

A
S Y S T E M
O F
M O R A L
P H I L O S O P H Y,
I N T H R E E B O O K S ;

WRITTEN BY THE LATE
FRANCIS HUTCHESON, L. L. D.
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT,
BY HIS SON FRANCIS HUTCHESON, M. D.

To which is prefixed
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER OF THE AUTHOR,
BY THE REVEREND WILLIAM LEECHMAN, D. D.
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V O L U M E I.

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TO THE RIGHT REVEREND
FATHER IN GOD,
EDWARD,
LORD BISHOP OF ELPHIN.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship's known regard for the sacred interests of Virtue and true Religion, is sufficient to ensure your favourable reception of any work which tends to promote those great and important ends. The following has yet a farther claim to your Lordship's favour. The Author, my excellent Father, (your Lordship knows I exceed not the truth in calling him so) was formerly honoured with a place in your friendship. As this was a source of the highest pleasure to him while he lived, so it must reflect particular honour upon his memory. It is with pleasure I embrace this public opportunity of declaring myself, with the highest respect and gratitude,

MY LORD,

Your LORDSHIP's most obedient,
and most humble Servant,

DUBLIN, }
Jan. 25, 1755. }

FRANCIS HUTCHESON.

T H E
P R E F A C E,

Giving some ACCOUNT of the LIFE, WRITINGS,
and CHARACTER of the AUTHOR.

DR. FRANCIS HUTCHESON was born on the 8th of August, A. D. 1694. His father, Mr. John Hutcheson, was minister of a dissenting congregation in the North of Ireland; a person of good understanding, considerable learning, and reputation for piety, probity, and all virtue. His son Francis, when about eight years of age, was sent to be educated along with his elder brother, under the eye and direction of their grandfather Mr. Alexander Hutcheson, who was also a worthy dissenting clergyman in the same part of the country, but had come from Scotland. He was second son of an ancient and reputable family in the shire of Ayr in that kingdom.

A superior capacity, an ardent thirst for knowledge, and the seeds of the finest dispositions soon began to

shew themselves in Francis: particularly a singular warmth of affection and disinterestedness of temper, for which he was distinguished thro' his whole life, appeared in many instances in this early period of it. The innocence and sweetness of his temper, his great capacity and application to his learning soon procured him a distinguishing place in his grandfather's affections. But such was his love for his brother, that his grandfather's fondness gave him no joy while his brother did not equally share it: nay the preference that was shewn him gave him real concern, and put him upon employing all means and innocent artifices in his power to make his brother appear equally deserving of his grandfather's regard. And when his grandfather in his last will had made an alteration of a prior settlement of his family-affairs in his favour, tho' many arguments were used by his relations to prevail with him to accept of it, he peremptorily refused, and insisted to the last that the first settlement should take place. These, and many other instances of the like kind which might be related, were promising prefaces of remarkable disinterestedness in more advanced years.

When he had gone thro' the common course of school education he was sent to an Academy at some distance from his parents to begin his course of Philosophy: he was taught there the ordinary Scholastic Philosophy which was in vogue in those days, and to which he applied himself with uncommon assiduity and diligence.

In the year 1710 he removed from the Academy, and entered a student in the Natural Philosophy class in the University of Glasgow, and at the same time renewed his study of the Latin and Greek languages: and in all parts of literature, to which he applied himself, he made such proficiency as might be expected from a genius like his cultivated with great care and diligence.

After he had finished the usual course of philosophical studies, his thoughts were turned toward Divinity, which he proposed to make the peculiar study and profession of his life. For prosecution of which design he continued several years more at the University of Glasgow studying Theology under the direction of the reverend and learned Professor John Simson.

Among the manifold theological enquiries which occurred to him as deserving his most serious examination; he chused to begin with the grand fundamental one concerning the being, perfections, and providence of God. The reverend Dr. Clark's learned and ingenious book on this subject, published a short time before, fell into his hands. Tho' he most heartily approved of all the Doctor's conclusions, and had the highest sense of his singular abilities and virtues, yet after the most serious and attentive consideration of his arguments, he did not find that conviction from them which he wished and expected. In order to procure more satisfaction on this subject, and particularly with regard to the force and solidity of the arguments *a priori* (as they are commonly called) he wrote a letter to him, about the year 1717, urging his objections, and desiring a further explication. Whether the Doctor returned any answer to this letter does not appear from Dr. Hutcheson's papers. After all the enquiry he could make, he still continued extremely doubtful of the justness and force of all the metaphysical arguments, by which many have endeavoured to demonstrate the existence, unity, and perfections of

the Deity. He not only thought that these kind of arguments were not adapted to the capacity of the bulk of mankind, but even that they could afford no solid and permanent conviction to the learned themselves. It was his opinion in this early part of his life, and he never saw cause to alter it, that as some subjects from their nature are capable of a demonstrative evidence, so others admit only of a probable one; and that to seek demonstration where probability can only be obtained is almost as unreasonable as to demand to see sounds or hear colours. Besides he was persuaded that attempts to demonstration on such subjects as are incapable of it were of very dangerous consequence to the interests of truth and religion: because such attempts instead of conducting us to the absolute certainty proposed, leave the mind in such a state of doubt and uncertainty as leads to absolute scepticism: for if once we refuse to rest in that kind of evidence, which the nature of the subject only admits of, and go on in pursuit of the highest kind, strict demonstration, we immediately conclude there is no evidence, because we do not meet with that kind of it which we expected: and thus the mind remains in a state of

absolute uncertainty, imagining there is no evidence, when all that the nature of the case admits of is laid before it, and enough to satisfy every one whose understanding is not disordered with an unnatural thirst for scientific knowledge on all subjects alike. This opinion of the various degrees of evidence adapted to various subjects first led Dr. Hutcheson to treat morals as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the abstract relations of things. But of this more particularly hereafter.

After he had spent six years at the University of Glasgow, he returned to Ireland, and submitted to trials, in order to enter into the ministry, and was licensed to preach among the Dissenters. He was just about to be settled a minister in a small dissenting congregation in the North of Ireland, when some gentlemen about Dublin, who knew that his abilities and virtues qualified him to be more extensively useful than he could possibly be in that remote congregation, invited him to take up a private academy there. He complied with the invitation, and acquitted himself in that station with such dignity and success as gave entire satisfaction to all those who committed their

children to his care; and soon drew the attention of the public upon him. He had been fixed but a short time in Dublin when his singular merit and accomplishments made him generally known: men of all ranks, who had any taste for literature, or esteem for learned men, sought his acquaintance and friendship. Among others he was honoured with a place in the esteem and friendship of the late Lord Viscount Moleworth, who took pleasure in his conversation, and assisted him with his criticisms and observations to improve and polish the Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, before it came abroad. The reverend Dr. Synge, now Lord Bishop of Elphin, whose friendship Dr. Hutcheson always regarded as one of the greatest pleasures and advantages of his life, likewise revised his papers, and assisted him in the general scheme of the work.

The first edition came abroad without the author's name, but the merit of the performance would not suffer him to be long conceal'd: such was the reputation of the work, and the ideas it had raised of the author, that Lord Granville, who was then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, whose discernment and taste as to

works of genius and literature is univerfally acknowledged, fent his private fecretary to enquire at the bookfellers for the author, and when he could not learn his name, he left a letter to be conveyed to him, in confequence of which he foon became acquainted with his Excellency, and was treated by him all the time he continued in his government with the moft diftinguifhing marks of familiarity and efteem.

From this time his acquaintance began to be ftill more courted by moft men of diftinction either for ftation or literature in Ireland. Archbifhop King, the author of the book *De Origine Mali*, held Dr. Hutche- fon in great efteem, and his friendship was of great ufe to him in an affair which might otherwife have been very troublefome to him, and perhaps ended in putting an entire ftop to his ufefulness in that place. There were two feveral attempts made to profecute Mr. Hutche fon, in the Archbifhop's court, for daring to take upon him the education of youth, without having qualified himfelf by fubfcribing the ecclefia- ftical canons, and obtaining a licence from the Bifhop. Both thefe attempts were effectually difcouraged by his Grace, with expreffions of hearty difpleafure againft

the persons who were so forward as to commence them. And at the same time he assured him that he needed be under no apprehension of disturbance from that quarter, as long as it continued in his power to prevent it.

He had also a large share in the esteem of the late Primate Bolter, who, thro' his influence, made a donation to the University of Glasgow, of an yearly fund for an exhibitioner, to be bred to any of the learned professions. This is only one instance among many of that prelate's munificent temper. Mr. West, a gentleman of great abilities, and of known zeal for the interests of civil and religious liberty, was particularly fond of Dr. Hutcheson, and lived in great intimacy with him, while he continued in Ireland.

A few years after the Enquiry the Treatise on the Passions was published: as both these books have been long abroad in the world and undergone several impressions, a sufficient proof of the reception they have met with from the public, it would be needless to say any thing concerning them. About this time he wrote some philosophical papers accounting for Laughter, in a different way from Mr. Hobbs, and more honour-

able to human nature: these papers were published in the collection called Hibernicus Letters. Some letters in the London Journal 1728 subscribed Philaretus, containing objections to some parts of the doctrine in *the Enquiry*, occasioned Mr. Hutcheson's giving answers to them in those public papers: both the letters and answers were afterwards published in a separate pamphlet. The debate was left unfinished, Philaretus's death having put an end to the correspondence, which was proposed to have been afterward carried on in a more private manner.

After he had taught the private Academy in Dublin for seven or eight years with great reputation and success; in the year 1729 he was called to Scotland to be a Professor of Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. His established reputation for literature and worth was the only consideration that induced the University to elect him into the place vacant by the death of the learned and worthy Mr. Gershom Carmichael. The public approved of their choice, and the event abundantly justified the wisdom of it. The Professors were soon sensible, that his admission into their body had good effects both upon the reputation and inte-

rests of the society. Several young gentlemen came along with him from the Academy, and his just fame drew many more both from England and Ireland. But it will probably be rather matter of surprize to the reader, that he accepted of the place, than that the University unsolicited made him the offer of it. If any one should ask, as it is natural to do, how it came to pass that a man of Dr. Hutcheson's accomplishments and virtues, and who could count such lists of honourable persons, and many of them of great authority and influence, in the number of his friends, should continue to teach a private Academy for seven or eight years in the heart of a country where there were so many beneficial places proper to be bestowed on men of genius and merit. Or if any one should ask, how it came to pass that he was permitted, to leave his country, break off all connections with his relations and friends, and in the midst of life remove to another kingdom to accept a place in an University far from being lucrative and very laborious? It is sufficient to answer to these questions: that it was not the want either of inclination or power in his friends to serve him that was the stop to his preferment. He

had private reasons which determined him neither to seek promotion, nor to encourage the most probable schemes proposed to him for obtaining it. It is but justice to his character to say, that he was useful and contented in that station in which it had pleased Divine Providence to fix him, and that neither the love of riches, nor of the elegance or grandeur of human life prevailed so far in his breast as to make him offer the least violence to his inward sentiments. To which it may be added, that the silent and unseen hand of an all-wise Providence which over-rules all the events of human life, and all the resolutions of the human will, conducted him to that station in life, which tho' far from being the highest in external distinction, yet was perhaps of all others the most suited to the singular talents with which he was endowed, and gave him the opportunity of being more eminently and extensively useful than he could have been in any other.

After his settlement in the College he was not obliged (as when he kept the Academy) to teach the languages and all the different parts of Philosophy, but had leisure to turn his chief attention to his favourite study Human Nature: he had high thoughts of its

original dignity, and was persuaded, that even in this corrupt state, it was capable of great improvements by proper instruction and assiduous culture. The profession of Moral Philosophy was the province assigned him in the College. In cultivating this science he pursued the same method in which he began, setting aside all researches into the abstract relations and eternal fitness and unfitness of things, and directing his enquiries into what is more obvious and immediately known from observation and experience, viz. What is in fact the present constitution of human nature; what is that state of heart, and course of life which is most correspondent to the whole frame.

He had observed, that it was the happiness and glory of the present age, that they had thrown off the method of forming hypotheses and suppositions in natural philosophy, and had set themselves to make observations and experiments on the constitution of the material world itself, and to mark the powers and principles which are discerned operating in it: he saw plainly that it was by adhering strictly to this method that natural philosophy had been carried to a greater degree of perfection than ever it was before, and that

it is only by pursuing the same method that we can hope to reach higher improvements in that science. He was convinced that in like manner a true scheme of morals could not be the product of genius and invention, or of the greatest precision of thought in metaphysical reasonings, but must be drawn from proper observations upon the several powers and principles which we are conscious of in our own bosoms, and which must be acknowledged to operate in some degree in the whole human species. And that therefore, one proper method at least to be followed in the moral science, is to inquire into our internal structure as a constitution or system composed of various parts, to observe the office and end of each part, with the natural subordination of those parts to one another, and from thence to conclude what is the design of the whole, and what is the course of action for which it appears to be intended by its great Author. He thought there was ground to hope, that from a more strict philosophical enquiry into the various natural principles or natural dispositions of mankind, in the same way that we enquire into the structure of an animal body, of a plant, or of the solar system, a more

exact theory of morals may be formed, than has yet appeared: and a theory too built upon such an obvious and firm foundation as would be satisfactory to every candid enquirer. For we can be as certain of the several parts of our internal frame from inward perception and feeling, as we are of the several parts of an animal structure from ocular inspection: and we can as little doubt of the ends for which the principal parts at least of our internal constitution are intended, as we can doubt of the ends for which the members of our body, or our external senses were framed: and whatever evidence we have for the existence and perfections of the Supreme Being, we have the same evidence that the moral constitution of our nature is his work, and thence we conclude, that it is most certainly his will, that we should cultivate that temper of mind, and pursue that course of life, which is most correspondent to the evident ends and purposes of his divine workmanship; and that such a state of heart and plan of life, as answers most effectually the end and design of all the parts of it, must be its most perfect manner of operation, and must constitute the duty, the happiness, and perfection of the order of beings to whom it belongs.

Our author has attempted in the following work, first to unfold the several principles of the human mind as united in a moral constitution, and from thence to point out the origin of our ideas of moral good and evil, and of our sense of duty, or moral obligation; and then to enquire what must be the supreme happiness to a species constituted as mankind are; and then he proceeds to deduce the particular laws of nature, or rules necessary to be observed for promoting the general good in our common intercourses with one another as members of society. How far he has succeeded, must be left to the judgment of the attentive and candid reader.

Whatever corrections or improvements his scheme may be supposed to admit of, after longer observation and further examination into the frame and operations of our minds, one thing is certain that the result of his observations and reasonings must meet with entire approbation, as it places the highest virtue and excellence of a human character, where all sound Philosophy and Divine Revelation has placed it, viz. *In such habitual and prevailing exercise of all these good affections to God and man, as will restrain all other appetites, passions, and affections within just bounds, and*

*carry us out uniformly to pursue that course of action, which will promote the happiness of mankind in the most extensive manner to which our power can reach**. And it must also be acknowledged, that our Author's doctrine, which asserts that we are laid under a real internal obligation, of a most sacred kind, from the very constitution of our nature †, to promote the good of mankind, tho' at the expence of sacrificing life itself and all its enjoyments, coincides, or at least is no way inconsistent with these precepts of Christianity, by which we are enjoined to lay down our lives for the

* Some seem to have mistaken our Author's doctrine so widely, as to imagine that he placed virtue in the mere sentiment or perception of moral beauty and deformity in affections and actions, which it is owned the worst of mankind may retain in a very considerable degree. Whereas he always places it in the exercise of these affections and actions flowing from them which the moral faculty recommends and enjoins. Or in other words, virtue does not lye in the mere sentiment of approbation of certain affections and actions, but in acting agreeably to it.

† Some seem to have mistaken Dr. Hutcheson so far on this subject, as to imagine, that when he says we are laid under a most real and intimate obligation by the moral sense to act virtuously, he meant to assert that all other obligations from the consideration of the will of God, and the effects of his favour or displeasure in this

and in another world were superseded. Nothing could be farther from his thoughts; nor is it a consequence of his scheme. He was fully sensible of the importance and necessity of enforcing the practice of virtue upon mankind from all possible considerations, and especially from these awful ones of future rewards and punishments. If any one should say, that there is a natural sense of equity implanted in the human mind, which will operate in some degree even on those who know not that there is a God or a future state: it could not justly be concluded from thence, that such a person also maintained, that this natural sense of equity alone, was sufficient to ensure the uniform practice of justice, in all mankind, even when meeting with numberless strong temptations to depart from it. The application is so obvious, that it is needless to insist upon it.

bretheren; while at the same time it gives us more just, more amiable and worthy ideas of human nature, as originally intended to be actuated by more disinterested principles, than these philosophers are willing to allow, who labour to reduce all the motions of the human mind to self-love at bottom, however much they may seem to be different from it at first appearance. According to our Author's views of human nature, tho' these generous principles may be born down and over-powered in this corrupt state, by sensual and selfish passions, so as not to exert themselves with sufficient vigour, even when there is proper occasion for them; yet the intention of the Author of Nature is abundantly manifest from this important circumstance, that the moral sense is always so far true to its office; that it never fails to give the highest and warmest approbation to every instance of truly disinterested virtue. The less suspicion there is of any view even to future fame in the behaviour of the martyr, the patriot, or hero, when he yields up his life in a worthy cause, so much louder and stronger is the applause of all spectators, and so far as any interested considerations are supposed to influence him, the approbation

given to him is proportionably diminished: according to this representation of things, the soul of man, not only bears a resemblance of the Divine Intelligence in its rational faculties, but also of the Divine disinterested benignity in its social and public affections: and thus too our internal constitution, formed for pursuing the general good, beautifully tallies with the constitution of the universe: we see thro' the whole of Nature what admirable provision is made for carrying on the general interests of all the species of living beings. So that it is quite agreeable to the analogy of Nature, that mankind, the highest order of creatures in this lower world, should be formed with dispositions to promote the general good of their species, and with a discernment that it is their duty to part with life itself, when a public interest requires it.

But Dr. Hutcheson's character, as a man of parts and learning, does not depend merely on the peculiarities of a scheme of morals. His knowledge was by no means confined to his own system: that he was well acquainted with the writings both of the ancients and moderns relative to morality, religion, and government will appear evident to every one who per-

uses the following work. Nor did the study of morals, even in this extensive view, engross his whole time and attention. An ardent love of knowledge was natural to him. He loved truth, and fought after it with impartiality and constancy. His apprehension was quick and his memory strong: he was not only patient of thought and enquiry, but delighted in it. His mind was never subject to that languor which frequently interrupts the studies of worthy men: his faculties were always at his command and ready for exercise. A mind endowed and disposed in such a manner, and employed in study for a long course of years, must have been furnished with a large compass of knowledge.

In the earlier part of his life he entered deeply into the spirit of the ancients, and was soon sensible of and admired that justness and simplicity both of thought and expression which has preserved and distinguished their writings to this day. He read the historians, poets, and orators of antiquity with a kind of enthusiasm, and at the same time with a critical exactness. He had read the poets especially so often, that he retained large passages of them in his memory, which he frequently and elegantly applied to the subjects he

had occasion to treat in the course of his prelections. His knowledge and taste in Latin appears from what he has wrote in it. His Synopsis of Metaphysics, Pneumatics, Natural Theology, and his Compend of Ethics are written with a spirit and purity of style seldom to be met with in modern Latin compositions.

He had studied all the parts of Philosophy with such care as to have attained clear and comprehensive views of them. He composed a small treatise of Logic, which tho' not designed for the public eye, yet gives sufficient proof how much he was master of that science. It appears from his treatise of Metaphysics, that he was well acquainted with the logomachies, meaningless questions, and trivial debates of the old Scholastics, which had thrown a thick darkness on that part of Philosophy: he has set that branch of knowledge in a clear light, and rendered it instructive and entertaining. He understood Natural Philosophy as it is now improved by the assistance of Mathematics and experiments, and applied his knowledge of it to the noble purposes of establishing the grand truths of the existence, the perfections, and government of God. He was well acquainted with the history of the arts

and sciences: he had carefully traced them from their origin, thro' all their various improvements, progresses, interruptions, and revolutions, and marked the characters of the most remarkable Philosophers, and the distinguishing doctrines and peculiar genius of their Philosophy. Besides he knew the civil and ecclesiastical history both of antient and modern times with an exactness that was surprizing in one so much conversant in deeper and severer studies. He had studied too the original language of the Old Testament, and tho' his other necessary studies had not permitted him to become a critic in it himself, yet he knew the most important criticisms of the learned in that way.

His great capacity appeared in the strongest light, in his conversation with his friends; there he discovered such a readiness of thought, clearness of expression, and extent of knowledge, on almost every subject that could be started, as gave delight to all who heard him. There are some men who have amassed great stores of learning, but it is repositied as it were in some corner of the mind, and requires time to recollect it and bring it forth. In others you see their great erudition seems to darken their conceptions and

disturb their views of things, by the different ideas which crowd into their minds at once. But the whole compass of his knowledge lay as it were always before him, and was at his command at all times; and he saw at once whatever was connected with his present subject, and rejected what did not belong to it. He spoke on the most difficult and abstruse subjects without any labour and with a degree of perspicuity which would have cost other men of no mean parts repeated efforts, without equal success: he exposed and took to pieces deceitful reasonings with the greatest facility; and distinguished at once, betwixt true learning and false, betwixt subjects which admit of demonstration, and such as do not, and betwixt questions which are useful and important, and such as are only curious and amusing. He gave an habitual attention to the real uses to which knowledge could be applied in life. He did not chuse to amuse with insignificant speculations, but in all his enquiries having the real good and utility of mankind in view, he took occasion even from metaphysical disputes, (of which no other use could be made) to repress that pride and vanity that is apt to puff up young minds from a notion of their

superior knowledge, by shewing how incapable the acutest of mankind are of penetrating into the intimate nature and essences of things.

These singular abilities and talents were united in Dr. Hutcheson with the most amiable dispositions and most useful virtues: the purity of his manners was unspotted from his youth: as he always express the highest indignation against vice, he kept at the greatest distance from it, avoiding even the smallest indecencies of conduct: but this severity of virtue was without any thing of that sourness, stiffness, or unsociableness which sometimes accompanies it, and renders characters, otherwise valuable, in some respects disagreeable, and prevents the good effects that the example of their virtues might produce upon others. His integrity was strict and inviolable: he abhorred the least appearance of deceit either in word or action: he contemned those little artifices which too frequently pass in the world for laudable arts of address, and proofs of superior prudence: his nature was frank, and open, and warmly disposed, to speak what he took to be true: you saw at first sight his sincere and upright soul, and in all further intercourse with him you found

him always the same. He was all benevolence and affection; none who saw him could doubt of it; his air and countenance bespoke it. It was to such a degree his prevailing temper, that it gave a tincture to his writings, which were perhaps as much dictated by his heart as his head: and if there was any need of an apology for the strefs that in his scheme seems to be laid upon the friendly and public affections, the prevalence of them in his own temper would at least form an amiable one.

His heart was finely turned for friendship; he was sparing indeed of the external professions of it, but liberal of its most important offices: he was the refuge of his friends for advice and assistance in all cases of perplexity and distress. The ardor of his affection for his friends got the better of a natural reluctance he had to ask favours, which no regard for his own interests could have overcome: his kind offices were far from being confined to the circle of his particular friends and relations; his heart overflowed with goodwill to all around him, and prompted him to embrace every opportunity of doing kind and obliging things. Tho' there are but few to be found who had such a

keen thirst for knowledge, or who pursued it with such unremitting attention and vigour; yet even this taste yielded on all occasions to the more important one of doing good. Among many other acts of beneficence, he took a peculiar delight in assisting worthy young men, in straitened circumstances, to prosecute their studies with his money, and admitting them to attend his colleges without paying the customary fees.

A remarkable degree of a rational enthusiasm for the interests of learning, liberty, religion, virtue, and human happiness, which animated him at all times, was a distinguishing part of his character: he was visibly moved by some of these noble principles in whatever he said or did. They had such an ascendancy over him as gave a peculiar cast to his whole conversation and behaviour, and formed in him a public spirit of a very extensive kind. Public spirit in him was not a vague and undetermined kind of ardor, for something unknown or not distinctly understood; but it was an enlightened and universal zeal for every branch of human happiness, and the means of promoting it. His love of valuable knowledge, his unabating activity in pursuing it and spreading a taste for it, fitted him, in a

very fingular manner, for that ftation which Providence had affigned him. And perhaps very few men, even in fimilar ftations, have difcovered equal zeal, or had equal fuccesfs, in promoting a tafte for true literature: but his zeal was not confined to what peculiarly belonged to his own profeflion, but extended to every thing that could contribute to the improvement of human life. When he fpoke, you would have imagined that he had been employed in almoft all the different ftations in fociety, fo clearly did he appear to underftand the interefts of each, and fuch an earneft defire did he exprefs for promoting them. His benevolent heart took great delight in planning fchemes for rectifying fomething amifs, or improving fomething already right, in the different orders and ranks of mankind. Thefe fchemes were not airy and romantic, but fuch as were practicable, and might have deferved the attention of thofe whofe power and influence in fociety could have enabled them to carry them into execution. This warm zeal for public good appeared uppermoft in his thoughts not only in his more ferious, but alfo in his gayer hours. But while he abounded in projects for the interefts of others, none

ever heard of one which centered in himself. It has already been observed, that in the earlier part of life, when the taste for external enjoyments is commonly strongest, he did not listen to proposals which offered prospects of rising to wealth and preferment: in a more advanced age, but when he was still in such a vigorous state of health, as he might have hoped for many years longer of life, he had offers made of removing him to the University of Edinburgh, to be Professor of Moral Philosophy there, which might have been a more lucrative place to him, and given him better opportunities of forming connections with people of the first rank and distinction in this country, but he was contented with his present situation, and discouraged all attempts to change it.

These singular accomplishments and moral endowments rendered his conversation, especially among his friends, so entertaining and instructive, that it was a school of wisdom to those who had the happiness to enjoy it. It must have been an undiscerning company which did not receive both pleasure and improvement from him. A remarkable vivacity of thought and expression, a perpetual flow of cheerfulness and good-

will, and a visible air of inward happiness, made him the life and genius of society, and spread an enlivening influence every where around him. He was gay and pleasant, full of mirth and raillery, familiar and communicative to the last degree, and utterly free from all stateliness or affectation. No symptoms of vanity or self-conceit appeared in him. He sought not after fame, nor had he any vain complacency in the unsought possession of it. While he was visibly superior to others about him, he was the only one that was quite insensible of it. His own talents and endowments were not the objects on which his thoughts were employed: he was always carried away from attending to himself, by the exercise of kind affections, zeal for some public generous designs, or keen enquiries after truth. This was such an acknowledged part of his character, that even those who were least disposed to think well of him, never insinuated that he was proud or vain: the natural modesty of his temper was heightened and refined by his religious sentiments.

He had a full persuasion and warm sense of the great truths of natural and revealed religion, and of the importance of just and rational devotion to the happi-

ness of human life, and to the stability and purity of a virtuous character. The power of devout sentiments over his mind appeared in his conversation : in his public prelections he frequently took occasion from any hints which his subject afforded him, as well as when it was the direct subject itself, to run out at great length, and with great ardor, on the reasonableness and advantages of habitual regards to God, and of referring all our talents, virtues, and enjoyments to his bounty. Such habitual references appeared to him the surest means of checking those emotions of pride, vain complacency, and self-applause, which are apt to spring up in the minds of those, who do not seriously and frequently reflect, that they did not make themselves *to differ from others, and that they have nothing but what they received*. Such sentiments deeply rooted in the mind, he looked upon as the proper foundation of that simplicity of heart and life, which is the highest perfection of a virtuous character.

Such abilities, such dispositions, and such stores of knowledge, as have been mentioned, accompanied with a happy talent of speaking with ease, with propriety and spirit, rendered him one of the most masterly and

engaging teachers that has appeared in our age. He had a great fund of natural eloquence and a persuasive manner: he attended indeed much more to sense than expression, and yet his expression was good: he was master of that precision and accuracy of language which is necessary in philosophical enquiries. But he did not look upon it as his duty, either in his prelections, or in his writings upon moral and religious subjects, to keep up strictly at all times to the character of the didactic teacher, by confining himself to all the precision requisite in accurate explication and strict argument. He apprehended that he was answering the design of his office as effectually, when he dwelt in a more diffusive manner upon such moral considerations as are suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for virtue, as when explaining or establishing any doctrine, even of real importance, with the most philosophical exactness: he regarded the culture of the heart as a main end of all moral instruction: he kept it habitually in view, and he was extremely well qualified for succeeding in it, so far as human means can go: he had an uncommon vivacity of thought and sensibility of temper, which rendered him quickly suscep-

tible of the warmest emotions upon the great subjects of morals and religion: this gave a pleasant uncti^on to his discourses, which commanded the attention of the students, and at the same time left strong impressions upon their minds: he filled their hearts with a new and higher kind of pleasure than they had any experience of before, when he opened to their view, in his animated manner, large fields of science of which hitherto they had no conception: when, for instance, he pointed out to his pupils, in his lectures on Natural Theology, the numberless evidences of wonderful art and kind design in the structure of particular things, and the still more astonishing evidences of the wisest contrivance, and of the most benign intention, in the whole material system considered as one thing, it is easy to conceive that their tender minds, warm with the love of knowledge, would be greatly struck. Such views of nature were new discoveries to them, which filled them with delight and astonishment, and gave them at the same time the most joyful and satisfying conviction of the being and perfections of the great Author of all. In like manner, when he led them from the view of the external world to the contemplation of

the internal one, the soul of man, and shewed them like instances of Divine wisdom and benignity in the contrivance of its moral constitution, they were filled with fresh delight and wonder, and discerned new and encreasing proofs of the glorious perfections of the Father of our spirits. And when he described the several virtues exercised in real life, as beautiful in themselves, as the noblest employment of our rational and moral powers, as the only sources of true dignity and happiness to individuals and to communities, they were charmed with the lovely forms, and panted *to be* what they beheld. The pleasure springing from the light of truth and beauty of virtue breaking in upon ingenious and well-disposed minds, excited such a keen desire of knowledge, and such an ardor of pursuing it, as suspended for a time those impulses of youthful passions which are apt to hurry young men away, in that period of life. But that it may not be imagined these strong effects are entirely to be ascribed to the charms of novelty, it deserves to be taken notice of, that students advanced in years and knowledge chused to attend his lectures on Moral Philosophy, for four, five, or six years together, still finding

fresh entertainment, tho' the subject in the main was the same every season.

It was a great addition to the usefulness of his lessons, that they were not confined to high speculations, and the peculiarities of a scheme, but frequently descended to common life, sometimes pointing out and exposing fashionable vices and follies in the upper part of the world, departures from real justice and equity in the busy and commercial part of it, and the dangerous rocks on which youth is apt to split and make shipwreck both of virtue and happiness; and at other times insisting upon matters acknowledged by all, to be of the highest importance. The grand maxims he dwelt upon, and laboured to instil into the minds of his pupils, were to rejoice above all things in the firm persuasion of the universal Providence of a Being infinitely wise and good, who loves all his works, and cannot be conceived as hating any thing he hath made. This he constantly inculcated in the warmest manner, “ as a steady foundation of entire trust and
“ confidence in him, and chearful submission to his
“ will in all events. That sufferings may be considered
“ as our greatest blessings, by giving us an opportu-

“ nity of practising the most sublime virtues, such as
“ resignation to the will of God, forgiving of injuries,
“ returning good for evil, and by leading us to form
“ just notions of the vanity of all things, except the
“ love of God, and the love and practice of universal
“ goodness: that all our advantages, of all kinds, are
“ things which ought never to be ascribed to ourselves,
“ but to God the giver of all. That love and gratitude
“ ascribing to him the glory of all that is excellent,
“ joined to a vigorous zeal of doing good, seems to
“ be the height of human perfection.” He delivered
himself on these grand topics in that simple but striking
manner which immediately touches the heart, and
presents the imagination with the most beautiful and
engaging forms.

As he had occasion every year in the course of his
lectures to explain the origin of government, and com-
pare the different forms of it, he took peculiar care,
while on that subject, to inculcate the importance of
civil and religious liberty to the happiness of mankind:
as a warm love of liberty, and manly zeal for promot-
ing it, were ruling principles in his own breast, he always
insisted upon it at great length, and with the greatest

strength of argument and earnestness of persuasion: and he had such success on this important point, that few, if any, of his pupils, whatever contrary prejudices they might bring along with them, ever left him without favourable notions of that side of the question which he espoused and defended.

Besides his constant lectures five days of the week, on Natural Religion, Morals, Jurisprudence, and Government, he had another lecture three days of the week, in which some of the finest writers of antiquity, both Greek and Latin, on the subject of Morals, were interpreted, and the language as well as the sentiment explained in a very masterly manner.

Besides these sets of lectures he gave a weekly one on the Sunday-evening, on the truth and excellency of Christianity, in which he produced and illustrated, with clearness and strength, all the evidences of its truth and importance, taking his views of its doctrines and divine scheme from the original records of the New Testament, and not from the party-tenets or scholastic systems of modern ages: this was the most crowded of all his lectures, as all the different sorts and ranks of students, being at liberty from their pe-

cular purfuits on this day, chufed to attend it, being always fure of finding both pleasure and inftruction.

A Mafter, of fuch talents, fuch affiduity in the duties of his office, with the accomplifhments of the gentleman, and fond of well-difpofed youth, entering into their concerns, encouraging and befriending them on all occafions, could not fail to gain their efteem and affections in a very high degree. This gave him a great influence over them, which he employed to the excellent purpofes of ftamping virtuous impreffions upon their hearts, and awakening in them a tafte for literature, fine arts, and every thing that is ornamental or ufeful to human life. And he had remarkable fuccefs in reviving the ftudy of ancient literature, particularly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the Univerfity before his time : he fpread fuch an ardor for knowledge, and fuch a fpirit of enquiry every where around him, that the converfation of the ftudents at their focial walks and vifits turned with great keennefs upon fubjects of learning and tafte, and contributed greatly to animate and carry them forward in the moft valuable purfuits. He did not confine his attention to the pupils immediately under his care, but laid

himself out to be useful to the students in all the different faculties, whenever any opportunity offered: and he was especially solicitous to be serviceable to the students of divinity, endeavouring, among other important instructions, to give them just notions of the main design of preaching. High speculations on disputable points, either of Theology or Philosophy, he looked upon as altogether improper for the pulpit, at least on all ordinary occasions. He particularly insisted upon the uselessness and impropriety of handling in the pulpit such speculative questions, as, whether human nature is capable of disinterested affections, whether the original of duty or moral obligation is from natural conscience, or moral sense, from law, or from rational views of interest, and such like enquiries. Tho' such disquisitions might be proper and even necessary in a school of philosophy *, yet in his view of things

* According to our Author's scheme it is only vindicating the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, manifested in the constitution of our nature, to assert the existence and binding authority of the moral sense; because whatever other obligations we may be under, this internal one will co-operate with them, when the mind perceives them, and will exercise its authority without them, when thro' a variety of causes we may be hindered from attending

to them. Is the law of God duly promulgated the supreme obligation on all intelligent beings? in this view of obligation, the internal law will co-operate with the external one, when we are attentive to its authority; and when we are not, it will be a rule of action, in some degree at least, without it. Besides it may be observed, that if the obligation of the moral sense be admitted to be a real one, men of the most sceptical turn of mind must be considered

they did not fall within the province of the preacher, whose office is not to explain the principles of the human mind, but to address himself to them, and set them in motion: besides, as to the philosophical question concerning moral obligation, all the different ways of explaining it conspire to press the same virtuous course of action, which is the main thing the sacred orator should be concerned about. The general plan of preaching which he recommended was to this purpose: As mankind are weak, ignorant, guilty creatures, altogether insufficient for their own happiness, and every moment exposed to many unavoidable calamities, let them be called upon to reflect upon themselves as such, and let these doctrines of natural and revealed religion, which will impart consolation to them under these humbling views of themselves, be set before them in the strongest light: As they are apt to

as remaining under its authority when they have set themselves at liberty from all other ties. Let us suppose a person so unhappy as not to believe that there is a God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, or that it is his interest upon the whole in this life to act the virtuous part; even such a person is still under the power of the internal sentiment, that one thing is right and another wrong. If he acts contrary to it he violates a known obligation,

and must be conscious that he deserves punishment, and that it awaits him, if there is a judge and punisher. If we suppose that the sense of right and wrong is entirely erased, then on our Author's scheme, as well as that of others, he is still accountable at least for the previous steps he had taken to bring himself into this state of total insensibility as to all moral perceptions and views.

be seduced both from their duty and happiness by selfish and sensual passions, let both the awful doctrines of religion, which may strike a dread and check the impulses of bad passions, and the joyful ones, which may excite and encourage to the practice of purity, sincerity, and all goodness, be displayed before them in all their force. And as they are prone to rest in the general knowledge of their duty, without seriously applying it to the government of their hearts and lives, let the religious instructor take care not to dwell too much upon such general topics as the beauty, excellency, and reasonableness of the Divine Laws, but commonly descend, in a minute and particular manner, to direct their conduct in all the relations and stations of life, even the lowest, and in the ordinary business and intercourses of it. And let all these things be done without laboured elevation of language, in that plain and simple manner which touches the heart, and brings things home to the conscience and immediate feeling of every one.

To all which it is but just to add, that he was a most valuable member of the University in all other respects as well as that of an instructor of youth, his

great talents qualifying him, and his unwearied zeal prompting him on all occasions to promote all its civil as well as literary interests.

Such was the life of this worthy person, spent in a course of assiduous but not painful study, in continually doing good to the utmost of his power, and propagating truth, virtue, and religion among mankind. To conclude, he had uncommon abilities, uncommon virtues, and small failings, and these arising from good qualities; if he was at any time too much or too soon heated, it was owing to the quickness of his parts and sensibility of his temper; if his indignation was strong, it was only provoked by such baseness or malignity as his heart abhorred; if at any time he was open, when reserve might have been more proper, it proceeded from an honesty and sincerity of heart unaccustomed to dissimulate. Some were displeased with his honest freedom, some might emulate his reputation, some traduce him thro' prejudice, some thro' bigotry; but his parts, his spirit, and his worth, will be remembered, when any prejudices that were raised against him will be entirely forgotten.

A firm constitution and a pretty uniform state of

good health, except some few slight attacks of the gout, till some months before his death, seemed to promise the world much longer enjoyment of so valuable a life; but it pleased all-wise Providence to cut him off, after a few months of an uncertain state of health, and a few days of a fever, in the fifty-third year of his age, and about sixteen years after his coming to Glasgow, to the great regret of the lovers of learning and virtue, and the irreparable loss of the society of which he had been a most excellent member, and of all who were connected with him, either by blood, friendship, or acquaintance.

He was married, soon after his settlement in Dublin, to Mrs. Mary Wilson, a daughter of Francis Wilson, Esq; a gentleman of estate in the county of Langford, who distinguished himself at the Revolution as a Captain in the service of the late King William of glorious and immortal memory. He showed the same liberal and generous principles in this transaction, which appeared in all the other steps of his life. He had an abhorrence of that spirit of traffick which often mingles so deeply in forming this alliance: he was determined solely by the good sense, lovely dispositions,

and virtuous accomplishments of the lady: and the uniform happiness of their whole conjugal state justified the wisdom and virtue of his choice: he has left behind him one son, Francis Hutcheson, Doctor of Medicine, who gave early marks of genius, and is the publisher of this Work. If any one should wish to know any thing about Dr. Hutcheson's external form; it may be said it was an image of his mind. A stature above middle size, a gesture and manner negligent and easy, but decent and manly, gave a dignity to his appearance. His complexion was fair and sanguine, and his features regular. His countenance and look bespoke sense, spirit, kindness and joy of heart. His whole person and manner raised a strong prejudice in his favour at first sight.

It only remains to be added, that it has been intended, in any thing that is said of the Author's Philosophy, to deliver his sentiments without any regard to what may be the writer's own views of these subjects. The Author was a lover of truth and freedom of thought, and did not wish that any one should espouse his opinions, farther than the evidence with which they were supported, determined him. There

appears thro' the work fuch a manifelt aim of promoting piety and virtue, and the good of mankind, that it is hoped the main of it muft be approved of by all unprejudiced and well-difpofed perfons, however the writer of thefe memoirs or others may differ from the Author, as to particular fentiments, or the decifion of particular queftions.

Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not without reason, that by any thing yet faid, juftice has not been done to Dr. Hutchefton's character as an author: " That he has been represented only as enquiring into the mind of man as a moral conftitution, and afferting a diftinct order of affections in it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and a Moral Senfe, by which we infantly perceive a certain fet of affections, characters, and actions as good, and a contrary one as bad; all which is commonly done by that whole order of Philofophers who agree with him in admitting generous principles in human nature: whereas he juftly deferves to be exhibited to the public in the light of an original, original in the moft capital of all articles relative to the fcience of human nature and morality:

“ for tho’ all the disciples of the generous philosophy
 “ assert, in the strongest manner, a distinct order of
 “ affections in our nature, having the happiness of
 “ others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent
 “ is put upon determining the most important mea-
 “ sure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this
 “ present desire? or why should I rather chuse to con-
 “ troul it in favour of another? the answer which this
 “ order of philosophers has given, is very different
 “ from that which is and must be given by Dr. Hut-
 “ cheson: according to the former the agent is refer-
 “ red to the consideration of his personal happiness*
 “ (arising indeed from the prevalence of virtuous af-
 “ fections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it
 “ for granted, that there can be but one ultimate
 “ end of the agent’s cool and deliberate pursuit, viz.
 “ his own highest interest or personal happiness: but
 “ Dr. Hutcheson’s doctrine is far otherways; accord-
 “ ing to him, there are three calm determinations in
 “ our nature, namely, the calm desire of our own
 “ happiness, the calm desire of the happiness of other
 “ beings, and the calm desire of moral perfection,

* Shaft. Inq. from p. 77 to 174, and p. 69 middle sect. Lond. Ed.

“ each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the se-
 “ cond and third determination there can scarce hap-
 “ pen any opposition, but that it is quite otherwise
 “ betwixt the first and the other two, where an appa-
 “ rent opposition at least may often fall out, and in
 “ all such cases it is so far from being intended by the
 “ constitution of our nature, that the desire of pri-
 “ vate happiness should controul the other desires, that
 “ the Moral Sense never fails to dictate to the agent
 “ the voluntary sacrifice of the first, to either of the
 “ other two †: the whole is a question of fact, and
 “ every one must judge of it for himself: but the diffe-
 “ rence is the greatest imaginable, whether the desire
 “ of moral excellence, or the desire of private happi-
 “ ness is destined to be the supreme controuling prin-
 “ ciple according to the actual constitution of our na-
 “ ture: and none of the Philosophers before our Au-
 “ thor has ever hinted at such a representation of our
 “ nature as pleads for the former as the just account
 “ of the matter: nature has formed the union be-
 “ tween the latter two of the three great ultimate de-
 “ terminations of the human mind; but it is religion

† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.

“ alone, according to him, that can render all the
“ three invariably harmonious, and incapable of ac-
“ ting in different and opposite directions.”

It may be acknowledged that Dr. Hutcheson has taught this doctrine more fully and explicitly than any of the Philosophers either antient or modern †; but that none of them have *ever hinted at it*, tho' it should be so, cannot well be positively asserted without a very extensive, and at the same time a very particular survey of their works. Our Author has indeed made no pretensions to new discoveries, but rather expressly disclaimed them*: but this may be owing to the particular modesty of his genius and disposition: it was probably owing, in some degree, to this amiable turn of mind, that he chused to consider morals rather in the humbler way of a matter of fact, than in the more pompous one of scientific knowledge: and this too made him always more solicitous that his doctrine should in the main coincide with that of other good Moralists, than that it should be different or opposite: thus he endeavoured to shew,

† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.

* Pref. to Essay on the Pass. p. 18 and 19.

that once admitting the generous affections into human nature and the Moral Sense, the doctrine of the eternal fitness and unfitness of things, and of immutable moral truths was very just and solid. But it is time to leave the candid reader to the perusal of the Work itself, and to form such judgments of the Author's doctrine in all respects, as upon serious examination shall appear to him to be well founded.

W. LEECHMAN.

GLASGOW-COLLEGE, }
Dec. 24. 1754. }

CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

The Preface, giving some Account of the Life, Writings,
and Character of the Author.

B O O K I.

Concerning the Constitution of Human Nature, and the
Supreme Good.

CHAP. 1. Of the Constitution of Human Nature and its
Powers; and first, the Understanding, Will, and
Passions. Page 1

CHAP. 2. Concerning the finer Powers of Perception. 15

CHAP. 3. Concerning the ultimate Determinations of the
Will, and benevolent Affections. 38

CHAP. 4. Concerning the Moral Sense, or Faculty of per-
ceiving Moral Excellence, and its Supreme Ob-
jects. 53

CHAP. 5. The sense of Honour and Shame explain'd. The
universal Influence of the Moral Sense, and that
of Honour; and their Uniformity. 79

B O O K I. P A R T II.

An Enquiry into the Supreme Happiness of Mankind.

CHAP. 6. How far the several Sensations, Appetites, Passi-
ons and Affections, are in our Power. 100

CHAP. 7. A Comparison of the several sorts of Enjoyment,
and the opposite sorts of Uneasiness, to find their
Importance to Happiness. 116

CHAP. 8. A Comparison of the several Tempers and Cha-
racters in point of Happiness or Misery. 148

CONTENTS.

- CHAP. 9. The Duties toward God; and first, of just Sentiments concerning his Nature. Page 168
- CHAP. 10. The Affections, Duty, and Worship, to be exercised toward the Deity. 209
- CHAP. 11. The Conclusion of this Book, shewing the way to the Supreme Happiness of our Nature. 221

B O O K II.

Containing a Deduction of the more special Laws of Nature, and Duties of Life, previous to Civil Government, and other adventitious States.

- CHAP. 1. The Circumstances which encrease or diminish the Moral Good or Evil of Actions. 227
- CHAP. 2. General Rules of Judging about the Morality of Actions, from the Affections exciting to them, or opposing them. 238
- CHAP. 3. The general Notions of Rights and Laws explained; with their Divisions. 252
- CHAP. 4. The different States of Men. The State of Liberty not a State of War. The way that private Rights are known. The Necessity of a Social Life. 280
- CHAP. 5. The private Rights of Men; first, such as are called Natural; and the natural Equality of Men. 293
- CHAP. 6. The adventitious Rights, real, and personal. Property or Dominion. 309
- CHAP. 7. The Means of acquiring Property. How far it extends. In what Subjects it resides. 324
- CHAP. 8. Concerning derived Property, and the Ways of alienating or transferring it. 340

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O F
M O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y.
B O O K I.

*Concerning the Constitution of HUMAN NATURE,
and the SUPREME GOOD.*

C H A P T E R I.

*Of the Constitution of Human Nature and its Powers,
and first the Understanding, Will and Passions.*

I. **T**HE INTENTION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IS TO Moral Philosophy, what. direct men to that course of action which tends most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation: these maxims, or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the system or collection of them is called the LAW of NATURE.

As human happiness, which is the end of this art, Knowledge of the human powers necessary to it. cannot be distinctly known without the previous knowledge of the constitution of this species, and of all its perceptive and active powers, and their natural objects; (since happiness denotes the state of the soul ari-

BOOK I. sing from its several grateful perceptions or modifications;) the most natural method in this science must be first to inquire into the several powers and dispositions of the species, whether perceptive or active, into its several natural determinations, and the objects from whence its happiness can arise; and then to compare together the several enjoyments this species is capable of receiving, that we may discover what is its supreme happiness and perfection, and what tenor of action is subservient to it.

In this inquiry we shall but briefly mention such parts of our constitution, whether in body or mind, as are not of great consequence in morals; avoiding unnecessary controversies, and often referring to other authors for those points which have been tolerably well explained by them. Thus we pass over many ingenious anatomical observations upon the advantages and dignity of the human body above that of other animals. The reader may find them in the anatomical authors, and Dr. Cumberland.

*Early infirmities
of men.*

II. Consider mankind from their birth, you see a species at first weaker and less capable of subsisting, without the aid of the adult, than any other; and continuing longer in this infirm state. Animals of several other kinds attain to their full vigour and the perfect use of all their powers in a few months; and few require more than four or five years to their maturity. Ten or twelve years are necessary to mankind before they can obtain subsistence by their own art or labour, even in civilised societies, and in the finest climates af-

ter they have been cleared of all beasts of prey. Many CHAP. I. other animals are both cloathed and armed by nature, and have all that is necessary for their defence or convenient subsistence without any care or contrivance of their own: the earth uncultivated offers them their food, and the woods or rocks their shelter. Mankind are naked and unarmed; their more salutary and agreeable food is more rare, requiring much art and labour: their bodies are less fit to resist the injuries of weather, without more operose contrivances for cloathing and shelter. Their preservation therefore, in their tender years, must depend on the care of the adult; and their lives must always continue miserable if they are in solitude, without the aids of their fellows.

This is no unreasonable severity in the Author of Nature to our species. We shall soon discover the natural remedy provided for this lasting imbecillity of our younger years, in the tender parental affection of a rational species; and the final causes of it, in the several improvements we are capable of receiving. The means of subsistence to our species require much contrivance and ingenuity: we are capable of many noble enjoyments unknown to other animals, and depending on useful and delightful arts, which we cannot attain to without a long education, much instruction and imitation of others. How much time is requisite for learning our mother-tongues? how much for dexterity even in the commonest arts of agriculture, or in domestic service? full strength of body, without a mind equally advanced in

BOOK I. knowledge and arts and social habits, would make us ungovernable and untractable to our parents or instructors. Since we need to be so long in subjection, we should not soon be able to shake off the necessary and friendly yoke.

*Powers which
appear first.*

III. The natural principles which first discover themselves are our external senses, with some small powers of spontaneous motion, an appetite for food, and an instinct to receive and swallow it. All these powers exert themselves in a way too dark for any of us ever to apprehend completely: much less have the brutes any knowledge to direct them to the teats of their dams, or notion of the pressure of the air upon which sucking depends. At first indeed we all alike act by instincts wisely implanted by a superior hand.

Our external senses soon introduce to the mind some perceptions of pleasure and pain: and along with these perceptions there immediately appears a natural constant determination to desire the one and repel the other; to pursue whatever appears to be the cause or occasion of pleasure, and to shun the causes of pain. These are probably our first notions of natural good or evil, of happiness or misery.

*Proper ideas of
sensation.*

The external senses are those “determinations of nature by which certain perceptions constantly arise in the mind, when certain impressions are made upon the organs of the body, or motions raised in them.” Some of these perceptions are received solely by one sense, others may be received by two or more. Of the former class, are these five sorts, viz. colours, sounds,

tastes, smells, cold or heat; some ingenious authors CHAP. I. reckon more: these we may call the proper ideas of sensation.

These sensations, as the learned agree, are not pictures or representations of like external qualities in objects, nor of the impression or change made in the bodily organs. They are either *signals*, as it were, of new events happening to the body, of which experience and observation will shew us the cause; or *marks*, settled by the Author of Nature, to shew us what things are salutary, innocent, or hurtful; or intimations of things not otherways discernable which may affect our state; tho' these marks or signals bear no more resemblance to the external reality, than the report of a gun, or the flash of the powder, bears to the distress of a ship. The pleasant sensations of taste, smell, and touch, generally arise from objects innocent or salutary, when used in a moderate degree; the disagreeable or painful sensations, from such as are pernicious or unfit for common use. But sight and hearing seem not to be immediate avenues of pain; scarcely is any visible form or any sound the immediate occasion of it; tho' the violent motion of light or air may cause painful feelings; and yet by sight and hearing the exquisite pleasures of beauty and harmony have access to the soul, as well as the ideas of magnitudes, figures, situation, and motion. It is by the former senses, and not by those, that we receive the pleasures commonly called *sensual*.

The ideas of two or more senses are Duration, numConcomitant ideas of sensation.

BOOK I. ber, extension, figure, motion, rest. Duration and number are applicable to every perception or action of the mind, whether dependent upon bodily organs or not. The simpler ideas of this class, which some call the Concomitant ideas of sensation, are not generally either pleasant or painful. It is from some complex modes of figure and motion that pleasure is perceived: beauty, from some proportions of figure with colour: harmony, from some proportions of time as well as of tones or notes. The proportions of numbers and figures are the field in which our reasoning powers have the most free and vigorous exercise. Of these hereafter.

Ideas of consciousness or reflection.

IV. There is another natural power of perception, always exercised but not enough reflected upon, an inward sensation, perception, or consciousness, of all the actions, passions, and modifications, of the mind; by which its own perceptions, judgments, reasonings, affections, feelings, may become its object: it knows them and fixes their names; and thus knows itself in the same manner that it does bodies, by qualities immediately perceived, tho' the substance of both be unknown.

judging and reasoning.

These two powers of perception, *sensation* and *consciousness*, introduce into the mind all its materials of knowledge. All our primary and direct ideas or notions are derived from one or other of these sources. But the mind never rests in bare perception; it compares the ideas received, discerns their relations, marks the changes made in objects by our own action or that of

others; it inquires into the natures, proportions, causes, effects, antecedents, consequents, of every thing, when it is not diverted by some importunate appetite. These powers of judging and reasoning are more known and better examined by all philosophers than any other, and therefore we pass them over. All these several powers, of external sensation, consciousness, judging, and reasoning, are commonly called the acts of the *understanding*.

CHAP. I.

V. Tho' there are many other sorts of finer perceptions to be considered as natural to men, yet as some of them have the acts of the *will*, the affections, and passions, for their objects, it is necessary to take a short view of the will and its natural determinations, before we proceed to these finer perceptions.

The acts of the will.

Here it is plain, as soon as any sense, opinion, or reasoning, represents an object or event as immediately good or pleasant, or as the means of future pleasure, or of security from evil, either for ourselves or any person about whom we are solicitous, there arises immediately a new motion of the soul, distinct from all sensation, perception, or judgment, a *desire* of that object or event. And upon perception or opinion of an object or event as the occasion of pain or misery, or of the loss of good, arises a contrary motion called *aversion*; on all occasions of this sort, these primary motions of the will naturally arise without any previous choice or command, and are the general springs of action in every rational agent.

To the *will* are commonly referred also two other

Four general classes of the acts of the will.

BOOK I. modifications, or new states, arising from our apprehensions of objects or events, as obtained or not-obtained, according to our previous desire; or repelled and prevented, or not, according to our previous aversions; which are called *joy* and *sorrow*. But as they do not immediately move the soul to action, they seem rather new *feelings* or *states* of the soul, than acts of the will, more resembling sensations than volitions. These words however are often used promiscuously, as are many other names of the actions and passions of the soul. Thus *delight* or *joy*, is often used for the desire of any event which when it befalls will give delight; so is *sorrow*, for fear and aversion. Thus we have the * old division of the motions of the will into four general species, Desire, Aversion, Joy, and Sorrow. Nor can we easily imagine any spirit without these modifications and motions of Will of one sort or other. The Deity indeed, as he is possessed of all power and all perfection, must be incapable of every modification implying pain.

These selfish or benevolent. The acts of the will may be again divided into two classes, according as one is pursuing good for himself, and repelling the contrary, or pursuing good for others and repelling evils which threaten them. The former we may call *selfish*, the later *benevolent*. Whatever subtile debates have been to prove that all moti-

* See Cicero's Tuscul. lib. iii. & iv.
*Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudent-
que.* Virg.

The Stoics, the avowed enemies of the passions, allowed the *βίαιαι* and *πάθη*,

and *χαρά*, in the perfectest character, even the Deity; but all these of an higher sort than the turbulent passions; of which distinction hereafter.

ons of the *will* spring from one fountain, no man can deny that we often have a real internal undiffembled desire of the welfare of others, and this in very different degrees. CHAP. I.

VI. There are two calm natural determinations of the will to be particularly considered on this occasion. First, an invariable constant impulse toward one's own perfection and happiness of the highest kind. This † instinct operates in the bulk of mankind very confusedly; as they do not reflect upon, or attend to, their own constitution and powers of action and enjoyment; few have considered and compared the several enjoyments they are capable of, or the several powers of action. But whosoever does so will find a calm settled desire of the perfection of all our active powers, and of the highest enjoyments, such as appear to us, upon comparison, of the greatest importance to our happiness. Those who have not made such reflections and comparisons, naturally desire all sorts of enjoyments they have any notion of by their senses or any higher powers they have exercised, as far as they are consistent with each other, or appear to be so; and desire the perfection of such powers as they attend to. Where several enjoyments appear inconsistent, the mind, while it is calm, naturally pursues, or desires in preference to others, those which seem of the greatest importance to its happiness. So far all agree.

The two calm determinations of will. Self-love.

The other determination alleged is toward the *Benevolence.*

† We need no apology, for using the word instinct for our highest powers, to those who know the Latin language. Appetite is in our language much confined to lower powers; but in Latin the word is applied to the highest.

BOOK I. universal happiness of others. When the soul is calm and attentive to the constitution and powers of other beings, their natural actions and capacities of happiness and misery, and when the selfish appetites and passions and desires are asleep, 'tis alleged that there is a calm impulse of the soul to desire the greatest happiness and perfection of the largest system within the compass of its knowledge. Our inward consciousness abundantly testifies that there is such an impulse or determination of the soul, and that it is truly ultimate, without reference to any sort of happiness of our own. But here again, as few have considered the whole system of beings knowable by men, we do not find this determination exerted generally in all its extent; but we find natural desires of the happiness of such individuals, or societies, or systems, as we have calmly considered, where there has intervened no prejudice against them, or notion that their happiness is any way opposite to our own.

Affections extensive or limited.

As the notion of one's own highest happiness, or the greatest aggregate or sum of valuable enjoyments, is not generally formed by men, it is not expressly desired or intended. And therefore we cannot say that every particular calm desire of private good is aiming directly at that sum, and pursuing its object under the notion of a necessary part of that sum. Men naturally desire, even by calm motions of the soul, such objects as they conceive useful or subservient to any valuable enjoyment, such as wealth, power, honour, without this conception of their making a part

of this greatest sum. In like manner we have calm benevolent affections toward individuals, or smaller societies of our fellows, where there has not preceded any consideration of the most extensive system, and where they are not considered formally as parts of this largest system, nor their happiness pursued as conducing to the greatest sum of universal happiness. Such are our calm benevolent affections to friends, countries, men of eminent worth, without any reference in our thoughts to the most extensive system. We can make these references of all selfish enjoyments pursued by us to the greatest sum of private happiness, whenever we please; and we can in like manner refer all our calm particular kind affections to the general extensive benevolence; and 'tis of great consequence to have these large conceptions, and to make these references. But 'tis plain the several particular affections, whether selfish or benevolent, operate, and that too without turbulent or passionate commotions, where no such references have preceded.

