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Introduction:

Some thoughts on the nature of Scottish Regiments

Highland regiments or regiments of the line of Highland origin have long excited the imagination of writers, historical and literary, and readers alike, a romantic relationship that dates from the Napoleonic wars. The poetry, literature and painting that in the wake of the Allied victory over Napoleon at Waterloo enshrined it as an historic moment - it is one of Sir Edward Creasy's fifteen decisive battles and commemorative medals were issued to all troops involved for the "first time in the history of the British army" - also elevated the Highland regiments to new heights in the British popular imagination. The image of the Highlanders' square bristling with cold steel, the Scots steadfast as the French cavalry bears down on them, the piper playing "Cogadh na sith" within the square, captured the hearts of the English and quelled any lingering doubts about the loyalty of the Scots to the political entity that was the United Kingdom. With the entry of Ireland into the union in 1801, the pacification of one segment of the "Celtic fringe" was of no small import.[1]

Since Waterloo, the image of the Highland regiments has changed little; regimental fortunes have waxed and waned but they have maintained for themselves an image as an elite force, embodying the martial and tribal aspects that many would describe as central to the Scottish experience and perhaps, more importantly, have come to represent the maintenance of Scottish identity in the face of numerous pressures for acculturation.

The articles in this special issue suggest that the Highland regiment experience is much more complex. Regiments represent a variety of military experiences, both collectively and for the individual. The importance of understanding the regiment in

the context of the mercenary tradition rather than that of the clan or the prism of nation building is highlighted by Andrew Nicholl's "For More than King and Country." That the regiment is a useful unit for measuring social change as much as tradition and continuity is evident from Scott McLean's "An Officer and a Gentleman". The Scottish and British political experience is also a fruitful area to explore through the prism of recruitment. Was the recruitment of Highlander manpower a grand experiment in nation building or an extension of an intrusive state? These are some of the issues addressed by Ron Sunter and Andrew McKillop respectively.

The topic of state building suggests the utility of examining regiments. The growth of the state, and nations, was an important development during the modern period. One could argue that the experience that the Highland regiments most clearly embody is the reduction of the Highland and Scottish culture during the 18th and 19th centuries by the British state and then that culture's reconstruction within a new British Empire framework. Some suggest that the Highland regiments indeed represent a tremendous success story in the building of a national identity: a British identity. The paradox of the Highland regiments is that they can represent both the maintenance of the older culture while being both a key agent and a prime example of acculturation.

Perhaps if there is one central theme that runs through the establishment of the Highland regiments it is that of the evolution of the British state and the gradual development of identifiable symbols of that state, shared symbols that would provide the framework for a national identity. In some ways Highland regiments represent what C.A. Bayly defines as "tributary patriotisms," national identities based on a rediscovery of indigenous languages, literatures or customs, all encouraged by the state and compatible with the new identity. Fostering a subordinate form of nationalism within the United Kingdom by the rediscovery, or construction, of indigenous customs was assimilation by patriotism: if the empire and the monarchy became the symbols of the new British national identity in the 19th century, the army and empire were the tangible forms of

that identity, particularly for the Scottish "proprietary elite", a point well-made in Andrew McKillop's article.[2]

"Ever since the Union," writes Linda Colley, "the British army had been one of the few departments of the state open to Scottish ambition."[3] For ambitious Scots, the army and empire provided opportunities for wealth and position unavailable to them in the British Isles. For the less ambitious, the army provided food and shelter when the economic foundations of a changing Highland culture were destroyed. It seems evident that the army was for the Highlanders in the 18th and 19th century a viable, even attractive, avenue. Was this in fact the case? Andrew Nicholls argues that the nation-building paradigm needs to be understood in the context of Scotland's long tradition of mercenary service. To fully understand the issue, several of the authors suggest that a key question remains: why would the British government recruit, train and arm those who had been among its most ardent, if not most dangerous, opponents?

The Highland regiments' origins were rooted in the practicality of manpower needs in a century characterized by almost continuous warfare and the state-building process that was central to 18th and 19th century Britain. The use by more organized societies of 'barbarous' peoples on the margins to assist in fighting their wars has a long history: the Cossacks in the Russian army are one of the more analogous examples. Indeed, it was in the need to forge ties of loyalty between the governing classes and those fighting for them that the origins of "regimenting" are found in seventeenth century Europe as the rulers of the emerging nation-states sought a means of replacing the feudal landholding system of military service and social organization that had collapsed under the pressure of the near endemic warfare. Two centuries earlier the Italian city-states had developed a system that gradually subordinated the mercenary companies to the government by increasing the dependency of the individual officer for advancement on civic officials. Charles VII of France followed suit and by the early 1600s, colonelcies of the "regiment" or command were being granted by the monarch, completing the link between the military organization and the state.[4] As such, the regiment was an essential element of the growth of

modern nation-state. It secured "the control of armed forces to the state" in response to the inadequacy of the traditional landholding basis for raising armed forces.[5] As a social institution it was designed to ensure that loyalty was transferred from the local lord to the state; on an individual level, it harnessed the value system of the individual warrior but transferred those values from the individual to the unit. The regimental system's success lay in the fact that its foundations were those of its own history; tradition and ritual ensured loyalty and continuity and, in the 19th century, a pool of experience and expertise that formed the professional core of the British army. Scott McLean discusses some of the tensions between the older and newer traditions, suggesting as well that the regiment is a useful way of examining social changes in Scotland and Britain.

The general characteristics of the regiment in the British army in the 18th century ensured that it became an agent for transmitting a new identity to the individuals who joined at the same time as it provided a vehicle for reconstructing the old one to fit the requirements of the regimental system. This process was also shaped by the logic of recruiting in the Highlands and the state's perception of the utility of Highland regiments of the line.

Highlanders were first formally recruited by the government, represented by the second Earl of Atholl, in 1667 to police or "watch" themselves and their country. Their purpose reflected the mistrust with which they were viewed by the British government. The Watch was not a success; the loyalties and hence the goals of the various companies were those of the "ceann-cinnidh" who had raised them. The fundamental failure to transfer loyalty to the state was exemplified when many who had taken part in the '15 were untroubled by their role, following as they had their chieftain's decision.[6] The government took a different view and disbanded the regiments in 1717.

The concept lived on, however. Major-General George Wade believed that it was for "want of being put under proper regulations" that the experiment had failed. His entreaties through the 1720s to the King to raise more companies of Highlanders were couched in terms that reflected his personal

belief that the companies should be treated, as were other army units and that elements that suggested individuality and loyalty other than to the regiment should be extinguished. Hence when a new Watch received the King's authority in 1725, the choice of plaid was, under orders, a green and blue; it reflected not a "clan tartan" affiliation but an attempt to break down the individuality of the clansmen, an individuality that was an anathema to the regimental system of discipline.[7]

Over the next decade and a half, six more companies were added to the Highland Watch. The most significant addition came in 1739 when a Royal Warrant added four companies and changed them from Independent Companies charged with policing the Highlands to a line regiment, 43rd (later 42nd) in precedence, in the service of the British state. The mutinies that followed in 1743, when the 43rd were to be used outside the Highlands, suggested that the Highlanders were not aware of the distinction although their officers most certainly were, an illustration that the loyalty to the British state, or to the allegiance which best furthered their own interests, of the upper classes was secured. Indeed the army became an important agent in the creation of a new Anglo-British elite.[8]

Despite the mutiny of the 43rd, this decision to regiment met with markedly more success. If the Highlanders who filled out the ranks did not appreciate the point, from 1739 it was also more clearly an attempt at nation building and its success was partially due to the appeal of the regimental system itself. While creating a community of interest between the Highlanders and the rest of Britain, the Highland regiments were more than just a result of a new relationship being forged between these cultures and peoples; they were also important catalysts shaping and promoting a new identity not just for the Highlanders but both for the British and the Scots.

This is an important point and one reason that examining the regiments is important. Nation building was a two-way street. Fontenoy may have proved the battle-worthiness of the Highland regiments, but it took longer to dispel the suspicions fostered by rebellion and centuries of mutual antagonisms. "To remind themselves of Scottish depredations," notes

Linda Colley, "Englishman had only to . . . glance at the beacon towers strung along the hills of Cumberland and Westmoreland, erected over centuries so as to give warning of impending Scottish raiders. As for Scotsmen, the genocide that had reputedly followed the Battle of Culloden was reminder enough of the English capacity for racialism and hate."[9] There was at this time also a widespread concern, culminating in the narrow English patriotism of John Wilkes in the 1760s and 70s, that Scots were alien to English political temperaments. The populist nature of the Scot phobia that gained currency was partially a result of the government's campaign to secure the allegiance of Scots through government and royal patronage. In the late 18th century, peerage appointments of Scottish, and Irish, nobility increased dramatically.[10] It was also a product of the tenacity with which many Scots were promoting the notion of Briton as an identity based on a commonality of political and moral characteristics, a decidedly Lowland initiative that did not have a great impact in the south.

The conspicuous success of the Highland regiments during the Seven Years War was a primary factor in the decision to raise further regiments. It also did much to quell the suspicions that had characterized attitudes towards the "barbarous" peoples of the north up until that time. The success of the Highland regiments in promoting a new feeling of harmony was, however, only made possible by the extinction of the culture and threat that they represented. In the aftermath of the '45, the British government, with its attention drawn to the Highlands by the successes of the Rebellion, effectively embarked on a two-fold program of destroying the underpinnings of the Highland society and rebuilding it on a basis more suitable to the burgeoning commercial nation that was England and increasingly Lowland Scotland. In the former they achieved rapid success; the latter took longer.

The Disarming and the Heritable Jurisdiction acts of 1746-47 were only two of the numerous pieces of legislation that were designed to replace allegiance to hereditary lords and the Stuarts with allegiance to the state and the monarch. More substantive measures included the subsidization of certain primary industries

and the establishment of schools for teaching English and the industrial trades.[11]

None of this proscribed the future of the Highland way of life; neither in perception nor reality was the Highland way of life expected to survive much less shape the image of the whole of Scotland. Indeed, the Highland Scot prior to the '45 was as often the butt of humour as the root of fear. The image of the Highlander as "fool, rogue or beggar" was pervasive through the early 19th century and is not completely absent from the novels of Sir Walter Scott.[12] The late 18th and early 19th century witnessed not only the triumph of the image of the Highland Scot as warrior but the transmission of natural martial virtues to all Scots, a transmission made easier and facilitated by the romanticization of the "noble savage" and primitive peoples across Europe and the concurrent decline of the threat they posed to their more civilized neighbours.[13]

If the Rebellion both brought the Highlands as a region and as a people to the attention of the British and finished them as a real threat, the Disarming Act proved the catalyst for the association of the Highland regiments with the development of 19th century Highland traditions. From the beginning, the importance of maintaining Highland "traditions" became central to the mandate of the regiments, not least because of the proscription against the use except in the Highland regiments in the British army abroad of the incidental symbols of Jacobitism and Gaeldom like the belted plaid and the bagpipes. The Disarming Act, by specifically excluding the Highland regiments, ensured that for the twenty-five years that the ban held, the Highland regiments not only retained the remnants of the Highland martial tradition but more importantly changed it forever. The next century then saw the Highland regiments as one of the key factors in popularising and spreading the traditions that they had helped fashion.

Instrumental in fashioning this role was Prime Minister William Pitt. He supported the raising of ten regiments in the period 1757-1760. All but the renumbered 42nd Royal Regiment of Foot were disbanded. Their influence survived them. Pitt himself characterized the new image of the Highlander:

> I sought for merit wherever it was to be found;
> it is my boast that I was the first minister
> who looked for it, and found it,
> in the mountains of the North. I called it forth
> and drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race.[14]

Pitt, however, was also desperately short of men and conscious that Highland manpower had been turned against the state in the not too distant past, fallen "prey to the artifice of [its] enemies."[15] Major, later General, James Wolfe, immortalized on the Plains of Abraham, was less oblique, writing in 1751 that "They are hardy, intrepid, accustom'd [sic] to rough Country, and no great mischief if they fall." Interestingly, he illustrated the dynamic attitude towards the Highlanders, noting that the public would think his ideas "execrable and bloody".[16] Pitt was neither the first nor the only state servant to envision large-scale recruiting among the Highlanders; Lord Barrington the Secretary for War in 1751 told Parliament:

> I am for having always in our army as many soldiers
> as possible; not that I think them more brave than
> those of any country we can recruit from but because
> they are generally more hardy and less mutinous.

There were thus numerous rationales for recruitment but not least was the desire to increase the number of loyal subjects as a proportion of serving soldiers. It has been estimated that between 50-60% of soldiers in the British army at the beginning of the 18th century were foreign subjects or mercenaries. By the end of the century that figure was probably less than 20%. That the themes of obedience and loyalty frequently recur suggests that the attempt to recreate a Highland identity in a less threatening fashion was also part of a larger objective of promoting patriotic service to the British state. Certainly contemporaries viewed the Highland regiments as a "very significant experiment" in nation building.[17]

None of this explains why the Highlanders answered the call or how they gained widespread acceptance as an embodiment of

the Scot as warrior. On these questions we can use the regiments to illustrate that the two issues are intertwined. The former question is beyond the scope of this essay but the soldiers who enlisted must be remembered as individuals coming to grips with the decline of their society on an economic and cultural level, with the traditional social elites either rendered helpless or actively accelerating the process. Martial ardour does not provide a useful explanation. The ambivalence of the Scots' reaction to the whole process is reflected in McKillop's discussion of the difficulties they obtained in raising a full complement of men as well as other studies of the mutinies of the regiments through the later 18th century. Ron Sunter's article sheds light on the practice of recruiting and what this suggests about the recruits. Certainly the upheaval in the aftermath of the failed rebellion explains the appeal of the provisions of the Disarming Act, as was surely the objective; also critical was the maintenance of the loyalty of the chieftains who retained their influence and saw in regimenting a chance to both rid themselves of tenants and a way to curry status and favour when opportunities for advancement in the new order were still limited. Thus when the decision was made during the American Revolution to once again expand regimenting amongst the Highlanders, and they proved their worth in the service of the state, the place of the Highland regiments in the British Army was cemented. This positioned them to influence the image of the Scots in general.

The importance of the Highland regiments in this process is now well documented. Between 1777 and 1800, twenty regiments were raised and half were retained on the establishment of the British Army through the early 19th century. These regiments adopted the revisions that had been made in the traditional Highland costume. The kilt proved more practical than the plaid cloth worn from the waist to the knee. While there is some dispute as to the origins of this innovation, it replaced the belted plaid in the aftermath of the Disarming Act. Until 1782, when the act was repealed, the Regiments were the main repositories of the traditional garb albeit in an altered form. The same forces that had brought like-minded Scots together in the Highland Society in London in 1777 to promote a Gaelic cultural

revival also prompted a renewed interest in the wearing of the belted plaid and kilt, not amongst the traditional wearers of such costume but among the Lowland upper and middle classes. Reactions to attempts to promote the trews as more traditional than the kilt during the late 18th and early 19th century suggest that the kilt was not assured a victory. In 1794, Sir John Sinclair dressed his Rothesay and Caithness fencibles in tartan trews. In contrast, in 1804 the War Office considered a wholesale change, an idea that was firmly rebuffed by the officer corps of the Highland regiments who argued forcefully against any attempt to strip them of their native garb.[18]

The regiments as medium also ushered in another innovation that would soon take its place among the pantheon of traditional symbols: the tartan. As the number of regiments increased so to did the need for new patterns to differentiate them and create the distinctiveness so central to the regimental system. All new regiments, with the exception of the 79th Regiment of Foot (Cameronian Volunteers) whose tartan was designed by the mother of the founder of the regiment Alan Cameron of Erracht, modelled their tartans on the Government or Black Watch design. The degree to which this was rooted in clan tradition is debatable but its commercial potential was obvious, particularly in the climate of a resurgent interest in Gaelic culture. Consequently, at least according to Trevor-Roper, clan tartans rapidly multiplied and were certified legitimate just as rapidly by the Highland Society. The idea was popularised by a retired Black Watch officer, Colonel David Stewart, who took his regimental tradition for history.

The link between the Highland regiments and the resurgence of interest in Highland tradition is not all that remarkable. They moved, however, from vehicles for the maintenance of a way of life to agents for its transmission to the entire nation. The "Highlandization" of Scotland, the identification of Highland symbols and costume with the Lowland Scots, was speeded by the new heights of adulation afforded the Highland regiments, and army in general, following the Napoleonic wars. The identification was cemented during King George IV's royal visit to Edinburgh in 1822, when "Highlandism" became a fashion

statement. Orchestrated by Sir Walter Scott, as detailed in John Prebble's *The King's Jaunt,* Highland traditions were created, legitimised and paraded before the whole British nation as representative of all Scots. "A bogus tartan caricature of itself had been drawn and accepted," writes Prebble, "even by those who mocked it."[19]

Sir Walter Scott's novels were also instrumental in promoting the seemingly contradictory romanticization of the Highlands while bemoaning their backwardness and the need to accept the modernizing forces of progress that accompanied the union. Sir Walter Scott in *Waverley* describes "without sentiment" the vanishing of "much absurd political prejudice" and the many "progressive" changes that have characterized Scotland since the defeat in the '45.[20] Indeed, Scott's novels reflect the paradox that while Highland culture was an anathema to many who saw ancient historic Scotland's culture and roots as quite distinct from the barbaric Highland culture, the identity being formed in the 19th century was rooted in the romanticization of that which they had so long despised.[21] The Lowlands, if one can be allowed a generalization, had rather emphasized the similarities in moral and political characteristics with the south that made for the unique identity of the Briton and it was they who first coined the term North Briton. Scott's success, balanced on the shoulders of the Highland regiments, the economic success of the union and the creation of a new "British" upper class from the English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh, was the that he "built a single Scotland on the territory soaked in the blood of warring Highlanders and Lowlanders, kings and Covenanters, and he did so by emphasizing their ancient divisions."[22] The final triumph of the process of Highlandization was the creation and then adoption of a Highland warrior ethos as a characteristic of Scottish nationalism. The reputation of the Highland warrior had its roots in a culture and circumstances that made no distinction between soldier and civilian, that produced a fighter proficient in arms and whose value system was intertwined with his skills as a combatant. The Highland culture was also one whose system of social organization - the clan - inhibited the development of a political state and a concurrent military institution, a failing

which would prove fatal in its struggle with its southern neighbours. From warriors who were expected to fight due to their place in the social order and their culture they were transformed into natural soldiers, a conclusion drawn by their success in the British army. No one has really answered the question of how and why the Highlanders took so well to the discipline of the regimental system in the regular British army. Instead environment and character became linked, clan battles were no longer examples of lawlessness but of the martial spirit evidenced as well by Highland regiments. As Highland regiments began to represent Scotland, Scottish martial spirit became a cornerstone of identity and part of the cornerstone of imperialism and the Scottish role in it. It was as distinct a national characteristic as the kilt and clan tartan symbolic. A "Highlandization" which represented martial ardour as a national characteristic and the kilt, bagpipe and tartan as national symbols could be said to be complete with the decision by the War Office during the army reforms in 1881 to introduce the tartan and Highland costume to the Lowland regiments.

Was a new Scottish identity formed within a British framework? Perhaps the better question is could a new identity, given the diversity of Scottish culture, have been formed otherwise? J.G.A. Pocock characterizes the Scottish identity as one "consisting in a continuous movement between alternative roles" and observes that its choices of national identity have always been "open".[23] How the regiments came to be a key vehicle for Scottishness and at the same time define what it was follows from their successful integration into the state apparatus and the cultural vacuum that the British state created in the aftermath of the failed rebellions. Regimenting itself represented the type of nation building that was transforming Scottish national identity into an uneasy mix of British and national. The Highland regiment's retention of certain aspects of what became defined as traditional garb and music can also be represented as the expansion of the British state and the successful management of one culture by another.[24] The Highland regiments for many Scots became the embodiment of a culture and tradition that was stateless but a nation nonetheless. Did they also represent an

attempt to extinguish that culture that produced? The success and promotion of the regiments as important agents of the new Highlandization was also a product of the destruction of that culture by the adaptation to commercialisation by their former clan leaders, now landlords. Does then the raising and incorporation of the Highlanders into the regimental system reflect the diminishment of their culture and the related phenomenon of the rise of the British state? Did the regiments harness the Highlander's martial ardour or did they create the idea in the first place? An examination of the history of the Highland regiments can shed some light on these questions.

The regiment was the central institution shaping the Scottish military experience through the late 18th and 19th century, and as such is a fruitful area for studying Scotland's soldiers and people. The study of the regiment is not, however, limited to military questions. A much-maligned historical endeavour, the regimental history was held up as an example of the worst excesses of the "drum and trumpet" approach to military history. They were often overly descriptive "battle pieces" which generally provided the framework for the main objective of these narratives: relating the exploits of individual members of a particular unit.[25]

The regiment, however, provides a wealth of opportunity to examine numerous social, cultural, political and, of course, military questions. The history of imperial expansion, the esprit de corps of the British army, even the social and demographic organization of the country is reflected in the regiment and the regimental system. The regiment is not simply a military institution. Strictly speaking, a regiment is not an operational unit; it has no tactical function. Rather they are parent organizations, recruiting, training and fielding battalions for service as well as, in theory, providing them with reinforcements. Regiments are also a bridge with the past, the embodiment of particular geographic or cultural contributions to military service; as such they can provide a forum for studying a culture or the clash of cultures.

Culture plays an important part in attitudes towards war and fighting; how that warfare is organized and perceived also

reflects the society. In few places were the disparities between the two cultures more apparent than in their respective war making traditions. One important question is why, in such a seemingly warlike society, did the military organization of the Highlands remain largely unchanged for centuries; perhaps, as Andrew Nicholls' paper suggests, the mercenary tradition of many of Scotland's finest military leaders and rank and file could not help but have influenced the development, or lack thereof, of the Scottish military and indeed the Scottish state.

The mercenary tradition raises further questions about the centrality of the martial tradition in Scottish history, questions examined by Andrew McKillop in his paper. While the Scots became known for their fighting qualities, the adaptation of the Highlanders to the discipline of the regimental system should come as a surprise for indiscipline was central to their "Highland charge". They resisted recruitment, yet fit in well to a hierarchical system where their affinity for the symbols of honour and tradition would be critical to the success of the regimental system. Did they respond better to discipline than the average urbanized English soldier? One author suggests that Scots made particularly good soldiers in the service of the British army because "Scots were sometimes credited with being more easily shepherded than Englishmen."[26] Clearly, there are many questions left to answer.

"Imagination and sentiment . . . are a dangerous medium . . . through which to approach the subject of battle."[27] They are also a dangerous way to approach the subject of history despite the fact that that history may be shaped by those very factors. The following papers have attempted to shed some light on the Highland regiments, frequently romanticized, but not always well understood.

Paul D. Dickson
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Endnotes

1. This term comes from Michael Hector. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (London, 1975).
2. C.A. Bayly. *Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World 1780-1830* (London, 1989).
3. Linda Colley. *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven and London, 1992), 126-7.
4. William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago, 1982), 75-9; John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York, 1993), 12-6.
5. John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993), 12-6.
6. John Prebble. *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt, 1743-1804* (London, 1975), 23-9.
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For More than King and Country: Reflections on the Mercenary Tradition in Early Seventeenth Century Scottish Military History

This volume seeks to consider the history and significance of one of the most important and inspiring aspects of Scotland's contribution to the British Empire - the performance of the army's Highland regiments. Among other things, discussions of their exploits in the Seven Years War, the American War of Independence, the Napoleonic wars, and India, will serve as noteworthy samplings of the range of their services. And yet, as impressive as the records of the Highland regiments clearly are, their very emergence as key components of the British military in the generation after Culloden presents certain ambiguities, particularly when one considers the factors that might have prevented such a scenario from developing.

Is it not puzzling, for instance, that the Highlanders would become such effective instruments of a state, and of institutions, that had worked diligently for nearly a century and a half, to suppress their very culture and way of life? This development appears to have been even more surprising when we consider that the eventual Highland companies were drawn from many clans that had been supporters of the exiled Stewarts. As mark of this, they had nearly succeeded, twice in the first half of the eighteenth century, in toppling the dynasty which they were now pledged to serve. Were Highland fighting men of the later eighteenth century thus turning their backs upon the principles of their forebears, merely to "take the king's shilling"?

For its part, the British government can also be seen to have undergone a substantial change in attitude in its decision to

recruit fighting forces from Jacobite areas of the Highlands after 1756. This was a government that had worked to smash the clan system, and disarm the Highlanders in the wake of its victory at Culloden in 1746. What had happened to cause this official reversal? The apparent paradox created by these alterations would seem to beg two obvious questions. Why was it that the Highlanders came into the military service of a regime that had previously treated their society as a pariah?, and why did it happen so quickly? Traditionally, an explanation for this bold, but ultimately successful arrangement, has been sought in the convergence of two enabling factors.

The first reflects the changing international situation which faced the British government in the 1750s. As it happened, war ultimately necessitated an expansion of the British army to fight in a variety of theatres. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748 had left numerous issues unresolved in Britain's stormy mid-century relations with France, and this meant that the United Kingdom would remain more or less on a war footing. Between 1750 and 1756, commercial disputes in North America escalated into a series of conflicts, centered mainly in Nova Scotia, in the Great Lakes region, and in the Ohio Valley. Meanwhile, the duke of Newcastle's bumbling attempts to forge a continental alliance against France merely had the effect of committing Great Britain to provide military support to her German allies, in the event of war in Europe. When war with France finally came in 1756, the government thus found itself in the difficult position of having to provide significant numbers of land forces for service on both sides of the Atlantic. This made it imperative that new soldiers be found.

Back in Britain, Jacobitism was now considered to be a spent force because ten years of repressive social engineering had largely succeeded in pacifying its most fertile area in the Scottish Highlands. Under the circumstances, William Pitt, the new secretary of war, was prepared to act upon the prompting of the 3rd duke of Argyll, who urged that men from the Highlands be raised for service in America. By the end of 1756, some 1400 men from Fraser estates and surrounding territories were organised into a regiment for service in America under the command of

the former Jacobite, the Master of Lovat. Thus, a new chapter in the history of the British army had been written as men from formerly Jacobite areas were recruited for government service.

These events, however, only explain part of this new equation, for even though they provide some insights into why the government needed new recruits, they do not explain why the Highlanders began to enlist themselves to government service. For the men in government who made the decision to recruit Highlanders, however, and for many later historians, the explanation for tapping this resource has tended to find its roots in a rather crude conception of the Highlander as an individual who was bred and conditioned to fight.

A sense of this can be read in William Pitt's remarks in a 1766 speech on the mounting troubles with America. For his part, Pitt harboured no doubts that the enlistment of the Highlanders to the cause of empire was an act of sheer brilliance, and that he alone was owed the credit for creating this new fighting force. He said in his speech:

> I sought for merit wherever it was to be found; it is my boast that I was the first minister who looked for it and found it in the mountains of the north. I called it forth, and drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race of men, who, when left by your jealousy, became prey to the artifice of your enemies, and had gone nigh to have overturned the State in the war before the last. These men in the last war were brought to combat on your side; they served with fidelity, as they fought with valour, and conquered for you in every part of the world.[1]

This claim of Pitt's, that his boldness and temerity transformed the Highlanders from simmering enemies into valiant allies, has not been without its adherents among later commentators. Sir Winston Churchill, who certainly knew something about assembling fighting forces out of diverse interests, wrote that: "... Pitt, canalized the martial ardour of the Highlanders into the service of his Imperial dreams. Highland regiments," he

recorded, "brought glory to Scotland under Wolfe at Quebec, and ever since have stood in the forefront of the British Army."[2] In a popular study of the regiments themselves, even a sympathetic historian has stated that the Highlanders enlisted in the new regiments as: "...an outlet for their natural martial ardour ..."[3]

This theme has continued, and more recent scholarly works have pointed to the actual and symbolic importance of the imperial wars of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in finally breaking down the cultural barriers that divided the peoples of the British Isles, and retarded the emergence of a British nation. Linda Colley has been most assertive in suggesting this link between external military tests, and a decline in internal hostilities and suspicions, by calling the British nation an "...invention forged above all by war." "Time and again," she has written, "... war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales, Scotland, or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other, and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it."[4]

Now perhaps it is just me, but somehow this apparently happy mix of an ingrained fighting spirit within Highland society, coupled with new opportunities for putting it to constructive use in the four comers of the globe after 1756, seems a rather pedestrian and old fashioned way of treating these soldiers. While it may be useful in terms of dating the emergence of Highland regiments in the British army, it still seems to fall somewhat short in terms of explaining an apparently bold, and new relationship, between former enemies. It fails to consider, for example, that the Scots in general, and the Highlanders in particular, traditionally opted to undertake military service for the soundest of personal reasons in the early modem period. This tradition stands in stark contrast to a belief that the Highlanders' possessed some ingrained spirit of martial ardour which constantly needed to be canalized. Simply put, Highland fighting men generally fought when it was pragmatic to do so, and they often did their fighting in the service of persons who were offering them a viable return. Therefore, if there was any novelty to the post-1756 Highlanders' service, it lay in the fact that they were offering it to their state, rather than to some more localized entity, or foreign sponsor.

What would not change was the tendency of the Highland solider to use military service as a means for personal survival. In order to understand how service to the state thus stands as a natural progression for these soldiers, several general points must be established surrounding the opportunities that were open to Highland fighting men in the early modern period.

