats, collected by Moolraj for the traject. With the Daoud-potras,¹ checking Moolraj in the south-east, and securing the country between the Sutlej and Mooltan, the hard-fought game began to show new phases. At Koreyshi, upon the Indus, lay another fleet of boats, and Moolraj sent his cavalry by forced marches to secure them. But Edwardes had been able to anticipate the movement, and the rebel Sowars found the fleet hauled up beyond their reach. With seventy boats and a force eager for action, Edwardes could now join the Bahawulpore Chieftain advancing with 6,000 men, for which step, if necessary, he had obtained the Resident's permission. On the 10th of June, Moolraj withdrew from Koreyshi to oppose the progress of the Daoud-potras, and on the same day Edwardes placed ten guns and 2,500 Pathans on board his flats, and began the passage of the Indus. The river at this point is fifteen miles wide, and the force did not muster on the left bank till the 14th. Pushing his men across the Doab, he reached the Chenab on the 17th, and, against orders, or rather anticipating them, he made the passage of that stream the same night, with a portion of his forces. Edwardes himself slept on the right bank, but embarked to cross with a detachment of his

¹ The name borne by the Bahawulpore levies.

Pathans at dawn of the 18th. The rebellion Chap. IV.
gathers to its first crisis of interest at this point, where Moolraj is pressing back to crush the Daoud-potra advance, and the Mussulman army, improvised by the political officers, finds itself strong enough in two months to leave the frontier, and hurry to share the impending battle.

The English leader had not yet arrived at the bank of the river, when the echo of artillery reached his boats, and the white cloud of the cannonade was observed above the jungle. It was answered, replied, and was again answered, and the sound and sight foretold a general engagement. The Pathans muttered impatient interjections of "Allah! Allah!" at every shot, and sprang to shore with pure pleasure beaming in their faces. Their commander was graver with the doubtful feelings of a young lieutenant, set by fortune and his own gallantry to command two armies, one never yet engaged, and one never seen; and to oppose a third, where defeat would cost not the field only, but the allegiance of a wavering army, and turn the rebellion of Mooltan into the rising of the Punjab. But these apprehensions passed between the stirrup and the saddle, and, mindful of the day and of its memories, Edwardes rode away with the troops already over the river, for the plain of Kineyree.

The battle
of Kineyree,
June 18,
1848.

Chap. IV.

On passing the belt of valley-jungle, the camels hurrying to the rear out of range, and the wild-looking Daoud-potras, remarkable by their red hair and beards, announced the battle-field. The first news of it which saluted the English leader was ill-omened. The Bahawulpore force was reported disorganized, and their commander, a fatuous old man, was pointed out counting his beads under a peepul-tree, while the confusion in his army grew from bad to worse. The forces of Moolraj had taken a strong position, and, with the whole day before them, appeared to await the dispositions of their antagonists. Meantime, they were keeping up an effective fire from cannon, against whose metal the Daoud-potras had nothing equal to oppose. Edwardes at once despatched a message to Cortlandt, who was still beyond the river, bidding him send over the guns and reinforcements with all possible haste. Until their arrival, nothing could be done but to preserve a defensive position, and restore the broken order of the allies. Aided by the Lieutenant's officers, the Bahawulpore regiments reformed, and lay down in line with the Pathan levies, who occupied a position on the left. The artillery of the force was directed to respond incessantly to that of the rebels, rather to animate the patience of the troops than to keep down the enemy's fire. In this attitude the

early morning passed, but the gunners of Moolraj had found the position and range of the Pathans, and turned their hottest fire upon the Mussulmanee ranks. Impatient before, these wild and raw soldiers were now almost unrestrainable; as the round shot plunged through the bushes where they lay, they leapt, against orders, to their feet, and clamoured for the advance, which it seemed scarcely possible to deny much longer. The guns were not yet come, and the rebels, ceasing their salvoes, began to threaten the line with clouds of horsemen, whose approach the camel-swivels were useless to check. It was imperative to win time, and Edwardes called for all the chiefs and officers who had horses, to mount, and charge the Mooltan cavalry. "Put off the fight," he said, to Foujdar Khan, the Bahawulpore leader, "or the field will be lost." The Khan and his comrades gladly undertook the task. They mounted, under cover of the jungle, adjusted their long beards, and repeated the formula of their creed, with the serious air of men who were preparing for their last act. The gallant squadron then dashed out unexpectedly upon the enemy's horse, and, completely surprising them, drove them back upon the advancing infantry. Foujdar Khan was twice wounded, and few returned unhurt from this splendid service. It effected its purpose, as the rebels took time to rally, and to discover to how small a force they had given ground.

Chap. IV. They were again advancing, and it seemed impossible to avoid the fatal order to meet them with a line unsupported by a single field-piece, when the bugle-note of the artillery was heard from the rear. The guns had arrived at last, and two fresh regiments with them. Edwardes now gave the word to move forward, bringing up to the front all his reinforcements. The sun was declining as the English leader pushed into the open, and saw the troops of Moolraj approaching through some sugar-cane fields. The guns were instantly wheeled round and discharged, and the rebels, sinking their line in the cover of the long canes, comprehended for the first time that the Sahib had crossed the river, and brought Cortlandt's artillery. Grape succeeded to round shot, and was poured in and returned at speaking distance, but the Sikh artillerymen began to yield to the better-directed fire of the new field-pieces. The time had arrived for the charge, and Edwardes gave the word to men who needed no repetition of it. Shaking their swords, the Pathans rushed upon the Sikh line with a yell of gathered malice, and Moolraj's army broke away. Gun after gun was captured, and the plain, at first occupied by a series of scattered skirmishers, was gradually yielded, till the rebels were in full and confused retreat upon Mooltan. Eight cannons were taken, and the Sikh Nazim, who had anticipated an easy

victory over the recruits of the frontier officer, fled before them without a halt till he reached the protection of his fortress at Mooltan. Fought on the anniversary of the great battle, this well-handled action adds its own lustre to the day; and, though the stage was smaller, Cortlandt's advance was watched for as eagerly as Blucher's, and the example of Wellington never animated a more spirited patience than that shown by the hero of Kineyree. Chap. IV.

Up to this point, the proceedings of the Resident had been marked by a rare and sustained prudence. He, more than any, had appreciated the urgent need for action, and had given the reins to his gifted subordinate with a wise and generous confidence. Up to this point, he shares with Edwardes the credit and the success of energy—for so far he had held the disaffected Sikhs of Lahore in the leash, thoroughly aware of their desire to join Moolraj, and of Moolraj's anxiety to have them on the march against him. But, upon intelligence of this successful engagement, too hastily concluding that the hopes of the revolt were crushed, he allowed Shere Singh and the Sikh army at Chuchawuttunee to move forward to Mooltan, the crowning fault of the first portion of the campaign, and full of mischief for each succeeding stage of the war.¹ No one

Policy of the
Lahore Resi-
dent.

¹ Shere Singh dared not have disobeyed his recall, if a Lahore battalion had brought it.

Chap. IV. had a profounder conviction of Sikh unfaithfulness, and the letter, in which the Resident announces the advance of Shere Singh, iterates and reiterates his knowledge of the disaffection of the troops. But the measure, condemned by events, was not without the defence of theory. The treachery of the Khalsa was selfish, and Sir Frederick Currie believed them wise enough to know that Moolraj's adventure was hopeless. The revolt of the Churunjit Regiment in marching down the Sind Saugor had been followed by abject overtures, to be again received when they found Kineyree fought and Moolraj shut up in his fortress. The Resident and the Khalsa each knew of this revulsion of feeling, and he believed that they, too, had shared it. In such case, their advance on Mooltan might summarily finish the war, and that by an instrument, of all others the best for employ, if only it would answer the hand. Add the immense difficulty of restraining the troops from their route without a too overt exhibition of fear and distrust, and the Resident's measure lacks nothing but success to be applauded. The issue was to compromise all the success that had been gained; to give to rebellion a diversion and a new leader; and, by deferring the capture of Mooltan, as will be seen, to allow the campaign to grow into a war. But for these traitorous allies despatched to them,

Edwardes¹ and Lake would have achieved yet more towards ending the rebellion single-handed, and a British force need not have retired disheartened from the gate of a fortress at which it had boastfully sate down. Chap. IV.

But the achievements and the errors of this portion of the campaign must be set beside the inaction of the high authorities to have their just estimation. The Resident might have hoped to find the Commander-in-chief stirred by the successes of Edwardes into the despatch of a force, in presence of which Shere Singh must have been awed into good faith. The Sikh Chief did not accomplish his crowning treachery till the 14th of September, and, on the 1st of July, in reply to a fresh appeal, Lord Gough had not only seen nothing in circumstances to alter his resolution, but contemplated with placid satisfaction his original decision. His department had not given way either to any immoderate emotion or exertion, and, if a force had moved at all, its means of transport—after two months' notice of need—would still have had to come from Cawnpore. Lord Dalhousie, not yet aroused, echoed the dictum of the military chief, distrusting his own instincts, since they spoke against

¹ Thus Edwardes, June 27, 1848 :—"There is not a moment's reliance to be placed on any Sikh army whatever, and I heartily wish Raja Shere Singh and Sirdar Shumshere Singh, and all the Singhs with them, were at this moment two hundred miles off, and that I was left alone to cope with Moolraj."

Chap. IV. so much experience and such martial reputation. It is easy to appreciate the contentment with which he followed the astonishing fortunes of the young English lieutenant, and welcomed the assertion of Lord Gough, that the time was not come, and might never come, to move. Before long, Lord Dalhousie summoned his judgment to the level of his responsibility, and recognizing peace hopeless, declared that "if its enemies wanted war, war they should have, and with a vengeance."¹ But as yet the Viceroy had not ceased to hope for the continuance of an impossible peace.

¹ *Vide* speech at the Barrackpore Ball, October 5, 1848.

CHAPTER V.

BEFORE following the progress of events at Mooltan, it is needful to turn aside for an episode of the rebellion, which illustrates the active sympathies of the partisans of Moolraj, and the inveterate opposition between Sikhs and Musulmans. Bhai Maharaj, a Sikh Guru, had been implicated in the Preyma plot, already mentioned as detected during the Lawrence Residency, and a price had been set upon his head. But no Kardar would risk unpopularity by arresting a character respected for religious and political reasons; nor would the people connive at his capture. He moved about accordingly, evading pursuit, and appearing from time to time with a few followers by the tank at Umritsur, and even in Lahore. The outbreak of Mooltan raised him from an outlaw to a leader, for he suddenly appeared at the head of large armed parties, and possessing command of sums of money sufficient for lavish distribution to the poor and to those who came for service. The money and the arms were supplied by Moolraj, in whose interest the Guru now openly acted. Whole

Chap. V.
The Rising
of Bhai
Maharaj.

Chap. V. villages came out to meet him, and subscribed to feed his recruits with sweetmeats and fruit; and the officers of the Durbar, charged to intercept him, took especial pains to give him notice of their neighbourhood. Bhai Maharaj, the Guru, with his black mare and camp of beggars, grew at last to be too dangerous, and a judicious plan was arranged by the Resident for driving him upon the Chenab, where the Mussulman villagers were grateful to us for a generous revenue-settlement, and entertained no respect whatever for the Guru's creed or politics. The plan succeeded, and the Bhai was forced into the Chenab, by a Mussulman attack, hundreds of his men being drowned in the swollen river. Moolraj had eagerly expected his arrival and assistance, and concealed the report of his death in order to personify him by another Guru to the troops. Shere Singh also gave out at his defection that the Bhai Maharaj was of his council, and the name had great influence, yet the Mussulmans protested they had seen the Guru loose the tail of his black mare in the Chenab, and go down in the cold snow-waters, cursing the Islamites who had driven him there.¹

Edwardes
again
requests
assistance.

Turning the same religious animosity to his own purpose, Edwardes saved the Derajat, and won Kineyree. Four days after that battle,

¹ He really escaped, and was afterwards taken at Jalundhur by Mr. Vansittart.

his success had encouraged him to ask for a breaching battery, and the permission to commence a siege of Mooltan, if Moolraj should shelter there. "We are strong enough," he urged, "to undertake the task, and if the three months before the winter campaign are spent in idleness, the men will have time to think of the heat and to grow sick." "A few heavy guns, a mortar battery, sappers and miners, and Major Napier to head them, are all we want." The contagion of this boldness infected the Resident at Lahore, and he replied in terms of encouragement. He professed himself of belief that Edwardes's success had taken away all grounds for refusal to lend him the aid of an English force. The idea that Mooltan would, or could, be isolated by cuts from the Chenab, had been exploded since the date of the first application to the Commander-in-chief. Although strong, Moolraj had had no time to perfect his defences, and Major Napier who had advised Lord Gough against undertaking operations in the first instance, was now sanguine of the success of a siege. Above all, there was to be considered the daily increasing mischief caused by the rebellion, which, though confined in appearance to a fort, really smouldered throughout the country. On these grounds, the Resident called upon Lord Gough once more to sanction the despatch of the troops named as sufficient by Major Napier. The

Chap. V. Commander-in-chief declined the responsibility of sending a force so small; but if Lord Dalhousie should decide for the movement, he would consent to see it made with one twice as large. At the same time his despatch neglected, as indeed it might, the conveyance of the troops and stores. Lord Dalhousie, not even yet comprehending the crisis, gave adhesion to the refusal of the Commander-in-chief, resting his objections also upon the danger of moving British forces at such a season. British forces had eventually to move at a season quite as perilous, and under circumstances far less favourable.

The Khalsa soldiers of Shere Sing, nominally sent to co-operate with Edwardes, had received orders to halt their untrusted succour at Chichawuttunee, sixty miles from Mooltan. They continued to advance, under a sense of duty, as their leader said, but invited, according to camp-talk, by the resuscitated Bhai Maharaj. At the same time, the troops at Bunnoo, and at Jhung, were reported to be deserting. In such a juncture, and with Shere Singh's defection not yet accomplished, the best hope of Edwardes was in continued action. If Kineyree could not extinguish the hope of the insurrection, the lives of the frontier officers at Bunnoo, Hazara, and Peshawur, as well as the prestige of the Government, hung upon a successful advance. Uniting himself, therefore, with the Mussulman troops

of the Durbar, under Sheikh Emamuddin, Edwardes gave the order to march for Mooltan. Under its walls lay the army of Moolraj, inspired by the confident prophecies of the real or supposed Bhai Maharaj, and stronger by the accession of deserters from the Khalsa, and recruits between up by the agents of Moolraj. On the 1st of July the Gurus and the stars agreed in promising victory to the Sikhs, and at noon of that auspicious day the Dewan arrayed his battle. Edwardes set the Bahawulpore forces on his right under Lake; the Mussulmans occupied the centre with Cortlandt's ten guns, and the Pathan horse and foot held the left. These last Edwardes commanded in person; posting the doubtful auxiliaries of Sheikh Emamuddin on the extreme left. The Sikhs sustained the attack with obstinacy, but a cannon shot carried away the howdah from which Moolraj was issuing commands; and the flight of the Dewan was followed by the wavering of his men. Cortlandt's Mahommedans pressed upon them with musketry, and the artillery, under the command of an office clerk, named Quin, plied the clubbed ranks, and turned their confusion into a retreat. The insurgents, however, carried off all their guns, except two; which, desperately served to mask the retirement, were abandoned without disgrace. The victory of Suddoosain was thus complete. It drove Moolraj into his walls, and

Chap. V.

July, 1848.
Battle of
Suddoosain.

Chap. V. cooped up the revolt there along with him. What Edwardes could do by wonderful fortune and brilliant soldiership, was now accomplished; and had a British force been afloat upon the Sutlej, as might and should have been the case, the hand which had kept down the growth of rebellion might have destroyed it, root and branch.

Policy of the
Governor-
General and
of the Com-
mander-in-
chief.

The news of a second decisive victory induced the Lahore Resident to act upon his own authority, and despatch a force to the assistance of the English officers. In an elaborate letter, he informed Lord Dalhousie of this step, and reviewed the grounds upon which it had been taken. Nothing in that paper appears open to question, but the continued mistake of regarding Shere Singh as reliable. Nothing in it convinced the Commander-in-chief; but Lord Dalhousie was sensitive for the dignity of his officers, and, disapproving the measure, he declined to countermand it. The etiquette of Government sufficed, at least, for a public reason, but, in his private judgment, the Viceroy had now withdrawn from the policy of waiting on Providence.

To the chief of the army it still seemed premature to move; yet in what were the levies of Edwardes and the Sikhs of Moolraj to pass the three months of inaction contemplated by him? The best hounds will not sit for ever at the mouth of the den—the quarry, however cowed,

will recover breath and opportunity. If the Sirdars and the soldiers of the Regency were still on the side of loyalty, it was because "jagheers and titles and whole thrcats seemed, all things considered, to be upon it." The one thing necessary to change their wavering convictions, was to know that the British still dared not, or could not, move; thus the mere tidings of Sir F. Currie's measure came upon their smouldering indecision "like water upon fire." If, in spite of all, the fire afterwards broke forth, it must be asked what the dimensions of that conflagration would have been, which was to rage for three months, without the show of repression? India was given to us, and will be kept, by men who, in the high mission of her mastery and redemption, are cautious in counsel without dulness, and swift in action without rashness. The policy which afforded Moolraj time to turn a personal quarrel into a national revolt, and swelled the six thousand rabble of Mooltan into the thirty thousand warriors of Chillianwalla, cannot be praised. That it could be so long pursued was due to that passage of the Indus, for which Edwardes has not been unblamed by official purists. His advance filled up the tedious gap between the assassination of Agnew and the announcement of the march of British troops, and found Moolraj his occupation for three months. The rebel chief was thus prevented

Chap. V. from marching up the Manjha to meet Shere Singh, and to raise the Sikhs; at whose head he would have shown how troops should move in May, by the thunder of his guns at Lahore gate. Or, check that advance, Ramnuggur, Chillianwalla, and Guzerat must have been fought in those months, when the Commander-in-chief had declared it impossible to take the field. From a dilemma so fatal to the Empire, or to the judgment of its rulers, Edwardes's courageous disregard of formalities had delivered them; while the credit of the succours sent so tardily belongs to the Resident, though somewhat counter-balanced by his error in trusting Shere Singh.

March of a
British force.

But the one brigade which Sir F. Currie was for despatching, was usefully doubled by the Commander-in-chief, who frankly gave his best offices to the expedition once set afoot. The siege-train and columns, however, did not reach Mooltan from Lahore and Ferozepore till forty days after the Resident's requisition, although the rebellion had been flagrant three months, while the distance was not greatly over two hundred miles, and these brigades had been specially appointed by Lord Hardinge for instant service. The two columns encountered no serious obstacle, and marched at an unhealthy period of the year without loss or suffering. The difficulty of transit had been as much exaggerated as the danger of the season, for the Lahore division

made its way at leisure in a long flotilla on the Ravee, while that from Ferozepore passed as easily by the Sutlej to the Bahawulpore Ghât. On the 19th August, they met before Mooltan, where the siege-train also arrived on the morning of the 4th September, its escort and supplies extending along eight miles of road. Seven thousand men and a formidable breaching battery had thus been safely brought through all the dreaded airs of the autumn, by a route and to a spot declared forbidden in the dry heats. The lesson was well bestowed upon Lord Dalhousie, whose faith was not again to be found stronger than his reason. It must, in effect, have been full of chagrin to speculate on the consequences of the same movement if it had taken place in July instead of September, and if Lord Gough had marched with it in person, instead of planning at Simla an orthodox winter campaign.¹

Meantime, the wealth of Moolraj, and the contagion of rebellion, began to have results. Hazara, at the base of the Sind Saugor Doab, had been entrusted to the Rajah Chuttur Singh, with an accomplished officer, James Abbott, as Political Agent. Chuttur Singh was the father

Extension of
the revolt.
Hazara.

¹ A letter from Mooltan of this date exhibits the public feeling more forcibly than formally. "The Commander-in-Chief's policy," it says, "is to await the cold weather, as if the rebellion could be put off like a champagne-tiffin with a three-cornered note to Moolraj to name a date more agreeable."

Chap. V. of Shere Singh, commander of the Khalsa, and the grandfather of a princess who had but lately been affianced to the young Maharajah. The consummation of this alliance must have placed him at the head of the Sikh Sirdars; but the position lost its allurements under an English Regency. Captain Abbott had regarded Chuttur Singh with suspicion ever since the Mooltan outbreak; but this mistrust is alleged, without reason, to have suggested to that chief his treachery. On the 1st August, the Pukli brigade at Hazara broke up the bazaar, sold their stores of grain, and declared their intention of marching to Lahore. The Sirdar failed to report these mutinous proceedings, but Abbott hearing of them, called out the Mahomedan chiefs and landed yeomanry, whose hearts he had won by a conciliatory administration, and declared his resolution to dispute the departure of the troops. The hill-passes were thus secured, when three companies of Sikhs arrived at Hurreepore, and the Sirdar ordered them to encamp in a position forbidden by the Political Agent. Attached to the force were two guns, under the command of Canora, an American or Irish¹ officer of Runjeet Singh's, at this time commedan² in the army of the Durbar. Canora refused to move out his guns, without the order of Captain Abbott. The

¹ His real name was Kinnery.

² A grade under that of colonel.

Rajah used persuasion and entreaty, but finding the European's fidelity unshaken, he directed two companies to take the pieces by force. Canora loaded his guns with grape, laid them with his own hands, and ordered his artillerymen to open on the advancing troops. They declined, alleging that they were the Sirdar's servants. The Comedan turned to his havildar, bidding him apply the match, and, upon an insolent refusal, he cut the man down in his place. Then seizing the port-fire, he himself endeavoured to fire upon the approaching files, but his gun burned priming, and, in stooping over it, two sepoy's shot him through the chest. The gallant officer drew and discharged his pistol with fatal effect upon one of his assailants, but was cut down from behind by a Sikh soldier in the act of unsheathing his sword. Guilty of such a deed, Chuttur Singh still gained time before finally siding with the rebellion, and persuaded the Resident that he was innocent of mutinous intention. But when the Sirdar Jhunda Singh was sent from Lahore to Hazara, as a trusted agent, to assure his fidelity, the Envoy and the Chief revolted together. Chuttur Singh then boldly proclaimed that he had devoted his head to God and the Gooroo, and would stand or fall with the cause of the Sikhs. Thus Hazara at the north caught the fire of revolt from Mooltan in the south. Major Lawrence had wisely sent a force from Pesh-

Chap. V. awur to occupy Attock, but all the villages around were burned or ravaged, and the officials doing duty on the frontier were isolated from assistance.

The siege-train in position at Mooltan. The fort summoned.

The guns being at last arrived before Mooltan, the town and fortress were summoned by General Whish. That which events already seemed to portend is shown by his proclamation, wherefrom the General had omitted all mention of the Maharajah. Yet the besieging force had no title to its position and demands, except as acting in the name and for the interests of the Royal minor. But the fort was summoned in the style of the British Government, and all men well knew that the Sikh revolt must abolish the Regency if successful, and destroy the dynasty if it failed. It had come of necessity to this. The decision of Lord Hardinge to preserve the kingdom to the Lahore dynasty, whether inspired by moderation or weakness, involved the maintenance of thirty thousand Khalsa troops and fifty guns; and wherever these were, there also were discontent and the restless longing for change which is surest to bring it. Only one influence could have perpetuated among these soldiers the wholesome memory of Sobraon, and that—the instant exercise of power to repress offence—had been wanting. The English Regency had forfeited by this failure its hold upon the loyalty of a band of quick-

tempered soldiers. A military rule cannot profit by patience;—that is the triple armour reserved to the unarmed;—and in the East, especially, to wait is to be weak. It did not need the diplomatic error of General Whish to show that the contest was no longer carrying on in the name of the infant king, or to support the regency. It was the old question half decided before, and now to be renewed between those rivals of the Sutlej—the Khalsa matchlock, and the Company's musket;—the shining yellow Squadrons of Runjeet, and those Scarlet lines which colour the map of India wherever they come. Chap. V.

A reconnoitre on the northern face of the fort convinced the besiegers that Moolraj had not wasted his opportunities. The walls bristled with guns, the weak points were guarded with scientific forethought, and nothing could be effected on that side but by regular approaches. A *coup de main* upon the town was next considered, to be carried out by moving the whole force in line upon the Khonee Burj behind the guns, and storming a breach so soon as it could be made. But matters would not be necessarily advanced by the capture of the city, and great loss of life was to be counted upon. The town of Mooltan is separated from the fort, though its walls were connected with the defences. Outside the fort, which had a circumference of about a mile, were large groves and enclosed Siege of
Mooltan
commenced.

Chap. V. gardens, and mounds formed by ruined brick-kilns, offering so many standing-points to the enemy, and held by him in force. The proposition of Lieutenant Lake to clear these in succession, and to run a trench to the south-western face of the fort, was finally accepted. On the 12th of September sufficient progress had been made to induce Moolraj to threaten the works in earnest, and a general assault was made upon the Sikhs as they gathered in front of the advanced trenches. The success achieved was signal; the Sikhs fell back within their walls, and the guns were advanced, without the delay of spade-work, to breaching distance from the ramparts.

Desertion of
the Rajah
Shere Singh.

At this juncture, when triumph seemed obtained, it was suddenly snatched away by the desertion of the Rajah Shere Singh. Allowed to march, as has been shown, by the Resident, Shere Singh's movements had been erratic and insubordinate; till at last he joined the frontier force before Mooltan, and took a dilitory part in the siege. The question of his fidelity was ever present to Edwardes's mind, especially after that his father, the Rajah Chuttur Singh, raised the flag of revolt in Hazara. Sedition was known to be openly broached in his camp. "Listen! oh, Khalsa!" said a Sadh, in presence of the soldiers, "this is no war between Moolraj and the Durbar, but a strife of religions." Even if a third of Shere Singh's troops were Mussul-

mans, they had yet imbibed the spirit and the hopes of the Khalsa, and would act, it was believed, with the Sikhs. Chutter Singh was known, too, to have exchanged turbans with Sooltan Mahomed Khan the Barukzye, whose name was strong with Mussulmans, and Shere Singh himself bore in camp the nickname of the "Islamite." The six guns with the Rajah's force increased its importance, so that Edwardes at last prepared, as better than uncertainty, to surround and disarm it. It was agreed instead to detach the suspected troops on outpost duty, and the route was given to the Rajah and his Sirdars. But news had come from Chuttur Singh in Hazara, by letters, written over in Gurmùki, which the Rajah, his son, had carefully obliterated with water. Fidelity was not longer to be looked for from one whom filial duty called to a path, whither Sikh feeling and Sikh belief had long tempted him. On breaking camp for the march, the soldiers clustered round their chief, and clamoured to be led to the side of their faith. Shere Singh, half persuaded by the hopeful words, half impelled by the angry menaces of his Sikhs, yielded to their mutual desire to seize the occasion, and ordered the "*dhurm ka dhosa*," "the drum of religion," to strike up. Thus he rode away at the head of five thousand men towards the citadel. Some Sirdars only, still faithful, or still doubtful of the future, took horse, and

Chap. V. made their escape to the camp of Edwardes. As the Sikh deserters approached the fort, Moolraj moved out to meet them. The Rajah's duplicity had deceived friends and enemies alike,¹ and the reception accorded him was full of suspicion. Amid an overpowering escort, Moolraj gave the deserters audience, and calling for the Grunth, administered to each the oath of fidelity. The new army was then ordered to encamp in the Huzooree Bagh, under the fort guns, till their sincerity should be approved by action.

The siege
raised.

The rebellion had thus assumed a more menacing aspect. Shere Singh's defection made its supporters 15,000 strong, so that a Sikh army, instead of the Bunneah Moolraj, now defied the British from Mooltan. The position of the deserters, by the Bohur gates, threatened the right rear, and a council of war reluctantly perceived the question to be of the safety of the besiegers, not any longer of the capture of the fort. An alternative hardly remained, and General Whish raised the siege, withdrawing his baffled forces to Sooruj Khond, the position previously occupied by Edwardes. The Resident's letter, announcing their retirement, reasonably defends his share in the expedition. It had been frustrated neither by climate,² nor by loss

¹ On the 3rd September, Shere Singh had marched out of camp and cannonaded Moolraj's troops at the bridge, throwing them into great confusion.

² Even when operations were suspended, the wounded and sick averaged only 6 per cent. of the force.

upon the march, as the Commander-in-chief Chap. V. expected; the difficulty of inundations had vanished; in point of strength Lord Gough had himself sanctioned its departure, and Major Napier had pronounced the reduction of the place feasible. But whilst Sir F. Currie dwelt, and justly, on the mischief of the long delay in despatching the force, he could not defend his own act in setting Shere Singh free; and that act must share, with the inaction of the military authorities, the blame of our reverse. It was Measures of
the Lahore
Resident. partially redeemed at this crisis by the Resident's wise and energetic action. The Governments of Bombay and Scinde were apprised at once by him of the course of events, and requested to hold their troops in readiness. The citadel of Lahore was quietly garrisoned by an English battalion, and Sirdars of known disloyalty there were placed under guard. The Resident took possession also of Govindghur, a fortress at Umritsur, upon which Runjeet Singh had expended infinite pains and treasure, regarding it as the key of the Manjha. It needed little more defence than to close its gates, but the corps of guides, under a faithful native officer, occupied it before resistance could be improvised, and made it over to a company of English soldiers.

Lord Dalhousie was now aroused in earnest, and estimating for himself the task prepared for

Chap. V.
Preparations
of Lord
Dalhousie.

his administration. His despatch to the Secret Committee recognizes the past as lost, and the future dependent on vigorous action and certain counsels. "There is no other course open to us," he writes, "but to prepare for a general Punjab war, and ultimately to occupy the country." With measures suiting such language, an addition of 17,000 men was ordered to the army; the Resident's demand on Bombay and Scinde was endorsed, and Lord Dalhousie himself prepared to leave Calcutta for the borders of the Punjab. The appeal to Bombay did not need repeating. Sir G. Clerk (then and now the Governor) had himself been Plenipotentiary at Lahore, and foreboded mischief as early as the despatch of the English officers to Mooltan. When their murder took place, he advised that no delay should weaken the effect of punishment, and took steps, in conjunction with Sir Willoughby Cotton, to prepare a force for any emergency. Thus, when the siege was raised, the Bombay Fusileers could pass from Kurrachee to Roree without delay, unlike the flying brigades present near the spot; and Lord Dalhousie's request for a reserve of 5,000 men at the latter place could be met with an offer of 7,000.

Motives of
the revolt.

It has now been seen how the edifice of Government, reared by Lord Hardinge, crumbled away from its foundations, leaving the work to do again, and a lasting lesson that the only modera-

tion at present respected by the Asiatic is that shown by overwhelming power. The Sikhs had weighed English forbearance in Eastern scales, and perceiving that Sobraon had not given the victors a will to abolish Sikh supremacy, they had never ceased to hope that a lack of power had been felt. The nation and the faith of the Khalsa were once more against us with all the unanimity of a sentiment more nearly akin to patriotism than any ever yet enlisted against the British Government. The chiefs of the rebellion flung their names and wealth into the venture, with a bold devotion that comes near to be heroic. It is hard to reach the deepest motive of the oriental heart, which not only conceals its purpose, but counting upon a practice esteemed so natural, accustoms itself to disguise disguise. Yet the Rajahs, Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh, could hardly win more for themselves from a successful rebellion, than all which they possessed already in titles, jagheers, and the immediate alliance with a protected throne. They grieved, however, to see Runjeet's son leaning on the hand which Runjeet had only touched in haughty friendship; they longed to try out a new Sobraon on a field where treachery should not fight against the Sikh army. Greater indignation, too, had been felt than shown, when the Maharanee was taken from her people and her child; bitter feelings rankled to witness the Sikh

Chap. V. religion no longer paramount, and the Mussulman strutting past the holy tank of Umritsur, "his head 'full of wind,' and his belly of cow-beef." All these wrongs, and the means to right them, are set forth in the proclamation issued by Shere Singh, which is also a programme of the rising, and but for its tinge of Punjab ferocity, a frank and straightforward state-paper, as such things go. "It is known," he thereby declares, "to all good Sikhs—to those who have been cherished by the Khalsajee—in fact, to the world at large, with what oppression, tyranny, and undue violence, the Feringees have treated the widow of the great Maharajah Runjeet Singh, now in bliss, and what cruelty they have shown towards the people of the country."

"In the first place, they have broken the treaty, by imprisoning, and sending away to Hindostan, the Maharanee, the mother of her people. Secondly, the race of Sikhs, the children of the Maharajah (Runjeet Singh), have suffered so much from their tyranny, that our very religion has been taken away from us. Thirdly, the kingdom has lost its former repute. By the direction of the holy Gooroo, Raja Shere Singh and others, with their valiant troops, have joined the trusty and faithful Dewan Moolraj, on the part of Maharajah Duleep Singh, with a view to eradicate and expel the tyrannous and crafty Feringees. The Khalsajee must, now, act with

all their heart and soul. Those who are servants of the Khalsajee, of the holy Gooroo, and of the Maharajah, are enjoined to gird up their loins, and proceed to Mooltan without delay. Let them murder all Feringhees, wherever they may find them, and cut off the daks. In return for this service, they will certainly be recompensed by the favour of the holy Gooroo, by increase of rank, and by distribution of rewards. Fourthly, let all cling closely to their religion. Whoever acts accordingly, will obtain grace in this world, and hereafter; and he who acts otherwise, is excluded from the pale of the Sikh faith.”

Chap. V.

Nor were these hopes of exterminating the Feringhee altogether visionary. Shere Singh had borne his part in our councils, and knew their divisions. The plot of Chuttur Singh—if Golab Singh of Cashmere, and the Barukzye Sooltan should give their adhesion to it—was an enterprise of the fairest promise. That Golab Singh would join a rebellion successfully commenced, was probable from the character of the man, and in a less degree, because he had solemnly sworn to the Hazara Rajah to do so. Such, at least, was the statement of the Sirdar Lal Singh, who afterwards related how the Cashmere Rajah at first refused to have anything to do with the matter, saying, that he placed no faith in the Sikhs, who had murdered so many members of his family; but, at the same time, that, if Chuttur Singh

Prospects of
the Revolt.

Chap. V. would swear by the yellow Punjee, and on the Grunth, that he would devote his life, and his property, to any plan which Golab Singh might desire, the Maharajah would place reliance in his professions. How Chuttur Singh took the oath of the Punjee and the Grunth, and sent a confidential servant to Golab Singh, who gave him an interview in a house only frequented by himself and the Dewan Jowala Sahae. How the Maharajah showed the messenger a great quantity of arms and ammunition, which were in the house mentioned, saying that he had been occupied for the space of a year in collecting these materials. How he further averred, that the conduct of the British had changed, that they had not even left the remnant of a sovereignty in Lahore, and had acted contrary to the treaty in assuming the supreme power. How he added that he now placed confidence in Chuttur Singh's promises, but still stipulated that the latter should commence operations, by creating a disturbance in Hazara. How the messenger was then dismissed, to request Sooltan Mahomed Khan to assist in the undertaking. And how Dost Mahomed Khan wrote in reply, that if he afforded his aid to Chuttur Singh, the latter must covenant to give up, to the brothers of the Dost, the whole of the country from Peshawur to Attock, promising not to demand

anything for the expenses of the affair until it should be consummated.

So much, therefore, if this be true, as all that which Runjeet Singh had valued beyond price, as all that for which the Affghan war was fought, the Sikhs were ready to surrender to expel the strong and just Feringhee. The part borne afterwards by Dost Mahomed makes that attributed to the Cashmere Rajah also plausible; nor could any other than prudent villainy be looked for from a tyrant whose passions were as low as his intellect was lofty.

The Sikhs, almost to a man, shared the sentiments and hopes of their leaders, contrasting the good times of plunder and presents with the monotonous proprieties of English rule. The views of such natives as were favourable to us, may be gathered from correspondence such as that quoted in the Memoirs of Sir Charles Napier.¹ The writer there reviews the situation in terms which his countrymen use not infrequently in private criticism of their rulers, when candour sometimes merges into contempt. The Punjab seems to him more imperilled than Lord Dalhousie comprehends. Whish is surrounded at Mooltan, and the officers on outpost stations are abandoned. The Sikhs have schemed to bring the British out under the heat, as the Ameers also did in Scinde, and Moolraj has all along

Native
opinions of
the situation.

¹ Vol. IV.

Chap. V. not put forth his full strength against Edwardes, but allowed him just that success which demanded assistance for its completion. He had enlisted none but Sikhs, in order to convert his rebellion into a religious war. His overtures for terms had been part of the plot to feign extremity, and while he sued humblest for his life, the foundries at Mooltan were busiest in casting cannon. Sir F. Currie's succours were inadequate, and Moolraj could have crushed them upon arrival, had the Sikhs attached to the British kept their promise of coming over. As it was, Shere Singh's tardy defection had sufficed to raise the siege, and Whish was in turn beleaguered at Sooruj Khond. Golab Singh, alone sure of profit, watched the game with satisfaction; prepared, "as the Unritsur merchants knew," to call out seven lakhs of drilled men at a week's notice. Safe in Cashmere, he studied to renew his Cabul treachery, and laughed at Lord Gough and the shortcomings of his costly commissariat. Camels, corn, everything was wanting, as well as good counsels, and "the little wheels would not turn while there was no sure hand at the large ones."

Such was the talk of the Khan and the bazaar, not to be set aside, because not official. Fuller information disowns the ingenious suspicions of a native gossip who accepts no direct cause and nothing simple. While hope of pardon remained, Moolraj would gladly have re-

treated from his position, and his defeats at Kinneyree and Suddoosain were hard realities. The force despatched to Mooltan cannot be called insufficient, since Sir C. Napier, in 1846, contemplated its reduction with a smaller column, and less artillery. But the Hindoo's judgment upon the military department cannot be so easily reprov'd. Delay had caused failure, and if the Resident erred once and gravely, it has been seen that he redeemed it by energy and afterthought. Neither did he err without excuse. The one objection not raised against despatching English troops, was the chance of such a defection as Shere Singh's. Their movement was denied on the score of climate, which ultimately failed to affect them; of an inundation, which did not occur; of want of carriage, which two rivers offered; of want of stores, which should have been ready; of lack of preparation in troops, which Lord Hardinge had specially organized for instant service. Like one choosing the time for invasion, rather than seizing it for defence, the English army kept its own bank of the Sutlej. Nor did Lord Dalhousie, as has been shown, at first appreciate the crisis, though afterwards no one more plainly demonstrated that a Government has undertaken to defend its officers, and to see justice done in all weathers. Unwilling to lessen by a leaf the well-earned laurels of brave and able men, the annalist must

Chap. V.

Events
reviewed.

Chap. V. yet declare that neither by its apologies, nor by its issues, can the marked inaction of this period be justified. Subalterns and civilians kept the rebellion in bounds. Lawrence, Nicholson, Abbott, and Taylor gave the insurgents employment at Peshawur, Hazara, Kangra, and Bunnoo; and a district-officer controlled the imperial peril, till the supreme authorities comprehended and encountered it.¹ The lustre of their fidelity suffices to gild the inauspicious opening of an administration sufficiently illustrious afterwards by the occupations and the achievements of its chief.

¹ The conclusion here arrived at is, at any rate, that of an observer impartial by birth and language. Speaking of the Mooltan outbreak, the author of "*L'Inde Contemporaine*" observes,

"Ce soulèvement, qu'un peu d'activité de la part des généraux cantonnés sur la rive gauche du Satledje eût peut-être étouffé à sa naissance, mit du moins au grand jour la haute valeur personnelle, la fécondité de ressources des jeunes officiers Anglais employés comme résidents dans le pays insurgé. Surpris par les événements dans des positions isolées, n'ayant sous la main que de faibles escortes, ils tirèrent admirablement parti des divisions de sectes, des haines religieuses qu'ils savaient exister au sien des populations. Opposants aux Sikhes des bandes irrégulières de Mussulmans ou de Djats brahmaniques, ils réussirent à tenir presque partout l'ennemi en échec jusqu' à l'arrivée des renforts de l'Inde."

CHAPTER VI.

THE siege was raised on the 15th of Sep- Chap. VI.
tember. Writing at Dinapore upon the river Aspect of
Ganges on the first of the following month, Affairs.
Lord Dalhousie had new complications to an-
nounce to the Secret Committee in the de-
parture of Shere Singh to join his father, the
revolt of the Sikh troops at Bunnoo, and the
imminent loss of Peshawur. The Governor-
General by this time, indeed, found himself in
presence of difficulties taxing all his power.
The time had passed for a quick decisive stroke,
and a struggle was to be commenced, under diffi-
culty and disappointment, with a brave people
united by a common religion and country into a
nation. Never before had the British to meet
a courage so nearly equal to their own, and sen-
timents so like those which they obey; nor will
India again furnish such, unless Nepal must
some day be compelled into the round of empire.
As pieces of a complicated game, every station
in the Punjab now required attention and
defence. The deluge of rebellion, but just shut
in at Mooltan, threatened daily to inundate the

Chap. VI. land; and, at many other sources, as in Bunnoo, Peshawur, Jullundhur, and Hazara, a tributary disaffection was gathering or actually flowing down. At this crisis, isolated from help, and yet forbidden by duty and by their Government to despair, the conduct of the frontier officers stands above praise. If they asked the help of a regiment or a company, it was in hopes to hold their desperate position longer, not for personal safety. And when Lord Dalhousie reluctantly denied them a man, he could be sure that he had not diminished, by one passing feeling, the patience and the firmness of men who kept their lives between his authority and its enemies. In the enthusiasm of battle a noble spirit will prompt the soldier to sacrifices which redeem war and illustrate humanity, but that devotion must yield in rank to one which dares to do as much with no more inspiration than the cold bidding of duty. The work of Government is easy with such agents, though ribands will not make them, nor the places and pay of an unjust Rule engage their service. The history of India is full of their names, because under her Government, whatever may be excepted, brave men have been always able to enlist their consciences, and to believe that in defending their posts with life, they defended that which far outweighed it in value. The history of India would be still richer in such examples if

Devotion of
Frontier
Officers.

it recorded the names of all those who, with the same devotion, have accepted obscurity and even blame; content to be rather than to be known as faithful. In presence of that supreme and self-conscious recognition an annalist has little to offer to the Lawrences of Jullundhur and Peshawur—to Abbott of Hazara, Herbert of Attock, Taylor, Nicolson, and Coke, and the legion of their unnamed equals. Chap. VI.

Whish gained his new camp without loss, except of ammunition and stores, much of which remained behind, although every sowar of the irregular horse rode to Sooruj Khond with a shell or a ball upon his saddle-bow. The final position taken up was south of the town and east of the Chenab, where, the jungle having been cleared, wells sunk, and flanking batteries erected, the besieging army prepared to assume the humbler character of one of observation. The Sikh Sirdars who had come in from Shere Singh were dismissed as dangerous, and Sirdars Mallee Singh and Bhoor Singh, in charge of works upon the river, at this time elected to abandon the British side.¹ To

Before Mool-tan. The New Camp at Sooruj Khond.

¹ It is worth while to give the religious and practical arguments, addressed by the chiefs of the rebellion to every officer who could be considered as remotely inclined to join it. Cortlandt himself was invited as an old servant of Runjeet, and native-born.

Proclamation.

“To all the officers of the Sepoys, and Sikhs, and Mussulmans, and regiments, and all others that eat the salt of the Sovereign of the

Chap. VI. check rebel reinforcements from the north and from Lahore, a detachment was sent to occupy Rungpoor. Meantime the attitude of the English general had not failed to provoke the insults of the enemy. By night and day attacks Moolraj harassed his antagonist, and tested the staunchness of his new friends. Their courage certainly surpassed their discipline, since, upon intelligence of the approach of a sum of Sikh money for pay, a body of Shere Singh's men marched out on their own adventure to secure it. General Whish, who needed nothing so much, and had been on the point of incurring obligations with the Bahawul Khan, anticipated them, contriving thus to secure the two lakhs of

Khalsa, Maharajah Duleep Singh Bahadoor; such for instance as Sheik Emamooddeen, and Jowahir Mull Dutt, and General Cortlandt Sahib Bahadoor, and Colonel Budri Nath, and Soobhan Khan, and Commandant Lahora Singh, &c., &c.

"A religious war being now on foot, it becomes every public servant, whether he be Sikh or Moslem, at sight of this document, to march, without delay, and join the camp of the Khalsa, along with Rajah Shere Singh Bahadoor and Dewan Moolraj, in the work of eradicating the Feringhees from this country of the Punjab.

"1st. For their own religion's sake.

"2nd. For the salt they have eaten.

"3rd. For the sake of fair fame in this world.

"4th. For promotion's sake.

"5th. For love of the Jagheers and dignities which are to be obtained. And whoever shall not join in this religious war,

"1st. He is unfaithful to the salt of the Sirkar.

"2nd. An outcast from religion.

"3rd. Worthy of any punishment that may be inflicted on him.

"Sealed by Rajah Shere Singh, Dewan Moolraj, Sirdar Khooshal Singh, Morareea, and others."

rupees destined for their chief, or at least for his followers. Chap. VI.

But the offensive measures of Moolraj were weakened all this while by his distrust of the Sikh Rajah, and a letter from the English camp, written as from Whish to Shere Singh, and purposely thrown in his way, is said to have confirmed the Nazim's suspicions. This letter hinted at a plot; congratulated Shere Singh on its approaching success; and thanked him for his astute support of the pretended fraud. Moolraj summoned a durbar, and read the paper out in the presence of the Sikh Rajah, who, with indignant innocence, declared himself devoted to the Khalsa, and ready to encounter all hazards in its support. The Mooltan Nazim, but half convinced, desired some proof of the fidelity of his troops, and protested that, as they had yet struck no blow against the Feringhee, he held himself acquitted of any debt to them. Such want of accord could not continue without result, and on the 9th of November Shere Singh withdrew his troops from Mooltan; moving off, after an insulting demonstration against the British, to Sirdarpoor upon the Ravee. His departure weakened the garrison by 5,000 men and 20 guns, and was doubtless unwelcome to Moolraj, who is reported to have removed the fleet of boats by which Shere Singh was to cross the Ravee. But Shere Singh crossed the river,

Departure of
Shere Singh
from Mool-
tan.

Chap. VI. nor must a movement be wholly ascribed to pique and disagreement which was full of embarrassment for the British, and opened a new phase of the war. Placed *à cheval* upon the stream, his force daily augmented by veterans of Runjeet crowding up from Manjha, and deserters from Mooltan weary of its confinement, Shere Singh had made himself the centre of the revolt. To the north his communications were open to act with his father, the Rajah Chuttur, so soon as Abbott and Nicholson were shaken off; to the north east lay the Sikh Doab, alight with hope and anger; and farther up the Ravee was Lahore, where, of 90,000 natives, 30,000¹ were reputed swordsmen, so that only for the gate guards five British regiments were hardly sufficient. "Notwithstanding Shere Singh's departure," writes Lord Dalhousie, "General Whish does not feel himself strong enough to recommence operations against Mooltan." It may be judged, therefore, that no demonstration, or only the faintest, could have been made against Shere Singh's departure. Impatient spirits accused even Edwardes of weakness, in having deprecated the despatch of those thousand horsemen, whom the besieging force might have spared in pursuit. The light-limbed Sikhs could have drawn them

¹ The authority for this statement is a paper communicated to the "Calcutta Review," of March, 1854, by Sir H. Lawrence, defending the Punjab Administration against Sir Charles Napier's posthumous work.

on and fought or fled from them almost at choice. Chap. VI.
Such a force must have vainly attacked 5,000 men, with twelve guns perfectly equipped and handled, nor would Moolraj's disappointment have prevented him from attacking its rear. While if Shere Singh had declined battle, cavalry must have been well handled, indeed, to have overtaken those soldiers who, as will be seen, at Ramnuggur, Chillianwalla, Russool, and elsewhere, moved round the solid English columns, followed them, escaped them, appeared and disappeared, in a way impossible except to Punjabees upon their own ground. Crossing rivers in a day—the foot soldiers on inflated goat-skins—carrying nothing but their arms, their water-pots, and a little parched grain, these Sikh hosts might be beaten in fight, but could not be compelled to an action by a force moving with leagues of baggage and double tents, and fed by the apparatus of the commissariat.

And now, arrived at Delhi, the Governor-Nov. 22,
General had to learn and to communicate that 1848. Lord
Peshawur had declared for revolt. Dalhousie at
Chuttur Delhi. The
Singh had for a long time vainly intrigued Peshawur re-
against Major Lawrence, and was setting out in volt.
chagrin to join his son, when the Durbar troops at Peshawur sided at last with the rebellion. So far back as August, Major Lawrence had applied for a detachment to crush the Hazara insurrection. A force of 5,000 men had been

Chap. VI. detailed for the service and was ready to march in September, when the order of the Commander-in-chief forbade the succours. Thus relegated to his unaided resources, with treason on every side, Major Lawrence, relinquished the hope of preventing and strove only to defer the outbreak. The success of Chuttur Singh, the mutiny of the troops at Bunnoo, and the crowning disloyalty of Shere Singh, passed like successive storm-gusts over the troubled valley of the frontier. But, by mingling Affghans with Sikhs, and by the influence of the masterful spirit and manner which George Lawrence shared with his brothers, Peshawur was yet, and might almost have remained, quiet. At a review held on the 28th of September, an outbreak was looked for, and Major Lawrence received information that he would be assassinated. He held his inspection, passed among the troops, directed the punishment of certain offenders, and transacted the day as though his life had not hung, with many another, on the thinnest thread. This danger blew over, and if a brigade could have been despatched by the Jhelum the province must have been saved. Lord Dalhousie could only deny that aid, and praise the fidelity which had so well deserved it. On the 24th of October, the Peshawur troops rose and attacked the Residency, persuaded to the act by a man who, more than others, was bound to respect the name and the

safety of a Lawrence. Sultan Mahomed Khan, the brother of Dost Mahomed, had been detained as a state prisoner at Lahore under Runjeet Singh. On the appointment of Sir Henry Lawrence as Resident, the chief had been set at liberty and restored to his estates at Peshawur. Forgetting these favours, and the traditional chivalry of Affghans, Sultan Mahomed sold his help to the revolt in the dream of restoring Peshawur to the Barukzye house. By his means, the Affghan garrison was corrupted, an overwhelming attack was made, and Major Lawrence hardly escaped with his life from a post where nothing else remained to save. The faithless Affghan assured the officers and ladies of the fugitive party that he would afford them safe escort from Kohat; but, violating Affghan custom and tradition, he surrendered them instead to Chuttur Singh. Prisoners to him, but well treated, they were conducted back to their own lost fortress of Peshawur on the 11th of November. Thus nearly every issue that could compromise matters had befallen. The circle of revolt was completed when Peshawur joined Bunnoo and Hazara, exposing a naked countryside to the watchful Affghans. Attock alone stood fast in it, garrisoned by the gallant Herbert. All the old Khalsa, with almost all their Sirdars, were up against us, seeking nothing less—and with fair hope of success, too—than the expulsion of

The spread
and peculi-
arities of the
Rebellion.

Chap. VI. the British from the Five Waters. Lord Dalhousie justly noted the evidence of national feeling, in directing the attention of the Secret Committee to the leading names in the rising, as those of men most honoured and benefitted by British power. As singular a feature of the revolt was that defection upon defection had occurred at the very juncture when the Sikh cause seemed least promising. Rajah Chuttur Singh had despaired of the advance of his Affghan ally, and was imploring Golab Singh's mediation with the British Government when Peshawur rose. Rajah Shere Singh left the camp of Whish immediately after the General's most signal success. The chiefs near Umritsur never made their venture of rebellion, till the seizure of Govindghur rendered it desperate; and a Poorbeah regiment could desert Edwardes in the very hour of a victorious action at Sooruj Khond. These paradoxes prove the insurrection to have been one of impulse rather than concert: a general sentiment had outrun the cautious plots of the Queen Mother. The intense nationalism of the Sikhs was indeed stronger than personal interest, or cold calculation of chances, or even hereditary animosities. Nor would they have yielded to Sobraon at all if Bhyrowal had not promised to preserve the land of the Gooroo to his book and to his people. When it was seen that the British regency might continue a kingdom to the Maha-

rajah Dhuleep, but not his father's, the Sikh Chap. VI.
appealed to the sword again to decide a question only deferred by Lord Hardinge. Once thoroughly defeated at his own hard logic of force he was ready, as will be seen, to accept the conclusion of his conquerors.