VII. But beside all these calm motions of the will more or less extensive, there are many particular passions and appetites which naturally arise on their proper occasions, each terminating ultimately on its own gratification, without further reference; and attended with violent, confused, and uneasy sensations, which are apt to continue till the object or gratification is obtained. Of these turbulent passions and appetites some are selfish, some benevolent, and some may partake of both characters. Of the selfish are hunger, thirst, lust,

Turbulent passions selfish or benevolent.

BOOK I. passions for sensual pleasure, wealth, power, or fame:

Of the benevolent kind are pity, condolence, congratulation, gratitude, conjugal and parental affections, as often as they become violent and turbulent commotions of the soul. Anger, envy, indignation, and some others, may be of either kind, according as they arise either on account of some opposition to our own interests, or to those of our friends or persons loved and esteemed. These all arise on their natural occasions, where no reference is made by the mind to its own greatest happiness, or to that of others.

The difference between the calm motions of the will and the passionate, whether of the selfish or benevolent kinds, must be obvious to any who consider how often we find them acting in direct opposition.* Thus anger or lust will draw us one way; and a calm regard, either to our highest interest the greatest sum of private good, or to some particular interest, will draw the opposite way: sometimes the passion conquering the calm principle, and sometimes being conquered by it. The calm desire of wealth will force one, tho' with reluctance, into splendid expences, when necessary to gain a good bargain or a gainful employment; while the passion of avarice is repining at these expences. The sedate desire of a child's or a friend's virtue and honour and improvement, will make us send them abroad amidst dangers; while the parental and friendly passions are opposing this purpose. Gratitude, pity, and friendly passions, sollicit to one side;

* See this well described in *Plato. Rep. l. 9.* and *Aristot. Eth. Nicom.*

and love of a country, or a yet more extensive benevolence, may be soliciting on the other side. We correct and restrain our children, we engage them in uneasy studies and labours, out of calm good-will, while this tender passion is opposing every thing that is uneasy to them. Desire of life persuades to abstinence; to painful cures and nauseous potions, in opposition to the appetites destined to preserve life in the order of nature.

As there belong to the understanding not only the lower powers of sensation, common to us with the brutes, but also those of reasoning, consciousness, and *pure intellect*, as 'tis called; so to the will belong not only the bodily appetites and turbulent passions, but the several calm and extensive affections of a nobler order.

VIII. To the Will we also ascribe the power of Spontaneous Motion; since, in consequence of our willing it, we find many parts of the body move as we incline. All its parts are not thus subjected to be moved as we please; but only such as 'tis necessary or useful in life for us to have thus subjected. The inward parts go on, in those motions upon which the continuance of life immediately depends, without any acts of our will; nor can we directly, by any volition, accelerate or retard them. To superintend motions continually necessary would engross the mind perpetually, and make it incapable of any other business. Nor does every motion or impression on the parts of the body excite sensations in the soul. There is no sensation of the inter-

CHAP. I.


Powers of motion.

BOOK I. nal motions on which life immediately depends, while the body is in good order. Such sensation would be an uneasy useless distraction of the mind from all valuable purposes; as we experience, when a disease makes the contraction of the heart, or beatings of the pulse, become sensible. Sensations indicate only such changes, and new events, or objects, as 'tis convenient we should be apprized of. Thus volitions move the head, the eyes, the mouth, the tongue, the limbs, and, that exquisite instrument of a rational inventive and artful species, the hand. All these are plain indications of the wise and benign counsel of our Creator. Nay our limbs are moved immediately in consequence of the contraction of muscles, and of some power sent down by nerves from the head. But in our spontaneous motions we neither know nor will these intermediate steps: we intend the last motion; and those other motions are performed without any knowledge or will of ours. Sensation in like manner immediately ensues upon some motion in a nerve continued to the brain: we perceive no motion in the brain; but have a sensation immediately referred to the extremity of the body where the impression was made, and seeming to occupy that place; in a manner quite inexplicable. These considerations have led some ingenious and pious men to conclude that a superior Being, or the Deity himself, is the sole physical cause of all our motions; according to certain general laws; and the sole efficient cause of all our sensations too, in the like manner.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the finer Powers of Perception.

I. **A**FTER the general account of the perceptive powers, and of the will, we proceed to consider some finer powers of perception, and some other natural determinations of will, and general laws of the human constitution.

To the senses of seeing and hearing, are superadded in most men, tho' in very different degrees, certain powers of perception of a finer kind than what we have reason to imagine are in most of the lower animals, who yet perceive the several colours and figures, and hear the several sounds. These we may call the senses of beauty and harmony, or, with Mr. Addison, the *imagination*. Pleasures of imagination. Whatever name we give them, 'tis manifest that, the several following qualities in objects, are sources of pleasure constituted by nature; or, men have natural powers or determinations to perceive pleasure from them.

1. Certain forms are more grateful to the eye than others, even abstracting from all pleasure of any lively colours; such complex ones, especially, where, uniformity, or equality of proportion among the parts, is observable; nor can we, by command of our will, cause all forms indifferently to appear pleasant, more than we can make all objects grateful to the taste. Beauty.

2. As a disposition to imitate is natural to man- Imitation.

BOOK I. kind from their infancy, so they universally receive pleasure from imitation*. Where the original is beautiful, we may have a double pleasure; but an exact imitation, whether of beauty or deformity, whether by colours, figures, speech, voice, motion or action, gives of itself a natural pleasure.

Harmony. 3. Certain compositions of notes are immediatly pleasant to the generality of men, which the artists can easily inform us of. The simpler pleasures arise from the concords; but an higher pleasure arises from such compositions as, in sound and time, imitate those modulations of the human voice, which indicate the several affections of the soul in important affairs. Hence PLATO † and LYCURGUS ‡ observed a moral character in musick, and looked upon it as of some consequence in influencing the manners of a people.

Design. 4. As we are endued with reason to discern the fitness of means for an end, and the several relations and connexions of things; so, there is an immediate pleasure in knowlege †, distinct from the Judgment itself, tho' naturally joined with it. We have a pleasure also in beholding the effects of art and design, in any ingenious machinery adapted to valuable purposes, in any utensil well fitted for its end; whether we hope to have the use of it or not. We have delight in exercising our own rational, inventive, and active powers; we are pleased to behold the like exercises of others, and the artful effects of them. In such works of art

* *Aristot. Poet. c. 4.* calls man ζῷον μιμητικώτατον. † *De Repub. l. 3.* ‡ *Plut. in Lycurgo.* † *Inquiry b. i. c. 3.* and *Aristot. Ethic.* there cited.

we are pleased to see intermixed the beauty of form, and imitation, as far as it consists with the design; but the superior pleasure from the execution of the design makes us omit the inferior when it is inconsistent.

CHAP. 2.



II. Granting all these dispositions to be natural, we may account for all that diversity of fancies and tastes which we observe; since so many qualities are naturally pleasing, some of which may be chiefly regarded by one, and others by others. The necessitous, the busy, or the sloathful, may neglect that beauty in dress, architecture, and furniture, which they might obtain, and yet not be insensible to it. One may pursue only the simpler kind in the uniformity of parts; others may also interperse imitation of the beautiful works of nature; and, of these, some may chuse one set of natural objects, and others may chuse other objects of greater beauty or dignity: the manner too of imitation may be more or less perfect. Again, some in their works may chiefly regard the pleasure from appearance of design, and usefulness, admitting only the pleasures of beauty and imitation as far as they consist with it. In the most fantastick dresses there is uniformity of parts, and some aptitude to the human shape, and frequently imitation. But our modern dresses are less fitted for easy motion, and the displaying of the human shape, than the antient. Spectators who regard these ends may prefer the ancient dresses; those who do not think of them, or regard them, may prefer the modern.

Cause of variety of tastes.

In like manner as to architecture; they who dis-

BOOK I. cern the imitation of the proportions of the human body in certain parts, may relish one manner on that account. Others, who know the uses of which certain parts present the appearance, may relish this design; others, without these views, may be pleased with the uniformity of the parts: others may like or dislike through some * associations of ideas; of which hereafter.

not reducible to
usefulness.

One who would reduce all sense of beauty in forms to some real or apparent usefulness discerned, will never be able to explain how the spectator relishes those useful forms from which he gets no benefit, nor expects any beyond the pleasure of beholding them; nor how we are pleased with the forms of flowers, of birds, and wild beasts, when we know not any real or apparent uses indicated by them; nor how any spectator, quite a stranger to the views of the architect, shall be pleased with the first appearance of the work; nor whence it is that we are all pleased with imitations of objects, which, were they really placed where their images are, would be of no advantage; one may as well assert that, before we can be pleased with a favour, we must know the figures of the minute particles, and see their inoffensive nature to our nerves.

of great consequence in life.

The pleasures of these † finer senses are of no small importance in life. How much soever they seem ne-

* See the *Inquiry into Beauty*. b. i. c. 7. §. 4.

† One who would make all these to be perceptions of the external senses, and deny that we have any distinct powers of

perception, may as well assert that the pleasures of geometry, or perspective, are sensual, because 'tis by the senses we receive the ideas of figure.

glected by the votaries of wealth and power, they are generally much in their view for themselves, in some future period of life, or for their posterity: as for others who have a more elegant taste, they are the end of a great part of their labours: and the greatest part of men, when they are tolerably provided against the uneasy cravings of appetite, shew a relish for these pleasures: no sooner are nations settled in peace than they begin to cultivate the arts subservient to them, as all histories will inform us.

To these pleasures of the imagination may be added two other grateful perceptions arising from novelty and grandeur. The former ever causes a grateful commotion when we are at leisure; which perhaps arises from that curiosity or desire of knowledge which is deeply rooted in the soul; of which hereafter. Grandeur also is generally a very grateful circumstance in any object of contemplation distinct from its beauty or proportion. Nay, where none of these are observed, the mind is agreeably moved with what is large, spacious, high, or deep, even when no advantage arising from these circumstances is regarded. The final causes of these natural determinations or senses of pleasure may be seen in some * late authors.

III. Another important determination or sense of the soul we may call the *sympathetick*, different from all the external senses; by which, when we apprehend the state of others, our hearts naturally have a fellow-feeling with them. When we see or know the pain, dis-

CHAP. 2.
Relish for grandeur and novelty.

The *sympathetick* sense.
Compassion.

* See *Spectator* N. 412. and the *Inquiry into Beauty*, last section.

BOOK I. trefs, or misery of any kind which another suffers, and turn our thoughts to it, we feel a strong sense of pity, and a great proneness to relieve, where no contrary passion with-holds us. And this * without any artful views of advantage to accrue to us from giving relief, or of loss we shall sustain by these sufferings. We see this principle strongly working in children, where there are the fewest distant views of interest; so strongly sometimes, even in some not of the softest mould, at cruel executions, as to occasion fainting and sickness. This principle continues generally during all our lives.

Congratulation. We have a like natural disposition to Congratulation with others in their joys; where no prior emulation, imagined opposition of interest, or prejudice, prevents it. We have this sympathy even with the brute animals; and hence poets so successfully please us with descriptions of their joys. But as our own selfish passions which repel evil, such as fear, anger, resentment, are generally stronger commotions of soul than the passions pursuing private good; so pity is a stronger benevolent passion than congratulation. And all this is wisely contrived, since immunity from pain seems previously necessary to the enjoyment of good. Thus the stronger motions of the mind are directed toward that which is most necessary. This sympathy seems to extend to all our affections and passions. They all seem naturally contagious. We not only sorrow with the distressed, and rejoice with the prospere-

* See *Inquiry into Virtue* sect. 2.

rous; but admiration, or surprize, discovered in one, CHAP. 2. raises a correspondent commotion of mind in all who behold him. Fear observed raises fear in the *observer* before he knows the cause, laughter moves to laugh, love begets love, and the devout affections displayed dispose others to devotion. One easily sees how directly subservient this sympathy is to that grand determination of the soul toward universal happiness.

IV. Before we mention some other finer senses, which have actions of men for their objects, we must observe one general determination of the soul to exercise all its active powers. We may see in our species, from the very cradle, a constant propensity to action and motion; children grasping, handling, viewing, tasting every thing. As they advance they exert other powers, making all trials possible; observing all changes, and inquiring into their causes; and this from an impulse to action and an implanted instinct toward knowledge, even where they are not allured by any prospects of advantage. Nay we see almost all other animals, as soon as they come to light, exercising their several powers by like instincts, in the way that the Author of Nature intended; and by this exercise, tho' often laborious and fatiguing, made happier than any state of slothful sensuality could make them. Serpents try their reptile motions; beasts raise themselves and walk or run; birds attempt to raise themselves with their wings and soar on high; water-fowl take to the water as soon as they see it. The colt is practising for the race, * the bull is butting with his

A natural propensity to action in most animals.

* *Dente lupus*, &c. Hor. lib. i. sat. 1. l. 52.

BOOK I. horns, and the hound exercising himself for the chace.

chiefly in men.

Children are ever in motion while they are awake, nor do they decline weariness and toil: they shew an aversion to sleep till it over-powers them against their wills: they observe whatever occurs, they remember and inquire about it; they learn the names of things, inquire into their natures, structures, uses, and causes; nor will their curiosity yield to rebukes and affronts. Kind affections soon break out toward those who are kind to them; strong gratitude, and an ardor to excel in any thing that is praised; in vying with their fellows they are transported with success and victory, and exceedingly dejected when they are out-done by others. They are soon provoked to anger upon any imagined injury or hurt; are afraid of experienced pain, and provoked at the cause of it; but soon appeased by finding it undesigned, or by professions of repentance. Nothing do they more resent than false accusation or reproach. They are prone to sincerity, and truth, and openness of mind, until they have experienced some evils following upon it. They are impatient to relate to others any thing new or strange, or apt to move admiration or laughter; ready to gratify any one with what they have no use for themselves; fond of pleasing, and void of suspicion, till they have had experience of injuries.

*High pleasures
in action.*

This impulse to action continues during life, while we retain the use of our powers. The men who are most worthless and slothful yet are not wholly idle; they have their games, their cabals and conversation

to employ them, or some mean ingenuity about sensual pleasures. We see in general that mankind can be happy only by action of one kind or other; and the exercise of the intellectual powers is one source of natural delight from the cradle to the grave. Children are transported with discoveries of any thing new or artificial, and impatient to shew them to others. Publick shows, rarities, magnificence, give them high entertainment: but above all, the important actions of great characters; the fortunes of such men, and of the states where they lived, whether related, read, or represented by action, are the delight of all ages. Here the pleasure is heightened by our social feelings of joy, and the keenness of inquiry increased by our impulse to compassion, and our concern about the persons we admire.

When men have the proper genius, and access to more laborious knowlege, what ardour of mind do some shew for geometry, numbers, astronomy, and natural history? All toils and watchings are born with joy. Need we mention even fabulous history, mythology, philology? 'Tis manifest there is an high natural pleasure in knowledge without any allurements of other advantage. There is a like pleasure in practical knowlege about the business of life, and the effects of actions upon the happiness of individuals, or that of societies. How contrary are all these appearances of Nature to that Philosophy which makes the sole impulse or determination of the soul to be a desire of

BOOK I. such pleasures as arise from the body and are referred to it, or of immunity from bodily pain!

A moral sense.

V. Action is constituted to mankind the grand source of their happiness by an higher power of perception than any yet mentioned; namely, that by which they receive the moral notions of actions and characters. Never was there any of the human species, except idiots, to whom all actions appeared indifferent. Moral differences of action are discerned by all, even when they consider no advantage or disadvantage to redound to themselves from them. As this moral sense is of high importance, it shall be more fully considered in a subsequent chapter. It may suffice at present to observe what we all feel, that a certain temper, a set of affections, and actions consequent on them, when we are conscious of them in ourselves, raise the most joyful sensations of approbation and inward satisfaction; and when the like are observed in others, we have a warm feeling of approbation, a sense of their excellence, and, in consequence of it, great good-will and zeal for their happiness. If we are conscious of contrary affections and actions, we feel an inward remorse, and dislike to ourselves; when we observe the like in others, we dislike and condemn their dispositions, reputing them base and odious.

The affections which excite this moral approbation are all either directly benevolent, or naturally connected with such dispositions; those which are disapproved and condemned, are either ill-natured, by which one is inclined to occasion misery to others; or

such selfish dispositions as argue some unkind affection, or the want of that degree of the benevolent affections which is requisite for the publick good, and commonly expected in our species. CHAP. 2.

This moral discernment is not peculiar to persons of a fine education and much reflection. The rudest of mankind shew such notions; and young minds, who think least of the distant influences of actions upon themselves or others, and have small precaution about their own future interests, are rather more moved with *moral forms* than others. Hence that strong inclination in children, as soon as they understand the names of the several affections and tempers, to hear such stories as present the moral characters of agents and their fortunes. Hence that joy in the prosperity of the kind, the faithful, and the just; and that indignation and sorrow upon the successes of the cruel and treacherous. Of this power we shall treat more fully hereafter. *universal in
n.a.kind.*

VI. As by the former determination we are led to approve or condemn ourselves or others according to the temper displayed, so by another natural determination, which we may call a sense of honour and shame, an high pleasure is felt upon our gaining the approbation and esteem of others for our good actions, and upon their expressing their sentiments of gratitude; and on the other hand, we are cut to the heart by censure, condemnation, and reproach. All this appears in the countenance. The fear of infamy, or censure, or contempt, displays itself by blushing. *A sense of ho-
nour;*

BOOK I.

an immediate principle.

'Tis true, we may observe from our infancy, that men are prone to do good offices to those they approve and honour. But we appeal to the hearts of men, whether they have not an immediate pleasure in being honoured and esteemed, without thinking of any future advantages, and even when they previously know that they can receive none. Are not we generally solicitous about our characters after our death? And whence is it that blushing accompanies this sort of fear, and not the fears of other disadvantages, if this is not an immediate principle?

* ARISTOTLE'S account of this pleasure, tho' more elegant, is not just: "that we relish honour as it is a testimony to our virtue, which we are previously conscious is the greatest good." This consideration may sometimes make honour very grateful to men who are doubtful and diffident of their own conduct. But have not also the men of greatest abilities, who are perfectly assured of the goodness of their conduct, a like natural joy in being praised, distinct from their inward self-approbation?

The kind intention of God in implanting this principle is obvious. 'Tis a strong incitement to every thing excellent and amiable: it gives a grateful reward to virtue: it often surmounts the obstacles to it from low worldly interests: and even men of little virtue are excited by it to such useful services as they would have otherways declined. The selfish are thus, beyond their inclination, made subservient to a publick interest; and such are punished who counteract it.

* *Ethic. ad Nicom. l. i. c. 5.*

What may further prove that this sense of honour CHAP. 2. is an original principle, is this; we value the praise of others, not in proportion to their abilities to serve us, but in proportion to their capacity of judging in such matters. We feel the difference, between the interested desire of pleasing the man in power who can promote us; and the inward joy from the approbation of the judicious or ingenious, who cannot do us any other good offices. The desire of praise is acknowledged to be one of the most universal passions of the soul.

VII. Tho' it is by the moral sense that actions become of the greatest consequence to our happiness or misery; yet 'tis plain the mind naturally perceives some other sorts of excellence in many powers of body and mind; must admire them, whether in ourselves or others; and must be pleased with certain exercises of them, without conceiving them as moral virtues. We often use words too promiscuously, and do not express distinctly the different feelings or sensations of the soul. Let us keep *moral approbation* for our sentiments of such dispositions, affections, and consequent actions, as we repute virtuous. We find this warm approbation a very different perception from the admiration or liking which we have for several other powers and dispositions; which are also relished by a sense of *decency* or *dignity*. This sense also is natural to us, but the perceptions very different from moral approbation. We not only know the use of such valuable powers, and of their exercise, to the person possessed of them; but

BOOK I. have agreeable commotions of admiration and liking, and these in several degrees. Thus beauty, strength, swiftness, agility of body, are more decent and esteemable than a strong voracious stomach, or a delicate palate. The manly diversions of riding, or hunting, are beheld with more pleasure and admiration than eating and drinking even in a moderate degree. A taste for these manly exercises is often valued; whereas pursuits of mere sensuality appear despicable even when they do not run into excess, and at best are only innocent. Nay there is something graceful, in the very shape gesture and motion, and something indecent and uncomely; abstracting from any indications of advantage discerned by the spectators.

in different degrees.

But this is still more obvious about the powers of the mind and their exercise. A penetrating genius, capacity for business, patience of application and labour, a tenacious memory, a quick wit, are naturally admirable, and relished by all observers; but with a quite different feeling from moral approbation. To every natural power there seems to be a corresponding sense or taste, recommending one sort of exercise, and disliking the contrary. Thus we relish the exercise of all the ingenious arts, machinery of every kind, imitation in painting, sculpture, statuary, poetry; gardening, architecture, musick. We not only behold the works with pleasure, but have a natural admiration of the persons in whom we discern a taste and genius for these arts. Whereas the exercise of our lower powers, merely subservient to sensual gratification, are

at best beheld with indifference, are often matter of CHAP. 2.
 shame, and the cause of contempt.


Thus according to the just observation of ARI-
 STOTLE, "The chief happiness of active beings must
 " arise from action; and that not from action of eve-
 " ry sort, but from that sort to which their nature is
 " adapted, and which is recommended by nature."
 When we gratify the bodily appetites, there is an im-
 mediate sense of pleasure, such as the brutes enjoy,
 but no further satisfaction; no sense of dignity upon
 reflection, no good-liking of others for their being
 thus employed. There is an exercise of some other
 bodily powers which seems more manly and graceful.
 There is a manifest gradation; some fine tastes in the
 ingenious arts are still more agreeable; the exercise is
 delightful; the works are pleasant to the spectator,
 and reputable to the artist. The exercise of the high-
 er powers of the understanding, in discovery of truth,
 and just reasoning, is more esteemable, when the sub-
 jects are important. But the noblest of all are the vir-
 tuous affections and actions, the objects of the moral
 sense.

Some other abilities and dispositions of soul, which
 are naturally connected with benevolent dispositions,
 and inconsistent with the highest selfishness and sensu-
 ality, seem to be immediatly approved by the moral
 sense itself. These we refer to another place. We
 shall only take notice here, that by certain associati-
 ons of ideas, and by frequent comparisons made in si-
 milies and metaphors, and by other causes, some ina-



*Happiness of ac-
 tive beings is in
 action.*

Additional ideas.

BOOK I.  nimate objects have obtained additional ideas of dignity, decency, sanctity; some appear as mean and despicable; and others are in a middle state of indifference. Our relish for imitation and observing resemblances has made all languages full of metaphors: and similitudes and allegories give no small pleasure in many compositions: hence we cloath many objects with additional ideas of qualities they are not naturally capable of; some of these ideas are great and venerable, others low and contemptible. Some attempt to explain the natural cause or occasion of laughter, a commotion of mind generally agreeable, of which all are susceptible, from a natural sense of the *ridiculous* in objects or events.

Association of ideas very necessary.

VIII. Before we pass to the dispositions of the will, we may observe a natural involuntary determination to associate or bind together all such perceptions as have often occurred together, or have made at once a strong impression on the mind, so that they shall still attend each other, when any object afterwards excites any one or more of them. As this is experienced in smaller matters, so it affects our apprehensions of good and evil natural and moral. When the strain of conversation and popular maxims have long represented certain actions or events as good, and others as evil; we find it difficult to break the association, even after our reason is convinced of the contrary. Thus certain actions are confusedly imagined honourable, others dishonourable; certain stations miserable, and others happy; as spectres are imagined in church-yards. Tho'

many miseries and vices spring from this fountain, we may see the absolute necessity of this determination.

Without it we could have little use of memory, or recollection, or even of speech. How tedious would it be to need a particular recollection, upon each word we hear or desire to speak, to find what words and ideas are joined by the custom of the language? it must be as tedious a work as decyphering after we had found an alphabet. Whereas, now, the sound and idea are so associated, that the one ever is attended with the other. Nay, how is it we remember? when we are examined about a past event, the time, or place, some circumstance, or person then present, is suggested in the question, and these bring along with them the whole train of the associated ideas. The subject of a debate is suggested; a man conversant in it finds, previous almost to volition, the principal reasonings on both sides arising in his mind. To this disposition in a great measure is owing the power of education, which forms many associations in our early years; and few have the patience or courage to examine, whether they are founded in nature, or in the weakness of our instructors.

IX. Many of the natural determinations of the will are abundantly explained by such as treat designedly upon that subject, and point out the natural occasions of the several passions and affections. To these authors we may refer much of this subject. We considered, above, the strong natural propensity to action. We may also observe another determination, or law

The will and habits.

BOOK I. of our nature, by which the frequent repetition of actions gives not only a facility in performing them, by encreasing our active powers, but makes the mind more prone to them for the future, or more uneasy when it is by violence restrained from them. And this is called an Habit. In our passive sensations the pleasures and pains are rather abated by frequent feelings: and yet the uneasiness under the want of pleasures is increased by our being long enured to them. If we find much detriment from habits of vice, equally great is the advantage of the habits of virtue. It is of general advantage to a rational species, that it thus can increase any of its powers as it chuses, and make them more stable and vigorous. It is still in our power, too, to wear out any habits, by abstaining from their acts, or resolutely acting in opposition to them. Could we acquire no habits, our powers must remain miserably weak, and all artificial action continue as uneasy as we found our first essays.

No habit or custom gives new ideas.

But all these associations, habits, customs, or prejudices, recommend objects to our liking, or raise aversions to them, under the notion of some quality or species perceivable by the senses we are naturally endued with, nor can they raise any new ideas. No sentiments therefore of approbation or condemnation; no liking or disliking, are sufficiently explained by attributing them to prejudice, custom, or education, or association of ideas; unless we can fully shew what these ideas or notions are, and to what sense they be-

long, under which these objects are approved or condemned, liked or disliked.

CHAP. 2.


X. At a certain age arises a new desire between the sexes, plainly destined for the continuance of our race; which, as it would be pernicious or useless in our first years, before we had acquired knowledge and experience sufficient for the preservation of offspring, is wisely postponed in the order of nature. This desire in mankind does not terminate merely on sensual pleasure, as in the brutes; nor is it in mankind only a blind impulse, such as excites the brutes, previously to experience of pleasure. There is a natural liking of beauty as an indication of a temper and manners. A character is apprehended, and thence goodwill and esteem arises, and a desire of society for life, with friendship and mutual love, and united interests. Thus these sentiments and desires, in mankind, always accompany the natural impulse. They have also universally a desire of offspring, where no stronger inconsistent views restrain them.

Conjugal and parental affections.

Toward offspring there is in man, as in other animals, a peculiar strong affection, and a tender solicitude for their preservation and happiness. In mankind this affection continues during life, as parents may always do some good to their posterity. It descends to grandchildren, and their children, almost undiminished. In the brutes it is found where the young need assistance; where they don't, it is not found. It lasts till the young can support themselves, and then generally ceases. All this carries with it ma-

BOOK I. nifest evidences of design in the Author of Nature.

Like affections, but weaker, are found generally to attend the ties of blood among collaterals. These tender affections are the springs of more than one half of the labours and cares of mankind: and, where there is any ability, they rouse the mind to diligence and industry, and to things great and honourable. By means of them the heart is made more susceptible of every tender kind and social affection.

Men social, and fit for civil society.

XI. One can scarce deny to mankind a natural impulse to society with their fellows, as an immediate principle, when we see the like in many species of animals; nor should we ascribe all associating to their indigence. Their other principles, their curiosity, communicativeness, desire of action; their sense of honour, their compassion, benevolence, gaiety, and the moral faculty, could have little or no exercise in solitude, and therefore might lead them to haunt together, even without an immediate or ultimate impulse, or a sense of their indigence. The ties of blood would have the same effect, and have probably first united large numbers for mutual assistance and defence, upon a common apprehension of their indigence in solitude. When many were thus associated, the superior goodness, prudence, or courage of some, would naturally procure them a superior esteem and confidence from all around them. Controversies would arise; the mischief of deciding them by violence would soon appear. They would soon see the danger of divided counsels, either about

improving their condition, or common defence; tho' all agreed in the general end. The most esteemed would soon be chosen *arbitrators* of their controversies, and *directors* of the whole body in matters concerning their common interest; and, as their prudence suggested, laws and political institutions would be established. The rest, finding the sweets of good order, safety, and laws, would have a veneration for the society, and its governors, and constitution. The finer spirits would feel patriotism and the love of a country in their breasts: and all, in some measure, by bonds of acquaintance, and intercourse of business, and the enjoyments of protection for themselves and their fortunes, would acquire a love to the community and zeal for its interests.


XII. As the order, grandeur, regular dispositions and motions, of the visible world, must soon affect the mind with admiration; as the several classes of animals and vegetables display in their whole frame exquisite mechanism, and regular structure, evidencing counsel, art, and contrivance for certain ends; men of genius and attention must soon discover some intelligent beings, one or more, presiding in all this comely order and magnificence. The great and the beautiful strikes the mind with veneration, and leads us to infer intelligence as residing in it, or directing it: a careful attention to the structure of our own nature and its powers leads to the same conclusion. Our feeling moral sentiments, our sense of goodness and virtue, as well as of art and design; our experience of

BOOK I. some moral distribution within, by immediate happiness or misery constantly attending virtue and vice, and of a like distribution generally obtaining even in external things by a natural tendency, must suggest that there is a moral government in the world: and as men are prone to communicate their knowledge, inventions, conjectures, the notions of a Deity and providence must soon be diffused; and an easy exercise of reason would confirm the persuasion. Thus some devotion and piety would generally obtain, and therefore may justly be called natural to a rational system. An early revelation and tradition generally anticipated human invention in this matter: but these alone could scarce have diffused the belief so universally, without the aids of obvious reasons from strong appearances in Nature. Notions of Deity and some sort of worship have in fact as universally obtained among men, as living in society, the use of speech, or even propagating their kind; and thus may be counted as natural.

The several powers dispositions or determinations above-mentioned are universally found in mankind, where some accident hath not rendered some individual monstrous, or plainly maimed and deficient in a natural faculty. But, in the different individuals, these dispositions are not in the same proportion as to strength; one being prevalent in one, and another in another: and hence the great diversity of characters. Yet, upon a proper occasion, when there is no opposi-

tion from some stronger principle, each of these powers will exert itself, and have its effect.

CHAP. 2.



*The causes of
vice.*

XIII. Notwithstanding that all these nobler powers we mentioned are natural to us, the causes of that vice and depravity of manners we observe, are pretty obvious. Not to say any thing of causes not discoverable by the light of nature, mankind spend several of their first years, where there is not a careful education, in the gratification of their sensual appetites, and in the exercise of some lower powers, which, by long indulgence, grow stronger: reflecting on moral notions, and the finer enjoyments, and comparing them with the lower, is a laborious exercise. The appetites and passions arise of themselves, when their objects occur, as they do frequently: the checking, examining, and ballancing them, is a work of difficulty. Prejudices and groundless associations of ideas are very incident to men of little attention. Our selfish passions early gain strength by indulgence. Hence the general tenor of human life is an incoherent mixture of many social, kind, innocent actions, and of many selfish, angry, sensual ones; as one or other of our natural dispositions happens to be raised, and to be prevalent over others.

*Concerning the Ultimate Determinations of the Will,
and Benevolent Affections.*

*The ultimate de-
terminations of
the soul.*

I. **A**FTER this long enumeration of the several senses or powers of perception, by which a great multitude of objects may be the occasion of pleasure or pain, or of some sorts of happiness or misery; and a like enumeration of many dispositions of will, or determinations of desire; human nature must appear a very complex and confused fabrick, unless we can discover some order and subordination among these powers, and thus discern which of them is naturally fit to govern. Of this we shall treat in some following chapters. In the first place the *Understanding*, or the power of reflecting, comparing, judging, makes us capable of discerning the tendencies of the several senses, appetites, actions, gratifications, either to our own happiness, or to that of others, and the comparative values of every object, every gratification. This power judges about the means or the subordinate ends: but about the ultimate ends there is no reasoning. We prosecute them by some immediate disposition or determination of soul, which in the order of action is always prior to all reasoning; as no opinion or judgment can move to action, where there is no prior desire of some end.

*The self's gene-
ral determina-
tion alleged the
only one.*

Were there no other ultimate determination or desire in the human soul than that of each one toward

his own happiness; then calm * *self-love* would be the sole leading principle, plainly destined by Nature to govern and restrain all other affections, and keep them subservient to its end; having reason for its minister or counsellor, to suggest the means. But the *end* would be constituted by that ultimate determination, without any reasoning.

CHAP. 3.
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This is a favourite tenet of a great many authors, and pleases by its simplicity. But very different and contrary accounts are given, by these authors, of the private enjoyments or happiness pursued in the offices we commonly repute virtuous. Some make the sole motive to all offices or actions even the most honourable, the sole end ultimately intended by them, to be some worldly advantage, some bodily pleasures or the means of them. This was the tenet of the *Cyrenaicks*, and probably of the *Epicureans* too, and of some moderns. Others say, that we desire the good of others, or of societies, merely as the means of our own safety and prosperity; others, as the means of some subtiler pleasures of our own by sympathy with others in their happiness: others make our end to be the pleasures we enjoy in being honoured, or some rewards we expect for our services, and these either from GOD, or men.

Various accounts  
of it.

But there is still an higher scheme; allowing indeed no other calm settled determination of soul but

\* By *self-love* we mean, one's desire of his own happiness, and this only. By a frequent use of the word *love*, for *esteem*, some have imagined an universal *self-esteem*, or preference of our moral character and accomplishments to those of others, which is contrary to what the modest and self-diffident continually experience.

BOOK I. that in each one toward his own happiness; but granting that we have a *moral faculty*, and many particular kind affections truly disinterested, terminating upon the happiness of others, and often operating when we have no reference of it in our minds to any enjoyment of our own. But, say they, “ the sole original “ spring of all calm deliberate purposes of cultivating “ these generous affections, and of gratifying them “ in opposition to any selfish affections, is this; we experience the sublimest joys of self-approbation in “ gratifying these generous motions; these joys are a “ nobler happiness than any other; and the desire of “ them, flowing from the *calm selfish determination*, “ is the view of all deliberate purposes of virtue; tho’ “ the kind passions themselves often hurry us into “ friendly and generous actions without this thought.”

*This consistent  
with many disinter-  
ested affections.*

This last account gives a lovely representation of human nature and its affections, and leaves a great deal of room for most of the generous virtues of life; but it does not please us with such simplicity as the other schemes, which directly deduce every motion of the heart from *self-love*. This is not to be reckoned among the selfish schemes, since it makes all the eminent virtues flow from disinterested affections, natural to the heart, however in our calmer hours they may be corroborated by the calm views and desires of our own happiness. But our business is to find the truth, let the schemes, or their authors, be classed as they will: and, for this purpose, ’tis necessary to consider well, both these affections alledged to be disinte-

rested, and the *moral faculty* by which we judge of all the motions of the *will*; that we may see, whether there be in the soul, as we alledged above, another *calm determination*, beside that one toward our own happiness; as well as many particular affections, terminating upon the good of others, as their immediate and ultimate object, without reference to private interest of any kind. CHAP. 3.

II. The *calm self-love*, or the determination of each individual toward his own happiness, is a motion of the *will* without any uneasy sensation attending it. In desires, the uneasiness differs from the motives. But the several selfish desires, terminating on particular objects, are generally attended with some uneasy turbulent sensations in very different degrees: yet these sensations are different from the act of the will to which they are conjoined; and different too from the motives of desire. The motive is some good apprehended in an object or event, toward which good the desire tends; and, in consequence of desire, some uneasiness arises, till the good is obtained. To aversion, the *motive* is some evil apprehended or feared, and perhaps not yet felt. Uneasiness too attends the aversion, untill the evil is repelled. Prospects of the pleasures or powers attending opulence are the motives to the desire of wealth, and never the uneasy feelings attending the desire itself. These feelings are, in nature, subsequent to the desire.

Again, when we obtain the thing desired; beside the pleasures to be obtained from this object, which were the motives of the desire, and often before we

BOOK I. enjoy them, there is one pleasure immediatly arising from the success, at least in those cases where there was any difficulty in the pursuit, or fear of disappointment. It would be absurd to say that this joy in the success was the motive to the desire. We should have no joy in the success, nor could we have had any desire, unless the prospect of some other good had been the motive. This holds in all our desires, benevolent or selfish, that there is some motive, some end intended, distinct from the joy of success, or the removal of the pain of desire; otherways all desires would be the most fantastick things imaginable, equally ardent toward any trifle, as toward the greatest good; since the joy of success, and the removal of the uneasiness of desire, would be alike in both sorts of desires. 'Tis trifling therefore to say that all desires are selfish, because by gratifying them we obtain the joy of success, and free ourselves from the uneasy feelings of desire.

*Subordinate  
good-will is not  
virtue.*

III. 'Tis owned by all, that many actions, beneficial to others, may directly spring from selfish desires of rewards, of returns of good offices, of honour. One may serve others from fear of unjust violence, or of just punishment. Nay, from the desire of our own happiness we may have an inward undissembled desire of another's happiness, which we conceive to be the means of our own. Thus, one desires the success of a partner in managing the common stock; the prosperity of any country or society upon which his fortunes depend; the advancement of a friend from

whom we expect promotion; the success and good CHAP. 3.  
conduct of a pupil, which may redound to the honour of the master or tutor. These real desires of the welfare of others may all be subordinate to one's own selfish desires.

Here 'tis agreed by all, that desires of the welfare of others, subordinated to one's desires of his own worldly advantages, without any other affection, have nothing virtuous in them. A change of outward circumstances, without any change of temper, would raise desires of the adversity of others, in the same manner. The main question is, whether the affections reputed benevolent are subordinated to some finer interests than worldly advantages, and ultimately terminate upon them: or, if there are not kind affections ultimately terminating on the good of others; and these constituted by nature, (either alone, or perhaps sometimes corroborated by some views of interest,) the immediate cause of moral approbation. Now 'tis plain,

IV. 1. That all hopes or fears from men, whether about wealth or poverty, honour or infamy, bodily pleasure or pain, can only be motives to external actions or services, and not to any inward good-will or desire of their happiness; since we all know that our internal affections are hid from others. External deportment alone can be the means of obtaining what we hope from them, or of avoiding what we fear.

2. As self-love can make us desire only what appears the means of our own happiness, one can scarce

*Whether kind affections are ultimate;*

*they do not terminate upon rewards from men;*

*nor on those from God, or from self-approbation.*

BOOK I. alledge that even the subtlest interests are the springs of real good-will to others. If one is aware of the high pleasures of self-approbation, arising upon consciousness of inward good-will and kind affections; or is convinced that the Deity will confer rewards upon men of such tempers; these two motives may make one desire to have that useful set of affections; in order to obtain happiness. Now, could we by command of the will directly raise what affections we desire, from these motives we would raise kind affections. But a temper or set of affections cannot thus be raised. As esteem cannot be raised, by any act of the will, toward an object in which no excellence appears; nor fear where there is nothing formidable, nor anger where there is nothing hurtful, nor pity where there is no suffering, nor gratitude where there has been no evidence of prior benevolence; so neither can a mind wholly determined toward selfish good raise in itself kind affections, by a command of its will. The natural cause must be presented before any affection can be raised.

*How divine laws  
operate to make  
men virtuous.*

If indeed our hearts are so constituted, as the assertors of disinterested affections alledge, that upon presenting the state of any sensitive beings to our calm thoughts, when no opposition of interests or evil dispositions apprehended in them obstruct the natural motion of our souls, a kind good-will naturally arises; then the motives of gaining the nobler pleasures of self-approbation, or rewards from God, will incline us to turn our calm attention to the state of others; will

surmount little interfering interests, and remove even the obstacles of anger \*. The same motives will make us inquire also into all such qualities excellencies or good offices of others as are the natural occasions of the warmer and more endearing affections. And thus it is that the sanctions of the divine laws can influence our affections. But,

3. From self-love we desire only the means of our own happiness. Now the *actual happiness of others* is neither the cause nor means of obtaining self-approbation, nor rewards from God. Our hearts approve us, and God promises rewards to us, not because others are in fact happy, but because we have such kind dispositions, and act our parts well in their behalf, whether in the event they are happy or not. Our desire therefore of the pleasure of self-approbation, or of divine rewards, can only make us desire to have these affections, and to act a suitable part. But these affections cannot be directly raised by the will: and wherever they are, they plainly terminate upon the good of others, as the ultimate end intended by them; tho' in our previous consultations with ourselves, or deliberations about the inward culture of the mind, we may have resolved, with a view to our own perfection

\* This is the reference to our own highest and most noble enjoyments and interests, which we see made in some of the best writings of the ancients, and in Lord Shaftesbury: "That, conscious of the inward delights and dignity of *virtue* surpassing all other enjoyments, we resolve to follow all the noble and generous motions of our hearts in opposition to

"the lower interests of this life." Not that they imagined we can raise any new affection, by command of the *will*, which nature had not planted and connected with its proper causes: nor that all generous affections have private good in view. This notion they opposed with the greatest zeal and strength of reason.

BOOK I. and sublimest happiness, to encourage all such affections in ourselves, and to turn our attention to all such considerations as are naturally apt to raise them; and to despise all the mean interfering interests of this present world. These generous affections often operate where there have been no such previous deliberations and purposes of cultivating them; and where there have been such purposes, still the generous affection terminates and rests upon its natural object, the good of others; and must have had its existence in the soul previous to all desires and intentions of cultivating it.

*The affections do not arise immediately upon our willing to have them.*

There is nothing strange or unusual in this that one should want certain tender generous affections, of love, esteem, gratitude, pity, repentance for offences; while yet he earnestly wishes to have them. An inward temper and a set of affections do not start up at once upon a wish or command. Men who have been careless about virtue and piety are often observed, upon approach of danger, and on other occasions, heartily wishing, from self-love or fear of punishment, that they had love and gratitude to God, warm charity and good-will to their neighbours, meekness and a forgiving temper, and sorrow for their sins; and yet they have a distressing consciousness that these dispositions do not arise in them. In good men these affections operate without any intentions of interests, without views of self-approbation, or future rewards.

Nay, are not some of these kind affections strongest where we least expect honour from men, rewards from



God, or even any considerable self-approbation; as the conjugal and parental affections, friendship, and gratitude? However the want of them is much condemned, these affections are reputed but a lower kind of virtue, some of them scarce any virtue at all.

CHAP. 3.

V. Some plead that our most generous affections are subordinate to private interest by means of *sympathy*, which makes the pleasures and pains, the happiness or misery of others, the constant causes of pleasure or pain to ourselves. We rejoice in seeing others happy, nay in knowing that they are happy tho' at a distance. And in like manner we have pain or sorrow from their misery. To obtain this pleasure therefore and to avoid this pain, we have from self-love, say they, an inward desire of their happiness, undiffembled, tho' subordinate to our desire of our own. But this sympathy can never account for all kind affections, tho' it is no doubt a natural principle and a beautiful part of our constitution. Where it operates alone, it is uniformly proportioned to the distress or suffering beheld or imagined without regard to other circumstances, whereas our generous affections are in very different degrees and proportions; we may have a weaker good-will to any person unknown; but how much stronger is the affection of gratitude, the love with esteem toward a worthy character or intimate friend, the parental affection? This sympathy, if it is the cause of all love, must be a very variable disposition, increasing upon benefits received, moral excellence observed, intimacies, and ties of blood: for the inward

*All kind affections are not from sympathy.*

BOOK I. good-will, the kind affection, is plainly increased by these causes.

Grant it naturally varied from these causes, yet this sympathy could never account for that immediate ardour of love and good-will which breaks forth toward any character represented to us as eminent in moral excellence, before we have had any thoughts, or made any inquiries into his state in point of happiness or misery. Suppose him in the remotest parts of the earth, or in some other planet. Sure we can know the intention of the soul in its pursuits or affections. Is our own future pleasure in some sympathetick joys the object upon which every kind affection and every friendly wish terminates? Does parental care, patriotism, even when it is deliberately sacrificing life for its country, terminate upon some private joy of its own? when and where is it to be obtained? only a moment or two, before death is to carry us off from all human affairs, and few of us think of knowing the state of our survivors. Should God intimate to a brave man that his death is approaching next moment, and that he should have no longer fellow-feeling with mortals or memory of them, but that he would grant his last wishes about his children, his friends, his country; would he not as ardently desire their prosperity as in any former period of life, tho' his joyful sympathetick imagination would cease next moment? how will one account upon this scheme for those anxieties, tender recommendations, advices, and ardent prayers of men a-dying for those who were dear to them, tho'

they are persuaded that they shall presently be removed from this state and know no more of human affairs? CHAP. 3.

Our compassion too toward the distressed, 'tis plain, terminates upon their relief, even when we have no attention to our own pain. Nor is the termination of any desire merely upon the removal of the uneasiness which accompanies it. Thus tho' there may be in nature some connections of interest between us and the objects of our tender affections, yet the affection terminates on their good, is previous to this connexion, and is the cause of it. We therefore rejoice in the happiness of our child, our friend, our country, because we previously had an ultimate good-will to them. Nor do we therefore love them or wish them well because we have observed that we would derive joy from their happiness, and sorrow from their misery. Hence it is that, the stronger our previous love and esteem was, the greater shall our joy be on account of their happiness, and our sorrow for their misery.

This may suffice to establish that important point, that our nature is susceptible of affections truly disinterested in the strictest sense, and not directly subordinated to self-love, or aiming at private interest of any kind. The ties of blood, benefits received, moral excellence displayed, tho' we apprehend no advantage redounding to ourselves from it, are the natural causes of these particular kind affections; many of them arise unmerited; all terminate on the good of others; and all of them often operate in the soul when it has no

BOOK I. views, or rational ground of hoping for any private advantage; nay when they are involving it in trouble and anxiety.

*Calm affections  
and passions.*

VI. As we observed formerly that the particular motions of the will toward private good are, either the calm stable affections, or turbulent passions; so are the particular motions of the generous kind: some of them are calm, sedate, and steady; aiming at the happiness of their object, whether an individual or a society, attended with no turbulent sensations, and only causing uneasiness when they are defeated in their intention; others are turbulent, and attended with uneasy sensations. We may proceed further in this comparison.


*Disinterested benevolence.*

As there is found in the human mind, when it collects itself, a calm general determination toward personal happiness of the highest kind it has any notion of; so we may find a like principle of a generous kind. When upon recollection we present to our minds the notion of the greatest possible system of sensitive beings, and the highest happiness it can enjoy, there is also a calm determination to desire it, abstracting from any connection with or subserviency to our private enjoyment. We shall find these two grand determinations, one toward our own greatest happiness, the other toward the greatest general good, each independent on the other, each capable of such strength as to restrain all the particular affections of its kind, and keep them subordinate to itself.

*Whether should  
the selfish yield to*

But here arises a new perplexity in this complex

structure, where these two principles seem to draw different ways. Must the generous determination, and all its particular affections, yield to the selfish one, and be under its controul? must we indulge their kind motions so far as private interest admits and no further? or must the selfish yield to the generous? or can we suppose that in this complex system there are two ultimate principles which may often oppose each other, without any umpire to reconcile their differences? or shall we deny any original calm determination toward a publick interest; allowing only a variety of particular ultimate kind affections; not indeed arising from self-love, or directly aiming at private good as their natural termination, and yet in all our deliberate counsels about the general tenor of our conduct, subjected, in common with all the particular appetites and passions of the selfish kind, to the original impulse in each one toward his own perfection and happiness? This last seems to be the scheme of some excellent authors both antient and modern.

CHAP. 3.  
  
*the benevolent principle or not.*

To alledge here that, by our reason and reflection, we may see what was the intention of God the Author of our Nature in this whole fabrick of our affections; that he plainly intended the universal happiness, and that of each individual, as far as it is consistent with it; and that this intention should be our rule: that we should therefore restrain and controul, not only all selfish affections, but even all generous particular affections, within such bounds as the universal interest requires: this is true in fact, but does not remove the

*This determined by the moral sense.*

BOOK I. difficulty, unless we are first told from what determination of soul, from what motive, are we to comply with the divine intentions? if from a desire of reward, then the selfish calm determination is the sole ultimate principle of all deliberate counsels in life: if from a perception of his moral excellence, a desire of imitating him, and from love and gratitude, then the desire of moral excellence must be the supreme original determination. But this desire of moral excellence, however an original principle, must presuppose some antecedent determinations of the will as its object. And among these there must be some one in which the supreme moral excellence consists, otherways our very sense and desire of moral excellence, since it may recommend many particular affections, which may interfere with each other, will again lead us into a new labyrinth of perplexity. The solution of these difficulties must be found by considering fully that *moral faculty* above-mentioned, to which, in the next place, we proceed; briefly touching at those reasons which shew this *moral faculty* to be an *original determination* or *sense* in our nature, not capable of being referred to other powers of perception.

## C H A P. IV.

*Concerning the Moral Sense, or faculty of perceiving moral excellence, and its supreme objects.*

I. ALTHO' we have kind affections ultimately aiming at the good of others, the success of which is joyful to us, yet our approbation of moral conduct is very different from liking it merely as the occasion of pleasure to ourselves in gratifying these kind affections. As we do not approve all conduct which gives us this pleasure, so we approve sometimes such conduct as does not give it; and our approbation of the good conduct which gives this pleasure is not proportioned to the pleasure it gives us. Thus many inventions, and much art and industry which does good to the persons or country we love, is not approved as virtuous: we approve generous attempts tho' unsuccessful; we approve the virtues of enemies, which may hurt the chief objects of our love. We equally approve the virtues or generous designs of good men in former ages toward their contemporaries, or in the remotest nations, toward their countrymen, for whom our affections are very faint and weak, as if the like were done to our friends, or country, the objects of our strongest affections.

Again----Tho' the approbation of moral excellence is a grateful action or sensation of the mind, 'tis plain the good approved is not this tendency to give us a

*The notion of moral goodness is not giving us pleasure by sympathy;*

*nor pleasing our moral sense.*

BOOK I. grateful sensation. As, in approving a beautiful form, we refer the beauty to the object; we do not say that it is beautiful because we reap some little pleasure in viewing it, but we are pleased in viewing it because it is antecedently beautiful. Thus, when we admire the virtue of another, the whole excellence, or that quality which by nature we are determined to approve, is conceived to be in that other; we are pleased in the contemplation because the object is excellent, and the object is not judged to be therefore excellent because it gives us pleasure.

*nor that of usefulness to the agent;*

II. Much less is it the approved species of virtue, that it is an affection or action which gives pleasure to the agent. It always may indeed give him pleasure upon reflection, by means of this moral faculty: but 'tis plainly *then* that we most admire the virtue of another when we attend to its labours, dangers, difficulties, pains; and have no thought of any present or future pleasures of the agent.

*or to the approver;*

'Tis strange that men should be at a loss to discern what form, or conception, or species it is, under which they approve esteem or admire their own affections and conduct, or that of others; and disapprove and condemn the contrary. One would think it manifest that the notion under which one approves virtue, is neither its tendency to obtain any benefit or reward to the agent or to the approver. The approver never expects a reward for the virtue of another; he approves where he sees no interest of his own promoted: and he would less approve such actions as are



beneficent, the more he considered them as advantageous to the agent, and imagined him influenced by the views of his own advantage. Actions are conceived rewardable because they are good, not good because they are to be rewarded. Both the spectator and the agent value good actions the more in point of virtue, the more expensive or disadvantageous they are to the agent; and both will disapprove as immoral some actions which the one will allure to by bribes, and the other undertake; both conceiving them in this manner advantageous. CHAP. 4.

Now, if direct explicit opinions of tendencies to the advantage of the approver or agent do not raise moral approbation, much less can we suppose that any confused imaginations, or vague associations of ideas, about such advantages to the approver or the agent, can be the form under which virtue is approved. nor imaginations of advantage.

'Tis also obvious that the notion under which we approve virtue is not its tendency to procure honour. A prospect of honour may be a motive to the agent, at least to external actions: but the tendency of an action to procure honour cannot make another approve it, who derives no honour from it. Our very desire of gaining honour, and the disposition in spectators to confer it, must presuppose a moral sense in both. And any views an agent may have to obtain self-approbation must also presuppose a moral sense. We cannot therefore say an action is judged good because it gains to the agent the pleasure of self-approbation; but it gains to him this pleasure because it was antecedent-

BOOK I. ly good, or had that quality which by the constitution of this sense we must approve. Our present question is, what is that quality, and how perceived?

*Not conformity to laws;* III. The primary notion under which we approve is not merely a *conformity to the divine will or laws*. We seriously inquire about the moral goodness, justice, holiness, rectitude, of the Divine Nature itself, and likewise of his will or laws; these characters make up our common praises of them. They surely mean more than that *his will or laws are conformable to themselves*. This we might ascribe to an artful impure Demon. Conformity to his nature is not conformity to immensity, eternity, omnipotence. 'Tis conformity to his goodness, holiness, justice. These moral perfections then must be previously known, or else the definition by *conformity to them* is useless.

*nor conformity to truth.* Neither is the notion of moral goodness under which we approve it well explained by conformity of affections and actions to *truth, reason, true propositions, reason of things*; as in the common acceptance these characters agree to every object of the mind, about which it judges truly, animate or inanimate, virtuous or vicious. *Conformity to moral truth*, or true propositions about morals, equally belongs to virtue and vice; as the mind discerns truth about both; and, as every true proposition is conformed to its object, so is the object to the proposition. If 'tis said that these moral truths intended are only such as shew what actions are *good*, what we are *obliged to do*, what *ought to be done*. These words mean no more than the

word moral goodness; and then the definition is no better than this, "the moral goodness of an action is its conformity to such true propositions as shew the action to be good;" or, "good actions are such a-  
bout which 'tis true that *they are good*." CHAP. 4.

In general, all descriptions of moral goodness by conformity to reason if we examine them well, must lead us to some immediate original sense or determination of our nature. All reasons exciting to an action will lead us to some original affection or instinct of will; and all justifying reasons, or such as shew an action to be good, will at last lead us to some original sense or power of perception.

In like manner all descriptions of it by *fitness, congruity, agreement*, must lead us to these original determinations. The fitness of means or subordinate ends, does not prove them to be good, unless the ultimate end be good. Now fitness of an end truly ultimate must be an absurd expression; as it is referred to nothing, or is fit for nothing further. All ultimate ends are settled by some of the original determinations of our nature.\* or fitness, congruity, &c.

'Tis in vain here to alledge instruction, education, custom, or association of ideas as the original of moral approbation. As these can give no new senses, let us examine what the opinion or what the notion is upon which we approve, and to what sense it belongs, whatever way the notion may have been conjoined, or whatever

\* A complete examination of these characters would call us off too much from the present design; we must therefore refer to the illustrations on the moral sense.