It is axiomatic that the clan system stood at the heart of Highland society, and that fighting was related to this. Clanship offered a model for dividing lands; it afforded protection for one's lands; and it provided an opportunity to grow richer through raids against neighbouring lands. It also created a unit that could be mobilized to exact vengeance if an individual, or the clan itself, was perceived to have been attacked or wronged. Clearly, there was a quasi-military character to this system, and this factor has contributed to the popular perception of the Highlander as a born soldier. What must be remembered, however, is that notions of the clans as cohesive, family units, with absolute loyalties to their particular chiefs, have by now been largely discredited. Rather than seeing the Highland warriors as the unthinking tools of their particular chiefs, research has now shown that clanship was elastic, and that loyalties shifted. Indeed, the survival of smaller clans often hinged upon striking the most beneficial bond possible with a neigbouring magnate.[5] Rights of plunder following conquest, and the prospect of booty, were understood components of pledging one's service. Under the terms of such arrangements, it would seem clear that military service was a commodity which the Highlanders used as a form of social barter, and thus, it was not a one-dimensional expression of blood lust.

Promises of military assistance did not run for indefinite periods, either. In fact, loyalty to a chief or commander might be cut short if the fighting men believed that they were not receiving their due, or that a cause was lost. Two famous examples may serve to demonstrate this. On 15 August 1645, the Marquis of Montrose routed what appeared to be the last of the Covenanting armies, and capped a spectacular year of victories at the Battle of Kilsyth. Triumphantly, he marched into Glasgow at the head of an army comprised mainly of Highlanders and

Irish Gaels. Scotland seemed to be on the verge of being retaken for the royalist cause. And yet, within a month, Montrose saw his army dissolve, and his own fortunes turn at the battle of Philiphaugh. In the wake of Kilsyth, he had tried to prevent his Highland troops from plundering the Lowlands, something they considered to be their right of conquest, and a due return for their services. In reaction against this, and using the excuse that their homes and families needed tending, some 3,000 Highlanders, mainly MacDonalds and Gordons, deserted Montrose, and thereby sapped his army.[6]

If the desertions from Montrose's army offers one example of the Highland soldiers' understanding of their best interests, and their perceived notion of rights through service, then the lack of cohesion shown by the small Jacobite army of some 2,000 men in the wake of the Battle of Killiecrankie in July 1689 demonstrates another. In this case, Viscount Dundee's successor, Colonel Alexander Cannon, proved unable to exercise his authority over the ranks of Keppoch MacDonalds, MacIans of Glencoe, and MacGregors, who made up much of his force. Deprived of their leader, sensing that opportunities for plunder had passed, and perhaps seeing that defeat was imminent, this force soon went down to defeat at Dunkeld, and temporarily diminished the Jacobite cause in Scotland.[7]

These famous examples illustrate at least some of the tradition which saw military service offered in anticipation of some form of material reward. To be sure, the behavior of the respective warriors, even at the moment of victory, ought to cause us to question the notion that these men served under Montrose or Dundee, simply to satisfy their natural "martial ardour". Nonetheless, these were peculiar circumstances brought on by civil war and revolution, so they do not tell us as much as we need to know about the more regular kinds of military service that were open to the Highland soldiers.

It must be remembered that notions of service to one's state were developing very slowly throughout Europe during the early modern period. For most fighting men in the Scottish Highlands in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an understanding that they might be asked to serve their *state* would have been a

virtual anathema. Thus, we must probe the influences and opportunities that could cause them to fight for more immediate and understandable motives or masters. The first point which requires our consideration surrounds the military capacities of the early modern Scottish state, particularly after the union of the crowns in 1603. Briefly, Scotland lagged behind most of its European counterparts in nationalizing its fighting forces during the seventeenth century. Where states such as France, Spain, England and Sweden had succeeded in bringing coercive forces under the control of their respective central governments, fighting men in Scotland continued to face a host of alternatives in terms of where they could offer their services, throughout the seventeenth century.[8] They were bound, for instance, to provide their services to their clan chiefs. This fact in itself has often been used to exemplify the "fighting spirit" of Highland society, but it is now largely understood that military service was in many cases a portable commodity, which might be transferred from one master to another, depending upon a chief's capacity to sustain his fighters.[9] The options open to fighting men from Scotland were broader than this, however.

James VI was the first Scottish monarch of the early modern period to attempt to make such institutions as the administration of justice national in scope, and here, a recognition of the need to minimize the violence present in various regions of Scotland was at the centre of his ambitions. In particular, he sought to curb the practice of blood feuds among the clans of the Highlands, and made a number of attempts to restrict the capacities of the clan chiefs to make war on each other.[10] And yet, it would be wrong to suggest that James held any illusions that an outlet for the "war-like spirit" of his subjects, especially in the Highlands, could be found in their recruitment for national enterprises. Unlike many of his contemporaries, who were harnessing the regional and hereditary loyalties of fighting forces in the name of creating state armies, James possessed neither the financial, nor the coercive resources to achieve such an undertaking. Indeed, while he sometimes expressed a desire to pacify the Highlands by force, James showed time and again his understanding of the central government's limitations.[11]

Thus, while an uneasy peace was enforced in Scotland's more remote regions, only the Borders were pacified through the agencies of the central government. Even here, the success of the Commission of the Middle Shires was reflective of a British, rather than a purely Scottish initiative; something which had been facilitated by the union of the crowns after 1603.[12] In the far north of Scotland, in the Hebrides, and in the western Highlands and Islands, order was established by proxies such as the earls of Huntly, the Mackenzies of Kintail, or the earls of Argyll.[13] Ironically then, James' efforts at curbing the private military capabilities of his subjects depended upon the personal resources of a few, select lieutenants, whose actions can more accurately be described as policing for profit, rather than enlistment to a national cause. Here, the essentially mercenary character of service to the sovereign was alive and well.

The union of the crowns itself proved to be another complicating factor that retarded Scotland's capacity to nationalize its military capabilities. Instead of following the trend present in other independent states, which entailed a growing sense of national interests, and a corresponding development of national forces with which to assert them, Scotland was placed in the new position of finding its interests and foreign policy tied to England's.[14] Except during the ascendency of the Covenanting regimes in the middle of the century, Scotland's relations with the wider world were inextricably tied to, and defined by, English preoccupations. I would suggest, therefore, that in terms of describing the effect which this had upon the military talent and capabilities present in Scotland, we can identify four distinctive alternatives that were open to Scotland's fighting men, which took the place of service to the state. Each, in their own ways, will demonstrate that personal factors, not demonstrations of martial ardour, were the soldiers' primary motivations.

The first example involves fighting men who provided direct services to their sovereign in the early modern period. At the officer level, this proved to be an especially important development which saw men drawn from the Scottish aristocracy rise rapidly in the military profession over the course of the seventeenth century. By the end of the century, this had

contributed to the creation of a cadre of leading rank officers who had earned their commissions through loyalty to the British, rather than the Scottish state. They were to prove to be ardent opponents of Jacobitism after 1688 and pivotal supporters of the Union of 1707. The entire phenomenon has been well described by Keith Brown as the transformation of Scottish lords into British officers.[15]

The second example illustrates how the Scottish state was lagging behind other European states in developing a tradition of national military service. This alternative involved the large numbers of officers and men who served as mercenaries on the continent during the seventeenth century, particularly during the Thirty Years War in the first half of the century, and during the wars of Louis XIV in the second half of the century. Some of Scotland's most celebrated commanders such as Alexander Leslie and John Graham of Claverhouse gained their military experience on the continent, fighting as paid mercenaries. Even more significant was the large number of ordinary soldiers who fought abroad for pay, under various national flags, during this period. In what stands as a remarkable proportion, it has been estimated that over one in ten Scottish males served in the armies of other European states during the first half of the seventeenth century.[16]

A third alternative, by contrast, did go some way toward making military service more of a national enterprise. This entailed the enlistment of men into local militias which were usually commanded by leading local magnates. While this did provide some spur toward seeing militia service as a duty owed to one's shire, and by extension, to one's country, the reality was that local defences were poorly funded, led and organized over the course of the seventeenth century. Except for the years of the wars of the Covenant, local militias often operated according to a convenient myth - the notion that a common monarch precluded the need for defence against England. While this cut both ways, as Charles I learned to his horror during the Bishops' Wars, the nascent system of local defences in Scotland still signaled a lack of emphasis upon national defence, or a clear definition of national needs.[17]

The final alternative was rooted in the history and traditions of the Highland clans themselves and the resonance of military capabilities among clan chiefs. Despite the efforts of the central government, the Highland nobility continued to wield significant coercive power throughout the century, and in times of crisis or need, the government was not above utilizing this.[18] It is this mercenary nature of service within the Highlands which makes a comparison with the other three alternatives I have noted rather important. At every level, military service in Scotland assumed that maximum credit would be obtained for one's efforts. None of these alternatives, (with the possible exception of militia service) achieved a great deal toward providing Scotland with a tradition of national service. Each entailed the pursuit of personal, and in many cases profit-oriented motives, and indicated a resonance of mercenary objectives. Thus, the overwhelming emphasis among fighting men in early seventeenth century Scotland seems to have been upon personal, local, or clan interests, but almost never upon expressly Scottish interests.

Against the range of factors that might have caused a Highland fighting man to serve a variety of masters prior to the suppression of the clans, the zenith-like rise to prominence of the Highland regiments of the British army in the later eighteenth century, gives the appearance of a new kind of control. On the surface, we might indeed be led to the conclusion that the martial ardour of Highland society could be channeled in the service of a national cause. Stereotypes die hard in history, and the cartoonish view that so many have sketched of the Highland soldier, is one that ought to be breathing its last gasps. It is hoped that the essays which follow will help with that process, and will further demonstrate that the men of the Highland regiments were fighting for something more than king and country.

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Endnotes

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Continuity, Coercion and Myth: The Recruitment of Highland Regiments in the Later Eighteenth Century[1]

The British army's Highland regiments have proven to be one of the most resilient and enduring institutions to emerge in post-Union Scotland. While the empire that created them has come and gone, both literary and popular interest in many aspects of the Highland regimental tradition remain strong. This ongoing attraction is due largely to the flexible nature of the regiments themselves and the larger cultural issues that find expression through them. Although initially sanctioned in the 1740s and 1750s to maximise the use of Highlanders as cannon fodder, their role has nevertheless continually evolved.[2] Later in the same century they were promoted in order to rehabilitate leading Jacobite families and ensure the social and cultural acceptance of the region's elite by the rest of Britain's landed establishment. More generally, it has been argued that the positive shift in perceptions of the Gael from an alien barbarian in 1746 to a loyal and morally upstanding Briton by 1815 was due in large part to his conspicuous service in such levies.[3] In the nineteenth century the role of Highland regiments adapted yet again, and the tartan warrior became a wider symbol of Scotland's martial past and of its equal, not to say disproportionate, role in the Empire. This perception was driven by the country's anxieties over its place and importance within the domestic British Union. Faced with the need to counter their nation's patently junior status, Scots - both Lowland and Highland - used such regiments as a pan Scottish badge to prove their country's value and worth to the United Kingdom.[4]

Yet such units also answered what could have been a potentially contradictory desire to celebrate Scotland and Scottishness. Their existence enabled Scots to envisage an effective and enduring imperial institution that was not reliant upon England for its historical antecedents. Therein lies their past and indeed present popularity. Highlighting their Scottish character had become all the more important by the Victorian era given that urbanisation and industrialisation had transformed Scotland and made it appear indistinguishable from England in many fundamental respects. This ability to fulfil multiple cultural concerns survived into the twentieth century. Despite the ongoing recruitment problems and amalgamations encountered by the regiments themselves, the image of the kilted soldier continues to act as an extremely successful marketing aid within the highly competitive global tourist industry.

Clanship and Continuity:
The basis for Highland regiments?

Two particular strands within this celebrated regimental tradition are continuity and authenticity. From their very inception the regiments were seen as somehow representative of wider Highland society. The erstwhile Master of Lovat, Simon Fraser, whose upwardly-mobile career in military service was an example to every broken Jacobite family, is particularly important in this regard. In 1757, as part of his rehabilitation under the aegis of Archibald Campbell, third Duke of Argyll, Fraser raised a battalion of 1,400 men to serve in North America. This regiment is a particularly useful example in demonstrating the perceived continuities with pre-Culloden society that supposedly characterised the recruitment of Highlanders in the later eighteenth century. That it was raised under the direction of the Argylls - whose historic reputation is based primarily on their leading role in the destruction of clanship and is to point to merely the most obvious weakness in the continuity argument. Yet this has not prevented Fraser's 78th Highlanders being the subject of extravagant romanticisation and assertions that it was, in some way, a clan regiment. For example, a nineteenth century historian of the Highlands noted; 'Though not possessed of an inch of

land, yet, such was the influence of clanship, that young Lovat in a few weeks raised a corp of 800 men'.[5] Thus an essentially imperial levy was linked to a distinctly Scottish past, and clanship effortlessly stitched into the infrastructure of the empire that had helped destroy it. The image of ongoing clannishness that underpins the reputation of Fraser's first battalion subsequently became evident in the portrayal of the numerous regiments that followed it. Regimental histories emerged as a particularly effective medium that stressed the links with the old values of chieftains, kinship, and unquestioning loyalty. The impression created by such histories is that, despite its social and economic obliteration, clanship was preserved in the units of Highlanders raised for British service. Thus a typical nineteenth century history noted that when the Reay Fencibles were raised in 1794 it was because the government had 'made appeals to their noblemen to arm their clansmen'. The powerful imagery of old loyalty and clan power was further reinforced when it was recorded that 'the Mackays came cheerfully forward at the call of their chieftains'.[6] Regimental histories obsessively emphasised 'the true Highland spirit' of the post Culloden levies, with the kilt and distinctive 'martial spirit' being highlighted as defining characteristics. This mentality ensured the vigorous defence of regiments when their historical authenticity and Highland character was questioned. Assertions that the Highlander tended towards pacificity, or that kilted units differed little from other British regiments in their social makeup, usually brought swift rebuttal. It was pointed out that:

> It has, indeed, often been a matter of surprise to those acquainted with the truth, how the assertion that the Highland regiments were destitute of Scotsmen, and principally composed of Irishmen, could be so generally believed . . . BBB . . . even now the martial spirit exists in Scotland to a greater degree than either in England or Ireland.[7]

Such assertions were all designed to support the central argument that the Highland regimental tradition was unique because

it provided a rescue channel for an increasingly threatened Highland culture and lifestyle. One of the most recent and detailed studies on the social composition and role of such levies has summarised this generally accepted historiography, and argued that as early as the last half of the eighteenth century.

> The Highland regiments formed an elite, proud of their service, second to none and would have greeted any suggestion of abuse with anger and disdain. The best qualities of Highland men had been brought to their full potential in these regiments. It is difficult to understand how this could have been done if the Highlanders had not had their hearts in the business . . . These were all raised by eminent Highland men, drawing up the loyalties and discipline of the clan system . . . Highland regiments were close and elite societies which seemed in many ways seemed to mirror the society from which they originated.[8]

Thus the British army that at Culloden broke not just the clans but also, according to popular perception, the entire society they represented, now became the vehicle whereby the most visible traditions of that culture survived. The undoubted success of British recruiting in the region, therefore, appeared to be that it offered a logical outlet for the Gael's supposed cultural preference for wearing arms as well as his propensity to violence. In summary, the basic appeal of the eighteenth century regiments lay in the fact they offered continuity in an age of intensive, not to say revolutionary, change. During the twentieth century this version of British army recruiting in the region has been countered by a radically alternative historiography. This asserts that the excessive military use of Highlanders amounted to little more than the institutionalised and cynical exploitation of a peripheral and subordinate people by an aggressive and imperialistic ruling elite.[9]

There is, on the face of it, considerable evidence to support the view that these regiments were indeed a natural recourse for the culturally disorientated and morally dejected Gael. This

involves recognising the sheer scale of the region's contribution to Britain's imperial expansion and entrenchment in the last half of the eighteenth century. Even allowing for the nominal amount of Highlanders within many supposed 'Highland regiments',[10] the involvement of Gaels in the British army was disproportionate to say the least. Twenty-three regiments of line and twenty-six fencible units were raised between 1756 and 1815, giving a rough estimate of 48,000 men enlisted. Others have calculated that between 1793 and 1808, 70,000 Highlanders were recruited into the armed forces, although this is certainly an exaggeration. With an approximate regional population of between 250,000 and 300,000 however, even the lower, more realistic estimate represents an extraordinary level of military recruitment.[11] With such enlistment figures it is not surprising that within ten years of Culloden Highland regiments had already emerged as a substantial element within the British army. Overall, this impressive record of successful recruiting does seem to suggest the survival of military endeavour and the continuance within Highland populations of the ingrained bellicosity traditionally associated with them.[12] It was this short period of intense and relatively disproportionate enlistment between 1756-1800 that established the long-term reputation, both real and romanticised, of the Highland regiments. However, in light of the radical changes that occurred in the political, social and economic position of the region it remains debatable whether this recruitment phenomenon really represented the continuance of the older clannish society. Indeed, to understand the forces that created the eighteenth century Highland regiments it is surely more constructive to move beyond notions of clanship and martial tendencies and examine the essentially external recruiting pressures of empire, government, and economic under-development.

The Martial Highlander?

As one of the central historical myths surrounding Highland regiments it is necessary to clarify the exact role of clanship. In the new set of commercial circumstances clearly evident by 1750 clanship's military aspects were not enough, in themselves, to produce the levels of enlistment evident in the region.

Nonetheless, it is easy to understand why this connection with clanship has been made. After all, clans and warfare are all but synonymous with each other. The era of feuding was matched, if not surpassed, by the clans' performances during the Scottish civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century, and later by the dramatic, if spectacularly unsuccessful, Jacobite campaigns.[13] However, while entirely valid, this perspective has distorted and prevented a fuller understanding of the multiple functions of what was a complex political, social and economic arrangement. Increasingly, historians have stressed how rivalry between clans cannot be divorced from the broader economy, nor, indeed, that land can be portrayed as merely a reserve for military manpower. While fully accepting the Highland's capacity for rapid and often devastating military activity, recent analysis has stressed that clanship was ultimately about control of local subsistence resources. Thus, for instance, its focus was much, if not more, to do with securing *beathachadh boidheach* (comfortable subsistence) as maintaining the emphasis on military preparedness.[14]

With their *raison d'etre* re-configured to involve the objectives of arable and pastoral management, the clans' ability to make war has been de-emphasised, though by no means dismissed by historians. This new perspective helps explain one of the main characteristics of British recruiting in the region: namely, the severe reluctance on the part of ordinary clansmen, both before and after Culloden, to get involved in military activity. It is not necessary to highlight the 1790s and 1800s, when most historians accept that the impact of commercialism had begun to take effect, to find evidence that calls into question the Gaels' supposed zeal for army service. There is now little doubt that by the first half of the eighteenth century clanship's military ethos was in rapid decline. One indicator that most effectively demonstrates this shift is the severe coercion and, indeed, outright brutality that characterised the mobilisation of manpower during the 1745 rising. It has been argued that an element of compulsion had always been a feature of military activity in the Highlands. However, the severe and apparently unprecedented use of threats and intimidation severely undermine accepted notions of the Highlander's 'ancient enthusiasm' for armed

service. Even that most celebrated clan figure, Donald Cameron, younger of Locheil, required the threat of township destruction to procure the mobilisation of various kin groups under his control. This was especially true of tenantry, such as those in the Rannoch Moor area, that lived outside his father's estate.[15] It can be argued that such instances of brutality represent the type of negative propaganda deployed by both sides during the bitter and divisive affair of 1745. There is undoubtedly an element of truth to this; but there remains a solid case for arguing that substantial numbers of Highland troops fighting on the Hanoverian and Jacobite sides had been obtained under conditions of severe duress. The Mackenzie of Cromartie family, for instance, deployed the threat of violence to mobilise around 200 men from their Ross-shire estates for the Jacobite army. In a private letter, not intended in any way for propaganda purposes, the Easter Ross laird, John Mackenzie of Belmaduthie, informed the Edinburgh lawyer, John Mackenzie of Delvine, that a mutual kinsman from the Mackenzie of Kilcoy family had been recruiting for John Mackenzie, Lord Macleod, heir to the Cromartie earldom. Belmaduthie noted that harsh means had been used to take men from his own estate, and that 'it is true the party forced away five or six cottars and servants off my grounds'.[16]

One particular method whereby large numbers of men could be obtained through force can be illustrated by the order sent from the Jacobite High Command in September 1745 to John Campbell, second Earl of Breadalbane.

> The men of Deshoir of Lochtay and Glenlochy are ordered to be at the Port of Kenmore with their best arms and accouterments against twelve of the clock, Tuesday - a man out of each merkland, under pain of rebellion.[17]

The last section of this order reveals the implied violence that was in all likelihood an integral part of recruiting during the era of Scottish clanship. Had the Jacobite army remained in order to intimidate Lochtayside, instead of moving south to capture Edinburgh, around 310 men could have been obtained.

Indeed, even the Campbells, noteworthy for their relative cohesion and correspondingly formidable military capability, found it difficult to raise their own men. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy, heir to Breadalbane, stressed in a revealing series of letters how his Perthshire tenantry preferred to avoid mobilisation of any kind. He intimated that they would only join in a military effort if the Jacobites actually devastated their farms. Glenorchy learnt that even on the family's Netherlorne estate in Argyll, where the tenantry were relatively safe from Jacobite violence, it was necessary to concede various provisos on the nature and length of military service. This scenario was also evident in Skye where the equivocation of Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat was surpassed only by his tenantry's aversion to the prospect of involvement in any military campaign. Instead of a natural and deep-rooted willingness by his tenants to form a clan levy, Macdonald found he had to agree to their estate concerns before they would consider mobilising in any numbers. Indeed, it was noted six years later that 'many deductions were claimed by the tenants for their services in a military way'.[18] This intense hostility amongst Highlanders towards armed service can be best summed up in the observations of Lieutenant-Colonel John Campbell of Mamore, who was recruiting for Lord Loudoun's Highland battalion in the late spring of 1745.

> The strange songs the country people have heard from Flanders have struck such a terror among them that several young fellows have quitted the country upon my arrival. In short, the western Highlands are like to make but a bad figure in this affair.[19]

What is particularly striking about this quote, coming as it does from the age of militarised clanship, is how it finds resonance in the reaction of Gaels in the last half of the century to the same prospect of military service. Examination of the private papers, as opposed to the formulaic public proclamations, of Highland landlords reveal a population just as reluctant to enlist as their supposedly more pacific Lowland neighbours. This hostility was particularly evident in Atholl. Given the recruitment

methods practised at the time it is not surprising that the 1745 rebellion helped entrench non-martial sentiments amongst the population. The Atholl Brigade in Charles Edward Stuart's army was raised against a backdrop of deep family division. This created an atmosphere of implied and actual recruiting violence so severe that it engendered a tradition of bitter folk memory which was still evident in the area over 112 years later. John Murray, fourth Duke of Atholl, was forced to admit this reality when, in 1797, he told no less a person than Henry Dundas that his tenantry had a real and intense 'dread' of military service.[20] During February and March 1778, at the height of the duke's earlier efforts to complete a regiment for the war against the Americans, the true depth of these community feelings were revealed. The property of the Robertson of Lude family, which bordered the Atholl estate, was inundated with people fleeing the prospect of forced military service. The Robertsons' correspondence reveal what can only be described as a kind of inverse Highland charge.

> How thankful am I that we [the Robertson family] have nothing to do with the Atholl regiment, things are drawing on terribly badly here. The Duke is to be up this night . . . sad work is expected amongst his people, you never saw such a time, grief and terror painted in every face, they all ran here, poor things, and nobody can help them.[21]

It is hard to equate arguments that stress the sense of pride and favoured elite status felt by the eighteenth century Highland soldier with the obvious distress described above. Clearly, the undeniable *esprit de corp* of the units themselves has too often been celebrated without reference to the fact that their creation was deeply resented, even rejected by townships from which the manpower was drawn. Moreover, the situation in Atholl cannot be dismissed as an isolated instance of unorthodox recruiting. There is sufficient evidence from across the Highlands to suggest that such an extremely negative response was in no way unusual. As early as February 1756, less than a decade after Culloden,

military officers recruiting on the estate of Sutherland highlighted the backwardness of the male population. This was confirmed a year later by General James St. Clair, a close relative and tutor to William Gordon, seventeenth Earl of Sutherland. St. Clair admitted that men from Sutherland would not be easily recruited for the two battalions of Highlanders recently commissioned by the crown. Given the county's impressive reputation as a recruiting district for the British army this relatively early reluctance may seem surprising. However, its existence was confirmed in a report of March 1763 by Captain James Sutherland of the first Sutherland fencible regiment.[22] Similarly, in December 1775, the Campbell of Glenure family were informed that, across the entire county of Argyll, many young men were extremely averse to military service. This sentiment had also been evident around twenty years earlier. In December 1757, while recruiting for a kinsman, the Glenure family noted that the populace were totally unresponsive to their requests. One of those attempting to acquire men added; 'I did all that lay in my power with them to enforce the reasonableness of your demand but they are determined to do nothing as far as I understand'.[23] On the Badenoch estate of the Gordon family in 1778 it was reported that, as with their counterparts in Atholl, the tenants were ordering their sons and close relatives to remove to bordering districts like Strathspey in order to avoid enlistment in the duke's fencible regiment. Meanwhile, during the same year, it was reported that in Strathnaver 'the men in that country had lost the spirit of inlisting'. Non-martial sentiments were also apparent on the large Mackenzie of Seaforth estate in Lewis. When news reached the island that recruitment was to be initiated for the earl's new regiment it was noted; 'there is a great clamour through the country about this affair'.[24]

Several early nineteenth century authors, such as the pro-emigration theorist Thomas Douglas, fifth earl of Selkirk, and Sir George Mackenzie the noted Ross-shire sheep farmer, did question the military reputation of the Gael. However they did so for their own particular reasons. Both needed to counter the accusation that their 'improvement' policies threatened Britain's best per capita recruiting district. For this reason it is

possible that some contemporary observations regarding the Highlanders' aversion to military service were nothing less than self interested exaggeration.[25] However, the confidential correspondence of families as diverse as the Dukes of Gordon, the Macdonalds of Sleat, and the Campbells of Glenure, suggest that the pacificity of the Highlander was not merely the assertions of improvers eager to remove population. Indeed, a profound fear of the military seems to have been a widely acknowledged feature of Highland communities. Moreover, it is deeply significant that a contemporary of Selkirk and Mackenzie, James Macdonald, who wished to retain population and increase recruitment levels, nevertheless accepted that many Highlanders detested the whole notion of army service.

> They have no longer any predilection for the military life, on the contrary, their abhorrence of it is deep rooted and inveterate. This is the fact, whatever may be the cause of which we may impute it. The same antipathy exists against the naval service of their country: so that we need not look for any voluntary levies from these Isles.[26]

These examples of anti-recruiting sentiment both before and after 1746 suggest that if any continuity existed at all between the attitudes of pre- and post-Culloden Gaels it was their antipathy towards military service, not their supposed zeal. It would appear, therefore, that beneath the myth of the Highland warrior lies a far more complex picture involving an obvious contradiction. On the one hand there existed an intense dislike for the army and, on the other, a simultaneous and disproportionate involvement within it. In light of the strong case against the notion of a naturally martial Highlander, why did such a pattern of disproportionate military service nonetheless emerge in the area?

The Impress Acts

Conscription legislation demonstrates how external forces interacted with local economies and cultural attitudes to provide a new and highly effective context for the enlistment of substantial

numbers of Highlanders. The background to the Impress Acts lay in a series of mundane government initiatives that centred upon the construction of a comprehensive network of local J.P.s and Sheriffs within the region. These policies constituted a major intrusion by the British state into what been a relatively isolated part of Great Britain. Successive Commanders-in-Chief of the army in Scotland co-operated with senior Scottish legal figures like the Lord Advocate and the Lord Justice Clerk in ensuring that a reliable and effective system of local government officers was built up in the north. Efforts were made, though not always successfully, to encourage local gentry and resident half pay officers to become J.P.s on the explicit understanding that their presence would facilitate recruitment.[27] These developments may appear innocuous but it is important to understand the umbilical relationship between the military and the judiciary. In order to avoid charges of unorthodox and oppressive recruiting it was vital that officers were able to avail themselves of nearby J.P.s sympathetic to local conditions and the difficulties of acquiring men. Nothing demonstrates this better than the contrasting degrees of success experienced by the Press Acts instituted in Scotland in 1744-45 and in 1756 to 1758.

