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Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish and Portuguese Domination
Vol 2, Chapter VIII


On the 2nd of August, 1824, the Imperial squadron again quitted Rio de Janeiro, the rendezvous being appointed at Jurugua, where we arrived on the 13th, and on the 16th landed a body of twelve hundred troops under General Lima, at Alagoas, seventy or eighty miles from the seat of revolt! this notable step being taken in pursuance of strict orders from the Administration at Rio de Janeiro.

On the 18th, the squadron reached Pernambuco, falling in, near the entrance of the port, with a number of Portuguese vessels quitting the city with passengers; but in consequence of the prize tribunal having decreed damages for the seizure of enemy's ships within a certain distance of the coast, they were permitted to pass unmolested.

We did not reach Pernambuco too soon, for proclamations had been issued by Manuel Carvalho Paes de Andrade, the revolutionary President--denouncing Don Pedro as a traitor, whose aim it was to abandon Brazil to the Portuguese; which denunciation, though right in one sense, was wrong as regarded the Emperor, whose views were thoroughly national--though the object of his ministers was as thoroughly Portuguese. Had the Pernambucans been aware of the want of concord between the Emperor's intentions and those of his ministers, who had forced themselves upon him--the probability is that they would have supported, instead of denouncing his government.

The revolution had, however, now taken vigorous root, and the democratic spirit of the Pernambucans was not to be trifled with. A republican form of Government had been proclaimed, the views of which were on a more extensive scale than was commensurate with the abilities of those propounding them; it being their vain hope to constitute all the equatorial provinces into a federation, on the model of the United States, a project fostered--if not originated--by Americans resident in the city. To further this object, an appeal was made to the other Northern provinces to repudiate the Imperial authority, and to form with Pernambuco an alliance, under the title of "Confederation of the Equator;" the consequence being, that a large proportion of the inhabitants of Parahyba, Piahuy, Rio Grande do Norte, and Ceara, declared in favour of the measure.

The annexed is the Concordat of the revolutionary provinces:--

In the year of Our Lord 1824, third year of the Independence of Brazil, and the 3rd of August in that year, in the Hall of Session of the Government of the Province of Pernambuco, there being present, the Brazilian citizen, Quaresma Torreao, on behalf of His Excellency the President, Carvalho Paes de Andrade, and the Illustrious and Reverend Francisco da Costa Leixas; Jose Joaquim Fernandez Barros, and the Citizen Jose Joaquim Germiniano de Moraes Navarro, on behalf of the province of Rio Grande del Norte, by diploma dated August 16, 1824, and also the Illustrious deputies commissioned by His Excellency the Governor of the Province of Pernambuco to treat on behalf of his Government, with a view to extinguish dissension in political opinions, which has so greatly retarded the progress of Brazil, and of independence and liberty; and, at the same time, to do their endeavour to banish a servile spirit which tends to enthral Brazil by a pretended Constitution, domineering over the Brazilian nation like that of the Grand Seignior of the Ottoman Porte.

The Commission of the Government of this province, and the illustrious deputations before-mentioned, having maturely considered these subjects, agree--

First,--That these provinces of Pernambuco and Rio Grande unite in a fraternal league, offensive and defensive, to assemble all their forces against any aggression of the Portuguese Government, or that of the Government of Rio de Janeiro, to reduce these provinces to a state of thraldom.

Secondly,--That the said league shall extend to the establishing constitutional liberty throughout the said provinces, and to supplant the servile spirit with which they are infected, and thus avert civil war, engendered by the intrigues at Rio de Janeiro, the influence of which now pervades the whole of Brazil.

Thirdly,--That to insure the effect of this compact, the Government of Rio Grande must form a body of troops, and place them on the borders of the province of Parahyba, to be employed as necessity requires.

Fourthly,--That this body of troops shall be supported by the province of Pernambuco, but shall be afterwards supported by the "Confederation of the Equador." And that the same may be carried into immediate effect, this Concordat shall have full force, after being signed and ratified by their Excellencies the Presidents of the said provinces of Pernambuco and Rio del Norte.



Printed at the National Press.

Carvalho, however, was not the man to carry out such a scheme, his enthusiasm being without prudence or daring; hence, on our arrival--in place of union, the contending factions were engaged in destroying each other's sugar-mills and plantations, whilst Carvalho himself had taken the precaution to station a vessel at the island of Tamarica, for the purpose of escaping, if necessary, from the turbulence which he had raised, but could not control. On learning this, I felt it my duty to despatch a corvette to seize her, though at the risk of four-fold damages, according to the regulations of the Admiralty Court!