BOOK I. have been the causes of our getting this opinion that  
 ~~~~~ such a quality is inherent in or connected with the  
 action? and this will lead us to an original principle.

There is a moral sense.

IV. There is therefore, as each one by close attention and reflection may convince himself, a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections, and actions consequent upon them; or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our other senses or by reasoning. When we call this determination a *sense* or *instinct*, we are not supposing it of that low kind dependent on bodily organs, such as even the brutes have. It may be a constant settled determination in the soul itself, as much as our powers of judging and reasoning. And 'tis pretty plain that *reason* is only a subservient power to our ultimate determinations, either of perception or will. The ultimate end is settled by some sense, and some determination of will: by some sense we enjoy happiness, and self-love determines to it without reasoning. Reason can only direct to the means; or compare two ends previously constituted by some other immediate powers.

This plainly analogous to other parts of nature.

In other animal-kinds each one has instincts toward its proper action, and has the highest enjoyment in following them, even with toil and some pain. Can we suppose mankind void of such principles? as brutes seem not to reflect on their own temper and actions, or that of others, they may feel no more than present delight in following their impulses. But in men, who can make their own tempers and conduct the ob-

jects of reflection, the analogy of nature would make one expect a sense, a relish about them, as well as about other objects. To each of our powers we seem to have a corresponding taste or sense, recommending the proper use of it to the agent, and making him relish or value the like exercise of it by another. This we see as to the powers of voice, of imitation, designing, or machinery, motion, reasoning; there is a sense discerning and recommending the proper exercise of them. It would be anomalous in our structure if we had no relish or taste for powers and actions of yet greater importance; if a species of which each one is naturally capable of very contrary affections toward its fellows, and of consequent actions, each one also requiring a constant intercourse of actions with them, and dependant on them for his subsistence, had not an immediate relish for such affections and actions as the interest of the system requires. Shall an immediate sense recommend the proper use of the inferior powers, and yet shall we allow no natural relish for that of the superior?

V. As some others of our immediate perceptive powers are capable of culture and improvement, so is this moral sense, without presupposing any reference to a superior power of reason to which their perceptions are to be referred. We once had pleasure in the simple artless tunes of the vulgar. We indulge ourselves in musick; we meet with finer and more complex compositions. In these we find a pleasure much higher, and begin to despise what formerly pleased us.

BOOK I. A judge, from the motions of pity, gets many criminals acquitted: we approve this sweet tenderness of heart. But we find that violence and outrages abound; the sober, just, and industrious are plagued, and have no security. A more extensive view of a publick interest shews some sorts of pity to occasion more extensive misery, than arises from a strict execution of justice. Pity of itself never appears deformed; but a more extensive affection, a love to society, a zeal to promote general happiness, is a more lovely principle, and the want of this renders a character deformed. This only shews, what we shall presently confirm, that among the several affections approved there are many degrees: some much more lovely than others. 'Tis thus alone we correct any apparent disorders in this *moral faculty*, even as we correct our reason itself. As we improve and correct a low taste for harmony by enuring the ear to finer compositions; a low taste for beauty, by presenting the finer works, which yield an higher pleasure; so we improve our *moral taste* by presenting larger systems to our mind, and more extensive affections toward them; and thus finer objects are exhibited to the moral faculty, which it will approve; even when these affections oppose the effect of some narrower affections, which considered by themselves would be truly lovely. No need here of reference to an higher power of perception, or to reason.

Is not our reason itself also often wrong, when we rashly conclude from imperfect or partial evidence? must there be an higher power too to correct our rea-

son? no; presenting more fully all the evidence on both sides, by serious attention, or the best exercise of the reasoning power, corrects the hasty judgment. Just so in the moral perceptions.

CHAP. 4.

VI. This moral sense from its very nature appears to be designed for regulating and controlling all our powers. This dignity and commanding nature we are immediatly conscious of, as we are conscious of the power itself. Nor can such matters of immediate feeling be otherways proved but by appeals to our hearts. * It does not estimate the good it recommends as merely differing in degree, tho' of the same kind with other advantages recommended by other senses, so as to allow us to practise smaller moral evils acknowledged to remain such, in order to obtain some great advantages of other sorts; or to omit what we judge in the present case to be our duty or morally good, that we may decline great evils of another sort. But as we immediatly perceive the difference in kind, and that the dignity of enjoyment from fine poetry, painting, or from knowledge is superior to the pleasures of the palate, were they never so delicate; so we immediatly discern moral good to be superior in kind and dignity to all others which are perceived by the other perceptive powers.

The moral sense designs to govern our other powers.

In all other grateful perceptions, the less we shall relish our state, the greater sacrifice we have made of

* Thus the Stoick in Cicero de Fin. l. iii. c. 10. Bonum hoc, de quo agimus, est illud quidem plurimum aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. — Alia est aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet.

BOOK I. inferior enjoyments to the superior; and our sense of the superior, after the first flutter of joy in our success is over, is not a whit increased by any sacrifice we have made to it: nay in the judgment of spectators, the superior enjoyment, or our state at least, is generally counted the worse on this account, and our conduct the less relished. Thus in sacrificing ease, or health, or pleasure, to wealth, power, or even to the ingenious arts; their pleasures gain no dignity by that means; and the conduct is not more alluring to others. But in moral good, the greater the necessary sacrifice was which was made to it, the moral excellence increases the more, and is the more approved by the agent, more admired by spectators, and the more they are roused to imitation. By this sense the heart can not only approve itself in sacrificing every other gratification to moral goodness, but have the highest self-enjoyment, and approbation of its own disposition in doing so: which plainly shews this moral sense to be naturally destined to command all the other powers.

*The chief objects
of approbation
are kind affections.*

VII. Let us next consider the several powers or dispositions approved or disapproved by this faculty. And here 'tis plain that the primary objects of this faculty are the affections of the will, and that the several affections which are approved, tho' in very different degrees, yet all agree in one general character, of tendency to the happiness of others, and to the moral perfection of the mind possessing them. No actions, however in fact beneficial to society, are approved as virtuous if they are imagined to flow from no inward

good-will to any person, or from such dispositions as do not naturally suppose good-will in the agent, or at least exclude the highest selfishness. The desires of glory, or even of rewards in a future state, were they supposed the sole affections moving an agent in the most beneficial services, without any love to God, esteem of his moral excellencies, gratitude to him, or good-will to men, would not obtain our approbation as morally good dispositions: and yet a firm belief of future happiness to be obtained by Divine appointment, upon our doing beneficent actions, might be as steady and effectual a cause of or motive to such actions as any other. But mere desire of one's own happiness, without any love to God, or man, is never the object of approbation. This itself may shew us how distinct moral approbation is from a persuasion of the tendency of actions to the interest of the approver, since he might hope equally great advantages from such a steady interested disposition to actions in fact beneficent, as from any kind affection.

That some sort of benevolent affections, or some dispositions imagined to be connected with them, are the natural objects of approbation; and the opposite affections, or the want of the kind ones, the objects of condemnation, will be plain from almost all our reasonings in praising or censuring, applauding or condemning the characters and actions of mankind. We point out some kind or beneficent intention, or some beneficent purposes proposed by the agent in what we praise, or would vindicate from censure. We shew

*This evident
from experience.*

BOOK I. some detriment ensuing to others, either intended or known, or what easily might have been known by one who had any tender regard for the interests of others, as the evidence either of ill-nature in the agent, or such selfishness, or such selfish passions as over-power all kindness and humanity.

A decency and a dignity distinct from virtue.

VIII. There is a plain gradation in the objects of our approbation and condemnation, from the indifferent set of actions ascending to the highest virtue, or descending to the lowest vice. It is not easy to settle exactly the several intermediate steps in due order, but the highest and lowest are manifest. The indifferent affections and actions are such as pursue the innocent advantages of the agent without any detriment to society, and yet without any reference made by the agent to any good of others. Such are the necessary and moderate gratifications of appetite, and many trifling actions. To explain the different degrees, we must observe, what was hinted at formerly, that beside the moral approbation of virtue, there is also another relish or sense of a certain dignity or decency in many dispositions and actions not conceived as virtuous. Thus we value the pursuits of the ingenious arts, and of knowledge, nay even some bodily perfections, such as strength and agility, more than mere brutal sensuality. We in like manner value more in another activity, patience of labour, sagacity, and spirit in business, provided they are not injurious, tho' we conceive them solely exercised for his own promotion to wealth and honour, than a lazy inactive indolence.

The calm desire of private good, tho' it is not approved as virtue, yet it is far from being condemned as vice. And none of the truly natural and selfish appetites and passions are of themselves condemned as evil, when they are within certain bounds, even tho' they are not referred by the agent to any publick interest. It was necessary for the general good that all such affections should be implanted in our species; and therefore it would have been utterly unnatural to have made them matter of disapprobation even while they were not hurtful. Nay, as these selfish affections are aiming at an end necessary to the general good, to wit the good of each individual, and as the abilities of gratifying them are powers which may be very usefully employed in subserviency to the most generous affections, it was highly proper and benign in the Author of Nature to invite us to the culture of these powers by an immediate relish for them wherever we observe them, in ourselves or in others; tho' this relish is plainly different from moral approbation.

We all have by consciousness and experience a notion of the human constitution, and of a certain proportion of affections requisite to an innocent character. The selfish affections are then only disapproved when we imagine them beyond that innocent proportion, so as to exclude or over-power the amiable affections, and engross the mind wholly to the purposes of selfishness, or even to obstruct the proper degree of the generous affections in the station and circumstances of the agent.

BOOK I.

Degrees of vir-
tue; first some a-
ffections and dispo-
sitions different
from kind affec-
tions.

IX. But there is another set of dispositions and abilities still of a finer nature, tho' distinct from both the calm universal benevolence and the particular kind affections; which however are naturally connected with such affections, natural evidences of them, and plainly inconsistent with the highest sorts of selfishness and sensuality; and these seem immediate objects of the *moral sense*, tho' perhaps not the highest. They seem to be approved immediatly, even before we think of this connexion with disinterested affections, or imagine directly that the agent is referring them to beneficent purposes. Of these moral dispositions there are several sorts, all immediatly approved, unless the mind directly discerns that they are employed in vicious purposes. Thus is fortitude approved, as it imports that something moral is more valued than life, and as plainly inconsistent with the highest selfishness: if indeed it be seen employed in rapine, and merely selfish purposes, such as those of lust or avarice, it becomes the object of horror. Candour, and openness of mind, and sincerity, can scarce ever be unattended with a kind honest heart; as 'tis virtue and innocence alone which need no disguise. And these dispositions too are immediatly approved, perhaps before we think of this connexion; so is also a steadfast principle of veracity whenever we speak.

When veracity
is approved.

I know not if CIGERO's account of this be exact;
“ that we naturally desire knowledge, and are averse
“ to ignorance, and error, and being deceived; and
“ thence relish these dispositions which are the natu-

“ral means of knowledge, and the preservatives a- CHAP. 4.
 “gainst deceptions.” Veracity seems to be immediat-
 ly and strongly approved, and that from our infancy;
 as we see the first natural impulse of the young mind
 is to speak truth, till by experiencing some inconveni-
 encies it is taught to counteract the natural impulse. One
 needs not mention here courtesy and good manners:
 they are the very dress of virtue, the direct profession
 of kind affections, and are thus approved. As all these
 abilities and dispositions are of great importance in
 life, highly beneficial to mankind when exerted in
 consequence of kind affections, and are naturally con-
 nected with them, or exclude the opposite extreme, ’tis
 with the highest goodness and wisdom that they are
 immediatly recommended to our approbation by the
 constitution of our *moral faculty*.

But of all such dispositions of our nature, different The relish and
 desire of moral
 excellence.
 from all our kind affections, none is so nearly connec-
 ted with them, none so natural an evidence of them,
 none so immediatly and necessarily subservient to them,
 as an acute moral sense itself, a strong desire of mo-
 ral excellence, with an high relish of it wherever it is
 observed. We do not call the power or sense itself vir-
 tuous; but the having this sense in an high degree na-
 turally raises a strong desire of having all generous af-
 fections; it surmounts all the little obstacles to them,
 and determines the mind to use all the natural means
 of raising them. Now, as the mind can make any of
 its own powers the object of its reflex contemplation,
 this high sense of moral excellence is approved above

BOOK I. all other abilities. And the consequent desire of moral excellence, the consequent strong love, esteem, and good-will to the persons where it is found, are immediately approved, as most amiable affections, and the highest virtues.

The degrees recited.

X. Having premised these considerations, we may observe the following degrees of approbation, as they arise above what is merely indifferent.

Certain abilities of dignity.

1. One may rank in the first step, as the object of some sort of esteem or good-liking, the exercise even of those more manly powers, which have no necessary or natural connexion with virtue, but shew a taste above sensuality and the lower selfishness: such as the pursuits of the ingenious arts, of the elegance of life, and speculative sciences. Every one sees a dignity in these pleasures, and must relish the desires of them; and indeed they are far less opposite to virtue, or the publick interest, than keen tastes or appetites of a lower kind.

2. 'Tis plain however, that our moral sense puts a much higher value upon abilities and dispositions immediately connected with virtuous affections, and which exclude the worst sorts of selfishness. Thus candour, veracity, fortitude, and a strong sense of honour, have a moral estimation above other abilities.

Calm kind affections more approved than passions.

3. But to come to the more immediate objects of moral approbation, the kind affections themselves; 'tis certain that, among affections of equal extent, we more approve the calm stable resolute purposes of heart, than the turbulent and passionate. And that,

of affections in this respect alike, we more approve CHAP. 4. those which are more extensive, and less approve those which are more confined. Thus, the stable conjugal and parental love, or the resolute calm purpose of promoting the true happiness of persons thus related to us, is preferable to the turbulent passionate dispositions of tenderness. And the love of a society, a country, is more excellent than domestick affections. We see plainly the superior dignity in these cases from this, that, notwithstanding the struggle felt in our breasts, and the opposition made by the passionate or more limited affections, yet, when we resolutely follow the calm and extensive notwithstanding of this opposition, the soul in its calmest hours and most deliberate reflections approves of its own conduct; and scarce ever fails to approve the like conduct in others at once; as in the case of others its passions are not raised to give opposition. On the contrary, when we have yielded to the passion or the limited affection, in opposition to the calm or more extensive principle, the soul upon reflection is dissatisfied with itself, and at first view it condemns the like conduct in others.

Extensive more approved than the narrow.

That disposition therefore which is most excellent; and naturally gains the highest moral approbation, is the calm, stable, universal good-will to all, or the most extensive benevolence. And this seems the most distinct notion we can form of the moral excellency of the Deity.

The chief moral excellence, universal good-will,

Another disposition inseparable from this in men, and probably in all beings who are capable of such ex-
and love of this affection.

BOOK I. *tensive affection, is the relish or approbation of this affection, and a naturally consequent desire of this moral excellence, and an esteem and good-will of an higher kind to all in whom it is found. This love of moral excellence is also an high object of approbation, when we find it in ourselves by reflection, or observe it in another. It is a pretty different affection from benevolence or the desire of communicating happiness; and is as it were in another order of affections; so that one cannot well determine whether it can be compared with the other. It seems co-ordinate, and the highest possible of that kind; never in opposition to benevolence, nay always conspiring with and assisting it. This desire of moral excellence, and love to the mind where it resides, with the consequent acts of esteem, veneration, trust, and resignation, are the essence of true piety toward God.*

We never speak of benevolence toward God; as that word carries with it some supposal of indigence, or want of some good, in the object. And yet, as we have benevolence toward a friend when he may need our assistance; so, the same emotion of soul, or the same disposition toward him, shall remain when he is raised to the best state we can wish; and it then exerts itself in congratulation, or rejoicing in his happiness. In this manner may our souls be affected toward the Deity, without any supposition of his indigence, by the highest joy and complacence in his absolute happiness.

indifferent state of the soul through the several degrees of moral turpitude. The first may be the want of these more reputable abilities; which indeed implies no evil affection, and yet plainly makes a character despicable, tho' not immoral. Thus we dislike the imprudent conduct of any man with respect to his own interest, without thinking of any detriment to arise to society from it. Thus negligence, rashness, sloth, indolence, are naturally disliked, abstracting from their effects upon society. So is a mind insensible to the more manly pleasures of arts and genius. When indeed imprudent conduct, in point of private interest, is considered also as affecting a publick, or some other persons than the agent, whose interests he ought to have regarded, as it generally does; then it may be matter of high moral condemnation and remorse: so may the meanness of our talents or abilities, when occasioned by our immoderate sloth and sensuality, and a defect of generous affections.

1. The objects of the gentlest moral disapprobation or censure are those cases "where one in gratifying some lovely narrower affection has inadvertently omitted what would have most tended to the publick good." Such is the promoting a good friend or benefactor in opposition to a competitor of superior merit and abilities. The preferring, in such cases, a less worthy friend to one's self, may be censured indeed as a want of due proportion among these lovely affections, when a more extensive one yields to the more limited; but the moral beauty of some limited affecti-

CHAP. 4.



*Several degrees
recited.*

BOOK I. ons is so great that we readily overlook some defects in the more extensive. The same is the case if one has served a friend at a trouble or expence to himself much above the value of the good he has done his friend; perhaps too incapacitating himself for some wiser services hereafter. Where indeed one preferred to himself a friend of equal merit, the publick interest is as well promoted this way, and a beautiful affection of friendship is displayed. And yet the contrary conduct, when there are no special circumstances pleading for a friend, could not be censured as immoral.

2. Other objects of lighter censure are those actions detrimental to the publick which a person is forced to do to avoid death torture or slavery; when yet the publick detriment is still greater than those evils he avoids. Here the agent may have no ill-will; nay may have many generous affections, tho' not of that heroick strength which the moral sense would recommend. The guilt is exceedingly extenuated by the greatness of the temptation, which few have sufficient strength of soul to resist. In order to retain the character of innocence, we expect, not only the absence of all malicious dispositions, but many good affections, and those too of an extensive nature; with much caution about the interests of others. The precise degrees cannot well be determined; nor is it necessary. But the stronger and the more extensive the generous affections are, so much the better is the temper; the lower they are, and the more that any opposite or narrower ones prevail against them, so much the temper is the worse.

'Tis our business to aim at the highest moral excellence, and not content ourselves with merely avoiding infamy or censure. CHAP. 4.

3. Another degree of vice are the sudden passionate motions of anger, resentment, and ill-will, upon provocation either falsely apprehended, or aggravated beyond any real ground. Such passions when they lead to injury are vicious, tho' not in the highest degree. When indeed by indulgence they turn into habitual rancour and settled malice or revenge, they form a most odious character.

4. A more deformed sort of vice is when the selfish passions and sensual appetites lead men into like injuries. These are worse excuses and weaker extenuations of guilt than the angry passions.

5. A degree more deformed is when calm selfishness raises deliberate purposes of injury known to be such. In these cases the moral faculty must be quite over-powered, and deprived of all its natural force in the soul, and so must all humanity. The like is the case when men from mere selfishness, without any grievous temptation, or without any motives of publick interest, counteract their moral sentiments by falsehood, treachery, ingratitude, a neglect of honour, or low cowardice dreading to lose some positive advantages, even while there is no such evil impending as could much affect a brave and good man.

6. In this class, or rather in a worse one, we must rank impiety, or the want of all due affections to the Deity, when he is known and conceived to be good.

BOOK I. Our moral faculty must be strangely asleep where the desire of knowing the Supreme Excellence is a-wanting, or love to it when it is known: or where there is no care to cultivate devout affections of gratitude where there have been the greatest benefits received, and where they are repeated every moment.

There is a disposition still worse, conceivable in the abstract, but scarce incident to mankind, or the creatures of a good Deity; a fixed unprovoked original malice, or a desire of the misery of others for itself, without any motives of interest.

The moral sense reduces all our powers into order.

XII. Without a distinct consideration of this moral faculty, a species endued with such a variety of senses, and of desires frequently interfering, must appear a complex confused fabrick, without any order or regular consistent design. By means of it, all is capable of harmony, and all its powers may conspire in one direction, and be consistent with each other. 'Tis already proved that we are capable of many generous affections ultimately terminating on the good of others, neither arising from any selfish view, nor terminating on private good. This moral faculty plainly shews that we are also capable of a calm settled universal benevolence, and that this is destined, as the supreme determination of the generous kind, to govern and controll our particular generous as well as selfish affections; as the heart must entirely approve its doing thus in its calmest reflections: even as in the order of selfish affections, our self-love, or our calm regard to the greatest private interest controlls our particu-

lar selfish passions; and the heart is satisfied in its doing so. CHAP. 4.

To acknowledge the several generous ultimate affections of a limited kind to be natural, and yet maintain that we have no general controlling principle but self-love, which indulges or checks the generous affections as they conduce to, or oppose, our own noblest interest; sometimes allowing these kind affections their full exercise, because of that high enjoyment we expect to ourselves in gratifying them; at other times checking them, when their gratification does not over-balance the loss we may sustain by it; is a scheme which brings indeed all the powers of the mind into one direction by means of the reference made of them all to the calm desire of our own happiness, in our previous deliberations about our conduct: and it may be justly alledged that the Author of Nature has made a connexion in the event at last between our gratifying our generous affections, and our own highest interest. But the feelings of our heart, reason, and history, revolt against this account: which seems however to have been maintained by excellent authors and strenuous defenders of the cause of virtue.

This connexion of our own highest interests with the gratifying our generous affections, in many cases is imperceptible to the mind; and the kind heart acts from its generous impulse, not thinking of its own interest. Nay all its own interests have sometimes appeared to it as opposite to, and inconsistent with the generous part, in which it persisted. Now were there

BOOK I. no other calm original determination of soul but that toward one's own interest, that man must be approved intirely who steadily pursues his own happiness, in opposition to all kind affections and all publick interest. That which is the sole calm determination, must justify every action in consequence of it, however opposite to particular kind affections. If it be said "that 'tis a mistake to imagine our interest opposite to them while there is a good providence:" grant it to be a mistake; this is only a defect of reasoning: but that disposition of mind must upon this scheme be approved which coolly sacrifices the interest of the universe to its own interest. This is plainly contrary to the feelings of our hearts.

Another ultimate determination of will toward publick good.

Can that be deemed the sole ultimate determination, the sole ultimate end, which the mind in the exercise of its noblest powers can calmly resolve, with inward approbation, deliberately to counteract? are there not instances of men who have voluntarily sacrificed their lives, without thinking of any other state of existence, for the sake of their friends or their country? does not every heart approve this temper and conduct, and admire it the more, the less presumption there is of the love of glory and postumous fame, or of any sublimer private interest mixing itself with the generous affection? does not the admiration rise higher, the more deliberately such resolutions are formed and executed? all this is unquestionably true, and yet would be absurd and impossible if self-interest of any kind is the sole ultimate termination of all

calm desire. There is therefore another ultimate determination which our souls are capable of, destined to be also an original spring of the calmest and most deliberate purposes of action; a desire of communicating happiness, an ultimate good-will, not referred to any private interest, and often operating without such reference. CHAP. 4.

In those cases where some inconsistency appears between these two determinations, the moral faculty at once points out and recommends the glorious the amiable part; not by suggesting prospects of future interests of a sublime sort by pleasures of self-approbation, or of praise. It recommends the generous part by an immediate undefinable perception; it approves the kind ardour of the heart in the sacrificing even life itself, and that even in those who have no hopes of surviving, or no attention to a future life in another world. And thus, where the moral sense is in its full vigour, it makes the generous determination to publick happiness the supreme one in the soul, with that commanding power which it is naturally destined to exercise. *Which the moral faculty shews destined to control all others.*

It must be obvious we are not speaking here of the ordinary condition of mankind, as if these calm determinations were generally exercised, and habitually controlled the particular passions; but of the condition our nature can be raised to by due culture; and of the principles which may and ought to operate, when by attention we present to our minds the objects or representations fit to excite them. Doubtless

BOOK I. some good men have exercised in life only the particular kind affections, and found a constant approbation of them, without either the most extensive views of the whole system, or the most universal benevolence. Scarce any of the vicious have ever considered wherein it is that their highest private happiness consists, and in consequence of it exerted the calm rational self-love; but merely follow inconsiderately the selfish appetites and affections. Much less have all good men made actual references of all private or generous affections to the extensive benevolence, tho' the mind can make them; or bad men made references of all their affections to calm self-love.

Comparing, reasoning, laws, religion, still necessary.

XIII. But as the selfish principles are very strong, and by custom, by early and frequent indulgences, and other causes, are raised in the greatest part of men above their due proportion, while the generous principles are little cultivated, and the moral sense often asleep; our powers of reasoning and comparing the several enjoyments which our nature is capable of, that we may discover which of them are of greatest consequence to our happiness; our capacity, by reasoning, of arriving to the knowledge of a *Governing Mind* presiding in this world, and of a moral administration, are of the highest consequence and necessity to preserve our affections in a just order, and to corroborate our *moral faculty*: as by such reasoning and reflection we may discover a perfect consistency of all the generous motions of the soul with private interest, and find out a certain tenor of life and action the most effectually sub-

fervient to both these determinations. This shall be the subject of some following chapters, after we shall have subjoined some further confirmation of these moral principles, from the sense of honour; and observed the universality of both, and how far they seem uniform principles in our species. CHAP. 5.

C H A P. V.

The Sense of Honour and Shame explained. The universal influence of the Moral Sense, and that of Honour, and their uniformity.

I. IF we consult our own feelings we must acknowledge that as there are certain affections and actions which we naturally approve, and esteem, and praise, so there is an immediate grateful sensation felt when we are approved and praised by others, and generally a most uneasy one when we are censured; without the expectation of any other advantages or disadvantages which may thence accrue to us. A more distinct consideration of this sense of honour and shame will much confirm the preceding account of our *moral faculty*. Sense of honour an immediate principle.

They who refer all the motions of the heart to private interest, and would reduce all our perceptive powers to a very small number, by one artful reference or another, depart exceedingly from nature in their accounts of those determinations about honour and shame, which are acknowledged to appear universally among men. Abstracted from private interest.

BOOK I. They tell us “our honouring a man is merely reput-
 ing him useful to us either explicitly, and thus we
 “ honour the generous and beneficent, with whom we
 “ have intercourse, and by whose offices we are profi-
 “ ted; or implicitly, and by some confused imagina-
 “ tions, and thus we honour *heroes* who lived in prior
 “ ages, or remote nations, imagining they are our
 “ contemporaries or countrymen; or thinking that
 “ they would be very useful to us if we had intercourse
 “ with them. And thus our esteem is only an opini-
 “ on of a character or conduct as useful to us, and a
 “ liking it on this account.” And, say they, “we de-
 “ sire to be honoured, or reputed useful to others, not
 “ from an immediate sensation, but because we know
 “ that men are studious of serving such as they ho-
 “ nour and repute useful to them; not indeed from
 “ ultimate love to them, but as a further allure-
 “ ment to continue thus useful; and we, in hopes of such
 “ services from those to whom we are reputed use-
 “ ful, desire to obtain this reputation of being useful
 “ to others.” ’Tis a pain to dwell upon such schemes
 as contradict the immediate feelings of the heart so
 manifestly.

*This proved by
 several reasons.*

Upon this scheme, the man who honours an agent,
 and the agent himself who approves his own conduct,
 must have notions of the same honoured action the
 most different imaginable. The honourer must only
 value it as tending to his ease, wealth, pleasure, safety;
 and the agent values it as the artful, and necessary, but
 disagreeable means of obtaining some remote advan-

tages from others, who will probably invite him to continue such conduct by making him some returns of useful services. But 'tis plain there are many tempers and actions useful to us, nay to a whole community, which we don't honour; such as useful treachery, a selfish inventive industry in improving manufactures; a promiscuous profuseness. Nay we honour sometimes what we conceive directly to be detrimental; as patriotism or courage, in a foreigner, or an enemy. Shall confused imaginations of usefulness be regarded here, against the most direct opinions of detriment to ourselves? Who finds these imaginations respecting his own interests, in reading antient histories, or dramatick writers, when the soul is so strongly moved with the several *moral forms*?

And then, surely, this notion of my own temper and conduct as beneficial to others can upon their scheme have nothing immediately grateful to me. These cool uncertain prospects of returns of advantage from the selfish arts of others can have nothing alluring amidst certain expences, labours, wounds, and death? whence the ardour for a surviving fame? this is all monstrous and unnatural. Is all our admiration, our high zeal for the brave, and merciful, and generous, and magnanimous, all our ambition and ardour for glory, this cool traffick, this artful barter of advantageous services without an express bargain? We appeal to every human heart in this matter; to the hearts of the young, who are most ardent in praising, and most delighted with praise; and have little felt those artful

BOOK I. mean designs of interest. Is all esteem and honour a mere cool opinion that from some actions and affections we shall reap some advantage? Is all the confounding sense of shame, and blushing, only a fear of some future uncertain losses, which we know not well what they shall be, or how they will befall us? Are not men conscious of their own designs in the pursuits of honour; of their own apprehensions in their avoiding of what is shameful; and of the occasion of their sorrow when they are ashamed? surely these artful views of our own interest could not be unknown to us.

This sense appears very early.

II. There is therefore an immediate sense of honour and shame, often operating where there are no such views of interest, and plainly presupposing a *moral sense*. It generally appears very early in life, before any considerable reasoning or reflection can settle well the notions of morality; and thus before we can judge for ourselves we are wisely and benignly subjected to the direction of others, are rewarded for our compliance by a most grateful sensation, and by a most uneasy one deterred from forwardness and obstinacy. The selfish accounts of this principle make all the ardour for glory the same base temper with that of a traitor or informer, who desires to appear useful to others in hopes of a reward. No better notion can they give of modesty, the sense of shame, the abhorrence of any imputation of moral turpitude, that *pudor* of the ROMANS, the finest stroke in a character.

We see this sense of *honour* admits several degrees in conformity to the *moral sense* on which it is founded. But first, in consequence of that natural desire or impulse toward the perfection of all our powers, and a sense of dignity and decency in some of them above others, we find a natural pleasure in discovering to others the perfection of any manly powers, and in being valued in that respect. Hence a taste for the ingenious arts of musick, sculpture, painting, and even for the manly diversions, is reputable. The grandeur and elegance of living, in dress, architecture, furniture, gardens, are in certain circumstances matter of glorying and of praise: much more so are the abilities yet higher, a strong genius in acquiring knowledge, the high lively imagination of the poet or orator. This last indeed plainly includes an high moral sense.

CHAP. 5.

There are several degrees of the honourable and shameful.

But to come directly to our sense of pleasure in obtaining moral approbation. All actions which proceed from any friendly or kind affection, and are not opposite to some more extensive one, are attended with assurance, and openness of behaviour, and we glory in them. The sensual passions, and ill-natured affections of anger, malice, envy, and even cool selfishness, we naturally conceal; and are ashamed of them.

III. One cannot well pass by that peculiar branch of modesty so conspicuous in all ages and nations, about venereal enjoyments. As there is a very violent appetite implanted for the most necessary purposes of the system, requiring however, in order to answer these

The modesty of the sexes natural.

BOOK I. ends more effectually, a great deal of nice regulation, by our reason and consideration of the common interest of society. 'Tis with great wisdom and goodness that such an early check is provided for this appetite by a natural principle of modesty. Children uninstructed would not soon discover to us this modesty, nor have they for some years a notion of the object or design of it, as the appetite does not arise in our first years. Should we whimsically suppose savages come to maturity in solitude, without these objects occurring to them which could excite social affections or moral notions; in this unnatural state some natural principles might not appear. But were they brought into society, and had the actions and sentiments of others presented to them, their moral faculty, and their sense of honour and shame, would soon discover themselves; and particularly their natural modesty of this peculiar kind would quickly appear. As they would approve all humanity and kindness, even when practised toward others, and abhor the contrary dispositions, they would soon despise sensuality and selfishness. As soon as they knew how the race of mankind is preserved, they would desire marriage and offspring; and when the occasion of this natural modesty was felt, and the intention of the appetite known, this natural check of shame would discover itself.

When the necessity of strict marriage-laws for the ascertaining to the fathers their own offspring was once observed, new reasons would appear for modest behaviour, and for creating an early habit of it in the

education of both sexes. But, besides, there seem to be several natural dispositions and senses peculiarly relative to this affair, distinct from the general shame of all immoderate selfishness, particularly that of modesty, which begins at that period when the appetite which needs its controll arises, and seems to abate in old age along with the appetite. CHAP. 5.

IV. Having a natural capacity for moral notions, we may be ashamed of actions without knowing the true reasons why they are immoral. By education we may contract groundless prejudices, or opinions about the qualities perceivable by any of our senses, as if they were inherent in objects where they are not. Thus we are prejudiced against meats we never tasted: but we could not be prejudiced on account of favour, or under that notion, if we had not the natural sense. Thus it is always under some species recommended by the *moral faculty* that we praise or desire to be praised, tho' we frequently have very imperfect views of the tendencies of actions, and of the affections from which they proceeded. This sense how affected by education.

What we observed about the *moral faculty*, holds also in our sense of honour, that we are highly delighted with the approbation of others, not only for the good affections themselves, but for all those abilities and dispositions which are their natural concomitants, or which exclude the contrary affections. Thus we glory in fortitude, veracity, candour, openness of mind, and the desire of honour itself; tho' the pleasure of receiving praise is known to be so strong, and there are

BOOK I. such suspicions of our being envied for it, that men are averſe to let any impatience for this pleaſure appear, or to diſcover their high delight in it, leaſt it ſhould argue too much ſelfiſhneſs.

The moral ſenſe and that of honour affect all parts of life.

V. The force of the *moral ſenſe*, and that of *honour*, is diffuſed through all parts of life. The very luxury of the table derives its main charms from ſome mixture of moral enjoyments, from communicating pleaſures, and notions of ſomething honourable as well as elegant. How univerſally deſpicable is the character of one who in ſolitude purſues eagerly the pleaſures of the palate without ſociety or hoſpitality.

The chief pleaſures of hiſtory and poetry, and the powers of eloquence are derived from the ſame ſources. Hiſtory, as it repreſents the moral characters and fortunes of the great and of nations, is always exerciſing our *moral faculty*, and our ſocial feelings of the fortunes of others. Poetry entertains us in a way yet more affecting, by more ſtriking repreſentations of the ſame objects in fictitious characters, and moving our terror, and compaſſion, and moral admiration. The power of the orator conſiſts in moving our approbation or condemnation, and the enſuing affections of eſteem or indignation, by preſenting fully all the moral qualities of actions and characters, all the pityable circumſtances which may extenuate or excuſe, to engage our favour; or all the aggravating ones, to encrease our indignation; diſplaying all the high colours on both ſides, as he is either praizing or making invectives.

The very arts of musick, statuary, and painting, beside CHAP. 5. the natural pleasures they convey by exact imitations, may receive an higher power and a stronger charm from something *moral* insinuated into the performances.

The chief beauties of countenance, and even of behaviour, arise * from indications of some sweet affections, or morally esteemable abilities, as it appears by almost all the epithets of commendation. 'Tis always some real or imagined indications of something vicious which chiefly causes our dislike, as we see from the qualities censured and condemned. Hence it is that such deformity is † observed in the countenances of the angry, the envious, the proud, and the selfish; and so much alluring sweetness in those which display the tender gentle and friendly affections.

We see how these moral indications affect the natural desires between the sexes. Could one attain to maturity without having any moral notions, which however scarce ever happened in one instance, except in ideots; he might be moved by this instinct as the brutes are. But we find that beauty raises first some favourable notions of an inward temper; and, if acquaintance confirms them, we feel an high esteem and a desire of mutual friendship. Thus we are admiring wit, good-nature, prudence, kindness, chastity, a command over the lower appetites, while the instinct is

* See *Inquiry into Beauty* &c. § vi.

† See *Cicero de Offic.* l. i. c. 29. *Appetitus qui longius evagantur — a quibus non modo animi perturbantur, verum etiam cor-*

pora. Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum, aut eorum qui libidine aliqua, aut metu commoti sunt, aut voluptate nimia gestiunt &c. and often in his other works.

BOOK I. also exciting to its natural purpose. Hence it is that this passion is often observed to make considerable improvements of the temper in several amiable virtues.

'Tis in like manner some *moral worth* apprehended, some justice or goodness of intention in persons and causes, which occasions most of that keen zeal for certain parties and factions, and those strong attachments to them, in people who have no hopes of those advantages which the leaders of them may have in

Our intimacies
not from inter-
est.

view.

To alledge that our * chusing persons of knowledge, courtesy, and good-nature for our intimates, and our avoiding the ignorant, the morose, or selfish, argues all our intimacies to arise from selfish views, is plainly unjust. 'Tis true the one sort of companions are improving, pleasant, obliging, safe; and the other useless, unpleasant, dangerous. But are all friendships and intimacies mere grimace and hypocrisy? does one feel no inward esteem of certain characters, and good-will to the persons? does one only desire his own improvement or pleasure or gain, as when he hires a master to teach him a mechanick art, or a musician to entertain him, or a labourer to do a piece of common work? do we only intend a fair outward appearance with our best friends, that we may not lose these advantages? On the contrary does not every one feel an inward esteem and good-will toward any virtuous acquaintances, which shall remain when we are separated, and hope not to meet them again?

Were there no such *moral sense* and sense of *honour*

* See *Hobbes, Bayle, Mandevil*, in many places, after *Rocheffocault*.

in our constitution, were we as entirely *selfish* as some CHAP. 5. *refiners* alledge, human life would be quite different from what we feel every day, a *joyless, loveless, cold, sullen state of cunning and suspicion.*

'Tis worth our notice here that however by the early prejudices of the external senses we are apt to imagine little reality in any thing which is not the object of one or other of them, and to conceive what is not thus sensible to be fictitious and imaginary; yet if we attend to the inward feelings of our hearts, the greatest realities, our very happiness and misery, that dignity or worth in which alone we can have the most entire satisfaction with ourselves, or for which we love, esteem, and admire another, and count him excellent or happy, or chuse him for a friend, are qualities entirely insensible, too noble and excellent to fall under the cognizance of these powers which are chiefly destined for the support of the body. Things insensible are most real

VI. Many suspect that no such senses can be natural, because there are such different and opposite notions of morality, among different nations. But granting that their relishes were different, that different men and nations approved and condemned actions upon different accounts, or under different notions; this only proves that their senses are not uniform; and not that no such principles are natural. Men's palates differ as much; but who thence denies a sense of tasting to be natural? These senses uniform.

But the uniformity is much greater in our *moral faculty* than in our palates. The different reasons gi-

BOOK I. ven by different persons for their approving or condemning will all lead us at last, when we examine them, into the same original species or notions of moral good and evil.

In approving or vindicating of actions, in all nations, men generally alledge some tendency to the happiness of others, some kind intention more or less extensive, some generous affections, or some dispositions naturally connected with them. When we alleviate any imprudent conduct, we say, the agent intended well; did not foresee the bad consequence; or had such provocation as might have transported even a kind temper, or a man of justice. When we inveigh against bad conduct, we shew that all the contrary affections or dispositions were evidenced by it, such as cruelty, wrath, immoderate selfishness, or a want of such kind affections as we generally expect in our species. If we blame imprudent conduct, without this reference to evil affections, or to the want of the good ones, 'tis sometimes from our good-will and pity toward the agent, with some contempt of his mean abilities, his sloth, stupidity, or indolence. And yet how are we softened by the thought that "the poor creature intended no harm, or occasioned none to others." This is often indeed a false excuse, as the publick suffers by any one's making himself less capable of serving it, as well as his more peculiar friends.

*The immediate
object approved
is generally the
same.*

Nay we shall find that men always approve upon some opinion, true or false, that an action has some of those qualities or tendencies, which are the natural

objects of approbation. We may indeed often imagine without ground, that actions have good effects upon the publick, or that they flowed from good affections, or that they are required by the Deity and acceptable to him; and then under these appearances we approve them. 'Tis our reason which presents a false notion or species to the *moral faculty*. The fault or error is in the opinion or understanding, and not in the *moral sense*: what it approves is truly good; tho' the action may have no such quality. We sometimes chuse and like, in point of interest, what is in event detrimental to ourselves. No man thence concludes that we are not uniform in self-love or liking of our own interest. Nor do like mistakes about the moral qualities of actions prove either that we have no *moral sense*, or that it is not uniformly constituted. The passions of spectators, as well as those of agents, prevent a mature examination of the moral natures of those actions which are subservient to the designs of the passions; as lust, rage, revenge, will hurry men into what a calm man would discern to be ruinous. But these things do not prove that men are dissimilar to each other, either in their *moral faculty*, or their *self-love*.

To prove that men have no *moral faculty*, or very dissimilar ones; we must shew either that nations or great numbers of men hold all actions to be indifferent which don't appear to them to affect their own private interest; or that they are pleased with cruelty, treachery, ingratitude, unprovoked murders, and tortures, when not practised toward themselves, just as

BOOK I. much as with their contraries: they should in some nations be deemed as reputable and lovely as humanity, compassion, liberality, faith: the action of Sextus Tarquin, or Claudius the decemvir, should be approved as much as that of Scipio with his Spanish captive. But such nations have not yet been discovered to us, not even by the invention of the boldest traveller.

The causes of different approbations and censures, different notions of happiness.

VII. The chief causes of different approbations are these three. 1. Different notions of happiness and the means of promoting it. Nations unacquainted with the improvements which life receives from art and industry, may see no occasion for encouraging them by securing to each man a property in the fruits of his labours, while the bare necessaries of life are easily obtained. Nay they can see no harm in depriving men of their artificial acquisitions, and stores beyond their present use, or of superfluities tending to dissolve them in pleasure and sloth: hence no evil may appear in theft. If any nation saw no use in the ascertaining of their offspring to the fathers, or had no desire of it; they might discern no moral evil in practices which more civilized nations see to be destructive to society. But no nation has yet been found insensible to these matters.

The causes of barbarous laws.

In some civilized states laws have obtained which we repute barbarous and impious. But look into the reasons for them, or the notions under which they were approved, and we generally find some alledged tendency to some publick good. There may no doubt

be found some few instances where immoderate zeal CHAP. 5. for their own grandeur, or that of their nation, has made legislators enact unjust laws, without any moral species recommending them. This only proves that sometimes a different principle may over-power our sense of justice. But what foolish opinions have been received! what fantastick errors and dissimilarities have been observed in the admired power of reasoning, allowed to be the characteristick of our species! Now almost all our diversities in moral sentiments, and opposite approbations, and condemnations, arise from opposite conclusions of reason about the effects of actions upon the publick, or the affections from which they flowed. The *moral sense* seems ever to approve and condemn uniformly the same immediate objects, the same affections and dispositions; tho' we reason very differently about the actions which evidence certain dispositions or their contraries. And yet reason, in which all these errors happen is allowed to be the natural principle; and the *moral faculty* is not, because of the diversities of approbation; which yet arise chiefly from the diversity of reasonings.

2. A second cause of different approbations are the larger or more confined systems which men regard in considering the tendencies of actions; some regarding only their own country and its interest, while the rest of mankind are overlooked; and others, having yet narrower systems, only a party, sect, or cabal. But if we enlarge our views with truth and justice, and observe the structure of the human soul, pretty much

Different systems regarded.

BOOK I. the same in all nations; none of which wants multitudes of good men, endued with the same tender affections to kindred, friends, benefactors; with the same compassion for the distressed, the same admiration and love of eminent virtue, the same zealous concerns for their countries which we think so lovely among ourselves; we must find a sacred tie of nature binding us even to foreigners, and a sense of that justice, mercy and good-will * which is due to all. To men of small attention their own countrymen or partisans are the only valuable part of mankind: every thing is just which advances their power, tho' it may hurt others. The different approbations here arise again from different opinions about a matter of fact. Were certain nations or sects entirely impious, cruel, and fixed upon such measures as would involve all men in eternal as well as temporal misery, and possessed of such arts of fascination as no reasonings could effectually withstand; one could scarce blame any violent destruction made of such monsters by fire or sword. Under this very notion all persecutors out of principle behold such as they call hereticks; under it they raise a general abhorrence of them. The like notions many little sects form of each other; and hence lose the sense of moral evil in their mutual hatreds and persecution.

Different opinions about God's commands.

3. A third cause of different sentiments about actions, as frequently occurring as any one, are the different opinions about what God has commanded.

* See this often inculcated in *Marc. Antonin.*

Men sometimes from desire of rewards, and fear of punishments, counteract their *moral sense*, in obedience to what they conceive to be divine commands; as they may also from other selfish passions: they may have some confused notions of matters of duty and obligation, distinct from what their hearts would approve were the notions of divine commands removed. Habits and associations of ideas affect men's minds in this matter. But where there are different opinions in different nations about the objects of the divine command, there are such strong *moral colours* or *forms* in obedience and disobedience to God, that they must necessarily cause very different approbations and censures, even from the most uniformly constituted *moral faculties*. God is generally conceived to be good and wise, to be the author of our lives, and of all the good we enjoy. Obedience must be recommended to our approbation generally under the high species of gratitude, and love of moral excellence, as well as under the notion of advantageous to the publick: and disobedience must appear censurable, under the contrary notions. Disobedience therefore to what one believes God has commanded, from any views of secular advantages or sensual pleasure, or the inveigling others into such disobedience, must appear grossly ungrateful, sensual, selfish or cruel. Where different opinions about God's commands prevail, 'tis unavoidable that different approbations and censures must be observed in consequence of these opinions, tho' the natural immediate objects of praise and censure were the

BOOK I. same to all men. This accounts for the different rites of worship, different notions of sanctity and profanity, and for the great abhorrence some nations may have of some practices in which others can discern no pernicious tendency, and repute indifferent, having no opinion of their being prohibited.

*Different rites
of religion and
notions of impiety.*

These considerations account sufficiently for the approbation of human sacrifices and other monstrous rites: tho' 'tis probable they have been often practised merely from fear, without moral approbation, by such as scarce were persuaded of the goodness of their gods: they likewise shew how incest and polygamy may be generally abhorred in some nations, where a few only can shew their pernicious consequences; and yet be deemed lawful in other nations.

*Errors often
criminal.*

Let no man hence imagine that such actions flowing from false opinions about matters of fact, or about divine commands, are light matters, or small blemishes in a character. Where the error arises from no evil affection, or no considerable defect of the good ones, the action may be very excusable. But many of those errors in opinion which affect our devotion toward the Deity, or our humanity toward our fellows, evidence very great defects in that love of moral excellence, in that just and amiable desire of knowing, reverencing, and confiding in it, which is requisite to a good character; or evidence great defects in humanity, at least in the more extensive and noble kinds of it. Where these principles are lively, they must excite men to great diligence and caution about their

duty and their practical conclusions: and consequently must lead them to just sentiments in the more important points, since sufficient evidence is afforded in nature to the sincere and attentive. No man can have sufficient humanity of soul, and candour, who can believe that human sacrifices, or the persecution of his fellow-creatures about religious tenets which hurt not society, can be duties acceptable to *God*. CHAP. 5.

VIII. Our having a *moral sense* does not infer that we have innate complex ideas of the several actions; or innate opinions of their consequences or effects upon society: these we discover by observation and reasoning, and we often make very opposite conclusions about them. The object of this sense is not any external motion or action, but the inward affections and dispositions, which by reasoning we infer from the actions observed. These immediate objects may be apprehended to be the same, where the external actions are very opposite. As incisions and amputations may be made either from hatred, or from love; so love sometimes moves to inflict painful chastisements, and sometimes to confer pleasures, upon its object. And when men form different opinions of these affections in judging about the same actions, one shall praise what another censures. They shall form these different opinions about the affections from which actions proceeded, when they judge differently about their tendency to the good or the hurt of society or of individuals. One whose attention is wholly or chiefly employed about some good tendencies of the actions, while he over-

No innate ideas as supposed.

BOOK I. looks their pernicious effects, shall imagine that they flowed from virtuous affections, and thus approve them: while a mind more attentive to their pernicious effects, infers the contrary affections to have been their spring, and condemns them.

Why it is necessary to consider the connexion of virtue with interest.

Were nothing more requisite in laying the foundation of *morals*, but the discovering in theory what affections and conduct are virtuous, and the objects of approbation, and what are vicious, the account now given of the constitution of our *moral faculty* would be sufficient for that purpose; as it points out not only what is virtuous and vicious, but also shews the several degrees of these qualities in the several sorts of affections and actions; and thus we might proceed to consider more particularly the several offices of life, and to apply our power of reason to discover what partial affections, and actions consequent upon them, are to be entirely approved, as beneficial to some parts of the system, and perfectly consistent with the general good; and what affections and actions, even of the beneficent kind, tho' they may be useful to a part, are pernicious to the general system; and thus deduce the special laws of nature, from this *moral faculty* and the generous determination of soul. But as we have also a strong determination toward private happiness, with many particular selfish appetites and affections, and these often so violent as not immediately to submit to the *moral power*, however we may be conscious of its dignity, and of some considerable effect it has upon our happiness or misery; as strong suspici-

ons may often arise attended with great uneasiness, CHAP. 5.
that in following the impulse of our kind affections and the *moral faculty* we are counteracting our interest, and abandoning what may be of more consequence to our happiness than either this self-approbation or the applauses of others; to establish well the foundations of morality, and to remove, as much as may be, all opposition arising from the selfish principles, that the mind may resolutely persist in the course which the *moral faculty* recommends, 'tis necessary to make a full comparison of all human enjoyments with each other, and thence discover in which of them our greatest happiness consists.



BOOK I. PART II.

An Inquiry into the SUPREME HAPPINESS of
MANKIND.

C H A P. VI.

*How far the several Sensations, Appetites, Passions
and Affections are in our power.*

I. **T**HE chief happiness of any being must consist in the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature desires and is capable of; or if its nature admits of a great variety of pleasures of different and sometimes inconsistent kinds, some of them also higher and more durable than others, its supreme happiness must consist in the most constant enjoyment of the more intense and durable pleasures, with as much of the lower gratifications as consists with the full enjoyment of the higher. In like manner; if we cannot ward off all pain, and there be different kinds and degrees of it, we must secure ourselves against the more intense and durable kinds, and the higher degrees of them; and that sometimes by bearing the lower kinds or degrees, or by sacrificing some smaller pleasures, when 'tis necessary for this end.

Wherein Happiness consists.

To direct us in this conduct 'tis necessary to premise some distinct account in what manner we have power over our several affections and desires, and how far any meditations or self-discipline may affect our

very perceptions of good and evil, of happiness or misery, in the several objects. CHAP. 6.

1. As the calm desires and aversions of the soul naturally arise from our opinions of good or evil in their objects, so they are proportioned to the degrees of good or evil apprehended. We have power over the selfish desires of any particular good only by means of the calm original determination toward the greatest happiness; and by the power of reasoning and comparing, which may discover what are the values of the several objects of desire. 'Tis by the correcting our opinions of their values that the several desires are kept in their due proportion. 'Tis also by means of the other original determination toward publick happiness of the most extensive kind, and by a like exercise of reason in comparing the values of the objects desired for others, that we can regulate the several kind affections and desires: since where a greater good is discerned, the calm desire of it is stronger than that toward a smaller inconsistent good, whether pursued for ourselves or others.

Here too the *moral faculty* displays much of its power. As the several narrower affections may often interfere and oppose each other, or some of them be inconsistent with more extensive affections to whole societies, or to mankind; our *moral sense* by its stronger and warmer approbation of the more extensive, both points out the affection which should prevail, and confirms this nobler affection by our natural desire of *moral excellence*.



*How we have
power over our
desires.*

BOOK I. The turbulent appetites and particular passions
 whether of the selfish or generous kind, are governed
 by the same means. They naturally arise on certain
 occasions, and that often with great vehemence. To
 govern and restrain them an habit is necessary, which
 must be acquired by frequent recollection and disci-
 pline. While we are calm we must frequently attend
 to the danger of following precipitantly the first ap-
 pearances of good or evil; we must recollect our for-
 mer experiences in ourselves, and our observations a-
 bout others, how superior and more lasting enjoyments
 have been lost by our hasty indulgence of some pressing
 appetite, or passion: how lasting misery and remorse
 has ensued upon some transient gratification: what
 shame, distress, and sorrow have been the effects of un-
 governed anger: what infamy and contempt men have
 incurred by excessive fear, or by their aversion to la-
 bour and painful application. We may thus raise an
 habitual suspicion of unexamined appearances, and
 an habitual caution when we feel any turbulent pas-
 sion arising. When the calm principles are thus con-
 firmed by frequent meditation, and the force of the
 passions abated, then it is we obtain the true liberty and
 self-command: the calm powers will retain and exer-
 cise that authority for which their natural dignity has
 fitted them, and our reason will be exercised in cor-
 recting all appearances of good and evil, and examin-
 ing the true importance of the several objects of our
 appetites or passions.

*Causes of false
 estimates of ob-
 jects.*


II. To this purpose 'tis necessary to observe the or-

dinary causes of our deception, and of our unjust estimation of objects: such as, 1. The strength of the impressions and keenness of the desires raised by things present and sensible, beyond what the insensible or future objects presented by the understanding and reflection can raise. Frequent meditation alone can remedy this evil. Our younger years are almost totally employed about the objects of sense: few can bear the pains and energy of mind requisite to fix the attention upon intellectual objects, and examine the feelings of the heart. Strength is acquired by those powers which are most exercised. The recurring motions of the appetites annex confused notions of high felicity to their objects, which is confirmed by the intenseness of some sensations while the appetite is keen. Few deliberately compare these enjoyments with others, or attend to the consequences, to the short duration of these sensations, and the ensuing satiety, shame and remorse. And yet 'tis evident to our reason that the duration of any enjoyment is as much to be regarded as the intenseness of the sensation; and that the ensuing state of the mind when the brutal impulse is sated, is to be brought into the account as well as the transient gratification.

2. Again----Allowing the imagination to dwell much upon some objects presenting hopes of high pleasure inflames our passions and byasses our judgments. Little indeed is hereby added to the enjoyment when we obtain it: nay our pleasure is rather diminished, as it seldom answers the previous expecta-

CHAP. 6.

reference to the
senses.Indulging the
imagination.

BOOK I. tion, and brings with it the air of disappointment.  But by roving over all the pleasures and advantages of certain stations, certain pitches of wealth or power, our desires of them are made more violent, and our notions represent an happiness in them, much higher than we shall find it to be when we attain to them. And this uncorrected imagination never fails to increase the torment we shall find upon a disappointment.

Associations of ideas.

3. But no cause of immoderate desires, or unfair estimates is more frequent than some groundless associations of ideas, formed by instruction, or our usual conversation, annexing confused notions of happiness, and even of virtue, and moral perfection, or their contraries, to what has little affinity to them. Seldom are objects of desire presented to the mind as they are, without some disguise. Wealth and power are truly useful not only for the natural conveniencies or pleasures of life, but as a fund for good offices. But how many notions are there often likewise annexed of great abilities, wisdom, moral excellence, and of much higher joys than they can afford; which so intoxicate some men that they forget their natural purposes, begin to love them for themselves, affect the ostentation of them; and dread the lower stations as abject, miserable, and inconsistent with moral worth or honour. Some natural pleasures too by like associations are estimated far above their worth, and immoderate desires of them torment the soul.

Superstitious opinions.

4. Some perverse superstitions also, instilled by e-

education, cause groundless aversions to tenets and CHAP. 6.
practices of the most innocent nature, by annexing to them notions of impiety, enmity to God, and obstinate wickedness of heart; while contrary tenets or practices, not a whit better, are made indications of piety, charity, holiness and zeal for the souls of men. Hence arises that rancour in the hearts of unwary zealots of all sorts against those who differ from them; and that persecuting spirit, with all the wrathful passions, which have been so long a reproach to human nature, and even to that religion which should inspire all love and meekness.

III. It is the more necessary to observe these several causes of the wrong estimations made of the objects of our desire, and of the several enjoyments of life, because scarce any of mankind can live without some solicitation or other from every one of these several sorts of enjoyments; nor can one hope to be wholly unexperienced in contrary evils. The pleasures and pains of the external senses are in some degree felt by all who have the natural powers, and must raise desires and aversions. The impulses of the appetites too are unavoidable: they recur after certain intervals, nor can their uneasy sensations be otherwise prevented altogether, than by gratifying them with their natural objects. But, according to the benign order of nature, such gratifications as may prevent the pain of the appetites may very generally be obtained; and where some moral reason prevents the gratification, there are higher moral joys accompany-

All men feel the several original desires pleasures and pains.

BOOK I. ing this abstinence, which fully make up the loss.
 Bodily pain seldom employs a great part of life; wise men find out many preservatives, which are generally effectual; and when they are not, may obtain strong consolations and supports under it.

Other desires more difficultly gratified than the appetites.

'Tis more difficult to gratify other most uneasy desires, arising from some opinions of great happiness in certain enjoyments. Had we formed no such opinions or confused notions, we had felt no misery in the want of these enjoyments; which is not the case with the appetites. But when we can change these opinions, and rectify our confused imaginations, the desires and their attendant uneasinesses cease or abate. A greater share of the misery of life is chargeable on these desires than upon the appetites. Of this kind are the desires of wealth, power, the grandeur and elegance of living, and of fame; and our aversions to their opposites are of the same nature. Our affections to others, and our kind desires, are affected by opinions in the same manner with our selfish ones. What we conceive as a great good we must warmly desire for those we love; we must be uneasy upon any disappointment.

The necessity of correcting our opinions and imaginations.

Now when these opinions are true and natural, we cannot alter them, nor would it be desirable. Reason and reflection will confirm them. But many opinions and confused notions which raise our desires are false and phantastick; and when they are corrected we are freed from much pain and anxiety. Some enjoyments are still in our power, which too may be found to be

the highest. If this be true, it is our highest interest to be fully persuaded of it; that our strongest desires may be raised toward such things as may certainly be obtained, and can yield us the noblest enjoyments.

In general, the greater any good or evil is imagined, the stronger are our desires and fears, the greater is our anxiety while the event is in suspense, and the higher shall our sorrows be upon disappointment and our first transports upon success: but where the previous imagination was false, this joy soon vanishes, and is succeeded by uneasiness: on the other hand, the sorrow upon disappointment may remain long and very intense, as the false imagination is not corrected by experience of the enjoyment. This shews the great importance of examining well all our notions about the objects of desire or aversion. Thus we should break off from sensual enjoyments, in our estimation of them, all these foreign notions of moral dignity, liberality, elegance, and good-nature, which dispositions we may display in a much wiser and more virtuous manner, without expensive luxurious tables or sumptuous living. These additional notions inflame the desires of splendid opulence, and are a fund of perpetual anxiety.

IV. Ideas once firmly associated in this manner give lasting uneasiness to the mind; and a full conviction of the understanding will not break the association, without long meditation and discipline. There are only confused imaginations, and not settled conclusions, or direct opinions, in the minds of the luxu-

*Associated ideas
not easily separated.*

BOOK I. rious, the miser, the ambitious, the lover, representing some wonderful excellence in their favourite objects proportioned to their eager desires. But long indulgence and repeated acts of desire, in a mind called off from other objects, the strain of conversation, and the airs of countenance, and the very tone of voice of the men of the same turn with whom they have haunted, associate high notions of felicity to the favourite gratification so firmly, that a long attention and reflection is necessary to rectify the confused imagination.


*Just notions of
virtue necessary
to happiness.*

A full persuasion of the excellence and importance of virtue above all other enjoyments, provided we have just notions of it, must always be for our interest. The opinion will stand the test of the strictest inquiry, as we shall shew hereafter; and the enjoyment is in our power. But disproportioned admirations of some sorts of virtue of a limited nature, and of some inferior moral forms, such as mere fortitude, zeal for truth, and for a particular system of religious tenets, while the nobler forms of goodness of more extensive good influence are overlooked, may lead men into very bad affections, and into horrid actions. No natural sense or desire is without its use, while our opinions are true: but when they are false, some of the best affections or senses may be pernicious. Our *moral sense* and kind affections lead us to condemn the evil, to oppose their designs; nay to wish their destruction when they are conceived to be unalterably set upon the ruin of others better than themselves. These ve-

ry principles, along with the anger and indignation CHAP. 6.
 naturally arising against what appears evil, may lead us into a settled rancour and hatred against great bodies of mankind thus falsely represented as wicked, and make us appear to them, as they appear to us; maliciously set upon the destruction of others.

When our opinions and imagination are corrected, Correcting our opinions abates many desires.
 the natural appetites and desires will remain; and may be attended with some uneasiness; but the strength of many will be abated and others will acquire more. The simpler gratifications of appetite, these of the easiest purchase, may by good management be as satisfying, nay almost as joyful and exhilarating as any. The pleasures of the imagination may be highly relished, and yet no distress arise from the want of them. Much of this pleasure is exposed to all, and requires no property, such as that arising from the exquisite beauties of nature, and some of the beauties of art. Nor are even these either the sole or the highest enjoyments.

V. The sympathetic pleasures and pains in some degree or other must affect us; no management can prevent it. We must live in society, and by the aid of others, whose happiness, or misery, whose pleasures, or pains, we cannot avoid observing. The sympathetic feelings unavoidable.
 Nay mankind universally feel the conjugal and parental affections; eminent goodness too, when it occurs, must excite strong love and friendship. Thus we must experience the sympathetic joys and sorrows of the higher kinds. In this matter too we must watch carefully over our opinions and imagination, that our minds be not in-

BOOK I.  flamed with vain desires about mean transitory or unnecessary goods for others, or oppressed with sorrow upon such evils befalling them as are small and tolerable. But unless we get the imaginations of our friends corrected, we shall still have occasion for sympathy. All misery is real to the sufferer while it lasts. Whoever imagines himself miserable, he is so in fact, while this imagination continues.

Where choice binds the tie of love, the previously examining well the character of the person, his opinions and notions of life, is of the highest consequence. In the stronger bonds of love with persons of just sentiments and corrected imaginations, we have a fair hazard for a large share of these higher social joys, with fewer intense pains; as the happiness of such persons is less uncertain or dependent on external accidents.

*No necessary
causes of ill-will.*

As there are not in human nature any necessary causes of ultimate ill-will or malice, a calm mind considering well the tempers, sentiments, and real springs of action in others, will indeed find much matter of pity and regret, but little of anger, indignation or envy, and of settled ill-will none at all. And thus we may be pretty free from the uneasinesses and misery of the unkind affections and passions. Human nature is indeed chargeable with many weaknesses, rash opinions, immoderate desires of private interest, strong sensual appetites, keen attachments to narrow systems beyond their merit; and very subject to anger upon appearance of injury to themselves, or those they

love: but 'tis free from all ultimate unprovoked malice; much influenced by some moral species or other; and abounding with some sorts of kind affections. Many of their most censurable actions flow from some mistaken notion of duty, or are conceived by the agent to be innocent, and are the effects of some partial and naturally lovely affection, but raised above its proportion, while more extensive ones are asleep.

CHAP. 6.

VI. As soon as one observes the affections of others or reflects on his own, the moral qualities must affect the mind. No education, habit, false opinions, or even affectation itself can prevent it. A Lucretius, an Hobbes, a Bayle, cannot shake off sentiments of gratitude, praise, and admiration of some moral forms; and of censure and detestation of others. This sense may be a sure fund of inward enjoyment to those who obey its suggestions. Our own temper and actions may be constant sources of joy upon reflection. But where partial notions of virtue and justice are rashly entertained, without extensive views and true opinions of the merit of persons and causes, the pursuit of some moral forms may occasion grievous distaste and remorse. False notions of virtue may be less lasting than other mistakes. Persons injured by them seldom fail to remonstrate; spectators not blinded by our passions and interest will shew their disgust. And thus our ill-grounded joy and self-approbation may soon give place to shame and remorse.

*Moral forms
universally affect
mankind.*

The sense of honour too must occasion pleasure or pain, as the world about us happen to disclose their

*The sense of ho-
nour affects all.*

BOOK I. sentiments of our conduct: and as we have not the opinions of others in our power, we cannot be sure of escaping all censure. But we can make a just estimate of men and of the value of their praises or censures, in proportion to their qualifications as judges of merit; and thus we may turn our ambition upon the praises of the wise and good. The approbation of our own hearts, and the approbation of *God*, give satisfactions of an higher nature than the praises of men can give. We can repress the desire of this lower enjoyment, when it proves inconsistent with the higher.

The desires of wealth and power universal.

VII. The desires also of wealth and power must affect the mind when it discerns their obvious usefulness to gratify every original desire. These pursuits in men of corrected minds may be easy and moderate, so that disappointment will not give great pain. But when the notions not only of external convenience and pleasure, and of a fund for good offices, but of all valuable ability, and moral dignity, and happiness are joined to wealth or power, and of all baseness and misery joined to poverty and the lower stations; when the natural use of these things is overlooked, and the mind is constantly intent upon further advancement, anxiety and impatience must imbitter and poison every enjoyment of life.

How fantastick desires arise.

When the mind has been diverted from its natural pursuits and enjoyments, fantastick ones must succeed. When through indolence and aversion to application men despair of success in matters naturally honourable; when any accidents have called off their

minds from the affections natural to our kind, toward CHAP. 6.
offspring, kindred, and a country; the desires of some
sort of eminence, and of amusement and pleasure, in
an incapacity for all valuable business, must set them
upon any pursuits, which have got reputation among
their fellows of like sloth, incapacity, or depravation,
under some confused notions of genteelity, liberali-
ty, sociableness, or elegance. How else shall one ac-
count for years spent by young people of easy fortunes
in hunting, gaming, drinking, sauntering, and the sil-
ly chat and ceremonies of the places of rendezvous
for gayety and amusement.

VIII. Now it is obvious our nature is incapable
of the highest pleasures of all kinds at once, or of
pursuing them together. There are manifest incon-
sistencies among them, and the means of obtaining
them. An high relish for one kind is inconsistent with
a taste for some others. Sensuality and indolence are
plainly opposite to all the higher active enjoyments.
The pursuits of knowledge and the ingenious arts are
opposite to avarice, sensuality, and to some sorts of
ambition: so are the pursuits of virtue. Nay the high-
est enjoyments of some kinds are much increased by
consciousness of our having sacrificed other inferior
pursuits and enjoyments to them, as those of virtue
and honour.

'Tis equally manifest that in our present state, one
cannot constantly secure to himself any one enjoyment
dependent on external things, which are all subject
to innumerable accidents. The noble enjoyments of

*Many enjoy-
ments opposite
and inconsistent.*

*Few enjoyments
are certain.*

BOOK I. piety, of which hereafter, and those of virtue, may be stable and independent on fortune. But a virtuous temper, whatever sure enjoyment it may afford upon reflection, ever carries a man forth beyond himself, toward a publick good, or some interests of others; and these depend not on our power. There's great pain in the disappointment of virtuous designs, tho' the temper be ever approved. In this, as in all other things, we depend on providence, which, as it gave us at first all our perceptive powers, and their objects, so it disposes of them, and particularly of the happiness or misery of others, the object on which the virtuous affections terminate. This sufficiently shews that the Deity must, for this reason, as well as many others, be the supreme object of our highest happiness: since we can never be secure, nor can we enjoy true serenity and tranquillity of mind, without a firm persuasion that his goodness, wisdom, and omnipotence are continually employed in securing the felicity of the objects of our noblest affections.

No solid tranquillity without religion.


It would not be improper to consider here the plain evidence for the existence of God and his moral perfections; not only as a firm persuasion of these points is an high matter of duty, but as the Deity and his providence are the foundations of our tranquillity and highest happiness. But as the most persuasive arguments on some of these points are derived from the very constitution of human nature, and that *moral administration* we feel within ourselves, that structure of our souls destined to recommend all those kind and

generous affections which resemble the moral perfections of God; we shall postpone the sentiments and duties of piety to be considered afterwards as the highest perfection of happiness, as well as of moral excellence. CHAP. 6.

IX. As to other enjoyments which are uncertain; tho' pure unmixed happiness is not attainable, yet our endeavours are not useless. We hinted already that having had high previous expectations, tho' it may increase the first transports of success, when the preceding anxiety is removed; yet rather lessens the subsequent enjoyment, and still embitters disappointments, and makes misfortunes, in their own nature light, become unsupportable: so having our notions lower about these uncertain objects, and our desires moderate, rather encreases our stable sense of pleasure in the object obtained, and abates the sense of disappointment. *How our endeavours have some effect.*

Thus the temperate, the sober, the chaste, the humble, have senses as acute at least as others, and enjoy all the good in sensual objects, and in honour. Abstinence and restraint, when virtue requires, vitiates no sense or appetite. Moderation in prosperity, temperance, humility, and modesty, low notions of happiness in sensual objects, prevent no sense of pleasure in advantages obtained. Men of this turn have their reason calm and active to procure the gratifications they desire, and to find out other preferable enjoyments when they are disappointed. In this uncertain world their prosperity and success is as joyful as

BOOK I. that of others. And then under misfortunes,



Si quis, quae multa vides discrimine tali,

*Si quis in adversum rapiat casusve, deusve,**

*A lively sense
of the instability
of human affairs
very useful.*

(And sure such disappointments are as incident to the inflamed admirers of external things as to others) the difference is manifest. The one had other funds of happiness: he foresaw such accidents; the loss to him is tolerable. To the other; *he is deprived of his gods; and do you ask what aileth him?* So necessary is frequent consideration of the uncertainty of human affairs; the accidents we are subject to; and the proper resorts, and springs of relief, and the other enjoyments which may still be in our power. This abates no solid joy in prosperity, but breaks vain associations, and corrects the imagination; gives strength of mind, and freedom from that terror and consternation which distracts the unprepared mind, and deprives it of the good remaining in its power.

C H A P. VII.

*A Comparison of the several Sorts of ENJOYMENT;
and the opposite Sorts of UNEASINESS, to find
their Importance to HAPPINESS.*

TO discover wherein our true happiness consists we must compare the several enjoyments of life, and the several kinds of misery, that we may discern what enjoyments are to be parted with, or what uneasiness

* *Virg. Aeneid. ix. vers. 210.*

to be endured, in order to obtain the highest and most beatifick satisfactions, and to avoid the most distressing sufferings. CHAP. 7.

As to pleasures of the same kind, 'tis manifest their values are in a joint proportion of their intenseness and duration. In estimating the duration, we not only regard the constancy of the object, or its remaining in our power, and the duration of the sensations it affords, but the constancy of our fancy or relish: for when this changes it puts an end to the enjoyment.

Enjoyments valuable by their dignity and duration.

In comparing pleasures of different kinds, the value is as the duration and dignity of the kind jointly. We have an immediate sense of a * dignity, a perfection, or beatifick quality in some kinds, which no intenseness of the lower kinds can equal, were they also as lasting as we could wish. No intenseness or duration of any external sensation gives it a dignity or worth equal to that of the improvement of the soul by knowledge, or the ingenious arts; and much less is it equal to that of virtuous affections and actions. We never hesitate in judging thus about the happiness or perfection of others, where the impetuous cravings of appetites and passions do not corrupt our judgments, as they do often in our own case. By this intimate feeling of dignity, enjoyments and exercises of some kinds, tho' not of the highest degree of those kinds, are incomparably more excellent and beatifick than the most intense and lasting enjoyments of the lower kinds. Nor is duration of such importance to some higher.

* See above chap. iv. § 10.

BOOK I. kinds, as it is to the lower. The exercise of virtue for a short period, provided it be not succeeded by something vicious, is of incomparably greater value than the most lasting sensual pleasures. Nothing destroys the excellence and perfection of the state but a contrary quality of the same kind defacing the former character. The peculiar happiness of the virtuous man is not so much abated by pain, or an early death, as that of the sensualist; tho' his complex state which is made up of all his enjoyments and sufferings of every kind is in some degree affected by them*. Nor is it a view of private sublime pleasures in frequent future reflections which recommends virtue to the soul. We feel an impulse, an ardour toward perfection, toward affections and actions of dignity, and feel their immediate excellence, abstracting from such views of future pleasures of long duration. Tho' no doubt these pleasures, which are as sure as our existence, are to be regarded in our estimation of the importance of virtue to our happiness.

Now if we denote by intenseness, in a more general meaning, the degree in which any perceptions or enjoyments are beatifick, then their comparative values are in a compound proportion of their intenseness and duration. But to retain always in view the grand differences of the kinds, and to prevent any imaginations, that the intenser sensations of the lower kinds

* The Stoicks have run into extravagance on this head. See Cicero de Fin. l. iii. c. 10. *Haec de quibus dixi non sunt temporis productione majora. — non intelligunt valetudinis aestimationem spatio indicari; virtutis, opportunitate.*

with sufficient duration may compleat our happiness; CHAP. 7. it may be more convenient to estimate enjoyments by their dignity and duration: dignity denoting the excellence of the kind, when those of different kinds are compared; and the intenseness of the sensations, when we compare those of the same kind.

II. Tho' the several original powers above-mentioned are natural to all men, yet through habit, associated ideas, education, or opinion, some generally pursue enjoyments of one kind; and shew a disregard of others, which are highly valued by men of a different turn. The different tastes of men. Some are much given to sensuality; others to more ingenious pleasures; others pursue wealth and power; others moral and social enjoyments, and honour. Wealth and power have some few faithful votaries adoring them for themselves: but the more numerous worshipers adore them only as ministring spirits, or mediators with some superior divinities, as *pleasure, honour, beneficence.*

Thus different men have different tastes. What one admires as the supreme enjoyments, another may despise. These must be examined. Must we not examine these tastes? Are all persons, all orders of beings equally happy if each obtains the enjoyments respectively most relished? At this rate the meanest bruté or insect may be as happy as the wisest hero, patriot, or friend can be. What may make a brute as happy as that low order is capable of being, may be but despicable to an order endowed with finer perceptive powers, and a nobler sort of desires. Beings of these higher orders are immedi-

BOOK I. ately conscious of the superior dignity and importance to happiness in their peculiar enjoyments, of which lower orders are incapable. Nature has thus distinguished the different orders by different perceptive powers, so that the same objects will not be sufficient for happiness to all; nor have all equal happiness when each can gratify all the desires and senses he has.

The superior orders in this world probably experience all the sensations of the lower orders, and can judge of them. But the inferior do not experience the enjoyments of the superior. Nay in the several stages of life each one finds different tastes and desires. We are conscious in our state of mature years that the happiness of our friends, our families, or our country are incomparably nobler objects of our pursuit, and administer proportionably a nobler pleasure than the toys which once abundantly entertained us when we had experienced nothing better. God has assigned to each order, and to the several stages of life in the same person, their peculiar powers and tastes. Each one is as happy when its taste is gratified as it can then be. But we are immediately conscious that one gratification is more excellent than another, when we have experienced both. And then our reason and observation enables us to compare the effects, and consequences, and duration. One may be transitory, and the occasion of great subsequent misery, tho' for the present the enjoyment be intense: another may be lasting, safe, and succeeded by no satiety, shame, disgust, or remorse.

Superior beings by diviner faculties and fuller knowledge may, without experience of all sorts, immediately discern what are the noblest. They may have some intuitive knowledge of perfection, and some standard of it, which may make the experience of some lower sorts useles to them. But of mankind these certainly are the best judges who have full experience, with their tastes or senses and appetites in a natural vigorous state. Now it never was alledged that social affections, the admiration of moral excellence, the desire of esteem, with their attendant and guardian temperance, the pursuits of knowledge, or a natural activity, impaired any sense or appetite. This is often charged with great justice upon luxury, and surfeiting, and indolence. The highest sensual enjoyments may be experienced by those who employ both mind and body vigorously in social virtuous offices, and allow all the natural appetites to recur in their due seasons. Such certainly are the best judges of all enjoyments. Thus according to the maxim often inculcated by Aristotle, "The good man is the true judge" and standard of every thing.

CHAP. 7.
*What men are
the best judges.*

But it may justly be questioned, whether men much devoted to sensual pleasures, to those of the imagination, or to wealth and power, are sufficiently prepared to judge in this question. Such pursuits indeed are seldom continued long without some notion of their innocence, nay of some duty or moral obligation. Habits sometimes deface natural characters and powers. Men of vicious habits have small experience

The vicious seldom can judge well.

BOOK I. of the generous affections, social joys, and the delights of true impartial uniform goodness. Bad habits weaken social feelings, and the relish of virtue. And yet even such men on some occasions give a strong testimony to the cause of virtue.

III. Having premised these things we may first compare the several sorts of enjoyment in point of dignity and duration; and in like manner their opposites, sufferings. And then compare a little the several tempers or characters in point of inward satisfaction.

Sensual pleasures are the meanest.
The pleasures of the external senses, are of two classes; those of the palate, and those betwixt the sexes. Both these we call sensual.

The pleasures of the palate.
The pleasures of the palate how grateful soever they may be to children, must appear the meanest and most despicable enjoyments to all men of reflection who have experienced any others. The uneasiness felt when the body needs support may be pretty intense; as 'tis wisely contrived, to engage us to take necessary care of the body. The allaying this pain may give a strong sensation of pleasure at first. But the proper pleasure of taste, the positive enjoyment, must be despicable to all who are above the order of brutes. The differences in point of pleasure among the several kinds of food is so small, that the keenness of appetite is allowed to make a much greater. The most exquisite cookery can scarce give such high sensation of this kind to a satisfied appetite, tho' it be not surfeited; as the plainest fare will give to a brisk appetite after abstinence and exercise; even altho'

there was no pain, inconsistent with mirth and gaiety, to be allayed. When therefore the allaying so gentle an uneasiness causes more pleasure than any exquisite favours without it, the positive pleasure must be very inconsiderable. The preventing of appetite, or the increasing or prolonging it by incentives of any kind, are vain efforts for pleasure; so are all arts, except exercise and abstinence, till the natural appetite returns. The greatest Epicures have acknowledged this when business or diversions have casually led them to make the experiment.

Men would universally agree in this point, were not these pleasures generally blended with others of very different natures. Not only nice oeconomy, art, and elegance in fine services and grandeur of apartments, but even moral qualities, liberality, communication of pleasure, friendship, and meriting well from others, are joined in our imaginations. Strip sensuality of all these borrowed charms, and view it naked and alone as mere pleasing the palate in solitude, and it is shameful and despicable to all.

Reasons of mistakes, a mixture of moral pleasures.

Imagine a life spent in this enjoyment without interruption, and that, contrary to the present order of nature, the appetite still remained; but that there was no social enjoyment or affection, no finer perceptions, or exercise of the intellectual powers; this state is below that of many brutes. Their appetites allow intervals for some pleasures of a social nature, and for action; and when thus employed, they shew an higher joy than in feeding.

BOOK I. *The duration small.* The duration too of these sensations is inconsiderable. Such indeed is the bounty of *God*, that the means of allaying the cravings of appetite may be easily procured; and thus by good management we may all frequently enjoy almost the highest pleasures of this kind. But the appetite is soon satisfied, and recurs not till after long intervals. Artificial incentives may raise an unnatural craving, but the allaying of this gives little pleasure. 'Tis a real depravation and sickness; and, when long continued, turns to such bodily indisposition as must stop all enjoyments. Where grandeur and variety are affected, the fancy grows capricious and inconstant, and the objects uncertain. The humour may grow too expensive for our fortunes, and increase, while the means of gratification are diminished.

The same true of animal operations.

Many of the same considerations deprectiate the other species of sensual pleasure, which much depends upon the allaying the uneasy craving of a brutal impulse, as the positive good is of itself mean and inconsiderable. Conceive the sensation alone, without love or esteem of any moral qualities, or the thought of communicating pleasure, and of being beloved; it would not equal the delights which some of the finer brute beasts seem plainly conscious of. And then this enjoyment is the most transitory of all. Indulgence, and variety, and incentives, bring upon the mind a miserable craving; an impatient ardour; an incapacity of self-government, and of all valuable improvement; a wretched slavery, which strips the mind of all

candour, integrity, and sense of honour. Add to this CHAP. 7. the capriciousness of fancy, the torments of disappointment, which such wandering dissolute desires must be exposed to; and that after the transient sensation, there can scarce remain any thing agreeable, to one who has not lost all manly sense of good. The reflection on any past sensual enjoyments gives no sense of any merit or worth, no ground of self-esteem, or scarce any sort of joy except from the low hopes of repeating the same, which may a little revive the appetite after intervals. The remembrance is no support under any calamity, chagrin, pain, provocation or sorrow, or any inward disturbance of mind, or outward misfortune. The very nature of these sensations we call sensual, and the inward sentiments of our hearts about them, abundantly declare that the supreme happiness of human nature must consist in very different enjoyments of a more noble and durable nature.

IV. 'Tis often occurring, on the other hand, that we see multitudes who prefer such pleasures to all others, and make the pursuits of sensuality the business of their lives; and that therefore the bent of the mind is naturally toward them; and their power superior to our *moral sense*, and to the generous affections.

To remove this cause of suspicion; let us recollect that the constant pursuits of sensuality are seldom ever observed without an opinion of their innocence. Our *moral faculty*, our sympathetick sense, and our kind affections are seldom set in opposition to them, or combat with them, in the minds of men much de-

Objections removed from the practice of the dissolute.

BOOK I. voted to sensuality. Where without this notion of innocence men are hurried into sensual enjoyments by impetuous appetites, the state is miserable and full of abject remorse after the transient gratifications. The professedly dissolute have some specious reasons by which they are deluded into a persuasion of the innocence of their pursuits.

Nay some moral notions, such as communication of pleasure, love, friendship, meriting well, and being beloved, make the main charm even in sensual enjoyments. This is manifest in the luxury and intemperance of such as are not sunk below the beasts, and universally despised. It holds too in the unchaste passions: and hence some notions of moral excellencies, good nature, friendliness, sweetness of temper, wit, and obligingness recommend their objects. But on the other hand; such as by generous affections, and love of moral excellence and honour, are led into a virtuous course, avowedly despise sensual enjoyments; nor does any confused imaginations of them, or hopes even of immunity from labour and pain recommend it to their choice. The external evils, toil, expence, and hardships are known and despised as well as the allurements of ease and pleasure: the moral forms by their own proper power are superior to them. In the voluptuous, the *moral sense* is seldom conquered; the enjoyments seem innocent, or at least the guilt is so diminished by the sophistry of the passions, that 'tis only the smallest moral evil which seems to be incurred for the highest sensual good; and the weakest ef-

forts of the moral kind overcome by the strongest of sensuality; and often, even by the assistance of some mistaken moral species. CHAP. 7.

It is here likewise proper to observe that all sensual gratifications are not opposite to moral enjoyments. There is a moderate indulgence perfectly innocent, sufficient to allay the uneasiness of appetite; which too by wise oeconomy may frequently be as high as any sort of sensual enjoyments, and even subservient to the moral. The temperate, and such as, after proper self-government in coelibacy, have made a wise choice in marriage, may have as high sensual enjoyments as any. In recommending of virtue we need not suppose it opposite to all gratifications of sense; tho' its power in our hearts should be maintained so high that it may be able to controll all the appetites which by accident may oppose it. Its gentle sway generally allows such gratifications as may be the highest of the kind; or where it does not, it makes abundant compensation for the loss, by the joyful approbation of such abstinence and self-government. What rich compensation is made by the joyful approbation one must feel of fidelity, friendship, and meriting well, and by the returns of a constant affection from a worthy heart, for the want of the irregular, shameful, perplexing, joyless passions and indulgences, with persons of no moral worth or steadfastness of affection.

V. We come next to consider the pleasures of the imagination in the grandeur and elegance of living, and the perceptions of beauty and harmony, to which we

The sensual enjoyments consistent with virtue as high as any.

The pleasures of knowledge and the ingenious arts superior to the sensual in dignity.

BOOK I. may add those of the ingenious arts, and knowledge. Here there is no brutal uneasy previous appetite, the satiating of which might enhance the pleasure; and yet one may immediately find that these are enjoyments superior to the sensual, and more recommended by the constitution of our nature. When the cravings of appetite are grown painful, one will readily quit these pleasures till the pain is removed; especially when there are no apprehensions of our not being at liberty of speedily returning to them. But the beholding beautiful forms, the curious works of art, or the more exquisite works of nature; the entertainments of harmony, of imitation in the ingenious arts; the discovering of the immutable relations and proportions of the objects of the pure intellect and reason, give enjoyments in dignity far superior to any thing sensual, where the sensual are considered alone without borrowed charms of an higher nature. These more manly pleasures are more suited to our nature; and are always more esteemed and approved when we are judging of the pursuits of others.

They are also superior in duration.

These pleasures too far surpass the sensual likewise in duration. They can employ a great part of life without satiety or cloying, as their pleasure is so much positive enjoyment independent upon the allaying of any previous uneasy sensations. They are the proper exercises of the soul, where none of the higher social offices, or those of rational piety claim its activity. They partake of its lasting nature, and are not transitory, as all enjoyments are which are merely subservi-

ent to the perishing body. Thus, as often as the more important offices of virtue allow any intervals, our time is agreeably and honourably employed in history natural or civil, in geometry, astronomy, poetry, painting, and musick, or such entertainments as ingenious arts afford. And some of the sweetest enjoyments of this sort require no property, nor need we ever want the objects. If familiarity abates the pleasure of the more obvious beauties of nature, their more exquisite inward structures may give new delights, and the stores of nature are inexhaustible.

Such objects of these tastes as require property are more uncertain, and the pursuit of them more solicitous and anxious, and the fancy more inconstant, as long possession abates the relish. The imagination here needs strict reins, that it may not run out into excessive admiration by associated notions of moral dignity, and liberality; and thus involve us in innumerable vexatious pursuits of what is not essential to happiness.

VI. Pleasures of the sympathetick kind arising from the fortunes of others are proportioned to the strength of the kind affections we have for them. Our nature is exceedingly susceptible of these affections; especially the stronger sorts of them toward offspring, parents, kinsmen, benefactors, or eminently worthy characters; toward sects, parties, countries. They furnish the far greater part of the business, and of the happiness or misery of life.

*Sympathetick
feelings very in-
tense.*

Compare these with others: Consider the joy of

BOOK I. heart upon any considerable prosperity, or any eminent virtue of one whom we heartily love, of a child, a brother, a friend: upon any glory or advantage to our party, or country; to any honourable cause we have espoused, or any admired character; or upon their escaping any imminent danger. Where there is an hearty affection these joys are incomparably superior to any of the former. What pleasure of sense or imagination would we not forego to obtain these events? Some ecstasies of joy upon the escaping of great imminent personal dangers have been too violent for nature, and have proved fatal: we have more* instances of sympathetick joys which proved also unsupportable and fatal. And if some tempers cannot bear life after some misfortunes befallen themselves; more instances are found of such as throw it away upon the misfortunes of others. The enjoyments must be very high which can sweeten all the toil and labour about offspring and friends, even in common characters. Having affluence of all things desired for one's self, abates very little of the diligence of mankind.

And may be of long duration.

These pleasures endure as long as the person continues to be beloved and to be prosperous. New successes of our own, or of our friend, raise greater commotions at first than advantages long possessed. But while the affection continues, the sense remains; and the sympathetick pleasure never cloyes. Where indeed affections are founded upon wrong sentiments of the

* See two instances in Livy upon the defeat at Thrasymen, l. xxii. c. 7. See on this subject Cicero de Fin. l. v. c. 24.

merit of persons, or causes, they can have no stability, and the sympathetick joy may be lost, and succeeded by disgust and indignation. But the chief cause of instability in this branch of happiness is the uncertainty of the fortunes of those we love; for their misery must occasion the most severe distress. In this we wholly depend on providence. CHAP. 7.

All that we can do to secure any fund of joys of this kind is to examine well the merit of persons, and causes, and by these means to turn our stronger affections toward the superior merit of men of true goodness and correct imaginations, whose happiness is less inconstant than that of others; to have a firm persuasion of the wisdom and goodness of providence, and to cultivate the most extensive affections. The stronger our universal good-will is, if our joys be so much the higher upon the general prosperity, the greater also shall our regret be upon apprehended general misery. But what makes this affection ever safe in all events, and a fund of superior joy, is a firm persuasion of a good Providence governing the universe for the best, amidst all the apparent evils and disorders. Of this more hereafter. *Belief of providence the sole security.*

VII. The fourth class of enjoyments are the *moral*, arising from the consciousness of good affections and actions. These joys are different from the sympathetick, which may arise from that happiness of others to which our affections and actions contributed nothing. But our affections and actions themselves, abstracting from the state of others, cannot be indiffe- *Moral enjoyments are among the highest in our nature.*

BOOK I. rent to us when we attend to them. When we find our whole soul kind and benign, we must have a joyful approbation: and a further and higher joy arises from exerting these affections in wise beneficent offices. These joys we find the highest and most important both in respect of dignity and duration.

In respect of dignity. How much inferior are the highest sensual pleasures, or even those of the imagination, or speculative knowledge, to the stable joy of conscious goodness of heart; and to that high approbation one feels of himself in any important offices for the good of his country, or his friend; and to the joyful thought of meriting well of mankind, and deserving their applauses? The kind affections alone sit easy in the heart; there is an inward complacence in them, and we joyfully entertain them for life.* But our nature is fitted for more than unactive affection. An high happiness arises from the exerting our powers; and the nobler the power is, the more beatifick is its exercise: when the virtuous efforts are successful, there is such an assemblage of pure joys from conscious goodness, sympathy with others, and the expected love and approbation of all, especially the complacency of our Maker, as far surpasses all other enjoyments. If we should fail of success, we may want the sympathetick joy, and may be touched with compassion; but the other sources of joy remain: the moral enjoyments can sweeten these distresses from the misfortunes of the person or cause espoused; which without the consciousness of our hav-

* This is often justly observed by Aristotle and Cicero.

ing acted our part well, must have been much more
intolérable. CHAP. 7.

The fancy here is not inconsistent. Our taste for
virtue increases by exercise; and habits make it still
more pleasant. The remembrance is ever delight-
ful, and makes the enjoyment lasting, where there
have been just notions of virtue, and of the merit of
persons and causes. One end proposed in the creating
different orders of beings, and ordaining the different
states of those of the same species, some more, some
less perfect, is probably this, that the nobler minds
should never want opportunities for the joyful exer-
cise of their good dispositions toward the inferior ei-
ther in perfection or in fortune. These joys too are
seated above the power of fortune while men retain
soundness of mind. A low station, and a hard condi-
tion of life, or external disadvantages may prevent our
doing the most important services to others in exter-
nal things; but can neither hinder the sound inward
affections of heart, nor a course of action suited to
our abilities; and this is the highest virtue.

Unexamined admirations of some partial moral
forms, and some narrow affections, without true no-
tions of merit in persons and causes, may lead us into
such conduct as upon better information may be mat-
ter of shame and remorse. But where by close reflec-
tion we have attained just notions of virtue and merit,
and of the effectual means of doing good, virtuous
action, as it is the natural purpose of a rational and

*These pleasures
are most durable.*

*Just notions of
virtue necessary.*

BOOK I. social species, so it is their highest happiness, and always in their power.

Among these moral enjoyments, the joys of religion and devotion toward God well deserve to be particularly remarked, which in the class of moral enjoyments are the highest of all. But as these enjoyments are of a pretty different nature from the rest of the moral ones, they shall be considered apart hereafter, for reasons above-mentioned; and we shall shew their high importance to a stable and sublime happiness above all others.

Pleasures of honour very intense.

IX. The pleasures of honour from the approbation, esteem, and gratitude of others as they naturally ensue upon virtue, so when they are founded on it, are among the most grateful feelings of the soul. These joys of honour and virtue and the sympathetick joys are naturally connected, nor need we minutely compare them; as the same conduct is naturally subservient to them all: and where they concur, no words can express the happiness enjoyed. The sympathetick feelings may be more intense in some tender affectionate hearts: active spirits in publick stations may be more affected with conscious virtue and merited glory. But where the three are united, with a firm persuasion of a good *God* approving our temper, and ensuring the universal order and happiness, our state must come nearest to *that joy unspeakable and full of glory*, which we hope for as the perfect consummation of the rational nature.

True glory is also durable, not like the sensual enjoyments, which pass like the shadow of a cloud leaving no trace behind them. The approbation and esteem of others, when founded on virtue, may probably continue during life, and survive us: and the approbation of God shall be everlasting. The pursuits of extensive fame for eminent abilities and virtues may indeed be subject to disappointment, and be full of labour and liable to excess. Ordinary virtues; or even the highest virtues in the low stations will not obtain the extensive applauses of nations. But a wise and virtuous man may generally obtain such honour either in a narrower or larger sphere as may give great joy. And a good heart, persuaded of a good providence observing all things, is sure of the approbation of the best judge, and that to eternity.

CHAP. 7.

And of great duration.

X. Among such solemn subjects the pleasures of mirth and gayety must be of small account. And yet even children despise sensuality in comparison of them: and sensual enjoyments borrow from them many of their charms, without which they would be despicable and shameful. They are an agreeable seasoning to other enjoyments, and some relief from the fatigues of serious business. The nobler joys are grave, severe, and solemn. But human life must have relaxations. Now whatever value we put upon mirth and gayety it must be cast into the side of virtue: since that mind is always best disposed for the reception of all cheerfulness and pleasantry where all is kind and easy; free from anger, ill-will, envy, or remorse. These pleasures

The pleasures of mirth are on the side of virtue.

BOOK I. are always social, and fly solitude. They are best cherished amidst love, good-nature, and mutual esteem.

Wealth and power are more desirable to the virtuous than either.

As wealth and power are not immediately pleasant, but the means of obtaining pleasures: their importance to happiness must be in proportion to that of the enjoyments to which they are referred by the possessor. The virtuous man therefore who refers them to generous and virtuous purposes, has a much nobler enjoyment of them than those who refer them to the pleasures of the imagination, or the elegance of life; and yet this is a finer reference than that to sensuality. Where through confused imaginations they are not directly referred to their natural purposes, but pursued for themselves, avarice and ambition become wretched insatiable cravings, hateful to all mankind; and the possessions become joyless to the person who obtains them.

All natural gratifications mean, and are desirable.

XI. As to some other pretended enjoyments in gratifying the passions of anger, malice, envy, revenge: 'tis certain there is no small sense of joy in these gratifications, where the passions were intense. But then 'tis obvious, that as good-will, love, esteem, gratitude, and every kind affection are natural and original pleasures sitting easy in the mind; so the happiness of any innocent person observed is the occasion of pure unmixed joy, not arising from the allaying any previous pain. If the person has been in misery, and thus has raised our compassion: his being relieved adds also another joy from stopping our sympathetick pain. But the misery of another is naturally uneasy to the ob-

server: it must then be by some accident that it ever CHAP. 7. becomes grateful: by some previous anger, or envy; some injury apprehended, or some opposition to the interests of some person beloved.

These passions of the unkind sort are not useleſs Such paſſions not uſeleſs in our conſtitution. parts in our conſtitution. Upon apprehenſion of injury or damage done to us, or to thoſe we love, anger naturally ariſes to rouse us for defence. When perſons we do not eſteem are preferred to thoſe of higher merit, an honeſt concern and indignation ariſes. A like indignation ariſes againſt all ſuch as appear groſſly immoral. Indulgence may make theſe paſſions ſtrong and habitual. The feelings attending them are original uneaſineſs and torment; to which however it was reaſonable for the general good that we ſhould be in ſome degree ſubjected on certain occaſions, as we are to bodily pain. The ſweeteſt tempers have experienced ſome ſhort fits of them, and have felt how uneaſy theſe moments paſs. Where ſuch paſſions are high and laſting, degenerating into rancour and ſtated malice and envy, the miſery muſt be very great: no wonder then that the removal of it ſhould give at firſt a conſiderable pleaſure. The miſery is removed by the ſufferings of the perſon hated or envied. But this turbulent joy, even while it laſts, is not to be compared with the ſweet ſympathetick joys, the ſenſe of merited love and eſteem, or the ſelf-approbation of forgiving, where no publick intereſt requires puniſhing. And then this ill-natured joy ſoon ceases after the paſſion is ſated, as the miſery of the moſt hated object cannot

BOOK I. please us long; nor is it ever the object of approbation, either in ourselves or others, upon reflection; nay 'tis generally succeeded by remorse, regret, and sorrow. The calm mind can have no pleasure in the misery of another, tho' it may acquiesce in such sufferings as a publick interest requires. We cannot wish to prolong vengeance but upon some notion of repeated acts of unrelenting wickedness; or from some remains of the preceeding fear with which we were tormented. And this shews one reason why "the brave are not cruel." The pleasures then of this ill-natured kind are to the calm joys of humanity, as the slaking the burning thirst of a fever, or the sating a gnawing diseased stomach, to the enjoyment of grateful food with an healthy and vigorous appetite.

*Our moral feelings
value, estimate
and enjoyment
is proportioned to
their tendency to
the general good.*

XII. We may observe concerning these several enjoyments, that with the most benign counsel our minds are so constituted that we value them upon calm reflection in proportion to their importance to the happiness of the whole system. These which only regard the safety and animal gratifications of the individual are felt to be the meanest; such as may be of more extensive use, and incite men to be serviceable to others, are naturally more esteemed, and that in different degrees according to their extent. Thus we value more the pleasures of the ingenious arts, and such exercises of body or mind as may naturally be useful to many. The partial narrow affections are lovely and joyful; but still the more stable and calm and extensive, as they are more useful, are also more

joyful both in the exercise, and in the remembrance, CHAP. 7.
 where there has been any tolerable attention and reflection. We see then that the *moral faculty* most approves and recommends such dispositions as tend most to the general good, and at the same time such as may give the noblest enjoyments to the agent upon reflection. And thus the two *grand determinations* of our nature, by a thorough consideration of our constitution, may appear perfectly consistent, and be generally gratified by the same means. The same conclusion will be confirmed by a comparison of the several sorts of pain.

XIII. We come next to compare the several sorts of uneasiness, or pain. And first it immediately occurs, that the several sorts of pain are not in the exact proportion of the pleasures of these senses. Mere bodily pleasure is the lowest and least intense, and yet bodily pain may be very violent. But we cannot thence conclude that it may be the greatest possible misery, as some have maintained. In pain, as in pleasure, the kind is to be regarded as well as the intensity. The preservation of the body required this strong connection with the soul, and that the sensations indicating its sufferings should be very strong; such as sometimes wholly to occupy the weaker minds, making them incapable of any attention to other things. But the soul finds that it cannot approve the sacrificing its duty to the avoiding of any bodily pain; and that moral evil is still something worse. Some kinds of pain have a quality contrary to that dignity

The several sorts of pain compared.

Bodily pain not the highest.

BOOK I. we mentioned, which makes them the causes of greater misery than any bodily pain, how intense soever it may be. This debases not the worth of the person; nor causes such an abject state of misery, as the consciousness of the more odious moral evils, which occasion remorse, and self-abhorrence. We rashly conclude otherways from seeing persons of ordinary virtue breaking all ties of affection, duty, and honour, to avoid tortures; and betraying their friends and country under such temptations.

*The causes of
mistake in this
matter.*

But in such cases the highest bodily pain is compared with some lower sympathetic pain, in some weaker bonds of affection, or with some lower moral species; whereas the highest of both sorts should be compared to find their importance. One who has no high sense of virtue betrays his friend, or country, in some point not conceived absolutely necessary to their safety, nor certainly involving them in ruin by the discovery of it; whereas his tortures are present and unavoidable any other way. The cases should be put of men of high virtue, where the point to be extorted would be certain unavoidable ruin to their friends, or country. Brave men in such cases have endured all tortures; and such as cannot, yet feel they have acted wrong, and disapprove their own choice of incurring moral evil rather than the highest pain. There is a fine machinery of nature here; that men of small reflection who may conceive tortures as the greatest evil, yet some way expect it as natural conduct, and highly approve it, that men should sacrifice what they

take to be their highest private interest, by suffering CHAP. 7. the greatest misery, for a publick good. This confirms what we said above of a calm determination toward a publick good without any reference to the private interest of the agent, how sublime soever; and that this determination should controll all others in our nature.

In the more common cases, how often do parents, friends, patriots, endure the highest sufferings to free others from the like? The direct sense of hunger, toils, wounds, and bodily pain, is lighter than the sympathick with the like sufferings of others. And in parental affection there is seldom any view to duty, honour, or compensation. Some crimes are so horrid that many ordinary characters would endure tortures rather than commit them; and freely expose their lives to avoid the imputation of them.

In the cases where duty yields to torture; the private evil is present, certain and sensible: the publick What cases are proper and what not. detriment absent, uncertain, and otherways perhaps avoidable. The moral turpitude is extenuated by the greatness of the temptation, and the effort of the *moral faculty* is thus made more languid. Where virtue conquers pain, the pain appears in its full strength; but is over-powered, by the generous affection, or the abhorrence of what is base. Put both sensations in their full strength without alleviation. Whether would one chuse to commit the worst crimes without such extenuating necessity, or to be in the condition of one

BOOK I. tortured with the gout or stone, as severely as any tyrant could torture him?

Put cases, as in some antient fables; that, upon such false information as nothing but a faulty, passionate, impetuous, and cruel temper could have entertained, one had tortured to death a person unknown, who is afterwards found to have been his tender parent, his dutiful son, or his generous friend, or affectionate brother; what bodily pain could equal the remorse and sympathetick sorrow which must arise? and yet here the guilt is alleviated by ignorance. When men have thrown away their own lives from remorse, the crimes have generally flowed from ignorance, inadvertence, or some furious passion; all which are some alleviation of guilt. What must the torment have been had men knowingly, and unprovoked, committed the like crimes, and soon after recovered a sense of virtue? But 'tis hard to find instances of such guilt; as our nature is scarce capable of it, or if it is, the *moral sense* is irrecoverable.

Take the sympathetick sense alone. Where is the great difference, in point of misery, between enduring tortures, and beholding the tortures of a beloved or only child, or of a tender parent; or beholding them subjected to something more ignominious? *Would to God I had dyed for thee*, is no feigned wish on such occasions.

In considering the state of such as are dear to us, moral evil appears always superior to bodily pain.

Who could wish a son or friend to be rather sunk irrecoverably in all vice and baseness of soul, but free from pain, and abounding with sensual pleasures; than exposed to the greatest tortures in some act of heroism, with a lively sense of integrity and self-esteem, and the sympathetic joys in the prosperity of every interest that is dear to him? CHAP. 7.

The natural strength of the human mind in resisting pain would appear much greater, were it not for the terrors of death which generally attend the severer kinds of it. Remove this fear, and the soul can bear it much easier. In some diversions, and in the accidents which attend them, where there is no fear of any thing fatal, men without dejection of mind, nay sometimes with gayety, can bear very acute pain, and despise it.*

Pain in the extremities of the body may be very lasting. But all bodily pain differs in this from moral feelings, that it leaves no sense of evil when the uneasy sensation ceases. The reflection on it is rather pleasant than uneasy, when there is no fear of its returning. The soul is often bettered by it, as experience gives it more strength and fortitude. Where pain was endured in any honourable cause, it always remains matter of joy and glorying. Bodily pain may be very lasting.

XIV. Our higher senses by which we receive the pleasures of the imagination, admit far less pain than pleasure, if the mind is under good discipline. Bodily deformity or distortion may be very uneasy to the per- By the imagination we receive more pleasure than pain.

* On this subject many noble sentiments are to be found in *Cicero's Tusculan*. l. ii.

BOOK I. son who is so unfortunate; and so may meanness, or the want of the decencies and elegancies of life, to such as have high desires and notions of happiness in such things. But there is no uneasy craving, as in the appetites, previous to these imaginations of great good in the objects; and the correcting of these imaginations may remove all the pain, especially where nobler enjoyments compensate the want of these pleasures. And then beauty, harmony, and ingenious works of art, and true imitation of every kind, without any property in the external objects, give pretty high positive pleasures; whereas the deformity of external objects, dissonance, bad imitations, or rude works of art, give no other pain than that trifling sort from a disappointment of expectation in a matter of no necessity in life. Knowledge is attended with exquisite pleasure; but the want of it only occasions pain where there is an high desire and admiration of it, or a fear of shame for the want of it. The uneasiness even to an inflamed imagination from the want of the grandeur and elegance of life is generally lighter than bodily pain, or the sympathetick, or the sense of moral turpitude and infamy; and 'tis wise and just that it should be so, as these other senses are intended to guard mankind against evils more pernicious to the system. If men expose sometimes their friends, families, and country, to many evils by immoderate expences on grandeur and elegance; the distant miseries of others are unexpected, or not attended to: there are hopes of new friends, of support, of profitable employments by the

friendship of the great, the approaching evils are not apprehended, and the guilt is unobserved. CHAP. 7.

XV. The sympathy, and moral pain of remorse, and infamy, are the highest our nature admits, as their opposite joys are the highest: they can make life quite intolerable. The misery of one beloved, while it continues and is attended to, is incessant pain to the observer. When it ceases by death, the painful remembrance long survives in an affectionate heart; till business diverts the thoughts, or deep reflection suggests consolations. The sure refuge in such cases is to a good providence, and that future happiness provided for all worthy objects of kind affections.

'Tis vain to alledge that all sympathy carries with it pleasure superior to the pain. We should not then incline to change the state of the object. 'Tis true we are prone to run to spectacles of misery, and are fond of tragedies: and yet misery alone observed is the cause of misery only. But there is a natural impulse, implanted for the kindest reasons, forcing us to such spectacles of misery, which generally brings relief to the sufferers. And we can restrain this impulse where we foresee that it can do no good. Let none be surpris'd at such impulses where no pleasure is in view, or any removal of our own pain: do not we observe after the death of a dear friend, when we can serve him no more, nor enjoy any sympathy pleasures with him, the tormenting thoughts of his dying agonies and groans are for many weeks, and months, and years recurring to our minds. Our many efforts to

The sympathy and moral pains the highest of all.

Why we are prone to tragical sights.

BOOK I. banish the painful useles thoughts are long ineffec-
 ~~~~~ tual. When these efforts are repeated frequently and  
 vigorously, they may at last banish them; but when  
 we intermit our watch they return again and torment  
 us. Can that sensation have superior pleasure which  
 upon reflection we shun to retain, and guard against  
 as a torment; which in tenderer constitutions turns  
 into bodily sickness?