While only seeking a small amount of men the Press Acts passed in Scotland prior to the 1745 rebellion nevertheless failed to achieve any real success. Only 92 men were raised throughout the entire country, and only two conscripts came from the Highlands. It was noted at the time that one reason why the Act failed was a lack of interest amongst military officers, as well as the fact that local gentry were hostile towards the legislation.[28] However, the situation had changed radically by late November 1756 when an Impress Act was passed as part of Britain's mobilisation for the Seven Years War. There were now in place local Sheriff-substitutes and J.P.s that had a clear and formal authority to expedite the whole conscription process. Indeed, the normally Scotophobic military high command north of the border understood their importance and proceeded to practise some uncharacteristic diplomacy in order to solicit assistance from national and local legal authorities. Lieutenant General Bland informed the Secretary of War; 'I may venture to assure you that the

success of it, will in great measure depend on the countenance it meets with from the people of distinction in this country'.[29] The Act was designed to raise fifteen battalions across the United Kingdom, with Scotland being responsible for three, or 1,830 men.[30]

The success of this new approach can be gauged from the figures in Table 1. Indeed, within two months of commencing conscription Scotland had largely completed its required quota. Moreover, the second battalion of the 32nd Regiment, assigned to collect the pressed men from Highland counties, was completed within a month. The sole reason for the deficiencies evident in Highland quotas came from the fact that recruiting officers, such as Captain Aeneas Macintosh of the 42nd Highland Regiment, tended to appropriate conscripted men for their own purposes. He informed his superior officer that 'I shall send all the good pressed men I can get that they may pick and chuse for the Highland Regiment'.[31]

Table 1: Number of Required Men and Those sent by the Commissioners of the Impress Act in Scotland, January-March 1757[32] (S.R.O., Fletcher of Saltoun, MS 17505, f. 98; P.R.O., W.O. 1/974, f. 485)

County	Expected total	Total conscripted	Still required
Caithness	34	24	10
Sutherland	31	22	9
Ross	65	49	16
Cromarty	9	9	0
Inverness	79	52	27
Argyll	80	43	37
Scotland	**1,836**	**1,733**	**151**

Notwithstanding the poaching of such men into Highland units supposedly consisting exclusively of volunteers, it was evident that excess numbers, over and above the national quota, would soon collect in Scotland. In 1758 another quota of 1,400 men was successfully ordered from north of the border. The scale of Scottish success becomes clear when these figures are contrasted with those of England. In the same period, England, with a substantially larger population, only managed to recruit around 400 men by means of the Impress Acts.[33]

Several points, however, need to be clarified. While the 1757 Impress Act was a startling success, as, indeed, was the Act passed in 1758, the numbers involved were never particularly substantial, always under 2,000 men. Yet simply highlighting the numbers actually conscripted is to misunderstand the way in which the legislation operated and, moreover, seriously underestimates its ability to procure much larger numbers of men. While the Acts had specific quotas, they, along with the measures passed in 1778-79, were basically intended to aid the normal practice of recruiting volunteers. Notices published by county commissioners in 1778 and 1779 made it clear that persons targeted under the stipulations of the Press Act would be given a £3 bounty and the promise of a discharge if they volunteered. If they refused and were forced into the ranks they received no such benefits.[34] Essentially, the Acts were a stick deliberately designed to make the normally unpalatable prospect of voluntary enlistment seem like a carrot. The Acts also sought to complement the local economy by removing those perceived to be economically and socially expendable. It targeted specific social groups such as beggars, those that refused to work as day labourers, those that migrated seasonally for higher wages and so produced labour shortages in their own parishes, as well as persons that could generally be described as lacking continuous employment.[35] As such, the agrarian labour cycle of the Highlands, with its structural dependency on temporary migration and its long periods of under-employment, left entire communities of Highland males especially vulnerable. As landlords clarified and vigorously defended their rights of ownership over estate resources, those that had committed crimes of

property such as stealing and wood-cutting often became targets for impressment. Thus, new commercial changes actually helped to facilitate the traditional search for soldiers. Other targets included those who were suspected or previously convicted of wearing Highland dress. It is deeply ironic that recruitment for Highland regiments, traditionally seen as preserving the plaid and tartan, actually ensured it was in the best interest of Highlanders to rapidly abandon their traditional apparel and so avoid the attention of the army. Thus, in 1778, a tacksman on the Duke of Gordon's Strathavon estate in the eastern Highlands noted that 'In order to prevent giving recruiting parties any handle for trouble I have caused my servants and others to lay aside evidence of Highland garb'.[36] This is one instance at least where the celebrated role of Highland regiments in preserving Highland culture can, at best, be described as a severe distortion.

The Impress Acts were not, therefore, a crude conscription tool: rather they represented a flexible method of ensuring maximum levels of recruitment while causing minimal economic damage. Moreover, in light of the number of officers recruiting in the region, when coupled to the nature of the region's economy, they were particularly suited to applying intense pressure in Highland localities. In May 1778, tenants on the Gordon estate panicked when confronted by officers offering the stark choice between high bounties for volunteers or conscription without payment. Throughout 1778 and 1779 such tactics on Skye facilitated the voluntary enlistment of men into Lord Alexander Macdonald's 76th Highland Regiment. The extent to which Press Act legislation was used to intimidate populations can be seen from the comments of Alexander Campbell, a son of the Argyllshire laird, Duncan Campbell of Glenure. In 1757, after finding that a tenant on the estate would not accept a particular farm it was decided that the best strategy was to; 'fright[en] him with the story of the Press which I find is a prevailing argument'.[37] Such comments suggest that the selective use of threatened conscription was common throughout Argyll and was being used to maintain social order even within a wholly civilian context. The atmosphere of coercion created by this policy should not be underestimated. There is, for instance, definite

evidence that the intimidation was consciously designed to tap into cultural and social taboos. Forcing men from small close-knit townships into the army without any semblance of negotiation or recognition of mutual responsibility attacked the community's sense of order and status. Indeed, even the recruiter, if he came from an estate small enough where those involved would be known to him, could find the business objectionable in the extreme. In early 1759, after forcing the son of one of his father's own tenants into the first Argyll fencible regiment, Alexander Campbell of the Glenure family highlighted how recruitment placed real strain upon traditional social ties. He informed his father that;

> The prisoner is crying like a child and says you was [sic] the last man on earth that he imagined would use him ill. For heaven's sake dear Sir, if you can anyway avoid it, give no more men to the Fencibles, this is certainly the damndest work that ever man took in hand. If I see but little more of this work for Peace's sake I will [en]list in the Fencibles myself.[38]

Such extreme reactions show how conscription undermined the population's sense of social standing and security. As such, it was the ideal method for prompting *voluntary* enlistment. Conscription measures sanctioned by the British legislature thus represented a major new lever of pressure that could be added to older recruiting mechanisms traditionally practiced in the region. As noted above, Highlanders had a clear dislike, even hatred of enlistment. However, as was probably true across most of Britain, some forms of military service were more disliked than others, and the Impress Acts were deliberately designed to play upon the differences. Their true impact sprang not from direct compulsion, but from the fact they exploited deeply held cultural attitudes. In the Old Statistical Account of the 1790s the minister of the parish of Duirinish in Skye revealed that the population 'are averse to the naval and military services, and are extremely disgusted with the idea of being pressed'.[39] The difference in intensity is clear. To be conscripted meant social stigmatisation;

while even the appearance of voluntary enlistment brought some cultural kudos within small communities where status and reputation remained an important pre-occupation. Therefore, one result of this hatred of military conscription was, paradoxically, a tendency on the part of Highlanders to enlist before compulsion could be brought to bear.

In 1757, Hugh Rose, Laird of Kilravock, noted how he had gained several recruits from a neighbouring estate where the landlord had simply adopted conscription methods. In an obvious demonstration of disgust and protest two tradesmen came to Rose and stated that they had no wish to be in the military, but as their own landlord offered no terms they came voluntarily to him on certain limited conditions. Exactly this type of protest mentality was highlighted in 1778 on the estate of Alexander Gordon, fourth Duke of Gordon. The duke was informed that if the tenantry perceived that they would be forced into the army they would, as in former times, deliberately enlist in another corp. In 1778, this attitude was exemplified in Sutherland when the imposition of the Impress Act allowed the military to intimidate the populace. As a result of such tactics by a lieutenant in Seaforth's regiment the factor noted that; 'you may depend upon it that the people will enlist rather than be dragged from their beds under silence of the night'.[40]

This seemingly paradoxical form of protest could often involve substantial numbers of men. In April 1756 Captain Aeneas Macintosh of the Black Watch explained his manipulation of the general fear of impressment.

> As there is such numbers of idlers in Lochaber, I am to tell them [the local commissioners for the Press Act] if they do not fall upon proper means to secure those idlers to complete our regiment as soon as possible, that I shall take care to let it be known I have proclaimed at all the parish churches that for a fortnight after the Act takes place I will give two guineas and a crown to any that will come willing to me . . . The common people here have taken it in their head that the press was for the Highland Regiment which

> makes a good many handsome fellows go to the Cameronians as they think they are to stay in the country.[41]

This method was very successful and, by 6 May, Macintosh had recruited 92 men, concluding that; 'If the Press Act had continued longer I believe we would have got a regiment'. The surprisingly large amounts of men that could be raised through the concurrent imposition of conscription and voluntary recruiting can be sensed from the successes of Mungo Campbell, factor on the forfeited estate of Locheil. By April 1757 he had pressed eight men from the parishes of Kilmonavaig and Kilmallie, yet also gained 41 volunteers - a ratio of over five to one.[42] From these examples it is clear that the systematic use of coercion was evident across whole swaths of the Highlands. Moreover, while it is impossible to accurately quantify the number of soldiers gained in this way, the general consensus amongst Scottish gentry concerning the expediting role of the Impress Acts was made clear in late 1758.

> The recruiting of those nine companies will be a matter of difficulty at this time, unless the Press Act is enforced, for though it may not be used, yet to say the truth, the terror of it was a main cause of that recruiting going on so successfully for the Highland battalions.[43]

The levies of 1757-58 have traditionally been portrayed as the result of a residual clan loyalty that survived Culloden. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise, and that external 'British' factors were also vital to the process. The example of Captain Macintosh, as well as those of the Sutherland and Gordon tenantry, explain the apparent contradiction between the known aversion of Highlanders for military service and the large numbers that eventually entered the British army. The Acts of the 1750s and 1770s produced a reasonable amount of soldiers in themselves; but, in reality, these men were only the tip of a far more subtle conscription iceberg. Moreover, coercion remained

an underlying theme through the remaining decades of the eighteenth century. In 1775, just as the first Highland battalions of the American Revolutionary War were being raised, a militia scheme was proposed for Scotland. Taking account of each county's population, it involved conscripting 923 men from Argyll, Sutherland, Ross, Cromarty and Inverness. The scheme never materialised but, as was common with all proposed or potential levies, the rumours sparked by it provided a suitably threatening atmosphere. This provided the ideal context that allowed recruiters to play upon the population's fear of conscription.[44] As in the 1750s, the sense of confusion and intimidation induced by pressing often drove recruits, however reluctantly, into the regular regiments staffed by local officers with whom they had some connection.[45] Again, at the commencement of the French Revolutionary War in 1793, a militia scheme involving conscription was widely rumoured for Scotland, though intense opposition from Scottish M.P.s prevented it being made law. In 1795, a Press Act was passed for a quota of sailors from across all parts of Scotland. In Lewis, the Earl of Seaforth threatened tenantry with the prospect of naval service in order to gain recruits for his levy. As the sentiments of Lieutenant-Colonel John Campbell of the second Argyll Fencible Regiment make clear, the naval press was ideal for intimidating populations and expediting army recruiting. Regarding conditions in Argyll during 1795, he noted:

> Neither money nor flattery can persuade the lower ranks of the natives in this quarter to become soldiers either in line or fencible corps. Nothing but a Comprehending Act will bring them forward.[46]

Finally, in 1797, the intermittent and ad hoc use of compulsive methods to complement voluntary recruiting in Scotland was formalised by the creation of a national militia. This provided Highland landlords like the Maclaines of Lochbuie and the Campbells of Breadalbane with additional coercive leverage when seeking men for their own volunteer companies. Thus, in April 1797, Breadalbane's tenantry were informed that if

they did not come forward in sufficient numbers to complete a volunteer regiment they would simply find a compulsive militia would be instituted instead.[47]

The element of coercion inherent within the recruiting system operating in the Scottish Highlands after Culloden helped to create and define the region's involvement with Britain's military. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that such arrangements did not constitute some vague remnant from the era of clanship. The Impress Acts of the 1750s and 1770s represented the new forces gripping the Highlands. Instituted by British governments that had acquired unprecedented influence in the region after 1746, the Acts show the extent to which the Highlands had been fully assimilated into the United Kingdom. Moreover, the success of this legislation reveals that leading gentry and elite families had bought into this new British agenda. Their willingness to implement conscription in the 1750s and 1770s explains why, in contrast to the 1740s, the later Impress Acts produced a healthy return. This new-found zeal needs to be put in its proper context and fully understood. The readiness to raise men was undoubtedly a method whereby Highland elites attempted to redeem their Jacobitism. Indeed, the extent of the backlash against Scotland after the events of 1745-6 meant that the country as a whole needed to demonstrate its loyalty in an irrefutable manner. Understandably, many felt that by exerting themselves in the ultimate patriotic activity of recruiting they could begin to actively establish their British credentials. Thus, in May 1757, a Highland officer noted that 'there is so much expected of us here and in England that I pray God we may answer their expectations'.[48]

It was not, therefore, the direct coercive power of the British state that successfully managed the Impress Acts or, indeed, recruiting in general. Neither was it old clan values that set the context for successful levying. Instead it was the desire amongst Highland gentry to prove their Britishness that provided central government with their best coercive tool. While new, not old, influences ultimately created Highland regiments, the role of other factors must not be forgotten. There is little doubt that in the 1790s and early 1800s the influence of commercialism

helped to maintain the flow of Highland troops. While conscription legislation had provided an effective recruiting lever in the 1750s and 1770s, the declining economic value of Highland tenantry provided landlords with increased coercive powers in the 1790s. No more convincing demonstration of this fact can be found than an incident which occurred in Sutherland on 14 September 1799 during the raising of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders. Finding the population unco-operative, an estate official related the plan he had devised to frighten the tenants into giving up the men required. This simply involved giving a hint of tenurial change.

> I then on each farm concluded with a question that could not but come home to their minds and speak more strongly to their feelings than any address of mine. It was "What rent would this farm fetch if in the hands of one tenant?".[49]

The type of psychological intimidation deployed in an almost casual manner against Sutherland tenantry was extremely successful. Indeed, supplying soldiers had become one of the few ways Highlanders could justify themselves to their landlords.[50] Ultimately, it was this bargain of land in return for military service that underpinned the eighteenth century recruiting economy in the Highlands. Ironically, this old feudal style arrangement was not in any way a static, declining influence but, in fact, heightened its effectiveness as townships became ever more economically insecure in the face of commercial pastoralism. Operating together from 1750-1800, legislative compulsion and the issue of access to land ensured that recruiting remained effective long after the other social and economic aspects of clanship had died out.

Conclusion

The portrayal of Highland regiments has developed a mythology that is both popular and tenacious. Many of the nineteenth and twentieth century perceptions of these units are based in some way upon supposed eighteenth century conditions. The

regiments raised in the period from 1746-1800 have been portrayed as forming an unbroken link with the distinctively Scottish social institution of Highland clanship. Thus, from the early nineteenth century onwards the regiments came to be perceived as the living embodiment of a historically authentic past. Yet examination of the methods used during the eighteenth century contradict the idea that these regiments were the preferred employment solution for Gaels. It would be highly inaccurate to suggest that every Highland soldier was little more than a reluctant conscript, incapable of seizing the opportunities for social advancement that military service offered. Nevertheless, beneath the apparent close association between clanship and kilted regiments, lay entirely new methods and levels of coercion. While the 1750s and 1770s saw the region produce soldiers on a scale that was comparable to the mobilising power of the pre-Culloden clans, the example of the Press Acts reveal influences that were wholly British and imperial in character. Moreover, Highland recruiting was all the more efficient because of the dual impact of state sponsored impressment and the economic leverage held by the region's proprietary elite. For all the supposed distinctiveness of these units, the landlord families that sponsored them did so as fully paid up members of the Anglo-British elite. While the traditional influences of loyalty and clanship doubtless helped Highlanders rationalise these demands for human tribute, it was, ultimately, British influences that brought these units into existence. Rather than the myth of the Highland regiments as an unbroken link with the clans, their true significance lies in the fact they represented one of the most high profile manifestations of the truly revolutionary changes impacting upon the Scottish Highlands.

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Endnotes

1. A version of this paper was presented at a conference held by the Department of History, University of Guelph in September 1995. I would like to express my appreciation to the Scottish Studies Foundation for their financial assistance. I would also like to express my deep thanks to both Scott McLean and Andy Nicholls for their comments and feedback on the whole issue of Highland regiments.
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9. J. Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt 1743-1804* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975), pp.93-97.
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12. D.M. Henderson, loc. cit., p.20.
13. J.M. Hill, *Celtic Warfare, 1595-1763* (Aldershot, 1993), pp.15, 49 & 74.
14. A.I. Macinnes, *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788* (East Linton, 1996), pp. 18, 30 & 170.
15. J. Prebble, loc. cit., p.99; N[ational] L[ibrary] of S[cotland], Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, MS 16604, f. 64; MS 16610, f. 289.
16. E. Richards & M. Clough, *Cromartie: Highland life, 1650-1914* (Aberdeen, 1989), pp.60-61; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Collection, MS 1327, f. 30.
17. 'Merkland' was a method of land assessment whereby the productivity of a farm was judged. B[ritish] L[ibrary], Hardwicke Papers, Add MS 35450, f. 23.
18. B.L. Hardwicke Papers, Add MS 35450, ff. 40, 65, 72; G[lasgow] U[niversity] B[usiness] R[ecords] C[entre], J.A. & J.L. Campbell & Lamond, W.S., UGD 37/2/1, p. 51.
19. N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, MS 16605, ff. 33, 48, 50, 169.
20. The extent to which the population of the Atholl area held distinctively hostile attitudes towards their traditional military leaders and army service in general was evidenced by their reaction to recruiting in 1778 and 1797. See J. Prebble, loc. cit. 212-213. For the maintenance of such anti-recruitment sentiments well into the nineteenth century see Somers' description of the folk history of Glen Tilt. Robert Somers, *Letters from the Highlands; or, the Famine of 1847* (Glasgow, 1848), pp.22-3; B[lair] A[tholl] M[uniments], Box 59/4/18. For a similar reaction from tenantry in Ross-shire during the French Revolutionary War see S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 19 June 1793.
21. S[cottish] R[ecord] O[ffice], Robertson of Lude Papers, GD 132/764/25-27.
22. N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep. 313/1089, ff. 22-23; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, MS 1461, f. 199; MS 1487, f. 112.
23. S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1062/49; GD 170/1681; GD 170/1061/5/2.
24. S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/180/67; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/303/1.
25. T. Douglas, (Selkirk), *Observations on the Present State of the Highlands with a view of the causes and probable consequences of emigration* (Edinburgh, 1806); G.S. Mackenzie, *A General Survey of the Counties of Ross and Cromarty* (London, 1810); D.M. Henderson, loc. cit., p.20.
26. J. Macdonald, *A General View of the Agriculture of the Hebrides or Western Isles of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1811), p.552.

27. B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add MS 35447, f. 27 & 123; Add MS 35448, ff. 49, 57, 110; B.L., Egerton MSS, MS 3433, ff. 1, 109; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add MS, 32737, f. 375. S.R.O., Campbell of Stonefield Papers, GD14/142. For evidence on the military role played by J.P.s and pensioned officers see S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/43/198/21-2; H.B. Macintosh, *The Northern or Gordon Fencibles, 1778-1783* (published privately, 1929), p.26.
28. *Scots Magazine*, vol. 6, (Edinburgh, 1744), pp.122-23; vol. 7, (Edinburgh, 1745), p.144; N.L.S., Yester Papers, MS 7061, f. 124; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine, GD 170/939/8/1; P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], W.O. 25/3196, List of Impressed Men 10 April-26 May 1744; W.O. 25/3197, Miscellaneous of Press Act 1744.
29. P.R.O., W.O. 1/972, f. 305; N.L.S., Letter Book of Lord George Beauclerk, MS 13497, p.19.
30. N.L.S., Letter Book of Lord George Beauclerk, MS 13497, p. 26-27.
31. D[umfries] H[ouse], Loudoun Papers, A/972, ff. 1, 14, 22.
32. The discrepancy in figures for those expected, those conscripted, and those still required, arises because some conscripts never made it to their designated regiments but, instead, volunteered to join another units. This still left the original quota to be met. See footnote above.
33. N.L.S., MS 13497, p. 19, 30, 35-37 40, 43 & 54; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, MS 16518, f. 144; P.R.O., W.O. 4/53, p. 30, 175. T. Hayter (ed.), *An Eighteenth Century Secretary at War: The papers of William Viscount Barrington* (London, 1988), p.54.
34. A[rgyll] & B[ute] D[trict] A[rchive], Commissioners of Supply & J.P.s, C 05/1/1/1, p. 266; P.R.O., W.O. 1/995, f. 869.
35. H[ighland] R[egional] A[rchive], 1:1/1/2, Minutes of Commissioners of Supply for Inverness-shire, p. 52-53; 1:1/1/1, Minutes of Commissioners of Supply for Ross-shire, meeting dated 29 July 1778; A.B.D.A., C 05/1/1/1, Commissioners of Supply & J.P.s, p.265. S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/11/79. p.40.
36. P.R.O., W.O. 4/95, p. 248; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, MS 1483, f. 145; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep. 313/1089, f. 34; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine, GD 170/1061/10; Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/2/1/6(3).
37. S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/43/203/11; C[lan] D[onald] T[rust] L[ibrary], GD 221/434; B.A.M., Box 65/2/2/; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine, GD 170/1061/1/2.
38. S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1061/10.
39. D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), *The Statistical Account of Scotland*, vol. 20 (Wakefield, 1983), p.165.

40. S.R.O., Rose of Kilravock Papers, GD125/22/2/5; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/27/12/; John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/180/66.
41. D.H. Loudon Papers, A/972, ff. 8 & 1.
42. D.H., Loudon Papers, A/972, f. 14; N.L.S., Murray Erskine Papers, MS 5079, f. 125
43. N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, MS 16698, f. 50.
44. S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/226/5/12; B.A.M., Box 65/2/23.
45. S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine, GD 170/1090/16.
46. S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/6/25/1-2; GD 46/17/13, unnumbered letter dated 27 December 1796. G[lasgow] U[niversity] L[ibrary], Campbell of Inverneil Papers, vol. 14, Letter Book, 3/11/1794 to 8/5/1795, pp. 94 & 156.
47. S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments GD 51/1/821-22; S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/683/5; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1506; GD 174/1426/41; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/16/4/2/8.
48. A. Murdoch, *The People Above: Politics & Administration in Mid Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), p.132; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1539.
49. R.J. Adam (ed.), *Papers on Sutherland Estate Management, 1802-1816*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1972), pp.2-3.
50. For evidence that even contemporaries understood it was the Highlander's poor economic position that kept heavy recruitment in the region going, see T. Douglas, (Selkirk), *Observations on the Present State of the Highlands with a view of the causes and probable consequences of emigration* (Edinburgh, 1806).

The Problems of Recruitment for Scottish Line Regiments during the Napoleonic Wars

The great war which Great Britain waged against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France drained Scotland of manpower long before the ultimate overthrow of the Emperor Napoleon I at the battle of Waterloo in 1815. Britain emerged from this struggle with enhanced prestige and clearly had little inclination to question the methods employed to provide the soldiers who gained that victory. A closer examination of recruiting methods which were practiced in Scotland however suggests that the political leadership of Great Britain was extremely fortunate to have obtained a successful outcome. The administration of William Pitt, encouraged by his Scottish colleague, Henry Dundas, and its successors, attempted to raise far too many soldiers in the northern kingdom for its population to support without conscription.

The administration was supplied with totally inadequate forces for the task which confronted them when war broke out in 1793. The strength of the army which had fought in America had been so reduced that it was capable only of providing garrisons for the empire and undertaking supplementary police duties within Britain itself. Obviously additional battalions would be necessary, for most of the line regiments consisted only of a single battalion, and these would have to be supplemented in the traditional style by the formation of new regiments if the army was to undertake any major operations. The first line of defence was of course the ships of the Royal Navy, so the fleet also began to make tremendous demands on the available manpower, as vessels were placed in commission and full crews were required to man them in place of a maintenance party, and the press gangs were soon active in all the major seaport towns.

Many of the new military units together with reinforcement drafts for existing corps were nominally recruited in northern Scotland, for the government was now fully aware of the fighting potential of the Highland soldier. Recruiting parties were active throughout Scotland, competing with one another for every potential recruit. Scotland, moreover, posed unique difficulties for the recruiter. In England home defence was entrusted in the first instance to a militia, a force of troops raised for home service by conscription. Scotland at the commencement of the war lacked such a force, since the militia tradition had been allowed to fall into disuse during the eighteenth century fear of Jacobite insurrection. The Jacobite cause was now dead, and a militia on the English model was long overdue and in fact a small militia force was raised in Scotland during the course of the war. By the time that decision was made the Scots had become accustomed to raising troops by the existing methods of voluntary recruitment and concluded, correctly, that the new militia had been put in place only to reduce expenditure at the expense of the poor.

The lack of a force for home defence in Scotland made life very difficult for the officers charged with raising new line troops in the north, and their problems appeared to be misunderstood or ignored by the administration. Was Scotland, particularly Highland Scotland, not a veritable reservoir of manpower eager to serve the crown in arms? Certainly the Highland counties were densely populated, for the Clearances still lay in the future, and in spite of considerable migration to North America before and after the American war, a considerable portion of the Highland population could be considered underemployed. The Highlander had a tradition of bearing arms, though the government had long been zealously discouraging the practice in the aftermath of the eighteenth century Jacobite risings. Many Highlanders were now resident in the Lowlands for all or part of each year, as they migrated in search of work, but they could nonetheless reach a bargain with a recruiter in the streets of Edinburgh or Glasgow as easily as at a northern fair.

If the line regiments were needed elsewhere an alternative home defence force would have to be provided for Scotland

and the government chose to follow the methods used in the American War and was reluctant to use compulsion. The administration authorized the formation of what were called fencible regiments for Scotland rather than employing a militia. Fencible troops had been employed in previous wars, but the fencible soldier was not the equivalent of the English militiaman. Where the militiamen were chosen by ballot from the population at large, the fencibles were not conscripted. Fencible soldiers were essentially short service regular troops who would be disbanded at the conclusion of the war, if not earlier. Fencible regiments were regular formations whose service was confined to the war years, they were uniformed and equipped similarly to the line regiments and paid at the same rates, while like the line soldier he received an enlistment bounty. Unlike the line soldier, however, a fencible could not be sent out of Scotland except in the case of an actual invasion of another part of Great Britain, or with their own consent. Unlike the line soldier, a fencible man could not be drafted against his will into another corps than that in which he was enlisted, unless by sentence of a court martial. There were fencible formations which did extend their services. Scottish fencible regiments served in Ireland during the insurrection of 1798, and others agreed to reinforce overseas stations, one battalion serving in Gibraltar for example, but this was always a matter for their own choice. Attempts to extend the service of a fencible corps unilaterally could, and did, provoke mutiny. Within their limits, however, the fencible regiments continually changing station throughout Scotland and assembling in training camps for brigade exercises in conjunction with such line troops as were available, became a very efficient force, as had the earlier fencibles of previous wars. In the American war, when so many line troops were engaged on the other side of the Atlantic, the fencibles protected the coast against landings from enemy warships. The number of United States vessels which could cruise off the Scottish coast was however small, and even with the reinforcement provided by French cruisers the threat of invasion was fairly slight, and the internal danger was even less, and relatively few fencible regiments were authorized.

In and after 1793, however, it appeared to the administration

that the. threat of insurrection in the. event of an actual invasion was very serious. The French Revolution and its ideology appeared to the responsible ministers to have struck deep roots in the Scottish population. Fear of revolution was endemic even if in retrospect these fears seem exaggerated. Thus, the government was not content to re-establish the handful of fencible formations which had garrisoned Scotland in the previous conflict. By 1797 the army list contained no less than twenty-three battalions of Scottish fencible infantry and eight regiments of fencible cavalry.[1] Forming and maintaining this fencible army, in addition to Scotland's large contribution to the line army, the marines, and the navy, stretched Scotland's manpower to the breaking point. Ministers of the crown made a serious error in trying to secure so many troops from Scotland's limited resources. The traditional pool of young men fit for service was always limited, and too many fencible regiments were formed at the beginning of the war which absorbed many men of military age and with an inclination to serve into regiments enlisted for home service.

Competition between recruiters was immense, with a score or more recruiting parties in attendance at a single market or fair. The recruiters for the line were authorised to pay higher enlistment bounties than the fencible officers, but the difference in the bounty was insufficient to induce many a canny Scot not to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the two forms of service. Fencible service had too many advantages not to be attractive to the more thoughtful soldier. Essentially fencible soldiers formed an army awaiting an invasion which never came. Such men could be injured in action against rioters or smugglers, and the death rate for disease was often high as men recruited in rural areas were moved from one town to another. Casualties among line soldiers were however much higher, whether in combat or from disease, for they could find themselves in the fever ridden West Indies. Fencible soldiering offered a young man an opportunity to try the military life, with the certainty that if he did not find it agreeable he could return to civil life when his regiment was disbanded. Should he like the military life, trained soldiers discharged from fencible regiments were always

in demand. Many former non-commissioned officers who could be persuaded to volunteer for a line regiment were permitted to take their rank with them into the new corps, and any former fencible soldier already possessed many of the necessary accouterments, assuming they chose to enlist in the same branch of the service. The fencible regiments however attracted men who might not have found the line units attractive. Married men were commonly found in most fencible regiments, because their wives and children could accompany their regiment as it changed station within Scotland, whereas only a small proportion of the married personnel of a line battalion could hope to secure passage on a transport when their regiment embarked for overseas service. In some fencible formations the number of married soldiers approached fifty per cent of the total.[2]

The single advantage which the line battalion had over a fencible unit was permission to offer a higher bounty to a potential recruit. The rates were established from time to time by the Secretary at War, the responsible minister, but in view of that politician's repeated threats directed at fencible officers calling upon them to refrain from paying sums in excess of that authorized it is obvious that the regulation was ignored if the matter was sufficiently pressing.[3] In some areas of Scotland competition between recruiting parties became so fierce that a good potential recruit could often strike his own bargain, if his height and physical appearance were desirable, and particularly if he had previous service in a former fencible regiment or the line. When the strength of the Perthshire Fencible Cavalry was being augmented, the commissioned officers put money into a common purse to meet the expense of recruitment in excess of government regulation,[4] and that too for a mounted regiment which had its attractions in Scotland which only had a single line cavalry regiment, the North British Dragoons, upon the establishment. Without such unofficial additions to the authorized bounties no regiment could have been completed within the time constraints imposed by government.

