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FROM THE VARANGIANS

TO THE BOLSHEVIKS

BY

Charles

A RAYMOND BEAZLEY, NEVILL FORBES

AND G. A. BIRKETT

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INTRODUCTION

WAR is a time of rapid vicissitudes. Among all the vicissitudes in the destinies of nations which this great war has caused or occasioned, none have been more rapid or more striking than those which we have seen in Russia. Failure has alternated with success : one figure after another has appeared, stood for a moment in the ascendant, and then passed away : parties, causes, political creeds have come and gone with an amazing velocity. From our thoughts and pictures of Holy Russia we have been swung to the spectacle of Russia secularized and socialist : we have seen the apparent unity of Russia dissolved, and Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine disengaged from the body of the Russian Empire ; and while we recognize the depth and profundity of these changes, we dimly guess that the future may bring us changes still deeper and still more profound. Bewildered by all these revolutions of the wheel, we cannot but ask ourselves how and why they came—whence they sprang, and whither they tend.

If we are to answer such questions, we must turn to the story of Russian history. History cannot solve the riddle of humanity, but it can at any rate record the gradual accumulation of factors which have gone to produce the result by which we are confronted, and by breaking up the problem into its constituent elements and successive stages it may enable the student to find some reason and provide some answer for the whole. The stages of Russian history, as they appear in this volume, are sufficiently various. In the first book Professor Beazley paints the romantic epoch of mediaeval Russia—the epoch of vikings and traders, of Kiev and Nóvgorod : in the second Mr. Forbes

depicts the hard and austere story of the building of the Russian colossus : in the third Mr. Birkett traces the infiltration of Western thought and Western science into the Russian State, and the accumulation, during the nineteenth century, of a mass of social and political problems—problems of serfdom, peasant proprietorship and socialistic doctrine ; problems, again, of autocracy and bureaucracy, of nationality and constitutionalism. The one gives an impression as of a gay banquet : the other unfolds a story of perpetual wars and annexations : the third has to tell a tale of railways, education, economics, and agitation—a tale which ends, for the moment, in the crumbling of the colossus and the dissolution of the structure reared by autocracy into the component elements from which it was built.

The original Russia was gay, boisterous, and full of colour, vitality and emotion. It suggests to the imagination the spectacle of the great Russian opera, with all its colour and motion and music. The Tartar Invasion of the thirteenth century clouded much of the gaiety—but not all. It left traces for many centuries—but not, perhaps, as many as the famous dictum ascribed to Napoleon (‘ scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar ’) would suggest. More important in its influence on the future history and character of Russia was the rise of the Princes of Moscow, and their steady pursuit of a dour policy of adding acre to acre and principality to principality. It was a policy natural under the geographical conditions amid which it was pursued. Here was a vast plain, with few or no marked boundaries or natural frontiers within which a State might feel itself naturally designed to live. A snowball once set rolling would roll continuously over this area until it was shattered by some shock of events, or dissolved by some sudden heat of action. This absence of natural frontiers has, indeed, been the sad geographical dower of Eastern Europe, and it explains much of

its history—the intermixture and interlacing of its stocks : the dissolution of Poland, unsupported by any frontier buttresses : the increase of Russian territory, unchecked by any resistance of physical barriers. As long as the face of the earth remains the same, this dower will tend to produce its tragedies ; and as one Power has rolled westwards, another may roll eastwards in its turn for its appointed space. But there has been another factor in Russian history which also accounts for Russian expansion—a factor partly dependent upon the last. This is the migratory habit of the Russian stock, moving restlessly towards new land and new settlements—southwards towards the Black Sea and the rich black soil on the way towards it, or eastwards across the Ural Mountains into Siberia. The most striking result of this migratory habit is the Cossacks ; but the migrations of the Russian stock are older than the Cossacks, and its results are written in many other regions of the world than those of the Cossack settlements.

Combine these things—the policy of the Princes of Moscow and their successors, the absence of natural frontiers, and the migratory habit of the Russian people—and the result is that enormous expansion which has carried Russia from Warsaw to Vladivostók, and from the White Sea to Southern Turkestan. This expansion has two sides—one which is national, and another which is governmental, or, according to a prevalent word, ‘imperialistic’. The national expansion still lives, and—perhaps above all in Siberia, a solid core of Russian life—it will continue to live. It has created the Russian ‘Colonies’, which (we hope) may yet find self-government in a Russian Commonwealth. The governmental expansion is different : it has brought into dependence on the Tsars a belt of non-Russian peoples on the west, and another belt of non-Russian peoples on the south. On the west are the Finns, the Baltic peoples between Finland and Poland, and the Poles ; on the south, from

the Crimea to Turkestán, are the Turks.¹ The expansion which has brought the belt of peoples on the west of Russia into dependence on the Tsars is now being undone before our eyes; and as for what may happen on the south of Russia, that is a thing which perhaps no man can tell.

We are beginning to realize that the dissolution of the great State which had been built on the east European plains is less astonishing than its long continuance in the past. Shaped by force to a great extent, it was held and clamped together almost entirely by force. Nothing but the old bureaucracy, with all its engines of police and gendarmerie, could have maintained that artificial structure for so long a period; and even while we condemn its methods, we cannot withhold a meed of admiration from its achievement. But if it was, in its way, an Atlas, it was not a very thoughtful or efficient Atlas, and the world which it sustained on its shoulders was a world possessed by an instinct for dissolution. On a long view, it was perhaps an unwise policy for Russian rulers, if they valued the preservation of the *status quo*, ever to venture on a great European war. War searches the joints and harness of every State that challenges its verdict: it appraises, first by a rude and sudden shock and then by a long, slow, dragging tension (just as we test and appraise the worth of steel), the endurance and the capacity for survival of each political community. More than once, in the last few decades, the test of war has shaken Russia. The Crimean War caused searchings of heart; the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 left an uneasy legacy; the Russo-Japanese War of this century made the whole structure of Russia rock on its foundations. Less than ten years after its conclusion there ensued the great war in which we are still engaged—a war which dwarfs all previous wars to child's play—

¹ See the article in the *Round Table* for December 1917 on 'Russia, Islam, and the Turks'.

and the structure, though it endured the strain for almost three years, cracked and collapsed. A State with communications still thin and scanty, and an organization of her resources still largely imperfect, was plunged into a modern scientific war that demanded perfect communications, along which millions of men could be moved like the shuttle across a loom, and required an intensive organization of resources and productive effort which would have taxed the most highly developed machinery of government. The communications were not there: the organization was not ready. The triumph of Russia over Austria was more amazing than the triumph of Germany over Russia. The triumph of Germany let loose the forces of dissolution, social and national, which were already at work in Russia—*suis et ipsa viribus ruit*.

It was natural, a year ago, as we watched the beginning of the Russian Revolution, that we should think of the French Revolution. We drew hope from the analogy for our ally and for our own cause. We remembered revolutionary France gathering herself together to defend her freedom against Prussia and Austria: we hoped that revolutionary Russia would gird her loins no less successfully against the same foes. Historical parallels are often misleading; and we have found by experience that the parallel which we drew for ourselves was very far from true. The French Revolution was a revolution of a united country—a country united round the common hearth of Paris, in spite of federalist or royalist movements in the south-west and the west, with an intimate and enduring unity. The Russian Revolution was a revolution of a country essentially disunited—a country of many centres, many nationalities, many languages, many creeds. There is also another difference perhaps no less profound. The French Revolution was political rather than social: it sprang more from the *bourgeoisie* than from the proletariat. Not till the days of the Directory did

any movement of a socialistic character appear, and when it appeared it was rapidly stifled. From the beginning of the Russian Revolution the socialistic movement was strong, and during its rapid course it has become progressively stronger. Socialism, all the more advanced in proportion as Russia herself was less advanced in her economic development than other States, had been a force, indeed, for many years before the Russian Revolution had its birth. Social disruption, no less than political, was thus the product of the Revolution of 1917. The French Revolution may have led to the emigration of the *noblesse* of France ; but instead of disrupting France, it made her one in many respects in which she had before been divided, and it produced a national and social unity which carried her safely through more than twenty years of war.

In searching for the causes of events, whether they be great or whether they be small, we are naturally prone *chercher l'homme* ; and the man who naturally presents himself to our thoughts, when we seek the author of the present state of Russia, is Peter the Great. He first, it may be said, set Russia on the wrong path. Introducing a German system of bureaucracy and pushing towards the Baltic and the Black Sea, he wrested his country from a quiet internal development on the lines of her own Slavonic genius. This may be true ; but it is also true that the cause of trouble goes farther back, as it also goes farther forward, than the reign of Peter the Great. It goes back to Ivan III and Basil III and Ivan IV, who also followed the way of annexation and the way of autocracy : it runs forward to Catherine II and her successors, whose thoughts were also thoughts of annexation and autocratic government. It is possible to think of a better, if a harder, way ; but it is a way that one can hardly expect ' dynasts ' to have seen or, if they saw, adopted. That better way would have been to turn energy inwards to domestic, instead of outwards to foreign

politics: to shed bureaucracy, and to develop local self-government and initiative; to create a free peasantry and a thriving middle class; and to erect, on such a social basis, a system of free institutions. No reformer, it is true, even if he be a Tsar, can achieve any real results without the co-operation of a people possessed of enough practical gifts to work new institutions and fit themselves to new requirements. Whether the Russian people possesses these practical gifts time alone will show; but the work done by the local *zémstvos*, both before and during the war, would seem to suggest that reforming Tsars might have found a basis among their people for their reforms. The difficulty was perhaps less with the people, and less with the Tsars themselves, than with the bureaucracy. Some of the later Romanoffs have shown a strain of idealism which, under favourable auspices, might have made their names famous in the annals of progress. Alexander I had his phase of liberalism; and even his Holy Alliance, however Utopian, was in its beginnings a noble conception. The Tsar liberator, Alexander II, added to the sum of human freedom by the emancipation of the serfs; and the name of Nicholas II will always be connected with the history of the Hague Conference. But bureaucracy does not love new things, which will disturb its routine and diminish its power; and Russian bureaucracy was always a tract of sand in which the waters of reform sank and were absorbed without a trace. Nor was the attitude of the Orthodox Church and the Slavophil party very favourable to any change. The Orthodox Church was proud of Russia as she stood, and regarded her as the depositary and treasurer of a unique and immaculate faith, which any approximation to the West would only soil; and the Slavophiles tended to think that if Russia was different from the West, that only meant that she was better, and that she must at all costs maintain her superiority pure and intact.

Under conditions such as these the attention of the Russian

government was steadily turned to what seemed the more attractive field of foreign politics, and the old policy of expansion and annexation (one may almost call it agglutination) continued to be steadily pursued. Here Constantinople offered itself as a natural goal. It had, indeed, been a goal of Russian effort far back in the earliest mists of Russian history. A thousand years ago, and more, Russians—or rather Scandinavian leaders at the head of Russians—had been pushing southwards down the Russian rivers to the Black Sea and so to Constantinople; and to this day, it is said, the cascades of the Dnieper bear Scandinavian names. Luitprand, the ‘scandalous chronicler’ of the tenth century, tells of these attacks and of their collapse before Byzantine organization and Greek fire. These were early forays; but from the end of the fifteenth century, when the Princes of Moscow married into the House of the Palaeologi, a new and more insistent element of irredentism was added. The Tsars could now claim to be heirs of the Roman Caesars, and could oppose themselves to the similar (but less founded) pretensions of the Turkish Sultans, now established in Constantinople as usurping Kaisar-i-Rum. From the time of Catherine II this motive becomes conspicuous; and it could be pleaded in its defence that the recovery of Constantinople would also mean the redemption of the suffering kinsfolk of Russia in the Balkan peninsula. Thus Russia entered into the perennial question of the East, and thus she was brought into conflict primarily and particularly with Austria, the great Danubian Power—like Russia an agglutination of fragments, like Russia looking outwards instead of inwards, and like Russia looking towards Constantinople—but also, of late years, when Germany began to look south-eastward towards Bagdad, with the military power of Germany. Across the slow movement of Russia—a movement which, if it was half imperialistic, was also half idealistic, and directed to noble objects such as the redemption of the Slavs in south-eastern Europe

and the recovery for Christendom of Constantinople—there was suddenly plunged the German *Drang nach Osten*, half militarist, half mercantilist, but almost wholly materialist. Challenged to war by Germany, first in 1909, when she was too weak to accept the challenge, and again in 1914, when she could not but accept it on pain of seeing Serbia ruined and south-eastern Europe brought under German control, she accepted the challenge, and was plunged into the great war which has brought her so many vicissitudes in its course, and last of all has brought her revolution.

The results of the Revolution, as far as Russia is concerned, and the results for the whole world of what will result in Russia, are things still hidden from us. Some of us dreamed before the war of the possibility of a federal Russia, in which the different and seemingly incongruous elements of her life would be composed together in unity and harmony. We can only continue to hope, and to pray, that our dream may still come true, and that all the groups and nationalities of the Russian commonwealth may find a *modus vivendi* (or a *modus convivendi*) in a federal state. If that should prove impossible, and if Russia should fall permanently asunder into a number of separate States, there will be a happy hunting-ground in eastern Europe for the ambitions and intrigues of three Powers—Germany in the north-west of Russia, Austria in the Ukraine, and Turkey in the region from the Crimea, through the Caucasus, to Turkestan. Meanwhile, there is, as it were, a vacuum in the world, and we wait in suspense to see what will rush into the vacuum. Whatever it be, we in these islands shall be affected by it—as will, too, the peoples of many other countries. The future of Russia in Asia (to say nothing of Russia in Europe) must vitally affect the future of our Empire. But there is a still larger question, and a still larger issue, than the future of our Empire; and that is the future peace of all the world. The old Russia did not make for peace. States imperfect within

are a source of menace without ; and it is the incompleteness of the organization of their life that has made the States of eastern Europe, and Russia among the rest, military in character and militarist in policy. It is now forty years ago since T. H. Green, writing of the military system of Europe which even then appalled the observer, attributed that system to ' the fact that the organization of State-life, even with those peoples that have been brought under its influence at all, is still so incomplete '. ' Standing armies,' he wrote, ' though existing on a larger scale now than ever before, are not products of the civilization of Europe, but of the predominance over that civilization of the old *δυναστείαι*. The influences which have given rise to and keep up those armies essentially belong to a state of things in which mankind—even European mankind—is not yet thoroughly organized into political life.'¹ If only the vacuum which now exists in Russia can ultimately be filled with the complete and thorough organization of a State-life, based not on a *δυναστεία* but on a true *πολιτεία*, it will mean more than perhaps any other event could mean for the future peace of the world.

But these things are in the future ; and the concern of the historians by whom this book is written is with the past. What they have sought to do is to set forth the successive stages of the past, and to explain how each successive stage produced the next. They give us the key to the present : they can give us no key to the future until the future has become the past. History is not prophecy ; and if it teaches, what it teaches is not the future. But it is perhaps possible to take some comfort for the future from the history of the past. Russia has gone through trouble before, and she has come out safely on the other side. Some three hundred years ago there was a 'time of troubles', with an aristocracy dominant where the Bolshevik now reigns, and the Poles interfering from outside as the Germans are

¹ *Principles of Political Obligation*, § 173.

doing to-day. She escaped from the 'time of troubles' by a vigorous native reaction; and a similar reaction may yet come to-day. We must not expect it too impatiently: the music of history is not played at a rapid pace. But it may come, none the less, in its own time and at its own season. Russia has shed lately many foreign elements in her body politic—a bureaucracy largely German: annexed and alien peoples of different stocks and with different traditions from her own: a social order which was incompatible with liberty. It may be that she is being purified as by fire, and that from the fire, and the beating of the iron on the anvil, a firmly-wrought unity will emerge—a peasant democracy, or a federation of peasant democracies, still holding firmly the old religious faith which has so long been of the essence of Russian life, but adding a new liberty to the old faith, and a new equality to the old Christian brotherhood of true believers.

At any rate we in England can only wish Russia well, whatever we may suffer to-day from her defection. She has left us: our kinsfolk who live in Russia are passing through deep waters: our armies who stand on guard in Flanders and northern France have a heavier burden thrust upon their shoulders. But if she has left us now, she looked to us, in her struggles for liberty, during the early years of this century; and the study of our constitutional history, it is said, has raised among the Liberal thinkers of Russia an enthusiasm which might astonish an Englishman. 'All three Dumas', wrote Professor Pares some years ago, 'were remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for quotation.'¹ What was true of the earlier Dumas and their Liberal members is not, it must be admitted, true of the Soviets and the Socialists of whom they are composed. To them England is the home, not of liberalism, but of capitalism and imperialism—a *bourgeois* State, no more able to be the ally of the social

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. xii, p. 379.

republic of Russia than Germany or Austria. Experience may teach other lessons ; and the progressive forces of Russia may yet turn back to us, as builders of an ancient house of freedom which, with all its defects—its rambling wings, its incommodious passages, its many relics of an outgrown past—can still give suggestion and even inspiration to new builders. If ever they turn to us—if ever the statesmen to whose lot it falls to build the new Russia of the future come to us for counsel or comfort—we shall be proud to give freely, and to help, in whatsoever measure we can, the building of a State so organized and so completed that it can be a full fellow member with our own in the comity of the nations that we trust to see established.

Whatsoever comes and goes in the future, there is one lesson that these great happenings in Russia teach us, even more, perhaps, than anything else that has happened in the war. They teach us that we are entering into a new order and upon a new dispensation of the political system of the world. The war has surged over eastern Europe, and lo, the old landmarks are gone. We shall need new maps : we shall see new States : we shall meet new groupings : we shall find a fresh system of politics. Our more stable and older West will change less ; but it too will change, and its relations with eastern Europe will change. We stand on the threshold of new hours. From the peaks to which we have climbed we stare at a new ocean, dimly descried, unsailed, uncharted, moved by unknown tides and currents. What fortunes will attend our voyaging—whether we shall have halcyon days, or still be tossed by adverse winds—the voyage alone can prove. What rests upon each people is to trim its ship : what rests upon all peoples is to sail in convoy.

February 24, 1918.

THE PRONUNCIATION OF RUSSIAN AND POLISH NAMES

Russian uses the Cyrillic alphabet, Polish the Latin with additional signs; the table gives first the Cyrillic, second the equivalent in English, and third the Polish letter or letters corresponding.

Russian		Polish
Cyrillic	Transliteration	
а	a (as in <i>far</i>)	a
б	b	b
в	v	w
г	g	g
д	d	d
е	e (as in <i>yct</i>)	e or ie
ж	zh (= s in <i>pleasure</i>)	ż or rz
з	z	z
и	i	i
(иі)	(i)	
к	k	k
л	l	{ l = soft l (in <i>lend</i>) { l = hard l (second l in <i>little</i> , almost like English <i>w</i>)
м	m	m
н	n	n
о	o (as in <i>or</i>)	o
п	p	p
р	r	r
с	s	ś
т	t	t
у	u (as in <i>rule</i>)	u or ó
ф	f	f
х	kh	ch (in Scots <i>loch</i>)
ц	ts	c (= ts)
ч	ch	cz (in <i>chin</i>)
ш	sh	sz (in <i>shin</i>)

Russian		Polish
Cyrillic	Transliteration	
Щ	shch	szcz
Ѣ	(hard sign, omitted)	—
Ы	y (as in <i>bymn</i>)	y (as in <i>bymn</i>)
Ь	(soft sign, omitted)	(expressed by an accent on a consonant)
Ѣ = e	—	—
Ә	e (as in <i>end</i>)	—
Ю	yu (as in <i>yule</i>)	ju
Я	ya (as in <i>yard</i>)	ja

In Polish *ć*, *dź*, *ś* and *ź* are softened or palatalized consonants : *ć* sounds like *t* in *tune* (Russian : ТѢ), *dź* like *d* in *dune* (Russian : ДѢ); *ś* and *ź* are sounds between *s* and *sz*, and *z* and *ź* respectively ; when followed by a vowel the place of these accents is taken by *i*, e.g. *ci-* and *dzi-* = *ć* and *dź*.

In Russian *e* is always preceded by a *y*-sound (as in *yet*) when *e* is initial, or is preceded by a vowel or the letters *l* (Л), *n* (Н), *t* (Т), *d* (Д), and to a less extent when preceded by other consonants ; this 'softening' is represented in Polish by *ie*.

In Russian when *e* is accented it sometimes acquires the sound of *yo* (as in *yonder*), but when preceded by certain consonants, e.g. *ch* (Ч), this *y*-sound disappears and then *e* has the sound of *o*, e.g. Pugachëv, pronounce Pugachóv. This *e* is represented by the diaeresis : *ë*.

Polish *ł* = Russian Л (*l*) before Ѣ or a 'hard' vowel (*a*, *o*, &c.) ; Polish *l* = approximately Russian Л (*l*) before Ъ or a 'soft' vowel (*e* or *i*).

In Polish the nasal vowels *a* and *e* have the sound of the French syllables *on*, *om*, and *in*, *im*, respectively.

Polish *j* = English *y*, and Polish *b* = English *b*.

Both in Russian and Polish final voiced consonants become voiceless, e.g. final *v* (Polish *w*) is pronounced like *f*.

ACCENTUATION

Russian names, except those most familiar to Englishmen, have been marked with the accent to indicate the stress. In Polish the stress is always on the last syllable but one, and has therefore not been marked. Accented *o* (*ó*) in Polish only means that this letter is pronounced like *u* in *rule*.

BOOK I

I

The Old Free Russia

The Foundations

THE history of the Russian people may be considered as beginning about the middle of the ninth century (c. 852-62, as the *Ancient Chronicle* gives it), when a Scandinavian migration founds a new national centre in the east European plains, along those east European rivers which traverse the great isthmus between the Baltic and the Black Sea.

At this time (c. 860) the Slavonic race inhabited only a part of what is now European Russia. It lay mainly in what we may call the middle west of the modern country. In the north it stopped just short of the Nevá, Petrograd, and the Gulf of Finland, nowhere reaching the Baltic. In the east it stretched almost, but not quite, to the longitude of Moscow. In the south it was cut off from the Black Sea by the great plains or prairies of the *steppes* (a little earlier some Slav tribes may have touched the Euxine coast for a time, between the mouths of the Danube and Dnieper). To the west the tribes which became the Slavs of Old Russia were perhaps bounded by the upper course of the Polish Buh (Bug) and by the Carpathians. Beyond the Buh, Slavdom of course continued in the ninth century over the Polish and Wendish plains, rivers, and forests, up to the Elbe, and even beyond, till it met the German stock—but these, like the Slavonic lands of Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, and the

Balkans, were regions altogether beyond the historic limits of the *Rus*.

Just as the Finnish tribes, who then occupied all the extreme north of Europe, cut off the Russian Slavs from the coast of Esthonia and all the northern Baltic, so Lithuanians and allied races cut them off from the Gulf of Riga and the outer coasts of Courland.

And as all the north, the far north-west and north-east, and much of the middle east, of our Russia-in-Europe were then in the feeble hands of thinly-scattered Finnish tribes, to whom belonged the upper course of the Volga, the sites of Moscow and Petrograd, and most of the Urál range; so the south-east and nearly all the south (up to the southern, or Black Sea, Buh) were held by Turkish tribes, strongly mixed in some cases with Finnish elements. The semi-Judaized Khazars in the Euxine coast-lands, and the Muhammadan Bulgarians of the middle Volga, were the most interesting of these.

Looking at Russia from north to south, in its various zones or belts, it is clear that the famous but almost desert *tundra* of the far north lay entirely outside the interests, and even knowledge, of the eastern Slavs in the ninth century; that the steppes of the extreme south were almost equally beyond their power, though by no means so far beyond their ken; and that their settlements were restricted to certain sections of the forest and agricultural zones.

Thus the *Russian land*, at the beginning of the national history, was perhaps slightly smaller than the Scandinavian peninsula.

The Russian Revolution of this year should serve to remind one that Russia was not always an autocratic empire. However false the Napoleonic sneer about scratching a Russian and uncovering a Tartar, the Tartar conquest, the Tartar domination,

the Tartar legacy, are elements of some importance in the life of Russia. This life-story may well be divided into three parts, by reference to the Tartar age. Russian history is all *Before the Tartars*, *Under the Tartars*, or *After the Tartars*. And from the Tartar slavery, Great Russia, the only part in question (for the rest, as a result of the Tartar devastation, had fallen under alien European rule), emerges as the principality, the kingdom, the empire, of the despotic Tsars of Moscow. The Tartar 'Time of Troubles' is the direct and main cause of the modern Russian autocracy.

But the Tartars did not come till the thirteenth century. It was in the half-dozen years from 1237 to 1243 (midway in the reign of Henry III of England, and while Westminster Abbey was in building) that the Mongols and their followers wrecked and subjugated the old free Russia.

Now the origins of the Russian people, as a people, and of the old Russian federation of states, reach back to the middle of the ninth century, to the early days of King Alfred. For these first four centuries the Russian land was certainly not ruled by despotic monarchs. And to an astonishing degree, democratic ideas, free life, even republican organization, prevailed in this oldest Russia. The formation of the Russian nation begins with the settlement of a body of Scandinavians (traditionally under the leadership of one Rurik¹), in east Baltic regions, from Old Nóvgorod, about a hundred miles south of modern Petrograd, up to, and even a little east and north-east of, the present Russian capital (then, of course, a swamp). These Scandinavians, in the tradition, mostly come from the region of Upsala in Sweden. Both the name of *Rus*² and the fact of a Russian people and Russian States are due to them. With the coming

¹ The Scandinavian *Roerek*, *Hroerekr*, or *Hrurikr*.

² See the note on p. 201.

of these 'Varangians' this name of *Rus* (originally a Finnish description of the Swedes as *Rowers*) becomes famous in all the East. As a Hebrew writer of the tenth century puts it :

'The tribes of the North, and among them the people of *Rus*, have placed certain of the Slavs in subjection, and are dwelling in the midst of them to this day—so intermingled, that they¹ have even adopted their language'.²

In the oldest Russian record this great event, a Norman conquest in the East, is disguised as the result of a spontaneous invitation to Varangian princes from the scattered and warring tribes of these regions, so incessantly attacked by Viking and other enemies.

'In the year of the world 6360 [A. D. 852] at the accession of the Emperor Michael [III of Constantinople] they began to name the Russian land. . . .

'The Varangians from over sea laid tribute upon the Chuds³ and the Slavs' (859). . . . 'They drove the Varangians beyond the sea and paid tribute to them no more. And they set themselves to govern themselves, and there was no more justice among them : families disputed with families, and there were discords, and they made war between themselves. Then said they, Let us seek for a prince to reign over us and judge us according to right. And they went beyond the sea of the Varangians and went among the *Rus*—for these Varangians called themselves *Rus*—others called themselves *Swedes*, others *Normans*, others *Angles*, others *Goths*. So the Chuds, the Slavs, and the others said to the *Rus*, Our land is great and rich, but there is no order among us ; come then and rule and govern us. And three brothers joined together, with their *families*, and brought them to *Rus*. They went first among the Slavs, and built the town of Ládoga, and Rurik the eldest established himself at Ládoga ; the second, Sineus, on the shores of the Bélo Ózero [the White Lake] ;⁴ the third, Truvor, at Izborsk. It

¹ The Varangian conquerors.

² The Slav.

³ Finns.

⁴ Almost due east of Ládoga.

is from these Varangians that the men of Nóvgorod are called *Rus*; to-day the men of Nóvgorod belong to the Varangian race: they were at first Slavs.¹

All three phases—a time of raids and civil war, an invitation to Swedish Vikings by some discontented party (perhaps itself of partly Scandinavian origin), and the entrance, success, and domination of the foreign conqueror and settler—are probably represented in the complete history of the facts.

Rurik and his comrades hesitated for a time—we read in one suggestive version of the record—‘scarce electing to go, for dread of the beast-like manners of the men of Nóvgorod’. Yet no sooner had they settled than they began ‘to build them towns and to wage war everywhere’. Native risings were rigorously suppressed. The Varangian dominion had only lasted two years when the folk of Nóvgorod ‘rebelled, saying, We are but slaves, and suffer evil from Rurik and his nobles’. But the revolt quickly died away with the death of its leader, the punishment and the exile of his followers.

‘At the end of two years’, says *Nestor*, ‘died Sineus and his brother Truvor,² and Rurik made himself master of all the country. He went forward to the Ílmen,³ fortified a little town on the Vólkhov⁴ and called it *Nóvgorod*.⁵ He established himself there as prince, and divided among his companions the lands and the towns, giving to this one Pólotsk, to that one Rostóv, to a third Bélo Ózero. And in these towns the Varangians were only colonists; the first inhabitants of Nóvgorod were Slavs.’

¹ *Chronicle of ‘Nestor’*, A. D. 860.

² It is not necessary to labour the point of the legendary element in these earliest Russian records. *Sineus* and *Truvor* are the Scandinavian *Sigñiutr*, *Sibñiutr*, or *Sibñiuta*, &c., and *Thorvardr* or *Thorvard*.

³ The lake just above, and to the south of, Nóvgorod.

⁴ The river of Nóvgorod, flowing from Lake Ílmen to Lake Ládoga.

⁵ New Town.

Kiev and Constantinople

The Scandinavian conquerors soon pressed south and made themselves overlords of all the eastern Slavs, who then stretched from the Baltic to the middle Dnieper or Dnepr. Here the trading town of Kiev was perhaps already of some importance. This was the southernmost of the east Slav settlements, the final link in the chain of primitive markets which dotted the river route from the Baltic basin to that of the Black Sea—though commencing some way from the shores of the northern sea and ending at a great distance from the waters of the latter, on the northern edge of the steppe or prairie country.

From Kiev an ancient trade, even before Rurik, passed down the Dnieper and over the Euxine, or along its shores, to certain rich sources of supply and profit, the great markets of the East Roman Empire, and above all the Eastern Rome itself. From Kiev a Russian people, once formed, would naturally move towards those markets, and might even aspire to command them.

Within little more than twenty years of the migration of Rurik his successor takes Kiev, and makes it his capital. Even before this, Viking free-lance leaders had been masters of the place; and in 865, over a thousand years ago, while their princes are settling themselves in the north-west, and crushing rebellion in Nóvgorod, these free lances make their first attack—the earliest Russian raid—upon Constantinople, by the sea.

‘There were with Rurik’, says *Nestor*, ‘two men, Askold and Dir,¹ who were not of his race, but were among his nobles. And they left him to go to *Tsargrad* ² with their family. And

¹ *Askold* or *Oskold* is the Scandinavian *Höskuldr* (*Ascald* in some old Irish records); *Dir* the Scandinavian *Dyri*.

² The ‘City of the Caesars’, Constantinople; *grad* is the old Slavonic form of the Russian *gorod*, etymologically the same as our words *garden*,

they crossed the Dnieper, and beyond this river they saw upon a hill a fort.' Here was the town of Kiev, which then paid tribute to the Khazars, in which Askold and Dir fixed themselves, to which they 'gathered a great number of Varangians', and from which they 'marched against the Greeks. . . .'

'It was the fourteenth year of the Emperor Michael [Michael III of Constantinople]. The Emperor had gone against the Agarenes [Saracens]. . . . His enemy [the *Rus*] penetrated into the gulf [the Bosphorus], made a great slaughter of Christians, and besieged *Tsargrad* with 200 ships.' The Emperor returned, and with the Patriarch Photius sought the miraculous help of the Mother of Christ. The storm which dispersed and wrecked the fleet of the Russian pagans—'so that but little of it escaped from disaster'—was naturally ascribed to her by the monastic chronicles of Russians and Byzantines alike.

The Patriarch Photius (so eminent and tragic a figure in the history of the Eastern Empire, of the Christian Church, and of scholarship; so valuable a witness to early Russia) was not merely an eyewitness of this raid. He was also its best historian. Like *Nestor*, he records how cunningly the *Rus* crept up to the Bosphorus and the very walls of the city, at the time when the Emperor was absent, with his main fleet and army, in one of his campaigns against the Saracens. But, unlike *Nestor* and all other marvel-lovers, he also tells us how the Russian attack was planned after the Empire had broken a trade agreement, and how it was embittered by an insult offered to Russian merchants. The *Rus*, he adds, who had been hitherto unknown and of no account, had now become, after this daring onslaught on the Queen of Cities, 'most renowned and glorious'. These same *Rus* had also recently conquered the tribes living around their home, and were become 'boundlessly proud and bold'.

garth, *yard* = an enclosure, cf. German *Zaun* = fence, Dutch *tuin* = garden, and English *town*.

Photius somewhat prematurely congratulates the Greek Church and himself on the conversion of these fierce and bloody barbarians.

Askold and Dir, according to the *Ancient Chronicle*, were mere Viking adventurers, 'neither princes nor of the family of the prince'. They were soon followed, captured, and executed, it is said, by Óleg the successor of Rurik and the guardian of his son Ígor ¹ (A.D. 880-1).

When the main Varangian body, under its official chiefs, had mastered Kiev,² and made it the head-centre of the new Slav-Scandinavian Russian people, now in formation, this expansive energy showed itself afresh, more fiercely than ever.

Four times in the tenth century (904-7, 935-41, 944, 971) did the Russians, from their Kiev centre and under their Kiev princes, return to the attack on New Rome—before the Russian people at last realized the prophetic description of Photius, and 'acknowledged Christ for their God, the missionaries of the Church for their teachers, and the Romans for their friends and brethren'.

Kiev stood to Russia in the position of the chief advanced base either for aggression or for defence, and of the chief market for the east Slav trade of this early time. Mainly from Kiev proceeded the impetus of Russian attacks upon the Eastern Empire or upon the Muhammadan world; upon Kiev rested the burden of guarding the *Russian land* from the raids of its enemies of the steppes. Russian trade with Germans, with

¹ Óleg is the Scandinavian *Helgi*; Ígor the Scandinavian *Ingvarr* or *Ingvar*.

² It is a curious point that just at this time a great part of the Hungarian nation passed Kiev on its westward migration to its final home in the Danube valley. The Magyar chronicles speak of an Hungarian victory over Óleg and his *Rus*.

Poles, or with Hungarians, as yet, was not ; with the Scandinavians it was but a small thing in comparison with the two chief fields of commerce for this easternmost Europe—the Byzantine and the Arabic. The chief starting-point for Russian traders faring to the markets of the south and east—the chief supporting base to travellers crossing the steppes by river or land, to Euxine or to Caspian—was Kiev.

As soon as an armed power appeared in Kiev, able to do something effective for defence of the country and support of its expansion, there was a widespread submission to it on the part of tribes, groups, and settlements, hitherto disunited and hostile, but having the inward bonds of common race, tradition, manners, morals, religion, and interests. Hitherto, these common elements had been insufficient to form even such a loose federation as now comes into being under the pressure of this new external military force. Once revealed as unifier and protector of the common interest, the powerful Varangian chief, who was now master of Kiev and Nóvgorod, becomes a political force. With the justification of the common interest, a powerful plea along the riverine trade-routes from Baltic to Euxine, the *Veliki Knyaz* [Grand Prince] of Kiev subjugates, or rather federates under his leadership, the whole of the east Slav tribes (beyond the borders of Polish influence)—even those least responsive to nationalist appeal.

As the Kiev suzerains extend their dominions, piece by piece, they establish in the conquered or federated territories a system of tribute and taxation which was one of the chief objects of their administration. The rulers or princes of these conquered or federated districts are generally, by the time of the conversion (980–1000), either near relatives or paid retainers of the Grand Prince. Yet they act so independently of Kiev, and maintain so slender a connexion with it, that they are nearly as complete sovereigns as the head of the federation himself, the chief of the

House of Rurik, who stood to them as president, the chief of a military league, rather than as monarch.

Like the early English kings, the Grand Princes of *Rus* made periodic tours of their dominions and dependencies, to be fed and entertained throughout the winter, and to fix and collect their dues and taxes, tribute and tolls. Usually these visitations—solemn progresses with the whole of the princely retinue, who of course shared in the *gifts* or tribute—began in November and ended in April: contributions were paid sometimes in coin, more usually, perhaps, in furs and skins, corn and slaves, honey and wax. When the Prince returned to Kiev with the spring, all had been made ready for the summer trade. Trees had been felled; boats had been built. When June came, a great flotilla of small craft floated, sailed, or rowed down the Dnieper, entered the Black Sea, and so reached the Byzantine ports. By the Sea of Azóv, the Don, and the Volga, the Russian traders could also reach the markets of eastern Islam. The chief actors in this curious commercial movement were the Prince of Kiev and his retinue; the latter formed the Prince's chief instrument of rule, and was also the principal commercial class—thus playing a leading part both in the politics and in the trade of Old *Rus*. With the official convoys, however, went the boats of private merchants, under the protection of the Prince's fighting men. As an early treaty with the Eastern Empire claims, in 941: 'Every year it shall be lawful for the Grand Prince of *Rus* and his nobles to send to the Greek Tsar as many ships as the Prince may desire, together with his commissioners and his guests.'

Thus every summer the Russian traders came to Constantinople for the season. They had other foreign markets, but Byzantium was the chief. Throughout their stay they were lodged in a particular suburb of the capital [St. Mamas]. Both the Prince's official traders and the private merchants

were allotted free board and baths by the Imperial Government, which, in 971,¹ bound itself to 'receive as allies, and as hath always been the custom', the *Rus* folk visiting Constantinople for trade. On this principle they were free from tolls, and on departure received a present from the Imperial Government of provisions for the journey home, and of all such shipping-tackle as required to be made good.

The official traders from *Rus* received a Byzantine allowance in accordance with their rank, while private merchants received a sum, paid monthly, varying according to the status of their home towns—Kiev, of course, holding the first place.

Trade was chiefly by barter: Byzantine silks, stuffs, gold, wine, and fruit were exchanged for Russian furs, honey, wax, corn, and slaves. Only a few Byzantine coins seem to have found their way to Russia.

The tribute collected by the Prince as Ruling-President formed a large part—perhaps the mass—of his commercial material as Trading-President. His character as the chief warrior-merchant of the people over which he presided was essentially Varangian:—how different in most respects from the autocracy of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The Russian intercourse with the Empire was especially important as the basis of the conversion of *Rus* to Eastern Christianity, and the origin of the working of Roman legal conceptions in Russia. Among these conceptions that of the absolute power of the head of the State was the most fruitful—for good and ill; reinforced by the results of the Tartar conquest, its effect was at last quite revolutionary.

It was Óleg and Ígor, Rurik's first successors, who fixed the Varangian-Russian capital at Kiev, about 880. From this centre the new Russia was organized, and the native tribes of the middle

¹ As in the treaty between John Tzimiskes and Svyatosláv: see p. 17.

Dnieper were conquered, in the last years of the ninth century. And from Kiev (we have seen) proceeded all the tenth-century attacks upon *Tsargrad*. So goes the witness of the *Fundamental Chronicle* of 'Nestor':

' And Óleg established himself as Prince of Kiev, and said, This shall be the Mother of Russian towns. . . . He had around him Slavs, Varangians, and other peoples, and they called themselves Rus. Then Óleg began to build fortified towns, and he laid tribute upon the Slavs. . . . And he ordained that Nóvgorod should pay to the Varangians a yearly tribute, and they paid this till the death of Yarosláv.'

Flushed, perhaps, with their rapid and easy conquests among the native tribes of the Dnieper, largely at the expense of the declining Khazar Empire, the Russians, in 904-7, made a fresh descent upon Byzantium with an armada of 2,000 boats, and perhaps 80,000 men. They ravaged the country near the imperial city with the ferocity which earned them the most dreaded name among all the barbarian enemies of the Eastern Rome in this age. For not merely did they kill many a Greek, pillage many a palace, and burn many a church: they butchered and tortured their prisoners with a ruthlessness uncommon even for the tenth century.¹ Terrified by the Russian successes, the Russian cruelties, and the danger of the imperial city, the *Christian Government* (as the documents express it) concluded an agreement in 907, and a fuller treaty in 912. Nestor professes to give the text of both, and their bearing on commerce is evident throughout. No less evident is the Scandinavian nationality of the Russian leaders of this time.

' When the merchants come they shall receive bread and wine, fish and fruit, and baths shall be provided them for six months.

¹ Some they beheaded, some they drowned, some they cut in pieces, some they made targets for arrows; they broke the limbs of others, or drove iron nails into their heads. *Nestor*, A. D. 904-7; 935-41.

... If a Russian come without merchandise, he shall receive no monthly subsidy.

‘The Russians who shall come shall enter the city by one only gate without arms, by fifty at a time, and shall transact their commerce as they please, without paying dues. . . .’

‘If a tempest throws a Greek vessel on a foreign shore near the Greek land, and some of our Russians find it there, our people shall come to the aid of the ship and its cargo . . . and shall bring it with its cargo unbroken. . . .’

If such an accident happened to a vessel near the Russian land, the cargo was to be sold, as far as possible, and ‘when we go into Greece, to trade or negotiate, we shall honourably hand over the price of the cargo’.

Murder, theft, and other crimes committed by Greeks against Russians, or by Russians against Greeks, were to be expiated on a regular system according to the terms of this treaty. Provision is made for the ransom of Russian slaves sold into Greece, of Greek slaves sold into Russia. The eternal friendship of the two nations is asserted with special emphasis: even something of a military alliance is projected.

‘If the Emperor goes to war, and the Russians wish to honour your Emperor by putting themselves at his service, all those who wish to go with him and remain there can do so freely.’

This treaty, concluded in the second week of September in the year of the world 6420 [A. D. 912], is subscribed by ‘us of the Russian nation’ Karl, Ingeld, Vermud, Ruald, Karn, Ruar, Lidul, Fost, Stemid,¹ and others, whose racial origin, from across the Baltic, is hardly open to question.

‘Greeks’ and Russians declared their agreement to be *unshakable*. Yet, after a generation this eternal peace is violently broken by a fresh Russian offensive [from 935]. Igor, the son of

¹ *Ingeld, Vermud, Ruald, Karn* are the Scandinavian *Ingjaldr, Vermundr, Hroaldr* or *Hrualtr, Karni*. And so with the other names here quoted (e. g. *Lidul* is *Leidulfr* or *Litulf*).

Rurik, the third of the Rurikide Grand Princes of *Rus*, leads a new fleet of a thousand war boats against the Empire. Descending the Dnieper, and crossing the Black Sea, in the regular manner, he ravages the coasts of Bithynia almost to the mouth of the Bosphorus with the customary atrocities. But his troops while on land in north-western Asia Minor are caught by an impèrial force returning from the East; they are defeated on shore, and driven to their boats; finally, they are pursued and decimated by Byzantine vessels armed with 'a fire like that of heaven', the *liquid, unquenchable, or Greek fire* of the Middle Ages. '... A terrible prodigy. The *Rus*, seeing the flame, threw themselves into the sea, and those who survived thus returned to their country.'

Ígor, 'longing to avenge himself', collects a new army, even 'sending to the Varangians beyond the sea to excite them against the Greeks', and in 944 he marches to the Danube.¹ After their last experience the Russians no longer venture all so readily on the hazard of the sea-route. But at the great river, the northern boundary of hostile Bulgaria, the invaders listen to the 'Greek' offers of the ancient peace, the ancient treaties, the ancient subsidies (judiciously increased); reflect upon the question, Who has the sea for his ally; and recollect, That death menaces all.

A new edition of Óleg's agreement is witnessed by Ivor, Buiefast, Kanimar, Shikhbern, Prastien, Libi, Grim, Kary, Egri, Shibrid, Kol, Steggi, Sfirka, Alvad, Frudi, and other ambassadors and merchants of Scandinavian name,² with whom appear an equal number of Slavonic personages, or at least of Slavonic name-forms. Ígor's infant son Svyatosláv, for whom

¹ In this same year the Russians are reported by Arab historians as fighting at Berdaa, beyond the Caucasus.

² Thus *Ivor* is the Scandinavian *Ivarr*, *Buiefast* is *Bofastr* or *Vefastr*, *Shikbbern* is *Sigbjörn* or *Sikbiarn*, &c.

in this treaty Buiefast is sponsor, represents in his own name, person, and reign, somewhat in the manner of Henry III of England, the change from foreign to native, from Varangian to Slav, from the first to the second chapter of Russian history.

Special provision is made in the charter of 944 for the safety of the Graeco-Roman colonies in the Crimea—‘Kherson and its towns’, ‘the Khersonese’ of the North.¹ The Russians are to leave this land in peace; they are even requested to prevent the Black Bulgarians of the Volga from raiding there. Russians, both merchants and others, coming to *Tsargrad*, are not to pass the winter there—they are not to make a permanent residence even at the Dnieper estuary. ‘When the autumn shall come, they shall be bound to return to their home in *Rus*.’ The Russians are to send soldiers, on appeal to the Grand Prince, to reinforce the armies of the ‘Greek’ Emperor. ‘Greeks’ are to go, on the occasion of a similar appeal, to help the Russian Prince. ‘Thus other lands shall learn what friendship there is between Greeks and Russians.’

Once more, and for the last time before the conversion of the *Rus*, the friendship between these formidable pagans and the *Christians* is broken by Ígor’s son Svyatosláv. The revival of the Eastern Rome, which made it again so formidable a power from the early days of our King Eadgar to the Norman Conquest of England, gave to its diplomacy as well as to its arms a fresh daring. Into the timid policy of Byzantine tradition, into the precepts of the *Administration of the Empire*, Nikephoros Phokas breathes a new spirit. ‘Aux grands maux les grands remèdes.’ To meet the Bulgarian danger he invokes the Russian peril. Svyatosláv responds to the appeal, accepts the imperial subsidy,

¹ Part of the modern Sevastópol stands on the site of Old Kherson. The latter’s history begins in the days of early Greek colonization: it ends in the time of Lithuanian conquest in the fourteenth century.

falls upon the Bulgars, and heavily defeats them. A great part of Bulgaria is occupied by the Russians (although the treaty of alliance forbade their permanent retention of the country), and their Grand Prince declares his purpose of moving his capital from Kiev on the Dnieper to Pereyaslavets on the Danube, newly won from the shattered Bulgar State. 'I do not like Kiev,' *Nestor* makes him say to his mother Olga and the Boyárs. 'I will live at Pereyaslavets . . . there is the centre of my dominions, and there all rich products come—money and stuffs, fruit and wine, from Greece; money and horses from Bohemia and Hungary; skins, wax, honey, and slaves from Russia.' The Empire was faced with a more pressing danger than had threatened her since the great Arab siege of 717—a Slav-Scandinavian foe, ruling from Philippopolis almost to the Baltic, with its capital upon the Lower Danube; allied by race with Danes, Swedes, and Northmen on one side, with the Slav colonists of the Balkans and of Greece upon the other, practically certain of military and social help from both these quarters, and commanding the resources of a *Rus* now fairly united for purposes of plunder, conquest, or trade-expansion.

Nikephoros had been murdered, and succeeded, by John Tzimiskes (A. D. 969), but the new emperor-regent was no less capable of dealing with the crisis. The Russians, who had just stormed Philippopolis and massacred its people with their usual freedom, received the imperial summons of evacuation with contempt. They would soon be at *Tsargrad* instead (971).

Tzimiskes opens the campaign in March 972. He sends the Greek fleet to the mouth of the Danube: advancing with his army from Adrianople, he outflanks the Russian main force, seizes the passes of the Balkans, arrives by forced marches at Pereyaslavets, and storms the place after desperate resistance. Eight thousand Russians defend the palace of the Prince to the last extremity, refuse all quarter, and perish in the flames.

Svyatosláv, obliged to fall back, contrives to reach the Danube and encounters the *Romans* at Dorystolon or Silistria, so long the key-fortress, in later time, of north-eastern Bulgaria and the Dobruja. A Borodinó of the tenth century closes with the retreat of the Russian masses into Silistria, with all the honours of war. A siege follows, equally remarkable for the ability and steadiness of the blockade, for the heroism, the cruelty, and the brilliancy of the defence. The struggle is set off by Homeric duels of champions. Russian women, amazons of the Varangian camp, join in the combats. The heavy Byzantine cavalry, horse and man alike shod in iron, proves a match even for Russian infantry. Among the latter are many who prefer suicide to surrender. By the light of the moon the *Romans* watch their enemy burning their dead : with horror they see them slaughter their prisoners upon these funeral pyres, and fling into the Danube chickens, and children, to appease their gods.

Famine forces the Russians to a final effort, and after the splendid failure of this outbreak, peace is concluded. The Empire, with apparent generosity, grants a free departure and a renewal of the treaties :

‘I, Svyatosláv, Russian Prince, wish to have peace and abiding friendship with all the great Greek emperors inspired by God, and with all your people ; and so do all the *Rus* subject to me. . . . Never will I attack your land, or gather an army, or guide a foreign people against those subject to the Greek Government, nor against the Khersonese [Crimea], nor against the land of the Bulgars. And if any other attack your land, I will march against him and fight with him. . . . If we do not observe this . . . may we be accursed by the god in whom we believe, by Perún, and Vólos the god of flocks : may we become yellow as gold, and perish by our own weapons.’

The treaty was sealed by a personal interview of the two leaders upon the bank of the Danube. Tzimiskes, who ‘in his diminutive body concealed the spirit of a hero’, on horseback and in

full armour awaited Svyatosláv. The Russian Prince came to the meeting-place by boat, rowing with his attendants. He was of moderate height, but most robust : big in the chest, thick in the neck, with blue eyes, thick eyebrows, flat nose, long moustache, a slight beard, and shaven head, with a single tuft of hair left to mark his rank. In one of his ears was a gold ring set with a ruby and two pearls. *Svyatosláv* is a good Slavonic name, but Leo the Deacon is here describing ¹ the true Varangian chief, who would march 'like a panther' at the head of his army, who would use no carriage nor cooking-pot on his marches, for whose meals a little horse-flesh would suffice, and who would sleep in no tent, but on a garment spread upon the ground, with a saddle for his pillow.²

The peace of 971—so soon followed by the conversion of the *Rus*—is practically final between Constantinople and the Kiev princes ; the magnanimity of the victorious Empire appears impressive ; yet it seems probable that under cover of all this friendliness, spoken, written, and acted, Byzantine diplomacy, with characteristic cunning, repaid the Russians in their own coin. The Pechenég ³ attack at the cataracts of the Dnieper, which cost Svyatosláv his life and 'gave his skull for a drinking-cup' to the Nomade chiefs, shattering the remnants of the Russian army in almost the last stage of its homeward journey, was surely concerted with Tzimiskes.

The Conversion

The conversion of the Russian people, which Photius hailed as an accomplished fact in the days of our King Alfred, was only seriously begun in the time of Eadgar, a century later. Only

¹ 'Remarquons ce portrait ; il nous faudra aller loin dans les annales de la Russie pour en retrouver un autre.' Rambaud, *Russie* (1893), p. 55.

² *Nestor*, A. D. 965.

³ This Turkish race was now replacing the Khazars in the mastery of the steppes south of Kiev.

at the end of the tenth century did the Prince of Kiev, his court, retinue, and council, receive baptism. They received it from the Eastern Church and Empire, from Constantinople; they rejected the claims of Rome, as they rejected the claims of Islam and of Judaism; by this they cut themselves off from the chief civilization of the Western, and even of the Christian, world—in particular they severed themselves from their brother-Slavs of the Polish stock, with momentous consequences.

Russia was the chief convert of Greek Christianity; the Russian Emperor was long the supreme earthly protector and champion of the Eastern Church; and the Church of Russia has shown itself in history, not only the largest in extent, but certainly the freest, most courageous, patriotic, spiritual, and active of all branches of the Orthodox communion. The influence of its own type of religion upon the Russian people has been almost incalculable in the past.

Holy Russia has been no empty phrase. Constantly one finds the religious element surprising one afresh by the depth, the ubiquity, and the subtlety of its action in Russian history. Constantly one has to recognize its power of accomplishing what nothing else can do. To take only one instance: it is the greatest of all factors in the creation of the autocratic empire of Moscow, in the absorption of all the lesser Russian princedoms and cities, in the deliverance of the country from the yoke of the misbelieving Musulman and the heretic Pole.

The first *Rus* attack on *Tsargrad*, and the first failure, produced, it is said, the first converts. Askold himself (in a more than doubtful tradition) was won to the faith of the Greek Church. It is far more certain that about this very time the first Christian bishop was sent by the Emperor Basil I from Constantinople, and settled in, or at least visited, Kiev. This bishopric of *Rus* continues to appear in the list of Byzantine sees.

in the next generation, under Óleg and Leo VI.¹ The treaty of 944 discloses the existence of a numerous body of Russian converts, who swear, separately, their acceptance of this *confirmation of charters*—‘for many Varangians were Christians’ by this time.

The reign of Ígor’s widow and practical successor, the regent Olga,² shows us another step on the road to the conversion of Russia. In 955 this ‘wisest of women’, who by most cunning treachery and ruthlessness had avenged her lord’s murder upon the tribe of the Drevlyans, comes on a state visit to Constantinople. She is received by the *Porphyrogennetos*, Constantine VII, who holds so honourable a place among the royal authors of the world.

‘And he, seeing that she was perfectly beautiful and very wise, said, admiring her intelligence, Thou art worthy to reign with us. And she said, I am heathen. If thou wilt, baptize me thyself. Otherwise I will not be baptized. And the Emperor with the Patriarch baptized her. And they gave her the name of Helena, from the mother of Constantine the Great.’

With her usual cunning (the *Ancient Chronicle* exultingly relates) she cheats the emperor out of his hopes of marriage with his proselyte—for she had now become his godchild, and was within the prohibited degrees—just as she cheats him out of his expectation of costly presents from *Rus* in return for all he had showered upon her in *Tsargrad*. ‘When thou hast come and stayed in Kiev as long as I stayed in thy city, I will give thee those presents.’

Yet St. Olga fails to win either her son or the bulk of her nation to Christianity. Her example and her influence probably increase conversion, but the mass of the nobles and warriors despise the new faith. ‘My retinue would laugh at me,’ pleads Svyatosláv. His mother’s final argument, ‘If thou

¹ Leo ‘the Wise’, Emperor of Constantinople.

² The Scandinavian *Helga*.

art once baptized, all of them will do the same', was worthy of the 'wise woman', and it proved sound enough under Vladímir in the next generation. As yet it was perhaps premature and dangerous. In any case, Svyatosláv rejects it, and lives and dies a typical heathen Varangian.

Only with his son Vladímir (who, like so many other princes of Varangian *Rus*, had found a refuge oversea in the Varangian homeland in time of trouble) does Christianity master the Russian people.

St. Vladímir's career is a good instance of historic irony. The Clovis of Russia is at first noteworthy for his love of war, of heathenism, and of sensuality: in *Nestor* he is 'another Solomon'. Besides two wives and three mistresses of some standing, he keeps eight hundred concubines in three great harems.

At the same time he reconquers from the Poles the Red Russia of East Galicia, wins Peremyshl¹ ('still subject to Russia to-day,' adds *Nestor*²), and makes extensive conquests in the non-Russian lands of the east Baltic shore, in Livonia and Lithuania. He opens a window for Russia upon the seas of the south by conquering Tmutorokán at the entrance of the Sea of Azóv.³ Finally, he attacks the Graeco-Roman settlements in the Crimea and takes Kherson.

But with all this he feels the stirrings of the religious movements agitating his people. At first it makes him a zealous restorer of the old heathendom. He sets up a new wooden image of Perún, 'with a head of silver and a beard of gold', on one of the heights overlooking the Dnieper. By its side were images of other gods. Both Kiev and Nóvgorod offered sacrifice

¹ The Przemyśl of the Poles and of the present Austrian official use.

² This was probably written about A. D. 1120.

³ A. D. 988. Here a Russian principality survived for about a century: we read of it still in 1078 in *Nestor*, chap. 70.

to Perún—‘their sons and daughters as victims to the demons . . . and the Russian land was defiled with blood’. Nestor records how a Christian Varangian of Kiev, ‘come from Greece’, was summoned to give his son for sacrifice, and died in his defence, defying the mob, and scorning their deities—the wooden carvings of men’s hands. ‘I will not give my son to demons.’

It was, perhaps, through his wars with the *Black Bulgaria* of the Volga (the modern Kazan region) that Vladímir came to examine the theory and practice of Islam as a religion for his people. From this the Russian Prince and his Council (in the record of the *Ancient Chronicle*) went on to the examination and comparison of all the great faiths of the European World, and to the adoption of Eastern, Greek, or *Orthodox* Christianity. The successes of Vladímir in the Crimea definitely brought about the last and decisive stage of this religious settlement.

Less than a century before (about A. D. 900) Muhammadanism had won its most northerly success with the conversion of Bolgar, the great market town of the Middle Volga basin, whose commerce and influence are so remarkable in the tenth century. These hyperborean Bulgarians in their turn became a focus of proselytism, and *Rus* a special field for their missionary zeal and hope.

Islam might have seemed to offer certain attractions very winningly to such a devoted warrior and polygamist as Vladímir, but according to *Nestor* its prohibition of pork and wine was fatal. ‘We Russians cannot live without drinking.’ Deeper causes were perhaps at work. Vladímir was possibly already in reaction from the bloody and sensual heathendom of his earlier life. In such a mood, he would be repelled where the stranger might have expected the reverse. The *Ancient Chronicle* pictures him as disgusted by the darker vices of some Bulgarian Musulmans. ‘When he heard that, he spat upon the ground and said, “It is abomination.”’

The appeal of the Roman Church was quite unattractive ('our forefathers would never have allowed that'), whether from the failure of the Russian envoys to appreciate its services ('we saw nothing beautiful therein'), or from other and weightier causes, more probable, though not expressed in *Nestor*.

The Jewish faith was put aside as that of men hated and rejected of God and dispersed abroad ('Do you wish that this evil should befall us too?').

Full satisfaction was only given by Eastern Christianity, the creed and the services of the Orthodox Church. In the Patriarchal Church of Hagia Sophia, in the imperial city, the Russian visitors no longer knew whether they were in heaven or on earth. 'For there is no such spectacle upon the earth, nor one of such beauty. We cannot describe it: we only know that there God dwells in the midst of men.' And to this another argument was added: 'If the Greek Faith were evil, Olga thy grandmother, the wisest of human beings, would never have received it.'

Such was the position, according to *Nestor*, at the end of 987; next year befell Vladimir's successful siege of Kherson; and the fall of this cherished *Roman* colony was followed by the conqueror's marriage and conversion treaty with the East Roman Empire. The Emperor Basil II was carrying on the triumphs of the Byzantine revival, and the military strength of the Byzantine State was nearing its zenith. But the final conquest of the Bulgaria of the Balkans called for all the energies of the *Kaisar*, and the Russian alliance was to be welcomed, at the easy price of an imperial marriage and with the enormous premium of a Russian conversion.

Vladimir, therefore, married the sister of the *Boulgaroktonos*;¹ before the ceremony he himself received baptism at Kherson.

¹ 'Slayer of the Bulgars' is a favourite and well-earned title of Basil II, one of the greatest of Byzantine generals and not the least cruel.

As a wedding present for his princess he gave the town back to the 'Greeks', and returning to Kiev, a true Russian Clovis, began to adore what he had burned, to burn what he had adored. The new Perún he had set up over the Dnieper was thrown down, beaten with clubs, dragged at a horse's tail, and thrown into the stream: the other gods were tossed into the fire. 'Whoever he be,' the Prince proclaimed, 'who will not come to the river to-morrow to be baptized, be he rich or poor, will fall into disgrace with me.' *A new people*, as he said, was added to Christendom that day. What was done at Kiev was soon accepted, and imitated, throughout *the Russian land*.

Zenith and Decline of Kiev

Under St. Vladímir, Russia's Constantine, the *Isapostolos*,¹ early Russia attained its highest power, greatest extension, least defective organization—though always stopping far short of a thoroughly unified State. But, as in the early Frankish kingdom, the death of the supreme chief is marked by the partition of his dominions among his sons. The sovereignty is put into commission. Under Yarosláv the Law-giver, the ablest of Vladímir's children (1016-54), the Russian federation again assumes, for a time, something of the appearance of a great political entity under a single government, that of the Grand Princedom of Kiev. Most of the Red Russia of Galicia was again recovered from Poland. Russian colonization was extended in the east Baltic coast-regions and among the Finns of the north. Yúrev and Yaroslávl are settlements of this time and of this Prince.² A fresh disastrous war with the Eastern

¹ This title, specially applied to Constantine the Great, was also given by the grateful Church to the Russian who 'brought so great a people to Christ', and so deserved to 'rank with the Apostles'.

² Yaroslávl 'belonging to or founded by Yarosláv'; Yúrev 'belonging to or founded by George' (Yúri), which was Yarosláv's 'monastic' name.

Empire over trading privileges made an unhappy but momentary breach in the friendship and alliance of 'Greek' teacher and Russian proselyte. But the age of Yarosláv, on the whole, was marked by the deepening and strengthening of all the ties, religious, commercial, and cultural, which bound the *Rus* to Constantinople. The Pechenégs of the steppes were decisively repulsed, and with the aid of other Turkish hordes pressing towards the West, their power was broken, only to be replaced by a fresh danger in the same region. The Nomade *Kumans* are the curse of Kiev in the later eleventh century and in the twelfth, just as the Pechenégs had been in the tenth and throughout the life of Vladímir. And from these same steppes, in the thirteenth century, came the final overmastering blow—the invasion of the Tartars, who beat down Kuman and Russian alike.

To Yarosláv was long ascribed the complete authorship of, or at least the responsibility for, the *Rúskaya Právda*, the *Russian Law* or *Right*. This earliest Russian legal code itself claims to be 'the judgement' or 'ordinance' of Yarosláv: in the articles of the code it is repeatedly stated that Yarosláv 'did thus judge' or 'thus ordain'. To a large extent this is no doubt true. But the *Právda* is not the work of Yarosláv alone; it contains decrees of Vladímir Monomákh, and other successors of Yarosláv, reaching into the twelfth century. Again, 'it does not always present us with the original or exact text of a given law, but, in place of this, with a mere explanation or paraphrase of that law'. As one instance of its incompleteness, 'it ignores the legal duel, or trial by battle, which undoubtedly was practised in *Rus* throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries, despite the ban of the Church'. Some have gone so far as to maintain 'that the *Právda* is not an independent code', but a supplement to a code of Canon or Church Law; that its composition was deeply influenced by the ecclesiastical legislation of the Eastern

Empire ; and that its primary inspiration is not to be found in the courts of princes but in those of bishops.

In any case, this primitive *Russian Right* is curiously, but naturally, parallel to the early law and custom of the Scandinavian and Germanic peoples. It sanctions private vengeance ; it fixes the tariff for the various crimes known to the law—both what is due to the injured individuals, and what must be paid to the treasury of the sovereign. From other sources we know that this early Russia recognized, quite in the manner of Roman Christendom, not only the trial by battle, but the ordeal in certain forms, the system of *compurgators*, the trial by a jury assistant to a representative of the Prince. Like the West, again, Russia did not yet acknowledge either capital punishment, or the legal use of torture, or the penalty of judicial flogging, or a regular prison system.

With Yarosláv the House of Rurik won a full recognition from the rest of Christendom, and made a brilliant entry into the Christian family. The Grand Prince married his sister to Casimir, King of Poland ; one daughter, Elizabeth, to Harald Hardrada of Norway ; another, Anne, to Henry I of France ; a third to Andrew I of Hungary. Exiled princes from Sweden, Norway, and England, took refuge at his court. St. Olaf and Harald Hardrada, especially, owed much to him in their time of trouble. One can say of the Russia of Yarosláv what one can no longer say of the Russia of the fourteenth, or even of the early fifteenth, century, that it was a true European State.¹

The time from the death of Yarosláv to the fall of Kiev, and still more from the fall of Kiev to the coming of the Tartars,² is, on the whole, a time of disorder, civil strife, and disintegra-

¹ Cf. Rambaud, *Russie* (1893), p. 63.

² Roughly, from the eve of the Norman Conquest of England to the morrow of the Great Charter, 1054-1169 ; 1169-1220.

tion. It is therefore, in its essential historic meaning, parallel to the period which precedes it in English history, the later Anglo-Saxon time. It is in complete contrast with the contemporary English time—the reconstructive and consolidative age of the Normans, of Henry II, and of the Great Charter.

The princely anarchy of this Eastern Europe almost matches the earlier feudal anarchy of the West. Thus sixty-four principalities of considerable importance and duration (not to count more transient examples), two hundred and ninety-three sovereign princes, eighty-three civil wars, are reckoned by a Russian historian for this period of one hundred and sixty-six years. To these may be added a trifle of forty-six invasions by the Turkish Kumans of the steppes. Some appearance of effective Kievian primacy, ensuring some strength and order to the nation as a whole, is maintained as late as Vladímír Mönomákh (1113-1125), who won notable successes against the Nomade foes of Russia to south and south-east; who extended Russian colonization among the Finns of the north-eastern forests; who was able to punish and even dethrone refractory and troublesome princes of junior position (as at Minsk, at Nóvgorod, at Vladímír Volýnsk); who gave a refuge to the relics of one of the most interesting of the lesser peoples of history (the Khazars); and who left in his *Instruction* to his sons, his *Letter* to his cousin Óleg, and his *Prayer*, a bequest of wisdom, kindliness, and human nature worthy of an unspoilt and heroic age.

Thus under certain Kiev princes of outstanding ability and influence—Óleg, Svyatosláv, St. Vladímír, Yarosláv the Law-giver—we seem to see a possibility of the welding together of all Russian lands, principalities, and settlements, in a single organized and centralized State. But, as in Anglo-Saxon England, the old weakness and disunion obstinately reappear. National elements have been prepared from which the Russian

nation is at last to be formed. But the Russian nation, in the full political sense, is not evolved in the times of the Old Free Russia.

At the height of its power Kiev becomes the centre of a great federation and a great trade, the home of a powerful and wealthy chief and court, a city of widespread extent and widespread fame. Foreign rumour credits it with hundreds of churches.¹ To Adam of Bremen it is the would-be rival of the Eastern Rome—proud ambitious *Chive*, emulous of the sceptre of Constantinople, that brightest glory of Greece. But it just fails to become, like Moscow, a true national capital.

From Ládoga in the north to the steppes of the Dnieper in the south, from the Klyázma in the north-east to the Carpathians in the south-west, the Grand Prince of Kiev is overlord, at the time of his highest power. But he just fails to become a true monarch or national head.

x The *druzhina* or retinue of the Prince was alone enough to prevent an autocracy in this early Russia. And besides the Prince's personal following—his greater and lesser nobility of service, the former mainly Varangian—the military officers of the towns, the elected City Wardens, commanding the local forces, had at least the right to form part of the *Dúma* or State Council of the sovereign, and to be consulted therein. St. Vladímir himself, the most powerful of all the Kiev princes, 'delighted to consult with his *druzhina* concerning the administration of the land, and concerning the army, and concerning the statutes'. The momentous question of the conversion is debated by Vladímir with his *Dúma*.

y And if there had been no other barrier to an autocracy, the fierce free spirit of the towns—the great trading communities—would have been enough. Thus Old Nóvgorod, with Kiev the

¹ Thus Thietmar of Merseburg gives it 400 churches, and eight markets.

most populous city of early Russia, and the chief centre of trade—after the decline of Kiev, without a rival among the Russian city-states of the Middle Ages—though in name a principality, is, in fact, something of a democratic republic.

From the earliest times Nóvgorod is famous for its free spirit. When, in 972, the Prince of Kiev proposes to govern Nóvgorod by ordinary officials, disregarding the custom which already entitled it to the eldest son, or nearest relative, of the *Veliki Knyaz*, the city insists on its rights. 'We know how to find another prince.' The menace is heeded.

Again, when in 1102 Kiev wishes to conform to this rule and displace the reigning Prince of Nóvgorod, who was now an example of the citizens' own choice of a permanent head of their own, it is met with defiance and threats. 'Nóvgorod hath sent us to say this unto thee, We desire neither thee nor thy son. Send thy son unto us only if he have two heads. Already have we Mstisláv . . . reared by us to rule Nóvgorod.'

As the Old Russian federation falls to pieces, and Kiev declines, republican spirit develops in Nóvgorod. The sovereignty is treated as purely elective, and election is often followed by deposition. A prince installed one year may be 'shown out' the next.

Thus, after the time of Henry I of England all hope of a centralized Russian State, an effective Russian monarchy, fades away. The real leadership of the Grand Prince of Kiev disappears. Even the nominal leadership seems to cease to be centred in the hands of one prince (especially after 1169). From the fall of Kiev till the creation of the Moscovite Empire no single prince makes any serious pretension to the presidency of the Russian States as a whole : no single prince is in any sense lord of *the Russian land*.

The various princes do not even remain permanent irremovable rulers of their allotted provinces, but, as changes occur in the great family of Rurik, junior members of that stock are

promoted to provinces of superior rank. And these transferable rulers move from one principality to another, according to a definite rotation.

Soon after the middle of the twelfth century, a few months before Archbishop Thomas Becket was murdered in his cathedral at Canterbury, Kiev, which had so long beaten back the foreign foe of the steppes, falls a victim to a rebellion of its own Russians. The Mother of Russian Cities, taken in 1169 by *Andréy Bogolyúbski* and his confederates, never recovers its position. The Grand Princedom, the vague Russian suzerainty so shadowy since *Monomákh*, now forsakes Kiev for ever. Seventy years later ambitious *Chive* is stormed and sacked by the Tartars (1240), and for a time lies desolate. Little more than ruins told of trade or town, when the first of the great friar travellers in the Mongol Age ¹ passes through south Russia to the head-quarters of the Tartars in Central Asia (1245). And when the Mongol hold relaxes in the next century (1300–1400), Kiev and all its neighbourhood, the *Rus par excellence* of earlier days, only passes under another foreign and heathen rule, that of Lithuania. The union of Lithuania and Poland (1386), and the conversion of the former to Roman Christianity in the days of our Richard II, a year or two after the death of Wycliffe, incorporates Kiev for centuries in the Great Poland of the House of 'Jagellon', ² and in Roman Catholic Christendom. Not till 1669, in the hey-day of Louis XIV or Charles II, is the old Russian metropolis restored to an independent *Rus*—now the Empire of Moscow.

The blow of 1169 was so fatal because it was both a result and a cause of a certain malignant process. It was largely a result

¹ John de Plano Carpini.

² See pp. 62 and 87. Jagiello is the Polish, and Iagáilo the Lithuanian, form of James.

of the migration movements which had already begun to drain away the life of Kiev to new lands in the north-east. And its success added such volume and speed to this movement as to make the complete decay of the old capital and the collapse of the old Kiev régime unavoidable. x

Up to this time—the middle of the twelfth century, the early days of Henry II, or of Frederick Barbarossa—a high level of material prosperity, active citizenship, and general culture, had been maintained by the men of Kiev. Trade, especially foreign trade, the ruling factor in the industry of the people, had served both to preserve the life of the community from isolation and stagnation, and to bring wealth into the country. Money circulated in abundance. The splendid materials and artistic taste of such shrines as the cathedrals of the Holy Wisdom, in both Kiev and Nóvgorod, show what resources in money, labour, and skill were at the command of the princes and the chief towns, even at the era of the Norman Conquest of England. A little later than this, one of the lesser princes is recorded as receiving in yearly tribute from his province (the province of Smolénsk) sums equal to fully 150,000 rubles to-day. Rich presents from one prince to another are frequently on record. There is abundant evidence, too, of remarkable wealth among nobles, officials, and private persons. Magnificent offerings are made to the churches. Heavy fines are expected from those persons of the upper classes who had broken the law of the State or of the Church. Many documents, such as inventories, attest the size and magnificence of the princely households. Not merely the Grand Prince himself, but the provincial sovereigns and governors keep wine-puncheons by the dozen, slaves and corn-stacks by the hundred, horses by the thousand, honey by the ten thousand pounds.

Naturally enough, this constant flow of native and foreign wealth to Kiev, and the other leading towns, enables the ruling

class to live sumptuously, to dress well, to build itself lordly habitations. For centuries the memory of the festivals of the *Rus* princes (and especially the Easter feasts) lingers among the people, and echoes of it are still to be heard in the folk-songs of the north, and especially in Olónets and Archangel.

All this material prosperity found expression also in art and literature. To this day the mounds and hoards of Old Southern or Little Russia yield gold and silver, and other articles of beautiful workmanship, while the buildings of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with their frescoes and mosaics, mainly inspired from Byzantine sources, produce an extraordinary impression of delight and surprise.

The annals of this time bear emphatic testimony to the learning of the Russian princes of the great Kievan time, and to their zeal for culture—their knowledge of other tongues ('a thing foreigners admire in us,' says Vladímir Monomákh), their wide reading, their book collections, their foundation of schools, their encouragement of Greek and Latin study, their reception of foreign scholars. Before the era of our Norman Conquest something of a Russian Literature had been founded, and there are Russian manuscripts of the twelfth century which can almost be compared with really fine examples from the West.

There is a darker side to the picture. And here we find the chief causes of those movements of migration which sapped the strength of Kiev and founded Moscow, which completely shifted the Russian centre of gravity, and which gave so much of western Russia for a prey to Lithuanians and to Poles.

xx> The economic prosperity of the old Kievan *Rus* largely depended on slavery. And the slave-system of Russia became steadily more important down to the Tartar Conquest. For three centuries and more, slaves were a principal article of export to the Byzantine and Muhammadan markets, and even,

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perhaps, to the Scandinavian. The Russian merchant came to be known above all as a slave-dealer.

Arab writers of the tenth century, such as Ibn Fozlan,¹ graphically sketch the Russian trader plying his slave-commerce at the Volga ports. Much later than this, when a man wanted a slave in Constantinople, his best plan was usually 'to go to the merchants who came from *Rus* to barter with the slaves'. (So declares Nicolas the Magician, about 1090, at the beginning of the Crusading Age.)

To slavery the early Russian legislation devoted its most close and detailed attention. From slave-owning Russian ownership of land derived its special character, its legal theory of origin. In other words, the original title to the soil appears normally based upon the settlement and exploitation of the land by slaves. 'This land is mine, because the slave-labour that works it is mine.' X

To the end of the tenth century the Russian ruling class is largely urban. The simple fact sounds paradoxical indeed; such is the effect of later history in destroying the very capacity to understand the earlier. Slave-raids and wars of all kinds filled the houses of the rich and powerful with serfs though great part of the captives were sent abroad to foreign markets. The chief articles of early Russian export trade were slaves and furs.

Gradually, however, from the opening of the eleventh century, the upper class begins to settle its serf-dependents more and more widely upon the land. Thus the privileged soldier and merchant slave-dealer of the tenth century (the characteristic figure of the Old Nobility) is by the end of the twelfth

¹ Ibn Fudhlan ('Fozlan'), sent in A. D. 921 on a mission from the Baghdad Caliph to the Black Bulgarians of the Volga, who had lately embraced Islam, has left us a famous picture of the blue-eyed and fair-haired *Rus*, 'tall as palm-trees', their weapons, funerals, human sacrifices, and other traits.

converted into the landowner and slave-owner of the New Nobility. And along with this process goes a constant widening of the slave-class, both from without and from within. The social system of Kievan Russia is maintained only at the cost of the enslavement of the lowest class, and the debasement of the simple freeman towards poverty and slavery. Hence there is an ever-widening separation between the upper and lower orders—not only between the wealthy and their slaves, but between the wealthy and the poor of the free community.

To these causes of decay and of migration we must add the feuds of the princes and the increasing menace from the Nomade tribes of the steppes.

The princes were only kept from raiding one another by a strong suzerain at Kiev. After Vladimir Monomakh there were no more Grand Princes who counted for much in the Mother of Russian Cities. And the rotation of princely rule helped the development of princely anarchy.

Degenerating into a series of savage and greedy reprisals, in which the chief objects were vengeance in destruction and enrichment through plunder, these struggles, which converted Russian freemen wholesale into slave-captives, completed the misery of the lower and lower-middle classes.

Here, then, in the divorce of classes, the growth of slavery, and the degradation of the poorer freemen, are the chief causes of the ruin of the Social Order of early Russia. For this Social Order appeared more and more to the common people as merely oppressive and hateful.

Lastly, we often forget that, in examining early Russian history, 'we are observing a drama which has for its scene the very edge of the world of Christian culture—the edge beyond which stretched the boundless sea of the steppes', of the heathen and nomadic world of Asia and the Arctic lands, of

the vast countries of Tartars, Turks, and Finns. The Nomades of the steppes, we have seen, were the chief historic scourge of early Russia, a Russia which was finally destroyed by the greatest of nomadic empires, in the thirteenth century. Already in the twelfth century (as if in anticipation of the next age) the attacks of the Kumans so increased in number and violence that the border region south and south-east of Kiev became almost a complete waste. 'Thus men began to ask themselves whether life was possible under such conditions,' and two streams of migration set in : one westward, into Galicia and other Red Russian and White Russian lands (which, in the next age, passed under Poland and Lithuania); the other, northward and north-eastward, into the regions of the Upper Volga basin, and beyond, into the lands of Nóvgorod. The former was lost to Russia, politically, for ages (not till the seventeenth century is its recovery even begun). The latter created a new Russia in the northern forests, from which, after much tribulation, Moscow and the Empire of Moscow, the Empire of the Tsars, arose.

The Republic of Nóvgorod

'Lord Nóvgorod the Great,' *Gospodín Velíki Nóvgorod*, as it once called itself, is the starting-point of Russian history. It is also the best example of the Russian city-state of the Middle Ages. Kiev and Moscow, in their separate times of supremacy, are greater in political importance—the one before 1169 (or at least before 1125¹), the other after about 1380—but no Russian town of any age has the same republican individuality, self-sufficiency, activity, and success.

'Who can stand against God and the Great Nóvgorod?' (*Któ prótiv Bóga i Velíkago Nóvgoroda?*) was the famous proverbial expression of this self-sufficiency and success.

¹ The death-year of Vladímír Monomákh.

Nóvgorod, we have seen, is the first centre of a Russian nation, the first capital—the ‘New Town’—of Russia, in the ninth century. With the decline of Kiev in the twelfth, Nóvgorod again becomes the chief centre of Russian city-life, as it had been at the dawn of Russian history. Out of the universal ruin of the Tartar Conquest it alone survives, tributary but almost uninjured, the one important relic of the Old Free Russia. In size and wealth and democratic energy it seems to grow throughout the Tartar age, at least till Moscow, under Dmítri of the Don, takes command of a new *Rus* (about 1380). Even in the early fifteenth century Nóvgorod is probably by far the largest and wealthiest of East Slav settlements.

From the age of the Norman Conquest of England to the fall of the Eastern Empire (c. 1070-1450) Nóvgorod is unique among Russian cities as controlling a colonial empire, or sphere of influence, of vast extent. This was mainly in the Far North, extending from Lapland to the Uráls, and perhaps at certain periods to the Siberian Ob. The modern provinces of Olónets and Archangel, with parts of Vólogda, Perm, and Tobólsk, represent this colonial domain—the present *Government* of Nóvgorod standing for the old homeland of the Republic. Both the homeland and the colonial dominion were traditionally divided into five parts (the celebrated *Pyátini* or *Fifths*). In the colonial division were reckoned all the lands beyond Bélo Ózero, including the northern Dviná country, Russian Lapland, the region of Lake Onéga and the White Sea coastlands, the Perm country or the upper Káma basin, the Pechorá basin, and (at the zenith of Nóvgorodian power) the land on both sides of the Northern Uráls.

The Great Nóvgorod of the Middle Ages, the quiet decayed cathedral town of to-day, lies on both sides of the deep and

broad Vólkhov, at the beginning of its course from Lake Ilmen to Lake Ládoga. Here we are about one hundred miles south-south-east of Petrograd. Before the Moscovite Conquest of 1471 Nóvgorod may be considered as a mediaeval Petersburg—the great Russian outpost on the Baltic side of *Rus*, the chief link, especially in race and trade, with the Western world and the Western seas. It is the foundation of St. Petersburg that deals a final blow at the ruined republic, still capable (up to 1703) of playing an important provincial and commercial part in the life of Russia.

As in the Middle Ages, the *Side* or *Quarter* of ‘*St. Sophia*’ still lies on the left or west bank of the Vólkhov, the *Commercial Side* on the right. The eleventh-century cathedral of the Holy Wisdom is still one of the oldest and most precious historic monuments of Russia; the walls of the Nóvgorod Kremlin still show how slender was the old Russian skill in fortification.

But the mighty turbulent republic is no more. The modern town, of some 26,000 people, has little more than a tenth, perhaps, of its old numbers, when to Ghillibert de Lannoy, coming from the Low Countries in 1413, it appeared of such ‘prodigious size’. The Hanseatic Market is a memory. The ancient earthen ramparts are in ruins, and of their stone towers only one, *The White*, still stands, on the south of the city. Quite as ruinous is the *Tower of Yarosláv* within the town, overlooking that *Court of Yarosláv*, which was once the favourite meeting-place of the popular assemblies. The great bell which summoned the citizens to these assemblies, or to riot, hangs there no longer. More than from Florence or from Ghent has the old life departed, which made Nóvgorod a Slavonic counterpart of the city-states of Italy or of Flanders.

As already suggested, the government and social system of Novgórod, especially after the death of Vladímír Monomákh

and the beginnings of Kievan decline, is essentially democratic. Nominally, it is an elective principality, and in the hands of a strong character the headship of the State is not without its influence. The full course of the democratic current is also modified by the influence of the Church and the influence of the foreign traders. Yet in the last resort, when inspired by definite purpose and not too much divided by faction, the *Véche*¹ or General Assembly of the Citizens is supreme and irresistible.

The power of the elected princes (especially after 1125) rests mainly on their own personality, on the sympathy of the Church and the leading merchants, and on the capacity of the individual *knyaz* for maintaining popularity and organizing definite support. In modern language, Nóvgorod is largely governed by the party system. While the prince can command a majority, or at least avoid open defeat in the *Véche*, he is fairly secure; as soon as his party is unpopular, the result is inevitable; in the old Russian phrase, they 'show him the way out'.

We have seen how independent was the tone of Nóvgorod throughout the time of Kievan power, and how its semi-sovereign position in eastern Europe, and its democratic spirit at home, were alike strengthened by Kievan decline. The princedom becomes more dependent on popular will. Thus, to take examples only from the middle of the twelfth century, in 1136 the men of Nóvgorod seize their *knyaz* and imprison him in the archbishop's palace 'with his wife and children and his mother-in-law', and finally expel him. The next prince reigns less than a year; his successor is driven out after 'twenty-one months'. In 1141 the city 'sat without a prince' for nine months, and the man next chosen is put in the care of the

¹ Two syllables, *vé-ché*, the emphasis on the first, which is pronounced like *Vienna*.

archbishop and 'let go' after a few weeks. Again, in 1154, Nóvgorod expels its prince and fetches in another who soon goes to reign at Kiev, leaving his son in his place. The son is shown the road before the close of this year. In 1157 his successor, despite the support of the *Commercial Side*, has to fly under cover of night. The prince next appointed (in 1158) is shown the way out to Ládoga, in 1160—only to be restored after a 'year, less a week', when his rival and supplanter is 'fetched away'. And in this way examples might be tenfold multiplied.

There is another side to the picture. In the changeful line of Nóvgorod princes, we meet at times with men who rule. Yarosláv the law-giver, in the eleventh century, is such a sovereign; Alexander Névski, in the thirteenth, is another. From 1240, when he gains his surname by his Nevá victory over the Swedes, down to his death in 1263, Alexander dominates Nóvgorod. He even makes the Republic diplomatic. After such triumphs as his over Swedes and Teutonic Knights,¹ it was hard to submit to the Mongol tax-gatherer, 'taking tribute for the accursed' (1259). But Alexander realizes that to defy the Tartars is to complete the desolation of a Russia where only Nóvgorod had survived. The hero of the city at last persuades her of the humiliating truth. He rides out with the Mongol emissaries, whom he had guarded day and night from the fury of the mob, and under his protection 'the accursed go through the streets, writing down the houses of the *Christians*'. To save the Russian remnant, Alexander journeys repeatedly to the head-quarters of the Western Tartar army, or *Golden Horde*, upon the Volga—once at least to the Grand Khan in Mongolia. Death overtakes him on his way home from a final visit to the Horde. The news reaches Nóvgorod as the Eucha-

¹ The battle of Lake Chudskoe (Peipus)—fought on the ice—on April 5, 1242, 'lest they should boast, saying "We will humble the Slovan race under us, for is not Pskov taken, and are not its chiefs in prison?"'

rist is finishing ; turning to the people, Archbishop Cyril tells the disaster—‘The sun of the Russian land has set, my children’. ‘Grant, merciful Lord,’ exclaims the chronicler, ‘that he may see thy face in the age to come, for he has laboured for Nóvgorod, and for the whole Russian land.’

Yet even this hero of the North, fresh from the victory of the Nevá, has for a time to leave Nóvgorod, ‘having quarrelled with the citizens’. Better thoughts come with reflection : within a year Alexander is recalled.

As time goes on, and both Eastern and Western Christendom witness the growth of more powerful and centralized monarchies, the Nóvgorod princedom still further declines ; by the end of the fourteenth century, the Grand Prince of Moscow begins to press hard upon the Republic ; and at last, in the later fifteenth, we find the citizens, unable to stand longer alone, doubting only whether to become frankly Moscovite or disloyally Polish.

The crisis of 1471, ended by the victory of Moscow, brings into special prominence the second person in the temporal polity of Nóvgorod. At this time we hear nothing of a prince, but much of the *posádnik*, governor, or burgomaster Isaac (or Simon) Borétski, and of the *posádnitsa* Marfa, his ‘accursed’ widow. This remarkable woman, a Russian parallel to Elizabeth of England, Catherine de’ Medici, and the rest of the female offspring of the Classical Renaissance, plays a vital part in the intrigues which almost succeed in detaching Nóvgorod from *Rus* and the Eastern Church. She is therefore not highly flattered by the Moscovite annalists from whom come most of our records of the fall of the Republic. The hatred of her opponents¹ shows the influence which one *posádnik* at least was

¹ ‘That tempter, the Devil, entered into the wily Marfa Isakova Borétskaya, and that accursed woman entangled herself in words of guile with the Lithuanian *knyaz* . . . she beguiled the people, diverting them from the right way to Latinism, for the dark deceits of Latinism blinded the eyes of her soul through the wiles of the cunning Devil.’

able to exercise. And even in more normal periods strong and popular *governors* sometimes appear, and play a leading part in home and foreign politics. At times¹ the Nóvgorod democracy keeps a *posádnik* in office, in defiance of the prince. 'He is without blame . . . therefore we bow down to thee, but this is our *posádnik*, and we will not give in to this.' Yet next year the fickle monster may displace its favourite, only to restore him the following winter. But usually these burgomasters, like the princes, are creatures of the popular will. They are set up and cast down almost as frequently, and their fate is harder. Deposed princes are shown the road, but deposed *posádniks* are often killed.

The riots of 1209 give a vivid picture of the city in uproar over an unpopular burgomaster :

'The men of Nóvgorod held a *Véche* over *posádnik* Dmítri and his brethren, because they had ordered the levying of silver on the people of Nóvgorod, for collecting money throughout the district, [and] fines from the merchants, for enforcing the collection of taxes at fixed times, and everything bad. And they went to plunder their *courts*,² and set fire to . . . Dmítri's, seizing their effects; they sold all their villages and servants, they sought out their treasures, and took of them without number, and the rest they divided, so that each got some. . . . God alone knows how much any took secretly. And many grew rich from this. . . . The same year they brought Dmítri dead . . . and buried him. . . . The people of Nóvgorod wanted to throw him from the bridge, but the archbishop . . . forbade. . . . And the men of Nóvgorod kissed the honourable cross, That we will not keep Dmítri's children by us. . . .'

'As everywhere in Old Russia, the Church in Nóvgorod is of the first importance. From some points of view the Republic

¹ As in 1218.

² *Dvory*, houses, especially the houses of the great, with their enclosures, outbuildings, &c.

has been well described as semi-theocratic. Its prelates share power with princes and burgomasters. Religious feelings, religious scruples, are the most efficient checks on the activity of the popular assembly. As early as 1034 *Nestor* mentions a bishop of the city,¹ and in 1045 the historic cathedral of the Holy Wisdom is built by Yarosláv the Law-giver and his son Vladímir. 'St. Sophia' becomes the symbol of the prosperity, freedom, and power of the city. 'Where St. Sophia is, there is Nóvgorod,' exclaims one of the princes, in 1215. 'Come to your patrimony, to St. Sophia,' the citizens beseech another, in the same year. 'With the aid of St. Sophia' Nóvgorod conquers in battle. Sooner than submit to the Mongol census of 1259, the people resolve to die honourably for St. Sophia. 'I bow down to St. Sophia, and to the men of Nóvgorod;' . . . 'I make my greeting to St. Sophia and to you : God grant that I may lie by my father in St. Sophia,' are typical expressions of princely courtesy to the city. An accused archbishop who has been exiled rights himself 'through God and St. Sophia'. 'The Devil crushed by God and St. Sophia,' is the exclamation of the chronicler, at the end of a riot, when 'brethren come together . . . and kiss the Cross'.

The *Nóvgorod Chronicle*, the official annals of the city, a work of ecclesiastics, abounds in reference to Church matters. Almost every other year we read of the consecration or adornment of a church or monastery, 'a refuge for Christians, a joy to angels, and ruin to the Devil'. Often it is St. Sophia itself, Nóvgorod's Westminster, which is repaired or beautified, or which becomes the burial-place of another prince.

The *Vladýkas* or Bishops, usually chosen by the Prince and citizens, but needing confirmation by the *Metropolitan of All Rus* at Kiev, Vladímir, or Moscow, somewhat depend on popular favour for their election, and largely depend on the same for

¹ One Tidyata.

continuance in office. Thus, in 1211, the archbishop of the day, one Mitrofan, is exiled, 'bearing this gladly, like John Chrysostom', and after eight years is recalled by the same General Assembly and Church of the Citizens.

Monasticism, which began in the Eastern Church, and has always played so prominent a part in Russia, is of course powerful in the great Russian trading town. From its ranks, here as elsewhere in the Orthodox Communion, the higher clergy are mostly drawn. Foundations of monasteries—'refuges for anchorites, delights to the faithful, terrors to devils'—are common events indeed in the annals of Nóvgorod: they are landmarks in the architectural and artistic and social life of the Republic.

As in the West, so in the East. The greatest soldiers and statesmen often take refuge in the cloister. Alexander Névski himself, when he feels his mortal illness upon him, is 'shorn' as a monk.¹

'Mediaeval society', many still believe, 'included only soldiers, churchmen, and peasants.' The Old Free Russia, and especially Nóvgorod, gives as much help against this superstition as any Western land. The burgess, the responsible citizen, who possesses a stake in the country, and who deliberates, votes, and fights for its freedom and well-being, is constantly in evidence in the history of the North Russian Republic.

But beyond the ordinary life of the average prosperous mediaeval town the merchant and his trade hold an exceptional rank in Nóvgorod. For this was the chief commercial centre of the eastern Slavs, at least from the middle of the twelfth century—it was certainly little less than this in earlier time, from the foundation of Russia—and here, in the later Middle Ages, was

¹ November 14, 1263.

one of the four leading factories of the Hanseatic League in non-German lands.

Both before and during the reign of Frederick Barbarossa¹ (the exact contemporary of our Henry II) 'foreign', apparently German, traders are noticed at Nóvgorod; Bremen merchants appear in the neighbouring lands of Livonia; and direct commerce between Cologne and Russia is recorded.² The agreement concluded in 1269—in the first years of the North German *Hansa*, the last years of Henry III of England—between Nóvgorod, Lübeck, and Gothland, shows that the *Némtsy*³ had long possessed a regular commercial status on the Vólkhov. And the famous *Skra* or Code of the German factory here goes back to the early thirteenth century, a generation before the permanent organization of the Hanseatic League.

Half Nóvgorod is known, we have seen, as the *Commercial Side*. Here the foreign traders had their quarters—their guildhall, their church of St. Peter, their shops, stores, and dwelling-houses. This *Court of the Némtsy*,⁴ *Court of the Germans*, or *Court of St. Peter*, was built for defence as well as for trade—like the *Hansa* settlements in Bergen and London—and was closed and guarded at night. At its head was a Council of Aldermen, with a President, the chief Alderman of St. Peter's Court. *Common Rooms* were maintained for all the Hanseatics, 'summer and winter travellers' alike, the privileged seafarers and the landsmen whose easier life was rewarded with fewer privileges. The junior clerks and apprentices had plenty of freedom in the 'children's room'.

¹ 1152–90. 'Foreign' traders of Scandinavian origin, besides the original Swedish *Rus*, of course abound in Nóvgorod from the age of Rurik.

² 1142, 1157, 1165.

³ The 'dumb' or 'incomprehensible' folk, the old Russian term most in use for Germanic foreigners (sometimes including Scandinavians).

⁴ See the note on p. 191.

The *Némtsy* of St. Peter's Court had their own brewery, bees, and forests. Their organization was largely governed by the sound principles of keeping their good things to themselves and guarding against fraud by their customers. Above all, they forbade the intrusion of non-Hanseatics into the Russian trade.

In the early days of this factory, the annual profits were stored at St. Mary's Church in Visby—another indication of Gothland influence. The original authors of the *Skra* were probably Gothland merchants, and the Nóvgorod Court of the *Némtsy* is perhaps, at first, a dependency of Visby. But in the fourteenth century the Gothland domination is first rivalled, then replaced, by that of Lübeck. Thus from 1346 the Hanseatic President in Nóvgorod is chosen, by representatives of the Hanse towns, from among Lübeck and Visby merchants.

The growth of German, and especially of Hanseatic, trade in Nóvgorod and other parts of western Russia during the Mongol Age (1220–1460) is not only due to the business ability of the German merchants. It is aided by the disasters, and consequent dependence, of so much of the Russian people at this time—by Tartar, Lithuanian, and even Teutonic conquest.

Except in Flanders, no field of non-German trade gives so wide a Hanseatic picture, shows so many Hanseatic centres engaged in the local commerce. Merchants of Brunswick, Dortmund, Duisburg, Magdeburg, and many other Teutonic towns appear in Nóvgorod, in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, often travelling by the dangerous overland routes. And even mediaeval Russians sometimes venture far overland, in search of customers.

The Annals of Nóvgorod abound in notices of trade, especially from early in the twelfth century. We have seen an instance (in 1209) of the whole city in uproar over extortions practised upon merchants. We read again, not once or twice, of commercial interests causing foreign war and civil strife. Trade

is the life of the Republic : if other Russians could not 'live without drinking', Nóvgorod could hardly exist without commerce.

Every rank, power, and interest in Nóvgorod rests upon the Sovereign People. As no dynasty can establish itself permanently, still less any aristocracy of Western type, the République preserves with peculiar purity the ancient democratic ideas and institutions. From the death of Vladímír Monomákh down to the Moscovite conquest, the city is more powerful than any of its lords, officials, or classes. As we have seen, the great popular assembly, comparable to the *ecclesia* of Athens in power, is supremely characteristic of Nóvgorod. Once the city-state has fully developed (before the middle of the twelfth century) the *Véche*—which is both a citizen republic and a Christian community—supervises all government. It invites a new prince, and arraigns, imprisons, or expels him when it pleases. It elects and deposes burgomasters and the lesser officers of state. With due respect to the sacred lot, and to Orthodox feeling, it elects the bishops : in other words, it designates the favoured few from whom a new *Vladýka* might be chosen. It is free, in extreme cases, to depose an unpopular prelate.

It decides peace and war, banns black magic and pagan superstitions, punishes crime. A bad character, or unpopular personage, may be hurled from the Great Bridge—or otherwise disposed of—at the conclusion of a *Véche*.

Like the Polish Diets, the Nóvgorod *Véches* nominally respect the primitive Slav principle of *necessary unanimity*. But there is no real *liberum veto* on the Vólkhov. Minorities in Nóvgorod are bludgeoned, ducked, drowned, put to the sword, or expelled. Prince or *posádník*, or any respectable party among the citizens, can legally or practically summon the *Véche*. Sometimes rival personages, or rival parties, call rival

Véches, and the meetings end with desperate fighting, a conference, or the mediation of the archbishop.

On any general view of European history, there are few incidents more suggestive than the colonial expansion of Russia—the eastern vanguard of Western civilization.

However we may criticize the Russian people, it is certainly the pioneer and representative of Christendom in the north-east of Europe and in North Asia. And nowhere in the Old World has the dominion of the higher races been so much widened as in the lands from the Black Sea to the White, and from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan, which have been gradually conquered or colonized by the *Rus*.

As we have seen, the primitive Russian homeland did not include more than a portion of the present Russia-in-Europe. Racial movements of remarkable depth and tenacity, continued over several centuries, have gradually given so noteworthy an extension to the Russian name.

The first discovery of those two Siberias—European and Asiatic—which lay to the north of the primitive *Rus*, as far as the Polar Ocean and the Ob river, was the work of Nóvgorod.

Probably about the time of the First Crusade (1096), and certainly before the Second (1147), the Republic had already come into touch with that corner of Asia, between the Uráls and the Ob estuary, which was known to the Russians of that age as *Yúgra*.

Long before this, perhaps as early as the time of Cnut the Great, the Nóvgorod pioneers had penetrated to Lapland, to the White Sea, and even to the Uráls. One of the north Urál passes probably corresponds to those *Iron Gates* where the men of Nóvgorod suffered disaster in 1032—‘few returned, but many perished there’.

The time of Henry I of England shows Nóvgorod communi-

cating with the Asiatic lands beyond the dividing range. Speaking of a year which apparently answers to A. D. 1112, the *Ancient Chronicle* tells how a Nóvgorod personage¹ sent his servant to the Pechorá, how the Pechorá folk then paid tribute to *Novgrad*,² and how from the Pechorá the messenger went on to *Rúgra*. We may doubt the *Rúgrian* report of a mysterious people enclosed in lofty mountains by the sea, vainly struggling to break out, and accessible only by a minute opening through which they screeched their unknown lingo, thrust out an iron finger, and bartered furs for iron. But we need not doubt that 'Nestor' in this entry refers to the real fact of Nóvgorodian intercourse with the north-west corner of Asiatic Siberia early in the twelfth century.

And this Siberian intercourse is not a passing incident like the early Russian dominion on the Azóv or in the Crimea, or the early Russian raids towards and beyond the Caucasus. It is indeed so far persistent³ throughout the central and later Middle Ages that when Nóvgorod is displaced by Moscow, the Moscovite power is able to continue and develop the Russian overlordship in *Rúgra*. What Nóvgorod had asserted (with uncertain success, it is true) down to 1445, Moscow takes up with more vigorous hand, greater resources, and more definite result, from 1465.

In 1471 Moscow crushes Nóvgorod and enters upon its whole inheritance. But at least six years before this the founder of the Moscow Tsardom, Ivan the Great, had begun the conquest of the Asiatic Siberia with which Nóvgorod had dealt so long.

The less remote colonial provinces or spheres of the Republic were probably acquired, in part at least, before the way was

¹ Guryata Rogovishch by name.

² See p. 6, note 2.

³ Thus in 1187 there is a great native rising, both east and west of Urál, against Nóvgorod; in 1193-4 a disastrous punitive expedition; in 1323, 1329, &c., notices of Nóvgorod citizens travelling to *Rúgra*.

opened to *Yúgra*; but our records are here scanty in the extreme. In later times, the twelfth and following centuries, we have fuller references to Novgorod influence, trade, and military action here; and fullest of all is our knowledge (though fragmentary and badly-lighted even in this) of the intrusion of Moscow into these regions at the expense of the older Russian colonists. The foundation of Vyátka in 1174; the tribute-gathering expedition of 1169 in the northern Dviná basin; the hold of the Republic upon the Kóla region of Lapland in the thirteenth century; the native risings against Nóvgorod domination;—are broken lights of evidence for a fascinating chapter of colonial history. From the time when Iván Kalitá, the first founder of Moscovite power, demands *tribute in silver* for the lands beyond the Káma (probably with special reference to the mines which Nóvgorod had long exploited in the Northern Uráls), the pressure of Moscow continues and increases, till all the people of *Yúgra* and the Pechorá, of the Dviná and of Kóla, had 'kissed the cross' in fealty to the new Head of *Rus*.

This early Russian expansion, it may be remembered, is led not by an absolute monarch and his soldiers, but by a fickle democracy, whose chief activity is commerce, and to whom the right of insurrection is sacred. One may also notice that the free life of Old Nóvgorod has left widely-scattered traces in North Russia. Thus the colony planted in the well-stocked and beautiful woodland of far-away Vyátka in 1174—though no longer governed by elected civil magistrates, sharing power, in Nóvgorod fashion, with Church dignitaries—yet still keeps much of the manners and customs, the domestic architecture, the dialect, and even the head-dress, of the mother city.

On the other hand, when autocratic Moscow displaces its liberty-loving rival, popular government has clearly been found wanting in Russia. If Nóvgorod had not fallen before Moscow,

she would have fallen away to Poland. Ivan the Great conquers her, in the name of Russia and Orthodoxy, to save her from treachery and *Latinism*. And Moscow certainly substitutes a clearer political reality, and a higher national unity, for the ill-ordered diversity of the turbulent city-states which she absorbed in northern *Rus*—Nóvgorod, Pskov, Vyátka, and the rest.

To understand the Russian expansion in which Nóvgorod took so great a share, we must not overlook the influence of rivers. The territorial growth of Russia, like that of French America, is largely a river-history—a progress from end to end of a river-basin, a passing from one river-system to another. The slight elevation of the northern plains aids the inland navigator from Baltic to Urál.

And again, if the Urál were not, in so much of its course, despite length and breadth, a very moderate obstacle—in height, as in scenery, something of a Russian *Schwarzwald*—the early Nóvgorod connexion with *Rúgra* might be quoted as another disproof of the fallacy that mountain chains form an absolute barrier between states and races.

Lastly, the Empire of Nóvgorod, like the home-life of the Republic, is largely commercial: her discoveries and conquests are perhaps normally the results of trade expansion. The mercantile side of history has often been treated with contempt. But what form of man's energy has done more to bring about the discovery of the earth, to 'clear the mind of cant', to break down the obstacles of ignorance, fear and prejudice which once hemmed in mankind, and separated lands and races?

Russia under the Tartars

The Tartar Conquest

OLD NÓVGOROD is the only Russian state, or city, of importance which escapes full subjugation by the Mongols of the thirteenth century. And even Nówgorod, saved from siege and sack behind her marshes, in a summer of providential wetness, becomes the vassal of the Tartars. The Asiatic irruption, which alters the whole course of Russian history, and so sharply divides the life and polity of the Old Free *Rus* from the life of Russia in succeeding times, breaks upon all eastern Europe with the force of sudden terror. 'For our sins came unknown tribes. No one knows exactly who they are, nor whence they came out, nor what their language is, nor of what race they are, nor what their faith is; but they call them *Tatáry*. . . . God alone knows who they are, and whence they come out. Very wise men know them exactly, who understand books, but we do not. . . .'¹

It was in 1224 that the *Ta-ta* armies, which in this first quarter of the thirteenth century had already formed out of the ruin of the older Orient the largest Asiatic empire in history, first came in conflict with the *Rus*. Under the chief of a petty Mongol tribe, a great military genius, who had gradually brought under his leadership all the eastern and most of the western Turks, a new empire of Huns, a new confederation of Asiatic Nomades, had been formed. And this chieftain, the most terrible of land-wasters, best known by his title of Chingiz or 'Jenghiz' Khan, had now conquered all of modern Mongolia, much of Manchuria, a great part of northern China, with Peking itself, and most of what is now Chinese and Russian Turkestan.

¹ *Chronicle of Nówgorod*, A. D. 1224.

Finally, he had proclaimed for himself and his race a universal lordship—one sun in Heaven and one lord on Earth.

From the conquest of Bukhára, a part of the Mongol host, led by the strategist Subudai, the most brilliant of the lieutenants of Chingiz, fought its way round the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, broke into Georgia, forced the passes of the Caucasus, and overran the steppe-lands of the Kumans, nearest neighbours of the *Rus* to south and east.

‘These cursed *Pólovtsy*, godless sons of Ishmael, had indeed wrought evil to the Russian land, and they died by the wrath of God and his immaculate mother, to atone for the blood of Christians upon them.’ So wrote the annalist of Nóvgorod, a little later, but at the moment the Russian rulers felt the force of the Kuman appeal: ‘They have taken our country to-day: to-morrow they will take yours.’

Nearly all the princes of *Rus*, from Nóvgorod and Smolénsk to Kiev and Galicia, made common cause with the ‘*Pólovets* people’: the Khan of ‘these accursed’ proclaimed his conversion to Orthodox Christianity.

After a series of successes against outposts, and after the thoughtless and criminal massacre of the Tartar envoys, the Russians met their new enemy, the most sinister in all their history, just beyond the little river Kálka, close to the north shore of the Azov Sea (May 31, 1224). ‘But the *Pólovets* men ran away back, having accomplished nothing, and in their flight they trampled the camp of the *Rus* princes, and they were all thrown into confusion, and there was a terrible and savage slaughter.’ The Tartars pursued the Russians to the Dnieper: several of the vanquished princes were taken and suffocated—‘put under boards’, while the Tartar chiefs themselves ‘took seat upon them to have dinner’. One of the leading fugitives, who reached the Dnieper, ‘cut loose the boats from the bank . . . and himself barely escaped. And of the rest of the people, every

tenth man returned to his home. . . . But the Tartars turned back at the Dnieper, and we know not whence they came, nor where they hid themselves again. God knows whence he fetched them against us, for our sins.'

So the annalist of Nóvgorod wrote in 1224; in little more than a decade, some nine years after the death of their Attila,¹ the godless Tartars returned. Their first attack, a reconnaissance in force, had been by the south; their next onslaught—one of conquest—was by the north-east, through the *Black Bulgaria* of the Volga, our Kazán. 'The year of the world 6744 (A. D. 1236) . . . This year the Tartars seized all the Bolgar land, and took their great city, and slew all, even wives and children.'² Thus perished the chief market of the Volga, one of the central points of interest in the Oriental life of the Middle Ages, the ancestor of the Fair of Nízhi³ Nóvgorod, and the most northerly colony of Islam. Yet neither the trade nor the faith of Old Bulgaria was permanently extinguished. Both reappear in the Kazán of later time; the former lives also in the Great Fair a little higher up the Volga. And even the Bulgar race, although its tradition, in this northern branch of the stock, is fatally obscured from this time, perhaps survives in some measure in the obstinately Muhammadan people of Kazán.

The collapse of the Volga Bulgarians, and of the Kumans of the steppes, opened Russia to attack along the whole of the east and south-east, and the worst fears of patriots were realized. The 'Tartar foreigners' poured west like locusts. The town and principality of Ryazán, to the south-east of Moscow, was the first important bulwark of *Rus* itself, on the side of Old Bulgaria; it did not stand long.

¹ Chingiz, who by about 1206 had formed his Turco-Tartar Empire in its first Mongolian form, died in 1227.

² *Chronicle of Nóvgorod*, A. D. 1236.

³ Cf. note on p. 114.

‘The year of the world 6746 (A. D. 1238). . . . The Tartars sent envoys to the princes of Ryazán, a sorceress and two men, demanding a tenth of everything, of men and princes and horses. And the princes said, When none of us remain, all will be yours. And they sent to George of Vladímir asking for help. . . . But George listened not to the request, but wished to make war separately. But it was too late to oppose the wrath of God, as was said to Joshua the son of Nun, *I will send upon them before you perplexity, and thunder, and fear, and trembling.* . . . And the foreign pagans encompassed Ryazán, and fenced it in with a stockade.’

An attempt at relief was made from Kolómna, George of Vladímir helping, but it ended in disaster, ‘and many fell here, and the men of *Moscow* ran away, having seen nothing.’¹ The Tartars had ‘advanced against Ryazán’ on the 16th of December, and on Mid-winter Day, the 21st, the town fell, with terrible butchery. ‘They killed the prince and his wife, men, women, and children, monks, and nuns, and priests.’

Next came the turn of Vladímir, claimant of the *Grand Princedom* since the decline of Kiev, but almost useless as a leader of *Rus*. Hither from Ryazán came

‘the pagan and godless Tartars, a host of shedders of Christian blood. . . . And the whole of the province shut themselves up in Vladímir. And the lawless Ishmaelites surrounded the town and fenced it round. And it was in the morning that the Prince Vsévolod and the Bishop Mitrofán saw that the town must be taken, and they entered the Church of the Mother of God, and were all shorn into the schema² by the bishop—prince and princess, daughter and daughter-in-law, good men and women. And the lawless ones set up battering rams, and took the town, and fired it, on the Friday before Sexagesima.’

Prince and princess and bishop had taken refuge in the

¹ One of the earliest notices of Moscow in history.

² I. e. admitted to the strictest form of monastic life.

Church of the Virgin Mother, but the pagans, breaking in the doors and piling up burning wood around, slew all. 'Thus they perished, giving up their souls to God.'

After the town, its sovereign. The feckless George, titular head of the Russian people, had fled: he was soon overtaken. While he fancied himself to be sending out scouting parties he was himself entrapped. The scouts 'came running, "They have surrounded us already". And behold the Tartars came up suddenly, and the prince fled, without having done anything. And when he reached the river Sit¹ they overtook him, and there he ended his life.'

Thus 'the accursed' work their will on the fragments of dis-united and defeated Russia. Moscow, and Pereyaslávl, and Tver, and many another town greater than the Moscow of those days, they take, quickly and easily—'Rostóv and Súzdal going each its own way'—only at Nóvgorod is the flood arrested. Advancing north-west, the foe master Torzhók² with another indiscriminate massacre. 'They slew all, from the male sex even to the female, all the priests and the monks, and all, stripped and reviled, gave up their souls to the Lord in a bitter and a wretched death.' The road to the Baltic was now open, and the 'accursed lawless ones' pushed on, cutting down every one like grass—but before the heaven-protected birthplace of the *Rus* the Mongols paused. God, and the sacred apostolic cathedral of the Holy Wisdom, and the prayers of the bishop, of the faithful princes, of the monks, guarded the Republic.³ At the *Cross of Ignáti*, 70 miles away, the invader turned aside, weary and disgusted with the thick woodlands, vast morasses, and incessant rains, which confronted and impeded him. For all this summer it 'stood with' wet.

¹ Almost at the frontier of the Nóvgorod territories.