Knowing that it would take some time for the troops to come up, I determined to try the effect of a threat of bombardment, and issued a proclamation remonstrating with the inhabitants on the folly of permitting themselves to be deceived by men who lacked the ability to execute their schemes; pointing out, moreover, that persistence in revolt would involve both the town and its rulers in one common ruin; for, if forced to the necessity of bombardment,--I would reduce the port and city to insignificance. On the other hand, I assured them that if they retraced their steps, and rallied round the Imperial throne, thus aiding to protect it from foreign influence--it would be more gratifying to me to act the part of a mediator, and to restore Pernambuco to peace, prosperity and happiness--than to carry out the work of destruction which would be my only remaining alternative.

In another proclamation I called the attention of the inhabitants to the distracted state of the Spanish republics on the other side of the Continent, asking whether it would be wise to risk the benefits of orderly government for social and political confusion; entreating them not to compel me to proceed to extremities, as it would become my duty to destroy their shipping and block up their port, unless within eight days the integrity of the empire were acknowledged.

These threats were held out in the hope that by intimidation a struggle might be prevented, but they failed to produce the desired effect. One result was, however, not a little curious, as originating an offer to myself from the revolutionary President, of a bribe of 400,000 milreis, to be shipped immediately on board the English packet anchored off the port, if I would abandon the Imperial cause, and come over to the Republicans; this offer alluding, in strong terms, to the "infamous treatment with which my services had been met by the administration at Rio de Janeiro, and warning me that, by adhering to it, I should meet with nothing but continued ill-treatment and ingratitude."

The subjoined is the revolutionary President's letter:


Frankness is the distinguishing character of free men, but Your Excellency has not found it in your connection with the Imperial Government. Your not having been rewarded for the first expedition affords a justifiable inference that you will get nothing for the second. I therefore use the freedom to assure Your Excellency the amount of 400 contos of Reis, as an indemnification for your losses.

The services required from Your Excellency are to take up the cause of the "Confederation of the Equator," as adopted by the majority of the Northern provinces, whose limits will be the river of Francisco da Norte.

I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's most humble servant,


The letter contained, in addition, an argumentative justification of therevolt, but as it abounds in abuse of the Emperor, couched in the most indecorous language, I will not sully these pages by printing it entire.

The result predicted by Carvalho--as I had learned by experience--was not improbable, but it did not follow that, because the Brazilian ministers were unjust and hostile to me, I should accept a bribe from a traitor to follow his example. I therefore transmitted the following reply to his impudent proposal:--

Pedro Primiero, Off Pernambuco, Aug. 26, 1824.


If I shall have an opportunity of becoming personally known to Your Excellency, I can afford you proof to conviction, that the opinion you have formed of me has had its origin in the misrepresentations of those in power, whose purposes I was incapable, on principle, to serve.


His Excellency M. DE C. PAES D'ANDEADE.

On the 19th, the Junta requested the interposition of the English and French consuls to induce me to give further time for consideration. This I refused, from the dangerous nature of the anchorage, by which the safety of the ships was imperilled.

Unwilling, however, to injure this fine city, I sent in proposals for capitulation, giving permission to the revolutionary leaders to depart unpunished, together with their property, provided they quitted the Brazilian territory--demanding in return the surrender of the forts, ships of war, gunboats, &c. as well as of all public property. In order to prevent waste of time in correspondence, I proposed to Carvalho to meet me on board any neutral ship of war, pledging my honour as to his being permitted to return in safety; he nevertheless declined the interview, proposing in return to meet me on shore on an island near the town but--as after his insulting proposal, I could have no confidence in his honour, this was of course declined.

Still anxious to avoid extremities--from which, after the threats made, I could not consistently refrain--I again wrote to Carvalho, that, had he possessed the means of distinguishing between the intentions of the Emperor, and the proceedings of a foreign faction, he would not have been in arms against His Imperial Majesty, by adherence to whom Brazil could alone be saved from that anarchy and confusion into which Mexico and other South American States had fallen through individual rivalry and the ignorance of their popular assemblies. I further pointed out to him, that if, by procrastination I was compelled to bombard the city, the popular clamour against the insurgent authorities might be followed by melancholy proof to himself how quickly political adventurers may be abandoned or betrayed in the hour of danger, and that he had better yield to reason, what he could not prevent my effecting by force.

