THE LIFE
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR THOMAS MUNRO, BART.
AND K.C.B.
LATE GOVERNOR OF MADRAS.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE
AND PRIVATE PAPERS.

BY THE REV. G. R. GLEIG,
M.A. M.R.S.L. &c.

LONDON:
HENRY COLBURN AND RICHARD BENTLEY,
8, NEW BURLINGTON STREET.
1830.
I HINTED BY. SAMUEL BENTLEY,
Dorset Street, Fleet Street.
PREFACE

TO THE THIRD VOLUME.

The following Supplement to the Life and Correspondence of Sir Thomas Munro, has been arranged in consequence of the very favourable manner in which the preceding volumes were received. I confess that I never entertained any doubt as to the light in which the work ought to be viewed by a discerning public; but I think it just, both towards that public and myself, to state why any addition to it, as it first appeared, should be necessary.

When the friends of Sir Thomas Munro put into my hands his public and private papers for the purposes of arrangement and selection, I entered upon the task, not indeed under the smallest misgiving as to the real excellence of my materials,
but with an impression upon my mind that a good deal of condensation would be required in order to secure to the biography of a Company’s officer, however highly gifted, the degree of attention to which his merits were entitled. I have seen too much of what is called the reading portion of the community not to be aware, that of all the subjects offered to them, those connected with India are, by some strange fatuity, the least attractive; and hence I felt diffident in sending to the press more than a moderate selection from the writings even of such an Indian functionary as Sir Thomas Munro. I sincerely rejoice to find that I was mistaken in harbouring any such notions respecting the public taste. With the friendly censure which has been passed upon me for keeping back so much of Sir Thomas Munro’s correspondence, I am more gratified than I should have been by any meed of praise. I freely acknowledge my error, and I hasten to make amends for it.

But while I thus acknowledge that publicity might have been given at first to a larger portion of Sir Thomas Munro’s Correspondence than actually appeared, I must at the same time state, in my own vindication, that a good deal of that now presented to the notice of the reader has
come into my possession since the original selection was made. The military papers, in particular, which carry on so delightfully the narrative of events from 1781 to 1784, have been procured for me by the indefatigable exertions of the same gentleman who so largely assisted me before,—I mean Mr. Ravenshaw, whose admiration of the memory of his friend gives the best evidence of his own faculty of discerning the characters of men. In like manner, I am indebted to his Grace the Duke of Wellington for letters, of which till lately I was not in possession, but which will, I am sure, be read, not by soldiers only, but by civilians, with the deepest interest. The same thing may be said of the extensive correspondence inserted here, with Mr. Elphinstone, Sir John Malcolm, Sir Thomas Hislop, and other distinguished persons; all of which has, since the appearance of the former volumes, been forwarded to me, with a degree of liberality, honourable both to the heads and hearts of those concerned. While, therefore, I admit that I did the public taste some injustice, in doubting whether it would receive all at once a Memoir, even of Sir Thomas Munro, extended beyond certain limits, I find some consolation in the idea, that
not the least attractive part of the Correspondence which composes the present Volume, is scarcely more new to the general reader than to myself.

I have only to add, that the present mode of publishing has been adopted, in justice to the purchasers of the two previous volumes. Nothing would have been more easy than to recast the whole work; but, in this case, persons already possessed of the Memoir, must have been content either to go without the fresh matter given here, or have incurred the expense of purchasing an entirely new edition.

*Ash, near Wingham, Kent,*  
*August, 1830.*
CONTENTS

OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.
Letter from London.—Account of his reception in India.—Additional Military details.—Private Correspondence.
Page 1—81

CHAPTER II.
Letters from the Baramahl to his Father, Mother, and Sister, and to Captain, afterwards Sir Alexander Allen. 82—111

CHAPTER III.
Letters from Canara.—Correspondence with Colonel Wellesley, Mr. Webbe, Colonel Wilks, and his Relatives at home. 112—157

CHAPTER IV.
Ceded Districts.—Correspondence with Mr. Cockburn, Colonel Read, General Wellesley, the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, and his Relatives. 158—209
CHAPTER V.

Colonel Munro appointed Chief Commissioner for the Revision of the Judicial System.—Correspondence with his Sister Mrs. Erskine.—The Marquis of Hastings. 210—219

CHAPTER VI.

Southern Mahratta War.—Correspondence with the Governor-General, Mr. Elphinstone, Sir John Malcolm, Sir T. Hislop—Plan for the Campaign, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief.—Mr. Chaplin.—Private Letters. 220—284

CHAPTER VII.

The same subject continued.—Letters to Sir John Malcolm, Mr. Elphinstone, the Commander-in-Chief, Quarter-Master-General, &c. 285—314

CHAPTER VIII.

Sir Thomas Munro as Governor of Madras.—Minute on Interfering with the Succession of Native Princes.—Minute on the State of the Country, and the Condition of the People.—Minute on the Preservation of the Peace.—Minute of a Tour through the Southern Provinces.—Letters to Mr. Canning, Mr. Elphinstone, Sir Graham Moore, Mr. Finlay, &c. 315—437
THE LIFE
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR THOMAS MUNRO, BART. & K.C.B.

CHAPTER I.
Letter from London.—Account of his reception in India.—Additional Military details.—Private Correspondence.

The following gives an account of the mode in which young Munro spent his time, while residing in London, preparatory to his first voyage to India.

TO HIS SISTER.
London, 11th March, 1779.

DEAR ERSKINE,
If I was to give you as much advice as I have got, about withstanding the predominant vices and follies of the age, and acquiring the graces, I might make a long enough letter. When I came here, I used to walk in

VOL. III.

B
Hyde Park every day, from two to four o'clock; at this
time it is filled with carriages; the people of quality come
to take the morning air; they go home about four o'clock
to dress for dinner; the crowd of people and the dust made
me desert the Park for Kensington Gardens. I stay with
Mr. Gilson, Cashier to Mayne and Graham. I went to a
tavern yesterday, where we dine for a shilling a head;
there was a long table in the room with forty covers; the
company amounted to twenty-five, seventeen of whom were
Frenchmen. I did not understand one word they said,
except commerce and maritime, which they sometimes pro-
nounced with great emphasis, from which I concluded they
were not in so good a state as they wished them to be. I
live very happily, except sometimes when I am tormented
by a tailor's wife, a neighbour of ours; these four or five
days past about four o'clock, a little before I go out to
dinner, she opened the door, looked in, and went down
stairs. I could not understand her meaning till Tuesday,
when she came in at her ordinary time with a large bowl
of soup and a penny roll boiled in it. "The soup will do
you good," says she, "you don't look well, and I am afraid
you eat very sparingly." I endeavoured to convince her
that I was well enough, but to no purpose; I was obliged
to take the soup. I might as well have swallowed melted
tallow. I thought to have avoided the soup yesterday; I
did not come home till night; but I had the same bowl-
full to supper last night that I had to dinner the day be-
fore. She has been telling the people below that the young
gentleman in the garret is either in a consumption or starv-
ing himself. I am, your affectionate brother,

Thomas Munro.
SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS FATHER.

Madras, 6th Feb. 1780.

DEAR SIR,

We sailed from the Cape on the 4th of Nov. We had a strong gale on the 25th, which gave us an opportunity of escaping from the fleet; had we arrived at Madras a fortnight before the other ships, as the Captain expected, it would have been very lucky for the Cadets on board, as we might have been appointed and sent up the country before the rest arrived. But when we arrived on the 17th of Jan. we found that the Superbe and Eagle had been there six days before us, and the next day the whole fleet arrived.

Most of the Cadets that have come out this year are for the Madras Establishment; the greatest part of them are Scotsmen, all particularly recommended to the care of the General. You cannot conceive what a number of relations he has got—nephews, cousin-germans, &c.

There are eighty-three Cadets for this Establishment, and very few for Bengal, all of whom Capt. H. says will have commissions the moment they arrive. I believe it would have been better if I had been for the Bengal Establishment, as I would have been sure of a commission even though I had no letters. George Smith and John Lennox went home, and George Macpherson died before I came here; all the rest of the people to whom I had letters, except Mr. Haliburton, were gone up the country.

As soon as I came ashore, I waited upon Mr. Haliburton; he is a very plain man, and the most entertaining that ever I was in company with: he gave me a general invitation to his house. A few days after, he carried me in his phaeton to the General's; he asked me many questions upon the road, and told me if I wanted any money,
to let him know. I mentioned my deafness to him; "I know that," says he; "you must be as near the General as you can, and mind you be on his right hand; (he is not a ceremonious man) for he will be surprised if he asks you a question, and you don't make any answer." The General told me that he would do every thing for me that lay in his power; then turning to Mr. Haliburton, "you know," says he, "there are such a number of Cadets this season, that all that I can do for Mr. Munro, is to send him up the country."

Cadets here are allowed either five pagodas per month, and free quarters, or ten pagodas, and find their own lodging; all the Cadets follow the first way. Of the five pagodas, I pay two to a Dubash, one to the servants of the mess, and one for hair-dressing and washing, so that I have one pagoda per month to feed and clothe me.

Hyder Ally has stopped two expresses coming overland; there have been some skirmishes, and a good many officers killed up the country. I hope he will soon begin to act more effectually. Jack Brown is a Lieutenant. I expect to hear from you soon; I have not heard any thing of Daniel this long time. Has Alexander gone to sea? if he has, he'll repent it. I will write to him and D. by the first opportunity, and tell him my reasons against his going to sea.

THOS. MUNRO.

TO HIS FATHER.

Fort St. George, 30th March, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I wrote my mother, the 6th of February, upon a report that some of the ships were to sail for Europe in a few days. I delivered Mr. Robertson's letter to Mr. Ross. After reading it, "I see," says he, "that you understand Spanish and Italian, and of course you must be
well versed in the learned languages. I suppose you have been educated in Glasgow: how long did you attend the College? What is the firm of the house you was in? Where did they trade to? When did you leave Scotland? How long was you in England? In what ship did you come out?” He asked all these questions, and a great many more, which made me think that he had some suspicions of me. After answering them all, he told me that he knew nothing of the drawer of the bill, and that he could do nothing without the consent of Mr. Cuthbert, who was joint attorney, but that I might call to-morrow and he would give me his answer, and that, in the mean time, when I was not otherwise engaged, he should always be glad to see me. Next day I called upon him; he told me that he was so busy that he had not had an opportunity of seeing Mr. Cuthbert, but that he would give me a positive answer to-morrow. I was going away, when he called me back: “I think,” says he, “you told me that you came out in the Walpole; do you know this gentleman?” pointing to Doctor Allen, who came out in that ship. I told him I did. “I forgot to ask you,” says he, “if you would have occasion for the full amount of the bill?” I told him that 12/. or 15/. would be sufficient. I called almost every day for a fortnight after, but he was always so much employed that he had not had an opportunity of speaking to Mr. Cuthbert. I happened to dine at his house one day along with a Cadet, who had a bill upon him for a small sum; after dinner, he went into the writing room and received his money; when he came out, Mr. Ross called me in. I don’t know what was the reason, whether it was my great learning, which I had displayed that day more than usual, or that, by paying one bill he was put in a humour for paying more, but he told me that he would advance me twenty pagodas for my note, payable on demand. On the 1st of March our pay was
increased to thirteen pagodas per month; Ross says, that it was at his request. One half of the Cadets were ordered to be at Velore, and the other half at Pondicherry, on the 1st of March. Mr. Haliburton told me that he had got me appointed for Velore, as I could live cheaper there, and would have a better opportunity of learning my duty than at Pondicherry. Ross advised me to go to Pondicherry, as the difference of expense was trifling, and that I would have an opportunity of learning the French language. I was surprised that Haliburton had overlooked this, but I soon found his reason; he told me that he would give me a letter to the paymaster at Velore, who was a very intimate friend of his, who, he was certain, would be of great service to me, and that he would give me an order on him to advance me whatever money I should want. He has likewise often bid me let him know if I wanted any money. Now I want to know your opinion, whether Haliburton or Ross is my best friend, and which of them I should most depend upon.

The next time I saw Ross, he said, that he thought I had better stay here sometime longer, till the ships sailed for England; that he then would have leisure to speak to the General, and that something, perhaps, might be done, but if I was disappointed there was no time lost; I would have enough to learn my exercise before I got a commission. I consented to stay for a few days longer, merely to please him, as I really have no expectations. The next time I saw Haliburton, he told me that he had been talking of me with the General, and that he was surprised to hear I had applied for leave to remain here. After he had heard my reasons—"Never mind," says he, "tell that old fellow that you cannot stay here any longer, and that all your friends advise you to go to Velore." I went and told Ross this. "I know who advises you to go to Velore; Mr. Haliburton; he is a very good young man,
and does well enough in his own way, but he knows nothing of these affairs; he is a great Galligakus; he has not," says he, (taking one of his white locks in his hand,) "lived so long in the world as I have done; when he has, you may follow his advice." Another reason, however, has determined me to set off directly.

There is a Dr. Koenig lives with Mr. Ross; he is a native of Livonia, a disciple of the famous Linnaeus, and a school-fellow of Dr. Solander's; after having travelled through most parts of Europe, he came out to India in search of natural curiosities; he has been over most part of the country, from the Ganges to the Indus, and from Delhi to Cape Comorin; he was put upon the list of Company's servants in the year 78, when he was sent by the Governor and Council to Siam, and the Straits of Malacca in search of plants and minerals, from whence he is but lately returned. I suppose Ross told him what a learned man I was, for I had not seen him above once or twice when he began to talk with me of chymistry: he carried me to see his collection. I was with him almost every day, till one day he told me that he would take it as a favour if I would examine an English translation that he had made of the Latin descriptions of some of his plants; I altered most of the spelling, and, in many places, the arrangement of the words. He put a Greek book into my hands, from which he said it was easy to discern that the natron of the ancients was a different substance from the nitre of the moderns; the book did not give me much disturbance; but he talks Latin, Portuguese, and French,—his English is a mixture of all the three, which makes it very difficult to understand him. When he sees I am at a loss for any particular word, he gives me the Latin; if I still hesitate, he gives me the Greek, which is always an effectual method of making me understand. The other day, as usual, the Scots and English had a very warm engagement
with the Swedes and Germans; it continued a long time doubtful, till the Doctor cried out, "Black! pray what has Black discovered? Fixed air, a pretty discovery! But can any body compare it to those of Becher, Stahl, Homberg, and Reitzius, who has discovered that the acid of sugar is stronger than aquafortis?" after which he repeated a Latin sentence, which totally silenced Black and all the rest of them; then he put two Latin letters into my hand, one from Linnaeus, and the other from Reitzius, which he sent him with his book, which is written either in Danish or Swedish; he promised to send it over to-day for my perusal and opinion, which will be no easy matter, and even though I should succeed, I don't know but he may speak Chaldean to me the next time he sees me, so that I must set off for Velore as soon as I can.

I am, dear Sir,

Your affectionate and dutiful son,

THOMAS MUNRO.

P. S. Doctor Koenig has taken a house about six miles from this; he says, if I will come and stay with him, I shall have two rooms, and a palankeen always ready to carry me wherever I desire to go. I have declined accepting his offer, for some reasons which I have mentioned, and likewise because I don't choose to be obliged to any body for a thing of this kind, whilst I can live upon my pay. Koenig's principal design in going to Siam was to see the manner in which the Chinese reduce the tin ore; he has written an account of it, which he will send to Mr. Banks, along with several specimens of the ore: the Doctor thinks that this important discovery will be of great advantage to the British nation. I wrote all the descriptions which the Doctor sends to Banks, Solander, and Mr. Greville; after all, I don't think there is any thing in these important discoveries that was not before known in Eu-
rope; if there had, I would have written Dr. Irvine upon the subject. I hope Alexander has not gone to sea; he would be much better in Somervel and Gordons'. I hope their business goes on briskly. I never shall forget what I owe to them and Mr. Macrae; I never was so happy as whilst I was there; a merchant is his own master, he has not to comply with all the humours of men whom he despises.

TO HIS MOTHER.

[Giving an account of his first arrival in India.]

DEAR MADAM,

When the ship anchored in the Roads, a number of the natives came on board. They were dressed in long white gowns; one of them, a grave, decent-looking man came up to me; he held a bundle of papers in his hand which he begged I would read; they were certificates from different people of his fidelity and industry. He said, that strangers on their arrival in India were often at a loss for many necessary articles, but that I need give myself no trouble, for if I would only give him money, he would purchase for me whatever I wanted; he would attend me as a servant, and would be content with such wages as I should think upon trial he deserved: I congratulated myself on having met with so respectable a person in the character of a servant. He said he would go on shore and get me another, for that no gentleman could do without two, and that he would at the same time carry my dirty linen to be washed; I had only a few changes clean; I gave him the rest.

Two days after, when I went on shore, I found my old man standing on the beach with half a dozen of porters to carry my baggage to Captain Henderson's house.—I
went early to sleep, quite happy at being rid of my old shipmates the soldiers.

My servant entered the room while I was dressing next morning. He surveyed me, and then my bed, with amazement. The sea-chest, which occupied one half of the chamber, was open; he looked into it, and shook his head. I asked the cause of his wonder. "Oh, Sir, this will never do; nobody in this country wears buff waistcoats and breeches, or thread stockings; nor sleeps upon mattresses; sheets and blankets are useless in this warm climate—you must get a table and chairs, and a new bed."

I was vexed to learn that all the clothes, of which I had taken so much care in the passage from Europe, were now to be of no service.

He inspected the contents of the chest. The whole was condemned, together with the bed-clothes, as unserviceable, except three or four changes of linen which were to serve me till a tailor should fit me out in a proper manner.

"It is customary with gentlemen," said the old man, "to make a present of all their European articles to their servants, but I will endeavour to dispose of yours to advantage: four guineas will buy a table and chairs, and cloth for the tailor, and as Captain Henderson is going to Bengal, you must get a couch of your own; it will not cost above two guineas." He went out with the six guineas, leaving me with an empty chest, and my head full of new cuts of sleeves and skirts, which the tailor was to make in a few days. But all my schemes were disconcerted by some unfortunate accident befalling my good friend with the credentials, for he never returned.

This unexpected blow prevented me from stirring out above twice or thrice in a week, for several months after. On these days I sallied forth in a clean suit, and visited all my friends. After Dr. Koenig came to live with Mr. Ross, I spent the greatest part of my time at his house,
amusing myself with shells and flowers; but before that I employed it differently.

I rose early in the morning to review my clothes; after having determined whether skirt No. 3 or 4 was best, I worked at my needle till breakfast. When it was over, I examined the cook's accounts, and gave orders about dinner; I generally read the rest of the day till the evening, when I mounted to the top of the house to observe the stars I had been reading of during the day in Ferguson's Astronomy. When I had finished this book, I diverted myself in a different manner in my evening walks. After considering the matter for several nights, I at last resolved that my country-house should be near Lochlomond, and that Erskine should be my housekeeper. I rose early in the morning to work in the garden, or if I was lazy, I read Justice, and gave the gardener directions. I then sent five or six messages for my sister to come down and make breakfast. After making an apology for disturbing her repose, I went to fish in the Loch, or in the stream that winded through my garden and woods, or to read a book under a tree in some retired walk. But when I was called down to supper, I did not see any thing of the plenty of my country-house.

While I remained in Madras, my pay as a Cadet was eight pagodas a month; of this I gave two to a servant called a Dubash, one to the cook, and one to the washerman: the remaining four were to answer every expense in a place where every thing is sold at the highest price.

With all my economy, it was near six months before I could save money enough to buy me a few suits of linen. I did not choose then to ask any of Mr. R. and Mr. H. did not seem disposed to give me any assistance till I should leave Madras; but Mr. R., wishing to get me appointed to join the detachment under Colonel Baillie, I continued in Madras, making application for this purpose,
till Hyder entered the Carnatic, when I joined the army in the field. From the great expense of servants, I did not find my situation bettered by the change, till Mr. G. got me appointed a Quarter-master; before that time, I found it difficult to keep myself clear of debt. I was once obliged to borrow thirty or forty pagodas from Mr. Ross, which I repaid two or three months afterwards. Mr. G. is in Bengal with Sir Eyre Coote; he told me before he went away, that he hoped he should see Alexander there; I am pretty sure that he will serve him if he remains long in the country; he has been talking for some time of going home.

I have already told you, in a former letter, in what situation I found Alexander on his arrival at Madras. Till then I never repined at my poverty, when I saw myself unable to give him the assistance I wished. I could only spare him a few shirts, and could hardly have done that had I not just then received the first month's pay of my late appointment; for we were then six months in arrears. I believe he is sensible himself that I did what I could. I desired him to take what he wanted from Mr. Ross and I would repay him. He was more prudent than I expected. He was rather too moderate in his demands. I could see him but seldom, as the army then lay about twelve miles from Madras, and marched up the country a few days after his arrival; he sailed for Bengal before I returned. Mr. Ross told me that he had given him money but sparingly, as he had observed the openness and thoughtlessness of his disposition, and that he thought it best to accustom him to struggle with little difficulties of that kind;—that he had recommended him to Mr. Ferguson in Bengal, whom he knew for a man that would leave nothing untried to promote his interest as far as he found him deserving.

I imagine that Mr. R. did not discover Alexander's disposition so much from his behaviour, as from a conver-
sation he had had with me some time before concerning him; he, however, takes all the merit to himself, and he desires Mr. F. in his letter—"To point out to the young man the propriety of his perfecting himself as soon as possible in some of the most necessary branches of education in which he was deficient, either through negligence, or from having left school at too early a period."—I do not remember the words, but that is the substance.

SUPPLEMENTARY TO LETTERS PUBLISHED
AT PAGE 54, VOL. I.

TO HIS MOTHER.

Camp at the Mount, 21st Feb. 1782.

I wrote to you in the beginning of January, before the army went to Velore, and again upon our return from thence, in the latter end of the same month; both of which letters were dispatched in the Swallow.

I have now almost laid aside all hopes of ever again hearing from home. The ill success of my father's application in London, which you take notice of in your letter of October 79 (the only one I have received since my leaving England), and the uncertainty of your present situation, has made me much more impatient and uneasy at your long silence than I should otherwise have been.

You desire me not to write you a simple letter, but rather a kind of a journal of whatever befalls me. I have many times resolved to begin, but have as often been hindered by something or other coming in the way. To relate my own adventures, is the same thing as to write a history of the present war, they being so intimately connected that it is impossible (at least for me) to separate them. I shall, therefore, in imitation of several great men, who have been in a similar situation, take them together.
Sir Hector Monro went to the southward in October last, to take the command of the army intended for the reduction of Negapatam. On his arrival, he found the Dutch army, consisting of five hundred Europeans, two thousand Sepoys, besides a considerable body of Hyder's troops, encamped within a few miles of that settlement. He stormed their lines the last day of October; completely routed them; killed a good number, and took about three hundred prisoners, with all their baggage, military stores, and twenty-one pieces of cannon. Negapatam capitulated a few days after. Sir Hector, after having reduced a few small forts in the Tanjore country, which were still in possession of the enemy, returned to Madras.

A cessation of arms having taken place with the Mahrattas, enabled General Goddard, in the beginning of January, to send two battalions of Sepoys and fifty Europeans to the relief of Tellicherry, then closely besieged by a Mysorean army, commanded by Sirdaar Khan. As many small vessels had from time to time arrived with supplies for the garrison, the enemy did not suspect any thing more than usual at the appearance of the ships which brought the reinforcement. Major Abingdon, who commanded in the place, determined to attack them before they should discover their mistake. He accordingly sallied, with the greater part of the garrison and the whole of the succours he had received, at three o'clock in the morning, which followed the day of their arrival. The enemy, totally unprepared for such an attack, fled on all sides. Sirdaar Khan himself, wounded by a musket-ball in the foot, and having had his horse killed under him, threw himself, with three hundred men, into a house, where by the gallantry of his defence, he in some measure compensated for his negligence in the guard of his camp. He obstinately refused every offer of quarter till fifty of his soldiers were killed, and till the fire which had been set to the house had
caught hold of his clothes. His party, notwithstanding, persisted to the last, and perished in the flames. Six hundred of the enemy were killed on the spot; fifteen hundred were taken prisoners. All their tents, baggage, elephants, and fifty-six pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

The garrison of Mahe (which is about four miles distant), though it consisted of two thousand men, were so much terrified at this disaster, that they sent proposals to surrender, on being permitted to retire to their own country, which was granted.

11th March.—In the beginning of February Sir Edward Hughes landed a force from his ships for the attack of Trincomalee; they began by constructing batteries, but having intelligence of a by-path, which led through the woods to the rear of the fort, a detachment was ordered to march through it and to make an assault on the back part, which it was imagined would be unguarded. The party, after marching all night, stormed the place in the morning so unexpectedly, that they made themselves masters of it in less than half an hour, though it was garrisoned by six hundred Europeans.

Fifty of the English were killed and wounded in the assault; among the former was Mr. Long, the Admiral's first Lieutenant.

Besides a large quantity of sugar, arrack, &c., and one hundred thousand dollars found in the fort, two homeward bound Indiamen were taken in the harbour.

The taking of this place is a very fortunate circumstance, as it is here only that the French fleet, which is daily expected, can find refreshment, after the fall of Negapatam; and as it is here only that our own fleet can be sheltered from the tempestuous weather which so often prevails at the change of the Monsoon, as there is not a single harbour on the coast of Coromandel.
It was strongly reported in the beginning of the last month, that the long-expected French fleet had been seen to the northward; but though they had been looked for, one would have thought with rather somewhat of impatience for a twelvemonth past, nobody would now believe it. The French have got their hands full at home; they could not have known at their departure from France of the situation of affairs in this country, and it would therefore be madness in them to come upon the coast, was the general discourse; but the fact was soon put beyond a doubt, for on the 11th, two days after Sir Edward Hughes returned from Ceylon, Captain Dickson, the commander of a country vessel, went to Pulicat, put to sea on a catamaran, and discovered the French fleet at anchor, forming a chain about ten leagues in length, in order to intercept all vessels coming from Bengal with supplies for the army; as nearly as he could judge they consisted of twelve ships of the line, six frigates, and eighteen transports.

The report of this gentleman was soon after confirmed by the arrival of two men at Madras, who had been prisoners for six days on board the French squadron, and had been taken in the Bay whilst the British fleet lay at Trincomalee; but to put an end to all doubts, on the 15th the French fleet anchored in sight of Madras, and in the afternoon they came opposite to the fort, when it was discovered that they amounted to thirty-two sail. They sent a frigate into the road to reconnoitre the situation of the Indiamen which they understood were there, but to their astonishment, in place of these they beheld nine men of war, and made signals accordingly. Their fighting ships instantly shortened sail for some of the transports which had dropped astern, and upon their coming up they passed the roads in the evening.

This armament, as it was undoubtedly fitted out from France before they had information of Colonel Baillie's
defeat, must have been intended to drive the English out of the Carnatic, or at least to gain some footing in it for themselves; to neither of which designs was it equal, had the country been in the state which they had reason to have expected. Had they, instead of going to the northward, immediately attacked Sir Edward Hughes, in Madras roads, their success might even have exceeded their expectations; but fortunately, had they afterwards thought of such an attempt, the arrival of Commodore Almes put the execution of it out of their power.

This officer followed a very uncommon route in his passage to India. After touching at Johannah he went to Socotora, from thence coasted along the Arabian shore to 172. when he parted with the fleet and pursued his voyage to Bombay, where he arrived on the 6th of January; having taken on board a supply of water, he set sail for Madras, and anchored in the roads the 11th instant, with the Monmouth, Hero, Isis, and a transport with four hundred and fifty of Fullerton's Regiment; three hundred and fifty of them were reimbarked to act as Marines, and General Meadows went on board as a volunteer.

14th March.—The fleet returned three days ago; the Admiral seeing that the enemy declined fighting, he resolved on the 17th to draw them to an engagement by attacking the transports. In the execution of this plan he lost the weather gage, and the French bore down upon him with nine men of war: he had only four ships of the line and a fifty; the rest were becalmed a great way astern. His own ship, the Superbe, was soon after attacked by three ships, and the Exeter by five. The Admiral was so roughly used, that he was obliged to make the signal of distress: it was a long time before he got any assistance, but at last the Hero came down to his relief when he was in the greatest danger; his ship filled so fast from the great number of shot that she had received between wind and
water, that he was obliged to call the men from the guns of the lower tier to man the pumps. The situation of the Exeter was little better till the Monmouth and Isis arrived to support her. They continued this unequal dispute above three hours, when the wind changing, the rest of the fleet came to their assistance, and the French withdrew. The shattered condition of the Admiral and Commodore prevented a pursuit; the former had fourteen shot between wind and water, and one, seven feet under the surface, was not discovered till some days after, when he arrived at Trincomalee. He continued there eight days to refit the squadron. He returned to Madras for powder and stores. The Admiral lost his Captain; his surgeon was killed in the cockpit. Captain Regnier of the Exeter was killed. There were thirty men killed and ninety wounded.

The French fleet went to Porto Novo two days after the action, where they now are taking on board water and fresh provisions; and it is said that they landed their troops about a fortnight ago.

16th March.—Not one of all the letters I brought from home have been of the smallest service to me here, except those for Mr. Graham and Mr. Burne; nor does it surprise me, when I consider how many who are unfit to act in any capacity come to this country provided with the strongest recommendations. Mr. Graham (as I mentioned in my letter by the Swallow) got me appointed to act as Quarter Master to a Brigade; it is worth one hundred pagodas a month, but it is only temporary.

TO GEORGE BROWN.

Camp near Madras, 28th June, 1782.

In my last, I believe I gave you all the public news, till the arrival of the fleet in the beginning of April, and Sir Edward Hughes for Ceylon. He carried a reinforce-
ment for the garrison, and wished to throw it in before he should engage the French fleet. This, however, he could not accomplish; for he was discovered on the 11th (April), by M. Suffrein, who immediately gave him chase. Sir Edward, finding next day he could not avoid an engagement, formed his line, and awaited the approach of the enemy. The battle was the longest and most desperate that ever happened between the two nations in this part of the world. The two Admirals were long closely engaged. M. Suffrein was obliged to shift his flag; and the Hero, the ship he had left, was on the point of striking, when the deck of the Superbe blew up, and a number of the hands perished by the explosion. The action ceased by mutual consent; and so tired and disabled were both parties, that they anchored within cannon-shot of each other. The Admiral derived no advantage from the junction of the Sultan and Magnanime, as their crews were so sickly that they could hardly muster men to work the ships.

The French fleet, which lay to windward, made a shift to put to sea two days after the action. They formed the line at a great distance, and seemed to offer battle to the English; but they not being in a condition to go out after them, they bore away, and were in a short time out of sight. Sir Edward Hughes, a few days after, arrived at Trincomalee.

The army continued in the neighbourhood of Madras, till the 10th of April, when we marched to Chinglaput. We were joined towards the end of the month by five hundred men of the 78th regiment. With this reinforcement, we ventured to cross the Paliar for the first time since the arrival of the French. From every account it now appeared, that their force was so much diminished, that we ought rather to seek for, than to decline an engagement.

It was said, that of two thousand two hundred Europeans which they landed, between six and seven hundred
were already dead, and so many were sick, that after leaving a small garrison in Cuddalore, they could not join Hyder with more than eight hundred men.

We remained in this camp a few days, during which the enemy made no movement towards us; but as our provisions were nearly expended, and Hyder had sent a detachment to St. Thomé, we again marched towards Madras. This party was commanded by his son Kerisn Sahib. It consisted of about four thousand horse and foot, with five or six field pieces. Their intention was to have attacked the Mount; but the garrison having been put on their guard by some deserters, they did not venture to make an attack. They, however, went within three miles of Madras, and plundered many of the garden-houses. A few of them entered the house where Gen. Monro was with his Secretary, Capt. Clownis: they escaped, with some domestics, by a trap-door, to the top of the house; where, finding firearms, they defended themselves till relieved by a party of Sepoys. In the mean time, a detachment of the garrison of Madras, joined by the recovered soldiers of the 78th, sallied, and, after a little skirmishing, obliged the enemy to withdraw. The army, after receiving a supply of provisions, marched to the Southward. On our arrival at Chinglaput, we heard of the fall of Permacoil. Hyder invested it on the 10th, and it surrendered on the 17th May. It was garrisoned by four companies of Sepoys, with two European officers. It is one of the strongest forts in the Carnatic. The officer who commanded thought it imprudent to stand an assault when there was a practicable breach.

When we arrived within a few days' march of the enemy, they retreated: Hyder to the red hills, and the French to Valdore. The General, wishing to bring them to an engagement, marched towards Arnee, where Hyder had his principal magazine of ammunition and provisions, and he
had often been obliged to have recourse to the stock he had laid up here, when any unforeseen event delayed the arrival of his convoys. He therefore determined to make Sir Eyre Coote relinquish his design.

On the 2nd of June, our advanced guard had already reached the fort, when he attacked the rear. The army, as soon as it could be formed, advanced towards the enemy, who made no opposition. After some distant cannonading, they gave way: we pursued them six miles, to the bank of the Tiar, and took five tumbrils and two shot-carts, in the sand of the river. The 73rd regiment, which continued the pursuit two miles farther, took a long six-pounder. Our loss was not more than eighty killed and wounded. The French were not in the action; they remained at Valdore.

As the enemy declined a second engagement, and our provisions were nearly consumed, it became necessary to return to Madras.

At Trivatore, we halted on the 8th. We lost our grand guard. In the afternoon, Lieut. Creutzer, who commanded, observed two camels, attended by a small party of horse, crossing a plain in his front; he immediately followed them. They continued to retire, till they had drawn him four miles from camp, when a large body of horse, rushing from ambush, in an instant cut his detachment in pieces, except Lieut. Burrows, with fifteen troopers, who made their way through the enemy, and reached camp, after losing six of their number. This guard consisted of eighty horse, two companies of light infantry, and two field-pieces.

The army returned to the Mount on the 19th inst.; many officers and soldiers, sick from the fatigue of continual marching in the height of the land winds. No idea can be formed by those who have not been witnesses to it, of the effects of marching, on Europeans unaccustomed
to the climate. It was reckoned a very great hardship in America, when thirty or forty British soldiers died of heat and fatigue, in the retreat from Philadelphia to New York. Five hundred of the 78th marched from Chinglaput—in three weeks, they had not fit fit for duty.

In this regiment, we have a sad proof of the evil consequences that have already and will continue to attend the failure of Commodore Johnston's expedition against the Cape of Good Hope. All the reinforcements sent from Britain will arrive diminished above one third of their original force, and the rest, reduced by a long voyage to the last stage of the scurvy, will require long rest and refreshment, before they can be brought to the field.

Official accounts were received four days ago of a Peace being concluded between the Company and Mahrattas. You will have the particulars in England. Hyder is commanded to leave the Carnatic, to deliver up all his conquests, prisoners, &c. within six months from the 19th of May; or not complying, he is to be considered as a public enemy and disturber of the peace of India. He is inactive at present: he perhaps waits the event of the engagement between the two fleets, which is daily expected, to take his final resolution.

4th August.—No ship has sailed for Europe since I began this letter, which gives me an opportunity of making it longer than I at first intended; as also of telling you that I received yesterday your letter, 22nd August, 1781, which has all the appearances of the hurry of business. It appears from what you say, that I am to consider your epistles as the thermometer by which I may judge of the state of the office. When there is little to be done, I may hope for a sheet: when you are busy—three or four lines; but when there is hurry and bustle—none at all.

Sir E. Hughes remained at Trincomalee till the beginning of July. The crews of the Sultan and Magnanime
being by that time freed from the scurvy, and the ships thoroughly repaired, he sailed for Madras.

The state of his squadron, it is said, was such as could neither induce him to seek, or to decline an engagement—it was in better order than that of the enemy, and was nearly equal in the number of guns; but then it was weakly manned, and not sufficiently provided with ammunition. There were two hundred recovered seamen at Madras, and the San Carlos armed transport, which in the present situation of the fleet would be a great reinforcement. The crew of the Eagle, officers commissioned and noncommissioned included, amounted only to two hundred and seventy; the other ships had a proportionable number.

The French Fleet was discovered on the 5th of July at Karrical. The English, being to windward, bore down upon them; the action began at ten o'clock, and lasted till one; when the wind shifting, gave the enemy an opportunity of escaping; their disabled ships towed by the frigates, and the rest following with all their sail. Sir Edward Hughes hung out the signal for a general chase. Captain Gill, of the Minorca, who was next to him, called out that he was unable to follow. The Monmouth and Hero were in the same condition, and the Sultan had lost her rudder; the pursuit was therefore given over.

This battle would have proved decisive, had not the wind changed from the land to the sea two hours sooner than it had done for some days before. At the instant of the change, the crew of the Sultan were hoisting out their boats to take possession of the Sevère, which had struck to them, but the Sultan turning round with the wind, presented her stern to the enemy, who, seizing an opportunity, poured in a broadside, hoisted their colours, and made sail; nor was she able to take revenge, an unlucky shot having broke her rudder.
On the following day, Captain Watts was dispatched by Sir Edward Hughes to demand her of M. Suffrein. When he came in sight of the French Fleet, an officer who came off in a boat told him, that he would carry any message that he had to the French Admiral. Captain Watts gave him a letter from Sir Edward Hughes, demanding the Ajax, which struck to the Sultan, with which he returned, desiring that the Captain would come no nearer the French Fleet, but anchor where he was.—M. Suffrein's Captain soon after brought this reply: That the ship in question was not the Ajax, but the Sevère; that the colours were not struck, the haulyards had been shot away; and that he neither could, nor ought to deliver up the ship.

*It is said*, that this officer, in the course of conversation with Captain Watts, expressed his pleasure to find there were poltroons amongst the English as well as the French. This remark was occasioned by some of the English ships not engaging so close in the late action as he thought they might have done, and by one of the French not engaging at all.

The Sceptre arrived in the roads the 12th of July, and was dispatched the following day with the San Carlos to join the Admiral; the latter ship carried near two hundred sailors discharged from the hospital, and a large quantity of ammunition and stores for the use of the squadron.

This measure was blamed, as the Admiral before this had acquainted the Board of his intention of coming to Madras, and it was feared that he would have left Negapatnam ere they could possibly arrive there; and that there was little chance of their meeting him, as they must stand so far to the eastward to avoid the French cruisers. Sir Edward Hughes arrived on the 20th without having seen them. The Sceptre came in three days after; she
had parted from the San Carlos, and looked into Negapatnam, where not seeing the Fleet, she set sail for Madras. On her way, she fell in with the La Fine frigate, which she chased into Cuddalore, where the enemy's fleet lay; two line-of-battle ships ran out after her, but being an excellent sailor, she escaped them both.

The San Carlos did not return till the 28th; thirty per cent. had been refused on the ship and cargo.

The Sceptre and Monmouth sailed on the 31st July, with two hundred Europeans to reinforce the garrison of Trincomalee, lest M. Suffrein should attack it before the English squadron can leave Madras.

Captain B———, who commanded, as he has quarrelled with all the Officers, and neglected the fortifications and every thing else, except the making of money, is to be removed; and the care of this important place, for the relief of which they have risked two ships of the line, is to be entrusted to Captain Hay M'Douall, whom you may remember.

Sir Eyre Coote moved with the army to Wandiwash, to be in readiness to attack Cuddalore, in case the French Fleet had been forced to leave the coast; but as nothing decisive happened, he returned to Madras.

Hyder has sent two Vakeels to him. All that I can learn of their proceedings is, that Mr. Graham's interpreter, who returned to Hyder with the Vakeels, received a present of a horse and a gold chain.

The army will march in a few days to throw provisions into Velore.

The Sceptre took a French transport off the Cape with ninety-six men of the regiment of Pondicherry. She left it in charge of the Medea frigate, which is not yet arrived. 'Sir Richard Bickerton, who was seen in the beginning of June to the eastward of the Cape, has taken the Apollon, a frigate of forty-four guns. M. Suffrein,
among a number of other valuable prizes, has taken the Fortitude Indiaman. Do not omit letting Mr. Mayne know how much I esteem myself indebted to him for his recommendations to Mr. Graham and Colonel Owen. I am now almost recovered.

I am, &c.

TO GEORGE BROWN.

Camp at the Mount, 6th October 1782.

I have heard nothing from you these eighteen months, except a few lines with a letter from my brother Daniel. I know that you do a great deal of business, but not so much as to hinder you from writing to me more frequently. I begin to long for a few more magazines; the bundle you sent me was the most joyful sight I had seen for many months.

I believe I have sent you more news in the course of the last twelve months than was in the whole of them, so that I disclaim all obligations, till you send me a fresh stock.

I wrote you in August last, and two days ago inclosing a letter for my father, which I left open, in case you should have leisure to peruse it.

I had a letter from Jack about a fortnight ago. He had been troubled with obstructions in his liver for several months, but was then so much recovered, as to have laid aside all thoughts of coming to Madras for the benefit of his health.

On the 7th of August, two or three days after I wrote you last, the army marched with a large convoy of rice to Velore, where we arrived in six days, and threw in seven months' provisions; we could have thrown in three months more, had not the agents in Madras, by their way of measuring, kept about one-fourth of the whole in their
own hands. We returned on the 20th to the Mount without having seen any thing of Hyder, who was encamped near Arcot. His army was so much reduced by desertion and death, that he did not think it prudent to approach us, as he could not have prevailed on his people to fight, and would also have given an opportunity for the disaffected to leave him, for most of them were now tired of the war, and wished to return to their homes, to which they were the more induced, by their getting a high price from us for their horses, which they thought the best way of being paid their arrears, which amounted to ten months at least.

As soon as the army returned from Velore, preparations were made to attack Cuddalore. The guns, stores, and rice, were put on board some country ships to be convoyed by a frigate.

The army marched the 29th August, full of hopes of putting an end to the French power in India; but as usual, we were disappointed in our expectations. We remained six days on the red hills, without seeing any thing of the transports. The General, from the anxiety of his mind, and exposing himself too much to the sun, fell into a violent fit of sickness. His life was for some days despaired of, and he found himself obliged to give up the command of the army to General Stuart, who, receiving intelligence from Madras, that M. Suffrein being reinforced, had taken Trincomalee and defeated our fleet, took the resolution of returning to Madras. This was instantly put in execution. The army marched the same day (12th Sept.) at noon, and on the 20th arrived at the Mount. We found Sir Edward Hughes had anchored at Madras, ten days before; he had sailed in the end of the preceding month to look for the French Fleet; he soon had the satisfaction he wished for. On the morning of the 3rd of Sept., as he was steering for the harbour of Trin-
comalee, he was surprised to see fifteen two-deckers come out of it to attack him. He immediately formed his line in the closest order: the enemy manoeuvred for some time at a great distance, endeavouring as much as possible to engage a part of our fleet with the whole of their own: but their compact disposition rendered this impracticable.

M. Suffrehn bore down and began the action at 2 p. m., which he might have done at 10 o'clock, as he had the weather gage. He attacked the Superbe with great fury, but, after an obstinate struggle, he found it impossible to stand her fire any longer, and his helm not answering when he attempted to retreat, threw him into such a situation that he was for a considerable time exposed to the fire of six ships. Three or four of the bravest of the French Captains bore down to the assistance of their commander and carried him off, with not a mast standing. The rest, who cannonaded at a distance, were unworthy of serving under so gallant an officer.

The enemy being to windward, had the choice of distance, and after the repulse of their Admiral availed themselves of it in such a manner, that they suffered little from the fire of the English. They retreated in the evening to Trincomalee. Sir Edward Hughes followed them to the mouth of the harbour, and had the mortification to find that though he had defeated them twice in the course of two months, they had got possession of the most valuable place on the coast of Coromandel. It was thought that the place was out of danger after the reinforcement had been thrown in by the Sceptre and Monmouth in the beginning of August, and for this reason the Admiral stayed at Madras to complete his ships with water, stores, &c. In the mean time M. Suffren was reinforced by two ships of the line and a frigate of 44 guns. He landed two thousand five hundred Europeans at Trincomalee 22nd Au-
gust, and the same day took the lower fort by storm, and a week after the upper by capitulation. Dreading the approach of the British squadron, he granted the garrison all they demanded. They were sent to Madras, and had liberty to serve wherever the exigencies of service might require their assistance. Hay M'Dowal, whom you may remember, was the commanding officer. I have not yet learned the particulars of the attack and defence.

The French fleet are now at Cuddalore. The L'Orient struck upon a rock going into Trincomalee after the last action.

We wait with impatience for the arrival of Sir Richard Bickerton; it is reported, but I fear with little foundation, that he was seen to the Northward a few days ago. If he arrives before the monsoon, it is probable that Trincomalee will be immediately attacked; if he does not arrive, the squadron will go to Bombay, and the army into cantonments.

30th October, 1783.

I have not yet had an opportunity of sending the above to Europe. There was a storm here on the 15th, when many ships were driven ashore, among them the Hereford Indiaman. Sir Edward Hughes put to sea; none of the ships suffered but the Superbe, which lost all her masts. Sir Richard Bickerton arrived on the 19th with all the ships but one Indiaman: he sailed next day to look for the Admiral.

He returned on the 24th, but before he dropped anchor the Juno frigate came in sight and made signals, upon which he went out again.

It is imagined, as neither he nor Sir Edward have been seen since, that they are both gone to Bombay.

John arrived here about ten days ago. I do not think he has grown any since he left home. He is now perfectly recovered, and will soon go round again to Bengal.
DEAR SIR,

As I believe you wish to know the situation of public affairs in this country, I shall mention the principal events of the war since I wrote you in November last, though I believe my talking too much of these matters has already been the occasion of several of my letters not reaching you. The death of Hyder, which happened on the 7th of December 1782, gave great hopes of being able to prosecute the war more successfully than we had hitherto done, but the changes attending this event were not so sudden as had been expected. His son Tippoo succeeded to his power without any of those violences so common in Indian governments; he soon after took the field, joined by a considerable body of French, and prepared to besiege Wandiwash. Neither this place nor Carrangooly being able to afford any protection to the neighbouring country, nor from their weakness to defend themselves for any length of time, the Board at Madras determined to destroy them. For this purpose the army under General Stuart marched to Wandiwash in the beginning of February. On our arrival we found the enemy encamped about fifteen miles from us on the South side of the river Chiar. They passed it on the 11th and 12th, and encamped at the village of Nedingul, about ten miles distant. We marched at daybreak on the 13th to attack them, but they having intelligence of our approach, recrossed the river, and when we came to the bank of it, they were four miles on the opposite side. To follow them would have been in vain, as they seemed to have had no other intention than to cannonade our rear on our return to Madras, or, by pretending to offer battle, to amuse us from the demo-
lition of the fort till we had consumed our provisions, and should be obliged to return without finishing our work. The army marched back to Wandiwash next day, and having destroyed the fortifications, we moved towards Carrangooly on the 16th, which we also demolished, and arrived at Madras.

In the beginning of March the army threw a convoy of grain into Velore; we met with no opposition, as Tippoo with his whole army had marched towards his own country on the 30th of the preceding month, drawn there by the accounts he had of the rapid progress of General Mathews on the Malabar coast.

I have never seen any connected accounts of the operations of the army on that coast; you cannot therefore expect the particulars from me. Colonel Humberston, after passing the monsoon at Calicut, laid siege in November to a place called PollyPOCHERY, but was forced to retire on the approach of Tippoo with a strong detachment from his father's army. He was followed by the enemy, and found it necessary to take post in a strong camp about twenty-five miles from Calicut. He was joined here by Colonel Macleod, who had been sent from Madras to take the command of the detachment, which now consisted of five hundred Europeans, eight hundred Bombay sepoys, and twelve hundred from the King of Travancore. At daybreak on the 29th of November the enemy attacked him in his camp. They took by storm a redoubt about three hundred yards in his front: they were hardly in possession of it when they were attacked and beaten out by the 42d regiment. They made a second attempt, and were repulsed. The action then became general, and continued till 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy quitted the field, after having had a thousand men killed and wounded. Colonel Macleod, a few weeks after this, was ordered by General Mathews to join him at Onore, a fort
on the sea-coast to the northward of Mangalore. After the junction, the place was taken by storm in the month of January, and a few days after another fort, called Bassalore, surrendered. In these places three ships of war were found nearly finished. The force at this time under General Mathews consisted of one thousand three hundred Europeans, and five battalions of sepoys. The ratification of the Mahratta peace, which took place some time before, had enabled the Bombay Government to detach so considerable a force. General Mathews began his march to Bidanore in the end of January; he took by storm the works which defended the passes into the country, and Hydernagur, the capital of the province, capitulated on the 30th. It was the loss of this country, one of the most fertile of India, which had always furnished great supplies to the Mysorean army, that carried Tippoo so suddenly out of the Carnatic. He gave orders at the time of his departure to demolish Arcot, Permacoil, and several other forts, and to send the magazines of grain into his own country. The army passed near Arcot on its return from Velore. The fortifications were so completely destroyed as to render it unnecessary to leave any garrison in it.

At this time M. Bussy arrived at Cuddalore; he brought with him a reinforcement of 2000 Europeans and three ships of the line. Sir Edward Hughes did not return from Bombay till the 13th of April. Nine Indiamen, that sailed from England in September, arrived on the 16th. Sir Eyre Coote arrived on the 24th from Bengal; he was brought ashore insensible, and died on the 26th. His death was occasioned by the continual anxiety and restlessness of his mind during five days that he was chased by a French frigate. Nothing could prevail on him to quit the deck for a moment; he sunk down at last, exhausted by fatigue and the heat of the sun; he was carried to his cabin, and was heard frequently to exclaim, "How
cruel it is, after all my labours, to fall in this manner into the hands of my enemies!" The army marched from Temaram, a village about twenty miles from Madras, on the 21st of April, to besiege Cuddalore. We carried ten days' provisions with us; the remainder, with the stores, went by sea. A detachment took possession of Permacoil on the 26th, and the army arrived on the 2nd of May. The army encamped before Cuddalore on the 7th. The five following days were employed in landing a regiment of Hanoverians, under Colonel Waggenheim, intrenching tools, ammunition, &c. The enemy were at the same time busy in making lines from the Bandepollam hills, on their right, to the sea, on their left—running nearly, from east to west, about a thousand yards in front of the fort. They began to finish them from the right, as being farthest from the fort, and least protected by its fire. They completed a trench from the foot of the hills, six hundred yards to the left, in the centre of which there was a small redoubt, and two hundred yards from the left a large one, nearly finished; going on five hundred yards farther to the left, there was a redoubt on the high road from Cuddalore to Chilambrum, and between this and the sea three batteries. This was the state of their works when they were attacked on the 13th. In the range of hills which extend to the northwest of Cuddalore, a situation was found within six hundred yards of the finished part of the enemy's works, which entirely commanded them; four eighteen-pounders were placed on it. The enemy, next day, got some guns on a hill that overlooked it, but neglected to take possession of one between them, as they thought it impossible to carry up guns to it. Major Mackay, of the artillery, marched at midnight on the 12th, with a detachment of Sepoys and pioneers, and eight field-pieces, to take possession of it: he made a road among the bushes with as little noise as possible, and got all his guns mounted before daybreak.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was waiting behind the hill with eighty of the Company’s Europeans, and a brigade of Sepoys, to take possession of it, when the enemy should be dislodged by the artillery, and then to attack the right of their intrenchedment; while the rest of the army was to be drawn out, to attack their lines in different places. At daybreak, Major Mackay opened his guns against the enemy’s post on the hill: the fire was so severe that they did not wait to carry off their guns; they ran headlong down the hill, and were followed by Colonel Kelly, who defiled with some difficulty through a narrow path among the bushes, and drew up his Europeans in the rear of the trench; the intricacy of the road prevented his being joined immediately by the Sepoys: he did not hesitate to advance with his small party. The enemy, as much surprised by his appearance as they had been by the fire from the hill, retreated, after receiving a few platoons, to the battery on the left of the intrenchedment, from whence they soon after began a heavy fire on the European grenadiers under Colonel Cathcart, as he advanced from the left of the army to support Colonel Kelly; and they killed many of them after they had reached the trench, before their fire could be silenced by the eighteen-pounders on the opposite hill. When this was effected, Colonel Cathcart advanced to storm the redoubt. The enemy returned to their guns, and the grape they fired did such execution that he was forced instantly to retreat. Colonel Stuart, with the 73rd regiment, and two battalions of Sepoys, had by this time come down to the intrenchedment. The report he made of the enemy’s strength determined the General to make two attacks at the same time—one on the right of the redoubt and the other on the front of it: the former led by Colonel Stuart, having under his command the European grenadiers, the 73rd regiment, and a brigade of Sepoys; the latter, led by Colonel Gordon and Major Cotgrave, was
composed of the 101st regiment and Hanoverians, supported by two battalions of Sepoys. The whole of the Europeans were to advance without their cannon. Major Mackay was ordered to fire three minutes, and no longer, after the signal should be given, which was three guns, that were fired from the hill a little after eleven o'clock. The front attack immediately moved forward; the Hanoverians on the left, led by Colonel Gordon, marched in battalion order; four companies of the 101st regiment on the right, led by Major Cotgrave, by files, as they had to pass through a grove of palmyras: the remainder of the regiment was left with the reserve, about three hundred yards in the rear. The troops advanced through a heavy sand, and when the 101st, quitting the palmyra grove, appeared in the plain, about two hundred yards from the redoubt, the enemy began a warm cannonade; and the greater part of their infantry abandoning the redoubt, extended themselves behind a breastwork to the left of it. They fired a volley at the distance of about one hundred yards, and a second when we had advanced about thirty yards nearer. The Hanoverians then halted, gave their fire, and the greater part of them ran away. Two companies of the 101st, from the order of march, were in their rear; these they carried along with them to the reserve of the regiment, and the whole together broke through the Sepoys that were drawn up to support them. The two front companies, not seeing the flight of the rear, continued to advance, and most of them fell at the foot of the redoubt. The enemy now advancing from their work, dispersed the few Hanoverians that still stood by their officers; followed them to the 101st, that had been prevailed on to halt in the rear; drove both through the Sepoy reserve, and chased the whole about a quarter of a mile. They were now in their turn obliged to retreat quickly, to prevent their being cut off from the garrison; for as they had all
quitted the redoubt to follow the chase, five companies of Sepoys, that were on the left of the Hanoverians, took possession of it, while the division under Colonel Stuart hastened forward to the post on the Chilambrum road: upon seeing this, they formed, and retired in good order to another regiment, that was drawn up about two hundred yards beyond the left of this post, which Colonel Stuart had taken with little opposition. They immediately began a heavy fire of musketry from the cover of sandbanks; and at the same time poured grape into the redoubt, which was open in the rear, from four pieces of cannon. The grenadiers and 73rd, seeing themselves unsupported by artillery, and falling fast under the fire of the enemy, lost courage, and retreated in confusion to the redoubt that had been attacked by the Hanoverians. Three battalions of Sepoys followed them in good order, and hindered the enemy from pursuing them. The firing soon after ceased on both sides; and before daybreak, the enemy abandoned all their outposts, and retired to the fort.

We took sixteen pieces of cannon in the different works we carried. We lost, in killed and wounded, near sixty officers, seven hundred Europeans, and two hundred and fifty Sepoys. The loss of the enemy is not known, but must have been less than ours.

The squadron under M. Suffrein came in sight the same day; it consisted of fifteen ships of the line. Sir Edward Hughes was at this time four miles to the southward of Cuddalore, covering the rice-ships at the landing-place. He moored, on the 16th, opposite to the fort, to prevent the garrisons having any communication with their fleet, and was followed by M. Suffrein who kept abreast of him, at the distance of a league. In this situation were both fleets lying-to at sunset. Some signal-guns were heard after dark, and next morning not a ship was to be seen. M. Suffrein returned
in the afternoon, and anchored in the roads. Sir E. Hughes appeared to the eastward on the 18th, but could not bring the enemy to action till the 20th: his whole fleet was not engaged: he withdrew after having had between five and six hundred men killed and wounded. He made sail next day for Madras, and the French squadron returned to Cuddalore on the 22d. As I have not seen any body belonging to our fleet, I cannot give you any account of the action. Our rice-ships having been forced to run, after having landed little more than half their cargoes, it became necessary to discontinue the daily allowance to the public and private followers of the army. They were reduced to the greatest distress; the little they procured from the country was hardly sufficient to keep them alive. This was not the only bad consequence of the departure of the fleet. The presence of such a man as M. Suffrein, obliged us to make our approaches with caution, and to keep strong guards in them. He was continually urging M. Bussy to attack us. He offered to land the greatest part of his crews, and to head them himself, in storming our camp. M. Bussy rejected his proposal, but ordered twelve hundred men to be landed to reinforce the garrison, while the regiment of Aquitaine, and some other corps, amounting to a thousand men, should make an attempt on our trenches. We had by this time carried our works within eight hundred yards of the fort, and had thrown up a small redoubt to the right of the road, which led to it. The enemy attacked this post in the morning of the 25th, about two hours before daybreak. They dispersed a regiment of Sepoys that was drawn up in an unfinished part of the trench that extended to the right of it, and attacked it in flank. The European pickets that were in the rear were ordered to support, but all, except a few men of the 73d, ran away upon hearing the first discharge of musketry; and before the arrival of any reinforcement,
the guard of the redoubt, consisting of two companies of Sepoys and a company of the 78th regiment, repulsed the enemy. Our loss in this affair was not more than twelve or fifteen men killed; that of the enemy was between two and three hundred men killed and wounded. The Chevalier Dumas, who commanded the sally, and sixty privates, were taken. Two columns, which were intended to attack the left of our trenches, after receiving two or three discharges from some field-pieces that were mounted in different parts, retreated to the fort.

Nothing of any consequence happened after this day. We made no new approaches, but employed ourselves in strengthening what we had already made, till the 2nd of July, when Mr. Sadlier, a member of Council, and Mr. Stanton, private secretary to Lord Macartney, came to camp from Cuddalore, where they had arrived two days before in the Medea. They published a cessation of arms they had concluded with M. Bussy, by virtue of powers vested in them by Government; and, at the same time, an order for General Stuart to leave the command of the army to General Bruce, and to return himself to Madras.

We are now embarking the heavy stores, and shall leave this place in a few days. A detachment, consisting of the 78th regiment, two hundred Hanoverians, eighty of the Company's Europeans, and two battalions of Sepoys, under the command of Colonel Stuart, marched, on the 25th, to join the army under Colonel Fullerton, which is now near Trichinopoly.

The French Commissioners have been detained at Bombay. It is said that Cuddalore will not be given up till their arrival.

General Mathews was taken by Tippoo, in Hydernagur, in the month of May. No official accounts have been received, but there seems to be little room to doubt the truth of this event. Tippoo laid siege to Mangalore, but raised it on the approach of the rainy season. It is ima-
gined that he will make peace on almost any terms that shall be proposed: he must either do this or see the war transferred to his own country. Were he inclined to enter the Carnatic, he could not subsist his army, as he has resigned all the advantages he once had, by demolishing the principal forts, and removing the magazines of grain that were formed in the lifetime of his father. The arrival of convoys from Mysore would, at this season of the year, be too uncertain to depend on for the subsistence of his army. He sees all hopes of assistance from the French at an end, and must be sensible that, being now disengaged from all our other enemies, he can no longer have any prospect of success in contending against us.

General Stuart was ordered to Madras for unnecessary delays which the Committee say he made in his march to Cuddalore, and yet he arrived there as soon as the store-ships: his going a month sooner would have been to no purpose, for, as our intrenching tools and heavy cannon were in them, we could not have begun our operations. We could only carry ten days' provisions, and therefore could only have remained four days before the place, as we must have kept six days' to carry us back to Chingalaput, the nearest place we could have got a supply. When the Admiral arrived, he wrote the General that the fleet should remain till the surrender of the fort, but that he must send him a supply of fresh provisions. The General answered, that he would not only comply with his request, but would also send a battalion to Porto Novo to cover the watering of the fleet. Sir Edward, when nothing was wanting to secure the capitulation of the garrison but his keeping his station, allowed himself to be drawn away by M. Suffrein in the night of the 16th of June, and ran so far to the eastward that he could not with all his endeavours again reach the roads.

The General has been much blamed for not taking possession of the ground on the 7th, which he gained with such
great loss on the 13th. It was said that the enemy, not expecting to be attacked on that side, had made no preparations; that the ground might have been occupied without resistance; and that it was not till the day following that, encouraged by our inactivity, they thought of forming lines; that he entertained too high an opinion of the enemy, and placed too little confidence in his own officers; that as it was not till after many entreaties of the field-officers that he allowed the works to be stormed on the 13th, he would probably, had he been left to himself, have so long delayed the attack, as to have rendered the success of it very doubtful; that his deferring the attack of the redoubt from break of day, when the right of the enemy's lines were carried, till eleven o'clock, gave them time to recover from their panic, while our troops were fatigued and dispirited from standing so long in the sun; that his ordering the officer commanding the artillery on the hills to fire for three minutes and no longer, to cover the troops as they advanced to the assault, could not have been expected from any man who had ever been a soldier, for that the time was expired before the troops got near the redoubt, and the enemy, perceiving the firing ceased, came from behind it, and extended themselves in good order along the sand-banks, which they could hardly have done had the cannonade been continued as long as it might have been with safety to our own people.

The flank attack, under Colonel Stuart, did not move till the front one was repulsed; had it advanced at the same time, two regiments that were at the redoubt would have been cut off. There seemed to be no connexion in our movements; every one was at a loss what to do, and nothing saved our army from a total defeat but the French being, like ourselves, without a General.

I am, dear Sir, your affectionate Son,

(Signed) Thos. Munro.
TO HIS BROTHER, JAMES MUNRO.

Camp at the Mount, November 1st, 1782.

All my correspondents mention with wonder your extraordinary talents. They say that you talk in quite a different style from the other boys of your age, and that you imitate none of them: this peculiarity is a sure mark of an original genius. They also say that your deportment is grave, and that you despise making a vain display of your abilities; that you are the wonder of your schoolfellows; that thoughts like yours never entered into any of their heads; and that you never open your mouth but you say something new and uncommon, and utter sentences that deserve to be noted in a book. Whatever the boys may think; I hear that it was entirely owing to you that they all got books at the examination. When you go to the College, you will be of great use as a speaker in the societies. I have even hopes that you will rival your brother Daniel, who was a great ornament of them in former times. He once, if I mistake not, made a speech, and was, when he stuck in the middle of it, within an ace of gaining great applause.

Let William and Margaret know that it is my orders that they do not presume to interrupt your meditations. Should William not comply, he shall not hear a word about the Great Mogul: as for Margaret, she is a female, and they, you know, always take advice.

TO HIS BROTHER, WILLIAM MUNRO.

Camp at the Mount, November 1, 1782.

DEAR WILL.

The above appellation will, I fear, be pronounced by the gentlemen of the College to be rather too familiar
for a man of such profound erudition as you assert that
you are, notwithstanding what appearances may say.

Among a number of Europe letters I received the
other day, I saw one which, from the superscription, I con-
cluded to be from James. I rejoiced at the thoughts of
having my understanding enlightened by some of those
sententious remarks and grave observations that he delivers
without premeditation; but what was my surprise, when,
on breaking the seal, I found I had got for a correspon-
dent one of the most eminent of the literati, who was a
proficient in geography, was master of Euclid, understood
all the cases of right-angled and oblique-angled trigo-
nometry; had gone over the mensuration of heights, dis-
tances, and superficies; talked Latin as fast as Greek,
and English as fast as either, and had crowned all his
studies by the attainment of the four common rules of
arithmetic. I was one evening amusing myself in a boat
upon the Canal—your great discernment will tell you that
it was before I left home—when the sun went down, one
of the company, (a weaver,) a sensible man, observed that
it put him in mind of Young's Night Thoughts. In imi-
tation of this gentleman, Sir, give me leave to say, that
your extensive learning puts me in mind of a Doctor—I
have forgot his name—no matter, you will remember it,
when I tell you it begins with an M—, and that he was
a great theologian, and made speeches at the Council of
Trent, and was less attended to than several who spoke
less of themselves, and more of the public business.

You demand an account of the East Indies, the Mogul's
dominions, and Muxadabad; but I shall be cautious how
I submit it to your inspection, till it is properly digested,
especially as I am advised by you of a circumstance of
which I was before ignorant, that Muxadabad is more
populous than London. I imagine, when you made the
above requisition, that you did it with a view rather to try
my knowledge than to increase your own; for your great skill in geography would point out to you, that Muxabad is as far from Madras as Constantinople is from Glasgow:—you will, therefore, I hope, favour me with a description of the Turk and his capital.

I am sorry to learn that your Spanish drove out the French, and went after them. With proper respect and due decorum,

I am, profound Sir, your admirer,

T. Munro.

To His Father.

[On the death of a brother.]

Cassimcottah, 29th September, 1786.

Dear Sir,

Your last letter brought the melancholy accounts of the irreparable loss we have sustained in the death of poor William. Your former misfortunes might have been alleviated by the pleasure of seeing all your children in health, and by the hopes of their doing well, and being enabled to assist you:—but this last stroke admits of no alleviation. He who could have been least spared has been torn from you! He would have been the joy of his parents, and the friend and companion of his sisters. I vainly flattered myself that I should return home and spend many years in his company, and that I should rejoice in having a brother of such excellent dispositions and abilities. It will be long before he dies out of my remembrance. Every circumstance, every place where you were accustomed to see him, must place his fond image before your sight. What must you not all have felt in sitting down to table without him? I read with delight every part of your letters that mentioned his pro-
gress in his studies. When I began your last, mentioning your intention of sending him to London, I little thought that it was also to inform me of his death. I hope that you and my mother will be able to support this severest trial that you could have undergone, that it will be the last you will ever experience, and that the conduct of your remaining children will afford you as much comfort as you can receive after such a loss. Alexander, who was once so sickly, is now as healthy as any of his brothers. I had a letter from him a few days ago, dated the 6th instant, in which he mentions his having sent five hundred rupees to Calcutta, to be remitted to you.

I was appointed a Lieutenant in March last, and as there was no vacancy for me at Tanjore, I was removed to the regiment at Madras, where I lived three months with Mr. Ross. Your letters, which I then received, led me to believe either that Daniel would not come to India, or, at least, that he would not come till next fleet; I therefore applied to be removed to a Sepoy corps. I sailed from Madras the 24th of June, and soon after my arrival at Vizagapatnam, I received a letter from Daniel, acquainting me of his having landed at Madras five days after I left it. I could not return to see him without getting leave from the General, of which there was little chance: besides, I had no money to carry me down, as I had left Madras with only six pagodas in my pocket. Although I had no money of my own, I had ninety pagodas, in bills, of the hundred that I received for Alexander's horse, about two years ago. I sent them to Mr. Ross, and requested that he would advance him the amount in money. I have not yet learned whether he has done so or not. I have too little knowledge of the different branches of trade in this country to point out to Daniel what line would be the best for him to adopt; his own inclination, and the advice of his friends at Madras, must determine him. If he goes to Bengal,
Mr. Ross will recommend him to his friend Mr. Ferguson, to whom he may be of use in the great sugar manufacture that he carries on. I have mentioned this to him. I am only afraid that Mr. Ferguson may have no use for him, as he has already got Mr. Lennox for his manager. But I need not say any more: he will write you fully himself. Alexander writes me that he will allow him a certain sum monthly, until he is settled.

I have applied to return to Tanjore; if I succeed, I shall have an opportunity of spending a few days with Daniel at Madras.

My pay as a Lieutenant is thirty pagodas a month, and half batta, sixteen: but it has been stopped since the end of last year, and will not be paid till the Treasury can afford it. I shall always endeavour to live on my pay, and remit the batta to you, as it is paid. Mr. Ross sent you in March last, a bill on the Royal College of Commerce of Copenhagen, for 268l. 2s. 6d. payable in London, at six months sight.

I do not know if I mentioned to you in my last General —'s offer of appointing me a cornet; as I was not in Madras, he made the proposal to Mr. Ross, who declined it, by the advice of my military friends. They told him that I would be a Lieutenant in a few weeks, when I should have more pay than a Cornet; and that, if he accepted the General's offer, I would be superseded by above a hundred Ensigns of infantry, who would be Lieutenants before I could be a Lieutenant of cavalry. The General said, that whatever Mr. Ross might think, it was intended for my good, and that the present difference in opinion should not prevent him from attending to my interest on a future occasion: but he has had the disposal of more appointments than any of his predecessors, and has found no one proper for me. Besides other posts, he has disposed of six brigade majorships, and five quarter-mas-
terships, without ever thinking that the holding of any of them could be for my interest; though I had some kind of claim to one, from having acted as a Staff till the army was new modelled by General Lang. But though the General's conduct has not answered my wishes, I do not consider myself the less indebted to Mr. H. Ross for his friendly letter. I shall write him whenever I get his direction from Daniel.

It gives me much pleasure to hear of the sympathy you have met with from your friends on the loss of poor William, but particularly the tender attention that Miss Stark showed him during his illness. I hope that you and my mother, though you can never forget how much you have lost, will be able to support it with resignation. I intended to have written my mother, but as my last was to her, and it makes no difference to which of you I write, I thought it as well to answer your letter.

I am, dear Sir,

Your affectionate Son,

THOMAS MUNRO.

This place is about twenty-four miles west of Vizagapatnam. Direct for me in the 11th Battalion. There will be no need to inclose to Mr. Ross, as a post-office is established.

TO HIS FRIEND MR. FOULIS.

- Madras, Dec. 1788.

Your last despatches left you (I presume from their contents,) making a display of your loyalty after the good old English manner, on the transactions in Holland by getting drunk with a parcel of swaggering companions, ascribing the success of the Prussians to the spirit of the British councils, the majority of the people so much respected by Foreign Nations, and the five hours' speeches
of our indefatigable orators, so much dreaded by every Sovereign in Europe who has any taste for eloquence, and abusing the House of Bourbon, setting both branches at defiance, and manfully asserting that Britons were now as superior to them in the Cabinet as they had always been in the field. It is well for Master Bull that his head is filled with the same kind of fantastic visions that possess those men who are in quest of the philosopher's stone; for if it were not, the knowledge of his misfortunes must long ago have deprived him of the little sense he has left. Let him be mauled by every foe he encounters in the field; let disasters rain upon him as thick as Lairds in Scotland, and duped and outwitted by every one he treats with in the closet, yet, if his troops by chance gain a petty advantage, or if a negotiation in which he is engaged is brought nearly to the point he wishes, then Europe is swayed by his councils or trembles at his arms. I made allowances for your giving a loose to the exultation of your heart on the triumph over insidious France, obtained by a Prussian army inspired by British valour and directed by British wisdom, and therefore easily accounted for your not having written to me for some time past; but when I heard of the commotions in France, and of the fate of Du Presmenil and Monsabar, and the proceedings of the bed of justice, and saw Mr. Vander Spengel's treaty and no letter from you, I said with a sigh, "This likes me not;" for if he did not perceive in these events more danger to the prosperity of Britain than ever past times have witnessed, or perhaps future will experience, why this profound silence? He is certainly alarmed, and no wonder; for even I, unskilled as I am in political phenomena, think I see some cause for serious apprehensions for the safety of the empire. I wish Louis may avail himself of the powerful engine he has in his hands, a standing army, to crush the mutineers of his parliament; for if they carry their point of esta-
blishing a free Government, commerce will become as honourable among them as it is in England, and France will then prove by sea what she is now by land, the greatest power in the world; and you and I may live to see Britain stripped of all her foreign dominions; her free-born sons restrained from quitting their barren isle without a French passport, and left to talk of the empires they once held in the East and West, and their empire of the sea, when no trace of it remains; but "Come cheer up, my lads," and "Rule Britannia." To avert such evils as these, I would recommend to you and your loyal party to drink prosperity to Louis and confusion to his parliament, for every means ought to be taken to discourage and suppress the spirit of liberty in a nation that is so formidable a rival as France.

TO THE SAME.

Ambore, April 2, 1790.

If, like you, I were liable to be possessed by blue or any other devils, the situation of affairs in France would be more likely than any thing besides to produce such an event, for as a friend to the glory and prosperity of Britain, I cannot behold with indifference the restoration of French liberty. That nation, already too powerful, wanted nothing but a better form of Government to render her the arbiter of Europe; and the convulsions attending so remarkable a revolution having subsided, France will soon assume that rank to which she is entitled from her resources, and the enterprising genius of her inhabitants. You and I may live to see the day when the fairest provinces of India (reversing Mr. Gibbon's boast) shall not be subject to a company of merchants of a remote island in the Northern Ocean; but when, perhaps, those merchants and their countrymen, being confined by the superior power of their rival to the narrow limits of their native isle, shall
SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

sink into the insignificance from which they were raised by their empire of the sea. With the freedom of our Government we may retain our orators, our poets, and historians, but our domestic transactions will afford few splendid materials for the exercise of genius or fancy, and with the loss of empire we must relinquish, however reluctantly, the idea so long and so fondly cherished by us all, of our holding the balance of power. In looking forward to the rising grandeur of France, I am not influenced by any groundless despondency, but I judge of the future from the past; and when I consider that after the Revolution she opposed for some time, successfully, the united naval powers of England and Holland; that she did the same under Queen Anne, and under George II. till fifty-nine; and that notwithstanding the almost total annihilation of her marine in that war—in the East, in Europe, America, and the West Indies, she never shunned, and sometimes sought our fleets, and met us in this country (the East Indies), if not with superior force, at least with superior fortune, and perhaps bravery;—that she made all those exertions when she was left to the mercy of capricious women, who made and unmade ministers, generals, and admirals almost every month, and when commerce and even the naval profession met with no encouragement; I cannot but fear that when she shall direct her attention to the sea, she may wrest from Britain her empire of that element, and strip her of all her foreign possessions. When two countries have made nearly the same progress in the arts of peace and war, and when there is no material difference in the constitution of their governments, that which possesses the greatest population, and the most numerous resources from the fertility of her soil, must in the end prevail over her rival. But let us leave this struggle with France, which I hope is yet at some distance, and talk of the affair which we have now upon our hands with Tippoo, &c. &c.
TO HIS MOTHER.

