Sierra Leone Handbook
WARNING

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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Sierra Leone is a small, economically underdeveloped country on the bulge of the west African coast. An independent member of the British Commonwealth since 1961, it enjoyed constitutional civilian rule until a military coup in 1967. The military remained dominant politically until April 1968 when civilian rule was reintroduced. The largely illiterate population has little understanding of the various institutions of representative government that replaced or were grafted to their traditional system by the British. As a result, the government is manipulated by a westernized minority for its own ends, while the needs of the majority rural population are given only lip service.

President Siaka Stevens assumed power in 1968 after a mutiny within the security forces ended 13 months of military rule. Since then Stevens has managed to preserve a shaky coalition between the Temne and other smaller northern tribes represented within his party, the All People’s Congress (APC). The violence and intimidation that seem endemic to Sierra Leone’s political life have accelerated under Stevens, however. At the center of these frictions is the traditional rivalry between the two major ethnic groups, the Temne and the Mende, the predominant tribe in the south.

Stevens has departed from some policies of previous governments. Contacts with Communist states have been increased, but without sacrificing traditional close ties with the West. Growing nationalistic sentiments have been expressed through the take-over of a majority interest in the important, formerly foreign-owned diamond industry, and through the declaration of a republic in 1971. Stevens has embarked on a policy of extending Sierra Leonean control over other parts of the economy, but he is quick to reaffirm his continuing desire for private foreign investment. Attractive investment opportunities are scarce, however.

The government faces serious economic and political challenges. Two thirds of the population farms, but food production does not meet domestic requirements. Agricultural expansion is hampered by lack of money and equipment, primitive farming practices, and poorly developed transportation and marketing systems. Rising prices, low wages, and high unemployment are sources of potential labor unrest. Over half of export revenues comes from diamonds, which are being depleted and are subject to fluctuating world markets.
In the political arena, Stevens survived, within the space of six months, a rebellion within his own party and a military coup attempt that included two attempts on his life. Stevens' responses were decisive and ruthless. He declared a state of emergency, then arrested the dissenters and outlawed their newly formed opposition party. In March 1971, while army leaders debated the fate of the government in the confused aftermath of their commander's inept coup attempt, Stevens signed a defense agreement with Guinea, brought in Guinean soldiers, and regained control. Then in quick succession he changed the constitution, declared a republic, and made himself the country's first president.

Stevens has further consolidated his power since, but his position continues to rest largely on the forceable repression of opponents. His short-sighted and blatant use of corruption and misuse of governmental institutions—including the courts—to maintain power has increased Sierra Leone's social and political divisions and made necessary the even more intensive use of such tactics. Political stability, therefore, seems as elusive as ever.
I. GEOGRAPHY

Location

Sierra Leone is situated on the bulge of the west coast of Africa. It is bordered on the north and east by Guinea, on the south by Liberia, and on the west by its 210-mile Atlantic coastline.

Area

The nearly circular country has an area of 27,900 miles, slightly less than South Carolina. The maximum east-west distance is approximately 200 miles.

Climate

The climate is tropical with constant high temperatures and humidity. The rainy season extends from May to November. Rainfall is heaviest in July and August, and along coastal areas such as Freetown where about 150 inches fall annually. Daytime temperatures vary from the low 80s during the rainy season to the low 90s during December when the harmattan—a hot, dry dusty wind from the Sahara Desert—is blowing.

Topography

Sierra Leone consists mostly of flat to rolling plains less than 500 feet high in the western part, and dissected plains, hills, and occasionally mountains in the east. The western section consists of a coastal band of alluvial sand and clays interrupted by numerous broad tidal creeks and estuaries, and by a wider belt of rolling plains covered by brush in the south and tall grass and scattered trees in the north. The generally rough dissected plain that constitutes the eastern part of the country has similar vegetation. There are few areas with elevations over 2,000 feet. One such area is the rugged Sierra Leone Peninsula on which Freetown is located. About 25 miles long and seven miles wide, the peninsula is covered by dense broadleaf evergreen forest and contains many steep-sided valleys and ravines.