By writers who could not have known anything of the circumstances--which exist only in my own documents--I have been blamed for this tone of moderation towards the revolutionary President. There were two valid reasons for this course; first, that the conduct of the Pernambucans admitted of great palliation, seeing that the distractions resulting from the Portuguese faction in the administration at Rio de Janeiro had been ignorantly construed into acts of His Imperial Majesty--so that the injured people argued that it would have been better for them to have remained a colony of Portugal, than a colony of the Government at Rio de Janeiro--this mode of reasoning not being very far wrong. Secondly--and this fully accounts for the moderation complained of--I knew, from the most authentic sources that, in case of attack on the city, Carvalho had determined to retire into the interior, there to carry on civil war by enlisting the negro population under his standard; to avert which, I considered that moderation was the best course to induce him and his partisans to quit the empire, which would thus have been well rid of them.

It was folly, therefore, to consider the rebellion local, as had been represented to the Imperial Government, or that its actors and instigators were few and insignificant, for, in truth, as has been said, it had already extended far and wide into the adjacent provinces, I therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine, that "although it might not be difficult to put down the revolution in the city, which, even the land forces could have already accomplished, had they not been landed at a distance--yet that without great circumspection, the prevention of further revolution in the interior would be a work of time, trouble, and expense; and that even all these would be thrown away, unless the causes which had led to the rebellion, were removed or explained."

The time given having expired without acceptance of the terms, it became necessary to make at least a shew of enforcing them, though the water was too shallow to admit vessels of large burden to approach with safety, and the small vessels were ill adapted to the purpose; still I determined to make a demonstration, and as a preparatory step ordered Captain Welsh, of the Paraguassu, to shift into the flagship all the English petty officers and seamen; but a heavy swell set in, and as the anchorage was bad, I considered the risk imprudent.

The schooner Leopoldina was therefore ordered to try the effect of a few experimental shells; but the mortar so shook the vessel, that she had to be withdrawn, it being evident that nothing further could be done till the weather would permit the approach of ships, or that rafts could be constructed--for which purpose timber had been ordered from Bahia. Little damage was effected by this experiment, for the wealthiest inhabitants had fled into the interior, taking with them all their valuable property.

Heavy weather having now set in compelled the flagship to run to Bahia for safety, the outer road of Pernambuco being at this season exceedingly dangerous from the coralline nature of the bottom, as was practically proved by the fact that the Pedro Primiero lost every anchor but one, so that to remain was certain destruction, and there was no alternative but to make for Bahia to procure anchors.

Nothing had been heard of General Lima's force since its debarkation, I was therefore anxious to know what had become of it, and how far it was in a condition to cooperate, the speedy possession of the place being nautically an important point--for, whilst blockading we had intercepted a Portuguese vessel, only forty-three days from the Tagus, and learned from her letters that a large force was preparing at Lisbon, consisting of sixteen ships of war and numerous transports, their destination being Pernambuco; this forming sufficient proof that the Portuguese Government counted on the recovery of those disorganised provinces which had alike revolted against the mother country and the Emperor of Brazil.

On the 4th of September, the flagship left for Bahia, first visiting the island of Alexo, where the Cacique and Maranhao were at anchor. From them we learned that General Lima's head-quarters were at Leimham, his advance guard having joined the troops at Mogado, on the banks of a river near Cape St. Augustine, the revolutionary forces occupying the other bank.

On reaching Bahia, we received information that the rebel Government at Pernambuco was in immediate expectation of several fast sailing vessels, ordered by the revolutionary President from North America, and also of two steamers from England. I therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine to send me some superior sailing vessels, as, if the anticipated expedition from Lisbon, or those expected from England and America, made their appearance, four at least of our force would, from their bad sailing, run the risk of being captured on the first appearance of the enemy.

On learning the panic which had been created in Pernambuco, by the show of bombardment, and its anticipated repetition in earnest on my return, General Lima pushed forward towards the capital with no more formidable opposition than a few desultory skirmishes; and on the 11th of September, with the co-operation of the naval officers and seamen there left, took possession of the city, Carvalho retreating into the suburbs, where, breaking down the bridge which united them, he entrenched himself. On the following day, it was said that General Lima found in the treasury 400,000 dollars; perhaps the same which Carvalho had offered to me as a bribe to join the republican party.