Contrary to General Stewart of Garth's near contemporary account of the Highlands,[5] many of the soldiers of Highland regiments were recruited where they could be found, and often

that was not within the Highlands. The occasional regiment was fortunate enough to find the bulk of its men within the area designated by its title, but few could claim as much.[6] In general the designation of a Highland regiment during the Napoleonic wars gives a misleading impression, their soldiers coming from every part of Scotland and beyond. Scottish regiments, moreover, were not the only corps to actively seek recruits in Scotland. The Royal Artillery had many Scots drivers and gunners, and although there were few regular artillery batteries in Scotland at this time, that corps found it worth while maintaining recruiting parties not only in the Central Lowlands but in North-Eastern Scotland where their recruiters actively competed with the newer infantry battalions for men. To further complicate the picture, the Scots Brigade, which had long been in Dutch service, was brought home and placed upon the British establishment and was actively seeking recruits, apparently to no avail for the Scots Brigade ended as part of an Irish regiment, the Connaught Rangers.

Some of the newer formations did not have a long life. The 97th (Inverness-shire) Highlanders lasted only three years as a battalion strength formation, being mustered at the town of Inverness in 1794 and disbanded in 1796,[7] when its commissioned officers went onto half-pay and the rank and file were drafted into other regiments. The 97th was raised and commanded by Colonel Sir James Grant of Grant, the chief of Clan Grant. Sir James was simultaneously the commanding officer of the 1st or Strathspey Regiment of Fencible Highlanders, a formation whose service was restricted to Scotland, and in which much of the available Grant manpower was enlisted. Colonel Grant's 97th was one of six new line battalions being recruited in Scotland in 1794-5 and Sir James, as an experienced fencible colonel, can have been under no illusions about the difficulties which faced him.

By 1794 many of the underemployed and adventurous had already been taken for the army or the fleet. Those who remained and could meet the age and physical requirements for military service were well aware of their own value, and recruiting was certain to be a costly venture, with potential soldiers

insisting on enlistment bounties far in excess of what had been authorized by government. Moreover, the last war was a recent memory in the community. When the American War ended, the government had disbanded the higher numbered regiments along with the American provincial corps as an economy measure. The officers were of course placed on the half-pay list until the next expansion of the army, but this had not meant that the soldiers were necessarily discharged. A soldier in a line regiment could be, and often was, transferred to any other regiment which was under strength and in need of augmentation. Not surprisingly such regiments were often serving in undesirable stations, such as the West Indian colonies, where the death toll from tropical fevers was enormous. Drafts from disbanded regiments could be shipped to such a station, and much of the population of Scotland was fully aware of the dangers of the West Indies, where entire battalions of European troops could be dead of disease within a few years.

Sir James Grant, having obtained his regiment of the line after much lobbying of government, now had the task of mustering approximately one thousand soldiers for the 97th Highlanders, and this in competition with many other officers and with much of the desirable manpower locked up in home service regiments. At the outset Sir James determined that in spite of its name, the Inverness-shire Highlanders should find the bulk of its recruits out-with that county. Sir James, who was also Lord Lieutenant of Inverness-shire, was concerned that further recruitment would gravely harm the county, and his own estates in particular. This supposedly Highland regiment, with its headquarters at Inverness, found its recruits in the cities and towns of Lowland Scotland and England, and even had a recruiting party operating with some success in Belfast in Northern Ireland. Many of the soldiers of the 97th were found in London and Bristol, a very long way from the Highlands of Scotland.

Most of the underemployed young Highlanders had already been swept up by the armed forces, and in spite of having a colonel who was an important Highland proprietor, Sir James Grant and his officers were obliged to use the services of crimps, who provided recruits for a fee. Crimps generally operated in

the major urban centres, where they had long been used to provide seamen for the fleet, but in this period of rapid military expansion they also provided soldier-recruits if the price offered was attractive.

Many of the soldiers enlisted for the 97th, as their individual attestations show, had been born in the Highlands but were now residents of Paisley, Glasgow or Edinburgh, but many more had no connection with the Highlands or even with Scotland prior to their enlistment. These were generally men collected by the London crimps, a considerable proportion of whom were actually aliens.

> Last night arrived by sea from London, forty-seven men for the Invs.Shire Regt., the depot commander reported from Inverness. The man who came with them in the character of Serjeant ... was employed by Whiting the crimp to bring & deliver them - having only been employed for the job ... They are young, but low, a strange mixture, some Italians, Portuguese etc., so you may believe we shall have some employment in keeping them in order.[8]

Quite apart from the obvious language difficulties, with most of the non-commissioned officers being Gaelic speaking Highlanders, the presence of such men illustrates the extreme difficulty of finding suitable recruits even when willing to pay twenty-four pounds a head. The 97th were dressed as Highlanders and it is supposed that some at least of the recruits were in for a surprise when they joined their battalion.

Sir James Grant, unlike some of his rivals, did not recruit from his own fencible regiment for the 97th. Many fine Highlanders were serving in the Strathspey Fencible Regiment and were now fully trained soldiers,[9] and might easily have been induced to enlist in their chief's line regiment with the offer of a small additional bounty. Grant, however, refused to reduce the strength of his fencible battalion in this way, although he did permit enlistment of Strathspey soldiers for the Fraser Fencible Regiment,[10] a new formation whose service extended beyond

Scotland and which served in the suppression of the 1798 Rising in Ireland. One of Grant's fencible officers advised him that he could get "ten to one that will inlist in the Strathspey Fencibles that will not go into Regiments going upon service." But he also insisted that "one third of your fencible regiment wou'd volunteer it, & they cou'd be made upon a month's time. Was this permitted I am certain it wou'd forward the service much."[11] He was undoubtedly correct in his assessment, but Sir James declined the advice and retained the trained soldiers in his fencible battalion. Other commanding officers were not as reluctant. The 93rd (Sutherland) Highlanders, for example, was formed around a nucleus of 269 men discharged from the Sutherland Fencible Highlanders. Obviously a regiment like the 93rd, with a strong contingent of made soldiers in its ranks, would be ready for service before a completely new regiment like the 97th, which had few experienced soldiers in its ranks. Those few who were discharged from the Strathspey Fencibles were very doubtful assets for their new regiments. One who went was Drum Major Waddel, a non-commissioned officer whose departure was universally welcomed by the fencible officers, for besides being an excellent drummer the man was rarely, if ever, sober.

Competition for men led to the enlistment of soldiers who were truly unfit for active service. Lieutenant-Colonel Onslow, who commanded the 97th for Sir James Grant, sought his permission to discharge no less than eighty of the oldest men, while he complained that others were so young that they were unable to bear the weight of their arms and equipment on the march.[12] But whatever Onslow's wishes, Sir James could not afford to discharge men who had passed inspection by a general officer. The establishment of the new battalions was a thousand other ranks in addition to the commissioned officers, and none had reached that figure. All the colonels of new regiments recruiting in Scotland had been obliged to petition for permission to have their regiments inspected when their strength exceeded six hundred men, and the War Office had conceded that this might be done while at the same time optimistically insisting that recruiting should continue beyond the date upon

which the regiments were placed upon the establishment.[13] Suitable recruits were not to be obtained, no matter what bounty was offered. Alexander Grant, who supervised recruitment for the 97th at Edinburgh, remarked that his ill-success was due to "recruiting parties bidding as high as ever" but with few men forthcoming "except for cavalry & internal defence . . ."[14]

The subsequent fate of some of the new regiments of the line raised in Scotland was not such as to encourage further recruitment. The 109th, or Aberdeenshire Regiment, raised by Colonel Leith-Hay in direct rivalry with the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, with many of its soldiers coming from the same region as the Gordons, will serve as an example. No sooner was the 109th embodied and moved to England than it was disbanded, its officers placed on half-pay, and its rank and file given to the 53rd Regiment, later called the Shropshire Light Infantry. This transfer was made in direct violation of the terms upon which the soldiers of the Aberdeenshire Regiment were enlisted. The recruits of the 109th had been given a written promise that they would not be drafted, and that in the event of their regiment's reduction they would be discharged in the county in which their regiment had been raised. The government did not consider itself bound by Colonel Leith-Hay's promise and in spite of his protests the 109th Regiment was reduced in England and the soldiers continued their service in an English regiment of the line which had been experiencing recruiting difficulties.[15]

The 97th (Inverness-shire) Highlanders suffered a very similar fate. The 97th left Scotland for a training camp in England, and subsequently saw duty as part of the garrison of the island of Guernsey close to the French coast. Thereafter, for most of its short history, most of the company officers and rank and file served as temporary marines on board the ships of the Channel fleet, for the Royal Navy's expansion had far outdistanced recruitment for the corps of marines. Some of these soldiers of the 97th, by virtue of the fact that the ships upon which they were serving had been ordered to distant waters, continued to serve long after their own regiment had been disbanded. The 97th was formally disbanded at Hilsea Barracks, Portsmouth, in 1795, and the men were discharged into numerous other corps,[16]

many of them continuing to serve in the fleet as marines, and a large detachment going to strengthen the 42nd, or Black Watch, the senior Highland regiment.[17] The repeated disbandment and drafting of newly raised battalions had a markedly negative effect on subsequent Scottish recruitment. Perhaps it was as well that there were so many soldiers serving, while the distinguished record of the Scots regiments in the Peninsula and elsewhere kept a steady trickle of the young and impressionable volunteering for the older established corps so long as the war lasted. The government, however, was storing up trouble for the future. Scots have a long memory for abuses and are reluctant to repeat their predecessors' errors, and enlistment in a high numbered regiment had been demonstrated to be a fool's game.

The errors of the war government were numerous. Far too many men had been enlisted in limited service regiments, which were much more attractive to good recruits than the line regiments, but a lot less flexible for the administration. The advantages of serving in a fencible battalion were immediately obvious to a potential recruit, who thereby acquired military skills without the need to commit himself to a lengthy period of service. The administration, however, was responsible through its own actions for discouraging the augmentation of the line army. There were English, Welsh and even Irish fencible regiments as well as the Scots units, but in numbers they were considerably smaller and did not cause the same recruiting problems as in Scotland.

Forced to admit its error, the government commenced the disbandment of the fencible troops,[18] starting with those units with the most restricted service obligation. This freed up many thousands of trained soldiers for re-enlistment in the line battalions,, receiving an additional bounty for so doing, and many former fencibles participated in the continental engagements. A small force of conscripted militia, reinforced by unpaid volunteers became the main strength of the home defence army in Scotland.[19] Those fencible soldiers who would be unlikely to re-enlist, for example, the large contingent of married men, would still be available to extend the benefits of their military skills to the volunteers. With the fencible competition

withdrawn, the administration should have been able to draw extensively upon Scotland for the line army. Once more, however, they shot themselves in the foot by forming regular battalions in Scotland and as promptly drafting them into the English line.[20] There was a tendency at the opening of the nineteenth century for government and parliament alike to see Scotland as an inexhaustible reservoir of manpower, which it clearly was not, and no other explanation of the attempted formation of so many new battalions and regiments in that country appears plausible. Scotland, in short, was being asked to provide far more men than its population could sustain.

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Endnotes

1. List of Officers of the Fencibles, Militia, Yeomanry & Volunteers, 1797. Public Records Office. Edinburgh.
2. Buccleuch Papers, GD224/381.
3. William Windham to Sir James Grant, 11 March 1795. Seafield papers. GD248/689/3
4. Cornet McLaurin to Captain MacKenzie, 31 Dec. 1794. MS 1500/82-3 National Library of Scotland.
5. David Stewart, *Sketches of the Highlanders.* (Edinburgh: 1822).
6. Notably the 93rd (Sutherland) Highlanders.
7. See the forthcoming article on the recruitment of the 97th in *The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research.*
8. Captain Patrick Stuart, 97th, to Col. Sir James Grant, 20 May 1794. Seafield Papers. GD248/686/3.
9. Major John Grant indicated to Sir James Grant that ten men had been given their discharges to join the 97th, besides recruits not yet joined.
10. Francis William Grant, Sir James Grant's son, upon his appointment as major in the Fraser Fencibles, obtained sixty men from the Strathspey Fencibles. Other deductions reluctantly accepted were an entire flank company formerly commanded by Captain McDonnel of Glengarry, which went with their chief to his new battalion, the Glengarry Fencibles, and ten men who were given to please the political ruler of Scotland, Henry Dundas.

11. Captain Grant to Sir James Grant, 20 Feb. 1794. Seafield Papers. GD248/685/4
12. H.B. MacKintosh, *The Inverness-shire Highlanders or 97th Regiment of Foot.* (Elgin: 1926) 32.
13. Lord Amherst to the Duke of Gordon, 4 May 1794. Seafield Papers GD248/686/3.
14. Alexander Grant to Sir James Grant, 12 August 1794. GD248/687/30.
15. John Malcolm Bulloch, *Territorial Soldiering in the North-East of Scotland.* (Aberdeen: 1914) 253-262.
16. H.B. MacKintosh, *The Inverness-shire Highlanders.*
17. One hundred and twelve soldiers were discharged to the 42nd Highlanders and one hundred and ninety-eight to the Marines. Seafield Papers. GD248/698/2.
18. The reduction of the fencible regiments began in 1798-99, with the last regiments being disbanded in 1802.
19. The Scottish Militia consisted of ten battalions each of eight companies.
20. Mackerlie, *Account of the Scottish regiments with the statistics of each from 1808-1861.* (Edinburgh: 1862) 18.

An Officer and a Gentleman?: Military Reform and the 93rd Highlanders in Canada, 1838-1848

There is considerable controversy regarding the professional state of the British Army following the Napoleonic wars. More specifically, the debate centres around the extent of reforms prior to the Crimean war. Generally, the British Army has been characterized as impervious to reform, caught between the 'greatness' of the Duke of Wellington and the dead weight that was the war ministry. There were few incentives for officers to improve themselves or the army in general. This interpretation has, however, been challenged by a number of historians. Hew Strachan has argued that there were a number of military journals supporting improvements, and a growing number of officers who sought to both professionalize the officer corps - the prerequisites of officership being a background as a gentlemen rather than a professional field of study - as well as to promote innovations at the regimental level.[1] The promotion of innovations was particularly relevant to service in British North America, where commanding officers were confronted with a variety of problems: boredom, poor living conditions and the lure of a better life in the United States which induced so many to desertion.

The Highland regiments were not immune to the problems which were plaguing the British Army as a whole, and commanders of Highland regiments stationed in British North America were often at a loss when it came to stopping the flow of recruits south of the border. For a small number of officers the answer lay in reforms which they believed would make the military

more attractive, or at least more bearable, for the average recruit. The 93rd (or Sutherland) Highlanders, which served in British North America during the decade following the outbreak of rebellion in 1837, provides an opportunity to examine the application and impact of reforms upon a regiment serving in British North America. The regiment's commander, Colonel Robert Sparks,[2] is representative of the newly emerging officer who took an active interest in the welfare of their men, adopting many of the innovations put forth by Lord Howick and others.

Without question the single most difficult problem facing regimental commanders in British North America was desertion. Despite desertion being considered "the most heinous and shameful crime a soldier could commit in peacetime,"[3] several thousand rank and file fled from army life each year. Commanding officers in the Mediterranean, Australia, the Cape or the West Indies had little problem with desertion, either because of the desirability of the location (the Mediterranean) or the remoteness of the garrison (Australia and the West Indies). Such was not the case with British North America where a long border with the United States, which offered the prospects of cheap land and high wages, made desertion both easier and desirable.[4]

From January 1st 1839 to January 1st 1847 no less than 2,228 men deserted from British regiments stationed in Canada. Commanding officers of the period seem to have been at a loss as to how they could effectively control the number of deserters. In a letter regarding the prevention of desertion one officer stated that,

> In his opinion it would be extremely difficult to adopt any measure for preventing desertion owing to the country, bordering as it does on the long line of frontier of the United States, which not only holds out great inducements to the soldiers from the constant ideas indulged in by them of bettering their condition from the high rate of wages supposed to be given them there . . . particularly those who have been brought up to any trade.[5]

Another officer blamed the high rate of desertion on the Irish who, ". . . are induced to desert from their having relations

and friends settled in various parts of the U.S. and no doubt many Irish enlist for no other purpose than that of ultimately affecting this objective, and being brought to America free of expense."[6] There is no doubt that many Irish joined with the intention of escaping the grinding poverty they faced in Ireland. The decades leading up to the outbreak of the Potato Famine were difficult and there were few prospects at home. However the Irish were clearly not the only ones joining with the intention of gaining free passage overseas. In 1839 one writer commented that "no cause can be figured out for desertions except that it's greater after drafts from England."[7] New recruits, regardless of nationality, were more likely to desert.

The 93rd, known for its discipline in the early decades of the nineteenth century,[8] did not escape the increase in desertion. During the decade the regiment spent in British North America desertion remained a constant concern. In October of 1839 eight privates are listed as deserting from Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island.[9] The problem reached serious proportions in June of 1840 when eighteen men deserted in the same week. Perhaps most disconcerting was the fact that "...the last two that deserted were picked soldiers, and were at the time employed as Police Men to prevent this very crime."[10] Lieutenant Governor Sir George Arthur had feared that the 93rd, a regiment he described as one of the best Corps, would see a rise in desertion when the regiment was sent to the frontier. His reasoning was simple: "They are generally farming Men; and, at a short distance from the Niagara frontier is a Scotch settlement from whence I have not a doubt many allurements will be held out."[11] In each year which followed a small, but significant number of men deserted from the regiment. It was not until June 1848 that desertion ceased to be a problem as the regiment received orders to return to Scotland in September. The number of deserters each year created a great deal of concern amongst commanding officers struggling to find more effective ways of maintaining discipline and the strength of their regiment.

What then, was the cause of the growing trend towards desertion? The intention of fleeing to friends, family and better prospects in the United States was certainly a major factor. More

important however, is the fact that the composition of the Highland regiments was changing. They no longer drew primarily upon the Highlands, or even specific localities, for their rank and file. Highland regiments increasingly drew upon Ireland and England, and perhaps more importantly, they drew heavily from urbanized areas where unemployed tradesmen and laborers might be found.

R.H. Burgoyne, in writing his history of the 93rd Highlanders in 1860, stated that,

> A census having been made of the disposable population on the extensive estates of the Countess of Sutherland, her agents lost no time in requiring a certain proportion of the able-bodied sons of the numerous tenantry to join the ranks of the Sutherland regiment, as a test at once of duty to their feudal chief and to their sovereign.

He goes on to add that,

> The appeal thus made to the patriotism of the men of Sutherland was very generally responded to, and though discontent was occasionally manifested by individual parents at the arbitrary proceedings to which in certain cases it gave rise, yet the young men themselves never seemed to question the right that was assumed over their military services by their chieftain.[12]

These two statements bring up a number of interesting points. First, that the majority of men recruited were from the tenantry of the Sutherland estate and were therefore agricultural laborers. Secondly, it brings up the question of recruitment and its relationship to the Sutherland Clearances. The social implications involved in the Sutherland tenantry losing four hundred and sixty men, many between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, is certainly worthy of further study. Burgoyne saw this type of recruitment in a positive light, arguing that it instilled a high level of character:

> Not only were many of the non-commissioned officers and privates the children of respectable farmers, but a certain proportion of the officers themselves were gentlemen associated with the counties in which the regiment was raised. Therefore both they and the soldiers regarded the regiment as one large family bound together by the strong ties of neighbourhood, and even relationship.[13]

In such a regiment individuals not only felt accountable for their own actions, but for the conduct of their comrades as well. These bonds were strengthened by different companies of the battalion being classified by parish. Many of the men serving together would have been acquaintances, longtime friends and relatives, and would therefore be less-likely to damage the reputation of the regiment through desertion or other negative actions.[14]

By the 1820s the 93rd, like all regiments of the period, was going through a transition which changed the social composition of the regiment. Diana Henderson's work on the Roll Book of the 93rd Highlanders has shown that the composition of the regiment changed significantly from its first establishment to the 1830s. In 1799 the regiment was comprised predominantly of Highlanders, with the majority of NCO's and Sergeants being drawn from Sutherland. Enlistment figures for the 1820s show that while Highlanders still predominated, there was an increasing trend towards enlistment from outside the Highlands, with Sutherland supplying few new recruits.[15] The 93rd was not alone in this respect, as all Highland regiments of the period were forced to look outside the Highlands for recruits, and increasingly to urban, instead of rural environments.[16] The impact this could have upon a regiment was considerable. As Henderson notes, the "... wider spread of recruiting, the lessening of the more personal aspects of recruiting, the alcoholic temptations of garrison service, ... and the intake of unconnected and unenthusiastic general service men, all combined to change the character of the regiment..."[17]

Such changes presented new challenges for commanding

officers who could no longer rely upon the traditional means of discipline and deference to superiors. From the early 1830s there was continued pressure from the public, the British press and radicals to end practices such as flogging, the traditional form of discipline. The public generally condemned flogging as barbarous and totally out of touch with the more humane spirit that was prevalent in Britain. The monarch, many military officers, Tories and most Whigs continued to defend flogging as essential to military discipline, but had to concede ground and gradually reduce the number of lashes which were given out for various punishments.[18]

Faced with the prospects of commanding a different type of regiment in a rapidly changing world, an increasing number of officers began to professionalize, to move away from the traditional methods of command which stressed harsh punishments and a reliance on the traditional deference of the men to their superiors. The new breed of officer took a more active role in maintaining the morale of his regiment by looking more closely after the needs of his men. In the 1820s a small but growing number of people within the military pressed for reforms they believed would make the military a more attractive career. Changes argued for included higher rates of pay, better living conditions and the abolition of flogging. It was however, not until Lord Howick became Secretary of War in Lord Melbourne's ministry in 1835 that any real success at initiating reforms was realized.

Howick energetically set about tackling the problems of desertion, drunkenness and general apathy for military life common amongst the rank and file and showed a particular sympathy for the challenges faced by commanders of regiments serving in British North America. Howick struggled against years of tradition and prejudice which held that any attempt to make the soldier's lot in life more bearable would undermine military discipline, the very glue which traditionalists believed held the military together. In contrast to this view, Howick believed that with the application of the right reforms the army would be able to attract a better class of recruit and even make a career in the military desirable. A strong argument could be made for the

necessity of reform in British North America where desertion had reached alarming proportions. Harsh discipline in the form of flogging appeared to have little effect in stopping the flow of recruits to the United States and may well have been a factor in promoting desertion as many may have fled their regiments to escape the harsh punishments inflicted for minor offences. Howick therefore looked to implement a wide range of reforms, from rewards for good behavior to the more controversial establishment of Savings banks and Regimental Libraries, in order to make military life more attractive.[19] Lord Howick's reforms were adopted slowly, yet influenced a growing number of officers.

The records available for the 93rd Highlanders during the regiment's decade of service in British North America demonstrate that Colonel Sparks took an active interest in the well-being of his men and was willing to go out of his way to ensure that they had necessary articles such as warm clothing. Until 1830 troops received funds to help cover the cost of warm winter clothing - flannel shirts, mitts, cloth coveralls, boots, great coats and cloaks. In 1830 the government, in an effort to save, no longer supplied such articles free of charge, instead opting to deduct the costs from the soldiers' pay. Howick demonstrated that since this practice had been put in place desertion rates had increased, yet he still had a difficult time convincing the treasury to free up money for winter clothing. Colonel Sparks took great pains to acquire the necessary clothing for the men of his regiment. In a letter of April 1st, 1840, Colonel Sparks asked the Lieutenant General for funds to have two hundred and fifty great coats made for his men. This letter is one of a series concerning the need for both great coats and boots. On 5th October, 1843 Colonel Sparks ordered an additional one hundred coats, and in a later letter he requested the use of old great coats which he wanted so that his men could make capes to be used on guard duty.[20] The need for proper winter wear was an ongoing concern and one which had the potential to alleviate a considerable degree of hardship and discomfort.

The founding of regimental savings banks, a popular innovation outside of the military, held out much promise as a way to better the lot of both the men and the military in general. It was

believed by Howick and others that if the rank and file could be convinced of the benefits of putting some money away they would be in a better financial position upon leaving the military and also be less likely to attempt desertion. There was considerable opposition to the idea. "Has a soldier in the Army more pay than he requires?" enquired Lord Fitzroy Somerset, military secretary to the Commander-in-chief, in 1827. "If he has the soldier's pay ought to be lowered, not to those now in the service, but to others enlisted hereafter. I don't think it desirable to encourage our soldiers to become over thrifty."[21] The 93rd was one of the first to organize a savings bank. As early as November 1839 a large number of Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the regiment had requested permission to establish a savings bank, a request which Colonel Sparks wholeheartedly supported.[22] The Savings bank was established in January 1840, before legislation on the matter had been passed, with fifty-eight men depositing small sums of money. The benefits of this innovation caught on quickly and within a year of its establishment one hundred and twenty one 'thrifty' soldiers had deposited £605.[23]

The savings bank was believed to have had a very positive effect upon the regiment. Colonel Sparks wrote that "the savings bank has been productive of many good effects and I am not aware that any evil has resulted from it... Many of the Depositors who were formerly of intemperate habits are now of sober character."[24] Drunkenness, the source of many discipline problems at colonial garrisons, was reduced as men invested their extra shillings. But more significant, and not unrelated, was the apparent drop in desertion. Colonel Sparks attributed a drop in desertion in 1840-41 to the founding of the bank and others soon came to the same conclusion.

> Whatever objections may exist against Savings Banks elsewhere, in Canada they possess a strong recommendation, and, under good arrangements, carefully observed, any possible bad consequence may be avoided. If the Soldiers can be prevailed upon to lay up a portion of their Pay, it will operate as a powerful

> counteracting influence against desertion. During the two months after their arrival at Niagara, eighteen men deserted from the 93rd Regt., but of those not one had any stake in the Savings bank.[25]

Soldiers investing in a savings bank may well have thought twice before deserting as it now carried more than a stiff penalty if caught; it also meant the loss of any money placed in the bank.

Colonel Sparks was also one of the first Commanding officers to establish a regimental library for his regiment. Since the early decades of the century a number of officers had started libraries for their men, but these, like the other reforms, were for the most part viewed as frivolous and suspicious. In 1832 the Adjutant General warned commanding officers that libraries were a threat as they afforded

> legitimate pretexts for meetings, and eventually, cabals, which sooner or later must weaken the Authority of the Officer and the discipline of the Soldier . . . for any institution whose regulations authorize the soldiery to meet, to congregate and to deliberate in their Barrack Rooms for any purpose, or upon any pretense whatever, except in the presence of their Officers is, in its very nature, repugnant to the principles of Discipline and subordination.[26]

Despite such opposition libraries were established. By 1844 there were thirty-eight libraries in Britain and forty overseas, however it should be noted that great care was taken in ensuring that only books deemed suitable, those that would ". . . teach the soldiery the value of sober, regular and moral habits.."[27] were available. The 93rd was one of the first regiments stationed overseas to establish a library, and its effects would seem to have been wholly positive. The library not only offered an alternative to the tavern, but also allowed soldiers the opportunity to better prepare themselves for life outside the military. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the library was used, however the men appear to have had a considerable interest in education.

In 1840 no less than two hundred men of the regiment were voluntarily attending a school which had been formed. The men of the 93rd were described by Lieutenant Governor Arthur as "... altogether a different Class of men ... younger, and more amenable in the way of learning ..."[28]

Colonel Sparks could also be very accommodating towards his men, particularly where family was concerned. When the regiment returned to Upper Canada from Halifax in 1838 there were among their numbers thirty-eight women and fifty-six children;[29] therefore issues surrounding the accommodation and maintenance of the families of married soldiers would have affected a large number of men of the regiment. When Private William Macpherson died, leaving behind a wife and five children, Colonel Sparks wrote headquarters asking that rations continue to be supplied until support for the children could be arranged.[30] Such actions must have been greatly appreciated by the men of the regiment. Leniency was also on occasion extended to deserters. The story of Private James Traille is a case in point. Private Traille had deserted the regiment and then given himself up. Colonel Sparks wrote a letter asking for leniency as Traille came from an honest Protestant family and regretted what he had done. Colonel Sparks would no doubt later regret writing the letter as troubles with this particular recruit would continue.[31]

The impact the adoption of these various reforms had upon the 93rd during their time in British North America is difficult to ascertain. Colonel Sparks was innovative and clearly looked out for the well-being of his soldiers. He adopted a wide-range of reforms which he believed would make army life more bearable, and perhaps more importantly, lessen the appeal of desertion. It would appear that the rates of desertion from the regiment remained low throughout the 1840s, and that many of the desertions that took place can be attributed to new recruits. Many of these may have joined with the intention of deserting to the United States, and given the geographic location of the 93rd, stationed primarily along the St. Lawrence, those wishing to desert would have ample opportunity. It would therefore appear that the reforms implemented by Colonel Sparks had a positive impact upon morale and garrison life in general.