² Torzhók is the diminutive of, and an alternative name for, the town of Nóvi Torg (= New Market), south of Nóvgorod.

³ So the *Nóvgorod Chronicle*, 1238.

Yet Nóvgorod, though saved for the moment, would soon have shared the fate of the rest of Russia, if she had not placated the danger by prompt, unvarying submission. Her princes and officials now obey the Tartar *Tsar* in all things, visiting the *Horde* when summoned,¹ doing homage, punctually paying tribute, admitting Mongol assessors and tax-gatherers,² showing every mark of respectful vassalage. The orders of the Khan brook no evasion or delay, and the hero Alexander Névski, statesman no less than soldier, is especially active in propitiation.

Thus, in 1259, when 'the accursed raw-eating Tartars came, taking tribute for the accursed', the Republic, we have seen, though bursting with defiance, yields to the judgement of its leader. Nóvgorod rages and trembles; the greater men 'bid the lesser be counted for tribute'; the citizens gather in force—they will 'lay their heads by St. Sophia'; but the city pays at last, without a blow.

Nóvgorod escapes destruction; but her great rival, already so heavily buffeted by fortune, receives the full fury of the Tartar storm (1240). From the low east shore of the Dnieper, the Mongols, it is said, gazed with astonishment and delight on the white walls and coloured roofs, the church domes and towers, of the still splendid town on the heights of the western bank. Under the leadership of Baty, their supreme commander in the west, a grand-nephew of Chingiz, the Nomade hosts stormed the old Russian capital. 'It was hardly possible within the city', declares the chronicler, 'to hear oneself speak—such was the din of the assault, the groaning of the wooden chariots, the lowing of the buffaloes, the grunting of the camels, the neighing of the horses, the shrieks of the warriors.' By the *Polish Gate* the enemy forced his entrance, and the sack which followed was decisive for Old Kiev. When Carpini, five years later, passed

¹ As in 1247.

² As in 1257, 1259.

through the *Mother of Russian Cities*, there were but a few houses standing, and a few survivors sheltering. Not till the nineteenth century does *Chive* revive as a large and prosperous city, and then only as capital of a *Little Russia*.

With Kiev fall the south and south-west of *Rus*: the principalities of Volýnia and Galicia are quickly overrun, and the Tartar hordes pass on to the attack of the lands of Central Europe. Hungary is overwhelmed and devastated, almost from end to end. Poland suffers only less severely. Even the borders of the Holy Empire, of the German nation—Silesia, Moravia—are threatened and insulted.

But now the death of the Grand Khan Okkodai, second 'Emperor and Moderator of all the Tartars', the son and first successor of Chingiz, who ended his short and terrible reign in China, helped to recall the Mongol flood from Europe. The immense extent of the Tartar advance into the west, the almost infinite lengthening of the lines of communication, the increased vigour and obstinacy of the resistance offered on the borders of the Germanic world—at Olmütz or at Liegnitz—the satiety of such a marvellous and interminable series of victories and marches, also contributed to the ebb of the Nomade tide. But it was the conquest of Persia and of China, occupying all the energies of the Tartars for so many years (till about 1280), which finally saved non-Russian Europe from another attack.

Gradually the Mongol hold over western *Rus* relaxes; Mongol garrisons withdraw; the Lithuanian armies are able to defeat the Tartar forces in the Dnieper basin; only the east and south-east of our Russia-in-Europe—the Middle and Lower Volga, the Don and Donéts (= Little Don), the Crimea, the steppes between Don and Dnieper—are retained in immediate possession by the *Golden Horde* in the fourteenth century and

the early fifteenth. But all the Russian land not overrun by western enemies remains, as we have seen, under the Mongol obedience.

Within the desolated and broken fragments of tributary Russia her Tartar masters introduce little direct political change. To each principality they leave its constitution, its laws, and (usually) its dynasty.¹ The position of Russia under the Mongols may be compared with that of Moldavia and Wallachia under the Ottoman Turks. Like the Rumanians, the Russians remain in possession of their lands. They are not fully annexed to the Mongol dominions, nor directly subjected to *Tartarization*; but they are under a definite and often grinding overlordship. At all times of importance, the Russian princes are compelled to visit the *Horde*—the court and camp of the Khan of the *Golden Horde* upon the Lower Volga, himself a viceroy, for many years, of the supreme Mongol-Tartar Emperor, or Grand Khan, in Mongolia or in China. For authorization to rule, for investiture in their principalities, for justification against any grave charge,² for the solution of such disputes as were then so frequent between princely claimants, rivals, and enemies—on all such occasions the Russian vassals appear before their suzerain. At times these pilgrimages have to be extended to the court of the Grand Khan in Asia.

The Russian people, even in Nóvgorod, are obliged to pay heavy poll taxes, whose severity repeatedly provokes rebellions and disorders.³ By farming these taxes in the fourteenth century—until strong enough to lead the patriot cause—the princes of Moscow laid at least one foundation-stone of their wealth and power.

¹ Where the princely line survived.

² With which the Tartar overlordship could be in any way connected.

³ As in 1262 at Súzdal, in 1284 at Kursk, in 1318 at Kolomna, in 1327 at Tver.

Again, every Russian principality is bound to furnish the Mongol armies with a contingent of troops, on demand. Russians are thus frequently brought against Russians, and the first faint stirrings of national revival are crushed with the help of the oppressed themselves. Sometimes Russian troops are employed, like slaves of an Assyrian monarch, at the other end of the Empire and of Asia, at the utmost possible distance from home. A 'faithful Russian regiment' camped near Peking is frequently noticed in the Mongol-Chinese records.

Once more, no Russian ruler, state, or town, is allowed to carry on hostilities with another without the Khan's permission. And, generally, in social life, in finance, in war, and in the theory and practice of government, the Tartar influence is deep and long-continued. The Russian princely and aristocratic families are sometimes forced, bribed, or attracted into matrimonial alliances with the Tartars. In all but physical origin, the early Tsars of Moscow, it has well been said, are far more descendants and imitators of the Tartar Khans than of the Old Russian princes. The Moscovite autocracy is largely built on Mongol foundations, and largely after Mongol pattern. The partial separation of Russia from the rest of Christendom, and especially from central and western Europe, is, above all, due to the Tartar conquest and domination—the *Tatárshchina*. The half-Oriental seclusion of Russian women, which lasts, in a measure, till the reforms of Peter the Great, is probably, to a large extent, of Tartar origin—though Byzantine contributory influence must not be forgotten, here as elsewhere. And the same may perhaps be said of the tortures, mutilations, and floggings, the distant and painful banishments and forced labour, of the later Russian laws; of much of the military equipment and civil dress of Russians till the age of Peter; of the prostrations and other humilities both of the court and of the Church.¹

¹ Due allowance being made for Byzantine influence as well.

But the Tartar influences also produce, at least indirectly, a surprising increase in the comparative power and resources of that Church. In the national disasters religion is often the chief remaining comfort. Among the national humiliations, after the first storm of the conquest, the Asiatic overlords make a partial exception of things and persons ecclesiastical. The Tartars of the later thirteenth century show, in various quarters—Persian, Russian, Chinese and other—a decided leaning towards Christianity : high hopes of their conversion are entertained, both at Rome and elsewhere, till the age of Timur (1370–1405).¹ The princes of Moscow lean on the Church as their surest support : the Khans of the *Golden Horde*, even after their definite profession of Islam, seem hardly less anxious to win the friendship and alliance of the clergy.

The Lithuanians and Russia

The *godless Litvá* of Russian annals, the last important heathen race of Europe, had little concern with *Rus* before the Mongol conquest. As early as 1183 we hear of the men of Pskov, the *younger sister* of Old Nóvgorod in the extreme north-west, fighting with the Lithuanians : in 1258 the Tartars ‘took all Litvá land and killed the people’—it reads like the end of any possible danger from this quarter—but we know what these large phrases mean to chroniclers (as to journalists) of many countries. And here it is more than usually misleading.

For at this very time (1240–63) the *Litvá* were first becoming a serious political power under their Prince Mindovg, the captor of Grodno. And a few years later, the next of the great Lithuanian military leaders or *dukes*, Gedimin the Conqueror, tears away most of the west and south-west of Russia, with Kiev

¹ The life of Timur sees the complete defection of all the western Turks and Tartars to Muhammadanism.

itself (1315-40). The great fortress of *Brest Litóvsk*,¹ *Brest of the Litvá*, on the Polish Buh, the easternmost of the *Polish Quadri-lateral*, still preserves the memory of these Lithuanian conquests. Far beyond Brest, Gedimin masters Pinsk and Pólotsk, Vladímir Volýnsk, with the whole of the Volynian principality, Chernígov, even Kiev itself, with most of what we know as *Little Russia*. With admirable policy he courts the favour both of the Orthodox and of the Roman Church, both of the cities and of the country-folk. Large sections of western *Rus* 'welcome this new master who freed them at once from the crushing yoke of the Mongols and from their own eternal civil strife'. On one side, he endeavours to legitimatize his conquests in Russian eyes by contracting alliances with the House of St. Vladímir, by permitting his son to embrace the Orthodox faith, by authorizing the construction of Orthodox churches.² On the other hand, he welcomes Franciscan and Dominican missionaries, negotiates with the Papacy, offers to recognize its spiritual supremacy at the price of its friendly influence in holding back or diverting the Teutonic Knights. From Germany he draws artists, artisans, and merchants to his new capital at Vilna.³

Olgerd, son and successor of Gedimin, brings Lithuanian power nearly to its zenith (1345-77). He defeats Nóvgorod,⁴ forces Pskov to obedience, conquers Podolia and almost the whole basin of the Dnieper, expels the Tartars from the Russian south-west, overruns the Crimea, and ruins that ancient Kherson which had outlived the barbarian attacks of two

¹ See the note on p. 207.

² e. g. at Vilna and Novogoródek.

³ Here, on the Vilya, Gedimin fixed the permanent centre of Lithuanian politics and nationality.

⁴ Olgerd's attack in 1346 follows upon some plain language from Nóvgorod. 'Your *posádnik*', declares the duke, 'has barked at me: he called me a hound.' The abusive *posádnik* is executed by his fellow citizens, in Carthaginian wise, 'for it is owing to you that our lands have been seized'.

thousand years. Thus he extends the *Litvá* empire from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In 1370 he penetrates almost to Moscow. But for Poland and the Teutonic Order, Olgerd, like (and unlike) Vitovt in the next century, might have subdued all the fragments of the Russian race.

The next era, the age of the 'Jagellons' (1377-1434), witnesses the chief events of Lithuanian history. Under Duke Iagáilo¹ this great heathen race accepts Roman Christianity, as the price of the crown of Poland, and gains its decisive victory over the German knights. The *Litvá* prince becomes the Polish king; the *Litvá* people are baptized; Tannenberg is won. Despite all difficulties Personal-Union gradually hardens, as in the British Isles, into National-Union. The work of 1386 is completed in 1569. No prominent European people has shown less political insight than the Poles, in recent centuries—but the marriage-treaty of Queen Hedwig with 'Jagiellon', completed in the desperate hope of ending an everlasting Polish-*Litvá* warfare at all costs,² is a master-stroke. It creates the mighty Polish state of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the seventeenth century. It holds back the Moscovite till Peter the Great. It forms a powerful and fairly effective barrier against Turkish advance beyond Hungary, Transylvania, and the Euxine steppes. It arrests and rolls back the German crusading and colonial expansion, the *Drang nach Osten* in Baltic lands. It shatters the Teutonic Order, wins Courland and Old Prussia from the German knights and settlers, commences a momentous Slavonic revival, a notable Germanic depression. Not till the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia under the Great Elector,³ and the reco-

¹ Of which name *Jagellon*, the ordinary term, is a Germanization. See p. 87 and p. 30, n. 2.

² These including the sacrifice of every personal feeling of Queen Hedwig, who loathed her barbarian bridegroom.

³ The contemporary of our Charles II, 1640-88.

very of Moscovite Russia under the Románovs, do its effects begin to weaken. In the time of Charles I of England, as in that of Richard II and Henry IV, Poland-Lithuania is mistress of all western *Rus*.

With Duke Vitovt, the partner and ally of the Polish king, who governs Lithuania from 1392 to 1430, partly as co-sovereign, partly as chief vassal, of 'Jagellon',¹ ends the last hope that Lithuanian conversion, despite the Roman allegiance of the 'Jagellons', might ultimately profit the Eastern Church. 'For Prince Vitovt (the Nówgorod annalist bemoans in 1399) 'had previously been a *Christian*; but he renounced the Orthodox Faith and adopted the Polish, and perverted the holy churches to service hateful to God.' Yet in the great Duchy of Lithuania, from the time of its formation by Gedimin, a majority of Christians has perhaps always belonged to the Russian race and faith. The official documents of the Litvá dukes long continued to be written in White Russian. The savage struggles of these dukes and their people against the German Order imparted a specially bitter anti-Roman colour to Lithuanian patriotism, for a time. Cruel were the trials of some of the early Latin missionaries.

Finally, with the death of Vitovt,² the last great Litvá conqueror, whose triumph at Tannenberg (1410) balances his defeat by Timur near Poltáva (1399), the separate politics of Lithuania really come to their end. Even in his latter years a common diet of Polish and Litvá representatives is arranged for the election of Polish kings or Lithuanian dukes, and for all matters of outstanding importance affecting kingdom or duchy. After his disappearance from the scene, Lithuania is soon again

¹ This was a concession to Litvá conservatism, alarmed at the rapid changes (kingship of their dukes, conversion of the people, removal of the capital to Cracow).

² Whose intrigues to make his dukedom a sovereign royalty fail in 1429-30.

joined in complete personal union with Poland, and after 1501 this union is permanent. In the fifteenth century only Moscovite conquest¹ prevents the absorption of Nóvgorod and Pskov—in other words, the gain of all north-western *Rus*—by Poland-Lithuania, already mistress of the middle west and south-west of Russia.

The Germans and Russia

Occasional and highly interesting Russian relations with the Germans are recorded from the beginnings of the Russian nation, but it is only in the twelfth century that these begin to be generally important. And as yet they are in trade and religion rather than in politics or war. German merchants undoubtedly appear in Nóvgorod long before the organization of the Hanseatic League in the thirteenth century, but their influence is perhaps not very marked before that event (*c.* A. D. 1250–60). German traders and German missionaries on the coast of the Gulf of Riga are soon followed by German crusaders, who found Riga in 1200, and plant there the head-quarters of a new German Order—the famous *Brotherhood of the Sword-Brethren*, or *Sword-Bearers*, also called the *Brotherhood of the Soldiers of Christ*. But these are events which for some time exclusively concern the non-Russian peoples of the Baltic coasts—Lithuanian and Finnish.

There is no clear reference in the annals of Nóvgorod to the Teutons of the Continent, as opposed to the Scandinavians, before the time of the Third Crusade (1188). We are now told of *Némtsy* plundering the Nóvgorodians. But a little later, soon after the days of Magna Carta, the same records notice how *Némtsy* from beyond sea succour the city with corn and flour, after a terrible famine, when already near its end (1231). And in 1237 the union of the Sword-Bearers with the Teutonic

¹ 1471–8, &c.

Order of Old Prussia is perhaps recorded as a piece of good news : 'The *Némtsy* came in strength from beyond sea to Riga, and all united there ; and the men of Pskov sent aid, and they went against the godless Litvá, and for our sins they were defeated by the godless pagans.'

Yet soon the *Némtsy* appear among the most dreaded enemies of Russia. In 1242 Alexander Névski fights his good fight with the German Order on the ice of Lake Chúdscoe 'by the Raven's rock' ; when the *Némtsy* drove themselves like a wedge through the army of Nóvgorod, and God helped Prince Alexander.

Much lost ground is thus recovered (including Pskov, just conquered by the Teuton knights), and the Russian remnant of the north-west is saved from German dominion, in politics if not in trade. But it is a deliverance which has to be worked out once and again in the next two centuries. Thus, in 1268, after an agreement with the bishops and godly nobles of the German Order—wherein these godly men, in the Russian view, planned only deceit—the men of Nóvgorod fight a desperate drawn battle near the Kegola river, with iron troops of *Némtsy*, like a forest to look at, 'for the whole land of the *Némtsy* had come together'.

Almost every decade of later Nóvgorod history gives us some notice of conflict, negotiation, or trade with the *Némtsy*, mainly represented by the Teutonic Order and the Hanseatic League. But although lands and towns near or even within the limits of the Russian race fell under German rule throughout this period (1270–1410), during a great part of it, or at long intervals ; and although the whole Baltic coast, from Danzig to the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, is at one time held by the Order and the League, yet the German danger only touches the fringe of north-western *Rus*. Nóvgorod itself is never even besieged by the Teutonic Knights, though her trade passes in great measure under Hansa control.

And from the German fear mediaeval Russia is finally delivered by the union of Poland and Lithuania, and by the victory of the new Slav power over the Order. The Nówgorod Annals, which so constantly neglect decisive events of neighbouring history, do not forget that battle of Tannenberg or Grünwald, which marks the ebbing of the tide of German eastward advance—so active since the twelfth century, first apparent in the tenth.

‘The year of the world 6918 (A.D. 1410). . . . This year on July 15th, King Jagailo son of Olgerd and the Grand Prince Vitovt fought with the Prussian Némtsy, in their country of Prussia . . . and killed the Meister ¹ and the Morshold ² and the Kuntury,³ and defeated the whole army of the Némtsy, and took the towns of the Némtsy.’

The Rise of Moscow

Later generations of Russians were accustomed to ask themselves in amazement how Moscow ever contrived to rise so fast and so far. As a seventeenth-century tale begins, ‘What man ever divined that Moscow would become a kingdom? What man ever guessed that Moscow would be accounted an empire? Once by the Moskvá there stood only the goodly hamlets of a noble.’

It is as the establishment of one of the lesser Russian princes that Moscow first appears about 1147, midway in the anarchy of Stephen’s reign in England.

George Dolgorúki, Prince of Rostów, invites a friend and neighbour to visit him at his country seat on the present hill of the Kremlin. Here he gave him a mighty dinner, and nine years later, in 1156, he ‘laid the town of Moskvá’, probably

¹ The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order.

² The Marshal.

³ The Commanders.

running an enclosure of wooden walls round his villa, his estate, and the dependent settlement which had grown up there.

Not long before, all the Kremlin had been pine-woods, and the little Church of the *Saviour in the Wood*, the oldest building of Moscow, in the courtyard of the great palace of Nicholas I, still preserves the memory of this time.

The rise of Moscow may be traced partly to its geographical position, partly to movements of colonization, but mainly to the personal qualities, the policy, the good fortune, of its princes. It is the policy of the ruler which gives him the practical direction, the temporal headship, the enthusiastic support, of the Russian Church. It is by home and foreign policy that he becomes leader of a new Russia.

The geographical position of the *White Stone City* offered certain advantages. It was placed conveniently near the courses of the Volga and the Oká,¹ and it communicated with both by navigable tributaries. It lay at the intersection of three important land-tracks (one cannot call them roads), of which one connected the city with Kiev, and another with Nóvgorod. It lay, roughly, equidistant between the northern and southern extremities of the Russian world, though on its eastern fringe. In particular, the river Moskvá had special commercial importance, as a most convenient and direct waterway connecting the Middle and Upper Oká and the Upper Volga.² The Moskvá formed a chord between the two ends of this *Mesopotamia* of Central Russia, whose settlements, trade, and wealth were at first mainly along the courses of the enclosing rivers.

The importance of this Moskvá waterway, and its *portage* to the Volga, is well borne out by the history of the valuable and

¹ The Oká, joining the Volga at Nízhi Nówgorod, in volume and importance is almost equal to the main stream.

² I.e. the basins of both rivers above Nízhi Nówgorod.

fiercely disputed Nóvgorod colony at Vólok-Lámsk, commanding this very portage, and serving as the central Nóvgorod trade-station towards the Oká and the rest of these southern trans-Volga regions.

The colonizing movement, which had called Moscow into being in the early days of Kievan decay, from various causes set with peculiar strength into the Moscow region, both before and after the Tartar conquest (1237-43). The process of colonization caused the emigrant Russian population to become chiefly massed in the region between the Oká and the Upper Volga, beyond which—to north and north-east, east and south-east, beyond the Nízхни Nóvgorod of the future—farther advance was very difficult. There were other centres of migration, such as Vjátka or Ustyúg¹ in the far north, but this Oká-Volga *Mesopotamia* was certainly the chief; and in the very middle of it stood Moscow. In other words, it stood in the middle of what came to be known as the *Great Russian* stock—the colonizing, eastward-moving part of the Russian race, which had long been escaping from Kiev and the rest of the ruined and enslaved south.

Moscow's inner position in this colonized region, far away from the troubles of the south, yet not absolutely exposed (from the time of Iván Kalitá) to the frontier dangers and assaults of the East, was a sensible assistance to the town's early growth. 'Blows from without might fall upon neighbouring places'—Ryazán, Rostóv, Yaroslávl, Smolénsk—but they seldom reached as far as Moscow. Thanks to this, Moscow became a refuge for the surrounding Russian population, which everywhere was suffering from alien pressure.²

For a century and a quarter, between 1238 and 1368—between the first Tartar onslaught (when the men of Moscow

¹ Ust-yug = the (town at the) mouth of the river Yug.

² See Klyuchévski, *History of Russia* (Eng. trans.), i. 277-8.

ran away, or when the Mongol *Ishmaelites* took the city) and the first Lithuanian attack—Moscow was one of the few places in Russia which suffered little at enemy hands. The Tartar sack of 1293 is almost the only instance we have of such suffering. This comparative immunity not only drew on settlers from the West, in pursuance of the long-established colonizing movement of the *Rus*,¹ but drew back settlers from farther East, where settlements were more dangerously exposed.

As the point where popular movements of colonization north-eastwards intersected popular movements of commerce south-westwards, and south-eastwards, Moscow conferred perceptible economic advantages upon its ruler. A large population attracted to his principality meant a large number of taxpayers, while the commercial movement on the *Moskvá* meant the stimulation of popular industry in his dominions, and a good income from transit dues.

But the main source of Moscovite greatness, after all, lay in the character and policy of its princes. Without the personal equation Moscow would have remained a *bourgade*. Geography by itself should have made *Nízhni Nóvgorod*, at the *Oká-Volga* junction, an imperial position, the head of the new Russia in the middle east.

Beginning with Ivan I, *Iván Kalitá*, John the Purser (A.D. 1328-41), the descendants of Alexander *Névski* who reigned at Moscow created what no favourable circumstances of geography or of history would have accomplished by themselves—the foundation of a new Russia.

Western Europeans are not well acquainted with these men—before Ivan the Terrible, the contemporary and correspondent, dear brother and good friend, of Elizabeth of England. Yet they are worth attention. They were not all of shining moral

¹ Which ultimately brings the Russian to the Pacific.

virtue. Several of them were conspicuously wanting in daring, even perhaps in courage. From the standpoint of rival princes and towns, they were unblushing robbers. They first rose by calculated and unbounded subservience to the foreign tyrant. The Russian patriot of the fourteenth century, seeing only the present, might have counted Ivan the Purser, or Simeon the Proud, the worst of traitors.

But they were statesmen, they were financiers, they were far-seeing helpers of their country. In almost everything they were men of cool head—almost everywhere they shunned the falsehood of the extreme; the weakest of them kept at least to a silver mediocrity. They were, in private, usually models of temperance and precision—even the fashionable tendency to get drunk after dinner was honoured by them, as Hamlet would have had it, rather in the breach than in the observance. ‘They loved not treason or sedition, and punished the guilty; they drank, but not unto drunkenness; they loved not war, but always held their army in readiness.’ They showed an unswerving continuity of policy—external and internal. In the latter they were remarkable for their freedom from dissension, their family harmony. As their wills constantly exhort their descendants—they lived ‘at one’. And they were the keenest and closest of treasurers and economists. It is not without reason that the first founder of Moscovite greatness is known in history as *Kalitá*, the *Purser*. When dictating their bequests, in preparation for a last account, how attentive were these men to every item of their property. They forgot neither their cities nor their broad lands, neither their treasure-chests, their flocks and herds, their golden girdles, nor their fur coats. Everything was recorded in its place by these testators. To preserve their inheritance, and add to it—that seemed to be always in their thoughts.

But *Kalitá* and his successors were more than economists,

princely stewards, enterprising merchants, successful men of business—just as they showed themselves in time to be more than pliant servants of the foreign tyrant.

If the *Purser* consolidated his power by eager unscrupulous subservience to the Tartars, and by the most rigid and petty attention to finance, he prepared the way for his successors to become leaders of a revived Russia—and within fifty years of his death this result was reached. Having won the willing consent of the *Golden Horde* to his revival of the Grand Principedom at Moscow, to his removal of the chief bishopric of the Russian Church to the same place, and to his financial supervision (for the purposes of tribute) of all the subject Russian principalities, Kalitá really created a new national centre for the Russian people,¹ and before half a century even the Mongols of the *Horde* had to recognize this fact.

In 1380 Kalitá's third successor, the hero-warrior Dmítiri 'of the Don', led the whole of eastern *Rus* against the Tartars. Under the Moscovite standard the eastern Slavs, on the 'clean field' of Kúlikovo² beyond the Don, gained their first victory against the invincible Asiatic conqueror, the unendurable Ishmaelite oppressor.

The incessant Tartar raiding, which Kalitá had stopped by diplomacy (so that 'thenceforth there was quietness forty years, and the ravaging of the Russian land did cease'), was now challenged by the sword. The financial union of east Russian princes, which Kalitá had accomplished as chief tax-gatherer for the *Horde*, was now becoming a political union of the elements of a reviving nationality. And the spiritual leadership which Kalitá had given to Moscow was now beginning to bear fruit.

The transference of the old ecclesiastical primacy of Kiev

¹ Roughly the time of Crécy (1346). Kalitá died in 1341.

² Kúlikovo Póle, *the field of woodcocks* (kúlik).

(like the political presidency) from Vladímir¹ to Moscow might have seemed a mere incident, a result of convenience, perhaps a temporary arrangement, in Kalitá's own time. Did it matter so very much that the Metropolitan Peter should stay so often with his friend the Prince of Moscow, should finally fix his seat in his friend's city, should join with him in founding the Uspénski² Cathedral in the Kremlin? What had Vladímir gained from its possession of the chief metropolitan see, or indeed of the Grand Princedom itself? Gradually the full value of the connexion of the religious primacy (as of the princely headship) with a vigorous and growing political power, and with a city of such vitality and possibility as Moscow, became apparent.

The threads of Church life which spread over the Russian land from the metropolitan seat helped to draw the various parts of the country, especially of eastern Russia, towards Moscow. And the material wealth in the hands of the Church now also tended to gravitate towards the city, and contributed to its enrichment. Even more important was the moral impression. As the permanent connexion of the metropolitan see with Moscow was proved by events, all Orthodox Russians began to treat the Prince of Moscow with a semi-religious reverence. They began to see in him the eldest son of the Church, the friend and protector of the supreme Russian hierarch. They began to see in *Mother Moscow* a sacred city. Thus political resistance to the new power in eastern and northern Russia was everywhere undermined. And along with the extension of Moscovite power and influence goes the personal advancement of the Prince, who finally tends to claim the supreme lordship of all Russian land, the absolute monarchy

¹ On the Klyazma (roughly half-way between Moscow and Nízхни Nóvgorod), whither the title of Grand Prince had been, partially, transferred after the fall of Kiev.

² Uspénski, *of the Assumption* (uspénie, lit. falling asleep).

or autocracy of all the Russias—*Great, Little, White, Red*, or other.

At about the same time, therefore,¹ Russians began to look upon the Moscovite ruler as a model administrator, the true political head, and the spiritual protector of the subjected and broken Russian people. They saw in him, even under Kalitá, the source of new territorial, judicial, and financial relations, which had at last won a measure of peace and security for the tortured country.

And with Dmítiri Donskói Russians were able to recognize in the Moscovite Prince their chief hope of liberty, their leader to victory and national restoration.

Although Iván Kalitá makes Moscow the real head of the States of *Rus* vassal to the Tartar, Vladímir remains, for nearly a century after his death,² the coronation-city of the Grand Prince, the Rheims of *Moscovy*. Simeon the Proud, Ivan the Good, Dmítiri of the Don, Vasíli I, are all crowned here. But before Dmítiri's death in 1389, still more under his successor Vasíli, Vladímir increasingly becomes the mere possession and dependency, *the patrimony*, as it is called, of the sovereign of the Moskvá. Towards a similar dependence, a similar inclusion in their *patrimony*, the Moscow rulers, from Kalitá to Dmítiri, from Dmítiri to Ivan the Great, steadily endeavour to force the Republic of Nóvgorod, and it is in the course of a constant struggle to shake off this grip and save their ancient liberties that the citizens of the great trading town lean upon Lithuania. Even in the time of Kalitá they install a son of Gedimin as their prince; in the age of Ivan the Great the decisive struggle with Moscow is provoked by the same policy—of aggression and resistance—on both sides.

Kalitá's Church policy, which does so much for Moscow, is

¹ In the course, and even before the middle, of the fourteenth century.

² Till 1431.

studiously continued by his successors. If John the Founder, the *Purser*, builds the first great churches of the Kremlin, and brings the *Metropolitan of All Rus* to settle there, his next successors help St. Serge to found the monastery of the Trinity (the famous *Tróitsa*)¹ in the forests near the Moskvá. Here and in the capital are formed effective substitutes for the convents of Kiev : the new *Mother Moscow* becomes as holy as the older *Mother of the Cities of Rus*.

The aid of the Church is invaluable to the new power at every crisis. When the fatal gentleness of Ivan the Good threatens to bring about a transference of the Grand Principedom from Moscow once more, it is St. Alexis the metropolitan who puts up Ivan's little son Dmítri, to struggle for the post of the Khan's chief vassal : by appeal to the *Horde*, Moscow's position is maintained. The same spiritual power which enables Dmítri to mount his war-horse, in all the dignity of his twelve years, and to march with his army to be crowned at Vladímir (1363), supports him as a man in his defiance of the Tartars (1378-80, &c.). Before Kúlikovo the hero of the Don visits the *Tróitsa*, and is solemnly blessed by St. Serge, who predicts victory at a heavy price, and sends two of his monks (one of whom had been a noble and a soldier of renown) with the army of Moscow.

Under the same Dmítri Donskói and his successors, the Russian Church shows no little activity in missions. About 1376 the monk Stephen, afterwards canonized as the apostle of Perm (Stephen Pérmski), founds a Christian outpost on the Upper Káma. It was a venture of some risk, for an earlier missionary in this region had been flayed by the natives, 'while they were yet but infants in the faith'. Yet, before his death in

¹ One of the chief holy places of the Russian Church to the present day; a head-centre of the national resistance to the Poles and to anarchy in the *Time of Troubles* (1612-13).

1396, Stephen had overthrown the local idolatry of the *Golden Old Woman*, stopped the sacrifice of reindeer, secured the triumph of Orthodoxy, and founded Moscovite influence in the region from which, two centuries later, Moscow overruns the Siberian khanate. Under Stephen's successors, and under Novgorodian and Moscovite protection, the Russian Church takes root in the Pechorá country and among the Lapps¹—as it does also in the White Sea, during the early fifteenth century, through the foundation of the chief monastery of the Far North, in Solovétski Island.²

¹ 1397-1445.

² 1429. On this magnificent foundation, still perhaps the most notable building in Russia north of Petrograd, see Engelhardt, *A Russian Province of the North*.

3.

The Founding of the Russian Empire

Ivan the Great and the Moscovite Empire

UNDER IVAN III, *Iván Veliki*, John the Great,¹ Moscow gathers into its orbit every part of the Russian stock, every region of Russian land, that had not been absorbed by the Christian, Catholic, West. Ivan is the first true founder of the Russian Empire, as we know it.

If Peter, the son of Alexis, gave Russia a new capital, a new aspect, new claims and ideals, a window on the West, outlets on the seas, a fresh European position and consciousness, an awakened discipleship in the school of modern Western progress, Ivan, the son of Vasíli, first gave to the Russian people the unity and power and consciousness of an imperial state, the policy and claims of a great European power.

The *Reuniter of Russian Land* inherited the humiliation—expiring, indeed, but not yet dead—of Tartar overlordship. His dominion, far smaller than Poland (and how much more barbaric), nowhere reached the sea. Before his death he had raised the Moscow principality to be a sovereign international realm, nearly trebled its extent, brought into it all Russians (outside the defined territories of Western Powers), made it the sole representative in politics of the Russian race and name. He had arrested the advance of Poland-Lithuania, won from it some regions of White Russia, saved Novgorod for *Rus* and the Eastern Church, won a sea-board on the Arctic, a window on the Baltic. He had begun the destruction of the Tartar

¹ 1462-1505.

khanates to the east with the overthrow of Kazán, and had carried the arms and authority of Moscow beyond the Uráls, thus beginning the Moscovite conquest of North Asia, *Asiatic Siberia*. And he had united his family, race, and country, with the claims of the dethroned Caesars of the Eastern Rome, by his marriage with Sophia Palaiologos. In the very spirit of Peter the Great, he had developed intercourse with the West, and endeavoured to utilize Western talent in the service of Russia, in peace and war, in architecture and art, as in artillery and fortification.

It is, above all, as *Reuniter* of the Fatherland that Ivan leaves his mark upon his country. In 1463 Yaroslávl was absorbed by the Prince of Moscow; and in the next few years large tracts of the colonial domain of Nóvgorod fell into his hands.¹ In 1471 Old Nóvgorod itself, with all its remaining possessions, was conquered; and in the next decade its incorporation in *Moscow* was made more complete. In 1472 Perm made final submission—extensive regions of the Perm principality had already been acquired. In 1474 the northern Rostóv² sold its remaining lands to Moscow, and its princes became Moscovite *boyárs*. In 1480 the Tartar overlordship came to an end: no part of *Rus*, henceforth, beyond the limits of Lithuania-Poland, acknowledged a foreign master; nearly the whole of this independent Russia, *Great Rus*, was now formed into a Moscovite Empire. In 1485 Tver, the chief remaining exception, almost the only Great Russian town or principality of any note which Ivan could not yet claim as his,³ was taken without resistance. And in 1489

¹ Portions of this had been acquired by Moscow before his day, as by Iván Kalitá, and by Dmítri of the Don.

² Not, of course, Rostóv-on-the-Don, founded in the eighteenth century, but the ancient (ninth-century) Rostóv near the Upper Volga, between Moscow and Yaroslávl.

³ Ryazán was not fully reunited till 1517.

little Vyátka, in its far north-eastern forests, already for some time practically won, made final and formal submission to the new *Tsar of Rus*. In the subsequent nineties were recovered from *Litvá* both Vyázma and most of the lands of Chernígov. Thus the western Moscow frontier was brought close up to Smolénsk. Pskov, although not formally annexed, became practically Moscovite with the fall of Nóvgorod. Its reunion was complete by 1510.

Beyond the borders of the Russian race, to east and south, in Siberia, on the Middle Volga, and in the steppe-lands of the Don, Ivan carried forward the rule of Moscow; he is the first true Russian conqueror of *Rúgra*, the first Orthodox lord of Kazán. The extent of *Moscovy* was nearly trebled in the forty years of his reign. By the absorption of Nóvgorod she gained a large sea-board on the Arctic and a small outlet on the Baltic.¹

But it was not only in extent and local value of acquisition that the importance of this *Reunion* lies. Still more valuable was the creation of a new national feeling. Russia is born again in *Moscovy*. And the new birth is not the reappearance of the old 'complex and languid' federation, so rarely federated in any true sense, but the advent of a new monarchy, a highly centralized autocratic state, resembling the East Roman Empire under such a ruler as Basil II. A general feeling was now created in the Russian race that a mighty and age-long work was in progress which bore a profound relation to that race.² Thus when one of the last petty obstacles to Moscovite supremacy had been removed by the arrest and imprisonment of the Prince of Nóvgorod-Séversk, a monk is said to have appeared in the Moscow streets, carrying a broom. 'The

¹ I.e. on the Gulf of Finland, a tiny and precarious opening, disputed by the Swedes, who soon closed it again to Russia.

² So Klyuchévski.

Empire is not yet wholly cleansed. It is time to sweep hence the last of the dust.'

By the close of Ivan's life the *Great Russian* stock (including all the elements of the eastward colonial movement we have noticed) was now combined under one political head and directed by one political organization. The principality of Moscow had become a Great Russian nation, the Prince of Moscow a Great Russian sovereign, independent of all foreign power—a *Gosudár* or *Tsar*.¹

When, in 1486, the Hapsburg Frederick III, as Holy Roman Emperor, offers Ivan the royal title, a fitting reply is made. 'We have been sovereigns of our land from our earliest forefathers, and held of God, even as they. . . . May we never need to be commissioned to this sovereignty.'

Before Ivan *Veliki*, the Moscow rulers had not developed external or foreign relations beyond their own immediate circle, the other princes of *Rus*, and the national oppressor and overlord, who could not be avoided, the Tartar Khan, the *Golden Horde*. But now Moscow begins to deal with many of the states of Christendom and Islam—with Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, the Teutonic Knights, and Germany, and even with Italy, the Turkish Empire, and Persia. The *ritter* Poppel discovers *Moscovy* for the Teutonic world; the *White Stone City* receives an embassy from Vienna; Ambrogio Contarini the Venetian visits the country and the capital, and describes the court, the appearance, the speech, of 'Duke Zuanne'.

¹ This term ('Tsesar' in *Nestor*), the Russian form of 'Caesar', had been usually applied hitherto, in contemporary Russian history, either to the Emperor at Constantinople, whose imperial city was the *Tsargrad*, or to the Tartar Khan as overlord. David and Solomon, and the Kings of Judah and Israel, were *tsars* in the Slavonic scriptures; any absolutely independent monarch had some claim to this title; but it was of course specially the prerogative of the Caesars of Old and New Rome, and their successor, the new Head of the *Orthodox* World at Moscow.

With this extension of the political outlook there goes a natural change in Moscovite ideas, and to a great extent a change in the ideas of all Russians. The theory of a national state, the sense of need for political unity on a national basis, is developed in and from Moscow, in proportion as Great Russia becomes united as a sovereign state.¹

From the Tartar conquest to the revolt of Dmítri Donskói, the struggles of Moscow had been entirely part of the mutual feuds of the Russian vassals of the *Horde*. Since Kúlikovo these struggles tend to become, with Ivan the Great they are, struggles of a Great Russian nation—the only independent Russia in the world—with other nations.

By the end of the fifteenth century the idea of *Mother Moscow* is widely spread in all branches of the Russian stock, and dominant among Great Russians—the conception of Moscow as a heaven-protected citadel, to watch over the interests, and guard against the dangers, of the Russian land and race.

‘Thus external policy inspires political theory.’ And that theory in turn leaves its mark upon the political and social consciousness of the Head of the State. With the whole of *Great Rus* under his sway, and an obligation of national leadership laid upon him, the *Tsar of All Russia* begins from 1480, more definitely from 1494, to demand that every part of Russian territory and settlement, however much separated by foreign conquest, should ultimately recognize his supremacy, and thus realize the complete union of the race.

Ivan does not merely imply this by general titles, however aggressive. He makes his claim in full diplomatic manner. Thus in 1493, when Lithuania, through the ambassador of Hungary (and of the Pope), complains that Moscow had robbed Lithuania of *her possessions*, the *Gosudár* disputes the whole position :

¹ Cf. Klyuchévski.

‘Wherefore do they call them *their possessions* ? Are they not towns and provinces which Rus princes have brought to our service ? . . . Surely the Pope knows that the princes Vladislav and Alexander are heritors of Poland and Lithuania from their fathers only, whereas we are heritors of the Russian land from the beginning.’

The same language recurs in 1503 on the conclusion of peace between Moscovy and Lithuania-Poland. King Alexander, on behalf of the latter, reproaches Ivan with unjust seizure of land ; he desires nothing but his *ótchina*, he declares. ‘And do I not also desire mine own *ótchina*,’ replied the *tsar*, ‘even the Rus land still held by Lithuania, in which lie Kiev and Smolénsk, and other towns of ours ?’

Until he has regained his *ótchina*, ‘that is, all the Rus land now belonging to Lithuania’, Ivan protests to his ally, the Khan of *Krym*,¹ there can be no permanent peace, only a truce ‘for the gathering of fresh strength and the drawing of fresh breath’.

Nor did the claims of Moscow stop here. Her Grand Prince now aspired to be more than *Gosudár Vseyá Rusí, Sovereign of All Russia*. That was his racial ambition. But on a wider field yet he demanded to be recognized as the true successor of the East Roman Emperors, the heir of the Caesars of Constantinople, the head of *Orthodox* Christendom.

Ivan’s second marriage (in 1472) with Sophia Palaiologos, an orphaned niece of the last Byzantine *tsar*, was an expression of this claim. The rights of the only true imperial House were now to be transferred to the one great political power of the Greek Church, of *Orthodoxy*. By throwing off the Tartar suzerainty, and thus becoming an ‘international sovereign’, he was able to make his claim complete to the headship of the

¹ Whose khanate included both our Crimea and an extensive steppe-region on the mainland to the north.

Orthodox World. That world now contained no one comparable to himself.

Moscovite state documents now begin to take on a richer and more ceremonious diction, and to elaborate a terminology hitherto unknown. The Byzantine marriage is one expression of this imperial ambition. The assumption of the terms of *Tsar* and *Gosudár*, the translation for Russian use of the Byzantine term of *Autocrat*,¹ and the adoption of the Byzantine crest of the double-headed eagle, are other indications of the same.

Lastly, Ivan's imperial claims over *Orthodoxy*, like his royal claims over all Russian lands, are passionately supported by many of his people, most of all perhaps by the churchmen. A monk of Pskov, a few years after the death of the *Reuniter*, expresses his rapture at what (he thinks) has come to pass—in that the states of Christendom are now centred in the one great Orthodox sovereign, and that his city of Moscow has become the *Tsargrad*, the third and final Rome.²

¹ *Αὐτοκράτωρ* is rendered by *Samodérzhets*. Sigismund von Herberstein, Imperial Ambassador at Moscow from the Vienna Court in the days of Ivan's successor (1517–26), gives Europe the first good foreign account of the new Moscovite Russia, and witnesses to the realization of the autocratic idea. The Tsar was more absolute over his subjects than any other sovereign in the world. Moscow said, *The will of the Tsar is the will of God, and of the will of God is the Tsar the fulfiller*. The ordinary man of Moscow said, *I know not. Only God and the Tsar know*.

² Here, as elsewhere, V. O. Klyuchévski, *History of Russia*, is of special value.

BOOK II

I

The Consummation of Great Russia

Basil III (1505-33)

The State of Russia in 1505

VASÍLI (or Basil) III, the son and successor of Ivan III, found himself, on his accession, face to face with a situation of great and ever-growing complexity. The family estate of the Grand Dukes of Moscow, thanks to their aptitude in adding to their property, had grown into a political state which comprised the entire Great Russian people. It was largely because neither ruler nor people would realize this fact and adapt themselves to the altered relations in which, as a result of it, they came to stand to one another, that the calamities which overtook Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were brought about. Instead of introducing the principles of political economy or making even an attempt at establishing any definite form of government, *tsars* Ivan III (1462-1505), Basil III (1505-33), and Ivan IV (1533-84) continued to rule their people and order the affairs of their country strictly according to the principles of household economy and estate management which their ancestors had consistently applied with such eminent success.

Before we deal with this question, we must first of all consider the Great Russian people itself. The bright figures of the *tsars* and their courtiers are apt, in the eyes of the foreign spectator, to obliterate this dumb and grey background—this mass of

people of such amazing strength and persistency, which, after all, formed the substance of the Russian state and the not very stable foundations upon which the power of Moscovy rested.

One of the most noticeable characteristics of the Russian people is their migratory tendency; another is their appreciation of the transience of all matter. These two characteristics help to explain many of the perplexing phenomena of Russian history, and both of them are, no doubt, partly due to the geographical and climatic conditions in which the Russian people have always lived. Dwelling from time immemorial in the midst of a virtually boundless plain which is intersected throughout its length and breadth by magnificent rivers, flowing in all directions and offering a cheap, easy, safe, and pleasant means of getting about, the Russians were perpetually urged by nature to migrate whenever the soil was unable to give them as much as they asked of it, or they were unwilling to give their ruler as much as he asked of them. Often enough the pressure of external and hostile forces, or the worry of internal and civil strife, impelled them to seek fresh homes, to trek like the Boers, 'to scatter' (*razbrestís' rózno*), as the Russian idiom is, and there were neither mountain barriers nor ocean perils to daunt them. Towards the end of the eighteenth century we see Stephen Mikháilovich Aksákov, head of an ancient and noble line, obeying this secular instinct, abandoning his ancestral estate in the government of Simbírsk on this side of the Volga, the enforced co-ownership of which with many importunate and litigious relatives had become irksome to him, and trekking with his family and his serfs, his furniture and his cattle, hundreds of miles to the remote province of Ufá, almost under the shadow of the Urál mountains.

On a larger scale, and for very different and more vital reasons, the Russian people had begun to migrate, at first almost imperceptibly, but nevertheless steadily, and in ever-increasing

numbers, from the eleventh century onwards, from their homes in the country round Kiev, the middle reaches of the Dnieper and its tributaries. This region had been rendered increasingly uncomfortable by the endless civil wars on the part of the innumerable princes for the possession of Kiev, the sentimental yearning for which was their undoing; by the ceaseless raids and depredations on the part of nomadic Tartar tribes which swept in successive waves across the steppes of southern Russia; and by the constantly deteriorating economic condition of the people as the result of these two causes. While one part of the population moved westwards towards Poland, the main stream of migration flowed from the basin of the Dnieper over into that of the Volga. The territory most intensively colonized was a tract of roughly oval shape with very irregular sides contained between the upper Volga and its great southern tributary the Oká, which both flow from west to east and join together at Nízhni Nóvgorod. This territory, famous in Russian history as the nucleus of the nascent state, is known as the Land-between-the-rivers,¹ that is, between the Volga and the Oká. It was the kernel of Great Russia.

The term Great Russian which came to be applied to those Russians who migrated north-eastwards into the basin of the Volga and the Oká, and thence spread ever farther north and east, from the basin of the Dnieper, presupposes the existence of a nationality and country of Little Russia. This latter term in effect makes its appearance in documents of the fourteenth century. This division of the Russian race, and the origin of the difference between Great and Little Russians, are easily explained. It has already been said that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the Tartar invasions, recurring with ever-increasing frequency, combined with other causes to make life in Kiev and the surrounding country intolerable, part of the population

¹ *Mezhdú-récbie* (cf. Mesopotamia): see p. 67.

moved westwards towards Poland and the Carpathians, while the bulk migrated north-eastwards. From the middle of the fifteenth century onwards the people who had migrated westwards began to return to Kiev and the region of the Dnieper, to lands which had been lying fallow and virtually deserted for two hundred years. The causes that contributed to this reaction were the gradual weakening of the Tartar horde in the fifteenth century, rendering the Dnieper region again habitable, and the rapid development of serfdom in Poland in the same century. It is these Russians, returning to their original homes in south-western Russia, after 200 years, who went to form the Little Russian people. Probably, as the result of their long absence in Galicia and Poland, they there incorporated Polish elements, and absorbed Tartar elements on their return to the basin of the Dnieper, where, doubtless, some had been left after the ebbing of the Tartar tide. Similarly, the Great Russians in the basin of the Volga and the Oká inevitably assimilated Finnish elements, because that country, at that time, was purely Finnish. In fact, neither the Great Russians nor the Little Russians represented the pure and original Russian stock.

Thus the first cause of the differentiation between the Russians of the north-east and those of the south-west, between Great Russians and Little Russians, was geographical. When once the migration from the basin of the Dnieper began, a process of differentiation was bound to set in. The greater rigours of the climate and the greater hardships of existence in the north-east very soon affected the colonists in the Volga region. The altered manners of the princes who ruled over them typify this change in the national character. Instead of the chivalrous, sentimental, debonair, reckless, thriftless, and riotous princes of south-western Russia, we have the matter-of-fact, careful, calculating, persistent, and abstemious rulers of Vladimir, developing into the gloomy, forbidding, materialistic,

unscrupulous, and spider-like Grand Dukes of Moscow, builders of vast fortunes, prototypes of the modern *real-politiker*.

The second cause of the differentiation between these two halves of the Russian people was political. The vicissitudes of fortune experienced by the people of south-western Russia were destined to accentuate the process of differentiation. Throughout the whole of the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries they were under foreign political domination, first Lithuanian, then Polish. The Lithuanian principality, before it became entangled in the toils of Polish statecraft, enjoyed a boisterous and expansive if somewhat ephemeral career at the cost of its eastern neighbour, Russia, while the latter was preoccupied in trying to find shelter from the Tartar storm. The energetic Lithuanians, last of the European peoples to be converted to Christianity (1386), emerging from their ancestral lairs around Vilna and Kovno,¹ began in the thirteenth century to extend their sway south-eastward. Under Olgerd, in the fourteenth century, they conquered the whole of the basin of the Dnieper except Smolénsk, territory which constituted the Russia of the early Kiev days, and even claimed control of the steppes north of the Black Sea between the rivers Dnieper and Dniester. In 1386, as the result of a successful diplomatic and hierarchic intrigue, Lithuania and Poland were mechanically joined by the marriage of their rulers Iagáilo (or *Jagiello* = James) and Jadwiga respectively, but nevertheless throughout the fifteenth century Lithuania remained a semi-independent state, often indeed with a national prince at its head. Under Vitovt (1392-1430) it acquired Smolénsk, thus completing the conquest of the basin of the Dnieper, and overflowed eastwards into that of the Oká, counting the towns of Orël² and Mtsensk within its boundaries. Thus the whole of *old* Russia, except the city-republics of Nóvgorod and Pskov, was by the middle of

¹ Cf. pp. 60-4.

² Pronounced *Aryól*.

the fifteenth century brought under *non-Russian* political influence.

A factor which militated against this racial differentiation was that of the common religion, which constituted a powerful tie between the two halves of the people. The Lithuanian administration did not interfere with the Orthodox religion of its Russian subjects. Little Russia, indeed, and the country to the north of it, lying between the rivers Pripet and western Dviná, which came to be known as White Russia¹ (*Ruś Biała* in Polish), exercised in their turn a considerable influence on the state of Lithuania, under whose political sway they came. The greater part of the territorially vast principality of Lithuania was purely Russian in nationality, and the White Russian dialect became its official language. Until the union of Lithuania and Poland in 1386 Russian influence—not the political influence of Moscow, but the racial influence of the Russians of the whole Dnieper basin—was predominant in Lithuania. From 1386 onwards this influence began to give way before that of Poland. After this date the laws, the administration, and the society of Lithuania gradually became assimilated to those of Poland. The nobility of Lithuania, which included a very large number of Russian families, acquired immense political power, and secured immunity from taxation and absolute control of the peasants, who became serfs on the vast estates of these rural magnates. In the fifteenth century great efforts were made by the Poles to propagate their religion as well as their legal, political, and social institutions in Lithuania and western and south-western Russia. Indeed, from 1413 to 1447 conversion to Roman Catholicism conferred important political advantages. In the second half of the fifteenth century, in the reign of Casimir IV, the religious

¹ The country between the Pripet and the Niemen, west of the Berézina, was also differentiated under the name of Black Russia (*Ruś Czarna* in Polish).

propaganda was carried on with so much vigour that it aroused the antagonism of many of the chief Russian Orthodox families in Lithuania. The result was that several of them, whose territories were adjacent to that of the Grand Dukes of Moscow, turned their thoughts and directed their steps eastwards; and Ivan III, always ready to make hay while the sun shone, was pleased to accept their allegiance and to become suzerain of their lands.

The reign of Basil III (1505-33), along with that of his father Ivan III, may justly be called the golden age of the autocracy in Russia. Not that at later periods of Russian history individual rulers did not wield just as great power as they, and even greater, in proportion to the growth in size and power of the Russian Empire. But at no other time did the autocracy command the whole-hearted approval and confidence or serve the best interests of all classes of the community, hierarchy, nobility, merchants, and proletariat alike, as it did during this period. Its achievements, its conduct, and its aims were applauded by the whole people. It met their most urgent needs. It is indeed mainly for this reason that the autocracy came into existence; and it was owing to the support of the whole Great Russian people that the Grand Dukes of Moscow¹ became the autocrats of all Russia.

Even after their colonization of the country between the Volga and the Oká had been accomplished, the Russians found that they had not yet got over all their troubles. The Tartars still reached them, subjecting them to methodical taxation instead

¹ *Grand Duke* is the usual English equivalent for *Veliki Knyaz*, the title borne by the rulers of Moscow till they adopted that of *Tsar* (cf. p. 79, n. 1), which is a corruption of *Caesar*, and latterly also borne by all male members of the imperial family except the emperor. The word *Knyaz* is of Germanic origin, and is of the same derivation as our word *King*; as the highest title of the Russian aristocracy it is habitually translated *Prince*.

of erratic depredation. Their own princes they had always with them, and these multiplied and fought amongst themselves with all their pristine vigour. The result was that the people began to look for some centre round which they could cluster, and they found that Moscow answered their requirements. The policy, and even the character, of the Grand Dukes of Moscow happened to coincide with the aspirations of the people, distracted as they were by the discords of their princes within and the pressure of the Tartars without. It was not so much the personal qualities of the Grand Dukes of Moscow that inspired confidence, as their solid achievements. The success of their policy was patent and impressive. Neither heroic nor saintly, they were at the same time neither vicious nor stupid. They were eminently practical, careful, and dogged, and in contrast to their contemporaries and fellow princes in other parts of Russia, they had a just sense of proportion, they realized what was possible and what was not, and, above all, they had a keen eye to the main chance. In 1300 they were the poorest and the most despised princes in Russia, with barely 500 square miles of territory ; in 1462 they were the richest and incomparably the most powerful, with 15,000 square miles. They owed much to accident. The geographical position of Moscow, almost the hydrographic centre of Russia, was of inestimable advantage to them, and in particular the source of great economic strength, which did not escape the notice of the grand dukes. Again, from 1326 onwards, Moscow became the residence of the Metropolitan of all Russia, a fact which imparted immense prestige to its rulers. On the other hand, they owed much also to their own brains. Their policy of temporizing with and humouring their Tartar suzerains and paying them regular tribute gained the country comparative peace, which much redounded to their credit. Their policy of snapping up odd pieces of territory belonging to their relations and their rivals by fair means or foul

had the doubly satisfactory result of reducing the number of warring princes, and of increasing their own revenue.¹

All these factors contributed to the growth of a feeling of admiration for Moscow, and its rulers, who inspired a sense of security and solidity in the people, actually attracted large numbers of them to their capital and rallied still greater numbers to their cause. Moscow became the symbol of strength and unity. Not only did *boyárs* flock thither from other districts of Russia, forsaking their local princelings for service with the Grand Dukes of Moscow, and thus forcing the princelings to follow in their footsteps, cap in hand, but noble families migrated from other countries, notably from Lithuania and from Tartary, and settled down in Moscow. The grand dukes, and their people with them, began to be filled with the consciousness of success. They had faced and solved the two problems by which they had so long been vexed. They had become a united nation under one ruler, and they had survived the Tartar domination.

This latter process is euphemistically termed the casting-off of the Tartar yoke; what really happened was that the yoke merely, very gradually and very prosaically, lapsed. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that for 250 years the Russian people, the youngest in the European family, acted as a shield and breakwater for the rest of Europe against the Tartar invasions. Of course this rôle was not optional, and, as a Russian historian² has remarked, the successful performance of rear-guard service seldom evokes gratitude, but at the same time, and for the same reason, it is unfair to reproach the Russians with being 250 years behind the rest of Europe.

¹ Cf. pp. 69 sqq.

² Klyuchévski, vol. ii, p. 508.

The Conquests of Basil III

The statement that the realm of Ivan III included the whole of the Great Russian people requires some small reservation. It was his son and successor Basil III (Vasíli Ivánovich) who was destined to be, in the words of the Russian chronicle, the last of the gatherers of the Russian land. Russia already, in 1505, stretched from the White Sea in the north to the river Seim (which falls into the Désna, a tributary of the Dnieper) in the south, from the Urál mountains in the east to the shores of the Gulf of Finland and the river Sozh (another tributary of the Dnieper) in the west, and controlled the course of the Volga as far as Vasilsúrsk,¹ midway between Nízхни Nóvgorod and Kazán. But there were still a few cities and districts, ancient and integral members of the Great Russian community, which by their effective independence impaired the complete unity of the nation at which the ruler of Moscow aimed. These were the city-republic of Pskov, in the north-west, 'younger brother' of Nóvgorod; the ancient city of Smolénsk on the Dnieper, which had been appropriated by Lithuania at the beginning of the fifteenth century; Ryazán on the Oká, south-east of Moscow, always a turbulent and unsubmitive member of the Russian family; and Chernígov and Nóvgorod-Séversk on the Désna in the south-west.

Pskov was a replica of Nóvgorod, of which, indeed, it was an early colony. Like some portraits, it was more attractive than its original. This miniature republic reproduced all the better features of its prototype. Controlling a very much smaller extent of territory, the merchant-nobles never amassed such huge fortunes as did those of Nóvgorod. There was less commercial exploitation and speculation, a more even distribution

¹ Cf. p. 114.

of wealth, and consequently greater social harmony. At the same time, situated much farther west than Nóvgorod, on the extreme western border of the Russian land, Pskov was always in imminent danger of attack from foreign enemies and acted as the outpost and sentinel, not only of Nóvgorod, but of the whole of Russia against the enemies in the west, the Livonian Order of religious knights (the German soldier-politicians disguised as missionaries, who planted themselves on the western Dviná in 1187, and throughout the two succeeding centuries held all the lands between the Gulf of Finland and the Niemen), and against Lithuania and Poland in the fifteenth century.

As a result of this the people of Pskov could not afford to indulge in the civil war which was such a popular form of pastime in Nóvgorod. Pskov was free and contented, so it could not be redeemed; it was loyal and useful to Russia, so it need not have been crushed. But its continued independent existence was an offence in the eyes of Moscow, and so it had to be gathered in. In 1510 Basil III fell upon his prey, carried off the great bell of the city council, symbol of independence, and the 300 foremost families to Moscow, amidst the lamentations of the inhabitants, and replaced them with his own officials and colonists, distributing their lands amongst his nobles.

In 1517 a similar fate overtook Ryazán. This district was still governed by its own prince. He attempted to assert his independence but was imprisoned, and on his escape to Lithuania his principality was annexed to Moscow.

In 1523 the towns and districts of Chernígov and Nóvgorod-Séversk were also finally incorporated within the territory of Moscow.

Smolénsk was only acquired after more arduous efforts. This ancient Russian city, which was to change hands many times before it became definitively united to Russia, was at this moment in the possession of Lithuania. But Sigismund I of Poland had

united Lithuania and Poland¹ under his single sceptre as from 1501, so that war with Lithuania meant war with Poland. Basil III, supported by the whole people, had no hesitation in continuing the policy of aggression in the west for the reclamation of Russian lands, which his father had successfully initiated. One war terminated in 1509 without any result. Another began in 1514, when the Russians, provided with formidable artillery, attacked Smolénsk and took it. The capture of this city evoked much enthusiasm throughout Russia. The same year, however, the great prince-landlord of Little Russia, Constantine Ostrózhski, Orthodox yet loyal to his suzerain the King of Poland, inflicted a severe defeat on the Russians at Órsha, on the Dnieper below Smolénsk. But Smolénsk he failed to retake. The war dragged on until 1522, when negotiations were opened. In 1526 peace was concluded, and Smolénsk remained in Russian hands. Thus ended the first bout between Russia and Poland.

The Tsar and the Boyárs

The reign of Basil III (1505-33) is apt to appear somewhat tame and colourless between the long and eventful reign of his father Ivan III (1462-1505) and the still longer and more eventful reign of his son Ivan IV (1533-84). But beneath an impassive aspect a great deal was going on. Basil III reaped the benefit of his father's strong will and iron rule. His power was even more absolute than his father's, and it cannot be said that he abused it. Such small incidents as the crushing of Pskov were merely exceptions that proved the rule. They were part of a fixed policy and would have happened in any case. By sweeping away the last of the apanaged princes he had finally and absolutely united Russia under Moscow. That was also in the

¹ Poland and Lithuania were united by Jagiello in 1386, but after his reign Lithuania had (intermittently) princes of its own till 1501.

family tradition. Again, the brothers and other relatives of Basil III were less troublesome than his father's had been before him. Each of the Grand Dukes of Moscow defined in his will the territory and income which he left to each of his sons, and one of the means adopted by them in order to strengthen the position of their successor on the grand-ducal throne was for each in turn, in each succeeding generation, to reduce the apanages of the other sons and to increase that allotted to his appointed successor. While in the early days of Moscow each son had been left a large slice of territory and a share in the remunerative city of Moscow itself, Basil III succeeded his father with an infinitely greater property than all his brothers combined, and possessed the whole of the city of Moscow. In addition, his father, besides leaving him ample material means for asserting his authority, had invested him with certain judicial and political rights, such as the sole right of coining money, innovations which still further increased his power. Basil III's reign was thus the continuation and the complement of his father's, as was remarked by Herberstein, the Emperor's envoy who visited Moscow and its ruler in 1526, and published a most valuable account of his experiences and impressions, in which he states that the power wielded by Basil III over his subjects exceeded that of any other monarch in the world. In character also Basil resembled his father; he was equally ambitious and pertinacious; he was still more suspicious, reserved, and secretive; but he practised cruelty less extensively.

It was not for nothing that his mother was the sister of the last Greek emperor. It was not only heraldic paraphernalia that she had brought with her from Constantinople. Ivan III, though he always insisted on having his own way, at any rate observed the old custom of consulting the Council of the *boyárs*, the *boyárskaya dúma*, which was a legislative and administrative body, and the supreme court of appeal, consisting

of all the chief nobles, dignitaries, heads of departments, and officials. It resembled a house of lords and a permanent cabinet rolled into one. The sovereign often presided at its meetings, which, as a rule, took place daily, but his presence was not necessary for the taking of a decision or the passing of a law. Basil III introduced the practice of ruling and taking decisions without consulting the *boyárs*, preferring an intimate and small circle of advisers whom he gathered round him in his own apartments. This innovation caused much offence, and the *boyárs* were probably justified in discerning in it the fruit of occult Byzantine influence. Ivan III encouraged discussion, and liked to be answered back and to hear the opinion of the *boyárs* for what it was worth ; Basil III, even when he met any one outside his inner cabinet, would not tolerate any voice except his own. In short, the *tsar* was discontented with the *boyárs* and the *boyárs* were discontented with the *tsar*, though the decencies were so strictly observed in Moscow that on the surface everything seemed smooth.

This discontent was, not many years later, to burst forth into a conflagration which destroyed the *boyárs* as a class, involved the end of the dynasty, and almost ruined the whole fabric which the Grand Dukes of Moscow had, for three hundred years, been building with ant-like patience and industry. Meanwhile, it merely smouldered. The real reason for it lay in the accumulation of contradictions and misunderstandings on which the system of government was built up, which vitiated the relations between the two ruling forces, the *tsar* and the *boyárs*. Both parties were conscious of, and took pride in, the fact that they were at the head, no longer of a small princely apanage surrounded by other small princely apanages, but of a great nation with considerable population, territory, and resources ; but neither party realized the fact that the accession of wealth and power brings increased responsibility.

The *tsar* continued to look on the whole of Russia as his personal estate, with which he was entitled to do what he liked. The *boyárs* continued to look on themselves as voluntary assistants of the *tsar*, not as his subjects. As the various apanages had been abolished and absorbed by Moscow, so the princes who had ruled them and all their *boyárs* flocked to Moscow, took up their residence there and entered the *tsar's* service. But they continued to look on themselves as free agents, able to stipulate their terms of service, and resented the fact that the *tsar* did not agree with them. In the old days the *boyárs* had been able to choose the prince under whom they would serve, and the princes could choose their servants. Now there was only one prince to serve, and only one source from which favours in the shape of remunerative posts and landed estates were dispensed. It was a question of Moscow or nothing. There were only two alternatives—service under the *tsar* at Moscow, or flight abroad. The latter was a difficult and dangerous undertaking. It was almost impossible to avoid detection or capture, and this meant impoverishment, torture, and life-long imprisonment or exile. In the eyes of the *tsar* this was almost the greatest offence that a *boyár* could commit.

Placed in this way at cross-purposes, neither side would openly define its aims, its wishes, or its ambitions. The situation had arisen in a haphazard way, and it was allowed to complicate itself by a policy of drift. Neither *tsar* nor *boyárs* made any attempt to define their own or each other's positions, or to state what their power and their functions actually were.

The direction in which trouble most often and most clearly manifested itself was on the question of the succession to the throne. There was no law of succession. Looking on the whole country as his personal estate, the *tsar* naturally considered himself entitled to dispose of it as he chose, though the custom had been for the eldest son to succeed to Moscow and the

Grand Duchy, and to be given increasing superiority over his younger brothers. Basil III was the son of Ivan III's second wife. Ivan had intended that his eldest son by his first wife should succeed him, and then changed his mind, presumably owing to the influence of his second wife. His eldest son predeceased him, but he, in his turn, had a son who by right of primogeniture would have succeeded his grandfather. This alteration of the succession, although Ivan III was perfectly entitled to make it, had always rankled in the minds of the *boyárs*. It was not that they had any liberal leanings or hankered after anything like a constitution. They were indeed ultra-conservative, and merely wished to enforce their ancient right of influencing, not the method of government, but the choice of a governor. But they mistook the accidental cause of the trouble for its origin. Its origin lay in the fundamental contradiction from which the government of Moscow and of Russia suffered, which they could not see, and in the altered relations between themselves and their sovereign, which they would not regulate. The accidental cause was the introduction of foreign influence into the court life of Moscow, which they observed and resented.

In the good old days the relations between the *boyárs* and their master had been free and easy. Even Ivan III was bluff and outspoken in a bear-like sort of way. His son cultivated aloofness and inaccessibility; the virus of Byzantinism had taken deep hold. Instead of facing the facts of the situation and defining by law his own power and that of the *boyárs*, the *tsar* tried to solve the difficulty by shutting himself up and surrounding the throne with a nimbus.

In defence of this policy, which combined the ineptitude of the ostrich with the efficacy of the hedgehog, it must be admitted that the *boyárs* scarcely offered promising material from which to select collaborators. The co-operation which they

offered was so limited and passive, that it resembled obstruction. Their only wish was to conserve their privileges. With this object they had evolved an exceedingly elaborate code which, with adamant rules, regulated the quality and the quantity of the service which they consented to render the State. This code was called *méstnichestvo* (from *mésto*, 'place'). Its governing idea was a distorted and exaggerated valuation of what was considered family honour. It was a sort of trade union founded on genealogical principles. The rules, stated briefly, were that no *boyár* could accept any post (civil, military, judicial, or diplomatic) if it was lower in rank than that which any member of his family, alive or dead, had already held, and, further, no *boyár* could accept any position in which he found himself subordinate to another *boyár*, to whose family his own family had never been subordinate before. If he infringed either of these rules, he drew down the collective wrath of his family on his head, and the will of the family was stronger than the will of the *tsar*. The *tsar* could not force a *boyár* to do what the *boyár* considered derogatory service. But provided these rules were observed the *boyár* did not mind what service he performed.

It can be imagined that such a system scarcely promoted efficiency. It involved interminable disputes, law-suits, and delays in the filling of all the government posts, and ended by filling them merely with those whose relations had filled equivalent posts before. The field where the effects of this incredible and fantastic code were most injuriously felt was that of military operations. The prospects of an army in which no officer would serve under any other officer unless any or all of their ancestors, if serving together, had previously occupied exactly similar positions, were naturally gloomy. Besides, as an inevitable corollary, each family was perpetually trying to advance its fortunes, which meant trying to break the rules of the trade union to its own advantage. At the same time the effect of such a system

on a ruler who considered himself an absolute autocrat, and yet was unable to appoint those whom he judged best fitted to carry out his intentions, was exceedingly exasperating.

The phenomenon was one of the unfortunate results of the concentration of popular forces in Moscow. The *boyárs* as a class were of very mixed origin. There was, first, the untitled nobility of Moscow itself (*boyár* was a designation, not a title), families who had been settled in Moscow, and served the grand dukes before and during the unification of Russia by them; next, there were the apanaged princes, who came and settled in Moscow as they lost their apanages (to the Grand Duke of Moscow) or became impoverished, and also their untitled nobility, who either preceded, accompanied, or followed them (this class by mere force of numbers naturally soon swamped the first); lastly, there were titled and untitled foreign families, mostly of west Russian ('Lithuanian') or Tartar origin, who were attracted to Moscow by the prospects of a successful career which it offered. *Méstnichestvo* was a result of this flood of noble fortune-seekers and of the desire of each family to establish the superiority of its origin over, and improve the chances of its success at the expense of, all the others. The passive assistance which they offered the *tsar* in the administration of his country and the conduct of his wars soon developed into a chronic obstruction. It brought about, eventually, the undoing of their own class. Meanwhile, it forced the *tsar* to look elsewhere for workers and helpers. The people from whom he began to choose these were of humble origin—sons of priests, clerks in the government offices, and others. These very gradually began to form the nucleus of a new class of State-servants, who were rewarded, not according to their birth, but according to their work, and owed everything to the *tsar*. Whereas the *boyárs*, having patrimonies (*vótkhiny*) of their own, were, at any rate in theory, economically independent, the new

class of officials were granted estates (*poméstiya*) by the *tsar* in return for services rendered and on condition of future service; and though these, in course of time, also became freehold estates, they owed their origin to the favour of the *tsar* and their owners were not the heirs of troublesome traditions of independence.

His first wife, to whom he had been married twenty-three years, having borne him no children, Basil III induced the Metropolitan of Moscow to allow him to divorce her, though this uncanonical behaviour aroused great opposition in the stricter ecclesiastical circles. As his second wife, Basil married Helen Glinskaya, daughter of a Little Russian ('Lithuanian') magnate, of Tartar antecedents, who had settled in Moscow. She had two sons, of whom the elder, Ivan, was born in 1530. Basil III died in 1533 at the age of 55, having reigned 28 years; and Ivan ruled in his place.

2

*Expansion Eastwards**Ivan IV* (1533-84)

THE long reign of Ivan IV, called 'the Terrible' (1533-84), was one of the most eventful, and in its consequences one of the most important, in the history of Russia. Its general effect was absolutely calamitous, and this effect was felt long after the death of the monster who caused it. d

After the death of Basil III an inevitable reaction took place. Moscow had been ruled by a firm hand for seventy years. Two autocrats of strong mind and determined character in succession had kept the *boyárs* in order, and had, moreover, seriously begun to undermine their position as a class. On the premature death

of their sovereign, leaving behind him an infant successor aged three, the *boyárs* entered on halcyon days, which, at the lowest estimate, might reasonably be expected to last fourteen years, as in effect they did. Their position resembled that of a community of mice after the passing of two generations of exceptionally formidable cats.

For the first five years (1533-8), it is true, the *tsar's* widow and her uncle Michael Glinski kept the power in their own hands, and under the rule of these intelligent foreigners Russia prospered. But Helen died suddenly and mysteriously, and from 1538 till 1547 the *boyárs* had the time of their lives. One might have expected, in view of the disapproval of the methods of government of the two previous *tsars* which they had intermittently and obscurely, though unmistakably, expressed, that they would have been ready with some alternative plan, or, at any rate, would have impatiently and eagerly set to work to elaborate one as soon as they were free to do so. Far from it. Their only idea of government was to snatch the supreme power from one another, and while each held it, to abuse it to the greatest possible advantage of himself and his family, and the greatest possible detriment of the hostile families of his class. The two bitterest rivals were the families of the Shúiskis, descendants of Rurik, and of the Bélskis, descendants of the Lithuanian prince, Gedimin. Of these the latter were the less selfish and vindictive. Delation, imprisonment, exile, and torture were everyday occurrences. Such practices were, of course, universal in those days, and were just as normal in Russia as in other countries, and probably no worse at this period than previously. But whereas in the days of the two last *tsars* they were the accompaniment of order and strong government, now they served no end except family spite and personal greed, and indicated nothing but anarchy.

It is intelligible that such a state of things hardly offered a

propitious setting for the nursery of Ivan IV. Congenitally somewhat abnormal, Ivan experienced in his childhood treatment which was bound fatally to influence the development of his character. He was exceptionally impressionable and nervous from his earliest years, and he and his brother, left orphans in their eighth and sixth years, grew up in an atmosphere which under these circumstances was absolutely ruinous. Stinted in food and clothing, except when he had to be present at the reception of a foreign ambassador, bullied and terrified, neglected and insulted, he saw the *boyárs* fighting amongst themselves, slighting his father's memory, and plundering his property. In the person of Ivan IV the *boyárs*, to satisfy their malice, scratched a Russian and in very fact discovered a Tartar, who was a plague to them and to his whole people for the rest of his natural life.

Like all children who are left entirely to their own devices, Ivan was precocious, and the feeling of neglect and isolation which was habitual to him made him secretive and suspicious. He had by nature a quick mind. It never occurred to any of his relations or spiritual advisers that it would be a good thing to train it. He was never educated, but he steeped himself in the Bible and the Fathers of the Church, and learnt long extracts from them by heart, which he was fond of quoting in and out of season. He was all his life the victim of his emotions, which he was never taught and never learnt to control. Everything he did was the result of impulse. Since the emotion which, more than any other, dominated the whole of his life was fear, or rather terror, his impulses were almost always those of a man who is defending himself from attack, and since the attacks directed against him were conjured up by his own imagination, the reprisals which he exacted for them were in reality the expression of blind tyranny and senseless cruelty. He was consumed with the conviction that he had been appointed from

on high to rule over his country, and also that his *boyárs* and other officials, whom he always termed his 'slaves', were perpetually aiming at wresting his power from him. In short, he was the victim of a fixed idea which the bitter experiences of his childhood had engendered in him. He was firmly persuaded that he was misunderstood, that nobody loved him or appreciated his good intentions, and that everybody was against him. He was not mad, but he was exaggeratedly self-centred and mentally and morally unbalanced. Such people on the borderline—victims of emotion and passion, and of limited reason and intelligence—are difficult enough to deal with in ordinary life, but when they are placed on a throne with unlimited power and means to satisfy their impulses they become absolutely impossible. But it must be admitted that Ivan IV had better moments, fits of docility, accommodation, even of enterprise and public spirit, which, while he was still comparatively young, alternated with his moods of passion, and sometimes lasted long enough to facilitate the carrying out of really important work. At his worst moments he was neurotic and cruel, bigoted and hypocritical; at his best he was an energetic and even enlightened ruler.

In 1547, at the age of seventeen, in the midst of an unbridled and lurid adolescence, he astonished the Metropolitan of Moscow by seriously announcing his intention of being crowned, beginning to govern by himself, and getting married. His coronation is not unimportant, because of the fact that he was the first Russian sovereign to have himself crowned '*tsar*'. This title, the Slavonic version of the word Caesar (*tsar* is contracted from the Old Slavonic *tsesar*), was used by the father and grandfather of Ivan IV occasionally in diplomatic documents and on coins, but only, as it were, casually and tentatively. In the old days the only sovereigns to whom Russians had applied the title, which signified to them absolute independence but did not

connote any particular form of government, were the Byzantine emperors and the Tartar khans, to whom they had owed spiritual and temporal allegiance respectively. Most commonly the rulers of Russia styled themselves either Grand Dukes (*veliki knyaz*) of Moscow, or *Gosudár vseyá Rusí*, which can be approximately rendered by 'Sovereign of All Russia'. Occasionally, also, they used the designation—afterwards adopted permanently—of *samodérzhets* (or autocrat), the Slavonic rendering of the Byzantine *αὐτοκράτωρ*. But though his immediate predecessors had dallied with these titles, Ivan IV, obsessed as he was with the idea of his divine mission and his own dignity, was the first to assume them publicly and officially, and to claim the right to be recognized as autocrat, and not merely to act as one.

The family of his wife, chosen at the parade of eligible young ladies which was customary on these occasions, is of some importance, in view of the consequences which attended his marriage. She was Anastasia, daughter of Román Yúrevich (= son of Yúri or George) Zákharin-Kóshkin, member of an ancient family of Lithuanian origin long settled in Moscow, and founder of the family which came to be known in Russian history as the Románovs.

His new responsibilities did not at first produce much change in Ivan's behaviour, which may be termed wild. His maternal relations, the Glínkis, wielded most of the power and made themselves very unpopular in Moscow by their behaviour. About this time a series of exceptionally destructive conflagrations broke out in the capital; thousands of lives were lost and houses burned, the *tsar's* palace amongst them; and the *tsar* barely escaped with his life. The people accused the Glínkis of having caused the fires by their practices in the black art. All this, it is said, made a great impression on Ivan. He was living in a village outside Moscow, and here he was visited by a priest of his own private chapel, named Silvester. This man

urged on him the view that these disasters were an expression of the divine anger at his misdeeds and frivolity, and admonished him to repent and to turn over a new leaf. The fact is, at any rate, undoubted that at this time Ivan did turn over a new leaf. He threw all his energy into the task, and showed as great an anxiety to administer his country as he had hitherto shown to amuse himself. He put himself entirely into the hands of Silvester, and appointed an extremely intelligent young man of humble origin, named Adáshev, at the head of a new department (*prikáz*) which was to receive popular petitions to the sovereign.

One of the first results of this new era of concord and conscientious government was the summoning of the first General Assembly (*zémski sobór* = 'land assembly') in 1550. The principal object with which this was summoned was to carry out the reform of local government; at the same time a new codification of laws was undertaken, the last having been made in 1497. Local government was still carried on as it had been in the days when the country was split up into apanages. It was in the hands of the ruling class, whose double duty it was both to provide the sovereign with military forces to defend (or to extend) his country in time of war, a personal service performed by them in lieu of the payment of taxes, and also to administer his country in time of peace. The emoluments of their offices guaranteed their military efficiency; these, however, were not paid them by the State, but levied by them directly from the land which they administered. This administration, as was natural in such remote days, was merely disciplinary and punitive, not preventive or in any way philanthropic, and the payments consisted mostly of various fees and penalties, originally paid in kind and later commuted. This system of decentralization led to many abuses and disputes, and also caused delay at a time of mobilization owing to the vast extent of country over which the officials were spread. These posts were, appropriately

enough, known as 'feedings' (*kormléniya*), as those who held them literally battered on the mass of the people—the peasants who tilled the soil.

As the result of laws passed at this general assembly, these posts were gradually abolished, the inhabitants of the country districts and towns were made responsible for the punishment of criminals and collection of fees payable directly to the State treasury, and certain criminal cases were to be tried in future in Moscow instead of locally. Thus greater centralization was combined with an increase in the liabilities and responsibilities of the peasants. Two objects were gained at one stroke: the sources of large income were more effectively controlled, and the military forces were more effectively concentrated. This was very necessary in view of the fact that the needs of the State grew out of all proportion to the productivity of the people.

The assembly of 1550, like others summoned during the century, was not representative in the sense that it consisted of deputies elected by the people to express their views; it was composed of certain representatives of the people whom the *tsar* chose to consult and to make responsible for innovations in administration. It included the *boyárskaya dúma*, the heads of the *prikázy* (the equivalent of ministries and government departments composing the executive), the heads of the Church and of various institutions such as trade-guilds, mostly drawn from the metropolis—all of them appointed to take part in the assembly, but not elected.

The following year, 1551, witnessed the convocation of a council, the object of which was the reform of the Church and especially the limitation of the acquisition of landed property, to the detriment of the State, by the monasteries—institutions the members of which, having renounced the world in order to pray for its sins, had become the largest and wealthiest land-owners in the country. It was not till considerably later that

laws were ultimately passed which restricted the practice of testators bequeathing their estates to the Church, especially to the monasteries, in payment for prayers to ensure their salvation after death. This practice became so prevalent, and the lands held by monasteries on condition of offering prayers for the dead assumed such dimensions, that the State was hard put to it to find enough land to grant, with peasants to work it, in order to maintain the efficiency of the living.

The Foreign Policy of Ivan IV

Ivan IV, not content with initiating reforms in the internal administration of the country, undertook at this time an enterprising foreign policy, the successes of which laid some of the foundations of the Russian Empire as we have known it. As a matter of fact, Russia was almost always at war. The history of Moscow is illustrative of the truth that a healthy organism cannot remain stationary. It must expand and develop. The internal development of Russia was very slow. Cut off from material contact with Europe by her inveterate enemies, the Swedes, Germans, and Poles, who knew well enough how dangerous to themselves a well-equipped Russia would be, deprived of mental and spiritual intercourse with the West by her devotion to the Orthodox Church, which inspired fanatical hatred of anything coming from the lands of heresy, there was nothing to restrict her expansion, which, owing to the tireless energy of her people and the peculiarities of her geographical situation, literally knew no bounds.

But after the subjugation of all the small Russian principalities, the unification of the Russian people, and the consummation of Great Russia, Moscow found itself confronted with other problems. These were the establishment of commercial contact with Western Europe, the reclaiming ('redemption') of ancient Russian lands still under non-Russian rule, the security of its

south-eastern frontier, and the acquisition of more land for domestic purposes such as the raising of revenue and endowment of its officials and soldiers, or professional governing classes, with estates. It may be said that the accomplishment of the first two objects necessitated the preliminary achievement of the last two. The first two objects were not accomplished in the sixteenth, nor yet in the seventeenth, century. The first involved access to the Baltic; and the Swedes, the Germans of Livonia and the other Baltic provinces, and the Poles, had no intention of allowing such a blow to be struck at their power. The second implied the union of Lithuania with Russia; but Lithuania was one half of Poland, and Poland was, at the height of its strength, far too vigorous to allow itself to be dismembered. The solution of the third problem implied that of the fourth: it was eastwards that the line of least resistance lay, and in the East that two of Russia's most vital needs could be simultaneously and most easily satisfied. It was to secure the south-eastern frontiers of Russia, and to acquire more land to meet the most immediate necessities, that Ivan and his able councillors now set themselves.

It seems at first sight curious that a State already owning such vast territory should need more, but the nature of the territory must not be forgotten. The soil of Moscow was very different from that of Kiev—a fact well appreciated by the Polish magnates who were pegging out for themselves vast estates in Little Russia. The soil of the whole of Great Russia between the Volga and the Oká was comparatively poor. It consisted largely of forest-land, and, especially under the agricultural conditions of those days, could not support a large population, and therefore could not produce a large revenue. Industries did not exist, and timber was not such a marketable asset in those days as it is now. It is true that Russia owned already all the land between the Volga and the White Sea, between the

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Russia about 1500
Acquisitions by end of XVIth Cent
Territory lost by 1620
Acquisitions of Alexis
" "Peter the Great
" "Anne
" "Elizabeth
" "Catherine II

Uráls and Finland, but the conditions there were, economically, even more unfavourable. What was not forest, in the region north of the Volga, was neither arable nor habitable. The peasants at this time enjoyed, it is true, a certain prosperity: they had still fairly unrestricted usufruct of the countless rivers and of the abundant wild honey in the forests; the fur-trade was always profitable; and live stock was cheap and plentiful. Nevertheless, it was more grain-bearing land which was the prime necessity of the State, and this was to be found, not in the north, but in the rich black-earth country south of the Oká, while in order to win this country the south-eastern frontier had to be secured.

It has been said that at this period Russia was almost constantly at war. It must not be forgotten that in those days Moscow was, except to the north and north-east, surrounded by enemies. In the north-west were the Swedes, in the Baltic provinces the German Order of Knights, in the west Poland, and everywhere else the Tartars. In the period between 1492 and 1595 Russia waged ten wars with her western neighbours on the north-western front, which altogether lasted over fifty years. But during the same period on the south-eastern front war was literally perennial: it died down every autumn and sprang up every spring. The Tartar domination, as exercised formally over Russia, came to an end with the fifteenth century, but the Tartar peoples continued to harass the Russians for many years to come; in fact, it was not until the eighteenth century that the last remnants of Tartar political power were suppressed. When the Golden Horde,¹ as such, ceased to exist, its offspring took its place. This comprised the two khanates of Kazán and Astrakhan, which occupied the middle and the lower reaches of the Volga, and the khanate of the Crimea, which joined to that of Astrakhan on the east, and covered virtually the whole of southern Russia as far west as the Dnieper. All three states

¹ *Orda* = camp.

were solidly and fanatically Muhammadan, and thus in close spiritual communion with the ruling powers in the Ottoman Empire, at this period at the very zenith of its strength. The Crimea became, in fact, a sort of dependency of the Sultan.

It was also the Tartar power which caused most material harm to Moscow. Every year bands of marauders on horseback would come north, skilfully making their way along the watershed between the basins of the rivers Dnieper and Don. Having arrived within the borders of territory settled and inhabited by Russians, which at this time did not extend far south of the line of the river Oká, the Tartars would spread out fanwise amongst the peasants labouring on the land, and then, enclosing them as it were in a vast net, they would kidnap all the able-bodied and good-looking of both sexes, drag them off to the Crimea, and sell them as slaves. The Crimea was in those days one of the principal slave-markets of the Muhammadan world, and in this way tens of thousands of valuable lives were lost to Russia every year. Such experiences as these explain the growth of the bitter antagonism which long existed between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires.

These incessant raids necessitated the organization of serious defence. A regular system of frontier police grew up, for which members were recruited every spring in Moscow. The men were distributed along a line of forts, connected with each other by barricades of felled trees in forest-areas and earthworks in the open country. At the beginning of the sixteenth century this line followed the course of the river Oká, from Nízhni Nóvgorod westwards to Túla and Kózelsk, a line not far to the south of which began the southern steppe, or open treeless country. This frontier police was very effective in counteracting the raids. It gave notice to the larger bodies of troops posted behind whenever the approach of the raiders was apprehended, and in this way, year by year, the amount of occupied and cultivated country

was gradually extended southwards, though the lot of the people who settled there was not without excitement or peril.

But the Tartars of Kazán on the Volga were more accessible and vulnerable than those of the Crimea, who were protected by hundreds of miles of steppe and the easily defensible isthmus of Perekóp¹ at the end. Russians had for years past been gradually feeling their way down the Volga, the upper reaches of which had been in their possession for centuries. Kazán was an important commercial, as well as a political, centre. It had been the scene of a great annual commercial fair. Basil III had aimed a blow at Kazán by establishing a rival fair at Makárev, below Nízhni Nóvgorod,² a fair afterwards transferred to the latter town, where it became world-famous. He had also founded an outpost-town, called after him Vasilsúrsk, at the point half-way between Nízhni and Kazán, where the river Surá falls into the Volga.

In 1552 Ivan IV, in the hey-day of his good temper and good fortune, undertook the expedition against Kazán, which was a formidable stronghold. After an arduous siege of several months, the city fell, and the whole of its territory passed into Russian possession. Much of this, on both sides of the river, belonged to tribes of Finnish origin, the Mordvá, Cheremís, Chuvásh, Votyák, and the Bashkírs; and it was some years before all these were successfully reduced, and all their land became the property of those classes in Russia who so much needed it—the soldiers and the clergy. But the capture of Kazán was not only of material advantage. It was a great personal triumph for Ivan, and a great moral triumph for the whole of Russia. It has been called the Russian *Las Navas de Tolosa*, and it was indeed the first step in the progress of the Orthodox Cross against the Crescent. The sequel to the conquest of

¹ Means literally *Cross-ditch*, i. e. the earth-work across the isthmus.

² 'Lower Newtown', so called to distinguish it from old Nóvgorod.

Kázán was that of Astrakhan, which was effected with much less difficulty in 1556. The lands on either side of the lowest reaches of the Volga are arid, but Astrakhan is an economic centre of great importance. The whole course of the Volga was henceforward in Russian lands; trade with Persia and the East was thereby facilitated; and, incidentally, a regular supply of caviare was assured. The foundation-stones of Russia's great Eastern Empire had been laid.

The eastern flank having thus been satisfactorily cleared, more attention could be devoted to thwarting the destructive inroads of the Crimean Tartars. These robbers, whose community subsisted almost entirely on the profits of the slave-trade, did as much damage to Lithuania and Poland as they did to Moscow. If Russia and Poland had once put their heads together they could have swept the Tartars into the Black Sea instantly, but of course this was the one thing they never could bring themselves to do. But with the aid of their frontier police the Russians gradually pushed back the Tartars and brought under cultivation the fertile zone of black earth, which begins south of the Oká and extends right across Russia in a strip nearly two hundred miles broad. This land was apportioned amongst the upper class which provided the professional army. It was given them as a reward for their service and also as a means of providing them with the income necessary to maintain their service efficiently. There remained the question of labour. This was drawn from the populous districts north of the Oká, from which such a flood of emigrants set out for the new fertile lands that the government, fearing depletion of the country round Moscow, began to restrict the right to migrate. Only younger members of families were allowed to go. These naturally arrived in their new homes without means of starting work, and were compelled to borrow from the landowners. Such debts are never easy to pay back,

and, while serfdom did not at this time formally exist in Russia, this was one of the ways in which the peasant gradually became fastened to the land on which he worked ; he could not buy back his freedom, and thus he became a slave. Like a wasp that indulges in jam, his wings were caught.

During the reign of Ivan IV a second line of forts and earth-works was constructed, farther south than the first ; this second line started at Alatór on the river Surá in the east and went westwards to Novosil and Orél, southwards to Nóvgorod-Séversk, and thence again south-eastwards to Putívl.

At the end of the sixteenth century a third line took its place ; this was really a triple line of fortified towns, namely Eléts and Lívny, Vorónezh and Kursk, and, far to the south, Valúiki and Bélgorod. In the course of a century the line had shifted from the Oká to half-way down the courses of the rivers Donéts and Don, which flow into the Sea of Azóv.

It was in the formation and in the functioning of this frontier-police that the Cossacks came first into prominence. The word Cossák (in Russian *kozák* or *kazák*) is of Tartar origin, and it was first applied to men of no fixed abode or occupation who hired themselves out as day-labourers. The scene of the frontier warfare against the Tartars was country, some of which had been lying waste for centuries, and more of which had never been exploited at all. It abounded in all manner of game, and the rivers teemed with fish. The Tartars, in the interludes between slave-driving, spent their time in the capture of animals. The Russians similarly, when not killing the Tartars, went hunting. This sort of life attracted all those elements in Russia who either did not possess a home or did not want one. Such men hired their services to the local tradesmen as fishers and hunters, and to the local authorities as frontier police, and they probably acquired the name of Cossack from the Tartars who were engaged in similar occupations. The earliest Cossacks

were those of Ryazán, who are mentioned in 1444, and the first line of frontier forts was where they first developed. As the Tartars receded southwards, the Cossacks pushed forwards, and many of them began themselves to form permanent settlements in the open steppe which they had helped to reclaim. In course of time they grew into a large community, a sort of semi-independent military republic with its own laws and organization, and came to be known as the Cossacks of the Don, the river along which their settlements chiefly lay. From here, again, the more restless spirits migrated eastwards to the banks of the Volga, where they deteriorated into mere brigands who preyed on the rich traffic of that mighty river. Ivan IV sent a punitive expedition against them, and they then dispersed, many going still farther east and settling on the river Urál, then called the Yaík, others going south towards the Caucasus, to the banks of the rivers Kubán and Téreik. The Cossacks of the Dnieper, who in the seventeenth century played such an important part in Russian history, arose in the same way, and somewhat later than those on the Don.

In general, the Cossacks, who became an extremely important element in Russian society, may be described as follows. They were originally hunters and adventurers who preferred the risks and profits of a roving life to the security and the liability to taxation of a sedentary life. People used to go and join the Cossacks in Russia (as they used to emigrate from England) when the conventions of society became irksome to them or the conditions of life intolerable. From the nature of the country where they plied their trade and the prevailing political conditions the Cossacks developed into a force of permanent irregular soldiery, which afterwards grew into military communities with territory and laws of their own. The Church had no authority over them, and that of the central Government of Moscow was, for long, of the most shadowy description. Ethnologically, the

Cossacks were extremely mixed. The preponderating element was doubtless Russian, but many Tartars came over from the enemy's camp and made common cause with them, just as, in the days of the Tartar domination, numerous Tartar families had settled in Moscow; and their wives were as often as not of Tartar origin. It was natural that such communities should show but scant respect for persons or traditions. They did not mind where or at whose expense they made a living, and on several occasions took as much out of the Russians as they had ever done out of the Tartars. The *tsar* and his Government found that they formed a useful hedge against their hereditary nomade enemies, but they also found that a hedge has thorns on both sides. In later years their liberties were drastically clipped, and Russian authority was definitely and firmly enforced upon them. At the present time they still form separate communities, enjoying certain privileges, such as partial exemption from taxation, in return for life-long liability to military service. In the eyes of Russian society they have always had a somewhat heroic colouring. But admiration for them is tempered with fear, as their exploits—at times in opposition to, at others in support of, the central authority—have usually been performed at a heavy cost to the proletariat.

Meanwhile events of importance had been happening elsewhere. In 1553 occurred a portent of the coming storm. Ivan IV fell seriously ill, and, death appearing imminent, he required the *boyárs* to swear allegiance to his son, whom he wished to succeed him. Most of the *boyárs*, and with them Silvester and Adáshev, hesitated; many refused; all of them were bitterly hostile to Ivan's maternal relatives, the Glínskis, and to his wife's family, the Románovs, who, if his infant son were to succeed him, would inevitably secure all authority. Besides this, the ostensible and the equally cogent reason for their unwillingness was the fact that they regarded as Ivan's

rightful successor not his son, but his cousin, who, being senior, had in their view prior claims. As it happened Ivan recovered, but the simmering disloyalty and the latent intentions of his confidential 'ministers' and of the *boyárs* which had been revealed to him rankled, and conscious of the fate which would befall his wife and family in the event of his death, he never forgave them.

The success of his arms on the Volga, meanwhile, encouraged Ivan to try his fortune on the north-western front. The fact that Russia was cut off from the Baltic by the Swedes, the Germans, and the Poles, was the motive for this policy, and it proved also the cause of Ivan's failure. Ivan understood clearly the material necessity for Russia to obtain access to the coast, but he did not realize that the resources which enabled him to vanquish the Tartars were unequal to the task of overcoming his enemies in the west, who were thoroughly well equipped. His advisers were in favour of first attacking the Crimean Tartars, and thus making a clean sweep of the hereditary foes on that side, but Ivan was determined to have his own way, and this divergence of policy led to further recrimination. The pretext for beginning the war against Livonia, or rather the German Order of Knights who ruled that country, was the fact that some years previously, well aware that uninterrupted intercourse with western Europe would strengthen Russia's material resources and make her a more dangerous neighbour, they had established a blockade and would not allow engineers and artisans, who had been summoned by Ivan from Saxony, to proceed to Moscow. The war began in 1558, when the Russians invaded Esthonia and Livonia, and captured a number of places, including Nárvá and Dórpát (in Russian called *Yúrev*, or 'George's (town)', because it had been founded by Yarosláv, whose monastic name was George, early in the eleventh century). Kettler, the grand master of the Livonian Order, took alarm and

sought the help of Sigismund II Augustus, King of Poland, who concluded an alliance with him. Russia was thus again at war with Poland, with a long frontier to defend, and this war lasted with intermissions for twenty-five years. If Ivan and his counsellors had been at one it might have continued as well as it began, but unfortunately they were at loggerheads, and their continual discord prepared the way for catastrophe abroad and at home. Domestic differences and divergence of policy eventually brought about a rupture between Ivan and his advisers. Silvester and Adáshev, whom he had himself spoilt by an excess of confidence, were dismissed ; the first joined a monastery, the second the army in Livonia. But these two were the ringleaders of the large mass of the *boyárs'* party, who were bitterly hostile to the family of Ivan's wife ; they had, moreover, gathered virtually the whole of the executive in their hands, and filled the administration with their partisans. Their dismissal foreshadowed a complete break in the order of government.

The same year, 1560, two further disasters occurred ; another great fire broke out in Moscow, and Ivan's wife Anastasia, to whom he was passionately attached, suddenly died. Both events still further exasperated the *tsar*, and the latter he attributed directly to the worry of the personal feuds which were always raging behind the scenes in the palace ; indeed, he asserted that she had been poisoned. But even yet the bursting of the storm was delayed. The war in the West was still the chief pre-occupation, and the Russian arms gained further successes. The Baltic provinces were in liquidation. Kettler, the master of the Livonian Order, unable to carry on the war, ceded Livonia to Poland, and himself retained only Courland with the title of hereditary duke. Poland, possessed of Livonia, threw more energy into the campaign. Sweden obtained a footing in Esthonia, and the large island of Oesel was bought by Denmark.

In 1563 Ivan was present at the capture by his army of the ancient Russian city of Pólotsk on the western Dviná, which, since 1300, had been in the possession of Lithuania. But the strain of keeping the *boyárs* in hand, and of keeping the Poles at bay, was too great, and in 1564 the crash came.

The Revolution of 1564 and the New Régime

The general causes of the break have been described. They were, roughly, the claim of the *tsar* to absolute power over Russia and all that it contained, which he, true to his traditions and to his instinct, looked upon as his private property; the claim of the *boyárs* to a large share in the government of the country and the direction of policy; and the fact that both claims were justified by the absence of laws defining the powers of the rival parties. While the *boyárs* were, strictly speaking, more conservative than the *tsar*, both were the unconscious victims of the fatal policy of drift—the hesitation to define the position clearly. On the other hand, the particular reasons for the break at this juncture have never been thoroughly elucidated, though events which certainly contributed to it were the question of the succession, raised in 1553, and divergence of views on foreign policy.

What actually led to the crisis was the flight and desertion of Prince Kúrbski in 1564. This man, a member of one of the oldest Russian families, was one of Ivan's best generals. He had been a member of the *boyárskaya dúma* and one of Ivan's counsellors in what are known as his 'good years', and he had distinguished himself in the campaign against Kazán. He may be described as an enlightened and intelligent conservative, with a *penchant* for Western civilization; he was relatively well educated, and his patriotism was tempered by a sense of his country's deficiencies. He was in command in Livonia, where

after many successes he lost a battle. Fearing the *tsar's* anger he deserted to the King of Poland, abandoning his wife and child in Dórpát. The fact of the matter was that he could not endure Ivan or Moscow any longer. He was only one of many. Flight abroad, on the part of his subjects, was the one thing Ivan dreaded most, and he used to exact financial guarantees from them against this contingency. Kúrbski's defection is especially important because it resulted in an extraordinary exchange of polemics between him and Ivan, one of the most curious of political correspondences and one of the chief sources for the history of Ivan's reign. The correspondence lasted with long intervals from 1564 to 1579. Kúrbski opened it, and wrote in all four letters to Ivan's two, crowning his work with a short history of the 'Grand Duke of Moscow'. Both sides were so exasperated that neither seriously attempted to argue or succeeded in proving anything. They were just like two hysterical women screaming their convictions at each other, and Ivan certainly screamed the louder. 'I didn't—yes, you did; I shall—no, you shan't' is the general tenor. Kúrbski asserts that Ivan ruled perfectly as long as he listened to the advice of his counsellors. His political programme goes no farther than existing political institutions—the *boyárskaya dúma*, which had always existed, and which he considers a panacea for all ills, and the *zémski sobór*, which was a new creation in 1550. Ivan, in his immense and chaotic rigmarole (his first letter occupies 62 quarto pages, while the whole correspondence only contains 100), asserts that the *boyárs* have unjustly tried to wrest the power from him, and that he has the absolute right to do what he chooses with his 'slaves'. Neither side could see beyond its own grievance; neither had any remedy to suggest. The only touch of novelty was introduced by Ivan in the reiteration of his claim to despotic power by divine right and by inheritance; this he was the first ruler publicly and definitely to proclaim,

but in doing so he was begging the question and falsifying history. The main value of the correspondence is its indication of the profound contradiction and of the mutual misunderstandings which prevented Ivan and his government from fulfilling their real duties, which were to defend the country from its enemies abroad and to enforce at any rate law and order at home. Both Ivan and Kúrbiski foresaw disaster ; Ivan prophesied the doom of the *boyárs*, Kúrbiski that of the dynasty.

Ivan was not long in fulfilling his own words. Kúrbiski had assumed the beneficent omniscience of the *boyárskaya dúma* ; but, as a matter of fact, the *boyárs* as a class had never been conspicuous for their enlightenment or their spirit of self-sacrifice. Even when capable men of more humble origin, such as Silvester and Adáshev, came accidentally to the top, their impulse of public spirit soon exhausted itself, and simony and corruption supervened. Ivan, for his part, assumed the beneficent omnipotence of the autocracy, and at least his contention was supported by the facts of experience. He compared the reigns of his father and grandfather with the rule of the *boyárs* during his own childhood. But both Ivan and Kúrbiski chose unfortunate methods of enforcing their arguments. Both of them reverted to type—evading instead of confronting their problems. Kúrbiski turned traitor and ran away, claiming the right for all his colleagues to do likewise unmolested. Ivan proceeded to declare civil war on his own subjects.

This he initiated by the unusual step of suddenly leaving Moscow, late in the year 1564, with his family, his followers, and all his household belongings and valuables, and settling down in the village of Alexándrov, about 70 miles to the north. Like Kúrbiski, he migrated. From here he sent forth two decrees, one to the hierarchy and nobility, which included the whole administration and the army, another to the merchants and people of Moscow. In the first he accused the *boyárs* of ruining

the land, of robbing both *tsar* and people, the priests of conniving at this, and the army of failing to defend the country ; he put his ban on them all collectively, and said he would have nothing more to do with them, and would go and live somewhere else. In the second he announced that he had no quarrel with the good citizens of Moscow. In short, it was an experimental abdication to test the extent of his power. At the stage of political and intellectual development which the people of Moscow had then reached it worked admirably. They were filled with alarm and terror at the departure of the *tsar*—an unheard of and portentous act—and promptly sent deputations, headed by priests and *boyárs*, to beseech him to return. This he did in February 1565. He was now able to make his own terms. These reduced themselves to the simple and drastic plan of cutting Russia in two. He chose out a number of towns and districts, scattered over various parts of Russia, which should serve for the maintenance of himself, his family, and his body-guard. This latter was chosen from amongst the military class (the nobility), and numbered a thousand. This separate estate (which amounted to nearly half the country) and *personnel* he termed *opríchnina*—*opríchn* means ‘apart, separate’—and the *opríchniki*, the desperadoes and cut-throats who formed the guard, were nicknamed by the people *kroméshniki*, the approximate equivalent of ‘outsiders’. The rest of the country, and of course the whole onus of its defence and government, he left to the *boyárskaya dúma* and the *prikázy* (ministries), which were termed *zémshchina*, approximately ‘commonwealth’ or ‘dominion’, from *zemlyá*, ‘land’. The supreme control over decisions of state, nevertheless, he reserved to himself. He also stipulated for the unquestioned right of punishing any *boyárs* or others who were guilty or suspect of disloyalty. He abandoned the palace in the *Kremlin*, and built himself and his satellites a whole new quarter in Moscow, summarily evicting the actual

tenants ; but he did not live much in the capital, preferring to direct his reign of terror from the forests of Alexándrov, which village he made his residence. Here he led the life of a lunatic, and forced his two sons, Ivan and Theodore, to do the same. The mornings were spent in bell-ringing and prostration, during dinner he read aloud the lives of the saints, in the afternoon he watched his victims being tortured, and in the evening he listened to soothsayers or got drunk. Everybody whom he suspected he had murdered, tortured, or imprisoned ; these included his cousin and all his family, and many of the *boyárs* and their families. The Metropolitan of Moscow was outraged, imprisoned, and finally put to death for remonstrating with him. Not content with this, Ivan toured his unfortunate country, dealing death and destruction wherever he went. He literally devastated the prosperous city of Nóvgorod, and decimated its inhabitants, because it had dared to oppose his grandfather, and had rendered itself suspect of treachery. Finally, his suspicions fell on his own followers, and some of the chief *opríchniki* were executed. He made the people of Russia realize what it meant to invite a sovereign to come and rule upon his own terms. He did infinitely more material and moral harm to his country and to his subjects in twenty years than the Tartars had done in two hundred, and the irony of it was, that he completely failed in his object. Instead of systematically undermining the position of the *boyárs*, who, as a class, undoubtedly were a far greater hindrance than they were a help to good government, or patiently forming another class of officials to take their place, Ivan merely struck at individuals amongst them whom he suspected or disliked. He tried indeed to replace them by his *opríchnina*, but a regiment of blackguards hastily got together does not form a good executive. It was reserved for a greater character than Ivan's to supplant the *boyárs* and to replace the criterion of birth by a standard of efficiency.

Another aspect of Ivan's singular procedure was more personal. It illustrated the persistence of the type of the selfish landlord. Unable to cope with the management of the whole of his estate, he left the responsibility for that of half of it to others, reserving to himself absolute power over his own half; and the right to control decisions which affected the whole. Moreover, he was possessed with the idea that all the *boyárs* were plotting against him. Undoubtedly they were too much for him; they got on his nerves, and he wanted to get away from them; and he devised his scheme as a sort of refuge from the cares of state—a return to a relatively simple life. He even appointed a mock *tsar*, in the person of a converted Tartar prince, to rule in Moscow, and himself addressed petitions to him and assumed a lower title. In fact, he made a rudimentary attempt at getting rid of all the responsibilities while retaining all the advantages of his position. But he led a double life, and, not wishing the realities of the situation to be grasped abroad, used to return to Moscow to receive foreign diplomatic missions (as yet there were no resident ambassadors in Moscow) with full state ceremonial, as if the current of life in Russia was normal. A curious light on his character is afforded by the fact that he kept a careful record of all his victims, and this he used to send to various monasteries in order that prayers might be offered for their souls. It contained over 4,000 names, and of these only a small number were actual *boyárs*—the large majority being their relations or underlings, while many victims from other classes were also included.

The Later Years of Ivan IV

During all this time of horror the people murmured; but patiently endured. The hold of the dynasty on them was very great. They knew that the only alternative to the tyranny of the monarch was that of the oligarchy, and their memory was

good enough to tell them that the former was preferable for them. While the Russian people, for no fault of its own, was suffering these internal torments, it was naturally handicapped in its resistance to its numerous external enemies, whose pressure was scarcely ever relaxed. In 1566 a short truce supervened in the war between Russia and Poland, during which Ivan convoked the general assembly (*zémski sobór*) for the second time, especially to determine whether the war should be continued or given up; the former alternative was chosen, the conditions of the King of Poland being considered unacceptable. But Russia was not in a position to wage a successful war, and, added to all the other troubles, two more enemies—the Swedes in the north, and the Crimean Tartars in the south—began now to attack her. Ivan tried to make an alliance with the Danes on the island of Oesel, but this came to nothing. The Tartars, supported by the Turks, were anxious to recover the lost khanates on the Volga. In 1569 they laid siege to Astrakhan, but ignominiously failed to take it. In 1571 they marched on Moscow with a large army; they soon crossed the Oká and appeared beneath the walls of the capital, which they burnt entirely except the *Kremlin*, retiring with a large number of captives. The next year they returned, intending to go against Kazán, but this time they were met and routed by the Russians.

During this period Poland was approaching the zenith of its fortunes. In 1569 took place the famous congress of Lublin. In view of the growing aggressiveness of the Russians which had manifested itself throughout this century, the Poles were prompted to consolidate their loosely-united kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. At this congress the bonds between them were drawn tighter, and certain changes, destined to be momentous, were made in their status. It was decided that the king should be henceforth elected by the nobles; and a territorial rearrangement also took place, by which Lithuania absorbed

the newly acquired coast-province of Livonia, and Poland took over the southern part of Lithuania—Kiev, Podolia, and Volýnia. From the economic point of view this was a good bargain for the Poles, as it placed the rich lands of Little Russia and the lower course of the Dnieper under the direct control of Warsaw; but it was bound to complicate the issues between Moscow and Warsaw, as it put a large number of Orthodox Russians under immediate Polish rule, and thus extended the range of conflict. The change in the status of the King of Poland indicated that the power of the Polish land-magnates was increasing at the expense of that of their sovereign, while in Russia simultaneously the reverse process was taking place. In Russia, indeed, the nobles for many years made frequent and desperate attempts to curb the autocracy, but ended in accommodating themselves to it, thus securing themselves a longer lease of pleasure.

In 1572 occurred the death of King Sigismund II Augustus of Poland, and the line of Jagiello (cf. p. 87) became extinct. In 1573 Henry of Valois, Duke of Anjou, was elected to the throne, but he could not stand the life and fled to France the next year.

The year 1575 witnessed the election of Stephen Batory, *vóivoda* (= 'duke') of Transylvania, who was destined to be a thorn in the side of Russia. He was energetic and ambitious, and had good artillery and many well-trained German and Hungarian mercenaries at his disposal. He set himself the task of recapturing all that the Russians had wrested from Poland, and he was as good as his word. In 1579 he retook Pólotsk (cf. p. 121), and after other successes he laid siege to Pskov (1581). At the same time the Swedes invaded Carelia and Esthonia, north and south of the Gulf of Finland respectively, took Keksholm¹ on Lake Ládoga, and all the Russian towns on the

¹ = 'Two Hills'.

south of the Gulf of Finland established by Ivan III. But Pskov, ably defended by Ivan Shúiski, was too much for Batory, and proved the furthest limit of his success. Ivan IV implored the mediation of Pope Gregory XIII. His legate, Antonius Possevinus, who has left a remarkable account of Ivan, succeeded in bringing about a truce. Peace was made in 1582, but it deprived Ivan of Pólotsk and all his other earlier conquests, secured to the Swedes and the Poles all that they had taken from him, and marked with failure his attempt to reach the shores of the Baltic.

But already, at this time, Russia was so vast and the energy of her people so boundless that, while these disasters were going on in what may be termed the home country, more fruitful and not less important events were taking place in districts which, to the Russians, were the equivalent of our colonies. In 1553 communication was first opened between England and Russia by means of the White Sea, as the Germans, Swedes, and Poles between them definitely closed the Baltic to Russian commerce with western Europe; in that year the English navigator, Chancellor, after losing two ships which accompanied him, landed at the mouth of the northern Dviná and bore a letter to Ivan from Edward VI. At this spot, near the monastery of St. Nicholas, the English established a 'factory', which later developed into Archangel. From this time onwards English, French, and Dutch vessels frequented the northern coasts of Russia and carried on a considerable exchange of goods. Later Ivan entered into direct relations with Elizabeth, seeking, in return for commercial concessions, a matrimonial and political alliance, and an eventual right of asylum; but in all these matters the queen confined herself to amiabilities.