Rajah Chuttur Singh had given Goojerat as Movements of the Rajah Shere Singh.
the rendezvous where he would meet his son and assemble the Khalsa for their supreme effort. But the gallant defence of Attock by Herbert, still delayed him after the fall of Peshawur and the mutiny of Bunnoo. Rajah Shere Singh, meanwhile, had continued his march beyond the Ravee, and moved to Jhung on the Chenab, a city tenanted largely by Mohammedans. Here, like a true Sikh, he damaged his cause by treating with shameful outrages the Moslem inhabitants and their places of worship; at the very time, too, when the difficult alliance of his father and the Affghan Sultan was maturing. He lingered at Jhung till the 23rd of October, throwing his cavalry forward, however, to Sheikhopoor and Lahore, to cover the march of his infantry up the left bank of the Chenab. It was then the Resident's turn to implore the assistance he had before lent; Lahore could but just be held against her own bazaars, and not a handful of men were available to check the approaching army. Shere Singh's vanguard came actually within sight of the city, and a party of his cavalry

Chap. VI. even set fire to the bridge of boats within a koss of the walls, carrying off eighteen camel guns from a suburban post. Had the Sikh Rajah led his troops forward to the assault of Lahore, it would scarcely have resisted, since no aid could have been looked for from the Ferozepore contingent, which, made up to three regiments only, was approaching by provoking marches of eight miles a day. But Shere Singh, content with insulting the British Resident, forbore to assault him, and the tardy arrival of Brigadier Cureton, on the 2nd of November, rendered Lahore safe. The Sikh leader had been satisfied with gaining a strong country for his operations, and an open road for the levies of the Bunnoo and Hazara Sirdars.

Advance of
the grand
army under
Lord Gough.

The troops under Cureton were the advanced guard of the main English army now at last assembling, seven months after the Mooltan murders, and to fight a campaign elaborated for them by delay. The force of which Lord Gough assumed the command numbered about 20,000, with nearly 100 guns. Its head quarters reached Lahore on the 13th of November, and the Chenab on the 21st. Shere Singh was *à cheval* upon the river, but the mass of his army kept the right bank, communicating with Chuttur Singh, ready to welcome or to challenge the Cashmere Rajah, and fed by way of Ramnuggur from the Manjha. When Attock should

fall, reinforcements would reach the Sikh Prince; meantime he looked to draw the British general into a difficult district, and whether on the Chenab, or the Jhelum, or even the Indus, to strike a decisive blow before the fall of Mooltan should set Whish at liberty. The Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, could cover Mooltan as well as Lahore, and deny the supplies, if not the sympathy, of the Manjha to the Sikh leader. What the Commissariat proper would have proved itself after seven months' preparation, will not be known, except by a computation from past short-comings. Lord Dalhousie with a trenchant act deposed the military board, and appointed in its stead an officer allied by name and family to the Governor-General. The change was doubtless for the better, but the army was fed throughout at an extravagant cost; supplies were fetched from Hindostan, and those collected at less expense by the Politicals were stolidly refused.

It was necessary to confine Shere Singh to the right bank of the Chenab. Part of the Sikh force, as has been said, held Ramnuggur on the nearer side, and a second portion occupied an island in mid-stream. The main body lay beyond the river with a well-armed battery. Lord Gough resolved to drive the Ramnuggur vanguard across into their own country, and, on the 22nd, two regiments of infantry, the cavalry

Cavalry action at Ramnuggur.

Chap. VI. division, and some horse artillery moved towards the town with that purpose. On reaching high ground near its walls, the growing light disclosed that the Sikhs had already crossed, leaving only detached parties, who were also passing over. The artillery was ordered to open upon them, and dashed forward in ignorance of the ground; with such precipitance, too, that a gun and two ammunition waggons plunged over the bank, and became immoveable in the deep sand of the river-sole. The English fire, which had inflicted some loss on the retreating Sikhs, was now answered from the opposite battery, so that the overturned gun, inextricable in the centre of a hot fire, had to be reluctantly spiked and abandoned. A retreat was ordered: the Sikhs, elated at their success, crowded again into the river, and swarmed upon the left and near bank in threatening numbers, while a party secured and carried off the piece. They maintained this insulting advantage till past mid-day. The cavalry had received orders to charge upon opportunity, but Colonel Cureton, commanding the horse, dared not expose his men to the accurate fire of the Sikh guns without a clear advantage, and for a long time restrained their impatience. At last a body of the enemy approached more closely, and the dragoons chastised their presumption with effect. The Sikhs again ventured out beyond the protection of their

battery, and the 14th Light Dragoons received the word to charge from their colonel, William Havelock, a name since more illustrious than the splendid failure at Ramnuggur can make it. At the sound of their trumpet, the dragoons rode down together on the masses of the Sikhs, which, without yielding ground, broke up right and left before the troopers. Not pausing, or only for the second summons of the trumpet, they kept their course towards the river, and fell on a second body of the enemy, who received them with the same tactics, evading rather than yielding to their charge, and leaving the front files of the cavalry on the abrupt edge of the river bank. The trees which had masked the first charge now afforded no protection, and the Sikh artillery opened upon the dragoons, while matchlock men below the bank kept up a withering fire. Cureton had galloped forward exclaiming, "That is not the body I desired to attack!" when a ball pierced his breast. Havelock, meanwhile, over eager to drive the Sikhs through the water, called upon his willing men to follow, and leaped down the embankment into the sand-beds. The broken channel of an Indian river is no place for English cavalry, and the dragoons became confused and hampered; the Sikh marksmen dealing destruction among the tall horsemen and horses, but flinging themselves flat among the stones and

Deaths of
Cureton and
Havelock.

Chap. VI. rushes whenever they approached. Havelock, last seen in a throng of assailants, fighting like a hero of the Iliad, was unhorsed and killed, and his body left upon the sand flats. Nor was the retreat of his dragoons effected without a loss of ninety in men and officers, and one hundred and forty horses. The deaths of Cureton and Havelock would alone have marred a victory, and enhanced the discouragements of the first field-day of the campaign. Cureton had risen from the ranks, and was regarded as one of the best cavalry officers of his service, knowing the exact force and use of this important arm. Inferior to him in the arts of command, Havelock was unsurpassed as the fiery leader and sharer of a charge; and long before, in the Peninsula, "follow the fair boy!" had passed into the battle-cry of his devoted soldiers. His body was discovered upon the passage of the river, mangled by honourable gashes, and was buried with Cureton's at the Imambarra of Ramnuggur.

Lord Dalhousie's cautious attitude.

Lord Dalhousie, arrived at Loodhiana by the 22nd of December, received intelligence of this engagement without much increase of his confidence or composure. He had earnestly warned Lord Gough to venture beyond the Chenab with great diffidence, and he had even gone so far as to forbid the passage of the river, except to attack the Sikhs in position. Supplies would be difficult to obtain in the Jetch Doab,

and the enemy, thrust towards Mooltan (if he declined to fall back upon the Jhelum), could seriously embarrass the besieging force, of whose success Lord Dalhousie so ardently waited to hear. Yet, not willing to close to the Commander-in-Chief the doors which fortune might abruptly open, the Governor-General thus notified to the Secret Committee that he had withdrawn his veto: "The information which I have received, has led me to believe that, in many material respects, circumstances have undergone a change. I have, therefore, acquainted his Excellency that, if he can convince his own judgment regarding the state of his supplies, his supports, and communications, if the intelligence he may receive, and the reconnoissances he may be able to make, shall satisfy him that the enemy may be attacked, with success, by such force as he may have safely disposable, and without a heavy loss—in such case, I should be happy indeed to see a blow struck that would destroy the enemy, add honour to the British arms, and avert the prospect of a protracted and costly war. Meanwhile, his Excellency, with the British army, remains at Ramnuggur." In the same despatch Lord Dalhousie draws attention to a curious and able paper forwarded to the British Government from Shere Singh's camp, two days after the action at Ramnuggur. It exposes the Sikh's

Chap. VI. opinion of the past, and the Sikh's justifications for his revolt. The advancement of Golab Singh, the banishment of the Maharanee, the abstraction of state funds, the disregard of Sikh prejudices, the preferment of Affghans and Pathans, and, beyond all, the killing of the cow, are the chief grievances of the Khalsa Sirdars. But the time was past for words; though the ordered and reasonable tone of this document could not but command the Viceroy's attention, and convince him of the solidity of that national movement which he had to subdue. Lord Dalhousie declined to treat with "rebels" for the restitution of Major Lawrence and their other valuable prisoners, but he took care to assure Shere Singh that "terrible retribution would be exacted if any injury was done them."

The flank movement of Sir J. Thackwell. Action of Sadoolapore.

For a week after Ramnuggur, Lord Gough lay waiting his heavy artillery; which reached him on the 28th of November. On the 29th, a design was formed, of so evident a genius and judgment, as to secure the suffrages of all military critics, if the wisdom of moving at all, while Shere Singh was in check, be once conceded. It was proposed that General Sir J. Thackwell should cross the Chenab at an assigned ford, and attack the enemy's left flank, while the main army assaulted his front. Thackwell set out on the 1st of December; but on reaching the ford, found it impassable for guns,

and, not willing to return, marched higher up the stream, and crossed it at Wuzcerabad. The Commander-in-chief, meantime, pushed his batteries to the edge of the river, and opened a cannonade to distract the Sikhs from the flank movement. He despatched also a second force, under Brigadier Godby, to a ford six miles from Ramnuggur; and sent orders to Thackwell not to attack, till he had united with this body. Under these directions, the General halted at noon of the 3rd, when within a few miles of the enemy. Three villages, affording a strong position, were in his immediate path, and it is not quite clear why an advanced guard had not explored and occupied them.¹ Encouraged by the halt, Shere

¹ To supplement, and perhaps to correct, the view taken of the passage of the Chenab and the engagement of Sadoolapore, the subjoined is quoted from an original letter of sufficient authority, addressed to the author by one present on those occasions, and closely attached to the person of Sir Joseph Thackwell. The sentence and phrase italicised appear to confirm the opinion that the fault of Sadoolapore, perhaps unavoidable, was the inefficiency of the previous reconnoissance :

“There are two points upon which you require information, to which I will at once apply myself.

“You inquire why Sir Joseph Thackwell had not explored his front before the action of Sadoolapore? He had taken the usual precautions. Lieutenant Nicholson, with his Pathan Cavalry, had been sent in advance. The cavalry, on each wing, had also pushed forward patrols, and sent out flanking parties. The infantry picquets were also well in advance of the infantry brigades. As the ground in our front was studded for a very long distance with khets of thick, lofty sugar-cane, and several villages, it was easy for an enemy to remain concealed. The first round shot that lobbed into the British line was fired from heavy guns at a great distance. As soon as Sir Joseph received information from Lord Gough that Brigadier Godby was to cross the river to reinforce him, coupled with an order that he was to defer his

Chap. VI. Singh moved out to attack him, and seized the position which the English general had neglected or overlooked. Thackwell's guns, however, after two hours' fighting, completely subdued the Sikh fire; and the infantry, native and European, were desirous to advance. At this moment, though Godby had not joined, a message from Lord Gough made Thackwell free to act; but the daylight was waning, and he

December 3,
1848.

attack upon the Sikh intrenchments until reinforced by Godby's Brigade, he ordered his detachment to halt, and proceeded to take steps to secure the ford on his left flank, over which Godby was to pass. It certainly would have been better for us to have occupied the villages in our front; but they *might have been filled* with the enemy, and no doubt were so, which would have precipitated a fight. Our advanced guards and patrols *had not gone up* to the villages, but had halted at a little distance from them. It is indeed almost certain that the enemy were in the villages in great force.

"Not merely a '*corps d'armée*,' but the whole Sikh army, deserted the Sikh position at Ramnuggur, and took Sir Joseph's force *by surprise* on their way to the River Jhelum. Thousands were drawn up in our front. Lord Gough had announced his intention to Sir Joseph to cross the river at Ramnuggur, in front of the Sikh army, and to occupy their attention whilst Sir Joseph attacked the left of the Sikh position. But neither was he able to fulfil his promise, nor could Godby's reinforcement, though assisted by boats, cross the river in time to be of use to Sir Joseph before the Sikh army retreated to the Jhelum.

"There can be no doubt that if Sir Joseph had advanced upon the Sikh intrenchments, without waiting for Godby's reinforcement, he must have inevitably sustained a defeat. His force was too small to have carried the Sikh position without aid from Lord Gough. It was fortunate that Lord Gough gave him an imperative order to halt until reinforced, otherwise he would have been *ccrasé*.

"The gallant 24th, composed of young recruits, might have failed there as at Chillianwallah.

"*Sir Joseph was not aware how far the villages in his front, at Sadoolapore, were situated from the Sikh intrenchments. They might have been in close proximity.*"

would not order the charge upon uncounted Sikhs, strongly-placed and fresh, when his own force of 7,000 was jaded by a march of twenty miles, and had gained no advantage, except in artillery. Chap. VI.

Those who blame the caution of an officer whose courage and enterprise had been sufficiently testified by the Peninsula and Waterloo, will expatiate on the magnificent results which fortune reserves to daring, and which might have crowned Sadoolapore. Those who, like the historian of the Roman empire, respect the intricacies of the art of destruction,¹ will suspend their judgment. It seems quite as difficult to pronounce why no advance could be made beyond the river by Lord Gough, in aid of Thackwell, since the great majority of Sikh troops was withdrawn in his attack, and the battle-field was not distant. But throughout the campaign, the ground was never known to the commanders, and not very carefully explored. It was fought, beside, in the face of an active foe, and among a thoroughly hostile population. Ramnuggur—the ford of the Chenab—Sadoolapore—and Chillianwala—a main army seated, as here, in front of empty batteries, while the enemy, miles away, engages a wing—all these exemplify the cost of local ignorance. As for Sadoolapore, Lord Gough himself recognised

The conduct
of General
Thackwell.

¹ *Vide* Chap. 68, "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire."

Chap. VI. the arguments for Thackwell's self-restraint; nor does public opinion exact more of a subordinate general than his commander. Great enterprise might have cost us the Punjab—prudence may also have missed a victory.¹ The Sikhs had, however, sustained a heavy loss. The barking of their dogs in the dead of night gave the General reason to believe them retreating, and the morning showed their camp deserted. Shere Singh had withdrawn his men, “without leaving a goat,” from Thackwell and Lord Gough, and was beyond pursuit at dawn. The

¹ The opinions of Brigadier John Nicholson and of Sir Henry Lawrence, which the author has to give, in the words of one best entitled to report them, will be accepted by many as most decisive on the vexed question of Sadoolapore :

“The flank movement from Ramnuggur, across the Chenab, was ably designed, but badly executed; and the General was absurdly fettered by orders, which, however, he ought not to have observed. General Thackwell, however, though a steady soldier, was a man of no particular genius. He missed a great opportunity at Sadoolapore. It is true that the great bulk of the Sikh force, under Shere Singh, moved out against him; but, on the other hand, that force has been greatly over-estimated. The greater part of the Bunnoo Brigade, and none of the Peshawur Brigades—the flower of the Sikh army—had then crossed the Jhelum. Thackwell had ample means, then, of dealing with Shere Singh's force at Sadoolapore. His artillery had silenced their guns, and a forward advance of the infantry would have cleared all before it, and taken these guns, and broken up the rest of that army. As you afterwards say, such an action would have saved the shame, and the loss of Chillianwallah. Though Godby could not have come up to them in the fight, the circumstance that he was crossing the Chenab ought to have been an argument for Thackwell's fighting. On the field of Sadoolapore, we had the Sikhs just in the way they ought to have been met—namely, on ground of their own selection. The difficulty, moreover, is to catch such an enemy in the act of moving, and here we had such an opportunity. I doubt much if the Sikhs had 10,000 soldiers at Sadoolapore.”

same astonishing want of information which sent Thackwell to an impracticable ford, and allowed the guns of the Commander-in-Chief to throw shot and shell into the deserted camp of the Khalsa, till their departure was discovered, now construed it into a flight. A despatch, dated from the "camp of pursuit," prematurely announced as a victory, vouchsafed by Providence, a movement whose utmost advantage was to circumscribe the Sikh's sphere of supply, while it increased the difficulties of the British commissariat. Lord Gough himself fell back to Ramnuggur, inclined, indeed, to have pursued and brought the enemy to battle, but withheld by Lord Dalhousie's extreme disinclination to risk the Punjab rivers on a blow, with Mooltan still defiant.

Affairs at this date wore a more critical look than any which loss or failure by an earlier advance could have given them. The grand army, which had jealously hoarded its energies for the cold months, had so far expended them in a disastrous cavalry fight, a futile flank movement, and an innoxious and brief pursuit. The public in India and England chafed at the spectacle of a British army making the passage of the river only to draw up when the videttes of each force encountered one another. It was not, in truth, Lord Gough's fault that his troops lay in idleness from the 5th of December to the 12th of January. The statesman restrained the

Chap. VI.

Serious posture of affairs.

Chap. VI. soldier; Lord Dalhousie dreaded the cast of a die, thus far so persistently unfortunate. Yet, if the Commander-in-Chief had had his will, and pushed the Sikhs to a fight, it is fair to point out the strong chances of success. Attock had not fallen, and Chuttur Singh was not yet free to join his son. Shere Singh himself had received a lesson, if not a punishment, from Thackwell; and was retiring, if not retreating; nor would time have been given to the Khalsa leader to choose and take up those strong positions at Russool, which afterwards cost us the shame and the loss of Chillianwala. It is to be set down to Lord Gough's credit that his policy of advancing, in this instance, was that of a sagacious, as well as of a courageous, chief; and, if carried out, might have averted the fall of Attock, and hastened the termination of the war.

Position of
the Punjab at
the time of
the second
siege of
Mooltan.

However, the Scotch blood of Lord Dalhousie clung to the counsels of prudence, and urged, meanwhile, the renewal of the siege of Mooltan. The Bombay column, under Dundas, reached that city on the 22nd of December. But the second siege demands a separate narration; and, to recount its incidents, the Eastern Punjab must be a little while deserted. The rival armies remained a month at Heylah on the Chenab, and Russool on the Jhelum, quietly watchful of each other. Almost all the Five Rivers was virtually gone from the British, except Attock in the north,

and Lahore and the Jullundhur Doab in the south; and all the active chiefs of the Durbar were estranged, except the veteran Sheikh Ema-mooddeen. The revolted Sirdars besieged his fidelity as anxiously as Chuttur Singh the walls of Attock, and the brave Mussulman held out for his salt as staunchly as the gallant Herbert. That officer's defence of the river-fortress, claims indeed a larger page than the desultory notice of a record can bestow, eager to disembarass itself of the tumult of war, and to pass to subjects of less imposing monotony. When Peshawur rose in revolt, Herbert had strengthened himself at Attock, and kept the most exposed fortress of the frontier safe while all the others had fallen.¹ His walls were not shot-proof, his garrison only continued faithful because the advance of the British army was expected; and Chuttur Singh beleaguered the fort on one side of the river, while Dost Mahomed Khan and his Barukzyes threatened it from the other. The trees and brambles of the rock of the citadel supplied its external defences, and the pay for the impatient garrison could only be obtained by selling the fort-stores. Yet thus straitened and isolated, Lieutenant Herbert held his walls and his men together for more than fifty days, doing an incalculable service to the cause of the

Herbert's de-
fence of
Attock.

¹ Srikote in Hazara must be excepted, where Captain Abbott also courageously maintained himself.

Chap. VI. Government. When the Doorannees swarmed across the river, a Durbar of his officers declared that they could no longer resist the Sultan, who held their wives and families as hostages. Herbert, therefore, with a few companions, made his escape by night on rafts, and Attock fell to Dost Mahomed. A minute issued by the Governor-General at this date, sets aside, with a rather transparent politeness, the idea of Dost Mahomed's implication in the war. It declines to believe that he has come through the Khyber—it is sure he has not reached Peshawur—it is confident that he can be arrived so far only to offer his assistance. But Dost Mahomed was down from his valley for something else beside smooth words. Peshawur, the “burial-place of his fathers,” the old apple of Sikh and Dooranee contention was again within his reach, and Dost Mahomed had come to grasp at it.

Good service
of officers at
Jullundhur,
Hazara,
Lukkee, &c.

It is plainly impossible to embrace in a narrative which does not claim a military character, the episodes of adventure and fidelity which coincided with these events in the Jullundhur Doab, the Derajat, and elsewhere. If the names which attach to them had not long ago become known by greater achievements of heroism and devotion, it would be a duty to delay the passage of the narration that justice might be done. But to relate the vigilant and masterful management of Jullundhur, cannot enhance the reputation of John Lawrence, whose arm since then has controlled

the rebellion of an imperial army. Nor is the story of the services done on the Punjab frontier necessary to the renown of Nicholson, Edwardes, Lumsden, Taylor, and Abbott. The Government which works by such men has less to boast than another, and less to fear; and such men have never been wanting to the Government of India.

But Peshawur and Hazara were of course largely peopled by other races than Sikh Hindus; and if those distant provinces were caught in the flame of rebellion, it must be natural to inquire specially how these districts fared where the Sikhs predominated. The Manjha was covered by Lord Gough's army, and the western extremity of the Doab was sufficiently pre-occupied at Mooltan. But Jullundhur, a Sikh centre, will serve to exhibit the infectious character of the rising. A great many of the disbanded Khalsa inhabited the Baree Doab, whose eyes were anxiously turned towards Shere Singh, and the Mooltan defenders. Their numbers were not of course so formidable as their influence, but yet sufficient to have created a great diversion in favour of Mooltan, and a serious embarrassment to Lahore, if any negligent hand had held them. They were encouraged to move at last by a Sikh detachment which crossed the Ravee to Pathankote, hoping to raise the country. Ram Singh, son of the titular Wuzeer of Noorpore, joined these men with a following of 300, and raised the flag of

Chap. VI. revolt near that city. It did not fly long or far in the district entrusted to John Lawrence's keeping. The Commissioner of the trans-Sutlej collected a force mainly composed of Sikhs and Hill Rajpoots, and caused the insurgent chief to evacuate his mountain-fort before he could firmly establish himself in it. By a series of movements of unparalleled energy and rapidity, an *emeute* was thus extinguished which could not but have grown to a separate rebellion. Oonah, the town of the Bedee Bikrama Singh, Chief Priest and Chief Leader of the Sikhs, was taken and dismantled; nor did the victors show themselves less lenient in success than they had been resolute in peril. The 1st Sikh Local Corps, which contributed most of all to the defeat of their countrymen, contained nearly 300 Sikhs proper; but that they were gallantly led, explains a loyalty stronger than sentiment or bigotry. This campaign, notable in its influence for good, has attracted too little regard from the annalists of the period. A horseman who plays no fine tricks of horsemanship, nor trifles with the hot temper of his steed, wins less applause from an idle eye than the showy rider, who provokes the fury which he has then to check. Mr. Lawrence in Jullundhur, might have waited for Brigadier Wheeler with decorum and precedent: for Sikhs against Sikhs were odds at least as doubtful as those which Lord Gough had before refused. Another revolted

province, and one too within British territory, would then have been in full rebellion on the flank of the grand army. He chose instead the course of boldness, which in the East, lies close beside the path of prudence. The decision of his measures, in the council-tent and in the saddle, diminishes thus against themselves the popular estimate of the Jullundhur episode. It is but modestly summed up by its own hero in these words:—"The Sikhs attacked Puthankote on the 19th. On the 24th, the Jeswan Raja and the Bedee rose in the lower range of hills. About the same time, the Mulmoree Raja, in the upper range, also rebelled. The General was absent from the territory, and I and my assistants were thus, necessarily, obliged to act on our own responsibility, to a considerable extent. By the 3rd of the ensuing month, or within thirteen days, peace and order have been restored throughout the territory, by the capture, or dispersion, of the insurgents. This result has been effected with little loss of life, and hardly any expense to Government. Had we not thus promptly acted, I am convinced that the rebellion would have assumed a formidable aspect, and have cost blood and treasure to suppress. Many who had every intention of joining against us, were paralyzed by our movements; and the good intentions of the well-disposed were confirmed."¹

¹ See letter from Sir John Lawrence, in "Punjab Blue Book."

CHAPTER VII.

Chap. VII. FROM the day when the siege of Mooltan was
Mooltan. raised, and the camp shifted to Sooruj Khond, General Whish had maintained an attitude of observation, and contented himself with limiting rather than repressing the excursions of the Khalsa horsemen. Indeed, pending the arrival of the Bombay reinforcements, his position was precarious, and daily rendered more so by the skilful appeals of Moolraj to the native portion of his forces. The Sikh irregulars, under Edwardes and Cortlandt, beheld dawn after dawn passing without the advent of the promised troops, and the sowars of Mooltan scouring the country before the very faces of the English, and accumulating stores into the garrison so plentifully, and with such impunity, that Moolraj had not cause to open a rice-bag of his granary. From time to time unsuccessful skirmishes rendered the Mooltanees less daring, and the disaffected soldiers in the British camp more than ever doubtful; but on the 7th of November, no less than 300 of Cortlandt's men

went over to Moolraj. On the same day, a spirited attack was made by the men of Moolraj from a battery outside the town, whence his gunners had long annoyed us. Either dreading the regular troops, or not believing that the irregulars would act against it, the attack was made chiefly upon these last. It was repelled with signal fidelity and courage. Edwardes in person called upon the men of Kineyree and Suddoo-sain to retrieve the credit which their comrades' desertion had forfeited; and the same gallant leader, who had laid aside the clerky pen for the soldier's sword at Kineyree wielded it again on this occasion with the same valour and fortune. It was Mr. Quin, head writer and fighter to Major Edwardes, who drove the Sikhs from the canal bank where the Pathans had been posted. Brigadier Markham meanwhile placed himself in the rear of the sortie, and Major Wheeler, commanding the cavalry, executed a charge which drove the enemy in masses from the defence of their guns. The British force gained no new position by this affair, but it did not return to the camp of observation without leaving the battery in ruins, and 1,200 Mooltanees dead under their walls.

The Bombay contingent, delayed by causes which could not be examined without grave and retarding condemnation, at last appeared at Mooltan. They had marched from Roree

Chap. VII.
Arrival of
the Bombay
Contingent,
Dec. 26,
1848, and re-
newal of the
siege.

Chap. VII. upon the Indus, on the 18th, and reached Mooltan on the 26th, in all about 9,000 men, thus swelling the available forces of General Whish to 17,000 men, with sixty-four heavy guns. Three months had elapsed since the raising of the siege, a lapse which it would be lost time here to qualify or account for. It seems inherent in Saxon counsel to find its way to victory by blunders, to condemn no system till it falls to pieces of itself, and to supersede no unfit leader till all the mischief of his unfitness is effected. The troops, however, were arrived, and General Whish, with a decision and energy which somewhat retrieves this record of inaction, ordered them to service on the very next morning. The 27th of December was fixed for the long interrupted siege to recommence. The plan resolved on was to approach by clearing the suburbs of the city, and thus to secure a position for the breaching batteries. Four columns moved to the new attack. They succeeded in driving in the outposts, and capturing in succession the Mausoleum of Sawun Mull, with the Shumstabreez, or Blue Mosque; and batteries for six-and-twenty breaching pieces and mortars were quickly prepared and opened on the fort, the heaviest against the Mundi Ava to the right. Under a constant and well-directed return, the trenches were pushed forward, and the guns brought nearer and nearer. On the 29th, the

18-pounders opened on the Delhi gate, breaching the curtain at a distance of eighty yards. For three nights and days the tempest of artillery had no intermission. The town was repeatedly set on fire, and the buildings within it crumbled into clouds of dust, pounded by solid shot and shells. The populace, cooped up without any cover, perished by hundreds, or were cut down by the cavalry in escaping. Nor was the defence less desperate; the guns of the fort were gallantly manned by Moolraj's artillerymen, and for four hours of the terrible 29th, every shot of the English had its reply. Before noon a catastrophe had occurred. A chance shell from the British batteries fell upon the Musjid used as a grand magazine, and with a terrific reverberation, tearing up the ramparts and platforms of the adjacent works, the edifice was hurled into the air. The witnesses of that scene of horror describe with impressive minuteness the appearance of the immense column of fragments and smoke which rose above the blaze and ruin of the explosion. It spread out its slow and massive volutes, and swept away upon the wind, like the Genius of Rebellion abandoning to their fate the victims he had duped. The fire, which had been suspended for a moment on each side, was recommenced with new energy from the English batteries. Bombay and Bengal artillerymen emulated each other in the frequency and the effect of

Chap. VII. their discharges. Nor did their crashing visitations, or the catastrophe lately suffered, daunt the courage of the besieged. The Sikh guns, still in position, continued to be served as bravely and with as much steadiness as before.

Capture of the city.

On the last day of the year the troops of Moolraj made a sortie upon the position held by the levies under Edwardes. It was driven back with heavy loss, Sir Henry Lawrence, who had returned from England and reached the camp on the 28th, himself heading the repulse. At noon a conflagration arose in the store-house of the fort, and raged all day and night, consuming grain to the value of five lakhs, and many hundred maunds of oil. The light of the flames enabled the besiegers to serve their batteries all through the night, and the English new year dawned to these fierce salvos and to their echo from the town. The British shells were now falling upon the bazaars and the citadel in clusters of threes and fours. The breaches were rapidly widening, but the storm of the town, designed for the New Year's Day, was put off till another twelve hours' bombardment should have fully prepared for it. At early dawn, on the 2nd of January, the Bengal and Bombay columns advanced from opposite points. On reaching the breach, the former was received with a ready and firm resistance, and found an inner mass of masonry blocking up the gap

2nd January, 1849.

which rendered entrance impracticable. They retraced their steps, and hurried away to support the other column, which had already effected its object. Leaving their lines at 2 A.M., the Bombay troops, under Colonel Stalker, arrived at their breach before the first dawn, and found cover in some ruins near it. After resting a little, the order was given to advance, and the column left its shelter, and started for the escalade. A tremendous fire at once opened upon them from the ramparts and loopholes of the Kooni Boorj, and the flash of musketry aiding the grey light of the morning, showed the crest of the breach crowded with armed men. A discharge of grape over the head of the stormers cleared it for an instant. The rush of the British troops followed, and was irresistible. The Fusiliers under Captain Leith swept up to the glacis and over the shattered masonry like a wave of steel, the sepoy supporting them most faithfully. Captain Leith himself is declared to have been the first man upon the summit; a sword-stroke lopped his left arm, but he killed the two Sikhs engaged with him by downright blows, before he was carried off exhausted. A serjeant of the Fusiliers, John Bennett, planted their colours on the ridge he had gained, and stood for a moment alone in such a storm of matchlock balls that the silk was shredded to tatters, and the staff all but cut in two. The colour, how-

Chap. VII.

The capture
of the town.

Chap. VII. ever, quickly received support, and the city, in almost every quarter, was taken, the garrison retiring into the fort, where Moolraj now possessed no more than 4,000 fighting men.

Investment
of the fort.

The capture of the city had not, however, assured the surrender of the fort, which, indeed, was strongest on the town-face. Siege operations were again commenced, and parallels opened to within 500 yards of the fort, whose obdurate walls still resisted and returned our fire, though the shells sank into them as into a bank, dislodging tons of brickwork. Mining was at last resorted to, and galleries were run in the direction of the counterscarp, by the "Gate of Dignity." On the 18th this was blown in, the ruins choking up the ditch below. During all this while no real investment of the fort had been attempted, the cattle of Moolraj daily passing in and out to water, and supplies and assistance reaching him without hindrance. But, on the 17th, a cordon was first drawn round the place, and the nearer discharge of 8-inch shells, plunging into the enormous ramparts, and rending them in exploding, began now to teach their defenders despair. Emissaries at last came in twice or thrice from Moolraj with proposals for a conditional surrender. In the fort, indeed, his men could endure the storm of shot no longer, and had lost heart for resistance. The Dewan himself found his only shelter in a bomb-proof gateway, and the

Sikhs had to grind their own grain, all the meal being blown up with the Jumma Musjid. They plainly gave him to understand that he must either put himself at their head and try the desperate chance of cutting through the English forces, or give himself up a prisoner. He engaged to take poison, or to adopt the last alternative. His urzee for surrender came in on the 21st, the morning before the day fixed for a final assault. Moolraj asked only for his life, and respect for his women. General Whish replied, "I have neither authority to give your life or to take it except in war; the Governor-General alone can do this: as to your women, the English fight only with men—they will be protected. If you intend to come in, do it before sunrise at the Dowlat Gate. After sunrise, there is nothing for you but the fortune of battle." On the 22nd the garrison surrendered unconditionally, and Moolraj rode into the English camp. The head of the great rebellion which had claimed the Punjab for the Sikh, the defender for nine months of his father's fort and faith against the English, European and Asiatic soldiers crowded alike to see him. His spare figure and dignified air attracted their comment and admiration as he rode down the long files of British troops from the "Gate of Dignity" to the tent of the General. Mounted on a well-conditioned Arab splendidly caparisoned, and himself radiant in

Surrender of
Moolraj.

Chap. VII. enamelled armour and gilded silks : he illustrated Eastern fatalism, submissive to destiny, but never dejected. The rebellion which his accomplishments would have led him to shun,¹ as they taught him, once committed, to direct, was no crime in the eyes of the chiefs and adherents, who threw themselves at his feet in parting, with expressions of passionate devotion. A force was now set free to march along the Chenab and join the Commander-in-Chief, and the custody of the Mooltan Chief was committed to it. His family were safely removed; Moolraj had refused to see them, lest the pain of bidding farewell should dispossess him of his last dignity of composure. Only when he learned that banishment, and not death, was likely to be his doom, his fortitude gave way. He begged instant and disgraceful execution rather than to be dragged across the river, or, perhaps, even the great "Black Sea,"² to prolong existence in exile. The Hindoo can meet his dissolution carelessly, but the "death in life" of lost authority, departed friends, desperate fortunes,

¹ If the letters intercepted on the Jhung Road (Blue Book, p. 480) are really Moolraj's, they exhibit him in the light of an accomplished and intelligent chief, hostile, of course, to the English, but not with the "bigoted bitterness" which Sir H. Edwardes has declared them to display. "Thank God, you have hold of those ill-mannered Feringhees," he writes of the Peshawur captives; "the tree of my hopes has indeed borne fruit, and the buds of my desire begin to blossom." To his own friends, as to Sooltan Khan, the Dewan could be polite and scholarly. "Your welcome letter," he writes, "breathed in every line the perfume of friendship; from the fragrance of its contents, my senses were steeped in gladness."

² "*Kála páni*," the "black-water," a Hindustani phrase for the ocean.

and distant or forbidden home, overpowers his Chap VII.
reliant nature.

The house of Moolraj had risen from steward-ship to sovereignty, and his fortress curiously Interior of
the captured
fort.
blended the resources of the chieftain with a trader's stores. The wealth discovered by the prize agents illustrated, indeed, on a great scale, the government of the Kardars, whom years of illegitimate gain raised to dignity. Within the citadel, and round the gaping crater of the great explosion, lay bales on bales of silk, confused with large stone shot, shattered gun-carriages, and the blades of swords plundered of their far less valuable hilts and scabbards of silver. In the Toshakhanas and go-downs of the fort "dubbas" of ghee and chests of opium and indigo were crowded in thousands above cases of Cashmere shawls, and jars of coined and uncoined silver. Salt, sulphur, and drugs of all kinds, crammed the bomb-proof vaults below the terre-pleine, along with tiers of copper canisters brimming with golden mohurs. Of warlike stores, the prize agents found an equal profusion. There were supplies for an army, in matchlocks and spears, gun-wheels, zumbooruk saddles, cannon and the moulds for casting them, wood, iron, and saltpetre; while powder was profusely and recklessly exposed, and lay heaped in spots where the retiring garrison had emptied out their horns together. A fortified warehouse rather

Chap. VII. than a fortress, Mooltan might have defied for years skill less practised and courage more easily daunted than that of English besiegers.

22nd Jan.,
1849.
Lord Dal-
housie at
Mukkoo.

The presence of Lord Dalhousie at Mukkoo, near the scene of action, enabled him now to inspire the policy and to use the successes of the English arms.¹ The sick and wounded of the siege were sent by river to Sukkur; the fortress of Mooltan was entrusted to the safe hands of Edwardes; and Generals Whish and Dundas received instructions to move their forces with the least possible delay along the Chenab, in two divisions, to effect a junction with the Commander-in-Chief. To his camp at Loah Tibbee the narrative must also revert. Major Mackeson had arrived there, despatched as the Governor-General's political agent. On the 10th of January, he announced to Lord Gough the fall of Attock. Set free by this tardy triumph, Chuttur Singh's troops were advancing to join Shere Singh, who could of himself array twenty-seven thousand men and sixty guns against the forces of Lord Gough. It was on this account that Lord Dalhousie pressed Gough, by Major Mackeson, to act on the offensive. "I would urge," he writes, "if your lordship is strong enough with the army under your com-

¹ Sir H. Lawrence had also joined the Commander-in-Chief, having been the first to communicate to Lord Dalhousie the fall of Mooltan on his way through Mukkoo and Lahore to resume the Residentsip.

mand to strike an effectual blow at the enemy on our front, that the blow should be struck with the least possible delay." Shere Singh was posted with his left on Russool, at the Jhelum, whither Gilbert and Thackwell's advance had not so much driven as followed him, and the Commander-in-Chief determined to give the Sikhs battle there. Chap. VII.

On the 13th of January, the English army broke up and marched for the Jhelum, halting in the evening at Dinghee. The route next day led through the open and scrub country of the Jetch Doab. At noon the advanced guard came in sight of the enemy, strongly posted in line of battle, on a low range of furrowed hills, his front protected by the thick jungle. The Jhelum flowed in his rear, and a bridge of ingenious construction had been thrown across it. He lay from Chillianwala to Russool, about a koss, and rested on a broad pass at this last point. Lord Gough's plan was marked by military knowledge and forethought. A road led from Dinghee full upon the Sikh left at Russool. To march by this, to force the flank and break it away through Chillianwala to the bridge of boats, might drive Shere Singh in confusion beyond Jhelum, and must certainly coop him in a battle-field not of his own choice. Accordingly, in the afternoon, Lord Gough moved his army in order to a village in his front, and halted there again to reconnoitre. March to
Chillianwala.

Chap. VII. Sikh pickets were met upon the road, and these retired before the fire of the artillery, leaving their tents standing. The day was well advanced when the army approached Chillianwala; the troops had been long without refreshment, and the position of the Sikhs forbade the hope of making a decisive attack in such daylight as remained. It was accordingly resolved to stand fast, and the colour-men were taking up ground for an encampment, when the enemy advanced his horse-artillery and opened fire on the British. Shots fell within the flags, and either unwilling to change his ground for a securer one, or convinced that the Sikhs intended battle, and would deny a quiet night, Lord Gough suddenly altered his plan and the point of his attack. An advance was ordered, the guns were brought to the front, and quickly silenced those of the enemy. The left division, under Brigadier Campbell, was then directed to advance, moving upon the enemy's centre; the right, under Gilbert, following over a less extended space. Campbell's advance was effected under a murderous fire, masked by thick jungle. A portion of this brigade, under Pennycuik, consisting of Her Majesty's 24th and two native regiments, outstripped its artillery, and reached the foot of a hill crowned by a Sikh battery. The word to charge was given, and, although the ascent was long and steep, the guns were taken. The breathless column was securing its triumph alone, for

Battle of
Chillianwala.

the natives had lagged behind, when a Sikh regiment, concealed in the hill-side jungle, opened a deadly matchlock fire upon it. Confused and unsupported the soldiers looked in vain for their foe, and ten minutes of irresolution sufficed to spread the ground they had won with two hundred bodies. Pennyquick himself had fallen, and the retreat which then began was pressed so savagely, that the soldiers who bore the body of their leader were compelled to abandon it. His son, a boy of seventeen, sprang forward in the face of the Sikh files, and bestrode his father's body, sword in hand. Their exulting rush stretched him a corpse upon the corpse of his parent,¹ and drove the English force back to the main line with a loss of more than half their numbers.

Hardly less costly were the advances of Mountain on the centre, and Gilbert and Godby on the right. Each pushed his way to the enemy's entrenchments, to find themselves outflanked by the Sikh supports; and to retire, or reinforced by their own artillery, to obtain a critical success. Meanwhile, on the left, emboldened by their advantage, the enemy was pushing forward, and Thackwell ordered the 3rd Dragoons and 5th Native Cavalry to charge them. The sowars fell away unsteadily from the Sikh steel as

¹ It was thus reported; but another version states that the young soldier was killed in his palanquin, at the rear.

Chap. VII. they came up, so that the English cavalry charged alone, or but half supported, on the Sikh line. They broke through it, and the dense masses of the enemy closed over their track, apparently cutting off all return. However, the white cap-cloths soon appeared again, cutting a road back from the rear; and the gallant troopers made their return good, with a loss of forty wounded and slain. On the right less spirit or greater difficulty had sorely compromised the day. The brigade of horse under Pope, consisting of the 9th Lancers and 14th Dragoons, and the 1st and 6th Light Cavalry, with Grant's Horse Artillery, had been posted upon this wing, to overawe the enemy's left, strongest in the same arm. Entangled in their advance by the brush-wood, and exposed, it is said, to the same concealed matchlocks, which everywhere on that day beat down our musketry, the brigade was suddenly confronted by a battery, and a body of five hundred Sikh horsemen. "Either by an order, or the men's apprehension of an order," writes the Commander-in Chief, "a retreat was begun, which rapidly changed its character into a flight." Dragoons became mingled with lancers, horsed and unhorsed men clubbed hopelessly, and in the headlong rout fell reckless and confused among the guns and upon the gunners of their own force. A scene ensued which is better confessed with simplicity, than criticized or extenuated. The artillery just opening on the

enemy was overridden, tumbrils upset, and the artillerymen, embarrassed by the plunging of entangled horses and the approach of the Sikhs, could neither limber up to withdraw their pieces, nor usefully defend them. Some of the guns indeed, were so disabled in the tumult, that to retire them was impossible, and the Sikhs crowding down upon the confusion, became masters of six out of the number, two of which they carried off. The military error which had brought cavalry to the front of a battery in a jungle where two troopers could hardly ride abreast, had also left them without supports, and the retreat did not find a rallying point till it had involved the field hospital in the confusion. It is even said that the dragoons overswept their surgeons and the dressers' amputating tables, with their bleeding burdens, and trampled to death the wounded as well as their attendants. But these must be exaggerations. The despatch of Lord Gough informed the Governor-General that "the moment the artillery was extricated and the cavalry reformed, a few rounds put to flight the enemy that had occasioned the confusion." That a panic took place, therefore, is true, that it was more than momentary is not so. The very men who thus fled from Sikh horsemen, were those who, under the leadership of Cureton and Havelock, drove the Sikhs under their own guns into the river at Ramnuggur; and the 14th Dragoons may remember the day of Chillianwalla, with the deep regret of

Chap. VII. soldiers whose standard can bear one blank rather than with shame. Upon re-forming, the English guns checked the enemy and beat down his return fire; while throughout the field the Sikh artillery had gradually to succumb to the English. When the night closed upon the combat, the troops bivouacked under arms; the troopers by their horses, and the artillerymen by their guns, in a cold and rainy night. The Sikhs employed it in removing the captured pieces, and in murdering our unprotected men wherever they lay wounded. Our loss was very heavy, for if we had captured twelve guns and a standard, the enemy could display four taken from us—the colours of H.M. 24th and of three native regiments. Lord Gough's despatch again prematurely claimed a victory for an issue which left the vanquished upon the field free to strengthen their unimpeached position, and the victors doubtfully balancing a retreat with the advisability of entrenching on the spot. The Sikh salute, exultingly announcing their own contentment, might have been heard in the Commander-in-chief's tent, as he permitted his wishes thus to interpret his thought. Another such a Pyrrhine victory and the contest would not have been fought out at Goojerat, but on British territory, and for more than the sovereignty of the Punjab!

The general-
ship of Lord
Gough.

In thus criticising the campaign of Lord Gough and his battle of Chillianwalla, justice must be reverently done to the worth of a

general whose heroism made him the idol of his men. If the Commander-in-chief's courage needed evidence—a thought to smile at—it might suffice to adduce the amusing report that he had been well-nigh cut down at Chillianwalla, in the act of spiking a Sikh gun. But Lord Gough brought much more than the common courage of Englishmen to his task. He had a large experience, and great military attainments. He added to these also a coolness and sobriety of counsel, perhaps only too well shown by his Punjab policy. But like Augereau, to whom he has been compared, the plans drawn out in the cabinet seemed forgotten in the field. The first echo of the enemy's gun stirred in him an impulse stronger than the prudence of age or the resolve of education could control. The leader forgot himself in the soldier, and hurled mass after mass upon the strongest front of the enemy, aiming to obtain by force of sheer fight what strategy would have accomplished with lighter loss. On the Sutlej, at the Jhelum, at Gwalior, and in China, the same splendid valour gilded the same patent mistakes. Lord Hardinge at Ferozeshuhur could thus present the singular spectacle of a Governor-general of India fighting in the ranks with his Commander-in-chief to rescue a battle all but lost by lack of plan, although glorious by the example of devotion. But these remarks and whatever

Chap. VII. precedes them, are made in profound regard for Lord Gough's unquestioned qualities. To him will have to be ascribed the entire merit of Goojerat, which crowned and redeemed the war. And if the martial science be deemed too abstruse for a civilian's judgment, to set this aside will leave him free to admire, where he has ever reluctantly blamed. Yet a soldier does not value the courtly praise which seeks phrases instead of reasons, and cheapens eucumium by lavishing it.

Movements
preceding the
Battle of
Goojerat.

The battle of Chillianwalla preceded the fall of Mooltan by ten days. On the 27th January, General Whish began his upward march to join the Commander-in-chief, whose force, entrenched upon the field, had exchanged its broken regiments for the 53rd and 98th, from Lahore and Ferozepoor. Wheeler's division, engaged hitherto in the Jullundhur Doab, was also directed to join. The Sikhs were still expecting reinforcements, though Chuttur Singh and the son of the Ameer of Cabool were arrived in their camp. Their commander of artillery, Ilahi Buksh, had meantime come over to the English. Until the 6th of February, nothing of importance occurred, the Khalsa continuing to strengthen their position on the Russool hills, and provoking the engagement they desired by attacks upon foraging parties, and demonstrations upon the English flank. Suddenly the report arose that their position was abandoned, and that they

had crossed the Jhelum into the Sind Saugor Doab. Their camp was reconnoitred, found to be deserted, and occupied, for a second time in the campaign. But no certain intelligence could be obtained of their movements until the 14th Feb., when it was learned that Shere Singh's army had marched quietly past the British camp, and was occupying the town of Goojerat, seventeen miles to its rear. The object of this bold and masterly movement was, of course, to fall upon Lahore, first seizing Wuzeerabad, beyond the Chenab, on the high road to the capital. The sudden rise of the river, and a forced march of Whish, frustrated the design. On the 16th, that general joined the Commander-in-chief at Ramnuggur, having fallen in on the route with the Lahore reinforcements, and, in concert with them, forbidden to the vanguard of the Sikhs the passage of the stream. These had then fallen back on their main body at Goojerat. His army being strengthened, Lord Gough quitted his camp at Sadoolapore, and in two easy marches came within three koss of the Sikh outposts, taking up a position which would enable him to force a battle, or await the rest of his reinforcements.

Chap. VII.
Disappearance of the
Sikh camp.

The Sikh array, strengthened now by the Attock rebels, and commanded by Rajahs Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh, lay in a semi-circle about Goojerat. Fifteen hundred Affghan Horse, under the son of Dost Mahomed, had also joined

Battle of
Goojerat.

Chap. VII. them; but their number was certainly not in excess of 40,000 of all arms, with sixty pieces of artillery. The bed of the Dwara, dry in February, runs well round the town, and their right rested upon it; another watercourse, flowing down to the Chenab, covered their left. The Dwara nullah, after skirting the north and west faces of the town, passes off to the south, and takes its course through the centre of the ground occupied by the Commander-in-Chief. An open battle-field extended between the two, and Lord Gough chose it for the action. The British force of 25,000 men, with nearly 100 guns, took order of battle on the morning of the 21st of February. The Dwara bisected their line; on the left of it was the Bombay column, under General Dundas, with cavalry, including the Scinde Horse, under Thackwell, and some horse-artillery. Campbell's division of infantry, with field-batteries, came next the Bombay column, their right resting on the Dwara. To the right of that rivulet was posted Gilbert's Division, with eighteen heavy guns, next Whish and Markham's infantry, with horse-artillery and field-guns; Henessy's and Lockwood's Horse, and Warner's Horse Artillery, protecting the right flank. The troops were in position by daybreak, and started in the above order with the precision of a parade movement. The Commander-in-Chief's intention was "to pene-

trate the enemy's centre with his right, so as to turn the position of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable the left wing to cross without much opposition, and in co-operation with the right, to double upon the centre the wing of the enemy's force opposed to them." The advance began at half-past seven A.M., and the force moved in one line upon the position of the enemy. He commenced his fire with precision and energy, so soon as the leading files came up into range. The infantry was, indeed, halted just out of reach of the Sikh guns, but the artillery pushed on supported by skirmishers. Then commenced a duel of great guns, magnificent as a spectacle, but terrible in effect. The heavy English cannon opened at 1,000 yards upon the Sikhs, and as their lighter metal succumbed to the tremendous discharges, the field-batteries were constantly pushed forward. The Khalsa served their guns resolutely and with rapidity, but their fire slackened perforce under the sustained cannonade of the British, and by half-past eleven A.M. it had in many places ceased, the guns being withdrawn, dismounted, or abandoned. As the Sikh defences thus yielded, the infantry advanced, deployed, and carried in succession point by point upon the field. The artillery, moving also with their front, broke down every faint attempt to make a stand; and while the brigade under Penny forced the village of Burra Khalsa, the key of the Sikh position, that

Chap. VII. under Colonel Franks drove the enemy through and out beyond Chota Khalsa. At more than one spot the enemy endeavoured to resist, and especially rallied against the British left, gallantly cheered on by the Sikh leaders. They were withered, however, by a rain of grape; and a strong detachment, preparing to defend the nullah, became enfiladed by the same terrific fire, and yielded their position. Yet every arm of the Khalsa did its best on this last field. The Affghan horse, too, was especially conspicuous for boldness, and made a determined effort to turn the English left. A charge was ordered by the Scinde Horse, under Malcolm, and a squadron of the 7th Lancers. The files of the Dooranee horsemen gave way before the onset of the splendid cavalry of Indus, and fled, leaving standards and slain behind them at every step. The success of the cavalry on the left was crowned by the capture of six guns, among which was one of those that had been lost at Chillianwallah. The captor, recognising the piece his regiment had yielded, embraced the recovered trophy with an enthusiastic delight. As for Lord Gough, having thus magnificently redeemed his character as a general, he supported it as a soldier, by joining in the hot pursuit. A body of Sikh Horse at one time charged his escort, and the Commander-in-Chief owed his safety to personal vigour, and to the timely

succour of an aide-de-camp who slew his immediate assailant. The advance was by this time unchecked, and the long British line went rolling forward in fire and smoke. But still ten thousand irregular horse and Avitabili's trained dragoons, hung in a cloud about the field, anxiously seeking a weak point for attack. The 14th Dragoons, and the 1st and 3rd Light Cavalry, received the word to charge them, and the last effort of the Khalsa army was over, as they turned and broke away in flight. The dragoons drove them into the hilly ground, and captured their red silk standards. A general pursuit then took place; the nullah and fort were crossed; and the enemy, abandoning a gun at every step, yielded entrenchment, camp, and villages, and fled. The British followed along the east and north faces of the town. One party of desperate Sikhs made a stand in a temple, and a few awaited death in the buildings of the town, but the storm of shells and the bayonets of the infantry dispersed or despatched them. The cavalry, under Thackwell, were tardily sent in pursuit, with the horse artillery; and until nightfall their repeated charges, and the incessant fire of the guns, harassed, but not with much result, the flying masses of the Sikhs. The loss of the enemy was in fact by no means heavy, though their desperate enmity permitted no quarter, and demanded none. The Sikhs, as they lay wounded or dying on the field,

Chap. VII. watched every occasion for one more blow at the victorious English; and were killed by the troops, as they passed along, for their own safety. At night the divisions returned to hear how complete was their victory. Of the fifty-nine Sikh guns, fifty-three had been taken, those lost at Chillianwallah recovered, and camp, baggage, and magazines abandoned to us.

This crowning victory had been obtained by the British at a loss greatly inferior to that which Chillianwalla's disastrous success had entailed. It restored to Lord Gough also his popularity. Military critics have ungenerously attempted to diminish the Commander-in-Chief's triumph by denying to him the design of the attack and advance. But the commander of an English army must have the glory of its success, as he must consent to share the disgrace of its reverses. The Jhelum had, perhaps, taught Lord Gough that restraint which marked his wise dispositions at the Chenab. A more far-seeing, but not a braver, soldier has, indeed, envied the lost occasion¹ which might have

¹ "It is a subject of gladness to me not to have commanded at Goojerat. I might not have been able to control that love of war, which a certain consciousness of being able to wage it, creates in me: and I know well what Goojerat and its results would have been in my hands. Shere Singh had a road running to the only pass behind his right rear by which he could escape; had his right flank been turned, his whole army was lost, for there was no passing the ridge of rocks behind him except by that one pass. His position would have been very strong indeed had he made Goojerat the front of his centre, instead of a support a mile in rear; that, or gone in rear of the pass altogether."—*Life of Napier*, iv., 193.

converted the rout into an annihilation. It is Chap. VII.
 enough to know, however, that the work was done, and the better the less bloodshed. This battle of Goojerat, admirably planned, patiently fought out, and sufficiently consummated, ended the second Sikh war, and finally crushed the Khalsa army.