Velore, 19th February, 1788.

DEAR MADAM,

Though I have the satisfaction of hearing from my friends at home as often as most people in this country, yet of late I have received but few of your letters. This I can only attribute to the afflictions you have met with for some years past making you too low-spirited for writing, and to the apprehension that expressing your sentiments to your children might recall things to your mind which it would be better were forgotten for ever. You have suffered some trials, but you have still many comforts left. You have lost him of your sons whom you perhaps could least have spared, but those that remain, though they can never hope to make you forget him, will leave nothing undone to console you, as far as consolation can go on such an occasion. They are not rich, and may not be so for a long time, but they will always, I believe, be in a situation to place you in comfort. I am convinced that you do not consider riches as essential to happiness, and that, while your sons can keep themselves independent in the world, you will feel no regret at seeing other men in better circumstances than they. I often think that you enjoy more real happiness amidst anxiety for their welfare and continual hope of their acquiring fortunes and returning home, than you could have done if they had all been born to independence and never been separated from you.

Daniel returned from his eastern voyage in December, and has written me twice since; his last letter is dated the 20th January: he tells me he has no immediate employment, but that he is looking out for something or other. He does not mention if he has saved any of his salary,
or how he supports himself. I suppose that he will be more particular in his letters to you. He had a letter from Alexander, dated Camp near Patna, 13th January: he was on his march to Chumsi, which he expected to reach by the 2nd February. Alexander at one time had expectations of succeeding William Duncanson, but he has now in a great measure given them up, for Lord Cornwallis is averse to any officer being sent on that station, as it is out of the regular line of service.

I left Vizagapatam above a twelvemonth ago to come here; in doing this I gave up sixteen pagodas a month, half batta, which I did not think an object to be put in competition with my health, which I was never sure of preserving a moment, as I was continually liable to be sent among the Hills.

The four companies to which I belonged were, soon after I left them, ordered among them to quell some disturbances raised by a Zemindar who had been displaced; above half the Sepoys that composed the detachment died, and of four officers, one died, two are still lingering with the fever, and will never while they live perhaps be totally free from its effects, and the fourth, Captain Grant, had so violent an attack, that he has been for this six months' past entirely deprived of his memory.

I had an offer some weeks ago of returning to Tanjore, which I declined, as I at that time flattered myself that I could do better; but I have since found that I was mistaken in my judgment, as the place I wanted will be given to another officer, who has more interest than I. The place which I wanted was that of Private Persian Secretary to the Government; the person who holds it promised to recommend me as his successor when he goes home, which he will by the first opportunity; but I believe, from the orders lately received from the Court of Directors, that this appointment, with several others, will be abo-
lished; at least I am sure, if it does stand, that it will not be given to me.

I am much obliged to Mrs. Wilkie, for her kindness in writing in my favour to Captain ———. I forwarded her letter to him as soon as I received it, and in course of post I got his answer, expressing his wish of serving me or any friend of his old acquaintance Mrs. Wilkie, and desiring me to point out any thing in which he could be of use to me.

I have done my part, but I suspect that he will not be so ready in doing his. There is such a northern inundation, such a chain of clanish and political connection about the General, that it is ridiculous for an unsupported stranger to think of breaking through or even of sneaking into it.

I have lately had so much bad news from home, that I am now almost afraid to open an Europe letter. My Father's last conveys the distressing accounts of the death of Doctor Irvine and another daughter of Mrs. Craig. I lament the untimely death of the Doctor, not only on account of his family and friends, but on account of the public, who have sustained a great loss by being deprived of the benefit of his distinguished talents. I don't know whether it was owing to my having a predilection for the study of chymistry, or the clear and scientific composition and arrangement of his lectures, but they made on me that kind of lasting impression which was made on me by Robinson Crusoe and Plutarch's Lives, the two first books I read, so that though since my leaving home I have not had opportunities of paying much attention to chymistry, I have hardly forgotten any thing that I learned from him.

You never say any thing of my aunts Stirling. I hope yet to have the happiness of squiring you to drink tea with them.

I am, dear Madam,

Your affectionate son,

Thomas Munro.
SUPPLEMENTARY TO PAGE 112, VOL. 1.

TO HIS SISTER.

Camp at Raicottah, 25th July, 1791.

DEAR ERKINKE,

Most of the ships of the season have already arrived, but bring me no letters, except from you, dated in September, November, and January. You must not expect me to keep pace with you in returning letter for letter; my way of life has been, for some months past, too unsettled to allow it. I am sometimes, for several days together, without pen or ink, or any kind of baggage. I shall make up all my deficiencies at more leisure; and, in the mean time, content myself with saying a few words about the appearance of some unfortunate productions of mine in a London paper. I have not seen it myself, and I hope nobody else will. The war is in my favour, and will, I hope, prevent it from reaching camp. I never in my life was more alarmed than when I came to the passage in your letter which mentions it. I was almost as much shocked as any old lady is, when she reads that a ship was wrecked in the Chops of the Channel with five hundred poor wretches, and that every soul perished. The partiality of relations and friends has often distressed their correspondents in this country by exhibiting their hasty careless reflections to the public eye. There is always some mark which betrays the author to his acquaintances here—he is often injured, and always exposed to ridicule by the discovery. The ridicule of conversation it is easy to retort, but it is not easy to parry that which falls on the prediction of events which never happen, or the assigning of wrong causes to transactions which have actually taken place. It is of no use to the unlucky author that his opinions were at one period ap-
parently founded on reason, when time has shown their fallacy. Every man, even those who had perhaps formed the same notions, (but not published by their friends,) fall upon him without mercy. The very name of Glasgow will expose the author "of the policy of reducing Tippoo;" for, in a small society like that of Madras, not only the characters of the different members, but the places of their education, are known to each other. Kippen and I are the only emigrants from your town; and, unless I should have fortunately thrust into my strictures a quotation, or a few lines of poetry, nothing can save me from detection. I wonder how my father could have given up any part of my letter for publication, on any terms, far less on those of prefixing a sketch of the life of Mr. Blank, the author, of whom I suppose it is said, that, notwithstanding his deafness, he had a prodigious genius for eating milk porridge. Your letter was too late to stop a long letter written from Bangalore, about a fortnight ago, abounding in judicious comments on the past, and sage predictions of what is to come. It is, however, luckily in time to hinder the publication of a much larger work, of which the Bangalore performance contains but a few scattered hints. You have saved me from falling out of Scylla into Charybdis, which old proverb, translated by the moderns into the frying-pan and fire, I have thought it politic to introduce here, to the end that, in case you may be infected with the rage of publication, when this falls into your hands, it may disguise the author; for my friends, knowing that I have no acquaintance with dead languages, when they see these two ancient names, will acquit me of every suspicion. Had my long treatise on the war, which the post-master, by refusing it as too bulky, forced me to keep, and which your letter has shown me the propriety of destroying, ever reached the College, my friend, the professor, would not have permitted me to remain any longer as an humble letter-writer,
but would, no doubt, have at once exalted me into a pamphleteer. The pamphlet is now, however, gone. There was no use in keeping it, when I could not venture to send it to those for whose amusement it was intended. It mentioned what ought to have been the general plan of the war, explained the impolicy of commencing it in Coimbatore, which, I believe, I took notice of before General Meadows joined the army. The propriety of advancing from the Carnatic to Bangalore pointed out the mistakes of the Seringapatam expedition, as well as the manner in which it ought to be next attempted, and the government of Tippoo entirely overthrown; and, by a discussion of the nature of Mahrattah armies, their method of marching, and the way of supplying them with provisions, showed how little cause there was of apprehension from them. These, and all other political speculations, I shall give up, and confine myself, in future letters, to narratives of what has happened. To begin then:—The army left Bangalore about a fortnight ago, and moved towards Ossore, which was evacuated on our approach. Tippoo had almost entirely rebuilt the fortifications on a modern plan—and though part was unfinished, the place is so strong that a garrison was left in it to extend the communication to the eastward, which has, within these few days, been farther advanced by the taking of several hill forts near the entrance of the passes in this neighbourhood; and, lastly, by the acquisition of this place, with the loss of only one officer killed, and a few men wounded. Kishnaghery will probably be threatened, but not regularly attacked, as it is impregnable by open force. If by storming the Pettah we can frighten the garrison above into a surrender, it will be very fortunate, for it will give us possession of all the country to Amboor, and opens the roads for the arrival of convoys. We have reports of ambassadors from Tippoo being on their way to
negotiate, which I am sorry for, as it appears mere child-
ishness to consider him any longer as a sovereign who can-
not preserve any part of his own empire by his own re-
sources, or who ought to be maintained by our arms for
the sake of visionary schemes of the balance of power. I
wished to write you a quiet letter about the climate and
the face of the Mysore country, but it is in vain that
I laugh at myself for thinking so much of public affairs,
which I cannot influence either one way or another. These
ambassadors continually run in my head, and keep me in
perpetual alarm lest British weakness and ignorance, under
the names of moderation and justice, should re-establish
Tippoo. When this point is settled, I shall write to you
of ghauts and jungles, and all the wonders of this coun-
try,—all which I would gladly exchange for a family sup-
per with the Miss Stirlings, followed by a bowl of their
white rum punch, and a discourse on the virtuous charac-
ters of the days of Charles the Martyr. My mother need
not be uneasy about my eyes: I now find no inconvenience
in reading till midnight: another year will make them as
strong as ever. Your friend Spiers is on the Malabar
coast with the 14th battalion, which joined Abercrombie in
his burlesque campaign. I wrote him two or three times
without receiving any answer, which may have been owing
to the miscarriage of my letters. George Kippen has been
for a few months past with a troop of cavalry, under Cap-
tain Read, employed in collecting grain for the army: his
income, one month with another, must be at least three
hundred and fifty pagodas. You have, perhaps, already
learned the melancholy end of poor John Younge. With
many amiable and many manly qualities, too much solici-
tude about public affairs made him too apt to despond at
every unfavourable turn. The destruction of our batter-
ing train at Seringapatam was too much for him to bear,
and he put an end to his life to avoid seeing the disasters
of which he considered this step as the certain prelude. His fortune, about ten thousand pagodas, he has left to his sister. I have heard nothing of Daniel or Alexander for three months; but am not uneasy at it, as there has been of late but little communication with the Carnatic. In six months, I shall be worth about eleven hundred pagodas, which I shall put into some person's hands at Madras, to remit the annual interest to my father. It will be about fifty pounds sterling, and may be increased when I grow wiser, which you will think is much to be wished for, when you know that I might now have been worth treble that sum. I shall have no difficulty in a future letter of convincing you of the impossibility there has been for some years of my making any remittances. I have felt it the more, as it has laid James under obligations to a stranger in the pursuit of his studies.

Yours affectionately,

Thos. Munro.

TO MR. GEORGE BROWN OF LEITH.

Camp between Ossore and Raicottah,
10th Aug, 1791.

I do not know if I have written to you since the fall of Bangalore. It is, however, of little consequence, as you will see all the particulars of that and of other operations of the army in the public papers. I shall content myself, at present, with a few observations on the general situation of affairs. Though we have taken possession of no post to the westward of Bangalore, and have fallen back from Seringapatam to the confines of the Carnatic; we have, notwithstanding, since the beginning of May, greatly reduced the power of Tippoo. The same severity of weather which destroyed half of our cavalry, and almost the whole of our bullocks during the expedition against Seringapatam, was likewise experienced by him; and if not with so
great immediate loss, yet with greater in respect to the consequences, because we can easily procure both bullocks and horses; the former of which he cannot get without difficulty, and the latter he cannot by any possible means recruit. When we last saw his army on the banks of the Cavery, he had not four thousand horse, and since that time the number must have greatly diminished, for he was forced to remain near his capital, exposed to the chilling winds of the western monsoon; while we, by retiring into a milder climate, saved a considerable part of ours. His supplies were formerly drawn from the territories of the Mahrattas and the Nizam; the war has deprived him of that resource: the only other, which was indeed but trifling, was drawn from the brood mares in particular districts of his own country; but this too, is at an end, for his enemies have seized them all. His infantry, as men suffer less than animals from the inclemencies of the weather, though they may not have fallen away in so great a degree as his cavalry, are no doubt much lessened in their numbers; nor is there any probability of his being able to make up the deficiencies, because the countries near his capital are entirely depopulated, and those at a distance from it are either under the dominion of his enemies, or his communication with them extremely precarious. The Mahrattas, on their march to join us, ravaged a great tract of country between Sera and Seringapatam; they followed the same practice on our return to Bangalore; so that between these two places, every village is burned, and the inhabitants have either fled to distant provinces, or taken refuge on the tops of fortified rocks. Chitteldroog, Gooty, Ballary, and Gurrumconda, are either regularly invested, or in some measure blockaded, by their neighbourhood being overrun by the horse of our allies. Except in those places which are far removed from the active scene of war, Tip-poo has no magazines but at Seringapatam: the only chan-
nels of supply now open to him are Bidanore, and a part of the Malabar coast, from which he draws a few cattle, and some grain, perhaps not more than enough to answer his daily consumption. His army is too weak to approach us; but supposing it to be as complete as at the beginning of the war, how in the present state of things could he advance to the eastward, to interrupt our communication with the Carnatic? The fear of the Mahrattas would deter any thing less than his whole army from attempting it; but having no intermediate magazines, he would, in such a case, be reduced to the necessity of bringing every thing along with him from Seringapatam; but the great train of cattle requisite for this purpose would, by impeding his progress, hinder the execution of his design, which could only be accomplished by rapid movements; and by making him incapable of marching faster than we, would soon constrain him to fight for his provisions, or to abandon them to save his army. It is therefore likely, that he will not trust himself far from his capital, that he may advance a few miles to the eastward for the sake of the health of his troops, and of grass for his cattle, and that he will again return, and shut himself up when we are ready to besiege him. He has not a man between Bangalore and Madras, and while the army remains in this part of the country, a very slender force is sufficient to cover our convoys. One is now on the road, and I have no doubt but that in little more than two months, we shall have enough for the grand enterprise against the capital, with the fall of which his power will cease to exist.

This is the situation of Tippoo. Compare it with ours. We are in the centre of his dominions with an army as strong as when we first ascended the Ghauts, and which can be augmented, whenever it is thought expedient, both with Europeans and Sepoys. To supply ourselves with provisions, we have not only the Carnatic open, but other re-
sources, unknown to us in former wars; we have Bunjaries from Cuddapah and other northern provinces; and we have in the Mahratta camp almost every kind of grain, which, though dear, is perhaps, all circumstances considered, nearly as cheap as the Government could furnish it; and add to all this, that our own country, having seen no enemy since February, is cultivated in the same manner as in the most profound peace. We can never expect so many favourable circumstances to attend us again. The force of the contending powers is too unequal to make it be considered as a war; it is rather a Tanjorean expedition, which will terminate with the capture of a single place: are we then to forego the fair prospect of extending our territory, and increasing our power and revenue, because some people, who have heard of the balance of power in Europe, imagine that we cannot exist without it in India? Is not the present war a strong proof of the difficulty of preserving such a system? and may not such a combination, as has now reduced Tippoo so low, become hereafter fatal to us? What happened last war may happen again, and with a less favourable issue. The timidity of the Nizam, and the divisions of the Mahrattas, then saved us; but the former may one day have an able successor, and the latter more union among themselves; they may then, in conjunction with such a Prince as Tippoo, conceive it to be politic to drive the English out of India, and divide their possessions among themselves. The most likely means to avoid such a contest would be to crush Tippoo, in defiance of all the calamities which an increase of territory, and the destruction of a formidable rival, are to bring upon us. The dominions of the Mahrattas are so extensive, and their Government so disjointed, that the acquisition of a part of Mysore would add little to their power; and with respect to the Nizam, the possession of Tippoo's northern
provinces would form a very inconsiderable accession to his power at present, and might, in the event of his death, occasion the partition of his dominions, by holding out to the ambition of a candidate for power, the sovereignty of a second kingdom, strongly guarded by the Kistnah against the parent state.

But our strength and our security would be augmented in a very great proportion by the conquest of Baramahl, and Coimbetore, with a part of the Malabar coast; because these countries are rich, and our boundaries being extended to the Ghauts, would, by having so strong a natural bulwark, make it more easy to defend an enlarged dominion, than what we now possess. Then it will be said by those who have read, in speeches, of the Mahrattas, that when Tippoo is removed, "they will hang like black clouds over the mountains, and pour down in torrents upon the ill-fated Carnatic;" the answer is, they will be too wise to try the experiment hastily; they know their own strength and ours, they therefore say little to us about Chout, and never trouble Bengal, though it has been frequently as open to invasion as ever the Carnatic can be; they know that it was Hyder who gave vigour to the grand alliance, and employed the chief exertions of the English armies; and they have not forgotten that we reduced Guzerat, the most valuable of their provinces; and that nothing but his successful irruption could have restored it to them. In Europe, and even in India, a great apprehension, but without any solid foundation, has been entertained of the irresistible force of the Mahratta States: this opinion arose with their Government, and was confirmed by their early successes, but we ought to remember that they found a favourable conjuncture for extending their empire. They grew as the Mogul monarchy decayed, and they found no rivals to oppose them, for they had effected most of their
conquests, and arrived at their full vigour after the death of Aurengzebe, and before the appearance of the Nizam, Hyder, or the English.

The formation of these Governments put a stop to their progress, and their collected armies received a blow at Panniput which they will perhaps never recover. The armies of the Nizam want only a military leader to make them meet them with confidence. Tippoo has sometimes done it with success; and an English army would rejoice at an opportunity of engaging such an enemy.

But there are other ways, it may be said, besides mere fighting, of prosecuting a war successfully; by harassing the enemy with a hardy body of cavalry, by cutting off his supplies and detachments, by ravaging the country and forcing him to retreat. The Mahrattas, however, though always ready to burn the possessions of their neighbours, are not over-fond of destroying their own, which they would be obliged to do by adhering to this system of war; because, by having magazines on our frontiers, we could always penetrate into their country: if they do not burn, we could subsist at their expense; and if they do, they must either live on a small allowance of provisions, or carry a great quantity with their camp. But they are as impatient of want as any other people; and though their diet, according to European notions, is simple, they like to have abundance; they will therefore take care to have a large stock of grain with their army. A prodigious number of bullocks will be required to carry it, and their movements will by this means be rendered as slow as ours, and the advantages of rapidity be at an end. If they are overtaken and lose their bazar, their army will disperse till another can be provided; for they are not a people to sacrifice their conveniences to military achievements. I have heard much of the hardness of what are called uncivilized nations; and I have heard of Tartars invading
Poland, and living on snow; but these observations will not apply to India, for here the most regular armies are undoubtedly the hardiest.

The English army endure hunger and fatigue infinitely beyond that of any Native power. Tippoo comes next, and then the Mahrattas. There are other circumstances besides the above, which will make the Mahrattas cautious of entering into a war with the English. They are a commercial nation, and are sensible how much we could injure their trade: they enter into war only where they see a certainty of acquiring money or territory; but they have had too much experience to expect either from us, and after failing in the design of the Confederacy of eighty, they will hardly conceive that the destruction of the most powerful member of it, should be the means of rendering them more successful on a future trial. The Nizam never can be very formidable; his dominions are extensive, and his revenues great, but his Government is feeble. A great part of his army are composed of Moormen of family, the bravest soldiers in India; but they are without discipline, nor is there any likelihood of their undergoing a change; none has taken place since their first connection with Europeans. If ever it is effected, it must be by their means; but the Nizam having now no seaport, has no intercourse with any of them but deserters, whom he despises too much to think of new modelling his army by their directions. The Mahrattas are too much attached to their ancient customs, to take any trouble about the innovations of Europeans. Neither they nor the Nizam have made any progress in the art of war since they were first known to us; and, excepting the instance of Scindia's vagabond legion, have shown no symptoms of change. But the case is widely different in Mysore. The well-regulated, vigorous Government of Hyder has, under his son, become more systematic and more strong; the European disci-
pline has been more rigidly enforced, and all kinds of firearms, which were formerly imported by strangers, are now made by his own subjects under the direction of foreign workmen. He has, by various regulations and institutions, infused so much of the spirit of vigilance, order, and obedience, into every class of men, that he has experienced none of the accidents which always attend unsuccessful wars in Asia, the revolt of his Chiefs, or the desertion of his men. Whatever he has lost, has been owing to the superior power of his enemies, never to the defection of his officers; and even when forced to shut himself up in his capital, his authority continued so firm in the distant provinces, that the Mahrattas could not by any means convey information of their approach to Lord Cornwallis, or advise him that they had left Darwar, till they joined him at Seringapatam. He conducts the operations of war on regular principles, taking the forts, and securing the country as he advances; and add to all that, by destroying or expelling all the Rajas and Poligars, by not permitting his great officers to keep any independent bodies of troops, and by paying all the military himself, he has adopted the wisest measures for securing to his descendants the undisturbed possession of his dominions. It is from a power constituted like this, and not from the Mahrattas, or the Nizam, that the English have any just ground for apprehension. He will ever be their irreconcileable enemy, because they are the great obstacle to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs, and he will be always ready to join or to lead any confederacy against them; and it is only the presence of such an enemy that can render any combination of the other States formidable, because they require some ally more regular and more vigorous than themselves, to hold them together and give spirit to their proceedings.

Hyder did this last war, and we do it in the present;
shall we then, alarmed by idle dreams of policy and balance of power, hesitate to crush, while we can, such a rival? Would it not rather be the wiser course to strengthen ourselves by his downfall—to seize every favourable opportunity of increasing our power, and to trust more to the terror of our arms than to visionary speculations for defending our territories from the insults of our neighbours. Those who prefer the security of treaties, know little indeed of India.

In Europe, where every people is nearly on a level with respect to the arts of peace and war, and where the boundaries of most of the great kingdoms have been long fixed, alliances are sometimes successful. But in India, where dominion changes every day, where the powers among which it is divided have only had a short existence, with the extent of their territory and power continually varying, and where it is not certain how soon all of them may be overthrown, a nation like the English, whose strength does not depend on the qualities of one man, whose government is fixed on solid foundations, and whose military character is so infinitely superior to that of its competitors, need not fear that by gaining an increase of territory and force, it will stimulate those to combine against it who were afraid to do so when it was in a weaker condition.

TO HIS SISTER.

Camp at Bangalore, 9th Sept. 91.

MY DEAR ERSKINE,

I wrote to you and my father last month, and to my mother yesterday: I purposely avoided writing to her any particulars of James, because I have not leisure to mention the same thing in many letters, and because the danger of their being lost on the road to Madras, makes me wish to divide whatever I have to say into se-
parate sheets, and to dispatch them at different times, that some of them at least may arrive. He landed at Madras on the 15th August, after a passage of three months and nineteen days, and has written me two letters, the last of which is dated the 27th. His health, poor fellow, is mended, and he will soon, in such a climate as Madras, get as strong as ever he was in his life. He seems to be as anxious to get near me as if I were his old nurse Elizabeth; his character, from what I can gather from his observations, has not the least resemblance to that of any of his brothers; it is full of candour, good-nature, diffidence, and a great respect for his superiors, in which light he views all men who are older than himself, particularly doctors. One of his reasons for coming to this country was to be with me, he says; but this cannot at present be effected, and possibly never will to the extent he wishes; it will, however, be no loss to him, for if he can derive any benefit from me, he is more likely to do so from my correspondence than my example; for he would be much scandalized at beholding in his brother, instead of a man of a grave deportment and wise discourse, one little changed since the time that he used to carry him to swim, and play tricks upon him on the way home. He can be with me only in two situations—either by belonging to the same corps, or to the same garrison. The latter must, during the war, be out of the question; and the former too, while I remain in my present employment, which is the command of two companies in Camp, by which I receive about forty pagodas a month above my Lieutenant's allowances. My battalion has been in Bangalore ever since the taking of the place; the Captain, on hearing of the arrival of James, wrote to get him appointed to it; his pay, &c. till the peace, would be about eighty pagodas per month. It is not clear to me that the appointment can be effected, and I am doubtful if it would be ultimately of advantage to him. I have
written to an old friend of mine, Mr. Duffin, a member of
the Medical Board, and desired him, even if the removal
can be procured, not to consent to it unless he thinks
James qualified for the situation; he is a most excellent
man, and I am certain will do whatever is best for our
brother. If James joins a battalion in the field, it would,
I am afraid, be too arduous a task for him to take charge
of five or six hundred men, and to decide without any as-
sistance when limbs ought to be taken off, and when pre-
served. Madras is the best and the only good medical
school in India; he will there, by a few months' residence,
have an opportunity to see the treatment of the disorders
peculiar to the climate, to become an expert operator, and
perhaps to recommend himself to the heads of his pro-
fession: he will have a good house, and leisure to confirm
his health and prosecute his studies, and he will mix in
society, and insensibly acquire that confidence in himself
which he wants at present. When the war is over, and
my station fixed, I shall endeavour to get him near me, if
he is not better provided for. I am not uneasy at his
diffidence, it is better in a young man than too much
forwardness; for the first may be removed by time, but
not the last. I mentioned this part of his disposition in
my first letter to Mr. Duffin, to which I have to-day re-
ceived an answer, in which the Doctor observes—"I have
great pleasure in telling you your brother is a steady
well-informed young man; he is stationed at the general
hospital here, and seems very well satisfied with his situa-
tion. As I am with him, you may depend upon it I will
do everything in my power to assist him." This letter
is dated the 2nd instant, at which time the application
for James's removal had not reached Madras; but on
that subject I shall trust entirely to Mr. Duffin, who is
the best judge; and I do it with the more confidence, be-
cause there are so many alterations daily making in the
medical line, that what is now a good situation may next month be a bad one. Mr. Ross says, "that he has a decent, discreet behaviour." This is more than ever he could allow to Alexander or Daniel, and more than he would allow me for a period of some months after my having spoken disrespectfully of certain parts of the character of Peter the Great.

If James did not find in the study of anatomy, in the wonderful construction of the human frame, a wide field for indulging the contemplations of a religious mind, I should be afraid of his abandoning the hospital for the pulpit. He is so very spiritual, that he seems to follow literally the text of "Thank God for all things." When I opened his first letter, I thought I had got hold of a new litany. In every sentence there was "thank God"—"if it please God"—"God willing," and many other ejaculations of this sort. I have been obliged to quote his favourite book, to show him the impropriety of such expressions, except in his closet. He is much attached to botany, which he tells me gives to a reflecting mind the most exalted ideas of the power of the Divinity. This doctrine, though it is always introduced as an exordium to all botanical treatises, has never made much impression on me, for I never could conceive why a man ought to admire the omnipotence of the Creator in the minute, rather than in the grand objects of the creation; or why he should be less struck by rivers and mountains, the ocean and the firmament, than by the sexual system of plants. I shall say no more of this till I see James, and hear his reasons for worshipping a rose rather than the sun; and if he has not already made a convert of you, I shall then endeavour to bring you over to my more sublime religion.

He will give you himself the particulars of his voyage, and of his new way of life. I could hardly have believed that he would have left you, or that you would have
parted with him. It is, however, I think, the best step that could have been taken; he is better calculated to succeed when a regular promotion is established, and when reward is often the consequence of merit, than when much would have depended on bustling impudence: he is already able to maintain himself, and will soon be able to spare something to send home, and perhaps to go there sooner than any of his brothers.

My father accuses me of forgetting George Kippin; he now commands a party of sixty or seventy horse, under Captain Read, and gives much satisfaction by his activity; his income is handsome, above three hundred pagodas, I am told. He also taxes me with coining new words. If I do, it is like Mrs. Slipslop, by miscalling old ones. He asks where I found explanates? I never found it, and if it is in any of my letters, it is a slip of the pen, and such slips, if I do not observe at the instant, I seldom correct them afterwards; for I very frequently dispatch letters without reading them over, because I remark that men who give in to the habit of mending their letters never do otherwise. I catch myself often, particularly when in a hurry, manufacturing an unintelligible word, by writing the first half of one word and joining to it the whole or the last half of that which ought to conclude the sentence, leaving out, very likely, half a dozen of intermediate ones. I shall not write again by the Swallow, as she is to sail the 15th. I have a great deal on my hands, being obliged to send Alexander and many other Correspondents accounts of our operations; his last letter is 25th August. I wrote Daniel yesterday, but have not heard from him for some time.

Your affectionate brother,

Thomas Munro.
TO HIS FATHER,

[Introducing his friend Mr. Fowlis.]

DEAR SIR,

Bangalore, 8th January, 1792.

From some of your letters I observe that you know, but cannot guess how you learned, that the bearer of this is a man for whom I have the highest esteem; my attachment to him is not one of those which proceed merely from the chance of being brought together, and forming a connection or friendship for mutual convenience; but it is the result of an intimate knowledge of his sterling virtues and his amiable feelings. Every part of his character is genuine and manly, and I like him as much in the momentary bursts of passion, excited sometimes by the contemplation of successful villainy, and sometimes by a servant's snuffing out the candle, as in his feeling for the sufferings of the helpless, and his exertions for their relief. A few days will make you interested in his favour as much on his own account as on account of his knowledge of me. I must, however, tell you, that I think one of his great defects is a want of discernment of the characters of men—produced by want of suspicion, not of penetration. He therefore makes a man much better or worse than he really is, and though he fancies himself a misanthrope—though he dislikes, in general, going into large companies, there are particular parties which he is fond of even to dissipation; but this will not prevent him from preferring the most homely fare with you to the best in the town; if he does not, I shall have as little faith in my own as I have in his knowledge of mankind.

I have now by great parsimony scraped together one thousand pagodas, and, if the war continues a twelvemonth longer, I shall have two thousand, the interest of which shall be remitted to you regularly. I have quitted one
division of the army to join another, in what I think a shameful, but what other people call a prudent, way. I am again under Captain Read, whom I deserted on the centre army's taking the field—but of this I shall say more hereafter. I expect James every day.

Your affectionate Son,

Thomas Munro.

TO ANDREW ROSS, ESQ. OF MADRAS.

Bangalore, 17th February, 1792.

DEAR SIR,

My last letter to you, mentioning my leaving camp from several causes, and among others the intention that I saw there was of posting me on the road, would sufficiently account for my not writing to you on so memorable an event as the storming of the Sultan's lines.

I had determined never to write of what I did not see, because I foresaw the difficulty of describing transactions from imperfect accounts of inaccurate men. But our late attack has been so masterly and so successful, that I could not resist saying something about it, and my delay in doing it has proceeded only from not being able to comprehend the general plan and design, from the vague, unsatisfactory accounts received here. I am still far from understanding every part of it, but as chance may have thrown some points in my way which you have not seen, I shall give you whatever I have been able to collect on so interesting a subject.

Tippoo was encamped with his right towards the Pagoda Hill, and his left extending parallel to the river Soomer Pet; the distance, I think, must be above four miles.

A broad deep nullah, which leaves the river near Caniambaddy, ran along his front; on the edge of it was a thick hedge of thorns and aloes; behind this hedge were his lines, and within them, at convenient distances, eight
redoubts, or rather little forts, for most of them had a double ditch, a glacis, covered-way, and winding sortie; they were as highly finished, it is said, and infinitely stronger, than those of Budge Budge.

They were capable of containing five or six hundred men, and from ten to twenty guns, each. The principal of them was that which went by the name of Lally. It stood near the Jelgoch of Soomer Pet, which, if I recollect, is almost the only rising ground within the lines, most of the area within them being a flat, intersected with several ditches running from the great nullah.

The left, besides works, was covered by a swamp, the rear by the river, and the whole, except the extremity of the right, was under the fire of the fort.

In so strong a situation Tippoo thought he had little to apprehend from any enemy, and his Lordship, seeing him determined to keep his ground, lost no time in attacking him.

At nine o'clock on the night of the 6th, the army, leaving their tents and guns under the protection of the reserve, moved forward in three columns, each preceded by a proportion of pioneers and scaling ladders.

The right, under General Medows, consisted of the 36th and 76th regiments, the 3d Bengal brigade, and Captain Oram's battalion, and was destined to turn the enemy's left. The centre, commanded by Colonel Stuart, under Lord Cornwallis, composed of the 52d, 71st, and 74th regiments, the 4th Bengal, and the 2d and 21st Coast battalions, were to attack a strong redoubt near the enemy's centre, and to endeavour to get possession of all their works extending to the right, towards the hill.

The left, under Colonel Maxwell, formed of the 72d regiment, the 5th Coast brigade, and the 23d battalion, was to storm the Choultry and Pagoda Hills.

Major Montague, with a party of artillerymen, and three
hundred Lascars, marched with them to make use of the enemy's guns.

The three columns arrived nearly at the same time, between eleven and twelve, at their respective points of attack. The centre column passed the nullah, and entered the works before they were discovered. They found no troops drawn out to receive them, and pushing through the camp, they found all the tents standing, shades, &c. on the tables of the French officers. They passed close to Tippoo's tents; the canaul was standing, but the green tent had been removed to the fort the day before. Here the column separated into three divisions, of which the leading one proceeded directly towards the river, crossed it near the fort, and advanced to within eighty yards of the east gate, when perceiving a torrent of people rushing back from it, they concluded it was shut. They then turned to the left, marching through a long bazaar street, about a mile and a quarter, till they reached the Cingul ford, on the south of the island. The gate leading to it was defended by two small bastions with two guns, one of which the enemy fired at them, and accompanied it with a volley of small arms, which was instantly returned, and followed by a charge with bayonets, in which so great a slaughter was made that the gateway was choked up to the top with men and horses. After dispersing the enemy, the party took post at the ford, waiting for accounts of other parts of the army.

The second division of the centre column crossed the river soon after the first, and, I believe, a little lower down. Colonel Stuart, who led it, does not seem to have met with much opposition; he pushed towards Ganjam and the Lal Bagh, where he was joined by Colonel Maxwell. His march along the island probably facilitated Maxwell's success, by drawing their attention to another quarter. Maxwell reached the hills just as his Lordship
entered the camp. He found no works on them. They were defended by a party without guns, which he soon dispersed, and, descending after them, entered the river, in which, from the roughness of the bottom, and the strength of the lines on the opposite side, he lost many men before he could dislodge the enemy and effect his passage. Having accomplished it at last, his party, in conjunction with Colonel Stuart, occupied all the posts and redoubts to the eastward of the fort.

The division under Gen. Medows had, in the mean time, met with a more steady resistance. After penetrating the left of the camp, he attacked what is called Lally’s battery, which was defended by a part of Seid Hamet’s cushoon, and supported by the remainder of that corps; Seid Guffar’s cushoon, and the party under Mons. Vesser, commonly called Young Lally.

The grenadiers of the 36th and 76th soon carried the covered-way, but were three times repulsed in attempting to enter the gorge, by a severe fire of musketry and a discharge of grape. The enemy, however, having expended most of their ammunition, and beginning to lose their firmness, a fourth attack was made, the work carried, and every man in it, about three hundred and fifty, put to the bayonet.

The General, after this success, directed his march towards the enemy’s centre to join Lord Cornwallis, but by keeping too near the front of their camp he passed his Lordship’s rear in the dark without perceiving him, and got near the Pagoda Hill before he halted. His Lordship was by this means left in a very critical situation, for confident of being supported by the General, he had detached two divisions of his column, and likewise seven companies of the 52d, to the island, and had been above two hours on Tippoo’s encampment with only four companies of the 74th, two or three of the 73rd, and some companies of Sepoys.
The left wing of the enemy, which had suffered little, discovering that he had but a small force, advanced, between two and three in the morning, with great impetuosity to attack him. Just as the firing commenced the 52nd regiment fortunately arrived, and charging the enemy in front, broke them, and pursued them to a nullah, over which it was not thought prudent to follow them. They had shown so much resolution in their attack, that his Lordship, after leaving four companies of Sepoys and Europeans in a strong redoubt, within twelve hundred yards of the fort, under Captain Sibbald, retreated about half a mile nearer the Pagoda Hill, when being informed of General Medows' situation, he halted till daybreak.

His situation was certainly at one time extremely critical, and had he not been joined by the 52nd, the consequences might have been very fatal.

Captain Hunter, who commanded that corps, after crossing the river at midnight, took post under the wall of Dowlet Bagh, near the fort; here he waited above two hours expecting to be reinforced, but seeing no friends, and being discovered and fired on from the works, he determined to retreat; he had scarcely begun to move when a large party with four guns came down to attack him, he saw that nothing but an exertion could save him; he pushed for the guns and took them before they could be unlimbered, on which the enemy fled; he continued his retreat, but, missing the ford, got into deep water, where all his ammunition was damaged. On returning to Tippoo's camp he found nine barrels of cartridges belonging to a Sepoy corps, and his men had just filled their muskets, when a message from Lord Cornwallis informed him of his danger.

The party which went to the south ford left it before daybreak and joined Colonel Stuart at Ganjam. The enemy were at this time still in possession of two or three redoubts in the rear of their centre near the fort, the fire of which
secured them from an attack in the day, but they abandoned them in the evening.

Captain Sibbald's redoubt being too near the fort to admit of its being supported from the camp by day, was twice attacked in the course of the 7th by two corps of infantry and one of dismounted cavalry. The loss was great on both sides, but the enemy were repulsed. Captain Sibbald, with the artillery officer, and above half the men in the battery, were killed or wounded, and after the fall of the officers, it was probably saved by the spirited behaviour of Major Skelly and Captain Hunter, who had gone there out of curiosity a little before the enemy appeared. This repulse was a brilliant close to so decisive and important a victory; every thing was attained by it which could have been wished for.

Our own loss was trifling, while the enemy had four thousand killed and wounded, and lost thrice that number by desertion; they lost their camp, their bazaar, their redoubts, and the greatest part of their cannon, seventy-six of which are now in our possession, and by being masters of the island, we have an excellent station for making approaches, and plenty of materials for battering, even without destroying the noble cypresses which shade the tomb of Hyder.

Tippoo's overthrow is in a great measure to be attributed to his confidence in engineers. Extensive lines are always dangerous, especially when the troops who attack are of a superior quality to those who defend. Tippoo's lines lost him the island, for our troops, after forcing them, passed the river with the fugitives, with no opposition, close to the fort, which could not distinguish friends from foes.

He would have acted a wiser part had he confined himself to the island. The river having but few fords he would have known the points of attack, and could have secured them; the fort and the island would have opened all
their fire on the appearance of any troops moving towards them, knowing that they must be enemies; and we could not possibly have crossed the river and driven the enemy from their works without sustaining a very heavy loss.

The small remains of the Sultan's army is now in the fort, except his cavalry, which are encamped between the Mysore river and the glacis; he himself sits there the whole day under a private tent, but retires into the fort at night.

I am sorry to think that his spirit begins to bend to his fortunes, for I could have wished him to act consistently to the last. He gave Chalmers, on dismissing him, a present of five hundred rupees. This I easily believed, but I could not as readily credit another report, which, however, I am now afraid is but too true,—that his pride and firmness had so far deserted him as to make him request Chalmers to intercede for peace. I hope he will recover from this fit of despair and make a vigorous defence; he is at present as much changed as Mr. Burke's vision.

Lord Cornwallis having written him that he had broken the treaty with the Coimbetore garrison, he sent in Chalmers and Nash on the 9th, and along with them letters for the Earl and the allies, which were not answered till the 12th. Tippoo sent another letter the same day; the result of which is that two Vakeels on his part arrived on the 13th at one of the outposts to talk to the confederates, and on the 14th they were to be met by Sir John Kennaway on the part of the English, Meer Allum on the part of the Nizam, and some Row or other on that of the Mahrattas.

Tippoo fired none on the 13th. I shall not be easy till I hear that he has begun again. If he is restored to his dominions in part, Seringapatam ought not to be given up to him, for with it, and only half of his former possessions, he would in a few years be as formidable as ever.
Those who think otherwise know little of the situation and resources of his country; the inhabitants have only emigrated, they are not destroyed, like those of the Carnatic in 1780; the scene of desolation is only in a circle of seventy miles round the capital.

This is all I have been able to collect; I have waited in vain for satisfactory accounts, and have at last been obliged to write in a hurry from confused, vague relations.

I am far from thinking every thing I have written accurate; I have not yet seen enough to comprehend the whole myself, and cannot, therefore, give a clear idea of the whole design and execution to others.

The following seems to have been written soon after Mr. James Munro's arrival in India, but no year being specified, I am unable to state explicitly to what circumstances it especially referred.

Oscottah, 24th October.

DEAR JAMES,

It gave me much concern to observe from your last letter, that you have had a return of your old complaint, which I thought a warm climate would have removed, as it did Alexander's. I hope the attack has been only temporary, and that you are again perfectly recovered. You would do well, notwithstanding your contempt for the old school, to consult some of its followers in this country. The modern is, perhaps, not much superior to it. It is a common idea among young men, but particularly Scotchmen, that the masters under whom they have studied, are the most eminent in their respective professions that have ever appeared in the world; but those who leave their prejudices and colleges together, find that science is not confined to the North of the Tweed. I never meet with three
or four gentlemen from the Northern seminaries, swelling with gas, and talking of the wonderful discoveries made by Doctors Edinburgh and Glasgow, that I do not think of the old woman, who said that sixteen French ambassadors had come to ask peace of the provost. In medicine and in chemistry, system yields to system; and in both so little has hitherto been ascertained by the test of experiment, that it would be presumption to say what is, or what is not, the truth. Fourteen years ago, I pronounced with reverence the names of Messrs. Black and Irvin, and considered them, as at least equal to Hermes Trismegistus; but little did I then dream of Lavoisier and his heretical doctrines. Had I seen one of the new sect in those days, when my head was full of phlogiston and fixed air, I should have regarded him with as much contempt as our old aunts would do a Hanoverian. Seeing such revolutions, I am become a little sceptical with respect to every new system; and think it not impossible, that the medical Board, without following either Black or Lavoisier, may have almost as much illumination as Doctor —. Perhaps I injure the Doctor by this supposition, or the lights which your anatomical eyes may have observed might have been hid from mine by his modesty. But you will excuse my blindness, for you know a man does nothing but blunder when he attempts subjects beyond his reach. This was so much the case with me, that though I have often listened to the Doctor, as I do to all Doctors, with becoming deference, I never could perceive any thing of the quality which you mention: however, to make amends, I saw through the veil of an awkward address, what you did not see, a great deal of what the vulgar call vanity; but the learned, more properly, tenacity of opinion. This circumstance is a strong proof of the great progress which knowledge has made of late years. When a man knows a thing imperfectly, he has doubts. When by seeing it demonstrated,
he understands it fully, they are removed. Newton, after all his discoveries, was diffident on many points, because he had not been able to prove them; but Dr. —, having no such defects, speaks with the confidence which he derives from a perfect knowledge of his subject. I hope you will have no occasion for his aid to remove your disorder. Burn your books, rather than hurt your health by study.

Your affectionate brother,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE SAME.

Pinagur, 9th June.

DEAR JAMES,

Captain Read and I have been here since the 4th, we move again in a day or two, in different directions; he for Cavereperam, and I for Tingrecottah. I shall be moving up and down the country for about six weeks more; after which I shall take up my quarters either at Darrampoory, or some other convenient place, of which I shall give you notice, that I may have a visit from you. You ought to get up in the morning, and take exercise, and mix with the people of the garrison, to whom you have already, I suppose, received an addition, by the arrival of Cuppage. You will find him an excellent man in every respect, both as a commanding officer, and a companion. When you do not like the manners of people who are generally esteemed, you should attribute it to your having mixed little with the world, and not to its want of discernment. You will soon by habit approve of many things, about which you are now indifferent; and even your anxiety to return to Europe will, by degrees, be so far lessened, and your attachment to this country so much increased, that if it should be in your choice to stay here or return, you
will be undecided which course to take. If you have no sick officers, and few men, bad cases, you can accompany Cuppage, Irton, or any of the garrison, in their excursions about the country. This kind of exercise will contribute both to your health and amusement; it will prevent you from indulging melancholy reflections, and will insensibly improve your mind, by showing you the country and the manners of its inhabitants; but to make these expeditions, you must have a horse, which I am too little of a jockey to purchase for you. You might get one for your purpose for about a hundred pagodas. Sam. Bub is, I believe, the best judge of horse-flesh with you; but Kishangury is not a favourable place for purchasing. If you cannot supply yourself there, I shall write to Captain Dallas. Let me know what money you have, and in what time you can get payment, that I may look for a bill on Europe. Remittances are bad just now; but it is as well to make it, as to keep money without interest, as none is now given at Madras, owing to the great quantity of specie brought there by the war.

If you have got your books from Madras, send me Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. You ought to get rid of the Moorman, by sending him with Kippin to be reduced. A cook, a boy to attend you at table, and some one to assist you in medical preparations, are all the servants you have occasion for. All bullocks should be sold, no matter at how small a price; the randy one, if recovered, send to me. Your expenses should be within your pay, but not on too narrow a plan; while you have no horse, you may easily manage on thirty-five pagodas a month.

Your affectionate brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.
CHAPTER II.

Letters from the Baramahl—To his Father, Mother, and Sister, and to Captain, afterwards Sir Alexander Allen.

TO HIS SISTER.

[Giving an account of the arrival of her miniature.
—The date is wanting.]

You fell into the hands of James George Graham at Madras; James can tell you who he is; and he marched you off for the Baramahl without giving me any notice of your approach. I happened to call at Kishangury a few days after your arrival. There was a meeting of the officers to read some papers respecting the arrangements of the army, and you were introduced. You were handed to me—I looked at you carelessly, as coldly as if I never had seen you. I thought you were one of Graham's female cousins whom he had just returned from visiting, and I declared that it was highly improper that the gravity of our deliberations should be interrupted by women. I had just seized you to force you into your dark retreat, when the secret was discovered. You may easily guess that I granted you a reprieve, and surveyed you with more enquiring eyes, and with very different feelings; but still I could find no traces of the countenance which I once so well knew. I could perceive no marks of age to account
for this change; but time, without making you old, has worked such a total revolution either on your looks or my memory, that you are now a perfect stranger to me. I cannot think that the fault is mine, for in general I remember long and distinctly both what I read and what I see. It must be you who have thrown off your old face and disguised yourself with a new one. I suspect, however, that the painter has assisted, for there was a Lieutenant Noble, from Greenock, present, who declares that he has often seen you and recollects you perfectly, yet he did not know your picture. The consolation to be derived from all this is, that we cannot meet after a separation of twenty years exactly as we parted. I have not been idle in that time, as you shall see when I return to expose my sun-dried beauty.

(Here again several lines are lost.)

I have myself so vulgar a taste, that I see more beauty in a plain dress than in one tricked out with the most elegant pattern that ever fashionable painter feigned. This unhappy depravity of taste has been occasioned, perhaps, by my having been so long accustomed to view the Brahmin women, who are in this country, both the first in rank and in personal charms, almost always arrayed in nothing but single pieces of dark blue cotton cloth, which they throw on with a decent art and a careless grace which in Europe, I am afraid, is only to be found in the drapery of Antiques. The few solitary English ladies that I meet with only serve to strengthen my prejudices. I met with one the other day all bedizened and huddled into a new habit, different from any thing I had ever seen before. On asking her what name it went by, she was surprised that I did not know the à la Grecque. It looked for all the world like a large petticoat thrown over her shoulders, and drawn together close under her arms. I could not help smiling
to think how Ganganelli, and the Abbé Winkelmann, and the King of Naples would have stared had they dug such a Greek as this out of Herculaneum. The fashions of the Gentlemen are probably as fantastical as those of the ladies; though from having them continually before my eyes, the absurdity of them does not strike me so much. We have black and white hats, thunder and lightning coats, stockings of seven colours, and tamboured waistcoats bedaubed with flowers, and more tawdry finery than ever was exhibited on old tapestry. I have heard some military geniuses deplore very feelingly the neglect into which three-cocked hats had fallen. They have been accustomed when they were young to see some strutting warlike phantom or other with a hat of this kind, and they can never afterwards look upon it without being filled with ideas of slaughter and devastation. They think that in it consists half the discipline of armies, and that the fate of nations depends as much upon the cock of the hat as of the musket.

I see so many turbans and handkerchiefs every day, and so seldom any hats but round ones, that I have lost all taste for the sublime, and think a three-cornered hat as absurd a piece of head-dress as a tiara. I wonder that the women among all their changes of fashions never thought of trying it. If I were sure that any one of the nine Muses had ever worn one, I would advise Mrs. Grant to do the same, but I suspect she is like Professor M——, too much degenerated from her ancestors to try it. I think she had no right to accuse the long-descended Celtic bard of effeminacy, when she herself has forgotten the simplicity of her ancestors, and does not hesitate to drink tea and ride about the country in worsted stockings. I do not find that Malvina had a single pair, or even Agandeeca who lived farther north, and had a better excuse for such an indulgence. What these two ladies drank at the feast of shells, if they drank at all, I don't know. It might have
been whiskey, but certainly was not tea. If the Muses must drink, as most poets tell us, it is perhaps as well that they should drink tea as any thing else: but it is no where said that they must wear worsted stockings. This unhappy corruption of manners would be inexcusable in an ordinary woman, but poetry covers a multitude of sins, and Mrs. Grant has a lyre which Ossian would have laid aside his harp to hear, and to which it is impossible to listen without forgetting all her offences against the customs of her forefathers, the bare-legged bards of other times. The Professor, though not born a Poet, seems to have taken some trouble to make himself one, and if he has, like most modern Sophs, been unsuccessful in conjuring up any sprite of his own, he has at least no common merit in having called forth the muse of Mrs. Grant with

"Poetic transports of the maddening mind,  
And winged words that waft the soul to heaven."

In her journal she has used the privilege, which superior geniuses often do, of writing carelessly. I lose much of the interest of the piece from not being acquainted with any of the characters she describes. Her ladies are all from the Grandison school—so full of smiles and gaiety, and wit and sense, and so charming and divine—that I am almost as happy as she is herself, when escaping from George's-square, to get into the open fields, and follow her through Bedley's ancient Grove, "by Carron's streams or banks of Forth." There is so much of inspiration in her poetry, on seeing the Perthshire Hills and Allan Water, that I am much out of humour at being forced away in such a hurry to drink port at the Inn: but she, however, makes ample amends at Killikranky; and again, where we

"Hear young voices sounding on the mountain gale."

The whole is so animated, that it makes me more impatient than ever I was before to see the scenes which she
describes. And were I not afraid of being taken for a Nassau, or some other foreigner, on all of whom Mrs. G. looks so indignant from her misty mountains, I would mount the yellow horse, and pay her a visit. She has the same faults that all modern poets have, and that you give us a specimen of in your Celestial Spark—she is continually running after the ancients. A man cannot look into an ode, or sonnet, or any thing else, but he is instantly thrown over "Lethe's Wharf," or plunged into Cocytus. The hills and the glens of the Highlands are as wild as any of the old poetical regions: or, if they are too vulgar from being so well known, yet still we have other scenes of real nature—the wilds of America and Africa, the Andes, with all its rushing streams, and the frozen seas in the Polar regions, with their dismal islands, never trod by human foot—sublimier subjects of poetry than all the fictions of Greece and Rome. In Burns's best poems there is no mythology. I don't care how many Scandinavians we have, but I am almost sick of Jupiter and Neptune.

Your affectionate Brother,

Thomas Munro.

TO HIS SISTER.

Darramopory, 21st January, 1794.

Dear Erskine,

I have had no reason for some years to complain of your correspondence, except in one point, that it has, in general, I believe, cost me more time to read than you to write. Had it not been for the assistance of James and George Kippin, I should never have been able to make out a number of old characters whom you have introduced at different times under new names. But now
that I have got a key from them you may write away without fear; for I am, to use a figure of your own, "up to every thing." Even the Governor-General will not now make me, like the Persian poets, scratch the head of thought with the nails of despair. All your letters for James this season have fallen into my hands: but I must look for no more, as I hope he is now near enough to tell you of all his sufferings in this country, and the doctors of their mistaken notions of climates and constitutions, though not to convince them: this, like other great works, is, I suppose, reserved for your millennium, when the world is to be inhabited only by Marats and modest physicians. James has as much reverence for the faculty as yourself, and would not venture to confute any of them, however much he might think them in the wrong. He would rather sit among them as silent as a young Pythagorean, swallowing, like pills for his mental constitution, all the profound nothings they utter. This is not the case with you; for if it was, I am sure you would not admire their company so much as you do: for, from your letters, I should expect, on going home, to see you with a scalping knife rather than a pencil in your hand, and to find more skeletons than pictures in your room. You mention no less than eight or nine doctors in one letter. There is Maclane and M'Farlane, and Cowan and Murray, and five more; and you speak of them all with as much kindness and affection as Madame Sévigné does of her daughters. It is they, I suspect, who are the cause of your so often complaining of want of time, and of being hurried in writing your Indian letters; for Andrew Ross, of whom James can give you some account, once told me that he had been kept idle for near five years by one doctor, the Rev. Mr. Bell, who lived in his house. I remember having been a witness one day of the manner in which he effected this:—he heard the Doctor speaking to me, and
called him into his visiting room, when he immediately commenced a learned discourse. "Well, Sir, have you shown Lady Campbell the ice you made this morning?—have you got your air-pump in order?—have you seen Mr. Spalding's diving machine?"—and was proceeding with fifty more questions, when he was interrupted by the guns of the ship, which was to carry the letters he was then writing, saluting the fort on her leaving the roads for Europe. On this, he started up, turned out the philosopher, ordered his servant to get a catamaran, or raft, to chase the ship with his dispatches; finished his letter in about an hour, and then came to me, when we both began to abuse the Doctor who had by this time taken shelter up-stairs in his museum.—"This is the most preposterous man I ever met with; he always makes a point of coming to me when he sees me busy, and when he knows too that it is a matter of consequence about which I am engaged, and of pestering me with absurd talk about ice, and air-pumps, and diving-bells, and such like trumpery." I don't know if the conversation of your Doctors turns on the same subjects as that of Mr. Ross's, but it seems to have the same effect on your correspondence. It is now about fifteen years since I left home, and in all that time you have not sent me a single letter which has not been written just as the post was going away, or the ship weighing anchor, and in which our father is not blamed for keeping so bad a look-out. "I have just had a dreadful fright,—I have this moment been terribly alarmed,—my father has this instant informed me that I am too late," is the exordium to every one of them. I now receive such tidings without emotion, but it was not the case at first; when on breaking the seal such terrible, dreadful words met my eyes, I had no power to read farther, I stood aghast, with the fatal letter ready to
drop from my hand like the ring or bracelet or other token from that of a hero or heroine in tragedy. I was filled, as the poets say, with dire alarms—I had the most dismal presages,—I thought that death in the shape of a Doctor had triumphed over Mrs. Maxwell the brewer, or untimely stopped the tuneful tongues of the Blackstone Signorinas. But after mustering, I believe the ladies say stringing, all my scattered nerves, and venturing to cast another melancholy glance on the letter, I discovered that the postboy, by not waiting for you, had been the innocent cause of your horrible frights and of my constitution suffering such a shock as had almost entirely unhinged my woe-worn frame. So much for the pathetic. I begin now to be very anxious to hear from home; it is almost time to have accounts of James's arrival. I wish to know what effect the voyage has had on him. Mr. Hoar, Paymaster of the army, the two last campaigns, was his fellow passenger, and would, I am sure, pay him every attention. The doctors tell me that his complaint can only be removed by medical assistance at home. I am also a good deal uneasy about Foulis, who was ill at the date of my father's last letter; he has now had a long period of bad health, and for the greatest part of the four last years he has been very little better than when my father saw him in Edinburgh. When I saw him last in the beginning of 1791, both his looks and his temper were so much changed from what they had been three years before, that I hardly knew him again; but the moment that he recovers his health his flow of spirits will return, and you will see that I have not said more of him than he deserves. You have by this time, I suppose, met your old acquaintance Colin M—again; if you wish to learn any thing respecting this country apply to him, for no one is more able to answer all your questions—he has read a great deal,
chiefly politics, he has a great fund of information, and his head is clear and methodical, and you may depend on the correctness of whatever he tells you—he is studious, and as inquisitive as Kippin, though not like him troublesome in his enquiries; he has much more acquired knowledge than Foulis, but is very inferior to him in natural endowments. M—— knows more of books, and Foulis more of men. M—— has a ridiculous passion for playing both the Fine Gentleman and the Courtier; he has a native formality which totally disqualifies him for the first character; he succeeds rather better in the other, though I think he would lose nothing either in the esteem of his friends, or in the way of his own interest, if he was to abandon both. I believe he has no reason to be pleased with ———, who, I understand, never took the least step to provide for him at his resignation of the government; but it will not try M———’s philosophy much to bear patiently the neglect of a man who has nothing but integrity to put in the scale against a heart without attachment, and a head almost destitute of ideas. I hear nothing of George Kippin, except that he is cantoned at Cuddalore, and that he is much admired by the French officers at Pondicherry for making so much stir in the public rooms there; he is, I am told, grown prodigiously fat. There is another acquaintance of yours at Pondicherry — Captain ———. I have never yet met him in India, but an officer lately arrived at Kishnagerry from Pondicherry, told me a few days ago, that he had given him a very full account of all our exploits at school. Now I remember no more of him than Falstaff did of Justice Shallow; that he was a puny creature, and looked for all the world like a forked radish with a head fantastically carved upon it. Daniel is very well pleased with his situation; his manufacture must be going on as he wishes, and I suppose he writes to you of it, and I hope
will in a few years visit you along with one of his Indigo cargoes. Alexander is only beginning, and from his connection with Mr. Johnson, there can be no doubt of his success.

Your affectionate Brother,

MUNRO.

TO CAPTAIN ALLEN.

[Explanatory of the Revenue System pursued in Baramahl.]

8th June, 1794.

You seem to think that I have a great stock of hidden knowledge of revenue and other matters, which I am unwilling to part with; I have already given you the little I had, and your own experience of the ceded countries will supply the rest. I have more than once endeavoured to convince you that we have no mysteries, that we have made no new discoveries, and that our only system is plain hard labour. Whatever success may have hitherto attended the management of these districts is to be ascribed to this talent alone, and it must be unremittingly exerted, not so much to make collections as to prevent them, by detecting and punishing the authors of private assessments, which are made in almost every village in India. We have only to guard the Ryots from oppression, and they will create the revenue for us. Captain Read, in order to be enabled to turn his attention to general arrangements, has divided the ceded countries among his assistants into three divisions. These are again subdivided into Tihsildaries, few of which are under ten or above thirty thousand pagodas. The Tihsildars, who have charge of them, are mere receivers of the revenue, for they can neither raise nor lower the rent of a single individual. They are not per-
mitted to give any decision, unless on matters of the most trifling nature. To refer all disputes respecting property to a court of arbitration, to order the members of such courts to assemble, to receive the kists from the head farmers of the villages, and the accounts from the village accountants, and to transmit them to the collector of the division, is the whole of their duty. Every Tihsildary is farmed out in villages to the Gours, or head farmers, who, having the management of the details of cultivation, may be considered as the renters of the country, though they are in fact (unless in some particular cases,) answerable only for the amount of their own particular lands, for the whole inhabitants are jointly answerable for the revenue of the village, which is seldom less than ten or more than a thousand pagodas. Every man who pays a single rupee to Government has the rent of his land fixed by the division collector, for which he has a roll signed by him, specifying the nature and quantity of it, and the periods of payment. As the Gour can demand no more than the stipulated rent, he can of course gain nothing by the Ryots, and as every man enjoys the profits of his own land, it is for these reasons that the whole are made jointly responsible for any deficiency. The Gour, in consideration of the troubles of his office, has a small piece of ground rent-free. By farming the country in such detail, every division contains near twenty-one thousand renters, the greatest part of whom having been always accustomed to be plundered by their Gours, in league with an army of revenue officers under the Mysore Government, still (notwithstanding constant exhortations to pay no more than their fixed rent, and to give no money without receipts,) submit to private levies without complaining. It is the most difficult part of the collector's business to discover these impositions, but in the present state of things it is impossible wholly to prevent them. If he is vigilant he
may reduce them, perhaps, to five per cent.; if he is remiss they will soon rise to fifty: nothing will effectually put an end to them but a long lease, which, for this and many other reasons, ought to be hastened as much as possible. From many circumstances which have come to my knowledge, I am convinced that the Brahmins of the different cutcherries, in the ceded districts, collect privately above fifty thousand rupees a year for favouring certain individuals in the valuation of their lands at the annual settlements; and this may be estimated as the cause of the loss of more than a lac to the public, because the sum of rents excused must be more than the sum paid, otherwise no advantage would arise to the payers from the transaction, and because every Ryot must keep a little money in hand to bribe the Brahmins, which ought to have been laid out for the purpose of cultivation. An example will show you how easily these operations can be carried on. There is a village with ten Ryots, who last year paid each ten pagodas; it is this year worth one hundred and ten. One or two of the head farmers, who ought to pay fifteen each, say to the Brahmins, let our lands remain at ten, and we will pay you five; you can add five to the village for the benefit of Government, and we will point out two men who can afford to pay it. If the two men whose lands are thus overrated complain, which they do not always do, the collector may go to the spot; but as he knows nothing of the value of land, he must consult the inhabitants. They all declare the valuation is just, because they are afraid that if any remission is allowed, it will be laid upon them. What can the collector do? there is a majority of four to one against the sufferers. He goes home, convinced that the complaint is frivolous, and satisfied with having gained five per cent. for the revenue.

The gross revenue of the present year, which ends in
July, is five hundred and eleven thousand pagodas. The expenses of collection, will, I imagine, be about seven and a half per cent. surveyors one and a half, and commissioners five per cent. making altogether fourteen per cent. The land rent is about four hundred and sixty thousand, the remaining fifty-one thousand are customs, which are composed of road duties, taxes on ploughs, houses, and particular castes. The last has been in part abolished, and ought to be wholly so, as well as the first, with the exception, perhaps, of one or two articles which might affect our own manufactures; but all duties ought long ago to have been taken off cotton. Almost the whole of the land-rent arises from grain, of which raggy, rice, and bajera make about four-fifths. The season of sowing raggy, rice, and bajera, is from the end of June to the end of August; if later they will hardly cover the expense of cultivation. Reckoning back to the beginning of May, the earlier they are sown the more abundant the produce; but sowing is uncommon in May, for rain is hardly ever in sufficient abundance till the end of June. Of these grains the two first remain six months in the ground. Dall and the oil-nut are sown with raggy, and pulled a month later. There are several kinds of rice which remain only four months in the ground, and are grown at all seasons of the year when there is water, but two crops from them do not yield so much as one of the rice. The time of collection is from January to June, in order to give the Ryots time to convert their grain into money. Cotton and sugar are grown in such small quantities that they cannot be called sources of revenue. The remainder of the land produce consists chiefly of different kinds of dall, and the nut and small grain from which oil is made. The ceded countries have very little trade—the jealousy of Tippoo's Government prevents much intercourse with Mysore—his possession of Coimbatore cuts them off from the Malabar
Coast, to which they used formerly to send great quantities of cloth, and the heavy duties check the communication with the Carnatic, there being no less than sixteen stages where customs are exacted between the Baramahl and Madras. The imports from above the Ghauts are cotton from the Nizam's country, and betel-nut and dyeing-woods from Tippoo's dominions. The exports to the westward are a small quantity of cloth and bajera. To the eastward little cloth goes but that of the Company's investment; dall and oil-nut are the principal articles sent there; they amounted last year to about a lac and a half of pagodas, and the demand appears to be increasing. The imports from the Carnatic are only salt, and a few trifling European articles. The inhabitants of this country, from the long series of oppression they have undergone, are in general very poor; few of the farmers are, I believe, worth a thousand pagodas, and scarcely one merchant worth a thousand pounds. The exertions of industry have always been restrained by the demands of Government keeping pace with their profit, and often outrunning them. The tanks are few, and having been neglected ever since Hyder made himself master of Mysore, are in so ruinous a condition that it will require a considerable sum to save the present produce of the land beneath them from being lost altogether. The ceded countries have, however, many natural advantages, and are capable of great improvements. The first step for the attainment of this object must be the settlement of the lease at a moderate rent, for all attempts to better their situation will be in vain as long as the land-tax is not only high but arbitrary; let it be low and fixed and it will be soon seen that the prosperity of the farmer will extend to every source of revenue. By the lease every man will become sole master of his own land; when he pays his rent there will be no farther claims against him, unless when it may be necessary, which will rarely be the case,
to contribute jointly with the other inhabitants to make up a deficiency in the village. Every man will have as much ground as he can cultivate, the waste will be reserved by Government to be disposed of as population and cultivation increase. The gradual but certain progress of the country in wealth and industry will, in a few years, make ample amends for any little sacrifice of land-rent; we shall have no long arrears of balances, no calls for remission; the collection of the revenue will become easy and regular, and the present shameful system, if such it may be called, of a continual struggle between the inhabitants to elude, and the collector to enforce payment, will be done away. The farmer, when convinced by the experience of two or three years that he has not been deceived as formerly by false promises, but is in reality the proprietor of his land, and that all its produce beyond the rent is his own, will begin to exert himself, and, where he now cultivates grain for a bare subsistence, will raise cotton and sugar-cane. The road-duties must be abolished to enable these articles to go to market to advantage, and it were to be wished that the Nabob could be prevailed on to do the same in his country. The weavers should be left at liberty to work when they please, and not forced or inveigled into the Company's service, and when once engaged never allowed to quit it. The fear of this treatment deters many from coming from Tippoo's country who wish to settle here; no restraint of any kind should be used, if it is wished that manufactures should thrive. The abolishing of road duties, the giving liberty to weavers to work whenever they find it most for their advantage, and the fixing the land-rent, would soon change the face of the country. The people, as they advanced in wealth, would become more expensive in their modes of life, and their luxuries becoming in the course of time articles of taxation, would amply compensate for the loss of road customs.
Hyder's system of finance was much the same as under all other native governments, he rented the country in large districts to Amildars, who were pretty regular in their payments because the terms were favourable, but besides collecting the public revenue they amassed large sums for themselves. Hyder having information of this from the numerous spies he employed, ordered them to the Durbar, stripped them of their money, gave them a small present, and sent them to another district to renew the same operations. Tippoo began his reign with changing every civil and military arrangement of his father, and he changed his own almost every year, and always on these occasions framed new codes of regulations to send to different provinces; his last was much the same as we have now in the ceded country, only that he endeavoured to excite the warfare between the civil and military powers, after the manner in which it has been so long and so successfully carried on in the northern chiefships. The two lines were entirely distinct. The military was under an officer called the Suddoor, and the civil under another called the Assoph. One of each was stationed at Kishnagurry and Sinklidroog. The Baramahl formed one government, and Darrampoor, Pinagre, and Tingricottah with the country below Tappoor another. Though all Killadars were under the Suddoor, he could neither remove nor appoint without orders from Tippoo, and in the same manner, though the Assoph had the superintendence of the revenue, his power over the Tahsildars, who were in every district as at present, was equally confined: he could not interfere in the detail of the revenue; every Tihsildar settled the amount of his own district, and rented out the villages separately to the Gours or head farmers. The Tihsildar received a small monthly pay, and was supposed to derive no other advantage from his situation; he remitted his collections to the Assoph, by whom they were
forwarded to Seringapatam. The Suddoor and the Assoph were directed to hold their cutcherries in the same hall, in order that all the transactions of the two departments might be public and known to both; but all these checks served only to diminish the revenue. All parties soon found that it was wiser to agree and divide the public money than to quarrel and send their complaints to the Sultan; the Assoph and the Suddoor with their cutcherries, the Tihsildars and their cutcherries, and the land farmer and accountant of the village, all had their respective shares, which were as well ascertained as their pay. The whole amounted, on an average, throughout the extent of Tippoo's dominions to above thirty per cent. being in some Provinces more, and in some less, according to their distance from the seat of Government. Then as well as now the farmers were the only renters. The total collections were nearly the same, and the difference between the sums carried to account of the Company, and those which found their way to Tippoo's treasury, is to be entirely ascribed to the difference between the personal character of Captain Read and of Tippoo's Assophs.

TO HIS SISTER.

4th October, 1795.

You begin, I imagine, by this time, to suspect that by this long dissertation on Doctors, I am endeavouring to fight off replying to your outrageous attacks on military men, and I am not ashamed to confess that it is not far from the truth; for when I unthinkingly enough, last year, said something to you about war being almost as excellent an invention as sleep, it was only for want of something else to talk of, and I little dreamed that I should see you in less than seventeen years decorating the horizon of controversy, and coming down upon me like another Mrs.
Mary Wolstonecraft with a host of first principles, and physical and moral causes, and defying me to mortal combat, in which you propose to gather laurels. Then you talk of Olives, and Myrtles, and Oaks, at such a rate that I began to doubt if I was not reading a letter from the famous Kensington Gardener, who renovates old fruit-trees; and after dragging me into this wilderness, you talk of things invisible, and divine, emanating and reascending sparks, and internal warfare, and you conclude this discourse on politics, morals, astronomy, and forest-trees, by praying that we may all at last become planets. This is all much too sublime for my poor spark of intelligence, particularly as I have not got the metaphysical visual ray; I must, therefore, leave you, and return to earth again, and speak of things as we see them, and talk of men as we find them. I am still of opinion that war produces many good consequences: those philosophers who prophesy that the millennium is to follow universal civilization, must have shut their eyes on what is passing in the world, and trusted entirely to intellectual light, otherwise they would have seen that in proportion to the progress of science and the arts, war becomes more frequent and more general, and this I consider to be the true end of civilization. In former ages of barbarity and ignorance, two petty states might have fought till they were tired, without any of their neighbours minding them, and perhaps without those who were at a little distance ever hearing any thing of the matter; but in these enlightened times of mail-coaches and packet-boats, no hostility can be committed in one corner of Europe but it is immediately known in the other, and we all think it necessary to fall-to immediately. I should be glad to know in what uncivilized age a fray in Nootka Sound would have produced a bustle at Portsmouth. Barbarous nations, when at war, generally returned to their homes at the harvest season, and took the field again in the holi-
days, to fight by way of pastime, and they were not afraid to leave their towns with no other guard than their women, because no other nation was supposed to be concerned in their quarrel; but now, by the happy modern discovery of the balance of power, all Europe is fraternized—every nation takes at least as much interest in the affairs of other nations as in its own, and no two can go to war without all the rest following their example. We are not like barbarians contented with one or two campaigns, the riches of commerce and the improvement of science enable us to amuse ourselves much longer, and we are now seldom contented with less than seven. Why do our men of genius speculate, and our manufacturers toil unceasingly, but that we may collect money enough to treat ourselves now and then to a seven years' jubilee of warfare. The only instance in which civilized is less destructive than barbarous war is, in not eating our prisoners; but this I do not yet despair of seeing accomplished, for whenever any philosopher, or politician, shall demonstrate that eating prisoners will improve the cotton manufacture, or augment the revenue, an Act of Parliament will soon be passed for dispatching them as fast as possible. War is to nations what municipal government is to particular cities, it is a grand Police which teaches nations to respect each other, and humbles such as have become insolent by prosperity. If you are not satisfied with political arguments, I shall give you some of a higher nature. Do not all religious and orthodox books insist strongly on the manifold benefits resulting from the chastisements and visitations of stiff-necked and stubborn generations? Now what better visitation can you wish for, than forty or fifty thousand men going into a strange land and living there at free quarters for two or three years. Don't you think that the calamities of the American war have made us more virtuous than we were, and that more Britons have gone to heaven since
these chastisements, than did in all the preceding part of the century? and I, therefore, for my own sake, thank Providence that such a visitation happened in my life. It is in vain to look for the termination of war from the diffusion of light, as it is called. The Greeks and Romans in ancient times were, and the Germans, French, and English in modern times are, the most enlightened and warlike of nations; and the case will be the same till the end of the world, or till human nature ceases to be what it is. As long as nations have different governments, and manners, and languages, there will be war, and if commerce should ever so far extend its influence as that trading nations will no longer fight for territory—they will never refuse to take up arms for cloth—and then the age of chivalry having given place to that of economists, prisoners will no more be released on parole; the privates and subs. will be employed in coal-heaving and other works serviceable to the state, and those of superior rank ransomed, and if they are dilatory in settling accounts, they will, perhaps, be tossed in blankets of a particular manufacture, to promote the circulation of cash. Those who rail against war have not taken a comprehensive view of the subject, nor considered that it mingles, in a greater or lesser degree, with the most refined of our pleasures. How insipid would poetry be without romances and heroic poems, and history without convulsions and revolutions! What would a library be with nothing but Shenstone and a few volumes of sermons? What would become of all those patriotic citizens who spend half their lives in coffee-houses talking of the British Lion, if he were to be laid asleep by an unfortunate millennium?

I am so far from wishing to abolish hereditary distinctions, that I think them useful when kept within proper bounds. I speak of them rather in a moral than a political view. Nobility of birth if it does not always give ele-
vation of sentiment, often prevents a man from descending to actions which he would hardly have started at had he been born in an inferior sphere; the fear of disgracing his family keeps him above them; but this is only a negative kind of merit. When, however, nobility is joined to an excellent natural disposition, cultivated by education, it gives the possessor a dignity of thinking and acting rarely found in the middling ranks of life; of these there are many instances among the Spaniards. Alexander was in high spirits on the 8th of August, the date of his last letter.

Your affectionate brother,
T. Munro.

TO HIS FATHER.

Tirtamulla, 35 miles East of Darrampoory,

DEAR SIR,

Sept. 30, 1796.