*The delights in  
 tragedy.*

In tragedy there is a lively imitation of manners,  
 of heroick virtues, struggling against fortune; and  
 noble sentiments and affections are expressed. Our  
 sympathetick feelings indeed of every kind are exer-  
 cised; and compassion and terror are gently raised up-  
 on distresses which we know are feigned. Can one say  
 that terror has superior pleasure in it; and yet we  
 sometimes court such stories as terrify ourselves. But  
 when the imitations by sculpture, painting, and mu-  
 sick, please us so much that we can bear toil and hun-  
 ger, in prolonging the entertainment; what wonder  
 is it that such noble imitations of manners delight  
 us, notwithstanding the gentle uneasiness of sympa-  
 thy with imaginary sufferings? what pleasure is there  
 in an infirmary or lazaret-house, and in hearing real  
 groans, where there is abundant matter of compassi-  
 on, but without such virtues discovered? should one  
 forget that the distresses in tragedy are feigned, his  
 pain will increase; but the lovely virtues and noble  
 sentiments affect the mind with the higher pleasure.

*Remorse the  
 greatest and most  
 lasting torment.*

Remorse may be the highest torment, and make  
 life and all its enjoyments hateful. 'Tis not like ex-

ternal sensations referred to a body, a material system, indicating its disorders, but not abating that inward worth for which a man esteems himself or his friend. We seem conscious that the body is not the *person*, the *self* we esteem; and that its disorders or decays of any kind do not abate the excellence or worth of a rational active being. Moral evil we feel to be the immediate baseness of this *self*. It makes our inmost nature odious and distasteful to ourselves, and to all who know it.

These feelings are not transitory; the remembrance is always tormenting. They \* are less acute while the unfated passion continues impetuous: their violence appears when the crime is committed. They gnaw the soul a long time, nor cease unless habit brings on a stupor on this power, and men become abandoned to every thing that is bad. And even here any considerable adversity or danger, which checks a while the vicious passions, may revive the *moral principle*, and renew the torment.

XVI. Infamy and reproach when they justly befall us, are a great misery. But when we unjustly suffer this way, while our own hearts approve our conduct, the suffering is much lighter, and we may have many strong supports under it. The evil in this latter case is less durable; as the truth often breaks out beyond expectation. The omniscient God knows we are in-

*Infamy a great misery.*

\* *Quum scelus admittunt superest constantia. Quid fas  
Atque nefas, tandem incipiunt sentire, peractis  
Criminibus.*

Juv. Sat. 13.

BOOK I. *jured, and the wiser part of men with whom we have to do will sooner or later discern our innocency, and we are sure of their compassionate regards. Reproach however is generally a greater evil and more afflicting than most of the bodily pains, and may be pretty lasting. It over-balances all sensual pleasures with such as are not abandoned: to repel it many would sacrifice their all, and many have hazarded even life itself.*

After this impartial enquiry into our several sorts of pleasures and pains, how unnatural must that account of the supreme good and evil given by the old Cyrenaicks and Epicureans, and by some moderns likewise, appear, which places the origin of both in the bodily sensations, and refers both ultimately to them.

#### C H A P. VIII.

*A Comparison of the several TEMPERS and CHARACTERS, in point of HAPPINESS, or MISERY.*

THE grounds of suspecting a great opposition between one's private interest and the indulging of the social affections in all generous offices of virtue, may be pretty well removed by what is already said of the high enjoyments of the sympathetick and moral kinds. But the unreasonableness of all such suspicions will further appear by considering which of the several sets of affections constituting the various characters of men, are of themselves the sweetest enjoyment, the most easy and serene state of mind.

As all the senses and affections above-mentioned are parts of our inward fabrick, so each of them have their natural use either to the animal itself, or to the system of which it is a part. Moral goodness indeed consists principally in the social and kind affections carrying us out beyond ourselves. But there is a natural subserviency of the private or selfish affections; while they are kept within certain bounds, not only to the good of the individual, but to that of the system; nor is any one compleat in his kind without them. And as the happiness of a system results from that of the individuals, 'tis necessary to it, that each one have the selfish affections in that degree which his best state requires, consistently with his most effectual services to the publick.

CHAP. 8.

*All our affections are useful in the system.*

The most benign and wise constitution of a rational system is that in which the degree of selfish affection most useful to the individual is consistent with the interest of the system; and where the degree of generous affections most useful to the system is ordinarily consistent with or subservient to the greatest happiness of the individual. A mean low species may indeed be wholly subjected to the interests of a superior species, and have affections solely calculated for these higher interests. But in the more noble systems it would be a blemish if in fact there was an established inconsistency between the two grand ends to each rational being, personal enjoyment and publick happiness, and in consequence, an irreconcilable variance between the affections destined for the pursuit of them.

*The best constitution of a species.*

BOOK I.

*No natural af-  
fection is exces-  
sive.*

None of our affections can be called absolutely evil, in every degree; and yet a certain high degree, beyond the proportion of the rest, even in some of our generous affections, may be vicious, or at least a great imperfection, detrimental both to the individual and the system. At the same time the greatest strength of any one kind is not of itself necessarily evil: nay it may be innocent, if the other affections have a strength proportioned to this kind, and to the dignity of their several natures, and of the purposes for which they were implanted. But where the mind is not capacious enough to contain this high degree of other affections, any one of the selfish, and many of the generous, may be excessive. The calm extensive good-will, the desire of moral excellence, the love of God, and resignation to his will, can never exceed: as they exclude not any partial good affection as far as it is useful, nor any just regard to private good. But the more confined affections even of the generous sort may exceed their due proportion, and exclude or over-power other affections of a better sort: as we often see in parental love, pity, party-zeal, &c. The moral turpitude consists, not in the strength of these affections, but in the weakness of the more extensive ones in proportion to their dignity and superior use.

*Tis possible  
in want of pro-  
portion.*

'Tis still more evident that the selfish affections may be excessive and vicious. But it ought also to be observed that there may be a degree of them too low and defective with respect to the intention of nature. If a creature exposed to dangers, and yet neither ar-



med by nature or art, were fearless, and had no concern for its own safety in its services to others; we do not count this temper vicious, but 'tis manifestly imperfect, hurtful to the individual, and useles to the system. In the lower orders we discern the wise oeconomy of nature giving courage to the males along with their superior strength or armour, and denying it to the females, unless where the defence of their young requires it. Strong social passions, little self-regard, with ardent desires of honour, in men of very small abilities, would be an excess on one hand, or a defect on the other. The same generous ardours in men of great abilities, with proportional caution, would be useful and well proportioned: such social affections and relishes for some fine enjoyments of the imagination, as sit easy in some characters, and exclude no duties of life, might to others occasion useles misery, and starve all their other parts or faculties.

II. Now as we shewed the social and moral enjoyments, with those of honour, to be the highest; we shall briefly shew that the affections pursuing those objects with which these enjoyments are connected, when they are all kept in due proportion to their dignity and use in the system, are the most advantageous and easy to the individual; and that the selfish affections when they are too strong and inconsistent with the generous, are hurtful to the individual.

Our nature is susceptible of such ardour toward moral and social enjoyments as generally to be able to surmount all other desires, and make men despise all

CHAP. 8.

*Affections toward social and moral enjoyments are the most advantageous;*

*they are capable of the greatest strength.*

BOOK I. bodily pleasure or pain. We see instances not only among the civilized, or where notions of virtue are strengthened by a finer education, but even among rude barbarians and robbers. From a point of honour, from gratitude, from zeal to a clan, or resentment of wrongs done to it, they can joyfully embrace all hardships, and defy death and torments.

*Moral disturbance destroys all pleasure.*

On the other hand, place one amidst the greatest affluence of sensual enjoyments, but let him feel some social or moral disturbance from some distress of his friend, some danger to his party, or to his character from the imputation of cowardice, or treachery; sensual pleasures become nauseous, and wounds, and death appear little to him. He scorns one who tells him, “that befall his party, his friend, his character, “what will, he may still enjoy his sensual affluence.” He finds within himself superior springs of action, which are likewise superior sources of happiness, or misery.

Since then these social and moral enjoyments are the highest; that taste, those affections, and that course of action which tends to procure a constant train of such enjoyments, and secure us from their contraries, must be the natural means of the chief happiness, and preservatives from the deepest misery. Now these highest enjoyments are either these very affections and suitable actions, or the natural concomitants or consequences of them.

*Social affections the most joyful.*

Have we felt the state of mind under lively affections of love, good-will, bounty, gratitude, congratula-

tion? What when we have acted vigorously and successfully from such affections; served a friend, relieved the distressed, turned sorrows into joy and gratitude, preserved a country, and made multitudes safe and happy? The sense of every man tells him this state is preferable to all others. The vicious themselves, who seem wholly devoted to sensuality, yet are not void of such affections and sentiments. They have their friendships, their points of honour, and engagements to parties, how rash or capricious soever. Some delights of this kind, some social affections, and imperfect virtues are their highest enjoyments: 'tis \* the general voice of nature that where these pleasures are excluded there is no happiness. And as sensuality cannot sufficiently employ or gratify human nature, affections of a contrary sort, fullness, moroseness, suspicion, and envy must arise, which are both immediate misery, and the fruitful sources of it, wherever the social affections are suppressed.

Tho' the tendency of the social affections is to prevent misery, and thus prevent sympathetick sorrows; yet when this cannot be effected we must necessarily feel some degree of uneasiness of this generous sort. Here we should have recourse to some higher considerations, of the wisdom and goodness of the Divine Providence, of the duty and the moral excellence of an entire resignation to the supreme wisdom and goodness, and of the firm grounds of hope thence arising, that such evils as our best efforts cannot prevent, are

*But require belief and trust in Providence.*

\* *Cicero de Amicit. l. 23.* and often elsewhere.

BOOK I. destined by our universal Parent for the best purposes.

Upon less presumptions than these our sympathetic sufferings are often alleviated; when we have probable hopes that what at present moves our compassion is subservient to some superior future interest of those we love. This trust and resignation, with hope, upon a firm persuasion of the divine goodness, should be maintained by frequent meditation in such strength and vigour as to controul all narrower affections, and support the soul under the social distresses occasioned by them. Of this hereafter.

*Restraining the  
social affections  
immoral and  
hurtful.*

To root out or abate the social affections, if it would prevent or abate our social sorrows, must also destroy or abate proportionably all our social and most of our moral joys. The abatement of even the narrower affections is rather a detriment to the human character. The most natural and perfect state which our minds at present seem capable of, is that where all the natural affections, desires and senses are preserved vigorous, in proportion to the dignity of the object they pursue; so that the inferior are still kept under the restraint of the superior, and never allowed to defeat the end for which God intended them; or to controul either of the two grand determinations of our souls toward the happiness and perfection of the individual, and that of the system.

*All the united  
affections agree.*

III. The several unkind affections and passions, 'tis plain, are originally uneasy. Nature clearly shows that they should not be the ordinary state of the mind. The very degrees of them which are innocent, nay neces-

fary to the ſyſtem, are attended with uneaſy ſenſations, and little approbation can for any length of time accompany them. Such is anger, even in that degree which is neceſſary for defending ourſelves or our friends, and repelling injuries: ſuch is that deliberate reſentment againſt the inſolent and injurious, which aims at no more puniſhment than the ſafety of ſociety requires: ſuch that honeſt indignation againſt men advanced far above their merit. Theſe all are uneaſy affections; and there is little lovely in them. The ſame is true of that ſelfiſh deſire of being ſuperior to others, or the emulation or ſtrong deſire of eminence in ſome valuable qualities. This affection may be innocent, and is an uſeful ſpur to ſome tempers; but 'tis generally uneaſy; and there is no moral beauty which the heart can calmly approve of this fondneſs of ſurpaſſing upon compariſon.

Befide the uneaſineſs which attends theſe paſſions, 'tis plain they naturally tend to make ſuch changes upon their objects, as ſhall put an end to themſelves, and raiſe contrary motions of regret and pity; when the objects are ſo depressed that we ceaſe to fear evil from them, or are brought into an hearty repentance for any thing in them vicious or injurious: whereas the kind affections which we conſtantly approve, aim at ſuch ends as remain delightful, and prolong and ſtrengthen the affections. Good-will, and pity, aim at the happineſs of their objects, and this, when obtained, is matter of permanent delight to the agent: and ſuch offices done to worthy objects increaſe our love

*And only tranſient emotions.*

BOOK I. to them. This shews that the former set of affections  
 are destined by nature to be only transient occasional  
 emotions; but the latter to be the stable permanent  
 dispositions of soul.

*This set altho' lately evil in all degrees.*

We have stated names for the excesses of these unkind passions, or when they arise without just or proportional causes, and are habitual; to wit, *malice, revenge, envy, ambition or pride*. But we have no such settled names for the innocent degrees. Hence some have too rashly imagined that some of our natural passions are absolutely evil in all degrees.

But these unkind passions, thus uneasy even while innocent, were implanted partly for the interest of the individual, and partly for that of the system. As the external senses by grateful perceptions point out the safe state of the body, and the ordinary enjoyments, to the individual; and rouse him on the other hand by uneasy sensations occasionally, to ward off what is destructive: so the *moral faculty* in a like subserviency to the publick, recommends to the agent, and to every observer too, by a grateful approbation, all kind affections and actions; and on the other hand by an uneasy reluctance and remorse deters the agent from such affections as are pernicious to the system; and by the uneasy impulses of anger and indignation rouses every observer to oppose his designs.

*Not contented with the present as permanent in passions*

These passions of anger, resentment and indignation even while they are innocent, or useful, are uneasy: and this, as well as the foregoing observation, shews that they never were destined to be the ordi-

nary permanent dispositions of the soul: they should only arise occasionally, when something pernicious to the individual or the system must be repelled. They are a sort of ungrateful medicines for disorders, and not the natural food: they were implanted to repel injuries, and so far only as they are thus employed can they be deemed innocent. Now as a sense or appetite is depraved in an individual, which loaths its natural food, or craves what is not nourishing; as the organs of feeling must be disordered and sickly when they are pained with the salutary air, or necessary cloathing; surely that temper of mind must be as much depraved, where anger arises without hurt or injury received; or aversion and hatred, where there is no moral evil in the object; or envy upon the success of merit; or ill-will toward any innocent part of a system formed for, and preserved by, a social life, and an intercourse of good offices.

'Tis therefore our interest to examine well the merit of persons and causes, and to keep a strict rein over the unkind passions, which are uneasy while innocent; and so apt to exceed, that even in their moderate degrees they look so like something evil that they are little approved. The calmer affections of the soul toward the good either of the individual or the system, are more generally effectual than the turbulent passions, whatever use these passions may have in minds not enured to reflection. 'Tis desirable therefore to have our lives committed to these safer conductors, and to have an habitual caution against all violent

BOOK I. commotions of the unkind sort, as what are frequently dangerous.

*Imperfections  
incident to our  
kind affections of  
two sorts;*

IV. If the social affections are in themselves and their consequents the noblest enjoyments, 'tis plain the calm and extensive are the best of that kind, when they are in their full vigour, and enjoy their natural authority to direct or restrain the several narrower affections.

Two imperfections are incident to our kind affections; one when they extend only to a part, and yet without any bad dispositions toward any other part; the other is, where in the course of the operation of strong kind partial affections towards some, unkind and mischievous affections are apt to be excited towards others.

*not of full extent,*

In the first case, Men of smaller reflection may never form that most diffused calm purpose or desire of good to all, which is the highest moral excellence; and yet have friendly dispositions as far as their views and sphere of action extend, without ill-will to any. This temper is very excellent, nor can more be expected from the generality of mankind: nor is more needful; as very few can have power to do the most extensive services. 'Tis no unjust partiality, when men generally follow the stronger ties of nature, or bonds of gratitude, or the motions of hearty esteem toward their worthy friends; provided they neglect no such offices as occur toward others, and can restrain these narrower affections when opposite to any more extensive interest which they discover.