But not all were enthusiastic over the changes being implemented, and at least one officer of the 93rd found the new approach to command to be difficult to accept. Lieutenant Andrew Agnew, who had joined the regiment in 1835 as an Ensign, found Colonel Sparks style of command not to his liking. Like many officers of the day, Lieutenant Agnew came from the landed class and looked upon the military as a means of advancement, travel and adventure.[32] After the excitement of the Battle of the Windmill at Prescott,[33] the only action the regiment would see in its ten years in British North America, Lieutenant Agnew grew restless, and after an extended canoe trip through the Great Lakes,[34] believed he had seen all that there was to see and began to think of transferring to another regiment. He believed the 16th Lancers would be a perfect fit as:

> I should have a free passage of course and see much of India, perhaps a little service which now a days is a great object indeed, the regiment went abroad in 1822 so that it should return to England at the latest about 1844; when I should of course be brought back again gratis after having seen an immensity of the world . . .[35]

It would seem that military life in the colonies no longer offered Agnew the excitement which he craved.

There was, however, another reason Lieutenant Agnew began turning his mind to transferring out of the 93rd. Agnew's private correspondence with his father demonstrates that he found life in the regiment 'lacking'. For him there was ". . . no recommendation in the way of society, polishing to the mind or manners . . ."[36] More significantly, he had developed a certain uneasiness with the regiment, which he found lacked 'gentlemen'. Lieutenant Agnew got along 'tolerably well' with Colonel Sparks, but also found him lacking in civility. Colonel Sparks was not, Agnew would write in strictest confidence to his father, "born a gentleman."[37]

Lieutenant Agnew clearly disliked Colonel Sparks and was one of a number of officers who as early as 1839 complained

about aspects of his command.[38] Agnew and the other like-minded officers may well have been reacting against the new style of officer Colonel Sparks represented, one which took greater interest in the well-being and day to day lives of their men. The changes implemented by Colonel Sparks, while perhaps grating upon the sensibilities of his "gentlemanly" officers, must have had a positive impact upon the regiment as a whole. Lieutenant Governor Arthur, in addressing the subject of Colonel Sparks Command wrote that,

> With regard to the management of the 93rd Regt, I have certainly heard that some of the officers fancied that Lt Colonel Sparke [sic] was not so kind and considerate as he might be in some unimportant particulars, and a hint to this effect was given to him some time ago; but there is nothing approaching to a want of unanimity; and with the noncommissioned officers and soldiers no commanding Officer can be more liked. His influence over them is most decisive . . . My Conviction is that Sparke is an honest, straightforward, sober-minded soldier. . .[39]

Colonel Sparks was clearly an effective officer who actively introduced new reforms in an effort to curb desertion and provide better care for the men of his regiment. He was well-liked by the non-commissioned officers and rank and file, and desertion, although a problem throughout the period, subsided after 1840 when many of the reforms had been initiated. The decades before the Crimean War were, however, a transitional period where many refused to accept the necessity of military reform. For many officers it was still necessary that an officer be a gentleman in the traditional sense, that they have the correct bearing and breeding, and in this respect it would seem Colonel Sparks fell short of at least some of his officers' expectations.

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Endnotes

1. Hew Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830-1854.* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) 6-43.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sparks had a long career in the 93rd Highlanders. Sparks joined the regiment in 1807 at the rank of Ensign. He served with the regiment in America and took part in the Battle of New Orleans, where he was wounded. He made Captain on 17th February 1820, and Lieutenant Colonel on the 28th July, 1838, at which time he assumed command of the regiment in the Canadas. He died in 1852 while serving as Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment. R. H. Burgoyne, *Historical Records of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders.* (London: 1883) 410-411.
3. Peter Burroughs, "Tackling Army Desertion in British North America," *Canadian Historical Review.* Vol. LXI. No. I. March, 1980. 28.
4. There were many different possible reasons why a soldier might choose to desert his regiment. The monotony and boredom of garrison duty, harsh discipline, poor pay, indebtedness, and drunkenness were all contributing factors. Many commanding officers complained of Americans who convinced soldiers to desert to a better way of life, high wages and ample employment south of the border. Burroughs, "Tackling Army Desertion in British North America," 28-36.
5. Letter to Lieutenant Colonel Eden. Citadel barracks, Quebec. 24th January 1833. R.G. 8. C2775. 'C' Series. Vol. 171. 92-95.
6. Ibid.
7. MG13, WO 17. Reel B1577. Vol. 1545. 135. Of course many of these may well have been Irish who had migrated to the industrial centers of Northern England in search of employment.
8. Not a single man of the Light Company is reported to have been punished between 1799 and 1819. Diana Henderson, *Highland Soldier.* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1989) 60.
9. MG 13, WO 17 Reel B1577 Vol. 1543. Desertions were a particular problem in Prince Edward Island where farmers faced with a labour shortage were only too willing to harbor a fugitive in exchange for work. Burroughs, "Tackling Army Desertion in British North America." 42.
10. Arthur to Sir R.D. Jackson, July 25 1840. *The Arthur Papers* Ed. Charles R. Sanderson. Vol. 3. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1959) 96.
11. Arthur to Sir R.D. Jackson, Government House, Toronto. March 7 1840. *Arthur Papers.* [1217] 452-453.

12. Burgoyne, *Historical Records.* 1-2.
13. Burgoyne, *Historical Records.* 3.
14. Diana Henderson suggests that the social control supplied through the organization of platoons and companies by parish of origin was an important factor in maintaining discipline within the 93rd. *Highland Soldier.* 60.
15. Henderson, *Highland Soldier.* 54-61.
16. By 1830 Irish soldiers were 42.2 per cent of the British Army and increasingly a larger proportion of recruits were drawn from the growing urban centres. Edward M. Spiers, *The Army and Society 1815-1914.* (London: Longman Group Ltd.,1980) 48-49. Scottish soldiers comprised just 13.5 percent and were proving reluctant to join the army. Strachan, *The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54.* 51.
17. Henderson, *Highland Soldier.* 60-62.
18. Flogging continued as a form of punishment until 1881, but its use was restricted considerably from the 1830s. For an in-depth discussion see, J.R. Dinwiddy, "The Early Nineteenth-century Campaign against Flogging in the Army," *English Historical Review.* Vol. XCVII. 1982. 308-331. Peter Burroughs, "Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815-1870," *English Historical Review.* Vol. C. No. 396. July 1985. 561-563.
19. Burroughs, "Tackling Army Desertion," 37-39.
20. War Office Records. C Series 1006. 87-88; Letter of April 1st, 1840. C Series. 1007. 55; Requisition Form, 11th August 1842, 106; Letter dated Montreal, October 29th 1844, 188. National Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
21. As quoted in, Burroughs, "Tackling Army Desertion," 52.
22. Robert Spark to Colonel C.C.L. Foster, Toronto November 8th, 1839. *Arthur Papers.* [1802]. 359.
23. Robert Spark to the Assistant Military Secretary [C.J. Colville] January 13, 1841. *Arthur Papers.* [1804] 360-361.
24. Ibid.
25. Arthur to Lieut. Colonel [John] Eden, August 24 1840. *Arthur Papers.* 115.
26. As quoted in, Burroughs, "Tackling Army Desertion in British North America," 55.
27. Strachan, *The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54.* 93.
28. Arthur to Col. J.F. Love, March 22, 1840. *Arthur Papers.* [1234] 466-467.
29. MG13, WO 17 Reel B1577. Vol. 1542. 187.
30. Letter dated Quebec, 11th November, 1846. War Office Records. R.G. 8. Vol. 1008. 50.

31. Private Traille was tried and convicted of desertion and other charges, including disregarding his superior officer's commands on the line of march, and was sentenced to six months imprisonment. Before being confined he escaped and fled to the United States, where he promptly enlisted in an artillery regiment. Shortly after he deserted from this regiment and returned to Port Colborne, where he was apprehended in connection with a robbery in Buffalo. He was later escorted to Toronto and tried by general court martial. Letters of 13 January, 1841, 86-88; November 30, 1841, 89; 23 January 1842, 91. War Office Records. "C" series. 1007.
32. Lieutenant Andrew Agnew was the eldest son of one of southern Scotland's prominent families. The Agnews of Lochnaw were substantial landowners in Wigtonshire, and for generations had been actively involved in the political, social and religious development of the region. Agnew's father, Andrew Agnew Sr., served the county as Member of Parliament and was a vocal advocate for the observance of the Sabbath. See, Thomas M'Crie, *Memoirs of the Life of Sir Andrew Agnew of Lochnaw.* (Edinburgh: 1850).
33. See the account of the battle by Lieutenant Agnew in Scott A. McLean, "The Battle of the Windmill Revisited," *Canadian Military History.* Volume 9, Number 4. (Autumn 2000).
34. For a full discussion of this and a copy of the journal kept by Agnew during his trip to Manitoulin for the native gift-giving ceremony see, Scott A. McLean, *From Lochnaw to Manitoulin: A Highland Soldier's Tour Through Upper Canada.* (Toronto: Natural Heritage Books, 1999).
35. Letter of Andrew Agnew dated Toronto, Upper Canada, March 9, 1840. Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office. GD154/745/14 (1-2).
36. Ibid.
37. Letter of Andrew Agnew dated Toronto, Upper Canada, November 8th, 1839. Edinburgh. Scottish Record Office. GD 154/745/12.
38. In 1839 Agnew wrote that some internal differences within the regiment had cemented a small band of the officers together. Henderson, *Highland Soldier.* 134. The officers Agnew was referring to, and who had similar complaints regarding certain aspects of Colonel Sparks command, were: William Robert Haliday, who exchanged to the 93rd in 1834 at the rank of Lieutenant, and later became a Lieutenant-General; Neil Snodgrass Buchanan who made Captain on the 28th July, 1838; and Captain William Pitt Trevelyan, the last of the officers to be named by Agnew. Burgoyne, *Historical Records of the 93rd.* 367, 386, 414.
39. Arthur to Sir R.D. Jackson, August 18 1840, Government House, Toronto. *Arthur Papers.* [1445]. 112.

REVIEWS

MEDIEVAL

MEDIEVAL SCOTLAND
CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL TEXTBOOKS

A.D.M. Barrell. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
xvi, 296 pp. Maps. £12.95 (Hardback)

Although there are many one-volume histories of Scotland as a whole, and several good books that deal with one part or another of the Middle Ages, works that take on the entire sweep of the medieval period in a single volume are a rare breed indeed. *Medieval Scotland* by A.D.M. Barrell fills an obvious lacuna in Scottish historical studies, and, what is more, manages to do it very efficiently in a mere 267 pages of text.

This book is a single-volume history of medieval Scotland, concentrating on the period from the reign of Malcolm III 'Canmore' in the eleventh century (1058-1093) to the Reformation Parliament of 1560. Eight chapters cover Early Medieval Scotland; Feudal Scotland; the Transformation of the Scottish Church; the Consolidation of the Scottish Realm; the Wars of Independence; the Stewart Kings; Crown and Nobility in Later Medieval Scotland; and the Road to Reformation. The author's approach to his subject is unashamedly traditional – that is, the book is primarily a political and ecclesiastical study. Several key themes are developed throughout, including the development of the institutions of the medieval Scottish state; crown-nobility relations; relations with external powers; the development of the Scottish church; and the formation of a distinct Scottish identity. Another major concern of the author, and one that mirrors current trends in medieval Scottish and European scholarship, is that of core-periphery interactions.

There is much to admire in this study and little to criticize. The work is valuable not only as a one-volume survey of the

period and its major developments, but it also takes full account of the tremendous amount of scholarship on the subject that has been produced over the past twenty years, and so provides an excellent synthesis of historiography as well. The author is well versed in current literature on, for example, core-periphery interactions, resistance to the Canmore kings, the nature of the transformation of the 12th-13th centuries, the nature of Stewart kingship, and the perennial debate over late medieval crown-nobility relations. The bibliography will be a very useful guide for those wishing to read further on virtually any aspect of the subject.

Another praiseworthy facet of the work is the author's even-handedness and his willingness to move beyond the tired old assessments and stereotypes that commonly find their way into even the best-intentioned texts. This shows through most prominently in chapter five, on the Wars of Independence, where the motives of Edward I are thoroughly and fairly reassessed; the internal bickering of the Scots is not diminished; and where the reigns of monarchs like John Balliol and David II, traditionally seen as unfortunate at best and dismal at worst, are thoroughly re-evaluated in light of both recent scholarship and the context of the times. Indeed, the chapter on the Wars of Independence is an excellent analysis and summing up of the whole theme from 1286 until 1371, made even more outstanding by virtue of the fact that it extends beyond some of the more traditional end-points for such an investigation (i.e. 1329, 1346). As Barrell concludes at the end of this chapter: 'The Wars of Independence were in some respects just what the name implies, a struggle for liberation, but the events of this period of crisis are much more complex than the selective rhetoric of the Declaration of Arbroath and other propaganda, Scottish and English, might suggest' (p. 136).

On the whole the coverage of each theme is thorough, economical, and incisive, and one senses that what omissions there are exist largely because of constraints of space. It is surprising, for instance, that the third chapter, on the Transformation of the Scottish Church, makes no mention of the physical transformation of the Scottish church – the building

and rebuilding of churches and monasteries – that accompanied the structural transformation of the late eleventh through the thirteenth century. Similarly, although there is a good deal of material in chapters six and seven relating to the MacDonald Lords of the Isles, it is sometimes woven unevenly in and out of the narrative, and it might have been preferable to consolidate this material in a more concise block of text – or even a separate chapter - which would have enabled the author to say even more about the division between highlands and lowlands which is such an important theme of this period in Scottish history.

Such minor points notwithstanding, *Medieval Scotland* by A.D.M. Barrell is a concise, well-informed, and authoritative one-volume history of medieval Scotland that should make its way into the library of everyone interested in the subject.

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SOMERLED AND THE EMERGENCE OF GAELIC SCOTLAND

John Marsden. East Linton, Tuckwell Press, 2000. 180 pp.
Map. Plates. £16.99 (Paperback)

John Marsden is the author of a number of popular history books on early Scotland and Northumbria, including *Alba of the Ravens* (1997) and *Northanhymbre Saga: The History of the Anglo-Saxon Kings of Northumbria* (1995). In his most recent work, *Somerled and the Emergence of Gaelic Scotland*, he turns his attention to the western seaboard of Scotland to tackle the life and times of the mighty Hebridean sea-king who perished in an invasion of the Scottish mainland in 1164 and whose descendants continued to rule in the west until the late fifteenth century. In so doing, Marsden is dipping his oars into a rising tide of historical interest in not just Somerled, but the broader, related, phenomenon of Celtic Scotland in the medieval period.

The author's stated motivation for writing the book is the lack of any full-length studies dealing with Somerled. However, given the increased amount of work by historians dealing with Argyll and the Isles over the past decade or so, including one book-length study of the region between 1100 and 1336, it remains to be seen whether Marsden has anything new to say about the subject (of which more anon). Marsden's aim in writing the book is clearly laid out in the preface, where he states that he hopes to provide 'the fullest possible portrait of Somerled as an historical personality in his own right rather than as a prologue to the subsequent history of the Lordship [of the Isles]…' (p. ix). This is laudable as far as it goes, although historians now no longer view Somerled as a mere prologue to the later Lordship, and such a reprimand is not in keeping with the most recent historical scholarship on the subject.

The book is divided into seven chapters, which deal more or

less chronologically with Somerled's origins, ancestry and rise to power; his challenge to the Canmore kings of Scots; his war with the Manx kings; his invasion of the Clyde and his death; his patronage of Iona, and a concluding chapter on 'The Long Shadow of Somhairle Mor.' The text is peppered with quotations from contemporary sources, which not only help to provide a sense of *how* we know what we know about this difficult period, but also allow the reader to feel more directly connected to events by hearing what contemporaries (and later clan historians) had to say about them. On the other hand, many of the quotations – some of which run to almost two pages of text – are too long, and readers would have been better served by their more judicious use.

Marsden has, however, done his homework in the preparation of the book. The bibliography is solid, and the author utilizes the major primary and secondary sources throughout. The book can, therefore, certainly be recommended as a good overview of, and introduction to, the topic, and Marsden does a solid job of discussing the changing perspectives on Somerled across the centuries, right up to the recent blossoming of material on the topic in the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, it has to be said that the book contributes little to the overall debate on the subject – its real value lies rather in its ability to synthesize existing material and present a straightforward narrative of events.

It is the provocative subtitle of the work that may well draw the most criticism. Marsden seeks to demonstrate, as he says in the preface, that Somerled was 'the one figure who, more than any other, represents the first fully-fledged emergence of the medieval Celtic-Scandinavian cultural province from which modern Gaelic Scotland is ultimately descended' (p. x).

On the one hand, it is difficult to argue against the view that Somerled's rise to power is rooted firmly in the medieval Celtic-Scandinavian cultural province, and also that the delineation of Gaelic Scotland really only begins in the middle ages, perhaps in the twelfth century (most would say later). It is also difficult to disagree that Somerled cast a very long shadow over the subsequent history of the highlands and islands. But the question is, ought we to regard Somerled and the cultural province

from which he was sprung as the precursor to modern Gaelic Scotland? To do so is to ignore several crucial points. First, in its strictest sense, the origins of Gaelic Scotland lie in the migration of Gaelic speakers (the Scots of Dalriada) from Northern Ireland to the west coast of Scotland some six centuries before Somerled's birth. So in a sense, Marsden relegates to the sidelines six hundred years of important political and cultural developments that include the takeover of Pictland by the Scots of Dalriada in the ninth century and the territorial expansion of the new kingdom of Alba in the tenth to twelfth centuries. Indeed, as a number of works have demonstrated, this new kingdom of Alba itself represented a crucial phase in the formation of a new Scottish identity.

Second, and as Marsden himself is well aware, Somerled's cultural milieu was not purely Gaelic but rather mixed Gaelic-Scandinavian; even Somerled's name was Norse and means 'Summer sailor' or 'Viking.' To regard Somerled as a phenomenon of *Gaelic* Scotland is to ignore the very milieu from which he was sprung, and is, I think, to read backwards from the sentiments of the later clan historians into the much more complicated situation of the twelfth century. Somerled would certainly not have viewed himself as a champion of Gaelic Scotland, a view that is sometimes taken by historians but is not, in fairness, championed by Marsden.

Another difficulty with Marsden's argument is that it also ignores key developments in the period following Somerled's demise: arguably, subsequent developments among his descendants, and especially during the period of the Lordship of the Isles, did as much to shape the development of Gaelic Scotland as did Somerled himself. To attempt to demonstrate a linear development from the time of Somerled in the twelfth century up until the twentieth is to forget subsequent developments and to succumb to a very linear view of history.

In *Somerled and the Emergence of Gaelic Scotland*, John Marsden has produced a brief, readable, and interesting introduction to this great twelfth-century sea-king and his life and times. Although not all of Marsden's arguments convince, the book can still be recommended as a sound introduction to the topic

for the general reader; academics will find little of real value here. Finally, before you rush out to purchase this book, be warned: actually obtaining a copy might prove to be difficult! At the time of writing, searches for the book at several internet bookstores, including Indigo.ca and Chapters.ca, were unsuccessful, while Amazon.com indicated that it had yet to be published!

Readers desperate to obtain this book will have to order from British internet sites like *amazon.co.uk* or *jamesthin.co.uk*, or else contact the publisher directly at *tuckwellpress.co.uk*. It is to be hoped that this book (like other Tuckwell titles) will become more widely available in North America, where it will no doubt appeal to all of those interested in Scottish studies.

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Colonisation and Conquest in Medieval Ireland: The English in Louth, 1170-1330

Brendan Smith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999
208 pp. £37.50. (Hardback)

The relationship between Ireland and England has illustrated a long and antagonistic history. Often described as England's first colony, Ireland was dominated by the English crown long before Great Britain's imperial expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Working within the paradigm of colonialism, Smith's work provides an excellent insight into the roots of this relationship. Rather than random settlement by individual English lords seeking to expand their territory, Smith presented the English involvement in Louth as part of a clearly directed state policy. Much of Louth was retained under the crown's direct control and successive kings used their power to grant these lands and titles as a political tool. Because of this direct tie, colonists in Louth were not cut off from the centre of English power but were "in some ways more closely connected with the metropolitan centre than were the English of many parts of England" (9). This state-centred nature of the English expansion into Ireland enables historians to examine this process within the analytical framework of colonialism. Although acknowledging the problems of applying colonial theory to medieval Ireland, Smith argues that the theory of colonialism provides an important analytical tool for understanding the complex and frequently interwoven relationship between the crown, English colonists, and the native Irish nobility.

In addition to the agricultural potential of the region, the English were attracted to Louth because of the relatively weak

local power structure. Rather than long-standing local nobility, the English replaced the *Ui Cherbaill* "foreign" rulers who had controlled Louth for only half-a-century. While this weakened internal resistance, Smith clearly demonstrated that the colonisation of Louth was undertaken in an "atmosphere of tension and military preparedness" (34). Since the beginning, this process was governed directly by the state, as "the king secured for himself a permanent and immediate stake in affairs by retaining substantial estates in his own hand. These demesne lands could then be used to reward favourites and influence events in the royal interest" (31). Following early-fourteenth-century rebellions, the crown again strengthened its direct influence by creating the title of earl of Louth (113). In this way, Smith clearly demonstrates that the colonisation of Louth was not an isolated process of emigration, but was directly connected to the centre of England's volatile internal politics. Within this power structure, the key to understanding the development of the Louth settlement was the interplay between the influence of "royal command, magnate direction and sub-tenant enterprise" (47). While the Irish nobility was displaced, many Irish families continued to play an important role in the development of Louth; it is this internal dynamic that forms the focus of Smith's work.

Beyond a simple switch from an Irish to English nobility, Smith argues that the development of Louth involved substantial English migration that was reflected in "the large number of English place-names" (51). While this may have produced a mixed English-Irish society in Louth, Smith presents evidence of the development of close relationships between English and Irish noble families. It is clear that this society developed within a framework of constant conflict and shifting alliances. For the Louth settlement, the principal threat came from the bordering territories that had not been subdued by the English. As a result, the crown placed a significant emphasis on the fortification of Louth, as many of the land grants were contingent upon the construction of new forts.

However, while the surviving records emphasize the hostility between English and Irish, this was not the only feature of this

relationship. As Smith argued, "if such relations had been as virulent as ecclesiastical and judicial sources suggest it is difficult to understand why so many Irish continued to live in the parts of Louth conquered and settled by the English, let alone explain why more joined them as the fourteenth century progressed" (75). Consequently, a system of opportunism developed in which English and Irish made and broke alliances as circumstances dictated. This focus points to Smith's desire to understand the "colonial ambitions of native aristocracies" (8). It is only by recognizing the continued agency of the Irish, that the true nature of this tripartite relationship can be seen. According to Smith, it was the alliance system that facilitated the settlement of Louth by ameliorating "the position of tenants living in exposed areas" that the English could not directly protect (85). In this respect, rather than being great land owners, the source of English power in colonial Louth "lay instead in the alliances they made by marriage or business with their neighbours and in the service they offered to the crown both within their county and beyond" (138-39).

Service to the crown was an important aspect of the political dynamics within colonial Louth and various offences could be redeemed through military service in the King's campaigns. As a result, nobles from Louth participated in campaigns not only in Ireland, but also in Scotland and in Europe. This participation provided settlers the opportunity to enhance their own position and, as Smith argues, "it is noticeable that the colonists were more willing to fight outside of their own regions than inhabitants of many parts of England" (154). Smith credits the proximity of the frontier and close ties to the crown with enhancing the martial nature of the Louth settlement that he describes as "competitive, bellicose and self-aware" (138).

In developing his analysis of colonial Louth, Smith provides an important insight into the nature of conquest and settlement in medieval Britain. As demonstrated, the key factor that held combative English nobility together was their common loyalty to the crown, and this loyalty, in turn, was predicated on the King's direct control of land and his power to grant titles. In this way, Louth perhaps presents a microcosm where the transformation

from a feudal society to a nation state can be observed. This is important because Smith's use of colonialism was based on a state directed settlement of Louth and the power of the state was effectively demonstrated throughout the work.

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Border Bloodshed: Scotland, England and France at War, 1369-1403

Alastair J. Macdonald. East Linton, Tuckwell Press, 2000
ix, 277 pp. £16.99. (Trade Paper)

Historians have traditionally portrayed the border lands of late medieval England and Scotland as hopelessly ungovernable regions of their respective kingdoms. Perceptions of chaotic raids and counter-raids, of the machinations of families constantly at feud, and of widespread lawlessness first began to inform the historiography of the borders in the sixteenth century, and until recently have remained remarkably persistent in scholarly and popular writing. In this work, a recasting of his doctoral dissertation, Alastair Macdonald sets out to debunk many of the myths that have so deeply coloured the history of the border lands. Although in some respects a dense and, at times, impenetrable book, Macdonald's effort is commendable for its attention to detail and its thorough assessment of surviving record materials.

Macdonald pursues a single, well-articulated theme throughout the book. He argues that, despite the enduring opinion of some historians, Anglo-Scottish warfare in the period between the accession of King Robert II in 1371 and the year 1403 'was absolutely driven by the Scots' (p. 1). Related to this central claim are challenges to two equally persistent beliefs about the border lands of England and Scotland, namely that the disorder of the region was a reflection of the evils of overmighty subjects and that it was a consequence of the inability of the central governments of the two realms to control feuding among magnate families. Macdonald's view is that both arguments are seriously weakened when the 'bigger picture' is taken into account. Thus, he explores the involvement of the

Scots not only in war with the English, but also in alliance with the French.

The book is divided into two sections. The first (and longer) consists of a survey of the dozens of raids, forays and formal campaigns that occurred in the border lands between 1371 and 1403. The endless recital of these incidents makes for dry reading; of greater interest here are the footnotes, which reveal just how meticulously the author searched a plethora of extant record material in constructing his chronology. Although Macdonald constantly reminds his reader that the hand of the Scottish crown is clearly visible behind the incursions, great and small, his arguments about the consistency of governmental control are not altogether convincing. Robert II does indeed appear to have lived up to the image he shaped for himself as a 'defender of the integrity of the Scottish realm' and an aggressive champion of his territorial claims. Under his overall direction the Scots undertook an ultimately successful campaign to re-conquer English-held lands in the east, central and west marches. From 1377 Scottish attacks on England increased in intensity, and collectively their success helped to ensure that the smaller realm remained very much an active player in its relations with England and France. Macdonald makes a compelling case for arguing that, during the 1370s and '80s at least, Scottish military activity reflected a unity of design and purpose on the part of the crown and its magnates that Robert II's biographers have seldom acknowledged. The decisions to escalate war in 1385 and again in 1388 were made entirely by the Scots, without reference to circumstances in England or in France, and when the forces of Douglas and Percy clashed at Otterburn in 1388, the Scottish victory was much more a tangible expression of the cohesion of royal and baronial forces than it was a mere episode, however glorious, in a purely personal feud between border magnates.

The 1390s, however, saw a reversal in Scottish fortunes and, simultaneously, a cessation of the constant raiding that had characterised the previous two decades. Scotland was isolated as a consequence of the retreat of the English and French crowns from open war, and in this decade 'the cautious planning

evident during Robert III's reign would be replaced by a generous measure of recklessness' (p. 118). Despite Macdonald's contention that the Scottish government (variously led by King Robert III or his ambitious brother) remained firmly in control of Anglo-Scottish affairs generally and border warfare more particularly, he finds it difficult to assemble strong evidence in support of this claim.

Deeply troubled by internal dissension and frozen out of the Anglo-French détente, the crown was powerless to do anything more than 'tolerate' the raids and forays of its chief border lords. More damaging still to Macdonald's central thesis is his choice of 1403, rather than 1406 (the year in which King Robert III died) as the year in which to conclude his detailed study. In 1403, following the rebellion of the Percy family, the English government began to alter its northern policies. In designating that date as a turning point in border history Macdonald emphasizes the leading role that English governmental decisions played in border politics, and portrays the Scottish government as marginal, able merely to respond to changes effected by its powerful neighbour. Problematic also is Macdonald's admission in Chapter 4 (an admission that then becomes a major theme of the concluding chapters) that the year 1399 in fact marked a more significant watershed than did 1403 in the direction of the war effort. If this was the case, one wonders why the author did not identify the accession of Henry IV as a terminal point for his study.

In the two final chapters Macdonald steps back from a purely narrative description of events to a more thoughtful examination of the ways in which border warfare shaped the lives and the culture of southern Scotland and northern England. This portion of the book is worth the price of its purchase. In an attempt to understand why war between England and Scotland should have been as long-lasting and as destructive as it was, the author sets out to explore the motives of the men who fought. Carefully noting that 'the distinction between private and public motivations is blurred' (p. 168) he nevertheless offers several explanations for the willingness of the crown and its subjects to devote so much time, energy and expense against a large and

formidable enemy. Governmental motivations are defined here chiefly as the successful assertion of the independence that the Scots had achieved in 1328 but which the English crown thereafter chose to ignore and, more obviously, the prospect of re-conquering lands in the borders occupied by the English. Private reasons were many and varied, some 'rational', others not, including the chivalric desire for glory and booty, patriotism, attachment to the notion of the feud and retaliation against a bitter enemy of long standing. Religious sentiment may also have been a factor here, but Macdonald does not elaborate on just how the Schism that began in 1378 could have been meaningful to the mass of the Scottish soldiery.