The Piranga arriving at this juncture with a convoy bringing eight hundred additional troops, preparations were made to attack Carvalho; but the insurgent president, making his escape on a fishing raft, took refuge on board the British corvette Tweed, and afterwards got to sea.

During the interval which elapsed between my departure for Bahia and my return to Pernambuco, the distribution of prize money amongst those entitled to it took place, the flagship and the Maria de Gloria being paid at Bahia, and the rest at Pernambuco. As His Imperial Majesty had left me altogether unfettered by orders or instructions, and as he had given the 200,000 dollars to be used in furthering the Imperial objects, I determined not to regard the advances which had been made at Rio de Janeiro, as forming any portion of the reward, especially to the flagship, which had, unaided, achieved the more important results of the late campaign, and was therefore entitled to a share commensurate with the arduous exertions of the officers and crew, now again under my flag.

The subjoined extracts from the log of my secretary will shew the periods at which the distribution took place:--

Sept.10th. Made distribution of prize money in silver.
Sept.15th to 16th. Went on board the Maria de Gloria, and paid
prize money.
Sept. 17th. Paid Capt. Crosbie, 10,400 dollars in specie. Paid
other officers 5750 dollars.
Sept. 18th. Paid Admiral 4750 dollars.
Sept. 27th. Paying prize money to the Paraguassu and others.
Sept. 28th. Similarly employed.
Sept. 30th. Paying prize money.
Oct. 1st to 5th. Paying prize money.

The following were the amounts disbursed on these occasions, as far as they appear in my private memoranda--some doubtless having been lost:--


Disbursements at Rio de Janeiro 70,750
(Paid Squadron as per account, made up Sept. 23, 1824.)
To petty officers and seamen of flagship, in classes
numbered A to Y, as per pay books transmitted by Piranha 18,289
Paid Captain Crosbie 10,400
"Captain-Lieutenants Carvalho, Grenfell, and
Shepherd, 2250 dollars each 6,750
"Capt. Grenfell, on account of captures at Para 2,750
"Seven Lieutenants, at 1500 dollars each 10,500
"Two Lieutenants at 1000 dollars each 2,000
"Six Lieutenants at 750 dollars each 4,500
"Lieutenant Ross as prize master 500
"Maria de Gloria 2,483
"Nitherohy, Carolina, and Paraguassu, noaccount, say the same 7,500
"Brig Bahia 274
"Officers and men of the Piranga 7,053
"Mr. Dean, purser 600
"Lieutenant Ayre 480
"Florencia Jose da Costa 140
"Gratifications to artisans 419
"To Admiral 4,750
"Secretary, for distribution 5,000
"May and Lukin, prize agents, as per balanceof account, July 15, 1824 5,324
Original amount 200,000
Balance to be accounted for 39,538

The above were not the whole amounts paid, but they are all that a search amongst my numerous papers at present furnish; and as the original accounts, as has been previously stated, were sent to Rio de Janeiro, a more precise balance cannot here be drawn; but even this is sufficient to carry conviction to any reasonable mind, that the sums above stated were disbursed in ordinary routine, and should make the Brazilian administration ashamed to say, that "the First Admiral never sent in his accounts of the 200,000 dollars entrusted to him," thus inducing an unworthy inference that they were not disbursed; though any man possessed of common understanding could never believe that a squadron, constituted as the Brazilian Marine was, would obey orders and cheerfully act in unison with me, knowing that their prize money was on board--of which I unwarrantably held possession!

These explanations are more humiliating to the Brazilian administration than to myself--though for so many years the subject of unmerited obloquy from their denial of accounts which must unquestionably have been in the possession of the Administration of 1825. But I must carry these explanations yet farther. With the exception of 4750 dollars for my own necessities, I took none as my share, though entitled to an eighth in all cases, and to a fourth in the absence of other ships whenever important services were performed by the flagship alone. Neither had I received from the Imperial Government a single dollar of the customary emoluments due to me, though, had these been honestly paid according to the usages of nations and the stipulations of the Emperor's decree of December 11, 1822, my share ought to have been more than double the whole amount entrusted to me to man the ships and satisfy the officers and men. Still I did not appropriate the 39,000 dollars which remained, after paying the men, but determined to withhold it till I saw what course the prize tribunal at Rio de Janeiro intended to pursue; and, if that course were not satisfactory, then to appropriate it as a right, although it was wholly inadequate to the services rendered, for which I had been loaded with Imperial honours and national thanks, without a shilling of emolument, notwithstanding the capture of a hundred and twenty bona fide enemy's ships--the expulsion of their fleet and army--and the annexation of more than one half the empire. But more of this in another place.