The dangerous partiality is when there are strong CHAP. 8. affections to a few, without any regards to other parts or unjustly partial. of the system equally valuable which are within the compass of our knowledge and sphere of action; or, perhaps, malicious dispositions toward them without natural causes, or quite beyond the proportion of them, or any subserviency to a publick interest. These social tho' partial affections are often occasions of pleasure; but the aversions may create as great uneasiness. When the kind affections are thus capriciously placed, there is little merit in them; they must be inconstant, and the self-approbation must vanish upon reflection. The object now admired may presently be disliked, and abhorred, by the same capriciousness which made it agreeable. In these partial affections there is less participation of joy; and what merit is in love without a proportioned cause? what satisfaction in returns of love from favourites injudiciously chosen? whereas the universal good-will, and even the limited affections upon natural causes, which exclude no just affection toward others, must be full of joy, and give the consciousness of meriting well from all; as such affections are subservient to the good of all.

The unjust aversions from an erroneous conscience Danger of ill-grounded aversions. and false notions of religion and virtue formed by superstition and wrong education, must lead into innumerable inconsistencies. If men do not banish all reflection there must be grievous remorse and inward displeasure: a bigot, a persecutor, a robber, with a sort of conscience of duty to his party or his system

BOOK I. of opinions, opposing natural compassion and the plainest dictates of justice, can have but poor narrow satisfactions. What are services to a party or cause where we have no just persuasion of its worth, and in opposition to the interest of many others? What in pleasing a Demon of whose moral perfections we can have no just or consistent notion? The struggles must be terrible between all the principles of humanity and this false conscience. Reflection must ever raise torturing suspicions that all is wrong. All stable satisfaction must be lost; or they must banish reason and inquiry.

Upon a false point of honour one kills a friend. Compassion and remorse immediately succeed. In persecution too, or cruelty from any party-zeal, may not the remonstrances of the sufferers, the talk of the world, or of the persecuted party, raise inward horrors and remorse, where they are often boldly denied? What is it to offend multitudes, and to be abhorred by them? How hard is it to justify any conduct opposite to humanity? What may our condition be in cooler years, when our present ambition and party-spirit may abate, and we shall see our conduct to have been full of guilt and cruelty toward the innocent; and offensive to God and all wise men? A good mind will never think it can be too cautious against any such superstitions, or party-prejudices, as may im-bitter it against any of its fellow creatures.

*The selfish pas-  
sions when too  
strong are mis-  
er-  
able.*

V. We next consider the temper where any or all the selfish passions are too violent. They are chiefly

these, the *love of life*, and of *sensual pleasure*, the *desire of interest*, or of the means of pleasure and the conveniencies of life, *desire of power*, of *glory*, and *ease*. CHAP. 8.

Of all these there is a moderate degree, consistent with social affections in their full strength. But, as we shewed above, that the good, the happiness aimed at by them, is inferior to that arising from the social affections; they ought therefore to yield to them and to the pursuits of virtue. When they are beyond their proportion they are called *cowardice* or pusillanimity, *luxury* or voluptuousness, *avarice*, *ambition*, *vanity*, *sloth*.

Love of life beyond a certain degree is a great unhappiness. Life in many cases is not worth retaining; and to preserve it on certain terms may be too dear a purchase. Death doubtless in many circumstances becomes an event earnestly to be longed for by the person himself; and others may wish for it as a joyful release to their dearest friends, whilst they studiously decline what others see is eligible. The love of life makes some act against their own interest as enemies to themselves. The dread of death often defeats its own end, betraying to dangers instead of repelling them, and taking away that presence of mind which in the courageous finds out the means of safety.

*Thus love of life.*

The very passion itself is misery; to feel cowardice and to be haunted with perpetual horrors. None live free from danger. The most athletic constitutions are not secured against acute distempers. The dread of death will poison all parts of life and all enjoyments,

BOOK I. even in the most fortunate circumstances: it will force  
 ~~~~~ men on some occasions into the meanest conduct, and  
 make the heart such a wretched sight that we shall
 never endure to look into it; when for life, which is
 an uncertain enjoyment at best, and must be parted
 with at last, we have lost every thing generous and a-
 miable which could make it worth retaining.

High sensuality
 is miserable.

VI. The passions of sensuality, as we shewed above,
 pursue the meanest enjoyments, and where they en-
 grofs the man they make the most despicable charac-
 ter. There is nothing in the enjoyments which we can
 like upon reflection. Nay it requires a long habit to re-
 strain a natural sense of shame when we are keenly set
 upon such gratifications. Moral ideas must be joined
 in our imaginations to make the indulgence appear
 reputable, and to avoid the uneasy checks of that **na-
 tural modesty* which is designed to restrain these mean
 desires.

Where passions of this sort are immoderate, the ef-
 fects are most pernicious. They impair the health of
 body and mind; and exclude all manly improvement:
 the waste of time, the effeminacy, and sloth, and a
 thousand disorderly passions, break the natural strength
 of the soul, and the reins of self-government. The de-
 triment to society from the extravagancies of the a-
 morous kind; the bitter miseries occasioned in the
 dearest relations of life; the distress and infamy this

* *Humiliorum appetituum moderator pudor.* is the pretty expression of Cicero. The
 word is indeed often taken more exten-

sively for our *moral sense*; and *aisle*, is used
 in the same extent by the Greeks.

treacherous love exposes its object to, must be obvious to the slightest attention; and must give the most bitter remorse, where any sense of virtue or humanity remains; not to mention the waste this passion makes in the honesty, ingenuity, and modesty of our nature. Must it not then be contrary to our interest to have such passions violent?

VII. As wealth may be useful in gratifying any of our desires, may promote the good of the individual, or be a fund for offices of humanity, 'tis no wonder that it is very generally pursued by such as extend their views beyond the present moment. A moderate desire of it is innocent, and wise, and subservient to the best purposes: and the possession is most joyful to such as refer it to the purposes of humanity and virtue. But when the desire is violent, and referred only to selfish purposes; or, by some confused notions of dignity and power, terminating almost only upon mere increase of possessions; the temper is as wretched as it is unreasonable, more oppressive to the heart where it resides than it can be to its neighbours. The natural desires are easily satisfied. Frugality and temperance with small expence may equal in pleasure the highest luxury. The thirst for wealth without reference to pleasure or offices of liberality, is an eager, insatiable, restless, joyless craving. Such as entertain high prospects of dignity and happiness secured to their posterity by their acquisitions, frequently by their example and instruction root out as far as they can every joyful and honourable disposition out of their minds; and when

*Avarice a
wretched passion*

BOOK I. the ungainly lesson has not its effect, the deformed example presented to their posterity tempts them into the opposite extreme: and the hope of lazy opulence and luxury quenches all ardour for improvement in the honourable arts of life, and encourages every dissolute inclination.

Ambition is miserable.

The same things may be said of the desires of power and of glory. A moderate degree is innocent and useful; but when they grow too violent they are restless and uneasy to the individual, and often pernicious to society, and generally break through the most sacred ties of duty and humanity, and ruin every good disposition of heart. To desire reputation for integrity and moral worth is natural to every good temper; and it excites men to be what they desire to be reputed, which is the shortest way to true glory. Nay the desire of eminence in valuable abilities, while it is moderate, is useful in our constitution and innocent. But it may grow so violent as to be a perpetual torment, and the source of the vilest and most wretched passions. All superior merit will then raise envy, and ill-will, and an humour of detraction. The mind will grow restless, violent, jealous, captious, easily provoked, incapable of bearing the least neglect, uneasy to all, and disliked by all. No passion can more defeat its end than vanity; as nothing is more odious and contemptible than arrogance, nothing more lovely than its opposite, modesty and humility.

Shew and indolence miserable.

VIII. The most opposite temper to ambition is the love of ease. This too while moderate is innocent and

useful, as the desire of sleep when one is weary. But CHAP. 8. when it turns to habitual sloth, not yielding to the social affections, and declining all laborious offices, it must destroy all true worth, all social enjoyment, sense of merit, and hopes of esteem. The languid sickly state of a body uncapable of exercise appears in the complexion and weak appetites; a worse disorder seizes the mind that wants its natural exercise in the social offices of life. It must have tedious hours, be suspicious of contempt, jealous, and impotent in every passion. The effects upon interest are obvious. The indolent are exposed to all inconvenience and perplexity in their business; wanting to themselves in every thing, and deprived of the aid of others, as they have merited none from them, and discourage all assistance by their own inactivity.

Thus the excesses of the selfish passions are certain misery. They make up the character called *selfish*, which is despicable and deprived of all the nobler joys of life. The temper as it is shameful runs into subtilty of conduct, and a feigned behaviour; loses its natural ingenuity and candour, and contracts distrust, suspicion and envy. An interest separate from our fellows is more and more formed every day, and the social motions suppressed. At last the temper becomes completely wretched and hateful.

IX. Some extraordinary and rare instances of most immoderate excesses of these selfish passions are in common speech properly enough termed monstrous and unnatural, but seem to have these epithets given Monstrous passions whence arising.

BOOK I. them by some authors, as if they were of a distinct kind; such as when men seem to delight in torments, or to have an unprovoked desire of insulting, or petulance, unnatural lusts, enormous pride, tyranny and misanthropy. These are only excesses of some passions naturally implanted, but raised to a prodigious degree without a just cause, upon some false opinions or confused imaginations, and by long indulgence and frequent irritation. Every one sees this to be the case in monstrous lusts, where the natural passion is grown ungovernable; and caprice and curiosity oft make men try all kinds of indulgences.

Tyranny.

In the same manner, when the temper from natural constitution and other causes happens to be savage and morose, and where the mind has been long irritated and galled by opposition or some apprehended injuries, and no thorough reflection intervenes to stop the growth of the passion, surprizing rancour and cruelty may appear. One may easily suggest to himself, how long continued self-flattery and ambition, without any check from reflection, and the frequent anger arising from the oppositions which ambitious spirits generally meet with; and the constant causes of suspicion which their own conduct must afford, may make that horrid temper of jealousy, rage, cruelty, and oppression of every thing free and virtuous, which reigns in tyrants.

*Jealousy and
oppression.*

Consider the affectation of liberty, the anger at those restraints which the dissolute meet with from the laws of civilized societies, the abhorrence they ex-

pect from their soberer fellow-citizens, and the ostentation of fortitude; and they will account for that surprising petulancy we meet with in some characters. CHAP. 8.

Civilized nations of great humanity, from false conceptions of the spirit and tempers of the rest of mankind, and from some absurd notions of dignity and pre-eminence in themselves, have thought them fit only to be slaves: some have found such entertainment from the surprising efforts of art and courage, that insensible to the misery which was every moment obvious to their sight, they accounted it a spectacle of high delight, to behold gladiators putting each other to death. We all know the notions entertained by the vulgar concerning all hereticks; we know the pride of schoolmen and many ecclesiasticks; how it galls their insolent vanity that any man should assume to himself to be wiser than they in tenets of religion by differing from them. When this insolent pride is long indulged by the enjoyment of power and popular veneration, it grows prodigious; and, it may explain how such men, and their implicate votaries, can behold with joy the most horrid tortures of men truly innocent, but dressed up in all the forms of impiety, and wickedness. 'Tis needless to explain the original of other monstrous dispositions. *Savage cruelty.*

As we shewed already the misery which attends the smaller excesses of these selfish and ill-natured passions; 'tis plain the more monstrous excesses must be still greater misery.

We have hitherto considered what affections of

BOOK I. mind and what temper toward the enjoyments of this world, or toward our fellow-creatures, are the natural sources of the highest enjoyment. There remains another object of affection to every rational mind to be fully considered, and which, from what already hath often occurred in our former inquiry, must be of the greatest importance to our happiness, viz. the *Deity*, the *Mind* which presides in the universe: and then we shall have in view the sources of all the enjoyments our nature is capable of. Our *moral faculty* too finds here its supreme object; as it naturally determines the mind to esteem and reverence all moral excellence, and perceives a duty and moral excellence in such veneration, and in the affections which ensue upon it.

C H A P. IX.

The DUTIES toward GOD; and first, of just Sentiments concerning his NATURE.

OUR inquiries on this subject are reduced to two heads; first, What are the sentiments concerning the *Divine Nature*? And then, what are the affections and worship suited to these sentiments, and what enjoyment or happiness they afford to the human mind?

*Just sentiments
and just wor-
ship to a Deity.*

Previous to our forming just sentiments concerning the *Deity* there must be a persuasion of his existence. The world has ever agreed that there must

be some superior *Mind*, or *Minds*, endued with knowledge and great power, presiding over human affairs. Tradition no doubt from race to race has contributed something to diffuse this persuasion. The experience of evil from unknown causes, the fear of them, and the desire of some further aids against them when all visible powers have failed, may have excited some to this enquiry: the natural enthusiasm and admiration arising when we behold the great and beautiful works of nature has raised the curiosity of others to inquire into the cause: and this probably has been the most general motive: but the certainty of any tenet depends not on the motives of inquiry into it, but on the validity of the proofs; and its dignity depends upon its importance to happiness. Vanity or avarice may have excited some to the study of Geometry; no man on this account will despise the science, or count it less certain or useful in life. We shall only point out briefly the heads of argument on this subject. The whole of natural knowledge or natural history, is a collection of evidence on this affair.

II. Whithersoever we turn our eyes or our thoughts, there occur as great evidences of design, intention, art, and power, as our imagination can conceive. The most stupendous orbs, the greatest masses, moving in constant order, with great rapidity: forces and powers exerted every where, in worlds as large as this habitation of men: an universe large beyond imagination and all our powers of observation. But as far as we can make observations, manifest footsteps of

*Proofs from the
structure of the
world.*

BOOK I. contrivance and regular design appear in the most exquisite fitness of parts for their several uses, and in mutual connexions and dependances of things very distant in place. The earth, were it alone, would be a stupid mass, inactive and uselefs; but it is enlivened by the sun: and 'tis impregnated with innumerable seeds, which by warmth and moisture, and the other nutritive principles in the earth and air, extend and unfold their wondrous beautiful parts, and break forth in innumerable regular forms of different orders, from the lowest moss, to the stately oak: and these generally fitted for the nourishment or other conveniences of superior orders of beings, endued with powers of motion, of sense, of reason.

From the structures of animal bodies;

The animal bodies again display new wonders of art, in their innumerable kinds, by the curious structures of their numerous parts, bones, muscles, membranes, nerves, veins, arteries. This wondrous structure appearing, not in a few instances, but in every one of the innumerable individuals of each species; similar to each other in their structures, and endued with the several powers and instincts of the kind, for their preservation and the continuance of the species. What nice organs to distinguish, receive, grind, swallow, and digest their food; and to diffuse the nourishment to all their parts! what a variety and nice structure of organs for spontaneous motions, subservient to their pleasure, support, or defence!

And their propagation.

As all plants produce their curious seeds, many of them with proper mechanism to be dispersed by the

winds into their proper places: so animals are endued with instincts for the same purpose, a new form arises of the same kind with the parent-animal; and, where 'tis necessary, a salutary juice is prepared in the breasts or teats of the parent for its nourishment: the young has an instinct to apply to the proper source of its support, and nourishment: and the parent by a like instinct is prone to supply it. A fond care continues in the parent while the young needs protection, and the parent can be of use to it; and ceases when it is of no further use. And, that nothing may appear superfluous or ill designed, where the young of certain kinds needs no such food or protection from the parent, no such juices are prepared, no such instinct is implanted; as is the case with some kinds of *fish*, and *insects*.

CHAP. 9.



III. The earth and all its beauties depend on the sun. 'Tis placed at the most convenient distance: a considerably nearer, or more distant situation, would make it a less convenient habitation. The eyes of animals are fitted to the degree of light, and to their proper occupations, with the most admirable art; stronger light would be painful and pernicious, and fainter would be inconvenient. Their lungs, their ears, their blood, are suited to the surrounding air, its weight, and ordinary motions. This yielding, pressing, salutary fluid, is the means of life, of breathing, of circulation of blood, of voice to communicate desires and sentiments, and of gratifying their taste for harmony.

Connexion of the sun and atmosphere with the earth and animal bodies.

Land animals continually need fresh water. Such

BOOK I. is the extent of the ocean, itself also full of inhabitants suited to that element, such the heat of the sun, that vast quantities of vapours disencumbered of their salts are daily raised, and float in the air, till grown too dense they descend in fructifying showers; or, meeting with hills or mountains in their motion, are condensed and supply fountains and rivers, which after carrying water to great tracts of land, are again discharged into the ocean. Thus all is full of power, activity and regular motion, wisely and exquisitely adapted to the uses of the living and sensible parts of the creation.

*No art of men
or other visible
agents the cause
of these things.*

IV. The several classes of plants, and animals, owe nothing of this wondrous structure to any wisdom of their own or their parents; no art of theirs contrived the material frame, or the inward fabrick of their powers and instincts, or the conveniencies of their habitation. This immense power and wisdom must reside somewhere else; in some other being. Were the world supposed eternal, the argument is the same. The effects, the evidences of wisdom, were upon that supposition in all times. In all times therefore wisdom and power superior to human existed in some other being. If this admirable frame had a beginning, the evidence is more manifest.

*Two sorts of
action, with, or
without design.*

Men have some power, and make some changes: we can exert our force in making them two ways; one in which we have no intention of any particular form or effect; as when we throw carelessly any materials out of our hands; another, when we design some end, intend

some form, and direct motions for that purpose. By CHAP. 9.
 the former manner of action scarce ever arises any thing regular, uniform, or wisely adapted to any purpose: by the other it is that we produce things regular and well adapted. Now the forms of nature in general, the changes and successive appearances in the new plants and animals, are manifestly of this later sort, regular, uniform, curiously adapted, and similar; and hence we justly conclude an original designing wisdom and power.

All nature shews design.

Had we any evidence that the power or art which modified these materials resided in themselves, we should not perhaps recur to a prior cause. But whence that correspondence, connexion, and similarity? whence the mutual dependences of the several species, and of their individuals, on each other, and of all of them upon the earth, the atmosphere, and the sun? whence this adapted habitation? There must have preceded a concert among the several intelligences of the parts, or there must have been one presiding Intelligence. We have no evidence for such wisdom in the parts themselves as could have contrived their constitutions: and therefore must conclude that there is a superior *all-ruling Mind*.

This *Mind* must itself be *first* and *original* in nature; nor is there any room for the question, from what cause did it proceed? The order of nature shews that wisdom and power have always existed somewhere; unless at some period existence could commence without a prior cause; or a being void of all power, thought,

This not resident in the material world.

BOOK I. and wisdom, could at a certain period, without the aid of any powerful or wise being, start into power or wisdom; or a being void of all power or wisdom could convey these perfections to others; all which suppositions are absurd. Since then there is evidence for original intelligence and power, as high as we could have upon a supposition that it existed, where shall we conclude it resides? Whether in this vast material system is there one intelligence or counsel enlivening and moving the whole, and modifying some parts of itself into particular intelligences for certain ends, and still governing them from certain affections toward them, and toward the whole; which was the notion of some Stoicks, who zealously taught many duties of piety and humanity? or does it reside in a spirit, a being simple and uncompounded, distinct from all divisible, changeable, or moveable substance; which was the notion of the Platonists? The grand duties of piety, the foundations of our hopes, and the motives to virtue, subsist on either scheme; but that of the Stoicks is loaded with unfurmountable objections of a metaphysical kind.

To: moral Dispositions of the original Mind.

V. When the existence of original boundless art and power is ascertained, the next point is the moral character, or the dispositions of will toward other beings capable of happiness or misery; which must be the foundation of all piety, and all joy in religion.

That it is benevolent, as this imparts pure perfection.

Here first, if we can any way reason concerning the *original Nature* from what we feel in our own, or from any of our notions of excellency or perfection, we

must conceive in a *Deity* some *perceptive power* analogous to our *moral sense*, by which he may have self-approbation in certain affections and actions rather than the contrary. Such a *power* must bring a large addition of happiness, and that of the noblest sort, along with it; and, in an omnipotent Mind, cannot be inconsistent with any other perfection or source of enjoyment. The ultimate determinations or affections of the *Divine Being*, which can be approved by himself, must either be *that* toward his own happiness; or a desire of the greatest universal happiness; or a desire of universal misery. The desire of his own happiness cannot be the sole ultimate desire or determination; because the desire of the happiness of other beings distinct from himself would be another source of sublime pure happiness, distinct from the former, but perfectly consistent with it, in a mind which always has it in its power to gratify this desire to the utmost, without obstructing any other source of happiness. The approbation and delight in this kind determination must be quite excluded from the *Divine Mind*, if there is no such original determination in it. And 'tis inconceivable that the *original Mind* can want any source of pure enjoyment or happiness, consistent with every other sort of excellence, while yet in other beings formed by the counsels of that which is original we experience such sources of happiness.

The ultimate desire of universal misery cannot be supposed the determination approved in the *Divine Mind*, nor can any such affection be conceived as ori-

*No ultimate
desire of the mi-
sery of others.*

BOOK I. ginal and essential; since there can be no original sense or power of perception corresponding to it in the *Divine Mind*. The *Deity* must have powers perceptive of happiness immediately. But in *that* which is *original* and *omnipotent* there can be no sense of misery, nor any idea of it, but what is suggested by his knowledge of the perceptive powers he has granted to his limited creatures, and the laws of sensation to which he has subjected them. *That* cannot be supposed the object of an original desire, the idea of which is not perceived by some original faculty of perception immediately suggesting it.

Besides, all malevolent dispositions of will, as they seem to carry along with them some uneasiness and misery to the mind where they reside, so they naturally tend to destroy their objects, and thus to destroy themselves. A resolute malice must ever be uneasy while its object subsists; and can only find rest by an entire removal of it, upon which the affection also ceases. Anger tends to inflict such misery on its object as must at last produce entire repentance, and thus remove the moral evil or turpitude which raised the wrathful indignation; or to bring the object so low that all opposition of interest must cease, and, along with it, the passion raised by it. Envy has the same tendency, and when its purpose is accomplished must in like manner cease. Whereas all the benevolent dispositions are in their own nature everlasting, producing happiness, and delighted with its continuance. Pity tends to remove the misery of its object; and thus

its own attendant pain is removed; but the love and good-will remain unabated by this change. 'Tis evident therefore that malevolent dispositions cannot be conceived as *original* in that *Mind* which is omnipotent, the source of all, and the sovereign disposer of all: but original good-will, and propensity to communicate happiness must be its essential permanent immutable disposition.

CHAP. 9.

To suppose a determination toward the universal misery of others to be *original* in the Divine *Mind* is also entirely inconsistent with the constitution of all his rational creatures, in whom no such determination is found; and with that great degree of happiness we experience in life. *Omnipotence* sure would have effectually gratified its desires, by the highest universal misery.

We find in ourselves that all the ill-will we are capable of arises from our weakness, when we apprehend some damage or injury received, or dread it for the future; or find some opposition to our interest, or to the interests of those we wish well to: in that which is *original*, *omnipotent*, and the *cause* of all existence, there can neither be weakness, nor indigence, nor an opposition of its interests to those of its workmanship. If these more abstract reasonings do not satisfy, let us consider others more obvious from the effects of the Divine counsel and power.

VI. In judging of the design of any mechanism, where we tolerably understand it, we can always discern the *natural intention*, the *proper end* or *effect* of the

Proofs of goodness from the effects of Divine Power.

BOOK I. contrivance; and distinguish it from events which may casually ensue, or be the necessary attendants or consequents of it, tho' they are no part of the end aimed at by the contriver. The finest statue may hurt one, by falling on him: the most regular and convenient house, must obstruct the inhabitant's prospect of the heavens and the earth, more than a field does; and must put him to some trouble and expence in supporting it. By the most benign and wisely contrived course of the sun some severe weather must happen in some places. Some evils may be so essentially connected with the means of the supreme good, that *Omnipotence* cannot make it attainable to some beings, without them. Such evils therefore must exist in a world contrived by perfect Goodness. The goodness therefore of the author of a system, in which some evils appear, may be sufficiently proved, if the natural design of the structure appears to be good and benign, and the evils only such as must ensue upon laws well calculated for superior good. This reasoning will be exceedingly confirmed if we find a great superiority of pleasure, of happiness, actually enjoyed by means of the constitution and laws established in nature. Creatures who have no immediate intuition of the Creator, nor a compleat knowledge of the whole plan and all its parts, can expect no better evidence; nor should they desire it.

If the defect appears good and the effect a superiority of happiness.

The whole consistent with good.

Now all the curious mechanism observed, has conservation of life, pleasure, happiness, in some species or other, for its natural end. The external senses of

animals recommend things salutary, and reject what is destructive: and the finer powers of perception in like manner recommend to every one what is beneficial to the system, as well as to the individual; and naturally raise aversion to what is pernicious. The whole inward constitution of the affections and *moral faculty* above explained, is obviously contrived for the universal good, and therefore we only hint at it in this place. Some kinds of animals are plainly subordinated to some others, and the powers and instincts of the superior species may be destructive to the inferior; but they are the means of good to the species in which they reside. The effects of them on the inferior is indeed the depriving some of them sooner of their existence; but not in a worse manner than they must have lost it however in a natural death: nay the suddenness of the violent death, to a creature of no fore-thought, makes it preferable to the tedious sort we call natural. And many of such low kinds must have perished as early by want of sustenance, had not nature provided other causes more gentle than famine. An *original malicious being* would have exercised its art in proper engines of torture, in parts formed for no other purposes, in appetites and senses leading ordinarily to what would be useless or pernicious, even in a moderate degree; in impatient ardours for what gave no pleasure or use; in excrescences useless for life or action, but burdensome and tormenting; and in affections pernicious to society, approved by a perverse taste.

BOOK I.

Observe all nature as far as our knowledge extends; we find the contrivance good. The objections of the *Epicureans*, and of some *moderns*, arose from their ignorance. The alledged blemishes are now known to be either the unavoidable attendants or consequents of a structure and of laws subservient to advantages which quite over-ballance these inconveniences; or sometimes the direct and natural means of obtaining these advantages. The vast ocean, often reputed barren, we find is a necessary reservoir of water for the use of all land animals; itself also peopled with its own tribes, and richly furnished for their subsistence, from which too men derive a great support. The mountains are partly useful for pasture, for fruits, and grain; and partly for procuring rain, fountains, rivers. Storms arise from such causes as are most necessary for life, the exhalation of vapours by the sun, and their motion in the air. The care, attention, and labour, incumbent on men for their support, invigorate both the soul and the body: without them the earth becomes a barren forrest, but by them becomes a joyful copious habitation: and they are the natural causes of health and sagacity. 'Tis every way our advantage that we have no such slothful paradise as the poets feigned in the golden age.*

Why an omnipotent God permits any evil.

VI. But tho' it be granted that the contrivance naturally tends to good, yet if God be omnipotent, say

* Compare the censures of Lucretius | subjects. His brother-poet Virgil, beautifully defends Providence upon the laborious condition of mankind, 1 Georg. line 120 to 145.

some authors, “ why are we made of such poor ma-
“ terials, that we are often oppressed with pain during
“ life; often tormented by our own passions, and by
“ the injuries of others? Our frame too at last de-
“ cays, and we yield our places with great pain to our
“ successors of the same species. Why are we of such
“ frail materials? why this succession of generations?
“ why are our minds so imperfect either as to know-
“ ledge or virtue? might we not have had too greater
“ strength of understanding, and a better proportion
“ among our affections?”

CHAP. 9.

In answer to these arduous questions let us consider, what is highly probable, that the best possible constitution of an immense system of perceptive beings may necessarily require a diversity of orders, some higher in perfection and happiness, and some lower. There may be abundant enjoyments to some orders of beings without social action. But this we are sure of from experience, that there are orders of beings pretty high in the scale, whose supreme enjoyments consist in kind affections, and in exerting their powers in good offices from these affections. Nay 'tis impossible for us to conceive an higher sort of enjoyment. The consciousness of good-will to others tho' inactive, is highly delightful; but there is still a superior joy in exerting this disposition in beneficent actions. What if this be the supreme enjoyment in nature, as our minds seem to feel it is? This must be excluded out of nature in a great measure, unless there be imperfection, indigence, pain, and even moral evil in nature.

*Different orders
necessary in the
best system.*

BOOK I. There may be a social congratulation and esteem among well-disposed happy beings, in a state of inactive joy, without any difficulties. But there can be no place for action where there is no evil.

*Experience of
evil gives us
higher sense of
good, and exalts
our virtue.*

Not to mention, what is obvious among men, that our sense of many high enjoyments, both natural and moral, is exceedingly heightened by our having observed or experienced many of the contrary evils. The whole life of virtue among men, which we shewed to be the chief enjoyment, is a combat with evils natural or moral. No place can be for liberality where there is no indigence; or for fortitude where there is no danger; or for temperance where there are not lower appetites and passions; or for mercy and forgiveness, or friendly admonitions and counsels, and long-suffering, and requital of evil with good, where a species is incapable of moral evil. Such lovely offices, the remembrance of which must be eternally delightful, must be excluded; or some moral evils must exist. Nay what patience, resignation, and trust in God can be exercised in a system where misery cannot exist? If then the highest enjoyments we can conceive are fit to be introduced into the universe, some evils must come along with them. Nay what shall we conceive the life of the highest orders, if there were none inferior to them; no good to be done, no kind offices, no evils to be warded off, or good formerly wanting to be communicated? Can we conceive any thing more blessed, or delightful to the *Deity*, than communicating of good to indigent creatures in different orders? And

must not the highest goodness move him to furnish to the several higher orders opportunities for such divine exercises and enjoyments, by creating also orders inferior to them, and granting different degrees of abilities and perfection to the several individuals of the same species, that thus they may exercise their good affections in beneficent offices? CHAP. 9.

If thus the most perfect goodness would determine the Author of Nature to create different orders of beings, and some of them subject to many evils and imperfections; the same goodness must require that this plan of creation be continued down to the lowest species in which a superiority of good to the evils in its lot can be preserved, while the creation of such inferior species obstructs not the existence of as many of the superior, as the most perfect universe can admit. The lot therefore of great imperfection must fall somewhere: mankind can no more justly complain that they were not in an higher order, than the brutes that they were not made men.

Don't we see this confirmed in experience? We have no ground to believe that this earth could nourish an higher order than mankind. A globe of this kind may be necessary in the system: it must have such inhabitants or be desolate. Besides all the men it could maintain, there yet is room for other lower orders subordinate and subservient to their subsistence. We find all places peopled with such orders of life and sense as they can support; the inferior occupying what is not fit for the superior, or what is neglected by them. In

Perfect goodness must make all orders in which good is superior.

This confirmed by experience.

BOOK I. like manner, let us ascend to higher orders: there may be as many such as the best system of the universe admits; and yet in this great *house of our father* there are many mansions unfit for the higher orders, but too good to be desolate; and they are occupied by men, and lower animals. This was their place, or they must not have existed in the system. This earth perhaps could not furnish bodies incapable of decay, and as this decay comes on, we lose our keen appetites and senses of the goods of life. The scene cloy; we quit it, and give place to new spectators, whose livelier senses and appetites and more vigorous powers make it a greater blessing to them.

*Strict laws of
sensation necessary.*

VII. But men will make further complaints. "Why these harsh laws of sensation, subjecting us to such acute pains, to such sympathetic sorrows, and remorse? why such furious passions?" and cannot an *omnipresent infinite Power* interpose, beyond the common course of nature, in behalf of the innocent, the virtuous? no variety of business can fatigue or distract the *Deity*."

But in reply to all this: 'Tis absolutely necessary for the preservation of life that destructive impressions from without, and indispositions from within, should occasion pain to animals. Were it not so, how few would in any keen pursuits guard against precipices, wounds, burning, bruises, or hurtful abstinence from food. How could we be apprized of disorders, or guard against what might increase them? This law is absolutely necessary to men of maturity and know-

ledge; and how much more so to the young and im- CHAP. 9.
prudent? Nor can we complain of the law as consti-
tuting too acute sensations, since they do not univer-
sally obtain their end. The experience of the gout,
and stone, and fevers, and racking sores, does not re-
strain all men from the vices which exposed them to
these torments.*

Can we more justly repine at other laws subjecting us
to compassion and remorse? are they not the kind ad-
monitions and exhortations of the *Universal Parent*,
delivered with some austerity, to restrain us from what
may hurt us or our brethren, and excite us to assist
them; or natural chastisements when we have been de-
ficient in our duty to any part of this family.

*So are all social
and moral feel-
ings.*

VIII. As to the stopping of these laws in favour of
the innocent who by means of them are now exposed
to many calamities, as by storms, fires, shipwrecks,
the ruins of buildings, which make no distinctions; let
us consider that the constant stopping or suspending
the general laws when they would occasion any evil
not subservient immediately to some present and su-
perior good; or the governing the world by a variety
of dissimilar wills, and not by uniform rules or laws;

*The laws should
not be stopped.*

* One would think this common rea-
soning abundantly clear and certain; but
Θερσιτης δ' ἐπὶ μῦθος ἀμετροεπῆς ἐκολωα. Mr.
Bayle in his *Reponse a un Provincial*
ch. 77. tells us, "That we might have
" had an ordinary sensation of pleasure
" when all was well; and that a sensible
" abatement of this pleasure might have
" sufficiently intimated to us our dan-

gers: " Whereas we find that much
stronger intimations and motives from the
acuteſt pains, do not always deter from
luxury and intemperance; or give suffi-
cient caution even to the aged. And what
will deter the rash and young? This abate-
ment he talks of might indeed be sufficient
if men were such triflers as to mind no-
thing but that sensation he supposes.

BOOK I. would immediately supersede all contrivance or forethought of men, and all prudent action. There could be no room for projecting any kind offices to others, or concerting any schemes for our own interest, since we could find no constant or natural means for executing them.* Nay all such sollicitudes would be useless and vain, as there neither would be any proper means, nor any need of action; since we should find that all evil was prevented, and good obtained, without our activity. Thus all active virtue must be excluded.

They cannot be suspended when evils cease, and obtain when 'tis otherwise.

Or shall the laws obtain whenever the effect is innocent or useful, but always be suspended when it is pernicious? This would make all human activity vain. No good man would be faint or weary with fasting, or labour; or be cold when he was naked. No occasion for any assistance or good-offices to a good man. Nay our very pleasures would lose a great deal of their relish, which partly arises from experience of pain. Rest is only grateful after weariness; and food has the best favour after hunger. And all active virtues must be superseded as entirely superfluous.

All such [?] preliminary facts

Or shall the laws only then be suspended when God foresees that no good shall arise from these evils which

* To make this more obvious. Were there no fixed laws, no man would attempt to move. Motion would not follow his will, or not in that way he intended; or it would fail in as many instances as it succeeded. We could not depend on the promises of others, nor hope for the success of any labours. Food would often cease

to nourish; nor would the want of it occasion pain or death. Bodies would not persist in their states of rest, or motion; nor their parts cohere. None would build, plant, sow, or provide rayment. If the world remained, yet we could discern no order in it. Poisons would nourish; and wounds sometimes give us pleasure.

ensue upon them, but take place when good is to arise from them? This may be so in fact, tho' we do not discern the good that may arise from such evils. But do they want that the laws should be stopped when some present visible superior good does not arise from the evils they occasion? that sickness or pain befalling infants or other innocents should be prevented, whenever God foresees that none will, or none can, by any virtuous office relieve them? "Many evils, say they, occasion no exercises of virtue either by the sufferer, or by others. Many injuries do not exercise the virtues of patience, resignation, or forgiveness, but draw after them bitter resentments, and a long train of mischiefs. The laws of nature might in these cases be suspended, and take place in others."

But again, if the course of nature were still observed to alter in favour of such whom none assisted, all succour would be superfluous. Men would continue in these sins of omission, that *this grace might abound*. The good would ever be exposed to injuries and sufferings; for to such they would give occasion for exercising patience, resignation, and forgiveness; but the obstinate, the haughty, and the proud must remain secure. And why should men study to govern their passions, when the worst of them, they would see, could do no harm.

Or shall the course of nature take its full effect in bringing evils on the wicked, but always alter in favour of the good? Even so, all care about the good would

BOOK I. be foolish, and the most delightful virtues would be superfluous. Again, the happiness of the virtuous is often much connected with that of others. Must all their families, friends, and countries be protected? At this rate what shall we call the order of nature, the knowledge of which can direct our actions? The deviation must be as common as the ordinary course. And then there would remain no exercise for the patience of the virtuous, their resignation, fortitude, sacrificing their interests to *God*, and the *Publick*, when they were thus made impassible, and inaccessible to the strokes of fortune.

In fine, if it was worthy of a *good God* to create an order of beings whose chief enjoyments should consist in the vigour and activity of kind affections, and moral pleasures, there must be different orders of beings; the world must be governed by general laws universally obtaining; and many particular evils, natural and moral, must be permitted.

*The Mischief
of the evil
is inevitable.*

IX. Now as the sole foundation of the most plausible scheme of two independent principles, the one *evil* and *malicious*, and the other *good*, is the mixture we observe of evil and good in this world: since we have abundantly proved that there must be such a mixture intended by the most perfect Goodness, that supposition must be without any rational foundation. Did we observe some beings perfectly good, and others perfectly evil, there might be some presumption for two opposite principles; or did we discover any laws plainly destined for mischief alone, and others destined

for good; this too would be another presumption. But CHAP. 9. that *two Minds*, with opposite intentions, should always unite and conspire in a mixed system is inconceivable. Now the whole of natural knowledge shews us the contrary of these presumptions: no species is constituted absolutely evil: no law obtains which is not designed for superior good. For this we must refer to all the antient and modern observations on the constitution of nature.

Opposite intentions in *two causes* of equal art and power could have no effect. They could have no motive to unite in forming a world: since each would know that the art and power of the other would introduce as much of what was offensive to him, as his own art or power could effect of what was agreeable. No effect from two opposite principles.

Upon this supposition should we not plainly observe malicious mechanism in the works of nature, as frequently as we observe what is kind and useful. But nothing of this sort occurs. No malice, original, sedate, and unprovoked appears in the works of nature; but on many occasions we see kindness gratuitous and unmerited, in the tender relations of life, in the esteem of virtuous characters by which we have not been profited, and in compassion toward the unknown. No original or natural joy in misery, it never pleases without some previous notion of great moral evil in the sufferer, or of some opposition to our interest. No *moral faculty* is observed approving what is hurtful to the publick; but in all rational agents we find a contrary one, which immediately approves all kindness,

BOOK I. and humanity, and beneficence. Sure the art of a malicious principle must have exerted itself in some original mechanism destined for mischief.

*God superior
in life.*

X. But granting the mechanism to be universally good; yet if there appeared a prepollency of misery in this world, as some good men in their melancholy declamations have alledged, it would still leave some uneasy suspicions in the mind. This present state is the only fund of our evidence, independent of revelation, from which we conclude about other worlds, or future states. If misery is superior here, 'tis true that even in that case, the *Deity* might be perfectly good, as this misery of a part might be necessary for some superior good in the universe: but then we should not have full evidence for his goodness from the effects of it. The case however is otherways. Happiness is far superior to misery, even in this present world; and this compleats all the evidence we could expect, or require.

*Natural good
superior in the
whole.*

*Pleasures of
sense.*

First as to natural good: How frequent are the pleasures of sense, and the gratifications of appetite; and how rare the acute sensations of pain? seldom do they employ many months in a life of seventy or eighty years: the weaker bodies who have a larger share of it, are not the hundredth part of mankind. If bodily pleasure is of a low transitory nature, so is bodily pain: when the sensation is past, and we apprehend no returns of it, all the evil is gone; and it begins to yield pleasant reflections. Consider the frequent returns of our pleasures, and their duration will appear incom-

parably greater; and they are pretty near as intense in their kind, as any pain we are commonly exposed to. Such as are well experienced in both are not terrified from some high sensual enjoyments by the danger of pain ensuing. To ballance the acuter pains, which are rare, let us consider the frequent recurrence of very high pleasures. If many perish early in life, the pain they feel is probably neither so intense, or lasting, as that felt by men in full strength; nor is it increased by fears and anxiety.

The pleasures of the imagination, and of knowledge, are pretty much a clear stock of good, with small deductions, * as there is scarce any pain properly opposite to them: and the pains of sympathy are over-ballanced, by the more lasting joys upon the relief of the distressed, and upon the prosperity of such as we love: not to mention the joyful approbation of the temper itself; the joyful hopes, under a good providence, for all worthy objects of our affection: and this pain we see plainly is a necessary precaution in providence, to engage us to promote the happiness of others, and defend them from evil.

The difficulty seems greater as to moral evil. But a person wholly devoid of all virtue is as rare as one free from all vice. For the very kindest purposes, God has indeed planted a very high standard of virtue in our hearts. We expect universal innocence, and a long course of good-offices, to denote a character as good: but two or three remarkably vicious actions make it

* See above ch. vii. § 14.

BOOK I. odious. Fraud, theft, violence, ingratitude, lewdness, in a few instances, ruin a character almost irreparably; tho' the rest of life be innocent, and tho' these actions were committed under great temptations, or flowed from no evil intention, but from some selfish passion or eager appetite, or from even some lovely partial tenderness, such as that to a family. There are few in whose lives we will not find an hundred actions not only innocent, but flowing from some lovely affection, for one flowing from any ill-natured intention. Parental love, friendships, gratitude, zeal for parties and countries, along with the natural appetites, and desires of the means of self-preservation, are the common springs of human action. And seldom do their vices proceed from any thing else than these principles grown perhaps too strong to be restrained by some nobler or more extensive affections, or by a regard to the rules which are requisite for the good of society. We have indeed a standard of virtue set up in our hearts, which we cannot keep up to: and thus are all conscious of guilt in the sight of God. And yet the lower virtues are so frequent, that human life is generally not only a safe state, but very agreeable.

This circumstance in our constitution, that the standard of moral good is set so high, tho' it is apt to give the mind an unfavourable impression of our species as very corrupt, is yet very necessary and useful, as it is a strong restraint from every thing injurious or vicious, and a powerful spur to a continual advancement in perfection. Indeed without such a standard

we could not have any idea of perfection, nor could there be any formed intention in the human mind to make progress in virtue. But when we see so few on whom it has its full effect, even of those who live to mature age, it seems to carry no faint intimation, that either we once were in a higher state of perfection, or that such a state is still before us. Unless we be destined for such a state, the planting such a standard must have the same unaccountable appearance, as the laying up of great magazines, and trains of artillery, where no military operations were intended.

XI. To confirm this prevalence of good in life, let us consider, that men can certainly tell what they would desire upon any possible supposition, as well as in matters which actually befall them. Imagine a medicine discovered, which without pain would cast both soul and body into an everlasting sleep, or stop all thought or existence for ever. In old age perhaps, or under some sore diseases, some few might chuse to use this medicine, to escape from all evil by the loss of all good; but not one in a thousand: and the few who would, have enjoyed many years during which life was eligible, for the months in which they would chuse annihilation. Many of them have had their share of life; they should be ready to leave it, as a satisfied guest leaves a plentiful table. What altho' at last death should for a few months become eligible to every one, after an agreeable life for many years? If the judgments of the young, while all the senses, appetites and passions are vigorous, and joyful hopes inflame the ima-

*An appeal to
men's hearts.*

BOOK I. gination, may overvalue the good of life; the judgments of the aged may be equally partial on the other side, when all the powers are become languid, and the memory of pleasures almost effaced. Men in the middle of life, who see the condition of it, who remember the joys of youth, feel their present state, and observe in others the condition of old age, are certainly the best judges. Not one in a thousand would quit all he enjoys, to avoid all he fears. 'Tis high ingratitude in men to pique themselves upon depreciating all the gifts of God, and aggravating all the evils of our lot. Should Mercury come at their requests, when they have fretfully thrown down their burthens, as in the old fable, they would soon intreat him, not to take down their souls to Lethe, but to help them to take up their loads again.

*The receipt of
justice here.*

In these debates some recite all the wickedness and misery they have seen, read, or heard related: wars, murders, piracies, assassinations, sacking of cities, ravaging of countries, military executions, massacres, crusado's, acts of faith in the holy inquisition: all the frauds and villanies detected in courts of justice: all the corruption, falshood, dissimulation, ingratitude, treacherous undermining, and calumny, and lewdness, in palaces; as if these were the common employments of mankind; or as if a large portion of mankind were concerned in such things by their stations. Prisons, and hospitals, the abodes of the criminal and diseased, were never so populous as the cities where they stand: they scarce ever contained the thousandth part of a-

ny state. Milton's description of the infirmary, in his CHAP. 9.
 vision, must move the hardest heart: but who will estimate the health of a people from an infirmary. A monstrous plant or animal is long exposed to view in the repositories of the curious: the rarity makes the view entertain us, and makes us fond to talk about it. But millions of regular compleat forms exist for one monster; they are so common that they raise no attention or admiration. We retain a lively remembrance of any grievous sickness or danger we escaped, of any horrid calamity, or villany: our souls are pierced with wars, slaughter, massacres, plagues; forgetting the vastly superior numbers which escape all these evils, and enjoy the common peaceful condition of life. The sufferers in these calamities seldom endure more pain than what attends a natural death; and they make not a fortieth part of mankind. Scarce five hundred thousand of our countrymen have perished by these calamities, in any century of the British history: and forty times that number, in the worst of times, have escaped them.

'Tis that lovely natural compassion which makes us so deeply feel these great calamities and remember them. We wish well to all, and desire an happy state of the universe, from a yet finer principle; and deeply regret every contrary appearance, even when we have no fears about ourselves. These lovely principles in our constitution should plead more strongly in our hearts for the goodness of the *all-ruling Mind*, than those appearances of evil, were they as great as a

*Compassion the
cause of our mis-
taken reasonings.*

BOOK I. melancholy eloquence often paints them, could plead
 for the contrary.

*Histories give
 us a view only of
 a small part of
 life.*

While histories relate wars, seditions, massacres, and the corruptions and intrigues of courts, they are silent about those vastly superior numbers who in safe obscurity, are virtuously or innocently employed in the natural business and enjoyments of mankind. We read the actions of the great, of men exposed to all the temptations of avarice and ambition, raised above the common lot of honest labour and industry, with minds often corrupted from their infancy by the elevation of their fortunes, and all their passions inflamed by flattery and luxury. The social joyful innocent employments of the bulk of mankind are no subjects of history; nor even the ordinary regular administration of a state in the protection of a people and the execution of justice. Histories dwell upon the critical times, the sicknesses of states, the parties, and factions, and their contentions; revolutions, and foreign wars, and their causes. These dangers, their causes, and the remedies applied, must be recorded for the use of future ages; and their rarity, in comparison of the natural business of social life, makes them more entertaining. Thus authors in medicine relate not the agreeable enjoyments and exercises of health. The causes, symptoms, and prognosticks of disorders, their critical turns, and the effects of different medicines applied, are the proper subjects of their dissertations.

*Lower conditions
 are as happy as
 the higher.*

Men placed in the higher conditions of life, enured to ease and softness, may imagine the laborious state

of the lower, to be a miserable slavery, because it would be so to them were they reduced to it with their present habits of soul and body. But in the lower conditions, strength of body, keen appetites, sweet intervals of rest, moderate desires, and plain fare, make up all their wants in point of sensual pleasure. And the kind affections, mutual love, social joys, friendships, parental and filial duties, moral enjoyments, and even some honour, in a narrower circle, have place in the lower conditions as well as the higher; and all these affections generally more sincere. CHAP. 9.

XII. How shall a being too imperfect to comprehend the whole administration of this universe in all its parts, and all its duration, with all the connexions of the several parts, judge concerning the presiding *Mind*, and his intentions? We see particular evils sometimes necessary to superior good; and therefore benignly ordered to exist. We see also some pleasures and advantages occasioning superior evils. There may therefore be other like connexions and tendencies on both sides unknown to us. We cannot therefore pronounce of any event that it is either absolutely good, or absolutely evil, in the whole. How does a wife and dutiful child judge of its parent's affections? Or how does one in mature years judge of the intention of his physician when he is a stranger to his art? The child is sometimes restrained in its pleasures, chastised, confined to laborious exercises or studies; the patient receives nauseous potions, and feels painful operations. But the child finds the general tenor to be kind; ma- *How men of imperfect views can judge of the whole.*

BOOK I. ny pleasures and conveniences supplied; and a constant protection and support afforded; it has found the advantages arising on some occasions from restraint and discipline; it finds its powers, its knowledge, and its temper improved. The patient has found health sometimes the effect of nauseous medicines. 'Tis just thus in nature. Order, peace, health, joy, pleasure, are still prevalent in this great family, superior to all the evils we observe. Human life is universally eligible, tho' it is an unmixed state to none: we can have no such presumptions of any interest of the Supreme Mind opposite to that of his creatures, as may lye against the intentions of the best of men. Should we not then use that equity in our conclusions about the *Deity*, that is due to our fellows, notwithstanding a few opposite appearances.

*If God be good
he is perfectly
good.*

XIII. Since then the whole contrivance of nature, directly intended for good, and the prevalence of happiness in consequence of it, proves the *original Mind* to be benevolent; wherever there is any real goodness, a greater happiness must be more desired than a less; and where there is sufficient power, the desire shall be accomplished. If God be omnipotent and wise, all is well: the best order obtains in the whole: no evil is permitted which is not necessary for superior good, or the necessary attendant and consequent upon what is ordered with the most benign intention for the greatest perfection and happiness of the universe.

*Unreasonable to
demand the par-
ticular purposes
of all evils.*

'Tis arrogant to demand a particular account how each evil is necessary or subservient to some superior

good. In the best possible scheme many things must be inexplicable to imperfect knowledge. The ends and connexions must be hid, as some steps in the oeconomy of the parent, or the practice of the physician must be dark to the child, or the patient. 'Tis enough that we discern the natural end to be good in all the mechanism of nature which we understand; that happiness is prevalent, and our state very eligible. All new discoveries increase our evidence by shewing the wise purposes of what before seemed an imperfection. A candid mind must conclude the same to be the case of parts whose uses are yet unknown. The very anxieties of men about this grand point, help to confirm it, as they shew the natural determination of the soul to wish all well in the universe; one of the clearest footsteps of our benevolent Creator imprinted in our own hearts. This truth must be acceptable to all, where vanity, affectation of singularity and of eminent penetration, or an humour of contradiction, hath not engrossed the heart.

XIV. Add to all this, that the prevalent goodness observed in the administration of nature leads to an hope which at once removes all objections, that of a future state of eternal existence to all minds capable of moral sentiments, of enquiring about the order of the whole, of anxiety about it, of knowing its author, or of any fore-thought about existence after death. The powers of thought and reflection, as they extend to all times past and future, and to the state of others as well as our own, and are accompanied with exten-

BOOK I. five affections and a *moral faculty*, make all orders of being endued with them capable of incomparably greater happiness or misery than any of the brutal kinds. If the duration of men is to be eternal, and an happy immortality obtained by these very means which are most beatifick to us in this life; the evils of these few years during our mortal state are not worthy of regard; they are not once to be compared with the happiness to ensue.

No proofs of
the contrary.
The soul seems
distinct from
matter.

The boldest Epicurean never attempted direct proof that a future state is impossible. Many have believed it who conceived the soul to be material. Mankind in all ages and nations have hoped for it, without any prejudice of sense in its favour. The opinion is natural to mankind, and what their Creator has designed they should entertain. 'Tis confirmed not a little by arguments which shew the subject of thought, reason, and affections not to be a divisible system of distinct substances, as every part of matter is. The simplicity and unity of consciousness could not result from modes dispersed and inherent in an aggregate of different bodies in distinct places.* Nor is the activity of the soul consistent with the passiveness of matter. We feel our happiness or misery, and the dignity and perfection, or their contraries, for which we esteem or dislike ourselves or others, to be qualities quite insen-

* This argument from our consciousness of the unity of the perceiver and agent, in all that multitude of sensations, judgments, affections, desires, is well urged by Aristotle *de Anima*. l. i. and by Dr. Sam. Clarke. See also Mr. Baxter's ingenious book on this subject.

sible, no way related to the body or its parts, or affected by any changes befalling the body. CHAP. 9.

The nature and order of our perceptions shew this distinction. First, *external sensations* present forms quite distinct from this *self*, and no further related to it than that they are perceived. Their changes to the better or the worse affect not nor alter the state of the perceiver. A second set of perceptions approaches a little nearer, those of *bodily pleasure* and *pain*. The state of the perceiving *self* is affected by them, and made easy or uneasy. But *nature* orders in a way quite inexplicable, that these perceptions are connected with parts of the body, or the spaces which they once occupied: and the accident is naturally conceived as affecting the body, and not altering the dignity of the soul. Let *Anatomists* talk of motions propagated by nerves to the brain, or to some gland the seat of the soul: when the finger is cut, as sure as pain is felt at all, 'tis felt in the finger, or in the space where the finger was. *Nature* declares the event to be an accident to the body, not destroying or abating the excellence of the perceiver: not even when the sensations indicate such accidents as must soon destroy the body altogether. Nay some such sensations of pain increase rather the personal dignity; and some sensations of pleasure abate it. But there is a third sort of perceptions, when we are conscious of knowledge, goodness, faith, integrity, friendliness, contempt of sensual pleasures, publick spirit. These we feel to be the immediate qualities of this *self*, the personal ex-

The nature of our perception confirms it.

BOOK I. cellencies in which all its true dignity consists, as its baseness would consist in the contrary dispositions. We know these qualities, and their names, as well as we do the sensible ones: we feel that these have no relation to the body, or its parts, dimensions, spaces, figures. * *Nature* thus intimates to us a spirit distinct from the body over which it presides, in regulating its motions, as clearly as it intimates the difference of our bodies from external objects. Nay it intimates a greater difference, or disparity of substance; as all the qualities of the soul are quite disparate and of a different kind from those of matter: and 'tis only by their qualities that substances are known.

*Direct proofs
of a future state.*

XV. *God* declares by the constitution of nature, by the *moral faculty* he has given us, that he espouses the cause of virtue and of the universal happiness. Virtue in many instances is born down and defeated in this world. In such events our best dispositions give us much sorrow for others, and virtue sometimes exposes to the greatest external evils. From the goodness of *God* we must hope for some compensation to the worthy and unfortunate; and that the injurious and oppressive shall find cause to repent of their contradicting the will of a *good Deity*. There is no defect of power in *God*; no envy or ill-nature. Shall beings of such noble powers, so far advanced in the perfections *God* approves, with such desires and hopes of immortality, be frustrated in their most honourable hopes? Hopes necessary to their compleat enjoyment

* This reasoning frequently occurs in Plato. See 1 *Alcibiades*.

of virtue in this world, since without them they could have little joy, in this uncertainty of human affairs, either from their own state, or from that of the dearest and worthiest objects of all their best affections. Shall a plan of an universe so admirable in other respects want that further part which would make all complete? What altho' *God* could not be charged with cruelty or injustice upon this supposition, since he has made virtue itself the chief happiness, and vice the supreme misery? Shall we expect no more from the *original omnipotent Goodness* than what we count a poor degree of virtue in a man, the doing only that good which is necessary to avoid the imputation of injustice? How far is this surpassed by the overflowing goodness of some worthy men? And how unlike to the conduct of that *liberal hand* that *satisfieth the desires of every thing that lives?*

If there are in the universe any rational agents capable of defection from their integrity, spectators of human affairs, who need motives to perseverance from the sanctions of laws: if such beings discern the external prosperity of the wicked, when their stupified consciences are insensible of remorse, and they live in affluence of all the pleasures they relish, and in a moment go down to the grave free from all future punishment; how must this encourage any imperfect spectator in his vices? Must not such impunity of transgressors destroy the authority and influence of the divine laws? The minds of a nobler relish see indeed that the vicious have lost the supreme enjoyments of

BOOK I. life; but the vicious have no taste for them, nor regret for the want of them, and wallow in what they relish. Can such unfelt punishments answer the wise ends of government, the correcting and reforming even of those who are depraved in a great degree? How little effect can they have, if men need dread nothing further?

Should one behold a building not yet finished, the several parts shewing exquisite art, yet still wanting a further part to make all compleat and convenient, room left for this part, and even some indications of this further building intended; would not a candid spectator conclude that this further part was also in the plan of the architect, tho' some reasons retarded the execution of it? This is the case in the moral world. The structure is exquisite, but not compleat: we see space for further building, and indications of the design in the desires and hopes of all ages and nations, in our natural sense of justice, and in our most noble and extensive affections about the state of others, and of the universe; and shall we not confide and hope in the art, the goodness, the inexhaustible wealth of the *great Architect*.

We have dwelt long on this head, rather pointing out the sources of evidence than displaying it fully, because the ascertaining the goodness of *God* is the grand foundation of our happiness and the main pillar of virtue. We shall briefly touch at his other attributes, lest any mistakes about them should abate that high veneration and admiration due to his excellency.

XVI. First all the reasons which prove any think-
 ing being to be a distinct substance from matter, prove
 that *God* is a spirit, and is not the great material mass
 of this universe; as all the proofs of his existence are
 proofs of original thought, wisdom, consciousness, ac-
 tivity, affection; powers quite inconsistent with the
 nature of matter. By calling him a spirit we do not
 mean that he must be a substance of the same species
 or kind with the human soul, and only greater. Tho'
 all thinking beings differ in kind from all matter, yet
 there may be innumerable orders or kinds of spirits,
 with essential differences from each other, from that
 lowest spirit of life, which is in the meanest animal, to
 the *infinite Deity*.

CHAP. 9.
 The other at-
 tributes of God.
 A spirit.

Again, what is *original* and *uncaused* cannot be con-
 ceived as limited in its nature, either by its own choice,
 or by the will of any prior cause, to any particular fi-
 nite degree of perfection, or to those of one kind,
 while it wants others. No possible reason or cause
 can be assigned for some sorts or degrees rather than
 others. We see from the effects, that the original per-
 fections are high beyond imagination: and there was
 no prior will or choice of any being to confine it to
 one species or degree. This leads us to conceive an
 original boundless ocean of all excellency and perfec-
 tion, from which all limited perfections have been
 derived.

Infinite.

The same thoughts lead us to conceive the *origi-
 nal Being* as one, and uncompounded of distinct be-

And One.

ings or parts. No possible reason or cause for plurality, for one number of *original beings*, rather than any other. No evidence for more, from any effects or appearances which *one original Cause* cannot account for. Nay all the appearances of connexion, mutual dependencies of parts, and similarity of structure, in those which are very remote from each other, lead us to unity of *design* and *power*. This shews sufficiently the vanity of *Polytheism*, if any ever believed a plurality of *original beings*. The wiser *Heathens* had a different *Polytheism*; and that of the vulgar arose from low conceptions of the *Deities* as weak and imperfect, subject to distraction and confusion by a multitude of cares, or by an extensive providence, and like men, embarrassed when they undertake too much. *One almighty and omniscient Being* can preside easily over all, without toil or confusion.

Omnipresent.

The continual power exerted in all parts of the universe, and the unlimited nature of the *original Being*, leads us to conceive him possess'd of such *omnipresence* and *immensity* as is requisite to universal knowledge and action. And *that* which is *original* must be eternal.

*God rules all
by his provi-
dence.*

XVI. From power, wisdom, and goodness we infer that *God* exercises an universal providence. To a Being endued with these perfections the state of an universe of so many creatures capable of happiness or misery cannot be indifferent. Goodness must excite him to exert his power and wisdom in governing all for

the best purposes, the universal happiness. Nor can we conceive any exercise of his powers more worthy of *God*, or more delightful to him. CHAP. 9.

What other motive to create, but a desire to communicate perfection and happiness? *God* cannot be conceived as ultimately studious of glory from creatures infinitely below himself. And all desire of glory must presuppose that something is previously discerned as excellent, that some determination of his nature, or some affection, is essentially the object of his approbation: and what other determination can we suppose the object of his highest approbation than perfect goodness, ever disposing him to communicate happiness. This determination must move him to display his own excellencies to his rational creatures by his works, that thus he may be the source of the highest happiness to them, the noblest object of their contemplation and veneration, of their love, esteem, hope, and secure confidence, and the best pattern for their imitation. *God* displays his perfections to make his creatures happy in the knowledge and love of them; and not to derive new happiness to himself from their praises, or admiration. *Goodness the
spring of creati-
on.*

The *wisdom* and *goodness* of *God* shew us his moral purity or holiness. As he is independent, almighty, and wise, he cannot be indigent: he can have no private ends opposite to the universal good; nor has he any low appetites or passions. These are all the incitements to moral evil which we can conceive. In *God* none of them can have place, nothing contrary to *The holiness of
the Deity.*

BOOK I. that universal goodness in which he must have the
 highest complacence.

His conduct toward his creatures must be such as
The justice of
 God goodness and wisdom suggest. His laws must be good
 and just, adapted to the interest and perfection of the
 whole. No unworthy favourites shall find in him a par-
 tial tenderness inconsistent with the general good or
 the sacred authority of his laws: no private views shall
 stop the execution of their sanctions, while the gene-
 ral interest, and the supporting the majesty of these
 laws require it. 'Tis no unjust partiality that the lot
 of some should have many advantages above that of
 others. This, we shewed above, the best order and
 harmony of the whole may require. These are the na-
 tural notions of justice in a *moral governor*. 'Tis a
 branch of goodness conjoined to wisdom, which must
 determine the *governor* to such conduct as may sup-
 port the authority and influence of his laws for the ge-
 neral good.

C H A P. X.

The AFFECTIONS, DUTY, and WORSHIP, to be exercised toward the DEITY.

I. IN the consideration of the several enjoyments of our nature we shewed the frequent occasion men must have for recourse to the Divine Providence, for the security of their enjoyments, and a stable tranquillity of mind, under the adversities of this life which may befall ourselves, or the objects of our tenderest affections. We established in the preceeding chapter that grand foundation of our happiness, the existence, and moral perfections of *God*, and his providence. It remains to be considered what affections and duty are incumbent on us toward the *Deity* thus abundantly made known to every attentive mind.

What affections are suited to the Divine Perfections.

In this matter, as much as any, our *moral faculty* is of the highest use. It not only points out the affections suited to these perfections, but sacredly recommends and enjoins them as absolutely necessary to a good character; and as much condemns the want of them, as of any affections toward our fellow-creatures. Nay points them out as of more sacred obligation. The *moral faculty* itself seems that peculiar part of our nature most adapted to promote this correspondence of every rational mind with the great Source of our being and of all perfection, as it immediately approves all moral excellence, and determines

This known by the moral sense.

BOOK I. the soul to the love of it, and approves this love as the greatest excellence of mind; which too is the most useful in the system, since the admiration and love of moral perfection is a natural incitement to all good offices.

Worship is internal, or external.

The worship suited to the Divine Attributes is either internal, or external: the former in the sentiments and affections of the soul; the later in the natural expressions of them.

What is due to the natural perfections.

Our duty in respect of the natural attributes of *God* is to entertain and cultivate, by frequent meditation, the highest admiration of that immensely great *original Being*, from which all others are derived; and to restrain all low imaginations which might diminish our veneration; all conceptions of the *Deity* as limited, corporeal, resembling any brutal or human form, or confined within certain places: all which seem inconsistent with his infinite power and perfection, and his original uncaused existence.

The affections due to the moral perfections; Love, esteem, veneration.

II. Due attention to the moral attributes must excite the highest possible esteem, and love, and gratitude. Extensive stable goodness is the immediate object of approbation, love, and esteem. Wisdom and power joined to it, raise love, esteem, and admiration to the highest. They must excite the most zealous study to please, the greatest caution against offending, and give the highest satisfaction in the consciousness of conformity to the will of a Being possessed of such excellencies. When we are conscious of having offended him, they must fill our souls, not only with

fears of punishment, but with inward remorse, inge-
 nuous shame, and sorrow, and desire of reformation. CHAP. 10.

These divine perfections firmly believed, beget Trust and resignation. trust and resignation, and entire submission to every thing ordered by Providence, from a firm persuasion that all is ordered for the best, for the greatest universal interest, and for that of every good man. Extensive goodness must desire the best state of the whole; omniscience must discover the means; and omnipotence can execute them. Every thing becomes acceptable in the place where *God* orders, or permits it; not indeed always for itself, yet upon implicit trust or faith that it is necessary for the purposes of infinite goodness and wisdom. We know that the benign intentions of the *Deity* are partly to be executed by the active virtues of good men; and that in these virtues a great share of their supreme perfection and happiness consists. Our dependence therefore upon the Divine Power and Goodness will retard no kind and virtuous purposes of ours, but rather invigorate and support us with joyful hopes of success. The same resignation and trust we exercise for ourselves, and our own interests, we shall also exercise for all who are dear to us by any virtuous bonds, for every honourable cause in which we or others are engaged; that it shall be prosperous in this life, or tend to the future glory and happiness of those who have espoused it.

III. Just apprehensions of the creation and providence of *God* must raise the highest resentments of gratitude, must repress all vanity in his sight, all con- Gratitude and humility before God, and pity toward our fellows.

BOOK I. tempt of others, and beget true humility. All the good we enjoy, all the pleasures of sense, all the delights of beauty and harmony, are so many favours conferred on us by *God*. To his power we owe our very being, we owe these objects, and the senses by which we enjoy them. If we interpose our activity in improving the objects, or cultivating our own relish, it was *God* who gave us all our powers, all our art or sagacity, and furnished us opportunities for such pleasant exercise, and so agreeably rewards it. All the joys we feel in mutual love, all the advantages we receive from the aids of our fellows, are owing to *God*, who contrived that frame of soul for man, gave him such affections, and made him susceptible of whatever can be the object of love in him. He gave to all animal kinds, human or brutal, their powers, senses, instincts, affections. He bound together the souls of men with these tender and social bonds which are the springs of all good offices. The external advantages we procure to each other by our active virtues, *God* could have immediately conferred by his power without any action of ours; but, such was his goodness, he chose that we should enjoy some share of that divine and honourable pleasure of doing good to others; and, by the exercise of our kind affections and by our *moral faculty*, we do partake of it. The joys we feel in being honoured by our fellows are also his gift to us; by his implanting this sense of moral excellence, and that natural delight we perceive in the approbation and esteem of others.

All the good natural or moral which we enjoy is due to him.

All the pleasures of knowledge, all the effects of art and contrivance, are owing to him, who *taught us more than the beasts of the field, and made us wiser than the fowls of heaven*; to him we owe that we can discern the beauty and kind intention and wisdom of his works, and thus adore the footsteps of his wisdom and goodness; that we can discern moral beauty, the affections and conduct which are acceptable to him, and most resemble the Divine Beauty; that we can discover his perfections, and imitate them; and that we can give secure tranquillity to our souls by an entire confidence in them, and resignation to his providence. By the reason he gave us he converses with us, assures us of his good-will, gives us the most friendly admonitions; and, by the affections of esteem, love, and gratitude he has implanted, calls us to a state of friendship with himself. Thus all our happiness and excellency is from his bounty. *Not unto us, Lord; not unto us, but to thy name be the praise.*

IV. 'Tis vainly alledged, "that these devout affections are vain or useless because *God* needs them not, nor do they increase his happiness." They are the chief enjoyments of rational souls, their highest joy in prosperity, and sweetest refuge in adversity. The rational heart cannot approve itself if it wants them; if it prefers them not to its chiefest joys. Without love, friendship, gratitude, life is insipid. These affections, when mutual, are the more joyful the more excellent the objects are. What stable and transporting

The exercise of these affections necessary to us, not to God.

BOOK I. joy must arise from living with an habitual sense of the Divine Presence, with the highest love, admiration, and gratitude, and justly persuaded of being approved and beloved and protected by him who is infinitely perfect and omnipotent.

Without this confidence in *God*, what can we call secure? Our bodies and all external things are obviously uncertain: so is the prosperity of our friends, of all the objects of our generous affections. Their very virtues, tho' among the most stable things of life, are not secured against change. Some accidents can disturb their reason and their virtue. 'Tis only the soul resigned to *God*, with firm trust in his perfections, that can promise to itself in the whole every thing happy and honourable at last.

In every good temper certain affections must arise upon their natural occasions, whether they can affect the state of the object or not. Tho' we were fully aware of our own impotence, or want of opportunity to do good offices, or make returns, a temper must be odious which had no love and esteem of great excellency, no gratitude for great benefits. Thus joy must arise in a good heart upon the prosperity of one beloved, tho' we cannot add to it; and sorrow upon his adversity, tho' we cannot remove or alleviate it. The want of such affections, where there are such strong natural causes presented, must argue a depravity of soul which we cannot avoid abhorring upon reflection. These affections are as it were the natural attrac-

tion of the Divinity upon our souls, and of every excellence which resembles him in his works; and every pure soul feels its force. CHAP. 10.

Nay, without lively apprehensions of the Divine Providence, and continual resignation to his will, with a joyful confidence in his goodness, which are the main acts of devotion, our noblest affections must expose us to grievous sympathetick sorrows in this uncertain world. But a firm persuasion of an omnipotent, omniscient, and most benign universal parent, disposing of all in this system for the very best; determined to secure happiness in the whole to the virtuous, whatever evils may befall them in this life; and permitting no further evil than what the most perfect constitution requires, or necessarily brings along with it; a persuasion of all this, with like extensive affections in our souls, must afford the strongest consolation in all our tender sorrows, and bring our hearts either chearfully to embrace, or at least calmly to acquiesce in whatever is ordered or permitted by sovereign wisdom and goodness. If our friends or favourites are at present unfortunate: this the very best polity in this grand state required: many more of our brethren and fellow-citizens, of as great virtue, are still happy. They have their dear friends rejoicing with them; their affections are as tender and lovely; their virtues are as valuable, as those in our set of friends. If ours are in distress and sorrow, others with equal tenderness and virtue are rejoicing. One generation passeth, and another comes; and the universe remains for ever; and ever as fruitful

No stable tranquillity or happiness without them.

BOOK I. in virtue, joy and felicity. Nay from the short period we know, we cannot conclude about the future miseries of such as are now unfortunate. We know not what the ever-during course of ages may bring to those very persons whose misfortunes or vices we are bewailing. The thoughts of a future eternity, under a good *God*, make all things appear serene, and joyful, and glorious.

*First offices
increase all vir-
tue and joy.*

A constant regard to *God* in all our actions and enjoyments, will give a new beauty to every virtue, by making it an act of gratitude and love to him: and increase our pleasure in every enjoyment, as it will appear an evidence of his goodness: it will give a diviner purity and simplicity of heart, to conceive all our virtuous dispositions as implanted by *God* in our hearts, and all our beneficent offices as our proper work, and the natural duties of that station we hold in his universe, and the services we owe to this nobler country. Our minds shall be called off from the lower views of honours, or returns from men, and from all contempt or pride toward our fellows who share not equally in his goodness: our little passions and resentments shall be suppressed in his presence. Our hearts will chiefly regard his approbation, our aims shall be obtained when we act the part assigned us faithfully and gratefully to our great Creator, let others act as they please toward us. The mistakes, imperfections, provocations, calumnies, injuries, or ingratitude of others we shall look upon as matters presented to us by providence for the exercise of the virtues *God* has

endued us with, by which we may more approve our selves to his penetrating eye, and to the inward sense of our own hearts, than by the easier offices of virtue where it has nothing to discourage or oppose it. CHAP. 10.

Thus as the calm and most extensive determination of the soul toward the universal happiness can have no other center of rest and joy than the original independent omnipotent Goodness; so without the knowledge of it, and the most ardent love and resignation to it, the soul cannot attain to its own most stable and highest perfection and excellence: nor can our *moral faculty*, naturally delighting in moral excellence, obtain any other compleat object upon which it can be fully exercised, than that Being which is absolutely perfect, and originally possesser of all excellence, and the source of all such excellencies in others.

IV. External worship is the natural expression of these devout sentiments and affections. The obvious reasons for it are these; the exercise and expression of all sentiments and affections makes their impressions deeper, and strengthens them in the soul. Again; gratitude, love and esteem, are affections which decline concealment when they are lively; we are naturally prone to express them, even tho' they give no new happiness to their object. 'Tis plainly our duty to promote virtue and happiness among others: our worshipping in society, our recounting thankfully *God's* benefits, our explaining his nature and perfections, our expressing our admiration, esteem, gratitude, and love, presents to the minds of others the proper

*The reasons for
external wor-
ship.*

BOOK I. motives of like affections; and by a contagion, observable in all our passions, naturally tends to raise them in others. Piety thus diffused in a society, is the strongest restraint from evil; and adds new force to every social disposition, to every engagement to good offices.

The natural expressions of devotion.

The natural expressions are, instructing others in the perfections of *God*, and the nature of piety and virtue, the great end of his laws; praises, thanksgivings, acknowledgements of his providence as the spring of all good by prayers, and expressions of trust and resignation; confession of our sins and imperfections; and imploring his pardon, and future aids for our amendment. We may add solemn invocation of him as the witness and avenger of any falshood in our assertions or promises, wherever it may be requisite to settle some important right of our fellows, or to give them confidence in our fidelity.

Additional requirements for our improvement in virtue and proficiency.

V. Our praise, admiration, or thanks, add nothing to the Divine felicity; our confession gives no new information; our importunity alters not his purposes from what he had formerly determined as best. Our swearing makes him no more attentive, or disposed to execute justice, nor gives it any new right to punish. These acts of adoration, praise, thanksgiving, confession, prayer, increase our own piety, love, and gratitude, our abhorrence of moral evil, and our desires of what is truly good, and our resignation to his will. When we have lively dispositions of this kind, we are best prepared to improve all temporal blessings, and may hope for them according to the gracious tenor

of Divine Providence. Invocations of *God* by oaths, in a religious manner, and on important occasions, must imprint the deepest sense of our obligations to fidelity, and of the crime of falshood; and thus give the greatest security we can give, by words, to our fellow-creatures. The effect of all these acts is upon ourselves, and not upon the *Deity*, or his purposes, which have been originally fixed upon a thorough foresight of all the changes which could happen in our moral dispositions, which themselves also are a part of the objects of his eternal counsels and power.

'Tis a needless inquiry whether a society of *Atheists* could subsist? or whether their state would be better or worse than that of men possessed with some wicked superstition? True religion plainly increases the happiness both of individuals and of societies. Remove all religion, and you remove some of the strongest bonds, some of the noblest motives, to fidelity and vigour in all social offices. 'Tis plain too that some systems of religious tenets, where much wicked superstition makes a part, may contain many noble precepts, rules, and motives, which have their good effects upon the minds of such as are not concerned in executing the purposes of the superstition. Thus many of the best moral precepts, and the doctrine of future rewards appointed for virtue, are retained in Popery, and excite many to the most virtuous offices, whilst others by the superstitious political tenets, destined for the aggrandising of the ecclesiasticks, and the enslaving of

The influence of religion on human society.

BOOK I. the souls and bodies of the rest of mankind, are excited to the most horrid cruelties.

'Tis of no importance to determine whether such superstitions have worse effects than *Atheism*. They may, as to men in certain stations; tho' they hurt not the rest considerably. The experiment of a society of *Atheists* has never yet been made. Grant that the effects of some superstitions were worse than those of *Atheism*: this is rather honourable to religion. The best state of religion is incomparably happier than any condition of *Atheism*; and the corruptions of the best things may be most pernicious. A surfeit of nourishing food, may be more dangerous than that of food less nourishing: spoiled wines are more dangerous than bad water. 'Tis the business of rational minds to take all the blessings of a true religion, and guard against any corruption of it, without searching out what motives might remain to some sorts of virtues under the joyless wretched thought that the universe is under no providence, but left to chance, or as blind and undesigning necessity; if religion, when depraved, does great mischief; a pure and good religion is a powerful engine of much good.

C H A P. XI.



The CONCLUSION of *this* BOOK, *shewing the* WAY
to the SUPREME HAPPINESS of *our* NATURE.

HAVING thus considered the several sources of *The sum of human happiness.* happiness our nature is capable of; and, upon a full comparison, found that the noblest and most lasting enjoyments are such as arise from our own affections and actions, and not the passive sensations we receive from those external things which affect the body: having also compared the several sort of affections and actions, whether exerted toward our fellows in narrower or more extended systems, or toward the *Deity*, whose nature and grand intention in the administration of the universe we have also endeavoured to discover: and having found that, as our *moral faculty* plainly approves in an higher degree, all the more extensive affections toward our fellows than it approves the more confined affections or passions; that these extensive affections are also more noble sources of enjoyment; and that our love of moral excellence; our knowledge, veneration, and love of the *Deity*, conceived as perfectly good and wise and powerful, and the fountain of all good; and an entire resignation to his will and providence is the source of our sublimest happiness, the grand foundation of all our tranquillity or security as to any other object of the most honourable desires: 'tis plain our supreme and compleat

BOOK I. happiness, according to the universal doctrine of the wisest men in all ages, † must consist in the compleat exercise of these nobler virtues, especially that entire love and resignation to *God*, and of all the inferior virtues which do not interfere with the superior: and in the enjoyment of such external prosperity as we can, consistently with virtue, obtain.

The moral sense and the calm determination, which is recommending, justice,

II. The course of life therefore, pointed out to us immediately by our *moral sense*, and confirmed by all just consideration of our true interest, must be the very same which the *generous calm determination* would recommend, a constant study to promote the most universal happiness in our power, by doing all good offices as we have opportunity which interfere with no more extensive interest of the system; preferring always the more extensive and important offices to those of less extent and importance; and cautiously abstaining from whatever may occasion any unnecessary misery in this system. This is the cardinal virtue of *justice* which the antients make the supreme one, to which the rest are all subservient. It may include even our duties toward *God*.

and temperance,

As sensual enjoyments are the meanest and most transitory, the desires of which, by the impetuous force of some of our brutal passions, frequently seduce men from the course of virtue, it must be of high importance to be fully convinced of their meanness, and to acquire an habit of self-command, a power over these lower appetites in the manner we explained when we

† This is Aristotle's definition, Ευτυχια κατ' ἀριστον ἐστὶν ἡ βίη τῆς πόλεως.

considered the nature of these enjoyments. 'Tis equally necessary by close reflection to make a just estimate of other more elegant enjoyments of the imagination, that, as they are far inferior to moral and social enjoyments, they may yield to them in our choice where they interfere. This is the virtue of *temperance*.

A just estimation of the value of this life, and of the several sorts of evil we are exposed to, must be equally necessary. If moral evils, and some sympathetic sufferings are worse than any external ones, and can make life shameful and miserable amidst all affluence of other things, as we shewed above; if at best, life is but an uncertain possession we must soon lose; we shall see something that is more to be dreaded than death, and many just reasons why it may on certain occasions be our interest to incur the danger of it. Were death an entire end of all thought it would indeed put an end to all good, but surely no evil could ensue.

———— *num triste videtur*

Quicquam? nonne omni somno securior extat.

But if we are to exist after death under a good Providence, what a glorious foundation is this for *fortitude* in every honourable cause? what strength of mind must that hope give to every good man upon apprehensions of death, or any of the evils which lead to it? This is the third cardinal virtue.

Prudence is that habit of attention to the nature of the several objects which may sollicit our desires, engaging us to a thorough inquiry into their impor-

Prudence prerequisite to virtue of all sorts.

BOOK I. tance, in themselves and their consequences, either to the greatest private happiness of the individual, or to that of the system. This virtue is some way prerequisite to the proper exercise of the other three, and is generally first mentioned in order; tho' *justice* is the supreme one to which all the rest are subservient. We leave it to more practical treatises to dilate upon these things. The proper considerations, and the means of acquiring these four habits of virtue must be evident from what is said above concerning the comparative values of the several sorts of good and evil, and concerning the supreme enjoyments of our nature.

Mistakes.

III. Many are discouraged from a vigorous culture of their minds for the reception of all virtues by a rash prejudice. We are dazzled with the conspicuous glories of some great successful actions in higher stations; we can allow such virtues to be the noblest enjoyments; but they are placed so high that few have access to them. Nay persons in higher stations often despair when their power is not absolute. The humours, follies, or corrupt views of others obstruct all their good intentions. They are fretted with such disappointments, and quit the pursuits of virtue, desponding of any valuable enjoyment attending it.

To arm the soul against this prejudice, we should remember that the reality and perfection of virtue, and the inward satisfaction of it too, to a calm mind, depends not on external success, but upon the inward temper of soul. Persisting under these doubts about the success or glory, in the publick offices of virtue;

or if we are excluded from them, in all the lower private offices; in a constant sweetness of deportment in obscurity, and a constant resignation to the *supreme Mind*; embracing chearfully the lot appointed for us, repressing every envious motion, and every repining thought against providence, resolving to go stedfastly on in the path pointed out to us by *God* and nature, till our mortal part fall down to that earth from whence it sprung; must appear rather more noble and heroick to the *All-searching Eye*, and to the judgment of every wise man, than the more glittering virtues of a prosperous fortune. In these there is less purity and simplicity discovered, since the alluring views of glory and worldly interests may have had a large share in the affections, or been the principal motives to the agent.

When we despair of glory, and even of executing all the good we intend, 'tis a sublime exercise to the soul to persist in acting the rational and social part as it can; discharging its duty well, and committing the rest to *God*. Who can tell what greater good might be attainable if all good men thus exerted their powers even under great uncertainties of success, and great dangers of misrepresentations and obloquy? Or how much worse should all matters proceed, if all good men desponded and grew remiss under such apprehensions? If virtue appears more glorious by surmounting external dangers and obstacles, is not its glory equally increased by surmounting these inward discouragements, and persisting without the aids of glory or

BOOK I. applause, conquering even the ingratitude of those it serves, satisfied with the silent testimony of our hearts, and the hopes of Divine approbation. Thus the most heroick excellence, and its consequent happiness and inward joy, may be attained under the worst circumstances of fortune: nor is any station of life excluded from the enjoyment of the supreme good.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

B O O K II.

Containing a Deduction of the more special LAWS of NATURE, and Duties of Life, previous to Civil Government, and other adventitious States.

C H A P. I.

The Circumstances which increase or diminish the MORAL GOOD, or EVIL of Actions.

HAVING shewed, in the former book, that the course of life which GOD and NATURE recommends to us as most lovely and most conducive to the true happiness of the agent, is that which is intended for the general good of mankind in the wisest manner that our reason and observation can suggest; we proceed, in this book, to enquire more particularly into the proper means of promoting the happiness of mankind by our actions, which is the same thing with inquiring into the more special laws of nature. And this we shall endeavour to do first abstracting from those adventitious states or relations which human institutions or actions have constituted, considering only that relation which *nature* hath constituted among all. But it may be necessary here to premise some account of many complex notions of moral qualities, the understanding of which seems prerequisite to the doctrine of the particular laws of nature. This shall be the subject of this and the two following chapters.

BOOK II. I. The ground of all imputation * of actions as virtuous or vicious is, “ that they flow from some affection in the agent, and thus are evidences of his temper and affections.” Virtue, as it was proved in the former book, consists primarily in the affections. The highest kind of it is the calm and fixed principle of good-will to the greatest system; and love, esteem, gratitude, and resignation to *God*, upon a full persuasion of his moral perfections, and a constant prevalent desire of making still further progress toward that moral perfection of which we perceive ourselves to be capable. The lower kinds, are the particular kind affections and passions pursuing the good of particular societies, or individuals, consistently with the general good. This, one would think, could scarce be matter of debate among Christians, after the sum of the law delivered to us, † viz. *Loving God and our neighbour*. If virtue be not placed in the affections, but in some other faculty different from the will, as *reason* or *intellect*, then love is to be called an act of the understanding, contrary to all language.

Qualities and circumstances necessary to the morality of actions.

II. From this description 'tis easy to find what circumstances affect the morality of actions, or omissions, increasing or diminishing the moral good, or evil, in them; or making actions good, which otherways had been evil; or evil, which otherways had been good.

Liberty.

First. 'Tis manifest that whatever action, or rather event, happened not in consequence of one's will, ei-

* *Imputation* is one of the *vores mediae*, tho' more commonly used in charging men with guilt. † *Math. xii. 30, 31.*

ther at present, or in some prior time, cannot be imputed as either good, or evil. Nor can any omission or abstaining from action be imputed as good, or evil, to him who could not have performed it by any efforts, and knew this impossibility. Such events or omissions can evidence no affection, either good, or bad. Events, however, are then only called *necessary* with respect to an agent, which he could not prevent tho' he seriously desired it; not such as, through his strong aversions or habits, he cannot avoid desiring. Those only are called *impossible*, which no efforts of his can accomplish by any means. We call any thing possible, which one who heartily desires it, can get accomplished, whether by his own power, or by any aid of others which he can obtain.*

These alone are the necessary and wholly unimputable events † which neither any present desire or action of ours can prevent, nor could they have been prevented by any prior diligence or care which we ought to have had about such matters. Such events as prior fore-thought and care could have prevented, tho' they be now unavoidable, are in some measure voluntary ‡ and imputable; whether they happen from free agency, or from natural inanimate causes. Thus if one by negligence in his office suffers banks or mounds to decay, when a storm comes he cannot prevent the inundation; and yet it is justly counted voluntary and imputable to him.

Necessary events, not moral.

* This explains the common maxim, *Impossibilium et necessariorum nulla est imputatio.* † *Involuntaria et in se, et in sua causa.* ‡ *Involuntaria in se, sed non in sua causa.*

BOOK II.

*nor the omission
of impossibilities.*

So the omissions of actions now impossible are justly imputed, when they might have been possible, had that previous diligence been exerted which becomes a good man. A slothful profuse man cannot now discharge his debts, yet as a prior course of prudent oeconomy would have prevented this injury to his creditors, the non-payment is imputable. In these cases, indeed, the unavoidable event or omission, contrary to present strong inclination, shews no present evil affection. But the former negligence, which made one incapable of doing justice, argues a prior culpable defect of good dispositions. And 'tis here that the guilt properly lyes. Two persons may be equally criminal in the sight of God, and their own consciences, when the events of their conduct are very different. Suppose equal negligence in both, and that both become insolvent, but one by an unexpected inheritance discharges his debts; the other, tho' equally inclined, remains incapable of it. They are equally criminal, tho' one by accident does no wrong in the event to his creditors.

*What effects
and consequents
imputable.*

III. No distant effects or consequents of actions or omissions, affect their morality, if they could not have been foreseen by that diligence and caution we expect from good men; for then they are no indications of the temper of the agent. For the same reason any prosperous effects which were not intended, do not increase the moral goodness of an action; but an evil action is made worse by all the evil consequents, which would have appeared to a man of such caution as good

affections would naturally raise, tho' the agent did not actually foresee them. They do not indeed prove any direct evil intention; but there are other forms of moral evil. The very want of a proper degree of good affections is morally evil. One studious of the publick good will be cautious and inquisitive about the effects of his actions; the inquisitive will discover such effects as are discoverable by their sagacity. He then who is ignorant of such effects, tho' he had no direct evil intention, betrays a culpable weakness of the good affections.

In judging of the moral characters of such as have not had any considerable reformation made in their affections, 'tis not of consequence whether the guilt be evidenced by some present action, or omission; or by some preceding one equally criminal. That aphorism therefore is just, that "an action can be made
 " virtuous only by such good consequents as are actu-
 " ally intended for themselves: but may be made vi-
 " cious by any evil consequences which a good and
 " honest mind could have foreseen as probably en-
 " suing."

But good consequents intended then only prove an action to be good, when the sum of them over-ballance all the evil ones which could have been foreseen, and when the good consequents could not be obtained without these evils. If the case is otherways, they may extenuate the guilt, but do not justify the action. On the other hand, evil consequents foreseen, but not desired for themselves, do not always make an action

BOOK II. evil. 'Tis only in such cases where they over-balance all the good effects to which this action is subservient, and for which it was intended; and where this over-balance might have been foreseen, or when the good effect could have been obtained without these evils.

By consequents of an action we understand not only the direct and natural effects, or what the agent is the proper cause of; but all these events too which ensue upon it, and had not happened had the action been omitted. A good man regards whatever he foresees may ensue through the mistakes, follies, or vices of others; and avoids what he foresees will occasion vicious actions, or unreasonable offences, in others, * tho' otherways it might have been innocent: unless the good effects, not otherways to be obtained, over-balance these particular evils. †

Ignorance and error, invincible, or inevitable, affect actions to certain degrees.

IV. Ignorance of the tendency or effects of actions, affects their morality differently, according to the different causes of the ignorance or error, and the difficulty, greater or less, of coming to the knowledge of the truth. If the ignorance or error be absolutely invincible by any present, or any prior diligence, evil consequents thus unknown cannot be imputed, as they can shew no evil affection, nor any defect in good affections. If that degree of caution which we expect in like affairs from the best men could not surmount the ignorance tho' the utmost possible caution might, we still count it morally invincible, and wholly excusing from guilt, except in cases where all men know that

* Rom. xiv. 21. † Matth. x. 34, 5

the utmost caution is incumbent on them. But where the ordinary caution of a good mind would have foreseen such consequents, then the ignorance argues a defect of good affections, is vincible, and tho' it may alleviate the guilt, it does not wholly take it away.

Ignorance and error may be at present invincible and involuntary, and yet prior diligence might have prevented them; or it may be invincible and involuntary every way.* The latter only takes away all imputation: the former, shews that there is no direct evil intention at present, but it may evidence a prior want of good affections, and thus be justly culpable.

But as direct evil intention, or insensibility of the evil we plainly see we are doing to others, are much more odious tempers than mere inadvertence, or the want of such warm affections as would raise accurate attention; all ignorance not directly affected or desired is some alleviation of guilt; and that in different degrees, according as the effects were more or less obvious. The easier the discovery was, the less does the ignorance alleviate the guilt.

Ignorance may either be about the effects of the action, or the true intent and meaning of laws. Ignorance of the law or the fact. The same maxims hold about both. Only, since wise legislators take care so to publish their laws that the subjects may always know them by proper diligence, ignorance of the law cannot be deemed absolutely invincible. If any laws are absolutely undiscoverable

* *Involuntaria in se, sed non in sua causa.* or, *Involuntaria et in se, et in sua causa.*

BOOK II. by the subjects, they are not laws given to them; their not obeying them cannot be culpable.*

Conscience what.

V. The questions about vincible ignorance, and consciences erroneous, or doubtful, are only difficult through ambiguity of words. Conscience sometimes denotes the *moral faculty* itself: sometimes “the judgment of the understanding concerning the springs and effects of actions upon which the *moral sense* approves, or condemns them.” And when we have got certain maxims and rules concerning the conduct which is virtuous, or vicious, and conceive them to be, as they truly are, the laws given to us by *God* the author of nature and of all our powers; or when we are persuaded that other divine laws are revealed to us in a different manner, then conscience may be defined to be “Our judgment concerning actions compared with the *law*.”

How an erroneous conscience excuses, or excuses.

Now first, “A person purposing to act virtuously, and yet by mistake imagining that action to have a good tendency, and to be conformable to the law, which is of a contrary nature in reality, will certainly during his error follow his conscience: since no man in an error knows that he errs.” The observers only can make the question, whether 'tis better for him to follow his conscience, or counteract it? And this cannot in all cases be answered the same way.

2. “He who follows the erroneous judgment of his mind in doing what he believes to be good, at present evidences a good disposition: and acting a-

* *Ignorantia juris, ignorantia facti.*

“gainst his judgment, during his error, must evidence CHAP. I.
 “some vicious disposition; such as neglect of more ex-
 “tensive good, or of the lawgiver.” This holds in general true as to all men who are firmly persuaded of the goodness of *God* and his laws. As we all censure a man who from any narrower affection of a lovely fort should counteract the views of the more extensive affections; the same way we must censure the counteracting such commands of *God*, as we believe are calculated for the most extensive happiness, tho’ the agent has been excited to it by some humane and lovely affections of the narrower fort; which, however, in all cases alleviate the guilt.

But when there is no such settled apprehension of *God*, or his laws, as perfectly benevolent; and only a notion of high private interest in obedience, and great private danger to ourselves from disobedience, with a confused notion of duty or obligation to obey; if some very tender humane dispositions of heart should lead one to disobey some severe and cruel orders imagined to come from the *Deity*; whatever convulsions he might feel in his own heart by the struggles between two such opposite principles, a judicious spectator could scarce condemn the counteracting such a conscience from principles of humanity: for example, if one who believed it his duty to persecute hereticks to death, yet were restrained by compassion to his fellow-creatures.

3. “The falling into such vincible errors, so opposite
 “to the humane dispositions of the soul, in matters so All errors are not innocent.

BOOK II. “deeply affecting the interests of our fellows as that of
 ~~~~~ “persecution, and some others, must argue great prior  
 “guilt and deficiency of good affections.” And there-  
 fore, during the error, whether one follows his con-  
 science, or not, we have some evidence of a bad tem-  
 per. If he follows it, his prior negligence is very cul-  
 pable: if he does not, and yet believes the command  
 to have been given by a good God for the general in-  
 terest, his prior negligence is culpable as in the other  
 case, and now he superadds the guilt of omitting his  
 duty to *God*, and the general interest. But where one  
 has no notions of the Divine Goodness, and the be-  
 nign tendency of his laws, counteracting the imagined  
 law may be less odious, if it be from a lovely humane  
 disposition.