In his general order upon the victory, Feb. 21, 1849.
 Lord Dalhousie spoke with a voice that did not The order of the Marquis of Dalhousie upon the victory.
 unworthily echo the guns of Lord Gough. "The war," he declared, "in which we are engaged, must be prosecuted now to the entire defeat and dispersion of all who are in arms against us, whether Sikh or Affghans." His despatch to the Commander-in-Chief has the same tone, and urges the necessity of following up with spirit the blow so fortunately struck. The Sikhs and their Mahommedan allies, he declares, must find no breathing time; let them be driven, without rest or respite, from Doab to Doab, till Attock and Peshawur are cleared of them, and they are thrust through the Khyber Pass, or stand to perish in its jaws. The season is advancing, and the difficulties of military operations may be great, but there can be no concession or compromise. The one object which the pursuing general will hold in view, is to be the entire dispersion of those in arms against us, and the expulsion of the Ameer and his Affghans from the Punjab and the Peshawur Valley. In these

Chap. VII. terms, the incisive judgment of the Governor-General appreciated the occasion, and directed its right employment. His camp was by this time advanced to Ferozepore, whence, all but present on the field, his wishes could be promptly received.

Gilbert's
great chase.

The pursuing force, under Major-General Gilbert, 12,000 strong, left camp the day after the battle. Major Mackeson, as the representative of the Viceroy, took part in the hunt of the flying enemy. They had quitted the field in great confusion, and were dispersed over the Doab; some making in parties for the Jhelum, others throwing away their arms and uniform, and stealing off to their homes from the finished struggle. Only one body left the battle organized, and these, the Affghan horse, fled before the sunset, upon their overthrow by the Scinde Horse and the Lancers. They effected the passage of the Jhelum on the same night. Gilbert's movements were not much less rapid; for three days he pressed forward on the track of the dispirited Sikhs, never halting longer than to breathe his horses, and leaving his sowars no time to cook their rice and dhal. When the pursuers reached the banks of the river, it was to find the Sikhs encamped beyond it, with a few guns and 20,000 regulars and stragglers, employed in burning and breaking up the boats by which they had crossed. The Jhelum, flowing sluggishly and in one channel in the cold season, swells

here to a large river of three distinct streams, with rain-fall, or with the melting of the mountain snow.¹ Gilbert crossed to an island, and there awaited the arrival of his main body, left behind by the rapidity of the chace. For three days the British force was engaged in transporting guns and horses, but lost in the operation only one soldier and one camel-man. Without awaiting the Bombay column, the "Flying General" had his guns pressed forward over the abandoned camp of the Sikh fugitives. Disheartened by the closeness of the hunt, they nowhere stood their ground. Rhotas and the formidable Pass of Bakrala were in turn occupied by them, and abandoned. Before the fires were out in the town and in the defile, the leading squadrons of the pursuit passed through them, until, at Hormook, they fairly ran down a body of 4,000 Sikhs, under Boodh Singh. These surrendered without a shot. On the 8th of March, Gilbert rested for the first time with his troopers, from the exciting and successful chase. It had given no breathing time to the other fugitives, who, threatened by forces under Steinbach and the Sheik Emam-ood-deen; shut out from the passes on their flank by Captain

¹ The spot here reached was probably the ground of Alexander's battle with Porus: but the position of the armies was now reversed, the Orientals being encamped defensively on the shore occupied by the Macedonian conqueror, and the cavalry of Gilbert occupying the bank of Porus.

Chap. VII. Abbott; and harassed by the Mussulman population, whom their bigoted persecution in the hour of ascendancy had enraged, had now no alternative but surrender or death. Not even the protection of the Indus remained to them, for Dost Mahomed, separating himself from a lost cause, threatened to put to the sword every Sikh who should cross that river with his Doo-ranees. Mrs. Lawrence and the prisoners had all this time accompanied the Khalsa camp in its advance and flight, and Major Lawrence, released upon parole, had constantly in negotiation passed between the tents of Lord Gough and Shere Singh. These were now brought in—the first spoils of the spirited chase—in health and safety, and Shere Singh himself accompanied them to sue for terms. He left the British camp, with an ultimatum, to urge its acceptance on his followers, and Gilbert's continued pursuit supported his arguments. On the 12th, encamped at Rawul Pindee, the General at last received the submission of the entire Sikh army, not more beaten in the "Battle of the Great Guns" than worn out by the unsparing energy of the pursuers. Rajahs Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh presented the "nuzzur"—a complimentary gift, which engages fealty, and betokens subjection—and thirty-five Chiefs laid down their swords at Gilbert's feet. The Sikh soldiers, advancing one by one to the file of English drawn across the

road, flung down tulwar, matchlock, and shield, upon the growing heap of arms—salaamed to them as to the “spirit of the steel”—and passed through the open line, no longer soldiers.¹ Forty-one pieces of artillery were also surrendered, making, with those taken at Mooltan, no fewer than one hundred and sixty cannon captured by the British since the outbreak of the war. With the submission of the Sirdars, not a Sikh remained on foot, and the second Sikh war was triumphantly consummated.

It remained, however, to punish the daring confederates, and Lord Dalhousie, acknowledging this splendid result of Gilbert's celerity, encouraged his ardent spirit to new exertions. “The war is not concluded,” he still wrote, “till Dost Mahomed Khan and the Affghan army are driven through Peshawur.” Once more Gilbert started in pursuit, leaving the Sikh Chiefs to accompany Lawrence to Lahore. At Allora he learned that the Affghan Horse had not yet crossed the Indus. Starting thence with but a handful of horsemen, his staff, and the Agent of the Governor-General, he led the eager hunt over a difficult country, and through three rivers, till Attock was distant in front only six miles. It was told them that the Affghans were evacuating the fort, and destroying the bridge

Pursuit of the
Affghans.

¹ A gratuity of one rupee was offered to each Sikh, and 15,000 rupees were thus disbursed. Many, however, although fasting, refused to accept money, and some few escaped with arms.

Chap. VII. of boats. First of the few who still kept up, Gilbert again set spurs to his horse, nor ever drew rein till from the hills above the river he came in sight of the Dooranee batteries, firing upon the platforms to break the bridge. The apparition of the English, supposed to be two days' distant, struck such consternation into the Affghans that without staying to count their pursuers, they turned, and left the bank and the bridge, fifteen of its boats coming thus uninjured to the English. The artillery was brought up with all speed; the fort was occupied, and a force crossed the river to take possession of the opposite *tête du pont*. On the 19th of March, Gilbert crossed the Indus, and still seeking to bring the Affghans to bay, pushed on, night and day, for Peshawur. Halting rarely, as men who fly for their lives, and carrying no burden but their arms, the Affghan Horse had just before skirted that city, the gates of which had been closed in their faces. The Resident's house in the cantonments, set on fire by them, smoked yet as Gilbert passed upon their footsteps. If the hill-men had been won in time to hold the pass, not one Affghan would have reached Cabul; as it was, the disheartened and breathless fugitives gained the mountain only ten koss in advance of the terrible hunter, who had tracked them from Goojerat.¹ They crowded into

¹ In announcing and applauding the deeds of his agent, Lord

its protecting defiles, troopers and chieftain, in a rout; as hopeless as they had swarmed out of it hopeful, on the first news of English disaster. Not again would Affghan and Afreedee venture lightly into the reach of English horsemen, or the range of English guns. These picked troopers of Dost Mahomed went down to fight for Peshawur with the son of their Khan; and "the cursed Feringhees," they reported in the Cabul bazaar, "have beaten us, and driven us, like deer, over two deserts, and across two rivers. The snow is melted at Jellalabad that bore the stain of the English blood."

The Governor-General had continued to exhibit a statesmanlike decision from the day when he supported the Resident of Lahore in sending troops to the aid of Edwards. The costly success of Chillianwala had forced him to assume a share in the campaign, for the issue of which he first was responsible. Nor had his hand been laid long upon the helm before its strong and masterly touch was felt in the steadying of the ship; and if Goojerat was a soldier's victory Lord Dalhousie, at least, taught Lord Gough how a civilian could employ it. His counsels inspired the rapid Gilbert, his own agent drew rein beside him on

Chap. VII.
The decisive policy of the Governor-General.

Gough refers them to his own audit with a not quite natural egotism. "These brilliant results have been obtained, your lordship will observe, without a single shot having been fired by our troops since the victory of Goojerat."—*Despatch to Governor-General*, March 25, 1849.

Chap. VII. the hill of Attock, and every step of that swift course was watched with keen intelligence by the Governor-General. Its result had been anticipated, and Lord Dalhousie was prepared to act. It was well that no delay should half divulge and weaken the edict, by which the Punjab passed from the Lahore dynasty to the British, and the frontier of English India found its inevitable advancement. The genius of the Governor-General prompted him to action, and circumstances demanded that it should be pronounced and commanding. The Sikhs were indeed prostrate, and the Affghans had been ignominiously driven off; but while no new rule was proclaimed, the Punjab took all advantage of the inter-regnum. Thus, in the Barea Doab, absolute anarchy prevailed; its restless people not knowing, and not caring to know, whom they should serve. The hot season, too, was approaching, when the movements of troops and officials, necessary on the annexation, would be arrested; above all, the harvest was standing ripe for the sickle, and to have left long in doubt the right to its assessment would have been to lose all hope of securing its dues to the State. While a single soldier of the Khalsa or a sowar of Dost Mahomed remained a-field, Lord Dalhousie had reason to be reticent of his purpose, but the army had made his word good, that war should only cease with resistance. It was known that the Affghau

aids had escaped through the Khyber, and reached Cabool unpunished. But their flight had been a punishment heavy enough to tame for a generation the swaggerers that "rode down through the hills like lions, and ran back into them like dogs." Had the Khyberees kept their word, and shut the Pass across their flight, few Doorannees would have re-entered Cabool; but even those could not have taken home a more desponding story. Gilbert had left them scornfully at Jamrood, a spent and breathless quarry. The memory of that discomfiture long indeed quelled the ambition of the Affghans and of their King; and Dost Mahomed sued humbly enough, in 1855, for the friendship of the power he had defied in 1849. "To be friend of our friends, and foe of our foes," was the condition he gladly accepted for the privilege of renewing our unpledged alliance: so thoroughly had the great ride of Gilbert lowered his prestige and his hopes.

Justly then regarding the war as finished, Lord Dalhousie prepared to declare its inevitable consequence. He deputed his secretary to represent him with the Durbar, and despatched an additional brigade to Lahore, to preclude resistance. Mr. Elliot was to communicate to those few Sirdars of the Council of Regency, who had remained faithful, the decision of the English Government. It was that the Punjab should be forthwith declared a portion of the

Chap. VII. British Indian Empire, and that all the state property should be surrendered. If the Durbar, or that which survived of it, should acquiesce in this resolve, and relinquish for the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, at once and for ever, his title to sovereignty, the British Government would engage to secure to him, and to the faithful Sirdars, a becoming state and stipend. If the Durbar refused to accede, the British Government would take its own course without condition, and in either case Mr. Elliot had commission to issue the proclamation, annexing the Punjab and the territories of the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh to the British Empire.

28th March,
1849.
Deposition of
Dhuleep
Singh.

The deputy of the Government, being arrived at Lahore, invited the attendance of the leading members of the Council, Raja Tej Singh and the Dewan Deena Nath. The Rajah pleaded sickness to escape the conference, but abandoned the excuse upon urgent intimation, and attended in rude health, yet nervous and ill-at-ease. Mr. Elliot explained his mission, whereupon the Sirdars expressed themselves unconvinced of the right and justice of the English Government, but inveighed most of all against the rebellious chiefs, who had left no alternative but to suppress the Council of Regency. They demurred to the expatriation of the Maharajah and his court. "When they have quitted the palace, and its restraints," said the Dewan, "they will begin to lead licentious lives, and bring scandal on

the memory of Runjeet Singh." These scruples, somewhat new to Sikh sentiment, yielded to the representations of the envoy, who was then questioned upon the destination of the Maharajah. "He will go to the Deccan," said Mr. Elliot. "He must not go to the Deccan!" cried the Rajah. "God knows whether the people there are Hindoos or Mahommedans! let him go to Benares." "He shall not go far from the Ganges, if not there," replied the envoy; "choose yourselves for him between Hurdwar, Gurlmuktesir, Bithoor, and Allahabad; they are all sacred places." "Allahabad is very far!" objected the Raja. "Not so far," responded Mr. Elliot, "as Benares." With this, and more parley, a good deal directed to securing their own future interests, the Sirdars exercised such option as their circumstances allowed, and signed the conditions. The Fakeer Nooroodeen, and Bhao Meham Sing—almost the only remaining members of the Regency¹—followed the example of their reluctant colleagues, and affixed their seals. It was agreed to meet next day in Durbar, to promulgate the articles, and to witness the Maharajah's abdication.

On the 29th, Mr. Elliot proceeded to Durbar, accompanied by the Resident (now again Sir H. Lawrence), and escorted by a strong body-

Ceremony of
Proclamation.

¹ In his despatch, December 25th, 1848, the Lahore Resident enumerates as actively engaged in rebellion the names of sixty-three Sidars of the Lahore state, many among whom had signed the Treaty of Bhyrowal.

Chap. VII. guard of cavalry. The young Maharajah met the messenger of his victors at the gate of the citadel, and was conducted with careful respect to his throne in the hall of audience. A crowd of Europeans and natives lined the walls on either side, the latter being present in numbers great enough to have endangered order, if Asiatic apathy and fatalism had not conquered sentiment. In perfect silence the paper was read which proclaimed the annexation of their country. Recited in English, in Persian, and in Hindostani, it set forth the provocations that had followed the death of Runjeet Singh; the incursion and defeat of Lal Singh's army, and the submission made at Sobraon for the Maharajah and his chiefs. It dwelt on the moderation of the Government which had replaced the young Rajah on his father's throne, and recapitulated the terms of the treaty of Bhyrowal. That treaty, it declared, had been broken by the Lahore Court, though the British Government had failed in no part of its pledge. The Sikh Sirdars had joined in a rebellion commenced with the murder of English officers. The Sikh government, it declared, had been unable or unwilling to control its subjects, and its army had everywhere risen to drive out the British, and had made prisoners of their officers, women, and children. The Sirdars who had signed the treaty of friendship had been the foremost to

violate it. The Commander-in-Chief himself of the Sikh host, had been an actual member of the Council of Regency. The Government of India desired no conquest, and had shown thus much by its previous moderation. Being provoked, however, it had put forth its power. The Khalsa army had been discomfited, its guns taken, its allies put to rout, and the Punjab occupied. Such an outrage and such a costly repression must not be repeated, and the Lahore Government, wanting in loyalty and authority, was decreed to have expired. The sovereign was responsible for his people, and regret for the young Maharajah could not interfere to the prejudice of justice. The Sikh dominion had come to an end therefore in the Punjab and its territories, and would henceforth be replaced by British rule. Chap. VII.

No sign of wonder, sorrow, anger, or even interest was evident in the countenances of the natives who listened to the message of the Governor-General. Its purport was too obvious and too clearly foreseen to surprise, and eastern self-command forbade that it should visibly affect them. Rajah Deena Nath remarked indeed that the judgment of the Government, whether just or not, must be obeyed.¹ The paper of conditions was

¹ He pressed, however, for better terms for the Maharajah, reinforcing his argument from Western history. "If France," urged the Sirdar, "after the defeat and imprisonment of Buonaparte, had been restored to its legitimate ruler, though the country

Chap. VII. then handed in duplicate by Raja Tej Singh to the Maharajah, who affixed the initials of his name in English characters, with an alacrity and composure chiefly due, perhaps, to his inconsiderate youth. The envoy took leave and the ceremony was over. But for the absence of the costly jewels and glittering armour conspicuous on former state occasions at the Sikh Court, no outward sign had marked the last Durbar of the empire of Runjeet Singh. The English colours hoisted upon the rampart, and the thunder of the fort guns saluting them, as the envoy passed out, proclaimed it very plainly.

The Koh-i-noor reserved to Her Majesty the Queen. Supposed fatality of the gem.

One condition of those then accepted provided that, in token of submission, the Maharajah should surrender to the Queen of Great Britain the beautiful and precious gem known as the "Mountain of Light." Taken from Sooja-ool-moolk, by Runjeet Singh, the Koh-i-noor had long flashed in the turbans of the Khalsa Rajahs—itsself a kingly appanage. Hindoo tradition ascribed a baleful influence to its presence; the genii of the mines, as it declared, enviously persecuting with misfortunes the successive holders of their treasure. The history of the gem curiously supports the belief,

yielded thirty crores of revenue, it would be no very extraordinary act of British clemency, if the Punjab, which yielded less than three crores, should be restored to the Maharajah. However," he added, conscious of doubtful logic, "let the Governor-General's will be done."

and, doubtless, suggested it. First of its proud possessors was Karna, King of Anga, a hero of the Mahabharat, who was slain in the war of the Pandava princes. From his keeping, it passed through many hands; death or distress, according to the legend, always accompanying its lustrous beauty. Thus the Rajah of Ujayin, Vikramaditya, obtained it, and lost his kingdom with the gem to the invading Mahommedans. Thus, too, Ala-ood-deen, Sultan of Delhi, wrested it from the King of Malwa, and reigning but turbulently, left it to his descendant; who yielded the fatal prize, together with his throne and life, to the Mogul conqueror. The Royal Baber escaped its sinister influence by declining its possession. "My son, Humayon," say his memoirs, "hath won a jewel of the Rajah, valued at half the daily expenses of the entire world—the which, when he would have given me for 'peshkash,' I presented back to him." Vainer of such an ornament, or less superstitious, Aurungzebe's grandson, Mahommed Shah, wore it in his turban when he rode to meet his conqueror Nadir. The glitter of the unparalleled jewel caught the eye of the Affghan chief, and took his heart with a fancy too strong for omens. "We will be friends," he said, "and change our turbans in pledge of friendship!" Whereupon, with rude humour, the conqueror transferred to his own forehead the

Chap. VII. boast of his enemy's treasure-house. Nadir Shah wore his "rock of light"—for so he named it—but eight years, and perished by assassins. Shah Rookh, his son, succeeded to the beautiful and evil charm; and lost it, with all besides, to Ahmed Shah. Under Timur and Zemaun, the successors of Ahmed in its keeping, the great Dooranee empire wasted away, till Shah Soojah, the last of the line, retained nothing of all its greatness but the fated stone, which seemed thus to blight its masters.¹ When Shah Soojah was in name the guest, and in reality the prisoner of Runjeet Singh, the Maharajah saw and coveted his jewel, and obtained it on the easy terms of a purchaser who can enforce acceptance of his price. The "rock of light" glittered on the old king at many a Sikh Durbar; but its malignancy, subdued by a stronger genius, brought him no ills, unless a perturbed death-bed and the eventual downfall of his house, be ranked as due to its influence. As the Maharajah lay dying, the Brahmans, more covetous than superstitious, begged the diamond for the forehead-jewel of the image of Juggurnauth. The feeble motion of Runjeet's dying head, was interpreted by them as his acquiescence; but the royal treasurer refused to surrender the important bequest upon a testament so doubtful. Kurruck Singh, therefore,

¹ Mr. Elphinstone saw the gem upon Shah Soojah's arm in 1805, at Peshawur.

succeeded to it, and died of poison. Shere Singh wore it in Durbar, on the day when he was shot upon the throne. And to the last of its Hindoo masters—the little Dhuleep Singh—it brought, or might seem to bring, the disaster of two wars—the first of which diminished, and the second forfeited, his kingdom. A less signal series of mischances to the owners of the Koh-i-noor, would have suggested to a credulous people the attribution of malevolence, at which a larger knowledge smiles. The jewel brought no evil where it found none, and gleamed too often on guilty bosoms to be associated with happy lives and deaths. Like the mantle in the old ballad, which sat ill over unworthy shoulders, but fell into fair and graceful folds upon a virtuous wearer, the great diamond has lost all evil spell in its new resting-place. It shines now upon a proud and unshamed forehead—above all others, as the gem surpasses other gems in lustre—and secured against disaster by the simple charm of a good and noble life.

The conditions signed by the Maharajah at Lahore on the 29th of March, were ratified by Lord Dalhousie on the 5th of April. They abrogated the rights and title of Dhuleep Singh as sovereign, escheated all state property to the East India Company; and secured to him and to his family, on the other hand, a yearly pension of five lakhs, and the respect and honour due to the person of

Chap. VII.

The Punjab
annexed.

Chap. VII. a deposed king. The energy of the Governor-General lost nothing truly in occasion or time. His was no hand to leave the fruit hanging which many years and much labour had brought to maturity. He plucked it ripe on the 30th of March, when the famous proclamation¹ issued, announcing in every station of British India that the country of the Five Waters was henceforward an English possession. The vigour, the wisdom, the boldness, and the equity of the Viceroy were on trial at this crisis; and to deny the last to his decision, seems to be criticising human actions from a sphere of speculation beyond common sense. The act which advanced the British frontier to its natural boundaries had been once deferred, but not to any profit. Sohraon gave the right which Goojerat compelled us to exercise. We had honestly struggled² to set a strong Sikh power between Asia and our borders; though the edifice was idly built upon the shifting sands of a Sikh agency. It had crumbled quite away. Once, perhaps, a Khalsa kingdom might have been made a barrier against Affghanistan, and the Khalsa's hatred of the Mussulman a sufficient

¹ *Vide* Appendix No. I.

² The efforts of the Lawrence administration to fortify the native Government, prove the sincerity of the English protectorate. One evidence of this may be found in the fact that Lawrence summoned fifty Sikh elders to Lahore, who were placed under Shere Singh to compile a code of laws for the Punjab, in strict conformity with Sikh traditions and statutes.—Cf. Kaye's *History of Administration of East India Company*, p. 449.

protection to our frontier. But that hope Chap. VII.
 was gone when the Sirdars of the Regency invited the aid of the Ameer of Cabool, and bore with the insolence and brutality of his troops to be rid of ours. The keys of the north gates of India could not be any longer left with warders who had thrown them wide. The duty of self-preservation is a national, as well as an individual, instinct, and it counselled the course which justice also allowed, in presence of the fact that the Sikhs first crossed the Sutlej to engage the English. The moralist may go along with the statesman and approve an acquisition, which might have been desired, but was never sought for. He will not concede perhaps to complacent patriotism all the generous motives it has claimed for Lord Hardinge's moderation. The four battles of the first Sikh war left no spare strength to the victors, and only the strong can be generous. If Lord Hardinge had possessed the power, he had all the motives, and much of the justification, which were at this time Lord Dalhousie's. What had been gained by losing three years was chiefly this, that the easy charge of lust for territorial aggrandisement was answered.¹ The unfair critics who

¹ "An experiment to set up a Sikh kingdom may have failed, but the failure can entail upon us no imputation save that of too great abstinence, too great generosity, and too charitable a conception of the dispositions of our foe."—*Edinburgh Review*, January, 1849.

Chap. VII. see in the advance of a great nation to its destined duty, nothing but the quick and reckless steps of men "hasting to be rich," can fix the evil eye on little in our progress hither. If even it had been still possible, by ingenious modifications of our Protectorate, or by the costly maintenance of an armed force between the Beas and the Sutlej, to conciliate such opinions with a shadow, certainly a nation, twice our assailants and twice vanquished, could not demand so much of us. No man, mindful of the narrowness of human knowledge, will pronounce any measure or any motive pure; but the annexation of the Punjab seems really to rank with the best accepted conquest. History will pronounce that kingdom acquired honourably, ruled justly, and ours by fair good right.

Lord Dalhousie's apology for the annexation.

The act is reported, and its apology is urged, in a state paper by Lord Dalhousie's own hand.¹ Comprehensive in grasp, and graphic in its language, the document is the patent labour of a statesman who knew the strength of intelligent opinion, and strove hard to enlist it. The despatch will be appended to these pages, since, in addressing it to the Secret Committee, Lord Dalhousie not only defines his policy and defends it, but recapitulates the events which had preceded it, and reviews in a close and able summary the turbulent times we have thus far followed.

¹ *Vide* Appendix, No. II.

With a glance, then, at his able statement, a division of this task is closed. It concludes a period, whose commencement at Cabool under Lord Auckland had threatened a very different termination, and it stamps Lord Dalhousie as a practical and sagacious statesman. Hardly a voice was raised against the annexation at home, while honours and decorations were freely awarded to those who had shared in procuring so satisfactory a result. First on the list in place, and perhaps not second in merit, stood the Governor-general. The tenth Earl of Dalhousie became therefore the first Marquis of his line: the fourth of those Viceroys for whom India had been the gate to an English peerage. The satisfied public forgave Rannuggur and Chillianwalla, for the sake of Goojerat, and criticised with kindly pleasure Lord Gough's advancement to a viscountship. The high honours of the Bath were awarded to Sir J. Thackwell and to Sir W. Gilbert, while General Whish, the chief of the Mooltan forces, received recognition as a useful general of division. The lower distinctions fell, not very discriminately, to men who had done much and to men who had done little: for if Edwardes, Taylor, Lake, and Herbert, were fairly advanced for their gallant services, Abbott, the sole defender of a frontier through months of isolated peril, received no more substantial

Chap. VII. thanks than those reserved to the intelligent post-master of the forces. But the servants of England do their duty with or without reward, and a Government may safely pass over the deserving, if it only refrains from openly rewarding the undeserving.

Remarks on
the annex-
ation.

The salient points of the despatch are its defence of the annexation, and its apology for the delay in sending troops to Mooltan. Of that delay Lord Dalhousie's generosity and not his judgment is the advocate, since the arguments of the Commander-in-chief did not prevent him from confirming the subsequent order of Sir F. Currie. In truth, the outbreak at Mooltan took the supreme government by surprise. The Resident's appeal for help, and Lord Gough's objection to afford it, came very suddenly for confirmation or reversal, and as a civilian, Lord Dalhousie hesitated to act upon instinct against experience. The reaction of his natural good sense inspired the decisiveness of his after measures, and therefore if Lord Dalhousie defended in his despatch the policy of inaction, it could only have^d been to shield the inactive. The successful can afford to be generous, and may even presume upon indulgence; nor did public opinion fail to respect the young Viceroy's bold adoption of responsibility. Probabilities weighed as much as the actual issues are ranged against

the wisdom of Lord Gough's line of conduct; nor did the Governor-general of India, in the words of Lord Dalhousie, "choose delay as the least of two evils," but simply, at first, acquiesced in the choice of it. What was done was, however, past undoing, when the despatch was penned, and the Supreme Government accordingly accepted the instance without committing itself to any principle. But the Governor-general justly, after all, puts by the discussion of a contingency; and whether the instant beleaguering of Mooltan would have averted the second Sikh war may remain a thesis with more than one solution. Certainly Moolraj's strength was, at the outset, nothing. His citadel was an uncleared shop. Four thousand men moved down by water would have overwhelmed his defences, nor in that case would the north and east have risen. The very reason for not moving troops was just as strong when they were moved, and the result proved it just as weak. The good fortune of Gough's fault can best defend it, since if Mooltan had fallen and Chuttur Singh's disloyalty had remained latent, the sore of Sikh disaffection might have remained open till the mutiny, in place of being healed by the rough cautery of the English guns. But if Lord Gough erred, he redeemed his error grandly—Goojerat covered all, and entailed the annexation. The national voice has pronounced approval of that annexation; foreign

Chap. VII. caudour admits our beneficent rule,¹ and foreign jurists our title; the historian, therefore, must confess as providential what he cannot pronounce provident. For Lord Dalhousie's share in the acquisition of the Punjab, he deserves applause and respect; we may come to acts of his administration where a verdict is not so easy to give. Later annexations may or may not have conduced to the great mutiny, but this at least is clear of such a charge. More than clear indeed, for to have turned the Punjab from a peril to a mainstay—to have provided, by the splendid government which we are about to describe, a basis beyond the Sutlej for the suppression of the insurrection—is what was done by that Viceroy who annexed the Five Rivers. The policy of Lord Dalhousie in this, as in subsequent instances, has been set in unfavourable contrast with Lord Metcalfe's or Lord Bentinck's, and only upon the very reverse of it, it is said, can the

¹ Thus Jacquemont :

“Oui! la domination de l' Angleterre est désormais un bienfait pour l' Inde !”

And Lanoye :

“Le paysan montre avec joie d'immenses étendues couvertes de riches moissons—autrefois sans cesse ravagées par les Sikhes. ‘Maintenant,’ dit-il souvent, ‘ nous recoltous les champs que nous avons semés; nos pères ne le pouvaient pas.’”

And again :

“Le peuple des Cinq Rivières vit et mourt sous l' Administration Anglaise plus paisiblement qu'il ne faisait depuis bien des generations.”

“The English are the best masters India ever had: wherever in that vast continent their dominion is direct—it is a benefit.”—*Sismondi*, quoted by Kaye, p 661.

future safety of India be based. But let it be at least remembered that Lord Dalhousie helped to make Lord Canning possible, and brought our history to its old point of departure, if also to the mutiny. The secret of his administration is known, when we perceive that wielding the army the Viceroy set all in India firm again except the army. This he overlooked—a workman too busy at work to regard his instrument. But when its ruinous collapse is alleged against him, the Punjab must be remembered, and that treaty of 1855 with Dost Mahomed, which “razed the written troubles” of 1837 from the page of history.

APPENDIX No. I.

Appendix I. NOTIFICATION.—FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Ferozepore, the 30th March, 1849.

THE Governor-General is pleased to direct, that the accompanying Proclamation, by which the Punjab is declared to be a portion of the British Empire in India, be published for general information; and that a royal salute be fired at every principal station of the army on the receipt thereof.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) P. MELVILL,

Under Secretary to Government of India, with the
Governor-General.

PROCLAMATION.

29th March, 1849.

For many years, in the time of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, peace and friendship prevailed between the British nation and the Sikhs.

When Runjeet Singh was dead, and his wisdom no longer guided the counsels of the State, the Sirdars and the Khalsa army, without provocation and without cause, suddenly invaded the British territories. Their army was again and again defeated. They were driven with slaughter and in shame from the country they had invaded, and at the gates of Lahore the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh tendered to the Governor-General the submission of himself and his chiefs, and solicited the clemency of the British Government.

The Governor-General extended the clemency of his government to the State of Lahore; he generously spared the kingdom which he had acquired a just right to subvert; and the Maharajah

having been replaced on the throne, treaties of friendship were Appendix I.
formed between the States.

The British have faithfully kept their word, and have scrupulously observed every obligation which the treaties imposed upon them.

But the Sikh people and their chiefs have, on their part, grossly and faithlessly violated the promises by which they were bound.

Of their annual tribute no portion whatever has at any time been paid, and large loans advanced to them by the Government of India have never been repaid.

The control of the British Government, to which they voluntarily submitted themselves, has been resisted by arms.

Peace has been cast aside. British officers have been murdered when acting for the State: others engaged in the like employment have treacherously been thrown into captivity. Finally, the army of the State, and the whole Sikh people, joined by many of the Sirdars in the Punjab who signed the treaties, and led by a member of the Regency itself, have risen in arms against us, and have waged a fierce and bloody war, for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power.

The Government of India formerly declared that it desired no further conquests, and it proved by its acts the sincerity of its professions.

The Government of India has no desire for conquest now; but it is bound in its duty to provide fully for its own security, and to guard the interests of those committed to its charge.

To that end, and as the only sure mode of protecting the State from the perpetual recurrence of unprovoked and wasting wars, the Governor-General is compelled to resolve upon the entire subjection of a people whom their own Government has long been unable to control, and whom (as events have now shown) no punishment can deter from violence, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace.

Wherefore the Governor-General of India has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the Kingdom of the Punjab is at an end; and that all the territories of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh are now and henceforth a portion of the British Empire in India.

His Highness the Maharajah shall be treated with consideration and with honour.

The few Chiefs who have not engaged in hostilities against the British shall retain their property and their rank.

The British Government will leave to all the people, whether Mussulman, Hindoo, or Sikh, the free exercise of their own religions; but it will not permit any man to interfere with others in the observance of such forms and customs as their respective religions may either enjoin or permit.

Appendix I. The Jagheers, and all the property of Sirdars or others who have been in arms against the British, shall be confiscated to the State.

The defences of every fortified place in the Punjab which is not occupied by British troops, shall be totally destroyed, and effectual measures shall be taken to deprive the people of the means of renewing either tumult or war.

The Governor-General calls upon all the inhabitants of the Punjab, Sirdars, and people, to submit themselves peaceably to the authority of the British Government, which has hereby been proclaimed.

Over those who shall live as obedient and peaceful subjects of the State, the British Government will rule with mildness and beneficence.

But if resistance to constituted authority shall again be attempted,—if violence and turbulence be renewed,—the Governor-General warns the people of the Punjab that the time for leniency will then have passed away, and that their offence will be punished with prompt and most rigorous severity.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Governor-General.

APPENDIX No. II.

* * * *

The time has now arrived when it has become my duty to review, in all its bearings, the question of the future relations of the Punjab with the British Empire in India. Appendix II.

I need hardly say that, during the whole progress of the war, this question has formed the constant subject of my deep and most anxious consideration.

Before stating in detail the considerations that have led me to the conclusion I have formed, it will be convenient to trace briefly the course of events in the Punjab.

On the 27th of April, 1848, intelligence having reached Lahore that Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson had been murdered, at Mooltan, after the Sikh troops, who were their escort, had accepted the overtures of the Dewan Moolraj, and had deserted them in a body, the Resident called upon the Durbar to take measures for punishing those who had committed this gross outrage against the British Government.

After long consultation, the Sirdars informed the Resident that their troops, and especially the regular army of the State, could not be depended upon, and would not obey their orders to act against Moolraj.

On the same day, the Resident addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a dispatch pointing out the importance of military operations being immediately commenced against Mooltan, if it were thought practicable to undertake them at that period of the year.

The Commander-in-Chief replied that operations at that time against Mooltan would be "uncertain, if not altogether impracticable, while a delay in attaining the object would entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged," and he gave his decided opinion against the movement which was proposed. The Resident concurred in his Excellency's view; and the Governor-General in Council, after full (?) deliberation, confirmed the decision.

Appendix II. As the wisdom and propriety of this resolution have subsequently been questioned, I trust that you will permit me to repeat the declaration, which was made to you at the time, that, in referring to the opinions of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Resident, I do not desire to throw upon others any portion of the responsibility which attaches to that resolution.

The decision was the decision of the Governor-General in Council, and on him the responsibility must rest.

The question which the Governor-General in Council was called upon to consider, was a difficult and perplexing one.

On the one hand, it was impossible to doubt that, if there existed in the minds of the people of the Punjab any inclination to rise against the British power, a delay in visiting the outrage committed at Mooltan, and the apparent impunity of the offender would give strong encouragement to an outbreak, which might spread over the whole Punjab. On the other hand, it was equally clear that there would be serious danger to the health, and to the very existence, of European troops, in commencing extended military operations at such a season of the year.

The risks which are incurred by the exposure of troops in carrying on military operations in the hot and rainy months are too well known to require description or corroboration.

Whatever the danger of the season in Hindostan, the Government of India had every reason to believe, both from the information that had been received, and from experience of the effects of climate in neighbouring provinces, that the ordinary danger would have been greatly aggravated to troops engaged in operations at Mooltan.

The fierceness of the heat of Mooltan is reputed to exceed that any other district, and is such as to have passed into a proverb, even in India.

The Government were in possession of plans of the fortress, which, though rude, were sufficient to show that it was formidable in its character, and would require time and ample means for its reduction.

We were already in the month of May.

The distance which the troops would have to traverse was considerable. As the garrison at Lahore could not be materially weakened with safety, some time must have elapsed before troops could have been assembled, and could have reached Mooltan.

Thus, the toil of siege operations must have been commenced and carried on against a fortress of formidable strength, during the very worst season of the year and in the worst district in India.

The Government conceived that there was good ground for his Excellency's belief that a fearful loss of life among the British troops would have been the consequence of this movement.

Moreover, the sickness and loss of life would not have been the only danger; for this involved in itself the further danger of a necessary discontinuance of operations against the fort. A failure of those operations would have afforded even greater encouragement to risings in the Punjab than a postponement of them would have given; while we should have been thereby compelled to enter on the subsequent struggle with a force greatly reduced, both in strength and confidence.

These were the grave considerations upon which the Government of India was called upon to determine.

It was a choice of difficulties—an alternative of evils; and the Government of India selected that which appeared to be the lesser evil of the two. I venture still to maintain that the decision was not an error. It is, at all events, satisfactory to one to know that the course which I adopted was in accordance with the opinions of the highest military authorities in this country, and in accordance, also, with the opinions of those in England, who must be regarded by all as the highest authorities there on matters connected with warfare in India.

It is, above all, satisfactory to me to know that the determination was approved by those whom I have the honour to serve, and that you not only cordially concurred in “the resolution to abstain from all movements of British troops upon Mooltan until the season should admit of field operations,” but that you entirely agreed with me in preferring the risk which might arise from delay in putting down insurrection, “to the certain difficulties of an immediate advance upon the revolted province.”

Whether the immediate commencement at that time of the siege of Mooltan would, or would not, have averted the war that has occurred, can never now be determined. But this, at least, is certain, that if the short delay, which took place in punishing the murder of two British officers at Mooltan, could produce an universal rising against us throughout all the Punjab, the very fact itself betokens the existence of a deep and wide-spread feeling of hostility against us, which could not long have been repressed.

The worst that can be alleged, therefore, against the delay is, that it precipitated the crisis; and opened, somewhat earlier, to the Sikhs that opportunity for renewal of war, which, sooner or later, so bitter a spirit of hostility must have created for itself.

In point of fact, however, no hostility was openly shown beyond the district of Mooltan, until after the British army had actually taken the field.

The detection of the attempts to seduce from their allegiance the sepoys of the native army at Lahore, and the execution of the conspirators, one of whom was the confidential servant of the Maharance; the immediate removal to Hindostan of Her High-

Appendix II. ness whose complicity in these intrigues was distinctly shown : the measures taken against Bhace Maharaj Singh, who, with some thousand men, was rising the country in the Rechna Doab ; and the flight and dispersion of his followers ; all combined to keep down any manifestations of disaffection in the neighbourhood of Lahore.

The distinguished gallantry and energy of Major Edwardes (for which he has justly received the highest approbation and reward from the Sovereign and from your Honourable Court), aided by the troops of our ally, the Nawab of Bahawulpore, under the command of Lieutenant Lake, prevented the extension of the outbreak beyond the limits of the province of Mooltan ; and confined the Dewan and his troops within the walls of his own fort.

At this juncture, the Resident at Lahore directed the movement of a British force, accompanied by a siege-train, to effect the reduction of the fort of Mooltan.

The Governor-General in Council, on receiving intelligence of the order having been publicly issued, gave to it his confirmation ; and, in the beginning of September, operations against the city were commenced.

While our troops were on their march towards Mooltan, Sirdar Chuttur Singh, and the portion of the Sikh army under his command, declared open hostility in Hazara.

Rajah Shere Singh, and his troops, on the very day after our successful attack upon the suburbs of Mooltan, followed Chuttur Singh's example. Shortly afterwards, he moved towards the north, and was there met by all the troops of the State from across the Indus.

Finally, the remainder of the Sikh army joined the standard of Chuttur Singh in Peshawur. The disbanded soldiers and the people flocked to the army, in thousands, from the Manjha ; and proclamations were issued, calling upon all to make war upon the British.

The reduced condition of our revenue, and the state of affairs both in India and in Europe, which held out little hope of any great or immediate improvement, had rendered it the imperative duty of the Government of India to abstain from costly and extensive preparations for war, so long as any reasonable hope whatever existed of its being possible for us to avoid a war.

But when the grave events, which I have above recounted, began to develop themselves, and when Rajah Shere Singh openly joined the enemy, proclaiming a holy war against the English, the Government of India felt that every other consideration must give way to the necessity of preparing ourselves fully for the renewal of formidable war in the Punjab.

It was my conviction, that the occasion was one which would Appendix II. require us to put forth all the resources of our power.

For, although the defeat of the Sikh army, in 1846, was still recent, and their humiliation had been complete at the time, there appeared to me to be good grounds for believing that means for carrying on a severe struggle were again at their disposal.

The official returns of the Durbar showed that the regular army of the State, though very greatly reduced in numbers and power, was still by no means insignificant.

It consisted of 27,000 men, including 5,000 Goorehurras or Irregular Horse: and there could be no doubt that, on the first appearance of disturbance, the soldiery, who had been disbanded after the defeat in the previous war, would join in crowds from their villages, the leaders of the Khalsa.

In like manner, the official returns showed that nearly one hundred pieces of artillery could be brought into the field; and there were strong reasons for entertaining the suspicion, that when they were wanted, more guns would be forthcoming from among the Sirdars and Chiefs.

The discontinuance of our operations against Mooltan, which had taken place in September, rendered it a matter of the utmost moment, that the next attack upon that fortress should be certain, and the capture of the place as speedy as possible. The strength of the fort was unquestionable; and proportionate means were required for effecting its reduction, and for maintaining ourselves at the same time against the Sikh army in the field.

It is, at all times, unwise to underrate an enemy. It would have been doubly unwise to do so in this case, when we had recent experience of the courage, the strength, and the skill, of the enemy, with whom we were again about to engage.

The result has shown that my estimate of the power of the enemy was not a fallacious one.

That the fortress of Mooltan was, in truth, a place of strength will, probably, be acknowledged, when it is mentioned that, after operations were resumed, it sustained a siege by 15,000 British troops, and as many more Irregulars, for a period of several weeks; receiving the fire of more than 70 pieces of artillery, from which nearly 40,000 shot and shell were poured into the place.

The Sikh army in the field has, on every occasion, been formidable in numbers as in skill; and 60,000¹ men met us on the plain of Goojerat.

Lastly, in all the actions, of the war, under various officers, and at different places, we have captured in the field, or seized in for-

¹ This number, like many official estimates of the enemy throughout the war, is in excess.—E.A.

Appendix II. tresses, more than 200 pieces of heavy and field artillery, exclusive of 40 guns of small calibre, besides a vast number of swivel pieces. It was in anticipation of the powerful opposition which is indicated by the results I have just mentioned, that the Government of India resolved on the extensive preparations which were ordered.

Every regiment which could be made available, without rashly weakening the provinces in India, was ordered to the frontier. The Native Army was immediately augmented—a reinforcement of European troops was applied for. The Government of Bombay was requested to dispatch a strong division to Mooltan, from the side of Sindh. The Government of Fort St. George was solicited to supply, by its troops, the places of additional regiments, which were ordered to be sent to the frontier from Bengal.

The orders of the Government were executed with every possible expedition; and, before Christmas, there was assembled in the Punjab (exclusive of the garrison at Lahore, and all in its rear), an army of 38,000 effective men, with nearly 100 pieces of artillery, and a siege train of 70 guns.

It is unnecessary for me to trace the progress of the campaign, or to dwell again on the triumphant success which the army has achieved.

These have been already most fully reported to you, and the services of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and of the army under his command, have been commended to your warmest approval and favour.

It is enough to say, that, in every quarter, our success has been complete.

The fort of Mooltan has been reduced, the Dewan Moolraj has been captured, and will shortly be placed upon his trial for the offence of which he has been accused.¹ The Affghans have been expelled from the Trans-Indus Provinces. The chiefs who created the disturbances in the Jullundur are now in prison.

The Sikh Sirdars, and their troops, routed at Goojerat, shortly afterwards surrendered, and were disarmed. The Ameer of Cabool, and his army have been driven out of Peshawur; and there is not, at this moment, in all the Punjab a single man who is openly in arms against us.

Having thus traced the events of the prolonged campaign which, commencing in July, 1848, has now been brought to a close, I request you to mark the position in which this narrative shows that the British Government and the nation of the Sikhs now stand towards one another.

The relations which exist between them, the duties and obliga-

¹ He was sentenced to death, and the sentence was commuted for transportation.

tions of each, were marked out in the Treaty of Lahore, and in Appendix II. the subsequent Articles of Agreement concluded at Bhyrowal.

The British Government has rigidly observed the obligations which the treaty imposed ; and it has fully acted up to the spirit and letter of its contract

It has laboured to prove the sincerity of its profession, that it desired no further aggrandizement. It has maintained the government of the State in the Council of Regency. It has advised the adoption of measures, which improved the condition of the troops, and lightened the burdens of the people at large. It has given liberally the use of its forces to aid the administration of the State of Lahore. It has carefully avoided to offend by any of its acts the feelings of the people, and has meddled with none of the national institutions and customs.

How have the Sikhs on their part, fulfilled the corresponding obligations which the treaty imposed upon them?

There is not one of the main provisions of the agreement which they have not either entirely evaded, or grossly violated.

In return for the aid of British troops, they bound themselves to pay to us a subsidy of 22 lakhs per annum.

From the day when the treaty was signed, to the present hour, not one rupee has ever been paid. Loans advanced by the British Government to enable them to discharge the arrears of their disbanded troops have never been repaid, and the debt of the State of Lahore to this Government, apart altogether from the vast expenses of this war, amounts to more than 50 lakhs of rupees.

They bound themselves to submit to the full authority of the British Resident, directing and controlling all matters in every department of the State.

Yet when the British officers were murdered at Mooltan by the servants of a chief officer of their State, and after having been deserted by the troops of the Durbar, who, unhurt, went over previously to the service of the murderer, the Government of Lahore, in reply to the orders of the Resident, neither punished the offender, nor gave reparation for the offence; but declared that their troops, and especially the regular army of the State, were not to be depended upon, and would not act against the Dewan Moolraj.

The conduct of the Sikh troops, in their various districts, speedily justified our suspicion of their hostility.

Repressed for a time, their disaffection broke out in one quarter after another, till, ultimately, nearly all the army of the State, joined by the whole Sikh people throughout the land, as one man, have risen in arms against us, and for months have been carrying on a ferocious war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying our power and exterminating our race.

Appendix II. Thus we see that not only has the control of the British Government, which they invited, and to which they voluntarily submitted themselves, been resisted by force of arms, but peace has been violently broken; and the whole body of the nation—army and people alike—have deliberately, and unprovoked, again made war upon us.

If it should be alleged that this has been merely the act of a lawless soldiery, similar to that which was committed in 1845, and that it has been done against the will, and in spite of the opposition, of the Sirdars; I answer, admitting it to be so, what justification does that furnish for them, or what security can the reflection afford to us?

That which we desire to see—that which we must have, as indispensably necessary for the future prosperity of the territories we already possess, is peace throughout our bounds. That which we desire to secure in the Punjab is a friendly and well-governed neighbour, and a frontier without alarms, and which does not demand a perpetual garrison of 50,000 men. Of what advantage is it to us that the Council and Sirdars are friendly, if they have not the ability to control their army, which is hostile?

If the Sikh army and Sikh people are eager to seize, and have the power of seizing on every opportunity of violating the peace which we desire to render permanent, of what value to us, as a State, is the impotent fidelity of the Sirdars? But the fact is not so. Their chiefs have not been faithful to their obligations. The troops and the people having risen in arms, their leaders have been the Sirdars of the State, the signers of the treaties, the members of the Council of Regency itself.

If you will refer to the roll which was lately transmitted to you of those who surrendered to Sir Walter Gilbert at Rawul Pindie, and to other documents, which have from time to time been forwarded, you will find there an array of names of the Sirdars who then surrendered, and were disarmed.

Analyse it, and you will find there, not merely men who are of note in the Punjab, but the very chiefs whose signatures are affixed to the treaties of peace. For it is a shameful fact, that of the Sirdars of the State, properly so called, who signed the treaties, the greater portion have been involved in these hostilities against us.

If irresponsibility should be sought for the Sikh nation, in the statement that their Government, at least, has taken no part against us—you will not admit that plea when I acquaint you that, while the Regency, during these troubles, gave no substantial or effective assistance to the British Government, some of its chief members have openly declared against us, and one of them has commanded the Sikh army in the field.

In the preceding paragraphs I have said, more than once, that the Sikhs have risen in arms against the British. I request you to dwell upon the phrase; for I desire to press upon your attention the important fact that this rising in the Punjab has not been a rebellion against the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh—that, on the contrary, the Sikhs have constantly professed their fidelity to their Maharajah, and have proclaimed that it is against the British, and against the British alone, that this war has, from the beginning, been directed. Appendix II.

That the destruction of British power, and the expulsion of the British themselves, was the real object of the war, and not an insurrection against the Maharajah and his Government, does not rest upon my assertion alone, or upon inference. It has been avowed and declared by themselves, in all their own letters and proclamations to the neighbouring chiefs, to Mahomedan Powers, and to the native soldiers of the British Government.

I will only quote a single passage from one of these proclamations, which was issued by Rajah Shere Shing. It sets forth distinctly, and in a few words, the sentiments and objects, which are declared in all the similar documents, and fully establishes the correctness of the statement I have made.¹

* * * *

This is not all. Not content with making war themselves upon the British, the Sikhs have laboured to induce other states and sovereigns in India to attack us also.

There are in the possession of the Government many letters which have been addressed by the Sikh chiefs to the neighbouring powers, Mussulman, Hindoo, and Sikh, earnestly invoking their assistance; and the burthen of every letter is the necessity of destroying and expelling the British.

The bitterness of their enmity has carried them yet further still. No one ever thought to see the day when Sikhs would court the alliance of Affghans, and would actually purchase their assistance by a heavy sacrifice. Yet their hatred to the British name has induced them to do even this. They invited the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, from Cabool, to their aid. They promised him, as the reward of his assistance, the Province of Peshawur, and lands which the King of Cabool formerly held—a possession which the Sikhs themselves valued beyond all price; which for years they had struggled to obtain; and which they gained, and held, only by vast expenditure of treasure, and with the best blood of their race.

The Ameer of Cabool came. He raised immediately the standard of the Prophet in their land—defiled the temples of the Sikh

¹ Quoted elsewhere.

Appendix II. religion, plundered their villages, and most brutally treated their people—yet, for all that, the Sikh nation continued to court the Ameer of Cabool still. They have fought, side by side, with his troops, and, after their defeat, applied for the continuance of his assistance. So inveterate has their hostility to us proved to be, that the securing of Affghan co-operation against the British, has been sufficient to induce the Sikhs to forget their strongest national animosity, and has, in their eyes, compensated even for Affghan cruelty to their people, and for Mahomedan insults to their religion.

Such have been the acts of faithlessness and violence by which the Sikh nation has, a second time, forced upon us the evils of a costly and a bloody war.

If the grossest violation of treaties—if repeated aggression, by which its national security is threatened, and the interests of its people are sacrificed,—can ever confer upon a nation the right of bringing into necessary subjection the power that has so injured it, and is ready to injure it again, then has the British Government now acquired an absolute and undoubted right to dispose, as it will, of the Punjab, which it has conquered.

The British Government has acquired the right; and, in my judgment, that right must now be fully exercised.

I hold that it is no longer open to this Government to determine the question of the future relations of the Punjab with British India, by considerations of what is desirable, or convenient, or even expedient.

I hold that the course of recent events has rendered the question one of national safety, and that regard for the security of our own territories, and the interests of our own subjects, must compel us, in self defence, to relinquish the policy which would maintain the independence of the Sikh nation in the Punjab.

I cordially assented to the policy which determined to avoid the annexation of these territories on a former occasion.

I assented to the principle that the Government of India ought not to desire to add further to its territories; and I adhere to that opinion still. I conceive that the successful establishment of a strong and friendly Hindoo Government in the Punjab, would have been the best arrangement that could be effected for British India; and I hold that the attempt which has been made by the British Government to effect such a settlement of the frontier state, the moderation it has exhibited, and its honest endeavours to strengthen and aid the kingdom it had reorganised, have been honourable to its character, and have placed its motives above all suspicion, whatever may now be its policy towards the Punjab.

Experience of subsequent events has shown us that a strong

Hindoo Government, capable of controlling its army, and governing its own subjects, cannot be formed in the Punjab. Appendix II.

The materials for it do not exist; and even if they were to be found, it has now become evident that the object for which the establishment of a strong Sikh Government was desired by us would not thereby be accomplished.

The advantages which we hoped to derive from such a Government, were the existence of a friendly power upon our frontier; one which, from national and religious animosity to the Mahomedan Powers which lie beyond, would be an effectual barrier and defence to us.

But we have now seen, that the hatred of Sikhs against the British exceeds the national and religious enmity of Sikhs against Affghans; so that, far from being a defence to us against invasion from beyond, they have themselves broken again into war against us, and have invited the Mahomedan Powers to join with them in the attack.

Warlike in character, and long accustomed to conquest, the Sikhs must, of necessity, detest the British as their conquerors.

Fanatics in religion, they must equally detest us, whose creed and whose customs are abhorrent to the tenets they profess.

It was hoped that motives of prudence and self-interest might possibly counteract these feelings; that the memory of the heavy retribution which their former aggression brought upon them, would have deterred them from committing fresh injuries; and that consciousness of our forbearance, and conviction of our friendliness, might have conciliated their good will, or, at least persuaded them to peace.