On my return to Pernambuco, I found General Lima in quiet possession of the city, and as the Piranga had brought me instructions from His Imperial Majesty, that, as soon as order was restored, a force should proceed to Para, and depose the, General-at-Arms there nominated, I applied to General Lima for a small military detachment to effect that object; but he declined--on the ground, that in the present state of affairs in Pernambuco, it was not practicable to diminish his force.

It was not at Para only that irregularities prevailed: even at Maranham serious disturbances had broken out, with the avowed intention, on the part of the insurgents, of deposing the Governor acting under the authority of His Imperial Majesty--to whom this new attempt at revolution was as yet unknown. In short, the order to depose the General-at-Arms at Para had unexpectedly resolved itself into the necessity of tranquillizing the whole of the Northern provinces, which were only waiting the result of Carvalho's measures at Pernambuco, openly to declare against the Imperial authority.

The dissatisfaction in the Northern provinces originated solely in the anti-Brazilian system of Government pursued at Rio de Janeiro, which in the estimation of all at a distance was Portuguese rather than Brazilian. As they were either ignorant, or did not believe, that the patriotic intentions of the Emperor were overruled or thwarted by the Portuguese faction in the administration, which, holding in reality the reins of power, left to His Majesty little more than nominal authority.

It was not, then, to be wondered at, that the inhabitants of these distant provinces, who, only a year before, had welcomed me as their liberator from Portuguese oppression, and as the representative of constitutional authority, should now be dissatisfied with what they rightly considered an unnational system of government--preferring to submit to a bad government of their own choosing rather than to one thus arbitrarily imposed upon them.

To avert revolution required able presidents, well skilled in the management of public affairs; but, in place of these, men of an opposite character had, for the most part, been chosen by the administration.

It was no less essential that the Generals-at-Arms, or military commandants, should be temperate and unprejudiced; but those placed in this responsible position used their authority in the most obnoxious and arbitrary manner. It was, no doubt, difficult to find proper men; or, if they existed amongst the Brazilians, the jealousy of the Portuguese party in the administration prevented their elevation to power; the aim of that faction being disorder, as auxiliary to their anti-imperial views. This had been strikingly evinced by the instructions given to disembark General Lima's force at Alagoas, instead of near the seat of disturbance; thus entailing loss of time and a difficult and tedious march, which might have ended in failure, had it not been for the distraction caused by the threatened bombardment of Pernambuco by water, and the demonstration made to shew how easily it would be effected, when means for a destructive attack were complete; the result was, that--knowing my return from Bahia, with everything in readiness for an attack in earnest, could not be delayed beyond a few days, no serious opposition was offered to the occupation of the city by the force under General Lima.

The reports of increased disaffection in the Northern provinces becoming daily more precise, it was necessary to take advantage of the panic which the recovery of Pernambuco had occasioned; the more so, as serious commotions had arisen, whilst a strong disposition to revolt was almost universally manifested. As General Lima had refused me a military detachment--and as the Pedro Primeiro and Piranga could render him no further assistance, I considered it more in conformity with His Majesty's interests to visit the Northern ports with these ships; taking also the Cacique and Atalanta, for the performance of services to which the larger vessels were not adapted. The mere presence of these off the disaffected ports would, I knew, suffice to restore order, by affording inferential demonstration that, if force were required, it was ready to be applied.

Accordingly, leaving at Pernambuco the remainder of the squadron, we sailed on the 10th of October for Rio Grande do Norte, where great confusion prevailed amongst the inhabitants, threatened by the insurgents in the adjacent province of Ceara, on account of their abandonment of revolutionary designs in consequence of events at Pernambuco.

Arriving off the Rio Grande on the 12th, I requested information from the President, relative to the state of the maritime towns and provinces between Rio Grande and Para, especially with regard to Ceara. The nature of the reply determined me at once to proceed to the latter place, though regretting the necessity of going farther to leeward, on account of the time which would be occupied in getting back to Rio de Janeiro; yet feeling assured that it would not be satisfactory to His Majesty, were we to return without ascertaining more particularly the condition of the North, and without contributing to the restoration of tranquillity.