Natural resources

Sierra Leone's major natural resources are its minerals, but known deposits are modest and, in the case of diamonds, a wasting asset. Diamonds,
found in alluvial deposits in the southern part of the upland plateau, are the most important mineral resource and account for over half of total export revenue. Other important minerals include iron ore, bauxite, and rutile—a titanium-bearing ore. Petroleum exploration has so far been unproductive. Sierra Leone has considerable hydroelectric potential, but there is at present only one major hydroelectric plant, which supplies most of Freetown’s needs.

Agricultural products account for only about one fifth of total exports, although farming is the largest sector of the economy. Principal export crops are palm kernels, coffee, and cocoa. Most people engage in subsistence farming on small plots, using low-yield traditional methods that employ very little fertilizer and almost no machinery. Principal food crops are rice, cassava, ginger, millet and yams. Large areas of potentially productive swamplands suitable for rice growing remain uncultivated because farmers prefer the drier and healthier highlands.

Human resources

Sierra Leone’s youthful, predominantly rural population is largely unskilled and poorly educated. As of 1 January 1972 the population was estimated at 2,607,000 with an estimated annual growth rate of 1.5 percent. Population density averages about 93 persons per square mile, but the highly urbanized western area averages nearly 800 persons per square mile. Nearly ten percent of the people now live in the western area, and an exodus from rural areas is continuing. Ninety-nine percent of the population is African, divided among 13 indigenous tribes. The two major groups, the Temne in the north and the Mende in the south, each account for one third of the total. About two percent of the total, or 40,000 people, claim to be Creoles, descendants of the freed slaves who first settled the country. Creoles traditionally have comprised a social, intellectual and, formerly, political elite. Major rivalries center around the competing interests of these three groups, and those of urban and rural dwellers. The foreign population consists mainly of an estimated 3,000 Europeans and Americans and about 4,000 Lebanese and Indians.
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Growth rates and trends

Sierra Leone's economic performance since independence has been uneven due, in large part, to its overdependence on one resource—diamonds. After several years of slackened growth and serious budgetary difficulties, the economy showed marked improvement in the late 1960s due to a stabilization program and increased diamond production. In 1968 gross domestic product increased and foreign exchange reserves grew substantially. An economic slump began in early 1970, however, and the real annual growth rate fell to an estimated 2-3 percent. Meanwhile, expenditures, some linked to persistent political instabilities, continued to grow, producing severe budgetary pressures which were expected to continue over the next year.

Income distribution

Most of Sierra Leone's annual income goes to the relatively small political elite, those who work in the modern economic sector, and foreign businessmen—including Africans—who have investments in the minerals industry or the wholesale and retail trade. About 100,000 Sierra Leoneans—11 percent of the labor force—are salary and wage earners, with well over half of these employed either in the mining industry or by government. The remaining 89 percent engage in subsistence agriculture and are only marginally involved in the money economy.

Status of agriculture, mining, and industry

Agriculture—Farming, together with animal husbandry, fishing, and forestry, provides a livelihood for 80 percent of the population. It accounts for 30 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 20 percent of total exports. Rice is by far the most important subsistence crop, accounting for 45 percent of total agricultural output. Self-sufficiency in rice is a major economic goal, but 30-40,000 tons annually must still be imported. The main export crops are palm kernels, coffee, and cocoa. There is good potential for increased food production.

Mining—Mining is the second most important domestic activity and the most important foreign exchange producer, accounting for over 75 percent of total exports. The major minerals are diamonds, iron, bauxite, and rutile. Diamonds account for about 80 percent of the value added by the mining
sector. They are mined in roughly equal shares by local diggers and by the National Diamond Mining Company (DIMINCO) under a concession agreement with the government, which owns 51 percent of DIMINCO shares. Rutile production, a key element in future government planning, was suspended in 1971 when the financially pressed concessionaire ended operations. Operations under new ownership were expected to resume in 1972.

**Industry**—The small manufacturing sector—six percent of GDP—so far has made only a limited contribution to the growth of output and employment. It consists mostly of foreign owned and managed establishments producing simple import substitutes and employing less than 50 persons. Production of most commodities declined in 1970, but the reduction in value was more than offset by increased output at the local refinery, which began operations in 1969.