4. When the conscience is doubtful, the safest way  
 is to defer acting till further inquiry be made, unless  
 some general potent reason urges to a speedy determi-  
 nation. Cases happen in which 'tis plainly better to  
 do either of the two actions, about the preference of  
 which we are doubting, than to omit both; and there  
 may be no time for delays. In such cases we must fix  
 upon one or t'other, according to superior probability  
 of its importance. If these probabilities are equal, we  
 must do what first occurs.

*The duty of  
 such as err.*

What is the duty then of one in an error? or what  
 conduct will be entirely approved? 'Tis plain the er-  
 ror already has evidenced a prior culpable negligence.  
 The only conduct which now shall gain entire appro-  
 bation again is correcting the error by a new unpreju-

diced inquiry. The erroneous, during their error, do not see this to be their duty; but 'tis the only way to set all right again. And this shews the great advantage of modesty and diffidence as to our own understandings; and the danger of self-confidence and bigotry. CHAP. I.

The degree of diligence requisite in a good man, cannot be precisely determined. We naturally expect very different degrees from different capacities, stations, opportunities. Aristotle\* well observes, that “many points in *morals*, when applied to individual cases, cannot be exactly determined; but good men know them by a sort of sensation: the good experienced man is thus the last measure of all things.” This holds in general: “the greater the diligence and caution about our duty is, the character is so much the better; and the less the diligence and caution is, so much the worse is the character, when other circumstances are equal.”

\* *Nicom.* l. iii. c. 4. and l. ii. c. ult. and l. vi. c. 11. and often in the *Magna Moralia*, particularly l. ii. c. 10. Hence the *arbitrium viri probi*, with the *Civilians*.

*General Rules of judging about the MORALITY of ACTIONS, from the Affections exciting to them, or opposing them.*

ALTHO' men cannot accurately judge about the degrees of virtue, or vice, in the actions of others, because their inward springs are unknown: yet some general rules may be abundantly certain and useful in our judging about ourselves. And we have no great occasion to make application of them to others, which must be extremely uncertain.

*General rules about the impotence of actions.*

1. Where kind affections alone are the springs of action, the good effected by any agent is as the strength of these affections and his ability jointly. The strength of affection therefore is directly as the good effected, and inversely as the abilities; or, in plainer terms, when the good done by two persons is equal, while their abilities are unequal, he shews the better heart, whose abilities were smaller.

*How views of private interest affect the morality of actions.*

2. Where men are also excited by views of private interest, the effect of these selfish desires is to be deducted, and the remainder shews the effect of the virtuous disposition. Where motives of private interest dissuaded from some good action performed, the virtue appears the higher by surmounting these motives.

3. In like manner we compute the moral turpitude of unkind or basely selfish affections leading us to injury. The strength of them is directly as the evil effected, and inversely as the abilities. That is, where



equal mischiefs are done by two, who had it in their power to do more, in gratification of their evil affections, he shews the worse temper, who had the smaller power but exerted it further. CHAP. 2.

4. When private interests excite to hurtful actions, the effect of the selfish desires is not the same way to be deducted to find the pure effect of some inclination wholly vicious. We seldom can have any such inclinations. The moral evils of men generally flow from the immoderate degrees of some selfish affections, which in a moderate degree would be innocent; and the very want of high degrees of some good affections is vicious. This deduction can only be made where the exciting selfish motive was the avoiding some great sufferings terrible even to very good minds; and such temptations much extenuate the guilt. Where great interests known to the agent dissuaded from the evil action, indeed the guilt is exceedingly aggravated, as the depravity of temper surmounts these interests, as well as all sense of duty and generous affection. *The same circumstances affect evil actions.*

II. But in comparing actions and characters we not only regard the strength of the exciting affection, but the kind of it, since, as we observed above, our *moral sense*, by the wise constitution of *God*, more approves such affections as are most useful and efficacious for the publick interest. It immediately approves the calm sedate good-will either to particular societies, or individuals, more than the turbulent passions of the generous sort; and of the calm affections most approves the most extensive. And thus tho' the effects *The kind of the affections to be regarded.*

BOOK II. of two actions were equal, that one is more approved which flowed from a calm settled principle of kindness, than another from some turbulent passion. The superior excellency of these calm dispositions is allowed on all hands; and shews men what temper nature recommends to their culture, by all the power we have over our affections; and what restraints should be laid upon the less extensive affections, whether calm or passionate, that they may never defeat the purposes of the most extensive and excellent dispositions of the soul. Here we see also the reason why no great virtue is imagined in our kindness to our offspring, kindred, or even benefactors. Strong particular passions naturally arise toward persons so related to us, whether we have any of the more extensive affections lively in our breasts or not: and few characters are so depraved as to be void of these natural affections. The want of them indeed, for reasons presently to be mentioned, would argue a temper depraved in the most odious degree.

*Hard to fix  
precise degrees of  
obligation.*

III. When promoting the publick good is opposite to the agent's worldly interest, 'tis hard to fix a precise degree of good affection requisite merely to avoid a bad character, or obtain that of bare innocence. One may be called in one sense innocent who never hurts others in pursuit of his own interest. But notwithstanding this he may be a bad man, if he contributes little to a publick interest. God has set in our hearts, if we would attend to it, a very high standard of necessary goodness, and we must be displeas'd with

ourselves when we omit any office, how burdensome or hurtful soever to ourselves, which in the whole would increase the publick happiness after all its consequents are considered. In our common estimations of characters and actions we do not judge so rigidly, nor can one easily tell precisely how far one must sacrifice his private interests to the publick, to avoid a bad character. The extremes of virtue and vice are abundantly known; but intermediate degrees are less discernible from each other when they approach very near, as in colours shaded into each other. The following maxims seem pretty probable, or certain;

1. That affections of equal degrees of extent or strength are not expected from persons of unequal circumstances and opportunities, tho' originally of equal tempers. More is demanded from such as have had instruction, leisure for meditation, and access to better stations. Several general rules.
2. Such offices as are useful to others, and of no expence or labour to the agent, are justly expected from all toward all who need them. They are but low evidences of virtue, but refusing them is very hateful, and shews a temper void of humanity.
3. Nay we universally condemn the refusal of such smaller expences or trouble as can scarce disturb the happiness of life, when it is necessary for any important advantage even to a stranger.
4. The greater the expence or trouble is one submits to for the benefit of others, it must be to others the greater evidence of his virtue.

BOOK II.

5. The smaller the advantages are for the sake of which one does what is detrimental to the publick, or declines any useful services, the worse we must conclude his character.

*How narrower  
affections should  
yield to more ex-  
tensive.*

The same difficulties may appear in determining precisely how far the narrower affections in particular cases should yield to the more extensive; or how far the interests of families, kindred, benefactors, friends, our party, or country, should be sacrificed to more extensive interests, to avoid a bad character or the charge of guilt. A calm mind, solicitous about its own conduct, will blame every defect of that most perfect moral order, which requires sacrificing all narrower interests to the more extensive. But there is something so beautiful and so engaging in many narrower affections of the soul, that we judge less rigidly of the conduct of men who from such lovely principles neglect the highest perfection. And as it is but a small degree of attention and discernment, which can be reasonably expected from men of lower stations and capacities, much encumbred by procuring to themselves and their immediate dependents the necessaries of life, nature is far from leading us to pronounce the character bad, which does not in all cases adhere to the most exact rules of perfection. But withal the attentive reflecting mind cannot but see the fairest mark set up by *God* in his heart, a clear idea of perfection. The nearer he can come to it, so much the better and more excellent he is. Nor was it the Divine intention that we should satisfy ourselves by merely avoiding such

conduct as is matter of infamy. Two general maxims are abundantly obvious in these cases. CHAP. 2.

1. First, that to maintain the calm and most extensive affection toward the universal happiness the strongest principle of the soul, able to controll all narrower affections when there is any opposition; and the sacrificing all narrower interests to the most extensive, while yet every tender affection in the several relations of life is preserved in as great strength as the just subordination of it to the superior will admit; is the highest perfection of human virtue.

2. And yet when some of these narrower kind affections exceed their proportion, and overcome the more extensive, the moral deformity is alleviated in proportion to the moral beauty of that narrower affection by which the more extensive is overpowered. Thus 'tis more excusable if we do what is hurtful to the most general interest, from zeal for our country, for a whole people; than if the same had been done for aggrandizing a party, a cabal, or a family. And any of those tender affections extenuate the guilt more than any merely selfish principle could have done, such as avarice, ambition, sensuality.

IV. The greater part of mankind, by the necessary avocations of life, are incapable of very extensive designs, and want opportunities and abilities for such services. But we have this just presumption, that by serving innocently any valuable part of a system, we do good to the whole. The lives therefore of many of the most virtuous are justly employed in serving

*The ordinary virtues from the narrower causes of love.*

BOOK II. such particular persons, or smaller societies, who are more peculiarly recommended to them by the very order of nature. *Nature* constitutes many particular attachments and proper causes of loving some more than others. Some of these causes are of a generous kind, but in different degrees. Such as the *conjugal* and *parental relations*, and the other *tyes of blood*; *benefits conferred*, which excite a generous gratitude, tho' we expect no more; *eminent virtues* observed; and the very relation of *countrymen*. Of the selfish sort are, a *profitable intercourse of offices*, *dependence for future preferment*, or *other favours*. All these are natural causes not only of keener passions, but of a stronger calm good-will in most of men. On the other hand, tho', to a man of just reflection, there can be no natural cause of any calm ultimate ill-will, yet to the greater part of mankind there are natural causes of the unkind passions, anger, indignation, envy, and aversion; some wholly selfish, such as *private injuries* received, *opposition* to our interest; others of a generous kind, such as *moral evil* observed, *injuries done to the publick*, or *to friends*, *unreasonable promotion*, to the exclusion of more worthy men.

*General rules  
of computing.*

Now a temper is certainly so much the better, the more susceptible it is of all sweet affections upon smaller causes, especially those of the generous kind, provided it entertains proportionally warmer affections where greater causes appear; and the less susceptible it is of unkind passions upon any causes, especially the selfish. The temper must be very good which retains

good-will, where many occurrences would readily banish it from the heart: and that temper must be very bad, where love cannot be kindled by the natural causes.

In general, the stronger the merit or the natural causes of love there are in any person, our want of love to him must evidence the greater depravation: and any low degree below the proportion of the merit, must evidence the smaller virtue. A temper where any thing virtuous remains must be warmed by eminent virtues, or by great benefits conferred. And since there must appear in the *Deity* all the highest causes of love, when one with tolerable attention contemplates him as the author of all good natural and moral, as the supreme moral excellence, as the great benefactor of all; the want of the highest love to him must evidence the greatest moral deformity in any rational mind to whom his perfections are discovered.

V. These principles lead to some more special conclusions. 1. Defect of power, of opportunities, of the means of external good offices, without any fault of ours, will not exclude us from the most heroick virtue.\* This maxim is the most joyful to a good heart.

*More special conclusions.*

2. No disappointment of any wise and good attempt, by external force, or accidents which one could not foresee, can diminish the virtue: nor do unexpected or unintended good consequents increase it, † or diminish the guilt of a bad action. In human affairs men must follow probabilities. If the probable good

\* See conclusion of book j. † B. ii. c. 1.

BOOK II. effects intended, which could not be obtained in a safer way, surpass all the ill effects we could foresee, the action is good, altho' superior evil consequents ensue beyond probability.

3. Prospects of private advantage then only abate the moral beauty of an action, when 'tis known by the agent, or justly presumed by others, that without this selfish motive the agent would not have done so much good.

4. Motives of private interest diminish the guilt of an evil action undertaken from them, only in proportion as they would in such cases affect a virtuous mind. The passions raised by the greatest natural evils impending or threatened, more occupy and ingross the mind than any desires of positive good to be obtained. And hence it is that when a person through fear of death, tortures, or slavery, threatened to himself, or those who are dear to him, or from some high provocation to anger, does what brings superior detriment to society, the guilt is much more extenuated, than if he had been induced to the same conduct by the highest bribes. And resisting the former temptation would show a nobler strength of virtue than resisting the latter, or any inducements of sensuality.\* In general, the greater the vice is in any action we are tempted to by motives of interest, the less is the virtue evidenced by our abstaining from it: and the smaller the vice is to which we have such strong

\* See Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. l. iii. c. ult. and Antonin. l. ii. c. 10.



temptations, the virtue of resisting them is the \* great-  
 er, provided we have proportionally firmer resolutions  
 against the greater vices. Some crimes are so very odious  
 that few amongst the most corrupt order of men  
 can be brought to commit them. CHAP. 2.

5. The temper is the more depraved the greater  
 the motives to goodness are which it counteracts. He  
 who sins against a known law shews a worse mind, by  
 surmounting the strong motives to obedience from  
 the sanctions, and other circumstances to be mention-  
 ed hereafter, than one who does the same action  
 without any knowledge of the law.

6. Offices of no trouble or expence do not prove  
 an high virtue in the agent, tho' declining them shews  
 great depravity, as there are no motives of interest  
 against them.

7. Common offices done to persons of great me-  
 rit in whom there are high causes of love, are no evi-  
 dences of great virtue in the agent. He has little vir-  
 tue who shews no more zeal for a friend, a benefactor,  
 a man of eminent virtue, than another will do from  
 smaller bonds of affection. And yet the neglecting any  
 friendly services due to such high virtues or merit, is  
 more vicious than omitting offices of general huma-  
 nity where there were no such high claims.

8. When one cannot at once do offices of both  
 sorts, and other circumstances are equal, we should  
 follow the stronger ties of nature and the higher cau-  
 ses of love. Thus we should rather do services to a

\* Thus 'tis a good rule of perfection, to *abstain from the very appearance of evil.*

BOOK II. parent, a benefactor, a kinsman, a man of eminent virtue, than to a stranger. As *God* constituted these special bonds for the wisest purposes, 'tis for the general good that, when other circumstances are equal, these stronger bonds should engage our services rather than the weaker. The omission of the other offices, now inconsistent with the more sacred ones, is altogether innocent.

9. When only equal good is done by persons of equal abilities, from whom more might reasonably have been expected, one acting from mere humanity, the other from additional motives of divine laws and promises proposed by revelation; we have better evidence of a good temper in the former. Our good actions should rise in proportion to the stronger motives proposed, \* to shew an equally good temper.

10. Yet as the true aim of virtue is to promote the publick good, and not the pleasing one's self with high notions of his own virtue; every good man must desire to present to his mind all these motives which can further prompt him to good offices, and make him steady and resolute against all difficulties. He must desire the firmest persuasion that virtue is his truest interest; that *God* will espouse his cause by making the virtuous happy either in this life, or the next. Settling these points firmly in our minds, and frequently reflecting on them to obtain constancy and vigour in a course of virtue, superior to all temptations of secular interest, shews the truest benevolence:

\* Matth. v. 20. Luke vi. 32, — 35.

and the rejecting such considerations would shew a wrong temper, negligent of the natural means of fortifying all kind dispositions, and of removing all impediments out of their way. Such will be most constant and vigorous in all good offices, who have the strongest motives to them, and have removed all opinions of any opposite valuable interests. Now such are they only who believe and often reflect upon the Divine Providence as protecting the virtuous, and ensuring their happiness; who raise an habitual love, esteem, and gratitude to *God*, which strongly co-operate with all our generous affections to our fellows. A like effect, in a lower degree, arises from a just observation on human affairs, that a course of virtue is the most probable way of obtaining outward peace and prosperity, as it never fails to create inward peace and joy. But all this is no proof that one's own happiness of any kind is the only thing he ultimately intends in his virtuous offices.

CHAP. 2.  
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VI. But as the affections of men are sometimes discovered by the actions of others to which they contributed, 'tis plain any good office of another, to which we have designedly contributed from any good affection, may be imputed in some degree to our honour. And where we have contributed to any bad action of another by acting or omitting contrary to our duty, it may be imputed also as our fault; but in very different degrees, as circumstances may be very different.

How the actions of others are imputed.

1. As they who exhort, advise, or direct others in virtue shew a good disposition, and share in the honourable

This in various degrees.

BOOK II. imputation ; so the advisers of wickedness are alike guilty whether their advice has been followed or not. But bad advice may in many instances abate the guilt of the person who perpetrates the wickedness. Human courts indeed seldom punish for mere advice, where there was no power or authority in the adviser; and where no share of the profit by any injury came to him, he is not made liable to compensation of the damage. 'Tis hard to find what effect such general advices may have had on the agent, who without them might have acted the very same part.

2. In many cases the advising, exhorting, or congratulating another in any wicked design may not shew such depravation as the execution of it, as many things occur in the execution to dissuade the undertaker, and make him relent, which do not occur to the adviser or congratulator; such as stronger feelings of compassion and remorse, and views of punishment, and even present danger. The surmounting all these motives which affect men more deeply in the execution, may shew a greater depravity in the executer. On the other hand, when the adviser or applauder has no such motives of interest, or of escaping from some great danger, no such violent passions moving him, and yet advises or applauds others in mischief; the executer who performs it from these strong motives may not be so entirely debased, so void of moral feelings, as the adviser and applauder.

3. He who of his own pure motion commits a crime, shews a worse disposition than one who under com-

mand of a superior, and threatened with severe punishment if he declines obedience, executes a like action with inward reluctance. Where the hurt to others from his obeying the command is much less than the evil he had incurred had he disobeyed, his obedience may be perfectly innocent, especially if he is ready to compensate the damage done to others for his own safety; and the only guilt will be chargeable on the commander. In general, the persons vested with authority or power, are the principal causes of what is executed by their command: the subject is often innocent; and where he cannot be wholly justified, the guilt is extenuated by the temptation. Nay the strong importunities of friends are some extenuation.

CHAP. 2.


4. But whatever is done in consequence of the command of our will or of our choice, which affects the happiness or misery of others, whatever were our motives, is still a moral and imputable action, as it is some indication of our affections. The fear of great evil threatened may, as other pleas of necessity, make that innocent, in some cases, which without that necessity had been criminal; such as delivering money or arms to robbers that our lives may be preserved; throwing our own or other men's goods over-board in a storm, are imputed as innocent actions, nay matters of duty. And even where the publick detriment ensuing is greater than that we escape from by the action, the guilt, tho' not quite removed, is much extenuated. Still such actions are moral, and imputable as morally good or evil.



C H A P. III.

The general Notions of RIGHTS, and LAWS, explained; with their Divisions.

Right and wrong in a gen. I. FROM the constitution of our *moral faculty* above-explained, we have our notions of **right*, and *wrong*, as characters of affections and actions. The affections approved as right, are either universal goodwill and love of moral excellence, or such particular kind affections as are consistent with these. The actions approved as *right*, are such as are wisely intended either for the general good, or such good of some particular society or individual as is consistent with it. The contrary affections and actions are *wrong*.

Goodness material, and formal An action is called *materially good* when in fact it tends to the interest of the system, as far as we can judge of its tendency; or to the good of some part consistent with that of the system, whatever were the affections of the agent. An action is *formally good*, when it flowed from good affections in a just proportion. A good man deliberating † which of several actions proposed he shall chuse, regards and compares the *material goodness* of them, and then is determined by his moral sense invariably preferring that which appears most conducive to the happiness and virtue of mankind. But in judging of his ‡ past actions he con-

* This is the *rectum*, as distinct from the *jus*, of which presently: the *jus* enſues upon the *rectum*. † *Conscientia antecedens*. ‡ *Conscientia ſubſequens*.

CHAP. 3.
 considers chiefly the affections they flowed from abstracting from their effects. Actions materially good may flow from motives void of all virtue. And actions truly virtuous or formally good may by accident, in the event, turn to the publick detriment.

Our notion of *right* as a moral quality competent to some person, as when we say one has a *right* to such things, is a much more complex conception. The notion of rights; Whatever action we would deem either as virtuous or innocent were it done by the agent in certain circumstances, we say he has a *right* to do it. Whatever one so possesses and enjoys in certain circumstances, that we would deem it a wrong action in any other to disturb or interrupt his possession, we say 'tis *his right*, or he has a *right* to enjoy and possess it. Whatever demand one has upon another in such circumstances that we would deem it wrong conduct in that other not to comply with it, we say one has a *right* to what is thus demanded. Or we may say more briefly, a man hath a *right* to do, possess, or demand any thing, † “ when his acting, possessing, or obtaining from another in these circumstances tends to the good of society, or to the interest of the individual consistently with the rights of others and the general good of society, and obstructing him would have the contrary tendency.”

II. The *righteousness* or goodness of actions is not not always referred to a publick good.

† This is the same with the common definition, *Facultas lege concessa ad aliquid agendum, habendum, aut ab altero consequendum*; since the end of the law of nature is the general good.

BOOK II. indeed the same notion with *their tendency to universal happiness*, or flowing from the desire of it. This latter is the highest species of the former. Our *moral sense* has also other immediate objects of approbation, many narrower affections, which we must immediately approve without thinking of their tendency to the interest of a system. In like manner we immediately condemn many unkind passions and actions, without considering their distant effects upon society. When one by innocent industry and some kind affections procures for himself and those he loves the means of ease and pleasure, every good spectator is pleased that he should enjoy them, and must condemn the disturbing his possession and enjoyment immediately, without thinking of the effects of such injustice upon a community. Indeed if any grand interest of a community requires his being deprived of some part of his acquisitions, then we see a superior moral form; a publick interest, which a good mind must more regard: and a more extensive affection, appearing more lovely than the narrower, justifies the mind in controlling it. The former approbation was equally immediate; but this latter is of an higher kind, to which the former is naturally * subordinate.

Now, as in fact it is for the good of the system that every desire and sense natural to us, even those of the lowest kinds, should be gratified as far as their gratification is consistent with the nobler enjoyments, and in a just subordination to them; there seems a natural

* See B. i. c. 2.

notion of *right* to attend them all. We think we have a right to gratify them, as soon as we form moral notions, until we discover some opposition between these lower ones, and some principle we naturally feel to be superior to them. This very sense of right seems the foundation of that sense of liberty, that claim we all naturally insist upon to act according to our own inclination in gratifying any desire, until we see the inconsistency of its gratification with some superior principles. The several appetites no doubt operate in us before we have any moral notions, pursuing their several gratifications. But after moral notions are obtained, we assume to ourselves, and, where our passions are not raised, we allow a right to others to gratify any desire which is not apprehended opposite to some higher natural principle: and not only look upon it as a damage or hurt when we are hindered without this reason, but deem it immoral and ill-natured in one who assumes a power to obstruct us. We condemn the man who should by violence, without the just cause, obstruct the enjoyments of a third person with whom we are not concerned. †

But, altho' private *justice, veracity, openness of mind, compassion*, are immediately approved, without reference to a system; yet we must not imagine that any of these principles are destined to controll or limit

† This seems the intention of *Grotius de J. B. et P. l. i. c. 2. § i.* where he deduces the notion of right from these two; first, the *initia naturae*, or the natural desires, which do not alone constitute right,

till we examine also the other, which is the *convenientia cum natura rationali et sociali*; using the phrases of the Stoicks, tho' not precisely in their meaning.

None can be valid against the publick interest.

BOOK II. that regard to the most extensive good which we shew-
 ed to be the noblest principle of our nature. The most
 extensive affection has a dignity sufficient to justify
 the contracting any other disposition: whereas no moral
 agent can upon close reflection approve himself in
 adhering to any special rule, or following any other
 disposition of his nature, when he discerns, upon the
 best evidence he can have, that doing so is contrary
 to the universal interest or the most extensive happi-
 nefs of the system in the whole of its effects.

*The causes of
 mistakes.*

When some ingenious and good men conceive some
 other independent or unsubordinated notion of † jus-
 tice in punishing, they seem to have derived it from
 the feelings and impulses of a natural passion, a ge-
 nerous indignation or anger arising against grosser
 crimes. But this passion, however wisely implanted,
 must be under the controll of an higher principle.
 Its sole impulse is to inflict evil on those whose vices
 have excited it. This passion, and pity too, tho' both
 are lovely, must often be restrained by wise magistrates,

† There is a mistake in an argument
 on this head in an excellent book, Bishop
 Butler's Analogy. "Ill-desert, or merit-
 ing punishment, must be another notion
 " than this that the sufferings of such tend
 " to the publick good; because the suffe-
 " rings of innocent persons may some-
 " times tend to the publick good; and in
 " such cases, 'tis just to subject them to
 " such sufferings: and yet here there is no
 " ill-desert." All men grant that under
ill-desert one other notion is involved than
 the *tendency of sufferings to the publick good*,
 viz. the notion of some *moral evil* preced-

ing. But where moral evil has preceded,
 what else can justify punishing, but shew-
 ing that punishing, in such cases, tends to
 some publick good? One tendency to
 publick good in punishing where guilt pre-
 ceeded justifies the punishment. Another
 tendency to publick good in a different
 way justifies the subjecting innocent per-
 sons to sufferings. This rather proves that
 there is no other ultimate measure of jus-
 tice than some tendency or other to this
 end; tho' anger moves us to punish with-
 out this consideration.

parents, guardians. Nay were it possible to root out all these passions, and substitute in their place a strong calm regard to the most extensive good, ever present to the mind, and ever awake to discern the several duties of life subservient to this general end, so much the better would these duties be performed. Superior orders of beings may want these passions altogether.