While 'those who fought in the Anglo-Scottish wars did so for a complex of reasons' (p.194), there can be little doubt that the existence of a near-perpetual state of war exerted a profound influence on border society. In his last chapter Macdonald once again challenges long-held notions, this time about the unity of belief that English and Scottish borderers are supposed to have shared, and succeeds in making a compelling case for treating the Scottish border lands as a region quite distinct from their English counterparts. The circumstances that collectively bred in the English marches profound feelings of alienation from the Westminster government are not, he shows, applicable to the Scottish border lands. Moreover, there did not exist the 'raiding culture' so beloved of Walter Scott and his imitators, though Macdonald admits that his argument cannot really be sustained for the period after 1399. Similarly, the acculturation that is said to have occurred among English and Scottish frontier dwellers, popularised in the ballad literature of the sixteenth century, 'is not clearly evident until after 1399' (p. 235).

Despite its rather lurid title Macdonald's book will be of real interest to historians of Anglo-Scottish relations in the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The author has made remarkably good use of a sometimes bewildering variety of primary source materials, many of them hidden away in remote corners of record offices local and national. His use of secondary sources, however, is rather more limited. In the course of the last two decades the history of the border regions has attracted the

attention of a growing number of English and Scottish historians. Aspects of their culture, politics and legal peculiarities have been subjected to careful scrutiny and the findings of many scholars are generally in agreement with Macdonald's. A more concerted effort to include the work of some of these other scholars would have given his book greater breadth and depth.

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JAMES V: THE PERSONAL RULE, 1528-1542
THE STEWART DYNASTY IN SCOTLAND

Jamie Cameron and edited by Norman MacDougall
East Linton, Tuckwell Press, 1998.
408 pp. £16.99 (Paperback)

James V has not enjoyed good press among Scottish historians. Unfortunate enough to have lived in the shadow of the reigns of his charismatic father James IV, and his romantic daughter, Mary Queen of Scots, James has been largely ignored. Those few historians who have dealt with his reign have been largely negative in their assessment, describing him as avaricious and vindictive, a king who had largely lost the trust and loyalty of his nobility by the end of his personal reign, a few weeks after the loss of his army at Solway Moss in 1542.

Thanks to the work of Jamie Cameron, this image of James will need to be reassessed. Cameron has painstakingly assembled and analysed the evidence for the personal reign, and the result is a much more nuanced interpretation of this supposedly "ill-beloved" king. Indeed one of the great strengths of the book is Cameron's demonstration of how much of the traditional view of James V is based on biased English and post-Reformation Scottish sources, which had their own reasons for wanting to present a portrait of a deeply unpleasant and disliked monarch. Based on his doctoral thesis, and lightly edited by his supervisor Norman MacDougall after Dr. Cameron's untimely death, *James V: The Personal Rule* will be required reading for all serious students of the political history of early to mid sixteenth-century Scotland.

James V emerges from this study as a man who was more

than capable of holding his own in the fractious politics of the sixteenth century. Cameron argues that the 1528 overthrow of Archibald Douglas, earl of Angus, who had seized power along with the young king's person in 1525 was undertaken largely at James's own initiative. Angus continued to throw a long shadow over Scotland even after his flight to England, but ultimately James was able to deal effectively with the threat, even though it took him the best part of his personal reign. James's actions towards members of the Douglas family remaining in Scotland have traditionally been seen as vindictive and breeding fear in the rest of the nobility, but Cameron shows that the king's response was measured and achieved without alienating the rest of the magnates of the realm. Even the execution of Janet Douglas, Lady Glamis, which has been used as an example of James's tyranny, is shown to be justifiable, even if the explanation for the execution might not satisfy all historians.

Several other stories traditionally associated with James V are subjected to the author's analysis and found to be wanting. For example, there is no contemporary evidence to support Pitscottie's colourful tale of James's daring escape from Falkland in 1528. The king's stern dealings with the Border reiver John Armstrong, the subject of a popular ballad, are placed in the context of the assertion of royal authority over the lawlessness of the Borders. Most significantly, the assertion that James's magnates were disaffected by the end of his reign and that this led to the losses of 1542 when they first refused to fight the English, and then surrendered at Solway Moss, is firmly disproved. Indeed, James's reign is show to be marked more by harmony between king and magnates, than by friction. The stability which had been established is demonstrated by the fact that James could be absent from his realm for nine months, something that no other Stewart king achieved.

The picture of the king's grasping nature and meanness towards his nobility is also qualified. As Cameron points out, James had no need to reward his nobles with patronage in order to ensure their loyalty. The 1540 annexation to the crown of the lands of the Angus earldom and the Lordship of the Isles provided him with the opportunity to do so if he wished, but his

sudden death in 1542 prevented any change in royal policy. Cameron also points out that many of the actions used by James to increase his financial resources were simply following the methods of his Stewart predecessors.

Reflecting its origin as a doctoral thesis, the book is not an easy read for those unfamiliar with the history of sixteenth-century Scotland. The wealth of detail, while showing the author's impressive grasp of the sources, can be overwhelming at times. For example, the detailed analysis of the personnel of the king's council at various periods will be extremely useful to scholars, but may be confusing for general readers. In a few places, the author assumes knowledge of events which not every reader has. The Cleanse the Causeway incident of 1520 is referred to several times, but not clearly explained. In a few places, there are references to incidents which are not clearly explained until later in the book. James's abortive first trip to France is mentioned several times in the middle of the book, but the circumstances of this trip are not described until later. It would also be useful to have a brief discussion of the period of the minority 1513-26, although the decision not to include this in light of the completion of a recent doctoral thesis on the topic is understandable.

There are a few topics which would benefit from further discussion, and perhaps help shed light on James V's personality. More could be said about James's trip to France, the only trip outside the realm during an adult Stewart's personal reign. James's lasting legacy is his ambitious palace improvements programme; more discussion of this might demonstrate his concern with the outward trappings of monarchy, briefly mentioned in the book, and discussed at more length in the work of Carol Edington and others. In the realm of government, more could be said on the actual legislation passed by Parliament, a parliament which, as Cameron points out in his appendix, met throughout the reign. Similarly, a brief discussion of the formation of the College of Justice and what this meant, if anything, for the judicial system of Scotland would be useful.

Dr. Cameron's tragically early death robbed him of the opportunity to develop and analyse these topics in the admirable

way in which he dealt with the rest of James's reign. As Norman MacDougall points out in his preface, he had plans to investigate further many topics which he could only lightly touch upon in his thesis such as the relations between church and state. It is to be hoped that the high standard of his research will inspire others to continue his work in reassessing the reign of the "the most unpleasant of all the Stewarts". In aid of this, the proceeds from the sales of this book will go to the Dr. Jamie Stuart Cameron Trust to provide funds for postgraduate research in medieval Scottish history.

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Early Modern

Scotland's Society and Economy in Transition, c 1500 - c 1760

Ian D. Whyte. Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1997. 176 pp.
£45.00 (Hardback) £14.99 (Paperback)

Ian Whyte's new book is the first Scottish volume to be published in MacMillan's Social History in Perspective series. It is a detailed and comprehensive examination of the social and economic history of Scotland in the early modern period, introducing the reader not only to the most recent research findings, but also to many of the debates which are current in the field.

Whyte has chosen to structure his book around themes rather than chronology. Indeed, there is a conscious attempt to ignore the traditional political framework, as can be seen in the very title of the book. The author eschews those great organising dates of political history, 1560, 1603, 1707, and 1745, in order to avoid breaking up the picture of economic and social change and continuity. Instead the book is organised around the important relationships which marked Scottish society, with chapters on "Lord and Laird", "Landlord and Tenant", "Kirk and Culture", "Centre and Locality", "Highland and Lowland", and "Town and Country". A final chapter on "Economic Decline and Growth" ties together the themes covered in the rest of the book. There is much to be said for this type of organisation, although readers unfamiliar with the political history of Scotland might find the discussion confusing in places.

A particular strength of the book is the author's very clear discussions of areas of debate among recent historians. Among the topics he discusses are the changing views of king-magnate relations in the late middle ages, the causes of the Scottish Revolution, the debate about the primacy of economic or political

factors leading to the Union of 1707, the causes of eighteenth-century economic growth, and the extent of urbanisation in early modern Scotland, the last being a topic to which the author himself has made significant contributions.

Particularly useful for non-Scottish readers is the way in which Whyte places his discussion of Scottish developments in the context of the wider area of British and European history. He points out, for example, that the growth in urbanisation in early modern Scotland was among the most extensive in Europe. He discusses the Scottish Revolution in the larger context of what European historians have labelled "the seventeenth-century crisis". He also points out areas in which Scotland was unique. The Convention of Royal Burghs gave the royal burghs a collective voice in national politics which was stronger than their European counterparts, while the extent to which the nobility continued to be strongly identified with their locality well into the early modern period stood in sharp contrast to contemporary England.

For potential students of the period, Whyte has performed a valuable service in identifying those areas which are crying out for further research. For example, he points out the need for more individual community studies, of the types which are being carried out in other countries for this period, and suggests the value of the Kirk Session registers and estate papers for such research. He argues that such communities are "family communities" rather than "local communities" (pp 69-70). He is also clear about some of the difficulties of research, arguing for instance that the academic study of the Highlands has been hampered by modern historians' unfamiliarity with the Celtic cultural past.

The format of the series means that the length of individual volumes is quite restricted. Inevitably this has led to some areas receiving less attention than they perhaps deserve. It would have been useful to hear more about the pre-Reformation church, so that readers could assess the extent to which the Reformation changed religious practice and belief. More could be said about women, a topic to which the author has made several important contributions elsewhere. A second problem is that the discussion

of each topic covered is necessarily densely packed with detail in order to conserve space. This may make the book less accessible for a general audience, although the final chapter does provide a more generalised overview of the period. Finally, the use of social science format for the references - author and date only - is not helpful; some indication of the relevant page numbers or sections would be useful.

Overall, the book provides a valuable overview of a neglected topic in Scottish historiography and students interested in the economic and social history of early modern Scotland will find much here of interest. If it encourages further research in the field, one of the primary goals of the author will have been met.

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THE OLD SCOTTISH POOR LAW IN SCOTLAND: THE EXPERIENCE OF POVERTY, 1574-1845

Rosalind Mitchison. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2000. ix, 246 pp. £18.95. (Paperback)

Rosalind Mitchison's fine new book offers the first full-length study of the Old Poor Law of Scotland from its legislative origins in 1574 to its demise in 1845. At heart, it is a book about Scottish values and class relations. Professor Mitchison outlined the main lines of her argument in a pioneering and somewhat controversial *Past and Present* article in 1974. Many of her conclusions – which are not calculated to reassure those inclined to extend the benefit of the doubt to men in authority – will be familiar to specialists, but here the case rests much more securely on a mountain of archival research undertaken over the past twenty-five years. The author has peered into the kirk session records of no less than three hundred of Scotland's nine hundred-odd parishes, and it is this engagement with the records of poor relief at ground level, with the real experience of poverty in every region of the country and over more than two centuries, that sets this book and its conclusions apart from previous studies based mainly on legal statutes and the published statements and writings of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century lawyers and ministers.

The book begins with a deft survey of the first century of the Scottish Poor Law. The great upheavals of the sixteenth century – population increase, climatic change, price inflation, currency debasement, the increased scale and expense of war, profound religious and political disruptions in many areas – pushed large numbers of people into destitution. There was a new sympathy for the poor in many quarters, but also a heightened fear of their numbers and violent potential. Governments across Europe

struggled to cope. The most effective response to the problem of poverty was the Old Poor Law of England, set out in the famous Act of 1572 that became the foundation of English local government. In 1574 the Scottish Parliament issued a near copy of the English Act as its own blueprint for poor relief. Scotland, however, lacked the resources and centralized system of government on which the English system depended. Professor Mitchison reminds us that little came of this initial legislative effort: Scottish landowners would not consent to local taxes for the poor called for in the Act, and the government had no means to compel them. That initial refusal by the propertied classes to support a poor rate set the tone for much that followed.

Scotland's poor relief system came to be managed differently than England's. Central government was weaker in Scotland, but the Church was stronger. By 1600 the Scottish Parliament had acknowledged that any comprehensive poor law would have to be administered by kirk sessions, the only effective units of local government in many communities. Kirk sessions were established as early as the 1560s in the major burghs, but it took until about 1640 before nearly every Lowland parish had one, and some parts of the Highlands were not so equipped until late in the next century. Once established, sessions quickly began to oversee poor relief as well as godly discipline. As in other countries, relief practices first developed in larger towns gradually filtered out to the countryside, and over time a degree of uniformity set in.

Professor Mitchison demonstrates that it was really only from the middle of the seventeenth century that the Scottish Poor Law functioned over a significant part of the country. By that point the main characteristics of the system that were to persist for two centuries were set. Potential recipients were screened to weed out those able to work, or under church censure, or from another parish: such people might receive the occasional small dole, but nothing regular. Some workhouses and hospices were built, mainly in the big cities, but these proved costly and inefficient. The "deserving" poor of distressed but otherwise worthy local people were treated instead to various forms of "outdoor" relief intended to help sustain them

at home. Some parishes offered help with child care, schooling, vocational training, medical expenses, or burial, and the occasional bible was given out, but most of those on the poor rolls received small weekly handouts of cash or oatmeal. Provision varied somewhat from place to place, but nowhere at any time would public charity provide for all of a person's needs. Poor relief was only ever meant to supplement the poor's efforts to support themselves through odd jobs or begging, or to augment the private charity of family, neighbours, and friends. The kirk's support alone would not keep an adult from starving, let alone provide for the other bare necessities of life.

Having rejected a regular poor rate, the Scots normally paid for their Poor Law with voluntary donations, mainly collections at church services, augmented by mortcloth and pew rentals, the occasional legacy, and fines paid by convicted sinners. (I would like to have heard more about this and other links between the war on sin and the war on poverty, especially since Professor Mitchison and the late Leah Leneman recently published two good books on godly discipline.) From the eighteenth century on the voluntary system came under increased strain as dissenting congregations broke away from the state Church. Long before then, however, many parishes had turned to mandatory assessment in times of crisis. One of the author's key findings stems from her examination of 229 kirk session registers surviving from the last great Lowland famine in the 1690s. She found conclusive evidence that Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and 46 other communities (20% of the sample) introduced some form of mandatory assessment during the emergency (p.36). Assessment was also introduced during other crises, but never without resistance from local heritors. One way that landowners could subvert assessment was by staying away from key meetings, and with her usual acuity the author notes that "Records of heritor's and session meetings show a sharp difference between the attendance when such prestigious topics as the allocation of seats in church were made, or decisions about repair to the fabric of the church, and about assessment" (p.39).

Professor Mitchison acknowledges that, one way or another, by the late eighteenth century the Poor Law had been made to

work well enough to keep people alive within their communities in most parts of Scotland. Rapid economic change thereafter, however, left some people much better off even as others saw their traditional livelihoods disappear. Just as the need to shift towards regular assessment would seem to have become obvious, however, the opposition to poor rates on the English model grew stronger than ever before. Indeed, the fact that occasional assessment had been an integral part of the Scottish Poor Law was rapidly forgotten, or more properly buried, by lawyers and evangelical ministers keen to promote the myth that poor relief in Scotland had always been sustained on an entirely voluntary basis. Lawyers representing landed interests knew that provisions in the Poor Law for assessment could be stricken from the books if the courts could be convinced they had never been applied, while evangelicals inspired by Malthus and caught up in the individualist ethos of the time argued that poor relief actually harmed the poor by depriving them of the necessary incentive for self-improvement. The Rev. Thomas Chalmers was the leading proponent of these latter views, and Mitchison reserves for him her most withering scorn for having "elevated the natural ungenerousness of humankind into a virtue" (p.209).

Rosalind Mitchison pulls no punches, and when she sets pious pronouncements against the evidence of past practice, the effect is devastating: some brave soul may yet wish to revive the case for a kinder, gentler Scotland, but it will not be easy. This is a fully formed book, the product of a quarter-century of copious research and mature deliberation. It bristles with stern judgements and sharp opinions backed by carefully sifted evidence that seeks to persuade without overwhelming the reader. The writing sparkles, and the book is a pleasure to read. A grim story well told, it is essential reading for anyone interested in the Scottish past.

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The Days of Duchess Anne: Life in the Household of the Duchess of Hamilton, 1656-1716

Rosalind K. Marshall. East Linton, Tuckwell Press, 2000.
256 pp. £14.99. (Paperback)

First published in 1973, this detailed study of life in the household of Anne, Duchess of Hamilton, from the Cromwellian period until a few years after the union of 1707, was hailed at the time as a fascinating reconstruction of the way of life of one of the greatest families of Scotland. The book, for some time out of print, is published now in a new edition at the suggestion of the admirable Tuckwell Press. Undoubtedly the exercise has merit. Dr Marshall's use of some twelve thousand letters and assorted household and estate accounts from the Hamilton Archives is skillful and thorough, as reviewers of the first edition pointed out (see, for example, Rosalind Mitchison, *History* 60 [1975], 125.).

The *Introduction* sets the long-lived Duchess Anne (1632-1716) firmly at the centre of the stage. Part 1, *Life Restored*, loosely covers the period of the family's recovery from the confiscations and depredations of the Commonwealth period; there are sections on servants, clothing, food, entertainment, recreation and celebrations. Part 2, *The Great Design*, describes the vision of the future in the minds of the Duchess and her husband, William, 3rd Duke of Hamilton, and the means taken for its realisation. Their aim was the establishment of the political, religious and social pre-eminence of the House of Hamilton and its continuation in future generations (p.130). Chapters are devoted to the creation of a suitable setting, the new Hamilton Palace, the education of the Duchess and Duke's numerous progeny (they had thirteen children), and the marriage of the heir, the Earl of Arran. The increasing English influence on all aspects of the life

of the family, from the education of the heir (we see that James, Earl of Arran, attends Hamilton Burgh School before continuing his studies in Glasgow, while his own son, after a few years at Hamilton School, is swiftly dispatched to Eton) to the decorative styles employed at the new Palace, is skillfully described, and not just in the chapter of that title: it is a process which forms a sub-text of the whole book.

The material setting of the Duchess's life is delineated in lively fashion; we share the Duke's impatience when he misreads "palatine" (a furred scarf) as "sallantine" in one of the Duchess's long lists of items she wishes procured by the Duke in London (p. 93); predictably, no-one had ever heard of it. We admire the spirit of the Duchess and her daughter Katherine (seven months pregnant at the time) when they can "laugh heartily" remembering the recent overturning of their coach en route to Kinneil Castle (p.109); we sympathise with the frantic efforts of the Duchess and Duke as they attempt to rein in the extravagant spending of their heir, who was 10,000 sterling in debt by 1687, and to move him in the direction of an advantageous marriage.

Yet in the end one is left with some reservations about this book, both in its original form and in this new edition. Actual textual alterations are slight. Dr Marshall has discovered an entire set of inventories of furnishings for both Hamilton Palace and Kinneil Castle; a sentence of chapter 2 has been changed to refer to this and transcripts of several of the inventories form an appendix. A useful glossary of Scottish terms has been inserted at pp.267-8. The reproduction of some of the illustrations in colour, including the splendid Kneller portrait of Duchess Anne, and the expansion of the illustrations to include, among other things, more of the Hamilton offspring, are welcome: although one wonders why the new edition's numbered list of illustrations now lacks accompanying page numbers, a particular annoyance since the illustrations are themselves unnumbered. The footnote reference to the Duke's Rubens painting of *Daniel in the Lions' Den* was accurate in the old edition but mangled in the new (p.45). It is also a pity that the endnotes do not seem to have been cleaned up; for example, note 4 to chapter 1 still gives a reference to "Burnet, op.cit…" when this is the first mention of

Burnet's *History of His Own Time*. Moreover, it is not helpful to the serious reader when all references to the Hamilton Archives which form the backbone of the book are omitted and the reader simply referred to the author's Ph.D. thesis. Other missed opportunities include the failure to provide brief notes on the difference between pounds Scots and pounds sterling and on how the transcriptions have been modernised for quotation purposes. The list of sources is unchanged, not unreasonably since, with the exception of the trifling alteration already alluded to, the text is also unchanged. This does not mean, however, that the work of the past twenty-five years goes unnoted.

This book remains an excellent example of old-fashioned social history (and is based on the type of solid primary materials which some old-fashioned social historians neglected); perhaps we should not castigate it for failing to address in any depth such matters as the secret of the remarkable financial recovery of the Hamilton family in the Restoration period or the real scope of the activities of the redoubtable Duchess Anne, who held the title in her own right until her death, resisting all suggestions for its legal assignation to her undoubtedly incompetent son. Did the Duchess work as hard at estate management and political manipulation as her contemporary, Lady Grisell Baillie? Certainly, a recent study of her daughters refers to the Duchess as an excellent role model for women's political activism.[1] And what of her activities as one of James Anderson's *Ladies of the Covenant* (beyond the connection between her Presbyterianism and her dress habits: pp.85-6)? It is clear that in various ways this new edition could and should have been better: the improvement wrought by G.W.S. Barrow in the third edition of his *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*, where a work first published in the 1960s was harmonised with the state of learning nearly twenty-five years later, might serve as an example.

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1. Karl von den Steinen, "In Search of the Antecedents of Women's Political Activism in Early 18th Century Scotland: the Daughters of Anne, Duchess of Hamilton", Eliz. Ewan & Maureen Meikle (eds.), Women in Scotland c.1100-c.1750, (Tuckwell Press, 1999), p.112

LATE MODERN

FRANCOPHILIA IN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1748-1815

Robin Eagles. London, MacMillan Press, Ltd.; New York, St. Martin's Press, LLC, 2000. x, 229 pp. $69.95 U.S. (Hardback)

Recent historiography has dealt more frequently with the role of France in the identity formation of Modern Britain. Norman Hampson, for example, focuses on the early 1790s as pivotal to French and English identity formations in *The Perfidity of Albion.* In 1789, the French idealized English institutions, but became disillusioned over equivocal English support in the Revolution. Hampson argues that this was mirrored by English disgust over the trajectory of the Revolution.[1] Eagles continues the debate on English national identities, but her *Francophilia in English Society* employs a broader scope. The work spans the period from the end of the War of Austrian Succession in 1748, occasionally dipping toward 1688, and forward toward the Bourbon Restoration in France. Chiefly, Eagles' book is a highly successful attempt to counter the dominant focus, the development of English identity, merely *in reaction* to France.

For Eagles, "No … fixed concepts [either of "Britishness" or "Englishness"] existed in the eighteenth century, and aristocratic Francophilia, and cosmopolitanism were … dominant in the years leading up to the French Revolution." National identity in reaction to France, Eagles cautions, *was* a trend of the late 1700s among the Protestant, commercial "middling sorts," as Gerald Newman also argues.[2] Yet, Eagles shows that France remained central to English society, especially for the aristocracy, and later in the century, for Newman's middling sorts also.[3]

Eagles' is a thematic approach, dealing first with satirical

caricatures, and with the role of French plots and character typologies in the rise of the English novel. Widespread adoption of French goods and fashions in the eighteenth century is evident from cartoons and satires of English politicians (Charles James Fox, for example).[4] Yet, Eagles notes that London especially "was a cosmopolitan centre [where] there was nothing terribly alien about the French," even if French cultural trappings were mocked by sources as diverse as Hogarth and Fanny Burney, or attacked as socially corrosive in periodicals like Boitard's *London Magazine*.[5] In Eagles' view, Frenchness *per se* was not on trial; merely its excesses (among aristocrats and middling groups) which fearfully foreshadowed "popery, prostitution," or Bourbon absolutism.[6]

Eagles' narrative of the love-hate relationship with things French is most insightful concerning eighteenth century cross-channel travel and expatriates. After the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Eagles uncovers a surge in cross-Channel travel and in the number of expatriate communities (emigrating in both directions). Indeed, the protracted state of war with Napoleon seems to have induced sadness and anxiety among English elites who enjoyed friendships, land, or even kinship ties with French notables.[7]

Eagles deals lastly, and most tentatively with relationships between cultural and diplomatic relations between the two realms. Eagles detects a sudden amity between English and French dignitaries from 1763-1778. This "era of good feelings," she sees as bearing the seeds of an Anglo-French entente - an argument that seems overstated.[8] Much of what she describes is the prevailing harmony between England and France over Baltic affairs in the early eighteenth century, and the widely recognized warming of Anglo-French relations coinciding with the end of serious support for Jacobitism in 1763.[9] Eagles seems to think only a handful of trifling issues were at issue. Yet, some such conflicts - colonial rivalry, for example - were inexorable and likely to short-change any long-term attempts at conciliation.[10]

Nevertheless, Eagles is right to emphasize the cultural entente of British and French elites, and to caution that the contemporary rhetoric of enmity must be contextualized by recognizing their cultural affinities. In all fairness, Eagles elsewhere

acknowledges the slim possibility for entente in the 1760s and 1770s, and her "fear of absolutism, not of France" interpretation of English opinion is insightful, and explains the initial enthusiasm for the French Revolution among English elites. "The Whigs," she writes, "feared the Bourbon menace much as they feared the absolutist tendencies of George III, but … a France purged of tyranny, would be a natural friend of England."[11]

Francophilia and English Society has much to recommend it, not least of which is its breadth of scope and versatile use of archival and print sources. Eagles also addresses well the recent historiography on British identity formation, including the works of Newman, Hampson, Linda Colley, in cultural history, and Paul Langford. Eagles, finally, argues for the further study of Francophilia and its influence on Jacobitism, Scottish empiricists, and the Radical Whigs of the English Enlightenment.[12]

Eagles does, however, have a disturbing tendency to blur analytical categories. What exactly is meant by the cultural dominance of France? What Eagles describes is not necessarily "francophilia;" many portrayals of the French she analyzes are bitingly "francophobe." "[P]opular culture, and the modes of the elite … who aped them," she writes, "were all … coloured by contact with France, and whether the resulting reaction was Francophobe or Francophile, this influence as a positive approach cannot be ignored."[13] Francophobic satire *does* mask serious concerns for the cultural rapprochement between French and English elites, but to explain it as just another aspect of "francophilia" is not enough.[14] Along with Linda Colley, Robin Eagles believes "National character in England was dependent on France."[15] Yet, Eagles shows mostly that English elites were cosmopolitans who admired enlightened sociability whether in Paris or London. Even if elites identified fully with France, in what sense is this a British national identity? Many English aristocrats and *noveaux riches* were so taken by Francophilia that they decided to reside more or less permanently in France. But is simply relocating really evidence for a switch in national identity? Asserting that "Englishness [was] understood only in terms of France," that English culture simply "aped" the French seems a bit too painlessly Hegelian.[16]

All criticisms aside, Robin Eagles has demonstrated great skill, timeliness, and acuity in this work. The one who jumps first into a large murky lake is always accused of splashing too much, and Eagles has not only jumped in, but done much to clear the waters.

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Endnotes

1. Norman Hampson, *The Perfidity of Albion* (London: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), *passim.*
2. Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830* (London, 1987), *passim.*
3. Eagles, 3-4; cf. 170.
4. Ibid., 18.
5. Ibid., 23, also 24-28.
6. Ibid., 27, 35, 28-30.
7. See above in Ibid., 95-96, 98-99, 102, 113-114, 121, 139, 150, 160-161.
8. Ibid., 68 and 72.
9. Ibid., 70, also 80.
10. Ibid., 76.
11. Ibid., 74-75.
12. Ibid., 109.
13. Ibid., 10.
14. Ibid., 13, 25.
15. Ibid., 176.
16. See e.g. Ibid., 176; also 164, and 167-170.

THE IRISH IN THE WEST OF SCOTLAND, 1797-1848: TRADE UNIONS, STRIKES AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

Martin M. Mitchell. Edinburgh, John Donald, 1998.
286 pp. £20.00 (Paperback)

Martin Mitchell's book is part of a veritable explosion in recent years of studies on the Irish abroad. While much of this scholarship examines the Irish in America, it has increasingly been supplemented by studies of the Irish in Canada, Australia, the Caribbean and beyond. The attention now given to the Irish overseas is perhaps best exemplified by the multi-volume series *The Irish World Wide* (London, 1992-97) edited by Patrick O'Sullivan. This renewed interest has also resulted in the production of new studies of the Irish in England, Wales and indeed Scotland - perhaps most notably with Elaine McFarland's volumes studying the development of the Orange Order, *Protestants First* (Edinburgh, 1990) and the impact of the United Irishmen, *Ireland and Scotland in the Age of Revolution* (1994) respectively.