Events have proved how entirely this hope must be abandoned. If, in less than two years after the Sutlej campaign, they have already forgotten the punishment which was inflicted by us, and the generous treatment they subsequently received, and have again rushed into war against us, it would be folly now to expect that we can ever have, either in the feelings, or in the reason, of the Sikh nation, any security whatever against the perpetual recurrence, from year to year, of similar acts of turbulence and aggression. There never will be peace in the Punjab, so long as its people are allowed to retain the means, and the opportunity, of making war. There never can be now any guarantee for the tranquillity of India, until we shall have effected the entire subjection of the Sikh people, and destroyed its power as an independent nation.

It may, probably, be suggested, that it would be well for us to avoid the appearance of extending our conquests over another Indian kingdom; and politic to retain the Sikh nation as an inde-

Appendix II. pendent State, while we provided, at the same time, for our own security, by introducing a larger measure of British control into the Government of the Punjab, and by effecting such further changes as would place all actual power in our hands.

I am unable to recognise the advantage of such a course.

By the Articles of Bhyrowal, the government of the Punjab was entrusted to a Council of native chiefs, subject to the authority of the Resident in every department of the State.

If a more stringent and really effectual control is now to be established, the army of the State must be reorganized, and made directly subject to the orders of the Resident.

The Native administration must be set aside, and European agency must be generally introduced. The Maharajah would be the Sovereign on the throne, and the Punjab would be governed for him by British officers.

Short of this, no change can be introduced, which will give to the Resident any more effectual control than he has hitherto held.

But, if this be done, if a British functionary is at the head of the Government, if European agents conduct the duties of civil administration, if the government of the chiefs is removed, if the army is (as it will be in such a case) entirely ours, raised, paid, disciplined, and commanded by British officers, then I say that it would be a mockery to pretend that we had preserved the Punjab as an independent State. I conceive that such a policy would neither be advantageous to our interests, nor creditable to our name.

By maintaining the pageant of a Throne, we should leave just enough of sovereignty to keep alive among the Sikhs the memory of their nationality, and to serve as a nucleus for constant intrigue. We should have all the labour, all the anxiety, all the responsibility, which would attach to the territories if they were actually made our own; while we should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue, and acknowledged possession.

Nor should we, by such shifts, gain credit with the powers of India, for having abstained from subverting the independence of the State. Native Powers would perceive, as clearly as ourselves, that the reality of independence was gone, and we should, in my humble judgment, neither gain honour in their eyes, nor add to our own power, by wanting the honesty and the courage to avow what we had really done.

It has been objected, that the present dynasty in the Punjab cannot with justice be subverted, since Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, being yet a minor, can hardly be held responsible for the acts of the nation. With deference to those by whom these views have been entertained, I must dissent entirely from the soundness of this doctrine. It is, I venture to think, altogether untenable as a principle; it has been disregarded, heretofore, in practice; and disregarded in the case of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh himself.

When, in 1845, the Khalsa army invaded our territories, the Maharajah was not held to be free from responsibility, nor was he exempted from the consequences of his people's acts. On the contrary, the Government of India confiscated to itself the richest provinces of the Maharajah's kingdom, and was applauded for the moderation which had exacted no more. Appendix II.

The Maharajah was made to tender his submission to the Governor-General in person; and it was not until he had done so that the clemency of the British Government was extended to him and his Government restored. Furthermore, the Maharajah having been made to pay the penalty of the past offences of his people, due warning was given him that he would be held, in like manner, responsible for their future acts. The Maharajah, in reply, acknowledging this warning, says, "If, in consequence of the recurrence of misrule in my Government, the peace of the British frontier be disturbed, I should be held responsible for the same."

If the Maharajah was not exempted from responsibility on the plea of his tender years, at the age of eight, he cannot, on that plea, be entitled to exemption from a like responsibility, now that he is three years older.

As the Honourable Company most fully approved of his being deprived of the fairest provinces of his kingdom, in consequence of the misdeeds of his people, in 1846, it cannot, on the same principle, condemn his being subjected now to the consequences of whatever measures the repeated and aggravated misdeeds of his people may have rendered indispensably necessary for the safety of British interests.

I sincerely lament the necessity by which we are compelled to depose from his throne a successor of Maharajah Runjeet Singh; but, when I am fairly convinced that the safety of our own State requires us to enforce subjection of the Sikh nation, I cannot abandon that necessary measure, merely because the effectual subjection of the nation involves in itself the deposition of their Prince. I cannot permit myself to be turned aside from fulfilling the duty which I owe to the security and prosperity of millions of British subjects, by a feeling of misplaced and mistimed compassion for the fate of a child.

Having thus adverted to the modifications of policy which might have been proposed, and to objections which have been suggested, I repeat the declaration of my conviction, that we have now no admissible alternative; that, as the only mode which is now left to us of preventing the recurrence of perpetual and devastating wars, we must resolve on the entire subjection of the Sikh people, and on its extinction as an independent nation.

We have been, for the second time, engaged in war with the

Appendix II. most formidable enemy we have yet encountered in India. They have resisted us through the course of a protracted and severe campaign.

The Amcer of Cabool, proclaiming himself the Apostle of Islam, and calling on all true Mussulmans to unite in a holy war against the English, has joined his ancient enemies, in order to a combined attack upon us. This is no question of a province; this is a direct appeal to Mahomedan India.

If, having met this danger, crushed our enemies, and driven out the invader, we do not now occupy, and hold as our own, every foot of the Sikh territory, and of the province which has been forcibly taken by the Mussulman from under the protection of Britain; if we do not thus reduce to absolute subjection the people who have twice already rudely shaken our power in India, and deprive them at once of power and of existence as a nation:—if concession or compromise shall be made:—if, in short, the resolution which we adopt, shall be anything less than full assertion of absolute conquest of our enemy, and maintenance of our conquest hereafter,—we shall be considered, throughout all India, as having been worsted in the struggle.

We must make the reality of our conquest felt. The moderation, which was wise and politic before, would, if repeated, after the experience we have gained, be the veriest feebleness now.

Hesitation on our part would be attributed, not to forbearance, but to fear; it would be regarded, not as the result of a magnanimous policy, but as the evidence of a pusillanimous spirit.

It would encourage the hope of restored supremacy in the minds of the States and the People of India; where hostility, perhaps, is dormant, but where it is not, and never will be, extinct.

It would insure the certainty that, before many years had passed, we should be called upon to renew the struggle which we have just triumphantly terminated, and it would unquestionably tend to bring about the time when the supremacy of the British power in India might, perhaps, be contested on other fields than those of the Punjab.

Although I have more than once stated to you that the Government of India did not desire, and ought not to desire, the conquest of the Punjab, I do not wish, by any means, to convey to you the impression that I regard the Punjab as a possession which it would be seriously difficult for us to maintain, or which would be financially unprofitable.

You are well aware that the Sikh people form comparatively a small portion of the population of the Punjab. A large proportion of the inhabitants, and especially the Mahomedan people, peaceful in their habits and occupations, will hail the introduction of our rule with pleasure.

* * * *

I have thus fully laid before you the grounds on which I have formed the conclusion that, having regard to events which have recently occurred, it is indispensable to the security of the British territories, and to the interests of the people, that you should put an end to the independence of the Sikh nation, and reduce it to entire subjection.

* * * *

After interviews with the Members of the Council, a public Durbar was held, when the Notè addressed to the Regency by the Governor-General was read; the Terms granted to the Maharajah, which had been signed by the Council, were ratified by His Highness, in like manner as the Treaty of Lahore; and a Proclamation was issued, declaring the Punjab to be a portion of the British Empire in India.

In liquidation of the accumulated debt due to this Government by the State of Lahore, and for the expenses of the war, I have confiscated the property of the State to the use of the East India Company.

From this confiscation, however, I have excluded the Koh-i-noor, which, in token of submission, has been surrendered by the Maharajah of Lahore to the Queen of England.

If the policy which has now been declared, shall be confirmed, I am confident you will sanction my having thus set apart the Koh-i-noor, as a historical memorial of conquest, and that the Court of Directors will cordially approve the act which has placed the gem of the Mogul in the Crown of Britain.

* * * *

While deeply sensible of the responsibility I have assumed, I have an undoubting conviction of the expediency, the justice, and the necessity, of my act.

What I have done I have done with a clear conscience, and in the honest belief that it was imperatively demanded of me by my duty to the State.

* * * *

P A R T I I.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUNJAB.

CHAPTER VIII.

Chap. VIII. THE events have thus been narrated which led to the annexation of the Punjab and its dependencies. No country so vast, and none of such importance had merged into the dominions of the British in India since the acquisition of the north-western provinces at the commencement of this century. The outlines of this fine and fertile conquest have been already drawn. It is now our task to fill them in lightly with the fair colours of peace, no longer traversing the Doab uplands, and threading the river vales with the dust of Sikh cavalry or the smoke and thunder of English guns, but following the engineer, the surveyor, and the minister of justice. The Sikhs themselves were prepared to accept our rule. We had deserved it in their eyes, by the paramount merit of strength. The lordly

quality of English blood had been vindicated to them by the Lawrences, by Abbott, by Herbert, and by Taylor; its energy and self-reliance Edwardes had shown, and if the higher authorities had seemed to illustrate no northern virtue so much as deliberateness, theirs, at least, was the collection of that army, whose massive strength at Goojerat had crushed rather than conquered the last effort of the Khalsa. By such signs the Hindoo, for the present, knows and accepts a master. He respects, in strength and in the will to wield it, the same heralds of supremacy which the Greek tragedian attached as emissaries to Zeus. Strength, indeed, is sure to be respected in practice; but it demands the regard of the philosopher also, being of its nature divine; and, at least, a presumptive title to authority. Strength, inspired by benevolence, needs only wisdom to be the earthly analogue of the Divine Government. The two first are present together on all the pages of the history of the English in India. Sordid those pages sometimes are with the contact of money, blotted sometimes with innocent blood, but they always recite a progress to other gain than gold, and to other conquest besides territory. That India, from Comorin to Cabul, has been conquered by the sword, makes it hard, but not impossible, to win her goodwill. That selfish men have ruled, and selfish policy prospered, is to confess of

Chap. VIII. human administration its inevitable defects. But, when all is conceded that envy or candour can ask, there remains that wherein England may challenge the comity of nations to match her work. The mantle of the Roman is descended on us; bringing a larger gift, and a better spirit. We have overspread the earth; for our own gain, truly, but not for that alone—nor always for that at first. Where we have come, justice, the best we know, is done; benefits, the best we possessed, have been imparted. We have had a Verres and a Crassus—but never a national will to spoil—never a national condonation of avarice. Ashamed of our faults as rulers, confessing with humility our shortcomings, we have still the right to declare our appreciation of the work committed to us, and to take credit for strenuous efforts to execute it. If we have not yet gained the affections of India, at least we have never yet despaired of deserving them: and the temptation of a military mutiny has failed to enlist against us the accusation and the hostility of her working people. Civilization, let it be remembered, returns with English rule in India upon its starting-point; nor is the round of human thought and intercourse to be welded as though the ages were all of one metal. In whose hands could the work have progressed further? France will not claim for her home-sick soldiers and changeful spirit a higher mission or a more

settled beneficence. She herself has taken counsel of England that she might learn in Algiers how the Christian should rule the Moslem. Russia, destined to a fair but distant future, has abandoned the presumption of seeking to seize the reins of Indian empire. The Phaethon of the north holds a course at home wide enough to employ any ambition, and to practise in all dangers; and Tartary with Siberia may serve to engross an energy, great indeed, but decreed unequal for many future ages to the aspirations of Peter and Nicholas. We have deserved to keep what we have dared to acquire, and they read history ill, and fail beside in duty to their country, who speak of our Indian annals as fain to apologize for them. Let them be written, extenuating nothing and enlarging nothing, and a record will stand which the future will value and the present may be proud of. From Plassy to Lucknow there have been just men in the councils of our capital, and under the tents of our armies, for whose sake the State has prospered, and the armies have triumphed. If wars are ever defensible, those that secure the blessings of peace are so; and Indian rulers have mainly striven for these neither selfishly nor in vain. For these the Punjab war was waged; and they were obtained in the peaceful administration, the details of which are now to be reviewed. It deserves a close consideration; the soldier may find in every

Chap. VIII. history the example of successful campaigns, but not every history can teach the statesman how in a few years a people may be subdued to contentment; and prosperous, secure, and justly governed, bless the strong hand that compelled them to their own happiness.

Questions as
to govern-
ment of
Punjab.

The first problem that confronted Lord Dalhousie was to decide on a form of government for the newly-acquired province. The surrender of the Sikh army at Rawul Pindee had flooded the country with 40,000 disbanded soldiers, unarmed, indeed, but with new weapons and fresh occasions within reach, upon the appearance of another leader. Against the hopes of any such revival was arrayed a victorious army, whose military chiefs presented a body to whom it might seem natural to confide the government of the country they had conquered. An ability sufficient to subdue, would suffice to hold the province, had the design or the duty of the English Government found its limit in profitable possession. Another alternative was to entrust the administration of the country to that civil agency which, in the regulation provinces, with more or less success, had so long dispensed justice, and collected revenue, providing for the security of their districts in concert with the military arm.

Views of
Sir Charles
Napier.

Sir Charles Napier (to whose genius and great qualities justice has yet to be done) was

the advocate of a military government. He had Chap. VIII.
 been sent out to India to supersede Lord Gough, when the news of Chillianwalla alarmed and roused the home-country; but reached Calcutta too late to add the unneeded laurels of Goojerat to those of Meanee and Hydrabad. Arriving at Simla, in June, 1849, he found the Governor-General busy in establishing his Punjab Government. The fiery veteran, and the autocratic statesman did not meet without some touch of jealousy. "I have been warned, Sir Charles," said Lord Dalhousie, "not to let you encroach upon my authority, and I will take good care you shall not." By whatever motive actuated, the Viceroy did well to reject the counsel that would have established in the Punjab the *régime* of Scinde. The valley of the Indus was a country where armed occupation did not begin with the dethronement of its Princes. It was its normal state, and the people were better used to the scimeter than the sceptre. Border robbers had besides to be put down; tribes, like those of Trukkee and the Murree hills, would have distracted a civil government, and were best committed to the law and the settlement of the sword. But such a system needed such a hand, and could be justified only by similar conditions; and when Sir Charles Napier had gathered, by his just and substantial administration, the fruit of his victories, Scinde passed by right

Chap. VIII. under the civil power. A judicious writer on Indian administration has well animadverted on the prejudice with which Napier regarded this rule of politicals and civilians. He has accurately described him as "keenly discerning the faults of the civil system, and then drawing down a shade over those strong eyes to blind himself to its manifest advantages."¹ But Napier was unjust by temperament, and not by intention. His nature, created for dictatorship in difficult days, was too intolerant of control to advise rightly, unless at the head of the council. Yet while his judgment sometimes erred, his purpose was ever dutiful and honest; and they do injustice to our greatest soldier after Wellington, who accuse him of that vanity which is the sin of little minds. The failing which obscured his insight, and which detracts from the admiration excited by his noble character, was that hasty suspicion of pretentious incompetency which its prevalence justifies in an eager and earnest heart. Certain of his own powers and purposes, uncertain of men and policies not so strong or so outspoken, he indulged in a personal isolation, till it egotized and misled his opinion.

System
adopted.

The Punjab differed in this respect, too, from Scinde, that the discomfiture of its Khalsa army left us no overt enemy; and that it had already

¹ Kaye on the Company's Administration.

experienced a two years' administration under the English Regency. This administration had succeeded as far as success was possible;¹ and partly because it had blended the military element into the system of the regulation provinces. A purely military system is for transition only. Napier's cohort of young officers had courage and zeal, and to spare; but not the acquaintance with native thought and local institutions, possessed, or quickly acquired by civil officers. Lord Dalhousie accepted neither exclusively; he resolved to follow out an interrupted experiment, by combining the best men of the civil and military services in his Board of Administration. He selected Henry Lawrence, then but a captain in the Artillery—a name now, and always, in Indian history—to be its president; and associated with him as colleagues, his brother John Lawrence and Mr. Mansel. A secretary and under-secretary were attached to the Board, which was assisted by a body of Commissioners, Deputy-Commissioners, and Assistant-Commissioners: in all, some fifty-six covenanted

¹ Thus Lanoye: "Grâce à ces mesures, à la suppression de monopoles arbitraires, à un recensement général qui permit de répartir d'une façon plus équitable que par le passé les contributions du Pundjaub et de réduire même d'un tiers les redevances exigées par les anciens maîtres du pays, le colonel Lawrence, investi des fonctions délicates de résident, put réaliser, entre l'Indus et le Satledje, plus de progrès en un ou deux ans, qu'on n'en avait effectué dans toute l'Inde depuis un demi-siècle; et le peuple semblait calme et soumis."

Chap. VIII. officers. Of this number twenty-nine were from military branches of the service, and twenty-seven from civil, a division made with an impartiality observed almost as exactly in other respects. Among the commissioners was Mr. Montgomery, whose name must be coupled with those already mentioned, as succeeding to Mr. Mansel's place at the Board, and distinguished for his share in its later labours. The Board was vested with power of life and death, was itself the highest court of appeal, and had full control of the revenue, the excise, and all troops not an actual part of the army.

Personnel
of the Board. Lord Dalhousie's selection and combination exhibited a real knowledge of human nature or a most fortunate accident of choice. His president and prime agent, the well-known and regretted Sir H. Lawrence, had held the post of Political Agent in Nepal, and was summoned therefrom to Lahore, to treat with the Sikhs after Ferozeshuhur. He brought to the Punjab the education of a statesman, with the experience of a soldier: and knew, from close observation, the spirit and systems of native government. As Resident at Lahore, under the treaty of Bhyrowal, he had kept the Sirdars wonderfully in hand: and Hindoo superstition, admiring his *ikbal*, had not failed to remark that rebellion in the Punjab rose upon his departure, and was quelled upon his return. He was—what his life and death

exhibit him—a man of rare spirit and ability; Chap. VIII.
prompt in action, sagacious in counsel, and of so brave a resolution, that difficulties only aroused to their rich activity the powers at his command. Something like their stimulus was even needful to evoke all his capacity—a Northern nature, with latent, but sterling, gifts, and a somewhat undemonstrative exterior. Dutiful, as all great men have been, he never spared himself in a work for which he had pledged his word, and was even at this date returning from a sickness caused by close application at his post. The stern virtues of a soldier were qualified in the new President by a benevolence which ever desired to gain the goodwill of dependents by mildness rather than their submission by force. In his practical and solid genius, in the variety and fertility of his powers, in kindness which was never sentimental, and, beyond all, in his constant regard of duty, he might be named for the head and type of those Indian administrators whose betters an Imperial Government has yet to find. Detraction has added, without much disparagement, that his manners had the frankness and freedom of a stirring life, but no man was a greater favourite, of all the English officers, with the silken ministers and jewelled lords of the Sikh Durbar. He has been pronounced the type of the best servants of the Company. In view of these qualities, so earnest,

Chap. VIII. so simple, so English; in regard especially to that settled beneficence of purpose which cares far more to do good than to be praised for it, Sir Henry Lawrence embodied what have been the best characteristics of all British government in India.

Sir John Lawrence, his brother's colleague, had acted for him as Resident at Lahore, and held charge of our first acquisition in the Punjab, the Jullundhur Doab. He, too, knew the people, and their revenue and judicial systems: and was best of all qualified to aid and support his brother. With less distinctive character Mr. Mansel was known to possess a thoughtful and inventive mind, and contributed to the councils of the Board the acquirements of a practiced financialist. Mr. Montgomery, not long afterwards his successor, was able and experienced as an administrator, with greater decision of mind, and a less timid regard to responsibility. These gentlemen still share the labours of the Indian Government; and to justify the selection of Lord Dalhousie would be impertinent. All, in the greatest trial of fortitude and wisdom, have shown themselves brave and wise, and one is renowned beyond praise. Their early and half-forgotten achievements engage these pages. In recalling their joint administration, the history will no longer follow the order of time, but present a general view of reforms and ordinances

originating with the annexation, and extending over a period of four or five years. Chap. VIII.

Before passing these in review, it is well to look back to the system of Runjeet Singh's government. Its evils, as regards the people, were those due to want of legislation rather than to a tyrannical or barbarous code. The Maharajah himself, pitiless in war, never ordered or even directly permitted the infliction of capital punishment. His *régime* was the rude and simple one of an Eastern conqueror, asking nothing of his kingdom but revenue to pay for his pleasures and carry on his wars, and owning no obligation in return, but to leave his punctual vassals to themselves. The Sirdars enjoyed grants or districts on a feudal tenure; and while their remittance of taxation to the treasury was regular, the Maharajah left the mode of obtaining it and the surplusage to them. Such were Sawun Mull and Golab Singh, afterwards the ruler of Cashmere; and such, too, the Corsican Avitabili. The military chiefs held jagheers, on condition of sending contingents to the field. Those districts, neither granted nor farmed, were assessed and levied upon by Kardars, who were responsible to the central authority, and paid themselves by the perquisites of their appointment. In all the land there were no State officers but soldiers and tax-collectors; and only at the close of Runjeet Singh's reign

Retrospect of
Runjeet
Singh's Go-
vernment.

Revenue and
Civil and
Criminal
Justice.

Chap. VIII. was any scrutiny established of the State accounts.¹ The Maharajah himself, in dispensing and receiving his rupees, trusted to the vigorous memory of a Sikh in money matters, and to the rough memoranda of a notched stick. Every sort of fraud thus escaped detection; the people were overtaxed; accounts were rudely and safely confused; and such reluctance as that attributed to Moolraj under fear of having to account for wealth accumulated at such a time, becomes natural. Runjeet was well aware of these defalcations, though he had slender means of detecting them; and often, upon suspicion only, he would call upon his servants to disgorge their plunder — confiscating everything if they resisted the summary audit.

In the absence of any statute law, a rude justice was administered by the local authorities, and private arbitration was largely resorted to. The arbitrators had no guide but tradition, native usages, and family custom, though the precepts of the Shureh, the Shastras, or the Grunth, had influence, as their faith was Mussulman or Hindoo. The Kazees exercised, by custom rather than appointment, the duties of their antecessors in imperial times; registering wills, attesting deeds, and presiding at ceremonies.

¹ Upon annexation it was discovered that the Sikh Sirdar who acted as paymaster to the Khalsa forces, had presented no balance-sheet for sixteen years.—*Cal. Rev.* vol. 41, p. 229.

In the frequent circuits which he made of his dominions, Runjeet lent an easy ear to complaints, and too many of them in one province would be accepted by him as cumulative proof of a governor's unfitness or want of tact. Personally averse to the punishment of death, as has been observed, he imposed but two penalties for crime, fines and mutilation. The last was reserved for adultery, seduction, the slaughter of kine for food, and cases of theft with violence, where the culprit was unable to buy himself off. Impunity might generally be purchased. Murder itself was condonable upon a payment of a thousand rupees to the treasury, and lighter crimes were to be less expensively expiated. On the frontier the system was different. Avitabili at Peshawur, and Hurree Singh in Hazara, ruled those districts in the Maharajah's name with a terrible severity, condemning all criminals indiscriminately to a death by hanging, decapitation, or blowing from great guns. Chap. VIII.

If the judicial system of the Sikh sovereign was simple and rude, his fiscal exactions were in the highest degree complex and ingenious. Hardly a tax exists which could not find a counterpart under Runjeet Singh. Direct or indirect, on land, houses, herds, and manufactures; on grain in the green ear, and grain at the gates; he levied a cess from every available Fiscal ex-
actions.

Chap. VIII. source and article. The drain on the country was not, however, much greater than the sum lost in passing the Kardars; the rest found its way back in pay to soldiers and State subordinates, numbers of whom came from every Jât village. The activity of his rule kept prices high and the markets animated, and the Sikh Maharajah may fairly boast of having raised to its prosperity the rich emporium of Umritsur. If other Punjab classes suffered under a rule so energetic and centralized, the Sikhs at least found it thoroughly to their liking, and were heart and soul with their sovereign; so long as his statecraft or his sword added province after province to the Khalsa name. The introduction of an English method of government had been distasteful to them even when employed to consolidate a kingdom for Runjeet's son; to persuade them to accept it as their permanent system needed the convincing voice of the Goojerat artillery.

Division of
the Punjab.

The newly-annexed territory was divided into four circles, or commissionerships. That of Lahore comprised part of the Baree and Rechnah Doabs with Umritsur and Lahore; that of Jhelum embraced the Chuj Doab, and the country of the salt range; Mooltan comprehended the lower portions of the Baree and Rechnah as far as Jhung, and Leia included the Sind Saugor Doab south of the Salt Hills, and all the Derajat and

trans-Indus districts up to Kalabagh. Peshawur, Hazara, and Kohat constituted a tract placed immediately under the Board, and was subsequently erected into a separate Commissionership. Chap. VIII.

This distribution made, Lord Dalhousie's first charge to the Punjab Board imposed on them the careful defence of the frontier. Defence of frontier. The annexation had pushed our borders forward to the Khyber on the north-west, and to the Suleyman range on the west. We guarded our own gates at last—the masters of Peshawur; but beyond the Indus our frontier lay along the bases of a furrowed and intricate range, peopled by tribes whose trade was warfare and pillage, and whom a day's march across the Mehra would anywhere bring to the banks of the river. The Indus, in the floods an inland sea, presents no insuperable obstacle to these river-tribes, who cross it on inflated skins, or gourds, or even leaning upon the open mouth of a chatty. The Governor-General at once recognised the importance of protecting such measures as he might introduce from the disturbances of border war. The precautions he adopted were these. Along the entire marches forts were to be erected, or repaired; stores and ammunition for three months were to be kept deposited in the chief of them; roads affording easy transit for troops, and penetrating the haunts of the robber-tribes

Chap. VIII. were to be opened, and a sufficient force was to be raised and maintained, to hold the frontier unimpaired. The lines of traffic had also to be protected, since the merchants of Cabul and Ghuznee pass by many defiles like that at Soorduk into the Derajat, and had been too long used to pay to plunderers, such as the Wuzerees, a black mail which checked the increase of commerce. Of the border-tribes thus to be watched and controlled, it was estimated that more than 100,000 carried arms, and could array themselves against us. How formidable their ancestors had been to the ancient masters of the land was shown by a long line of tumuli and forts, extending down the Derajat, the positions of outposts taken up against the mountain robber, more than a thousand years before.

Organization
of frontier
forces.

Ten regiments, five of cavalry and five of infantry, were raised from the natives of the province. The Peshawur Horse enlisted Pathans of Eusufzye, and in a year their discipline and bearing was high enough to please the critical judgment of Napier. The Rawul Pindee cavalry was recruited from Hindostanees principally. That raised at Lahore contained a large proportion of the same element. The fourth and fifth regiments received Punjabees, Mussulmans, and Hindoos alike, as did the second and fifth of the infantry levies. The first, raised at Peshawur, like the first cavalry, was also mainly Pathan;

and the third and fourth infantry regiments mingled Punjabees, Hindustances and Mussulmans in their ranks. Attached to this force were field batteries served by trained Sikhs; and two companies of sappers, along with a camel and guide corps. The camel corps on the frontier proved itself a less valuable arm than it has been shown on more suitable ground, where it is capable of throwing a fully equipped regiment at brief notice to a point sixty miles distant. The immense utility of such a body has best been proved at the fight of Calpee under Sir Hugh Rose,¹

¹ "It is worth quoting the spirited description of Sir Hugh Rose : I was watching the determined attack on the centre of my position, from the left of the village of Tehree, and at the same time the movements of the rebels towards my right and left, when I heard a slackening of our fire on the right. I instantly sent an inquiry to Brigadier Stuart, whether he would wish to be reinforced by half of the Camel Corps. He replied that he should be very glad to have them; directly afterwards, Brigadier Stuart's fire became fainter and fainter, and that of the enemy heavier. I understood that my right, the key of my whole position, was in danger, and instantly proceeded myself to its assistance with the whole of the Camel Corps at their best pace. On the way I met an orderly coming to me at full speed, from Brigadier Stuart, asking for further reinforcements. I knew that they were required, for the enemy's fire now came from within our position. The Camel Corps, under Major Ross, having reached the foot of the rising ground, on which were the Mortar Battery and the three 9-pounders; dismounted, and went up the rise in line at the double in perfect order.

"The situation of Brigadier Stuart's position was very critical. Vollies of musketry, which killed or wounded every horse of my Staff but one, were coming over the crest of the rising ground from the Sepoy troops, who had debouched, and were debouching, in great numbers from the gullies leading into the ravines, and were advancing rapidly, firing heavily, with yells of triumph, their faces distorted by opium and fury, across a small piece of level ground against the Mortar Battery and Guns, to which

Chap. VIII. and the credit of its best exposition seems due, and must be referred to the genius of Sir C. Napier.

The Guide
Corps.

The guide corps owed its origin to Sir Henry Lawrence, who raised the nucleus of it in 1846. Lord Dalhousie increased its strength to three troops of horse and six companies of infantry. It was composed of natives chosen for courage, endurance, and intelligence, whose self-dependance had been tried by a life of constant solitude and danger. Hunters and robbers from all parts of the Punjab were received into it, and scarcely a wild or warlike tribe exists in Upper India which was not represented. It resulted that to whatever region service might call them, there was a guide among them for every pass—a spy accustomed to every accident of ground—and interpreters to converse in every village. As pioneers and intelligencers, the corps became most useful; and the personal strength, hardi-

they were close. The guns had ceased firing. Brigadier Stuart was on foot at the guns, ordering the few artillerymen, who served them, to draw swords and defend their guns. His lines of defence had been driven in, the men having been struck down to the ground by sun-stroke, where they lay, and the fire of the rest rendered insufficient by the defective ammunition of their rifles. Without halting on the crest, I charged down it with the Camel Corps, upon the dense lines of the mutineers who were ten times superior to us in number; the gallant soldiers of Her Majesty's Rifle Brigade and Her Majesty's 80th Regiment giving one of those cheers which all over the world have been the heralds of British success. The rebels wavered, turned and fled, pursued by the Camel Corps, with all their energy, through the ravines, where numbers of them were bayoneted or killed by musketry fire."—*Despatches of Sir H. Rose, 1858.*

hood and activity of the men made them as formidable native troops as ever were seen in India. Their pay was above the ordinary scale, a private receiving eight rupees and a trooper twenty-four; but this included all allowances, and the baggage of the Punjabee guides had no place except on the saddle of the horse-man and the back of the foot-soldier. Chap. VIII.

These levies, well-armed, and dressed in the dust-colour or "Khakee" uniform, almost invisible at short distances upon the parched background of an Indian plain, were distributed among the frontier forts. The most important of these were Kalabagh, Kohat, Bahadore Kheyl, guarding the salt mines, Dhuleepgurh in Bunnoo, and the twenty-four posts from the Tank Valley to Dera Ghazee Khan. An uninterrupted line of strongly-held stations was thus drawn along the further bank of the Indus, a good military road connecting them, with branches cut to the mountains and the river. By such a wall, the peace of the cis-Indus was secure. A force of 11,000 men gave cogency to the friendly invitations of the Lahore Board, and its measures of internal settlement were never interrupted by serious incursions from the Suleyman. Posts of the frontier force.

The marches of the Punjab being thus provided for, its social quiet was secured by a police, also raised and recruited from the native Organisation of a police.

Chap. VIII. populations. It detracts nothing from the administrative triumph of Lord Dalhousie and his legates, to replace to the credit of Sir Charles Napier¹ the example and the arguments that induced the raising of these effective safeguards. Like those in Scinde, the Punjab police, charged with preventive duties, consisted of horsemen and footmen. They numbered 7,000 men in six regiments of foot, and twenty-seven troops of horse, mainly Mahommedans, and officered by native commandants under English surveillance. The infantry furnished guards for treasuries, goals, and outposts, while the mounted force acted as patrols for the roads, and orderlies for the civil functionaries. At each civil station a sufficient body of the military police were maintained to reinforce the detective police, in the event of any emergency, and to turn out to quell a riot, or prevent a disturbance. Besides this force, a detective body of police were maintained under the direct control of the magis-

¹ In a letter addressed to Lord Dalhousie, the Commander-in-Chief writes: "If the Board of Administration in the Punjab had a body of police like that of Scinde, only more numerous, say 8,000 men, the country might be kept in order without soldiers..... Rendering the civil power dependent on the military, is of all evils the greatest. A powerful police placed wholly at command of the Board of Administration, with which the Commander-in-Chief shall have no right to interfere, will be the safest for the Punjab."—*Vide* "Napier's Memoirs," vol. iv., p. 174-5.

It is right, however, to point out that the Scinde police was under English officers, while that of the Punjab was attached to the magistrates, and subordinate only to them.

trates of the country. These two classes of Chap. VIII. police were paid by the state, and served in addition to the village watchmen, who form a part of the village system of India in its ancient integrity. These village watchmen while selected from their own communities, paid for by the people, and working under the influence of the village elders, were under the direct authority of the magistracy. Throughout Upper India, the watchman or Ramoossie, is an official existing in every "gaum" or "chuck," with the "patel," and his colleagues the astrologer, blacksmith, &c. Under Khalsa rules, their functions had been as ill-defined as their stipends were irregular, but they offered the right nucleus for a rural constabulary which might be made a link between the People and the Executive. This was established by judicious and concessive modifications, and thus was constituted with the city constables the police force of the country. The village Ramoossie was paid by the village in coin or grain; the city constables received their wages from town dues specially levied; the burghers of an Indian city possessing everywhere influence enough to substitute these for the more equitable resource of a house tax.¹

¹ The wisdom which conceded to native sentiment in such instances what educated administrators may condemn, was well rewarded. "Taxes repugnant to our system, worked admirably through the power of popular sympathy."—*Report on Parliamentary Administration*, p. 176.

Chap. VIII.

Its close connection with the people.

The constabulary thus raised in the country was not dissevered from its source by an unwise centralization, for while the magistrates supervised and controlled its services, the actual employment of them was with the "tehsildars." These were native collectors of revenue, whose duties, within their fiscal division, was to encourage, restrain, and assist the police. Under their countenance and superintendence the police reported crimes, tracked and arrested criminals, escorted supplies and guarded prisoners. The distribution of the force was of course governed by the requirements of the Punjab. In the great wastes of the Doabs, where cattle-stealing had been an immemorial course of life, and the country was traversed by nothing but camel-paths, a large body was to be maintained in proportion to the population. A hundred herds of lifted oxen might be, and had been, hidden in a very narrow tract of these tangled expanses of brushwood. Roads were therefore cut through them; police patrols threaded their thickest coverts, and the wonderful gifts of the native tracker were brought into use for the apprehension of cattle-reivers. On a soil which gives no perceptible sign, to betray a footstep, like the clay and fallen leaves of North America, the "puggee" will detect and follow one from village to village. Invisible peculiarities of conformation make a foot as individual to him as a

face, and he can trace the thief and his booty over and among a labyrinth of soils, with the steady certainty and success of a bloodhound. These men, in Punjab phrase, were called "*khojis*" or "seekers." So sure is their skill, that the responsibility of a theft rests as a matter of custom with the village patel, to whose walls the "*khoji*" has brought his trail. About Peshawur also, as well as in the Doab, these Indian detectives and the police were strongly gathered. The amphitheatre of mountains encircling that valley had always harboured robbers, who frequently descended to take up their lair, like prowling jackals, in the broken ground about the city. The active measures of the Board did away with this frontier danger. Suspicious characters found themselves watched; the head men of the valley stations were called upon to answer for strangers passing the night in their serais, and none but shepherds tending their flocks were allowed to wander outside the village *enciente* at night. Armed travellers coming down the pass, deposited their weapons at the police station of Janrood, resuming them on their return. Thus the gates of India were kept with close and careful ward.

To Peshawur as well as to the Indus and H - General
zara¹ populations, permission was continued to disarmament.

¹ The land of the thousand chieftains.

Chap. VIII. or under their highland dens, they would else have been at disadvantage. Throughout the rest of the Punjab, the people were quietly and firmly disarmed. This measure, hardly possible but in the profound dejection of the country, was the indispensable condition of its future peacefulness. Six weeks after annexation, an edict issued from Lahore to every town and village between the Beas and the Indus, naming a day for the rendition of weapons, and declaring it forbidden to possess, to sell, or to manufacture arms or munitions of war, after that date. The execution of this decree was entrusted to the head men of the rural communities: in the towns the city police had to enforce it. One hundred and twenty thousand stand of arms were thus surrendered throughout the Punjab—the implements of robbers as much as the weapons of warriors. Matchlocks, curiously inlaid with ivory and silver thread; the double-edged Guzerat dagger, with its barred wrist guard; the crooked knife; the long “putta” sword, welded to a gauntlet; curious blunderbuses, known as “*sher-butchas*” or “lion-whelps,” and of lethal aspect; the sharp-edged discus, which, skilfully thrown, rang above the Sikh battle, to cleave the forehead of a foe; and the curved Sikh scimitar—every blade and every barrel was a loss to disaffection and crime, and a gain to peace. The effect of this disarming move-

ment was, indeed, quickly visible in a dimi- Chap. VIII.
 nution of the outrages, too common in the days
 of the Khalsa rule. Then every Sirdar kept
 an armed following; no man's life was safe
 whose hand could not guard his head, and the
 nation "carried iron"¹—the sign by which the
 sagacious Greek historian denounces barbarism.
 Violent crimes were, of course, committed after
 the disarmament, but not in proportion to the
 violent passions and traditions of the people;
 and such murderers or pillagers as were ar-
 rested, were in most cases found bearing rude
 or disused weapons, the ineffective substitutes
 for those heaped up and rusting in the arsenal
 at Lahore.

As for the Sikh army which surrendered at The Khalsa
 Rawul Pindee, it had at the same time deposited broken up.
 its arms; but there remained a large body of
 equipped soldiery, troops of the Regency,
 and the military retainers of Sirdars and Jag-
 heerdars. These, trained to a soldier's calling,
 and meriting a soldier's treatment, were called
 to Lahore. They were there formally disbanded;
 all arrears of pay were discharged to them; the
 picked men of the force were taken into British
 service; and gratuities and pensions were
 awarded to the unadmitted men and the vete-
 rans. The Sikh is not uselessly contumacious;
 he acknowledged the stronger star of the Fe-

¹ Ἐσιδηροφόροι, Thucydides' brand of a low civilization.

Chap. VIII. ringhee, and took his discharge not with submission only, but with good grace. Men, who through their immediate leaders, had governed the government of the land, and lived upon the excitement of making and unmaking kings, now laid down their swords before the Saheb, accepted his gift of money, and passed away to tend cattle in the Doab, or to till a field. The staunch foot-soldier became as good a cultivator, and the brave old Sikh captains retired to be elders in their village, and to hold the gossips many a night at the gateway with stories of the Lahore court, and of great battles with the victorious British. The fiercer spirits found their way into the new frontier levies, or were enlisted in the Indian army, to do good service on the Irrawaddy, on the Indus, and even the far rivers of China, for their new masters. At first certain only of their strength, the Sikh has since acknowledged their wisdom and opulence,¹ and loyally followed the hand that humbled him, when it pointed his way to the doubtful breach at Delhi.

¹ "The Padisha," said a Sikh officer to his colonel, during the mutiny, "would never pretend to shut you out of Delhi if, like me, he had *lived a month in Vere Street, Oxford Street.*"

CHAPTER IX.

THE policy which, so far as possible, strove thus to link the people with the government, securing external defence and internal quiet by native agency, was anxiously persevered in by the Marquis of Dalhousie. Under his direction the Punjab landholders were vested with police powers and general responsibility, as has been seen; and English habits of thought gave way to meet and win the co-operation of the country. Its disturbers disarmed; its fighting men absorbed into the industrial population; its Sirdars hoping for nothing so much as amnesty of the past—the land at last found rest. A police force of 11,000 men kept the peace from Sindh to the spurs of the Himalaya—from Ferozepore to Attock; and so thoroughly displaced sedition, that not an outbreak occurred in any part of the Punjab, to check the steady progress of settlement. Thanks to this policy, three years after annexation, the Lahore Board could declare that “in no part of India had there been more perfect quiet than in the territories lately annexed.”

Chap. IX.

Judicious
policy of the
Marquis of
Dalhousie.

Chap. IX.
Evils de-
manding re-
pression.
Dacoity.

But the license of preceding governments, and the desperate rivalry of religious sects, furnished, of course, many crimes for repression and punishment. The Sikhs had risen to empire by robbery: Runjeet himself was but a freebooter, with a crown instead of a dacoit's turban; and dacoitee was esteemed by his people as a free and dashing trade, rather than an offence. It was not, in truth, practised in the Punjab without such rough virtues as fill our own ballads with the praise of Robin Hood and the Moss-troopers. A Sikh chieftain rode a-field to lift cattle, or to plunder a village, by the light of day, like them; and not by night, or stealthily, like the Bengal gang-robbers. Even after the Sikh power was concentrated under one head, the Sirdars preserved or marked out their respective borders by point of spear rather than of pen. Such national habits are not readily changed, so that the new Government found foraying everywhere prevailing and undenounced, except by its immediate victims. About Umritsur, the great roads themselves were dangerous to travellers: armed troops of Sikh outlaws levied along them the ornaments and silver no longer to be obtained in war, and attacked, too, the dwellings of rich or influential natives, for plunder or revenge. Driven from the main lines, they fell back upon the central plains. The Punjab highways pass in most parts through a country

alternating constantly from cultivation to barrenness, and in the intervening tracts of desolate sand or intricate thicket, dacoity made its last home. Signal and summary penalties inflicted on captured robbers; the unrelenting chase of those who were known as such; and the slender profits of the successful gangs, gradually dissolved them. Fleeter horses, stouter riders, and stronger arms than theirs, chased them into Bikaner and Rajasthan, or decimated them if they stood. Not many years after Lord Dalhousie's proclamation, no part of Northern India was freer of dacoity than its birth-place and haunt, the Punjab.

Another prevalent crime, in the Punjab, was *Thuggee*. that which, under the name of *Thuggee*, has won for Hindoo assassins a dreadful pre-eminence of success and skill. To understand this horrid worship of blood, it needs to be familiar with that patient and pertinacious temperament of the East, which moves as calmly through a tedious labyrinth of cheating to murder, as it labours through the many-coloured threads of the shawl-loom to the complete design. A Hindoo's cruelty is like a child's—cold, contemplative, objective, and pitiless; and hardly lacks, indeed, the child's excuse of ignorance; since ages of a ritual of fear have suppressed in him the instincts of manhood. Without compassion, without offence,

Chap. IX. without profit, in a purely professional enthusiasm, the Thug despatched his victim: so subtly too, and secretly, that they lay by thousands under the roadway, and among the feet of the Europeans, before a chance confession first unveiled the fraternity of blood.¹ The story of that astonishing discovery is not unknown. The active magistrate,² proud of his province, where, as he fancied, no criminal lived unknown, heard

¹ The remarks of M. Lanoye are just, and he estimates fairly the gigantic evil from which English rule has purged India:

“L’Européen qui ignore comment est constituée la société en Orient ne pourra comprendre, comment une semblable association a pu se développer sans que son existence ait été connue ou au moins soupçonnée des populations au sein desquelles elle recrutait ses professeurs et ses affiliés. Mais celui qui a un peu étudié l’Asie, qui connaît le fractionnement de son territoire, l’indolence de ses gouvernants despotiques, la corruption, l’arbitraire de son administration et l’envieuse jalousie qui a toujours empêché ces morcellements de peuples de se liguier entre eux pour assurer en commun la sécurité des voies publiques et la police des transits; celui qui sait que les mœurs et les coutumes des natifs s’opposent également à ce qu’il se fonde dans l’Inde des moyens de transport réguliers à l’usage du public, celui-là conviendra que toutes les tentations et toutes les conditions possibles se réunissent dans cette contrée pour former des bandes des brigands et assurer leur impunité. Aussi l’Asie en a-t-elle enfanté de tout temps et sous mille dénominations diverses: mais aucune d’elles n’a été si nombreuse, si unie, si discrète et partout si dangereuse que celle de thugs.

“Qu’on songe maintenant à l’effroyable consommation de vie humaine qui devait se faire dans l’Inde avant la découverte de ce prodigieux mécanisme! Combien de familles ont dû périr annuellement sous les coups de plus de cinquante mille assassins régulièrement organisés, procédants avec ensemble et méthode et dans des régions où les pèlerinages, la superstition et les mœurs rendent l’homme essentiellement nomade! Là, bien plus que dans les ravages passagers des guerres des Mahrattes et des Pindaris, est le secret des vastes solitudes qui séparent aujourd’hui les populations, et de leur faiblesse numérique en proportion du sol.”

² Colonel Sleeman.

with incredulous horror that not in the province simply, but a day's march off; not so far either, but in the public-road outside his tent; nor in the thronged highway only, but under his very carpet, beneath his chair, the rotting victim of the Thug lay hidden. Then first was learned the wide range of Thuggism, its passionate excitement, its slow noviciate, its life-long practice. Then were understood those bands of strangers passing with pleasant words and busy air from town to town; or encamped beyond the suburbs, and seemingly engaged in innocent industries. They were known for Thugs; Thugs unknown they had been for years, succeeding ancestral assassins, and practising an art of murder perfected by the experiments of generations. A chance question in the bazaar—a good-humoured “ram-ram” upon the road—a fellow-traveller's casual talk—and the Thug's web was spinning. Then followed the rencontre with the group of courteous strangers—the meal by the well, or beneath the mango-trees—the easy confidence and kindly smiles of the slayers, and, suddenly, the fatal signal—the cruel handkerchief—and the victim, whose grave was already dug, was stripped and hurried into it palpitating and warm. Exhumed from hundreds of such trodden tombs, the remains of missing travellers confirmed the story, once whispered. Until this, the Thugs had kept their secret by an

Chap. IX. affiliation extending into all ranks, and every district. "You may kill me," said one, "I would not live to be any other than a Thug; but, besides me, there are many, in your houses, your barracks, and your bazaars; you may find them in the mosques and the temples, even on the bench of the Adawlut, everywhere, and among all, except, perhaps, in your English churches."

Thuggee in the Punjab at the period of annexation.

This guild of death first extended its dark circle beyond the Sutlej in the days of Runjeet Singh. It affiliated none or few from any Punjab caste, except that of the Muzubees,¹ or sweepers, with whom, although they profess the Sikh faith, no Sikh would condescend to sit at meals. Wuzeer Singh, the first Punjab Thug, was himself a Muzubee, and learned his trade of death at Hurdwar. Some of the Hindostanee

¹ Sir J. Malcolm seems to err in identifying this caste with the descendants of Mahomedans turned Sikhs: the number of such proselytes is too few to have founded a separate caste. Their true origin is thus. When the Sikh Gooroo was murdered at Delhi, no Sikh dared venture to bring the corpse to his son and successor, Govind. The Mahomedan Emperors made short work of heretics, and shortest of a Sikh heretic. One Hindoo, a "choora," or sweeper of Govind, seeing his master's distress and anxiety, volunteered to go, and brought the Gooroo's remains safe back to Mukoolwal. The Gooroo Govind, delighted at his fidelity, made him a disciple, and admitted him to the "muzub," or faith. The Sikhs' story denies this; they are ashamed to owe the prophet's recovery to a choora. But it is affirmed; and it illustrates the original principle of Sikhism, which was to do away with caste distinction and to set up a great military propagandism, to grow eventually into national ascendancy. Brahmans and even Kshattriyas deserted the Gooroo at the outset in consequence of this policy, but had the English not been beyond Sutlej, Gooroo Govind might have stood in religious history as a second Mahomet.

gangs were known to be less exclusive than others, and such a one communicated to this Punjab cut-throat the secret of the bloodless "rumal." Wuzeer Singh, returning to the Five Rivers, initiated his sons and nephew, who were all, like himself, in the service of Runjeet Singh, then consolidating his power, and enlisting all the most reckless spirits of the country. Wuzeer and his novice kinsmen were soon at the head of organized gangs, and conducted regular Thuggee expeditions. Their victims were usually Sikh soldiers going home on leave. With these the Thugs, disguised as travellers of distinction, would fall into conversation. Their perfect knowledge of the army, of the Maharajah's policy, of the merit and valour of this or that "*misl*," made them pleasant companions. The Sikh would listen gladly to tales of Khalsa daring, and recount them in turn; or tell with pride to his chance friend what a beltful of rupees, what arms, what shawls, what jewellery he was taking home with him. Many such a victim fell to the Muzubee Thug, till the imprudent murder of two travellers of repute was traced to him, and Runjeet's men hung the founder of Sikh Thuggee to the branch of a tree. The fraternity still, however, grew, and one Kurum Singh became its leader. He, also, had been invited to take service with Runjeet, ever keen-eyed to personal courage or stature, like that of the young Sikh

Chap. IX. assassin. Kurum refused the offer of two rupees a day, and it illustrates the Maharajah's method of enlistment, that he was allowed the option of service or mutilation. He declined the first, and escaped the last by breaking his prison, and for some time led a fortunate gang about Mooltan. But proceeding too boldly upon Sawun Mull's high road, that rigorous ruler seized and executed him, and Muzubee gangs avoided the Kardar's country long after. The Maharajah, Shere Singh, took active measures also to suppress the growing crime. He hanged, or maimed, every man convicted of employing the handkerchief, and his prisons contained many Thugs, some of them miserably lamed by hamstringing, when his death occurred. After that time, Thuggee increased. The roads of the Punjab were patrolled by gangs, and missing travelers were regularly sought upon them by relatives, who looked along the path for the freshly-turned earth, and the forgotten turban or slipper which might mark where the hurried grave was made. The Thugs even abandoned the form of concealment; they left the strangled corpses in the grass, or by the forest-side, and if the authors of the crime were known, they were either safe as members of the dreaded Khalsa, or protected by the zemindars of the villages on their line. Nor could any complaints be made, because no court existed, nor any criminal jurisdiction.

It was in this unhappy and restless time, that the thirteen hundred murders, of which evidence has been registered by the Board, were committed, with very many more. Chap. IX.

The first blow among this confederation of murderers was struck in 1848, when the confession of a Muzubee dacoit led to the discovery of Thuggee in the states just annexed to British India. Skulls were exhumed, and other presumptive evidence of the rampant and ubiquitous crime. Thuggee then migrated beyond British sway, and at annexation it was prevalent throughout the Five Waters, though not at first suspected. The general disarmament, and the close patrolling of the roads, broke up its organization into small gangs. The Sikh soldiers, too, no longer travelled; and though British camp followers fell victims in their place, yet a paid-up Gorechurra of Lahore was a better booty than the poor servant of the English officer, who made so strange a stir about his fate. The Thugs, therefore, began to have recourse to stratagems, letting out ponies for hire, and killing the riders; or hiring themselves as public labourers, and ascertaining from their comrades the date of their departure, and the amount of their savings, so as to accompany and strangle them on the journey. At last, the corpses thus exposed and discovered suggested suspicion, and especially one which was found with the stran-

Measures to suppress Thuggee.

Chap. IX. gling-cloth still adhering to the neck, but hidden by the swelling and decomposed integuments. Nor did the Thugs always finish off their villainous work. A young Brahman, Asa Ram, was strangled and left for dead upon the Jullundhur road, but he recovered, and was confronted with his clumsy assassins. Thus, at last, a clue was obtained to the confederacy of the Punjabee Thugs, and it was followed up with keenness and zeal. To Mr. Brereton was committed this important investigation. Bargaining with his convicted approvers that their lives should be spared upon full disclosures, but that a single false statement would forfeit them, he soon obtained a complete revelation. In two days the list of guaranteed murders rose to two hundred and sixty-four, and only the delay of transcribing the depositions, prevented the list from being longer. A roll of declared Thugs was drawn up and sent to all the Punjab stations, and the Commissioner himself rode round with his approvers to certify their confessions. Along one portion of road not much frequented, fifty-three Thuggee graves were opened, and bones or shoes were generally found which, by the rags adhering, or the fashion of the leather, proved the wearer's caste and identity. As strange as any phenomenon of the crime, was the fond tenacity with which the Thug recollected the scene of his

exploit. In the great grass jungle at Adcean, an informer led Mr. Brereton aside from the road. "Here, Saheb," he said, "Budeen Singh and I gave the handkerchief to a traveller, as long ago as nine rains." Not a trace could be found, nor did any neighbouring tree, or configuration of the spot stamp the locality. The Commissioner was on the point of charging the confident Thug with deceit, when a village boy, playing about, came upon the skull and bones in a tuft of thick spear-grass.

By these means, in the Lahore and Jullundhur districts alone, Mr. Brereton shortly arrested five hundred Thugs. Arresting parties were also sent into all the Doabs, and even into Cashmere. Although not a Thug could any longer rely upon his profession being unknown, it was still largely practised, and even the very camp of the Superintendent for the Suppression of Thuggism furnished a victim to the long list. But Mr. Brereton's labours, taken up by Colonel Sleeman, were crowned by the gradual extirpation of the fraternity; and since the Muzabee Thug numbered murder as one only of his criminal avocations, a great reduction in statistical crime followed them. Thuggee was never, indeed, quite confined to these Muzabee Sikhs:—the Sainsee, or gipsy tribe of the Punjab, were more than suspected of affiliation to the guild. Without religion or caste, this singular people had their

Chap. IX. home in the jungles, living by cattle-lifting, child-stealing, and highway robbery. They trace their origin to Shah Puree, the Queen of Wandering Spirits, who danced before Indus, the God of Rain. The deity, pleased with the performance, caused rain to fall, and a drop of it touching the lip of Shah Puree, she became pregnant with Sains Mul, progenitor of the Sainsees.