A still more notable development and one of purely Russian enterprise was the great movement of expansion and colonization eastwards which commenced after the conquest of Kazán

and Astrakhan. In 1558 Ivan gave a large grant of land to the Stróganovs, a family as enterprising as it was humble in origin, on the banks of the river Káma, which rises in the Urál Mountains and joins the Volga not far below Kazán. Here these energetic colonists, surrounded by wild and uncivilized Finnish tribes, founded a great commercial settlement with Russian emigrants, which, beginning with agriculture and salt-production, went on to exploit the vast mineral wealth of that region, and soon overflowed into Asia. But when the Stróganovs made their way across the Uráls they came into conflict with more bellicose Tartar tribes who took up arms in defence of their homes. It was at this point that their venture developed into a sort of East India Company and conquest of Peru and Mexico combined. They enlisted a small number of irregular troops from among the Cossacks of the Don and the Volga (cf. pp. 116-18), promising them the *tsar's* forgiveness if they would divert their energies from the robbery of the natives of their own to that of the natives of another country. This force, numbering in all under a thousand, equipped with fire-arms—which were a novelty to their adversaries—under the leadership of the *hetman* Ermák virtually conquered Siberia. Ermák had little difficulty in disposing of the disorganized Tartar forces which opposed him, and in 1582 possessed himself of their ‘capital’ Sibír, situated on the river Irtýsh. These successful exploits somewhat made up for the failure in the west, and gained their reward. Ivan received a deputation of the Cossack-conquistadors who brought him trophies, forgave them their past misdeeds, took them into his service at a good rate of pay, and dispatched his own officials to organize the newly acquired territories.

Ivan IV aged prematurely and rapidly. In view of his experiences, of his character, and of his mode of life, this fact is not surprising. He always put an excessive amount of zeal,

violence, and passion into any action in public or private life which he undertook, and the results he achieved were in an inverse ratio to the amount of energy he expended. His character and psychology have already been indicated. As he grew older his passions grew stronger and his temper more violent. He was haunted by the fear—largely imaginary and much exaggerated—that everybody was plotting against him, and he realized that the *boyárs* as a class were impossible to govern with, or rather that it was impossible to reconcile their oligarchical and his own monarchical pretensions. But he had neither sufficient brains nor sufficient patience to evolve any good alternative form of government, nor sufficient discernment to choose good counselors; perhaps there were none, but the result was that he abandoned himself to his fears and his passions, and his reign became one of terror and himself a typically irrational despot. It is often said that, owing to the Tartar domination, Russia is two hundred years behind the times, but some of Russia's rulers, by no means solely or even mainly its monarchs, are just as much to blame as the Tartars for retarding the people's material and moral progress, and in this respect Ivan IV can least of all be acquitted. It is difficult to believe that any people could suffer the terrible ordeals which Russia has suffered, and still exist; but the Russian people had been going through a hard school from the very beginning of its history—it early developed phenomenal powers of endurance and persistence, and qualities of elasticity and diffusion which have enabled it to withstand the ravages of climate, crown, and crosier. Russia has been dealt hard blows by her friends and by her enemies, but her superficies is considerable, and distribution lessens the violence of shock and the pressure of weight.

Ivan IV not only did his best to ruin and exhaust his country while he was alive, but directly—though, it must be admitted, not deliberately—prepared a period of still greater turmoil and

misery for it after his death, and himself immediately and permanently modified the whole course of its history. He was guilty of the manslaughter of his eldest son and heir, and thereby ultimately destroyed his own dynasty. It is impossible to imagine a case where such a comparatively trivial incident led to such momentous results. The event occurred in 1582, two years before Ivan's own death. By his first wife Anastasia Románovna, Ivan had had two sons—the elder called Ivan, and the younger Theodore—who were, at this time, between 20 and 30 years of age. The elder son was married, and his wife was expecting a child. One day the *tsar* entered a room where they were, and, offended by what he considered the too scanty costume of his daughter-in-law, hit her, whereupon her husband came forward in her defence. Ivan habitually carried an iron staff, the heavy weight and sharp point of which were painfully familiar to his courtiers and attendants. Incensed at his son's interference, Ivan struck him on the head with it, and naturally killed him. He sacrificed his dynasty to his temper. His younger son, Theodore, was feeble in mind and body, and Ivan foresaw that at his death, and by his own doing, his country would pass into the hands of those he most hated, namely, the *boyárs*—a contingency which he had spent his whole life in trying to avert. After the death of his first wife in 1560 Ivan had several others; the seventh, Maria Nagáya, bore him a son in 1583, called Demetrius (*Dimítri*), but Ivan himself died the following year, and his infant son was destined only to complicate the issues in which Russia was soon to become involved.

3

The End of the Dynasty and the Time of Troubles
(1584-1613)

Tsar Theodore I (1584-98); Regency of Boris Godunov

IVAN IV had made a will in 1572 in which, true to his ancestral traditions, and in the absence of any law of succession (cf. p. 97), he had nominated his elder son, Ivan, as his heir and successor. This will was nullified by the tragedy of 1582, and no other had been made to take its place. Therefore, the general assembly (*zém ski sobór*) was summoned in 1584, for the third time (cf. pp. 106, 127), especially in order to confirm the legitimate succession of Theodore to the throne. The foremost people, it is said, came from all the towns of Russia and prayed the *tsarévich* (tsar's son) to become *tsar*. The Englishman Horsey, who was at that time in Moscow in the capacity of unofficial consul, considered it a sort of parliament composed of the upper hierarchy and nobility.

Theodore accordingly ascended the throne, and his infant half-brother, Demetrius, was with his mother and all her relatives removed to the small town of Úglich, on the Volga, to the north of Moscow, which, with the small surrounding district, had been designated as his apanage, and was shortly to acquire tragic fame.

Theodore was the absolute antithesis of all his predecessors. The Russian historian, Klyuchévski, has pointed out the extraordinary irony of fate which placed this sovereign—the last of his line—on the throne of Moscow. The most striking characteristic of the whole dynasty founded by Ivan Kalitá (cf. p. 69) was their acute matter-of-factness and common sense, their appreciation of the value and power of money, and

their ability to turn to their own good account all the conditions and surroundings in which they found themselves placed; through the successive efforts of generations they had built up a huge material fortune and secured immense political power. The last member of their dynasty was a man who cared absolutely nothing for the things of this world, whose chief pre-occupation was the ringing of church bells and the observance of church ritual. The general impression which this *tsar* made on his contemporaries, notably on foreign envoys, who saw him and have left accounts of their impressions, was that he was half-witted. This is possibly true, but it must be remembered that he lost his mother at the age of four, in 1560, and spent his childhood and youth in the midst of the orgies which Ivan and his *oprichnina* carried on at Alexándrov. It is possible that he cultivated a habit of silliness in order to be left in peace and not be drawn into the dangerous tangle of palace and political intrigue, and that this habit became permanent.¹ What is undoubted is that he took no interest whatever in affairs of state or in any problems which concerned the material welfare of himself or of anybody else. It is also a fact that he was undersized, dropsical, and rickety—defects easily accounted for by his upbringing.

In these circumstances it was natural that the supreme power should pass to the hands of others. The sordid struggle between the rival families began all over again. The head of the family of the Bélskis, who was suspected of conspiring to place the infant Demetrius on the throne, was exiled to Nízhni when Demetrius and his mother were sent to Úglich. Amongst the remaining families the most notable were the Mstislávskis, of Lithuanian origin; the Shúiskis, descendants of Rurik—amongst whom Ivan Shúiski, hero of the defence of Pskov, had a large following amongst the townsfolk of Moscow, and had the

¹ This is the suggestion of Klyuchévski.

Metropolitan Dionysius on his side; the Románovs (cf. p. 105), headed by Nikíta Románovich,¹ who was Theodore's maternal uncle; and the Godunóvs. The last were a family of Tartar origin, who had settled in Moscow during the reign of Iván Kalitá. The head of the family was named Borís, and his sister, Irene, was the wife of Theodore and had great influence over him. Borís himself had married a sister of Malyúta Skurátov, one of Ivan IV's chief *opríchniki*, and, without becoming an *opríchnik* himself, had been in Ivan IV's good graces for some years.

At first Nikíta Románovich directed affairs, but he was very old, and shortly afterwards became paralytic and then died. During his illness Borís Godunóv, who was clever, ambitious, and unscrupulous, was already gradually gathering the power into his own hands. Borís was not long in getting rid of his rivals, whom he suspected, quite possibly with good reason, of plotting against his life. Mstislávski, Shúiski, and Dionysius, with all their partisans, were, one after the other, relegated to distant towns and monasteries where they were unobtrusively exterminated. Dionysius was replaced by Job, Archbishop of Rostóv, an ally of Borís; the necessary amount of executions and imprisonments of suspected opponents took place in Moscow, and from 1587 onwards Borís had no rivals.

Fortune, indeed, seemed to favour him. In 1586 Russia's most formidable foreign enemy, the redoubtable Stephen Batory, King of Poland, died, and the danger of further aggression against Russia on the part of that country was temporarily removed. Applications for this vacant and uncomfortable

¹ This family, originally called Kobýlin-Kóshkin, came to be known as Zákharin, i. e. children of one Zákhar (= Zachary) Kóshkin, or Zákharin Kóshkin. Román Yúrevich (= son of Yúri or George) was the father of Anastasia Románovna (= daughter of Román), wife of Ivan IV; Nikíta was her brother, and his descendants came to be known as the Románovs.

throne again began to be received. In 1572 Ivan IV had been a candidate, and now Borís Godunóv, who was virtually regent, put forward Theodore's name, but misplaced economy ruined his chances of success with the electors. The other candidates were Sigismund Wasa¹ of Sweden and Rudolf of Austria, and the former was eventually elected. On the death of John III of Sweden in 1592 the two great Powers of Sweden and Poland were, for a brief period, joined together in unnatural union, and Russia's two greatest enemies joined hands—a sufficiently threatening contingency. But the Swedes would have none of Sigismund; he was an alumnus of the Jesuits, and these were already casting envious eyes across the Baltic. His uncle, the Protestant Charles Wasa, the father of Gustavus Adolphus, was first appointed regent, and eventually made king by the Swedes under the title of Charles IX. The momentary union dreaded by Russia thus ended in rupture, and this led to a fratricidal war which lasted for sixty years, and much weakened both countries.

But Borís Godunóv did not avail himself of these circumstances, as he well might have done, to effect the recovery of Livonia and Esthonia. Himself no warrior, he mistrusted his generals and contented himself with a passive foreign policy, merely recovering a few of the towns on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, between the rivers Nárova and Nevá, which the Swedes had taken from Ivan IV. Borís was more interested in the internal progress of Russia, and the much-needed peace which the country enjoyed during the reign of Theodore went some way towards repairing the damage caused by his father's activity.

Whether Borís, in the earlier years of his regency, foresaw the extinction of the reigning dynasty is uncertain. It was not impossible that Theodore and Borís's sister, Irene, would yet be

¹ Son of John III, who had married Catherine, sister of Sigismund II of Poland, and been converted by her to Roman Catholicism.

blessed with offspring, and the infant Demetrius was still alive. Nevertheless, he took every possible precaution to secure friends and supporters, not amongst his own class, but amongst the clergy, the small landowners, who provided the bulk of the fighting forces, the middle classes and the peasantry. He secured the loyalty of the Church by a bold and clever stroke. At this period the head of the Church in Russia was the Metropolitan of Moscow, whose colleague, the Metropolitan of Kiev, was the head of the Orthodox community in the kingdom of Poland. In 1589 the Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremy, was in Moscow raising funds to help the oppressed Christian subjects of the Sultan. Boris Godunov, while generously responding to his appeal, induced him to consecrate the Metropolitan of Moscow, a nominee of his own, as Patriarch, though poor Jeremy would have liked to occupy the post himself, and simultaneously it was enacted that thereafter the Russian hierarchy should be considered competent to institute their own Patriarch. In this way Boris Godunov enhanced his own prestige as well as that of the Church in Russia, and Moscow now definitely eclipsed Kiev in the spiritual, as it had previously in the political, sphere, becoming the head of the whole Russian Orthodox community. At the same time four Russian archbishops were raised to the rank of metropolitan, while six bishoprics became archbishoprics.

Boris Godunov was sincerely interested in the material welfare of the people as well as in that of himself and his family. He was a great colonizer, and one of his hobbies was the foundation of new and the restoration of ruined townships; amongst the former were Archangel (cf. p. 129) on the north coast, Saratov and Tsaritsyn on the Lower Volga, Yaitsk (later known as Uralsk) on the river Urál (then called the Yaik), and Tobolsk and Tomsk in Siberia; amongst the latter Kursk and Voronezh in the southern steppe country.

Himself an illiterate, he appreciated the value of education

and wished to found a number of schools with foreign teachers, but the project was quashed by clerical opposition. He protected foreign merchants and favoured the introduction of foreign customs and inventions. He was an ardent philanthropist, in the sense that he dispensed largesse on a prodigal scale to the poor, was always the first to help in case of any public disaster, and habitually declared himself ready to share his last mite with any who should need it. This he could of course well do, because in his capacity of dictator he amassed an enormous fortune; nevertheless, it was a novel rôle for the ruler of Russia, as he already virtually was, to play. There is no reason to suppose that Borís Godunóv did not genuinely desire the advancement and welfare of his country, but at the same time there is no doubt that he was inordinately ambitious. He was intelligent and prudent, but only up to a certain point. He was absolutely unscrupulous and very determined, and he laid deep schemes which took long to mature. The people of Moscow were vaguely conscious of this, and their suspicions were further aroused by the methods which Borís used to achieve his ends. He developed on a large scale a system of espionage and delation, and the agents of his secret police were usually the domestic servants of those whom he disliked and distrusted. This aroused great resentment and, added to the fact that he allowed himself to be influenced by necromancers, rapidly discounted the effects of his beneficence. He was one of those unfortunate people who are always blamed for every misfortune and are never credited with any success. His indubitably good intentions in the way of reform made him all the more suspect with the ignorant people of Moscow, who perceived a baneful design in all he did or attempted, to such a degree that in later times he has, quite without justification, been made the scapegoat for the general introduction of serfdom.

At this period the peasants, the large mass of tillers of the soil,

not to be confused with the much smaller body of household servants of the *boyárs* and others, who from the earliest times had been in the position of slaves, were still, theoretically, free. They were subject to taxation and not to military service, and were still in possession of the technical right to change their place of residence, or, rather, the scene of their labour. But in practice they had already largely forfeited this right, inasmuch as it could only be legally exercised by those who were economically independent. The peasants, though there were many intermediate varieties, were roughly divided into two categories, those who were on lands owned by the Crown or the State, and those who worked on private properties—the vast estates of the monasteries and of the hierarchy, the dwindling patrimonies of the ancient landed families, and the fiefs, which developed into hereditary estates, of the newly-constituted class of military and official land-holders. Those who were on the Crown lands had long since been subject to taxation under a system of corporate and collective guarantees which made it extremely difficult for any member of the community to move from the spot. The majority of those on private estates had, in course of time, become economically dependent on the persons on whose land they worked. Those who were not under any financial obligation and fulfilled all the requisite conditions, such as the giving of adequate notice, and that of moving only during the specified autumnal period between the gathering of one harvest and the sowing of the next, were still at perfect liberty to move. These conditions, however, so rarely existed that, for the most part, the only possibility for peasants who desired a change of surroundings was removal by force, that is to say, against the wishes of their employer. This was commonly effected in one of two ways, by flight or by agreement with another landlord. This last method merely meant a change of employer, not a change of condition, and usually implied an

increase of indebtedness and therefore a change for the worse. Owing to the increased emigration which took place to the newly-acquired territories in the second half of the sixteenth century, the central provinces around Moscow became largely denuded. The younger members of families, who were not taxable, especially migrated in large numbers, leaving the heads of households unable to cope with the work. Much of the land became neglected and reverted to forest. The land went down and labour went up in value. As a result of this the richer landlords, including the monasteries, made great efforts to attract labour to their estates from those of the small landowners. This they did by going round in the autumn and offering subsidies and abatements wholesale, not hesitating, when occasion arose, to intoxicate and abduct. This naturally provoked violent reprisals from the other side, and the autumn season of moving became notorious for scenes of appalling disorder and gross ill-usage. A few years later these abuses were met by legislation, when it was enacted that only small landholders might take over labour from equally small landholders, monasteries and large estates being forbidden to attract labour from small estates. Such a measure was necessary in order to enable the class of small landowners, from whom the army was drawn and who derived their income entirely from their land, to maintain themselves in a state of efficiency, but it of course involved, in its turn, a further restriction of the peasants' right of movement. The most popular expedient to which discontented peasants had recourse was flight, and it was this expression of their sentiments which caused the greatest embarrassment both to the owners of estates and to the government. Flight was of course illegal, as it implied the repudiation of all liability, but it was the peasants' only method of redress, as effective as it was popular, if by no means always successful. Legislation had already been directed against this procedure,

and landlords, if they duly announced the flight and sent in a claim, could legally enforce the return of the peasants when found. There was such an accumulation of pending claims, and such delay in their settlement, that in 1597 (i. e. during the regency of Borís Godunóv) a decree (*ukáz*) was passed limiting the period for the retrospective validity of claims to five years. That is to say, the peasants who had fled before 1592 could not be reclaimed unless their employers had sent in a claim before September 1, then New Year's Day, in 1597. But this was only a measure *ad hoc*; it only applied to the year 1597, and introduced no change into the law. Nevertheless, on the strength of this decree the unfortunate Borís Godunóv has been branded as the man who definitely enslaved the peasants. The facts of the matter are, that, owing to the general economic conditions of labour, the peasants were long before the end of the sixteenth century attached to the land on which they worked; their right of movement had not been abolished, but had lapsed; and restrictive legislation was aimed not at that right but at cases of the infringement of that right which were disadvantageous both to the government and to the landowners. The actual legal conversion of the theoretically free peasants into serfs or slaves, the absolute and hereditary chattels of the landowners, who could be put to any use, for instance as dowries—a development which had such calamitous effects on Russian society—was not formally accomplished till the second quarter of the seventeenth century.¹

But contemporary opinion was concerned with everything rather than with the welfare of the peasants on whose labour the welfare of Russia still almost entirely depended, and was especially interested in events of a more concrete and individual character. In these the last years of the sixteenth and the first of the seventeenth century in Russia abounded. The psycho-

¹ See Klyuchévski, lecture xxxvii.

logical atmosphere which Borís Godunóv as regent created in Moscow has been described. By the spirit of reform and altruism which animated his intentions and his actions he evoked admiration, but at the same time, as so often happens, he inspired distrust and even dislike. Himself responsible for many good deeds, he was made responsible for all the dark events which occurred during his period of rule. He was probably guilty of as many political crimes as were most of his colleagues in contemporary Europe, but unfortunately for him he was not protected by dynastic prestige or heavenly grace. One of the tragic events which took place during his regency was destined to have results personally disastrous to himself and politically disastrous to Russia. This was the supposed death, in 1591, of the *tsarévích* Demetrius, the son of Ivan IV, which was the immediate cause, though not the ultimate reason, of the period of anarchy and revolution known as the Time of Troubles (*smútnoe vrémya*), which lasted from 1598 to 1613, and would have ended, but for the heroism of the middle and lower classes, in the total disruption of Russia.

It will be recalled that soon after the accession of Theodore (in 1584) the *tsarévích* Demetrius, then two years of age, was removed to his apanage of Úglich together with his mother and all her relations. Shortly afterwards Borís Godunóv appointed from among his satellites a sort of supervisory commission which he dispatched to Úglich to reside there. It was the general opinion that only Demetrius promised a prolongation of the dynasty, because it was thought improbable that Theodore would become a father. In May 1591 a brawl occurred at Úglich in which the *tsarévích* Demetrius, it was reported, accidentally lost his life. What actually happened, and who was really to blame, has not been and probably never will be discovered. The popular belief at the time was to the effect that the members of Borís Godunóv's commission one day fell upon

the defenceless boy and murdered him. The sexton happened to be in the belfry, whence he witnessed the murder and immediately rang the alarm. Thereupon the boy's relatives and attendants rushed to avenge him, and were aided by the townsfolk, who rose unanimously in their defence. A general scrimmage ensued, in which many of Godunóv's partisans, including his chief commissioner, were killed.

Whatever the exact nature and sequence of these events, as soon as the news reached Moscow a commission of inquiry was appointed, under the presidency of Prince Vasíli Ivánovich Shúiski, who, though married to the sister of Borís Godunóv's wife, was a secret enemy and rival of the regent. This commission went about its work in an egregiously unjudicial manner, and only succeeded, perhaps not unintentionally, in rendering more obscure an affair which was already highly mysterious. In its summing up it declared that Demetrius, who was notoriously subject to epileptic fits, had been playing with a knife on which he fell, inflicting on himself a fatal wound, and the townsfolk of Úglich, for having unjustifiably attacked and done to death the commissioners, were subjected to wholesale torture, mutilation, and banishment. Even the bell which sounded the tocsin was deported to Siberia. After the commission had in this sense concluded its labours the Patriarch Job made a solemn and official pronouncement to the effect that Demetrius met his death by the divine will. With that the incident was superficially and temporarily closed. Another and very different theory¹ of the dark business has been put forward, namely that Demetrius really did hurt himself by accident, but not fatally; his mother rushed out and began to belabour the governor whose negligence was responsible for the accident; whereupon other people, including Borís Godunóv's agents, came on the

¹ This theory is clearly expounded by M. Waliszewski in his book *La Crise révolutionnaire*.

scene and added their voices and their muscles to the fray, which ended in a general *mêlée* and many deaths. Meanwhile the injured Demetrius was quietly removed. His relatives, well aware of the danger which to the common knowledge constantly threatened him, took the opportunity to abduct him from Úgliche, in order that he might mature in secret and in peace. Some even believed that the whole thing was organized beforehand with this object, and that Borís Godunóv's agents murdered the wrong boy. That a boy lost his life that day is certain, because one was buried, and, moreover, extremely hurriedly. Not one of the members of the commission of inquiry ever even saw the body, or so much as interrogated the mother. The body was not exhumed until fifteen years later, and it has never been proved that it was the body of Demetrius. The theory that it was an accident, but not fatal, of course exculpates Borís Godunóv, and explains the severe measures of reprisal taken by him against the Nagói family,¹ who were all imprisoned or banished, and against the townsfolk of Úgliche for their needless slaughter of his agents. But at the time it was generally supposed that Demetrius did lose his life in May 1591, and this is still the most commonly accepted and the official theory; in any case, to immediate intents and purposes, he had ceased to exist. The people of Moscow imputed guilt directly to Borís Godunóv, and accused him of causing an outbreak of fire in the capital and an invasion of the Crimean Tartars in order to deflect attention from his misdeed. If the theory that Demetrius was murdered on that occasion—which has never been proved—be true, then the probability is that Borís Godunóv had nothing directly to do with the matter, but that it was carried out independently by his partisans, who knew that it was a consummation he desired and one which would further his and therefore also their own ends. In any case, the mystery

¹ I. e. the relatives of Demetrius' mother: cf. pp. 132, 133.

in which the whole episode was shrouded made it all the more likely to redound to the misfortune of those who contrived it and were involved in it.

The following year a daughter was born to Theodore and Irene, but she lived only a brief space, and her demise was naturally attributed to her uncle. In 1598 the *tsar* Theodore died, and the dynasty became extinct. More important than that, a peaceful and prosperous reign came to an end, and the Time of Troubles began. The immediate consequences of the event were that the widowed Irene withdrew to a convent near Moscow, the Patriarch Job summoned a general assembly (the fourth *zémski sobór*) to appoint a new sovereign, and Borís Godunóv was elected *tsar*. But it implied and involved a great deal more than this. In ordinary times and places the end of a dynasty may be regrettable; in Moscow, in the sixteenth century, it was an overwhelming calamity, an elemental catastrophe. Looked on for generations as the absolute and personal property of their master, and taught to look on themselves as such, the people were literally like sheep at large without a shepherd, and there were plenty of wolves about. What immediately impressed the popular imagination was the mysteriously tragic way in which the ruling family flickered out. This gave rise to a phenomenon which was new to Russia, a malady which, in other countries, is epidemic, but in Russia remained endemic for two hundred years, that of the recurrent appearance of pretenders to the throne. As the historian Klyuchévski points out (lecture xli), from 1600 till 1800 scarcely a reign passed without the advent of a pretender, and so deep-rooted did the habit of discovering pretenders become that when a real *tsar* like Peter the Great—real in character as well as in name, and of unimpeachable authenticity—appeared, he was converted by the popular imagination into a pretender.

The Time of Troubles (1598-1613)

Before relating the confusing and exciting events which filled the Time of Troubles (1598-1613), it is necessary to state briefly the reasons which led to it and enabled it to continue for so long and to assume such calamitous proportions.

The immediate cause was the extinction of the dynasty, and the fact that a new one had to be found—a new *tsar* elected. Owing to the political immaturity of the people it did not easily accommodate itself to the novel idea of an elective *tsar*; hence its dislike of the *tsars* who were elected, and its welcome to any pretender with even the most shadowy claim to genealogical continuity. At the same time the *boyárs* quite realized that it was within the power of any one of them to become *tsar* and to found a new dynasty—a prospect sufficiently tempting to them to inspire the most desperate strife and intrigue. The other and deeper cause was the general condition of the Russian people at this time, which was highly unsatisfactory. It was the vague and half-conscious but profound feeling, not merely of discontent, but of injury and resentment, permeating all classes, that converted what should have been no more than a transitory crisis, lasting until a suitable dynasty was found, into a veritable revolution which dragged on for fifteen years. In a word, the whole people was overburdened with duties and totally bereft of rights. Everybody's obligations, except the *tsar's*, but nobody's privileges—not even the *tsar's*—were defined. Of course the ruling class, the *boyárs*, the officials, the landowners who provided the armed forces of the country, and the hierarchy, had fewer burdens and more power than the lower classes, but even they were well aware from personal experience that their property and their position were not safe from the attacks of the Crown. No one had any guarantees of any sort. The sovereign claimed absolute power—a claim

which was historically unjustifiable and was never formally conceded. The late *tsar*, Ivan IV, had for twenty-four years (1560-84) grossly abused this power, ruining the country in order to allay his mad suspicions. He had ended by instilling into the whole people dread of the throne. They had borne the iron rule of Ivan III and Basil III with equanimity, and even with gratitude, in view of the dangers which threatened Russia with disruption from within and from without; but even the Russian people resented oppression which was arbitrary, unreasonable, meaningless, and totally negative in result. The welcome relief and calm of Theodore's reign (1584-98) was unable to destroy the deep and painful impression which Ivan IV had made. Borís Godunóv as *tsar* (1598-1605) only maintained himself with the aid of a secret police force and by the application of arbitrary methods as ruthless as those of Ivan IV. In Borís Godunóv's case these were more justified by facts than in that of Ivan IV, but Boris had not the quasi-prescriptive right to terrorism possessed by Ivan in virtue of his imperial descent and family prestige. What was pardonable in the lineal descendant of the men who had consolidated Russia and the conqueror of Kazán and Astrakhan was not so in a *tsar* who had been elected. Rebellion against a *tsar* of the old dynasty at that time and in those surroundings was unthinkable. But when the dynasty with its halo came to an end a general social upheaval took place, which, like an illness, was all the more virulent because it had been so long repressed.

Beginning with the quest for a new dynasty, the Time of Troubles developed into a social and political revolution embracing all classes in turn. The most notable feature of the whole movement was that each class came out, one after the other, to improve its material fortunes at the expense of the class 'above'.¹ It began by the attempt of the *boyárs*, taught

¹ See Klyuchévski, lecture xliii.

by bitter experience, to limit the power of the new sovereign, whoever he should be, and to extend their own. It was continued by the efforts of the greater military caste and the lesser nobility of the capital to limit the political power, the oligarchy, of the *boyárs*, and then by those of the lesser military caste and the petty nobility of the provinces to secure a decisive voice in the government of the country. It was completed by a general repudiation of their obligations by the mass of tax-paying, non-serving people, who, as it were, declared a general strike in the name of anarchy.

Tsar Borís Godunóv (1598-1604)

The tangled skein of events which filled the Time of Troubles was briefly as follows. Borís Godunóv was elected *tsar* by the *zémski sobór* in 1598 on the death of Theodore, but there is ample evidence that his election was neither honest nor spontaneous. It was engineered by his creature, the Patriarch Job, and by the secret police. Emissaries were dispatched all over the country, whose duty it was to inspire the people to demand the accession of Borís. The people of Moscow were impelled to go in a mass to the convent of the widowed *tsarítsa*, Borís's sister Irene, and piteously to implore her to persuade her reluctant brother to ascend the throne. Borís's reluctance was sufficiently disingenuous, though not entirely so. The *boyárs* were not unwilling to elect him, but they knew what was at stake in the foundation of a new dynasty, and were anxious to obtain guarantees and to limit the power of the sovereign. Borís also, if only partially, appreciated the importance of the moment, and was unwilling to make any concessions. Both sides maintained silence, and the whole episode was vitiated by this refusal of either Borís or the *boyárs* to avow their real aspirations. Finally, Borís won the day and, after twice refusing the honour in order to make the demand more insistent, was elected un-

conditionally. This was his cardinal error. If he had not committed it he might have founded a lasting dynasty, and the revolution would have been averted. Unfortunately, he lacked political insight. Instead of admitting that he had no right to the throne, and submitting to the terms of the *boyárs* in return for his election, he invented death-bed injunctions of Theodore, and even of Ivan IV, to take over their task, and foolishly insisted on perpetuating their claim to look on Russia as the personal property of the sovereign. He sacrificed his career to his vanity, while eventually the *boyárs* had their way all the same, only at the cost to the country of inestimable and unnecessary losses.

As *tsar*, Borís was less fortunate than he had been as regent. He soon became aware of his extreme unpopularity with the ruling class of Moscow, who, disappointed in their hopes, began silently to work against him. To counter them Borís developed his secret police system. Servants were encouraged to give information against their masters, and many *boyárs* were imprisoned, tortured, or banished, as in the days of Ivan IV, and their dependants, thrown out of employment, carried discontent and disaffection everywhere. But Borís had more cause for alarm than Ivan IV. From 1600 onwards rumours began to spread that Demetrius, the rightful heir to the throne, was alive, and that the child who had been buried at Úglich in 1591 had been a substitute. From this moment Borís knew that his position was seriously threatened, and his blows fell heavier and faster. He aimed with especial animosity at the family of the Románovs, the relations of the late *tsar* Theodore's mother (Nikíta Románovich or Románov was Theodore's maternal uncle), and therefore the most dangerous opponents of the relations of the late *tsar's* wife, the chief of whom was Borís. Nikíta Románov had left five sons, all of whom, with their families, were now exiled to remote parts of the country. The

eldest, Theodore, who was the ablest and the most dangerous, and his wife, were both forcibly 'shorn into a monastic order', one of the least unpleasant forms of political disgrace, and were dispatched, under their names of Philaret and Martha, to distant cloisters. Their infant son, Michael, was banished to Bélo-ózero (= 'White Lake'), the site of a famous monastery 150 miles to the north of Moscow. He and his father were the only two of this family who survived the storm. But the reports about Demetrius merely gained in credence in proportion as Boris grew more suspicious and tyrannical. Moreover, his reign was unlucky. Even the elements were against him. There was a total failure of the harvest for three years in succession (1601-3), bringing famine and disease in its train, and in the eyes of the people, steeped in ignorance and superstition, this was the finger of God pointing at their temporal sovereign. During the last years of the preceding century the *boyárs*, and especially those in the Godunóv circle, had had a particularly severe bout of acquisitiveness, which took the form of vying with each other and with all the smaller landowners in attracting labour by fair or foul means on to their lands and attempting to fasten it there by contract. During these years of dearth, consequently, they found themselves with more labour than they could keep, and the unfortunate peasants who had just been torn from their old homes were forthwith turned adrift wholesale from their new ones and went to swell the rising numbers of malcontents.

Pseudo-Demetrius I

To crown all, in 1604 it was declared that Demetrius had crossed the Polish frontier and was advancing into Russia amidst the blessings and acclamations of the populace. He had sent his emissaries ahead to explain who he was, and he soon had an immense following. Anybody who had a grievance flocked

to his banner, especially the peasants and the Cossacks. Boris denounced him and the Patriarch Job fulminated against him in vain. He overcame the only resistance that was offered, that of Basmánov in Nóvgorod-Séversk, and marched upon Moscow. At this point Boris fell ill from the strain, and suddenly died one day after dinner. His son, a promising and handsome youth of sixteen, was proclaimed *tsar* as Theodore II, but his cause was lost. The whole people, with Basmánov and the army, had already gone over to the pretender, who inundated Moscow with manifestoes. His authenticity was in the popular mind confirmed by the fact that after a *tête à tête* interview with him his hypothetical mother, the widowed *tsarítsa* Maria (cf. p. 132), declared herself convinced that he was her son. Finally, Vasíli Shúiski (cf. p. 143) was called upon to make a suitable declaration, which he did publicly, to the effect that the son of Ivan IV had not lost his life in 1591. Thereupon the people acclaimed ' *tsar* Dimítri Ivánovich ', invaded the ' palace ' in the *Kremlin*, seized and imprisoned the whole family of Godunóvs, putting the most important of them to death, and sent a declaration of loyal submission to Demetrius, at the head of which stood the name of the Patriarch Job. Ten days later Demetrius triumphantly entered Moscow, but Job and all the partisans of Boris were promptly disgraced and removed.

Who ' Demetrius ' was is not known, though the man was already familiar to Moscow. He first came to the capital shortly before the death of Theodore, and was known as Yúri (= George) Otrépev, son of a petty landowner in the country north of Moscow. In Moscow he was a domestic in the households of the Románovs and of others. Then he became a monk, taking the name of Gregory (Grigóri, *Grishka* for short), and for his literary and clerical qualifications was made a clerk to the Patriarch Job. He became outspoken in this capacity, and is alleged one day to have said that he would be *tsar* in Moscow. For this he escaped

imprisonment only by flight to Lithuania, which he was somewhat mysteriously enabled to effect. It was at this moment that the wrath of Borís was vented on the Románovs. In Poland the young man entered the service of Prince Wiśniowiecki. This was in 1603, and he was then 20. To his patron he is supposed to have declared his identity. By him he was brought into touch with Polish society, especially with one Mniszek, *wojewoda*¹ (= 'palatine') of Sandomierz, who had a beautiful daughter, Maryna, who captivated the young pretender. Further, he was introduced to high Catholic circles, whose interests he promised to advance in Russia, and finally to King Sigismund III, who, however, only committed himself to qualified support. Such is the theory officially and most generally held in Russia. Foreign historians have been more inclined to accept the view that he was at least a natural son of Ivan IV, or else some foreign prince of high degree. Nothing has been proved, not even that the young pretender who entered Russia from Poland in 1605 was the same person as the clerk who fled into Poland from Russia in 1603, though the probability is that he was.

Whatever the facts, his identity is of little importance in comparison with his personality. In appearance he was distinctly unprepossessing, and anything but regal. He was, however, gifted with exceptional intelligence. He was enlightened, generous, brave, energetic, frank, well educated, eloquent, and versatile. He appeared convinced of his own authenticity, and treated all those who came in contact with him with a candour and trust sufficiently reckless to be convincing. While his predecessors had gone on the principle of punishing the innocent as well as the guilty, he went on that of rewarding the guilty as well as the innocent. At one moment the notorious family of the Shúiskis began to spread reports

¹ Literally = army-leader, i. e. the equivalent of Duke or Herzog.

that Demetrius was a pretender. He promptly summoned the general assembly, which this time achieved a genuinely representative character, and handed over the whole matter to them to decide. They condemned the Shúiskis to death, but Demetrius commuted the sentence to exile, and eventually brought back the culprits and restored to them all their former honours and possessions. In the domain of actual government Demetrius manifested extreme energy. He attended every day the *boyárskaya dúma*, where he found himself faced with the task of the political education of the *boyárs*. This he undertook as tactfully as possible. At the same time he made it clear to them that he was not going to be a tool in their hands. Both in external and internal politics he began to develop ambitious and well-laid plans of his own. He carried through a new law which aimed at preserving the nominal independence of the peasants as a taxpaying class by forbidding them to become serfs, i. e. non-taxpaying, a means of getting rid of their liabilities equally detrimental to themselves and to the State which had been expressly permitted by a law of 1550 and was much employed in the hungry years 1601-3. In foreign policy he began to prepare an all-European league to combat Muhammadanism under the aegis of Russia. As regards the social life of the country, he turned it inside out till the poor unsophisticated Moscovites, whose menfolk led a patriarchally primitive life while the womenfolk lived in semi-oriental seclusion, did not know whether they were standing on their heads or their heels. It was ostensibly his many innovations, his complete disregard of local prejudices, his unconcealed predilection for foreign ways and people, and finally his marriage with the Polish Maryna and the subsequent influx of Polish place-seekers, but all the time really, and more than anything else, it was his political self-will which turned the scales of noble and ecclesiastical opinion against him. With the mass of the people both in the capital and in the provinces,

in spite of his unconventionality, he maintained his great and well-deserved popularity till the last; he was considered a sportsman. But a sportsman was not what the *boyárs* had bargained for. Already, in the early part of 1606, the Russian envoy who went to Cracow to announce the formal accession of Demetrius quietly hinted to the Polish chancellor that the ruler the Poles had sent the *boyárs* was not at all the sort of man they wanted; they had no peace from him and would be ready to exchange him for Ladislav, the son of King Sigismund. It is the fashion among Russian historians to accuse the Poles of having foisted the 'false' Demetrius on Russia. As a matter of fact he was in all probability concocted in Moscow itself, and most likely among the Románovs and their partisans. As Klyuchévski says, he was baked in a Polish oven, but he was leavened in Moscow. Once he had served his purpose of supplanting Borís Godunóv, and since, moreover, he turned out not to be malleable, the *boyárs* began to think it was time that he was supplanted.

Tsar Vasíli Shúiski (1606–10)

At the head of the conspiracy was Prince Vasíli Ivánovich Shúiski, who admitted that he had only acknowledged Demetrius in order to get rid of Borís. In May 1606 he headed a revolt with the cry that the Polish nobles were plotting against the life of Demetrius. Thereupon the people furiously attacked the courtiers, while Shúiski and his band of followers made short work of the unfortunate Demetrius. Before anybody had time to look round, Vasíli Shúiski had been elected *tsar*, not by the general assembly, but by the small party of *boyárs* and others in Moscow who had worked for him all along. He was fifty-four years of age, a lineal descendant of Rurik, insignificant in appearance, and in character ambitious, miserly, crafty, and narrow-minded. As a ruler he was as unsuccessful as he was unpopular.

His accession was, nevertheless, an important event. Owing his election, as he did, to the support of his fellow *boyárs*, he was not a free agent and could not maintain the position of absolute despot, consecrated by divine grace. He had to accept terms. These amounted to a considerable curtailment of the most valued, and to the *boyárs* the most dangerous, prerogatives of the sovereign. He renounced the right of arbitrary punishment without proof of guilt or trial, the right of confiscation of the property of the family and relatives of those convicted, and the right of secret trial with torture merely on the strength of information. He took the oath publicly not to pronounce sentence of death or to take important decisions without consulting the *boyárs*, or to disgrace any of the *boyárs* without just cause. In short, he became a limited ruler, at any rate in theory, and the personal security of the *boyárs* was assured. Nevertheless, nobody was enthusiastic about him. This was especially the case in the provinces, where Demetrius was sincerely regretted and Moscow came to be looked on as a factory of lies and deceptions. Confidence was not encouraged by the fact that at this point Demetrius' hypothetical mother, the widowed *tsarítsa* Maria, declared herself convinced that he had not been her son, while *tsar* Vasili Shúiski had the boy who was buried in 1591 canonized as St. Demetrius by the Patriarch Hermogen, and his holy remains transferred to Moscow. The inevitable result was a fresh resurrection of Demetrius, which duly took place very shortly after *tsar* Vasili Shúiski's accession.

The years from 1606 to 1613 were a period of complete chaos and anarchy in Russia. Claimants and counter-claimants, defections of provinces, risings of Cossacks and invasions of foreigners, followed one another with bewildering rapidity. The extent to which this chronic disorder weakened Russia is shown by the increasing interest, leading to open interference, taken in her internal affairs by foreign countries, notably Sweden and

Poland. Revolts against the authority of *tsar* Vasíli Shúiski began immediately after his accession in 1606, being especially frequent amongst the Cossacks of the Don and in the southern provinces generally. It was from this time onwards that the lesser nobility of Moscow broke away from the greater ; they were followed by the petty nobility of the provinces and finally by the mass of the people, who seized this longed-for opportunity of attacking the wealthy landowners. Thus, what began by being political rivalry in the capital ended in a social revolution throughout the country and the armed intervention of foreign Powers. For the first two years of Vasíli Shúiski's reign disaffection smouldered in the provinces, but in 1608 it broke out openly and threatened the capital. A plausible pretender had been secured. For the rest, his identity was absolutely vague, but that did not matter, as he was now merely a symbol. He is known as Pseudo-Demetrius II. He gathered all the discontented and also the disorderly elements under his banner. He was supported by strong Polish forces, and by the Cossacks of the Don under their *hetman* Zarútski. He actually established an armed encampment under the *tsar's* very nose, in the village of Túshino, ten miles from Moscow, where he and his followers led a riotous and predatory life. In return for a considerable sum Maryna's father persuaded her to recognize Demetrius II, who was a mere ruffian, as her husband, and she joined him at Túshino, and in due course bore him a son. Many towns and districts all over Russia went over to his side, though the excesses of his myrmidons were not long in causing a reaction against him, and especially against his lawless Cossacks, in the more sober sections of the people. His success, however, was such that Vasíli Shúiski in alarm invoked the aid of the Swedes, who, in return for certain concessions, agreed to help him.

But the appearance of the Swedes on the scene was immediately and inevitably followed by that of the Poles. King

Sigismund III of Poland was determined not to let his uncle, King Charles IX of Sweden, steal a march on him. So he turned his arms against Moscow, and in the autumn of 1609 laid seige to Smolénsk, a fate which always befell that unfortunate city, half-way house between Moscow and Warsaw, in any war between Poland and Russia. This step on the part of the King of Poland, his covert protector, took the heart out of Demetrius II, who fled incontinently to Kalúga. The lesser nobles of Moscow, who were amongst his camp-followers at Túshino, found themselves in mid-air. So they repaired to Smolénsk, headed by one M. G. Saltykóv, to try and make terms with King Sigismund, or rather with his son Ladislás, whom they now nominated as *tsar*.

In February 1610 these adventurers, who usurped the function of plenipotentiaries speaking for the whole of Russia, made an agreement with King Sigismund setting forth the conditions on which they were willing to place his son Ladislás on the throne of Moscow. It has become famous in Russian history; for it was nothing less than a draft constitution with complete fundamental laws, defining the rights of the sovereign and of the subject, and the powers of the *boyárskaya dúma* and of the *zémski sobór*. In spirit it was essentially conservative, but it included some innovations which, for the good people of Moscow, were sufficiently startling, such as the principles that service to the State should be rewarded by elevation in rank, and that subjects of the *tsar*, though not, *bien entendu*, the peasants, should be free to go abroad without risking confiscation of their property. Even religious toleration was indicated; and it was laid down that the *tsar* must not enact any important measure, such as the introduction of fresh taxation, without consulting the *boyárskaya dúma*, and that no man should be condemned without trial.

Meanwhile, the Swedes under de la Gardie, having joined

forces with the Russians under Prince Michael Skópin-Shúiski, the talented and high-minded nephew of Vasíli Shúiski, were clearing northern Russia of disaffected elements, and in March 1610 triumphantly entered Moscow, for a moment restoring the *tsar's* drooping fortunes. Skópin-Shúiski, who was only twenty-four, became the idol of the hour, and was openly nominated for the throne. Unfortunately, he came to a sudden and mysterious end, probably poisoned by his jealous relatives. At the same time Sigismund's general, *hetman* Zólkiewski,¹ defeated the *tsar's* army. Thereupon, in July 1610 *tsar* Vasíli Shúiski was forcibly deposed by one Z. Lyapunóv, much against his own will and against that of the uppermost *boyárs* and of the hierarchy. Z. Lyapunóv and his brother, P. Lyapunóv, were petty provincial nobles, natives of Ryazán. They played a leading part in all the revolutionary movements from 1605 onwards, being always the first to advocate the cause of each new claimant, with the exception of those put forward by the *boyárs* of Moscow. They maintained the reputation of the men of their native district—semi-nomads of the steppe country and semi-Cossacks—for headstrong and turbulent courage. But the great *boyárs* of Moscow were now thoroughly alarmed at the popular character which the revolution was assuming, and hastened to acknowledge Ladislas. Moreover, Pseudo-Demetrius II was again approaching Moscow, counting on the support of the populace; and the *boyárs*, rather than accept him, turned to Ladislas.

The Polish Supremacy (1610-12)

After the deposition of Vasíli Shúiski the *boyárskaya dúma* assumed complete responsibility, and, at any rate in the capital, enforced its authority. Zólkiewski was invited to occupy Moscow with his army and to accept the oath of allegiance to

¹ Pronounced *Zbuukyéski*.

Ladislas (August 1610). The oath was taken on the basis of the agreement of February 1610, but the Moscow *boyárs* managed to tone down the features most objectionable to themselves; the stipulation entitling obscure subjects of the *tsar* to attain elevated rank was replaced by one preventing foreigners in the *tsar's* service from being honoured at the expense of natives, and the permission to travel abroad was abolished, as being fraught with menace to the safety of the realm. Żółkiewski and his army of occupation won golden opinions in Moscow by their exemplary behaviour, but the fact that the capital was in the possession of the Poles and that the *boyárs* were hand-in-glove with a Catholic king aroused misgiving throughout the country. After accepting the oath of allegiance to Ladislas, Żółkiewski dispatched an embassy to King Sigismund at Smolensk with the request that Ladislas should become a member of the Orthodox Church. This opened the religious question. The embassy included Philaret, Bishop of Rostov (ex-Theodore Románov), and Prince V. V. Golitsyn, who had himself been a candidate for the throne. Shortly afterwards Żółkiewski himself left for Smolensk, taking with him the ex-*tsar* Vasili Shúiski as hostage, and leaving Moscow under the command of the Polish noble Gąsiewski.¹ But King Sigismund now showed his hand. He refused to allow his son to join the Orthodox Church, and moreover declared that he himself would be *tsar*. He packed off Philaret and Golitsyn as prisoners to Poland, captured and destroyed Smolensk, and triumphantly returned to Warsaw with Vasili Shúiski in his train. At Warsaw Vasili Shúiski soon afterwards died; and meanwhile in Moscow the *boyárskaya duma* recognized Sigismund as *tsar*, and the *boyárs* sought and accepted favours at his hands as their sovereign.

¹ Pronounced *Gonsbéski*.

The National Rising under Minin and Pozhárski (1611-13)

At the end of 1610 Demetrius II was assassinated, and the issues immediately became simplified in the sense that all Russia outside Moscow began to rally against the Poles and the pro-Polish party who controlled the city. Towns and villages which had each been acting independently began to communicate and to concert measures with one another. But by this time the whole country was so torn asunder and demoralized that it was no easy matter effectively to reunite the warring social elements which composed it. The Polish garrison, too, had such a firm hold of Moscow that it was not to be ejected for the wishing. However, in the early part of 1611 a force of about 100,000 men, known as the 'first national levy' (*opolchénie*), was collected and made its way to Moscow, led by P. Lyapunov, representing the petty provincial nobility, and including a large force of Cossacks under Prince Trubetskói and *hetman* Zarútski, in whose arms Maryna and her infant son now sought shelter. The people of Moscow rose in sympathy with the new movement, but the well-armed and alert Poles fell on them, and after massacring many of them and burning a large part of the city, shut themselves up in the *Kremlin* and in the fortified quarters adjacent to it (March 1611). Here they were besieged by the national levy, the three leaders of which formed a provisional government. But dissensions, fomented by the Poles, soon broke out between Lyapunov, by far the most able of the three, and the two others, and developed into a quarrel between the purely Russian and the mixed Cossack elements. In the upshot Lyapunov was killed and the levy broke up.

The year 1611 marked the *nadir* of Russia's fortunes. The Poles were in possession of Moscow and Smolénsk, the Swedes occupied Nóvgorod, the treasury was empty, and the fields were waste. Final disruption seemed imminent and inevitable. The

forebodings of the people as to the probable result of the extinction of the dynasty seemed about to be justified.

But from the end of 1611 the instinct of national self-preservation began to assert itself. The people scattered throughout the vast land began to realize the danger which threatened them and the necessity for united action. In the national movement for the re-establishment of law and order and for the restoration of Russia to the Russians which now began, the Orthodox Church played a great and noble part. Both priests and people realized that their religion was menaced by foreign domination, and the Church rose to the occasion. The ecclesiastical centre whence flowed the current that galvanized the people to political and military action was the monastery of the Trinity of St. Sergius, the largest, wealthiest, and most famous of all Russian monasteries, founded in the forests 40 miles north of Moscow by the hermit Saint Sergius, about the year 1340. The monastery had already successfully withstood a siege of sixteen months by the Polish forces under Lisóvski and Sapieha, followers of Pseudo-Demetrius II. It was strongly fortified, and was a sort of general base of supply of arms, money, and food for the whole people. At this time it was under the rule of the archimandrite, Dionysius, who, after the Poles in Moscow had imprisoned and done to death the Patriarch Hermogen, became the leader of the Russian Church. He was ably assisted by the bursar Abraham Palitsyn, who has left a remarkable history of the period. Between them they sent forth a number of hortatory missives in all directions, urging the people to make common cause against the foreign usurpers and promising them their help. In the town of Nízhni Nóvgorod on the Volga (cf. p. 114) these appeals met with a notably warm response. The townsfolk mustered under the leadership of their mayor (*stárosta*), the butcher Cosmo Minin, and were joined by large numbers of the petty nobility and professional military class of the surrounding

country, many of whom had in the course of the revolution lost all their property. These were led by Prince D. M. Pozhárski. Mínin was really at the head of the movement, and his was the supreme authority. Equipment was provided by abundant voluntary subscriptions which flowed in from all sides, and further, a levy was ordered by Mínin consisting of one-fifth of all personal property. This force is known as the second national levy.

At length, in the spring of 1612, it started on its way, but its journey proved long and slow. It moved first to Yaroslávl, where it halted and deliberated. During this time the Poles were still besieged in the *Kremlin* by the Cossacks under Trubetskói, who had organized a replica of Túshino.¹ At the monastery of the Trinity of St. Sergius it was learnt that a strong Polish force under Chodkiewicz was approaching Moscow from the west, in order to relieve the garrison and reassert the authority of King Sigismund. Palítsyn sent urgent messages to Mínin and Pozhárski not to delay their advent, and at last went himself to Yaroslávl to impress them with the necessity of anticipating Chodkiewicz. Eventually, the national levy did get to Moscow in time, but when they found the Cossacks there they refused to act with them. To the gentry and townfolk the Cossacks were even more distasteful than the Poles. But the fact was, that without the Cossacks nothing could be done. In this wonderful combination of national forces the Church supplied the spiritual impulse, the *bourgeoisie* the material resources, but the irregular soldiery the military initiative and capacity. The nobility, the great *boyárs*, the great official and military caste, whose duty and profession it was to govern and defend the country, were nowhere in the picture. Russia was saved by the Church, the people, and the Cossacks. Palítsyn, with genius born of despair, succeeded in reconciling the two

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 156.

rival camps. Mínin, with the help of the Cossacks, defeated Chodkiewicz and forced him to retire. In October 1612 the Cossacks stormed the fortified part of the city of Moscow adjacent to the *Kremlin* known as *Kitái-gorod*,¹ and the national levy laid siege to the *Kremlin* itself, the Polish garrison of which, reduced to starvation, eventually capitulated.

When they had expelled the Poles and recovered their capital the Russians were in the same position as they had been fifteen years previously. That is to say, they were confronted with the task of electing a new *tsar* and establishing a new dynasty. But there was this difference, that after fifteen years of civil war they were no longer the same people. Their eyes had been opened; their minds were enlarged, their political education had begun. For generations taught and accustomed to believe that the dynasty and the government were a permanency and themselves no more than its adjuncts, they now realized that the exact opposite was, in fact, the case. The days when the people accepted the caprices of the dynasty as part of the divine ordinance were gone, never to return. It is true that this political self-consciousness was at this time, and subsequently remained for more than two centuries, embryonic. Its manifestations were only spasmodic, having the character for the most part of violent and ill-conceived outbreaks. But the seed of discontent was sown and was never eradicated. On the other hand, the crisis through which the Russian people had passed had been excessively severe. Dissolution had been averted, but the illness was so acute that complete prostration supervened, and the strength of the patient was only very slowly built up again. Meanwhile, the class which had lost least in the whole affair—the *boyárs*, the officials, and the greater landowners—was the largest and most immediate beneficiary.

¹ The origin of this word is obscure, but it has not, as is often supposed, anything to do with China (*Kitái*).

From Moscow summonses were issued to all parts of Russia in the names of Prince Pozhárski, representing the national levy, and of Prince Trubetskói, representing the Cossacks, for the convocation of a general assembly to elect a *tsar*. This *zémski sobór* was by far the largest and most genuinely representative which had ever assembled, containing, as it did, delegates from all classes of the population, including townsfolk and villagers. It met in Moscow at the beginning of 1613. Faced with the question whether to elect a *tsar* of foreign or of native origin it decided with one accord on the latter alternative; but with that unanimity ceased. There were many candidates, and there was much canvassing. The revolution had produced men of sterling worth, but none of more than mediocre intelligence, and no popular heroes; or rather, none such had survived. Two of the most notable personalities, Prince V. V. Golitsyn and Philaret, were in Polish captivity. Eventually and gradually the choice settled on Michael, the sixteen-year-old son of Philaret. His name was put forward both by the Cossacks and by the provincial nobility, and the concurrence of these two otherwise hostile factions settled the question.

The Románovs (cf. p. 155) were a family of Lithuanian origin, established in Moscow since the reign of Iván Kalitá (1328-41). They were the only untitled family of *boyárs*, that is, of the original Moscow nobility, to maintain themselves in the first ranks of the *boyárstvo* amid the numerous provincial titled families who flocked to Moscow in the reign of Ivan III. They were, moreover, the only family which, in the eyes of the people, maintained a decent reputation during the reign of Ivan IV and in subsequent years. Their persecution by Borís Godunóv had turned them into martyrs. During the Time of Troubles they had acted astutely, if somewhat equivocally. They retained the good opinion of the people of Moscow, but at the same time they cultivated friendly relations with the

pretenders, and acquired popularity among the Cossacks. Pseudo-Demetrius I had appointed Philaret Bishop of Rostóv, while Pseudo-Demetrius II had actually made him Patriarch in opposition to Vasíli Shúiski's Patriarch Hermogen. The boy Michael Románov himself was not remarkable for virtue, vice, or intellect, nor was he robust in health, and perhaps for these very reasons he inspired confidence in the *boyárs* no less than in the people. His tender age alone was sufficient to disarm suspicion. But beyond all this he had one supreme qualification which especially in the popular mind ensured his success. He was the first cousin once removed of the late *tsar* Theodore I, whose mother Anastasia had been the sister of Nikíta Románov, grandfather of Michael. That alone was enough. The craving for genealogical continuity was satisfied. At the end of February 1613 Michael was vociferously and unanimously elected *tsar*.

4

The New Dynasty and the New Times (1613-72)

The Reign of Michael (1613-45)

Internal Affairs

THE election of the new dynasty, after fifteen exhausting years had been spent, and many failures and misfortunes experienced, in the search for a satisfactory sovereign, may be regarded as a great achievement, and it proved the opening of a new era in Russian history. The 'Time of Troubles' (*smúta* or *smútnoye vremya*), a euphemism for what was really a virulent form of revolution, was, with its tale of fifteen tumultuous and calamitous years, a great crisis which drove a wedge between one epoch and another. It was like a long and trying illness, with its temporary recoveries and relapses; but the convales-

cence, of which the definitive selection of a new dynasty was merely the preliminary step, was much longer and more trying still. The contrast between Russia before and Russia after the revolution, between Russia of the sixteenth and Russia of the seventeenth century, is very striking, as much as that between Russia of the seventeenth and Russia of the eighteenth century. Russia in the seventeenth century was very different in almost every respect from Russia in the sixteenth, and on the whole it may be said that it was a far less happy and attractive country. Old Russia and the old order of things may, in a sense, be said to have passed, together with the old dynasty. Notably the good points of the old régime, a certain free and easy looseness in the structure of society, the freedom of labour (at any rate in theory), and a general atmosphere of contentment and relative prosperity of all classes, came to a definite end. The defects of the good old times, on the other hand, survived and became intensified. These were especially the rapacity and the ignorance of the governing social class, the disinclination or the inability of that class to initiate any serious reform or even any constructive policy, particularly in the economic and educational spheres, and, on the part of the whole people, the largely self-imposed distrust of, and isolation from, other European peoples.

Throughout the sixteenth century Russia had, except as regards territorial expansion, been virtually stationary, so much so that it may be called an age of consolidation which came to resemble stagnation. Even during its second half, the madness of Ivan IV, though undoubtedly it prepared the way for the revolution, at the time merely embittered certain sections of society and crippled the foreign policy of Moscow without disturbing the massive complacency of the nation.

The revolution proved a very rude and shocking awakening, and nothing after it was the same as it had been before. It was, in the first place, a period of disillusionment, and its effect on

the character of the Russian people was profound. For long accustomed to consider itself and the land it inhabited as the accidental attributes and chattels of an autocratic dynasty, providentially ordained and permanently established, it discovered, when the dynasty perished, that exactly the opposite was the case: the land and the people kept their position, and found themselves, almost as it were unconsciously, electing monarchs and attempting to limit their power.¹ And it stood to reason that the dynasty which, after several unsuccessful efforts, was eventually established, was shorn of much of its glamour by being elected. In the second place, the revolution was a period of disintegration and of economic ruin. The frontiers of the realm no longer expanded but began to shrink. Swedish and Polish armies and bands of Cossack marauders manœuvred all over the country. During all those years the fields remained untilled, the harvests unsown and unreaped. The population was dispersed, and the forest began to reclaim its lost ground; and as a result the public revenue lapsed. The instincts of the people had been right in so far as, during this period of social and political chaos, Russia very nearly went the way of the old dynasty. The definite re-establishment of the monarchy was an undisguised blessing, though it was bought at what turned out to be a ruinous price.

In contrast with the sixteenth, the seventeenth century was a period pre-eminently of internal ferment and development, while the process of territorial expansion was only tentatively resumed from 1667 onwards. The seventeenth century in Russia was an age of change, of reaction, of reform, of discontent, and of schism. The changes most in evidence were those of an outward and material character. The governing class eagerly introduced measures of reaction and repression in order to cope with its own people, and, much against its will,

¹ This is based on Klyuchévski.

was compelled to introduce measures of reform in order to cope with its economic troubles and with its foreign enemies. The people became impoverished, and for the first time rebellious. Finally, all these troubles in the spiritual sphere resulted in the first schism suffered by the Church in Russia, which had hitherto been proud above all of its unanimity.

Still greater than the difference between the Russia of the new era and that of the old was the difference between Russia and the rest of Europe in the sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries. In this respect it is no exaggeration to say that the fifteen years' revolution put Russia back 150 years. In the sixteenth century Russia was far more on a level with the rest of Europe, both morally and materially, than in the seventeenth. It is true, of course, that in any case geographical remoteness isolated Russia from central and western Europe, and that this isolation was accentuated, first by the 250 years' of Tartar dominion, and then by the Turkish conquest of Constantinople and of the Balkan peninsula; for Constantinople in many ways had been to Russia what Rome had been to the rest of Europe. But the revolution, and still more its various political and economic consequences, was even more to blame for widening the gulf which by the laws of nature and by the evolution of religion already separated Russia from Europe. At the very time when the rest of Europe was developing at a phenomenal rate, when the discovery of new worlds, the invention of new industries, and the reformation of religion were rapidly amplifying European civilization, the political growth and economic development of Russia were suddenly and completely arrested. Russia stood still while Europe went forward, with the result that when peace returned and normal intercourse with Europe was resumed, the leeway to be made good was greater than before, and Russia's position, especially in the material sense, was far more difficult than ever.

At the same time material backwardness was aggravated by mental narrowness. This was the great national moral defect of mediaeval Russia. Cut off from the rest of Europe spiritually as well as geographically, convinced of her religious infallibility and complete moral and material self-sufficiency, violently xenophobe, looking upon Rome as a heretic, upon Constantinople as a degenerate in bondage to the Muhammadans, upon Moscow as the only repository of truth, and upon Russian Orthodoxy as the only road to salvation, Russia remained unvivified by the Renaissance and undisturbed by the Reformation—abysmally superstitious and voluntarily ignorant.

The revolution, which had so many disastrous and negative results, had at least the positive and not unfruitful effect of throwing a strong light on the internal state of Russia and of opening the eyes of the Russian people to the conditions under which they lived. Hence the main characteristic of the seventeenth century in Russian history, apart from all those already mentioned, though they were all more or less tinged by it, was the spirit of cleavage, while the spirit of the preceding century had been that of unanimity. From the beginning of the seventeenth century in Russia society was divided, almost imperceptibly and very unevenly at first, but ever more noticeably, into two sections. Of these, one recognized that things could not continue on the old lines if Russia was to develop and was to maintain, let alone improve, her position in the comity of nations; that, in a word, reform both material and spiritual was urgently necessary, and that the means to this end could only be supplied by the countries of central and western Europe. The other held that reform, or rather change, was both unnecessary and injurious, and that salvation could only be found by preserving the old tradition intact and unaltered. These currents of opinion were the forerunners of the famous parties of the Westerners and the Slavophiles which rent each other in

the first half of the nineteenth century. Seventeenth-century Russia tried to solve this problem by a compromise, in that it tried to emulate the physical aptitudes of a Swedish artilleryman while preserving the mental attitude of a Byzantine monk. Hardly a promising combination.

The immediate results of the revolution were that the Crown suffered a great loss of power, that Russia was sensibly diminished in territory, in strength, and in prestige, that the land was impoverished and the people half-ruined and exasperated. The class which had suffered least in the upheaval, the great land-owners, both temporal and spiritual, eventually profited most from it, though it made sensible gaps in the ranks of the aristocracy; and many of the old families, titled and untitled, went under in the storm, never to reappear, their places being taken by families of new names and reputations.

The Crown was the first, after a short eclipse, to recover its pristine splendour. It took the dynasty only one generation to live down the fact of its having been elected. The State took a considerable time to regain its balance and its international position, and to pick up the threads of its foreign policy. The people went under for 250 years. After its bitter experiences at the hands of Ivan IV, and of the shrewish sovereigns it had elected out of its midst, the *boyár* class adopted as its motto 'Never again'. To ensure its fulfilment two things were necessary: they had to secure their political position by limiting the power of the *tsar*, and to improve their financial position by curtailing the freedom of labour. Circumstances facilitated the achievement of both objects.

At the time of his election in 1613 Michael Románov was only sixteen. Moreover, he was far from strong in health, while his mind was remarkable neither for depth nor for vigour—a combination of defects which hampered him till the last. His father, the Metropolitan of Rostów (Philaret), had been a

prisoner in Poland since 1610 (cf. p. 159), and did not return to Moscow until 1618, so that at the moment of his election and for the next five years the boy was alone, and the *boyárs* had a good opportunity to put some of their ideas into practice, and made the most of it.

At the beginning of the new reign both *boyárs* and people were in an exceptionally strong position with regard to the Crown. The new dynasty owed to them its existence, and it had to pay the price; the fiction that Moscow and Russia were the *tsar's* personal property had, at least temporarily, to be waived. The election of the new sovereign was sufficiently remarkable in this respect, that the popular assembly (*zémski sobór*) of 1613 was far larger and more genuinely representative of the whole people than any held heretofore, and also, for that matter, than any held afterwards. But it was still more so by reason of certain obscure events connected with it which have never been completely elucidated. It is virtually certain that in return for his election the *boyárs* extracted from Michael, or from his family, stipulations amounting to a limitation of the monarch's prerogatives and an extension of the *boyárs'* privileges in the shape of a guarantee of their personal immunity. Though no actual charter has ever been proved to have existed, the belief at the time was very general, and is warranted by the behaviour of the *boyárs* during this reign, if by nothing else.¹

At the same time, Michael was the first ruler officially to style himself 'autocrat' (the Russian equivalent, *samodérzhets*, being a literal translation of the Byzantine *αὐτοκράτωρ*), possibly by a graceful concession on the part of the *boyárs*. Again, his position in relation to the people was also equivocal, for, though elected by them, the cause of his election was largely the fact that he was the first cousin once removed of *tsar* Theodore I, and was popularly considered the legitimate heir to the throne.

¹ This is based on Klyuchévski.

With all this his status as sovereign remained as anomalous as had been that of his predecessors. It was completely nebulous and undefined. There was still no law of succession, and the oath of allegiance only extended to Michael and to his children. The position became fantastic when, on the return of his father from his Polish captivity in 1618, the latter, a strong and determined man, who was already Patriarch, was further created co-*tsar*, on the plea that the father could not be less than the son. The two actually 'shared the autocracy' until the death of Philaret in 1633, this period of Russian history being known as the 'dyarchy' (*dvoevlástie*).

Parliamentary Institutions

While the *boyárs* thus secured their persons and their position, the representatives of the people found themselves in the surprising position of being considered indispensable to the government of the country. The reign of Michael witnessed the efflorescence, premature for the rest and transitory, of parliamentary government in Russia. The reasons for this phenomenon are not far to seek. During its first years the position of the new dynasty was precarious. Moreover, as a result of the revolution, the whole country was in a state of chaos and ruin; the whole machinery of the administration, central and local, was utterly disorganized. Above all, there was no money in the treasury. Order had to be re-established, the organs of government had to be set up afresh, taxes had to be devised and collected—a task far more difficult, because the whole population had been dislocated, and momentous questions of foreign policy constantly required attention and decision. In a word, everything had to be re-created and re-constructed. This was a thorny and responsible task which neither the *tsar* nor the *boyárskaya dúma* (the legislature) was willing even to face, far less to attempt to solve, unaided. Hence

the services of the popular assembly (*zémski sobór*) were called on, and this body accordingly throve. For the first two years of the new reign it virtually became the government, replacing or rather absorbing both the legislature (the *boyárskaya dúma*) and the executive (the *prikázy* = the ministries or chancelleries), and performing their functions. During the remainder of Michael's reign, which lasted until 1645, the representatives of the people met no fewer than ten times and took an active part in legislation, being often consulted on matters such as the sanctioning of new imposts and the deciding of questions of peace or war. Thus parliament seemed to promise well to become an established institution. As a matter of fact, it did not do so; and the history of the Russian national assembly in the seventeenth century is that of its gradual but persistent decline. Like a blossom out of season, it withered before it had fully opened.

The reasons for this are obvious. The *zémski sobór* existed only in so far as the *tsar* and the *boyárskaya dúma* needed its help for the shouldering of responsibility. In proportion as the dynasty waxed more secure and the exchequer less empty, the importance of the assembly dwindled. It had no solid foundation, and it failed to appreciate the potentiality of the weapon of financial control. The initiative in its convocation and the decision as to what it was required to do when once it had been convoked lay, not with itself, but with the *tsar* or with the supreme council of the Russian Church (*osvyashchénnny sobór*). It is true that in its constitution it differed considerably from its fellow of the previous century. Then its members had consisted entirely of officials, central and local, and of their nominees. Now, while it still included in itself the whole *boyárskaya dúma* and *osvyashchénnny sobór* and representatives of the chancelleries (*dyáki*, lit. 'clerks', who were also members of the *boyárskaya dúma*), the popular part of it was really elective and represented

the merchants of Moscow and of other centres, and the country people. But unless it was actually asked by the *tsar* to initiate legislation its functions were merely consultative and advisory. The constitutional assembly of 1610, which met to select the new dynasty, had been of course unique. Otherwise, the history of the assembly is illustrated by an enumeration of its meetings. During the reign of Michael's successor, Alexis (1645-76), it met five times, as opposed to ten during the preceding thirty years, and these five were all during the period 1645-53. Subsequently it only met twice in 1682, and once—for the last time—in 1698.

In the course of this period the assembly itself gradually became less representative of the people. It was sometimes summoned on the spur of the moment, giving no time to the members who were scattered over the immense expanse of the country to gather, and on these occasions it consisted merely of those members who at the time happened to be in the capital, these naturally always including the *boyárskaya dúma* and the permanent high officials. Finally, it came to resemble a random gathering from the streets of Moscow, as it were the chorus in an opera whose sole duty was to shout monosyllabic assent. Thereafter legislation became reduced in form to the piecemeal presentation of petitions by isolated classes of the community, which were naturally easier to deal with. In time the formula 'in answer to the petition' (*chelobítie*, lit. = 'forehead-beating') of the people' became the accepted preamble to any new law which the *tsar* or the *boyárskaya dúma* chose to impose.

Thus one of the principal reasons for the lapse of the national assembly was the fact that, once having accomplished the purpose for which it was summoned, the assembly ceased to be necessary to the governing class. Another reason was that in the given conditions no other result was to be expected. The

political consciousness of the people was so undeveloped and the general obscurity so profound that the need of a regular assembly, permanently established and properly defined and secured, was not acutely felt. No serious or concerted effort was made by the people to keep the thing alive, none was really even possible, and therefore it died a natural and easy death. But there were other positive causes which also contributed to this result. One was the change in the whole system of administration. In the sixteenth century the tendency had been to decentralize authority and develop local government on an elective basis, which in its turn formed a groundwork for the election of representatives to the national assembly; in the seventeenth century the tendency was to centralize authority and concentrate it in the hands of single individuals appointed by the Crown. Another was the entirely fresh constitution of society which appeared at this time, the result of the new policy of cutting up the whole population into rigid classes with fixed and impassable barriers between them. This arrangement was new to Russia, and was the basis on which society in the new régime was reconstructed. Its ultimate expression was the formal and general introduction of serfdom. With the disfranchisement and enslavement of the responsible 'free' rural population the national assembly was, to a great extent, deprived of its popular elective basis.

Growth of Serfdom

One of the features of Russian society in the sixteenth century was its looseness of structure and the relative freedom of labour. These characteristics, combined with the great extent of territory covered by the State and the sparseness of the population by which that territory was covered, produced a state of things very disadvantageous to the central authority, especially from the fiscal point of view. The greatest drawback

in this connexion was the regular evasion of their financial obligations to the State by large numbers of people. Taxes were paid to the State by the townsfolk and by those peasants (agricultural labourers and village folk) who were still technically free. The monasteries excepted, the land-holding class (the nobility, great and small) paid its duty to the State in the shape of military service, in return for which it was allowed to own the land, the land itself providing it with the means of becoming an efficient fighting force. The immediate dependants of this class—servants of the house and of the State—were not free and were liable neither to taxation nor to conscription. In the absence of laws to the contrary, it was a great temptation to penurious members of the serving class, younger members of petty land-holding families, and also to needy townsfolk and peasants, to escape their onerous obligations by a voluntary renunciation of their liberties and by enrolling themselves as dependants (*zakládchiki*, lit. ‘pledgers’) of some large landowner or land-owning corporation, such as a monastery. This process differed from serfdom in that the agreement was entirely voluntary and could be terminated at will, while at the same time it absolved the person who made it from all his obligations to the State. This practice was very injurious to the prosperity alike of the State, the towns, and the free peasants, while it poured money into the pockets of the landowners, who exploited labour which was not liable to taxation.

Legislation was first directed to the preservation for the State of the military land-holding class. A law of 1642 forbade members of this class to renounce their liberties and their obligations. As a result of this, the various grades of nobility and gentry (*boyárstvo* and *dvoryánstvo*) became assimilated into one vast class of ‘serving people’ (*sluzhílye lyúdi*). Next the townsfolk were taken in hand, and after much delay a law was passed in 1658 absolutely prohibiting removal from one town to another,

the settling in the towns of non-taxpaying peasants for purposes of trade, and the settling in the country of townsmen as non-taxpaying peasants. In 1649 a law was passed that all those peasants who had renounced their freedom and their obligation to pay taxes (*zakládchiki*) must be reinstated in their former position as taxpayers, or at any rate as liable to taxation either directly or through their employers. The necessity for this was realized in 1619, but the monasteries and the landowners successfully battled against the passing of the measure for thirty years. Thus trade became the exclusive right of the townfolk and the payment of duties their class obligation, just as the ownership of land was the right and State service the class obligation of the nobility and gentry, great and small. Thus these two classes became fixed in their spheres for the benefit of the State as they had never been before. There remained the peasants. The problem of their status had in effect been in process of solution for some time past. The peasants were a bone of contention between the central authority, especially the treasury, and the large landowners. A triangular contest was engaged between the Crown, labour, and capital, in which capital won, labour went under, and the Crown, while sacrificing its principles, managed to secure its interests. Such was the setting in which the drama of the generalization, formularization, and legalization of serfdom in Russia was played; a drama which vitiated the whole of Russian life for 250 years, undermined the moral strength of the Russian people, and left indelible traces on the national character.

Domestic and estate slavery (*kholópstvo*) had existed as an institution from the earliest times, but at the beginning of the seventeenth century the mass of agricultural labour, the peasants (*krestyáne*), was still technically free (cf. p. 139), though owing to various causes most of them were already in a state of total

or partial dependence economically on the great landlords. The date at which this dependence became complete and legalized slavery, a gradual process, may be said to have been the second and third decades of the seventeenth century. One of the factors which hastened the change proceeded directly from the revolution. During those years the whole country population had been scattered. This was partly the result of the reaction after the reigns of Theodore and Boris. The central authority weak, the *boyárs* indulged in an orgy of enslaving free labour by foul means, whereupon, during the three years of famine which heralded the revolution (1601-4), they found themselves in possession of more mouths than they could feed and were forced to liberate their serfs, often incurring severe loss of personal property in the process. It was also the result of the general chaos of those years, when all who found their obligations irksome took the opportunity to disown them and decamped. One of the first duties of the new régime was therefore to make a census and inventory of the living resources of the State in order to fix the responsibility for the taxes and to secure their payment. It had to re-establish the village communities, bring back the fugitives, and restore to their freedom and to their obligations to the State those peasants who had renounced them.

This work was first undertaken in 1619, but it made very slow progress, and all the results in manuscript were destroyed by a great conflagration which visited Moscow in 1626. It was begun afresh in the next year, and finished in 1628. The general principle which guided the censors was 'Stay where you are'. Where the peasants were found, there they were inscribed and there they had to remain. Complication was introduced by the fact that, wherever they were, the peasants already were almost all economically dependent on the landlords, with whom they had made contracts (*krépost*, lit. 'a

security'), which gave the landlord the right to their labour, if not yet to their bodies. These contracts took a number of forms, according to the various conditions which attached to them. The formulae contained in them, however, gradually changed till they came unmistakably to imply that the peasant, for economic reasons, had forfeited his right of changing his employer, and that first of all he himself, and then his family and his descendants, had become the chattels of the landlord. Thus the peasant was pinned down to one place by the government census, bound over to a master by his own contract and his economic dependence, and finally crushed by the quantum of forced labour which the landlord chose to demand from him in return for the use of a portion of his land. Thus both the government and the landlords *cherchaient l'homme*.. The latter wanted his labour, the former his money. During the reign of Michael the *boyárs* were in such a strong position that they carried the day. This fact was expressed in the ultimate outcome of the whole process, which was that peasants, after they had lost the last vestiges of their independence and become merged with the serfs, became the absolute and hereditary property of their landlords, but, in return for this, the landlords were made collectively responsible for the collection of the taxes which the peasants as tillers of the soil owed the State. Thus was legalized the baneful state of serfdom known in Russia as the 'law' or 'right of security' (*krepostnóe právo*), that is, control over the destinies of an object, the object in this case being the body of another man and those of his wife and children, and eventually all his belongings. Thereby also the aim of the government to demarcate society into as few, as large, and as unalterable compartments as possible was promoted: the various kinds of labourers, domestic serfs, peasants, voluntary slaves (*zakládchiki*), and others were all rolled into one huge category.

Although all these important and eventually disastrous developments were given their legal and political form only at this late date (during the years 1620-50), the effect was merely to legalize a state of things which was already informally existing and prevalent. For long the landlords had used their serfs (*kholópy*) to plough their land, while the 'free' peasants (*krestyáne*) under contract often performed household duties; each class did the work of the other, and both served the same master, with the result that their status became identical. It is true that even after this date there were certain technical differences which preserved the personality of the 'secured peasant' (*krepstnói krestyanín*) before the law, and distinguished him from the slave (*khólóp*), but these were in practice speedily effaced. This, then, was the manner in which the *boyárs* achieved their second object, the abrogation of the freedom of labour. This was the present which the Románovs had to make to their most formidable electors, the nobles, for their support, which was bought at the expense of the people.

The results of the enslavement of labour were calamitous. Specious order and prosperity were restored, but they had no reality and no foundation. Secure, as they thought, in their persons and in their pockets, the landowners, far from devoting themselves to works of public utility, became immersed in the sordid and degrading occupation of exploiting the labour for which they did not need to pay. They found their whole energy engaged in preventing the escape of their serfs and in disputing their possession with their neighbours. The only object of the landlords being to extract as much as possible, and that of the serfs being to give as little as possible, abuse of power and evasion of duty became the order of the day. The landlords had no incentive to thrift, the peasants no incentive to work. The landlords had no inducement to study domestic or rural economy, the peasants had no inducement to study

honesty or the rights of property. Fraud became the guiding principle in the relations between capital and labour. The one object of both master and servant was to cheat each other. Meanwhile the State, having simplified the structure of society by thus reducing the variety of the elements of which it was composed, achieved a semblance of well-being.

But the revolution had ploughed, however lightly, the popular consciousness, the seeds of discontent had been sown, and the result was a series of periodic disturbances and outbreaks, the expression of class-hatred, which were a new phenomenon in Russian life, and during this century caused the government grave loss and embarrassment.

External Affairs

As regards foreign policy the general tendency during the reign of Michael was 'go slow'. This was not from choice but from necessity. Russia had suffered a severe loss of prestige as a result of the revolution, but the financial situation was so deplorable that, however galling such a course was, foreign adventures and projects of revenge had to be rigorously postponed or reduced to the most modest dimensions. Poland was still the arch-enemy. Russians could neither forget nor forgive the fact that Moscow had been profaned by Polish occupation, that the Poles had treated them like dirt. But Poland was still very formidable.

Russia had, however, lost something more tangible than prestige, namely, territory. Ever since the consummation of Great Russia by Ivan III and his son Basil (cf. pp. 89-94), the aims of Russian foreign policy had become focused on two main objects. The first was to unite politically the various elements of the Russian race, to bring the Russian populations and the Russian lands of the basin of the Dnieper under the same rule as those of the basin of the Volga, to bring west (or

'White') Russia and south-west (or 'Little') Russia under the control of Moscow and Great Russia. The second was to extend the political rule of Moscow to the geographical limits of the Russian plain, to make the coasts of the Baltic and of the Black Seas the frontiers of the State. The two objects were, in a sense, complementary, because the larger the purely inland State of Russia became, the more urgently would it need free commercial outlets and inlets on the sea-coast. The attainment of the first object was largely on the sentimental ground of desire for the reunion of those of the same race and religion who were separated by political accident, though the material advantages to Moscow of this reunion were obvious. The attainment of the second object was desired purely on utilitarian grounds, regardless of the fact that it violated the principle which animated the first and could not be gained without bringing large populations of alien race under Russian rule. What concerned contemporary Russia more was the fact that the achievement of the first object could not be attained without conflict with Poland, or that of the second without conflict with Sweden and Turkey.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century already the Russians had won their way to the Baltic, or rather to the Gulf of Finland, one of its arms. Here they occupied the towns of Yam¹ or Yamburg, Kopórie,² Koréla³ (or Keksholm⁴), and Ivan-gorod.¹ All these places were lost to the Poles by Ivan IV in his unsuccessful war against King Stephen Batory (cf. p. 129), but were recovered again in the reign of his successor Theodore. During the revolution the Swedes pushed in these Russian outposts and

¹ Yem or Yam (*Em* in Russian) was the name of a Finnish tribe.

² A town on the western shore of Lake Ládoga.

³ The name of a Finnish tribe from which is derived the name of the district: Carelia.

⁴ Cf. p. 128.

⁵ = 'John-town'.

took possession of all these places with the addition of Oréshck¹ (or Schlüsselburg), situated at the point where the Nevá flows out of Lake Ládoga. These losses the first *tsar* of the new dynasty had the painful duty of confirming at the Treaty of Stólbovo² in 1617. A similar fate befell the two westernmost districts of Great Russia—Smolénsk, the much-disputed city on the Dnieper, the half-way house between Moscow and Warsaw, and Séversk, the border-province between Great Russia and south-west Russia. These had been recovered by Basil, who thereby extended the boundaries of Moscow to the river Dnieper, but were lost again to Poland during the revolution. It was against Poland that Russia's principal efforts, such as they were, were directed during the reign of Michael. Poland stood to Russia in much the same relation as Spain to France at this period. Unfortunately Michael was no Henri IV. In 1615 a conference was held at Smolénsk to regularize the relations between the two countries. This was necessary because, until peace was formally made, the Poles continued to subsidize and instigate the Cossacks against Moscow. But Ladislás still claimed the title of *tsar*, and so agreement was impossible.

In 1618 war was renewed. The Poles, under Ladislás and Chodkiewicz, took Vyázma and Dorogobúzh, but failed before Kalúga and Mozháisk. Ladislás thereupon decided to march on Moscow. Michael, supported by the national assembly, decided to make every effort to continue the struggle. The Poles actually reached Túshino, but an attack made thence on Moscow itself failed. Then another conference was proposed. This met at Deúlino³ in 1618, near St. Sergius's monastery of the Trinity, sixty miles north of Moscow, which had withstood

¹ *Orékb* in Russian means *walnut-tree*; its Swedish name was Nöteborg (*nöt* in Swedish = *nut*, *borg* = *burg*).

² A village to the south of Lake Ládoga.

³ Known in Polish as Dywilino.

two Polish sieges. As a result a truce of 14½ years was concluded, Poland retained the districts of Smolénsk and Séversk, and Ladislav the title of *tsar*, but he agreed to an exchange of prisoners, amongst whom was Michael's father Philaret (cf. p. 159). The truce notwithstanding, hostilities nearly broke out again in 1621, when Turkey and Sweden proposed to join Russia in a war against Poland. Michael was willing, and preparations had begun when news arrived that Turkey had already been put out of action.

In 1632 occurred the death of Sigismund III, King of Poland. This was followed by another war between Russia and Poland, which proved calamitous and ruinous for the former. At first successful, the Russian forces under Shéin and Izmaïlov were held up eight months before Smolénsk. Ladislav, now King of Poland, attacked them there, cut them off, and forced them to capitulate. His progress, however, was arrested at Bély, and at a conference held by the river Polyánovka in 1634 peace was definitely made. The conditions of Deúliño (1618) were confirmed, but Ladislav renounced all claim to the throne of Moscow and agreed to recognize the Grand Duke of Moscow as *tsar*.

To the south activity was renewed only after a long period of enforced quiescence. From 1636 onwards the zone of occupation was gradually extended southward by the constant building of fresh fortified posts connected with one another by ramparts and palisades; it was about this time that the towns of Tambóv and Orël were founded, amongst many others.

In 1637 occurred an event which was illustrative of Russia's plight at this epoch. The coastal regions of the Black Sea and of its arm, the Sea of Azóv, formed at this period part of the Ottoman Empire. The fortress of Azóv, situated at the point where the river Don enters the Sea of Azóv, was a natural strategic key, as its possessors controlled the water communica-

tion between central Russia and the Black Sea. It was held by a Turkish garrison. In the year 1637 a force of 4,000 Don Cossacks captured it by surprise and offered it to the *tsar*. The national assembly was summoned, and was asked whether it would sanction war with Turkey and with the Tartars of the Crimea for the sake of Azóv. The assembly decided that the Cossacks' offer must be declined, as there was no money wherewith to wage war and no prospect of obtaining sufficient for the purpose.

The Reign of Alexis (1645-76).

Internal Affairs

Michael died in 1645 at the age of forty-eight, without ever having made any personal or public mark. Elected for his harmlessness, he had justified the opinion of his electors. He was succeeded by his son Alexis, at that time aged sixteen, whose mother was Eudoxia, of the family of Stréshnev. Two independent witnesses have given accounts of his accession. These are Olearius, an emissary of Holstein who visited Moscow twice during this period, and afterwards compiled a description of the country, and Kotoshíkhin, a clerk in the Russian Foreign Office, who fled from Moscow in 1664, made good his escape to Sweden, and there compiled an invaluable account of Russia in the reign of Alexis. Both writers affirm that this *tsar* was unanimously elected to the throne on the death of his father by representatives of all classes of the community. Kotoshíkhin adds that, as he was known to be of a mild disposition, no written guarantee was demanded of him and he was allowed to style himself 'autocrat' and to act as one. Contemporary conjecture was right. Alexis proved to be a just and lenient ruler, with considerably more character and intelligence than his father. He was a

thinker, and he had a strong sense of his responsibility and of his public duty, but he lacked courage, energy, and initiative: he preferred to follow the line of least resistance, and had a weakness for compromise. His most remarkable personal characteristics were a determination to insist on the recognition of his power as absolute autocrat combined with an extreme piety which he allowed to temper the manifestations of his prerogative. He was the most normal, human, and civilized ruler that Russia had yet had. His companion and tutor from early childhood was the *boyár* B. I. Morózov, who was one of the first Russian grandees to be imbued with a passion for Western civilization. Subsequently Morózov became the *tsar's* favourite, and proved a skilful diplomat and man of affairs. The connexion between them was made closer by their marrying two sisters of the Miloslávski family. One of the features of the new régime had been the displacement of the old serried caste of families, who had had an hereditary monopoly of the government, by individuals of comparatively mushroom origin and reputation who wielded great personal influence over the ruler and came to be known as '*vremenshchiki*', which may be translated 'men of the hour', or 'temporaries' (*vrémya* = time). Such a one was Morózov, and it was he who guided Russia's destinies during the first part of the reign of Alexis.

The reign was full of important events, and witnessed many changes. Its outstanding features were: (1) a series of alarming popular disturbances, born of the profound discontent and misery of the people; (2) the codification of the laws, a measure made urgent by these disturbances and by the new social conditions; (3) the intensive penetration of Russia by Western influence; (4) the introduction of reforms, especially military and ecclesiastical; the latter resulting in (5) the great schism in the Russian Church, which was caused by the introduction of ecclesiastical reforms; and (6) the partial liquidation of the

quarrel with Poland and the annexation of Kiev and of Little Russia east of the Dnieper.

Most troubles in Russia at this time had a financial origin. Economically, the position in the seventeenth century was far more difficult than it had been in the sixteenth. The wars were waged on a still more extensive scale and against still better equipped enemies than formerly, while, on the whole, the country was less prosperous and less loyal than before. The new dynasty had not taken root in the affections of the people, while the rigorous stratification of society and the enforcement of serfdom had resulted in the estrangement and mutual distrust of classes, in the enrichment and demoralization of the landowners, in the impoverishment and demoralization of the labourers, and in the general exasperation of the whole proletariat. But the spirit of criticism which was thus generated was not confined to the lower classes. It infected those few of the aristocracy and the bureaucracy whose intelligence was able to perceive the need for reform and whose conscience was not deaf to the prevalent abuses, and produced a number of men who were the forerunners of Peter the Great and his circle.

The revolution had interrupted the old tradition and undermined the popular faith in the stability and efficacy of the government. Even the most obtuse official minds were aware that new methods must be substituted for old. The difficulty of meeting the expenses of government was in itself a sufficient proof. At the same time the collective official mind was extremely averse to any radical measures of reform, and it was decided to repair the old edifice in the hope that reconstruction might be avoided. The whole of the reign of Michael had been spent in legislating on all manner of subjects. Under Alexis a new codification was undertaken (the last having been made in 1550), to include all these new laws and all the old ones which had not been superseded. It so happened that in

June 1648 grave popular disturbances broke out in Moscow and found an echo in many other towns. These were the result of oppression by the *boyárs*, whom the new dynasty, owing to its equivocal position, was powerless to hold in check, and were the expression of general anti-governmental and anti-dynastic unrest. The effect of this outbreak was to make the projected codification a more urgent matter and at the same time one of wider scope. The representatives of the people, the *zémski sobór*, were summoned to Moscow to deliberate and advise on the work of compilation and codification. But the wish to accomplish the task rapidly and thereby to anticipate any further disturbances had a deleterious effect on the quality of the work. The summons was issued on July 16, 1648; the deputies assembled in Moscow by September 1; by October 3 the commission which had been entrusted with the work had finished nearly half the code (12 chapters out of the 25 of which it ultimately consisted), and the *tsar* and the *dúma* began to go through it. The elected representatives of the people influenced the work by consultations with the commission, which consisted of permanent officials from the ministries, by the presentation of petitions to the *dúma*, and also by collective consultation with the *tsar* and the *dúma* regarding the decision of particular points. The whole code was completed by January 1649 and immediately promulgated. This code, ratifying and embodying as it did the results of all the new legislation of the preceding thirty-five years, was as it were the mature expression of the ideas of government of the new régime, and remained in force until 1833. Although its value as regards technique was impaired by the haste with which it was compiled and by the occasional character of many of its enactments, it was nevertheless a much more serious and compendious work than its predecessors. However, while it undoubtedly infused order and uniformity into the administration of the

law, it failed to conjure the alarming social unrest which was a feature of the time. In 1650 risings occurred in Pskov and in Nóvgorod. In 1662 there took place in Moscow a much more serious affair, known as the revolt of July. In 1656 the government, in order to meet its financial difficulties, had begun to issue copper money with the forced value of silver. All went well until the multiplication of sudden fortunes in unexpected quarters convinced the people that those in charge of the operation were themselves buying copper and having it minted. High personages, including the *tsar's* father-in-law, were implicated. A mob issued forth, and meeting the *tsar* in person, then in summer residence at Kolómenskoe, near Moscow, began to threaten him unless he gave up the culprits. Thereupon the bodyguard of *stréltsy* (lit. 'shooters') was summoned, the mob was fired on and a veritable terror followed, thousands of innocent people being executed, expropriated, and exiled. Finally, in 1670-1, there was the rebellion known as that of Sténko¹ Rázin, its leader. This originated amongst the Don Cossacks, spread to the lower Volga, and rapidly developed into a campaign of all the discontented elements in south-eastern Russia against the authority of Moscow. Rázin acquired popularity by the liberality with which he distributed his plunder, and mustered under his banner, besides the Cossacks and other potential brigands of the neighbourhood, all the riverain cities of the Volga and the alien nationalities, Finnish and Tartar, who dwelt on both sides of the Volga and were not yet reconciled to Russian rule. The revolt spread as far as Nízhni Nóvgorod, but was eventually quelled by the defeat of its ringleader near Simbírsk.

¹ The diminutive of Stepan = Stephen.

Western Influence

One of the most momentous developments of the reign of Alexis was the change which took place during it in the relation between Russia and the rest of Europe. In the sixteenth century there had merely been surface contact between Russia and her Western neighbours. Moscow was then completely self-sufficient both mentally and materially. After the revolution things were different. The more intelligent minds in Moscow began unwillingly to admit that Russia could not successfully face the immense and complicated problems of the seventeenth century, especially those of foreign policy, with exactly the same equipment, mental and material, which had sufficed her in the fifteenth century. Byzantium, whom a cynical fate had appointed to be the senile and inadequate nurse of the youngest and most backward child in the European family, was of less use than ever since the Turkish conquest. Russia, now arriving at years of discretion, began to perceive that her difficulties could not be solved by merely asserting that Moscow was the third, final, and perfect Rome, and that this was the end of the matter, as she had done for the last 200 years. The only quarter whence help, at any rate of a material kind, could come was central and western Europe, and thus it was that the door was opened, with extreme reluctance and misgiving, to European influence. In the reign of Michael it had been a negligible trickle; in that of Alexis it was a measurable stream. The first evidences of this influence were seen in the satisfaction of the most elementary requirements of the State, those of self-defence. It began in the reign of Michael with the hiring of foreign mercenaries, officers, and soldiers, of whom a number, notably Scotsmen, were at large in Europe after the 'Thirty Years' War and ready for further adventures; it went on with the formation for the first time

of a regular and permanent Russian army with infantry and artillery, trained by these same foreigners, in place of the cavalry militia of the nobility of which it had hitherto almost wholly consisted ; it ended, as a natural consequence, with the establishment in Russia itself of foundries and arsenals to maintain the equipment of this force independently of the precarious and costly supplies from abroad. Expeditions were dispatched to discover deposits of ore in various parts of Russia ; in 1626 the English engineer Bulmer was given permission to carry on investigations with this object ; in 1632 the Dutchman Vinus established a factory at Túla, which ultimately became the Russian Sheffield ; in 1634 a number of German skilled workmen were imported ; in 1644 other iron-foundries were started in the basin of the upper Volga. Thoughts were also turned towards the establishment of a mercantile marine, but with Archangel the only Russian port the idea did not prosper. But the government did at last begin to realize that the country possessed sources of wealth which could be developed with advantage to the exchequer. Hitherto its financial policy had consisted solely in magnifying the burden of taxation without doing anything to increase the productivity of the land or of the people, regardless of the misery and discontent which the incessant multiplication of levies and taxes produced.

While Western science proved its value to the State in the stern realms of engineering and metallurgy, Western influence began to penetrate the homes of the good people of Moscow by introducing to them some of the amenities of life of which they had till then known nothing. The natural intermediary between Russia and Western civilization was the foreign colony in Moscow. This was known as the *Nemétskaya*¹ *Slobodá*, i. e.

¹ *Némets* (masc.), *némka* (fem.), *némtsy* (plur.), derived from *nemói* = dumb, is the name by which the Germans of all descriptions, from the Baltic

the German Suburb, doubtless because the majority of its inhabitants were Germans. Already in the previous century it had been segregated outside the city on the rivulet Yáuza, but in the revolution it had been swept away. In the reign of Michael its members returned, but began to settle down and even to build churches anywhere within the city. This proved an offence to the Orthodox conscience and discipline ; in 1643 the churches were removed beyond the cincture, and in 1652 the whole colony was again relegated to its old home on the Yáuza and confined there. The manner of life of these foreigners could not but influence that of the natives by the direct method. At first it was a question of purely utilitarian innovations such as furniture, clothes, carriages, and clocks ; but later the products of musical, pictorial, and theatrical art began to find their way to the comparatively broad-minded court of Alexis and the homes of the more receptive members of the Moscow aristocracy. *Tsar Alexis* actually had a theatre built at Preobrazhénskoe¹ near Moscow, and the first *régisseur* was a Lutheran pastor from the German colony, the troupe consisting of foreign amateurs.

At the same time the more reflective minds began to realize that Moscow needed an increase of intellectual nourishment as well as of material comfort. Schools did not exist : what schooling was given was entirely private, haphazard, and piecemeal. This neglect of education made itself felt most acutely in the spheres of diplomacy and of religious controversy. While the purveyors of technique were of Germanic origin, it was Kiev which provided Moscow with mental préceptors. The reasons for this were religious. Western and south-western

to the Adriatic, have from immemorial times been known to all Slavs ; the term was often stretched to include European foreigners in general.

¹ Sc. Selo (= village) ; this word means *of the Transfiguration*, the name of the local church which gave its name to the village.

Russia, with Kiev as its centre, was still almost entirely in Polish possession, while its population, except the aristocratic land-owning class which was Polish or had become polonized, was purely Russian and of the Orthodox faith. Exposed to the missionary activity of the Jesuits, and at the same time profiting by knowledge and experience of their methods; goaded by the zeal of their flocks for the Orthodox faith, and fearing for their own ultimate security as a religious body, the Orthodox hierarchy of south-west Russia had been stimulated to intellectual activity. In defence of their faith they adopted the weapons of their opponents and began to educate themselves and provide for the education of their co-religionists. In this way the intellectual awakening of Russia may be said to have begun outside its political confines, namely, in Little Russia and White Russia. In 1633 Peter Mogila, Orthodox Bishop of Kiev, founded an academy in that city for the study of the classical languages, of theology, philosophy, and rhetoric.

It was to this quarter that Moscow turned in its search for spiritual nourishment. The lead was given by the government itself, which in 1650 invited an erudite monk, by name Slavinétski, and two others from Kiev to Moscow in order to carry out a complete translation of the Bible from Greek into Slavonic,¹ which had never been done hitherto.

Another scholar of west Russian origin who achieved fame as a pedagogue was Simeon Pólotski,² under whose direction a miniature school was formed in one of the monasteries in Moscow in 1665; he also acted as tutor to *tsar* Alexis's two

¹ Slavonic, or Church-Slavonic, the language of the Orthodox Church in Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, is essentially the same as Old Bulgarian; it has, however, inevitably become coloured by the vernacular of each country where it is used, so that Russian Church-Slavonic is really Old Bulgarian with a Russian flavour.

² Pólotsk is a very ancient Russian town on the western Dviná.

sons by his first wife, Theodore and Ivan. At court there was a whole coterie of men who took a more or less serious interest in the spread of learning, and were sufficiently enlightened to appreciate the spiritual as well as the material value of western civilization. Such men were the *tsar's* three successive foreign ministers, his old tutor and wife's brother-in-law B. I. Morózov, the skilful diplomat, A. L. Ordín-Nashchókin, a native of Pskov, and A. S. Matvéev, who was the uncle of the *tsar's* second wife, Natalia Narýshkina, married a Scotswoman, and was the first Russian to start anything in the nature of a *salon*. But the most notable was a man who held no official position, Th. M. Rtishchev, a contemporary and close personal friend of the *tsar*. He was a truly remarkable man for his time and surroundings, with a passion for learning and an absolute disregard of worldly success. This scholar-saint devoted his life and his fortune to education, and the relatively small success with which he met proved what a wilderness he had to work in. He founded near Moscow a monastery which he filled with thirty learned monks from Little Russia, whose duty it was to translate learned books into Russian and teach the humanities to any who should wish to learn; and he was himself one of their most assiduous pupils.

The Great Schism in the Russian Church

But barely had the movement of reform began to gather pace when the inevitable reaction set in. The products of science and art were recognized by the Orthodox Church in general only in so far as they promoted an understanding of its dogma. Knowledge which did not directly serve this end, the study of lay subjects and indulgence in all the amenities of life, was regarded as useless and superfluous and was even discouraged as being potentially subversive. When it was realized that the learning of Greek and Latin, especially the

latter, and other profane studies, were positively encouraged by laymen in authority, the most profound misgiving was aroused in devout circles, which in Moscow in those days meant the whole people from top to bottom. This feeling ultimately led to the great schism which at this time rent the hitherto united Russian Church. The schism was actually caused by the decision of the government, at the instigation of Nikon, appointed Patriarch in 1652, one of the most remarkable figures in Russian history, to carry out a revision of the liturgical books of the Russian Church, and to purge them of the mistakes which had gradually crept into them through the imperfect copying of manuscripts, and had then been multiplied, perpetuated, and disseminated all over Russia after the introduction of printing in 1552. But as a matter of fact that was only a peg, and the movement was really the expression by the mass of the more ignorant of the people of their mistrust and hatred of the innovations introduced by the government.

The views held by Russians about their own Church were narrow and fanatical, but perfectly natural and intelligible. They had received Christianity from Byzantium; their missionaries and all their early bishops had been Greeks; Constantinople had been to Russia what Rome was to the rest of Europe. But the Greeks never enjoyed in Russia either popularity or respect. In Russian a Greek and a rogue were synonymous. For this the Greeks themselves were to blame. Russia in the early centuries was a rich, credulous, and helpless proselyte. The Greek prelates sent from Byzantium to watch over the spiritual destinies of the new flock in barbarous Scythia were not men of great character, and were more interested in shearing its wool than in the cure of its soul. Moreover, though they may not have been such profound thinkers or such acute dialecticians as the Greeks, the Russians took Christianity far more seriously. From the very first the Orthodox faith seems to

have impregnated the Russians far more deeply than any of the Balkan nationalities. Even to-day it is far more vital to the mass of Russians than it is, or than it has for long been, to Greeks, Rumanians, Serbians, or Bulgarians. In the Middle Ages and in the seventeenth century in Russia the whole people may be said to have lived exclusively in and for their Church. Meanwhile, their faith in their spiritual teachers received one shock after another. Their position resembled that in which English people sometimes find themselves, when they have lost respect for their vicar but have not the power to turn him out. Notably at the council of Florence in 1439 the Greeks accepted the union with Rome and sent their Metropolitan Isidor to try and foist it on Moscow, which 'diabolical scheme' the Grand Duke Vasili Vasilevich happily frustrated. Finally, in 1453, Constantinople fell before the infidel. The Greek halo was broken, and the rôles began to be reversed. Russia emerged from Muhammadan bondage just as the Greeks succumbed to it, and it was natural that after what they considered the defection of Rome and the eclipse of Constantinople the people of Moscow should come to look on their city as the ultimate and the unique repository of the true faith. The creation of the Russian patriarchate in 1589 (cf. p. 137) completely and finally emancipated the Russian Church from Constantinople, and thenceforward for many years the bonds which united them were purely formal. The Greek community became, as it were, Russia's poor relations, and their prelates came to Moscow no longer to levy tribute but to crave for alms. Thus the Russians, losing sight of the universal Church, became possessed of the idea of a particularist national Church; they also became convinced that not only was their particular form of faith the only true one, but also that their forms of ceremonial and liturgy were the only correct ones, that their religion was outwardly as well as inwardly

infallible and incapable of improvement. They did not consider that they had anything to learn from the Greeks or anything to gain from a study of Greek. As for Latin, Polish, geography and geometry and such things, their study was regarded as positively dangerous. This was the general feeling of the masses, including the more ignorant of the clergy. The necessity of reforms was realized by only a very limited number of men, but as these happened to be the men in power their introduction became ever more extensive. While they were confined to purely utilitarian ends, such as the domains of military equipment, mining, and engineering, they were tolerated, though the influence of the heretic Lutherans in these spheres was profoundly deprecated. But when they spread to the realm of spiritual equipment and ritual the situation became far more difficult.

The heads of the Russian Church realized the need of reform in their own province just as much as the heads of the government realized it in theirs. At this time Russia was about to make war with Poland in order to settle accounts long overdue and reunite with Great Russia the purely Russian districts of western or White Russia and south-western or Little Russia. The quarrel with Poland, besides being political, was also, if indeed not mainly, religious, inasmuch as the Russian subjects of the Polish State who were being coerced into union with Rome were of the Orthodox faith. The Russian Church, faced with the exigencies of supporting this crusade against Latinism, found itself obliged to furbish its intellectual weapons just as the State had been forced to furbish its artillery. As the State had recourse to Lutheran engineers, so the Church had recourse to Greek theologians and to the Russian scholars of Kiev. Intercourse with Kiev and Constantinople was revived, the visits of Greek dignitaries to Moscow were encouraged, and their advice and opinion solicited. A strong movement

was set on foot in high ecclesiastical circles for the closer union of the Greek and Russian Churches, to be symbolized by the standardization of their ritual, and for the re-establishment of the 'universal' Orthodox Church as a single whole. It was at this moment, in 1652, that Nikon became Patriarch of the Russian Church. He flung himself heart and soul into the new movement, but unfortunately he had less intelligence than energy. He identified himself with the Greeks and adopted their point of view—that the Russian priesthood in general was appallingly ignorant, and that the errors of formula and idiosyncrasies of ritual which had crept into the liturgy must be forcibly eradicated. Inasmuch as the textual errors had become sanctified by antiquity, and to tell a Russian he does not know how to pray is like telling a gunner he does not know how to shoot, these aspersions and suggested innovations evoked deep resentment. Nikon was one of those reformers who with the minimum of necessity arouse the maximum of opposition. The autocratic and tactless manner in which he enforced his reforms caused a schism. At first confined to the hierarchy, it spread to the laymen and ended in the formation of the community of the Old Believers.¹ These held not only that the Russian faith was incapable of improvement, but also that it was the Greeks who ought to come to Russia, rather than the Russians to the Greeks, for spiritual guidance; and, as the reforms were being forced on them with the connivance of 'foreigners', they fancied the whole scheme was a disguised plot to subject Russia to the Pope and to open the way to the Jesuits. As their name implied, they considered that not they, but the innovators, from the Patriarch downwards, were the schismatics. Thanks to the uncompromising character of Nikon the dispute, from being one of texts and ritual, became one of hierarchical discipline

¹ *Staróvétsy*, from *stáraya véra*, the old belief.

Eventually the Patriarch carried the day, but at the cost of the unity of the Russian Church, and the position was regularized when in 1667 the Old Believers, with the Protopóp¹ Habbakuk at their head, were definitely excommunicated.

The *tsar*, over whom Nikon exercised considerable influence until he fell out with him and was deprived of his office and disgraced, and the mass of society, including the official circles, stood on one side during this tumult, which by its nature concerned the hierarchy most closely. If anything, their sympathies were with the upholders of the old tradition, though their sense of decorum and their horror of insubordination naturally compelled them to support the supreme ecclesiastical authorities.² The effects of this commotion were just the opposite of what those who took part in it expected. The evidence which it gave of what harm could be caused by blind adherence to the old order of things only added impetus to the movement for reform in general; at the same time, owing to its obvious incompetence in its own domain, the authority of the Church was lowered and its political influence lessened, whereby one of the greatest obstacles to the penetration of Western influence was removed.

External Affairs in the Reign of Alexis. The Question of Little Russia or the Ukraine

Russian foreign policy in the reign of Alexis followed two different lines. For the first twenty years, when Morózov was Foreign Minister, it was directed above all against Poland, while during the last ten, under the able guidance of Ordín-Nashchókin, conciliation with Poland was aimed at. By

¹ = 'Arch-priest', a rank slightly higher than that of the ordinary priest (*pop*), lit. 'first priest'.

² Based on Klyuchévski.

continuing the secular struggle against Poland Russia consistently pursued the traditional aim of recovering Russian lands which were still in non-Russian possession, an aim which was religious and sentimental as well as political. But whereas hitherto it had been especially western Russia, Smolénsk with the upper basin of the Dnieper and Séversk with the basin of the Desná (a tributary of the Dnieper), which had been envisaged, the field of ambition and of operations was now extended southward, and the whole question as between Russia and Poland was made infinitely more complex by the inclusion within it of Kiev and south-west or Little Russia. This made what had been a duel into a triangular struggle, an increase of dimension for which Moscow was neither mentally nor materially prepared. The extremely complicated question of Little Russia may be said to have been definitely opened, as far as Moscow was concerned, in 1654 by the offer of its inhabitants, in revolt against their Polish masters, to place themselves under the protection of *tsar* Alexis. The problem of Little Russia had been brewing for many years, but it need never have achieved such importance and would never have become so tangled were it not for the peculiar geographical position and complicated history of the country and the wayward character of its motley population. Geographically, 'Little Russia'¹ in those days comprised the lower basin of the Dnieper from Chernígov, on the Desná, one of its tributaries, and from Kiev southwards, and stretched as far west as the southern or Black Sea Buh; it thus occupied a pivotal position between Russia and Poland and the Ottoman Empire. In itself the whole of this country, being situated largely in the fertile 'black earth' zone, was extremely rich; its surface had, so to say, barely been scratched for purposes of agriculture, though often enough ploughed

¹ In Polish always known as *Ukraina* = 'the Borderland', and now called in English *Ukraine*.

up by armies of invasion, and economically, therefore, it was a great prize to any possessor.

With the Tartar invasion and the consequent displacement of the Russian political centre of gravity north-eastwards, and the general dispersion of the population which simultaneously took place, the importance and prosperity of Little Russia declined (cf. pp. 85-9). It was then (in the thirteenth century) that there was formed the geographical, political, and ethnical entity which came later to be known as Great Russia,¹ so called because it was much greater in size than the other territorial and ethnical divisions of the Russian race. In the thirteenth century Lithuania conquered western and south-western Russia (the *whole* basin of the Dnieper), and in 1386 Poland and Lithuania were united. While they were under purely Lithuanian rule these Russian districts exercised a strong Russianizing influence on the Lithuanians² who had conquered them, doubtless because the Lithuanians were relatively few in number and were less civilized than the Russians. But from 1386 onwards Polish influence was introduced into those same districts, and being that of a stronger and more civilized people began to get the upper hand. It is important to remember, however, that the Polish nomenclature of these districts is

¹ *Rus' Velikaya* in Russian, *Rus' Wielka* in Polish; *Rus'* (a feminine collective noun) was the name by which Russia was from the tenth century known to its own inhabitants and to its neighbours. *Rossiya*, the modern name, was of much later formation and modelled on Latin names of countries. In Polish *Rusin* (pl. *Rusi*) means a native of Eastern Galicia, Ruthenia or Red Russia, and their language is called *ruski*; Poles call Great Russians *Rosjane* (sing. *Rosjanin*) and the (Great) Russian language *rosyjski*.