**Transportation and communications**

Transportation and telecommunication facilities are inadequate and poorly maintained. Major components include two unconnected rail lines totaling 368 miles of single, narrow-gauge track, 4,000 miles of highway (of which less than 400 miles are paved), an adequate inland waterway network, and a major, recently enlarged seaport. The government, aided by the World Bank, is embarked on a substantial road-building program in anticipation of the planned phase-out of the 311-mile publicly owned rail line. Freetown is linked by air to west and central Africa, Europe, and the United States. Domestic service is restricted to six airfields. Freetown is the country’s main telecommunications center with links by radiotelephone to London and several African countries. In addition, three old submarine cables provide links with Accra, Ghana; Bathurst, Gambia; and Ascension Island.

**Government economic policies and monetary systems**

All Sierra Leone governments have emphasized the importance of economic development, particularly in agriculture, and of attracting foreign investment. However, actions have varied considerably from stated objectives. Long-range development plans were ignored or soon abandoned as unrealistic, promised austerity measures gave way to excessive government spending and borrowing, and the agriculture sector was not allocated the promised funds. These disparities continued into 1972. The Stevens government called for greater foreign investment, but in 1971 it acquired controlling interest in the privately owned diamond mining company, and passed new laws to restrict foreign participation in the economy. This helped
sour the investment climate. The proposed budget for 1972-73 apparently reflects a recognition of the need for austerity—development and military spending has been cut. Nevertheless, the past performance of the Stevens government, the pervasiveness of corruption, and the potential for more political instability make austerity doubtful.

The monetary system consists of a central bank, three foreign-owned commercial banks, a development bank, and a postal savings bank. Sierra Leone's currency, the leone, was created in 1964 along with the central bank, and is informally pegged to the pound. Sierra Leone belongs to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

**Foreign trade**

Duties from imports and exports constitute the government's largest source of revenue. Declining customs receipts, combined with higher than normal trade deficits in 1970-71, contributed to the country's deepening economic slump. Diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, and rutile are the major exports. Major imports are foodstuffs, chemicals, manufactured products, machinery, and transport equipment. The United Kingdom is Sierra Leone's major trading partner, accounting for 65 percent of its exports and 30 percent of its imports. The European Economic Community countries, the United States, and Japan also figure prominently.

**Balance of payments**

Perennial trade deficits since independence have been more than offset by a net inflow of capital—mainly private foreign investment—resulting in a payments surplus during most years. The higher trade deficits of 1970 are continuing, however, accompanied by declining foreign investments, declining revenues, and increased government spending and borrowing. As a result the government faces a serious liquidity problem. External reserves are being used up, and there are no immediate prospects of a brighter future.
III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS

Historical background

Present day Sierra Leone was formed from two elements: the former colony, consisting of the area around Freetown, where the Creoles were an important part of the population; and the much larger Protectorate, inhabited almost entirely by tribal people. The British established limited representative political institutions in the colony in 1863, and the Creoles played a leading political role from the outset. In contrast, representative institutions did not exist in the Protectorate until 1946. Their establishment ensured that the more numerous tribal people would eventually gain political control, which they did during the 1950s when Britain began to relinquish its hold and encourage political party activity.

1951-1967: The unity of independence begins to fragment—For three years after independence in 1961 Sir Milton Margai, leader since 1951 of the southern-dominated Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), controlled politics through a conservative coalition based on traditional chiefs and the Mende tribe. The coalition, united on the question of independence, began to fragment as competition for the political spoils intensified after sovereignty was attained. The fragmentation accelerated under the autocratic rule of Albert Margai, who assumed leadership of the SLPP and the post of prime minister upon the death of his brother. At the same time, the challenge of opposition political elements gradually grew stronger and culminated in the narrow election victory in March 1967 of the All People’s Congress (APC) led by Siaka Stevens.

1967-1968: Military intervention—Before Stevens could take office Margai, with the help of the army commander, arrested the APC leader in a desperate effort to retain power. After two days of confusion and mounting tensions, senior military officers seized control in an effort to stabilize the deteriorating security conditions. Organized into the National Reformation Council (NRC), the military ruled for 13 months. Their inability to develop popular support or establish the legitimacy of their rule resulted in a mutiny by the lower ranks of the army and police in April 1968, paving the way for a return to civilian government under Stevens.