You will have seen by the papers that the Mahratta Peshwah died last year, and that after many intrigues about a successor, the eldest son of Rayobah was at last proclaimed. Scindia and Purseram Rhow, however, soon after confined him, and placed his younger brother in his room. Nanah Furnavese, who has so long ruled the empire, wishes to set aside both brothers and to bring forward a child, a real or pretended adoption of the late Peshwah. It seems to be merely a struggle between him and Scindia who shall direct the Government. He has formed a strong party, and, I suppose, it will depend on circumstances whether he will support this child or the deposed Peshwah; he is to be joined by the Nagpore family, and there is little doubt but that Tippoo has engaged to espouse the same cause. It is said that the Nizam is also inclined to support this party; but as his minister, who is a man of strong understanding, has lately
been released by the Mahrattas, it is likely that, on his arrival at Hyderabad, he will detach him from this ill-judged connection. To save the Rhow and Scindia from being crushed by this formidable confederacy, but more particularly to prevent the aggrandisement of Tippoo, we are now arming and endeavouring to form a camp by drawing together the fragments of battalions scattered between Ceylon and Amboyna. What is now going forward was to be expected. It was foreseen by every man who has reflected much on Indian politics, and is only the natural consequence of our leaving Tippoo so strong at the close of the late war. If he enters into the contest it is certainly a good ground for our taking the field, but if he does not, I can see no reason, if we are not already bound by treaty, for our having any thing to do with it; for to us it is not of the smallest importance which of the Mahratta chiefs prevail. By applying European maxims to India we have formed the chimerical project of maintaining the balance of power, by joining sometimes one party of Mahrattas and sometimes another, but chiefly by supporting Tippoo and the Nizam as a barrier between ourselves and their whole nation. We take it for granted, that if this fence were once removed they would instantly break in upon us, overrun the whole country, and drive us into the sea. I am so far of a different opinion, that I am convinced that the annihilation of both these powers would rather strengthen than weaken the security of our possessions. Experience has shown, that augmentation of territory does not augment the force of the Mahrattas; it only serves to render the different chiefs more independent of the Poonah Government, and to lessen the union of the confederacy. With more territory they are not half so formidable as they were fifty years ago; but Tippoo is, what none of them are, complete master of his army and of his country. Every additional acre of land and rupee of revenue in-
creases his force in the same manner as among European nations. He introduces modern tactics and all the improvements of musketry and artillery into his army. He is always ready for war, and can begin it without consulting a superior government or a confederate chief, whenever he sees a conjuncture favourable to his designs. He was certainly in 1789 more than a match for the whole of the Mahratta states, and even now, they would probably be cautious in attacking him, though he could not bring into the field above eight or ten thousand horse, and twenty-five or thirty thousand infantry. The Nizam has not followed the same plans, but an able successor may. The present minister has evidently begun them by attempting, in several instances, to reduce the great Jageerdars, or feudal vassals. Mussulmans, from the spirit of conquest mixed with their religion, are much more disposed than Hindoos to spread among their armies all the advantages of foreign discoveries. Whenever the Nizam adopts them he will become the most powerful prince in India, for he has now in his dominions great numbers of excellent horse and brave men, who want nothing but discipline. He and Tippoo, with regular armies, would be far more dangerous neighbours than the Mahrattas. Their system would be conquest—that of the Mahrattas only plunder. Ours ought therefore to be to let the Mahrattas strip the Nizam of as much of his dominions as they please, and to join them on the first favourable occasion to reduce Tippoo entirely. When this was effected, it may be said, they would turn their whole force against us; but the interests of their leaders are so various, that we should never find much difficulty in creating a division among them; and, admitting the worst, that we did not succeed, their united force would be able to make no impression on us. I have seen enough of their warfare to know that they could do little in action, and that their mode of laying waste the country
would be more destructive to themselves than to us, and would never effectually stop our operations. It would not hinder us from making ourselves masters of all the Malabar coast, nor from re-establishing the Rajahs of Oudipore and Jaipore, and many other princes who are impatient to recover their independence. They would soon get tired of the war, make peace with us, and resume their old disputes about the Peshwah and his minister. Their government, which was long conducted by a Peshwah or minister, in the name of the Rajah, has for more than twenty years been held by the ministers of his minister, and they are now going to decide by the sword, whether minister the first, or minister the second shall usurp the Sovereign power. From a Government, whose members are scarcely ever united—where there is a perpetual struggle for the supreme authority—which forms no French alliances—and whose armies are constituted in the same manner that they were last century, we have surely much less to apprehend, than from such an enemy as Tippoo. By our scheme of politics, he is to save us from Mahratta invasions, but is not to extend his dominions; but as he is always contriving means to do it, we are, on every alarm, to be at the expense of taking the field, or going to war to keep him within the bounds which we have prescribed to him; but we are never to go so far as to overturn him entirely. The consequence of all these whimsical projects will be, that we shall at last make the Native powers so warlike, that in order to enable us to oppose them, we shall be obliged to sink the whole of our revenue in augmenting our armies. Any one who compares our present military establishment, King's and Company's, with what it was twenty years ago, will see how fast we are advancing to this point. The Company may flatter themselves, that by their late arrangements, they have set limits to their expenses on this head; but they must go on increasing, while the cause which produces
them exists—a prince who meets us with regular armies in the field.

We have for several years had a small detachment of two battalions with the Nizam. This is too trifling a force to give us any control over his measures; but it serves as a model for him to discipline his own army, and it compels us either to abandon him disgracefully in the hour of danger, as we did last year, or to follow him headlong into every war which he may rashly undertake. He is considered as more particularly our ally than either Tippoo or the Mahrattas; and it was, therefore, at the opening of his last unfortunate campaign, mentioned with exultation by our Resident, that there were in his camp above twenty battalions clothed and armed like English Sepoys. I would rather have been told that there was not a firelock in his army. These very troops would have driven the Mahrattas from the field, had they not been deserted by the great Lords, with their bodies of horse and irregular foot, from cowardice, or more probably, from treachery; and to reduce some of these turbulent, seditious Chiefs, is now the principal employment of our detachment. Thus we are wisely endeavouring to render him as absolute a Sovereign, and of course, from his greater resources of men and money, a more formidable enemy than Tippoo.

We ought to wish for the total subversion of both, even though we got no part of their dominions; but as it is not absolutely necessary that we should remain idle spectators, we might secure a share for ourselves; and were we in this overthrow of Tippoo to get only his Malabar provinces, and Seringapatam, and Bangalore, with the countries lying between them, and our own boundaries—our power would be much more augmented by this part, than that of the Mahrattas by all the rest. What are called the natural barriers of rivers and mountains, seldom check an enter-
prising enemy. The best barriers are advanced posts, from which it is easy to attack him, and to penetrate into his country, and both Bangalore and Seringapatam are excellent situations for this purpose. The balance of power in this country ought also to be formed on much the same principles—by making ourselves so strong that none of our neighbours will venture to disturb us. When we have accomplished this, their internal wars and revolutions ought to give us no concern. It is not impossible, but that the Mahratta Chiefs may settle all their differences without coming to hostilities; but if they should not, it is not easy to foresee what effect our preparations may have on Tippoo. It will most likely depend on the extent to which they are carried—he is a good judge; and if he thinks they will enable us to attack his capital, he will probably remain quiet. If they stop short of this, he will take an active part in the contest. I don’t know what our plan of operation is, or if any has yet been thought of. If we are to be joined by the Nizam, we ought, I think, to follow the road of ninety-two, by Bangalore and Savendoog: if we are to have only the Bhow and Scindia, or detachments from their armies, it would be best to proceed by Caveriporam, with the Caveri on our right. They could join us by crossing the river above Seringapatam, and the Bombay army, from the top of the Ghauts, would reach us in two or three marches. If none of our allies can join us, we must still take this route. The reduction of the place will then, by the want of cavalry to protect our convoys, be difficult, but by no means impracticable. If we take the field, the military collectors will, I suppose, be ordered to join their regiments. If we are permitted to remain in office, and we are to have only a campaign of negotiations, I shall continue where I am; but if it is to be a real war, I am afraid I shall not be able to resist the temp-
tation of returning to the army, though such a step will place me for the rest of my life on simple military allowances.

Your affectionate Son,

Thomas Munro.

TO HIS FATHER.

Wamlore, 2nd August, 1798.

DEAR SIR,

I have been a long time anxiously looking for letters from home. May 1797, is the date of the last. Not only the length of time, but the situation of affairs, makes me more uneasy than usual; for the nation does not appear so warlike as it ought to be. It seems to consider the fleet as its only defence, and to have fallen into something of that state, which rich nations often fall into, when they think it more economical to be plundered, than to go to the expense of fighting, to save their property. Were it actuated by a proper spirit, it would despise the threat of two hundred thousand Frenchmen landing; and would consider such an event as rather to be wished for, than dreaded, as the most likely means of enabling it to obtain an honourable peace. We are here again preparing for war with Tippoo, who has lately been very busy, corresponding with the French, and has got about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men from the islands. He has drawn his army together, and there is little doubt of his intentions being hostile; but he will probably wait till he sees whether the reinforcements arrive, which they have made him expect. Our Government are anxious to avoid a war: they are alarmed at the expense, and dread the event. For my own part, I think the sooner we have it, the better, and that it is the only thing that can make amends for the extreme folly of the last peace. We never can be safe, while
such a power as Tippoo exists; nor can the Carnatic be secure, till we have Seringapatam. It is the most important post south of the Krishna: it might be taken, and the war finished, by the complete reduction of Tippoo in one campaign; but this could not be done, unless we began our operations by the siege of it, and advanced against it by the Caveriporam route to the westward of the Caveri. If we act on any other plan, which is likely enough, we shall lose our time to little purpose. Few men, and still fewer governors and councils, know when the current of events is in their favour. It is, therefore, most probable that we shall endeavour to keep on good terms with Tippoo, till the French, by the fears of the people at home, are again permitted to establish themselves in India, when he and they together, will keep us in very good order. I have so much writing on my hands, that I cannot be more particular at present; besides it is of the less consequence, as I hear of no conveyance for Europe, and only send this to Madras, to go by the first. John Robertson is very right; he gave me a bill on London for fifty pounds, all of which I expended on my outfit. I ought long ago to have thanked him, and discharged the debt. I now send him one hundred pounds for this purpose. Whatever may still remain due, I shall remit next year, on your letting me know the amount. The other one hundred pounds is for James, unless your own necessities require your retaining a part. The demand for money being great in this country, at present I have paid Lieutenant Gregson only five hundred pagodas for the two hundred pounds.

I am, Sir,

Your affectionate Son,

Thomas Munro.
DEAR SIR,

Since I wrote you last, I have received your letters, dated in March and May, conveying the melancholy tidings of the loss of my excellent brother James. His sufferings were so long and so unremitting, that much as I regret the early termination of his days, I could hardly have wished to have seen them prolonged on such terms. I have long dreaded this event, for he never once, after going home, gave me any reason to believe that there was any chance of his being restored to health.

Camp at Raicottah, 20th March.

Since I began this letter there has been so much to do in collecting supplies for the army, that I have had no leisure to attend to any thing else. The army left this place on the 6th and 7th for Seringapatam; but as the battering train was not sufficiently provided with either bullocks or drivers, I do not believe that it will reach its destination before the 25th or 26th. There will probably be some time lost in effecting a junction with the Bombay army, which is too weak to advance without being reinforced. It was unfortunate that the Supreme Government did not send three or four thousand men to the Malabar coast, instead of indulging General Craig, at a great expense, in his idle whim of marching the army to oppose the improbable invasion of Zuman Shah. There can, however, be little doubt but that, if hostilities are prosecuted, Seringapatam will fall by the middle of May. Should any unforeseen event protract the siege till the river rises, it may still be continued by throwing a bridge of boats across the stream, out of reach of the fire of the fort. It was said, at the end of the last war, that Tippoo's power was effectually reduced: but, after an interval of only seven years, we now think it necessary to approach him with the same forces
and the same caution as before he lost half his country. I hope we shall make no peace on the same terms this war; because it might be easily shown that such a measure would not reduce his actual force one-third, perhaps not more than one-fourth; for, as the embezzlements of his revenue run from five to fifty per cent.—least near the capital, and most in the remote provinces—by diminishing the extent of his country one-half, every thing would come more immediately under his own view than at present, and the defalcations, which are now about thirty-three per cent. on an average, might be reduced to ten per cent. He would, no doubt, be greatly weakened by the loss of so much territory, but he would still be the most powerful Prince in India; and, in alliance with France, a very dangerous enemy. The wisest and safest plan would be to overthrow him entirely: but I suspect that we are so full of apprehensions of we know not what, that we will scarcely venture, by so simple and decisive a measure, to put it beyond the reach of France to shake hereafter our Empire in India. Whatever may be the issue of the war, unless we take and keep Seringapatam, we shall have done nothing, for Tippoo draws half his strength from the situation of his capital. I am now acting under Colonel Read, who has the command of a detachment for collecting and carrying on supplies to the army. It is composed of about two thousand infantry, and one thousand five hundred horse, and of about one hundred and fifty Europeans and one thousand two hundred Sepoys, of the Company's, drawn together from different corps. I shall, in my next, give you very satisfactory reasons for my not writing home of late—for my silence on the breaking out of a war, so contrary to my usual custom—for the shortness of this letter—and for my writing to none of the rest of the family.

I am, dear Sir,

Your affectionate Son,

Thomas Munro.
CHAPTER III.

Letters from Canara.—Correspondence with Colonel Wellesley, Mr. Webbe, Colonel Wilks, and his relatives at home.

TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Curreshwall, September 17th, 1799.

DEAR COLONEL,

When I wrote you last month, it was on the report that Government intended limiting us to the usual allowances of collectors. Had I known that it had actually been ordered, I should have said nothing of the matter. I am afraid we have very little chance of making anything of our old claim for past services in the Baramahl. We never considered ourselves there as ordinary assistants, but rather as collectors under a superintendant, and having the entire management of our respective divisions, the charge of the settlements and collections, and also of the survey of them: we did not think that two per cent. among three of us was an allowance adequate to the situations of labour and responsibility in which we were placed. We, therefore, solicited an increase: the Revenue Board answered, that they would recommend us to the notice of Government, whenever the Lease Settlement should be finished. This Settlement was done in 1796; but a change having been made in the original system by Colonel Read, various alterations followed, and he had made no final report to the
Board when the late war began, so that they may fairly say it is time enough to speak in our favour when that report shall be laid before them. We certainly did not think that we were to expect nothing till the appearance of a Report, which a variety of circumstances might, perhaps, prevent from ever being finished. But then there are two parties to this case. We put our own construction on the letter of the Board, and they put theirs; and it must be confessed that there is nothing specific in the words of it. It is not like a bond, which a man may take in his hand, and boldly demand payment: I must, therefore, I believe, after having been twenty years in India, and toiled seven years in the Baramahl, relinquish all thoughts of any reward for the past, because the period at which the Revenue Board supposes we became entitled to consideration, does not commence till Colonel Read gives in his final Report. I have no objections to forget all that is past, if I am only permitted to return in July at the end of the Revenue-year, after having settled Canara, to my old division in the Baramahl. I wrote Mr. Wellesley fully on this point, but as my letters may have been too late, I must now take the liberty of requesting your assistance in bringing it about. You know very well that I long hesitated about coming here; I felt a great reluctance to quit the part of India in which I resided so long, to go and form new acquaintances in a country where I was an utter stranger, and where, being considered as an intruder, I was more likely to meet with secret opposition, than with co-operation. But as I thought there was a chance that I should be placed on such allowances in Canara as would enable me, in two or three years, to pay a visit to Europe in order to recruit my Baramahl constitution, and as I thought, perhaps unjustly, that was not equal to the settlement of a new country, I proposed myself again to the Commissioners, after having be-
fore declined the appointment. It appears now that I was too sanguine in my expectations of allowances, but I am not sorry for it, for I would not wish to remain in Canara longer than to make the first settlement of it, on any allowances whatever. I would not stay three years in such a country of eternal rains, where a man is boiled one half the year and roasted the other, were it given to me in Jaghore. After the first settlement is finished, and the revenues of the first year collected, all which will be done by the end of the Fasly, or Revenue-year, on the 11th of July; the country may afterwards be easily managed by any body. It is therefore my earnest wish to be then permitted to return to my former station in the Baramahl; that is to say, to be re-appointed to my old division, with such portion of the conquered territories as would have been annexed to it, had I returned directly from Seringapatam. This is surely no great request; it is only putting me where I ought to have been, with this difference, that by my coming here, Canara, instead of being left in confusion by ——— in January, will be left settled in July—Government will have gained something—I shall have got nothing but the expense of the journey. I never had an idea of passing my days on the Malabar coast, where I am entirely cut off from the great scene of Indian war and politics; let me get back to the Baramahl, and now that Read is off, I shall be ready to follow you with Bunjarries next war, which I trust is not many years distant. The Mahrattas will not be quiet, and events, stronger than all our moderation, will drive us on the Kistnah. I shall hope that you will again take the field in my favour and get me out of this, but the resolution of Government to this effect should only be communicated to me, as making it public would probably impede my settlement here.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.
I have it from Macleod himself that he will be very happy to give me up half his present collection. He can easily make the settlement for the present of all the additional territory he has got, but it is too extensive for one man to manage hereafter in the correct way that is necessary, so that my return, so far from opposing his views, will be conferring a favour upon him.

TO THE SAME.

Woorpi, Nov. 12th, 1799.

DEAR COLONEL,

It is now a long time since I received your friendly answer to my complaints against Canara; I did not mean to arraign any one but myself, or my evil destiny, which has given this country more hills, and jungles, and rivers than I like, and has made it much wetter and hotter than it ought to be. I am sensible enough that coming here was an act of my own, but it could not well be avoided; I had been named along with ———; I doubted much his ability to ascertain the revenue, but when he declared his intention of going home in January, there was no room left for doubting, I was certain that he must leave the country unsettled, and under such circumstances it would have been improper not to have volunteered the business; not to have done it, would have been testifying an indifference for the public service, and might have had the appearance of my not feeling sufficiently the honour that was done me in originally nominating me along with ———, I do not therefore at all regret coming here to make a settlement of the revenue. All that I wish is, that when it appears that this settlement is completed, I may be removed and appointed collector of half Macleod's collectorate, either that which lies to the north or the south.
of the Cavary, for either of them are large enough for one man; you must help me to this by and by.

By your description, Soonda makes a great accession to the jungles, from which I am doomed to extort revenue. The map is very satisfactory and is entirely new to our geography; but I wish you would give me the latitude and longitude of Soonda or Soopah, or any one place, in order to connect it with a sketch of Canara, on which Captain Moncrief is now employed. I wish means could be fallen upon to keep him here until he finishes his map, and repairs the roads, not forgetting the one you propose to Sedashagur from Soopah. Three months would be sufficient for the whole. Macaulay wrote me long ago that the Soonda Rajah was in camp; I have not heard what you have done with him since; I hope you have taken care that he shall not disturb the country in future.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.

FROM COLONEL WELLESLEY TO MAJOR MUNRO.

Seringapatam, March 2nd.

DEAR MUNRO,

Since Colonel Close's return to Seringapatam, I have had some conversation with him respecting the thieves in Soonda; it has appeared to him and to me that the only mode by which you can expect to get rid of them, is to hunt them out. In the province of Bridnore we employed some of the Rajah's cavalry; with the support of our infantry, some thieves were caught; some of them were hanged and some severely punished in different ways; the consequence has been, that lately that country has not been visited by them, and most probably a similar operation in Soonda would have a similar effect. I have spoken to Purniah on the subject, and I find that he can assist
with about two hundred and fifty or three hundred horsemen without inconvenience; these divided into two or three small parties, supported by our infantry, would give a proper shekar; and I strongly advise you not to let the Mahratta boundary stop you in the pursuit of your game, when you will once have started it. Two or three fair hunts, and cutting up about half a dozen, will most probably induce the thieves to prefer some other country to Soonda as the scene of their operations. Let me hear from you upon this subject, and, if you approve of the plan, I will make all the arrangements for putting it into execution.

FROM THE SAME.

Seringapatam, May 7th, 1800.

DEAR MUNRO,

I am glad to find that your people in Canara are so free from the foul crime of rebellion. We shall not be able in this year to make an impression on Kistnapah Naig, which will keep him entirely quiet; but on the 30th of last month he received a beating from Colonel Montresor, who took from him his post of Arakury, which will at least give him reason to believe that it is not easy to keep our troops out of any place into which they are ordered to enter. The entire subjection of him depends upon the destruction of his strongholds, and for that, as we cannot expect much more fair weather, we have not at present a sufficiency of time. Colonel Montressor is now gone through to the Bipolla Ghaut; but I do not expect from that, that we shall be able to re-establish the Tappal upon the road; that, I am afraid, must still go round by Canara. Measures have been taken for collecting in Canara as many troops as Lieutenant-Colonel Mignan will require; one battalion must come from Goa, if he wants it, and another from Malabar. It would not do to with-
draw every thing from Goa; for, in that case, how is Soonda to be assisted if it should be attacked? Not from Mysore, certainly, for we cannot get there during the rains; nor from Canara, where there are no troops, but from Goa. Soonda appears a favourite place of yours, and it is extraordinary that you should not have provided for it some way or other, and that you should not allow your Amildars to assist the paymasters in procuring provisions for the forts which are to be kept. I think that upon the whole we are not in the most thriving condition in this country; Poligars, Nairs, and Moptas in arms on all sides of us; an army full of disaffection and discontent, amounting to Lord knows what, on the northern frontier, which increases as it advances, like a snowball in snow. To oppose this we have nothing that ought to be taken from the necessary garrisons, and the corps we have in them are incomplete in men, and without officers. If we go to war in earnest, however, (and if we take the field at all it ought to be in earnest,) I will collect every thing that can be brought together from all sides, and we ought not to quit the field as long as there is a discontented or unsubdued Poligar in the country.

FROM THE SAME.

Seringapatam, May 10th, 1830.

DEAR MUNRO,

I have again this morning received a letter from the Commanding Officer at Hullihall, stating that the paymaster's servant cannot get grain, and that he begins to feel a want in the bazaar. I acknowledge, in general, the propriety of the refusal of those charged with the Civil Government to interfere with the purchases which it may be necessary to make on account of the military; but there may be cases in which such an interference may be not only
proper, but absolutely necessary. If the paymaster's servant is dishonest, it may be possible that nothing more may be required than to turn him out, and an honest servant may be able to procure all he wants, notwithstanding the neutrality of the Sircar. But it may happen, that the Sircar, or his servants, are not neuter, and that (as it is stated in this instance) the Amildar throws difficulties in the way of procuring the necessary supplies for the troops; in that case, surely the interference of the collector is necessary to check the improper conduct of his servant. As the frontier is disturbed, it may happen that the people are unwilling to part with their grain at any price; or there may be a real scarcity, which may induce the people to wish to keep it. But in either of these cases it surely is necessary that the Company's garrisons should be provided, and in order to procure a provision, the authority of the Civil Government must be exercised. There are other circumstances under which the interference of the Civil Government might be desirable in order to procure supplies; but I only allude to those which it appears have hitherto prevented us from making any store of grain in Soonda, and upon them I wish you to make enquiry, and to take such measures as you may think necessary to remedy the evil.

Government have approved of the measure of throwing grain into the garrisons in that country; they will require about one thousand loads, and all I can say upon the subject is, that if the grain is not procured, I do not conceive that I am answerable for the consequences.
THE LIFE OF

FROM THE SAME.

Seringapatam, May 17th, 1800.

MY DEAR MAJOR,

You will be glad to hear that I have called away both the battalions of native infantry from Goa, and I hope they will join the army which is forming to the northward by the end of the month.

I have attended to your suggestion regarding the interference of commanding officers of posts in the price of grain, and I have this day issued an order, of which the enclosed is a copy. An officer at Chandergooty has contrived to drive away all the bazaar people, and if I find upon enquiry that this is to be attributed to his improper interference, I will put in execution the threat contained in the order. I hear from Mr. Gordon this morning, that your Amilkdar in Soonda has given his servant some assistance, and the consequence is that he has got some grain. I hope the assistance given has not been to enable him to get it at a low price, but to get it at any price the Ryots may ask.

You will perceive by my letters to Colonel Mignan that I am entirely of your opinion regarding the utility of providing against disaffection at all points: we shall do well if we can provide against those places where it manifests itself by acts of violence and rebellion. I have urged Colonel Mignan to provide for a call which you may make upon him for troops, to be stationed at Vittell, and as he will not require so large a force for the blockade of Jemadamabad as I expected, he will be able to furnish what you may require.

Colonel Montresor has been very successful in Bulum; has beat, burnt, plundered, and destroyed in all parts of the country. But I am still of opinion, that nothing has
been done which can tend effectually to put an end to the rebellion in Bulum, and that the near approach of the rains renders it impossible to do that, which alone in my opinion, will ever get the better of Kistnapah Naig.

FROM THE SAME.

(OFFICIAL.)

Camp, left bank of the Tumbudra,

sir,

June 26th, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 22d instant and its enclosure, and I am obliged to you for the intelligence which you give me, that a lac of Bahaudry pagodas for the use of the troops in this country, were likely to leave Cundapore on the 23d instant. From a conversation which I had with Mr. Webbe, at Seringapatam, early in the last month, I had reason to expect that this sum would have been at Nuggur some time ago. I sent orders to the officer commanding in Soonda to drive the party which had got possession of Budnagoor out of that post. He would have done this before now, according to the former orders which his predecessors received from me, only that he has found it impossible to move even a small detachment of the troops under his orders, for want of the common assistance which the country can afford.

This, he informs me, the Amildars have refused to give, and I am waiting here at this moment for a battalion of Bombay Sepoys, which are detained at Hullihall, in Soonda, for want of a few bullocks, which cannot be provided without the Civil Government.

If the officer commanding in Soonda should be enabled to detach a force to get possession of Budnagoor, I do not propose to have a post there, and I conceive that it will be expedient to raise as many more Peons as you can get in Soonda. The number of troops allotted to that province
by Government was one battalion, and although it is certainly much exposed, I have not means of increasing that force at present.

TO THE HON. COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Cundapore, 30th June, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

I am much concerned to find that you think I have been remiss in sending the money for you. I only knew from Webbe in general terms that you were to have the surplus of this province; but when it would be wanted, or where it was to be sent, I knew nothing of. This delay is the more to be regretted, as the money might have been at Nuggur a month ago as easily as now; but it is to be recollected that I am but a collector, and have no discretionary power to judge what ought to be reserved for Canara, or what ought to be sent to you. You and Close know what troops are likely to be retained in different quarters, and how far up they ought to be paid, and are, of course, the men from whom I am to expect instructions. Had I followed my own opinion, I would have sent you two lacs instead of one; for I can do this after paying up the troops in Canara to the 1st of October. I took upon myself to remit the full amount of their pay, &c. up to the 1st October, above a month ago, to Mangalore, from being convinced of the propriety of Colonel Mignan having in these troublesome times a sum of money by him, to answer any unexpected call, without waiting for it, in the monsoon. It is more than two months since, with the same view, I proposed officially, through Close, that the detachment at Goa should have been paid up to the same period; but Government have never yet given their answer. Had they ordered the payment, it would have obviated most of the inconveniences that have been experienced, as the different corps would have left Goa well supplied with cash.
I have, on the supposition that you will call for the other lac of pagodas, ordered it to be packed up in two lots of fifty thousand each, so that the moment you send for half, or the whole, it shall be despatched. If you think it should at any rate go to Nuggur to wait for an opportunity of joining you, I shall send it there. I have sent by almost every opportunity for the last fortnight, orders to the Amildar of Soopah, to pay all the money he could collect to the Paymaster-General, or the Commandant, and to assist in every way all the troops of every description. I am afraid an adherence to the letter of his orders, which mentioned the Goa troops, has prevented him from assisting as he ought to have done the Hullihall battalions since ordered to camp. I have not yet heard any particulars, but if he has acted improperly, I shall dismiss him. Unluckily, there is no being sure that Amildars will answer, until they are tried and the mischief done. He is now ordered to put himself entirely under the directions of the officer commanding, and to obey him implicitly without any reference to me.

In raising Peons and securing Soonda, the progress of your operations may probably enable me with their aid, and giving Cowle to occupy Hangal, and other districts bordering upon us. I think we can never cover ourselves with mere defensive measures. Giving Cowle to the neighbouring districts, and occupying them with Peons, is the most likely way to keep Soonda clear of inroads. Should therefore, the weakness of the enemy enable the Amildars to extend their limits, do you approve of its being attempted? Unless it be contrary to engagements which may have been made with the Peshwah, it would, I think, be of use to your operations, by confining the resources of the enemy, and extending your own.

Yours very truly,

T. Munro.
FROM COLONEL WELLESLEY TO MAJOR MUNRO.

Camp, three miles south of Havery, July 3rd, 1800.

DEAR MUNRO,

I don't deny that I did believe that you were not quite so ready to assist my wants as you might have been, as I understood from Mr. Webbe that you had been desired to send to Nuggur all the money which you had in your treasury, and which was not immediately wanted for other purposes; and I therefore did not think it necessary to take any further steps to procure the money, than to desire the Officer in command at Nuggur to have in readiness an escort to bring it to camp. I also thought, and from the complaints which have been received, it appears to be true, that your servant in Soonda gave no assistance whatever to enable the battalions marching through that district to move. For want of money and every thing, one of them has not joined me yet; and from what I am going to tell you, you will perceive that it is probable that I shall not see it for some time.

Doondiah has beat Goklah, and I am informed that a body of the troops of the latter fled to Hullihall with Chintamene Row, where they are at this moment. Doondiah followed them, and if the battalions had not marched before the 30th of June, on which day was the action, it is probable that Doondiah will have kept such a watch upon Hullihall, as to have rendered it impossible for it to march since. I have no orders to take possession of any part of the country, and I have hitherto put the Bhow's people in possession of every part that has fallen into my hands. I have done this as much because I have no troops to spare for garrisons, as because it is a most desirable and necessary thing to me, that the country on this side of the Werda.
towards the Rajah's frontier should be settled, that I may draw from it its poor resources, and have my communication with Mysore unimpeded. I enjoy all these advantages at present, and I am, therefore, desirous not to risk the loss of them even for a moment by asking you to come up to settle this country. The change of Government would, I fear, have this effect; and besides, as I already told you, I have no order to take possession of the country in any manner.

I approve of your proposal to advance your Peons to Hangal, or where else you please, when your Amildars hear that I have crossed the Werda. I will also apprize you when I shall have done so. It will be proper that I should tell the Bhow that I have desired them to enter the Savanore country, and to possess themselves of the districts on the borders for the general good.

It appears to me that when they will be at Hangal, they will be able to assist me with some rice, of which I stand woefully in need; all that I have comes from the rice countries in Mysore, which are at the distance of about a month's march; and you will perceive that to bring it to me will require a tolerably large number of Bunjaries. If I could get a little at Hangal it would be a great relief. Desire your Amildars to let me know if they can give me any assistance whatever in rice? from what country it is to come? to what place I am to send for it? the distance such place may be from Savanore? and such other information regarding it as they can afford.

There is not a single paddy field in this whole country; but plenty of cotton-ground swamps, which in this wet weather are delightful.
TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CLOSE,
RESIDENT IN MYSORE.

Cundapore, July 8th, 1800.

SIR,

I am favoured with your letter of the 1st instant. I have frequently heard of late, with much concern, that the troops in Soonda have experienced great difficulties, notwithstanding my having used every means that occurred to me as the most likely either to obviate, or remove them. The great distance of Hullihall, the interruption of the Tappals by the incursion of the enemy into Soonda, and the slowness of the communication by Peons, have prevented me from ascertaining how far they may be owing to unavoidable accidents, to want of exertion in the Amildars, or to mistakes of my own. I shall state, for your information, what has been done, and the reasons upon which I acted.

On the 26th of April last I received a letter from Mr. Gordon, dated the 18th of that Month, advising me that he wanted star pagodas five thousand at Hullihall, and that the provision department would require between two and three thousand more. I immediately dispatched seven thousand bahadric pagodas, which were paid into his office at Hullihall, on the 11th of May. As his letter had stated that "there was not remaining in the cash chest, then quite sufficient for the 1st of May abstract," I supposed that the sum in it was nearly sufficient, and that therefore the supply which had been sent, after allowing for the store department, would be sufficient, or nearly sufficient, for the June abstract: in which case, the garrison would want no pay till July, and, at all events, as they were paid
in the middle of May, that they could be in no great want till the middle of June.

The first intimation that I had respecting the march of the troops from Goa, through Soonda, was from Mr. Uhchoffe. On the 22nd, of May he mentioned, in general terms, that they would require assistance in money and carriage. Money from Canara could not have been forwarded so as to reach the corps in time; but there was enough in Soonda, for the Amildar of that district had in his hands five thousand pagodas, and the Amildar of Soopah two thousand. I therefore wrote immediately to both the Amildars on the 22nd of May, directing them to give the necessary assistance to the corps on the march through their respective districts. I directed the Amildar of Soopah to hire two hundred bullocks, and to advance whatever money was wanted; and, if his own funds were not sufficient, to draw for three or four thousand pagodas on the Amildar of Soonda, who was, at the same time, ordered to comply with whatever demand he might make. The letter to the Amildar of Soopah was written in duplicate, one copy went by the Tappal, and the other was forwarded by two Peons. The letter by Tappal, instead of going on to Hullihall, was, by some accident or other, returned from Nuggur; that by the Peons reached Soopah on the 4th of June, on which day the Amildar acknowledges the receipt of it, mentions that the battalion had passed a few days before, and that it was assisted with rice and coolies. The Amildar of Soonda, in a letter of the 8th of June, says that he had supplied it with one hundred coolies and fifty bullocks.

*The Amildar of Soopah again wrote me on the 6th of June, that another battalion had arrived; that he had communicated to the officer commanding his orders to furnish him with money; that he had also communicated them to
the Paymaster's servant, but that the officer had only taken up the two hundred pagodas, for which he had passed a receipt to him, in the name of the Paymaster's servant: had he called for two thousand it would have been as readily granted.

The Amildar of Soonda, in a letter of the 16th of June, states, that he had been cautioned by the Amildar of Soopah to provide a hundred bullocks for this second corps; but that, after advancing as far as Burtanhilly, between Jilapore and Soonda, it had suddenly returned to Hullihall. My latest letter from him is dated the 22nd of June, mentioning that he had supplied the Amildar of Soopah with five hundred pagodas.

I cannot account for the commanding officer of the 24th having demanded only two hundred pagodas of the Amildar of Soopah, when his demand for any sum would have been complied with, or for his not repeating his demand, unless it may have been that he supposed that his corps was included in the refusal of the Amildars to advance cash to the garrison. It appears, from the Amildar's letter of the 6th of June, that the officer commanding the garrison had called upon him for a supply of cash, which he declined giving, on the ground of such advances never having been made, except in consequence of an order on him in favour of the Paymaster's agent, from me; and of his instructions in the present instance having been confined to the battalion from Goa. I must confess that this was a difficulty which I did not foresee; for I never suspected that the garrison which had been paid in the middle of May, could be in distress on the 5th of June. I, however, immediately wrote to the Amildar, directing him to answer, without distinction, all demands made upon him by any servant of the Company. I had the preceding day dispatched five thousand pagodas direct to the officer commanding Hullihall: two thousand four hundred pagodas have, in
addition, by this time gone on from Ankalah, and nine thousand more will be forwarded from hence to-morrow morning.

By Mr. Uhchoff's report, it seems to have been an opinion formed by the troops in Soonda, that there was a monopoly of the rice in that quarter: this idea was natural enough among men from the Low Country, where they had seen it at half the price. There is, however, no monopoly; rice is always scarce and dear in Soonda from natural causes: there is very little land in cultivation, and the produce is far short of the consumption of even the thin population of the country; the deficiency must, therefore, be brought, at a great expense, from below the Ghauts. Rice bought on the sea-coast, at twenty-five sears the rupee, after paying bullock hire and customs, cannot be sold in Soonda under twelve sears the rupee. Eleven and twelve sears was the price from January to April in every part of the country, from Jelapore to Belghie, and this too in all the small villages, where there was not a single Sepoy.

Soonda produces no carriage cattle: the numerous droves seen there during the dry season come from the Mahratta country for pepper and betel-nut, and go off when the rains set in, except a few, the private property of merchants at Jelapore and Sersey, which remain tied up in their houses during the rains: there may be also a few with Bazarmen at Hullihall. These were the only means the Anildar had of supplying the detachment; though they were small, they were, no doubt, sufficient to have furnished two hundred bullocks, which I directed him to provide.

I had reason to believe that the battalion from Goa would only be a few days in Soonda: money from this could not have reached Hullihall in less than twelve days, and would, of course, have been too late.
I was not certain that the battalion would not turn off before reaching Hullihall, but I was certain that they must either march by Sersey or Buddangoor. I therefore directed the Amildar of Soonda to remain at Sersey, and to disburse the five thousand pagodas in his hands either to the troops on their arrival, or the orders of the Amildar of Soopah. By waiting too long in expectation of the 3/4th coming on, he was surprised and made prisoner on the night of the 22nd of June. It might have been supposed that the equipment which had enabled the 3/4th to march from Goa to Jelapore, and back to Hullihall, would have enabled the 1/4th, with a very little assistance from the Amildar, to move, though far from being properly equipped, yet sufficiently so to have made it possible for it to have reached the army. I have to regret that, amidst all the difficulties and disappointments which have occurred, none of the officers ever once wrote to me. The first notice I had that matters were not going right was, as I have already mentioned, from the Amildar himself, on the 21st ultimo. When it is considered that the passage of the Tappals has frequently been interrupted in the course of the last six weeks, and that the answer to a letter sent from Hullihall by a common Peon, cannot reach that place in less than twenty-two, or sometimes, in the rains, twenty-eight days, it will readily be perceived how much time must be lost in rectifying any point that requires a reference. My presence was necessary here to take measures against the insurrection in the southern districts of Canara, which was, at one time, making so much progress under Futtieh Hyder and Vittel Hegada. But had I supposed that the march of a single battalion through Soonda would have been so serious a matter, I would not have hesitated a moment in setting out for that province.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

THOMAS MUNRO.
TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Cundapore, 12th July, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

I see now the situation in which you stand with respect to the Mahattas, and you are certainly right to risk no part of the advantages of having a quiet rear. You speak rather doubtfully of your supplies; they are, to be sure, distant, but as the communication is open, if there has been time to make an arrangement with the Bunjarries, they ought to be constant, and plentiful, and regular.

Penacondah used to yield a great deal of rice, and also the Pollams of Colar, and both are within a month's march. I hope, however, that you do not trust to any contingent supplies from such countries as Soonda, for it has been a den of thieves for ages. To leave nothing untried, however, to procure even a small supply, I have written to all the Amildars to do their utmost, and to let you know the result; but I expect nothing: the country afforded scarcely any rice when matters were quiet, and now that it has been for two months overrun by banditti, who plunder everything, I do not believe that what is left would feed you for a single day. Canara could easily give you five or six weeks' rice at present, but it has not a carriage-bullock; and could you send bullocks to Mangalore, the Ghaunts and torrents would, I imagine, make the transport more tedious than even your present sources of supply. The severity of the rains too, would also be apt to damage the rice. If you think it worth the trial to send some of your Bunjarries to Mangalore, I could immediately deliver to them about thirty thousand sears; but I suspect they will not venture down, for in general they never come till November.

I believe I stated to you in a former letter, that after October, rice might be supplied to any extent from this
country, and that the land carriage to Hullihall would be only about sixty miles. If the present service is likely to continue, it would certainly be of great advantage to your operations to have a large depot at Hullihall, or rather at Damar, where the Peshwah might probably admit a garrison of ours. But whatever you may determine with respect to this point, the bullocks must come from you, as I have none within my jurisdiction.

My Amildar has returned to Bonawasi, and from him I understand that a party of Sepoys, from Hullihall, had been repulsed about the end of last month, in an attempt to escalade Buddangoor, and that they had remained ever since. A letter this moment, from Jelapore, confirms the account, and adds that the party of Sepoys was only two hundred. The Amildar of Soopah, from whence the letter is, adds that he had paid three thousand pagodas at Hullihall, and that five thousand more had that day (2nd instant) left Jelapore for that station. I inclose you a copy of an official letter I wrote to Colonel Close, in consequence of his writing to me of the difficulties in Soonda. If you will consider the map, the time to receive and answer letters, and the danger of many being lost in these times, I think you will find that, had the officers commanding been people of any experience or resource, they would have found the means of getting enough of money to move. If a man is determined to move, he might move, and join the army too, in spite of the opposition of an Amildar, or, if you will have it, of the negligence of a collector.

Yours, very truly,

Thomas Munro.
FROM COLONEL WELLESLEY TO MAJOR MUNRO.

Camp at Savanore, July 19th, 1800.

DEAR MUNRO,

I have received your letters of the 7th and 12th, and I have written to your Amildar at Bonawasi to desire him to increase his Peons as much as possible, to endeavour to drive the banditti out of Soonda, and to retake Budnapoor in concert with the officer at Mudnapoor, to whom orders will be sent to make another attempt on that place. I have also desired the Amildars, if the attempt on Budnapoor should fail, at all events to turn the siege into a blockade, and to advance and take possession of Haurn-Gul, and give protection to the inhabitants on the borders. If we can't restore tranquillity to Soonda in any other manner, I must stretch out that way myself, which will certainly do the business effectually.

I am prevented from doing so at this moment by the necessity of looking out for the safety of Bowser on one side, and of the remains of Gocklah's army on the other. I have given Doondiah one run, and I have established an opinion of our superiority in our own people, in his army, and in the country in general—his people begin already to leave him—I have not time to write you the particulars.

TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Cundapore, 22nd July, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

We have accounts here of your having passed the Werdah. I hope you have the certainty of supplies from your rear, for I think there is little chance of your finding any thing in front. As there is no knowing how long the present service may last, I shall raise as many Peons as
may be sufficient to protect Soonda; and I shall endeavor to throw eight or ten days’ rice for your army into Hullihall. Such a depot being there would be of service in the event of your being near that place, and your supplies from other quarters being interrupted by any accident. As Soonda has no rice, the supply to Hullihall must go from Goa, and the northern parts of Canara, and as it must be carried on men’s heads, the price, till the rains abate in October, will be about seven sears the rupee. I have bargained for seventy-five thousand lacs; one third to be at Hullihall the 20th of August, and the rest on the 4th of September. I shall endeavor to complete the quantity to a lac of sears; this would be ten days’ rice for twenty thousand men, at the allowance of half a sear per man daily. If you are sure of a constant supply at a cheaper rate, it would be needless for me to lay up more; but if you are not, it would, I think, be proper to continue increasing the store, even at the rate of seven or eight lacs the rupee, the whole of the months of September and October. It may be said, if matters are settled in a month or two, we shall have gone to a useless expense; but suppose that twenty or thirty thousand pagodas are lost in this way, it ought not to be put in competition with the object of ensuring a supply for the army. I wish to have your instructions on this subject; for if you see no objection, I shall immediately enter into agreements with grain-dealers, and engage to take whatever quantity they can deliver at Hullihall, within the months of September and October, at seven or eight sears the rupee, or as much cheaper as it can be had.

Colonel Close has advised me to go up the Ghauts, and offer my services in settling your conquests; but your reasons for employing Appah Sahib’s manager, probably did not occur to him. To secure a quiet rear, and the arrival of provisions, is certainly the grand object, and ought not
to be risked for any other consideration. If this is effected by means of the managers of the Peshwah and Appah Sahib, any interference on my part would, perhaps, do more harm than good. While this obstacle remains, what you propose would, I imagine, be the best plan,—to let my Amildars occupy what they can secure, informing the Mahrattas, at the same time, that it is for the general good. This will answer all the purposes that could be obtained by my appearing in the business, and it will not be so likely to excite jealousy; for it will be supposed, that you will order away the Amildars, and transfer their districts to the Mahrattas, whenever they may require it. The Amildars will, in the mean time, raise Peons, and draw from the districts whatever supplies they can afford for the use of the army.

Soobah Row, whom I detached lately with a commission to raise Peons, and a letter to you, has been some time with me, and is a very smart fellow, and much fitter than I am to take charge of a new acquisition, and draw forth its resources for the public service. His orders from me were to consider the procuring of supplies for the army as his only object; and not to think of revenue, but in so far as it promoted this end. We must have possession for a month or two, before we can get any thing from new countries; but it is always something gained to keep the enemy out of them, and to have a barrier to our old possessions.

Whenever you think that my taking charge of your conquests can be of any use, I shall go up the Ghauts; for a fortnight or three weeks, my presence is more necessary here than anywhere else; for though we have defeated Vittel Hegada, and taken all his family, he is still himself in the jungle, with about two hundred adherents. A detachment of three or four hundred banditti has gone down the Dewamany Ghaut, seven coss east of Ankolah; but as the
Amildars have collected a number of armed people, and
as I understand that Colonel Stevenson has gone against
the head-quarters at Buddangoor, we shall, I trust, be
able to expell them. I must also remain below two or
three weeks, to make some arrangements about rice, in case
you shall approve of throwing what we can into Hullihall.

Yours very truly,
Thomas Munro.

I have heard this moment, that Vittel Hegada, not being
able to effect his escape, had given himself up to Captain
Bruce, whom Colonel Mignan had sent to Vittel, at my re-
quest, to disarm the district.

FROM COL. WELLESLEY TO MAJOR MUNRO.

[Operations against Dhoondee.]

Camp at Soondetty, Aug. 1st, 1800.

DEAR MUNRO,

I have received your letters of the 22nd and
23rd; I have sent orders to the commanding officers at
Hullihall and at Nuggar, to furnish ammunition, in mo-
derate quantities, on the requisition of your Amildars; in
any quantities you please, on your own. Don't press Hul-
lihall too much, as I know they are not very well supplied
there. Take what you please from Nuggar. I have
taken and destroyed Doondiah's baggage and six guns, and
driven into the Malpurba, (where they were drowned,) about five thousand people: I stormed Dumnfull on
the 26th July. Doondiah's followers are quitting him'
apace, as they do not think the amusement very gratifying
at the present moment. The war, therefore, is nearly at
an end; and another blow, which I am meditating upon
him and his Bunjarries, in the Kentoor country, will most
probably bring it to a close. I must halt here to-morrow, to refresh a little, having marched every day since the 22nd July; and on the 30th, the day on which I took his baggage, I marched twenty-six miles; which, let me tell you, is no small affair in this country.

My troops are in high health and spirits, and their pockets full of money, the produce of plunder. I still think, however, that a store of rice at Hullihall will do us no harm, and if I should not want it, the expense incurred will not signify.

TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Cundapore, 2nd August, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

Yours of the 20th did not reach this place till the 29th; I, however, though it must have been too late, wrote immediately to Mungus Row, to assist the Hullihall corps. I have already informed you, that there was no chance of getting any supplies for your army from Soonda. Sersey and Bonawasi, the only places which could have supplied a little rice, have been so long in possession of the enemy, that they have consumed it all; and unless the corps from Hullihall dislodges them, I am afraid it will be some time before we can get Peons enough for this purpose, for their situation prevents us from raising any in the Southern parts of the province, which are the most populous, and Purneah’s new levies in Nuggar prevent our getting there. If Buddangoor, however, is once retaken, we shall be able to keep it, and to get Peons to extend ourselves to the eastward. The only means I have of doing any thing in the provision way, is by sending rice from below the Ghauts, on men’s heads. I have now no doubt of having a lac of scars for you at Hullihall, and probably more, by the 4th September. This is
no great supply, but it may be of some use. It will be necessary to send gennies for it from camp, for there is not one in this country, all rice here being packed up in straw-ropes. I shall keep what rice I have on hand, as you desire. Bunjarries might, I think, be prevailed upon to come down in September, to the Sedaswaghur river, to take up rice. I will thank you to inform me what the price is in your camp, that I may judge how far it will answer to send it from below the Ghauts.

I shall be ready to come up whenever you think that it can be of any use, or that Government has any intention of retaining a part of your conquests, as a security for us in future, or as an indemnification for the expense of the campaign. I would go up now, to wait in readiness, were I not detained here by the necessity of not moving, till I know the determination of the Revenue Board respecting the customs of this country. I expect to receive it by the middle of the month; five or six days more will be sufficient to make my arrangements, and I shall then be ready to act in any way you please. If the service you are now upon, should be likely to last any time, the best way of employing me, would be to spare me a small detachment to occupy the countries, intended for the Company (if there be any such), and to escort rice. We have now the means in our hands of making Canara as quiet as the Carnatic, for Vittel Hegada and his Etat Major are all in prison.

Yours, very truly,

Thomas Munro.

In the battle against Hegada, we took his two elephants. If they can be of any use in the army, I shall send them wherever you may direct.
DEAR COLONEL,

I have received yours of the 30th, and congratulate you most cordially on your success, and long to hear the result of your expedition against the Bunjarries in Kittoor. Your dashing way of carrying on the war is better calculated than any other to bring it to a speedy conclusion. Dhoondheah and his Assops, and Foujdars, and Nabobs, certainly did not expect that their reign was to have been so short; you probably, yourself, did not a month ago expect that it would have been terminated so soon; I must own I did not. Your short campaign has added so much to the reputation of our arms, that it will, I think, make our vagabond neighbours respect our frontier more in future. I have not been able to discover from your letter whether Dhoondheah has gone towards Kittoor, or crossed the Malpurbah; I see, however, that five thousand of his people have gone to the bottom, which is some satisfaction, in the mean time. I have lost the only map I had, and can therefore make nothing of your present route, nor of the country between the Malpurbah and the Kismah; but I make no doubt that you mark as you go along what part lies convenient for us as a new frontier, and what posts might, by a little strengthening, be used as depôts in carrying on war hereafter to the northward. Darwar would be a good station, but you may have seen others more to the eastward. A war with an enemy that could bring forty or fifty thousand horse into the field, as the Mahrattas have sometimes done, would be a very serious matter, were we obliged to draw our rice from such a distance as we now do; a good post in Savanore would obviate this difficulty, because, during the dry season, rice
in any quantity might be thrown into it from Canara. The smallest escort would be sufficient to protect it as far as the eastern boundary of Soonda, and the only risk would be during a march of, perhaps, forty or fifty miles through the open country. We must not let all your conquests go for nothing, otherwise we shall have Soonda just as much exposed as ever. I trust that, besides subduing Dhoondheah, you will extend the limits of our empire as far at least as the Malpurbah; if to the Kisnah, so much the better. Your opinion on this head would most likely determine the conduct of Government. I have just heard of the taking of Buddangoor, and the death of our friend the Buckshee Allayar Beg, so that Soonda is now clear; but as there is a gang of Dessays all along the frontier who plunder us as much as ever Dhoondheah did, I have written the Amildars to extend themselves well to the eastward if they can. There are two notorious fellows, Soonançaap and Koodlagiu, nearly, I believe, opposite to Mundagow, who have had the presumption to drive off large flocks of cattle since you gave Dhoondheah the first run. You will probably hear of disputes between my Amildars and the Bhows, but this is to be expected; it is the nature of these fellows always to be complaining of one another, even though they should not be on very bad terms. I should wish to keep the Bhows' people ten coss at least from the frontiers of Soonda, for the gangs of robbers which they have always protected do more mischief than an open enemy.

Yours very sincerely,

Thomas Munro.
TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Cundapore, 10th August, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

After writing you yesterday, I received yours of the 2nd, denouncing certain levelling Almildars of mine: the mischief is easily stopped, the remedy is in your hands, for you can either order them to camp or back to me. I am convinced, however, that no great harm has been done; it is merely the altercation of Dubashes, for such are the disputants on both sides. Addoor received Soobah Row, the man I sent, and though the Mahratta Dubashes could not get admittance from the people, they are now angry that he has got in, and say that he intercepts your convoys.

As to the money, he had orders from me to collect no money, but to get grain in lieu of it, and send it to camp; he was also particularly directed not to touch any district in which the Bhows' people were. My intention was that he should occupy Addoor and Hangal, by giving cowle to the country people, and then draw together Peons to blockade Buddangoor; for you must know that the enemy's situation, in possession of all the southern parts of Soonda, prevented us from raising Peons there, and none could be got in Nuggar, for Purneah wanted them there. The battalion from Hullihall has now done the business, and rendered all these circuitous operations unnecessary. But when I gave Soobah Row the plan of his campaign, we did not suspect that you would have been able to spare the battalion; I also thought that Dhoondheah might have ventured to leave a small party of horse in your rear, in which case, the Company's Amildars would have been more likely than the Mahratta ones to have kept the country quiet.
Your rapid success has entirely changed the face of affairs, and it is to it, and not to the Mahrattas, that you ought to attribute the advantages of a free communication with Mysore. All that the Mahrattas have done, the country people would have done themselves; they would be very glad to have your leave to drive every Mahratta out of the country.

But this is not the point at present to be considered; your rear must not only be clear, but it must be like Caesar's wife, you must have no suspicion about it; I have therefore written my Amildar to give no interruption. I must, however, tell you, in vindication of the proceedings of Mungus Row, that your letter, of which he sent me a copy, did not restrict him from acting both as a revenue and military agent; this may have been a mistake of your writer.

After all, I do not regret what has happened, for they will give Soobah Row, or perhaps me, the credit of invading their rights, and you that of defending them.

When the campaign is over, however, we must not let all your conquests go: we must keep some to give us a better frontier than the long isolated district of Soonda. By this time I hope you have got among the Bunjarries.

Believe me yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Cundapore, August 14th, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

I am very happy to see from your letter of the 7th that matters are going on so well, and I perfectly agree with you, that it is better that my Amildars should keep within their own bounds. Your success has been so much more rapid and complete than could have been expected,
that the great object of their seizing on any posts belonging to the Mahrattas, in order to keep the enemy at a distance from our own frontier, is now removed. To keep your allies in good-humour is now what is principally required, and this you can easily effect by ordering my people to stay at home. Your present expedition will answer many useful purposes. We shall, as you say, have gained a knowledge, conciliated the principal people, and raised our reputation; but I much doubt our being able to establish a government capable of preserving the relations of amity and peace. Indeed, I am convinced that we cannot; all will be well while your army is present, but withdraw it, and you will soon see what will happen. We have already seen that the Peshwah is incapable of establishing his authority; we ought not to wish to see Scindia's established, for he has already too much influence in India. A few months ago Gocklah, acting nominally for the Peshwah, was in fact independent, and he and Bopajeer Scindia, and every man, except Balkishar Bhow, encouraged depredations in Soonda, and had not Dhoondheah driven them out, some other upstart adventurer would soon have attempted it; for it is the character of all Indian governments, that whenever the energy of the ruling power is gone, every subordinate agent, under the title of Nabob, Rajah, &c. pushes for independence. Look at the numberless revolutions Delhi has undergone, while the title of emperor still remains. It has always been, and always will be the same under all Indian governments. They have no principle of strength or stability in themselves, and when, therefore, they once give way, they never recover. There are two circumstances against the establishment of a strong government in Savanore, one is the weakness of the Peshwah, and the other is the hatred of the natives to the Mahrattas; for the natives are Canarines, who are as angry at seeing themselves under the Mahrattas, as you
say the Mahrattas are at Mungus Row's Peons taking their forts. They are, therefore, always ready to drive out their present masters when they can get any body to help them; and, I believe, that in the late business, they showed at least as much zeal for Dhoondheah as for the Peshwah, or the Bhow. Had we to do with distinct independent nations, as in Europe, it might be wise to withdraw again into our own limits for the sake of preserving an useful ally, but here things are entirely different. Savanore makes no part of the Mahratta nation, and is less connected with it than with the natives of Mysore. To throw it back again upon a power which cannot keep it, would only be keeping in reserve for ourselves a second military expedition to restore order.

I confess, for my own part, that as we have thought it necessary to appear in India as sovereigns, I think we ought to avail ourselves, not of the distresses of our neighbours, but of their aggressions, to strengthen ourselves, and to place ourselves in such a situation as may be likely to prevent such attacks hereafter. Scindia has been allowed to increase his power by the subjugation of the Jeypoor and Odapore Rajahs, and also in a great measure of the Peshwah. We want money to oppose him, and money, too, more particularly since the increase to the pay of the native troops; and if in order to attain these objects, we retain in our possession certain territories, which pour forth invaders upon us, we can hardly be charged with having violated the laws of nations. I am for making ourselves as strong as possible before the French return to India, and set Scindia to war with us after completing his demi-brigades with pretended deserters.

If you reduce Dhoondheah completely, the Mahrattas ought to think themselves well off in giving up to us, for our help and expenses, all on this side of the Malpurbah. Now for the rice. I do not believe Mungus Row's bro-
brother can give you any, or that you will get much from Kittoor. Bunjarries are the only sure resources, and unless some of Dhoondheahs join you, the source of your supplies will be as distant as ever, unless you can prevail upon your own Bunjarries to come down to the Siediswaghur river, and take rice from Canara. The Ghauts will be practicable next month for bullocks, and I have got about two thousand bullock-loads remaining, which I shall keep till I hear whether or not you can send for it. You ought, certainly, to have as large a store as possible at Hullihall, for the service is not yet over. We do not know what steps Scindia may take, who is as ambitious, and fully as faithless, as our late friend the Sultan; and even if the service were over, it is probable, that arrangements would render the presence of your army necessary for some time to the Northward, so that there is every reason to suppose that you will still have occasion for all the rice you can get; and, as I learn from Colonel Close, that it is becoming scarce in Mysore, it becomes the more necessary that your Bunjarries should come down and load in Canara. If your arrangements at Hullihall can procure you any rice, it can occasion no inconvenience to me, for I shall send cash to complete whatever deficiencies may arise from the advances made from the paymaster's money. I hope you will give the necessary orders, either to the commanding officer, or to Mungus Row, for punishing the rebels who delivered up the Amildar of Soonda to Allayar Beg. Believe me, yours very sincerely,

Thomas Munro.

VOL. III.
Cundapore, August 29th, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

I HAVE got your letters of the 19th and 20th. I like your plan against Dhoondhea, and am only afraid that the fellow has boats; without them, if one may judge from the severity of the weather lately, there can be no chance of his getting over. I have written to Mungus Row to take the opinion of the Buttusk people as to the best Ghaut for the Bunjarries to come down for rice, and I shall give you notice on receiving his answer. I imagine that the village at the foot of the Jelapoor Ghaut must be the place. Your arguments against extension of territory are certainly very strong, but, still I cannot help thinking that you allow too much for its increasing the number of our enemies and weakening our means of defence. There are three things that greatly facilitate our conquests in this country; the first is—the whole of India being but one nation, always parcelled out among a number of chiefs, and these parcels continually changing masters, makes a transfer to us be regarded not as a conquest but merely as one administration turning out another. The second is—the total want of hereditary nobility and country gentlemen, so that there is no respectable class of men who might be impelled by a sense either of honour or of interest to oppose a revolution. And the third is—our having a greater command than any of the native powers of money, a strong engine of revolution in all countries, but more especially in India. As to the enemies we create by driving men out of employment, I do not apprehend it can ever do us any serious mischief. We have already, in overthrowing Tippoo, seen more of it than we can ever see again, because his service contained
so great a number of Mussulmans. Let us suppose Savanore to fall into our hands; the only person almost in the revenue line who would suffer is Bul Kishar Bhow; all the headmen of villages would remain exactly as they are; ten or a dozen of Bul Kishar's Gomashtas might be changed, but as we must have men of the same description, their places would be supplied by a dozen of other Gomashtas, and as the whole of both sets would be probably natives of Savanore, the result would be, that among the revenue people of the country, there would be twelve outs in favour of the Mahrattas, and twelve ins in favour of the Company. But it may be said, we should have the military against us. The chiefs would certainly be against us, but their resentment would be very harmless, because the payment of their men is the only hold they have upon them; and, as the means of doing this would be lost along with the revenue, they would be left without troops. These troops, if natives of the country, either have land themselves, or a share of what is held by their fathers and brothers, and as the labouring part of the family would prefer the Company's government, on account of being more moderately taxed, they would in most cases be able to keep the military part quiet. Many of the young men among the disbanded troops would find employment in the Company's army, and even the older, though they would be rejected themselves, would by degrees become attached to it by their younger brothers or sons entering into it. There is no army in India which supports decently, and even liberally, so great a number of what may be called the middling rank of natives as our own. It is true, it offers no field to your Nabobs and Foujdars, but what of that? these men have no influence but while in office; they are frequently raised from nothing, and often dismissed without any reason, and the people, by being accustomed to see so many successions of them, care about none of them;
so that although these officers by losing their places become our enemies, yet, as they have no adherents, they can do us no harm.

Scindia is at this moment as much our enemy as we can make him; if he does not break with us, it is because he fears us, and an extension of territory, by giving us greater resources, would make him still more cautious. The acquisition of Savanore would give us a frontier that would not require more troops to defend than our present one. But I have not the least doubt myself, that from the nature of Indian Governments, every inch of territory gained adds to our ability both of invading and defending. Every province that falls into our hands diminishes the force of the enemy by the loss of the revenue destined to support a certain number of troops, and it increases our force in a greater ratio, because the same province under us will pay as many troops, and of a much better quality. A Mahratta, or Nizamite army invading our territory, can make no lasting impression upon it; they cannot take forts, and we have no great feudal vassals to revolt to their standard. They might for a time ravage the country, but they would soon be obliged to fall back, by their Bunjarries, &c. being intercepted, and probably by disturbances at home. But we, in entering their territory, would find little difficulty in reducing every place that came in our way, and we should everywhere find Rows, and Bbows, and Nabobs ready, if not to join us, at least to throw off their dependence upon the enemy. All that India can bring against us, is not so formidable as the confederacy of Hyder and the Mahrattas was in 1780, when we had but a small force, with a frontier as difficult to defend as our present one. The increase of our resources has enabled us to double our army, and has given us an excellent body of cavalry, and a few more lacs of pagodas of country will give us the means of making this cavalry so strong, that
nothing in India will look at them. I am, therefore, for
going to the Malpurbah in the mean time; unless you are
determined upon going to the Kisnah at once, which un-
luckily must be our fate, sooner or later. The business
must be settled at Poonah, and the territory may be said
to be made over to us, either for a subsidy, or for the ex-
penses of the war, and future aid against new Dhoondheahs.
Scindia cannot well act against us in the Peninsula, unless
by usurping the Poonah Government, and then we should
be able to bring a strong confederacy against him, all the
friends of the Peshwah; the Nizam, in order to recover
the valuable territory he lost before the last war, and the
Rajahs of Oudipore and Jaypoor, supported by the Bengal
army.

Believe me, yours very sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Barkoor, 22nd September, 1800.

DEAR COLONEL,

I am so rejoiced to hear of the decisive and glo-
rious manner in which you have terminated the career of
the King of the World, that I can hardly sit still to write:
I lose half the pleasure of it by being alone in a tent at a
distance from all my countrymen. On such an occasion
one ought to be in a crowd, to see how every one looks and
talks. I did not suspect when I left you in the Tappore
pass two years ago, that you were so soon after to be
charging along the Kistna and Toombudra, murdering and
crowning Assophs and Nabobs, and killing the King of the
World himself. You have given us a very proper after-
piece to the death of the Sultan. A campaign of two
months finished his empire, and one of the same duration
has put an end to the earthly grandeur, at least, of the
Sovereign of the two Worlds. Had you and your regicide army been out of the way, Dhoondheah would undoubtedly have become an independent and powerful prince, and the founder of a new dynasty of cruel and treacherous sultans, but Heaven had otherwise ordained, and we must submit.

Now what is the next object? There are two, I believe: one to secure the country which the Nizam is to give us, and the other to reduce the Pyche Rajah. If both can be done at once, so much the better, for we ought to push on every thing whilst the native powers are weak, and the French out of India; but if we have not troops for both, I would be for beginning with the most important of the two, which is certainly the extension of our frontier both in the Nizam's territory and in that of the Mahrattas, if the vagabonds could be prevailed upon by treaty to let us advance to the Malpurbah. If Government are determined upon the Malabar war, I hope they will give you troops enough, for without a great force of infantry nothing can be done in such a country, where it is so easy for the enemy to annoy you from thickets, and to escape without any loss. They can easily take measures to harass with impunity a small detachment, which must march in one or two columns by certain paths; but a numerous army, which could act in many different columns, and which could leave posts wherever they were wanted, would disconcert all their plans, and would soon, I imagine, compel them to submit and disarm. It might facilitate your operations to have it clearly explained that it was the intention of Government rather to lighten than to increase the burdens of the inhabitants, and that the war would cease whenever the Rajah and all the fire-arms were given up.

On receiving your letter of the 11th, I immediately wrote to Mungus Row to direct your Bunjarries not to come down the Ghauts until they got opposite to Cundapore and Mangalore, as in consequence of your being on
the march back to Mysore, I had countermanded the rice ordered to Ankolah. I begin to suspect that they may not come down, but fill sooner here above the Ghauts, and follow you towards Seringapatam. Should this actually happen, I will thank you to inform me, because it will then be necessary to sell the rice, to prevent it from spoiling by too long keeping.

I wrote you a few days ago, that after paying the troops in Soonda, Nuggar, and Canara, for the 1st of January, I would only have Star Pagodas thirty-five thousand left, and that Mr. ——— wanted forty-five thousand rupees monthly for Goa. Yours, &c.

Thomas Munro.

FROM MR. WEBBE.

Fort St. George, 4th September, 1800.

DEAR TOM,

I was sanguine that my diplomatic appointment would at once have rescued me from the eternal and unseasonable complaints of my own countrymen, at least; but since it has stood me in no stead, I have thrown it up. Among that accursed tribe (as the Mussulmans say) I see that you hold a distinguished place; but since I find that my system of moderation, and complacency, and persuasion has had no effect among the refractory Chieftains of Malabar and Canara, I am determined to try the system of terror; and have, as you will have observed, begun with the Vittel Hegada. Being once embarked, consistency will require us to go through with it.

With respect to your notion of managing Savanore, I have no doubt of your ability; but, unfortunately, we have no right to submit it to your authority, at least, for the present; though I know not what might have been done, if you had not prevented me from going to Poonah.
According to existing engagements, we have entered the Mahratta dominions for the purpose of suppressing the rebel Dhoondheah, with the full consent of our ally the Peishwah; and I do not know on what principle of neutrality, (those, at least, established on this side of India,) we could make such a return of civility, as to deprive him of his territories.

You will probably have heard by this time, that the whole civil and military government of Malabar has been transferred to this Presidency; and we have only to consider how we can undo the management of the Bombayers. As I knew that you had no great predilection for those gentry, I advised Lord Clive to place the whole province under you; but the Governor-General having, for the present, some scruples with respect to the entire transfer, is desirous of the continuance of a commission. Lord Clive is very desirous that you should be at the head of it, and has authority from Lord Wellesley to grant you powers of acting separately whenever you please. This outline his Lordship means to fill up as soon as Lord Wellesley shall recommend a Commission from Bengal.

My notion at present is, that we should begin by thumping the refractory Rajahs; and, in order that they may be disposed of without let or molestation, that the courts of Adowlut should be abolished, and military process substituted until the province shall be quiet and subdued. In the mean while, it may be divided into two collectorships on our establishment; and the multitude of Europeans, who eat up the revenues at present, allowed a respite from their fatiguing duties. Palighaut might be added to Coimbatore again, and the Cochin Peshcush received by the Resident of Travancore. Write to me soon what you think of all this, and reconcile yourself to the severe hardship of being made only the greatest man on that side of India.
You will naturally enquire what the Commission is to do? The fact is, that if the Collectors would do their duty no Commission would be requisite; but without assistance, I do not think the servants of Bombay will become Collectors. I wish you would take two or three of those in Malabar to be your assistants.

Believe me, yours truly,

J. Webbe.

(Extract.)

TO HIS SISTER,

[In allusion to a Lady who used to devote her whole attention to the care of her husband's health.]

Cundapore, September 7th, 1800.

A wife cannot be gifted with a more dangerous talent. Such women be never at rest when their husbands' sleep well a-nights; they are never at ease, except when the poor man is ailing, that they may have the pleasure of recovering him again; it gratifies both their medical vanity and their love of power, by making him more dependent upon them; and it likewise gratifies all the finer feelings of romance. What a treasure, what a rich subject I shall be about ten years hence, when shivering at every breeze, for the laboratory of such a wife! when my withered carcase would be made to undergo an endless succession of experiments for the benefit of the medical world! I should be forced, in order to escape her prescriptions, to conceal my complaints, when I was really sick, and to go out and take medicine by stealth, as a man goes to the club to drink, when he is unhappily linked to a sober wife. Were Heaven, for some wise purpose, to deliver me into the hands of a nostrum-skilled wife, it would in an instant dissipate all my dreams of retiring to spend my latter days
in indolence and quiet. I would see with grief that I was doomed to enter upon a more active career than that in which I had been so long engaged; for I would consider her and myself as two hostile powers, commencing a war in which both would be continually exerting all the resources of their genius; she to circumvent me, and throw me into the hospital, and I to escape captivity and elixirs. No modern war could be more inveterate, for it could terminate only with the death of one or other of the combatants. If, notwithstanding the strength of my conjugal affection, the natural principle of self-preservation should be still stronger, and make me lament to survive her, I imagine my eating heartily and sleeping soundly would very soon bring about her dissolution. But there is no necessity for my anticipating these heart-rending scenes, for I have suffered enough of late. I have been shut up for near four months by a continual pour of rain, and have only seen one fair day since the 26th of May; but, as it is getting more moderate, I mean to take the field to-morrow, and not to enter a house again for many months. I am now among a crowd of writers, who keep up a constant clack, and interrupt me every moment to hear and sign their letters; and I shall not be able to get a few idle hours to write you, until I can get clear of them while travelling, as I did when I sent you a journal from Soonda.

FROM COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Camp at Dummul, September 26th, 1800.

MY DEAR MUNRO,

After receiving my letter of the 14th, I hope that you will have sent the rice to Ankolah, notwithstanding that you will before have stopped it, as you state in your letter of the 22nd, and that you will have allowed the Bunjarries to go into Canara, by the Arbigh Ghaut, as you first pro-
posed. If, however, you should have ordered them down to Cundapore, it does not much signify, as I have plenty, and I am going over towards Soonda, from which country I expect to draw enough for my consumption during the time that I may find it necessary to remain in its neighbourhood. Between ourselves, I imagine that I shall have to carry on operations on a much more extended scale than you suspected; but I am well prepared for every thing.

FROM COL. WILKES TO MAJOR MUNRO.

Fort St. George, 10th March, 1800.

MY DEAR MUNRO,

I have reason to be highly flattered by the motive of your letter; because I am a profligate, and because you cannot help yourself, _noscitur à socio_; and if you have need of such people, you can yourself be little better than one of the wicked. There is something so pastoral and plaintive in your lamentations of "wasting your sweetness in the desert air," that no lover of music or poetry could be accessory to silencing the strain. You, however, address yourself to me as a serious man, _like yourself_, and in that capacity, although I might be justified in laughing at your distress, I will have the mercy to tell you most soberly, that I shall secede from the confederacy, whenever I find a disposition to make you a prisoner for life in the jungles, contrary to your own consent.

In the mean time, you are pretty certain of one of the steps in the military line which you enumerate: Home will never return, and the Mornington must bring accounts of his resignation, and of your becoming better qualified for the grey down on your cheeks. Cuppage's retirement must be announced by the same opportunity. At present I do not know of any authority sufficient to justify Go-
vernment in filling up his vacancy. Frissell is a Scotch cousin of mine, and a very promising boy; I recommend him to your fatherly protection.

England is a good place enough for a man who has abundance of guineas; and as a recommendation to the jungles, I can tell you with great truth and sincerity, that I advise no man from India to go thither with the boyish cant of content on a little; rural felicity, the exiguum rus, the cottage, and the balderdash. We have all attained habits that are at direct variance with these doctrines, and there is nothing which disgusted me so much as the littleness, which is absolutely necessary, if you desire to keep out of gaol. I therefore desire, most earnestly to keep in feather in this country, until my plumes are well-grown. I am at this moment engaged in a discussion with regard to Horace's ode,

"Hoc erat in votis, modus agri
Non ita magnus.

Which I say the critics have blundered, parens being the word; but as you are planning a small collectorship, I suppose you will join with the critics.

What can I say more? continue to rejoice me with your serious letters.

Ever truly yours,

W. Wilkes.

FROM COLONEL WELLESLEY TO MAJOR MUNRO.

Camp at Hoobly, Oct. 6th, 1800.

MY DEAR MUNRO,

I have received your letter of the 27th September. I have been ordered by Government to remain for some time in this country, and I have come here in order to eat rice, which I propose to draw from the borders of
SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Soonda, without using any brought from Mysore by my Bunjarries. You will, therefore, perceive the necessity that my Bunjarries should return to me to the Northward; but I am not in a hurry about them, and it does not much signify if they do go to Cundapore and Mangalore to receive their loads.

I fancy that you will have the pleasure of seeing some of your grand plans carried into execution; all that I can say is, that I am ready primed, and that if all matters suit, I shall go off with a dreadful explosion, and shall probably destroy some Campoos and Pultans, which have been indiscreetly pushed across the Kistna; that is to say, if the river remains full.

I have written to Colonel Close about your money, which I shall want. The only reason why I cannot get it is, that you are obliged to keep enough in your hands to pay the troops in Canara, &c. till January. I have written to desire that a sum of money for that purpose may be sent round from Madras, in one of the ships of the squadron; and whatever sum I hear that they will send, I will draw an equal one from you; that is the only mode that occurs of procuring the supply of money which I shall want in December.
CHAPTER IV.

Ceded Districts.—Correspondence with Mr. Cockburn, Colonel Read, General Wellesley, The Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, and his Relatives.

TO MR. COCKBURN.

Timmanairpet, 7th Jan. 1801.

DEAR COCKBURN,

I received your birthday letter a few days ago, on my way from Cumbum to this place. I had, you may suppose, anticipated the orders of the Board about settling with the Rayets of the Polligars, but I do not make it a matter of favour but of right. I insist on the Polligars attending in the same manner as Potails, and you may depend on my reducing them to more complete subordination than has ever yet been done in any part of your dominions. If General Campbell is not interrupted, but supported as hitherto by Government, he will in two or three years so perfectly subdue them, that there will never be any serious commotion in the Ceded Districts in future times. With respect to permanent tranquillity, I think it will very soon, in a great measure, be established; I am, however, just now engaged with two Polligars, usually called Jolliwars in Cumbum. They will commit some depredations, but their followers will probably be dispersed in a couple
of months: besides them there are two other Polligars to be expelled, which will not be difficult, but must be deferred till matters are settled in Adoni. I have already told you, that I regard what has happened there, rather as the effect of private animosity, and the spirit of assassination which was licensed by the Nizamites, than of any design of opposing Government. I shall reach Adoni about the 20th, and I hope that in two or three weeks after everything will be restored to order. The Polligars there are very insignificant; I do not believe that they have any hostile designs, and even if they had, they have not the means of making any serious resistance. What happened at Ternikull was one of those unlucky accidents which must now and then be expected in all military operations; the same army which defeated Hyder at Porto Novo, was only a few days before repulsed from the Pagoda of Chillobrum, after entering the gate.