² The Lithuanians are of Aryan or Indo-European race, but not Slavs; they have, however, especially in language, more affinity with the Slavs than with other European races. Together with the Letts and the Prussians (the extinct aboriginal inhabitants of Prussia) they form the 'Baltic' group of languages and races (*baltas* in Lithuanian = *white*).

in some respects different from the Russian. The lower basin of the Dnieper and the district between the Dnieper and the southern or Black Sea Buh was never in Polish called 'Little Russia', but always *Ukraina*, which literally means *the Borderland*,¹ a name also used by the Russians, and, in one form or another, common to most Slavonic peoples.² The name 'Little Russia' (in Russian *Rus' Málaya* or *Maloróssiya*), which was used in Moscow from the fourteenth century onwards, was used by the Poles for the first time in the Treaty of Andrúsovo in 1667. The advantage of the term from the Russian and its disadvantage from the Polish point of view lay in its elasticity, though for that matter the term *Ukraina* was also in its essence extremely vague. The other Russian districts which were under Lithuanian rule at that time were known as Volýnia,³ which lay between the *Ukraina* and Poland proper; *Polésie*,⁴ which included the central basin of the Prípet; White Russia,⁵ the whole upper basin of the Dnieper and the Berézina; and Black Russia,⁶ which lay between the Berézina, the Prípet, and the Niemen. The district south of Volýnia, between the Dniester and the southern or Black Sea Buh, came to be known as Podolia,⁷ and its extension south-eastwards as *Pobereże*, which is a literal Russian translation of *Riviera* (*bereg* = bank); Galicia, otherwise known as Red Russia,⁸ and at a later date as Ruthenia, which lay between Volýnia and the Carpathians, had become Polish in 1340.

¹ *Kraj* = border or edge; *u* = along, by.

² Cf. the name of the Austrian province of Krain (known to us as Carniola), in Slovene *Kranjsko*; outlying portions of Bosnia and Serbia are also called *Kraina*. ³ In Russian *Volyn'*, in Polish *Wołyń*.

⁴ Lit. 'along the forests' (*les* = forest).

⁵ In Russian *Belorússiya* or *Rus' Bělaya*, in Polish *Ruś Biała*.

⁶ In Russian *Rus' Cbĕrnaya*, in Polish *Ruś Czarna*.

⁷ In Polish *Podole*, lit. 'along the valleys' (*dole* = valley).

⁸ In Russian *Rus' Cbervónnaya*, in Polish *Ruś Czerwona*.

The political arrangement arising from the personal union of Lithuania and Poland lasted from 1386 to 1572, the date of the death of the last king of the 'Jagiello'¹ dynasty, Sigismund II Augustus. During the fifteenth century an intensive Catholic propaganda was carried on for political purposes in Lithuania (i. e. West Russia) by the Polish government and hierarchy, which resulted in a reaction amongst the Orthodox Russian population and the defection of a number of petty princes in west Russia, with their lands, to Moscow (cf. pp. 88-9). In the sixteenth century the situation became very different. The reformation, in spite of the desperate opposition of the Polish priesthood, from the first made rapid progress both in Poland and in Lithuania; its tenets seemed especially to appeal to the landed aristocracy, headed in Lithuania by the magnate Nicholas Radziwiłł. The Lutheran and Calvinist movement, combined with the religious tolerance of both Sigismund I (1506-48) and Sigismund II Augustus (1548-72), acted as a check on the Catholic propaganda in Lithuania, and consequently the Orthodox population became reassured and the separatist movement ceased. By the middle of the sixteenth century the organization and administration of Lithuania had largely approximated to those of Poland. The political power, which had originally been in the hands of the great landowners, princes and *boyárs*, had gradually passed, in Lithuania as in Poland, to the much larger class of petty land-holders (*szlachta*) who formed the army and controlled the diets (*sejmy*). Administrative office, tenable for life and sometimes hereditary, and jurisdiction were in their hands. The towns, cut off from all connexion with the country and confined to purely urban activity, dwindled in importance, though endowed with the 'Law of Magdeburg',

¹ Cf. p. 87.

which had already been introduced into the towns of Poland in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by German colonists.

As Sigismund II had no heir, it became necessary to determine what should happen at his death, since technically only the person of the sovereign united Lithuania and Poland. With this object in January 1569 a diet (*sejm*) was convoked in Lublin. The petty nobility of Lithuania favoured a continuation of the union, hoping thus to raise their power to the level of their Polish colleagues, while the magnates, fearing this very development, were opposed to it. The king, however, gained the support of the two greatest of these latter, the Lithuanian Prince Alexander Czartoryski and the Russian Prince Constantine Ostrózhski (the owner of a large part of Little Russia, whose income was reputed to be a million sterling), who were the leaders of the Orthodox Lithuanian aristocracy. This settled the question, and it was decided to make the union of Poland and Lithuania permanent and absolute, dynasty or no dynasty. They became two halves of one state, and though they had a king, elective in character, a senate, consisting of the great dignitaries, spiritual and temporal, and a diet, consisting of the deputies of the petty nobility, in common, yet each half retained its own separate administration, army, and laws. The whole state, which was in appearance an elective monarchy, but in essence a republic, was termed the *Rzecz Pospolita*, the Polish equivalent of *res publica*, Poland being known as the 'Crown' (*Korona*) and Lithuania as the 'Principality' (*Księstwo*). At the same time the boundary between the two halves were changed, to the great advantage of Poland; Little or south-west Russia, i. e. Volýnia and *Ukraina*, was excluded from Lithuania and included in Poland.

This arrangement, which was known as the Union of Lublin, had the immediate effect of greatly enriching Poland, though it brought much trouble in its train. The enormous and fertile

tracts of Little Russia were thrown open to colonization and to speculation in land. The only inhabitants at this moment were the Cossacks, whose mode of life has been described (cf. p. 116); and the wholesale arrival of agricultural settlers, followed by land-grabbers, government officials, the introduction of serfdom, and other paraphernalia of civilization, was not at all to their liking. The southern limit of the *Ukraina* was quite undefined, and the farther south civilization marched the farther south the Cossacks extended their activities, which were of such a kind that eventually they threatened seriously to embroil Poland and Turkey, under whose sway the steppes¹ to the north of the Black Sea technically stood. The government of Warsaw in 1570 tried to turn a portion of the Cossacks into a regular government soldiery of so-called 'registered' Cossacks, compelling the others to resume peaceful and settled occupations, in the hope of thus making them more amenable and no less useful as a frontier police. They so far succeeded that a force of registered Cossacks was formed and gradually grew till in 1625 it reached 6,000, but the hope that the out-and-out Cossack would change his habits proved vain. Those who were not included in the register, but nevertheless were called up in thousands when the Polish government needed them, became a discontented and dangerous element; the wilder spirits went farther afield, and on the remote and inaccessible islands in the lower Dnieper, below the rapids (*porógi*; *poróg* lit. = 'threshold'), founded the famous freebooters' colony known as the *Zaporózhskaya Sech* or *Zaporózhie*.² Here, out of reach of the long but weak arm of the Polish administration, the Cossacks formed a lawless and joyous community which became the quintessence of Little Russia, the embodiment and symbol of the Cossack spirit, which was one of uncompromising opposi-

¹ 'Steppe' implies flat or undulating, treeless, grass-covered country.

² Lit. = 'the stockade beyond the rapids', *za* = 'beyond.'

tion to all authority. The *Sech* was a no man's land which was a magnet to all the discontented elements in the surrounding countries, and its business was to let out its armed services on hire to one neighbour in order to help him plunder another. Nominally Orthodox, these Cossacks were just as ready to exercise their art of robbery on Christians of any denomination as on Muhammadans. It was they whose services were engaged by the Poles in the war against Moscow in the Time of Troubles. In the seventeenth century the Poles were themselves to learn the quality of this many-edged weapon.

The reason for this was that the Dnieper Cossacks had really no nationality; they spoke a *langue russe à la polonaise, sauce Tartare*. Just as the Dnieper gathered its tributary waters from Poland, Lithuania, and west Russia, so Little Russia, geographically the middle basin of the Dnieper, collected stray ethnic elements from these and other countries, and the *Sech* was a sort of overflow from it, with the difference that it was still more composite, attracting recruits from the Muhammadan south as well as from the Christian north. It was a sort of international, anarchical, martial brotherhood, in which unanimity was ensured by the total exclusion of female society, with no laws except those of military discipline, no common object save the evasion of restraint, and no common ideal but the achievement of excess. It was this whimsical tool which was forced into the uncertain hands of the Russians in their next war with Poland by no less an agency than the Orthodox Church.

Revolts against the Polish authority began to take place in Little Russia as early as 1591, but at first these were of a purely social character, being risings of the peasants, supported by the Cossacks, against the Polish landlords. But in 1596 an event took place which gave them a different colouring. As a result of the Union of Lublin Catholic propaganda, headed

by the Jesuits, had been renewed in Lithuania and Little Russia with great success, and began seriously to undermine the position of the Orthodox clergy. To save this a portion of the latter agreed to the union of the Churches, accepting submission to the authority of the Pope and conformity to the rites of the Catholic Church, while retaining the use of the vernacular in the service and certain other local privileges. This was decided on at the Congress of Brest ¹ held in 1596.

The Orthodox community was thus divided; the nobles in a body and the majority of the bishops went over to Rome, while the towns, the mass of the peasants and a considerable number of priests, remained true to the Orthodox faith. It was under these conditions that the people of Little Russia made common cause with the Cossacks against the Poles, and that what had been merely the expression of economic discontent became a religious and national crusade.

The motives of the various parties were different, but they were united by their hatred of the Polish government, priests, and landlords, and of their agents the Jews. Consequently the numerous anti-Polish revolts in Little Russia during the first half of the seventeenth century began to acquire a political character. They were all unsuccessful and were crushed with great severity, coming to a temporary end in 1638, when the Polish government tried completely to suppress the Cossacks except those few whom it chose to maintain as a regular force. This policy, however, completely failed to allay the Little Russian Jack-in-the-box. The conditions became ever more complex; added to the varied antagonistic national and international, religious and economic interests which all had

¹ Sc. Brest Litóvsk (= Lithuanian Brest), in Polish *Brześć Litewski*, so called to distinguish it from *Brześć Kujawski*, a town in western Poland in the district of *Kujawy*, near Thorn.

a stake in the country, the Cossacks themselves were split up into half a dozen different categories and parties, each with its own axe to grind. After these ingredients had simmered another ten years a really big explosion occurred in 1648, which blew the Polish lid off the Little Russian box. This was the great rising under the Cossack chief, Bogdan¹ Chmielnicki.²

In anticipation of this result Kiev and Moscow had for some time been exchanging glances and even words; but both words and glances were so ambiguous that they eventually cost both partners very dear. The truth was that Russia, barely recovering from the revolution and still smarting from the effects of the unsuccessful war against Poland in 1632-4, was neither anxious nor yet able to undertake another campaign; at the same time the Little Russians were obviously a useful instrument to beat the Poles with, and failure to make use of them or absolute refusal of support to Chmielnicki might mean that Kiev and the Dnieper would pass for good and all into Polish, or, still worse, into Turkish possession. The Cossacks, as the people of Moscow knew to their cost, were capable of anything. Chmielnicki, for his part, kept invoking the help of the *tsar* and offering to place himself and all the Cossacks under his rule if only Moscow would join with the Cossacks in a concerted attack on Poland. As a matter of fact he really aimed at the autonomy of Little Russia under the rule of himself and the Cossacks, and under the protection of the *tsar*, while Moscow aimed at getting possession of Little Russia without the Cossacks. Chmielnicki, knowing that he and his Cossacks were not alone equal to the Poles, alternately cajoled and threatened the *tsar*, while the people of Moscow, anxious above all to avoid open rupture with Poland and to secure the reversion of Little Russia with the minimum of trouble,

¹ This name is the literal Russian translation of *Theodore*.

² This is the Polish spelling; in Russian it would be Khmelnitski.

alternately encouraged and discouraged Chmielnicki. The result proved disastrous for all parties concerned.

In his first campaign against Poland in 1648 Chmielnicki's success was unexpectedly rapid, and he found himself master of nearly the whole of Little Russia. The Poles were forced to make concessions and to recognize him as *hetman*.¹ If Moscow had then accepted his offer, proclaimed the annexation of Little Russia and declared war on Poland, the matter would have been settled; but a policy of interested expectation was preferred. Chmielnicki was forced to fight again alone against the Poles, and in the second and third campaigns, betrayed by his allies the Tartars, lost all he had won in the first.

At last, faced with the alternatives of accepting Chmielnicki and his Cossacks as Russian subjects or seeing them forced to place themselves under the protection of the Crimean Khan or the Turkish Sultan, Moscow in 1653 decided on the former course, and the following year war was declared against Poland. The same year (1654) Charles X of Sweden also went to war with the Poles, who thus found themselves in an apparently hopeless position with three enemies in as many quarters. While the Russians quickly took the whole of White Russia and other large tracts of Lithuania, including Vilna, Grodno, and Kovno, the Swedes overran Great and part of Little Poland,² capturing Posen, Cracow, and Warsaw. But Russia and Sweden then fell out over the division of the spoils. Peace was made with the Poles, who by the Treaty of Vilna, concluded in 1656, ceded

¹ Or *ataman*, supposed to be a corruption of the German word *baupmann*.

² These terms are misleading because, as a matter of fact, Little Poland (*Mało-Polska*) was much larger than Great Poland (*Wielko-Polska*): the latter was western Poland, the country round Posen; the former was originally merely the upper basin of the Vistula, with Cracow, and was in fact smaller, but had gradually grown till it stretched eastwards beyond the river Dnieper.

to Moscow all White Russia and Little Russia, and war was declared against Charles X. Thus the energy of Russia was suddenly diverted from the sentimental task of beating Poland and annexing Little Russia to the economic task of beating Sweden and reaching the Baltic—a diversion which proved fatal. It had, indeed, the negatively good result of preventing Charles X from establishing himself as King of Poland, which he was preparing to do, but it also gave Poland time in which to recover her strength. Chmielnicki, characteristically enough, wishing to ensure himself against a possible Russo-Polish understanding, had already begun to coquet with the Swedes and the Tartars. He died in 1657, but his successors continued this policy, and in 1659, with the help of the Tartars, defeated the Russians at Konotóp. This gave courage to the Poles, whom the stress of these years had united and endowed with unexpected strength, and they prepared to denounce the Treaty of Vilna, having already driven the Swedes out of their country and concluded with them the Peace of Oliva (1660). Russia now found herself surrounded by enemies as Poland had a few years previously been. War on three fronts was impossible, and it was decided to make peace with Sweden. The war with that country had been quite fruitless. The Truce of Valiesar ¹ (1659) gave Dórpát to Russia, but the Treaty of Kardis ² which finally terminated the war in 1661 restored this town to Sweden, and merely confirmed the old Treaty of Stólbovo (cf. p. 183), denying Russia all access, not only to the Baltic, but even to the Gulf of Finland.

The war which was now renewed between Poland and Russia proved disastrous to the latter. The affairs of Little Russia were by this time so involved that the Cossacks were rather a hindrance to Moscow than a help. Of their various factions each had a different object and pulled its own way till civil war ensued.

¹ On the river Narva.

² In Esthonia.

the west or right bank of the Dnieper siding with Poland, the east or left bank with Moscow. In the campaign against Poland the Russians suffered defeat and lost all that they had gained by the Treaty of Vilna. But by this time the economic position of both combatants was extremely serious. Riots broke out in Moscow, and the Poles rose against their king. Little Russia had been laid waste from end to end, the Cossacks had been embittered, and a large number of those on the right bank of the Dnieper placed themselves under the rule of the Sultan. Faced by this new danger, Russia and Poland decided to come to terms, and in 1667 concluded the Truce of Andrúsovo.¹ This was the first fruit of the new turn which Russian foreign policy took under the direction of Ordín-Nashchókin, who had succeeded Morózov, and it marked an epoch in the relations between Russia and Poland. By its stipulations Moscow gained important increases of territory, though seemingly little enough in proportion to the enormous and exhausting effort they had cost, namely the towns and districts of Smolénsk and Séversk and the whole of Little Russia east of the Dnieper as far as the rapids, with the city of Kiev and its environs as an *enclave* on the west bank; Kiev was ceded nominally only for two years, but as a matter of fact Poland never regained possession of it. These provisions were confirmed nineteen years later by the Treaty of Moscow (1686), by which 'permanent' peace was declared between Russia and Poland.

These events may be said to mark the turning-point in the relations between the two secular enemies. At this period they were about evenly matched; until now the strength of Poland had always grown, but from now it began rapidly to decline, while Russia, whose strength had been growing slowly and fitfully, underground, as it were, rather than visibly, thwarted in its natural development both by nature and by history, now

¹ A village south-west of Smolénsk; in Polish *Andruszowo*.

for the first time began to overtop Poland and to appear as the premier Slavonic power.

The Truce of Andrúsovo was, however, satisfactory to nobody. Moscow was exhausted, Poland weakened, and Little Russia divided, disappointed, and ruined. It is true that in-so far as it signified the first territorial gain made by Russia for virtually a hundred years it redounded to the credit of the new dynasty, but at the same time it brought Moscow face to face with more responsibilities and complexities, notably with the Ottoman Empire. It was about this time that, influenced by their crusade on behalf of the Orthodox Russians under Polish rule, the Russians also first began to think about the other Orthodox Slavs under Turkish rule. But this path, though inviting, was dangerous, because, while it was quite true that there were millions of Slav Christians in Turkey who were languishing under the Crescent, it was also incontrovertible that there were millions of Muḥammadans in south-eastern Russia pining under the shadow of the Cross. Hence, for the time being, nothing more explosive was conveyed to the oppressed co-religionists on either side than the expression of sympathy and remembrance.

The Truce of Andrúsovo and the Treaty of Moscow close a period in Russian foreign policy, which henceforward was based on alliance with Poland and directed against Sweden and Turkey. Unfortunately, varying circumstances compelled it to alternate between the two objectives, north and south, a vacillation which naturally prejudiced the speedy attainment of either. These agreements also marked the end of Russia's isolation and the beginning of its establishment as a factor to be reckoned with in European politics. The exchange of diplomatic missions with other countries during the reign of Alexis became general and uninterrupted; Sweden even established a permanent resident minister in Moscow. Ordín-Nashchókin, who was responsible for the Truce of Andrúsovo, may be said to have been Russia's

first real statesman. He designed the foreign policy which was followed in the next generation by Peter the Great. He was not only perspicacious but also high-minded. When the time came to restore Kiev to Poland according to the terms of the treaty, he proposed to do so, but this was too much even for the philanthropic, easy-going *tsar* Alexis, and Ordín-Nashchókin fell. He was succeeded as Foreign Minister by A. S. Matvéev, also a strong advocate of reform and admirer of Western ideas and civilization, whose niece, Natalia Narýshkina, became the *tsar's* second wife. By his first wife (Maria Miloslávskaya) *tsar* Alexis had had two sons—Theodore, born in 1662, and Ivan, born in 1666—and numerous daughters; by his second wife he had one son, Peter, born in 1672, and two daughters. In the continued absence of a law of succession, *tsar* Alexis settled this question in an off-hand and unconventional way: in September 1674, in the presence of the highest dignitaries of State and Church, and of the foreign envoys then in Moscow, he proclaimed his eldest son Theodore as his successor. Alexis died in 1676, at the age of forty-six. Theodore III was only fourteen at his accession, and was of extremely feeble constitution. During his reign desultory warfare continued with the Tartars of the Crimea, which was only terminated by the sterile Treaty of Bakhchi-sarai in 1681. The same year the question of the abolition of hereditary precedence (*méstnichestvo*, cf. p. 99) was raised. The *boyárs*, in alarm at the idea, which if carried out would undermine the foundation of their political power, proposed to divide the country into a number of vast satrapies, over each of which one of them should be placed as viceroy for life. This drastic and dangerous scheme of decentralization was actually sanctioned by the *tsar*, but the Patriarch was fortunately able to veto it, and the following year *méstnichestvo* was formally abolished, and the famous books of precedence were burnt. In April of the same year (1682) Theodore died at the age of twenty, and the question of the succession entered on a new and exciting phase.

Expansion Westwards

Peter the Great (1682–1725)

Youth, Adolescence, and Early Exploits

THERE were two candidates for the throne, Ivan and Peter, aged 16 and 10. Sons of different mothers, each was supported by his mother's relatives. Both parties, Miloslávskis and Narýshkins, had long anticipated the situation. Ivan had priority of birth in his favour, but he was, both in mind and body, a still poorer thing than his late brother. Peter had the advantage of physical vigour and of the prestige of his mother, the dowager-*tsarítsa* Natalia, who was still alive and technically the head of the family. The Patriarch Joachim and the *boyárskaya dúma* hastily summoned what they chose to call an 'assembly of the whole people' (*zémski sobór*) out of the streets of Moscow in the palace square. A majority of this body there and then expressed a preference for Peter. The Patriarch and the *boyárs* concurred in the choice, the matter was considered settled, and the Narýshkins had won the day. But they had reckoned without Ivan's sisters—six in number, and far more vigorous than their brother. The most determined was the *tsarévna* Sophia, who made up her mind to fight before resigning herself to her otherwise inevitable fate, the veil. By circulating rumours against her stepmother's family she secured the support of the *stréltsy* (the local militia of 'archers' on foot, who formed the permanent garrison of Moscow), and incited them to revolt. Although her allegations were refuted and the mob temporarily calmed by the appearance of the *tsarítsa* Natalia with both Ivan and Peter at the palace window, the tumult was renewed and continued until Sophia's object was

attained ; the *stréltsy* raided the palace, murdered several men of the Narýshkin family and party, and finally sent their leader, Prince Khovánski, to demand that both Ivan and Peter should reign together as *tsars* with equal power and with Sophia as regent. The *boyárs* agreed, and this settlement by violence of the vexed question of the succession was sanctioned by an act which pretended to represent the will of the whole people.

But disagreement soon broke out between Sophia and her soldier-friends. Their enemies were the same, but their aims were not. The *stréltsy* represented the party of reaction and of the Old Believers, while Sophia was an enthusiastic modernist. Considering the absolute seclusion in which women in Moscow had till then lived, she may be considered enlightened. She favoured the study of Latin and Polish, and though her intelligence was limited and her aspect forbidding, she had many friends, and was supported by the intellectuals of the day, such as the 'Latinists' Simeon Pólotski and Silvester Medvédev. Above all she was ambitious and quite unscrupulous and shameless. For their part the *stréltsy* and the extreme conservatives were scandalized at the supreme power being in the hands of a woman, in spite of proved Byzantine precedents. A movement against her was set on foot, and she, together with Ivan and Peter and the latter's mother, had to take refuge in St. Sergius's monastery of the Trinity. From there Sophia managed to deal with the insurgents. Khovánski and his son were waylaid and killed. The *stréltsy*, suddenly submissive, were given a new commander, Shaklovítý, a creature of Sophia ; and she returned to Moscow triumphant, resting on his support and on that of her other favourite, Prince Basil (Vasíli) Golítsyn, one of the most remarkable men of his time. He was well educated and well read himself, and was an urgent advocate of education for others, for reform, and for spreading the influence of Western civiliza-

tion. His house in Moscow, on European lines, and his library were famous. He inherited the ideas and continued the policy of Ordín-Nashchókin, but while the latter had been essentially a practical business man, and was thus the direct predecessor of Peter the Great, Golitsyn was more of a liberal idealist, premonitory of the 'philosophers' of the reign of Catherine. One of his plans was the liberation of the serfs. He was a keen student of Latin and Polish, and the work which he and Sophia undertook in collaboration was the formation of an alliance with Poland (then under King John Sobieski), Austria, and Venice against Turkey. This policy was confirmed by the Treaty of Moscow in 1686, but unfortunately failed in its execution. Golitsyn conducted two expeditions against the Crimea, then a dependency of Turkey, in 1687 and 1689, in conjunction with the Cossacks of Little Russia, but both were failures. Otherwise the rule of Sophia and Golitsyn, which lasted seven years, was an unqualified success. Contemporaries witness to the fact that under it Russia blossomed and flourished economically. But their position was equivocal and insecure. The fantastic trio of autocrats which nominally governed the country was too absurd to last. The two male members, Ivan V and Peter, were both *tsars*, and at public functions actually sat on a double throne side by side, but they were as yet minors, and were merely puppets. The moving power, who at these same functions, like an intangible spirit, used literally to crouch behind the throne, was Sophia. But she was only regent. Ivan V, it is true, had no mind or will of his own, and was negligible. But Peter was growing up, he had very definite ideas, and soon gave expression to them. The stormy events of 1682 had made an indelible impression on him (he was then only ten years old), though he is said to have displayed the greatest *sang-froid* amidst the riots and the murders of his mother's relations. But he never forgave his sister, and he never forgave those forces of

the old régime, represented by the *stréltsy* whom she had used as her agents and by the dissenters, whom he regarded as disturbers of the peace. He realized that his sister constituted a personal danger to himself and must therefore be eliminated; while dissent appeared, to his mind, to mean disorder, and he therefore concluded that it was a danger to the authority of the State and must be suppressed. After these bitter experiences he and his mother settled down in the village of Preobrazhénskoe,¹ near Moscow, which had been *tsar* Alexis's favourite residence. Here they lived in retirement, and virtually on charity.

But Sophia had set her brother a dangerous example, which he took to heart. If she had been the first emancipated Russian royalty, he would be the second. If she had been able to make use of the army he would do so too. During the whole seven years of his life at Preobrazhénskoe he was never idle a minute. He was one of those people who could never sit still. Contemplation or reflection was impossible for him. The first thing he did was to start playing at soldiers. But while others thought he played, he himself took his game in deadly earnest. He equipped his companions, who were the sons of noble families of his own age, out of the State arsenal, and drilled himself and them to such purpose that by the year 1690 he had two excellent regiments of Russian soldiers to work with. They were officered by foreign soldiers of fortune whom he found in the neighbouring *Nemétskaya slobodá* (cf. p. 191), but the actual commander was a Russian. They were named, after the two villages where they were housed, Preobrazhénski² and Semënovski,³ and formed the nucleus of the Russian army that was to be.

¹ Cf. p. 192, n. 1.

² Sc. *polk* = regiment.

³ Sc. *polk* = regiment; *Semënovski* is pronounced *Semyónofski* = Simeon's; *Semënovskoe* (*seló*) = Simeon's (village); Russian villages are commonly named after the saint to whom the local church is dedicated.

But this was not the only way in which Peter showed his unconventionality. His elementary education had been scrappy and scanty in the extreme, and for humane letters he never had any use all the days of his life, but he had a passion for mechanics and for technical knowledge of all sorts. He studied mathematics and all naval and military sciences with fury. His greatest delight was hard manual labour, especially carpentry and the building of boats, objects the mere sight of which filled the average Moscovite with terror. His pastimes were drinking and dancing, in both of which he indulged freely, and he knew nothing of insomnia or of dyspepsia. As a result of this mode of life he grew up a handsome giant nearly 8 feet in height, of immense strength, of iron muscle and iron will, but without sentiment or intellect. The most attractive things about him were his simplicity, his unselfishness, and his absolute honesty, both to himself and to others. He only cared for money in so far as it provided technical equipment or promoted technical efficiency, and to display and luxury, pomp and ceremony of any sort he showed absolute indifference. His tastes were coarse and his sense of humour primitive, and he vastly preferred the company of soldiers and sailors and mechanics to that of his social equals. He hated religion: the Church for him symbolized obscurity and stagnation, the hierarchy obstruction. The one thing he lived for was the good of his country, whether his country wanted it or not. He was intensely patriotic, jealous, and ambitious—not for his own reputation or glory, but for the sake of his countrymen *malgré eux*. He was conscious of their immense latent possibilities, and bitterly resented the fact that they were so much behind other peoples in every respect, and most of all that they acquiesced in their own apathy and isolation, and seemed to have a positive preference for inertia. Unfortunately, he never learnt to think, and had no intuition. Being born in the purple he had no idea of personal economy, and he was never

taught political economy. The first did not matter because his personal wants were so simple, but the second did because his political aims were so vast and complex. He would not adapt his ends to his means, and he could not adapt his means to his ends. The results were a frightful struggle between sovereign and people which led to intense exacerbation of both, an appalling waste of life and treasure, and successes which were great, it is true, but were won with unnecessarily exhausting efforts. Peter had a will and he knew what he wanted, and therefore he forced his way; but his manner of doing it always aroused the maximum of resentment and cost the maximum of labour. He did wonders, but he could not change the character of his people even in the thirty-six years of his reign, showering *ukázēs* on them every day of the year as he did. There is no question that nobody but a man like him could have done what he did in the time and in the circumstances, but it is a question whether it could not have been done more wisely. Peter was not the first Russian reformer: reform was already in the air, and Russia was already moving when he came on the scene, but it did not move fast enough to suit his temperament nor in those directions which appealed to his fancy. The series of violent blows and shocks which he applied certainly made the machinery move faster, and acceleration was doubtless desirable; but he had not the gift of making it work smoothly. He was an enthusiastic, high-minded, and skilful artisan with absolute power over a vast, antique and complex empire, and he tried to work it as if it had been a machine. He was a conscientious tyrant and a disinterested hustler. He accomplished a great deal, but not half of what he thought he was accomplishing. With a little more imagination and thought he would have done a great deal more. But he had no inclination to think when he was young, and when he grew up he had no time. His father and he were the first Russian rulers with any real sense of duty except to themselves.

But while his father's sense had been merely passive, his own was positive and extremely active. No Russian *tsar*, before or since, and probably no sovereign in any other country, ever slaved for what he honestly believed to be the good of his people more unremittingly.

With such a character it was natural that he should have many enemies, but also that he should have great influence on those who sympathized with him, and especially on the blithe and devoted military brotherhood which he had trained and infected with his ideas. These formed his body-guard and helped him to carry out his plans. The first was to make himself master in his own house. This meant the downfall of Sophia. She knew that a conflict was inevitable, and felt her position grow weaker as Peter himself grew stronger. It was she who made the first move by planning another attack on the Narýshkin family with the help of the *stréltsy*. This was in August 1689, when Peter was seventeen. The *coup* failed because he was warned in the night, and just managed to escape with his mother and his wife Eudoxia (*née* Lopukhiná) to St. Sergius's monastery of the Trinity (cf. p. 161). Here there took place a great rally and public demonstration in favour of Peter, and his emancipation and triumph were complete. Sophia was relegated to a convent, and her partisans were either beheaded or exiled.

This done, with his mother and her friends, who had no idea how to manage affairs of state, installed at Moscow, Peter next began to prepare to put some of his ideas into execution. After a flying visit to Archangel he turned his attention southward. Following the policy of his immediate predecessors he planned a campaign against Turkey, hoping thus, first of all, to gain access to the Black Sea. Whereas Golítsyn had attacked the Crimea, Peter aimed at the Turkish fortress of Azów, at the mouth of the Don. The first attack, in 1695, failed, because only made from the land side. But Peter, though

disappointed, was not disheartened ; perseverance and willingness to learn from his own mistakes were two of his strongest characteristics. He spent the winter building a flotilla at Vorónezh, higher up on the Don, and the next year Azóv was captured. This was a great triumph for Russia, and a still greater personal triumph for Peter. His years spent in drilling and in manœuvres, and in boat-building, had borne fruit.

Peter's mother died in 1694 and his brother, Ivan V, in 1696; and in 1697—freed from family cares and covered with military glory—he started on his famous and highly unconventional European tour. He was the first *tsar* who had ever left the confines of Russia. Peter's object was to perfect himself and his chosen companions in the arts of naval construction and of navigation, to collect all conceivable scientific knowledge and technical equipment, and to bring back to Russia instructors qualified to disseminate and to apply them. Nothing else interested him. He spent nearly a year in Holland and England. In the summer of 1698 he was in Vienna on his way to Italy, when he received news from Moscow which compelled his immediate return. The *stréltsy* were again in revolt. Already in 1694, and again on the eve of his departure for abroad, there had been trouble with them, and attempts had been made to liberate Sophia. Peter's long absence abroad had given the disaffection and discontent time to mature.

All reformers are unpopular, but Peter had the knack of going against his people's grain. He had tried to alter their character by forcibly altering their appearance, and his senseless decrees against beards and against the national costume had, in the eyes of the masses of the people, and especially amongst the Old Believers, turned these trivial superficialities into sacred symbols of the true faith. While he was away people averred he had perished, and when he returned some said he was a false *tsar*, some that he was Antichrist. The *stréltsy* had again been the

organs of disloyalty and disobedience, and this time they were severely dealt with. Peter lost his temper, and hundreds were tortured and executed. Sophia, and also his wife, who had favoured the reactionaries, were both forced to become nuns and imprisoned in convents. In 1705, after a revolt raised by them at Astrakhan, the *stréltsy* were finally abolished.

The Northern War

Barely had he succeeded in suppressing these turbulent elements when he was confronted with the necessity of embarking on a war which lasted, off and on, for twenty years. This was the great war with Sweden, known in Russian history as the Northern War (*Sévernaya voíná*), an undertaking for which neither Russia nor Peter himself were in the least prepared. It was a complete reversal of the policy in hand, and necessitated an absolute dislocation of the national forces which greatly handicapped the operations. The two main objects of Russian foreign policy were still the same as before—the reunion of the whole Russian people, nearly half of which was still under foreign (viz. Polish) domination, and the extension of Russian political power to the natural limits of the Russian continent (viz. the shores of the Black Sea and of the Baltic). The first implied war with Poland, the second war with Sweden and with Turkey. The first had been given a rest by the Truce of Andrúsovo (1667) and the Treaty of Moscow (1686), and during the next ten years all the energies of Russia were directed against the Ottoman Empire in conjunction with the new allies, Poland, Austria, and Venice. This culminated in the capture of Azón (1696), after which Peter determined to turn the Sea of Azón into a Russian lake with all speed, and, having furnished it with a navy, to use it as a naval base for further operations against Turkey. But suddenly the relation of all these Powers was changed. Venice and Austria (in anticipation of the War of the Spanish Suc-

cession), and also Poland, made peace with Turkey, concluding the Treaty of Carlowitz, by which Austria obtained Transylvania, Hungary, and Slavonia, and Poland recovered Podolia¹ (between the Dniester and the southern or Black Sea Buh) in 1699. The Russians were left in the lurch, being given Azów, but not Kerch in the Crimea, which commands the bottle-neck exit from the Sea of Azów into the Black Sea, and without the possession of which the former is useless. Thus all Peter's southern plans were knocked on the head. But he was no sooner free from one coalition than he found himself entangled in another. Having built a fleet in the south of Russia for waging a naval war, he had to face right round to the north and begin a war on land virtually without an army. The new coalition was directed against Sweden.

Sweden was at this period one of the great Powers. The results of the Thirty Years' War had left her supreme in northern and central Europe. Throughout the seventeenth century the Vasas held not only Sweden itself, but Finland, Carelia and Ingria, Esthonia and Livonia, Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein. The Baltic was a Swedish lake, and both Poland and Russia were injured and aggrieved by this state of things. But the organizer of the coalition—a sufficiently incongruous one—was a Swedish subject, one Patkul, a Livonian landowner, who had taken part in the struggle between the Swedish Crown and the aristocracy, had been arrested and condemned to death, but managed to escape and then began to plot his revenge first against Charles XI, and later against that king's son and successor Charles XII. He first approached the King of Poland, at that time Augustus II, Elector of Saxony, whose position on the Polish throne was very insecure; he then obtained the adhesion of Denmark, while Augustus II invited Peter to join, and the

¹ In Polish *Podole*, lit. 'the Lower Country' (i. e. stretching towards the Black Sea); cf. p. 202, n. 7.

latter accepted with alacrity. Patkul's plan was to secure the maximum of help from Russia with the minimum of cost: the small provinces of Ingria and Carelia were to be Peter's recompense. But the campaign by no means went according to the plan of the allies. The Swedes with lightning tactics dealt with one of them at a time. Denmark within a few days was forced to sign the Peace of Traventhal (1700). The Poles at the approach of the Swedish army promptly raised the siege of Riga and retired. Russia and Sweden were left face to face. The two armies met at Nárva, on the river of the same name, on November 30, 1700. The Russians, consisting mostly of raw recruits and foreign officers, misunderstanding and mistrusting each other, numbered 35,000; the Swedes 8,000. Charles XII, with a surprise attack in a blizzard, stormed the Russian camp and gained a complete victory. The Swedes, however, were so uncertain of it at the time that they themselves facilitated the retreat of the bulk of the Russian army, only retaining the artillery as booty. Nevertheless, the honours of the first round were with the Swedes: the eighteen-year-old Charles XII leapt on to a pinnacle of European fame, and Peter was correspondingly discomfited. But he was never too proud to learn, and the following year he set to work with a will to make good his losses in men and artillery. The churches and monasteries had to surrender their bells to be made into guns; a more rigorous system of recruiting was introduced; and Nóvgorod and Pskov were strongly fortified.

He was aided by the fact that Charles XII, instead of following up his victory, spent the next seven years in trying to dethrone Augustus II of Poland. This gave Peter time to recuperate his strength and to accustom his new armies to the exigencies of regular and continuous warfare. But he also had to keep his ally, the King of Poland, supplied with subsidies, which increased the strain on Russia's meagre—because undeveloped—resources.

While the Swedes were preoccupied with the Poles, the Russians gradually got to work and secured a number of successes which, though individually inconsiderable, made up a handsome aggregate. In 1701 the Russian general, Sheremétév, defeated the Swedes at Erestfer in Livonia, for which he was made field-marshal, and in 1702 he repeated the process at Hummelshof. But Peter's main immediate objective was the Nevá, which flows from Lake Ládoga into the Gulf of Finland, and was thus at that time the best and most natural highway between central Russia and the Baltic. It was on the banks of the Ízhora,¹ a southern affluent of the Nevá, that Prince Alexander had defeated the Swedes in 1240, a victory which secured the use of this vital river for Nóvgorod and won him the eponymous title of *Névski*.²

In 1702 the Russians captured the Swedish fortress of Nöteborg³ (the old Russian Oréshek), strategically important by reason of its situation at the point where the Nevá flows out of Lake Ládoga. Peter renamed the place Schlüsselburg, obeying his curious instinct of trying to bring Russia up to date by painting it with Germanic colours. The next acquisition was the small Swedish fortress of Nienschantz,⁴ situated at the other end of the Nevá where it empties its swift waters into the Gulf of Finland. This fort was demolished, and on a neighbouring islet⁵ Peter, on May 27, 1703, laid the foundations of another. This became the famous citadel of SS. Peter and

¹ Ízhora or Ízhera, a name etymologically the same as that of the district, viz. Ingria; in Swedish Ingermanland.

² He was canonized, and a subsequently famous monastery and church in the new capital was named after him, and the great thoroughfare leading from that church to the Admiralty was named the 'Névski Prospéct' (sc. Avenue).

³ Cf. p. 183, n. 1.

⁴ Another name of this place was Kántsy.

⁵ Its original Finnish name was Jeni-saari = 'Hare Island'.

Paul, around which grew up the new capital. At that time it must surely have been one of the most desolate spots, in the midst of vast marshes and stunted forests, the victim of periodic inundation and of perpetual damp. Nevertheless, such is the fascination of having one's own way that Peter loved the place from the very first and, personal comfort being the last thing he ever thought of, wrote to Ménshikov in 1706 to say that he felt as if he was in paradise. The peasants who died in thousands while building this fantastic capital would hardly have agreed with him.

In 1704 the Russians secured possession of Kopórie, Yam,¹ Dórpat,² and finally Nárvá itself, all of which were ancient Russian possessions though situated in territory whose inhabitants had always been Finns. At the same time Sheremétev overran and devastated the whole of the Swedish Baltic provinces of Esthonia and Livonia. The next year, 1705, was critical. The Russians, directing themselves against the Swedes in Poland, had advanced across the western Dviná into Courland, occupied Vilna, and established themselves in an entrenched camp at Grodno. At this moment a formidable revolt against Peter's authority broke out among the *stréltsy* at the other end of Russia in Astrakhan, and Peter had to dispatch his best general Sheremétev with a considerable force to quell it, the disaffection threatening to spread from the *stréltsy* to the Cossacks along southern Russia. Meanwhile Charles XII moved away from

¹ The modern Yamburg; Yam is etymologically the same as Em (pronounced *Tem*), the name of the Finnish tribe which originally inhabited this part.

² Called in Russian Derpt, also *Yúrev* (= George's (sc. town), *Yúri* = George), founded by Prince Yároslav, whose monastic name was George, in 1030; it was sometimes known as Yúrev Nemétski (i. e. German Yúrev, because near the territory of the Teutonic Knights), to distinguish it from Yúrev Pólski (*póle* = 'open treeless country'), north of Moscow.

Warsaw and in January 1706 suddenly appeared at Grodno, and by a daring stroke cut the communications of the Russian army. Peter was alarmed, and, though he had a superiority in numbers, ordered a general retreat. This difficult operation was successfully accomplished, at the cost only of the artillery which was sunk in the Niemen, thanks to the skilful plans for it elaborated by Peter himself. This took place in March 1706, when the ice was breaking; the Swedes were unable to pursue, and the Russian army extricated itself, marching through Brest and round the southern edge of the then impassable Polésie¹ through Volýnia to Kiev.

The same year Charles XII succeeded in driving Peter's ally, Augustus II, from the Polish throne, on which he set up his own nominee, the Pole Stanislas Leszczyński. Augustus's general, Schulenburg, had been defeated at the battle of Frauenstadt in 1706, and though Ménshikov, towards the end of the same year, won a victory over the Swedes under Mardefelt at Kalisz, Augustus had to accept the Treaty of Alt-Ranstädt, one of the terms of which was that Patkul, the cause of all the trouble, was handed over to Charles XII, who promptly put him out of the way.

Charles, installed in his armed camp at Leipzig, battenning on the land of his defeated enemies, appeared for the moment as the arbiter of Europe. Louis XIV looked wistfully in his direction. Marlborough thought it prudent to pay him a visit of reconnaissance in 1707, and left satisfied that he had no idea of helping France. This military meteor and eighteenth-century *berserker* cared only for the glory and excitement of victory, and nothing for politics or sentiment or money; his ambition was to conquer Peter and to march on Moscow, as being the most arduous and therefore the most glorious enterprise. So, having

¹ The name of the vast tract of swamp and forest through which the river Prípet flows.

made peace with all his German enemies, he set out, in 1708, to find his quarry.

At the head of more than forty thousand admirable and seasoned troops he marched to Grodno, on the river Niemen, where he came in contact with the Russian rearguards. At this moment grave disturbances broke out in Russia—first the revolt of the Bashkir Tartars along the whole middle course of the Volga; then that of the Cossacks of the Don, which embraced all the country from Tambóv to Azóv. These caused the utmost embarrassment to Peter, as he had to detach forces to deal with them. But not only was Charles marching straight on Moscow; his general, Loewenhaupt, with another 16,000 men and large supplies of ammunition and food, was coming from Livonia to join forces with the main army under the king. So anxious was his position that Peter tried to negotiate, but Charles refused. The Russian army gradually retreated before him. Charles crossed the Berézina, and at Golóvshchino met a force of 20,000 Russians who only gave ground after a stubborn fight. He reached the Dnieper at Mogilév,¹ and advanced as far as Mstislávl. At Dóbroe, to the south of Smolénsk, he again attacked the Russians, but it was an even fight, and he himself had a narrow escape from death. But it was already the end of September, the winter began early, and he was in want of supplies. He was advised to retire on Mogilév, and there await Loewenhaupt's arrival. But, true vagabond and adventurer that he was, having no fixed plan, he suddenly decided to turn due south towards Little Russia, presumably lured by its traditional abundance and relying on the fickle support of the weather-cock Mazeppa. The Cossacks of Little Russia had chosen this opportunity to turn and fight against the *tsar*. Their *hetman* was now the Byronic Mazeppa, who had been appointed to this office by Sophia and Golítsyn. The Cossacks of the

¹ Pronounced *Magilyóf* or *Mabilyóf*.

Dnieper (or 'of the Ukraine', cf. p. 117) had for some time been alarmed at Peter's energetic use of his despotic power and at his evident determination to unify all the military forces of the empire (the Cossacks had hitherto enjoyed a form of autonomy), and to bring them up to the disciplined standard of a regular army and under the control of the central authority. They acutely anticipated an increase of hard work and a decrease of leisure as the result. Mazeppa had long been dallying with suggestions emanating from Stanislas Leszczyński without committing himself to disloyalty. He had been repeatedly traduced to the *tsar*, but Peter chose to trust him, and paid no heed to these delations. But when both Swedes and Russians began to verge southwards he had to make up his mind on which side he would fight, and he chose the first.

The real reason which prompted Charles to move south is obscure, but the result was made rapidly and fatally plain. It was the one thing which he ought not to have done. If he had waited for Loewenhaupt to join him, no force which Peter had at his disposal could have withstood them. As it was, he presented Peter with his opportunity. The Russians, numbering 14,000, intercepted Loewenhaupt at the village of Lesnáya¹ on the Sozh on October 10, 1708, and completely defeated him. Loewenhaupt lost two-thirds of his force of 16,000 men, as well as all his artillery and his immense and valuable convoy. Charles and his army wintered in Little Russia, suffering great hardships; the spring brought no improvement to his fortunes, neither did it thaw his obstinacy. Mazeppa indeed crossed the Desná to join him, whereupon Peter, in justifiable rage at this treachery, sent his general, Prince Ménshikov, to destroy Mazeppa's stronghold Baturin, and also the Cossacks' nest, the *Zaporózhskaya Sech*² (May 1709). Other help which Charles

¹ Sc. Derévnya, or village; *les* = forest.

² Cf. p. 205.

expected—Turks and Poles—never appeared, but he insisted on advancing to attack the Russians at Poltáva on the Vórscla, a tributary of the Dnieper. This famous battle was fought on July 8, 1709. The Swedes numbered 30,000, with virtually no artillery: the soldiers' bodies were exhausted by their privations, the generals' tempers by their failures and by their hopeless position. The Russians numbered 60,000, plentifully supplied with guns. The result, in view of these conditions; and especially after the battle of Lesnáya, could hardly be in doubt, though the Swedes were an army of veterans, were still formidable, and attacked the Russians with incredible fury. But Ménshikov worked round their flank and separated their army from its camp, which he finally captured. Attacked from behind by Ménshikov and on their front by Peter, Sheremétev, and the other generals, the Swedes were absolutely overwhelmed, and Charles barely escaped capture. He and Mazeppa managed to reach the Dnieper, whence they made their way by boat to Turkey. Of the Swedish army 10,000 perished, 3,000 were captured during the battle, the rest retreated with Loewenhaupt to the Dnieper, but Ménshikov, who had anticipated their movements, intercepted them at Perevolóchna and forced 16,000 to surrender.

This great victory, though it did not prove immediately decisive, was none the less an immense personal triumph for Peter and an immense military and political triumph for Russia. It completely justified all Peter's tireless efforts in the organization of the army, and the people felt that all their sacrifices had not been in vain. Nevertheless, those sacrifices had been very great, and Russia was on the verge of complete exhaustion. It was from this time onwards that Peter had to pay more serious attention to the internal organization of his empire. His ideas of political economy were absolutely vague and therefore generally rose-coloured, and his methods were entirely hand-

to mouth ; he expected the same flock of sheep to produce crops of wool, families of lambs, and supplies of mutton in perpetual and unflagging abundance, and was surprised and angry when they did not. But after Poltáva he was compelled to give a little more time to thought. Not only had the internal strength of the country to be restored ; the mere fact of the victory, by enlarging Peter's outlook and making Russia the cynosure of Europe, tempted him dangerously to increase his liabilities, forced him to keep up the expensive luxury of prestige, and drove him to make ever greater demands on his subjects.

At Poltáva Peter laid the foundations of Russian military glory and pricked the Swedish bubble. Nevertheless, the war dragged on for another twelve years, largely through Peter's own doing. Incidentally, at this point a further step was made towards the complete assimilation with Great Russia of Little Russia east of the Dnieper. The mass of the population and the bulk of the Cossack soldiery had indeed rallied to the *tsar* ; but henceforth the privileges of the Cossacks were ignored, officials from Moscow began to share in the government of the country, and the office of *hetman* gradually became a decorative sinecure. Other immediate results of Poltáva were that Charles's Polish king, Leszczyński, had to retire to Charles's patrimonial estate of Zweibrücken in Pomerania, while Peter's Polish king, Augustus II, reoccupied Warsaw.

In 1710 Sheremétev again conquered and occupied the whole of Livonia (which had been promised to Russia's ally, Augustus II) and Esthonia, and all the coast of the Baltic from Riga at the mouth of the Dviná to Viborg in Finland (Caretia). At the same time Peter turned European matchmaker, and married his half-niece Anna (Ivánovna, daughter of Ivan V) to the Duke of Courland, a Polish vassal.

At this point Peter began to suffer from want of concentration ; his successes somewhat upset his judgement and con-

siderably alarmed some of the other Powers. Notably Turkey, incited by the envoys of France and by Charles who was a refugee at Bendéry, made as if to threaten Russia, and reclaimed Azóv. Peter light-heartedly took up the challenge, and in the summer of 1711 set out to conquer the Ottoman Empire. This expedition ended in disaster. Peter was disappointed in the hopes he had placed in Balkan help, as Charles had been in the Cossacks in 1709, and met the Turkish army on the Prut outnumbered to the extent of five to one. The Russians inflicted heavy losses on the Turks, but the task was hopeless; Peter himself narrowly escaped capture, and had to agree to the Treaty of the Prut (1711) and to the restitution to Turkey of Azóv and the destruction of all the Russian fortresses erected on Turkish territory. Thus vanished the glory of all his early exploits, a sufficiently bitter but possibly salutary pill for Peter. Meanwhile the northern war went on. During 1712 and 1713 Peter continued to help his allies to drive the Swedes from Pomerania. In 1713 a Russian flotilla under Admiral Apráxin captured Helsingfors and Abo, and in 1714 defeated the Swedish fleet at Hangö,¹ at the extreme south-western corner of Finland, and occupied the Åland Islands. In two years Peter had conquered practically all Finland, and Stockholm was menaced.

Unfortunately for Russia, the coalition against her grew still stronger, being joined by Brandenburg and Hanover. Moreover, Peter of his own accord wandered still farther into the sordid labyrinth of German domestic politics. In 1716 he married his other half-niece Catherine (Ivánovna) to the Duke of Mecklenburg, and began fighting that potentate's quarrels with his nobles. This resulted in Hanover and Denmark leaving the coalition, and further, in a mad scheme concocted in Holstein by an agent of Sweden named Görtz to reconcile Peter with Charles XII, while the new allies were then to restore the

¹ This battle is known in Russian history as *Gangud*.

Stuarts to the throne of England. Peter, on his part, had other plans, wishing to make an alliance with France. Louis XIV had naturally never favoured Peter, but the *tsar* hoped more from the Duke of Orleans, now regent. So in 1717 he journeyed to Versailles, and tried to arrange for the betrothal of his daughter Elizabeth to Louis XV. Peter was now a very different figure from what he had been when he had first visited western Europe. He came no longer as an apprentice, but as a master and a hero. Paris could not help admiring his intelligence and his appearance, though somewhat shocked by his unceremoniousness. The matrimonial project never materialized, but as a result of the visit a commercial treaty was concluded between France and Russia, and permanent diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. Meanwhile, the baneful influence of northern Germany over Russian diplomacy, which Peter had himself encouraged, grew in strength. Görtz of Holstein had almost succeeded in reconciling Russia and Sweden with the object of using Peter to recover for Charles his lost German possessions, which Peter had himself done his utmost to take from him. A congress was even settling the details of the scheme, when in 1718 Charles XII, who had returned to Sweden four years previously, was killed at Fredrikshald in Norway. The Swedes made a *volte-face*, excluded Charles XII's nephew Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, from the throne, chose instead his sister Ulrica as queen, set up an aristocratic constitution, robbed the Crown of its power, made peace with Brandenburg, Hanover, and Denmark, and determined to fight on against Russia. So Peter was again left to face his old enemies alone, and only now did what he ought to have done ten years earlier. In 1719 and again in 1720 Admiral Apráxin landed his troops on the Swedish coast and took punitive measures with such effect that in 1721, through the medium of French diplomacy, the Swedes decided to nego-

tiate, and that year the Peace of Nystadt¹ was concluded. By its terms Russia acquired Livonia, Esthonia, the islands of Oesel and Dago, Ingria, Carelia, and the south-eastern corner of Finland. Russia went mad with delight, perhaps as much from the prospect as from the terms of peace, and the Senate spontaneously conferred on Peter the title of Emperor (in Russian *Imperátor*) and the epithet of 'the Great' (*Velíki*). Peter's dream, and that of his ancestors, had come true. Russia was a great Power, with the Baltic coast from Riga to Viborg. He had secured his port-hole on to Europe, even though the view was poor, while the glass itself was frosted for half the year and during the other half was liable to be destroyed by flood. Sweden, for its part, relapsed into obscurity as suddenly as a hundred years previously it had emerged into the light.

But Peter abhorred repose. No sooner had he secured a broad footing on the Baltic than with characteristic energy and ambition he turned about, and decided to make himself master of the Caspian. A maritime outlet on Asia seemed a natural corollary to the acquisition of one in Europe, and the problem of the Black Sea was not yet ripe for solution. Therefore he discovered a pretext and declared war on Persia, already then in an anarchic condition. An expedition descended the Volga in 1722 and the Russians took Dérbent and Baku, though these were later relinquished.

Peter's Domestic Policy

The year 1724 was the only year of peace which Peter allowed himself or his country. In the history of Russia Peter's reforms at home, both in themselves and in their results, loom just as big as his campaigns abroad, but it is impossible here to describe them in any detail. In their general character they were essentially and immediately utilitarian. There was nothing

¹ Sc. 'Newtown', on the west coast of Finland.

liberal or idealistic or philanthropic about them. They were tyrannical, and though they were revolutionary in manner and in effect, in spirit they were reactionary. They were really less reforms than an endless and rather chaotic series of sumptuary laws designed with the purpose of simplifying the organization of society, eliminating the enormous class of drones, accelerating the machinery of the administration, and generally increasing the efficiency of the State. Peter loved his country passionately and infinitely. He deified and worshipped the State—a thing no Russian *tsar* had ever done—and he did his best to make all his subjects do the same. He was a tyrant, he valued his absolute power, and was determined to make everybody else obey it, but there was sense in his tyranny : it was, if one might say so, objective and conscientious despotism. He neither deified nor worshipped himself, and never asked anybody else to do so, but he insisted on obedience, honesty, truthfulness, and work. He was neither cynic nor actor, but he had no heart, no imagination, no taste. He was not selfish, neither was he humane. His reforms were subsidiary to his military policy. He judged his campaigns necessary for Russia's benefit, as no doubt they were. He saw that their success and, further, the maintenance of their results were impossible under the old conditions. Therefore, the old conditions must be changed. There were three respects in which changes were most obviously necessary to promote the ends he had in view. Russia must produce more men, more money, and more munitions. The misfortune was that neither Peter's own attainments nor those of his staff were equal to ensure the co-ordination of these demands and their fulfilment. Hence the irritation which his measures provoked in his people, and the irritation which their relative ineffectiveness provoked in himself. Expansion may be desirable and even indispensable, but it is impossible to expand profitably or successfully, so to say, on an empty stomach,

Russia's misfortune has always been that she has had to expand before getting, or rather in order to get, proper nutriment. Fate decrees that certain peoples should suffer from certain elemental and extrinsic limitations. Geographical and historical circumstances over which the Russian people had no control determined the handicaps from which they have always suffered and still suffer, namely, chronic exaggeration of frame and, simultaneously, chronic malnutrition. Fortunately, the amazing Russian people, though it has little or nothing of a constitution, has such strength that it has so far survived the strain. There is nothing surprising, therefore, that in many respects it has remained comparatively undeveloped. Peter did what he could, and doubtless did more than anybody else could have done, to rectify these adverse circumstances, but even he was only human. The marvel is, not that he effected so little, but that he effected so much. It was Peter *contra mundum*. He had to contend not only with his foreign enemies but simultaneously with his own people and with nature. In the words of the remarkable writer Pososhkón, the first Russian publicist, an entirely self-educated peasant, a contemporary and keen admirer of Peter, the *tsar* alone pulled uphill, and millions were pulling downhill. Klyuchévski compares him to a man who drives a horse with the utmost urgency and at the same time keeps pulling the reins tight. It may be added that he was desperately fond of the horse, but had no intuition and did not understand its temper. Besides, for twenty-one years of his reign it was war-time.

The general object of Peter in his reforms was to impose equal service on all, and to allow no privilege to any save that earned by service to the State. The army, from being a monopoly of certain classes of society, became representative of all of them. A modified, though fairly stringent, form of conscription was introduced amongst the peasants, an innovation which

in those circles evoked loud lamentation and a number of deprecatory folk-poems. By this means a regular army of over 200,000 men was raised, not counting the numerous regiments recruited from the Cossacks; and a personnel of nearly 30,000 was formed for the incipient navy. At the same time Peter used constantly to commandeering labour on a vast scale to carry out works which he had conceived, such as canals, roads, harbours, and the building of the new capital, all of which cost thousands of lives. His policy with regard to the *dvoryánstvo* (the aristocratic class of landowners from which the army and the government officials were recruited, and with which the few remaining old families of the *boyárstvo* had become merged) may be described as 'a clean sweep'. He decreed that every single male member of this class must serve the State, either as a civil or as a military or as a commercial servant. The quality of nobility could thenceforward only be earned by service; no other way was recognized, and evasion entailed expropriation and degradation, or worse. Thus was created the bureaucracy and the famous 'table of ranks' enumerating the fourteen degrees of *chin*¹ which must punctuate the career of any gentleman, whether that career were chosen in the army, the navy, the civil service, the palace, or the Church. This obligation to serve caused deep resentment in aristocratic spheres of life. It is true that the *dvoryáne*,² who had made their careers in the seventeenth century and had largely replaced the moribund old hereditary ruling class of the *boyáre*,³ were by their very nature a class who had earned their position by service to the sovereign. But they had gradually acquired the habits of the class they had replaced, and had come to look on service as a privilege and not as an obligation. Also the new

¹ = Row, rank; hence *chinóvnik* = 'an official'.

² Lit. courtiers, household-servants of the sovereign; sing. *dvoryanin*.

³ Sing. *boyárin*.

service was of a character different from the old. Then they had been able to choose their service and to take their serfs with them as subordinates. Now they found themselves in the ranks with their serfs, inasmuch as all were obliged to begin from the lowest rank. One of the results of this novel arrangement was that the regiments of the Guard (cf. p. 217), the kernel of the army, came inevitably to be wholly recruited from, and not only officered by, the nobility. Another development, which applied not only to these regiments but to the whole army, was that the troops lost their territorial connexions (excepting the Cossacks), inasmuch as the new organization of the army took no account of these ; all the recruits from all over the country were poured into one machine, and when they came out of it they had nothing in common but their uniform and their officers. The manner in which this affected the Guard regiments was soon to make itself apparent. Torn from their own territories and shut up in barracks in the damp and dismal new capital, it was obvious that they must develop into a formidable instrument which might well serve a strong ruler, but which a weak ruler would have to serve himself. Peter the Great had been able to make an army, but other Peters were to find that an army could unmake them.

In financial matters Peter was compelled to adopt a policy of perpetually squeezing his subjects in order to pay for his army and his campaigns. But he at least also recognized the fact that one cannot keep taking out without ever putting anything in. His greatest ambition was to further the development of trade and the exploitation of the natural resources of the country, and he did all he could and all that the blind obstinacy of his people would allow in this direction. As regards taxation he did away with the hitherto existing unit of taxability, the household, and substituted a capitation tax, known in Russian as the 'soul tax' (*podúshnaya pódat'*), which caused many

searchings of heart. Amazement seized the administration when it was realized that owing to conscription, war, forced labour, and to wholesale flight on the part of the population in order to escape these unpleasant contingencies, the new tax would not, for a long time to come, bring in as much as had been expected of it. It was characteristic of Peter that when in straits he would put double taxes on nonconformists and on anybody who insisted on wearing the national costume or a beard. Hygiene was promoted by the taxation of baths, longevity encouraged by that of coffins. In any event, whatever criticism may be made of his methods, it is a fact that Peter died without leaving a *kopéka* of public debt. The peasants might have been able to explain how this was done.

In the reform of the administration Peter, always ready to learn from his enemies, borrowed largely from Swedish, and also from German, models. The *dúma* and the *prikázy* (i. e. the Council and the Chancelleries) were abolished, and in their place appeared the Senate and the ten 'colleges' or ministries.¹ The Senate was nominated by the Crown, and originally was an administrative commission appointed to act in the *tsar's* absence from Russia. But it became permanent, and, replacing the *dúma*, acquired the character of a cabinet responsible to the sovereign, with the duty of enforcing the execution of his decrees (and, incidentally, of elucidating their meaning), and of acting as a superior financial committee and as the supreme court of justice. Later, the office of Procurator-General was created with the duty of supervising the activity or the inactivity of the Senate in the interests of the *tsar*. The provincial administration was simplified by the division of the whole country into provinces or 'governments' (*gubérnii*). The towns were granted municipal autonomy. The patriarchate was abolished,

¹ The building in which these were housed is now the home of the University of Petrograd.

and the Holy Synod created in its stead. This meant the complete subjection of the Church to the State. The representative of the *tsar* who supervised its work was also styled Procurator-General, and he was a layman—as often as not an officer. Peter did not venture to lay hands on the fat money-bags of the monasteries, but in the interests of the army and of the capitation tax no man was allowed to become a monk under the age of thirty. Peter's especial bugbears were the Old Believers, and against these he fulminated unceasingly and ruthlessly. They retaliated by dubbing him Antichrist.

His interest in education was frankly utilitarian. Any branch of science which could be turned to the immediate material profit of his subjects he encouraged. Armies of writers were engaged in translating into Russian scientific works in other languages. Russians were packed off to other countries to be educated, and foreign savants were imported into Russia wholesale. Peter abolished the use of the hitherto prevalent Slavonic alphabet except for ecclesiastical purposes, and in its place put that which is now known as the Russian alphabet; it is essentially the same, but is clearer and less ornamental, the difference between the two being comparable to that between 'Gothic' and 'Latin'. In the realm of social intercourse, with which Peter was most unfamiliar, he forced on his unwilling subjects those amenities which he himself detested. The womenfolk of Russia, strange as it may seem to-day, had to be compelled to emancipate themselves, just as in the previous century peasants had been forbidden to enslave themselves.

The net concrete result of Peter's 'reforms' must be admitted to be very considerable, though it was disproportionate to the cost in life, temper, and treasure. He succeeded in creating what was for those days a very big and formidable regular army, so big that when the war came to an end he did not know what to do with it, and cheerfully turned it loose to

batten on the villages whence it had been recruited until its services were required again. He succeeded in trebling the public revenue. His conquests brought Russia into the light of day, if rather too abruptly. He gave her means of communicating with the rest of Europe which she had not possessed before, though it was inevitably a long time before she could make proper use of them. He put the latest results of applied science into the hands of people who could neither read nor write. He forced to dance and to converse those who had hitherto only moved about in litters and prayed. He woke the Russian people suddenly, as it were, by pulling it out of bed and making it stand on its head, a process which inevitably induces bad temper; he dressed it differently, and made it do all sorts of things that it had never done before; but it was not in his power to transform it, or even to reform it. Just as New Russia had begun fifty years before Peter was born, so Old Russia persisted for many years after he died. It has been calculated that it would have taken Russia, if left to her own natural evolution, 150 years to reach that stage of development to which Peter brought her by his revolution *ex machina*; to which it may be replied that potted civilization is notoriously difficult to digest, and that the shortest cut to a place is often the longest way there.

In the aggregate, except in externals and in certain immediately tangible and visible changes and so-called improvements of a material order, Peter's reforms left things very much as they were, 'only more so'. Under his rule Russia became, if anything, a more absolute monarchy than it had been before. The will of the sovereign and of his nominees counted for more than it had ever done. The seventeenth century had witnessed the decay of the representative assembly, and of other collective organs and institutions of local and central government. In the eighteenth century they completely disappeared. The seventeenth century had witnessed the gradual passing of all initiative

and power, legislative and executive, into the hands of individuals, as often as not of no experience and of mushroom reputation. In the eighteenth century personality, the opportunist, the *arriviste*, whether in the shape of the sovereign or of the favourite, reigned supreme. Peter was no exception. In his own case it did not matter, because his intentions were good, his plans were bold, broad, intelligent, beneficent, and ultimately or at any rate intrinsically benevolent; while his character, if cruel and harsh, was noble, unselfish, honest, and honourable. But though he had many fellow workers whom he impregnated with his own spirit, there were other companions who basked in the sunshine, or rather filled their pockets in the protective shadow, of his reputation and of his favour. The system worked while a despot with an iron will and of an honest character was on the throne. But under other circumstances the results were bound to be fatal. Even Peter, by his own example and in his own all too short lifetime, could not do much to palliate, far less eradicate the national failings of ignorance, prejudice, and corruption, or the misfortune of inexperience against which he had to contend. In the general disposition of society Peter did not alter but merely confirmed the arrangements made by his predecessors of the seventeenth century. The simplified and arbitrary classification of society arranged for the joint benefit of the treasury and of the landowners in the reigns of Michael and Alexis, Peter, in what he considered the best interests of the State, simplified further and made still more arbitrary. Those intermediate, semi-free, and often, it is true, parasitic and drone classes, which had survived in large numbers in spite of the ordinations of the *Ulozhénie* (cf. p. 176), he ruthlessly pressed into the three main classes of the *dvoryánstvo* (the serving aristocracy), the *meshchánstvo* (the bourgeoisie), and the *krestyáne* (the peasants), in which he could more easily lay hands on them for any service he might require them to perform.

So far was he from attempting anything in the nature of social reform that he made the power of the landlords over their serfs more absolute, just as he made his own more absolute over the aristocracy. In his eagerness to make all the male members of land-owning families serve the State either in a military, an official, a professional, or even—most repugnant of all innovations—a commercial capacity, Peter violated the fundamental principle of Russian law by which estates, on the death of the owner, were divided equally amongst the members of his family (who were thereby weakened and impoverished), and decreed that they must be left whole to one son, not necessarily the eldest, while the others were to make their own way in the world, and be of use to the State.

Thanks to his will, his character, his physique, his prestige, and to the band of faithful admirers and enthusiastic helpers, the nucleus of which he had formed when himself a boy, Peter was able to attain a good many of the objects he had in view. But the opposition and obstruction which he met with, from the very first, in all classes of society at least doubled his difficulties and halved his success. His absolute power certainly gave him complete control over the destinies of the majority of his helpless subjects, but when he came up against the resistance of the aristocracy whose power was rooted in the land, and that of the Old Believers whose strength was religion in its narrowest and most fanatical sense, his success was by no means so complete. In spite of all his fulminations, his daily *ukazes* plentifully seasoned with threats of exile, torture, and decapitation, and his elaborate organization of secret police and of delation, there were large numbers of the land-owning class who resisted his measures by every means in their power. This same class took the earliest opportunity after Peter's death to secure the repeal of the law of indivisibility of landed property, and it was not long before it achieved emancipation as complete as of

old. Religious obstruction was still more difficult to deal with than evasion, and led to many tragedies, one of which (cf. pp. 246-7) gravely prejudiced the destinies of the country.

It is of course a truism to say that the foundation by Peter of his new capital of St. Petersburg in 1703 is symbolic of himself, of his character, of his policy, and of his greatness. But the part it has played in the history of Russia is apt to be overlooked.

Probably no whim of any despot has ever caused such discontent or cost so much life and money. Probably no place has been so cursed and so hated. Certainly no one has ever sincerely loved it except the man who founded it, and he was bound to love his own creation, because every one else loathed it. To choose a Finnish swamp as the site of the capital of the mighty Russian Empire was one of the most unfortunate inspirations of Peter's quixotic brain. In every respect, literal and figurative, physical and political, Petersburg is eccentric.

Petersburg is unique in that, in itself, it has absolutely nothing to recommend it and suffers from every conceivable disadvantage from which a town, let alone a capital, can suffer. All reason for its continued existence ceased with the introduction of the steam-engine. Until then it certainly fulfilled its destiny, during the season of navigation, as a clearing-house between Russia and the rest of Europe, although it was a long time before Russian merchants, creatures of habit, could be persuaded to abandon Archangel in its favour. Like the human appendix, which once served a useful purpose, it is now merely a source of worry and expense. As for making it the capital, there was never any valid reason at all. Peter, resolved to jolt the Russian government out of its Moscow groove, characteristically decided to fix it in the most unattractive spot in the whole country. Of its drawbacks he never thought, any more than he did of building himself a palace in his new capital, though

he forced all his wealthier subjects to erect houses there on pain of heavy fines.

But there are other aspects of this amazing migration of which its author was utterly unconscious. It was uncannily atavistic. Ivan IV in a mad huff abandoned Moscow and tried to terrify Russia from his police-court residence at Alexándrovsk. Peter, from very different motives, founded or anchored, or rather moored, his residence at the mouth of the Nevá and called it his capital; and the imperial residence (during the reign of Nicholas II only in theory), the official seat of government, and the artificial and political capital it has since remained. It never has been, and never can be, anything else. It is far removed from the heart of Russia and only shares its brain. Majestic, spacious, even beautiful, cold, sunless, tragic, mysterious, dank and gloomy like the forests which surround it, and unhealthy, it has had a sinister and unwholesome influence on Russian history. It has warped Russia with its damp breath. In the past, divorced from the genuine life of the Russian people, it had no interest but the palace, served no cause but repression, and had no object save the apotheosis of the autocracy. Until 1905 it had no roots in Russia, just as it had no foundation in the earth. But the creation of a purely political capital has brought its own Nemesis. Now that its population has risen and has destroyed the chains which riveted it there, the sooner the horrible place is abandoned and Moscow is once more made the capital, the better for everybody. A cross between Byzantium and Stockholm, it never was anything but foreign, as its founder wished it to be, and it never will be anything else, in spite of its absurd, neo-Slavonic, pseudo-Russian name of Petrograd.

Of his domestic life it can only be said that Peter made a bad muddle. For him the home did not exist: he preferred the bivouac and the tavern; nor was it astonishing, therefore, that

he should mismanage his family affairs. He had married in 1689, at the age of 17, one Eudoxia Lopukhiná, or rather she had been foisted on him by his relations. However, neither her mind nor her body was able to captivate him. Her undisguised predilection for the old order of things and her dislike of his innovations, her want of sympathy, alone sufficed to alienate his affection, and after the capture of Azóv he banished her to a convent at Súzdal. Meanwhile she had borne him a son, Alexis, in 1690, and, during Peter's protracted absences from home, she had succeeded in imbuing him with her dislike of the new régime. Rid of his wife, Peter attempted to reform his son, but it was too late. He was completely and irremediably saturated with the bigoted and narrow views of his mother, in addition to which he was idle, obstinate, and obtuse. While his mother held court in her convent, he hedged himself round with monks and visionaries, and his attitude towards education was positively mulish. In 1711 his father forced him to travel to Germany, and at Torgau to marry Princess Charlotte of Wolfenbüttel, of the House of Brunswick,¹ a fate for which he vowed to avenge himself in due course. His son's hostility to all that he loved drove Peter to the verge of despair. He threatened to disinherit him. It was of no avail. During his father's second absence in western Europe in 1717 Alexis fled with his concubine Euphrosine to Vienna, where he was promised shelter and protection. Thence he journeyed to the Tyrol, and finally took refuge in the castle of St. Elmo at Naples. But he was tracked by his father's agents, and with the promise of a pardon was induced to return to Moscow. There he had to appear before a solemn tribunal to answer charges of conspiracy. Peter soon learned in the course of this inquiry that his son was the centre of a vast plot against his life, in which all the forces of reaction and obscurantism, as well as the services of the

¹ Whose sister became the wife of the future Emperor Charles VI.

Austrian and Swedish armies, were enlisted. All the ramifications were traced, the plot was crushed with frightful severity, Eudoxia was whipped and imprisoned, and Alexis was condemned to death and perished in circumstances of ominous mystery. His wife had died already in 1715, after giving birth to a son, named Peter, who survived him. But the *tsar* now boasted a second family. He had divorced his first wife, a proceeding in the eyes of many religious people quite devoid of legality, and in 1712 had married again. His second wife he first met in 1702 during the campaign in the Baltic provinces. She was of uncertain origin, but is thought to have been a Livonian peasant, by occupation a *blanchisseuse*. She passed blithely from the hands of a Swedish dragoon to those of Generals Sheremétev and Ménshikov before she finally reached the arms of Peter. Though ignorant and illiterate, she had something about her which fascinated him, and she obtained a unique hold over his wayward spirit. She did not accompany him to Versailles in 1717. By his second wife Peter had no less than twelve children—four sons, two of whom were called Peter and two Paul, who all died in infancy, and eight daughters, of whom only two, Anne and Elizabeth, survived. In 1722 Peter, obeying atavistic instinct, issued the celebrated and baleful *ukáz* publicly arrogating to the reigning sovereign the right to designate his successor. In the words of Ivan III, ‘to whom I will, to him I shall give my kingdom’. But fate decreed that he should never avail himself of this right. He died in 1725 at the age of fifty-three, without having named his heir—the first and last Russian sovereign who has earned the name of ‘Great’.

Après moi les Femmes (1725-62)

WHILE the consequences were equally momentous for all classes of the Russian people, the effect on them of the death of Peter the Great was varied. The feeling amongst the mass of the people was undoubtedly one of relief mingled, however, with equally sincere dismay. They could not be expected to regret the tyrannous author of such upheaval, such innovations, and such exactions as they had suffered. Those Russians of humble origin who knew him personally indeed worshipped him, but their number was relatively infinitesimal. The vast majority were estranged by his personality and his habits, while they bitterly resented both the letter of his decrees and the brutal spirit in which they were carried out. The whole thing passed their comprehension. In accordance with the popular temperament their attitude was characteristically expressed in the wildest legends and beliefs about Peter. As in other times, when the prince was dead and the people, convinced that he was alive, resurrected countless false *tsars* and died for their belief in their authenticity, so now when they had a genuine live prince they persuaded themselves, first, that he was not really the *tsar*, for no Russian *tsar* could do such terrible things, but a changeling of German origin, and then, as a result of his journeys abroad—things which no *tsar* had ever done—that he had been trapped and killed while travelling, and that the man who came back and ruled was a false *tsar*. The natural corollary to these illusions, in the revulsion of popular feeling at his death, was a belief that he had indeed been waylaid in ‘Germany’ (= abroad), but that he was still alive and would one day come to reclaim his own.

In ecclesiastical spheres, which, with the exception of a

few enlightened divines such as the famous preacher Feofán (= Theophanus) Prokopóvich, were extremely hostile to Peter, a parallel belief was notoriously elaborated to the effect that Peter was none other than Antichrist. This theory especially seized the imagination of the Old Believers, who looked on resistance to Peter's infamous decrees as a means of sanctification. These could hardly bemoan his death. In the governing official class, the bureaucracy which Peter himself had largely created and had recruited characteristically from all ranks, even the lowest, of society, there were many of his pupils and collaborators and admirers who loudly and honestly lamented his demise as a national calamity, which indeed it was. But there were also many of these who had only served him half-heartedly. To them must be added almost the entire aristocracy, both in the capital and in the country, who justly regarded him as a pitiless task-master and whose natural feelings at his death were that now at last they could breathe again. The position of the whole upper class may be compared to that of an unwieldy school of sturdy, self-willed, lazy, and half-educated boys suddenly bereft of the only person who has hitherto kept them in order, whom, for the most part, they have neither understood nor appreciated. Abandoned to the indulgence of his widow, who was the mistress of the most unscrupulous of them, they found her as easy as her husband had been impossible to manipulate, and vowed themselves to a prolonged course of riotous self-indulgence.

Officially, of course, Peter was glorified and bewailed by all and sundry, while by his genuine supporters he was promptly deified and vociferously worshipped. This process of blind and semi-blind admiration continued for half a century. But by the reign of Catherine II, when Russia was already more familiar with European civilization, and the standards of the philosophy, the art, and the elegance of France held sway in Petersburg,

opinion towards Peter had somewhat chilled. His activities appeared too material, his personality too undignified to merit more than the respect of a society which hob-nobbed with Diderot and Voltaire. After the Revolution, to the nervous conservatives and 'Slavophiles', whose mission in life it was to shelter the growth of the tender plant of the pure Russian nationality from the demoralizing influences of effete and corrupt western Europe, Peter even appeared a dangerous revolutionary, who had done more harm than good by tampering with the primitive, beautiful, and divine simplicity of Russian home-life. This view again was reversed by Solovëv,¹ the first really serious and scientific Russian historian, who, writing in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, reverted to the opinion of Peter's contemporaries and extolled his life-work as a veritable, indispensable, unprecedented, and wholly beneficial revolution.

At the same time, as we can now see, the extent and the effect of the 'reforms' were exaggerated and their character misapprehended both by those who survived them and by the succeeding generations of critics. It was natural that contemporaries should glory in having lived in an epoch during which they proudly imagined that Russia had been transformed as with a magic wand, and no less natural that many should share those feelings who by their own resistance had militated against any real transformation taking place. Hence Peter came to be known as 'The Reformer'² *par excellence*, though all his reforms when reduced to their simplest terms were a series of measures aiming purely at military and financial efficiency, all of them devised on the spur of the moment while the country was in the throes of a twenty years' war. Certainly an astonishing degree of efficiency had been achieved, and

¹ Pronounced *Salavyóf*.

² In Russian *preobrazovátel'*, lit. 'transfigurer', 'transformer'.

dazzling results had been obtained. But there had been neither revolution nor reformation. Rather, there was an earthquake and a typhoon. And for the Russian aristocracy halcyon days supervened, so that they could afford a generously roseate impression of their recent experiences. Russia had, indeed, had a first coat of European paint, but this had neither obliterated nor improved the natural complexion, which reasserted itself with disconcerting celerity.

After his death the general tendency of the mass of the governing class—the bureaucracy and the aristocracy—was to devote itself to the pleasurable and inexacting occupation of resting on Peter's laurels. The real power was concentrated in the hands of a few of his fellow workers and of his widow, but, unfortunately for Russia, these were among the least promising of his creatures. It may be said that it was the ' reforms ' which had promoted them rather than they who had promoted the ' reforms '. Under Peter's direction they seemed impressive and devoted public servants, but in his absence they rapidly emerged in their true colours of selfish opportunists. They have been well compared with a series of noughts without the strenuous unit which alone lent them any real value. Whereas Peter himself worked and made all classes of society work for the country, his successors were fully alive to the importance of keeping up the level of production, but were equally determined to invert the rôles and to make the whole country work for them. Peter's great achievement had been to stir up the landed aristocracy, drag them from their ancestral lairs, and harness them to the military or the civil or the industrial service of the State. At the same time, by his rigorous, not to say tyrannical, methods of recruiting, both for the army and for labour, and by his methods of taxation, he had laid incomparably more onerous burdens on the backs of the working-classes, i. e. of the agricultural labourers and of their families. In the hands of

Peter's followers, both on the throne and around it, his work had no prospect of being continued. It is true that what he had built was so strong that they could not entirely destroy it, but they did not even keep it in repair, let alone improve or finish it. What met with the full approval of the governing class and what they were ready to maintain were the exacting standards of productivity which he had imposed on the people.

The great achievement of the Russian aristocracy in the eighteenth century was the complete enslavement of the people and the complete emancipation of itself. The enslavement of the people had been the result of a bargain made between the State and the nobility, based on the theory that serf-labour provided the nobility with the wherewithal to ensure its due efficiency as the class from which the army was drawn. It is true that Peter had strengthened the control of the landowners over the serfs, but he had made the landowners work as well. He had squeezed all society still tighter into compartments; forcing the numerous intermediate and largely parasitic classes (monastic dependants, mendicants, casual labourers, and others) either on to the soil or into the army, but at the same time he opened careers to merit and hard work. After his death the huge governing class of the *dvoryánstvo* (lit. 'courtiers'), which, starting from the civil service at Moscow, had absorbed all the remaining elements of the old aristocracy in the capital and in the country and also included all those of the new bureaucracy recruited from the provinces as well as from the capital, made up its mind to fasten more firmly on the people their obligation to pay and to liberate itself from the obligation to serve. This process, which began in 1725, ended in 1762 with the final triumph of the nobility and the total and hopeless subjection of the people to a class which was in very fact the idle rich. The other factors in the situation were the old one of the throne, which in such an absolute monarchy as Russia

was the most important factor of all, and the new one of the regular army, especially the privileged regiments of Guards composed entirely of scions of the nobility, which henceforward was hardly less important in deciding the destinies of the country. Indeed, during the next forty years it may be said that while the bureaucracy which Peter had created to be the servant of the country made the country its servant, the army which he had created to be at the disposal of the throne had the throne at its disposal.

Simultaneously this period of Russian history is remarkable for the development of the power of the individual at court. It is the golden age of imperial favourites who follow one another, in a dazzling though unedifying sequence, throughout the eighteenth century. It is also the age of court intrigue. Everything was pervaded by a general sense of complete insecurity. There was no responsibility and there were no guarantees. No one ever knew what was going to happen next. Peter's way of government had in some respects been of a hand to mouth character, but at any rate it was dominated by a brain. The method was now the same, but it was directed merely by passion and caprice. There were plenty of decrees, but there were no laws. The need of fundamental laws was repeatedly acknowledged, but no one had the energy or the ability to formulate them. There was theoretically absolute power of the monarch, but there was no occupant of the throne fitted to wield it, and therefore it became only nominal. The real governors of the country were the court favourites, the secret police, and the regiments of the Guards (*gvárdiya*). But none of these again, not even the *dvoryánstvo* itself, of which the 'Guards' were really the head, were possessed of any political rights or status, and every one was the potential victim of delation and of arbitrary disfavour. In fact, the system of government threatened to revert to that in vogue among the

Golden Horde in the fourteenth century, with this difference, that in Petersburg the potentate was usually a woman and the favourites were men.

The atmosphere of hazard which permeated Russian life at this time is illustrated by an enumeration of the changes on the throne. This period, from 1725 to 1763, is known as that of palace revolutions. The life of the Empire centred in the palace, which in its turn was controlled by the barracks of the Guards. Its government was in the hands of the sovereign's favourite and of the favourite's satellites, as was natural and inevitable with a weak or frivolous occupant of the throne.

The throne changed hands no less than six times between the death of Peter the Great in 1725 and the accession of Catherine II in 1762. In almost all of these changes the Guards played a major if not the principal part. The relation of Peter's successors to himself, and the order in which they found their way to supreme power, illustrate the complete instability which prevailed. His successors were his widow, his grandson by his first wife, his half-niece, his half-great-great-nephew, his daughter, his grandson by his second wife, and finally the latter's German wife, who cheerfully usurped her husband's throne. For this inconceivably chaotic order of succession nobody was to blame but Peter himself. By his *ukáz* of 1722 he established the freedom of the sovereign to choose his own heir, thus abrogating the privilege of the national assembly of meeting at the death of one ruler and electing or at least confirming the election of another. Unfortunately he was three years in making up his mind whom to nominate as his successor, and the instructions he gave when moribund were unintelligible.

Peter the Great's family at the time of his death consisted of the following : his granddaughter Natalia ; his grandson Peter, born in 1715, the obvious heir, the son of his only son by his first marriage, Alexis, who had perished in 1718 (cf. p. 247) ;

his widow, Catherine ; and his two daughters by her, Anne and Elizabeth. Catherine had, indeed, borne him four sons, Peters and Pauls, but they all died in infancy. Of his two surviving daughters the elder, Anne, had in 1725 married the Duke of Holstein, whose mother was a sister of Charles XII of Sweden, and had at her marriage renounced all rights to the Russian throne for herself, her husband, and their offspring. The younger, Elizabeth, born in 1710, who had been flung at the heads of half the royalties in Europe, was still unmarried, and was a rival of her mother for the throne, since, in default of sons, the daughter according to Russian law inherits and not the wife.

But for the present Elizabeth had no serious following, and the contest resolved itself into one between the grandson and the widow, or rather between their supporters. Catherine had the army solidly behind her for reasons of 'auld lang syne', and could naturally count on Peter's eaglets, who knew that with her on the throne they could continue to feather their own nests as intensively as theretofore. The chief of these were Prince Ménshikov, Count Tolstóy, the General-Admiral¹ Apráxin, Baron (later Count) Ostermann, the son of a Westphalian priest, and Yaguzhínski, the procurator-general of the Senate ; 'parvenus' and bureaucrats, men of temperament and intelligence, but without scruples or ideals. The boy Peter, on the other hand, not indeed through any qualities of his own, but by reason of his legitimacy and as representative and would-be champion of the old tradition for which his father and his grandmother had suffered martyrdom, rallied to his side the remnants of the old aristocracy, notably the two great families of the Golítsyns and the Dolgorúkis. While Peter lay in his death-agony the Senate began anxiously to deliberate as to the succession. But Catherine's plot was well laid ; a few hours after he

¹ This was the highest title in the Russian Navy.

had passed away these deliberations were interrupted by the drums of the Guards drawn up outside the palace, and the Senate obediently proclaimed Catherine empress, on the ground that she had been actually crowned by Peter the previous year and was therefore his legitimate successor. The accession of Catherine was a great triumph for the followers of Peter the Great and ostensibly a pledge that his work would be carried on. As a matter of fact, it was merely a confirmation in power of those who already possessed it, and a guarantee that they would not be disturbed in their pastimes. Catherine herself was entirely frivolous, and was able fully to indulge her craving for pleasure in the protective sunshine of military favour. The bureaucracy decreed themselves a prolonged holiday from all serious work—a relaxation amply justified by their unwonted exertions in the last reign. But this millennium was short-lived. Catherine's motto was an adventurous and merry life, but having combined this with consistently imprudent living she had undermined her health. After a prodigal reign of a little over two years she died in May 1727.

Already when she had been taken ill the members of the chief government organs, including of course a contingent of officers of the Guards, had assembled at the palace to discuss the succession to the throne. This time there was a general consensus that the claims of Peter the Great's grandson could not be again ignored. To this even the omnipotent Ménshikov agreed, planning as he was a marriage between his daughter and the emperor-to-be. Catherine herself was violently opposed to the proposed arrangement, as she wished one of her daughters to inherit. But she was overborne and a document was drawn up, which failed to carry out, though it succeeded in distorting, Peter's decree. It appointed four successors to the throne: first Peter's grandson, then, failing his issue, Catherine's two daughters in order of seniority, and finally, with the same

proviso, Peter's granddaughter Natalia. As he was, in any case, regarded as the legitimate heir and had the vast majority of the people in his favour, there was no opposition to the first of these, and the son of the ill-starred *tsesarévich*¹ Alexis ascended the throne as Peter II at the age of twelve. As the accession of Catherine had been a victory for the devotees of European civilization, for the advocates of superficial progress and modernism whose motto was 'Russia for the foreigners', whose outward symbol was Petersburg, so that of Peter II was a triumph for the conservatives and for the party whose symbol was Moscow, whose device was 'Russia for the Russians'. 'Back to Moscow' became the order of the day, and thither, in fact, the court returned. The leaders of this party were the two ancient and noble families of the Dolgorúkis and the Golítsyns. The former had virtually monopolized the new emperor, and a matrimonial alliance was planned between him and the daughter of Prince Alexis Dolgorúki. This was incompatible with the ambitions of Ménshikov, who from the start had irritated Peter and spoilt his own chances by forthwith assuming and abusing the position of a parent. In September 1727 he was disgraced and exiled to Siberia, and his vast estates all over Russia, which ran into millions of acres, were confiscated. But the return to Moscow soon proved fatal to the new *tsar*. In the winter of 1729 Peter II contracted small-pox, and he died on January 19/30 of 1730, the day that had been fixed for his wedding. This was a catastrophe for the Dolgorúkis, who thereupon tried to obtain their end by fraud and by force. They forged a will of the deceased emperor nominating his betrothed as his successor, and planned to put this into effect with the help of the Guards, amongst whom they had considerable influence. But events took a turn entirely unforeseen.

¹ This was the title of the eldest son; the others were called *tsarévich*, though both are etymologically the same.

The Attempt at a Constitution in 1730

One of the most important results of Peter the Great's reign and of his policy of stirring up the physical energies of his subjects, and one which he had scarcely anticipated, was that he had immensely quickened their capacity for political thought. He had forced them abroad to study engineering and anatomy, and they had observed humanity and the mechanism of states. He sent them on diplomatic missions, and they gained first-hand acquaintance with European society. What impressed the more reflective among them was not so much the advisability of the enlightenment and enfranchisement of the people as the desirability of putting some check on the absolute power of the Crown, and limiting its potentiality for manifestations disconcerting to themselves. History was repeating itself. Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, as far apart as north and south—Ivan who was egotism and Peter altruism incarnate—each succeeded in arousing a similar feeling of apprehension and the same instinct of self-preservation in the ranks of the aristocracy. The passing of both rulers was followed by an attempt to curb the autocracy. Neither attempt was directly successful. Immediately, this led in the seventeenth century to the rule of the Poles, in the eighteenth to that of the Germans. Ultimately, both attempts did strengthen the aristocratic and bureaucratic class.

The first step which the heads of the bureaucracy and of the aristocracy took in order to secure their ends was the creation in 1726 of the Supreme Secret Council,¹ really the handiwork of Tolstóy, and designed by him to conciliate the old families which were out of office with the new which were in. It consisted of six members (Ménshikov, Tolstóy, Golóvkin, Apráxin, Ostermann, and Prince D. M. Golítsyn), formed a sort

¹ *Verkhóvny Táyny Sovét.*

of permanent super-cabinet under the presidency of the ruler (then Catherine I), arrogated to itself in council with its president the sole right of legislation, was responsible to nobody but itself, raised itself above the Senate which became purely executive, and aspired to share the attributes of sovereignty, thereby definitely limiting the monarch's absolute power. But its authority was not firmly founded ; the following year (1727) its extensive powers, which must have aroused alarm, were more closely defined, and at the same time the initiative of the sovereign and the right to take advice outside the ranks of the council were re-established. During the reign of Peter II the council proved powerless to resist his arbitrariness and that of his favourites, but at his death it vigorously reasserted itself. At this moment there were three vacancies in the council, which now consisted of eight members, of whom one was Prince D. M. Golítsyn and two others were Princes Dolgorúki. These places were hastily filled the same night (January 19/30, 1730) by a process of family gravitation, two more Dolgorúkis and one other Golítsyn being co-opted. The oligarchy then began to deliberate on the succession to the throne, Peter II having died without appointing a successor. The point was that with his death the male line of the family of Románov had become extinct.

Prince D. M. Golitsyn, like his namesake of the previous century, was the best educated, most cultivated, and most thoughtful Russian of his time. He was a distinguished public servant, especially remarkable among his compeers for his earnestness and his integrity, but he and Peter the Great had not been friends. Golítsyn was a warm advocate of reform and of Western influence, but he wished to combine these with the old Moscow tradition and to place the control of the new movements in the hands of an aristocratic oligarchy by no less a process than limitation of the power of the *tsar*. His was the

brain which evolved and directed the plan which was now disclosed. Unfortunately for himself, and for Russia, he was not sufficiently trained or experienced in high political tactics to bring it to fruition.

The opening chosen was astute and its very unexpectedness brought it success. In their choice of a sovereign the Council passed over Peter's daughter Elizabeth on the grounds that she was born in illegitimacy, and that her mother Catherine had had no real right to the throne and therefore no right to dispose of it. Reverting to the older female Románov line, they elected Anne, Duchess of Courland, the supposititious daughter of Ivan V, Peter the Great's half-brother, on the condition that their own supremacy should be guaranteed. The next morning the choice of sovereign was publicly proclaimed to the assembled Senate, Synod, generals, heads of government departments and others, and was ratified by them. As regards the guarantees no announcement was made, but the conditions demanded by Golítsyn in the name of the Council were rapidly drawn up and dispatched in secrecy to Anne at Mitau for her signature. They were that she must neither marry nor appoint a successor, and must take no decisions in matters of declaring war and of making peace, nor in the control of the army, the levying of taxes and the spending of public money, the conferment on members of the nobility of titles and properties, the confiscation from them of the same and the infliction on them of the death-penalty, without the consent of the eight members of the Supreme Secret Council, and failing compliance must sacrifice the throne. On receiving these conditions Anne decided to accept them, attached her signature, and forthwith set out for Moscow.

Moscow, and indeed the whole of Russia, was going through an acute and complicated political crisis such as it had not experienced since the Time of Troubles, for it so happened that

the whole of official and unofficial Russia which counted in politics was at this moment assembled in the old capital. Summoned to celebrate the wedding of Peter II, they found themselves instead the bewildered spectators first of his funeral, then of the election of a new sovereign, and finally of an attempt to launch a Russian constitution.¹ This unusual gathering included, besides the high aristocracy and all the dignitaries of state, the regiments of the Guards and all the lesser nobility from the provinces. All of these Peter the Great had, for the purposes of his government and of his army, rolled into one vast class, the nobility (*dvoryánstvo*); but nevertheless they were far from a united body and contained a number of layers, circles, and parties. It is estimated that outside the actual Council there were as many as five hundred notables involved in the political agitation. The general attitude of this large body of opinion towards the oligarchy which had arrogated to itself the decision in the election of a new sovereign was one of jealousy, distrust, and hostility. There were two main factions amongst them. One was for using force in order to overthrow the oligarchy, the other was for obtaining a share in its counsels.

The next step in the crisis was on February 2/13, when, having received an affirmative answer from Anne, the oligarchy summoned a general meeting of the nobility and read the conditions which the new sovereign had signed. Prince Golítsyn was playing a very risky game, for which he was not really equipped. Thinking disingenuousness the best policy, he had given Anne to understand that the conditions imposed represented a popular demand, and he now tried to persuade the assembled notabilities that her agreement to them was a spontaneous act of grace on the part of Anne. At this point he failed. The audience was silent and uneasy. Many amongst them had sympathized with Golítsyn's sentiments and wished

¹ See the account in Klyuchévski, vol. iv.

to reduce some of the imperial prerogatives and at the same time to be absolved of some of their own obligations; but this definite limitation of sovereignty was too much for the Russian conscience. Besides, it soon became apparent that the whole thing was a trick. When asked how the country was in future to be governed, Golítsyn naively issued an open invitation for the submission of plans for his consideration. From that moment he had lost the game. He was inundated with projects and counter-projects, the general tenor of which was a tabulation of claims for class privileges and for a share in the higher organs of government. At the same time, in the less reflective spheres, notably amongst the officers of the Guards, there was a great and genuine revulsion of feeling in favour of a complete restoration of the autocracy. It was naturally and reasonably felt that one ruler, especially if the ruler were a woman, would be more tolerable, and also easier to manipulate, than many. People had experienced the oligarchy of the Dolgorúkis in the reign of Peter II. By this time, too, the struggle had so grown in scope that it threatened to end in civil war. It was no longer a question of the Council against the Crown, but of the rest of society—the army, the other State organs, the Senate and the Synod—against the Council. Even most of the old aristocratic families were now against the ringleaders.

It was at this juncture that Anne arrived on the scene, on February 15/26. She had been apprised betimes of the turn things had taken, and, assured of the support of the Guards, handled the delicate situation with skill. The same day in the cathedral the highest dignitaries took the oath to her only as sovereign (*gosudárynya*), but later, on being presented with two petitions from the Senate and from the nobility, one begging her to appoint a commission of inquiry into the various projects of government, the other imploring her to assume absolute power and annul the conditions which had been imposed on her, she

publicly exposed the attempt of the conspirators to deceive her and tore up the document she had signed, to the accompaniment of exuberant expressions of fealty on the part of the officers of the Guards. A fortnight later in all the churches the oath was enthusiastically taken to Anne as autocrat and empress (*samo-dérzhitsa-imperatrítsa*). Thus ended the famous attempt of Prince Golítsyn to limit the monarchy, a limitation not guaranteed by a fundamental law but merely imposed by a body of mixed origin and irregular composition, itself not secured by tradition or by law. He was bound to fail because he had neither the support of the people nor of his class.

The Reign of Anne (1730-40)

The reign of the Empress Anne, which lasted from 1730 to 1740, is one of the gloomiest periods of Russian history. The empress herself is certainly the most repellent person who has disfigured the Russian throne. She was born in 1695. Her mother was a Saltykóv, her father was nominally Ivan V, though he was so weak in mind and body that in all probability it was some one else. In 1710 Peter the Great had married her to the Duke of Courland. Courland had since the sixteenth century been a fief of the kingdom of Poland, and by this union Peter hoped to establish Russian influence in this outwork of his neighbour's property. It fell out that Anne's husband died from alcoholic poisoning very shortly after the marriage, and she herself was condemned to spend the next twenty years in widowhood in the meagre ducal capital of Mitau. Here, a despised and helpless but carefully watched pawn in the game of international chess, she developed a rancorous temperament and a most unedifying mode of life, the only restraint on which was an inadequate supply of cash. A diversion was caused in 1725 by the irruption of Prince Maurice of Saxony, the natural son of Augustus II,

King of Poland, who made up his mind to waste his good looks on the unattractive Anne if the reward was the duchy. He almost succeeded, but was not supported by Warsaw, which hoped to annex Courland on the death of the old Duke Ferdinand (the uncle and heir of Anne's husband, who lived in retirement at Danzig, and never effectively claimed his inheritance), and was thwarted by Ménshikov, then all-powerful, who himself cast covetous eyes on the duchy.

When, therefore, Anne took her seat on the throne of Russia she was like a poor and embittered relation who unexpectedly succeeds to a vast family property. She was now for the first time able to satisfy her immense lust for pleasure, which she did in the most prodigal way. She demoralized society and impoverished the people by her extravagance, which was consistently marred by the worst and lowest taste. In herself Anne had absolutely nothing to recommend her either in mind, in body, or in soul. She was merely a very gross, cruel, vindictive, and unintelligent woman. To these qualities must be added dislike and distrust of her compatriots, which were inevitably increased by the episodes preceding her assumption of power. She gave Russian society, not excluding the army, good cause to remember and to regret its insistence on the preservation of the autocracy. Her fury naturally descended first on the Golítsyns and the Dolgorúkis, who were exiled, expropriated, and done to death wholesale. But throughout her reign no Russian felt safe, and persecution, torture, and decapitation under the auspices of the Secret Chancellery were the order of the day.

The chief characteristic of her reign was the predominance which German influence acquired during it in Russia. Not only did she bring with her from Courland her notorious and disreputable favourites Bühren¹ and the two brothers Loewenwold, who ruled the court and ruined the country with their

¹ The Russian spelling of this name is *Biren* or *Biron*.

extravagance, but all the chief places and the most lucrative posts in the government and in the army were given to Germans. At the head of the former was Ostermann, now Chancellor, who, after abolishing the Council, became permanent and supreme chief of a nominal cabinet of ministers. The army was under Münnich,¹ one of Peter the Great's latest importations, who first achieved fame as the constructor of the Ládoga canal.²

Outwardly the reign of Anne was a continuation of that of Peter the Great, though the spirit which characterized it was not his. After the coronation the court returned to St. Petersburg, and foreign influence and fashions remained supreme; but the public income was year after year wasted on the private extravagances of the court, and commerce and agriculture decreased lamentably. The people was crushed by taxes which it was never able to pay in full, and expeditions had to be undertaken into the villages to squeeze the money out of the peasants or to sell up their homes. This congenial task was assigned to the army, even to the famous Guards, who thus became police and fiscal agents of the government. To Peter's two famous regiments of the Guards, to whom she owed so much but over whom she was careful to place foreign commanders, Anne added two more, the Izmaílovski³ and the Cavalry Guards.⁴

The cumulative effect of her ten years of tyranny and cruelty, and especially of her handing over of the country to be monopolized and exploited, and the army to be controlled, by Germans, was to arouse the latent sense of national pride and to provoke a widespread, genuine, and profound feeling of hostility to

¹ Written in Russian *Minikk*.

² Owing to the stormy nature of Lake Ládoga it became necessary to make this canal, skirting its southern end to complete and to ensure the safety of communication by water between the Nevá and the Volga.

³ Sc. *polk* (= regiment); thus named after the village of Izmaílovo near Moscow, where Anne had a country residence.

⁴ *Kónno-Gvardeíski polk*.

foreign influence, and especially to that of Germans. Peter the Great, in forty years, had hammered into the Russian intelligence the fact that foreigners in general, and Germans in particular, however unpleasant they may be, were the symbols of reform and the sole guarantee of efficiency, wholesome though distasteful, and he had endowed them with an unmistakable if unpopular halo. In ten years Anne and her disreputable favourites succeeded in dispelling this uncomfortable illusion, and in proving that Germans could be just as lawless and unprofitable as Russians. Their experience in the reigns of Catherine I and Peter II had proved to Russians that the existence of a multitude of decrees does not ensure an era of equity and security: that in the reign of Anne showed them that the rule of foreigners does not connote good government. The attempts to limit the power of the autocracy had failed because the factions amongst the nobility could not agree on a policy, and they consequently ceased dabbling in constitutional architecture. But they were thrown together and reconciled by the domination of foreigners in this reign, and made up their minds that, if they must have the autocracy, they would have it supported by Russian and not by German shoulders, and that they would in their own country be as far as they could the masters of their own destinies. During the reign of Anne this feeling naturally found only furtive expression; the many who shared it had not forgotten what part they themselves took in the events of 1730. Besides, Anne had satisfied many of the selfish claims put forward in that year by the lesser nobility. Thus she abrogated Peter the Great's unpopular law of the inheritance of property. She also alleviated the burdens of military service. In 1731 Münnich founded in St. Petersburg the Corps of Cadets,¹ a sort of Eton and Sandhurst combined, from which sons of the aristocracy who reached a certain educational

¹ *Kadétski Kórpus.*

standard could pass as officers into the services, no longer being obliged to begin their career in the ranks according to the terms of Peter's doubtless salutary but very unpopular enactment. Further, in 1736 the number of years of obligatory service, whether military or civil, was reduced to twenty-five, and out of each family a father was allowed to retain one son permanently at home to look after the estate. But Anne's death removed the factors in the situation which had held this feeling of restiveness in check, while it left in power the one person who had done more than anybody else to provoke it.

Anne died on October 17/28, 1740, and the vexed question of the succession again emerged. She had not considered it necessary to remarry, but she did appoint a successor. This was her great-nephew Iván Antónovich, at this period aged two months. This infant was the child of her niece Anne Leopóldovna. It will be recalled that in 1716 Peter the Great, engrossed in the sport of European dynastic intrigue, then new to Russian royalty, had married his second half-niece Catherine, the sister of the Empress Anne and, like her, presumed daughter of his half-brother Ivan V, to Charles Leopold, Duke of Mecklenburg. To them was born a daughter, called Anne (Leopóldovna), in 1718. After much hesitation, and after having already proclaimed as her successor the son of this niece, if one should be born, the Empress Anne, in 1739, married her to Prince Antony Ulrich of Brunswick-Bevern. Expectations were fulfilled, and their son Ivan (Antónovich) was born in 1740, two months before the death of his great-aunt the Empress Anne. He duly succeeded her and reigned for thirteen months as Ivan VI,¹ hypothetical great-grandson of Ivan V. Neither of his parents was distinguished by any ability, and moreover they

¹ i. e. the sixth Ivan to rule Russia, counting from Ivan 'Kalitá' (1328-41); he was the third *tsar* of this name, counting from Ivan the Terrible, who is known as Ivan IV, and the first *emperor*.

were hardly on speaking terms with one another. On her death-bed Anne therefore confided the regency with autocratic powers to the unspeakable Bühren. But while the Russian nobility and their spokesmen, the regiments of the Guards, had tolerated Anne, the prospect of Bühren as regent was more than they could stand, especially as it was known that he distrusted the Guards, whose ranks, it must be remembered, were solidly filled with noblemen (*dvoryáne*), and that he intended to transfer these aristocratic privates as officers to other regiments in the provinces and fill their places with ordinary recruits.

In addition to all this the death of the empress was the signal for all her German favourites to start fighting among themselves. Münnich, who at least enjoyed some prestige in Russia as a great general, espoused the cause of Ivan VI and his parents, and on November 8/19, at the head of his regiment, the famous Preobrazhénski, arrested Bühren in his bed, after which it was not long before the latter found himself in Siberia. Thereupon Ivan VI's mother, Anne Leopóldovna, proclaimed herself regent, a position for which she was notoriously incapable. After this the government became completely disorganized, and plot succeeded plot. In particular, the veteran Ostermann ousted Münnich from favour and championed Prince Antony against his wife Anne.

The Reign of Elizabeth (1741-61)

This welter was terminated by one of the most famous episodes in Russian history. The younger daughter of Peter the Great (by his second wife), Elizabeth, born in 1709, was at this time still unmarried and resident in Russia. During the reign of the Empress Anne and the regency of Bühren she had been kept in the background and under close watch. But she had a large circle of devoted and able friends and enjoyed great popularity, based on the memory of her parentage, with the regiments of

the Guards. During the chaotic regency of her cousin, Anne Leopóldovna, Elizabeth and her party began to take courage and to form plans. Both she herself and her immediate circle realized that the longer any attempt at the assertion of their ambitions was postponed the less likely these would be to succeed. Moreover Elizabeth focused in herself the hopes of the great mass of the people, and of the army, the nobility, and the clergy, who saw in her the one pledge of their redemption from the rule of the foreigner. These designs were not unknown to Ostermann, who, in view of them and of imminent hostilities with Sweden, decided to remove from the capital certain of the troops on which Elizabeth counted. Knowledge of this made immediate action imperative. She knew that it was a question of the convent or of the throne. On the night of November 25/December 6, 1741, she repaired with her intimates to the barracks of the Preobrazhénski regiment, where she and the Guardsmen took enthusiastic oaths of eternal mutual fealty. Thence they made their way in company to the palace, which was swiftly mastered, and there and then they arrested in their beds Anne Leopóldovna and her husband Prince Antony, and their infant offspring, who were transported in blankets to Elizabeth's own palace. All the foreign chiefs of the fallen régime, Münnich, Ostermann, and company, shared the same fate but not the same respect. The very next day, amid the acclamations of the people, Elizabeth entered into occupation of the evacuated palace, where, surrounded by the swords and spurs of the jubilant Guards, she received the unhesitating allegiance of the Senate and other functionaries of State.

Ivan VI was imprisoned in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, where he spent the rest of his life. His unfortunate parents were relegated to Kholmogóry, near Archangel, where Anne Leopóldovna died in 1746. Her husband survived until 1775. In 1780 the other children, who had grown up only semi-intelli-

gent, were by order of Catherine II, and much against their will, conveyed to Denmark, where they were provided for by their aunt, the queen of that country. Ivan VI perished miserably and darkly in his prison in 1764. Thus was the first German brood, which the Empress Anne had hoped to acclimatize to the inconstant and inhospitable banks of the Nevá—that of Brunswick—dispersed; but another—that of Holstein—soon took its place and was successfully hatched out, to the bane of Russia, by its thoughtless foster-mother, the Empress Elizabeth herself. The wonderful transformation scene enacted by this merry Columbine and her grenadier scene-shifters was not confined to the palace. The great figures of the late reign, including Münnich and Ostermann, were packed off to Siberia. Those who had been disgraced, with the surviving Dolgorúkis at their head, were recalled to the fickle sunshine of St. Petersburg and reinstated in favour. Bühren was promoted to live at Yaroslávl on the Volga.

Compared with the grim reign of the Empress Anne, that of her cousin the Empress Elizabeth, which lasted twenty years, from 1741 to 1761, was relatively a millenium. The material prosperity of the country and the general contentment of the people were greater than they had ever been at any time since the short administration of the *tsarévna* Sophia. The main reason for this was that, not counting the short and successful war against Sweden with which it was inaugurated, the first fifteen years of her reign were spent in peace. Another was that a share in the government of the country fell to men of intelligence and ability, who, though they could hardly be called wholly disinterested public servants, did nevertheless look beyond their own pockets. Such was the senator Prince P. I. Shuválov, who by some of his measures, notably the encouragement of the credit system and the abolition of the internal dues in favour of increased tariffs on both exported

and imported goods, considerably improved the financial position of the country. It was now indeed for the first time since the reign of Peter the Great that any such measures of reform were taken.

Besides these facts a certain amount of credit must be conceded to Elizabeth herself and to the atmosphere which she created around her. The watchword of her reign was pleasure all the time, and therefore things which interfered with pleasure, such as business, were strictly neglected. Elizabeth possessed her father's immense energy, but, while he had devoted his to hard work with an intermittent carouse, hers was dedicated unreservedly to amusement. In this she resembled her late cousin the Empress Anne, but it must be admitted that though Elizabeth's taste and manners were not those of Versailles, and in view of her parentage could not be expected to be so, they were nevertheless an improvement on those of Mitau. In all other respects she differed profoundly from her cousin. Elizabeth was only occasionally cruel and malicious, not habitually so. She could be heartless and implacable when the safety of her throne or the supremacy of her own personal charms was involved, but by nature she was undoubtedly kind and benevolent. She was excessively vain, a trait justified by very beautiful eyes, a dazzling complexion, and a good figure. Her education had been partial; she could dance faultlessly the minuet, but was unaware that Great Britain is an island. She never read a book, but she had plenty of brains. She was, above and before all, an indefatigable and unabashed voluptuary. Her thirst for pleasure, which had been severely held in check during her cousin's rule, now enjoyed full play, and remained unsated and insatiable till the end. Her whole reign was spent in a continuous whirlwind of excitement and jollification. Her dominant passions were for music, the theatre, dancing, and costume; at her death she possessed

15,000 dresses. A succession of lively affairs of the heart also played a great part in her life, the chief being with Alexis Razumóvski, a Cossack from Little Russia, who began his career as a choir-boy of the Empress Anne, and remained Elizabeth's favourite to the last, though he had many rivals. His younger brother Cyril was made President of the Academy of Sciences and also *Hetman* of the Ukraine, an office of which he was the last holder.