III. Rights, according as they are more or less necessary to be maintained and observed in society, are divided into perfect, and imperfect. Every proper right is some way conducive to the publick interest, and is founded upon some such tendency. The observing and fulfilling every proper right of others is matter of conscience, necessary to obtain the approbation of *God*, and our own hearts. But some of them are of such a nature that the interest of society requires they should ever be maintained and fulfilled to all who have them, and that even by methods of force, where gentler measures prove ineffectual; these are called *perfect rights*; such as every innocent man has to his life; to a good name; to the integrity and soundness of his body; to the acquisitions of his honest industry; to act according to his own choice within the limits of the law of nature: this right we call natural liberty, of which liberty of conscience is not only an essential but an unalienable branch. These rights should be maintained to all men, when no more general interest of mankind requires any abridgement of them. Society cannot subsist unless these rights are

CHAP. 3.



*Rights perfect,
and imperfect;*

BOOK II. sacred. No individual can be happy where such rights
 of his are promiscuously violated.

*both create a
 corresponding ob-
 ligation.*

Other rights as truly sacred in the sight of *God*, and our own consciences, yet are of such a nature, that for some remote reasons of publick utility, they must not be asserted by violence or compulsion, but left to the goodness of other men's hearts. These are the *imperfect rights*. The regarding and fulfilling them to every one who has them is of great advantage and ornament to human life, and the violating or declining to fulfil them to others, in many cases may be as criminal in the sight of *God* as the violation of perfect rights: but as they are not of such absolute necessity to the subsistence of society among men, and there are the most obvious reasons why they should be left to men's honour and conscience, they are not matter of compulsion. Such are the rights of the indigent to relief from the wealthy: the rights of all men to offices of no trouble or expence: the rights of friends and benefactors to friendly and grateful returns: the right of every good man to such services as are to him of much greater importance than any small trouble or loss they occasion to men in splendid stations or fortunes.

*Imperfect rights
 not matter of
 compulsion.*

To make all these rights of so delicate a nature matters of compulsion, especially when it is so hard to determine the several claims of men, and the nice degrees of them, about which there must be great diversity of sentiment, would furnish matter of eternal contention and war: and were they made matters of

compulsion, there would remain no proper opportunity for good men to discover their goodness to others, and engage their esteem and gratitude. The most artfully selfish, for fear of compulsion, would be the readiest to fulfil these rights were the measures of them once determined. Nothing too would be left to choice or natural liberty. CHAP. 3.

There remains a third species, but rather a shadow of right than any thing deserving that honourable name, which we call an *external right*; in the use of which no man can be approved by God, or his own heart, upon reflection. “ When doing, enjoying, or “ demanding from others is really detrimental to the “ publick, and contrary to the sacred obligations of “ humanity, gratitude, friendship, or such like; and yet “ for some remote reasons ’tis for the interest of society “ not to deny men this faculty, but on the contrary “ in some instances to confirm it.” ’Tis thus the uncharitable miser has this shadow of right even to that share of his possessions which he should have employed in offices of humanity, charity, or gratitude; or to recal money unseasonably or cruelly from an industrious spongable debtor; to demand performance of too severe and unequal covenants, while no law prohibits them. Many such like claims are introduced by civil laws in the cases of wills, successions to the intestate, and contracts, where the equitable and humane part may be very different from the legal claim. This external appearance of right is all that remains when any duty of gratitude, friendship, or humanity re-

BOOK II. quires our receding from what otherways would have
 been a perfect right.

*What rights may
 be opposite.*

Now as no action, enjoyment, or demand, and its contrary, can be alike useful to society, so nature has in no instance constituted proper rights opposite the one to the other: imperfect rights of humanity may be opposite to external rights; but as neither the former, nor the latter, entitle one to use force with a good conscience, war can never be really just on both sides. Any obligation in conscience to comply with external shadows of right which others may have, can arise only from prudence with regard to our own interest, or from some remote views of the detriment that may in some cases redound to society from opposing them, and not from any sense of duty toward the person who insists on them in opposition to humanity.

*Justice of laws
 of several sorts.*

There is a like division of the justice of laws. Some systems of them are called just, only in this sense, “ that they require only what is of high necessity for every peaceful state, and prohibit all that is necessarily everfive of good order and polity, yet without a nice regard to promote the nobler virtues, and to prohibit all actions of a bad tendency, when they are not absolutely pernicious.” In such states actions are legally just which violate none of these necessary laws, and men have legal rights to do whatever the laws permit, tho’ often contrary not only to humanity, but to what a finer institution would make necessary. Sometimes a good legislator is constrained

to give no better laws, from the bad dispositions of his subjects which would bear no better.* In another meaning of the word, that system of laws only would be called just, “ where every thing is decreed in the “ wisest manner for the best order in society, and promoting the greatest virtue and happiness among individuals.” In the former sense only can the Jewish system be called just, while it permitted polygamy, divorces at pleasure, and execution of justice on murderers and all man-slayers by private persons the nearest kinsmen of the deceased; and contained a very burdensome ritual institution of worship.

CHAP. 3.

IV. Our rights are either *alienable*, or *unalienable*: Rights alienable, or not. The former are known by these two characters jointly, that the translation of them to others can be made effectually, and that some interest of society, or individuals consistently with it, may frequently require such translations. Thus our right to our goods and labours is naturally alienable. But where either the translation cannot be made with any effect, or where no good in human life requires it, the right is unalienable, and cannot be justly claimed by any other but the person originally possessing it. Thus no man can really change his sentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of another; nor can it tend to any good to make him profess what is con-

* This is probably the most useful application of the distinction of Civilians of the *jus naturale* into the *primarium* and *secundarium*: the former unalterable, and the later variable according to the prudence of civilized nations. To call the one self-evident, and the other not, is trifling: a just conclusion is as sure as the premises. See Grot. l. c. 1, 2.

trary to his heart. The right of private judgment is therefore unalienable.

The degrees from imperfect to perfect, inalienable. V. By dividing rights into the two classes of perfect, and imperfect; we do not intimate that all those of either class are of the same importance or necessity; that the guilt of violating all perfect rights, is equal; or that the violating all imperfect rights is equally criminal. There is plainly a gradation from the weakest claim of humanity, to the highest perfect right, by innumerable steps. Every worthy man, tho' not in distress, has a claim upon the great and opulent for any good office in their way for improving his condition, when none of greater merit, or greater indigence, has an interfering claim. This is among the lowest imperfect rights or claims. A good man in distress has an higher claim. One who has done eminent publick services has an higher still: one who had done singular services of an honourable kind to men now in power has a stronger claim upon them, especially if he is fallen into distress. All these we call imperfect rights. The greater the merit and natural causes of love there are in the person who has these claims, the nearer also they approach to perfect rights. A worthy man in distress has an imperfect claim to the necessaries of life upon all who can relieve him, but on his children his claim is almost perfect, not only for a bare support, but for such conveniencies of life suited to the parent's station as they can afford without distressing themselves. The sense of an honest man, practised in the affairs of life,

must determine these points more precisely in particular cases. CHAP. 3.

In general, rights are the more sacred the greater their importance is to the publick good, the greater the evils are which ensue upon violating them, the less the trouble or expence is of observing them, the greater the merit or causes of love are in the persons who have them. And the stronger the claim is, so much the greater is the crime of opposing it; and the smaller is the degree of virtue in complying with it. *Upon what their strength depends.*

On the other hand, the less the detriment is which ensues upon violating a right, the greater the trouble or expence is of fulfilling or complying with it, the smaller the merit of the person is, the right is so much the weaker: but then the more virtue is evidenced by regarding it, provided there be a proportionably higher regard to the higher claims of others; and the moral turpitude of neglecting it is so much the less. Small virtue is shewn by paying a just debt, by abstaining from outrages and violence, by common returns of good offices where we have been highly obliged, by common duty to a worthy parent in distress: but the conduct contrary to such sacred claims would be most detestable. Offices of singular generosity to a worthy man who has no special claim upon us, are greater evidences of a good temper (if we show a proportionably higher ardour of goodness where there is equal merit and peculiar claims upon us) than offices equally beneficent toward a kinsman, or great benefactor.

BOOK II.

Right, and ob-
ligation, rela-
tive.

VI. To each right there corresponds an *obligation*, perfect or imperfect, as the right is. The term obligation is both complex and ambiguous. We primarily say one is obliged to an action “when he must find from the constitution of human nature that he and every attentive observer must disapprove the omission of it as morally evil.” The word is sometimes taken for “a strong motive of interest constituted by the will of some potent *superior* to engage us to act as he requires.” In the former meaning, obligation is founded on our moral faculty; in the latter, it seems to abstract from it. But in describing the *superior* who can constitute obligation, we not only include sufficient force or power, but also a just right to govern; and this justice or right will lead us again to our *moral faculty*. Through this ambiguity † ingenious men have contradicted each other with keenness; some asserting an obligation antecedent to all views of interest, or laws; others deriving the original source of all obligation from the law or will of an omnipotent Being. This leads us to consider the general doctrine of laws, and the foundation of the right of governing rational agents, to which corresponds their obligation to obedience.

Indications of
the Divine Will.

VII. As we shewed in the former book that we all have sufficient indications of the existence and providence of *God*, and that he is the author of all our natural powers and dispositions, our reason, our *moral faculty*, and our affections; we can by just reflection

† See Leibnitz's censure on Guffendorf and Barbeyraque's defence of him.

also plainly discern what course of action this constitution of our nature recommends both to our approbation as morally excellent, and to our election in point of interest. We must therefore see the intention of the *God* of Nature in all this, and cannot but look upon all these conclusions of just reasoning and reflection as so many indications to us of the will of *God* concerning our conduct. When we have arrived at this persuasion, these practical conclusions receive new enforcements upon our hearts, both from our *moral faculty*, and from our interest. CHAP. 3.

As *God* is justly conceived a being of perfect goodness and wisdom, and the greatest benefactor to mankind, our hearts must be disposed by the strongest sentiments of gratitude to comply with all the indications of his will, and must feel the strongest disapprobation of all disobedience. His moral excellence must add strength to these feelings of gratitude and make a deeper sense of the duty incumbent on us to obey him, as it shews that what he enjoins must be conducive to the universal interest. These practical conclusions therefore from the constitution of our nature do not suggest mere matters of private interest, or finer taste, which we are at liberty either to follow as the means of more delicate enjoyment, or to counteract, if we please to content ourselves with another sort of enjoyments. They are enforced as matters of sacred obligation by the very feelings of our hearts, and a neglect of them must be disapproved in the highest manner, and be matter of deep remorse under the odi-

*The right of the
Deity to govern
all.*

BOOK II. ous form of ingratitude, and counteracting the universal interest. Thus it is that we are sensible of our moral obligation to obey the will of *God*. The divine perfections which suggest these sentiments are his moral attributes, and the benefits he has bestowed on mankind.

founded on wisdom and goodness.

For as it must tend to the universal good that a being of perfect wisdom and goodness should superintend human affairs, assuming to himself to govern their actions, and to declare his pleasure about them; so it must undoubtedly tend to the universal good that all rational creatures obey his will. This shews his right of moral government. For the ultimate notion of right is *that which tends to the universal good*; and when one's acting in a certain manner has this tendency, he has a right thus to act.† The proper foundation of right here is infinite goodness and wisdom. The benefits conferred on us by *God*, superadd a new enforcement to our obligation by the sense of gratitude, and our natural abhorrence of ingratitude. But benefits alone, are not a proper foundation of right, as they will not prove that the power assumed tends to the universal good or is consistent with it, however they suggest an amiable motive to obedience.

confirmed by his omnipotence.

But as the Deity is also omnipotent, and can make happy or miserable as he pleases, this attribute suggests to us, not a proper foundation of right, but a strong motive of interest to obey his will, and a qua-

† These are the *fundamenta potestatis sive imperii*. Power is rather the *conditio sine qua non*.

lity very necessary to execute effectually the right of government assumed. The right itself is founded on his wisdom and goodness, which shew that his assuming of power by giving laws and annexing sanctions will conduce to the greatest good. And if this good cannot be obtained when the laws have no influence on the subjects, nor can they have influence upon minds any way depraved, if they find that the sanctions are not executed; 'tis plain from the same perfections, that 'tis right, or the *Deity* has a right, to execute such sanctions as are thus necessary; which his power always enables him to do.

But as no man can give such evidence as shall satisfy his fellows of his superior goodness and wisdom, and remove suspicions of his weakness and interested views; as there is no acknowledged criterion of superior wisdom for governing; and multitudes at once would pretend to it; as there is no assurance can be given of good intentions, to which the worst might by hypocritical services pretend; and as a people cannot be happy while their interests precariously depend on persons of suspected goodness or wisdom; these qualities cannot be, among men, the natural foundations of power; nor can it serve the general interest that they should be deemed sufficient to constitute such a right of governing, or of compelling others to obedience. Some extraordinary cases may be excepted.

VIII. As a law is “ a declaration made by him who
“ has a right to govern, what actions he requires, or for-

BOOK II. “ bids, for the publick good; and what motives of interest he has constituted to excite to the actions required, and deter from those prohibited.” It contains these two parts, the *precept*, shewing the actions required, or prohibited; and the *sanction*, shewing the rewards to ensue upon obedience, or the evils to be inflicted upon the disobedient. The precept must always be expressed, but the sanction may be understood as reserved discretionary to the governor.

Practical dictates of reason are declaratory.

This notion of a law shews how justly the practical conclusions of right reason from the order of nature constituted by *God*, and laid open to our observation, are called *laws of nature*, and *laws of God*; as they are clear declarations of his will about our conduct. And all the private advantages, internal or external, which we can foresee as probably ensuing upon our compliance, from the constitution of our own nature, or that of others, or of the world around us, are so many sanctions of rewards: and all the evils in like manner to be expected from our non-observance of these conclusions, are sanctions of punishment, declared or promulgated by the same means which declare the precepts.


The sole use of words, or writing, in laws, is to discover the will of the governor. In positive laws it must by such means be discovered. But there is another and primary way by which God discovers his will concerning our conduct, and likewise proposes the most interesting motives, even by the constitution of nature, and the powers of reason, and moral perception,

which he has given to mankind, and thus reveals a law with its sanctions, as effectually as by words, or writing; and in a manner more noble and divine.*

IX. Laws are divided into *natural*, and *positive*:
 But these two terms are used in very different meanings. Sometimes the division is taken from the *different manners of promulgation*; and then by *natural laws* are understood the moral determinations of the heart and the conclusions of right reason from these determinations and other observations of nature; and by *positive laws*, such as are promulgated in words or writing, whatever the matter of them be.

Others take the division expressed by these words from the diversity of the *matter of laws*; as some laws declare the natural direct and necessary means of supporting the dignity of human nature and promoting the publick good; so that either opposite or different laws could not be equally useful, nay would be pernicious to society: these they call *natural*: such are all the laws of justice and humanity. Other laws have indeed in intention some good end, and with a view to it require certain means, but these are not always the sole, or the necessary, or preferable means. The same good end may be obtained by different means, and these equally convenient or effectual, and yet it may be necessary for the good of a society that a certain set of means be agreed upon for all. Nay, certain institutions make some practices useful which in their own nature were of no use. Thus some rites

*. On this subject see Dr. Cumberland *de Leg. Nat. Prolegom. et c. i.*

BOOK II. of religion, in their own nature of no importance, yet,  by being instituted in memory of some great events, the frequent remembrance of which must increase grateful, pious, or humane dispositions, may become very useful to mankind.

*The wise ends
of positive laws.*

The most frequent occasions for positive laws are where the same good ends may be obtained different ways, but 'tis requisite that some one way be fixed for all in a certain district. Thus neither can social worship be performed, nor courts of justice be kept, unless times and places are determined: and yet 'tis seldom found that any one time is fitter than another for any natural reason. In like manner, in the execution of justice there are different forms of process, different penalties for crimes, different times for executions. 'Tis convenient all these points should be known and settled for a whole society; and yet no one of the possible determinations can be said to be absolutely best, so that the smallest variation would make it worse.

*They are useless
or arbitrary.*

Positive laws are quite different from what we call arbitrary or imperious, such as are enacted merely from ostentation of power, without subserviency to the publick interest.

To the obligation of a law promulgation is necessary; not that every subject should actually know it; but that every one have it in his power, by such diligence as he is capable of, to attain to the knowledge of it. The penalties of laws may be justly exacted, where the laws have not been actually known, when

the subject is culpably ignorant, and might have known them by such diligence as a good man in his circumstances would have used. But the ignorance of some laws of more difficult discovery may be very excusable in some men because of many avocations, and low abilities, or opportunities, which yet may be very culpable in others placed in more advantageous circumstances.

X. As the laws of nature comprehend not merely the original moral determinations of the mind, but likewise the practical conclusions made by the reasoning and reflection of men upon the constitution of nature, shewing what conduct is worthy and tends to publick good, there needs be little controversy about their perfection, as all must own that the reason even of the most ingenious and most improved is still imperfect. And that it may be very possible that a superior being could see a certain rule of conduct to be conducive to the publick good, which none of human race could ever have discovered to be useful: and as to the bulk of mankind, they may indeed easily discover the general and most necessary rules, but they seldom can find out or even apprehend well the reasons upon which some of the more special laws which yet have a substantial foundation in nature are built. If one by the system of the laws of nature means the very constitutions of nature itself, or the objective evidence laid before rational beings in the whole; this no doubt is perfect: but its perfection does not supersede the usefulness of the revelation of laws.

CHAP. 3.

How the laws of nature is perfect.

BOOK II. to mankind by words or writing, or of the discoveries of the wiser human legislators or moralists, or of precepts positive as to their matter; since so few of mankind can attain any great knowledge of this constitution, and none can pretend to understand it completely.

*In Superstitio-
ne et in timore
providentiae.*

We should not censure providence on account of this imperfection, for reasons * mentioned above, any more than we censure it for our small bodily strength, or the shortness of our lives. If we use our powers and opportunities well, the condition of human life in this world will be in the main an agreeable and happy state; and yet by divine revelation, or even by accurate reasonings of wise men, much may be discovered for the improvement of this life; and many fine institutions contrived, the reasons for which neither any one in the ruder nations, nor the populace in the more civilized, shall ever apprehend.

*All laws should
conduce to some good.*

But this holds in general, that all wise and just laws have some tendency to the general happiness, or to the good of some part of the system subservient to and consistent with the general good. The moral good in obedience consists in either a direct intention of this good end proposed by the law, whether we know it fully ourselves, or implicitly trust to the goodness of the legislator; or in some grateful affection toward the legislator: where obedience flows only from fear of punishment, or hope of reward, it has no moral excellency, tho' in some cases it may be innocent.

* B. i. c. 9. § 12.

XI. Precepts of the law of nature, or these practical observations, are deemed immutable and eternal, because some rules, or rather the dispositions which gave origin to them, and in which they are founded, must always tend to the general good, and the contrary to the general detriment, in such a system of creatures as we are. But we must not imagine that all the special precepts of the law of nature are thus immutable as they are commonly enunciated universally. If we make the precepts immutable, we must allow many exceptions as parts of the precept, or understand the precept as holding only generally in ordinary cases. As the precept is indeed no more than a conclusion from observation of what sort of conduct is ordinarily useful to society; some singular cases may happen in which departing from the ordinary rule may be more for the general interest than following it. And some wise human institutions may take away or limit some rights which formerly were sacredly confirmed to each individual by the law of nature. Before civil polity each one had a right by private violence when gentler methods were ineffectual, of obtaining reparation of wrong from the author of it. But in civil polity private individuals cease to have a right to use those means. In like manner civil laws justly limit our use of our own property, and take some share of it for publick exigences, whereas previously to some political institution the general law of nature allowed to each one the full use of all his own acquisitions, and the right of disposing of them at

CHAP. 3.
How the law of nature is immutable.

BOOK II. pleasure. Singular cases of necessity are also justly deemed exceptions from the ordinary laws. 'Tis injurious ordinarily to use the property of another without his consent; but an innocent man when he cannot otherwise save his life in his flying from an unjust enemy, does no wrong by taking the horse of another when he cannot wait for the owner's consent.

The two fundamental precepts of "loving God, and promoting the universal happiness," admit of no exceptions; nay in the latter precept are founded all the exceptions from the special laws of nature; all the rights of receding, in cases of singular necessity, from the ordinary rules; and all the limitations of our rights by any wise institutions: since all these are justified by their tendency in certain cases, and upon certain suppositions, to a superior good of the system than would ensue from following the ordinary rule.

XII. Some intricate controversies arise among moralists and schoolmen, from not observing sufficiently the difference between these practical observations we call laws of nature, and the laws declared in words and writing by legislators, divine, or human. They may be prevented by the following remarks.

Equity 1. As by * equity, they understand, a "correction of any defect in the law by too great or too small extent of its expression," when it is justly interpreted according to the true intention of the legislator, extended as far as the reason of it extends, and not extended to cases where the reason of the law does not

* The *Equitas* of Aristotle and the schoolmen.

hold; there is no room for this sort of equity as distinct from the letter in the law of nature; as the law is not declared to us by words, in which alone there can be too small or great universality. Whatever right reason shews to be humane and equitable in conduct, is a part of the law of nature. CHAP. 3.


2. The whole doctrine of *dispensations* was introduced by the *canonists*, after many capricious, imprudent, and unnecessary laws were imposed upon the Christian world, with the worst designs, and yet it was often found necessary to free men from the obligation of them. By *dispensation* is understood “some act of the legislator exempting certain persons from the obligation of laws which extended to them as well as others:” and always imports some abatement or derogation from a law. The doctrine of Dispensation arose from the Canon Law.

3. The word *dispensation* is very ambiguous; and there are different kinds of it. *Dispensation* may be given either from the sanction, after the law is violated, or from the precept, previously to any violation of the law. A dispensation from the sanction is “exempting a person from the legal punishment who has incurred it by violating the law; or the abating or altering of the punishment.” Now, as we shall see hereafter; there are some very strong reasons why a power of such dispensation should be lodged somewhere in every state, when the publick interest may require such dispensations: and, in like manner, as to such punishments as may naturally ensue, and be ordinarily necessary for the general good upon the vio-

BOOK II. lation of the laws of nature, it may be perfectly wise and benign that *God*, the great ruler of the world, should sometimes mercifully interpose and prevent these sufferings when the true end of them can be otherways obtained. But as we cannot conceive any such laws limiting *God* himself as may limit even the supreme magistrates of states, nor are any such particular punishments specified by the laws of nature invariably as may be by human laws, there can be little occasion for debating about the divine right of dispensing with the sanctions of the laws of nature.

Previous dispensation from just laws must be evil.

4. As to previous dispensations from the precepts of laws, if the law itself be wise in all its extent, the previous dispensing with any violation of it must appear unjust and imprudent in any governor. And 'tis plain that no permission or command of any person can alter the moral nature of our affections so as to make the love of *God*, and our neighbour, become evil; or any contrary affections become good: nor can any permission or command alter the moral nature of the external actions which flow from these affections. No man could approve any such permissions or commands, nor can they ever be given by a good *God*. Some confused notions of the divine right of dominion or sovereignty have led some authors into such sentiments, as if a divine command could justify unkind or inhumane affections, and actions consequent upon them tending to the general detriment of the system. But if one would consult the feelings of his heart, and examine well the original notion of right in

action, or the right of governing, as distinct from CHAP. 3. mere superior force, he would see such tenets to be  contradictory to themselves.

5. As to external actions required, where nothing is in words prescribed about the affections, the certain command of a being who we are persuaded is possessed of perfect goodness and wisdom, may justly make us conclude that such enjoined actions, contrary to the present external appearances, may truly tend to superior good in the whole, and occasion no prepollent evil: when the evidence for the goodness of the joiner, and for this fact that he is the author of this injunction, is so great as to surpass sufficiently the contrary presumption from the external appearances of a bad tendency in the actions commanded. This case can scarce be called a dispensation from the laws of nature, since the agent is acting according to the law, what he believes is tending to good, tho' his opinion about this tendency is founded upon the testimony of another, and not upon his own knowledge.

6. If by dispensation be understood only “ a granting external impunity to actions really evil, or contrary to those rules of right reason which shew the most perfect and virtuous course of actions;” human lawgivers must often grant such external impunity, as we shall see hereafter. And 'tis alledged that many such permissions are in the *Mosaick Law*, which may be justified from the circumstances of that people and of the neighbouring nations: since a more ri-

What dispensation may be indicated.

BOOK II. *gidly virtuous institution would have made them revolt altogether from the worship of the true God. But then such a grant of external impunity does not remove or abate the moral turpitude of the actions in such men as know their pernicious tendency, or their contrariety to the most perfect and virtuous institutions. By such permissions however, and the general practice ensuing, the populace may be made generally less attentive to any bad tendency of such actions, and secure about it, so that the guilt may be much extenuated by the ignorance prevailing, which in some of the lowest orders of men may become almost invincible. But since the guilt is not entirely removed by such permissions, they are not what the Schoolmen and Canonists generally understand by dispensations from the law of nature, which they suppose makes the actions in consequence of them perfectly innocent.*

Mistakes about dispensations.

7. Nor do these cases come up to the common notion of dispensation when a superior acting according to the powers vested in him by the law disposes in an unusual manner of things committed to his disposal; or when the goods of the subjects, who have a right to them valid against their fellows, but not valid by law against their sovereign, are disposed of by the sovereign according to the powers vested in him by the law, and transferred from one to another. Or when the prince impowers others to do in his name what he has a right to do by what officers he pleases, tho' it would have been criminal in any subject without his prince's commission to have done such ac-

tions. What is commanded by any one in consequence of the powers constituted to him by the law, and executed accordingly, can scarce be said to be done by virtue of a dispensing from the law. A debtor is bound by the law to make payment: but a remission or release from the creditor frees him from this obligation. We should not therefore say that every creditor has a power of dispensing with the laws of nature. The more acute Schoolmen, upon these considerations, do not allow the extraordinary commands given to Moses and Joshua to be dispensations from the laws of nature. But 'tis needless to debate about words. If the law itself be wise and just in all the extent in which it is expressed, no act of any superior can make the counteracting it innocent or lovely. But most of the special laws of nature are not to be expressed in words strictly universal, without the exception of many cases; particularly that of God's exerting his rightful dominion.

Dispensations therefore, according to the full intention of the Canonists, are only to be made with laws either capricious or imprudent, or too universally expressed without mentioning the reasonable and just exceptions, which ought to have been inserted in the very laws themselves. In the laws of nature there can be no place for them, since the same reason and observation which discovers the ordinary general rule, discovers also all the exceptions, which are therefore parts of the law.

Having premised this general doctrine about the

What is commonly meant by them.

BOOK II. morality of actions, rights and laws, we proceed to the more special consideration of the rights and duties of mankind, and the special laws of nature; and that first, as they are constituted by nature itself previously to adventitious states and relations introduced by human institution and contrivance, and then as they arise and are founded in some adventitious relation or institution.

C H A P. IV.

The different STATES of MEN. The State of LIBERTY not a State of WAR. The Way that private RIGHTS are known. The Necessity of a SOCIAL LIFE.

What is a moral state. **W**HEN we speak of the different states of men, by a *state* we do not mean any transient condition a man may be in for a little time, nor any obligation he may be under to one or two transient acts, but “ a permanent condition including a long series “ of rights and obligations.” The conditions men may be in as to sickness or health, beauty or deformity, or any other circumstances which are considered in the other arts, are foreign to our purpose. The moral states of men always include a series of moral obligations, and rights.

The state of natural liberty not a state of war. **I.** In the first state constituted by nature itself we must discern abundantly from the doctrine of the preceding book that there are many sacred rights com-

petent to men, and many obligations incumbent on each one toward his fellows. The whole system of the mind, especially our *moral faculty*, shews that we are under natural bonds of beneficence and humanity toward all, and under many more special ties to some of our fellows, binding us to many services of an higher kind, than what the rest can claim: nor need we other proofs here that this first state founded by nature is so far from being that of war and enmity, that it is a state where we are all obliged by the natural feelings of our hearts, and by many tender affections, to innocence and beneficence toward all: and that war is one of the accidental states arising solely from injury, when we or some of our fellows have counteracted the dictates of their nature.

'Tis true that in this state of liberty where there are no civil laws with a visible power to execute their sanctions, men will often do injurious actions contrary to the laws of their nature; and the resentments of the sufferers will produce wars and violence. But this proves nothing as to the true nature of that state, since all the laws and obligations of that state enjoin peace and justice and beneficence. In civil societies many disobey the law, by theft and violence, but we do not thence conclude that a political state is a state of war among men thus united.

'Tis also true that the natural passions and appetites of men will frequently lead them into mutual injuries. But then the laws of this state are not derived from these principles alone. There are superior

Frequent injuries do not prove it.

BOOK II. powers naturally fitted to controll them, particularly that *moral faculty* which points out the rights and obligations of this state, and shews how far any appetite or passion can be indulged consistently with the inward approbation of our souls, and what indulgences must be matter of remorse, self-abhorrence, and shame. We are also endued with reason which clearly points out even our external interests in this matter, and shews that we cannot probably gratify even our selfish desires, except by an innocent and friendly deportment toward others. These powers suggest the rules or laws of this state of liberty, and all states are denominated from what the laws and obligations of them enjoin or require, and not from such conduct as the passions of men may hurry them into contrary to the laws of those states.

*Contradictions
in that scheme.*

The authors of this most unnatural scheme never fail to contradict their own doctrine, by owning and arguing that that rational faculty, which they allow we are naturally endued with for the conduct of life, will soon shew that this universal war of all with all must be the most destructive imaginable; and that it is to be shunned by every one as soon as he can; and that reason will also shew some obvious rules of conduct proper to preserve or restore peace to mankind with all its blessings. Surely then that conduct which the natural principles of mankind shew to be most necessary and most obviously eligible to every one, should be deemed the natural conduct in this state, and not what a brutal thoughtless appetite may hurry one in-

to while the governing principles of his nature are asleep, or unexercised.

CHAP. 4.

'Tis also a foolish abuse of words to call a state of absolute solitude a *natural* state to mankind, since in this condition neither could any of mankind come into being, or continue in it a few days without a miraculous interposition.

II. This state of natural liberty obtains among those who have no common superior or magistrate, and are only subject to *God*, and the law of nature. 'Tis no fictitious state; it always existed and must exist among men, unless the whole earth should become one empire. The parental power of the first parents of mankind must soon have expired when their children came to maturity, as we shall shew hereafter, or at least when the parents died. This state of liberty probably continued a long time among the several heads of families before civil governments were constituted. And 'tis not improbable that it yet subsists in some ruder parts of the world. Nay it still must subsist among the several independent states with respect to each other, and among the subjects of different states who may happen to meet in the ocean, or in lands where no civil power is constituted. The laws of nature are the laws of this state, whether they be confirmed by civil power or not: and 'tis the main purpose of civil laws and their sanctions, to restrain men more effectually by visible punishments from the violation of them. The same reasons which justify the greater part of our civil laws, shew the obligations of men to observe

The state of liberty always subsists.

BOOK II. them as laws of nature abstracting from any motives
 from secular authority.

*Rights are those
 of individuals, of
 societies, or of all
 mankind.*

III. As men are said to “ have rights to do, possess, or demand from others whatsoever the happiness of the individual requires and the publick interest of mankind permits that they should be allowed to do, possess, or obtain from others;” and all rights and obligations are founded in some tendency either to the general happiness, or to that of individuals consistently with the general good, which must result from the happiness of individuals; rights may be divided, according to the subject or persons in whom they reside or to whom they belong, and for whose good they are immediately constituted, into those of individuals, those of particular societies or corporations, and those in general belonging to all mankind as a system. The first sort are constituted immediately for the behoof of individuals, by the law of nature; the second for the common interest of a corporation or state, tho’ not more immediately for any one member of it than another; in the third sort of rights neither any one individual, or any one corporation, may be more concerned than another, and yet it may be for the general interest of mankind that such rights be asserted and maintained. And each of these three classes may be either perfect, or imperfect, according as they are more or less necessary to be maintained for the publick interest, and of such a nature as to admit of compulsion and violence in the defence or prosecution of them; or, on the other hand, such as must be left to each

one's conscience and sense of duty: this division we explained above.

CHAP. 4.



*How private
rights are
known.*

IV. The private rights of individuals are obviously intimated to us in the constitution of our nature, by these two circumstances, jointly; first, natural desires and senses pointing out the gratifications we are fitted to receive as parts of that happiness the author of our nature has intended for us, and secondly, by the powers of reason and reflection which can discover how far the gratification of our natural desires is consistent with the finer principles in our constitution, which, as we shewed above, are destined to govern and controll all our particular desires. These principles shew the limits to be put, not only to the selfish desires aiming at the private happiness of the agent, but to the several narrower generous affections, and the gratifications which they pursue; and plainly discover that the grand end of our being is indeed the promoting the most universal happiness, but that our heart at the same time may approve our conduct not only in acts of particular beneficence toward persons especially dear to us in some of the nearer relations, while this beneficence does not interfere with more extensive interests; but also in the pursuit of all private gratifications which are consistent with these interests, and do not engross the mind or contract it too much within itself.

The natural appetites and desires first intimate the matters of private right, but we can seldom justify to ourselves a compliance with their intimations till we

BOOK II. have considered whether the gratification to which we are prompted be consistent with the designs of the more noble parts of our constitution, which are the grand objects of the soul's approbation, aiming at a more extensive or the universal happiness. Indeed in many of the objects of our desires, this consistency is so obvious, or there is so little presumption of any opposition, that we are convinced of our right to them at once without much reflection on more extensive interests; nay in many cases we seem to have an immediate sense of right along with the natural desire, and a sense of moral evil in any opposition given to us by others, as we at once apprehend the necessity of certain gratifications to our having any tolerable enjoyment of life; and we must abhor as cruel and inhuman any opposition given to us, or to others, in these gratifications, where we do not see such opposition to be necessary for some more extensive interest.

*The necessity of
great caution on
this subject.*

But as the chief dangers to our manners arise from the vehemence of our selfish appetites and passions, which often break through these restraints from the finer principles in our constitution regarding a publick interest, it may be of advantage to satisfy the mind on every side of the justice of these restraints, and to shew that its own interest of every kind conspires to recommend this subjection of the *selfish*, to the *generous* and *social principles*. Our *moral faculty* above-explained shews both the justice and beauty of such subjection; and shews a very sublime internal interest in the inward delight and approbation of our

CHAP. 4.
 hearts. Our reason by discovering to us the moral government of the *Deity*, and his perfections, presents further motives to preserve this subordination, both of the generous and interested kind: and a just consideration of the circumstances of mankind with respect to external things, will afford also new motives of secular interest to that same external conduct which these sublimer principles excite us to, as we shall endeavour briefly to explain.

V. In the first place, 'tis obvious that for the support of human life, to allay the painful cravings of the appetites, and to afford any of those agreeable external enjoyments which our nature is capable of, a great many external things are requisite; such as food, cloathing, habitations, many utensils, and various furniture, which cannot be obtained without a great deal of art and labour, and the friendly aids of our fellows.

Again, 'tis plain that a man in absolute solitude, tho' he were of mature strength, and fully instructed in all our arts of life, could scarcely procure to himself the bare necessaries of life, even in the best soils or climates; much less could he procure any grateful conveniencies. One uninstructed in the arts of life, tho' he had full strength, would be still more incapable of subsisting in solitude: and it would be absolutely impossible, without a miracle, that one could subsist in this condition from his infancy. And suppose that food, raiment, shelter, and the means of sensual pleasure, were supplied by a miracle; yet a life in so-

Solitude necessary and indispensable.

BOOK II. solitude must be full of fears and dangers. Suppose farther all these dangers removed; yet in solitude there could be no exercise for many of the natural powers and instincts of our species; no love, or social joys, or communication of pleasure, or esteem, or mirth. The contrary dispositions of soul must grow upon a man in this unnatural state, a sullen melancholy, and discontent, which must make life intolerable. This subject is abundantly explained by almost all authors upon the law of nature.

The mutual aids of a few in a small family, may procure most of the necessaries of life, and diminish dangers, and afford room for some social joys as well as finer pleasures. The same advantages could still be obtained more effectually and copiously by the mutual assistance of a few such families living in one neighbourhood, as they could execute more operose designs for the common good of all; and would furnish more joyful exercises of our social dispositions.

*The advantages
of society.*

Nay 'tis well known that the produce of the labours of any given number, twenty, for instance, in providing the necessaries or conveniences of life, shall be much greater by assigning to one, a certain sort of work of one kind, in which he will soon acquire skill and dexterity, and to another assigning work of a different kind, than if each one of the twenty were obliged to employ himself, by turns, in all the different sorts of labour requisite for his subsistence, without sufficient dexterity in any. In the former method each procures a great quantity of goods of one kind, and

can exchange a part of it for such goods obtained by the labours of others as he shall stand in need of. One grows expert in tillage, another in pasture and breeding cattle, a third in masonry, a fourth in the chace, a fifth in iron-works, a sixth in the arts of the loom, and so on throughout the rest. Thus all are supplied by means of barter with the works of complete artists. In the other method scarce any one could be dextrous and skilful in any one sort of labour.

Again some works of the highest use to multitudes can be effectually executed by the joint labours of many, which the separate labours of the same number could never have executed. The joint force of many can repel dangers arising from savage beasts or bands of robbers, which might have been fatal to many individuals were they separately to encounter them. The joint labours of twenty men will cultivate forests, or drain marshes, for farms to each one, and provide houses for habitation, and inclosures for their flocks, much sooner than the separate labours of the same number. By concert, and alternate relief, they can keep a perpetual watch, which without concert they could not accomplish.

Larger associations may further enlarge our means of enjoyment, and give more extensive and delightful exercise to our powers of every kind. The inventions, experience, and arts of multitudes are communicated; knowledge is increased, and social affections more diffused. Larger societies have force to execute greater designs of more lasting and extensive ad-

*The advantages
of large societies.*

BOOK II. vantage.* These considerations abundantly shew the necessity of living in society, and obtaining the aid of our fellows, for our very subsistence; and the great convenience of larger associations of men for the improvement of life, and the increase of all our enjoyments.

*Good offices
must be mutual,
and much self-
government.*

But 'tis obvious that we cannot expect the friendly aids of our fellows, without, on our part, we be ready to good offices, and restrain all the selfish passions which may arise upon any interfering interests so that they shall not be injurious to others. Much thought and caution is requisite to find out such rules of conduct in society as shall most effectually secure the general interest, and promote peace and a mutual good understanding. Whatever generous principles there are in our nature, yet they are not alone, there are likewise many angry passions to which we are subject upon apprehension of injury intended, or executed; and all these powers by which men can so effectually give mutual aid, and do good offices, may be also employed, upon provocation, to the detriment of their fellows. Provoking of others by injury must generally be imprudent conduct in point of self-interest, as well as matter of remorse and self-condemnation. No man can be tolerably assured that his force or art shall be superior to that of those who may be roused to oppose him; multitudes conceive a just indignation against any unjust violence, and are

* See this whole subject beautifully explained in the second book of *Cicero de Officiis*.

thence prone to repel it. And they are further roused by pity for the sufferer and just apprehensions that such mischiefs unrestrained may soon affect themselves. How dangerous then must it be to rouse such indignation by any acts of injustice toward any of our fellows?

Nature has also presented to us all a very strong motive to abstain from injuries, and to restrain all the extravagancies of the selfish passions from the delicacy and weakness of our frame. Tho' mankind have no powers which can properly be called engines of mischief, since such as can hurt others can also be employed in kind social offices; and as all the governing principles of nature rather excite to good offices, all our powers are justly deemed to be naturally destined for promoting social happiness; yet 'tis plain our efforts in hurting others, where we intend it heartily, can more probably be successful and effectual, than our designs to secure the happiness of others, according to a common maxim, that "few have sufficient talents to do much good, but very mean ones may do much mischief." We are of a very delicate texture; our ease and happiness not only requires a right disposition of a great many nice bodily organs which can easily be put out of order, but a great many external objects and conveniencies of which we may easily be deprived; and the ease of our minds requires the prosperity of many other persons who are dear to us, whose texture is as delicate as our own, and exposed to be disordered by any malicious efforts

A strong motive from the dangers of violence.

BOOK II. of our fellows. To our complete ease and happiness the prosperous concurrence of a great many things is requisite: whereas we may be heartily disturbed by any thing unprosperous in one or two of these circumstances: and 'tis very often in the power of our fellows to create to us this disturbance, tho' they cannot so effectually secure our happiness when they desire it.

This infirm uncertain condition of our external happiness must powerfully move us to cultivate peace and good-will in society, and to shun all offence and provocation of others; since we hazard more by incurring the hatred of others than we can probably hope to gain. Tho' the forces of men are unequal, yet art can supply the defects of force; and an obstinate resolution can supply the defects of both, so as to deprive an adversary of life and all his other enjoyments, as well as of the advantage he aimed at by the provoking injury. Thus when men are not forced into violence for their own defence, peace and justice are still eligible to the powerful and artful as well as to others; since they know not what universal indignation may be raised by any thing injurious, from the *moral sense* of mankind, from sympathy with the sufferer, and apprehensions of their own future dangers: and a friendly just kind deportment, as it naturally engages the good-will, the esteem, and good offices of others, is the only probable method of obtaining security, and all the external advantages and pleasures of life.

C H A P. V.

The Private RIGHTS of MEN; first such as are called NATURAL; and the natural Equality of Men.

I. PRIVATE rights of individuals according to their different originals are either *natural* or *adventitious*. Rights natural and adventitious. The *natural* are such as each one has from the constitution of nature itself without the intervention of any human contrivance, institution, compact, or deed. The *adventitious* arise from some human institution, compact, or action.

The following natural rights of each individual seem of the perfect sort. The natural rights to life and safety. 1. A right to life, and to that perfection of body which nature has given, belongs to every man as man, while no important publick interest requires his being exposed to death, or wounds. This right is violated by unjust assaults, maiming, or murdering. The connate desire of life and self-preservation intimates to every one this right, as does also our immediate sense of moral evil in all cruelty occasioning unnecessary pain, or abatement of happiness to any of our fellows; not to mention the dismal air of the human countenance occasioned by grievous pain, or death, the beholding of which must move every human heart with pity and terror, and abhorrence of the voluntary cause of such unnecessary sufferings.

2. As nature has implanted in each man a desire of his own happiness, and many tender affections to To liberty of action.

BOOK II. ward others in some nearer relations of life, and granted to each one some understanding and active powers, with a natural impulse to exercise them for the purposes of these natural affections; 'tis plain each one has a natural right to exert his powers, according to his own judgment and inclination, for these purposes, in all such industry, labour, or amusements, as are not hurtful to others in their persons or goods, while no more publick interests necessarily requires his labours, or requires that his actions should be under the direction of others. This right we call *natural liberty*. Every man has a sense of this right, and a sense of the evil of cruelty in interrupting this joyful liberty of others, without necessity for some more general good. Those who judge well about their own innocent interests will use their liberty virtuously and honourably; such as have less wisdom will employ it in meaner pursuits, and perhaps in what may be justly censured as vicious. And yet while they are not injurious to others, and while no wise human institution has for the publick good subjected them to the controll of magistrates or laws, the sense of natural liberty is so strong, and the loss of it so deeply resented by human nature, that it would generally create more misery to deprive men of it because of their imprudence, than what is to be feared from their imprudent use of it. The weakest of mankind are not so void of forethought but that it would occasion to them exquisite distress, and sink their souls into an abject sorrow, or kindle all the passions of resentment; to deprive them

of their natural liberty, and subject their actions, and all interests dear to them, to the pleasure of others about whose superior wisdom and good intentions they were not thoroughly satisfied. Let men instruct, teach, and convince their fellows as far as they can about the proper use of their natural powers, or persuade them to submit voluntarily to some wise plans of civil power where their important interests shall be secured. But till this be done, men must enjoy their natural liberty as long as they are not injurious, and while no great publick interest requires some restriction of it.

This right of natural liberty is not only suggested by the selfish parts of our constitution, but by many generous affections, and by our *moral sense*, which represents our own voluntary actions as the grand dignity and perfection of our nature.

3. A like natural right every intelligent being has about his own opinions, speculative or practical, to judge according to the evidence that appears to him. This right appears from the very constitution of the rational mind which can assent or dissent solely according to the evidence presented, and naturally desires knowledge. The same considerations shew this right to be unalienable: it cannot be subjected to the will of another: tho' where there is a previous judgment formed concerning the superior wisdom of another, or his infallibility, the opinion of this other, to a weak mind, may become sufficient evidence. As to opinions about the Deity, religion, and virtue, this

Private judgment.

CHAP. 5.

BOOK II. right is further confirmed by all the noblest desires of the soul: as there can be no virtue, but rather impiety in not adhering to the opinions we think just, and in professing the contrary. Such as judge truly in these matters, act virtuously: and as for weak men, who form false opinions, it may do good to instruct and convince them of the truth if we can; but to compel them to profess contrary to their opinions, or to act what they believe to be vicious, or impious in religion, must always be unjust, as no interest of society can require it, and such profession and action must be sinful to those who believe it to be so. If any false opinions of a religious or moral nature tend to disturb the peace or safety of society, or render men incapable of such duties of subjects as are requisite for the publick safety, it may be just to oblige those who embrace them to give sufficient security for their conduct, * and to defray the charge of employing others to perform their duties for them; or to remove themselves from this state with their effects, and make way for better subjects, where the state cannot otherways be safe.

Right over one's own life. 4. As God, by the several affections and the moral faculty he has given us, has shewed the true ends and purposes of human life and all our powers; promoting the universal happiness, and, as far as is consistent with it, our own private happiness, and that of such as are dear to us; in conformity to his own gracious purpo-

* This resembles the *actio de damno infecto*, which is no diminution of the right of property.

ses; we must discern not only a right that each one CHAP. 5. has over his own life to expose it to even the greatest dangers when 'tis necessary for these purposes, but that it is frequently the most honourable and lovely thing we can do, and what we are sacredly obliged to out of duty to *God* and our fellow-creatures. Mankind have often a right to demand this service from us, tho' we had no prospect of escaping. A brave man has a right to act such a part, and the publick interest has this claim upon him, from the constitution of nature, previously to any political constitutions, or any compacts in this affair. Magistrates have a right to compel men to such perilous services, because they were antecedently good and right: and they are the more glorious, the more voluntarily they are undertaken.

About these cases where the publick interest may require the hazarding life, exposing ourselves to certain death, men must judge, by impartially comparing probabilities, as we judge about all human affairs where absolute certainty is seldom attainable. If we have no right over our lives for the publick interest, we cannot justly expose them to danger; what one has no moral power over, he cannot subject to contingencies. “*God* has indeed placed us in life as soldiers in certain stations, which we are to maintain till we are recalled,” according to the fine sentiment of Socrates, or Pythagoras. But we must discharge the duties of these stations at all hazards. Our sole business is not to prolong life on any terms. As our reason and *moral faculty* shew us our station and its duties, the

BOOK II. same powers must shew us when we are recalled, what the duties of life are, when it is to be exposed even to the greatest dangers; when the publick interest requires, then it is that our *Commander* recalls us by the same voice which intimated to us our station and its duties.

A right to use what is common.

5. Each one has a natural right to the use of such things as are in their nature fitted for the common use of all; (of which hereafter:) and has a like right, by any innocent means, to acquire property in such goods as are fit for occupation and property, and have not been occupied by others. The natural desires of mankind, both of the selfish and social kind, shew this right. And 'tis plainly cruel and unjust to hinder any innocent acquisitions of another: when indeed some acquisitions would endanger the liberty, independency, or safety of his neighbours, they have a right either to prevent such acquisitions, or to oblige him who makes them to give sufficient security for the safety of others.

Right to society with others.

6. For the like reasons every innocent person has a natural right to enter into an intercourse of innocent offices or commerce with all who incline to deal with him. 'Tis injurious in any third person to interfere, or confine his or their choice, when he has not acquired some right to direct their actions.

To the character of innocence.

7. As we all have a strong natural desire of esteem, and the greatest aversion to infamy, every man has a natural right to the simple character of probity and honesty, and of dispositions fit for a social life, until he has forfeited this right by an opposite conduct.

To marriage.

8. From the natural and strong desires of marriage

and offspring we may discern the natural right each one CHAP. 5. has to enter into the matrimonial relation with any one who consents, and is not in this matter subjected to the controll of others, or under a prior contract. In this matter, as much as any, an opinion of happiness and a mutual good liking is necessary to the happiness of the parties, and compulsion must create misery.

That all these rights are of the perfect sort, must appear from the great misery which would ensue from the violation of them to the person thus injured; and a general violation of them must break off all friendly society among men.

II. *The natural equality of men* consists chiefly in this, that these natural rights belong equally to all: Natural equality of men. this is the thing intended by the natural equality, let the term be proper or improper. Every one is a part of that great system, whose greatest interest is intended by all the laws of *God* and nature. These laws prohibit the greatest or wisest of mankind to inflict any misery on the meanest, or to deprive them of any of their natural rights, or innocent acquisitions, when no publick interest requires it. These laws confirm in the same manner to all their rights natural or acquired, to the weak and simple their small acquisitions, as well as their large ones to the strong and artful. The same access to adventitious rights is open, and the same means appointed for all who can use them. If great occupation and much labour employed, intitles the vigorous and active to great possessions; the weak and indolent have an e-

BOOK II. qually sacred right to the small possessions they occupy and improve. There is *equality in right*, how different soever the objects may be; that *jus aequum* in which the Romans placed true freedom.

Natural Liberty
Justice.

Men differ much from each other in wisdom, virtue, beauty, and strength; but the lowest of them, who have the use of reason, differ in this from the brutes, that by fore-thought and reflection they are capable of incomparably greater happiness or misery. Scarce any man can be happy who sees that all his enjoyments are precarious, and depending on the will of others of whose kind intentions he can have no assurance. All men have strong desires of liberty and property, have notions of right, and strong natural impulses to marriage, families, and offspring, and earnest desires of their safety. 'Tis true the generality may be convinced that some few are much superior to them in valuable abilities: this finer part of the species have imperfect rights to superior services from the rest: they are pointed out by nature as the fittest to be intrusted with the management of the common affairs of society, in such plans of power as satisfy the community that its common interests shall be faithfully consulted. But without this satisfaction given, permanent power assumed by force over the fortunes of others must generally tend to the misery of the whole. Mere promises or professions give no security. The darkest and most dangerous tyrants may make the fairest shews till they are settled in power. We must therefore conclude, that no endowments,

natural or acquired, can give a perfect right to assume power over others, without their consent.

CHAP. 5.



III. This is intended against the doctrine of Aristotle, and some others of the antients, “ that some
“ men are naturally slaves, of low genius but great
“ bodily strength for labour: and others by nature
“ masters of finer and wiser spirits, but weaker bodies:
“ that the former are by nature destined to be sub-
“ ject to the later, as the work-beasts are subjected to
“ men. That the inhabitants of certain countries,
“ particularly Greece, are universally of finer spirits,
“ and destined to command; and that the rest of the
“ world are fitted for slavery. That by this subordi-
“ nation of the more stupid and imprudent to the
“ wise and ingenious, the universal interest of the sys-
“ tem is best promoted, as that of the animal system is
“ promoted by the power of the rational species over
“ the irrational.”

*Aristotle's doc-
trine considered.*

The power of education is surprizing! this author in these justly admired books of politicks is a zealous asserter of liberty, and has seen the finest and most humane reasons for all the more equitable plans of civil power. He lived in that singular century, in which Greece indeed produced more great and ingenious men than perhaps the world ever beheld at once: but had he lived to our times, he would have known, that this beloved country, for sixteen centuries, hath seldom produced any thing eminent in virtue, polity, arts, or arms; while great genii were often arising in the nations he had adjudged to slavery and barbarity.

Is it not abundantly known by experience, that

BOOK II. such as have a less fortunate capacity for the ingenious arts, yet often surpass the ingenious in sagacity, prudence, justice, and firmness of mind, and all those abilities which fit a man for governing well. And then 'tis often found that men of less genius for arts, or policy, may have the loveliest turn of temper for all the sweet social virtues in private life, and the most delicate sense of liberty. Are such amiable characters to be less esteemed, or their interests and inward satisfaction less regarded, or subjected to the pleasure of the artful and ambitious? The natural sense of justice and humanity abhors the thought.

Had providence intended that some men should have had a perfect right to govern the rest without their consent, we should have had as visible undisputed marks distinguishing these rulers from others as clearly as the human shape distinguishes men from beasts. Some nations would be found void of care, of fore-thought, of love of liberty, of notions of right of property, or storing up for futurity, without any wisdom or opinion of their own wisdom, or desires of knowledge; and perfectly easy in drudging for others, and holding all things precariously while they had present supplies; never disputing about the wisdom of their rulers, or having any suspicions or fore-boding fears about their intentions. But where do we find any such tempers in the human shape?

*Wisdom gives
no right to pow-
er.*

Superior wisdom or penetration of understanding, were all convinced of it, cannot give a right to govern, since it may be employed by a selfish corrupt temper to the worst purposes, even the general misery of the

community. Goodness must be ascertained too before the subjects can have any satisfaction or happiness under a dominion founded in will. Now 'tis impossible with respect to man to give assurance of the stable goodness of intention. The worst will pretend to it till they are settled in power. Nay do not the most ignorant sometimes sincerely judge themselves to be wiser than their neighbours, and fitter for governing? and how seldom would men of superior abilities agree about the persons most eminent in the arts of government. To found therefore a right of governing others upon a superiority of abilities, without any consent of the subject, must raise eternal controversies which force alone can decide.

IV. As to those natural rights which are of the imperfect sort, almost all the eminent and lovely virtues of life are employed in observing and fulfilling them. We may present to men a view of their duties by considering them as fulfilling some private rights of the persons to whom they are performed which are necessary to their happiness, as a right, perfect or imperfect, corresponds to every obligation or duty. But most of these duties are recommended by still a nobler moral species, viz. the love of virtue itself, and the dignity there is naturally felt in exercising every amiable tender humane disposition toward our fellows; for, as was observed above, the fulfilling perfect rights rather shews only the absence of iniquity, whereas all the honourable virtues and duties of life rather correspond to the rights called imperfect; and the soul

Imperfect natural rights.

BOOK II. must feel as sacred a moral obligation to these duties
 on many occasions, and as great a turpitude in omitting them, as in direct acts of injustice against the perfect rights of others.

To offices of no trouble or expence.

These imperfect rights are, 1. A right each man has to all those useful offices from his fellows which cost them no trouble or expence. † 'Tis horridly inhuman to refuse them.

To offices of some expence.

2. Any man has an imperfect right to such offices, even of some trouble or expence, as are necessary to relieve him from some great distress or calamity incomparably greater than any little trouble or expence requisite for his relief. 'Tis often very inhuman to decline such trouble or expence, and that in proportion to the greatness of the sufferer's distress.

In several degrees.

3. Men of eminent virtue have still a more sacred claim to more important good offices, and every virtuous heart is sensible of a deeper obligation to such offices, even where one has received no previous favours from them. Such men have a right to be received into the more near attachments or friendship of the virtuous, and to their good offices in promoting them to the higher stations, where they may do more publick good by the exercise of their virtues. To this we are obliged by the more extensive virtuous affections which regard the publick interest.

To social worship.

4. Every person disposed to piety, and willing to improve in it, has a like right to be admitted into any religious society or institution, that he may improve

† *Officia innoxiae utilitatis.*

by the instructions and devotions of the society; provided that he does not forfeit this right by any impious or immoral tenets or practices, which make it opprobrious to the society to entertain him. CHAP. 5.

5. Persons in distress, who are not made unworthy of the liberality of good men by their sloth or vices, should not be excluded from it; nor should the liberality of good men, who incline to exercise it toward them, be restrained, unless more worthy objects in greater or equal distress are unprovided. *To charity.*

V. In liberality and munificence the importance of any gift to the receiver is in a joint proportion to the value of the gift and his indigence; and the real loss to the giver is in proportion to the said value, and to his wealth inversely: that is, the greater his wealth is, the less will an honest heart feel the want of what it gives: and that sense of loss which a poor covetous wretch may have about a trifle is not to be regarded. *The importance of liberality.*
The virtue of any donation is, in the same manner, directly as the value of the gift, and inversely as the wealth of the giver, as far as men can discern it by external evidence; as thus the strength of some generous affection above the selfish is manifestly displayed.

The addition made to the happiness of the indigent may be incomparably greater than the diminution of that of the donor, where the donor is wealthy: and this shews that persons in such circumstances are chiefly obliged to liberality. But there is no determination can be made of the precise quantity or proportion a good man should give. The different at-

BOOK II. tachments in life, the numbers of the indigent, and the degrees of their distresses, make different quantities and proportions reasonable at different times. Laws fixing a certain quantity, or proportion to the wealth of the giver, would be unreasonable; and would much abate the beauty of such actions. Liberality would then appear like paying a tax, or discharging a legal debt. Spectators could conclude nothing about the honourable or generous disposition of the giver, and liberality would cease to be a bond of love, esteem, or gratitude.

Wise and just Several prudent cautions and general rules are delivered about liberality. First, that it be not hurtful to the morals of the object, under a false shew of advantage, by encouraging them in sloth, meanness of temper, or any vicious dispositions; and again, that it be not so immoderate as to exhaust its own fountain, and prevent the like for the future when more worthy objects may occur; or incapacitate the donor for other offices of life toward those whom he may be more sacredly obliged to support.

Wise and just When many claim relief or support from us at once, and we are not capable of affording it to them all; we should be determined by these four circumstances chiefly, (tho' some more remote ones of a publick nature in some cases may for the general interest be preferred) “ the dignity or moral worth of the “ objects; the degrees of indigence; the bonds of affection, whether from ties of blood, or prior friendship; and the prior good offices we have received

“ from them.” The more of these which conspire in any person, our obligation to assist him is the more sacred. Virtuous parents in distress are recommended by all these circumstances in the first place. The ties of blood next recommend our offspring and kinsmen. And next to them the ties of gratitude should ordinarily take place, nay sometimes be preferred to the ties of blood. And when other circumstances are equal, the more virtuous should be preferred to those of less virtue*.