In *The Irish in the West of Scotland*, Mitchell focuses on the role of the Irish in the broad development of working-class and reform politics. In doing so, he takes direct aim at prevailing stereotypes, reproduced at least since the publication of James Handley's 1947 ground-breaking examination of the Irish in Scotland. Specifically, Mitchell demolishes the notion that the Irish had little positive impact on working-class politics since they were largely employed as cheap labour and, more sinisterly, as blacklegs and strike breakers by the industrialists of the west of Scotland. While conceding that many Irish were employed in this manner, Mitchell provides an overwhelming number of examples of Irish involvement in early trade unionism and political radicalism. He demonstrates that the Irish were a

notable presence among the membership of early miner's unions in the Lanarkshire coal fields and, by the 1830s, dominated both the volatile Cotton Spinner's Union and handloom weaver's organizations. Building on the work of McFarland, W. Hamish Fraser, Chris Whatley and others, Mitchell also provides details that link Irish working men to the development of political radicalism in Scotland in the opening decades of the nineteenth century, both in the foundation of the revolutionary United Scotsmen and the movement for parliamentary reform that followed the Napoleonic War.

While Mitchell focuses on the positive Irish contribution to broad Scottish working-class politics, he also pays attention to the particular concerns of the west of Scotland's burgeoning Irish Catholic population. Indeed, a large portion of the book is devoted to examining the response to Daniel O'Connell's Catholic Emancipation and Repeal Movements. Given Mitchell's evidence, it is clear that both were enthusiastically supported by Irishmen in Scotland. His study is particularly helpful for understanding the connection between the Irish middle class agitation for Catholic Emancipation and the support for the 1831 Reform Bill. Intriguingly, Irish immigrant's endorsement of O'Connell's demand for the repeal of the 1801 union of the British and Irish parliaments resulted in tardy support for Chartism. According to Mitchell, the rivalry between O'Connell and the Chartist leader Feargus O'Connor accounts for this development, since the Irish in the west of Scotland tended to side with O'Connell. He points out that the Irish did support Complete Suffragism and eventually embraced the Six Points of the Charter, but only in 1848 when the movement began its precipitous decline.

Mitchell's evidence and analysis are compelling. After reading his study, one can have little doubt that the Irish played a pivotal role in Scotland's working-class and reform politics during the first half of the nineteenth century. Mitchell concedes, however, that this is far from the whole story and calls for more detailed study of Irish political involvement in the second half of the century. Such a study may indeed corroborate the findings of Stephen Fielding, who in *Class and Ethnicity* (Buckingham, 1993)

has argued that stereotypes similar to those found in Scotland have obscured Irish involvement in Labour politics in late nineteenth and early twentieth century England. There are, however, particular questions raised by Mitchell's study as it stands. Did, for example, the development of strident Irish Nationalism undermine the basis for cooperation across the religious divide? Mitchell points out that Glasgow's Chartists tried in vain to involve the Irish in the movement, succeeding only when it was too late. Given that Chartism was arguably the most intense popular political movement in nineteenth-century Scotland, this may well have caused deep lingering resentment. Mitchell acknowledges that in order to understand the significance of Irish political involvement during the first half of the century, we need to develop a fuller understanding of the relationships between Irish immigrants and Scottish society. This must entail a nuanced appreciation of the community itself, one that would include the role of women and children, both in the work force and as agents in agitation, as well as a more thorough understanding of the link between the growth of the Irish Catholic community and the rise of sectarianism and racism. Studies of the Irish in the United States could prove to be useful models here, particularly Haisa Diner's, *Erin's Daughters in America* (Baltimore, 1983) and Noel Ignatiev's recent study *How the Irish Became White* (New York, 1995).

Martin Mitchell has produced a valuable contribution to the study of the Irish abroad. His carefully argued and well-supported book will encourage many of us to re-examine our received ideas about the Irish in Scotland. As the author concedes, the book raises as many questions as it attempts to answer, but nonetheless it provides the reader with an appreciation of the extent to which the Irish contributed to Scottish working-class consciousness before the sectarianism that scars Scotland's industrial west became firmly entrenched.

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THE RADICAL THREAD: POLITICAL CHANGE IN SCOTLAND: PAISLEY POLITICS 1885 - 1924

Catriona M. M. Macdonald. East Lothian, Tuckwell Press, 2000, pp. vi, 320, £16.99 (Paperback)

Catriona Macdonald has taken the 'linguistic turn'. Using as her theoretical framework concepts drawn from linguistics theory together with Gramsci's concepts of 'hegemony' and 'organic change,' Macdonald traces the decline of Liberalism in Scotland and explains the "thread" that underpins and determines political change. The town of Paisley is the focal point of her study no doubt because she accepts the argument of Robert Kelly that "Paisley provides . . . a reference point in the history of Liberal thought in Britain." (JBS, iv [1964], p. 133) On the whole, Macdonald puts forth a very good effort to present fairly her historical research. Her empirical evidence is well organized, supported and documented, and the historical record is used to good advantage. The reader is left in no doubt as to Macdonald's strong abilities as an historian or the veracity of her historical research. However, in an effort to use a conceptual framework for analysis and interpretation of political change in Scotland, the author encounters one or two methodological problems.

At the outset, Macdonald assumes the reader's familiarity with linguistics theory as well as Gramscian political theory. She accordingly makes no attempt to precis the actual theories, nor does she ever discuss whose linguistic theory she will be using. Moreover, she commits the faux-pas of not defining concepts which appear to be particularly relevant to her discussions and analysis. For example, in Chapter one she frequently refers to the political culture of Paisley yet nowhere, either in the beginning of her book or as the analysis progresses, does she concep-

tually define, or say how she will use, the term. As Macdonald is attempting to use a political concept for analytical purposes, defining a concept such as political culture becomes very important inasmuch as it has many meanings. In this instance, political culture appears to be equated with ideology, but the reader is left to guess at the meaning. When Macdonald does attempt to define noteworthy concepts such as community, political community and paternalism (Chapter two), she has a propensity to define the concept very narrowly as is the case with political community (p. 36) or, in the case of paternalism, she chooses not to define the concept at all but rather lists five characteristics of it (p. 55). This lack of definition, conceptualization and precision becomes particularly important to the historical analysis when, in Chapter three, Macdonald attempts to make the connection between the fall of Liberalism, the break-down of paternalism and the decline of elite influence on the political community.

Chapter three represents a critical point in the book insofar as it marks Macdonald's first substantial effort at textual analysis. However, she uses this methodology rather parsimoniously, and there are very few instances in this chapter where this form of linguistical methodology is used to great advantage. Nevertheless, there is a consistent effort to work within the Gramscian framework and link his concept of 'hegemony' to the rhetorical language used on the political stage, although this reader is never quite clear on the actual point Macdonald is attempting to make. It is therefore disappointing that the reader must wait until the end of Chapter three to have the author interpret her empirical evidence within the theoretical framework she has indicated she will use.

The author again picks up the "thread" of linguistical analysis in Chapter four as she dissects the language used in the women's movement, the Labour movement, and 'radicalism'. However, she makes no attempt to interpret her historical analysis preferring instead to use it more as corroborative support to give credibility to her empirical evidence. Interestingly, in this chapter she takes to task two authors - Smith and McKinlay - for "... employing ill-defined terms" (p. 182). This criticism is rather surprising coming from someone who commits the same faux-pas.

In Chapter five Macdonald seems to be warming to her task of discussing the downfall of the Liberal Party and their 'pact' with the Unionists. She apparently is quite at home with the 1914-1924 period and makes some valid observations with respect to Asquith, namely: that he failed to understand that his brand of Liberalism and the language used to express the Liberal 'creed' was out of step with the times (p. 228-9). Here Macdonald makes good use of textual analysis to explain the gradual decline of Liberalism.

Despite the methodological problems, Macdonald puts forth a good effort to trace the decline of Liberalism in Paisley and Scotland and determine the reasons for this decline which includes: the collapse of 'paternalism', the disintegration of the 'hegemony' of the ruling-class, the establishment of 'class-based' politics, the internal divisions within the Liberal Party and the inability of the Liberal and Conservative Parties to respond to the social problems of the day. The arguments and evidence that Macdonald presents are cogent and convincing based on the historical record. She thus achieves her first goal - of tracing the decline of Liberalism and turns her attention to the second goal, explaining the "thread" that underpins and determines 'political change'.

Explaining the concept of 'political change' or 'change' of any kind is a challenging task as Macdonald readily acknowledges (p. 35). She 'zeros-in' on Gramsci's concept of 'change' and quotes him as saying "change . . . comes about as a form of discourse *through* rather than *across* lines of difference and . . . continuity rather than dramatic fracturing emerges as the key to explaining how change happens" (p.10). Using this notion, Macdonald has proceeded to use linguistic theory to assist her in her analysis of Liberalism, Radicalism, Unionism and the working class. Despite the well-known and recorded criticisms of the 'linguistic turn', Macdonald has made a good attempt to conjoin both linguistic theory and empiricism in her analysis. She also selects certain concepts from Gramscian theory such as 'hegemony' and 'organic movements' (of which the latter is subdivided into 'permanent' and 'conjunctural' crises) to organize her analysis of both the decline of Liberalism and political change

in Paisley. These concepts, when conjoined with linguistical and post-structural approaches, are then applied to the deconstruction of political identities such as 'Radical', 'Liberal', 'Working Class' and 'Unionist', in order to assist in explaining the "thread" that underpins and determines 'political change'. In this reader's view, given the methodological problems encountered by Macdonald, she is remarkably successful in achieving her second goal.

Despite the criticisms, the book does satisfy its mandate to trace the decline of Liberalism and it goes a long way to explaining how the "thread" that underpins and determines 'political change' developed in Paisley and in Scotland. This book however, is not directed toward undergraduate students or students without some background in political theory and semiotics. Furthermore, despite the apparent chronological organization, the book does have a slight tendency to 'ramble' and occasionally seems somewhat disjointed. It is not an 'easy read'. However, the book provides a most interesting look at the social structure of, and political changes in, both Paisley and Scotland during the 1885 to 1924 period and is worth the effort to read.

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'Look after the Bairns': a Childhood in East Lothian

Patrick McVeigh. East Lothian, Tuckwell Press in Association with the European Ethnological Research Centre, 1999. xii, 146 pp. £7.99. (Paperback)

Since its introduction over thirty years ago, the history of childhood has witnessed increasing interest by both the public and scholars alike. Despite this attraction, the study of childhood is still wrought with the same methodological problems as when it first became a topic of serious academic study. Because children are unable to accurately record their own experiences, we rely on adult-centred sources, oral histories and memoirs. In order to validate these sources, there have been several initiatives taken on by scholars in order to scrutinize and contextualize these stories. One example of this attempt is seen in the European Ethnological Research Centre (based out of the National Museums of Scotland), which has published a series of memoirs and local histories entitled *Flashbacks*. The eighth book of that series is Patrick McVeigh's *Look after the Bairns* which chronicles the childhood of the author in East Lothian during the inter-war period. Much like the popular memoirs that have been published recently, *Angela's Ashes* being the most conspicuous example, McVeigh's recollection of his childhood is not necessarily chronological but is more thematic and anecdotal and reads like a narrative rather than a thesis-driven monograph. As with any source akin to personal memory, oral history and the like, this should be very cautiously approached as a sourcebook for any scholar of the Scottish family in the early part of the twentieth century. While the material of the book is generous, it is supported by neither historical context nor a rigorous methodology. McVeigh's discussion of Scottish national identity through experiences of education and language during the inter-war period is a prime example of this (see chapters 6-8).

Furthermore, McVeigh provides insight into the experience of childhood as well as attempting to determine how adults regarded children; yet, precaution is sill needed because of his contemporary views on a historically problematic subject. Despite its underlying value in the areas of cultural and material history, the book's overall value to students of the family and of childhood is limited by its presentation by the European Ethnological Research Centre and Tuckwell Press who failed to properly introduce the book in its historiographical context.

The book is divided into twenty-six chapters, all exclusive to one childhood experience or memory. These range from solemn remembrances of the death of his father, to more fanciful tales of holidays, schooling and extracurricular activities. Yet, on several occasions McVeigh makes value judgments that do not warrant historical study, but instead place blame for wrongdoings. For example, in the chapter where McVeigh recounts his affliction with Scarlet fever, he is accusatory in his judgment of the nurses who took care of him; "I can remember little kindness in that hospital; we were never treated as worthwhile human beings, far less with the tolerance and patience that children deserve" (121). This statement is methodologically problematic as McVeigh is using late twentieth-century child welfare standards to judge his own treatment as a child in an early twentieth century context. This is clearly a reflection of how personal memory, mixed with contemporary views of childhood can obfuscate reasoning behind why things happened the way they did. This anecdote could have revealed much about the way in which children were regarded during this time period had there been some context provided to the reader, for example, the state of health care in Scotland's rural areas during that time or of the state of children's living standards during that time. McVeigh's discussion of his experience in the public school system (30-46) is most interesting because it reveals how a sense of British versus Scottish identity was constantly in conflict, particularly in the areas of education and language. As well, aspects of class division between rural and urban children is discussed through the use of cultural anecdotes. These two observations come together in the chapter entitled, "Learning English" where McVeigh states:

> The determining difference - between the farm children and the village children was that the farm children arrived at school and immediately they were expected to learn in a language, the English language, which was completely and utterly foreign to them. The village children of course spoke Scots, or at least they did so outside the school and for the most part in the home as well. Those whose parents aspired to better things were discouraged from speaking Scots in the home and were forced to speak what their parents imagined to be English.... For the farm children there was no other language but Scots; they spoke Scots in the home and it was the first and, until they went to school, usually the only language they had ever heard. It is important to remember that these Scots speakers didn't just use different words from the English, but they spoke and thought in an entirely different idiom" (33).

Yet, this class difference, influenced by many factors including language, was overridden by a more general trend of linguistic othering by the 'Victorian' English. "The aim of our schooling was to turn us into Anglicized Scots. We would of course never be real English; that was accepted and understood ... we could finish up like our schoolteachers, conscious of having achieved a good third-rate education and without any sense of identity and national pride" (34-35). Again, this is a valuable insight into the experience of "Scottishness" in the early twentieth century, but should be cautiously approached because of the heavy influence of personal memory and vehement scholarly and contemporary views on this subject (such as those of Christopher Harvie, *No Gods and Few Precious Heroes*, 1981). Additionally, McVeigh reveals the contentious issue of identity through cultural and material examples. These are found in the recollections of songs and poems which reveal attempts at Anglicization of the Scots by the English. This includes the 'patriotic' song entitled "Pin your Faith in the Motherland" where the 'motherland' is the British Empire (42) and "The Yeoman of England", sung by McVeigh's

family. He remembers that "we knew nothing of Scottish poetry or the Scottish literary tradition" (90). Regardless, Scots cultural practices seemed an important feature of a Scots identity which was maintained by an entire community as "festivals, such as they were, remained Scottish, although with our increasing Anglicization things were slowly changing" (86). The main problem with this book is not with the material, but rather with the way in which it is presented to the academic audience. The forward is interesting, but it tells us nothing of how the book fits into the current historiography in Scotland or, more importantly, into the social historiography that fosters the study of the family and childhood more generally. *Flashbacks* is a series of books that detail the memories of those previously neglected in history: women, labourers, families and children. Some are introduced by historians in the field of social history who take the time to integrate the work into a larger body of scholarship and methodology (such as Ian MacDougall (ed.), *Hoggie's Angels: Tattie Howkers Remember*, 1995). Series editor Alexander Fenton, now working at the National Museum of Scotland, very rarely makes his presence known in the introductions of these works and does not readily explain or justify the series or the European Ethnological Research Centre that supports it. This leads one to the publisher of the series to explain the nature of the series. Tuckwell Press advocates in its catalogue that it "publishes mainly at an academic level but not exclusively so . . ." (Autumn, 1999) yet the series itself is not discussed in the catalogue and so the reader is left wondering what the intentions of the works are besides the fact that it is found under the heading of Ethnology and Folklore.

The anecdotes and memories that make up *Look after the Bairns* are interesting and can be a valuable tool for historians of the Scottish family if it is approached with caution and the realisation that contemporary views on historically divisive issues and subjects such as children and their welfare can influence such histories. A more systematic framework would have made this a more user-friendly resource for an academic audience.

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How Scotland Votes: Scottish Parties and Elections

Lynn Bennie, Jack Brand and James Mitchell. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997, xi, 174 pp. £12.99 (Paperback)

Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707 to the Present

Christopher Harvie.
New York, Routledge, 1998 [1977], xii, 292pp.
$128. (U.S.) (Cloth) Paper. $37.99. (U.S.) (Paper)

Thursday, September 11, 1997 and Wednesday, May 5, 1999, stand out as political watersheds in the evolution of Scotland. On the first date, 74.3 percent of Scots (with a 60.1 percent voter turnout) indicated their preference for establishing a Scottish Parliament with the ability to increase or lower income taxes by up to three percent of the rate determined by Westminster, while May 5, 1999 signifies the date when the long struggle for devolution became a reality. For the first time since the Union of 1707, the Scottish people had representation in Edinburgh in the newly elected Scottish Parliament. As remarkable as these events were, however, they were not entirely unexpected for keen observers of British politics: since the early 1970s, public opinion polls consistently revealed that a vast majority of Scots supported either devolution or outright independence, be it within the United Kingdom or as an autonomous member state within the European Union. The realisation of the Scottish Parliament, therefore, was the culmination of a longstanding political struggle for some form of home rule.

Nonetheless, both of the aforementioned dates are landmark events that have contributed to a profound transformation in the Scottish political landscape and society more generally. Unfortunately, neither *How Scotland Votes* nor *Scotland and Nationalism*, provides much insight regarding these critical events. The first book was published prior to the 1997 referendum, and although Harvie does address the milestone in this updated version of his classic work on Scottish nationalism, his remarks are far too brief and therefore his analysis is wanting.

As Bennie et al and Harvie both detail with such clarity and insight, the Scots have a rich cultural heritage and their own distinct political, economic and religious institutions, all of which have collectively nurtured a separate Scottish national identity. The latter book in particular, "…concerned with political nationalism, why it remained apparently in abeyance for two and a half centuries, and why it became relevant in the second half of the twentieth century" (p.2), is replete with references to the cultural foundations of the nationalist movement. For Harvie, much can be explained by the fact that post-Union Scotland "was gripped in a complex cultural dialectic" (p.36). As he notes, the Scottish political intelligentsia was in no way a unified body; the group was divided between those who were avowedly Scottish and those who looked to the British Empire for power, patronage and, ultimately, progress. While the many detailed (but, at times, pretentious) cultural references make *Scotland and Nationalism* a fascinating read, they similarly elevate the book beyond the full comprehension of those who do not have much background in or knowledge of Scottish society, history and politics. This is the case despite the fact that the book deliberately replaced academic footnotes with a bibliographical essay as a means of ostensibly "appealing to the elusive 'general reader'" (p.xi).

Notwithstanding this limitation, it should be recognised that it is Harvie's treatment of the cultural component of the Scottish nationalist movement that truly sets this book apart from other works in this field of study. Unlike Quebecers, who have been and continue to feel compelled to accentuate their distinctiveness from the rest of Canada, Scots are secure in the knowledge that they are culturally different from the English. Time and energy

has not been needlessly spent debating this point. Consequently, since its inception, the modern nationalist movement in Scotland has been able to focus almost exclusively on articulating an economic rationale for independence. Academic studies devoted to this subject matter have therefore focused narrowly on the economic aspects that account for the rise of Scottish nationalism. For the most part, scholarly treatments of the independence movement in Scotland have not adequately addressed its critically important cultural precursors.

Scotland and Nationalism is a notable exception. Beginning with the Union of the Crowns in 1707, this book, a literary *tour de force*, meticulously chronicles the evolution of the nationalist movement in Scotland paying particular attention to the influence of the intelligentsia and cultural nationalists in the early part of the twentieth century – people like Lewis Grassic Gibson, Compton Mackenzie and Hugh Macdiarmid – leading up to the creation of the Scottish National Party in 1934. Harvie then proceeds to document the trials and tribulations of the SNP from the immediate post-war period, when the party was no more than a "resilient little sect, rather than a political movement" (p.169), to the "Scottish settlement" of 1997 at which point it had effectively matured into "the only opposition in town" (p.248).

Bennie et al offer quite a different book. Based on data derived from the 1992 Scottish Election Study and supplemented with earlier Scottish and British election surveys, *How Scotland Votes* offers the reader an account of Scotland's political distinctiveness in typical academic fashion. The introductory chapter broadly covers Scottish politics since 1945, and makes the argument that class and materialist politics have been dominant, as has been the case in other parts of Europe. Part I of the book proceeds to set out the context for understanding modern Scotland by examining British Parliament, Scottish administration and local government. Each of the remaining chapters in the first part of *How Scotland Votes* is devoted to one of the four main political parties that have been vying for the loyalty of the Scottish voter: the Scottish Labour Party, Scottish Conservative Party, Scottish National Party and the Scottish Liberal Democrats. These pithy chapters provide an excellent overview of the

history of the parties, their organisation and structure, electoral performance as well as policies and ideology.

Part II of the book focuses on Scottish voting behaviour. Chapters six and seven examine the issues of class and religion in Scottish politics. After presenting their data, the authors draw the conclusion that "class is still an extremely relevant feature of voting in Scotland" (p.107) and, "as elsewhere in western Europe, religion is less significant politically than it once was" (p.119). Subsequent chapters deal with the Scots as economically rational voters, national identity and the image of political parties and leaders on voting behaviour. The book concludes with a brief discussion of the salience of home rule as a political issue in Scotland.

Bennie et al begin the final chapter by arguing, "home rule has, in a way, become the key to understanding Scottish politics" (p.152). This reviewer could not agree more. Home rule has been an integral part of Scottish political debates since the nineteenth century, and finally became a step closer to reality with the election of Tony Blair's Labour government in 1997. Labour campaigned in that election on the promise that devolution would lead to the decline, if not outright demise, of the Scottish nationalist movement, while the unionists countered that it would be the slippery slope to full independence. While it may be somewhat premature to comment on the accuracy of either prognostication, this latest development begs further scrutiny. Scots are now much closer to being "masters of their own destiny," but in time the seductive lure of Europe may prevail. One thing is certain: the Scottish National Party will continue to espouse the virtues of that option.

Bennie et al have written a book befitting the neophyte student of Scottish politics. Whether the appeal of the subject matter is academic or general interest, *How Scotland Votes* is highly recommended; at 160 pages, it is a short, easy read that highlights the key social, economic and political features that make Scotland unique. More sophisticated readers will undoubtedly find *Scotland and Nationalism* a challenge well worth the effort.

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The Origins of Scottish Nationhood

Neil Davidson. London, Pluto Press, 2000, vii, 264 pp.
£14.99 (Paperback)

Scotland: The Challenge of Devolution

edited by Alex Wright. London, Ashgate, 2000
xiii, 268 pp. $74.95 (U.S.) (Hardback)

The 1999 re-convening of the Scottish Parliament, after 292 years, forms the explicit focus of *Scotland: The Challenge of Devolution*, a collection of brief but informative essays exploring the new institutional contexts and possibilities of Scottish politics. Drawn from a 1999 conference which took place just months after the Parliament re-convened, some contributions in this collection already seem somewhat dated, all the more given recent indications of growing public disillusionment and re-assessment of the hopes many invested in the heady events of 1999. Some of the essays describe the new framework for administration; others underscore the continuing anomalies within the government of the United Kingdom, the "West Lothian question" now having become an "English" and wider "British question". The thematic structure of the collection provides very useful internal coherence, and two sections in particular, "Part IV: Inter-Governmental Relations: Ireland - E.U. - Global' and "Part VI: Devolution, Economic, and the U.K. Territorial Project" explore causes and consequences of the re-configuration of the U.K.'s political map on internal political dynamics, relations with Ireland, and between constituent parts

of the United Kingdom, Europe and the wider world. The issues raised in these sections may assume greater salience in the months and years ahead. Parts of *Scotland: The Challenge of Devolution* may already form part of the historiography of Scotland *circa* 1999, given much that has since changed, but this collection nonetheless serves as a very useful, coherent and reasonably comprehensive survey of Scottish politics at the dawn of a new era.

The same events foreground Neil Davidson's problematique of Scottish national consciousness, which begins by interrogating why the apparent rise of national consciousness has not seen a concurrent rise in support for "capital-N" nationalism in Scotland. Davidson's analysis takes aim at the approaches of historians such as Richard Findlay, who has located national consciousness in a longer continuum, and Graeme Morton, who has argued that the Scottish nation existed, and was even nurtured, outwith state structures. Indeed, Davison argues that the development of a specifically Scottish national consciouness took place in the mid- to late-eighteenth century, as a companion to capitalist development and reformist, rather than revolutionary, class consciousness. This analysis posits three discrete phases of national development, and then relates this theory to the Scottish experience.

The first phase involves "psychological formation" (1450-1688), during which a feudal society adapts to emergent capitalism, standardised idioms become part of requisite communication links, and an absolutist state develops in response to power shifts within the social structure; the "geographical extension" (1688-1789) involves the establishment of the nation-state in its approximate modern form; and "social diffusion" (1789-1848), involving the legitimating of national consciouness throughout the social structure. In the Scottish case, Davison borrows, and then refines (or reduces) the thesis advanced by Linda Colley in exploring the evolution of a hybrid Scottish-British identity in the post-Union period. Flatly rejecting the importance which Colley ascribes to Protestantism, conflict with France, and the monarchy, Davidson sees Scottish participation in the Empire as definitive and formative in the development

of this hybrid consciousness. He is not only critical of many theorists of nationhood and ethnicity (both Modernist and Primordialist), but also of many of the touch-stones of Scottish nationhood beloved of the diaspora and nurtured by historiography: Davidson tears away at such shibboleths as the Declaration of Arbroath, whose historic importance as an expression of Scottish polito-cultural coherence he flatly rejects. In seeking to present pre- and immediate post-Union Scotland's national consciousness as incoherent, Davidson argues that two communities - Highland and Lowland - operated within Scottish territory, and that the progressive weakening of Highland society - and the ultimate appropriation of its symbols by a Lowland core - point to weaknesses in approaches which suggest all of Scotland formed a "periphery" to an English core and which reduce and conflate the complexities of the Highland-Lowland dynamic to an "English-Scottish" conflict. This is a welcome contribution to historiography, although in its dissection of "Tartanry" and "Balmorality", it treads familiar, if still persuasive, ground. Davidson's caveat is that this was not so much Nairn's "deformed" nationalism, as much as the very substance of Scottish national consciousness which necessarily emerged under the specific political and capitalist development of union, and which was progressively diffused through the population.

Davidson's account is an explicitly materialist (and more specifically Marxist) approach to the questions of class and nation; as such, it will no doubt attract much of the same criticism levelled at analyses which apparently reduce cognitive functions to products of specifically economic structural changes. Its originality lies in its theoretical position, not in its source base, which largely comprises secondary material; like other largely schematic efforts, this analysis of Scottish national consciousness is painted on a very large canvass. It can be faulted for its cursory treatment of many themes, and its ambitious time-span of analysis, taking in Robert the Bruce, Union and, more briefly, twentieth-century developments. Indeed, given the theoretical schema for this analysis, Davidson's obvious focus is on the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century, which he sees as critical in the birth of Scottish national consciousness. *The Origins of Scottish*

Nationhood should excite scholarly debate among historians, and students of politics and sociology. It offers a provocative periodisation and a valuable perspective on key themes in Scottish (and British) national development.

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MISCELLANEOUS

SCREENING SCOTLAND

Duncan Petrie. London, distributed for the
British Film Institute in North America by
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2000. 240 pp.
Illustrations. $59.95 U.S. (Cloth) $ 24.95 U.S. (Paper)

In recent years Scottish films have emerged as a fresh and vivid voice on the world stage. Cult hits like Danny Boyle's *Shallow Grave* (1995), Gillies McKinnon's *Small Faces* (1996), and Ken Loach's *My Name is Joe* (1998), to name but a few, have helped to define Scottish cinema production in the 1990s as something notably different from an earlier era in Scotland and Britain in general. These films have also traveled outside the country receiving international release, albeit limited, and critical acclaim. Boyle's *Trainspotting* (1996) in particular pushed Scottish cinema to the forefront becoming a popular and critical success on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, larger Hollywood productions like the Oscar winning *Braveheart* (1995) and Danish director Lars von Trier's *Breaking the Waves* (1996), a European art film set in the Western Highlands, have helped foster Scotland's reputation as a nation where quality films are being created.

Screening Scotland is a response to this recent insurgence of Scottish cinema as Petrie attempts to explain the phenomenon and chart its growth. His analysis is divided in two parts: Scottish film production as an extension of a London based cinema and Scottish film production as depicted and financed by Scotland. The division does not correspond with a date per se, but with the decline of productions associated with Tartanry, Kailyardism, and Clydesidism and the rise of documentaries, television, and art cinema. These new formats of expression sought to address

the historical and contemporary reality of Scotland and not the myths of reality associated with three aforementioned cultural traditions. Moreover, the division within the book is associated with the decline of British film production centralized in London, a consequence that compelled artistic emigration south, and the emergence of Scotland as both the producer and consumer of cinema. Petrie does not make the mistake of reducing earlier cinema to myth making, kitsch, or inauthentic representations of Scotland. As he demonstrates, Tartanry, Kailyardism, and Clydesidism have their place and continue to live on as Scottish cinema is still engaged with their dominant themes: resurrecting the historical, reworking the idea of peripheral, and reengaging the urban experience. To believe that an authentic representation of Scottish reality can be created is a fallacy as a myriad of 'Scotlands' exist in a pluralistic society; old myths can only be rejected when new ones take their place.