Character of
the crime in
the Punjab.

The Muzubee Thugs observed none of the refinements of Hindostanee Thuggism. They paid a careless worship to Devee and to the Mussulman *peer* Lacedoota, the patron Saint of Bandits. To these they made offerings at the outset of an expedition, and set apart a portion of their booty. Extremely superstitious, they would turn aside from a promising foray if a Brahman, a washerman, or the lumburdar of a village had been encountered. The cry of the little owl, of the black partridge, or the jackall, was a formidable omen when heard upon the right, and to breathe through the nose, the air escaping with greater force from the left nostril than the right, was a certain augury of success. Before starting, the oath of fellowship and secrecy was always renewed. The Muzubee bound himself by the Grunth, or the stone of Devee; the Moslem by the Koran; the Brahman was sworn upon the peepul leaf; and the Jat Thug vowed his fidelity on a sword-

blade. Initiation in the Punjab lacked, however, the curious and solemn ceremonies observed beyond the Sutlej. The holy *goor*, or treacle, was not consumed in company; nor a blessing invoked on the "rumals," and the instruments for grave-digging. Neither did any religious sanctity attach to the strangling cloth as in Hindostan. It was a simple turban piece, or part of a cummurbund, doubled twice or thrice, and twisted upon the neck in the form of a screw, so that a turn of the hand caused a terrible and deadening constriction. Frequently, indeed, in the savage fury of the moment the rumal gave way under the strain applied, and in this case the sword or knife finished the deed. A shallow hole in a freshly ploughed field, the bed of a river, or a deep well, furnished a receptacle for the corpse or corpses. But the Muzubee, although a clumsy Thug, felt, in all its force, the enthusiasm of his dreadful calling. One of them was questioned as to the number of his victims. "*How can I tell?*" he replied. "*Do you remember, Sahab, every animal you have killed in the chase? Thuggee is our sport—our shikar!*" The booty was carried two or three marches from the scene of murder, and divided in the jungle; nor did the Thugs ever trust their women with any particulars of these raids. The Muzubee Sikhs were wretched, debauched characters—scavengers, and executioners by prescrip-

Chap. IX. tion, and accustomed to death in every loathsome form. There was reason, therefore, that this caste should chiefly recruit Thuggee. It is said that the shameful murder of wounded British soldiers on the battle-fields of the Punjab, was the work of Muzubee Sikhs; and it has been seen that one of this tribe was the actual assassin of Agnew and Anderson. The Muzubee exhibited, indeed, the worst type of the worst features of the Sikh faith, the "Muzub" to which he had been permitted to attach himself. That Lord Dalhousie's administration not only put down these Thugs and Dacoits, but reclaimed the tribe and filled villages and schools with them, is a triumph of which it may boast.

It was in the revolts and disorders of the years succeeding Runjeet Singh, that Thugs and Dacoits had flourished—the storm birds of a tempest-tossed society. Thirteen hundred murders were registered, as has been said, to Thuggee before the English annexation. In the first year of our rule the annual average sank to its half; in the fourth the crime had disappeared; and of the criminals apprehended nearly a thousand had answered justice for their deeds; while the whole Muzubee caste, as well as those known for affiliated Thugs, were under a close surveillance. Their limited numbers and declared bad character, rendered necessary and proper the measure which registered in every police juris-

diction their families and habits, and regarded them as nefarious until proved honest. But to make honesty possible, free employment was offered them on the great Northern road works, and industrial schools were opened. The great highway from Lahore to Peshawur is in many places laid by Thugs, whose occupation, until English rule, had been to waylay and strangle the travellers by that same route.¹

The suppression of Dacoitee and Thuggism were achievements to which Lord Dalhousie could before his departure refer the critics of his policy; but its executors had to purify the social state, as well as to protect it. The general disarmament had done more to repress turbulent than insidious crime, since Hindoo passion for revenge or for gain is patient, and finds its occasion at leisure, and its weapon in the instruments of domestic life, or the jungle-weeds. So many

Abuses existent in Sikh society.

¹ Many of their evil ways had doubtless arisen from their feeling themselves a proscribed, contemned race. Maharajah Runjeet Singh had considerable bodies of them in his Irregular Cavalry, and companies of them in his Regular Infantry. But they were deemed the "enfants perdus" of the army, and were thrust forward to be expended in difficult and dangerous work. When the Mutiny broke out, in 1857, and we were at our wits' end for sappers and miners (nearly all ours had mutinied, and were inside Delhi) we improvised two Battalions of these Muzubees, many of whom were then working as labourers on the Baree Doab Canal. They went down to Delhi, and there did excellent service; and then went on to Lucknow, and behaved equally well. The corps is now at Attock, working at the tunnel under the Indus. One of the kindest and best Missionaries in that part of India, Mr. Clarke, is with them, and already a number have become Christians.

Chap. IX. murders as are recorded on the first returns of the Lahore Board, astonish those who have not regarded the social state of the Punjabees. "Jealous of their women's honour, even beyond other Hindoos, their customs tend most to endanger it. In no part of India does mutual choice, and mutual or accepted passion, often dignify and make easy the marriage tie.¹ But the Sikh girl's wedding was arranged without the least regard to her or to her husband. Family considerations entirely governed it, and the amount in cattle and shawls which was likely to change hands on the occasion. Not only was marriage thus reduced to a bargain, which one or other was sure to find bad, but in very many parts of the Punjab a betrothed bride was an exchangeable commodity, passing again and again from betrothal to betrothal, as profit could be made by the transaction. The sanction of English law was sternly withheld from these sordid dealings, and quick and sure redress was opened to persons proved to be aggrieved by them. These patent causes of immorality yielded, therefore; and in the Hill districts the whole subject of inter-

¹ Among the Pathans of Eusufzye, weddings are arranged by "Dooms," or professional match-makers, who do their best for their employers, without much opportunity of choice. A tale is current there of a Doom, who had arranged and settled a wedding, and was exulting over the Doom of the other party, because the bride had a cast in her eye. "It is we who may laugh," the other responded, "for when the bridegroom dismounts, you will find that he is as lame as a camel with his knees tied."

marriage and betrothals was re-arranged by conventions, which took their inspiration from English ideas. But a Sikh girl, legitimately betrothed and married, became a wife at a very early age, and service or pilgrimage carried her husband from home often and for long. Neither her rearing nor her treatment as a wife fortified a constancy thus exposed, and inconstancy was yet fiercely avenged upon her and her paramour. The old Sikh code, somewhat careless of other offences, was merciless against seduction; so that the severest penalties short of death or mutilation, pronounced against it by English administrators, failed to satisfy the popular sentiment. Among the lower orders of Sikh Hindoos there prevailed, too, a social law which allowed the next male relative of a deceased husband to marry or dispose of his widow. With the Punjab Mahommedans the same custom exists, and its enforcement against a common and natural repugnance, was second to jealousy only as the origin of homicides. Thus in the Rawul Pindie district, in 1852, seven persons were murdered at midnight, by assassins who set fire to their dwellings. The sole cause of this outrage was that a widow had desired to marry contrary to the law, and her relations had failed to enforce it. Of murders not arising out of domestic questions, a large number were due to the fashion followed by Hin-

Chap. IX. doo parents, of bedecking the wrists, ears, waist, and ancles of their children with silver ornaments. These are worth from two to thirty rupees, and sorely tempt the robber. He would win the child from its playfellows into the enclosure of a temple, or the high crops of an adjacent field, and strangle it there for the sake of the bangle or ear-gems. Against this savage crime the Government vainly meditated an edict, forbidding the wearing of ornaments by children. The savings of India are so laid up, and must continue to be so, until governments can find a better bank of deposit for them than the melting-pot of the Soucar, or the limbs of the little children.

Slavery and kidnapping.

Slavery had prevailed under the Khalsa rule, though its form was domestic and not predial. To supply households, children of both sexes were openly bought and sold, and the marketable article thus became an object of theft. After English-accession, the offence ceased with its cause. Other and ordinary crimes of a passionate and lawless people were made to recede from absolute licence to those limits within which severity cannot force them. Before four years had elapsed, organized crime in the Punjab had yielded to organized repression. If violence still kept a seat it was only upon the frontier where the mountains pressed upon the river, and where quarrels were chronic. Throughout the Punjab dangerous fraternities were broken up, and

prompt pursuit of actual offenders, coupled with quick decisions, enlisted the people on the side of a justice not too lame for a busy and quick-tempered country. In cases of cattle-lifting and petty crime, the change of government brought at first no diminution. To make a goad of the sword was regarded as a spirited calling in the Khalsa days, and was not likely to be abandoned when herds grew more plentiful. The class of milder offences partly owed its apparent increase to greater frequency in detection, and was, besides, natural while so much unoccupied villany was passing through the gradations of light misdeeds to the dull walks of industry. Chap. IX.

But a greater triumph than the extirpation of Thuggee crowned the early years of this administration. It may be dwelt upon, because the subject is rich in illustrations of Eastern sentiment, and because, in dealing with the dreadful crime of infanticide, the strong good sense of Lord Dalhousie, and of his coadjutors, made itself signally apparent. The history of the extirpation of this blot in the Punjab, is a comment upon that admirable maxim of Sir John Lawrence, that "Christian things done in a Christian way, never yet offended the people of India." Christianity which is without patience, which affects all Christian graces except faith, hope, and charity, will labour in vain upon the heart of India. Christianity which forbears, which Suppression
of infanticide.

Chap. IX. relies upon the loveliness of its morality to win, more than on the iteration of its doctrines to weary belief, may some day add all India to that sublime faith which certain of its teachers have so little understood. The solid sense and steady determination shown by the Chief Commissioner and his colleagues (the Board at this time was dissolved), in ridding his province of infanticide, will repay attention, as well as anything recorded of the administration.

The ordinary
type of the
crime.

The crime had long been but too familiar in connection with the Rajpoots of Central India, and the local Governments had striven with little success against its cruelty and selfishness. Maternal feeling had been appealed to, births were registered, and periodical musters held of the children. The result showed hardly a girl-child among a hundred houses. The Rajpoot mother, on the point of delivery, felt but half the sweet consolations of maternity. She dreaded her pains as vain, knowing that for her offspring, if a female, death must follow the first breath of life. Guilty of sex, the girl-child was suffocated in a vase of milk, or sucked its destruction from the poisoned nipple of its mother. Nor had this prevalent and shameful crime the excuse of pride, which many writers have advanced, as if it palliated a sin against the common law of nature. The Rajpoots murdered their new-born daughters from avarice as much as arrogance, and

those who, like a Scandinavian author,¹ can see in those people the chivalry of India, have mistaken truculence for courage, vanity for pride, and the vices of a miser or a beggar for the scruples of a prince.—The almost insuperable obstacles encountered in dealing with Rajpoot infanticide should be kept in mind, as bearing upon their successful removal in the Punjab. Chap. IX.

It was not till 1851 that the Deputy Commissioner of Goordespoor brought to the notice of his superiors that the Bedees at Dera Baba Nanuk practised the destruction of their female children, and were known as *Koore-mars*, or “Girl-slayers.” The Lawrence Administration took the subject into instant consideration, and returns were called for from other Punjab districts. They showed that not the Bedees only, but the Rajpoots and Mussulmans were addicted to the enormity. Leia, Peshawur, and Hazara were free from the taint, but nearly all the other Punjab divisions were infected. The Punjabee Rajpoots had practised the crime from antiquity, through mingled causes of pride and poverty; the Bedees had no reason for it but priestly pretension. The Bedees were the descendants of the Gooroo Nanuk, and numbered the proudest families of the Punjab. They were at the head of the list of precedence, and the murder of their female children was the natural corollary. A Hindoo of

The causes of the crime in the Punjab.

Causes of the crime.

Bedee infanticide.

¹ Bjornstierna.

Chap. IX. this caste holds that to bestow a girl in unequal marriage betokens inferiority; a son may marry his equal or inferior; a daughter must wed above her, and in no case below. But an unmarried daughter brings yet greater disgrace than one unworthily bestowed. It follows, therefore, as the Bedees reasoned, that, being at the highest round of society, no marriage was possible for their daughters. To bestow them on inferior castes would have been to abdicate their superior pretensions, and to preserve them unmarried was an alternative not to be entertained. The Bedees were uniformly wealthy, and could well afford the very lavish expenditure of Hindoo weddings. In these conventional observances, therefore, they found their only arguments, and for these, until our annexation of the province, almost every Bedee girl died in the hour of her birth.

The Bedees themselves, indeed, alleged a tradition in defence of the practice. They say, that the practice was first enjoined upon their tribe by Dhurm Chund Bedee, grandson of Baba Nanuk. He had two sons named Mihr Chund and Nanuk Chund, and one girl, who, at the proper age, was espoused to the son of a Khuttree, as was then the custom of the Bedees. When the bridegroom's procession reached the house of Dhurm Chund, the door was found too narrow to admit the litter on which the boy was carried; and the riotous attendants, with more

than the usual license of the occasion, proceeded to widen it by force. The incensed Bedee prayed, "that the threshold of the Khuttree tribe might, in like manner, come to ruin;" and the nuptial rites were celebrated amidst mutual ill-feeling. When the bridegroom and his party were departing, the two sons of Dhurm Chund, as in duty bound, accompanied them to give them "Rooksut." The weather was hot, the guests out of temper, and they made a malicious pleasure of taking the young Bedees further than etiquette required. When the lads returned home footsore, Dhurm Chund asked, "If the Khuttrees had not bid them turn back sooner?" The boys said "No:" and it was then that the old man, indignant at all the insults which the bridal of his daughter had drawn down upon him from an inferior class, laid the inhuman injunction on his descendants, that "in future no Bedee should let a daughter live." The boys were horror-stricken at so unnatural a law, and with clasped hands represented to their father, that to take the life of a child was one of the greatest sins in the Shastras.¹ But Dhurm Chund replied, that if the Bedees remained true to their faith, and abstained from lies and strong

¹ A graceful humanity often characterizes these venerable precepts, as in the recognition of filial and marital duties. "Though the wife commit a hundred faults," say they, "smite her not *even with a blossom*." So also the Vedic writings, as in the verse, "*Where the Gods are, or thy Goro — in the face of pain or age, Cattle, Brahmans, Kings, and CHILDREN, reverently curb thy rage.*"

Chap IX. drink, providence would reward them with none but male children. But, at any rate, the burden of the crime should be upon his neck, and no one's else; and from that time forth Dhurm Chund's head fell forward upon his chest, and he ever more walked like a man who bore an awful weight upon his shoulders.

With consciences thus relieved, the race of Bedees continued for three hundred years to murder their infant daughters; and if any Bedee, out of natural feeling, preserved a girl, he was excommunicated by the rest, and treated as a common sweeper.

Through the mists of this story it is still clear that religious pride, and the horror of giving a daughter to an inferior caste, rather than pecuniary considerations, first led the Bedees to adopt the custom of female infanticide.

What still further proves that the motive to infanticide was religious and not pecuniary, is the fact, that in consequence of the Bedees having no daughters to give to the Khuttrees in exchange, they were compelled to adopt the singular custom of giving dowries with their sons, to enable them to marry Khuttrees' daughters. Notwithstanding this obvious purchase, the Bedees prided themselves so highly on receiving wives from the Khuttrees, that as a mark of their own superiority they never allowed a Khuttree to smoke from the same hooka.

Other classes, too, as has been said, imitated the custom. The Rajpoots of the Plains practised infanticide, to attest their equality with the Hill Rajpoots; in the case of other castes, the desire to avoid the heavy expense of a daughter's wedding, and a proud unwillingness to diminish it by a rupee, was the prevailing cause. Thus, upon annexation, it was found that the natural ratio of the sexes was inverted. In Kangra, for every hundred male children, there were but eighty-seven female, and in Hoosheearpoor but seventy-seven.¹ Where pride did not make the crime fashionable, poverty thus compelled to it, the choice lying between the father's fortune and the daughter's life.²

Chap. IX.

The nature of the crime elsewhere.

It will appear incredible to all but those who have studied the force of custom, that natural affections can have been so completely set aside

¹ This is the more remarkable if the tendency of polygamy, as Captain Burton has remarked at Utah, seems to be to increase the proportion of girl children.

² It was happily necessary to preserve one or two girls for the reason that to receive the "Kuneeadan" is, by the inconsistent law of the Shastras, a great sin; but to give it, is one of the most meritorious of acts: consequently, to rear a daughter and bestow her in marriage was a good deed in a scrupulous Hindoo, who had ever been married himself.

Kuneeadan, or the Virgin's Gift, is the water which the bride's father takes in the palm of his hand, and after the Brahmans have read prayers over it, pours into the hand of the bridegroom. The sin of receiving it is thenceforth on the head of the bridegroom, until he has himself reared a daughter and given the same gift to others at her bridal. The Brahmans explain the sin as consisting in this, that "Kuneeadan" is a form of "Poon," or religious gift, which none but a Brahman should dare to receive.

Chap. IX. by its injunctions. The Punjabee for these chiefly took the little life of his daughter, with no compunction, and almost without the decency of concealment. A girl-child was destroyed immediately after birth. The usual method was to fill the mouth with cow-dung, or else to produce suffocation by immersing the head in a vase of cow's milk; or death was induced by drawing the umbilical cord over the face, or by leaving it unsecured upon delivery. In the Goojrat district the commoner practice was to bury the child alive, the body being placed in a large earthen jar, and covered with a crust of dough. The juice of the Madur plant (*Asclepias gigantea*) was employed with opium as a poison, the nipples of the mother being smeared with the fatal compound. If a scruple of parental feeling lingered, the father removed the child from its natural sustenance, and allowed it to die as cruel a death by inanition.

A Bedee
birth.

A birth in a Bedee family was never, therefore, a time of tender emotion or joy. When the trembling mother was delivered, the anxious question had to pass as to its sex. The whisper outside the purdah quickly told the fate of the infant. If it were a son, the congratulations were loud, and the fainting wife had not borne her dread trial vainly. If a daughter, she turned her face to the wall, not willing to look upon the little features which she could never see again.

The silence of that bitter disappointment would quickly be broken by the harsh voices of the Bedee matrons commanding the child to be disposed of. Sometimes one, less womanly or more bigoted than the rest, stopped the fluttering breath at once with her hands, and the mother's ear thrilled to the dying sigh of her baby. But for the most part the murder had its scene away from the place of birth. The deed being done, the tiny corpse was buried with a piece of "goor," or crystallized sugar, in its lips, and a lock of cotton in its fingers; the Bedee women singing over it a Punjabee verse:—

"Eat the goor and spin the thread,
But send your brother here instead!"

To this system of general homicide the exceptions were rare, and but one or two are mentioned unless as alluded to, previous to annexation. The first voice raised against it in the Punjab had been that of Sir John Lawrence, who, as Commissioner of the Jullundhur Doab, at once and strenuously denounced the practice in the trans-Sutlej. To this, and to the known humanity of the British, it was due that the bare fact of the Saheb becoming master in the Punjab checked the custom of infanticide long before its existence was found to be so general. At Deera Baba Nanuk, the very stronghold of the Bedees, Lord William Hay found sixty-one female children alive in the

Prevalence of
the crime.

Chap. IX. fourth year of annexation, each of four years of age, no edict having at that time been specially issued. If it seems unaccountable that the enormity should have been detected and deterred so late, it must be recollected that the privacy of a Hindoo household is complete, and that the pressing occupations of the first years of government prevented the gathering of statistical evidence. Thus, even when attention was awakened, the first report exonerated the Rajpoots. Subsequent examination showed, as has been said, that Bedees, Rajpoots of the hill and plain, educated and intelligent Khuttreas of the Middle Doabs, Suddozye Pathans, known for gallant men, Mooltanee Mussulmans,¹ and even the humble cattle-drivers of the Sutlej valley, were addicted to the inhuman practice of destroying their girl children. With these last, of course, poverty was the chief incentive. The betrothals and marriage ceremonies for all castes in India, are expensive affairs.² Very

¹ The Koran was guiltless of their crime, since it permits a maiden to remain unmarried if her parent's choice displease her.

² It may help in throwing light on both, to give a short explanation of the expenses alluded to:—

1st. The Lugun; this decides the rate of all the other expenses. The bride's father sends it generally in one-third cash, and two-thirds property, such as horses, camels, &c., &c.

2nd. The Milnee; if 100 rupees are spent in Lugun, then Milnee is fifty rupees, and the bride's father presents it as a Nuzzur when the bridegroom's procession arrives at the house, and the two fathers embrace.

3rd. The Beydec; this is generally one-fourth or one-half more than the Milnee, rupees sixty-two, and eight annas, say, or rupees

few householders die unembarrassed by debts contracted for the tinsel, the sweetmeats, and the presents of a wedding, and the cost falls on the father of the bride. Those who could ill support them, scorned to lessen these charges by an unambitious match; and those without means at all, preferred to outrage natural feeling, when borrowing was hopeless, rather than to violate a fashion. There is grave reason to believe that the custom yet prevails where it is least suspected; for the census of an Indian city shows often a strange disproportion of sexes. The attention of Indian legislators might be also usefully directed towards a cognate practice which decimates the children of the India of to-day. The Hindoo mothers, too poor to afford to substitute a food while nature will continue to supply it, suckle their infants for two and a half or even for three years. The child grows up

seventy-five. It is a fee to the priest for reading Shastras over the young couple under a canopy of plantain boughs.

4th. *Mecta bhat* :—for two days, all sorts of sweetmeats and fruits, mixed up together, are set before the assembly, and all the neighbours of the same caste come and partake, but it is etiquette only to take a morsel or two. The leavings, which are very considerable, are the perquisite of the barber, who sells them to the confectioner, who retails them to anybody of any caste. Much fault has been found with this custom, because, in the first place, the real guests are deprived of the feast, and, in the second place, a Brahmin may thus buy and eat the leavings of a *Khuttree*, which are a pollution to him.

5th. The *Duheya*; or, as it is called in the Punjab, the “*Khut*.” This is one-fourth or one-fifth more than the “*Lugun*,” and consists of a gift of all household requisites, from water vessels down to a sweeper’s broom.

Chap. IX. weakly and stunted,¹ and the maternal strength is sapped by so ignorant a practice. It is continued in spite of this evident result, for the sad reason that a fertility which would embarrass the straitened means of the household is avoided by its observance. The poverty of the poor is everywhere their curse, but nowhere so bitterly as in the East. To the social state of the Hindoo women, and to the hopeless bondage of India to her money-lenders, I earnestly invite their regard who have place and power among that capable race, which has produced the best of queens in the person of Aholiya Bae,² the wisest exponent of Christianity to India in the Brahman Rammohun Roy, and the most princely of all princely givers, in the Parsee Baronet Jamsetji Jejeebhai.

Measures
adopted
against it.

The proud Sikh priesthood of Jullundhur and Dehra Nanuk offered especial difficulties to the Board. Among them a religious sentiment consecrated a false pride, and the people, who might have been unconcerned with private feeling, joined in general repugnance to the marriage of a Bedee maiden. But the voice of English indignation at the custom was not, of course, to be silenced by such scruples. Proclamations were issued, appealing to the common dictates of

¹ A writer completely acquainted with the East (Captain Burton) strangely maintains the reverse opinion.

² See "Malcolm's Central India," p. 176, for an account of this noble and virtuous Mahratta lady.

humanity, and denouncing against infanticide the penalties of murder. Major Edwardes, Deputy Commissioner of Jullundhur in 1852, convened there the Bedee and Khuttree tribes, and conducted a close and searching examination into the prevalence of the crime among them, and the possibility of eradicating it. His able report, supplemented by the researches of the Judicial Commissioners, passed from the Lahore Government to the hands of Lord Dalhousie. The Governor-General perceived that coercion must fail against a conspiracy which had a people for its accomplices, and a new-born babe for its victim. Common consent could alone thoroughly destroy what it sanctioned, and he endorsed the wise advice of Sir J. Lawrence, now Chief Commissioner, which counselled an appeal to it.

The Chief Commissioner had at first declared that to reduce the exorbitant expenditure on marriages would be to cut away one root of the evil. Espionage, and police supervision, he rejected as useless in comparison with inducing among the people a radical change of opinion. This was not impossible if the leading natives could be secured, and already these were weary of a forced and fruitless extravagance. When Nao Nehal Singh married the daughter of the Atara chief, one hundred and seventy thousand pounds went in sweetmeats, fireworks, dresses

Chap. IX. of honour, &c. The Rajah Tej Singh expended ten thousand in uniting his daughter to the son of a poor Brahman. These expenses were swelled by the hordes of noisy and extortionate Bhats and Faqueers who crowded the gates of a bridal festival, shrieking for alms, which they claimed as their right. In the way of any hope to a readjustment of bridal charges, these drones of the Hindoo hives stood prominent. The Chief Commissioner recommended that they should be dealt with as vagrants, and that a great general meeting of English and Hindoos should be held at Umritsur, to take into consideration the entire subject.

The Marquis of Dalhousie responded to the requisition of the Chief Commissioner with earnest humanity. He promised to bring all the terrors of authority, and all its rewards to bear upon the matter, and warmly sustained the proposition for a great Durbar.

The great
Umritsur
meeting.

A general meeting was accordingly summoned at Umritsur, for the discussion of the subject. The occasion chosen was the Dewallee,¹ the most popular and best kept of Hindoo festivals, when the great Sikh city would be full of life and leisure. To the gathering came, by in-

¹ The feast is dedicated in practice to Lukshmee, goddess of prosperity, and is celebrated with illuminations, and a general bedecking of persons and habitations. Indian scholars may notice the coincidence, that Kallee or Bhowanee was the original patroness of the *fête*, and to her children were formerly offered in sacrifice.

vation, all the hierarchy and nobility of the old Sikh *régime* as well as the wealthy and influential men of the new. The Sikh Sirdars, the hill chiefs, the Mussulman nawabs, the priests of Nanuk, were all represented; and busy Hindoo merchants and Brahman pundits attended the unusual convention. Whatever dignity official position could bestow was added by the presence of the chief officers of the British government, and of those called in from every district in the Doabs. Umritsur—the opulent and gay—had never assembled so large and distinguished a concourse, as that which the festival and the great Durbar of the Sahebs had brought to her walls. The plain outside the city was covered with tents, and inside, the bazaars and tanks were thronged with eager spectators and debaters. The native delegates, chosen from every tribe and class, met the English gentlemen under a spacious awning, spread over the spot of greatest resort. The practice which disgraced the nation was temperately discussed by the assembly: its heinousness was urged and admitted, and measures were debated in concert which might remove the grounds for its continuance. Reason and nature triumphed when they had fair speech; the humane propositions of Lord Dalhousie and the Chief Commissioner were accepted as just and honourable bases by Sikh, Mussulman, and Rajpoot alike.

Chap. IX. They solemnly covenanted to observe the prescriptions which should be founded upon the resolution of the meeting. These, subsequently defined by mixed committees, reduced marriage expenses to a scale graduated for rich and poor, and no longer in unvarying ratio to the vanity common to all degrees. They laid down social and sumptuary rules, obvious and free from objection when generally accepted; and which, by removing all real difficulty in providing for a daughter in marriage, destroyed the motive for her murder. These rules being fixed in detail, were proclaimed and published. Wherever they came, reason and humanity surely prevailed; and the fame of the great meeting of Umritsur, spreading to every city and village of the Five Rivers, won compliance to its resolutions, and a confession of the beneficence of the new Government.

Other meetings.

The example set at the Sikh capital was followed by supplementary meetings at Goojeranwalla, Mooltan, and Jhelum. But the good work was crowned at an assembly convoked between Sealkote and Jummo, by the Maharajah Golab Singh, at which the Commissioner of the Lahore division presided in person. As Lord of the Dogra Rajpoots, and Rajah of Cashmere, Golab Singh directed all his Rajpoot chiefs to meet and confer with the Commissioner and the Prince Runbheer Singh, his son, upon the expenses of mar-

riage. Resolutions were agreed to of the same tenor with such as had before passed, and were confirmed by the Maharajah as thenceforth law. The Rajpoots of the Punjab intermarry with those of Jummoo and the Cashmere valley, and the movement without his aid would have wanted its completion. It was, doubtless, granted from a desire to conciliate the British Government, and perhaps to increase the population of a thinly-peopled district. No one will doubt the forethought and statesmanship of Golab Singh, or credit with very philanthropic sentiments the Tyrant of Cashmere. His policy once taken, he gave it free effect, and to aid in reducing the marriage expenses to narrower bounds, he remitted at once and for ever the tax which had long been levied on the occasion of a wedding. The thanks and congratulations addressed by the Marquis of Dalhousie to the Maharajah and the Prince, were more justly extended to the Chief Commissioner and those gentlemen—English and native—who had assisted him in this notable crusade.¹ Its trophies

¹ Associated by Sir John Lawrence himself in the honour of his work, are Sir R. Montgomery, then Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab; Mr. D. McLeod, who succeeded as Commissioner of the trans-Sutlej Division; Mr. G. Edmonstone, the Financial Commissioner, who presided at the great Umritsur Meeting; Mr. Raikes, who had done so much as Magistrate of Mynpoorie in former days to root out the practice from among the Rajpoots of that district, and who took a very prominent part in the Punjab arrangements; together with the present Sir Herbert Edwardes, Major Lake, Mr. Edward Prinsep, and many others.

Chap. IX. were won by the quick and willing compliance of hundreds of Punjabee families, and in the preservation of many innocent lives. Thus among the first who set the good example of a marriage without extravagance, were the wealthy minister of Runjeet Singh, and his grandson, the Prince Dewa; the Sikh general, Ilahee Buksh; the chief minister of Cashmere; and many of the richest bankers and burghers of Lahore and Wuzeerabad. The tendency of this great reform was not to save life merely, but to do away with abuses in regard to betrothal and marriage, thereby elevating domestic morality, and securing regard for women. The people of the Punjab must share, too, the credit of its promoters, for reasonable reception of an innovation rationally made. Those whom haste or horror impels to deny so much to them, must set against the instinct of nature the Sikhs' low estimate of life—lowest in regard of one but just beginning. For the Sikh infant, too, dying in its birth, no ingeniously cruel theology conceived an inevitable condemnation, and an age to come may criticize certain European marriages and European mothers, as this one speaks of Punjab sins. But civilization must nevertheless shudder at an ignorance which was brutally deaf to the voice of the Great Mother, and there remains in Sikh infanticide a crime horrible and

unforgiven, from which British administration happily freed the province. Chap. IX.

The section detailing the measures for establishing peace on the frontier, and order and morality within the borders of the new province, may fitly close with a reference to the steps taken for dealing with its convicted criminals. A new and severer justice soon crowded the Punjab gaols with prisoners whom Runjeet Singh would have fined, or maimed, and set free. If it be questioned whether the ready sentence of mulct or mutilation was less repressive of larcenies than the English code, which visited with imprisonment only these natural Punjab offences, the offenders certainly benefitted. Sentences of penal servitude for short or long periods filled the central and provincial gaols, so that, in 1853, they contained ten thousand inmates.¹ With the sanction of the Supreme Government, in-door labour in Punjab prisons was substituted for the less healthy out-door work. Each gaol became an industrial school, where the wild cattle-lifters and desperate dacoits acquired the rudiments of education and a trade. Carpets and tent-cloths, country-paper, camel and elephant-gear, carpentry, and even lithographic printing, were produced by the convicts, Prisoners
and prisons.

¹ Maintained at 41 rupees per man per year, an average larger than that of the North Western prisons, by six rupees, the expense of the Punjab guards being greater.

Chap. IX. who themselves constructed and repaired the gaols, and performed all menial duties in them. A large proportion of the cost to Government was thus returned,¹ and the State could not grudge the moderate expenditure which sought to punish offenders by reforming and furnishing them with the hopes of industry.

Gaol discipline under Sikh rule.

Gaol discipline in the East is a matter altogether disregarded, and the Khalsa prisons, such as they were, resembled, for squalor and misery, those which Howard visited in the Levant and the Crimea, and such as still disgrace the Turkish Government. That an offender against the law and peace of society has still his rights, was a maxim which never entered the head of Runjeet Singh. His justice, as has been observed, gave itself little trouble, but fined all criminals to the extent of their means, and where fines were out of question, mutilated and dismissed them. Political offenders were incarcerated sometimes in grain-cellars and dungeons, or at the bottom of unused wells. Debtors who had no means of payment, were chained to the gates of towns and cities, and depended for their existence on the chance charity of passers in and out. Mutilation had its grades: thieves taken in the act lost their noses only, highway robbers their

¹ The *Punjab Report*, No. VI., gives the value of convict labour for 1853, as 150,231 rupees, against 424,852 rupees, the cost of maintenance and guard.

hands, and the midnight burglar was effectually but cruelly restrained from repetition of his crime by ham-stringing. Imprisonment was so rarely resorted to that at no time in the annals of the Khalsa Government had there been at once more than two hundred prisoners of all classes in the Punjab. The spacious reformatories erected by Lord Dalhousie's administration were a marvel, accordingly, to the Sikh. He saw for the first time the benevolent system in force which recognizes that punishment is a word out of harmony with nature when revenge inspires it. Hospitals and industrial schools were erected, to his wonder, in the precincts of the great gaols, as a necessary part of them. The central gaol of Lahore was made to contain two thousand prisoners, and comprised all the constructional and economical improvements of the best European prisons. These large reforms were inaugurated while Sir H. Lawrence still presided in the Punjab, and their credit is due to that high-minded officer, and to Dr. Charles Hathaway, Civil Surgeon of Lahore, subsequently Inspector of Gaols.

CHAPTER X.

Chap. X.
Administra-
tion of jus-
tice.

THE administrators of civil and criminal justice found in the annexed country a people utterly unused to legal technicalities. No ponderous statute books, or verbose forms, would have been tolerable to the yet litigant villagers of the Punjab. Such cases as the Cazee or the Gooroo could not settle, had been generally referred by them to arbitrators, constituting a kind of jury, whose decision was at least enlightened by intimate knowledge of the parties, the facts, and the local practice. The Punjabee estimates by the extent of such knowledge the competency of his judge. The Hindoo and Mahomedan codes, adopted by the Sikhs and the peoples of the Five Rivers, were constantly traversed by local customs and traditions—observed with jealous care. These must be familiar to a magistrate, whose decision the native suitors will accept, and the Lahore Government had to look for such a class of officers. They found them in the Tehseeldars, whose duties as revenue collectors brought them into

constant intercourse with the natives, and made them the centres and the authorities of rustic society. The Tehseel was at hand for every village; justice could be dispensed in it, cheap, expeditious, and easy; and regulated besides by local public opinion. To these officers, then, judicial powers were given in all petty suits arising within their fiscal circle, of less disputed value than 300 rupees. If the system of arbitration by native punchayets in some points resembled a jury, the Tehseeldars' court might recall the form and practice of our country bench. Its merit was to attempt no more than the community needed—a ready reference for disputes, and a simple and quick decision. When subsequently the Lahore Board was remodelled, and a judicial commissioner set over the department of justice, the Tehseeldars were still retained as a fourth order of Judges, the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, and Extra Assistant, dealing with urban cases, and cases by the amount or the questions involved, not properly cognisable by small cause tribunals. A total of more than 60,000 suits in 1853 by no means represents the entire litigation of the population. The adjudication of causes and tenures relating to land had been made over to the Revenue Settlement Department, and thousands of suits were so decided.¹

¹ In the district of Jullundhur, during five years of settlement

Chap. X.
Respect of
native codes.

To provide the higher judges with the principles of local law, and to declare the occasions when it should take precedence, a manual of native codes was prepared and circulated. The native rules for inheritance, property of females, adoption, and wills, were confirmed. In commercial affairs, native custom was also endorsed, but upon betrothal, marriages, and divorce—the fertile springs of Oriental bad blood—the old prescriptions were somewhat modified. They had permitted a vicious practice, already alluded to, of interchanging betrothed girls for considerations of money; and of giving and receiving considerations in money or cattle, for procuring betrothal. These transactions, degrading to the sex, and tending to represent women as saleable commodities, were suppressed. Legal support was withdrawn from all traffickers in matches, and with that discouragement, domestic morality notably improved. In the highlands of the Punjab, where the contract of marriage had been least observed, the village communities uniformly agreed to revise their local customs, and to observe the sanctity of the marriage promise. All these wise innovations have borne, and are bearing, fruit. Western justice is an exotic in the East,

work, one European officer and his two native deputies, dealt with 20,000 judicial questions, a fourth connected with land.—*Punjab Report*, par. 295.

striking its roots slowly, and blossoming late; but simplicity of form and sincerity of intention, with a practice that eschewed technicality for principle and fact, succeeded in introducing it to the Punjab.

In these native courts something, of course, was sacrificed to the celerity of justice. The presiding officer, of his own authority, decided what issue should be referred, and confirmed the award of the arbitrators in open court, stating the grounds of the award.

In cases beyond the village jurisdictions, the spirit rather than the letter of the "Regulations," guided the English officers.¹ A Deputy Commissioner had powers co-extensive with the magistrate of the North West, while the Commissioner answered to the superior Judge. Heavy cases were sent up to the superior court, which had power of decision without appeal. One novelty in its constitution may startle the juris-consults of more ordered countries. Where the sentence was not to exceed seven years; or where a *primá facie* case was not made out by the depositions of the witnesses,

Powers of
the Commis-
sioners, &c.

¹ A well-informed writer in the "Westminster Review" (Dec., 1861), has pointed out the conflict between rival native codes, and (demanding a substantive "*lex loci*") has denied that justice could have any place under the regime described above. Long after Lord Canning's Code is published, India will prefer the award of the English captain or civilian; for when a common law is acceptable, and common nationality can begin to be felt, patriotism will be possible, and "the beginning of the end" is approaching.

Chap. X. the Commissioner could pass decision upon the record of the lower court, without rehearing the evidence. A population, accustomed to see the thief's hand stricken off while it held the stolen bracelet, and the adulterer's heart pierced while it still beat with lawless passion, could put up with the mistakes of justice, but not with its delays.

Sources of
revenue.

The new Government had inherited from the times of the Khalsa three accepted sources of revenue. From land, from water, and from goods in transit, Runjeet Singh especially replenished his exchequer, and the Lahore Board had to look mainly to these for their expenditure, and to just dealings with them for the popularity of the English raj. The land-tax was paid in recognition of the State as sovereign, out of produce. In Runjeet's day, the Government asserted its right to one-half of the entire crops, and from fertile districts as much as fifty-four per cent. was not uncommonly exacted. Beyond the Indus, the Maharajah had adjusted his demands to his power of enforcing them; while about Mooltan the scarcity of population operated at first to diminish the Government dues to a third of produce. Cesses were paid, too, for gardens and forests; for the gold-washings on the banks of the Indus; the iron and salt mines of the Sind Saugor Doab; and in rent for those alluvial fields, which the

snow-floods wash from owners on the upper waters, to attach them in lower reaches. The vast herds of camels and cattle paid besides for the right of depasture on the central wastes. At certain seasons they are turned loose among the thorn-trees and scrub-grass of the Doabs, to wander about at will until the transit trade again opens. The camel-drivers had their own clans and chiefs, and each of them disbursed into the Lahore treasury a sum proportioned to his drove, receiving it in detail from the drovers.

Water, again—the one first need of the thirsty East—contributed its quota by rents levied on lands irrigated from Government canals. Water-grown timber, water-mills, and the use of water-carriage, also yielded a return, as did the ferries, which everywhere occur on Punjab highways. For goods in transit, Runjeet Singh had woven a perfect net of preventive lines. Mooltan silks passing to Lahore could no more evade him than groceries entering by Cabool, or cotton goods from Manchester by the Indus. Articles in traversing the Punjab to reach their market, might pay, indeed, a dozen duties. Neither luxury or necessary was overlooked by Runjeet's guagers.

If, under a taxation so oppressive and penetrating, commerce could thrive, and the people multiply, it must be referred to the isolation of the Khalsa Government; which, drawing its

Chap. X. supplies, its soldiers, and its officials, from its own country, restored to the general circulation the blood so freely drawn. The same drain under foreign rule would have exhausted the vitality of trade. On abstract economical grounds, indeed, the British Resident had before induced the Council of Regency to abolish duties on half the articles taxed by Runjeet, setting free inland traffic, and substituting for his ubiquitous custom-lines, one cordon, coinciding with the frontier, and arresting foreign produce only. The change promised well in practice, but the second Sikh war interrupted the working of these and many governmental experiments. After annexation, the administrative Board set itself to re-model the department of the revenue. It swept away all custom-lines, and set free from toll and duty, all ports and passages but the ferries, and all productions but spirits; providing, to meet these reductions, a stamp duty like that obtaining in the older provinces, and a duty on salt of two rupees on the Company's maund. It was on the 1st of January, 1850, that all the town and transit, export and import duties, levied in the Punjab Proper, were swept away. The western line of stations, running along the banks of the Indus, as far as Mittunkote, on the frontier of Scinde; the line along the foot of the hills, which guarded Kashmir, and the line on the

Fiscal re-
missions of
the Board.

1st January,
1850.

banks of the Sutlej, together with the timber-duty stations on the rivers Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum, were, as toll-bars, abolished. The whole trade of the Punjab, the traffic from Central Asia, the ingress of merchandize from our older provinces, was left to flow, free and unshackled, in every direction. The only restrictions maintained, were in keeping not merely with the policy of the Indian Government elsewhere, but with permitted principles of sound administration in any country in the world. An excise was to be levied on spirituous liquors and drugs. Stamps were to be introduced in negotiations and civil suits. Tolls were to be levied at public ferries in the Punjab and cis-Sutlej. The salt mines were taken under the direct management of the State, instead of being farmed out to contractors, as they had been; and the excise duty of two rupees a Company's maund, was made payable on the delivery of the salt at the mouth of the mines. The only line of customs which it was imperative to extend, was the line of the N. W. provinces, meant to guard the ingress of salt from Rajputana; and this was prolonged from Fazulkote on the Sutlej, down that river and as far as Mittunkote, below Mooltan. The reader who consults the map, will at once see that the effect of this prevention was to exclude the Rajpoot salt from surreptitiously entering the new British

Chap. X. provinces through the native states of Bahawalpore and Bikanir. The actual loss to the state, by the relinquishment of the above duties, was estimated at two lakhs and a half of rupees. But the deficit was eventually made up, and it is not easy to appreciate the boon to the people dwelling east of the Sutlej, as well as in the Punjab, conferred by the abolition of every impediment to traffic; by the cessation of all those vexatious and inquisitorial proceedings, which the mere maintenance of a preventive line entails, with the justest management; and by the abundant supply, at a moderate cost, of a first-rate article of universal consumption.

Conspectus of
Punjab
finance.

A brief conspectus must exhibit the past, the present, and the future of Punjab finance, as the Board had to regard them. The forty-eight taxes of the Sikh Government yielded an annual revenue of sixteen lakhs; the revised code of the Regency, thirteen and a half; but the four new English taxes were looked to for sixteen and a quarter, of which twelve were to be derived from salt alone. Salt in India is a necessity as well as a luxury, and a salt-tax can never be quite defensible. In this case, however, it is enough to say, that under the increased burden, salt was not only as largely consumed as ever, but, in 1854, had nearly doubled the revenue by increased sales; and passing the Beas and Sutlej without

impost, had supplanted in the cis-Sutlej states Chap. X.
the unwholesome Mundee mineral.

The rugged and bleak range which thus ^{The salt range.} maintained a kingdom, has been already described. The Sind Saugor hills traversing a desert, and themselves as barren, are inexhaustibly rich in iron ore, slate, lignite, gypsum, and the rock-salt. This last lies in strata cropping out from the hill-sides, and penetrating them in veins of wonderful fecundity. It requires no operations for recovering, but excavating and pounding. The grain is of perfect flavour and purity, except when the proximity of the iron-stone has reddened the saline mass with a peroxide. This is the case most frequently beyond the Indus, which cuts the range at Kalabagh. The salt dug there was very lightly worked, but the frontier custom-line, following the river, formerly shut it from the Punjab. The cis-Indus mines, however, easily supplied all demands, producing, so early as 1854, nearly a million maunds. Under Runjeet Singh, the seven excavations had been farmed out like the land-taxes. The contractor might sell or hoard, without restriction in time, price, or place, while he kept his contract with the Maharajah. No less a man than the astute tyrant of Cashmere, the Dogra Goolab Sing, grew rich from these neglected hills, under the easy Lord of Lahore, and built his throne of gold from the poor man's salt.

Chap. X. The principal veins open, were those at Khewra and Buggi. When the state assumed the direct working of the mines, it was found to have been carried on by a rude and unskilful process. The entrances to, and galleries along, the quarries, were irregular, winding, and narrow. The carriers of the article, women and children, could hardly crawl about them. The supply of water was scanty, and what there was, brackish. The place where the salt was weighed before delivery to the merchants was confined, and exposed to wind, wet, and heat. A rocky road ran along the gorge to the Khewra mine, and was most dangerous for loaded animals. All these difficulties were remedied by the judicious suggestions of the Head of the Government. The road was levelled, the entrances were cleared: good water was provided by wooden troughs, which conveyed a supply from a distance to the mouth of the mines: the blocks of salt were excavated on an improved system: godowns were built to protect the officers and merchants concerned in the weighment from the inclemencies of the weather, and everything was done to expedite delivery. On the other hand, prohibitions against smuggling were enforced by considerable penalties. Carriages and packages might be searched on reasonable suspicion. Salt in excess of one seer, not covered by a pass, might be detained within a circuit of

ten miles round each mine; no person not licensed could excavate the article; and the manufacture of a baser quality, which used to be carried on in the districts of Mooltan and Jhung to a considerable extent, but in a rough fashion, was put down by law. This salt, made by washing the efflorescent earth, had been taxed by former Sikh governors, and in fits of morality the manufacture had been prohibited altogether. The British Government, which had removed so many other taxes on trade, and on the very necessaries of life, could not be condemned for the enforcement of this single prohibition, which was imperative for the revenue, and for the public health. Chap. X.

The land-tax was paid, or taken to be paid, to the agents of the Lahore Court in kind. Cane, tobacco, indigo, and cotton, were among the few exceptional crops upon which a money rate was demanded under the Khalsa. But the gradual enrichment of the country, and the greater certainty of results to labour afforded by irrigation and peace, encouraged the Board to introduce a general money assessment. The Rajah Deena Nath, Chancellor to the Punjab Regency, had announced a money assessment, in 1847, as one fifth of the produce collected in kind. The British Resident recommended the general adoption of that scale, and British officers made a tour of the villages, settling, by the averages of past years, and by the aspect of the soil and its The Land-tax.

Chap. X. natural advantages, the fair Government dues. The assessments were favourable to the people: in the four Doabs the revenue was reduced by twenty-eight per cent., and Major Abbott, in Hazara,¹ lightened taxation by no less a relief than fifty-three per cent. Mooltan, again, which had yielded Moolraj, by his own admission, not less than twenty-four lakhs, was assessed at nineteen and a half to the British Government.

Land settle-
ments.

A new province, with involved proprietary rights, could not receive, perhaps, the immense boon of a permanent settlement. In the Punjab Proper the settlements were made for short periods: in few cases for less than three, but in none for more than ten years. The occupants of the land, in this part of the annexed country, were divided into the following classes. 1. Proprietors not in possession, who held a lien on the land in the shape of a head rent, variously collected, and sometimes not averaging more than one seer on a maund of produce.² 2. Proprietors in possession; in which class the proprietary right was vested in one individual, or in a family composed of a few individuals, or in a large coparcenary community of cultivating proprietors. 3. Hereditary culti-

¹ As an instance of the rapacity of Kardars, and the room for these concessions, it is stated that of 385,577 rupees, the revenue previously raised from Hazara, only 239,935 rupees found its way to the State coffers.

² Equal to two-and-a-half per cent.

vators, who by usucaption were hardly to be distinguished from real proprietors; the main distinction between such a cultivator and a proprietor, being the inability of the "former to sink a well, or to sell, mortgage, and transfer land." 4. Tenants at will. If they resided in villages cultivated like those of the Khudkasht ryots of Agra or Bengal, their tenure was tolerably secure; if they resided at a distance, like the Pykasht, it was questionable. These were the main tenures with which the Board had to deal, and under its fostering care they were consolidated where weak, and confirmed where strong. Chap. X.

In districts where irrigation was easy, the remissions reached even fifteen per cent., but in many villages water had to be raised from reservoir to reservoir by a succession of wheels, and labour was, in such cases, more generously relieved. The grazing-tax, to which allusion has been made, was diminished by one half, as well as that upon date-groves. These concessions did not lower the actual returns of the land-tax, because the resumption of Mooltan to the State, and the many rich jagheers confiscated from rebellious Sirdars, gave ample margin for them. The revenues of the Punjab Proper, under the Regency, amounted to ninety-eight lakhs; in the first year following on annexation they stood at ninety-eight lakhs, and in the third year reached one hundred and six. Thus, while the public Further remissions.

Chap. X. treasury was not impoverished, the burden on land had been reduced by a general average of twenty-five per cent., and the native jagheerdars themselves were compelled to lower their own rates in conciliation of tenants, enviously regarding the advantages of British rule.

Unexpected
effect of the
remissions.

But the country had a natural, though curious, reason to be discontented rather than gratified by the immediate effect of these remissions; and the paradox is heightened by the fact that the three rich harvests which followed annexation seriously increased its discontent. The security of the land, and the lowness of taxation, encouraged agriculture beyond any former limits; while thousands of disbanded soldiers betook themselves to the occupation. Soil was broken for grain in uplands where before it would have been dangerous to herd cattle for a night; and produce increased till prices were too low for payment of dues. Lands, fertilized by labour and capital, had, besides, to compete with new lands yielding richly from a casual abundance in the rainfall; and even the districts of Sealkote, the best watered ground of the Punjab, failed, with full grain-stores, to pay their assessment. The excess could not be exported. Affghanistan is approached by long and costly climbing. Sindh produces more than it consumes, as does the Jullundhur Doab. Bhawulpore is a thin market, and the hill-men on the north have no means of

purchase. The assessment, therefore, in money, though generously levied, pressed more heavily than the old dues in kind; and this, too, in the face of a large increased demand for food within the province. The English army, numbering 60,000 men, with five times as many camp followers, and the host of labourers employed on public works, set in circulation large sums of money. Their pay, and the expenditure of the civil establishments, nearly doubled the amount of the Punjab revenues, and, if spent in the country, would have gone far to adjust any other embarrassment. But a portion only remained in the province: the Oude sepoy's remit their pay to their native villages; labourers in the public works were not indigenous Sikhs, and the official salaries of English officers find very frequently a destination far from the place of receipt. No sufficient consumption existed, therefore, in the glut of production; and the people, misunderstanding a natural coincidence for the effect of a policy, demanded a return to the former system. Their rulers more wisely perceived that the Sikh fiscal system had been even more exacting for a country fully peopled than had been imagined—that it had been an unfair basis for estimation—and they prepared, by a further remission of payments, to reach the point of a just impost. That the distress, however, was artificial, and caused by a general and

Chap. X. injudicious cultivation of cheaply-taxed crops, was shown by the case of the sugar-cane. The goor, or molasses, rose fifty per cent. in price, not by a largely increased demand, but because the cultivators had thrown their land out of cane, expecting better results from the produce bearing lighter assessments. To place the land-tax on a sound basis, a new inquiry was instituted, and, pending its result, concessions were freely and repeatedly made. From a rent-roll of one hundred and forty-five lakhs by the assessment, fifteen lakhs were finally subtracted, and the Chief Commissioner with the Commissioner of Finance, traversing every district of the Punjab, saw for themselves that agriculture had found justice at last, and learned contentment. The revenue, constantly increased by wider cultivation, bore, without diminution, these generous deductions.

Liberality of
the Govern-
ment of the
Marquis of
Dalhousie.

In dealing with the various tenures already described as obtaining in the Punjab, and the alienations of revenue classed as jagheers and pensions, Lord Dalhousie's moderation was conspicuously reflected by his representatives. Inspired by him, they strove hard to diminish the asperities of a change, which could not have place without its victims. The laws of Menu and Punjab sentiment equally recognize the title of the first clearer of the land as irrefragable, and regard with strong sympathy the

claims of ancestral descent, even in the case of families who have not exercised possession for two generations. On the right to sink a well hinged most proprietary questions, since without the well the land is nothing, and the "chuck-dar"¹ is accordingly a recognized possessor. All such points were referred to the settlement courts, and adjusted with nice regard to popular feeling by native officers, who were at once umpires and judges. The new government reviewed with the same considerateness the burdens bequeathed by Runjeet's feudal rule and barbaric prodigality. In no part of Hindostan had the early institutions of Europe been more closely paralleled. The Maharajah's army was made up of armed contingents furnished by vassal chiefs; and even regiments of the standing forces were charged upon fiefs. Civil officers were also paid by assignments on revenue; the royal zenanas and the state pensioners were so supported; and religious and charitable endowments so maintained. Lord Dalhousie affirmed the continuance of these to the families of rulers and State pensioners; to religious objects, while the conditions of the gift were observed; and absolutely, and in all cases, upon the written authority of the Maharajahs Runjeet Singh,

¹ The "Chuck" is the large circular ring of wood set at the bottom of the well, and is used as synonymous with "gaum," or village. Umritsur itself was formerly known as "Soora Chuck."