CHAP. 5.
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Tho' the duties of mere humanity to persons under no special attachment should give place to the more special ties, yet when they can be discharged, consistently with more sacred duties, they have great moral beauty, and are of more general importance, than one at first imagines. Such offices raise high gratitude, and by the example encourage the more extensive affections: they give amiable impressions of a whole nation, nay of the human species. Thus courtesy and hospitality to strangers, a general civility and obligingness of deportment, even to persons unknown, are justly esteemed high evidences of sweetness of temper, and are the more lovely, that they are unsuspected of interested views.

VI. The duties of gratitude naturally follow those of liberality, and are also exceedingly useful; as the neglect of them is very pernicious. The prevailing of gratitude encourages every generous disposition, and gives lovely impressions of mankind. The truly

Claims of grati-  
tude.

\* See Cicero de offic. l. i. c. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

BOOK II.  great mind does good to others as its natural work from its own sweet dispositions and natural impulse to exercise them, whatever returns are made. It has its main end when it acts its part well. But the lower virtues of others are discouraged by ingratitude: and the ungrateful are the common enemies of all the indigent, as they discourage liberality, and as far as they can, dry up the fountain whence the indigent are to be supplied.

No precise measures can be fixed for returns of gratitude, more than for liberality. Equality to the benefits received would in many cases be too much, and in many too little. A kind grateful heart with common prudence is to itself the true measure, *as the liberal mind must devise liberal things*. There is the same reason against precise laws in this case, as in liberality.

There is a general obligation of gratitude upon us all, toward those who have done any generous or useful services to any valuable part of mankind, that we should esteem and honour them, and promote their interests, and give them just praise, one sweet reward to noble minds, protecting their characters against envy and detraction. Such conduct encourages every generous disposition, and excites men to imitate such as are eminently virtuous. The hopes of honour overbalance those disadvantages and losses which often deter men of weaker virtue from any generous designs.

## C H A P. VI.

*The adventitious RIGHTS, REAL and PERSONAL,  
PROPERTY or DOMINION.*

I. **A**Dventitious rights are next to be considered, and they are either *real*, “when the right terminates upon some certain goods;” or *personal*, when “the right terminates upon a person, without any more special claim upon one part of his goods than another.” In personal rights our claim is to some prestation, or some value, leaving it to the person obliged to make up this value out of any part of his goods he pleases.

*Rights real and personal.*

Of real rights the chief is property constituted in these things which are of some use in life. As to the origin of it, we first inquire into the general right which mankind have to the use of things inanimate, and the lower animals; and then into that property which one man may have in certain things to the exclusion of others from all use of them.

II. As the inferior animals are led by their appetites and instincts, without any capacity of considering the notions of right or wrong, to use such fruits of the earth as their senses recommend and their appetites crave for their support, mankind would probably at first act the like part, without considering the point of right, and that from the like instincts. When they attained to the knowledge of a wise and good *God*, the creator of all these curious forms, and

*The right to use creatures inanimate.*

BOOK II. to the notions of right, they would soon discover that it was the will of *God* that they should use the inanimate products of the earth for their support or more comfortable subsistence, and that they had a right thus to use them, from the following obvious reasons. They would perceive their own species to be the most excellent creatures that could be supported by them, that without this support they must soon perish in a miserable manner; that their instincts and senses were plainly destined to lead them into the use of them; that the instincts of lower animals, who had no superior powers to restrain them, plainly shewed the inanimate things to be destined for the support of animals; that these forms, however curious and beautiful, must soon perish of their own accord, and return to the common mass of earth without answering any such valuable purpose as supporting animal-life and increasing its happiness; that to things inanimate all states are alike, and no diminution or increase of happiness is occasioned by any changes which befall them, except as they are subservient to things animated. These considerations would clearly shew that a great increase of happiness and abatement of misery in the whole must ensue upon animals using for their support the inanimate fruits of the earth; and that consequently it is right they should use them, and the intention of their Creator.

A new created pair indeed could scarce subsist even in the finest climates, without a place cultivated for them artificially, and stored with fruits ready for their



subsistence. Their first days must be anxious and dangerous, unless they were instructed about the fruits CHAP. 6. proper for their use, the natures of animals around them, the changes of seasons, and the arts of shelter and storing up for the future. They would not need a revelation to teach them their right, but would need one to teach them how to use it.

III. The right to use inferior animals is not so obvious, and here instruction would be more necessary, The right to use the lower animals. if there was early any need to use them; and yet reason would pretty soon teach one the right of mankind in this matter. A rational being, who had notions of right and wrong, and in some distresses needed the labours or other use of creatures so much inferior in dignity, being conscious of his natural power by means of reason to make such creatures subservient to his support and happiness, would readily presume upon his right, and a little further reflection would confirm his presumption.

'Tis true these creatures are capable of some happiness and misery; their sufferings naturally move our compassion; we approve relieving them in many cases, and must condemn all unnecessary cruelty toward them as shewing an inhuman temper. Could we subsist sufficiently happy without diminishing the ease or pleasure of inferior animals, it would be cruel and unjust to create to them any needless toil or suffering, or to diminish their happiness. But the human species is capable of incomparably greater happiness or misery: the external senses of brutes may be equally, Men the supreme part of the system.

BOOK II. or more acute, but men have superior senses or powers of enjoyment or suffering; they have sublimer pleasures by the imagination, by knowledge, by more extensive and lasting social affections, and sympathy, by their *moral sense*, and that of honour. Their reason and reflection collect joys and sorrows, glory and shame, from events past and future, affecting others as well as themselves; whereas brutes are much confined to what at present affects their senses. Thus mankind are plainly the supreme part in the animal system of this earth.

*The right to  
the labours of  
beasts.*

Now suppose an impartial governor, regarding all animals in proportion to their dignity, and aiming at the best state of all: suppose the highest species, mankind, multiplying so fast that neither the natural fruits of the earth, nor those procured by their own labour, are sufficient for their maintenance; and that they are oppressed with immoderate toil and anxiety, as they must be without the assistance of brute animals. In this case men could give no aid to the tamer species of brutes in defending them against savage beasts, in providing clear pastures, or storing forage for the winter: the tamer kinds must generally perish. Some of these kinds, by their greater strength, could bear any given quantity of labour, or effect certain works, with far less pain than men; and by want of forethought and reflection would suffer much less by any labour. By their assistance men might obtain a great increase of happiness, and be freed from evils much superior to those labours imposed on the beasts. Men could thus

have leisure, and it would become their interest, to defend and provide for their fellow-labourers, and to encourage their propagating. Here is plainly a well ordered complex system, with a proper connexion and subordination of parts for the common good of all. It tends to the good of the whole system that as great a part as possible of the severer labours useful to the whole be cast upon that part of the system to which it is a smaller evil, and which is incapable of higher offices requiring art and reason: while the higher part, relieved from such toil, gains leisure for nobler offices and enjoyments of which it alone is capable; and can give the necessary support and defence to the inferior. Thus by human dominion over the brutes, when prudently and mercifully exercised, the tameable kinds are much happier, and human life exceedingly improved. And this sufficiently shews it to be just.

But if after all this, men and other animals multiply so fast, that there is not sufficient food for their sustenance; it plainly tends to the good of the whole system, that when both the nobler and the meaner kinds cannot sufficiently subsist and multiply, that the nobler should rather be increased: and perishing by violence, by want of food, or any other cause which can be foreseen, is a greater evil to the kinds endued with fore-thought, than to those who feel only the present pain. The brutes therefore can have no right or property valid against mankind, in any thing necessary for human support. Had God intended for

*Beasts no rights  
valid against  
men.*

BOOK II. brutes any such right to any parts of the earth, or any goods they once possessed, so as to exclude men in their greatest indigence of such things; this would have been a right opposite to the greatest good of the system, which is absurd. He would certainly have given to brutes some sagacity to have marked out their bounds, to have made known their claims, and treated with men about them.

*Brutes may have rights.* And yet brutes may very justly be said to have a right that no usefess pain or misery should be inflicted on them. Men have intimations of this right, and of their own corresponding obligation, by their sense of pity. 'Tis plainly inhuman and immoral to create to brutes any usefess torment, or to deprive them of any such natural enjoyments as do not interfere with the interests of men. 'Tis true brutes have no notion of right or of moral qualities: but infants are in the same case, and yet they have their rights, which the adult are oblig'd to maintain. Not to mention that frequent cruelty to brutes may produce such a bad habit of mind as may break out in like treatment of our fellows.

*Rights of men to other use of animals.* IV. But if mankind so increase that all their labours, even with the assistance of that of beasts, cannot procure them sufficient support; 'tis plain they can spare no labour for the defence of such tameable kinds as are unfit for labour, unless they obtained from them some other use: such kinds must be banished from all cultivated lands, and be exposed to savage beasts, and to the winter colds and famine. It must

therefore be for the interest of those kinds that men CHAP. 6. should make any other advantage they can from them by their milk or wool, or any other way, which might purchase to them human defence and protection. By this means these creatures shall have an happier and a longer life, and shall be more encreased.

But if mankind so increase, that all this use of living animals is not sufficient, men must exclude from their care all such animals as yield no such use; unless some other use of them is found out to engage and compensate human care about them, they must be left to perish miserably in deserts and mountains by savage beasts, or by want of forage: since many of the tameable kinds multiply beyond all necessity for any uses men can derive from them during their lives: nature here points out another use; as we see many animal kinds led by their instincts to feed upon the flesh of other animals. Those of the inferior species thus destined for food to the superior, enjoy life and sense and pleasure for some time, and at last perish as easily as by old age, winter-cold, or famine. The earth and animals must have had quite different constitutions, otherways these seeming evils could not have been prevented. The superior orders must have had some food provided: 'tis better this food be animated for some time, and have some low sense and enjoyment, than be wholly insensible, and only subservient to nourish animals. These lower orders also during their lives may do considerable service in the world, as naturalists observe that the smaller insects, the or-

BOOK II. dinary prey of birds and fishes, by feeding on all putrefaction, prevent the corruption of the air, and thus are useful to the whole system.

It would be the interest of an animal system that the nobler kinds should be increased, tho' it diminished the numbers of the lower. A violent death by the hands of men may be a much less evil to the brutes than they must otherways have endured, and that much earlier too, had they been excluded from human care. By this use of them for food men are engaged to make their lives easier and to encourage their propagation. They are defended and fed by human art, their numbers increased, and their deaths may be easier; and human life made agreeable in those countries which otherways must have been desolate. Thus the intention of nature to subject the brute animals to men for food is abundantly manifest, and its tendency to the general good of the system shews that men have a right to make this use of them.

If all these reasonings did not soon occur to men, 'tis probable they had not soon any need of the flesh of animals. When they needed it, their own sagacity might discover their right. And yet this right is so opposite to the natural compassion of the human heart that one cannot think an express grant of it by revelation was superfluous.\*

\* This point is so little debated in these Northern nations that these reasonings may seem needless. But 'tis well known, that many great sects and nations, at this day, deny this right of mankind. And some great names among ourselves have

V. We next consider the right of private property CHAP. 6.  
 which one man may have exclusive of his fellow-men. 

And here first, the natural appetites and desires of The right of pro-  
 men lead each one to take such things as are fit for perty.  
 present use, and yet lye in common, with full persua-  
 sion of his right, if he has attained to moral notions;  
 as he sees that such things are destined for the use  
 of men, and none of his fellows have obtained any  
 prior right to them, to preclude him from using them.  
 He must easily see too, should another take from him  
 what he had thus occupied, that, beside obstructing  
 his natural and innocent design for his own support,  
 which must appear odious, as it is ill-natured; such  
 practice obtaining among men must subject them to  
 the greatest misery. What one man now occupies,  
 another without any preferable claim deprives him of:  
 a third person may in like manner deprive him of  
 what he next occupies; he may in like manner be a-  
 gain defeated by a fourth: and thus the whole grant  
 made to him by God and nature of the inferior crea-  
 tures for his support, might be defeated by the ill-  
 nature and injustice of his neighbours, without any  
 necessity; since these neighbours might by their own  
 diligence provide for themselves, without interfering  
 with his acquisitions: Thus the first impulses of na-  
 ture toward supporting ourselves, or those who are dear  
 to us, point out the right of the first occupant to such  
 things as are fit for present use: The obstructing this

alleged that without revelation, or an ex- | they were solid, would make any grant of  
 press grant from God, we would have had | it by revelation appear incredible.  
 no such right. Their reasons indeed, if

BOOK II. innocent design must appear morally evil, as it is ill-natured to hinder any man to take his natural support from the things granted for this purpose by God and nature, while others can otherways support themselves. And reflection upon the general tendency of such practice further confirms this right. These considerations establish the first rule of property, that “things fit for present use the first occupier should enjoy undisturbed.” The accident of first occupation may be a trifling difference; but a trifle may determine the right to one side, when there is no consideration to weigh against it on the other.†


*Confused notions on this subject.*

The difficulties upon this subject arise from some confused imagination that property is some physical quality or relation produced by some action of men. Whereas in our inquiries about the original of property, we only mean to discover what considerations or circumstances shew it to be morally good or innocent that a person should enjoy the full use of certain things, and that it would evidence an immoral affection in another to hinder him. Now from the natural desires of men, of which we are all conscious, and from the manifest intention of nature, it must appear immoral, cruel, or inhumanly selfish, to hinder any man to use

† By occupation is understood sometimes first discovering by the eye, sometimes touching with the hand, sometimes securing by any instrument, such goods as before were common. 'Tis always immoral, when we can support ourselves otherways, to defeat any innocent design of another. If without any design of defeating the attempts of others, several persons

at once occupy the same thing, one by first discovering, another by touching with his hand, a third by any other method, they should naturally be deemed joint proprietors. Where the design of one was previously known, 'tis immoral and unjust for another, without necessity, to prevent or intercept his advantage.



any goods formerly common, which he has first occupied, while there remains abundance of other things which others may occupy for their own support. And such defeating of the first occupiers must give perpetual occasion for the most destructive passions and contentions. CHAP. 6. 

Before mankind were much increased, if the regions they possessed were so very fruitful and mild that there was plenty of all conveniencies without any uneasy labour, there was little occasion for any further rules of property. But as the world is at present, and as mankind are multiplied, the product of the earth, without great labour, is not sufficient to maintain one hundredth part of them. Pastures for cattle as well as corn are plainly owing to human labour, since almost all lands would grow into woods unfit even for pasture, were it not for the culture of man. The very subsistence therefore of our species, as well as all our agreeable conveniencies, require an universal laborious industry. Nature hath given to all men some ingenuity and active powers, and a disposition to exert them: and each man has not only selfish desires toward his own happiness and the means of it, but some tender generous affections in the several relations of life. We are all conscious of some such dispositions in ourselves, and justly conclude that others have the like. We know that these are the ordinary springs of the activity of mankind in employing their labour to cultivate the earth, or procure things useful in human life. We all feel a sense of *Natural reasons for propriety of a private kind.*

BOOK II. liberty within us, a strong desire of acting according to our own inclinations, and to gratify our own affections, whether selfish, or generous: we have a deep resentment of any obstruction given to these natural desires and endeavours; while accompanied with a sense of innocence or a consciousness of being void of all injurious intention, and we must disapprove it as unkind and cruel, where no important publick interest requires it, whether we meet with it ourselves, or see others thus opposed in their innocent designs. From these strong feelings in our hearts we discover the right of property that each one has in the fruits of his own labour; that is, we must approve the securing them to him, where no publick interest requires the contrary; and must condemn as cruel, unfociable, and oppressive, all depriving men of the use and free disposal of what they have thus occupied and cultivated, according to any innocent inclination of their hearts.

*Reason of com-  
mon interest.*

If we extend our views further and consider what the common interest of society may require, we shall find the right of property further confirmed. Universal industry is plainly necessary for the support of mankind. Tho' men are naturally active, yet their activity would rather turn toward the lighter and pleasanter exercises, than the slow, constant, and intense labours requisite to procure the necessaries and conveniences of life, unless strong motives are presented to engage them to these severer labours. Whatever institution therefore shall be found necessary to promote univer-

sal diligence and patience, and make labour agreeable or eligible to mankind, must also tend to the publick good; and institutions or practices which discourage industry must be pernicious to mankind. Now nothing can so effectually excite men to constant patience and diligence in all sorts of useful industry, as the hopes of future wealth, ease, and pleasure to themselves, their offspring, and all who are dear to them, and of some honour too to themselves on account of their ingenuity, and activity, and liberality. All these hopes are presented to men by securing to every one the fruits of his own labours, that he may enjoy them, or dispose of them as he pleases. If they are not thus secured, one has no other motive to labour than the general affection to his kind, which is commonly much weaker than the narrower affections to our friends and relations, not to mention the opposition which in this case would be given by most of the selfish ones.

Nay the most extensive affections could scarce engage a wise man to industry, if no property ensued upon it. He must see that universal diligence is necessary. Diligence will never be universal, unless men's own necessities, and the love of families and friends, excite them. Such as are capable of labour, and yet decline it, should find no support in the labours of others. If the goods procured, or improved by the industrious lye in common for the use of all, the worst of men have the generous and industrious for their slaves. The most benevolent temper must decline supporting the slothful in idleness, that their own neces-

*Confirmed by  
the extensive af-  
fections.*

BOOK II. cities may force them to contribute their part for the publick good. Thus both the immediate feelings of our hearts, and the consideration of the general interest, suggest this law of nature, "that each one should have the free use and disposal of what he has acquired by his own labour;" and this is property, which may be defined, when it is unlimited, "a right to the fullest use of any goods, and to dispose of them as one pleases."

*How communi-  
ty could be tol-  
erable.*

VI. These reasons for property, from the general interest of society requiring universal diligence, would not hold if a wise political constitution could compel all men to bear their part in labour, and then make a wisely proportioned distribution of all that was acquired, according to the indigence, or merit of the citizens. But the other reasons would still hold from the natural sense of liberty, and the tender natural affections. Such constant vigilance too of magistrates, and such nice discernment of merit, as could ensure both an universal diligence, and a just and humane distribution, is not to be expected. Nay, no confidence of a wise distribution by magistrates can ever make any given quantity of labour be endured with such pleasure and hearty good-will, as when each man is the distributor of what he has acquired among those he loves. What magistrate can judge of the delicate ties of friendship, by which a fine spirit may be so attached to another as to bear all toils for him with joy? Why should we exclude so much of the loveliest offices of life, of liberality and beneficence, and grate-

ful returns; leaving men scarce any room for exercising them in the distribution of their goods? And what plan of polity will ever satisfy men sufficiently as to the just treatment to be given themselves, and all who are peculiarly dear to them, out of the common stock, if all is to depend on the pleasure of magistrates, and no private person allowed any exercise of his own wisdom or discretion in some of the most honourable and delightful offices of life? Must all men in private stations ever be treated as children, or fools?

The inconveniencies arising from property, which Plato and Sir Thomas More endeavour to avoid by the schemes of community, are not so great as those which must ensue upon community; and most of them may be prevented where property is allowed with all its innocent pleasures, by a *cenforial* power, and proper laws about education, testaments, and succession. Plato\* indeed consistently with his scheme of community takes away all knowledge of the particular ties of blood as much as possible, and all the tender affections founded on them, at least among those of the highest order in his state. He is indeed unjustly charged with indulging any dissolute inclinations of those men: but it seems too arrogant in that fine genius to attempt an overturning the manifest constitution of the Creator, and to root out what is so deeply fixed in the human soul; vainly presuming to contrive something better than the *God* of nature has ordered. The more extensive affections will never give the generality of

*The faults in  
the schemes of  
community.*

\* See book iii. c. 1.

BOOK II. men such ardors, nor give them such enjoyments, without particular affections, as are plainly necessary in our constitution to diligence and happiness. Leaving a place for all the particular bonds of nature, but keeping them in due subjection to the more noble affections, will answer better all the ends of polity and morals: and such schemes as his will never be found practicable among creatures of our constitution.

## C H A P. VII.

*The MEANS of acquiring PROPERTY. How far it extends, in what Subjects it resides.*


I. **P**ROPERTY is either *original* or *derived*. The original is that which is acquired by first occupation and culture: the derived, is what is obtained from some former proprietor.

*Occupation and culture the means.*

The general reasons for property are already explained, and shew the original means of acquiring it, viz. occupation, and labour employed in cultivating. But to apprehend the natural grounds of property more fully, we may observe, that men are naturally solicitous about their own future interests, and those of such as are dear to them, as well as their present interests; and may be miserable amidst present plenty, if they have no probable assurance as to futurity. Again, a great part of those things which yield the greatest and most lasting use in human life after they are improved, require a long previous course of la-

bour to make them useful. Now no man would employ such labour upon them without some security for the future enjoyment of the advantages they afford. 'Tis necessary therefore that a continual property, beyond all possible present consumption, should ensue upon the culture a man has employed upon things formerly common. Of this kind are flocks, herds, gardens, vineyards, fruit-trees, arable grounds, or pastures.

CHAP. 7.



II. Since property thus arises from first occupation of things ready for present use, and labour employed in cultivating goods which require it; we justly look upon property as begun, as soon as any person, with a view to acquire, undertakes any cultivation of what was common, or any labour previously requisite to cultivation or occupation. And the property is completed when he has occupied, begun his culture, and marked out how far he designs to extend it by himself, or those whom he obtains to assist him. 'Tis not always necessary that we have arrived at or touched the goods occupied. Every step taken which is of consequence to this end, † by which goods are made readier, or more secured for human use than they were formerly, gives us a right not to be prevented by others; and it is unjust in another to intercept or prevent our enjoying the fruits of our innocent labours which we have begun and persist in. He who wounded or tired out any wild creature in the chase,

*When it commences.*

† *Propius humanis usibus admoventur.*

BOOK II. so that it becomes an easy prey, and continues the pursuit; or has entangled it in a net, has a property begun, and is wronged by any who intercept his prey, or frustrate his labours. One who has fitted out ships for a descent upon unoccupied lands, towards the occupation of which no previous labour has been employed by others, would be wronged if another hearing of the design made greater dispatch and prevented him, and afterwards refused to make a division. Nay had one without knowing the former's design, arrived first, he could not justly exclude him who arrived later, from a share of the land thus lying in common, if it was sufficient for the purposes of both.

*How far it may be extended.*

III. But as property is constituted to encourage and reward industry, it can never be so extended as to prevent or frustrate the diligence of mankind. No person or society therefore can by mere occupation acquire such a right in a vast tract of land quite beyond their power to cultivate, as shall exclude others who may want work, or sustenance for their numerous hands, from a share proportioned to the colonies they can send. Thus it would be vain for a private man with his domesticks to claim a property, upon the circumstance of his having first discovered or arrived at it, in a country capable of maintaining ten thousand families, and requiring so many to cultivate it. Equally vain would it be in a nation of eight or ten millions of souls to claim, upon the like foundation, a property in a vast continent capable of maintaining three times that number; as no nation can send a



third part of their people for colonies in one age. CHAP. 7.  
such capricious claims, beyond all possible use or convenience of the claimants, must not keep large tracts of the earth desolate, and exclude nations too populous from obtaining for some of their people that use of the earth which *God* intended for mankind. At this rate the caprice or vain ambition of one state might keep half the earth desolate, and oppress the rest of mankind.


Nay, as we shall shew hereafter, that some publick interests of societies may justify such Agrarian Laws, as put a stop to the immoderate acquisitions of private citizens which may prove dangerous to the state, tho' they be made without any particular injury; the same or like reasons may hold as to acquisitions made by private men in natural liberty, or by states and nations. If any acquisition is dangerous to the liberty and independency of a neighbourhood, or of neighbouring states, these neighbours have a right either to defeat it altogether, or compell the proprietor to give sufficient security for the safety of all around him. This would be the case if one had occupied a narrow pass, with the adjacent lands; or the lands surrounding a fountain necessary to a whole neighbourhood, or a strait sound, so that he could stop all communication and trade of multitudes with each other. But of these less ordinary rights we shall treat hereafter.

If it be inquired what is the reasonable time to be allowed to a family or a state for cultivating the lands they pretend to occupy, 'tis plain they may occupy

BOOK II. more than the first set of hands they send can cultivate. Private persons may obtain more servants, and a state may send new colonies or new supplies of men. No precise answer can be given. To limit a state to twenty or thirty years for the cultivating all they can justly acquire by occupation may be too great a restraint; and to allow them to keep lands uncultivated for some centuries, in prospect of their sending new colonies, may often be too great indulgence. The measure of time must be different according to the exigences of neighbouring states. If none be overcharged with inhabitants, a larger time may be allowed. If many are overcharged, a less is sufficient. Mankind must not for ages be excluded from the earth *God* intended they should enjoy, to gratify the vain ambition of a few who would retain what they cannot use, while others are in inconvenient straits. Neighbouring states, upon offering a rateable share of the charges of the first discovery and occupation, have a right to obtain such lands as the first discoverers cannot cultivate. In this and all other controversies where there is no common judge, and the parties cannot agree by amicable conferences, the natural recourse is to unbiaſſed arbitrators; and such as decline arbitration should be compelled by force.

*Right legal  
property.*

IV. But 'tis plain that our acquisition by labour in any one sort of goods may extend far beyond our own present consumption and that of our families; and they may be stored up for the future: nay it may extend beyond all present or future consumption; as

we may employ the surplus as matter of beneficence, CHAP. 7.  
or of barter for goods of different kinds which we   
may need. Otherways each one would be obliged to  
practise all sorts of mechanick arts by turns, without  
attaining dexterity in any; which would be a pub-  
lick detriment.

The several rules of property as they obtain in na-  
tural liberty, like all other special laws of nature, not  
only admit exceptions in cases of great necessity, but  
may justly be altered and limited under civil polity,  
as the good of the state requires.

V. The origin of property above explained, shews *What things  
are still common.*  
the reason why such things as are inexhaustible and  
answer the purposes of all, and need no labour to  
make them useful, should remain in common to all,  
as the air, the water of rivers, and the ocean, and even  
strait seas, which can give passage to all ships without  
being made worse. Where the use is inexhaustible,  
but some expence is requisite to secure it, this may  
be a just reason for obliging all who share in it to  
contribute in an equitable manner to the necessary  
expence, such as that of light-houses, or ships of force  
to secure the seas from pyrates. But the property in  
the shores on both sides of such straits can give no  
right to exclude any who are ready to make such e-  
quitable contribution, from passing such straits, or  
carrying on any innocent commerce with the nations  
who live within them.

Where indeed the use of any adjacent parts of the  
sea or shore allowed to foreigners, may endanger our

BOOK II. possessions, such as mooring of ships of force in those bays which run up into the heart of a country; we may justly refuse it, unless sufficient security is given against danger. We may likewise refuse to others, or exclude them from such use of things naturally common and inexhaustible, as would occasion some uneasy servitude upon our lands; such as fishing in rivers, or drawing water from them through our ground, tho' the river were not at all appropriated by us, and the fishing were inexhaustible.

Property in the  
sea.

'Tis scarce conceivable upon what other foundation than compact, or consent of neighbouring states, any one can claim any property in the sea, or any right in it superior to that of other nations. Each nation indeed for its own defence, seems to have a right to prevent any ships of force of other nations to sail so near its coast that they could annoy any of its subjects in their possessions. But this property can extend no further than a gun-shot. Hovering indeed without necessity upon our coasts, tho' at a greater distance, may give just suspicion of some hostile design, and may be a just reason for expostulation and demanding security, or obliging them by force to withdraw to a greater distance.

Things left by  
God to negative  
community, are  
positive.

From what is said we see abundantly, that this earth, and all it contains, was placed by God in that state the moralists call *negative community*, and not *positive*. The negative is "the state of things not yet in property, but lying open to the occupation of any one." Positive community is the "state of things

“ in which not any individual but a whole society have CHAP. 7.  
 “ an undivided property.” Goods in this positive community neither any individual member of the society, nor any other, can occupy or dispose of without consent of the whole society, or those who govern it. Now from the preceeding reasons 'tis plain, that any man could acquire property, and see his right to acquire any thing he first occupied, without consulting the rest of mankind; and it would be injurious in any other person to hinder him. Thus we need not have recourse to any old conventions or compacts, with Grotius and Puffendorf, in explaining the original of property: nor to any decree or grant of our first parents, with Filmer.

VI. All things fit for human use either yet remain in this negative community, or are in the property of individual men, or of societies. *Bona universitatum*, or the goods of corporations are in the property of societies; the † *res nullius* of the Civilians, viz. things *sacred* as temples and their utensils, and lands for the support of religious orders, and the defraying any expences of worship; burial-places and what things are employed in funeral-rites; and places railed in or secured from promiscuous use, such as the walls of cities; are all in property either of some larger society, or some family; tho' some superstitious laws may restrain the proprietors from a free and full use of

*Mistake about the res nullius.*

† *Nullius sunt res sacrae, religiosae, et sanctae. Quod enim divini juris est, id nullius in bonis est.* Instit. l. ii. tit. 1. sect. 7. | &c. where these three sorts of goods are explained according to the notions then prevailing.

BOOK II. them, or from converting them to other uses than what they were first destined to. These laws are often very foolish, and founded upon some confused inexplicable notions. All such goods are truly designed for the use of men alone. The old proprietors, who gave them for these purposes, may have been moved by devotion toward God to make such donations for the use of certain orders employed in religious offices, or of societies, to accommodate such as inclined to worship in these places; or for the burial of their dead; or for defence of societies by fortifications. But none of these lands or goods can yield any use to God, nor can his rights receive any increase or diminution by any deeds of men. Such donations are acceptable to him as far as they do good to his creatures, by promoting their piety, virtue, and happiness. Devotion to God may as justly move men to make donations for civil uses to their country, or friends; and these may be as wise and acceptable to God, as any donations to uses commonly called pious. But none thence imagine that there is some mystical quality infused into such goods that they cannot be applied upon wise occasions to other purposes.

'Tis a natural evidence of piety in any person or society to provide whatever is requisite to accommodate men in publick worship, in proportion to the wealth of a country. It would evidence avarice, and want of piety, if men would not spare from their private use what is requisite to make places of publick worship safe, convenient, and agreeable. When they

are mean and despicable in proportion to private build-ings, the attending there may be disagreeable. 'Tis yet worse if those whose office it is to preside in publick worship, and instruct men in the duties of life, are not so supported as may enable them to attain knowledge themselves, and discharge their useful office. But when sufficient provision is made for all these purposes, 'tis folly and superstition to employ that wealth which might do more good in trade or other civil purposes, either on expensive ornaments of churches, or on their furniture, or in so enriching the instructors of the people as to give them avocations from their business, or temptations to luxury, ambition, and avarice; or to maintain more of them than are requisite. 'Tis still more foolish to maintain men in sloth, or useles ways of life.

A beautiful metonymy has been artfully abused by some orders commonly called religious, with the basest selfish purposes. Donations to them have been called *gifts to God*, as all wise liberality and charity may justly be called. But these donations alone which are made to their orders, or where they are the trustees, are called consecrations. God is proprietor of all things alike, and can receive no gifts from men. Donations can be made to men only. As far as they contribute to the general happiness of men, so far they are acceptable to God, and no further. When they are pernicious to a country in its trade, or liberty, when they corrupt the clergy, as they are called, by opportunities and temptations to luxury, tyranny,

CHAP. .7

*The causes of mistakes.*

BOOK II. or avarice, they are as offensive to God as any sins of ignorance can be. 'Tis wise and just in any state, when sufficient provision is made for the purposes of religion, to restrain or make void all further donations; to resume any useles grants that have been obtained by fraud and imposture, whether from the publick, or private persons; to free the publick from the charge of supporting useles structures, or idle hands, by converting the structures to other purposes, or demolishing them; and by obliging the idle hands to pursue some useful occupation. This must be acceptable service to God.

Some wild notion of consecration or sanctity infused into stones, timber, metals, lands, has made men imagine it impious to convert these things to other uses than what they once were destined to. And yet 'tis obvious that no religion or sanctity can inhere in such materials. We formerly used them when our minds were employed in devotion: but what then? so we did our bodies, our cloaths, our organs of speech: must they never be used to other purposes? The superstitious donors perhaps ordered "that such houses should only be used for accommodating men in worship, and such lands for the maintenance of such as officiated in it." But is it not folly to confine that to one purpose only, which can answer other purposes, and be no less fit for the purpose chiefly intended? The state has a just right to annul superstitious restrictions in any conveyances, and to make void all such conveyances as prove foolish or hurtful to society.



Grant that in the confused imaginations of the vulgar, the devotion in churches would be abated, if they were used for other purposes in the intervals of worship. Should this weakness be encouraged? And then it requires no more but that such edifices while they are used for worship should not in the intervals be used for other purposes. If the worshippers are as well provided with other structures or utensils, and the instructors provided with other sufficient salaries; nothing hinders the state to apply the former structures, utensils, or lands, to any other wise purposes. But in the Popish religion the mystery of consecration is so deeply inculcated that all this appears impious. In that whole institution the chief part God is introduced as acting, is that of a sharpening purveyor, or agent for the religious orders, grasping at and defending whatever they have obtained by any fraud or artifice from the weakest and most superstitious of mankind, for the most foolish or pernicious purposes.

VII. Things once in property may return again into a state of community if the proprietor quits his property by throwing them away, or designedly neglecting them: and then the next occupier may acquire them. If the proprietor lost any goods unwillingly, but being again otherways provided, neglects what he lost, and puts in no claim tho' he knows who has found them; a long neglect of this kind may sufficiently declare that he quitted the property, and so preclude his future claim against the present possessor. This seems the only prescription valid against

*The right of prescription.*

BOOK II. the old proprietor, before civil laws. There are just reasons why civil laws should introduce other rules of prescription, partly to engage the subjects to proper care about their goods and claims in due time while they can be ascertained; partly because in a long tract of undisturbed possession against some latent titles, goods may be transferred upon valuable considerations to fair purchasers, or be for like considerations subjected to settlements and entails and mortgages, which cannot be set aside without great injuries to innocent persons; and partly to exclude artful and undiscoverable frauds, which could not be prevented, if any deeds pretended to be very old, the witnesses of which must be dead, should be sustained as valid to overturn a long undisturbed possession.

The civil law makes a presumptive title, or the *bona fides*, upon which the possessor may probably have believed the goods to be his own, a necessary beginning to prescription; so that no length of possession, begun without a plausible title, can give a right. But the case of a fair purchaser from an old possessor, without any intimation made to the purchaser of a latent title of another, is so favourable, and his plea so equitable, when he cannot recover his price from the seller, that tho' the seller had begun possession without this just presumption, it would be very hard to set aside all claim of the fair purchaser, at least to recover the price he paid. Some of the reasons for prescription may hold even where the possession was not begun upon a presumptive title.

VIII. As to accessions or any additional profits of goods in property, these rules are obvious. 1. "All fruits, increase, or improvements happening to the goods in a man's property, to which neither the goods or labours of others contributed, belong to the proprietor, except where another by contract, or civil law, acquires some right in them." But, 2. "Where the goods or labours of other persons have contributed to any increase or improvement, without the fraud or culpable negligence of any concerned, all those who have contributed by their labours or goods have a joint property in the pound, or in the fruits and improvements, each in proportion to the value of what he contributed."

CHAP. 7.  
The rights to accessions.

If the goods or the fruits can admit of division without loss upon the whole, they should be divided in this proportion among those who contributed to them. If the subject will not admit of division without loss upon the whole, it should be used alternately for times proportioned to the values each one contributed, or be used in common continually if it can admit of such use. If the subject neither admits of common or alternate use, it should fall to that partner to whom it is of the greatest value or importance, in this manner: first, let the proportion of each one's right to those of the other partners be determined, and that partner who bids most for it should have it, upon making compensation to the rest for their shares.\*

\* See cases of this kind in *Cicero de offic.* l. ii. c. 23. and the judgment of Aratus upon them.

BOOK II. Thus he obtains the goods who values them most, and the compensation to the rest is the greater. \*

Where any debate arises about the values of the several shares contributed, there is no other remedy, previous to civil polity, but the arbitration of wise neighbours who understand the goods.

Where by the fraud or blameable negligence of one, his labours or goods are blended with the goods of others, so that the compound or the new form ceases to be desirable to the other innocent proprietor, this proprietor has a right to full compensation for the value of his goods now made unfit for his use, and for whatever clear profits he could have made by his goods had they been let alone to him. If my goods are improved for my use by another's goods or labour, without commission from me; I am only to pay the value of the improvement to my purposes, and not the value it may be of to the purposes of the culpable intermeddler with my goods. There is no reason that through his fault I should either lose my goods, or be obliged to pay for more expensive improvements than were convenient for my affairs. The proper punishment for this fraudulent or culpable intermeddling with the goods of others, is a subject of inquiry quite distinct from this of property.

*Philosophic-  
races in pro-  
perty.*

IX. The right of property, when it is entire and unlimited as it is first acquired, contains these three

\* This section may determine in a natural manner most of the questions of the civilians about the accessions, viz. the

*naticitas, alluvio, specificatio, commixtio, confusio, edificatio, &c.*

parts. 1. A right to the fullest use. 2. A right to exclude others from any use of the goods in property. and 3. A right of alienating and transferring to others either in part or in whole; absolutely, or upon any condition or contingency; gratuitously, or for valuable consideration. Civil laws may sometimes justly limit men in the exercise of these rights; and some potent reasons of general utility may even in natural liberty require some limitations, and justify some extraordinary steps contrary to the rules which ordinarily oblige us. CHAP. 7.

To this right of property corresponds a general indefinite obligation upon all not to violate this right or obstruct others in the enjoyment of it. The sacredness of this obligation, we all may find by considering the keen resentment we should feel upon such violation of our rights by others; and by the strong disapprobation we must have of such avarice or selfishness as breaks through all regards to the peace and safety of society, and all humanity to our fellows, for the sake of a little private gain; in those matters too which we look upon it as honourable and the evidence of a great soul to despise. This disapprobation we must feel toward such acts of injustice as affect the property of others, even tho' we ourselves suffer nothing by it.



## C H A P. VIII.

Concerning DERIVED PROPERTY, and the ways of alienating or transferring it.

*Rights real and personal.*

I. **A**DVENTITIOUS rights are either *real*, or *personal*. All *adventitious real rights* arise from a translation of some of the original rights of *property* from one to another. And all *personal adventitious rights* are constituted by transferring to others some parts of our natural liberty, or of our right of acting as we please, and of obliging ourselves to certain performances in behalf of others. The *real rights* terminate on some definite goods. The *personal* do not.

The necessity and use of frequent contracts and translations of property is in a good measure manifest from what is said above,\* and will still more fully appear hereafter. The difference between real and personal rights must here be explained, and the foundation too for this distinction, previous to any civil laws.

*The ground of this distinction.*

One may often incline to incur an obligation to another to a certain value, and have all moral certainty and an honest purpose of discharging it faithfully, while yet he is unwilling to put any one part of his goods more than another in the power of his creditor, and keeps it in his own election what part of them he will alienate for discharging this obligation. And a creditor may often be satisfied with such engagements from the debtor, if he is assured of his

\* Chap. vi. and vii.

wealth and integrity, without any specifick goods being subjected to the claim. Such an agreement constitutes a personal, and not a real right. The creditor no doubt in such a case has a general security from all the debtor's goods, since upon the debtor's default, he may in natural liberty seize any part of them for discharge of the debt, if no other creditor has obtained a real right in them. But the advantage of the personal obligation to the debtor is this, that he is still master of all his goods, and retains it still in his own election, within the time limited, to discharge the claims upon him in the manner he likes best. And the advantage of the real right to the creditor consists in this, that from the goods specially subjected to his claim he may be secure, notwithstanding of any subsequent debts incurred to others, or even prior personal debts which his debtor may be incapable of discharging.

If one has done any damage to another, he becomes indebted to the person who suffered this damage in the full value of it. And yet the sufferer has only a personal right, not preferable to any claims of a third person, nor affecting one part of the goods of him who did the damage, more than another. If full compensation is made, he cannot limit the debtor as to the goods out of which this compensation is to be made.

When the lender insists on more security than the faith of the borrower, or suspects his ability, and gets a pledge or a mortgage, this constitutes a real right,

BOOK II. as certain goods are assigned and specially subjected to  
 this claim.

*Real preferable  
to personal,*

A just man no doubt will observe and fulfil the personal rights of others, as well as the real, to the utmost of his power; but the security is not the same in both, as 'tis abundantly known, where different claims occur against a person who has not effects to answer them. The real rights must take place of the personal. He who consented to accept of a less security, must not expect to be equally safe with one who insisted upon and obtained a greater, nor would have contracted or lent upon other terms.

*For what reason.*

The preservation of the necessary faith in commerce requires this preference of real rights, to personal. In the full translation of property, and even in assigning goods as real securities by pledge or mortgage, there must be such publick forms as will secure the purchaser or lender against all prior secret contracts with others, tho' these private contracts gave personal rights. But no man would buy goods, if he could not be secured in the possession of what he purchased against former private contracts of sale. Nor could he be secured if prior secret contracts did not yield to such publick ones with the usual forms instituted for conveying real rights. Nor would men lend upon any pledge or mortgage, were there not some publick forms appointed to transfer a real right preferable to any prior personal rights constituted to others by a latent contract.

All nations agree in having some publick formal-



ties for transferring full property or real rights, not to be defeated by prior latent personal rights. These formalities should intimate the transaction publicly, or some way prevent the person who transfers to impose afterwards upon others. Delivery answers this end in moveables; and some publick symbolical deeds giving possession, in such as are immoveable; or some publick registration of the conveyance. Where these confirm a contract, a real right is constituted, which no personal one should defeat. And yet the person thus defrauded of his personal right by means of the subsequent real one transferring the property, has a just claim upon the seller who defrauded him not only for compensation of all the damage \* he sustains, but for the † full value of all the profit he could have made had he not been deceived. But without this preference of real rights to personal, there could be no commerce.

CHAP. 7.  


II. Derived real rights are either some parts of the right of property transferred to another, and separated from the rest, or compleat property derived from the original proprietor.

*Derived real rights parts of property often separated from the rest.*

The parts of property frequently transferred separately from the rest of it are chiefly of these four classes. 1. *Right of possession*, thus one may have a right to possess the goods he knows belong to others, until the true proprietor shews his title. This right is valid against all others, and often may be turned into compleat property. 2. The right of *succession*, which one

\* *Pensatio damni.* † *Pensare quod interest.*

BOOK II. may have to goods, while another retains all the other parts of property except that of alienating. 3. The rights of a *mortgage* or *pledge*. 4. Rights to some small uses of the goods of others, called *servitudes*.

As to the right of possession. The possessor by fraud or unjust violence has no right: any one who inclines to recover the goods to the owner may justly dispossess him. But he who possesses without fraud or unjust violence the goods he knows belong to others, has a right valid against all except the proprietor, or such as claim under him. If none such can be found, or if the proprietor quits his claim, the possessor becomes proprietor by occupation. The possessor is always obliged to make publick intimation that he has such goods, and to use all reasonable means to make it known to the proprietor. Designed concealment of them is no better than theft. When the possessor restores, he may justly demand to be repaid all prudent expences made upon the goods, or upon giving publick intimation about them.

Rights of the  
presumptive possessor.

III. In instances where one possesses goods belonging to others which yet he obtained upon some plausible title, such as donation, legacy, succession, or purchase, and believes them to be his own †; the following rules seem equitable. 1. If the goods have perished by any accident without any fault of the possessor, he is not obliged to any compensation. 2. If he has consumed them he is obliged to restore as far as he

† This is the *bonae fidei possessor* of the Civilians, not importing that all other possessors are fraudulent.

was profited by them, or in proportion to the advantage or pleasure he obtained by them, which otherways would have consumed like goods of his own: for he is so far enriched as he spared his own goods. But as to pleasure enjoyed and not necessary maintenance, if the possessor enjoyed it only because he believed these goods to be his own, and otherways would not have been at such expence in matters of pleasure, one cannot pronounce univervally that he is obliged to compensate the value. 'Tis the honourable part to do it whenever the proprietor is indigent, and the possessor wealthy; or if they are in equal circumstances; or if the compensating would not distress the possessor in his affairs. But if compensating would distress him, if he obtained the goods by an onerous title, such as by paying a price for them which he cannot now recover he would at least in most cases seem to be under no other obligation than that of humanity, which might perhaps direct to sharing the loss, where it would be too sensibly felt were it to fall singly on the original possessor.

3. When the goods yet remain, the possessor is obliged to restore them with all their accessions after deducting all prudent expences he has made about them. If he purchased them, he has recourse for the price upon the seller.

4. If the seller is not to be found, or is insolvent, the case is more difficult. Here a certain loss must be sustained either by the proprietor, or the presumptive possessor: both are supposed alike innocent: which

BOOK II. of them must bear it? The case of both is equally favourable, and no publick advantage requires the casting the whole loss on one rather than the other. If freeing the proprietor from it will make purchasers more cautious and inquisitive about the titles of those they deal with, and thus thefts may be detected; the subjecting the proprietors to the loss, will make men more vigilant to prevent thefts, and prevent their goods thus becoming a snare to honest purchasers. In strict justice one would think the loss should be divided equally among all those through whose hands the goods passed without fraud, along with the proprietor, until they can recover the whole from the author of the fraud.

*A confused imagination to be avoided in this case.*

In these questions our reason is disturbed by some confused imagination of property as some physical quality or chain between the goods, and the proprietor, conceived to found a more sacred right than many other most equitable claims. And yet it cannot be of a more sacred kind than the rights arising from contracts and fair purchases; since 'tis by contracts and purchases that property is most frequently acquired: and there is no reason that an innocent man should suffer because of any vice of another in which he had no hand.

Abstracting from such imaginations; property is thus determined by the law of nature; in certain circumstances we see at once that it would be cruel and inhuman toward an individual, to deprive him of the full use of certain goods; as when they were acqui-

red by his own innocent labour, or by any fair contract; and we see also that like practices generally prevailing would be detrimental to society. In these circumstances we pronounce that the man has the right of property. When equal circumstances of particular humanity plead for two persons in opposition to each other; we then consider any circumstance on one side which some remote interest of society may require to be regarded; and we deem the right to go along with that circumstance: or at least, when a law or custom is once received on account of this remote utility, we deem the property to be on that side, and do not regard the weaker claim of the other: tho' a humane man would not disregard it altogether. Other cases happen where the pleas from remote utilities of society are also equal: and in them, there is no other remedy but dividing the loss among all concerned, in some proportion or other.

One sells me an horse this hour, in discharge of an Some Examples old debt he owed me: and next hour, upon a price paid down, sells and delivers him to another who knew nothing of my bargain. If the feller can be found, and is solvent, there is less difficulty: but if he is not; on whom shall the loss be cast? The contract and price paid, the grand foundations of the titles and pleas of humanity, are the same on both sides. 'Tis equally hard that either of the innocent men should suffer. Custom and civil laws regarding a remote interest of ascertaining commerce, and preventing frauds, make the delivery a most important circumstance for the

BOOK II. later. But were it not for this remote interest, the priority in time would plead for the former. Suppose that the horse had also been delivered to the former, but the feller allowed to keep him some hours in his stables. When other circumstances are now equal, priority of time is of great importance, and is much regarded in all contracts; as there can be no suspicion of fraud in the first purchaser; and as a regard to this circumstance too is of great necessity to ascertain commerce. In our present question about the claim of the fair purchaser to obtain the price he paid from the proprietor, when he can have no recovery from the feller, all pleas, both of a private and publick nature, are pretty near equal on both sides. And the same general observation about the original notions of property will be of considerable use in other questions, particularly these concerning the rights by testament, and by succession to the intestate.

In this and many like cases there are obvious reasons of humanity and mercy to shew a good man what is the lovely and honourable part. If the possessor be poor, and the proprietor rich, it would be barbarous if the proprietor did not indemnify the honest possessor as to the price he paid. If the possessor is wealthy, and the proprietor poor, it would be inhuman in the possessor to insist on the price paid, when it bore no such proportion to his wealth that the want of it could distress him. If their fortunes are nearly equal they should divide the loss, whatever civil laws may determine; or should bear it in proportion to their wealth, when

their wealth is unequal, but neither in distress. The want of obvious reasons for casting all the loss on one side in this and some other cases, will be little regretted by any but such selfish wretches as are grasping at every advantage they can obtain without incurring the infamy of direct injustice, and have no humanity to others. CHAP. 8.

In general, as far as such possessors are enriched or profited by means of the goods of others, so far they are obliged to restore; but they are enriched only by what remains after all expences they made in preserving, improving, or cultivating are deducted; and these expences the proprietor is obliged to restore when he obtains his goods. Goods obtained by donation, succession, or any gratuitous title, should plainly be restored without any other compensation from the proprietor than that of those expences for preservation and improvement.

IV. The next class of real rights often separated from property is that of successions in entails. *Right of succession in entails.* When one who has unlimited property conveys a right of succession to several persons, in a certain series, upon certain contingencies, these persons have a right to this succession just as valid as men acquire by any donation; as unlimited property includes a right of disposing upon any contingency or condition, as well as absolutely. Such entails may be made imprudently, or contrary to reasons of humanity, and so may donations. When they are so, the present tenant for life who has all the other rights of property except

BOOK II. that of alienating, is not culpable in taking all methods consistent with the peace and order of society, to break the entail: as a man would not be culpable who used such peaceful methods to prevent imprudent or inhuman donations, or to get them revoked. But where there is nothing imprudent or inhuman in the entail, the tenant in reversion has as good a right to succeed as the present possessor has to enjoy for life; and it would be criminal to defraud him of it. And the peace of society often requires the confirmation even of imprudent and inhuman conveyances, of which hereafter; tho' the person to whom they are made cannot with a good conscience insist on them. Civil laws however may justly limit this power of entail as the interest of the state, or the necessity of encouraging industry may require.

*Rights by mortgage or pledge.*

V. The third sort of real rights separable from the rest of the property are those of the mortgagee, and of the person to whom moveable goods are pledged, and delivered for security of some debt. By either of these a right is given to the creditor, in case the debt is not duly discharged, to appropriate to himself the lands mortgaged, or the goods pledged\*, notwithstanding any prior personal rights of others against the debtor. The assuming a property in the lands mortgaged, or the moveables pledged, upon non-payment, has no iniquity in it if the pledger or mortgager obtain all surplus of the value of the lands or goods

\* *Lex commissoria in pignoribus.*



above what discharges the principal debt with all interest and expences. CHAP. 8.

VI. The fourth class of real rights separable from the rest of the property are *servitudes*, when one has a right to some small use of the goods of another. All servitudes are real rights terminating on some definite lands or tenements, or goods. But some are constituted in favour of a person and only for his behoof; and others for the advantage of some adjacent farm or tenement be the proprietor who he will. The former, from the subjects of these rights, and not from the object on which they terminate, are called personal servitudes, expiring with the person; the later for the like reason are called real servitudes, and may be perpetual. Thus the use of an house or a farm granted to a friend for his life-time when the property is in another, is a personal servitude, which cannot be conveyed by him to another: but when a farm is subjected to a road for the convenience of the possessors of an adjacent farm, or the possessors of one tenement in a town have a right to put in beams into the gables of the contiguous house for supporting the floors or roof, these are real servitudes, which may be constituted for the convenience of lands or tenements, and may be perpetual.† The nature of the contracts or deeds by which such servitudes are constituted shews the rights, and obligations of the parties, which too depend much upon the customs of the places where they are received.

*Servitudes.*

† See Instit. l. ii. tit. 3, 4, 5.

BOOK II.

VII. The complete property may be transferred either by the *voluntary deed* of the proprietor, or by the *disposition of the law of nature*, without his consent, for the interest of others. By deed of the proprietor it may be transferred either *during his life*, or *upon the event of his death*. And by disposition of the law of nature, without his consent, property may be transferred either during the proprietor's life, or on the event of his death. Of these four in order.

*Voluntary deed during life.*

1. By voluntary deed of the proprietor during his life, either gratuitously by donation, or for a certain price or valuable consideration; of this we treat in the following chapter about contracts.

*By testament.*

2. Property is conveyed by the voluntary act of the proprietor upon the event of his death by last will or testament. This right of devising by will is naturally included in the property, which contains a right of disposing upon any condition or contingency. Take away this right and industry shall be much discouraged after men are tolerably provided with necessaries for themselves and their families during life; or men must be forced into a pretty hazardous conduct by actually giving away during life whatever they acquire beyond their own probable consumption in their lifetime. Not to mention that they must give away as soon as they acquire any surplusses, since the suddenness of death, or a delirium, may make them incapable of donations upon the approach of death. This right therefore of devising by will seems manifestly founded in the law of nature, tho' civil laws may li-

mit the exercise of it in common with all other rights respecting property, such as the disinheriting or passing by a child without any fault of his, or the conveying almost all a man's wealth to one of his numerous posterity from a foolish desire of raising one great family. Civil laws also justly oblige men to such forms as shall best prevent forgeries. By the law of nature every declaration of a man's will of which credible evidence can be given, is valid and obligatory on those concerned: but that all men may be engaged to use the most convenient forms, civil laws may confirm no testaments made without them.

That the law of nature and the interest of society establish this right of devising by will is as plain as that they establish other rights of the proprietor. The natural design of mankind in any acquisitions beyond their own consumption is to promote by them the happiness of those they love; this happiness one desires they may obtain not only during his life, but after his decease. These kind affections and suitable offices to make others happy, whether we are to live with them or not, are the natural, joyful, and honourable exercises of the human soul while we live. And 'tis cruel and unjust to hinder a man either from such good offices while he lives, or to deprive him of the joyful hope that his surviving friends shall be profited by the fruits of his labours. 'Tis cruel to these friends to intercept the benefit designed them by their friend now deceased. There is no method so convenient for individuals, or for the society, by which goods can be

*The foundation  
of this right of  
testaments.*

BOOK II. transferred to survivors as that by testament, or a  
 “ declaration of the will of the proprietor revocable,  
 “ and not to take effect till after his death.” † To leave  
 the goods of the deceased in common open to occu-  
 pation must occasion the most odious contentions and  
 mischiefs. To all these reasons we may add that a  
 wisely contrived will is generally in consequence of  
 moral obligation, and a fulfilling of the rights or  
 claims either of a perfect or imperfect kind which the  
 survivors had upon the goods of the deceased. All  
 which proves abundantly the right of devising, and  
 the obligation upon all to observe and maintain the  
 will of the testator, where it is tolerably prudent, and  
 not contrary to some strong principles of humanity.  
 Where it is contrary, there may be no injustice in an-  
 nulling it.

*Transcription by  
 the law of nature;  
 during the life of  
 the proprietor.*

VIII. The third manner of transferring property  
 is by the plain law of nature, without consent of the  
 proprietor, during his life, whenever it is requisite to  
 satisfy any just claim another had against him which  
 he declines to comply with. This will be considered  
 hereafter among the rights arising from the injuries  
 done by others. Thus for compensation of damage, or  
 discharging a just debt, a man's goods are justly seized,

† Some improper use of metaphysics  
 in this subject has raised great controver-  
 sies to little purpose, as if the validity of  
 wills imported some physical action done  
 when the agent was dead; some trifling  
 objections are raised too from the nature  
 of other transactions. The question is  
 truly this, whether it is not requisite for

an innocent satisfaction of men that their  
 testaments be observed after their death?  
 and whether the interest of society does  
 not require it? which are obvious. See  
 Barbeyraque's notes on Puffend. *de jure  
 nat. et gent. lib. iv. c. 10.* and authors  
 there cited.

and the property of them acquired by the persons who had such claims. CHAP. 8.

The fourth manner of translation is by the law of nature, without the deed of the proprietor, upon the event of his death, in the successions to the intestate. In succession to the intestate. The grounds of it are these. The intention of the deceased in all his acquisitions beyond his own use, was contributing to the happiness of such as were dear to him, as 'tis abundantly known to all. We see that one's posterity, and failing those his kinsmen, are dearer to men universally than others, tho' they may happen to have conversed more with others, in matters of business or pleasure. When men declare their wills, we see the general inclination to improve the fortunes of their posterity and kinsmen, and justly presume the same where it is not expressly declared. 'Tis cruel, without some publick interest requiring it, to defeat this natural hope of succession founded by the ties of blood. Our children, and failing these our kinsmen have plainly a right where some undutiful conduct has not forfeited it, not only to support from us in their indigent state, but to have their condition improved by any surplus of goods we have beyond our own consumption. 'Tis contrary to nature, as well as humanity, to defeat this claim when no publick interest requires it. 'Tis plain also that leaving the goods of the intestate in common to be occupied would cause the greatest confusion.

If friends were admitted along with kindred, it

BOOK II. must be in some proportion to the degrees of friendship; but these cannot now be determined; and much less could they be determined if the hopes of succession invited all flatterers. We justly too presume upon the will of the intestate from this, that since the custom has universally obtained, in all nations almost, to admit only kinsmen to succession, had the deceased intended that others should be admitted, he would have expressly declared this peculiar and less usual desire.

*The natural way  
of succession.*

The natural affections of men shew that their posterity should be admitted in the first place, viz. children and grandchildren; grandchildren at least admitted to their parents share among them, where a deceased child has left more than one: and along with posterity parents should be admitted, if they are in straits. In default of both, brothers and sisters, and along with them the children of a brother or sister deceased, at least to the share their parent would have got had the parent been alive. Reasons of humanity would recommend other proportions sometimes, but they would occasion great controversies. In default of such relations all kindred of equal degrees should generally come in equally, and exclude the more remote.

*Unnatural cas-  
es.*

The notion of having some one representative of the person deceased, succeeding to all his rights, and subjected to all his obligations, as the Roman heir was, has no foundation in nature; nor is there any rea-

son why a far greater part of the inheritance should go universally to one of many children, or one of many in the same degree; nor why seniority among children, or kinsmen of the same degree, should have such preference; nor why the distinction of sex should in the first degree of children take place of all other considerations, and yet be quite neglected in the degree of grandchildren, or be postponed to that of seniority of the parent, so that an infant grand-daughter of an elder son deceased, should take before an adult grand-son by a second son, nay before the second son himself. A niece by an elder brother deceased, nay her daughter, take place of even a younger brother himself, as well as the male descendants of younger brothers. All these things are founded only in civil laws. In the succession to private fortunes there is seldom any reason for having one heir rather than many equally related to the deceased. Customs of many nations and their civil laws about these matters are very foolish, and have some pernicious effects upon society.

IX. Personal rights are constituted against a man when he has limited some part of his natural liberty, or his power of disposing of his actions and goods, and transferred it to another, who thence acquires the personal right. And when this right or claim of another is fulfilled, or abolished, the natural liberty of the person obliged becomes again in this respect entire, or the personal right is consolidated with it; as

*Personal rights  
how acquired.*

BOOK II. it was before the right subsisted. Such rights arise either from some contract, or some deed of the person obliged; and the consideration of them leads to the subject of contracts or covenants, the main engine of constituting either personal rights or real.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.