Arriving off Ceara on the 18th, I sent a communication to the President, requiring him to make known my arrival for the purpose of restoring order, and promising that all disaffected persons who, within fourteen days, should return to their allegiance, would be permitted to retire quietly to their homes, and would not in any way be molested on account of their previous acts or opinions.

A deputation of the inhabitants came off to the flagship, asking me to land as large a force as I could spare, but as General Lima had declined to supply a military detachment, it was out of my power to comply; for the roadstead being unsafe, and the flagship nearly aground, I could not dispense with the English seamen, whilst the Portuguese portion of the crews was not to be trusted. Besides which, the foreign seamen were not adapted to garrisoning a town.

The application was, therefore, evaded; but with an assurance to the President that, should the insurgents advance, we would render effectual assistance; reminding him, however, that the inhabitants ought to be induced to adopt amongst themselves, measures for their own protection and preservation of tranquillity, which results were perfectly within their power; and would render unnecessary the presence of military.

I however landed a small detachment for the purpose of ascertaining the means of defence, as well as in the hope of exciting the authorities on shore to some degree of activity in their own cause. In case of attack, I promised to disembark for their assistance the whole of the men who could be spared; at the same time giving permission to withdraw to the ships in case of sudden emergency, which might not admit of communication with me in time.

This offer produced the best effect in the city, giving confidence to the well-affected, whilst, as the discontented were ignorant of the extent of aid that could be afforded, they deemed it wisest to keep quiet. On the following day, the inhabitants returned to their allegiance, the officiating President hoisting the Imperial flag on the ramparts with his own hands, amidst every demonstration of general satisfaction.

I next caused despatches to be sent to all quarters of the province, announcing the return of the city to its allegiance, promising oblivion of the past to all who followed the example, and this was succeeded by a general acknowledgment of the Imperial authority. Confidential agents, entrusted with similar despatches, were likewise sent to the revolutionary forces headed by Bizarra, the rebel General-at-Arms, the whole of whose troops abandoned him; whilst, by similar agency, the corps, under the immediate command of the revolutionary president, Araripe, was reduced to a hundred men--even the Indians, without exception, abandoning his standard.

As one of the first steps towards the pacification of the province, I had published not only a general amnesty, but also a particular amnesty, offering to the insurgent leaders themselves especial pardon, from which, in ordinary general amnesty, they might otherwise imagine themselves excluded, I had, in my own mind, determined upon this as a general course to be pursued, as I could not but see that, in the outset of the revolt, both insurgents and leaders had good cause to be dissatisfied with the central Government at Rio de Janeiro. I had even addressed a letter personally to the revolutionary president, Araripe, remonstrating upon the folly of the course he was pursuing, and promising my protection to himself, as well as to the other revolutionary leaders, if they would return to their allegiance. He chose rather to withdraw into the interior, with the discontented who adhered to him, intending, no doubt, to wait till the naval force had retired. Foreseeing the danger of this, I issued a proclamation, offering a reward for his capture, sufficient to induce the Indians who had previously been his supporters to proceed in quest of him, the result being that he himself was killed, and the whole of his followers captured. The Indian chiefs, as well as their dependants, were of great service in the restoration of order, combining superior bodily strength and activity, with energy, docility, and unfailing power of endurance --forming, indeed, the best specimens of the native race I had seen in South America.

Previous to this I had succeeded, without much trouble, in restoring tranquillity to the province of Parahyba, which had also been disturbed by the mandates of Araripe; the inhabitants complying with his orders, from the immediate danger to which they were exposed by his violence, and being under the impression that Rio de Janeiro was too far distant to afford them succour. Their delight at finding a squadron at hand was, therefore, immediately followed by a repudiation of the insurgent chief, and a return to unqualified allegiance.

My next endeavour was to organise an effective force at Ceara, and this was accomplished by the embodiment of more than a thousand men, though we had not a soldier in the squadron. Various corps were also raised in the towns and villages of the province, and were active in pursuit of the scattered remains of the republican army.

Having thus assured myself of the complete restoration of order in the capital and province of Ceara, and addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, pointing out to them the folly of being misled by designing persons, who could have no accurate knowledge of matters which formed the ground of complaint against the Imperial Government, we sailed on the 4th of November for Maranham, which province was found in a state of even greater anarchy than had prevailed at Ceara.

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