Chap. X. Khurruk Singh, and Shere Singh. In other cases, the occupance of three generations conferred a title; and in those of grants for service, the troopers were discharged, and the impersonal portion of the grant resumed. To the royal ladies of the Khalsa Court, money equivalents for life were substituted for landed allotments; while the "inams," the fruitful source of heartburning elsewhere, were liberally maintained, to the great benefit of the public service, by the good-feeling and co-operation of the "enam-dars."

Pensions and trusts for religious uses.

But numerous pensions conferred by Runjeet Singh and his successors, were paid directly from the treasury. It was the judicious policy of the Board to buy these up when small, and to commute annuities for a solid sum. Many, too, had been given for the support of temples, mosques, and places of pilgrimage, and to keep up those resting-places for travellers and mendicants, which everywhere adorn and characterize the Hindoo villages. About the temple, or the "dhurrun-sala," rises commonly the stateliest and shadiest grove of the locality, and the gentle spirit of hospitality consecrates it even more than the passing rites of a creed. The bright cupola, or gaily painted porch, is the pride of the village, and the place of evening gossip and debate. On these and on their guardians the new rulers looked with a kindly eye, confirming

them in the possession of the field or palm-grove which supported a religious institution so catholic and useful. Chap. X.

In dealing with the currency of the Punjab, Currency of the Punjab. the Board found a matter of no slight difficulty or mean importance. To stamp money is specially a king's act in the East, and the image and super-scription upon the coin current confers, as well as declares, the rights of a Cæsar. The many masters of the Five Waters had each left his badge or legend on its currency, so that the bag of a Kangra money-changer might have served as the epitome of its history. Among the contents would have been found pieces of Zeman Shah and Nadir, and the much-worn tokens of early Gooroos, with monies of Cashmere and Candahar kings, and all the discrepant coinage of Mussulman and Sikh. In the Leia division about twenty-eight different denominations of stamped money circulated. In other districts, nearly as many varieties were in use, since each prominent ruler or ambitious chief had aped the kingly dignity, and set afloat his own currency. The basest rupee of these, the Kashmir *Hurree Singee*, was worth sixty-six of the Company's rupees the hundred; the best, and most general, was the Nanukshahi rupee, of purer metal than the British currency. But of this coin alone, besides sixty-one other denominations, there were fifty different varieties, not less

Chap. X. than six crores and a half having issued in forty-two years from the mints of Lahore and Umritsur. The Hindoo money-changer can everywhere live; but in the Punjab he prospered. The exchange of a currency so perplexed was an art utterly past the arithmetic of the sepoy or villager, who surrendered it to the shroff, not, indeed, without suspicion, but without resource. The officials of the new treasury regarded it with hardly less dismay; and it was clear that a reform in this particular must be immediate and sweeping. The change was, however, introduced with proper caution: the different currencies were gradually called in, the mints of Calcutta and Bombay sending for exchange large supplies of Company's silver. It was more than a monetary reform thus to substitute for the symbol of the Sikh prophet the effigy of the English Queen. The Sikh accepted the handsome and brilliant coin as a rightful token of the new authority, and gave and took from oriental sentiment what convenience or art might not have reconciled to his prejudices. The Nanukshahi rupee, in all its varieties, with all its sixty-one co-current coins, fell rapidly out of circulation, and rarely exists now, except on the necklet of a Punjab girl, or in the drawer of a collector.

It was natural that so rude and diversified a coinage should encourage counterfeits. Coiners exist everywhere in India, and thrive wherever

independent states strike their own rough money, as in Putteala, Gwalior, and, until lately, at Lucknow. The skill of the native soucar is, indeed, equal to higher flights of metallurgy than the imitation of shapeless bosses of silver and copper. But the larger coins are very closely scrutinized by a Hindoo, to whom they represent the sustenance of so many days, and the reward of so much labour. No ear is keener to detect the ring of true metal than a villager's, who touches it so seldom. In preserving this, and yet debasing the piece, the Indian coiner shows exquisite skill and patience. Those of the Punjab were especially numerous and daring. Under the Mussulman rulers, a detected utterer of spurious money was forthwith disembowelled; and yet, not silver monies only, but the gold mohur of Mahomed Shah was frequently and cleverly counterfeited.¹ Runjeet Singh, if public report is to be credited, and the statement of Punjab coiners, absolutely countenanced the utterers of false money as a guild, and drew from them a tax varying from four to ten rupees a head. It would reconcile the wisdom of the Khalsa Maharajah with his grasping avarice, to find the forgers prohibited from passing their bad money at home; but no such restriction

¹ Six hundred base gold mohurs were found among the Mooltan loot, and the deception escaped many of the shroffs even.

Chap. X. seems to have existed. The Sikh nature of Runjeet was more unscrupulous in money-getting than the nose of Vespasian: and it really appears that for a trifling tax he thus demoralized his people, and undermined the financial basis of his government. Coining, so encouraged, rose to the degree of an art, and about the time of annexation, it was practised by families, and even by whole villages, which had abandoned agriculture for this more lucrative pursuit. The Company's rupee itself was adroitly imitated, and native informers testified that their die-cutter, a deserter from the Delhi mint, had worked two years upon the matrix, before himself and his pupils reaped fruit from their laborious frauds. The utterers had the bye-laws and pass-words of a fraternity. "We know each other everywhere," said one, "and if I am pardoned I can lay my hands on coiners five hundred koss from this." By means of such a confederacy they passed off their base monies with an ingenuity hardly to be paralleled in Paris or London. Thus the utterer would bring good Nanuk Shahi rupees to exchange for British coinage. The shroff would test and accept them, and pay the exchange, afterwards asking for the "batta" or ajio. At this the coiner would pretend indignation, and break off the bargain, returning, however, by sleight of hand, two or three bad rupees, for the good ones given before. Or a

good Mahomed Shahi rupee would be offered singly to a shroff, and another, and again another, on different days, till at last the money-changer was given to understand that these were part of a treasure-trove, which he was at liberty to buy. A vessel of coins would be produced, covered with dirt; two or three good ones would be dexterously passed, and melted down for trial, and money would be thus obtained for a pile of spurious metal.¹ The Jullundhur Doab was the especial seat of this illicit trade, and its mention finds a place in the history of the administration, because the suppression of it, coinciding with English rule, caused a distress in many villages, not to be explained except by the dislike of the coiner for the slow returns and dull labours of legitimate industries.

The language, like the coinage of the Punjab, illustrated its varied history. Lord Dalhousie's legates found themselves masters of a land where the dialects of successive conquerors, blended in Hindostan, still kept their boundaries and character. In the Punjab, the tongues due to Persian, and those derived more directly from the Aryan, exist side by side with primitive vernaculars, and the corrupt Urdu called Punjabee. In Hooshearpore alone, Captain Abbott reported ten characters in use among professional writers,²

Languages
of the Pun-
jab.

¹ *Vide* Mr. Brereton's "Report on the Coiners of Jullundhur."

² Cf. "Eight years British rule of Hooshearpore," by J. H. Abbott, 1857.

Chap. X. but some of these, like the Gourmukhi (in which the Grunth is written), were the symbols of a sacred, rather than of a spoken, dialect. The speech most general in the Southern Doabs, was the Urdu, with idioms and inflections imported from very various sources. In frontier districts by the Indus, the Affghan Pushtoo was common, and about Leia, the passage and settlement of Beloochistan merchants, had introduced a corrupt "Biluchi." In Mooltan as in Peshawur, the common artisan spoke Persian, and wrote his bill of charges in the phrases of the court language of India. We had, indeed, come so far in the path of empire, as to encounter in its first home and in familiar utterance the judicial and diplomatic vocables of the invading Mahommedan. The judge and the settlement officers, pronouncing with difficulty the technicalities of Indian revenue and justice, found them with surprise to be the household words of villagers and shopmen. In the old provinces, Persian had been banished from pleading and politics. It served little purpose but to remind a sufficiently unforgetful people of times when law and authority spoke a dialect and obeyed the canons of the Prophet. In the Punjab we were come where, to dispossess the Persian, the cultivator, the trader, the children at the tanks, must have been taught a new language. The road of conquest had been retraced so far, that

we had arrived upon the farthest footsteps of our victorious predecessors. But graceful as the Persian is, and well fitted for business, for diplomacy, and the elegancies of intercourse, it was still but partially understood in the Punjab; and though men may recite their faith in an unknown tongue, they will not be content with it for their law-courts and government. The Board comprehended the character and requirements of the border-land better than to form the design of establishing one court dialect in it. In Hazara, Peshawur, and the trans-Indus Derajat—in Leia, Khanjurh, and Mooltan city, Persian was recognized as the official language. Throughout the rest of the Punjab, the indigenous Urdu was accepted as the vehicle of government. In the spirit of simple justice, however, it was specially provided that the confession of a prisoner or the complaint of a wrong, should be taken in the dialect of the criminal or the oppressed, and the study of local tongues was encouraged to this end among officers.

The credit of all these untiring and beneficent reforms belongs to the Board of Administration and to Lord Dalhousie; nor would it be graceful nicely to divide the honours, when the labour was loyally shared. By never-ceasing communications, by ready counsel, with active and personal supervision, the annexer of the Punjab made himself also the

Credit due to
the Marquis
of Dalhousie.

Chap. X. foremost of its successful administrators. His reputation was thoroughly staked upon the triumph of his measures, and he was not the man to trust any others wholly with such a charge. Quick in decision and consistent in execution, his close association with his Board embarrassed and impeded nothing, but added to the councils of Lahore a wisdom enlightened by a different, though not more useful, experience. He sat, as it were, in permanence at the Board, superior only in his power to give sharp effect to the results of common deliberation. No project, it is understood, issued from it without the impress of his hand. He visited in person every province of the country which he had added to India; he crossed its rivers; dwelt in its cities; rode over its wild plains; and threaded its winding defiles. Wherever his provident glance observed an opportunity, or detected a want, he registered it for improvement or reform. The simple and salutary justice, whose introduction we have reviewed; the sweeping abrogation of annoying taxes; the just and ready modifications of the settlement; the masterly combinations for internal and external peace; these are in no mean degree due to Lord Dalhousie, and those which we have yet to review took their rise in the same energy, the same educated statesmanship, the same practical philanthropy. The Marquis of Dalhousie was, indeed, fortu-

nate beyond comparison, in the qualities and the devotion of his representatives at Lahore; but perhaps not even a Lawrence or a Montgomery could ask for a franker confidence, or more faithful co-operation, than the Governor-General accorded. Chap. X.

Lord Dalhousie visited the Five Rivers in 1851, and inspected for himself the results of past reforms, and the occasions for new ones. In his progress through the provinces he could not fail to observe a grand defect of the Punjab plains. The rich soil, which, with irrigation, would have produced a plentiful growth of trees, had but few to show; and sometimes not even a thin underwood. In the East the rank growth of native jungle is unhealthy, but scattered timber-groves and thickets are very useful, since the blinding dust of the dry soil needs vegetation to bind it, and shade in India is no luxury, but a need of life. Along the Rawul Pindee Hills forests abounded, and Leia about Bukkur, and Deera Ghazee Khan, were densely wooded. Bunnoo also had groves to show and, until the flood of 1841, the islands of the Indus had been belted with riverside timber. But this enumeration leaves the main portion of the Punjab bare, as the eye of the Governor-General found it. Scotch forethought teaches that a tree will grow while its planter is sleeping, and Lord Dalhousie recalled his earliest Want of forest-trees supplied.

Chap. X. instincts¹ in presence of these leafless uplands. By a special minute, he directed the protection of such forest tracts as existed, the selection of spots for model nurseries, and the planting of groves along the banks of water-ways, and about all public buildings. The landholders were encouraged by the same to promote the growth of timber; and coppice lands were specially exempted from taxation. New cuts were to be opened from the canals only on the condition that the zemindar should plant the sides with saplings, and the high road to Peshawur was to be shaded at every half-mile with trees of large foliage. Acting upon these instructions, although in the mid-pressure of State affairs, the Lahore Board found time to have planted about Lahore and in Gordaspore and Goojeranwalla, a million of young trees. They established nurseries, set out roadsides, and distributed forest and fruit tree seeds and cuttings. In conjunction with the Agra Horticultural Society of the Punjab, they imported to the Five Rivers not less than ninety varieties of timber; and, provident of the day when steamers would ply upon the Sutlej and need fuel, they sowed many acres of the riverain, broad-cast, with the "sissoo." The same Society, with the Board

¹ It was the Marquis of Tweeddale who sensibly praised the appointment of his son-in-law as Governor-General, on the ground that he was a *first-rate* farmer.

and the Governor-General, prosecuted in every direction inquiries and experiments, turning Golab Singh himself from beheading and flaying to horticulture, from a Tiberius to a Trajan. It investigated the agriculture of the province, and exposed the faulty rotation of its crops, the waste of fertilizing matter, and the want of attention in the production of staple to quality and kind. It has been seen that on the remission of taxes, the farmers of the Punjab grew the whole land over with cereals, for lack of acquaintance with foreign markets and new resources. To avert this, exotic growths were introduced, such as New Orleans cotton, Otaheite sugar-cane, flax, tobacco, and root crops. In the remunerative growth of flax, the Punjab soon showed itself unsurpassed by any Eastern country, while in wool the exportation by 1854 had risen to 30,000 maunds. Here, also, Government lent its assistance, by importing from Sydney a selected flock of rams. Silk culture was set on foot too, the mulberry-trees being everywhere abundant in the Punjab; and raw silk was produced with success at Lahore, which had before drawn all its supply from Bokhara and Khorasan. But no more felicitous innovation was made by the new Government than in transplanting the tea-plant to the slopes of the Himalaya about Kangra, and the uplands of the Murree hills over Rawul Pindee. Every climatic

Introduction
of the tea-
plant.

Chap. X. and regional condition existed there for its culture, and the shrub was introduced under experienced growers. One large sub-Himalayan plain, known as Holta, had long been deserted by the mountaineers from superstitious motives. This part was planted, much to the hill-men's dismay, and produced in due season, equally to their admiration, the finest teas grown out of China. The zemindars to the eastward took up the profitable occupation; and Kumaon and Gurwhal now rival the Punjab in an increasing supply. It must be remembered that in thus introducing to the Five Rivers a new and valuable cultivation, its administration gave it a lasting boon. The consumption of its tea will not depend upon the foreign customer, although the first excellent qualities commanded too high a price for any but native and European gentlemen. But the Mussulmans of North India delight in tea; the Cashmerees drink it as eagerly as the Russians; and Loodhiana, Umritsur, Noorpoor, and Jelalpoor, are all connoisseurs of the leaf. The Punjab will henceforth supply all these, and place within reach of the poor a most useful beverage. So vast and varied are the capabilities of the beautiful peninsula of Hindostan, so lavish its returns to earnest and hopeful government! Upon such generous labours—the foundations of new kingdoms of commerce—the historian may pause with pleasure, con-

trasting the planting of the garden and forest whose profits another generation must reap, with the reckless waste by fashionable conquerors of the resources of posterity. Chap. X.

Under Sikh rule, the wood-cutters might tear up the jungle brushwood, root and stem, for the camp-fires; and feed their cattle among the shooting saplings. The gatherers of resin, too, upon the hills, killed myriads of trees by their wasteful methods, while the villagers burned them down by firing the old grass to obtain the aftermath. Where the Chumba range abuts upon the Ravee, and on the Kooloo table-lands an ample growth of timber flourished, including varieties of the pine, with elm, plane, chestnut, and walnut. These, also, had been recklessly expended by the hill-men. If the trunk rolled, upon falling, into the mountain-stream, it might reach Lahore by the Ravee; if not, the woodman had neither appliances nor anxiety to utilize it, and handsome sticks of sound and beautiful wood rotted where they lay. To avert this waste, and supervise the Punjab forests, a commissioner was deputed; and an agent at the capital of Golab Singh overlooked the regular importation of Cashmere timber. Conservancy
of forests, &c.

Allied with this subject is that of the "Rukhs," or great grass-preserves of the Punjab. An important arm of the Khalsa force was the cavalry, and for its forage, Runjeet had reserved an

Chap. X. immense breadth of jungle, just as the Scinde Ameers shut out the woods of the Indus-valley for "shikargahs." In some of these districts a swath was produced sufficiently thick to be cut and stacked; in many, the herbage was only adapted for grazing. Some portions were set apart for the grasses used in thatching and weaving ropes and mats—for the young "mulla," or jujube leaves, eagerly bought up at Lahore—and for the "khai," the favourite food of elephants. The Sikh custodians of these preserves had defrauded the State without compunction; selling the bulk of the crop in the bazaar, and reserving the refuse for the cavalry stables. The new Government, in assuming charge of the Rukhs, broke up such as were fitted for cultivation, appointing agents to superintend those retained for forage near the central stations. An adequate supply of grass for the British Cavalry was so secured. The Rukhs, which were set apart, cost about £700 in supervision, and brought in crops valued at £5,000, only thirty of the ninety-four maintained under Runjeet Singh being kept under grass. But the Punjab ceased to maintain the fine breed of horses from which Runjeet Singh had mounted his sowarry. The decreased demand operated as forcibly as the resumption of the meadowlands; nor was the Board successful in essaying to counteract it by the introduction of Arab

stallions into the chief breeding districts. With Chap. X.
a like desire to improve the draught cattle of the Punjab, the famous bulls of Hissar and Hansee were imported. The villagers had suffered injustice and inconvenience (upon annexation) by the forced employment of their carts; this, too, the Government hastened to obviate, by the purchase of baggage camels, the encouragement of "chowdrees," or carriage contractors, and by establishing a fair and fixed tariff of engagement. These details would be trivial, but that they display the character of the province, and touch the welfare of the people; serving, also, to illustrate the energy of an administration which found nothing too high or low for its noble labours.

The Anglo-Saxon brought to the cities of the Five Rivers the order and the cleanliness in which his nature delights. Baal-zebub, Lord of dust and flies, is still the genius of Eastern abodes, and the Punjab cities had a bad pre-eminence for broken causeways and imperfect ventilation. The suburbs of Oriental capitals, raised at the fancy of individuals and with the irregularity of a camp, present especial difficulties to sanitary reform. That of Anarkullee, the cantonment of Lahore, stood, for example, on the ruins of many successive townships of different eras and dynasties. Dilapidated kilns and mosques, covered with a rank vegetation, everywhere obstructed the soil; which was nitrous and barren, and full of stagnant

Municipal
regulations.

Chap. X. water, so that the English troops suffered terribly before they were withdrawn from its insuperable malaria. The police assessment, before alluded to, supplied funds for the general reform. It was vigorously taken in hand. Drainage was effected; main streets were everywhere paved, and bazaars exchanged their old picturesqueness of ruin and squalor, for trim and orderly frontages and footways. Lahore, the most malodorous of native capitals, rose into actual repute for its sewerage and pavements; and, at Umritsur, Lord Dalhousie saw and acknowledged with delight the great work which his representatives had effected. Their credit must be shared, too, by the native burghers, whose co-operation was wisely invited, and freely given. The dresses of honour granted under Runjeet for nothing but successful raids, or a full payment of revenue, were now first presented to good and active citizens for labours of peace. When the cities of the Punjab, therefore, lit their lamps and exploded their fireworks on the occasion of Lord Dalhousie's progress, it was to greet a conqueror, whose victory on the face of things was a popular benefit.¹ A municipal system, which bore results so satisfac-

¹ At Umritsur, a very general illumination welcomed the Governor-General, and the Raja Deena Nath expressed the general satisfaction in Oriental fashion, by remarking, "What need to light up the streets; is not the Governor Bahador himself the sun and the rain of the earth?"

factory, deserves the close attention of Indian politicians. It may be made to the cities of India what the vical institutions are to her village-communities—the one form suited to Indian habits, and under which they may grow into self-government. In Punjab towns, the English magistrate sate, *ex-officio*, as President of the Municipal Commission, and administered the town duties with the advice and agreement of a native committee elected by the townsmen. The same system is now extended over India; in its judicious encouragement, the English Government may find an open road to native enlightenment, and educate Hindoo citizens into statesmen by experience and a gradually increasing independence.

Enjoying a good climate for part of the year, *Sanataria.* the greater part of the Punjab is a desert of driving sand during the hot season. Its mountains afford, nevertheless, those cooler retreats so necessary to recruit the constitution of the sick or wounded, and sanitary stations were founded on the Murree and the Chumba ranges, and the hill of Badaruddeen overhanging the valley of Bunnoo. To the convalescent depôt of Chumba, at the extremity of the Baree Doab, the title of “Dalhousie” was given. The new port upon the Bassein river also bears that honourable name, which was well committed to a harbour destined to be known in commerce, and to a station of

Chap. X. serene and healthy airs, re-invigorating the wearied servants of the Punjab Government. The graceful slopes and beautiful woodland scenery of "Dalhousie" present a contrast to the plains below, only to be experienced and appreciated in India. It possesses, with stone and wood abundant springs, among which several are medicinal; and it is easy of access besides to all the eastern and northern cantonments of the Punjab. Not yet a large settlement, it can hardly fail to become one eventually.

Certain sites thus approved, became the nucleus of a considerable population, and it was necessary to lay down rules for the guidance of the valetudinarian colony. With this view, regulations were passed which, as likely to form precedents for other sanatoria of the same kind, deserve to be noticed, especially in regard of the present inducements offered to English settlers in India. A tract was duly marked off, within which the local rules were to have effect. The timber in the locality was to be jealously preserved from reckless hands. Springs of water were public and not private property. Applicants for sites for building might purchase ground at the upset price of 50 rupees for the first acre, 100 rupees for the second, and so on to ten acres, which was the largest extent of ground to be allotted to a single individual. Houses, when built, were to

be taxed at three per cent. of their actual or estimated rental. The funds derivable from this tax, from the sale of sites, and from a land-tax of two rupees an acre, were to be appropriated to local improvements. Defiling springs, turning horses loose to graze, encamping on public paths, and similar acts, were declared nuisances, and made punishable. Above all, the rights of the hill-men were scrupulously observed, and their good offices to be won, and not constrained towards the mountain-colony.

For the natives of the Punjab public dispensaries were erected at all the chief stations. Public dispensaries, &c. Even the Mussulman allows that Allah has made the Frank a great "hakeem," and resorts, like humbler classes, to his skill and humanity. But in the languor of sickness the pride of caste is still strong—and true benevolence must stoop to native prejudice, or see its offices refused. The Government wisely adapted its central hospitals to the customs of the people, providing them with separate wards, where the sick inmate might be tended and fed by his own relatives, and his harmless prejudices meet with respect. A boon so granted was sure to be well received: and in the wildest parts of the Five Rivers—even from the independent tribes among the Khyber hills—the sick or injured came to avail themselves of English medical help. Vaccination was organized, also, throughout the province;

Chap. X. operations impossible to native surgery were carefully and successfully performed; and chloroform, the kindest gift of science to agonized humanity, then but newly granted, was introduced for the wondering and grateful Punjabees. It is for these peaceful triumphs, that those of war are chiefly tolerable. The natural enemies of man should not be men of other creeds and countries, but disease and pain, which thwart and rack his nature; ignorance, which obstructs his reason; and those powers of the external world, which he conquers by enlisting in his service.

Postal service.

The Punjabee was no letter-writer, and could appreciate nothing at first like a European system for epistolary communication. The district posts which passed for civil purposes between the central and detached police stations, were opened for general service, and proved for a long time sufficient; but with increasing use it was necessary to establish dâk-runners in place of employing the police force. The rates of postage were assimilated to those existing in the North Western provinces, but no tax was levied, as in the older districts, upon landholders through whose territory the mail had to pass. A postal system, cheap, speedy, and infallible, is one of the most powerful engines of education. In England it has outdone all the experimental labours of Councils and

Inspectors; replacing by one effectual motive their faltering and tentative inducements. In the Punjab, under a similar form, it initiated the same result, and working silently with educational efforts, it exists at the present time, a system that Runjeet's unlettered Doabs would by no means part with. Chap. X.

The natural resources of the new provinces constituted a subject of inquiry not likely to be overlooked by its new rulers. Under the direction of Lord Dalhousie himself, Dr. Jameson made researches into the physical features, botany, geology, and zoology of the Punjab. Dr. Fleming was deputed to examine and report on the Great Salt Range, extending his inquiry to the whole Alpine region of the Sind Saugor Doab and Hazara. The base line of a grand trigonometrical survey was carried into Cashmere, with the Rajah's sanction; and the crags and passes of the rarely-trodden Sulimans took their positions on the maps of the Civil Engineers. A French mineralogist exploited for Government the mineral riches of the land, north of Kangra. Iron was proved to exist abundantly in ores of considerable richness, but not so favourably placed for wood and water as to attract enterprise. In the interests of the English potteries, an exploration was directed of the Spiti and Kooloo uplands, where borax is found in efflorescence on the surface. Exploration
of natural
resources.

Chap. X. Here also the difficulty of access prevented the utilization of a product, of which Tuseany monopolizes a demand of 60,000 maunds. This iron and this borax await the English capitalist, to whom Lord Canning's recent edict at last offers security for his expenditure, and railways conveyance for his out-turns. The productions of the Punjab are, indeed, as various as its climate and physical features, and its manufactures numerous and esteemed. A list of each will be found in the appendix to this division of the present work.

Conservatism
of the Board.

New governments are of necessity iconoclasts, and a later age often pretends to regret, from sentiment more than reason, the demolition of institutions which had done their work and were due to decay. But the administrators of the Punjab, although unsparing in real reform, showed nothing of that intolerance which will not wait patiently while the old blends itself with the new by natural grafting. It has been seen that their measures were built on the foundations of existing feelings and habitudes, and that their innovations never took the unwelcome shape of revolutions. A frontier army had thus been raised from the restless spirits of the population; an efficient police had been created from the nucleus of the village watchmen; a country magistracy had been founded on the Tehsildars; and a code formed upon the tra-

ditions and statutes of the Koran and Shastras. Thuggee and infanticide were suppressed with the help of the people, and municipal conservancy and sanitary reform introduced by their aid, and not in spite of them. Through such a spirit the despotic government of England in the East becomes not only acceptable to the people, but the one best form by which they may rise to a higher. In keeping with the same wise policy the monuments of the Punjab received an attention, due not less indeed to their historical importance than to the feelings of a sensitive nation. During the visit of the Governor-General to the province which he had annexed, he announced his lively interest in its architectural remains, and their careful preservation was directed by his special orders. Thus the mausoleum of Runjeet Singh, which stands by the Hazoori-bagh of Lahore—the tomb of a ruler, first and greatest in Sikh history—was completed at a large expense. Less regarded by the people, but dear to all who value the records of royal magnificence and world-wide beauty, were the tombs of Jehan-Shah at Shahdurrab, and the cenotaph of the peerless Sultana Nour Jehan at Hussun Abdul. These monuments were restored, and committed to proper keeping. The Shalimar gardens, famous in Sikh annals, were extended and enriched, and the Padishahi musjid, with its marble cupolas and minarets rising

Chap. X. above a magnificent structure of red sandstone, was preserved from threatened decay. Near Buttala, the bridges thrown across the stream by the pioneers of Islam were repaired by the officers of the Governor-General, who crossed upon them in returning from his progress through Peshawur. Stranger contrasts yet marked the works undertaken at Manikhyala, where inquisitive Westerns exhumed from tope and well the coins of Greek and Bactrian soldiers—relics of a time when Alexander and Porus stood in the places of Gough and Shere Singh. And, betokening the practical and peaceful genius of this second conquest, the fort which had witnessed the coronation of Akbar—then a boy of fourteen, and afterwards to be the wisest and greatest of Indian Emperors—was renovated and converted from a Sultan's palace into a serai for the shelter of the merchant and the traveller.

CHAPTER XI.

THE rising of this fair edifice of good govern- Chap. XI.
ment, in a country hardly still from the earth- Thorough-
quake of war, cannot but be regarded with ad- ness of the
miration. Its builders, busy with outwork and Administra-
tion.
buttress, rearing upon Affghan and Sikh founda-
tion-lines the stately pillars of order and
justice, might well have been forgiven for disre-
garding the adornments of their task. But, like
faithful labourers, in a work of all works archi-
tectonic, the administrators of the Punjab spared
nothing, and set aside nothing, carving the
capitals as faithfully as they set the base. This
record has therefore to recall, and cannot, in-
deed, fail to omit, many details of their labour.
Its result was, in point of time and complete-
ness, unparalleled even in the annals of our
imperial race, and impossible to industry less
obstinate and purpose less thorough than British.

As matter with which the Board had again ^{Inams,}
and again to deal, was that of the rent-free and ^{pensions, &c.}
service tenures, which the lavish prodigality of
Sikh government left on the hands of its succes-
sors. They have already found a mention, but
they recurred for final consolation, and their

Chap. XI. latest settlement may be noticed. The alienations and cash pensions alone amounted to twelve lakhs, and the rent-free holdings to fifteen. Runjeet and his successors had burdened the State lists with all kinds of hangers-on. Vakeels successful or pliable in law-suits; soldiers, faithful to the person, and ready at the bidding of their lord; the favoured ladies of the Zenana and their favourite slaves; cooks who had known how to excite the royal appetite; perfumers who had compounded sweet waters for the boudoirs of Sikh princesses; artists; hakeems; sweetmeat makers; hunters; and priests: all these figured on the pension list. Those who know what heartburnings and discord have sprung from the little word "inam," in the Eastern and Western Provinces, will appreciate the delicacy of the task of revision, imposed in this respect upon the Administration. Its merit was in dealing with them quickly, and not permitting illegal claims to grow into something like legality by the prescription of delay. The first care of the Governor-General in regard of this, had been to impress on the Board the necessity for prompt measures; and clear, simple, and decisive rules were laid down for guidance of officers engaged in the invidious duty. The resumption commissioners were directed to use despatch, as far as was compatible with the attainment of facts; to avoid the extremes of leniency and harshness, and to represent the

certain and quiet possession which the British authority would confer, as contrasted with the capricious grants and the arbitrary recalls of the old rule. "Vested rights" and established privileges were, if possible, respected. Grants for the maintenance of deposed chieftains, or proprietors dispossessed, were maintained for the lives of incumbents. Trusts, made over to religious societies, or for the accommodation of travellers, or for weekly and annual charities to the indigent, were all to be preserved, provided they were not unreasonably large, and for such time as the institution was really devoted to the purpose for which it had been endowed, and while the guardians of each showed themselves peaceful and well-conducted subjects. Regard was given to the claims of a class of persons, numerous under the Sikh rule, who had either obtained villages, or portions of villages, free of rent, or on payment of *nuzzurs*, or had assignments on the public revenue, or had leave to levy certain cesses from the people in addition to the regular imposts. Grants made for service, whether religious or military, were finally commuted to pay one-fourth of their previous revenue, the condition of service being, of course, dispensed with. Prescriptive right was to be inferred from the undisturbed possession of three generations, even in cases where no title-deeds were forthcoming. Chiefs who had won their lands by sword, in the old days of no right but

Chap. XI. violence, received fair consideration. But grants made by provincial governors, Kardars, Zemin-dars, and others without authority to alienate, were at once resumed. As was to be expected, the local officers, impressed with a sense of the necessity of keeping noisy priests and popular Jaghirdars quiet, were a little lavish in their recommendations, while the Government, on the other hand, was anxious not to alienate for ever the lawful dues of the State, and thus confine the liberality of future rulers. The result of this natural and not ungraceful struggle between local sympathies and provident statesmanship, was to grant comparatively few of those perpetuities which the English law is declared to abhor. Nearly all cessions, founded on title or long occupancy, were upheld for the lives of the occupants; where the same person had several holdings, the weakest were sometimes resumed. In certain cases valid grants were declared enjoyable by the second or third generation at an assessment progressively enhanced; in others they were made referable at the demise of the present occupant. Viewed in any aspect, the result of these proceedings was marked by wonderfully little irritation and annoyance. Officers and men who had formed part of the regular or irregular Durbar troops, and who were unable, from old age, to take service in the new Punjab regiments, together with the nearest of kin of those soldiers of the irregular

force who fell fighting against the British in the Sutlej campaign, were admitted pensioners. A distinction was made between those arrayed in arms against us in the second Sikh war, and those of the earlier campaign, whose surviving relatives were thus cheerfully supported by the British Government. This will be easily understood. The Sikh State remained in nominal integrity after the battle of Sobraon. Its existence was still guaranteed by treaty; the acts of its Durbar were essentially valid, and as such were to be respected by the Government that replaced the Regency. The British Government, in pensioning the widows of men who had fallen in battle against it, did, therefore, only that which the independent native Government had done, or would have done, for its subjects, while it lawfully enjoyed power. A succeeding executive was bound to uphold such acts. But the Jaghirdars and rent-free holders who appeared on the side of Moolraj or Shere Singh were rebels against the Regency, and as such had nothing to expect from the Maharajah Dhuleep and his supporters, or from those who took the Government out of the young ruler's hands.

The grants of land were mainly to be divided into two classes, Jaghirs and Maafi tenures. To the former class belonged grants held on condition of service; to the latter, those, the proceeds of which were to be devoted to some particular institution, to a series of devotional acts, or to

Tenures of
two kinds.

Chap. XI. purposes of charity. As to these religious holdings, the British Government regarded with wise impartiality the privileges of every sect. The first in importance were the Beedees, or descendants of Nanuk, who enjoyed great influence over the minds of the Sikh community. Next came the Sodhees or Sikh priests, a class quite distinct from the above; and after them the Grunthees, or readers of the sacred volume of the Sikh faith; men who in the day of battle bore their part in it, reciting passages in front of the Khalsa. There were, beside, as pensioned classes of the Hindoos, Byragis, Brahmans, and Sunnyasis; of the Mussulmans, Syuds and Faquirs, as well as Dewans, Jats, Khâtrees, and Rajpoots; for the subtle spirit of Sikh policy aimed to conciliate all classes—fanatic without bigotry, and proud without exclusiveness. To all these subsidised priests equal forbearance was shown. The Mahomedan was permitted to burn his lamp and spread his green cloth at the tomb of a departed saint; the Brahman, who had repaired his roadside well, and planted the ground near it with trees, was left to enjoy the produce of his improved *beeghas*; the periodical dole of rice to hungry pilgrims or houseless wanderers was carefully continued; nor was the Serai or Choultry consigned to disrepair. Worship was nowhere harshly extinguished at the Bonga of the Sikh, the shrine of the Pir, or the temple of the Bhut. The Faquir, with his hut

at the foot of a large tree; the wandering Jogi, with knotted locks; the Sunnyasi, smeared with ashes and clad in his tiger-skin; the Pundit, with his Bywasta; and the Moulavi, with his Koran; they were one and all invited to register their claims, to defend their rights, and to trust to the forbearance and the good policy of the British officer. In a wide review of tenures like these, there must always be a vulnerable point. If much is reserved in favour of unproductive classes, the industrious complain that revenues are alienated, taxes imposed, and resources undeveloped. If much is hastily resumed, there is danger of arousing fanaticism and exciting hostility. The Board at Lahore, on this difficult question, seems to have pursued a course equally successful, politic, and wise. In maintaining grants, it took especial care to re-assess the holding of the Jagheerdar, so that the cultivator should not be forced to pay in excess of what was just. The peasant thus escaped the undue exactions of a landlord hurrying to enrich himself, and the evil of a new settlement at final resumption was avoided. Altogether it has been fairly said that the Punjab, in regard of alienations, stood five years after annexation where Bengal stood seventy years after Clive.

Not unconnected with this subject, although beyond the Punjab Proper, were the cis-Sutlej free-lists, of which our administration became

Cis-Sutlej
tenures.

Chap. XI. more direct after the Punjab campaign. British connection with the Protected Sikh States, as they were called, commenced, indeed, in the year 1808-9, when it was deemed politic to oppose a barrier against the advances of Runjeet Singh. At annexation there were no less than nine large States, besides about one hundred petty chieftainships in this division, politically dependent on British authority, but internally independent, and enjoying fiscal, judicial, and police powers within their own bounds. The largest of these was Puttiala, with a revenue of nearly twenty-five lakhs. The complications produced by the manner in which the cis-Sutlej territory had been parcelled out amongst invading Sikhs, engaged a large share of the Board's attention. The Sikh horsemen, who first overran the country, had divided it into shares, varying in size from the fief of Puttiala to a fractional part of a village. In some cases they had been content to usurp the right of collecting revenue; in others they had ousted the actual proprietors of the land, whether Goojurs, Dogras, or Jats. The interweaving of jurisdiction, the traversing of civil, criminal, and revenue powers claimed by one Sikh chief or another; the questions of succession; the amount of tribute; all these made up a tangled web of business, which required the undivided time and energies of the best officers to reduce to order. The

cis-Sutlej chiefs, besides, had never felt the sharp curb of Runjeet's rein. The British Government interposing, they had grown strong, and had acquired pretended rights which they were not disposed readily to surrender. To deal with them required much tact and suavity of demeanour, since there were conflicting claims to be balanced, important questions to be finally ruled, rights to be definitely adjusted, privileges to be curtailed, obedience to be enforced. Besides the nine independent States, already mentioned, there were others dependent on the British, and others again dependent on the first nine, and others dependent partly on one and the other power. It is not possible to present a fair picture of this complexity otherwise than by giving a classification of the different States, as it was made by the Board when the subject was first taken up in earnest. No less than fifteen classes of tenures, exhausting all the permutations and combinations of authority, had to be dealt with.¹ The labour by which all these

- ¹ 1. Villages belonging solely to the British Government.
2. Villages belonging partly to the British Government and partly to a sovereign State, the former having police powers therein.
3. Ditto ditto, the latter having police powers therein.
4. Villages belonging partly to the British Government and partly to a dependent State, the former having police powers therein.
5. Ditto ditto, the police powers being with one of the sovereign States.
6. Villages belonging solely to a dependent State, the police jurisdiction being with the British Government.

Chap. XI. Course pursued in dealing with them. diversified claims and interests were adjusted, may therefore be imagined. It is only necessary to state here, that a village demarcation and professional survey were at once set on foot; that British villages were duly assessed; and where communités belonging to one jurisdiction or the other were isolated, exchanges were gradually and carefully effected, each jurisdiction being rendered more compact; that the rights of the protected chiefs and townships were duly asserted, and the privileges of the independent States as duly respected; in short, that everything was done to amend a system whose normal state was confusion, and in which the absence of any certainty was the only thing certain. Occasion was also taken to regulate the amount of commutation to be paid by the holders of "Horsemen's shares." This was fixed at from two to four annas in the

7. Ditto ditto, the police jurisdiction being with a sovereign State.
8. Villages shared by two or more dependent States, the police powers being with the British Government.
9. Ditto ditto, the police jurisdiction being with a sovereign State.
10. Villages shared by two or more sovereign States, the British Government having criminal jurisdiction.
11. Ditto ditto, only one of the sovereign States having police jurisdiction.
12. Villages belonging solely to a sovereign State, exercising police jurisdiction.
13. Ditto ditto, but the British Government having police powers.
14. Villages held by two or more sovereign States, having joint jurisdiction.
15. Villages showing almost every possible combination of the the above forms.

rupee, and a broad and yet liberal rule laid down as to the right of succession to the shares in question, so called because the mounted Sikhs literally overran the country in their first raids, and each *sowar* took and kept just what he could. By the rule in question, no widows were permitted to succeed; no descendants in the female line were to inherit; but on the failure of male heirs in the direct line, a collateral might succeed, if the common ancestor of the deceased and of the collateral was in possession in the year 1808, when the connexion of the British Government with the cis-Sutlej provinces first commenced. A land of contentions, like all borders and marches, and tenanted by a population requiring gentle measures and most delicate management, the cis-Sutlej, nevertheless, under the able administration of Mr. Edmondstone and Mr. Barnes, made no exception to the general tranquillity and progress of the new Province.

It will be interesting to notice some other points which arose in the settlement of the land revenue. This was made, as has been observed, for various periods; nor could the immense boon of a permanent settlement be extended to a province, of which so little was known, either as to resources or even topography. The Administration had even to deal with occupancy rights of a perfectly novel and unprece-

Other tenures dealt with in settlement—as in Leia.

Chap. XI. dented character. The example of Mozuffurnuggur, in Leia, will illustrate this. The original zemindars of this district, turning to arms under the unsettled governments preceding Sawun Mull, had let their estates out to cultivation. Exacting too much rent, and affording too little protection, they gradually lost their tenants. Sawun Mull, therefore, upon coming to power, had to restore cultivators as well as cultivation; and he did not turn to the zemindar, who was impoverished, but to the Hindoo capitalist, and to the Mooltan agriculturist. Upholding none the less the original owner, he admitted these as permanent tenants, at an assessed and equitable rent, and as the class of "Chukdars." "Chuk" is the wooden frame sunk for the foundation of a well, so that the chukdar was the owner of the well, in distinction to the zemindar, or owner of the land. Whilst the chukdar paid his "lickh" to the owner, he could not be dispossessed. This "lickh" was a portion of the produce, and was heritable, as also the chukdaree;—and the chukdar, unlike the hereditary cultivator of Hindostan, might alienate his field or fields. The extent of land irrigated by the well defined the holding, a not unnatural allotment in a country where produce depends entirely on artificial irrigation. A man, indeed, was not said to own so much land, but so many "kusers" (water-courses), "chuks" (deep wells), and "jhalars"

(Persian wheels). When the chukdar sub-let his holding, he continued to disburse the yearly expenses for the woodwork of the well, by which his right of occupancy stood. Chap. XI.

In Hushtnuggur, again, the allotments were by "bukhras," or parcels of land apportioned to cultivators by nature and locality of soil; the irrigated or rice grounds (sholgurra) being altogether more important than the unirrigated. In Hushtnuggur. From this division by selection a curious custom had arisen: whole villages, as well as individuals, periodically exchanged their holdings. Certain contiguous communities transferred homes as well as land, the inhabitants mutually migrating at the expiration of every five years. Other villages, again, in performing this exchange, removed even the timbers of their dwellings, leaving every homestead unroofed. This curious custom arose among the original military settlers, who intended thereby to equalize the profits of all the villages, as the division into "bukhras" equalized the profits of each member of them. Nothing could be more subversive of good cultivation, but the Sikh Government had blindly encouraged it, because each transfer was accompanied by the presentation of "nuzzurane." Among other primitive rights was that also by which a man first cultivating any land, abandoned by a neighbour's flight, might hold it rent free, or acquire the same fee-simple by leading a

Chap. XI. watercourse into soil previously unirrigated. Assessment by the plough obtained in certain districts; manifestly unfair, like many Sikh arrangements, to the Government and to the peasant. Upon all these varied tenures, and many more, the Lahore Board had to adjudicate, accommodating them to more equitable principles, with careful effort to adopt whatever could be maintained. Eusufzye, the land of wild men and wilful manners, may serve as an example of their success. Pushtoo poetry declares that an Eusufzye Pathan cannot be quiet. "He is your friend for a hundred years, and your enemy in an instant; you think him the rose, and he is of a sudden the thorn;"—yet even the mountain people, by four years of tranquillity and light assessment, were turned to peace. Hill sides were scoured for the booty of nature, instead of neighbour's houses. Substantial cottages replaced the slight huts reared to be abandoned at an attack, and great droves of the beautiful northern cattle were herded under the Swat hills by a Pathan girl, which formerly snatched the scanty herbage under guard of a band of wistful matchlockmen.

Native methods of measurement and survey retained.

Thus retaining, as far as possible, existing arrangements, the Administration did not even disdain to employ native methods of measuring for assessment. In Kangra, for example, Mr. Barnes was content to use the curious instru-

ments and primitive survey indigenous to the sub-Himalayan uplands. The land measurer held a flexible bamboo rod of fifty-two "chhapas," or fists, in length, equivalent to four and three-quarter English yards. With this bamboo (*kân*) the surveyor (*kânbah*) stands at the edge of the field, and, grasping it in both hands, swings it forward to his full reach like an angler's rod, making it touch the earth, which it slightly indents. Walking to the spot thus marked, he repeats the process, till the whole field is estimated, practice enabling him to advance at a steady and uninterrupted pace, and to obtain results singularly correct. In more broken ground the "*kudum*," or double step, was the rude measure in use, and professional walkers (*hândah*) were employed as measurers. To have supplanted these with the more perfect appliances of Western science, would have delayed the settlement necessary to the outset of government. It would be out of place, however, to mention here so slight a point as their temporary retention, except that it illustrates in what a wise spirit of tolerance the Lahore Administration blended the new times and the old.

From their police-stations the Board, as has Education. been seen, developed a postal service adequate to the wants of the country, and their system of settlement, adapted to native habit and put in force by native agency, was contrived to promote

Chap. XI. a practical education among natives. Not only did the village accountants find, under the English rule, a strong necessity for mathematical acquirements, but the zemindars, who had signed acquittances mainly with the sword under Runjeet, had to learn, for their own sakes, to wield the pen. Education, indeed, always held its place among the Sikhs, and shared, as one of their institutions, the astonishing vitality of the Khalsa. A race, whose history could be comprised within an old man's memories, whose dynasty was but a ruler, and whose empire was only for a reign, yet possessed this among other distinctions which nations of slower growth and longer continuance painfully elaborate. The Sikhs, indeed, were not a separate nation in blood or creed, but rather the Puritans of India, whom the strong bond of a common dissent held together and rendered powerful. Like the Puritans, too, their unity had grown up in presence of hot religious and political antagonism, which they had found in the merciless Islamism, first resisted, then overcome, and, in turn, persecuted. From Hindooism, the Sikhs' dissent was but slight, and without bitterness. The Rajpoot, or the Pathan, might take the "*pahul*" with little scruple, and the Brahman was not only respected by a good Sikh, but employed by him as the orthodox ministrant of funeral obsequies and services of purification.

Goroo Govind Singh himself has left an example of this toleration,¹ and his disciples, in following it, have shown what little hindrance a reformed Hinduism might present to a real national development.

It has been observed that the feudal system of the Punjab reflected that of the west, and that the ingenuity of its ruler had anticipated, and the spirit of the people sustained, every tax known to Western finance. In regard to education, also, the new Government found existing a large and consolidated system. In Lahore, about six per cent. of the male population were receiving instruction, when Mr. Montgomery made his inquiry shortly after annexation, and if the proportion be small in comparison with the statistics of Europe, it will seem large for India, and is positively more favourable than the returns of our North-western provinces at the same period. Yet more significative of the liberal genius of the Sikh, female schools were found existing in the Manjha, where Sikh, Hindoo, and Mussulman girls were taught by female teachers of their own creed. At Lahore, the Commissioner reported no less than 111 girl-scholars; at Kussoor, a flourishing seminary of

Its advanced state under Sikh rule.

¹ There existed at Dolbaha a copper-plate, upon which the Goroo had himself scratched, with an arrow-head, an inscription to the effect that "Purohit" Puddia was his spiritual guide, and that he and all his house would follow his teaching.—Vide *Abbott's Report on Hoosheerpore.*

Chap. XI. seventeen girls chattered Gurmukhi, or read the Pushtoo legends of the hill and plain Rajpoots, while their teachers retired coyly behind the purdah, fluttered at the unusual inspection. Female education, the root of all good for Hindostan, is hardly planted there yet by English effort. Yet in the Punjab it had, at our coming, a natural and healthy growth. Is it possible not to speculate on what might have been the future of the Sikh people had Dewan Dena Nath lived, or Kurruck Singh conciliated his support, or Lal Singh kept upon his own side of the Sutlej? But the genius of a greater people was to subdue the Sikh's; his country was to be our border, his schools were to teach English instead of Gurmukhi, and his soldiers to win our battles in China. The Prince who led against us at Goojerat is a wandering visitor while this is written, in the capital of his conquerors, and the last Maharajah of the Khalsa, a Christian of the Christians, knelt but yesterday beside the General who destroyed his throne, to receive with him the "Star of India."

Sikh schools. Sikh education would still be misunderstood, if it were taken to have been anything like what the word conveys to an English ear. The Punjab school-house was the town-shed, or the temple-enclosure, or the shade of a tree; and its pupils were unfettered by class or order, and very free to learn or leave learning alone. They

sate or squatted round the teacher, as all young India sits, chanting in monotone the verses of the Grunth, or tracing on dust-boards, with stick or finger, the forms of purwannas, bonds, mortgages, and letters. To count money is, and must long be, the first and last object of a Hindoo's study. The teacher's pay was as precarious as the pupil's instruction. Sometimes, the community subscribed for his support, contributing so much per plough or bullock-tail to the maintenance of the school. Sometimes a cash payment was made for pupils, but more generally each brought on certain feast days a present of grain or sweetmeats; and each received subsequent attention in proportion to the dimensions of his heap. In the Hindoo schools, writing in Hindi and the rudiments of arithmetic constituted the curriculum. The Mussulman scholars read the Koran in Arabic and Persian, and the Gulistan and Bostan of Saadi, nearly always assembling at the mosque. Books were not frequently found, except with the teacher; being, indeed, unnecessary to the acquisition of the cursive character employed in each language for its all-important calculations. The faculties of the Punjabee were lively, however, and made the best of little. The village accountants to whom Lord Dalhousie's Board confided its first settlement, could hardly be surpassed in intelligence by trained officials of the old provinces, nor would it have been impos-

Chap. XI. sible to find in Lahore blacksmiths and butchers who could have capped maxims in Gurmukhi, or read a "ghuzl" from Hafiz.

Attendance
of cultiva-
tors at Sikh
schools.

Another point of difference between indigenous Sikh education and that existing or implanted elsewhere, was, that the agricultural population, in many parts of the Punjab, chiefly attended schools. In Hindostan, the Brahman has had the sagacity, in losing his priestly ascendancy, to seize upon that which education can confer; and our English schools and colleges are crowded with his caste-fellows. If any other class, as Purbhoos, or Parsees, or Koombis, compete with him for the utilities of learning, they leave to him its distinctions; and for good or ill, education in India is now actually restoring to the deposed Brahmans the dignity and the monopoly of a paramount caste. The Mussulman of Hindostan turns from the textbooks and the teachers of the Kaffir with unconcealed repugnance, and no ryot or soodra, or only very few, pretend to the right of education. But, in the Punjab, the children of the cultivators of the soil filled most of the indigenous schools, and everywhere stood forward daily with Rajpoots and Kayeths for their share of teaching. The Sikh name, in obtaining power by the energy of a liberalized creed, had raised the Jat from a caste to a nation; and thus the occupation, allotted in Hindostan to the lowest caste, became identified

with the dominant order. The Sikh therefore a soldier in war and a cultivator in peace, educating his children by book, and plough, as well as drill-manual, had already solved the problem of castes by blending them.

Lord Dalhousie's legates found time to give attention to this subject, less pressing but not less important than matters of settlement and revenue. With the plant of learning, thus self-sown, they dealt very tenderly. Wherever land had been granted for school-funds in rent-free tenure by the state or by the village, the title-deeds were not too closely scanned. The pundit's patch of corn-land, and the garden outside the mosque, paid nothing to the state, which rather sought indeed to add to these slender endowments of literature. Every effort was made, too, in encouraging and preparing young Punjabees to take office under Government as clerks, &c. Rawul Pindee and Goojerat could soon boast of flourishing British schools, and Hindi, Sanskrit, Arabic, and even the Gurmukhi were neglected for the language of the new lords of the Five Rivers. The native committees were encouraged to apply for teachers, and central schools were established in all the principal towns. That at Umritsur rose at once to importance. Sikhs, Hindoos, and Mussulmans hurried to avail themselves of the means of learning English, and the attendance

Action of the Board regarding education.

Chap. XI.
Docility of
the Punja-
bees.

of the first year was doubled in the third.¹ Punjabee Sirdars, in the same willing spirit, eagerly sought English instruction for their sons, paying beyond its value for the scanty acquisitions in that branch of Calcutta Baboos. In introducing Revenue-office classes, in training the people to better school method and economy, in preparing the way for a comprehensive system of education, the Board found nothing of the opposition, and nothing like the apathy of old provinces. The plastic spirit of the Sikhs, obdurate in nothing so much as courage, had leavened the Punjabees generally with its quality, and once fairly mastered, the Province loyally submitted to serve and learn. "There are less prejudices and elements of hindrance in the Punjab than elsewhere," Mr. Montgomery reported to the Supreme Government—"Sikh fanaticism is dying out, the Hindoos are less superstitious and less priest-ridden, and the Mahommedans less bigotted and less bound by traditional practice than their co-religionists in any part of India." On such ground it was not altogether difficult to lay the levelled foundations for an edifice of good government. The fault must have rested with the rulers, and not entirely with such a people, if the Punjab had not steadily advanced in the path entered upon

¹ In 1854, it numbered 308 scholars :—Hindoos, 107 ; Sikhs, 114 ; Mussulmen, 87.

under its own princes. It is indeed just to confess a combination of favourable circumstances which made the administration of the Punjab a series of successes. There was little to demolish; there were few errors to be repaired; and no ground to be gone over experimentally. In many departments it was necessary only to nurse the things which were actually found existing, or carefully to construct an edifice out of ready-dressed materials. The canvass was white for us, or else the existing picture had only to be re-touched. But, then, to deal with the best manhood of India, we had the best men of the Indian Government, the warmest interest of the Governor-General himself, and a lavish employment of time, labour, and treasure. It was an imperial experiment, imperially conducted, and crowned with an auspicious result which must be divided between the rulers and the ruled. If few Governments can begin with such advantages as that of Lahore, few could boast of having substituted, in the short space of four years and a half, order for anarchy, obedience for irregular impulse, gardens for jungles, plenty for barrenness, peace for war.