Elizabeth's accession was generally hailed with favour as a symbol of the determination to eradicate German influence, and of the reassertion of nationalism. This it undoubtedly was to a large extent, though the nationalism which asserted itself was distinctly qualified. The empress prided herself above all else on being the daughter of Peter the Great, and therefore a return to the old régime was precluded. She had a great partiality for Moscow as a place of residence, but nevertheless St. Petersburg remained the official capital and gradually became a more habitable city. There is no doubt that Elizabeth was intensely, though by no means narrowly, patriotic; it was in this that she most closely resembled her father, and by this that she rallied the nobility to her throne, for her patriotism, though ardent and sincere, did not express itself in ways which interfered with their leisure. It is also true that Elizabeth, unlike her father, had a positive dislike of Prussians and Prussia. Therefore, her interests lying not in the realm of metallurgy and mechanics, but in that of art, in its most catholic sense, her eyes turned naturally towards France, inexhaustible fount of the amenities of life. It was in this reign that intercourse between Russia and France, hitherto confined to the exchange of diplomats, first became generally extended to the exchange of commodities and of ideas, and the French language and French civilization established themselves in Russia in that unique position of supremacy from which they have only

very gradually during the last fifty years been deposed. With all this Elizabeth showed great lack of judgement and of imagination on one all-important point, that of the succession to the throne. One of her first acts as empress was to send to Kiel for her nephew with the intention of appointing him as her heir. She was in this measure actuated certainly by a sense of family loyalty, wishing to secure the throne for the last descendant of Peter the Great, and possibly also by a sense of justice and prudence, inasmuch as this nephew, being the son of her elder sister, had just as good, if not a better claim to the crown than she herself. At the same time it was a tacit indication that she entertained no idea of hampering her personal freedom by marriage. Having decided not to found a new dynasty herself, there was no other choice open to her than that which she adopted; but nevertheless, for herself, for her country, and for her people, it was one that proved calamitous.

The creature she summoned—for he was more marionette than man—was the only child of Elizabeth's elder sister Anne, who was born in 1708, and was the only grandchild of Peter the Great by his second marriage. Peter the Great in the course of his match-making activities had arranged for his daughter Anne to marry Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, the nephew of Charles XII of Sweden, whose sister had married the Duke of Holstein. He did not live to witness the event, but six months after his death, in June 1725, the marriage duly took place. Anne died shortly after the birth of a son in 1728, and her husband did not long survive her. It was this orphan who was destined to play such a momentous, albeit brief, rôle in Russian history. His names were Charles Peter Ulrich, and, being originally considered the probable heir to the throne of Sweden, he had been brought up as a Protestant and taught Swedish. He was now, at the age of fourteen, diverted from his natural growth, uprooted from his home at Kiel, and planted in

Moscow, where on November 7/18, 1742, Elizabeth proclaimed him heir to the Russian throne under the name of the Grand Duke ¹ Peter Feódorovich, ² converted him to Orthodoxy, and told him to learn Russian. He himself deeply resented every step in this involuntary process of transformation, and nursed his resentment for nineteen years. Elizabeth ingenuously hoped that, caught so young, this German could be moulded into a Russian, but her hopes were to be sadly undeceived. From the very first, exile in Russia only accentuated his love for the country of his birth and for everything belonging to it. It was a most tragic irony. Peter the Great, with his passionate patriotism, had laboured all his life to break down the barriers which shut off Russia from the rest of Europe and to introduce the fruits of European science into Russia. One of the perhaps inevitable but perhaps also regrettable features of his policy and his desire to fuse Russia with Europe was the discontinuance of the old tradition which compelled the *tsars* to marry some one of their own faith, i.e. a daughter of the Russian nobility (there had only been one extra-territorial marriage in the history of Moscow, that of Ivan III), and the substitution of matrimonial alliances based on reasons of dynastic and international politics. It cannot be contended that the old system had been perfect, or even generally beneficial. It almost always led to distracting family feuds and to the gross abuse of influence on the part of the *tsarítsa's* relatives. But at least it had given Russia a Peter the Great. The new system, inaugurated with the best inten-

¹ In Russian *Veliki Knyaz*, literally 'Great Prince'; Russian has no title literally equivalent to 'Duke'.

² From this time onwards it became a convention to give this patronymic (Feódorovna, in the case of women) to members of foreign royal houses and other faiths on being received into the faith and the imperial family of Russia; thus the consort of the ex-*tsar* Nicholas II was known as Alexandra Feódorovna.

tions by Peter the Great, merely involved Russia still more inextricably and unprofitably in the great game of European politics, in which Russia became a valuable stake; it opened a fruitful field for the deployment of European, especially German, intrigue, and another market for the disposal of German princes and princesses, while it forced the Russian people, without any justification, to provide armies to fight alien battles for alien kings. It gave Russia Peter III and Catherine II, and, after a century of unbridled and unparalleled and picturesque extravagance, punctuated by assassinations and palace revolutions—the immediate untoward effect on the Russian system of the virus of European civilization with which Peter the Great had inoculated it—resulted in the achievement by the Russian court of the cosmopolitan dullness and international respectability which it maintained until the end of the nineteenth century.

In the logic of the new order of things it was inevitable that the German Grand Duke Peter should have a German wife. She was duly provided by Frederick (the Great), who had ascended the Prussian throne in 1740, in the person of Princess Sophie of Anhalt-Zerbst, and sent to St. Petersburg with her mother in 1744. She was not a stranger to Peter, as they had already met at Eutin in 1739. This girl, destined to be the great Empress Catherine II, was at the moment fifteen years old. Her father was Prince Christian Augustus of Anhalt-Zerbst—an indigent princely House—and an officer in the Prussian army. He had married a Princess Johanna Elizabeth of Holstein, sister of a Prince Charles Augustus of Holstein, Bishop of Lübeck, who in 1726 had actually been affianced to the Empress, then the Princess, Elizabeth of Russia, but had been carried off by small-pox before the marriage could be celebrated. Both were first cousins of the Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein who had married Elizabeth's sister Anne in 1725, and was the

father of Peter. The young Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst was thus the second cousin of her future husband. She found favour in the sight of Elizabeth, and also in that of Peter, and, after being duly converted to Orthodoxy, renamed Catherine Alexéïevna and betrothed, was at length, after many delays caused by Peter's ill health, married to him at St. Petersburg in August 1745. The bride was at this time sixteen and the bridegroom seventeen.

To Catherine's credit it must be said that she never pretended to be captivated by Peter. He was, indeed, in every respect a most unattractive person, resembling in face, in manner, and in character a monkey rather than a man. He was stunted both in mind and in body. His education had been neglected when he was a child owing to his weak health, and was never subsequently made good. He astonished even the unstudious Empress Elizabeth by his ignorance. He was, in general, absolutely shallow and flippant, and at the same time vain and mischievous. Such was the great-nephew of Charles XII and the grandson of Peter the Great. Catherine, on the other hand, in spite of her unpretentious antecedents, was even at this time a remarkable princess. She was good-looking and sprightly. She combined ambition with tact. She was relatively well read and well educated. She was unobtrusively observant and precociously shrewd. Her most striking characteristic was her keen and infallible judgement of men and of situations. The union of these two persons in wedlock was a matrimonial farce and a political comedy. As *promessi sposi* they had got on tolerably well together. Both Catherine and her mother realized that a throne was at stake, though at one moment the latter all but ruined the prospect, and brought down on herself the wrath of Elizabeth, by her tactless and premature political intrigues, so that after the wedding she was encouraged to make an early start on the return journey to Anhalt-Zerbst. Bu

marriage seemed to divide rather than to unite this already ill-assorted couple, who had nothing in common but nationality. Catherine soon found the company of other men more diverting than that of her ill-conditioned husband, though she never subordinated her passion to her intelligence. Peter, for his part, was popularly supposed to be impotent, and at the same time managed to acquire the reputation of a profligate.

Years passed: Russia's expectations awaited fulfilment; Ivan VI grew in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, and Elizabeth wondered. A duenna was appointed to watch over Catherine and to promote an atmosphere of domesticity and motherhood in the Grand-Ducal household, but the only result was that Catherine fell in love with the duenna's husband. Nevertheless, nature and dynastic exigencies were not for ever to be defied. In 1754 Catherine became a mother, and gave birth to a boy of whose parentage all that can be said is that while his maternity was relatively certain his paternity was absolutely vague. Be that as it may, he was forthwith regarded as the ultimate heir to the throne and ravished from his mother by Elizabeth, who regarded isolation as the most secure means of ensuring the survival of this supposititious scion of Peter the Great. This was the boy who afterwards became the fantastic Emperor Paul. To do him justice it must be conceded, with apologies, that both in character and in appearance he later resembled his hypothetical and worthless father, Peter III. So slender is the thread of authenticity on which the legitimacy of the late dynasty depended. The purpose for which she came to Russia having thus been fulfilled, Catherine relapsed into unimportance and neglect. But she had more sense than to waste her enforced leisure. She had from the first been the exact opposite of her husband in this, that while he never made any concealment of his contempt and dislike of his adopted country, and made no effort to overcome them, she had from the moment of her

arrival done everything to ingratiate herself with the Russian people and taken pains to get to know the land and the language, and she had in large measure succeeded. It was from now onwards, as it were scenting the great part which destiny held in store for her, that she devoted herself more intensively to the study of her surroundings and also to the improvement of her own mind.

One of the most striking features in the official Russia of the reign of Elizabeth was the separate existence in the country of two courts, that of the empress and that of the heir-apparent and his consort, and therefore of two separate political camps and two sets of court influences and intrigues. In view of the complete absence of any regular system of government, of the disappearance of such representative institutions as had still existed in the seventeenth century, of the omnipotence of personal favour, and of the backstairs influence which all these conditions favoured, it can be imagined what a maze of intrigue grew up and entangled Russian diplomacy at this period. Foreign diplomats, when they could not get what they wanted from one court, had recourse to the other. Finally, in the Seven Years' War, when Russia fought against Prussia, the 'Young Court', as it was called, became definitely and notoriously a hot-bed of German espionage and the information bureau of Frederick the Great in the land of his most formidable and most implacable enemies. In the end, it is true, even this succour failed him, and he found himself veritably at bay, his amorphous and upstart kingdom threatened with disruption, when he was saved by the death of the Empress Elizabeth. This event, which occurred on December 25, 1761/January 5, 1762, had been imminent for some time past. A combination of worries hastened its consummation. Elizabeth was worried by the war which dragged on owing to the incapacity of her generals, the treachery of the pro-German party within Russia,

and the endless international intrigues which clouded the issues ; she was worried by the deterioration in the internal condition of Russia which the war had produced, especially in the realm of finance ; she was worried by the rising star of the ' Young Court ' and by the simultaneous eclipse of her own personal attractions ; at the same time she was desperately anxious to continue the war to its logical conclusion, which was the total destruction of Prussia. But it was not to be. Elizabeth, whose comparative wisdom and goodness of heart, as Russian sovereigns went, had been inadequately appreciated during her lifetime, was universally deplored by her subjects after her death.

The Reign of Peter III and the Accession of Catherine II,
1761-2

She was succeeded by her nephew, in accordance with her own dispositions. The accession of Peter III was unaccompanied by the disturbance of peace at home and was the signal for the immediate restoration of peace abroad. Always an admirer of Frederick the Great, whom he absurdly imagined himself to resemble, Peter III immediately on coming to power reversed the policy of his predecessor, brought literally to nought all Russia's immense efforts and immense losses in the Seven Years' War, triumphantly and brazenly inaugurated the era of pro-Germanism which was to last without intermission for over a hundred years, and stretched out the hand of friendship to the King of Prussia. Thereby Prussia was saved, and Poland, inferentially, doomed.

Peter III's reign was brief but eventful. It lasted only six months, but that period was quite long enough for him to prove, to any who still doubted, his utter and absolute imbecility. This he did by two notorious acts. The first was the conclusion of peace with Frederick, then as good as vanquished, in April

1762, the restitution to him of East Prussia, that kernel of modern Germany, which he was ready to surrender, a proof of the straits in which he found himself, and the proposal to let him use the Russian army against Russia's ally, Austria. The second was the formal liberation of the Russian nobility (*dvoryánstvo*) from those few obligations to the State, which, after a process of whittling down during fifty years, were all that remained of the great universal national service scheme of Peter the Great.

Peter the Great had introduced compulsory service for all the nobility, either civil or military, in return for their possession of land and of the labour with which to work it. But the subjection of the peasants to the landholders was still understood to be the means of enabling the latter to discharge efficiently their duties to the State, and a very large proportion of the land was still regarded as State property granted to the holders with the same object. Peter the Great, while relaxing nothing of the rigours of the customs and laws which chained the peasants to the land, yet exacted in return a considerable amount of personal service from the holders of the land, the virtual owners of the peasants. During the thirty-five years which followed his death (1725-60) all these conditions changed. War ceased to be a permanent condition and financial requirements came to take precedence of military. The methods for the collection of revenue introduced by Peter the Great and his immediate successors were quite inadequate, and failure to pay the taxes in full (*nedoímka*) and large deficits became perennial. Compulsory service, especially of the arduous character demanded by the indefatigable Peter the Great, was very unpopular with the nobility, and from 1730 onwards they managed to bring about various mitigations of their hard lot. The general sense of these was to lessen the incidence of State service, and to enable the landholders to spend more time on the land which

they held. Simultaneously the nobility, the controllers of the land and of the labour, were made definitely and collectively responsible for the collection of revenue from the peasants and its due payment to the State; their powers of control over the lives of their serfs were made virtually absolute; all the land held by the various grades of the nobility became assimilated, in the sense that it all came to be looked on as the absolute property of the individual holders; and, finally, the ownership of land and labour, together with the collection of revenue from the land, was made a close monopoly of the nobility. Meanwhile the nobility itself (*dvoryánstvo*), to enhance the value of these privileges, serried its ranks and made it much more difficult than it had previously been for outsiders to obtain admission; and all the vague intermediate classes—casual labour, monastic dependents, and so forth—were swept into the net of serfdom or slave-labour. That is to say, the nobility tended to become rather the police and fiscal agents of the Government than the exclusively military or official caste; and their ardour in their new capacity could be unquestionably relied on, because their own private income and well-being was derived from and was dependent on the same sources as those which provided the State with revenue—the cultivators of the land.

This process, by virtue of which the land-owning class had secured in its own hands such immense power, was crowned by the famous manifesto of February 18, 1762, known as the emancipation of the nobility. By its provisions service to the State on the part of the *dvoryánstvo* was made entirely voluntary, except in moments of national crisis when it could still be proclaimed compulsory, and the only obligation to the State from which the nobility were not relieved was—to provide for the education of their sons. The emancipation of the serfs, which in reason and in fairness would have been the natural and immediate consequence of this

enactment, was, as is well known, not promulgated till exactly a hundred years later.¹ This *ukáz*, which was really the work of Vorontsév, father of the mistress of Peter III, and of a circle of nobles of which he was the centre, evoked frenzied enthusiasm in the class which it liberated. The nobility was now free to provide itself with the means wherewith to play a rôle befitting its dignity in the great times which were to come. Other edicts of Peter III, such as those abolishing the secret police and permitting freedom to the dissenters, were more sensible, but were also dictated by officials who hoped by this means to ensure the popularity of the emperor and thus also the security of their own position. But it was all of no use. Do his ministers what they would, they could not turn an idiot into a sage. His own acts discounted the popularity which his edicts were meant to win. He alienated the clergy and all the faithful by his open contempt for the Orthodox Church, and by suggesting the secularization of the ecclesiastical and monastic properties; and he had not the strength of his grandfather to weather the storm which such action threatened to raise. He alienated the army by his ostentatious worship of Frederick the Great, by forcing it to adopt a uniform like the Prussian, by the multiplication of reviews and the accentuation of discipline, and, finally, by creating a regiment of Household Guards composed of non-Russian, i. e. German and other foreign-born, soldiers. The famous Russian regiments of the Guard saw their position of supremacy threatened, and Peter III's fate was sealed. Opinion in the capital was still further exasperated by the fact that, not content with making peace with Prussia, Peter III was preparing to use the Russian army in a war against Denmark in order to recover the province of Schleswig, of which that country had lately robbed his own microscopic duchy of Holstein. This was the last straw. Discontent was so widespread and so unanimous that

¹ Based on Klyuchévski, vol. iv.

people talked openly of the coming change, days before it occurred. Only a spark was needed to set all this tinder alight, and this was duly provided by the electric personality of Catherine. She had won the sympathies of the people, and especially of the Guards, by her personal charms, by her identification of herself with her adopted country, and by the ill treatment to which her outrageous husband subjected her.

The revolution which followed was a very different affair from those which have been described. It was not a palace conspiracy but a popular movement, at any rate as far as the capital was concerned. It was not provoked by dynastic intrigue, but sprang spontaneously from a deep sense of national injury. It was made not in the name of any member of the dynasty (of whom only two were alive—the prisoner Ivan VI and the eight-year-old boy Paul), but in that of a German princess who had no connexion with Russia except as the consort of its very un-Russian emperor. Thus the Russian people, or rather the nobility in the capital and the army, who were then its only vocal representatives, abjured the emperor to whom only six months previously they had sworn fidelity, and gave Russia a non-Russian sovereign of their own choice. The revolution itself was of short duration and absolutely bloodless. The preparations for it were rapid and few—such was the strength of opinion in its favour. Catherine was staying at Peterhof, on the shore of the Gulf of Finland, 15 miles west of St. Petersburg, where on the 29th of July, his name's-day, she was to be rejoined by her husband; thence he was to proceed to the capital to bid God-speed to his troops on their way to Holstein. He himself was meanwhile merry-making at Oranienbaum, 5 miles west of Peterhof, in blissful ignorance of what was afoot. Catherine's supporters-in-chief were Count Cyril Razumóvski, Colonel of the Izmáilovski regiment, the two stalwart and handsome brothers Orlóv, Alexis and Gregory, of the same regiment,

Count Pánin, and Princess Dáshkova, daughter of the Chancellor Vorontsów and sister of the emperor's mistress. The development of the plot was hastened by its inadvertent betrayal by an excessively zealous supporter, which led to the arrest of one of its chief agents, and as a consequence it was unexpectedly rapid. Catherine, summoned post-haste from Peterhof on the morning of July 8, arrived in the capital, made a tour of the barracks where she received the exuberant homage of all the Guards' regiments, and thence made her way to the newly-completed Winter Palace, where the assembled Senate and Synod took the oath of loyalty to her. She was there and then proclaimed empress 'by the will of the whole people, in defence of the Orthodox Faith, of the glory of Russia, and of internal order'. The evening of the same crowded day she rode on horseback and in uniform, accompanied by all her newly-found court, to Peterhof. Peter III, meanwhile, who had arrived to find an empty palace, had by that time learnt vaguely of the latest events. Emissaries, including Vorontsów, whom he had sent to St. Petersburg to bring the empress to reason, merely and promptly went over to her side. Left alone with his court ladies, he hurriedly embarked and returned to Oranienbaum. The next day Catherine compelled him to sign an act of voluntary abdication, had him brought to Peterhof, and thence dispatched him to Ropsha, a village to the south of St. Petersburg which the Empress Elizabeth had given him. There he was interned and placed under the guard of Alexis Orlów, and there, a week later, as the result of a brawl in which the whole party, all the worse for drink, became involved, he perished. This peaceful revolution was the last of the series of upheavals enacted by the regiments which Peter the Great had created. The Russian governing class, controlling as it did both financial and military resources, had found itself.

External Affairs from 1725 to 1762

In the course of this period (1725-62) Russia became involved in a series of wars of which the general characteristics were, that though an immense number of lives were lost, vast treasure was spent and many victories were won, no proportionate material advantage was gained from them in return, and the main objects of Russian foreign policy, the complete reunion of the Russian nation and the extension of the political boundary to the natural limits of the Russian plain (that is to say, the shore of the Black Sea, Esthonia and Livonia being already Russian), were not in the least advanced. The reigns of Catherine I and Peter II (1725-30) were peaceful. The Russian forces were able to enjoy a few years of rest on the strength of Poltáva and of Hangö. In 1724 an alliance had actually been concluded between Russia and Sweden, and this was followed by one with Austria in 1726, the year in which Russia recognized the pragmatic sanction of the Emperor Charles VI. Russia was in the position of a new boy at school who has unexpectedly proved the efficacy of his fists on older members of the community and reaps the novel reward of respect and solicitation.

The two wars which filled the reign of the Empress Anne (Ivánovna, 1730-40) were that called 'of the Polish Succession', and that against Turkey.

Poland had already at this time for more than a century been subject to an almost continuous process of corrosion within and erosion without. In 1733 it was already no longer a genuinely autonomous state, as events rapidly proved. The two candidates for the throne were Stanislas Leszczyński and Frederick Augustus, son of the last king. The former was supported by France and by the powerful Polish family of the Potockis; other Polish magnates also disingenuously urged the exclusion of a foreigner from the throne, knowing that

the neighbouring Powers would not tolerate Leszczyński and hoping to secure the crown for one of themselves. Leszczyński had paid visits to Vienna, where he promised to recognize the pragmatic sanction in return for Charles VI's support, and to Petersburg, where he promised the Empress Anne the Grand Duchy of Courland, on the death of the last of the Kettlers, for her to give to Bühren. In spite of the fact that both Austria and Russia announced through their ambassadors that they would not recognize Leszczyński, he was elected king in September 1733. But a large party of the electors dissented and withdrew to the right or east bank of the Vistula. There, three weeks later, they were joined by a large Russian army, under Anne's Scottish general Lacy, and Augustus III was then proclaimed king by them. Leszczyński in alarm made his way to Danzig, while Augustus was crowned at Cracow (January 1734). Lacy laid siege to Danzig, but the Russian army was no longer equipped as in the days of Peter the Great. The city capitulated to Münnich after four and a half months and at great sacrifice of Russian life, and Leszczyński took refuge in Königsberg.

Meanwhile France and Austria were also engaged in hostilities on the same question. The French armies seized a number of Austrian provinces, but the situation was saved by the sudden appearance of Lacy with a Russian army corps on the Rhine, and the result was the Treaty of Vienna (1735), by which Leszczyński abdicated and was given a life interest in Lorraine as a reward, the province afterwards to revert to France. The war of the Polish Succession was followed by one between Russia and Turkey. This was partly instigated by France in revenge for the Russian help of Austria and was partly sought by Russia, who was anxious to maintain her prestige and also to rectify the conditions of the Treaty of the Prut (1711, cf. p. 232). In those days the Ottoman Empire occupied, with

regard to France, the same position as it has done to the modern German Empire in the last forty years. The pretext for the war on Russia's part was to punish the Crimean Tartars, who were under Turkish suzerainty, for making raids into Russia, and also, to prevent possible intervention of Turkey in the affairs of Poland. The war began in 1735 and lasted four years. The Russian armies under Münnich covered themselves with glory. The Crimea was raided and devastated three times. Azóv and Ochákov, a fortress on the Black Sea coast between the mouths of the rivers Dniester and Dnieper, were stormed, and finally Moldavia, with its capital Jassy, was conquered and occupied. A hundred thousand lives were sacrificed. But the Treaty of Belgrade, which in 1739 terminated the war, was little short of disastrous both for Austria and Russia, largely owing to the military failures of Austria, to the ineptitude of Russian diplomacy headed by the Chancellor Ostermann, and to the skill of the French ambassador at Constantinople. Russia demanded the Black Sea littoral from the Kubán to the Danube, including the Crimea, but in the end secured only a narrow strip of territory between her northern frontier and the Black Sea coast, and the town of Azóv, which she was forbidden to fortify, nor could she even get permission to sail any ships, of commerce or of war, on the Black Sea. Austria by the same treaty lost much of the territory which Prince Eugene of Savoy had won for her and secured by the Treaty of Passarowitz (*Požarevac*) in 1717.

The alliance with Austria, which had been in force since 1726, involved Russia in two wars during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth (1741-62), that with Sweden, and that of the Austrian Succession which developed into the Seven Years' War.

The Emperor Charles VI had died in 1740, and had been succeeded by his daughter, Maria Theresa, as Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, and ruler of the various other scattered Hapsburg dominions. Although he had spent the energies of a whole reign

in obtaining the recognition of the pragmatic sanction by the various Courts of Europe, little heed was paid at his death to the various agreements, and Maria Theresa found herself beset by enemies. The principal of these was of course Frederick, who had succeeded to the throne of Prussia, also in 1740. Frederick promptly made war on his neighbour, and after a series of victories secured possession of the valuable province of Silesia. The arrangement of the Powers was one in which France and Prussia were pitted against Great Britain, Austria, and Russia. Sweden, no longer the Power that she was, was still a satellite of France. In order to prevent Russia from helping her ally Austria, France and Prussia had provoked Sweden to attack her, on the chance of recovering once more some of the conquests of Peter the Great. The Swedes ingenuously posed as the champions of Elizabeth's rights to the throne; this was in 1741, during the brief régime of Anne Leopoldovna. When, therefore, in November 1741 Elizabeth herself seized the throne without the help of anybody, except that of the Guards, they no longer knew exactly what to say they were fighting for. The campaign itself was brief and entirely creditable to the Russian army, which was under the command of the Scottish generals, Lacy and Keith. It took place in Finland. The Russians rapidly conquered the whole south of the country, including Helsingfors and Abo, and in the autumn of 1742 the Swedes sued for peace. This was concluded at Abo in 1743, and gave Russia a considerable slice of south-eastern Finland.

The war of the Austrian Succession was a more complicated and grander affair. Neither it nor its successor the Seven Years' War had the slightest ultimate effect on Russian history. They were rather luxurious and costly manifestations of Russia's newly-acquired power of intervention in European affairs. The war of the Austrian Succession lasted from 1740 until 1748, when it was terminated by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle;

Russia took no really active part in it until that year. For six years she hedged. Elizabeth was absorbed by the newly-found pleasures of being an empress, and her ministers, the Chancellor Bestúzhev-Ryúmin and the Vice-Chancellor Vorontsév, could not agree on a policy. The ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria kept pulling this way and that. Finally, in 1746, Russia renewed the treaty of alliance of 1726 with Austria. In 1748 a Russian army corps under Repnín again marched to the Rhine, but never fired a shot, and did not in the least affect the issue. That had already been decided in various European theatres of war. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 Maria Theresa had definitely consolidated her position on the throne of the Hapsburgs, and had lived down the pragmatic sanction at the cost of Silesia and some less important outlying portions of her dominions. Meanwhile, her husband Francis Stephen, Duke of Lorraine, had in 1745 been elected emperor as Francis I, on the death of the Emperor Charles VII (the Elector of Bavaria, 1742-5), and thus the imperial dignity had returned to Austria in the person of the queen's consort.

During the next decade a complete change took place in the arrangement of the European Powers. The acquisition of Silesia by Prussia opened the eyes of Europe to the latent dangers to all its neighbours which the rise of that Power contained. The enmity between Vienna and Berlin grew rather than diminished. Maria Theresa possessed a very able minister in Count Kaunitz,¹ who had represented Austria at Aix-la-Chapelle, and from 1751 to 1753 had been Austrian ambassador at Paris. He directed all his efforts to the isolation of Prussia; and the result of them was the Treaty of Versailles of May 1756, by which France and Austria, the secular enemies of one another, became allies. About the same time Great Britain became involved in a colonial war with France, and in January 1756 concluded an

¹ The real name of this Bohemian family was *Kounic* (lit. *marten*).

alliance with Prussia in order to secure Hanover from French attack. The position of Russia, a matter of the greatest importance to both sets of Powers, remained ambiguous. Elizabeth and Bestúzhev-Ryúmin were notoriously anti-Prussian, but the latter, imagining that in the war which all saw to be imminent the old grouping of the Powers would be maintained, had in September 1755 concluded an alliance with Great Britain. Thus Russia had a foot in either camp. Frederick had also faithful friends in Russia in the persons of the Grand Ducal couple, Peter and Catherine. Eventually, owing to the great activities of French official and unofficial diplomacy at Petersburg, Russia became a party to the Treaty of Versailles in January 1757, so that Frederick had Russia, Austria, and France, not to mention Sweden and Saxony, against him.

Frederick opened the war by invading Saxony and Bohemia in May 1757. In East Prussia, which was separated from the rest of his dominions by Polish territory, he left a comparatively small force, judging it a secondary theatre of war and under-estimating the weight of the impending Russian attack. This was launched in the summer of 1757, when the Russian army, under Apráxin, invaded Prussia, and, advancing towards Koenigsberg, joined battle with the Prussians under von Lehwaldt at Gross-Jaegersdorf¹ on August 29, 1757. The Russians, at the beginning of the battle, were on the point of losing the day, and in effect suffered far heavier losses than their enemies, but the valour of young Count Peter Rumyántsev at the head of the Nóvgorod regiment rallied the shaken Russian army and turned what appeared inevitable defeat into a great Russian victory. Frederick had already been beaten that summer by the Austrians at Kolin in June, and by the French at Hastenbeck in July, and was already in a difficult situation. But, instead of following up his victory, Apráxin retreated to Tilsit, and then evacuated

¹ Between Insterburg and Friedland.

Prussia and retired beyond the Niemen. This retreat, which greatly helped Frederick and greatly embarrassed Russia's allies, has always remained a mystery. Apráxin has been accused of corruption and of having been unduly influenced by the 'Young Court'. The Russian army was also lamentably short of supplies of all sorts. Probably his action was connected with the health of the Empress Elizabeth, which already was very precarious.¹ Just at this time she had a stroke which at first all believed to be fatal. As her health failed the influence of her heir, the Grand Duke Peter, and of his wife Catherine increased. Bestúzhev-Ryúmin had already gone over to their side; and this had been one reason which had inclined Frederick to minimize the Russian danger. Her death at this moment would have meant an instant alteration of Russian policy, as it did five years later. But she recovered. Inquiries were held, as a result of which, in 1758, Bestúzhev-Ryúmin was disgraced and exiled, Catherine and her husband brought to heel by a threatened alteration of the succession, Apráxin died of apoplexy, and Elizabeth determined to prosecute the war with greater vigour than ever. This was a triumph for France and Austria, damped as they were by the effect of Rosbach in October, and of Lissa in December, 1757.

Already in January 1758 the Russian army, under the command of Count Fermor, had again invaded Prussia and, advancing unopposed, had occupied Königsberg. Thence it slowly made its way to Küstrin on the Oder, which it reached in July. Frederick hurried to save this place, which defended the road to Berlin, crossed the Oder and forced the Russians to retire to the village of Zorndorf, where the battle of that name was fought on August 24, 1758. The result was a great victory for Frederick; and it was followed by the retreat but not the destruction of the Russian army. The following year the command of the Russian

¹ Waliszewski, *La Dernière des Romanov*, p. 449.

army was given to Saltykóv, who was not any more gifted as a general than his two predecessors. On August 9, 1759, took place the great battle of Künersdorf near Frankfort (on the Oder), which proved a veritable disaster for Frederick and his army. Here, too, the Prussians were successful in the earlier phases of the battle, but the fire of the Russian artillery and the resistance of the Russian troops, combined with an attack on Frederick by the Austrians under Laudon, were in the end too much for him, and he retired, himself in despair and his army and artillery in ruins. But once more neither the Russians nor the Austrians followed up their victory, and Frederick was again given time to recuperate. The following winter was spent in negotiation and in discussion of their respective terms of territorial compensation by the allies. In 1760 a joint expedition of Russians and Austrians was planned against Berlin, and if it had been properly carried out, would have undoubtedly settled the issue of the war. As it was, it resolved itself into a mere raid under the Russian general Tottleben, who was all the time receiving money secretly from Frederick. The Russian and Austrian troops entered Berlin, which the Prussian army had abandoned, on October 8, imposed a levy, ransacked the shops, destroyed a lot of property, and left again on the 11th on getting news of Frederick's approach from the direction of Silesia. The following year the Russians conquered Pomerania and Rumyantsev captured Kolberg. The Austrians under Laudon took Schweidnitz. Frederick was exhausted and was no longer able to offer serious resistance. If better co-ordination had existed between the Austrians and the Russians he could not have escaped destruction. At the end of 1761 he was so desperate that he thought of asking Turkey for help. The death of the Empress Elizabeth on December 22, 1761/January 2, 1762, and the accession of Peter III, saved him.

The war between Austria and Prussia was continued half-

heartedly until 1763, when it was terminated by the Peace of Hubertsburg. This stipulated that things should be as they were before the war. Silesia remained Prussian, and Frederick kept a province—then, as now, half Polish in population—which was the source of a large revenue, and to-day is one of the main economic pillars of Germany.

7

*Conquest of the Crimea and Dismemberment of Poland**Catherine II (1762-96)*

CATHERINE II was thirty-three years old when she became empress in 1762, and she reigned until 1796. She was a German princess who usurped the throne, stepping to it across the corpse of one legitimate Russian emperor, Peter III, grandson of Peter the Great and her own husband (though not, be it remembered, the husband of her own choice), and across the living skeleton of another legitimate Russian emperor, Ivan VI, imprisoned in Schlüsselburg—brushing aside, too, the rightful heir, her own son Paul, born in 1754, whom she relegated to the estate of Gátchina, near St. Petersburg, where he was forced to spend the next thirty-four years of his life (1762-96), chafing in virtual imprisonment. But all this did not prevent her from being unutterably shocked by the execution of Louis XVI.

Her reign was a great epoch in Russian history, though it is impossible honestly to concede that epithet to the empress herself. Catherine did not make her epoch, as Peter the Great did his, but was made by it. All the conditions which made her achievements and those of her coadjutors possible existed at the time of her accession. The complete emancipation of the

nobility (*dvoryánstvo*) and the complete enslavement of the proletariat enabled the former to develop habits of life both at home and abroad ‘*dans le grand style, la grande manière*’ which created the tradition of the boundless wealth of the Russian aristocracy—wealth which was produced by the impoverishment of their estates and the degradation of their serfs and was squandered abroad—and also forced the latter to express its feelings in the great social revolution of 1773. The anarchy and demoralization of Poland and the decadence of the Ottoman Empire enabled Catherine with comparative facility to acquire enormous territories at the expense of these countries, to gain the merit of having enlarged the boundaries of the empire more than any sovereign since Ivan IV, and generously to endow her favourites with other people’s property. By 1762 two whole generations had passed since Peter the Great had dragged and pushed unwilling Russia to the waters of Western civilization and succeeded with untold efforts in making her drink: it was therefore not surprising that now the upper class of Russian society should not only look, but should also begin to feel and think, like their compeers in other European countries, that they should dabble in continental freemasonry and in the philosophy of the French Encyclopaedists, and, so far from considering, as they did in the old days, that the acquisition of foreign languages endangered the salvation of the soul, should come to look on their mother-tongue as a vulgar and negligible *patois*. The existence of these conditions and the occurrence of these events cannot be put to the credit of Catherine, though it is undeniable that she turned them to the best possible account. She gave the impression that she was pulling hard all the time, but in fact she was merely borne along on the current. *Imponieren* was her watchword. Her reign was extremely imposing and so was she herself, but it was also something of an imposition, and she herself was something of a humbug. In her self-advertisement

there was a good deal of bluff. She was one of those persons who are made responsible for a number of nice things which they do not do, and escape responsibility for a number of nasty things which they actually do. In the Russia of those days, after all that had gone before, it did not require a great mental effort to appear as an enlightened despot, a philosopher, a torch-bearer of civilization. When she was young and felt secure she liked to play with liberal ideas, to shock her ministers, and to astonish the men of letters in Paris. But it only required the events of 1789 and advancing age to make her show her true colours.

At the same time, there was much that was good in her, and even much that compels admiration. She offered a great contrast to all her predecessors on the throne, and in most respects a favourable one. She might almost be called a feminine *pendant* to Peter the Great. Once she had achieved her ambition, which was the imperial crown, she applied herself with skill and energy to what she thought were the best interests of her adopted country. Just as he was the first ruler of Russia who really worked, she was the first who read and wrote and thought. She was the first Russian sovereign who can be termed educated. She was also really clever. She had a passion for writing and expressed her thoughts with facility and verve. She appreciated painting and architecture. She also had her foibles. She was notoriously sensual, with a ready passion for large and handsome men. Her lovers cannot be counted on the fingers of two hands. But she never abandoned herself to pleasure like her predecessors, and, though she valued occasional pomp and luxury, in her personal habits she was frugal. She never spent an idle moment, used to rise early, wasted little time on her toilet, and did not abuse her servants. On the whole, in spite of the resounding political successes which she achieved, it cannot be said that the Russian people as a whole in her reign were any happier than they had been in that of the Empress

Elizabeth. Rather the reverse. Most of the last reign had been peaceful, only the last four years being occupied with the war against Prussia. The reign of Catherine was filled with great events, but included disasters such as the outbreak of the plague at Moscow in 1771 and the great rebellion of Pugachëv¹ in 1773. External successes and expansion of the frontiers coincided with an increase of the burdens of the people. The scope of serfdom was extended to the whole of Little Russia, and was also increased by the bestowal of imperial lands on private owners, entailing the conversion of the semi-free peasants on them to serfs. In addition, the control of the serf-owners was made still more rigorous.

On the other hand, in matters of religion Catherine was quite broad-minded, while Elizabeth had been narrow and fanatically Orthodox. Catherine's reign was remarkable for the toleration extended to all forms of belief, including the Russian dissenters themselves, the Old Believers whom Peter the Great had persecuted.

In the first few years of her reign especially, Catherine made a great display of liberal and even revolutionary views. The fruit of these was the great Legislative Commission summoned to Moscow in 1766 to undertake a new codification of the laws. This was, in effect, a representative assembly of all classes and nationalities in the polyglot Russian Empire, numbering 658 deputies. For its guidance Catherine herself compiled a weighty 'Instruction' (*Nakáz*), founded, as she herself owned, on the works of Montesquieu and Beccaria. This Instruction indeed was so radical that it alarmed her ministers, who insisted on drastic expurgation. The Commission was heralded with a tremendous fanfaronnade, was extremely quaint and picturesque, and ended in nothing at all. More than two hundred sittings were held, every conceivable topic was discussed, all sections of

¹ Pronounced *Pugachóf*.

the community, from the Baltic barons to the Kalmuks and Samoyeds, were represented and voiced their grievances. But when certain of the deputies brought forward the question of the serfs and pronounced themselves in favour of their emancipation, the Russian nobility considered that matters had gone far enough, and cried out in alarm to Catherine to curb the dangerous spirits which she had unchained. Happily this was facilitated by the outbreak of the war with Turkey in 1767, and the Commission fizzled out. Catherine's most notable acts of 'reform' were the redivision of Russia into fifty 'governments' (*gubérniya*) instead of Peter the Great's ten, which were far too unwieldy administrative units; a general delimitation of public and private boundaries; the secularization of the vast monastic properties, which were made dependent on the State, as was the Church; the foundation of a considerable number of schools, orphanages, and hospitals; and the colonization of immense spaces of empty lands in south-eastern Russia—largely with German immigrants who remain there to this day—and in the newly-conquered southern territories. Little Russia was also completely absorbed; the *hetmanate* of the Cossacks was abolished; their *sech* (cf. p. 205) was destroyed by Potëmkin,¹ who was a sort of viceroy and organizer of the extreme south, known as 'New Russia'; and the Cossacks who would not accept the new arrangements were transferred to the territory immediately east of the Sea of Azóv, where they were organized as the 'Black Sea Cossacks'.

Catherine particularly prided herself as an authoress and as a patroness of art, especially literature. Certainly letters in her reign flourished in Russia as they had never done before. The dramatists Fon-Vizin,² Sumarókov, and Knyazhnín, the fabulist

¹ Pronounced *Patyómkin*.

² A Russianized German name, *Von-Wiesen*.

Khémnitser,¹ the poets Derzhávin and Kheráskov have all made names for themselves which have endured in Russian literature, though Russian poetry of this period is so imitative of the French and Classical Schools, so unspontaneous and un-Russian, that it has little more than historical value. Memoirs (almost always written in French) occupy a place of honour in the literary history of the period, and many illuminating volumes of these have survived, including those of the empress herself and of her friend the Princess Dáshkova, President of the Academy of Sciences, at whose instance the Russian Academy (of Letters) was founded in 1783. Journalism played a great part in the education of the society of the time, and the principal figure in this field was Nóvikov, who made famous the *Moscow News* (*Moskóvskiya Védomosti*) and rendered inestimable service in the popularization of reading.

In the last years of the reign, when it was seen what the effects of enlightenment had been in France, a wave of reaction set in. Catherine became thoroughly alarmed; Nóvikov was imprisoned, and Radíshchev, another writer of liberal tendencies, was exiled to Siberia. But on the whole, it must be conceded that literature flourished, at least relatively, during this reign, and the men of letters of the next generation knew, at all events, what to avoid. The reign of Catherine II was the culmination, though not the end, of an epoch in Russian history. The class which governed the country, the nobility (*dvoryánstvo*), was now a vast conglomeration of landowners, officers, and bureaucrats, more united in spirit and more uniform in aspect than it had ever been before. It no longer hankered after political reforms. It had got what it wanted—a sufficiency of wealth, power, and security, and a sovereign who was an autocrat, a woman, and at the same time a reasonable, intelligent, and thoughtful person with a thorough grasp of international politics, who did not

¹ A Russianized German name, *Chebnitser*.

chop off their heads or make them work too hard, and had some sense of dignity and of the fitness of things. The tree planted by Peter the Great had indeed flowered and borne fruit, though not exactly of the quality of which he had dreamed.

Events preceding the Partition of Poland

Whatever were its defects, the reign of Catherine II created the impression of greatness and serenity which gratified the governing class of the day and, when it was all over, earned for it the complimentary reputation of the 'good old days'. The events which principally lent colour to these pretensions were those of external politics with which this reign was filled, the successful wars against one hereditary enemy—the Ottoman Empire—and the liquidation of another, Poland. As a result of these it may truly be said that what had been the chief aims and ambitions of Russian foreign policy, not only since Peter the Great's time, but ever since the beginning of the sixteenth century, were at length triumphantly accomplished. Unfortunately, the consumption of Poland was such an easy matter that Russia here committed an excess from which she has suffered ever since. Catherine looked upon war against Turkey, and the liberation of the Christians in the Near East, as her historic mission. But in the end it was Poland who paid the bill for this unsuccessful crusade. Catherine's first war against the Turks (1768-74) and the first partition of Poland (1772) were in reality two parts of a single operation. Poland during the reign of the Saxon King Augustus III (1733-64), who owed his election to Russian support (cf. p. 286), had been more and more exposed to the effects of Russian influence. The country was divided against itself by two powerful parties, headed respectively by the great families of the Potockis and the Czartoryskis. Both parties were animated by a sense of insecurity and danger in view of the increasingly menacing attitude of the

neighbouring Powers, and both realized the necessity of reform. The Czartoryskis were openly in alliance with Russia, an alliance which they hoped to use in order to force their policy of reform on the country and to secure the throne for their own family, but which the Russians only meant to turn to their own account. The Potockis were in favour of gradual, spontaneous, and home-made reforms, but, as these are notoriously slow in maturing, they earned for themselves the name of conservatives; they looked to France and Austria for support. Until 1751 the Czartoryskis had had more influence at court and with the king's Saxon minister Brühl. But from that year onwards, largely owing to skilful matrimonial alliances, the Potockis ousted them, and they came to rely on Russian support more than ever. In 1755 a Polish nobleman, Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski, whose mother was a Czartoryska,¹ was appointed as Secretary to the British Embassy in Petersburg. He was then twenty-four years old, and a very handsome, eloquent, and cultivated young man. He made friends with the Grand Ducal couple, and soon became Catherine's most ardent lover. Through her influence and that of the Chancellor Bestúzhev-Ryúmin he was shortly made Saxon Minister at the Russian Court. During the Seven Years' War he became involved in the traitorous intrigues which the 'Young Court' were carrying on in favour of Frederick the Great; and these, when they were exposed, led to the temporary disgrace of Catherine, the fall and exile of Bestúzhev-Ryúmin, and the discreet withdrawal of Poniatowski to Warsaw (1758). When the revolution of June 1762 occurred in Petersburg it was assumed that the hands of the Czartoryskis would be still further strengthened by the existence of the affectionate bond which linked their nephew with the new empress, and they took up a menacing attitude towards the reigning king, Augustus III. Civil war was on the point of

¹ In Polish the surname ends in *-ski* for males, and in *-ska* for females.

breaking out between their party and that of the Potockis, when early in October 1763 Augustus III died in Dresden.

The troubles attending the election of the new monarch were prolonged and acute. The Potockis supported the late king's son, the Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxony; but he died of small-pox in December 1763. Thereupon they proceeded to choose a candidate from among their own party. The Czartoryskis hoped for the election of one of themselves. The opposition to them in the country was so bitter that they had to have recourse to a violation of the constitution before they could get their own way. Russian troops were actually on Polish soil supporting them, and in view of this fact the other party refused to proceed with the election in May 1764, the date fixed, and dispersed. The Czartoryskis then proclaimed a general secession (*Konfederacja*) and proceeded to hold the Diet on new lines, suspending the right of individual obstruction (*liberum veto*) and legislating by a majority of votes. Under these conditions they intended to carry out important reforms in the administration and to pass, amongst others, a law stipulating that future candidates for the throne must be of purely Polish birth. It was under such circumstances that the election was held in August 1764, and the Czartoryskis received a shock when they discovered that Russia and Prussia had between them decided that no Czartoryski, but Poniatowski, was to be king. Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski, the last King of Poland, was thus elected on September 7, 1764. Shortly after this hostilities were declared between Russia and the Czartoryskis, because the Russian and Prussian ministers would not permit the reforms proposed by the Czartoryskis, and the Czartoryskis would not accept the demands put forward by Russia, namely, an offensive and defensive alliance and concessions to the Polish subjects of Orthodox faith and Russian nationality, known as *dissidents* (November 25, 1764). This power of intervention in the inter-

nal affairs of Poland was the natural outcome of what had gone before, but it was none the less tragic for Poland. It was, in official parlance, blandly termed the preservation of the rights and liberties of the Polish people. Poland was before long to learn the full benefit of this peculiar form of international altruism, in which one country prevents another from reforming itself and then attacks it because it has not reformed itself. In Poland the preservation of all the privileges of the only politically emancipated class, the nobility, had resulted in anarchy. Anarchy was useful to the neighbouring Powers because it gave an excuse for interference; and therefore it must be preserved. This was the vicious circle from which Poland, handicapped in addition by all the difficulties of social and religious cleavage, was unable to emerge. With the amiable, indolent, and malleable Poniatowski on the throne, Prussia and Russia knew that they would be able to do as they liked. It was another nail, by no means the first, in Poland's coffin. The symptoms were multiplying, and dissolution, if not immediately in prospect, was in the long run clearly inevitable.

Besides the prevention of all useful reforms, the weapon which Russia and Prussia used in their undermining of the Polish national edifice was the ever-ready argument of religious grievances. There were large numbers of Lutherans in western, and of the Orthodox in eastern Poland; it was the cause of these which Frederick the Great and Catherine espoused in their joint efforts against the Polish State. Unfortunately, the large majority of Poles were so fanatically intransigent and intolerant in their Roman Catholicism that they may be said themselves to have put this weapon into their enemies' hands. It was not long before the Russian ambassador at Warsaw, Prince Répnin, raised the question of the persecution of the Russian Orthodox communities in White and Little Russia. When, in 1766, the Polish Diet definitely refused to grant

equality of rights and full liberty of conscience to non-Roman Catholic subjects of the Polish State, whether Poles or not, they produced the spark which lit an immense conflagration, fatal to themselves. Secessions immediately sprang up, one of the Lutherans at Thorn and another of the Orthodox at Slutsk in White Russia. At the same time at Radom yet another was formed by the intransigent Poles, enemies of the Czartoryskis and of all reforms, political or religious. When the Diet met at Warsaw in 1767, the opposition to the granting of religious liberty was so fierce, that the Russian ambassador intervened and had the most intemperate Roman prelates, who were members of it, removed by force and deported to Russia, in the name of religious tolerance. All the while a large Russian army was mustered on the frontier, and indeed there were Russian troops in Warsaw at Répnin's service. After this the Diet yielded and granted equal political rights to non-Roman Catholic nobles (November 19, 1767). The following year (February 24, 1768) a treaty was concluded between Russia and Poland which stipulated that no alteration should be made in the constitution without the consent of the former. Henceforward Poland was virtually a vassal-state of Russia. But her troubles were not at an end, and what had been a semi-domestic quarrel between the two premier Slavonic nations now became a first-class European *imbroglio*. The secession of Radom, composed of the Roman Catholic conservative fanatics, was intensely dissatisfied at the turn events had taken, and after it had disbanded it immediately re-formed in the guise of the famous secession of Bar, in Podolia (February 28, 1768). This secession, which, like all other movements of the kind, was actuated by hostility to the authority of the king and to the enactments of the Diet, rallied together all the extreme conservative elements in the country and adopted as its programme

the refusal of equal rights to non-Roman Catholics and the preservation intact of all the idiosyncrasies of the old constitution. Its members promptly proceeded to invoke the help of Austria, Saxony, and France in their domestic dispute, while King Stanislas Augustus and his government, in the face of this formidable insurrection which spread over the whole country, naturally, if unwisely, turned to Russia for support. Meanwhile Frederick the Great watched and waited.

The most striking facts about the Seven Years' War were that its results were exactly the opposite of those which it had been expected to yield. It was to have crushed Frederick, instead of which it merely confirmed the position of Prussia as one of the Great Powers, and left France weakened and discredited throughout Europe. Louis XV's minister, Choiseul, who came to power in 1766, made it his task to rehabilitate his country, and, besides relying on the alliance with Austria, which never brought France any advantage, began to develop great activity in the three minor and Francophil political centres of Constantinople, Warsaw, and Stockholm. But even France was not unanimous. While the Court party favoured the rebellious Poles who had raised the standard of faith and liberty (i. e. the maintenance in full of the political privileges of the Roman Catholic nobles), Voltaire and the Encyclopædists sympathized with the cause of the dissidents who were claiming equal political rights with Roman Catholics, and with that of the king and the government who favoured measures of reform. Choiseul formed the plan of neutralizing the Continent while France should be left free to deal with England.¹ Austria was to keep Prussia quiet, while Poland and Turkey and Sweden were to be exploited against Russia. None of these plans fructified, because Austria and Prussia in October 1768 came to a formal understanding; because Poland and Turkey were both in

¹ Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*, p. 26.

a state of decadence; and because Frederick and Catherine were already united in alliance. The Russian army had placed Catherine on the throne and deposed Peter III largely on account of his pro-Prussian sympathies and his alliance with Frederick. But Catherine was not long before she showed what her real feelings were. On April 11, 1764, she concluded a treaty of alliance for eight years with Frederick, by which they mutually guaranteed each other's dominions, and promised each other support in men or money in case of war. It was on the strength of this alliance that the Russian and Prussian ministers henceforward acted in unison at Warsaw, procuring the election of Poniatowski (cf. p. 301), and also at Constantinople, where they made it their business to counteract French diplomacy. Ever since France and Austria had been in alliance the former country had lost credit in Turkey, whose whole foreign policy was based on the hereditary enmity between these two countries.¹ When, therefore, the French ambassador began to enlist Turkish sympathies on behalf of Poland and against Russia, he had an uphill task, but since the election of Poniatowski, in which Turkey had evinced no interest, France had no longer any minister at Warsaw,² and therefore action via Constantinople became more than ever imperative. The Turks were unwilling to move, but events soon forced a decision in favour of France and against Russia.

When King Stanislas Augustus appealed to Russia to lend assistance, the Russian army with alacrity invaded southern Poland, defeated the secessionists of Bar and captured Bar itself, Berdichev,³ and eventually the old capital of Cracow. This campaign was soon enlivened by a general rising of the Cossacks of the Ukraine against their Polish masters, headed by fanatical Orthodox monks. These had been stung to action by the

¹ Sorel, op. cit., p. 22.

² Ibid., p. 21.

³ In Polish, *Berdzów*.

fanatical Roman Catholic priests, who had inflamed all Poland against the dissidents and had largely brought about the fatal secession of Bar. Waged under the banner of Orthodoxy, this rising was really national and economic in character, was directed against the Polish landlords and their Jewish 'farmers', and was accompanied by the usual massacres and devastations. At the same time France was egging on Turkey against Russia and smuggling through military aid to the Polish rebels, and Russia—cross in hand—was egging on the Balkan Christians against Turkey, promising them deliverance from their oppressors. One party was using the crescent to enforce the supremacy of the cross, the other the cross to undermine that of the crescent. Meanwhile, Orthodox and Roman Catholics were massacring each other in Poland, and in the end Turkey survived but Poland went under.

The First War against Turkey (1768-74), the First Partition of Poland (1772), and the Rebellion of Pugachëv (1773-5)

The explosion occurred unexpectedly on October 6, 1768 : a party of Russians, in chasing some Cossack hot-heads whose anti-Polish zeal was even excessive, had inadvertently violated Turkish territory at Balta, between the Dniester and the southern (or Black Sea) Buh rivers, and Turkey declared war on Russia. 'Every one was taken by surprise, though it was what all had expected ; the Russians, although they wanted a war with Turkey, were fully occupied in Poland, and were not prepared to take up the challenge, and the Turks were not prepared to put their threat into effect. Frederick the Great, with friendly candour, called this a war between the one-eyed and the blind, in which the former (Russia) could not help being victorious. The first act of war, as neither

Russians nor Turks were prepared to start fighting, was committed by the Crimean Tartars, subjects of Turkey, who successfully accomplished their usual rôle of ravaging the confines of southern Russia during the winter of 1768-9. The same period was spent in agitated negotiations by the interested Powers, who were anxious, if they could not prevent the Russo-Turkish conflict, at any rate to localize it and turn it to their own advantage. Frederick in particular was dreading another general European war after his narrow escape in the Seven Years' War. Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, who had been elected emperor in 1765, were apprehensive that a Russian triumph over Turkey with large annexations would destroy the balance of power. Catherine was afraid that she would not be equal to the task of conquering the Turks and suppressing the Poles at the same time. It was in these circumstances that Frederick conceived the dismemberment of Poland as the best way out of all the difficulties and a means of reconciling the jealousies of the three autocracies. A simultaneous development was the reconciliation of Austria and Prussia, who were supposed to be deadly enemies, and a cooling of the relations between the two pairs of allies, Austria and France, Russia and Prussia. Frederick was determined not to help Russia actively in the coming war against Turkey, and Austria had no intention of acting up to her engagements towards France.

In November 1768 Catherine wrote to Frederick to ask for his help as her ally. The same month Frederick tried to mediate between her and the Sultan Mustafa at Constantinople, but failed. In December 1768 he wrote to Catherine to say that she could count on his loyalty. In January 1769 it was arranged that Frederick and Joseph should meet at Neisse in August of that year. In February 1769 Frederick suggested a partition of Poland between the three Powers to Catherine and her minister Pánin, but they turned a deaf ear, having already marked

out the whole of Poland as their prey. Meanwhile Austria, in view of the imminent outbreak of hostilities, took the precaution of mobilizing troops and placing them along the extremely vague frontiers which separated her dominions from those of Poland and Turkey, and in February 1769 committed the first breach of Polish integrity on her part by occupying the famous county of Zips,¹ which formed an island of Polish territory in the north of Hungary and had been Polish ever since 1412.

Hostilities between Russia and Turkey began in the spring of 1769. In September of that year Prince Golítsyn defeated a Turkish army much larger than his own at Khótin,² on the Dniester in Podolia (September 16, 1769), which opened the road for Russia into the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. There they set up Russian administrations in the capitals of Jassy and Bucarest respectively. This was Catherine's first military triumph, which was a trifle soured by the fact that on August 25 Frederick II and Joseph II had met and exchanged confidences at Neisse. The year 1770 was still more favourable to Russian arms. A fleet under the command of Alexis Orlów, and of Admirals Greig and Spíridov, made its way from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, revictualled, and was refurbished in English ports, was not molested by the French, and appeared in the Aegean. The anticipated sympathetic revolution in Greece failed as usual, but the Turkish fleet was located, met, and totally destroyed off Chésmé on the coast of Asia Minor opposite Chios (July 5, 1770). Unfortunately, instead of forcing their way there and then to Constantinople, the Russians wasted time in the Aegean, and when they arrived at the Dardanelles these had been so strongly fortified under French supervision that the Russian fleet could not penetrate them. Nevertheless, it was a shock to the nerves of Constantinople. On August 1,

¹ In Polish, *Spiz*; in Magyar, *Szepes* (pronounced *Sépesb*).

² In Polish, *Cbocím*.

1770, Prince Rumyantsov totally defeated a Turkish army seven times the size of his own at Kagul, on the river Prut, which confirmed the Russian hold on the Turkish provinces north of the Danube.

By this time Austria was thoroughly alarmed at the successes achieved by the Russian arms, foreseeing a Russian conquest of the Balkans as well as of Poland and therefore a complete destruction of the continental balance of power, and began to rattle the sword in its scabbard. On August 12, 1770, Turkey decided to ask Austria and Prussia to mediate. In September 1770 Frederick II met Kaunitz and Joseph II at Neustadt, and was urged by the Austrian minister to use his influence at Petersburg to restrain the Russian lust of conquest lest Austria should be forced to make war against Russia, which might end in war between Austria and Prussia and in French intervention. In October 1770 Frederick's brother, Prince Henry, visited Petersburg and sounded Catherine. She would not yet formulate conditions of peace as the campaign was not yet at an end, and therefore the mediation hung fire. By November Rumyantsov had captured all the Turkish fortresses north of the Danube. In December Catherine announced her conditions, which included a protectorate over the Danubian principalities, Bessarabia, and the Crimea. These horrified Frederick, who knew that they were sufficient to precipitate war with Austria and France. Austria threatened that the passage of the Danube by the Russians would be a *casus belli*. Fortunately for all concerned, except Poland, Choiseul fell at the end of December 1770; France thereafter virtually no longer appeared on the scene; and the autocrats at Vienna, Berlin, and Petersburg breathed more freely. Meanwhile, Austria had definitely annexed Zips on December 9, 1770, and begun to encroach on Galicia, and Frederick, in order to prevent the plague which was raging in Poland from spreading into Prussia, drew a sani-


tary cordon composed of soldiers along the frontier between Brandenburg and Poland. Catherine, faced by the military preparations of Prussia and Austria, unable to rely on Prussian aid against Austria, and freed by the fall of Choiseul from the fear of French intervention, now began herself to come round to the view put forth by Frederick a year previously, and, in order to conciliate Austria and satisfy Prussia, she now in her turn proposed to Prince Henry on January 8, 1771, that the three Powers should assuage their mutual jealousies by all joining in the partition of Poland.¹ Russia was in virtual occupation of Poland and had conquered Turkey, but had not the physical capacity to assimilate both at the same time. Therefore, in order to retain some of either, she had to agree to share the former with Prussia and Austria. Thus it came about that France pushed Turkey into war with Russia in order to help Poland and embarrass Russia, but in the end it was Russia who came out the winner and Poland that was sacrificed in order to save Turkey.

The whole of the year 1771 was spent by the three Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in trying to bluff and to hoodwink each other. The cynicism of those who were planning the partition of Poland was only equalled by their dishonesty. Even France, the friend of Poland, had in March 1769 proposed its dismemberment to Prussia in return for an alliance, but Frederick knew that he would get what he wanted without any condition so embarrassing, and would not listen. In the complicated and delicate negotiations which filled the year 1771 it was inevitable, in view of the alliance between Prussia and Russia, of the understanding between Prussia and Austria, and of the jealousy between Austria and Russia, that Frederick should play the part of broker between the two latter countries. The policy of Frederick was to extort a solid commission for

¹ Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*, p. 133.

his pains ; to prevent a war between Austria and Russia, in which he would unwillingly have to take sides ; to prevent an alliance between Austria and Russia, under which he might be crushed ; and to make both Austria and Russia accomplices in the ticklish business of the dismemberment of Poland, since he feared that, if Austria did not take part in it, the Poles would inevitably look to Austria as the protector of their integrity. Russia did not want a partition for the reason that she wanted the whole, but was prepared to agree to partition rather than to total loss or to war with Austria. Austria had no *prima facie* interest (whether economic and strategic, like that of Prussia, or racial, like that of Russia) in the dismemberment of Poland, whose existence as a large territorial unit acted as a counterpoise both to Russia and to Prussia ; but the aggrandizement of Russia, especially at Turkey's expense, was the Austrian bugbear, and if this could be prevented by the partition of Poland, Austria was prepared to fall into line on this question and to choose the lesser of two evils. Equivalent compensation must be obtained somewhere, and the economic loss of Silesia had still to be made good ; Maria Theresa, the only one of the autocrats who had anything reminiscent of principle, was strongly against the partition of a neighbour who had always been friendly, but Joseph and Kaunitz had no such scruples.

Meanwhile, the war between Russia and Turkey and the war of the Russians against the Polish insurgents continued. In the campaign of 1771 Prince Dolgorúki invaded the Crimea, captured all the Turkish fortresses, and finally destroyed Turkish power in the peninsula. Turkey turned to Austria for help, and in July 1771 concluded a treaty with that country by which, in return for subsidies and territorial and commercial concessions, Austria undertook to redeem for Turkey some at least of the Russian conquests. In Poland Russia was not so successful. The French and the Austrians were helping the



rebels, and the task of pacifying the country, while the bulk of their army was fighting Turkey, proved too much for the Russians. The fact was that, however anarchic and disorganized, Poland in revolt was more than one of the neighbouring empires could master single-handed. While Russia struggled in Poland and Austria tied herself into intricate diplomatic knots on all sides, Frederick's plan matured. By playing off Russia against Austria and Austria against Russia he eventually brought them both into complete agreement with himself. In January 1772 Prussia and Russia finally agreed to dismember Poland and to invite Austria to take part in the feast; and in February Austria, on her own account, decided to propose partition in order not to be left out in the cold. The treaties of partition were finally signed in Petersburg on July 25, 1772, and were carried out during the same summer. It must be remembered that Russia had been in military occupation of two-thirds of Poland since 1768, so that her soldiers had actually to retire; the Austrian troops had long been percolating into Galicia, planting emblems of Austrian sovereignty far and wide; and Frederick had been gradually extending his military cordons in the part which fell to his share.

Although equality was the principle on which agreement had been originally secured, the lots eventually proved very uneven in size. Russia gained a large slice of White Russia—including the towns of Dvinsk (Dünaburg), Pólotsk, Vítebsk, and Mogilëv¹ (the western Dviná and the Drut, a tributary of the Dnieper, becoming the frontier)—with 1,600,000 inhabitants. Prussia secured Polish or 'Royal' Prussia, except the cities of Danzig² and Thorn,³ and the enclave of Warmia (Ermeland), with 600,000 inhabitants. Austria, in spite of the scruples of Maria Theresa, acquired the whole of Galicia with the valuable

¹ Pronounced *Magilyóf*.

² In Polish, *Gdańsk*.

³ In Polish, *Toruń*.

salt-mines of Wieliczka, and 2,600,000 inhabitants ; this territory was prudently annexed direct to the Austrian crown under the name of the kingdoms of Galicia¹ and Lodomeria.² From the Polish point of view, while the loss of part of White Russia was relatively trifling, the loss of Prussia and that of Galicia were absolutely vital. With Prussia went the control of the Vistula, Poland's only practicable outlet to the Baltic ; with Galicia the Carpathians, Poland's only natural frontier. Poland herself, absolutely exhausted by four years of civil war, could not offer any armed resistance, and the treaties of spoliation were accepted and finally ratified by the Diet on September 18, and by the king on November 18, 1773.

Such was the train of évents which actually brought about and accompanied the first partition of Poland, though the real causes were very different and far older in origin. In view of the historical development of Prussia, Poland, and Russia it was almost inevitable that Poland should be crushed between her two neighbours. For Prussia, with her peculiar geographical and economic conditions, the partition of Poland was a vital necessity ; for Russia, with her millions of co-nationals in eastern Poland and her age-long desire for revenge, it was a natural step in her process of national evolution as soon as she was strong enough to move in that direction ; for Austria it was a luxury and a question of equilibrium. Whether the Poles themselves could have prevented it, if they had been less narrow-minded and more far-seeing, less individualistic and more united, is doubtful, in view of all the circumstances which militated against their country. What is certain is that their political cunning was less than that of their neighbours, and that when they realized this fact and sought to begin to reform

¹ Named thus after the ancient Russian principality of *Halicz*.

² Named thus after the ancient Russian principality of Vladímir (in Volýnia), the old Russian form of Vladímir being Volodímir.

themselves, it was too late. Poland was the unhappy medium which reconciled these three Powers and resolved their community of jealousies into a community of interests. The débris of the aristocratic republic of Poland formed the foundation on which the future Holy Alliance of the three military autocracies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria was built. Both sides were to blame; but while the aggressors were guilty of a complete lack of principle, the victim was merely guilty of what may be called exaggeration of principle and political absence of mind.

As soon as Austria had secured compensation in Poland her anxiety to help the Turks against Russia abated; so, having made sure that Russia would not annex the Danubian principalities, Kaunitz advised the Turks to make peace as best they could. The first peace congress met at Focșani¹ in Moldavia in April 1772, but the Turks would not accept the Russian demand for the independence of the Tartars of the Crimea and of the Black Sea coastal region, and negotiations were broken off.

The summer of 1772 was an embarrassing time for the three partitioning Powers. Having decided to dismember Poland they were faced with the delicate task of carrying this decision into effect, and of communicating the news to the victim and to the rest of Europe as decently and plausibly as possible. While engrossed in this business there occurred a *coup d'état* in Sweden which was not at all to the taste of Frederick and Catherine. French diplomacy, which had been utterly discredited in eastern Europe by the defeat of Turkey and the dismemberment of Poland, here achieved its one success. Sweden was at this time governed by its aristocracy under an oligarchic constitution which resulted in a perpetual anarchy similar to that reigning in Poland, and it was in the interest both of Catherine and Frederick, who had their eyes on Swedish as well as on Polish territory (Finland and Swedish Pomerania), that this state

¹ Pronounced *Foksbani*.

of things should continue. In February 1771, on the death of King Adolphus Frederick, his son succeeded him as Gustavus III. He had spent some time in France and was much under French influence. Seeing the fate of Poland, he determined to save himself and his country from a similar misfortune, and with the help of the army and of the citizens of Stockholm abolished the existing constitution and promulgated a new one which, while re-establishing the absolute power of the Crown, made the country stronger externally and was accompanied by the introduction of many internal reforms (August 1772).

Frederick was afraid now that if Russia attacked Sweden he would have to help his ally (Russia), and that this again might range Austria and France against him, cause a general European war, and undo all the achievements of his diplomacy. He accordingly decided to keep Russia engaged with Turkey, and therefore professed to sympathize with the Turks on the exorbitance of the Russian demands, while at the same time he encouraged the Russians to insist, knowing that the more the Russians asked the more the Turks would refuse.¹ Catherine, for her part, could not think of a war against Sweden until peace was concluded with Turkey. A second peace congress assembled at Bucarest, and an armistice was agreed to in the autumn of 1772. This time the Turks conceded the independence of the Tartars, but the Russians now in addition demanded the retention of the two strongholds of Kerch and Yeni-Kalé,² which, situated at the eastern extremity of the Crimea, commanded the channel between the Sea of Azóv and the Black Sea. The Turks naturally retorted that these two places belonged to the now independent Crimean Tartars. Upon this the negotiations were interrupted. When they were resumed, in February 1773, the Russians further demanded the disarmament of the fortress of Ochákov on the north side and the cession of that of Kinburn

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

² = New Fort. ~

on the south side of the estuary of the Dnieper, and a religious protectorate over all the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. The Turks agreed to everything except the cession to Russia of Kerch and Yeni-Kalé. They even offered to pay for not allowing the Russians to have them, while the Russians offered to pay in order to be allowed to have them. Agreement proved impossible. The congress broke up, and the war was resumed. The year 1773 was not favourable to Russian arms. Catherine ordered Rumyantsov to cross the Danube. Being prudent, he was unwilling to take this risk, but having to obey he carried out the command, crossed the river in June 1773, and laid siege to Silistria. In this he failed, and barely avoided disaster in recrossing the Danube. Meanwhile Joseph II was touring his new property, Galicia, and cast his eyes on the Bukovina,¹ which formed the northern tip of Moldavia, was then still Turkish territory, and appeared to him a desirable and even necessary complement to Galicia, and a small price for the Turks to pay if he used his offices successfully in securing peace between them and Russia. The autumn campaign of Rumyantsov's army went no better than that of the summer. He again crossed the Danube, but was defeated by the Turks, and again had to recross the river with considerable losses. Meanwhile the whole of Russia was turned upside down by the great upheaval known as the *Pugachëvshchina*, so called after the leader of the rebellion, Pugachëv.

Nominally this was a political movement in favour of a pseudo-Peter III and against the rule of Catherine II; in reality it was a social and economic revolution of the peasants against the landed aristocracy. It started, like the similar movement under Sténka Rázin in the reign of Alexis (cf. p. 189), amongst the Cossacks of the rivers Don and Yaík (or Urál), who banded together under the leadership of one Pugachëv. This extremely

¹ Lit. *Beech(land)*.

unprepossessing ruffian gave himself out to be Peter III. He was just as ugly as the late *tsar*, without in the least resembling him, but while nature had been equally unkind to his exterior, she had endowed him with a far keener brain. By displaying in clever alternation cruelty, sensuality, and magnanimity, and especially hatred and disregard of all existing authority, and by the lavish distribution of stolen property, he rapidly gathered under his banner (that of Holstein!) all the discontented and disreputable elements in the country. For the sake of appearances he aped the actual court, giving his confederates the names of Catherine's favourites, conducting reviews of his tatterdemalion troops, calling his strongholds Petersburg and Moscow, even producing a boy-heir whom he named Paul, and, by a piquant inversion of Catherine's practice, instituting six concubines whom he called his maids of honour. But the strength of the movement lay in its predatory and revolutionary character. Driven to desperation by long years of war superimposed on the longer years of crushing exactions on the part of the landlords, the peasants greedily seized this opportunity of expressing their feelings; it was the only means at their disposal, and was the inevitable outcome of social conditions. Pugachëv's *ukázés*, although absolutely illiterate, promised to liberate the peasants and to destroy the nobility, to grant full religious freedom, and to shut up Catherine in a convent. Within a very short time he collected a vast rabble of followers, marshalled into the form of an army by fugitive Cossacks from the Don and the Dnieper, and for a year terrorized the whole basin of the Volga, from Kazán to Tsarítsyn, capturing towns, destroying properties, and eluding his pursuers. Spreading to the more thickly inhabited country between Kazán and Moscow the movement became a regular *jacquerie*: the peasants rose against the landlords and the landlords fled to Moscow, so that the old capital

itself became infected with the spirit of unrest. As Pugachëv could not be ubiquitous, other pseudo-Peter III's and even pseudo-Pugachëvs began to spring up on all sides. Meanwhile, the troops who were sent against him went over to his side, killing their officers ; and the only general who inflicted defeat on him, Bíbikov, died before he finished his task. At length a large force was organized against him, including Suvórov amongst its leaders ; Pugachëv was eventually tracked and cornered between the lower Volga and Urál rivers, and in 1775 was brought to Moscow and executed.

It was natural that in these circumstances, compelled to fight the rebels as well as the Turks, the Russians were at some disadvantage. Catherine appealed to Austria to act as mediator with Turkey, offering to agree to territorial compensation, at Turkey's expense, as a reward.¹ Luckily for Russia, the Turks were quite incapable of following up their military advantages of 1773. When the campaign was renewed in 1774, Rumyántsov again crossed the Danube, defeated the Turks, surrounded the army of the Grand Vizier at Shúmla, and compelled it to surrender. In July a third peace congress opened at Kuchuk²-Kainardji near Silistria, and here was signed on July 21, 1774, the famous treaty of that name between Russia and Turkey which terminated the war. The only territory which Russia gained by this treaty was the district of Kabardá to the north of the Caucasus, and the strongholds of Azón, Kerch, Yeni-Kalé, and Kinburn. Far more important than these were the recognition by Turkey of the complete political independence of the Crimean Tartars and of the spiritual protectorate of Russia over all Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, Rumans, Slavs, and Greeks. This was the kernel of the treaty, inasmuch as, purposely and skilfully veiled in obscure phraseology, this stipulation gave

¹ Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*, p. 258.

² *Kuchuk* in Turkish means 'little'.

Russia the right henceforward to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, as she had hitherto so effectively done in Poland, on the pretext of the defence of religious practices and beliefs. No sooner had they signed the treaty than the Turks tried to enlist Frederick's sympathy in order to have these clauses abrogated. Austria would no longer help them. By this time the ill feeling between Vienna and Petersburg had considerably abated. With Galicia in his pocket and the Bukovina within his reach, Joseph II was fast becoming friends with Catherine. Frederick claimed a little more of Poland as the price of his agreement to the Russo-Turkish terms of peace and as equivalent compensation for the Bukovina. Catherine acquiesced. Frederick told the Turks that they had nothing more to hope for. Still protesting, they ratified the Treaty of Kainardji on January 24, 1775. Meanwhile, the emblems of Austrian sovereignty had been planted in the Bukovina in September 1774, and on May 7, 1775, this territory was formally ceded by Turkey to Austria.

The Change in Foreign Policy after 1775

From this time forward Russian foreign policy took a new course. During the first part of her reign Catherine and her chancellor Pánin, who was also a Prussophil, relied mainly on the alliance with Prussia (cf. p. 305) and on an amicable understanding with Denmark and Great Britain. From 1775 onwards Catherine began to cultivate more friendly and intimate relations with Austria, though there was no breach with Prussia. From 1780, the year of the death of Maria Theresa and of Pánin, this tendency became still more marked. The place of the former was taken by Joseph II, that of the latter by Bezboródko. The *northern system* was abandoned, and a reconciliation with Austria and with France, leading to an alliance, took its place. The years 1777-9 had been critical in

the relations between Austria and Prussia. In 1777 Máximilian Joseph, Elector of Bavaria, the last of the Wittelsbachs, died. Joseph II disputed the succession with the legitimate heir, Charles Theodore, the Elector Palatine. The latter was about to cede half Bavaria to Austria when Frederick in alarm again took up the cudgels and invaded Bohemia. The war did not develop into anything serious, and was terminated in 1779 by the mediation of France and Russia, when a peace conference met at Teschen¹ in Austrian Silesia, and the treaty of that name was concluded between Austria and Prussia. Austria secured only a strip of the desired territory, but Russia established a precedent for claiming a voice in the arrangement of the affairs of the empire. The following year Catherine had a meeting with Joseph II at Mogilëv, on the Dnieper, and he afterwards visited Petersburg.

The year 1780 also witnessed the promulgation of the principle of *armed neutrality* in which all the continental maritime Powers, foremost amongst them Russia, united against Great Britain, claiming the immunity from seizure of all neutral vessels and the right to sail where they pleased as long as they were not actually carrying contraband to belligerents. Claiming the authorship of this scheme, which really originated in Denmark and was adopted by Pánin (the principle had been proclaimed by France in 1778), Catherine now posed as the arbiter of Europe's destinies.

In the year 1783 Russia proclaimed the annexation of the Crimea on the ground, which was perfectly true, that ever since it had been given political independence (1774) it had been in a state of anarchy which was intolerable to the orderly Russian government. Such was the inevitable and also the desired result of the Treaty of Kainardji. Turkey was beginning to experience what Poland had already undergone. France now

¹ In Bohemian, *Těšín*; in Polish, *Cieszyn*.

played the exact opposite of her former part, and intervened at Constantinople to appease the indignation of Turkey. In 1784, by the Treaty of Constantinople, the Sultan formally recognized the annexation by Russia of the Crimea and of the large district of Kubán, the territory between the river of that name which flows into the Black Sea at the extreme north-western end of the Caucasian range, opposite the eastern promontory of the Crimea, and the river Don. By the acquisition of this territory one of the secular aims of Russian foreign policy—the extension of Russian dominion to the Black Sea as well as to the Baltic—had at last, after many delays and checks, been achieved. The work begun by Ivan the Terrible in the conquest of Kazán and Astrakhan, and continued by Peter the Great in the capture of the fortress of Azóv, was accomplished. This was the culminating point of Catherine's reign, being really the fruit of the Russian victories over Turkey. The possession of the Crimea and of the neighbouring Black Sea littoral was essential to the free economic development of Russia. It is essentially part of Russia geographically, if not ethnically, and it cannot be asserted that, in destroying the piratical and barbarous Tartar State, Russia was committing an outrage on civilization or making an unjustifiable conquest.

The organization of the new territory, known as New Russia, was entrusted to the empress's new favourite, Gregory Potëmkin, who first came into prominence in 1774. He was an uneducated upstart, but his manly if coarse beauty fascinated Catherine, and she called him her 'factotum'. He was a courtier, but no statesman. As a general he was hopeless, but he had considerable gifts of organization, and he soon attained immense wealth and power. Under his supervision the naval ports of Sevastópol in the Crimea and Khersón on the lower Dnieper were founded, and the construction of a Black Sea fleet was begun. The 'republic' of the *Zaporogian* Cossacks (cf. p. 205) had

been abolished in 1775 after the alarming experiences of the *Pugachëvshchina*, and at the same time Potëmkin finally destroyed the *Sech*,¹ and scattered abroad the last remnants of the militant and predatory Cossacks, some of whom fled to Turkey while others were in 1792 transported to the new territory east of the Sea of Azóv, where they gradually settled down. Freed from them and from the Tartars, the new provinces quickly began to be colonized and populated, and their future capital was fixed at Ekaterinosláv² on the Dnieper. In 1787 Catherine undertook her famous tour of the new territories, during which she had meetings with Joseph II and Stanislas Augustus. Potëmkin was created Prince of Tauris,³ a title which gave its name to his palace in Petersburg, since 1905 the home of the Dúma.

The year 1782 was also notable in the history of Russia's foreign relations. In that year the Grand Duke Paul, the heir to the throne (cf. p. 277), and his German wife paid a state visit to Paris, where they had a great reception. The result of this was seen in the commercial treaty concluded between France and Russia in 1787.

The Second War against Turkey (1787-91)

With Austria Russia concluded an alliance in 1782. This had special reference to the relations of the two countries in the Near East. Their aims in this direction Catherine and Joseph defined in the so-called *Greek project* which aimed at the creation

¹ From 1711 to 1734 this had been established at the *moub* of the Dnieper, i.e. in Turkish territory, but in 1734 it was again transferred north and re-established near its old home and in Russian territory.

² Lit. 'Catherine's glory'; cf. *Ekaterinodár* = 'Catherine's gift', on the river Kubán in Circassia; Ekaterinbúrg, in the Urál Mountains, in Siberia, was founded by Catherine I.

³ *Knyaz Tavricheski*.

of an independent State consisting of the Danubian principalities, Wallachia and Moldavia, with Bessarabia, to be called Dacia (the modern Rumania); Austria was to acquire Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina; Russia some more territory along the Black Sea coast and some islands in the archipelago; France, Great Britain, and Spain other fragments of the Ottoman Empire; while Constantinople, with Thrace, Macedonia, and other home provinces, should be reconstituted as a Greek Empire under the Grand Duke Paul's second son Constantine. Joseph II claimed in addition Dalmatia, and was ready to compensate Venice with the Peloponnese, Crete, and Cyprus.

In view of all these developments it was not long before the Turks took alarm. Promises of support came to them from Sweden, Prussia, and Great Britain; and France, in her new capacity as a moderating influence, failed to restrain them. In the summer of 1787 they presented an ultimatum to the Russian ambassador demanding, amongst other things, the withdrawal of the Russian consuls from the Danubian principalities and the right to search all Russian vessels passing through the Bosphorus, and upon this being refused, declared war. This second Turkish War (1787-91), which Catherine herself had as good as provoked, took the Russians as usual quite unprepared. The Black Sea fleet was not ready to co-operate, and the army was disorganized and very deficient in artillery and all manner of supplies. Potëmkin's courage failed him when the crisis came, and Catherine with difficulty persuaded him not to abandon the Crimea. No plan of campaign was ready, and finally Rumyantsov quarrelled with Potëmkin and retired. To make matters worse, Gustavus III of Sweden declared war on Catherine in sympathy with the Turks and in the hope of recovering the whole of Finland for himself, and began to besiege the Russian strongholds of Fredrikshamm and Nyslot,¹

¹ = 'Newcastle' in Swedish.

situated on the Russo-Swedish frontier established in Finland in 1743 (cf. p. 288). During the year 1788 the war against the Turks was barely carried into their territory. Large forces had to be detached to defend the Caucasus and the Crimea, and an army of 80,000 Austrians under Joseph II which co-operated was thrown back across the Danube from Serbia into Hungary.

It was during this war that Suvórov, who first distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War and had since taken part in every campaign, won a series of great victories and laid the foundations of his fame. In the campaign of 1788 he defended Kinburn against a much larger army than his own, while Potëmkin after a long siege took the great Turkish fortress of Ochákov. In 1789 Suvórov, in conjunction with the Austrians, inflicted severe defeats on the Turks at Focşani and Rymnik in Moldavia, from which battle he derived his title *Rýmnikski*. The same year the Austrians under Laudon recaptured Belgrade, while Potëmkin took Bendéry and overran Bessarabia. Meanwhile, the war against Sweden, which at one time assumed a highly menacing aspect, eventually came to a tame end. Catherine herself never lost heart for a moment, though the guns of the Swedes could be heard in Petersburg. She refused to leave the capital, collected what troops she could, sent out the Russian fleet to meet the enemy, and trusted to luck. In the middle of the campaign Gustavus had to return to Stockholm to suppress a revolt of the nobles, many of whom were in the pay of Catherine, against his authority, while Denmark threatened to invade the south of Sweden. In 1789 he resumed operations against Russia, but with no success. There were several naval battles which were indecisive, the French Revolution suggested caution, and in the summer of 1790 he concluded with Catherine the Peace of Verela,¹ which left things in the state in which they were before. Freed from

¹ In Finland, near Fredrickshamm.

the anxiety of the Swedish War, Russia in 1790 was able to devote more energy to that against Turkey. In 1790 the great event was the capture by Suvórov of the immensely strong Turkish fortress of Ismail on the northern bank of the Danube, in Bessarabia, which the other Russian generals had hesitated to attack. The losses were appalling, but the glory was great.

The death of Joseph II on February 20, 1790, led to an early conclusion of peace between Austria and Turkey, in August 1791. The Russians continued the war for some time longer, and in the course of 1791 captured Akkerman and Kilia at the mouths respectively of the Dniester and of the Danube. At the same time the Black Sea fleet threatened Varna and the Turks' communications with Constantinople. The Sultan thereupon sued for peace, and, the affairs of Poland and France demanding full attention at this time, Catherine acceded to his request. Negotiations were opened by Potëmkin, in the course of which he contracted malaria and died; they were continued by Catherine's much more able minister Bezboródko, and the war was terminated by the Peace of Jassy in January 1792, in virtue of which Russia retained Ochákov and the littoral between the southern (or Black Sea) Buh and Dniester rivers, where the city of Odessa soon sprang up. The Sultan, for his part, definitely abandoned all claims to the Crimea. This war was more arduous and costly in life than that of 1768-74, and brought Russia fewer advantages.

Events preceding the Second Partition of Poland

Ever since the first partition had been completed in 1772-3 Poland had been in an extraordinary state of ferment. The most notable characteristic of this was a radical change in the behaviour and in the outlook of the educated classes, the nobility and the hierarchy. The loss of a third of their territory had brought home to them at last the gravity of the situation

of their country. There was a considerable party which was still ready to buy the continued maintenance of its privileges and of the old state of anarchy at the price of allowing the influence of Russia to make itself permanently predominant in Poland, but the vast majority made a serious and relatively concerted effort to turn over a new leaf.

During the period 1773 to 1791, the eighteen years between the first and second partitions, there was a remarkable economic and intellectual revival in Poland. Prussia had indeed blocked the Vistula and by imposing exorbitant export duties on Polish produce cut down trade in that direction, but the conquest by Russia of the Black Sea littoral and the opening of the Dardanelles to commerce gave an outlet to Polish exports in the south. In the sphere of education new and sustained activity suddenly manifested itself. Religious fanaticism grew less intense, the influence of France made itself felt, the universities of Cracow and Vilna revived and schools sprang up everywhere. King Stanislas Augustus, who was an extremely intelligent and cultivated man, did much to further the cause of education. A sign of the changing times and of the revival of the national consciousness was the fact that Latin began to fall into disrepute and the Polish language to come into its own. Coincident with this was the dissolution of the Society of Jesus by the Pope Clement XIV in 1773. Most notable change of all, a serious attempt was made at political reform in order to strengthen inwardly and outwardly what was left of the Polish State.

In 1775, after the first partition, Russia had succeeded in imposing on Poland a new form of constitution which impaired the authority of the king, still further increased the power of the nobles, and thus increased the influence of Russia, because the Russian ambassador was always able to buy support amongst the latter and thus to secure the passing of measures and the

nomination to office of individuals agreeable to the policy of his government. This had been the Russian practice in Sweden also until Gustavus III's *coup d'état* in 1772. Prussia and Austria having in the treaties of 1773 agreed to guarantee without specification the future form of government, and Russia having now settled that form and proclaimed herself its guarantor, Poland was prevented from reforming herself under pain of incurring fresh intervention at the hands of her neighbours.

But the new political situation which arose after 1780 altered these conditions and made it possible for the Poles to try and set their house in order without the risk of interference from outside.

During the decade 1780-90 the international position underwent great changes. Great Britain quarrelled with Russia; Austria and Russia were completely reconciled, and became absorbed in their projects against Turkey. Frederick the Great died in 1786, and his successor Frederick William II, alarmed at the intimacy of Joseph II and Catherine II and by the prospect of the disproportionate aggrandizement of their empires at Turkey's expense, sought the friendship of Stanislas Augustus, and finally, as we have seen, both Turkey and Sweden declared war on Russia, the eternal enemy. On the other hand, France—Poland's traditional friend—first made friends with Russia and then became too much involved in the Revolution to pay immediate attention to foreign affairs. In 1787 both Catherine II and Frederick William II sought Poland's help, the first in the war against Turkey, the second as a possible ally against Russia and Austria. Poland herself was divided in opinion which side to take. In 1788 Frederick William II offered a definite alliance, and renounced his promise to guarantee the constitution. Thus, relying on Prussian support, the Poles took courage and denounced the hated Russian constitution of 1775. This was a direct challenge to Catherine,

but for the moment, at war with Sweden and Turkey, she could do nothing, and her ambassador at Warsaw contented himself with threatening vengeance. On January 19, 1789, the constitution of 1775 was formally abrogated, and a committee was appointed to undertake the elaboration of a new draft.

Meanwhile, the successes of Austria and Russia against Turkey so alarmed Frederick William II that, in view of a possible conflict between himself and Russia and Austria, early in 1790 he offered Poland an offensive and defensive alliance, and also to halve the dues on Polish exports at the mouth of the Vistula if Poland would cede him Danzig and Thorn. Poland refused this trap, but agreed to a defensive alliance, which was formally concluded on March 29, 1790. This was another blow to Russian influence at Warsaw and resulted in the retirement of the Russian ambassador.

But with the change of sovereigns in Austria the aspect of things again changed. Leopold II, who succeeded his brother Joseph II on February 20, 1790, took the earliest opportunity to withdraw from the war against Turkey and to effect a reconciliation with Prussia. In July 1790 he had an interview with Frederick William II at Reichenbach in Prussian Silesia, and with the mediation of Great Britain made an agreement with him to cease co-operation with Russia against Turkey, while the King of Prussia renounced any claims to territorial compensations. This robbed the Prusso-Polish alliance of half its value, and the Peace of Verela (cf. p. 326) was another cause of discouragement to Poland. Nevertheless, the Poles went on with the work of reforming their government, and in the following year brought their labours to a successful conclusion. With unprecedented and almost complete unanimity the new constitution was ratified on May 3 and promulgated on May 5, 1791. Amongst other things it restored the privileges of the king and increased his power, abrogated the right of individual obstruc-

tion (*liberum veto*) in the legislature, vested the king and a council of six responsible ministers with executive power, increased the autonomy of the towns and gave them representation in the Diet, granted full religious liberty and decreed that on the death of Stanislas Augustus the throne should again pass to the Elector of Saxony and remain hereditary in his family. By thus increasing the privileges of the Crown and diminishing those of the nobles this constitution resembled that which Gustavus III had imposed on Sweden in 1772, by which he had strengthened his country against its external enemies ; it transformed the state from an oligarchical republic into a virtually absolute monarchy with limited popular representation.

The new Polish constitution won universal approval everywhere except in Russia and with a section of the ultra-conservative Polish nobility, who were ready to do anything rather than sacrifice any of their class privileges or submit to the permanent occupation of the throne by any one family or dynasty. It was welcomed in England and in France, and Frederick William II and the Emperor Leopold II agreed to recognize it and to make no further attempt to impair Polish integrity. But in Russia this sign of a new life in Poland met with bitter hostility. Catherine, who was inexpressibly horrified by the destruction of the Crown and the proclamation of popular liberties in France, was equally disgusted by the enhancement of the royal authority and the weakening of the anarchic elements in Poland. The corrupt, factious oligarchies of Poland and Sweden were quite to her taste ; the democracy of France was not.

As long as the war against Turkey continued Catherine could do nothing, but the fact that she openly expressed neither approval nor disapproval of the new Polish constitution had a damping effect on the Saxon Court, which hesitated to accept formally the proffered succession to the throne till it knew

whether Catherine would eventually smile or frown. The Poles themselves soon solved the riddle.

In the autumn of 1791, after the promulgation of the constitution and while Potëmkin and Bezboródko were conducting the negotiations with the Turks at Iassy, a group of Polish noblemen, the Polish 'last-ditchers', Felix Potocki, Seweryn Rzewuski, the *hetman* Branicki, the two brothers Kossakowski and some others, repaired to the Russian camp, and with Bezboródko concerted a plan for the overthrow of the new constitution with the aid of the Russian army, and for the restoration of the former anarchical régime and the preservation of all the aristocratic privileges. To the order of the Polish Diet recalling them to Warsaw they replied by accepting an invitation of Catherine to go to Petersburg. There it was decided, in January 1792, to form a secession with the object of 'restoring the liberty of the people', and a Russian army was to aid the secessionists to attain their aims. Catherine was somewhat apprehensive of the attitude of Prussia and Austria. But other events helped her. Leopold II died on March 1, 1792, and his son and successor Francis II was more interested in the French Revolution than in Poland. Catherine indeed, wishing to have her hands free, encouraged him with promises of help against France. In April 1792 France declared war on Austria. Prussia was bound by a defensive alliance with Poland, but Catherine relied on being able to detach such an ally with promises of compensation. In May the secession gathered at Targovica,¹ a small town in the extreme south-east of Poland, half-way between Kiev and Odessa; belonging to Felix Potocki, whence they issued their proclamation, falsely dated May 14, 1792. On the 18th the Russian ambassador in Warsaw, Bulgákov, informed the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs that Russian forces had crossed the Polish frontier.

¹ Pronounced *Targovitsa*.

Poland, which had been relying for salvation on the support of Austria and Prussia, found herself absolutely unprepared to meet the crisis and virtually helpless. The available troops numbered hardly more than 45,000, while the Russian army of invasion was 100,000 strong. The Polish army was under Prince Joseph Poniatowski and Duke Ludwig of Würtemberg, who was a cousin of the wife of the Russian Grand Duke Paul, and whose wife was a Czartoryska; the future hero Thaddeus Kościuszko¹ also held a command under Poniatowski. Duke Ludwig turned out to be a traitor, and the army under Poniatowski could do nothing but retire fighting rearguard actions. King Stanislas Augustus appealed to King Frederick William II to help him according to the terms of their alliance, but the latter replied that, as the constitution of May 1791 had been made without his cognizance, he was not responsible for its consequences and considered himself free from obligation to help. Stanislas Augustus, seeing that further resistance was hopeless, decided to negotiate with Catherine, proposing to settle matters by a marriage between Constantine, second son of the Grand Duke Paul, and the daughter of the Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus; the elector had no sons and his daughter was under the constitution of 1791 the heiress to the Polish throne, which Stanislas Augustus by this means offered to bring into the possession of the Russian imperial family. Catherine replied that she could not negotiate until she had restored the freedom of the republic, and would not abandon the secessionists; that the only course for the king was to come over to her side and join the ranks of the secession. On July 23, 1792, Stanislas Augustus summoned the council of ministers and announced his intention of joining the secession. The ministers protested, but could do nothing. Many of those who had made the con-

¹ Pronounced *Kostyúshko*; it is really a diminutive of the name Constantine (*Konstantyn* in Polish).

stitution of 1791 and held prominent office left the capital in disgust, migrating to Prussian or Austrian Poland. On receipt of the news Prince Joseph Pōniatowski resigned his command, and the whole army was indignant. But there was nothing to be done; the war was at an end, and the Russian troops occupied Warsaw. Simultaneously the secession grew in numbers, spread over the whole country, usurped all the functions of government, and abolished the constitution of 1791.

The Second Partition of Poland (1793) -

Having successfully restored its 'liberties' in this fashion, the secessionists were now faced with the necessity of surrendering half their country. While they were engaged in restoring the old constitution, Catherine and Frederick William II had been busy planning another partition of Poland. Austria was too much preoccupied with the French war to take any notice. The treaty between Russia and Prussia was concluded on January 23, 1793, and at the same time the Prussian ambassador announced at Warsaw that Prussian troops were occupying Great Poland (*Wielkopolska*, i.e. Poland proper or West Poland, the basin of the river Warta or Warthe). The second partition was nothing but the most brazen and cynical robbery of a weaker neighbour, and entirely lacked what justification the first partition had possessed. Poland was now far from anarchical, and was at this moment in possession of a stable form of government, and well on the way to a complete national regeneration. But it was just on this account that its continued existence appeared dangerous to its unscrupulous neighbours. The Poles had no sooner framed a new constitution giving a very great measure of power to their king than Catherine and Frederick William II again dismembered their country on the ground that it was under the influence of French democracy and a hotbed of Jacobinism, and must therefore be reduced in size in order to be rendered

harmless to its peaceable neighbours. The secession, which had now become the government, protested against the invasion of the Prussian army and appealed to Catherine through the Russian ambassador Sievers. Without waiting for an answer the secession, on February 11, 1793, proclaimed a general *levée en masse* in defence of the country, but the Russian ambassador intervened and prevented the issue of the proclamation, whereupon it was decided to send a diplomatic mission to Petersburg to appeal for help.

Meanwhile Prussia and Russia calmly published their proclamations of annexation and proceeded to take possession of their new territories. Prussia acquired the cities of Danzig and Thorn and the whole of Great or West Poland up to a line running north and south about 25 miles west of Warsaw; this territory included the original kernel of Poland, the country between the Oder and the Vistula, the ancient Polish cities of Gnesen (Gniezno), Posen (Poznań), and the great sanctuary of Czenstochowa.¹

Russia acquired a whole half of Lithuania, an immense slice of territory including all the rest of White Russia, a large part of Black Russia, and the whole of Little Russia or the *Ukraine* west of the Dnieper. The southern boundary of this space was formed by the river Dniester, then the Turkish frontier; the eastern by the rivers Dnieper, Drut, and the western Dviná; to the south-east, between the Dnieper and the Dniester, the new territory marched with the new southern provinces of Russia, and on the west its boundary was a straight line running from Dvinsk (Dünaburg) in the north, through Pinsk, to Kamieniec Podolski (i.e. in Podolia) on the Dniester in the south.

After robbing them of their country it remained to secure the

¹ Pronounced *Cbenstokbóva*; the German name is Czenstochau, or Tschenstochau.

formal consent of the Poles themselves to the robbery. The leaders of the secession, in despair at the awful consequences of their folly, had by this time mostly left the country, or at least the political arena, and the virtual ruler was the Russian ambassador Sievers. He restored the Russian-made constitution of 1775 and forced the unfortunate king to go to Grodno, half-way between Warsaw and Vilna, where the Diet had been summoned to meet. In this town, on June 17, 1793, the Polish Diet met for the last time.

This Diet was held literally under the shadow of Russian bayonets, and had to obey the orders of the Russian and Prussian ambassadors, Sievers and Buchholtz. Nevertheless, considerable opposition was manifested to their outrageous behaviour. The Poles in despair sought to divide their enemies and offered to ratify the treaty, embodying the cession of territory, with Russia alone first, in the hope of then securing the help of Catherine in resisting the demands of Prussia. Their innocence was soon undeceived. After much altercation and many threats on either side, Sievers agreed to treat with the Poles alone with respect to Russia's portion of the stolen territory, and the treaty between Poland and Russia was signed on July 22 and ratified by the Diet on August 17, 1793. No sooner had they done this than Buchholtz demanded the ratification of the analogous treaty with Prussia. The Poles appealed in vain to Russia for help; Sievers, on the contrary, joined in supporting the Prussian demands. The Poles then agreed to treat with Prussia, but only as regards a commercial treaty, not admitting the possibility of a cession of territory. It must be remembered that the claims of Prussia and those of Russia were from the Polish point of view not of identical character or value. What Russia claimed was territory which, however valuable economically to Poland, was not in the first instance Polish, but Russian. Lithuania had conquered these Russian lands in the

twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and they had come to Poland on its union with Lithuania. Though the nobility of Lithuania had become Polish by education and intermarriage, and Roman Catholic (though by no means wholly) in religion, yet the country itself was only Polish on the cultivated surface ; underneath it was Russian (White Russian or Little Russian), and in the far north, between the western Dviná and the Niemen, Lithuanian and Lettish. The loss of Lithuania and the Ukraine was a great blow to the pride and the purse of Poland, but she could have survived the blow. What Prussia demanded was the very heart of the original Poland, the cradle of the Polish race. The loss of Great Poland implied the death of the Polish State.

The Prussian demands, even in the reduced and emasculated Diet of Grodno, which was not really in the least representative of the Polish nation, aroused such opposition that Sievers had to have recourse to measures of violence. Pretending that the Poles were plotting against the life of the king, he surrounded the chamber with soldiers and guns and refused to allow the Diet to adjourn until the treaty with Prussia had been agreed to. Thus terrorized and exhausted, the Diet at length consented to treat, but only on condition that a commercial treaty should be ratified before that of partition. To this both ambassadors replied that, on the contrary, the only treaty to be discussed was that of partition. Thereupon followed the famous *dumb* session of September 23, 1793. Sievers had the leaders of the opposition forcibly removed from Grodno, and filled the precincts with Russian troops. Russian officers occupied places of importance in the actual chamber. In view of these violations the Diet refused to open proceedings and sat in silence until 3 a.m. At last, after the Russian general, Rautenfels, had threatened to apply armed force if resistance were prolonged, the proposition to sign the treaty of partition with Prussia was read, and to the question, repeated thrice according to the rules

of procedure, whether the Diet consented, no one answered a word. Then one of the deputies rose and said it was necessary to conclude that silence gave consent. The treaty was duly signed on September 25, 1793.

Meanwhile, the secession of Targovica had already been dissolved (September 15, 1793), being no longer necessary to Russia and utterly discredited in Poland in view of the disastrous consequences of its folly, and the Diet of Grodno continued to act in its stead. As the last drop of Poland's cup of humiliation Russia forced her to accept a treaty of alliance, by the terms of which Russia became Poland's suzerain, and to restore completely the constitution of 1775 (October 16 and November 23, 1793).

After this Stanislas Augustus returned to Warsaw with a new Russian ambassador, Igelström. Meanwhile, numerous elements in Polish society were concerting a final effort to free their country by force of arms from the Russian yoke. Many Poles had emigrated to Saxony, and it was principally amongst these that the rising was planned. Preparations for it had begun as soon as the king had joined the secession of Targovica. The head of the movement was Kościuszko, the most famous of Polish patriots, who, born in 1746, had studied military engineering in France, taken part in the American War of Independence, and returned to Poland in 1785. He was in Saxony in the autumn of 1793, and was still making his preparations, which were far from complete, when news arrived that the Russian agents in Warsaw had discovered the conspiracy, that Igelström had ordered the numbers of the Polish army to be reduced to 15,000, and that it was time to act.

Kościuszko therefore moved to Cracow, the old capital, which was still in independent Poland, and there, joining forces with what was left of the Polish army, he proclaimed the insurrection amidst great popular rejoicings on March 24, 1794, and

declared war against Russia. The Russian forces, meanwhile, concentrated at Radom, between Warsaw and Cracow. On April 4 the Poles and Russians, each about 5,000 strong, met in battle at Raclawice,¹ a village to the north of Cracow; the Polish force, under Generals Kościuszko, Zajączek,² and Madaliński, mostly consisting of peasants, was victorious and captured twelve guns from the Russians. Following on this the insurrection broke out in Warsaw, where the whole population rose and, on April 18, forced Igelström and the Russian garrison to make a hurried retreat. Vilna followed the example on April 23. A provisional government was then established in Warsaw by the men who had made the constitution of 1791; it was essentially monarchical and conservative in character, and recognized the sovereignty of Stanislas Augustus—who remained in his palace—though it counted on the political support of revolutionary France.

In May Kościuszko resumed military operations. By this time the alarm of Prussia had been excited, and her army was gathering on the frontier ready to help that of Russia. Kościuszko pressed back a Russian force towards the new Prussian frontier, but there the two enemies joined hands and inflicted a defeat on his forces, on June 6, 1794, at Szczekocine. On June 8 Zajączek, too, was defeated by another Russian army near Chelm, in eastern Poland. Kościuszko then retired towards Kielce and Zajączek to Lublin. Meanwhile, another Prussian force advanced southwards and captured Cracow, which its Polish commander treacherously surrendered without firing a shot, on June 15. The loss of the old capital, not of strategic importance, was nevertheless a severe moral blow to the prospects of the insurrection. It led directly to an alarming revolutionary outbreak on the part of the people of Warsaw against the authority of the provisional government, which it

¹ Pronounced *Ratslawitse*.

² Pronounced *Zayónchek*.

accused of leniency towards traitors, past and present. Many acts of violence were committed, and a general atmosphere of civil strife, mutual distrust, and jealousy was created, which Kościuszko had difficulty in mastering and which militated against the success of the insurrection.

At the same time both the Russian and Prussian armies were threatening the capital. Frederick William II had left his army on the Rhine in order to be present at the capture of Warsaw. This action on his part provoked the just indignation of Catherine, who said that he ought to be leading the holy war of kings against the revolutionary armies of France rather than interesting himself in the domestic affairs of Poland. The occupation of Cracow, too, caused umbrage to Austria. It looked as if the partitioning Powers were about to fall out seriously amongst themselves, and indeed the coalition against France was considerably weakened by the effects of the Polish insurrection.

The Russian and Prussian forces besieged Warsaw from July 13 till September 6, 1794, and then retired ignominiously. This result was brought about partly by the vigour of the Polish defence and partly by a general rising which broke out in the whole of Great Poland—the territory newly acquired by Prussia, and therefore in the rear of the Prussian army. The rebels cut off a flotilla which was bringing ammunition up the Vistula to the besieging forces, and this compelled Frederick William II to abandon the siege and take steps to suppress the rising.

In Lithuania, on the other hand, the insurrectionary movement met with no success, and this eventually brought about Kościuszko's failure. On August 11, 1794, the Russians recaptured Vilna, which opened for them the road to Warsaw.

Kościuszko was now threatened on three sides : by a combined Prussian and Russian army of 100,000 to the west ; by an invasion of southern Poland by an Austrian force ; and by another Russian army of 18,000 men which, under Suvórov, was march-

ing against him from the east. He had to divide his forces, which consisted of only 70,000 men; he sent Prince Joseph Poniatowski westwards to hold up the Russo-Prussian army, Generals Dąbrowski¹ and Madaliński to help the rebels in Great Poland, and Sierakowski to meet Suvórov near Brest Litovsk. Suvórov defeated this force on September 19 and continued his march. At this moment the Russian army in the west, under Fersen, succeeded in crossing to the right bank of the Vistula, and aimed at joining hands with that of Suvórov. In order to prevent this junction, which meant disaster to his cause, Kościuszko hurried south in order to intercept Fersen and give battle. He concentrated his small force of 7,000 men at Maciejowice² on the Vistula, half-way between Warsaw and Lublin.

In the battle which took place here on October 10, 1794, the Poles suffered complete defeat and Kościuszko himself was very severely wounded. This disaster decided the fate of the insurrection. Wawrzęcki, nominated to fill Kościuszko's place, had not his influence. The armies of Fersen and Suvórov joined hands on the right (east) bank of the Vistula, and the Prussians approached Warsaw from the west. The citizens of Warsaw (which is situated on the left or west bank of the river) raised a force to defend the capital; some remained on the left bank to hold the Prussians; the majority, 18,000 in number, crossed the river and took their stand in Praga, the eastern suburb of Warsaw on the right bank. Suvórov's army stormed Praga on November 4, 1794, a success which was followed by an appalling massacre of its inhabitants, and Warsaw decided to capitulate.

Suvórov would not treat with the head of the civil government, Ignatius Potocki, and the king had to mediate between

¹ Pronounced *Dombróvski*.

² Pronounced *Matyeyóvítse*; Maciej is the Polish for Matthew; *-(o)wice* is a common ending of place-names.

the belligerents. Wawrzecki, with what remained of the army, refused to surrender and marched out of Warsaw southwards. The delegates of the city then accepted Suvórov's terms, and on November 9 he entered Warsaw. Meanwhile, Wawrzecki could do nothing against the Russian forces which he met, and surrendered at Radoszyce near Kielce. This was the end of the insurrection. Kościuszko was imprisoned in Schlüsselburg, the other leaders exiled to Siberia : both he and they were released by the Emperor Paul in 1797.

The Third Partition of Poland (1795)

Stanislas Augustus placed his own fate and that of his country in the hands of Catherine. Both were soon settled. On January 3, 1795, Russia and Austria, and on October 24, 1795, Russia and Prussia, came to terms as to the final partition of the unfortunate country amongst themselves. Prussia secured all the territory between the Niemen and the Vistula, including the capital, Warsaw ; Austria a triangular piece of territory north of Galicia, bounded on the north by the western (or Polish) Buh and including the old capital, Cracow. Russia acquired a huge slice of territory which included Courland in the north and all the rest of Lithuania and Black Russia. The Niemen formed the boundary between Russia and Prussia, the Buh that between Russia and Austria. The point of contact of the three states was between Niemirów and Brest Litovsk, on the Buh. Thus was the Polish State destroyed, but not the nation. No partitions and no repressions have succeeded in doing that. Indeed, the destruction of the state may almost be said to have created the national consciousness. It was certainly from this period onward that the Polish people grew in strength and vitality, and, divided politically, achieved a degree of spiritual unity which they had never known before.

Meanwhile the historical and national grievance of Russia

against Poland was at last satisfied. Except for Red Russia or Eastern Galicia, which was in Austrian possession, and if we consider Brest Litovsk (*Berestie* in Old Russian) as the extreme western limit of Russian political domination in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as it is the extreme western geographical limit of the Russian race, all the lands that had originally been Russian were now in Russian hands once more, and all the historical and ethnical claims were met. More than that : Russia acquired the original territory of Lithuania up to the Niemen and the duchy of Courland, which had never been Russian in any sense before. Courland had, it is true, ever since the days of Peter the Great, been a Russian political outpost, and in 1762 Catherine had forced King Augustus III of Poland to recall his son, to whom he had awarded this duchy, and had restored it, with the help of a Russian garrison, to the infamous Bühren, who thus, after a varied career of thirty-two years, returned to his place of origin.

In January 1795 Stanislas Augustus moved from Warsaw to Grodno, at Catherine's suggestion, and there, on November 25 of that year, he signed his abdication. After Catherine's death he moved to Petersburg, where he died in 1797. The acquisition of the Black Sea littoral and the advancement of the Russian frontier westwards as far as the Niemen and Buh fully gratified the secular ambitions of Russian foreign policy, and amply secured the peaceable economic development of the Russian people. At any rate, with regard to Poland Russia might well have stopped there. Even so the vengeance which Russia had wreaked on Poland was so short-sighted, so unstatesmanlike, so petty, and so excessive, the seeds of Polish hatred had by Russia's own action been sown so deep, that the fierce and unquenchable enmity was engendered which still separates the two greatest Slavonic peoples and profits nobody but Prussia—the enemy of both.


Needless to say, no thoughts of the possible advantages of moderation ever entered the heads of such people as Catherine and her advisers. The problems of Slav and German had not then been raised. Peasants, of whatever nationality, were merely taxpayers and recruits. Catherine's ambition was to enlarge the political boundaries of Russia, and in this she was eminently successful.

The last few years of this outwardly brilliant reign were clouded by the French Revolution, which brought about a severe reaction in Catherine's domestic policy. But though she was shocked and alarmed by the tenets and by the proceedings of the revolutionaries, she felt that distance lent security to her throne and never dreamed of taking an active part in the royalist coalition against republican France. She made first the Turkish War and then the Polish insurrection an excuse for her failure to do so. She claimed as her peculiar rôle the punishment of the Jacobins in Sweden, Poland, and Turkey—a task, as Rambaud says,¹ infinitely easier and more lucrative than the punishment of those in France. As a matter of fact, Catherine was far more interested in pursuing her personal ambitions in the East than in helping the rulers of Prussia and Austria to defend their thrones. Without having conquered Turkey she now meditated a war against Persia, whose sovereign had invaded the kingdom of Georgia, already under Russian protection, and had burnt its capital, Tiflis. But the conquest of the Caucasus was to be left to her successors. Catherine II died on November 17, 1796, leaving behind her a memory comparable to that of Queen Elizabeth in our own history.

Though it cannot be said that the *people* of Russia were happy in her reign, yet its achievements and the atmosphere of success which they created were such as to give it the air of a 'great epoch' in Russian history, and the 'times of Catherine'

¹ Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie*, p. 509.

(*Ekaterininskiya vremená*) came to occupy a place in Russian thought and literature comparable to what is conveyed by the expression 'Merrie England'. By the conquest of the Crimea and the destruction of Poland Russia achieved the contour, and gave herself the general character, which she retained throughout the nineteenth century. The conquest of the Crimea may be regarded as having been legitimate in the interests of civilization: it was necessary to the free development of the Russian people, which was unquestionably of superior 'cultural' value to the Tartar races which dominated the coasts of the Black Sea. The destruction of the Polish State was indefensible from every point of view, and it can only be said that its consummation robbed Europe for over a hundred years of the full value of a valuable member of its family.



BOOK III

I

Paul (1796-1801) and Alexander I (1801-25)

Paul before his Accession

THE personality of the Emperor Paul, which has been the subject of acute controversy amongst historians, entirely dominated the last four years of the eighteenth century. By the time he succeeded to the throne, at the age of forty-two,¹ Paul's character was undoubtedly spoiled, and many of his actions were so strange that they earned him the title of 'the crowned madman'. There is no evidence, however, that in his youth he showed any signs of mental disability or that he was marked by any of those mental weaknesses that later became noticeable in him. He was fond of study, and interested in mathematics; he loved reading and serious conversations. But any talents or serious leanings that he may have possessed were never allowed to develop, and the conditions of his early life encouraged only the weaker sides of his character. Catherine had a very poor opinion of his capabilities, and would not allow him to share in the management of affairs of state. She had seized the throne in violation of his right to it,² and never ceased to regard him as a possible rival. He was forced to live in complete isolation at Gátchina, with only his private affairs to occupy his mind,

¹ Paul was born on October 2, 1754. He married (1) Augusta, Princess of Hesse-Darmstadt, who died three years after the marriage, leaving 10 issue; (2) Dorothea Sophia, Princess of Würtemberg, who took the name of Mária Feódorovna, and lived until 1828.