1968-1971: Stevens takes hold—Stevens faced enormous problems when he took over, notably the unreliability of his security forces which mirrored the deep tribal and regional divisions that plagued the country.
generally. Violent clashes between the Mendes and Stevens’ northern supporters, now in power for the first time, led to a declaration of a state of emergency in late 1968. Gradually the new prime minister gained control and the Mendes resigned themselves to the role of a legal though ineffectual opposition. In mid-1970 Stevens faced a new challenge, this time from within his own party. A group of dissident Temnes from the Tolkollili district, unhappy with their role in Stevens’ system and with his drive to install himself as an executive president, formed a new opposition party and sought SLPP support. Stevens reacted vigorously, banning the new party and arresting its leaders—some of whom have since been released.

1971 - Consolidation of Stevens’ rule—The Temne challenge put great strain on the loyalty of the army, which Stevens still regarded as suspect. In March 1971 Army Commander Bangura, a Temne and former Stevens supporter who had become disenchanted, launched a poorly conceived and executed coup attempt. Subordinate officers again stepped in, but while they were debating what to do, Stevens struck back with the help of loyal army officers, and Guinean troops rushed to Freetown under a hastily signed defense agreement. Once back in control, Stevens exploited the coup attempt to achieve long-sought political changes. A republic was declared, a new constitution adopted, and Stevens was installed as the country’s first executive president. By year’s end Stevens and the APC were well entrenched in power, although their control rested more than ever on force and intimidation.

Government

Sierra Leone is governed under a patchwork constitutional structure that incorporates elements as diverse as British parliamentary democracy and customary tribal law. Long division of the country into colony and protectorate and the differing governing procedures followed in each further confuses the picture. Those government structures inherited from Britain have no roots among Sierra Leoneans, except possibly in the case of the Creoles, and are poorly understood by most citizens. Surprisingly few modifications were made until 1971, however. Those that have occurred have been designed to facilitate the application and retention of executive power. The 1971 modifications superimposed a powerful presidential system through which Stevens runs the country. His office no longer is linked to parliamentary elections, but he is required to face presidential elections every five years, beginning in 1976. Further changes toward stronger executive control are likely. The 78-member parliament is thoroughly controlled by Stevens’ party and does not challenge his decisions. The main political
divisions are three provinces divided into 12 districts with 146 chiefdoms, and the western area which comprises Freetown and other coastal areas of the former colony.

Political dynamics

Sierra Leone politics have been unstable and marred by violence since independence. Competition for the top job has been intense. Parties are narrowly constructed along tribal and regional lines, although there are frequent defections to the group that appears stronger at the moment. The once powerful Creole minority is particularly adept at this. Their support swung the 1967 elections in Stevens' favor.

The All People's Congress—The left of center APC was formed by President Stevens in 1960 to push for elections before independence. Elections were not held and power passed from the British directly to Milton Margai, a Stevens rival and head of the Sierra Leone People's Party. The APC remained the major opposition party until its upset election victory in 1967. Its main support comes from northern tribes, particularly the Temne and Limba.

The Sierra Leone People's Party—The SLPP is a coalition of tribal chiefs and educated elite from the former Protectorate. It is particularly identified with the Mende tribe. The party was founded by Dr. Milton Margai in 1951. Leadership problems, government harassment, and financial difficulties have reduced the SLPP to an ineffectual opposition in 1972. A potential for resurgence remains because of its continued identification with a major tribe and specific geographic area, however.

Stevens' power rests on his prestige, his position as chief executive and commander in chief, and the unstated threat that Guinean troops would again intervene to suppress any challenge. Like each of the four governments in power since independence, Stevens has sought to augment the power of the executive. Unlike the others, he has been generally successful. The opposition was neutralized by combining repression with political deals, constitutional changes, and judicial decisions that nullified many of the opposition's election victories. A principal tool has been the state of emergency declaration under which the President is granted additional powers and all political activity is prohibited. An emergency declaration first approved by Parliament in October 1970 was renewed one year later. Stevens' views do not go unchallenged, however. He is subjected to strong and conflicting pressures from within his party and cabinet. Moreover, Stevens is constrained by some desire to adhere at least to the appearance of legality.
Stevens' hard-fought and nearly constant battle to retain control and enhance his powers has left little time for building a durable national political system or an ideology to unite the country. His constituency today is probably weaker than when he took power. Deep scars remain from the 1970 revolt within the APC. Moreover, Stevens has abandoned some of the policies that attracted the urban poor and rural disenfranchised who swelled the ranks of his party in the mid-1960s. He has, in fact, turned for support to the same traditional chiefs he criticized when in opposition. All this, plus an economic slowdown, probably has diminished Stevens' popularity and made his position more dependent than ever on the use of force and corruption.