There has been a very great increase of cultivation this year, a greater than will ever be in any succeeding one, because it can never be again encouraged by so low a rental as that of 1210, and because part of it is merely what would have been cultivated last year, had the Rayets not fled to avoid the extortions of the Nizam's officers. Our success will depend less upon revenue regulations, than upon the instant exertion of military force wherever it is necessary, and the total subjugation of all Polligars; an object to which I must yet, for some time, give more attention than to revenue. You see in Canara and Malabar the contrast between having a country immediately under government and being overrun with Rajahs. Had ..., as was at one time proposed, gone to Canara, he would undoubtedly have introduced the Malabar system there. You would have had the Rajahs of Neliserum, Coomlah, Vittel, and some other petty chiefs in possession
of all the country south of the Mangalore river, and the Soonda and Bilghee Rajahs masters of all the districts above the Ghauts, and of all below to the Northward of Gokurn. —— wrote me frequently on the subject of restoring the Rajah of Soonda, and when he found that I paid little attention to his arguments, he wrote to Bengal. If he went so far, there can be no doubt of what he would have done as Collector of Canara. He would have spoken sentimentally of the attachment of the exiled Rajahs to the British Government—of the love of the Canarins for their ancient Princes, and of the impossibility of establishing the authority of Government, unless by restoring them to the ardent vows of their subjects and their long lost dominions.

TO COLONEL READ.

Hundi Arrantpoor, 16th June, 1801.

DEAR READ,

I have often been thinking of writing to you, but I have led such a life these two last years, that I have been obliged to give up all private writing, and I should hardly have begun again just now, if your old Gamashah, Hummunt Row, had not made his appearance the other day as an Umedwar, and told me that Narnapah, by the blessing of God and your Dowlet, were in good health, which I thought you would still be glad to hear: he says that both of them were heyran and perishan with the climate of Madras, and that Narnapah got chopped lips and a sore mouth, and slavered about a pucka sear a day. The old gentleman is now with Mr. Stratton, investigating the state of the revenue in the Calastri and Venkutghury Pollams. Your friend, Alexander Read, who is now Collector of the Northern division of Canara, has, I imagine, long ago described that country to you. To a revenue
man, it is by far the most interesting country in India, and had it not been for the confinement during the five months' monsoon, I never would have left it. All land is private property, except such estates as may have fallen to the Sirkar from the failure of heirs, or the expulsion of the owners by oppression, under the Mysore government. By means of a variety of Sunnuds, I traced back the existence of landed property above a thousand years, and it has probably been in the same state from the earliest ages; the inhabitants having so great an interest in the soil, naturally adopted the means of preserving their respective estates, by correct title-deeds and other writings. Besides the usual revenue accounts, all private transfers of land, and all public Sunnuds respecting it, were registered by the Curnums, who, as accountants, are much superior to our best Mutsiddies. In consequence of this practice, there is still a great mass of ancient and authentic records in Canara. I made a large collection of Sunnuds, with the view of endeavouring to discover when land first became private property; but I was obliged to leave them all behind and abandon my design. Several of them were reported to be older than Shaliwahan, but I had not time to ascertain this fact: among the very few that were translated, the oldest was, I believe, in the eighth century; from which it appeared, that there was then no Sirkar land; for the Sunnud, which was for the endowment of a pagoda, states that the government rent of such and such estates is granted to the Brahmins, but the land itself is not granted, because it belonged to the landlord. All Enamdars, therefore, in Canara, are merely pensioners, who have an assignment on a particular estate; they have not even a right to residence upon the estates from which they draw their subsistence. Were they to attempt to establish themselves, the owner would eject them with very little ceremony. The antiquity of landed property, and the
sharing it equally among all the male children, has thrown it into a vast number of hands. The average Sirkar rents of estates is perhaps twenty or twenty-five pagodas, but there are some which pay near a thousand. The average of the Sirkar rent is about one fourth of the gross produce; but, on many estates, not more than one sixth. Litigations are endless in a country where there are so many proprietors; and Punchayets are continually sitting to decide on the rights of the various claimants. Landed property being thus the subject of discussion among all classes of Rayets, every thing relating to it is as well understood as in England. The small landlords are probably as comfortable as in any country in Europe. The never-failing monsoon, and the plentiful harvests of rice, far beyond the consumption of the inhabitants, secure them from ever feeling the distress of scarcity. Rents are therefore easily collected—no complaints about inability—no absconding at the close of the year. Even after all the disturbances of a civil war, I had not a single application for remission, except from one or two villages near Jumalabad, which had been twice plundered by the garrison; and in this case they paid the money before making the demand, saying, that unless it was returned, they could not replace their stock of cattle, so as to carry on to the usual extent the cultivation of the ensuing year. I often felt a pleasure, which I never have experienced in any other part of India, in seeing myself at the time of the Jummabundy, under the fly of a tent, among some large trees, surrounded by four or five hundred landlords, all as independent in their circumstances as your yeomen; I could not help observing on these occasions the difference that good feeding makes on men as well as on other animals. The landlords of Canara are, I am convinced, fatter in general than those of England. I was sometimes tempted to think, on looking at many who had large estates, and particularly at the Potails, that they had
been appointed on account of their weight. Many of them were quite oppressed by the heat, when I felt no inconvenience from it; and they used to sit with nothing on but their blue Surat aprons, their bodies naked, and sweating like a corpulent Briton just hoisted from a Masulah boat on the beach at Madras; but their labourers were as miserable-looking peasants as any in the Carnatic. In Canara there is already established to our hands all that the Bengal system, supposing it to succeed according to our wishes, can produce in a couple of centuries—a wide diffusion of property, and a permanent certain revenue, not only from the wealth of the inhabitants, but also farther secured by the saleableness of land. What a wide difference between that province and our late acquisitions here, where land is of even less value, and the Rayets more unsettled than in the Baramahl. You will be surprised to hear of the revenue being so much below the schedule of Ninety-two. This has been occasioned by the ravages of the allied armies of horse and Bunjarries in Lord Cornwallis’s war; by the oppression of the Nizami’s Government, and by their having been overrated. The settlement this year is one million one hundred and two thousand pagodas, exclusive of village servants. It will probably be twelve and a half lacs next year, and may in four or five years get to fourteen and a half or fifteen lacs. Brynyanpilli continues in Jageer to Assud Alli, and Canoul is to pay through the Nizam for two years, and then be transferred to us. This is at his own request; and I suspect that when he is made over to us, he will not be able to pay his two lacs of rupees peshcush. The country is overrun with Polligars: I have between thirty and forty who send me Vakeels. They are not confined to one corner, but are in every district. I am trying, with the help of Dugald Campbell, General of Division here, to get rid of as many as possible; but it will
take some campaigns to clear them out. Were I to labour as much as ever you did for seven years, there would not be so much order and system as you had in the Baramahl the first year. This reflection makes me sometimes wish that I had never entered into the revenue line at all. All the drudgery you suffered was comfort to what I am obliged to undergo, for without it there would be no getting on. You had a small society in your family, and occasional visitors, besides your gala-days, when all the society were assembled; and you had the cheering prospect of the country improving under you—but I have none of all this. I have not had one holiday since I entered Cànara, going out after four o'clock to dine and escape a night cutchery was the greatest indulgence I ever had there: I have still less here, and I see no chance of getting more. I am usually seated before eight in the morning, and never stir till sunset, often not till dark, besides a meeting to hear letters at night. This is not for one or two weeks, but for months together; and if it has not made me blind, as you said you was, it has done worse, it has given me the staggers, for I often reel when I get up as if I were drunk. As to company, I don't see an European in three months. I have got four deputies, but they are at Cumbum, Adwa-ni, &c. their different divisions. Some of them will do, but others are good for nothing but to exercise my patience, which is nearly exhausted. I am very sorry I ever left the Baramahl, and should be very happy to be there again at this instant as your assistant, receiving a letter of twenty sheets of queries to answer. James George is the only old stander there; he has made some new erec-
tions, and completed his arrangements by taking a wife—Miss Johnson, daughter of a former counsellor, who is said to be accomplished. But Kishangury is no longer a mili-
tary station, and will be as solitary almost as Pinagur.
Futty Khan, Irton, and Noble, are the only old canibals in
this quarter; I have seen none of them since January. Futty, ever since his campaign against Dhoondheah, has been a prodigious rider; he makes nothing of a few hundred miles, and is now trotting up from Madras. I know nothing of your other friends. Dugald Campbell, as I have told you, commands here; Stevenson, Malabar and Canara; Colonel Wellesley in Mysore; and though last not least, your old staff Pop Munro, at Gurrumcondah, where, though only temporary, he plays the Commandant in a very respectable manner. Simmons is Collector of Seringapatam. I hope I shall hear from you after you have run your rig, and made your debut at all celebrated places of business or amusement. Let me know how you like the change upon the whole, and what you think of the Coories and Loogwassis in your neighbourhood. If ever you visit Glasgow, I trust you will call on my father; he will be very happy to see you, and he will ask more questions perhaps than you will be able to answer. You will find no spot in Scotland so naked as the Ceded Districts, where there is hardly a tree to be seen from Penimecondah to Adwani. Gurrumecondah is something like the Baramahl, but has more topes and tanks. Cumbum has also a great deal of wet grain; but all the other districts have little else but dry grain. I suppose you have ere now encountered Arthur Young, and had some debates with him on Sagwulli* and Tuckawi.† I dare say he never saw buffalo-horns growing; and he would probably, after all his rant about turnips, make but an indifferent collector. Give us your opinions on all the wonders you see.

Yours, ever truly,

Thomas Munro.

* Cultivation. † Advances made to enable the people to cultivate.
FROM MAJOR MUNRO TO COLONEL WELLESLEY.

Anantpoor, 20th July, 1801.

DEAR COLONEL,

HAVING to-day answered an official letter from Ogge, which ought to have been done long ago, I now venture to offer you my congratulations on your return to Mysore. You have probably heard from Colonel Close, or Purneah, that many of your old friends who served under the King of the World, are now lurking in the villages of Sondoor, Ballari, and Cumpli,—report makes them above a thousand. I am now endeavouring to ascertain what part of this number is in the Ceded Districts; but after having effected this, I am in some doubt respecting the mode of proceeding. It would not be prudent to disturb them without a force at hand to secure them; General Campbell is now in the Cuddapah province, and will probably be there some months; but if we wish to seize any of the chiefs, it should be done before the end of August, while the river is full. There is, however, another difficulty, most of them are in Sondoor, and while they are safe, it would be doing nothing to lay hold of the few in our territory.

It is a point deserving some consideration, whether we ought to let them alone or not; but as nothing can be done without a few cavalry from Mysore, I must leave the matter to your judgment. Supposing we had secured the fords and boats on the Toombudra, they might easily escape to Sondoor. I wish we had that vagabond, Vinkai Row, out of it; for it is a sanctuary in the heart of our country for all kinds of banditti. I hope Cottioli continues quiet; you have still the Bheell-man to reduce.
Sir Thomas Munro.

Now that we have got rid of mad Paul, I trust we shall manage Abdulla Menow.

Believe me, dear Colonel,

Yours, very truly,

Thomas Munro.

To Colonel Read.

Chitwagh, 28th September, 1802.

My dear Read,

It gave me great pleasure to see, under your own hand, the 30th July, 1801, that you were getting better, and that you enjoyed the English summer, which I hope is a prelude to your also enjoying the winter. Your account of the expense of housekeeping alarms me, for I have not the smallest chance of being master of 3,000l. a-year, unless I were to stay in India until I could not see my way home, and then I should never be able to manage an excursion with you to Madras—how that place runs in my Indian head—to France, I meant to have said. I would give a great deal to be there at this present moment with you, that we might see how Buonaparte makes his bundobust, and how he sumjayeshes his Rayets. But before I can possibly get home, you will have either returned to India, or entered upon some plan of life at home; and then it will be as difficult to carry you to the Continent, as it was formerly to carry you from Tripettore to Raycottah. If I do not find my bones too stiff, I shall probably go home over-land, and when I reach the confines of Europe, I shall begin to look out sharp for you in every fashionable hotel; so, if you see me, I hope you will make yourself known, for it is very likely that, with your English costume and blooming cheeks, I shall not recognize you. My meagre, yellow, land-wind visage,
will readily tell who I am. You have now been between two and three years at home, and have, I imagine, by this time resolved upon your future operations. If you mean to return to India, I hardly know any situation after that which you have held that would be worth your acceptance, except the Government itself. After it, the most eligible would be the command and collection of the provinces south of the Colleroon. If you stay at home, do you mean to turn country gentleman, and plant topes and dig nullas? or do you intend to become an active citizen, and endeavour to get into the Direction? I wish you were there, that you might endeavour to support some of your old friends. G——, according to report, is likely to lose his collectorship. I have only had one letter from him on the subject, and it is in such general terms that it does not enable me to form any judgment of the question. The report is, that the Board thinks that he was precipitate in his settlement of the Carnatic; that it was much too low, and that he trusted too much to your old friend, Lachman Row. G—— says, that he made it low on purpose, with the view of being the better able to raise it hereafter. I shall be extremely concerned if he is removed, not only from my regard for him as an old friend, but because I am afraid that his marriage, after his long revenue life, has left him but little before the world. I think it hard, too, that a man should be removed merely for an error in judgment—censure would, I think, have been sufficient. You will observe, too, that his error is on the right side of the question. G—— says, that he is accused of not having extended the benefits of his low settlement to the cultivators; but, with the exception of Letcheram, and; perhaps, a few other instances, the head Potails have been the renters, and their profits will in the end go chiefly to cultivation; but before this reaches you, Cockburn will be at home, and you will get the whole story from him. You
will, no doubt too, fall in with Corner and Cuppage, who have also got their topsails loose. Corner, I suppose, you will find in the upper gallery at Drury Lane, calling out for music, and Cuppage in a chop-house.

It is needless to tell you how I pass my time; for you know well enough what kind of life that of an itinerant collector is. I have all the drudgery, without any of the interesting investigations, which employed so much of your time in the Baramahl. The detail of my own division, near ten lacs of star pagodas, and the superintendence of others, leave me no leisure for speculations. The mere common business of Amildars' letters, complaints, &c. often occupy the whole of the day; besides, I am taken up an hour or two almost every other day in examining spies, and sending out parties of Peons in quest of thieves and refugee Polligars. I am also obliged to furnish grain for three regiments of cavalry, and the gun bullocks, and to transmit a diary every month to the Board, to show that I am not idle. My annual circuit is near a thousand miles, and the hours I spend on horseback are almost the only time I can call my own. The desolate state of the Ceded Districts, and the greater part of them having been so much overrated in the schedule of Ninety-two, give me a good deal of vexation; for the public, having been accustomed to see Tippoo's estimate exceeded everywhere else, they think it ought to be so in every instance, without making any allowances. The cessions of 1792 will never equal the schedule in my time. Those of 1799 will probably exceed it from fifty to eighty per cent. I had intended to have made my settlement this year about fifteen lacs of stars; but the total want of rain will force me to keep it thirty or forty thousand lower. I have just had a letter, dated the 18th, from Allick, at Harpenhilly, where he had come to meet Cochrane, one of my coadjutors. He is in good health, and very much pleased with his situation.
General Campbell has his head-quarters at Ballari. I told you in my last, I believe, that he had had great merit in clearing the country of rebels.

Yours, ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Punganoor, December 11th, 1802.

MY LORD,

The late occurrences at Poonah will, I hope, excuse my venturing to submit to your Lordship a few observations not altogether unconnected with the present aspect of affairs. The victory of Holkar, by reducing the influence of Scindia, and overthrowing in a great measure the Government of the Peshwah, seems to open a road by which your Lordship, ever watchful over the national interests, may, in supporting an ally, establish a subsidiary force at Poonah, and eventually accomplish the important objects of making Scindia relinquish the country to the eastward of the Jumna, and of disbanding every foreign corps throughout the Mahratta empire.

If the Peshwah can be prevailed upon to receive a subsidiary force, it would be desirable on many accounts that certain districts equivalent to their maintenance should be ceded to the British Government; for, without such a security, neither the payment nor the continuance of the detachments at Poonah could be certain for any length of time. The Mahrattas are more tenacious of their money than the Nizam; and the Peshwah, were his dispositions ever so friendly, would undoubtedly be extremely irregular in his disbursements; but were he, as is most likely to be the case, to change his mind with the improvement of his affairs, and to give himself up to the councils by which he has hitherto been guided, he would endeavour to get rid of
the detachment, and if he saw no other way of effecting it, he would withhold payment entirely.

As it is from his fallen condition alone that his acceptance of a subsidiary force can be hoped for, it would probably be easier to obtain along with it, than at any future period, a cession of country for their subsistence. The same distress which compels him to receive the troops, would induce him to surrender the provinces required for their support. The expenses of a detachment such as the Nizam now has, would, I imagine, be more than equal to the revenues of all the Mahratta districts west of the Kisnah and south of Suttarrah, together with the Konkan. The possession of these provinces, besides cutting off almost every intercourse by sea between the French and the Peshwah, by facilitating military operations in the centre of the Mahratta dominions, would give the British Government a complete control over the whole of the Deccan. Darwar, as I had formerly the honour of stating to your Lordship, might, by drawing rice from Canara, be converted into a grand depôt capable of subsisting the most numerous army for a whole campaign. This carriage is short, and as the Soonda jungles extend to within twenty miles of the place, a small body of troops would be sufficient to protect the convoys against the enemy’s horse. An army advancing now from the Ceded countries, or Mysore, must receive its supplies of rice and gram, not from the Northern districts, which yield very little of those kinds of grain, but from Gorumcondah, Penemcondah, and Colar. This line of communication is so long, that it could hardly be defended against an active enemy; and were the Mahrattas, in the event of hostilities, to direct their attacks against it, the army, unless it had other resources, would be reduced to the greatest distress; but if it had its granaries in Darwar, it could act in the enemy’s country, which would be the most effectual means of securing our own from invasion.
Hullihall might in some degree answer the same purposes as Darwar, and if there is any chance of hostilities, it might be highly useful as a depot.

The great strength of the Mahratta armies consisting in cavalry, and there being no important places in their dominions like Bangalore or Seringapatam, by the fall of which an enemy could establish its authority over the neighbouring provinces, it becomes a question how, in case of being forced into a war, we might subdue a part of their territory, so as to prevent them from obtaining any resources from it. Whatever may be the motives of the war, conquest must be the object; for there is no other way of saving our own country from devastation.

It does not appear that there would be greater difficulty in subjugating Mahratta provinces, than was experienced in reducing those of Mysore. Such strongholds as might require regular garrisons would easily be taken by the army; the numberless little forts and fortified villages, which would surrender without resistance, might be garrisoned by Peons, and placed under Amildars. The Peons of the country would offer themselves in abundance for this service, because they would be better paid than by their former masters; and their fidelity might be farther ensured, by choosing a proportion of their chiefs from that class of people in Mysore and the Ceded Districts. The merchants and other wealthy inhabitants would take up their residences in these places; the cultivators would likewise fly to them whenever an enemy came in sight; and though bodies of horse might spread themselves over the country, they would not be able to collect any money. If they attempted to destroy all the cultivation, except what was immediately under the protection of the forts, they would be constrained to retire from the want of subsistence. If they did not interrupt agriculture, the greatest part of the produce would be conveyed at night by the
inhabitants into places of safety; and though they would have plenty of forage, this would not satisfy them for the loss of pay, which would be diminished in proportion as the sources from whence it had been formerly drawn fell into other hands. They would fall back upon their main body, in order to get their arrears; and if they did not succeed, those that were natives of the conquered districts, would probably return to their homes, and be glad to serve as Peons, or in any other way in which they could obtain a livelihood.

The Amildars would be able to collect revenue sufficient to pay their Peons; and though they might not have it in their power to furnish considerable supplies of money or grain to the army, they would at least hinder the enemy from getting any. The army not being encumbered by a battering train, would move as rapidly as that of the enemy; for, though their horse detachments make long marches, their main body, with infantry, guns, and bazaars, cannot march faster than our own. As the Mahrattas would be incapable of stopping the progress of the army, and as the country in its rear would be secured when necessary by garrisons of regulars, and every where else by Peons, there seems to exist no reason why a permanent conquest might not be effected.

I have made these remarks upon the supposition of the possible contingency of the Company being engaged alone in a war with the Mahrattas; but if they were supported by the Nizam and other allies, the operations of their armies would be much more expeditious and decisive.

I have no authentic documents respecting the revenues of the Mahratta districts south of the Kishnah, but judging by the produce of those immediately bordering on Soonda, I do not believe that the provinces ceded to the Peshwah by Tippoo Sultan, in 1792, yield above three-fifths of the schedule estimate. They would, however, improve under
better management, and their political importance might in the mean time compensate for their deficiency in revenue.

When I consider how many better channels your Lordship must have for obtaining information upon all these points, I cannot conclude without apologizing for the liberty I have taken in offering my own opinions.

I have the honour, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Anantpoor, 28th August, 1803.

DEAR GENERAL,

Since replying to your letter on Savanore, I have heard of your brilliant and important capture of Ahmedruggar; war is therefore now begun, and if Scindia does not take flight or call for a peace, it may last long enough. If the Bengal army can act efficiently, it would greatly facilitate your operations; for it is in his Northern possessions that Scindia is weakest, and they might no doubt be easily subdued, if the Bengal army, instead of covering their own provinces, will only pass the Jumna, and avail themselves of all the advantages of an offensive war. If the Mahrattas will not come to terms, and if the war must go on, it might be of great use to your army to settle the districts that submit to it in such a way as to hinder the enemy from getting supplies from them, and at the same time to enable you to get as much as possible. This might be done by placing Peons in all the small forts and walled villages, and appointing a military Collector, with a small detachment, to manage them. He would be able to keep the enemy's horse out of the country, or to prevent their raising contributions; but he would still be able to collect supplies of grain and money, and to forward them occasionally to the army. I speak without knowing what arrangements may have been made respecting such coun-
tries as may be subdued, whether they are to be transferred instantly to the Peshwah or the Nizam, or kept in your own hands during the war; in the latter case, if you think that I could be of use, I am ready, but I must keep the Ceded Districts at the same time; it would never do to give them up, for the Mahrattas might suddenly make peace, and I should then be a Major with a company of Sepoys, the same command I had when I entered the service. I should have no difficulty, though absent, in collecting the revenues of the Ceded Districts, provided the enemy are kept out of them; the Mahrattas certainly have the means, if they know how to employ them, of continuing the war for a couple of campaigns; and in a protracted war an army will always find great advantage in settling, however imperfectly, the country in its rear; for it by this means increases its own resources, and diminishes that of the enemy. The revenues of Savanore are, I suppose, collected on account of your allies, if not, we might, I think, take possession. But if General Campbell's division is required to act offensively, he would not be able to spare any troops in that quarter.

Yours, most truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Anantpoor, 17th Sept. 1803.

DEAR GENERAL,

I was lately favoured with your letter of the 30th of August, and am happy to find that you approve of retaining the Wurde bullocks in the service. I should be glad to see you execute your threat of "striking a blow against those myriads of horse;" but I own, that I do not see how it is possible to be done; there might have been some chance of such a thing in July, when the rivers were all full, but when they are fordable, the enemy must be
very simple if they throw themselves into a situation where
they can receive any serious blow from an army of infantry. I
do not know what cavalry you have, exclusive of the
Company's; but unless you have enough to hazard against
that of the enemy at a distance from your infantry, it must
be their own fault if they allow themselves to be brought
to action, either by your watching or following their mo-
tions. If your cavalry is strong enough to attack theirs,
it will of course be practicable to force them to fight, or at
least, to give them a blow. I know nothing of the general
plan of operations, but I am convinced that they can only
be completely successful by making them as offensive as
possible, and only so far defensive as may be necessary to
secure supplies. If subsistence could be procured in the
enemy's country, it would perhaps be best to relinquish the
defensive altogether; taking and garrisoning the strong
places; occupying the small forts with Peons, and bunda-
busting the country, is a much more certain way of fight-
ing, than destroying, or dispersing an army of horse: they
might enter the Nizam's or Company's territory, but plun-
der alone would not compensate for the want of regular
pay, which they could scarcely receive if their own pro-
vinces were falling one after another. Scindia is weakest in
his Northern dominions, and the greatest impression could
therefore be made on him from Bengal; the Rajahs of
Jeypoor, Oudepoor, &c. would no doubt join any force
that would march to support them. But I fear that unless
you can obtain the direction of the movements of all the
armies, those of Bengal will be too cautious; that they
will be satisfied with the Dooab, which can make no more
resistance than the Nizam's Dooab, and that they will not
like to march into the heart of Scindia's country, lest his
cavalry should cross the Jumna and Ganges, and cut the
Bengal grain. If the Confederacy do not call for peace,
the campaign will be interesting, and I should be glad to
see it; and if you could find out any employment for me with your army, without losing my hold of the Ceded Districts, I should be obliged to you.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Raydroog, 14th Oct. 1803.

DEAR GENERAL,

I have seen several accounts of your late glorious victory over the combined armies of Scindia and the Berar-man, but none of them so full as to give me any thing like a correct idea of it; I can, however, see dimly through the smoke of the Mahratta guns, (for yours, it is said, were silenced) that a gallanter action has not been fought for many years in any part of the world. When not only the disparity of numbers, but also of real military force, is considered, it is beyond all comparison a more brilliant and arduous exploit than that of Aboukir. The detaching of Stevenson was so dangerous a measure, that I am almost tempted to think that you did it with a view of sharing the glory with the smallest possible numbers. The object of his movement was probably to turn the enemy’s flank, or to cut them off from the Ajunla pass; but these ends would have been attained with as much certainty and more security by keeping him with you. As a reserve, he would have supported your attack, secured it against any disaster, and when it succeeded, he would have been at hand to have followed the enemy vigorously. A Native army once routed, if followed by a good body of cavalry, never offers any effectual opposition. Had Stevenson been with you, it is likely that you would have destroyed the greatest part of the enemy’s infantry; as to their cavalry, when cavalry are determined to run, it is not easy to do them
much harm, unless you are strong enough to disperse your own in pursuit of them. Whether the detaching of Stevenson was right or wrong, the noble manner in which the battle was conducted makes up for every thing. Its consequences will not be confined to the Deccan, they will facilitate our operations in Hindostan, by discouraging the enemy and animating the Bengal army to rival your achievements. I had written thus far, when I received your letter of the 1st of October, and along with it another account of your battle from Hyderabad. It has certainly, as you say, been a "most furious battle;" your loss is reported to be about two thousand killed and wounded. I hope you will not have occasion to purchase any more victories at so high a price. I subscribe entirely to what you say about the movements of a Mahratta army; I have always been convinced that our own could bring it up. Their bazaar is, if any thing, more unwieldy than ours; and though their horse may dash on for a few marches, they must at last wait for it. Light troops are not fond of acting at a distance from the army, but the spirit of enterprize and the hope of plunder often increase that distance. The Mahrattas have long been on the decline, and have in a great measure lost their military spirit; the formation of regular infantry, by throwing all the severe part of service upon them, has deprived the horse of all their boldness and activity. It was the same in Tippoo's army: in proportion as he placed his dependence upon his infantry, the reputation of his cavalry, and with it their exertions, declined. But still Cummer ul Diu and Gazi Khan were more respectable officers than any of the Mahratta Sirdars; Meer Saheb, Cummer ul Diu's father, was the best of all their partisaps. He was in the Carnatic with a body of horse, was perfect master of all the open country, and kept our army in a state of siege while Hyder was at Trichinopoly. It is true, he had a body of infantry, but it was not so much the
presence of his infantry, as our having no cavalry, that enabled him to run over the country: we had about five hundred horse,—had we had two thousand he could not have done it. Had I not a very poor opinion of Scindia, I would have suspected his movements upon Hyderabad to have been a feint; his cavalry alone could have done nothing against the force there, supported by General Campbell. I should be more afraid of an irregular body of five thousand, under a daring enterprising leader, if they have any such, than of their main body. Five thousand might find subsistence without touching the fortified villages; the Nizam’s cavalry would probably keep together, and not follow them, but General Campbell would be able to come up with some of them; and the fear of this, even without your hunting them, will probably always keep them at a distance. I hope measures are taking to reinforce your army; you want an addition of at least three or four thousand men to enable you to push your victories. If Perron has been defeated, the great object ought to be to open a communication with the Rajpoot Chiefs; their own cavalry is able to meet Scindia’s, it is only his infantry and guns that alarm them, and these have already been pretty well settled. If you can find subsistence in the Berar country, you will probably be able to force the Rajah to a separate peace, and there will then be no great difficulty in Polandizing Scindia’s dominions.

I go to Belari in a few days, when I shall enquire into the affair of Bisnea Pundit’s village. I am, however, afraid we shall be able to make nothing of the Polligar, as he can dispose of his own jageer as he pleases. I cannot pretend to point out any employment for myself in your camp, but if you can find out any for me in which you think I might be useful, I shall be very happy to be called upon.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.
I have been alarmed at hearing a report of a congress to be held for the purpose of making peace with the Confederacy: I must own that I think it would be more politic not to receive any proposal until we have either taken, or the enemy put us in possession, of all the places we may think it expedient to hold. Scindia's disasters have come fast upon him at the heels of each other, and his army is, of course, much dispirited, as well as himself, and most of his principal Sirdars are probably endeavouring to secure service for themselves under some other chief: but the rumour of a congress will make them pause; they will see a hope of his being saved, and they will be encouraged to stand by him longer than they otherwise would have done. When an Indian prince meets with a reverse of fortune, he goes rapidly to ruin; there is no national spirit, no generous efforts to be expected from his followers; and he may therefore, by a little perseverance, be forced to capitulate at discretion. There never will be such an opportunity again for establishing our control over all the Mahrratta States, and we ought not to stop until we have accomplished all we can wish, even though it should cost us twelve or eighteen months' more of war. The field is entirely open to us; not a Frenchman in India, and little chance of our seeing any here for two or three years, for the Chief Consul will hardly in less time be able to drive Pitt and George from Windsor; and until that is done, he cannot send any more demi-brigades to give you another battle of Assaye. If we are determined to have peace, I hope that the terms will not be short of both indemnity and security. The Concan and Cuttack, the countries East of the Jumna, Delhi, and Agra, to make a provision
for the Emperor; the transfer of the Rajpoot Princes from Scindia's authority to that of the British Government, and the provinces between the Toombudra and Kishna, must all be added to our dominions: they are not more than Bonaparte's bagatilly in Europe, or than what is wanted to reduce Scindia within reasonable bounds. The Concan is unconnected with our other possessions, and may be thought less advantageous than additional territory in Guzzerat; but it may be advisable to have the command of the whole sea-coast, not only for the purpose of excluding foreigners, but also with a view to the great resources which may hereafter be derived from the monopoly of all the sea-salt consumed in the interior provinces of the Peninsula. Scindia, after all his losses, would still have enough left to render him, with good management, nearly as powerful as he was at the beginning of the war. He has, like Tippoo, weakened himself by reducing his cavalry, to enable him to increase his regular infantry. His infantry has facilitated his conquests against the Polligars and Rajahs who had none; but it has also facilitated his overthrow when opposed to us, for it obliged him to carry on the war by battle, instead of distant cannonades, and intercepting supplies. It would also be desirable to remove the Kurnoul Nabob, and give him an equivalent in the territory of Scindia, or the Berarman, and to give the kind of equivalent to the Nizam for the Dooab, which in its present state he would perhaps be very glad to exchange. If all this cannot be effected at present, the Confederacy will be glad to agree to it six months hence: if we take less, we shall deserve to lose what we have. The treaty of Amiens is a very good lesson to all negotiators who affect to relinquish advantages for the sake of conciliation, and the relations of amity, and I don't know what.

Believe me, dear General,

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.
I only wish I were near enough to talk over these matters with you, and in particular to explain the benefits that would result from sending my neighbour, the Nabob of Kurnoul, farther north.

TO GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Cawderabad, 28th November, 1803.

DEAR GENERAL,

I have received your letter of the 1st instant, and have read with great pleasure and interest your clear and satisfactory account of the battle of Assaye. You say you wish to have my opinion on your side; if it can be of any use to you, you have it on your side, not only in that battle, but in the conduct of the campaign: the merit of this last is exclusively your own. The success of every battle must always be shared, in some degree, by the most skilful general with his troops. I must own, I have always been averse to the practice of carrying on war with too many scattered armies, and also of fighting battles by the combined attacks of separate divisions. When several armies invade a country on different sides, unless each of them is separately a match for the enemy's whole army, there is always a danger of their being defeated one after another; because, having a shorter distance to march, he may draw his force together, and march upon a particular army, before it can be supported. When a great army is encamped in separate divisions, it must, of course, be attacked in separate columns. But Indian armies are usually crowded together on a spot, and will, I imagine, be easier routed by a single attack, than by two or three separate attacks by the same force. I see perfectly the necessity of your advancing by one route, and Colonel Stevenson by another, in order to get clear of the defiles in one day; I know, also, that you could not have recon-
noitred the enemy's position without carrying on your whole army; but I have still some doubts whether the immediate attack was, under all circumstances, the best measure you could have adopted. Your objections to delay are, that the enemy might have gone off and frustrated your design of bringing them to battle, or that you might have lost the advantage of attack, by their attacking you in the morning. The considerations which would have made me hesitate are, that you could hardly expect to defeat the enemy with less than half the loss you actually suffered; that after breaking their infantry, your cavalry, even when entire, was not sufficiently strong to pursue any distance, without which you could not have done so much execution among them as to counterbalance your own loss; and lastly, that there was a possibility of your being repulsed; in which case, the great superiority of the enemy's cavalry, with some degree of spirit which they would have derived from success, might have rendered a retreat impracticable. Suppose that you had not advanced to the attack, but remained under arms, after reconnoitring at long-shot distance, I am convinced that the enemy would have decamped in the night, and as you could have instantly followed them, they would have been obliged to leave all or most of their guns behind. If they ventured to keep their position, which seems to me incredible, the result would still have been equally favourable: you might have attacked them in the course of the night; their artillery would have been of little use in the dark; it would have fallen into your hands, and their loss of men would very likely have been greater than yours. If they determined to attack you in the morning, as far as I can judge from the different reports that I have heard of the ground, I think it would have been the most desirable event that could have happened, for you would have had it in your power to attack them, either in the operation of passing the river, or
after the whole had passed, but before they were completely formed. They must, however, have known that Stevenson was approaching, and that he might possibly join you in the morning, and this circumstance alone would, I have no doubt, have induced them to retreat in the night. Your mode of attack, though it might not have been the safest, was undoubtedly the most decided and heroic; it will have the effect of striking greater terror into the hostile armies than could have been done by any victory gained with the assistance of Colonel Stevenson’s division, and of raising the national military character, already high in India, still higher.

I hear that negotiations are going on at a great rate; Scindia may possibly be sincere, but it is more likely that one view, at least, in opening them, is to encourage his army, and to deter his tributaries from insurrection. After fighting so hard, you are entitled to dictate your own terms of peace.

You seem to be out of humour with the country in which you are, from its not being defensible. The difficulty of defence must, I imagine, proceed either from want of posts, or from the scarcity of all kind of supplies; the latter is most likely the case, and it can only be remedied by your changing the scene of action. The Nizam ought to be able to defend his own country, and if you could contrive to make him exert himself a little, you would be at liberty to carry the war into the Berar Rajah’s country, which, from the long enjoyment of peace, ought to be able to furnish provisions. He would probably make a separate peace, and you might then draw from his country supplies for carrying on the war with Scindia.

Believe me, dear General,

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.

Macleod is gone to join his corps in Cuttack; he might
be of great use here in managing the country, and I hope, that if Colonel Harcourt is under your authority, you will recommend to him to facilitate the execution of his military operations by employing Macleod as a Collector.

TO GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Rachotti, 6th February, 1804.

DEAR GENERAL,

I hear from all quarters that peace has been made with Scindia; I congratulate you on the conclusion of your brilliant and decisive campaign: I believe that no person, however sanguine, expected to have seen so speedy and fortunate a termination of the war. If we keep Cuttack, and the countries east of the Junna, we shall be well paid for our expenses. When the terms are published, I do not wish to see an honourable peace, like that of Amiens, but a successful one, which I have no doubt you have dictated. It would be desirable to make some new arrangements with the Peshwah, for the original treaty, calculating by the schedule of Ninety-two, would only give us a part of Savanore, not extending beyond Dumbal and Sirhitty. That country is greatly overrated, and will not yield two thirds of the estimate, and our frontier is a bad one. If we cannot reach the Malpurbah, we ought, at least, to run up to Guddick Noolyond, and thence to Hullihall. But whatever the boundary may be, the cession can only be made valuable by putting down all authority except that of Government.

I formerly mentioned Macleod to you as the fittest man for that purpose, but he is now Collector of Arcot. After him, I think Major Graham is the man best qualified for such a situation. I have not heard how he has managed at Ahmednuggur; the state of the country probably gave
him no opening to be of much service in the revenue way, and he may therefore have been disabled from furnishing such supplies for the army as you might have expected. If any thing of this kind makes you doubtful as to his being a fit person to manage a new country, I can only say that it would be in much worse hands under a civil servant. If you mean to dispose of Graham any where else, then I see no resource but your recommending me to Savanore, or it to me.

Now that the war is over, I hope that you will think of some general plan for the defence and security of our extensive dominions. Notwithstanding our successes, it is evident that our armies in the late war were not sufficiently numerous. Had Holkar taken a decided part against us, or had the French been able to land a strong detachment, our difficulties would have been so much increased, that I doubt if we should have made any conquests. We met with no disaster, but had we lost a detachment, or had one of our divisions been defeated—a thing though very unlikely yet not impossible—the difficulty of supplying the immediate loss of the men, the effect which such an exploit would have had in encouraging many of the inferior Mahratta chiefs to act against us—encouraging our own tributaries to rise and interrupt our communications, and in inspiring the Confederacy with confidence, would altogether have formed so many obstacles, as to render the issue of the contest very uncertain. We cannot expect that the French are never to have a fleet, and that they are never to be able to land a force in India, nor ought we to imagine that we are never to meet with a reverse of fortune in the field against a Native power; our army should be such as to enable us to meet either of these events without any serious danger; this was not the case in the late campaign. Not only your own army, but that of General Campbell, ought to have been
SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

considerably stronger; I will not say that you might have
been defeated at Assaye, but you will probably allow, that
we have sometimes had, and may have again, generals
who might have lost such a battle, and the immediate
consequence of such a misfortune would be the transfer
of the war to our own provinces.

Believe me, dear General,
Yours most truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

Ten thousand Wurde bullocks ordered with rice to your
army, will march about the 15th instant, from Gootty, if
not countermanded. I do not know that you are perfectly
secure against a renewal of hostilities, and shall there-
fore let the convoy go on; but I have apprized the Com-
mander-in-chief, that he may order as he thinks proper.

TO GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Muddanpilly, 20th February, 1804.

DEAR GENERAL,

I read yesterday, for the first time, with great
satisfaction, your treaty with Scindia; your successes
made me sanguine, but it exceeds greatly my expectations,
and contains every thing that could be wished: more
territory can hardly be desirable until we have consolidated
our power in what we now possess. This cannot be effected
without an augmentation of every description of troops,
and it must be very considerable, if a subsidiary force is
established at Poonah, and if Scindia is simple enough to
receive that which you have endeavoured to tempt him
to accept, by stipulating to pay it out of the revenues of
his lost provinces. We want men; not only for foreign
wars, but to preserve tranquillity at home. Had the ene-
my been able to act offensively; had they penetrated into
the heart of our country, they would have been joined by
many of the adherents of former governments, and most of our feudatories would have openly, or privately favoured them, and we should then have discovered the weakness of our armies. We can hardly expect in any future campaign to see the same rapid successes as in the last; we may have a more formidable confederacy against us, and the enemy may come into the field with fewer infantry and more cavalry, less able to give battle, but better prepared to carry on a protracted and even an offensive war.

The Mahrattas, after all their cessions, have still as much territory as they had in the height of their power. They may therefore, if they can only remain quiet for some years, and agree among themselves, bring greater armies into the field than we have yet seen. It must be confessed, that it is most likely that no cordial union will ever take place among them. It is also probable that we shall have the Nizam and the Rajahs of Jaypore, Ondepore, &c. on our side. But our stake in the country is now so great, that nothing ought to be left to chance. Our armies ought to be placed upon such a footing as to enable us, without allies, to bid defiance to any confederacy that can be formed.

The Indian armies, in the different augmentations that have been made to them since the fall of Seringapatam, have received no proportionable increase of Europeans, and the European force is in consequence much below the proportion which it ought always to hold to the Native battalions. Though we have but little reason to apprehend any danger from our Native troops, yet it is not impossible that circumstances may induce them to listen to the instigations of some enterprising leaders, and support them in mutiny or revolt. After seeing what has happened among our own soldiers and sailors in England, we cannot suppose that it is impossible to shake the fidelity of our Sepoys.

The best security against such an event would be an increase of our European force, which ought to be, I think,
to our Native in proportion of one to four, or at least one to five. I see that you have kept Ahmednuggur and some other districts in the Deccan, but I know not whether, as permanent possessions, or with a view to exchange them for other territories. If the districts about Ahmednuggur offered any supplies, that place might be useful as a military station; it has the inconvenience of being insulated, but then it has the advantage of being far advanced, and by serving as a point of junction and support to our divisions at Poonah and Hyderabad, might facilitate our operations hereafter.

The Harponhilly man denies having any intention of resuming Bistnea Pundit’s village; at least, this is the information I have from the Amildar. I did not think it advisable to write the Polligar myself, because, in case he had refused to obey, it would not have been advisable to push him at present. But if Bistnea Pundit says that his people do not enjoy the Enam, I shall order the Polligar to give it up, whenever I am certain that hostilities are at an end, and that there is no other demand for the services of General Campbell’s division.

Believe me dear General,

Yours most faithfully,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO COLONEL READ.

Punganoor, 6th March, 1804.

DEAR READ,

I have only heard from you once since you left India, in the few lines that you sent me from Portsmouth. I have, I believe, only written you twice, owing partly to my being much occupied, and partly to my not being sure whether you were in England, or on your way back to this country. My secluded situation prevents me from hearing what is going on until long after it is known to
every one else, so that I can never communicate any thing that you will not have heard both earlier and more correctly from some others of your friends. Many causes have concurred to keep me at a distance from society, and to force me to travel about my districts alone, where I have more business of different kinds than I can well manage. The subordinate collectors having been all removed, and a complete new set given to me last year, has been a great hinderance to my operations; for it has obliged me not only to continue to retain the greatest part of the country in my own hands, but to look after for a time the internal management of the other divisions. I am also a kind of commissary and agent to the army, for almost all their supplies are drawn from this province. I should have thought nothing of it, had it been only to equip them at first starting, but the demand is increasing. Ever since November 1802, when the preparations for war began, I have never had less than ten thousand, and sometimes above thirty thousand bullocks in motion; and though peace has now been concluded, I am at this moment sending off ten thousand Wurde bullocks with rice to General Wellesley's army beyond Aurungabad. I have not only always had the purchase of the supplies, but the payment of most of the bullocks. This bullock business, together with sheep, boats, pay of boatmen, and I do not know what, and the endless disputes and correspondence about accounts, bills, &c. leave me very little time for revenue. For more than three years I have not had a single holy-day, and have very rarely risen from business before sunset. I could not have believed, had I not made the experiment, that it was possible to undergo such a constant drudgery; but, after all, my time is in some respects very unprofitably employed. You did infinitely more in one month in investigating the condition of the inhabitants, and the principles of revenue, than I do in twelve. Two very
bad seasons in this country, and all over the Deccan, have greatly augmented the usual difficulty of finding subsistence for the armies. In some parts of the Deccan there is a famine, and the scarcity here very nearly approaches to that calamity. The revenue of course has suffered greatly, and now stands at about fourteen lacs of pagodas, instead of sixteen, to which it would have risen this year, had the two last been but ordinary seasons. Now let us turn to other concerns, for you have already had enough of mine. You will be happy to learn that your two old deputies, Macleod and Graham, are both again Collectors. Macleod has probably given you himself his motives for quitting Malabar; his resignation occasioned great surprise at Madras, and gave, I believe, great offence to Lord Clive, who had selected him for the appointment. Lord Bentinck gave him, without any solicitation on his part, the collectorship of Arcot. Macleod thinks that Hurdis has befriended him in this affair. Graham accompanied General Wellesley's army in March last, as deputy-paymaster, and on the fall of Ahmednuggur was appointed by the General Collector of that province, and as it has been ceded by Scindia, he will probably remain there. I am not certain that it will not be exchanged for some other territory. I hope, however, notwithstanding its being insulated, that it will be retained as a point of junction for our detachments at Poonah and Hyderabad, and as an advanced station, from whence we may, if necessary, hereafter carry our arms beyond the Nerbuddah.

I shall not enter into any details of the late war with the Mahrattas, for not having been myself in the field, I could give you no information that you will not find in the newspapers. I never entertained any doubt that our success would be great, but I did not expect that it would have been so rapid, for I could not have believed that the enemy would have shown so little exertion as they
did. Our constant succession of victories is chiefly to be attributed to the Bengal and Madras armies having had a much greater body of regular cavalry than in any former war, and to the conduct of Generals Lake and Wellesley in availing themselves of this circumstance to make the campaign entirely offensive, to give the enemy no respite, and to push all their advantages to the utmost; but other causes also contributed greatly to favour our operations. The Mahrattas in general were much weakened by their long dissensions, and Scindia in particular had suffered heavy losses in his war with Holkar. The introduction of a great body of regular infantry, with a vast train of artillery, had made his armies unwieldy, and in order to keep up the foot, the cavalry were neglected. They were deficient in number and quality, and as they were considered as only a secondary corps to the infantry, they had lost all their spirit of enterprise. They gave very little support to their infantry in the different battles that were fought, and they attempted nothing alone. They fell in during the campaign with several convoys, and though the escorts were but inconsiderable, they did not cut off one of them. I have heard much said of the excellence of Scindia's battalions, and of the danger to which our power in this country would have been exposed, had he been permitted to go on much longer augmenting them. But my own opinion is the very reverse of this, for I think that he could have had no chance of success, except from his cavalry; and that as he must have reduced them in proportion as he increased his infantry, every addition to that part of his army would only have tended to weaken his real force. Had he been satisfied with Peons instead of battalions, and with a few long field-pieces instead of a cumbersome train of artillery, and had he applied the funds consumed by his infantry to the equipment of his cavalry, his army might not have been so able to meet us
in battle, but it would have been much better calculated than it was to have carried on a protracted, harassing, and doubtful war. His infantry was regular enough, but it wanted steadiness, in which it must always be greatly inferior to ours, from the want of a national spirit among its officers, and of the support and animating example of European regiments. At the battle of Assaye, the severest that took place in the course of the war, I do not recollect, among all our killed and wounded officers, one that suffered from a musket-ball or a bayonet, a convincing proof that the Mahratta infantry made very little serious opposition. Its discipline, its arms, and uniform clothing, I regard merely as the means of dressing it out for the sacrifice. Its numerous artillery prevents it from escaping by rapid marches; it is forced to fight, deserted by its cavalry, and slaughtered with very little loss on our side. Scindia, by abandoning the old system of Mahratta warfare, and placing his chief dependence on disciplined infantry, facilitated the conquest of the states of Polligars and Rajahs, whose forts and jungles might have secured them against his horse; but he at the same time disabled himself from maintaining a contest with us, for he reduced the war to a war of battles and sieges, instead of one of marches and convoys. As long as his battalions are not under French influence, by being commanded by officers of that nation, it is more our interest that he should keep them up than that he should disband them and raise horse.

The treaties lately dictated to the Berar Rajah and Scindia by General Wellesley, have given us a greater accession of territory than we ever gained by any former war. The revenues of Scindia's cessions are said to amount to one crore and sixty-seven lacs of rupees, and those of the Berarman's to about seventy. I can state this only as report, for I have not seen the schedules. The cessions of Berar are Cuttack, and all the districts inter-
mixed with the Nizam's which formerly paid a part of their revenue to both powers. You will see Scindia's cessions in the treaty which I enclose; they comprehend all the countries north of Jeypoor, Oudipore and Gohud, together with all his claims upon these Rajahships, which will now, under our protection, form a barrier between him and the Bengal provinces. We have only to put our armies on a better footing to be completely masters of India, and to defy all European and native enemies. I wish you were twenty years younger, and back again here to bundobust some of our new acquisitions. I hear different accounts of your health; some say that you are ill, others that you are well; I hope, at any rate, that you are better than when you left India; that you enjoy the climate of your native land, its society, and all the wonders of its commerce and manufactures. I have lately had a letter from your old friend Narnapah, telling me that you have sent him a magnificent present of silver atterdans, kuldumans, &c., and that he is praying Shuborore for the return of Huzzoret. I imagine that if you have any design of coming out again, that you will defer it till after you have seen the event of Buonaparte's threatened invasion, for until that is decided, the scene in Europe is much more interesting than in India. I shall in a very few years be rich enough to pay you a visit, but I shall be so old that it will hardly be worth while to go home—Khoda Hafizbad.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Hidadapore, 12th April, 1804.

DEAR GENERAL,

I am sorry to hear it reported that it has been in agitation to relieve the subsidiary force at Hyderabad with Bengal troops; I think there are many strong public
grounds for having no Bengal corps either there or at Poonah. It is easier to carry on war in all the countries south of the Nerbuddah from Mysore than from Bengal. Where troops are in all respects equal, there is still an advantage in having those who are to act together drawn from one and not from different establishments; but the Coast troops are perhaps in some respects superior to those of Bengal, they are more regular, more tractable, more patient under privations, and they have been more accustomed to military operations. If this is true, the argument against employing Bengal Sepoys in the Deccan becomes so much the stronger, for why bring them here when we have better on the spot? The Peninsula will perhaps always be the principal scene of war in India, and it would therefore be more advisable that the Coast army should be so much increased as to be able to meet all its enemies, than that it should be obliged to depend on succours from Bengal, which are always slow and expensive. The Coast army has not only to contend with the Native powers, but also with the French, and if any of our military establishments in India are to be greater than what is required for the ordinary exigencies of affairs, it ought certainly to be that which is exposed to the greatest dangers. We can hardly hope for any peace with France that will not leave her as formidable as she was under the monarchy; but she was then always able to bring a fleet into the Indian seas, and to land as she wished; she will be able to do so again, for as to her fleet being destroyed, it is a loss which we have seen by past experience can always be replaced by ten or twelve years of peace. She cannot now, it is true, have the advantage of a Mysore alliance; but still, in the event of hostilities in the Deccan, her landing three or four thousand Europeans upon the coast would form a powerful diversion. If you have not renounced all intention of leading the Coast army in some future cam-
paigh, you must wish to have it composed of such men as you commanded at Assaye, and I therefore hope that you will recommend an increase of the establishment.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Anantpoor, 24th May, 1804.

DEAR GENERAL,

I should have answered your letter of the 25th March, relative to Ram Rowe long ago, but I was to the Southward when I received it, and wished to make some enquiry about him in this part of the country before writing you. From what I can gather, I imagine that he is the son of the Sir Dessay a Desmook Narthing Rowe, of Gootty, who was taken with Mosari Rowe by Hyder, and either died or was put to death on the road to Seringapatam. The Enam lands, which were considerable, were at that time resumed, and the family have never since ventured to return to this country. The orders of Government to me were, that no claims should be admitted that were not authorised by Tippoo. It is therefore, you see, impossible that I can do any thing for him. If any particular view is to be answered by serving him, the surest way would be your recommending him for a pension. The restoration of his lands would be very impolitic, they would give him an influence in the country which he would always employ in favour of the Mahrattas. All Desmooks are Mahratta agents, and by being established in the heart of our territories they would form connections and prove very dangerous subjects. I wrote you some time ago about an increase of our military force, but as I see only one additional cavalry regiment, I fear that the want of money or some such cause opposes the measure, for I cannot
believe that you think our army as it now stands adequate to all the purposes for which it is required. I am convinced that all extra expenses arising from an increase of military force would be fully compensated by the improvements of the revenue, and the prevention of insurrection. At this moment there is no government in Malabar; I doubt whether we are secure in Tinnavelley against future disturbances. The Chittore Polligars, under Arcot, have paid no tribute this year, because they probably expected the Mahrattas; and had a thousand horse crossed the Toombudra, the inhabitants of the Ceded Districts would have been in array. A conspiracy has been lately discovered among the Zemindars of Adoni and the leading men of Gooty, Ballari, and Anantpoor, the object of which was to rise and join the enemy. Some of the conspirators and their papers have been taken, which leave no doubt of their intentions. But the Adoni Polligars, who were most active, must be overlooked for the present, because there is not a disposable military force of more than two companies of Sepoys in the Ceded Districts, and because hostilities must if possible be avoided in this quarter while the armies are in the field. I have called for the two companies, but it is only for the purpose of checking any attempt to rise; for if disturbances were once to begin, they might become general. I should be able, however, to suppress them by arming the loyal Rayets against the insurgents, but as this would suspend all cultivation, it would be more expensive than employing regular troops. Believe me, dear General,

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.
DEAR SIR,

My last letter to any of the family at home was, I believe, to Erskine, and I then told her that I should make a remittance for the purchase of Leven Lodge. Some letters, both from you and her, gave me reason to fear that it might be sold, and that you would be forced to leave it. I hope that I have not been too late, for my mother appears to be attached to the place, and has enjoyed better health at it than she has done for some time, and she would probably not be so well anywhere else. It would, at all events, be very distressing to her to be driven to seek another habitation, for even a better one would not please her so much. She would regret the loss of her walks in the garden, and of all the trees and shrubs she has been accustomed to take care of. Messrs. Harrington, Cockburn, and Harrington, of Madras, have promised to remit to you an order for 2,000/. sterling by the first opportunity. This money is meant for the purchase of Leven Lodge, but should that place have been unfortunately already sold, you can then buy any other which you think will be agreeable to my mother. I hope she received the two shawls mentioned in the enclosed bill, which were consigned by the Monarch, in March 1802, to Munro and Brown. My last letter from Alexander is from Agra, the 16th of March. His affairs are going on well, and he talks of being soon able to go home; but as he gives no particulars, I doubt his calculations.

In a former letter I mentioned the principal events of the Mahratta war, which was finished in December, by Scindia and the Berar Rajah submitting to the conditions which were imposed upon them. Their overthrow and subjugation was no more than what was to have been expected; but it was hastened by their own want of con-
duct, and by the enterprising spirit of the British general. Their feeble efforts in the field, and their frequent defeats, are to be chiefly ascribed to their having abandoned their ancient mode of warfare, and neglected their cavalry in order to maintain large bodies of regular infantry. This system was in one respect useful, for it enabled them to subdue many petty Rajahs and Polligars, whose strong holds, situated among hills and forests, would have bid defiance to cavalry; but in proportion as it facilitated their operations against these inferior states, it lessened their means of contending with one, the strength of whose armies lay in its infantry. Discipline might have rendered the Mahratta infantry as regular as our own, and had, in fact, nearly done so, but it still left it a lifeless mass; it could not inspire it with a national spirit, or with the spirit of honourable emulation. Their infantry had not, like ours, the advantage of being commanded by a body of officers anxious to maintain their own reputation and that of their country, and it had no regiments of European soldiers to set it the example of steadiness and intrepidity in action. Their cavalry, from the great expense of their infantry establishment, had been much reduced both in number and quality; and from being less employed, and less trusted on important occasions than the infantry, it had lost almost all its former enterprise and activity. The infantry was attended by a train of field artillery more than double the proportion that is usual in European armies—all this necessarily rendered the movements of the Mahrattas slow, and compelled them to decide the fortune of the campaign by battles and sieges, instead of harassing marches, ravages, and attacks of convoys, from which only they could have had any chance of success. Their artillery was excellent, for much practice had made their gunners very expert; and it was from it alone that we suffered any serious loss in the different engagements—it kept up a heavy fire while our troops were forming and ad-
vancing to the bayonets. Their infantry gave way whenever they were charged by ours, and being deserted by their cavalry, they were slaughtered almost without resistance. At the battle of Assaye, their cavalry, it is true, covered the retreat of their infantry; but this was owing to General Wellesley’s inability, from his loss in the action, and the absence of half his army, to pursue them. Had all his cavalry been present, very few of their infantry would have escaped from the field. The history of every battle in the war was nearly the same; a heavy fire of cannon while our troops were advancing to the charge, the Mahratta infantry giving way when they approached near, and their cavalry leaving the infantry to its fate. Their armies in Hindostan were still more unfortunate than in the Deccan, for there they were in a great measure disorganized at the beginning of the war by the desertion of the French and other European officers who commanded them, and by a part of their cavalry disbanding themselves. Scindia’s principal force was employed in the Deccan, where he commanded in person. He might have protracted the war somewhat longer by avoiding fighting, but the result would have been finally nearly the same, for he was not strong enough in cavalry to carry the war into our country. General Wellesley, besides having as large a force of regular cavalry as had ever been employed in any former campaign in India, had a body of auxiliary horse from the Nizam, a body of Mahrattas in the interest of the Peshwah, and a body of the same Mysore horse who had so often harassed our armies under Hyder and Tippoo. With all these horse he was able to meet Scindia’s in action, though he could not venture to disperse his own at any great distance from his infantry in pursuit of them. Scindia, with his ally the Berar Rajah, was perhaps able to have detached from fifteen to twenty thousand irregular plundering horse; but even this force would have been too
weak to invade our possessions. When it crossed the Godaveri, the Nizam’s army, in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad, would have followed and attacked it. If it escaped him and passed the Kismah, it would have been opposed in the Dooab by the army of observation under General Campbell, who had several regiments of regular cavalry with him, besides a party of Mysore horse at Hurryhurr.

Plundering horse are not fond of venturing without support into an enemy’s country, where they expect to meet with cavalry. They carry on their ravages boldly only when no resistance is looked for, or when they are followed by their main army, and can retire upon it in case of danger; but Scindia never was able to cross the Godaveri, and his irregulars therefore durst not pass into the rear of our armies. Scindia, without infantry, with his cavalry alone, made several attempts to pass that river, in order to carry the war into the Nizam’s and Company’s territories; but he was always obliged to relinquish his design by General Wellesley’s following him closely for several days, because his supplies would have been intercepted or overtaken. A great army of Mahratta horse cannot march so rapidly as is generally supposed; it is encumbered by the tents and baggage, and often by the women of its chiefs, by elephants, camels, and servants, and even when all these are left behind, it must still have a great train of bullocks for the carriage of provisions. It is to no purpose that the cavalry can march thirty or forty miles a day, they cannot find subsistence in an enemy’s country, and must at last halt for their grain bullocks, which cannot march so fast as the army which pursues them. The open countries of the Deccan and Mysore, as soon as the harvest is gathered in, present nothing but a naked waste to an invader. The inhabitants are all armed; the villages are all fortified, and cannot be taken without infantry. An army consist-
ing merely of horse can raise very few contributions among
them, it must therefore depend chiefly for its subsistence
on supplies drawn from its own country.

The treaties with Scindia and the Berar Rajah, give us
the greatest accession of territory ever acquired on any
former occasion: not having seen the schedules, I do not
exactly know the amount of the revenues, but I have heard
that the cessions from Berar are estimated at sixty lacs,
and from Scindia at one crore and seventy lacs of rupees.
We get the provinces of Delhi and Agrat, and all Scin-
dia's possessions to the northward of Jeypoor, Jondipoor,
and Gohud, a part of Guzerat, Ahmednuggur in the Dec-
can, and Cuttack, which connects the northern Circars with
Bengal. General Wellesley dictated the terms; but he
probably received some assistance in the details from John
Malcolm, who has since concluded a subsidiary treaty with
Scindia. The gradual conquest of India might have been
considered as certain when Bangalore was taken; for when
the Mysore power was broken, there was no other that
could resist us. Tippoo himself was incapable of making
any great exertions in the war in which he lost his life.
Several of the principal powers have already received a
subsidiary force, and there is little doubt that most of the
others will follow their example hereafter, either with the
view of defending themselves against external enemies or
rebellious competitors; for in Eastern governments the
death of the reigning prince is usually followed by a dis-
puted succession. Whenever they submit to receive a sub-
sidiary force to be constantly stationed in their dominions,
they have in fact lost their independence. They are influ-
enced by the councils of the British Government in India—
they become accustomed to its superiority—they sink into
the rank of tributaries—and their territories, on the failure
of heirs, or perhaps sooner, will form provinces of the Bri-
tish empire. I did not think of writing so long a letter
when I began; the thermometer is now at 106 in my tent, and the ink will hardly flow from my pen, so that it is time I should stop.

I am, dear Sir, your affectionate son,

Thomas Munro.

TO LORD W. BENTINCK.

Muddug Serah, 20th October, 1804.

MY LORD,

Your Lordship having on a former occasion done me the honour of permitting me to deliver my sentiments relative to the appointment of a successor to Major Macleod, I am thence encouraged to address your Lordship on another subject connected with the public services.

The Polligar of Poolcherlah, in the Chittore district, who is now in arms, has written to the Amildar of Gorumcondah; offering to surrender himself upon my cowle, but stating that he cannot accept of Mr. Cockburn's. He acknowledges that he has not paid his kists, but pleads in excuse that they were raised so high by Mr. Stratton, as to disable him from discharging them. This letter was probably written with the knowledge of the other refractory Polligars, and it was, I imagine, the intention of all of them to have made a similar application, if a favourable answer were returned. I directed the Amildar to inform him that, having no jurisdiction over him, I could grant him no cowle; but that I recommended his submitting without delay, and waiting upon the commanding officer of the troops, or the committee.

The motives which gave rise to this application were, no doubt, the impossibility of making any farther resistance, and the despair of being able to keep his adherents any longer together. The petty Polligars now in arms are incapable of making any serious opposition; they have but few followers, and these, from a long enjoyment of
peace, are very unwarlike. If the Polligars are convinced that it is the intention of Government to insist on their unconditional surrender, they will submit immediately; but if they see any reason to believe that certain points will be given up to them for the sake of quiet, they will persevere in their depredations. The measures that may now be adopted towards them may have very important consequences; for if a remission of arrears, or a reduction of the tribute already established, is allowed, it will be a signal to the Gorumconcdah Polligars to follow their example; but if they are compelled to submit at discretion, and, if reinstated, to pay up their balances, Gorumcondah will remain quiet. Disturbances among the Polligars of Chittore or Tinnavelley are not felt at a distance; but in Gorumcondah their effects would be more extensive, for they would put an immediate stop to the supplying the troops in the field with grain. Nine-tenths of all the rice, grain, and cattle, sent from the Ceded Districts to the army in the Doobab and to Hyderabad during the two last seasons, were drawn from Gorumcondah alone; and if the supply from that quarter were interrupted, the armies would be obliged to depend entirely on Mysore, from whence the quantity that could be obtained would not only be insufficient, but would, from the distance, be too slow in reaching its destination.

In Gorumcondah the Polligar of Ghuttim is the only person from whom I apprehend any danger. I have never yet seen him, for he has hitherto disobeyed every summons to attend at the annual settlement of his rent. All the other Polligars attend regularly, not only when summoned, but at all times, when they have any business, they come to me of their own accord from the most distant parts of the country. The Polligars of Harpenhilly and Punganoor, who are by far the most powerful in the Ceded Districts, require no summons, and the Rajah of
Annagoondy, whose ancestors were sovereigns of the greatest part of the Peninsula, visits me oftener than I wish. Some preparatory steps were taken in October 1802, in order to force the Ghuttim Polligar either to come in or to relinquish the management of his district for a pension; but the prospect of a Mahratta war rendered it expedient to abandon the design at that time. The conduct of this man would be of little moment if it could be confined to himself, but as it will undoubtedly extend by degrees to the rest of the Gorumcondah Polligars, it may produce the worst effects. He is too weak, and has too little confidence in the co-operation of his neighbours at present, to venture to take up arms, and he will therefore, probably, wait for the appearance of an enemy in this country, or some other favourable conjuncture, before he commits any act of hostility; but, in the mean time, he gives all the secret opposition to Government that his limited power admits of. He evades compliance with every order sent to him; he punishes the head inhabitants of his villages when they complain to me of his having extorted more than the fixed rent; he assists the Chittore Polligars with men and arms—and he has now, it is said, several of them under his protection. I have sent a party of Peons in quest of them, and it will be ascertained in a few days how far the report of their being with him is well founded.

The Ceded Districts, including Punganoor, but excluding the Kurnoul Peshuish, will, most likely, in four or five years, yield a gross revenue of seventeen lacs of pagodas. If the Ghuttim Polligar is removed, this revenue will be at all times easily realized, for there will then be no country of equal extent under the Madras Government in which its authority will be so completely established; but if he is suffered to hold his pollam, he will at some future period raise the neighbouring Polligars, and the revenue will be
consumed in reducing them to subjection. What may then be difficult, is now easy: his expulsion would probably be effected without the loss of a man. His adherents would desert him, except a few of his friends and relations who would accompany his flight, and in ten days his pollam would be as quiet as any part of the Ceded Districts. No great injury can result from suspending, for some time, operations against him; but should your Lordship, in the event of his still refusing to come in, and protecting the Chittore fugitives, deem it advisable to call him to an account, I shall report officially upon his conduct.

It is hardly necessary to observe to your Lordship, that there is a wide difference between the situation of the Polligars of Chittore and Gorumcondah. Those of Chittore have held a long uninterrupted possession of their pollams, while those of Gorumcondah were expelled, partly by the Mahrattas, and partly by Hyder Ally, between the years 1760 and 1770. Any claim they can have from ancient possession, if admitted, might be extended with more justice to the descendants of the Nabob of Cuddapah and the Rajah of Raydroog, whose expulsion is more recent; and would, in fact, if carried to its full length, leave the British Government not an inch of territory in the Ceded Districts. The Polligars, on the fall of Seringapatam, collected followers and seized their pollams. They were never acknowledged by the Nizam, whose officers were engaged in driving them out when the country was ceded, and who, though they made but little progress, would undoubtedly have expelled them all in a few years.

They now hold their possessions only from the forbearance of Government: a rigid adherence to my own instructions, not to allow any claims which were not sanctioned by Tippoo Sultan, would have dispossessed them all. They owe, at least, the return of obedience for the indulgence which they have experienced.
The connection between the Polligars of Chittore and Gorumcondah, will, I trust, appear a sufficient excuse for my troubling your Lordship with this long address.

I have, &c.

TO HIS BROTHER.

[On the military operations in the North of India.]

Muddanpilly, 21st Dec. 1804.

DEAR ALEXANDER,

I have received your letter of the 15th to-day, giving an account of General Frazer's glorious victory at Doog. It gives me great pleasure to see from the papers that ——— has acted so conspicuous a part on the occasion. It must have been very gratifying to him to discover his own eleven guns among those taken; but he must allow me to deduct them, which he can easily do. I hope he has got many more by this time; that he has taken Doog, and that part of the infantry which took shelter there, and that he will yet pay a visit to his old friend the Cottah Rajah. I see that your indignation against Holkar rises in proportion to his progress down the Dooab. You call him a prince and a chieftain at first, but when he approaches your indigo-house, he becomes a villain. I fear that my public spirit begins to decline, for I must confess, that I would rather that the villain with his gang had attacked the cantonment of Futtyghur, or even of Barraekpoor, than that he should have broken into your indigo storeroom. If this was his sole object in entering the Dooab, I hope that General Lake's victory will have made him give it up.

Yours affectionately,

THOMAS MUNRO.
DEAR ALEXANDER,

Chitweyl, 29th March, 1805.

I have received your letter of the 25th Feb. and admire the gallantry and perseverance with which both the Europeans and the Bengal army have returned so often to the assault of Bhurtpore; even if the report of the Europeans being dispirited is well founded, it is not to be wondered at; for I do not believe that any troops in Europe would have preserved their spirit under so many discouraging repulses as they have sustained. Their despondency will soon vanish—a little rest or any trifling success will reanimate their courage. General Lake's official report of the affairs of the 20th and 21st of Feb. makes the loss less than your account, and he says nothing of raising the siege. I should like much to be on the spot, to see how it is conducted; for one would think that there is either a want of skill or of artillery, for all the breaches are stated to have been narrow and steep, and it is therefore not at all surprising that the troops should have been repulsed. When a breach is bad and the defenders numerous, if they make any resistance at all, it is almost impossible to carry it. The General describes the assault of the 21st as having lasted two hours. Troops who could support such a contest, would certainly have carried the place, had the breach been a good one. I am afraid that your artillery have not been sufficiently numerous to make a proper breach, and to destroy the defences. Was there no possibility of making a lodgement in the breach, though the place could not be carried? The attacks lasted long enough for a party to have made a lodgement, but there might have been some insurmountable obstacle to such a mea-
sure being carried into execution, arising from the nature of the defences and the situation of the breach. I wish you could send me a plan of the place and of the attacks, and a sketch of the country between Agrah and the Mockundar Pass. I often consult your friend Hearsey's; but though it lays down Bhurtpore, every thing to the West and South is blank. I hope that the General will persevere in the siege, and if he is deficient in military stores, convert it into a blockade until he gets a supply. I see nothing gloomy in your situation, but on the contrary, every thing that ought to inspire hope and confidence. The repulses at Bhurtpore give me a higher opinion of the Bengal army than all their victories. We cannot expect that we are to carry on war without meeting any disaster, and that it should be quite a holiday work, in which every thing is to go on as we wish. I see nothing alarming in Meer Khan's irruption into the Dooab and Rohilkund. In our wars here, Hyder and Tippoo have always been in the heart of the Carnatic with a host of cavalry that nothing less than our whole army could face. An army of horse is only formidable when it can keep the enemy in check; when it cannot face his cavalry nothing is more contemptible. This is the case with Holkar; his cavalry can neither oppose yours, nor venture to attack any considerable detachment of infantry. It appears from your letters, that his infantry is all at Bhurtpore. He can therefore hardly be said to have any army at all; for his infantry is converted into a garrison, and his cavalry into a party of marauders. I see nothing to be apprehended from such an enemy; only persevere in offensive operations, and he must be reduced. I think Scindia will be too cautious to engage in a new war, but if he does, we shall prevent him from giving you any trouble.

Yours affectionately,

Thomas Munro.
CHAPTER V.

Colonel Munro appointed Chief Commissioner for the Revision of the Judicial System.—Correspondence with his Sister Mrs. Erskine.—The Marquis of Hastings.

TO HIS SISTER THE HONOURABLE MRS. ERSKINE.

Portsmouth, 5th May, 1814.

MY DEAR ERSKINE,

I am once more so far on my way to India. I went on board yesterday to look at our cabins. They are as well fitted up as can be expected, but the best cabin appears very small to any person who is not accustomed to a ship. Mine is large enough, but it is very low, not above five feet high, so that I cannot stand upright in it; and I must, after sitting some time, be cautious in rising, lest I should knock my head against the beams. I know from the experience of many a hard blow, that it will be some weeks before I learn that the roof of the cabin is lower than my head. The want of room is not what I most dislike in a sea-voyage; the long confinement to the same set of people, and the unvaried prospect of sky and water for several months, are much more unpleasant.

We came here on the 3rd, and were to have sailed on the 4th, but an order from the Admiralty has directed us to wait till the 10th for some Brazil ships; but as it is possible that fresh orders may be received to-night, directing us to sail to-morrow, I write while there is an opportunity
for it, for even if I stay here some days, I may not be able to get a moment to myself. You can have no idea of the confusion and bustle of an inn in a seaport town full of people going abroad; having nothing to do here, impatient to sail, and running about visiting, to fill up the time. I am already tired of this state of suspense, and wish we were fairly at sea. I was in this place thirty-five years ago, on my way to India, and much more impatient than now to reach my destination; for my head was then full of bright visions which have now passed away. I now, I am sorry to say, go out not to hopes but to certainties; knowing exactly the situation in which I am to be employed, what I am to have, and when I may return. This to many people would be very comfortable; to me, it is dull and uninteresting. I had more pleasure from my excursion of a few days to Paris, than I shall derive from a residence of two or three years in India. My inability to speak the French language with any kind of ease was a great inconvenience, and could I have remained in Europe, I would have gone to France, and lived entirely in French society until I was able to speak the language fluently. By going back to India for a short time, I become unsettled, I am neither an Indian nor an European, and am prevented from forming any fixed plan of life. But it is idle to talk of life when the best part of it is past. I hope that you will be as good a correspondent as when I was in India before. Direct to "Colonel Thomas Munro, Madras," and never send letters by a private conveyance. When I return, I hope I shall see more of Ammondel than I have done. Remember me kindly to Mr. Erskine and all the family.

Your affectionate brother,

Thomas Munro.
I left Madras in October, after a residence of a year, which is longer than I have been in any one place these five-and-twenty years. My wife accompanied me, and made a better traveller than I expected.

I am employed at present with the Collector of Coimbitore, in investigating the abuses which were committed under his predecessor. This has already employed us above two months, and another will be required to finish our work, when I must return to Madras.

Our time passes pleasantly enough. We live chiefly in tents, stay at a place ten days or a fortnight, and then go to another forty or fifty miles' distant. Our journeys are generally about fifteen miles a day, and at this season of the year the weather is fine and the country beautiful. Travelling days are always pleasant to me, and I do not care if I were to travel all the time I continue in India, but I fear I shall be obliged to stay chiefly at Madras. I wish myself home again, for I like to be either completely idle and my own master, or to have an employment that is important and interesting. There is no situation likely to fall to me in the country that I care about. There is but one I think of any consequence, and even that one in a few years would be indifferent to me. I shall, therefore, most probably, be leaving this country in less than two years; and I suppose, from having so long led a rambling life, I shall never be able to settle quietly anywhere.