² Cf. p. 293.

which, restricted in the circle of its interests, became narrowed and shrivelled at a time when he was thirsting for activity. Catherine denied him even the rights of a father, by appropriating his children and having them brought up under her own personal supervision. Her attitude was imitated by her favourites, who never hesitated to show their contempt for the unfortunate grand duke, and never lost an opportunity of insulting him.

For many years Paul endured in silence the indignity of his position, which roused in him a bitter hatred of his mother's system and of the people who surrounded her. Towards the end of her reign Catherine formed the intention of excluding him from the succession for the second time, by using the right she possessed, under a law enacted by Peter the Great (1722),¹ and appointing her grandson, Alexander, heir to the throne. She died before this plan could be put into execution; but Paul knew about it, and his resolution to take revenge on those who had for so long injured and insulted him, and to destroy all the work of Catherine's hands, became confirmed.

Internal Affairs, 1796-1801

The first important measure of the reign was the law of April 16, 1797, by which Paul abolished the system that had so nearly led to his complete exclusion from the succession, and directed that the crown should pass from father to oldest son, 'in order that it may never be without a legal heir, and that there shall never be the slightest doubt as to who is to succeed to it'. From the moment of his mother's death he began to vent his accumulated wrath on the privileged upper classes, for whom Catherine's reign had been a veritable golden age. Catherine's ministers and favourites were scattered at once, and Paul entrusted with high office only the very few who had consorted

¹ Cf. p. 247.

with him in his retirement at Gátchina. He withdrew the charters that Catherine had granted to the towns and the gentry, and deprived the latter of many of their privileges, such as that of presenting petitions directly to the throne. He destroyed Catherine's system of local administration, and tried to gather into his own hands complete control of all branches of the work of government, for which he was quite unfitted. Personal caprice became the main principle of government; and if Catherine had tried to play the part of an 'enlightened' despot, Paul was a despot without her enlightenment. He was no more benevolent towards the mass of the people than towards the privileged classes, although the wording of a manifesto published simultaneously with the law on the succession (April 16, 1797) has led some historians to credit him with the intention of restricting to three days a week the amount of forced labour that the landowners could exact from their serfs. The manifesto contained a categorical prohibition of forced labour on Sundays, on the ground that it was contrary to the laws of God and of the State; and expressed a pious opinion that the remaining six days of the week—equally divided by the serfs, as they usually were, between the service of their masters (*bársbchina*) and work on their own land—were quite sufficient for all the needs of agriculture. Paul's attitude to the serfs was clearly defined by his treatment of those who complained of oppression by their masters: he ordered one such deputation to be publicly flogged 'as much as their masters should wish'. Peasant disturbances broke out in many parts of the empire early in the reign. They were suppressed by military forces under the leadership of Prince Répnin, who in some provinces had to fight pitched battles against the peasants, killing and wounding many, and burning and levelling with the ground whole villages. Paul showed his approval of these measures by threatening the peasants with similar treatment if they failed to yield complete

obedience to their lords. Despite his rough handling of the privileged upper section of the gentry, Paul regarded the rank and file of the land-owning class as guardians of public order, and did not hesitate to safeguard their absolute authority over the serfs. He considered that tranquillity was assured while Russia possessed 100,000 such 'police-masters'. He was even quite ready to increase their numbers, and in four years handed over to private persons state lands with a population of 530,000 free peasants.¹

Only the clergy had any reason to be satisfied with Paul, who was piously religious. But his attentions to them became embarrassing at times, as, for example, when he instituted the practice of rewarding high Church dignitaries with medals and ribbons. Plato, Metropolitan of Moscow, who protested that such secular rewards were inadmissible from the point of view of canon law, and inconsistent with the dignity of the clergy, was forced to accept the insignia of the Order of St. Andrew, though he begged on his knees to be allowed to decline the honour. Paul was tolerant to the Russian sectaries, especially the Old Believers, who for the first time were permitted to conduct public services. One of the strangest episodes in his career was the protection he gave to the Knights of St. John of Malta, for he not only allowed them to establish a priory in Petersburg, but in 1798 became Grand Master of the Order, and thus created a situation without precedent—the leader of the Orthodox Church acting as head of a Catholic organization subject to the Pope.

In his views on education Paul was entirely reactionary. Private printing-presses had been closed down by Catherine, and the number of books published each year declined considerably before she died. Under Paul they became fewer still, and the importation of books from abroad was forbidden.

¹ Catherine, in thirty-four years, disposed of 800,000.

Russian students were recalled from foreign universities, and it became almost impossible for foreigners to enter the country. Paul energetically persecuted every outward manifestation of liberalism, and his zeal led him sometimes to extremes that now appear ridiculous. All the foreign tastes and habits that had come into Russia during the French vogue of the preceding reign were strictly tabooed. Many people were arrested and even exiled for wearing hats or costumes of a prohibited pattern. Officials suspected of the least sympathy with progressive ideas lost their posts. Heavy penalties were inflicted for infringements of the stilted court etiquette that Paul introduced, and his subjects considered a meeting with him a misfortune to be avoided if possible. Paul's despotism was keenly felt in the army, in which he took a personal interest and pride. All ranks, from private to general, were compelled to suffer endless parades and were harshly punished for trivial offences. The troops were subjected to a discipline and training that seemed more suited for a *corps de ballet* than for the army of a great European Power. They were dressed in uniforms that were elaborate and even magnificent, but impeded their movements and made their service still more burdensome.

Paul's Foreign Policy

In his relations with other Powers Paul gave to his personal feelings the same freedom that he allowed them in his conduct of domestic affairs. Towards the end of her reign Catherine had realized the necessity of joining the coalition against republican France, but on his accession Paul announced that, while he would remain in firm union with his allies, he could not undertake any active operations, since Russia had been at war 'without a break' since 1756 and was needing a rest. Before long, however, he changed his mind again and joined England, Austria, Turkey, and Naples against France (1799).

A Russian army under Suvórov was sent to co-operate with the Austrians. Suvórov won a series of brilliant victories, drove the French out of northern Italy, and frustrated all their attempts to regain the ground they had lost.¹ The field of operations was then transferred to Switzerland, where Suvórov soon found himself in a very difficult position, owing to the withdrawal of the Austrian forces that should have supported him. Surrounded and heavily outnumbered by the French, suffering from lack of supplies and food, the Russians broke through in the end, and Suvórov made his famous march over the Alps into southern Germany. Another Russian force, under Rímsky-Korsakóv, had been defeated by the French at Zurich. Suvórov attributed his failure in Switzerland to the treachery of the Austrians, and Paul was so angry with them that he broke off the alliance and recalled his ambassador from Vienna (1800).

Dissatisfaction with the treatment of a Russian detachment acting in Holland led him to break with England also. Napoleon immediately took advantage of the new situation and opened negotiations with Paul. He offered to hand over to him the island of Malta in case the garrison, then closely besieged by the English, should be compelled to evacuate it. He sent some thousands of Russian prisoners back to their own country without ransom, and completely captivated the not unwilling Paul, who considered Napoleon's overthrow of the Directory as the beginning of the restoration of order in France. Peace was soon concluded, and Paul entered into alliances with Prussia against Austria, and with Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark against England (the second 'Armed Neutrality'). Active preparations for the new war were carried on. Paul seized English goods and English vessels in Russian ports, and even sent

¹ Battles of the Adda (April 27, 1799), the Trebbia (June 17-19), and Novi (August 15).

a force of Cossacks to conquer India, a project so mad that it gave rise to the legend that his purpose was really to destroy the Cossacks, whom he suspected of disaffection.

The End of Paul and the Accession of Alexander I

Meantime discontent was beginning to show itself at home, and spread to classes of the population that had, up to that time, suffered least of all from Paul's caprice. After the conclusion of the alliance against England and the consequent break-down of Russian foreign trade, which at that time was carried on chiefly with England, the rank and file of the gentry were deprived of the income which they derived from the export of raw materials, such as flax, hemp, and timber, produced on their estates. During the last two years of his reign Paul's despotism knew no bounds, and roused terror in those circles against which it was chiefly directed. A petty intrigue led him to break with his wife, who had been able at times to exert a moderating influence over him. From that time he began to fear the fate that had overtaken his father.¹ He persecuted his own family and intended to have them all put into prison. But before he could carry out this plan he was struck down by a blow even worse than the one he had feared. A small party at court, led by Count Nikíta Pánin, determined to get rid of him, on the pretext that his madness threatened the safety of the dynasty. The Grand Duke Alexander was to be set up as regent, and Pánin induced him to agree to this plan, promising that no harm should come to his father. Pánin was soon banished from court, and the leadership of the conspiracy passed to Count Páhlen, a much more resolute character, who was determined to remove Paul from the throne 'at all costs'. On the night of March 23, 1801, a number of the conspirators penetrated into the palace, apparently with the

¹ Cf. pp. 283-4.

intention of forcing Paul to abdicate, but after a rough altercation they attacked and strangled him.

Paul's reign did not last long enough to exert any serious influence on the destinies of the country. Like a sudden squall it ruffled for a time the surface of Russian life, but did not penetrate to the depths. His successor set out with wide plans of reform, with the definite purpose of diverting the history of his country into new channels. Though most of his ideas turned out to be too visionary for the period in which he lived, Russia did indeed begin to cast off the bonds of mediaevalism and advance along the path of progress on which other nations had far outstripped her.

Alexander blamed himself for having consented to a plot that had ended so tragically. He could not help feeling that he was partly to blame for his father's death, and feared that others might be of the same opinion. But his first steps showed that he fully appreciated the cause of Paul's removal. The Cossacks who had been sent to conquer India were at once recalled. Thousands of officials and private persons who had been removed and banished without trial were brought back, and the most hated of Paul's favourites had to retire. Russians received permission to journey abroad, foreign books were admitted once more, and the ban on private printing-presses was removed. Alexander, further, revived the charters to the nobility and the towns, and granted an amnesty to all refugees except those who were guilty of murder. In a manifesto published on the day of his accession he promised to rule 'according to the laws and spirit' of his grandmother, and the upper classes fully expected to see a revival of the age of Catherine, 'the empress of the nobility', as she came to be called. This manifesto, as well as the other early measures taken by Alexander, showed that he had no sympathy for the policy of his father, and helped to strengthen his position in the eyes of the people. The dark

age of Paul passed away like a nightmare, and did not leave a single regret behind it.

The character of the new emperor, like that of his father, contained many traits that bewildered his contemporaries, and have not been properly explained even by his most intimate biographers. Some have tried to show that he was weak-willed and impulsive in his actions ; but though it is true that he constantly acted in ways that seem to give ground for such an opinion, and that he often failed to carry out plans on which he embarked with every appearance of sincerity, it is not just to him to suppose that these failures were due to lack of will-power. Many times over, especially in his dealings with Napoleon and during the long struggle for the liberation of Europe, he showed that he was capable of forming a deep purpose and of putting it into execution, and his country had reason to be grateful to him. It must be admitted that he was frequently guilty of insincerity, even of duplicity, and could always play a part. Modern historians explain this aspect of his character by the very unfortunate circumstances of his early life, which was no happier than that of Paul had been. Catherine kept Alexander away from the influence of his parents, for whom he had a touching fondness, right up to her death. At his grandmother's court he could never show any sign of his affection for Paul, who in turn distrusted him for his submission to Catherine's will. From boyhood he was forced to be insincere, and had constantly to conceal his real thoughts and feelings. In the later years of Catherine's reign his position became even more uncomfortable. Paul never ceased to regard his son as a dangerous rival, and during his own short reign submitted him to humiliating treatment that Alexander's love for his father made only the more difficult to bear.

Catherine personally supervised her grandson's education, and brought him into touch with the intellectual movements of the

period. She chose as his tutor a Swiss revolutionary, Laharpe, from whom Alexander imbibed the abstract theories of the French philosophers. In his early letters he proclaimed himself a believer in free institutions, and even seems to have considered the possibility of using his absolute authority as emperor of Russia to introduce a representative system of government that would set him free to retire into private life. Unfortunately, his education was confined to theories, and without real knowledge of the conditions of his country he was unable to judge how far his theories might be put into practice, how far they were only theories. Contact with the hard logic of facts brought him constant disappointment, and although he continued to profess himself an admirer of free institutions to the end of his life, his admiration became purely academic and ceased to have any influence on his actions. The stages by which the liberally-minded young heir to the throne turned into the reactionary emperor of the twenties were quite clearly marked.

First Attempts at Reform

On his accession to the throne in 1801 Alexander undoubtedly had the intention of embarking on a course of political reforms, and gathered round himself a circle of men who had been his friends in youth and to whom he now turned for advice. These 'young friends', as they came to be called, were Prince Czartoryski, member of a distinguished Polish family, a man of brilliant mind and talent, and a strong patriot who never concealed from Alexander his hopes for his country's resurrection; Stróganov, once member of a Jacobin club in Paris; Kochubéy, who had been educated in England and, when only twenty-four years of age, served as Russian ambassador at Constantinople; and Novosiltsev, a cousin of Stróganov. These four young men formed a 'secret council', which drew up endless

schemes of reform, but effected little beyond the creation of ministries in place of the obsolete colleges set up by Peter the Great, and the reorganization of the Council of State and the Senate. Like Alexander himself, the 'young friends' were equipped in the sphere of politics only with abstract ideas, and failed to grapple with the many problems that were awaiting settlement. The highest point to which they attained in their treatment of the question of serfdom was a law published in 1803, which permitted landowners to liberate their peasants, on conditions fixed by mutual agreement between both parties and approved by the ministers. This law was of little use to the serfs, and very few of them received their freedom under it. But it marked the beginning of a change in the attitude of the government towards serfdom, and showed the gentry that the age of Catherine II was not to return.

As Alexander gained experience of practical affairs the members of the 'secret council' lost their influence over him. They found that he rejected plans of reform drawn up by them in the spirit of his openly declared opinions and intentions, and in the end they gave up trying to understand him. Alexander's conduct of foreign affairs soon gave the whole country cause to wonder.

Foreign Policy, 1801-7

The international situation was unfavourable for Russia in 1801. Paul had been preparing for war against England. Nelson was in the Baltic, and actually reached Rével before Alexander could make peace (June 17). The British government, through its representative Whitworth, had been in touch with the conspirators against Paul, and knowing the inner meaning of his removal, was willing to come to terms with Russia.

Alexander at first took up an attitude of non-interference in European affairs which allowed him to devote all his attention

to internal questions. Relations with France, however, were far from cordial. Each successive step by which Napoleon built up his power in the West set Alexander more against him, and in the end he found himself forced to abandon his original policy and join England and Austria in the Third Coalition. War broke out in 1805. At the beginning Napoleon, by a clever move, isolated the advanced Austrian forces under the command of General Mack, and forced them to capitulate at Ulm (October 20, 1805). Before the Russians, under Kutúzov, could come up he occupied Vienna and crossed the Danube. Kutúzov wished to avoid an unequal meeting with the French, but was overruled by Alexander. On December 2 the Austrians and Russians were defeated at Austerlitz, and Austria had to agree to the Peace of Pressburg (December 26). The Russians retired to their own frontiers, and Napoleon turned to deal with Prussia.

Napoleon's seizure of Hanover in 1803 (a measure directed against England) had caused Frederick William III to lean towards the Coalition,¹ but he hoped to gain more by remaining neutral than by interfering in the struggle between France and the other Powers. The help of Prussia in 1805 might have turned the balance of forces in favour of the Coalition, but after Austerlitz Frederick William was face to face with Napoleon, and had to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with him (December 15), one condition of which was that he received Hanover in return for Cleves and Anspach. Soon, however, it became apparent that Napoleon did not intend to keep his promise with regard to Hanover. The death of Pitt (January 23, 1806) opened up the prospect of peace with England, and in the negotiations that followed Hanover

¹ The seizure of Hanover was a direct infringement of the treaty of 1795 between France and Prussia, by which a line of demarcation, beyond which France should not advance, was set up.

was used as a pawn. Frederick William was naturally indignant, and at the same time Napoleon's high-handed conduct in western Germany seriously alarmed him. He renewed relations with Alexander, and sent an ultimatum to Paris, demanding the withdrawal of all French troops beyond the Rhine. But he acted so hastily that Alexander could not move his armies across in time to support him. Napoleon struck first, and the Prussians were defeated at Jena-Auerstadt (October 14, 1806). After the fall of Berlin, eleven days later, the theatre of war moved to East Prussia. Napoleon entered Poland and was enthusiastically welcomed by the Poles, who regarded him as their deliverer. An indecisive battle was fought at Eylau (February 8, 1807). After four months' inactivity the summer campaign began, and was speedily concluded by the French victory at Friedland (June 14). Russia was not crushed, as Austria had been at Austerlitz and Prussia at Jena, but she had lost her allies on land. Alexander, irritated by the failure of England to give adequate support, felt himself justified in negotiating for peace, the terms of which he arranged in person with Napoleon at Tilsit, on the river Niemen (July 9, 1807). He tried to secure favourable conditions for Frederick William,¹ who had, however, to give up nearly half of his territory and suffer French garrisons in the fortresses that he was allowed to retain. Out of Prussia's Polish acquisitions of 1793 and 1795 Napoleon formed the Duchy of Warsaw, which he gave to the King of Saxony, whilst the district of Belostók went to Russia. By a secret treaty of alliance Napoleon and Alexander agreed to help each other in case either of them was involved in war with a third Power. If England refused to make peace, Russia was to join the Continental System. Napoleon promised not to restore to Poland her original frontiers, for this would

¹ Napoleon had the greatest contempt for Frederick William, and but for Alexander's mediation would have destroyed Prussia completely.

have necessitated the cession of a large area of territory by Russia. He secured a free hand in the West, advising Alexander to seek compensation for the growth of France by acquisitions in the East, at the expense of Sweden and Turkey.

Effects of the War and the French Alliance

Alexander came out of an unsuccessful war without loss, but he saw his ally crippled and a strong French post established at his own door. Russia was shackled with the Continental System, which ruined her foreign trade again by cutting off all connexion with England. The mobilization of large numbers of troops and the requisitioning of supplies for the army had imposed very heavy burdens on the people. The financial position was growing worse every year. Revenue declined, while expenditure increased rapidly.¹ Large annual deficits were covered by new issues of paper-money, which depreciated seriously in value; the paper rouble in 1806 was still worth 78 kopeks silver, but in 1808 it had fallen to 48. Taxes were paid in paper, while most of the payments for war material and for the maintenance of the army abroad had to be made in bullion, large amounts of which also found their way abroad to meet the heavy adverse trade balance.

The economic difficulties created by the French alliance caused great dissatisfaction in the country. There was also widespread opposition amongst the people to Alexander's friendship with 'the enemy of the human race', who, it was rumoured, wanted to abolish the Christian faith. Alexander had great difficulty in securing a polite reception in Petersburg

1.	Revenue.	Expenditure.
1806 . . .	100,000,000 roubles	122,000,000 roubles
1807 . . .	121,000,000 „	171,000,000 „
1808 . . .	111,500,000 „	240,000,000 „
1809 . . .	195,000,000 „	278,000,000 „

society for General Savary, the French military agent. Between his own people on the one hand, and Napoleon on the other, Alexander's position was far from safe. His father's fate was fresh in his memory, and he set up a secret police in order to follow the course of public opinion. He had given way to Napoleon in 1807 only because circumstances made it impossible for him to continue the struggle. During the trying years that followed, his chief task was to outwit Napoleon, in order to postpone a renewal of the conflict until the country was better prepared for war.

Finland, Bessarabia, and the Caucasus

When he entered the struggle against France Alexander had acted in the interests of the balance of power in Europe. After Tilsit he returned for a time to the traditional policy of expanding towards the north-west and the south-west, at the expense of Sweden and Turkey.

In accordance with a promise which he gave to Napoleon, Alexander addressed a note to Gustavus IV, King of Sweden, calling upon him to abandon his alliance with England. Gustavus refused to yield, and Russian troops invaded Finland. They met with little opposition from the Swedish garrisons, and within a few months occupied the whole country. Alexander at first posed as a conqueror, but soon discovered that he had roused the patriotic feelings of the inhabitants, who were ready to prove that they had not been conquered. He then changed his attitude, and promised the Finlanders that they would be allowed to retain their liberties and institutions (June 17, 1808). This guarantee was repeated in the Diet that met at Borgå in March 1809, and the Emperor of Russia added to his titles that of hereditary Grand Duke of Finland. The whole of Finland, including the Åland Islands, was formally

ceded to Russia by the Treaty of Fredrikshamm, September 17, 1809.

The constant gravitation of Russia towards the south-west was due, in the first place, to a natural desire to protect the oppressed Slav and Orthodox Christian peoples of the Balkans. But racial and religious sympathies were backed up by, and usually served to cover, a much more compelling motive—the need for an outlet in this direction like that which Peter the Great had obtained in the Baltic. The free economic development of Russia was impossible without unrestricted access to the Mediterranean. The ‘Greek Project’¹ showed how wide were the aims of Catherine II, and although it was not executed, considerable progress had been made before the end of the eighteenth century, for Russia had gained a firm footing on the Black Sea² and the right to send ships through the Straits, and her claim to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey was conceded in part.³ The opportunity for a further advance came in 1806, when, through the scheming of Napoleon, Russia and Turkey were again involved in war. Alexander’s attention was fully occupied at that time in the north, but the Russians seized Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1807, however, Napoleon changed his attitude with regard to Turkey, and in order to gain Alexander’s support for his great plan of striking a fatal blow at England in the East, he

¹ Cf. pp. 324–5.

² Cf. map, p. 376.

³ The actual concessions made by Turkey were: (1) the right to interfere in certain cases in the affairs of Moldavia and Wallachia, which, unlike the other Balkan lands, were autonomous, under the rule of *bospodars* appointed by the Sultan (Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, 1774, cf. p. 320), and (2) the right to make representations on behalf of the new church which the Russian government was allowed to build at Constantinople (Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, Arts. vii and xvi). On this slight foundation Russia built up her pretension to a general right of protecting the Orthodox Christians throughout the Turkish Empire.

suggested that they should divide the Turkish Empire between them.¹ From August 1807 an armistice had been in force between the Russian and Turkish armies. After the conquest of Finland Alexander sent reinforcements to the Danube; and by the end of 1810, though not without some reverses, the main fortresses along the river were reduced. In 1811 the prospect of war with France caused Russia to relax her efforts, and in the following year the situation in the north became so threatening that peace had to be concluded, on terms which were much more advantageous for Turkey than they might have been had the Russians been free to press home their victories. Russia was allowed to retain Bessarabia, thus extending her frontier to the river Prut and the Kilia mouth of the Danube, and the obligations of Turkey with regard to Moldavia and Wallachia were reaffirmed (Treaty of Bucarest, May 28, 1812).

Before the end of the eighteenth century Russia had begun to advance in the south-east, towards the Caucasus. The motives which impelled her forward in this quarter were similar to those which had caused her to gravitate towards Constantinople. In the Caucasus, as in the Balkans, there were Christian peoples to protect, and, further, between the Black Sea and the Caspian lay the only practicable land route to the East. The effective frontier of Russia at the beginning of Paul's reign was formed by the rivers Kubán and Tére², along which a chain of forts was built. The steppe to the north of this line was gradually colonized by Cossacks. To the south lay a number of small states nominally subject to Turkey and Persia. Some of them were Christian, and at one time had

¹ Russia, however, was not to have Constantinople, a reservation that caused constant friction between Alexander and Napoleon.

² The district of Kabardá, ceded by Turkey in 1774, was only subdued in the nineteenth century.

been united in the kingdom of Georgia, which reached the height of its power in the twelfth century.

The natural route to the south lay along the narrow strip of lowland between the eastern spurs of the Caucasus Mountains and the Caspian Sea, but it was not in this direction that Russia advanced.¹ The kingdom of Georgia, after the Tartar invasions that swept over it in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, split up into a number of small states,² which were ravaged by Turks and Persians alternately. The Christian princes appealed to Russia for help, but it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that she felt herself strong enough to interfere. Catherine II took Georgia under her protection, and in 1783 Count Paul Potëmkin,³ after erecting the fortress of Vladikavkáz, built the great Georgian military road across the mountains, and led a Russian column to Tiflis. The Russians retired in the following year, but their intervention had irritated the Shah of Persia, and in 1795 a Persian army sacked Tiflis and massacred the inhabitants. Russia at once declared war, and occupied the districts of Dérbent, Koubá, and Bakú, and a number of Persian khanates farther south, but after Paul's accession a fresh retreat was made to the original frontier. Russia had apparently not yet decided how far she wished to commit herself in the Caucasus. In 1800, however, a decision had to be made, for King George XII of Georgia died, leaving his crown to Paul, who, after some hesitation, accepted it. Georgia was finally annexed to Russia by Alexander I. Its acquisition led to a long war with Persia

¹ Peter the Great tried the route round the north of the Caspian in 1717, but met with disaster. Five years later he led an expedition down the Caspian coast and occupied Dérbent and Bakú, but these conquests were abandoned by the Empress Anne.

² One of these retained the name of Georgia.

³ Cousin of Catherine's favourite, Gregory Potëmkin (cf. pp. 323-4).

(1804-13), during which the remaining Christian states went over to Russia, and all the khanates as far as the river Aras (Araxes) were overrun. When peace was made (Treaty of Gulistan, 1813) Persia ceded the regions of Karabágh, Gandja, Shekín, Shirván, Dérbent, Bakú, and Koubá, with part of Talish, and abandoned all claim to Daghestán, Georgia, Mingrelia, Imeritia, and Abkhazia. These important gains gave Russia a dominating position in the Caucasus, and her possessions now stretched from sea to sea. But it could not yet be said that the Caucasus was definitely conquered, for between the original frontier and the northern boundary of the new territory there lay a broad belt of hilly country peopled by wild tribes of Tartar origin. Their fate was already certain, but half a century passed before they were finally subdued.

The Return to Reform : Speránsky

After Tilsit Alexander turned once more to the consideration of political reforms. By this time the 'young friends' had retired into private life, and Alexander relied for help on Michael Speránsky, the most remarkable of all his advisers. Speránsky, the son of a country priest, was educated in a church seminary, but read and studied very widely. He entered the service of the government, and his talent and intelligence were so conspicuous that ministers of state quarrelled for his services. Soon he came under the notice of the emperor, who put before him the papers of the 'secret council',¹ outlined his own ideas, and ordered him to prepare plans for the complete reorganization of the system of government.

In the 'Constitution' which he drew up, Speránsky divided society into groups distinguished by the rights they enjoyed. All classes of the population, including the serfs, were to be

¹ Cf. pp. 356-7.

granted civil rights, while special political rights, i. e. a share in the government of the country on a representative basis, were to be given to all property owners. The grant of civil rights to all classes implied the abolition of serfdom, which, together with the suggestion of a representative system, brought Speránsky's plans into line with Alexander's liberal dreams. At the same time Speránsky carefully pointed out that under the external forms of a representative system it would be quite possible for the autocratic central power to retain its absolute authority, on which ultimately the whole political fabric could be made to depend. How far Speránsky's ideas on the abolition of serfdom went may be judged from his proposal to grant to members of the gentry class the exclusive right of buying *inhabited* lands; these lands were to be governed according to law,¹ and the peasants who lived on them were to receive the civil rights accorded to all other classes, but Speránsky continued to call them serfs.

However liberal in promise its principles might seem, Speránsky's scheme could be made very moderate in application. But the political institutions which he proposed to set up marked a serious attempt to meet the ever-growing difficulty of ruling the country. The whole territory of the empire was to be divided into administrative areas called 'governments' (*gubérniya*), which were subdivided into 'districts' (*ókrug*), each containing a number of 'cantons' (*vólost*). Each of these units was to have its own legislative body (*dúma*). That of the 'canton' was to be elected by the owners of property, and to send its deputies to the 'district' *dúma*; the legislature of the 'government' was to be formed of representatives from the district legislatures, while an Imperial *Dúma* was to meet annually in Petersburg. There was also provision for a corresponding series of judicial institutions, with the Senate

¹ I. e. not by the uncontrolled caprice of the landowners.

as supreme court, and of administrative offices centring in the ministries. All branches of government were to be united in the Council of State, appointed by the emperor, which was to serve as the link between his autocratic authority and the administrative system, and presumably as the instrument through which he could exercise that supreme control hinted at by Speránsky.

Alexander adopted only a very small part of this ambitious plan. In 1810 and 1811 the Council of State and the ministries were completely reorganized. But no steps were taken towards the reform of local government. Speránsky's proposals are more important in the history of ideas than in that of institutions. They represented new tendencies in Russian political thought and roused strong opposition from conservatives, like Karamzín the historian, who pointed out that their ultimate origin was France, which was regarded at that time as the fountain of social and political disruption. Probably Alexander did not persist with Speránsky's plan of reforms because he felt that it was too complete and too drastic, and did not wish to do anything that would arouse fresh opposition in court circles.

Although Speránsky's name is always associated with the 'Constitution', he was entrusted with other important commissions and occupied the first place among political workers of the period. He supervised the drafting of a new code of civil law, which was rejected by the Council of State but served as an important preparation for a much more successful work of codification which he carried out under Nicholas I.¹ He found scope for his talents in organizing the territory of Finland,² and made important proposals for dealing with the financial situation, which showed no signs of recovery from the effects of the war of 1806-7 and was becoming more critical every year,

¹ Cf. p. 396.

² Finland was acquired in 1809. Cf. p. 361.

owing to the constant and heavy drain caused by the wars with Turkey, Sweden, Persia, and Austria,¹ and the economic dislocation brought about by Russia's adherence to the Continental System. Revenue figures showed an increase,² which was largely fictitious, for the value of the paper rouble gradually fell until it was worth no more than 20 kopeks in silver (1810). Speránsky proposed to stop the issue of new paper-money, to recognize paper already in circulation as State debt, and to buy it in gradually. He suggested, also, that the annual budget deficits should be covered by increases in taxation, and strongly recommended that State finances should be made public and an effective system of control set up. He insisted on the widest possible interpretation of Alexander's obligations under the Treaty of Tilsit, since Napoleon's aim was to ruin, not Russia, but England. Owing to Speránsky's representations Russian ports were opened for all ships under neutral flags, whatever the origin of their cargoes (1810), and a new tariff, with increased duties on articles of luxury, was introduced. These measures relieved the general economic situation, but Speránsky's other suggestions were not heeded. In 1810 another large issue of paper was made (forty-three million roubles), and Gúriev (Minister of Finances) devoted to current needs the proceeds of a special tax imposed for the purpose of extinguishing part of the State debt.

Speránsky made many enemies, especially at court, where his birth was against him. His political proposals, based on French models, roused very strong feeling. When Alexander saw that a break with France was inevitable he was not unwilling to have

¹ Cf. pp. 361-5. Russia was at war with Austria in 1809, in alliance with France, but did not participate actively in operations. As a reward she received the district of Tarnopol. At the same time a large part of Galicia was taken from Austria and added to the Duchy of Warsaw. Both Tarnopol and Galicia were handed back to Austria in 1815.

² Cf. p. 360, note.

it supposed that Speránsky was responsible for the spread of French influence, and in March 1812 banished him to Nízhny Nóvgorod.

The Break with Napoleon and the Invasion of Russia, 1812

The alliance with Napoleon was unbearable for Russian national feeling and ruinous for the economic interests of the country. Alexander had reason to know that it was a danger to the future of Russia as a European Power. He had watched with suspicion the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807 and the extension of its territory at the expense of Austria in 1809.¹ Napoleon constantly assured him that he did not intend to re-establish the kingdom of Poland, but a secret document intercepted by the Russians proved that his real aim was to drive Russia back beyond the Dnieper and western Dviná, and to set up Poland as a barrier to prevent her from advancing westwards. Napoleon's action in depriving of his possessions the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Alexander, and his hasty marriage with Marie Louise of Austria before receiving a definite answer to his request for the hand of Alexander's sister Anne, introduced personal motives into the distrust that was growing between the two emperors. Napoleon was annoyed by Russia's failure to support him effectively against Austria in 1809 and by the virtual abandonment of the Continental System. The new customs tariff weighed heavily against French traders. Both Alexander and Napoleon realized that the alliance was doomed, and began to prepare for war.

Russia's resources in 1812 were insufficient for an offensive. Part of the army was occupied against Turkey and a hasty peace had to be concluded in order to set it free to meet the French.²

¹ Cf. p. 368, n. 1.

² Cf. p. 363. The Peace of Bucarest was strenuously opposed by the 1832.2

The Russian plan, dictated by natural conditions and the discrepancy of forces, was to entice the enemy on into a desolated country without allowing any decisive action to be fought. Napoleon would thus be drawn farther away from his base and his communications lengthened, while the Russians would be falling back towards their source of supplies. The Russian army was divided into two groups, one of which, under Barclay de Tolly, was to retreat before Napoleon, while the other, led by Bagration, threatened his flanks and rear. The Grand Army crossed the Niemen near Kóvno on June 24. Napoleon first tried to get between the two groups and defeat them separately, but after hard fighting they managed to meet at Smolénsk (August 2). When he found that the Russians continued to retire to the east, he made an effort to drive them from the Moscow road and thus cut them off from the fertile provinces of the south. This plan also failed, and after a fierce engagement with the Russian rearguard at Valyútina-Gorá Napoleon thought of wintering at Smolénsk.

Meantime, Alexander had left the control of operations in the hands of his generals, and returned to Moscow, where he received an unexpectedly warm welcome. A wave of patriotic feeling swept over the country. The wealthy classes made large contributions towards the cost of the war, which became a war of the people—a struggle for the defence of the fatherland against the invader. Alexander vowed that he would not make peace while a single enemy remained on Russian soil, and, yielding to popular demand, appointed Kutúzov commander-in-chief of the armies. Kutúzov knew that he was expected to make a stand against the French, but determined to retreat until he reached a favourable position. On September 7 a great battle took place at Borodinó (75 miles west of Moscow), in which the French, and its successful conclusion was due largely to the efforts of the English representatives at Constantinople.

losses of both French and Russians were very heavy. Both sides claimed the victory, but Kutúzov saw that he could not hope to keep Napoleon back for long, and abandoned Moscow without another fight. The French entered the city on September 14. They had expected a long rest and plentiful supplies of provisions, but found only flames, famine, and desolation. Almost the whole population had fled with the army and removed everything that could be of service to the enemy. Napoleon tried to negotiate with the Russian leaders, but without success. Forced inactivity, starvation, and the terrors of a burning city, led to the final demoralization of the seriously depleted French forces, and after little more than a month in Moscow Napoleon decided to retreat (October 15). He attempted to break through to the south, in order to avoid the old, devastated route by which he had advanced, but was headed off at Maloyaroslávets¹ (October 24) and driven back once more on to the main road from Moscow to Smolénsk. Fierce rearguard actions were fought at Vyázma and Krásnoe, and only a brilliant stratagem saved the remnant of the French forces from complete annihilation at the crossing of the river Berézina (November 26-8). Winter came on, and the whole country rose against the French as they straggled west. Harassed from all sides by guerrilla bands and Cossack irregulars, the Grand Army turned into a hungry, frozen rabble, and only a small portion of it was left to recross the Niemen.

The Wars of 1813-14

Alexander had attained his immediate purpose and might have stopped at his own frontiers, but determined to take advantage of Napoleon's desperate failure and rouse Europe against him. In January 1813 the Russian army crossed the

¹ One hundred miles south-west of Moscow, on the road to Kalúga.

Niemen, and Alexander embarked on the most brilliant period of his career. Never at any time previously had Russia meant so much for the fate of Europe.

Frederick William of Prussia had been compelled, early in 1812, to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Napoleon, and furnish an auxiliary corps for service with the Grand Army. After the Russian disaster he was anxious to sever this alliance, but, mindful of the fate he had so narrowly escaped in 1807, he could not make up his mind until forced to do so by events that were beyond his control. General Yorck, commander of the Prussian corps that had been acting on Napoleon's left, allowed the Russians to cross the Prussian frontier in pursuit of the retreating French (Convention of Tauroggen, December 30, 1812), and a national rising broke out in East Prussia. Frederick William fled from Berlin to Breslau. On February 27, 1813, by the Treaty of Kalish, he formally joined Alexander, and on March 13 declared war against France.

While Napoleon was preparing a new army, the French troops in Germany were pressed back, first to the Oder, and then to the Elbe. The allies took Hamburg and Dresden, and their southern army, under Blücher, advanced to Leipzig. But by this time Napoleon had arrived with fresh forces. He crossed the river Saale, occupied Leipzig, defeated the allies at Lützen (May 2), and retook Dresden. After the battle of Bautzen (May 20-1) the allied armies retreated slowly into Silesia, fighting all the way.

At this point an armistice was arranged (Pläswitz, June 4), with a view to peace negotiations. Peace terms were to be offered to Napoleon by Austria, who, if they were rejected, was to join Russia and Prussia (Convention of Reichenbach, June 17). Napoleon hesitated until the time fixed by the ultimatum had expired, and on August 12 Austria declared

war. Sweden had also joined the Coalition by this time, and England had agreed to provide large subsidies.

During the armistice Prussia had mobilized all her forces, and Russian reserves were moved forward. Operations were renewed in August. The French broke through into Silesia, but met with disaster on the river Katzbach (August 25). A strong force which advanced towards Berlin was checked at Grossbeeren, and later defeated at Dennewitz (September 6). Napoleon himself won an important victory over the southern allied army at Dresden (August 26-7), and caused it to fall back, but a column which he sent to cut off its retreat was caught in a trap at Kulm, and had to surrender (August 30). The battle of Kulm proved the turning-point in the campaign. The allies slowly converged on Napoleon, and engaged him with their full strength at Leipzig. In the terrible 'Battle of the Nations' (October 16-19) the French army was defeated and ruined. The survivors fled west, and, after breaking through a Bavarian force¹ that tried to bar their retreat (Hanau, October 30), crossed the Rhine.

In January 1814 the war was carried into France. The main army of the allies concentrated on the plateau of Langres. Farther north Blücher advanced almost unopposed as far as Brienne. On February 1 he defeated Napoleon, who had hastened to meet him, at La Rothière, but two weeks later his army was shattered and compelled to fall back on Châlons. Napoleon turned south and checked for a time the main army of the allies. His successes in this period were due in part to the lack of cohesion amongst his opponents. Selfishness and jealousy even threatened to break up the Coalition, but it was saved by Lord Castlereagh. When peace negotiations, which had been proceeding for some weeks, failed, Russia, Austria,

¹ Bavaria joined the allies in October 1813, and was followed by most of the other German states.

Prussia, and Great Britain bound themselves (1) not to treat separately with Napoleon, (2) to continue the struggle until France should be confined once more to her original frontiers, and (3) to endeavour to secure a lasting peace, for the protection of which their representatives were to meet together periodically (Treaty of Chaumont, March 1, 1814). Blücher was reinforced, and defeated Napoleon at Laon (March 9-10). Believing his enemies to be in retreat, Napoleon marched east, and the allied armies, by a rapid converging movement, occupied Paris (March 31).

The Settlement of 1815: Poland

The first care of the victorious allies was to render impossible a repetition of the events of the past twenty-five years. They were determined that France should not be allowed to turn Europe upside down again. There was at first some disagreement amongst them as to the form of government that should be set up. Napoleon, who abdicated on April 11, was permitted to retire to the island of Elba, and in the end the restoration of the Bourbons, in the person of Louis XVIII, was decided upon. In order to avoid a renewal of the political conditions which had prevailed under the old monarchy, to which in part the Revolution had been due, Louis was to grant a constitutional charter. The frontiers of France were defined as those which she held on November 1, 1792 (Treaty of Paris, May 30, 1814).

The second task which faced the allies was the reorganization of Europe. This was entrusted to a congress that met at Vienna in October 1814. From the point of view of Russia, the most important question was that of Poland, which Alexander had decided to revive, as an autonomous state, ruled over by himself and his heirs. It was thus necessary for him to retain the Duchy of Warsaw, of which the greater part had

belonged to Prussia before 1807.¹ In order to induce Frederick William to abandon his claim he had undertaken to provide him with compensation in Germany. Frederick William wished to annex Saxony, an arrangement which was opposed by France, Austria, Bavaria, and the smaller German states, as likely to make Prussia too powerful. Great Britain and Austria, on the other hand, were alarmed by the advance of Russia into Europe. The Polish-Saxon question thus divided the Powers into two camps, and for a time there was grave danger of a violent rupture, which might even have led to war.² In the end a compromise was arrived at : Alexander agreed to leave Prussia the western part of the Duchy of Warsaw, while Frederick William contented himself with the northern half of Saxony, and important acquisitions in western Germany. Austria received back Tarnopol and the portion of Galicia which she had been forced to cede to the Duchy in 1809,³ while the city of Cracow became an independent republic.

Alexander thus gained a large part of what he had set out to gain. But to carry out his original plan with regard to Poland he would have had to cut off from Russia, besides the Polish lands gained at the time of the Partitions, Lithuania and a large expanse of territory, east of the Dnieper, which had been acquired earlier. Owing to the hostile feeling against the Poles in Russia at that time, caused by their adherence to Napoleon, such a step would have aroused a storm of protest. Alexander therefore had to content himself with turning that part of the Duchy of Warsaw which he had just acquired into a kingdom, and giving it a constitution.

¹ Cf. p. 359.








² Great Britain, France, and Austria provided for this contingency by concluding an alliance (January 3, 1815), which was obviously directed against Russia.

³ Cf. p. 368, n. 1.

EUROPEAN RUSSIA IN THE 19TH CENTURY

English Miles

0 50 100 200 300 400 500

	Belostok acquired 18
	Finland " 18
	Bessarabia " 18
	Kingdom of Poland " 18
	Caucasia " 1801
	Part of Bessarabia handed back to Moldavia 1856
	Russian again from 18



By the settlement of the Polish question the western frontier of Russia was fixed, and, with the exception of very slight adjustments in the far south-east,¹ it remained unchanged for a century.

The Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance

Before the Congress of Vienna had completed its work, Europe was again plunged into war by the return of Napoleon, who landed on the south coast of France on March 1, 1815, and in less than three weeks reached Paris. Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain at once came to an agreement by which each of them was to provide an army of 150,000, and to keep it in the field until Napoleon, 'the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world', 'should have been rendered absolutely incapable of stirring up further trouble' (March 25). Within a short time a great new European league had been formed. Napoleon proceeded to gather together an army, but, despite his acceptance of the constitution, he could not gain the unanimous support even of his own people, while his enemies were resolved to crush him. The short campaign which ended at Waterloo (June 18) decided his fate, and he had to abdicate once more. This time the allies took no risks, and removed him to St. Helena.

The events of the 'Hundred Days' proved that the arrangements embodied in the Treaty of Paris did not guarantee the peace of Europe as fully as the allies intended that they should. They accordingly imposed a fresh settlement, which provided for the occupation of the fortresses in the north and east of France by allied troops for a period not exceeding five years, and effected some slight changes in the frontiers laid down in 1814 (Second Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815).

The idea of a European Concert for the maintenance of

¹ Bessarabia ; cf. pp. 422-3, 464.

peace, which had been foreshadowed in the agreements concluded between Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain on March 1, 1814, and March 25, 1815, took final shape in the convention signed by the four Powers on November 20, 1815. Napoleon and his family were to be excluded for ever from the French throne, and 'since revolutionary principles might again tear France in pieces, and thus menace the repose of other states', the high contracting parties undertook, in case so unfortunate an event happened to occur, 'to agree amongst themselves and with (the King of France) on such measures as they might judge necessary for the safety of their respective states and for the general peace of Europe'. Representatives of the four Powers were to meet periodically to discuss common interests and to take measures which they might consider 'salutary for the repose and prosperity of the peoples and for the peace of Europe'. The terms of this agreement show that the Powers regarded the spirit of revolution as the most dangerous enemy of the European system which they had founded. In its conception the Quadruple Alliance was a league for the defence of the principle of 'legitimism', which, however, did not necessarily imply the negation of all political progress. Under the influence of later events and the guidance of Metternich, the representative of the most reactionary state in Europe, it gradually developed into a league of reaction, and devoted itself to the suppression of liberal ideas, wherever and in whatever form they showed themselves.

The idea of a European Concert was applied in a novel and interesting manner in the 'Holy Alliance', formed on the initiative of Alexander I. The stirring events of the years 1812-15 had a marked effect on his character. He declared that the burning of Moscow 'lit up his soul and warmed his heart with a hitherto unfelt faith'. He had always been an

idealist, and the tendency towards mysticism which had been noticeable even in the early years of his reign now showed itself more prominently. Under the influence of Baroness Julie von Krüdener, whom he met in Germany, he turned to the Bible for inspiration and guidance, and began to regard himself as the instrument of Providence, which through him had punished the too ambitious Napoleon. He conceived the idea of reorganizing Europe in accordance with the principles of the Christian faith, and the Holy Alliance was to be the means of putting this idea into practice. The monarchs who subscribed to it¹ declared their determination 'to base their conduct in the administration of their respective states, and their political relations with other governments, on no other rules than the precepts of the Christian religion—justice, charity, and peace', and bound themselves 'to remain united by the bonds of true and indissoluble fraternity'; 'to assist each other on all occasions and in all places'; to treat their peoples as members of a single 'Christian nation'; and to govern in conformity with the teachings of Christ. This vague and harmless confession of faith, which Castlereagh referred to as 'a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense', had no practical significance for European politics. It remained a 'sonorous nothing' (Metternich's description of it); for the actual principles which were to govern the relations between the European states were laid down with sufficient clearness in the convention of November 20.

Economic Conditions after 1815

The brilliant success attained by Russian arms was dearly bought. The provinces over which the tide of war had passed directly were quite ruined, and the whole country had been

¹ The original signatories were Alexander I, Frederick William of Prussia, and Francis I of Austria (September 26, 1815).

drawn on for men, supplies, and transport. The taxable resources of the people were exhausted, and the war had been carried on with the help of English gold. After the conclusion of peace serious attention was once more turned to the financial position of the country. Paper-money to the value of 38 million roubles was withdrawn in 1817, but no less than 800 millions remained in circulation. Russia was saved from bankruptcy at this period only by her foreign trade, for by 1812 there was a large excess of exports over imports, and the rouble stood favourably on the foreign exchanges. In 1816 all prohibitions of the import of foreign goods were abandoned and many customs duties, especially those on raw materials that could not be produced at home, were lowered.¹ In 1819 the tariff became still more liberal.

Manufacturing industry had made little progress by the end of the eighteenth century, though factories had existed from the time of Peter the Great. Iron, arms, woollen cloth, and linen were needed for the army and fleet. In order to obtain a regular supply of these articles the government supplied the factories with capital and forced labour, but in return demanded that they should work only for State needs and refused to allow them to produce goods for sale. Even when this policy was abandoned the industries that had been affected by it did not make much progress, for owing to the general economic backwardness of the country the market for manufactured goods was formed only very slowly. In the younger industries, such as cotton, that were beginning to develop independently of the government, significant changes took place in this period. The superior productivity of free labour, as compared with that of the forced workers whom the government had tied to the eighteenth-century factories, was clearly recognized by the new

¹ The tariff changes of 1816 were introduced in fulfilment of promises made by Alexander to other Powers at the Congress of Vienna.

generation of manufacturers. During the first half of the nineteenth century serfs were gradually replaced by hired workers in industry. A few of the more intelligent landowners began to see that even in agriculture the same change would be profitable.

Alexander and the Serfs

Serfdom reached the height of its development under Catherine II, but from the reign of her successor the process of decline set in. Although too much importance must not be attached to Paul's law of 1797, the one enacted by Alexander in 1803² clearly showed in which direction official opinion on this question was beginning to lean. In the years 1816, 1818, and 1819 the peasants of the Baltic provinces received their personal freedom, but remained in economic dependence on their former masters, who were allowed to retain all the land. The question of serfdom was constantly in Alexander's mind, and he welcomed schemes for its solution that were presented to him by persons interested in the subject. He fully recognized the need for reform, but knew that the great majority of the landowners would not tolerate any interference with their privileges, although they had lost all claim to the right of disposing of the person and labour of the peasants when the compulsory service in return for which they had received that right was abolished in 1762.³ In 1818 Alexander ordered his minister Arakchëev to prepare a scheme for *gradually* emancipating the serfs, which was not to include 'any measure that might be burdensome for the landowners or likely to necessitate the use of compulsion'. This was the official attitude on this important question right up to the middle of the nineteenth century.

¹ Cf. p. 349.

² Cf. p. 357.

³ Cf. p. 281.

Education

Public education won for itself in this period a definite place in national life. From the time of Peter the Great, and even earlier, the State had encouraged education in the same way that it encouraged industry, and with an equally narrow object—to train officials and administrators. In the nineteenth century education was recognized for the first time as a social need. The first years of the reign were particularly fruitful. An intelligent Minister of Education (Count Zavadóvsky) was devotedly supported by a group of enlightened public workers who endeavoured to organize a national system of education. For administrative purposes the country was divided into ‘circuits’, each controlled by a ‘curator’, who lived in Petersburg, sharing in the discussion of the educational affairs of the empire as a whole, but kept in touch with the provinces through periodical visits of inspection. At the beginning of the century Russia possessed only three universities—Moscow (founded in 1755), Vilna, and Dórpát (now Yúriev in Livland). Of these Moscow alone was really Russian, for Vilna and Dórpát represented Polish and German civilization. Soon after Alexander’s accession three more universities were opened, all of them in Russia proper—Khárkov, Kazán, and Petersburg¹—and higher education became for the first time accessible to large numbers of the people. In 1804 the first University Code was published. The universities became practically autonomous, and were made responsible for the supervision of secondary education. Government grants for educational purposes were raised to 2,800,000 roubles a year.² Each university received 130,000 roubles, while fixed sums were assigned to the secondary and elementary schools. In the hope of inducing the

¹ Petersburg University was founded as a ‘Central Pedagogical Institute’.

² From 780,000 roubles under Catherine II.

gentry to have their sons properly educated, instead of employing foreign tutors, as was the custom at that time, the government founded the Lycée of Tsárskoe Seló. The Richelieu Lycée, which later became the University of Odessa, and the Lázarev Institute of Oriental Languages at Moscow, were the fruits of private enterprise.

This productive work was brought to a standstill by the financial embarrassments created by the wars, and after 1815 the educational policy of the government changed sharply. The spirit of mysticism which then spread through society found its way into the educational system. Alexander even joined the administration of education and spiritual affairs in one ministry, at the head of which stood Prince Golitsyn, who was charged with the task of 'spiritualizing' education. Enlightened curators were replaced by confirmed reactionaries. The best professors were removed, and the curriculum and spirit of university life changed completely.¹ The obscurantist policy was further expressed in a strengthening of the press rules, and although the policy embodied in the 'Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Education' was really nothing more than a passing fad, reaction became firmly established under Golitsyn's successor, Admiral Shishkóv.

The Eastern Question, 1813-25: Greece

By 1813 Russia had gained a commanding position in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and but for events in Europe she might have established herself on the Danube. Turkey was greatly alarmed by the reference, in the agreement signed by the members of the Holy Alliance, to a single 'Christian nation',² and by her own exclusion from the Concert of

¹ Students who broke the rules had to parade with the word 'Sinner' inscribed on boards hung round their necks.

² Cf. p. 379.

Europe. After the conclusion of peace, Alexander kept up a large army, and, in order to be able to pick a quarrel at his own time, delayed the settlement of certain questions arising out of the Treaty of Bucarest by presenting demands which the Sultan would not accept.¹ Agitators who conspired almost openly for a rising of the Christian subjects of the Sultan were tolerated and even encouraged in Russia,² and several Greeks, known to be hostile to Turkey, occupied important positions in Alexander's service.³ Alexander's intentions with regard to Turkey were thus no secret, and caused apprehension to other Powers, especially Austria and Great Britain. Austria was already concerned at the occupation of the mouth of the Danube by Russia, and saw that the next stage in her advance might easily be the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. British statesmen feared the growth of Russia, and regarded the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey as a matter of life and death for the British Empire in the East.

A general revolt of the Christians in Turkey broke out in 1821. Prince Ypsilanti crossed the Prut and called upon

¹ During the war with Persia, Russia had been allowed to use the military road from the Black Sea coast, up the valley of the river Rion, to Tiflis. Turkey had renewed this privilege on several occasions, and by a secret article of the Treaty of Bucarest had promised to cede this district to Russia, who agreed to dismantle the fortresses of Kilia and Ismail, at the mouth of the Danube. The Sultan refused to confirm this arrangement, and relations between Russia and Turkey were thus governed by the open articles of the treaty, according to which Russia should have evacuated the valley of the Rion. Alexander refused to do this, and pressed for the ratification of the secret articles.

² The *Hetairia Philike*, a secret society which prepared the ground for the Greek rising of 1821, was revived in Odessa in 1814.

³ The two brothers Ypsilanti, one of whom became the leader of a rising in 1821, served as aides-de-camp to Alexander, and Capodistria, later president of the Greek Republic, was Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.

the people of Moldavia to rise against the Sultan. This movement had no chance of success, and was easily suppressed. The real revolt took place in Greece, where the ground had been thoroughly prepared beforehand. Before long the Turks were completely driven out of the Morea.

Alexander now had to clear himself in the eyes of Europe from the suspicion of collusion with the insurgents to which his policy had laid him open.¹ He therefore disowned Ypsilanti and the Greeks, whom he denounced as revolutionaries, unworthy of sympathy. But soon the excesses of the Turks and the growing popularity of the Greek cause in Russia seemed to justify him in intervening. On June 28, 1821, he sent an ultimatum in which, besides demanding the settlement of questions that had been in dispute since 1812, he declared that the Sultan would find himself faced with the hostility of the whole Christian world, if he did not promise (1) to rebuild the Greek churches which had been destroyed by the Turks, (2) to protect the Christian religion, (3) to grant an amnesty to those rebels who submitted to him within a given period, and (4) to remove his troops from Moldavia and Wallachia, and respect the autonomy of those provinces. A few days later he addressed a note to the allies, asking them what would be their attitude if war broke out between Russia and Turkey, and what measures they proposed to take in the Balkans if, as a result of the war, the authority of Turkey should be overthrown.

The Sultan rejected all Alexander's demands, and on August 8 the Russian ambassador left Constantinople. Russian troops were massed in the south, ready for action against Turkey. In answer to Alexander's note, Great Britain and

¹ In his proclamation to the people of Moldavia, Ypsilanti claimed that he was supported by a 'great Power', which, under the circumstances, could only mean Russia.

Austria replied that they would protest against any scheme for the dismemberment of Turkey, and would try to persuade the Sultan to grant Russia the satisfaction to which her treaties entitled her. As for the Greeks, they were rebels, and the Sultan, their legitimate ruler, should be left to deal with them as he thought fit. They were no more worthy of consideration than the rebellious peoples of Naples and Piedmont. These representations influenced Alexander, especially as they were couched in language which made it clear that the two Powers would not allow Russia to intervene alone. The need for caution was further brought home by the course of events in Greece, where the national assembly adopted a liberal constitution and declared Greece to be completely independent of Turkey (January 1822). Alexander therefore accepted the offer of mediation between himself and the Sultan, and consented to modify his demands.

Towards the end of 1822 the struggle between the three Powers entered a fresh phase. Sympathy with the Greek cause was just as warm in England and France as it was in Russia. There were even rumours that the Greeks were preparing to elect a French prince as their ruler. At the same time their military position became so much improved that it seemed possible that they might win, and Great Britain could not afford to allow them to attribute their success to Russian intervention. The British government therefore countenanced the organization of relief for the Greeks by private persons, while Canning (who had succeeded Castlereagh at the Foreign Office in 1822) tried to get the dispute between Russia and Turkey settled as quickly as possible, so that there should be nothing to prevent the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries, an event that, to the Greeks, would seem to signify the abandonment of their cause by Alexander. In answer to an inquiry addressed to him from

London as to his views on the ultimate settlement of the Greek question, Alexander proposed that the revolted territory should be divided into three provinces, autonomous as far as internal affairs were concerned, but dependent on the Sultan. This plan angered both Greeks and Turks. The Sultan would hear of nothing but the complete submission of his rebellious subjects, who in turn rejected the idea of being reduced to a condition of vassalage. Canning thus attained his object, which was to compromise Alexander in the eyes of the Greeks, and make them regard Great Britain as their chief protector.

At Alexander's suggestion a conference met at Petersburg in February 1825, to consider the question of a collective offer by the Powers to mediate between Turkey and the Greeks. By this time the Sultan had procured help from Ibrahim Pasha (son of Mehemet Ali Pasha of Egypt), who landed in the Morea and soon reduced the Greeks to a desperate condition. Great Britain interfered dramatically to save them from complete destruction. Relations with Russia at once became very strained, and Canning declared that if Russian troops crossed the Prut, the British would occupy the Morea and the Greek islands. Europe was waiting in suspense to see what would happen, but the crisis was resolved by the death of Alexander (December 1825).

Political Development, 1815-25

The struggle for the liberation of Russia from the French, followed by Alexander's military and political successes in the West, had roused patriotic feeling and awakened the national consciousness of the people. Interest in public affairs did not subside when peace was concluded, and to many people the time seemed to have come when the government might

return to the policy of reform which had apparently been interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1812.

Alexander still posed as a liberal. He gave Poland a constitution, supported the moderate liberal régime in France, and encouraged the German princes to grant free institutions to their subjects. In 1818 he had Speránsky's 'Constitution' taken out of the archives for further consideration, and at the opening of the Polish Diet in the same year he hinted that he was preparing a surprise for his own people. But his liberalism was no longer the sincere faith that had inspired him in his youth. He was becoming an opportunist, and allowed ulterior motives to influence his political views. Though not yet a reactionary, he had one important common interest with his colleagues of the Quadruple Alliance. Even in his most liberal moods he insisted that freedom was a gift, to be bestowed by monarchs, not snatched from them by their peoples. It was this hatred of revolution that bound him originally to his allies. In the name of 'established authority' he agreed to, even insisted upon, the use of force for the suppression of popular risings in Italy and Spain. His full conversion to the doctrine of which Metternich was the leading exponent was hastened by events at home. In 1820 a mutiny took place in his favourite Seménovski Guards, which seemed to indicate that Russia herself was becoming infected with the spirit of revolution. The attitude of the second Polish Diet, which, after a series of hostile speeches, rejected most of the legislative proposals of the government, alarmed Alexander even more. After 1820 he no longer believed that liberalism and revolution were two entirely different things. Long before this, however, he had lost interest in domestic politics and all chance of further reforms had disappeared. The conduct of affairs passed into the hands of Arakchéev, who acted as intermediary between the emperor and his ministers. He

received their reports and passed them on, in the form of short summaries, along with his own conclusions, for Alexander's approval.

In the last ten years of his reign Alexander's attention was devoted mainly to foreign affairs and the maintenance of his position as leader of Europe. He kept up a large standing army, and in order to attain the maximum of military preparedness with the least expenditure he resorted to a plan that had been in his mind for several years. In certain districts 'military settlements' were established; the population of each settlement was freed from all ordinary taxation and State burdens, but had to maintain a unit of the army. Large sums of money were spent in securing the prosperity of the settlements, but they were hated and feared by the people. The inhabitants were placed under strict military discipline, every detail of their lives was controlled, and their position became worse even than that of the serfs working on private estates.

Alexander's loss of interest in internal affairs came at an unfortunate time. The wars of 1813-15 took the armies of Russia into Europe, and with them large numbers of the younger and better educated members of the gentry, who thus became acquainted with the intellectual movements and political ideas that had moved the Continent during the revolutionary period, and with the political and social forms that prevailed in the West. In this way the educated classes of Russia were drawn more intimately than ever before into the intellectual interests of the Western world, and this contact with Europe caused many Russians to look at the conditions that existed in their own country from a new point of view. The reaction of Western ideas on Russian minds provided a directing influence on the development of opinion for many years to come, and led to the development of two distinct tendencies of thought. One of these is often referred to as 'practical',

since those who adhered to it sought to transfer to Russian soil the political and social forms of the West, and in particular aimed at securing representative government, or even a republic. The second or 'theoretical' tendency passed through several stages, and in the end split up into two distinct currents of political philosophy that went by the names of 'Westernism' and 'Slavophilism'.

Though most of these developments came later in the century, important movements of opinion took place in the last years of Alexander's reign. When the armies returned from abroad, many groups were formed amongst young officers who wanted to study social and political questions. As the government turned farther and farther from reform, the mood of discontent in educated society became stronger. Vague desires hardened into well-defined aims, and the isolated study-circles united into a secret society. The doctrinaire element predominated, but there was a small group of ardent revolutionaries led by a young officer named Péstel, who in the end formed a separate society in the south, where he was stationed with his regiment. The 'southern' group definitely aimed at a republic, and were ready to adopt the most violent methods—even to the assassination of the emperor—in order to attain their ends. The majority of the conspirators adhered to the much more moderate 'northern' society, which advocated a monarchy with the safeguards of a constitution.

Alexander's attention was repeatedly drawn to the existence of these secret political societies, but for a long time he refused to take any measures towards their suppression. At last, after much persuasion, he ordered an inquiry to be instituted. Very little progress had been made with it when news came that Alexander had died suddenly at Taganróg in the south of Russia (December 1, 1825).

*Nicholas I (1825-55)**The December Rising, 1825*

ALEXANDER's death was followed by a period of confusion, caused by the uncertainty that surrounded the question of the succession. He had no sons, and under Paul's law of 1797¹ his brother Constantine was heir to the throne, and after him another brother, Nicholas. Constantine contracted an irregular second marriage and renounced his rights, whereupon Alexander drew up a manifesto in which he announced that Nicholas was to succeed him. This manifesto was not published. Sealed copies of it were deposited with the Metropolitan Seraphim, the Council of State, the Senate, and the Synod, with instructions that they were to be opened on Alexander's death. Nicholas himself—the person most concerned—was not officially informed of his position, and only knew about it from some chance remarks let fall by his brother in private conversation.

When the news of Alexander's death reached the north, Constantine, who was acting as commander-in-chief at Warsaw, proclaimed Nicholas emperor. The manifesto was opened in Petersburg, but Nicholas feared to publish it, knowing that he was disliked by the Guards regiments and their officers. He would not accept the throne unless Constantine formally refused it, and even took the oath of allegiance to his brother, though the latter wrote to him from Warsaw, in a private letter, that he had long ago renounced all his claims. Nicholas tried to persuade him to come to Petersburg and clear the air with a public declaration, but he still refused to move. Messengers

¹ Cf. p. 348.

flew between the two cities, and in the end Nicholas very reluctantly decided to act on the basis of Alexander's manifesto. December 26 was fixed as the day on which the troops were to take the oath.

During the three weeks' interregnum the members of the 'northern' society met daily, and decided to turn the prevailing confusion to their own account. They hoped that, if they put Constantine on the throne, they would be able to extort from him the promise of concessions that would limit the power of the monarch and lead to the establishment of a constitution. By telling them that Nicholas was a usurper they gained over to their side several units of the Guards regiments, and believed that once the rising started other bodies of troops would join them. On December 26 the disaffected regiments assembled on the square before the Senate, and began to cheer for the Emperor Constantine. Nicholas sent messengers to talk them over, but they mortally wounded the military governor Milorádovich, fired at the Grand Duke Michael, and refused to listen to the Metropolitan Seraphim. An attempt to disperse them with the help of Horse Guards who remained faithful to Nicholas met with no success, and as crowds of people were gathering and the movement seemed to be spreading, strong measures had to be taken. The order to fire was given. Many of the mutineers and the public were killed and wounded, the crowds dispersed in disorder, and the whole affair was over.

The revolt never had any real chance of success, for its leaders gained their small following by false declarations, acted without any clear plan, and were themselves too few and too weak to be dangerous. The whole movement was the private venture of a group of officers, a parody of the court revolutions of the eighteenth century, when the aristocratic Guards regiments had played a decisive part in the making and unmaking of emperors and empresses. Nevertheless, the govern-

ment was very seriously alarmed and set to work to root out the political societies. Searches were conducted in Petersburg and the provinces, hundreds of arrests were made, and all the leaders were caught. Nicholas conducted a thorough inquiry in person. The conspirators made no secret of their intentions and plans. Five of them were executed, and the others sentenced to penal servitude or exiled to Siberia.

The Condition of Russia : Nicholas I and Reform

Unlike his brother Alexander, Nicholas¹ had been brought up by a French *émigré*, who taught him to hate liberal ideas. He had travelled considerably in Russia and abroad, and though his mother, the Empress Mária Feódorôvna, feared that he might become infected with liberalism during his stay in England, his education had inoculated him against this danger and he returned politically sound. In 1817 he married a daughter of Frederick William of Prussia and settled down to a quiet family life and the zealous execution of his military duties. He was appointed commander of the brigade of Guards, and occupied himself with restoring their discipline, which had been seriously weakened during their long period of foreign service. His strictness created that discontent among the soldiers and their officers which made him so disinclined to mount the throne without absolutely unassailable evidence of his right to it.

The facts that were revealed by the inquiry into the December rising gave Nicholas a clear picture of the causes of discontent and of the condition of the country. He knew that among the conspirators there were, besides ardent young idealists, men with wide experience of administrative work, including some of the most brilliant minds of the period. Some of those who were brought up for trial, on their own initiative or at Nicholas's

¹ Nicholas, the third son of Paul, was born on July 7, 1796.

direct request, drew up detailed and valuable memoranda which showed that the sharp turn in the policy of Alexander I after 1815 had disturbed and irritated the educated classes. The hope of reform had been roused by Alexander's early measures, inflamed by the awakening of national feeling during the struggle against Napoleon, and intensified by the promise of better things that Alexander's activity in western Europe had seemed to give—only to be cruelly disappointed in the end. The condition of the country, the complete disorganization of all the machinery of government, fed the general discontent. The laws were in a chaotic condition, and so full of contradictions that 'the strong triumph, and the weak and innocent suffer'. The machinery of justice was complicated and corruptly managed. Catherine's provincial institutions had been distorted, and the governors ruled like satraps. The central government was disjointed and out of touch with its representatives in the country. The Senate had become a mere office for registering the decisions of the person who for the moment enjoyed the confidence of the monarch. The State economy was badly conducted, the budget never represented the real financial position, and State monopolies hindered the growth of industry and demoralized the country. The peasants on State lands were given over to the arbitrary rule of the police, whilst those on private estates were subject to the uncontrolled caprice of their masters.

From the beginning of his reign Nicholas was aware of the need for reforms. That he had, however, very definite ideas as to how these reforms should be carried out is proved by the following statement: 'I have always distinguished, and always will distinguish, between those who wish for just reforms and desire that they should issue *from a legally constituted authority*, and those who would like to undertake them on their own initiative and use God alone knows what kind of methods.'

A manifesto published at the time of the coronation (July 25, 1826) stated that 'not by insolent, and always destructive, dreams are the institutions of the country to be perfected, their shortcomings made good and abuses corrected. We shall accept with goodwill every modest expression of a desire for improvement, if it implies improvement that shall be *gradual*.'

These declarations expressed the policy of Nicholas with regard to reform. They clearly indicated that if anything was to be done, it could only be on the initiative of the government, which was determined to act only by its own methods and without any pressure from outside. Public initiative was suspect from the beginning of the reign, and as time went on this attitude of distrust was expressed even more sharply and emphatically.

Nicholas's theory of government owed much to the influence of the historian Karamzín, who had opposed reforms under Alexander I, but was by no means an obscurantist reactionary. Karamzín believed that autocracy was the only possible form of government for Russia ; but he also held that absolute power was a sacred trust that imposed very definite obligations on the monarch who wielded it. Nicholas himself would have nothing to do with the reactionaries who had ruled during the last years of his brother's reign, and preferred men who represented the moderate conservatism propounded by Karamzín. Among his advisers were Kochubéy and Speránsky,¹ who had by now outgrown the idealism that had guided them in the time of Alexander. Speránsky's administrative work under Nicholas was entirely in practical fields. Kochubéy presided over a secret committee (founded December 18, 1826) that for ten years tried to draw up a scheme of reforms, but only succeeded in leaving

¹ After his disgrace in 1812 Speránsky acted as governor of the province of Pénza, and, from 1819, of Siberia. He was recalled by Alexander I in 1821, and became a member of the Senate.

things exactly as they were before. It drafted endless projects and enunciated many high-sounding principles, but astonished even Nicholas by its talent for contradicting itself.

No improvement was effected in the organization of central government under Nicholas I, but there were negative processes at work that led to important developments. The Council of State, as reorganized by Alexander in 1810, was mainly an advisory legislative institution to which all laws had to be submitted before receiving the emperor's approval.¹ But its rights had been gradually usurped by the Council of Ministers, and under Nicholas secret committees for the discussion of proposed legislation were constantly set up, and the functions of the Council of State reduced to a mere formality. In several cases Nicholas wanted to sign and publish forthwith projects sent up by the secret committees, and was with difficulty persuaded to submit them to the Council.

The authority of the Council of Ministers suffered in the same way. Nicholas tried to extend to current affairs of government that absolute personal control that he had succeeded in establishing over legislation. For this purpose he made use of the Emperor's Personal Chancellery, an institution that managed affairs of a semi-private, semi-official nature. In 1826 a special department of the Chancellery, under Speránsky's direction, was entrusted with the codification of the laws. In 1832 there was published the first complete Code, a massive work, which was not only Speránsky's greatest achievement, but one of the greatest monuments of Nicholas's reign. In 1826 the organization of

¹ The Council of State was appointed by the emperor; the paragraphs of the law of 1810 that defined its legislative functions were as follows: '2. All projects of laws and decrees shall be submitted to, and examined by, the Council of State, and shall then enter into force by the authority of the autocrat. 3. No law or decree shall issue from the Council and become active without the approval of the supreme authority.'

the secret police was vested in a new department of the Chancellery, which later became famous as the 'Third Section'. This step was the direct outcome of the revelations made at the trial of the Decembrists¹ and of Nicholas's conviction, formed at that time, that the secret police was one of the most important instruments of government. In 1828 a fourth department was created, to look after the charitable and educational institutions founded by Nicholas's mother, the Empress Mária; and in 1836 and 1843 two more departments were founded for special purposes. The idea underlying all these changes was that only ordinary routine business should be left to ministers, while all affairs that the emperor wanted to keep under his own close observation were entrusted to special institutions over which he could exercise a more effective control than he could over the ordinary executive organs. The departments of the Chancellery were ministries in all but name, and their directors were of equal rank with the ministers.

No progress in local government can be noted in this period, and indeed in the existing conditions of local life it was not to be expected. The majority of the population were serfs, ruled arbitrarily by their masters. The free classes were isolated from each other by wide differences of rights and duties. The people were regarded as an aggregate of units paying taxes or performing definite services for the State. Administration was purely bureaucratic, and the officials ruled arbitrarily and corruptly. Measures for establishing a closer control over their actions were suggested by the secret committee, but nothing was done. An attempt was made to give the inhabitants in country districts a share in the management of purely local business, such as the making of roads, by setting up local committees, half-bureaucratic, half-elective in composition. But the official

¹ Those who took part in the rising of December 1825. The Russian form is *Dekabristy*, from *Dekábr* = December.

element always took control and the scheme failed. The note of the period was distrust of public effort and public initiative, and local government continued to be thoroughly bureaucratic, inefficient, and corrupt.

The gentry possessed their own elective organs, but most of them felt that self-government, even for a highly privileged class, was impossible under existing conditions, and chronically neglected the exercise of their rights.

Catherine's municipal charter of 1785 enunciated the important principle that all the inhabitants of a town formed one community, which should have the right of managing independently its own affairs. But she did not apply this principle fully in the detailed provisions of the charter, and under her successors it became distorted beyond recognition. Class divisions could not be smoothed over by the mere enunciation of a principle, any more than uncontrolled officials could be restrained from using their powers in order to rob municipal institutions of their independence. Nicholas tried to revive the activity of the towns, but interest in municipal affairs was too weak. The reform of the administration of Petersburg (1846), which represented the highest point attained under Nicholas, only perpetuated all the evils of the existing system.

The Problem of Serfdom

The condition of the peasantry was rapidly becoming the most important problem in the life of the country. During the first half of the century a very notable change took place in the views of a large part of society and even of the government itself on the question of serfdom. The serf population was rapidly increasing, and the landowners, who were bound even in years of famine to feed their serfs,¹ could not find employment for all

¹ This obligation was incorporated into the Code of 1832.

of them. They were allowed to hire them out, but only to persons who possessed the right to own inhabited land, i. e. to members of their own class, who already had more serfs than they could use. The land was not exploited to its fullest capacity, but improved methods of cultivation demanded capital and knowledge that the gentry had no means of obtaining.¹ Some of them tried to utilize the labour of the serfs by setting up factories, but found that they could not compete with the factories in which free hired workers were employed.

The position of the gentry was serious enough, without the special difficulties created by the serf question. They had made great sacrifices in 1812, and in the succeeding period social developments led to a change in their manner of life. They acquired new tastes and new needs that could not be satisfied without money, which they had to raise on the security of estates that in a simpler age had supplied all their wants. By 1843 no less than 54 per cent. of all private land in the country was mortgaged at heavy rates of interest.

Impelled by purely material considerations, many landowners came to the conclusion that the liberation of the serfs would be profitable, so long as they could retain all the land in their own hands. They would still be able to keep the peasants economically dependent on themselves, and draw from them a supply of cheap labour that could easily be dispensed with when it was no longer wanted. The government regarded the matter from a different point of view. The frequency of serious disorders amongst the peasants made the question one of vital

¹ The gentry were not really an *agricultural* class. They were originally military or civil servants of the State, which paid for their services with grants of land, and, since land without labour was useless, fixed the peasants down to the land thus granted. The obligation of State service ceased in 1762, but the gentry retained the land, and the peasants were not set free until 1861.

importance for the State. During Nicholas's reign nearly six hundred disturbances took place, and half of them had to be suppressed with the aid of troops. This aspect of the question was not without influence on the gentry, who went in fear for their lives and property.

There was a real need for serious measures, and during this period the peasant question was constantly under consideration. Many secret committees discussed it, but none of them could formulate any practicable measure for its solution. The government feared to take any step that might rouse opposition from those landowners (the large majority) who still clung fanatically to their privileges, or raise the hopes of the peasants, disturb their minds, and make them even more dissatisfied with their lot. The secret committees, almost without exception, came to the conclusion that while some change was undoubtedly necessary, it should be gradual and imperceptible.

The nearest point to a solution ever attained before 1861 was a law published in 1842, which permitted landowners to liberate their peasants, who were to have the use of any land they already cultivated, in return for payment in labour or money. The Council of State pointed out with perfect justice that this law would mean nothing if it were not made compulsory. Nicholas's reply was characteristic of the attitude taken up by the government throughout his reign: 'I know that I am an autocratic, all-powerful ruler, but I could never force myself to go so far as to order the landowners to enter into agreements.' Though it proved of no value as a practical measure, the law of 1842 marked an important stage in the development of government policy. In 1803 the landowners had been permitted to liberate their serfs,¹ but were not required to supply them with land, whereas in 1842 the grant of land was made an essential condition of emancipation. The government could not yet

¹ Cf. p. 357.

bring itself to make emancipation, *with the land condition*, compulsory,¹ but it saw the danger of creating a huge landless proletariat and steered a middle course by making the law of 1842 facultative.

In 1847 peasant communes were permitted to buy themselves out of serfdom, with the land they cultivated, if the estate of their master was sold publicly by auction for debt. Such sales were frequent at this period, but the concession was subsequently so hedged round by restrictions that it became worthless. In the condition of the 'State' peasants² some improvement was effected by the creation of a Ministry of State Property (1837), directed by the enlightened Kiselëv,³ whom Nicholas frequently referred to as his 'chief of staff' on the peasant question.⁴

Only in one direction did the government feel itself able to act decisively. In the south-western provinces⁵ the peasant problem had developed under historical and political conditions differing widely from those that prevailed in the rest of Russia. Here Russian peasants were ruled by Polish landowners, whose interests the government had no reason to consider. After the Polish rebellion of 1830-1, and in view of the known hostility of the gentry, it felt its hands free, and was in fact anxious to gain the peasants as allies. It determined to regulate strictly the relations between them and their masters, and in 1847 put into force a series of regulations drawn up

¹ This was the solution which it eventually adopted in 1861 (cf. p. 428).

² 'State' peasants were the largest class of the 'free' (i. e. non-serf) peasant population: they cultivated land belonging to the State, for which they paid money dues: their position was always much better than that of the so-called 'private' peasants (serfs).

³ Pronounced *Kiselyóff*.

⁴ Kiselëv was a leader of progressive opinion on this question: the change in official policy indicated by the law of 1842 was due to his efforts.

⁵ Lands that had formerly belonged to Poland.

by General Bibikov (governor-general of the south-western provinces—Kiev, Volýnia, and Podolia). The amount of land to which the peasants were entitled, the payments in money or labour that they were to make, and the obligations of the landowners, were all carefully defined. In 1846 similar rules were enforced in the kingdom of Poland.¹ The government intended to introduce them also in the Baltic provinces (where the gentry were of German origin) and Lithuania, but owing to the strong protests of the landowners of those regions,² who had powerful representatives at court, it decided to defer its decision.

Financial and Economic Conditions

The condition of State finances and of the currency had gone from bad to worse during the reign of Alexander I. Large annual deficits caused by the wars of the earlier half of the reign were met by issues of unsecured paper-money, which depreciated enormously in value. After 1817, when the total amount of paper-money in circulation was no less than 800 million roubles, the government bought in large sums, but the value of the rouble increased only very slightly. The currency disorder had a very depressing effect on the economic life of the country, for there were several distinct rates for the paper rouble. Its value on the foreign exchanges was determined by the special conditions of international financial relations. The government accepted 'assignments' in payment of taxes at a fairly uniform rate, but in commercial usage there was complete chaos. The ordinary rates varied constantly in every locality, and there was no fixed relationship between the rates in different places, for the country was split up into more or less independent economic regions. Further confusion was

¹ Polish peasants were made *personally* free by Napoleon in 1807.

² Their protest was supported by the heir to the throne, the Grand Duke Alexander.

caused by the circulation of large numbers of foreign coins with arbitrarily-fixed values.

This was the situation which Kánkrin (Minister of Finances, 1823-44) was called upon to deal with, and so difficult did he find it that only after some years of preparation was he able to undertake a complete reform of the currency. In 1839 the silver rouble became the unit of currency, and its value was fixed at 350 kopeks in paper. A further step was taken in the following year, when the State Bank began to issue, against deposits of silver, 'deposit certificates' circulating at par. These were a great success, and besides bringing in large amounts of silver, helped to popularize the silver rouble. In 1843 the final reform of the series was carried through; all existing forms of paper-money were replaced by 'State credit notes', freely exchangeable for silver and guaranteed by a metal fund equal to one-sixth of the total amount of credit notes issued.

The complete reorganization of the currency system gave to commercial and financial dealings the element of stability that had been so conspicuously lacking, and helped to clear the way for the remarkable development of Russian economic life that came later in the century. Kánkrin's attempts in other directions to set the finances of the country on a sounder basis were not so successful. He was always careful in the expenditure of public money, but circumstances were against him in his struggle for economy. The wars with Turkey and Persia,¹ and the operations necessitated by the Polish rebellion, forced him to conclude loans for 400 million roubles, and absorbed reserves that he was putting by in order to finance the currency reforms. He was unfortunate also in his treatment of the spirit trade, for the gross corruption that had prevailed under the State monopoly set up in the preceding reign did not cease when the right to manufacture and sell spirits was again farmed out (1826).

¹ Cf. pp. 410-14.

Káńkrin believed that financial stability could not be attained until the resources of the country were more fully utilized, and its industries developed. Before he was appointed Minister of Finances he had taken part in the preparation of the protective customs tariff of 1822,¹ and throughout his long period of office he used protection for the purpose of fostering home industry. He did not build up a high tariff wall, but by constant revisions of the duties tried to force Russian manufacturers to devote their attention to technical progress, judiciously admitting foreign competition where he saw that it would serve as a stimulus, and excluding it when he thought that some particular branch of industry required that form of support.

During the second quarter of the century industry continued to develop along lines already marked out in the preceding period. Industries that had arisen without any support from the government continued to make progress, owing to the appearance of an open market for their goods, a sure sign that Russia was passing from a period in which each household and each economic area was practically self-supporting, into one in which exchange and division of labour were the dominant features of economic life. The number of factories and of factory-workers increased gradually. New branches of industry took root. Free labour came more and more into use. In the thirties and forties the cotton industry became firmly established. Important developments in the English cotton industry in this period led to a fall in the prices of cotton goods, which were admitted into Russia under a very low tariff. To meet this increased competition from abroad Russian manufacturers had to adopt improved methods and new machinery. The cheapness of cotton goods led to a great increase in the demand for them, and consequently in production. The staple textile industries of the eighteenth century, linen and hemp, fell on evil days, and their

¹ Which replaced the liberal tariffs of 1816 and 1819.

products were driven from the market, at home and abroad, by cotton goods. The woollen industry, owing to the primitive character of its methods, could make no headway against Polish competition.

Education and Political Opinion

Nicholas I had very definite ideas on the subject of education. He believed that, carefully managed, it might become a useful weapon in the hands of the government, enabling it to control the development of public opinion and protect the mind of the country from revolutionary influences. Uvárov (Minister of Education, 1833-49) expressed Nicholas's views in a report that he drew up in 1832: 'The younger generation can be turned into useful and zealous instruments of the government, if thoughtful guidance be brought to bear on the development of their spirit and attitude of mind. . . . They can be led into a mood of devoted and humble love for the existing order,' the principles of which Uvárov defined as 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality'.¹ When he became minister Uvárov declared that his aim was to construct 'dams' which would 'hold up the flow of new ideas into Russia, and prolong the period of her youth', and confessed that he would die happy if he managed to 'retard the development of the country by fifty years'.

This combination of Nicholas and Uvárov did not promise much good for education. The first 'dams' were constructed in the early part of the reign, while Shishkóv was still minister. In May 1827 orders were given that peasant children were to be admitted only to elementary schools. In 1828 elementary and secondary education were made entirely independent of each other. Up to that time pupils who finished the elementary school course had been able to pass into the secondary schools.

¹ This formula—Altar, Throne, and People—remained the watchword of reaction throughout the remainder of the century.

This was now forbidden. The elementary schools were to provide all the education that was considered necessary for the lower classes. Preparatory departments were added to the secondary schools, which thus became complete in themselves. They were intended for the children of officials and gentry. Shishkóv adopted an almost purely classical programme for secondary schools, and Uvárov systematically reduced the number of subjects taught. At the same time the number of schools increased, and the gentry began to use them more freely, for the school certificate was necessary for entry into the government service.

In 1835 the educational system was bureaucratized. Control over secondary education, which had been entrusted to the universities in 1804, was now vested in the curators, who lived permanently in the centres of their circuits and acted as agents of the ministry.¹ The independence of the universities was severely restricted. They retained the right to elect their own professors, but had to have them approved by the minister. A university was opened at Kiev in 1834, but since it only replaced that of Vilna, which was closed after the Polish rebellion, it represented no real gain for the cause of higher education.

The stimulus given to Russian thought by contact with the intellectual movements of the West was too strong to be countered by methods such as those adopted by Nicholas I and Uvárov. The events of 1825 had a depressing effect on the educated classes, but intellectual activity soon revived and, in spite of efforts to repress it, spread wider and deeper. The new generation of educated society studied the works of Fichte, Hegel, Kant, and Schelling, and discussed abstract questions of social and political philosophy. A small but brilliant group at Moscow University in the thirties contained, according to Hérzen, 'Russia of the future'. Among its members were

¹ Cf. p. 382.

Belínsky, Aksákov, Bakúnin, Katkóv, Granóvsky, and Yúry Samárin, each of whom played a prominent part in the development of Russian politico-philosophical thought and exerted a strong influence on the next generation of the educated class. Another group, led by Hérzen, was attracted by the socialism of Saint-Simon and his followers. By the beginning of the forties two important schools of opinion were clearly defined. There was, in the first place, a very strong 'westernizing' tendency, led by men like Belínsky, Bakúnin, and Hérzen. The 'Westerners' were strongly antagonistic to the existing political and social order, but under the circumstances of the time their antagonism was purely literary and theoretical, and did not lead to practical action. The 'Slavophiles' worked out an original philosophy of history. They idealized political, social, and religious principles which they claimed to be inherent in Russian society, and opposed everything that came from the West. The influence of the Westerners was much stronger than that of the Slavophiles, and for a long time Belínsky ruled the minds of the younger generation.

After 1848 the policy of the government took a very sharp turn. All consideration of reform, even in the vital question of serfdom, was abandoned. Thoroughly alarmed by events in France and by the revolutionary movements in other countries, the government embarked at once on an orgy of repression, calculated to crush the rising intellectual movement and stifle all signs of life in Russian society. The censorship rules were made even harsher than they were before, and above the ordinary censorship, controlled by the Ministry of Education, a special committee was appointed (April 14, 1848) which terrorized the press. The universities were attacked, the number of students in all faculties except medicine and theology was cut down, and the curriculum was pruned of such subjects as metaphysics and the history of philosophy. The pressure

on the universities was too strong even for Uvárov's taste. He resigned his post, and was succeeded by Shírinsky, one of his assistants, a thorough reactionary. Many well-known writers suffered for their progressive sympathies. Saltykóv was sent away to Vyátka (in the north-east); Turgénev, the Slavophil Yúry Samárin, and Iván Aksákov, with other leaders of thought, were arrested on various pretexts. There were, however, no *active* revolutionary tendencies in this period and the most dangerous enemy that the secret police could discover was a small circle of young literary men and officers,¹ who met to discuss socialist literature and indulge in Utopian dreams of future social organization. Twenty of them (including Dostoévsky) were condemned to death.² The government struck out blindly in every direction, until society seemed to be stupefied and paralysed.

Poland after 1815

Alexander I gave Poland a liberal constitution, which provided for a Diet, or legislative assembly, consisting of a Senate nominated by the king and a Chamber of Deputies elected by the propertied and professional classes. The Diet controlled taxation, and the executive was responsible to it. The use of the Polish language was permitted. Liberty of the person, freedom of the press, and religious toleration were guaranteed. There was a separate Polish army, and all civil and military posts were to be held by Poles. Alexander sincerely desired to rule as a constitutional monarch in Poland, but unfortunately he assigned the command of the army to his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, an overbearing tyrant and a thorough

¹ The 'Petrashévtsy' or followers of Petrashévsky.

² The sentence was commuted to penal servitude and exile to Siberia. Dostoévsky was reprieved only on the scaffold, and served ten years in Siberia.

reactionary, who gained a complete ascendancy over the weak Viceroy, General Zajonczek. The Diet was rarely summoned, and in the intervals Constantine ruled arbitrarily, breaking one article of the constitution after another. All the Poles were irritated by his conduct. Open protests were impossible, but secret societies flourished. The Poles followed attentively the course of events in western Europe, particularly in France, and the national rising that broke out in November 1830 was partly inspired by the July Revolution and by events in Belgium.¹ The army joined the national standard, and soon the whole country was up in arms. The great landowners, higher officials, and clergy (the so-called 'White' party) advocated an appeal to the Powers based on the guarantees contained in the Treaty of Vienna.² The more active 'Reds', led by the students, aimed at a republic, completely independent of Russia. The Diet proclaimed the dethronement of Nicholas and the union of Poland and Lithuania, and invoked the protection of the Powers, but in vain. A large Russian army defeated the Polish forces in a series of battles (February-May 1831), drove them back steadily, and in September occupied Warsaw. In spite of the heroic resistance offered by the rebels, they were completely overpowered before the beginning of the winter.

The Russians followed up their victory with ruthless energy. In 1832 the constitution was formally abolished. The use of the Polish language was forbidden, and the Polish army was merged in that of Russia. The Polish ministries were made to

¹ Nicholas intended to send the Polish army against the revolutionaries of France and Belgium.

² The Treaty of Vienna provided that 'the Poles who are respectively subjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia shall obtain a representative and national constitution regulated according to the degree of political consideration that each government to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to give to them'.

depend on the Russian central government. The Roman Catholic Church, one of the emblems of Polish nationality, had to endure relentless persecution. All who were suspected of participation in the rebellion, or of disaffection to the Russian government, were arrested and banished to Siberia, and had their property confiscated. From 1831 Poland was treated as a conquered country, and kept in subjugation by an army of occupation.

The War with Persia, 1826-8

During the years that followed the conclusion of peace in 1813¹ relations between Russia and Persia were disturbed by disputes that arose over the exact definition of the territory ceded to Russia. The border tribes gave constant trouble by moving from one side of the frontier to the other, and coming alternately under Russian and Persian jurisdiction. The Persians did not give up the hope of reconquering the land they had lost, and a favourable opportunity seemed to have come in 1826, when Russia was apparently on the verge of a struggle with Turkey. Persian troops suddenly invaded Karabágh (July) and found the Russians quite unprepared to meet them. They overran the border regions and gained a number of successes over small isolated Russian detachments. They advanced so far into the Caucasus as to besiege Bakú, but they were unable to capture it. The situation was complicated by the revolt of the native tribes, and for some weeks the Russian hold on the southern Caucasus was seriously threatened. The tide turned in September with the appointment to the command of the Russian forces of Paskiévich, who routed the main Persian army near Elizabetpól (September 14). In the spring of 1827 Paskiévich, detaching a small force to invest the important fortress of Eriván, marched south and

¹ Cf. p. 265.

occupied the khanate of Nakhicheván (June-July). He was recalled from there by events in the north. Owing to the heat and the lack of water, the siege of Eriván had to be abandoned. The Persians advanced from the south and made an effort to march on Tiflis. This move, which threatened the Russians in the south with disaster, was stopped after a desperate battle, and the Persians retired. Paskiévich attacked Eriván with such energy that it soon fell (October 2). In his absence the defence of Nakhicheván was entrusted to Prince Eristov, a Georgian, who, after repelling an attempt made by the Persians to reconquer the khanate, conceived the bold plan of invading Persia. He crossed the river Aras and in a very short time had taken the important city of Tabriz (October 13). This success was followed up early in 1828 by the capture of Urmia, and the Persians, thoroughly beaten and demoralized, had to abandon the struggle. By the Treaty of Turkmanchai (February) they granted to Russia the khanates of Eriván and Nakhicheván and the right of navigating the whole of the Caspian Sea. By these gains Russia consolidated her position to the south-east of the Caucasus and acquired a strong frontier in that quarter.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1828-9

Soon after his accession, Nicholas declared that he would take up the quarrel with Turkey at the point where his brother had left it. In March 1826 he sent an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding the settlement of the points that had been in dispute since 1812, and indicating that a refusal to grant satisfaction would lead to the suspension of diplomatic relations, an event that might have 'consequences' for Turkey. Faced with this threat, and hampered by the Greek insurrection, the Sultan yielded. Turkish and Russian envoys met in

August 1826, and after two months of bullying and bargaining the Turks agreed to Nicholas's demands (Treaty of Akkerman, October 7).¹

The Greek question, which had not been mentioned in the Russian ultimatum, still remained to be settled. Canning was determined not to allow Nicholas to act alone, and tied his hands by the Protocol of April 4, 1826, which stipulated that Great Britain should join in demanding autonomy for Greece, under the sovereignty of Turkey. France adhered to this arrangement, and the three Powers agreed to use force if their conditions were not accepted (Treaty of London, July 6, 1827). The Sultan, secretly encouraged by Metternich, declared that he would not tolerate any interference in his affairs, and coercive measures became necessary. The commanders of the allied squadrons, which were cruising in the eastern Mediterranean, were instructed to propose an armistice to both sides. The Greeks at once accepted the proposal, but Ibrahim Pasha, acting on orders from Constantinople, defied the allies and continued operations on land. The allied commanders then demanded the evacuation of the Morea, and decided to make a demonstration before Ibrahim's fleet, which was lying at Navarino, on the south-west coast of the Morea. While this was being carried out a slight incident that occurred between Turkish and allied units led to an exchange of fire, and a battle developed, which ended in the destruction of the Turco-Egyptian fleet (November 20, 1827). The

¹ By the Treaty of Akkerman the conditions of the Treaty of Bucarest were confirmed, and the Black Sea and the Straits opened to Russian ships. The *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia were henceforth to be elected by the local *boyárs* or nobles, and approved by the Sultan, but could only be removed with the consent of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople. The autonomy of Serbia was formally recognized, but the fortresses were to remain in Turkish hands.

Sultan was more indignant than ever, and demanded compensation for the loss of his ships. The utmost concession that could be extracted from him was the promise of an amnesty to the rebels if they submitted to him. On December 8 the British, French, and Russian ambassadors left Constantinople, and in spite of Metternich's appeal to Nicholas to remain faithful to the principle of 'legitimism', Russia declared war (April 26, 1828), after arranging for the co-operation of Great Britain and France in the Mediterranean. Early in May the Russian army crossed the Prut.

The first campaign did not yield the Russians any striking successes. They advanced to the Danube and captured the fortresses of Braila and Varna, but were held up by Silistria and Shúmla. In the meantime Austrian troops were being massed in Transylvania, and Metternich tried to form a coalition against Russia.

Early in 1829 Great Britain and France made a fresh attempt to mediate between Turkey and the Greeks, but the Sultan was obdurate, and the war continued. The Russian army in the Balkans, reinforced and placed under the command of Diebitsch, an audacious and confident leader, began the second campaign by defeating the Turks at Kulevcha (June) and driving them back on Shúmla. Resisting the temptation to sit down before this fortress, Diebitsch pressed forward with a small force across the Balkan Mountains, seized Adrianople, and sent a detachment on towards Constantinople. On the eastern front Paskiéovich had gained a series of important victories, culminating in the capture of Erzerum. The Sultan saw that further resistance was impossible, and peace was made.

By the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829) Turkey received back all the territory lost in Europe, while in the east Russia retained the fortresses of Anápa, Póti, and Akhalkalaki,

with part of the pashalik of Akhaltsykh. Russian troops were to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia until the indemnity exacted from Turkey was paid.¹ The Sultan renewed the pledges which he had repeatedly given, but only half-heartedly fulfilled, with regard to the Danubian principalities and Serbia, and accepted the demands of the Powers with respect to Greece.² Ships of all countries were allowed to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, while Russian subjects received complete liberty to trade in Turkey.

Foreign Affairs, 1830-49

In the case of Greece Nicholas had placed the eastern interests of Russia before his own personal sympathies, which were entirely on the side of 'legitimism'. He soon found occasion to return to the path to which Metternich had vainly recalled him in 1828. The outbreak of the July revolution in France and the revolt of Belgium against the settlement of 1815, which had yoked her to Holland, threatened to overthrow the European system which had been established at Vienna. Community of interests in the West caused Austria and Russia to forget their differences in the East, and on August 6, 1830, the project of an alliance, to which Prussia also adhered, was agreed upon. The three Powers prepared to interfere in the West, and war seemed inevitable. But the Polish rebellion³ diverted the attention of Russia, and without her aid Austria and Prussia feared to move, for France had

¹ These provinces were evacuated in 1834.

² The final settlement of the Greek question took place in 1832. Greece became a kingdom completely independent of Turkey, under the protection of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Otto, second son of the King of Bavaria, became the first king.

³ Cf. p. 409.

come to an understanding with Great Britain. The eastern allies, reduced to impotence, had to accept the new situation created by events in France and Belgium.

As soon as the crisis caused by the revolutionary movement of 1830 had passed over, the attention of Europe was once more taken up with events and possibilities in the East. Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, irritated by the Sultan's failure to reward him adequately for the services he had rendered in Greece, determined to help himself. An Egyptian army, under Ibrahim Pasha, invaded (November 1831) and overran Syria, advanced into Asia Minor, crushed the Turks at Konieh (December 1832), and marched triumphantly against Constantinople. The Sultan, in terror, appealed to the Powers whom he had so often flouted and defied.

France had ambitions in the Mediterranean which inclined her to support Mehemet Ali. For the moment, however, the danger of becoming completely isolated restrained her from taking any step that might lead to a rupture of the *entente* with Great Britain. The attitude of Great Britain was determined by her traditional fear of Russia, which recent events had only enhanced. Neither France nor Great Britain knew that the views of Russia with regard to Turkey had changed since 1829. Nicholas saw that the establishment of independent states in the Balkans, a solution of the Eastern Question that the other Powers might insist on if the Turkish Empire were to break up, was not in the interest of Russia, for it would rob her of all excuse for interference in the affairs of south-east Europe. The preservation of Turkey—a weak Turkey, who might be induced to regard Russia as her protector—thus became the main aim of his eastern policy. Had this change been made known to all the Powers interested in the Eastern Question, the situation would have been very much simplified. But Europe was now divided into two camps. The

revolutionary peril had reunited Russia, Austria, and Prussia, while on the other side stood France and Great Britain, who to the eastern group seemed hardly less dangerous than France.

This new international grouping was reflected in the attitude which the Powers took up with regard to the Turco-Egyptian dispute. Russia at once declared her readiness to help the Sultan. Great Britain and France, on the other hand, tried to persuade him to settle his differences with Mehemet Ali by negotiation, in order to make Russian armed intervention unnecessary. But in their eagerness to bring about a settlement, they pressed the claims of the stronger party (Mehemet Ali) too forcibly, and thus threw the Sultan into the arms of Nicholas, giving the latter the very opportunity for which he had been waiting. On February 20, 1833, a Russian squadron anchored before Constantinople, and two months later Russian troops landed on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.

The quarrel between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan was finally settled early in May. Mehemet Ali was left in possession of the whole of Syria, together with the province of Adana. The Russian naval and land forces were withdrawn on July 9, but not before Nicholas had gathered the fruits of his new policy—a defensive alliance with the Sultan, the terms of which entitled him to demand the closing of the Dardanelles to the warships of any foreign Power (Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, July 8, 1833).

Two months later Nicholas met Francis I of Austria at Münchengrätz and came to an important agreement on the affairs of the Near East. Russia and Austria were to respect the integrity of Turkey, and to act together if, in spite of their efforts, the Turkish Empire were to break up. Nicholas promised to accept the mediation of Austria in all cases in which the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi might be appealed to.

At Münchengrätz the alliance between the three absolutist monarchies, which had been foreshadowed in 1830, was finally concluded. In October 1833 Russia, Austria, and Prussia recognized 'the right of every independent sovereign to summon to his assistance, whether in the internal or external affairs of his country, any other independent sovereign whom he shall deem best able to assist him'. This counterblast to the liberal *entente* of the Western Powers was a triumph for Metternich. But Nicholas had not lost hope of coming to an understanding with Great Britain, and watched attentively the relations between that country and France, which from 1834, owing to rivalry in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, became steadily worse. The visit of the Grand Duke Alexander¹ in May 1839 created a good impression in England. A few months later Nicholas informed the British government, through a special envoy, Baron Brunnow, that if he was called upon to help Turkey under the terms of the treaty of 1833, he would act as the mandatory of Europe, and affirmed his willingness to accept the principle that the Straits should be closed to the warships of all nations. He further declared that if Russia and Great Britain came to an agreement on these points he would not seek the renewal of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which was to expire in 1841.

By this time a fresh crisis had arisen in the East. The Sultan, thirsting for revenge on Mehemet Ali, ordered his army to invade Syria (April 1839). It was met and completely defeated at Nezib (June 24) by Ibrahim Pasha, who once more found the road to Constantinople open before him. On June 30 the Sultan (Mahmud) died, leaving the throne to his son, Abdul-Mejid, a youth of sixteen. Four days later the Turkish fleet went over to Mehemet Ali. The complete collapse of the Turkish Empire seemed imminent, and the new Sultan's

¹ Afterwards the Emperor Alexander II.

advisers were on the point of capitulating to Mehemet Ali when the five Powers offered to mediate (July 1839). In the negotiations that followed British diplomacy obtained a decisive victory, for the Powers guaranteed the neutrality of the Straits (1841), and Russia was thus deprived of the exclusive protectorate over Turkey which she had established in 1833.¹

This fresh check only stimulated Nicholas's efforts to come to an understanding with Great Britain, the most consistent opponent of his Eastern plans. During his visit to England in 1844 he sounded the British government on the question of joint action in the event of the fall of the Turkish Empire, which he personified as the 'sick man' of Europe. Later events showed that the cold reception with which these overtures met did not make him abandon all hope of an agreement with Great Britain. But for some years his attention was occupied with other matters. In 1846 Austria, with the consent of Russia and Prussia, occupied Cracow, the last remnant of free Poland,² on the pretext that it was the centre of Polish revolutionary propaganda. The revolutionary movement that swept over Europe in 1848 raised many fresh problems. In spite of the assurance given by the new French government that its intentions were not aggressive, there was no certainty that the incendiary elements would not prevail, and bring the whole European system crashing to the ground.³ Nicholas was most concerned for his own country, and afterwards for his neighbours. The position of Austria became desperate, and in March 1849 the young Emperor Francis

¹ Egypt became the hereditary possession of Mehemet Ali and his heirs.

² Cf. p. 375.

³ On receiving the news of the outbreak of a revolution in France, Nicholas is reported to have said, 'Saddle your horses, gentlemen; a republic is proclaimed in France'.

Joseph¹ turned to Russia for help. Nicholas might abandon Austria to her fate, and thus get rid of at least one rival. On the other hand, he could turn her into a grateful client, and pose as the saviour of the conservative principle. His help was called for against the Magyars, whom he hated for the encouragement they had given to the Poles and for their hostility to the Slavs in Austria-Hungary and to his own plans on the Danube. He therefore decided to intervene, and a Russian army, which was already concentrated on the frontier, marched into Hungary, under the command of Paskiévich, in May 1849. With this help the Magyar rising was suppressed, and in August Paskiévich was able to declare to Nicholas, 'Hungary is at your Majesty's feet'.

The Crimean War

In spite of the general confusion and uncertainty of affairs in Europe, Nicholas's attention was not entirely diverted from the Near East. In 1848 he occupied the Danubian principalities, on the pretext of suppressing a revolutionary movement that broke out there, but Great Britain and France forced him to come to an understanding with the Sultan and to promise to withdraw his army. Another conflict occurred in the following year, for the Sultan, backed up again by the two Western Powers,² refused to hand over to Russia and Austria certain Hungarian refugees who had fled to Turkey. Nicholas was alarmed by the efforts of the Turkish government to introduce reforms throughout the empire, and by the growing influence of Great Britain and France at Constantinople. An open struggle seemed to be inevitable. Nicholas believed that

¹ Francis Joseph succeeded his uncle Ferdinand, who abdicated in December 1848.

² British and French squadrons were sent to the Dardanelles.

he could count on Austria, and still did not despair of coming to terms with Great Britain. He was not unwilling to try conclusions with France alone, and a very slight incident—a dispute between the Orthodox Greek and the Catholic Churches over the custody of the Holy Places at Jerusalem (1851)—provided him with the opportunity that he sought. Louis Napoleon, anxious to conciliate Roman Catholic opinion and to consolidate his own position on the throne by elevating the prestige of France in the East, took up the cause of the Latin Church. Nicholas, on the other hand, stood forth as the protector of the Orthodox faith. A long diplomatic quarrel ensued, and the Sultan, pressed by both sides, made concessions first to one and then to the other, until Nicholas lost his temper and sent a special envoy, Ménshikov, to demand recognition of his right to protect all the members of the Greek Church within the Turkish Empire (February 1853). The Sultan, after consulting with the British and French ambassadors, rejected this demand. Ménshikov left Constantinople, and early in July a Russian army occupied Moldavia and Wallachia as a pledge for the execution of the treaties.¹ In answer to this move the British and French fleets were ordered to the Dardanelles.² A conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia, held at Vienna in July, endeavoured to mediate between Russia and Turkey, but without success. The Sultan, encouraged by the attitude of Great Britain and France, and by a violent anti-Russian agitation amongst his own people, summoned the Russians to evacuate the Danubian provinces (October 10). When his ultimatum was rejected, Turkish forces crossed the Danube, and a state of war arose.

¹ For the actual rights accorded to Russia by treaty, cf. p. 362.

² Early in 1853 Nicholas had approached the British ambassador at Petersburg on three separate occasions with proposals for the partition of the Turkish Empire.

Although the British and French fleets sailed up to Constantinople, Nicholas did not believe that Great Britain would sink her differences with France and join her in taking extreme measures. The situation was, indeed, not entirely hopeless, until after the destruction of the Turkish fleet by the Russians at Sinope (November 30), when the British and French squadrons entered the Black Sea and 'invited' all Russian ships to return to their ports. Fresh diplomatic efforts early in 1854 were of no avail, and Great Britain and France, after demanding the evacuation of the principalities, concluded an alliance with Turkey and declared war on Russia (March 27).

Russia was now faced by a dangerous combination of enemies, and soon found herself completely isolated, for Austria, on whose gratitude Nicholas had counted, entered into a defensive agreement with Prussia, by which both parties undertook to demand the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and to oppose Russia if she advanced south of the Danube (April 1854). Russian troops had failed to make any progress during the winter, and when the Austrian ultimatum was presented (June) there was no alternative but to yield. As the Russians retired, the Austrians, in accordance with an agreement concluded with Turkey, marched into the principalities, which they were to hold and defend until the end of the war.

The main object of the allies was attained, but they decided not to make peace without at least seriously weakening Russia. It was by no means easy to decide where to strike. Points as far apart as Odessa and the Solovétski Monastery (on the White Sea), the Åland Islands and Petropávlovsk (Kamchatka), were attacked by allied squadrons. Finally the Crimean expedition was decided upon.

In September 1854 English, French, and Turkish forces landed at Eupatória, under the protection of a large number of warships, with the object of taking Sevastópol, the head-

quarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The landing was unopposed, and the defeat of the Russians on the river Alma (September 20) opened the road to Sevastópol, before which the allies disposed themselves for a siege. Assisted by Todleben, one of the most brilliant military engineers of the century, the Russians erected a strong system of earthworks, and were able to withstand several violent attacks. They took the guns from their warships, which they sank in the narrow entrance of the harbour, and energetically answered the bombardment of the allies.

The struggle lengthened out. Threatened by Austria in the west, and hampered by lack of transport facilities, Russia could not gather together a large army with which to drive her enemies out of the Crimea. A small force, under Prince Gorchakóv, that tried to enter Sevastópol was defeated at Inkermán (November 5). Repeated attempts to storm the Russian positions failed almost completely each time, and every slight gain was bought by the allies at fearful cost. In September 1855 the French, though beaten off at every other point, took the Malákov redoubt, a commanding position, the loss of which made it impossible for the Russians to hold out any longer. They retreated to the northern side of the bay, and after a siege of 350 days—one of the most brilliant episodes in Russian military history—the allies occupied the ruins of Sevastópol (September 9, 1855).

In Asia Minor the Russians were more fortunate, and succeeded in taking the important fortress of Kars (November 26). Nicholas I died early in the year (March 2), and his successor, Alexander II, was anxious to make peace. Russia was completely exhausted, and accepted an offer of mediation made by Austria. Peace was finally concluded at Paris on March 30, 1856. Russia received back Sevastópol, but had to restore Kars to Turkey and give up the south-western corner

of Bessarabia to Moldavia, being thus thrown back from the Danube. The Black Sea was declared neutral, and the convention of 1841 with regard to the closing of the Straits to foreign warships was confirmed. Turkey was admitted to the European Concert. Great Britain, France, and Austria promised to respect her integrity, and declared that they would not interfere, either collectively or individually, in her internal affairs, though the Sultan was to grant better treatment to his Christian subjects. Russia thus lost all claim to protect her co-religionists. Moldavia and Wallachia were to enjoy the privileges guaranteed to them by former treaties, and were placed under the protection of all the Powers.

3

*Alexander II (1855-81): 1. The Great Reforms**The Condition of Russia*

THE shock of failure in the Crimean War roused public opinion out of the mood of depression into which it had been forced by the policy of the government after 1848. Interest in public affairs revived, and all thinking people recognized that serious changes in the system of government were necessary. Many staunch patriots felt that if change could only come through defeat, then defeat was preferable to victory, which would only strengthen the existing order.¹ The general belief was that out

¹ Sevastópol fell in order that 'God might reveal all the rottenness of the system of government, all the results of the principle of "throttle"' (Iván Aksákov); the successes of the allies 'did not mortify us too much, because we were convinced that defeat would be more endurable and more beneficial for Russia than the conditions under which we were living' (Koshelëv). 'From the very beginning of the Eastern War, when as yet no one could foresee its unfortunate issue, the enormous preparations of our enemies

of the ruins of Sevastópol a new, regenerated Russia would rise.

Open discussion of political affairs in the press was not allowed before the death of Nicholas I, but many manuscript articles on the situation and the needs of the country circulated from hand to hand in educated society, and were eagerly read and discussed. The most remarkable production of this kind was Pogodín's *Political Letters*, which contained a merciless criticism of Nicholas's internal and external policy, and particularly blamed him for having assumed the duty of policing Europe in the interests of absolutism.¹

disturbed those of us who understood the position of Russia much less than our own internal disorganization. Events have justified our fears. We have fallen, not before the forces of the Western alliance, but as a result of our own internal weakness' (Samárin).