Stevens has gained, on the other hand, from the change to a strong presidency, the availability of armed backing from Guinea, and restoration of some discipline within the security forces. However, the army remains badly split and probably has not given up interfering in the political process.

Security forces

Police—The 1,800-man police force has primary responsibility for maintaining internal security and law and order. Poor discipline and leadership, political interference, and conflicting regional and tribal ties limit police effectiveness. Morale improved during 1971, but discontent still exists over low wages, poor working conditions, and tribal favoritism. In addition to the regular police, a small force of perhaps 200 men is being trained as a special Internal Security Unit.
IV. SUBVERSION

Communist party and front groups

There is no Communist party in Sierra Leone. There is some Soviet influence among students who have received their education through Soviet scholarship programs and among certain labor leaders. There are pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese sympathizers within the APC, and some of its members belong to international Communist fronts. Stevens, whose own children have studied in Communist countries, remains a pragmatic nationalist, however.

Foreign activities

Communist countries have shown only moderate interest in advancing their cause in Sierra Leone and pose little subversive threat. Only the Soviet Union and China maintain resident missions. Representatives from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia are accredited to Freetown, but reside elsewhere. East Germany periodically presses for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Soviet warships stationed off Guinea paid good-will visits to Freetown harbor in 1971 and 1972. Among African states only Guinea takes a strong interest in Sierra Leone's internal affairs. It has a defense treaty with the Stevens government. Guinea has no incentive to overthrow the present Sierra Leone Government, but has succeeded in strengthening radical elements in the country.

Exile groups

Several of Stevens' political opponents live in exile and undoubtedly plot against him. Their prospects were not good in early 1972, but Stevens was greatly concerned with the threat from this quarter. The exiles' main resources within Sierra Leone are tribal and regional allegiances, and former supporters of the now illegal political party formed by Temnes who bolted the APC in 1970. John Karefa-Smart, leader of that Temne faction, now lives in the United States, while Albert Margai, the former prime minister, lives in England. Both retain some support within Sierra Leone.

Popular discontent

Sierra Leone has many exploitable problems, but there is no evidence of organized subversion. The government must contend with grumbling over high prices and low wages, and with high urban unemployment, lawlessness,
and widespread corruption. Diamond smuggling continues unabated, due in large part to the participation of high government officials. The security forces remain factionalized and rumors of new plotting are common. Stevens currently has the force necessary to stay in power, but the potential for future political upheavals is obvious.

The military

A military coup remains the most likely method of removing Stevens from office. The prospect of such a coup diminished during late 1971, but did not disappear. Stevens sought to neutralize the threat through a combination of promises, warnings, purging of those of suspected loyalty, and creation of a well-armed special police unit to counter the army if necessary. Moreover, 50 Guinean troops have continued to be Stevens’ personal guard. A former army commander and three fellow plotters were hanged last June as a lesson to other ambitious officers. The rank and file remains divided into factions.
VI. ARMED FORCES

Organization and manpower

The 1,500-man army is controlled by President Stevens as commander in chief and minister of defense through his army commander, Colonel Joseph Momoh. There is no navy or air force. The army consists of one regiment, made up of one battalion plus supporting elements. The battalion has four rifle companies and a headquarters company. There are no significant paramilitary forces. The police force numbers 1,800, and a few hundred men have been organized into a special Internal Security Unit.

Equipment

Most arms and equipment are of British World War II origin. They consist almost exclusively of small arms, with some mortars and rocket launchers. Most are in a poor state of repair. A small amount of small arms and ammunition was received from China during 1971. Ten armored cars were purchased from Switzerland in 1970. At least eight had been delivered by early 1972.

Military budget

The defense budget for 1971 was $6.1 million, 8.4 percent of the total budget. This represents a substantial percentage increase over previous years and reflects the security problems of the government. Between 1964 and 1968 defense expenditures ranged between 4.0 and 4.4 percent of the budget.