I have this moment had a long visit from a Swami. This is a kind of religious Brahmin you have perhaps hardly ever heard of, for I do not remember meeting with any account of them in books on India. The officiating
priests of Pagodas, whom Europeans in general suppose to be at the head of the ecclesiastical establishment, are on the contrary an inferior class of Brahmins, who are regarded merely as servants of the Pagodas, and have no influence among the people; but the Swamis possess an influence not inferior to that of the Pope and his bishops and cardinals in the darkest ages. There are two principal ones, whose authority is acknowledged all over India; there are also several whose jurisdiction is limited to particular sects of Hindoos. The two principal have many subordinate Swamis, like cardinals and bishops, who in their respective districts settle all points of religion and cast. They have villages and sometimes whole districts allotted for their maintenance. All Hindoos treat not only the principal but their inferior Swamis with the highest respect; the greatest princes go out to meet them, and bow down before them. The Swamis do not marry like the Pagoda Brahmins, but must lead a life of celibacy and temperance, or rather abstinence. They have no nephews and nieces like the Swamis of Europe. Their abstinence is real, their diet is more simple than that of a peasant. They travel in state with elephants, palanquins, drums, and standards, but they amass no wealth. Whatever they receive they distribute as fast as they get it, and on the whole they are to the full as respectable as their brethren in Europe.

The old gentleman who has just left me, is a little thin man, whose appearance would never lead a European to suspect that he was a prelate. His only dress was a single piece of cotton cloth, one end of it wrapped round his loins, and the other thrown over his head, and a pair of wooden sandals. He walked into the tent with his sandals on his feet, without noticing me till he had got possession of a chair; he then drew his legs under him, turned to me, and talked away with great animation, but great gravity,
for almost an hour. The cause of his visit was to request my aid in preventing rents from being levied in certain villages by another Swami, until it should be decided to which of them they belonged.

I have been three days in writing this letter. The first day I wrote the most at Darramporam; the second day, yesterday, I got nearly to the bottom of the second page without interruption, and to-day I shall finish it in two lines more. I am now writing in my tent, after a short march, pitched in an open spot, surrounded by fields of luxuriant grain. You are shivering in your large rooms at Anmondel, and perhaps looking at your stream covered with ice. I hope I shall soon see its banks again. My love to Mr. Erskine. Many happy years to all at Anmondel!

TO THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.

January 1817.

Travancore, before its first alliance with us, had long been an independent little kingdom, secured by its remote situation, and the sea and mountains by which it was surrounded, from every enemy. One of our earliest political transactions with the Rajah was, I believe, a request by the Madras Government, about the year 1778, for a free passage through his territory to a detachment of troops to attack the French settlement at Mahé, which was granted. No farther intercourse appears to have taken place between the two Governments until the year 1788, when the Rajah, taking alarm at Tippoo Sultan's progress in Malabar, wrote to Sir A. Campbell, the Governor of Madras, requesting that four officers and twelve serjeants might be sent to discipline his own battalions. This document is dated the 19th June 1788, and is, together with
all the others to which I shall refer, inserted in the printed collection of Indian Treaties.

Sir A. Campbell in his answer, dated the 12th August 1788, declines sending the officers, as contrary to the system of the Company's Government; but offers to employ one, two, or three battalions for securing his country against any sudden attack.

The Rajah in reply, on the 28th of the same month, accedes to the offer, and desires to be informed of the expense of a battalion of Sepoys.

Sir A. Campbell in a letter to the Rajah, dated the 7th October, recommends that two battalions should be stationed in time of peace on the frontier of Travancore, at the Rajah's expense, and that if any additional force is required, it shall be at the Company's expense entirely.

The Rajah in his answer to the Governor, dated the 5th November 1788, agrees to receive two battalions of Sepoys at the estimated charge, and requests that some battalions of his own, which had for a considerable time been employed in Tinnavelley, may be sent back.

The Company's battalions, however, were of no use to the Rajah, for when Tippoo in the following year invaded Travancore, they did not act, and the Madras Government would have allowed Tippoo to complete his conquest, had they not been ordered by Lord Cornwallis to oppose him.

The next transaction with the Rajah, is the Pepper contract between him and Sir R. Abercrombie, dated the 28th January 1793, by which the Rajah engages to furnish three thousand candies accordingly, for ten years, at one hundred and fifteen rupees per candy, to be paid in warlike stores and money.

The cession of Malabar by Tippoo in 1792, and the placing of that province under Bombay, rendered that
government the channel of communication between the Supreme Government and Travancore, until the fall of Seringapatam.

On the 17th November 1795, a temporary engagement was concluded by the Governor of Bombay with the Rajah, by which the Rajah is to pay the expense of one battalion, to be kept in readiness to be sent when he calls for it, against external force. If he require more troops, he is to pay a sum equal to the expense of two battalions, but no more. The Rajah is to be liable to furnish one battalion of his own, at his own expense, to act under a British officer anywhere between Calicut and Madura.

A permanent treaty of the same date, viz. 17th November 1795, which was to be returned from Europe within two years, ratified by the Company, was received by the Supreme Government from Europe on the 18th May 1797.

By the 1st article, three districts ceded by Tippoo in 1792 to the Company, are restored to the Rajah.

By the 2nd article, the Company undertake to protect the Rajah from all foreign enemies.

By the 3rd, the Rajah is to pay annually, in peace and war, the expense of three battalions of Sepoys, one company of European artillery, and two companies of Lascars.

By the 4th, this force is to be stationed either in the Rajah's or the Company's territories as the Rajah may desire, and the Company to have no claim to any farther demand for war charges.

By the 7th, the Rajah is to furnish troops when required by the Company to serve between Madura and Calicut, at the Company's expense.

By the 9th, the Company are not to interfere in the Government of Travancore.

The Rajah is hitherto treated with on a footing of
equality as an independent prince. The case is very different in the next treaty, concluded ten years after, on the 12th January 1805.

The 1st article declares the treaty of 1795, to have been for the purpose of protecting Travancore against foreign enemies, and the present one to supply its defects.

The 3rd requires the Rajah to pay the expense of one regiment, in consequence of the Company's relieving him from the obligation of furnishing troops.

The 4th article stipulates that, if more force is wanted to protect Travancore, the Rajah is to pay a share of the expense.

The 5th, under the plea of security to the Company, provides for making regulations and ordinances for the collection of the revenue, or any branch of the administration, or to assume part of the territory.

The 6th provides that, if the Rajah does not within ten days issue orders for the transfer of the territory, the Governor-General may do so himself; but the Rajah is never to have less than one-fifth of the whole revenue, and two lacs of rupees.

The 9th stipulates that the Rajah is to attend to all such advice as the British Government may offer him respecting the management of his affairs.

The last engagement concluded with Travancore, by Sir George Barlow, had been mislaid, or could not readily be found when I left Madras, so that I have not seen it, but your Lordship knows perfectly the situation in which Travancore is now placed.

If it is asked, by what misconduct, or by what hostility, either open or concealed, towards the British Government, the Rajah has forfeited his rights as an independent prince? it would be difficult to answer the question.

I remember very well the alarm that was felt in 1788, at Tippoo's growing power; and that the alliance with
Travancore was regarded as a fortunate event, as the possession of that country by Tippoo would have endangered our Southern provinces. This alliance was frequently renewed, but always upon a footing of equality while Tippoo lived; but on the fall of this enemy of both states, the terror of whose arms had been the first cause of their alliance, and when the Rajah might reasonably have expected to be relieved from the whole, or at least a part of the expense of being protected against invasion, he finds himself compelled to make a virtual surrender of the dominion of his country to his ally.

If our present relations with Travancore are considered without any reference to the question of right, but merely as questions of policy, or economy, nothing can be more absurd. We have had a considerable force locked up there for several years, where it can be of no more use to our armies than if it were at Ceylon. This force has always consisted of a regiment of Europeans, and two or three battalions of Sepoys, with artillery, &c. and it must be occasionally augmented, whenever there is any disputed succession or internal disturbance. It is not a country through which an European enemy will ever think of attacking us; it furnishes neither horses, nor bullocks, nor tents, nor any of the means of equipping a force for the field. The French, when superior at sea, in 1782, and with their ally Hyder, master of the Carnatic, never thought of Travancore. If we look to economy, the troops should be withdrawn: the expense of keeping them there, and relieving and reinforcing them occasionally, is not covered by the subsidy. There can be no doubt, that the subsidy would be paid, if we had not a soldier in the province. It would be better to evacuate Travancore, and even to relinquish the subsidy, than to shut up a military force there. But if a subsidy is required, that of the treaty of 1795 might be taken, and the troops withdrawn,
and all interference with the internal administration or succession relinquished. The ruling party, or the successful competitor, in every revolution, would pay the subsidy gladly, to obviate the danger of the return of the British troops. The Travancore Government would become friendly, and for its own safety support us with all its means against every foreign enemy. In its present condition, it will always be hostile, and ready to join any enemy against us.
CHAPTER VI.

Southern Mahratta War.—Correspondence with the Governor-General.—Mr. Elphinstone.—Sir John Malcolm.—Sir T. Hislop.—Plan for the Campaign, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief.—Mr. Chaplin.—Private letters.

TO THE MOST NOBLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

[Soliciting military employment.]

January 1817.

The incursions of the Pindarries since I left Madras, rendering it probable that some offensive operations may be undertaken, I venture, in that event, to request that I may be entrusted with the Command of the Subsidiary Forces of Hyderabad and Nagpoor, or of such force as may be destined to act between the Godamy and the Ner-buddah. I am senior to any of the officers now employed in that quarter; I have seen as much service as any officer in the Madras army, having, with the exception of Lord Wellington's short campaign in 1803, been on every service with the army since June 1780, when Hyder Ally invaded the Carnatic. As the Pindarries are acknowledged by no Native power, I am not sure that Government at home may not have objected to offensive operations against them, and the districts in which they assemble.
Against native armies in general, defensive measures are always ineffectual, but more especially against Pindarries. The great Mahratta armies, though they move rapidly, must occasionally halt for their bazars, supplies, and baggage, which affords a chance of coming up with them; but there is no chance of this kind in the case of Pindarries, who move without bazars, and enter the country merely for plunder, without any view of conquest. They can only be put down by seizing the districts in which they assemble, and either keeping them, or placing them under a native government, which can keep them under complete subjection. Were our armies doubled, they would not be sufficient, on a defensive system, to keep the Pindarries out of the country. The force of the Pindarries is much increased by parties of horse, disbanded by the governments of Hyderabad and Nagpoor, who trust to our subsidiary forces to protect them, and by Scindia and Holkar, from inability to pay them. The evil might be in some degree lessened, by exerting the influence of the British Government, to induce the Nizam, the Peshwah, and the Rajah of Nagpoor, to keep up a respectable establishment of horse.

I shall conclude this address, with again venturing to solicit the appointment to the Command of the Subsidiary Forces; but if matters are likely to be accommodated without offensive operations, I have no wish for the present to join the army.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE, &c.

Camp at Darwar, 18th Dec. 1817.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive last night from Brigadier-General Pritzlen a copy of your letter to him of the 3rd instant, and of your letter to me of the 27th Nov. It
was probably the original of this letter that was lost by one of the two Peons who brought me your letter of the 1st instant.

I shall treat all the Jageerdars, except Gocklah, as friends. I have frequent communication with the Des-say of Kittoor, and have little doubt, both from the local situation of his country and other causes, that he is sincere in his propositions. I shall, however, put his sincerity to the proof in a few days, by calling upon him to aid us in expelling a party of the enemy from a small place in this neighbourhood. I have already got possession of a considerable number of places in this district, entirely by the assistance of the inhabitants, of whom nine-tenths at least are in our favour.

In my letter of the 14th instant, I mentioned that Purlusghur had set the example, and that all that the inhabitants had requested was, that they should not be transferred to any Jageerdars. I should have little doubt of gradually getting possession of all the territory south of the Malpurbah, by the help of the armed inhabitants, if the enemy had nothing to oppose to us but their garrisons. But as they are increasing the body of horse near Badauni, under Cossi Row, who may be expected to act immediately; and as we have no movable force while the reserve is at a distance, it may become difficult to keep what we have got. The two places mentioned in your letter would be of great use in securing our communications, and might be easily taken were the reserve near.

The Commander-in-Chief's instructions to me of the 19th ultimo, direct me to consider the Company's frontier as the first object, Hyderabad as the second, and the Southern Mahrattas as the third. It is evident that there is nothing to hinder the enemy, while the reserve is in advance, from collecting two or three thousand horse to the eastward of this, who, though they will not face our
troops, may attempt to pass the frontier and plunder the country.

This might be prevented by having a force, exclusive of the garrison of Darwar, of not less than a complete battalion of Sepoys, to move between the Ksnah and the Toombudra on whatever point it might be necessary; you will be able to judge whether the reserve ought to act with General Smith's force, or to return to the Ksnah. If it return immediately, we should soon get possession of what was necessary in the Carnatic, which by covering the Company's frontier, would leave that force more at liberty to act at a distance.

If the Peshwah continues to keep the field with the cavalry, it might be advisable to employ whatever infantry we could spare, after leaving a sufficient body to support our cavalry in the pursuit, and to cover our bazars and convoys, in the seizure of those places whose reduction would most distress the enemy. The war would be more likely to be brought to a speedy termination by reducing the strong places, as well as following the enemy in the field, than by limiting ourselves entirely to his pursuit.

As the division under General Smith is very strong in infantry, I trust that if the reserve is retained to act in advance, means will be adopted to send at least a battalion of infantry into this province as soon as possible.

I have, &c.

Thomas Munro.

TO THE SAME.

Camp at Darwar, 20th Dec. 1817.

SIR,

In my letter of the 18th instant, I omitted to mention that I had circulated proclamations in the neighbouring districts in the Carnatic belonging to the Peshwah
and to Gocklah, exhorting them not to pay any kists to the Mahratta officers, and to aid us in expelling them from the country. I should have taken this step at any rate, but it became the more necessary in consequence of the Sirsoobah having circulated notices that no farther cessions were to be reserved. I have held the same language as that recommended in your letter of the 24th Nov. to such of the servants of the Dessays of Kittoor and Nepawni, and of Chintamin Row, as I have met with.

There are a great number of little fortified places in this province, with garrisons of from thirty or forty to three or four hundred Peons. I have partisans in many of them, who, with the help of the inhabitants, will gradually expel those parts of the garrisons which are composed of men from the countries north of the Kishnah. But our operations will be slow and precarious while the enemy have in this quarter a movable force and we have none. If, therefore, a battalion of infantry could, without hinderance to more important measures, be spared for service in this province, it would secure the whole country south of the Malpurbah, cover the western part of the frontier on the Toombudra, and the communication between that river and the Kishnah, and would thus enable the reserve to act with more effect in camp.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL DYCE.

[Commanding the details of the army.]

Camp at Darwar, 26th Dec. 1817.

SIR,

I have the honour to enclose an extract from the Instructions of the Commander-in-Chief to the officer commanding the reserve, respecting the formation of that corps. As the detachment of Mysore infantry is mentioned
in every estimate of its force, I have applied to the Resident for the Mysore infantry to be sent to Darwar without delay. He informs me that he has received no communication upon this subject; the omission, I conceive, must have arisen from his Excellency's illness when at Hyderabad.

I trust that the necessary orders will be given for the advance of the infantry, and that a small party of Mysore horse will also be allowed to accompany them; a hundred horse, or any body from one to two hundred, would be able to render the most essential assistance to our operations in this quarter. I understand from the Resident, that the only objection to their passing the frontier is, that Government must pay the extra expense; but this difficulty may easily be removed, as I shall be able to defray the extra charge, and also the expense of some Peons, from the revenue of the districts which the horse will enable us to secure, and which without them will be carried off by the enemy. I need hardly observe that expedition in this measure is of the utmost importance.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LANG, COMMANDING CEDED DISTRICTS.

Camp at Woombal, 2nd January 1818.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to enclose for your information a copy of a letter from the Resident at Poonah, dated 18th December, by which you will observe that the whole of the cavalry under the Peshwah and Gocklah have gone to the north-west of Seroor, and were still proceeding in that direction. The great distance of the enemy's main army offers the most favourable opportunity for acting against Cossi Row Gocklah, who commands the only force they
have south of the Kisnah, and expelling him from this province. You know what troops I have at my disposal; were I to confine them, as originally intended, to the garrison of Darwar, Cassi Row would have the undisturbed command of the whole resources of the country, and would there be able to assemble a force with which he might easily overrun the Company's territory south of the Werdah, and enter Mysore or the Ceded Districts. By employing the troops in supporting the villages which rise against his authority, I have already got possession of a considerable part of the country; and even where I have not possession, the inhabitants, by withholding their revenue, render it difficult for him to pay his troops, or to undertake any distant expedition. But as he has now begun to subsist by plunder, he will certainly, if not prevented, compel them to desert our cause. I am, therefore, induced to request that you will allow two or three troops of the regiment of native cavalry at Tombirhilli to join me without delay. I proceed to Guddok to-morrow, and I have no doubt that within three or four weeks from the day on which the cavalry may join me, I shall be in possession of every place belonging to the Peshwah south of the Malpurbah.

The occupation of this tract of country would completely cover Mysore and the Company's north-west frontier, and would make it impossible for the enemy to collect anywhere south of the Kisnah a force sufficient to pass the Toombudra.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE, &c.

Camp at Dammal, 9th January, 1818.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive on the 6th instant your letter of the 20th December, with extracts of instruc-
tions from the Governor-General in April last, regarding the Southern Jageerdars, and copies of your dispatch to Mr. Adam of the 24th, and to me of the 27th November on the same subject.

The line of conduct which you recommend to be pursued with respect to the Jageerdars, is that which I have followed as far as my intercourse with them extended. I shall probably obtain some trifling secret co-operation from the Kittoor Dessay; from the other Jageerdars I expect nothing more than that they shall not take any very active part in opposing me.

Both their pride and their fears will deter them from deserting the Peshwah while there is any chance of his continuing to be their master. The Jageerdar of Hebbuli is zealous in our cause, because being near Darwar, he has nothing to apprehend from the Peshwah’s resentment, and probably imagines that a transfer of territory to the Company from the Peshwah might restore him to some part of his ancient patrimony, the Nurgoond and Ravedroog Jageers. I shall give him no promises, but keep up the intercourse with him. The Nurgoond Jageerdar has refused to receive Cassi Row’s wounded men, or to let his parties remain in his district; but there is with Cassi Row at this moment a party of one hundred and fifty Nurgoond horse. The Vakeel says that they do not belong to his master, and that the name is kept up merely because the horse were in former times furnished by the Jageerdar. I suspect, however, that they have Serinjami lands in the Jageer; but as long as the Jageerdar is not actively hostile, I shall not look for a very rigid neutrality. This place surrendered yesterday after a few hours battering; Gud-dok surrendered on the 5th instant. These are the only two places against which I have brought troops. I have now possession of nearly the whole of Gocklah’s Jageers, and of a considerable part of the Peshwah’s districts south
of the Malpurbah; but much yet remains to be done in dislodging the enemy from a number of small forts on this side of the river.

The greater part of the country of which I am now in possession, I owe to the exertions of the inhabitants who joined the Amildars. I sent to them and expelled the enemy. They are particularly inveterate against the Gocklah's agents, many of whom have committed great cruelties in exacting the revenues; and they have so completely committed themselves in our cause against their own Government, that I trust they will never be given up to it.

The movement of the reserve to the northward, will set some parties of the southern horse more at liberty to act in this quarter. A small body of three or four hundred entered the Ceded Districts a few days ago near Hoollall, in Hirpenhilly; they are said to belong to Mudden Sing, but many of them are probably adventurers from the southern provinces.

I am glad to hear that you propose the formation of a corps for carrying on sieges, while the lighter part of the army is pushing the Peshwah in the field. If a speedy termination of the war be not expected, recruiting ought to be continued to keep your army efficient, and to supply garrisons for the conquered places, and a regular system of permanent occupation of the enemy's territory ought to be adopted. I am convinced that four or five battalions of Sepoys would be sufficient to occupy a double chain of posts; one extending from the Kismah to Ahmednughur, and the other from the Kismah to Poonah. Regular Dawks might be established along both lines; convoys might pass without escort; all the enemy's movements within that tract would be instantly known, and a sufficient revenue might be collected to pay the whole expense of the five corps so employed.

I have, &c.

Thomas Munro.
TO MAJOR-GENERAL LANG, &c.

Camp at Hooble, 14th January 1818.

SIR,

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 11th instant, mentioning the irruption of a body of three hundred Pindarries into the Ceded Districts. No regular force can effectually protect the country from such an enemy while the villages are defenceless. A long course of peace has led to too much security, not only in the Ceded Districts, but in Mysore. The best remedy is to revert to the ancient system, to leave the Kutpudi Peons in their respective villages; to raise what are called Ahsham or regular Peons for the protection of all the Amildar's Cutcherries, and of all the larger villages; to see that all the Peons are well armed, and that they are supplied with ammunition; for the restrictions on the sale of gunpowder has rendered it so scarce, that very few people who have fire-arms have any ammunition. In this part of the country the Pindarries cannot plunder any village which has a wall or a mud tower, defended by ten or twenty Peons, and they can therefore do no material injury to the country. It was formerly the same in the Ceded Districts and will be so again whenever the proper precautions are adopted.

I need not mention that breaches in the walls of villages should be repaired as far as may be practicable.

I have, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.
TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Darwar, 25th January, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have this moment received yours of the 15th, and though much of it is in cipher, I can make out the general meaning of it. It will be impossible to discuss the various questions you propose until we meet, or until the war is over; but this is of little consequence, because I think that during war, harm rather than good would arise from the appointment of civil collectors in districts in which there is any enemy, or which are liable to be overrun.

Military possession is the great object during war, the next is to collect what we can by the help of Native Tihsildars. These should collect from the Pottails, or heads of villages, and the Pottails from the Rayets. There should be no farming; there should be no innovation, at least during the war. The rents should be much lower than usual, or the inhabitants will have no motive to join us. We should rather endeavour to hinder the enemy from getting revenue than to collect such ourselves; our revenue measures at present should all be directed towards the facilitating of our military operations. I find the revenue a heavy task, but it would be much heavier were it not under my immediate charge. If you have any military officer conversant with revenue, it would be convenient to employ him for the present. If you have not, the easiest and simplest way would be to direct the business yourself, through the aid of an experienced revenue servant as secretary.

The person I would recommend for this office is Mr. M'Donnell, or should he not be present, Mr. Nisbet.

The police should remain under the Pottails of villages
and Tihsildars of districts; both should have judicial authority in petty matters. The Collector should be judge and magistrate; road and market customs, and all other duties should remain as at present until the conclusion of the war. Districts which may now be occupied, will not pay the expense of their establishments, as the enemy will already have anticipated the whole nearly of the present year's revenue.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Nowlgoond, 28th January, 1818.

SIR,

I WROTE you on the 21st, 22nd, and 25th instant. I received yesterday General Pritzler's letter of the 23d, inclosing yours and General Smith's to him without date, mentioning that General Smith would be at Huttani on the 23d instant, and that if the Peshwah escaped, the whole of both forces would be formed into two divisions, one for pursuit, and the other for besieging forts and occupying the country. If such a pursuing force can be formed as may be able to force the Peshwah to fight or to take refuge in a fort, it would be better than a continuance of the present plan. But if such a force cannot be formed, it would perhaps be better to persevere in the present plan, as you will harass the Peshwah more and yourselves less by following him with two divisions, than by following him with one only. If you pursue with only one division, the besieging force must be equal to any thing the Peshwah can bring against it, because he may outrun the pursuing force and attack the besieging one, if it is not sufficiently strong.
Before this letter can be received your plan will probably have been fixed; should I not be able to join in time to take the command of the main body of the reserve, I shall take that of the besieging force. It may require consideration how far it may be advisable to treat the Jageerdars as friends for some time longer. If they employ their whole force actively against us, this indulgence cannot be necessary. But you have the best means of knowing what their conduct is.

In besieging forts, it would, perhaps, be proper to begin with those contiguous to our own territory, and to proceed so as to obtain a connected command of the country as we advanced. In this view it would be necessary to begin with the Peshwah's forts, between the Malpurba and the Kisdah, neglecting such of them as are of little importance in securing our communications. But if it be determined to act hostilely towards the Jageerdars, it may probably be deemed expedient to begin with the attack of such of their forts as might, from the fear of losing them, be most likely to induce them to quit the Peshwah; if, however, there is no great chance of the fall of their forts producing this effect, we ought to begin with those the possession of which will gain us the firmest hold of the country.

I have, &c.

Thomas Munro.

TO THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Camp at Moral, 30th January 1818.

sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of two letters from the Honourable M. Elphinstone to Brigadier-General Pritzler, respecting the movements of the Peshwah's army. As the Peshwah was on the 23rd a few miles to the north-west of General Smith's force, it is probable
that he will be able to escape to the northward. His army is much harassed, and, even if not forced to action, must lose a number of horses and camels in its flight. General Pritzler, in his reply to Mr. Elphinstone's letter of the 23rd, states, that he will reach Erroor on the 25th instant, but must halt there to refresh the troops.

In my letters of the 22nd and 23rd, I took the liberty of submitting my opinion as to the effect which the situation in the Ceded Districts of the reinforcements for the reserve would have in putting a stop to all offensive operations in this quarter. I am now obliged, by the smallness of my force, to employ the whole of it in covering a convoy from the Ceded Districts for the reserve.

Major-General Lang has called upon me to send back the three troops of the 5th Regiment Native Cavalry, and has informed me that he means to recommend that the detachment of the 22nd Light Dragoons shall be kept in the Ceded Districts until they shall have returned. As the state of affairs upon the Company's frontier has been entirely changed within the last ten days, by the retreat of the Pindarries and of the Peshwah, I trust that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council will approve of my retaining the three troops of native cavalry until they can be relieved by the dragoons, or until I can receive the orders of Government.

I beg leave to state that, with only a few companies of Sepoys, and without cavalry, it will be impossible to carry on supplies to the reserve, and to protect the country of which we have got possession; that I shall not be able to attack the most trifling place, because, while the troops were engaged in the siege, a small body of the enemy's horse might drive off our cattle while grazing, and with them the valuable establishment of draught bullocks belonging to the battering train; and that the vigorous prosecution of offensive operations in the Southern Mahratta
States is regarded as the measure which will be most likely to induce the Jageerdars, who compose so great a part of the Peshwah's army, to quit his standard.

I have, &c.

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE, &c.

Camp at Maral, 5th February, 1818.

My dear sir,

I received last night your private letter of the 27th January. In my letter of the 19th ultimo, in speaking of the advantage of leaving an opening for the employment of the native soldiery, I had in view the eighth and ninth fundamental principles, laid down by the Governor-General, for the settlement of the Poonah dominions, in Mr. Adams' letter of the 15th December. A new state, of moderate limits, as contemplated in the eighth article, may not be absolutely necessary, but it would greatly facilitate the settlement of the country, by giving employment to a number of the troops and adherents of the former government. The same object might no doubt be attained without the intervention of a new state, if the British Government would find employment for a part of the disbanded troops, who could not get service under the Jageerdars.

My appointment is to the command in the Dooab and Southern Deccan, and to the command of the reserve of the army of the Deccan. My instructions were very general. They directed me to consider the security of the Company's frontier as the first object; that of the Nizam's dominions as the next; and offensive operations against the Peshwah as inferior to both. These instructions are however superseded by a late order, directing the reserve to be held at your disposal.
I have written for the cipher, and when I get it, I shall answer your question respecting the force in this quarter.

Yours sincerely,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE, &c.

Camp, six miles W. of Bagracottah,

Sir,

1st March, 1818.

I had the honour to receive, on the 28th February, your letter of the 18th, and two letters of the 19th of that month.

Considering the circumstances under which Sundoor was occupied; that it was done in order to gratify the Peshwah at the very moment when he was secretly conspiring against the British Government; that the late Jageerdar had been long in undisturbed possession of the district, and that his removal must have been felt as an injury by all the members of the Gorpurray family; I am satisfied that the best course would be to restore him to his Jageer. The measure would, I believe, be highly acceptable, not only to the numerous branches of his own family, but to most of the Mahratta chiefs. The great inconvenience which formerly attended Sundoors being in the hands of a Jageerdar, was the Peshwah's visits to it at the head of an army, on pretence of religious pilgrimage, but, in reality, as much with the view of endeavouring to seize it by treachery. This inconvenience is now done away, and I see no other that can attend the restoration of the Jageerdar; none was ever felt during the long period that he was in possession. The only stipulations which it might be necessary to make are, for a free passage to troops, and the surrender of offenders from the Company's territory; there should be no interference whatever with his internal administration.
I have had no message or letter from Chintamin Row, but have received several reports of his having left the army sick. These are, however, contradicted by other reports. Should he have actually left the Peshwah for good, as stated by his messenger, and also by Dadguba Rostrah to you, there will not be much difficulty in seizing his lands, should he deem such a measure necessary, in order to furnish him with a pretence for withdrawing his troops from Bajee Row's army. Perhaps the Peshwah's suspicions are as likely as any thing else to drive him from his camp; and, in that case, it might be advisable to continue the exemption of his lands for some time longer. I wish also to suspend their seizure, until we see whether or not the other Putmundars come in, that we may know whether it will be necessary to make any distinction between them and Chintamin Row. We are now in possession of every village belonging to Gocklah south of the Kismah, and of all the districts of the Peshwah south of that river, and east of this place. The small force with which we undertook the siege of Badaumi, the strength of the place, and the garrison, amounting to eight hundred or one thousand men, and its capture by storm, have given us the command of the greater part of the Southern States. There is now only one strong fortress in them in the hands of the Peshwah; I am anxious to attack it, but fear that my means are inadequate. It is not the troops that I doubt, but the defective equipment of the heavy train, and the want of artillerymen and officers.

I am endeavouring to draw as much advantage as possible from the impression made by my success, by opening a communication with the principal inhabitants beyond the Kismah, and urging them to rise and expel the officers of the Peshwah. I have to-day sent off Tilhsildars to the district between Bejapoor and the Kismah, and to some of Gocklah's Jageers beyond Bejapoor. They are accompanied
by five or six hundred Peons raised in this quarter; they will be joined by more belonging to the Zemindars who join us. They will, no doubt, meet with many reverses; but they will, I think, be able to establish themselves in some districts, and to keep others, from which they may be driven, so disturbed as to be of little use to the enemy.

I have the honour, &c.

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE, &c.

Camp at Belgaum, 29th March 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I received your private letter of the 23rd instant yesterday, and hope that you will continue as usual to give me frequent notice of the movements of the Peshwah's and our own armies, as I have not the means of obtaining it readily through any other channel.

The artillery, about which I have so often written, would not have been too late even at the date you mention. I am anxious to hear that the ceremony of placing the Rajah of Sattarah on the Musnud has been performed; because it would probably hasten the termination of hostilities, and the settlement of the country. The limits of his principality might be left undefined for the present. He should be required to summon Bajee Row and his principal chiefs to his presence, and in case of their not obeying, to proclaim Bajee Row and all who adhered to him rebels; though the natives would understand perfectly well the relation between the Rajah and the British Government, and the motives which dictated this proclamation, this would not prevent it from having the desired effect. The chiefs who have left Bajee Row, as well as some of those who still follow him, have in their communications with us, always brought forward the disgrace they would
sustain from the charge of rebellion and ingratitude, were they to abandon him, and have often called upon us to point out how their character might be saved from such a reproach. The orders of the Rajah of Sattarah will, I have no doubt, be received both by the chiefs who have already deserted Bajee Row, and by those who wish to leave him, as a full justification of their conduct; and these orders will also, I think, have a considerable effect in intimidating even those few chiefs who are really attached to Bajee Row, and in inducing them to forsake his standard, and it might likewise be advisable to send them to the Kelladars of all forts, commanding them to surrender.

Yours sincerely,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

(Private.)

Camp near Balgaum, 8th March, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

The questions proposed in your letter of the 2nd, cannot easily be answered in writing, as they embrace subjects too extensive to be discussed in an occasional correspondence.

I shall, however, endeavour in a few words to state generally my opinion respecting them.

I think that the Jageerdars ought not to be in a worse situation than under the Peshwah's government, and that therefore those of your first class should not be required to keep up more horse than formerly, though the number which they then maintained might not have been a third or a fifth of their Tynant Zabitahs. This number, whatever it was, they might be obliged to muster, and in the event of any deficiency, a proportional part of the Jageer might be resumed.
In the case of your second class of Jageerdars, I would not attempt to exchange for money that part of their Jageers which is assigned for their personal expenses, unless with their own consent. Without it, the measure would give offence, and the land resumed would, in most cases, probably not yield the sum for which it was taken.

I see no objection to the sequestration of the lands of the third class of Jageerdars who may be very refractory, and giving some pecuniary allowance in the event of devastation.

I am not sure that I understand your remark on the numerous divisions of revenue, of which Jageers are usually composed, being oppressive in their collection to the Ryets. In the smaller Jageers, there will, I imagine, be no difficulty in consolidating the different heads, but in the greater Jageers, where the internal administration must be left to the Jageerdars themselves, it will not be so easy. Even among the greater Jageerdars, however, all such revenues as they may derive from Sirkar villages, under various administrations, may be redeemed, either by paying them the amount in money, or by giving them one or more whole villages, yielding a revenue equal to the aggregate of what they collect from many.

Though the people of India have not what we call gentry, they have what they respect as such themselves; it will not therefore, I think, merely with a view to the establishment of this class of society, be necessary to restore the Desmooks and Dessays who have been removed to make way for the Mahratta revenue servants. Many of these Desmooks, &c. had usurped lands and revenues during times of confusion, and though they have been deprived of them, they still enjoy, in many instances, all that they had any right to originally. Many of them will still be found holding the office of Potail, or Curnum, of one or of a number of villages, or even of a whole district; and
where this is the case, they should be continued. But it would not be advisable to restore them, where they have long been removed, because their offices and emoluments have been subdivided among another set of men, to whom long possession or purchase has rendered them a private property. Where they have been recently removed, and their rights not granted to any other persons, they might be restored. I do not apprehend the smallest danger from their influence; good treatment will reconcile them all to our government, and lead them to employ whatever influence they have in its favour.

All charities and religious expenses, whatever their amount may be, ought, I think, to be continued for the present; considerable portions of them are probably consecrated by time, and could not be touched without a violation of private rights and of religious prejudices; a large portion of them too, will, no doubt, be found to have arisen from unauthorized grants, and other frauds. The whole should be carefully investigated after peace is restored, and the country settled; and such part of the expenditure as is of modern date, and not duly authorized, should be stopped. This course is followed by the native governments at every new succession, and frequently more than once in the same reign.

We should, I think, let every thing connected with the religious establishments, charities, Jageerdars, Desmooks, and other public servants, remain as at present, until peace affords leisure to investigate them properly.

I wish to do nothing more in the case of the Jageerdars you have assigned to me. I shall assure the Putwurdan, that their situation will not be worse, but better than formerly; but I shall tell them, when they call upon me for the particulars, that it would be impossible, without many months of leisure, to make any arrangement
that would satisfy them all. Peace must be restored before any thing can be done in it.

This matter must be left to my successor.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS BROTHER.

Camp near Belgaumi, 6th April, 1818.

MY DEAR ALEXANDER,

I keep a list of letters, or rather I try to keep one, for I forget to insert many that I write, which is probably one cause of my finding none in it to you later than the 16th October. The two last letters from you I sent to Mrs. Munro, and desired her to keep them till we could meet; I forget their dates, but neither of them is, I believe, later than May. The interference of the post-office at home with Indian correspondence, makes the arrival of our letters much more uncertain, and often much slower than formerly. I hope, however, that a few months more will make it of very little consequence to me how long their voyage is. Had the Mahratta war not broken out, I should by this time have taken my leave, and probably been on my way home. As soon as the Peshwah is reduced, and I can get clear of his great feudatories, the Southern Jageerdars, whose affairs are to be arranged by Mr. Elphinstone and myself, I shall take my leave of Indian wars and politics. Mr. E. fancies that I shall stay to finish all these arrangements, and that I like the business as well as himself. The moment the war is over I shall make over to him all my share of political duties—nobody can conduct them better than he, and I am sick of them—I am tired of sitting for hours every day with the Vakeels of a set of high-titled Chiefs, who have long since been beaten into submission, and who follow the standard of Bajee Row, without any
intention of fighting against us. Even if they were more chivalrous than they are, we have some security against their exercising that spirit, by having already got possession of most of their Jageers, which will however be continued to them on their good behaviour. Were I a younger man, or had I any wish to prolong my stay in India, I should muster patience, and go through the tedious work of negotiating with these Vakeels; but as the complete arrangement of the claims of the different Chiefs would require at least a whole year of peace and leisure, I shall not stay to finish it.

You have, I suppose, already learned from different publications what were the causes of our present war. The Pindarries had been encouraged by our system of respecting the territory where they resided, to repeat their incursions every year, either into our own districts or those of our allies, and it became necessary either to submit to this disgrace, or to invade their possessions. It was thought that offensive operations might ultimately involve us in hostilities with Scindia, Holkar and Meer Khan, on account of their connection with the Pindarrie leaders, and our preparations were very properly made upon a scale adequate to whatever might occur. A much greater army was brought into the field than ever was done upon any former occasion by our Indian Government. The Pindarries, against whom the war was undertaken, were soon found to be the most trifling of our enemies, and the States of Poonah and Nagpoor, from which co-operation was expected, the most formidable.

In April and May last the Peshwah had been compelled to agree to cede to us territories yielding thirty-four lacs of rupees, for the maintenance of a body of five thousand horse and three thousand foot, which he was bound by former treaties to maintain for our aid, but which he had never done. The new treaty, to which he was so averse
that he did not sign it till June, was intended to secure the funds necessary for the maintenance of this body of troops, and also as a punishment for his supporting Dainglia, who had caused the murder of the Gwykwar Vakeel, and for conniving at, if not encouraging, his raising troops. It would perhaps have been better, as we had determined to reduce the Pindarries, to have reserved the punishment of the Peshwah for a future period, when this service should have been finished. It is not certain that he would even in this case have remained at peace with us. He might have intrigued, but I doubt if he would have taken an open and active part against us as he has done; and I think it is pretty clear, that if he had continued quiet, neither Holkar nor the Nagpoor Rajah would have commenced hostilities. Both these Chiefs, however, have been so completely humbled, that their joining this Confederacy has been fortunate on the whole, as it has enabled us to reduce their power, and to render the revival of the Pindarrie system impracticable.

I shall not enter into the details of the war, as you know as much of them at home as we do here. Lord Hastings says in his general order, that its objects have been obtained, and that the Pindarrie power has been destroyed. We have now no enemy to contend with except the Peshwah. Some corps are following him in the field, while others are employed in besieging his forts; and I trust that, by the end of June, if he does not submit sooner, we shall have reduced them all.

If you have seen the exaggerated statements which have appeared, even in most of the official papers, of the numbers of the Pindarries, you will be surprised at never finding them offering any resistance worth noticing. The truth is, that they possessed very little real strength; they were, in fact, nothing more than a number of bands of mounted thieves, under different chiefs, whose business was to plun-
der, and to avoid fighting. Their whole force was, I believe, estimated at about twenty-five thousand by Captain Sydenham, now at Aurungabad, in a paper drawn up by him a year or two ago. I have seen lists drawn up by officers who have served long on the Nurbuddah in watching the Pindarries, which makes the whole force under their different Chiefs about fourteen or fifteen thousand. Even this is, I imagine, far beyond the truth. I should not estimate the aggregate numbers of all their horse of every kind at more than seven or eight thousand. All the possessions of the Pindarries were confined to a few small districts in Malwa, which would not have maintained half that number. If we suppose that as many more were maintained by plunder, it is making a great allowance; for plundering, though destructive to the inhabitants, is not always profitable to the plunderers, who often lose more than they gain by various accidents, before they reach their homes through a hostile country. The Pindarrie Chiefs cannot bring large bodies into the field; but it is a part of their system to magnify their force, in order to strike terror, and prevent resistance. Secrecy and expedition are essential to their success, and it is only in small parties that they can move rapidly and elude pursuit. A body of them which crossed the Toombudra in January, and returned by Darwar, was estimated in the public dispatches, while on its march south, at two thousand; but it was certainly under four hundred. Some prisoners were taken as it returned; none of them called it more than five hundred, others not four hundred. Sydenham is, however, considered in general as very moderate; for many men in office think that the Pindarries can bring at least fifty thousand horse into the field. The Peshwah, and all his Feudatories together, have not during the present contest been able to bring into the field more than sixteen thousand horse. The number has at times been carried above twenty
thousand, by the accession of fugitives from the armies of Holkar and Nagpoor, but has soon sunk again. Tippoo, in the zenith of his power, had not more than twenty to twenty-five thousand horse; but it is believed that an army of horse which could hardly be kept up by him, can easily be maintained by a few miserable chiefs of banditti, who have not the fiftieth part of his means. Holkar's horse at the battle of Mahedpoor are estimated by the Adjutant-General Conway, a cavalry officer, at eight thousand, which is at least as many as Holkar was able to maintain; other officers, however, call them twelve and fourteen thousand.

The present war has been extensive, and sometimes very harassing; but we have had a most contemptible enemy everywhere to deal with. The only men who have made any resistance, are the Golandazes, who have behaved well on some occasions, both in the field and in garrison. As soon as the war is over, I shall prepare to return home; for there is no object to detain me in India.

Your affectionate brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Naggurmurly, 23rd April, 1818.

SIR,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter of the 12th instant, inclosing one for the Rajah of Kolapoor, which I have forwarded to him, because his troops cannot be more usefully employed than in repressing the depredations of the Prushetighur banditti. Churtamin Row's Vakeel informed me, that his master had sent a detachment against the banditti, but he denies his having restored any villages, from which he had driven them, to Bajee Row's officers. He says, that his master never
occupied those villages; that they were abandoned by the enemy in their flight, and again taken possession of by Bajee Row's officers. It is most probable, however, that the villages were actually restored by the servants of Chur-tamin Row to those of the Peshwah. It could hardly, indeed, be expected that he would have followed any other course, as there was no officer of the Company on the spot to claim them; and as he could not have retained them without the appearance, at least, of hostile conduct towards Bajee Row, a charge which all the Jageerdars are very anxious to avoid.

The Putwadars have often stated, through their Va-keels, the impossibility of their acting against Bajee Row. I have told them that all that was required was, that they should quit his standard, return with their troops to their Jageers, and remain there. Their doing this is as much as can be looked for at present. Their neutrality is of great importance, as it withdraws from the service of Bajee Row a very considerable portion of his army: any cooperation which they could give, would render us very little service. I have, therefore, abstained from demanding it, more particularly as the demand cannot be made without agitating the question of the transfer of their allegiance from Bajee Row to the Company, to which, as far at least as regards its being done openly and directly, they have all expressed the strongest repugnance. This repugnance would, no doubt, gradually subside, when they saw the dominion of the Company completely established, but something is wanted in the mean time to tranquillize and to facilitate the settlement of the country. I have mentioned in former letters, that they had proposed that some one of Bajee Row's family should be raised to the office of Peshwah in his room, and that I had informed them that it could not be, and that it was a point on which I had no authority to enter into any discussion with them.
Whenever they have more recently revived the question, I have shown them that it was evident, from the proclamation issued by you in February last, announcing the design of the British Government, after making provision for the Rajahship of Sattarah, to occupy the remaining possessions of Bajee Row, that no place was left in the proposed new arrangement for any separate state under a Peshwah.

The Jageerdars have now, I believe, no expectation of seeing Bajee Row, or any of his relations, at the head of a state; but their zeal for the continuance of the office of Peshwah, even though divested of all real power, is as strong as ever. They retain their own possessions, and feel, therefore, in a much smaller degree the dissolution of the substance of the Mahratta empire than that of its forms. They derive whatever they possess from those forms; they have for generations been accustomed to respect and serve under them, and they regard it as disgraceful to abandon them for others. The easiest way of subduing these prejudices, and of rendering them useful feudatories, would be for the Company to take upon itself the office of Peshwah, and to issue all public acts as coming from the Pundit Purdhan, as under the late Government Investiture might be received, according to custom, from the Rajah of Sattarah. The Company, acting as the Pundit Purdhan, would hold an office which, as in the case of that of the Dewanee in Bengal, would take from it none of its sovereign powers; and its governing the country under this ancient title, would, I believe, reconcile the Jageerdars to the change of masters, and induce them to employ their troops willingly at the call of the British Government.

They testify at present great aversion to being summoned as its immediate servants, and propose that they should rather give up part of their Jageers, and hold the rest service free. This objection is possibly exaggerated; but
if it can be removed merely by the maintenance of a form, and the substitution of a name, it ought perhaps to be done, more particularly as the preservation of this ancient name would probably be likewise acceptable to Scindia and Holkar, as their ancestors obtained their possessions not from the Rajahs of Sattarah, but from the Pundit Purdhan.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Thomas Munro.

TO THE SAME.

Camp, one coss south of Rayhaug,

MY DEAR SIR,

26th April, 1818.

We are moving towards the Kismah, looking anxiously for your answer respecting the two iron twelve-pounders, about which General Pritzler wrote you on the 19th. We shall, I hope, soon take Sholapoor, if we can find water to drink within any reasonable distance. The fall of that place will leave the Peshwah no fortress south of Ahmednuggur. The reserve then returns, and if found advisable takes Nepauni. In a few weeks we may expect that Bajee Row will be driven from all his southern and most of his northern possessions. He can have but little treasure, and having no revenue, he cannot long keep any thing like an army together. This war will become a mere Pindarry one. I can have but little share in it, and shall on that ground, as well as for other causes, wish to quit all duties, civil as well as military, in June, when I return to the Dooab.

I returned to this country with great reluctance, and had the Mahratta war not taken place, I would have gone home in January last, but having engaged myself both in the civil and military affairs of the Mahratta provinces, I should gladly, had my health permitted, have continued to
act until both had been finally settled. My sight, however, has lately suffered so much, as to render me nearly unfit for business. I first began to feel a visible change in it while I was in Malabar, during the last hot season; but within the last three months the decay has been rapid and alarming. I felt with much concern during the siege of Belgaum, when I was day after day straining my sight to observe the effect of our artillery, that I could not pronounce positively, as I could have done some months ago, whether the breach was practicable or not. But I am not obliged to look at a breach every day. It is in civil affairs, which require writing every day, that the decline of sight becomes a most serious evil. There are many days when I cannot write at all, in consequence of a painful straining of my eyes. There is no day in which I can write without pain, or for more than a few minutes at a time. In writing a letter I must pause every five or six lines, and shut my eyes to relieve them from the glare. A man who wishes to enter into the details of civil and political arrangements, among Jageerdars and Zemindars, must examine himself every person who can give him information, take down in writing what each person says, and compare their different reports. This is the course I have always followed, but I cannot continue it now. I should not get through in a month what was formerly the work of a few days. I must not, therefore, disgrace myself by holding employments, the duties of which the decay of my sight will prevent me from discharging with efficiency.

The Carnatic will be exposed to no inconvenience from my quitting the direction of its affairs. I shall leave in it a great body of revenue servants, some of them of the greatest experience, and a population attached to our Government by good treatment, as much as men can be in so short a period. The Jageerdars will give no opposition that can affect the tranquillity of the country. They will
enter into long discussions, and debate upon every trifling point; but they will submit to what we require if we only act openly and fairly. The Putwardars should, I think, have the possessions they were entitled to by the terms of Punderpore, with some addition, from a tenth to a fifth, according to circumstances. Their principal Vakeels should also have some provision.

The other Jageerdars who have not yet come in, ought not to have the Punderpore terms, but should be deprived of a smaller or greater part of their Jageers, as may be found advisable hereafter.

You will not yourself have time to settle all these matters, and I would therefore recommend your securing a man of ability and temper to arrange them. The fittest person in the Madras civil service is undoubtedly Mr. Chaplin, the Collector of Ballari. He has been talking of going home, but the charge of the Carnatic as principal collector, with a liberal salary, might induce him to accept the situation. The salary ought, I think, to be a thousand pagodas a month, or twelve thousand pagodas per annum. The first settlement of a country is of the utmost importance, for on it depends not only its future revenue, but its tranquillity. Government cannot purchase too dearly the service of a man who can give a proper form at first to the affairs of a newly-acquired province. I hope, therefore, that you will apply for Mr. Chaplin.

If he cannot be spared, or is unwilling to change, I would ask for Mr. Thackeray, formerly chief secretary, and now acting as Collector of Cimbetore.

I hope, when you have time, you will say that this letter has reached you, as I have no copy.

Yours sincerely,

Thomas Munro.
TO THE SAME.

Camp at Gottankerch, 5th May, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I wrote you a few days ago about the state of my eyes, having rendered me almost totally unfit for writing on any public business; I told you that I would reduce Sholapoor, and, if thought necessary, Nepauni, and then quit my situation; all serious work will then be over, and the country can be settled at leisure.

Mr. Mc' Donnell is on his way to join, and will, I have no doubt, be very useful. As you will have more on your hands than you can personally attend to, it would be desirable that you should have under you men well qualified to direct all the details of management. I know no man so fit to take charge of the affairs of the Carnatic as Mr. Chaplin, the Collector of Ballari. He possesses great temper, an excellent judgment, and has had much experience, and with your general instructions he will easily make all the arrangements with the Jageerdars, &c. I propose him with great reluctance, because if he is employed by you, the Ceded Districts, to which I am naturally partial, will suffer from his removal. It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of the Carnatic that its first settlements should be well made. To complete it, will probably require eighteen months or two years. I have been too long in India already, and had the war not taken place, I would have left it in January. I hope that by the middle, or at the farthest the end of June, I shall be relieved from all public duties; for I have no satisfaction in attempting to carry on what I am now incapable of doing efficiently. The failure of my sight obliges me to employ a week in what ought to be done in a few hours. I hope, therefore, that you will be able
to get Mr. Chaplin to take charge whenever I am ready to resign.

We are moving on Sholapoor. I have, ever since I left Badaun in February, kept up a broken correspondence with Nilu Punt, the Civil manager of Bijapoor and the neighbouring districts, for the purpose of inducing him to join us; his half brother has come. He will, I believe, come here to-morrow. His brother, who commands the Peshwah's infantry, promised to quit them, and is said to have done so. I shall try to open through some of these people a communication with Gunput, the Commander of the artillery, and with the Kellidar of Sholapoor. But I am not sanguine, I do not however despair.

Yours sincerely,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE SAME.

Camp near Sholapoor, 12th May, 1818.

My Dear Sir,

I have received your letter of the 3rd instant, inclosing one for Mr. Chaplin, which I have forwarded to him: I am convinced that you will be pleased with him, he has more talent and more extensive general views than any of the civil servants under Madras. I am, however, doing an injury to the public in proposing him, because his present district is more populous and valuable than the Carnatic, and his quitting it will be a most serious loss. It is fortunate that you were not trained in the usual routine of the service. The duties on which you have been employed, have rendered you much more competent, for the management of a broken-up empire, than you could have been by the study of all the regulations and codes of Calcutta and Madras together. It is too much regulation that ruins every thing; Englishmen are as great
fanatics in politics as Mahomedans in religion. They suppose that no country can be saved without English institutions. The natives of this country have enough of their own to answer every useful object of internal administration, and if we maintain and protect them, our work will be easy. If not disturbed by innovation, the country will in a very few months settle itself.

All that we have to do is to keep our faith, to treat the inhabitants with kindness, to maintain a respectable military force, to act firmly but mildly, and to proceed gradually and with the concurrence of the Jageerdars in all changes that may affect them.

You will have heard of our success on the 10th. After marching fourteen days without a halt, we came within three miles of this place on the west, where the line was to halt, but I came on with a strong column in advance. As their infantry and guns were drawn up under cover of the pettah, we could not reconnoitre without a force sufficient to beat them, in case they should have advanced. I made a circuit of four or five miles round the east and north side of the pettah, and was happy to see that it could be escaladed.

We looked at the enemy again in the evening to the southward, to make them suppose we had some design on their camp. The escalade was made at daybreak, and was perfectly successful. Gunput Row moved out with his infantry and seven guns, in order to attack the supporting party of the escalade, while some of his Arabs endeavoured to recover their lost ground in the pettah; but his line was charged, and three of his guns taken, before he could get again under the walls of the fort. Many of his men were killed, and he was himself wounded. Vittel Punt was among the slain. Several attempts were made in the course of the day to drive us from the pettah, but they all failed. The infantry were so much discouraged, that they moved
off in a body to the west, about four p.m. They were soon discovered, but were three or four miles in advance before we could muster a pursuing party under General Pritzler. The General overtook them about seven miles from camp, left about eight hundred dead on the field, and dispersed the whole; not ten men remained together. Their arms were thrown away and scattered all over the country. I consider the Peshwah’s infantry army as totally destroyed for all military purposes.

I hope you will, on receipt of this, write to Lord Hastings to permit me to retire from my command whenever I can do so without inconvenience to the service, and that I may be allowed to judge of the time myself. I shall not quit the command while I think that my retaining it is essential to the public service.

Yours sincerely,
Thomas Munro.

TO THE SAME.

Camp ten miles west of Sholapoor, 17th May, 1818.

The official accounts will have already informed you of the defeat and dispersion of the Peshwah’s infantry, and the capture of all their guns; there is therefore no enemy in this part of the country. I have left Major Sholdham’s corps at Sholapoor; two companies will do for the garrison, and the remaining eight will move about with two field-pieces, and will keep the country in order. It is a much larger army than I had at one time. Major Newall has marched by Bijapoor, and will join us near Yerroor, on the Kisnah. He goes merely to show the troops to the people, for all Bijapoor is in our possession. As I have heard nothing of Rowtuck, I have issued orders to day for the seizure of all his Jageers except Tullerattah, and a few other places. This, however, can, I think, be effected by
the Tahildars. If we do not attack Nepauni, I see no service for this force except to return beyond the Kisnah, and canton during the rain near Darwar, detaching a corps, if necessary, to check any appearance of opposition wherever it may arise.

Before I received your letter of the 11th, I had issued the orders for moving upon Nepauni, and I shall still continue our march to that place, so as to be ready either to take it or not, as you may decide.

Unless you know of some favourable circumstances in the conduct of Appah Dessays, of which I am ignorant, I think we should resume somewhat more than one-third of his Jageer—say six anas (six-sixteenths.) He ought not to be left in as good a state as he was when the war began.

If he consents at once to these terms, I would leave Nepauni in his hands; if he objects, I would besiege the place at once, as the approaching monsoon admits of no delay. At all events, we ought to insist on seeing his fort, and giving such orders as may be thought advisable about discontinuing the works.

I wish you would, by return of Tappal, give me your orders on these points, for there is no time to be lost.

If you say that we are not to take Nepauni, and if the road is safe and bearers could be posted from Poonah to Mirij or Pasgaum, I would take a run to Poonah to have a day's talk with you. 

Yours truly,

Thomas Munro.

I keep no copies of letters written in my own hand. All official ones are written by O'Donnaghoo, who is worth two pair of spectacles.

I hope you have made such application as will enable me to throw up my military and civil employments by the 15th June, or at farthest 30th June.

T. M.
Camp, 19th May, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM much obliged to you for your zealous exertions on every occasion to assist and facilitate our operations, and particularly for your sending Major Cunningham to join us, though you will ere this have heard that our business has been done, I have therefore written to him to return. The loss of the enemy on the 10th was much greater than was stated in my report. They were engaged with us from daybreak till eight at night, either in the pettah or the field. Gunput Row deserves great credit for his conduct in taking up a position to cover this place, in defending the pettah with part of his force, and attacking our reserve with the rest. He lost in this affair three of his guns, and was wounded; but his troops persevered all the forenoon in making repeated attempts to recover the pettah. They had here partial success, but their loss was so heavy that they were completely discouraged; and when they endeavoured to retreat in the afternoon without their guns, on which they placed great confidence, they had lost all spirit.

The behaviour of the dragoons was most gallant, and their exertions and success beyond what could ever have been believed.

No army was ever more completely destroyed than the Peshwah's infantry. Of the few who escaped with their arms, the greater part were disarmed or killed by the country people. Captain Chashwick has died from fatigue, and many of the dragoons have been taken ill from the same cause.

In five days from our coming in sight of Sholapoor, the
Peshwah's army was defeated and all its guns and the fort taken.

The impression made upon the country will long remain, and I trust, that it will continue as quiet as any part of our new possessions. 

Yours truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp near Darwar, 10th June, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I received yours of the 19th May some days ago, and yesterday your letter without date, but probably of the 30th May. It long since occurred to me that an official document, as stated by your friend Adams, would be necessary, and I therefore addressed the Madras Government in April in forma pauperis, and they forwarded my letter to Bengal; but you and Adams seem to have managed the business without waiting for it. I need not say that I feel myself much obliged to you both, not only in a pecuniary view, but on the higher ground of my having the satisfaction of believing that my services are thought to entitle me to the allowances proposed to be granted. You were present at the India Board Office when Lord B——— told me that I should have ten thousand pagodas per annum, and all my expenses paid; and you may remember that you proposed that as the allowance differed only a few hundred pagodas from that of a resident, that it should be made the same. I never thought of taking a Muchulka from Lord B———, because I certainly never suspected that my expenses would, above two years ago, have been restricted to five hundred pagodas, a sum which hardly pays my servants and camp equipage, or that Mr. E——— would have taken me by the neck and pushed me out of the appointment the very day on which the three years
recommended by the Directors expired, though they autho-
riséd the term to be prolonged if deemed advisable. I
hope that Bajee Row has by this time shown himself the
"man of taste you took him for," and gone to drink the
Ganges' river in preference to roaming about like a vaga-
bond. This event will settle the country, at least in all
great points. Many petty disputes may remain to be ad-
justed, but none that can give us any serious trouble. I
have been preaching this doctrine with as much zeal as any
new-light man to Elphinstone for some time past, as I find
that he considers the difficulties as much greater than they
really are, and that my aid would be useful in clearing the
ground; but this is already done. The jungles and the
Babool-trees are down, and he has only now to shave or
mow the weeds, which are plenty. I observe also that you
have been making honourable mention of me to Adams,
and have contrived to make him believe that I might be an
useful instrument in settling the southern Mahratta states.
The thing is very easy. All that is requisite is to do what
he himself suggests, to keep them out of the hands of the
Madras Government for some time. A provisional admi-
nistraction directed by Mr. Elphinstone, under the Supreme
Government, should be established for two or three years,
until the mass receive its form. For this task nobody is so
well qualified as Elphinstone. He knows all the Jageerdars
and the people better than any body else. He must have
deputies and assistants selected by himself, who will act
zealously with him; not fellows sent from a presidency,
who have been all their lives in a state of lethargy; and a
military force ready to move should be kept up in the con-
quered country. There will, I think, be no cause to em-
ploy this force; but the best way to obviate the necessity
of doing so, is to show that you are prepared.

With respect to myself, it is impossible that I can under-
take the settlement in detail of any part of this country. I
am as well with regard to general health as ever I was in my life; but my eyes have suffered so much, that I write with great difficulty at all times, and there are some days when I cannot write at all. Without sight nothing can be done in settling. It is a business that requires a man to write while he speaks, to have the pen constantly in his hand, to take notes of what is said by every person, to compare the information given by different men on the same subject, and to make an abstract from the whole. Since July last I have been obliged to change the number of my spectacles three times; and if you are a spectacle-man, you will understand what a rapid decay of vision this implies. I cannot now do in two days what a few years ago I did in one, and I can do nothing with ease to myself. I cannot write without a painful sensation in my eyes of straining. The only chance of saving my sight is to quit business entirely for some months, and turn my eyes upon larger objects only, in order to give them relief. At the rate I am now going, in a few months more I shall not be able to tell a Dockan from a Breckan. Before this happens I must go home and paddle in the burn. This is a much nicer way of passing the evening of life, than going about the country here in my military boots and brigadier's enormous hat and feathers, frightening every cow and buffalo, shaking horribly its fearful nature, and making its tail stand on end. I shall willingly, now that all the great operations of war are over, resign this part of it to any one else. I am not like the Archbishop of Granada, for I feel that I am sadly fallen off in my homilies.

Yours ever,

Thomas Munro.
Camp near Darwar, 13th June, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I received some days ago yours of the 3rd, with Malcolm's letters, and the extract from Mr. Adam, for which I thank you most sincerely. Your kindness has carried you much farther than I had any right to expect, for I never looked to any thing beyond the allowance of a Resident, particularly as the letter, which conveyed my appointment of Brigadier-General, stated, that as I received civil allowances, I ought, like Sir J. Malcolm, to cause no charge to the Government as Brigadier-General. I have since received an official letter from Mr. Adam, authorising my receiving the allowances of a Brigadier-General. They are quite enough, more especially as I am getting blind, and cannot do so much work for them as I could have done a few years ago. I shall collect a list of conspicuous persons, agreeably to your mem. I have some fear, however, of the inquiry producing some alarm.

Among the persons seeking cowle, are Cassi Row Goklah, and your old friend, Muddum Singh. You may perhaps have some reservation with regard to him, and I shall therefore give him my promise conditionally. I hope that Bajee Row has come in to Malcolm. I will thank you to order for me a copy of the notes you made when we were at Sattarah, as far as regards the treatment of Jageerdars, and other general matters, to prevent me from falling into any mistake. As the country is now quiet, I shall in a few days send up the pistols for your cavalry, which have so long been detained here. I shall at the same time send back the Bombay gun bullocks, but keep the guns, as they are wanted here, and could not now travel through the cotton ground. I shall also send to Sat-
tarah with them about forty thousand Bajee Row and Mahratta rupees, which may be useful in that quarter, but will not pass here but at a heavy loss.

Yours, truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp at Hoobli, 19th June, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I have got yours of the 5th, and congratulate you most cordially on your having caught Surmunt by the lugg. But you seem to have followed the practice of Buonaparte, and given him rather a friendly pinch when you offered eight lacs. You are mistaken in thinking that I am sukh (harsh) towards Maharajahs. You form this opinion probably from my having driven all pretenders to Principalities out of the Ceded Districts. But these were a set of fellows whose ancestors had been expelled forty or fifty years before. Some of them were serving as common Peons, when they were discovered by some adventurer of a Karkern, who borrowed a hundred rupees in the bazar, rigged out the new Rajah with a turban and mantle as fine as Timour the Tartar, and started him in the field under the title of Soam Shanker Nacy, or some other warlike name. On these fellows I certainly had little compassion, for I stripped them of their trappings in order to pay their creditors. But for fallen monarchs I have a great respect; and had Srimunt had the good luck to have fallen into my hands, or I to have caught him, I should probably have offered him ten in place of eight lacs. His surrender is a most important event; it will tend more than any thing else to restore tranquillity and facilitate the settlement of the country. It deprives all the turbulent and
disaffected of their head and support. I would rather have taken Bajee Row than the Bombay Government. You will, I hope, be the taker of both. In your situation I would wait a little for Bombay. You are still young enough to do so. I am not, and therefore if I had a chance, which I have not, I would not wait. I have passed too much of my life in obscure drudgery to have any wish to continue the same course any longer. You know that I have been long deaf, and knowledge at one entrance quite shut out. I am getting blind fast: I must take care and not get blind altogether, and have knowledge shut out at the only remaining entrance. I should then indeed be fallen on evil days, when I should be able to read neither the lucubrations of the Indian Governments nor of the Directors.

Yours sincerely,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Hoobli, 23th June, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have received yours of the 22nd. The Enam villages in Chickeri, formerly held by Row Maharaja's brother, can be returned to him. The new Jageer, which the Row wants for himself, may also, I think, be given, without offending the Rajah, who will think himself fortunate enough in getting the rest of the district. I shall probably, however, make the Jageer ten in place of twelve thousand rupees. The Rajah is young, and a great deal, I believe, under the influence of his mother. I have no means of ascertaining his disposition with respect to the proposed grant to the Row; because the only two persons whom he has sent to me, besides the Row, are entirely in his interest. I have resumed every thing belonging to Rattrah to the northward of Pandempoor, excepting
Talli-Kottah, where part of the family resides. Nothing beyond the present Jageer should ever be restored to him, the Vinchoorkah, or any of the other chiefs who followed Bajee Row, after the affair with Colonel Adams.

I would not now restore the whole of the personal Jageer, where a part of it is a recent grant, not older than the reign of Bajee Row. I imagine that Waman Row Aptah, and several other chiefs, have Jageers of this description. In order to reward the Kolapoor Rajah and other chiefs, who either did not join or left Bajee Row at an early period, it will be necessary to reduce the Jageers of those who acted differently as low as can be done consistently with any promises or hopes which may have been given to them.

The Sirkar portion of the country is in a ruinous state, and the decayed revenue is encumbered with an endless variety of dues to petty Zemindars, hereditary revenue servants, Bramins, fakeers, &c. All the revenue assignments to Jageerdars are double, and in many places triple the actual collections. The country will improve under us; but it will be some time before it yields more revenue to us than it did to the Peshwah, because we must lower his assessments, or rather exactions. The Rayets must have a greater, and we a smaller share of the produce.

I do not think that eight lacs will be thought too great a sacrifice for Bajee Row, when a little time has passed away, and his treachery, and the danger to which it exposed us, is less fresh in our memory. I scarcely regard treachery in him as a subject of resentment or punishment; his treachery is the natural consequence of his connexion with us. Every sovereign, who is in his own dominions controlled by a foreign subsidiary force, must become timid, cunning, and treacherous. We ourselves induce the treachery which we punish. We may say of the allowance to Bajee Row, as Alexander the Great said of one of
his gifts to some Greek or Mahratta; it may be too much for Bajee Row to receive, but not for John Company Bahauder to give.

Chaplin will be here about the 10th. I shall leave him about the 15th, and go to Mysore for a few weeks before I proceed to Madras. I want a cool climate, which Mysore has, a little relaxation from business, and also to be near enough to answer any references which may come from my successors; but I shall cease drawing allowances from the day I leave this province.

Yours, truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO MR. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Hoobli, 6th July, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have got your proclamations on Trimbukjee. He may conceal himself, or quit the country, but I have no doubt that you will get hold of him at last.

I think that the prohibitions against carrying arms may, when pushed too far, prove injurious. It is necessary in the present unsettled state of the country, and may be so for many years, that no considerable body or even small party of men should go armed through the country without a pass; but I would let all single travellers, and also all merchants with goods, and the higher classes of the inhabitants, with their families, though escorted by eight or ten armed men, pass without any passport.

I know from experience that the requiring every person who travels with arms to have a pass, is productive of an infinite deal of vexation and discontent. There is always some delay or difficulty in getting the pass; money is often privately given to expedite it; the traveller, after getting it, is stopped in secret places by Peons, who ques-
tion its authenticity, exact money to let him go on, or, if they think he will not return to complain, they take his arms and sell them. The inhabitants get disgusted, and rather than subject themselves to the trouble of getting passports, they gradually relinquish altogether the use of arms. This is what has taken place in the countries under the Madras Government. The inhabitants have become unwarlike, and are unable to defend themselves against common robbers, much less against Pindarries, or any foreign plunderers.

I have read with attention your paper, dated April 1814, on the Chickori and Manowli Purgunnahs, and see the difficulty you found in fixing the number of villages, on account of its varying from transfers at different times. It does not exactly correspond with either of the lists given in by the Kolapoor and Nipawni Vakeels, nor do those correspond with each other. This arises from their respectively taking the numbers as they stood at the period most convenient for their own purpose, and to the Nipawni Vakeels giving false statements.

I shall adopt your lists in making the transfer as far as possible. There must be some variation, for they include Nipawni itself, which it could never have been your intention to make over to Kolapoor.

We must leave Appah Dessay, Nipawni, and perhaps from twelve to twenty of his oldest villages near it. The Kolapoor Vakeels wish to leave him only six, which they call his original possessions; or, at most, eight more, which they say are the first of the remaining villages which he acquired. Appah Dessay wants to retain twenty-seven villages; and he will, I suspect, not give up the ten or twelve which we require without compulsion, or the seizure of some of his other possessions. One of his garrisons fired on the party sent by my Amildar to take possession, and wounded two or three Peons.
He has got nearly a hundred persons belonging to the Sirkar districts in confinement at Nipawni. A list was sent to him with orders to release them: he promised to comply, but has set at liberty only a very small proportion of them. He keeps the others to extort money from them. This has been his practice for a long time, and many of his prisoners perish every year from cruel treatment.

I have informed his Vakeels that your cowle was conditional; that it stipulated his surrendering the districts which had been promised to the Kolapoor Rajah, and his obeying the orders of the Sirkar, and that if he fail in these points, the cowle is void. Should he attempt to retain any of the villages which are to be ceded, or of the prisoners belonging to the Sirkar villages, I shall, unless you order otherwise, direct the seizure of Annigerah, and of such of his possessions as can be secured by the Amildars.

The Kittoor Dessay has not paid any thing to the Darwar treasury, and probably as little to Poonah, for last year. It is said he owes the Peshwah five lacs of rupees for former years; his Vakeels deny the debt, and I have no means here of proving it. Some, or even a considerable part may be actually due, but if even the whole were due, we ought not, I think, to demand it. Our claims ought, I think, to be limited to last year, and all balances of former years to be remitted, whether due by the Kittoor Dessay, or any tributary or servant of the Poonah state.

An attempt to recover balances beyond last year from Kittoor, would not only be vexatious, but most likely unsuccessful; because, though the Peshwah did not receive the money, the greater part of it was, no doubt, paid to his servants by the Dessay, for permission to retain and squander the rest. It would, however, be desirable to ascertain the truth, because the remission could then be made to appear a liberal act of Government, instead of an omission resulting from ignorance. If the debt were just, we might
call upon the Dessay to pay the whole of last year's Peshcush; but if we had no certainty of the debt, it would be proper to make some remission to the Dessay in last year's tribute for his quiet conduct, and the early attachment he showed to our cause.

Now that the Peshwah has submitted, many of his old servants have probably returned to Poonah with their papers and Duftus, and can enable you to furnish me with some Mahratta statements, without which it is difficult to make any arrangements here. Those which I most want are:

1st.—A statement or yad of the Kittoor Peshcush, or annual revenue payable to the Peshwah.
2nd.—A statement in detail of the Kittoor balances.
3rd.—A statement in detail of the villages and other sources of revenue belonging to Kittoor at the time the Peshcush was fixed.
4th.—Statements of the Tynat Zabtahs, and the villages, and other sources of revenue held under the terms of Punderpoor, by the Putwurdans Gokliah, Rastiah, Nipawni, and Kittoor.

I do not want any thing in English that can be got in Mahratta.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp near Houbli, 7th July, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I am anxious to learn that Bajee Row is safe on the banks of the Ganges. I have heard that the allowance of eight lacs has been deemed too large, as the use of such a sum might be converted to dangerous purposes. There can be no difficulty, surely, in preventing his intriguing with the money. All that is necessary is, to give him
a Mergen Kabitah for servants, horses, furniture, clothes, &c., and to appoint an agent to disburse the cash under its proper head. There are, no doubt, many Company's servants who would be very glad to undertake the duties of this office. He might be called comptroller, or purveyor, or any thing else. It was a great object to secure the person of Bajee Row, and to hasten the termination of the war, by leaving to the enemy no object or pretence for continuing it. When men's minds begin to cool a little, and Bajee Row's treachery to be forgotten, they will not think eight lacs of rupees too much for the fallen head of the Mahratta empire.

I find that I cannot get away from India till January, as no ship of the Company sails till then. I never saw Bengal; and were I alone, I should certainly go through the Deccan and Hindostan to Ayra or Benares, and pay you a visit by the way. I am not sure that I should not attempt this journey with Mrs. M. if I were certain as to the best route, and to my not being too late in reaching Calcutta for the voyage.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Hoobli, 8th July, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I WROTE you a long letter two days ago, requesting that if they could now be found at Poonah, you would send me Mahratta copies of the Tynant Zabitahs, and of the villages, and rights composing the Jageers of the Putwardars, Nipaunikur, Kittoorkur, Ractiah, and Gocklah, as settled by the terms of Punderpoor. I have since received your letter of the 30th June, wishing to know what expectations I had held out to Appah Dessay. In answer to a
former letter of yours on this subject, I think that I wrote you two or three weeks ago, that I had been guided in my communication with his Vakeels by your letter from Poonah on his coming in, in which you mention your having told him that he must make sacrifices to enable you to perform your promises to other persons. I have not written on the subject to Appah Dessay himself, and my communications with his Vakeels have been all verbal and very general. In the early part of the war, I informed them, that if the Dessay returned within the period prescribed, he would suffer no loss; but that the Makhassah which he held in the Nizam's country would be resumed, and a compensation given for it. As he did not return at the time stipulated, I have since, in speaking of the Makhassah, told them that some allowance would be made for it; but I have not said that it would be an equivalent. I have always declined giving up a number of villages of his Jageer, resumed by Bajee Row, and restored by him, or seized by Nipauni last year, and afterwards occupied by my Amildars.

He retook the whole of the resumed one-third of his Jageer, but I expelled his people from the greater part of it. I imagine that the expectation of his Vakeels on my return from Sattarrah was, that we should take Chickori and Manowli, and the resumed part of the Jageer which he had recovered; and that we should leave him the remaining part of his possessions, giving him a compensation, though perhaps not a full one, for his Makhassah in the Nizam's country.