Other leading cultural commentators, Angus Calder for example, argue that this recent renaissance in Scottish cinema and Scottish culture in general has been the product of the political developments of the last twenty odd years: the failed devolution referendum of 1979, the Thatcher administration, and the rise of a 'Middle England' sentiment south of the Tweed. Such developments have served to alienate Scotland and weaken a conception of Britain as a nation. In response, so the argument goes, Scottish cinema has been infused with a dosage of national spirit stirring film makers to a high level of productivity. The underlying assumption of the argument being that artistic work spawned from cultural nationalism is inherently of good quality. Petrie, however, downplays such a thesis and examines the broader historical framework citing the financial backing that has gone into the film industry. The "Scottish Film Production Fund/Scottish Screen," the "Glasgow Film Fund," and the "Scottish Arts Council National Lottery Fund," as well as numerous schemes to support shorter films have provided new opportunities and helped raise the number of productions throughout the nineties. Petrie's evidence demonstrates that the establishment of a supportive infrastructure explains both the volume and quality of recent Scottish films. The influx

of money going towards film production further attests to a recognition of the importance of film production to a nation. Funding has been provided for films that have nothing to do with Scotland, such as Terrence Davies' *The House of Mirth* (2000) which used Glasgow to represent Edith Wharton's turn of the century America, however, most of the funded films attempt to engage the reality of contemporary Scotland indicating that while economics is a consideration in the dolling out of funds, culture is of primary concern. Such a selection process by these organizations demonstrates a belief that a nation's health is tied to its artistic creations.

Screening Scotland, while an entertaining and illuminating book, never provides a satisfactory discussion of the relationship between cinema and nation. Can we speak of a new national cinema in Scotland or even national cinema in general? Is location, setting, or the nationality of the director sufficient to label a film 'Scottish' or is it required to capture a nation's history? French filmmaker Jean-Luc Goddard maintained that there have been only a handful of nations (Italy, Germany, America, and Russia) who can speak of possessing a national cinema, though his comments were made in 1991 prior to recent developments in Scotland. Goddard argued that it was only by necessity, by feeling a need to construct images of themselves, that nations created national cinemas. Such a definition has dubious merit. It is absurd to think that nations exist that do not have a compulsion to construct images of themselves through motion pictures. Scotland, a nation stricken by its need to express itself as autonomous but also limited in its sovereignty through its connection with Britain, would seem to be a nation where cinematic representations of the nation would have a great appeal. Petrie does not wholly disagree with Goddard's statement. While he dismisses Goddard's explanation as "characteristically provocative," Petrie does agree with Goddard's contention that national cinemas are few and far between. Of Scotland, Petrie concludes that a national cinema has not yet arrived. What has emerged in recent years, according to him, is a distinct component of a devolved British cinema, rather than a new Scottish cinema as an independent entity. Whether this

means that a national cinema comparable with Italy or Germany will eventually emerge and what steps are necessary for this to occur, are, sadly, questions the author does not address.

Nevertheless, Petrie has produced a solid work here, as is evident by the Saltire society recently short-listing him for a non-fiction award (which he did not win). His analysis has not only drawn upon the history of Scottish cinema, but also historical work done on Scottish national identity indicating the value of this contribution to Scottish studies as a whole.

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THE MODERN SCOTTISH NOVEL: NARRATIVE AND THE NATIONAL IMAGINATION

Cairns Craig. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999
256 pp. £14.95 (Paperback)

Cairns Craig's *Modern Scottish Novel* is the first work in over twenty years to thoroughly contextualize and theorize the twentieth-century Scottish novel.[1] With great clarity of style, Craig provides an overview of past critical approaches to the modern Scottish novel and thoroughly discusses the relevance of theories of nationalism to Scottish culture, making his book a useful introduction to the modern and post-modern Scottish novel. At the same time, the compendium of original critical approaches that Craig explores opens up new avenues of exploration for the experienced literary specialist.

The work has two broad objectives. First, Craig identifies and analyzes traits both specific to the form and content of the Scottish novel, and to the defining elements of Scottish culture in general, and traces their transmutation throughout the century. Five key interrelated traits are identified, and Craig devotes a chapter to each, placing a range of novels within the broader context of Scottish intellectual thought. In addition to discussing the penetrating influence of Scottish Calvinism, he engages with fiction through the theories of Scottish intellectuals from various disciplines, including the anthropological research of J.G. Frazer, R.D. Laing's model of the psyche, and John Macmurray's philosophical concepts of identity. Second, Craig reclaims the post-Scott nation, and the novel through which it is negotiated, from the pessimism promulgated by authors and critics from Edwin Muir and Hugh MacDiarmid to Allan Massie and Christopher Harvie. The novel, Craig suggests, creates an intellectual space in which national stereotypes and simplistic binaries can be challenged and replaced by complex dialogue on ideas of community and culture.

The first of the five tendencies that Craig finds in the novel is a penchant for grappling with characters that are either fearless or fearful; a legacy he associates with Calvinism and the impulse to submit to or defy a repressive figure of authority. Novelists of the 1920s and 1930s, he argues, wrote their way out of this binary in part by displacing the omnipotent narrator or author, although the binary reappears in later works such as *Trainspotting* in which it appears in the relationship between Begbie and Renton. Second, he traces a developing resistance in Scottish writing to language hierarchies that relegate Scottish dialect to an inferior position in the text, subordinated to the cultured English language of the narrator. This resistance frequently manifests in what Craig, using the terminology of Macmurray, refers to as heterocentricity, a concept that the self only comes into being in its dynamic relation with the Other, with community. Such interrelatedness is evident in a number of novels in which English and dialect become intertwined in both the speech of characters and the narrator. Third, Craig considers the relationship between history and myth in the Scottish novel. Scotland has frequently been represented as a space outside history, a void either filled by manufactured romance or a drab, eventless world of repetitive industrialism. Craig examines the way in which the modern novel attempts to resolve this by negotiating its way between a desire to participate in history proper and a drive to explore and revise the mythic world beyond history. Fourth, he discusses the use of typographical techniques by post-modern novelists to escape cultural/textual domination. Finally, Craig reveals the tension in many Scottish works between the author's recognition of the power of the imagination and the Calvinist suspicion of the imagination that often saturates the Scottish psyche.

The *Modern Scottish Novel* is an impressive work that substantially broadens and enriches current discussions about the nature of Scottish identity by weaving together unlikely comparisons in original and exciting ways. Who would have thought Willa Muir and Irvine Welsh would have so much in common? Despite Craig's decision to work with a relatively small number of Scottish authors to ensure the accessibility of the works he analyzes, he places emphasis on several writers who are frequently

marginalized in studies of Scottish literature. The reintegration of such neglected authors helps to counter Edwin Muir's contention that "the Scottish past…[is] constituted by a few isolated writers with a 'rude buttress of ballads and folk songs to shore them up and keep them from falling'" (p.16). Nan Shepherd, for example, whose work has only been revived in the past decade, becomes a vital part of the discussions of both dialect and the imagination. Similarly, Craig demonstrates that the concerns of J.M. Barrie, often reviled for his part in the sentimental Kailyard novels, were shared and explored by the Scottish novelists that followed him. His limited selection of novels does occasionally cause the reader to regret the absence of works that would be greatly illuminated by his arguments. The unique mythic novels of Fiona Macleod (the pseudonym of William Sharp) would have been a welcome addition to his chapter on history and myth, for example.

In this rich, complex analysis of the twentieth-century Scottish novel and its context, Craig explicitly rejects a detailed comparison to the English novel or to fiction coming from the other 'peripheral' nations - Ireland and Wales. This seems to be a justifiable response to the way in which Scottish literature has generally been overshadowed by the English canon. At the same time, it is rather problematic to discuss tendencies in the Scottish novel without distinguishing them from the traits of novels written elsewhere in Britain. Concepts of history and myth in Julian Barnes's *England, England,* for example, might have been effectively contrasted with the similar concepts in the work of Alasdair Gray or Robin Jenkins. Craig does provide brief moments of intersection with English or Irish modernist and post-modernist texts - glimpses of T.S. Eliot and James Joyce - and his discussion of the relationship between dialect and classical English also gestures towards British dialogue. On the other hand, by defining traits specific to the Scottish novel, Craig provides a solid foundation for future cross-border research, research shaped by Scottish fiction rather than defined by the English centre.

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1. Francis Russell Hart's *The Scottish Novel from Smollett to Spark* (Harvard University Press, 1978) was the last work to tackle the subject so extensively; Hart's work, however, covers a broader period than Craig's.

THE NORTHERN ISLES: ORKNEY AND SHETLAND

Alexander Fenton. 1978; reprinted East Linton, Tuckwell Press, 1997, pp. i-x, 1-721; references, bibliography, index and glossary; (Paperback) £20.00 (approx. $50.00 CDN.).

Tuckwell's offering is essentially a photo reprint of Fenton's original 1978 study. Given this, it might be difficult to justify reprinting such a book. Yet according to the author, there is plenty good reason for reissuing *The Northern Isles*: 'This book has been long out of print. Nevertheless it appears to have become something of a classic, and there is a continued demand for it' (p. vi). Certainly many would concur, as *The Northern Isles* was the recipient of Sweden's Däg Strömbäck Award.

Other reasons lend support to Tuckwell's decision to reprint Fenton's book, not the least being that the comparatively stark, denuded Northern Isles have often been overshadowed in print by Scotland's more 'glamorous' locales. Thus books on the Highlands, Western Isles, and Lowland burghs and towns like Glasgow, Stirling, and Edinburgh may abound, but the same cannot be said for the Northern Isles. Perhaps adding to the prejudice is the fact that Orkney and Shetland are only part of Scotland by default. A decision to formally annex the two island chains came in 1472, after Christian I of Denmark and Norway pledged them temporarily in lieu of dowry payment for his daughter, who was betrothed to James III. Because Christian never secured the needed funds, the Northern Isles ever since have remained part of Scotland. Theoretically, however, 'the deal is still good', and according to Fenton (p.1) the islands' return to the Scandinavian fold is occasionally mooted. (But would Orkney and Shetland be returned to Denmark, or to Norway?)

Being peripheral regions, Orkney and Shetland, as the subjects of critical writing, were perhaps a little too easily overlooked.

This has been somewhat mitigated by the current fascination with the alluring Picts and Vikings. As a spin-off of this preoccupation, the Northern Isles' prehistoric and Norse ages have received ample attention, producing useful modern studies like those by Anna Ritchie, Colin Renfrew, Barbara Crawford, Chris Morris and Colleen Batey. Yet up-to-date writing going beyond the Viking period is rarer – William Thomson's *History of Orkney* being one of the few. Within this category of far-reaching study, is also where Fenton's tome might be found.

Unlike Thomson's book, with its mainly chronological approach, *The Northern Isles* adopts primarily a thematic stance. The two studies differ on another level, as Fenton's book is essentially a people's history. In undertaking such an endeavour, the author adopts a wholly appropriate anthropological slant. When coupled with the extensive sources at his disposal, Fenton's approach produces a full picture of life in the Isles from earliest times to the modern era. Scant are the usual topics discussed by historians, when considering these isles' history. This volume is not the source to consult when seeking new insight into the Sinclair earls, the Hudson's Bay Company, or Scapa Flow as berth to the Royal Navy's Home Fleet. Similarly, readers curious about such elusive, and highly speculative, topics as the nature of Pictish life in these northern archipelagos, might not find full satisfaction. In fact, the Picts themselves warrant relatively slight attention in *The Northern Isles*, which is actually a bit of a relief, as studies devoted to them are not exactly rare these days.

Fenton prefers to deal with the readily discernible, and only rarely entertains speculation, such as when he suggests a peaceful co-existence between native Pict and incoming Viking (p. 12). Still, ancient settlement does receive full consideration when certain issues are discussed. When contemplating the Isles' grain and livestock types over the ages, Fenton relates that at Skara Brae, barley was grown (p. 332), while 'rams and ewes of a breed not unlike the Soay sheep' were also present (p. 446).

Obviously, the main thrust of *The Northern Isles* is settlement and subsistence over a protracted period. Detailed discussion of major political events associated with the Northern Isles' history

is secondary, the author concentrating instead on that which many others would pass over. This latter is indeed the book's greatest strength. Thus *The Northern Isles* contains entire sections devoted to 'Farm and Township: Pattern of Settlement', 'Homes and Working Places', ' Fuel for the Fire', 'Back Transport, Harness and Straw Working', 'Baskets and Rope', 'The Land and its Produce', 'Draught Animals and Transport', 'Cereal Crops', 'Root Crops and Gardening',' Cattle and Milk Products', 'Sheep and Textiles', 'Pigs, Rabbits and Geese', and 'The Shore and the Sea'. For those interested, *The Northern Isles* explains the finer points of cow-dung as fuel(!) – a necessity in Sanday and North Ronaldsay, owing to peat and wood shortages (p. 206).

The Northern Isles is filled with the type of anecdotal evidence that brings to life the people of bygone Orkney and Shetland. For example in chapter 64, 'Fishing Boats from Norway', Fenton points out that owing to a scarcity of native wood, the Northern Isles long depended upon Norway not only for timber, but also such finished items as boats. Orkney was a little less dependent, since the handful of native trees there constituted a veritable forest, compared to Shetland. But this did not stop a rudimentary early modern boat building trade in Shetland, as unassembled vessels from Norway were finished locally. Orcadians were building boats as well, and on this subject, Fenton introduces a gem by relating the story of Patrick Fea of Sanday. According to his diary, partially reproduced in *The Northern Isles*, on 2 June 1770, Fea 'Went to Savill and got wood for a Keel, Stern and Stem to my Boat'; while on 31 July 'Att the Smidie and got the last of my Ironwork made for my boat' (p. 557). Truly, this is a remarkable window into a little studied aspect of northern culture, captured by Fenton.

Assessing change versus continuity over the ages is another strength of *The Northern Isles*. This is evident in the author's discussion of the frequency of the longhouse, a specialised building combining dwellings for both human, and herd animal. Hence, certain Pictish homes at Buckquoy appear to incorporate a barn. But curiously, at Jarlshof, the earliest Norse dwellings did not adjoin a byre. Combined dwellings there only begin to appear in the eleventh century (p.113). Interesting as this is,

Fenton broadens the discussion by introducing comparative material from other parts of the Norse North Atlantic community, including the Faeroes, Iceland, Greenland, and even L'Anse aux Meadows. He further speculates that longhouse development in the Northern Isles was furthered as much through Scottish influence, as through Norwegian. The longhouse disappears from the historical record shortly after the Norse period, largely because it became such a regular feature of the countryside (p.114). It reappears early in the nineteenth century, thanks to Rev. J. Hall, his Shetland travel accounts described in *The Northern Isles.*

Fenton's book is filled with many similar offerings gleaned from everyday northern life, certain to provide fascination for both student, scholar, and general reader alike. Much of his knowledge concerning Orkney and Shetland is purportedly the result of personal communications with the people themselves. This is augmented by what must be virtually every period account, document, and recent study applicable to the topic. Hence, *The Northern Isles'* bibliography is as extensive as it could be, and of great value to all those interested in furthering Fenton's work. Also included are many of the raw statistics scholars especially find useful, such as both human and domestic animal populations. Fenton certainly was justified in underscoring his book's 'classic' status. Written with economy and precision, *The Northern Isles* is highly accessible and unencumbered with excessive levels of jargon, though by necessity, interspersed is some Old Norse and Norn. (The latter being the native Norse-based languages of the Northern Isles.) Therefore, this book can be recommended to all those desiring insight into the lives of ordinary people, native to the extraordinary lands of Orkney and Shetland.

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THE SCOTS AND THEIR OATS

G. W. Lockhart. Edinburgh, Birlinn Limited, 1997
128 pp. £6.99 (Paperback)

THE SCOTS AND THEIR FISH

G. W. Lockhart. Edinburgh & Chester Springs, PA,
Dufour Editions, 1998. 128 pp. £5.99 (Paperback)

Nutritionists regard the modern Scottish diet with a mixture of fascination and horror. High on *galshach* (rubbish food), which has recently found a new incarnation in the form of the deep-fried Mars Bar, and low on fruit and vegetables, it has produced the highest mortality rate from coronary heart disease in the world. Scots are more likely to die before the age of sixty-nine than the citizens of any other Western nation. However, it was not always thus, as these two excellent little books by Wallace Lockhart serve to remind us.

The first is a revised and updated edition of a work initially published in 1983 under the title *The Scot and His Oats*. As the introduction suggests, it "traces the journey of the oat crop not only from field to factory but over the centuries as an integral part of Scottish life" (xiv). It is a fascinating journey, and one made more vivid by frequent and apposite quotations from poetry and prose (Dr. Johnson's famous dictionary definition of oats among them). There are sections on the required soil and climate conditions, on the evolution of harvesting implements, on the processes of milling and on the method of weighing and measuring the crop. There are brief, clear descriptions of implements such as querns (still in use in some areas of Scotland at the beginning of the twentieth century) and discussion of the best methods of dressing millstones. The second half of the book consists of short chapters on the chief cooking uses of oats, such

as oatcakes, haggis (all you wanted to know but were afraid to ask) and porridge, this last for hundreds of years the staple food of the poorer people of Scotland (p. 31). We learn, for example, that left-over porridge was frequently ladled into the drawer of a chest to cool by farm-servants before they went out to the fields and then retrieved at the end of the day, sliced into sections and used to supplement an egg or fish dish. (I understand that occasionally unretrieved porridge has been discovered in dresser drawers by prospective buyers at sales of Scottish antique furniture). The book's photographic illustrations take us back to a period before the existence of the combine harvester, to the horse-teams at work in the harvest fields and to the bothy communities of the migrant agricultural workers in Aberdeenshire and elsewhere. Recipes and a useful and necessary glossary complete the work.

The Scots and Their Fish follows the same successful formula. Once again, the author surveys the historical background, taking us to the present day. Once again he has ranged far and wide for his materials, consulting for this study the Scottish Sea Fish Authority and the Scotttish Fisheries Museum at Anstruther among other sources. The mysteries of the movements of herring shoals, the seasonal work of the herring lassies, the dangers and hardships of the fisherman's life and the evolution of steam drifters, seine-netters and other types of boat are all investigated with the same engaging touch which characterises the volume on oats. The fortunes of the various types of fishing are followed and once again there are well-chosen photographs, recipes and a glossary. Canadian readers from the central provinces of Canada, however, will find it less easy, given the shortage of really fresh raw materials, to try out the fish recipes than the oat (and alcohol) based delights of crannachan and Athole Brose.

These books, although clearly meant for a general readership, will nonetheless provide, and in entertaining fashion, useful background knowledge for those proposing to investigate the longer and more demanding works of such historians as Christopher Smout and Tom Devine on food, crop production and prices, labour mobility and other such topics; for those who

wish to stick with a less formal approach, David Kerr Cameron's trilogy of rural life and Billy Kay's oral history, *The Complete Odyssey: Voices from Scotland's Recent Past*, delve more deeply into some of the topics covered by Lockhart.

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The Castles of Glasgow and the Clyde

Gordon W. Mason. Musselburgh, Goblinshead, 2000
232 pp., many b/w photographs £9.95 Hardback)

Glamis Castle

Harry Gordon Slade. London, The Society of Antiquaries of London, 2000. 136 pp., 49 b/w pls, 17 illus. £29.95 (Hardback)

For anyone interested in Scottish castles, two books have recently been published which are worthy of consideration. *The Castles of Glasgow and the Clyde*, by Gordon W. Mason, is a survey listing all known sites of castles, whether still standing or not, within the watershed of the River Clyde. Its first chapter, "The Development of Castles", provides a brief but informative outline of how the architecture of Scottish castles has developed over the centuries in response to changing military tactics. Most of the rest of the book is in the form of a gazetteer, in which all the castles are listed alphabetically. Each entry includes a symbolic assessment of how much of the fabric of the original castle remains; an Ordinance Survey grid reference where known; and basic directions to the castle site. There follows, where appropriate, an architectural description of the castle; information on its history; and a mention of any legends associated with it. Some castles receive quite extensive coverage. The entry for Bothwell Castle, for example, occupies five pages and features four photographs of the site as well as a drawn plan. In the case of some other sites where nothing of the castle survives above ground and where the historical record is uninformative, all that is known is a (sometimes estimated) location and a bare outline of the castle's history. Many black and white photographs accompany the text, including some of castles which have since been demolished.

Numerous entertaining details and anecdotes have been provided by Mason, such as the mention of the dungeon-inhabiting ghosts of Knockderry Castle, and the practical warning about the flesh-and-blood German shepherd guarding Auchinvole Castle. There are several maps indicating the locations of the castles, although these are of limited use since very few other landmarks, such as streets, are featured on them. Of much greater usefulness is a section towards the end of the book listing Mason's suggestions of which castles would be the best to visit, along with their opening times, admission rates, facilities, and telephone numbers. A glossary of terms will aid anyone unfamiliar with the vocabulary associated with castles, and a basic bibliography helps direct the enthusiast who wishes to learn more towards further readings. There is both a family index and a general index. Any castle enthusiast planning a trip to the Clyde region of Scotland would appreciate having this book in his or her pocket, both to give a fuller account of the well-known castles than what is usually printed in guide books, and to alert him or her to the less well-known castles open to visitors.

For the reader who would like a more in-depth examination of a single castle, there is Harry Gordon Slade's *Glamis Castle*. The majority of this book (ten chapters) deals with the changing physical structure of Glamis from the 14th through to the 20th centuries. The text is detailed but not too technical for the non-specialist, and is enhanced throughout by photographs of physical features on Glamis itself when still surviving and of other castles which Glamis may have resembled at some point, as well as floor plans and drawings of reconstructions of the castle as it might have appeared in the past.

This book is more than just an architectural history. Glamis' human side is the subject of the initial chapter, which concentrates on the history and varying fortunes of the family of Lyon / Bowes / Lyon Bowes / Bowes Lyon, the inhabitants of the castle for more than six hundred years. The furnishings of Glamis are specifically dealt with in one chapter which uses the evidence of various inventories of the castle taken in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Among other things, these inventories tell us that a very colourful Great Chamber in 1639 boasted a purple cloth

bed and covering, a tablecloth of the same with yellow lace, and green hangings; that by 1640 the residents had changed their keyboard instruments from virginals to the more modern harpsichords; and that Glamis residents were enthusiastic participants in the 19th-century love affair with tartan. Gardeners will particularly enjoy the chapter on the policies and gardens, which includes several lengthy excerpts from primary documents, such as an early 18th-century list of what seeds were ordered.

The final chapter, "Glamis: Literature, Legend and Letters" is perhaps a little short, considering the nature and origins of Glamis' fame for many people. While Slade seems eager throughout the book to avoid or debunk the more sensational myths which have accrued to Glamis over the centuries, stating that "its history is quite startling enough plain without making it fancy", many readers might well have enjoyed a fuller treatment of the stories behind Glamis' position in the popular imagination. Also in anticipation of a non-specialist audience, it would perhaps have rendered the book slightly easier to read if the few quotations from historical documents given in Latin, with translations into English found only in the endnotes, were instead in English in the main body of the text, with the original Latin at the back of the book for anyone curious enough to look them up. For the more scholarly reader, some frustration arises from the numerous excerpts from primary sources which go unattributed. This is presumably due to a request from the Trustees, mentioned in the preface, that full details of references be omitted in order to avoid an increase in the number of "casual enquiries" made into the Glamis archives. But even if the readers are a bit coolly discouraged from looking closely into Glamis themselves, they can surely appreciate Slade's work on this famous and evocative symbol of Scotland.

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THE CATHEDRALS OF SCOTLAND

Peter Galloway. Edinburgh, Scottish Cultural Press, 2000
192 pp. £19.99 (Hardback)

All thirty-five of Scotland's cathedrals and cathedral sites are attractively presented in this book. They are arranged alphabetically by the city or town where they are located, and while each entry contains enough information to stand on its own, Peter Galloway's carefully-researched and readable prose makes *The Cathedrals of Scotland* a pleasure to read straight through from beginning to end. The text is supplemented by many photographs of the cathedrals, both in colour and in black and white. The thirty-five cathedrals here show considerable architectural variation, and Galloway is sensitive to each building's uniqueness, appreciating both historical and geographical considerations in the aesthetics of a building. Thus he speaks of being "captivated by the rough and powerful beauty" of St. Magnus on Orkney, Britain's most northerly cathedral, "the cathedral of the Viking longboats, of North Sea gales, of storms and tempests", (135) and he finds the water stains in the Cathedral Church of St. Columba in Oban not a detraction, but rather a feature suited to "a sea front cathedral for a sea-girt diocese" (148).

Each cathedral's entry begins with the history or legend of its origin, and its subsequent development to the present day. After this, Galloway describes the cathedral's architectural features and weaves these in with Scottish history, demonstrating strikingly the importance of broad historical events and trends upon the fabric of specific ecclesiastical buildings. For example, he shows how the political turmoil of the 13th century affected Dunblane Cathedral when King Edward I of England ordered the roof to be stripped of lead in order to provide material for the construction of siege engines to be used against Stirling Castle, although, Galloway tells us, Edward "obligingly left a small portion of roof over each altar" (47). While he clearly appreciates

the complexity of historical change, Galloway does not withhold his opinion on periods which he sees as having been detrimental to his beloved churches. Not surprisingly, he shows no affection for the more destructive elements of the Protestant Reformation and "its vindictive hatred of the pre-reformation church and its philistine behaviour towards anything of beauty" (166). He demonstrates more sympathy towards the good intentions of the Gothic revival of the nineteenth century and even the upheavals of the comparatively secular twentieth century. Concerning the cathedral in Aberdeen, although he speaks of the "embarrassingly tiny communion table" (7), and the spire which "is clumsily cluttered with heavy ornamentation, as though the architect, restrained at lower levels, was unleashed on the spire", (13) nevertheless Galloway is, as always, aware that his own opinions are not the only valid ones. For this clearly disliked cathedral in Aberdeen, he says,

> Some observers would contemplate the interior of this cathedral today with a sense of depression. Whether, in the cause of liturgical change or, as here, seemingly on the basis of episcopal whim, the extensive and savage destruction of Victorian Gothic is inexcusable.... Others hold the opinion that in removing the clutter of Victorian Gothic, Bishop Walsh has left a cathedral with the clean architectural lines of its original design more evident and reordered in a way which makes it a joy for the celebration of the liturgy of the Second Vatican Council (15).

Galloway's descriptions of the cathedrals and his explanations of why they evolved into the form we see today are both informative and entertaining. His stronger opinions are usually lightened in tone by his sense of humour. It is a sense of humour I hope his readers, especially those with a connection to the cathedrals, share. Galloway certainly manages to evoke strong mental images when he describes the site of Glasgow cathedral as "horribly overshadowed by the vast, ugly, infirmary to the

north and the sinister looking necropolis to the east", (101) and when he says of St. Mary's cathedral in Edinburgh that "the spacious and expansive interior, with its acreage of chairs, slightly suggests a large airport departure lounge, although one that is pleasantly warm and welcoming" (83).

At the end of the book is a very helpful glossary of terms and a bibliography for those who wish to read further which, after reading this book, I imagine many people will. *The Cathedrals of Scotland* would be enjoyed by anyone with an interest in the religious history of Scotland or an appreciation of the beauty of Scottish churches.

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Works Received

Aidan Clarke, *Prelude to Restoration in Ireland*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999

Eveline Cruikshanks, *The Glorious Revolution*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000

Grant Jarvie & John Burnett (ed.s) *Sport, Scotland and the Scots*. East Lothian, Tuckwell Press, 2000

Ian MacDougall, *Bondagers: Eight Scots Women Farm Workers*. East Lothian, Tuckwell Press, 2000

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James MacLeod, *The Second Disruption: The Free Church in Victorian Scotland and the Origins of the Free Presbyterian Church*. East Lothian, Tuckwell Press, 2000

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Mary Ellen Brown, *William Motherwell's Cultural Politics, 1797-1835*. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2001

Mona K. McLeod, *Agents of Change: Scots in Poland, 1800 – 1918*. East Lothian, Tuckwell Press, 2000.

William Keneflick, *Rebellious and Contrary: The Glasgow Dockers, 1853-1932*. East Lothian, Tuckwell Press, 2000

The Frank Watson Prize in Scottish History

The Frank Watson Scottish History Book Prize will be awarded in Fall 2001 to the best book, monograph, dissertation or edited set of papers on Scottish history published between 1999-2000. Preference will be given to original work on a topic in early Scottish history or in any area of Scottish history which has been largely unexplored. Three copies of the book for consideration should be submitted by authors, publishers, or any other sponsor by 15 June 2001 to:

Dr. Linda Mahood,
Scottish Studies History Department,
University of Guelph,
Guelph,
Ontario,
Canada, N1G 2W1.

The prize will be awarded at the University of Guelph in late October. The award recipient is expected to receive the award in person and to present a lecture and a seminar while visiting Guelph. Transportation and accommodation will be provided.

Further information may be obtained by writing to the above address or by e-mail from: lmahood@uoguelph.ca

The 1999 Frank Watson Prize in Scottish History was awarded to Callum Brown for *Up-Helly-Aa: Custom, Culture, and Community in Shetland*, published by Manchester University Press. Dr. Brown's work was an exemplary example of the type of work that the Frank Watson prize was endowed to support. Honourable mention went to Robert Dodgson, *From Chiefs to Landlords: Social and Economic Change in the Western Highlands and Islands* (Cambridge University Press, 1998) and William Ferguson, *The Identity of the Scottish Nation: An Historic Quest* (Edinburgh University Press, 1998).