Military agreements and aid

UK assistance, mostly in the form of grants and loans, has steadily declined since independence. As of mid-1970 the UK provided only training. Currently Sierra Leone receives almost no foreign military aid. A mutual defense treaty was signed with Guinea in March 1971 under which Guinean troops were dispatched to help President Stevens suppress a coup attempt. Economic and technical agreements signed with China in July 1971 were believed to include some military equipment and possibly training, but the details are not available.

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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Western countries

President Stevens has modified Sierra Leone's traditional pro-Western foreign policy to create a more even-handed approach toward East and West. Nevertheless, the basic thrust continues to be toward close ties with the West. A general decline of British influence since the mid-1960s accelerated during Stevens' rule, although Sierra Leone has remained within the Commonwealth and economic and cultural ties with the UK remain substantial. The very loose constitutional ties provided for in the independence constitution were scrapped in favor of a republican system in March 1971. Relations with the US were occasionally stormy during 1968-71 due to repeated attempts by Stevens to implicate the US in domestic affairs. A decision by Freetown in 1971 to extend its territorial seas to 200 miles was in conflict with US Law of the Sea objectives. Overall relations appeared to be improving in early 1972, however. The UK and US remain the primary sources of foreign aid.

Communist countries

Initiatives on both sides resulted in increased Communist activity in Sierra Leone in 1971, and in the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and North Korea. Visits by numerous Communist delegations to Freetown resulted in some increased aid, including the first military aid from China, although the total amount has not been substantial. The visit of a Soviet naval contingent in December 1971 reflects a modest increase in Soviet interest. Moscow has maintained an embassy in Freetown since 1962. A further expansion of ties with Communist governments is expected, partly as a result of proddings by leftist Sierra Leoneans and partly from Stevens' pursuit of foreign aid and prestige.

African countries

African policy focuses on maintaining good relations with neighboring governments. A member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Sierra Leone follows the OAU lead on broader issues. Relations with Guinea are particularly close. Conakry's more radical views on African issues often are repeated by leftists in Stevens' government and have some effect on policy decisions. Sierra Leone was the African representative among non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 1970-71 and is active in UN debates.
VIII. US INTERESTS

Defense

The United States has no defense obligations to Sierra Leone and has not furnished any military aid.

Economic and technical aid

US assistance amounts to about $2.5 million annually for Peace Corps and PL-480 programs, and for staffing an agriculture college. The cumulative total from 1946-70 is $34 million. There were 215 Peace Corps Volunteers in Sierra Leone in 1971 under a 1961 agreement.

Trade

Trade with the US has increased somewhat since 1968, but it remains a small percentage of Sierra Leone's total. In 1970 exports to the US amounted to $6.2 million out of total exports of $101 million. Imports were $10 million out of $116 million. Primary exports to the US are coffee, rutile, and diamonds; primary imports are machinery and transportation equipment. The same pattern should persist, with little prospect for an increased US share.

Investment

Sierra Leone has attracted only limited foreign private investment, with the bulk coming from the UK. US investment is minimal, amounting to an estimated $15 million. Eleven million of that represents an Export-Import Bank claim on assets of Sherbro Minerals, a US-controlled rutile mining company that suspended operations in 1971 after encountering technical and financial difficulties. Another US company has picked up the mining concession agreement and is expected to resume production in 1972. The remaining investment represents investment in a flour mill, a diamond polishing factory, a petroleum refinery (Mobile and Texaco), and tuna fishing. There is an Investment Guaranties program for US investment in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is a signatory to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes.

Cultural

The US has no cultural or educational agreements with Sierra Leone, although the US Government sponsors a Visitors Exchange program and

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maintains a small USIS team in Freetown. The US cultural program cost $109,000 in 1971. One hundred eighty-five Sierra Leoneans have visited the US under the exchange program since 1949. Some 240 students were studying in the US in 1971, 24 under official US sponsorship. This compares with about 500 Sierra Leoneans studying in the Soviet Union, and 1,000 in the UK.

**US citizens**

There were almost 900 US nationals in Sierra Leone as of late 1971. Included besides the Peace Corps were 14 members of the US Mission and their dependents. The 579 private US citizens included 134 American missionaries.
Secret