I consider us as being, with regard to the expectations held out to Nipauni, exactly in the same situation as when you wrote to him on his return from Bajee Row's army. We are not pledged to grant more than you then intended; but we may give as much less as may be rendered expedient by his subsequent conduct. He has already lessened
his claim to indulgence, by still retaining a number of the pretended Enam villages of Chickori, and many unfortunate persons of all classes belonging to the Sirkar Districts, who have been confined at Nipauni for several years. If he does not give up the whole of the villages and prisoners within the present month, he ought to be reduced to the state in which we found him in 1800, the Dessay of six or eight villages, and to be stripped of all the possessions which he has since acquired through the influence of the British Government. He is a man who will never be quiet as long as he has the power of exciting disturbances. His administration is so cruel and destructive, that his fall would be a benefit to the country, and to all his neighbours; and we ought, if he forces it upon us, to adopt the measure of reducing him to his original condition. What was said of his supporting Trimbuckjee by Bajee Row to Malcolm may be false; but it would be worth while to ascertain whether it be so or not. Many persons have probably by this time returned from Bajee Row who know the truth.

The Kittoor Vakeels state that the Pesheush is altogether one hundred and seventy-five thousand rupees Shapoori. That you made a settlement three years ago of the balances, which amounted to six hundred and twenty-two thousand one hundred and fifty rupees, for which Appaji Luchmun gave his bond. That he paid six lacs, leaving the balance of twenty-two thousand one hundred and fifty rupees. That no Pesheush was paid either for the year which has just expired, or the preceding one; but that great expense was incurred last year in acting against the Peshwah's troops at Belgaum, Padshapoor, &c. I know that the expense on this account was considerable; and as the Kittoorkur also rendered great services at the siege of Belgaum in furnishing materials, I should have been inclined to remit last year's Pesheush; but as he paid none the
preceding year, I think that he should pay the full Peshcush for last year, and that we should make no other demand upon him, whatever the amount of his balances may be. To claim such balances, would be going too far back into the affairs and abuses of the late Government, and it will be much better to begin our operations with as few accounts as possible.

I hope that you will as soon as possible let me know if you have any objection to this arrangement, or to the occupation of Annagerah, and other possessions of Appah Dessay, in the event of his not speedily surrendering the Enam villages and the prisoners.

The Kittoor Vakeels assert, that in the yad fixing the Pesheush, Suptgaon and Bagwaddi are included in his possessions; other accounts say not. I hope you can remove the doubt by sending me a copy in Mahrattah.

Yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

FROM SIR J. MALCOLM.

Camp, 10th July.

MY DEAR MUNRO,

I have received your two last letters; that dated the 19th ultimo came two days ago. You were right in your guess about my reason for thinking you sucht; your sentiments upon my settlement with Bajee Row were quite a cordial. I have not been so happy in this case as to anticipate the wishes of the Governor-General: he expected Bajee Row would get no such terms; that his distress would force him to submit on any conditions, and that his enormities deprived him of all right either to princely treatment or princely pension. I think his Lordship will, when he hears all, regret the precipitation with which he formed his judgment. In the first place, he will find,
that in spite of the report made by every commanding officer who ever touched Bajee Row, that he had destroyed him, that the latter was not destroyed, but had about six thousand good horse and four thousand infantry, and the gates of Asseir wide open, all his property sent in there, and half his counsellors praying him to follow it; while Jeswunt Row Lar was positively ambitious of being a martyr in the cause of the Mahratta sovereign. Add to this, the impossibility of besieging Asseir till after the rains, the difficulty of even half blockading it, and the agitated state of the country, and then let his Lordship pronounce the article I purchased was worth the price I paid, and he will find it proved I could not get it cheaper. There are, however, other grounds which I can never abandon, that recommend this course on the score of policy: our own dignity; considerations for the feelings of Bajee Row's adherents, and for the prejudices of the natives of India. We exist on impressions; and on occasions like this, where all are anxious spectators, we must play our part well, or we should be hissed. I have your opinion in my favour; I have Ochterlony, Elphinstone, and Jenkinson, and many minor men, and I think I will yet force an assent from head-quarters; but they foolishly enough committed themselves, knowing, as they stated at the time, their instructions would be too late. They did not think any circumstances could entitle him to have more than two lacs, and he was to be watched, restrained, and I know not what. My system is all opposite: I am either for the main guard, or a confidence that gives you a chance at least of the mind, the only other security except the body. You shall have a short narrative of my proceedings.

I grieve for your decay of vision, and none of your arguments will persuade me it is not at this moment a public misfortune; but you should not remain a moment longer
than you can help in India, and give up labour, the wearing is too serious.

I shall stay till August 1819, till I get answers to letters I now write. If not then appointed, I go home.

Yours sincerely,

John Malcolm.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Bangalore, 2nd September, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I received a few days ago yours of the 9th of August, with the paper on Appah Dessay's conduct with respect to Tumbuckjee, which I have sent to Mr. Chaplin; I have also got your letter of the 20th, and thank you for the favourable manner in which you speak of my conduct while under your orders. I should have been very happy to have continued longer in the Carnatic; but as a man must quit business some time or other, I thought I could not have a better one than when, all the rough work being finished, I could not have remained longer without engaging in details of revenue, &c. which would have led me on for several months; I would, however, have continued two or three months longer had I not fortunately got such a successor as Mr. Chaplin.

I wished much to have visited Calcutta; but as my baggage is still detained by the extraordinary rising of the Toombudra, I fear that I shall be too late.

I hope that the Nagpoor Rajah's followers have been dispersed. We are always in too great a hurry in withdrawing troops from new conquests.

Colonel D——— has been very unfortunate. His brother, who was formerly in the army, and latterly a planter and agent, has failed. The Colonel's property has gone
with the house, and he must also maintain his brother and family until something can be done for him. He has written, to our friend Malcolm, and to Mr. Russell, at Hyderabad, to see if they can find any employment for him. He thinks that there may be some situation among police-magistrates, or justices at Calcutta, or some office within your dominions, which your recommendation might enable his brother to obtain. I should be happy if it were the case, for the brother is an intelligent and worthy man. Next to his brother's situation, he is most vexed by the silence of the Madras Government respecting its own troops during the war. He fancies, too, that Sir Thomas is unwilling to notice the reserve, in order that the greater share of military honour may fall to those who were at Mahadpoor; and that as the distribution of military honours depends entirely on the names of officers being invested in the general order of thanks, that the officers of the reserve will be excluded.

I do not know any one officer who is more entitled to notice than D———, but I cannot help him; I am in disgrace myself, and regarded as a deserter from the Madras Commission to yours. Any thing that I could say would at Madras rather injure than serve him and the other officers. The only notice the Madras Government took of me or my letters to them, was in a letter of strong censure about the three troops of native cavalry, which, had I been permitted to carry to Sholapoor, not a man of the Peshwah's infantry would have escaped.

I have received your letter, with Malcolm's observations on our military arrangements; I shall return them after looking over them again.

I enclose a few observations on the Carnatic, which have, I believe, all been made before, but I thought it as well to put them together in our official papers.

Mr. Chaplin tells me that he has sent you a receipt for
the balance which I left in the treasury. It will be sufficient, with the Killar Peschcush still due, to pay his civil establishment and irregulars till December, when his kists of the current year will begin.

Yours most truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO KIRKMAN FINLAY, ESQ.

Bangalore, 11th Sept. 1818.

MY DEAR LORD PROVOST,

A few weeks ago, before I left camp at Darwar, I saw a sight gude for sair een—two of your letters, dated the 26th Feb. arrived under cover from Mr. Jas. Ritchie, your partner at Bombay. He wrote me, mentioning that he intended after the monsoon to visit the Mahratta country. I told him that I should probably have left it by that time, but that I would request my successor, Mr. Chaplin, to facilitate his operations in carrying into effect your threats of showing the Rayets how much better customers free merchants were than a Company of monopolists. Mr. Chaplin is one of the ablest men these monopolists have got in their service. I have given him a copy of the paragraph of your letter, which promises to give his Rayets more than any one else for their cotton; and if this be not done, I trust that he will let your friend Baillie Graham know of it.

A great deal of fine cotton is grown in the provinces which have fallen into our hands. I was too much engaged in war and politics to have time to enter into inquiries regarding its fitness for the European market. The inhabitants have been so much impoverished by their late weak and rapacious Government, that it will be a long time before they can be good customers to Glasgow or Manchester. In those districts which I traversed myself,
I fear that I left them no richer than I found them; for wherever I went I appointed myself collector, and levied as much revenue as could be got, both to pay my own irregular troops, and to rescue it from the grasp of the enemy.

I shall not trouble you with military operations, as you will get the details in the newspapers. It is fortunate for India that the Peshwah commenced hostilities, and forced us to overthrow his power; for the Mahratta Government, from its foundation, has been one of devastation. It never relinquished the predatory habits of its founder, and even when its empire was most extensive, it was little better than a horde of imperial thieves. It was continually destroying all within its reach, and never repairing. The effect of such a system has been the diminution of the wealth and population of a great portion of the peninsula of India. The breaking down of the Mahratta Government, and the protection which the country will now receive, will gradually increase its resources, and I hope in time restore it to so much prosperity, as to render it worthy the attention of our friends in Glasgow.

Baillie Jarvie is a credit to our town, and I could almost swear that I have seen both him and his father, the Deacon, afore him, in the Salt-market; and I trust, that if I am spared, and get back there again, I shall see some of his worthy descendants walking in his steps. Had the Baillie been here, we could have shown him many greater thieves; but none so respectable as Rob Roy. The difference between the Mahratta and the Highland Robs is, that the one does from choice what the other did from necessity; for a Mahratta would rather get ten pounds by plunder, than a hundred by an honest calling, whether in the Salt-market or the Gallowgate.

I am thinking, as the boys in Scotland say, I am thinking, Provost, that I am wasting my time very idly in this
country; and that it would be, or at least would look wiser, to be living quietly and doosly at home. Were I now there, instead of running about the country with camps here, I might at this moment be both pleasantly and profitably employed in gathering black Boyds with you among the braes near the Largs. There is no enjoyment in this country equal to it, and I heartily wish that I were once more fairly among the bushes with you, even at the risk of being stickit by yon drove of wild knowte that looked so sharply after us. Had they found us asleep in the dyke, they would have made us repent breaking the sabbath; although I thought there was no great harm in doing such a thing in your company.

My wife joins in best wishes to Mrs. Finlay and the family. 

Yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Bangalore, 13th September, 1818.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th August. I do not apprehend any insurrection in the south. None of the Jageerdars are, I believe, disposed to risk the loss of their possessions, and without leaders, scattered horsemen will not act, and if they did, they could do nothing. The materials for Pindarries are no doubt, as you say, doubled by the disbanding of the native soldiery, but then we are to consider that our means of suppressing them are increased in a much greater ratio.

The Pindarries were bold before, because they had a safe retreat in Malwa. Without a place of refuge there can be no formidable insurrection.

The individuals who must compose an insurrectionary force, have families, and houses, and property, and many
of them a mare and colt or two. They will not hastily put
these things to the hazard for the sake of getting a little
plunder, which they cannot be sure of keeping. Had
they strongholds or places of refuge into which we could
not follow them, they might rise; but they have not, and
therefore cannot rise. In all the countries south of Poon-
ah, at least, our authority pervades every part of the
country, and no assemblage could take place without our
knowledge. If there is any rising, it will not be as an
army or a military body, but as banditti, and I doubt if it
will ever go to this extent. If any small parties were to
enter the Nizam's territory, his own troops would be suffi-
cient to disperse them; and our seizing their small property
in our villages, would discourage any future attempts of
the kind. I would not, however, neglect the additional
security to be derived from our military force being kept
moveable: Rastrah's Jageer, and the districts on the
Kisnah, are the most likely places for disbanded horse to
assemble. As the weather moderates, the reserve might
move towards the Kisnah, traversing the districts where
there is any suspicion. For two years, at least, I would
make the division march over the country during the fair
season. I would also keep the assessment very moderate.
There are many advantages in this. It enables the coun-
try to recover from its depressed state. It occasions a
greater demand for hands in agriculture, and gives an
opening for the employment of the soldiery as cultivators
or servants, and it strengthens the attachment of the body
of the people to our Government.

I have much more cause than you to regret the close of
our official correspondence, and to wish for the continuance
of our private one. Nothing but the state of my eyes
would have made me leave the reserve this year, for in
every other respect I am in perfect health, and I think that
I feel marching in the sun less than I did fifteen or twenty
years ago. Some days I can read and write the whole day, others an hour or two makes me half blind, and obliges me to stop. This was the case yesterday, and I was obliged to leave this letter unfinished, like an old woman who lost her spectacles. I believe the difference is owing to my sometimes beginning in the morning with small print, or a crabbed hand, which makes my eyes smart for the rest of the day. I must get away from writing entirely, for some time at least, except now and then a private letter. I shall always find sight enough to read yours with pleasure, and to answer them, though I shall not have much to say that you care about. I mean to go to Madras in a few days, and from thence to Calcutta, if I can get a passage, though I do not know a soul there. I do not like, however, to leave India, without seeing the capital and the sacred stream. If I can find time I shall endeavour to go a few hundred miles up the Ganges, perhaps as far as Patna.

While writing I have got yours of the 3rd you wrote me before on the Sholapoor affair, and said more than I had any right to expect. I imagine you have assigned the true cause of Lord Hastings's silence. Sir Thomas could say nothing, as he had given up the army of the Deccan; and if he had said ever so much, it would have drawn nothing from the Madras Government.

Yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO MR. CHAPLIN.

Villore, 23rd September, 1818.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

Before I received your last letter, I wrote to you about the reports of insurrections; Mr. Elphinstone had written to me on the subject, and I answered that I had no faith in them. The Cutcherry people are all great
alarminists, Lachman Rowe in particular is very timid, and a great believer in plots. There are no doubt many people out of employment, and many dissatisfied, as must always be the case in every revolution; but where there is a strong government, these discontents gradually subside by the individuals who wish for a change finding that they are too weak, and betaking themselves to some peaceable occupation. Men who are soldiers, and not mere thieves, in order to rise must have a leader, a fixed object, and at least some hope of success. There is no respectable Jageerdar who would risk his possessions on the chance of overturning our power. Even if he were disposed to make the attempt, he would find very few followers, because almost all the owners of horses are landholders or respectable inhabitants, who will not subject themselves to confiscation of property and banishment for the sake of any leader. They know very well that if the Peshwah, with all the advantages of an unbroken army and military and civil possession of the country, could not oppose us, nothing can be expected from the efforts of a few insurgents but ruin to those concerned. Horsemen who will readily make an incursion into a foreign territory, will not easily be induced to try an insurrection in their own; because, in the one case, they have a safe retreat in their own country, in the other none. Mr. Elphinstone supposes that the insurgents may invade the Nizam's country; but they would still run the same danger of punishment, because your Amildars would know what men had left their villages, or returned to them from such expeditions. Mr. Elphinstone formerly wrote to me about stationing Akbar Nowirs at Minez, Tar-gaom, and other places of the Jageerdars. I requested him to send his own, and said that the Amildars would do what was necessary in the other districts. For intelligence one Teshildar is worth a dozen of Akbar Nowirs. He has much greater means of procuring information, and is much more
interested in getting what is correct. Nana Row, and men like him, who have served with horsemen, are more likely to ascertain what is going on than mere Maamlet men.

The Teshildar of Sholapoor was put in, because there was at the time no choice; but there had been too short a trial to know whether he was or was not as fit as others.

The Cusbah Bijapoor man was selected on account of his connections in the district, by whose means it was thought that he would be more likely to get possession of it than the best revenue man who had not been accustomed to such service. It was a duty on which very few wished at this time, the end of February, to go. I imagine he knows little of accounts and farms; but I believe he will become, if looked after, a very useful agent.

When the weather settles, the reserve ought to move about the country.

There are two men at Misnikottah who ought to be kept in irons at labour. One is the late Keladar. After taking cowle, and being permitted to remain in the country, they engaged in a plot to seize the place. I ordered them to be confined, meaning, on my return, to have tried them by a military committee. Before we returned from the Kisnah, they were reported dangerously ill with bowel complaints. I wrote to the Cutchery to have them taken out of irons until they got better, and never afterwards till now thought of them.

Yours truly,

Thomas Munro.

I came here to-day, and start to-morrow for Madras.
TO HIS BROTHER.

Madras, 30th September, 1818.

MY DEAR ALEXANDER,

There are two causes for my writing so little to you: one is, that I have more official writing than I can easily get through; and the other, and a much stronger one, is, that my sight has been so much injured by unceasing labour, by the climate, and perhaps by age, that I cannot write long without pain at any time, and some days my eyes smart so much, and become so weak, that I can hardly write at all. I have resigned the command of the reserve division of the army, which I had long anxiously coveted, and also my situation of Political Resident and Collector in the Southern Mahratta States. It was always my intention to have resigned when the war was finished, and to have gone home immediately. There was no chance when I resigned last month of getting home before January, but the state of my eyes made me resolve to give up my appointments, and to go and visit Bengal in the intermediate time. I do not care about military command, excepting in war. I saw no chance of a Government, and I am determined never to act in any subordinate civil capacity. I wrote from Bangalore, to have a passage taken for me to Calcutta; but on my arrival here, I found the Castlereagh had come in with a detachment of the 48th regiment from Botany Bay, and was to sail for England next month. I have taken my passage in her, and we shall probably sail about the 25th of next month, and, with a tolerable passage, we may expect to see England in March. I am sorry to leave India without seeing Bengal; but as I have nothing to do there, and might lose my passage both there and here, by finding all the ships full before I reached Calcutta, I do not think that the mere sight of Calcutta is worth the risk of longer detention in India.
I do not mean to enter into any details of the Mahratta war, which may be said to have terminated with the surrender of the Peshwah early in June, though some small places held out two months longer. The last place which held for the Peshwah was Paurghur, a hill fort among the Western Ghauts, to the north-west of Darwar. It made a celebrated defence in former days under Sevajee; it offered to surrender in April last, if the arrears of the garrison were paid. This was refused. Being out of the line of operations, no attack was made upon it. It was foreseen that, if left to itself, it would capitulate, when it saw all the surrounding country subdued, and no prospect of relief: it surrendered on the 8th of August.

A great deal more has been said than was necessary about this war. Our enemies, though numerous, were not more so than ourselves. They were from the beginning disorganized and contemptible. The Pindarries were magnified to five times their real number; Holkar's horse and foot made no resistance; his artillerymen stood by their guns while we were forming to attack them, and it was from them alone that any loss was sustained. The Nagpoor troops were still worse than Holkar's. The family of Purseram Bhow, and the other Southern Mahratta chiefs, who composed the main strength of the Peshwah's army, followed his standard, to save themselves from the disgrace of having deserted their sovereign. They were more afraid of us than of him, as their Jageers, lying chiefly to the southward of the Kisnab, were in a great measure at our mercy. They kept Vakeels secretly with us during the war, and they never acted with any vigour against us. Some of them left him in February; all of them by the end of April. The long and close pursuit by the force under Brigadier-General Doveton was the immediate cause of the final breaking-up of his army; he was not allowed time to rest or to feed his horses. He made his escape to the neighbourhood of Assurghur, with a rabble of a few
thousand horse and foot; some of them his own troops originally, and the rest fugitives from Nagpoor and Holkar. He pushed forward a Vakeel to Malcolm, who agreed, on condition of his disbanding his troops, and residing where the Governor-General might think proper, to secure him in the enjoyment of his personal liberty, and an annual allowance of eight lacs of rupees. The amount of the pension, and I believe also the principle of granting him any terms whatever, have been disapproved of. I certainly think differently; I think that great allowance should be made for a native Sovereign, reduced to a state of degradation by a foreign power, from which he can have no hope of rescue but by treachery. If we were to grant terms at all, I do not think the allowance of eight lacs was too much. It is idle to say that he may make a dangerous use of such a sum; because it may easily be expended on his account, without passing through his hands. He would no doubt have been compelled in another month or two to have surrendered at discretion; but the speedy termination of the war, and settlement of the country, was well worth the sacrifice. He had before made overtures at different times to Mr. Elphinstone, who rejected them, as he had been instructed to receive none but those of unconditional surrender. No instructions regarding him had been sent to Malcolm, as it never had been supposed that he would have left his own country, and taken refuge at Assurghur. It is a general opinion in the Madras army, that the Governor-General might have said a great deal less of the Bengal troops, and somewhat more of those of Madras. I shall, on my return to England, be as unsettled and as undetermined as to the place of my future residence as when I last went home.

Yours affectionately,

THOMAS MUNRO
CHAPTER VII.*

The same subject continued.—Letters to Sir John Malcolm, Mr. Elphinstone, the Commander-in-Chief, Quarter-Master-General, &c.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Darwar, 10th Aug. 1817.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

This place was given up on the 6th to Newall, and I came here to-day. Your letter of the 21st, from Anant-poor, reached me only yesterday. I read your 95 par. letter at Madras, but was obliged to read against time, which I do not like, and must therefore read it again when I can catch it. In the mean time I am satisfied that your reasonings are just, and that the view you have taken of the resources, &c. of the different Native Chiefs, and their inability to make any effectual opposition, is perfectly correct. There are, however, one or two things which I do not like. One is the preventing the Peshwah and other Princes from having Vakeels resident with each other. This is an old article of our policy, but, I think, a very useless one; it is worse, it is degrading and insulting our weak allies to no purpose. If they wish to intrigue, they can do so without a public minister at a foreign court, as

*Since the preceding Chapter was closed, other letters written about the same period have occurred, which are comprised in the present Chapter.
they can employ private agents. The restraint can therefore only have the effect of making them feel their humiliation. Why not let them please themselves with keeping up all the forms of independence? The check may be useful with respect to the reception of European agents; because an European cannot conceal himself and act privately.

The other point of which I do not approve is more subsidiary alliances. We have enough of them. It is now more advantageous, and certainly more honourable, for us to have no more of them; but when we are insulted, to make war, and obtain reparation either by cession of territory or money.

Yours truly,
Thomas Munro.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR T. HISLOP.

Camp Darwar, 15th August, 1817.

DEAR SIR,

I have reported officially to-day the arrival of Colonel Pritzler's force. The Colonel has mentioned to me what he knows of his future destination. As he is to command a corps of reserve, it would be desirable that he should move as soon as practicable towards the quarter where he is to be employed, in order that he may have time to make himself acquainted with the nature of the country in which he is to act. The only obstacle here to his marching, is the chance of some places being transferred to us by the Peshwah, garrisoned either by his own troops, or those of Zemindars, who might refuse to surrender unless a respectable force appeared. But as we have already got Darwar, and as a respectable force might still be kept in the field here, even if the Colonel were to march with his own corps and the European flank battalion, I do not
apprehend that there would be any disturbance in the province. I am uncertain what force exactly can be spared for these new districts; but, whatever it might be, I would put very little of it into garrison, and keep as much as possible in the field. If any of the Zemindars were refractory, their conduct might be overlooked until the return of quiet times. It would, however, be imprudent to encourage such opposition, by reducing the force too much.

Nobody has yet come from Poonah; and my last letters from Mr. Elphinstone, though they express a hope of a man being soon appointed by the Peshwah, do not fix any time for his being here; so that it may yet be some weeks, or even months, before we know whether any other forts will be required to be ceded to us. It is on this account that I think that the formation of the reserve ought not to be delayed till the result of the discussions with the Mahratta agent is known.

I remain, with great respect, dear Sir,
Your faithful servant,
Thomas Munro.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp at Annakerah,
16th October, 1817.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I have read your memorandums with attention, but to judge of them properly, it would be necessary to know something of the Bengal plan of operations. I have but one objection to yours; it aims too much at guarding every point. It is very proper to cover our own country as well as we can; but this can never be done more effectually, than by vigorous offensive operations with an overbearing force. I have seen no country which can be
secured against irregular horse by guarding passes. In almost all ranges of hills, there are many unfrequented passes through which they can come, when those better known are occupied. They can come through paths followed only by goatherds. Posts or detachments at a few principal passes may be useful, to watch the enemy and cover convoys. Rivers with only a few fords, are more easily guarded than passes. If the Pindarries get into your rear, the rapid occupation of the country in which they find shelter is the best way to bring them back. They may be left to the few troops stationed in the interior, to hunt as well as they can. Another objection I have to your plan is, that it does not employ me. Government have notified to me officially, that my civil duties terminate the beginning of January; indeed, I consider them as terminated now, for it will be nearly January before I can reach Madras, and whatever I have yet to do, can be done in my tent as well as anywhere else. I am so far on my way to Guadoor, but have been stopped today by the rain. The Jageerdar may be induced to give up quietly in the expectation of getting better terms from me, his old neighbour, than from a stranger. If he does not, we must try to get into his valley or gulley.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Tamberhilli, 1st November, 1817.

Sir,

My letters of the 27th and 31st October will have informed you of the quiet surrender of Sundoor by its chief Sheo Row. I wrote to him on the 18th October, apprising him of the object of my march, and offering him a jageer of eight thousand rupees in any part of the Company's territory. I did not consider this sum as being an
adequate compensation for the loss of his district, but as I was aware that many demands would be brought forward for relations and dependents, I thought it best to begin upon a low scale.

On the 22nd October, I received his answer, which expressed in a general way, that it was his wish to conform to the desires of the British Government, and stated that he would send two Vakeels to treat with me. The Vakeels arrived in camp on the 24th October, bringing with them a paper containing a long list of Sheo Row's demands, among which were a jageer of twelve thousand rupees for himself, smaller ones for his brother and sister, and provision for his principal servants. I promised that he should have a jageer of nine thousand rupees; that the Vakeels should each receive an allowance of fifteen star pagodas monthly, and that the other claims should be taken into consideration on my arrival at Sundoor. The Vakeels objected to the smallness of the jageer; they said that their master might submit, but that he would not consent to the arrangement. They were dispatched from camp on the 25th October with my answer, and were directed to inform Sheo Row, that if he intended to submit, I should expect him to meet the detachment on the outside of the pass which leads into his valley.

On the 27th October, the detachment, on approaching near the pass, was met by Sheo Row, attended by a few horsemen and peons. He conducted it through the defile and barrier which defends the entrance into the valley of Sundoor. On reaching the glacis of the fort, he drew up his party, and as he delivered the keys, he said, that he threw himself entirely on the protection of the British Government. He then asked leave to go away, and having obtained it, he called out to me, so as to be heard by all his followers, "Think of my situation, have some consideration for us all."
He went through all the ceremony of surrendering his fort and abdicating the government of his little valley with a great deal of firmness and propriety; but next day when he came to my tent with his brother and a number of his old servants and dependents, to solicit some provision for them, and to make some arrangements for the removal of his family to the Company's territory, he was so agitated and distressed, that he was obliged to let his brother speak for him. It was finally settled that the two Vakeels should each have an allowance of fifteen pagodas, and that his jageer, instead of nine thousand, should be ten thousand rupees, from which he should make such allowance as he chose to his relations and followers, and that the pensions and jageers should be granted in whatever part of the Company's possessions they might be required.

Though I deemed it advisable to limit myself in promising a jageer to ten thousand rupees, yet, when I consider what Sheo Row has lost, that he was as much a sovereign in his own valley as any prince in India; that it contained a regular fort, built by Hyder and Tippoo Sultan at a great expense; that it was besides so strong by nature, that no Mahratta power could have taken it from him; and that he had ruled over it from his infancy, for the space of twenty-one years without interruption, I cannot think that even the twelve thousand rupees which he has demanded would be more than a very inadequate compensation for the sacrifice which he has been compelled to make.

From the information which I have been able to collect, both from the inhabitants of Sundoor and those of the neighbouring districts under the British Government, concerning Sheo Row, his claims to Sundoor seem to be in some respects better founded than they are stated to be in your letter to Mr. Strachey of the 10th December, 1816. Sundoor formed a part of the principality of Mora Row,
the Mahratta Chief of Gooty, who was deprived of his dominions by Hyder Ally. His adopted son, Sheo Row Bapa, fell in battle, leaving a son, Seddajee, only two years old, under the guardianship of his uncle, Vencata Row. In 1790, Vencata Row and his nephew Seddajee, with a party of their own adherents, assisted by the inhabitants of Sundoor, expelled Tippoo Sultan's Keladar, and got possession of the place, which they were allowed to retain after the peace of 1792, as part of the ancient inheritance of their family. Seddajee died without issue in 1796, on which his uncle, Vencata Row, applied to Dowlet Row, the half-brother of Mora Row, for one of his sons to be adopted by the widow, which was refused. He then made the same request of Eshwunt Row, who also refused, but said that he might have one of the sons of his younger brother, Kundy Row. An application being made to Kundy Row, he consented, and gave his son Sheo Row, the present Chief. None of the descendants of Mora Row ventured to reside in Sundoor during the life of Tippoo, because, being completely surrounded by his dominions, they were afraid of being seized by treachery; but on his death, in 1799, Vencata Row and Sheo Row went to Sundoor. The Peshwah about the same time issued a sunnud, granting Sundoor as a jageer to Eshwunt Row. No use was made of this sunnud until some years after, when Eshwunt Row sent a copy of it with a letter to Vencata Row, saying that he wished that means might be taken to prevent discussions in their families. Vencata Row, therefore, sent for Narsing Row, the second son of Eshwunt, in 1804, and gave him an allowance of one hundred pagodas monthly; but as Narsing Row attempted to form a party, he was dismissed in 1808.

It would appear as if Eshwunt Row had acknowledged the claim of Sheo Row, from his permitting his son to serve under him. Whatever may be the question of right,
there can be none of possession,—Sheo Row has held it during the long period of twenty-one years. He was in fact an independent prince, by the same right that so many other Mahratta chiefs have become so. He was independent before the treaty of Bassein, and can hardly, therefore, be included among the refractory vassals whom the British Government are bound by that treaty to reduce, any more than many other greater vassals, who had before that time shaken off their allegiance to the Peshwah. It is true that the Peshwah has always regarded him as a rebellious vassal, and has never admitted his right to Sundoor.

I trust, however, that on considering the long possession of Sheo Row, his claims as the descendant of Mora Row, to a small corner of the dominions of his ancestors, and his patient and moderate conduct, the most Noble the Governor-General will be disposed to grant him a more liberal compensation for the loss of his little principality, than that which I have thought myself at liberty to promise. I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Darwar, 17th Nov. 1817.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I received yours of the 26th, with a copy of your letter to Mr. Adam, which I forwarded to Cole as you desired. You say that your letter would probably find me at Sundoor; it found me here the day I returned. Sundoor was taken possession of on the 27th ult. for the Peshwah; and on my arrival here on the 14th instant, I learned from Native accounts, that our friend Surmaul had attacked our troops at Poonah; that Goklah led the attack, which was repulsed; but that Surmaul, who had gone off the preceding night, returned and renewed the attack,
which lasted from three in the afternoon of the 5th, all that
day, all night, and next morning, when both sides stopped
fighting, some to drink, and some to amuse themselves,
and that the English force then retreated to the distance
of about ten miles from Poonah. This is all we yet have
learned. Had I still commanded the reserve, I would
have hastened to Poonah, without waiting for orders, be-
cause they must have been too late to be of any use; but
I am sorry to say that I was ordered to give up the com-
mand of the reserve after the settlement of Sundoor, and
that I am now, in fact, without employment of any kind.
My life as a Commissioner expires the beginning of Ja-
uary; so that if I am ordered to Madras, I shall be dead
before I get there, and here I have nothing to do. Newall
commands the garrison, and there are no other troops in
the province. The Mahratta commissioners have gone off,
and are raising troops, Peons, and tattoos in all quarters.
A detachment of a battalion of Sepoys, and a squadron
of cavalry, might reduce all the country south of the Mal-
purbah; but the best way of reducing this or any other
province, is to employ our troops against the enemy’s prin-
cipal force, and I am very anxious to be in such service in
any way. Had there been a force under me at this mo-
ment, I might have advanced and secured the aid of the
Putwurdars, or any chiefs that were wavering; and the
reduction of the Peshwah would not have been very dif-
cult. If we are not active, he will have time to make
many join him who have not yet perhaps committed
themselves.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.
Darwar, 21st November, 1817.

Sir,

No farther intelligence has been received from Poonah since my letter of the 19th instant. All the roads to the north of the Mullapaharri are guarded, and passengers stopped, and all the parties of horse south of Mirij have marched for Poonah. A letter has been received from Major Imlac, at Malwa, stating that an official account from the Government of Bombay, dated the 9th, had arrived on the 13th, which mentions, that the Peshwah's troops had been repulsed on the 5th instant; Government will therefore, I imagine, receive more accurate and speedy intelligence of the transactions at Poonah from the Bombay Government, than can be communicated from hence.

The rupture with the Peshwah will immediately occasion a considerable change in the plan of the campaign, and occupy a greater portion of our force to the southward than was intended. In my letter of the 18th instant, I proposed that a large body of military Peons should be employed, both in the Ceded Districts and in the Savanore provinces. The chief use of these Peons will be to protect the revenue and cultivation, by giving confidence to the inhabitants. In Savanore they will also answer, in some measure, the purpose of securing Soonda from incursions.

The most effectual mode, however, of securing our own territory from devastation, is to carry on vigorous offensive operations in that of the enemy. I would therefore recommend, that whatever force can be spared from Mysore and the Company's dominions, should be employed in this quarter. Were there a field-force here at this important crisis, it might in a few weeks reduce the whole
of the Savanore province, and deprive the enemy of great resources, and increase the difficulty of entering the Company's possessions from this quarter.

A body of four or five hundred Mysore horse, and as many foot, would be of the greatest service, with any field-force which might be assembled; and though the Rajah has, I believe, already furnished his full quota, if not more, it might be advisable in the present state of affairs to call upon him for farther aid; for every increase of force which is now brought forward, by hastening the termination, will eventually lessen the expense of the war.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE CHIEF SECRETARY OF GOVERNMENT.

Camp at Darwar, 22nd November, 1817.

SIR,

I have in a former letter observed, that there is not the smallest probability of any of the Malwa Pindarries approaching the Madras territory while their own districts are invaded. If our territories are invaded at all, it is most likely that it will be done by the Southern Mahrattas; but they will hardly venture to make the attempt, if their own districts are invaded by a strong field force. The exemption or not of the Madras territory from invasion will depend principally upon the manner in which operations are carried on against the Southern Mahrattas. Under this term, besides the Kolapoor Rajah, are comprehended five great feudatories, guaranteed by the Company, besides many inferior chiefs. Among all of these, though they sometimes act together, there is but little real union; if the officer, therefore, who commands in this quarter, were to take advantage of their separate interests, he might effect as much by negotiation as by force, and
for this purpose he should be entrusted with political powers.

I forwarded last night, by express, to Brigadier-General Pritzler, a copy of Mr. Elphinstone's dispatch. Whether he follows the plan suggested in that letter, or any other which may have been prescribed to him, I would beg leave to recommend that a small battering train, such as was proposed for Sundoor, be sent to Darwar as expeditiously as possible; and that every practicable exertion be made to assemble a small force at this place, composed of such troops as can be spared from Mysore and the Company's dominions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Thomas Munro.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Darwar, 23rd November, 1817.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Although I have written to you about three times within these few days, I am not sure that the Tappals may not be stopped, and therefore repeat the substance of what I have said. The rupture with the Peshwah makes the Southern Jageerdars a much more important object than ever. I still remain appointed to the command of the proposed Ceded Districts in this neighbourhood, but I have no disposable troops, except three or four companies of Newall's battalion, belonging to the garrison. My object is to get my old force, and if it is not required about Poonah, to employ it in reducing all the Southern Jageerdars, and to have political powers, to a certain extent, to make arrangements with those who were neutral, or joined us, or, after acting against us, might submit. My influence in the country, and the knowledge I have of the principal people, would enable me both to subdue
and tranquillize the country much sooner than if I had been a stranger to it. The arrangement is easy; it is only removing Pritzler to the Commander-in-chief's division, or, if you think that it will make no difference, it is only sending me to the Commander-in-chief's division. I have sent to Harpenhilli for a few hundred Peons, and on their arrival, I mean to take the field against some of the little garrisons on the Soonda frontier, which ought to have been given up two months ago under the treaty.

Yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BLACKER, &C. QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

Camp at Darwar, 3rd Dec. 1817.

* * * * * * *

While the Peshwah's army remains together in force, it may be necessary that the reserve should either join Brigadier-General Smith, or co-operate under his orders. Whenever the Peshwah's army shall be defeated, and broken into different bodies, incapable of making much resistance in the field, I am of opinion that the reserve should, without delay, proceed to the reduction of all the principal places belonging to the Peshwah and the hostile Jageerdars south of the Nerbuddah. This service might be effected in the course of a few weeks, and would contribute greatly both to cover our own frontier, and to weaken the Peshwah's force.

The Southern Jageerdars feel at this moment no inconvenience from the war. Their territories are untouched, and they are drawing greater resources from them than in the time of the most profound peace; and whilst this is the case, they will be able to support the Peshwah with their full quota as long as he may require their services.
They have all forts where their families reside, where their property is deposited, and where their reserve and supplies are collected. These forts, and the principal fortified villages, ought to be taken possession of, and garrisoned by Peons from Mysore and the Ceded Districts, and Amildars appointed to secure, as far as practicable, the resources of the country, for the use of the Company’s troops.

The Southern Jageerdars, with the exception of Goklah, are men who have long held great hereditary possessions, and who are too fond of their ease to sacrifice them in the cause of the Peshwah. The reduction of these forts will therefore either compel them to seek peace, or deprive them of the means of continuing the war with effect.

* * * * * *

The plan of operations which I have ventured to suggest, is founded upon the supposition that the Peshwah will prosecute the war for some time. While the reserve is so employed, I see no cause to apprehend that any party of Pindarries will approach the Toombudra, or even that any body of Mahrattas will attempt to pass the river.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE DECCAN ARMY.

[Plan of Campaign.]

Camp at Darwar, 5th December, 1817.

DEAR SIR,

In my official letter of the 2nd instant, to the Quarter-Master-General, I stated my opinion as to the plan of operations that ought to be adopted by the reserve, and
transmitted a copy of my letter to Brigadier-General Pritzler on the subject,

Mr. Elphinstone, in a letter to me of the 7th November, expressed a wish that the reserve should move towards Mirij; and General Smith, in a letter of the 9th, that the 7th Regiment Native Cavalry might be sent to him. I did not think the regiment could be detached with safety, and I thought it better that the whole force should march and either join or co-operate as circumstances might require. Though the Peshwah was defeated and driven from Poonah on the 15th ultimo, yet, as Brigadier-General Smith had no regular cavalry, the enemy could have suffered very little loss except in infantry. The Bombay official accounts of the 20th ultimo say that the Peshwah has taken refuge in Poorundur: the Native reports say, with more probability, that he is with his army near Sattarah. My object in wishing the reserve to join Brigadier-General Smith is, that the Brigadier-General, by having under his command a strong cavalry corps, may be able to force the Peshwah to action, and to make his defeat destruction. Whenever the Peshwah's army is weakened, either by defeat or the defection of its chiefs, the reserve should, I think, instantly repass the Ksannah, in order to reduce the southern provinces. Brigadier-General Pritzler will probably not be able to keep open his communication for supplies on the line on which he is now moving; but as he has at least forty days' with him, he will be able either to join General Smith, if required, or to return to meet his supplies. Had he been in this neighbourhood, I would have desired him to move by the road from Darwar to Mirij. This would have made his communication safer, because he could have taken possession of a line of little Garries, into which garrisons of Peons might have been thrown; but he was already passing the Ksannah before I
received any orders to direct his movements. The Southern Jageerdars, who form a considerable part of the Peshwah’s force, can be under no necessity to abandon his cause while their own districts are untouched. The conquest of them would either compel them to submit, or deprive them of the means of keeping their followers together. The moment, therefore, that I can learn from Mr. Elphinstone or Brigadier-General Smith that the reserve is not required beyond the Kishnah, I shall recall it to this side of the river, and employ it in reducing the country to subjection. I have, with this view, requested that the battering train prepared at Ballari may be sent to this place.

As I am confident that there is no danger of Pindarries approaching the Toombudra, and hardly any of invasion from the southern Mahrattas, and that the most effectual way to prevent it is to use vigorous offensive operations for the reduction of their districts, I have addressed Government, proposing that a force consisting of one battalion of Native Infantry, half of the 69th Regiment, half of the 25th Light Dragoons, and half the 5th Native Cavalry, be employed in the southern Mahratta provinces. If this force, or even half of it, is placed at my disposal, there would be no necessity for my having any direct command of the reserve; General Pritzler would encamp separately, and might cover the siege of such places as I found it necessary to attack. Even if Government object to sending any troops beyond the frontier, I might take four or five companies from Darwar, and get a small party of Mysorians, and should only occasionally, in the attack of places, require from General Pritzler a reinforcement of European and Native Infantry. At all other times I would exercise no direct command.

I am, with great respect,
Your Excellency’s faithful servant,

Thomas Munro.
TO THE SAME.

Camp at Darwar, 7th December, 1817.

DEAR SIR,

I enclose a letter of the 1st instant from Mr. Elphinstone, though it is probable that more recent intelligence has reached head-quarters. I also enclose a letter from me to Brigadier-General Pritzler, and I hope that the important events which have lately occurred, will be some excuse for the length and frequency of my letters.

The Peshwah might be the most formidable enemy among all the Mahratta chiefs were he ably directed, because he is the head of those chiefs, and because his dominions comprise all the ancient country of the Mahrattas, and hence he has much more influence over his subjects than Scindia and Holkar, who are by them regarded as strangers. But he is weak and timid, and trusted by nobody, and is probably by this time anxious for peace. Goklah is his principal director, and the chief instigator of the war. Most of the Southern Jageerdars would, I believe, be well pleased to find a decent pretext for getting out of it. But while the Peshwah himself is with his army, and while their own Jageers are not invaded, they cannot leave him without disgrace. If a force were employed in reducing and occupying the principal places of the Nepauni, or any other chief, it would induce him to quit the Peshwah, in order to make terms for himself, and his example would soon be followed by others. But even if these chiefs persisted in adhering to the Peshwah, the occupation of their Jageers would deprive them of the requisite resources for keeping their followers together.

There can be little doubt but that the Peshwah's army may in a short time be compelled to disband, by the force which may be brought against it from different quarters;
but this result would be much facilitated by employing in the attack of places such corps as are not required for the pursuit of the enemy. It appears from Mr. Elphinstone's letters, that General Smith has already as much, if not more infantry, than is wanted for this object. Every additional corps of infantry will, therefore, tend to render his force less efficient for pursuit. It is only a greater proportion of cavalry and light troops that is wanted to aid his operations. General Pritzler might, therefore, with the cavalry and rifle detachment, act with General Smith in the pursuit of the Peshwah, until such time as that officer and Mr. Elphinstone might deem it advisable that he should return to the South, either to join me or take up a position beyond the Kismah. The infantry of the reserve, with any additional infantry that General Smith can spare, might be sent back immediately in order to be employed in the reduction of the southern Mahratta country, which would answer the double object of covering the western part of our frontier on the Toombudra, and of drawing off the southern Mahrattas.

I am, with great respect,
Your Excellency's faithful Servant,
Thomas Munro.

Since writing the above, I have received the Quarter-master General's letter of instructions, dated the 19th ultimo, by which I am directed to consider the protection of the Company's territory as the first object, Hyderabad as the second, and the southern Mahrattas as the third. I am satisfied that the best way of giving additional security to the Company's territory is to reduce the Savanore and Darwar provinces. I shall direct Brigadier-General Pritzler not to go too far north, but to return towards Bijapoor as soon as possible.

It is evident, however, that while I am confined to Dar-
war, and am restricted by the instructions received through the Quarter-master General from joining the force personally, the instructions I may send to it must often, from the change of circumstances, be rendered inapplicable before they can reach it. Before an answer to any thing I may hear from General Pritzler can reach him from me, ten or twelve days must elapse, and more if the Tappals or messengers are interrupted, which must be expected. During this period the rapid succession of events must render orders dated ten or twelve days back not only useless, but frequently dangerous to be acted upon.

Were I present with the force, it would move instantly upon my hearing of any event which rendered a particular movement necessary.

Your faithful Servant,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE CHIEF SECRETARY OF GOVERNMENT.

Camp at Darwar, 10th Dec. 1817.

Sir,

Since my letter of the 2nd instant, I have learned that there are in the Northern Sirkars, including Guntoor, nine battalions of Native infantry, and that another battalion is now on its march to that quarter. I would beg leave respectfully to submit, that however proper this distribution of force might have been at the time it was made, the war with the Peshwah renders it advisable that a part of it should be withdrawn, and brought where it may be employed to more advantage.

Any force stationed in the Sirkars, however large it may be, can only be employed in the defence of the country. It can take no part in offensive operations, and as far as regards them is completely useless. It can hardly be necessary at the present moment to keep up a whole army
in that district solely for internal security. The presence of the Bengal and the Madras armies on the Nerbuddah, contributes perhaps more to the defence of the country than that in the Sirkars, which is distant from every foreign enemy. The Ceded Districts are separated from the Mahrattas only by the Toombudra; yet the force in the Sirkars is, beyond all proportion, greater than that in the Ceded Districts. Whatever force is brought forward to the Toombudra comes into the general field of operations, and becomes immediately applicable to every service, either of defence or incursion of the enemy’s territories, or for covering convoys to and from the armies in advance. The officer commanding in the Ceded Districts, cannot at this moment spare a single company for an escort; and has on that account been obliged to detain three companies belonging to the reserve, which is exposed to great inconvenience from their absence.

I would therefore beg leave to suggest, that the battalion of infantry now on its march to the Sirkars, and two of those stationed there, be moved without delay to the Ceded Districts. This would leave seven battalions of Native infantry for the protection of the Sirkars, including Guntoor, which are certainly amply sufficient for this purpose. The petty incursions of the followers of refractory Zemindars, have always prevailed more or less for these last fifty years. They are but of secondary importance, and ought not to interfere with the great object of subduing the foreign enemy.

I would propose, that when the Sirkar battalions entered the Ceded Districts, the battalions in the Ceded Districts should march for Darwar, in order to be employed in the reduction of that province. If two battalions join me, I shall be able to reduce all the country south of the Malpurbah; if three battalions, all the country south of the Ksnaah. If they were now with me, I should not
only be able to do this, but to pay them from the revenue, though the Mahrattas have already collected a considerable part of it, and are urging the collection of the remainder by every possible means. The defraying of the expense of the troops is, however, but of little importance, compared with the advantages which would result from this conquest. It would give great additional security to our frontier, by removing the Mahrattas above a hundred miles farther from it than they now are. It would facilitate the communication between our own territory and the corps in advance. It would cut off the resources of the southern Jageerdars, and compel them either to submit, or to disband the greater part of their troops, from the want of the means of maintaining them; and it would thus contribute essentially to the dissolution of the Peshwah’s army, if it should not previously be effected by the forces engaged in its pursuit.

The conquest of the Darwar and Savanore provinces would be easier than that of any other portion of the Peshwah’s dominions above the Ghauts, because the vicinity of Soonda, in the Ceded Districts, would enable us to annex every acquisition immediately to our own territory, and to draw from thence and from the Mysore, Peons to garrison all the little forts, for which regular troops were not required.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp at Darwar, 18th Dec. 1817.

SIR,

I SHALL treat all the Jageerdars except Gocklah as friends. I have frequent communications with the Dessay of Kittoor, and have little doubt, both from the local situ-
ation of his country and other causes, that he is sincere in his professions. I shall, however, put his sincerity to the proof in a few days, by calling upon him to aid us in expelling a party of the enemy from a small place in this neighbourhood. I have already got possession of a considerable number of places in this district, entirely by the assistance of the inhabitants, of whom nine-tenths at least are in our favour. In my letter of the 14th instant, I mentioned that Purrusythur had set the example, and that all that the inhabitants had requested was, that they should not be transferred to any Jageerdar. I should have little doubt of gradually getting possession of all the territory south of the Malpurbah, by the help of the armed inhabitants, if the enemy had nothing to oppose to us but their garrisons. But as they are increasing the body of horse near Badaumi under Cassi Row, who may be expected to act immediately, and as we have no moveable force while the reserve is at a distance, it may become difficult to keep what we have got. The two places mentioned in your letter would be of great use in securing our communications, and might be easily taken were the reserve near.

The Commander-in-Chief's instructions to me of the 19th ultimo, direct me to consider the Company's frontier as the first object, Hyderabad as the second, and the southern Mahrattas as the third. It is evident that there is nothing to hinder the enemy, while the reserve is in advance, from collecting two or three thousand horse to the eastward of this, who, though they will not face our troops, may attempt to pass the frontier and plunder the country. This might be prevented by having a force, exclusive of the garrison of Darwar, of not less than a complete battalion of Sepoys, to move between the Kishnab and the Toombudra on whatever point it might be necessary. You will be able to judge whether the reserve ought to act with General Smith's force, or to return to the Kishnab. If it
return immediately, we should soon get possession of what was necessary in the Carnatic, which, by covering the Company's frontier, would leave that force more at liberty to act at a distance.

If the Peshwah continue to keep the field with his cavalry, it might be advisable to employ whatever infantry we could spare, after leaving a sufficient body to support our cavalry in the pursuit, and to cover our bazars and convoys in the siege of those places whose reduction would most distress the enemy. The war would be more likely to be brought to a speedy termination by reducing the strong places, as well as by following the enemy in the field, than by limiting ourselves entirely to his pursuit.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Camp near Darwar, 26th January, 1818.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

Your performance at Mahedpoor had reached me before I got your letter, but I rejoice to see it under your own hand. I rejoice that you have acted so conspicuous a part in that drama, both on your own account, and on that of the honour of the coast army. You have nobly supported each other, and I have nothing to regret but that I was not present. This victory will be decisive of the fate of the war in all other quarters. Surmaul may again once or twice traverse the whole length of his dominions, and probably of a part of the Nizam's, but he must submit. There will be some difficulty in arranging matters so as to keep down the Pindarries after they are dispersed and expelled. The states in which they lived must either be made strong enough for this purpose, or the neighbouring ones must be able to confine them to their own districts, if they are al-
lowed to have any. Your battle, while it lasted, seems to have been as severe as that of Assaye; but I do not understand why you did not instantly follow up the victory, instead of halting four days to sing Te Deum, and write to your grandmothers and aunts how good and gracious Providence had been. We shall talk it all over, some rainy day, in the Strand or Oxford-street.

Between three and four hundred Pindarries crossed the Toombudra on the 6th and repassed it on the 18th; about half of them were killed before they reached the Malpurbah on their way back. This twelve days' irruption of three hundred horse has thrown the whole country, to the Carnatic, into alarm. Lang has been censured for letting me have two hundred cavalry to guard my camp while I was besieging Gudduk with an army of four hundred Sepoys. But what is much more serious, the 29th, and detachment of the 22nd Light Dragoons, ordered by Lord Hastings to reinforce the reserve, have been detained until farther orders in the Ceded districts, by Government, and I don't know when I shall get them. This has disconcerted my whole plan of driving the Peshwah's troops from all their possessions south of the Kisnah.

Yours most truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Badaumi, February 21st. 1818.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive, on the 12th instant, your letters of the 31st of January and the 1st of February, with a copy of your letter to Mr. Adam, of the 17th of January.

I expect every day a copy of the cipher, which will enable me to understand fully the plans proposed in these
letters, of which at present I can only form a very imperfect idea. The plan of operations against the Peshwah should be regulated by the amount of the whole force that is likely to be brought against him, not only by General Smith and the reserve, but by the divisions under the immediate command of General Doveton and of the Commander-in-chief. As I have no information regarding any of the divisions excepting General Smith's and the reserve, it is only upon the employment of these two that I can offer any opinion. I suppose that General Smith, when joined by the cavalry of the reserve, will always be able to keep within one or two marches of the Peshwah, and that he will occasionally be able, in favourable situations, to leave his infantry and push him with cavalry alone to a certain distance. If General Smith, instead of being able to follow the Peshwah closely, should be left five or six marches behind, nothing will be gained by the junction of the reserve cavalry to his force, the Peshwah would be less harassed than at present, and might, during the intervals when he had left the pursuing force at a distance, do much injury both to us and our allies in the southern districts. This might in some degree be prevented, if the reserve were so equipped as to be able, after leaving its heavy train in some fort or post, to move expeditiously to the point of danger. Such a movement might, however, prove extremely inconvenient by being required in the middle of a siege. The most effectual, and, I believe, the only mode of securing and extending our acquisitions in this quarter, is to allot for these objects such a force as might meet the Peshwah's cavalry without danger, or maintain itself against his whole army, by taking up a position protected by a fort or garrisy. If we leave this country without a force to protect it, an invasion of a few days might produce a very dangerous reaction. The people would lose their confidence in our power of defending them, and
arm against us in order to save themselves from punishment by their former masters. The force which I should think necessary for the Carnatic would be two battalions of Native Infantry, in addition to the battalion and detachment of the 22nd Light Dragoons, already ordered by the Governor-General, with a proportion of artillery, and a body of irregular cavalry of from five hundred to a thousand. The force would perhaps be more efficient if four or five hundred Europeans could be substituted for one of the battalions of Native Infantry. Europeans are necessary for the storming of forts, but more particularly where a part of the garrison is composed of Arabs. If it were smaller, it would be unequal to the complete conquest of the Peshwah’s and Gocklah’s possessions in the Carnatic; because, after taking the forts, it would not be able to spare garrisons for their defence. It might occasionally either join the main body of the reserve, or give or receive reinforcements from it. The heavy division formed, as you propose, partly from the reserve and partly from General Smith’s force, for the siege of forts ought to begin with that of Sattarah, because this place, though of little strength, is of great political importance. After Sattarah, no place could be so useful in every view as Nepauni; its capture would compel Appah Dessay to quit the Peshwah, and his example would undoubtedly be followed by all the Southern Jageerdars, for they adhere to him only because none of them like to incur the reproach of being the first to desert him. The defection of these chiefs would soon be followed by the dissolution of the Peshwah’s army. The fall of Nepauni, even if it did not make its Chief abandon the Peshwah, would make us masters of the Carnatic, for though Belgaum, a strong fortress belonging to the Peshwah, would still remain, its situation does not enable it to command the country, excepting to a very small distance. By the possession of the Carnatic, we should have in our hands the best means both of forcing
the Jageerdars to leave the Peshwah, and of carrying on
the war against him. If we do not take Nepauni, we shall
not be able to subdue the Carnatic; for though we might
seize the lands of Appah Dessay, they would be recovered
again by troops detached from his capital, and this could
not be prevented without employing a greater force for the
purpose than we can spare. The siege of Nepauni should,
if possible, be commenced by the 10th of next month,
which will allow sufficient time to Appah Dessay to re-
nounce the Peshwah's cause, if he be so disposed. The
force now with me is hardly adequate to the reduction of
the place with the ordinary garrison; but as the garrison
has already been, and may be still further augmented, the
capture of the place could not be insured without a greater
force. I would therefore recommend that either the whole
of the heavy division now acting under General Smith,
or the infantry and artillery of the reserve, should be
ordered to join the force now with me in order to carry on
the siege. With such a force the operations could last
only a few days, and the troops brought from the North
of the Kisnah might be immediately sent back. There is
no place whose fall would have so great an influence in
hastening the termination of the war as that of Nepauni;
for it would give us possession of the Carnatic, from the
Toombudra to the Kisnah, and of all the resources of
the Southern Jageerdars. The Vakeels of Madho Row
Dajee and of Gopaul Row arrived in camp some time ago.
They have, in all their discussions with me, repeated nearly
the same language as in their meetings with you. Madho
Row's Vakeel stated the difficulty of withdrawing his mas-
ter's son and nephew in safety from the Peshwah's camp,
as great obstacles in the way of his complying with the
terms proposed by you. Gunput Row's Vakeel asked,
how his master, after bringing away his troops, was to be
protected, if the Peshwah marched towards his Jageer? I
told him that Gunput Row might either shut himself up
in a garry for a few days, retire into the Company's country, or join one of their armies; but both Vakeels maintained, and I believe with truth, that the main objection to acceding to our terms, was the disgrace of abandoning the Peshwah. I observed that Purseram Bhow had not been so scrupulous in remaining in the Peshwah's cause. They answered that he had transferred his allegiance to another Peshwah, and that if another were now set up, they could do the same. I informed them that I had no authority to say in what manner the final arrangement would be made, but that their masters must in the meantime recall their troops to their respective Jageers. They left me on the 19th instant, after promising that their masters would comply with the terms proposed in your letter, and they would themselves return as soon as possible with their answers.

I received yesterday a letter from the Nepauni chief, brought by Walli Khan, the same Jemadar of horse who brought me his first letter in November last. The letter stated that the Jemadar was authorised to treat with me. Walli Khan, however, denied that he had such authority; he said that he could treat, but that he could settle nothing without the presence of Appaujei Litchmen, his master's Vakeel. He spoke much of the good advice given by his master to the Peshwah, and of his wish to bring about a peace. I answered that no proposition could be received regarding the Peshwah, unless it came openly from himself, and that our discussions must be confined to the point of the Nepaunikurs being willing or not to renounce the cause of Bajee Row. In reply, he said a great deal of his master's obligations to the British Government—of his wish to continue under its protection—of his conduct in not acting hostilely towards our armies, but merely accompanying the Peshwah with his contingent, and of the disgrace to which he would be exposed were he to desert him. As he appeared to think that the disgrace
consisted, not so much in the act of desertion itself, as in the reproaches which would be cast upon him, I answered that there could be no disgrace in abandoning a cause in which Gocklah and Trimbukjie were principals, and that as the other Jageerdars would undoubtedly follow his example, it could not be supposed that they would reproach him for what they had themselves done, and that he would have the advantage (as the first to join us) of greater consideration in the final settlement of the Carnatic. He asked what this advantage would be. I answered, in granting some additions to his Jageer, and making the conditions of his service easier; but that they could only be settled by his master’s returning with his troops to his own Jageer; that I would give him fifteen days to go to camp, and return with the Vakeel; and that if within that period his master did not either actually quit, or agree to quit Bajee Row, the British Government would not deem it necessary to respect his master’s possessions any longer.

Camp at Bagri-Cottah, 22nd February, 1818.

The object of Appah Dessay is evidently to gain time, in the hope that his mediation for the Peshwah may be accepted, or that by some of the other chiefs leaving him, he may be spared the disgrace of having been the first to do so. There can be no doubt but that his attention to his own interest will induce him to take this step, but no dependence can be placed upon any promise he may make of doing it at a particular time. We ought also to consult our own convenience, and act against him when we are ready. I think that a force ought to be assembled for the siege of Nepauni by the 10th or 15th of March. If we are not prepared to reduce this place, the partial seizure of his lands might serve only to irritate and bind him closer to the Peshwah. I have had no message or Vakeel from Chintamin Row. His Jageers are more within our reach
than those of Nepauni; but I should wish to delay taking advantage of his circumstances as long as it can be done with safety to ourselves. I shall immediately endeavour to raise a few hundred irregular horse in the Carnatic, both with the view of employing them against the enemy, and of showing that they may find service under our Government. I shall not send you any of the Peons or irregular infantry of the country, because their expense far exceeds any service they can render. They will not cross the Kisnah for less than seven rupees a month for each private. They would be more than double the expense of regular Sepoys. One thousand Sepoys, however imperfectly trained, would go farther than five thousand Peons in protecting our conquests: I employ Peons only because I cannot get regulars. There are no troops so cheap as regular Sepoys, either in subduing or maintaining possession of a country; they should therefore be recruited with increasing exertion as long as the war lasts.

The infantry force in the field in this province has, until within a few days, varied from two to six companies from the garrison of Darwar, with two companies of the second battalion 12th regiment Native Infantry, which joined with the battering train. The reinforcements ordered by the Governor-General joined during the siege of Badami, which place was taken by storm on the morning of the 18th instant. Bagricottah was abandoned by the garrison on the 20th instant, and we took possession of the place this morning. Cassi Row, Gockla and Madden Sing, who left this neighbourhood on the 19th, are said to have repassed the Kisnah with the remains of their horse.

I trust that I shall as soon as possible receive your answer respecting the proposed operations against Nepauni.

I have, &c.

Thomas Munro.
CHAPTER VIII.

Sir Thomas Munro as Governor of Madras.—Minute on Interfering with the Succession of Native Princes.—Minute on the State of the Country, and the Condition of the People.—Minute on the Preservation of the Peace.—Minute on Sir John Malcolm's Code of Instructions.—Minute of a Tour through the Southern Provinces.—Letter to Mr. Canning.

MINUTE BY SIR THOMAS MUNRO, ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERFERING WITH THE SUCCESSION OF NATIVE PRINCES. 27TH APRIL, 1821.

1. Mr. Campbell, the Collector of Bellary, has stated that the Nabob of Karnool is in such bad health, that his death may be looked for every day, and he has requested instructions as to the conduct he is to observe, should that event take place. He suggests the expediency of placing Muzaffer Khaun in confinement, and of compelling the Nabob to release Daood Khaun, whom the Supreme Government are disposed to regard as the person having the best claim to the succession, and who is now kept as a prisoner at Karnool. We have already, within these few years, engaged in two expensive military expeditions to Karnool, for the purpose of placing a Nabob on the Musud, and the execution of the measures proposed by Mr. Campbell would oblige us to engage in a third.
2. The nature of the particular dependency of Karnool upon us, does not seem to require that we should be forward in interfering with the succession, but rather that we should abstain from it whenever we can, without injury to ourselves. On the breaking-up of the Mogul empire, the Nabob of Karnool, like the Nabob of Cudapah, and many other chiefs, seized his own district, and became, in fact, the prince of it, acknowledging, however, the Soubah of the Deccan's claim to military service as his feudal lord, but maintaining his own exclusive right to the internal government of his country. Karnool was transferred to us upon this footing by the Nizam in 1800.

3. Whatever may be the rule of inheritance among private persons, it is certain that priority of birth in claims to dominion has never in India been much attended to, except among sons of the same mother. The elder son is frequently excluded, by the choice of the father falling upon a younger son by a mother of higher birth than that of the elder; and the choice in such cases is usually supported by the principal officers; and I think that it will in general be our best course to adopt this choice. Were an adventurer to set up his standard, and endeavour to get possession of Karnool by force of arms, our interference might then be proper; but this is not a case ever likely to occur. In all cases, where the dispute is between the different members of the family, I think that we ought to confirm the choice of the father, and of the leading men of the country.

4. I see no good, but much evil, in following any other course. It may be asked, what useful object is to be attained by our interference? If we wish to establish a prince who is disagreeable to the leading men of Karnool, we must do it by force, at an expense probably of eight or ten lacs of rupees. This is as much as the whole Peshecush is worth; for it amounts only to a lac of Hyderabad ru-
If we wish to reimburse ourselves, we can do it only by taking possession of the country, and collecting the revenue for ourselves; but as it amounts only to about eight lacs of rupees, and as a great part of it is mortgaged to creditors, or assigned to military followers, it would require several years to liquidate our demand, during which time we should in fact set aside the Prince whom we had undertaken to protect. Could it be shown that any material advantage, either immediate or distant, is likely to result from this interference, either to the people of Karnool, or to those of our own provinces, there might be some reason for incurring the expense with which it is always attended. But so far from doing any good, we always do mischief by it. The Nabob whom we set up will, from his confidence in our support, commit many acts of oppression, which he would not otherwise have thought of; because we remove the salutary check which the fear of his own followers and people imposes upon him. If we expected to make him act right by giving him advice, we should only make him worse; he would become jealous and suspicious, and would punish every person, either openly or secretly, whom he suspected of having complained against him. We know perfectly that there can be no middle course in such interference; that if we seek to interfere effectually in the internal affairs of Karnool, or any other Indian principality connected with this Presidency, we must go on, from step to step, on the specious plea of protecting the inhabitants, until we have usurped the whole government of the country, and deposed the Prince; unless, therefore, we are determined beforehand to go to this extremity, we ought cautiously to abstain from entering upon a line of measures which must inevitably lead to it.

5. As I think that we have no right to meddle in the affairs of Karnool, on the pretence of maladministration,
or the sufferings of the people, or on any other grounds than those of securing our own rights of Peshcush, and military service, and the peace of our own districts, I think that we ought to wait quietly for the Nabob's death, and to acknowledge as his successor the person of his family who by his choice and the support of his officers may be enabled to assume the government. If we were now to move a military force to release Daood Khaun, or to support his claims, we should voluntarily, and without the smallest necessity, incur all the expense that would be likely to be occasioned, even by a contested succession. No party in Karnool could make any serious opposition; so that the expense of the military force would be nearly the same, whether employed in placing a Nabob peaceably on the Musnud, or in removing one who had already usurped the government: if we march so suddenly as to give the Nabob no time for preparation, and instant submission follows, we gain nothing; for if we withdraw our troops, the same opposition may be renewed whenever the succession becomes vacant. If, on the other hand, we wait for the death of the present Nabob, and he is quietly succeeded by a candidate whom we approve, we avoid all expense: if the successor should be a person whom it may be deemed advisable to remove, and a force is required to effect it, we can in this case resume the jageers of his adherents, and remove them from the district, which will be the most effectual means of ensuring future tranquillity.

It is not at all unlikely, that were we to make any movement in favour of Daood Khaun, it might induce the Nabob to have him secretly put to death. Goolaum Russool, who was destined for the succession by his father, the late Nabob, is said to be the favourite of the present Nabob and of the people, and would probably succeed without opposition; and in that case we could not do better than to acknowledge his title. It is of no importance to us
whether he or any other person of the family ascend the Musnud; whoever does will always be punctual in the discharge of his duties to the British Government. The Nabobs of Karnool are too dependent ever to act otherwise; they have always been regular in the discharge of their tribute, and zealous in their endeavours to apprehend and deliver up all disturbers of the peace. Had no former reference been made to the Supreme Government, I should, on the present occasion, have proposed that the Nabob should have been called upon to declare whom he intended for his successor, and that we should have acknowledged the person named by him, if no material objection appeared to his right; but as the Bengal Government have already said that they are disposed to give the preference to the claim of Daood Khaun, it seems advisable that a letter should be written to them, stating our views of the question, and strongly recommending the policy of abstaining from interference, unless in cases of urgent necessity, and that we should take no steps in the business until we receive their answer.

(Signed) Thomas Munro.
Fort St. George, 4th January, 1821.


We are now masters of a very extensive empire, and we should endeavour to secure and improve it by a good internal administration. Our experience is too short to judge what rules are best calculated for this purpose. It is only within the last thirty years that we have here begun to acquire any practical knowledge; a longer period
must probably elapse before we can ascertain what is best. Such a period is as nothing in the existence of a people; but we act as if this were as limited as the life of an individual.

We proceed, in a country of which we know little or nothing, as if we knew every thing, and as if every thing must be done now, and nothing could be done hereafter. We feel our ignorance of Indian revenue, and the difficulties arising from it; and instead of seeking to remedy it by acquiring more knowledge, we endeavour to get rid of the difficulty by precipitately making permanent settlements, which relieve us from the troublesome task of minute or accurate investigation, and which are better adapted to perpetuate our ignorance than to protect the people.

We must not be led away by fanciful theories founded on European models, which will inevitably end in disappointment. We must not too hastily declare any rights permanent, lest we give to one class what belongs to another. We must proceed patiently, and as our knowledge of the manners and customs of the people and the nature and resources of the country increases, frame gradually from the existing institutions such a system as may advance the prosperity of the country, and be satisfactory to the people. The knowledge most necessary for this end is that of the landed property and its assessment, for the land is not only the great source of the public revenue, but on its fair and moderate assessment depend, the comfort and happiness of the people.

Opinions respecting the ancient state of landed property in India are various, in consequence of our ignorance of it. The knowledge of it is however only useful in so far as it may serve to throw light on its present state, and to aid us in finding the way for improving it. There is no reason to suppose that private landed property ever, at any one time,
existed upon the same footing over the greater part of India. From Pulicat to Ganjam, in the Ceded Districts, the Baramahl and Coimbatore, it seems to have been always, as now, little known, except as enan from the sovereign. Along the Malabar coast, and above the western Ghauts, from Soonda to Wynaud, it seems to have existed from a remote period as now almost universally, and in the Carnatic, Tanjore, and Madura. In all these provinces it is important to recollect, that when they first fell under the British dominion, the land, whether private property or Circar, was held in small portions by a great body of petty owners immediately of the princes, the Poligars of the south. The modern Zemindars of the northern Circars, whom the Company allowed to retain the districts which they had rented or managed under their native sovereign, and the old Hill Rajahs of that country, form no exemption, as they were, in fact, petty princes, in whose districts the land was in the hands of small occupants, as in those of the Circar. Unless we know in what manner the land of a province is occupied, we can form no just opinion as to how its internal administration should be regulated. In the Carnatic and the southern provinces, where the meeras, or private landed property, as described by Mr. Ellis, prevails, the land, as in other provinces, is distributed in small properties of from five to ten acres to one or two thousand acres. It may be proper to inquire a little into the Meerassee system of the Carnatic, in order to ascertain whether it possesses any such inherent advantages as should render it desirable to uphold the common tenure, where it still exists; or whether the change of common into separate tenure, which has been going on from a period beyond our knowledge, is not rather an improvement which ought to be encouraged.

The Board of Revenue seem to have considered the Meerassadars of the village as the persons to whom the

VOL. III.
lands of the village were granted on its original settlement. They say that on the original establishment of every Tamul village, the hereditary right to all the lands was vested in all the occupants. They speak of this original settlement as a thing that was perfectly certain. But all this is assumed without the least proof, and is altogether incredible. The account given by Mr. Ellis is not more satisfactory. He supposes that the Carnatic was chiefly a forest until Adawla Chuckraweti, sovereign of Canara, whose capital was Banawassi, settled three hundred thousand colonists, of whom one fifth were Vellallers, in Tondamundalum. This is evidently fabulous. No prince ever planted such a colony: no country could have supplied the drain. The number of deaths from casualties in such an undertaking would have been as great as that of the surviving colonists. New settlers brought from Canara and Banawassi would die very fast in the Carnatic, even now, when it is cleared. We are not told how three hundred thousand colonists were to maintain themselves among jungles to be cleared away, when we know that, even at this day, such a population could not be maintained without the aid of numerous tanks and water-courses for the cultivation of the lands, which would be otherwise very unproductive.

It is much more likely that the Meerassee tenure with all its incidents, as described by Mr. Ellis, was the gradual growth of a country long peopled and cultivated, than that it was created at once by a grant to a particular tribe of Hindoo cultivators, Vellallers, on their first settling in Arcot, and that province was then an uncultivated forest. It probably originated in local circumstances, and perhaps more in the great number of tanks and water-courses constructed at the public expense, than in any other. As the Circar could be reimbursed for the expenditure upon these works only by the regular cultivation of the lands for which he had provided water, he might have thought it advisable
to grant the occupants certain privileges, to enable them to keep up the cultivation as high as possible. A moderate rent, and a hereditary right in the soil, were two of the most obvious means of effecting this object. The joint or Somadayem tenure, by which all the Meerassadars hold all the lands of the village in common, interchangeable at stated periods, probably arose out of the same view of keeping up the cultivation; for, as in unfavourable seasons a portion of the lands could not be fully watered, it is evident that the Meerassadars who held this land, unless there were a periodical interchange, would be worse off and less able than the others to pay their rent regularly.

The great distinction between the wet lands of Malabar and Arcot is, that in Malabar the cultivation of them depends entirely on the falling rains; while in Arcot it depends chiefly on tanks, and other artificial sources of irrigation, constructed at the expense of Government. In Malabar, the cultivator of wet lands is not at all dependent on the aid of Government: in Arcot, he can do nothing without it. In Malabar, therefore, the cultivator trusts to the seasons and to his own industry for success; and he can with confidence venture to employ all his savings in the improvement of his land. As Government furnishes him with no water, and bears no share of the expense of the improvements, it has no fair claim to any additional rent on account of it; and has, in fact, not made it to any great extent, and hence has been enabled to render his land a valuable private property, saleable at all times, and transferable at will. In Arcot, the nature of Meerasese hereditary landed property is very different, and is much less perfect; because being dependent on the Government for its supply of water, and being, in fact, held in partnership with the Government, it does not hold out the same inducement to undertake improvement: and hence the land in general is but indifferently cultivated, and though
it is nominally saleable, it will seldom fetch any price in the market. In Malabar, where the falling rain during five or six months supplies all the water of cultivation, the proprietor can lay out his money with safety on his land; for he knows that he cannot be disappointed while the order of the seasons continues as it is. But in Arcot the proprietor has no such certainty: he is not even sure that he can keep his lands in their present condition; for, unless Government keep the tanks in repair, this cannot be done. It may often happen that he cannot improve without a larger supply of water, and that this cannot be obtained without enlarging the tank or water-course, which Government may think too expensive; and it may sometimes happen that the bursting of the tank may render his land for ever unfit for cultivation, because the tank may be allowed to go to decay, from its being found that the revenue of all the land watered by it would not defray the expense of repairing it. There are tanks in the country whose lands would not yield five or even four per cent. of the necessary repairs.

The Native Chiefs were fond of building tanks as good works, or as the means of transmitting their names to posterity; and as they frequently erected them at an expense far beyond what the land could yield any adequate return for, when they were broken down by floods, their successors did not always think it advisable to repair them; and hence the land formerly watered by them was necessarily either left waste or cultivated with dry grain, not yielding more than from one-fifth to one-tenth of the rice crop. In many parts of Arcot the soil is so poor and sandy, that it will not pay the expense of cultivation unless it be watered. It is evident, therefore, that when Government provides the water, which is the principal part of the expense of cultivation, it becomes a partner with the owner, and has a claim upon him for a fair return for this expense, and that
he can never have the same share of the produce as the owner of rice land in Malabar, who bears himself the whole expense of cultivation. From these causes, it happens that in Arcot, and still more in districts where the soil is richer, the most substantial Rayets are found engaged, not in the cultivation of the wet land, where Government supplies the water, but in that of the dry, where they can improve without the aid of Government, and derive the exclusive benefit of every improvement.