¹ Pogodín wrote that : 'The emperor, charmed by the brilliant reports [of his ministers], has no real knowledge of the condition of Russia. Having taken his stand on an unassailable height, he has no means [of learning the truth]. All the ways through which thought might find expression have been closed. There is no publicity, no public opinion, no appeal, no protesting, no control.' Each of the ministers 'is autocratic ruler in his own department, and (like the emperor) cannot know the truth, for no one dare tell it to him, for fear of earning a rebuke or of rousing suspicion'. The officials 'think only of how to gain the goodwill of their superior, by foreseeing his thoughts and wishes, and guessing his intentions'. Those entrusted with authority 'have their heads turned by endless flattery, are demoralized by imaginary success, and think themselves infallible geniuses. . . . They take every critical remark as a personal insult, and attribute it to want of respect for their authority or to the influence of liberalism. They consider "restless" any one who does not praise them, and do all they can to keep him back, to the profit of the incapable and base-minded, who rush into our public departments like flies to a pot of honey. These all form one friendly, secret, masonic society. They regard every thinking man as an enemy. They support each other and the system of which they form a part—a system of paper-spoiling, of deceit and secrecy, of darkness, evil, and immorality under the mask of subservience and legal order.' Pogodín's exposure of the position

Nicholas I died unmourned by his people. An immense sigh of relief went up from the whole country, as if it had just cast off an intolerable burden. An important turning-point had been reached. A whole epoch of Russian history was ended. Every one felt that reforms were bound to come, whatever the opinions of the new ruler might be.

Although his reign took Russia farther forward on the path of progress than that of any of his predecessors since Peter the Great, Alexander was not a 'born reformer', and his administrative work under Nicholas was no preparation for the rôle that history forced him to play. Nicholas, resolved that his son should not suffer, as he had done himself, from lack of training for the position he was to occupy, kept him constantly employed with responsible work which was intended to give him an insight into the conduct of affairs of state. Alexander became a warm admirer of his father's policy, especially after 1848, and constantly defended serf-right and the privileges of the gentry.¹ But before he succeeded to the throne he witnessed the complete break-down of the system in which he had so firmly believed. Even Nicholas himself was beginning to lose faith in its efficacy. Death saved him from the necessity of abandoning the principles that had guided him for thirty years. Alexander was left with an enormous and responsible task, and saw that heroic measures would have to be taken to save Russia.

of the people was no less trenchant: 'The people labour, pour out their blood, bear all kinds of burdens and suffering, and at the same time think only with love, with the purest devotion, of their Tsar and fatherland. Yet no one troubles himself about them, they exist only on official papers.' He specially emphasized the need of peasant reform, since it was not revolution, but something worse, that was to be expected: 'It is not Mirabeau that we have to fear, but Pugachëv. . . . No one will go over to the side of Mazzini, but only let another Sténka Rázin appear!' Pogodín claimed that his criticisms and ideas were only representative of those current in society.

¹ Cf. p. 402, n. 2.

During the first months of the reign his attention was occupied with the war, which was exhausting the country and bringing financial and political bankruptcy nearer every month. When peace was concluded Prince Gorchakov wrote to the emperor: 'It is fortunate that we have made peace, for we could have fought no longer. Now we can turn our attention to internal affairs.' The whole country agreed with him in blaming Russia's internal disorder for her failure in the war. Alexander at once relieved his people of some of the most oppressive burdens imposed on them in the previous reign, and raised their hopes for the future still higher. The censorship rules were so far relaxed that within moderate limits the press could discuss political questions. The prohibition of travel abroad was withdrawn. The position of the universities became easier, and the restrictions on the number of students were removed. These changes roused enthusiasm and gratitude amongst all sections of the educated classes, and seemed to promise a complete reversal of government policy. During these early months Alexander had no definite programme of reforms, though, in a manifesto published at the conclusion of peace, he expressed a hope 'that the internal order of the State may be settled and brought to perfection; that justice and mercy may reign in our law-courts; that the desire for education and all manner of useful activity may spread and grow stronger'. He gave no clear indication of his plans until March 1856, when, in addressing the gentry at Moscow, he used the words: 'It is better to begin the abolition of serfdom from above, than wait until it begins to abolish itself from below,' and asked the gentry 'to think out how this may be accomplished'. This declaration came as a complete surprise to Alexander's ministers, but it committed the government to definite action on a question which, as Alexander saw, had to be settled before any progress could be made in other directions.

The Emancipation of the Peasants

For some time after the Moscow speech the government seemed to be waiting for the gentry to take the initiative. Unsuccessful attempts were made to interest those of them who assembled in Moscow for the coronation in the summer of 1856. Though many of the landowners realized that emancipation could now be postponed no longer, they preferred to wait for the government to announce its intentions in more definite terms before expressing their own views. Only the gentry of the Lithuanian provinces (Vilna, Kóvno, Gródno) seemed inclined to proceed farther in the matter.¹ The Governor-General of Vilna, Nazímov, received a rescript ordering him to explain to the gentry that : (1) they were to be allowed to retain full rights of ownership over all their land, except that on which the peasants' houses stood ; (2) the peasants should be allowed the *use* of portions of land, sufficient to enable them to discharge their obligations to the State, for which they were to pay rent in money or service. The government sent copies of the rescript to all the provinces of Russia, hoping to get the gentry to discuss emancipation on these terms. By the autumn of 1858 the proposals were being actively debated in local committees of landowners in every province.

There were serious differences of opinion, based on differences in economic conditions, between the landowners of two clearly marked regions. In the fertile provinces of the centre and south the landowners derived their income from the cultivation of the land with the unpaid labour of the serfs, whom they were quite willing to liberate, without reward, so long as they could keep all the land in their own hands. Such an arrangement would relieve them of the burden of maintaining, the whole year

¹ They still had the Bibikov regulations hanging over their heads (cf. p. 402).

round, large numbers of serfs for whom they could not find constant employment, and at the same time it would ensure them a plentiful supply of cheap labour, since the peasants, if left without any land of their own, would be compelled to work for their former masters. In the provinces north of Moscow the position was different, for there the landowners drew most of their revenue, not from agriculture, which in face of the competition of the south was becoming less and less profitable, but from payments made by the peasants for being allowed to work in the towns and factories. They accordingly demanded a high reward for the loss of their right of disposing of the labour of the peasants, but had no objection to parting with some of their land.

At the beginning of 1858, when the rescript to Nazímov was published, the government clearly favoured the view of the centre and south, and seemed still afraid of taking the step that Nicholas I had refused to take.¹ But when the claims of the landowners of the different provinces were considered, it became clear that some compromise would have to be arranged. In the end the government, urged by Count Rostóvtsev and Nicholas Milyútin, who were entrusted with the work of drafting the reform, came to the conclusion that all the peasants should be allowed to acquire portions of land, to be paid for by instalments ; and this principle, which involved compulsory expropriation on a limited scale, was applied in the Act of Emancipation, published on March 3, 1861.

The liberation of the peasants was an event of first-rate importance in Russian history, but the law of March 3 was by no means a full and final settlement of all the economic and social problems connected with serfdom. It contained plentiful traces of compromise with powerful vested interests and with old conceptions of the relationships between the State, the land-

¹ Cf. pp. 400-1.

owners, and the peasants, on which serfdom itself was based. For the first time the peasant became a member of society. He could no longer be bought and sold, nor could he be turned into a mere slave. But as a class the peasants did not become fully free. They did not receive the same civil rights as the rest of the population. Part of the authority formerly exercised by the landowners was transferred to the communes. Where the land was held in common, the village commune assigned to each household the amount it was to cultivate, and dictated the way in which the land was to be used. It assessed the share in the common burden of taxation that each of its members had to bear, and had the power of withholding the passport without which a peasant could not leave the district and seek work elsewhere, unless he guaranteed to continue the payment of his contribution.

The land assigned to the peasants did not become their property, but they could not be deprived of it. They held it in 'perpetual possession', and paid fixed yearly dues for the use of it. By agreement with the proprietor they might acquire the complete ownership of their holdings. The transaction was financed by the government, which paid the proprietor a sum equal to the amount he would receive for the use of the land for $16\frac{2}{3}$ years, and recovered the money from the peasants by small annual instalments.¹

The amount of land assigned to each household was not the same in all districts. Three standards were adopted. In the rich black-land provinces a much smaller average holding was fixed than in either the newly colonized steppe region of the south and east, or the industrial provinces of the north. But even in places where land was plentiful the holdings were never larger, and in most cases were much smaller, than those which the peasants had cultivated when they were serfs. As serfs they had

¹ The 'redemption payments'.

spent no more than half their time on their own land, devoting the rest to the service of their masters. The liberated peasants, therefore, found that their holdings occupied them no more than two or three days a week, and in most cases were barely sufficient to keep them in food. In order to pay their taxes and local rates, and provide money for other expenses, they had to rent more land, sell their labour to the large landowners, or take up some occupation other than agriculture. The reform of 1861 thus contained the seeds of agrarian trouble, and the difficulties it created became ever more serious as the population increased.

In the years 1863 and 1866 the government set free the 'apannage',¹ and 'State' peasants, who had always been more favourably situated, with regard to the amount of land they cultivated, than the serfs living on the estates of private owners; the settlement in their case was much more generous than that arranged for the 'private' peasants in 1861.

Local Government : Zémstvos and Town Councils

After the emancipation of the serfs the problem of local government became of vital importance. The existing system was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, and for a long time had failed to meet the needs of the people, even when most of them were serfs, governed and controlled by the absolute authority of their masters. As early as 1859, before the Emancipation Act was completed, the government saw that many new local needs would arise, which only a properly organized system of local government could satisfy, and set about preparing a scheme. Unfortunately the reforming zeal of the bureaucracy reached its highest point in 1861; and the Zémstvo Law, which

¹ 'Apanage' peasants cultivated the lands set apart for the maintenance of the imperial family.

appeared on January 13, 1864, was much less progressive than it had promised to be. In the conflict of ideas and interests that went on in this period round all questions of reform large concessions had to be made to conservative influences.

The law of January 13 entrusted the management of local affairs in each district (*uyézđ*) to a council elected by the inhabitants. The original plan had been to unite all classes of the population into one electoral body, the emancipated serfs voting on equal terms with their late masters. Strong opposition was raised to this proposal by a section of the gentry, who saw that if they could, through the *zémstvos*, gather into their hands the control of local government, they would be able to regain the commanding position in local life of which they considered that they had been robbed in 1861. The new institutions were accordingly based on the representation of property. In each district the inhabitants were divided into three groups. The peasant elections were indirect: each commune first chose a number of 'electors', and all the 'electors' of the district formed one body which elected a fixed proportion of the members of the district *zémstvo* council (*uyézdnoe zémskoe sobránie*). The other two electoral groups contained (1) all owners of a fixed amount of land (the minimum varied from 200 to 400 *desyatíns*¹ in different districts), and (2) inhabitants of towns who either had the right to engage in trade or owned business undertakings or real property within the urban boundary.² In fixing the number of members of the *zémstvo* council elected by each of the three groups, account was taken of the proportion that the property owned by each group bore to the aggregate amount of property in the district that was entitled to representation, but the

¹ From 550 to 1,100 acres.

² Many towns, of course, governed themselves independently of the *zémstvos*.

area of peasant land that sent one member was, as a rule, about twice the corresponding area of private land. The large landowners were thus much better represented than the peasants, but they did not secure the absolute predominance in the *zémstvos* for which they strove, since the law laid down the rule that no single group should have a larger number of representatives assigned to it than the other two groups combined, i. e. no one of the three classes into which the population was divided might possess a legally-secured majority in the *zémstvo* council.

Thirty-four provinces of European Russia, divided into about 360 districts, eventually received self-government under the law of 1864. Each district had its own *zémstvo* council, which elected an executive board (*upráva*) sitting constantly and reporting to the annual meeting of the council. The provincial councils (*gubérnskoe zémskoe sobránie*) were formed of deputies elected by all the district councils in the province,¹ and also appointed their own executive boards. They were supposed to co-ordinate the work of the district *zémstvos* and manage affairs² that could be more conveniently dealt with by an authority controlling a large area of territory, but the relations between the two units were never exactly defined, and varied considerably in each province. No provision was made for a self-governing unit smaller than the district and in closer touch with the needs of the population.³

¹ The number of districts (*uyézd*) in the province (*gubérniya*) varies from six to fifteen.

² Such as the upkeep of main roads.

³ The provinces and districts vary enormously in size. Taking only the territory covered by the *zémstvos*, the largest province is Vólogda (approximately 155,500 square miles, i. e. larger than the United Kingdom), and the smallest Kalúga (12,000 square miles), while the average for thirty-four provinces is 32,000 square miles; the districts range from 24,500 square miles to 668 square miles—the average being about 7,000 square miles.

The zémstvos were obliged to keep up roads, look after the needs of agriculture, provide for relief in famine years, and maintain existing elementary schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions ; but the set duties laid down for them by law formed only a small part of the work they eventually took up in order to satisfy the needs of the people. Funds previously used to support the public institutions that they took over were given into the control of the zémstvos, and they were allowed to levy rates.

The position of the zémstvos was in some ways very anomalous. The ordinary administrative system, controlled by the central government, continued to exist unchanged, and many matters that in western European countries are considered as part of the work of local authorities were left under the control of the government officials. Even the police were directed from the centre, and by a curious arrangement collected the rates for the zémstvos.¹ Local self-governing bodies were thus left in such an indefinite position that they could always be interfered with by the administration. Despite these and other defects, the law of 1864 conceded one principle of enormous significance for the future of Russia—that of representative government. In 1864 it was applied only to local affairs, but, as intelligent contemporaries could foresee, its extension to affairs of state was only a matter of time. From 1864 a wide sphere of useful public work became opened to that increasingly large section of the educated class which could not accept the ideals of public service that animated the bureaucracy, and in the zémstvos the progressive forces of the country were able for the first time to reunite.

Town life stood still throughout the first half of the century. The towns remained poor and undeveloped. Even in Moscow and Petersburg the great majority of the buildings were of wood.

¹ By contemporaries the zémstvos were said to be 'floating in the air'.

Self-government existed only in theory. No registers of electors were kept, and very few of the electors ever exercised their rights. In many places town councils were not elected, and where they existed they became submissive instruments of the administrative authorities and the police. The population were everywhere apathetic and indifferent. About the middle of the century, under the influence of a general revival of economic and political life, important developments took place. The movement of political unrest that marked the early years of Alexander's reign awakened in the inhabitants of the towns the desire to free themselves from the tutelage of the bureaucracy and manage their own affairs. In 1862 the government began to prepare a measure of reform, but the matter dragged on until 1870, when reaction had established itself and the forces of progress had lost whatever influence they possessed in the beginning of the reign.

The Municipal Government Law of June 30, 1870, made the franchise conditional on the payment of rates. There were three electoral groups, each of which paid one-third of the whole amount of rates collected in the town and elected the same proportion of the town council. The first group included only the largest ratepayers, who thus secured in the municipal councils a position similar to that held by the large landowners in the *zémstvos*. Municipal authorities had the right of imposing rates, but in such a restricted form that they were constantly in financial difficulties and could never raise money for the work of development. They also had the right to issue by-laws on such matters as public health and sanitary conditions, but they had no means of enforcing their decisions except through the police, who though paid and maintained by the towns, were controlled by the central government. Local officials continued to interfere in the affairs of the towns, and their interference was no less effective when regulated by law than it had been

when purely personal and uncontrolled. The law of 1870 thus left municipal government in much the same condition in which it was before.

Legal Reform

Very valuable reforms were effected by the law of December 2, 1864, which substituted a judicial system based on the results attained by theory and practical experience in western Europe for the obsolete institutions and forms of procedure that Russia had inherited from the eighteenth century. For the first time there was laid down the principle that justice should be equal for all.¹ Proceedings in the law-courts were made public, and were conducted on a regular system of prosecution and defence instead of by antiquated rules handed down from mediæval times. Trial by jury was introduced for all except political cases and certain offences committed by government officials. The judicial system became completely independent of the administration. Educated jurists were appointed as judges. They were properly paid and could not be arbitrarily removed. Small cases were submitted to the jurisdiction of special lower courts, presided over by justices of the peace elected by the zémstvos and town councils, for which a simplified form of procedure was adopted.

The legal reform was the most thorough and radical of all those introduced by Alexander II. It marked a complete break with the past, and its importance can be estimated by the bitterness with which the reactionaries later attacked every one of the principles on which it was based.

Education

Important changes took place also in education. After the accession of Alexander II, when the most irritating of the

¹ Within the limits of class-rights, for the different classes of the population did not enjoy equal rights (cf. p. 429).

restrictions imposed in the previous reign were removed, there was a stir in university life. The number of students increased rapidly, and they were allowed a fair amount of liberty. They showed great interest in political affairs, and gave themselves up to violent criticism of the existing order. Soon the government felt itself called upon to interfere, and the weak Minister of Education, Kovalévsky, was replaced by a reactionary, Admiral Putyátin, who at once abolished all forms of corporate organization among the students. Great demonstrations of protest in Moscow and Petersburg ended in conflicts with the police and troops. In Moscow the police hounded the mob on to attack the students by spreading a rumour that they were dispossessed landowners agitating for the restoration of serfdom. Many students were arrested and dismissed from the universities. Alexander was extremely dissatisfied with Putyátin's methods, and appointed the enlightened A. V. Golovnin in his place. Golovnin began at once to draft a new code for the universities. Professor Kavélin was sent abroad to study the organization of foreign universities, and other prominent scholars were invited to take part in the work of reform. When the draft was ready it was even translated and circulated abroad so that European scholars might express their opinions upon it. At the same time it was actively discussed in Russian academic circles and in the press.

On June 30, 1863, this new University Code was published. It restored to the universities the autonomy they had enjoyed under the Code of 1804. The professors of each university were formed into self-governing bodies, managing affairs through the council and boards of faculties. The powers of the curator of the circuit, which since 1835 had been almost unlimited, were severely restricted. The evidence collected by Kavélin in western Europe was overwhelmingly in favour of allowing the students to organize their own corporate life, but the reactionaries vigorously resisted the proposal and it had to be abandoned.

A new Secondary Education Code was published in 1864 (December 1). Two types of schools were recognized, the 'classical gymnasium' and the 'real gymnasium', preparing pupils respectively for the universities and the higher technical institutions. There was very little provision for the education of girls. Existing State institutes for the daughters of the gentry did not meet the needs of the more democratic classes, who began to take an interest in education in this period. From 1859 girls' secondary schools were founded by private enterprise, and the Empress Mária took them under her own protection.

The government left elementary education to public initiative, and the Elementary Schools Code of June 26, 1864, allowed the *zémstvos* and town councils to provide and maintain schools, which were supervised by specially formed district school boards.

Changes in the Army

The last of the great reforms, that of the army, was carried through in a later period, but in spirit and purpose it belonged to the first part of the reign. Before the Crimean War, and especially in the years after 1848, Russia seemed to dominate Europe by her colossal military strength. By 1856 over two million men had been mobilized, yet despite these enormous resources in men and the bravery of the troops the comparatively small army of the Western alliance was victorious. Russia's failure was undoubtedly due, in part, to the general internal disorganization of the country, and to the backwardness of her economic life. The lack of proper communications and means of transport, for example, directly influenced the course of the campaign, and contributed to the disaster of Sevastópol. But there were also special points of weakness which showed that radical changes were necessary in the military

system if Russia was to maintain her position in Europe. The leaders of the army were totally unfitted for their work, and with one or two brilliant exceptions showed a complete lack of initiative. In technical equipment and armament the Russians were far behind other countries. Their medical and sanitary services proved hopelessly inefficient and the administration of the army was full of abuses and corruption.

In 1861 Dmitry Milyútin, who had served as professor in the General Staff Academy and as Chief of Staff of the Army of the Caucasus, became Minister of War. During the twenty years in which he occupied this responsible position he devoted all his talent and energy to the task of reorganizing the army and the military system of which it formed only a part. The conditions of service in the ranks were improved, and the period of service reduced from 25 to 16 years. Shameful and cruel punishments were abolished, and the code of military offences and court-martial procedure was readjusted to bring it into harmony with the progressive civil law reforms of 1864. In order to raise the educational standard amongst the officers and remove them during the first years of their training from the exclusively professional atmosphere in which cadets were brought up under the old system, Milyútin radically reformed the military schools and paid more attention to the development of wide cultural interests. These and other similar changes, conceived in a humane and liberal spirit, were of great service in increasing the efficiency of all branches of the service. Milyútin's greatest achievement, however, was the Military Service Law of 1874, which extended the obligation of military service to all classes of the population and brought Russia into line with other continental states. Youths attaining the age of twenty were automatically called up at a fixed date every year, for six years with the colours, followed by nine in the reserve and service in the militia up to the age of forty. Total

exemption, or a considerable reduction of the six years' period, was granted to men who could bring proof of exceptional domestic obligations, and those who had completed the course of the elementary or secondary school or the university received privileges corresponding to the standard of education they had attained. The army was placed on a territorial basis, and the annual quota of recruits required from each military district was chosen by lot. The efficiency of the army was further increased by the introduction of a new system of training which included provision for the teaching of general subjects (1876). Each soldier at the end of his service returned to his home literate, and in Milyútín's hands the army became an important auxiliary in the work of educating the masses of the people.

Political Movements, 1855-66

For a century and a half no period in Russian history was so full of change as the first part of the reign of Alexander II. The 'great reforms' set free new social and political forces and started processes of development that, though they might be restrained, could never be arrested. Many millions of new members entered Russian society after the emancipation of the peasants. Local self-government was to provide the stepping-stone to political freedom. Russia acquired a properly organized legal system and a modern army. Education was put on a sounder basis and the instruction of the masses entrusted to public institutions.

A new Russia was indeed rising from the ruins of Sevastópol. Alexander was inspired by a sincere desire to help the country forward, and as a reformer he was enthusiastically supported by his people. But unfortunately he held firmly to the old administrative system, and by trusting bureaucratic institutions to carry out liberal reforms, and denying any share in their preparation to the people whose vital interests they concerned, he lowered

very considerably the value of the reforms and came into sharp conflict with public opinion.

Before the Emancipation Act was published the gentry showed their resentment at not being properly consulted on the matter. Alexander promised that they would be allowed to send delegates to discuss the reform before it was finally shaped. The delegates were actually summoned to Petersburg in the autumn of 1859, but they were not allowed to express their views freely. They were questioned by government officials on points of detail, and when they asked to be allowed to present a collective expression of opinion on the whole question of emancipation they were only rebuffed by the emperor. From this time the opposition movement amongst the gentry developed rapidly.¹ A large section of them strove merely to assert their class interests. Tired of bureaucratic tutelage and resentful of interference with their rights and privileges, they wanted to secure a share in political power as compensation for the abolition of serfdom. There was also a strong liberal group which was opposed to the bureaucratic principle, in the interests not of any particular class but of the people as a whole, and agitated for freedom of the press, responsibility of officials to the courts, an independent judicial system, and local self-government on a true representative basis.

Of these two tendencies, oligarchical and liberal, the latter found strong support in educated society for a time, but in view of its origin the liberalism of the gentry² did not appeal to the younger generation of the educated class,³ which from the

¹ 'The government itself acts arbitrarily, but demands blind submission from every one else. . . . In Petersburg, Moscow, and the provinces there is growing dissatisfaction, even bitterness, against the government' (Koshelëv).

² Or 'conscience-stricken gentlemen' (*káyushchisya dvoryáne*), as they were later called by Mikhailóvsky.

³ 'Men of mixed class' (*raznochintsy*).

beginning of the reign had been largely recruited from the more democratic sections of the people, to which the schools and universities had previously been almost inaccessible. Radical opinion, led by Chernishévsky, Dobrolyúbov, and their journal *Sovreménnik* ('The Contemporary'), did not trust the liberals and was turning more and more towards socialism.

The Act of 1861 caused much disappointment. The radicals came to the conclusion that the official and propertied classes had conspired to rob the peasants of the land, in order to be able to exploit them. Chernishévsky inveighed against the bureaucratic methods of reform adopted by the government, and was strongly supported by the liberals, who, in the province of Tver, declared that reforms ought to be carried out with the help of 'an assembly of elected representatives of the people, without any class distinctions'.¹ But in 1861 the policy of the government began to turn towards reaction. In order to appease the conservatives Alexander got rid of Nicholas Milyútin and appointed Valúyev, a supporter of the aristocratic party, to the post of Minister of the Interior in place of Lanský.²

Meantime, radical opinion was becoming more and more extreme. Under Chernishévsky and Dobrolyúbov the spirit of criticism fastened upon social and political questions, and was directed towards the emancipation of society from political oppression and the tutelage of the State. The field of criticism was enlarged by Písarev, who advocated a much wider emancipation than that which formed the ideal of the *Sovreménnik*—

¹ 'The gentry are firmly convinced that the government is incapable of carrying out reforms. The free institutions to which these reforms should lead can only issue from the people itself, otherwise they will only be a dead letter, and will place society in an even more critical position. In order to save itself and society the government should call an assembly of elected representatives of the people, without any class distinctions.'

² Lanský had held this position since 1855.

the emancipation of the human mind from all the religious, moral, and intellectual bonds that held it down, as serfdom had held down the peasants, from family and social traditions, dogmas, ideals, emotions, and all general principles of conduct. Pisarev's 'nihilism' caught the imagination of the younger generation, and though it was not revolutionary, i. e. did not demand an open political struggle, it served as a preparation for revolutionary agitation. In 1861 active revolutionary groups began to be formed, some of which aimed at an immediate social revolution, while others preferred to propagate socialist ideas amongst the people and wait until revolution came of itself. In the autumn of 1861 revolutionary proclamations containing wild demands were distributed among the people.¹ In 1862 (May-June) a series of mysterious fires, which destroyed whole quarters of the city, broke out in Petersburg. Popular rumour blamed the revolutionaries, but the real origin of the fires was never discovered. The public were terrorized, and the government became so alarmed that it determined to make a stand against the rising revolutionary movement. The *Sovreménnik* and Pisarev's journal, *Rússkoe Slóvo* ('The Russian Word'), were suspended for eight months. Many arrests were made, and Chernishévsky, on very slender evidence, was sentenced to fourteen years' penal servitude in Siberia for his connexion with the proclamations.² In May strict rules for the supervision of printing-presses were issued, in order to stop the production of 'underground' literature.

At this juncture a fresh turn was given to political affairs in Russia by the outbreak of the Polish rebellion. The severe repressive measures that had been adopted in Poland after

¹ One of these proclamations advocated the wholesale massacre of all who defended the existing order, in place of which a federal-communist system was to be set up.

² The sentence was eventually reduced to seven years.

1831 remained in force until the end of Nicholas I's reign. Alexander showed an inclination towards more lenient treatment of the Poles. Some concessions made in 1861, such as the creation of a separate ministry for Polish educational and religious affairs, seemed to foreshadow the grant of a certain degree of autonomy. But this attempt to conciliate the Poles came too late. The country was already divided between two revolutionary parties (aristocratic and democratic), neither of which would accept the Russian programme. In 1863 the Russian authorities put into force a new conscription law, and carried out a sudden raid with the purpose of taking off as recruits all young men suspected of disaffection. An armed rising broke out, and the Poles turned to the Western Powers for support. Russian opinion had for a long time been sympathetic to the Poles, but the diplomatic interference of Great Britain, France, and Austria on their behalf caused an explosion of patriotic feeling that made it easy for the Russian government to disregard the representations of the Powers. The Poles fought heroically, but there was no centre of resistance such as the Polish army had been in 1831. The insurrection was limited to a series of sporadic outbreaks, which, though difficult to deal with, were foredoomed to failure. By the spring of 1864 Russia was once more in complete possession of Poland. All idea of reconciliation was abandoned. The government tore up the last remnants of Polish freedom and embarked on a policy of active russification. In this it was supported by public opinion, for Russian hostility against the Poles became even more violent when the people learned that they had planned to spread disorder in Russia, in order to distract the attention of the government from the revolt. The influence of Polish agitation on the students' disorders of 1861 was established, and it was discovered that the Russian revolutionaries had been negotiating with the Poles. The

revolutionary movement, already seriously compromised in public opinion by the Petersburg fires, was now discredited. Even moderate liberalism lost many of its supporters. The government declared that its policy would be 'neither weakness nor reaction', and proceeded with necessary reforms. But the bureaucratic principle was energetically reasserted. When the Moscow gentry asked the emperor to 'crown the edifice of State' by calling a general assembly of 'representatives of the Russian land', in order that 'truth might penetrate unhindered to the throne' (January 1865), he declared that the reforms which he was introducing were sufficient evidence of his unfailing determination to improve and perfect the organization of the State, and emphasized his own exclusive right of initiative. Liberal advances were thus completely rebuffed, and the government began to think that revolution was dead. Suddenly the whole of Russia was horrified by Karakóзов's attempt to assassinate the emperor (April 16, 1866), which was immediately attributed to a wide revolutionary organization. The most patient investigation brought to light only an insignificant group in Moscow, to which Karakóзов belonged. But radical and revolutionary tendencies were finally compromised, the liberals lost their heads, and blind reaction set in almost before the smoke of Karakóзов's pistol had floated away. Alexander was deeply impressed by the attempt on his life, and thus all the readier to listen to the reactionaries. Count Dmítry Tolstóy (Procurator of the Holy Synod) attacked Golovnin's policy in the Council of Ministers (April 17), and blamed his laxity for the spread of revolutionary ideas among the students. Golovnin was at once removed and Tolstóy took his place. Similar changes were made in other ministerial posts. The *Sovreménnik* and *Rússkoe Slóvo* were stopped altogether, and the government appealed to the people for help in the struggle against 'disruptive forces'.

*Alexander II: 2. Reaction**Tolstóy's Educational Policy*

THE full force of reaction was immediately directed against the schools and universities, in which revolution was supposed to have its roots. Tolstóy held that the study of natural science had fostered the spirit of criticism and negation that carried away the younger generation in the sixties. His new programme for secondary education (approved by Alexander after it had been rejected by the Council of State) banished science altogether from the schools, and considerably reduced the time devoted to Russian language and literature, modern languages, history, and geography. Mathematics, Latin, Greek, and a third dead language—Church Slavonic—became the cornerstones of the new curriculum. The teaching of the classics was intentionally made as lifeless as possible, most attention being paid to formal grammar. The teachers' councils lost all their rights, which passed to 'directors' appointed by, and responsible to, the ministry, and virtually its agents, through whom it could exercise a close supervision over the whole course of school life. The spirit of the schools was distorted. Absolute, unquestioning obedience came to be demanded of the pupils, and though they were encouraged to be 'frank' with their teachers, 'frankness' took the form of spying on fellow pupils. 'Real schools', with a narrowly technical course lasting for six years only, replaced the 'real gymnasia' of 1864.¹ The new 'real school' did not prepare pupils for the higher technical institu-

¹ Under the Code of 1864 the course of both the 'classical' and the 'real' gymnasium lasted for eight years.

tions,¹ entry into which became possible only for those who had passed through the classical mill.

The new secondary-school system was intended to lower the general standard of knowledge, to deaden thought, and check the development of wide cultural interests, by providing a course of mere mental drill. It subjected the pupils to a severe process of selection; in the years 1872-90 only a very small proportion of them succeeded in finishing the school course in the proper time, while as many as 63 to 79 per cent. were rejected at different stages. The system was bitterly criticized from all sides until Tolstóy persuaded Alexander to issue an order forbidding the press to discuss the plans of the government. With the universities he did not get so much of his own way, though he managed to strike several hard blows at the none too liberal Code of 1863, which he would have abolished altogether but for the support it still enjoyed even in official circles. In 1867 very close police control was established over the students, both inside and outside the walls of the universities, and the powers and independence of university councils were considerably reduced. Serious student disturbances took place in 1869, 1874, and 1878.

The existing girls' secondary schools were not under the jurisdiction of the ministry, but Tolstóy brought such pressure to bear upon Vyshnegrádsky, head of the department which supervised them, that he had to resign. A number of State secondary schools for girls, with a programme similar to that of the classical gymnasium, were founded in this period, and the question of higher education for women came up in a form particularly serious from Tolstóy's point of view. In order to complete their education women were forced to go to Germany and Switzerland, where they came under the influence of revolutionary propaganda carried on by political refugees. In self-

¹ Cf. p. 437.

defence the government was forced to move in the matter, and in the seventies allowed courses of higher study for women to be opened by private persons at Petersburg and Moscow, in order to keep the women students at home. Tolstóy refused, however, to allow medical subjects to be taught, though from 1872 to 1881 medical training for women was provided by the Ministry of War (under Milyútin). The first medical institute for women students was opened only in 1897.

The *zémstvos* had taken up the work of elementary education, and were making good progress with the very modest resources at their disposal. They built and paid for the upkeep of many new schools, which were managed by the district school boards.¹ But Tolstóy could not reconcile himself to this system, and wanted to vest the control of elementary education in officials responsible to himself. With this object he began to appoint government inspectors (1869), and in a new Elementary Education Code, prepared in 1874, provided for a very considerable increase in their number, but owing to lack of money could not carry his proposal in full.² In the same measure he tried to increase the official element in the school boards, but met with unexpected opposition from the gentry, who persuaded Alexander to allow their district marshals (elected heads of the corporation of gentry) to preside on the boards, which were thus kept in close touch with the *zémstvos*.³ The plan of subjecting elementary education to purely bureaucratic control thus failed, but Tolstóy led an active and unceasing campaign against the *zémstvos*, which became so difficult to bear that many of them in despair thought of abandoning the schools altogether.

¹ Cf. p. 437.

² Instead of one inspector for every district he had to be content with two in every province, or about one-fifth of the number he wanted.

³ The district marshal (*predvoditel*) was by law president of the *zémstvo* council.

The Early Years of the Zémstvos

The zémstvos had to carry on their work under very difficult conditions. Their resources were quite insufficient for the tasks they had to perform, and in 1866 (December 3) their right of levying rates was severely restricted. From that time they were compelled to derive most of their income from the already over-taxed land. At first they made the peasants pay for schools and medical attention, but later it became possible for them to provide these and other services free of charge out of the general funds. In most of the zémstvos the gentry predominated, since they alone, by education and previous experience, were fitted to take an active part in public work. Even the peasants elected many of their representatives from this class.

For the first two or three years the zémstvos were on fairly good terms with the government and its agents in the provinces. From 1866 the position changed, and they were subjected to constant attacks on their authority and independence. In 1867 the powers of the presidents were enlarged, and they were made responsible for preventing the discussion of subjects that did not enter into the competence of the zémstvos. All accounts of the annual meetings were subjected to the governor's censorship, and the zémstvos were not allowed to publish their printed materials and reports on different branches of their work. The right of the public to attend the meetings was curtailed. These and other similar measures had the effect of rallying progressive forces in defence of the zémstvos. The unceasing struggle which they were forced to wage embittered and drove into opposition the best minds of the country, and kept alive in a dark period the liberalism that had made an unsuccessful effort to assert itself in the sixties.

Reaction in the Law Courts

The legal reform of 1864 was introduced at first, owing to financial difficulties and a shortage of suitable officials and judges, only in the Moscow and Petersburg circuits. Despite the fact that it was based on methods and principles entirely new for Russia, the system worked well and was a great improvement upon the one it replaced. But the government soon became dissatisfied with it, and particularly with the way in which offences against the press laws were treated by the juries. In many cases where convictions and heavy penalties would have been secured under the old system, the new courts either acquitted or imposed light penalties. On one occasion Valúyev went so far as to demand the dismissal of a judge, and Alexander had to save the law from violation. In another similar case he himself had to be reminded that he could no longer arbitrarily remove judges, though for daring to mention the fact the Minister of Justice, Zamyátin, had to leave his post. His successor, Count Páhlen, encouraged by the reactionaries, began an active campaign against the new system and its principles. By tampering with the appointments of prosecuting officials he turned them into instruments of the policy of the government. He tried to restrict the influence and independence of the corporation of advocates, and wanted to do away entirely with the hated jury system. It was saved only after a stiff contest, in which the chief protagonist on the side of progress was A. F. Kóni, the enlightened president of the Petersburg Circuit Court. In 1871 Páhlen changed the procedure for the investigation and trial of political cases, which from that time were gradually withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and subjected to that of uncontrolled and irresponsible police officials.

The Press

While thus engaged in getting rid of the inconveniences of the reforms which it had so recently carried through, the government was busy gagging the press and public opinion, so that there should be no protest against its actions. During the first ten years of the reign the position of the press had been uncertain. Periods of comparative freedom alternated with periods of repression, but it had been able to reflect the main currents of public opinion on the great questions of the time. In 1865 the newspapers and journals of the two capitals were freed from the preliminary censorship, but the natural feeling of relief caused by this concession was short-lived. In the provinces the press remained subject to the preliminary censorship, while the punitive censorship set up in Moscow and Petersburg was unceasingly vigilant.¹ Infringements of the press rules were treated so lightly by the courts that the government began to take 'administrative' measures.² Newspapers and journals were warned for a first offence, then stopped for months at a time, or crippled by being forbidden to print advertisements. In 1869 a committee that was set up to draft a new press law advised the government to relax its strictness, but the number of prosecutions increased. Radical journals suffered heavily, and moderate liberalism was represented by only one serious organ, *Véstnik Evrópy* ('Messenger of Europe').³ Thus reaction met with hardly a protest,

¹ Under the preliminary censorship newspapers and journals had to be submitted to the censor *before* publication. Under the punitive system the editors were made responsible, and might be punished by fine or imprisonment for allowing the publication of anything that contravened the press rules, the interpretation of which was left to the discretion of the officials.

² Substituting the summary jurisdiction of police officials for that of the ordinary courts.

³ Founded in 1866, and still in existence.

and public opinion, robbed of all means of expressing itself, exhausted and disappointed at the turn that affairs had taken after the promising years of reform, sank once more into a mood of depression.

Economic Expansion

Economic conditions were still primitive at the beginning of Alexander's reign. Russia's backwardness was accounted for by the conditions of her history, for she had been forced to expand over an enormous stretch of territory, and engage in a struggle for existence so incessant that all internal development had been subjected to the special, immediate needs of defence. The process of expansion was practically completed by the beginning of the nineteenth century, at least on the west and south, and the time had come for consolidation. Henceforward economic questions were bound to attract attention if Russia was to keep the place she had won in Europe.

The Crimean War showed how little progress had been made in the first half of the century, and brought Russia near to bankruptcy. It led first of all to serious reforms in the administration of State finances. The system of independent treasuries for each government department—a relic of the Moscow period—was abandoned in favour of a single central treasury. All revenue and expenditure were diverted to the Ministry of Finances. Public accounts were verified by an independent State control, and in 1862 the first regular budget was issued. Although these changes led to a more efficient, honest, and economical administration of finances, they were purely external, and did not touch the real problem, which was to increase the resources at the disposal of the government. Reïtern, appointed Minister of Finances in 1862, saw that only an active economic policy could save Russia.

Three important obstacles had hindered economic progress

in the first half of the century. The first of these, serfdom, fell in 1861. Reïtern devoted himself to the removal of the other two—lack of means of communication and the absence of an organized system of credit. Russian roads were quite undeveloped, and very little use was made of the wonderful system of waterways which intersect the country in all directions. At the outbreak of the Crimean War there were only two railways—one a short line of 25 versts, of no economic or strategical importance, from Petersburg to Tsárskoe Seló (opened in 1837), and the other the Nicholas Railway from Petersburg to Moscow (605 versts), built by the State at enormous cost and finished in 1851. A line from Petersburg to Warsaw had been begun, but lack of funds had prevented its completion. After the war the government began systematically to encourage private enterprise, for its experience of State railway construction had not been very encouraging. Concessions for new lines were freely granted to private companies, which were guaranteed a minimum dividend on their capital by the government. The first experiments of the kind, however, caused heavy losses to the Treasury, until a new venture in State construction showed that railways could be made to pay. The great boom of the seventies gave Russia a system of railways that changed the face of the country. The grain-growing provinces of the south were linked up with the great consuming centres (the capitals and the industrial provinces of the north) and with the Black Sea and Baltic ports, while the industrial regions were joined to the southern coalfields.¹ Of no less importance for the economic development of Russia was the creation of a system of banks and credit institutions, in which a very large amount of capital was invested in this period.

Industry passed through a very critical time after the emanci-


¹ By 1876 Russia possessed over 19,000 versts (13,000 miles) of railway, two-thirds of which were built in the years 1868-76.

pation. Those industries, such as iron ¹ and wool, which had continued to use forced labour, found themselves suddenly deprived of labour, for the liberated peasants left the hated factories and went away to the towns. The cotton industry suffered heavily from the effects of the American Civil War—a shortage of raw cotton and the consequent dearness of English yarn. Trade also was very depressed after 1861, and the returns of business done at the great fairs held at Nizhny Nóvgorod and other places, which at that time approximately reflected the general condition of trade in the country, declined very considerably. In the seventies, in close connexion with the railway boom, both trade and industry recovered, and a period of feverish expansion followed. The economic life of the country was beginning to respond to conditions more favourable for its development, but there was unrestricted speculation, and production became inflated. Towards the end of the seventies there was a marked reaction, leading to a period of depression that lasted up to 1887.

The Conquest of the Caucasus

Half a century of almost unceasing warfare was required for the subjugation of the tribes of the northern Caucasus. The Georgian military road, the main line of communication with the south, divided the unconquered territory into two parts. In the west the Cherkesses gave constant trouble by their raids into Russian territory, but they were gradually hemmed in and limited in their sphere of activity. In 1864 the last of them were allowed to migrate to Turkey. By the end of the first quarter of the century considerable progress

¹ The production of iron declined from 20,468,000 (1860) to 17,027,000 poods (1863) (Tugán-Baranóvsky, *The Russian Factory*, p. 309). There are about 62 poods in a ton.



had been made in the east, for the Russians had brought under their rule the greater part of Daghestan and lower Chéchnia, and built a line of forts that kept the tribes of the interior in check. But all this work was undone in 1829 by a rebellion, and for thirty years the peoples of the north-eastern Caucasus, united by religious passion and hatred of Russia, maintained the struggle for independence. Their first leader, Kazi Mulla of Ghimri, who was originally the head of a religious sect, declared a holy war. In 1831 he took and sacked the Russian town Kizliar, on the lower Térék, and attacked Dérbent and Vnezápnaya,¹ from which he was driven off. In the following year the Russians entered the difficult mountain country, forced Kazi Mulla to retire into Daghestan, and captured his stronghold Ghimri. Kazi Mulla himself was killed, but his friend and lieutenant, Shamil, escaped and took his place as leader of the rebels. A strong Russian column entered northern Daghestan again in 1837. Shamil was surrounded in the fortress of Akhulgo, but when it fell, after a siege lasting eighty days, he managed to escape. The following years brought Russia many disasters, for Shamil, with his mobile forces, swooped down upon isolated groups of his enemies without allowing himself to be drawn into any serious fighting. In 1846 he tried to break through into Kabardá, to the west of the Georgian road, in order to join forces with the tribes of the north-west. This movement failed, and for several years hostilities were confined to raiding expeditions carried out by each side in the territory of the other. During the Crimean War the allies failed to take the opportunity of seriously embarrassing Russia which the situation in the Caucasus presented to them, and when the war was over the Russians determined to rid themselves of the danger that threatened them in this quarter from the existence of unconquered

¹ In eastern Chéchnia.

territory within the Empire. In 1856 a number of strong columns were set in motion from different points. Advancing slowly, they consolidated all their gains by building bridges and roads. The long period of comparative inactivity had seriously undermined Shamil's power. The tribes went over to the Russians as they advanced, and in the end Shamil was shut up with a mere handful of followers at Gunib. After a short but eventful siege the main defences of this last stronghold were taken, and Shamil, seeing that there was no hope of escape, at last surrendered to the Russians (August 25, 1859).

Foreign Policy, 1855-75

For some years after the Crimean War France and Russia seemed to be drawing nearer to each other. The old alliance of the three Eastern Powers had been shattered by Austria, whom Alexander could not forgive. During the struggle between France and Austria in 1859 Russian influence was exercised in favour of France. Russia and France acted in unison with regard to Rumania (1858-61)² and on other Eastern questions. But Napoleon III's intervention in favour of the Poles in 1863 put an end for the time being to the development of a Franco-Russian understanding. Russian policy received a new orientation. The traditional friendship between the Russian and Prussian courts became strengthened.³ At the time of the Polish rebellion Prussia rendered important

¹ For ten years Shamil lived at Kalúga. In 1870 he was allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and died at Medina in the following year.

² Moldavia and Wallachia were partially united in 1858. In the following year both the provinces elected the same *hospodar*, Alexander Cuza, and in 1861 the Powers formally recognized the new state, Rumania, which, however, remained subject to Turkey until 1878.

³ Alexander II was the nephew of William I of Prussia, whose sister Nicholas I had married in 1817.

help to Russia,¹ who in turn supported Prussia against Austria in 1866. During the Franco-Prussian War Russia prevented Austria from joining France, and Prussia acquiesced in the repudiation of the articles of the Treaty of Paris which had prohibited Russia from maintaining a war-fleet on the Black Sea (November 1870).

From 1870 Bismarck's chief object was to isolate France. He had dealt very lightly with Austria in 1866, and after 1870 he was able to come to an understanding with her. With Russia the ground was already prepared. In September 1872 Alexander I and Francis Joseph met William I in Berlin, and the so-called 'Three Emperors' League' came into being. No formal treaty was signed, but an agreement was arrived at for (1) the maintenance of the new frontiers established in recent years, (2) the settlement of difficulties that might arise out of the Eastern Question, and (3) the suppression of revolutionary movements.² This new combination, however, was seriously weakened in 1875 by the intervention of Alexander II at a time when war between Germany and France seemed imminent. The three Powers hung loosely together for some years longer, but the semblance of friendship became ever more difficult to keep up.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877-8

The affairs of the Near East occupied the attention of Europe almost unceasingly during this period. The Peace of Paris apparently deprived Russia of all excuse for interfering in the Balkans, but it did not solve the question of the rela-

¹ Prussian troops were posted along the frontier to prevent the escape of Polish refugees into Prussian territory. Russian troops were allowed to cross the frontier in pursuit of those who managed to flee.

² There is evidence that about the same time Germany and Austria secretly arranged for the latter to receive compensation in the Balkans for the territory she had lost in 1859 and 1864.

tions between the Turks and the Christian peoples. Reforms were promised, but never introduced, and several isolated risings took place. There was, however, no serious trouble until the summer of 1875, when an insurrection broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Had it been confined to these provinces the occasion for European intervention might not have arisen. But the rebels received secret encouragement and assistance from Serbia and Montenegro, and the prospect of a general rising of the Slavs seriously alarmed the Austrian government. Count Andrassy (Foreign Minister), after communicating with Petersburg and Berlin, drew up a note containing a scheme of reforms intended to pacify the revolted provinces. With the consent of France and Italy, and the grudging concurrence of Great Britain, this note was presented to the Sultan (January 30, 1876), who at once accepted it. But the rebels had had enough of Turkish promises in the past, and declined to lay down their arms. A second and much sterner note, obviously inspired by Russia, was drafted at Berlin (May) by Andrassy, Bismarck, and Gorchakov (Russian Foreign Minister), but the British government refused to support it, and sent the fleet to Besika Bay, near the Dardanelles (May 24). Disraeli, whose imperialist policy in the East implied the close identification of the interests of Great Britain with those of Turkey, would doubtless have gone much farther in defining his attitude towards Russia, but for the pressure of public opinion, profoundly shocked by the Bulgarian massacres (May), and the opposition which he met with even within the Cabinet. Alexander II and Francis Joseph of Austria met at Reichstadt (in Bohemia) and came to an agreement by which Austria, in return for certain concessions, guaranteed to observe a friendly neutrality if war broke out between Russia and Turkey (July 8).

Early in July 1876 Serbia and Montenegro had declared

war on Turkey. By the autumn the Serbians were reduced to such straits that they had to ask for the mediation of the Powers. Russia compelled the Turks to agree to a two months' armistice (October 30). Alexander informed the British ambassador at Petersburg that although he sought no territorial gains and had not the least wish to possess Constantinople, he might be compelled to interfere alone if the other Powers refused to deal firmly with the Turks (November 2). Proposals for a conference at Constantinople were under consideration, and there seemed to be some hope of restoring unity. But after Lord Beaconsfield's speech at the Guildhall on November 9, in which he asserted that while the policy of Great Britain was peace, no other country was so well prepared for war, all hope of a diplomatic settlement of the crisis disappeared. The next day, Alexander, speaking at Moscow, reasserted, and in stronger terms than before, his determination to interfere alone if the Powers would not help him to obtain the guarantees that he had the right to demand from Turkey. The Conference of Constantinople met in December, but the Turkish government promulgated a bogus constitution, and referred to the Treaty of Paris, by which the Powers had engaged not to interfere in the relations between the Sultan and his subjects. In spite of warnings issued by Lord Salisbury, the British representative at the conference, and the withdrawal of the British fleet from Besika Bay, the Sultan rejected all the proposals of the Powers. For some months past Russia had been arming. In January 1877 the agreement of Reichstadt was converted into a formal treaty, by which the neutrality of Austria was assured. A final effort to impose the will of Europe proved unsuccessful (Protocol of London, March 31), and on April 24 Russia declared war. The obstinacy of the Turks was due to their conviction that the interests of Great Britain would not allow her to remain neutral, a conviction which

Beaconsfield's actions had tended to deepen. But the events of May 1876 had made an alliance between Great Britain and Turkey unthinkable, and when the critical moment arrived the British government announced that it would not intervene so long as Russia did not occupy Constantinople and the Straits or extend her operations to Egypt or the region of the Suez Canal.

Russia was not prepared for war, and there was no certainty that in the end she would not have to fight Great Britain. Financial affairs were beginning to assume a brighter aspect—in 1875 Réitern succeeded, for the first time, in balancing the budget with a surplus—but Milyútin's military reforms had not had time to become thoroughly rooted. Operations were begun with considerable success. After passing through Rumania, in accordance with an agreement arrived at beforehand, the Russian army crossed the Danube (June 26–7), and, with Sistova as a base, seized the towns of Biela and Nicopolis, in order to protect its flanks against large Turkish forces concentrated in the Quadrilateral¹ and round the fortress of Widdin. General Gúrko, with a small column, occupied Tirnova, the ancient capital of Bulgaria (July 7), crossed the mountain barrier at a point where it was only feebly defended; occupied the important Shipka Pass by an attack from the rear, and advanced towards Adrianople. But the tide soon turned, for Osman Pasha, commander of the Turkish western army, hurried forward and seized Plevna (July 19), which the Russians had neglected to secure. Two desperate attempts to dislodge him failed (July 20 and 31), and the position of the Russians in Bulgaria became seriously threatened. The Turks were pressing from the east, while Gúrko was driven back, and had to defend the Shipka Pass against a series of assaults by the Turkish southern army under Suleiman Pasha. In Asia Minor, as in the Balkans, the campaign opened successfully for the

¹ The four fortresses of Silistria, Rustchuk, Shumla, and Varna.

Russians, who occupied Batúm, Bayazid, and Ardahan, laid siege to Kars, and advanced towards Erzerum. But in July the Turks took the offensive, and began to drive the invaders back to their own frontiers.

Throughout the month of August 1877 the situation in the Balkans was critical. A combined movement by Osman from Plevna and Suleiman through one of the undefended passes of the mountains would have meant disaster for Russia. But the Turkish leaders did not act together. Reinforcements were brought down, and the Rumanian army joined the Russians. A great assault on Plevna (September 11-12) caused the allies very heavy losses, but failed to make any impression on the defences. A regular siege was then undertaken, under the direction of Todleben, the defender of Sevastópol. By the end of October Plevna was completely invested. The Russians gradually gained ground, and on December 10, after an unsuccessful attempt to break out, Osman Pasha surrendered.

After having been held up for five months the Russians were now free to advance. Gúrko crossed the western Balkans, occupied Sofia (January 4, 1878), and defeated Suleiman Pasha at Philippopolis (January 17). The Turkish forces guarding the southern end of the Shipka Pass were taken in the rear and forced to surrender. Adrianople was entered on January 9, and a few days later the Russian advance guard had reached the shores of the Sea of Marmora. Meantime, on the eastern front the Russians had been reinforced, and in the autumn moved forward once more. After storming Kars (November 18, 1877), they entered Armenia and pressed on towards Erzerum.

The Treaty of Berlin

The progress of the Russians was watched with the greatest anxiety by Great Britain. Three days after the fall of Plevna, Lord Derby (Foreign Minister) had reminded the Russian

government of its promises with regard to Constantinople, and when the Russian army entered Adrianople the British government ordered the fleet to proceed to the Bosphorus. This order was cancelled the day after it was issued, but on January 28 the ministry, having learned that Russia intended to demand, besides territorial compensation, an understanding 'for the safeguarding of her rights and interests in the Straits', introduced in Parliament a credit of £6,000,000 for purposes of defence. Preliminary conditions of peace were signed by Russia and Turkey at Adrianople on January 31. Six days later Russian troops advanced to the line of demarcation that had been agreed upon by the belligerents, and next day the British fleet was sent to Constantinople, where it anchored within sight of the Russian positions.

Early in February the Austrian government suggested that the peace terms should be discussed by an international congress. Great Britain, France, and Italy agreed to this, and Bismarck announced his willingness to act as 'honest broker'. The Russian government also accepted the Austrian proposal, but on March 3 forced Turkey to sign a treaty of peace based on the preliminary conditions agreed upon on January 31 (Treaty of San Stefano). The independence of Montenegro was proclaimed, and her territory quadrupled. Serbia and Rumania were also to be independent of Turkey, and the former received a considerable extension of territory. A 'Greater' Bulgaria was created, with frontiers extending from the Black Sea to the Aegean, and in the west as far as the mountains of Albania. The Bulgarians were to elect their own prince, who was to be approved by the Powers and remain a vassal of the Sultan. Their constitution was to be formulated under the supervision of a Russian commission, and Russian troops were to remain in occupation for a period not exceeding two years. Turkey agreed to pay an indemnity, and to cede to

Russia the regions of Kars, Batúm, Ardahan, and Bayazid, together with part of the Dobrudzha, which Russia intended to force upon Rumania in exchange for that part of Bessarabia which she had lost in 1856.

Great Britain and Austria immediately protested against this settlement, which meant nothing less than the end of Turkey in Europe, and demanded that it should be submitted as a whole to the Congress that was to meet at Berlin. The Austrian army was mobilized, and Rumania protested indignantly against the ingratitude of Russia. The British government called out the reserves and the militia (April 3), and ordered Indian troops to sail for Malta (April 17). Russia looked to Berlin for support, but Bismarck was not unwilling to see her quarrel with Austria and Great Britain, or even to become involved in a war that would leave him free to fish in troubled waters. After this 'great betrayal', Russia had to come to terms with Great Britain (May 30).

The Congress of Berlin, which sat in June and July, under the presidency of Bismarck, completely remodelled the Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria was confined to the territory north of the Balkans, which was little more than a third of what had been given to her in March. Russia was to occupy and administer the principality for nine months only. The southern part of Bulgaria, under the name of Eastern Rûmelia, was to have a Christian governor and autonomy in local affairs, but to remain under the direct political and military control of the Sultan. Montenegro and Serbia lost a part of the territory assigned to them at San Stefano. In order to keep down the Pan-Slav movement in the western Balkans, Austria was allowed to occupy the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to maintain garrisons in the district of Novi-Bazar, thus driving a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro. This arrangement opened a new chapter in the history of the Eastern Question

and of European relations. Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania were declared completely independent of Turkey. Rumania was compelled to agree to the exchange of Bessarabia for the Dobrudzha. Russia's gains in the east were only slightly modified: Batúm was to become a free port, and Bayazid had to be given up to Turkey (Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878).

Political Developments, 1866-81

All movements of opposition to the government seemed to be suppressed after 1866. The liberals amongst the gentry, though they had voiced the desires of a large part of educated society, were in fact rendered quite helpless. But the radicals did not allow themselves to be so easily discouraged. The extreme nihilism of the sixties carried them away for a time, but it failed to provide them with any positive ideals, any active policy that would satisfy their growing interest in social questions. P. L. Lavróv skilfully combined the old idea of personal emancipation with a social teaching that became the starting-point for a new revolutionary movement. Lavróv enunciated a new formula of progress—'the physical, intellectual, and moral development of the individual, and the embodiment of truth and justice in social forms.' He declared that every *civilized* minority should become a *civilizing* force, and urged the educated younger generation to devote themselves to the service of the people from which they had sprung. Lavróv's ideas were developed farther by N. K. Mikhailóvský. They did not necessarily lead to active revolution, and left room for choice of methods. A more definite and purely anarchist programme was advocated by M. A. Bakúnin, who accepted Lavróv's formula, but believed that the social and economic emancipation of the people could not be accomplished without the complete abolition of all authority, including that of the State, by means of a social revolution.

All types of revolutionary opinion were actuated by one common object—to advance the interests of the people—and though they disagreed as to the methods by which this object could best be served, they all came to the conclusion that in order to help the people it was necessary to *go to the people*. Early in 1874 large numbers of young men and women migrated to the country, in order to live with the peasants and raise them to a realization of their needs. Some of the more forward spirits even hoped to stir up a rebellion. The movement ended disastrously for the young enthusiasts, who acted so naively and carelessly that they were easily tracked down by the police. They found that the ideas that they propagated did not appeal to the peasants, whose needs were much more tangible and immediate than those to which the propagandists tried to awaken them. This first attempt to get into touch with the people, though it was outwardly a complete failure, had one important positive result: it showed the revolutionaries the need for bringing their programme into line with what they had learned of the real wants of the masses. In 1876 they formed a new society, 'Land and Liberty',¹ the aim of which was to attract the interest of the peasants to social questions by rousing amongst them the hope of a fair distribution of the land. The society contained a 'disorganizing' group, which carried on an active struggle, by means of terrorist acts, against the government and its agents, but the majority resorted once more to the country, this time with a much more practical programme.

The work of peaceful propaganda became more and more difficult, owing to the vigilance of the police. Groups of revolutionaries were arrested from time to time, often with the help of police spies, and political trials became frequent in the later seventies. Perhaps the most sensational and instructive case was that of Vera Zasúlich, arrested for the attempted

¹ *Zemlyá i vólya*.

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murder of Trépov, the city prefect of Petersburg, who had ordered a political prisoner to be flogged for refusing to remove his hat before him. The trial roused great interest, and public opinion was so clearly against the accused that the government thought it could safely leave the case to the ordinary courts. But when the real facts came to light the public began to sympathize with Zasulich just as strongly as it had previously censured her, and she was acquitted by the jury. As she was leaving the court the police attempted to re-arrest her, but the crowd that had been waiting to give her an ovation tore her from their hands and she succeeded in escaping across the frontier.

Zasulich had acted on her own initiative in attacking Trépov, but her deed served as the signal for an outburst of feverish activity on the part of the 'disorganizing' group of 'Land and Liberty'. At the same time, owing to the failure of the propaganda work in the country and the increasing severity and alertness of the police, many of the more peacefully inclined members began to demand a change of programme and advocated an immediate political revolution. Murders of spies and policemen became very common in 1878, and on April 14 an attempt was made on the life of the emperor. 'Land and Liberty' remained officially opposed to terrorism, but split up in 1879 into two distinct parties, the 'Black Partition' (peaceful propagandists) and the 'Will of the People' ² (active terrorists).

The rising revolutionary movement caused serious anxiety in official circles, especially when the number of terrorist acts increased. The government spread abroad its secret agents and punished more severely those conspirators whom it arrested. But it had comparatively little success, and felt that public sympathy was on the side of those whom it was

¹ *Cbĕrni peredĕl.*

² *Naródnaya vólya.*

persecuting. It was also faced with a marked revival of moderate liberal opinion, centred in the *zémstvos*, while dissatisfaction with the treatment of political cases, with official abuses, police repression, and the educational policy of Tolstóy, was growing rapidly amongst the people. The war with Turkey provided a fresh indictment of the existing system, and the failure of Russian diplomats to prevent the humiliation of their country at the Berlin Congress roused the resentment of all patriots. Russia's victories, on the other hand, had enabled Alexander to secure a constitution for the Bulgarians, while his own people remained under the absolute rule of police and bureaucrats. The government began to see that repressive measures alone would be of no avail in the struggle with revolution. In the sixties it had deliberately cut itself apart from the people, but now it felt its own helplessness, and appealed to society for help against 'a handful of evildoers'.

The appeal was answered by the *zémstvos*, the only channels through which public opinion could express itself. At Khárkov the *zémstvo* declared that it could give no help unless the government changed its internal policy. At Chernígov an address to the emperor, proposed by Iván Petrunkévich, asserted that 'society could only struggle against subversive ideas if it possessed the necessary weapons—freedom of speech, of opinion, and of the press'. Petrunkévich was arrested and exiled. The Tver *zémstvo* replied: 'The emperor, in his care for the welfare of the Bulgarian people, whom he has freed from the yoke of the Turks, has considered it necessary to grant them true self-government, inviolability of person, an independent judicial system, and liberty of the press. The *zémstvo* of Tver dares to hope that the Russian people, who have borne with such readiness and love for their ruler all the burdens of the war, will enjoy the same blessings.'

Towards the end of the seventies a number of leading zémstvo workers had met occasionally at Moscow to discuss practical matters connected with their work, and had formed a loose organization known as the 'Zémstvo Union'. After the government had issued its appeal, these liberal workers invited some of the revolutionary leaders to a conference at Kiev, and asked them to stop the activity of the terrorists for a time, in order to see if a series of more moderate appeals would induce the government to return to the path of reform. But all the peaceful and perfectly loyal representations of the zémstvos were rejected, and the government resorted once more to repression. Governors-general, with dictatorial powers, were appointed at Petersburg, Khárkov, and Odessa, and a special commission was set up to draft more decisive measures for the suppression of revolution. Perhaps as a result of the Kiev conference, there were no terrorist acts for some months, but the revival of repression led to a fresh outbreak, and from November 1879 the terrorists undertook an active campaign against Alexander himself. They mined the railways leading from the south, in the hope of blowing up the train that was bringing him home from the Crimea. After these attempts the government made arrests right and left, but on February 16, 1880, a great explosion took place at the Winter Palace in Petersburg, and the whole imperial family only escaped destruction owing to the fact that they were a few minutes late in entering the dining-room.

The failure alike of the appeal to society and of the struggle against terrorism, combined with the explosion at the palace, led to an important change of policy. On February 21 a 'Supreme Executive Commission' was appointed, under the presidency of General Lóris-Mélikov,¹ for the purpose of rooting out the

¹ Lóris-Mélikov had distinguished himself as commander of an army on the Caucasian front during the Russo-Turkish War. As Governor-General of

revolutionary movement. Lóris-Mélikov, who was entrusted with absolute dictatorial powers over the whole empire, firmly and actively pursued his main object, the restoration of tranquillity in the country, but respected the rights of the population, which had up to that time suffered very heavily from the indiscriminate application of repressive measures.¹ He abolished unnecessary restrictions and insisted on the proper observance of the law by those in authority. He loosened the bonds of the censorship, and caused universal rejoicing by removing Count Tolstóy and appointing in his place Sabúrov, a sincere liberal who tried to revive the system of Golovnin. When the Supreme Commission, which seemed to have succeeded in restoring order, was abolished, Lóris-Mélikov was appointed Minister of the Interior. He sympathized with the growing desire for some sort of a constitution, and began to consider what could be done to meet the wishes of the people. Rejecting both the constitutional forms of western Europe that were suggested by the liberals and the idea of a new *zémski sobór* advocated by the Slavophiles, he proposed that important legislative measures should be formulated by 'drafting commissions' and then discussed by representatives of the *zémstvos* and the chief towns, nominated by the government and summoned specially for each measure.² Though this plan was by no means a constitution in the accepted sense of the word, it would have gone far towards satisfying the general demand that the people should be allowed some share in the conduct of affairs.

Khárkov he had actively pursued the revolutionaries, but gained the sympathy of the inhabitants by safeguarding their rights and interests.

¹ Mélikov's rule is frequently referred to as the 'dictatorship of the heart' (*diktatúra sérdsia*).

² The plan resembled that adopted during the preparation of the Emancipation Act of 1861, with the difference that the government then summoned representatives elected by the gentry.

The ranks of the revolutionaries were by this time seriously thinned, but they had not given up their objects. In the autumn of 1880 the campaign against Alexander was resumed. The streets of Petersburg were mined in several places, and other measures were taken. On March 13, 1881, while driving home after a review, he was mortally wounded by the explosion of a bomb, and died the same day.

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*Alexander III (1881-94) and Nicholas II**The Triumph of Reaction*

AFTER the murder of Alexander II the public no longer had any sympathy with the revolutionaries, but there remained a large section of opinion in favour of reform. The new emperor, who was known to be conservative by inclination, announced that he would follow the example set by his father. Lóris-Mélikov's scheme had been approved by Alexander II on the morning of March 13, and Alexander III hesitated to renounce a measure which under the circumstances he regarded as 'the last will and testament' of his father. An intense struggle broke out between opposing parties at court. The reactionaries urged that what Lóris-Mélikov was proposing to grant was nothing less than a constitution, which would be the ruin of Russia. Seeing the emperor's hesitation, they pressed their advantage and persuaded him to issue a manifesto (May 11) in which he asserted his 'faith in the force and justice of the principle of autocracy', which he was 'called to strengthen and protect, for the good of the people, from all infringement'.¹ Lóris-Mélikov and the

¹ Lóris-Mélikov's scheme did not raise the question of imposing limitations on the autocracy at all.

ministers who supported him—Abazá (Finances), Milyútin (War), and later Sabúrov (Education)—resigned. The new ministers were not chosen from amongst the extreme reactionaries. The head of the government, Ignátiev (Minister of the Interior), was a Slavophil; Búnge (Finances), though conservative, sincerely believed in the reforms of the sixties; Baron Nikolái (Education) was no less devoted to the ideals of Golovnin than his predecessor had been. Ignátiev announced in his first circular (May 18) that the government wished to re-establish contact with the people, and would allow local workers a share in the conduct of the affairs of the country. The rights of the *zémstvos* and towns would be restored and respected, and special attention was to be devoted to the peasants, their burdens (taxation) and needs (land). All this was much in the spirit of Lóris-Mélikov, and in June 1881 Ignátiev even invited a number of *zémstvo* workers¹ to express their views on certain important economic and social questions.² This promising beginning to the reign did not last for long. The reactionary party used all their influence over Alexander, and in May 1882 Ignátiev was forced to give way to Count Dmítry Tolstóy. The policy of the government now became definitely and unswervingly reactionary. The revolutionary movement was easily broken up, owing to internal dissension and the treachery of some of the revolutionaries. The moderate liberals who had begun to make themselves heard once more in the *zémstvos* lost their hold after March 13. The government felt itself safe from opposition, but in order to make quite certain it took a tight grip on the press and closed the last outlet for criticism of its actions.

Reaction, as a theory of government and a practical policy,

¹ Many *zémstvos* asked to be allowed to *elect* their representatives.

² E. g. the reduction of the 'redemption payments', the encouragement of migration, and the provision of land for the peasants.

had never before been so clearly defined as it was in this period. On the theoretical side its strongest exponent was K. Pobedonóstsev, who has been called the 'nihilist' of reaction.¹ According to Pobedonóstsev political freedom was a failure everywhere, and freedom of thought a humbug; parliaments and other organs of self-government were mere 'places for talk' and nests of sordid selfishness. In the law-courts, he held, the 'arts of casuistry' were practised, while murders and other serious crimes went unpunished; the press only spread falsehood and roused the passions of the people. His ideal was to preserve the principles of the Byzantine State and the Byzantine Church—autocracy and orthodoxy—and to guard them from contact with the disruptive influence of western Europe, from which he urged Russia to take solemn warning. The practical side of the same doctrine was formulated by Pázukhin, a landowner of the province of Simbírsk, who found the root of all evil in the breaking down of class-partitions that had followed the emancipation and the other reforms of Alexander II. The 'great reforms' had created, quite outside the limits of the existing class-system, an amorphous mass called the *Intelligéntsia*, which had lost touch with the people and selfishly aimed at shattering all the foundations of the State system. Pázukhin pointed out that the remedy for these evils was 'the restoration of all that has been broken up', a course that appealed to many of the gentry, who from 1861 had been steadily losing their predominant position in the country. With Tolstóy, Pobedonóstsev, and Pázukhin working together, the idea of 'restoration' became the guiding motive of government policy in the eighties.

¹ Pobedonóstsev was a brilliant jurist, and had helped to draft Alexander II's judicial reforms. He was a member of the Supreme Commission under Lóris-Mélikov, and from 1889 to 1905 occupied the post of Procurator of the Holy Synod. He had been one of the tutors of Alexander III, whose close confidence he enjoyed.

As in the previous reign, the schools and universities were the first to feel the effects of reaction, under the rule of Tolstóy's nominee Delyánov. A new Code issued in 1884 deprived the university councils of the last remnants of their authority, and the ministry assumed complete control of all sides of university life. All forms of corporate organization among the students were finally crushed out. Protests were met by stronger repressive measures. Students were exiled or dismissed, only to become ardent revolutionary workers. Secondary education was made, as far as possible, a class privilege. In 1887 the proportion of Jews in the schools was restricted to a fixed percentage, and Delyánov issued a circular proclaiming that 'the children of coachmen, servants, cooks, laundresses, small shopkeepers, and such-like people' should not be encouraged to rise above the sphere in which they were born. The classical system¹ was re-enforced. Tolstóy resumed his campaign against the elementary schools, and proposed that, while the zémstvos might be allowed to pay for and support the schools, they should hand them over to the Church, i. e. into the safe keeping of Pobedonóstsev. Most of the zémstvos refused to consider the suggestion, and the government, being without the funds necessary for the maintenance of the schools, could not take them over by force.

A constant struggle went on between the government and the zémstvos, which, towards the end of the eighties, were fighting for existence. Failing in the attempt to rob them of their schools, Tolstóy tried to subject all their work to the control of the Ministry of the Interior and its agents. In collaboration with Pázukhin he drew up a new Zémstvo Law, which was intended to 'restore' the system of close class-partitions that had been abandoned in 1864 only after a hard fight. The electoral groups of 1864 were based on property

¹ Cf. p. 445.

distinctions, and not on the three historical social classes.¹ No single group was allowed to have a numerical majority in the *zémstvo* council, but owing to their monopoly of education and experience the gentry were in practice able to shape the policy of the *zémstvos*, and occupied all the leading posts in the executive. In most of the districts the *zémstvos* worked sluggishly. The ruling class did not, on the whole, seek to further their own material interests, but they showed themselves indifferent to those of the peasants. *Zémstvo* work was carried on in a broad-minded, progressive spirit only in those few cases where the liberals managed to get the upper hand.² The new *Zémstvo* Law of 1890 (June 24) completely distorted the principles of that of 1864. It conformed entirely with Pázukhin's ideas, and gave the gentry a legally secured majority in most of the *zémstvos*. The electoral rights of the peasants were considerably restricted. Their representatives were appointed by the governor from a list of candidates submitted by the communes, and they could only choose members of their own class. The law embodied also much of the experience that the government had gained in its struggle with the *zémstvos*. Controlling committees,³ composed of local officials, were appointed in each province and the authority of the governors was enlarged⁴.

¹ Gentry (*dvoryáne*), townspeople (*meschbáne*), and peasants (*krestyáne*).

² Many of the most progressive *zémstvo* workers were members of the gentry class elected to the councils by the peasant groups (up to 1890).

³ The 'provincial committees on *zémstvo* and municipal affairs' (*gubérnskoe po zémskim i gorodskim delám prisústvie*) were formed almost exclusively of local representatives of the central government. Their function was 'to discuss the regularity and legality of the resolutions and orders' of the *zémstvos* and town councils.

⁴ Tolstóy's original proposals would have annihilated self-government by substituting official boards for the elected executives, and giving the councils only a consultative voice. He died in 1889, and his plan was subjected to

The same principle guided the government in its treatment of the peasants. In order to revive the patriarchal authority that the landowners had exercised over their serfs, a law published in 1889 (July 24) provided for the appointment of 'land captains',¹ chosen from the gentry in each locality. The 'land captains', who possessed practically dictatorial powers over the communal life of the peasants and even interfered in their private affairs, ruled quite arbitrarily and became thoroughly hated. They served as local agents of the police and the officials, and united with their ordinary administrative functions those of judges in all small cases. This new arrangement broke up the system of lower courts of justices of the peace,² and dealt a heavy blow at the judicial reforms of the preceding reign. Breach of contract by an agricultural labourer was made a criminal instead of a civil offence (1886). The periodical redivisions of communal land were subjected to the control of the land captains (1893).

Reaction spread to the army, and the enlightened principles introduced by Milyútin gradually disappeared. The material position of the officers improved, but the narrow spirit of caste was revived. Officers were granted the monopoly of the right to fight duels, and the atmosphere of the military schools became as strictly professional as it had been before Milyútin.

The Land Problem and the Peasants

The economic position of the peasants, bad enough after the emancipation, became worse as the population multiplied. The grants of 1861 had not given them enough land to occupy them fully or even to keep their families properly, and as time went on the original holdings became subdivided into some modifications, being considered, even in high official circles, too reactionary.

¹ *Zemskie nachálniki*.

² Cf. p. 435.

still smaller portions. The land was of the poorest quality or exhausted by bad cultivation. The peasants were without capital, and could not improve their methods of cultivation. The communal system hindered progress where, under other conditions, it might have been possible. In many parts the peasants could not even rent any extra land, since the growing market for grain at home and abroad made agriculture so profitable that the owners preferred to keep all the land in their own hands and thus compel the peasants to work for them. In the north-central provinces the gentry readily sold their land, but it was bought as a rule only by the richer peasants, while those most in need of it had to go without. Many of the peasants went away to work in the towns. Though migration was very difficult, owing to restrictions imposed by the government, there was a steady flow of settlers to the south-east or to western Siberia, where land was more plentiful. The position of those peasants who stayed in the country became steadily worse. The land difficulty and the excessive burden of taxation forced them to cut down their needs to a minimum, and they lived constantly on such a narrow margin that a poor harvest inevitably brought famine. They were badly housed and fed, disease was widespread, and the death-rate heavy. The peasant class has always been the economic backbone of Russia, and it was becoming so impoverished that the government was forced to take action. In 1881 the redemption of the holdings granted in 1861 was made compulsory¹ for both peasants and landowners. The government found itself able to grant considerable reductions in the 'redemption payments' (1882) and to abolish the poll-tax²

¹ In 1861 the peasants had been given the *option* of buying out their holdings. By 1882 the great majority of them had already exercised this right.

² The poll-tax was introduced by Peter the Great; cf. p. 238.

(1883-4). These concessions meant an appreciable relief in the burden borne by the peasants (over 50 million roubles annually), but no general revision of the system of taxation was undertaken, and the amount paid in various ways by the peasants continued to be out of all proportion to their earning capacity. The second vital problem, that of the land, was treated just as superficially, though the government knew that the peasants were excited by rumours of a general redistribution of all the land, an idea fostered by the 'Black Partition' propagandists. In order to help the peasants to buy land a Peasant Land Bank¹ was founded (1881). At first loans were given to the needier peasants, but the bank had at its disposal only a limited amount of capital, and after a time began to make advances only to the more prosperous peasants who could be trusted to repay them promptly. Thus the poor who really needed help found they could not get it. Some relief was afforded by making easier the conditions on which land belonging to the State might be rented, but this measure could only be useful in regions where the State properties were extensive, which did not coincide with those in which the land problem was most acute. Measures were taken for the encouragement of migration to Siberia.

All this activity on the part of the government came too late to avert the national catastrophe of 1891-2. A series of poor harvests in the eighties was followed by the total failure of the crops in 1891, and twenty provinces, including the most fertile grain lands, were plunged into the horrors of famine and disease. The government organized relief with delay and quite inefficiently, and showed its usual distrust of public initiative. The educated classes—especially the students—none the less threw themselves devotedly into the work of helping the peasants, and came into closer contact with them than had ever been possible before. The experience gained in

¹ Cf. p. 502.

this way of the appalling conditions of peasant life led to a remarkable revival of interest in public work during the nineties, and served as a powerful stimulus to the activity of the *zémstvos*.

Labour Legislation

The industrial boom of the seventies was followed by a period of depression. The results of inflation showed themselves at once, and many enterprises were ruined. The crisis seriously affected the workers, many of whom had to be discharged when the rate of production decreased. Wages fell and strikes were frequent. The situation became so threatening that in the end the government had to interfere. The question of State control over the conditions of factory labour was raised as early as 1859, but no action was taken, owing to the opposition of the manufacturers of the Moscow region, who were well supplied with cheap labour and refused to tolerate any interference in their relations with the workers. The Petersburg manufacturers, on the other hand, had to draw on the provinces for labour and pay higher wages, and it was in their interest to make industrial conditions more attractive. Their factories were technically much better equipped than those in the provinces, and they knew that improved conditions would give them a better return from machinery and labour. They constantly supported the recommendations of committees appointed to inquire into the subject of State control, which the Moscow manufacturers consistently opposed. In 1882 the government began to take action, and published a law (June 13) totally prohibiting the employment in factories of children under twelve years of age, fixing a maximum eight-hour day for children between twelve and fifteen, and forbidding the employment of children on night-work. Factory inspectors were appointed, but they had great difficulty in enforcing the law. Their investigations revealed the abominable conditions

that prevailed in the factories. Hours of labour were unbearably long (as many as sixteen daily in some occupations), while wages were low. The masters imposed heavy fines on their workers, and treated them despotically. Sunday labour was usual, while the sanitary and hygienic conditions in the factories were described as horrible.¹ In many cases wages were paid only once a year, and the workers were forced to buy all they needed on credit at the factory shops, from which the owners derived enormous profits. In the years 1884-6 the government issued a series of laws that effected considerable improvements in the condition of the industrial classes. Provision was made for the education of children working in the factories, and the conditions of their employment were strictly defined (1884). Women and young persons under seventeen were not to be employed on night-work in the textile industries (1885). In 1886 an important law set out recognized grounds for dismissal or for leaving work, and ordered that wages should be paid at least once a month. The powers of the factory inspectors were extended: they had to revise all contracts with workmen, the prices of necessities in the factory shops, and the scale of fines imposed by the employers. They were backed up by factory committees, which were allowed to issue by-laws regulating sanitary conditions in the factory areas. On all sides the exploitation of labour was restricted and controlled, and though the masters fought hard against this new legislation, they gained nothing but small concessions that did not affect the principles adopted by the government. The workers were left with one serious grievance, for they were deprived of the right of looking after their own interests. Participation in a strike became a criminal offence, and severe punishment was prescribed for strike leaders or those who incited workmen to leave their work.

¹ In many factories no living accommodation was provided for the workers, who slept in the work-rooms, on benches or on the floor.

State Policy and Economic Development

From the time of Kánkrin¹ the customs tariffs had been judiciously manipulated, with the object of encouraging the development of industry, but there had been no marked tendency towards extreme protection. From 1877 the tariff was constantly raised, and by 1891 Russian industry found itself surrounded by a high wall of protection from foreign competition. In 1891 Germany tried to force a reduction in the Russian tariff by raising the duties on Russian grain. Russia replied in the following year with a slight reduction of duties on French goods, and heavily increased those on imports from Germany. On February 10, 1894, a commercial treaty, to last for ten years, was concluded. German trade secured a favourable position in the Russian market, which enabled it gradually to drive out competitors and establish a complete domination that in the end cost Russia very dearly.

Protection imposed heavy burdens on the mass of the population, but it enabled the manufacturers to draw large profits. Russian and foreign capital began to pour into industry. Witte's currency reforms² were intended to make the conditions of investment in Russia more attractive. The government contracted large loans abroad and used the proceeds to finance industry. Private banks lent capital freely and thousands of factories were built.³ The total value of goods produced in all branches of industry was more than doubled in ten years.³

¹ Cf. p. 404.

² In 1894 the value of the paper rouble was fixed at two-thirds of a silver rouble; in 1897 the gold standard was adopted.

	1887.	1893.	1897.
Number of factories and works . . .	30,888	30,333	39,029
Number of factory workers . . .	1,318,048	1,582,904	2,098,262
Value of goods produced (<i>in thousands of roubles</i>) . . .	1,334,499	1,734,997	2,839,144

(Tugán-Baranóvsky, *op. cit.*, p. 342.)

Very important changes took place in the cotton industry, in which the number of mills and spindles doubled during this period. The machinery and technical equipment for this enormous expansion came chiefly from England. But the most remarkable progress was that made in the coal and iron industries. The production of coal in the Donéts region, which was in 1880 less than half of the 200 million poods mined in Russia, more than doubled during the eighties, and by the end of the century it amounted to about 70 per cent. of a total production of over 1,000 million poods.¹ Much of this coal was used as fuel on the railways, while the rest went to meet the needs of the factories, including the new iron-works of the south. In 1884 the Donéts coalfield was joined by railway with the rich iron-ore deposits of Krivói Rog.² The quantity of iron ore mined in south Russia rose from 5½ million poods in 1886 to 191 million poods in 1900. Before 1887 there were only two important iron-works in the south,³ but in the following ten years fifteen more large undertakings and some dozens of smaller ones sprang up. Foreign, and in particular British, capital played a prominent part in the development of the iron industry of the south, which quite overshadowed that of the Urals, up to that time the greatest iron-producing centre in Russia. Enormous quantities of iron and steel were used in the construction of railways,⁴ which created new markets and stimulated

¹ Production of coal in the Donéts basin :

1880	86,300,000 poods
1885	114,900,000 „
1890	192,300,000 „
1895	298,300,000 „
1900	691,500,000 „

There are about 62 poods in a ton.

² On the borders of the provinces of Khérson and Ekaterinosláv.

³ The first of these was founded in 1870 by an Englishman, Hughes.

⁴ The railway boom of the nineties exceeded in intensity that of the 1832.2

the economic life of the whole country. The geographical distribution of Russian industry changed completely. Many industries were attracted to the south by the presence there of coal and iron, and the southern provinces were transformed beyond recognition.

In the last ten years of the century Russia was passing through an industrial revolution that finally committed her to capitalism, with all its economic and social consequences. Enormous amounts of capital flowed into Russia from the older capitalistic countries of the West. Money was plentiful, and private banks lent freely to industrial companies,¹ many of which were founded almost entirely on credit. Cheap capital favoured speculation, and the process of inflation was further facilitated by the policy of the government, which helped new undertakings financially and gave them large orders for their manufactures. But the period of feverish expansion came to an end in 1899, when the demand for capital began to exceed the supply, and rates of interest increased considerably. Banks called in loans, and the market was flooded with shares. In 1900 the results of over-production made themselves felt: the market was overstocked with manufactured goods of all kinds, and prices began to fall rapidly. Production had to be cut down and large numbers of workmen were discharged. The crisis developed further in the following year and reached its climax in 1902. Many firms were ruined and had to close down their factories. In 1903 the position improved, but production

seventies. A large section of the Siberian line was built in that period. The growth of the railway system is indicated by the following figures of the length of line completed at different dates:

	<i>Versts.</i>		<i>Versts.</i>		<i>Versts.</i>
1861 . .	2,191	1888 . .	29,015	1898 . .	43,541
1870 . .	10,643	1891 . .	30,298	1899 . .	48,091
1879 . .	22,179	1897 . .	40,472	1905 . .	57,054

¹ Frequently on the security of shares.

increased only slightly. The market continued to be weak and capital was scarce. The Japanese War and the events of 1905-6 further hindered recovery.

Home and Foreign Trade

Trade grew very slowly in the first half of the century. Owing to the lack of proper means of communication the country was split up into a number of economic regions, each almost self-supporting. In the absence of an organized system of credit trade centred in the fairs,¹ where all the processes of exchange were carried on. In the ordinary life of the people trade played a negligible part, for most of them lived on their own products.

A new epoch opened in the sixties. The emancipation of the peasants, the construction of railways, the development of credit, and the growth of industry led to an enormous expansion of trade. Regions previously isolated came into contact and began to depend on each other. The growth of exchange welded the country into one economic whole.

Foreign trade in the first half of the century, though steadily increasing, was insignificant in amount. From the reign of Alexander II exports, especially of grain and other food-stuffs, were actively encouraged. The grain-growing provinces were linked up with the ports, and the manipulation of the railway rates amounted at times to a premium on export. But the increase in the export of grain² exceeded that in production, and there was a marked decline in home consumption, especially among the peasants. From 1877 imports were restricted by the imposition of heavy customs duties. At the close of the century

¹ *Tármarki*, e.g., at Nizhni Nóvgórod, at the junction of the Oká and the Volga, and Irbit, across the Urals.

² Cf. p. 452.

the trade balance was heavily in favour of Russia.¹ The government acquired a steadily increasing income from customs duties² and accumulated an enormous gold reserve,³ which was very considerably increased by annual free balances on the budget. The excess of revenue over expenditure amounted in 1899 to no less than 226 million roubles,⁴ while the total amount derived from this source in the last ten years of the century was over 775 millions. Revenue increased much more rapidly than expenditure. Interest on state debt accounted for one-fifth, and the army and navy for more than a quarter of the whole expenditure in 1898.

The economic and financial policy of the government in this period, closely associated with the name of Witte, produced outwardly an appearance of prosperity, increased the credit of the Russian government abroad, and enormously strengthened its position at home. But it imposed great burdens on the mass of the population, which through the customs duties and other forms of indirect taxation provided the greater part of the

¹	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Balance</i>
	<i>(in millions of roubles).</i>		
1900	716·4 . . .	626·3 . . .	90·1
1901	761·5 . . .	593·4 . . .	168·1
1902	860·3 . . .	599·1 . . .	261·2
1903	1,001·1 . . .	681·6 . . .	319·5

² The revenue from this source, about 55½ millions in the seventies, amounted to 218½ million roubles in 1904. From 1877 customs dues were paid in gold.

³ Gold reserve in 1886, 56 million roubles; 1893, 236 million roubles; 1900, 842 million roubles.

⁴	1889	1899	<i>Increase.</i>
	<i>(in millions of roubles).</i>		
Revenue	914·5 . . .	1,584·9 . . .	73 per cent.
Expenditure	868·8 . . .	1,358·2 . . .	56 „
Balance	45·7 . . .	226·7	

state revenue. Industry escaped with very light taxation, while the government lavished on it large sums of public money which in many cases were totally lost. Government orders were given to Russian firms at prices two or three times higher than those quoted by foreign contractors, and in this way the prices of many kinds of manufactured goods, already increased by the protective tariff, were artificially forced up still higher. The state debt increased by 1,000 million roubles in ten years. Out of the proceeds of foreign loans enormous sums were spent on the construction of railways and the purchase of private lines. But the state railways could rarely be made to pay, while the treasury was frequently called upon to provide the dividends that it guaranteed to private companies.

The Work of the Zémstvos

Education and other cultural objects were entirely neglected by the State, and the people looked more and more to the zémstvos for the satisfaction of their needs. The famine of 1891 touched the social conscience of the educated classes. Progressive forces rallied to public work in the zémstvos. Under new influences their methods and objects became more democratic. They got into closer touch with the people. Social changes of first-rate importance, set up by the emancipation, were working themselves out. The gentry were rapidly losing the economic basis of a ruling class. The money they received for the land allotted to the peasants in 1861 went to liquidate debts contracted with the government in the first half of the century. After the emancipation the gentry lost the monopoly of land-owning and as cultivators of the land had to face competition for the first time. Most of them had neither capital nor experience enough to be able to exploit their estates on business lines. By the end of 1903 almost one-half of the private

land in Russia (i. e. excluding peasant land) was mortgaged. Many of the gentry sold their estates, cut themselves off from the country, and joined the professional or commercial and industrial classes. Their special privileges disappeared one by one. From 1874 they were no longer exempt from military service,¹ and immunity from personal taxes was no advantage when the peasants were relieved of the poll-tax² and the State began to draw the larger part of its revenue from indirect taxation. In the eighties the government tried to bolster up the gentry, gave them financial assistance through the Gentry Land Bank, and handed the *zémstvos* over to them (1890). But except for the liberal group, they took little interest in local affairs, and the work of the *zémstvos* came to be directed by the progressive councillors, who joined forces with the hired specialists—doctors, teachers, engineers, statisticians, veterinary surgeons, and agricultural experts—the so-called ‘third element’, drawn from the educated classes, and as a rule very radical in political opinion.

From the beginning of the nineties rapid progress was made with the provision of schools and medical help, and the economic needs of the peasants were attended to. The organization of the medical service was taken in hand. The number of doctors, medical outposts,³ and hospitals increased, and there was a marked improvement in the quality of the attention given. Provision was made for the treatment of the insane, and measures were taken to combat and prevent epidemics.

¹ Cf. p. 438.

² Cf. p. 476.

³ These outposts were situated in the larger villages, and usually took the form of small hospitals, with several beds for in-patients, and a dispensary for out-patients. They were managed either by doctors, who looked after all the peasants in a given area, or by assistant-doctors (*fjéldsber*); in the latter case they were visited regularly by a fully qualified doctor.

The doctors won the confidence of the peasants by their devoted service. Similar progress was made with elementary education. Many of the zémstvos mapped out their areas and drew up programmes of school construction, while the standard of the instruction provided in the schools was raised. Libraries and bookshops were opened and lectures organized for the peasants. The zémstvos provided expert advice on the cultivation of the land, started experimental stations and agricultural schools, organized the sale of agricultural implements and seeds, investigated soil and climatic conditions, and encouraged home industries as an auxiliary to agriculture. The staff of experts engaged in this work increased from 29 in 1890 to 601 in 1908. By 1904 the turnover in zémstvo dépôts for the sale of agricultural implements and of the products of home industries amounted to over seven million roubles. The services of veterinary experts were secured for the peasants, and the zémstvos founded laboratories for the study of the numerous epidemic diseases to which horses and cattle are subject in Russia. Insurance of cattle against death from disease was widely developed, and measures were taken for the prevention of fires. The condition of the roads also attracted attention.

In all this important work the provincial zémstvos took the lead. They gave financial support to progressive district zémstvos and tried to co-ordinate all their activity. The most enterprising of all was the Moscow Provincial Zémstvo, headed by Dmítry Shipón, who first formulated the normal relations between provincial and district authorities.

Zémstvo Workers and the Reform Movement to 1903

Expenditure increased rapidly in the nineties, and still more in the early years of the present century. By the end of the first forty years of their existence the zémstvos were spending very

large sums of money on objects that the government neglected.¹ They had won the confidence of the people and the sympathy of the educated classes. Their work flourished and their sphere of usefulness extended, despite the law of 1890, the object of which was to curb and restrain them. The government began to take severer measures, but every attack only increased the solidarity of the *zémstvo* workers and public sympathy for them. The temper of the *zémstvo* men in the early nineties may be judged from their addresses to Nicholas II on his accession (1894). The *zémstvo* of Tver hoped that 'the voice of the people's need would be heard from the heights of the throne', that the laws would be unswervingly observed 'alike by the people and by those in authority, since law represents the will of the monarch and should stand higher than the casual views of individual representatives of authority'. Other *zémstvos* asked for unity between *tsar* and people. There was no mention of a constitution. The addresses were perfectly loyal, and much more moderate in tone than those of 1880.² None the less, the emperor expressed his 'extreme astonishment and dissatisfaction' at the 'tactless sally' of the Tver *zémstvo*, and in a general reply to the addressees made the following uncompromising declaration: 'It has come to my knowledge that of late there have been heard the voices of people lured by *senseless dreams* of representatives of the *zémstvos* sharing in the conduct of internal affairs. Let it be known to all that I, devoting all my

¹ *Expenditure on (in roubles):*

	1871.	1890.	1900.	1911.
Elementary education .	1,600,000	7,225,800	15,970,900	42,882,000
Medical help	2,229,200	10,908,500	24,601,900	48,103,000
Economic and veterinary work	54,300	30,212,700	4,291,500	11,347,000
Other objects	17,625,500			
Total	21,509,000	48,347,000	89,142,000	171,687,000

² Cf. p. 467.

strength to the pursuit of the good of my people, will maintain the principle of autocracy as firmly and steadfastly as did my late father.' Most of the zémstvo men wanted only to be left alone, and allowed to devote themselves to public work without constant interference from outside, to choose their own officials, manage their own schools, and meet together as they thought fit. From the beginning they had tried to discuss practical matters with their fellow workers in other provinces, to share their experiences, and formulate plans for further development. The tendency to unite gained in strength as the practical work of the zémstvos developed, but the government always insisted that, by the terms of the law, each zémstvo should concern itself only with its own affairs. Zémstvo men nevertheless found several opportunities of meeting in private in the nineties, though as time went on the practical side of their work occupied their attention less than the general position of the zémstvo and the attitude taken up by the government towards it. By the end of the century there was a very clearly defined opposition movement amongst zémstvo workers, which grew wider and stronger every year. The struggle between them and the government was the outward expression of a conflict between two fundamental principles, self-government and autocracy, principles that could not stand side by side in the same political system. When Goremykin (Minister of the Interior, 1895-9) proposed to apply the Zémstvo Law (in a modified form) to certain of the western provinces, Witte wrote a memorandum¹ in which he pointed out that, since local self-government was bound to lead ultimately to constitutionalism, there were only two courses open to the government: either it would have to recognize self-government as a 'natural and healthy growth' springing from the seed sown in 1864, or, if constitutionalism

¹ *Autocracy and the Zémstvo*, which was later used by the liberals to fortify their case for reform.

was 'the greatest falsehood of the age', it would decline to extend the *zémstvo* system as Goremykin proposed to do. On this point Goremykin fell,¹ and from 1899 to 1904, under his successors Sipyagin and Pléhve, the campaign against the *zémstvo* was carried on with redoubled energy. Petitions presented by the *zémstvos* on matters closely connected with their work were either rejected or totally ignored. *Zémstvo* men were refused permission to join together. The *zémstvos* were forbidden to increase the rates on real property by more than three per cent. each year² (June 24, 1900), and were deprived of the right of organizing famine relief, in which they had been uniformly successful.

A new campaign was undertaken against the *zémstvo* schools, and a scheme drawn up in 1901, had it been put into effect, would have established a purely bureaucratic control of elementary education in town and country. The government tried to prevent the *zémstvos* from publishing popular literature for the use of schools and country reading-rooms. In 1902 the right to collect statistical material in rural districts was limited. Statistical inquiries were prohibited altogether in eighteen provinces, and many of the officials were dismissed, on the pretext that they were carrying on a propaganda of revolutionary ideas amongst the peasants. Provincial governors had the right of protesting against all appointments of paid *zémstvo* workers, and would not allow any one who was not politically 'sound' to be employed. The government constantly refused to ratify the elections of presidents and members of the executive boards,

¹ Owing to the complete inefficiency of the local administrative system in the western provinces, it was reorganized in 1903, but on bureaucratic principles.

² This law was not always enforced, even in the years immediately following its publication, but it gave the administration unlimited opportunities for restraining the more forward *zémstvos*.

and many of the most active workers suffered in this way for their progressive views. Distrust of public initiative was expressed in two laws dealing with sanitary and veterinary work (1902 and 1903), which were so universally disapproved that they could not be put in force. Resolutions passed by zémstvo councils were held up by the governors and frequently vetoed by the special committees set up in 1890.¹

Meantime the opposition movement in zémstvo circles grew stronger, and became more definitely political. Even the moderate elements, who were hardly prepared to enter on an open struggle for political reform, supported the liberal group in its defence of the zémstvo. In 1902 a congress of zémstvo men, led by Shipóv, passed resolutions dealing with such general questions as the rights of the peasants, the hindrances to the development of education, the restrictions on the zémstvos, the unfairness of the electoral system, the need of a free press, and the financial policy of the government.² In April 1903 another congress asked that all laws dealing with local affairs should be submitted to the zémstvos for criticism, and rejected by only two votes the suggestion that elected deputies of the zémstvos should share in the drafting of such legislation. Local committees set up by Witte to inquire into the condition of agriculture, on which the zémstvos were represented, talked about general subjects, though Pléhve tried to stop them. The great majority of the committees were openly hostile to the government and its policy, and some of the proposals they put forward were very advanced. Zémstvo councils also, in many places, raised political questions, though offenders were punished with imprisonment and exile.

¹ Cf. p. 474.

² The congress condemned in particular the imposition of excessive burdens on the peasants, the unnecessarily large free balance in the budgets, and the heavy taxation of necessities.

The *zémstvo* movement continued to spread in 1903, but Shipóv had great difficulty in maintaining unity. The most advanced elements were in touch with the opposition groups in the professional and educated classes. In 1902 the foundation of a new liberal movement was laid with the publication (abroad) of *Liberation*,¹ a journal which was intended to unite all who were fighting for political reform. A series of conferences that took place between the liberals in the *zémstvo* and outside of it led to the formation in January 1904 of a 'Union of Liberation',² which declared its aim to be the political emancipation of Russia, through the abolition of autocracy and the establishment of a democratic constitutional régime.

Revolutionary Movements

The economic and political conditions of the period favoured the revival of the revolutionary movement, and diverted it into new channels. The revolutionaries of the seventies had relied on the peasants. In the nineties they turned to the rapidly-growing class of factory workers, and found that the struggle between labour and capital offered a wide field for the pursuit of their objects.³ Marxist socialism, with its synthesis of political and economic aims, supplied them with a set of theories that fitted, or could be made to fit, the new situation. They determined to organize the labour movement and use it, as they had planned to use the peasants, as a lever for the overthrow of the

¹ *Osvobozhdenie*, edited by Peter Struve, and published first at Stuttgart, later at Paris.

² *Soyúz osvobozhdenia*.

³ The number of factory workers increased from 1¼ to 2½ millions in thirteen years (1887-1900). Up to the eighties most of them were peasants who left the country temporarily in order to supplement the income they derived from the land: later they became a real industrial proletariat, cut off entirely from the country and depending solely on industry.

existing political order. The workmen were at first no more responsive to political propaganda than the peasants had been. The economic side of the Marxist theories appealed to them, but they wanted leadership in their fight for better material conditions.¹ The Social Democrats were thus led away into 'economism', and their political aims retreated into the background. They took advantage of the labour unrest that came to a head in 1895-6, and helped to organize strikes which so alarmed the government that it published a law restricting hours of labour to 11½ for day and 10 for night work (1897). At the same time the government saw that labour movements were inevitable, and determined to encourage the workers to unite for the improvement of their economic position, hoping by this means to divert their attention from politics and cut the ground from under the feet of the Social Democrats.² There was thus a prospect that the mass movement from which the revolutionaries hoped so much would turn towards trade unionism, and the Social Democratic Party,³ founded in 1898, made no headway.

But 'economism' was always opposed by the more active elements amongst the Social Democrats. In 1900 a bitter struggle began between the 'economists' and those who wanted to concentrate on the political aims of Social Democracy. External conditions favoured the latter. The labour movement

¹ The factory legislation of the eighties (cf. p. 479), though it led to important improvements, had left many questions unsettled. Sanitary and housing conditions remained bad. Employers were not compelled to protect workers against dangerous machinery, and medical attention was provided in only 40 per cent. of the factories. But the chief grievances of the workers were long hours (generally more than twelve per day) and low wages (the average for men was less than 200 roubles a year), and these questions caused most of the strikes in this period.

² Hence the movements associated with the names of Zubátov and Gapón.

³ *Sotsial-demokraticeskaya pártia.*

secretly promoted by the government attracted large numbers of workmen, but its origin soon became known and the 'economic' tendency was seriously discredited. The workmen, on the other hand, were taking great interest in the growing revolutionary movement among the students, and soon began to join them in open political demonstrations. By 1902 the political tendency had triumphed over 'economism'.

The Social Democrats now went to the other extreme, and establishing a dictatorship of the labour movement, hurried it forward along the political path at an unnatural pace, completely neglecting the economic struggle caused by the clash between the interests of labour and capital, which might have been taken as the starting-point for a real socialist movement. They were led away by the expectation of a sudden political upheaval, and tried to adapt the mass movement to their own purposes. They organized political demonstrations all over the country. In the great strike that took place in south Russia in 1903 political demands were put forward, while the treatment meted out to the strikers roused among the workers increasing resentment against the government.¹

The two tendencies, extreme and moderate, were clearly defined at a party conference held in Brussels in July 1903,² at which the extremists, though a minority in the movement as a whole, were more strongly represented than their opponents. From this accident of representation the two wings of the Social Democratic party have ever since been known as the 'majority' and the 'minority'. The moderate 'minority',³ representing orthodox Marxism, believed in peaceful methods

¹ Demonstrations were dispersed by Cossacks, and troops frequently fired on crowds of strikers.

² This conference had its first sittings at Brussels, and later moved to London.

³ *Menshevikí* (cf. *menshinstvo* = minority).

and were not unwilling to work with other parties or even to make use of parliamentary institutions for the pursuit of their aims. The revolutionary 'majority',¹ led by Lénin, wanted to overthrow the existing system at once, before the reform movement amongst the 'bourgeois' elements could attain such a measure of success as would satisfy the majority of the people and delay indefinitely the triumph of the proletariat.

Social Democracy was a purely class creed, but the Social Revolutionaries worked on a much broader basis. They were the direct successors of the 'Will of the People',² and clung to the idea that the revolution was to be brought about by the people as a whole, and not by any particular class.³ They divided the socialist forces into three groups—the educated class, the town proletariat, and the peasants, whom they still counted as socialists.⁴ The mass movement of the peasants only needed to have its ideals and aims clearly formulated, and the educated class were to serve as leaders. The proletariat of the towns was too small a body to act alone, but it might serve as a strong vanguard. The Social Revolutionaries revived the tradition of terrorism, which the Social Democrats deprecated. They regarded terrorism as a useful auxiliary weapon, and believed that isolated protests would stimulate the mass movement.⁵ The Social Revolutionary Party attracted many of the

¹ *Bolsheviki* (cf. *bolsbinstvo* = majority).

² Cf. p. 466.

³ There was another important distinction between the two socialist tendencies which is of special interest at the present moment: the Social Democrats stood for the idea of an international proletariat, while the Social Revolutionaries were purely national in their aims.

⁴ The Social Democrats considered the peasants to be merely 'bourgeois', and evolved the theory that they would have to pass through the stage of capitalism and then become 'proletarized' before they could become socialists.

⁵ The chief terrorist acts of this period were the work of Social Revolutionaries, e. g. the assassinations of Sipyágin (1902) and Pléhve (1904).

workmen, but it was strongest in the younger generation of the educated class, amongst whom the wave of opposition was rapidly rising. It represented the general mood of protest, and was in close touch with the 'Liberators', into whose ranks many of its followers passed. From 1902, however, the Social Revolutionaries began to pay more attention to the peasants. Spontaneous disorders that broke out in the provinces of Poltáva and Khárkov seemed to confirm their hope of an active socialist movement in the country. They founded an 'Agrarian League' to propagate the idea of the nationalization of land.

Poland from 1863

After the rebellion of 1863 the Russian government tried to win over the Polish peasants as allies against the gentry and the educated class, the leaders of the national movement. For this purpose it introduced a great scheme of agrarian reforms (1865). The peasants, who had been made personally free under Napoleon, became the owners of the land which up to that time they had only rented. The dispossessed proprietors were indemnified at the expense of the revenues of Poland. Village communes, from which gentry and priests were excluded, were set up. This policy, however, was soon abandoned in favour of more active measures for the assimilation of Poland with the rest of the empire. Every effort was made to stamp out Polish nationality. The Roman Catholic Church was deprived of its revenues and the parish priests became salaried state officials. Most of the monasteries were suppressed. Their lands were confiscated and sold to Russians. The use of the Russian language became obligatory in official transactions, in universities and secondary schools, whilst Polish was forbidden in newspapers and even in private conversation. Poles were excluded from government posts in their own country. In 1866 Poland was divided into ten

provinces (*guberniya*) and incorporated into the empire. In 1874 the viceroyalty was abolished, and two years later the Russian judicial system was introduced. Dark as was the political horizon, the last thirty years of the nineteenth century were a period of great social and economic progress. The agrarian reforms of the sixties created a class of small peasant farmers, and led to a considerable advance in agriculture. Many conditions favoured the development of manufacturing industry. Poland possessed important coalfields and a rapidly increasing population. The removal of the customs barrier opened up to Polish trade vast markets in Russia and the East, and brought Polish industry under the protection of the Russian tariff. Warsaw became the third city of the Empire, and its population quadrupled in forty years. Lodz and other industrial centres grew even more rapidly. The development of trade and industry brought about the formation of a middle class and a large industrial proletariat. These changes had an important effect on the political outlook of Poland. There was a reaction against the narrow ideals of the aristocratic national leaders of the preceding period. The middle class turned aside from politics, and adopted a broad national programme based on the development of all the spiritual and material forces of the Polish people. The Polish Socialist Party, founded in 1893, aimed at separation from Russia and the creation of a democratic republic, but the attitude of the majority of the Poles towards Russia changed completely. They saw that separation would mean the loss of all the economic advantages which the union brought to Poland, advantages which were essential for the creation of a strong national centre which should ultimately attract to itself all the scattered fragments of the Polish people. The immediate aim of Polish policy thus came to be autonomy within the Russian Empire.

Finland

The position of Finland was defined at the time of its annexation in 1809.¹ Alexander I promised to respect the Finnish constitution² and the religion, laws, and liberties of the people. This promise was renewed by his successors, and though the presence of a free, autonomous people within the empire was always regarded by extreme reactionaries as an insult to the principle of autocracy, the liberties of Finland remained unimpaired through the greater part of the century. The first blows were struck in the early nineties. A new criminal code that had been approved by the Diet was suspended and referred to a commission in the Russian Ministry of Justice. Finns were replaced by Russians in the offices of the governor-general at Helsingfors and of the Secretary of State at Petersburg, while instructions were issued that in the appointment of all Finnish officials preference should be given to those having a knowledge of the Russian language. At the same time the Finnish press was subjected to a strict censorship. In the first years of the reign of Nicholas II Finland enjoyed a short respite, but the appointment of Bóbrikov as governor-general in August 1898 marked the beginning of a new Russian offensive movement. The manifesto of February 15, 1899, practically abolished the Finnish constitution, by introducing important changes in the legislative functions of the Diet and reducing it to the position of a merely consultative body. In August 1899 Pléhve was appointed

¹ Cf. pp. 361-2.

² The constitution provided for a Senate, or national executive council, nominated by the grand duke, which carried on the actual government of the country, and a Diet, elected on a very limited franchise by the four estates (nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants). Senate and Diet communicated with the grand duke through the Secretary of State for Finland.

Secretary of State for Finland, though under the constitution only a Finnish citizen could hold this post. A few months later (June 1900) the use of Russian as the official language in Finland was prescribed. In 1901 a new military law approximated the conditions of military service to those that obtained in Russia, and abolished the hitherto independent Finnish army. In 1902 all government posts were thrown open to Russians, and the governor-general was empowered to dismiss administrative and judicial officials. The culminating point of this policy was reached in 1903, when Bóbrikov, invested with dictatorial authority, proceeded to introduce in Finland all those measures of repression, such as domiciliary searches, arbitrary arrests and imprisonments, which were already familiar in Russia. The people of Finland did not suffer these attacks on their freedom without opposition. Their protests at first took the form of popular petitions, which were unheeded, and deputations to the grand duke, which were not even received. When these forms of protest failed, they resorted to boycott and passive resistance. There were no open outbreaks or disorders, which would only have led to further severities on the part of the Russian authorities, but the opposition movement developed underground, and in touch with the corresponding movements in Russia.

Western Siberia

The conquest of Siberia began in the last years of the sixteenth century. Ermák's enterprise¹ showed the way, and in 1585-6 the first Russian settlements appeared—Tyumén, on the river Turá, and Tobólsk, at the junction of the rivers Toból and Irtýsh. These two towns served as bases for farther advance, which at first was directed north and east. The basin of the river Turá was secured in 1592-3 by the founda-

¹ Cf. p. 130. Ermák and his followers perished in 1584.

tion of Pelým. Farther north Russian posts were established at Berëzov (1594) and Obdórsk (1595), on the lower reaches of the Ob. Along the Ob, above the mouth of the Irtýsh, settlements arose at Surgút (1592), Narým (1595), and Kétsky Ostróg¹ (1597). Early in the seventeenth century the Russians crossed to the Eniséi, where the towns of Eniséisk and Krasnoyársk were founded. The tributaries of the Eniséi—the lower Tungúzka and the Angará or upper Tungúzka—led to the Léna. By 1632 the mouth of that river had been reached, and a fortified post established on its middle course, at Yakútsk. Within a few years the rivers of the north-east² were explored, and in 1639 the first Russian settlements appeared on the Sea of Okhotsk.

The Russians crossed the Urals in order to gain control of the fur-bearing country of northern Siberia, which had attracted them from very early times.³ Bands of Cossack adventurers, inspired by dreams of rich booty, sailed along the great rivers, imposing tribute on the scattered native tribes, and meeting with little resistance in their headlong advance, which could not stop until it had reached the natural limits of the country. The territory occupied by the Russians was almost useless for permanent settlement or colonization, and the fertile steppe region to the south hardly interested them in this period. For a long time to come they might have confined their attention to the north, but for the fact that their position was constantly threatened by the presence of semi-barbarous nomadic tribes on their borders. When they first started their movement towards the south they could not have foreseen that it would involve them in a struggle that was to last for nearly three centuries, and lead them on to the conquest of Central Asia.

¹ Near the mouth of the river Ket, a tributary of the Ob.

² The rivers Yána, Indigírka, and Kolymá.

³ Cf. pp. 47-9.

The first step was taken in 1594, when a forepost was established at Tára, on the Irtýsh, about 250 miles above Tobólsk. The next important move was made farther east by the foundation of Tomsk (1604) and Kuznétsk (1618), both on the river Tom, a tributary of the Ob. In the thirties of the sixteenth century a number of fortified places were built along the rivers Toból, Vagái, and Ishím,¹ and the Russian line in this direction was gradually pushed forward until by the middle of the eighteenth century it ran almost due west from Omsk to the river Toból, and then south-west to Orenbúrg. Under Peter the Great the line east of Omsk was advanced as far as the Irtýsh. Meantime progress had been made along the upper Ob, and a line of settlements joined that river with the Irtýsh at Ust-Kamenogórsk, 100 miles above Semipalátinsk. The Russian frontier at this point was coterminous with the present southern boundaries of the provinces of Orenbúrg, Tobólsk, and Tomsk, and the whole of western Siberia was thus brought under Russian rule.

From the very beginning of the forward movement the Moscow government realized that if the occupied territory was to be held permanently it would have to be populated. Throughout the seventeenth century a stream of 'official' colonists² crossed the Urals, until Siberia was, though not settled, at any rate made independent of Russia for its food supplies. When that point had been reached official interest in colonization declined, and for a century and a half Siberia was regarded merely as a place to which all dangerous or undesirable elements of the population might be removed.³

¹ The rivers Vagái and Ishím flow north and join the Ob above Tobólsk.