CHAPTER XII.

Chap. XII.
Judicious
selection for
Punjab ap-
pointments.

The secret of the almost uniform success of the Lahore Board in its various fields of labour is to be told in a word. The best men attainable had been nominated to the new province. The occasion was too important for favouritism, and when the Marquis of Dalhousie had made the obvious choice of the Lawrences for his proconsuls, he handed over to them the list of lower offices, scarcely stipulating for a name, except that of his agent, Major Mackeson. Neither security nor interest weighed therefore in filling the Punjab appointments. Genius was not relegated to dull routine, nor dulness hoisted to positions of responsibility. The right men were drafted to the right places, and nowhere is that allocation so imperatively called for as in India. There, if anywhere, the manhood of men is a quality indispensable; nor was any greater danger incurred by the change of government, than that it threatened to replace the appointments under the Company by the still more irresponsible nomination of a

minister. From that great peril to the Indian Empire the competitive system delivered it, established as it was in the very crisis of time. To this the country may safely look for men of ability and energy, and if they shall lack the traditional Orientalism of those who inherited service in the East, they will replace it with larger reading and more various cultivation. The Punjab was successfully administered because the Lawrences chose their officers much as a just competitive examination would have selected them. The chiefs were the ablest that could be found, and they had free leave to find subordinate ability, and to employ it in suitablest duties.

Lord Dalhousie's judgment, then, in the construction of his Punjab Government, has been seen to be abundantly justified by the directness and energy of its action. Confining the review to the first five years succeeding annexation, the country has been displayed as passing under the power and the influence of the Supreme Government with the least possible innovations, and the largest possible reforms. Seeking everywhere to reconcile the interest of the Empire and the Province, the action of the Board had reflected the intentions of its founder, and surpassed his expectations.

The principle of selection by absolute merit was again and with equal success asserted in

Chap. XII. the appointment of Colonel Napier to the super-
Colonel intence of the Public Works of the Punjab.
Napier and That officer had already studied the Punjab and
public works. its requirements as Consulting Engineer to the
Resident and the Council of Regency. He had
shared the labours of Sir H. Lawrence, while he
strove to remodel the Sikh kingdom, so that no
one could know better what were its old needs and
new opportunities. An efficient staff was placed
at his orders, and a liberal allowance allotted
to a department second to few in imperial
importance. The ferry funds, amounting to two
lakhs and a-half, were among those assigned for
public works, with a sum of one per cent. from
the land revenue, and such further grant as should
raise the total annual expenditure to five lakhs,
the sanction of the Company being to be obtained.
This allotment was for ordinary improvements;
works of special magnitude were to be specially
provided for, such as the grand military roads
and canals, the construction of which will be
presently noticed. To the civil engineer were
committed not only those departments which
elsewhere engage the whole Board of Works,
but the charge of fences, civil buildings, jails,
public offices, and frontier forts. At a time, too,
when the Lahore Government and its agents,
like the rebuilders of the Temple, had to work
with one hand, and to hold their weapons in the

other, Colonel Napier undertook all these Chap. XII. labours. As no measure issued without passing the mint of the Lawrences' consideration, so no work was put in hand without Napier's own regard, and Lord Dalhousie while he expected such service, himself gave it, working night and day for the new province.

It needed little thought, however, to appreciate the great wants of the Punjab. Its towns asked for lines of intercommunication, its rivers for bridges, and its plains to be watered by irrigation. These were the labours that pressed for earliest completion so soon as the frontier was secured by forts and posts, and the passage of the forces from station to station provided for. On the line of the Derajat Colonel Napier had first to erect the fortresses for the border garrisons. Court-houses, cantonments, treasuries and gaols were also to be established, while conservancy works in the great towns, and sanitary labours at the military cantonments claimed a necessary precedence. The troops first quartered at Anarkullee, a suburb of Lahore, had been decimated by epidemics, and the central station was shifted from Lahore to Meean Meer, and from Wuzeerabad to Sealkote, before the salutary lessons of experience had been duly purchased by suffering. Beside the works mentioned, police-posts and stations, *serais*, and supply-depôts also

The chief physical needs of the Punjab.

Chap. XII. called for construction. The serais were to have encamping ground for troops, and to include a hostelry for travellers, the "thanna," or police office, and the "tehsecl," or taxing office—concentrating all within the same enclosure. The camping grounds along the main roads, in connection with these concentrated stations, were to be marked off with stone pillars. Of these important posts, of masonry wells, and of "burdasht-khanas," or depôts of supply, the indefatigable labours of the Board provided in four years no less than eight hundred. All this occupied the Administration before it could finally lend itself to those works which are national in boldness of execution and greatness of result. These are now to be reviewed—the gifts to the Punjab of a government wise enough to plan them, and strong enough to carry them towards completion in repose.

Lines of communication. Lord Dalhousie's engineers, in creating lines of communication, had to regard three things—the movements of a force of occupation—the direction of external commerce, and the channels of internal traffic. The commanding points of a country in a strategic sense, do not always coincide with its centres of trade, unless where their wealth and importance render their possession a decisive gain or loss. In the Punjab, the main commercial line from Lahore to Peshawur was that upon which it was also expedient

to mass the army of the province. This line Chap. XII. passes through Wuzcerabad, Jhelum, and Rawul Pindee, crossing three doabs and four rivers. Lord Dalhousie himself travelled its course, and accepting it as the chief military base, called for estimates in detail for a permanent work. The engineering difficulties presented were grave and numerous. In the Rechnah Doab, the Bedh and Bagh Bucha rivers had to be bridged; in the Chuj Doab the Kharian defile was to be threaded, and the torrents sweeping down at Bakrala, and Deenah, and Bishundour, to be safely passed. The crest of the range at the first named place had to be cut through, and the Margulla ridge in the Sind Saugor Doab, which resisted Shah Jehan's power and resources, was to be excavated to admit the road. Beyond these lay the Geedur Gully Pass, to be in some way turned, while the Indus could be well approached only by precipitating into the stream with blasting an immense mass of its rocky border. Yet farther on lay the rocky labyrinth of the Peshawur Valley, embarrassing the termination of a road which was still imperatively demanded to open the way to the gate of the Punjab, and to unite it with the seat of Government.

These obstacles were attacked without timidity, the work being divided into sections, and simultaneously taken in hand. The first divi- The great high road.

Chap. XII. sion of fifty-nine miles, carried the road across the low grounds of the Lahore and Goojeranwalla districts, passing the channels of natural drainage and the nullahs by six large bridges, and thirty-one of smaller size. A lattice bridge with three spans of sixty-five feet, lifted the road over the Wuzeerabad stream. In the next division to this, it left Wuzeerabad upon a high and massive embankment, spanning the marsh land into which the Chenab overflows in the rains, and confining the channel of the river, as well as furnishing a certain passage over the inundated fields. From this it traversed the Goojerat plain, and entered the Kharian hills. It had to pass the nullahs and water-ways of the level country by forty-six small, and three large bridges, and to penetrate the defiles under Jhelum, by bold escarpments and deep cuttings in the friable sandstone. This portion from Wuzeerabad to Jhelum measured forty miles. The third division, thirty-seven miles in length, left Jhelum upon a nearly level plain, till it reached by excavation the Bakrala river, and passing it on a bridge of bold construction, pierced a stony ridge of 1,200 feet rising beyond the stream. On this part of the line only, seventeen large bridges, and fifty smaller ones required construction. The Rawul Pindee division of the line carried it from Rhotas in the Bakrala hills to the city of that name. Here

the broken surface of the Sind Saugor Doab is arrived at, and a chain of embankments and cuttings were to prolong the work. The almost impassable Margulla rocks were breached at their assailable point, by blasting the hard limestone—a substance found yet so obstinate, as to resist any but the finest tempered instruments in the process of boring. The line hence approaches the Sohan river and its feeder, the Leh, by stupendous cuttings through their rocky banks, and crosses the larger stream on spans aggregating 1,000 feet. One hundred and eleven minor bridges bear the road forward through this rugged country of sixty miles. The sixth division beginning from the Chablat river, carries the line to Attock, through the remaining portion of the Sind Saugor Doab, crossing the Hurroo stream by a bridge of 300 feet span. The Indus at the day treated of was bridged by boats, but the splendid work which was thus created and well advanced by the Administration of the Marquis of Dalhousie, is now being boldly supplemented by a tunnel under the Indus. When that audacious enterprise is perfected, a traveller may pass in the lightest built London carriage from Calcutta to the Khyber, traversing at his ease the rivers and the mountains, which stopped Alexander, and turned aside Shah Jehan. Descending from Attock beneath the great river, he will shortly

Chap. XII. encounter the Geedur Gullee range, a rocky mass overcome by deep cuttings, and before reaching Akora, forty-five miles from the Chablat, he will cross 130 bridges large and small. The seventh division takes this great road forward to Peshawur, passing through the main valley which drains the Khuttuk hills into the Cabul river. Over this channelled ground nearly 150 bridges required erection. The highway thus completed measures, from Lahore to Peshawur, 264 miles; it passes upon 103 great bridges, and 459 smaller ones, penetrates the heart of six mountainous chains, and crosses on immense embankments the marais of two great rivers. It overcomes every kind of engineering obstacle that shifting soil or iron rock can offer, and the active opposition of sudden seasons and heavy floods. Groves of trees planted simultaneously with its completion, shade its entire surface, and stations are erected along it for the residences of those charged with its repairs. Where the four great rivers are encountered, floating bridges continued the passage, the Chenab and Jhelum being crossed by 100 boats each, the Indus by 55, and the Ravee by 70. In winter a smaller number suffices; in summer, the melting snows of the Himalayas swell the streams into broad and rapid floods. The boats support a double roadway of 26 feet wide, which the heaviest artillery and most ponderous merchan-

dize may pass upon. The work was to bind together all the northern cantonments which lie along the Himalayan uplands, and assure communications with Peshawur, the greatest and most important frontier station of British India. In this regard it stands as one of imperial and not provincial concern. At the same time it set free the commerce of the Punjab, linking the centres of trade, and affording an adit to Hazara, and the territory of Golab Sing. The land traffic, and the export and import trade between Central Asia and India fell into it, as it advanced, like the waters of a pent-up river follow a new channel; and diverged from it along the secondary roads in full and useful streams.

Among the purely military roads drawn across the country, that from Lahore to the Beas crossing the Baree Doab was first completed; another from Umritsur to the new cantonment of Sealkote passed the Ravee through an open and important country, and struck the main line at Wuzeerabad. Other highways linked Lahore to Mooltan, to Ferozepoor, and to Umritsur, connecting the capital with the Delhi highway. This last line passed the valley of the Ravee upon a high and massive embankment, and crossed the stream under the Lahore wall by an ingenious lattice bridge. On the trans-Indus frontier a road was constructed from link to link of the long chain of forts which

Chap. XII.

Military roads.

Chap. XII. were built to keep the Derajat, and the rugged highlands between Attock and Kalabagh were also pierced by a line which served to connect the outposts with these northern stations. Rawul Pindee was opened from Kohat by Khooshalglur, and Kohat was joined to the salt-mines at Bahador Kheyl, and thence to Bunnoo by works of high strategetical value. The expense of these achievements was great, but not in proportion to their advantages and return, for the net-work of branch roads which completed the military lines opened the provinces to trade, while they ensured its protection.

Comparison
of old and
new lines.

These were primary lines of occupation necessary to the government of the province. But to estimate Lord Dalhousie's further labours, and to justify his expenditure upon new channels of commerce, it is requisite to follow on the map the old tracks. The Punjab, which was the campaigning ground of all invaders, was also, from old time, the thoroughfare of the Affghan and Cashmeree merchant; so that silks and silver for the north-west, and shawls for Bombay and Scinde, have ever traversed it. Ghuznee and Delhi were the sister capitals of the old Mahommedan empire, and their trade survived the dynasty which founded it. The caravans between these two cities followed a most circuitous and difficult route, describing the two sides of an immense triangle,

whose base was the direct line between them. Chap. XII. Emerging from the Suliman range at Kalabagh they toiled down from Dera Ismail Khan to Mooltan through a dangerous people and barren country. Thence, driven to follow the rivers for a supply of water, they kept the bank of the Ravee or the Sutlej. The first would lead them to Lahore, whence it would yet remain to cross the Manjha for Ferozepore. The Sutlej would conduct the kafila directly thither, but only after payment of heavy and vexatious dues to the native authorities of Bhawalpore. The trade was vigorous that could flourish in spite of such difficulties, where, besides onerous tolls, the merchant had not only to defend his camels with sword and matchlock, but to find grass and water for them by painful circuits. New lines were quickly exploited to assist this important traffic. One joined Dera Ismail Khan with Lahore by Shahpoor and Sheikhopoor, the other passed from the same commercial outpost to Jhung, at the confluence of the Jhelum and Chenab, and thence across the Baree Doab to Ubohur to strike the Delhi high road. Along these highways wells were dug and groves planted, since without water and shade the crowded kafilas cannot pass along. A choice of easy routes was thus offered to the Affghan trader, and no man could question the benefit of the labour, except, perhaps,

Chap. XII. the robbers of the Indus valley, and the greedy kardars of the Bhawalpoor customs.

Other works
of intercom-
munication.

Mooltan, which Sawun Mull had made his well-stored warehouse, became, by English occupation, the southern metropolis of the Punjab. Steamers, placed upon the Indus and plying occasionally to and from its walls, added to its importance as a commercial centre. It was, besides bound with land approaches to Jhelum by a road upon the river of that name, and with Wuzcerabad along the Chenab. Other roads joined it with Bhawalpore, and the ferries on the Sutlej and Ravee. Besides these leading lines for traffic, the great salt mines were rendered easy of access from Jhelum, Ramnuggur, and Sealkote; and a broad path continued up to the Sanatarium on the Murree Hills the road from Rawul Pindee. On the works of other districts it will not be necessary to pause. Many of the roads in each doab intersected the drainage of a country which becomes a waste of rushing waters in certain seasons: all of them were cut in the presence of local or special obstructions. They were completed by imported labour, and on ground where energy had to learn a new science by many failures. They traversed wildernesses, which contribute nothing to their own redemption; and crossed rivers never passed before, except by the tedious voyages of a flat, or the herdsman's inflated skin, or the netfull of

gourds, on which the hurkaru swims them. Chap. XII.
Runjeet Singh, indeed, with his grand capacity for rule, had seen the need of the country, and had launched boats upon its rivers, and endeavoured to bridge them; but the crafts were ill-built and the cordage weak. The floating bridges established by Lord Dalhousie's engineers, afforded a secure road in the winter, and a fleet of ferry vessels, supplying their place during the floods, preserved a constant communication. In five years there had been opened from point to point, metalled for floods, as well as for fair weather, and completed by a net of cross-roads and by-ways, this grand Punjab highway. The Commissioner, reviewing the achievements of his government in 1854, could report that not less than 3,600 miles of road had been altogether constructed; 7,880 surveyed; and 3,324 traced in the Punjab proper, since the annexation. This great result was not arrived at without the expenditure of four millions and a half¹ of rupees, a sum yet inadequate to have produced it without earnest interest on the part of the Supreme Government, and close devotion from its subordinates. The names of a noble Roman house, and of a generous Emperor, live in the maps of Italy, in connection with the Appian and Aurelian roads: and the Punjab peasant, passing on Dalhousie's highway, resting under

¹ 4,699,727r. 5a. 5p.

Chap. XII. his trees, and drinking water from his wells, pronounces the best, because the most artless, eulogium on his labours.

Works in the
cis- and trans-
Sutlej.

These imperial tasks were consummated in the Punjab proper; it is due to set beside them those completed by Lord Dalhousie for the cis- and trans-Sutlej states. Here the local committees conducted operations, defraying them from local funds. In the Julundhur district, 200 miles of road were finished, comprising one from the Sutlej to the Beas, and another, connecting the city of that name with Hoosheyarpore. The beautiful native bridge which crosses the Jamsha river was restored. In Hoosheyarpore district, nearly 500 miles of road and many enduring works of masonry were the peaceful trophies of British occupation. A line to Kangra and the hill station of Dhurmsala especially commemorates the engineers' skill, following the exact apex of the water shed with nice judgment. Major Abbott—brother of him whose prescience had foreseen the Sikh outbreak, and who was the one successful defender of the frontier—rivalled his courageous kinsman in peaceful works, and raised the district to an admirable development. In the rocky heart of the Kangra hills not less than 520 miles of road were cut and carried by bridges over the sub-Himalayan torrents. Where the solid conglomerate of the range was in no way evitable broad and lengthy

tunnels were blasted through it. On the Koolloo table lands, by which the traffic of Thibet comes and goes, 200 miles of road and bush-path abbreviated the laborious passage of the mountain-snows. Chap. XII.

The cis-Sutlej States constitute a great sandy plain between the Sutlej and the Jumna, through which the Himalayan torrents descend parallel with the great rivers. The country is thus everywhere intersected, and its roads had to be drawn at great expense in masonry work to avoid the driving sand-clouds, which cover the face of the province, and choke its water ways. In the period to which the review of these labours has been confined, and upon which Lord Dalhousie's legates presented the first account of their stewardship, some 300 miles of road had rendered the cis-Sutlej sand-wastes passable, in any weather, for troops and for merchants.

In the large and liberal scheme constructed by the Governor-General for the irrigation of the Punjab, he did no more than follow the indications of the soil, and the example of its former rulers. It is more possible to misinterpret the parched lips of the traveller dying with thirst, than to be blind to the eager drought with which Eastern fields seem to ask for water. Wherever irrigation exists, a mass of free and grateful foliage exhibits the fertility of the soil, and a Irrigation of
the Punjab.

Chap. XII. tender line of green lies along the course of every little streamlet from the well or the water-wheel. Elsewhere, the plain gleams yellow and bare—a desert in aspect, but, in capability, a garden. Watered by five splendid streams, and bounded on two sides by hills that drink the clouds, the Punjab should be the Lombardy of India for fertility. The general surface of the province slopes southward in a regular and sufficient gradient, down which canals are easily conducted. Ancient dynasties had observed the capacities of the land, and begun the work which Lord Dalhousie succeeded to finish. Almost all the previous rulers, indeed, of the Punjab had done something for irrigation, and nearly every district could show existing canals, or the ruins of old water-courses. About Wuzeerabad and Sealkote, the ruins were the most plentiful; but towards the west, the country was intersected by works of irrigation in complete or partial use. Among these, was the Khurwal canal, a loop passing from Ferozepore through the Gojaira district, and back to the Sutlej—the gift of Shah Jehan to the lower Baree Doab. In the Khangurh district 341 miles of waterway existed, while the Mooltan canals were justly famous, and had enriched their Pathan constructors and the house of Sawun Mull. Among their number, the Dewannah, Indarwah, and Mohammedwah were each navigable for boats,

and the Wally Mahommed, forty-three miles long, admitted them also to Mooltan from the Chenab. Upon the efficiency of these works the fertility of this portion of the Punjab depended. Colonel Napier's proposal to adopt the traditional system for their clearance and repair, was sanctioned by Government, as agreeing with its universal policy. Accordingly the zemindars had to take the work in hand, superintended by the revenue officers. To this end, the Punchayets of the landowners were assembled to assess for each village of the district the number of "cheers," or labourers, it should furnish to the task. These, or a money commutation, were called for, and the skill of the European engineers was usefully invoked to design new canal-heads, and to reconstruct the old banks and beds on scientific principles. No water-rate was taken, or very rarely; the increased cultivation amply repaying the State. In districts where the advantages of irrigation were known, the branch canals could be left to the local agriculturists, who gladly availed themselves of assistance or direction. Occasionally, the Government granted loans for improvement and repairs on the security of the land—an example set by the Government of Runjeet Singh. Thus during the year of drought a proclamation notified that any proprietors might accept a loan from the State to construct a well or canal, and would not

Chap. XII. be taxed in excess. Many villages adjoining the dry central wastes took advantage of this offer, and were thus saved from depopulation. The profits resulting from these enterprises were so general, that, although advanced in the poorest districts, the loans were, in all cases, recovered: the landholders, regarding the debt as one of honour, and strenuously labouring to discharge it. The Dutch system of Government loans, described by Mr. Money in his work upon Java, was anticipated in its best features by the policy here described. If greater results followed the bolder policy of Holland, they were obtained by a coercion, which endangers the security of Government, and which must ever be foreign to the spirit of a British Administration.

Ancient
irrigatory
works.

These arrangements restored the canals of the West to a state of efficiency never even known under Sawun Mull. The waters of the Sursooty and Guggur were also re-directed upon the land. These streams are declared by Brahman tradition to enclose the tract first settled in by Aryans; though, indeed, the Guggur must first be identified with the Drishadwati of Manu, to establish a point so interesting. But of all the ancient water-ways inspected or repaired by the British Government, none was more remarkable than the canal of Huslee, known as the Shah-i-nahr, or "royal stream." The emperor,

Shah Jehan dug it in 1663, a work of pure caprice and luxury, to supply the fountains and water artifices in his palace gardens at Lahore. Like other selfish autocrats of the East, who ordained a city or diverted a river to suit the whim of a day or needs of a hunting excursion,¹ the Mogul contemplated no act of philanthropy in the enterprise. It was enough for his splendid selfishness that the fountains of his terraces would sparkle more brightly for the purer water. With this view, he cut a channel of 110 miles from the Ravee, where it breaks out of the hills, to the royal city. The Huslee canal fertilized no desert, reclaimed no waste, gave birth to no new village. It followed the low levels, already sufficiently watered, and altogether shunned the "Bar," which might have invited and repaid an emperor's engineering. It has been observed that wherever water flows upon the rich soil of the Punjab, trees and bright verdure follow it like the trailing robe of a Naiad, and the Huslee canal did not fail to enrich its immediate banks, and beautify the landscape. The Sikhs, too, borrowed from its waters for the sacred tank at Umritsur, but Shah Jehan designed it for his own luxury only, and drew it to his palace by the readiest road. Immediately upon the treaty of Bhyrowal, Colonel Napier

¹ Thus one of the Jumna canals was excavated for the sole use of the palace at Delhi.

Chap. XII. had instituted a survey, under Lord Hardinge's order, of this imperial plaything. The Mooltan insurrection broke off his examination, but it had sufficiently shown the unfitness of the canal as a main line in any large system of drainage for the Doab. No part of the Punjab so much demanded, and would so much repay, such a system as the Manjha, where the ruins of canals and aqueducts, and of spacious cities beside them, plainly demonstrated what the land had been, and what it might again become.

The great
Baree Doab
canal.

Accordingly, upon annexation, when the Marquis of Dalhousie visited the Doab in person, he sanctioned the design of the chief engineer for a grand central canal, with three branches passing through the largest diameter of the Doab. While the Huslee canal was cleared and widened for temporary services, the execution of its great successor was busily taken in hand. It was to tap the Ravee river at the rocky gate by which it leaves the lowest rim of the Himalayas, and to traverse the heart of the Manjha, passing Deenanuggur, Buttala, and Umritsur. Then, striking through the wild plains of the lower Doab, it was to fertilize barren fields, and to redeem from jackals a hundred ruined cities and villages. Above Mooltan it was again to meet the Ravee, returning its well-employed waters to the parent channel. History, which lingers over war, the coarse

logic of politics, the rude but ordained method of man's first advancement, may pause without shame to regard these large labours of peace, which nobly struggle to set free the powers of nature, and to make rice-grounds and cane-fields of her empty deserts.

The central line, as laid down by Colonel Napier, was 247 miles in length. Its left was to leave the upper Ravee at Madoopoor by cuttings through high ground; cross two of the wild and wide hill torrents; and then strike away for the table lands near Goolpoor. At the thirteenth mile, not far from Goordaspore, it gives off a branch, fertilizing the sandiest fields of the Doab, those namely about Kussoor. From this branch issues a branchlet to the eastward, running parallel with the Beas, and past its confluence with the Sutlej, till it reaches that river, close to the battle-field of Sobraon—an honourable trophy of the victory. The main line, meanwhile, has flowed along for twenty-five miles, watering the country north of Botallo. A few koss to the westward of that place, a branch to Lahore is given off, passing north of Umritsur, and south of the capital, irrigating the circumjacent Sikh country. After a course of seventy-four miles, this branch strikes the Oudyara Nulla, near Manga, and falls through it into the Ravee river. Returning to the main channel, it skirts Umritsur in its onward

Chap. XII. course, and passes along the spine of the Doab to Satghurrah, through a country at present blank upon the map, but destined to spring into population and activity. At Tolumbah, it has accomplished its trajet, and terminates in the Ravee, not long before that river joins the Chenab. Adding to the main line of 247 miles, the Kussoor, Sobraon, and Lahore branches, the entire length of Lord Dalhousie's gift to the Punjab—the famous Baree Doab canal—will be reckoned at 466 miles.

Supply of
water to the
canal.

The engineers of this grand design proposed to supply from the canal head a volume of 3,000 cubic feet of water per second. To ensure this during the winter months, nearly all the waters of the Ravee must be drained off, and its bed left dry. Of these 3,000 feet, the Kussoor and Sobraon branches would subtract 1,000, and the Lahore 500; the other 1,500 remained for the lower Doab. The Ravee, thus cut off at its source, does not cease to flow in its lower channel. Its feeders remain to supply it, the Lahore branch returns to it, and the spring thaw of the Himalaya snow, as well as the summer rains, send down a vast flood, much of which is not intercepted by the canal-head. Against an excess of water, escapes and outlets were provided, and it was to be made possible to supply an additional 1,000 feet per second during nine months of the year, if agriculture

and navigation demanded it. The Doab slopes rapidly down from the mountains; and the steep gradients of the line thus rendered necessary were to be met by nineteen masonry falls, and near the canal head, by "boulder rapids." Throughout its length the channel was made navigable. At its head a width was taken of 120 feet, with a depth of five-and-a-half feet of water; near the Lahore branch it lessens to sixty-five in width, and four-and-a-half in depth. From this point to the Ravee it diminishes to a water-way of sixteen feet, with a depth of two, which is that of the Ravee itself at its lowest. Thus all country flats navigating the river, can pass up the canal to the northern end of the Doab. At the masonry falls, locks were constructed, and boats could haul over the "boulder-rapids." On the banks of the work and its branches, a wide space was taken up for the planting of trees, by the Governor-General's special desire. At the over-falls and rapids, corn-mills and presses for cane and oil-seeds, were encouraged, some of which have become the centres of a little population. This is but an outline of the task as Colonel Napier conceived, and Lord Dalhousie sanctioned, it—nothing less, indeed, than the creation of a new and important river. It remains to notice how large a portion the designers were enabled to complete.

Chap. XII.
Engineering
difficulties.

The obstacles upon the upper thirty miles were first attacked. When the Commissioners reported in 1855, the deep cutting to the canal-head had been already dug in the shingle. The channel had been excavated for fifty-seven miles of the main line, and twenty-three of the Kussoor branch; but upon these eighty miles occur all the great labours of the engineer. Not less than 240 million cubic feet of earth had been removed from this portion. At the two torrents which cross the course of the canal, the most arduous labours had been successfully carried through. One, the Chukkee, descends with desperate impetuosity from the Pathankote hills, and runs by a branch stream into the Ravee. Across this and its feeder, the Nurwa, it was requisite to carry the canal. Colonel Napier's engineers first diverted the Nurwa, into the Chukkee, by a deep cutting, using its dry bed for the passage of the canal, and then stemmed the swollen Chukkee by a solid dam of masonry, turning it aside from the Ravee into its Beas branch. The flood of 1852 breached the new embankment and flowed through it; but the next year found it strong enough to resist, and another enabled it to despise the assaults of the seasons. The work was aided by a bold stroke of engineering, known as the Dhango cut. The Chukkee, winding round a long spine of hills, took from

their projection a strong bias towards the Ravee rather than the Beas. To furnish the desired inclination, a broad dyke was made through the protruding spur. The masonry falls and boulder rapids were also completed, and the escapes, with their massive revetments of masonry. Along the banks of this canal, and leading from it, 300 miles of road were made, and more than 50,000 trees planted upon them. Sheds were raised, where the engineering corps worked up their own iron and sawed their own timber. For so much progress up to May, 1854, two million¹ rupees had been expended, including the pay of Colonel Napier's establishment; and the superintendent anticipated, with good reason, that the canal would open by 1857. Subsequent events falsified the prediction, but enough had been effected by Lord Dalhousie's government before it ended, to make the work his own, and what remained of it an easy task for his successor.

The cost for all these great enterprises,² by

¹ 20,56,806r. 3a. 5p.

General expenditure of the department.

² Nature of Expenditure.	Up to 30th April, 1852, as per Board's Report.	During 1852-53.	During 1853-54.	Total up to 30th April, 1854.
Roads and Bridges .	801416 1 6	1365695 7 5	2532615 12 6	4699727 5 5
Canals	684267 0 3	858394 2 4	1328805 11 2	2871466 13 9
Civil Edifices and general Public Works	348991 2 0	387614 3 6	469729 11 1	1206335 0 7
Military Buildings and Frontier Works	112933 2 9	148951 3 9	316333 8 10	578217 14 4
Total	1947607 5 6	2760635 1 0	4647384 11 7	9355747 2 1

Chap. XII. which the Punjab rose to be the model province of India, must not be vulgarly estimated. The practical genius of the Saxon refuses, indeed, to set show against expenditure, and demands a hard audit from works of peace as well as war. Nor will the balance-sheets of the Punjab fail to bear a rigid scrutiny. But the real profits of Lord Dalhousie's wise liberality commenced long after his outlay: the Supreme Government lavishly expended upon the present, confident of golden returns in the future. It is such enterprise, bold but never rash, which should mark our rule of India, where British authority must be accepted by a prosperous people, and not feared by a weak one, if it is to stand. It will not do to be narrow in administering the first imperial appanage of the world. India can bear, besides, the charges of an active and enterprising government, and raise her children to a high grade in the social scale by her own resources, if these be but wistfully developed. The entire land is a gold mine, where they work well who sink the deepest shafts and excavate the boldest galleries.

Revenue of
the province. If, indeed, the acquisition of the Punjab had been costly to the State, instead of adding surpluses to its Exchequer, late events would have sufficiently demonstrated the economy of its annexation. That province, which was formerly the danger of Northern India, and a neutral

ground into which fierce and exulting enemies were ever threatening to descend, became, in 1857, the defence of the empire, and a base of operations for overthrow of the Mogul rebellion. The policy which made this possible, and pushed the frontier line of British India to its geographical place, need not be scrutinized like a trader's bill. Some, indeed, discerning in the Indian deficit a worse enemy than the traitorous sepoy, have traced to this source among others the extent and origin of it. An able historian of India, from premises not illuminated by after events, has thus concluded unfavourably for Punjab administrators. But the sum by which the Punjab, however administered, could have diminished or swelled an Indian debt, was nothing to its political importance. And if the true cause of that debt be sought, it is to be found in the disastrous madness of the Affghan war, the fountain of so many bitter waters. Till that most fatal enterprise the revenue of India was never seriously compromised; since then, it has never been in equilibrium. We are too easy at forgiving and praising. We make a financial hero of the man who discovers the obvious fact that India at peace is ever richer than her expenditure, and we condone, as light offenders, the incapable politicians who well-nigh ruined the greatest power on earth, and did their worst to cripple the wealthiest dependency of it.

The extent of return to labour and outlay in the

Chap. XII. provinces of the Five Rivers varies, as we include the old possessions of the cis- and trans-Sutlej States with that Punjab proper which the Marquis of Dalhousie annexed; but it may be maintained that, both severally and together, these countries contributed largely to the imperial revenue, and were, in this plain sense, profitable. The older provinces of the Punjab shared the energies of the new Government, and their resulting prosperity must be set to its credit; as much as the transformation of Runjeet Singh's wild deserts to a quiet and thriving country-side. The revenue of the Punjab for the first two years following our annexation was swelled by confiscated jagheers and abrupt retrenchments, and stood very high. In 1849-50 the province produced 134 lacs, and consumed 82; in 1850-51, its revenue stood at 151 lacs, and showed a surplus of 64. The total available surplus that year of the whole territory under the Board, from the Khyber to the Bhuttiana frontier, was not less than 80 lacs of Company's rupees. However, the realization of arrears, and the sale of Royal property at Lahore, contributed to these results, and made them exceptional. The Commissioners, nevertheless, announced that they estimated the regular revenue at 134 lacs against an average expenditure of 112 lacs. This calculation was justified by the first normal year of finance, for, in 1851-52, the land-tax stood at 152 lakhs, 100 of which were derived from the new terri-

tory; and this was in the face of the distress arising from over-production of cereals. The salt trade had flourished by improvement of the mines and better conveyance, while tribute from feudatories in the cis-Sutlej States, postal receipts, and miscellaneous income, swelled the totals accruing from the Punjab for 1851-52, to 212 lacs, 148 being derived from the Punjab proper. Against this, the expenditure stood at $141\frac{1}{2}$ lacs, leaving a surplus of more than 70 lacs, of which 36 were due to the new provinces. Thus, for the three years following upon annexation, the Punjab yielded the large annual surpluses of 52, 64, and 70 lacs; the result especially favouring the acquired territories. Yet further to enrich the comparison of prediction and fulfilment, it remains to adduce the financial result of the fourth year. In 1852-53, the land-tax fell by liberal remissions, but regained dimension from lapsed jagheers. The excise and stamps rose with an advancing traffic, and the salt trade reached its equilibrium, yielding $17\frac{1}{2}$ lacs. But with consolidated order, the miscellaneous receipts due to sale of confiscated estates decreased, and the total receipts came slightly short of 200 lacs. While the revenue had thus declined, the expenditure advanced somewhat on that of the previous year, being swelled by the active prosecution of the works we have reviewed. 146 lacs disbursed, left a surplus of 54 lacs, the Punjab proper contributing $17\frac{1}{2}$. The first report of

Chap. XII. the Board had promised an annual income of 134 lacs, and although constant reductions were made in settlements, amounting, between 1852 to 1857, to $23\frac{1}{2}$ lacs, yet the Punjab met the storm of that year with a revenue collected from a quiet and consenting people of 205 lacs, and the surplus for the whole Punjab, diminished, of course, by constantly extended works and establishments, was $28\frac{1}{2}$ lacs. In 1856-57, the public work expenditure which, since annexation, had stood at 12 per cent. of the entire revenue, reached 16 per cent. The last report upon Lord Dalhousie's imperial acquisition had, therefore, the right to say, that these "territories have been shown during successive years to have yielded a not inconsiderable surplus," a surplus indeed only not considerable, because diminished by the "liberal expenditure" which Government had devoted to public works.

The annalist must consent to these dry details of a background which gives his picture its full effect. But it would suffice, as has been said, for a defence of the acquisition of the Punjab on economical grounds, to recall the days of the mutiny so lately passed, when Lawrence from Lahore, not then ten years British, held Northern India.¹ But the Punjab paid—the problem of a Government prosperous by a prospering people was actually worked out. It is quite true that the financial synopsis given makes no account of mili-

¹ He sent twenty lacs of rupees in coin to the siege of Delhi.

tary expense, and that a vast force has been always concentrated in the Five Rivers. But this advanced guard of the Indian army has but changed its posts from the Sutlej to the Indus, thereby securing a natural frontier. Neither the pay of the Punjab regulars, nor the expenditure for their housing and quarters, can be admitted to disturb the above conclusions. Lord Dalhousie has left extant the defence which covers this point. His minutes urge convincingly, that the claim to charge the expense of the 50,000 men stationed beyond the Sutlej upon the revenue of the Five Rivers, is not reconcileable with reason. It is indeed but a question of guarding the Suliman and Khyber, in place of Sutlej and Beas. The Calcutta Baboo's shop is protected by the Punjab army as much as the store of the Lahore shawl dealer, and contributes fairly together with it to what is an imperial charge, as much as the great Trunk Road, or the main Electric Line. The increase of the army by two Queen's regiments and 15,000 Sepoys, was not an increment either, but rather a restitution. Lord Hardinge had a little discounted the future for the present, when he reduced the forces at his departure so near the point of safety. Circumstances have set it in record, that in 1848, at the outbreak of the second Sikh war, the European force in India was insufficient to maintain the empire in real security. In proof of this, after the battle of Chillianwalla,

Chap. XII.
The Punjab
army not
justly
charged on
the province.

Chap. XII. Fort William was only held by the wing of a regiment from Madras; and from the Jumna to Burmah, and from Himalaya to the edge of the Deccan, there were but two battalions of English troops.

CHAPTER XIII.

To report upon the issues of all these measures; to summarise, as Chief Commissioner, the result of the Administration of the Board, fell to the pen of Sir John Lawrence. Under his hand, and those of his colleagues, with the constant solicitude of the Governor-General and the faithful labour of the subordinate services, the Punjab of Runjeet Singh was grown into the Punjab of the British. That change, auspicious for the province, did not have place without the disappearance of many institutions familiar to the reader of these pages. The feudal nobility of Runjeet decayed, in the nature of things, as the people prospered. Their gaudy retinues and gilded howdahs disappeared from durbar and bazaar as the "ruths" and trading-carts of the industrious increased in number. Their country-seats and hunting-palaces fell to disuse, and their long list of retainers dwindled to the attendance consonant with retirement and simple life. But like the soldiers whom they had led to battle, their generous and plastic genius accommodated them to the inevitable change. Their sons, throughout the land, took service under the English Government,

Chap. XIII.
Report of the
Chief Com-
missioner.

Changed
aspect of the
Punjab.

Chap. XIII. and sought the education which English schools afforded; so that the class which supported the throne of the Maharajah Runjeet still stands nearest to the supreme authority. Even the priestly houses of the Sikhs accepted the equal and benevolent rule. Their shrines at Dera Nanuk, Umritsur, Purun Tarun, and Anandpoor, were respected by the British long after the community itself began to disregard them. The Sikh faith and ecclesiastical polity are surely following the way of the Sikh political ascendancy. There were two elements in the old Khalsa, made up as it was of the followers of Nanuk, the first Sikh prophet, and of those who held to Gooroo Govind, the second great religious leader. The first were inferior in number but zealous in faith; the last were of later and less profound convictions. These were the "Singhs," or Lions, who embraced the Grunth because the sword lay within its leaves, and became converts to a religion which had war for its profession and plunder for its promises. With the disappearance of the Khalsa prestige, these votaries have fallen off; they joined in hundreds, and have deserted in thousands. The ranks of Hindooism receive them again, and their children will never drink the "pahul" at Umritsur. Only the disciples of Nanuk still perpetuate in the Five Rivers the memory of a faith which was the Islam of Hindooism.

Away from cities the transformations of social life were all in favour of the people. The undue

influence of the "Chowdries" and "head men" Chap. XIII. was circumscribed, while village rights and tenures were everywhere established. The regular money-assessment, working harshly at first, put an end to arbitrary valuations, and raised the value of land to a point unknown before. The ryots, the artisans, the day-labourers, and mechanics became better off than ever. Indeed, for its plentiful food and sure occupation, the Punjab was spoken of in all parts of Hindostan, and attracted a large immigration. Among the commercial classes certain sections, truly, were losers, and the ornamental manufactures, fashionable in Runjeet's time, fell out of favour. But the great trade of India and Central Asia grew immensely; larger caravans than ever brought gun and wool, raw silk and mountain fruits, drugs, leather, and horses from beyond the Khyber. Wool and iron came down by longer lines of porters from the Himalaya; shawls and blankets, and the beautiful "pushm" cloths flowed in from Cashmere. The Punjab cities shared this alternation of prosperity; for while Wuzeerabad, Jullundhur, Loodiana, Buttala, and Lahore declined, Umritsur, Peshawur, and Mooltan rose in prosperity, and Sealkote, Jhelum, and Rawul Pindee increased from jungle villages to country capitals. In short, as the pen has recorded what the generous heart and able hand helped to devise and effect, "while the remnants of a by-gone aristocracy are passing from the scene, not with preci-

Chap. XIII. pitate ruin, but in a gradual and mitigated decline ; on the other hand, the hardy yeoman, the strong-handed peasant, the thrifty trader, the enterprising capitalist, are rising up in robust prosperity to be the durable and reliable bulwarks of the power which protects and befriends them. Among all classes there has supervened a greater regard for vested right, for ancestral property, for established principle. There is an improved social morality ; many barbarous customs are being eradicated ; and the position of the female sex is better secured and respected. Among all ranks there is a thirst for knowledge and an admiration for the achievements of practical science. But, irrespective of the framework of society, the external face of the country is rapidly changing, from the advance of vast public works both for communication and irrigation ; and if the old palatial residences are decaying, on the other hand fine cantonments are everywhere springing up, and the public buildings, both civil and military, as regards size and architecture, are not surpassed at any stations of Upper India. The alteration is apparent in town no less than in country. The aspect of the streets is less gay and brilliant than before ; but the improvements in drainage, in pavements, in the laying out of bazaars, would prove to the commonest observer that an era of solid comfort and sanitary cleanliness had commenced.”

“The administrative operations undertaken in

the Punjab have, in a great measure, been designed Chap. XIII.
by the light of experience in older provinces. The frontier of the Punjab was perhaps the most difficult in the empire to defend. In the force and vigour of its police, in the simplicity and precision of its civil justice, and in the popularity of its municipal arrangements, it may challenge a comparison with any province in India. In other respects the crusade against dacoity, the suppression of Thuggee, the movement against infanticide, the tracking of criminals, the management and economy and salubrity of the gaols, the productive results of prison labour, the elaboration of the revenue system, the field measurement, the training of village accountants, the registration of rights, the interior professional survey, the census of the population, the preparation of statistics, the construction of roads bridges and viaducts in the face of physical difficulties, the excavation of canals, the arrangements for the great highways, the erection of caravanserais and supply depôts, the founding of dispensaries, the promulgation of educational schemes, the improvement of the breed of cattle, the planting of trees, the pursuit of agricultural science, the geological researches, and the supervision of finance, may have had their prototypes elsewhere and at other times, but a greater range and variety of improvement than that happily effected in the Punjab during five years can hardly be pointed out."

It did not seem desirable to scrutinize to the last

Chap. XIII.
The Admin-
istrators of
the Punjab.

rupee the expenses of an Administration so productive of results beyond price, and one, too, which has testified to itself by a rescued empire. Nor shall these pages scan too narrowly the exact share borne by each member of this notable Government, where all did faithfully and to the limit of their gifts. Life in the Punjab was no bed of roses during the years which have been enumerated. These consuls of a province, great and important as any kingly appanage, lodged, and fed, and lived in nothing like curule state. Rough fare, ill shelter, and a climate trying beyond measure to the Northern habit, made their labours arduous. But since these were equally shared by men who bore the lion's part of care and responsibility, it is just to mention them, in passing over others who deserve the historian's record less in degree rather than desert. To Sir Henry Lawrence and to Sir John Lawrence, this piece of admirable Government is in the first place due; and they themselves have named, as partners of their credit, the Judicial Commissioner, Mr. Montgomery, Sir Herbert Edwards and Major Lake, and Mr. Edmonstone and Mr. M'Leod, the Financial Commissioners. After these, the list of able and devoted officers would be too numerous for our narrow pages, or the names of the faithful English and Native labourers who worked in this fair and fruitful vineyard might enrich them.

It must be repeated, that in contemplating this

triumph of law and order, no reservation need be made as with those who watch to see if the end approves the effort. A great and terrible trial has tried the Administration with the trial of fire, and proved it sterling. How the Punjab behaved in 1857: how, cut off from friends and with a hostile frontier to watch, the soldier-civilian never bated a jot of hope or confidence, but called into existence the arms of the newly annexed province to redress the balance of things, and to reconquer the old: at what self-sacrifice, by what unparalleled exertions, and with what consummate foresight mutineers were disarmed, chiefs conciliated, loans raised, and the kingdom denuded of troops in order to secure the one object of paramount importance, the recapture of Delhi—is a tale familiar to every British ear. In the presence of facts so patent and of a triumph so conspicuous, the annexation of the Punjab finds one obvious apology by its administration. The country which threatened us became the beacon of our hope:—our worst enemies were made our staunchest friends. Was it owing to anything but the compact, complete, and thorough-going administration introduced in the eight years previous, that we found the population on our side, the remnant of the Khalsa faithful, and the whole resources of the province, the stores of its magazines, its cannon, its treasure, and its troops, available for an enterprise which might have seemed desperate except to men who could not spell the word despair?

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The Administration, an apology for the annexation.

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Personal
share of the
Marquis of
Dalhousie in
the Adminis-
tration.

Nor is it simply etiquette in the annalist to place Lord Dalhousie in the first rank of those who did this for their country and for India. No project started without the impress of his hand; he sat in permanence at the Board which he had so wisely constituted. In the years which occupy this portion of the present work, the mind of the Marquis was almost exclusively occupied with the settlement of the country which he had acquired. It was familiarly said at Lahore, that he wrote "sixty minutes to the hour," and the Board best knew his continuous application, his marvellous faculty of despatch, his fertility of invention, his rapidity of conception, and his firm persistence in a predetermined plan. A Governor-General of India is the final referee for every detail large and little of that vast empire. From a sea-wall in the Soonderbunds to a plunge-bath at Peshawur, every matter refers to him. Yet in all this press of formal business, Lord Dalhousie found time for constant and minute attention to his Five Rivers. He was well rewarded: we have performed our task ill, if we have not impressed our readers with gratitude and admiration for the work with which the Marquis confronted his accusers. Not too confident were the predictions of an able writer who could not know how quickly certain of his words would find verification:

"It may be, in the fulness of time, when Britain has well played her part, some Hindu Constantine,

indebted to the island in the German Ocean for an improved social system, a reformed polity, and a purer faith, shall re-construct, on a broader and more durable basis, the shattered fabric of the Empire of Akbar. Or, perhaps, in some remote generation, the delegates of happy and populous provinces, from the plains of Bengal, the hills of the eastern frontier, the sands of Rajputana, and the many-tongued Deccan; Hindus who have discarded caste, Mussulmans free from bigotry, and the descendants of Aborigines unstained by crime, shall meet in some new and national capital, to regulate the affairs of the great Indian Republic, without jealousy, and without intrigue. Or, perhaps, if '*a darker hour ascends,*' when some English conclave of violent partisans and crude legislators shall have gambled away the last stake in this our magnificent heritage, the good rule of the Company shall be estimated, during chaos and anarchy, only by the regret which it inspires, and by the traditions which it has left. But, whether it be deluge or civilisation, the whirlwind or the calm, we will venture to predict that the last five years of the history of the Punjab will not speedily be forgotten. A work has there been accomplished, on which the best friends of the Company may look without apprehension, and its calumniators with regret and penitence. It is one, than which a nobler was never contemplated by the best of Roman Pro-consuls, or by the most

Chap. XIII. civilized of Greek colonists: it is one, British in character, but such as men of all tongues and nations may comprehend and admire: it is one which will be linked inseparably with the names of the two Lawrences, and in which, to the latest hour of his life, the noble Head of the old Scotch House of Ramsay may feel an honourable pride."

Latest con-
spectus of
the Punjab.

When that retrospect was published, which will be found in the Appendix, Lord Dalhousie had less reason to know the success of his Punjab policy. He will never know it now, unless the Greek sage¹ did not err, who declared that the earnest labours of this life engage, in their results, the restful contemplation of that which follows death. The mutiny finally tested the work of the Marquis; nor are new indications wanting of the stability of the Government which Lord Dalhousie and his able administrators founded in the Five Waters. It may be interesting and appropriate in this light to glance over the "Report of the Punjab," which issues as these last pages are penned.

Criminal
justice,
Thuggee,
Infanticide,
&c., 1859-60.

Under "Criminal Justice," Thuggee, it is declared, is dead, not to revive. The measures, dwelt upon in a previous chapter, and sustained with energy, have entirely freed the Five Rivers from that scourge. In 1859, not a single case was recorded. Coining and forgery have disappeared nearly as completely; one reason, indeed, being, that the Victorian rupee, brought into general circulation, defies the skill of

¹ Aristotle. *Nicom. Ethics.*

the Punjabee soucar.¹ Suttee is so rare, that the Chap. XIII.
occasion of its celebration in an isolated instance could be marked by the dismissal of the entire local police. The humane and considerate policy of the Board towards that disgrace of the Punjab, infanticide, has also borne the best results for humanity. The latest local reports are emphatic in pronouncing its approximate extinction. Thus, for example, amongst the Bedees, resident at Dehra in the Goordaspoor District, there are now one hundred and seventy-two girls. No one of these is more than eleven years of age, a fact sufficiently demonstrating that their preservation is entirely owing to British interference. In the Kangra District, formerly so notorious for the commission of infanticide in Rajpoot families, a careful register of female births is kept. In 1859 such births were reported as being considerably in excess of male births. If this be an erroneous return, it is due, beyond question, to the scrupulous accuracy with which the birth is registered out of regard to penalties not enforced in the case of male children. From 1,923 girls born and reared in this district,

¹ "Some ten or twelve goldsmiths of Kerowly have been captured by Captain Impey of Ulawur; they are said to have carried on a very extensive trade in the manufacture of counterfeit coin for the last sixty years, without being molested in any way. They paid annual revenue to the chief of the villages, in which they resided, for protection. Their capture was effected with great difficulty; and praise is due to the captors, who are to receive rewards from Government for their trouble. These men *have coined all the rupees in Hindoostan, except the Queen's-head rupee.*"—"Delhi Gazette," Nov., 1861.

Chap. XIII. a fourth had died, and this proportion, startling at first, is not greater than may be explained by the ignorance of Hindoo nurses. Lord Dalhousie's annexation of the Punjab has, then, already saved more lives than were lost in the battles of the second Sikh war.

The sumptuary arrangements concluded at the Umritsur meeting, did away with infanticide, by abolishing its cause. They depended largely, it will be remembered, upon the determination to suppress the lazy faqueers, whose extortionate mendicancy at weddings chiefly rendered them expensive. The work of the Lahore Board bears fruit in this as in other respects. In December, 1859, the daughter of the Maharajah of Puttiala was married to the Maharajah of Bhurtpore. Both families are of the Jât tribe, and hitherto neither had sought alliances beyond its own neighbourhood. The estimation in which the Puttiala Maharajah is held by the British Government, on account of his services during the mutiny, has elevated him to the first place in the eyes of the native nobility. Many chiefs of highest rank who have not hitherto been in the habit of attending on such occasions, were present either in person or by their representatives at the marriage. The ceremony was celebrated with much pomp, but the Commissioner, Mr. G. C. Barnes, was able to procure the omission of the "Barah," the custom which obtains at the bridals of great personages in India, and one better honoured in the breach than the observance. A

Marriage of
daughter of
Maharajah of
Puttiala.

large inclosure of thorns is made, within which are crowded all who purpose to take advantage of the bridegroom's liberality, generally the thieves, vagabonds, and beggars of the territory. On the last day of the festivities, each one of these receives a rupee. The waste of money is often enormous : and it was calculated that it would have amounted to three lakhs of rupees had it been allowed at Puttiala. Chap. XIII.

The gaol system, established under Dr. Hathaway, prospers in the same sure hands. The average rate of mortality stands reduced to 2·35 per cent. Prison buildings are kept in repair by convict hands, and even the duty of guarding prisoners is gradually committed to convicts of good behaviour, tamed and trained into faithful men by the humane system whose introduction was touched upon. The Punjab dispensaries relieved, in 1859, 172,000 native patients; and vaccination is an accepted and general thing among this intelligent people. Present condition of gaols.

Education in the Punjab, starting from the Sikh schools, has passed satisfactorily through the usual stages of Eastern public instruction. In turn tentative, extravagant, and desponding, it has gravitated, like Education at home, to the safe ground of primary instruction and payment for results. In Government establishments, as many as 42,000 are under instruction; in indigenous schools the natural bias of the Sikh is still evi- Of Education.

Chap. XIII. denced by an attendance of sixty-three thousand. At Lahore, the sirdars have asked and obtained from Lord Canning the formation of an English College, the higher department of which will exclusively educate the sons of those brave fathers who met us in Chillianwala and Goojerat.

Of Public Works.

The great Lahore and Peshawur road was travelled throughout by the present Viceroy in 1859. The Baree Doab canal advances to final completion, and the Huslee, the native canal, restored by the Lawrences, brings in unexpected returns. Lord Dalhousie's trees thrive along the banks of these artificial streams, whose construction has benefitted the country only less than their eventual completion will.¹

Of Military and Police.