It has been maintained by some, that in Arcot and other Tamul countries, the Meerassadar of wet land is bound to pay rent only for what he does cultivate: that if he leave it all uncultivated, Government have no demand on him for rent; and that if Government send another person to cultivate this land, the Meerassadar has a right to exact from this person the landlord’s share or rent. If such a right existed anywhere, we might have expected to find it in Malabar and Canara, where private landed property is more perfect than in Arcot, and where Government bears no part of the expense of cultivation. But in those provinces there is no such right, and the landlord is liable for the whole fixed rent of his land, whether he cultivate it or not; and if he fail to pay the rent, his property is liable to distraint and his land to be sold. There does not seem to be any proof of the existence of such a right in Arcot. The belief of it appears to have arisen from confounding the tenant of the Meerassadar with that of the Government. The Meerassadar may undoubtedly make such terms as he pleases with his own tenant; but when he can neither cultivate the land himself nor find a tenant, and Government provides one, he has no claim for rent upon this tenant of Government.

It may at first sight appear to be hard that he should not be entitled to rent for his own land: but it is to be recollected that he has failed to pay the public assessment,
and that in such cases the land of the proprietor is in other countries as well as in this liable to sale, and that the Meerassadar has still the privilege for a long, though not clearly defined, term of years, of recovering his land from the Government tenant, on consenting to pay the rent.

The right of the Meerassadar to derive a rent from land for which he neither pays the public revenue nor finds a tenant, is certainly not acknowledged now, and probably never was so at any former time. Government, by the construction of tanks and water-courses in Arcot, supply the water, which is the chief article in the expense of wet cultivation, and has a right to see that the lands, on account of which it has incurred so heavy a charge, are not without necessity left uncultivated, or exempted from their share of the public burdens.

In many parts of Arcot, as has already been remarked, the soil is so poor that, previously to its being watered and converted into rice land, it would not have defrayed the expense of cultivation, and must have lain waste.

In general, the produce of wet is to that of dry land as five to one at least; if, therefore, we suppose that certain Meerassadars possessed a piece of land which under dry cultivation yielded two thousand rupees of annual revenue to Government, it would, after being converted into wet or rice land, yield ten thousand rupees: but the tank which would be required in order to supply the water, would probably cost Government a lac of rupees. The additional revenue, therefore, which Government would derive from this work would be eight thousand rupees per annum, which, making allowance for occasional repairs, would not be more than five or six per cent. for its money: and it would be much less, if we suppose that the Meerassadars, when they did not choose to cultivate, were not liable for the revenue. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Government, where it sunk so large a capital, would ex-
pect an adequate return; and as this could only be obtained by the regular payment of the revenue, it would not grant to the Meerassadars a privilege which would defeat this object, but would follow the custom which we find at present established, of transferring the land to other tenants when they failed to pay the rent.

If the Meerassadars, without cultivating themselves or finding tenants to cultivate, had been allowed to levy from the Government tenants a swamy bhogum, or landlord’s share, of ten to fifteen per cent. they would, without any liability for the public revenue, and without any expense, have derived, by means of a tank constructed at the sole charge of Government, an income from the land four or five times greater than before. No private person would make a tank on such terms; and while there is no proof to the contrary, we cannot suppose that any Government would have done so either.

It appears from the reports regarding the Poonah territories, that the Meerassadar of the Deccan, where meeras exists, is answerable for the revenue whether the land be cultivated or fallow. That if he decline to cultivate or pay his rent, he may be compelled to give in a written deed of renunciation. That the right of Government to dispose of the land after a long absence of the Meerassadar is not disputed. That the Meerassadar gets back his land when his absence has not been long, and when it has been given in temporary lease to another person, but not after a long absence, and its having been granted in meeras to another; and that though he is supposed to have a right, even for a century, to reclaim his land, usage does not allow so long a period. These rules differ very little from those of Malabar and Canara, respecting private landed property; and if ever it was the custom to exempt the Meerassadar of Arcot from rent when he left his land uncultivated, it was a custom different both
from that of other provinces, and from that which has long prevailed in Arcot itself. There is one case, and a very common one in Arcot, in which no demand can be made upon the Meerassadar when the land is left uncultivated: it is when it cannot be cultivated in consequence of a want of water.

The waste in meeras villages in Arcot is supposed by Mr. Ellis to belong to the Meerassadars jointly; and he supports his opinion by documents, showing that when a Meerassadar sells his cultivated lands, he transfers by the same deed to the purchaser his right in the produce of the waste, the quarries, mines, fisheries, &c. within the limits of the village. But this appears to be a mere technical form, which can give no actual proprietary right in the waste. It is used in villages where there is no waste as well as where there is, and may be used where there is no meeras. It confers a right, but not the right of ownership, to the pasture of the waste lands, and the fishery of the tanks and nullahs in common with the other Meerassadars of the village. The same right exists everywhere. In those parts of the Deccan where meeras is unknown, the Rayets of every village reserve the fishery and pasture to themselves, and drive away the cattle of strangers, and derive just as much benefit from the waste as those of meeras villages. Such a right seems to be a natural one everywhere, and it is accordingly assumed by the Rayets of every village, without its being supposed that any formal grant is necessary for the purpose. Mr. Ellis does not seem to be very decided as to the nature of the property enjoyed by the Meerassadar in waste. He admits that he cannot break it up without the permission of the Circar. He does not say that he has any specific share of it, or that he can sell it alone without the cultivated lands, or that he can do more than sell with his arable his
right of common in the waste. The Circar from ancient times has everywhere, even in Arcot, as well as in other provinces, granted waste in enam, free of every rent or claim, public or private, and appears in all such grants to have considered the waste as being exclusively its own property. It may be objected, that if this were the case it may give away the whole waste lands of a village, and injure the inhabitants by depriving them of their pastures. It certainly might give away the whole; but whether the exercise of this right would be injurious to the inhabitants, would depend on circumstances. If the lands, according to the general custom of the country, were left uninclosed, there would be no injury, as the cattle of the village would graze on them whenever the crops were off the ground. If the lands were enclosed, the inhabitants would be no worse off than those of many other villages, whose lands are entirely cultivated and enclosed, and who are, in consequence, often obliged to send their cattle during the dry season to graze in distant jungles, and to incur a trifling expense for the wages of the herdsman, and the tax on pasturage. This expense, even where greatest, could never have affected the right of the Circar to dispose of the waste, though it might probably have induced it to compensate the meerassadar inhabitants for their loss, by some reduction in the assessment of their arable lands.

It has been supposed that in meeras villages in Arcot, in the original compact between the Circar and the first settlers, the exclusive use of the waste was secured to those settlers; but it has already been shown that in all villages, whether meeras or not, the inhabitants reserve to themselves the exclusive use of the waste. But this right is good only against strangers, not against the Circar, which possesses, I think, by the usage of the country, the absolute right of disposing of the waste as it pleases, in villages
which are meeras as well as in those which are not. In the Deccan, in meeras villages, the corporation has not the right of disposing of unoccupied land, but the Circar has.

All the lands of Arcot were at one time held, according to Mr. Ellis, under the joint or somadayem tenure. This tenure has been much praised by some revenue authorities, and its breaking up into the separate individual or palabhogum tenure, has been regarded as a calamity to the country. The happy state of the natives in the joint tenure villages is not supported by the fact of most of them having long since adopted the separate tenure.

When this change took place is not exactly known; but it was probably the gradual work of time, long before the Company's government. It appears in some places to have occurred at a very early period; for in many villages, but especially in those south of the Coleroon, the Meerassadars, instead of dividing the cultivated lands periodically, according to the shares held by each, appear, after having once divided them in that manner, to have declared the division permanent. Such a change is the natural course of things, and must always precede every material improvement, and is only restrained from becoming general by over assessment, or by difficulties regarding water. If one part of the lands of a village has advantages over the other in these respects, the common tenure will be acceptable to the proprietors, by giving to all, in their turn, the benefit of the favoured land; but where the advantages of the several lots of land are nearly equal, the occupants will in general wish to keep their own permanently, because no man ever labours with the same spirit to improve what he is to share with another, as what he is to retain exclusively for himself. The common tenure has existed in many nations, but usually in the rude and early stages of agriculture, and has always, I believe, been considered
as hostile to improvement. I do not know that there is any cause to suppose that its effect has not been the same in India as in other countries, for the same substantial Rayets are seldom found in villages where this tenure exists, as in those where the individual tenure prevails. The common tenure is well suited to a country whose meerassadar Rayets are poor, and whose Government look always to its present wants, and little to futurity; because as the village community is bound to make good all deficiencies of its members, and to cultivate and pay the rent of all the arable land for which there is water, Government by this means draws as much revenue from the country as is possible under its then actual condition.

The system of paying in kind a share of the produce as the Government rent, is also well adapted to the same state of things, because Government is always sure of obtaining half of the produce, or whatever its share may be, from the Rayet, whether the crop be scanty or abundant, and because the Rayet is also sure of not being called on for rent when the crop has entirely failed, and he is, perhaps, unable to pay. Such a system is better calculated to save the Rayet from being oppressed by demands which he cannot pay, than to enable him to become wealthy.

This protection to the Rayet from the payment of revenue in a season of calamity, is the only advantage which appears to belong to the system; but it is an advantage which could be necessary only under a rigid system, and would not be wanted under a more liberal one of assessment. The very existence of such a system in Arcot and other districts, where it is most prevalent, is a proof that, however light Indian revenue may be in the theories of Indian writers, in practice it has always been heavy. Had the public assessment, as pretended, ever been, as in the books of their sages, only a sixth or a fifth, or even only a fourth of the gross produce, the payment of a fixed share in kind,
and all the expensive machinery requisite for its supervision, never could have been wanted. The simple plan of a money assessment might have been at once resorted to, in the full confidence that the revenue would every year, in good or bad seasons, be easily and punctually paid. No person who knows any thing of India revenue can believe that the Rayet, if his fixed assessment were only a fifth or a fourth of the gross produce, would not every year, whether the season were good or bad, pay it without difficulty; and not only do this, but prosper under it beyond what he has ever done at any former period. Had such a moderate assessment ever been established, it would undoubtedly have been paid in money, because there would have been no reason for continuing the expensive process of making collections in kind. It was because the assessment was not moderate, that assessments in kind were introduced or continued; for a money rent equivalent to the amount could not have been realized one year with another. The Hindoo Governments seem to have often wished that land should be both an hereditary and a saleable property; but they could not bring themselves to adopt the only practicable mode of effecting it, a low assessment. It is however supposed by the Board of Revenue, that it was low. The simple fact of its having been paid in kind is sufficient, were there nothing else to disprove this opinion. The Board say that the Mahomedan exactions converted the Hindoo tax into a land rent, reduced the landlord to a land occupant, who ceased to employ tenants, and restricted himself to such land as he could cultivate with his own servants, and then Government transferred the vacant land to strangers temporarily, and more often permanently. But there is no proof whatever of this former state of light assessment, of the time when it existed, or when the change began, or when it reached its present standard. It is somewhat singular, that the Board of Revenue, though they consider a
light assessment, and the payment in kind of a fixed share of the crop, as fundamental parts of the old Indian revenue system, yet in their conjectures as to the origin of the custom of the revenue, of wet land being demandable in kind, they never once think of ascribing it to any cause tending to favour the Rayet, but only to those causes which tend to secure a high revenue. They say, the fluctuation in the produce, in the value of the produce, the desire to obtain the utmost possible revenue, in times of high price, a knowledge of the fluctuation in the value of the precious metals, the impossibility of otherwise obtaining so large a proportion of the gross produce as fifty per cent. may all, or in part, have perpetuated the custom of receiving in kind the revenue demandable from rice lands. I never could discover the least foundation for the assumption, that the Hindoo assessment had been raised by the Mahomedan conquest, or for believing that the assessment which we now find did not exist before that period. We find the assessment as high in the territories of Hindoo as of Mahomedan chiefs. This cannot have been owing to the progress of the Mahomedan arms, because over many of the petty states they never established more than a nominal dominion, nor ever assumed the management of their revenues. Among the chieftains of the northern Circars descended from the ancient sovereigns of Orissa, and who have for ages been in a great measure independent, as well as among many of the Rajahs of the upper and lower Carnatic, descended from the sovereigns of Vijeanuggur or their deputies, and who also since the fall of that empire have in a great degree been independent, we find the same rate of assessment, amounting usually to about one half, and fluctuating according to the soil from two fifths to three fifths of the gross produce with little variation, except that in some places it is paid in kind, and in others in money. It cannot be maintained that the demands of the
Mahomedan conquerors may have compelled these chiefs to introduce a new and higher rate of assessment, because the peshcush imposed upon them by the Mahomedans was trifling, was often withheld, and was generally less than they had paid to their own princes. The few imperfect records which have reached us of the revenues of Vijeanuggur, the last of the great Hindoo powers, do not show that the assessment was lighter under that Government than under its Mahomedan successors. If, then, there ever did in any age prevail throughout India a moderate land tax, its loss must be attributed to some other cause than that of Mahomedan invasion. After the time of the first fanatical conquerors, many of the Mahomedan princes seem to have been more enlightened, and as much disposed to be moderate as the former Hindoo rulers. Among these were the Emperor Akbar Mullk Aubar, and other princes, by whom great and systematic reforms were introduced. There is, however, no ground, either from tradition or from record, or from the present state of the country, for believing that a moderate land-tax was ever at any time throughout India the general principle of its revenue system. It is much more likely that a variety of systems have always prevailed in different provinces at the same time, some more, some less favourable to the people, some admitting of private landed property, some rejecting it; that in the same province different systems have predominated at different times; and that the system of all land being the property of the Circar has sometimes succeeded that of private landed property, and sometimes given way to it. At Vijeanuggur, the seat of the last great Hindoo government, and in the countries immediately around it, where, according to the theory of private landed property having been the ancient Hindoo system until destroyed by foreign invasion, we might naturally hope to see
it in its greatest perfection, we find no trace or record of its having ever existed. In the countries in the Peninsula it is most perfect in Canara, which was long, and in Malabar, which was a considerable time, under a Mahomedan government.

Next to these provinces it is most complete in Travancore, which never was subdued by that power. In Arcot and Tanjore it is less valuable than in Travancore, and in Madura and Tinnevelley still less so than in Arcot. In a narrow stripe of country along the eastern side of the Western Ghauts, from the south of Mysore to Sattarah, it is found nearly in the same state as in the adjoining districts below the Ghauts. With the exception of this narrow slip, it is unknown in Mysore, in the Southern Mahrattah country, in the Ceded Districts, and in the Northern Circars. It is unknown in Bijapoor; it is found farther north at Sholapoor, on the same footing as at Sattarah; but again disappears to the eastward, on the Nizam's frontier. In Sattarah the proportion of Meerassadars to other occupants of the land is two to one; in Poonah, three to one; and in Ahmednughur, about equal. In Khandeis there are very few Meerassadars, and it is thought by the collector, Captain Briggs, that meeras has generally ceased in that province, since its conquest by the Mahomedans in 1306.

But Mr. Chaplin thinks that there is no proof that it existed antecedent to the Mahomedan conquest. The Meeras system was established in Ahmednughur about the year 1600, by Mullik Ambar, the Mahomedan ruler of that province, and in some other provinces where it is found, and which were long under the Mahomedan dominion. It is uncertain whether it is of Hindoo or Mussulman origin. It is, no doubt, possible that private landed property may in some countries have been swept away by the violence of Mahomedan invasion, and the long conti-
nuance of oppressive government; but it is equally possible that the same thing may have been produced long before the Mahomedan conquest, by the wars among the Hindoos themselves, and by the subversion of one great Hindoo empire by another; and it is probable that enlightened princes, both Hindoo and Mahomedan, seeking the welfare of their subjects, may have either revived or introduced private landed property into their dominions.

But the question regarding meeras is one rather of curiosity than of real utility; for in most districts the meeras is worth little, and has no value that might not be easily given to the lands in every province by a moderate reduction in the assessment. It is much more important to ascertain how this moderate assessment is to be gradually introduced, and private landed property reared upon it, than to seek to trace the origin and the fluctuations of meeras. It is only on the Malabar coast that the meeras yields such a landlord's rent, as to make it saleable. In Arcot it yields little landlord's rent and though nominally saleable can seldom be sold. In the southern provinces it gives hardly any landlord's rent, and in the Deccan the assessment is usually so high as to leave little or none, and the land when thrown up by the Meerassadar can seldom pay the old rent, because the uncertain tenure of the cultivator (Oopari) prevents his bestowing the same labour upon it. It may therefore be assumed, that except in a few districts, meeras land yields no landlord's rent.

But this does not hinder it from being a desirable property; for as a man cannot always find employment for his labour and stock, it is of great importance to possess land by which this employment may be secured. In Cercar land as well as meeras, Rayets sometimes have a landlord's rent; for it is evident that whenever they so far improve their land as to derive from it more than the ordinary profit of stock, the excess is landlord's rent; but they are
never sure of long enjoying this advantage, as they are constantly liable to be deprived of it by injudicious over-assessment. While this state of insecurity exists, no body of substantial landholders can ever arise; nor can the country improve, or the revenue rest on any solid foundation. In order to make the land generally saleable, to encourage the Rayets to improve it, and to regard it as a permanent hereditary property, the assessment must be fixed, and more moderate in general than it now is; and above all, so clearly defined as not to be liable to increase from ignorance or caprice.

This cannot be attained by receiving as revenue a specific share of the produce in kind, because it is exposed to fluctuation from fraud and many other causes, and because the usual share would be too heavy a tax on improvement; or by a money rent, fixed according to the custom of the country, because, though nominally fixed, it is nowhere registered or accurately known, but is merely understood to be so much, or about so much. It can be attained only by a moderate money assessment, fixed specifically on every separate field or piece of land, and accurately registered in the accounts of every village curnum and of every collector. This is, in fact, no new system, but is merely giving a more accurate form to the system of money rents followed by the natives, where such rents prevailed. There can be no doubt that this system is perfectly adequate to the accomplishment of every object of improvement for which it is intended. All doubt that might have existed on this subject ought to be removed by what has happened in the Baramah. It was supposed that, soon after the introduction of the permanent assessment into that province, the survey rates of assessment, which had been previously established by Colonel Read, were entirely abandoned between the Mootahdars, or newly-constituted proprietors, and the Rayets; but this is so far from being
the case, that the survey assessment was always considered by the Rayets as their great land-mark, and it was it alone which, by furnishing them with a clearly defined standard and maximum of rent, enabled them, when withdrawn from the protection of the collector, and left to that of the Mootahdars and the courts of justice, to which they were too poor to appeal, to undergo the experiment of such a system for nearly twenty years, and to revert from the Mootahdar to Government with much less loss than could have been expected, and, in some instances, in a much better condition than they had ever been before. In a considerable part of the land, the Mootahdars found it advisable to lower the survey assessment, in order to induce the Rayets to extend their cultivation; in some cases they raised it illegally, by the aid of the influence derived from their situation; but in by far the greater part of the land, the survey assessment still continued to be followed in the engagements between the Mootahdar and the Rayets. This long continuance of a known and fixed assessment has begun to introduce saleable private landed property into the Baranahl, where it was never known before. I do not speak of Mootahs or Zemindarries, because they are merely saleable portions of the Government revenue, but of the single field, or aggregate of fields, which usually compose the possession of a Rayet. In many Mootahs, several fields are saleable, and in some every field is so. This effect has been produced by the survey assessment, not from its moderation, for it is hardly lighter than that of the native governments usually is, but from its having been fixed, and so clearly defined, as to leave no uncertainty, and thus to encourage one party to improve, and the other to purchase the land.

This effect, too, has been produced under many disadvantages, and it would have been much more extensive had it been assisted by a lighter assessment, and not been
impeded by the petty oppression of the Mootahdarry system. The land which has become saleable in the Baramahl has been sold from two or three to ten or twelve years' purchase. This is an advantage which it possesses over the old meeras land of Arcot, which, though nominally saleable, is rarely so, except in the neighbourhood of Madras, or of towns on the coast, and there more commonly for building than for agricultural purposes. It possesses a great advantage in its simplicity; for it is not a complicated property, made up of various shares and fees, and bound to pay Government a large share of every improvement, like that of the meeras; but is a fee simple, held immediately of Government, and liable only to the same fixed rent, however great the produce derived from improvement may be. The land of the Baramahl will probably in time all become saleable, even under its present assessment; but private landed property is of slow growth in countries where it has not previously existed, and where the Government revenue is nearly half the produce; and we must not expect that it can be hastened by regulations or forms of settlement, or by any other way than by adhering steadily to a limited assessment, and lowering it wherever, after full experience, it may still in particular places be found too high. By pursuing this course, or, in other words, by following what is now called the Rayetwar system, we shall see no sudden change or improvement. The progress of landed property will be slow, but we may look with confidence to its ultimate and general establishment. We have never yet followed with perseverance any plan calculated to create or extend private landed property, and where we have laid the foundation of such a plan by a survey and fixed assessment of the land, as in the Baramahl, Coimbatore, and Arcot, and some other provinces, we have counteracted its design by injudicious leases and permanent settlements.
These settlements seem to have been adopted in deference to the example of Bengal, without sufficient knowledge of the claims of the Rayets. The rights of the Meerassadar Rayets of Arcot and Tanjore were well known at the time, but those of the Rayets of other districts, which were equally strong, though not called meerassy, seem to have been but little understood. Most of the well intended but visionary plans for the improvement of India by the creation of Zemindars of whole districts or of single villages, appear to have originated in extreme ignorance of the state of the landed property of the country and the rights of the persons by whom it was held. It has been supposed by some that the Zemindars were the landlords or proprietors, and the Rayets their undertenants or labourers, and by others that the sovereign was the sole landlord, and the Rayets mere cultivating tenants. But the Rayet is the real proprietor, for whatever land does not belong to the sovereign belongs to him. The demand for public revenue, according as it is high or low in different places, and at different times, affects his share; but whether it leaves him only the bare profit of his stock, or a small surplus beyond it as landlord's rent, he is still the true proprietor, and possesses all that is not claimed by the sovereign as revenue.

The land in most of the provinces under the Madras Government is occupied by a vast mass of small proprietors or Rayets, holding properties of every size, from two or three, or two or three thousand acres, and some few having whole villages.

These properties are in general very small; but they are of that extent which necessarily results from the limited means of the owners, and the nature of the institutions of the country. The correctness of this description is not altered by the existence of great possessions in the hands of Rajahs and old Zemindars in some of our provinces,
because these men are not private landholders, but rather petty princes, and the Rayets in their districts stand nearly in the same relation to them as to the sovereign in the Circar districts. The distribution of landed property differs in every country; it is different in Ireland from what it is in England, and in India from what it is in either of those countries. But we ought to take it as we find it, and not attempt upon idle notions of improvement to force a distribution of it into larger properties, when every local circumstance is adverse to its continuance in that state; the experiment has already been tried by the establishing of village Zemindars or Mootahdars, and has already very generally failed. The event could not possibly have been otherwise of a measure whose object was to bring a new class of proprietors into villages where the produce was too little for the old ones. Even in those villages which are still in the hands of the Mootahdars, the object of having larger landed properties will entirely fail, because the properties by sale and division among heirs are fast subdividing, and will soon dwindle into portions smaller than the properties of individual Rayets. There are instances in which this has already happened, and they will soon become so numerous that the system must, at no distant period, die a natural death.

There is no analogy whatever between the landlord of England and his tenants and the Mootahdar, or new village Zemindar of this country and his Rayets. In England, the landlord is respected by the farmer as his superior; here the Zemindar has no such respect, for the principal Rayets of most villages regard him as not more than their equal, and often as their inferior. He is often the former Potail or head Rayet of the village, but he is frequently some petty shopkeeper or merchant, or some adventurer or public servant out of employ. Whichever of these he is, he has usually very little property; he has none for the im-
provement of the village, but, on the contrary, looks to the village as the means of improving his own circumstances. The Rayets, by being placed under him, sink from the rank of tenants of the Government to that of tenants of an individual. They are transferred from a superior, who has no interest but in their protection and welfare, to one whose interest it is to enlarge his own property at the expense of theirs; who seeks by every way, however unjustifiable, to get into his own hands all the best lands of the village, and whose situation affords him many facilities in depriving the ancient possessors of them. The Rayets are jealous of a man from whose new power and influence they have so much to fear. They frequently combine, in order to keep down the cultivation, and force him, for their own security, to give up the village; and hence it has happened, that on one side the opposition of the Rayets, and on the other the oppression of the new Zemindar, have in many instances caused villages which were flourishing and moderately assessed, to revert to the Circar, from inability to pay their assessment. If we cannot make a permanent settlement with these village Zemindars, neither is it possible to make one, or even a lease for a term of years with the Rayets, because their properties are in general so small that numbers of them fail, and must fail every year, from the most ordinary accidents.

Some men are apt to suppose, when they find in almost every district two or three hundred Rayets who require remission for a part, for the half, or even the whole of their rent, that the assessment is too high, or that there is something wrong in the system, and they proceed immediately to recommend a change from the Rayetwarry to something else. But assessment, though it is often the cause, is not the chief cause of the failure of such Rayets. Where the landed property of a district is distributed among many thousand Rayets, and where there is no limitation to sub-
division, except what is imposed by the produce of the land being inadequate to the subsistence of the Rayet, it is evident that there will be many gradations of Rayets, descending gradually from those holding the largest properties, to those holding portions of land too small for their maintenance. It is evident that a lower assessment will not prevent this, nor cause any other change than that of making the smallest portion of land on which the Rayet can subsist somewhat smaller than before, without rendering him in any degree less liable to failure. There are many Rayets who fail from another cause, which no abatement of assessment can remove, and which it is not desirable should be removed; it is occasioned by a spirit of independence among the caste of husbandmen, which urges every labouring servant who can buy a pair of bullocks, to quit his master, and to take land and cultivate for himself. In this undertaking many fail, because the loss of a bullock or an adverse season, destroys their small means; but by far the greater number finally succeed, and their success adds to the resources of the country. It is like the spirit of adventure in trade, which, though it frequently ruins individuals, yet promotes at the same time the prosperity of the country. We must, therefore, in a district containing two or three thousand Rayets, always expect to find two or three hundred who are unable to pay their rent. We must, according to usage, grant them a remission for a few years, until they can do without it; and encourage, rather than repress the spirit of independence, which we may be sure will excite industry.

It is not necessary that we should have either permanent settlements with Zemindars, or leases with the Rayets; neither of them is the usage of the country, and neither is requisite for the security of the revenue, or the benefit of the Rayet.

But though we cannot obtain a permanent rent from each
individual Rayet, we may, by a fixed assessment upon the land, obtain a revenue from the whole body of the Rayets, sufficiently permanent for every useful purpose. It will rise or fall somewhat with good or bad seasons, but the average for a term of years will be nearly the same. If we wish to make the lands of the Rayets yield them a landlord's rent, we have only to lower and fix the assessment, and we shall then in time have the great body of the Rayets possessing landed properties, yielding a landlord's rent, but small in extent. They cannot be otherwise, while their present institutions remain, as these all tend to the subdivision of property. If, in place of lowering the assessment, and letting landed property rise in the natural way, we want to have great landlords raised at once, where none exist, and for this purpose create Zemindars, and turn over to each of them some hundreds of Rayets, we should commit a gross injustice, because we should enable the Zemindar, in time, to degrade the Rayets from the rank of tenants in chief, to that of tenants at will, and often, to that of mere cultivators or labourers. We say, that we leave the Rayets free to act and to make their own terms with the Zemindars, or renters; and that if they are wronged, the Courts will protect them. We put them out of sight, deliver them over to a superior, and then we tell them that they are free to make their own terms, and that there are Courts to secure their rights. But with what pretence of justice can we place them under any set of men, to make terms for their property, and to defend it against them in Courts of Law? They have no superior but Government; they are tenants in chief, and ought not to be obliged to make terms except with Government. But it is said, that the Zemindar does not infringe their rights, because he has no authority to demand more than the dues of Government, as regulated by the usage of the country, and that if the parties be left to themselves, things
will find their proper level. They will find the level which they have found in Bengal, and in several districts under this Government, and which the weak always find when they are left to contend with the strong. The question is, whether we are to continue the country in its natural state, occupied by a great body of independent Rayets, and to enable them, by a lighter assessment, to rise gradually to the rank of landlords; or whether we are to place the country in an artificial state, by dividing it in villages, or larger districts, among a new class of landholders, who will inevitably, at no distant period, by the subdivision of their new property, fall to the level of Rayets, while the Rayets will, at the same time, have sunk from the rank of independent tenants in chief, to that of sub-tenants and cultivators?—It is, whether we are to raise the landholders we have, or to create a new set, and see them fall? This question, it is to be hoped, has been set at rest by the orders of the Court of Directors, to make the settlement with the Rayets, in all districts in which the permanent Zemindarry settlement has not been established.

In all those provinces whose revenues are, by ancient usage, paid chiefly in money, surveys appear to have been made at different remote periods, in order to fix the assessment. In some districts they are only known by tradition; in others, they still exist, in a mutilated shape, in the Curnum's accounts; but there is no certainty that these accounts belong to any particular survey, or that they are not made of fragments of several; or, that the village accounts have not been so often altered by the Curnums, without any regular authority, as to contain no trace of any survey whatever. Though the village accounts were supposed to have a specific rate of assessment for every field according to the class to which it belonged, the Collectors were not made to conform very rigidly to this rate, but were usually somewhat above or below it, according to the nature of the
season and other circumstances. The farm or estate of a Rayet, was generally composed of three parts; the first and principal, was his old farm, containing the lands which he always occupied; the second, but much smaller part, containing land of an inferior quality, was called his Kuttgootah, and was held at a low and fixed rent; and the third was his cowle land, taken from the waste of the village, which he cultivated one, two, or more years, and then threw up or kept, according to the terms of the cowle, or engagement.

In all cases where the rent of a Rayet was raised, it was done by imposing an additional assessment on his old farm. The Kuttgootah and cowle lands were always exempted, both because to have imposed an additional assessment upon them would have been regarded as a breach of engagement, and would have discouraged the extension of cultivation. In some districts, the addition made in one year to the rate of assessment was taken off the next. In others it was continued, and fresh additions of five, ten, or fifteen per cent. being made at subsequent periods, and rendered permanent, the aggregate of these extra additions frequently came in time to equal or exceed the original assessment. But there is reason to suppose that these additions were in a great measure nominal, and that they did little more than counterbalance the fraudulent reductions made by the Curnums in the accounts of the original assessment. These extra rates were usually unwillingly paid at first, and instead therefore of imposing them, it was often thought more advisable to give the Rayet a piece of waste land, the rent of which he was required to pay, whether he could cultivate it or not. The ruling power always endeavoured to encourage, or rather to force the extension of cultivation, as a plea for drawing a larger revenue from the country. The result of such a system, pursued for ages, has been what was to be expected,
namely, that the extent of land in cultivation and paying revenue is much too great for the agricultural stock of the country; that every Rayet has more land than he can properly cultivate, and that he is only prevented from throwing off a part of it by the well-grounded fear, that the difference of rent would be thrown upon the part which he retained. This is the state of cultivation generally throughout the Deccan, and it was, and still is, in a great degree, that of most of the provinces which have fallen by conquest under the authority of the Madras Government. The excess of land occupied by the Rayets, beyond what they can adequately cultivate, varies in different provinces, and is estimated at from one-tenth to one-third, and may be reckoned on an average at one-fifth. It is obvious, however, that by more land being occupied than could be properly occupied, the rent must in time have adapted itself to this state of things, and become lower than it would otherwise have been, and that a fixed assessment made on such rent would in general be favourable to the cultivators or Rayets. It is also obvious, from what has been said, that if, after making such a fixed assessment, perfect freedom were given to the Rayets to throw up whatever land they did not want, they would throw up about one-fifth of their land, and thereby diminish the revenue nearly in the same proportion. But this diminution would only be temporary, because, as the Rayets, by concentrating their agricultural stock upon a similar extent of land, would obtain a greater produce from it, their means would gradually increase, and enable them to take and cultivate again the land which they had relinquished. Under annual settlements, and fluctuating assessment, they are not very anxious about throwing up land, because they know that, by the custom of the country, we can raise the assessment upon the remaining land, according to its produce and improvement; but whenever the assessment has been fixed,
they soon discover the advantage which it gives them, and endeavour to get rid of all their extra land. The liberty of doing so has already been partially granted, and must be fully granted to them; for though it will cause a temporary loss of revenue, it is a sacrifice which ought to be made, for the sake of securing the great public benefit of a permanent revenue, founded upon the general establishment of private landed property. It is the ever-varying assessment which has prevented, and as long as it continues, will prevent land from becoming a valuable property; for even where the assessment is lowest, the knowledge that it may at any time be raised, hinders the land from acquiring such a value as to render it a saleable article. We cannot communicate to it the value which it ought to possess, or render it a private property, capable of being easily sold or mortgaged, unless the public assessment upon every part of it be previously fixed. When it is fixed, all uncertainty is removed, and all land, which is not absolutely over-assessed, soon acquires a value, which is every day increased by improvements, made in consequence of the certainty of reaping all the profit arising from them.

The introduction of the fixed assessment into the Bara-mahl, Coimbatore, and other provinces, has not been so successful as it ought to have been in establishing private landed property; but it has been as successful as could reasonably have been expected, when we consider that it had no fair trial, and that it had hardly begun to operate when it was supplanted by a new system of permanent settlements and leases. Had it been left to produce its own effect undisturbed by a change, there can be little doubt but that private landed property would by this time have been very generally established in those provinces. Its progress would have been faster or slower, according as the rate of assessment was more or less mo-
derate. The rate of assessment, though somewhat lower than that of the Native Princes, was generally high, but not so high as to prevent the gradual growth of landed property. Wherever it might, in particular instances, have been found to produce the effect, the evil would have been easily remedied by a proportionate reduction. The survey assessment, however, notwithstanding all the difficulties by which it was opposed, has laid the foundation of private landed property in districts in which it was never before known, in the Baramahl, Coimbatore, and the Ceded Districts; and this beginning will gradually spread over all the land of these provinces. In the Baramahl land has become saleable for several years' purchase in many villages of every district, and even in Ah tore, the most highly assessed of all the districts. In the Ceded Districts land has become saleable in two or three districts of the Ballary division, and in several villages of almost every district in the Cuddappah division. In all these districts, the survey assessment has, besides giving a beginning to private landed property, simplified and facilitated the collection of the revenue. No survey assessment of a great province can ever at once be made so correct as not to require future alteration; when, therefore, it has been completed with as much care as possible, a trial should always be made of it for six or seven years. This period will be sufficient to discover all defects in the assessment. A general revision of it should then be made, and wherever it might be found too high, it should be lowered, and it may then, with safety to the revenue, and benefit to the people, be made permanent. None of the districts, however, in which the survey assessment had been introduced, had the benefit of such a trial, as in all of them a permanent settlement, or lease, was introduced very soon after the completion of the survey. Coimbatore was more fortunate than the rest; it escaped the decennial lease, and is
now the best ordered, the most easily managed, and the
most thriving district under the Madras Government. A
survey assessment, besides its other advantages, prevents
thousands of disputes and litigations about rent and bound-
daries, and it furnishes a standard by which the revenue
of the country can at any time be raised or lowered, ac-
cording as the state of affairs may require an increase of
the burdens of the people, or may admit of their diminu-
tion. I trust that we shall never have occasion to go
beyond the original assessment, and that we shall in time
be able to make considerable reductions in it. The fixed
assessment will not for some years have the same effect in
encouraging improvements as it had before the introduc-
tion of the leases and permanent settlements; because
these measures have shaken the confidence of the Rayets
in the continuance of the present system, and will render
them cautious in undertaking improvements, lest they
should be prevented from enjoying the full benefit of them,
by being again placed under a renter or Zemindar. Some
years, therefore, must yet elapse before this apprehension
can subside, and the survey assessment have its full effect
in encouraging improvement, and promoting the growth of
landed property.

There are, however, several extensive provinces in which
we have no control over the assessment, and scarcely any
means of bettering the condition of the Rayets; I mean
the Northern Circars. When these districts came into our
possession, one part of them was in the hands of Zemindars,
and the other and most valuable part was in the hands of
Government, and has since, by the permanent settlement,
been made over to new Zemindars of our own creation. As
in these provinces no fixed assessment has been introduced,
nor the rights of the Rayets been defined, the Rayets never
can become landholders, nor their lands acquire such a
value as to make them saleable. It may be said that they
have a right to be assessed only according to ancient usage, and that this right will secure them from undue exaction, and give them the same facility as the Rayets of the Government districts, of rendering their land a valuable property; but many causes combine to prevent this. The ancient usage was in every little district or even village. It is not recorded or defined, and is very little known to us. It is, I believe, in the Northern Circars very generally so high as to leave the Rayet no more than the bare recompense of his labour and stock, and thus to preclude his ever obtaining any portion of a landlord's rent. Even supposing that usage did leave to the Rayet some surplus as landlord's rent, the Zemindar might not permit him to enjoy it. He might raise the assessment. If he were an old Zemindar or hill Rajah, the fear of personal violence would deter the Rayet from complaining. If he were a new Zemindar, the Rayet would, nine times in ten, submit quietly to the loss, not from fear of personal injury, but from the well-grounded fear of losing his cause in the court. He knows that the influence of the Zemindar would easily procure witnesses to swear falsely on the question of usage, and that they would be supported by the fabricated accounts of the Curnum, who is entirely under the authority of the Zemindar; and that, if he even gained his cause, it would be of no advantage to him, as the Zemindar, without transgressing any law, would be able to harass him in many ways, and make his situation uncomfortable.

There is, therefore, no prospect, or but a very distant one, of our being able to establish landed property among the Rayets of the Northern Circars, or to improve their condition in any material degree. In the old Zemindarries, which are chiefly among the unhealthy hills, our prospect is as good now as ever it was, because we never there exercised any direct authority over the Rayets, and could not expect to see landed property grow up among them, until
time should gradually have wrought such a change in the
manners and opinions of their leading men, as to make them
see the expediency of encouraging it. But in the new Zemindarries we exercised a direct authority over all the in-
habitants, and could have raised their condition and landed
property at our pleasure; but we lost the power of doing
so by the permanent settlement. It may be said that Go-

ermment having set a limit upon its demand upon the
Zemindar, he will also set a limit to his demand upon the
Rayet, and leave him the full produce of every improve-
ment, and thus enable him to render his land a valuable
property. But we have no reason to suppose that this
will be the case, either from the practice of the new Zemindars during the twenty years they have existed, or from
that of the old Zemindars during a succession of genera-
tions. In old Zemindarries, whether held by the Rajahs of the Circars, or the Poligars of the more southern
provinces, which have from a distant period been held at a
low and fixed pesheush, no indulgence has been shown to
the Rayets, no bound has been set to the demand upon
them. The demand has risen with improvement, according
to the custom of the country, and the land of the Rayet
has no saleable value; we ought not, therefore, to be sur-
prised that in the new Zemindarries, whose assessment is
so much higher, the result has been equally unfavourable
to the Rayets. The new Zemindarries will, by division
among heirs and failures in their payments, break up into
portions of one or two villages; but this will not better the
condition of the Rayet. It will not fix the rent of the land,
nor render it a valuable property; it will merely convert
one large Zemindarry into several small Zemindarries or
Mootahs, and Mootahs of a kind much more injurious than
those of the Baramahl to the Rayets; because, in the Bara-
mahl, the assessment of the Rayets' land had previously
been fixed by survey, while in the new Zemindarries of the
Circars it had been left undefined. The little will in time share the fate of the great Zemindarries; they will be divided, and fail, and finally revert to Government; and the Rayets, after this long and circuitous course, will again become what they originally were, the immediate tenants of Government; and Government will then have it in its power to survey their lands, to lower and fix the assessment upon them, and to lay the foundation of landed property in the land of the Rayets, where alone, in order to be successful, it must be laid.

The state of the landed property of the country, held almost everywhere by the Rayets directly of Government, clearly points out to us what our revenue system ought to be, and that it cannot, consistently with usage, be other than Rayetwar. This term has been often much misunderstood, and been supposed to mean some mode of settlement entirely new, which overthrows all former rights; but this is altogether a mistake; the term itself is the ancient and common one of the country, and is used merely from the want of an English one exactly corresponding with it. In revenue language, it means a settlement with the individual Rayet who owns or occupies the land, and the receiving the public assessment from him without the intervention of any renter or Zemindar. Whether the assessment be a fixed rent in kind, or a fixed share of the crop in kind, or computed for money, or a fixed or varying money rent, it makes no difference; it is still Rayetwar. All these varieties of assessment prevail more or less in the provinces under this Government; but though they all come under the general denomination of Rayetwar, their effects on the prosperity of the country are very different; and it is therefore an important object that the kind of Rayetwar which is most conducive to improvement, namely, a fixed and moderate money assessment, should be everywhere gradually introduced. But before we endeavour to
make such a change in any district, it is absolutely necessary that we should survey its lands, and ascertain as nearly as possible its average revenue for a long series of years. If we attempt, without this previous knowledge, to convert a fluctuating into a fixed rent, we shall certainly fail, even if our knowledge should be so complete as to enable us to distribute fairly upon the land a fair assessment exactly equal to its former average revenue. This will not be sufficient, for the Rayets will not agree to the change without some abatement: the abatement must not be nominal and existing only in our accounts, but real and absolute, and amount probably to eight or ten per cent.; and we must satisfy them it is so, if we expect success. If the Rayet is convinced that the reduction offered to him is real, it will not be difficult to get him to accede to a fixed assessment. The chief cause of the difficulty which is usually found in prevailing upon him to agree to such a change is, that he thinks there is either no actual abatement, or that it is so small as not to compensate for the loss and inconvenience to which he might be subjected in unfavourable years by a fixed assessment. In his dealing with any private individual, he would not hesitate to stipulate to pay annually a fixed sum in money rather than a varying amount in grain, if he thought it would be more profitable. He will follow the same course in his engagements with Government whenever he is satisfied that he will be a gainer by it. To conduct a survey, however, and convert a fluctuating gain into a fixed money assessment, require a union of experience, industry, and temper, which is not always found. This must necessarily render the progress of the work slow, but it ought not to discourage us. Much has been already done, and what remains to be done will be more perfect, from the opportunity which the delay will afford of discovering and rectifying former errors.
It has been objected to the Rayetwar system, that it produces unequal assessment, and destroys ancient rights and privileges; but these opinions seem to originate in some misapprehension of its nature. In arguing against it, in favour of a Zemindarry system, it has been maintained that a detailed settlement must ever lead to inequality of taxation; but there seems to be no reason why the detailed should, more than any other settlement, produce inequality. It is to good or bad cultivation, and other circumstances common to all settlements, that unequal taxation is owing, and it must take place with regard to the lands of the Rayets, whether they are held immediately of Government, or of a Zemindar or renter. The use of a detailed settlement is not to prevent what can never be prevented, unequal assessment, but to prevent the assessment from being anywhere excessive; to furnish us with the best information respecting the resources of the country, and by giving us a complete register of all its lands, showing the extent and assessment of each field, to enable us to judge, whenever there is a failure in the revenue, whether it arises from the assessment, or some other cause. As it is one main principle of Indian revenue, that all land when cultivated is liable to the public assessment, and when left uncultivated is exempt from it, it is manifest that, without the detailed settlement, the amount of the revenue for the year could not be correctly ascertained.

It has also been argued, that it is useless to impose a fixed assessment upon each field or lot of land, because the produce will always fluctuate according to the culture. This objection would be a very just one, if it were intended that the rent payable to Government should always correspond with the produce; but this is not the case. All that is necessary in fixing the Government rent is, that it shall not be higher than what the land is able to yield under the most ordinary degree of culture; whatever
entire produce is derived from any culture beyond this should go exclusively to the Rayet, Government should have no share in it. Improved cultivation will, of course, regulate the rent between the proprietor or Rayet and his tenant, but not between the Rayet and Government; and if Government is satisfied with the moderate rent arising from common cultivation, the lands, if cultivated at all, will yield this rent, and there is no danger that any fluctuation in the degrees of culture will preclude the realization of the field assessment. By common usage, where there is no fixed field assessment, Government receives in kind a high share of the produce, or in money a high rent; and its rent, whether in kind or money, rises with the produce. By the field assessment, Government will receive a rent somewhat lower than the present one, and as it will be fixed, and not rise with improvement, it will be more likely to be permanently realized. It has been asserted, in speaking of the Meerassy privileges in the Carnatic, that the Rayetwar assessment destroyed by violence all these ancient usages and customs, and so completely, that both Mr. Graeme and Mr. Ravenshaw have denied the existence of Meerassy in these provinces. The Rayetwar assessment had not been established more than four or five years when Mr. Ravenshaw took charge of Arcot. These ancient usages and customs had probably fallen into disuse, or the preservation of them been deemed of little value, or they could not in so short a time have been so lost, as to escape the notice both of him and of Mr. Graeme. Even if it were true that they had been destroyed by violence, there can be no cause for attributing to the Rayetwar an effect which might have been equally produced by any other mode of settlement. The Rayetwar settlement, when properly conducted, respects all private rights; to ascertain and secure them are among its principal objects. The carelessness, or the over-zeal of collectors, may invade
them under any settlement whatever, if they are not re-
strained by superior authority.

It has been objected to the Rayetwar system, that it is
intricate, difficult of management, and expensive; but ex-
perience contradicts these opinions, for wherever Rayetwar
has been properly established, it has been found to be more
easy, simple, and efficient than any other kind of settle-
ment. The idea of its being more expensive arises from
not considering that it includes all the expenses of col-
lection which would be incurred by Zemindars if the coun-
try were under them, and which would, in that case, be
necessarily deducted from the amount of the revenue, and
not appear as a charge. One great advantage which the
Rayetwar settlement has over every other, is the strength
and security which it gives to our Government, by bringing
us into direct communication with the great body of the
Rayets, or landowners. Objections may be urged to every
system. It is enough to recommend it to our adoption, to
know that it is the common one of the country. It is one
of the primary obligations of a Government like ours to
suit its rules and forms of local administration to the con-
dition of the people, to provide every establishment which
it may require, and not to withhold any thing which may
be necessary to its efficiency, for the sake of avoiding either
labour or expense.

When we have determined the principles on which the
land revenue is to be fixed, the next question is, by what
agency it is to be managed? There can be no doubt
that it ought, as far as practicable, to be native. Juster
views have of late years been taken of this subject, and the
Court of Directors have authorized the employment of
the natives on higher salaries and in more important offices.
There is true economy in this course, for by it they will
have better servants, and their affairs will be better con-
ducted. It is strange to observe how many men of very
respectable talents have seriously recommended the abolition of native, and the substitution of European agency to the greatest possible extent. I am persuaded that every advance made in such a plan would not only render the character of the people worse and worse, but our Government more and more inefficient. The preservation of our dominion in this country requires that all the higher offices, civil and military, should be filled with Europeans; but all offices that can be left in the hands of natives without danger to our power, might with advantage be left to them. We are arrogant enough to suppose that we can with our limited numbers do the work of a nation. Had we ten times more we should only do it so much worse. We already occupy every office of importance. Were we to descend to those which are more humble, and now filled by natives, we should lower our character, and not perform the duties so well. The natives possess, in as high a degree at least as Europeans, all those qualifications which are requisite for the discharge of the inferior duties in which they are employed. They are in general better accountants, more patient and laborious, more intimately acquainted with the state of the country and the manners and customs of the inhabitants, and are altogether more efficient men of business.

Unless we suppose that they are inferior to us in natural talent, which there is no reason to believe, it is much more likely that they will be duly qualified for their employments than Europeans for theirs, because the field of selection is so much greater in the one than in the other. We have a whole nation from which to make our choice of natives, but in order to make choice of Europeans, we have only the small body of the Company's covenanted servants. If it be admitted that the natives often act wrong, it is no reason for not employing them; we shall be oftener wrong ourselves. What we do wrong is not noticed, or
but seldom and slightly; what they do wrong meets with no indulgence. We can dismiss them and take better men in their place; we must keep the European, because we have no other, or perhaps none better, and because he must be kept at an expense to the public, and be employed some way or other, whatever his capacity may be, unless he has been guilty of some gross offence. But it is said that all these advantages in favour of the employment of the natives are counterbalanced by their corruption, and that the only remedy is more Europeans, with European integrity. The remedy would certainly be a very expensive one, and would as certainly fail of success were we weak enough to try it. We have had instances of corruption among Europeans, notwithstanding their liberal allowances; but were the numbers of Europeans to be considerably augmented, and their allowances, as a necessary consequence, somewhat reduced, it would be contrary to all experience to believe that this corruption would not greatly increase, more particularly as Government could not possibly exercise any efficient control over the misconduct of so many European functionaries in different provinces, where there is no public to restrain it. If we are to have corruption, it is better that it should be among the natives than among ourselves, because the natives will throw the blame of the evil upon their countrymen; they will still retain their high opinion of our superior integrity; and our character, which is one of the strongest supports of our power, will be maintained. No nation ever existed in which corruption was not practised to a certain extent by the subordinate officers of Government: we cannot expect that India is in this point to form an exception. But though we cannot eradicate corruption, we may so far restrain it as to prevent it from causing any serious injury to the public interest. We must for this purpose adopt the same means as are usually
found most efficacious in other countries; we must treat the natives with courtesy, we must place confidence in them, we must render their official situations respectable, and raise them in some degree beyond temptation, by making their official allowances adequate to the support of their station in society.

With what grace can we talk of our paternal Government if we exclude them from every important office, and say, as we did till very lately, that in a country containing fifteen millions of inhabitants, no man but a European shall be entrusted with so much authority as to order the punishment of a single stroke of a rattan. Such an interdiction is to pass a sentence of degradation on a whole people, for which no benefit can ever compensate. There is no instance in the world of so humiliating a sentence having ever been passed upon any nation. The weak and mistaken humanity which is the motive of it, can never be viewed by the natives as any just excuse for the disgrace inflicted on them, by being pronounced to be unworthy of trust in deciding on the petty offences of their countrymen. We profess to seek their improvement, but propose means the most adverse to success. The advocates of improvement do not seem to have perceived the great springs on which it depends; they propose to place no confidence in the natives, to give them no authority, and to exclude them from office as much as possible; but they are ardent in their zeal for enlightening them by the general diffusion of knowledge.

No conceit more wild and absurd than this was ever engendered in the darkest ages; for what is in every age and every country the great stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, but the prospect of fame, or wealth, or power? or what is even the use of great attainments, if they are not to be devoted to their noblest purpose, the service of the community, by employing those who possess them,
according to their respective qualifications, in the various duties of the public administration of the country. How can we expect that the Hindoos will be eager in the pursuit of science unless they have the same inducements as in other countries? If superior acquirements do not open the road to distinction, it is idle to suppose that the Hindoo would lose his time in seeking them; and even if he did so, his proficiency, under the doctrine of exclusion from office, would serve no other purpose than to show him more clearly the fallen state of himself and his countrymen. He would not study what he knew could be of no ultimate benefit to himself; he would learn only those things which were in demand, and which were likely to be useful to him, namely, writing and accounts. There might be some exceptions, but they would be few; some few natives living at the principal settlements, and passing much of their time among Europeans, might either from a real love of literature, from vanity, or some other cause, study their books, and if they made some progress, it would be greatly exaggerated, and would be hailed as the dawn of the great day of light and science about to be spread all over India. But there always has been, and always will be, a few such men among the natives, without making any change in the body of the people. Our books alone will do little or nothing; dry simple literature will never improve the character of a nation. To produce this effect, it must open the road to wealth, and honour, and public employment. Without the prospect of such reward, no attainments in science will ever raise the character of a people.

This is true of every nation as well as of India; it is true of our own. Let Britain be subjugated by a foreign power to-morrow; let the people be excluded from all share in the government, from public honours, from every office of high trust or emolument, and let them in every situation
be considered as unworthy of trust, and all their knowledge and all their literature, sacred and profane, would not save them from becoming, in another generation or two, a low-minded, deceitful, and dishonest race.

Even if we could suppose that it were practicable without the aid of a single native, to conduct the whole affairs of the country, both in the higher and in all the subordinate offices, by means of Europeans, it ought not to be done, because it would be both politically and morally wrong. The great number of public offices in which the natives are employed, is one of the strongest causes of their attachment to our Government. In proportion as we exclude them from these, we lose our hold upon them, and were the exclusion entire, we should have their hatred in place of their attachment; their feeling would be communicated to the whole population, and to the Native troops, and would excite a spirit of discontent too powerful for us to subdue or resist. But were it possible that they could submit silently and without opposition, the case would be worse; they would sink in character, they would lose with the hope of public office and distinction all laudable ambition, and would degenerate into an indolent and abject race, incapable of any higher pursuit than the mere gratification of their appetites. It would certainly be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether, than that the result of our system of government should be such a debasement of a whole people. This is, to be sure, supposing an extreme case, because nobody has ever proposed to exclude the natives from the numerous petty offices, but only from the more important offices now filled by them. But the principle is the same, the difference is only in degree; for in proportion as we exclude them from the higher offices, and a share in the management of public affairs, we lessen their interest in the concerns of the community, and degrade their character.
It was from a conviction of the policy of extending native agency, that the establishment of the revenue board cutcherry was recommended in 1822. The right of the people to be taxed only by their own consent, has always, in every free country, been esteemed amongst the most important of all privileges; it is that which has most exercised the minds of men, and which has oftenest been asserted by the defenders of liberty. Even in countries in which there is no freedom, taxation is the most important function of government; because it is that which most universally affects the comfort and happiness of the people, and that which has oftenest excited them to resistance; and hence both its utility and its danger have, under the most despotic governments, taught the necessity of employing in its administration the ablest men of the country.

In this point, at least, we ought to be guided by the example of those governments, and employ intelligent and experienced natives at the head of the revenue to assist the revenue board. If in other departments we give experienced natives to assist the European officers, shall we not give them in this, whose duties are the most difficult and most important? We cannot exclude them from it without injury to ourselves as well as to them; we cannot conduct the department efficiently without them. But even if we could, policy requires that we should let them have a share in the business of taxing their own country. It attaches them to our Government, it raises them in their own estimation, and it encourages them, by the prospect of attaining a situation of so much distinction, to qualify themselves for it by a zealous performance of their duty. Although we can never leave entirely to the natives the power of taxing the country, we ought to entrust them with as much of it as possible under our superintendence. We ought to make them acquainted with our objects in taxation, and with the principles on which we wish it to be founded, in order that, in communicating their opinions to
us, they may not be guided by the mere object of raising the revenue, but that of adapting the revenue to the wants of the state and the circumstances of the people. It is desirable that this knowledge should be widely diffused among the natives; but it can only be effected by their having the benefit of free intercourse with us, and of acquiring experience in important official situations. They have the advantage of this intercourse already, in the cutcheries attached to collectors and to the board of revenue, and under many of the collectors this advantage is rendered more general, by their hearing the opinions of the most intelligent heads of villages, and of respectable inhabitants, not in the service of Government, and discussing in their presence questions of revenue. This establishes confidence in us among the natives, and gradually extends among them juster and more enlarged views of the purposes for which taxation is intended.

This kind of intercourse, however, could hardly subsist, or be productive of any advantage, if we adopted the opinions of most of the advocates of Zemindarry settlements, that the collector ought not to enter into the details of revenue, but leave the natives to conduct them and settle with each other in their own way, and that he should confine himself to their general superintendence under the guidance of general principles. This appears to me to be a mistaken doctrine which ought to be avoided; because, in order to maintain our power in India, we must have able and skilful servants, and such servants could not possibly be produced by merely learning a few general principles, without making themselves acquainted with the character of the people, and the rules and customs by which their transactions with each other, and with the officers of Government are usually regulated. The good government of the country must rest very much on the talents of our local officers, as it is from them chiefly that Government
must derive its own information; and hence there is no country in the world in which it is more absolutely necessary to have good public servants than in this. When an European is placed in charge of a district permanently settled, and belonging to a few great Zemindars who conduct all the details of the assessment and collection of the revenue, he has very little to do. No exertion is required from him, and he naturally becomes indolent; if the affairs of the district fall into confusion he cannot put them right, because, as he has not made himself acquainted with the revenue details and local usages, and has no practical experience, he is ignorant of the cause of the disorder, and of the means by which it is to be remedied. His knowledge of general principles, however extensive it may be, will in such an emergency be of little use, because he will not know how to apply them to the local circumstances of the country. The duties of the collector of a province should be such as to make it imperative on him to know the real state of the country, the amount of the assessment paid by the different classes of the inhabitants, its effects upon them, but especially upon the Rayets, in promoting or discouraging industry, and in rendering them satisfied or discontented with their rules, and to know all the details of internal administration by which the revenue is developed and realized; for it is only by possessing such knowledge, that he can understand either what are the actual resources of the country, or the means by which they may be improved, or furnish useful information to Government.

The duties of a public officer entrusted with the charge of a province ought to be such as to require the constant exercise of his faculties. Without this employment they become dull, and he is satisfied with remaining at the head of a province, for the management of which he is totally unqualified, and it is probably not until something goes wrong that his utter unfitness is discovered.
The civil servants of the Company mix but little with the native community; they have no common interest with it, and it is only such of them as have naturally a spirit of inquiry, or are forced by the duties of their situation to inquire, that know anything about it, or can tell Government whether any particular law is popular or the reverse.

Government itself knows nothing of the state of the country, except what it learns from its local officers. In other countries, Government and its officers are a part of the community, and are of course acquainted with the effect of every public measure, and the opinion of the country regarding it; but here Government is deprived of this advantage; it makes laws for a people who have no voice in the matter, and of whom it knows very little, and it is therefore evident that it cannot adapt its laws to the circumstances of the people, unless it receive accurate information upon this subject from active and intelligent local officers, whose duty it is to investigate carefully the condition and opinions of the inhabitants, and to report upon them. But these officers can acquire this information only through an establishment of experienced native servants, who have beyond all other men, from the very nature of their official duties, the best means of obtaining it. Intelligent collectors are necessary at all times, but more especially when it becomes expedient either to raise or lower the revenue. Such an operation requires not judgment alone, but great knowledge of details; and if undertaken without these essential requisites, would be productive of much mischief. We ought, therefore, not to be satisfied with a superficial knowledge of the general state of the country, but make it a part of our system to obtain the most minute and accurate information concerning its internal condition, and preserve and accumulate that information in clear and detailed revenue accounts, and statistical statements.
In comparing our internal administration with that of the native princes, it may be said that we have perhaps been more successful in our judicial than in our revenue institutions. In the criminal branch, the extent of our power has rendered the apprehension of criminals more sure, and in spite of the difficulties of conviction arising from the Mahomedan law, punishment is as certain, and justice much more so, than before. I doubt if in civil judicature we have the same advantage yet, or ever can have, until we leave to the natives the decision of almost all original suits. The natives can hardly be said to have had any regular system. What it was, has been well described by the late Commissioner of the Deccan; but their decisions by various local officers, by roprus, punchayets, and the prince, or the court established near him, though irregular, and often corrupt and arbitrary, dispensed as much real justice as our courts, and with less delay and expense; for the native judges, whatever their irregularities were, had the great advantage of understanding their own language and their own code much better than ours are ever likely to do.

Our judges will, however, improve every day from longer experience, and the expense to the suitors, both of time and money, be much reduced. Our judges even now, are in general more efficient than our collectors.

In this country the judicial require, perhaps, less talent than the revenue duties; they are less complicated, and are not, like them, affected by adverse seasons, or by peace or war, but are governed by fixed rules, and require in general little more than temper and assiduity. The district Moonsiffs, or native judges, are a great improvement on our judicial institutions. They have relieved the Zillah courts from a great mass of small suits; they get through a great deal of work, and there is reason to infer that it is performed in a satisfactory manner, because the inhabi-
tants crowd to their courts, because the proportion of appeals from their decisions is not large, and because it has not been found necessary to dismiss many for misconduct. They will every day become more respectable, when it is found that the corrupt and indolent are punished, and that the diligent and upright are allowed to hold their situations permanently. Their jurisdiction was extended in 1821 to matters amounting in value to five hundred rupees, and it might with great utility be extended much farther. It will in time absorb almost all original suits, with great advantage to the community, and leave to the Zillah judge hardly any thing but appeals.

There was nothing in which our judicial code on its first establishment departed more widely from the usage of the country than in the disuse of the punchayet. When this ancient institution was introduced into our code in 1816, there was so much objection to it, both at home and in this country, lest it should become an instrument of abuse, that it was placed under so many restrictions as to deprive it of much of its utility. It was unknown to some of the Company's servants as any thing more than a mode of private arbitration; it was known by others to have been employed by the natives in the decision of civil suits, and even of criminal cases, but it was imagined to have been so employed, not because they liked it, but because they had nothing better; and it was opposed by some very intelligent men, on the ground of its form and proceedings being altogether so irregular as to be quite incompatible with the system of our courts. All doubts as to the popularity of punchayets among the natives must now have been removed by the reports of some of the ablest servants of the Company, which explain their nature, and show that they were in general use over extensive provinces. The defects of the punchayet are better known to the natives than to us; yet
with all its defects they hold it in so much reverence, that they say, where the punj sits God is present. In many ordinary cases the punchayet is clear and prompt in its decision, but when complicated accounts are to be examined, it is often extremely dilatory. It adjourns frequently; when it meets again some of the members are often absent, and it sometimes happens that a substitute takes the place of an absent member. All this is, no doubt, extremely irregular; but the native Government itself is despotic and irregular, and every thing under it must partake of its nature. These irregularities, however, are all susceptible of gradual correction; and, indeed, even now they are not found in practice to produce half the inconvenience that might be expected by men who have been accustomed to the exact forms of English courts of judicature. They ought not to prevent our employing the punchayet more than we have hitherto done, because its duties are of the most essential advantage to the community, and there is no other possible way by which they can be so well discharged. The natives have been so long habituated to the punchayet in all their concerns, that not only in the great towns, but even in the villages, a sufficient number of persons qualified to sit upon it can be found. We ought to avail ourselves of their aid, by extending the range within which the operations of the punchayet are now confined. Its cognizance of all suits within a certain amount, both in the Zillah and district Moonsiff's courts, should be abolished, and neither party should have the option of declining its jurisdiction. The same rule should hold in all cases tried by the Collector.

The use of the punchayet in criminal trials has been recommended by several persons, and among others by a very intelligent judicial officer, who submitted a draft of a regulation for the purpose. I am persuaded that the measure would be very beneficial, and that until it is
adopted, facts will never be so well found as they might be. The employment of the punchayet, independently of the great help it affords us in carrying on the business of the country, gives weight and consideration among their countrymen to those who are so employed, brings us in our public duties into better acquaintance and closer union with them, and renders our Government more acceptable to the people.

None of the changes in the customs of the country introduced with the judicial code were better formed for the vexation of the people than the system by which the police was in some districts erected into an establishment by itself, and separated from all others. This separation was by many regarded as a great improvement, for it is naturally supposed that the business of the police would be conducted with more regularity and efficiency by a class of men whose time should be devoted to this duty only, than by any class who had other duties to attend to. But this system, besides being objectionable in many points, had one main defect, in not being founded in any of the usages of the country; for no system for any part of the municipal administration can ever answer, that is not drawn from its ancient institutions, or assimilated with them. The new police establishment resembles in some degree an irregular military corps; it was directed by the Zillah magistrate; it was spread over the country in small guards, at every town and principal village; it was entirely independent of the district and village local authorities, and subordinate only to its own Darogahs and petty officers; it had no common interest with the people; it seldom knew any thing of the neighbourhood in which it was stationed, and had no means of discovering offenders but by the village watchers, who had been withdrawn from their ancient masters, the Tihsildars, and placed under its authority for this purpose. It soon learned to make the use which might have been
foreseen of the power which it possessed; it harassed the heads and Curnums of villages, by constantly summoning them before it, under the pretext of inquiring into imaginary offences, and often extorted money from them as the price of exemption from this grievance; it often obtained money from some of the more respectable inhabitants, by raising reports of irregularities in their families, and threatening to bring them forward by public investigation; it also got money by releasing persons whom it had threatened to send to appear as witnesses regarding some pretended offence; and its abuse of authority was the more felt from the low rank of its agents, who were in general no better than common peons. This very circumstance of placing the dregs of the people above the more respectable classes, was of itself a serious evil, and was regarded by them as a most oppressive measure. Such a police had no interest in the peace of the country, because it knew that in tranquil times its services were less wanted, and that its numbers would probably be reduced. Its gains were derived from disturbance, and its importance increased in such times, and it was therefore its business to exaggerate every disorder, and to keep up alarm. It was altogether a harsh and vexatious system of espionage.

We have now, in most places, reverted to the old police of the country, executed by village watchmen, mostly hereditary, under the direction of the heads of villages, Tihsildars of districts, and the collector and magistrate of the province. The establishments of the Tihsildars are employed without distinction either in police or revenue duties, as the occasion requires; and it is the intimate knowledge of the inhabitants and of the country, which they and the village servants acquire from their occupation in the revenue, which enables them to discover by whom offences are committed, much more readily than could possibly be done by mere police servants. The village and
district servants, as well as the Tihsildar, under whom they act, are deeply interested in the good order of the country, and they have therefore the strongest motives for exerting themselves in preserving its peace.

What is usually called police can seldom prevent crimes; it can seldom do more than secure the greater part of the offenders. Much has been said and written in favour of a preventive police, but I do not know that the attempt to establish it has ever been successful in any country. When a vigilant police renders detection and punishment more certain, it no doubt acts as a preventive, in so far as it deters from the commission of crime. The only efficient preventive is the improvement of manners, in which the punishment of offences can have very little share. A moderate assessment, by enabling all to find employment and to live, is, next to the amelioration of manners, the thing best calculated in this country to diminish crimes. It is generally found that theft and robbery are most frequent in districts over-assessed, and that in seasons of scarcity, they become common in districts in which they were before of rare occurrence. Our present system of police is very well suited to its object, and is perfectly equal to all the purposes of its institution, though it is not always so well directed as might be wished. This, however, is not to be wondered at; it arises from our inexperience, and is not to be removed by any new rules, but solely by longer experience. The districts in which gang-robbery and plundering are most prevalent, are some parts of the Northern Circars, and the crime itself is occasioned by our want of control over the petty hill chiefs, and by the vicinity of their unhealthy hills and jungles facilitating the escape of the offenders. Those in which murder and maiming are most common, are Malabar and Canara. In Malabar this is to be ascribed chiefly to the depraved habits of the lower classes of the Moplahs, and in Canara to those of the
Seddees, a race as bad as the worst of the Moplahs, but fortunately very few in number. They are the descendants of Abyssinians, formerly employed in the armies of the Mahomedan kings of Bijapoor, many of whom rose to the highest ranks in the state, and enjoyed extensive jagerees, on which numbers of their countrymen were settled. Those who now remain are chiefly herdsmen or cultivators, and are in general poor. The atrocious crimes of murder and gang-robbery are much less common in districts which have been long under the Company's government, than in those of more recent acquisition, and are everywhere gradually diminishing.

The frequency of crimes in most of the countries which have fallen by conquest under the British dominion within the last thirty years, as well as in many of those received from the Nabob of the Carnatic, does not arise so much from any thing in the nature of the people, as from the encouragement given to every kind of disorder by a long succession of wars, misgovernment, and anarchy. During those times the sovereign power was too weak to restrain the disorders of its tributaries and subordinate chiefs; gangs of robbers were protected by every little chief, and even where they were not protected, they found security, by the number of petty independent jurisdictions enabling them to escape from one to another. Much was done by the Mysore Mussulman Government to eradicate these disorders; but its duration was too short, and it was too much occupied in foreign war, to have had leisure to remedy them effectually. The gangs which formerly lived by plunder are now much diminished by death and other causes; but there are still, probably, several thousand men scattered over our territory, whose business from their earliest days has been robbery. These men, and perhaps their immediate descendants, must pass away, before robbery as a profession can be destroyed.
In estimating the state of crime and the efficiency of the police, we are generally guided by the calendars of the magistrates and criminal judges, and the reports of the circuit judges. But these documents alone, without the consideration of many other circumstances, will not enable us to form any just conclusion; and even with the greatest attention to every circumstance, it is difficult to arrive at any thing like accuracy. Many incidental causes tend to swell the number of crimes at one time more than another; peace or war, plenty or famine, the disbanding of troops in our own or the neighbouring countries, the passage through the country of a greater or smaller number of Brinjarrics, who are generally robbers. Besides these, there are causes of an official nature, which give a very great increase or decrease of crime where there is little real change. In some districts the magistrates and police apprehend great numbers of persons on groundless suspicion, or for trivial matters, of which no public notice ought to have been taken.

These irregularities arise from the ignorance and the over zeal of the native servants, or from their carelessness, and not unfrequently from that of the magistrates. The best way of ascertaining with tolerable accuracy the increase or decrease of crime, would be by a comparison of the number of the higher crimes in periods of ten or fifteen years. If we include petty thefts, or even burglary, we shall be led to an enormous conclusion, for in this country most of the offences called burglary are little more than petty theft. They do not generally involve housebreaking, but are much oftener confined to the carrying away some trifling article from a hut or house, which is either open or entered without violence. Crimes are, no doubt, sometimes concealed from fear, and other causes; but I believe that the number actually committed is usually overrated, and that many of the burglaries and robberies said to have been ascertained, but none of the offenders discovered, never actually took place. If, what is not uncommon in
India, eight or ten thieves from a distant province enter a district, and after robbing a few of the inhabitants or their houses, disappear; an alarm is raised, statements are brought forward of losses which never happened, in the expectation of obtaining a remission of rent, and the magistrate himself is sometimes too easily led to give credit to these reports, and to represent the district as being in an alarming state, and to call for an increase of his establishment in order to meet the difficulty; whereas, if he had given himself leisure to investigate the reports, he would have found that his district was just in its ordinary state.

From the first introduction of our judicial regulations, the people of the country have been accused, both by the magistrates and judges, of not sufficiently aiding the police. The complaint of offenders escaping, because people do not choose to appear as prosecutors or witnesses, from indolence, apathy, or distance, is common to all countries, and is as little chargeable to India as to any other. I believe that if the matter were fairly examined, it would be found that the police derives much more gratuitous aid from the people in this country than in England; but we expect from them more than ought to be required in any country. As the Mahomedan law officers in criminal trials rejected not only the evidence of the police but of all public servants, it was thought advisable to remedy this inconvenience, by making two or more of the most respectable inhabitants of the village, to which any criminal was brought for examination, attest the depositions, in consequence of which they were obliged to make two journeys to the station of the Zillah court, and many of them were obliged to perform this duty twice a year, because, the better their character, the more likely they were to be called upon as witnesses. They often complained of this heavy grievance; but it was not till lately that they were exempted from it, as it was considered by most of the judges as a duty which they owed to the public, and were bound to perform. The
performance, no doubt, facilitated the business of the judge with the Mahomedan law officer; but it was certainly most unreasonable to expect that a respectable shop-keeper or merchant should be always ready to leave his house and his own affairs, and to undertake an expensive journey about a trial in which he had no concern, merely for the sake of public justice. Many of the judges have, however, done justice to the character of the people in their support of the law, and stated that they have of late shown great alacrity in the preservation of the peace of the country and gallant behaviour in attacking robbers.

We should be careful that in our anxiety to form an efficient police, we do not sacrifice the comfort of the people, and establish a system of general vexation and oppression. There is nothing by which we are so likely to be unintentionally led into systematic vexation as by schemes of police, registering the inhabitants of villages, making them responsible for each other, dividing them into classes to keep alternate watch, making them account for their absence. All these are fond imitations of the Saxon tything; a system well enough calculated, in an ignorant age, among a poor and scanty population, to ensure peace and personal safety, but calculated at the same time to check every improvement, and to perpetuate poverty and ignorance, and utterly unsuitable to a populous and wealthy country. In countries which have attained any degree of civilization, it is always found best to provide for the police at the public expense, and to leave the people at perfect liberty to pursue their several occupations without any restraint, and without any call upon them for police duties.

The number of persons apprehended, released, and punished, gives, though not an accurate, yet a general idea of the state of crime in the country. The following is the abstract for the last six months of 1823; it is taken in preference to a similar period in 1824, because in that year the number of commitments was swelled by the famine
driving many poor people to seek a subsistence by robbery, and plundering hordes of grain.

Abstract of the number of persons apprehended, released, and punished, from the 1st July to 31st December 1823.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apprehended</th>
<th>By the Magistrate</th>
<th>By the Criminal Judge</th>
<th>By the Court of Circuit</th>
<th>Foujdaroy Adawlut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23,188</td>
<td>Acquitted and released ... 8,356 1,957 374 86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convicted and punished ... 10,526 1,082 170 120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sent to the Criminal Judge 4,728 1,205 265</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 23,610 4,244 809 206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A short abstract of the civil suits for the first six months of 1824, taken from the report of the Sudder Adawlut of the 8th of November, 1824, shows that the operations of the different civil courts appear to keep pace with the demands of the country.

Abstract statement of suits in all the Zillahs, from the 1st of January to the 1st of July, 1824.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In all Zillahs</th>
<th>Original Suits</th>
<th>Appeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the Judge</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudder Ameen</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>1707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2433</td>
<td>3198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts Moonsiffs</td>
<td>27333</td>
<td>20594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Punchayets</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Moonsiffs</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Punchayets</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is observed by the Sudder Adawlut, that the whole number of suits depending on the 1st of July last in the Zillah courts is far short of the number which they may fairly be expected to dispose of within a period of six months; and that the number of causes of older date than 1822 pending in all the courts on the 1st of July last, was but thirty original suits and forty-four appeals.

The peculiar character and condition of the Rayets require that some laws should be made specially for their protection. The nonresistance of the Rayets in general to oppression, has been too little attended to in our regulations. We make laws for them as though they were Englishmen, and are surprised that they should have no operation. A law might be a very good one in England, and useless here. This arises from the different characters of the people. In England, the people resist oppression, and it is their spirit which gives efficacy to the law; in India, the people rarely resist oppression, and the law intended to secure them from it, can, therefore, derive no aid from themselves. Though the Rayets frequently complain of illegal exactions, they very seldom resist them; they more commonly submit without complaining, and they often abscond when they have no longer the means of paying them.