² Official colonists were recruited by two methods, 'invitation' (*pribór*), and 'transfer', or forced removal (*perevód*).

³ Peter the Great exiled the rebellious *sirélsy* (cf. p. 221) and also Swedish

Parallel with the 'official' colonizing movement, 'free' emigration went on unceasingly. Many thousands of peasants, in order to escape from the burdens of serfdom, or, in the case of free peasants, from over-taxation and the oppressive recruiting system, crossed over to Siberia and settled down there, in spite of measures taken to prevent them. By the beginning of the nineteenth century this movement had grown to such dimensions that some measures had to be taken to regulate it, though not until the last quarter of the century was the importance of Siberia, as an outlet for the surplus population of European Russia, fully realized. After 1861 the peasants were almost as closely bound to the land as they had been before,² for it was feared that if they were allowed complete liberty of movement the landowners would be left without agricultural labourers. But no artificial restrictions could check the perfectly natural movement to new lands, for the need for expansion became more and more pronounced as the population increased. In the eighties emigrants were numbered in tens of thousands, and the conditions under which permission to emigrate could be received had to be made easier. In 1889 some attempt was made to regulate the number of emigrants in accordance with the amount of surveyed land

prisoners of war. During the eighteenth century new categories of exiles were constantly being created, e. g. escaped or wandering serfs whom landowners refused to take back on to their estates (1729); factory workers who drank to excess or played cards or dice (1739). In 1754 exile to Siberia replaced the death penalty as a punishment for certain offences. From 1760 landowners were allowed to exile unruly serfs, and later the peasant communes received the right to send undesirable members to Siberia. In 1754; 150 families of Zaporógian Cossacks, and under Catherine II many 'Old Believers' (*raskólniki*), were exiled.

¹ In 1806, 1822, and 1837 steps were taken to help 'state' peasants, who suffered from lack of land, to emigrate.

² Cf. p. 429.

that was available. At the same time licensed settlers were exempted from taxation for a number of years, and received material help for the journey and in their new homes. Unlicensed settlers were threatened with repatriation, but they continued to form no less than half of the annual contingent of emigrants. After the famine of 1891 the wave of emigration mounted higher and higher, and a more active and progressive policy became necessary. In 1896 a special Emigration Department was created under the Minister of the Interior. Measures were taken to provide holdings for settlers, and to encourage peasant communes to send delegates (*khodoki*) to choose land and investigate possibilities of settlement before they decided to move.¹

The Conquest of Central Asia

By the middle of the eighteenth century Russia had acquired the whole of western Siberia. To the south lay a broad belt of barren steppe country, inhabited by nomade Kirghíz tribes, who constantly raided Russian territory and attacked caravans on their way to Bukhára and Khíva. The establishment of Russian authority in the Kirghíz steppes thus became necessary as a measure of defence. The process of penetration and conquest occupied a whole century, but one by one the nomade tribes were brought under control, and the frontier gradually advanced until it rested on the Caspian, the Aral Sea, and Lake Balkhásh. Having moved forward so far, however, the Russians once more found themselves unable to stop; the establishment of an advanced post at the mouth of the Syr-Dariá (Jaxartes) in 1847, and the occupation of the Semiréchie (Seven Rivers) region (south of Lake Balkhásh, where the towns of Kopál (1847) and Vérny (1854) were founded), though

¹ Most of the earlier colonists had migrated quite independently, and suffered great privations both on the journey and in Siberia.

intended to consolidate the Russian hold on the Kirghíz steppe, proved the first stages in the conquest of Turkestán.

Trade relations between Russia and Central Asia had existed from very early times. They were interrupted in the Middle Ages, but resumed after the fall of the Tartar Empire. In the seventeenth century the Moscow government sent several missions to investigate conditions in Central Asia and explore the routes to India. But the establishment of regular trade relations with the East was hindered by the disorder that prevailed in Central Asia and in the steppe country. Peter the Great had the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea surveyed, and sent a military expedition to Khiva in 1717 to open up a road to India, but it met with disaster. Further progress in this direction was impossible until order was established in the steppe. The Kirghíz were supported and encouraged in their resistance by the khanates to the south. In 1839 a fresh expedition was sent to Khiva, but, like that of 1717, it ended in disaster. Relations with Khiva were not improved by the settlement of the Russians at the mouth of the Syr-Dariá in 1847. Nomade tribes nominally subject to Khiva and Kokánd attacked the Russian line, and once more the Russians began to move forward. In 1853 they captured the Kokándian stronghold of Ak-Mechét (about 275 miles up the Syr-Dariá), which they renamed Peróvsk; a line of forts was built between this point and the mouth of the river. Eight years later they advanced as far as Dzhulék, and in 1864 they seized the town of Turkestán. Meanwhile a column advancing from the Semiréchie region had taken Tokmák, Pishnék, and Aúlie-Ata. By the capture of Chimként in 1864 the two lines of advance were joined up. Tashként fell in the following year, and Khodzhént in 1866. These conquests brought Russia into conflict with Bukhára. The Emir's army was twice defeated in 1866 and the town of Dzhizák occupied.

Two years later, after capturing Samarkánd (the capital of Tamerlane's empire), the Russians began to advance on Bukhára, but the Emir made peace (June 1868), ceding the upper half of the valley of the river Zarafshán, and becoming a vassal of Russia. Khiva, surrounded by deserts and feeling safe from attack, continued to incite the Kirghíz and Turkoman tribes to attack Russian territory. In 1873 five separate columns were directed against it. After suffering great hardships from heat and lack of water, four of them achieved their object, and in August 1873 Khiva at last submitted to the Russians. In 1875 trouble arose in the east, and operations were renewed against Kokánd. The towns of Kokánd, Namangán, and Andizhán were occupied, and the whole of the khanate of Kokánd was joined to Russia as the province of Fergána. The final stage in the conquest of Central Asia was the subjection of the Turkoman tribes who lived between the Amú-Dariá (Oxus) and the Caspian Sea. Some of them submitted to Russia after the fall of Khiva, but the Tekke Turkomans of the oasis of Akhál remained hostile. Operations against them began in the spring of 1879 with the capture of Kizýl-Arvát. In 1881 Skóbelev stormed the stronghold of Geok-Tepe, seized Askhabád, and forced the Tekkes to submit. Three years later the tribes of the oasis of Merv voluntarily went over to Russia.

Russian statesmen claimed that the advance of Russia in Central Asia was in the interests of civilization. The establishment of a strong authority over the warring and fanatical tribes and minor states of this region made possible, at any rate, the peaceful development of its rich natural resources. Large sums of money were spent on irrigation, and hundreds of square miles of desert were brought under cultivation. Russian trade and industry found in Turkestan a wide market for manufactured goods and valuable supplies of cotton and

other raw materials. Economic development was hastened by the construction of railways. The Trans-Caspian line was begun in 1880, in order to provide transport for the expedition sent against the Tekke Turkomans. Starting from Mikháilovsk, on an inlet of the Caspian Sea, it reached Kizýl-Arvát in September 1881. After the submission of Merv, when relations with Great Britain became strained, it was continued through Askhabád and Merv to the Amú-Dariá (December 1886), and thence by way of Bukhára to Samarkánd (1888). In 1897-8 a branch was built from Merv to Kushk, on the frontier of Afghanistan. The line was carried to Tashként in 1899, with a branch to Kokánd, Namangán, and Andizhán. The length of the main line from Krasnovódsck, which became the western terminus in 1896, to Tashként is 1,748 versts (about 1,200 miles), and that of the whole Central Asiatic system south of Tashként 2,370 versts (1,600 miles).¹ In 1909, 3,000,000 passengers and 7,000,000 tons of goods were carried.² The importance of the Trans-Caspian railways increased enormously after the construction of the Orenbúrg-Tashként line (1905), which joined them up to those of European Russia.³

The development of the railway system, though it has proved an important economic factor, was undertaken in the first place on strategical grounds, to facilitate the defence of Central Asia and enable Russia, in case of need, to strike at India. The possibility of an attack on India from this quarter made the question of the north-western frontier a matter of vital interest for Great Britain. In the early years of the

¹ The total cost of construction was nearly 80,000,000 roubles.

² In 1899, 443,000 passengers and 330,000 tons of goods.

³ A line now in course of construction will unite Tashként, via Aúlie-Ata, Véryny, and the Semiréchie region, with Semipalátinsk, and continue down the Irtysh as far as Omsk, through which the Siberian line passes.

nineteenth century a French invasion through Persia seemed to be imminent. From the thirties, however, Russia appeared on the scene, and through Russian intrigue Great Britain was involved in the Afghan War of 1838-42. In 1844 Nicholas I, desirous of coming to an understanding with Great Britain on the affairs of the Near East, offered to refrain from any movement against the khanates of Central Asia, which were to be left as a neutral zone between the possessions of Russia and Great Britain. Twenty years later Gorchakov (Foreign Minister) declared that Russia's policy was not aggressive, that she was compelled by the presence of semi-barbarous predatory tribes and states on her borders to push on until she came into touch with the territory of another civilized state, and the justice of this claim was admitted by many British statesmen. In 1873 Gorchakov announced that Russia had no intention of occupying Khiva, and a delimitation of 'spheres of interest' was arrived at. Reassuring declarations and agreements notwithstanding, Russia continued to approach the mountain barrier of north-west India. There is reason to believe that some of her conquests (Tashkent and Samarkand) were made without the consent of the central government, and even against the emperor's wishes. There was undoubtedly a 'forward' military party, and plans for the invasion of India were formulated.¹ Although the conquest of India was never seriously considered in responsible circles, the government was ready to embarrass the British whenever an opportunity occurred, in return for their hostility to Russia, especially in the Balkans. This policy was applied with conspicuous success in 1878, when relations between the two Powers were strained almost to breaking point by Disraeli's interference in the conflict between Russia and Turkey.² On June 13, the day on which the Congress of Berlin met, a Russian

¹ e. g. by General Skóbelev.

² Cf. pp. 461-3.

diplomatic and military mission set out for Kabul. The Amir, Sher Ali, alienated by the attempts of the British to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan and by their repeated refusal to conclude an alliance except on terms that he could not accept, was persuaded to place himself under the protection of Russia. The direct consequence of Russia's interference in this quarter was the Afghan War of 1878-81. When peace was made, the new Amir, Abdur-Rahman, agreed to allow his relations with other states to be controlled by the British government. In return he received a subsidy and a guarantee of support against aggression on the part of any other Power. After the fall of Merv in 1884 fresh complications arose between Great Britain and Russia over the definition of the frontier between Russian territory and Afghanistan. The Afghans claimed and occupied in force the oasis of Penjdeh, but they were attacked and driven out by Russian troops (March 1885). This incident seemed likely to lead to a rupture between Great Britain and Russia. Parliament voted £11,000,000 for war purposes. The reserves were called out and other preparations made. But the storm passed over, and a settlement was arrived at by peaceful methods. A joint Anglo-Russian commission was appointed, and in 1887 an agreement with regard to the north-western frontier of Afghanistan was concluded. Farther east, in the Pamir region, the boundary was fixed by another joint commission in 1895: a narrow strip of Afghan territory was interposed between the Russian frontier and the Hindu Kush, which Great Britain regarded as the natural boundary of India. In 1907 Russia agreed to regard Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence and to communicate with the Amir only through the British government. At the same time an important agreement was reached with regard to British and Russian interests in Persia.

*Alexander III and Nicholas II (continued)**Foreign Affairs after 1878: the Dual Alliance*

No great changes took place immediately after the crisis of 1875-8, but the complete re-orientation of Russian foreign policy became inevitable. Encouraged by Bismarck, Austria was seeking compensation in the Balkans for her territorial losses in Italy and her political exclusion from Germany;¹ and her interests clashed too decisively with those of Russia to permit of reconciliation. Russia had been drifting away from Germany since 1875. During the Eastern crisis German friendship proved 'too platonic' for Russian patriots, who attributed the humiliation of their country at the Congress of Berlin to Bismarck's 'ingratitude' and 'treachery'. Bitter attacks on Germany appeared in the Russian press, and Alexander II expressed his resentment at Bismarck's conduct in a long letter to the Emperor William I. A large army was mobilized on the western frontier, threatening both Germany and Austria. Faced by a hostile Russia, these two Powers drew closer together, and on October 7, 1879, entered into a defensive alliance, agreeing (1) to assist each other with all their military resources if either of them should be attacked by Russia, and (2) to observe benevolent neutrality in case of an attack by any other Power, unless Russia intervened. This compact was clearly more favourable to Austria than to Germany, for Austria was threatened only by Russia, while Germany's chief danger was from France, against whom Austria was not pledged to help

¹ By Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin Austria was allowed to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to maintain garrisons in the district of Novi-Bazar.

her. Bismarck felt that Germany needed further protection, and sought to paralyse France by isolating her diplomatically. With this object he approached Italy and Russia. In May 1882 Italy, embittered against France by the latter's seizure of Tunis, consented to join Germany and Austria, and the Triple Alliance was formed. Russia was bound to Germany only by the friendship that still existed between the two emperors. On this slender foundation Bismarck proceeded to build up a new understanding. William I had signed the treaty with Austria in 1879 very unwillingly, out of respect for the feelings of Alexander II, whom he assured that neither Germany nor Austria entertained any aggressive designs against Russia. Before Alexander II's death in 1881 relations between Russia and Germany improved slightly. His successor, Alexander III, distrusted and even detested Germany, but in the early years of his reign he did not allow his feelings in this respect to influence his policy. In 1882 one serious obstacle to the renewal of friendly relations was removed by the resignation of Gorchakov (Russian Foreign Minister), who since 1878 had been the enemy of Bismarck. In the following year Bismarck began to sound the Russian ambassador at Berlin with a view to the revival of the 'Three Emperors' League'. His advances were well received, and Giers, Gorchakov's successor, travelled to Germany to negotiate with him. In September 1884 the three emperors met at Skierniewice, in Russian Poland, and signed a definite treaty for three years, by which Russia, Germany, and Austria agreed that (1) if any one of them should be forced to make war on a fourth Power, the other two were to observe friendly neutrality;¹ (2) in case of a dispute between

¹ Bismarck wished this condition to apply if *two* of the contracting parties should be at war with a fourth Power, but Alexander would not promise to remain neutral in the event of a combined attack by Germany and Austria on France.

any two of them over Balkan affairs, the matter was to be referred to the third for decision ; (3) no one of the three was to occupy the Balkan principalities. About the same time Germany secretly entered into the so-called ' re-insurance ' compact with Russia, either side engaging to remain neutral if the other was attacked by a third Power. Bismarck's object was now achieved. He had built up a new diplomatic system, and placed Germany in a position of complete security. But this new system was not destined to last long. Though Russia and Austria had been brought together once more, their fundamental differences remained unsettled. Bismarck hoped to be able to hold the balance between them. The first crisis that arose in the Near East proved, however, that their hostility was too deep-rooted for them to remain allies any longer.

By the Treaty of Berlin Russia was allowed to occupy Bulgaria for nine months and to organize the administration of the country. By the wise use of the powers thus conferred upon her she might have won the lasting gratitude of the Bulgarians and recovered a good deal of her prestige in the Balkans. But her agents treated Bulgaria as a conquered province, gave all the chief civil and military posts to Russians, and completely alienated the population. Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the nominee of Alexander II, who became Prince of Bulgaria in 1879, was content for a time to rule under Russian tutelage. But even he grew tired in the end of the tactless, high-handed conduct of his advisers, and in 1883 broke with them and went over to the side of his people. Relations between Russia and Bulgaria were thus severely strained. A series of events that occurred in the years 1885-7 led to a complete rupture. From 1878 Russian agitators had taken part in a movement for the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, which had been left by the Powers under Turkish control.¹ After the quarrel with

¹ Cf. p. 463.

Alexander, however, Russia became opposed to the idea of a 'Greater' Bulgaria, evidently fearing that it might prove even less tractable than that part which had been liberated in 1878. The people of Eastern Rumelia acted independently of Russia. In September 1885 they drove out their Turkish governor, proclaimed the union, and offered the crown to Prince Alexander, who accepted it. Alexander III was thus faced with the accomplished fact, and in a fit of rage he struck Prince Alexander's name off the Russian army-list and recalled all his officers from the Bulgarian army. He also tried to persuade Turkey to protest against the union, and demanded an international conference at Constantinople to discuss the situation which had arisen. But the next move took place in an unexpected quarter. Serbia, jealous of her neighbour's increase of strength, and incited by Austria to seek compensation, declared war (November 14) and invaded Bulgaria. The Bulgarians completely defeated the Serbian army at Slivnitsa (November 17-19) and advanced victoriously into Serbian territory. Before they had gone very far they were stopped by the intervention of Austria, and in March 1886 a barren peace was concluded. Meanwhile, Turkey and the European Powers, with the exception of Russia, had agreed to the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.¹ After his military and political successes Prince Alexander became the hero of the Bulgarians. Russian influence was completely discredited, and Alexander III saw no other way of restoring it than by having his 'ungrateful' protégé removed. With this object Russian agents entered into negotiations with certain discontented Bulgarian officers, and on August 21, 1886, Prince Alexander was seized and, after being compelled to abdicate, carried off down the Danube to Reni, in Bessarabia. From this place he was allowed to proceed to Austria, where

¹ In a disguised form—Prince Alexander was recognized as governor of Eastern Rumelia for a term of five years.

he was sympathetically received. Soon after his abduction a counter-revolution, headed by the Bulgarian patriot Stambulov, had taken place at Sofia, and the people began to demand the return of their prince. Alexander yielded, but sent a telegram of submission to Alexander III.¹ The angry reply that he received convinced him that he would have to face the constant hostility of Russia. He therefore abdicated again, and on September 7 left Bulgaria, never to return. Russian agents set to work to secure the election of a prince who would favour their country's interests. But the anti-Russian party secured an overwhelming majority in the Sobranie; candidates put forward by Russia were rejected; and in July 1887 the Bulgarian people chose Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who was strongly supported by Austria. Alexander III refused to recognize him, and withdrew all Russian officials, including consuls, from Bulgaria. The open breach thus created lasted for nine years. Only after the death of Alexander III and the fall of Stambulov did Russia become reconciled to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian crisis led to the dissolution of the alliance between Russia, Germany, and Austria. Russia felt that her exclusion from the Balkans was due largely to the intrigues of Austria. Thus, when the Treaty of Skierniewice expired in 1887, no steps were taken towards reviving it. Russia and Germany remained bound to each other by the separate secret agreement of 1884,² which was renewed for a further term of three years. But relations between them were severely strained, owing to the support that Germany had given to Austria, and they drifted farther and farther apart, in spite of Bismarck's efforts to maintain the old friendship. The last years of

¹ 'Russia having given me my crown, I am ready to give it back into the hands of its sovereign.' But the Treaty of Berlin provided that 'the Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Porte, with the assent of the Powers'.

² Cf. p. 511.

Alexander III's reign were marked by the growth of a strong anti-German movement, led by Katkóv's ultra-Slav *Moscow Gazette*.¹ The policy of russification, as applied to German institutions and German civilization in the Baltic provinces, caused great irritation across the frontier. Increases in the Russian customs dues brought on a sharp tariff war with Germany, which ended only in 1894, when a commercial treaty was concluded. In 1888 there was a panic on the Berlin Bourse, caused by the large accumulation of Russian securities in the hands of German capitalists, and from that time it became impossible for Russia to borrow money in Germany except on prohibitive terms. Several incidents that occurred increased the tension. In 1887 Alexander III interfered between Germany and France when the two countries seemed on the verge of war over the Schnaebele affair. In the following year he himself nearly involved Russia in war with Germany by his decisive protest against the proposed marriage between Prince Alexander of Battenberg and Princess Victoria, daughter of the Emperor Frederick. After the accession of William II in June 1888 the personal bond that had kept Russia and Germany together so long was broken. Bismarck's fall in March 1890 removed another link with the past and its traditions, and the secret treaty of 1884, which had been one of the corner-stones of his policy, was allowed to lapse.

As Bismarck had all along foreseen, the break with Germany drove Russia into an alliance with France. The two countries had been gravitating towards one another ever since the Franco-German War. 'We need a strong France,' Gorchakóv said to Lord Odo Russell at Berlin in 1872, and Alexander II's action in 1875 showed that he did not intend to allow France to be weakened any farther.² Up to 1887 the formation of closer

¹ *Moskóvskiya Védomosti*.

² Cf. p. 457. After the crisis Alexander said to the French ambassador

ties was hindered by Bismarck's policy of division and by the political instability of France herself;¹ while, apart from his natural distrust of a country that had always been the home of the revolutionary spirit, Alexander III feared that if he gave her any encouragement France would embark on a war of revenge in which Russia might have to support her. After the Franco-German crisis of 1887 and the break-down of the alliance between Russia, Germany, and Austria, both France and Russia felt the danger of remaining isolated.² Public opinion in both countries set strongly in favour of a closer understanding, and an unofficial *rapprochement* of the two peoples took place. From 1888 economic ties began to be formed, for when Russia found difficulty in obtaining loans from Germany, France went to her assistance. During the nineties the Russian government borrowed large amounts of French capital,³ which was used for the reorganization of the defences, the extension of the railway system, and the financing of industry. In 1889 Russia, with the permission of the French government, placed an order for 500,000 rifles with French firms. The first official steps towards an alliance were taken in 1891, when a French squadron visited Kronstadt, under Admiral Gervais, who was graciously received by Alexander III. Probably no definite agreement was reached, but during and after the visit Russian and French military officers discussed plans for joint action in the event of the two countries having to fight on the same side in any future war. The further development of the *entente* was delayed by the

at Petersburg: 'Our relations will become more and more cordial. We have common interests and should hold together.'

¹ Fourteen ministries succeeded one another in the period 1880-90.

² About this time Alexander III on one occasion drank the health of the Prince of Montenegro, 'Russia's only sincere and faithful friend'.

³ French loans raised by the Russian government in the period 1888-1900 amounted to nearly 8,000,000,000 francs, or £320,000,000.

political scandals that arose in France over the Panama affair, but a commercial treaty was concluded in 1893, and in October of that year the Russian fleet paid a return visit to Toulon, receiving an enthusiastic welcome from the French people. Alexander III took the opportunity of sending a telegram to the President of the Republic, in which he referred to 'the bonds that unite the two countries'. This was a mere figure of speech, for at that time France and Russia were not bound to each other by any definite obligations. The military convention had been approved by the governments of the two countries in August 1892, but the actual treaty, which defined the circumstances under which it was to come into force, seems to have been signed only in March 1894.¹ No announcement of the alliance was made at the time of its conclusion,² and its precise terms have been kept secret up to the present day. There is reason to believe, however, that it was strictly defensive and related only to European affairs, i. e. that it was intended to act as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance, and thus restore the balance of power in Europe.

After her defeat in the Balkans and the formation of the Dual Alliance Russia withdrew for a time from Europe. During the first ten years of Nicholas II's reign her attention was diverted towards the Far East, where the opportunity for a wide extension of her influence seemed to present itself.

Russia in the Far East

The movement of exploration which in the early years of the seventeenth century established the authority of Russia

¹ Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congrès de Berlin jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. i, p. 193 (Paris, 1916).

² On June 10, 1895, Russia was referred to in the French Chamber as 'our ally'. Two years later, during a visit paid to him by President Faure, Nicholas II spoke of France and Russia as 'friendly and allied nations'.

throughout the length of Siberia¹ turned south when it reached the Pacific. Cossack bands appeared on the river Amúr in 1643, and for some years sailed up and down it, meeting with little opposition from the tribes along its banks. But China set a limit to expansion in this direction, and Russia, having at that time no particular reason for remaining there, withdrew from the Amúr region in 1689 (Treaty of Nerchinsk). As the settlement of eastern Siberia proceeded, however, the need for an outlet to the sea became felt. The Chinese persistently refused to allow free navigation of the Amúr, and towards the end of Nicholas I's reign Russia turned from persuasion to force. Cossack settlements, and even towns,² were established along the left bank of the river, while, in defiance of the Chinese authorities, Russian vessels began to navigate its waters. China, distracted by the Taiping rebellion and engaged at the same time in a struggle with Great Britain and France, could not resist, and ceded to Russia all the territory north of the Amúr (Treaty of Aigun, 1858) and the maritime region east of the river Ussuri, from the mouth of the Amúr to the boundary of Korea (1860), including the fine harbour on which Vladivostók was soon founded. The Treaty of Aigun provided for the navigation of the Amúr and its tributaries, the rivers Sungari and Ussuri, by Russian and Chinese vessels exclusively. Russia's policy was already sufficiently aggressive to rouse the suspicions of other Powers intimately concerned in the affairs of the Far East. In 1861 she attempted to establish a naval base on the island of Tsushima, midway between Korea and Japan, but was frustrated by Great Britain, while in 1873 a Japanese statesman declared that 'Russia, always advancing southwards, is the chief peril for Japan'. For some thirty years, however, Russia was content to consolidate the positions she had already

¹ Cf. pp. 500-1.

² Nikoláevsk (1851), Blagovéshchensk (1856), Habaróvsk (1858).

occupied, and for this purpose the construction of a railway across Siberia was undertaken (1891). From the accession of Nicholas II a more active policy was adopted. In 1894 Japan went to war with China, and after a series of striking victories forced her, by the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), to pay an indemnity and cede Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung peninsula. The unexpected success of Japan closed the door to Russia in the Far East. Steps were at once taken to reopen it, and to make sure that it should never again be closed. Having secured the support of France and Germany, Russia urged Japan to withdraw from the Liaotung peninsula, on the ground that its acquisition by any Power would be prejudicial to the interests of the others. Japan was forced to yield, but from that time she prepared actively for the inevitable struggle. Russia proceeded on her way. As a reward for her intervention on behalf of China she was allowed to lay the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian Railway straight across Manchuria, by way of Harbin, to Vladivostók, instead of taking it round by the Amúr valley ;¹ to build a branch line from Harbin to Mukden and Talienwan ; and to guard all her railways on Chinese territory with Russian troops. These successes led her into a policy of pure adventure. In 1898 she bullied China into granting her a twenty-five years' lease of the Liaotung peninsula, from which, only three years before, she had driven Japan. The Boxer rebellion of 1899-1900 gave her the excuse for pouring troops into Manchuria, in order to protect her interests in that quarter. At the same time there were unmistakable signs that she was beginning to penetrate into Korea. Japan had watched her progress with the closest attention, and when Korea became threatened she felt that the time had come for her to intervene. Having completed her military preparations and concluded an alliance with Great Britain (January 1902), she approached the

¹ The line along the north bank of the Amúr has since been built.

Russian government and proposed a definite understanding with regard to Manchuria and Korea. Throughout the negotiations that followed the Russians treated Japan with contempt, returning very unsatisfactory replies to all her proposals. In the end Japan lost patience, and on February 5, 1904, broke off diplomatic relations. Four days later the Japanese fleet, under Admiral Togo, suddenly attacked Russian warships anchored outside Port Arthur, with the result that a number of them were put out of action.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-5)

Russia was quite unprepared for war, had very few men concentrated in the Far East, and depended entirely on the Siberian railway.¹ The Japanese had been gradually making ready. Within a few days of the outbreak of war they were able to secure command of the sea, by shutting up the Russian fleet in the harbours of Port Arthur and Chemulpo. Troops were poured into Korea and concentrated on the river Yalu, the frontier of Korea and Manchuria. The first great event of the war was the battle of the Yalu (May 1). Large forces that had been assembled at Chinnampo on the Korean coast were thrown across to the Liaotung peninsula, and by May 14 Port Arthur was isolated. The Russians were gradually driven back on to the defensive works of the town, and the useful harbour of Dálny fell into the hands of the Japanese. The main body of the troops landed in Liaotung turned north along the railway towards Ying-kow, in co-operation with the forces acting under Kuroki on the Yalu. The Russians, commanded by Kuropátkin, had taken up a position at Liao-yang, on which the Japanese were advancing in three columns. On the way they took Ying-kow, which served as a sea-base for their left wing. At

¹ The last section, round Lake Baikál, was completed only in 1905.

this moment Kuropátkin might have inflicted a serious check on the enemy by undertaking a bold stroke against one of the advancing columns. The Japanese were not in such force as he thought them to be, and, moreover, were suffering at the time from lack of supplies. But he took no action, and the enemy had time to concentrate and organize his communications. On August 24 Kuroki began the nine days' battle of Liao-yang. Though it was by no means decisive, Kuropátkin retired north and took up a position in front of the river Sha-ho. Here he received reinforcements, and on October 10 began a great attack on the Japanese in front of him. After a desperate struggle, lasting ten days, the Russians were thrown back across the Sha-ho, and the campaign of 1904 was at an end.

At Port Arthur the Russians were much stronger than the Japanese had expected to find them. Progress was very slow, and costly general assaults had to be abandoned for siege operations. The command of the sea was never secure, for the Russian ships made frequent sallies from Port Arthur. In August the whole fleet tried to break through to Vladivostók, but it was caught by the Japanese. A few ships succeeded in escaping to neutral ports, some were sunk, and the rest had to retreat into harbour. In mid-October the Baltic Fleet, which had been preparing all summer, set sail for the Far East under the command of Admiral Rozhdéstvensky. The Dogger Bank incident of October 21, when Russian ships fired on English trawlers, roused a wave of indignation in England. War was only avoided by an immediate apology and a promise of compensation from the Russian Government. The sailing of the Baltic Fleet roused the Japanese to fresh efforts at Port Arthur. Nogi was reinforced and resorted once more to storming tactics. The Japanese advanced steadily, but with very heavy losses. As they came nearer serious disagreement broke out amongst the Russian leaders. Some of them wanted to abandon the struggle,

while others were in favour of resistance to the end. On January 1, 1905, the commander of the garrison, Lieutenant-General Stoessel, without making his decision known to his officers, sent out a white flag and surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese, although there was still a three months' supply of provisions and plenty of ammunition in the town.

The fall of Port Arthur released Nogi's forces, which were sent to strengthen Oyama, commander-in-chief in the north. During the winter Kuropátkin had gathered together over 300,000 men. The battle of Mukden, which began on February 23, ended in the retreat of Kuropátkin and the occupation of Mukden by the Japanese. But they were too exhausted to turn the retreat into a rout, and the two armies continued to face each other.

Meantime, the approach of the Baltic Fleet was being closely watched. Early in May it reached the China Sea, and owing to coaling difficulties Rozhdéstvensky decided to make for Vladivostók by the direct route that lay through the Straits of Tsushima (between Japan and Korea). Admiral Togo was lying in wait for him at Masampo, on the Korean coast. On May 27 the Russian fleet approached and was at once attacked. All its efforts to break through were foiled, and the next day it was flying in all directions, hotly pursued by the Japanese. Two-thirds of the Russian ships were sunk. Six were captured, only four managed to reach Vladivostók, while six got into neutral ports. Thus, only 600 miles from its goal, after a seven months' voyage, the Baltic Fleet was completely broken up, and Russia's last hope of regaining the mastery of the sea disappeared.

After the battle of Mukden military operations had reached a deadlock. Japan knew that she could not hope to bring the war to a decisive conclusion, even after Tsushima, for her resources were exhausted. Russia, hindered by events at home, made every effort to strengthen her forces in the East, but

Tsushima was too crushing a blow to leave any hope of success. Peace negotiations began on June 10, on the initiative of the President of the United States. No armistice was concluded, and the Japanese proceeded to strengthen their position for peace by driving the Russians out of the north-eastern corner of Korea. They also occupied the island of Sakhalín, and landed troops at the mouth of the Amúr. By the Treaty of Portsmouth¹ (August 29, 1905) Russia ceded to Japan the remainder of her lease of Liaotung and Port Arthur, along with the southern half of the island of Sakhalín; promised to evacuate Manchuria; and recognized Japanese influence in Korea. The relative smallness of the gains, after a series of apparently brilliant victories, roused great indignation in Japan, but the Japanese leaders knew that they could not hope to gain anything more from an enemy whose strength was constantly increasing.

The Reform Movement in 1904

The foundation of the Union of Liberation in January 1904² marked an important stage in the development of the reform movement. Branches of the Union were formed in the provinces, and round them the liberal elements of the population gathered. Pléhve continued his repressive policy in the hope of stopping the rising tide of opposition. The zémstvo of Tver suffered heavily for its 'harmful tendencies'. Several of its leading workers were exiled, while others resigned in protest. A large number of officials were dismissed, and a new executive board was nominated by the government. At Moscow Pléhve refused to sanction the re-election of Dmítry Shipóv, who had served as president of the executive board for eleven years and made Moscow the most enterprising and progressive of all the zémstvos. Shipóv was leader of the zémstvo movement, but he exercised a restraining influence over the zémstvo men, and

¹ Portsmouth, New Hampshire, U.S.A.

² Cf. p. 492.

tried to keep them moderate in their demands. Many *zémstvos* and other public bodies demonstratively expressed their sympathy with him, and the Moscow *zémstvo* elected one of his colleagues, F. A. Golovín, in his place. Incidents similar to those that took place at Tver and Moscow were common in other provinces.

By the middle of 1904 the government had not a friend left in the country, yet Pléhve found it possible to declare that 'revolutions are made by majorities, and the majority are for us'. On July 28 he was killed by a bomb thrown by Sazónov, a former student of Moscow University. His successor, Prince Svyátopolk-Mírsky, who was not appointed till September, appealed, like Lóris-Mélikov in 1880, for 'mutual trust' between government and people. He declared that no great changes need be expected, but promised to put into force a very modest programme of reforms that had been announced in March 1903. The position that confronted Mírsky in 1904 was, however, very different from that of 1880. The people were better organized for the struggle, and were not to be cajoled into trusting the government. The *zémstvo* party still led the country. The advanced (constitutional) elements had joined the Union of Liberation,¹ but they continued to regard themselves as *zémstvo* men, and tried to keep the movement united. The progress it had made was shown by the resolutions (the 'eleven points') passed at a congress held in Petersburg (November 19-22, 1904), at which the leaders of the reform party in all the *zémstvos* were present. The congress drew attention to the gulf that had grown up between the government and the nation, and declared that the constant fear of public initiative and the excessive development of centralization, which had led inevitably to administrative abuses and the arbitrary rule of the officials, had undermined the trust of the people in their rulers.

¹ Cf. p. 492.

It urged the need of securing the rights of inviolability of person and domicile, proposed to make officials responsible to the ordinary law-courts, and asked for liberty of conscience, speech, and the press, of meeting and association, and for equal political, civil, and personal rights for all classes. Other resolutions dealt with the reorganization of the *zémstvo* electoral system on a more democratic basis, the creation of a smaller *zémstvo* unit, the enlargement of the powers and independence of the *zémstvos*, and the extension of self-government to all parts of the empire. The congress asked unanimously for a freely elected national assembly, but disagreed as to the powers that it should possess. The majority advocated an assembly with full legislative authority, with control over the budget and over the actions of officials; but a minority, under Shipóv, supported the Slavophil view and did not want to limit the autocracy.

The November congress brought the reform movement into the open. Shipóv communicated the resolutions to Prince Svyátopolk-Mírsky, who put them before the emperor. They were received with enthusiasm in the country. The Union of Liberation tried to get into touch with the revolutionary parties, and organized demonstrations by different sections of the public. The professional classes expressed their opinions at a series of banquets, at which literary men, engineers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other similar groups put forward demands based on those of the November congress. The banquet movement spread all over Russia, and showed how popular the demand for radical reform had become. The resolutions of the congress were actively discussed by many of the *zémstvos* and in the press, which enjoyed comparative freedom for a time after Mírsky's appointment.

At this stage two official communications showed the irresolution that prevailed in 'higher spheres'. A decree published

on December 25 promised several reforms, but two days later the demands put forward by the reformers were declared to be contrary to the fundamental laws of the empire, and they themselves were denounced as enemies of public order. Meetings were forbidden, and the *zémstvos* were told to discuss only subjects that came within their competence.

The Revolution of 1905

The events of the early months of 1905 marked the entry of the workmen into the movement. The government had connived at the formation of a Factory-Workers' Society in Petersburg (directed by Father Gapón), with the object of engaging the workers' attention with purely economic questions. But from the time of the strikes in 1903 the influence of the revolutionaries had been growing constantly, and by the end of 1904 Gapón had great difficulty in keeping political elements out of his organization. In January 1905 over 13,000 metal-workers at the Putilov works came out on strike, demanding an eight hours' day, increased wages, and better treatment. These conditions were rejected by the employers, and all the large factories in Petersburg ceased work. When negotiations failed, the workmen decided to march with their families in a procession, headed by Gapón, and present a petition to the emperor. The police had been watching the change in the mood of the workmen's organizations and took elaborate precautions. On Sunday, January 22, orderly processions of men and women marched into the city, but were everywhere met and turned back. The troops fired repeatedly on the crowds, although there was no active resistance, and the revolutionary element in the processions was negligible. Accounts of the number of victims vary, but the estimate of the workmen (500 killed, 3,000 wounded) shows the impression made on their minds by the events of 'Bloody Sunday'.

The petition that the workers had intended to present dealt chiefly with labour conditions, but it contained also the political demands that were being put forward everywhere by the professional classes. The government hastily set up commissions to draft labour legislation and study the causes of discontent, but in February 1905 a fresh epidemic of strikes broke out.¹ Many of them, especially in Poland, the Caucasus, and the Baltic provinces, were open protests against the action of the government on January 22. The Gapón labour movement and other official labour organizations were discredited. The workers had lost all faith in the government and were ready to listen to the revolutionary propagandists. In sympathy with them the students struck, and the universities had to be closed down. Terrorist acts became common. Many police officials were shot, and on February 17 the Grand Duke Sergius (Governor-General of Moscow) was blown to pieces in the Kremlin. The disorder spread to Poland and the Caucasus.

Meantime, Mírsky had been replaced by Bulýgin. A number of half-hearted reforms were hurried through, and on March 3 the emperor announced his intention of 'summoning the worthiest persons, elected by the people, to share in the drafting and discussion of legislative proposals'. Ministers were instructed to consider suggestions sent in by private persons and institutions.

The promise of an advisory legislative assembly, however, could not satisfy public opinion at this stage. In March the zémstvo constitutionalists declared for 'universal, equal, secret, and direct' suffrage, with a two-chamber system, and adopted an agrarian programme, in which the chief point was the compulsory expropriation of private land for the benefit of the

¹ According to official statistics, over 700,000 men were on strike in January and February. Besides the factories, many of the railways were affected.

peasants. This step was taken in order to counteract the growing influence of the Social Revolutionaries and gain the support of the masses. The agrarian programme was endorsed by a congress of *zémstvo* liberals in April, while another congress that met in May demanded a national assembly with full legislative powers instead of the advisory institution foreshadowed by the manifesto of March 3.

By their aggressive policy the *zémstvo* liberals alienated the moderate men in the *zémstvos*, especially the landowners, and during the remaining months of 1905 the split between the two groups grew constantly wider. The liberals were in close touch with the radical educated classes, who, after the banquet movement in the end of 1904, organized professional unions which went so far as to demand a constituent assembly. In May a 'Union of Unions' was formed, under the presidency of P. Milyukóv, whose plan was to form a solid liberal party out of the *zémstvo* liberals and the right wing of the professional classes.

The crowning disaster of Tsushima (May 27) roused the reformers to fresh efforts. Shipóv summoned a coalition congress of both groups¹ of the *zémstvo* party, along with representatives of the town councils, which were beginning to take an active part in the movement (June 6-8).² The congress resolved to send an address directly to the emperor, and for that purpose elected a deputation, which was received on June 19. In presenting the address³ Prince Sergius Trubetskóy,

¹ Constitutionalists, who had joined the Union of Liberation (cf. p. 492), and moderates, under Shipóv.

² Representatives of 86 town councils met at a special congress in June and passed resolutions similar to those of the April and May *zémstvo* meetings.

³ Text of the address: 'By the criminal negligence and misgovernment of your advisers Russia has been precipitated into a ruinous war. Our army has not been able to vanquish the enemy, our fleet is annihilated, and even

leader of the deputation, described the condition of the country and urged the emperor to stand face to face with his people. Nicholas replied : ' Cast aside your doubts. My will, the will of your *tsar*, to call together the elected representatives of the people, is unshaken. You can tell this to all your friends. . . . I hope that you will co-operate with me.' The emperor's last words were interpreted as a direct invitation to discuss reforms. A great congress of *zémstvo* and town workers that met at Moscow on July 19-22 not only refused to obey an order to disperse, sent by the director of police, but appealed to the people to meet together, regardless of the police, and express their opinions, and itself examined and approved of a draft constitution drawn up by Múromtsev, Kokóshkin, and Shchépkin.

The manifesto published on August 19, 1905, granting an Imperial Dúma, with advisory functions, was thus condemned by public opinion beforehand.¹ Many radicals thought that the Dúma should be boycotted, but the last congress of *zémstvo* and town workers (September), which was attended by representatives of the minor nationalities, decided to accept the

more threatening than the danger from without is the internal conflagration that is blazing up. . . . Your Majesty, while it is not too late, for the salvation of Russia and the establishment of order and peace in the country, command that the representatives of the people . . . be summoned immediately. . . . In your hands are the honour and might of Russia. . . . Do not delay. In this terrible hour of national trial great is your responsibility before God and Russia.'

¹ The creation of a Dúma had been promised on March 3 (cf. p. 526). The draft scheme, drawn up by Bulýgin, Minister of the Interior, was thoroughly discussed at a special secret conference of grand dukes, ministers, and other high personages, presided over by the emperor himself. The conference met in the Peterhof Palace on August 1-8, and the report of its proceedings, which was afterwards published in Berlin, reveals with extraordinary clearness the state of opinion in court and official circles on the question of political reforms.

manifesto and use the advisory Dúma as the stepping-stone to a proper constitutional assembly. The congress asked for guarantees for the free cultural development of all peoples within the empire, for self-government for the different regions and autonomy for Poland. It repeated the demand for the expropriation of private land.

Each fresh step forward taken by the constitutionalists widened the gulf between them and the moderate zémstvo men, most of whom would have been satisfied with the manifesto of August 19. The Union of Unions was becoming more and more radical and getting out of Milyukóv's control, and he saw that the time had come for him to act. On October 25 the right wing of the Union of Unions and the left wing of the zémstvo movement joined together and formed the Constitutional-Democratic Party.¹

By this time an open revolution had broken out throughout the country. Peasant disorders, which had begun in February, became more frequent and widespread during the summer. At first the peasants simply burned the houses of the landowners, cut down trees, and carried away corn and cattle. In August a Peasants' Union was formed and the movement became organized. The revolutionaries tried to induce the peasants to put forward general political demands, but their chief interests were not political. They asked for the withdrawal of all class restrictions, the abolition of the hated 'land captains', and above all for land—'all the land for those who labour on it'.

Strikes had continued sporadically throughout the summer, but in October they became general. The railwaymen were the first to cease work, and within ten days railway communication was stopped all over the country. Factory workers joined in immediately, and their example was followed by all the pro-

¹ *Konstitutsionno-Demokraticheskaya Pártia*, or 'Cadets' (*Kadéty*).

fessional unions. The strike fever spread with elemental force and rapidity. Banks, law-courts, and public offices closed down. Telegraph and postal officials ceased work and the whole country was thrown into chaos. Trade stopped. There was neither water nor lighting in the large towns, and no news came from outside. Even the schoolboys held political meetings. Large crowds of strikers and of the general public assembled, and frequently came into conflict with police or troops. The movement broke out without any warning, but it was soon taken over by the Council of Workmen's Delegates,¹ formed, in the end of October, of representatives of all the Petersburg factories. The Council was dominated by the revolutionaries (chiefly the Social Democrats), and started to formulate the political demands of the workmen and organize them for effectual resistance.

The strike found the authorities helpless and unprepared. Several proposals were put forward, varying from a military dictatorship to the granting of a constitution, and the measures taken by the government swung from one extreme to the other with astonishing rapidity—on October 27 Trépov (Governor-General of Petersburg) ordered the troops 'not to spare their cartridges', while the historical manifesto of October 30 conceded civil rights (inviolability of person, freedom of conscience and speech, of meeting and association) and a wide extension of the franchise, and promised that the Dúma should have full legislative authority, i. e. that no law should be passed without its consent. On the same day it was announced that elected members would be admitted to the Council of State, while on November 1 the Council of Ministers was completely reorganized. Witte was appointed president and began to form a ministry, which he invited Shipóv to join. Shipóv insisted that the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) should also

¹ *Sovét rabócbíkh deputátov.*

be asked. Witte approached them, but they demanded a constituent assembly, and in the end the ministry was formed of bureaucrats. Durnovó, a thorough reactionary, became Minister of the Interior.

Tréprov and Witte represented two currents that had already shown themselves in official opinion. Both had one object—to maintain as far as possible the old order—but their methods were different. Tréprov stood for sheer repression, while Witte hoped, by introducing inevitable reforms, to appease and detach from the revolutionary movement the ‘reasonable majority’, and thus build up a large body of active or passive supporters of the government. In accordance with this policy a partial political amnesty was granted (November 3). All measures passed in contravention of the Finnish constitution since 1899 were annulled, and a Diet was summoned to draft reforms (November 4). A Ministry of Trade and Industry was created to look after the interests of the capitalist classes, while Witte assured the workmen that ‘everything possible’ would be done for them. Land-redemption dues were remitted, and the purchase of land through the Peasants’ Bank was facilitated. The press was allowed almost complete freedom, until freedom developed into licence, when it was again taken in hand. A press law published on December 7 abolished the preliminary censorship and simplified the procedure for the starting of newspapers. Infringements of the law were to be punished by the courts and not in ‘administrative order’, but the heavy penalties of the former repressive code were retained.

As the revolutionary wave grew in strength and volume, those groups of the population which for various reasons were opposed to any change in the existing political order began to organize themselves for resistance. Though numerically weak, they enjoyed support in high quarters. The directing influence in the reactionary movement, the Union of True Russian People, was

formed of officials, landowners, and clergy, while the main body of its adherents was drawn from the lower classes of the urban proletariat. The Union set out to mobilize the patriotism of the masses, in defence of the *tsar* and the old order. It fought revolution with revolutionary weapons, and the organization of counter-terrorist acts by the so-called 'Black Hundreds', or 'Black Gangs', was secretly supported by the police. The people were told that 'strikers, Jews, and students are against the *tsar*', that it was 'the duty of patriots to destroy sedition'. In all the anti-revolutionary demonstrations of the period portraits of the *tsar* were in evidence, while the Jewish *pogróms*¹ were frequently preceded by religious services. Immediately after October 30 attacks on students and workmen began,² and the *pogróms* spread all over Russia. Hundreds of Jews were killed and wounded, and their property was destroyed wholesale. In almost all cases the procedure was uniform. The authorities did not interfere, and it was discovered later that the whole movement was directed from the Department of Police at the Ministry of the Interior, where a secret press was set up to print literature inciting the people against the Jews.

The manifesto of October 30 was received with wild rejoicing in the country. Shipóv's moderate group was completely satisfied with the reforms that were foreshadowed in it, and formed a new ('Octobrist') party, which based its programme on the 'principles of October 30' and demanded nothing more from the government than the fulfilment of its promises. The Cadets continued to demand a constituent assembly. On November 1 the Council of Workmen's Delegates stopped the general strike, and urged the working classes to 'arm

¹ *Pogróm* means, literally, 'pillaging, devastation'.

² In Petersburg, and later in Moscow, the workmen armed themselves against the 'Black Hundreds', which were, in this way, kept in check.

for the final struggle' for a constituent assembly and a democratic republic. A second strike began on November 15, but it was only partial and soon broke down. The October strike had succeeded chiefly owing to its completeness, which had been assured by the support given to it by the liberal and democratic educated classes. But the second strike showed that the nation was no longer united. The liberals laid their hopes on the Dúma, and the struggle was becoming more and more a class struggle. As a political weapon the general strike could no longer be effective. The government continued its preparations for the final conflict and mobilized the counter-revolutionary forces. Officials were forbidden to join professional unions (November 15). The sale of firearms was subjected to strict control (December 7). Special measures were taken to maintain communication in the event of a strike of railway or postal and telegraph workers (December 12). Harsh punishments were introduced for strikes in undertakings of public or state importance (December 15). Local governors received unlimited powers, and a state of 'reinforced' or 'extraordinary' protection was declared in many regions. Martial law was introduced in Poland and Finland, at Kiev, Kronstadt, and other places.¹

The workmen hoped for a revolt in the army and navy, where

¹ A law published on August 26, 1881, co-ordinated all the special measures that had been adopted from time to time for the preservation of public order, i. e. for the struggle against revolution. The government could declare any area in a state of 'reinforced protection' (*usilennaya okbrána*), 'extraordinary protection' (*chrezvycháinaya okbrána*), or martial law (*voénnoe polozhénie*). Under these 'exceptional states' the ordinary laws were partly or wholly suspended, while varying degrees of discretionary power were given to the local governors and the military authorities. During the 1905-6 revolution this law was very widely applied. By March 1, 1906, sixty provinces were wholly or partially subjected to one of the three 'exceptional states'.

there were signs of unrest, due chiefly to material causes. Serious riots broke out at Kronstadt (November 5), while the sailors at Sevastópol revolted and raised the red flag on the battleship *Ochákov*, which was joined by other vessels of the Black Sea Fleet. Mutinies and disorders took place among the troops at Warsaw, Petersburg, Kiev, and other places. Even the first battalion of the Preobrazhénski Guard refused to obey orders. All these facts were taken by the workmen as indications of the readiness of the army and navy to join them. They began to prepare for an armed rising. The government took precautionary measures. It arrested the committee of the Peasants' Union (November 29), the organizers of the Union of Postal and Telegraph Workers (December 5), and the Council of Workmen's Delegates (December 12-16). An official communication condemned the revolutionaries as anarchists and threatened them with extreme measures. The revolutionaries replied with a manifesto calling on the people to 'deprive the government of its ultimate source of existence' by refusing the payment of taxes, withdrawing all savings from the state banks, and demanding payment in gold. On December 20 a third general strike broke out in Moscow. The railwaymen were again the first to stop work, and the factory workers joined them at once. The strikers armed themselves to repel the expected attacks of the Black Hundreds. There were meetings in the streets, and some conflicts with the police, but no firing took place. The strike spread on the 21st, and the atmosphere became tense. On the evening of the next day an encounter between a crowd and a squadron of dragoons proved the signal for the rising. Barricades were erected, and the troops fired along the streets. Artillery was used to clear away the barricades, but they were soon rebuilt. Certain parts of the city passed entirely into the hands of the insurgents. Continuous fighting took place from the 23rd to the 27th. The authorities could

not make full use of the Moscow garrison, fearing lest it should join the movement, but on December 27 the Semënov Guards and other troops arrived from Petersburg. The revolutionaries were then gradually hemmed in. The most determined of them made a desperate stand in the Présnya quarter, where artillery fire was brought to bear on them. By January 1 the rising was definitely suppressed.

Armed risings broke out simultaneously in several other towns,¹ especially in south Russia, but the government forces soon got the upper hand everywhere. Even in Moscow, where it was most formidable, the movement never had any real chance of success. The insurgents were few in number and scattered over a wide area. They held out so long only because the authorities could not take decisive measures against them. The population of the city had been between two fires, and suffered heavily.² From that time the public lost all sympathy for the strikers and their cause. The only positive result of the rising was the Electoral Law of December 24, which gave effect to the promise contained in the manifesto of October 30 with regard to the extension of the franchise. The electors were divided into groups, for the government hoped that under this system it would be able to influence the course of the elections. The number of town voters was very considerably increased (from 230,000³ to 2,700,000), and the professional and educated classes were enfranchised. In addition to the three traditional groups—landowners, peasants, and towns-

¹ Novorossisk, Nikoláevsk, Pyatigórsk, Rostóv-on-Don, Sórmovo (on the Volga), Khárkov, Perm, Vyátka, and in the Donéts coalfield.

² Over 1,000 peaceful inhabitants, including 137 women and 86 children, were killed. The losses of the police and troops numbered 35. Those of the insurgents could not be definitely ascertained, but they were probably small—13 according to one estimate.

³ The original electoral law, published at the same time as the manifesto of August 19 (cf. p. 528), imposed very high qualifications for the franchise.

men—a new group for workmen was created. The system of elections was very complicated, and the number of representatives sent by each group to the provincial meetings that finally elected members of the Dúma was not in proportion to the number of voters in the group. Moscow, Petersburg, and other large towns formed separate constituencies.

The Reaction in 1906-7

The events of December proved that the working-men and the revolutionaries were isolated. The political situation changed completely during the last months of 1905. Physical force had failed. The terrorized gentry joined the reactionaries. The middle classes were either passive or hostile towards the revolutionary movement in its later phases. The liberals had cut themselves off from the moderate groups on their right, but were despised as representatives of the *bourgeoisie* by the Socialists. The peasants and town population were too undeveloped, politically, to be relied upon for moral support. Local risings and economic strikes continued for months. There were disturbances in the army and navy, and disorders amongst the peasants. But from the beginning of 1906 the government felt itself master of the situation and took a strong line. Punitive expeditions were sent along the railways leading from Moscow, and the troops received orders to 'act mercilessly'. Similar measures were taken in Moscow itself, and expeditions were dispatched to other regions that had been particularly affected by the revolution. In the Baltic provinces 'order' was restored by large forces under commanders who were given absolute powers. Wholesale executions were carried out, villages were burned to the ground or forced to pay heavy contributions, and peasants were cruelly beaten. Soon the whole region became involved in a state of war, for the inhabitants, in self-defence, took up arms and fled to the woods. In Georgia and the Caucasus

there was a three-cornered struggle between Tartars, Armenians, and the Russian troops sent to calm the country. In the interior provinces the policy of terror was applied with no less energy. The exceptional laws allowed the local authorities unlimited power. Domiciliary searches were conducted wholesale, and the prisons became filled to more than twice their normal capacity. Thousands of innocent people were executed or exiled without trial. The system of police spies was extended, and many of the terrorist acts of the period were directly or indirectly provoked by police agents.

Besides these repressive measures the government took other steps to strengthen its position. In order to consolidate the alliance with the landed gentry a large sum of money (8,000,000 roubles) was assigned to those who had suffered from the agrarian disorders. Very heavy penalties were introduced for agricultural strikers. The communes were made collectively responsible for all damage to property done by their members. The government defined the civil liberties granted by the manifesto of October 30 in a sense favourable to itself. It curtailed very considerably the rights of meeting and association, and imposed fresh restrictions on the press. Severe punishments were announced for the illegal manufacture and possession of explosives, and new rules for the employment of troops in cases of civil disorder were issued.

A decree published on March 5 defined the position of the reorganized Council of State and the new Imperial Dúma. Half the members of the Council of State were to be nominated by the emperor; the other half consisted of elected representatives of the gentry, the *zémstvos*, the clergy, trade and industry, the Academy of Sciences, and the universities. The two chambers were to have equal legislative authority, and no law could be passed without the consent of both. Their financial powers were severely restricted. They could not deal with

payments on state loans or debts, or reduce the estimates for the Ministry of the Court and for the maintenance of the imperial family. Expenditure sanctioned by existing laws might not be touched, while in time of war the government received unlimited credit. The government reserved for itself the right to promulgate emergency legislation when the chambers were prorogued, but such legislation had to be submitted to the Dúma during the first two months of the following session.¹

In order to prevent any attempt on the part of the Dúma to assume the functions of a constituent assembly, the Fundamental Laws, which laid down the fixed principles of the political system, were published on May 6, four days before the Dúma met. These laws could only be changed on the initiative of the emperor. The title of 'autocrat' was retained. The emperor remained in supreme command of the army and fleet, and received the exclusive right of controlling foreign policy, concluding treaties with other states, declaring war and peace, and appointing or dismissing ministers.

The elections to the Dúma did not give the results expected by the government. The Cadets were the only party to carry on an organized electoral campaign. They gained 160 seats out of 524, and formed a strong centre round which several smaller groups rallied. There were a hundred Labour members, representing chiefly the interests of the peasants. The Socialist parties failed to appreciate the lesson of the last general strike, and practically boycotted the elections. The right wing consisted of a small number of Octobrists and Moderates, with a handful of reactionaries.

Before the Dúma met Witte was succeeded by Goremykin, in whose Ministry Peter Stolypin became Minister of the Interior. On May 10 the emperor received the deputies at

¹ This point was incorporated in the Fundamental Laws as Article 87.

the Winter Palace and appealed to them to work together for the good of the country. Múromtsev, a distinguished jurist and one of the leaders of the Cadet party, was unanimously elected president. In his first speech he urged the Dúma to aim at 'the complete consummation of rights which are the very essence of popular representation', though 'the prerogatives of the constitutional monarch' were to be respected. The address to the throne (May 18) referred to 'strictly constitutional principles', and demanded control over the executive, i. e. a ministry responsible to the representatives of the people; a general political amnesty; the abolition of the exceptional laws; full legislative rights and a monopoly of financial control for the Dúma; and the reform of the Council of State on a democratic basis. The second part of the address contained the legislative programme of the Dúma, which included measures dealing with the civil liberties; the abolition of all class privileges and of all restrictions based on religious or racial differences; the expropriation of private land and the transfer of state, apanage, and Church lands to the peasants; the recognition of the right of workers to organize in defence of their own interests; universal elementary education; the readjustment of the burden of taxation; the abolition of the death penalty; and guarantees for the free cultural development of minor nationalities.

The government replied on May 26. It expressed its willingness to work with the Dúma, within the limits laid down by law. On the land question it declared expropriation to be inadmissible, but promised to intensify the work of the Peasant Land Bank and provide for migration to Siberia. It refused to discuss the demand for a responsible ministry, the extension of the legislative powers of the Dúma, or the reform of the Council of State, since these questions were covered by the Fundamental Laws, and might be raised only on the initiative of the emperor. This declaration destroyed all hope of co-operation

between the Dúma and the government, for the positions taken up by the two sides were irreconcilable.

There was no longer any hope of a renewal of the revolutionary movement. Public opinion, though it had not gone over to the side of reaction, as the elections showed, was passive and indifferent. The most determined of the revolutionaries carried on the struggle, but terrorist acts were the work of individuals. Progressive forces were hopelessly divided. The Socialists regarded the liberals as enemies, and protested violently against 'constitutional illusions'.¹ Under the circumstances the only weapon at the disposal of the Dúma was moral force. Immediately after the government declaration a vote of censure was passed almost unanimously. Count Heyden, leader of the Moderates, pointed out that the demand for the resignation of the Ministry would place the Dúma in a blind alley—'either we must go, or the Ministry'. The Dúma continued its efforts. The right of interpellation was freely used, and the government had to account for the illegal actions of its agents. During the discussion of questions on the *pogróms* Prince Urúsov, who had been Assistant Minister of the Interior under Witte, revealed the existence of a close alliance between the Black Hundreds and the police authorities of all grades. Stolýpin admitted that individual officials had taken part in the organization of *pogróms*, but denied that the whole movement was directed from the Department of Police. Many other grievances were raised, and every interpellation led to a fresh conflict with the government. The decisive struggle took place over the land question. Two bills, both based on the principle of expropriation, were introduced by the Cadets and the Labour group, and an agrarian committee was set up. On July 3 the government published a communication in which it urged the peasants

¹ I. e. the hope of completing the revolution by constitutional methods, through the Dúma.

to remember the emperor's constant solicitude for them, and promised measures of relief, such as the transfer of state lands ; the purchase of private land by the State, and its re-sale to the peasants at reasonable prices ; increased subsidies for emigrants ; and the conversion of communal holdings into personal property. It attacked the proposals of the Dúma and warned the peasants that expropriation was a two-edged weapon, since it would rob them of all the land that they had bought to supplement the holdings granted in 1861. The communication was a direct challenge to the Dúma, which found itself compelled either to accept the official agrarian programme and renounce its own, thereby completely discrediting itself in the eyes of the people, or to take some decisive step. On July 19 it published an appeal to the people, in which it replied to the government, and declared that it would refuse to pass any measures that did not conform to its own programme, to which it intended to adhere strictly. The following day Stolýpin was appointed Premier, and early on the 21st the Dúma was dissolved. The government had been preparing this blow for some time, and, fearing a rising, had moved troops into Petersburg and taken similar precautions in other towns. On the evening of the 21st some 200 ex-deputies assembled at Víborg, in Finland, and signed an appeal urging the people not to pay taxes or furnish recruits until the Dúma should be restored. But the country was too exhausted to renew the struggle. There were armed risings amongst the sailors at Sveaborg (near Helsingfors), Rével, Kronstadt, and Libáva, and disturbances amongst the troops in several places, but these were all easily suppressed. A general strike was proclaimed by the revolutionaries, but the workers were now engaged in a bitter economic struggle with their employers and had lost interest in politics. Stolýpin's new Ministry declared its programme to be 'repression and reforms'; it would fight 'the enemies of society' with all the weapons

at its disposal, but intended to proceed with the reforms that had been promised. Stolýpin entered into negotiations with the leaders of the Octobrists and Moderates, but none of them would join him in the Ministry.¹

The policy of repression was followed out with renewed vigour, but the real results achieved by it became smaller and smaller. The general mood of the country was undoubtedly one of opposition, but active manifestations of this mood were as much the work of 'provocation' as of the revolutionaries. Adventurers and criminals covered their deeds with the cloak of politics, and in the absence of legal guarantees respect for the laws declined. Domiciliary searches, arrests, and exiles increased in number, and the provincial governors used their exceptional powers to the full. The old arsenal of weapons of repression was added to by the law of September 1, which set up field courts martial formed of military officers. There was no appeal from their decisions, though higher authorities frequently quashed sentences that seemed too light. One day only was allowed for the preparation of a case, and two for the trial, while the sentence entered into force immediately on its declaration. The death penalty was applied for petty offences, and up to May 1, 1907, 683 persons were executed by orders of these courts. Many political cases came up for trial in this period. The members of the Council of Workmen's Delegates were exiled, while 180 deputies of the first Dúma who had signed the Viborg appeal were deprived of all their rights and imprisoned. Repressive measures were taken against the press. The opposition parties, including the Cadets, were refused recognition, but monarchists and reactionaries formed societies unhindered. The activity of the Black Hundreds continued. Two former deputies, Hérzenstein and Yóllos, were murdered,

¹ These negotiations, however, had a marked influence on the Octobrist party, which in the third Dúma became the strongest ally of Stolýpin.

and a fresh *pogróm* was organized at Siedletz (September 9-10) by the head of the secret police in that town.¹

In the sphere of reforms the government concentrated its attention on the agrarian question, and proceeded to put into force the promises contained in the communication of July 3. State, apanage, and cabinet lands were offered for sale or leased to the peasants. The Peasants' Bank readily bought up private land, and the gentry were allowed to dispose of entailed estates.² Measures were taken to encourage migration. Important laws dealing with the rights of the peasants were issued. They were allowed to enter the Civil Service freely, to leave the communes, and to elect *zémstvo* members without the interference of the governors.³ The law of November 22, promulgated under Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws,⁴ allowed any head of a household to claim as personal property his share in the communal land of the village. This measure, which implied the complete reversal of the traditional policy of the State and inaugurated a great social revolution, was undertaken with a very definite motive. The government was anxious to convert the peasants into a class of small farmers, interested in the preservation of order. They were to be snatched out of the hands of the revolutionaries and liberals, and turned into conservative property owners.

The new Dúma was summoned for March 5, 1907. The reactionaries accused Stolýpin of 'radicalism', and demanded a new suffrage law and a Dúma with advisory functions only. The

¹ Sub-Colonel Tikhanóvsky, who was 'sincerely thanked' by his superior, the Governor-General of Warsaw. Captain Petukhóv, who exposed the whole story, was removed from the service.

² Enormous amounts of private land appeared on the market after the agrarian disorders. Much of this land was bought by the Peasants' Bank (a State institution) at inflated prices, and in this way the government drew the gentry class still closer to itself.


³ Cf. p. 474.

⁴ Cf. p. 538.

government believed that it could attain its end by actively manipulating the elections. By its 'interpretations' of the electoral law the Senate disqualified whole classes of voters. The Ministry of the Interior issued a hail of orders 'interpreting' the decisions of the Senate and formulating new ones of its own. Local officials arbitrarily removed voters from the registers. Jews were threatened with banishment if they used their right to vote. The electoral campaign of the opposition parties was paralysed. Their meetings were broken up or forbidden, and their newspapers confiscated. The police withheld large numbers of voting papers. All this energy was wasted, however, for the result of the elections was no more favourable to the government than it had been in 1906. The Socialists no longer boycotted the elections, and gained 113 seats.¹ The Labour group numbered about 100, but there were only 92 Cadets, with 80 representatives of the alien races. The Octobrists and Moderates were more numerous than before, and about 20 reactionaries were elected. The liberal centre was thus weaker than it had been in the first Dúma, while the right and left wings gained in strength—the latter very considerably.

The second Dúma, which met on March 5, 1907, lived very little longer than the first. From the beginning the parties of the left, particularly the Social Democrats, declared war on the government. Their attacks were thwarted, however, by the Cadets, who seemed disposed to abandon storming tactics and concentrate their attention on practical matters in the hope of making the Dúma a real force in the political system. The reactionaries, whose aim was to discredit and, if possible, wreck the Dúma, exploited the conflict between the two wings of the opposition for their own purposes, and created disorderly scenes, as a result of which several of them had to be suspended for a

¹ Of these 65 were occupied by Social Democrats (mostly of the minority or *mensheviks*) and 34 by Social Revolutionaries.



number of sittings. The Dúma discussed measures for the relief of the unemployed and of sufferers from the famine that had arisen in the south-eastern provinces. It interpellated the ministers with regard to the arbitrary conduct of the local officials; passed a law abolishing field courts martial; and devoted two days a week to the land question. But under the circumstances real work was impossible, and the Ministry prepared for the inevitable. On June 14 Stolýpin appeared in the Dúma to demand the immediate exclusion of the Social Democrats and a warrant to arrest sixteen of them who were accused of being concerned in a plot to overthrow the existing régime and set up a republic. The matter was referred to a committee, but before the Dúma could arrive at any decision it was dissolved (June 16). At the same time, in violent contradiction to the Fundamental Laws, a new electoral law was published. The number of deputies was reduced from 524 to 442. Poland lost 14 seats out of 37, the Caucasus 19 out of 29, and Siberia 6 out of 21. Central Asia was completely disfranchised. Provision was made for the representation of the Russian minority in provinces with a mixed Russian and alien population. Of twenty-six towns that had sent their own members to the first and second Dúmas, only seven retained this right.¹ The electoral assemblies were dominated in the towns by the large property owners and capitalists, and in the country districts by the large landowners. The number of peasant electors was reduced by half, and though the peasants still sent one deputy from each province, their representative was chosen by the whole provincial assembly.

¹ Poland, the Caucasus, Siberia, and Central Asia were strongholds of the opposition parties. The same can be said of the towns that enjoyed separate representation, for out of a total of 35 they sent 32 opposition members (including 25 Cadets) to the first Dúma, and 29 to the second.

Epilogue : Political Affairs, 1907-17

THE *coup d'état* of June 16 roused even less protest than the dissolution of the first Dúma. The excitement of the revolutionary period had given place to a mood of depression and indifference. Internal disorder continued for some time after 1907, but Stolýpin persisted in the use of repressive measures until relative calm was restored. Though the revolutionary movement failed to gain all its objects, it achieved one of the most important of them, for the 'senseless dreams'¹ of a whole generation had at last materialized, and Russia possessed a representative institution which, however restricted its powers might be, could at least voice the opinions and needs of the country and exert some influence on the laws by which it was governed. The reactionaries would have abolished the Dúma altogether, or turned it into a mere consultative assembly, while the liberals wanted a real parliament with complete control over the executive. Stolýpin followed a middle course and stood for the Fundamental Laws of May 6, 1906,² which represented a compromise between autocracy and parliamentary government. The new electoral system gave him a Dúma with which he could co-operate. Its political complexion naturally differed from that of its predecessors, which had been overwhelmingly liberal and socialist. The opposition was reduced to 150 (including 53 Cadets and 30 Socialists), the right wing consisted of about the same number of reactionaries and extreme conservatives, while the centre was formed of a solid block of Octobrists, whose political programme was similar to that of Stolýpin.³

¹ Cf. p. 488.

² Cf. p. 538.

³ Guchkón, leader of the Octobrist party, declared that Russia was a constitutional country, but that this 'did not, and could not, imply parlia-

The third Dúma, which met on November 14, 1907, devoted its attention chiefly to practical matters. The most important of these was national defence. In June 1908 Guchkóv opened the debate on the army and navy estimates with an attack on the army command. Three grand dukes who held high military offices at once resigned. Each year the campaign for reforms was renewed, and as the result of the combined efforts of the Dúma and the government the military power of Russia rapidly recovered from the set-back of 1905. Education also occupied a prominent place amongst the subjects dealt with by the Dúma, for it planned a wide extension of the elementary school system, voted large sums of money for this purpose in addition to those asked for in the official estimates, and approved of the foundation of several higher educational institutions.¹ The Dúma passed important laws dealing with state insurance for workmen, the reform of the local administration of justice, and the provision of state credit for zémstvos and municipal authorities. It ratified Stolýpin's agrarian law of November 22, 1906,² under which the peasants might convert their shares of the communal land into personal property. Its relations with the Ministry were, on the whole, peaceful, though several conflicts arose over constitutional questions. The most serious of these occurred in March 1911. The Council of State rejected a government measure providing for the creation of zémstvos in the western provinces.³ Stolýpin prorogued the Council and the Dúma, and promulgated the zémstvo law under 'mentary government in the English sense'. The peaceful development of Russia was only possible under a constitutional monarch, with a Dúma endowed with legislative powers and a strong executive responsible to the monarch.

¹ Including a university at Sarátov and commercial institutes at Moscow and Khárkov.

² Cf. p. 543.

³ Vitebsk, Volýnia, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilév, and Pólotsk.

Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws.¹ This arbitrary step raised a storm in both chambers. The Dúma pronounced Stolýpin's action to be illegal and passed a vote of censure on the government, while the president, Guchkóv,² resigned in protest.

The elections for the fourth Dúma, which took place in the autumn of 1912, led to no striking change in the balance of parties, but they showed that public interest in politics was beginning to revive, and the country was throwing off the apathy and indifference into which it had sunk after 1907. In 1913 there were signs that a new political movement was developing. The working classes became restless, and serious strikes broke out at Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, and Bakú. The fourth Dúma demanded the introduction of reforms. A congress of municipal workers met at Kiev in October and passed a resolution condemning the policy of the government. In the following month the Octobrist party demanded the withdrawal of the exceptional laws and the unqualified recognition of the civil liberties that had been promised in 1905, and pledged itself to use every constitutional means of combating the government, which, it declared, was acting in direct contradiction to the manifesto of October 30. In February 1914 Goremýkin was appointed Premier,³ with instructions to 'work in harmony with the legislature'. He tried to enter into closer relations with the Dúma leaders, and conferred with them over

¹ Cf. p. 538.

² The third Dúma had three presidents, all of whom were Octobrists—N. A. Homýakóv (1907-10), A. I. Guchkóv (March 1910-March 1911), and M. V. Rodzyáńko (1911-12). Rodzyáńko held the same office in the fourth Dúma, from 1912 right up to 1917.

³ Goremýkin succeeded Kokóvtsev, who had been appointed after Stolýpin's death in 1911. Stolýpin was shot during a special performance at the Kiev Opera Theatre, in the presence of the *tsar* and the court, on September 14, and died four days later.

a fresh series of measures for the reorganization of the national defences. But the Dúma remained hostile to the general policy of the government, and in May passed a vote of censure on the Minister of the Interior, Maklakóv, for persistently disregarding the representative institutions, thereby 'undermining the welfare and safety of the State'. Popular discontent continued to grow. May Day strikes involved 130,000 workers in Petersburg alone. The strikes continued throughout June and July, and became more and more threatening. On July 23 armed conflicts broke out in the streets of the capital. Barricades were erected, Cossacks charged the strikers, and there were many killed and wounded. On July 24 there were still 110,000 workmen out in Petersburg.

Thus, on the eve of the war Russia seemed to be drifting into a second revolution. External danger, however, thrust the political struggle into the background for a time. The Petersburg strikes ceased on July 26. The Dúma met on August 9 and gave expression to the feeling of the country in a great patriotic demonstration. Political parties called a truce. The war was popular—only the extreme section of the Social Democrats disapproved of it—and the whole nation seemed ready to trust the government.

Internal harmony did not last long. The military disasters of 1915 proved that the crisis through which Russia was passing was too serious to be dealt with by bureaucratic methods. The people began to demand a share in the conduct of affairs, especially in the organization of the supply of munitions and equipment for the army. The government became alarmed, and made important concessions. Sukhomlínov, Minister of War, was replaced by General Polivánov. Three other ministers, who had made themselves particularly obnoxious by their reactionary policy, gave way to moderate conservatives. War industrial committees were formed in the chief manufac-

turing centres. The Unions of Zémstvos and Towns, which were already in charge of the evacuation and treatment of the wounded, extended their activity and played an important part in the co-ordination of national effort. The government found itself constantly compelled to turn for help to these and other public bodies. The value of their services was fully appreciated by the army and its leaders, and they were uniformly successful in every task they undertook.

But public initiative was always suspect, and even in a time of national crisis the vested interests of absolutism and bureaucracy were placed before the safety and well-being of Russia. Towards the end of the year the reactionary party began to regain the ground that it had lost in the spring and summer. The war industrial committees and the Unions found themselves hindered at every turn. The voice of public opinion was silenced, and the censorship laid its hand heavily on the press. The nation looked for guidance to the Dúma, where a strong progressive *bloc* of over 300 members had begun to demand the reconstruction of the Ministry on a more popular basis, with a view to the attainment of greater efficiency in the conduct of the war.¹ The growth of disorder in the country, the complete break-down of economic life, and the hopeless failure of bureaucratic methods in the vital spheres of transport and food supply, were giving rise to widespread discontent. After two years of war Russia was suffering much more severe privation than any other of the belligerent countries. The government, however, became more and more arbitrary in its actions. Secret influences at court ruled the irresolute and yielding *tsar* and all knowledge of the real situation was kept from him. Ministers who sympathized with the national aspirations were dismissed at the bidding of an irresponsible knot of persons who exploited

¹ A similar *bloc* was formed by the progressive members of the Council of State.

the sinister hold attained by Raspútin over the mind of the Empress. The last remnants of respect for autocracy vanished, and the whole nation united in the demand for a responsible ministry, which was raised by the Dúma and the Union of Zémstvos, and insistently repeated by other public bodies throughout the country. Even the United Gentry and the Council of State, the strongholds of reaction, passed resolutions that showed their solidarity with the wishes of the people. Members of the imperial family constantly urged the *tsar* to yield, but he continued to believe his advisers, and even the murder of Raspútin did not open his eyes to the dangers of the situation.¹

The struggle was not confined to internal affairs, for both sides realized that the political future of Russia depended ultimately on the issue of the war. Progressive opinion was in complete sympathy with the Allies and demanded reforms that would enable Russia to take her proper share in the war. The reactionaries feared the triumph of the internal enemy much more than that of Germany, and in the summer of 1916 begged the *tsar* to conclude peace immediately, since the war was strengthening the 'revolutionary' elements. Sazónov's resignation in July and the appointment of Stürmer² as Minister of Foreign Affairs showed that the reactionary view on foreign policy was making headway, and roused unpleasant suspicions. Sazónov had been the close friend of Great Britain and France,

¹ The most outspoken appeal was that made at the request of the *tsar's* mother and sisters by the Grand Duke Nikolái Mikháilovich (the historian), who pointed out that 'the constant interference in affairs of State of "dark forces"', acting through the empress, was undermining the faith of the people in the *tsar*, and urged him to shake himself free from these influences and rely on his own judgements, 'which are always wonderfully sound'. This appeal was received politely by the *tsar*, but the empress resented the references to herself, and the grand duke was exiled to his estate.

² Stürmer succeeded Goremykin as Premier on February 3, 1916.

while Stürmer was the nominee of a party at court which, if not actively pro-German, was at least anxious to throw off the bonds that united autocratic Russia with the free countries of the West. When the Dúma met in November a determined assault was made on the Ministry. In a speech that was suppressed by the censorship for several weeks, Milyukóv referred to 'ominous rumours of treachery' that were spreading from end to end of Russia, rumours about 'dark forces' struggling, on behalf of Germany, to prepare the ground for a shameful peace, by sowing discord in the country.¹ He accused the government of playing into the hands of the enemy with its internal policy, and charged Stürmer himself with corrupt practices. The attack was so strong, and evidently so clearly justified, that Stürmer was dismissed. This was only a half-victory, for although the new Premier, Trépov, tried to revert to a national policy, he was opposed by Protopópov, the reactionary Minister of the Interior,² and early in 1917 had to resign. Protopópov prohibited the congress of the Union of Zémstvos, arrested the workmen's delegates on the Petersburg War Industrial Committee on the pretext that they were conspiring to set up a democratic republic, and annulled the Moscow

¹ Milyukóv described the satisfaction with which Stürmer's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs was received by the Central Powers, and read the following extracts from German and Austrian papers: 'In foreign policy Stürmer is a white sheet of paper. He is undoubtedly one of those who have no particular enthusiasm for the war with Germany.' 'We Germans have no reason to regret the change. Stürmer will not hinder the desire for peace which is growing in Russia.' 'Stürmer, in any case, will be free in his relations with Downing Street.'

² Protopópov was originally a member of the Dúma (Octobrist). After his appointment to the post of Minister of the Interior he went over to the reactionaries, and this complete change of front earned for him the bitter hostility of his former colleagues. He had been a member of the deputation to the allied countries in the summer, and on his way back to Russia had an interview with a German diplomat at Stockholm.

municipal elections, which gave the progressive parties an overwhelming victory. Under Trépov's successor, Prince Golítsyn, he became practically dictator, and though his policy roused dissatisfaction in the Council of Ministers, he was too strongly supported by the Court party to be moved.

Meantime, the government food campaign failed completely, and the towns were threatened with famine. The Dúma re-assembled on February 27 and turned immediately to the food question, which it discussed in close connexion with the whole policy of the government. The new Premier, Prince Golítsyn, made no statement of his programme, but sent Ríttikh (Minister of Agriculture), who talked about the details of food-supply and tried to prove that all was well. The progressive *bloc* replied with a direct attack on the existing system and renewed the demand for a responsible ministry. Milyukóv accused the government of deliberately disorganizing the supplies of war material and food. The bureaucracy was caring only for its own safety and carrying on war against the people. 'When the fruit of great national sacrifices is exposed to risk at the hands of incapable and evil-disposed authorities, then the people declare that the fatherland is in danger and wish to take its fate into their own control. We are now approaching this point.' Chkhéidze (Social Democrat) declared that, in order to force the existing government to give way to one satisfactory to the people, 'a decisive struggle is necessary—a national movement. Such a movement may develop into a revolution.'

The situation in the country, and especially in Petrograd, was by now threatening. On March 8 demonstrations took place in the streets, and crowds of people were demanding bread. Red flags appeared on the Névsky Prospékt. Next day the authorities set cordons of police and Cossacks, but the people broke through and held meetings in the centre of the

city. Red flags appeared again, and in some places there were conflicts with the police. The Dúma asked the Premier what measures he proposed to take in order to ensure a sufficiency of bread in the capital. A resolution was passed demanding that the supply and distribution of food products should be handed over to the municipal authorities. This demand was conceded the same day by the Ministry, at a special conference with representatives of the legislative chambers and the Petersburg City Council, convened at the instance of Rodzyánko.¹ But events continued to move in the city. During the night Protopópov strengthened the patrols and had machine-guns posted in commanding positions on public buildings. The movement in the streets increased on the 10th. The Social Democratic Party and the Labour Unions joined in, and the election of a Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates began. As a result of the first serious encounters of troops and police with the crowds before the Kazán Cathedral there were many killed and wounded. On March 11 Rodzyánko sent an urgent telegram to the *tsar* at head-quarters (Mogilëv): 'The position is serious. There is anarchy in the capital. The government is paralysed. The transportation of fuel and food is completely disorganized. The general dissatisfaction grows. Disorderly firing takes place in the streets. A person trusted by the country must be charged immediately to form a new Ministry.' Rodzyánko asked the army leaders to support his petition. Brusílov answered, 'I will perform my duty before my country and *tsar*'. On the morning of the 12th Rodzyánko sent a second telegram: 'The position is getting worse. Measures must be taken at once, because to-morrow will be too late. The last hour has struck, and the fate of the fatherland and of the dynasty is being decided.'

The troops were already beginning to join the people, and the revolutionary army grew in numbers every hour. Govern-

¹ President of the Dúma.

ment offices and the fortress of Peter and Paul were seized, and the crowd set fire to the head-quarters of the secret police. Representatives of the government were arrested and the political prisoners released. The people besieged the police in their strongholds. The Dúma refused to recognize a decree proroguing it until April, and elected a Provisional Committee of twelve members, which assumed executive power. One by one the regiments of the garrison declared themselves in favour of the Dúma, and patrols were detached to keep order in the streets. The Dúma sent its representatives to take over the machinery of government. By March 14 the revolution had triumphed. The Provisional Committee negotiated with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates for the formation of a Ministry, which was headed by Prince G. Lvov.¹ The inclusion of Kérensky as Minister of Justice secured the support of the Social Revolutionaries for the new government, which promised a political amnesty, full civil rights, the abolition of restrictions based on class, religious, or national differences, a new discipline in the army, the democratization of local government, and the summons of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal suffrage. Telegrams from Brusílov and Rúzsky announced that the armies in the field had joined the revolution. In Moscow the representatives of the old régime yielded at once, and within a few days the wave of revolution had rolled to the ends of the country. Public committees took over authority, and the change was everywhere accepted with enthusiasm.

The course of events in Petrograd and the provinces was known only to a few of the imperial suite at Mogilév. Aleksév (Chief of Staff) reported to the emperor Rodzyánko's telegrams. The empress at Tsárskoe Seló refused to believe that all was lost

¹ The first Provisional Government included six Cadets, two Octobrists, and one Social Revolutionary.

until the garrison and palace guards joined the revolution. The emperor left Mogilëv on March 13 and tried to reach Tsárskoe Seló by way of the Moscow-Petersburg line. Near the capital the railway was held by revolutionary troops, and the imperial train was diverted across country to Pskov, where the *tsar* proposed to put himself under the protection of General Rúzsky. He arrived at Pskov late in the evening of March 14, and during the night informed Rúzsky that he had decided to make concessions. But Rodzyánko, who was communicated with by telegraph, declared that it was too late to talk of concessions, and that the only course left for him was to abdicate. Rúzsky reported the results of these negotiations to Alekséev, the Grand Duke Nikolái Nicoláievich, and other army leaders, who agreed with Rodzyánko. In the evening of March 15 two representatives of the Dúma, Guchkóv and Shúlgin, arrived at Pskov and were received by the emperor. They informed him of the position in Petrográd, and insisted on his abdication in favour of his heir, Alexis. Nicholas decided that it would be too painful for him to part with his son, and in the end signed the following historical manifesto, handing over the crown to his brother Michael :

‘ We, Nicholas II, by the Grace of God Emperor of Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, &c., &c., declare to all our faithful subjects :

‘ In the days of a great struggle against an external enemy who for three years has been striving to enslave our country, it has pleased the Lord God to send down on Russia new and severe trials. The internal tumults which have begun threaten to have a fatal effect on the further progress of this obstinate war. The destiny of Russia, the honour of our heroic army, the welfare of the people, and the whole future of our dear fatherland demand that the war shall be conducted at all costs to a victorious end. A cruel foe is exerting his last strength, and the hour is already near when our valiant army, in concert with our glorious Allies, will finally overthrow the enemy.

‘ In these decisive days in the life of Russia we have considered

it our duty to make it easier for our people to unite and organize all their forces for the swift attainment of victory, and in agreement with the Imperial Dúma we have decided for the good of the country to abdicate the throne of Russia and lay down the supreme power.

‘Not wishing to part from our beloved son, we bequeath the heritage to our brother, the Grand Duke Micháil Alexándrovich. Blessing him on his accession to the throne, we adjure our brother to rule in affairs of State in full and unbroken harmony with the representatives of the people in the legislative institutions, on principles which they shall determine, and to take an inviolable oath to this effect, in the name of our dearly beloved country.

‘We call upon all faithful sons of the fatherland to fulfil their sacred duty to it by obeying the *tsar* in this grave time of national trial, and to help him, along with the representatives of the people, to lead the Russian State on to the path of victory, prosperity, and glory.

‘May the Lord God help Russia.

‘(Signed) NICHOLAS.’

The manifesto published by the Grand Duke Michael on March 16 was the last act of the dynasty :

‘A heavy burden has been laid upon me by the will of my brother, who in a time of unexampled strife and popular tumult has transferred to me the imperial throne of Russia. Sharing with the people the thought that the good of the country should stand before everything else, I have firmly decided that I will accept power only if that is the will of our great people, who must by universal suffrage elect their representatives to a Constituent Assembly, in order to determine the form of government and draw up new fundamental laws for Russia. Therefore, calling for the blessing of God, I ask all citizens of Russia to obey the Provisional Government, which has arisen and been endowed with full authority on the initiative of the Imperial Dúma, until such time as the Constituent Assembly, called at the earliest possible date and elected on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall by its decision as to the form of government give expression to the will of the people.’



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

- 852-62. Traditional beginning of the Russian Nation with a SCANDI-NAVIAN MIGRATION from the Upsala region of Sweden to Old NÓVGOROD in north-western Russia (Rurik).
865. First Rus attack on Constantinople, from Kiev.
- 880-1. KIEV becomes the chief town of the Russian Princes.
- 904-7. Second Rus attack on Constantinople.
Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
912. Fuller Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
- 935-. Third Rus attack on Constantinople.
944. Fourth Rus attack on Constantinople.
New Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
Russian raiders beyond the Caucasus, fighting with Muhammadans.
955. Visit of the Princess (Regent-Mother) Olga to Constantinople. Her conversion to Greek Christianity. Progress of the infant Russian Church under her protection.
- 964-72. Reign of Svyatosláv as Grand Prince in Kiev.
- 971-2. Fifth Rus attack on Constantinople and the Eastern Empire.
972. New Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
- 972 [973]-1015. Reign of VLADÍMIR THE GREAT ('St. Vladímir') as Grand Prince in Kiev. Zenith of the Old Russian Power.
983. Vladímir takes Kherson (in the Crimea) and begins to negotiate with the Eastern Empire (Alliance ; Conversion).
- 988-. CONVERSION of the Russians to the Orthodox Eastern (Greek) Church, effected by St. Vladímir.
- 1016-54. Reign of YAROSLÁV the Great ('the Lawgiver') as Russian Grand Prince. The Old Russian Federation at the height of its prosperity.
Buildings of Yarosláv at Kiev and elsewhere.
1032. Earliest record of Russians of Old Nówgorod in touch with *Túgra*—the NW. corner of Siberia-in-Asia (?).
1045. Cathedral of St. Sophia at Old Nówgorod completed.
1079. Fresh Nówgorod expedition to the Northern Dviná regions.
- 1106-7. Travels of Abbot Daniel of Kiev to Constantinople, Palestine, &c.
1112. Nówgorod pioneers in Pechorá and Ob basins, on both sides of the Uráls.

- 1113-25. Reign of VLADÍMIR MONOMÁKH, as Grand Prince in Kiev (last of the truly powerful Kiev Princes).
- 1147-56. Beginnings of MOSCOW.
1169. Siege and capture of Kiev by rebel Russians of the north, led by Andréy Bogolyúbski of Suzdal (fl. 1157-74).
Great Nóvgorod expedition (tribute and commerce) to the northern Dviná.
1174. Foundation of the Nóvgorod colony of Vyatka.
- 1187-94. Nóvgorod struggles for influence on both sides of the Urals end in disaster.
1203. Kiev again taken and sacked, this time by the Pólovtsi or Kumans of the Steppes.
1200. The German Order of the Sword-Brethren founded (Riga, &c.).
1220. Foundation of Nizhni-Nóvgorod.
1224. First Mongol Tartar attack on the Rus. Russian defeat on the river Kálka.
1237. Union of the Sword-Brethren and the Teutonic Knights. Conflicts with Russians of Nóvgorod, &c.
- 1237-43. Second and decisive TARTAR attack upon *Rus*. CONQUEST of the whole country. Beginnings of the *Tartar Age* of Russian history.
- 1240-63. Alexander Névski, Prince of Nóvgorod.
1240. Victory of Alexander Névski over the Swedes on the Nevá.
Fall of Kiev before the Tartars.
1242. Victory of Alexander Névski over the Teutonic Knights on Lake Chúdscoe or Peipus.
- 1245-7. Carpini crosses Russia on his visit to the Mongol Tartar courts from the Pope.
1269. (Earliest ?) commercial agreement between the merchants of Nóvgorod and the Hanseatic League.
- 1315-40. Gedimin the Conqueror, Duke of the Lithuanians or *Litva*.
Acquisition of Kiev, with Pinsk, Chernígov, &c., by the *Litva*.
- 1328-41. IVÁN KALITÁ, Grand Prince of Moscow (vassal to Tartars).
Beginnings of importance of Moscow.
- 1345-77. Olgerd, Duke of the Lithuanians. *Litva* power at its height.
- 1363-89. DMÍTRI DONSKÓI, Grand Prince of Moscow.
- 1376-96. Mission work of St. Stephen of Perm in the north-east (Káma, &c.).
- 1377-1434. Jagiello, Duke of the Lithuanians.
1380. Battle of Kúlikovo on the Don. First Moscovite success against the Tartars (Dmitri Donskói).
1386. Union of Poland-Lithuania (Hedwig-Jagiello).

- 1390-. Timur attacks and defeats the Mongol Tartars of Russia, and fatally weakens the Golden Horde, thus giving Christian Russia a new opportunity.
- 1392-1430. Vitovt, last great Lithuanian leader.
1399. Timur defeats the Lithuanians (Vitovt) at Poltáva.
1405. Death of Timur. Relaxation of Tartar hold over *Rus*.
1410. Battle of Tannenberg or Grünwald. Decisive victory of Poles and Lithuanians over Teutonic Knights.
1429. Foundation of Solovétski monastery on the White Sea.
1445. Last recorded Nóvgorod attempts to exercise dominion on both sides of the Uráls fail.
- 1462-1505. IVAN THE GREAT, Grand Prince of Moscow, first of the Russian *tsars*. Foundation of the new Russian Empire.
1465. Ivan the Great begins to interfere in *Yúgra* (NW. Siberia).
1471. Conquest of Nóvgorod by Ivan the Great.
1472. Moscovite conquest of Perm.
1480. End of the Mongol Tartar overlordship.
1483. Fresh expedition of Ivan the Great to *Yúgra*.
1485. Moscovite acquisition of Tver.
1499. Final expedition of Ivan the Great to *Yúgra*. Moscovite authority firmly established on both sides of Uráls.
1505. Accession of BASIL III (Vasíli Ivánovich).
1510. Subjection of the city-republic of Pskov to Moscow.
1514. War with Poland.
1517. Subjection of Ryazán to Moscow.
1523. Incorporation of Chernígov and Nóvgorod-Séversk with Moscow.
1526. End of war with Poland, and incorporation of Smolénsk with Moscow.
1533. Accession of IVAN IV ('the Terrible', *Grózny*, Iván Vasílevich).
1538. Death of Ivan IV's mother.
1547. Coronation, as *tsar*, of Ivan IV, and his marriage with Anastasia Románovna.
1550. First General Assembly, *Zémski sobór*.
1552. Introduction of printing.
Conquest of Kazán.
1553. Chancellor reaches Archangel and opens direct communication between England and Russia.
1556. Conquest of Astrakhan.
1558. War against the Baltic Knights and with Poland.
Colony of the Stróganovs founded on the Káma.
1564. Defection of Kúrbski.
Retirement of Ivan to Alexándrov.

1565. Institution of the *Oprichnina*.
 1566. Second General Assembly.
 1569. Congress of Lublin: Kiev, Volýnia, and Podolia separated from Lithuania and incorporated with the kingdom of Poland.
 1571. Crimean Tartars burn Moscow.
 1572. Death of Sigismund II, Augustus, King of Poland, last of the line of Jagiello.
 1581. Invasion of Carelia and Esthonia by Sweden.
 1582. Ant. Possevinus, legate of Gregory XIII, visits Moscow and helps to restore peace between Moscow and Poland.
 Ermák conquers western Siberia.
 Ivan IV causes the death of his eldest son and heir Ivan (Ivánovich).
 1583. Birth of Demetrius (Dmítiri Ivánovich).
 1584. Third General Assembly.
 Horsey in Moscow.
 Accession of THEODORE I (Fëdor Ivánovich).
 Supremacy of Nikíta Románovich.
 Demetrius exiled to Úglich.
 1587. Supremacy (Regency) of Boris Godunóv.
 1589. Jeremy, Patriarch of Constantinople, while in Moscow, consecrates the Metropolitan Job as Patriarch.
 1591. Supposed death of the *tsarévich* Demetrius at Úglich.
 1598. Death of *tsar* Theodore, end of the dynasty, and beginning of the
 TIME OF TROUBLES.
 Fourth General Assembly, which elects BORÍS GODUNÓV to the throne.
 1600. Banishment of Philaret and Martha, and of their infant son Michael Románov.
 1604. The 'False Demetrius' enters Russia from Poland.
 Death of Borís Godunóv and of his son, Theodore II.
 1605. Accession of Demetrius, *tsar* Dimítiri Ivánovich.
 1606. Revolt of the *boyars* against Demetrius, death of the latter, and election by the *boyars* of Prince Vasíli Shúiski to the throne.
 Appearance of Pseudo-Demetrius II.
 1609. Intervention of Sweden and Poland.
 Deposition of *tsar* Vasíli Shúiski (July).
 Chuzbevlástie, the period of *Foreign Rule*.
 The *boyars* acknowledge Ladislas, son of Sigismund III of Poland.
 Death of Pseudo-Demetrius II.
 1611. First national levy (*opolchénie*).
 1612. Second national levy; eviction of the Poles.

1613. Fifth General Assembly and election of MICHAEL ROMÁNOV to the throne.
1618. War with Poland, ending unsuccessfully for Russia.
Truce of Deülino (14½ years) between Moscow and Poland.
1632. Vinius establishes arsenal at Túla.
Death of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and accession of Queen Christina.
War between Russia and Poland renewed.
1633. Foundation of the Academy of Kiev by Mogíla.
1634. Peace of Polyánovka between Moscow and Poland.
1637. Capture of Azóv by the Don Cossacks.
1640. Accession of Frederick William, the 'Great Elector'.
1645. Death of Michael.
Accession of *tsar* ALEXIS (Mikháilovich).
1648. Popular disturbances in Moscow.
Codification of laws (*Ulozhenie*).
Beginning of the war between Khmelnítski and the Little Russian Cossacks against Poland.
1650. Slavinétski comes to Moscow from Kiev.
Disturbances in Pskov and Nóvgorod.
1652. Nikon appointed Patriarch.
The Great Schism in the Russian Church (*raskól*).
1653. Khmelnitski offers to place himself and the Cossacks of Little Russia under the protection of Moscow.
654. Moscow accepts the offer, and war is declared against Poland.
Abdication of Queen Christina of Sweden and accession of Charles X Gustavus.
655. Charles X of Sweden declares war against Poland.
War between Moscow and Sweden.
656. Treaty of Vilna between Moscow and Poland.
Issue of copper money.
658. Death of Khmelnítski.
659. Truce of Valiesar between Moscow and Sweden.
660. Peace of Oliva between Poland and Sweden.
661. Peace of Stólbovo between Moscow and Sweden.
662. Revolt of July in Moscow.
667. Truce of Andrúsovo : Moscow secures Smolénsk, Kiev, and Little Russia east of the Dnieper.
- 570-1. Rebellion of Sténko Rázin.
572. Birth of Peter (Alexéevich).
576. Accession of THEODORE III (Fëdor Alexéevich).

- 1681. Treaty of Bakhchi-Sarai between Moscow and Turkey.
- 1682. Abolition of *Méstnichestvo*.
Accession of IVAN V and PETER, under the regency of the
 tsaréwna Sophia.
- 1686. Treaty of Moscow between Russia and Poland.
- 1689. Marriage of Peter with Eudoxia Lopukhiná.
 Attempted *coup d'état* by Sophia against Peter, after the failure of
 which Sophia is relegated to a convent.
- 1690. Birth of Alexis (Alexéi Petróvich).
 Capture of Azón.
 Death of Ivan V.
- 1697. Election to the Polish throne of Augustus, Elector of Saxony
 (Augustus II).
- 1697-8. Peter visits Germany, Holland, England, and France.
- 1698. Revolt of the Stréltsy and return of Peter.
- 1699. Treaty of Carlowitz.
- 1700. Beginning of the Northern War.
 Battle of Narva (Nov. 30).
- 1703. Foundation of St. Petersburg.
- 1704. The Russians take Narva.
- 1705. Revolt of the Stréltsy at Astrakhan.
- 1706. Treaty of Alt-Ranstädt between Sweden and Poland.
- 1708. Defeat of the Swedes by the Russians at Lesnáya.
 Birth of Anne (Petróvna).
- 1709. Birth of Elizabeth (Petróvna).
 Battle of Poltáva (July 8).
- 1710. Anne (Ivánovna) married to the Duke of Courland.
 War between Russia and Turkey; Peter's defeat on the Prut.
- 1712. Marriage of Peter with his second wife (Catherine).
- 1714. Victory over the Swedish fleet at Hangö.
- 1715. Birth of Peter (Alexéevich).
- 1716. Catherine (Ivánovna) married to the Duke of Mecklenburg.
- 1717. Peter visits Versailles.
 Alexis escapes abroad.
 Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac).
- 1718. Death of Charles XII.
 Death of Alexis (Petróvich).
 Birth of Anne (Leopóldovna), daughter of Catherine (Ivánovna
 and the Duke of Mecklenburg.
- 1721. Peace of Nystadt and end of the Northern War.
- 1722. *Ukáz* giving the sovereign the right to nominate the heir to the throne

1724. Alliance between Sweden and Russia.
1725. Accession of CATHERINE I.
Marriage of Anne (Petróvna) with the Duke of Holstein.
1726. Institution of the Supreme Secret Council.
Alliance between Russia and Austria.
1727. Accession of PETER II (Pëtr Alexéevich).
1728. Birth of Peter (the future Peter III) and death of his mother Anne (Petróvna).
1730. Death of Peter II (Alexéevich).
Attempted *coup d'état* and establishment of a constitution by Prince D. M. Golítsyn.
Accession of ANNE (Ivánovna).
1732. Alliance of the 'three black eagles': the Emperor Charles VI, Frederick William I of Prussia, and the Empress Anne.
1733. Death of Augustus II, King of Poland.
War on the Polish Succession.
1734. Election of his son to the throne as Augustus III.
1735. War between Russia and Turkey.
1739. Treaty of Belgrade between Russia and Turkey.
Marriage of Anne (Leopóldovna) to Antony Ulrich, Duke of Brunswick-Bevern.
1740. Death of the Emperor Charles VI; accession of his daughter, Maria Theresa, to the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia.
Death of Frederick William I, King of Prussia, and accession of his son Frederick (the Great).
Death of the Empress Anne, and accession of her great-nephew, the infant IVAN VI (Antónovich), under the regency of Bühren.
Beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession.
1741. Deposition of Ivan VI and accession of ELIZABETH (Petróvna).
War between Sweden and Russia.
1742. Charles Peter Ulrich, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, brought to Russia from Kiel by the Empress Elizabeth and proclaimed heir.
1743. Treaty of Åbo between Sweden and Russia.
1744. Princess Sophie of Anhalt-Zerbst arrives in St. Petersburg.
1745. Marriage of Peter and Princess Sophie (Catherine).
1746. Renewal of alliance between Austria and Russia.
1748. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, terminating the War of the Austrian Succession, and giving Silesia to Prussia.
1754. Birth of Paul (Petróvich).
1756. Alliance of Austria with France, and of Prussia with Great Britain.

1757. Russia allies herself with Austria and France.
 Beginning of the Seven Years' War.
 Battle of Gross-Jaegersdorf.
 Battles of Rosbach and Lissa.
1758. Battle of Zorndorf.
1759. Battle of Künersdorf.
1760. The Russians raid Berlin.
1761. Imminent collapse of Frederick the Great.
1762. Death of the Empress Elizabeth (Dec. 22, 1761/Jan. 2, 1762).
 and accession of PETER III.
 End of the war between Russia and Prussia (April).
 Emancipation of the Nobility from compulsory service.
 Deposition of Peter III and accession of CATHERINE II (July).
 Peace of Hubertsburg between Austria and Prussia.
1763. Death of King Augustus III of Poland.
1764. Election of King Stanislas Augustus (Poniatowski).
 Alliance concluded between Russia and Prussia.
1765. Joseph II, son of Maria Theresa, elected emperor.
1766. Legislative Commission in Moscow.
1768. Secession (*Konfederacja*) of Bar (Feb.).
 First war with Turkey begins (Oct.).
1769. Frederick suggests partition of Poland to Catherine (Feb.).
 Austria occupies Zips (Feb.).
 Meeting of Frederick the Great and Joseph II at Neisse (Aug.).
 Victory of Russians over the Turks at Khotin (Chocin, Sept.).
1770. Victory of the Russian over the Turkish fleet at Chésme (July).
 Victory of the Russians over the Turks at Kagul (Aug.).
 Frederick the Great, Joseph II, and Kaunitz meet at Neustadt (Sept.).
 Prince Henry of Prussia visits St. Petersburg (Oct.).
 Fall of Choiseul (Dec.).
1770. Austria annexes Zips (Dec.).
1771. Catherine agrees to partition of Poland (Jan.).
 The Russians invade and conquer the Crimea.
 Treaty of Alliance between Turkey and Austria (July).
1772. Agreement reached on the partition of Poland (Jan.).
 Peace conference of Russia and Turkey at Focşani (April).
 Signature of the treaties of the first partition (July).
Coup d'état in Sweden (Aug.), and accession of Gustavus III.
 Peace conference of Russia and Turkey at Bucarest and armistice.
1773. Ratification by Poland of the treaties of partition (Sept.-Nov.).
 Unsuccessful Russian campaign on the Danube.


The rebellion of Pugachëv.


1774. Congress and Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (July).
Bukovina occupied by Austria (Sept.).
1775. Ratification of the Treaty of Kainardji (Jan.).
Austria annexes Bukovina (May).
Capture and execution of Pugachëv.
Russia forces a pro-Russian constitution on Poland.
1778. War between Austria and Prussia.
1779. Treaty of Teschen between Austria and Prussia.
1780. Death of Maria Theresa (Nov.); accession of Joseph II.
End of the *northern system*, rapprochement of Russia with Austria and France, 'armed neutrality'.
Meeting between Catherine II and Joseph II.
1782. Alliance between Russia and Austria.
1783. Russia annexes the Crimea.
1784. Turkey, by the Treaty of Constantinople, recognizes Russian ownership of the Crimea.
1786. Death of Frederick the Great, and accession of Frederick William II.
1787. Commercial treaty between France and Russia.
Visit of Catherine II to the Crimea.
Beginning of the second war, in alliance with Austria, against Turkey.
Sweden declares war against Russia.
1788. Suvórov captures Ochákov.
1789. Victories of Suvórov in Moldavia.
1790. Death of Joseph II (Feb.); accession of Leopold II.
Defensive alliance between Prussia and Poland (March).
Reconciliation between Austria and Prussia.
Suvórov captures Ismail.
Peace of Verela between Russia and Sweden.
Meeting of Leopold II and Frederick William II at Reichenbach (July).
1791. New Polish constitution promulgated (May).
Peace concluded between Austria and Turkey (Aug.).
1792. Peace of Jassy between Russia and Turkey (Jan.).
Death of Leopold II (March), and accession of Francis II.
France declares war on Austria (April).
Secession (*Konfederacja*) of Targowica (May).
War between Russia and Poland.
King Stanislas Augustus joins the Secessionists (July).
Constitution of 1791 abolished.

1793. Second treaty of partition concluded between Russia and Prussia (Jan.).
 Constitution of 1775 restored.
 Last meeting of the Polish Diet at Grodno (June).
 Ratification by Poland of the second treaty of partition (Aug.-Sept.).
1794. Polish rebellion under Kościuszko (March).
 Prussia joins Russia against Poland (May).
 Prussians capture Cracow (June).
 Siege of Warsaw (July-Sept.).
 Rebellion against Prussia in Great Poland.
 Suvórov storms Praga (Nov.); capitulation of Warsaw.
1795. Third treaty of partition concluded between Russia and Prussia (Jan.) and between Russia and Austria (Oct.).
 Abdication of King Stanislas Augustus (Nov.).
1796. Death of Catherine II (Nov.).
 Accession of PAUL.
1797. Russia joins the Second Coalition. Suvórov's campaign.
1800. Paul breaks with his allies, and prepares for war with England.
1801. Murder of Paul (March 23). Accession of ALEXANDER I.
 Peace with England (June 17). Annexation of Georgia.
1804. War with Persia (1804-13).
1805. Russia joins the Third Coalition, Austerlitz (Dec. 2).
1806. War with Turkey (1806-12).
 Prussia breaks with France, Jena-Auerstadt (Oct. 14).
1807. Eylau (Feb. 8) and Friedland (June 14). Treaty of Tilsit (July 9).
 Russia acquires Belóstov. Duchy of Warsaw created.
1808. Sweden cedes Finland (Sept. 17). Speránsky's 'Constitution'.
1812. Treaty of Bucarest. Bessarabia acquired. Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Borodinó (Sept. 7). French occupation of Moscow (Sept. 14-Oct. 15).
1813. Campaign in Germany. Battle of Leipzig (Oct. 16-19).
 Treaty of Gulistan. Central and eastern Caucasus acquired.
1814. Invasion of France. The allies occupy Paris (March 31). First Treaty of Paris (May 30).
1815. Treaty of Vienna (June 7). Russia acquires Poland.
 Waterloo (June 18). Holy Alliance (Sept. 26). Second Treaty of Paris and Quadruple Alliance (Nov. 20).
1821. Outbreak of the Greek revolt.
1825. Death of Alexander I (Dec. 1). Interregnum. Accession of NICHOLAS I. 'Decembrist' rising.

1826. Treaty of Akkerman (Oct. 7). War with Persia (1826-8).
1828. Persia cedes Eriván and Nakhicheván. Russo-Turkish War (April 26).
1829. Treaty of Adrianople (Sept. 14). Acquisitions in the Caucasus.
- 1830-1. Polish rebellion.
- 1831-3. Crisis in the Near East. Mehemet Ali.
1832. Publication of the Code of Laws.
1833. Russia assists Turkey. Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (July 8). 'Three Emperors' League'.
1847. Russian port established at the mouth of the Syr-Dariá.
1849. Russia helps Austria to suppress the Hungarian rebellion.
1851. Dispute over the custody of the Holy Places.
1853. Russian advance along the Syr-Dariá.
Outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey (Oct.).
1854. Great Britain and France declare war (March 27). Crimean campaign.
1855. Accession of ALEXANDER II (March 2).
Fall of Sevastópol (Sept. 9). Russians capture Kars (Nov. 26).
1856. Peace of Paris (March 30). Russia loses Bessarabia.
1858. Treaty of Aigun. China cedes the Amúr region.
1859. Surrender of Shamil. North-eastern Caucasus finally conquered.
1860. China cedes the maritime region east of the river Ussuri.
1861. Emancipation of the peasants (March 3).
Beginning of the revolutionary movement.
- 1863-4. Polish revolt.
1864. Creation of Zémstvos (Jan. 13). Educational and legal reforms.
1865. Capture of Tashként.
1866. Karakózov's attempt on the life of Alexander II (April 16).
Capture of Khodzhént.
1868. The Emir of Bukhara becomes a vassal of Russia.
1870. Municipal government reform (June 30).
1872. 'Three Emperors' League' revived.
1873. Conquest of Khiva.
1874. Universal military service introduced.
1875. Annexation of Kokánd.
1877. Russo-Turkish war. Fall of Plevna (Dec. 10).
1878. Treaty of Berlin (June 13). Russia acquires Kars, Batúm, and Ardahan, and regains Bessarabia.
1879. Alliance between Germany and Austria.
1880. Explosion in Winter Palace. Dictatorship of Lóris-Mélikov.
1881. Assassination of Alexander II (March 13). Accession of ALEXANDER III.

- 1881. The Trans-Caspian Turkomans subjected.
- 1882. Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, and Italy (May).
- 1884. Annexation of Merv.
‘Three Emperors’ League’ renewed. ‘Reinsurance’ treaty.
- 1885. Penjdeh incident.
- 1887. Great Britain and Russia define the frontier of Afghanistan.
Alliance between Russia and Austria terminated.
- 1890. New Zémstvo law (June 24).
Secret treaty between Russia and Germany lapses.
- 1891. Trans-Siberian railway begun.
- 1894. Dual Alliance concluded—Russia and France.
Accession of NICHOLAS II (Nov. 1).
- 1898. Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur leased from China.
- 1904. Russo-Japanese War. Battles of the Yalu (May 1), Liao-yang (Aug.),
and the Sha-ho (Oct.).
Zémstvo congress (Nov. 19–22). The ‘eleven points’.
- 1905. Fall of Port Arthur (Jan. 1). Battle of Mukden (Feb.). Baltic
Fleet destroyed (May 27). Treaty of Portsmouth (Aug. 29).
Manifesto granting a Dúma (Aug. 19). First general strike (Oct.).
Manifesto of Oct. 30. Armed rising at Moscow (Dec.). Electoral
law published (Dec. 24).
- 1906. First Dúma (May 10–July 21). Stolýpin’s agrarian law (Nov. 22).
- 1907. Anglo-Russian agreement.
Second Dúma (March 5–June 16). New electoral law (June 16).
Third Dúma meets (Nov. 14).
- 1911. Assassination of Stolýpin (Sept.).
- 1912. Fourth Dúma elected.
- 1913. Strike movements.
- 1914. Disturbances in Petersburg (July).
Germany declares war on Russia (Aug. 1).
- 1915. New national movement. Reforms demanded.
- 1916. The Dúma attacks the Government. Dismissal of Stürmer (Nov.).
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
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
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