On the 1st May, 1860, 65,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, garrisoned the Punjab. Nineteen thousand of these were Europeans, forty-six thousand natives. But they include the police, the frontier guards, and the irregulars, such as Cureton's and Lind's, embanded for good service in the mutiny. The Lahore light horse is a body of Eurasians transferred to the regular army. These forces form the garrison of India; the Punjab would remain quiet with its police alone.

Of Agriculture.

Agriculture in the province still feels the impetus given by Lord Dalhousie's encouragement and

¹ For manure alone, made into cakes, and sold for fuel, so much as two lakhs and a half (£25,000) have been up to this time expended among the villagers.

provident care. Dundee and Belfast purchase the flax of Goojeranwalla, though the cost of transport from Lahore to Kurrachee is £8 per ton. The African "imphee" has been naturalised with success. Peshawur has cultivated her valleys up to the Meeranzye, and in Hazara the breeders of Kaghan and Balakote are asking for merino rams to improve the "puttoo," a native broad-cloth. The Sind Saugor Doab is thoroughly exploited, and Captain Johnstone has pierced the Suleyman hills with peaceful messages, and lived among the savage tribes who fringe the Derajat, and who had never before seen a European except at the head of an expedition to chastise their incursions. It is ascertained, and the estimate has great interest in connexion with the recent permission to purchase land in fee-simple, that the English Government possesses in the Punjab more than eight million acres of waste. The tea gardens, planted by the Lahore Board, are covering the Himalayan slopes with their aromatic leaves and silver blossoms. The out-turn of tea in the Holt plantations was, for 1859, of black and green leaves, 29,312lbs. The native tea makers have become accomplished manipulators, and rival their Chinese instructors. A great bulk of the produce goes as yet to the Commissariat department. The demand for seeds and seedlings has greatly increased. Two independent companies have their representatives in the Kangra and Kohistan; and private capitalists are also anxious

Chap. XIII. to engage in the cultivation. The Holtta factory has been greatly enlarged, and additional pans erected.

In his report, Dr. Jameson (who has charge also of the plantations in the North-west Provinces) states, that "during the last season upwards of 100 tons of tea seeds, and two and a half millions of seedling tea plants have been distributed from the Government plantations in Kumaon, Gurhwal, and the Punjab, to private parties. The tea plant, therefore, is being broadcast over the hilly districts of Bengal, the North-west Provinces, and the Punjab, and will, ere long, become an important article of exportation."

Favourable
return of
revenue,
1861.

Finally, and by a test essentially practical, this great acquisition of the Government of the Marquis of Dalhousie pays. As these last sheets are printed, an important correspondence passes between the Government of the Punjab and the Supreme Government. Charged with causing a deficit, it is shown successfully that (the Punjab army being ranked, as it is, an imperial expense) the province is solvent now, and promises large returns. A deficiency of 24 lakhs of rupees constructively remaining against it, is due to the occurrence of the famine; and this would disappear, were not the expenses of the Home and Calcutta Governments partly assessed upon the Five Rivers. This defence will be summarized elsewhere,¹ and may be the last argument adduced, to show that the Punjab has been

¹ *Vide* Appendix No. III.

well and successfully governed. If that be not the Chap. XIII.
conclusion of an unprejudiced reader, the facts are set
unskilfully before him. The Report quoted speaks
last, and rightly, of the gain to the public treasury,
because that gain, little or great, is nothing to the
true profit which a just sway has achieved for us.
It has made the trans-Punjab a happy and contented Conclusion.
province, our pride and safeguard instead of our
menace and rival. It has opened a thousand fields
to agriculture, and a hundred roads to commerce ;
it has grafted on Punjab stocks the strong tree of
Saxon self-government. It has purged the land
of shameful crimes, and given it education, security,
and arts of life. A myriad of little lips live to
bless, and mothers and wives to thank the strong
and earnest Sahebs. In ten years we have done
what princes like Akbar decreed and despaired to
do. Were an impossible convulsion to eject us to-
morrow from Asia, the Punjab would be a monu-
ment, which would preserve to all Asiatic futures
our great faculty of Government. If, then, order
is better than anarchy, justice than tyranny, equity
than extortion, free institutions than feudalism,
nature's sweet law in homesteads than the savage
doctrines of superstition, and nature's lovely co-
louring on her fields than the pale corpses and the
crimson blood, these are what have come to the
Five Waters with English Administration. And
those who were the earliest of the mission—it is due
to repeat—the foremost by place and work in this

Chap. XIII. evangel of a substantial Christianity—were, first, James, Marquis of Dalhousie, and, not second, the late Sir Henry Lawrence, and Sir John Lawrence his brother.

The tomb of
Vans Agnew
and Ander-
son.

This narration of the incidents of the great war and fortunate Government began with the murder of Vans Agnew and Anderson. The best echo to their proud and defiant death-cry, “the English will come,” is to have shown how they came, and to what purpose. To the memory of those brave gentlemen—two of ten thousand such who have served England in India—the province of the Five Waters is a memorial. But their bodies do not lie in the shattered Eedgah at Mooltan. When the town and fortress fell, gentle hands lifted the two corpses from the grave; replaced the kindly Affghan “khes” with an English shroud, and laid the young men in an English tomb on the crown of the captured citadel. A graceful obelisk has been lately erected over the place, and a tablet thus records the death of the two officers whom the smiling fields and peaceful abodes of the Five Waters avenge with the vengeance which is best and finest;

Beneath this Monument
lie the remains of
PATRICK ALEXANDER VANS AGNEW,
of the Bengal Civil Service,
and
WILLIAM ANDERSON,
Lieutenant, 1st Bombay Fusilier Regiment,
Assistants to the Resident at Lahore,

who, being deputed by the Governor to relieve,
at his own request,
Dewan Moolraj, Viceroy of Mooltan,
of the fortress and authority which he held,
were attacked and wounded by the garrison,
on the 19th April, 1848 ;
and being treacherously deserted by the Sikh escort,
were, on the following day,
in flagrant breach of natural faith and hospitality,
barbarously murdered
in the Eedgah, under the walls of Mooltan.

Thus fell these two young public servants,
at the ages of 25 and 28 years,
full of high hopes, rare talents, and promise of
future usefulness.

Even in their deaths doing their country honour.
Wounded and forsaken, they could offer no resistance,
but hand in hand calmly awaited the onset of their assailants.

Nobly they refused to yield,
foretelling the day when thousands of Englishmen
should come to avenge their death,
and destroy Moolraj, his army, and fortress.
History records how the prediction was fulfilled.
Borne to the grave by their victorious brother soldiers
and countrymen,
they were buried with Military honours
here, on the summit of the captured citadel,
on the 26th of January, 1849.

The annexation of the Punjab to the British Empire
was the result of the war,
of which their assassination was the commencement.

END OF VOL. I.

APPENDIX No. I.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT,
26th October (No. 42), 1853.

The COURT OF DIRECTORS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA in Council.

Appendix I.
General Report on the Punjab.

1. Your letter in the Foreign Department, dated 2nd July (No. 52), 1850, transmits to us a general report on the administration of the Punjab, nominally for the years 1849-50 and 1850-51 (being the first two years after the annexation of the province to the British dominions), but bringing down all the main results to the close of the third year.

2. The various divisions of the report, and of its enclosures, will be taken into special consideration in the several departments to which they relate. We will not, however, delay to express to you the high satisfaction with which we have read this record of a wise and eminently successful administration.

3. In the short period which has elapsed since the Punjab became a part of the British dominions, results have been achieved such as could scarcely have been hoped for as the reward of many years of well-directed exertions. The formidable army which it had required so many battles to subdue has been quietly disbanded, and the turbulent soldiery have settled to industrious pursuits. Peace and security reign throughout the country, and the amount of crime is as small as in our best administered territories. Justice has been made accessible, without costly formalities, to the whole population. Industry and commerce have been set free. A great mass of oppressive and burthensome taxation has been abolished. Money rents have been substituted for payments in kind, and a

settlement of the land revenue has been completed in nearly the whole country, at a considerable reduction on the former amount. In the settlement the best lights of recent experience have been turned to the utmost account, and the various errors committed in a more imperfect state of our knowledge of India have been carefully avoided. Cultivation has already largely increased. Notwithstanding the great sacrifices of revenue, there was a surplus, after defraying the civil and the local military expenses, of 52 lacs in the first, and 64½ lacs in the second year after annexation. During the next ten years the construction of the Barea Doab Canal, and its branches, and of the great net-work of roads already in rapid progress, will absorb the greater part of the surplus; but even during this interval, according to the Board's estimate, a balance will be left of more than double the amount of the cost of two corps, at which the Governor-General computes the augmentation of the general military expenses of India due to the acquisition of the Punjab. After the important works in question are completed, the Board of Administration, apparently on sound data, calculates on a permanent surplus of fifty lacs per annum applicable to general purposes.

4. Results like these reflect the highest honour on the administration of your Lordship in Council, and on the system of Indian government generally. It is a source of just pride to us that our services, civil and military, should have afforded men capable, in so short a time, of carrying into full effect such a series of enlightened and beneficent measures. The executive functionaries in the subordinate ranks have proved themselves worthy of the honourable career which awaits them. The members of the Board of Administration, Sir Henry Lawrence, Mr. John Lawrence, Mr. Mansell, and Mr. Montgomery, have entitled themselves to be placed in the foremost rank of Indian administrators.

5. We approve your intention of printing and publishing the report for general information * * *

We are

Your affectionate friends,

(Signed) R. ELLICE,
J. OLIPHANT,
&c. &c.

LONDON,
26th October, 1853.

APPENDIX No. II.

MINUTE by the Most Noble the GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
dated 9th May, 1853.

THE PUNJAB.

Appendix II. 1. I have been for some time in possession of a report of their proceedings during the first three years of annexation, drawn up by the Board for administering the affairs of the Punjab. I have retained it until I should obtain leisure, by the disposal of other more pressing affairs, to offer the few remarks which I desire to make upon it.

2. The report is an able, clear, full, and most interesting document. It is given in a tone of success, and is marked by a hopeful spirit; but its narrative of the past is in no degree a boastful one, and its confidence in the future is justified by every event that has occurred up to the present time.

3. Since the territory of the Punjab proper was annexed, on the 29th March, 1849, its internal tranquillity has been wholly undisturbed.

Notwithstanding that the Sikh nation had been made to pass under the yoke with such complete manifestation of submission as has rarely been exhibited in the history of modern times, and although not less than 60,000 men were thrown loose upon the country after the surrender of their army at Rawul Pindee, no solitary instance of tumult has been recorded among them.

4. Not only were the Sikhs subjected, but the Mussulmans, whom they had long held in grievous religious oppression, were raised up to a level with them. All religious prohibitions were removed. Even the killing of the sacred animal was no longer forbidden. Many were disposed to doubt the prudence of this

permission. I thought otherwise. It seemed to me that such a prohibition would not be allowed to continue in perpetuity without great inconvenience and hardship to many; and that if its removal were ever to be effected, the fittest time for doing so was at that moment when the Sikhs were conquered and crushed. The order therefore was given. Every precaution was at the same time taken to prevent the animals being killed in such a manner as to shock the feelings and rouse the prejudices of the Sikhs. Those precautions were carefully enforced, and a disregard of them was severely punished.

The consequence has been, that the killing of the cows has been habitually carried on in the land of the Sikhs by those who required the use of it, without exciting a single city tumult, or so much as a village uproar.

5. How largely crimes of a violent nature have already been repressed in a country where violence was tolerated, if not recognized, and where criminal justice could not be said to exist, has been fully explained in the report. I will boldly affirm that life and property are now, and have for some time been, more secure within the bounds of the Punjab, which we have held only for four years, than they are in the province of Bengal, which has been ours for very nearly a century.

It is unnecessary to advert to the many changes and improvements connected with the internal administration of the new province that have been introduced during that period. They are fully detailed in the report, and they there speak for themselves.

6. The external relations of the Punjab have not been less satisfactory.

7. The hostility which was believed by many to be latent in the mind of Maharajah Golab Singh has been proved to be (as it was) imaginary.* Every act and word of that sagacious prince has shown, that he knows too well his own position in Cashmere, and the interests of himself and his family, not to exhibit every mark of subserviency towards us in his conduct; to conciliate the favour of the British Government by every manifestation of friendship, and to deprecate its displeasure by any sacrifice it might demand.

8. The Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabul, though he was driven ignominiously out of Peshawur through the Khyber, and has entered into no renewal of friendly relations by the conclu-

* This cannot be reconciled apparently with the passage at p. 282, vol. iv., of "Life of Napier:—"Shere Singh said that at Goojerat, his plan was to cross the Chenab and march on Lahore, and he evidently thought Golab Singh would have joined him; indeed, Lord Dalhousie told me that he had proofs that such was Golab's design."—E. A.

Appendix II. sion of a treaty, has nowhere attempted any act of aggression against us along the whole extent of our western frontier.

9. The frontier, indeed, has not been free from disturbance, but the attacks upon it have been made, not by the ruler of Cabul, but by the wild tribes of the hills, who, if they are hostile to us, are not one whit more so than they are to the Ameer, and to all mankind besides. There has not been war upon the frontier, but forays over the border.

These tribes have been murderers and plunderers since the days of Ishmael, their father; and it is not to be expected in reason that they should at once be converted to order and harmlessness, merely because British rule has been advanced to the foot of their mountain fastnesses.

10. Much, however, has already been done.

A policy of forbearance and defence was enjoined towards them. The lands they had held in the plains were left to them, and their communities were in no respect interfered with, so long as they respected the rights and the security of others. When after a time the tribes in the Derajat, and above the Peshawur Valley, began to commit aggressions, defensive measures alone were taken, while warning was given that a repetition of such aggressions would bring down punishment on their heads.

When the warnings repeatedly given to them were disregarded, our subjects murdered, and their property destroyed; and when it became apparent that the tribes were misconstruing the forbearance of the British Government, and were presuming on the supposed inaccessibility of their mountain retreats, the Government felt it to be its duty to have recourse to sterner measures, and severer retribution.

The punishment of the valley of Ranizaie by the force under Sir Colin Campbell, of the Syuds of Khagan and of the Huzzumzies by Colonel Mackeson, of the Omerzye Wuzeeres by Major Nicholson, and more lately of the Sheorancees and Kusserancees, on the borders of the Derajat, have given to those wild people a lesson, which will have, I doubt not, the best effects, and indeed has already produced them.

During the past cold season, no single outrage has been committed upon the Peshawur frontier.

The people of Ranizaie, and the several divisions of the Momund tribes that have been punished, have made their submission, have asked permission to re-occupy their lands, and have offered to pay for them revenue; a sign of subjection which they have never exhibited before to any previous dynasty, whether Mogul, or Persian, Affghan, or Sikh.

11. I do not by any means suppose that this peaceful attitude will be maintained without interruption, or that their conduct

towards us will always be void of offence. I recite these facts only as proving that the tribes already are fully conscious of our power, as of justifying the anticipation that their aggressions may be checked. Appendix II.

In the course of time, the fear of retribution, which experience will have shown to be certain, and a direct sense of their own interests, will combine with other causes, and will lead, I do not doubt, to the establishment of uninterrupted tranquillity along the western frontier of the British possessions.

12. While external peace and internal tranquillity have been thus preserved by the several measures which the report has fully and well described, the financial results of the annexation of the Punjab have been eminently satisfactory.

13. In the despatch in which the annexation of the Punjab was reported to the Secret Committee, I ventured to declare "a confident belief that the Punjab will, at no distant time, be not only a secure, but a profitable possession." 7th April, 1849.

In reply, the Honourable Court of Directors coldly expressed a "hope that the financial expectations of the Governor-General may be realized." 1st August, 1849.

That my expectations regarding the security of our possessions in the Punjab have been realized to the full, has already been shown. This report, I think, has proved not less clearly, that I did not err in anticipating that the province would be financially profitable.

14. After including every strictly local charge, civil and military, ordinary and extraordinary, the surplus revenue of the Punjab amounted in the first year after the annexation to 52 lacs, and in the second year to 64 lacs of rupees.

In the third year, large expenses have been added, including heavy pensions, public buildings, the construction of many hundred miles of roads, and the commencement of a great system of irrigation canals. Nevertheless, the estimated surplus revenue of the year is nearly a quarter of a million sterling. For ten years to come, the charges that will be incurred in the execution of these extensive measures of public improvement will probably prevent the revenue affording any material increase beyond the surplus of the present year. But after the expiry of that period, it is calculated in the report that the surplus revenue of the Punjab will again amount, as at first to 50 lacs of rupees, or half a million sterling.

15. From this surplus, however, deduction must be made of the additional military expense which the annexation of the Punjab may have imposed on the general revenues.

16. It has been contended that the whole expense of the army of 50,000 men, which is stationed across the Sutlej, ought to be

Appendix II. charged against the revenues of the Punjab alone ; but this position is irreconcilable either with reason or practice.

An army of 50,000 is stationed in the Punjab, not wholly for maintaining submission there, but because it is the frontier province, wherein must be placed our defence against the foreign powers that lie beyond it. The army is not there exclusively for the coercion of our new subjects, but for the defence of all. Its cost, therefore, is to be defrayed not only from the revenues of the province in which it is stationed, but from the revenues of the empire which it protects.

When, after the Sutlej campaign, a frontier army of 50,000 men, with 100 guns, was left behind the border for the defence of India against the possible recurrence of Sikh hostility, the expense of that army was not charged exclusively against the revenues of the Cis-Sutlej states, and of the Trans-Sutlej province, which we had lately annexed, and in which it chiefly was. In like manner, when the renewed hostility of the Sikhs has compelled us to effect their subjection, and to advance our frontier beyond the Indus, the expense of our frontier army is not to be charged exclusively against the revenues of the districts into which it has advanced.

In the former case the charges of the frontier army were borne by the general revenues of the empire which it was placed on the frontier to defend ; and the same general revenues must now be charged with the cost of the same army when discharging similar duties of defence on a frontier that has been advanced.

17. If our frontier were still on the river Sutlej instead of at the foot of Solimancee mountains, the military force that would be maintained for its protection would be little less than that which, occupying the Punjab, is now defending our furthest frontier. *The excess, then, of our present force over the adequate defensive force that must have been upheld if our frontier were on the Sutlej can alone be justly charged against the revenues of the Punjab, since that excess only is attributable to the annexation of the Punjab.*

This is the just and only true principle on which to determine what proportion of the military charges of the state is to be exclusively borne by the revenues of the province of the Punjab.

18. Apply this principle, the deduction that is to be made from the surplus revenue of the Punjab, on account of additional military expenditure, may readily be ascertained.

No addition whatever has been made to the number of the native regiments in India by reason of the annexation of the Punjab. The additional regiments of the regular army that were required for that province were obtained by making over the Saugor district and the Rajpootana field force to the Madras and Bombay armies, by which they are now occupied.

No addition whatever has been made to the artillery, European Appendix II. or native, in India.

The irregular troops, raised for local service in the Punjab, have already been charged against the local revenues, before the surplus in question appeared.

The only additions that have been made were caused by a numerical increase of the Bengal army to the extent of 15,000 men, which was ordered in 1848, and by an increase in the number of European regiments of infantry.

19. The numerical increase of the native army was urged by the Commander-in-chief, at the commencement of the war in 1848, and was effected by raising the number of each corps from 800 to 1,000. The cost of the increase is about fifteen lakhs of rupees. I regret that it was made, and I purpose the reduction of corps again to 800 men, at which strength a regiment is, for all ordinary purposes, as effective as a regiment of a thousand men. This additional item of expense will then disappear. In like manner the Trans-Indus batta will also, I trust, be hereafter withdrawn.

20. The only actual increase of the Indian army, that has been made in consequence of the annexation of the Punjab, beyond the establishment of 1847, consists of two regiments of European infantry.

Returns will show that on the 1st January, 1847, the year which followed the Sutlej campaign, and in which I was appointed to the office of Governor-General, the establishment of the Indian army comprised twenty-eight regiments of European infantry. On the 1st January, 1853, the present year, the establishment of the Indian army contained thirty regiments of European infantry, or two regiments in excess of the establishment of 1847.

21. I do not seek to suppress the fact that during the course of the year 1847, the establishment of European infantry regiments was reduced by four corps. But with great deference to those by whom this reduction was effected, I contend that it was premature and impolitic; that the establishment must have been again raised to twenty-eight regiments, even though the Punjab had never been annexed, and consequently that the increase actually caused by the annexation has been but two regiments, as I have already stated.

22. It is obvious that the European force in India must at all times be maintained numerically sufficient for war as well as peace, not only because no man can tell at what time war may arise, but because if it should arise, reinforcements cannot be promptly obtained by reason of the distance at which we are placed. It may be safe and expedient to reduce the force in any

Appendix II. one presidency or division, but the entire European force throughout India must be numerically adequate to a war demand.

The reduction of four regiments in 1847, was justifiable only on the assumption which was made, that the Sikh state was wholly disabled, and that sudden war with a formidable power was impossible. It left the presidency of Bengal insufficiently armed for such a contest as soon after arose, and it stripped the presidencies of Bombay and Madras of the means of giving permanent assistance to Bengal, by diminishing their establishments to the smallest number of regiments which would suffice for their local demands at that time.

23. Thus when the second war with the Sikhs commenced in 1848, the European force in India was inadequate to maintain the empire in security.

At one period, during the progress of that war, after the battle of Chillianwalla, Fort William was held by a wing of a regiment from Madras, while in the whole of our older territories above it, from the Jumna to the frontier of Burmah, and from the Himalaya to the borders of the Deccan, there were but two battalions of European troops.

Happily the native powers of India seem to be incapable of combination for a common purpose, and with the defeat of the Sikhs the risk passed by.

But the Government of India would not have been justified in running such a risk a second time: and if the campaign of 1849 had terminated like that of 1846, without the annexation of the Punjab, and our frontier had still remained at the Sutlej, the establishment of European troops for its defence must have been again made equal to what was justly considered requisite after the campaign of 1846. In fact, additional regiments were solicited from England early in 1848, and long before the annexation of the Punjab had been made or resolved upon.

24. The establishment of 1853 exceeds that of 1846-47 by two corps: and this excess alone is justly chargeable against the revenues of the Punjab.

25. If ten lakhs of rupees, the cost of those two corps, be deducted from the surplus of this year, it will be seen that a balance will still remain payable to the general revenues of the state; and if they be deducted from the revenues of the Punjab, as they are expected ultimately to stand, that province will still contribute a sum of four hundred thousand pounds a year to the treasury of the Indian empire.*

26. The report of the Board of Administration, with the brief

* The actual balance for 1859-60, due deductions made, is nearer a million.

comment that has now been added to it, will thus, I trust, be held Appendix II. to justify the confidence with which, at the time of annexation, I expressed a firm belief that the Punjab, as a British province, would prove to be "not only a secure, but a profitable possession."

27. For this prosperous and happy result, the Honourable Company is mainly indebted to the members of the Board of Administration, Sir Henry Lawrence, Mr. John Lawrence, Mr. Mansel, and his successor, Mr. Montgomery.

I desire on my own part to record, in the most emphatic manner, an acknowledgment of the obligations of the Government of India to those distinguished officers, and its admiration of the ability, the energy, the judgment and indefatigable devotion with which they discharged the onerous and responsible duties intrusted to them, and of which I have been, for several years, a close and grateful observer.

I request them to receive the most marked assurances of the cordial approbation and thanks of the Governor-General in Council, and at the same time I beg leave to commend them to the favour and consideration of the Honourable Court.

9th May, 1853.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

APPENDIX III.

App. III. It has formed the *gravamen* of a charge against the reports on the Punjab finances, that they represent the province as paying all its own expenses and contributing, besides, a large quota towards the General Government; while, from a true point of view, it is declared that the Punjab does not pay at present four-ninths of its own cost of Administration as it paid under Runjeet Singh.

This charge depends entirely upon the principle of debiting the cost of the Regular Army quartered in the Punjab upon the provincial government, a principle which was combated at length by the Marquis of Dalhousie, in a passage of his Lordship's minute. (Given in Appendix II., Part II.)

As to the statement that the Punjab paid all its expenses under Runjeet Singh's government, including military, it might be demonstrated that a foreign must always be more expensive than a native government, and a European than a Sikh army. Beside, Runjeet never hesitated to complete his revenue by spoliation, or to diminish his expenditure by withholding the pay of his troops. Then, too, on our first occupation of the country we were obliged in equity to affirm the alienation of a large portion of the land revenue to Jagheerdars, Priests, &c., and at the same time to incur a heavy outlay in cantonments and public works of all sorts. The province, too, under our rule has hardly commenced as yet to make a return for the treasure expended upon its improvement. Above all, the defence of the frontier of British India must be on a more costly scale than that of a principality; and the Punjab was not in Sikh times, as now, laid under heavy contribution on account of the Home and Supreme Governments. Obviously, and in a high degree, the regular machinery of civilised government must be

more expensive than the primitive institutions of Oriental despotism. App. III.

It is also charged that the present military expenditure in the Punjab greatly exceeds the cost of any force which was ever kept up to watch the Sutlej frontier when a formidable native army was ready for invasion. The force left by Lord Ellenborough at the stations of Meerut, Umballah, Ferozepore, and Loodiana, numbered 17,612 men and 66 guns. Lord Hardinge on his arrival considered this force insufficient. He, therefore gradually increased it until, at the breaking out of the war, it numbered 40,523 men and 94 guns. Lord Dalhousie gives the strength of the frontier army after the Sutlej campaign at 50,000 men and 100 guns. According to official returns, the force in the Punjab after the second Sikh war numbered 58,270 men and 114 guns, and at the present time the army in the provinces under the Lieutenant-Governor (including the force commanded by Brigadier-General Chamberlain) amounts to 40,258 men and 131 guns. The force could not have been safely maintained at the figure at which Lord Ellenborough left it, for if, out of 32,479 men, including the European regiments in the hills above Umballah, in December, 1845, only 17,727 men could be brought into action after junction with the Loodiana and Ferozepore forces; and if that number but just sufficed to beat back the most formidable enemy and win one of the most bloody battles which India has ever witnessed, what sort of an army could the Commander-in-Chief have assembled and brought into the field, and what would have been the position of the empire had the strength of the frontier at and above Umballah remained, as in July, 1844, at 13,538 ?

When, therefore, it is asserted that the present force is in excess of that formerly employed to watch the Sutlej frontier, it must not be forgotten that on the Sikhs becoming hostile the Sutlej army was hastily reinforced to more than double its original strength, which had previously been added to by Lord Ellenborough; and that but for this timely precaution its weakness might have entailed on the British Government disasters of the most serious character.

The total cost of the whole force in the Punjab is estimated at Rs. 1,53,33,221, inclusive of material; and, adding Rs. 10,41,761 for military works and buildings, the aggregate military expenditure may be set at Rs. 1,63,74,982. But, deducting the cost of the frontier army and of the regiments cantoned in the hills, the military expenditure properly debitable to the province amounts only to 74,93,380.

The fairer mode of charge, however, is to consider the Army, which for the safe tenure of India must be maintained at a certain strength, as an Imperial establishment; and to debit its cost to each province in proportion to the amount of revenue pro-

App. III. tected. By this method of account the Punjab Balance sheet would show as follows:—

<i>Receipts.</i>	Civil,	<i>Disbursements.</i>
2,76,79,000		1,60,88,000
Share of total military expenditure (viz. : 12,83,80,000) calculated at 31 per cent. on the Local Revenues	}	83,80,490
Share of total Home and Central expenditure (after deducting military charges for Central India, &c., above included) calculated at 24 per cent.	}	66,42,960
		<hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/>
	Total...	3,11,11,450

By which account a sum of Rs. 1,73,62,250, debited to the Punjab under the charges rebutted, is eliminated, and the apparent deficit reduced to Rs. 34,32,450 instead of Rs. 2,07,95,400.

But even this deficit exceeds the reality: for, the estimate of receipts having been made for a famine year, is 10 or 12 lakhs below the average outturn. The actual deficit, under the proposed method of account, probably does not exceed 22 or 24 lakhs of rupees. And this deficit must in great part be ascribed to the quota charged to the Punjab on account of the expenditure by the Home Government, and by the Government of India: which, rivalling in amount the total aggregate military charges in India, is entirely beyond the control of the provincial governments.

It must also be anticipated that the capital which has been invested in this recently acquired province will year by year increase the financial receipts. The Baree Doab Canal already yields a revenue of 2 lakhs per annum. The completion of the Railway will provide means of transport for the surplus produce of a country in which the prevalence of remunerative prices will speedily ensure the entire reclamation of the soil now only half occupied. Probably no administrator in India ever kept the great object of equalizing expenditure and income so steadily in view as Sir John Lawrence, and in pursuit of it he consistently opposed the alienation of the land revenue in jaghir, and the grant of pensions by the State except in extraordinary cases. Nor is the civil expenditure anywhere upon a more economical scale.

It may be logically concluded, then, that the theory propounded of debiting the Punjab with the whole of the military expenditure occurring within it, is in opposition to reason as much as to the deliberate opinion of the late Marquis of Dalhousie; that, from the difference of the circumstances, no fair financial comparison can be made between the results of Native and European rule; that the strength of the army formerly stationed on the

Sutlej frontier was proved to be inadequate, and that for the north-western frontier the force must ever be determined on another standard; that the cost and contingencies of the regiments quartered in the Punjab for sanitary and other reasons, cannot properly be charged to the revenues of a province which does not require them; that under no consistent method of account can imperial charges be imposed on the Punjab; that, whilst an immense outlay has for several years been going on, its returns are only beginning to come in; so that with the continuance of peace, the spread of cultivation, the construction of the railway, and the expansion of steam navigation, the wealth, population and revenue of the province may be expected gradually to increase, in very marked advances.

App. III.

APPENDIX No. IV.

SOME OF THE PRODUCTIONS OF THE PUNJAUB, AND OF THOSE
HILL STATES, ETC., BORDERING ON IT.

(*m*) is put for Medicinal as used in the Punjaub.

<i>Native Appellations.</i>	<i>English Names.</i>	<i>Places where Produced.</i>
Reshum, <i>m</i>	Silk	Cashmeer
Busma	Indigo Plant	{ Throughout the whole Punjaub
Afeem, Narcotic, <i>m</i>	Opium and Seed	" "
Kaisir, Carminative, <i>m</i>	Saffron	Cashmeer & the Hills, etc
Audrek, Stimulant and Carminative, <i>m</i>	Ginger	{ " and in different parts of the Hills
Hurdell, Astringent, <i>m</i>	Turmeric	{ Throughout the whole Hills, Low range
Kuth, Astringent, &c., <i>m</i>	"	Cashmeer
Maindee, " <i>m</i>	Henna	Punjaub in general
Mejeett, " <i>m</i>	Madder	{ Kolatchee and Dera Ismail Khan
Kosumba Seed, <i>m</i>	Safflower	Punjaub in general, etc.
Kuppah	Cotton and Plant	" "
Konuck, 3 sorts	Wheat, 3 kinds	" and the Hills, etc.
Jow	Oats	" "
Mekei	Indian Wheat	" "
Bajri	"	" "
Chola	Gram	" "
Musser	"	" "
Mung	"	" "

<i>Native Appellations.</i>	<i>English Names.</i>	<i>Places where Produced.</i>
Singara, Bread made from it	.	Cashmeer and the Hills
Trumba,	"	" "
Istik Pecha, <i>m</i>	<i>Purgative</i>	" "
Benufsha, <i>m</i>	Violet— <i>Laxative</i>	Hills in general
Kau Zeebbaum, <i>m</i>	<i>Carminative</i>	" and Cashmeer, etc.
Jeera, <i>m</i>	"	" "
Koul doda	<i>Sedative</i>	" "
Eerote	Walnuts	" "
Tangee	Hazel Nut	" "
Sew, 4 sorts	Apples	" "
Noc, 5 sorts	Pears	" "
Angour	Grapes	" "
Goth e Boogoo	Large Pear	" Cashmeer
Glasse	.	" "
Aloocho	.	{ " and the Puu- jaub, etc.
Aumul thash, <i>m</i>	{ Cassia fistularica, <i>Purgative and</i> <i>Laxative</i> }	Hills in general
Aùla, <i>m</i>	<i>Tonic</i>	" "
Behera, <i>m</i>	"	" "
Hareere, <i>m</i>	"	" "
Kour, bitter, <i>m</i>	"	" "
Mol Kungenee, <i>m</i>	.	" and Punjab
Jeeree, bitter, <i>m</i>	"	" "
Baang, <i>m</i>	{ Henbane, <i>Narcotic</i> <i>Soporific</i> }	" "
Datura, <i>m</i>	Datura, <i>Narcotic</i>	Hills and Punjab
Buttung	Sweet Pear	" "
Simloo	Fruit	" "
Akeree	"	" "
Chereitha, <i>m</i>	{ Worm seed Plants <i>bitter Tonic</i> }	Hills in general
Emlook	Fruit	" and Punjab
Annjeer, <i>m</i>	"	" "
Anaub, <i>m</i>	<i>Purgative Fruit</i>	" "
Kokko	"	" "
Dheruneh	"	" "
Mokeree	"	" "
Chinottoo	"	" "
Thun—a yellow die	.	" "
Mullett, <i>m</i>	Liquorice Root	{ Attock and Scinde, Banks of Indus

<i>Native Appellations.</i>	<i>English Names.</i>	<i>Places where Produced.</i>
Chuara, <i>m</i>	<i>Sudorific</i>	Punjaub, etc.
Gutahee, <i>m</i>	<i>Astringent</i>	Hills, and Cashmeer, etc
Sirroo	.	Punjaub in general, etc
Hulsee, <i>m</i>	<i>Linseed, Emollient</i>	" "
Shetooth	.	" "
Aum, <i>m</i>	<i>Mangoes, Astringent</i>	" "
Aroo	.	" "
Anaar, <i>Astringent, m</i>	<i>Pomegranite</i>	" "
Bee Seed, <i>m</i>	<i>Emollient</i>	" and Hills
Nimboo, <i>m</i>	<i>Lemons</i>	" "
Nouringee, <i>m</i>	<i>Oranges</i>	" "
Mitta	.	" "
Kutta	.	" "
Gol Gol	.	" "
Cheko Derra	.	" "
Therevee, <i>m</i>	<i>Colocynth, Purgative</i>	" "
Thooma Root, <i>m</i>	<i>Purgative</i>	" "
Kela	<i>Plantains</i>	Punjaub in general, etc
Kerbooja, <i>m</i>	<i>Melons</i>	" "
Therbooja, <i>m</i>	<i>Water ditto</i>	" "
Therrah, <i>m</i>	.	" "
Keera, <i>m</i>	.	" "
Metree, <i>m</i>	.	" "
Polluck	<i>Spinach</i>	" "
Tomoccoo	<i>Tobacco</i>	" "
Bere	.	" "
Souf, <i>m</i>	{ <i>Carraway Seed,</i> <i>Carminative</i> }	" "
Jeweine, <i>m</i>	<i>Aniseed, Carminative</i>	" "
Haaloo, <i>m</i>	.	" "
Kaajoor	<i>Dates</i>	" "
Pirnee	.	" "
Falsa, <i>Astringent, m</i>	<i>Fruit</i>	" "
Aroo	"	" "
Chumba	<i>Flower</i>	" "
Rebele	"	" "
Mothee	"	" "
Gulaub, <i>m</i>	<i>Rose, red, 3 kinds</i>	" "
Kulfa, <i>m</i>	<i>Cooling, sedative</i>	" "
Churaall	.	" "
Dock, <i>Astringent, m</i>	<i>Wild Grape, etc.</i>	" "
Zoe Seed, <i>Emetic, m</i>	<i>Deobstruent</i>	" "
Piaze	<i>Onion</i>	" "
Thome, <i>Stimulant, m</i>	<i>Garlic</i>	" "

<i>Native Appellations.</i>	<i>English Names.</i>	<i>Places where Produced.</i>
Buthony	Punjaub in general, etc
Dunnia, Carminative, <i>m</i>	Coriander Seed	
Gol Viree, <i>m</i>	<i>Purgative</i>	
Kuddoo Seed, <i>m</i>	<i>Emollient</i>	{ Throughout the whole Punjaub
Tinda	" "
Choul	Rice, 4 sorts	" "
Jewar	" "
Mah, <i>m</i>	<i>Emollient, Nutritive</i>	" "
Mung, <i>m</i>	<i>Light, Nutritive</i>	" "
Thill, <i>m</i>	" "
Muddull	" "
Cheena	" "
Kungenee	" "
Swank	" "
Kodera	" "
Kumaade	Sugar Cane	" "
Thoria	" "
Bede Musk, <i>m</i>	{ Willow, <i>Sedative</i> } { and <i>Carminative</i> }	" "
Gool Abaassee, <i>m</i>	" "
Saath Verg, <i>m</i>	" "
Gool Vergup, <i>m</i>	" "
Maalthee	" "
Gungeloo Seed, <i>m</i>	Turnips, <i>Emetic</i>	" "
Moollee Seed, <i>m</i>	Radish, <i>Emetic</i>	" "
Gaajer	Parsnips	" "
Arebee	Carrots	" "
Suker Kundee	" "
Bajera	" "
Sunn	Hemp	" "
Sun Kukkeree	Flax	" "
Tei, Stimulant, <i>m</i>	Mustard	
Kow, <i>m</i>	<i>Cooling, Sedative, etc.</i>	Punjaub in general
Kulfa	<i>Astringent, Cooling</i>	" "
Kasencee	<i>Cooling, Sedative</i>	" "
Kurm	" "
Quaar Gundul	Aloes	" "
Poodhena	Peppermint	" "
Neaz Bo, <i>m</i>	Mint	" "
Baboona, <i>m</i>	Camomile	" "
Lassoora	" "
Pugwara	" "
Kutch Naar, <i>m</i>	<i>Astringent</i>	" "

<i>Native Appellations.</i>	<i>English Names.</i>	<i>Places where Produced.</i>
Erund Tel, <i>m</i>	Castor Oil	Punjaub and the Hills
Lac	Lac Dye	" "
Telia, black and white, <i>m</i>	{ <i>Escarotic and Viru- lent Poison</i> }	" "
Nirbubsy, <i>m</i>	"	" "
Tulsee, <i>m</i>	Mint	" "
Merooa, <i>m</i>	Mint	" "
Beedana, <i>m</i>	<i>Emollient</i>	" "
Main Pull, <i>m</i>	<i>Emetic</i>	" "
Castooree, <i>m</i>	Castor	Kúbett
Pum, Pushmeena	"	{ Ladak—Thibet—Is- koordoo
Hermull, <i>m</i>	Wild Rue Seed	"
Thulsee, Carminative, <i>m</i>	Sweet Basil	"
Nerbissee, <i>m</i>	Zedoary	"
Lobia	Cabbage	"
Neel o Phir, <i>m</i>	Water Lily	"
Gool Kyra, <i>m</i>	Lily of the Valley	"
Jaipull, <i>m</i>	Nutmeg	"
Jemaall Gota, <i>m</i>	Croton, <i>Cathartic</i>	"
Googull, <i>m</i>	Gum Bedillium	"
Noc Chikkun, <i>m</i>	Euphorbium	"

TREES AND SHRUBS.

Bore	}	Fir Dale
Peepull		
Burna		
Thunn		
Cheell		
Bear		
Purwa		
Vun	}	Sissoo
Jund		
Kereer Seed <i>m</i>		
Kikker, <i>m</i>		
Tallee		
Kutch Naul*	}	
Swaingena Seed, <i>m</i>		

<i>Native Appellations.</i>	<i>English Names.</i>	<i>Places where Produced.</i>
Ferm Kikker . . .		
Saffedha . . .	White Poplar . . .	Punjab generally.
Chunara . . .		
Cymbull . . .		
Gool Nesthur . . .		
Emlee, Astringent, <i>m</i> . . .	Tamarind . . .	
Aum* . . .	Mangoe . . .	
Jummoo . . .		
Berc,* Nutritive, <i>m</i> . . .		
Lesoora . . .		
Aula* . . .		
Kou . . .	} A kind of Box Wood . . .	
Lou . . .		
Pullaih . . .		
Behera* . . .		
Hareere* . . .		
Kire . . .		
Gondce . . .		
Pona . . .		
Dreke,* <i>m</i> . . .	<i>Bitter Tonic</i> . . .	Hills
Nim,* <i>m</i> . . .	" " . . .	
Jainthe . . .	" . . .	Punjaub
Birmimee . . .	" . . .	Hills
Eerote* . . .		
Emlook . . .		
Pugwara* . . .		
Bedam, <i>m</i> . . .	Almonds, <i>Emollient</i> . . .	Punjaub
Anar,* <i>m</i> . . .	Pomegranite . . .	"
Pull . . .	" . . .	Hills
Mojenoo . . .	" . . .	Punjaub
Eeroo . . .	" . . .	Hills
Hor Singaar . . .	" . . .	Punjaub
Gool Cheen . . .	" . . .	Hills
Reroo . . .	" . . .	Punjaub
Kamecla, <i>m</i> . . .	<i>Seed is Purgative</i> . . .	Hills
Kukera . . .	" . . .	"
Gurria . . .	" . . .	"
Sirrec . . .	" . . .	Punjaub and Hills
Bere Lac . . .	" . . .	Punjaub, etc.
Ikker . . .	" . . .	Hills
Gurna . . .	" . . .	"

MINERALOGICAL PRODUCTIONS.

<i>English Names.</i>	<i>Places where Produced.</i>
Coal, ¹ of 4 sorts . . .	Hills, n. and w.
Galena, 3 kinds, etc. . .	„ in different parts
Iron, 5 kinds, etc. . .	{ „ the entire north, etc.
Salt-rock, 3 kinds . . .	Salt ranges
Alum	Kalabag and salt range
Borax	Thibet
Sulphur, Mineral, etc. . .	{ Cashmeer, Kurwar, and salt range
Sulphate of Iron . . .	Hills, n. and salt range
Pyrites, Iron . . .	„ „
„ Copper and Iron . .	„ „
Crystal rock	Kustwar and Hills
Sulphate, Copper Mine- ral } Copper }	Thibet and Gilghit
Gold, sand* and native† . .	{ *All the Rivers †Thibet, Ladack, etc.
Manganese, Black and } Grey Oxide }	Hills, Jummoo
Antimony, Sulphuret . . .	Gilghit
Saltpetre, or Nitrate of } Potass }	Punjaub and Bar
Muriate of Ammonia . . .	{ Lahore, m. and Thibet native
Lapis Lazuli	„
Nickel Pyrites	Hills, n. salt range
Cobalt „	„ „
Mica, 3 sorts	N. Hills

¹ This is only lignite, of a kind proved useless for most purposes.

MANUFACTURES OF THE PUNJAUB, AND IN THE STATES
DEPENDANT ON IT.

Plain tanned leather, of all sorts, etc.	Lahore, bows and arrows.
Green, Red, Black, etc., dyed Goat and Calf Skins.	Gold, and Silver, and Tin, and Zinc Wire, Lace, and Leaf.
Choumuet or Grained Ass Leather.	Damasked and Plain Iron Matchlocks and Swords, etc., Daggers, etc.
Chamois Leather, dressed, etc.	Steel and Iron Chain Armour.
Indigo, Moulton and Jummo, etc.	Snuff of Peshawar.
Opium, Panjaub in general.	Sulphuric, Nitric, Muriate, and Nitro Muriate, etc., Acids.
Shawl and Pushmeena, etc., Panjaub and Cashmeer, etc.	Muriate of Ammonia.
Chintz, Saubu and the Hills.	Saltpetre or Nitre.
Gool Buddun, or Striped Silk Stuffs.	Alum.
Derü, or Plain Silk Stuff.	Potass.
Silk, etc., Scarfs, Moulton, etc., em- broidered.	Soda.
Coarse Woollen Cloths, Kunla-Looe, etc.	Ivory Work, made and dyed, of all sorts and colours.
Camel Hair Cloth.	Sulphate of Copper, Lahore.
Fine and Coarse Cotton Cloths.	Super Acetate of ditto ditto
Glass and Glass Beads.	Borax, purified, etc.
Paper of different sorts.	Soap.
Fine Date and Straw Net, etc., Work.	Purified Wax and Yellow Candles.
Vinegar from Grapes, etc.	Cinnabar, Lahore.
Needles.	

A LIST OF THE DIFFERENT CASTES IN THE PUNJAUB.

h for Hindoo, m for Mohamedan, and sks. for Seik.

<i>Rajpoot, or 1st Class.</i>	Chib, <i>m</i> and <i>h</i>
Soorj Boonse, <i>h</i>	Jellall, ditto ditto
Chunder Bunse, <i>h</i>	Chundraall, ditto ditto
Jumwall, <i>h</i>	Suddun, <i>m</i>
Chumiall, <i>h</i>	Suttcc, <i>m</i>
Samiall, <i>h</i>	Dhoonde, <i>m</i>
Menass, <i>h</i>	Chittreall, <i>m</i>
Salire, <i>h</i> and <i>m</i>	Pethour, <i>m</i> and <i>h</i>
Rekwall, <i>h</i>	Chouhan, <i>m</i> and <i>h</i>
Bow, <i>h</i> and <i>m</i>	Kukka, <i>m</i>

Bomba, *m*
 Goree, *m* and *h*
 Rungur, *m*
 Thoor, *m*
 Pidaall, *m*
 Sukker, *m*
 Naroo, *m*
 Koker, *m*
 Buttee, *m*
 Johei, *m*
 Pavaan, *m*
 Kotouche, *h*—31

—————
Kotthree or Chetree, 2nd Class.

Kunneh, 2½ Ghura,	} 4 great Families, <i>h</i>
Kopoor,	
Seth,	
Medouthere,	
Jagull, <i>h</i>	
Choperat, <i>h</i>	
Vadoun, <i>h</i>	
Lack Vurria, <i>h</i>	
Saami ock, <i>h</i>	
Thoolce, <i>h</i>	
Thalwar, <i>h</i>	
Maathch, <i>h</i>	
Purce, <i>h</i>	
Mundeh, <i>h</i>	
Mundra joga, <i>h</i>	
Anund, <i>h</i>	
Nigereth, <i>h</i>	
Chouger, <i>h</i>	
Kochen, <i>h</i>	
Doogull, <i>h</i>	
Siotherch, <i>h</i>	
Kokeh, <i>h</i>	
Bolle wallia, <i>h</i> , all Hindoos	
Bobera	
Soe	
Cheddeh	
Rora	
Baunia—28	

—————
Jat, or 3rd Class.

Bojooa, *sks*
 Veeruk, *sks*

Gill, *sks*
 Avan, *sks* and *m*, few
 Duluck, *sks*
 Kukker, ditto
 Lollee, ditto
 Akaulce, ditto
 Gudger, *m*
 Eer, *h*, Itinerate
 Harrei, *m*
 Cheema, *sks*
 Chetta, *m* and *h*
 Chail, ditto ditto
 Doogull, ditto ditto
 Rathaves, ditto ditto
 Sau, ditto ditto
 Gondull, *sks* and *m*
 Ranja, *m* and *h*
 Seetra, *sks* and *m*
 Seecale, ditto ditto
 Trigur, ditto ditto
 Theheem, ditto ditto
 Lack, ditto ditto
 Nichun, ditto ditto
 Mingen, ditto ditto
 Tewanna, *m*
 Jelotha, ditto
 Kotia, ditto
 Herl, ditto
 Curl, ditto
 Gurai, *m*
 Bungu, *sks*
 Behere, *sks*
 Nangere, *sks*
 Sole, *sks*
 Doul, *sks*
 Deu, *sks*
 Dèthe, *sks*
 Saawull, *sks*
 Cheder, *sks*
 Dulloo, *m* and *sks*
 Dother, *sks* and *m*
 Jurah, ditto ditto
 Surah, ditto ditto
 Athar, ditto ditto
 Hathar, ditto ditto
 Buter, ditto ditto

Raah, ditto
 Maun, *sks*
 Buller, *sks* and *m*
 Hère, *sks*
 Tharer, *sks* and *m*
 Veraich, *m* and *sks*
 Lidder, *m* and *sks*
 Mongeth, ditto ditto
 Hanjerah, ditto ditto
 Monèse, *m* and *sks*
 Iase, ditto ditto
 Vuttoo, ditto ditto
 Dilloo, *sks* and *m*
 Mollee, ditto ditto
 Busserah, ditto ditto
 Vaise, *sks*, etc, few *m*
 Somret, *m* and few *sks*
 Soomraah, *m*, mostly
 Saatheh, *m*, ditto
 Ootherah, *m*
 Vaunder, *m*
 Tinset, *m*
 Shopel, *m*, mostly
 Sundoo, *sks* and *m*
 Sindoo, ditto ditto
 Vunon, ditto ditto
 Saungreh, ditto ditto
 Tuddy, ditto ditto
 Merolet, ditto ditto
 Velainche, *sks* and few *m*
 Lilleh, *sks*
 Kellussun, *sks* and *m*
 Thauriwall, ditto ditto—81

Koomeen, or 4th Class.

Telia, *m*
 Mochee, *m*
 Maachee, *m*
 Maskee, *m*
 Mire, *h*
 Jeur, *h*
 Chunger, *m*
 Kirkira, *m*
 Perpunja, *m*
 Doby, *m*
 Berwala, *m*

Nü, *sks* and *m*
 Doom, *m*
 Brahman, *h*
 Putt, *h* and *m*, Itinerate
 Merassee, *m*
 Kunger, *h* and *m*
 Kainchen, ditto ditto
 Sutt Kunger, ditto, Itinerate
 Maithum, *m*
 Gorekund, *m*
 Nutt, *m*, Itinerate
 Baazyghur, *h*, Itinerate
 Molla, *m* and *h*
 Marwaree, *h*
 Kelunder, *m*
 Thurkaan, *sks* and *m*
 Sovar, ditto ditto
 Mussellee, *m*
 Mudjbec, *sks*
 Soniar, *sks*, *h*, and *m*
 Naria, *m*
 Tatiar, *h*, *sks*, and *m*
 Kummiar, *m*
 Kolloll, *m* and *h*
 Kukkazye, *m*
 Jogee, *m* and *h*
 Decount, *h*
 Acharjee, *h*
 Koja, *m*
 Gogrerat, *m* and partly Itinerate—41

Brahman Castes.

Kolia
 Gour
 Gottuck
 Chibber
 Tuk
 Rickea
 Motera
 Acharjee—8

The Four great Classes of Mahometans.

Seid
 Sheik
 Mogull

Pataun
Khoresee.

—————
The Lowest Classes.

Churah, partly Itinerant
Saansce, Itinerant
Gondehlah, ditto
Bouria, ditto
Bungee, partly ditto
Butwall, partly ditto

Meg, partly ditto
Berhera, Itinerant
Gogera Cheera, ditto—9
Jinsee
Mauthom
Baroopia
Sepaida
Godeela
Hollol Kore—15

From Smyth's History of the Reigning Family of Lahore, 1847.

APPENDIX No. V.

Like districts of Hindoostan, the Punjab generally produces two crops, Rubbee and Khureef. The Rubbee cultivation commences about the end of October, and continues up to the first week in December; and as it is the staple crop, the best land is selected. Khureef operations commence in July, after the first fall of rain, and do not last more than a month. The following is a partial list of articles cultivated in each crop:—

RUBBEE CROP.

<i>English.</i>	<i>Native Name.</i>
Gram	Chunna
Wheat	Gehun
	Sursun
Linseed	Ulsee
Barley	Jao
Safflower	Kusumba
Dall	Masur
	Sawawa
	Bakla
Opium	Post
Onions	Piaz
Garlic	Luhsoon
Tobacco	Tumbakoo
Egg Plant	Baigan
Five-stamined Luffa	Gheea-turai
Angular-fruited Luffa	Chaola-turai
Water Melon	Turbooja
Colocynth	Indrayna
Melon	Khurbooza
Hairy Mamordica	Kurela
Senna	Sunna
Parsley	Ajmod

<i>English.</i>	<i>Native Name.</i>
Indian Hemp	Bhang Tukmalunga
Spogel seed	Isaf-ghol
Cucumber	Kheear Kakree
Henna	Mendee
Indigo	Neel
Dill	Ajwain
Coriander	Dhuneea
Fennel	Kalizira
Anise	Sonf
Leek	Gandana Ghumhi
Turnip	Shalgum Khaksar
Indian Dill	Son
Cummin	Zira
Cowage	Kawaneh
Green Amaranth	Hura Sag
Fenugreek	Methee

KHUREEF CROP.

	Mothee
Cotton	Poomba Koodec
Black Joar	Kala Joar
Millet	Sour Bajra Mangee Arah Mas
Indian Corn	Mukaee Ahari Till
Sugar-cane	Guna
Rice	Chaul
Capsicum	Lal Mirch
Dolieos	Lobeca
Edible Arum	Kuch Aloo
Ghoran	Nurma Buree
Turnip	Shalgum
Hoary Mustard	Sufaid Raee
Radish	Moolee Cuddoo
Turmeric	Huldee



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