It is in vain to caution them against paying, by telling them that the law is on their side, and will support them in refusing to comply with unauthorized demands. All exhortations on this head are thrown away, and after listening to them, they will the very next day submit as quietly to extortion as before. Some of the more bold and intelligent, it is true, withhold payment and complain; but the number is so small as to have no sensible effect, for the great mass submit quietly, and will continue for generations to submit, until a total change shall have been wrought in their character. There is nothing extraor-
ordinary in this; it is the natural consequence of their condition. They had always under their native Princes been accustomed to implicit submission to the demands of the government officers. Both they and their Princes have long since been under a foreign yoke; first, of Mahomedans, and afterwards of Europeans; and their exclusion under both from all share in the Government, has rendered the Rayets of less consideration, and made them still less disposed to resist unauthorised exactions than under their ancient native rulers. As, therefore, they will not protect themselves by resisting injustice, we must endeavour to protect them by laws, which would be unnecessary in England, or in almost any country not under foreign dominion; and we must, for this salutary purpose, invest the collector and magistrate, the person most interested in their welfare, with power to secure them from exaction, by authorising him to make summary inquiry into all illegal exactions, to recover the amount, to restore whatever is recovered to the Rayets, and to punish the offenders. We suppose that our laws are founded on just principles, and that they must therefore have the same beneficial operation here as at home; but we forget that one great first principle, the freedom of the people, from which they derive their influence, does not exist here. Our institutions here, not resting on the same foundation as those of a free country, cannot be made to act in the same way. We cannot make the inanimate corpse perform the functions of the living body; we must, therefore, in making regulations here, think only of their probable effect in this country, not of what such regulations have or might have in England. We must often entrust powers here which we would not there: we must even sometimes make a man a judge, where he may be said to be in some degree a party; but in this case, we are to consider whether it is not indispensable to the protection of the people.
For some years past it has been the object of Government to legislate as little as possible, and the few regulations which have been passed, are less to provide for new matters, than to cancel or amend former regulations, found to be unsuitable to the circumstances of the country. Two great evils which resulted from the joint operation of our judicial code and revenue system were, the frequent distraint of the property, and imprisonment of the persons of the principal Rayets, on account of balances. The confinement usually continued for many years; the prisoners frequently died in the course of it, and the debt was seldom realized. The default was sometimes occasioned by fraud, but much oftener by inability, arising from unavoidable losses, and it was always difficult to ascertain the real cause. It has been the main end of the provisions of some late regulations to lessen these evils, and if they produce the desired effect, which there is little reason to doubt, they will confer a most important benefit upon the people. The practice of distraint has been already greatly diminished, and the Collector of Salem, in his report of last year, observes, that the whole of the land revenue of that province, amounting to about seventeen lacs of rupees, had been realised without a single case of distraint. It was my wish to have abolished altogether the punishment of imprisonment for arrears of land rent, because I thought that the loss from fraud would never be very considerable, and that it would be better that the revenues should suffer it, than that a remedy so harsh and unpopular should be continued; but it appeared safer, on the whole, to adopt the opinion of my colleagues, that the power of imprisonment should be retained, but its exercise limited. The good effects of this measure have already been extensively felt; the imprisonment of a Rayet for a balance of rent is now a rare occurrence. On the 30th of September last,
the number of persons in gaol under this Presidency, confined by the several collectors for arrears of rent, was forty-five; but of these, only two were Rayets, the rest were adventurers, who generally engage in farming the sale of spirits, intoxicating drugs, and tobacco, and are usually fraudulent defaulters. When we consider that the land rent is collected from nine hundred and fifty-four thousand, nine hundred and fifty-two individuals holding immediately of Government, this result is extremely satisfactory.

Our great error in this country, during a long course of years, has been too much precipitation in attempting to better the condition of the people, with hardly any knowledge of the means by which it was to be accomplished, and indeed without seeming to think that any other than good intentions were necessary. It is a dangerous system of government in a country, of which our knowledge is very imperfect, to be constantly urged by the desire of settling every thing permanently. To do every thing in a hurry, and in consequence wrong, and in our zeal for permanency, to put the remedy out of our reach. The ruling vice of our Government is innovation; and its innovation has been so little guided by a knowledge of the people, that though made after what was thought by us to be mature discussion, must appear to them as little better than the result of mere caprice. We have, in our anxiety to make every thing as English as possible in a country which resembles England in nothing, attempted to create at once, throughout extensive provinces, a kind of landed property which had never existed in them; and in the pursuit of this object, we have relinquished the rights which the sovereign always possessed in the soil, and we have, in many cases, deprived the real owners, the occupant Rayets, of their proprietary rights, and bestowed them
on Zemindars, and other imaginary landlords. Changes like these can never effect a permanent settlement in any country; they are rather calculated to upset whatever was before deemed permanent. We erroneously think that all that is necessary for the permanent settlement of a country is, that Government should limit its own demand, and that it is of no consequence by whom this demand is collected; and that provided the amount be not exceeded, the Rayet is not injured, whether he pay it to the officer of Government, or to a newly-created Zemindar landlord. But nothing can be more unfounded than this opinion, or more mischievous in its operation; for it is a matter not of indifference, but of the highest importance, by whom the Government land rent is collected and paid. Every proprietor or Rayet, great and small, ought to pay his own rent and that of his tenants, when he has any, to the Government officer. If, instead of doing this, some hundreds of proprietary Rayets are made to pay their public rents to a Zemindar, they will soon lose their independence, become his tenants, and probably end by sinking into the class of labourers. Such an innovation would be much more fatal to the old rights of property than conquest by a foreign enemy; for such a conquest, though it overthrew the Government, would leave the people in their former condition. But this internal change, this village revolution, changes every thing, and throws both influence and property into new hands; it deranges the order of society; it depresses one class of men for the sake of raising another; it weakens the respect and authority of ancient offices and institutions, and the local administration conducted by their means is rendered much more difficult. It is time that we should learn, that neither the face of a country, its property, nor its society, are things that can be suddenly improved by any contrivance of ours, though
they may be greatly injured by what we mean for their good; that we should take every country as we find it, and not rashly, attempt to regulate its landed property, either in its accumulation or division. That whether it be held by a great body of Rayets, or by a few Zemindars, or by a mixture of both, our business is not with its distribution, but with its protection; and that if while we protect we assess it moderately, and leave it to its natural course, it will in time flourish, and assume that form which is most suitable to the condition of the people.

If we make a summary comparison of the advantages and disadvantages which have occurred to the natives from our Government, the result, I fear, will hardly be so much in its favour as it ought to have been. They are more secure from the calamities both of foreign war and internal commotions; their persons and property are more secure from violence; they cannot be wantonly punished, or their property seized, by persons in power, and their taxation is on the whole lighter. But on the other hand, they have no share in making laws for themselves, little in administering them, except in very subordinate offices; they can rise to no high station, civil or military; they are everywhere regarded as an inferior race, and often rather as vassals or servants than as the ancient owners and masters of the country.

It is not enough that we confer on the natives the benefits of just laws and of moderate taxation, unless we endeavour to raise their character; but under a foreign government there are so many causes which tend to depress it, that it is not easy to prevent it from sinking. It is an old observation, that he who loses his liberty loses half his virtue. This is true of nations as well as of individuals. To have no property scarcely degrades more in one case, than in the other to have property at the disposal of a foreign
government in which we have no share. The enslaved nation loses the privileges of a nation as the slave does those of a freeman; it loses the privilege of taxing itself, of making its own laws, of having any share in their administration, or in the general government of the country. British India has none of these privileges: it has not even that of being ruled by a despot of its own; for to a nation which has lost its liberty, it is still a privilege to have its countryman and not a foreigner as its ruler. Nations always take a part with their Government, whether free or despotic, against foreigners. Against an invasion of foreigners the national character is always engaged, and in such a cause the people often contend as strenuously in the defence of a despotic as of a free Government. It is not the arbitrary power of a national sovereign, but subjugation to a foreign one, that destroys national character and extinguishes national spirit. When a people cease to have a national character to maintain, they lose the mainspring of whatever is laudable both in public and in private life, and the private sinks with the public character.

Though under such obstacles the improvement of character must necessarily be slow and difficult, and can never be carried to that height which might be possible among an independent people, yet we ought not to be discouraged by any difficulty from endeavouring, by every means in our power, to raise it as far as may be practicable in the existing relative situation of this country to Britain.

One of the greatest disadvantages of our Government in India is its tendency to lower or destroy the higher ranks of society, to bring them all too much to one level, and by depriving them of their former weight and influence, to render them less useful instruments in the internal administration of the country. The native Governments had a class of richer gentry, composed of Jageerdars and Enamdars, and of all the higher civil and military officers. These,
with the principal merchants and Rayets, formed a large body, wealthy, or at least easy in their circumstances. The Jagheers and Enams of one prince were often resumed by another, and the civil and military officers were liable to frequent removal; but as they were replaced by others, and as new Jagheers and Enams were granted to new claimants, these changes had the effect of continually throwing into the country a supply of men, whose wealth enabled them to encourage its cultivation and manufactories. These advantages have almost entirely ceased under our Government. All the civil and military offices of any importance are now held by Europeans, whose savings go to their own country; and the Jagheers and Enams which are resumed, or which lapse to Government, are replaced only in a very small degree. We cannot raise the Native civil and military officers to their former standard, and also maintain our European establishment, but we can grant Jagheers to meritorious native servants more frequently than has been our custom; and we can do what is much more important to the country, we can place the whole body of the Rayets on a better footing with regard to assessment than ever they have been before, and we can do this without any permanent sacrifice of revenue, because their labour is productive, and will in time repay the remission of rent by increased cultivation. The custom of all the sons inheriting equal shares of the father's property, was among all Hindoos a great obstacle to the accumulation of wealth; and among the Rayets the high rate of assessment was an additional obstacle. Few Rayets could ever, even in the course of a long life, acquire much property from the produce of their lands; but many of their leading men or heads of villages had, under the Native governments, other ways of acquiring it. They leagued with the revenue servants in underrating the produce and the collections, and as they
were necessary to them in this work, they received a share of the embezzlement.

Wherever the government dues were paid in kind, the facilities of fraud were greatest, and the principal Rayets have therefore, on this account, usually opposed every attempt to convert a rent in kind into money assessment.

This source of wealth still, no doubt, remains, but in a very small degree in comparison with what it was under the Native governments. We are more exact and rigid in enforcing our demands, and it is therefore the more onerous on us to see that our assessment is so moderate as to be easily collected, and to enable them to thrive under it. We have of late years done something to raise the condition of the natives, by the appointment of the higher judicial and revenue officers, and of the Moonsiffs or district judges, who have an original jurisdiction to the amount of five hundred rupees. We may do much to raise it still more, by gradually admitting the natives into more important offices, both in the revenue and judicial department, and excluding them from none in which they can be employed consistently with the due preservation of European control.

There is one great question to which we should look in all our arrangements; What is to be their final result on the character of the people? Is it to be raised, or is it to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power and protecting the inhabitants, leaving them to sink gradually in character lower than at present, or are we to endeavour to raise their character, and to render them worthy of filling higher situations in the management of their country, and of devising plans for its improvement? It ought undoubtedly to be our aim to raise the minds of the natives, and to take care that whenever our connection with India might cease, it did not ap-
pear that the only fruit of our dominion there had been to leave the people more abject and less able to govern themselves than when we found them. Many different plans may be suggested for the improvement of their character, but none of them can be successful, unless it be first laid down as a main principle of our policy, that the improvement must be made. This principle once established, we must trust to time and perseverance for realizing the object of it. We have had too little experience, and are too little acquainted with the natives, to be able to determine without trial what means would be most likely to facilitate their improvement. Various measures might be suggested, which might all probably be more or less useful; but no one appears to me so well calculated to ensure success, as that of endeavouring to give them a higher opinion of themselves, by placing more confidence in them, by employing them in important situations, and perhaps by rendering them eligible to almost every office under the Government. It is not necessary to define at present the exact limit to which their eligibility should be carried, but there seems to be no reason why they should be excluded from any office for which they were qualified, without danger to the preservation of their own ascendancy.

Liberal treatment has always been found the most effectual way of alleviating the character of every people, and we may be sure that it will produce a similar effect on that of the people of India. The change will, no doubt, be slow, but that is the very reason why no time should be lost in commencing the work. We should not be discouraged by difficulties; nor because little progress may be made in our own time, abandon the enterprise as hopeless, and charge upon the obstinacy and bigotry of the natives the failure which has been occasioned solely by our own fickleness, in not pursuing steadily the only line of
conduct on which any hope of success could be reasonably founded. We should make the same allowances for the Hindoos as for other nations, and consider how slow the progress of improvement has been among the nations of Europe, and through what a long course of barbarous ages they had to pass before they attained their present state. When we compare other countries with England, we usually speak of England as she now is; we scarcely ever think of going back beyond the Reformation; and we are apt to regard every foreign country as ignorant and uncivilized, whose state of improvement does not in some degree approximate to our own, even though it should be higher than our own was at no very distant period.

We should look upon India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular Government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn. That the desirable change here contemplated may in some after-age be effected in India, there is no cause to despair. Such a change was at one time in Britain itself, at least as hopeless as it is here. When we reflect how much the character of nations has always been influenced by that of Governments, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk into barbarism, while others, formerly the rudest, have attained the highest point of civilization, we shall see no reason to doubt, that if we pursue steadily the proper measures, we shall in time so far improve the character of our Indian subjects, as to enable them to govern and protect themselves.

Those who speak of the natives as men utterly un-
worthy of trust, who are not influenced by ambition or by the law of honourable distinction, and who have no other passion but that of gain, describe a race of men that nowhere exists, and which, if it did exist, would scarcely deserve to be protected. But if we are sincere in our wishes to protect and render them justice, we ought to believe that they deserve it. We cannot easily bring ourselves to take much interest in what we despise and regard as unworthy. The higher the opinion we have of the natives, the more likely we shall be to govern them well, because we shall then think them worthy of our attention; I therefore consider it as a point of the utmost importance to our national character and the future good government of the country, that all our young servants who are destined to have a share in it, should be early impressed with favourable sentiments of the natives.

I have in the course of this Minute urged again and again the expediency of lowering our land revenue, and of establishing a moderate and fixed assessment, because I am satisfied that this measure alone would be much more effectual than all other measures combined in promoting the improvement both of the country and of the people. But before we can lower the land revenue to the best advantage, we ought to know clearly what it is we are giving up. As the information requisite for this purpose can only be obtained from an accurate survey of each province, these surveys, where still wanting, should be undertaken wherever the collectors are competent to the task. When completed, they will furnish a ground-work on which the land revenue of the country may with safety hereafter be lowered or raised, according to circumstances. We should look forward to a time when it may be lowered. India should, like England, be relieved from a part of her burdens whenever the state of affairs may permit such a change. What-
ever surplus might remain after the payment of all civil and military charges, and of all charges connected with the improvement or protection of the country, should be remitted. The remission granted in peace might be again imposed in war, and even something additional. This would probably obviate, in a great measure, the necessity of raising money by loans on the recurrence of war. The people would bear the addition willingly, when they knew that it was for a temporary object; and the remission which had been previously granted would dispose them the more readily to place confidence in the assurance of Government, that the increase was not intended to be made permanent.

Thomas Munro.

Preservation of the Peace.

Minute.

The duty of preserving the peace of the country being committed to the civil magistrate, he is necessarily vested with authority to call out the military force of the district whenever it becomes necessary for that purpose. This power is liable to abuse from ignorance, rashness, and over zeal, which it has hitherto been found difficult to remedy. Orders in particular cases have been issued by Government, but they have never been sufficiently comprehensive to meet the evil. This is to be attributed to the impossibility of providing for every case by any general rules, and to the difficulty of restraining the exercise of the power, without the risk of rendering the civil authority in calling for aid, and the military officers in affording it, too slow and cautious where promptitude and decision are urgently required. But though rules cannot be laid down for every
contingency, they may be made so as to answer almost every case that is likely to happen.

The first and most important rule is, that no civil authority shall call out troops until he is convinced, by a mature consideration of all the circumstances, that such a measure is necessary. When he is satisfied of the necessity of the measure, he should, before carrying it into execution, receive the sanction of Government, whenever the delay requisite for this purpose is not likely to prove detrimental to the public interests.

When he deems it unadvisable to wait for the orders of Government, he should address his requisition for troops not to any subordinate military officer, but to the officer commanding the division, to whom he should communicate his object in making it, and all the information he possesses regarding the strength and designs of the enemy. His duty is confined to these points; he has no authority in directing the military operations.

The officer commanding the troops has authority to determine the number and nature of those to be employed, the time and manner of making the attack, and every operation for the reduction of the enemy.

Whenever the officer commanding the division may think the troops at his disposal inadequate to the enterprise, he should call upon the officer commanding the neighbouring division for aid, and report to Government and the commander-in-chief.

No assistant or subordinate magistrate should call out troops. When he thinks such aid is necessary, he must refer the matter to his superior, the principal magistrate of the district.

These rules should be observed whenever it can be done without danger to the public safety; should some extraordinary case occur, which admits of no delay, civil and
military officers must then act according to the emergency and the best of their judgment; but such a case can rarely happen, unless where the enemy becomes the assailant. In some cases the leaders of insurrection become alarmed, and abscond, and in others they submit without the presence of a military force. In many cases insurrection is insulated and confined to a village or gang, and there can hardly ever arise a case in which there will not be time to proceed in the regular way, to call out the troops by the requisition of the principal civil magistrate of the province to the officer commanding the division.

15th March, 1825. Thomas Munro.

MINUTE BY SIR THOMAS MUNRO, DATED 24TH FEBRUARY, 1827.

[Tour through the Southern Provinces.]

Extract, Fort St. George, Revenue Consultation, 3rd April, 1827.

When I visited the Southern Provinces last year, I was accompanied by Mr. Campbell, third Member of the Board of Revenue. We investigated, as fully as our time would admit of, the state of each district, the nature of its revenue system, how far the different systems were well or ill conducted, and the means by which they might be improved. Mr. Campbell has submitted to me a statement, containing the result of his observations; but as the Board of Revenue have within the last few years had under consideration most of the points noticed in it, I recommend that it be transmitted to them, and that it be accompanied by the two petitions, Nos. 1 and 2, which are connected with the subject.
All the details of the Revenue administration of the Southern Provinces have been so frequently before the Board, and so much has been written upon the subject, that hardly any thing can now be said upon it, which will not be found either in Mr. Campbell's Report, or in former records; and as I am unwilling to augment what is already sufficiently voluminous, I shall merely notice, as shortly as possible, one or two points which most attracted my attention in each district.

In South Arcot, although the settlements are made in money, it has long been customary not to let the Rayet cut his crop without an order from the Tihsildar, for the purpose of making him give previous security for the payment of the kists.* Mr. Cunliffe, the present Collector, has directed this vexatious and injurious practice to be discontinued. Some other objectionable usages prevail in this Collectorate. The Tihsildars, in order to keep up the revenue, took engagements from the Rayets early in the year, to cultivate to the usual extent, or somewhat more, when the season appeared to be favourable; but it frequently happened that the season did not answer expectation, and that all the land calculated upon was not cultivated. The Tihsildar, however, went on collecting the assessment for the whole; but at the close of the year, the collector, on ascertaining the extent of uncultivated land entered in the settlement, returned the amount collected from it to the Rayets. The evil was thus, in some measure, redressed, but the Rayet ought never to have been subjected to the hardship of advancing money, for however short a period, for land which he had not cultivated. This will now be discontinued.

In order to prevent a decrease of revenue, by Rayets throwing up their old land, and taking new at a lower

* Instalment of public revenue.
rent, they are made to pay the difference, but only for one year. It amounted last year to about twenty-five thousand rupees. It must be discontinued, because it is not only unjust, but is contrary to the principle of a fixed assessment.

In the Puttah given to each Rayet for his rent, each field is not specified, but only the extent and assessment of the land of each class which he cultivates, by which means facility is afforded to fraud, in substituting one field for another. This will be obviated, by specifying every field hereafter.

The commencement of the Kistbundy* is too early. It formerly corresponded more nearly with the periods of realizing the produce of the crops, but was thrown forward by the late Collector from November to August, from the fear that the poorer Rayets would make away with the produce of the early crops reaped in September and October, and would abscond, or not be able to pay when called upon, if the demand were delayed till November, and that a part of the revenue would thus be lost every year. This opinion, that the Rayets in general, but especially the poorer sort, are not to be trusted with any delay after the crop is ripe, is very prevalent among all Native revenue servants, and it is often difficult to get them to act contrary to it. There is no doubt some foundation for the apprehension of loss of revenue, but much less now under the Company's Government than when there were many independent Native authorities in the country. The loss would be trifling, and would be infinitely overpaid by the benefit which would ensue to the great body of the Rayets, from being allowed time to dispose of their crop before the kist was demanded. We know that this would not be a very hazardous experiment, as late kists have long since been

* Account of dates when instalments are payable.
introduced into most of the unsettled districts, not only without loss, but with advantage both to Government and the people. The principles upon which the kists were fixed in those districts was, that the Rayet should have time not only to reap, but to sell his crop, before his kist became due. This principle should regulate the period of the kists in every district. It makes no difference to Government, but a very material one to the people, whether the kists begin two or three months sooner or later. The relief to them is great. It is in fact equivalent to a remission of rent, because it enables them to sell their produce at the fair market price, instead of being forced to raise money upon it at a heavy loss before it is reaped.

The early kists of South Arcot are an anticipation of the produce, and ought to be thrown back. The Collector is aware of the utility of the measure, but is naturally anxious that the revenue of his districts should not be exposed to loss from too sudden a change, and proposes that the change should therefore be made not in one but in three years, by making the kists begin a month later in each successive year. The Board of Revenue recommend that the changes should be made at once, and I concur in their opinion.

It has been usual in South Arcot to remeasure a great number of the fields annually, and where they are found to exceed the original survey measurement, to add proportionally to their assessment. This practice is destructive of confidence, and harassing to the Rayets, and ought to be discontinued. No remeasurement should ever be made, unless where there is good reason to believe that the occupant has passed his limits, and included in his field, land not belonging to it.

My principal object in visiting Tanjore was to ascertain whether there was any insuperable obstacle to the
making of the revenue settlement by a fixed money assessment, and whether such a settlement would be acceptable to the people. The danger of prices falling and remaining low for several successive years has always been the main objection to a fixed money assessment. From all that I could learn on the spot during my short stay in the province, it appears to me that the Meerassadars or land-owners, but particularly the more substantial ones, are in general desirous of having a fixed money assessment on the land, provided it be moderate, and of being relieved from all interference, except in the collection of their rents.

The establishment of a fixed money assessment ought to be more easy in Tanjore than in most other provinces, because none of them have a supply of water so certain and abundant as Tanjore has from the Cavary, and because the distribution upon the Meerassadars severally, of the sum imposed upon the village, which in most other provinces is the most difficult part of the process, is in Tanjore the most easy; because the relative value of the land or fields to each other having long been known, and the share which each Meerassadar was to pay of the whole assessment having long been settled among themselves, they would continue under the fixed assessment, whether it might be higher or lower than the present or any former one, to pay according to the usual proportions, and each man would take care that no more than his fair share was imposed upon him.

The chief difficulty in Tanjore, will be in determining the sum to be laid on each village; because there is a very great want of accounts for our guidance on which any dependence can be placed. We have only some defective accounts of produce for the early years of the Company's administration, and none hardly during the long interval
of the subsequent leases. There can be no doubt, however, that among upwards of four thousand villages comprised in the province, many are assessed at their just amount. By taking these villages as a standard, and by employing the Meerassadars of them in conjunction with the revenue servants to assess the contiguous villages at the same rate in relation to their produce, the same scale of assessment may be gradually extended over all the villages of the province; and when this is effected, there will be little difficulty in distributing the amount upon the several properties and fields.

The situation of Tanjore is singular, because, though placed on this side of the peninsula, the main part of its produce depends upon the rains of Malabar. It therefore frequently happens, that in seasons when there is a scarcity in the adjoining districts, it enjoys the double advantages of an abundant harvest with scarcity prices. As Government has always partaken in this advantage under the system of a land revenue, founded on a commutation of a share of the produce for money at the market price, it probably realizes as much revenue by following the old usage, as it would by adopting any other; and it may therefore be thought that no change is necessary. If we looked only to revenue, this might be true; but if we look to the constant vexatious interference with the Rayets in the reaping and removing of their crops, to the fraudulent collusion between them and the inferior revenue servants in pilfering the grain, and to the general corruption in the superior revenue servants which such a system encourages, we cannot but feel the necessity of endeavouring to substitute a system less liable to abuse. Although a fixed money assessment on the land may for some years rather diminish than augment the revenue, I am persuaded that it will augment it in time, by facilitating the culture of
products more valuable than grain, by rendering the proprietors more substantial, and by thus enabling them to extend their cultivation, and to bear without remission the losses of unfavourable seasons.

In Trichinopoly, in the districts watered by the Cavary, the lands are held by the same meerassey, or hereditary tenures, as in Tanjore. In the dry districts, the inhabitants do not claim the meerassee rights. They cannot sell their land, and whenever they cease to cultivate it, it is transferred to any person the Government pleases. The meerassee rights were enjoyed by the Poligars of these districts, by whom they had probably been usurped from the ancient proprietors, and they are now considered as having devolved upon the Government by the expulsion of the Poligars. While the land was regarded as public property, while the assessment was so high as to leave little or no profit to the cultivator, and while there was abundance of waste which any person might have who chose to cultivate it and pay the assessment, it could hardly become private property, or acquire such value as to become salable. But the assessment has of late years been considerably reduced, and when the inhabitants shall have some time longer enjoyed the benefit of the reduction, and shall from experience have gained confidence in its stability, they will set a higher value on their lands, occupy them permanently, and gradually render them a valuable private property, as in the wet districts.

The annual settlements in Trichinopoly are more satisfactory than in Tanjore, because they are formed upon a principle known to every body, upon a money assessment, which is probably moderate, because there were no complaints against it, and because the value of land has increased within these few years. Trichinopoly, by having a register of fields and a fixed assessment on each, pos-
assesses the means by which its annual land rent may be easily and fairly settled.

In Tinnavelley, there is no system of revenue management, and none appears ever to have been established. The system, such as it is, is calculated to keep the collector in ignorance of the state of the district, and seems to have answered this purpose completely. There are no detail accounts or even abstracts in his Cutcherry that can be depended upon. Too much is left to the Curnums. They execute many of the duties which properly belong to the Collector and the Tihsildars. They distribute the assessment. They assess the Rayets as they please, by entering their lands under a class of a higher or lower rate of assessment. They harass them by remeasuring the lands of many every year, which has, in fact, been rendered necessary, by the improper custom of allowing them to cultivate any portion of a field they please, instead of the whole or none.

The present Collector has begun to correct these irregularities; but the orders of the Board of Revenue regarding a money settlement, have been entirely misunderstood. The orders of the Board to fix a money rent upon the average produce and prices of a number of years, have been interpreted to mean, that after ascertaining the average of any village, the whole of the lands of that village, whether good or bad, are to be assessed at the same rate, instead of being assessed according to their relative produce. The mistake was, however, known to the Board of Revenue before any bad effects could result from it, and measures are now in progress in the district to reform its hitherto defective revenue system.

In Madura and Dindigul, the survey and assessment was made by Mr. Hurdis. In Dindigul, the assessment was regulated by what is called the Hooles, or produce of
the land. In Madura, it is said to have been regulated rather by the nature of the soil, than by its actual produce. But I have little doubt that the process was the same in both districts, and that though the estimated produce was not registered in Madura, it was taken into the calculation, along with the kind or quality of the land in fixing its terim or rate of assessment. All assessors of land, however differently their accounts may be framed, must be guided in making the assessment by the average collections of former years, and by the nature and present produce of the land, and the usual prices of produce.

The fields are not numbered either in Dindigul or Madura, but in Dindigul the assessment of each field is inserted in the register of fields, so that each Rayet knows exactly what he has to pay to Government. In Madura, the fields are registered in different classes, according to their quality. The extent of each is shown, but not its money assessment. A separate register contains the assessment which belongs to each class, so that great room is left for the Curnums to raise or lower the assessment by altering the class of any particular fields.

In both districts very little care has been taken to preserve the survey accounts. Those of several villages are not to be found; of the remainder only a small share is in the collector's eutcherry, and the rest in the hands of the Curnums, written on cadjons. Measures should be adopted for completing the survey accounts; there ought to be a complete set both with the Curnums and the Collector. The expense incurred in the preparation of Survey accounts, whatever it may be, is always greatly overbalanced by the advantages derived from them, by the very great saving of time and labour which they enable us to make in all settlements, and by the confidence which they establish between the Rayets and the Government, by fixing
distinctly the amount of assessment in every case, and leaving nothing regarding it arbitrary or doubtful.

In Coimbatore, the survey system has long been established, and has for many years been so carefully followed, that all the Rayets are perfectly acquainted with it, and, feeling the security derived from it, they are exerting all their means to improve their lands, and the revenue is in consequence gradually, but steadily, increasing. Nothing is required in this district but to continue in the course which is now observed.

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

April 30th, 1819.

MY DEAR SIR,

When I left Madras I had very little idea of ever visiting India again, but I had scarcely landed when I found that I should be obliged to go back to Madras. I would have preferred the overland route had I been alone, but as Mrs. M. accompanies me, my intention at present is to go in one of the Company’s China ships to Bombay in April. My reason for going by Bombay is that I may have the benefit of conversing with you on your arrangements in the Mahratta districts, and that I may learn something of the system of administration in the territories under Bombay. I am in hopes that I shall find many things in it which it will be useful for us to imitate at Madras; I am anxious that we should be able to ascertain the most effectual means of protecting the Rayets from oppression, and that every regulation for this purpose should be as short and plain as possible, and less encumbered with written forms, than it was thought necessary to introduce at Madras with the regulations there.

VOL. III. 2 D
I trust that Lord Hastings has continued the Peshwah's country under your superintendence, notwithstanding your appointment to Bombay; or that, if any change has been made, he has given the superintendence to Malcolm, whose eminent services so well entitle him to every distinction that can be conferred upon him. I hope that Macdonell is doing well, and that Captain Grant is bringing the Sattarah principality into good order. I found your uncle, William Elphinstone, in good health, but looking old, which was to be expected at seventy-nine; he is, however, as warm and as zealous as ever in supporting his friends.

Yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 9th August, 1820.

My dear Elphinstone,

I have many excuses, but no good one, for not answering your letter of the 14th June. The best I have is the oldness and consequent decay of my eyes, which, in place of serving me all day and all night, as in former times, can do duty only for a few hours daily. Since I came here they have been chiefly occupied in reading masses of papers of useless altercation between different departments; they require all my patience, and a great deal more, for I have very little left. Nothing is so tiresome as to waste time in discussions about matters of no importance in themselves, but which derive some from the absurd heat of the combatants.

Macdonell, who has just been with me, tells me that you want to know what the private secretary here has to do, in order that you may set Captain Terry to work in the same way. If you really wish to keep him busy, you should
set all your public officers at variance with each other, and employ him to read their lucubrations to you. This is what Macdonell and I do, and the Company are, no doubt, much obliged to us for occupying ourselves in a way so much to their advantage. If it were not for this, I really do not know what I could make of a private secretary. I find that there has always been an office for this gentleman here, with an establishment sufficient to have kept the records of a province, but I do not know what was done in it. I imagine that in early and better days, the private secretary's principal business was to lay every rich native under contribution for the benefit of his master; but as this class of natives has now become extinct at this place, my secretary will, I fear, have but little to do. I have therefore been thinking of desiring him to devote his attention to the discovery of a plan for restoring the prosperity of the country, and increasing the breed of rich men; and this will, I imagine, in the present circumstances of the country, save him from the evil consequences of idleness.

I think as you do of Macdonell, and shall be glad whenever I can find the means of acknowledging his service. Lady M. was much flattered by finding that your opinion of the merits of Ivanhoe agreed so much with her own; but she still looks for your critique on Anastasius. I shall wait till October for your report coming back from England; if it does not come within that time, I shall conclude that it has been seized by some admirer of Indian institutions, and request you to give me another copy. I wish you would in the mean time let me have a copy of your Minutes, &c. respecting the education of your civil servants.

Your's ever,

Thomas Munro.
TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL NEWALL.

Madras, 23rd December, 1820.

MY DEAR NEWALL,

You are now have heard of your appointment to be Resident at Travancore. You can either go direct to your station by the Malabar coast, or you may come here first. Do as you please, but let me know your plan as soon as you can. If you go direct to Travancore, you will, I hope, keep every thing just as you find it, and let the public business go on as if no change had taken place. You will, like all new men coming to the head of an office, be assailed by thousands of complaints against the servants of your predecessor. You can hear them calmly and leisurely, and if you are satisfied that they have acted wrong, you can remove them. But in all these matters too much caution cannot be used; and I hope that you will write to me on the subject before you attempt any innovation. We have already, I think, made too much in that country.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE CANNING.

Madras, 16th March, 1821.

DEAR SIR,

I write to you but seldom, because affairs here proceed so uniformly that hardly any thing occurs which it is necessary to bring to your notice. The territories of this government are perfectly tranquil, and not likely to be disturbed by either foreign or domestic enemies. We have occasionally, and probably will have for generations yet to
come, some petty feuds among families or rival chiefs of woody districts, which cause the loss of a few lives, or the burning of a few huts. They are usually much exaggerated by the local authorities, but they are trifling in themselves, and excited rather by private animosity than by opposition to Government, and have little effect on the general quiet of the country.

The country has suffered much during the last four years from the irregularity of the seasons, and the uncommon frequency of storms, and from the waste of life by the cholera; but this epidemic seems to be now on the decline, and though the revenue will in some districts be considerably less than in former years, it will, on the whole, be nearly about its usual standard.

I have not yet made any extension of the regulations of 1816, but I have never lost sight of the principles on which they are founded, namely, the relief of the people from novel and oppressive modes of judicial process; the improvement of our internal administration, by employing Europeans and natives in those duties for which they are respectively best suited, and the strengthening of the attachment of the natives to our Government, by maintaining their ancient institutions and usages.

I have always thought that the practice of confining Rayets in the common gaol like felons, so disgraceful to our code, might not only without inconvenience, but with advantage, be abolished. I have had much discussion on the subject since my return to India, and have so far yielded to the general opinion, as to agree that Rayets shall still, in some extreme cases of contumacy, be liable to imprisonment, and a regulation on the subject is now preparing. This regulation will also enable the Tihsildars and other native officers under the magistrates to punish trivial thefts when not committed by professional thieves. At present,
every petty theft of labourers from their masters' grain, of children in the power of their parents, or of idlers at fairs, which the natives themselves would either regard as mere mischief, or as an offence to be punished by reprimand or slight chastisement, are considered as crimes, and the offenders and witnesses dragged away from their homes fifty or a hundred miles, to the presence of the magistrate. As the court of the District Munsiff is much more frequented by the natives than that of the Zillah Judge, it is intended to extend his jurisdiction to five hundred rupees, that of the Sudder Amin to seven hundred and fifty, and of the Register to a thousand.

The only other regulation which I have in view at present, is one for entailing the possessions of ancient Rajahs upon their heirs, and to secure them against sale for debt. Our sweeping code of 1802 has made the domains of tributary Rajahs, which have been in the same families for ages, which all Governments but ours have respected, and which no money-lender could touch, all liable to sale. There will be some difficulty in replacing these Rajahs in the situations in which we found them, but it must be done.

* * * * *

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHEINSTONE.

Madras, 2nd of May, 1821.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I have only heard once from you since your unfortunate fall, which was as often as I could expect, when it is considered that you have in that interval been twice engaged in war in Arabia. Macdonell has sent you occasionally such of our regulations, &c. as he thought you would wish to see; but instead of sending you regulations, I would prefer sending you some young men, to learn in
the Mahratta provinces what the natives of India are, and whether they are likely to be the better of all the dull and heavy regulations which our supposed wisdom is so fond of imposing upon them. A great proportion of the Madras districts being under what is called the permanent system, affords no proper field for the instruction of young men in a knowledge of the people or of the revenue. This knowledge can nowhere be so well attained as in the territory under you, and I am therefore anxious to send some of our collegians to complete their education there. They would be of little use to you, but they would be very useful to us hereafter, in whatever quarter we might have occasion to employ them. You have not civil servants, I believe, to supply the demands of your enlarged dominions; and if you had, it would still, I think, be advisable to have Madras servants in that part of them which it is likely may, in a future period, be transferred to this Presidency. I hope, therefore, that you will draw upon us for a few young civil servants.

Yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO SIR GRAHAM MOORE, K.C.B.

Madras, 5th Nov. 1821.

MY DEAR GRAHAM,

Your letter of the 9th September reached me only in September last; it was sent to me from Penang by Sir H. Blackwood. I am glad that you sacrificed your seat at the Admiralty for the command in the Mediterranean, though I shall, perhaps, on returning home some years hence, and not finding my old friend in that comfortable corner-house of the Admiralty, which I liked so
much to visit, lament the romantic notions which tempted him in an evil hour to leave it. I must console myself for the loss by going out now and then to Brook Farm, and getting an account from yourself of your voyages and travels in the most delightful regions, and once the abode of the most interesting people of the earth. No wish has ever with me been so strong and constant from my earliest years as that of visiting Italy and Greece, and were I twenty years younger I should certainly spend seven of them there. But this last boyish expedition to India has, I fear, been fatal to all my rational plans of travelling in Europe, for by the time I get home I shall, I fear, be too old, or too doited, to feel the recollections which ought to be excited by the sight of the Capitol, or the Piræus. I wished myself along with you when you describe the portraits of De L'Isle, Adam, and Valette, in the hall of the Grand Masters at Malta. I feel more interest in Malta than Gibraltar, and I would rather see Rhodes than either, because it is more connected with the ancient Grecians, whom I admire above all nations, not even excepting the Romans. These nations had not the benefit of the art of printing, and from the effects which it has of late years produced in our own country, I am not sure that they were not as well without it. Perfect liberty of the press would be an excellent thing if we could have it without its licentiousness; but this is impossible; and I therefore suspect that it will one day become necessary to increase the restrictions upon it, for it is an instrument by means of which it is much easier among the lower orders of the people to do evil than good. A writer like Tom Paine can produce mischief almost immediately which it may require years to remedy. I could hardly have believed that the press could have done what it did in the case of the Queen, or that such a clamour could ever have been raised about
such a woman. It appears, however, to have now subsided, and I trust that the nation will feel the comfort of having in some degree recovered its senses, and endeavour to retain them. I send this letter by Sir John Malcolm, who goes home by Egypt, by which means it will reach you much sooner than by the usual channel. I am not sure whether or not you are acquainted with Sir John. His character stands very high in this country, so high that he has left none behind who can at all be compared with him. I regret his loss, both as a public servant, and as an old and esteemed friend. Lady M. met with a very unfortunate accident in February last, by falling from a horse on her head; the concussion was so great that she was for some days insensible, and one of her eyes has not yet recovered its proper place. She joins me in kindest wishes to you and Lady Moore. Tell Lady M. that her brother is well at Darwar.

Yours very truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. CUMMING.

Madras, 5th January, 1822.

MY DEAR SIR,

I take the opportunity of a vessel for England, whose packet closes this evening, to send you a part of a Calcutta newspaper containing an account of the Native Officers of Justice in India. The picture is correct, but perhaps too highly coloured—if not for Bengal, at least for Madras, except in a few districts. It, however, on the whole, presents a more distinct view of the subject than I have seen anywhere else. What most amuses me in it, is the strange conclusions of the writer in laying all the evils of the system upon the native character instead of our
absurd institutions. I agree with him in his facts, but differ from him entirely in all his reasonings concerning them. What he describes is our own absurd and oppressive Daroga system, introduced with our code, with which the natives have nothing to do. The merit of the measure is all our own, as well as all the effects attending it. The perjury, for which he can see no remedy, arises chiefly out of the very nature of the measure. When every little petty dispute is carried away from the spot where it happened, and sent to be decided by a European magistrate, one hundred miles distant, who is overwhelmed with countless causes of the same kind, who has not time to examine properly one tenth of them, and who from this cause, as well as his imperfect knowledge of the language and customs of the people, must decide in most cases by the number of witnesses rather than by their credibility—it is easy to conceive that the demand for false witnesses must increase. The District Munsiffs do not find many false witnesses, because they are not so liable as Europeans to be imposed upon by them.

Yours very sincerely,

Thomas Munro.

TO HIS SISTER.

Camp near Nellore, 9th Oct. 1822.

MY DEAR MARGARET,

I wrote you some months ago about a certificate for the share in the Calcutta Tontine which your brother took in your name; but as the certificate which you send from England may not be according to the form required by the Society, and as they themselves never thought of a form till lately, I send it to you, and will thank you to
have it executed and returned to me. Remember not to touch the affidavit below, as it must be left for me; but you know that I cannot swear that you are the lady until you swear that she is alive. I did not suspect when I last saw you, that the only correspondence you and I were to have was to be about certificates and affidavits, just like two lawyers.

Lady Munro was to have left Bangalore yesterday on her way to Madras, with Lady Grey, under charge of a wise doctor, whose name I forget. She had just received your picture, which Jessy calls a speaking likeness. Lady M. says it is very like, but that it wants something. I rather imagine that it wants nothing; but that it has got something which it ought not to have. An English artist is never satisfied with the quiet, sober grace of beauty, he always adds what he thinks will make it more striking, and I suppose that he has given you a pertish, smartish look like one of his exhibition heads. If Old Hicky at Madras were twenty years younger, I would rather have your picture by him than any English painter, for none of them ever give a true likeness of a lady. You may recollect the picture for which Lady M. sat so often at home: she has had one manufactured here by a French artist, which she thinks very like. It is such a striking likeness, that when it was shown to me with great exultation, I could not find out for whom it was intended. Mrs. Erskine has been equally fortunate at home; she has sent out her picture, her very image—another speaking likeness, I suppose. It looks about five-and-twenty, and is as like any other woman as her, but more like a milliner's girl than anything else. It is very odd that women never know what is like them; but the case is perhaps the same with the men: but, my goodness! what can be the cause of it? It is, however, lucky for the women, and for the painters too, that they can be
easily pleased by a picture which does not in the least resemble the original. What a heap of stuff about pictures! Let us talk of something more rational before I finish my letter. I am afraid that we have little prospect of seeing you in this country, because I hear with regret that though you are said to be looking as well as ever, you are still liable to the return of a little pain in your side, whenever you make any unusual exertions; and while this continues your medical men will advise you to remain in England. I have not seen Lady M. since the middle of May, but she is in very good health, and likes Bangalore, and if she had you there, she would never wish to leave it, unless to go home and see her son, whom his Craige friends are spoiling so fast. I have heard nothing of her eye for some months, and I therefore conclude that no great change has taken place in it. When I last saw her I thought that it would never entirely recover in this country, and perhaps not even at home. But the defect is now so slight as to be of no great consequence. I do not know where this will find you, but if with any of your own family, give my love to them, and believe me, my dear Margaret,

Yours affectionately,

Thomas Munro.

I have been travelling through the rain for the last three days. The country is everywhere under water, and it is still pouring, and I am sitting at the door of my tent in order to get light enough to write. Every thing looks uncomfortable. The servants and followers are huddling together, and the horses and bullocks are hanging their heads, but I enjoy the gloomy scene because it is cool, and is like home. 

T. M.
TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 26th November, 1822.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I received some time ago yours of the 27th October, and I have in consequence desired Mr. Mc'Donnell to look over, with my new Secretary, and see whether there be any papers of a general nature worth sending to you.

I have given the Board of Revenue a complete native cutcherry; I wonder that they should ever have been without it, for it is absolutely necessary to enable them to get through their business properly. I have long felt the want of it, and often found that when I wanted information on matters of which I was ignorant, I could not get it from the Revenue Board, and was obliged to consult an Oomédwar. It will keep up the connection of the Revenue Board with the people, and extend their knowledge of local usages and revenue; and it opens a field to able and aspiring Natives, and prepares the way for giving them some share in the Government half a century, or a whole century hence.

We give small grants of land to Native servants who have distinguished themselves in the revenue, political and military lines, but none for mere length of service. The custom has in some instances been abused by Company grants on writing and record keeping.

Punchayets are always slow, and as well as Potails, are averse to interfere in complaints and suits, from the fear of the Courts. They had no such fear of the Collectors, and under them were useful auxiliaries, and would be so again, if we could contrive some way of making them responsible only to their old superiors, the Tihsildars and collectors.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.
TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 19th April, 1823.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

It is a long time since I have written to you, but I have been better employed in reading at intervals your and Chaplin's valuable works, which I have no doubt will one day be considered all over India as the best guides for the internal administration of our provinces. My attention, since my return to India, has occasionally been called, to what appear to me to be defects in our military system, incompatible with good government, and which seem to have crept in by degrees, as I cannot discover any regular authority for them. I shall mention the principal.

The Commander-in-chief, at his own discretion, without any previous sanction of Government, alters the dress of the European officers and men of the Company's army. He, in the same manner, removes lieutenant-colonels from one corps to another as often as he pleases; and he, in the same manner, removes the majors and senior captains from the one battalion to the other of the regiment.

These powers, it is obvious, may be so exercised as to produce much discontent. I have known a lieutenant-colonel in six months in three different corps. Before the regulations of 1796, the commandant of every corps was appointed by Government. This seems to be the rule at home, as the Commander-in-chief can only appoint, with the sanction of the King, the head of the Government.

I am anxious to learn what is the practice of Bombay.
Are general alterations of dress, and appointments to, and removals from, the command of corps, made with or without the previous sanction of Government?

I suppose you are now at Malabar Point, looking out for the monsoon, or rather for the hot weather which precedes it.

Yours very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 21st July, 1823.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I send you a note from Mr. Ward on titles of honour. He seems to wish to maintain our claim, but I think that we have no right to it; for, it appears, that though Barlow gave the title of Honourable in private notes, he himself is the first who has given it in official records.

Our thermometer here is seldom under ninety degrees. We have a hot land wind, day and night, and I wish myself in one of your airy bangalows every time I think of them. Your description is enough to make a plain man romantic. You want nothing but sheep to finish your landscape.

The Governor-General talks of sailing on the 20th.

Yours truly,

Thomas Munro.
TO MR. CHAPLIN.

Muddanpilli, 14th October, 1823.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

I am much obliged to you for your letter on the survey assessment of this country, as it contains all that can well be said on the subject, and many details which had either never occurred to me, or escaped my memory. I have never seen the Report to which you allude; it had not reached Government when I left Madras, and I had only heard the general scope of it. It is said that a three years' experience of the Rayetwar, with the advantage of the twenty-five per cent. reduction, has proved that it will not answer. You would suppose from this, that the reduction has been enjoyed by the Rayets for the last three years. No such thing; waste has been added nearly equal to the remission. Ever since you left the Ceded Districts, the Tihsildars have been in the habit of adding waste to every village, as it fell in from the lease. In February 1230, the Collector was ordered to make the full remission; but when his report of his settlement came in, it appeared that he had, according to his own statement, induced such Rayets as were able to take waste equal to one-half of the remission. He does not mention the amount, but I believe it was between three and four lacs of rupees, in addition to what had before been imposed; and in place of being only half, was, on the whole, nearly equal, if not fully equal, to the remission. There are many cases in which it was more. Many Rayets, whose remission was twenty pagodas, were obliged to pay twenty-one or twenty-two for waste which they never saw, and have done so for three years. Government, of course, censured the imposition of the waste in Thirty, and expected it to be taken off in Thirty-one; but nothing of the kind was done. The
Collector, it seems, had heard of Putkut, and had taken upon himself to give each Rayet a Quaimi Puttah, as it was called, for, his Putkut, including the waste, and no settlement was made in 1231, but the collections were made upon these Quaimi Puttahs. In this year, about six lacs and a half fell in, and waste was added to them; and in 1232 still more waste was added. The Collector seems to have thought that these fresh additions were all the waste, for he took it for granted, that all that had been inserted in his Quaimi Puttahs was long ago cultivated. But it is all waste, as it was in 1229, and had I not come into this District, the Rayets would have had to pay for it in 1233, and many of them will, I have no doubt, do so still. In place, therefore, of a three years' trial of the remission, there has not been one; it has not yet begun, and the Rayets have suffered more than if there had been no remission. They pay the amount under another name, and with much contention and ill-will, from knowing that it is contrary to the orders of Government. All confidence has been destroyed between them and the Collectors, and a system of concealment has been introduced by the operation of adding waste, which has rendered most of the cutcherry accounts undeserving of credit. We are now, in the fourth year after the remission was ordered, only beginning the experiment, and under much more unfavourable circumstances. The Ceded Districts have been very unfortunate in their Collectors; two more unfit men could hardly have been found, and it is difficult to say whether they have suffered most from the listlessness of the one, or the mischievous bustle of the other.

I never supposed it possible to make a scale which should not require revision; but I thought that, after a trial of six or seven years, every material defect would be discovered, and that such a revision might then have been made as would have been permanent. Had there been no
leases, and had you and Ross remained, I am convinced that in 1214 you would have had no difficulty in doing it. What I have lately learned on the spot has rather strengthened than weakened this belief; for, in spite of all the changes and accidents during the leases, the greater part of the Rayets continued to pay according to the survey rates, and I am satisfied that, after the remission shall have been fairly carried into effect, the amount of lands, which may be left uncultivated on account of the rent, will not be one, certainly not two per cent. which is too inconsiderable to cause any injury. Even this will probably be cultivated ten or twelve years hence, when the Rayets have recovered; and should a part of it even then be found too high, it may be remedied by another and final reduction. Had there been a good Collector on the spot, it might have been done, by authorising him to make the remission, instead of one quarter everywhere, in some places a fifth, and in others a third. Coimbatore has had this advantage of one or two revisions, and it is now, in consequence, the district in which the Rayets are the most comfortable, and the collections the most easily made of any under the Madras Government. The Collector has hardly any trouble in making the settlement; North Arcot has been brought nearly to the same state; and Salem, notwithstanding all that has been written about over-assessment, will require very little revision. The lands in many villages of every Talook have acquired such a value as to be mortgaged and sold. This practice is beginning in the Ceded Districts, and will soon spread when the remission has had effect. In all districts which have been surveyed, the collections are the most regular, and landed property is best understood. As long as the Sirkar assessment is not fixed, and accurately registered, and known to the Rayets, private landed property cannot be established; because, even if the assessment be moderate, the
uncertainty of its continuance, and the chance of its being raised, destroys that confidence which is necessary to enable land to become saleable. I am convinced that, if you were now to revisit Tarputtey and Yarki, and see the scramble in those districts for land, where the assessment is fixed and moderate, you would not hesitate about a survey of the Southern Mahratta country. It would be the greatest benefit you could confer on the people. Let it be carefully made; let it be revised when finished before it is acted upon; let it be tried for seven or eight years; and then let it be revised and finally fixed. The revision should be limited to reduction; no increase should be made. Whatever land is at first over-assessed should be allowed to be thrown up during the seven years' trial.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 1st April, 1824.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I do not believe that I have written many Minutes lately of a general nature, but I shall desire M'Donnell to look over them, and send you any we may have of this description. The question of the press has, I hope, been settled by Mr. Adams's regulation. My Minute on the subject was but a sketch, and it was intended not so much to show how matters actually were, as how they might be at a future period, if we did not place the press in this country under some control. The Court of Directors have never acknowledged its receipt, and I therefore conclude that they have not been able to do any thing at home, or else that they think that what has already been done in Bengal is sufficient.

The prospectus of the British and Indian Observer, with
the circular, has been sent here as well as to Bombay. It is evidently intended to excite discontent and insubordination in the army, by giving it plenty of inflammatory matter.

My travels do not furnish any materials for Minutes. We have no new countries, and my route is over a beaten track, which has long since been fully and accurately described, and which it would be tedious and useless to describe again; so that all that I have to say, after returning from one of these expeditions is, that things are as they were. We write a great deal too much in this country; we are so prolix that few people read us, and we are in danger of becoming so voluminous, that we shall soon be unable to read ourselves.

We are busy here preparing an expedition for Rangoon; it will sail about the 12th instant, and will be composed of two regiments of European infantry, five battalions of Sepoys, artillery, &c. Another of the same force is under orders, to be ready by the end of May, and if you cannot relieve the 89th at Cannanore, we shall be put to some inconvenience, but not such, however, as to prevent our sending the force proposed.

Yours truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO THE RIGHT HON. C. WYNNE.

Madras, 8th July, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th February, and am happy to learn that you think the assessment of the country ought to be lightened when it can be done with prudence. It is a measure which is absolutely necessary, not only for the ease of the people, but for the ultimate stability and pro-
gressive increase of our revenue. It is not a measure which demands hasty or general adoption; but is one which must not be lost sight of, and which must be carried into effect cautiously and gradually, and suiting the extent of reduction to the condition of the several provinces. Our revenue is now tolerably permanent. There is no very great fluctuation in its annual amount, but it takes from the cultivator too large a share of the produce. If we lower the assessment a little, he will be enabled to improve his land, and get other crops, and his gain will be more than the mere abatement in his rent. But neither this, nor any plan calculated for his relief, can be successful, unless we abandon theories, and follow with perseverance the practical system in use among the Native Governments when best administered. The Rayetwar, the ancient and most common system in the peninsula of India, is that by which only we can know the real state of the country, and protect the people. It has by some misconception, arising out of a superficial knowledge of the customs of the country, been supposed to be something new. It is in fact nothing more than Government, through its officers, receiving the land revenue directly from the land-owners of the country, instead of farming it out to adventurers. Had the whole landed property of a district been in the possession of a few great proprietors, nobody, I believe, would have thought of such a plan; but because it is distributed among a great body of small proprietors, or rayets, it seems to be considered as quite reasonable that they should be turned over to any body, who will pay a fixed annual revenue for them, and that Government should thus be relieved from the trouble of looking after them. As long as the native rules of inheritance remain unchanged, landed property must be small and numerous. But whether a district be divided among a hundred, or ten thousand proprietors, it ought to make no difference as to the relation
in which the proprietors stand to Government. They are all tenants in chief, and have a right to the same protection. It is no excuse to say that a direct settlement with them causes greater detail and some additional expense. It is the duty of Government to adapt its arrangements to the convenience of the people, rather than to its own case.

TO SIR GRAHAM MOORE, K.C.B.


MY DEAR GRAHAM,

I AM not sure whether I ever answered your letter of the 30th of July from Zante, but I am sure that I have thought often of doing so; and if I have, this will be a second edition, but no matter if it were a third, for it is pleasant to write and think of auld lang syne. I never think of you without looking back half a century, when we were in Glasgow, and went to school in fear and trembling to meet Bald—-*

* * * * * I have had my share of a warm climate. I am now writing with the thermometer at ninety-two, and it is seldom below ninety in the daytime, from April till October. I don't mind the heat much, but my wife feels it, and probably the more from having brought me another son last year. She has a strong dislike to many good Christian names of his ancestors, and has therefore called him Campbell. I thought that one Highland name was quite enough in a family, and that two Highland surnames without a Christian name, such as Peter or Daniel, could not be canny. I hope that I shall one day have the pleasure of introducing him to your son John.

* A tyrannical teacher, whose chief pleasure consisted in punishing his pupils.
I see with delight that the Greeks are still on the whole successful. The very gaining of time is gaining an advantage. The longer the contest continues, the more confidence they will have in themselves, and the better qualified they will be to enjoy and preserve independence. You have now, I suppose, taken up your final abode in your own country, after all your toils and wanderings, quite satisfied with what you have done and what you have seen. I, however, have no right to rest, and I must go and see a little of the world like other people. It is, to be sure, rather late, but there is no help for it; it is one of the evils that attend our long employment in India. I shall, therefore, I imagine, soon after I get home, leave it again, in order to visit the Continent, and, if not too dangerous, Greece. I suppose that I must take a Domine to direct me, but on this point there will be time enough to consult you.

I was quite rejoiced to hear of the cruel disposition that old Carrick had made in keeping a part of his large fortune from David Buchannan, and giving it to your brother. I should not be at all surprised to meet him in Conduit-Street on my arrival, for he has, I fear, been too long about town to have any relish for a country life. I am not sure that even with you one of the chief enjoyments of your rural abode is not that of going to town and meeting an old shipmate occasionally. We are not much accustomed to quiet in India, and we have, therefore, gone to war with the King of Ava. His subjects, the Burmans, are much inferior as soldiers to the natives of India, and are a very miserable enemy; but there are many difficulties from natural causes in the invasion of Ava; the rains last nearly half the year, during which time military operations are nearly impracticable. The cattle, &c. for an army cannot be transported by sea, and by land there are no roads, and the distance is great, and through moun-
tainous and desolate passes. These difficulties will all, however, be overcome; they require nothing but arrangement and perseverance. I am sorry that I shall not be here to see the close of the war, for not expecting any rupture, I wrote last year to be relieved, and my successor will probably be here in January.

Yours affectionately,

Thomas Munro.

TO HIS BROTHER.

Madras, 26th Jan. 1825.

My dear Alexander,

I wrote to you in the beginning of the month of the unfortunate death of poor John Munro. What a fatality has attended him as well as his father! I told you in my last that he had been killed at Kittoor, by a matchlock ball, in accompanying the storming party, to which he was urged by the ardour of his temper, contrary to the orders of Mr. Chaplin. He was the only person who fell, and the only one who was not ordered there. There was something so unlooked for and so tragical in his death, that it appears to me almost like something that is not real. Had he lived, he would have turned out much better than you or I expected in his earlier days; for there appeared at that time to be something defective, which prevented his having any distinct impression from what he read. The defect was not in memory, but in want of attention or comprehension. This, however, disappeared as he grew up, and he promised to have become a very valuable public servant. Mr. Elphinstone, in writing to me, says, "The melancholy intelligence of your nephew's fate must have reached you long ago; earlier probably than it did us. It was a real misfortune. With his zeal and talents, and the rapid progress he had made in every thing, he must
have proved a public servant of the very first order; and every day makes me more sensible of the difficulty with which such a loss is supplied." How sadly this fair prospect has been darkened, and all the anxious cares and hopes of his friends disappointed by his melancholy death!

I have forgotten to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th April last, and of one after your visit to Craigie, which Lady M. has kept ever since it came. Erskine had enough to distress her before, but John's death will be a terrible shock, which I fear it will be long before she can recover.

I have heard nothing certain of my stay here, or of any successor.

Your affectionate brother,

Thomas Munro.

EXTRACT.

30th May, 1825.

It gives me great pleasure to hear you speak so favourably of the Rayetwar system, which, though the old system of the country, is by some strange misapprehension regarded in England as a new one. It has been unfortunate for the territories under Madras, that almost all the earlier discussions regarding Indian land and its owners or occupants, were carried on in Bengal, where the long previous weakness of the Mahomedan rulers had allowed the officers of the revenue to assume rights which did not belong to them, and which the British Government augmented, by considering them as landlords, under the term of Zemindar. The opinions derived from Bengal regarding Zemindars, were extended to this Presidency, where, in fact, they are unknown, excepting in the northern Circars, where they were suffered to grow up in the same manner as Bengal. The greater part of our territories have been acquired from Native Princes, who did not em-
ploy Zemindars, and who collected the revenue, as we now do, from the Rayets, by means of Tihsildars, receiving a monthly salary, and appointed and dismissed at pleasure. Most of our provinces have in ancient times been surveyed and assessed; but as the accounts have in general been altered or lost, we make a new survey and assessment, in order that we may know the resources of the country; and in order that every Rayet may know the exact amount of his assessment, and thus be protected against any extra demand. The tendency of the Native rules of inheritance to subdivide the land is no doubt an inconvenience; but the evil is not found in practice to be so great as might at first sight be supposed. We know its utmost extent. It can never go beyond what it is now; for in all Rayetwar countries, the course of time has long since carried the subdivision of land to its utmost natural limit; and it has been carried beyond it by frequent wars and arbitrary exactions, having impoverished the Rayets and prevented them from cultivating so much land as they would otherwise have done. Peace, and a moderate assessment, will in a few years considerably increase the size of the Rayet’s little properties or estates, by increasing their agricultural stock. The subdivision of estates is also counterbalanced in a considerable degree by the custom of the different branches of a family often remaining for one or two generations undivided, under one head. The subdivisions must, however, be great, as long as the present laws of inheritance continue to be followed. But it is our business to let the distribution of property remain as we find it, and not attempt to force it into larger masses upon any theoretical notion of convenience or improvement. There are many Rayets who have not more than four or five acres; there are some who have four or five thousand. Between these extremes, there are great numbers who have from one to five hundred. I have no doubt that if the
law of inheritance is found to be materially inconvenient to the Rayets, it will in time fall into disuse.

It is desirable in every country, that the natives should be employed in every branch of the internal administration, and that their situations should be made respectable. The Indian governments begin to be sensible of this, and they have during the last twenty years considerably improved the condition of the judicial and revenue native officers, and I imagine that they will gradually do all that is necessary in this respect if supported from home.

TO KIRKMAN FINLAY, ESQ.

Madras, 15th August, 1825.

MY DEAR SIR,

I do not know that I have ever yet acknowledged the receipt of your letter about Dr. Anderson. I have never seen him, but I understand that he is a very good public servant; which, being our townsman, I consider as a matter of course. I hope that you are a friend to free trade for public servants, as well as for other articles; and that you do not think that men ought to have a monopoly of offices, because they come from a particular town; or that we should call them China, when we know that they come from the Delft-house. I find, however, that there is no shaking off early prejudice, and becoming quite impartial, as a friend to free trade ought to be; I find that, notwithstanding my long exposure to other climates, I am still Glasgow ware; for if I had not been so, I should not, when I saw your opinion quoted by Mr. Huskisson, in support of his measures, have felt as much gratification as if I had had some share in the matter myself.

I remember, when I was in Somerville and Gordon's house, about the time of the appearance of the "Wealth of Nations," that the Glasgow merchants were as proud
of the work as if they had written it themselves; and that some of them said it was no wonder that Adam Smith had written such a book, as he had had the advantage of their society, in which the same doctrines were circulated with the punch every day. It is surprising to think that we should only just now be beginning to act upon them; the delay is certainly not very creditable to our policy. Our best apology is, perhaps, the American and the French revolutionary wars, during the long course of which the nation was so harassed, that there was no time for changing the old system. The nation was just beginning to recover from the American war, when the Revolution in France began; and had that event not taken place, I have no doubt that Mr. Pitt would have done what we are now doing. I am not sure that you are not indebted to your old friend, the East India Company, for the measure not having been longer delayed. The attack upon their monopoly by the delegates in 1812-13, excited discussions, not only upon their privileges, but upon all privileges and restrictions, and the true principles of trade, which probably prepared the minds of men for acceding to the new system, sooner than they would otherwise have done. Even now there seems to be too much solicitude about protecting duties: they may, for a limited time, be expedient, where capital cannot be easily withdrawn, but in all other cases why not abolish them at once? There is another point on which anxiety is shown, where I think there ought to be none—I mean that of other nations granting similar remissions on our trade. Why should we trouble ourselves about this? We ought surely not to be restrained from doing ourselves good, by taking their goods as cheap as we can get them, merely because they won't follow our example? If they will not make our goods cheaper, and take more of them, they will at least take what they did before; so that we suffer no loss on this,
while we gain on the other side. I think it is better that we should have no engagements with foreign nations about reciprocal duties, and that it will be more convenient to leave them to their own discretion in fixing the rate whether high or low.

India is the country that has been worst used in the new arrangement. All her products ought undoubtedly to be imported freely into England upon paying the same duties and no more, which English products pay in India. When I see what is done in Parliament against India, I think that I am reading about Edward III. and the Flemings.

I hope we shall talk over all this some day, in a ramble in the country, where the cows are still uncivilized enough to cock up their tails and chase strangers.*

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. CUNNINGHAM.

Madras, 10th July, 1826.

MY DEAR CUNNINGHAM,

I got your letter of the 11th of January only a fortnight since: I don’t know where it had been so long, but it seems to have been in bad weather, for it was drenched in salt water, had opened, and was hardly legible. I was, however, able to make out a great deal of satisfactory information about our old friends. They all seem to be very well, except Webb and Jourdan, who never were very strong. I observe you never say anything about ——;

* This expression refers to a little adventure in which Colonel Munro and Mr. Finlay took part. They had walked into a field in which a number of cattle were grazing, and Colonel Munro was describing to his companion some military movement, when the animals suddenly rushed at them, and they with some difficulty escaped over a wall.
I suppose you never see him now, and that he may have betaken himself to better company.

I need not write to you about this country, for I believe there is hardly a person in it whom you know, except General Hall and Doveton; one of whom commands the southern, and the other the centre division. I wish we had Scott or Nat. Forbes here, for we are much in want of old officers for divisions.

You will have heard that our Burman war is over. General Bowser, if you have seen him, will tell you all about it much better than I can, or any body else. Our loss in officers has been severe, and both they and the men deserve great praise for their behaviour. The troops will all be here in the course of the month, except one regiment of Europeans, and five regiments of native infantry, which remain for the present at Rangoon, and on the coast of Tenassim.

As peace has returned, I have no object in remaining in this country now, and shall be very happy when a successor arrives and sets me at liberty. It is a long time since January 1780, when I arrived here as a Cadet, and borrowed thirty pagodas of Andrew Ross about six months after, to equip me for the field against Hyder Ally. I begin to feel, though my health is good enough, that I am not so active as formerly; that my hand is not so steady; and that either the heat, the climate, or the lapse of time, has had the usual effect, and made me older than I was then. It is now too late to think of getting younger by dying my hair, or changing my dress, or going home. I shall quit this country, where I have passed so much of my life, with great regret, but still I shall be delighted to go home.

Yours, very truly,

Thomas Munro.
TO, DAVID HALIBURTON, ESQ.

Camp near Combaconum, 3rd August, 1826.

MY DEAR SIR,

I received, some time before leaving Madras, your letter of the 19th February, by your friend Mr. Findlay Anderson. He appears to be a smart lad, and I hope will in time make a good public servant. I agree with you entirely in thinking that a great deal too much importance is attached to a proficiency in the Indian language, and I was therefore glad to see the motion at the India House, for making all cadets pass an examination in them, rejected. An officer wants little more of the Native language than what is necessary to make his men understand him in all points of duty. Many of our best officers have merely this knowledge, and some of our best Orientalists are mere linguists, and better calculated for domines than officers. We have too many restrictions, both civil and military. A young man's prospects should never be permanently destroyed for mischievous pranks, or idleness at college or school. A lad, who is idle at fifteen or sixteen, often becomes studious at twenty, and gives great application to the country languages, after having been a year or two in India, and found their utility.

I am truly sorry to hear that James Anderson* has had so severe an attack; a man such as he ought never to be ill, and I trust that he has long since recovered. I am not at all surprised that you should still be fond of talking over the negotiations with Scindia in 1782; it was an eventful period, and more critical and interesting than any

* Formerly in the Bengal Service, now of Wilton Lodge, in the county of Roxborough.
thing that has occurred since, and I shall be very happy when I can see you at Bushey, to talk over some of the many of those days. They have been brought to my mind by my present journey through the Carnatic, by Carangooly and Tondervarum, where Sir Eyre Coote's army was always followed and harassed by Hyder, and by my halting two days lately at Chellumbrum, where we were repulsed in 1781, a few days before the battle of Porto Nero. It seems strange to me, that these things should have happened forty-five years ago, and that I should be still on the same spot, and that in riding along the bank of the river, I could in fancy see before me Meer Saheb's cavalry, scampering about and following us close on the opposite bank, as distinctly as if it had been yesterday. I am, I believe, the only European now in India who was with that army on that retreat. I thought little of the heat then, but now find it a serious matter to sit in a tent, with the thermometer at ninety-eight degrees. Such heat must soon wear me out. I must, however, get through my journey; it will be a long and hot one to Tanjore, Madura, and Palamicotah, and back by Dindigul, Coimbatore, and Salem, or Mysore. It is needless to speak to you of any body in this country, for I shall not in my circuit see a single person you know, or any very old acquaintance of my own; but notwithstanding this, there is a great pleasure in passing through countries enjoying profound peace, and full of industrious inhabitants, which I formerly saw desolate and laid waste by a destructive enemy. I am, my dear Sir, with great regard,

Yours, very sincerely,

Thomas Munro.
TO SIR GRAHAM' MOORE.

Naggamjiri, 18th October, 1826.

MY DEAR MOORE,

I RECEIVED some time since yours of the 5th October last. My reason for not writing sooner is the same as yours; I expected to have seen you before this time. It is nearly twenty years since I thought that I had taken a final leave of this country; but I am now, after a tour of nearly a thousand miles, sitting in my tent, at the head of one of the passes leading down from Mysore to the Carnatic, at the distance of about a hundred and thirty miles from Madras. I am anxious to leave India, yet I shall leave it with a heavy heart. I have spent so much of my life in it, I am so well acquainted with the people, its climate is so fine, and its mountain scenery so wild and beautiful, that I almost regret that it is not my own country; but it is not my home, and it is time that I should go there, whether it is to be in Scotland or in England. If I am not too old when I get home, which I suspect I am already, I must take a journey to Italy or Greece, that I may have time to settle where my home is to be. Nothing is more difficult to a man who has been long absent from his own country, than to determine in what part of it he ought to fix his abode. But I must get there first, and I shall be very happy to see Sir John Malcolm come out to relieve me,—no man is better qualified, and none would be more popular.

Your opinion of the Greeks is, I fear, too just. They have, however, after making large allowance for their exaggerations, and when we consider their means and their unfortunate dissensions, made a struggle not altogether unworthy of their ancestors. I should be delighted to see

VOL. III. 2 F
them an independent power; it would be a noble acquisition to Europe; their character would improve with their independence. My wife is now at home, and I hope she has been so fortunate as to meet you and Lady Moore, and renew her short acquaintance with you both. When I reach England, I shall not be long in finding my way to Brook Farm, to examine your improvements, and talk over Auld lang syne. You have never told me how young John Moore is: I hope he is well, and like his father. I am happy to hear that Lady Moore was much better, and I trust she is now as well as ever.

Yours, very truly,

Thomas Munro.

TO KIRKMAN FINLAY, ESQ.

Madras, 10th May, 1827.

MY DEAR SIR,

I had great pleasure in reading your letter of the 23rd February, 1826, because it reminds me of old times and places which I always think of with delight, and because I see from it that you are not involved in any of the joint stock companies. I had great confidence in your judgment, but the rage for speculation was so general that I thought it just possible that you might have gone with the spate. I am glad that it is not so, and I hope that Ministers will not be alarmed by clamour, but go on steadily, and remove all the absurd restrictions which have been heaped upon the trade and industry of the nation.

What castle is this you have got into? I read it Castle Howard at first, but thinking that could not be right, I have been trying again, and can make nothing of it unless it be Toward or Foward. I believe I must go to the spot in order to ascertain the true name. I hope you have got plenty of knowt, and stane dykes, and black boyds. The
dykes are useful for more things than one; they keep us in the practice of louping, they help to ripen the black boyds, and they enable us to parley with the knowt without danger.

You are perfectly correct, I believe, in your orthography of the black boyds, at least we spelt them your way when I belonged to the grammar-school between fifty and sixty years ago. I must not do so un-Glasgow-like a thing as not to reply to your recommendation of Lieutenant Campbell, of Ormodale. He is a promising young man, but he is out of my hands at present, as he has lately been appointed by the Commander-in-chief to a staff office with our troops at Penang, and I have no doubt that he will push his way in the service. I am afraid, from what I have read somewhere lately, of there being twenty-five thousand Irish weavers and labourers about Glasgow, that there can be very few of what you call right proper Glasgow-men left. I suspect that you have not now many of the pure old breed of right proper Glasgow weavers whom I remember about the grammar-school wind and the back of the Relief Kirk. They are probably now like a Highland regiment of which I once heard an old sergeant say, that "what with Irish and what with English, they were now no better than other men."

I am happy to learn that my old friend Colonel Noble is a neighbour of yours. He is an excellent officer, and very much liked by all who know him.

We are all quiet in India at present; and I shall be very happy, after so long an absence from Fatherland, to see my successor. Remember me kindly to Mrs. Finlay, and believe me always

Yours, very sincerely,

Thomas Munro.
TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Madras, 27th May, 1827.

MY DEAR ELPHINSTONE,

I lose no time in replying to your letter of the 15th instant, because if I delayed two days longer I should probably forget the matter. The enclosed statement will, I hope, answer your purpose. The same charges may not be exactly under the same heads as with you, but all are entered. You will see that I am rather an expensive traveller; but I console myself with the belief that my personal inspections save ten times the amount of the charge.

From what you say, as well as what we see in the Bengal papers, I conclude that Sir John has been appointed your successor, but we have no account of it here. You could not be relieved by a better man. He is very popular here, and his loss will be much lamented. I should like much to go home by Egypt, but I fear that there are some entanglements, not of my own, but of the Court of Directors, which will prevent it.

Yours, most sincerely,
Thomas Munro.

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH DELIVERED BY SIR THOMAS MUNRO, DELIVERED AT A PUBLIC MEETING 26TH OF APRIL, 1826.

"We must all deeply lament the melancholy cause of our being now assembled here. My own acquaintance with our late excellent Bishop was unfortunately but of short duration, yet in that short time I saw in him so much to admire, that I can hardly trust myself to speak of him as I could wish. There was a charm in his conversation by which in private society he found his way to
all hearts, as readily as he did to those of his congregation by his eloquence in the pulpit. There was about him such candour and simplicity of manner, such benevolence, such unwearied earnestness in the discharge of his sacred functions, and such mildness in his zeal, as would in any other individual have ensured our esteem, but when these qualities are, as they were in him, united to taste, to genius, to high station, and to still higher intellectual attainments, they form a character, such as his was, eminently calculated to excite our love and veneration.

"These sentiments towards him were everywhere felt. Wherever he passed in the wide range of his visitation, he left behind him the same impression. He left all who approached him convinced that they never had before seen so rarely gifted a person, and that they could never hope to see such a one again. The loss of such a man, so suddenly cut off in the midst of his useful career, is a public calamity, and ought to be followed by an expression of the public feeling."

THE END.